'ΑΥΤΟΚΑΤΑΚΡΙΣΙΣ, OR, Self-Condemnation, EXEMPLIFIED In Mr. Whitfield, Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hickman. WITH OCCASIONAL REFLEXIONS On Mr Calvin, Mr Beza, Mr Zuinglius, Mr Piscator, Mr Rivet, and Mr Rollock: BUT MORE ESPECIALLY On DOCTOR Twisse, and MASTER Hobbs; AGAINST WHOM, God's Purity and his Praescience, and his Eternal Decrees according to Praescience, (commonly called Respective or Condi­tional Decrees) with the sincere intention and the general extent of the Death of Christ, are finally cleared and made good; And the Adver­saries Absurdities (confessed by themselves to be unexcusable) are proved against them undeniably, out of their own hand-writings.

WITH An ADDITIONAL ADVERTISEMENT Of Mr Baxter's late Book Entituled The Grotian Religion discovered, &c.

By THOMAS PIERCE Rector of Brington in Northampton-shire.

London, Printed by J.G. for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivy-lane, 1658.

TO THE READER.

Christian Reader,

THAT I presume to entertain thee with this Additional Importunity in vindica­tion of those things so largely insisted upon already in several Tracts, to wit the Truth and Goodness of God's Decrees, and the things that are consequent there­unto, there is this (amongst other reasons) to be alledged for an excuse, that 'tis intended to be the last. Or if I live to grow worthier of bringing my thoughts into the light, as it is not likely to be in haste, so I hope it will be in some other kind.

I wish that some had remembred whilest they were men of ripe years, what we all have been taught in our several childhoods, that there are four sorts of things which should not be drawn in­to dispute; but either be granted, or rejected, as soon as named. And I had once a very pleasing, but (it seems) a vain hope, that it could never be­come a Question, See the right Reverend Bi­shop Bramhal his catching of the Levia­than, particu­larly from p. 467. to p. 473. Whether or no there is a God? or, Whether God is a Spirit? or, Whether the holy Spirit of God can be the soveraign Author of [Page]all uncleanness. To be barely sceptical in such things as these, is sure a crime of greater moment then to be cherished with impunity, or to be suf­fered to pass abroad without being put unto a stand.

But it seems we are fallen into that Age of the World, wherein the worst of Questions have not onely been rudely started, but blasphemously stated in the very worst sense too. The most unwholsom Doctrines that can be named, have not onely been brewed in the private phantasies and brains of un­learned men, but have publickly been broached by men of parts; and running out at their Pens, have been given for Drink to the giddy People.

Reader, thou wilt find, in the ensuing Treatise, strange contradictions of divers men, both against the Scriptures and themselves too. Thou wilt find them saying that sins are the works of God, that God is pleased with them, that God doth will them with a perfect willingness, and that they make for God's glory. All directly against themselves, who having said such things in many places of their works, have also said sometimes they never said them. And all directly against the Scriptures, which say that sins are the works of the Devil, that they are grievous to God Almighty, that he wills them not, but abhorres them, and that he is ex­tremely dishonoured by them. Thou shalt find it acknowledged and avowed to have been publick­ly taught by famous men, whom thou wilt find to be justified in their very worst sayings, and not onely so, but even owned for orthodox and classical Authors; I say, by such men as these thou shalt find [Page]it confessed to have been taught,If in a mul­titude of ex­amples the Reader desires to be directed to one or two, he may satisfie himself, ch. 3. sect. 13 & sect. 27. n. 2, 3, 4, 5. that God in plain terms is the Author of sin, that he not onely wills it, but impells men to it, and makes them sin by coaction. And yet with a turn of the tongue, thou wilt find a bold Artist trying to lick them all clean. For though such things (saithLook for­ward on c. 3. sect. 27. he) have fallen from the pens of the Orthodox, yet they have not understood them in any flagitious or unconscionable sense, nor have they used to do it often, and the Jesuites have done it as well as they, and they have said the contra­ry at other times: and so without any more ado, sal­vares est, saltat senex. Thou wilt find men ob­truding new Creeds upon the Church. One insert­ing this Article, that God is no Spirit; Another this, that God is the maker of all things real, and so (by a consequence unavoidable) of all the wicked­ness in the world. In a word, thou wilt find, that we Isa. 6.5. dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips, whoEzek. 22.26. put no difference between the holy and profane. It is impossible (saithJob 14.4. Job) to bring a clean thing out of an unclean; much more impossible (say I) to bring any thing unclean from the Spirit of puri­ty. It is a lesser wickednesse of the two, to ascribe unto the Devil some good works of God, then to charge God foolishly with the evil works of the De­vil. It is a very great sin, for men to bear false witnesse against their neighbours: 'tis yet a greater, to be false witnesses 1 Cor. 15.15. for God. It is a greater sin yet to be false witnesses against him: but sure 'tis the greatest sin of all (by2 Pet. 3.16. wresting and corrupt­ing his sacred word) to make him bear false witness against himself.

Had such impieties as these been onely practi­sed [Page]in private corners (as the Feasts of Bacchus heretofore) I had contented my self to have mourn­ed over them in secret, like one of theLam. 2.10. Elders of the daughters of Zion, I had sate upon the ground and kept silence: having the words of the Prophet A­mos as it were sounding in mine ears, The Amos 5.13. pru­dent shall keep silence in that time, for it is an evil time. I should then have reasoned within my self,Mat. 7.6. that no man living can be obliged to cast what is holy unto * Doggs, or to give the * Pearl of reproof to Swine, (if yet my charity could have suffered me to think mine Adversaries such.) For why should I draw upon my self the implacable hatred of evil doers, in case I had reason to expect a very great prejudice to my self, without any the least hope of being profitable to others?

But when I saw such things proclaimed in Gath, and as it were written with a Sun-beam in the streets of Askelon; when I found it taught byDamus De­um esse cau­sam particu­larem unius­cu jusque actus. Vin. Gr. l. 2. p. 40. col. 2. Doctor Twisse and his followers (Mr. W. and Mr. B.) that God is the cause in particular of every act, nay the natural Cause, and the Mr. B. c. 3. p. 11. soveraign Au­thor of the act of sin; nay that he wills and works, not in the act of sin onely, but in the Mr. W. Ext. of D. Prov. p. 12. sin of the Act too, whose very pravity and deformity doth make way for God's glory; and when I found it acknowledged by Doctor Twisse, Ex quibus quàm facile quae [...]o fuit vi­ris istis indo­ctis, quales erant Libertini colligere D [...] ­um Aucrorem faisse omnium scelerum quae ab hominibus perpetrantur. Vin. Gr. l. 2. sect. 1. p. 52. that such illiterate men as the Li­bertines then were (and as the Ranters now are) might very easily collect even from this one Doctrine, [The Act of sin is from God] that God himself is the Author of all the wickednesse in the World; when I found it granted byOf lib. and Nec. p. 26. & Q. p. 11. Mr. Hobbs himself, that evil [Page]use may be made of such bold assertions, and that though he thought them to be true, and so to be inwardly believed, yet he thought them too dan­gerous to be spoken aloud, much lesse fit to be preached and printed too, (forgetting that himself had even preached them in print, and that in the very same books wherein he confesseth the danger of them;) when I considered how great an odium had been derived from these doctrines upon the Protestant name, through the dexterities of the Jesuites, and other Emissaries of Rome, who have charged the whole body of the Reformed Church with the particular misbehaviours of some very unsound and unruly members; when I considered that those Doctrines had stopt the way to recon­cilement betwixt the Lutheran Churches, and those that follow the way of Calvin, theySee Doctor Jacksons Ex­act Collect. l. 10 sect. 6. p. 3188. not agreeing (say the Lutherans) in the worship of one God, be­cause the God of the Lutherans is onely the Author of what is good, whereas the God of the Calvinists is owned by them to be the Author of what is mo­rally evil; last of all, when I considered the tre­mendous dignity of my calling, which is not onely to be a shepherd, and a * Watchman in Israel, Ezek. 33.7, 8. & ch. 34. v. 2, 10. (and as such to be accountable as well forIbid. other mens lapses as for mine own) but also a 1 Cor. 4.1. steward of the mysteries of the living God, (however unworthy and2 Cor. 2.16. insufficient for so insuperable a work;) I say when I seriously considered these several things, and compared them all with one another, I had not the courage to be afraid of my fellow-creatures, the fear of whom did seem to me to be a desperate bold­ness: for what greater boldnesse can there be, then to [Page]stand in so great a fear of them who can at theMat. 10.28. most but destroy the body, as not to stand in fear of him who can cast both body and soul into Hell? It is not a true love of God, which is not able toJoh. 4.18. cast out the fear of men. I know whatEcclus. 2.12, 13. wo is to them who have fearful hearts and faint hands, and what will be said at the judgment-seat, unto the sinner that goeth two wayes? I know theRev. 21.8. fear­ful and unbelieving shall have their portion in the lake of fire and brimstone. I know it was one of those sins which the Prophet did not think he could sufficiently bewail, (unlesse hisJer. 9.1. head were all wa­ter, and his eyes a fountain of tears, that he might weep day and night, Vers. 3. Isa. 58.1. NOT TO BE VALIANT for the TRUTH. Isaiah was bid to cry aloud with­out sparing, and to lift up his voice like a Trumpet in shewing the people their transgressions. Should I presume to be afraid of the wrath of men, and in an aw of their persons forbear to tell them of their sins, (for some mens Doctrines become their sins, if 'tis a sin to blnspheme and dishonour God) I might well cry out, as the same Prophet did,Isa. 6.5. Vae mihi quia lacui, id est, quia peccata non liberè re­prehendi. Grot. in locum. WO IS ME FOR I [...]AM UNDON. And that for the very s [...]e reason which the Prophet gives of his outcry in the following words, because I am a man of un­clean lipps. That is, (as the learnedst Annota­tors have explained the place) I have been guiltily afraid to tell the great ones of their iniquities. Ma­ny are tickled with an opinion of their Policy and Prudence, when 'tis but cowardize and coldnesse in the cause of God. Wo be to such, for they are undon.

But neither indeed can I pretend to have been valiant in my encounters, whom even mine Ad­versaries [Page]themselves have made unable to be a­fraid. For I have spoken no harder things of what I have found in their writings, then their Ma­sters have spoken of the same, when they have found them in the writings or mouths of others. And this I doubt not but they will grant me, that Henbane is not the wholsomer for being found to grow in a specious Garden, no more then a Tul [...]p is the uglier for having grown out of a Dunghil. Nor is El [...]sphemy the better for being found in he Works of a Christian Writer, any more then Pon­tius Pilate for hav ng been mentioned in the Creed. When I find menJam. 2.7. bl [...]spheming that worthy name, which (I hope) shall ever be dearer to me then my life; and when I find themPsal. 73.8. corrupting others (as the Psalmist speaks) even byvers. 9. stretching forth their mouth unto the h [...]avens, and that theirvers. 8. talking is against the most H [...]gh; and when many of the vers. 10. peo­ple do fall unto them, whereout th [...]y suck no small advantage; I cannot but be offen [...]ed at what is spoken, without partiality to them that speak. Whether I find it in the Jesuites (as sometimes I do,) or in the rigid Pre [...]byterians, (as I have many times don.) or in the d wnright Libertines, (as who does not?) I desire to give it its proper name. When Mr. Calvin writ against Quintin and Poc­quet, and other persons of quality who were do­mestick servants to the Queen of Navar, See Calvins Epist. 62. com­pared with what follows. he made no scruple to call them Libe [...]tines, Qui [...]gnora­b [...]nt quid si­bi vel [...]et Li­b rt [...]norum no­men, id Quintini nomi [...]e cogn [...]turi sunt. Exp [...]dit Be [...]luas tam p [...]niciosas no â aliq â [...]nsigni [...]i. Blash [...] m [...]s x cra [...]il [...]s s [...]a [...]gunt. — Non solùm Ch [...]s;t nam Relig onem, s d e [...]am omnem human [...]tat [...]m quae hactenus inter Tu [...]cas, &c Calv. adversus Libers. c. 4. and (what is more) pernicious b [...]asts, charged them with ex [...]cra­ble [Page]blasphemy, then which no villany was greater, no poyson worse, as tending (saith the) to the subver­sion, not of the Christian Religion onely, but even of that ingenuity and civil nature, which hath hitherto prevailed amongst Turks and Infidels. The ma­king of God to be an Author and Cause of sin, Voetius confesseth to be [Voetius in Method. Resp. Calum. p. 1136. absurd, and sottish, and implying a contradiction, horrid, blasphemous, scan­dalous, against all Theologie and the consent of Chri­stendom, against the light of nature, and the dictates of reason.] If Voetius say thus, much more may I. Again, to say that God hath imposed a necessity of sinning upon his creatures, is concluded byHist. Got­tesch. c. 11. p. 173. R g. 5. Remi­gius, to be a charging God foolishly as the Author of sin, which Doctor Whitaker affirmes to be a ve­ry Dr. Whitaker contra D [...]rae­um. l. 8. sect, 1. p. 524. great blasphemy. Nay whether it is not the greatest to be imagined, let the Reader conjecture by that which followes.

1. The greatest blasphemy is that, which ascribes to God (as the Principal Cause and Contriver) the very worst of the worst that can be possibly ima­gined. 2. That is the worst of the worst which is the very worst thing in the Devil himself. 3. The Devil hath nothing worse in him then a necessity of sinning, or an impossibility to ab­stain from sin. 4. Therefore to say that God Almighty did eternally cause, or contrive, decree, or praedestin a necessity of sinning, in a great part of the Angels, and in the greatest part of mankind, is the greatest blasphemy to be imagined.

That this is frequently to be met with in a great variety of Writers, the intelligent Reader needs not be told. And such a variety he will meet [Page]with in the following Treatise. For though that rigid Ternary of Presbyterians, Mr. W. Mr. B. and Mr. H. may seem to be the chief in my conside­ration, yet my Reader will much misunderstand me, if he thinks that Writers of their Pitch could have drawn so many sheets from me, upon the sole account of their own atchievements. Had I spent so great a share of my precious time upon but two or three Aggressors of no greater fame and consi­deration, I had done much more then I could have answered, if not to my conscience, yet at least to my discretion. Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, in their several songs to the same Tune, (which they both intitle their vindications,) were of themselves sufficient to be the principal occasions of this my enterprise, but the impulsive causes were much more worthy: For I look upon these two, as on a couple of Chymists, whose very Quintessence and Elixir of strength and subtilty, I clearly discover to have been fetched from the publick Elaboratories of the greatest Artists, both of the upper, and lower way; and in a more especial manner of Mr. Calvin and Doctor Twisse, whose good Latine they have turned into no good English; and what for many years together they had been gathering, they have at once produced in the great, and in the profuse­ness of their humour have shed it abroad amongst the people. It hath been therefore my chiefest aim, to enfeeble those Armories and Magazins, from whence these Combatants have borrowed their choicest weapons, whether engaged in their offensive, or defensive quarrells.

I have allowed Mr. W. the first and chief place [Page]in my consideration, (I mean in respect of Mr. B. and Mr. H.) first because he is a person of the greatest gravity and theSo saith Mr. B. in his Ne­ces. V.n.c. [...]. p. 32. l penult. grayest haire, and one who was versed in these Controversies (as Mr. Bar­lee saith often) Introduct. p. 3 & ch. 3. p. 18. before I was born or brought forth into the l [...]ght; before I had a head or an eye; one who subscribed the 39. Articles Ibid. p. 40. before there was any such thing in the world as Mr. T. P. Lastlych. 2. p. 34. Old enough and wise enough to be my father. When I observed Mr. B. upbraiding to me my want of years, Ibid. p. 49. more then any other thing, not one y in these pages which I have cited, but in many more which I conceal, (calling me one while, ac. 2. p. 41. Demure Junior, and another while, ac. 2. p. 53. Juvenal Divine) sometimes objecting hisCh. 2. p. 27. own antiquity, and Mr. W's extremely often, as if he thought that old age were the strongest The weak­ness of it is vi­sible in the S [...]nner Implea­ded, p. 300, 301. argument in the world against what ever had been alledged by one who followed them into the world at some years di­stance; I comforted my self with the remem­brance, that I did not chuse my nativity, nor was I the Lord of my own Horoscope, and in regard I was as old as I was able to be by any means, it would no be reckoned as my fault, that I could not plead my longevity for the advantaging of my cause. It a [...]pears by the words of1 Tim. 4.12. S. Paul to Timothy, that a Priest is too apt to be despised for his youth. And to remove that stumbling-block out of the old man's way, he shall know that our Lord and Savi­our did not quite attain to my years in his Peregri­nation upon the earth. S. John and S. Timothy were both but young men, when yet the first was an Apostle, and the second a Bishop. If Argumen­tation [Page]and Orthodoxy were to be reckoned by a man's age, I am sure the old Serpent would go be­yond them. And though I my self am far from it, yet the truth which I assert hath Age enough to become an Argument. Quod pri­mum verum est. Tertul. So that from this day forwards, I hope the difference of years betwixt my adversaries and me, (which they have hitherto more insisted on in all the [...]r publick and private chat, then upon any one thing which they have conceived to be of use) shall be no longer an ingredient in our dispute. yet this is one reason, whyJob. 32.4, 6.7. Mr. W. comes first into my consideration. Another reason is, because he publickly made me a second challenge from the Presse, when I had in modesty and in mercy refused his first, as having been backward and unwilling to expose his age to inconvenience, (for which reason also I have been sparing to Mr. Cawdrey, notwithstanding his publick and grand abuses) but finding he thought himself unanswe­rable in that he saw he was not answer [...]d, I straight concluded it a charity, to undeceive him. A third reason [...]s, because he professeth in his Preface to his first book (which he hath boldly repeated in his se­cond) that he Ext. of Div. Prov. is Praef. p. goes h [...]gh [...]r, then other Divines of his par­ty, in making God have an active hand in the actions of sinful men. How much higher then the most, the Reader shortly will see and wonder. Adde to this, my having heard, that upon some weak Readers his book hath made some strong impressions. So that men of no skill, who are of narrow capacity, and very slow of apprehension, are not long to be trusted with that temptation. Again, I find that Mr. B. doth rely on Mr. W. as upon one of his [Page] Corr. Corr. Ep. Ded. p. 8. Majorites, to whose Protection and Patronage he chose to dedicate his former Book, (to wit his first­born, the excellency of his strength) and whose gra­ciousIbid. assistance he then implored. Mr. W. an­swers to the call, ownes himself for a Majorite, comes in to the rescue of Mr. B. (as Milo ran to set his shoulders as an equal prop to the falling house, which crushed him into Quiddini for his presum­ption) and 'tis but fit he should first be heeded, whom common Fame hath set uppermost in the thoughts of men.

Next I proceed to Mr. B. his second part (as he calls it) because I was bound to it by promise, which I was loath not to perform. Then I anti­dote Mr. Hickman because he invenomed Mr. Bar­lee, and intermeddled in his affaires to such a de­sperate degree, that if he preacheth as he hath printed, his Disciples (of all others) have the greatest need of a preservative. I have often to do with Dr. Twisse, because they often translate his words, and once most solemnly they bring him to me with a defiance. Not to mention all particu­lars (with whom I have to do as occasion serves) I have many reflexions on Mr. Hobbs, because he jumps so often with my Assailants, as if he had borrowed from their writings, or they from his. What I have more to premise I will dispatch in few words.

If I seem too much inlarged in explaining some things, It is partly because I have to deal with such disputants, as cannot be confuted but by being first taught; and partly because it often happens, that their Master's confutatian doth stand in theirs.

I do many times refer to what I have published already, as well to avoid prolixity, and vain repe­titions, as to exempt my Reader from paying often for the very same matter in several volumes.

I have reckoned with my Aggressers both sepa­rately and jointly. My two first Chapters and Intro­duction are chiefly addressed to Mr. W. My third to Mr. B. and Mr. H. My fourth to Dr. Twisse, Mr. W. and Mr. B.

I have so disposed of the whole, as that all their concernments may be seen distinctly and apart. But yet so many were my occasions to shew their differences and agreements, and their mutual collisi­ons more especially, (the running of their heads against each other to the great indangering of their brains, which I verily believe will hardly ever leave akeing, untill they accept my way of cure, ch. 3. sect. 9.) that Mr. B. is eminently concerned in all I say to Mr. W. and Mr. W. equally concern­ed in all I say to Mr. B. and Mr. Hickman common­ly concerned in what I say to both the former, and their greatest Masters are concerned in what I say to all three.

If I seem to have been pungent in laying open some sorer parts, I desire my Reader to look well upon the Case, to consider the duty of a Chirurgion, and then to imagine (if he is able) how such Pha­gedaenous and eating sores can be taken away without being touched, and that with either the Launce, or Caustick. When an inveterate Ulcer hath been long skin'd over, there is no way to cure it without searching it to the bottom: which though painful to the Patient, yet being in order to his ease, and (which [Page]is more) his safety too, he ought to be thankful to that diligent and impartial hand, which for some short time doth seem to hurt him. The ratio cu­randi cannot alwayes be such, as I can alwayes de­sire, and w [...]sh it might be; It must be such, as the malady requires, and calls for. But when my pre­sent Methods shall be found to have taken a good effect, so as the obstinate Tumour shall relent and suppurate, and finally cast forth its Core, together with the dreggs of the peccant hu [...]or, I shall glad­ly prepare another kind of composition, whose every line shall be a lentive.

May the persons the most concerned consider well what is said in the following sheets, and The Lord give them understanding in all things. 2 Tim. 2.7.

The general Contents of the Introduction, shewing the manifold Absurdities and Contradictions, which issue out from the Denial of Gods eternall, respective or conditional Decrees.

Sect. 1, 2. THe nearest way to end a Controversie, is to strike alto­gether at the Root of error. Sect. 3. The grand error touch­ing Gods Decrees, and its numerous off-spring, is rooted in the mistake of two things, The false conceits of Praescience and Praedetermination. Sect. 4, & 5. The speedy way to Conviction, made plain and open by a manifestation of three things. Sect. 6. The three things under­taken solemnly to be proved. Sect. 7. The same men affirm it to be both blasphemy, and truth, to say that God is the Author or Cause of sin, that he wills and works sin, &c. Sect. 8. Nothing but their Principles of Gods Decrees can lead them to blasphemies of such a Nature. Instances briefly set down from Calvin, Zuinglius, Zanchy, Piscator, P. Martyr, Beza, Borrhaus, Triglandius, Dr. Twisse, Mr. Hobbs, Mr. Whitfield, and Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Hick. Sect. 9. How the vi­olent streams of blasphemy may be quickly dried up in their several channels. Sect. 10. Mr. Whitfields whole Fabrick plucked up by the Foundation. His explication of what he means by conditional De­crees. His provision for a Flight from his whole undertaking. He is equally unfortunate whether he intended sense or non-sense. He is equally unhappy, whatever he means by the word Condition. Sect. 11. His first Argument compared with his Exposition of Condi­tional Decrees as he professeth to understand them. He is as unhappy in his best as in his worst meaning. His way of arguing in his best sense against Conditional Decrees, is as much against the Tri­nity of persons in the Godhead. He argues against his own Masters and Brethren, Beza, Wollebius, Dr. Reynolds. Directly against Saint Paul, and against the Eternity of Gods foreknowledge. And in a flat contradiction to himself; also against Dr. Twisse, and even against the Tenet for which he argues. He is fain to make Gods decrees to be Actus D [...]i ad iutra, against his own party who teach them to be ad extra. He makes Gods Actions to be God himself (and so infers ma­ny Gods) even against his own Masters, Gomarus and Wollebius. Five blasphemous Absurdities which that absurdity doth infer. He makes God himself to be Reprobation it self. Sect. 12. An easie way to Mr. W's Reformation concisely opened and pointed at. To his pretended Arguments against Conditional Decrees are confronted two Argu­ments for conditional Decrees. The first is grounded on the Confession of all the contrary party, and according to the tenour of the seventeenth Article of the Church of England exhibited to us in the last clause of the Article. The second is grounded on another Confession of the contrary party in their definition of Gods Decrees. Sect. 13. Mr. W's mistake of the thing in question represented in clearer and fairer colours.

The general Contents of the several Chapters.

Chap. I.

Sect. 1. MAster W's fanciful Creation of three general Obje­ctions. The distrust he puts in his cause. His stu­died aiming beside the mark. He overthrows his own rampire. His second overthrow of himself and of his Absolute Decrees.

Sect. 2. His third overthrow of himself by a most crimson contra­diction. He enters on that which Mr. Calvin judged the worst part of Libertinism. His new contradiction about the manner of Gods wor­king. His down right Libertinisme. Libertines no Christians. A Di­lemma as a touch stone to try his meaning. The determination of mans will to wicked actions is not Gods work. He inferreth God to be worse then the Author of sin. His meaning ferreted out of his words. His abuse of Scripture to serve his turn. He speaks worse of God then can be truely said of Satan. His ugly Doctrine of God spo­ken out by Mr. Barlee.

Sect. 3. His third general Answer a meer majestick mistake.

Sect. 4. He descends from Generals to Particulars, beginning with the charge of making God the Author of sin, and with a Tergiversation, and Imposition on the Scripture. He asperseth God with the decreeing of sin in the first attempt of his excuse. His memorable Answer to his own Objection. His meaning caught in a Dilemma. His foul use of the word Permission, and its odious im­propriety represented in other colours. The common Poultice for a sore Doctrine.

Sect. 5. He moulds a new Objection against himself, and grants what his Doctrine is charged with. His Answer consists in shifting the duty of a Respondent, and speaking quite another thing. He confounds the Permission of sin with sin, and tries to blot his Do­ctrine fair. His abuse of Saint Austin. He argues that God doth will sin perfectly, because he wills the permission of it. And fain would have Scripture to speak against God by speaking his activity in the production of sin. 1. From the selling of Joseph. 2. Pharaoh's obduration. 3. The Candanites hardening. 4. Absaloms defiling his Fathers Concubines. 5. Shimei's cursing David. 6, 7, 8. Three other Texts. 9. The Egyptians hatred of Israel. 10. Gods being [Page]said to deceive the Prophet. 11. Giving up to vile affections. 12. Gi­ving eyes not to see. 13. Sending delusion. 14. The Nations ma­king league with the Romans. All which Scriptures are explai­ned and vindicated from the frightful misapprehensions of this Mistaker.

Sect. 6. Mr. W. most groundlesly infers God to sit still, and to be an idle Beholder, if he is not busie in the efficiency of sin.

Chap. II.

Sect. 1. OF the common Hebraisme by which such verbs are active in sound are onely permissive in signification: by the admission of which Rule the foul Absurdities aforesaid would be avoided, and Scripture expounded [...]. Mr. W's. manifold unhappiness in rejecting that Rule. He makes contradictions in Scripture, and overthrows his own interest in o­ther cases. He is convinced by that which he cannot but confess. His woful shifts in expounding Scripture, and the mischiefs ensuing on it. His Masters contradict themselves by not observing the He­braisme. Mr. W. makes light to be a sin, and incest to be no sin, by making a parity of Gods working in either case. He is beaten with his own weapons by any Atheist Dialogue-wise, condemned out of his own mouth. Scripture interprets Scripture against Mr. VV.

Sect. 2. His return to his first method of forging Objections to himself. He is at odds with Doctor Twisse. To make men sin is a a sin of the worst size, yet ascribed unto God by that sort of men.

Sect. 3. The ease and ordinary perversion of the Scriptures. Mr. W. mistakes the errors for the persons of some Protestants, and confounds them with the Papists. His party clamour against them­selves, and affront God with an Epitrope. Mr. W's. clamours against Protestant Divines. He jumps in so doing with the Jesuited Papists.

Sect. 4. His foulest imputation cast upon the Scriptures. Saint Peters caveat touching Pauls Epistles. The literal plalnness of some Scriptures doth make them difficult to some. A short direction to the means of remedy, or prevention, removing a stumbling-block out of the peoples way.

Sect. 5. Mr. W. either means, that God hath a hand in evil, be­cause in good; or that the act of sin is not the sin; or that God is the proper cause and efficient of sin; and that he means the last is pro­ved by a Dilemma. Humane learning a good foundation for a Di­vine.

Sect. 6. Mr. W's. rare essayes to separate the wickedness from the act of the wicked act.

Sect. 7. His first essay is a bare Dictate, including eight gross absurdities: Of actions Natural and Unnatural. Of nature Cor­rupted and Uncorrupted. Mr. VV. denies Gods Omnipotence, and makes him the proper cause of sin.

Sect. 8. His second essay is an Impertinence beyond example; or what is so much worse, as that it ought not to be named. He is for­ced to be pertinent, and his answer challenged.

Sect. 9. His third essay is a continuance of his Tergiversation, and inferreth God the efficient of sin. Mr. VV. vindicated from his abuses put upon himself. The probable causes of his chiefest aber­rations. Five Expedients proposed to undeceive him.

Sect. 10. His fourth essay makes the wickedest actions to be good, and from God.

Sect. 11. His fifth essay doth betray him to a confession, that he maketh God the Author of sin. He mistakes a moral for a natural action, and is hampered in some Dilemma's. The method by which he is led into all his blasphemies.

Sect. 12. Sin is inseparable from the sinful action, which Mr. VV. seems to see by his Tergiversation. He makes an Accident the sub­ject of Inhesion to an Accident. Confounds the act of differing with the passive power of being parted. Makes Davids lying with Bathshebah no sin. And the sin of Adultery separable from it self.

Sect. 13. He sheweth his cause is desperate, by speaking purpose­ly beside the purpose. He attempts the washing of wet from water, roundness from a Globe.

Sect. 14. Mr. VV. affirms that God doth will and work sin, and hath a hand in effecting it, and that sin makes for Gods glory. Con­cludes sin to be good, or Gods working it as evil. Feigns God to work evil to a good end. Q. Whether he infers not God to be a sinner. His inconsistence with Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. and with him­self. He frames not his propositions to the nature of God, but the nature of God to his propositions.

Sect. 15, & 16. Mr. W's. great forgery in that little which he cites. His foul sense of Gods determination that sin shall be done. His impious expression or Gods having a hand in sin, and the Impor­tance of that phrase.

Sect. 17. His gross error in the notion of Gods permission. His tre­mendous notion of Alworking providence without exception of wickedness.

Sect. 18. He puts himself afresh into his old streights betwixt gross blasphemy, and extraordinary impertinence. He affirms that God hath an active hand in the sins of Oppression, Rebellion, Murders, Tre­chery, Violence, and VVrong How the Great Turk proceeds on those maximes. He justifies the Ranters, by ascribing all our English changes to the hand of God. God is cleared from carelesness or weakness, with which he is charged by Mr. VV.

Sect. 19. God is cleared from willing and effecting what he hateth. A case put to shew the danger of Mr. VV's. Doctrine in order to practice.

Sect. 20. Mr. VV's. dangerous misapprehension of that figurative sentence, that God doth punish sin with sin. His making God the pro­per cause of the greatest sins: which he also extends to the very sin of the act, the pravity it self. He treads a step beyond Calvin worst.

Sect. 21. The desperate nature of Mr. VV's. Salvo's. And the hardness of his Emollients. His open profession that Gods secret will is quite contrary to his revealed will in respect of the very same ob­jects.

Chap. III.

Sect. 1. MAster B's. Confession of the Fact of which he pleads not guilty. His making God the Author of sin, and worse then so, in his endeavours to speak as warily as his principles will suffer him.

Sect. 2. He contradicts his own and his Readers eyes without the possibility of gaining by it. His inconsistency with himself, with Mr. VV. and Mr.Hick. He betrayes himself many wayes in his pro­vision for an escape, making God (verbatim) the soveraign Author of sins both of omission and commission. Grants the whole charge, or understands not a moral act. His mixture of blasphemies with con­tradictions on the right and left hand.

Sect. 3. He is ashamed to cite his own words truly. Proves him­self conscious to himself of being left without excuse, in charging God with being a Tempter unto sin. Pretends a want of leisure to excuse or extenuate his blasphemy, yet baulks it at his great­est leisure. He accuseth God of that which is the worst quali­ty of Satan. Flatly contradicts the Scripture. Commits the worst of contradictions as well as blasphemies.

Sect. 4. He is enraged that his meaning should be measured by his words. Slanders ancient and modern, both Papists and Prote­stants. Saint Austin in particular. And implies it a sin for corn to grow.

Sect. 5. His uncharitable reflexion on his own Dr.Twisse. The Doctors words cited.

Sect. 6. Mr. B's. severity to himself, proving his falshoods by self-contradictions. He unavoidably chargeth God with sin in himself; ir­refragably proved from Heb. 6.18. He implies his blasphemies com­mon to him with his party. He is convicted by Dr. Twisse of making God the Author of sin.

Sect. 7. He makes no difference betwixt the act of Adultery, and Marriage, but equally makes God the Author of both: worse then the Encratitae.

Sect. 8. The undeniable blasphemies which ensue upon the Do­ctrine of unconditional Praedestination. The great Disease of making God the Author of sin. The original Cause of the Disease. The Pa­tient proved extremely sick of the Disease by his own acknowledge­ment of the Cause. Four short Arguments to confirm it.

Sect. 9. The easie and infallible means of cure to all that are not resolved to continue sick. The nature of Knowledge opened, and distinguished from Decree. Gods absolute Decree doth cause a necessi­ty of event, but his foreknowledge doth not, nor possibly can it. The Absurdities which would follow if it were so. An Argument taken from the knowledge of what is past. The wide difference shewed be­tween a necessity of consequence, and a necessity of the consequent. 'Tis vain for the Adversaries to quit the first error, unless they quit the second also. D. Reynolds his concurrence with T. P. in this point, Gods praescience doth not praesuppose a praedetermination. But rather praedetermination doth connotate praescience, if not praesuppose it. The cause of the error shewed and removed. The Application to the present case, and a way opened to reconcilement.

Sect. 10. Mr. B's. unavoidable consequential blasphemies, that God determined all wickedness before be could foreknow it. His igno­rant use of the words, Futurition, Will, certain, Counsel. A threefold blasphemy, besides a self-contradiction.

Sect. 11. His positive Doctrine of Gods ordaining sin both original and actual. Non-sense added to Blasphemy.

Sect. 12. His self-contradiction in denying and also affirming that he maketh God the Author of sin. He is convicted by his own words, and the Assemblies, and Mr. W's. and Dr. Twisse, and Mr. Hobbs, which last is justified by Mr. W.

Sect. 13. Mr. B's. 10000. curses upon himself and his Masters, with his confession of the blasphemy of which he was accused. The like confession of his owned Masters, together with their Commissions of the crime confessed.

Sect. 14. His confession of faith touching Gods commerce with sin. He professeth openly to believe, that God is the cause of sinfulness it self.

Sect. 15. Concerning the efficient cause of sin. The state of the case from the beginning. Sin proved to have a true efficient cause, and by Mr. B's. confession, who also denies it. How his railings in lieu of answers do strike at S. James, but hit himself and his party, of Jam. 1.15.

Sect. 16. Of the positive entity of sin, clearly proved.

Sect. 17. Mr. B's. first Argument to prove the goodn'ss of sin, in [Page]which Mr. Hick. is equally concerned. The noysomness of the Dis­ease. The purging out of the peccant humour. Of metaphysical and moral bonity. The dangerous effects in Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. of be­ing but Smatterers in Metaphysicks. Dr. Twisse his foundation of irrespective decrees a thin Sophisme. How a lye is verum, as much as si [...] bonum. Albertus Magnus his words explained, and Austin's vin­dicated from the impertinence of the Citation.

Sect. 18. The most remarkable impiety of one Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. called by the name of a second Argument. Inferring the Godhead of sin on one hand, or its being Gods creature on the other. Mr. H. miserably tost by the two horns of his own Dilemma. A way opened to his rescue from his ineffable dangers. He is shewed a me­dium betwixt God, and Gods Creatures, where he could see none. How Mr. H. and Mr. B. do infer Atheism it selfe to be the Creature of God, or God himself. Sins positive things, because inward habits. Man the Author of some positive things, and God of some privatives. Mr. H. confounds Negative and privative, as well as privative and privation. To harden our own hearts, and consent unto temptations are positive things. Our destruction from our selves a positive thing. Sin spoken of in Scripture as a positive thing. Mr. Hick. convinced by his own party. He will confess he hath blasphemed in case that sin is something positive, which is further proved many wayes. The sad effects of forging God to be the maker of all things real without exception.

Sect. 19. Mr. B's. first chip hewen out of Mr. H's. block. He foists into the Creed the word Real, and makes it supply the place of good. Provides a Creed for the Libertines, viz. that God is the maker of all sins, if sins are things real, (and things not real, implies a con­tradiction.) The different methods of our reasonings, and what comes of it. They ascribe the filthiest of positive Entities unto God. A [...]c convinced by the Assemblies confession of Faith. Are farther uncover­ed by being supposed to be catechized.

Sect. 20. His second chip of the same block. Inconsistency with himself, and making all sinful actions to be wrought by God. His unsuccesful Relyance on the Jesuits.

Sect. 21. His third chip more pitiful then the former.

Sect. 22. His fourth chip the most lamentable of all. His argu­ing concludes him Pelagian, or Libertine. He is impertinent on pur­pose to make God the Author of sin.

Sect. 23. By his fifth chip he denies Gods Praescience of all wicked­ness, unless he also praedetermined it.

Sect. 24. His impositions upon the Scripture. The Schoolmen. Aust [...]n. His new degree of Arminianism.

Sect. 25. Mr. Hick's. Heathenish expression of sins [...].

Sect. 26. Of Calvins Doctrine, that God commands, yea compels the [Page]Devil and all that are wicked to Conceive & execure their evil dving.

Sect. 27. Mr. B's. affected Tergiversation in his chiefest concern­ments. Of Zuinglius his Doctrine, that God is (in plain terms) the Author of sin. How Mr. B. holds the same, even in that which he confesseth to be the proper notion of the word Author. He accuseth Calvin in excusing him for saying that God doth will sin. And Piscator as well as Calvin, for saying that God doth thrust men into wicked­ness. He confesseth his Masters do some times teach a coaction from God to sin. He forgeth new Texts upon the Scripture.

Sect. 28. He turns his back to the prime charge, and tacitly yields the whole cause.

Sect. 29. Of Adams inclination to sin before he sinned. The birth and growth of the very first sin, with the very wide difference be­twixt the inclinations of the sensitive appetite, and the will.

Sect. 30. The whole importance of the word Author. How the Ad­versaries say worse, then if they had only said verbatim, God is the Author of sin. Mr. Roll [...]cks strange Salvo.

Chap. IV.

Sect. 1. OF the signal fallacy swallowed first by Dr. Twisse, then by his followers. Mr, W's essay to cover it. The Fallacy shewed in its deformity. The first cause of the whole mistake about the order of intentions and execution. That cause removed, and the fallacy left naked. Mr. W's. indirect course to excuse Dr. Twisse in contradiction to him. Dr. Twisse his error of Co [...]rdination in things subordinate.

Sect. 2. Mr. W's. forgery of objections in other mens names.

Sect. 3. Mr. W's. second part displayed, and Universal Redemption vindicated, as to the true intent and extent of Christs death, from the feeble utmost of his attempts, in a subdivision of eight Paragraphs.

Sect. 4. How the Presbyterians do nourish Socinianism in contra­cting Christs death, and perverting Scripture. Daille, Camero, Am [...]rald, why they forsook their party abridging the benefit of Christs death, Received rules for the interpreting of words, and ending controversies. The extream absurdity of dutiful misbelief exploded hy the Lord Primate. Mr. W's. reproch cast upon Christendom, and the Gospel of Christ. Europe, Asia, Africa, and America inferred by Mr. W. to be the least part of the world.

Sect. 5. Universal Redemption proved from 2 Cor. 5.14. by S. Austin and Prosper, to the stopping of Mr. W's. and Mr. B's. mouths.

Sect. 6. The conclusion, giving reasons why no more time is to be lost in this employment.

AN INTRODUCTION To the three first Chapters Concerning the impious, and un­excusable, because blasphemous, and un­avoidable, both Contradictions, and other Absurdities, which issue out from the Denial of Gods eternal respe­ctive or conditional Decrees.

SECT. 1.

The neerest way to end a con­troversie is to strike altogether at the root of error.When once an Error is grown fruitful, and hath run it self out into several Branches, it is commonly found (by sad experience) to grow the thicker for being lopp't. There is not an Error in all Theologie, which doth seem to have taken so deep a Root, or to have spread so sturdy Branches, or to have born so lewd a fruit, as that many-headed Error, whose extirpation out of the Church ought so much the rather to be desir'd, because it hath shed such a fatal and deadly influence upon a multitude of Pro­fessors [Page 2]who have lately sate under its shade. Of those that have exercised themselves in so good a work, I may call it my Lot, and my Necessity, to have been one of the meanest. Faithfulness and Affection have been my chiefest qualifications; and I esteem it a priviledge, as well as duty, to have done God service in any measure. But in every good Labourer, there is a skill and prudence, as well as industry and faithfulnesse, to be required. It is not enough to be doing and working, in a meer opposition to sloth and idlenesse; but by contrivance and forecast, to do a great deal of work in a little time.

Sect. 2.

I am not quite so sensible of that un­questionable Aphorism set down by Solomon,Eccles. 12.12. much study is a wearinesse to the flesh, as of the words going before it, in making many books there is no end. This I knew a long time since, but it is now that I consider it and lay it seriously to heart. And therefore now I determine to make an end of the Task imposed on me, not contenting my self with a bare Resistance, but proceeding to a Dispatch, of that Hydra-like Error of which I spake. I will no longer amuse my self with striking off now and then a Head, which (besides that they are many) are very apt to be succeeded by many others grow­ing up out of the very same Trunk; but rather compendiously endeavour to strike the Monster into the heart, which (besides that it is but one) is the [...], the first part that lives, and the last that dies in every creature.

Sect. 3.

The grand Er­ror about God's Decrees and its numerous off­spring is rooted in the mistake of two things.The false conceit of God's prescience, and predetermination, makes up the error of irrespe­ctive and unconditional Decrees (I do not say of the most natural, but) of the most voluntary actions and effects; neither reward nor punishment, nor sin it self being excepted. This I take to be the heart, imparting life and activity to every member and limb of that body of error, whose most affecti­onate friends and abettors have conspired to find me my late imployment. With this grand error, all the rest which grow from it must live and die. In this Mr. Whitfield hath put his chief trust. Up­on this he hath been poreing (as his admirers have [...]oasted) these thirty years. In his Apologie for [...]his, he hath publickly chosen to display his whole strength; as if by this he were desirous that eve­ [...]y part of the controversie should be decided. I [...]ccept his challenge, and heartily thank him for the [...]ontrivance; He having given me an occasion of taking much a neerer way to my journeys end then I first intended.

Sect. 4.

The speedy way to conviction.For if I prove out of his mouth, and out of the mouths of his predecessors, that what they publickly acknowledge to be blasphemously false, doth unavoidably follow from their espoused notion of God's Decrees; then can he not chuse but ac­knowledge, that such a notion of God's Decrees must needs be dangerously false. He must confess that his book is an insufferable Libel against his Maker; and such, as against which he must pub­lickly enter his protestation. Now that it is false and blasphemous, to say that God is the Author or [Page 4]cause of sin, both in those very terms, and in o­thers as bad, and in many others much worse, is ever acknowledged by themselves in some parts of their Writings, (wherein forgetful of their Doctrines they consider nothing but duty) who yet in other parts of their own writings, (wherein forgetful of duty they reason onely from their Doctrines) do most dogmatically deliver it for very great truth.

Sect. 5.

Made plain and open by a manifestation of three things.In great affection to the most vulgar and less intelligent Readers (whose deliverance and liberty from the worst kind of thraldom I do especially aim at in what I publish) I will use the greatest plainness and perspicuity of speech, which by study and meditation I am able to contrive. Our whole Dispute will be concluded by a most cogent de­monstration of these three things.

1 First, that it is granted by the Adversaries them­selves to be both false and blasphemous, to say that God is the Author or Cause of Sin.

2 Secondly, 'tis affirmed by the very same Party to be neither false nor blasphemous, but a most necessary truth, to say that God is the Author or Cause of Sin.

3 Thirdly, it cannot be denied by the aforesaid Par­ty, that what they sometimes confess to be both false and blasphemous, they would not at other times affirm to be neither false nor blasphemous, but that they find it to be the natural and una­voidable issue flowing out from their Principles of Gods Decrees.

Sect. 6.

The three thingsI do solemnly take upon me, after ma­ture [Page 5]deliberation, undertaken so­lemnly to be proved. (and in a full comprehension of the several evidences and proofs) to make a cogent de­monstration of those three things. A demonstra­tion so cogent, that the most stomachful adversaries shall not be able to gainsay it, unless they will say, that they never say what they say, and that they have not printed what they have printed, or that the world lieth in darkness, so as we cannot read either their Latine, or their English, but onely dream that we read what indeed we do not. Either they will, or they will not, proceed to those later degrees of madness. If they will, they will prove the liberty of their wills to speak against their own light, and against their own speakings, and against their testi­monies of conscience, and against the witness of other mens eyes as well as of their own; and what is this, but to sin as with a Cart-rope, to turn Grace backward, to bid righteousnesse stand afar off, and to say, we will be stubborn in spight of evidence and conviction? Thus it is if they will proceed to the degrees of madnesse above specified. And if they will not (as sure they will not,) then in spight of themselves, and their own perversnesse, they must fly by way of Refuge to these following confessions. First, That they have published self-contradictions beyond compare, affirming what they deny, and denying what they affirm, calling that by the name of blas­phemy which they professe to think Orthodox, and asserting that for true Divinity (with one stroke of their pen) which (with another dash of the same pen) they call the Doctrine of Devils. Their Second Confession must be this, that being proved to have printed such contradictions in several parts [Page 6]of their Writings (as their occasions did require, or their necessities enforce them) they are obliged in­dispensably to declare their last thoughts, and to name that part of their contradiction to which they will finally adhere, and in adherence to which they will quit the contrary from this day forward; whe­ther the affirmative, or the negative part of the contradiction; whether that which is for God, or that which is against him. If the later, they are declaredly Libertines and Ranters, and I shall wish for nothing more then the publick'st trial in the World to prove them such; there being nothing now wanting but a sufficient publication and notifi­cation of the thing, to effect its solemn [...], or total Banishment out of the World. Thus it is if they adhere to the later part of their contra­diction. And if they adhere unto the former, (which God of his mercy, and by his grace, may be pleased to work in them both to will, and to do,) I know not how they can escape an entire conver­sion unto the truth: or how obstinacy it self can slip its neck out of the collar, which the Soveraignty of Light hath sitted for it, and in a willing sub­mission unto which the ghostly freedom of the ob­stinate doth chiefly stand.

The same men affi [...]m it to be both blasphemy and truth, to say that God is the Author or cause of sin. Sect. 7.

To prove the three things of which I spake (in my last Paragraph but one) and to prove them so largely as I desire, is not the businesse of this place, but of my following Chapters, (of the second and third more especially) to which I now am but writing my Introduction. I will therefore say no more here, then what may serve to stay [Page 7]the appetite of any possible impatient and longing Reader.

1 First, That the Adversaries do grant it to be both false and blasphemous, to say that God is the Author or cause of sin, Note the double concessi­on of Mr. B. First, that his Masters do call it an exc­erable blasphe­my, p. 129, &c. and yet they teach in other places, 1. That God is the Author of sin, 2. Wills Sin, 3. Impells to it, 4. Forceth men to it, p. 132, 133. where he labours to make it good. I have abundantly proved in my Defence of God's purity chap. 4. Sect. 6. p. 30, 31. and shall farther do it in this following work, in particular chap. 3. sect. 13. & 27. Nor can they possibly eat their words, but at the peril of renoun­cing the whole stream of Church-Writers, both an­cient and modern, of whom I have given a large specimen in my Divine Purity Def. ch. 4. sect. 5. p. 22, &c. to p. 29. And yet

2 Secondly, That the same party do affirm it to be neither false nor blasphemous, but a most necessary truth, to say that God is the Author or cause of sin, I have more abundantly made apparent in Three di­stinct Tracts, viz. Correct Copy p. 9, 10, 50. especial­ly Div. Philanthropy defended ch. 3. sect. 34. p. 132. &c. to p. 139. & sect. 35. p. 141. and again Div. Purity def. ch. 4. sect. 3. p. 19, 20. And I shall do it yet more effectually in the second and third Chapters of this following Work, in particular ch. 3. sect. 13. & 27. And therefore

3 Thirdly, That they would not so frequently and affectionately contend for that very Doctrine, which sometimes (though very rarely) they confesse to be false & blasphemous, but that they find it must follow from their espoused Principles of God's Decrees (so as they see they must relinquish either both, or [Page 8] neither, I have abundantly evinced in the Div. Pur. def. ch. 4. sect. 7. p. 33, &c. to p. 39. especially from the citations out of Doctor Twisse, Du Mou­lin, Remigius, and the other friends of Gotteschalc, Bishop Cuthert Tunstal, and above all, out of Prosper, whom they many times dream to have been their Patron, and therefore cannot gainsay him without Discomfort. And again I shall evince it in several parts of the following work; and in particular ch. 3. sect. 8. & 10. Besides that the thing is so conspicuous of it self, that I may venture to make the Adversary the sole Iudge of the Businesse. For

Nothing but their Principles of Gods De­crees can lead them to blasphe­mies of such a nature. Sect. 8.

I demand of any man living, what should move such learned men as Huldericus Zuinglius, Doctor Twisse, Piscator, Zanchy, Triglandius, Beza, Calvin, Martyr, Borrhaus, and many others, to teach posterity in their printed works, [ ‘That God doth make men transgressors, For the seve­ral pages of their works, see the Div. Philan. def. ch. 3. sect. 34. especially the Div. Purity def. ch. 4. sect. 3. p. 19, 20. & sect. 6. p. 31, 32. and is the Author of adul­tery, and that murder is the work of God, and that sinners do sin by the force of Gods will; that God predestines men to sin, and to sin quatenus sin; that he is the Author of evil, not onely of punishment, but of sin too; that he is the cause not onely of hu­mane actions, but of the very defects and privati­ons; that he effecteth sins, that he exciteth, and tempteth, and All the ex­cuse Mr. B. makes for the saying that God doth compel men to sin, is that they use it but seldom. See what shall be said ch. 3. sect. 27. num. 5. compelleth men to sin, and a world the like stuff; I say, what moved them to print such loathsom Doctrines? Was it that they esteem­ed them as flowers of Rhetorick, or witty sentences, or pretty conceits, or well-sounding periods, or soul-saving [Page 9]preachments, or Hosanna's to the most High? This cannot be, no not so much as to be ima­gined.

What invited Mr. Hobbs to say [ That Mr. Hobbs of Liberty and Ne­cessi [...]y, p. 23, 24. sin may be necessarily caused in man by God's ordering all the world; that God doth will it and necessitate it, and Id. in Anim­advers. p. 11. & 107. & 106. cause men to erre, and is the principal A­gent in the causing of all actions? (which he who saith doth also say, that he findes no difference be­twixt the action and the sin of that action, from which great truth he should have inferred, that God cannot be the cause of sinful actions, not that he is the cause of sins.) What made thep. 36, 37: Comforter of believers to say, that God is the Author of sin­fulnesse it self, and hath more hand in mens sinfulness then they themselves? Were these Writers afraid lest men should think too reverently of God, too hardly of the Devil, and too profanely of them­selves? or were they moved with an itch to revive the Doctrine of Carneades, and to make men be­lieve that sin is nothing but a name invented by Ec­clesiasticks, and that the thing (call'd sin) is just as good as the thing call'd virtue, as being equally the work of God? 'tis very hard to think this. Or if this was one of their reasons, yet it was not certainly the first. But I have yet a harder Que­stion.

What should move Mr. Whitfield and Mr. Barlee, in the very books which they have printed on pur­pose to vindicate their Doctrine from all the hor­rible absurdities wherewith they stood charged, and wherein they knew it concerned them to speak as warily as they were able, as knowing that they [Page 10]were liable to be publickly called to an account, what (I say) should move them, at such a time▪ and in such a manner, to affirm that [ God For Mr. W's several pages where these things are taught, see the first and se­cond chapters of the follow­ing work, e­specially the second; and in that for in­stance Sect. 14. doth will and work sin; that he hath an efficiency in sin; that in all the wickedness in the world God hath a hand, a working hand, yea the chief hand; that sin doth make for Gods glory; and that it hath a respect of good; and that God hath a hand in effecting it; yea that God doth act in it as a natural cause; that God decreed the sin of Adam, and so ordered the whole business that he should certainly fall; that it was necessary the first man should sin; that the Gospel doth stirr up evil affections in the hearts of wicked men, and hardens mens hearts, and God intends it should do so, and sends it for this very purpose; that of sinful actions God is the Author and proper Cause; yea that he doth both will and work in the Sin of the Act, because not onely the action simply consider'd, but the very Pravity and Deformity of it makes way for Gods glory?] What moved Mr. Barlee to adde his suffrage to Mr. Whitfield, and to say in plain terms, [ That For Mr. B's several pages where these things are taught, see the third whole chapter of the following work, and the Index of the Divine Philan­thropy Def. which will di­rect to the rest. God is the Soveraign Author of the material part of sin, which is the doing or leaving undone not one­ly a natural, but moral act; such as David's lying with Bathshebah, or Cain's killing Abel, (as Doctor Twisse himself interprets the material part of sin) nay farther, that God is the cause of the very Ob­liquity of the Act of Sin; that God exciteth men to the act of adultery; that he stirreth them up to unjust acts, as a man puts spurrs to a dull Jade; that he tempts men to sin; and a world the like blasphemies? Nay what made him and Mr. Hick. [Page 11]to tell the World,See what shall be said ch. 3. Sect. 18. that if sin is a positive En­tity, either God is the Creator of sin, or else sin it self is God?] Did this prodigious pair of Wri­ters think that these were quaint Apophthegms which they were loth should die with them? or was it their purpose to strengthen the hands of evil­doers, and to tickle the ears of our English Liber­tines, who weare the new name of Ranters? or was their project the same with that of Mr. Hobbs? or did they mean by these things to administer com­fort to believers, whether Fiduciaries, or Solifidi­ans? were they fearful that Satan should be slan­dered, as the very first Fountain and source of sin? or that sinners should think too meanly of their sins, as if they had not a brave extraction? or are they inwardly haters of that very party which they are outwardly of? and have they taken this course to make them hateful to all besides? or do they real­ly believe that these are the profitable and pithy truths, in which the Godly of the land ought to be throughly grounded? or are these the instances of their care and circumspection, in such a defence of their Doctrines, as might not give any distaste to pious minds? or do they think that these speeches concerning God are the most supple, and the most popular, that their Principles will bear, and so exhi­bited as Abstersions and Vindications of their Di­vinity? or do they count it a fine thing to contra­dict themselves solemnly and in Print, by saying that God is This and That, and then by saying they never say it? O me propè lassum juvate posteri! If none of these were their inducements, (as my charity forbids me to think they were) what other account [Page 12]can be rendred (even by such as would plead in favour of them) but that they teach such things through the necessity of their affaires? they are so naturally flowing from their conceit of God's prae­science, and of his praedetermination (before his prae­science) of all events without exception, and so of his absolute Decrees of reward andNote, that absolute Repro­bation must needs be con­fessed to be a very sore pu­nishment, in whatsoever sense they please to take it. punishment, without the consideration of their being in Christ by Faith, or out of Christ by infidelity, of their abi­ding in Christ by perseverance, or out of Christ by impenitence unto the end; That whil'st they hold these Premisses, they cannot possibly escape the black and terrible conclusion so lately mentio­ned. They must either part with their first Prin­ciples, or else they find (by many experiments) that the ugly inferences will follow, do what they can to the contrary. Having swallowed it for a Maxime, that God's praescience of all things doth presuppose his praedetermination (as Mr. B. tells us) and that he foreknew nothing but because he first had decreed it, (as Mr. Calvin) they find it necessa­ry to infer, that God absolutely decreed and praede­termined all the wickedness in the World. Thus their Principles, rather then they, (or they by ser­ving their Principles) have brought those monsters into the light. And if they sincerely do hate the sequels, they must bid farewel to the antecedent. For when it is affirm'd, that two and two make five, it must be inferr'd, that five and but four, four be­ing the product of two and two: which Down­right Maccovius was so sensible of (who was as learned and as Zealous as any one of that Party) that he honestly confessed in the Synod at Dort, [Page 13] that if they did not maintain God's willing of sin, and his ordaining men to sin as sin, they must come o­ver to the Remonstrants.

How the vio­lent streams of blasphemy may be quickly dried up in their se­veral channels. Sect. 9.

Now that all those black and noisom streams may no longer gush out of their pens, I find the most effectual and speedy course will be to damm up the Fountain, or Headspring of the ef­fluxions. This is done on set purpose in the eighth and ninth Sections of the third Chapter of this Book. And there my Reader is to begin, if he will take my counsel; because he will there be entertained, not with the nature onely, and cause, and malignity of the disease, but (if I am not much mistaken) with the proper method and means of cure too. For thus I reckon within my self, if God's foreknowledge of all events, and so (by consequence) of all the wickednesses in the world, be proved not to praesup­pose his praedetermination of them, then it is proved in the same instant, that he did not absolutely decree the being of sin; but (on the contrary) that he conditionally decreed the permission of its being, which he foresaw would have a being by the sin­ner's determination of his own will to it, if he did not forcibly hinder the sinner's Free-will, which he eternally decreed he would not do. And in this is wrapp't up another proof as undeniable, to wit, that all God's Decrees are not absolute or irrespe­ctive or unconditional, (as my adversaries presume to limit the power of the Almighty) but some of his deceees, namely those which respect the acts of voluntary agents, with the rewards or punishments which do ensue, must needs be respective and [Page 14] conditional, that is, secundùm praescientiam, accord­ing to his foreknowledge and eternal consideration, For whatsoever is found to be, in time, either the cause of man's punishment, or the condition required to his reward, that did God from eternity both foreknow and fore-consider; and according to that eternal foreknowledge and consideration of the tem­poral cause of the one, or condition requisite to the other, he did eternally decree both to punish and to reward.

Mr. W's whole Fabrick pluckt up by the foun­dation. Sect. 10.

Whether Mr. Whitfield did understand this, or not, or whether he found it so clear a thing as not to be able to make a shew of any colourable resistance, but by dissembling his understanding, and putting all his confidence in his affectation of a mistake, let his dearest friends judge by that which followes. For he layes the foundation of all his structure in these most signal and extraordinary lines:

Arguments against Conditional Decrees.

By Conditional Decrees we understand such as wherein the condition doth not onely go before the execution, Mr. W's ex­plication of what he under­stands by condi­tionall Decrees. or effecting of the things decreed, but before the Decree it self, before the eternal act of God's will, and that purpose within himself, whereby he hath determined that such or such things shall be, p. 2. lin. 21, 22, &c.

His provision for a flight from h [...]s whole un­dertaking. Num. 1. Observe (Good Reader) how sublime­ly his building is design'd to rise, by him whose very basis is purposely laid within the clouds. He professeth to frame Arguments against conditional Decrees, not as I understand them, or any man li­ving [Page 15]of my way; but as He and his Peers are Poeti­cally pleas'd to understand them. And what is this but to make provision, that all his book may be no better then a vain-glorious Tergiversation? boasting his strength, in running away from the general Title of his book? bravely threatning to dispute, yet poorly declining the thing in question? Durst he have writ against my Doctrine of Condi­tional Decrees (as it seems he dares against his own) he durst have cited my words, wherein my meaning might have appear'd. Which why durst he not do, but because he found that my words were not liable to exception? He knew he was destitute of Argu­ments against Conditional Decrees, as I have alwayes understood them; but as he understands them, he can order them at his pleasure. A goodly [...]; and much good do't him with all his conquests, in that war which he wageth against himself.

He is equally unfortunate whether he in­tended sense or non-sense.2. But what are Mr. W's conditional Decrees, against which Mr. W. prepares to argue? he tells us [They are such, as wherein the condition doth go before the Decree it self.] Did he intend this for non-sense, or did he not? If he did, how mean and abject an opinion must he have had of his en­terprise, who thought it not safe to speak sense for fear the people should understand him? if he did not, it seems he thought it good sense, to say, that the condition in the Decree was before the Decree it self wherein it was. Had he not imbarqued himself in a most desperate Adventure (as very shortly he will find) he would have told us that a Decree is therefore said to be conditional, because it is made with a con­dition annexed to it, or concomitant with it, or in a [Page 16] foresight of something, in respect of which it is de­creed. For thence it is that the word conditional is commonly explained by the word respective, as absolute is (on the contrary) by irrespective. For example, God foreseeing or foreknowing that A­dam and Cain would determine their wills to sin, (the one in eating, as the other in killing, what was forbidden) decreed to permit, and to punish both. In which case his Decree is called respective or con­ditional, because it was made in a praescience and prae­consideration, that they would both determine their wills to sin: which praescience was concomitant be­cause coaeternal with his decree. Whereas accord­ing to Mr. W. God did absolutely decree that Adam should eat against praecept, and that Cain should kill his brother. Which if he shall venture to deny, and say he holds (as I do) that God did onely de­cree to permit them to sin, in a foreknowledge that they would freely and voluntarily do it, if not for­cibly hindred from using the freedom of their wills; he will then be exactly of my opinion, and over­throw his whole fabrick by subverting and even nulling his whole foundation. For to decree one thing in intuition of another, (and both from eter­nity, respecting their objects which shall be in time,) is to make a respective or conditional decree. Now because when God is said to decree and foreknow, he is implied eo ipso to decree something, and foreknow something, 'tis plain, the things now in time which were decreed and foreknown from all eternity, were some way present to the Almighty when he fore­knew and decreed them, because the act implies the object about which it is conversant. And how can [Page 17]that which is meerly temporal have been eternally present with the Almighty, but by its Idea or Exem­plar in mente Dei? as the work of every rational and advised Agent is conceived by the Agent, be­fore effected; the intelligible platform or concepti­on is present with the workman, whil'st the work it self or thing executed is yet but future. And here it is duly to be considered, that as the tempo­ral thing which God eternally decreed was every whit as future when God decreed it, as any temporal thing which God foreknew when he eternally fore­knew it; so his eternal foreknowledge was as eternal, as his eternal decree. Again it is duly to be consi­dered, that as now in time, the sin doth go before the punishment, so from all eternity God foreknew this priority of the sin, and posteriority of the pu­nishment. Nor could he possibly decree the second, until he had foreknown the first. Nay he must needs have decreed to punish sinners, according to his foreknowledge that they would sin; because whatsoever he did decree, he did knowingly, and wisely, and righteously decree, neither cruelly, nor by chance, or at a venture. So that God's fore­knowledge was simultaneous with his decree, as ha­ving been coaeternal; neither was before the other in order of time (for that would imply a contradi­ction) although in order of nature his foreknowledge of sin did praecede his Decree to punish sinners, and his foreknowledge that man would determine his will to sin, did praecede his decree to permit that man's determination. Now I proceed to shew more of Mr. W's unhappinesse, into which he hath freely cast himself, either by not comprehending, or by dis­sembling [Page 18]his comprehension of these so plain and obvious things.

3. He is equally unhappy what­ever he means by the word Condition.3. Forsooth he means such Decrees, by Condi­tional Decrees, whose condition goes before the De­cree it self, as well as before the execution of the Decree.] Very well. But what does he mean by the condition? As being in act a temporal thing, or onely in Idea, as being eternally in God's foreknow­ledge? If the first, then his meaning is wonderful, and never enough to be celebrated with admirati­on. For his project is but to prove, that temporal is not before eternal; and that that which comes after God's Decree at an infinite distance, could not possibly go before it. A very visible truth, but a most inexcusable Ignoratio Elenchi. If he shall say he means the second, he must also tell us his meaning of the word [before.] Does he mean a condition before in time, or before onely in order? If the former, he implies a contradiction, by imply­ing in eternity a priority of time: and when he saith that the condition is (understood by him to be) be­fore the Decree it self, he implies another contra­diction, by implying an eternal conditional Decree to have been a Decree, before conditional; for such it was, if the condition was in time before the Decree. But if he shall say he means the later, then he first of all infers that God is the Author of all the wick­ednesse in the World, by his denying the possibility of such Decrees, (as in part hath been shewed, and shall be shewed in great plenty;) and secondly he ruines the utmost force of his first Argument, which therefore now shall be compar'd. For his next words are these;

Sect. 11.

Mr. W's first Argument to be compared with his exposition of conditional Decrees, is he understands them. That such a Decree as this cannot agree with the excellent nature of God, if we consider him in regard either of his eternity, immutability, om­nipotency, simplicity, or other perfections belonging to his nature, may thus appear;

That which is absolutely eternal had nothing go­ing before it, for it is absolutè primum: but all God's Decrees (being acts within himself, and therefore not really differing from himself) are absolutely e­ternal: therefore they can have no condition or consideration of any thing without himself going before them, p. 2. and 3.]

Num. 1. Now his absurdities grow numerous, 1. He is as unfor­tunate in his best, as in his worst meaning. as well as grosse: for either he here bewrayeth his for­mer meaning to have been, of a priority of time in eternity it self, and so he is enwrapped in all the mi­series so lately mentioned; or else he must say in his defence, that he onely here means a priority of order, as I and others are wont to do. I am con­tent to allow him the utmost favour that he can wish; I will suppose he means sense, and the very best that can be meant: yet as things go with him, I cannot chuse but make him appear to be as un­happy in his best as in his worst meaning. And when I have done, he shall take his choice. For let him stick to what he will, and say he means what he can, or can be prompted by his Abettors to say he means, yet he hath so ordered the matter, that the measure of his calamities will be on every side equal. For admitting he here means a priority of order, from the impossibility of which in that which is absolutely eternal, he argues the impossibi­lity [Page 20]of Conditional Decrees, we find him fallen with­out redresse into these following absurdities.

2. His way of ar­guing in his best sense against Conditional Decrees is as much against the Trinity of persons in the Godhead.2. First his arguing is against the Trinity of the Godhead: for the Father is the first Person, the Son the second, the Holy Ghost the third and by a priority of order (though not of time) the first is before the second, as the second before the third. So that according to Mr. Whitfield, the second and third persons cannot be absolutely eternal; for what­soever is so, is absolutè primum (saith Mr. W.) but the second and third persons are not both the first person; therefore (according to Mr. W.) they are not absolutely eternal. But by his favour the three persons are coaeternal, yet they differ in order, as the first from the second, and the second from the third; nay they differ also in their proprieties, and in their manner of working. The Father existing and working from himself, the Son from the Father, the Holy Ghost from both, as the Adversaries agree. But that which is of it self onely, is before that which is of another, in some respect; therefore that which is eternal may have something going before it by a priority of order. Again, God's Es­sence is in order of nature before his attributes, and his attributes before his actions, yet God did act, and had attributes from all eternity. There must be Ens before Tale, and a subject before a praedicate, especially in Conjugates, where the praedicate is by way of adjunct; as when we say God is just, we im­ply his Being in the first word, and his attribute in the third. And as there must be men, before they can be happy, so God's decree that there shall be men, is (by one kind of priority) before his de­cree [Page 21]that they shall be happy. We intend the end before the means, God both at once; yet so, as that the one is in order of nature before the other. And this is confessed by Mr. W. p. 42. Arg. 3. viz. [That Divines do usually place an order in God's de­crees wherein one thing goes before another.]

3. He argues a­gainst his own M [...]st rs and Brethren.3. Next his way of arguing is against his own Masters as well as brethren: Calv. Lost. l. 3 c. 23. sect. 7. fol. 325. for Mr. Calvin placeth God's Decree before his praescience, and so dothBeza ad Rom. 11 4. Beza; and Mr. Barlee saith, Gods praescience prae­supposeth his praedestination, c. 3. p. 13. Doctor Reynolds more truly thus,D. Reyn. of the Passions, c. 42. p. 545. The actions of our will were foreknown because our will would certain­ly execute them, though not without freedom and electi­on. Wolleb. in Theol. compen. l. 1. c. 3. p. 29. Wollebius (more plainly then any other) af­firms God's will to be considered as the efficient cause, and his Decree as the effect: and again he saith,Id. ib. c. 4. p. 35. that God's praedestination doth praesuppose his decree. So that according to Mr. W. all these are enemies to the absolute aeternity of God's praescience, or of his praedestination; some placing his praedestination before his praescience, and some his decree before his praedestination, and some his will before his decree, even as the cause before the effect.

4. He argues di­rectly against S. Paul, as well as against the eternity of God's fore­knowledge.4. Again, his way of arguing is not onely di­rectly bent against the eternity of God's foreknow­ledge, as alwayes supposed by himself to be after his decree, but more unhappily against the words of S. Paul, who in the very same period doth imply God's purpose and counsel, (and so his knowledge) to be in order of nature before his praedestination, Eph. 1.11. In whom (that is in Christ) we also have [Page 22]obtained an inheritance, being praedestinated [ [...]] according to the purpose of him who worketh all things [ [...]] according to the counsel of his will. Where his counsel is as the Rule by which he acts, which is in order of nature before his action, his action being according to the Rule of his counsel: from whence it is evident, that God did not first Decree, and then consult or consider, but both together, because both from eter­nity, yet so, as that his counsel or consultation was in order of nature before his Decree; he having wisely decreed, for this reason onely, because he decreed according to his counsel; not by hap hazzard, but according to his knowledge and consideration, that it would tend to his glory, without which it is evident he would never have decreed it. And therefore saith the same Apostle (2 Thess. 2.13.) God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation (he doth not say absolutely, but) through sanctifi­cation of the Spirit, and belief of the Truth: which God foreknew when he chose them. And accord­ing to foreknowledge they were chosen or elected, as S. Peter saith expressely 1 Pet. 1.2. as 'twere defi­ning or explaining a conditional election. And S. Paul doth put foreknowledge before Praedestina­tion, Rom. 8.29. which may fitly be compared with Rom. 11.2. and Act. 2.23.

5. He argues in a fl [...]t contradi­ction to himself, and against Doctor Twisse.5. His way of arguing is contradictory to himself, and to Doctor Twisse, with whom he joyns in a con­fession, [ That there is in God's Decrees prioritas Rationis (p. 6. Arg. 4.) and because (saith he) in order of nature the end goes before the means, and we can apprehend no other way, therefore that order is [Page 23]usually attributed unto God in his Decrees, that first he decrees the end, and then the means, p. 7.’ Doth M. W. here mean by Prioritas Rationis, one of the quinque modi priorum commonly known to all the World, or doth he not? If he doth, he should have told us which, and have confessed that his Argument p. 3. is against his own Doctrine p. 6. But if he doth not, then either he asserteth a sixth way of priority, which no man living can imagine, or else he speaks of a verbal priority, as oppos'd to real; and then his fetch is no deeper then this, that there is no priority in God's Decrees, except no priority: and because it is ugly to say there is none, except none, he therefore expresseth his meaning of none, by prioritas Ration is. Just as Wollebius and others do first affirm that God'sDecretum reverâ est ip­sissima Dei vo­luntas: docen­di tamen cau­sâ, voluntas ut causa efficiens, Decretum ve­rò ut effectum consideratur. Loco superiùs paulò cit. p. 29. Decree is really his will, ipsissima voluntas, his very very very will; and then docendi gratiâ, considers his will as the effici­ent cause of his Decree, and his Decree as the effect of his will. This is still Mr. W's practice. To bring about his little ends, and to effect impossibilities, he considers God's Decrees as such in some places (as p. 6, 7, 42) which he professeth in other places to be impossible that they should be, (as p. 3, & 44.) And what is this but to acknowledge that they cannot procure for their Doctrines any colour of truth, but by grounding their Discourse upon the most declared falshoods?

6. He argues a­gainst the Te­nent for which he argues.6. His Argument is subversive of his own dear Te­nent for which he argues: Because if GodNote, that Mr. W. proceeds to say (p. 3.) God could not foresee Faith, or any other grace in man, before man had any being in the World, as if he either denied all foresight in God, or understood not what foresight means. Again he saith, p. 42. that the foresight of sin cannot go before God's Decree. fore­knew nothing but because the first had foreordained [Page 24]it, (which is the saying of the whole party) his praescience then would be conditional of his Decree, and so there would be place for a cendition in eter­nity, which Mr. W. whilest he inserrs, endeavours to prove to be impossible. This is rare: impossible one way, and yet another way unavoidable. Again, when he saith, that God decreed to permit sin, he either means, that God decreed the permission one­ly, in praescience of the sin; or that he decreed as well the sin, as the permission. If the later, he either means that the Decree was of the permission before the sin, or of the sin before the permission, Let him avow which he will, he must either avow a conditional Decree, or that his Doctrine is blas­phemous, and that it is but his Parties salve, when they say that God decreed to permit men to sin, and mean his decreeing that men should sin.

7. He is fain to make God's De­crees to be actus Dei ad intra, against his own party, who teach them to be ad extra.7. His memorable Parenthesis [that God's De­crees are acts within himself, and therefore not really different from himself, p. 3. hath quite undone him many wayes. For first, he means that God's De­crees are not onely immanent, but also actus ad intra, as he saith in terminis p. 37. But this is lamentably false, his own Teachers being witness: for those are actus Dei ad intra, which relate to nothing without God; as his contemplation of himself, the generation of his Son, the procession of the Holy Ghost. But those are actus Dei ad extra, which are re­ferred to any thing without the Godhead; such are God's Praedestination and Creation, which respect his creatures, whereof the former is [...], and the later [...], but both ad extra, for immanent and transient are the divisive members [Page 25]of actus or opera Dei ad Extra; as every Novi­tius in these controversies can well inform him. If he did not know the difference betwixt immanent and ad intra, or is a self-contradicter betwixt his p. 3. and p. 37. he alone is to answer for it. But this is the least of his absurdities; For

8. He makes Gods actions to be God himself against his own Masters and common sense.8. The very thing which he affirmes to be actus Dei ad intra, p. 37. and here an act within himself, he affirmes to be no other then God himself. But that God himself should be an act of God, within God, is a strange conception. Let him consult his Master Wollebius, and he will say that God's Decree is an internal Decretum Dei est inter­na voluniatis Divinae Actio p. 28. action of the Divine will. Again let him ask his MasterGomar. T. 3. Disp. 9. Thes. 29 Gomarus, and he will say that God's Decree is an action, and therefore not God, and therefore different from God: so incon­sistent he is with such as gave him his Lawes. But he is also inconsistent with common sense; For

9. Five blasphe­mons absurdi­ties which that absurdity doth inser.9. If God's Decree is not really different from himself, and so really is himself, then 1. He de­pends upon himself as upon a free Agent, which was at liberty once to have decreed, or not decreed the redemption of the world, and by consequence at liberty to have been, or not to have been. 2. It would also follow, that God was the efficient cause of himself, because of his Decree, and so in order of nature before himself. 3. It would follow, that God could not chuse but Decree, because he could not chuse but be himself; and so that his Decree is falsely defined by all Divines of all Parties, ex­cept Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Whitfield. 4. It would follow, that the generation of God the Son would be God himself, as being actus Dei ad intra, where­as [Page 26] Decretum is but ad extra. 5. It would follow, that the Son might be said to have begot the Father, and the Father to have proceeded from the Son and the Holy Ghost, because the essence of God is equally common to each person in the Trinity. But these are things which are blasphemously absurd; therefore God's actions are not his essence, and therefore different from his essence, and by conse­quence from himself.

10. He makes God himself to be Reprobation.10. Mr. W. forgetting what he here saith, by that time he comes to p. 44. will have it there to be [ Improper to say that God doth decree to repro­bate, as if he should decree to decree; where as re­probation it self is the Decree, p. 44.’] Were I not striving to put an end to my Introduction, I would examine whether he knew what is the En­glish of decernere, and whether he pleads not for my notion of God's Decrees against his will. But I will onely observe, how he first affirmes God to be the same Being with his Decree, (p. 3.) and now his Decree to be Reprobation it self (p. 44.) so that according to Mr. W. God is Reprobation, and Reprobation is God.

Sect. 12.

An easie way to his Reforma­tion concisely open'd and pointed at.That I may not seem to dwell in the very door, I will speak as concisely as I am able. 1. Mr. W. seems to have a prejudice against the coaeternity of God's consideration, according to which he did decree, because its object is temporal and without himself. As if the object of his Decree were not the same. 2.Certè omnis voluntas est respectiva, si­cut & scientia. Doctor Twisse confesseth, (l. 2. p. 24. col. 2.) that the will of God, as well as knowledge, must needs be respective. And if [Page 27]of one object, why not of another? if in one kind, why not in another? 3. If he could, and did, nay could not but consider the sins of Angels, or of Men, whilest he decreed their Reprobation, what should move men to say, that he decreed their Reprobation without any considerati­on of their sins, which yet he could not but con­sider, as being wise and omniscient? If he did not foresee the fall of Adam, before he decreed to give his Son, yet this they will grant, that he did not decree to give his Son before he foresaw the fall of Adam; which is as much as I desire, if they will also grant that he had a respect to the fall of Adam, when he decreed to give his Son. 4. Again, let them grant, that causa exemplaris is before the efficient by any kind of priority, (such as is granted by themselves at other times) and even that will suffice to undeceive them. Of twenty Arguments which I could urge, and as it were build upon the ruines of Mr. W's whole Fabrick, I shall lay down but two from the general confessions of the adverse Party.

1. They do unanimously confesse, that God's promise is conditional; and that his promise, though made in time, was decreed to be made from all Aeternity; The first Ar­gument for conditional Decrees groun­ded on the con­fession of all the contrary party, and according to the Tenor of the seventeenth Article of the Church of England, exhibited to us in the last clause of it. and that it was decreed to be such as it is, a conditional pro­mise. For, say they, (Mr. W. p. 37. and Mr. B. Correp. Corr. p. 86, 87.) God doth not onely [Page 28]determine the thing it self that shall be done, but the manner how it shall be done.] Now if God's promise is conditional (as all ac­knowledge) God eternally decreed that he would make it (what it is) a conditional promise: which yet he could not do, but by considering the condition, as well as the pro­mise to which it cleaves; for else he had not considered it as a conditional promise, nor could he be inconsiderate, in any thing, or circumstance, which he decreed: and a Decree of any thing in consideration of a condition, is exactly the thing I mean by a Conditional Decree. And what is thus argued from the promises of God which are conditional, may equally be argued from his conditional threats for his conditional Decree of Reprobation. Nor is there place for cavil in this plain Argument; for as the promise was decreed, so also was the con­dition; and as the condition was foreknown, so also was the promise. Again, as the promise was eternally in Idea or conception, so also was the condition. And as the condition is temporally in act or existence, so also is the promise. And hence plain Readers may see the mind of the seventeenth Article of the thirty nine.

The second Ar­gument for con­ditional De­crees from ano­ther confession of the contrary party in their definition of God's Decrees.2. It is unanimously confessed by the ad­verse Party, (as a prime ingredient in its defini­tion) that God's Decree is an action of his Di­vine will depending on God as a free Agent. And by a consequence unavoidable, that God was free (from all eternity) to decree, or not [Page 29]to decree, to elect, or not to elect. For if he was not once free, how can he be said to have elected? And how unlikely are those men to thank God for their election, whose Principles do infer that he could not possibly have done otherwise? But to elect of necessity, or to chuse without a freedom, implies a grosse contradiction in adjecto. It will and must be therefore grant­ed, that if God did decree any thing, he was free to decree it before he actually decreed; and if he chose or elected any one, he was free to elect before he actually elected. I say [Be­fore] for this reason; because when he actu­ally elected, he was not free to elect, and what he actually decreed, he was no longer free to decree. And the reason of my reason is most irrefragable, it being this, that what is done already cannot remain not yet done. That which is past, or present, cannot be future: and he who hath chosen, cannot still be to chuse the numerical thing which he hath chosen. This implying another Con­tradiction. It will be granted then on all sides, that when God had determined his will ad hoc, it did not ad hoc remain unde­termined. And because it was once com­pletely free, or undetermined, 'tis plain that his Being and his Liberty were before his actual Decree: which being granted, there is nothing to hinder (by the very confession of the Adversary) but that his Decrees might be conditional.

Sect. 13.

Mr. W's mis­take of the thing in Que­stion represent­ed in cleerer and fairer co­lours.But if Mr. W. and his Parti­sans will mean what they please by condi­tional Decrees, and then confute their ca­pricious meanings, and intitle others to those overthrowes, which (with paines and char­ges) they give themselves, I will leave them in their afflictions from this time for­ward. For what is to be done with such a Disputant, who undertaking to demonstrate that a man cannot possibly be an animal, shall begin his enterprise with this explication of his meaning?

‘[By the word Animal, we understand such as wherein the animality doth bear the chief sway. And because of animals there are two sorts, (& vox [...] must be distingui­shed into its different significata) I mean that sort which is commonly called by Logicians Animal irrationale.’

That such an Animal as this cannot agree with the excellent nature of man, if we con­sider him in regard either of his risibility, or rationality, or other perfections belonging to his nature, may thus appear.]’

This is just the case of Mr. W. represented onely in more visible, but fairer colours. It is a more important truth, that God's Decrees of election and reprobation are conditional, then that a man is an animal. And Mr. W. preparing to write against them, hath opened his meaning of [Page 31]the word conditional, as I have largely shew'd. How irresitible is the truth of conditional De­crees, which the Adversaries themselves cannot tell how to gainsay, untill they have created themselves a subject, and called it ours? How deplorable are the endeavours of such opponents, whose chiefest refuge and strength is to mistake the very ground on which the Defendant is known to stand? Upon fairer terms then such as these, I will at any time undertake to make it appear to Mr. W. that two and two amount to ten, or that five and five put together do make but four. I am secure of the successe whenso­ever it shall please him to shew his strength, be­cause I find the task is easier to prove that two and two are ten, then to prove that God's De­crees are all irrespective or unconditional: which though the chiefest of that Party have asserted as well as they have been able, yet have they done it in such a manner, as if they were afraid to have it believed. And this I hasten to make ap­parent in the following Chapters.

CHAP. I. Concerning his Fanciful Creation of Three General Objections; and his Propoundings in General in way of Answer, p. 19, 20.

SECT. I.

AS Mr. Whitfield found it his safest way, to s [...]end no lesse then eighteen [...]ages,1. M. W's distrust which he puts in his cause. be [...]des his E [...]istle to the Reader) upon a Subject of his own choice, before his courage would serve him to split himself u [...]on the Rocks, which he pretended to attempt in his valiant Title; so when he is brought to his proper Task (t [...]nquam Bos ad Ce [...]ma) of answe [...]ing such Ob [...]ections as had been made against his Doctrines in the Divine Philanthropie defended, he is fain to shrug three times together, before he is able to fall on.

First he tells us, It is agreeable to right reason, that God being a most free, absolute, and omnipotent Agent, he might design the creatures that were of his own making to what ends himself ple [...]sed, without giving account to any, &c. (p. 19. Num. 1.)’ And this he calls his first Generall Answer, or thing propounded by way of An­swer.

2. His studied aiming beside the mark.Secondly, But to whom, or to what, or upon what occasion, no man living can imagin, much lesse can he. Where dwells the man who ever dream't of such an Objection against the [...], or Soveraignty of God? not in any of their houses, who ascribe thus much to the Sapreme Civil Ma­gistrate, that he is [ [...]] unaccomptable upon earth, much more to the Omnipotent, that he is such even in Heaven. This general Objection was fram'd at Bugbruck, by that creator of Chimaera's who loves to fancy an Ene­my, and then to fight him; when he cannot answer what is objected, he objects such things as he can answer. It is the cream of his strength, that he feels his own weaknesse, and therefore deals with a proportionable Objection. That which comes out of his Forge, he thinks is fit enough to passe between his Hammer and his Anvil. But then he ought to consider, that he should feign no more Objections than he can dissipate with his practice as well as with his Pen.

3. Yet over­throwes his own Rampire.For Thirdly, If God was pleased that his Mercy should be over Ps. 145.9. Ps. 103.8. Ps 145.8. Ps. 86.15. all his works, and might do what he pleas'd, (as Mr. W. confesseth) why does he daringly exclude the greatest part of mankind from any imaginable share of that rich mercy? The least degree of Gods mercy hath some of comfort: But is it a comfort to the Reprobates, that by a peremptory Decree they are rendred incapable of Hea­ven, and sure of Hell, without respect unto their sins, and yet inevitably sinful without repentance, that so they may not be damn'd for nothing? Why then do men, who are as wormes, advance themselves against God, denying hisM. whitf. p. 2. l. ante-pen. penult. ult. & pag. seq. 1. Eternity. 2. Immutability, 3. Omnipotency, 4. Simplici­ty, and all his other perfections, because he was pleased to decree the end of his rational creatures, in an eternal con­sideration of the respective means? If God determin'd from eternity that Cain and Judas should beGen. 4.14, 16. Mat. 25.30. Act. 1.25. cast out of his presence, in regard of their Murder and Impenitence, (and no otherwise) what is that to Mr. Whitfield? Job 33.13. Why dost thou strive against him, for he doth not give account of his matters? as Elihu pleaded for God in another case. [Page 3]TheProv. 16.4 [...] Lord hath made all things for himself, them that are good, for the day of good things, them that are (a) wic­ked, for the day of evil; yea in an eternal foreknowledge and consideration of their wickedness. If God was pleas'd to give his Son to be a ransom for all the World (upon their several performances of no impossible conditions) why should a Calvinist be offended, that all others are savable as well as he, whose bodies areJob 33.6. formed of as good a clay, and whoseEccl. 12.7. souls can pretend to as high a pitch of extraction? why should theMat. 20.15. Creatures eye be evil, because his God is exceeding good, and it seems much more, than Envy and Avarice can well endure? Let Mr. Wh. therefore cease from contriving Objections a­gainst himself; or if his Invention must needs be busie, let him conjure up no more than he is able to exorcize; norWisd. 1.12. pull disgraces upon his Doctrine, with the work of his hands. But withall let him be told, that as God was not bound to give account of his wayes to any creature, (and as little to those of the Kirk, as to those of the Synagogue,) so when it pleased him (of his mercy and free love to Mankind) to reveal as much of them, as lies open to our eyes in his written Word, who dares call him to account for giving account of his Dispensations? if God is pleased in some Cases (and that as an instance of his freedom) to becomeIsa. 5.3, 4, &c. Ezek. 18. accountable to his creatures, and to become likeHeb. 4.15. Mat. 8.17. one of us (sin alone being excepted) he is not to give an account to any.

4. His second overthrow of himself, and of his absolute de­crees.Fourthly, What is added by Mr. W. That God might appoint his creatures to such ends as should make most for his glory, is very true, and very impertiment, and very much to the downfal of his Poetical Reprobation. For to de­cree men to punishment without respect unto their sins, makes not so much for Gods glory, as to decree them to punishment in consideration of their sins: Unless Mr. Wh. is of opinion, that 'tis a more glorious thing to torment a creature as a creature, then to punish a sinner as being sin­ful; of that eternal Decrees are not every way answered by their Temporal executions. God created Mankind as he [Page 4]was mighty, but decreed to reprobate and elect as he was in [...]nitely just. For Reprobation in all senses (nega­tive, or positive) imports a very sore punishment, as every punishment imports a sin, for which the punishment is in­flicted. That is most for Gods glory, which is most for his justice and Mercy too: but to decree a man's misery, for the meer shewing of a Soveraignty over the work of his hands, (and therefore to decree it without respect unto sin) hath nothing in it of Justice, much lesse of Mercy; and so is incompetible to [...]im, who could not chuse but be al­wayes (from all eternity) at once a Just and a Merci­ful Soveraign: it being destructive of his glory (and by consequence of his Being) that any one of his Attributes should (for an Article of time) exclude the other. From whence it followes that Mr. Wh. hath confuted all his own Doctrine in less than two lines. Nor can he be other­wise disintangled from his own dear [...]. Lime-twiggs, un­less he can prove that Gods dishonour doth make most for his glory: or unlesse he will adde to his other miseries, that to be sinful by a Decree, or to be punished without sin (which by the way is a contradiction) tends nothing at all to Gods dishonour. But for such things as these Ishall rec­kon with him hereafter: I hasten now to his Second General.

His third over­throw of him­self by a most crimson contra­diction.Sect. 2.

His second Propounding (as he words it) in way of General Answer to no-body-knowes-what (nor doth he venture to tell us what) General Objection, doth very happily run thus; That which the Scripture plainly, clearly, and positively asserteth that God doth, we ought not to deny that he doth it, though we cannot discern the manner how he doth it: and p. 19. bear witness Reader, a­gainst anon; for when he comes to those Scriptures, which do plainly, cleerly, and positively assert, that Christ hath died for all men, and tasted death for every man, and is the pro [...]itiation for the sins of the whole world, and the like, then the Case is alter'd with him; and in a flat op­position to what he here tells us, It is (saith he) a very weak way of arguing, to argue from the signification of words; especially such words as have various significations; [Page 5]as all men, every man, the world, the whole world, and the rest, which are oft-times used, not to signifie every particu­lar man and woman, but a part of them onely, (p. 71, 72.)’ Well fare the Disputant indeed, vvho vvill never lay down the Cudgels, so long as he is able to break his ovvn shins with them; let his cause be never so bad, he vvill not fall from his principles, so long as self-contradiction can hold him up: rather then others of his kind shall be as saveable as He, the whole world must signifie the smallest part of it; and we must not argue from the signification of words, we are not bound to adhere unto the letter, (p. 72.) So abomina­ble and impious is Universal Redemption, that it cannot stand with Gods wisedome (saith Mr. Whitfield) not be con­sistent with other Scriptures, nor can it agree with the Ana­logy of Faith, (p. 73.) Any vvay of exposition must be in­vented and embraced, rather then Christ must be admitted to have died for mankind. But here on the contrary side, vvhen Mr. W. desires to prove, that God hath a hand in all sin, an efficiency in sin, that sin is Gods work, and that God is actively the cause of sin, (and more such stuff, as shall be shevved and cited in its proper place) this is such comfort­able Doctrine to a man of his life and conversation, that all Texts of Scripture must be taken according to the Letter, vvhose outside and Letter doth sound this vvay: any thing must be svvallovved against the Analogy of Faith, and a­gainst the plain tenour of all other Scriptures, rather then God must be exempted from the causality of sin. Mr. W. then must needs argue from the signification of words, vvhich to do in other cases he calls a very great weakness, (p. 71.) This is the man of mettle, vvho cannot possibly be conque­red, he is under the protection of so much frailty: or grant him conquered, he must not possibly be caught; for if he cannot out at the door, he vvill escape at the window. Yet I vvill follovv him so far, as to lay some hold on him; and vvill not vvillingly let him go, until he shall promise a Recantation. For if in any one case, it may be pertinent in this to use the [...]. Greek proverb, That for a wicked man to prosper in making God the fountain and source of wicked­ness, [Page 6]vvill be apt to turn to Gods discredit. The name of God will be Rom. 2.24. blasphemed among the Gentiles, if such Theo­logy as this shall pass abroad among [...]t Christians vvithout control. Observe hovv he goes on, p. 19.

2. It rather becomes us humbly to acknowledge our Ig­norance 0688 0136 V 2 in the manner of Gods working, 2. Mr. W. enters upon the worst part of Libertinism, as Mr. Calvin himself judg­ed it. Contra Libert. c. 3. then to deny any of his works, then to deny that he worketh all things, &c.then to deny that he worketh most determinately, cer­tainly, and infallibly, in the various and mutable motions of mans will. And to shew his meaning to be no better then that of Beza, Piscator, and the rest of his Tea­chers, viz. that sinful works are some ofZuingl. in Serm. de Prov. c. 5 & 6. Gods works, and that heBeza advers. Castell. Aphor. 1. & 6. See The Divine Purity desend­ed. p. 21. 30. worketh all things, whether good or evil, with­out any the least exception, and that God doth determine the will of man to the most sinful Act which he commit­teth, he addes many things to make it evident that this indeed is the scope at which he here drives. For he tells us a little after, that when God is said in Scripture to har­den mens hearts, to send them strong delusions, to bid Shi­mei curse David, to bid the evil spirit go and deceive Ahab, to turn the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people, to have given up the Gentiles to vile lusts, to put into the hearts of the ten Kings to give their power unto the beast, and the like, (p. 22.) we must not expound such Texts by the com­mon Hebraism, but take them as literally as we do those other wherein God is said to make the earth, to form the light, to create man, and the like, (p. 23.) He also saith that Gods permission of sin is not without action and operation, (p. 21.) that he must needs have some efficiency in it, (p. 24.) that he doth both will and work it, (p. 26.) that he hath a hand in effecting of it, (p. [...]6.) And gaping so wide as he does, (nay wider then all this, as shall be shewed in due time,) how can we fail to know his meaning by his gaping? Let us then contemplate the large Dimensions of his swal­low, that at last we may demand what it is will stick with him.

3. His now con­tradiction, a­bout the man­ner of Gods working.3. First, an huge Contradiction goes down very glibly; for as soon as his ignorance is acknowledged as to the manner [Page 7]of Gods working, (p. 19.) he describes the manner of it, and sets it down as dogmatically, as if he had been an eye­witness, and of counsel to that secret and hidden will of God, which the men of his way are wont to oppose to his revealed one. He saith consentingly out ofNegari non potest, illum aliquo modo procurare ne­gotium, cujus consilio & de­creto genoti­um geritur. Piscat. ad Am. Collat. Vorst. sect. 17. Piscator, (but blusht to put it into English) that God doth procure the business of sin] by whose counsel and decree the business is managed or carried on, (p. 21.) my more distinctly as to the manner, in another shred of Latine, which he calls a true Rule, but puts it not into English. The true English of it is this, That Deus agit in peccato, non tanquam causa moralis, sed tanquam causa natura­lis. God doth act in sin, not as a moral, but as a natural cause, (p. 25.) that is to say, He doth not so act as to perswade onely (which yet is bad enough of it self, and the worst that the Devil can arrive unto) but in such a natural way, as to necessitate the sinner; (which is infinite­ly worse then to perswade him.) Nor will it advantage him to say, that God decreeth, and procureth, and is the natural cause of the positive act of every sin, but the accidental cause onely of the sin it self, (as He and Mr. Barlee shall be shewed to say in plain terms.) For Davids lying with Bathsheba was the positive act of Adultery, and sin it selfe, (but Davids lying without Bathsheba was no sin at all, either in whole or in part) which if Mr. Wh. cannot deny, as I am sure he cannot, (and do challenge him to do if he thinks he may, or dares to do it) then must be confess it to be his Doctrine, that God was the natural cause of Davids lying with Bathsheba, and that that positive act of Adultery was Gods work, and his Creature; because of positive acts (he saith) that God is the proper efficient cause, (p. 24.) This lies on him unavoidably, unless he can separate the positive act of Davids lying with Bathsheba, from Davids sin of Adultery, which was his lying with Bathsheba, and no­thing else: which I shall shew he cannot do (if so gross a visible needs shewing) when I discover how Mr. Hicks be­trayed Mr. Barlee into a Blas [...] hemy (no less then sins being God, if a pos [...]tive act) and hovv Mr. B. vvas even vvith him, by sending his Treachery to the Press. So much for Mr. W's. nevv self-contradiction.

4. His down­right Liberti­nism.4. Next Mr. W. must be observed to speak the language of the Libertines [...] to a syllable, as I lately inti­mated, but novv shall openly express. Saint Paul having said, God worketh all things, (Eph. 1.10.) meaning all the Graces of the Holy Ghost, of vvhich alone he there speaks (as Calvin himself confesseth,) the Libertines concluded (as Efficit omnia, id est, omnia sine exception [...]. Beza in locum. 1. Facinus, puta Adulterium aut homicidium, est Dei Auto. is, Mo­toris. Impulsoris opus. Zuing. de Prov. c. 6.2. Deus videri potest causa, non modò humanarum actionum, ve­rùm etiam D [...]fectuum atque Priva­tionum quae ipsis inhaerent. Pet. Mart. in 1 Sam. c. 2.3. Deus efficit ea quae peccata sunt. Sturm. de Praedest. Thes. 16.4. Idem facit Deus, scilicet, pro­curat adulterium, maledicta, men­dacia. Piscat. resp. ad Apolog. Birtii, p. 143.5. Omnes peccatores & flagitiosi, vi voluntatis Dei faciunt quicquid faciunt. Id. Resp. ad Tauffr. p. 65.6. Deus efficaciter agit seu efficit, & suâ efficacitate perag [...]t omnia, sine ullâ prorsus quantulâcun­que exceptione. Beza contra castel. Aphorism. 1, 6, 7. Beza did, and as Mr. W. novv doth) that all their sins vvere Gods works. For that vvas their rule, vvhich is novv Mr. Whitfields, that what the Scripture both plainly and positively asserteth that God doth, we ought not to deny that he doth it, (p. 19.) not admitting any Hebraisms, or other figures of speech, or restrictions and limitations of universal terms, but taking all by the Letter to serve their turn, as Mr. Wh. doth to serve his, (p. 23.)’ Hence are those ordinary Do­ctrines amongst the men of that batch: ‘1. That adultery or murder is the work of God the Author. 2. That God may seem to be the cause, not of humane acti­ons only, but of the very defects and pri­vations which cleave unto them. 3. That God effects those things which are sins. 4. That God procures adultery, cursings, lyings, &c. 5. That all wicked men do all that they do by the force of Gods will. 6. That God efficaciously acteth or effecteth, and by his efficacity performeth all things with­out any the least exception. From vvhich very saying, be­ing pronounced by the Libertines, Mr. Calvin discovers tvvo horrible, but unavoidable sequels. 1. That there is not any difference betwixt God and the Devil. 2. That God, by this Doctrine, is transmuted into the Devil. Calv. ad e [...]s. Libert. cap. 13. & 14.) Novv vvhen the Calvinists and the Libertines do teach the very same thing, vvhy shall not I hate it in the Calvinists, as Calvin hated it in the Liber­tines? [Page 9]nay, vvhy not more? since a Blasphemy is the worse (not one vvhit the better) for proceeding out of a learned and a leading mans mouth.

—Tanto conspectius in se
Crimen habet, quanto melior qui peccat habetur.

Nor doth it move me that some Calvinists vvill take it ill at my hands (vvhilest others not rigid vvill take it vvell) for no doubt but the Libertines took it as ill of Mr. Calvin. The Treasure that I covet is not their Favour, but their Amendment. Let this precede, and that vvill follovv un­avoidably. I therefore ask Mr. Whitfield, A Dilemma as a touch-stone to try his mea­ning. Is his mean­ing the same vvith Beza's and Peter Martyr's, and the rest in my margin, vvhen he saith, we must not deny that God worketh all things, or is is not? If he say, Yes, he is a Li­bertine, and Mr. Calvin shall be my witness; and then let him renounce the Christian name and Religion, that theRom. 2.24. Name of Christ be not blasphemed among the Gentiles. For we who are Christians do assert, that God worketh not all things without exception, good or bad, but all things only which are good, [...], all things vvhich become him. All the rest are the1 Joh. 3.8. works of the Devil, and of his genuine Children, vvho are resolved to do theirJob. 8.41, 44. Fathers works. This vvas Christs Doctrine, this vvas Saint Johns, and Saint John (believe me) vvas a Christian. All Gods works are done in Psal. 33.4. Truth, therefore lyes are none of his: and soPiscat. loco paulo superi­us citato. Piscator vvas out. The Lord is Psal. 145.17. holy in all his works, Adultery and Murder are therefore none of Gods vvorks:Zuing. loc. jam citat. Zuinglius therefore vvas deceived by his Do­ctrine of Decrees, and Mr. W. by Zuinglius. The Lord shall Psal. 104.31. rejoyce in his works, but hath Psal. 5.4. no pleasure in wick­edness: therefore Martin Borrhaus spake very madly, when he dared to say thatBorrhaus in Exod. cap. 4. p. 448. sins do please God; and Mr. Wh. more madly, when he saith that God doth will sin with a perfect will. p. 22. We see what must follow if Mr. W. shall answer, yes, to my Dilemma. But if his answer shall be, No, then he must burn his own Books, and all those Books from whence he made up his Cento, and publickly subscribe to [Page 10]the truth of mine. If he shall say his meaning is (p. 22.) that Gods will, of which he speaks, is onely objected on the wise permission or patient suffering of all sins, and not upon the sins themselves, why then did he entitle his book against me, and not against Mr. Barlee, or against his un­converted self? He and I will shake hands, if he will say he meant thus, and not as Doctor Twisse, whoSee the place cited Correct Copy, p. 10. saith, that the will of God doth pass, not onely into the permission of the sin, but into the sin it self which is permitted. Utrum horum mavelit, accipiat: Let him now take his choice, and spea­king distinctly to my Dilemma, let the world know what he is for, without any Tricks or Tergiversations. But I will tell him for his security, that he were better be try­ed by the waters of jealousie, if his meaning shal be found in the former part of the Dilemma; by how much a lesser e­vil it is, forNum. 5.21. the thigh to rot and the belly to swell, then for a man but to mean (or say in hisPsal. 14.1. heart) that adultery and murder are the works of God. And therefore timely let me advise him to use theNum. 19.13. waters of separation, that the uncleanness of such Doctrines may not be on him.

5. The Determina­tion of mans will to wicked actions is not Gods work.5. In the next place let us consider what he means by those words, God worketh most determinately, certainly, and infallibly in the various and mutable motions of mans will. I do but passingly take notice of his unscholar-like use of the word Infallible, as if he knew not its meaning, or did not consider its Derivation (the fault is too small to be observed in a Writer of his bredth and thickness) I will rather try him by another Dilemma. Doth he mean that God doth so work on the wills of men, as to determin them of necessity to all their objects and actions, both good and evil? or doth he not mean this, but rather grant that mans will doth determine it self? If the later, all is well; he hath no more to do next, but to abandon hisEspecially Mr. Barlee, and his brother Hickman, who say, that what­soever positive thing is not from God is God. c. 3. p. 112. The apex of Blas­phemy, as shall be shewed hereafter. party, and burn his books: whereas if the former is his meaning, (as hitherto it hath been) I know not what to do for him, to lighten the weight of his calamities, which will press him down deeply, do what I can: For first he implyes a con­tradiction, as I demonstrated to a person of greater worth. [Page 11]And therefore here I repeat it not, but refer him to theSee The Di­vine Purity de­fended. ch. 8. sect. 2. p. 80, 81, 82. & sect. 5. p. 86, 87. place where he cannot fail of it. Next it inferreth un­avoidably, that God is the natural cause of all the wicked­ness in the world. For example, suppose a wicked man hath conceived Adultery in his mind, or committed it in his Heart (as ourMat. 5.28. Saviour speaks.) If God did predetermin that wicked man to that physical Act of Concupiscence, and the will of that man to a consent, as well as the appetite to a complacency, he was not onely the cause, but the sole cause of the Adultery. Nay farther yet, if the inward in­tention of the end is the determination of the will to the first act of sin (as the subtilest of them do say,) and if that In­ten [...]ion, or whatever else is the Determination of the will, and the Determination it self, is a positive act (which none can deny,) and if God is the Creator or Maker, or proper cause, of whatsoever thing is positive (as these precious ones do affirm;) He is not onely concluded the sole cause of the Adultry in his Creature, [Verum etiam id ipsum quod dicere nolo] but also that which is worse, and ineffably blas­phemous. And here I ask Mr. Wh. was that adulterous thought or intention so determined to its object, in that re­spect evil, or was it not? If in that respect evil, he accuseth God; if not evil in that respect, he acquitteth the wicked man; and unavoidably inferreth, that there was never any Adulterer, Murderer, or the like, but was carried to the doing of all his wickedness with a good intention, a good desire, a very good determination of his will. And reason good too; For the Determination of mans will (they say) is Gods work, or Gods share in the procurement and ac­complishment of sins. And Gods part in the business they say is good. But then they leave man no share at all in his impieties: if they do, let them name it, which they never yet did. Indeed they talk in the general, [that God is the Note this distinction which Mr. Barlee makes ch. 3. p. 55. natural cause of the meer Act of sin, and a meer Acciden­tal Cause of the obliquity of the act of sin.] But bid them in­stance in some particular, then they see that they are blind, and quickly speak themselves speechless. VVhen a man hates God, orLevi [...]. 24.15. curseth God, or any otherwise blasphemes [Page 12]against him, let Mr. Wh. or Mr. B. or Mr. Hick. be asked, which is the act of that sin? and which is the obliquity of the act of that sin? you shall have them as mute as three dead Fishes. If the cursing of God is a whole sin, it is an act of sin, or an obliquity of an Act, or both together, and that either separably or inseparably: If onely an act, where is the obliquity? if onely an obliquity of an act, where is the act it self? (for all the whole sin is the cursing of God, nor more, nor less) if both together, and separably, let them make that separation in words, or dumb signs, that we may hear, and conceive it. But if both are inseparably together, let them confess the thousand blasphemies, and the six hundred contradictions, which have and may be detected in all their Doctrines and Distinctions; and after confes­sion, let them amend too; I ask no more.

6. His meaning ferreted out of his words.6. It may from hence be collected, what is meant by Mr. W. when he immediately addeth, [that God worketh most holily in those very Actions wherein man works unrigh­teously, p. 19.] Even the same withSee Correct Copy, p. 10. Zuinglius (abetted also byTwiss. Vind. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. p. 36, 37. Dr. Twisse) that the very same sin, viz. Adultery or Murder, as it is the work of God the Author, Mover, and Impeller, it is not a crime, but as it is of man, it is a great one; which is onely to say, that sin is Gods work, but God is no sinner. He is the Author of sin in others, but sins not himself. He co-operates with the sinner to the effecting of his sin, but being God he is not guilty. That this must be the meaning of Mr. W. I can demonstrate by many Ar­guments. 1. By his denying Scientia media (though I am not sure he understands it) and holding with Mr. Calvin, that God foresaw nothing, but because he fore-ordained it. 2. By hisNote that in his Epistle to the Reader he argues the later from the former with a [must.] concession, that there is the same reason of the fore sight of sin and the Decree of Reprobation, with the foresight of Faith, and the Decree of Election. But 'tis the Doctrine of him, and all his party, that Faith is the proper effect of Election, and not foreseen untill decreed. Ʋpon the very same ground (to use his own words in my violen­tum) he doth and must hold, that God did not foresee sin, until he had decreed it too. Nor will it lessen the absurdi­ty, [Page 13]to say that God decreed to permit sin onely, unlesse by permission he means a sufferance, or a wise not hindering: if so, he is right, but then he must burn Doctor Twisse his books, and retract his own: it being their constant do­ctrine, That God's permission of sin is efficacious. Nay no Twiss. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1 p. 142, 143, &c. lesse efficacious is God's decree in the permission of evil, than in the production of good: so very sore are their very salvo's. Thirdly, His meaning may be evinced, (as by all other passages of his book, which I have, and shall cite, so) by comparing his present words with the nature of sin it self, which is found to consist in such an indivisible point, that to say, God works in it, is to say as much as that he works it. As for example, To hate God is a sin, or a sinful action (two expressions for one thing). The very sinful­ness of the sin doth intirely consist in the hating of God; not in God without hating, (for he is purity it self) not in hating without God as the object of it (for hatred in it self is a thing indifferent, and as apt to be good as evil, and e­ven communicable to God, who hateth sin with a perfect hatred) but in the union and application of that act to that object. As the nature of man consists not in a body one [...]y, nor onely in a soul, but in the union of the one with the o­ther; so that the sinfulness of that sin of hating God, is nothing else but the union of that act with that object. And that is punctum indivisibile: for sin it self is a Physical ab­stract at theNote that there is no such thing as pecceit [...] in any Profane, or Sa­cred Writer. grossest, of which sinfulness at least is an ab­stract Metaphysical; which admitting not any Composition, cannot farther be abstracted so much as in imagination. How then can God work in the hating of God, and that no lesse than as a natural cause, (for so he doth, saith Mr. W. p. 25.) without being the cause of the sin it self, when in the hating of God there is nothing but sin? Here I exact of Mr. W. to tell the World what he means, or to satisfie for his words, of which he dares not tell the meaning. But again 4. He gives us notice of his true meaning (if not of the meaning which he will own) by three Texts of Scripture, which he applies to the purpose of which I spake: for thus run his words;

7. His abuse of Scripture to serve his turn.7. How else can it be said when Josephs brethren sold him into Egypt out of envy, that God sent a man before? &c. And when David numbred the people, it is said not onely that Satan stood up against Israel, and provoked Da­vid to number the people, 1 Chron. 21.1. but that the Lord moved David against them, in that he said, go number Israel, 2 Sam. 24.1.’ By these he seeks to make it cre­dible, that God doth work in the wickedst actions as a na­tural cause, although these Texts do prove the contrary. To the first and most impertinent of the two allegations, I have f [...]oken soIn the Divine purity defended, ch. 7. Sect. 6. p. 63, 64, 65. largely to Doctor Reynolds, that Mr. W. must fetch his answer thence. To the second, consisting of two contradictory Texts (as to the letter) I make an ease return, by shewing the literal inconsistence of the one with the other, unlesse the first may be allowed to ex­plain the second. For when the very same thing is said to be done by God, and by Satan, either one of the two must needs be figuratively spoken, or else there will be [ [...]] irreconcileables in Scripture, not onely [ [...]] the bare appearances of Discord: else farewel to Torniellus, and all other Writers in that kind, who recon­cile the Scriptures which seem to differ and contradict. First I take it for granted, that the word of God is not chargeable with any self-contradictions; That the very same action cannot at once be good and evil, Divine and Devilish; That God and Satan cannot do the same works. From whence it followeth of necessity, that when God is said toActivum pro Passivo, ut saepè, inquit Grotius in locum. move David to number the people (2 Sam. 24.1.) the meaning must be, He * permitted Satan to move David. For so the Scripture explains it self afterwards (1 Chron. 21.1.) by saying that Satan provoked David to that deed. Another example will make it plainer. It is said of the Devil (the God of this world) that he hath blinded the mindes of unbelievers, lest the light of the Gospel should shine unto them (2 Cor. 4.4.) Again it is said of our God who cannot endure the least sin, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardned their hearts, that they should not see with their eyes, &c. (Joh. 12.40.) where because the two senses of [Page 15]those two Texts cannot possibly be the same, the former must needs be active, and the later onely permissive. It is to be seriously considered, whether any such men can be fit for the Ministry, to be intrusted with the Key of Know­ledge, to be Stewards of the Mysteries of the living God, who are not able to distinguish betwixt those Scriptures which differ most; but help the people to confound the works of God, and of the Devil. I confesse my indig­nation is very great at this instant, whil'st I observe M. W. (in a bookSo he pro­fesseth in his Epistle to the Reader, p. 2, & 3. intended for the unlearned) to present the let­ter of such Texts without the least explication, nay oppo­site Texts without the least offer of reconcilement, nay teaching that God hath anP. 24. efficiency in sin, andP. 19. worketh in the worst actions as a natural cause, and25. He speaks worse of God then can be tru­ly said of Sa­tan. determines the wills of men to every event; whereas the Devil himself cannot contribute so much to sin, by the utmost force of his Temptations: He can but perswade, and incline, as a mo­ral agent, which cannot necessitate to wickednesse, as the natural doth. And if his parishioners, or others as void of learning, shall ask him the manner of God's working and efficiency in sin (that they may know how it differs from the Devils manner of working in the very same sin, and from the manner of working in which the sinner him­self worketh) behold his answer is onely this, [ It be­seems us humbly to acknowledge our ignorance in appre­hending the manner of his working (p. 19.) and again, we be not able to apprehend his secret and wonderful man­ner of working in evil actions, p. 23. lin. ult.] How then, Good Sir, saith the amazed Catechumenist? what shall we do in this Case, when our light is darkness? where shall we seek knowledge, when our Priests lips cannot pre­serve it? Mr. W's answer is at hand, P. 24. lin. 3, 4. Though he doth it miro & ineffabili modo, as Austin speaks, yet we are not to deny the doing of it. But first the people are abus'd with Austins name, who never said any such thing; HisP. 20. lin. 1. Enchirid. ad Laurent. c. 100. words are quite contrary: id non fit, that is not done beside the will of God, which is done against it. Mark Reader, He doth not say, what God doth, but what is done against Gods will [Page 16]by Gods permission, which is not beside his will to permit it. Next suppose Austin had said any such thing, had not that been one of his many Errors? But thirdly, 'Tis well Mr. W. will yield any authority to Austins Enchiridion, which is perfectlyAugust. En­chir. c. 98. destructive to Mr. W's Doctrine. Well, Mr. W. declares his ignorance to the unlearned Quaerist, touching the manner of God's working and efficiency in sin, as a natural cause (which being precisely his own expres­sions, do put us in mind of his contradiction, whilst he confidently defines in some places, what he professeth not to know in others, as being wonderful and ineffable.) Make but room for Mr. Barlee, and he will help his Fellow-labourer to make it out with a wet finger. [Mr. B's Ne­ces. vin. ch. 3. p. 12. He that cannot or will not tell how God may be said to excite men to the Act of Adultery, which to the Adulterer so excited is sin, ☞though not to God, neither will he tell how God without sin doth stir up men to the act of lying with their lawful Wives; ad utrumque ejusdem gene­ris excitatio & concursus. Idabid. for the excitation and concurrence to both is of the same kind.] Observe the growth of this Student since his Cor­rep. Correction. He there expressed his Divinity of God stirring up men to sin, by his putting spurs to a dull Jade. Now he tells us [ [...]] in downright terms, that God hath the same concurrence to the most unlawful, and the most lawful actions. S. Paul no sooner said, Marriage is honourable, but immediately added, and the bed undefiled, [...], immaculate, pure, and spot­lesse: but Adultery is Rebellion against the Monarch of all the world. And yet he stirs up the wicked to the unclean Act of Rebellion against Himself by the same incitation (saith Mr. B.) whereby he excites his loyallest subject to the most blamelesse thing that can be named; not onely not forbidden, but commanded by God for propagation; where­as Adultery is an Act which God forbids by his law, and from which he restraines by his Grace, disswades by his Spi­rit, and which his children cannot commit, but by resisting his Grace, and by grieving his holy Spirit, by whom alone we are sealed unto the day of Redemption. But M. B. may say, that I now torment him before his time. I [Page 17]therefore return to his majorite, whose third general An­swer doth now ensue.

Sect. 3.

Mr. Whitfield saith,Mr. W's third General An­swer a m [...]er Majestick mistake. [ that the summe of what Mr. P. or any of his Predecessors in this controversie about Gods absolute Decree hath objected against it, is included in that which the Apostle objects against himself, speaking of his subject, Rom. 9.14. Is God unjust? and, who hath resisted his will? which he answers with an Absit, & quis tu es? — And if we should give no other answer but this, it might suffice, p. 20.]’ What will not some be bold to say, rather then want wherewith to gain-say? First he forgeth a certain Tale, and gives it the Name of a Third general Answer. If he had called it a Whirligig, his impropriety had been lesse; for the Question there is the contrary to what it is here. There it was of God free mercy, which well might be without mans merit: Here it is of his wrath, which cannot be without our demerit. No lesse are the wandrings of Mr. W. But Secondly, Where was he told, that this is the summe of whatsoever hath been objected against his mythical Decree? He nei­ther names his Author, nor gives his Reason, nay speaks precisely against his knowledge, and crudely dictates (stilo satis praetoriano) This is the summe. I answer with more Truth, but much lesse Majesty, that this indeed is the summe of all their subter-fuges and salvo's, Quis tu es? Who art thou, O man, who objectest against God, that he hath not an efficiency and hand in sin? This was the very last plank which Mr. Hobbs was fain to betake himself unto, when he found himself ship-wreckt by the most learned Bishop Bramhall, in his book of Liberty and Neces­sity, p. 20. The shift is common to the Libertines and Ranters, with Mr. Hobbs, and Mr. W. and Mr. B. &c. This is the ablest of their Answers, when nothing else will do the work, to say that God would have it so because he would, and however contrary to his word, yet 'tis a part of his secret will, (revealed onely to that Tribe) at which the rest of mankind must content themselves vvith [...], and must hold themselves confuted vvith the [Quis [Page 18]tu es] of the Presbyterians. Thirdly, It is his other abso­lute leasure, to say that Saint Paul did speak of this sub­ject, Rom. 9.14. It is enough to say No, and that 'tis senseless to imagin it. But I vvill tell him farther, thatNon fuit levis offensio, quòd tam pauci Judaei credierunt.— Nomen populi Dei objiciebatur Apostolo.— Haec est (meo judicio) occasio harum disputa­tionum. Melanchth. in Praef. ad cap 9. ad Rom. Saint Paul is there disputing against the male-contented Jewes, vvho vvere very much offended that the Gentiles should be received, and the Jews rejected (the greatest part of them) vvho hither­to vvere vvell knovvn to be Gods peculiar and chosen people. This (saith Melanchthon) vvas the occasion of that vvhich follovves. AndNon aliud vult Paulus, Rom. 9. [...]0, 11. quàm docere, Gratiam universalem esse; contra Judaeos, qui culpâ suâ exciderunt Grat [...]â, &c. H [...]mming. Praef. in Exposit. Epist. ad R [...]m. See Doctor Ham. Annot. upon that Chapter. Hemmingius thus, That S. Paul intented nothing else (v. 10, 11.) but to teach that Grace vvas universal, and ex­tended also to the Gentiles: This vvas contrary to the Doctrine vvhich vvas then espoused by the Jewes, as novv it is by the Consistorians. Were this a place and a time to argue from the genuine and demonstrable sense of that Chapter (vvhich of it self vvould make a Volume) there could nothing prove more destructive to Mr. W's Doctrines, then that one Chapter; and that not onely according to S. Paul's sense, but even according to the senselesness vvhich the2 Pet. 3.16. unlearned and the unstable are vvont to wrest from that Scripture. Fourth­ly, The Quis tu es may fit my mouth a great deal better then Mr. W's. If God vvas pleased to punish none in his eternal Decree vvithout respect unto their sins, and toTit. 2.14. give himself a ransom for all mankind, Quis tu es, Who art thou O man that repliest against God? shall the thing for­med say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Why was I not decreed and necessitated to bliss from all e­ternity? why have I not grace irresistible? why shouldst thou leave it in my povver to be unhappy? vvhy should any kind of wickednesse be able to put me into a state of damnation? or vvhy should all men be capable of e­scaping Hell, as vvell as I and my party? vvhat have [Page 19] moral honest men to do vvith heaven? vvhy vvere they not rejected before they were? The Puritanical Jewes vvere apt to mutter to this effect, but let not Christians be so irrational. This vvere ansvver sufficient to all the ill­natur'd murmurings of carnal men. But for the good of the vulgar (for some of vvhom Mr. Wh. may be too hard) I vvill apply my [...] to the particular dangers novv spread before them.

Sect. 4.

Mr. VV. saith truly,He descends from Generals to Particulars, and begins with the charge of ma­king God the Author of sin. [ ‘that the first and prin­ci [...]al objection against the Doctrine of absolute De­crees, is, that it makes God to be the Author of sin, p. 20.]’ But doth he say hovv vve prove it? No, he durst not do that; Hovv then should he have ansvver'd? He therefore proves it his own way, taking on him the per­son of T. P. or the like; but does not so much as pretend to have read the objection vvhich he proposeth to be an­svvered. And to one who speaks lesse then nothing it is not fit to speak much, although it is hard to abstain from speaking. The last part of his objection is somevvhat honestly fram'd, [if God decrees the Being of sin, then he is the Author of it] Let us observe hovv he ansvvers it, for in that vve shall shortly find a very great jest.

First he saith vvhat vvas never denied I think by any,I. He begins with a Tergiversati­on, and imposi­tion on the Scripture. that God doth permit sin, and hath decreed to permit it. But then he addes (vvhat is most false, unlesse it be carefully explain'd) [The Scripture is plain, that God decrees those actions, which when men do, they do very sinfully, (p. 20.)] 1. He here addes to the vvord of God: there's no such Scripture. 2. He slides from vvhat he said of God de­creeing to permit, and (vvithout any transition, or pretense for the change,) pronounceth quite another thing, that God decrees the sinful actions, or sins themselves; for that these are synonymous I shevved before. But let his own words shame him y these degrees. Davids lying vvith Bathshebah vvas an Action, vvhich vvhen he did, he did very sinfully. Such Actions so done Mr. W. saith that God decrees. The Action specified vvas Adultery, and that vvas sin: and so according to M. W. God decreed that sin, [Page 20]that Adultery, that actual lying vvith another mans wife, that action vvhich, vvhen David did, he did sinfully. The instance vvhich he gives Act. 2.23. & ch. 4.27, 28. is cross to his purpose; for tvvas in a foresight and consideration that Christ vvould be crucified by the Jevves, if not vio­lently hindred, upon vvhich God determin'd he vvould not hinder, and so (by a consequence unavoidable) that the thing should be done by his permission. And there­fore the first Text Act. 2.23. affords an excellent exposi­tion to the second, Act. 4.27, 28. for 'tis said there expresly, he vvas delivered by the Counsel and foreknowledge of God. The vvord [...] to determine doth no vvay exclude, but suppose [...], to foreknow. And this vvas the ansvver of Justin Martyr to Tryphon, as I have elsevvhere noted, and spoke so much by vvay of ansvver to this very objection of Mr. W. that I must send him thither for a fuller account, though vvhat I have novv said is somevvhat more then I ovv'd him. [See Sinner Impl. part 2. ch. 2. p. 258. to p. 264.] And because the vvords of that Father vvere not there given at large, I have here thought fit to set them dovvn in the Margine [...]. Just. Mart. contra Tryph. p. 370. porrò illam objectionem, [...], ita solvit Justinus.. I am very vvell plea­sed, that the same is objected against my Doctrine, vvhich vvas objected by vvicked Tryphon against that lear­ned Apostolical and holy Father. What is added by Mr. W. of God permitting sin to be, is onely for me, and against himself, unlesse he vvill declare that he is just as I am, and fairly publish his Retractations.

2. His memorable answer to his own objection. 2. But vvher's his Ansvver to this Objection, [That if God decrees the Being of sin, then he is the Author of it?] Novv comes the jest. His Ansvver to it is fully and vvholly thus:

Pag. 21. ‘But though God hath decreed that sin shall be, and therefore hath decreed to permit it, without☜ which it could not be, yet it doth not follow that he is the Author of it.

Doth he mean by Gods decreeing that sin shall be, His meaning caught in a Dilemma. that he decreed it absolutely, and antecedently to his prescience that it would be, if the sinners will were not hindered be some violent means? or that he decreed not to hinder it upon his eternal foreknowledge that the sinner would determine his will to sin, if not miraculously impeded? Which soever he shall say, it will be equally pleasant (and he must say one, for there is not a third.) If the former, he makes God to be the first and principal cause of every sin, but denyes the sequel of his being the Author: which is as if he should say, Paul was a rational creature, but it doth not follow he was a man. Sophroniscus did beget Socrates, but yet was not his Father. The Jewish high Priests were the first and principal contrivers and procurers of the murdering of Christ (to which Judas and the Romans were instrumen­tal) but it doth not follow they were the Authors of that murder. Thus Mr. W. with the same breath, denyes what he affirms, whilest he affirms it, if he owns the former meaning of his words. And if the later, he yields the whole cause, by overthrowing the foundation of all his Doctrines; which is the placing Gods Decree before his Knowledge, his preordination before his prescience; which although the most against Reason and Philosophy of any thing that can be nam'd, hath been swallowed by the Calvinists from Mr. Calvin's ownIdeo prae­sciverit quia sic ordinavit. Calv. Inst. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 7. fol. 325. See Div. Pur. c. 7. p. 74. mouth. Thus it fares with Mr. W. if he means either of those two senses. If he can think upon a Third, I will speak to it when he shall name it. But be his sense what it can be, it was faulteringly done, to baulk the words in the Objection, and to substitute others in the Answer; and unskilfully resolv'd, to obtrude a bare De­nial, without pretending a dram of Reason to give it at least a little weight: nay, he hath not so much as an evasion to supply the room of an Answer; never an Orthodox put-off. The total of his answer (to bate the other flawes in it) is [Page 22]the syllable [No. It doth not follow, For it doth not.]

3. And because he mingles the word [permit] in this and many other places,3. His soul use of the word per­mission. Of which see Div. Philan. Def. ch. 3. p. 129, 130, to p. 139. & ch. 4. p. 53, 54. as a necessary Emollient to asswage the hardness of his sayings, the Reader must once more be put in mind what is meant by [permission] in the writings of this and such like Authors. Their common accom [...]t of their meaning is by the word efficacious: and if we ask how far forth Gods permission of sin is efficacious, Doctor Twisse is Prolocutor, and tells the sense of the Party. Gods De­cree (saith he) is no less efficacious in the permission of evil,then in the production of good. But in the production of good, they all affirm with one mouth that Gods Decree is abso­lute, irrespective, and irresistible; nor is it less (saith that Doctor) in the permission of sin. That Mr. W. thinks the Doctor Orthodox, his Book forbids us to disbelieve; for he saith that God hath a hand in sin, and a hand in the ef­fecting of it, (p. 26.) that he hath some efficiency in it, (p. 24.) that he acteth or worketh in sin (not as a moral Agent by disswading from it, but) as a natural cause pro­moting the Being and Act of sin, (p. 25.) that Gods per­mission of sin is accompanied with Action and Operation, (p. 21.) and all this in the ugly sense, as I shall shew more and more in the following Sections. And therefore his using the word permission doth but aggravate his guilt, un­till he shall declare, that he takes it in a passive and nega­tive sense, so as to signifie the suffering, and not hindering of sin. But then he must adde a Recantation of those un­sober expressions, with which the word Permission is incon­sistent.The odious impropriety re­presented in o­ther less odious colours. For suppose a man shall command or excite his Son to steal a Horse, and that so effectually, that the Horse is stolen by that Son upon his Fathers excitation; can the Father be thought to speak truth or sense, if he shall plead that he did onely permit his Son to steal by an efficacious permission, which could not be resisted because of its effi­cacy and force? Or will it avail him to plead not guilty, by saying he had but a hand in that stealth, or an efficiency in it, or that he onely commanded and stirred up his Son to that vile Action, but was not the Author of that sin which [Page 23]cleaved to the Action, nor was it he, but his son who stole the Horse? Reader, this is the Case, but represented in fairer colours then Mr. W's Doctrine doth deserve. For he and hisNote that those Authors are defended by Mr. W. and Mr. B. as well as imitated and followed. Teachers have said of God, that he decreeth, willeth, commandeth, determineth, seduceth, exciteth, stir­reth up, impelleth, tempteth, effecteth, and maketh men to sin, and that not onely as a moral cause (as some) but as a natural cause also (as others) as the Author of sin (say some) to sin quatenus sin (say others.) All which, and much more, I have formerly shewed in three distinct Tracts, to which I must ever refer the Reader, though I am ever adding to my Supellex. And let this serve for their Emollient, made up of contrary ingredients (as Emplastra and Cataplasmes may sometimes be) for the discussing the peccant Humour (at least for the concealing the ugly face of the Disease.) The first Ingredient is Active, and they allay it with a Passive, which is the second. The first they think hath too much of Positive in its Nature, and so they qualifie it with that which hath somewhat of Negation in it. They adde permission to efficacious, to save their credit; and efficacious to permission, for the salving of their cause. Their Dictio­naries can tell them (and they who never read Tully, may easily look into Nizolius) thatNote that to permit is not the En­glish of permit­to; any more then to occide is the English of occido. But permit is pure­ly Latine, made use of in English; as occide is Latine, not made use of in English. And as to occide is in English to kill; so to permit is in English to suffer. permitto and sino are words of one signification. Sino signifies to suffer, or per­mit; Permitto signifies to permit or suffer. Judge how sore that part of their Doctrine is, to which an efficacious permission (that is an active sufferance, or an operative not-hindering) hath been onely applyed by way of Poultice. But some Patients are so unhappy, that either they tear off the Poultice from the Oedematous Tumour, or else they adde to the composition as much as robs it of its anodynous and healing virtue. This will appear in the next Objection which Mr. W. hath raised against himself, as fittest (he thought) to fall before him.

Sect. 5.

Object. [But if he hath willed and decreed it, 1. Mr. W. moulds, a new objection against himself, wherein he grants what his Doctrine is charged with. his Decree is an energetical, and operative Decree, therefore [Page 24]he hath some hand in working and effecting of it, as Cal­vin, Piscator, and others teach, who are for the absolute Decree. Negari non potest illum aliquo modo procura­re negotium, cujus consilio & decreto negotium geri­tur, saith Piscator: and if his Decree be operative, so as he hath any hand at all in the working of it, then he must needs be the Author of it. p. 21.]’ Bear witness, Reader, that this is also an Objection of his own making up against his own Doctrine; which no doubt but he did with as much tenderness as he could, in special regard unto the weak­ness both of the Answerer and the cause. Yet even thus it is such, as we shall find by and by he is not able to elude. But first observe his acknowledgement, that Calvin and Piscator, and the rest of his way, do in good earnest main­tain the ugly premisses in the Objection, viz. that God hath willed and decreed sin, and hath some hand in working and effecting of it; & negari non potest, it cannot be deny­ed (saith Piscator) but that God procures the business, and that it is transacted by his Counsel and Decree. These things, I say, he doth not offer to deny in any part of his Answer, but doth his utmost to make all good (as shall immediatly be seen;) he onely denyes (and 'tis a naked denyal without the least reason) that they do hence infer God to be the Author of sin. Mark well his Answer, or rather his shifting himself of it in lieu of an Answer.

2. His Answer consists in shif­ting the duty of a Respon­dent, and spea­king quite ano­ther thing.Answ. For Answer of this, two things are to be clea­red. 1. That Gods permission is not such a bare permis­sion as is without all action and operation. 2. That though his permission is accompanied with some kind of operation, yet he is no Author of sin. p. 21.]

This is an [...], an atchievement never to be forgotten. For in the Objection, there was not a syllable of Gods Permission, which yet in his Answer is All in All. The Objection was of Gods willing, decreeing, working, effecting, procuring sin, and the like. The Answer standeth in the clearing of Gods permission, and shewing it is not unac ompanied. Here then I must ask him (as before I did) doth he mean that Gods permission is efficacious, and ac­companied [Page 25]companied with those things which are ingredients in the Objection, viz. decreeing sin by an operative energetical Decree, willing and working, procuring and effecting it, (which is all the language of his Predecessors?) or doth he not mean any such things? If the first, I take hold of his confession, and will demonstrate that he doth worse then if he meerly call'd God the Author of sin. If the second, he doth not answer, but sneak from giving any answer. He layes down a Cushion, and sits beside it. And if when one thing is objected, he shall answer to quite another, he is no sitter for a Disputant then a man that's deaf, who if he is askt what's a clock? will answer, a Windmill, or a Pump. But let him be granted to have a pertinent meaning (how­ever his words are nothing lesse) yet the state of his affairs will be but so much the worse: For by that he discovers, how many dismal mysteries are closely couched in the word Permission; enough to shew the great usefulness of what I spake on that subject a few minutes since. Now then let us observe how he clears his two things, which he calls in his margin by the name of two Arguments.

3. His first part of his escape, clea­ring his first thing with a very great blot.3. [ That Gods permission of sin is accompanied with some kind of operation, appears, because when he permits sin he doth volens permittere, he doth willingly permit it: then there is some act of his will about it. p. 21.]’

Mark his notable passage à genere ad genus. The per­mission he speaks of, is in relation to sin; but the will of God he here speaks of, is in relation to the permission. Did he take permission to be a sin, or not? If he did, he chargeth God with that sin, which (were it such) would denomi­nate him a sinner. And this would be blasphemy in its [...]. For the avoiding of which, if he shall say he did not, then he must say he is a shifter, not a Disputant or Re­spondent in any sense; for the thing he is to clear (and 'tis a task he imposed upon himselfe, without being bid,) is Gods permission of SIN attended with operation (not his permission of his PERMISSION, which is perfect non­sense, and yet implyed by Mr. W. unless he professeth to be impertinent) which in stead of clearing, he gives the slip, [Page 26]by saying that God doth willingly permit it. Where the willingness relates to the permission of sin, (which permission is no sin) not at all unto the sin which is permitted. Which if he did not discern, O the depth of his Apprehension! if he did, and yet pass'd it, O the depth of his Dissimulation! whether he did, or did not, he hath done a strange thing; for thus he argues, [God doth willingly permit sin, there­fore there is some act of his will about it.] About what, good Sir, is the Act of Gods will? about the permission spoken of, which is Gods? or about the sin permitted, which sin is the Devils and his Instruments? The first is as impertinent, as the second is blasphemous. And though 'tis plain that Mr. W. doth mean the second, yet he offends against Logick, as much as against Theology: for thus he argues; God doth will to permit sin, which to do is no sin; therefore he willeth sin, which cannot be divided or distinguished from sin: which is to say in effect, Gods will is conversant about what is good (such is permission) therefore it is conversant about what is evil (such is sin per­mitted.) Because he doth not will sin (but onely to suffer or to permit it, or not to hinder the sinners will) therefore he doth will it. One part of a contradiction is his proof of the other. But though he miscarries (to a prodigy) in his way of probation, yet he discovers his affection to his o­pinion, that God doth velle peccatum, immediately will sin, and that with a perfect will, as he goes on p. 22.

4. His abuse of St. Austin.4. Thus then he advanceth (if that can be in a Circle wherein he onely runs round.) HeDeus per­mittit aut vo­lens, aut no­lens & invi­ [...]s; non certè invitus, quia id esset cum Tristitiâ, & potentiâ se majorem haberet: Si volens permittit, est genus quoddam voluntatis. Enchir. aed Laur. p. 100. cites a passage out of Austin, in which he confesseth that that Father doth grant but this, [that God hath some kind of will in the per­mission of sin, p. 22.] So grants Arminius, and Pelagius, and all mankind. But what then (Mr. W?) A will in the permission is not a will in sin; for Gods permission is of a contrary nature. If Austin had said, that God hath a will in the effecting of sin (which is contrary to his holy wil) he had then said something to bear you out, or rather he had fallen [Page 27]into the same ditch with you. But Austin doth not, nay durst not say, that sin (permitted) is according to Gods will; for he saith that sin isFit contra voluntatem. Id. Ibid. against his will; and that at the ve­ry same time, when he saith he hath a will in the PER­MISSION of sin. Now be it remembred by the Reader, that Mr. W. doth mean an efficacious permission when he speaks of Gods permitting sin. And how much he meanes by efficacious, I lately shewed. Together with that, com­pare his process.

5. His arguing that God doth will sin per­fectly, because be perfectly wills the per­mission of it.5. If any kind of will, this must needs be a perfect will; for no imperfect will agrees to God, who is perfe­ction it self: and how can he be said to will any thing with­out any Act of his will? p. 22.]’ Now the Doctrine comes more into the light. Gods efficacious permissive will (as Mr. Barlee and others are wont to word it) is the same to sin, as to sinlessness, saith Mr. Whitfield: for more then perfect it cannot be when objected upon the best things; nor is it less then perfect (saith Mr. W.) when objected upon the worst: (for from Gods will to permit sin, he ar­gues Gods willing sin.) Which reasoning of his is so ex­cellently absurd, that it demonstrates the contrary to what he seeks to prove by it. For because nothing in God is im­perfect, and whatsoever he willeth he willeth in perfection, therefore he willeth not sin at all; it being of his perfection, that he cannot will sin; and the greatest imperfection in the worst of all Creatures, that they are able to will sin with a perfect willingness. And what a Divine must he be, who shall say the same of God, which is the very worst thing that can be said of the Devil, that he willeth sin with a perfect will? If to evade this whirlpoole, Mr. W. shall say, he meant the permission onely, nor the sin permitted, then 'tis the least of his misfortunes, that he hath onely made Answers to the Man in the Moon, and then he will be splitted on the less dangerous Rock. But to make good his meaning, he must abjure his whole Book: for to say that Gods decree is energetical onely (not permissive) and to say that he de­creeth the being of sin (which is his and his Teachers Do­ctrine) is in consistent with meer permission; which is not an [Page 28] exertion, but a suspension of the will, from interposing any Impediment which might forcibly hinder the Creatures choice. Nay one thing I must adde for the vindication of Gods holiness, & for the instruction of Mr. W.(whose meer want of instruction I have the charity to hope is his greatest stumbling-block) That though God doth not hinder a man from sinning by any such physical impediment, whereby the man is rendered not able to sin wilfully, yet even then he doth hinder by such moral impediments, whereby the man is rendered able not to sin wilfully.

6. He strives to prove Gods Activity in the production of sin from Gods own word.Now let us see how he clears the second thing he pro­posed in stead of Answer to the Objection. [Scripture-Expressions do constantly hold forth Gods manner of wor­king in sin, by way of action. It doth not say, God suffered Joseph's Brethren to sell him into Egypt, but that God sent him, Gen. 45.8. It doth not say, God suffered Pha­raoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it, Exod. 9.12, &c. p. 22.’] Here he tells us that the Scrip­tures hold forth, what before (p. 19.) and after (p. 23.) he professeth to be ineffable and incomprehensible, viz. the man­ner of Gods working in sin. This is his first degree of mi­sery. Again, he takes those Texts meerly according to the Letter, which Mr. Barlee himselfe confesseth to be figura­tively spoken, givingNeces. Vind. ch. 3. p. 55. this reason for it, [ that God ac­cording to the Letter of many of those Texts, seems to be made a moral cause of sin as sin.] So that now Mr. W. hath plaid such a prank, as his own fellow-laborer must needs con­demn in him. This is his second. Again he saith, that this is constantly held forth in Scripture by way of action, Constant­ly, good Sir? how can that be? Did not God tell Israel, that because he had purged them, and they were not purged, they should Ezek. 24.13. not be purged from their filthiness any more? that is to say, he would leave them to themselves, he would permit or suffer them to be filthy, he would not cleanse them against their wills? Which one Text is sufficient to have taught Mr. W. the true importance of all those at which he stumbles. And from thence it is evident what is meant by the School-men, when they say that God punisheth sin with sin: [Page 29]which must thus be negatively expounded by Gods forsa­king such sinners, withdrawing his grace so long resisted and abus'd, not clensing them any more from their beloved fil­thiness. Let M. W. answer to this Question; Doth the Scri­pture express or hold forth the real command of the holy Ghost, in using that imperative, Rev. 22.11. Let him that will be filthy, be filthy still? Or was our Saviour accessary to the Jewish mur­der, in saying,Joh. 2.19. which com­pare with Mar. 14.58. destroy this temple, meaning the Temple of his body? To have commanded it in the sense (as he did in the letter) had been a kind of [...], laying hands upon himself; yet the Jewes (like Mr. W.) were so intent upon the letter, that they took an occasion from those words to bear false witnesse against our Saviour. [We heard him say, I will destroy this Temple made with hands, &c. Mar. 14.58.] But enough of Mr. W's degrees of misery in his position, come we now to his examples.

1. From the sell­ing of Joseph.His first (Gen. 45.8.) is most remarkably impertinent to that for which it was produced: for in stead of saying God sold Joseph into Egypt (in which sale of Joseph his bre­thren sinned) he confesseth that Joseph did onely say unto his brethren, that God had sent him: nay he spake it with an Antithesis to his Brethrens action, and to a contrary scope to what Mr. W. directs the words. Reader, consi­der, and stand amazed at his matchlesse inconsideratenesse in this particular. Josephs speech runs thus,See the Di­vine Purity Def. c. 7. p. 63, 64, 65. [God hath sent me before you, to preserve you a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance: so now, it was not you that sent me hither, but God, and he hath made me a Father to Pharaoh, and Lord of all his house, &c. v. 7, 8] He speaks of nothing but the good which God had done for him, upon occasion of that evil which they that sold him had done against him. Yet this is urged by Mr. W. for Gods Activity and work in sin.

2. From Pharaohs obduration.His second Instance is not quite so ridiculous. [Exod. 9.12.] but tis ridiculous enough. For though God is said to harden Pharaohs heart by doing somewhat, yet was it not by working in sin, but by removing punishments, and all other means of his recovery, which had so long been afforded [Page 30]him, and all in vain. It was said before, Pharaohs heart was hardned, Ex. 7.22. which implies the permission, not efficiency of God. Nay farther it was said, That Pharaoh hardened his own heart, Ex. 8.15. Again after that, it was said that Pharaoh sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants, Ex. 9.34. (whom God is said to have endured with much long-sufferance, Rom. 9.22.) as 'twere on purpose to deliver us from the very possibility of erring grossely, when we afterwards reade, God hardened his heart. And how did God do it? sure not as Pharaoh, nor as Satan, by any activity or efficiency of obduration, (for Satan hardned Pharaohs heart, as well as Pharaoh himself) but by a to­tal and final withdrawing of his Grace, Indurabo cor Pharaonis, id est, sinam in­durari, non fle­ctam genui­nam impii cor­dis duriciem, Melan. in Praef. ad Comment. in c. 9. ad Rom. leaving him in a state of irremediable wickednesse, by such a kind of dereli­ction by which the damned are left in Hell. Nay even this very dereliction and leaving Pharaoh to himself, (the cer­tain consequence of which was his final obduration) was awarded to him as a punishment for his having hardened his heart so often, when God by his Messengers and their Mi­racles had often called him to repentance. Compare Gods words to Israel, Ps. 95.8.

3. From the Ca­naanites hard­ning.His third Instance is taken from Josh. 11.20. but more irrationally then the former. For it is said there expressely, the Canaanites hardened their hearts; which because they could not have done if God had not suffered them, it is therefore said it was of the Lord: for had he given them a cogent and irresistible Grace, or destroyed their human nature, their hardening their heart could not have been. And for GodIndurare quem si libe­ret, emollire potuistes, est non emol­lire— & paulò supe­tiùs, roli it Deus in perdi­tis salvificam vim explic [...]re. Dallaeus Apol. part. 2. p. 117. In eundem sensum Au­gustin. in Epist. 105. ad Sirtum. Idque fatente Calvino Instil. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. sol. 95. not to hinder, or not to soften their hearts, which the Text saith expressely they had hardened against Israel, was no more then to permit what they committed by their option; and this for ends of his providence, that his people Israel might destroy those wicked Canaanites for their sins, the measure whereof they had filled up. But besides it must be noted (to shew the impertinence was the greater) [Page 31]that for the Canaanites thus to harden their hearts against Israel, that is, to oppose and resist them coming to take away their land, could not be censured as a sin in them, unlesse they had a revelation that God had given their land to his People Israel; which as it appears not in Story (for ought I can learn) so if it doth, then Gods revealing it to them was far from having any hand in the hardening of their hearts: all he did was not softning what he found obdurate; and not to soften, is not to have any hand; the negative to that which is affirmed by Mr. Whitfield.

4. From Absa­lom's defiling his Fathers Concubines.His fourth Instance is taken from 2 Sam. 12.12. in which he seems to be unhappier then in all the rest which went before: for observe how he applies it. [ It is not said, God suffered Absalom to defile his Fathers Concubines, but he tells David, what thou hast done secret, I will do in the sight of this sun, p. 22.’] Now if it is literally meant (as Mr. W. contends) that God did do the same in publick which David had done in private, the blasphemy is such as cannot modestly be named: for what was that which David did in secret, but his adultery with Bathshe­bah? And can it be possibly imagined, that God could do the same thing openly? yet so run the words, [what thou hast done I will do.] vvhich undeniably proves, that the vvords are spoken by an Hebraism (vvhich M. W. very shortly vvill be found in the Act of denying) and are per­missive onely in sense, though active in sound. For God could not do actively in the sight of the Sun, vvhat David had done in secret. (That is such a grosse and impious thought as some Heathens conceived of their carnal Jupi­ter.) And if Mr. W. had but read unto the end of the Sto­ry (vvhich vvas at the most but the completion of Gods Prophesie) 2 Sam. 16.22. He vvould there have found, that it vvas Absalom vvho did vvhat Mr. W. applies to God. A Tent was spread upon the top of the house, and Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of all Israel. This (Reader) is the sin, vvhich Mr. W. urgeth as an instance, [vvherein the manner of Gods work­ing is held forth to us by way of action, p. 22.] But not to [Page 32]speak more of the impiety, behold the unskilfulnesse of the Respondent. I will do this thing (saith God to David v. 12.) And what was this thing? It is expressed (v. 11.) I will raise up evil against thee, that is, the evil of punish­ment. I will take thy wives and give them, that is, permit Absalom to enjoy them. There was not the least need of any more from God, because Absalom of himself was rea­dy enough to do it, his ownJam. 1.14. flesh was sufficient to draw him on. And besides his own flesh, he had Ahithophel at his ear to set him forward (ch. 16. v. 21.) nay both he and Ahithophel had the Devil at their elbows to urge and tempt them.Frustra fit per plures quod fieri po­test per pau­ciores. Was not all this enough to bring the wickednesse to passe, but God himself must be affirmed to have a hand in it, an efficiency in it, to work, to act, to operate in it, and that as a natural (which is a necessitating) cause? yet by all these expressions Mr. Wh. doth teach us his thoughts of God. I commend one thing to his consideration. It is acknowledged by him, and by all his party, that if God withhold or withdraw his Grace from any one of his crea­tures indued with reason, the creature is prone of him­self to do abundantly evil. Let them content themselves with that then, and go no farther, untill they can imagine some reason why.

5. From Shimei's cursing David.His fifth Instance is taken from Gods being said by David to have bid Shimei curse David, 2 Sam. 16.10, 11. of which I have spoken twice already in print, and both times largely. First, to Mr. B. in my Defence of the Divine Philan. ch. 4. §. 35. p. 47, 48, 49. And afterwards afresh to Dr. Reynolds in my Defence of the Divine purity, ch. 7. §. 8. p. 71, 72. To those two places I referr Mr. W. and to that which I shall say ch. 2. Sect. 1. Answ. 5. that I may not do like him, in printing the same book under two Titles, and letting it pass for two books, when 'tis indeed but one repeated.

6, 7, 8. From three Texts already answered in equivalence.So his sixth, seventh, and eighth Instances, from 1 King. 22.22. & Job 1. & Isa. 63.13. are answered out of the Answers which I have given to the five instances now im­mediately preceding, as also out of my Answers to D. Reyn. [Page 33]chap. 7. Sect. 8. particularly pag. 69, 70.

9. From the Aegy­ptians hatred of Israel.His ninth Instance may be referred to the foresaid pla­ces, and so indeed may the rest: but because in the ninth, at least a blind man may stumble, I will therefore add, That Gods turning the hearts of the Aegyptians to hate his people (Psal. 105.25.) was his doing that which provoked them to jealousie and fear: that was first, and from that theyOderint quem metu­unt. naturally turn'd to hatred. But what was that which God did, which did provoke them to that jealousie, fear, and hatred? even what was very good (v. 24.) for he in­creased his people exceedingly, and made them stronger then their enemies. He blessed and multiplied his people Israel, for which the envious Aegyptians did fear, and hate, and conspire against them, Exod. 1.9, 10.

10. From God's being said to deceive the Prophet.His tenth Instance from (Ezek. 14.9.) doth ruine the drift for which he brings it: for as he who loves, teaches, reades, or hears, (in the literal sense without a figure) must needs be a lover, teacher, reader or hearer; so he who doth deceive without a figure, must without a figure be a deceiver. But because it is blasphemy to say, that God is really a deceiver, it must needs be figuratively spoken, and understood by the Hebraism so often mentioned by the most learned and unquestionable Writers, when it is said in that Text [I the Lord have deceived him:] what will be thought of Mr. W. who disclaimes the Hebraism in that and in all the like cases? A word to the wise is here suffi­cient; but let him know, that in the judgment of all the Fathers, and by the granted meaning of other Scriptures, it is apparent that the meaning must needs be one of these two. Either deceiving is nothing else but Gods permitting the false Prophet, for his wickedness, to be deceived by the De­ceiver, that is, the Devil; or delivering him up to his own corrupt heart, which is willing of it self to be deceived, and accordingly it followes in the very next words, [I will stretch out my hand upon him, and will destroy him.] Or else that of Grotius may fitly take place. It should be rendred (saith he) not, I have deceived, but, I will deceive him, (viz.) by giving him such an end as he expects not.

11. From giving up to vile af­fections.His eleventh Instance Rom. 1.26. is of the same impor­tance with the former Instances above. By giving up is meant forsaking, Tradere in desideria si­gnificat deser­tionem. Malanchth. in cap. 9. ad Rom. pag. 132, 133. no longer calling them from vile affe­ctions. See The Sinner impleaded part 1. ch. 1. p. 9. where Austins Exposition in the Margin is the same with mine.

12. From giving eyes not to see.His twelfth Instance from Rom. 11.8, 9. doth onely serve him to let us know that he reads the English Trans­lation onely, and mistakes the meaning of the Translators: for there is no such thing in S. Pauls own words as [...], though our English Bibles read, [he gave them eyes that they should not see.] It is in the Greek [...], eyes of not seeing, or not to see, or eyes which see not. The sense is evidently this, that the major part of the people who made not use of that grace which God had offered, and resisted Christ when he was preached in their streets, did grow so obstinately blind (God withdrawing the means so long resisted, and so much abused,) as to fulfil the prediction of the Prophet Esay, ch. 29. v. 10. or at least to parallel the case of which the Prophet there speaks. And this doth farther appear from S. Pauls Psal. 69.23. citation of the Psalmist v. 10. Let their eyes be darkened that they may not see: words spoken by David, not as a Curse, but a Prophesie, that the things intended for their Vers. 22. welfare would become their trap. Their very Table (whose proper end was to refresh and feed them) would by their wicked­nesse be made theirIbid. snare: And even the preaching of the Gospel (resisted by them) would accidentally advance their induration. If Mr. W. read the note ofNon accidit haec induratio, nisi interveni­ente Dei De­creto. Beza in Rom. 11.8. Beza, and also took it by the worst handle, he alone must answer for it.

13. From sending delusion.His thirteenth Instance from 2 Thess. 2.10, 11. makes me think that his Concordance is his chief Commentator: for had he compared that Text with the whole Context (which your Concordance-Preachers seldom do) he had found the sense to have been this, That because they re­ceived [Page 35]not the love of the truth Mark the Chasm or El­lipsis which must of neces­sity be thus filled up [Which truth was offer'd to the end that they might be saved.] that they might be saved, (p. 10.) [...], for this cause (or to punish this wickedness) God will suffer the man of sin (v. 3.) whose coming is after the working of Satan with all power and signes and lying wonders (v. 9.) to come upon them with such advantages of strength and subtilty, as would gain credit vvith them, being not wonderfully restrained. God is said to send, what he (can, but) doth not hinder from being sent. We are taught to pray, Lead us not into temptation, when yet our meaning is, suffer us not to be led, or leave us not help­less in our temptations, permit us not to be tempted above our strength, let thy Grace be sufficient for us: and thence it followes, but deliver us from evil. Thus our Saviour may be said to have sent the Devils into the herd of swine, because when they besought him, he gave way to their prayer; when they said, Suffer us to go, he answered, Go. Of which the meaning must needs be this, I suffer you to go; for he granted what they ask't, and they ask't for suf­ferance.

14. From the Na­tions making league with the Romans.His fourteenth and last Instance from Rev. 17.17. doth onely proclaim him to be unqualified for such mysterious parts of Scripture. And I am heartily glad upon this oc­casion, that Doctor Hammonds Annotations are writ in English, that the lowest Reader may discern, how quite beside his ovvn purpose Mr. W. hath seized on that Text also, vvhich is onely a prophesie of S. John, foretelling an eminent and remarkable Act of Gods providence, in that all the nations should first confederate with the Romans, and yet aftervvards breaking off should execute vengeance upon those Romans, and that Alaricus the King of the Goths and Vandals should so suddenly retire after his conquest and captivity of Rome, as if he had purposely been sent by the special Providence of God, to destroy the Idolaters, and preserve the Christians.

Sect. 6.

From all which it is evident,How Mr. W. most ground­lesly inferreth God to fit still, p. 23. and to be an idle Beholder, p. 26. that none of those active expressions alledged by Mr. W. (in his 22. page) can [Page 36]be pretended to denote Gods working in sin; more then his punishing of it doth (vvhich yet is active) vvhen he casts the sinner into hell. The consequent to vvhich is the sinners continuance to all eternity in his sins. Nor doth it fol­lovv (vvhat he saith p. 23.) that if God hath no manner of working in sin, See more of this subject Sect. 17, 18, 19. he sits still as a spectator. For he is work­ing in divers respects; as by the motions of his Spirit dis­swading from sin, and also by his word, both writ and preached. Again he is working in over-ruling, ordering, and disposing sins committed to many excellent advanta­ges, to which he is able by his wisdom to make them serve. But all this is nothing to his active working in sin, or his having a hand in it, (as Mr. W. phraseth it) but on the contrary, it shews that he hath no hand in it: for over­ruling sins to good, suppo [...]eth them committed, and when it is said (as it is commonly) that God draweth good out of e­vil, the meaning is, (not that he maketh it to be good in one respect, which is evil in another, as such men dream, but) that upon man's doing evil he takes an occasion of doing good: such was the saving of the world upon oc­casion of that murder which▪ the wicked ones committed in killing-Christ. And as good things are made an occasion of evil, yet are not evil, (as I lately shewed) so are evil things made an occasion of good, yet are not good: which some men not descerning, are betrayed into the worst and uncleannest speeches; as, that adultery, or murder, as it is the work of God, its Author, mover, and impeller, is no sin at all, but onely as it is of man: which though the saying of Zuinglius, a great Master of those men, yet 'tis abetted and approved by Doctor Twisse in particular; and in particular by Mr. Barlee, and aequivalently by Mr. Whitfield also. If any others of their way shall re­nounce the Doctrine, let them do it in print, and then the World will forgive them. Having shewed that God is no idle spectator, (as the brethren do both speak) because he restrains from sin, and (when he suffers it) doth over­rule it (as hath been shewed) and doth also note it in his book (as the Prophets speak) and doth satisfie his justice in [Page 37]the punishment of sin, as well as exercise his mercy in for­giving it to the contrite and penitent sinner, and giveth the continuance of a Being unto his creature, by whose free-will the sin is made; I will adde this little, that it were much a lesser evil in Mr. W. and his partners, to say that God sitteth still as a spectator onely; then to as­perse him with a working and activity in sin: for as to the commission of the sin it self, God is truly a meer spectator. The Sinners sole will determines it self unto the Sin.

CHAP. II. Of Mr. W's Attempts to help Mr. B. by replying a few things to the Divine Philanthropie de­fended, which now at last he doth particularly consider, and not till now.

Sect. 1.

TO such Texts of Scripture as are literally taken by that sort of men,Mr. W. begins with the end of that book, to which his Title-page pretended a Reply. who do not onely take the boldness to bear false wit­ness against God, by charging his Majesty with having a high hand in sin, but most lewdly also do indeavour to make him bear false witness against himself, I did amongst many other things (which Mr. Whitfield studiously omitteth, that he may speak to that onely which he thinks is least above his strength,) afford my Correpto­ry Corrector this short note of Instruction,

Divine Philanth. de­fended, c. 4. p. 48. That by a common Hebraism, such verbs as are active in sound, are onely permissive in signification: by the admission of which Rule, those horrible absurdi­ties would be avoided, and Scripture expounded [...].

To which part of my Answer,M. W's wonder­ful reply in behalf of M. B. Mr. Wh. adventures this sad Reply. ‘This he dictates, but doth not demon­strate, nor bring the least patch of an Argument to prove it, neither will all his skill in the Hebrew enable him to do it. And may he not by this shift evade the cleerest and strongest Scriptures that are brought against him, by telling us that they signifie quite another thing then the nature of the words doth import, if we will be­lieve him? 2. Why may he not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, where the like expressions are used; as when the Lord saith, I form the light, and create darkness, I make peace, and create evil, Isa. 45.7. I have made the earth, and created man upon it, my hands spread out the heavens, Psal. 12? Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraismes, interpret these verbs that are active in sound to be permissive onely in signification, and say that God hath permitted light and darkness to be created, and suffered the earth to be made, and the hea­vens to be spread out? p. 23.’]

How many wayes Mr. Wh. hath uncovered himself in these words before the face of all people, I could never have shewed, if himself had not made it thus needful for me; which I beseech his best friends to carry alwayes in their mindes, that they may not accuse me of severity in any one of the particulars which now ensue.

His great un­skilfulness in the things of a Divine.First he uncovers his no-acquaintance, not only with the He­brew, but with the plainQuod autem in Scripturis legitur, Indurabo cor; item Tradidit eos in capiditates, & similia; haec figura ser­monis facilè potest explicari, si quis observet naturam Hebraici sermonis: certum est enim has figuras habere significationem permittendi. Melanchth. in Comment. in c. 9. ad Rom. fol. 132. edit. Argentorati A. D. 1536. spanhemius & Dallaeus huc accedunt. Latine Writers by whom the Idio­tismes of Hebrew have been observed. How else could he complain that I did not demonstrate the Sun at Noon? I [Page 39]expected that Lay-men should believe me as a Divine, in setting down that as a granted Rule; and that Divines should receive it upon their knowledge that it was true. But 'twas my fault not to remember that of the Clergy, as well as Laity, there are several sorts; and that many of the former are very ignorant, whereas many of the later have perfect knowledge. Be it so, that Mr. P. hath but a little skill in Hebrew, (who yet hath more then Mr. Wh. if he hath none) yet if any man living, sure Hugo Grotius had a great deal. And Grotius hisDecepisti, i. e. sivisti decipi. Saepe enim a­pud Hebraeos, verba sono a­ctiva, signifi­catu passiva sunt. Grot. in Jer. c. 4. v. 10. Annotations are guided much by that Rule. Nec figurae illae verborum in sermone Hebraico pug­nant cum sen­tentia quam dixi, Indura­bo cor Phara­onis, & sim [...]les: certum est e­nim, Hebrai­câ phrasi signi­ficare eas per­missionem, non voluntatem efficacem: Mel. in loc. de causâ pecc. p. 49. Melanchthon (I am sure) was a great that Rule. It shall suffice me to say that in my Answer to Doctor Reynolds (ch. 7. p. 67, 68, &c.) I have proved the use of this Rule in the interpretation of such Texts, by the verdict of all the Fathers, by that of S. Austin in par­ticular, by the exact Bishop Andrews, nay by the publick acknowledgments of the most skilful Hebreicians of Mr. Wh's own party, even Philippes de Morney, and Pe­ter the Calvinist of Florence. I farther proved it by Scri­ptures agreed upon by all the World to be onely capable of that construction. All which if Mr. W. did never see, nor what I said toDiv. Philan. c. 1. p. 23.24. ch. 4. à p. 37. ad finem usque. Mr. Barlee, I am not guilty of his omissi­ons. And if he really did see, but made as if he did not, it is a commission he must repent of. Here lies the won­derful [...] of this shrewd undertaker. Once I men­tioned and onely mentioned the abovesaid Hebraism, but in divers places I fully proved it; Mr. Wh. finding the naked mention, cries out I dictate, but do not prove; butNote that my proof was in the first chap­ter (p. 23, 24.) my naked mention in the fourth, (p. 48.) so as he passed by the first, before he fell upon the second. finding also my ample proof, of that he wisely makes no mention. From whence we may rationally infer, that all the fault was in his Will, and not (this bout) in his Understanding.

Secondly, He uncovers his moneths mind to the literal [Page 40]sense of those Texts,His frightful adherence unto the letter: which say (according to the letter) that God did2 Sam. 16.10. bid Shimei curse David, which was to do wickedly, andEzek. 20.26. polluted the people in their own gifts, and2 Sam. 13.11, 12. raised up evil, andEzek. 14.9. deceived, andJer. 35.1, 2, 3, 4. tempted, and Isa 63.6. made men drunk; which (according to the letter) do seem to charge God with the efficiency of sin. And yet (saith Mr. Wh.) such verbs as those must be actively, not permissively, understood; ‘for this (he tells us) is a shift, by which a man may evade the cleerest Scriptures, by tel­ling us that they signifie quite another thing then the na­ture of the words doth import. So unwilling is the old Eph. 4.22. man (as the Apostle speaks) that God should be cleer­ed from all impurity, and the word of God rescued from blasphemous contradictions, that he will rather reproch the antient Fathers of the Church, as well as the modern up­holders of it, with ridiculous shifts and evasions, then sub­mit to the judgment of common sense. For saith not the Scripture in other places, that God is ofHabak. 1.13. purer eyes then to behold evil, and cannot look on iniquity; and will havePs. 94.20. nothing to do with the stool of wickedness; and who is not a God that hath Psal. 5.4. pleasure in wickedness; and that all his wo [...]ks areGen. 1.31. very good; and that sin by one Rom. 5.12. man entred into the world; and that all the wickedness in the world, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life,1 Joh. 2.16 is not of the Father, but of the world; and thatJam. 1.13.14. God tempteth no man: that heIsa. 1.14. cannot in­dure sin, and hates it, and isibid. & M [...]l. 2.17. weary to bear it; and all things which may express, not onely his perfect unwil­lingness to be dishonored by sin, but his utmostZechar. 8.17. hatred and detestation? Now when two sorts of Scripture do con­tradict each other [...], in respect of the surface and letter of them, there must be a way to reconcile them, or they will not be thought to be every where true, nor by consequence the1 Tim. 3.15. word of God. They cannot be other­wise reconciled, then by taking one of the two in aNote, M. W. himself conf [...]s­seth, [...]. 48. that some Texts would contra­dict each other if literally ta­ken. figura­tive sense, and so the reconcilement is very easie. Now whether the figurative speaking is in the first sort of Texts, which do seemingly and literally asperse the goodness of [Page 41]our God, or in the second fort of Texts, which do really and plainly clear the goodness of God from all aspersions, let the Reader judge betwixt me and Mr. Whitfield. Nay Mr. Barlee himself, although he sometimes judgeth on Mr. W's side (as in hisSee Divine Philanthr. ch. 1. p. 24, 25. Correptory Correction, p. 69.) yet at last he is forced to judge against it: for he saith in plain terms (as I lately observed) in this his last print, [that God according to the letter of many Texts seems to be made a mo­ral cause of sin as sin, ch. 3. p. 55.] so that Mr. W. and Mr. B. are as much at odds in their very conspiracy and conjunction against a third person, as Mr. B. is at odds with his dearest self.

His overthrow­ing his own in­terest in other cases.Thirdly, If M. W. admits of Hebraisms in any parts of Scripture, much more must he do it in those we now speak of; where if they are not admitted, the inconvenience will be greater then any where else. But no doubt in some parts he will not dare not to admit them, for fear of being censured a direct enemy to Christ, and to take part with the Socinians, nay (which is worse) with such as Julian, and the profane Helvidius. For how many prophesies of Christ are read by us in the Preterperfect Tense, the He­brew Idiotism being retained in the English by our Trans­lators? Isa. 9.6. there are two Hebraisms at once, which no creature can deny who doth acknowledge that Text to have a prospect upon Christ: [unto us a child is born] for [unto us a child shall be born.] And when the Jewes ob­ject (as they do often) that Christs name was Jesus, not wonderful, counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Fa­ther, the Prince of peace; which yet (according to the letter) is affirm'd to be the name by which he should be called who is there spoken of (Isa. 9.6.) what can Mr. W. alledge for himself, unlesse he mind them of the most vul­gar Hebraism, by which the Name is put to signifie the Being? A man is said by the Hebrews to be called thus and thus, to whom such titles and epithets do well agree. SoCited from Isa. 7.14. Mat. 1.23. [They shall call his name Emmanuel] would be literally truer of theIsa. 8.3. com­pared with vers. 8. child of the Prophetess given to Ahaz for a sign, then of Jesus Christ the son of Mary, [Page 42]which yet according to the Hebraism is truer of Christ then of that child. Again, if our Greek copies of S. Mark did read [...], Mar. 3.29. (as well they may, because the ancie [...]t Manuscrip [...]s were found to do so, and out of them the vulgar Latine) what other reason could be rendred for our translating the words thus [in danger of eternal damnation] rather then [in danger of eternal sin] but that sin, by an Hebraism, is set to signifie the punishment of sin? Nay, it is much more probable (in the judgment of Grotius) that S. Mark himself writ [...] [of sin] and that [...] [of judgment or condemnation] was nothing else but Interpretamentum Hebraismi, the Exposition of that Hebraism which was used by S. Mark, who is known by all to have been an Hellenistick Writer; I say, by all, excepting such as Mr. W. who complains of hard words in a most plain English Writer. Again, if Helvidius his three objections (from Mat. 1. vers. 18. & vers. 25.) against the Virgin Maries being [...], (as the Greek Fathers are wont to call her,) a perpetual Virgin, should be urged by some Helvidian again [...]t Mr. W. he would be thankful to that man who should help him to answer unto the third, that there were three [...] among the Hebrews, the Principality, the Priesthood, and the right of Inheritance, which were all the privileges of the first-born, and in respect of which our blessed Saviour was so called. How much gladder should he be, to understand such Texts by the common Hebraism, whose literal acce­ption is of so dangerous importance as hath been shewed, if he did not [ [...]] live in vassalage to an opi­nion, which cannot otherwise be defended, then by making God to have a hand in sin?

He is convin [...]ed by that which he cannot but con­fess.Fourthly, M. W. cannot but confesse, that the verb sino is an active, that is to say, of the active voice, and yet its signification is onely passive, for it onely signifies to suffer. And when the Devils besought our Saviour, [Mat. 8.31. suffer us to enter] they did not command him, but begg'd his leave, although they spake in the Imperative or com­manding mood. Our Saviour said to the Haemorrhois [Page 43](Mat. 9.22.) Thy faith hath made thee whole: which was not literally, but figuratively true. S. Peters words to Aeneas were not figuratively, but literally true, [Act. 9.34. Jesus Christ maketh thee whole:] and if Christ healed the later, much more evidently the former. Thus when we are said to be justified byGal. 3.24. Faith (in S. Pauls phrase) and byJam. 21. & 24. works (in S. James) neither is literally true, without the help of a distinction or explication; for in exact propriety of speech, we are justified byRom. 8.33. God, and by God alone. And Mr. W. might have known, that there is nothing more common in the opening of Texts, then to distinguish the literall from the rational importance.

The mischiefes which ensue upon his way of exposition.Fifthly, Whereas Mr. W. alledgeth, [that the c [...]earest Scriptures may be evaded by this shift, &c.] I will shew him by some instances what kind of mischiefs have ensued by his way of apprehending those Texts of Scripture, whose Hebraism he slanders with the name of shift. One of his own examples is (p. 22.) David's saying of wicked Shimei, that the Lord had 2 Sam. 16.10, 11. bid him to curse his Soveraign, quite contrary to that which the Lord had commanded, [Exod. 22.28. compared with Jer. 19.5. Thou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the Ruler of thy people.] nay Shimei being penitent2 Sam. 19.20. Quomodo di­xit Dominus Semei male­dicere David▪ non jubendo, &c. Austin. degra & lib. arbit. c [...]0. confessed his sin a little after. In this case, say I, either David was mistaken, (as well he might be who could commit such scarlet sins) and thought that Shimei might really be sent by God in that message (as Nathan before ch. 12.) to pronounce that curse which David confessedly had deserved; and in particular cases, it is manifest that God can dispense with his precepts to the sons of men, who yet must never pretend to any such dispensation, unlesse they can prove it to us by miracles, and shew that the counter-precept was revealed to them from Heaven, which till then must be concluded to have been sent up from Hell: else any man may say, that God hath commanded him to kill, as well as to curse the Ru­le of his people, or whatever else is forbidden. But Shi­mei had nothing to shew for it, nay he had afterwards something to shew against it. And therefore if David was not mistaken, he must needs have spoken by an He­braism; [Page 44]it being impossible that David should be an ab­solute Reprobatarian, and so imagine that God could bid a man sin. God could have sent a curse to David for his sins, by what Messenger he had pleased, as well by Shi­mei as by Nathan; but then that curse had been Gods, and not his Messengers. Shimei could not have sinned in the delivering of his message, whilest he did as God bid him: yet 'tis apparent by the Text, that Shimei sinned a­gainst Gods Precept, Exod. 22.28. From whence it fol­lowes unvoidably, that the words of David are onely permissive in signification, though active in sound. Nay this (saith irrefragable Melanchthou) is the true Haec est ve [...]a Grammatica inter­pretatio, & nihil habet absurdi: Tradere in desideria significat desertionem: Deus deserit impins, & sinit [...]eo [...] furere, & non cohibet eorum furorem. Indurabo, id est, sinam indurari, non flectam im­pii cordis duritiem. Melanchth. in cap. 9. ad Rom. sol. 133. Grammaticall interpreta­tion of such Scriptures, and hath nothing in it of absurd; because the most active expressions imaginable do by an ordinary figure onely signifie desertion, and sufferance, a not re­straining of mens fury, and a not turn­ing of their hearts. But alas! Me­lanchthon was a poor shifter to Mr. Whitfield. He was onely admired for his learning and holiness, by the most learned and the most holy of the Christian world; he was courted and consulted by no greater persons then Kings and Princes: whereas Mr. W. is obliging the greatest Em­perour of the East, and in a zealous contention for the Mahumetan Decree, confutes Melanchthon and his He­braisme, and all the Pillars of the Church, (both ancient and modern) with the least puff of his breath. [By this shift the clearest Scriptures may be evaded.] Mr. W. and the Scotish brethren, and James Naylors worshippers, and Andrew Smith, with Coppinger, Artington, and the rest, are for a literal understanding of Gods bidding Shimei to curse King David. God did not onely permit, but was active and operative and efficacious in the villany, say these Expounders: nay, decreed it absolutely (say they) from all etermity, antecedently to his praescience of Shimei's will. And in conformity to these dreams, Coppinger said [Page 45]he was commanded by the Spirit of God to murder the Pri­vy Counsellors of Queen Elizabeth: a second had a call to slay the Ministers: and a third, who could not write or read, was to be the executioner of the Lords most holy will. (Dang. Posit. l. 4. c. 10. p. 164.) The same command was alledged by them who adored James Naylor: and when Andrew Smith, at prayer time, had stabb'd the Quar­ter-Master Farley in Farfar Church, he very seriously protested, that Christ commanded him to do it. Mr. Eger­ton was a Minister of no small note in the Presbyterie, to whom when Coppinger had revealed his extraordinary call to execute vengeance upon the Magistrates, Mr. E­gerton would not discourage him in his intentions: To use his own words,Dang. Posit. l. 4. ch. 14. p. 174. [he would not hinder the zeal of Cop­pinger, and should be loth to quench the Spirit of God in him.] Again, the Ministers of the Kirk, when they had caused the people to take up armes against theExod. 22.28. Ruler of the People, said they wereSpots. Hist. Scot. l. 2. p. 330, 331. moved thereunto by the Spirit of God, (without the shift of an Hebraism, you may be sure.) I know not whether Eldavid was brought up in the Doctrine of irrespective Decrees; but of this I am sure, that when he gave himself out to be the fore-runner of the Messias, he said he did it (without an Hebraism) by the See The self-Revenger Exempl. ch. 1. p. 3, 4. commandment of God. The time would faile me, if I should speak of all the Impostors whom I have met with, from Numa Pompilius to Mahomed, and so downwards, who did all pretend (without an Hebraism) to a secret re­velation of Gods command. I will conclude with one in­stance, which (in several pertinent respects) will be as good as a thousand; and which having touched upon elsewhere for another purpose, I shall exhibit more fully, and with a new application. This Story is to be had either in Knox his Hist. of the Church of Scotl. p. 143, 144, 145 or in Bish. B a­crests: Dang. Pos. l. 4. ch. 15. p. 177, 178. Norman Lesly (who was son to the Earl of Rothsey) had fallen out with the Cardinal who was withal the Archbishop of S. Andrews, upon a pri­vate cause (faith Buchanan) between them two. He, together with James Melvin, and Peter Carmichael (zealous Reformers of Religion in the Kingdom of Scotland) forcibly brake into the Castle, and into the [Page 46] chamber of the said Cardinal; where they found him sitting in his chair, and crying out in these words, [I am a Priest, ye will not slay me?] Lesly strook him once or twice, and so did Peter. But Melvin (sweet man!) perceiving them both to be in choler, (and being himself in cold blood) withdrew them from their teme­rity, which he reproved in these words: [This work and judgment of God, although it be secret, ought to be done with great gravity.] and then presenting to the Archbishop the point of his sword, he preached thus; [Repent thee of thy former wickedness, &c.Note that the Historian is Mr. Knox, who calls this Murder, the work of God; and writes in his margin, The Godly Fact and words of James Mel­vin. we from God are sent to revenge it: for here before God I protest, that neither the hatred of thy person, nor love of thy riches, moveth me to strike thee, but onely thy being an enemy a­gainst Jesus Christ and his holy Gospel.] Having so prea­ched, he fell to practice; first running him through se­veral times with a Stog-sword (to shew it was not any hatred of hi [...] person) and then seizing on all his Goods, Plate, and Jewels, (to shew it was not any love to his Riches.)’

Let it now be but remembred, how the men of Mr. Knox and Mr. Melvin's way do distinguish of Gods se­cret and revealed Will, what they acknowledge themselves to mean by that distinction, and in what manner they do apply it, and how without any Hebraism they understand such Texts of which I am speaking; let this, I say, be re­membred by the considering Reader, and then he hath met with the Application.

Sixthly,6. Mr. W's. Ma­sters commit contradictions by not observing the Hebraism. For want of using the said Hebraism in giving the sense of such Texts whose letter seems to make God to be the Author of sin (as Mr. Barlee saith, c. 3. p. 55.) it is wonderful to behold, into how many absurdities, and civil wars, the Commanders in Chief of that party have unawares betrai'd themselves.Piscator in Resp. ad du­plic. Vorst. par. i. p. 325. & in praefat. enunti­ato 6. Piscator flatly denies, that God doth will whatsoever he commands; and yet he flatly confesseth, we ought to grant and believe, that God will have to be done by us whatsoever he commands, and to be omitted by us what he forbids. Again, Doctor Twisse, [Page 47]although he saith inTwiss. Vin. Gr. l. 1. part. 1. Digr. 10. c. 1. sect. 12. p. 140. some places, that Gods secret will may be contrary to his precept or revealed will, which is improperly called his will; yet he saith in other places, that God must need; will whatsoever he commands: for thus he argues, [Idem l. 2. ad­vers. Arm. C [...]im. 3. sect. 5. p. 150. Col. 2. God cannot be denied to have willed that Shimei should cu [...]se David, because the Scripture pro­fesseth that God commanded Shimei to curse him.] But now Spanhemius, of the same party (and as eminent as either) doth wholly deny what is granted (and also denied) by those two; saying positively, thatSpanhemius in Exercitat. de Grat. univers. p. 147. God doth sometimes com­mand what yet he wills not that it shou'd be done: adding this for an instance, that they who neve [...] shall repent, are yet commanded by God to do what God intends they never shall do. Lastly, Dallaeus, at least as learned as either of them, and a professed Anti-Arminian, confutes all Three in a most excellent manner; andNon possum non admirati duos illos summos viros propositio­nem hanc, Deus ea vult quae jubet, quâ eae quae ipsis probantur ar­gumentatio­nes totae ni­tuntur, alibi fortiter nega­re. Dal. Apol. pro duab. synod. part. 2.104. admires at the two former, that men of their learning should abjure in some places, what at other times and places they make the Ba­sis of their reasonings, viz. That God doth will what he commands. What should be the reason of such enormi­ties? They could not think it a fine thing for Brethren to be at odds, nor did they purposely study for self-contradi­ctions. Why then did they run such deadly Risques? It was sure because they could not help it. When they had swallowed the great Camel, they could not strain at such Gnats. When a man begins in irrespective unconditio­nal Decrees, he cannot possibly foresee at what absurdity he shall end. Dato hoc uno sequuntur mille. AndDallaeus his ingenuity in leaving his brethren when they leave rea­son. there­fore Dallaeus was so ingenuous as to acknowledge, what a man of his judgement could not but know, that all those Actives above mentioned must be explained byDeus voluit indurare, id est, non- [...]mollire Pharaonem. Ibid. p. 118. In eundem senfum Polanus Partit. Theolog. l. 1. p 75, 76. permis­sion. He farther addes this observation, That the Hebrew [...] which is the word expressing the Induration of Pharaoh's heart, (Deut. 29.4.) is of that conjugation which is commonly called Hiphil; and verbs of that conjugation, by theSunt interdum [...], sive [...] potiùs quàm [...], verba hujus generis. Sp [...]n. Exerc. p. 214. confession of Spanhemius (a prime Author with [Page 48]Mr. W.) are many times rather privative then positive. So that when it is said, God hardned the heart of Pharaoh, the meaning is, he did not soften it, but permitted it to it selfe. I hope Mr. W. will not say, that the Orthodox Preacher at Charenton is a shifter, much less his admired Professor at Leyden, whom the Preacher at Charenton hath well confuted.

☞ Seventhly,Mr. W. makes Light to be sin, or Absalom's filthiness to be none, by ma­king a parity of Gods work­ing in either case. Mr. W's greatest unhappiness i [...] in the second part of his Answer before recited. Mark his words, good Reader: [ Why may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, where the like expressions are used? as when the Lord saith, I form the light, I create darkness, Isa. 45.7. I have made the earth, and created man upon it, my hands spread out the heavens, Psal. 12. Why may we not by Mr. P. his Hebraisms, interpret these verbs which are active in sound, to be permissive onely in sig­nification, and say that God permitted light and darkness to be created, and suffered the earth to be made, &c? p. 23]’ I have thus recorded his words in the seventh part of my Answer, though I had set them down in the beginning of the Section, because they are the most memorable I ever met with, and are alone sufficient to make a penitent Au­thor of Mr. W. For, first, I demand of his dearest Friends and Partizans (who will certainly condemn him for this adventure, in whatever else they may excuse him) Is the case the same in those other Texts and these? Is Light a sin? Or is it no sin to be hard-hearted, to defile the Concu­bines of a Father, to curse the Ruler of the people, and the like? The Texts expounded by an Hebraism, were such as I spake to in the fifth Section of the former Chapter, which to take according to the Letter, is adjudged by Mr. Ba­lee to be an impious Fact, if it is an impious Fact to asperse God with the causality of sin as sin. But when it is said, God formed the light, and created darkness, it cannot be pretended that the literal acception of the words doth so much as seem to make God the Author of sin. I therefore challenge Mr. Whitfield to publish his reasons for his pre­tended parity of Reason, by which he hath publickly affir­med, [Page 49] we may interpret Gods creating of light and dark­ness, of his permission to create them, as well as his harden­ing Pharaoh's heart, and his deceiving the false Prophets, of his permission and not hindering, that the former should be hardened, and the later deceived.] If he hath no reason to give (and sure if he had we should here have heard of it) I then require him, in the name of God, to take off the scandal which he hath given to many credulous soules for whom Christ died. Let him either declare it to be his Do­ctrine, that God had as really an hand in Shimei's cursing his King, in Absalom's polluting his Fathers Concubines, in the Egyptians hatred of his Israel, in sending strong delusion, in putting it into the hearts of the ten Kings to do wickedly, (as he interprets the Text Rev. 17.17) and as really an hand in Pharaoh's obduration, as in creating the light and the darkness, in making the earth, and in spreading out the heavens; or if he dares not declare this, then let him print his confession (to adequate the Plaister unto the wound) that he onely spake out of his stomach, and not out of his reason, because he was resolved to contradict my Answer to Mr. Barlee, and knew not how to do it better. He could not be otherwise revenged on me, then by ven­ting himself against the Scripture: wherein he conjectu­red very truly, if he took that course to make me smart; because there is nothing so grievous to me, as to find a professor of Christianity to turn Gods word against the ho­liness of his will. But whilest I pray for his amendment, I will necessitate his confession, or confusion of Face, and that by this following violentum, by which in the person of a Jew, or rather of an Atheist, I will turn his weapon upon himself. Secondly, therefore let us imagine, that Mr. Whitfield is to defend the two Natures of Christ, Divine and Humane, against the personated Atheist, who shall thus object against them both.

Ath. That which is really a Tree cannot be really a Man, Mr. W. beaten with his own weapons by any Atheist who shall oppose him. much less really a God: But Christ is really a Tree. And thus I prove it. That which is a true Vine (not a fictiti­ous one) is very really a Tree▪ But the Scripture saith plain­ly, [Page 50]that Christ is a Vine (Joh. 5.5.) nay a True Vine (v. 1.) Therefore Christ is really a Tree.

Mr. VVh. Those words of Scripture are onely spoken by a figure, and parabolically, which amongst the Hebrews was an usual way of expression. Christ did onely represent his relation to his members by that which is seen betwixt the Vine and its Branches.

Ath. This indeed you dictate, The Atheist replyes in Mr. W's. own words, p. 23. but not demonstrate; nor do you bring the least patch of an Argument to prove it. And may you not by this shift evade the clearest and stron­gest Scriptures when brought against you, by telling us they signifie quite another thing then the nature of the words do import, if we will believe you?

Mr. W. I tell you Christ was a Jew, amongst whom it was common to deliver themselves in Parables, as you may see throughout the Old Testament as well as New. And indeed all Nations have used Apologues and Tropes, not onely to signifie, but to imprint their mindes upon the hearers.

Ath. VVhy may we not then interpret other Scriptures in the like manner, The Athest re­plies in Mr. W's own words, p. 23. where the like expressions are used? as when the Lord saith, I and my Father are one, Joh. 10.30.’ Or when the Scripture saith that Christ said, I am the true Vine, why may we not say that the Scripture speaketh by a Parable, and brings in Christ speaking by a Prosopo­poeia, as divers Authors of Mythology do make Dialogues and Discourses betwixt Trees and Rivers? For how can a True Vine speak indeed, and say, I am a True Vine?

Mr. W. But 'tis granted by all story, as well secular as sacred, and by men of all Religions, as well false as true, that Christ did truly speak and teach in the Synagogues of the Jewes, and in many other both publick and private places.

Ath. That doth onely infer, that Christ was a speaking and didactical Tree, not that he was not a Tree at all; for if he really spake, this was one of his real speeches, That he said he was a True Vine. Had he said onely a Vine, you [Page 51]might have said he onely meant he was a Figurative Vine: But to anticipate that evasion, he said, I am the True Vine. And as when it is said, [God hardened Pharaohs heart, The Atheist re­plies in Mr. W's own words, p. 22. de­ceived the false Prophet, and the like, the Scripture doth hold forth the manner of Gods working in sin by way of Action;] so when it is said, that Christ said, I am the true Vine, the Scripture doth hold it forth by a verb substan­tive, which denoteth existence, and not Phraseology. AsAgain Mr. W's. own words, p. 22. it is not said, God suffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it, Exod. 9.12. so it is not said, I am a metaphorical Vine, or I am called, or ac­counted, or compared to a Vine, but I am the true Vine, Joh. 15.1.

Mr. VVh. But how can those words be literally meant, which infer such an absurd and unintelligible thing, as that a Tree should be rational, and yet a Tree still? This im­plyes a contradiction, for Christ to go about doing good, by preaching, healing, and exemplary life, and yet to be a True Vine in the literal notion of the word.

Ath. But that which the Scripture plainly, clearly, The Atheist re­plies in Mr. W's own words, p. 19. and positively asserteth, you ought not to deny, though you can­not discern the manner how it can be; It rather beseems you humbly to acknowledg your ignorance in apprehending the manner, then to deny the thing.

Let the Reader now judge, whether the Atheist in this Dialogue hath not replyed to Mr. W. as much like a Dispu­tant, as Mr. W. hath done to me. Nay, whether there is not this difference betwixt the two cases, that it is much a lesser evil, to say that Christ is a Vine without a Figure, then to say that God without a Figure did harden Pha­raoh's heart, and will that Absalom should do filthily a­gainst his Father, andMaledicere Davidi actus est malus, à pi­etate, & cha­ritate, adeoque & à Dei vo­luntate alie­nus. Dallaeus Apol. part. 2. p. 103. bid Shimei curse David, and de­ceive the Prophet, and the like. Again, it was said by our Saviour, I am the true Vine; but it was never said in Scri­pture, that God was a true hardener of Pharaoh's heart, or that he did truly deceive the Prophet.

Eighthly, Since Mr. W. asks,8. Mr. W. con­demn'd out of his own mouth. [why may we not interpret [...]ther Scriptures in the like manner, &c.] to which I have [Page 52]given at least a satisfactory Answer, and shewed him the wofulness of his Question by an Argument ad hominem, and since he jeers me with my Hebraisms (which yet are his Masters as well as mine;) I will now proceed to justifie my self, and to condemn him out of his mouth. For when he comes to deny Universal Redemption, and to resist the Scriptures which are point-blank against him, he is then so gracious as to use these words; Scripture must be inter­pre [...]ed by Scripture: and though we are not to recede from the literal sense when it will agree with other Scrip­tures, and with the Analogy of Faith; yet when it is de­fective both these wayes, we are not bound to adhere to the Letter, p. 72.’ Very good: I thank Mr. W. for this justice, in the dispensing of which he doth not spare his own selfe. For if the words of SaintHe is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours onely, but also for the sins of the whole world. 1 Joh. 2.2. John were two wayes defective as to the Letter, as neither agreeable with other Scriptures, nor with the Analogy of Faith, (as Mr. W. liberally dictates) how can all those Texts whose Letter seems to make God the cause of sin as sin (saith Mr. Barlee) be either agreeable to other Texts, or to the Analogy of Faith? Are any Scriptures inconsistent with the words of Saint John in the Letter? not one in any appearance; but all on the contrary do sound the same way. Or with what Analogy of Faith are Saint Johns words unagreeable? even the Faith of Mr. W. and them of his Creed. But I haveSee the second thing replied in this Section. proved by examples, that the Letter of those Scrip­tures which are cited by Mr. W. to prove that God hath a hand in sin, are inconsistent with those others by which God is affirmed to have no hand in sin; nor can it agree with the Analogy of any Faith but Mr. Whitfields. If the Letter of the Scripture may be two ways defective, (as Mr. W. tells us it may) where is it likely so to be, if not in the places of which we speak, since nothing is dearer to God Almighty, then the inviolable honour of his Purity and his Truth? And if we are not bound alwayes to adhere un­to the Letter (as Mr. W. also granteth, to serve his ends) why doth he hold himself to it where it is most to be for­saken? because 'tis more for his turn, that God should be [Page 53] operative and active in all the wickednesse in the world, then that Christ should die for all mankind? If that is not his reason, let him tell me what is. And if that is his rea­son, we know the length of his foot. Judge (good Rea­der) of this mans Doctrines.

9. Again,9. How Scripture interprets Scri­pture against Mr. W. if Scripture must interpret Scripture (as Mr. W. also doth acknowledge) I desire no more to prove my Hebraism. For all those Scriptures of Gods hardning Pharaoh, bidding Shimei curse David, delivering up to vile affections, sending delusion, and the like, receive the same interpretation (which I have given) from the words of S. Paul (which are also Scripture) who told the Peo­ple of Lycaonia, that [God in times past Act. 14.16. which com­pare with Act. 17.30. Rom. 2.4. 1 Cor. 10.13. 1 Pet. 3.22. Exod. 34.6. Act. 13.18. suffered all Na­tions to walk in their own wayes.] Their wicked wayes were wholly their own, and they alone did walk in them without Gods help: he gave them their being, life, and motion, which were very good things, but he had not the least hand in the determination of their wills to wickedness, or their consenting to their temptations; he onely suffered them with patience to walk in the wayes which they had Isa. 66.3. chosen, to wit, their own wayes, which were called their own, because they chose them. And here 'tis fit that I meet again with Mr. W. For as he said (p. 22.) that it was not said, God suffered Pharaoh to harden his own heart, but that God hardened it; so here I say on the other side, it was not said by S. Paul, God excited, or commanded, or decreed all nations to walk in their own wayes, but that he suffer'd them to do it. Come we then to a tryal of Scripture by Scripture, which to do for the benefit of common people (whom I am sure in my writings I most consider) I wil com­pare 2. Scriptures, by placing one on the right hand, another on the left; that men may see so much the better, which of the two must be the Rule, by which the other is to be guided; which the Touchstone, by which the other is to be tried; which the Standard, with which the other is to comply.

[Page 54]

Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleannesse, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between them­selves, Rom. 1.24. For this cause, God gave them up to vile affections, v. 26.God in times past suffered all Nations to walk in their own wayes, Act. 14.16. He endured with much long-suf­fering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction, Rom. 9.2. (that is, fitted by them­selves, by those their sins, which God endur'd or suf­fer'd.)

They are both the sayings of S. Paul, as well the Active on the left hand, as the Passive on the right. By which of the two, which of the two must be expounded? when God is said to have given up to uncleanness, is it not onely meant that he sufferd them to be unclean? or when he is said to have suffer'd them to walk in their own wayes, is it also meant that he had aNote that p. 26. Mr. W. saith of sin, that God doth both will and work it, and hath a hand in effecting it. hand and efficiency (to use the phra­ses of Mr. W.) in such their doings? Res ipsa loquitur, The Case it self speaks it self. For, first, the uncleanness, and vile affections, were the uncleannest and vilest that can be thought on: and how could God have a * working or * active hand in such villanies, more vile then which the Devil himself cannot invent? Secondly, They were be­fore habituated in the practice of their uncleanness, and that is rendred for the reason why God gave them up: These are also M.W's ex­pressions. as appears by the wherefore v. 24. and for this cause v. 26. But what sense is it to say, that God did actively and operatively give them up to filthy habits, to which they had given up themselves too long before? or admit they had not, yet what madnesse is it to say, that be­cause their tempter and their own hearts had made them admirably wicked, God should therefore be active to make them worse? Thirdly, There isNote, I mean the con­f ssion of M.W's Teachers, who know any thing of those matters; not of himself, who hath printed either his ignorance that there is any such thing, or at least the dissimulation of his knowledge. confessedly an Hebraism, by which actives in sound are permissives in significati­on; but no such Hebraism, or other figure, by which passives in sound are actives in sense. Fourthly, [Page 55]For God to suffer or indure the sins of men is exact­ly agreeable to the Analogy of Faith; but to will and work sin, or to have an hand in the effecting of it (as M.W's words are) is according to the Analogy of what is worse then infidelity. From all which it is apparent, that the Scripture in the left Column must be interpreted by that in the right. And now I will add some more Examples.

1. If the Prophet be de­ceived when he hath spoken a thing, I the Lord have
That is, I have permitted him to be de­ceived: or (as Grotius) I will deceive him by giving him such an end as he expects not.
deceived that Prophet, Ezek. 14.9.
1. Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour, and love no false oath; for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord, Zech. 8.16, 17.
2. Behold I will
That is, I will expose it to the lusts of the Gentiles, and not restrain them from profaning it.
pro­fane my Sanctuary, Ezek. 24.21.
2. He shall not profane the Sanctuary of his God. He shall not come nigh unto the Altar, that he profane not my Sanctuaries, for I the Lord do sanctifie them, Lev. 21.12, 23.
3. I
That is, I suffer'd them to commit sa­crileges, or to make sacrilegious sacrifices.
polluted them in their own gifts, Ezek. 20.26.
3. Thou art of purer eyes then to behold evil; neither canst thou look on iniquity, Hab. 1.13.
4. I
That is, I with drew my Grace from them, so that contemning my laws they made laws un­to themselves.
gave them statutes which were not good, Ezek. 20.25.
4. The Commandment of the Lord is pure, and in­lightening the eyes, Psal. 19.8. The Law is holy, and the Commandment holy, just, and good, Rom. 7.12.
5. God shall
That is, I will suffer Ma­gicians to de­ceive them: or will not hin­der delusion from being sent.
send them strong delusion that they should believe a lie, that they all might he damned who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrigh­teousnesse, 2 Thes▪ 2.11, 12.
5. Thou art not a God ha [...] hath pleasure in wickedness, neither shall any evil dwell with thee, Psal. 5.4. Thou desirest truth in the inward parts, Psal. 51.6. The fruit of the Spirit is in all truth, Eph. 5.9. As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your evil wayes, why will ye die? Ezek. 33.14.
6. O Lord, why hast thou
That is, why wouldst thou suffer us, by our being op­pressed with a long tyrannie, to faint in our duties, and to forsake thy law?
made us to erre from thy wayes, and hardned our heart from thy fear? Isa. 63.17.
6. Ye have wearied the Lord with your words, Mal. 2.17. Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations? Jer. 7.9, 10.

Now what opinion they were of concerning Gods De­crees, who wearied him with their words, and said they were delivered to commit all those abominations, (and that in an active sense, without an Hebraism,) is very obvious to be imagined. Again, whether it implies not a most blas­phemous contradiction, for God to will what he hateth, and to decree what he forbiddeth, & to set forward what he hinder­eth, (as far as promises, and threats, and perswasions come to) and to have a willingness of the same thing of which he is perfectly unwilling, every A B C darian may well in­form [Page 57]us. And then (by a consequence unavoidable) whether the Scriptures on the right hand are not theNote, that what is spoken by an Hebraism, Is. 6.10. Shut their eyes, and so repeated by S. John, he hath blinded their eyes, Joh. 12.40. is ci­ted thus by our Saviour, Their eyes they have closed, Mat. 13.15. and so 'tis explained by S. Paul, Act. 28.27. Touch-stone, and the Rule whereby to try and to interpret the other Scriptures on the left; And whether those on the left hand are not spoken by the Hebraism of which I spake, and to be meant of Gods permission, not of his working or efficiency (as Mr. W. tell us;) And whe­ther my way of understanding the Scriptures on the left hand is not perfectly agreeable to those Scriptures on the right, to the Analogie of Faith, to the judgment of right reason, to the constant assertion ofNote, that I exclude from the universali­ly of the Fathers all sorts of Libertines, by whatsoever Titles they are distinguished. all the Fathers, nay to the dictate of common sense, I leave it to be determined by the indifferent Reader.

Well therefore said S. Paul to the Heathens of Lycao­nia, that God had suffered all Nations to walk in their own wayes: for had he said (with Mr. W. p. 26.) that God did will and work sin, and had an hand in effecting of it, the Lycaonians might rather have ston'd him, then have been ready to doAct. 14.18. sacrifice. S. Paul therefore added, (that they might not think ill of God for suffering the wick­ednesse of the Nations) that although God had suffered them to walk in their own wayes, yet he left not himself without a witness, in that he did good (v. 17.) which had not easily been believed, had he said to those heathens (as Mr. W. to us) thatNote, that M.W, makes this his medi­um whereby to prove Gods hand in effect­ing sin, p. 26. lin. 5, 6, 7. sin does make for Gods glory, who in that respect doth both will and work it, and hath an hand in effecting of it. It being hard to believe, that sin, which is Gods dishonour can make for his glory, or that God, who is all purity, can will and work sin. Hard (I say) for a Heathen to believe such stuff, but impossible for a Chri­stian, who believes his Saviour affirming plainly,Mat. 7.18. that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a cor­rupt tree bring forth good fruit. There is an infinite dif­ference betwixt sins making for Gods glory, and Gods ta­king [Page 58]occasion from sin (which dishonors him one way) to glorifie himself some other way. The Jews murdering of Christ did not make for Gods glory, (for 'twas the greatest dishonour could have been done him, that they should com­mit such a wickedness whom God had owned for his people) but God did glorifie his Mercy, his Wisdom, and his Justice, in accepting the death of Christ for the propitiation of all our sins. I say, in accepting the death, not the murdering of Christ. As Ch [...]ist did willingly lay down his life, and suffer himself to be put to death, he was the sacrifice of the world, and that did make for Gods glory: But as the Jews did violently take away his life, they were murderers in the highest, and that did make for Gods dishonour. No so­ber man did ever say, that God can make evil good; but some have said, that God can draw good out of evil, which is quite another thing. Nor do they mean by so saying, that God draws good out of evil, as we draw water out of a ditch, but that from mens doing evil he takes an occasion of doing good.

Sect. 2.

Mr. W. proceeds to a new Objection, but of his own invention,His return to his first me­thod of serg­ing objections to himself. not taken out of my writings, or out of any mans else; for if it had, he would have cited the place where it is legible. And yet he confidently saith, [He further objects p. 23.] so that here I must as confi­dently accuse him of Forgery, and charge him to make me satisfaction. But what superchery is this, to intitle his book against mine, and to omit a hundred things which I did really there object, and to forge a ridiculous objection, and (which is the top of the Commission) to call it mine? I have already been too tedious in speaking to his Chimae­ra's throughout my first Chapter, and will now be shor­ter to make amends.

1. He is at odds with D. Twisse.First, I observe 'tis his opinion, [ that though God work­eth not in the same manner in evil actions as he doth in good, or as evil men themselves do, yet me must not deny that he hath any work at all in evil acti­ons, since himself doth so often and so expresly affirm [Page 59]it: p. 23, 24.’] Dr. Twisse and Mr. W. are at odds, for the DoctorSee Correct Copy, p. 10. saith undauntedly, that Gods decree is no less efficacious in the permission of evil, then in the produ­ction of good.

2. To make men sin is a sin of the worst size.2. To say that God doth not work in sin as sinful men themselves do, is no more then to say, that God doth nor sin, or is not a sinner, but onely makes men sinners, asSee Correct Copy, p. 10. Zuinglius expresly speaks, whom Mr. W. defendeth p. 24. but to say that God did decree sin, and praedestine men to sin, and work sin in men as a physical cause, and compel men to sin, so as they cannot but commit it, is worse then truly can be said of any sinner; neither Man nor Devil can compel any one to sin. Tarquin could ravish Lucretia, but could not compel her to be lascivious. The Devil could torment and plunder Job, but not compel him to be impatient. Now that those men do teach, that men are compelled by God to sin, (besides myDiv. Philanth. ch. 3. Sect. 34. p. 132, &c. Catalogue of e­xamples) I can prove by theQuoties quenquam im­pelli à Deo aut cogi dicunt, rhetoricè potiùs loquuntur, &c. Twisse. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. sect. 1. Crim. 3. c. 1. p. 29. confession of Doctor Twisse, who doth acknowledge, and excuse that very expression in his own party. Besides, Jeroboam did not work in Israels sins in the same manner that they did, (because he was not them) but 'twas the worst part of his Character, that he made Israel to sin, (2 King. 15.18, 24, 28.) yet he neither did, nor could compel them. It was the worst part of the unbelieving Jews, that they stirred up the Gentiles, and made their mindes evil affected against the brethren (Act. 14.2.) yet they proceeded not to compulsion. Nay, it was reckoned by Nathan as the worst thing in David, that by the sins he had committed, he had given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme (2 Sam. 12.14.) which was far from coaction or compulsion, the very terms applied by those men to God. And therefore Deodate himself, though the chief Minister of Geneva, denies that God is so much as theDeodat. in Prov. 16.4. occasion of sin; much lesse could he judge him to be the cause, or the coactor.

3. Yet ascribed unto God by that sort of men.3. Though it is said by M. W. that the manner of Gods working in sin is secret, & not to be apprehended, (p. 23.) yet he and his predecessors have described the manner of it, in the [Page 60]most plentiful manner that any description can be made in. They say [ he tempts, and prostitutes, and acts, and operates, and works, and wills, and seduceth, & draws, and commands, and compells, and moves, and drives, and stirrs up to sin, as a natural cause (say some;) as a moral cause (sayothers;) as an efficient cause of the sinful act, as an accidental cause of the obliquity of the act, as a man puts spurrs to a dull Jade, and as a man is excited to enjoy his own wife, &c.’] All these expressions I have met with in Mr. W. partly, and partly in Mr. B. yet these are far from being All; they are but All which I can remember in the present haste that I am in. But whosoever shall examine my seve­ral Catalogues in other books, and compare them with what they find in this which now I am upon, will say that all this is truth, yet not the whole truth.

Sect. 3.

1. The easie and ordinary perver­sion of the Scri­ptures. But Mr. W. proceedeth thus. [ But all those Scriptures mentioned, it may appear what little reason Mr. P. had to make such a clamour against those our Pro­testant Divines,as if they made God to be the Au­thor of sin, when he knows that they positively professed, and some of them strongly proved the contrary, p. 24.’] So he saith, and saith onely. But 1. I have proved in my Sect. 1. of this Chapter, that the abuse of those Scriptures is a great portion of the impiety. Suppose that some Lu­cian should make a Cento out of the letter of the Scri­ptures, as Ausonius did out of Virgil; would the impiety of the thing be any whit the more excusable, because he could shew that his expressions were all from Scripture? or would it not rather be so much the worse? 'Tis known that Proba Falconia composed a history of the Life of Christ, and a good part also of the Pentateuch of Moses, from out of the works of Virgil a Heathen Poet. And out of the very same Virgil (however so chast in his expressions, that he hath won the Title of the Parthenian Poet) Ausoni­us very wittily, but yet mostIngeniosum, sed adeo foe­dum, ut neque Scriptore nec Auditore dignum sir. Scaliger l. 6. p. 825 detestably, made up the fil­thiest Fescennine that hath been read. Again, the [Page 61]Empress Eudoxia writ the life of our Saviour in the words of Homer, (a blinder Heathen then Virgil was.) And were it not every whit as possible, to patch up the life of Achilles in a Rhapsodie collected from the holy Pen-men of our Gospel? If Mr. Wh. will know what may be done in this kind, let him consult the Capilupi, both Laelius, and Julius, set out by Henry Meibomius; and Otho Gry­phius of Ratisbon; or Lilius Greg. Gyraldus; or whom else he pleaseth. Let me mind him also of this, that all the Heresies in Christendom have suck't out a nourishment to themselves from the sincere milk of the word, although immediately flowing from the breast of truth. So great a difference is to be found amongst the several digestions of the very same meat.

Mr. W. mistakes the Errors for the Persons of some Prote­stants, and con­founds them with the Papists.2. I did not clamour against Protestant Divines, but a­gainst the heathenish asseverations which had been pub­lished in the writings of Presbyterians and Papists, not on­ly Dominicans, but Jesuits also, for which IS [...]e Div. Phi­l [...]n. ch. 1. sect. 5. p. 27, 28. produced the confessions of Doctor Twisse and Mr. Barlee. But being a Protestant my self, I had by so much the greater reason to declare against the blasphemies of any Protestant Divines, that I might not be accessary so much as by my silence; and that some Papists might cease to say (what they commonly have done) that those horrible Doctrines are indiscriminately the Protestants, and that quà tales. Nor can I but think it well worth my labour, if I have made it more known then it was before, that whatever dishonours have been done unto the Protestant Name, by those of the Kirk, or the Consistory, or their adherents here in England, yet the dutiful Sons of the Church of England have ever been free from any part of that guilt. Besides, the chief exclaimers against the Presbyterians (for Protestant Divines is an equivocal expression, and comprehends those Prote­stans whom I assert, as well as those whom I oppose) were the other sort of Presbyterians, I mean the Arminians & Re­monstrants in the Low Countreys, who still remained Pres­byterian in point of Discipline (for ought I can learn) al­though they left their own party for the enormities of [Page 62]their Doctrine. Farther yet; My clamours were no greater against the Dogmatical sort of Calvinists, then were their own clamours against each other; nor indeed so great, as I conceive I have evinced uponSee The Div. Purity defend­ed, ch. 4. sect. 6. p. 31, &c. another occasion. And how Doctor Twisse in particular hath made his clamours against his Brethren, I haveSee the Div. Philan. Def. c 1. p. 12. & ch. 3. p. 123, 124, 125. acquainted Mr. Barlee when he wanted that knowledge.

3. His party cla­mour against themselves, and affront God with an Epitro­pe.3. What Mr. W. plead for them, doth make their case so much the worse: for if they say in some places, that God is much more then the Author of sin (as the word Au­thor may be expounded;) and again in other places, that he is precisely the Author of it (both which I have shew­ed again and again;) and yet do say in a third sort of pla­ces, that God is not the Author of sin; they are [...], self-condemners, and contradictors, and have ju­stified me in all my sayings, as well when I accuse them of breathing hot and cold too, as when I accuse them of brea­thing all Fire. Besides, to say that God decreed sin by an Absolute Decree, that he wills and works it, that he is the cause of it, that he hath a hand and efficiency in it, tempts, excites, and compells men to it, but yet he is a good God, and therefore not the Author of it, what is this but to af­front him with a dishonourable Epitrope? If my memo­ry doth not deceive me, it was in a speech against Verres, where Cicero used such kind of Rhetorick: Sit fur, sit sacrilegus, sit flagitiorum omnium vitio­rumque Prin­ceps; at est bo­nas Imperator & felix. Cic. in Verr. Be it so that he is a Thief, a sacrilegious person, the Patron in chief of all villanies and vices, yet however he is a good and a happy General, &c. I clearly find that Mr. W. and many others of that way, do not hitherto understand the full importance of the word Author, its derivation, or use in classick Authors. I shall therefore make that a peculi­ar business, when I shall come to demonstrate, that I did use them with tenderness in saying no more of their Doctrines then plainly this, That they did make the God of purity to be the Author of sin. What can I think of that man, who shall tell me that I lye, and yet affirm when he hath done, I am a very true speaker? I cannot but think him a very bitter Rhetorician, and that he mocks me by [Page 63]an Epitrope. Doctor Twisse apologizeth (as I lately said) for the men of his way, by saying that their speeches are but Rhetorical, when God is said by any of them toSee the D [...]v. Philan. ch. 1. p. 26. com­pel men to sin. And when that Doctor doth plainly say, [that there is on Gods part aTwiss. Vin. Gr. l. 2. p. 1. sect. 2. Cr. 3. Digr. 2. c. 15. p. 156. prostitution to sin required, which prostitution cannot be perfected without temptations leading up to the act of sinning,] 'tis likely he would alledge that he did yet deny God to be the Author of sin. But then I should think it a shrewd Epitrope, than which I cannot conceive a greater dishonour to the Almighty.

4. Mr. W's. cla­mours against Protestant Di­vines.4 Mr. W. must call to mind, what clamours he and his party have commonly made against Protestant Divines, by calling them Enemies to the Grace of God, and Introducers of Atheism, without a tolerable colour of reason for it, nay quite against it; since they are enemies to Grace, who sa­crilegiously inclose it, and seek to rob it of its extent; and they are rather the Introducers of Atheism, who repre­sent God to be such, as cannot modestly be owned: for when men have been taught such Notions of God, which as soon as they believe, they cannot conceive him to be good, they think it modesty to infer that there is [...]. no God at all, and that the notions which they were taught were but the characters of a Chimaera.

5. And jumps in so doing with the Jesuited Papists.5. What Mr. W. saith in his parenthesis [that some of his Authors were instruments in advancing the work of Re­formation, p. 24.] it most concern'd him to have conceal'd: for in that he joynes hands with the most Jesuited Papists, who did purposely infect some noted Protestants with their invention of irrespective Decrees, that they might have some little colour for which to defame our Reformation; betraying some Protestants into the mire, upon a design to accuse them of being dirty. But we know, as well as Aristotle (from whom we learnt it) that the [...] may be faulty, and yet the [...] without all blame. Again, we insist upon Melanchthon, and the other brave persons of the Augustan Synod; upon the Orthodox Bishop Tunstal, who helpt to begin our Reformation; upon the Confessors and Martyrs (such as Cranmer, Cooper, Latimer, and the [Page 64]like) who carried it on here in England. As we think not the worse of Christianity, for what is spoken by Zosimus of Constantine the Great; so neither do we conceive our Reformation to be concerned in the personal Aberrations of Mr. Calvin, or Zuinglius, any more then in the vices of King Henry the eighth. If there were any sound argu­ing from some particular Reformers, unto the general work of the Reformation, or from the same mans errors in one kind, to his being erroneous in all others, (then which sort of arguing there is nothing more silly) Geneva and Helvetia must looke to that. But Luther in Saxony prece­ded both in that work; who though he fell into the errors of other men at the first, yet he exchanged them for the truth in his riper years, as well as Melanchthon and other Worthies.

Sect. 4.

1. His foulest Im­putation cast upon the Scrip­tures. Mr. W. saith further, [ that what expressions they used in this subject, were but the same in effect with Scripture-expressions, yea not altogether so high, p. 24.’ 1. This is so admirably false, that I wonder how he durst say it. And because it is the Word of God upon which he hath cast this foul aspersion, In the name of God I do require him, either to make good his words by a collation of the particulars, or to take away this stumbling-block in as pub­lick a manner as here he sets it in the peoples way. 2. If he shall make a Parodia of Holy Writ, which is a Rhap­sody invers't, and so endevour to palliate this ghastly speech, the fraud will be the more visible, by having on it so thick a cloak. And 3. If he is really of opinion, that the sense and mind of the Scriptures (though not the words) doth not onely go as high, but higher too, then the expressions of his party, and of himself, whilest they say, [ ‘that God doth make men transgressors, and that adultery is his work, that he tempts men unto sin, nay compells them to it, that he wills and works it, nay that he preordained men to sin as sin, that not onely the Action it self, but the very pravity and deformity of it makes way to Gods glory, and a world the like stuff;’] If he thinks that [Page 65]this was meant by the Apostle Saint Paul in his Epistles, God gave them up to uncleanness, Rom. 1.24. and God shall send them strong delusion, 2 Thess. 2.11. (which yet is infi­nitly different from those expressions I just now mentioned) I think it a duty incumbent on me, to admonish the follow­ers of Mr. W. that they take great heed to that important Advertisement which is given them by Saint Peter; and that they accommodate it at least to this occasion. It being likely,2 Pet. 3.16. Saint Peters Caveat tou­ching Pauls Epistles. That there are divers things in S. Paul's Epistles, which being hard to be understood, they that are unlearned and unstable are apt to wrest to their destruction. The mat­ter we see is of no small moment. A man may wrest Gods word (not to some little inconvenience onely, but) to the greatest mischief to be imagined, the eternal destruction of Body and Soul. Scripture is easily mistaken; mistakes of Scripture are not easily rectified; and being not rectified, they do pervert the word of God, which is the River of Life, not onely into a dead, but a killing Letter. Those two sayings of Saint Paul were both cited by Mr. W. (p. 22.) in the behalf of his own and his Teachers Doctrines. The ugly Nature of those Doctrines I have many times shewed: what he now saith of them, and of the Scriptures compared with them, the Reader hath seen in the be­ginning of this Section. And whether or no he is a wrester, good people judge.

I know 'tis said by Mr. W. (p. 19.) that in the places a­bove mentioned the Scripture doth plainly, and clearly, and positively assert what God doth; and so by conse­quence he may ask, what can be easier then a short sentence wherein there is never a hard word? Every man who hath been cheated may know the meaning of de­lusion, and every child who can but go on an errand can tell us what it i [...] to send. Saint Peter speaks of [...], difficult things to be understood in the Epistles of Saint Paul. But what need we have a Key when the Door is open?

2. The literal plainness of some Scriptures doth make them difficult to some. 2. But here the unlearned and the unstable must be in­formed, that in the plainness of some Texts the greatest [Page 66] difficulty consists. And dangers are greatest, when least suspected: which no doubt is the reason why many stum­ble in plain ground, because they there take no heed unto their footing. Nothing seems to be plainer then those words of our Saviour, My Father is greater then I: And, This is my Body, This is my Blood; My Flesh is meat indeed, and my Blood is drink indeed. Yet from the plainness of the former, how many have stumbled into Arianism? and from the plainness of the later, how many have fallen into the error of Transubstantiation? And from the literal plain­ness of such words, God shall send them strong delusion that they should believe a lye, how many have stumbled and fal­len head-long into that worst of errors, that God hath an hand and efficiency in sin? Even by those and the like ex­pressions, Mr. W. hath made us see (such hath been his own blindness) that such plain Scriptures are hard, because they are plain: hard as to the sense because so plain, as to the Letter. But we know that Satan is the spirit of Delu­lusion; that the Magicians there alluded to were the Emis­saries of Satan, and not of God; that God is the spirit both of holiness and Truth; that sin and Satan are none of Gods Messengers; that Simon Magus (that man of sin, v. 3, 9.) was Satans Apostle, and sent by Satan, but not by God, who did onely not hinder him from being sent; that Saint Paul's own words are [...], (not strong delusion, but) the working of errour, and [...], to the belie­ving of a lye, which signifies nothing but the event; it is not [...], that they may believe a lye, which might seem to the illiterate to note the end of an intention. But suppose it had been [ [...], That,] yet Mr. W. must have lookt into the whole importance of the word; and I do earnestly beseech him (since he takes upon him to be a Shepherd, nay aNote that He and Mr. B. did joyn in that prank of a mock-ordina­tion of Mini­sters. sender out of Shepherds into Christ his Fold) that he will vouchsafe to know the difference betwixt [...], and [...], the conjunction [That] as it is causal (and so in most places) or meerly consequen­tial, (and so in many:) this one distinction will preserve him from falling in many plain paths of Scripture (plain I [Page 67]mean as to the Letter) and in the path where he is fallen (2 Thes. 2.11.) it will contribute to help him up: whereas for want either of knowing, or at least of heeding this little thing, hee hath frequently fallen, and very foully.

3. A short directi­on to the means of remedy or prevention. 3. I will finally reinforce my Admonition upon the vulgar, that they take great heed in their perusal of many Scriptures; not that any Scriptures can be unsound or dan­gerous in themselves, but because they are capable of being wrested. Some are unlearned, and some. unstable, and the rather unstable, because unlearned. These must not be in­trusted (by us or by themselves) with the less fordable pas­sages of the waters of Life. I could give my instances in many Scriptures, but Saint Peter gives his in the Epistles of Saint Paul, that Learned Preacher of the Gentiles, whom none but such as are learned should dare to read without a Clavis. The Tremendous mistakes of the Texts above mentioned (Rom. 1.24, 26. 2 Thes. 2.11.) and of the greatest part of the ninth Chapter to the Romans, (to name no more) may serve for a warning to the ignorant and seduced people of the Nation, not to presume on such places without an Interpreter at their Elbow; I mean a qualified, authentick, uncontroulable Interpreter, and such as may easily be had, and be as easily used by English Readers, that is in a word, Doctor Hammond's An­notations upon the whole New Testament.

Sect. 5.

1. Mr. W. either means that God hath a hand in evil, because in the contrary. Mr. W. incurs another danger, which he also calls an other Argument. Some will laugh (I am sure) but others (I hope) will rather weep at it. His words are these, That God hath some hand in the Acts of sinful men, appears, because the substratum or subject of sin, namely, the natural motion or action whereunto the sin cleaveth, is that whereof he is the proper cause and efficient: therefore he must needs have some efficiency in it, p. 24.’] If by the Substratum he means the man who is the subject of sin, Look forward on c. 3. sect. 14. God indeed is the cause of man, but man is not a motion, much less a sin. If by Motion, Act, and Action, he means [Page 68]that which is natural, as the act of walking, eating, digest­ing, speaking, thinking, and the like; God again is the cause of these, but not of any thing that is sinful; it being no more sinful to walk, eat, speak, or think, then to be as God made us, not onely moveables, but men. So that if Mr. W. doth mean no more, he speaks not a syllable to the purpose, but plainly deserts his undertaking. And to prove that God hath a hand in evil, because he hath a hand in that which is good, is to say a thing is, because it is not; or that it is thus, because it is quite otherwise. By such Lo­gick as this, he may say, that the Devil hath a hand and efficiency in good, (giving this for his reason) because he is the efficient and proper cause of evill. And indeed it is much less impious, to ascribe something of Nature to that per­verter of nature, then the least perversion of nature to the God of all grace.

2. Or that the Act of sin is not the sin;But 2. It appears by the scope and tenour of his Book, that when he saith, God hath a hand in the Acts of sinful men, he certainly means, the sinful Acts, which sinful Acts are the Acts of sin, or (to speak it in other words) the sins themselves; for that these are [...], three expres­sions of the same thing, will be made undeniable by this ex­ample. The act of sinful David was the Act of lying with Bathshebah. The Act of lying with Bathshebah was the sinful Act, to wit, the Act of Adultery, and so the sin. For whether we say, that his lying with Bathshebah was his Adultery, or his Act of Adultery, we say the same thing, and we find them promiscuous in all men discour­ses of the thing. Now that his Adultery, or his Act of lying with Bathshebah, was the sin it self which he committed, (not the Substratum, or Subject of his sin, distinguishable from it tanquam accidens à subje­cto, aut res à re,) I am confident Mr. W. will not dare to deny: It being granted by men of all sides, that to pollute another mans Wife is Adultery it self, and that Adultery is the sin it self which is called by that name, and by that distinguished from other sins.

3. Or that God is the proper cause and efficient of sin; and this proved by a Dilemma.3. From whence it followes unavoidably, that Mr. W. affirms God to be the proper cause and efficient of sin it self. Nor can he escape it, let him go which way he will, to the negative, or the affirmative of what I said just now. For let him answer to my Dilemma. Was David's lying with Bathshebah (by which she was impregned) the meer substratum or subject of his sin of adultery, or the very sin of adultery it self? If Mr. W. shall say the first, then it is cleerly his Doctrine, that God was the proper cause and efficient of David's lying with Bathshebah. (for 'tis his positive assertion, that of the mo­tion or action to which the sin cleaves, God is the proper cause or efficient.) And if Mr. W. shall say the second, then he must run into the very same mischief, or yield me up the whole cause, and bid particular defiance to Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. which will soon appear by this other Di­lemma. Was Davids lying with Bathshebah (which is granted to be the very sin of Adultery in the second mem­ber of the first Dilemma) an Act, or an Action, or a Mo­tion, or a positive thing? or was it none of these four? If he shall say, it was an act, an action, or a motion, then again he calls God the proper cause or efficient of the sin it self, Da­vids lying with Bathshebah: (for if the Reader will look back, he shall find all three in the subject of this Section) and withal it implies a grosse contradiction, to say that that is the sin it self, which was said before to be the subject onely of sin to which the sin cleaves. If he shall say, that Davids lying with Bathshebah was a positive thing (which he cannot but say, if he shall say it is the other three) then either he must acknowledge that Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. are blasphemers in grain, for having said expresly, that Mr. Hick's words in a let­ter to Mr. B. printed by Mr. B. ch. 3. p. 112. whatever positive thing is not from God is God, or else he must say it was the creature of God, or else he must say it was God himself. For so it follows in the two bre­thren,Ibid Look forward on, ch. 3. Sect. 18. there is no medium betwixt Deus & Creatura: making no distinction betwixt Gods creatures and the Devils, but concluding that Davids lying with Bathshebah, if a positive entity, was as much Gods creature as David [Page 70]himself was. But if to avoid these rocks, Mr. W. shall throw himself on the later horn of the Dilemma, and say that Davids lying with Bathshebah was no act, action, motion, or positive thing; that will tosse him out of all reason; not onely set him at enmity with the [...], the common maximes of all mankind, and even the judgment of common sense, but also infer that sin is nothing, and so that sinners are either not damned at all, or dam­ned for nothing, or damned for something besides their sins.

4. Humane learn­ing a good foundation for a Divine.4. I will not here exagitate his wants of knowledge in Physiologie, (which would administer occasion of much discourse) because his errors in Divinity are too apt of themselves to make me tedious. I will onely observe, how needful 'tis for a Divine to lay his foundations of knowledge in humane learning, or at least to preach onely by way of exhortation to depart from evil, and to do the thing that is good, but not to meddle in matters beyond their ken. The sad effects of such meddling I have shew'd already, and am now to shew further in the ensuing Para­graph. For what I spake as a Physician to shew Mr. B. the immediate cause of his disease, Mr. W. either could not, or would not comprehend, and doth his utmost to nourish the peccant Humours. Mark him well as he goes on.

Sect. 6.

Mr. W's rare essayes to sepa­rate the wick­ednesse from the Act of the wicked Act. [Object. Against this Mr. P. objects, that it is as impossible to separate the wickedness of the Act from the Act which is wicked, as to separate roundness from the globe, and to separate sinfulness from the sin as from the sinful act, p. 24.’] 1. This is now the second morsel of my Philanthropy, which he hath ventured to fasten his Teeth upon: that the Reader may see, how much oftner I have occasion to confute Mr. W's inventions, then to defend mine own Doctrine delivered in that Book, which his boasting Title-page pretends to combat. 2. He had not [...]he courage to cite my words right, or to acknowledge in the Errata that his citation was wrong: For 1. he cites [Page 71]them all from ch. 4. p. 48. where I had said nothing like it: nor hath it cost me a little trouble to find the pages of my book where such words are to be found; which truly is matter of just complaint: and now at last I have found them in two distinct pages at great distance, whereas he hath cited them as from the same, and as spoken in the same period, p. 48. but the former part is p. 42. and the la­ter p. 43. and each in the midst of the several pages. 2. He hath left out the word [wicked] which he found in my sentence before the first mention of the word [Act;] which is the lesse excusable, because he cites so few things from me. 3. He takes not any notice of what Lurg'd for the proof of those few words, but barely sets down the words themselves: which being a great Tergiversation in a pretender to confute me, deserves no other reply then to be sent for satisfaction to my three whole See the Div. Philan. de­fended, ch. 4. p. 42, 43, 44. pages upon that subject. Yet that he may not be able to say I slight him, I will shew him his unhappinesse in every part of his Answer, though not so much of his unhappinesse, as I could easily discover if I would lose so much time.

Sect. 7.

His first essay is a bare dictate including a ma­nifold absurdi­ty, no less then 8. His 1. Answer is this [ God is little behold­ing to him for so denying him to be the Author of the evil that cleaves to the actions of nature, as withal to deny him to be the Author of nature; for maintaining his purity, by denying his omnipotency, p. 24, 25.’] First, 'Tis an ugly ex­pression, to say that God is little beholding to me for any thing, as if for something he might be possibly beholding: when I have done my best for the honour of God, I have done but my duty; which being my duty but in part, and infinitely far from what I ow him, I must say (when all is done) I am an Luk. 17.10. unprofitable servant. 2. But yield­ing Mr. W. his naughty terms, how much lesse can it be said that God is beholding to Mr. W. who would so main­tain him to be the Author of nature, as to make him also the Author of things against Nature? How much rather is Satan beholding to him, for so asserting Gods omnipotence, as to asperse his purity, and so by consequence to plead for [Page 72] Satan? 3. It goes ill enough with Mr. W. that what he saith, he saith only, without an offer of any proof; to which it were sufficient to say the contrary with the same confidence, and to charge or challenge him to provide his proof against hereafter: yet even thus he is worsted, by the meer opposition of dictate to dictate; because 'tis less wicked to ascribe some work of God unto the Devil, then to ascribe the proper work of the Devil unto God. Of actions natural and un­natural. Nature corrupted and uncorrupted. 4. But I will more then dictate: though he doth not; for I will mind him that the word Nature, which of it self is good when God is called the God of Nature, is often set in opposition to Grace, and is us'd to signifie the cor­ruption of Nature, at least by way of connotation: which Mr. W. not considering, (as something or other is still the cause of aberrations from the truth) confounds the Actions of Nature with unnatural actions. To speak, in­deed, is the work of Nature, but sure it is not a sin to speak: To pray sincerely is the work of Grace, and sure it is not a sin to pray sincerely: But to blaspheme against God, is neither a work or an action of Grace or Nature; yet is it a work or action as really as the former; that is, a work of the Devil, ungracious, and unnatural, against the God of Grace and Nature. Now the difference is wide be­twixt speaking in general, and speaking in particular to the glory of God, and particular speaking against Gods glory. For the last of these, I demand of Mr. W. is that action of blaspheming or speaking against God, an action of Nature, or is it not? If he saith Yes, he doth bewray it to be his doctrine, that God is the Author of blaspheming against God; which blas [...]heming, as 'tis an action, so 'tis a sin too: If he saith No, then he confesseth there are actions which are not of Nature, unlesse he will say that to blas­pheme is no action: if the former, he pulls down with both hands what he erected onely with one; if the later, then according to his reasoning, either to speak is not an action, or to blaspheme is not to speak: and so the farther he proceeds, the wo [...]se it fares with him. 4. Where now was the ground of Mr. W's saying that I deny Gods [Page 73] omnipotence? Even my dutiful denial that God is the Au­thor of such actions, as blaspheming, cursing, fighting against God, David's lying with Bathshebah, Cain's killing Abel, and the like. He may by the same Logick accuse the A­postle of denying God's omnipotence, and that in contradi­ction to the word of God: for our Saviour saith, with God nothing shall be impossible, Luke 1.37. but the Apo­stle saith, It is impossible for God to lie, Heb. 6.18. The reconcilement stands in this, that our Saviour spake of good things onely: for of evils it is true, that 'tis impossi­ble for God to be either Principal or accessory. Now be­cause I maintain, that God cannot will, or work sin in his creatures, Mr. W. proclaims that I deny Gods omnipotence. And this is just the very calumny of AtheisticalOrig. contra Cels. l. 4. Celsus against Origen. But I haveSee Correct Copy, p. 22, 23. elsewhere shewed, that if God were-able to be the Author of such actions, he were able not to be God, which were onely a power of being impotent. There are many things of which the Scripture saith, God cannot do them. As he cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2.13. He cannot lie, Tit. 1.2. What God hath promised absolutely he cannot but perform, Heb. 6.18. Ge. 18. [...]5. Gen. 19.22. Heb. 6.10. And therefore I am the asserter of Gods omnipotence, because of his purity, and Mr. W. is the man who disputes against both. 6. He again is the man that denies Gods omnipotence, who denies him to be able to decree the end in consideration of the means; or to make a rational creature with such a liberty of will, as to be able to determine his will ad hoc, to this or that forbidden object, without an efficiency from his creator. 7. What kind of Theist may he be thought, who doth not think that the creating and governing of a world, and the being the Author of all good things, are proofs enough of an omnipotence, unlesse the filthiest actions to be imagined may be admitted for Jewels in that rich Diadem?

Sect. 8.

1. His second es­say is an im­pertinence be­yond Example: His second Answer runs thus: [ Doth not the Scripture tell us expresly, that in him we live, move, and have our being? Act. 17.25. As he is the Author of [Page 74]our being, so also of those Natural motions that arise from our being, p. 25.’] Thus the same Fallacy conti­nues his error which made him erre. And here I might re­peat my former Section, if that were as seemly, as other­wise fit: but referring my Reader thither, I here will adde 1. My amazement at the impertinence: for I had said, It is impossible to separate the wickedness of the wicked act (to wit, of Blasphemy, Adultery, or the like) from the act which is wicked. And Mr. W. (instead of instancing in any one wicked act, and shewing how the wickedness may be separated from the act of wickedness, or (which is all one) the wicked act) doth onely tell us of things which are no wicked acts, viz. our living, moving, and being in God, &c.

2. Or what is so much worse, as that it ought not to be nam'd.2. If he pretends that he is not impertinent, he is infi­nitely worse, as the shallowest Reader can infer: for if the Apostle there spake of wicked acts (which to think is most unpardonable) let him perform his enterprise, by shew­ing which is the wickedness, and which the act, and by shewing the separation, which he denies to be impos­sible.

3. He is enforced to be pertinent, and his Answer challenged.3. But let us inforce him to be pertinent, and challenge his Answer to this Question, Doth the Scripture any where say explicitely, or implicitely, that in God we blas­pheme, and murder, and commit adultery? such as these are confessedly the wicked acts to which I alluded in my objection. Again, I ask Mr. W. Can the wickedness of an actual blaspheming be possibly separated from the act of blaspheming? Can the wickedness of Davids congress with Bathshebah be possibly separated from the act of his con­gress with Bathshebah? Since his Answer of necessity must be Yes, or No, I am bound in duty both to God and my neighbours, to exact thus much of Mr. W. That he will either shew how this may be done, or confess in print that he hath undertaken impossibilities, and that his first absurdity being swallowed, this is one of the thousand which follow after. Had he been able to shew it, or had he but thought he had been able, he would sure have [Page 75] tried, and offer'd at it at least; he would have taken some one wicked act for his instance, displaid his tooles, and be­gun his dissection, and made us perceive this separability, if not the separateness it self, at least with the eyes of our Metaphysical understandings. But because he hath meerly propos'd an objection, and forsaken it, speaking as far from his Theme as he could devise, I must needs be­lieve, he understood his own weakness, and felt the strength of the objection; yet I am checkt in my belief, by find­ing his answers grow worse and worse, as I think will ap­pear by what now follows.

Sect. 9.

His third Essay is a continu­ance of his Ter­giversation, and inferreth God the efficient of sin. His third Answer is this [ Was not Natures work the same in Adam when he ate the forbidden fruit, as when he did his necessary food? and in David, when he lay with Bathshebah, as when he lay with his lawful wife?It is a true Rule, Deus agit in peccato, non tan­quam causa moralis, sed tanquam causa naturalis, p.25.’] Now he makes us a discovery of his mind.

1. He had said a little before (Answ. 1.) that God is the Author of the actions of nature: look forward on Sect. 12, 13. and a little before that, that of natural motions and actions to which sin cleaves, God is the efficient and proper cause (p. 24.) now he addes, that natures work is the same in the most unlaw­ful and lawful actions; and exemplifies his meaning, not onely after, but before the Fall also. From whence his Tenent must be concluded unavoidably this, That God was the efficient and proper cause of Adam's eating the forbidden fruit, as well as of his eating his necessary food; and as much the efficient and proper cause of David's lying with Bathshebah, as of his lying with lawful wife. He shall be greater then great Apollo, if he can shew the least flaw in this deduction. Now to separate the act of Adam's eating forbidden fruit, from the wickedness of the act, which consisted in eating forbidden fruit, Mr. W. doth not so much as trie. And if he cannot do it hereafter neither, (as I am sure he cannot, because it cannot be done) then it is cleerly his opinion, (at least his Do­ctrine,) [Page 76]that God is the efficient and proper cause of all sin.

2. Nature depra­ved and unde­praved are op­posite things.2. It was the work of undepraved nature, for Adam to eat his necessary food, before he eat the unnecessary for­bidden food. But to eat the forbidden was the ruine of na­ture, and not the work: I mean that nature wherewith God made him (not simply a man, but) an innocent man. And by Adam's eating that prohibitum, Mr. W. must not think to say, he meant the motion of Adam's jawes onely, with­out his consent to the temptation, or his determination of his will to a forbidden object; for the eating the forbidden fruit was plainly the predicate in Mr. W's proposition, as Adam was the subject of it: not, eating, without forbidden fruit, nor eating fruit, without forbidden. And if twen­ty words are in the predicate (as possibly they may) they all can make but one term, and are equally coupled to the sub­ject, by a never-failing verb substantive, either expressed, or implied.

3. Adam sion'd before he eat in the determina­tion of his will to eat.3. Besides, Adam sinned before he eat, in the determi­nation of his will to eat: and if that was also the work of Nature, as well as his volition to eat of any lawful fruit, (as Mr. W. must say, or eat up what he hath said) then ac­cording to Mr. W. God was the efficient and proper cause of that sin also, which lies in puncto indivisibili, perhaps more intelligibly then others may.

4. Mr. W. vin­dicated from his abuses put upon himself.4. Because Mr. W. hath been abused by himself, in the misapprehension of his own Rule, I think it my duty to disabuse him. And I shall do it by saying no more then this: 1. That as God doth give, and continue the being of his creature, with the natural endowments of such a being, (such as Life, Loco-motive, Reason, and Will, in his crea­ture called Man) he doth not work as a moral, but as a natural cause. 2. But as he moves his creature by his grace to chuse a right use of all his Faculties, in applying his actions to their proper objects, he onely works as a moral cause. 3. And as he suffers or permits his creature to determine his will to forbidden objects, and in pursuance of that choice, to apply his faculties to execute what the [Page 77] will hath decreed, (be it to kill, to blaspheme, to hate God, or the like) in this third case, he neither worketh as a natu­ral, or moral cause, but suffers his creature to pervert and abuse his Faculties of Nature into a contrary thing to that which God made them. As for example, Adam's Facul­ty to will was the work of God, and (under God) of Nature, a very excellent and noble Faculty: But A­dam's applying that faculty to the forbidden fruit (which was his choice, or act of willing that numerical thing) was neither the work of God, nor of Nature, (Gods hand­maid) but the work of Adam against God, and against that Nature which God had given him; and which Adam, with Satans help, did deprave, or pervert into another thing. Yet am I willing that Mr. W. should say that there was in it the work of Nature, if he will say that he means that work of that Nature, which could not be pos­sibly the work of God, but of Adam onely in one respect, and of the Devil in another.

5. Five expedi­ents proposed to undeceive M. W. by pointing at the causes of his mistakes.5. The not distinguishing rightly betwixt Nature and Na­ture, Gods Handmaid and his Rebel, Nature created by the good will of God, and Nature corrupted by the wicked will of the creature, doth seem to me a prime cause of Mr. W's er­rors in this affair. Another cause doth seem to be his want of a steady consideration, that Adam's sin did begin in the first aversion of his will (which was his rational appetite) from God and his Precept, unto the creature which was forbid­den. His determining of his will (per actum imperatum) to the forbidden object, was the same sin in its growth. His actual eating in obedience to that Empire of his will, was the same sin in its perfection. In each of which three acts God had no hand at all: which because Mr. W. did not discern, the third cause of his errors doth seem to be, his not continuing to meditate, or to remember, that the Being of sin is [...], in the habitude andThis confes­sed by Dr. Twisse himself, in Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 2. Crim. 3. Sect. 1. p. 155. Col. 2. relati­on and indissoluble connexion of a voluntary act to a for­bidden object: after a fancied separation of which two, we cannot so much as fancy the sin to be. For consider A­dam's eating as unapplied to forbidden fruit, and so it can­not [Page 78]be conceived to be a sin, any more then the eating of a natural Agent, it being as natural to eat, as to grow by eating. Which makes me guesse a fourth cause of Mr. W's error to be this, that either he did not exactly know, or not incessantly bear in mind, that the same man (as to several actions) is both a natural and a voluntary agent. We eat and drink as we are animals; but we fast and pray, and do our duties, or eat and drink against Precept, as we are men: the former as we are spiritual, and the later as car­nal men. But Mr. W. in his instances of Adam and Da­vid, did confound the brutish with the rational property of the men. The fifth cause of his miscarriage doth seem to be, his not animadverting that sin is a concrete, in respect of sinfulness, and notes the same thing in one word, which sinful act doth note in two; which I will make him apprehend (do what he can to the contrary, beside; not reading what I am writing) by shewing that a sin, and a sinful Note that what is said of a sinfull Act, is as true if applyed to action or moti­on, which are also Mr. W's Termes. act, have the same enunciation in all propositions to be imagined. Ex Gr. It is as true a praedication (and in sense the same) to say that David's lying with Bathshebah was his sin, as to say it was his sinful act. Again, as true a praedication, (and in sense the same) to say it was his adultery, as to say his adultery was his sin. Mr. VV. shall find upon every turn of the tongue, that these terms are convertible, and that in Recto: and finding that, he will confess, that either he must separate the same thing from it self, or acknowledge his making God to be effi­cient of sin. Thus far am I brought beyond what I was bound to, or at first intended, by the meer strength of my desire to convert my Aggressor, whil'st I confute him.

And having done thus, I shall onely put him in mind of his concurrence with Mr. B. as well as of his discord with Doctor Twisse. 1. He concurres with that of Mr. B. [That Gods concurrence and excitation to the Act of adultery, and to the husbands lying with his lawful wife, is the same, ch. 3. p. 12.] 2. He is at discord with Doctor Twisse, who saith thatSee Correct [...] Copy, p. 10. God doth so administer the occasions of sin, and doth so urge them, that they smite [Page 79]the sinners mind, &c. which is to act in sin as a moral cause, whereas Mr. W. affirms his acting to be as a natural cause only. I will not exagitate the noysome instance by which he clears his meaning to us, nor will I shew how he hath gratified his carnal Readers. I rather hasten to his ensuing words.

Sect. 10.

His fourth es­say infers the wickedest Actions to be good, and from God. His fourth Answer is, [ That every new action and motion is a new Entity; now all entities and beings are from the first Being, and so far forth they are good, p. 25.’] Apply his generals to particulars, and he is ever undone. The first Rebellion against God that ever was, was a new action or motion, and so a new entity; and therefore (saith Mr. W.) was from the first Being, and so far forth was good. Thus every new filthiness or elaborate sensuali­ty which Petronius invented for Tiberius, hath Mr. W's commendation for the goodness of its being, and the Divi­nity of its extraction. It was descended (saith Mr. W.) from the first Being, which is God. 2. His sentence out ofIpsum quan­tulumcun (que) esse bonum est, quia sum­mum esse est summum bo­num. De verâ. Relig. c. 4. Austin is either quite beside the purpose (He speaking onely of Gods Creatures, and not of Satans) or taken on purpose by the left handle, that Austin (as well as Scrip­ture) may be pretended as a Factioner against Himself: For the sin against the Holy Ghost is a Being, as being really something, because the cause of damnation without hope of reprieve. But Saint Austin could not argue the least goodness in that sin, from the greatest goodness of that God against whom it is committed. 3. But it is added by Mr. W. [That if any natural act (quà actus) proceedeth not from the God of Nature, there must be a Creature with­out a Creator, Ibid.] But 1. Blasphemy, or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is not a natural act, but an act contra-natu­ral, and yet it is a real act. 2. When God is called the God of Nature, it is to be meant of good Nature. 3. Blas­phemy is an act of malicious Nature, against the Nature of God, and against the God of good Nature; but blasphemy as blasphemy (or that act as that act) proceedeth not from God: and yet it is not a Creature without a Creator; for [Page 80] men and Devils are the Creators of all sorts of blasphemy; which Mr. W. and theMr. Hickm. and Mr. B. spo­ken of before, & hereafter, c. 3 sect. 18. two brethren will have to be crea­ted by God himself, or to be an Independent Creature. This is therefore a sixth cause of his and their aberrations, that they do not distinguish (with the Scriptures) betwixt theJoh. 3.8. works of the Devil and thePsal. 103.22. works of God.

Sect. 11.

His fifth Answer is the most to his disadvan­tage, unless the confession of his guilt may lead the way to his repentance:1. His fifth essay doth insnare him with an implicit confes­sion that he maketh God the Author of sin. for believe me, Reader (though to believe it is very difficult) these words which follow are all his own. [ Doth not Mr. P. by this Doctrine make God the Author of sin? for if God be the Author of all natural Actions, (as hath been proved,) and it be impossible (as he teacheth) to separate the sin from the action, then he that is the Author of the Action, must needs be the Author of the sin also which is unseparable from it, p. 25.’] Thus he thinks he hath laid a Net for Mr. P. whilest Himself is caught in it,Look forwards on ch. 3. sect. 12. Num. 4. & sect. 18. and cannot possibly get out. For 1. He con­fesseth most explicitly (though not in any humble Form) that if it is proved to be impossible to separate the sin from the sinful action (which I have often proved to be impossi­ble) he cannot chuse but take God to be the Author of sin. Here then again he must be summoned, to shew us how David's sin, to wit, his Adultery, can be separated from his sinful action, to wit, his lying with Bathshebah: which until he shall perform, I must declare him (out of his Book, which is as much as from his own mouth) to be an Assertor of that Blasphemy, which yet he doth many times disown, though not so often as he owns it.2. He is fain to miscal things to countenance his mistakes, or else he knows not a moral action. 2. To make a shew of having insnared me, he is fain to call those things by the name of natural actions, which he knew at that instant I have ever call'd sins, or sinful actions, or acts of sin, unnatural actions, or acts against nature. But what he could not discern in the sins or sinful actions of Adam and David, I will compel him to see clearly by these following Queries, to which I shall earnestly expect his Answer.Mr. W. ham­pered in s [...]me Dil [...]mm's. Is a mans lying with a beast a sin, or not? If not a sin, how then was itExod. 22.19. forbidden upon pain of death? If a sin, is it an Action, [Page 81]or not an Action? If not an action, what is an action? and how defined? But if it is an action, is it a natural action, or an action unnatural and against Nature? If a natural action, why saith Mr. W. that God is the efficient and proper cause, and now the Author of all natural actions? and so by consequence of a mans lying with a beast? If, to avoid that blasphemy, he saith it is not a natural, but an unnatural action; why then did he say (Ans. 3.) that Natures work was the same, as well in wicked as lawful actions? If he flies from that too, (now he is scared with the danger) then let him say he is converted, and abjure his own Book, and joyn with me against Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. who say that sin is God, if a positive thing. To make sure work, I will appeal to Saint Paul, whether it hath not of old been found very possible, to Rom. 1.26. change the natural use into that which is against Nature, yet that change includes Acti­on, but contra-natural. So again to worshipJer. 2.27. stones, and to serve the Rom. 1.25. Creature more then the Creator, Witchcraft and Incest, are all against Nature: But some of the Gen­tiles did by Rom. 2.14. Nature the things contained in the Law; whilest other mens actions were unnatural, because as2 Pet. 2.12. natural brute Beasts, and not as men, they spake evil of things they understood not.

3. The method by which he is led into all his blasphemies.3. It is most apparent at every turn, that the main thing to be discussed, is, whether the sin can be sequestred from the sinful Action. If it can, I must acknowledge my error, and make amends if I am able. But if it cannot, then Mr. W. and his party must do the like. My Method is, first to lay it as my Principle, That God cannot be possibly the Author of sin; and thence to infer, that he cannot be the Author of a mans lying with a Beast, which is a real act, and yet a sin: and my reason is, because I cannot conceive, much less describe, how that sin (called Bestiali­ty) which consisteth in lying with a Beast, can be separated from that in which it perfectly consisteth. But Mr. W's. Method is, first to lay it as his Principle, that God is the Author of every real act, and so by consequence of a mans lying with a Beast; which because he knows to be a sin, of [Page 82]which he would not say plainly that God is the Author, he is fain to infer (as far as naked words come to) that the sin (which is the Devils part) may be separated from the sinful act, which act is Gods part, saith Mr. W. This (I say) he often dictates, but gives no reason, nor offers to try how it can be: nay clearly, though implicitly, doth make it appear that it cannot be, whilest he pretends to shew it can be. For observe hi [...]next words, & hold from smiling if you are able.

Sect. 12.

1. The sin is inse­parable from the sinful acti­on; which Mr. W. seems to see by his Tergiver­sation. Compare this with c. 3. sect. 18. [ But I suppose he is not so dull-sighted, but if he pleased he could easily discern a difference between the action and the evil quality of it, p. 25.’] This is his new Tergiversation, which is intended by its Author to do the office of a proof. In stead of trying to make me see what I affirm to be invisible, he contents himself to say, that I can see it if I please. By the same Logick I may prove, that he can stand in London, and hear the grass growing in this part of the Country; the medium to prove it being this, [Sure he is not so heavy-eared, but that he could hear it, if he pleased.] To discern anyNote, Rea­der, that I use the word Dif­ference as an act of my bounty to Mr. W. against whom it lies upon me to prove no more then that there is no separabili­ty of Davids sia called A­dultery, from his lying with Bathshebah, which was his Action as well as Sin. difference be­twixt David's lying with Bathshebah and his Adultery, or betwixt his Adultery and his Sin, is at least as impossible as to hear the grass growing at 60 miles distance. If Mr. W. can see a difference, where dull-sighted mortals can see no­thing but Identity, he must lend them his eyes and his per­spective, that they may see it as well as he; or supply them with Faith, by which at least they may believe that he can see what they cannot. Had he thought he spake rightly, why did he not descend to some one pertinent Instance, as that which I have given, or any other? It is a very ill sign when a man hides himself inDolus latet in generalibus. generals, which are known to be nothing but second notions.

2. He speaks as if be thought an Accident could be the subject of Inhesion unto an Accident.2. He speaks of an action, and its quality, as if he con­sidered not the predicaments they both are in; and thought that action is the subject in which quality is inherent, and from which it may be parted, as a separable accident from a substance. So that before I go further, it may be needful [Page 83]to mind him of these four things. 1. That action and quality are both accidents. 2. That an Accident is not the subject of Inhesion unto an Accident. 3. That some Accidents are separable from their subject of Inhesion, (as artificial colours upon a wall) and some inseparable, (as Risibility in a man.) 4. That every Action implies a Quality, according to which the Agent acts. Thus Ca­lefactio must needs imply Calor: Nor is it possible to imagine the act of heating without Heat. Thus Hatred is a quality, and to hate God is an Action: Nor is it possible to separate the hating of God (which is the action) from the hatred of God (which is the quality, without which the action can have no Being.) Yet betwixt these two there is a difference, though no possible separation; which shews the gross Fallacy Mr. W. hath put upon himself, in making no difference between a Difference and a Separability. Many things are inseparable from many things, betwixt which notwithstanding there is a difference: which I would make to appear by uncontrolable examples, if I thought so meanly of Mr. W. as to think he needs them. But if he will tell me his wants, I promise speedily to supply them.

3. He confounds the act of dif­fering with the passive power of being parted.3. This doth lead me to complain of a great injustice in Mr. W. who doth imply me to have said (what he knows I did not) that I cannot discern the difference between the quality and the action; whereas my words were these on­ly, (and so cited by himself) That 'tis impossible to sepa­rate the wickedness of the wicked act from the act which is wicked. As if, when I say, it is impossible to separate the three persons in the Trinity (commonly called Individual) the one from the other; Mr. W. should answer, I am not so dull-sighted as not to discern there is a difference between the first Person and the second, the second and the third: whereas 'tis he is dull-sighted, who discerns not the diffe­rence betwen the act of differing in Individuals, and the passive power of being parted.

4. He believes not (or dissembles) that David's action with Bathshtbah was his sin.4. But though I am bound to say no more, then that the wickedness of the wicked action cannot be separated from [Page 84]the action which is wicked; and again, that the sin cannot be separated from the action which i [...] sinful (as Mr. W. p. 25. Ans. 5. l. 30, 31, 32. saith it can) yet I just now added, and still adde, there is no difference. For Davids lying with Bathshebah was his action, which action was his sin, which sin was his wicked­ness. The whole world lieth in wickedness, that is, in Sin. To prevent a [...], I give this notice to Mr. W. that if the word VVickedness is not always synonymous with sin, yet it is so often; and so I now use it.

5. He makes the sin of adultery to be separable from it self.5. Because the words of Mr. W. are very homonymous and uncertain (of several aspects, and to be taken or mis­taken as many several wayes) I will tell him what I dis­cern, and where I cease to be discerning. I discern a gross difference between the sin and the sinner (though from some kinds of sinners some kinds of sin cannot be parted.) I dis­cern another difference between the action, and the quali­ty by which the action is good, or evil, or indifferent, (nei­ther morally good, nor morally evil.) Again, I discern a clear difference between one evil action and another; as be­tween Davids Adultery, and his Murder. But I discern no difference between the same evil action, and it self; as between Davids lying with Bathshebah, and his Adultery. Nor is it credible that such difference should be, much less be discernable, when even the acutest of Mr. W's own party (among whomLibert. & Ne­cess. p. 23. where note, that Mr. Hobbs seems to have borrowed his Argument, which proves his own do­ctrine blasphe­mous, from Doctor Jack­son, l. 10. c. 6. fol. 3013. Mr. W. specks purposely beside the purpose, by which he ta­citely confesseth his cause is de­sperate. Mr. Hobs hath no low place) have not onely professed that they cannot discern any difference betwixt the sin and the sinful action, but they have clearly discerned there can be none. Nay Mr. VV. doth here de­monstrate that he cannot discern the least difference, whilest he tells me, that if I please, I can discern it. For mark how strangely he speaks to my similitude.

Sect. 13.

[ The roundness may be separa [...]ed from the Globe, and yet the matter of it remain still, when it is put into another Form, p. 25, 26.’] Hence he discovers, that he knew his cause desperate, and did wilfully mistake his proper Task, because he saw it impossible to be performed. For first he leaves out the later end of my sentence, by [Page 85]which the sense is to be governed, and the scope of it to be taken: which had he not wilfully omitted, he could not certainly have said what here he saith. My words were far from being thus, [A Globe may be destroyed, and so its roundness be taken away; or, the roundness may be separated from the Globe by the Globes ceasing to be a Globe, and its matter cast into some other form] but on the contrary, thus, [See the Div. Philanth. def. ch. 4. p. 42. The roundness cannot be se [...]arated from the Globe which is round.] Which last words I did adde on purpose, to note the continuance of the subject of the roundness spo­ken of, and to preserve my simplest Reader from the very possibility of that mistake, which Mr. W. out of subtilty hath here most resolutely committed. Having mentio­ned a Globe, I needed not have added round, had it not been for such Readers as do not know or con [...]ider, that nothing not round can be a Globe. Nor did I imagine that Mr. W. could have been of their number, who not consi­dering a Globe is round, or else not a Globe, (which is a loathsom contradiction) can dream that roundness may be separated from the Globe, because the Globe with the roundness may be separated from the matter in which it was, to wit the brass or the wood, which may be cast or shap't into several figures. To separate roundness from the Globe, is neither more nor less impossible, then to se­parate roundness from roundness, which is so much more then to square the Circle, that many have ventured upon the one, (as well as M. Hobbs,) whereas none but M. Whit­field hath ever thought of doing the other. And yet his way of attempting it is at least as admirable as his attempt: For instead of proving against my words, that the round­ness may be separated from the Globe which is round, (so as it still may remain a Globe) he saith the Globe may be cast, as to the matter of it, into another form; and what is this but to say, the Globe is not immutable, but may cease to be a Globe, by being turned into a conical, or a cubical Figure? But Mr. W. knew that this was contrary to the subject of which I spake, and inconsistent with the case of which we are speaking: for it is not our Question, whether a sinner [Page 86]can be converted and become a Saint, or whether his sin can be done away and destroyed, and his actions which were wont to be very evil, be very much altered unto the better: But whether the sin can be separated from the sinful action, so as the action shall remain when the sin is gone from it. As whether David [...]s sin can be parted from his adultery, or his adultery from his lying with Bathshebah, it being supposed and granted, that he is lying with Bathshebah, and that the doing so is adultery, and that adultery is a sin. This being the Case, and Mr. VV. speaking not of it, but of quite another thing, I therefore condemn him out of his own mouth, for having spoken against a truth, even whilest he saw it was unresistible. For he who sits beside the Cushion, no less the twenty yards wide, even after he took it into his hands as if he meant to sit on it, cannot be thought to sit beside it because it is not conspicuous, but because it is conspicuously so full of prickles, or any otherwise so frightful, as that he dares not adventure on it.

2. His wonderful attempt to wash wet from water.2. To shew Mr. W. both his danger, and his dishonour in such his dealings, let him name any one thing in any part of his doctrines wherein he will affirm an inseparabi­lity, and I will presently enforce him to confute himself out of himself. I will prove by an argument ad hominem (which he at least will not resist) that Mr. W. may be se­parated from Mr. W. nay, I will prove with more colour, that the difference is wide betwixt twenty and twice ten, be­cause that is but one number, but this is two. I will prove the separability of his proper passion from his formal reason, and again of his formal reason from that essential whole to which it gives its specification. I will prove that a dis­ease, however incurable, may be cur'd; because it is possible to kill the Patient. There is nothing so impossible, but may be proved to Mr. W. to be the contrary, if he will but take his own coin for current, which here he puts off to others without a blush. If his marvellous error hath been through ignorance, or inadvertency, (which yet I cannot conceive) he shall do well to study the nature of conjugates, and [Page 87] denominatives, of adjuncts and subjects, of common and proper accidents; and if he will trie but to put his pre­sent sense into a Syllogisme, he shall find four terms in the Premisses, or Ignoratio Elenchi in the conclusion: he shall not escape one of the two, let him go which way he will.

3. The three lines of his present Section, which shut it up, p. 26. are cabbage (not onely twice, but) twenty times boyl'd, and from the first to the last is gratis dictum.

Sect. 14.

Mr. W. affirms God to will and work sin, and to have a hand in effecting of it, upon his supposal that sin makes for Gods glory. Mr. W's five Essayes, instead of Answers to my Objection, being now at an end, he proceeds to a fourth Argument as he calls it in the Margin) whereby to prove his beloved Doctrine, of God's efficiency in sin. And thus it runs: So far as sin makes for the glory of God, so far he may both will and work it; for if he neither intends it, nor hath any hand at all in effecting it, how shall it make for his glory? p. 26.’] First he layes for his foundation a most palpable falshood, That sin doth make for God's glory. This is his postulatum he will needs have granted, and therefore gives no reason, or colour for it. Observe the manner of his speech: he saith not passively, sin is made an occasion upon which God is glorified; but actively, sin doth make for the glory of God. Nor doth he say, that sin makes for it per accidens, from whence he could not infer, God wills and works it; but by making this inference, he implies that sin doth make per se for God's glory. Is not he likely to in­fer strange things, whose very Principle implies a contradi­ction? To sin, is to rebel against the Maker of that Law, of which it is a transgression: to rebel against him, is to disho­nour him: there is nothing but sin by which the God of all glory can be dishonoured: And to say that God's dishonour does make for his glory, is the same as to say, that that is for his glory which is against it. Thus the Ranters and Libertines are taught to plead for their sins, that they do not commit them as God thereby is dishonoured; but (in the contrary notion) as they make for God's glory: they [Page 88] rebel not against him, but take up armes; or if it must be called a rebellion, yet they rebel against him in his defence onely, to the end they may make him a glorious God; they fight against him in loyalty, that his pardoning mercy may shine forth in its highest lustre. They in the times of the Apostles, who did evil that good might come of it, and sinned the more, that grace might abound, were led to sin by their opinion, that sin did make for Gods glo­ry. The Carpocratians thought it their duty as well as incerest, to fill up the measure of their sins, by which God was to be glorified. And many have attempted to pull theThou shalt not revile the Gods, nor curse the Ruler of thy people, Exod. 22.28. Gods out of their Thrones, (that is, the Rulers of the people) professing to do it for their good, and for the glory of God Almighty.

2. He concludes sin to be good, or God's will­ing and work­ing it as evil. See what I, shall say Sect. 19. of this Chapter.2. When Mr. W. saith, that sin doth make for Gods glo­ry, he doth certainly mean that sin is good, at least, so far as it makes for Gods glory, because he presently addes, that God so far may will and work it. Which if he shall venture to deny, he will then bewray it to be his doctrine, that God may will and work sin as sin, and that sin as sin doth make for Gods glory. For whatever is the object of Gods will, or the effect of his working, or hath a tendency to his glory, must needs be taken in one notion of the two, as good, or as evil. If as good, then Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. are quite undone by Mr. W. who will either have God the Author of it, or else will conclude its [...]. And again, Mr. W. is undone by himself, because he would se­parate the sin from the sinful act, for this very reason, that the act onely is good, but not the sin. If he shall say, by way of refuge, that God doth will sin as evil, (not as good) how then doth he will it as it makes for his glory, unless Mr. W. will say, that it makes for his glory as it is evil? and if this last, then sin as evil must needs be good, because as such it does that in respect of which (saith Mr. W.) God wills and works it. And if God doth will, my work sin as it is evil, then it is not onely good as w ll as evil, whilest it is evil, but good eatenus, so far forth as it is evil; good, because evil; that is, good, and not good: [Page 89]nay it therefore is good, because it is not. Into such kinds of mischief hath Mr. W. ingulft himself.

3. He feigns God to work evil to a good end.3. Upon this foundation, that sin makes for God's glory, observe how he raiseth his superstructure. He saith that God may both will and work sin: not one, but both; not will or work, but will and work it. Here behold a bare­fac't speaker. The Sinner and his Satan can have no more said of them: God and they are said to differ in their aimes, not at all in their actions. All do will and work sin: but God doth both (saith Mr. W.) as it makes for his glory; the Sinner and Satan do both, but not for Gods glory; Let Satan pass; but how few sinners are there, who will and work sin, to the end that God may be dishonoured? I believe, and hope there are no such sin­ners. Nay, how many sinners have sworn (with hands lift­ed up to the most High God) that they have will'd and workt those very things, which they have afterwards con­fessed to have been damnable sins, without respect unto self, and meerly as making for the glory of God? we have our Saviours words for it, and Paul's example. Our Lord foretold his own Disciples, that Joh. 16.2. whosoever should kill them would think they did God service. And 'twas inPhilip. 3.6. zeal to religion that Paul persecuted the Church before his conversion of name and temper. He was cruel as he was godly, a rigidVers. 5. Pharisee, and in his wayVers. 6. blameless. Of these it will not be denied then, that they did will and work sin (not as sin, but) as it made for God's glory, as they conceived. The sad consequences and uses which some have made of this Doctrine, I have shewed partlySee the Div. Philanth. Def. ch. 4. p. 42. else­where, and so forbear.

4. Q. Whether he inferrs not God to be a [...] sinner.4. He doth not onely make sin to be the object of Gods will, (which is desperately bad) but the effect of his work­ing, which sounds much worse. To work sin doth define and denominate a sinner, witness the words of our Saviour to the condemned Reprobates, Depart from me ye that [...]. Mat. 7.23. work sin, or Transgression. The Devils chief sinning is his making others to become sinners, and thence he hath purchased the name of Satan, and [...], the Tempter. [Page 90]Nor doth it excuse Mr. W. to have said that God doth work sia as it makes for his glory. For besides the absur­dities which I shewed in that shift, he must remember that the end is but one circumstance of many, which are all required to make a good action:Bonum est ex causâ inte­grâ, malum ex quolibet de­fectu: the least defect is e­nough to deprave an action, and the greatest perfection is but enough to make it every way blameless. Besides, the end is extrinsecal to the essence of an action, in respect of the matter and the form, which make it up. And if it is impossible for a good man to work sin to a good end, (interim ut sit bonus secundum quod vult) much less can God work it in order to his glory. Further yet it must be noted, that as some things are evil, because forbidden by God; so others have been forbidden by him, because they were in their nature antecedently evil. And how can God work sins which are so naturally such, (as the blaspheming, cursing, and hating of God himself) that the purity of his being is an eternal Law unto himself against such working? Let Mr. W. make reflexion upon his words.

5. He is inconsist­ent with M. H. and Mr. B.5. If God doth work sin, in as much as it makes for his glory, then sin is his work in the same respect in which he works it. And if so, it is a positive thing, which Mr. H. and Mr. B. will by no means indure; for then (say they) it must be God, unless it be granted to be his Creature. Thus the Brethren betray each other, and each himself, both in­to most frightful and inextricable streights.

6. Inconsistent with them and with himself too.6. That we may not be able to wrong the meaning of Mr. VV. he gives his reason for his blasphemy: [For if he neither intends it, nor hath any hand at all in effecting it, how shall it make for his glory? p. 26.] Elsewhere he saith, God hath an efficiency in sin, and a hand in sin; but now he tells us in plainer terms, God hath a hand in effecting sin. Then sin (it seems) is the effect, of which God is the effici­ent; and yet at other times they tell us, that sin hath no efficient, but onely a deficient cause. So irreconcilable they are with one another, and with themselves. As the wick­ed men effect sin, Mr. VV. grants it dishonours God. And therefore to the end that it may make for his glory, M. VV. [Page 91]tell us, he himself must have a hand in effecting of it; for so he expostulates, if he doth not do so, how shall it make for his glory? A well-taught child would answer thus; If sin cannot make for Gods glory, unless God hath a hand in effecting it, then the first cannot be, because the second is impossible. So common it is for those men to begin their reasonings at the wrong end; witness this last violen­tum.

7. He frames not his Propositions to the nature of God, but the nature of God to his Proposi­tions:7. What at first he saith God may do, he now inferreth that he must do. And what is that, but to will and work sin, and to have a hand in effecting it? how else (saith he) shall it make for his glory? that is, how else shall Mr. VV's principle be true? Mr. VV's maximes must be true, though God must be blasphemed to help make them out. The original of his error I shewed long since, in his not apprehending what is meant by Gods taking occasion to glorifie himself, partly by punishing, partly by pardoning, partly by ordering the sins of men. In all which cases it is not sin, but Gods justice in punishing, his mercy in par­doning, and his wisdom in ordering, which do make for his glory.

Sect. 15.

Mr. VV's next thing, which I know not what to call, but is called by him a fifth Argument in his margin, is the same which was spoken by Mr. B. to whom I gaveSee the Div. Philanth. ch. 3. p. 129. to. p. 140. a large Answer; and the same which was spoken by the Superintendent Mr. Hobbs in his egregiousNum. 12. p. 107. lin. 1. Animadversi­ons (or rather Tergiversations) on the learned Bishops Re­ply; nay the same which was spoken by Mr. VV. himself, no longer ago then p. 23. to which I gave a whole Section in the close of my first Chapter. And it amounts to no more then an expression of his fear, that God will be found an Idle Spectator, and an Idle Beholder, (they are his own words) unless hebe granted to will and work sin. Against which he proceeds to frame, and answer an Objection; which that he may answer the less unhappily, he fashions it to himself in these following words.

Sect. 16.

1. His great forge­ry in that little which he cites. Sect. 16. [Mr. P. thinks to shift himself from this argu­ment by telling us, That God doth wisely order and dis­pose of sin after the committing of it, but doth not deter­min that it shall be done, or hath any hand in the doing, p. 26.] 1.’ These words he cites from my Div. Philan. Def. c. 3. p. 129. where I cannot find them, nor in any o­ther page of any thing which I have written: So that here I must demand more reparations for more injury. My words were these; [That God, besides his permitting of our sins, doth dispose and order them to the best Advantage.] VVhat Mr. VV. hath foisted in, and how he hath forged the whole period, I need not say; the Reader sees it.

2. His foul sense of Gods deter­mining that sin shall be done.2. God, according to his praescience that sin would be volun­tarily done, if not miraculously hindered, did determin not to hinder, & so consequentially or conditionally, that sin should be done by his permission, that is, God determined to permit it to be done. Where permission, not sin, is the object of Gods determination. But Mr. B's Doctrine was, (and Mr. VV's is) that God did absolutely and antecedently determin its being done, and determin the wills of men to do it, and that he could not foresee it but because he decreed it, and that his will of evil was as efficacious as his will of good. In a word, that he doth so determine its being done, as to have an efficiency and a hand in the doing of it. Nay in plain terms, that he doth work it. And working (we know) is acting, doing, causing, at least designing, or contriving sin.

3. His impious expression of Gods having a hand in sin, and the impor­tance of that phrase.3. VVhat he means by Gods determining sin, he explains in the next words, by his having a hand in it; which is a most formidable expression, and never enough to be dete­sted. For he who only permits sin cannot be said to have an hand in it. Nor 2. he who suffers another to tempt for the exercise of the constancy, or patience, of a Job, or a Jo­seph. Nor 3. he who withdraws grace for sin committed, to punish former despights which had been done to grace given. Nor 4. he who delivers up to Satan by way of Discipline, to bring unto Repentance the Presumptuous, or the Secure. But to have a hand in sin, is to be a partner in [Page 93]it, or an Accessory, whether by commanding, or counselling, or contriving, or countenancing, or carrying on the business by secret impul [...]ons and excitations; all which are but a few of our Adversaries phrases. And because Mr. W. is a frequent user of this expression, I will once for all desire my Rea­der to note the horrible importance of it. It is the obser­vation of the most Learned who have commented upon Scripture, that Gods great efficacy in working is expressed by Finger; his greater efficacy by Hand; his greatest by Arm. When Moses turned the dust of Egypt into Lice by the power of God, shewing it self in his weakness, the Magicians told Pharaoh, It was the Exod. 8.19. which com­pare with Luk. 11.20. finger of God. When Job spake of Gods power by which he created the world, and by which he doth sustain it, he said,Job 12.9. which com­pare with Act. 11.21. The hand of the Lord had wrought it. And when the Mother of our Lord would express the very greatest, that is, the most to be admired of all Gods works, his own conception and Incarnation in the Body of Mary, she said that God had shewed strength with his Luk. 1.51. Arm. And so without more ado I leave my Reader to judge both of the phrase and meaning of Mr. W. when he saith that God hath a hand in sin; which because I denied and disproved also, Mr. W. tells me again, what he told me twice before, that God is inferred to be a meer Spectator. Observe his words.

Sect. 17.

1. Mr. W's gross error in the no­tion of Gods permission. [ But then still it followes, that he stands as a meer spectator in regard of the greatest part of actions that are done in the world. — But how can this stand with the All-wise and All-working providence of God, (with­out which a sparrow falls not to the ground) that he should stand looking on, &c. and determine: nor do any thing while they be done and past, onely afterwards imploy his wisdom in ordering of them? p. 26, 27.]’ Though 'twere sufficient to refer him to what I have said of Gods permis­sion in divers Tracts already publisht, which if he hath read, he is utterly inexcusable for what he here so crudely, and yet so frequently, venteth: yet I will tell him once more, what I told him so lately (Chap. 1. Sect. 6.) but onely [Page 94]now I will do it in plainer terms, that I may leave him no pretence of misapprehending or overseeing my mean­ing in it. I do not mean that God permits sin with such a neglectfulness, and unconcernedness, as the Epicureans are wont to dream of, who feign a God sitting with his back towards the world; but I mean a most useful and a most wise Permission, becoming the wisdom as well as goodness of that onely wise God, who will not hinder what he sees, and hateth perfectly while he sees it, because it is better that he should bring that good out of evil which he can and doth, then that he should not suffer any evil to be done. I never speak of a bare permission, as that excludes every thing else, but onely as it excludes Gods working, or decreeing, or willing sin. God doth not onely permit, but punish evil, and dispose of it to good, as the murdering of Christ to the salvation of the world: yet God had no more a hand in that de villish murder, (non impediendo efficaciter) then I have a hand in the falling down of any house which I do not underprop.

2. His tremendous notion of all-working pro­vidence:2. Mr. W. opposeth to a meer looking on, the all-work­ing Providence of God, which is the language of the Li­bertines, without any distinction of good or evil, and shews us what he means by Gods having a hand in all the wicked­ness of the world. The instance he gives of a sparrow falling to the ground is most impertinent to the subject of his ciscourse, unlesse he can prove it to be a sin for a spar­row so to fall, which if he could do, he w [...]uld also prove that God doth neither will nor work it. His following words are most insipid, because he knowes 'tis granted, that God did foresee sin before it was; and sustains the Being of his creature whilest 'tis committing; and being committed, overruleth it also to some advantage. But what is this to hisThis hath been spoken of ch. 1. sect. 2. determining the will of the sinner to the sin, which is the boldly-irreligious Tenet, of which its Pa­trons cannot give us any excusable accompt?

Sect. 18.

1. M. W. newly puts himself in­to his old streights, be­twixt gross Blasphemies and extraordi­nary Imperei­nence. Mr. W. professeth to give instances in some of his former examples, and so with a bare repetition fils up the [Page 95][page 27. and part of p. 28.] That I may not repeat, as he hath done, I send back my Reader to the fifth Section of my first Chapter. Onely here I observe, he saith that God had the chief hand in Josephs being sent into Egypt. If he means his brethrens sin in selling Joseph to strangers, (not knowing or caring to what place they would carry him) then the blasphemy is apparent: if he means not that, but another thing, Gods doing good unto Joseph in his affliction, then the impertinence is as signal. As if when the question is, whether the Physician hath any hand in the Patients Disease, the Respondent should say, Yes, he hath the chief hand, because he is not onely a spectator, or looker on, but administers such things as cure his malady, and perhaps restores him to better health then before he fell sick. I have reason to be as weary of disputing with such Respondents, as any workman could be at the Tower of Babel; where when he call'd for stone, he was suppli­ed with morter, and when for morter, they brought him stone.

2. Affirms God to have a hand in oppression;2. Mr. W. goes on to Pharaohs oppression of the Israe­lites, which he affirmeth God to have had aNote that in his Preface to his Extent of Gods Provi­dence, he pro­fesseth to un­derstand it of Gods active hand. hand in, be­cause he had determin'd it, and foretold it many years be­fore. What [it] doth he mean that God determin'd? If Pharaohs will to his oppression, behold the blasphemy; if the permission of the oppression, mark well the impertinence. To foretel is far from having a hand in the event. The Physician foretells when his Patient shall have a paroxysme in a Chronical disease, even whilest he is prescribing the usual means of prevention. Mr. W. must study the difference betwixt the end of an intention, the event of a Prophecy, and the effect of a cause; and not imagine that Isaiah had any hand in the birth of Cyrus, because he fore­told it an hundred years before Cyrus was born.

3. And in rebelli­on.3. Mr. W. saith, that God had a hand in that, which is call'd rebellion, 1 Kings 12.19. And to say that he saith this, is a word enough for the wise. Again, that God hand a hand in the destruction of Samaria, Is. 10.3. But what then? was it a sin for God to destroy such sinners, who were the people [Page 96]of his wrath, because hypocritical, v. 6? And might he not do it by what instrument he pleased, by giving a right, as he did to Israel over the Canaanites, or by permitting the violence, as he did to Assyria over Israel? But what hath Mr. VV. got by this? was Assyria the happier for being the Rod of Gods anger, v. 5? No; the Rod, when it is used, is commonly cast into the Fire; and to be burnt is worse then to be beaten.

4. In murders, treacheries, vi­olence and wrong.4. Mr. W. saith farther p. 28. That when dominion hath been devolved from one hand to another, it hath seldom been done without much violence and wrong, yea, without murders, treacheries, and blood-shed. To which he presently addes, that God had a hand in such things. If he means in those unjust things, he speaks according to his Principles as well as Mr. Hobbs; if otherwise, he is but impertinent. I wish that that were the worst. But because it is said, that God doth give Kingdomes to whom he will (Dan. 4.14.) he must be brought to a remembrance, that God is some­times said to give Kingdomes in the Letter, as when he gave Israel the land of Canaan: but sometimes onely by an Hebraism, as when he permitted the Assyrians to hold his people in captivity for seventy years; though I do not remember that God was ever said in Scripture to have given the Kingdom of Israel unto Assyria. Besides, God giveth riches to whom he will, yet gives it not literally to them that steal, to them that seize on their neighbours goods by fraud, or violence. For then whosoever hath the strongest arm, and hath added to that the longest sword, might live among [...] his neighbours like a great Pike in a Pond, and say he doth but take what God hath given him. The King of Spain and the Great Turk would probably love to hear such Preachers, as would thus promote the universality of their Empire. And the later proceeds upon the very same Maxime with Mr. W.

5. He justifies all our English Ranters by a­scribing all our changes to the hand of God.5. Wh [...]t is added touching the changes which have happened here at home, I need not speak unto at all. It being cle [...]r already, that as all actions are wicked which are against the will of God, revealed to us in his command­ments, [Page 97](affirmative and negative,) so God abhorrs all such, and is so far from having a hand in them, that he will certainly lift up his hand against them, if not remarkably in this world, yet infallibly in the next: for the longer he is in lifting up his hand, he lifts it up so much the higher, and by so much more heavily he lets it fall. How quick­ly do mens opinions run out of their heads into their hearts, and thence into their hands too, I mean, their actions? I am persuaded that Mr. W. had hardly taken a se­questration, if he had not believed that God had had a hand in it.

6. God cleared from careles­ness or weak­ness.6. But mark how he goes on: To deny that God hath a hand (in the proper subject of our debate) were (saith he) to make God a very weak and impotent, or a very re­miss and careless Governour of the world, &c. p. 28. Bona verba quaeso. Ne saevi, magne Sacerdos. Must it be weak­ness in God not to have a hand in wickedness? No, 'tis an argument of his power, as well as purity. See the prodigious groundlesness of speaking thus concerning God, exhibited at large in the sixth Section of my first Chapter, and in the seventeenth of this. God indeed gives man his power to will, and to do: but man being left [in manu consilii sui] in the hand of his own counsel, doth determine his will to such and such actions as God forbids, rather then to such as God commands, to wit, Adulteries, Murders, Extortions, and the like. As God forbids these actions which are sins, so he gives Grace to abstain from the doing of them, and all things else, except an irresistible impeding of us. He farther disposeth and or­dereth the things done to good, and that in many respects, as I haveSee the Sin­ner impleaded, part. 2. ch. 2. p. 262. elsewhere shewed. This in all, but more in some, of whom we have Pharaoh for an example, whom he did not onely withdraw his Grace from, but condemn­ed also to live, (when he might have sent him as quick into hell, as he did Corah and his company) being deliver­ed up finally unto an utter obduration, I will shut up this Paragraph with that of Moses to Israel, Deut. 9.4. Speak not thou in thine heart, For my righteousness the Lord hath brought me [Page 98]in to possess this landVers. 5. Not for thy righteousness, or for the uprightness of thine heart, dost thou possesse it, but for the wickedness of these Nations the Lord doth drive them out from before thee. Ves. 6. Not for thy righteous [...]ess, for thou art a stiff-necked people.

Sect. 19.

God hath no hand in w l­ling or effecting what he hates. M.W. now proceeds to undertake a new Objection which he doth not cite from any part of my writings, or any mans else; but it seems it is such as he thought he could an­swer, and 'tis briefly this: God hates all sin, and therefore can have no hand at all either in willing or effecting of i [...]; for no man will have any hand in doing what he hates, p. 28.]’ First, I observe he doth not deny what is objected, in so much as he owns it to be his Doctrine, that God hath a hand in willing and effecting what he hates. Secondly, I observe that he doth not answer the Objection, but onely puts [Answ.] before his words, which are partly an Eva­sion or Tergiversation, and partly a Grant of the thing ob­jected. The Evasion is thus, [Though he hates it, yet he permits it.] And why is he said to permit sin, which he hates, rather then to permit righteousness, which he loves, but be­cause he hath not any hand in the former, as he hath in the later? And what an Argumentator must he be thought, who goes to prove that God doth will and work s [...]n, by saying, he permits it? that is in effect, because he neither wills, nor works it? His reason is worse, which is taken from Gods getting glory by sin, ibid. for God gets nothing by any mans righteousness (if we speak exactly) much less by his sins. Or if we may say by a Figure, that God gets glory by our thanksgivings, yet sure by our blasphemies he gets nothing but dishonour. Because God takes occasion of doing good, upon our doing evil, (which good conduceth to his glory) it seems Mr. W. is of opinion, that God gets glory by the evil: then which I cannot imagine a more in­tolerable mistake.A case put to shew the dan­ger of Mr. W's Doctrine. He who concludes he is a vessel of absolute election, and that he cannot fall totally or finally from Grace, may corrupt himself strangely by such a maxime, as that sin makes for. Gods glory, or that God [Page 99]may get himself glory by it; and be apt to plead, upon his committing of adultery or incest, that he did not do it as 'twas forbidden by the word (which isThis is the Doctrine of Dr. Twisse & others, parti­cularly own­ed by Mr. W. p. 47. improperly called the will of God, say they,) but as God did secretly will it, as it made for Gods glory, or to the end that God might get himself some glory by it. He did it not out of lust, or as a sin, but to procreate a Saint, and increase the num­ber of the godly, and withal to glorifie that discriminating mercy, which could not be exercised in the pardoning of such sins, if they were not committed by them in whom they are capable of being pardoned, that is to say, by the Elect. I put this Case, to fright men out of those pre­misses, from which (if God restrain them not) they have been known by experience to draw such horrible conclusi­ons. And had I not been able to give examples, I should not have thought this method needful. Mr. W. tells us plain enough, (both p. 26. and here too) that so far as sin makes for Gods glory, God may both Note that all are his own ex­pressions, [...].26, & 28. which must be com­pared: to which pur­pose, look on what I h [...]ve said sect. 14. of this Chapter. will, and * work it, and have a hand in [...] effecting, or * working of it. And though sin be in it self evil, yet it may have some respect of * good. As for that which he calls a true Rule, and what he hath out of Austin against himself, I will not exagi­tate his unhappinesse therein, (as I must also forbear to do it in many other particulars,) meerly for fear I should be endless.

Sect. 20.

Mr. W. proceeds to a sixth Argument, wherby he proves his great willingness to prove that God hath efficien­cy and hand in sin; Mr. W's dan­gerous mis-ap­prehension of that figurative Sentence, That God doth pu­nish sin with sia. but more then his willingness to prove it, he proveth not. For his Argument is but this, [ That God punisheth one sin with another; and punishment is more then a bare permission. It were ridiculous to say, that a Judge onely permitteth a malefactor to be arraigned, con­demned, and executed, p. 28. lin. ult. p. 29. lin. 1, 2, 3, 4.]’ First, it is not any where said in Scripture, that God doth punish one sin with another; but 'tis a sentence of the School­men, as commonly known to be catachrestical as any beg­gar knowes his own dish, and hath neither truth nor [Page 100] sense in it, unless it be figuratively meant. For God pu­nisheth the sinner and not the sin. Nor doth he imprint sin on him as the Lictor doth stripes, but withdraws his grace, and leaves the sinner to himself, whereupon he sin­neth without restraint. But I have spoken of this inSee the Sin­ner Impleaded, c. 1. p. 9. a­nother place, where I have also recorded S. Austins suf­frage for the truth.

2. His making God the proper cause of the greatest sins.2. But Mr. W. hath so prodigiously misunderstood that sentence, or else so guiltily dissembled his understanding, as to express Gods punishing of sin with sin by the positive actions of a Judge, in his arraign­ing, condemning, and execution of malefactors: which is to make God the Author and proper cause of the greatest sins in the world, such as are the later sins which are called the punishments of the former. It being frequently the Do­ctrine of Mr. W. that of all positive actions God is the Au­thor and Ext. of Gods Prov. c. 4. p. 11. proper cause. But Idolatries, and Adulteries, Blasphemies, and Murders, and the sins not to be named (Rom. 1.26.) are positive actions, and punishments, in the Schoolmens sense; and so according to Mr. W. God is blasphemously inferred to be their Author and proper cause.

3. Which he also extends to the very sin of the act.3. Now we see what moved him to say in print, [That God must Ibid. p. 12. Iin. 1, 2. needs some way both will and work in the sin of the Act.] Mark well, good Reader: He doth not say (as at other times) the act of sin, or the sinful act, but the sin of the act, meaning the pravity, and deformity and obliquity it self, as he explains himself in the next two lines, where­in he saith that God gets glory to himself by that very pra­vity and deformity.

4. He treads a step beyond Calvins worst.4. Mr. W. in this doth tread a step beyond Calvin, not onely"†" Calv. Instit. l. 1. c. 18. sect. 1. fol. 68. followes him through thick and thin. For though Mr. Calvin speaks broadly, [ ‘that the wicked man, whilest he acteth, isId. ib. sect. 2. fol. 69. Apparet cer â destinatione Dei fuis­se impulsos. Fateor quidem interpositâ Satanae operâ saepe Deum agere in Repre­bis; sed ut e jus impulsu Satan ipse suas partes agat. — unde hoc, nisi quod à Deo manat efficacia erroris, ut mendacium credant? &c. Ibid. Summa haec sit, quum Dei voluntas dicitur rerum omnium esse cause, — ut non tantùm vim suam exerat in electis, sed etiam reprobos in obsequium cogat. Ibid. Et jam satis apertè ostendi, Deum vocari eorum omnium Authorem, quae isti censores volunt otioso tan­tum ejus permissu contingere. Id. ib. sect. 3. p. 7. acted by God; and that the Assyri­ans [Page 101]were thrust on [to rob and plunder by the sure desti­nation of God; and that God doth act in the reprobates by the interposition of Satan's help; that Satan by God's im­pulse may act his own part also; and that the efficacy of er­ror proceeds from God; and that when he casts men into fil­thy desires, he is the chief Author of his just vengeance, (that is, of sin in Mr. W's sense) and Satan onely the Minister; and that the will of God is the cause of all things; and that his providence doth not onely exert its force in the elect who are ruled by his holy Spirit, but doth also compell the reprobates to be obsequious; and that God is called the Author of all those things which the censori­ous will have to happen by his idle permission onely: though these are frightful expressions, and applied in such a manner as not to be capable of excuse, yet Mr. VV. (as I shewed) hath stept beyond him.’

5. TheVeteres religiosiù interdum simplicem veritatis confessionem in hac parte reformidant. — Ne Augustinus quidem illâ super­st [...]tione interdum solutus est, quemadmodum ubi dicit, indura­tionem & excaecationem non ad operationem Dei, sed ad praesci­entiam spectare. Calv. Inst. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. fol. 95. Ancient Fathers were afraid to ascribe that to God's working which they saw could onely be the object of his praescience, and his permission; and this by the confession of Mr. Calvin himself, who as he calls it their superstition, so he confesseth that S. Austin was not alwayes free from it. But Mr. Calvin in de­spight of the Fathers piety, which he brands with the Title of Superstition, doth very dogmati­cally pronounce of those later sins of men which are called the punishments of the former, that as they are pu­nishments, God isIdem. l. 1. c. 18. Sect. 2. Author praecipuus, the prime or chief Author, and that the Devil is onely subservient to him, Satan verò tantù Minister. And though he saith that the Ancients were somewhat too religious in their fear of speaking the simple truth, (as he calls it) yet he confesseth their fear was very sober, because the thing which they feared was theIdem ib. l. 2. c. 4. Sect. 3. fol. 95. opening a passage unto impiety, of irreve­rently defaming the works of God. Now what it was which misled Mr. VV. and Mr. B. from that holy fear of those Fathers, to speak of God in such a fearless and frightful [Page 102]man­ner, (as I have partly already shewed, and am partly to shew in my following Chapter) I believe most Readers do judge as I do.

Sect. 21.

1. The desperate nature of Mr. u's Salvo's, and the hard­ness of his ve­ry emollients. Mr. W. having now done with the prime part of his enterprise, wherein he hath often made God to be the Author of sin, and often very much worse, goes on talking to himself, from p. 29. to p. 35. in an indeavoured excuse of what he hath hitherto delivered. And in the very entrance on that attempt, he makes himselef unex­cusable, by dropping out such excuses as stand in need of an excuse, but cannot find one. 1. Though Gods per­mission of sin is an operative permission (saith Mr. W.) yet he is not the Author of the evil permitted. His reason is, because what the wicked do wickedly, God doth holily, p. 29. Which is only to say, that God is not the Author of sin in Himself, not that he is not the Author of sin in others. The Question is not whether God is a Transgressor, but whether he makes men Transgressors, as Zuinglius pub­lickly affirmeth. Not whether David's lying with Bath­shebah was a good Adultery, and so no sin, in as much as it was the work of God, and in as much as God did impel him to it (as Zuinglius also speaks.) This is not the Question, but the sordid begging of the Question, and a taking that for granted, which we deny and abominate with all our might, as most blasphemous and irrational. The Questi­on is, whether God impelled David to that Adultery, or did work in the sin of that act, (as Mr. W. speaks) which whilest I deny as a most impious and a most senseless pro­position, he must first of all prove and make apparent, be­fore he comes to infer upon it, that the very same thing which man doth wickedly God doth holily and justly: For God doth it not at all, nor can he do it, because he is God.

2. What he saith of the Physicians occasioning the sick­ness, yea the death of the Patient, 2. by giving Physick which meets wi ha malignant Humour, who yet cannot be said to be the Author of those effects, p. 29, 30. is as impertinent [Page 103]a similitude as he could easily have chosen, and shews he considers not of what he speaks, or understands not any thing of the word Author, or seeks to amuse his illiterate Reader.

3. He hopes to excuse himself by uttering these follow­ing Aphorismes, 3. which pass with him for fan and soft and suppling speeches. 1. God may be said to administer oc­casions of sinning, and so to have some kind of hand in it, The mollifying expressions of the harsh spea­ker. by his word, and by his works, p. 30. 2. The Law hath an efficacy in stirring up sinful motions, p. 30. 3. The good word of God doth accidentally stir up the corruption that is in mens wicked hearts, p. 31. 4. Christs preaching, and Stephens preaching had an EFFICIENCY in stirring up the wrath of their Hearers, p. 31. 5. The good word of God doth stir up evil affections in the hearts of wicked men, p. 31.’ Thus he puts upon himself that thick and palpable Fallacy, non causae pro causâ. Because when the word of God is preached, the evil affections of the wicked are stirred up, he concludes that Gods word doth stir them up. As if my writing were the cause of those things which come to pass when I am writing. Again, he doth not distinguish betwixt the giving of occasions, and taking occasions when none are given. God hath spoken and done those exceeding good things, from which men have snatched an occasion of evil; but to administer or give occasions of doing wickedly, is so ill a phrase, that it is very unskilfully applyed to God (to say no worse.) And I had hoped that these times had taught the unlearnedst to distinguish betwixt Scandalum datum, & acceptum; Acceptum, sed non datum. Though David was pardoned his sin of Adultery, yet because by that deed he had given great occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme, his Infant Child did surely dye, 2 Sam. 12.13, 14. If Mr. W. did not consider that there is such a thing as the sin of scan­dal, or did not know what scandal is, and wherein it stands, he may both know and consider it another time. He, who in doing what is lawful, intends to make another man sin, as well as he who doth it by doing what is unlawful, with­out [Page 304]out intending any such thing, is properly said to give occasion, to scandalize, to lay a snare in his Brothers way.

4. His open pro­fession that Gods secret wil is contrary to his revealed will, in respect of the very same objects.4. I am urged to enlarge upon another passage in Mr. W. where he saith, that the wicked in their evil actions doe that which is contrary to the revealed will of God, though the same things which he wills, viz. by his secret will which they know not, p. 34. But I count the number of my pages, and am exhorted to spend but little time against a man of no greater strength, and have already acquainted him with enough of his unhappiness; and whatsoever I shall omit of his other misadventures, I shall abundantly meet with in my Account of Mr. Barlee and Mr. Hick. whom I intend for the Subjects of the following Chapter.

CHAP. III. Of Mr. Barlee's forging God to be the Author of Sin, and very much worse then so too, in his very endea­vours to speak as warily as his Principles will suffer him.

Sect. 1.

BEing now to consider the Doctrinal part of Mr. Barlee's Book, which he Intitles, A Necessary Vindication, or full Ab­stersion, I must begin with his Third Chapter: where omitting his Buffonery, (as that which serves to no end, but to proclaim him to the world for [Page 105]the most lantentable Zanie that ever pretended to stir up laughter) I will immediately address my self to the unco­vering of his Doctrines; and of those in the first place, which have most endear'd him to Mr. Whitfield, by forging God to have a hand in all the wickedness in the World with­out exception; and not onely to be the Author, but (which is much more frightful) the Necessitator of sin.

His first Abstersion in this kind (for so he was resolved to word it,His acknow­ledgment of the crime for which be Apologizeth. and the Printer it seems did let him have his own will) is a plain acknowledgment of the Crime with which he stands charged. For ofDiv. Philan. c. 3. from p. 1 [...]3. to p. 139. all those Authors and Assertions which I objected to Mr. B. as to a Follower and a Disciple, he professeth to disown no more then two. His words are these, [I will onely except against monstrous Leviathan Hobbs, and the Book which he calls Comfort for Believers. These I disown from ever having been my Ma­sters, c. 3. p. 7.] Away with these two then; they are ex­cepted against. But for Zanchie, Borrhaus, Piscator, Be­za, Zuinglius, and Martyr, and all the other ingredients in that long Catalogue, Mr. B. avows them to be his Masters. Ingenuum est agnoscere per quos profeceris. But it is taught by those Authors, (in the veryIbid. pages by him cited) That both the Reprobates and the Elect were preordained to sin as sin; That God is the Author of sin in general, of Mur­der and Adultery in particular; That he is the cause of sin; and in particular the cause of Incredulity; That God doth thrust men on unto wickedness, and the like. There­fore these and the rest (from p. 133. to p. 139.) are avow­edly the Doctrines of Mr. Barlee. And why Mr. Hobbs is out of favour, who hath not spoken so noisomly as these have done (for ought I have hitherto observed) I cannot guess at the reason, unless he hath offended by his compa­rative reservedness.

Sect. 2.

1. He contradicts his own and his Readers eyes, without the least possibility of gaining by it. His next Abstersion (c. 3. p. 11.) hath the un­happiness to begin with a very bold falshood, in contradi­ction to his ovvn and his Readers eyes. For he professeth [ every where (in his Correp. Correction) to have careful­ly [Page 106]distinguished these three things; least possibility of gaining by it. 1. The material part of sin, 2. The formal part of sin, 3. The ruling and over­ruling the sin and sinner. This he professeth to have done in all the places which I directed unto, and fears not to say, that his heedful Readers may easily see it. Either he is con­fident of no such Readers, or else he hath a worse con­fidence to affirm point-blank he cares not what: For when he spake of Gods tempting men to sin, p. 79. he said, he was not at leisure to tell in what sense: nay, he did perempto­rily pronounce, that God doth not onely determine all things and actions (without exception) but their several modalities too: and that of all such modalities God is the supreme cause, p. 86, 87.’ So that according to Mr. B. God was not onely the Determiner and soveraign Cause of David's lying with Bathshebah, which was a Thing or Action, but of every Circumstance or Modality, and so of the sinfulness it self, the application of David's will to the forbidden object, and of every point of Aggravation with which the Adultery was loaded. Now though the broad-est-mouth'd. Libertine must study hard to speak worse, yet this was one of Mr. B's. most careful speeches.

2. He professeth his care for the clearing of God from having any efficiency in sin, 2. His inconsisten­cy with himself, with Mr. W. and Mr. Hick. as such (p. 11.) yet it was flatly his language, as well as Mr. VV's. (p. 24.) that God must needs have some efficiency in sin. And his Masters say, in sin as sin, as hath been shewed. If by the word [as such] he means another modality, then he either con­tradicts what was so lately cited from him, or else it is his Divinity, that God is the cause of sin as such. But this again is a contradiction to his clearing God from it. If he means (as Mr. VV.) that God doth will and work sin, not as it is sin, but as it makes for Gods glory; then he is liable to all those miseries into which Mr. VV. hath plunged himself, and condemns himself out of his own mouth, as well as out of Mr. VV's. and Mr. Hick. out of both. In a word, he is ruined seven several wayes; for an Acquain­tance with which I send him back to my second Chapter Sect. 14.

But. 3. Let us come to the utmost of his Acumen and his Care. He saith, [that the material part of sin, 3. He betrayes himself many ways in his very provision for an escape. Look forward on Sect. 7. and 12. of this Chapter. is the doing or leaving undone some positive natural or moral act, and of that he calls God the soveraign Author, p. 11.] So that if Davids Adultery or lying with Bathshebah was a positive act either natural or moral (which he cannot deny) he is declaredly of opinion, that God was the soveraign Author of it. Again, he calls it a part of sin, whilest he calls it the material part of sin; and addes, that God is the Author of it: but every part of the whole must needs par­ticipate the nature of the whole, (especially in Accidents:) and even so he makes God to be the Author of sin, not on­ly in equivalence, but even in those very terms. Nor will it help him to say, materiale▪ substratum; for by that he must mean either the substance or the action, either David him­self, or his lying with Bathshebah. If the former, he is un­done; for 'tis to say, that a substance is a part of an acci­dent, and that David himself was a part of his Adultery. If he flies unto the later, he is worse undone then in the former; for 'tis to say, that the Action which is confessed­ly positive, is a part of that which (according to him and Mr. Hick.) is meerly privative; and that Davids lying with Bathshebah was but part of his Adultery, or at least that his Adultery was but part of his sin. If to avoid these Absurdities, he shall say the very truth, that the Action it self, to wit, Davids lying with Bathshebah, was indeed his whole Adultery, and so his whole sin; then his miseries are as pressing as when he spake the greatest falshood, un­less he cry peccavi, and yield the whole cause: For either he must deny that Davids lying with Bathshebah was a po­sitive thing, or say that God was the Author of it (as here he doth) or else he must say that Sin is God (which is his own Inference, c. 3. p. 112.) or he must spit in the face of his pious friend Mr. Hick. who betrayed him to that sense­less blasphemous Inference. Now let him go which way he pleaseth, he vvill find in conclusion (perhaps before I have done vvith him) that the last of the four is much the safest.

4. He saith that God is but a permissor of the [...], wherein he speaks as I would have him.4. He knows not how to dissent from my Do­ctrine, but by charging God as the author of sin. Again, he speaks my sense in the third particular, of Gods governing, ruling, and over-ruling both the sin and the sinner. So that our dif­ference must lie in the first particular of the three, or there is no difference at all, but he is exactly of my opi­nion. If this later, why then was I the subject of his Cor­reptory Correction? if the former, he is the subject of his own. For he knows I ever granted, that the Being of the Creature depends on God, and so the power to act, as well as liberty to chuse. It must therefore be in somewhat else that Mr. B. thinks fit to differ from me. And what can that be but this, that God doth determin the will of the sin­ner to the sin, and is the Author either of doing, or omit­ting, those things which are not to be done, or left undon? the very blasphemy with which I charged him.

5. He doth professe to make God the soveraign Author of doing, 5. He grants the whole charge, or understands not a moral act. or leaving undon, not onely natural, but moral acts. So that in case he knows the difference betwixt a natural and moral act, he must acknowledge it for his Doctrine, that God is the soveraign Author of all sins, both of omission and commission.

6. Yet no sooner hath this Abstersor divided sin into two parts, 6. He ingulfs him­self in contra­dictions on the right hand, and on the left. (material and formal) but straight he addes, that the second alone is properly sin, (p. 11.) and so in one short breath he implies a couple of contradictions. For if he means, the second part is alone the whole sin, how then is it a part? if he means that that alone is part of the sin, how then is it a second? He must either prove, that two parts are but one part, or that one onely is both together, or that one half is the whole, or that the whole is no more then the formal part; or else he must confess, that 'tis impossible to separate the act from the sin (as David's lying with Bath­shebah from his [...] for breach of precept) and that Mr. Hick. hath abus'd him more then any man living, by making him lean upon a weapon which is often running through his elbow.

Sect. 3.

He is asham'd to cite his own words truly. His third Abstersion defiles him all over, and proves him conscious to himself of such a guilt, as admit­teth of nothing in its excuse. He pretendeth onely to have said, [ He was not at leisure in reference to Jam. 1.13, 14. fully to open in what sense God may seem, and yet not be the Author of sin, p. 11.]’ But his words were quite otherwise, how God may be said to Correp. Corr. p. 79. tempt men un­to sin. Which here he durst not repeat, but puts the word seem to supply the place of that Blasphemy.

And here six things are very observable. 1. That he thought it a blasphemy beyond his power even to palliate, 1. He proves him­self conscious to himself of being left with­out excuse. to have charged God with being a Tempter, and a Tempter unto sin too. For why should he falsifie his own words, if he thought them innocent? why had he not the courage to be honest in the citation, if he thought his words had been excusable. He could not think it a gallant thing to be caught condemning himself in print without a confession that he had erred: and therefore he anchored upon this, as his lesser miserie of the two, hoping perhaps that I might probably overlook it; and of all other Readers he was secure, that they would not compare his second book with his first.

2. It was strange that he had the leisure to write a book of thirty sheets, the leisure to rail, and to raise reports,2. He pretends a want of leisure to excuse or extenuate his blasphemy. the leisure to charge God impiously with the tempting of men to sin, but not the leisure to shew how, so as not to infer him the Author of sin: at leisure to lay a stumbling-blook before the people, but not at leisure to remove it out of the way. It was highly for his interest, to have in­devoured the clearing of those words from blasphemy; why then was he wanting in any the least of such indeavours? even because he found it a most unfaisible attempt. But in­stead of confessing it was impossible to be done, he thought it handsomer to say, he had not leisure to do it in.

3. Be it so that he was not at leisure in his first book,3. Yet be baulks it in his second book, wherein he pretends a vindication, and cannot pre­tend a want of leisure. yet how comes it to passe he was not at leisure in his se­cond? Does he think it a vindication, to let us know that he is capable of no excuse? or will he say that nothing [Page 110] ayles him, because he is desperately sick? Either let him repent, and make some publick satisfaction for calumnia­ting God as a Tempter unto sin, or let him try to reconcile it with the analogy of faith, or let him declare himself a Libertine without delay. And if he writes another book, I do early bespeak him to be at leisure, and to repeat his own words without further fraud, or Tergiversa­tion.

4. Had he onely said that God doth tempt men,4. He forgeth God to be a Satan, and shewes the bottom of his doctrine of Gods decrees. he might have opened in what sense, by saying not unto sin. But having specified the object, as well as the act, by saying he tempts men to sin, he hath left nothing to be opened; having opened his whole heart, and shewed us the inside, the kernel, the very marrow of his Divinity, as to the sub­ject of our debate. For to tempt men unto sin, is the de­finition of Satan, and the worst that we can say of the Devil himself. The word tentare of it self is very in­nocent, and signifies to prove, or to try, or to bring as 'twere unto the Touch-stone. But when applied unto sin, it onely signifies to seduce, or debauch the person that is tempted. Vincentius Lirinensis, out of the Latine Trans­lation Deut. 13.3. doth read the Text thus,Sed objici potest, cur à Deo non pro­hibetur doce­ri, quod à Deo prohibetur au­diri? Quia (inquit) Ten­tat vos Deus. Vin. Lir. cap. 15. quia tentat vos Deus, and that is all; he doth not adde, ad peccandum: and our English Translators have fitly rendred the passage thus, The Lord your God proveth you, to know whether you love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, Deut. 13.3. And in this sense it is that God is said to tempt Abraham, Gen. 22.1. that is, by way of proof and trial, as the Apostle himself explains it, Heb. 11.17. By Faith Abraham, when he was tried, offered up Isaac.

5. But to tempt men unto sin, 5. He sets himself against the Scripture, and flatly contra­dicts S. James in particular. is so far from being spoken of God in Scripture, that it saith the quite contrary in the very place by him cited, Let no man say when he is tem­pred, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man, Jam. 1.13. At such enmity Mr. B. doth stand with S. James, that what the Apostle saith we may not say of God Almighty, Mr. B. [Page 111]saith we may say of him. Let the Reader believe which of the two he thinks good. I for my part believe S. James.

For 6. To say that God doth tempt men to sin, 6. He implies the worst of con­tradictions, as well as blasphe­mies. implyes a dull contradiction, as well as Blasphemy. It ceasing eo ipso to be a sin, when God is said to tempt to it. Admit that God had bid Abraham to kill his Son (whereas he bad him onely offer him, Gen. 22.2. and distinctly forbad the killing of him, v. 12.) it had then been a sacrifice, and not a sin. Or had it then been a sin, Abraham must not have done it; or if he must, he must have been sinful by Gods command; it had been his duty to do wickedly, as some of our modern men teach. But as it is said to be impossible for God to lye, (Heb. 6.18.) because to lye is simply evil; and for God to do evil, implyes the worst contradiction: so is it also as impossible for God to tempt us unto sin, because to tempt unto sin is as simply evil, as to lye; and for God so to do, implyes the worst contradicti­on. Nay, the tempting men to sin, is one of the very worst sins which men or Devils can commit: which when Mr. B. ascribed to God, he was necessitated to say, he was not at leisure to tell in what sense. It being as much as to say, he was not at leisure to facilitate things impossible, to verifie falshood in its extremity, to reconcile both parts of a con­tradiction, and to make a blasphemy a very good business. To do these things, Mr. B. hath not been at leisure any time these three years, and yet as little at leisure to confess, and repent, and amend his life.

Sect. 4.

Since he is destitute of Excuses, 1. He is enraged that his mean­ing should be measured by his words. Look forwards on Sect. 27. where he is shewed con­fessing, what is properly the Author of sin. I will take some notice of his complaints. His first is, [that I was un­charitable and irrational in insinuating, that he would have done it in a way which would have aspersed God with mans sin, p. 11.]’ First, he knowes I did not expound his meaning, but alledge his words onely, his saying God may be said to tempt men unto sin; leaving every Reader to judge of his meaning by his words: for by his looks or dumb signs, I knew not how it was possible to guess his meaning. Was I irrational [...] this, that I recited his words, [Page 112]and medled not with his meaning, yet supposed his mea­ning to be according to his words? I know but one meaning or signification of his words; nor doth he yet so much as try to set down a second. Suppose a man shall affirm that four and four do make twelve, and I shall tell him he is mistaken, they make but eight; will he tell me I am irra­tional in insinuating his meaning to be as bad as his words? yet this is our case in other colours. Or when the Libertines said, God worketh all things without exception (which Mr. Beza said as well as they) was Mr. Calvin uncharitable, when he concluded theirLook back to chap. 1. Sect. 2. Num. 4. meaning to be blasphemous in three respects? I direct this Question to Mr. Barlee.

2. He slanders Antient and Modern both Papists and Protestants.2. He saith his words might be explained, as ancient and modern Interpreters, both Pontifician and Protestant, have done, p. 12. But yet he names not any one, either ancient or modern, in the writings of whom any such words are to be found, much less their Interpretings of any such words. And I require him to tell me of any one or more of them, who have said that God doth tempt men to sin, or who have shewed that such words may have a to­lerable meaning: or if he cannot do this, let him publick­ly satisfie for the slander which he hath cast upon ancient and modern writers. There is not a Libertine, or a Ran­ter, but may say the same thing for the greatest blasphe­my to be thought on: calling all men irrational and un­charitable creatures, who shall think their meaning to be amiss; and referring in general to Ancients and Moderns, who being taken in their particulars did never dream of any such thing.

3. He slanders S. Austin in particular: and implies it a sin for corn to grow.3. Nay Mr. B. is more unhappy in his generality; for he proves irresistibly, he never read any such thing, be­cause in his marginal citation there is not one word of it, though pretendedly brought even for that very purpose. What other reason can be imagined, why Mr. B. should refer to the words of Austin, and set them down in his margin, but because he either did not understand them himself, or hoped that such of his Readers as know no Latine might suppose that Saint Austin had been as blas­phemous [Page 113]as himself? mark the dealing of the Disputant. Saint Austin saith, that Nature is good in as much as it is Nature, and that Nature is evil in as much as it is vicious; Ergo, God may be said in some way to tempt men unto sin, according to Austin. Is not this a rare Logician? But mark him farther; Austin instanceth in making stolne corn to grow (p. 12.) what then? why then according to Au­stine (saith Mr. W.) God may be said to tempt men unto sin. Auditum admissi Fletum teneatis amici? either he thinks it a sin for corn to grow when it is stolne, and that it grows upon being tempted, or else he speaks as impertinently as the art of man can devise; and hath nothing to excuse it but (what is very much worse) his opinion that the Thief was tempted by God to steal that corn, which being stolne, God makes to grow. As if the growing of such corn were the peculiar blessing of the Almighty upon the Thief, in reward of that stealth to which he yeilded, when so di­vinely tempted as Mr. B. supposeth him to have been. This is not ridiculous, for 'tis deplorably sad, and should stir up the pity as well as indignation of all that read it.

Sect. 5.

1. His unchari­table reflexion on his own Dr. Twisse. His next complaint is, [ that I was superci­lious in overlooking that which he directed me to out of Do­ctor Twisse, p. 12.’] First, in the page which he referres to, he cites not a syllable from Doctor Twisse, (as in other places he doth, and as no doubt he would have done, if he had thought it for his Interest) but magisteriallyCorrep. cor. p. 79. saith, [Let him consult with Doctor Twisse against Mr. Hoard, from p. 17. to p. 28.] a Book I never yet saw, nor know where to bo [...]row, and why I should buy it at his pleasure, I know no reason. If Dr. Twisse in those pages accuseth God of tempting men to sin, and then excuseth him by say­ing, that 'tis not a sin to be a Tempter unto sin (which yet we know is a sin in grain, and so, as incompetible to God as any thing else that can be named) I shall be as sorry for the Doctor as now I am for his Timothy, and think the Blasphemy but so much the worse. But if the Doctor saith no such thing, Mr. B. is guilty of having persecuted the [Page 114] dead with his invention.

2. Doctor Twisse his own words cited.2. If Mr. B. will needs know what was delivered in good earnest by Doctor Twisse, concerning the sense and the manner of Gods temp [...]ing men to sin (as Mr. B. words it) I will tell him out of my memory of the Doctors own words, not (as he) from my invention; that in case I shall by accident do the Author some hurt, it may be impossible for me to do him wrong. The Doctor taking upon him to shew G ds concurrence to the commission of sin, doth af­firm in plain terms, [ That Cùm tamen manifestum sit, ulteriorem aliquam, per occasiones a­gendi suppe­ditatas, ad peccata (ut it a dicam) prosti­tutionem re­quiri, quae si­ne tentationi­bus ad peccan­dum inducen­tibus absolvi non potest. Vin. Gra. l. 2. part. 1. Crim. 3. sect. 2. Digr. 2. c. 15. p. 156. besides his denial of effica­cious Grace, there is, by occasions of acting offered, a far­ther prostitution to sins required, which prostitution cannot be perfected without temptations inducing to sin, ad pec­candum (the word is) to the Action of sinning.] Would you have him explain his meaning? he doth it thus;Licet Deo, & occasiones quidvis agendi subministrare, easque ita movere, & agere, ut animum hominis pulsent, & imaginationem afficiant verè, juxta quoscunque gradus aut utilitatis, aut &c. Id. Ibid. p. 156. Col. 2. [God doth so move and put on the occasions which he subministers, that they smite the mind, and truly affect the imagination, according to all those degrees, either of profit, or pleasure, or opportunity of acting, represented to the sinner in those occasions.] I have shewed my knowledge of Doctor Twisse his opinion, in the most accurate of his writings against Arminius. But his medlings with Mr. Hoard I ne­ver read. Had Mr. B. produced his words as I have done, they had perhaps been as little to his advantage: yet still they come short of Mr. B's. in point of broadness at least, if not of sense.

Sect. 6.

6. Mr. W's. proof of his falshoods by his self-con­tradictions. It is another of his complaints, [ That I did barely repeat his several sayings, without any the least shew of confutation, when they were wary enough, and commonly enough received, p. 12.’] Here his falsities are loaded with his self-contradictions. 1. A little before he had accused me of irrational and uncharitable insinuations, and often told me of wresting his words; yet now he sig­nally confesseth, that I did barely repeat his words. And [Page 115]could I possibly have used him with greater equity and compassion, then to shew his Doctrines by their own light only, without those Gloses, Inferences, and Aggravati­ons, with which I might easily have exposed them to grea­ter shame? What doth he now but proclaim me the fairest Adversary, and the most tender, that he could possibly have provoked?

2. He unavoid­ably chargeth God with sin in himself, as may irrefra­gably be proved from Heb. 6.18.2. Admit it were true (what is most false) that I did barely set down his words, but never added a confutation; this had but tended unto his greater disadvantage. For how grosly blasphemous must those words be, which were sufficiently punished by being shewed? And how apparent­ly false must that have been, the very discovering of which I could think enough for a Confutation? If I accuse a man of saying, that God doth tempt men to sin, I need no other proof, then the page of the Book wherein the words lie printed; it being taken for granted, that the words are Blasphemy in the highest; it being no less then to say, that God is Satan, or a sinner. For to tempt men unto sin is a greater sin then to lye, and hath a blacker mark put up­on it throughout the Scriptures: but 'tis a great blasphe­my to say, that God doth lye; and a greater, by consequence, to say he tempts men to sin. VVhy saith the Scripture, It is impossible for God to lye, but because it is impossible for God to do evil? And for the very same reason, it is im­possible for God to tempt men to sin. And though the making this appear in its native colours, must needs be pungent to Mr. B. yet how can I help it, when he complains of me to the world, that I repeatd his words, but did not confute them?

3. He little needed a confutation.3. How little reason he had to complain of that, the Reader may see in many places of my Div. Philanthropie defended. And the Index will help him to make quick work of his experiment. But some of his words were so conspicuously blasphemous, that I thought it sufficient to h [...]ng them out upon a Gibbet; they having a natural pro­pens [...]on to scare the Reader with their appearance. If a School-boy should say, that God did tempt him to be a [Page 116] Truant, (citing the words of Mr. B. for his security) his Master would certainly think it fittest to confute him on­ly with a Ferular.

4. When he is most unwary he is wary enough, and implies his blasphemies common to him with his party.4. In that he saith his words were wary enough to be uttered even in print, he leaves us to imagine how much more he may say in his private Pulpit, and how much more in his private Parlour, where he is less kept in awe, then when he appears upon the Theatre. And when he addes, that such words are commonly enough received, he needs must mean his own Party; for which the most rigid will hardly thank him, and the moderater sort will cast it off as a slander. When Mr. B. had said, that God doth stir up men to unjust acts, he opened his mind by this simile, even as a man puts spurs to a dull Jade. And though he confesseth that the expressions of Mr. Calvin, Zuin­glius, and Dr. Twisse, may be possibly too high, (p. 8.) nay that they spake with someCorrept. Corr. p. 56. fearfulness of what they spake, nay though the Fathers of the Church were religiously a­fraid to speak the like (by the confession of Mr.Calv. Instit. l. 2. c. 4. sect. 3. sol. 95. Calvin) and though Mr. B. doth approve, yea defend their ex­pressions, as well as adde to their number as black as any, yet now he boasts that they were wary enough, and he hath nothing (happy Creature!) for which to crave mercy.

5. He is convicted by Dr. Twisse of making God the Author of sin.5. What he presently addes of his words and meaning at other times, when he denies that God is the Author of sin, doth but adde to his impiety a self-contradiction. My proof of which shall be taken partly from himself, and partly from Dr. Twisse. It is said expresly by himself, (p. 11.) That God is the soveraign Author of the material part of sin; Fornicatio notat pecca­tum, non tan­tùm secundum formale ejus, quà peccatum est; sed & se­cundum ma­teriale ejus, quà actus est. Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. Digr. 2. c. 14. p. 155. and as expresly by Doctor Twisse, that For­nication denoteth sin, not onely according to its formal part, but also according to its material part. Or if he had not said it (as he hath) in those very words, yet he approved of those words in Borrhaus and Zuinglius, and said it often him­self in words equivalent, yea divers times in very much worse; which however I have already made plain enough, [Page 117]yet in the Tract of my account I shall make it much plainer.

Sect. 7.

He makes no difference b [...] ­twixt the act of adultery, and of marriage, but equally makes God the Author of both. Look forward on c. 3. sect. 12. Now (Reader) observe how our intimate ac­quaintance begins to unbosome himself to us. His words and syllables are these; He that cannot or will not tell, how God may be said to excite men to the act of adulte­ry, which to the adulterer so excited is sin, though not to God, neither will he tell how God without sin doth stir up men to the act of lying with their lawful wives (for it is ad utrumque but ejusdem generis excitatio & con­cursus) unless he makes himself guilty of something of sinful concupiscence, which alwayes more or less since the fall cleaves to the act, p. 12.’] Here is matter for a whole Volume, if I could think it fit to give the reins to my pen upon such a large subject; but many things do admo­nish me to study brevity and dispatch. I will therefore first send back my Reader to what ILook back to ch. 1. sect. 2. num. 7. & ch. 2. sect. 9. spake (upon occa­sion offered to me by Mr. W.) to these very words. Next I will set down the Branches of Mr. B's Doctrine herein cont [...]ined. As 1. That God may be said to excite (that is in English, to stir up) men to the act of adultery. 2. That that to which the adulterer is so excited is a sin. 3. That (by a consequence immediate and unavoidable) God may be said to excite or stir up men to sin. 4. That Gods concurrence and excitation is of the very same kind, both to the lawful and unlawful act; to the matrimonial, which he commanded, and to the adulterous, which he forbad. Now that he who exciteth any agent to any act, is proper­ly said to be the Author of that to which he exciteth, is evident to as many as understand the word Author, and the uses of it in Cla [...]sick Writers; of which that none may be ignorant, I do intend very shortly to make provi­sion. And having said but thus much, I shall onely ask of Mr. B. what sinful concupiscence is that he speaks of (as unavoidable and inseparable) in a mans lying with his wife, according to Gods most holy and mo [...]t wise Institution, for the procreation of children, that he may train them to the service and glory of God? Is it lawful, commanded, [Page 118]pronounced honourable in Scripture, and undefiled, and (af­ter all this) is it sinful too? This was the horrible doctrine of the Encratitae, from whom the Fathers were wont to vindicate the Catholick Doctrine of Original sin. But Mr. B. is worse then the Encratitae, because he holds this Doctrine, and is yet the husband of two wives. He may perhaps have spoken truth in the noisome instance of his own secrets, (which yet I wonder he would thus publick­ly reveal,) but from his particular experience of himself, he was most shamefully advis'd to draw a gneral con­clusion.

Sect. 8.

He treads not many steps farther,1. The undeniable blasphemies which ensue upon Mr. B's. doctrine of prae­destination. but he stum­bles and falls down, and bruiseth himself, in a most deplo­rable and piteous manner. And I desire to make it the more illustrious, that Lookers on may take warning by his mishap; yea that himself (if it is possible) may no lon­ger be able to endure his Doctrines. The Case stands thus: I had said in myCorrect Cop. p. 49. Notes, [ God foresees I will write, not of necessity, but choice; so that his foresight doth not make an absolute and peremptory necessity, but inferrs a necessity on supposition.]’ Mr. Barlee saith, that this is sens­less; and as if he thought that necessity had been the Eng­lish of Praedestination, he changeth my words in this man­ner: [It is senseless to say that Praescience doth infer a Praedestination, p. 13.] In opposition to which he sets down this as a maxime, [ That Note, that he affirmeth (in It's p. 61.) that the will in respect of Gods decree is necessarily de­term [...]ned to will. Praescience of a thing future must needs praesuppose a Praedestination, or a Praedeter­mination of it, pag. 13. lin. 26.]’ Here it is that I desire the seduced Reader will give attention. This is one of the first stones at which the men of that way are wont to stumble: if this is happily removed, both they that are staggering will stand upright, and they that are down (if they are not stomachful and childish) will surely rise. Since Mr. B. hath been my Patient, I have often told him what he ayles, but he thought that the malady was some­what too loathsome to be acknowledged. I will therefore now perform two things: First, I will manifest his disease, [Page 119]together with the great cause, and then I will plainly de­monstrate the means of cure.

2. The great dis­cease of making God the Author of sin.2. The Disease (as I have frequently observed) is this; That he and his Masters do most openly, clearly, and unex­cusably make God to be the Fountain, Author, or Cause of sin, of all sin, of every sin, without exception; as much the Author of it as the sinner himself, and as much as Satan who tempts him to sin, and in some respects much more then both. VVhich before I come to demonstrate, I will name the Cause of this Disease; which being premised, must needs be followed by its effects.

3. The original cause of the disease.3. The Cause of it is this; That they believe Gods praescience or fore-knowledge of all things and events, to be neither praevious to, nor simultaneous with, but directly after his praedetermination of them. Mr. Calvin expressed it thus;See the Di­vine purity de­fended, ch. 7. sect. 8. p. 74. that God did therefore fore-know all things, because he fore-ordained all things: of which I have spo­ken on another occasion. And now Mr. Barlee expresseth it thus, [Gods praescience of a thing future must needs prae­suppose a praedestination, or a praedetermination of it.]

4. The Patient proved ex­trembly sick of the disease by his own ac­knowledgment of the cause. Look sorward on the tenth Section of this Chapter.4. That Mr. B. is sick of the disease I mentioned, I now prove out of his words, which declare the Cause to be reigning in him. And to make the shorter work of it, I shall proceed to conviction by this Dilemma. Doth he believe Gods praescience of sin, or not? If he doth not, then all his own party will send him packing to the Anti­cyrae, every mouth will be opened full wide against him: he will not therefore dare to say No to my Dilemma. And if he saith Yes, his calamity will be greater; for adhering to his Maxime, he must confess his Doctrine to be this, That God did praedetermine sin, antecedently to his prae­science or fore-knowledge of sin. To make it plain by Syllogism;

1. He who holds that Gods praescience of what is future must needs p esuppose his praedetermination of it, holds that the praedetermination praecedes the praescience.

2. But Mr. B. doth declaredly hold the former.

3. Therefore he also doth hold the later.

This being made thus evident to the most ignorant of his Favourers, and undeniable to the most obstinate, I will now go on to prove my Necessary Assertion, That Mr. B. is sick of the most loathsome and the most dangerous Disease, of making God to be the Author and Cause of sin.

5. Four short ar­guments to con­firm it, left for every Reader to enlarge upon in his thoughts.1. If God foresaw nothing, but as being first fore-appointed or predetermined by himself, then he foresaw not any mans determination of his will to sin, until himself had predetermined that mans determination of his will to sin. Now if the Devil is the cause of another mans sinning, by meerly inclining his will to sin, and if the sinner himself is another cause of his sin by meerly determining his will to sin, (though not as sin, but under the notion and appea­rance at least of good;) how can God be thought less, if from all Eternity (before the Man or the Devil had any existence) he had predetermined doth the temptation of the one, (which is the sin of the Devil) and the sin of the other (who yields himself captive to that temptation) yea, the determination of both their wills to both their sins? Yet thus he did (saith Mr. B.) at least in signo rationis, before he could be able to foresee the one or the other.

2. If he who shall command or advise a man to do a thing which he knows to be forbidden, and so a sin, cannot possibly be conceived to be less then a concause, and co­adjutor; what then must he be concluded, who doth absolutely and irresistibly predetermine and tye up the will to sin?

3. God in his Law doth forbid the whole moral act, (to wit, Adultery or Murder) and the liberty of the Agent to commit it; (Thou shalt not do this or that:) he doth not onely forbid the obliquity of the Act abstracted from the Act, (as the repugnance of killing an innocent with the Law, which saith, Thou shalt not kill, abstracted from kil­ling;) for this last is impossible to be so much as conceived, much less to be ex parte rei, and implies a gross contradi­ction. God forbids us to blaspheme, he doth not forbid us to blaspheme amiss, implying it possible to blaspheme [Page 121] aright. So that if he predetermines the will of man, (or man as a voluntary Agent) to the positive Act of blasphe­ming, he predetermines to that which he forbids, that is, to sin. And if the union of the pravity with the Act doth move God to forbid that the Act it self be freely done, how can he then predetermine that it shall be done freely? or admitting that he can, who is then the Author of sin? It is hard to say, whether the impossibility on one hand, or the absurdity on the other, is more observable in the Case.

Impossibilium nulla est obli­gatio.4. If God is not, by his predetermination of sin, the Author of sin, who is then the Author of it? Man can­not be, for in that case he cannot sin. For can he possibly hinder the for bidden Act from having a pravity or filth, on supposition that it be free, and known to be forbidden? Or can he so order the matter, that there shall not be an Entity of the Act, a wilfulness of the Agent, nor a testimo­ny of conscience against the thing done? No, this is impos­sible, the predetermination being supposed: or else it is a being too strong for God; which is blasphemous, as well as impossible. How then can God be conceived to exact any thing of his Creature, who doth the thing that is for­bid, being predetermined to the Act which is forbidden, and to every circumstance of the Act? What is said of man, may be repeated of the Devil; and if neither of them can be the Author of sin, according to Mr. B's. Maximes, the Reader knowes what to think of Him and Them.

Sect. 9.

To remove the cause of this Noysom and In­veterate Disease, and to keep it from being Desperate, 1. The easie and infallible means of cure to all who are not resolved to contine sick. at least from being Epidemical, I must clear the point of Gods Praescience to my less instructed and common Rea­ders, such as Mr. W. and Mr. B. appear to be. And because they are reckoned as chief men of their party, there must needs be great numbers who partake with them in their greatest wants. First, they seem not to con­sider that Praescience is nothing else but the Latine word [Page 122]for foreknowledge, or else not to know what knowledge naturally importeth; and so discern not precisely where­in Gods Knowledge doth differ from his Decree. How else could they imagin (withMr. W. disco­vers his opini­on, that what­ever God fore­knowes must necessarily come to pass (and so all sins) as well as what­ever he decrees, doth the like. Mr. W.) that Gods foreknow­ledge doth necessitate as well as his decree? or how could they dream (with Mr. B.) that Gods foreknowledge of what is future (and so of all sins) is after his praedeter­mination? two gross absurdities, not repugnant onely to reason and common sense, but inconsistent with one another, yet both affirm'd by the same sort of men. By Mr. Hobbs, amongst others, in his Animadversions on Bishop Bramhal. In his Answ. to an Object. p. 40. of his Extent of Div. Prov. Mr. B. c. 3. p. 26. and Mr. Hobbs, p. 108.

2. They will soon quit the first, if they have but the patience to conside [...],2. The nature of knowledge o­pened, and di­stinguished from decree. that scientia est habitus conclusionis, as simplex intelligentia is principiorum. VVhen the mind is in possession of any conclusion immediately flowing from the premisses, and united to them by an essential tye, then the rational Agent is said properly to know. Scire est per causam scire. To know is not to make either the cause or the effect; but to find out the effect by the cause (as in Demonstration à priori,) or to track the cause by the foot­steps of the effect (as in Demonstration à posteriori.) This is great plainness to such as know but a little Latine; but I labour for them who understand none at all: to them I speak thus. To know is properly an Act of the Intellect; but to decree or determine is an Act of the Will. The Act of knowing presupposeth the object, which needs must be knowable by a priority of nature, before it is possible to be actually known. There may be scibile, or a thing knowable, where there isNote that scibile and scientia are only Kelata secundum à ci, and are not capable of being both ways converted per conversionem simplicem, in respect of us who are not omniscient. In which re­spect only this thing is spoken. not yet scientia or an actual knowledge of it, (such as a very great part of the habi­table world, until Christopher Columbus and Americus Vespu­sius had begun their Discoveries.) But an actual knowledge cannot possibly be imagined before an object knowable, nay must [Page 123]imply its being actually known. And though the object is future (as in all foreknowledge) yet even then it must be actual in its Idea, and made present unto the mind by its intelligible species. In which respect it was rightly affir­med by thePlotin. Enn. 5. l. 9. c. 13. & Enn. 6. l. 3. c. 1. Platonicks, that before the Creation of this visible world, there was in Gods mind a World Intelligible, that is, an Exemplary Cause, an idea or Platform, ac­cording to which the world was made. But now to De­cree is another thing, as being an act of the will, and be­ing supposed to be absolute, is (for that very reason) ef­fective also. For though Gods Decree alone (abstractively considered) will not cause a necessity; yet his decreeing to do, being alwayes followed with his doing what he decree­eth, must needs (in sensu isto composito) necessitate the ob­ject which is decreed.

3. Gods foreknowledge doth not make things simply to be, and therefore makes them not to be of necessity. 3. Though Gods absolute decree of doing any thing doth cause a necessi­ty of the event, yet his fore­knowledge doth not, nor possi­bly can it. But his Decree (I speak of) must needs do both. This may be illustrated by a Physicians foreknowledge of alteration in the Patient upon a critical day, which yet hath nothing of efficiency in its coming to pass. But if the Physician doth decree to work a change in the Patient, by such or such means as he resolves on, he is then the Author of such a change; and if it be with a purpose to dispatch the Pati­ent, it is not his prophecy, but his murder.

4. If Gods foreknowledge did imprint a real necessity on the things foreknown, 4. The absurdity which would follow if it were so. this portentous absurdity would un­avoidably follow, that he must act in nothing freely, but in every thing as a necessitated and limited Agent. A blasphe­my not to be escaped but by the denial of his omniscience from all Eternity, which is every whit as great a blasphe­my. And to the same inconvenience the irrespective pre­destination must needs be subject.

5. If Gods foreknowledge did necessitate the things fore­known, it was either simply as foreknowledge, 5. Other absurdi­ties which would follow. or as Gods foreknowledge in particular. Not as the first, because then the foreknowledge of every man that can prophesie would be the cause of things future which he foretells. [Page 124] Cyrus then had been beholding to the Prophet Isaiah for his birth, because the Prophet foreknew it a hundred years beforehand. Not as the first there­fore; nor yet as theNote, that God foreknew what himself would chuse to do; yet did not necessitate himself. He eternal­ly foreknew that he would in time let Adam fall; and not onely let him, but help him to rise unto re­pentance: yet who dares say he was necessitated to either? second, because the act is not the cause of the object, but by a priority of order (as I shewed before) the object of knowledge is before the act, how long soever it may be after by a posteriority of Time. It must first have been true, that there should be such a man as Cyrus, or else it had not been pos­sible for the holy Prophet to have foreknown it. God fore­knew all things that are good, as being certain that he would do them; and he also foreknew all things that are evil, as being certain that wicked Agents would freely do them, if they were not hindered; and as certain that he would not hinder, but permit, or suffer them to be done. Both were present to his omniscience from all eternity.

6. There is no quicker way to make this point most plain and easie,6. An Argument taken from the knowledge of what is past. then by bidding the obstinate to consider, that knowledge is as properly of things past, as future. But it implies a contradiction, for a present act of knowledge to necessitate or cause a thing quite past. The Almighty knows at this instant that Adam fell, as well as he knew from eternity that Adam would fall. Now all acts of true knowledge must needs imply infallibility; else it cannot be perfect knowledge, but some other thing; as confidence, belief, opinion, suspicion, or shrewd conjecture. From whence it follows, that all acts of true knowledge do infer a neces­sity, although they cannot make any, to wit, a necessity of consequence arising from the truth of a proposition. But such a necessity is inferred from every true knowledge of what is past as well as from a foreknowledge of what is co­ming: which my hasty Adversaries having not hitherto considered, they have incessantly confounded it with the an­tecedent and absolute necessity of the consequent, even such as is conferred by every cause on its effect. And therefore next I must enforce them (do what they can to the con­trary) [Page 125]to discern a palpable difference betwixt these two; and to discern it so clearly, as not to be able to dissent, however able to conceal it by a dissimulation.

7. Before I shew the Case in God, I will provide some light for the weaker-eyed Reader to see it by.7. A manifestati­on of the wide difference be­tween a neces­sity of conse­quence from the antecedent to the sequel, and a necessity of the conse­quent imposed by the cause upon the effect. This is conspicuous to All, that if I hear a man blaspheme against his Maker, it doth necessarily follow that he blasphemeth; for if he doth not, I do not hear him, it being impossible to hear what is not to be heard: but this being granted that I do really hear the man blaspheme, his blasphemy is inferred by a most necessary sequel. Yet this is onely a Ne­cessity of Consequence, arising from the Truth of a Propo­sition; wherein the reality of my hearing his blasphemy being supposed, the reality of the blasphemy doth unavoidably follow. But my hearing him blaspheme doth not necessitate his blaspheming; for it would be what it is, if I did not hear it. And though I hear him blaspheming whilest he blasphemes, yet in order of nature his blaspheming hath the priority; for he must be to be heard, before I can hear him. From whence it is manifest, that here is not any absolute or antecedent necessity, or a necessity of the thing, as of the consequent or effect. But his blasphemy is a voluntary and contingent Action. Now by this it will be easie for the thickest capacity to discern, that if God foreknew from eternity this blasphemy of the man, then by a necessary consequence the man doth real­ly blaspheme: For if he doth not, God could not possibly foreknow he doth. But this is only a necessity arising from the truth of that Proposition, That God's foreknowledge is infallible, or not capable of erring, and that what he fore­knows is very really foreknown. It is not a necessity of the existence of the thing, imprinted in the blasphemer by Gods foreknowledge; but still the blasphemy is a voluntary and contingent action: which it could not be, if the man did commit it by an antecedent Necessitation. And if he did, such antecedent Necessitation must have flown from God's Omnipotence, and not at all from his foreknowledge. It being the nature of knowledge, not to produce its object, [Page 126]but to suppose it. God doth contemplate by his knowledge what he effecteth by his power. But it is not in his power to be effective of sin, much less in his foreknowledge to be ne­cessitative of blasphemy, which whosoever shall affirm, will be a very unskilful and dull blasphemer. For

8. As Gods Decree is Actio ad extra, so is his fore­knowledge also;8. Foreknowledge therefore doth not neces­sitate. yet (by theMr. Wh. p. 37. Where note that M. W. doth call Gods decree, Actus Dei ad Intra, which in another man had been a strange mistake. Note al­so, that Gods knowledge of himselfe is actio ad intra, though his foreknow­ledge of us is actio ad extra. con­fession of the Adversary) it doth not ponere quicquam in ob [...]ecto: being an action within himself (saith Mr. W.) it works not any thing upon the Crea­ture, and therefore doth not necessi­tate; for whosoever necessitates, does make necessary, not infer it onely. He makes a necessity in the thing which he necessitates, not onely infers it in a proposition which another makes of things contingent. If the Adversaries expound the word Necessitative, not by effective, but illative, then first they speak non-sense before they expound it, and after the Ex­position they give up their Cause. First they speak non­sense, in saying that Gods foreknowledge doth antecedent­ly necessitate the being of sin, when it infers onely that it will be; and next they give up their Cause, in confessing that there is not an antecedent necessity of all events, but a suppositive necessity of some, or a necessity of consequence, arising onely from the truth of a proposition, whose Antece­dent doth of necessity infer the Sequel.

9. Having snewed the difference betwixt an absolute causal and a conditional consequential Necessity, and freed the praescience of God from the vulgar and senseless im­putation;9. It is vain for the Adversa­ries to quit the first error, un­less they quit the second also. how will the men of that way be ever able to free themselves? For admit they quit the first great error of making Gods praescience to necessitate sin, yet still they live in the misery of the second, which is their absolute decree and praedetermination of all events. For this can ne­ver be freed from laying absolute necessity, having that in­fluence on the effect which praescience cannot be thought to have. As if I decree that my servant shall rob my [Page 127]Neighbour, I do contribute more towards it, then if I onely foresee that he will voluntarily do it: and suppo­sing my decree to be irresistible (as 'tis supposed to be in God) it must produce a Causal Necessity. The commonNote here, that Mr. W. holding the do­ctrine of Free-will, which he try's to recon­cile with his absolute decree of all things, was betrayed (poor man!) into this sad speech; [God having decreed the Fall of Adam, it was necessary that this should come to passe; but it was also necessary that it should come to passe freely] Ext. of Div. Prov. c. 9. p. 42. and again he saith [It was necessary that the first man should sin, upon supposition of Gods Decree, and that he should sin freely. Ibid. p. 40. See the Divine Purity Defended, c. 8. p. 80, 81, 82. shift is too shameful to serve in stead of an excuse. For if God did absolutely decree that man should voluntarily sin, (which they are oftenTreatise of the Passions, &c. ch. 42. p. 544, 545. fain to say, though it implies a Con­tradiction) then he might pos­sibly have forborne the commis­sion of it (because he did vo­luntarily commit it) which yet was absolutely impossible, if God had absolutely decreed it.

I think it fit in this place to insert a passage of Doctor Reynolds, Dr. Reyn. his concurrence with T. P. in this point. both because he doth condemn and severely cen­sure the very same error which I at this instant do write against, and also because he is a person whom Mr. W. and Mr. B. conclude to be of their party.Note, that he means an Hypothetical Necessity, or of the conse­quence, as ap­pears by his last words. His words are these, Others there have been yet more impious, which seek to fasten all the corruptions of their wills on something above the Heavens, even the eternal foreknowledge and the providence of God. As if my foreknowledge that on the morrow the Sun will rise, or that such men as these shall one day be brought to a most severe doom, were the cause working a necessity of the next day, or the last Judgement. It is true indeed, Gods praescience implies a necessity after that manner as he foreknows; but this is Necessitas onely Infallibilitatis, in regard of his undoceivable knowledge, which ever foresees things as they will certainly come to pass, by the free or natural working of the Agents whence they proceed. It is not necessitas coactionis, or DETER­MINATIONIS, whereby the will of man is, without any o­ther disposition or propension in it self, enforced or unspon­taneously determined to the producing of such effects. The actions of our will are not therefore necessarily executed, ☜ [Page 128]because they were foreknown; but therefore they were fore­known, because our will would certainly execute them, though not without freedom and election.]’ Now how con­trary this is to Beza, Wollebius, and Mr. W. in particular, all do know who have read these four: And how contrary in general to all the enemies of Arminius, all can tell who have any acquaintance with them all. It is evident by the last period, that Dr. Reynolds pleadeth for free-will as much as I have ever done.

I shall conclude this Subject by putting the Adversary in mind, that the English of Infallible is undeceivable, where­as the men of that way do use it to signifie irresistible: which is as gross a mistake, as if they should hearken with their eyes, or try to see with their ears. Were it not for the assistance of such obstinate mistakes, they would want wherewith to mutter against the Cogency of Truth. Two short propositions will subdue their error, if it lies not pro­tected by an invincible perverseness.

  • 1. What God decreed to effect, will come to pass unavoidably, and by a necessitation, because his absolute will and his power cannot possibly be resisted.
  • 2. But what he onely decreed to permit, will contin­gently come to pass; yet (in case he hath foreseen it will come to pass) with a certainty of event, because his foreknowledge is infallible, and cannot possibly be de­ceived.

What he decreed to effect is every way good, but what is morally evil he decreed onely to permit, and patiently, but wisely, to suffer Men and Devils to effect, (that is, not to hinder forcibly from being effected,) and being effected by the wilfulness of Men or Devils, to over-rule and order to the best advantages and ends to which they are capable of being made to serve.

10. Now I come to shew the senselesness of the next great error,10. Gods praesci­ence doth not of necessity prae­suppose a pra­determination. which Mr. B. expresseth in these words, [That praescience of a thing future must needs praesuppose a praedestination, or a praedetermination of it, p. 13.] It seems the man did not know, & even his Masters did not consider, [Page 129]that causa exemplaris is in order of nature before the effici­ent, and thought that God could decree to do something, before he knew what he would decree to do. If God did praedetermine before he foreknew, he praedetermined at a venture he knew not what. For he knew it not, until he had praedetermined it, if it was needful for his praescience to praesuppose his praedetermination. But it is blasphemy to say what unavoidably doth infer, That God decreed he knew not what, until he had actually decreed it. God knew all things, which yet he cannot be conceived to have done, if any thing can be conceived before his knowledge. From the first moment of Eternity (with pardon to the word Moment, which I onely use to reveal my meaning, as Unum in Metaphysicks is said to be momento primo, verum, secundo, bonum, tertio,) God knew himself, his own es­sence, attributes and actions, his actions ad intra as well as ad extra; therefore he knew he would decree, as well as what he would decree, and how he would decree it. He knew he would decree a world; and in that, all vo­luntarily, as well as natural Agents. So that though this visible world was temporal, yet the platform of it (the in­telligible world) was eternal: it being, before it was cre­ated, in mente Dei conceived. For he did not know no­thing, when he knew he would create it, at an infinite di­stance from its creation. He knew it eternally, but created it in time; betwixt which two there is an infinite distance. As he knew what, so also how things would be, and how himself would decree them. Somethings absolutely, as the being of man; other things conditionally, as the punish­ment of man: which could not possibly be considered, much less decreed, without respect unto sin, which the very word Punishment must praesuppose. Besides, if Gods praescience preceded not his Decrees of Election and Re­probation, there was not a [...] moment in Eternity in which he was free to elect or reprobate: For the freedome to chuse must needs precede the act of choice; and to deny God his freedom in his elections, is as impious as irrational.

11. But rather prae­determination doth connotate praescience, if not (in some sense) praesup­pose it also.11. Well then, It being blasphemously irrational, to say that God did praedetermine he knew not what, or before he knew what, (in any sense) 'tis plain his praedetermina­tion praeceded not his praescience, and by consequence his praescience praesupposed not his praedetermination; but rather his praedetermination (of what he did praedeter­mine) did connotate his praescience, if not praesuppose it. Let this one thing be well considered, that though we cannot say with truth or modesty, God decreed or praede­termined any one the least thing which he did not know; yet we may say with great truth, that he knew what he wouldThis is con­fessed by Mr. B. l. 3. p. 22. not decree, as well as what he would. And again, Verum, the object of the Intellect, is in order of nature be­fore Bonum, the object of the Will. So as his praescience in some sense praeceded his decree (by a priority of order) but his decree in no sense praeceded his praescience. Nay in a perfectly wise Agent, who doth nothing but according to the [...]. Eph. 1.11. counsel of his will, according to knowledge and consultation, it is not conceivable by the most precise and metaphysical abstraction, how a praedetermination can be before praescience. As in order of Dignity, Wisedom goes before Power, so in order of Naeture, Advice does go be­fore Action, and the act of the Understanding before that of the Will. A wise resolution doth praesuppose Knowledge. To determine before advice and consideration, is counted rashness and folly in mortal men, and so is impiously impu­ted to the All-wise God.

12. The cause of the error shewed, and removed.12. The cause of the error in Mr. B. and his Masters, ‘doth seem to me to be this, that even whilest they use the word Future, they do consider it as past. And though their speech is of a praescience or foreknowledge in God, yet their reasoning is clearly of a post science or after knowledge. Because they know the wisest Agent cannot tell what he hath done, until he hath done it; they therefore conclude of the wisest Agent, (even God himself) that he cannot tell what he will do, untill he actually doth it. God work­eth alwayes from eternity hitherto, [...], even till now, Joh. 5.17. saith our Saviour: and what he now worketh, he knew he [Page 131] would work from all eternity, even whilest he determined that he would work it.’ He did not first determine, and then know, but determined according to his knowledge. Thus far indeed the men of that way may safely speak; that Gods Decree of Creation was before his knowledge of a world actually created: for before a thing can be known as actually done, (as the actual creation of the world, or the world created) God must needs have decreed that he would do it. But withall let them consider, that we are speaking of Gods knowledge of what is future, not yet in act; and therefore call it his foreknowledge, which con­templates what will be, in the presence only of its Idea. And his Decree of Creation could not possibly be before that Idea of a world to be created. Man in some things hath a similitude with his maker. And as a man cannot de­cree to make a Watch (or any other piece of work) before the image of that Watch is in his mind; so God himself could not decree to create a world, before he knew it in its exemplar, and conceived how it should be: and that for the reason before specified, because he could not decree [vagum quid & indefinitum] he knew not what.

13. The Applica­tion to the pre­sent case, and away opened to reconcilement.13. I will apply my discourse to the case in hand. God must needs have decreed that he would permit sin, before he could know or consider it as actually permitted. But 'tis one thing to know it in Ideâ, or in exemplari, as a thing which may be, if God will, and so may not be, if he will not; and quite another thing, to behold it as actu­ally being: for this is after his decreeing that it shall be, if it be such on which his decree can pass, as the creating of a world, and the permitting of sin; but upon sinning it self the decree of God could never pass: and therefore for that, I must resume what I lately said, that God eter­nally foreknew what he did not decree the being of, as well as all which he did decree. As he knew he would create one world, so he knew he would not create a hundred. As he knew he would suffer or permit us to sin, so he knew he would not tempt, not incite us, not necessitate us to sin. As he knew, whilest he decreed, that he would give us free-wills; [Page 132]so he knew, whilest he decreed, that he would not take that freedom from them; and he knew what he did not, yea what he could not decree, our many impious abu­ses which we voluntarily make of this our freedom.

Now let my Adversaries recount, as well how far I go their way, as where I leave them, and for what Reasons. 1. Let them consider that I say (as well as themselves) that (in order of nature, though not of time) God did first decree to make or do things before he knew them as actually made or done. 2. Let them consider that I leave them by adding this, that God decreed nothing fu­ture before he foreknew it in Idea; and foreknew, but de­creed not, the Acts of sin, such as Adultery, Murder, Blasphemy, and the like. 3. Let them consider my Rea­sons (to name no more) are these two: first, it is impiously irrational, to make God to have decreed he knew not what; and next, it is worse, to make him the Author or Cause of Sin. Let them admit of so much as may consist with the wisedom and goodness of God. And for any thing else, I will not strive with them. But till that shall be done, I must proceed to discover their grievous failings.

Sect. 10.

I can pass no further then the two and twenti­eth page of Mr. B. without observing him teaching,Mr. B's. una­voidable con­sequential blas­phemy, that God determined all wickedness be­fore he could foreknow it. [ ‘That the things which God foreknows will have a cer­tain futurition; he foreknows them all by vertue of his own will and counsel, whereby from all eternity he deter­mines their futurition, and without which he could not know that they should certainly be, p. 22.]’ First he speaks of Futurition, 1. His ignorant use of the word Futuriti­on. as if he thought it signified Existence; for he talks of Gods knowing what will be future; whereas that which will be, is future now, whilest yet it is not, but hereafter it will be present. Had he said waterish water, he had committed a less absurdity.

2. Of the word Will.2. He talks of Gods knowing by vertue of his Will, as if he knew not the difference betwixt the Understanding, whose proper object is truth or falshood; and the Will, whose proper object is good or evil, (good onely of Gods will, and evil also of ours.) He might as well have said, [Page 133]that God did will by vertue of his knowledge, and indeed much better; because 'tis natural for the Will to follow the judgement of the Intellect. The sight of the object is before the pursuit, or else the pursuit is in the dark. If Mr. B. had said, that he sees by vertue of his hands or feet, he had been less to be blamed, because he had but made him­self a Monster; and with himself he may be bold, but not with God.

3. Of the word Certain.3. He talks of Certain, as if he thought it had been all one with Necessary; or if he knew what he spake, (as pro­bably he did) he hath blasphemed unexcusably. For God foreknew that all the wickedness in the world would very certainly be (it had not else been foreknowledge, but false conjecture, if what he seemed to foreknow had been uncer­tain:) and so 'tis the Doctrine of Mr. B. That God could not foreknow all the wickedness in the world, unless by his will he had first determined its futurition.

4. Of the word Counsel.4. He talks of Gods Counsel, as if he knew nothing of the word; For he saith that God foreknew by vertue of his Counsel, as well as Will: whereas Counsel cannot be Counsel, but by vertue of Knowledge. In the absence of Knowledge there must be Error and Unadvisedness, but consultation or Counsel there cannot be. Thus his Doctrine of Decrees hath made plain English a stranger to him.

5. His threefold Blasphemy, be­sides his self-contradiction.5. But the most notorious thing in his present speech, is his making God to will sin, and his not allowing that God could otherwise foresee it, then by decreeing its coming to pass. Which first, is blasphemously contradict­ing to the word of God, who saith he wills not the wicked­ness of a sinner, (Psal. 5.4.) Next,Look back on the eighth and ninth sect: of this Chap­ter. 'tis blasphemously con­tradicting to the Oath of God, who swears he wills not the death of a sinner, (Ezek. 33.11.) Thirdly, 'tis no less then blasphemously to infer, that the narrow knowledge of man is more extensive then the knowledge of God: For man doth know many things which he doth not will or deter­mine; whereas God (saith Mr. B. with his Condisciples, and Predecessors) never knew any thing in the world but what he willed and determined; nay (which is yet a greater [Page 134]madness) that he never knew, or could know any thing, but because he willed and determined its future being. Fourth­ly, 'tis repugnant to the common Rule by which his own dear party are wont to be guided at other times, to wit, that the Will doth necessarily follow (not go before) the practical Judgement of the Intellect or Understan­ding.

Sect. 11.

Not many lines farther,1. Mr. B's. posi­tive Doctrine of Gods ordai­ning all sins, both original and actual. he forgets himself thus, [ As for future moral evil things, whether original or actual sins, God foreknew them all in the same moment of Eternity, because even then he did by his permissive and ordinative will determine that they should fall out, p. 22.]’ Here let him distinguish, that his just meaning may appear. Does he mean Gods ordering onely of all sins, or his ordaining them also? If so, then it is blasphe­my; if not so, it is contrary to the Assemblies Catechism, and Confession of Faith too, and as contrary to himself. For it is said by that Assembly, that God by the counsel of his own Will, did freely and unchangeably Assem. Confes. of Faith, c. 3. Artic. 1. ordain whatso­ever comes to pass. And again, say they, He hath Assem. short Catech. p. 158. Edit. Lond. 1656. fore­ordained whatsoever comes to pass. Thus the Assembly of Divines. And Mr. B. himself affirms Gods Praescience to be subordinate to his Decree both in the moments of Time and Nature, p. 23. l. 5. Agreeable to which is the Pulpit-Doctrine of Mr. Case: [ This is the M. Case his Sermon, Inti­tuled, The va­nity of glorying in the flesh. p. 58. plot of Divine Pro­vidence, which he hath been * contriving from the dayes of Eternity; the miscarriage of the first Covenant was not of improvidence, but of * ordination.]’ But Doctor Twisse and Mr. Whitfield will have it thus;Non tantùm voluiss [...] De­um ab aeterno dicimus, sed conformiter ita operatum esse in tempore, & totum negotium ita administrasse, ut revērâ peccaret Adamus. Vin. l. 2. p. 27. cited by Mr. W. in Ext. of D. Prov. p. 10. God did not onely will [the sin of Adam] from Eternity, but con­formably to it did so work in time, and so administer the whole business, as that Adam might [or should] really [or effectually] sin. Mr. W. approves of this extremely, and translates it so, as to leave out the word whole, (which is in the Latine of great Importance) and renders reverâ by [Page 135] certainly, by which he meant unavoidably, if he meant at that as at other times. Thus we see 'tis the Doctrine of Mr. B. his Brethren, and his Masters also, that God ordai­ned all sins both original and actual, and that he foreknew them, because he foreordained them.

2. By this the Reader may judge,2. Mr. B's. Non­sense added to Blasphemy. what sense he puts on the word Permissive, when he adds Ordinative to it for explication. If the man should have said, that the world was created by Gods permissive and ordinative will, he had onely spoke non-sense, and had but moved his Rea­ders laughter. Whereas in saying that original and actu­al sins were determined to fall out by Gods permissive and ordinative will, he adds blasphemy to non-sense, and cannot but stir up his Readers wrath.

Sect. 12.

In his c. 3. p. 55. he hath done a stranger thing then when he denied his own hand, 1. Mr. B's. self-contradiction in denying, and yet affirming that he maketh God to be the Author of sin. because he denies what he hath printed, to wit, that he pleaded for a literal sense of those Texts, of which he now at last saith, [That God according to the letter of many of those Texts, seems to be made a moral cause of sin as sin, p. 55.] Yet in his Cor­rept. Corr. p. 69, 70. he did heartily plead against me (for my charging those men with too literal Expositions of such Texts) that the sense of Scripture was but one, Look back on Sect. 7. of this Chap. and on Sect. 2. Num. 3. and that the Grammatical; and withal jeered me for teaching him to recede from the words, and to approch nearer unto the genuine sense; ending his jeer too, with credat Judaens apella, non ego: all which he now denies, to my great amazement. 'Tis true indeed, he added these words, Where the Letter is not plainly metaphorical, typical, or contrary to some other plain places, and the clear Analogy of Faith: all which condemns him so much the more, because he said this of other Scriptures (like Mr. W.) which say that Christ did taste death for every man, and the like; but not of those Texts whose Grammatical sense he there defended. For he referred to the Texts reckoned up by himself, p. 103. and what should they be, but Mat. 20.28. & 26.28. Heb. 9.28. Rom. 5.18. concerning Gods mercy and love to [Page 136]mankind? not those, whose naked Letter doth seem (to such as he is) to make God the Author or Cause of sin. So that now more then ever, I admire his Conscience, which would suffer him to speak so very plainly against his know­ledge.

2. He is convict-by his own words, by the Assemblies, and by Mr. W's.2. I will convince him out of his mouth: for when he mentioned the Analogy of Faith, did he not mean that Faith which is owned by him and his party? And is it not one of the Articles of their publick Confession of Faith (which I lately cited, sect. 11.) That God did foreord in whatsoever comes to pass? Doth not Mr. W. (his Majorite) contend most stifly for a literal sense of those Texts which he would have to make God to will and work sin? (p. 19. 20.) and doth not that Majorite Mr. W's. Ext. of D. Prov. p. 12. elsewhere teach the people in Print, [ that God must needs some way both will and work in the Ibid. sin of the Act, because not onely the action it self, but the very pravity and deformity of it makes way for Gods glory? Ibid. p. 11. That as sin makes for his glory, he hath a hand in effecting it? and that Ib. p. 44. sin by ac­cident makes much for his glory? That God did Ib. p. 40, 42. decree the sin of Adam, and that his sin was therefore necessary? * That God intends his Gospel should harden mens hearts, and close their eyes, and shut their ears, and that he sends it for this very purpose? Lastly, doth he not say,Ib. 45. that in all the sins which are committed by men, God hath a se­cret working hand? and in this his last Book, he chief hand too? (p. 27.) Thus I convince him out of his own mouth, and Mr. W's.

3. He is convict­ed out of his own and Dr. Twiffe his words also.3. I will next convince him out of his own and Dr. Twisse his mouth also. First, for his own part he professeth, that he maketh God the soveraign Author of the material part of sin, p. 11. Now because from Dr. Twisse he learn'd his distincti­on betwixt the material and formal part of sin, and because I well remember what the Doctor saith of it, let us next consider that Doctors words. Futtum om­ne duo netat, viz. actum contrect [...]ndi sive surripiendi [...]es alienas, & actus hujus deformitatem, quatenus sc. lege divinâ nobis interdi [...]itur rebu [...] alienis sur ipiendis. Sic & Homici­dium duo consignifica [...], & actum interficiendi hominem, & illicitam ejus conditi­onem, sive cum lege Dei repugnantiam. Similiter Adulterium duo connotat, ni­mirum actum c ncumbendi cum alienâ, at (que) hujus actus turpitudinem. Twiss. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 1. D [...]gr. 2. cap. 14. p. 155. [ Theft doth note two things, [Page 137]the act of snatching away another mans goods (the mate­rial part of the sin,) and the deformity of this act, in as much as we are forbid by the law of God to snatch away another mans goods, (the formal part of the sin.) So also Murder doth signifie two things at once, the act of killing a man, and the illegal condition of that act, which is its repugnance with the law of God. Likewise also Adultery doth connotate two things, to wit, the act of lying with an­other mans wife, and the flagitious turpitude of this act.]’ These three are the examples which the Doctor gives us of his distinction betwixt the material and formal part of sin. Compare these words with Mr. B's. above cited, (and with the Doctors in divers places of his Books.) and Mr. B. must confess his printed Profession to be this, That God is the soveraign Author of any mans robbing his Neigh­bours goods, of any mans destroying his Neighbours per­son, and of any mans lying with his Neighbours wife. Or to instance in particulars, it is the publick profession of Mr. B's. Faith (a special Article of his novel Creed) That God was the soveraign Author of Achan's stealing the gol­den wedge, of David's lying with Bathshebah, and of Cain's killing Abel. Now since 'tis granted by all the world, that the first was Theft, the second Adultery, the third Murder, God is affirmed by Mr. B. to be the soveraign Author of Theft, of Adultery, and of Murder. And be­cause 'tis also granted by men of all sides, That Theft is a sin, Adultery a sin, and Murder a sin, God is affirmed by Mr. B. to be the soveraign Author of the first sin, of the second sin, of the third sin, and so (by a parity of reason) of all the sins in the world.

4. He is convicted out of his own, and Mr. Hobbs his mouth; Mr. Hobbs his words being justified by Mr. W.4. In the last place I will condemn him, not onely out of his own mouth, but out of Mr. Hobbs his also. First Mr. B. (as I shewed before) doth make his Confession of Faith in the first person singular, and speaks dogmatically thus; [I make God] and what is it that he makes him? he tells us in the next words, [I make God to be the so­veraign Author.] But of what doth he make him the so­veraign Author? He tells us that in these words, [of the [Page 138]material part of sin.]. And what doth he mean by the ma­terial part of sin? he tells us distinctly in the same breath, [either the doing, or the leaving undone some positive Natu­ral or MORAL Act, p. 11.] What moral Act for ex­ample? he tells p. 12. the Act of Adultery. And how makes he God the Author of that Act? he tells us in the same breath, by exciting men to it. What kind of exci­tation (or stirring up) doth he mean? he told us that in his first appearance upon the stage, even as a man pu [...]s spurs to a dull Jade, Correp. Corr. p. 61. Now let us com­pare Mr. Hobbs his words, who is as able a Calvinist (as to these points) as their party hath lately had. He, after all his meditation [ Mr. Hobbs of Liberty and Necessity, p. 23, 24. cannot find any difference between an Action, and the sin of that Action; as for example, be­tween the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah; nor when one is the cause both of the Action and of the Law, how another can be the cause of the disagree­ment between them, no more then how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can make the in­equality that is between them.]’ Whether Mr. Hobbs doth argue thus from his heart, as being really seduced by Mr. Barlee's principles which he defends, or doth onely talk it from his Teeth outward, as playing the Drole with Re­ligion upon the grounds which are given him by rigid Pres­byterians, I leave each Reader to pass his own judgement. But sure his deduction is duly made from the error of abso­lute praedestination, of praedetermination antecedent to prae­science, and so the necessitation of all events. And I won­der if any of that patry who have granted and given him his premisses, will adventure publickly to deny his conclu­sion. Well, we have the Confession of Mr. Hobbs, what that Doctrine doth unavoidably infer, which is common to him with Mr. W. and Mr. B. But because Mr. B. hath gi­ven him an Epithet, and a Praenomen, and expressed his detestation by calling himc. 3. p. 7. Monstrous Leviathan Hobbs, I will adde to his the like confession of Mr. W. [ That if 'tis impossible to separate the sin from the action, Look back on­th. 2. sect. 10. then he that is the Author of the Action must needs [Page 139]be the Author of the sin also which is inseparable from it, p. 25.]’

Sect. 13.

Notwithstanding all which hath been proved,1. Mr. B's. 10000 curses upon himself and his masters. And his implicit confession, that that is blasphe­my which I have called by that name. Look forwards on Sect. 27. Num. 2, 3, 4, 5. of this Chap. where Mr. B. confesseth & tryes to justi­fie what here he poureth his curses on. and will be proved yet farther, from the printed words of Mr. B. that God is made by him to be the Fountain and Cause of sin, yet like a desperate Malefactor, he falls a cursing in these words, [I wish miriads of Anathematismes to light upon him who holds it, be he who he will be, if he re­pent not the sooner, p. 54, 55.] One Miriad had been e­nough (if he who writ Myriad and did not mend it in the Errata, understood what it meant) it being no less then 10000. yet more then so many curses, the man who said he never cursed, doth pour at once upon himself, and up­on the chief men of his way, on supposition that they still do what I have proved them to have done. If their opini­on is contrary to their words, (which is the onely excuse he can pretend to) it doth but aggravate their guilt, and speak them wilful. He who shall deny his having aspersed his neighbour with the ignominie of Theft, because he did but charge him with having invaded another mans goods, will onely make himself capable of so much a greater con­demnation. I am sorry that Mr. B. hath put himself un­der a curse; but am heartily glad he dares not own what he hath written, because I hope he will find it needful, to hate those principles, which led him to write such Poeni­tenda.

2. The like confes­sion of his own­ed Masters, to­gether with their Commis­sions of the crime confes­sed.2. The like Confession hath been made by Mr. Calvin, and Dr. Whitaker, and many more; whose words do rise up in judgement against themselves and their party, as they do justifie my charge in the severest part of it throughout my Books: which that the stomachfullest Adversary may not be able to deny, I will confront their own words to their own words, and to the words of their friends, in two parallel Columns; setting down on the left hand the Adversaries Confession, that it is indeed a horrid Blasphemy, to say that God is the Author, or Cause, or Necessitator of sin; and linking with it on the [Page 140] right hand the Adversaries Commission of the very same crime confessed by them.

Mr. Calvin's Confes­sion.

De maleficiis Deo Authore perpetratis, lo­cutus, ‘Certe (inquit) ut quidvis contra tam pro­digiosam Blasphemiam dicatur, libenter patiar, modò ne immerito im­misceatur nomen meum. Calv. de occult. Dei Providentiâ p. 736.

Idem Calvinus in Libertinos cap. 13. ait, ex hoc Articulo, Deum scilicet omnia operari, Tria admodum horren­da consequi; quorum primum hoc est, Nul­lum inter Deum & Di­abolum discrimen fore. Et porrò cap. 14. in eosdem, Ipsum à se ab­negari oportet, & in Diabolum transmut a­ri.— Et cap. 4. Exe­crabilis Blasphemia di­citur.

Remigius, although a Patron of Gotteschalc's Cause, concludes against the whole party in these following words.

Nulli necessitatem imposuerit ut malus es­set. Hoc enim si fecis­set, ipse utique esset Auctor malorum, &c. Hist. Gottesch. cap. 11. p. 173.

Mr. Calvin's Commission of the Crime confessed.

Et jam satis apertè osten­di, Deum vocari eorum OMNIUM AUTHO­REM, quae isti Censores volunt otioso tantùm ejus Permissu contingere. Calv. Inst. l. 1. c. 18. sect. 3. p. 70.

De Assyriis praedatoribus iniquissimis locutus, appa­ret (inquit) certâ destinati­one Dei fuisse impulsos: fa­teor Satanae operâ interpositâ saepe Deum agere in repro­bis; sed ut ejus IMPULSU Satan suas partes agat.— A Deo ipso manat efficacia erroris ut mendaciis credant, &c. Vindictae suae (proje­ctionis, scilicet, in foedas cupiditates) praecipuus est AUTHOR, Satan tantùm minister.— voluntas Dei rerum omnium causa.—Re­probos in obsequium cogit. Id.’ ib. sect. 2. fol. 69. Idem faci­nus Deo, Satanae, homini as­signari, absurdum non est. Ibid. l. 2. c. 4. sect. 2. p. 95. Ob­stinatio cordis Divina fuit ad ruinam praeparatio. Ib. sect. 3. p. 96.

Frustra de praescientiâ lis movetur, ubi constat ordinati­one potius & nutu omnia eve­nire. Ib. l. 3. c. 23. sect. 6. fol. 324.

Hic (scilicet peccator) justo illius (scilicet Dei) IM­PULSU agit quod sibi non li­cet. Id. l. 1. c. 18. sect. 4. fol. 71. Idem consulatur contra Pig­hium, de aeter. Dei Praedest. p. 118. ubi Deum peccati Au­thorem facit.

Doctor Whitaker's con­fession in reference to the whole party, without exception.

Si Calvinus, aut Martyr, aut Quis­quam nostrûm affirmet, Deum esse Authorem & causam peccati, non repugno quin simus OMNES HOR­RENDAE BLAS­PHEMIAE scele­risque Rei. Whitak. l. 8. contra Duraeum, sect. 1. p. 524. Doctor Fulk con­fesseth the same in his Defence of the English Translation, p. 500.

Mr. Whitfield himself doth now confess it to be a Crime, and a great [Page 142] Crime, to make God the Author of sin, p. 2. l. 2. And Mr. Barlee multi­plies his Curses on all that do it, (as hath been shewed) and calls it a sot­tish unholy opinion, c. 3. p. 132. although they both are deeply guilty, not onely by approving it, and defending it in others; but by doing it also themselves in the most open expressions, in which an Author of sin can be described.

The Parties Commis­mission of the Crime confessed.

Unum atque idem faci­nus, puta Adulterium, aut Homicidium, Dei AU­THORIS, motoris, Im­pulsoris opus est. Zu [...]ng. in Serm. de Prov. c. 6. Deus Angelum vel Hominem Transgressorem facit. Id. ib. cap. 5. Dictis hisce Zuin­glianis D. Twissus patrocini­um suum commodat. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 2. p. 37.

Aliter Satan malorum quàm Deus, five de malo quod in culpâ, sive de eo quod in poena cernitur, lo­quamur, AUTHOR judicatur esse. Borrhaus ad Isa. cap. 28.

‘Fatemur Deum non mo­do ipsius operis peccaminosi, sed & intentionis malae AUTHOREM esse, &c.’ D. Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. p. 36.

‘Deus homines ad suas pravas actiones incitat, se­ducit, jubet, indurat, trahit, deceptiones immittit, & quae peccata gravia sunt ef­ficit. Martyr in Jud. 3. vers. 9. p. 45.

‘Ad peccatum quà pecca­tum praeordinati sunt tam electi, quàm reprobi. Trigland. Defens. fol. 87.’

Mr. W. and Mr. B. have equall'd all the rest, if not out-done them; as my Rea­der hath partly seen, and will see yet farther in the several Sections of my second and third Chapters, where I have faithfully exhibited, and shall exhibit, their words and pages.

It were a task too easie to write a just volume, in con­fronting the Confessions to the Commissions of that party. But of things so nauseous, I think it enough to let every Passenger have a taste. And I am call'd away by Mr. Barlee's next words, affirming God to be the cause of the very obliquity of the act of sin, in his very attempt of an Abstersion. That I may not possibly do him wrong, I will transcribe his own words, and make them the top of another Section.

Sect. 14.

His confession of Faith tou­ching Gods commerce with sin. His Apology for himself, and for his Creed, is verbatim thus; I do every where make it evident, that [Page 143]I do onely believe God to be a Natural Cause of the meer Act of sin (without which it is impossible that any sin can be committed,) but that he is onely a meer accidental [...]ause of the obliquity of the act of sin, wherein alone the formali­ty of sin is consisting, and from whence alone sins Denomi­nation ought to be taken, p. 55.’] This is his wary way of speaking, and this (he tells us) is his Belief, 1. That God is the cause of sin; both of that which he calls the material p. 11. part of sin, or the positive act, & of that which he calls the formal Ibid. part of sin, or the obliquity of the act. God (saith Mr. B.) is the cause of both parts, and so of the whole sin, of which they both are components. But 2. he tells us, that God is not the natural cause of both, but the acci­dental cause of the one, and the natural cause of the other. A fair confession of his Faith. For Cain's killing Abel, and David's lying with Bathshebah were positive acts, and each of them (saith Doctor Twisse) materiale peccati; so that of them Mr. B. believeth God to be the natural cause. And supposing it possible to separate their obliquities, he believeth God to be the cause of them also. For although he calls it accidental, he cannot mean that it is none; for then he would have said, that God is no cause at all of the obliquity of the act: whereas he now saith the contrary, that God is a cause of the obliquity, because an accidental cause; nor will the knownPōsito uno Conjugato­rum ponitur alterum. Et si Conjugato­rum unum uni­conveniat, al­terum etiam conveniet al­terit Rule of Conjugates allow him any the least evasion. The Question is not what kind of cause of the obliquity they affirm God to be, natural or moral, per se or per accidens, but whether or no he is a cause. And to this Mr. B. makes answer in the affirmative. Nor can he be imagined to argue thus, God is not a na­tural, but an accidental cause; therefore no cause at all. For that were to argue that a thing is not, because it is; and that a proposition is false, because it is true: We may argue by such Logick, that Mr. B. is not a man, be­cause he is not a patient, but an angry man. And to deny that God is the Author of that obliquity, of which he affirms him to be the cause, is the same thing as to say, he is indeed the Author of the obliquity, but the Author of [Page 144]the obliquity he is not; for whatsoever is the cause of any thing in any kind of causality, is so far forth the Author of it as it is the cause, according to the use of the word Au­thor in all Classick Writers, as I shall shew in due time.

How Mr. B. makes God the natural cause of sin it self.And if that which he calls the Act of sin, (as the act of cursing or hating God, of David's lying with Bathshebah, and the like,) is nothing else but the sin it self in its whole essence, (as indeed it is, and I have demonstrated before,) then his beliefe must needs be this, that God is the na­tural cause of sin; which is worse then to believe him the moral cause onely, by how much it is worse to necessitate any man to wickedness, then onely to tempt and perswade him to it. He who necessitates, being the sole cause of it; and he who perswades, the concause onely. I will say no more here, because I have enlarged so muchLook back on ch. 2. sect. 5. alrea­dy on an occasion offered by Mr. W. I will onely adde a word to Mr. B's. citation in his Margin; If he is to be judged a moral cause of any sin, who moves any one to it, by help or counsel, favour or perswasion, (as † Dominicus à Soto doth truely speak,In moralibus prorsus est judicaturque causa, qui lege, ope, consilio, favore vel per­suasu movet quempiam sive ad bonum sive ad malum. Domin. à Soto de Nat. & Gra. l. 1. c. 12. how falsly soever in some other things) then God is also accused of being the mo­ral cause of sin, by Mr. B. and his party, who have publickly taught, that God doth tempt men to sin, and so far favour the re­generate in the very worst sins they can commit, as that they cannot fall totally, much less final­ly from grace. I have shewed the former in the third Se­ction of this Chapter; and the later long ago in the Div. Purity defended ch. 14. sect. 2. p. 128, 129, &c.

Sect. 15.

Mr. B's. most signal and most desperate at­tempt, from p. 111. to p. 121 Now I proceed to that part of Mr. B. which will save me the labour of saying more, and make him wish (ere it be long) that he had said nothing at all, but that he had rather been born dumb. For 'tis that wherein he engageth, not his own credit onely, (if he can possibly imagine that he hath any yet left him) but the credit of his [Page 145] friends too, amongst whom Mr. Hick. of Mag. Coll. is branded by him for a chief. Nor onely so, but he enga­geth very deeply his soul and conscience, which ought (I am sure) to be dearest to him. Now that himself and his Abettors may not fail of comprehending the breadth and depth of the Calamity into which he hath ingulphed and plunged himself; and to the end that he may find it much the most for his Interest, to make a publick Recantation, and to act2 Cor. 7.11. revenge upon himself, I will (as briefly as I am able) premise the state of the affair betwixt him and me, that so the life of his unhappiness may at last appear in the greater lustre.

2. The state of the case from its Original.2. I had proved, in myCh. 3. p. 110. to p. 116. Defence of the Divine Philan­thropie, that the sinner is the efficient cause of sin, in confu­tation of Mr. B. who denied that sin had any efficient cause at all, but onely (forsooth) a deficient cause. I say, I had proved the efficient of sin by a great number of Argu­ments, whereof each was so cogent, that neither Mr. B. nor M. W. nor Mr. Hick. had the courage to venture on a solution. I do heartily wish that my Reader will here peruse those seven pages in my D. Philan. Defended, from p. 110. to p. 116. where he will find my Thesis proved by so many convincing Demonstrations, as have not left the Adversary the least colour for a Reply. And because some Readers may not have that Book in their possession, whilest others are unwilling to neglect the work they are upon, I will here recapitulate (but very briefly) what there is pro­ved in ample manner.

3. Proof [...] that sin hath an effici­ent cause.3. 1. If man is the cause of sin, and not efficient, he is the material formal, or final cause; if the Deficient is none of these, (as none will say it is) it is no cause at all. If sin hath no cause, it hath no real being, much less can it be the cause of punishment: and so God is inferred to punish men without cause. 2. Where there is no efficient, there is no effect, that is, there is nothing: and so (according to Mr. B.) men are either not damned, or damned for nothing. 3. If the sinner is but deficient as to the being of sin, he is less the cause of it then God is inferred to be by them, who [Page 146]say that Gods will of sin is efficacious, and irresistible, as that which predetermines, decrees, and necessitates sin; and ef­ficacious, ab efficiendo, is prevalent, forcible, &c. 4. Mr. B. confesseth (in a sober fit) that the sinning creature is the Corrept. p. 79. efficient cause of sin, although he saith (in a fit of passion) that sin hath Ib d. p. 55. no efficient cause. 5. He often mentions theIbid. p. 79. Being of sin, as when he saith that Godp. 178. ordained it. Whereby he infers it to be effected, and so to have an ef­ficient. 6. If he saith (as at other times he doth) that sin consists wholly in a deficiency, he infers (what is worse) that no creature can effect sin, nor by consequence com­mit it. 7. Whilest he affirms Gods absolute ordination of sin in one breath, and that sin hath onely a deficient cause in another breath, he chargeth on God all the causality of sin, of which he allowes it to be capable. 8. As when he breaths hot, he saith that God ordained and determined sin; so when he breaths cold, he saith that God can ordain nothing but good; which is to infer that sin is good: And to what is good he allows an efficient cause. 9. If sins of omission (as not praying, and not giving almes, &c.) had but a defici­ent cause, yet sins of commission (as cursing and sacrilege, &c.) have a cause efficient with a witness. 10. Admitting that sin were a privative Entity, it would not follow that it hath not any efficient cause. For he who deprives a man of life, or sight, is the efficient cause of death, or blindness. And darkness (the privative of light) was one of the works of Gods Creation, Gen. 1.4, 5. of all which he was the ef­ficient cause. 11. What is privative in one respect may be positive in another; as our sicknesses and sins do daily teach us. Murder is not onely privative of vertue, but also constitutive of vice; and must have something in it of positive, to make it differ in specie from all other sins, and in degree from all other murders. Of some we say, they are not good; whilest others are not onely positively, but superlatively evil. 12. Every privation presupposeth an habit to which it stands in opposition: but a man may be covetous who never was liberal. 13. An Agent morally deficient in the performance of a Duty doth effect [Page 147]that evil action which is so morally deficient. For 1. The Adulterer is the efficient of his filthy Act, which is his sin. 2. The Devil is the Father of lyes, and a Father is an efficient. 3. A man (through grace) is the efficient cause of a good Action. And Mr. B. is worse then a Pelagian, if he will say that man is more efficient of good then of evil. 14. Mr. B. Corrpt. 111. confesseth (in a lucid interval) that there may be something positive in a privati­on. 15. Punishment is a positive Entity, and owned to have an efficient cause. But Mr. B. saith often that sin is a punishment. 16. Whilest he denies his making God the Author of sin, because sin (forsooth) hath no efficient, he unavoidably infers, 1. Either that God is not the Author of death; or 2. that he is the Author of sin, if of death; or 3. of both; or 4. of neither. 17. If when they say that God is the cause of sin, they do not infer he is the Author, because the cause is but deficient, they plead no more for God then for the Devil; for if nothing is an Author which is not efficient, and if sin hath no efficient, then neither Men nor Devils can be the Authors of sin.

4. In stead of answering these things,4. Mr. B's imper­tinencies, and railings in lieu of Answers, do stricke ob­liquely at S. James. Mr. B. talks thus, p. 111. sect. 3. First, that my opinion of sins having a positive Entity, and an efficient cause is a dreadful opini­on. Secondly, that there is no question between us about a­ny thing else: (which if true, then my evincing this concludes the Controversie between us.) Thirdly, that he trembles more at the thought of commiting sin, then ma­ny of my party, if not my self, at the open acting of it. Fourthly, that Gods judicial hand appears against me. Fifthly, that my conclusion (out of S. James, ch. 1. v. 15.) is 1000. times more for Gods being the Author of sin, then the words of his party which I have cited. Sixthly, that Gods just hand is upon me. Seventhly, Quem perdere vult Deus hunc dementat, p. 112.’ These are his general An­swers thrust up together into one Paragra [...]h. Before I come to his particular Answers (which are infinitely worse) I will intreat my Reader to com [...]are my seventeen particu­lars with Mr. B's. seven, and with what I shall now say from the express words of S. James, who saith, thatJam. 1.15. lust [Page 148]having conceived bringeth forth sin. The conception of lust is before expressed by a mans being drawn away, and enti­ced by his lust (v. 14.) The Spirit solicit [...] the Will on one side, lust on the other. If lust prevailes and carries away the wills consent, then lust conceives; or (which is all one in effect) the Will is [...]. drawn away, and [...]. deceived, or overreached by Lust: not onely invited, but insnared and wrought upon by the invitation, so as to give up its consent. Lust by this doth conceive, and then bringeth forth sin, as the Parent the Child. VVhat is sin therefore, but the pro­duction of the will consenting to Lust, or drawn away by it? The production (I mean) of the evil will, which by thus consenting becomes evil. Now this being the upshot of what I mean by the efficient cause, and positive entity of sin; against whom hath Mr. B. spent the expressions of his Pet? against we onely, who spake from S. James, or a­gainst S. James also, from whom I spake?Note how the bitterest of his censures do hit himself and his party. Nay, hath he not spent them upon himself, who hath confessed, even in Print, the very same things which here he railes at? He hath openly affirmed, both that the sinning Creature is the efficient cause of his sin, (Corrept. p. 79.) and that there ☞may be something of positive in a privation, (Ibid. p. 111.) Nay are not all his railings against all his own party, who say that God dothLook back on ch. 2. p. 90. efficere peccata, and not onely will, butM.W's. own words p. 26. of which I have spoken ch. 2. sect. 14. and al­so sect. 20, 21. work sin, and that he hath a hand in * effecting sin? Sure these are very frequently the expressions of his Masters, as well as Brethren: and therefore judge (good Reader) whether S. James and Mr. P. or Mr. B. and his party, are the pertinent objects of Mr. B's. Invectives, especi­ally his last expressed inQuem per­dere vult De­us hunc de­mentat. Of the positive Entity of sin. Latine, [1. Dementation sent from God; and 2. as a token of Reprobation.]

Sect. 16.

To the Preface which he makes to his more particular Discussion, wherein he onely takes occasion to call it a horrible opinion, that sin as sin in respect of its obli­quity, hath a positive entity and efficient cause, p. 112. lin. 9, 10. I have but three things to say. 1. That if it were so indeed, he would be utterly unexcusable for having em­braced that opinion in that part of his Prints so lately ci­ted; or for railing at an opinion which himself confessed [Page 149]to be true: or if he hath since seen his error, why was not his second volume a Recantation of his first? And what will he do to Mr. W. for saying that God had a hand in ef­fecting sin, whereby he inferred, that sin had an effective or efficient cause? 2. He cannot say he speaks of the for­mal part of sin as sin, and not of the whole sin, because he speaks of sin in respect of its obliquity, which he is wont to call the formal part of sin. And 'tis non-sense to say, that sin as sin in respect of its sin, or that obliquity as obliquity in respect of its obliquity, hath not a positive entity, or ef­ficient cause. So as he dares not deny, but that sin doth signifie the integrum peccati, or whole filthy act (such as Cains killing Abel, or David's lying with Bathshebah) whose repugnance with Gods Law is called obliquity. And because that sin is an oblique, or crooked, or irregular acti­on, Mr. B. concludes it no positive Entity. 3. But to rest on him to sobriety and common sense, I shall need only to ask him, whether Rectitude is not a positive Entity. If he saith yes (as I am sure he needs must) what shew of rea­son can he pretend, why obliquity is not as much so as Rectitude? how much more that whole sin, of which obli­quity is accounted the formal part? Is not a Circle, quà talis, as positively a figure, or a round figure, as a right line is a right line? Is not crookedness or gibbosity in any mans shape as positively such, as streightness or clean ma­king? When a crooked parent begets a child which is also as crooked, is he less a positive and efficient cause, then if he and his child were both well shaped? When Adam be­gat Cain in a state of sin, (with Satans image in stead of Gods, as some of the Fathers have expressed it) was not the cause and the effect too, as truely positive, as if they both had been sinless? An action flowing from an Agent hath as positive an Entity, as the Agent himself from whom it flowes. The sin of Murder is an Action; as Cain's kil­ling Abel: So is the sin of Adultery; as David's lying with Bathshebah. Nor any whit the less such, in respect of their being irregular actions; any more then a wicked man is the less a man for being wicked. David's lying with [Page 150]Bathshebah before she was his wife, was as positive an En­tity, and had a cause as efficient, as David's lying with Bathshebah after she was his wife; which alone is suffi­cient to fill Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. with confusion of Face, and to compel them to Recantations, unless they will shelter themselves under Rantism and Libertinism, by saying that David's lying with Bathshebah was no adul­tery, or such an adultery as was no sin, or that it was a ve­ry good sin, because a positive Entity, and that which had an efficient cause. For Mr. B's. first Argument doth fol­low thus:

Sect. 17.

If sin as sin be a positive Entity, 1. Mr. B's first Argument to prove the good­ness of sin, in which Mr. Hick. is equal­ly concerned. then it is a thing in it self good. For every positive thing is good. It is to all Scholars well known, that unum, verum, bonum convertuntur, p. 112.]’ First, he cannot but confess, that if sin is a thing positive, he seeks to prove (by this Argu­ment) that sin is good. But that it is a thing positive, I have abundantly proved in my two last Sections, and himself hath confessed in his Correptory p.79. & p. 111. both before cited and com­pared with one another. Correction; therefore he cannot but confess, that all the force of this Argument is onely to prove that sin is good.

2. A thing that is privative in one respect, is also po­sitive in another,2. The noysome­ness of the Dis­ease. as every Sciolist knows and Mr. B. hath virtually confessed. Every Sciolist can tell, that the corruption of one thing is the generation of another; that what is privative of life or sight, must needs be positive of death or blindness. The Darkness which God created was not more privative of the Day, then it was positive of the Night. Nay, doth not Mr. B. confess as much? for in say­ing that the sinner is theCorrep. p. 79. efficient cause of his sin, he doth grant it to be a thing. And in saying, there may be some­thing of Ib. p. 111. positive in a privation, he doth more then grant it to be a positive thing. I therefore say, more, because a pri­vation is but the abstract of privative. And the Transgres­sion of the Law, which is sin, is not a meer privation of vertue, but a positive thing, which is privative of vertue, & positive of vice. Sin is so perfectly a concrete, that unless [Page 151]it is a concrete, it cannot be conceived to be a sin: No, no more then a concrete can be conceived to be a concrete when it ceaseth to be a concrete. The most Poetical brain cannot fansie the least [...]ial difference betwixt David's lying with Bathshebah, and his adultery with Bathshebah, at the time of her being Uriah's wife. So that now Mr. B. must confess, that the least part of his blasphemy is no less then this, that sin is good as it is positive of evil, although it is evil as it is privative of good. This being the Printed Article of his unchristian Creed, [THAT EVERY POSITIVE THING IS GOOD.]

3. The purging out of the pec­cant Humour.3. Having shewed him the noysomness of his Disease, I will now remove the peccant Humour by which it appears to have been fed, to wit, his Ignorance, or Inadvercency, that bonum metaphysicum, which is converted with ens, hath quite another signification then bonum morale. And being Aristotles phrase (who was neither a Prophet of the old Testament, nor an Evangelist of the new) should rather have been rejected as unsound and unsafe, then have been used by a Priest to prove the goodness of sin. For the Libertines and Ranters (who are as little versed in Meta­physicks, and in Aristotle's meanings, as Mr. B. or Mr. Hick. or Mr. Hobbs) are not onely very ignorant of theBonitas mo­ralis, natura­lis, transcen­dentalis, pas­sim leguntur apud id genus Scriptores. difference betwixt good and good, but they cannot easily be taught it. And a Carneadist will be glad to introduce an opinion that sin is good, by calling it Bonum Metaphysicum, or Transcendentale. Mr. B. must now be taught (that he may not debauch his Disciples) that the adaequate subject of Metaphysical Science is ens quatenus ens, reale illud; not omnimodo positivum quatenus positivum. And so, in one sense it comprehendethVide Scot. Quodl. 3. Art. 1 Res, andVide Mon­lorium de Uni­vers. cap. 7. Aliquid. And Mr. B's. very obliquity (he knows) is really some thing: but then again he must be taught, that Bonum in Metaphy­sicks, which is converted with Ens, doth not signifie Good in English, any more then Canis (the Star) doth signifie the Dog which walks about with four feet in our English streets and apprehensions, though that (in Latine) is Canis too. The difference is not the less betwixt malum (an [Page 152] Apple) and malum (an Evil) andIn accusati­vo. malum (an mast) because they are expressed in the very same letters. Bonum, in English, doth signifie good, as oppos'd to evil. But in Metaphysicks no more then ens in ordine ad appetitum. And that sin is such, Mr. B. knows by sad and minutely experience; and so before he is aware, he hath proved the thing which he indeavoured to disprove, by his very indea­vours to disprove it, viz. that sin is a positive thing.

4. Dr. Twisse his Foundation a thin Sophisme.4. Upon this lamentable Sophism, as lame and as na­ked as it appears, Dr. Twisse hath founded his Doctrine of irrespective Reprobation. Because, forsooth, there is aliqua bonitas (nimirum entis) in damnato, but none in annihilato, therefore God (saith the Doctor) who may annihilate for nothing, may damn his Creatures also for nothing; this being (saith he) the lesser evil. Chuse now (good Reader) whether thy Saviour, or Doctor Twisse, doth best deserve to be believed. Doctor Twisse tells us that it is better to be tormented in Hell for ever, then to be turned again to nothing. Our Saviour tells us the contra­ry, Mat. 18.6. & Mat. 26.24. Mar. 14.21. where he saith in effect, that it is better to be annihilated, then to be damned. By the Logick of that Doctor, it should be better also to do wickedly, then not to do any thing at all, and sin would be good by being something.

5. How a lye is verum as much as sin bonum.5. If non-sense is to be spoken in the style of Me­taphysicks (as misunderstood by a Hobbist or a Presby­terian) then indeed we must say, that sin is bonum metaphysicum, and that a lye by consequence is meta­physicum verum. Then which if Mr. B. doth mean no more, the Reader sees what he hath gained. But if by Good he means bonum morale, let him prove that Parricide, Incest, Witchcraft, or Blasphemy, must either be naked privations, or moral good things; for ac­cording to his dreamings, they must either be nothing, or no sins, or moral vertues, or sins and moral vertues too. And so the Devil, who is not a bare privation, must be with Mr. B. a moral good.

6. Now I must shew him the sense of his Latine Cita­tions in the Margin. 1. Albertus Magnus his speech hath thus far truth in it,6. Albertus Magnus his words explained. Perfectius est agere, quàm esse. Id quod non est à se nec potest à se mane­re in esse, multò minus potest agere à seipso. Et cùm actus malus secundum conversionem ad materiam sit simplici­ter actus egrediens à potentiâ activâ perfectâ secundum naturam, ideo non egreditur ab eo, nisi secundum quod movetur à causâ primâ, alioqui sequere­tur duo principia esse. Alb. Mag. in Pet. Lomb. Senten. 2. Disp. 37. that actus malus is not so from the man, as if he could simply agere à seipso, if God did not give him the power of being and acting as a very free Agent. But this being supposed, it is meetly the work of mans own will (which God hath left thus free, that is, determinable by it self) to determine his Will to this or that which is evil. So again it is true, quod non egredi­tur abeo, nisi secundum quod movetur à causâ primâ, if he means by movetur, his having the power of being and act­ing as a man, both given and continued by God unto him: which is abundantly sufficient to avoid the duo prin­cipia, if he means coaeterna: otherwise 'tis certain, that God is the principle of good onely, and Lucifer onely of evil. Thus the Citation makes not for Mr. B. but in two respects it makes against him: for actus malus is actus, and egredient from that power which is enabled to act (as that is more perfect then barely to be) and so as to need a dependence from the first cause, which must infer the A­gent to be more then deficient; for to a meer deficiency there needed not his moveri à causâ primâ. 2. Mr. B. doth here assert, that man had his power to sin from God, Mr. B. (taught by Mr. Rivet) doth most a­vowedly make God the Au­thor of sin. nor will he deny that that power hath a positive entity; but he had argued before (c. 2. p. 54.) That if the power to sin was from God, God must unavoidably be the Author of sin, which besides the great impiety, bewrayes a sottish­ness in the blasphemer: for the power to sin being (in or­der of time, as well as of nature) before the being of sin, it followes that such a power is not onely no sin, but 'tis impossible that it should be; else Adam must have been sinful whilest he was innocent, and sinned before he sinned, because he had the power to sin, before it was possible for [Page 154]him to sin, or for that power to be reduced into act. Mark now the arguing of Mr. B. from hisSee the Div. Philan. ch. 4. sect. 24. p. 24. friend Mr. Rivet. If that power or capability which neither was nor could be sin, was from God, then God was unavoidably the Au­thor of s [...]n, that is, he was, because he was not; it was ne­cessary, because impossible. This 'tis to be a rigid Consisto­rian. He and Rivet must either say,Look forward on sect. 29. that Adam actually sinned before he had the power to sin, or that it is part of their belief, that God is unavoidably the Author of sinne.

7. S. Austins words most im­pertinently ci­ted.7. Saint Austin's speech of Natura vitiosa in sensu diviso, in which are separated those two things, natura and vi­tium, is nothing at all to the purpose of sin, whose very being is evil, and hath not the least moral bonity in it; of which alone we here speak. There is no doubt, but Na­ture is good when it is not evil, and evil when it is vici­ous: but what is this to the posiciveness or privativeness of sin? This is but one of Mr. Bis. [...].

Sect. 18.

I now proceed to the second Argument, which is the most horrible of all: ☞ The most re­markable blas­phemy of one Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. called by the name of a second Ar­gument. it is hard to say, whether more impious, or more unscholarly. And as if one Presbyterian had not sufficed to make it sufficiently absurd, Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. have joined their forces. But Mr. Hick. is the Chieftain in this exploit, (if Mr. B. hath not done him wrong) because it came out of his Forge, and was sent from Oxford to Brockhole to be hammered on by Mr. Barlee. Observe (good Reader) the words and syllables of the men.

If sin is a positive Entity, IT IS GOD; for as a very Note that Mr. B. in his margin, ex­plained whom he meant in these large Characters. Mr. H. HICK. of his own Col­ledge, p. 112. learned pious friend of mine wrote to me not long since very well, Whatever positive thing is not from God, is God; there being no medium betwixt Deus and Creatura. In truth every positive thing must be Creator, or Creature; and who now is the Mani­chee, maintaining an independent evil principle? p. 112.’

Before I shew how many wayes this brace of Presby­terians have been unhappy in this conjunction of their abilities expressed in five or six lines, I will take a short notice of the Authority and Repute which is acquired to Mr. Hick. by his being noted (in the margin) to be a man of mine own Colledge. For ought I know, he may be also in possession of mine own Fellowship, and mine own Cham­ber, and mine own meat and drink, and those yearly Reve­nues which are mine own too: and for which I may the rather expect to have some satisfaction, because it seems the Visitors made him one of my Receivers and Usufru­ctuaries (for my legitimate Heir or Successor they could not make him.) And I have reason to be glad that he is thought such a pious and learned man: because if he is pious, he will the sooner pay me my Arrears; and if he is learned, he will not object against my known and in­disputable right. But of his Learning and Piety both at once, I am now to make some easie trials.

1. First he concludes the Devils Pride (not onely to be good, but) to be God; 1. How Mr. Hick, inferrs the God­head of sin, which I durst not repete, but that I cannot confute it o­therwise. for the Devils pride is a positive thing (as I have lately made apparent, Sect. 15, 16. and shall farther demonstrate by and by.) And being the very fil­thiness of the filthiest spirit, it cannot possibly be from God, or one of Gods Creatures. And if not so, then (say the Brethren) it must needs be God. For so run their words, [whatever positive thing is not from God, is God, there be­ing no medium betwixt Deus and Creatura, God and his Creature.] The Devils pride is as positive a thing as his lyes are, and as much from the Devil, and as really a sin, and so as infinitely far from being one of Gods Creatures. But Gods word tells us, thatJoh. 8.44. lyes are from the Devil, and not from God. The Devil alone is theIbid. father of lyes, whereas God on the contrary is the spirit of Joh. 16.13. truth. And as a lye in particular is the child of the Devil, (for relata dicuntur ad convertentiam) so sins in general are the1 Joh. 3.8. works of the Devil: and so they are called in many pla­ces of Scripture by the name ofMic. 6.16. Gal. 5.19. Eph. 5.11. Col. 1.21. Heb. 9.14. Rev. 9 20. works; as 'twere on purpose to shew us that they are positive things. The works [Page 156]of darkness, the works of the flesh, the works of mens hands, dead works, the works of the Devil. Nay farther yet, so far are those works from being Gods Creatures, that the Son of God was manifested in the flesh, that he might de­stroy the works of the Devil, 1 Joh. 3.8. And yet those works must needs be positive things, even for this very rea­son, that they are capable of destruction: privatio est habitûs privatio, and vacuum vacui implicat locatum. Every pri­vation is of something positive; and not to be so implies a palpable contradiction. He who shall prove there is a vacuum in nature, because there is vacuum vacui, will say no more in effect, then that there is a vacuum, because there is not a vacuum. And so a privation of a privation is nothing else but a position, that is, not a privation. So that unless Mr. Hick. will embrace the suds of a contradiction, he must confess that to be positive, which God came to destroy; and that he came to destroy, not his own works, but the Devils; and that the works of the Devil are no­thing else but sins: upon which he must recant his most deplorable way of arguing, and make some kind of satis­faction for his so scandalous an attempt; or else he must own his proposition in one part of it, or in another; either by saying that the Devils works are Gods Creatures, (and so from God) or that he thinks they are God himself.

2. I do so pity the Malefactor, 2. It way opened to the undecei­ving of M. Hick. by shewing him a Medium where he could see none. Look back on ch. 2. sect. 7. even at this very instant whilest I am persecuting his crime, that though in consci­ence and duty I am bound to shew it in every part of its deformity, (that the weaker sort may be warned against the killing Doctrines of such Instructers) yet am I un­willing to go farther in shewing the dangers (nay real mischiefs) into which he is fallen, and fallen headlong, by his own wilful precipitation of himself and others, (for I hear he is a person who hath many more followers then Mr. B.) until I have shewed him a way whereby he may scrabble out of the misery wherein he lies. He must know there is a medium betwixt God and his creatures, (and I wonder what ayl'd him that he should say there is none) even the works of the Devil, which the Son of [Page 157]God himself came to [...]. dissolve and dissipate, 1 Joh. 3.8. Men and Devils have their creatures, which are not God's: such are all theirPsal. 106.3. inventions, with which they are said to go a * whoreing, and with which they Vers. 29. provoke God to anger, and on which God is said to have taken Psal. 99.8. vengeance. God made men upright, but they have sought out many inventions (Eccles. 7.29.) Man and his natural faculties are the creatures of God, but the abuses and pollutions of those natural faculties are man's own creatures. Res in Metaphysicks hath three acceptions; in the first of which it comprehendeth entia rationis, as oppos'd to Nihil: so that when a man hath chimaera's in his head, as golden Mountains, Eutopia's, Hirco-Cervi, Centaures, Models of houses to be built hereafter, or per­haps never, false apprehensions of God, Atheistical con­ceits and imaginations, and all manner of lies; Man (in that case) is the creator of those entia rationis, whe­ther meerly groundless, or wicked notions. We know that to lye, is a positive thing; yet Saint Paul affirms it to be impossible to be the Creature of God, Tit. 1.2. Heb. 6.18. It was one instance of Gods Almightiness, that he created Men and Angels with such a liberty of will in con­junction with Ratiocination, as to be able to have their Creatures too; although those Creatures must needs be vain, whose Creators are finite, and Creatures too. Nay so evident it is; that men are really Creators, that they seem to be such in the proper notion of the word, as Cre­ation signifies the Production of something out of nothing; for there are entia rationis ratiocinantis, which have not so much as fundamentum in re. But why do I talk Meta­physically to such a Scholar as lies before me, who seems so great a stranger to it, that I may very well take up the proverbial verse, [...];’

My design is to convert, and not confound him, and there­fore I will use a greater plainness. When a witty Psal. 14.1. & Psal. 53.1. Fool [Page 158]strives to prove there is no God, and when a sil [...]y Foole does believe it, (as wrought upon by the witty ones proof) Atheism then becomes his Creature. My will and my power to will this, or that, or another thing, is the Crea­ture of God: but the determination of my will to that which God forbiddeth, and my aversion from God, and my dislike of Gods will, and my loving or willing what God abhorreth, these are my Creatures, and I alone must an­swer for them, if I shall ever be so wretched as to abuse my liberty by such a looseness. Concerning the many most real and positive things which were the Creatures of Nero, Tiberius, Petronius, and Domitian, and which to derive from Gods Will, or Creative Power, were a blasphemy great enough to make a mans hair stand upright at the very thought of it, I have spokenThe sinner Impl. part 2. ch. 2. sect. 12. p. 264, 265. elsewhere, and there­fore now do but give a hint of them. Concerning theBishop An­drews Sermon of the worship­ping of Imagi­nations, p. 33, 37. vain imaginations created and worshipped by Presby­terians, under the specious name of the Apostles Doctrine, Government, Sacraments, and Prayers, Bishop Andrews of blessed memory hath wisely treated. God indeed made Gold and Silver; but for the Idols which were made of Gold and Silver (the meer invention of the Heathens by the help of Satan,) the Scripture tells us they were the work of mens hands, Psal. 115.4. They that make them are like unto them, (v. 8.) It was God, who said in the second Commandment, Thou shalt not make to thy self any gra­ven Image. He did not say, Thou shalt not worship the graven Images which I the Lord thy God have made. God created the Earth out of nothing, and made metals out of the Earth: But the Idolaters themselves did make their Idols out of those metals. God made them men, but (by the help of the Devil) they made themselves Idolizers of graven Images. God continued their being, life, motion, and every faculty or power to act as free Agents; but to apply their faculties to the making of Idols, to reduce their power into the act of worshipping what they had made, to urite their wills with the accursed thing, and to chuse their own Gods, these were the instances of th [...]ir [Page 159] freedom, and humane creatures. When S. Paul saith plainly, there be Gods many, meaning false and fanciful Gods, (which were become the true God's Rivals in the greatest part of the world,) he cannot mean that the true God had made so many false God [...], but that they were creatures of the creature. And if mechanical works, (as Watches, Windmills, Fire-shovells, and Bellowes) are properly called the works 1 Cor. 8.5. of men, as to the shape and fashion by which they are specified (although the materials of wood and iron, and the men themselves, are the works of God onely,) how much more are those spi­ritual and cannal works, Pride, Envy, Malice, Idolatry, Murder, Drunkenness, and the like, the works and crea­tures of Men and Devils? It was the saying of S. Austin (as I have read him cited by a most eminent Prelate of our own) Peccator non est inter opera Dei, a sinner is no work of God: As a man, he is God's work; but as a sin­ful man, he is his own; or if not his own, I am sure the Devils, saith that great man. And when Austin saith (upon Luk. 15.7, 10.) that the joy of heaven extends no farther then the works of God, he doth imply that there are works which are not of God. Mr. Hick. therefore should have made his division thus, by a Trichotomy: All positive things are either 1. God, or 2. his creatures, or 3. things wrought by his creatures through the power which the Creator hath communicated unto them. And that the brethrens way of arguing the very Deity of sin (from its being something positive, yet none of God's creatures,) was the fantastick creature of the brethren, I farther proceed to make apparent and undeniable.

3. The sin called Atheism is a positive thing, 3. How Mr. H. and Mr. B. do infer atheism it self to be the creature of God, or God himself. ns being a positive belief that there is no God, not a belief of no­thing, nor a belief of any thing else, nor a privation of Godhead without belief, but (in sensu composito) a belief of no God; that is Atheism. Now I ask Mr. Hick. Is it from God as his creature, or is it not? If he saith that it is not, he must avow it to be God, or recant his argument: if he saith that it is, he must confesse he holds God to be [Page 160]the Author of sin. He cannot deny it to be a positive thing, because every belief is a species of quality, to wit an habit, or disposition of mind, and every [...] credere, or act of believing, is in the praedicament of action, and so a positive entity or thing. Nor can he say that all Atheism doth consist in not believing there is a God, as that is opposed to the being of belief; for stones and trees would then be Atheists, as not believing there is a God: whereas Atheism on the contrary (however the word is com­pounded with [...]) is the positive belief that there is no God, and is competent to nothing below a man. That I may not here be mistaken by such as are not onely willing, but glad to fall into mistakes (when nothing else is left to help them) I will explain my true meaning in what I speak concerning Atheism, when I call it a be­lief that there is no God, and not a meer absence of belief that there is a God. I take it for granted that there are none but have heard at least there is a God, and that the being of a God is at least believed by other men; from whence it followes unavoidably, that the supposed A­theists of whom I speak, (who have heard of a God, and of believers thatHeb. 11.6. God is, and yet for their own parts do not believe any such thing) must needs have a positive belief that they have heard a false report, and that the Theists are erroneous, and that their fellow-A­theists are orthodox in that particular. Nevertheless I dis­cern so wide a difference, betwixt irrational creatures which neither do, nor can, nor can be obliged to believe there is a God, and men who can, and ought also to believe it; that if it is possible for a man not to believe there is a God, without believing that there is no God, I pronounce him guilty of negative Atheism. But this I take to be impossible in any capable subject, which is able, and ob­liged to have an actual belief. And because an infant of two dayes old hath not the exercise of reason, and is not capable of any positive belief, it followes that that infant is not guilty of Atheism in any sense, (any more then the trees of which I spake) although he doth not believe [Page 161]there is a God. But admit the possibility of meerly ne­gative Atheism in a subject capable of actual Faith, yet all will grant that positive Atheism is a sin, and a grea­ter sin then the negative; which evinceth the thing that I am proving. Mr. Hobbs himself, though heMr. Hobbs his Leviath. p. 214. denies that there are spirits, which is the heart of Atheism, (for God is a Spirit, Joh. 4.24.) yet he saith thatId de Civ. c. 14. scot. 19. Atheism is an erroneous opinion, and so infers it to be a positive thing. Again, he saith that sins areLib. & Ne­ces. p. 23. actions; and that actions are things positive, his nearest Confederates will not deny.

The like may be said of all other sins, especially sins of commission; which being riveted in a man by long custom and continuance, are commonly calledSins are posi­tive things, be­cause inward habits. HABITU­AL SINS. So then, Mr. Hick. cannot but confess, that vices are habits as well as vertues, (there is a habit of Drunkenness, as well as of Sobriety;) and that Habits are Qualities he cannot be ignorant, if he is but able to tell his fingers; and that a habit is a thing positive, his postpraedicaments have taught him, where a habit and a privation are set as opposite terms, such as do mutually ne­cessitate each others absence: which being granted by all the world, Mr. H's. Dilemma hath caught him in this inextricable snare, that he must either do a publick penance, or confess his Belief to be one of these two things; [So many Sins, so many Gods; or so many Sins, so many Crea­tures derived from God.] He sees his sin in his punishment, and what a vain thing it is for [...]. Beetles to fly in the face of Eagles; for such a thing as Mr. Hick. to strike at God, and his Purity, by giving sin an [...], and laying his Child (when he hath done) at another mans door: For so I find by Mr. B. p. 114.

4. Man the Au­thor of some po­sitive things, & God of some privatives. Rom. 22.11.4. The positive Entity of sin may farther be evinced thus: There must be something positive to make a man positively foul; which foulness suffers a privation when the man is cleansed of his filth. Sin doth make a man filthy; God by his grace doth make him clean. The filth of sin is many times so ingrained, that after Gods own [Page 162] cleansings the habitual sinner remains unclean. I haveEzek. 23.13. purged thee (saith God) and thou wast not purged; there­fore shalt thou not be purged from thy filthiness any more. Yet in a flat contradiction to Mr. Hick's Divinity, the filth which is positive is mans own Creature, whereas the cleansing which is privative is Gods own work.

5. Mr. Hick. con­founds Nega­tive and Pri­vative, as well as Privative and Privation.5. Whilest Mr. Hick. denies sin to be something posi­tive, he seems to make no difference betwixt a simple ne­gative, and a privative properly so called. And again, confounds a privation properly so call'd, with a thing call'd privative secundum quid. He makes no difference betwixt not blessing, and cursing God; betwixt ceasing to give alms, (which is one kind of sin) and grinding the faces of the poor, (by rapine, oppression, and extortion) which is another. He makes no difference betwixt not saving, and killing another man. And yet the men of his party do interpret Gods sufferance or permission of sin, by efficacious and ope­rative; from whence I thus argue: If to permit sin onely (which is onely not to hinder) can be any way positive, be­cause efficacious; how much more is that positive which is called perswasion, or temptation unto sin? yet temptati­on unto sin is a horrible sin in the tempter, though none at all in the person tempted.

6. To harden our own hearts and consent unto temptations are positive things.6. Mr. H's. party are wont to say, that God doth har­den a mans heart by way of action. So saith Mr. W. p. 22. How much more by way of action doth a man harden his own heart? and every action is a positive entity; Ipsum pri­vare, as much as any. To consent to a temptation, he knows is sin; and he will not deny it to be a thing positive. But to consent to a temptation is none of Gods off-spring, much less is it a God; by which Mr. H. may discern, that in the Net which he had laid he isPsal. 9.15. & 35.8. caught himself. And his traiterous Child (I mean his Argument) hath done exactly unto him, as heDeut. 19.19. thought to have done unto his brother.

7. Our destruction from our selves a positive thing.7. Though it is God that made us, and not we our selves, (Psal. 95.) yet our spiritual destruction is from our selves, and not from God, (Hos. 13.6. Wisd. 1.13, 14.) And be­lieve [Page 163]me, to destroy is a positive thing, as the woful effect can well inform us. And if the determination of the will to blaspheme, or curse God, (which will be granted by all Sects to be a positive thing) is not mans own work, but his Creators, who then is made by Mr. Hick. to be the Au­thor of such impieties?

8. Sin is so spoken of in Scripture, as to be every where concluded a very positive thing. 8. Sin spoken of Scripture as a positive thing. There are that sin as with aIs. 5.18. Cart-rope, andIs. 30.1. adde sin unto sin. ChristIs. 53.10, 12 bare our sins, and made his soul an offering for them. All sin shall be forgiven,Mat. 12.31. except that against the Holy Ghost. We read ofGen. 20.9. Joh. 15.22. & 19.11. 1 Joh. 5.16.17 great and little sins in comparison. We also read (in proportion) ofMat. 23.14. Luk. 12.48. greater and lesser damnation. Sin is the1 Cor. 15.56. sting of Death, and death theRom. 6.23. wages of sin. And the cause cannot have a lesser Being then the effect. Sin Rom. 7.8. wrought in me (saith the Apostle) all maner of concupiscence. And perfectius est agere, quâm esse, saith Albertus Magnus. Sin hath itsRom. 7.8, 9. life, and death, and resurrection. There is aHeb. 3.13. deceitfulness of sin. And sin is said to have itsHeb. 11.25. pleasures. Sin is a thing to beHeb. 12.1. laid aside, either totally, or for a time. There are that areRom. 7.14. sold under sin, and are servants to it, and can­not 2 Pet. 2.14. cease from it. Insomuch that sin doth rule andRom. 5.21. & 6.12. reign over them. In a word, it is evident from the Scriptures, that from the time in which sin did make itsRom. 5.12. entrance into the world, it was able to change the course of Nature. And could a simple privation, which is but the absence of an Entity (supposed to have been present) have been the cause of all this?

9. Mr. Hick. con­vinced by his own party.9. Mr. Hick's own party acknowledge sin to be a com­pound, made up of a material and formal part. The material part of it Mr. W. calls a natural act (p. 25.) Mr. B. both a natural and moral act, (p. 11.) Doctor Twisse gives his instance in the act of lying with another mans wife; All positive things. Nay, the formal part of sin is a positive Entity, as themselves have defined it; it being the result of two positive things, to wit, the repugnance of any Action with the Law of God. Nay, Mr. W. saith broadly, that God [Page 164]must needs both will and work in the sin of the act, the very pravity it self, p. 12. implying it to have an efficient cause.

10. He argues with the Libertines.10. Mr. Hick. argues like the Libertines, and as it were out of their mouths, whilest he contends that all things positive are either Gods Creatures, or God himself. And so he comes to be concerned in what I said to Mr. W. ch. 1. sect. 2. p. 8, 9, &c. I leave the Reader to collect how Mr. Hick. would frame his Answers to any man that should Catechise him in the very first Article of the Ni­cene Creed, he having discovered to all the world in what a latitude he understands it.

11. Mr. Hick. will confess he hath blasphemed, in case that sin is something posi­tive; which is many wayes proved.11. This Mr. Hick. will unavoidably confess, that if 'tis impossible to separate the sinful act from the sin, as Da­vid's lying with Bathshebah from his sin of Adultery; nay that we cannot imagine or conceive how they can possibly be distinguished; then sin must needs be something positive, and so is inferred by him, to be either Gods Creature, or God himself. But that there is not the least difference be­twixt the sinful act and the sin, (as betwixt the act of hating God, and the sin of hating God, which is that act of hating God) I have manifestedLook back on ch. 2. sect. 12, & 13. and also on sect. 9, & 11. of the same ch. 2. before to Mr. W. In all which Mr. Hick. comes to be equally concerned; and I refer him to four Sections pointed out in the * margin. To all which I adde these following proofs. 1. Sin being complexum quid (in the acknowledgement of all) cannot admit of an abstraction, and yet remain the complexum which it was before abstracted. God can separate the soul of man from the body, but not the man from the man, who is the upshot of their union. This would imply a contradiction; as, that the parts are united when they are separated or not united. To make it plain and naked for the thickest heads, I shall use this example; David's sin of Adultery was not possi­ble to be meerly his repugnance with the Law, abstracted from his lying with Uriah's wife; nor meerly his lying with Uriah's wife, abstracted from its repug­nance with the Law of God: But 'twas the pro­duct or result of both united. As a man is not his body onely without his soul, nor onely his soul without [Page 165]his body, but a compound consisting of soule and body. 2. The sinful act being a Relative, whose very being (as such) is in relation to the law which it transgresseth, it is as impossible to separa [...]e the one from the other, as to se­parate a Father from his very relation unto a Son. 3. Mr. Hobbs hathLiberty and Necess. p. 23. confessed (what his brethren of the Kirk will never be able to claw off, either by owning or disowning,) that if God is the Author of the action, which is a breach of the law, as well as of the law of which it is a breach, he must be the Author of the breach, that is, the sin, and of the very repugnance betwixt the law and the action by which it is broken; which shews the insepa­rability of which I speak. And because the Author of all things requisite to the being of any thing, must needs be the Author of the being; therefore, say I, God is so far from being, that 'tis impossible he should be, the Author of any one action which is a transgression of the law, that is, a sin, but onely the Author of the man's free-will, and of his power to use his freedom, which power is innocent, as hath beenS [...]ct. 18. Num. 7. shewed. The sin begins not but with the abuse of that power in the determining of the will to the forbidden and wrong object: which wrong determining of the will is the sinners own action, and his alone, since he did freely chuse it, whilest yet the contrary was in his power to chuse. The power to act being before the act, is therefore separable from it, though the act being done against the law, is not separable from the obliquity, which is, its be­ing done against the law. 4. If it is said that man hath a pravity in his nature, Who they are who make God the Author as well of original as actual sin. Look forwards on the 27. sect. num. 4. of this ch. which accompanies the action of which God is the Author, and so distinguishable from it, and that God doth but make the lame horse go, which was lame before he made him go, and so is the cause of his going, but not of his lamenesse; that will be found to be a Reed, which will run into the elbow of such as shall dare to lean upon it: for when Adam was yet innocent, he was not as a lame horse, and yet he ceased to be inno­cent; or (if you please) he grew lame by eating that which was forbidden. So that if God was the cause of [Page 166]his eating that forbidden fruit, he was also the cause of the sin, which was nothing else but his eating the fruit forbidden, if he made him eat, he made him lame. Be­sides, if a horse which goes not, and hath onely an apti­tude to go lamely, will of necessity go lamely if he be made to go at all; he who shall cause that horse to go, will also cause him to go lamely: so will God be concluded the cause of sin, if having first given us the power to act against his law, he shall also reduce that power into that act, so as that positive act shall be his creature; yet so it must be, (saith Mr. Hick.) if a positive act. And Doctor Twisse doth say as bluntly, [Damus De­um esse cau­sam uniuscu­jusque actûs. Vin. Gr. l. 2. par. 1. p. 40. we grant that God is the particular cause of every act.] Wherein this differs from that of the Libertines, let him tell us who can. 5. God hath forbidden in his law the positive acts of Stealing, Adultery, Murder, and the like, for which positive acts he will also cast into Hell. It will be ill pleading for Cain that God alone was the Author of the positive act of his stabbing Abel, and of the law which forbad it, from which two the obliquity was an unavoida­ble resultance. And if the sin of blasphemy is distinguish­able from the act of speaking against God, then did God forbid something besides the sin, (which implies a horrible contradiction) and there may be a good act of speaking against God, as well as an evil one; which again implies another contradiction. 6. When Mr. Hick.'s Masters are wont to say, that God praedestin'd men to sin, as the means of damnation, they do and must mean, to sin as sin, because sin is no otherwise the means of damnation; and divers of them do use that very reduplication. Now be­cause they teach also that God decreed the means as well as the end, they infer sin as sin to be a positive act, and therefore not distinguishable from it.

I have now done with Mr. Hick. as to this particular, which Mr. B. calls his second Argument, u [...]on which I have the more enlarged, because I perceive it to be the great block at which those men are wont to stumble, and at which the Libertines have fallen down headlong. A­gain, [Page 167]I find it to be the block, out of which Mr. B. hath hewed so many chipps, and little splinters; which having flown into his eyes, have made him rageful as well as blind. This will very much appear by the following Secti­ons, which for that very reason shall be so much the shorter.

Sect. 19.

Mr. B's. first chip hewn out of Mr. Hick.'s Block. Mr. B. thus debauched by his leading friend as hath been shewed, sticks not to say in plain termes, He must either maintain God to be the Author of sin, or else he must speedily renounce the very first Article of his Christian Creed, and say that God did not make heaven and earth, and all real things visible and invi­sible therein. That in him we do not live, move, and have our being, Act. 17.28. That every good and per­fect gift in its kind is not from God, Jam. 1.17. p. 113.]’ Though this is a chip of the old block, and might be sent for its reception to the former Section, yet in order to his cure, I will make him feel his infirmity.

1. He foists the word real into the Creed, and makes it to stand in the place of good, and infers God the maker of all sins.1. The word reall is in neither Creed but foisted in by M. B. and if he intends it as exegetical of all things vi­sible and invisible, in the Nicaene Creed, he makes a Creed for the Ranters, who finding by experience that blasphe­mies and adulteries are real things, and having been taught (by whom think you?) to believe that God is the maker of all things real without exception, conclude those things to be very good. Such domestick Libertines must be taught that when God is said to be the maker of all things, it is onely meant of all things that are good, which a­lone are possible to be made by God; not of all things that are real, whereof many are evil, and onely made by Men and Devils.

2. The different methods of our reasonings, and what comes of it.2. Mark (Good Reader) before thou goest any far­ther, the different methods of our reasoning, and the dif­ferent effects. I lay it down as my Principle, that God is not the maker of sin, therefore not of David's adultery; therefore not of that action called his lying with Bath­shebah; therefore not of every positive and real thing. [Page 168]But Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. and the Libertines do build backwards thus: They lay it down as their Principle, That God is the maker of all things that are real without exception, therefore of David's lying with Bathshebah, (acknowledged by all to be a real and positive thing) there­fore of his Adultery, (unless his Adultery can be diffe­renced from his lying with Bathshebah) therefore of his sin, (unless his sin can be differenced from his Adultery.) Again, the Libertines argue thus; God doth decree sin, therefore it is good. But I argue thus; Sin cannot be good, therefore God cannot decree it. Of so great con­cernment it is, that they be beaten out of their methods and wayes of reasoning, and taught to begin at the right end.

3. They ascribe all positive enti­ties, however filthy, unto God.3. I who prove sin to be a positive entity, do also prove it to be the work of men and Devils onely; whereas 'tis he and Mr. Hick. who do impute it unto God, on suppo­sition of its positive entity. What he saith from Act. 17.28. is wholly impertinent, unless he thinks it to be a sin to live, and to move, and to have a being. For that in­nocent liberty and power which we have from God, we a­lone do determine to the doing of evil. Much less perti­nent is that from S. James (c. 1. v. 17.) unless he thinks that sin can be a good and a perfect gift, or that every positive entity is such.

4. They are con­vinced by the Assemblies confession of faith, ch. 9. Artic. 1.4. It is part of the Assemblies confession of faith, [God hath endued the will of man with that natural liberty, that is neither forced, nor by any absolute necessity of nature determined to do good or evil. From whence it followes, that Adam's determination of his free will to the eating of forbidden fruit, (which was a positive entity) was meerly from Adam, and not from God. Unlesse they will say, he had a necessity supernatural, though not from nature; which if they say, it will be at their perill. Again, 'tis granted by all, that man since the fall hath a liberty of will in things not moral, and in many things which are meerly moral; which inferres them to be the Authors of many positive Acts.

5. They are farther uncovered, by being supposed to be catcchi­zed.5. If Mr. B. and Mr. Hick. were to be publickly Catechized, and first asked who made them men, 2. who made them sinners, 3. who made them Priests, 4. who made their Dublets either long or short-wasted, 5. who is wont to wash their cloaths, to cleanse their hands, and their feet, and to do some other much viler offices; they would not say (for shame) that God did make or do those things, which they know to be positive and real Entities; but to each of those Questions they would certainly return a severe Answer. Again, if they are askt, who made the short-wastedness of the Dublet aforesaid, they will say, the same Taylor who made it a short-wasted Dublet. Ask them then, who made the sinfulness of the sinful Action (to wit Davids lying with Bathshebah) they will say, the same Agent who made the sinful Action, that positive Entity, David's lying with Bathshebah against the Law. Who made that positive Entity, or sinful action? Even God, sayMr. W. saith that of every positive act God is the pro­per efficient cause, p. 24. Mr. B. and Mr. H. the same and wors, as hath been shewed. they; but (say I) the Adulterer, against the precept and will of God, and against that measure of his grace, which had been sufficient to prevent it, if David had not been a resolute and wilful sinner. I conclude this Section with the confession of Mr. W. [That he who is the Author of the Action, must needs be the Author of the sin also which is unseparable from it, p. 25.] But both him­self and Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. do say, that God is the Author and maker of the action (as being a positive and real thing,) therefore according to their concessions they do all make God the Author of sin.

Sect. 20.

Mr. B's. second chip of the old block. Mr. B. hews out his second chip thus, [ He must hold, that there be myriads of myriads of actions in the world which are not wrought by God, &c. p. 113.’ This se­cond chip is wonderful, if compared with the first; 1. His inconsisten­cy with himself, and his infer­ring all sinful actions to be wrought by God. for there he would have me bound up by my Thesis, to maintain that God is the Author of sin, though here he makes me to hold, that there are 100000. of Actions not wrought by God: if the first were swallowed, there is no place for the se­cond; and if the second, then no place for the first. For if [Page 170]I hold (as I do) that there are myriads of sins, or sinful actions, whereof not one can by any possibility be wrought by God, then by no possibility can I make God the Au­thor of sin. But now Mr. B. declares his Tenet, that all the actions in the world (however filthy and noysome) are wrought by God. I say the contrary, that there is a world of wickedness which is none of Gods making, but of the Devils, and his party, whether in Hell or in Earth.

2. His unsuccesful reliance on the Jesuites.2. Whilest I deny that any sinful actions are wrought by God, I do not deny that he permits them; and I have of­ten shewed, how the sinner depends on God, both for his power to live and move. What he saith of the sesuites may well be true; for they are kinsmen in these affaires. The Jesuites, in waggery, did purposely propagate many blasphemies, arising from the Tenet of unconditional Reprobation, in many Protestant parts of the Christian world, that by making them odious, they might fright men from thence into the Church of Rome. I find the observati­on in the Renowned and JudiciousExact. Coll. l. 10. ch. 39. sect. 6. p. 3189. Dr. Jackson, whom Mr. B. put me upon reading, by his saying that I had read him, when indeed I had not. And since the Jesuite Suarez is of so much Authority with his Cousin of the Kirk, I will observe out ofProprio & reali influxu concurrit De­us ad actus liberi Arbitrii ut reales actus sunt, etiamsi saepissimè & intrinsecè ma­li sint: nam cùm hi actus sint verè res & effectus reales, necesse est ut saltem illam dopendentiam à Deo ha­beant, quae omnibus causarum secundarum effect bus generalis & omnino necessaria est. Suarez de concursu, motione, & auxiliis Dei, lib. 2. Suarez, that the acts of Free-will are real acts, though evil, and the real effects of second causes; which Mr. Hick. and Mr. B. are both intreated to chew upon. And again, I will observe, that Suarez gives those acts but a general dependance upon God; whereas Doctor Twisse (as I lately cited him) makes God to be causa particularis uniuscujusque actus: which is worse then the Jesuite, though the Jesuites and Dominicans are too too bad in their Assertions.

Sect. 21.

Mr. B's. 3d. chip more pitiful then the former. Mr. B. saith farther [ It will follow, that the more sinful acts any commits, the more he is a Creator, [Page 171]and a kind of an [...], a God of himselfe, p. 13.]’ Still a chip of the same block. But 1. what pretence hath he for this, when I have said so often, that though the sinner in some sort may be called the Creator of his sins, yet the evil which he doth, he doth by that power and freedom of will which he had from God? How then [...] in any sense? 2. To be a God of evil, is a very sad priviledge. And the word [God] is so far from signifying Him onely who is the [...], thatExod. 22.28. men and1 Cor. 8.5. Idols are called Gods in Scripture; and Satan himself, the 2 Cor. 4.4. God of this world. And so the summe of Mr. B's. acumen is but this, That the more sins a man commits, of the more sins he is the Author. The more evil the Devil invents, the works of the Devil are so much the more. Very pretty. Look back on Sect. 18. & 19. Num. 5.

Sect. 22.

Mr. B's. fourth chip, the most lamentable of all. Mr. B. begins to be more extravagant then himself, (not onely more then other men) by arguing from the supposal of sins being a thing positive, [That God did never concur to any the best action that ever the holiest Saint did act, p. 113.] As wild a saying as this is, his reason for it is little less; it being no other then this, [That sinful in­firmity doth cleave to their holiest performances. Ibid.]

1. Mr. B's. argu­ing concludes him either Pe­lagian, or Li­bertine.1. If this were reduced into a Syllogisme, it would over­throw his whole Fabrick, and that two wayes: for either it would argue him a Pelagian, in denying that our best actions are from the grace of God; or else a flat Libertine, in affirming our evil and good actions to proceed from God in equal manner. The summe of his arguing is this, That if sin is not from God, the holiest action of man is not from God. But first he must be minded of his least unhappiness, which is his great impertinence: for this is not the thing which here it lay upon him to prove, That sin is from God, but that it is not a thing positive; whereas by striving to prove it is from God, he proves it also a thing positive, against himself and his friend Mr. H. Hick. For in that they both say, whatsoever positive thing is not from God is God, they unavoidably imply, that whatsoever is from God is a positive thing.

2. His great imper­tinence is to no end, but to make God the Author of sin.2. From hence it is evident and undeniable, that though Mr. B. in some places doth deny his derivation of sin from God, yet his heart is so full, so brim-ful of it, that here he goes out of his way to shed some of it upon his paper; or if unknowingly it falls from him, it is still a sign he overflowes. If he thinks that the best actions of the ho­liest men are the very sins of infirmity which he saith doe cleave to them, he knowes his dangers above recited, and many more I need not name; butIsa. 5.20. wo to him that calleth good evil, and evil good. If he means that the sin is a distinct thing from it; why could he not distinguish be­twixt the Sun and a Coal-pit? betwixt the pious action, which is from God, and the sin annexed, which is from man? Gods concurrence is an equivocal word, and must be carefully distinguished. If it relates onely to good, God concurs to the very act; if to evil, God concurs not any o­therwise, then by continuing to us the liberty & power to act with which he indued us as we are men. But to abuse that liberty, and to reduce that power into any forbidden or evil act, is the unhappy and sole priviledge of the depraved Creature.

Sect. 23.

Mr. B. saith farther, that if sin is something positive, Mr. B's. fifth chip denies Gods praescience of all wicked­ness, unless he also praedeter­mined it. and none of Gods Creatures, [It will overturn all Divine praescience of sins; and how can that be foreknown by God, which is in no sense praedetermined by him; in which he hath at all no hand? p. 113.] This is the same sad beg­gery of the thing in Question, without the least offer of proof, which his cogent necessities have so often squeezed from him, and which I haveSee the eighth, ninth & tenth Sections of this third chapter. spoken to so largely in di­vers Sections. Though he hath several times confessed, that Deity it self is overturned if praescience, yet here he professedly overturns Gods praescience of any thing in the world, but what he first doth praedetermine, and hath a hand in. If God did not praedetermine (nor had any hand at all in) all the villanies in the world, (which none can imagine but Mr. B. and his party) then he could not fore­know them, saith the unclean Dictator. And so he casts [Page 173]himself into his wonted streight, of aspersing Gods holi­ness on the one hand, and his praescience on the other. To what he asks, and asks onely, I will fully (but briefly) an­swer, that God can foresee what we will do, as well as what he will do himself. He may determine to give us pow­er, and foresee how we will use it. He gives us a power to act freely, and to determine our own wills; which would not be wills, much less our own wills, if determined by any thing except our selves. So much am I for Gods praesci­ence, that I extend it to all things without exce [...]tion; as well to the evil, which he did not praedetermine, as to the good, which he did. But 'tis a great derogation to Gods in­finite knowledge, to say it reacheth no farther then to his own decrees and executions: The very thing which the So­cinians do so improve, as to deny Gods praescience of future contingencies. And whether Mr. B. with his party are not Socinians in this point (according to that method which they do constantly use in judging others) let them be their own Judges in cooler blood. If they deny it, 'tis at their peril; it being much a lesser error, to think that God foresaw no wickedness, then that he foreordained any.

Sect. 24.

Mr. B. concludes with an affirmation, 1. Mr. B's. Im­positions upon the Scripture, (which he hopes may pass with the easie multitude for a kind of sixth Argument) that my opinion is contrary 1. to Scri­pture, which speaks of sin as of a privative, when it speaks most properly; 2. to Austin, who pleads that sin hath no cause efficient, but onely deficient; 3. to School­men of all sides and parties; 4. to his honoured and beloved Father Arminius, p. 114.’ The first is contrary to truth in the very judgment of common sense, as I have largely made appear (and partly out of his own mouth) in the 15, 16, 17, and 18. Sections of this Chapter. But yet I will ask him this little thing, Doth the Scripture speak properly when it saith that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh? and doth it not speak properly when it saith that sin is a work of the Devil, that the Devil is the Fa­ther [Page 174]of it, that Lust conceiveth and bringeth forth sin? True indeed, it is called Vanity; but so isPsal. 39 11. Man too, who yet (I hope) is a positive entity neverthelesse. Nay Man at hisVers. 5. best estate is altogether vanity: nay alto­gether Psal. 62.9. lighter then vanity it self. Sin indeed is called darknesse, but by a figure, and so areEph. 5.8. men too. A man is no where called emptinesse, no more is sin. But sin hath negative attributes (as every thing in the world hath) in respect of its having no moral goodnesse. How many things are there, which God himself in Scripture is affirm'd not to be? yet Mr. B. will not deny him to be a positive entity.

2. The Schoolmer.2. As for the Schoolmen, if either they talk errone­ously (as Mr. B. will confesse they often do) or are mistaken by Mr. Barlee, (who is as good at that faculty as any man of his paste) or were never read by him, (who doth not cite so much as one in this place,) who can help it?

3. S. Austin might erre as well in this as in many other things wherein Mr. B. will say he erred,3. S. Austin. August. lib. 12. De Civit. Dei cap. 7. ubi de causâ malae voluntatis agit, confe­rat [...]r um ejus­dem lib. 21. de Civitate Dei, cap. 24. ubi pa [...]um (inquit) veraciter di­citur quod di­citur (Mat. 12.32.) nisi essent, quibus etsi non in isto, tamen rem [...]t­teretur in fu­turo saeculo. His new degree of Arminianism and in the very same book which here he cites. I say he might, not that he does. For Mr. B. understood not his own citation, which being seemingly for him, doth make against him in reality. For Austin's speech belongs onely to the cause of the evil will, not of every evil act of which the will is the cause. Again, it onely belongs to the causes that are without the man: and this is that which I would have, that God is far from being the efficient cause of an evil will; he is not so much as the deficient, be­cause he is not wanting in those things that are necessary to make an evil will good: so far is Austin from plead­ing that sin hath no efficient cause. Notwithstanding all that he hath spoken, the impious man's own will is the efficient cause of his impiety.

4. Whereas he saith that my opinion is most contrary to Arminius, he contradicts a good part of both his books, wherein he saith that my opinions arec. 3. p. 25. all derived from Arminius. I had formerly proved by manyDiv Phi. def. c. 1. p. 12, 13, &c. instances, [Page 175]how far himself was an Arminian, and how impossible it was that I should be so. Now he lends me another in­stance, wherein Himself and Mr. Hick, are at agreement with Arminius, and I am contrary to all three. But I am of opinion he wrongs Arminius, and makes him more Pres­byterian then indeed he was; had he read any such thing: he would in all probability have set down the [...]lace. His case is sad, whether he pretends to Truth or Falshood. If to the first, he hurts himself and Mr. Hick. If to the second, he slanders Arminius, and stabbs himself.

Sect. 25.

Having made this way for his own unhappi­nesse,Mr. Hick's heathenish ex­pression of sins, [...], commended by Mr. B. for 1. learned, 2. witty, and 3. well writ­ten. by that variety of attempts to which Mr. Hick. (it seems) betray'd him; he acts the well-natur'd man, and even blesseth the Author of his unhappinesse. ‘He de­clares that Mr. Hick. is his cordial friend, who wrote well to him, told him learnedly and wittily, that Mr. T. P. is the first who gave sin this [...], an extraordinary invention, p. 114.’] Here is his tragical Exit for many rea­sons. 1. Mr. Hick.'s saying that my invention is extraor­dinary, is no proof that Arminius doth say the contrary, or that Mr. Hick. did write well, or that his saying was both learned and witty. Each of these I deny, and have sufficiently disproved in my eighteenth Section. 2. He knowes that I had never mentioned any such Heathenish expression, as sins [...]; nor was it ever to be found in any Author but Mr. Hick. And he knowes that it was clearly his own invention; either arising from his opinion that [...] was derived from [...] pono, and signified the posicive entity of sin, (which though a sad miscarriage of the Scholar, is yet the very best that his friends can make of it) or from his sadder apprehension that sin must needs have a Godhead, if it is none of God's creatures, and yet a positive thing. To believe the former were a huge act of charity; but there is no place for it with Mr. Hick. who hath forced me to the severity of belie­ving the later. 3. All Mr. Hick. hath displayed is his being overflown with [...], which (could its [Page 176] banks have contained it, would not thus have gushed over on no occasion, when 'tis plain that the effect could be no­thing else but to drown his credit with a yellow, as well as his cause with a blacker Jaundise. But evenit malo male, and [...]. Erynnis (as they say) still p [...]oves a virgin: for poor Perillus is the first who is likely to be tortured with his invention; and believe me, the brazen Bull was a lesser miserie, then to be found in the im [...]iety of making the foulest actions to be the Rivulets issuing out by a necessity from God the Source. What Spirit but an unclean one, can be the cause of uacleannesse▪ that is, of sin? Who are they whom I have proved to have printed in plain terms, that God is the cause of that uncleannesse? When the Pha­risees heretofore, who were the Jewish Puritans, or Pre­ci [...]ans, and rec [...]oned themselves the godly party of the land, had slandered our Saviour with having an unclean Spirit, (who, although he was God, did appear to them as he was man too) our Saviour told them (on that occa [...]on) the danger of blaspheming against the holy Ghost. Let them who love the Lord Jesus in s [...]ncerity, and tender the safety of their own as well as of other mens soules, not onely read, but consider, and then apply what is spo­ken, Mar. 3.28, 29, 30.

I now dismisse the signal Paragraph which Mr. Hick. suggested to Mr. Barlee, and Mr. Barlee hath vented to all the People; which yet I should not have dismissed so soon, but that my Reader may be referred to several Se­ctions for an enlargement, as ch. 1. sect. 2. from p. 7. to p. 13. ch. 2. sect. 5. p. 69, 70. sect. 10. p. 79, 80, 81. sect. 14. p. 88, 90. All which being considered, Mr. B. doth fitly dislike the stile of Unfortunate Writer, for if it ever belonged to any, it doth to him and Mr. Hick.

Sect. 26.

Mr. B. having thus far miscarried (by the help of Mr. Hick.) proceeds to plead for himself, A short speci­ [...] of M. B's. rem [...]nt of Ab­st rsions in or­d r to the Rea­ders and P [...]in­rs [...]ase. and his guilty M [...]sters, in such a treacherous manner both to them and himself, that to give my Readers an account of such numerous failings, were to draw out the man's unhappi­nesse [Page 177]to an intolerable length. And because a Pigmy as well as Hercules may be judged of by a foot, I will leave the Reader, by that which followes, to guesse at the body of his abstersions.

1. What I had cited out of Calvin's Institutions, he affirmed to have been fetched from Calvin's Book De Providentiâ; and said I did as good as name it. IDiv. Phila [...]. def. ch. 3. p. 127 &c. shew'd him the grosseness of his mistake, and prov'd the wilful­ness of it, which raised the error into a sin. Now by way of abstersion, he confesseth the fact, p. 126. and com­plains he was mis-led by his edition of Calvin, which he saith was different from mine. And (which shewes the wilful­nesse of his last crime also) he is silent of the book De Providentiâ, and talks of nothing but Institutions: which had he really consulted, he must needs have met with the citation, as since he confesseth to have done. But this doth onely introduce his more incomparable Commission. For

Of Calvin's Doctrine, that God commands, yea compels the D vil, and all that are w cked to conceive and perpetrate their evil doing.2. I had cited other words from Calvin's Institutions, and that from the page where now I see them, to wit p. 66. c. 17. l. 1. Edit. Genev. A. D. 1637. But it seems M. B. conceived the passage so unexcusable, that instead of la­bouring to salve the matter, he daringly brake out in this equally ridiculous and desperate manner; [I will give all my books for a half-penny, which I should be loth to part with for 150 l. if the fourth testimony be to be found in Calvin's book of Institution in the place quoted by him, p. 126▪’ To [...]unish the Malefactor for such a [...]old disho­nesty, I will not challenge all his books, (which yet are due to me for one half-penny) but record the words of Mr. Calvin, with the page and the lines wherein they lie. [Verùm ubi in memo iam revocant, Diabolum totam­que improborum cohortem sic omnibus partibus manu Dei, ☜ tanquam fr no cohiberi, ut nec concipere ullum adver­sus nos maleficium, nec conceptum moliri, nec ad per­petrandum, si maxi [...]è moliantur, digitum movere que­ant, nisi quantum ille permiserit, imo nisi quantum man­dârit; nec compedibus tantùm ejus teneri ligatos, sed [Page 178]☞etiam ad obsequia praestanda fraeno cogi; habent unde se prolixè consolentur. Calv. Inst. l. 1. c. 17. sect. 11. p. (seu potius fol.) 66. col. 2. lin. 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Edit. Genev. 1637.’ And this was the fourth blasphe­mous Instance which I produced in English, Correct Copy, p. 9. Thus the Malefactor is proved most guilty; and not onely so, but he stands condemned out of his mouth too. For when it is for his turn to skin over an ulcer, which he sees cannot be cured, hep. 126. lin. 1, &c. saith, It appears by the pages which I quote out of Calvin, that he followes one E­dition of the Institutions, and I another; his having been printed 1585. and mine no longer ago then 1637. Is this a man to manage a controversie with any longer, who ne­ver regards what he utters, either to sully another, or to absterse himself, so that he may but say something, and become the Author of a book? 1. It seems my Edition is much later then his, and therefore probably more emen­date. 2. Had it been true that my citation did not ap­pear in his Edition, he should not yet have concluded that it appeared not in mine own. 3. Had he not been re­solute in making a refuge of a mistake, he might have borrowed my Calvin, or at least have ask't when it was printed. 4. Though the Printer erred in a punctilio, by putting sect. 12. for sect. 11. yet he made it no error by expressing the very page exactly right, which made the Section become needless; besides that sect. 11. and sect. 12. are the very next neighbours to one another, and being both extremely short, they cannot but both be seen at once, with one and the same cast of the Readers eye: so utterly destitute of excuses is the Merchant become in this ad­venture, which I have prosecuted thus at large for these three reasons. First in order to brevity, that other things may be compendiously and yet sufficiently replied to, by the Readers being intreated to guesse at the Disputant by this one instance; and how unworthy he is of my farther consideration. 2. It appears by this instance, that what­soever blasphemous Doctrines I have publickly cited from that Tribe of Writers, I am proved to have truly and [Page 179]justly cited, by that man of all the world, who is most con­cerned to have them thought false; for in case he had found one real flaw, how would the Victor have triumphed, who is so full of ovations in being beaten? 3. It appears by this one instance, how ashamed they are of those Doctrines in their modest intervals, which in their Fits of courage they use to boast of. Mr. B. was unwilling either to praise or dispraise what he found cited out of Calvin, viz. That the Devil and all other wicked ones, are not onely per­mitted, but commanded also; nor onely commanded, but compelled also [ad concipiendum, moliendum, perpetrandum maleficium] to conceive, to attempt, and to accomplish their evil doing. I will not dissect the words, much less read a Lecture on them, unless I shall possibly be invited by some worthier person then Mr. B.

Sect. 27.

Mr. B's. affect­ed Tergiversa­tions in his chiefest con [...] cernments. That which next follows in Mr. B. from p. 127. to 137. is never enough to be admired. For pre­tending to answer that large Catalogue of Blasphemies which I had collected out of his Masters in my Defence of the Divine Philanth. c. 3. p. 132. to p. 140. he doth not so much as meddle with any one of the particulars of which the Catalogue is composed: but in stead of that, he per­forms these pranks. 1. Hep. 127. sends the Reader to his first book, where there is not a syllable touching any one of them. 2.Ibid. He asks what it would conduce to the main Que­stion, though some out of divers owned classical Authors should not prove to be exactly defensible. 3. He saith,Ibid. if I will hold what they do, I shall explicate such matters by as soft phrases as I please. 4.p. 128. He complains that my De­sign was hateful in the making of that Collection. 5. He tells us that thep. 130, 131. Jesuites, to wit, Bellarmin, Suarez, Pe­rerius, Vega, have writ as boldly of God, as the Presby­terians so often cited; and that Arminius (who was also a Presbyterian) did something like it. 6.Ibid. He complaines that my Indictment doth serve for nothing, but to make his Classical Authors odious (for so he commonly describes the party) and to make room for such as Grotius and Ca­stalio. [Page 180]7.Ibid. Ibid. He protests against Hobbs, and the Comforter of Believers, as no Protestants. 8. He calls the objection which is made against his Masters, their making God the Author of sin, an old musty stale objection. 9.p. 132. He pleads (against matter of Fact, demonstrated to the eyes and ears of all) that men so eminent for piety and learning were never like to be the Authors of so foul and sottish an opinion. (Mark that, Reader. It is as if one should prove that Peter did not deny Christ, because of the unlikelihood that so great and good an Apostle should do so wickedly. Or that Pelagius was no Heretick, nor writ against by Austin, because Au­stin commended him so very much, which 'twas not likely he would have done, if he had thought him a Heretick.) 10.Ibid. He saith his Masters are not like to need an Apology, like that of the Poet, Lasciva est nostra pagina, vita proba est. 11. He granteth that his Masters have taught in Print, 1.p. 132, 133. ☞ That God is the Author of sin, 2. God wills sin, 3. He impells to it, 4. He forceth men to it. These things Mr. B. takes upon him to excuse; and the manner of it is wonderful.

2. To the first of the four he answers thus; 1p. 133. Of Zuinglius his Doctrine, that God is the Author of sin. That he doth at no hand like it, that God should be the Author of a­ny culpable evil. Reader, observe his partiality, and self­contradiction. When the Libertines pronounce the words, then he calls it, with Mr. Calvin, an execrable blasphemy, (p. 129.) and curses them that are so blasphemous, (54, 55.) but now he finds the same blasphemy in his own Masters writings, the case is alter'd; and the worst he saith is, [He doth not like it for his own part.] Like indulgent old Eli reproving his Sons for their sacriledge and rapine, Nay, my Sons, it is no good report which I hear; why do ye such things? 1 Sam. 2.23, 24. There's his partiality. And here he professeth to dislike what he frequently ap­proves (as hath been shewed) commending the Authors for very Classical, and owning them for his Masters. There's his self-contradiction. But now he hath said he likes not the blasphemy for his own part (that's the word) he shews us how vehemently he likes it for those other mens [Page 181]parts who are his Classical Authors. First forIbid. Note, that of all who call God the Author of sin, he names onely Zuinglius, omitting Borrhaus, who calls him the Au­thor of the evil of sin, as well as of punishment. Zuinglius he alledgeth, that a little Candor would interpret him to have meant that God is the Author of the evil of punishment, rather then of sin. But Zuinglius his word is peccatum, which signifies sin onely. And he doth instance in the sins called Adultery and Murder, naming them Gods works, and calling God their Author. (See Corr. Copy, p. 10. & Philan. c. 4. p. 59, 60.) So that the best of Mr. B's. excuse is this, that though Zuinglius calls God the Author of sin (not speaking a word of punishment in the place which I cited) and so must be confessed to have meant the evil of sin, yet charity should interpret, that he meant the evil of punishment also; and rather that then the other. Or 2. if Zuinglius did mean as he spake, he did not mean that God was a moral Author of sin, Ibid. How Mr. B. makes God the Author of sin in that which he confesseth to be the proper notion of the word Author. Look back on sect. 3, & 4. of this Chap. so as the Devil is, by way of perswasion, but (it seems then) a natu­ral Author of sin, which is infinitely worse, as acting by way of necessitation. But when Mr. B. said that God doth tempt men to sin, he spake of a perswasion; and now he saith, that to perswade unto sin doth infer the proper Au­thor of it. So he is judged and condemned out of his own mouth again, to have properly made God the Author of sin. 3. He saithIbid. it is not credible that Zuinglius should mean any other Author or Cause of sin, then non removens prohibens, or causa per accidens. But 1. I cited his words, and not his meanings (either beside or against his words.) 2. His words will not signifie such a meaning as this: Else, when the world is called Gods work, Mr. B. may say, God was but causa per accidens, and that the world was not properly his work. 4. Causa per accidens, if causa, is extreamly bad; and God is in no sense the cause of sin. 5. Removens prohibens he understands not, if I may guess by the Use he makes of it: For Zuinglius saith that God doth make men Transgressors, as well as that sin is the work of God.

Last of all, he produceth some Popish Writers, Ibid. who write [Page 182]as grosly as Zuinglius the Presbyterian. And who did e­ver doubt of it? Sure none that knows their consangui­nity. Ocham and Gabriel do affirm,Ocham & Ga­briel affir­mant, quod Deus in rigo­re & proprie­tate Sermonis est causa peccati. Medin. in 1.2. q. 79. a. that God in a rigour and propriety of speech is the cause of sin. What then? Therefore the rigider sort of Papists are like the rigider sort of Presbyterians.

3. To the second thing which he confesseth as his Masters Doctrine,3. Mr. B. accu­seth Calvin, in excusing him, for saying, God doth will sin. viz. that God doth will sin, he saith these things, p. 134.1. That the meaning of the Orthodox hath been often explained. 2. That Calvin explains himselfe. And how should that be, but that though God doth will sin, yet he wills it not as sin? The horrid nature of which shift I haveLook back on ch. 2. sect. 19. And see Div. Philanth. c. 4. p. 42. elsewhere displai'd. This is the fountain of those unclean sayings, That Adultery is good in as much as it is the work of God the Author; And that all sins are good in as much as they make for Gods glory. That is from Zuinglius, and this from Mr. W. 3. He tells us that Mr. Calvins meaning is no worse then the Schoolmens, naming a Papist in the margin,Look back on ch. 2. sect. 3. p. 61. according to his wont. To shew a very great affinity betwixt the worst sort of Papists and Presbyterians, doth universally pass with Mr. B. for an Abstersion. Yet this is the man who rayles so frequently at others for having any good thing common to them with the Papists.

4. To the third thing granted to be the Doctrine of his Masters,4. Mr. B. accuseth Piscator and Calvin, in his way of excu­sing them for saying that God doth thrust men into wickedness. viz. That God doth drive, or thrust men on into wickedness, and that men do sin by Gods impulse, he hath returned four things, p. 134, 135.1. That neither Calvin nor Piscator do understand it in a flagitious or unconscionable manner. (And may it not be pleaded as well for the Pha­risees, that although indeed they said of Christ, He hath an unclean spirit (Mark 3.30.) yet they did not understand it in a flagitious sense?) 2. That when himself had affirmed Gods stirring up the wicked to their wicked deeds, as a man puts spurres to a dull Jade, he brought the Simile to shew, that the man is the Author of the going of the horse, but not of the halting. (The sad estate of which shift I [Page 183]shewed veryLook back on sect. 18. num. 11. of this Chap. lately, and therefore I forbear to repeat it here.) 3. That whatever Calvin and Piscator do say in some places, yet they say the contrary in other places. (This doth justifie what I said in myLook back on Introduct. sect. 4, 5, 6, 7. Introduction: and the Logick here used is just the same, as if the Barbarians of Melita should plead for themselves, that though they call'd S. Paul a Murderer in one place, yet they did not wrong him, because in another place they call'd him a God, Act. 28.4, 6. And so though Judas at one time be­trayed his Master, yet he did not mean it in a flagitious sense, because at another time he did not betray him; yea and kissed him too when he did betray him. If Mr. B. speaks Treason, such Abstersions as these will not avail him. 4. That whatever they say, they understand no more then Arminius. (What is this, but to acknowledge, that as Arminius was a Presbyterian, so the Presbyterians are for Arminius, wheresoever Arminius doth chance to erre, or speak unhappily?)

5. To the fourth thing granted to be the Doctrine of his Masters, viz. That men do sin by Gods coaction, 5. Mr. B. grants that his Ma­sters do some­times teach a coaction from God to sin. Look back on ch. 2. sect. 2. p. 59, 60. &. sect. 3. p. 62. (which by the way he doth distinguish from forcing and thrusting into sin) he would seem to give a salvo by floundring again in this following manner, p. 135, 136. First he saith, That Orthodox Writers do use it very seldom. Hold, good Reader, and bear me witness, that the man pleads guilty to the very worst part of the Indictment. He confesseth that they do use to blaspheme in this manner, by saying that God doth compel men to sin, but onely alledgeth that they use it not often. And though I can prove they use it often, yet I am willing to pass it by, if they will but recant, and promise never to do the like. The Question was not, whe­ther a few times, or many times they vent this blasphemy; but whether or no they do it not sometimes. Mr. B. saith, Yes, sometimes, but seldom; not often, though now and then. Judas did not often betray his Master; but it was too much that he did it once. By such a soft phrase he slandered the Scriptures in his former Volume,☜He forgeth new things upon the Scripture. [The Scriptures say not much, or often, that God doth pradestine men to sin, Corrept. [Page 184]Corr. p. 72. at the bottom.] which is a desperate forgery imposed on the word of God, for the Scriptures say not any such thing, no not once, no not any thing like it; no nor the Fathers of the Church, who are slandered toge­ther with the Scriptures. (ibid.) 'Twas but a bold inventi­on to lessen the odium which lay upon his Divinity. Next he tells us, that whensoever Orthodox Wriers douse the word Coaction (in saying that God doth compel men to sin) they mostly at the same time acknowledge they speak im­properly, p. 135. (Which by the way is very false, and if it were true, 'twere too too bad, as I haveSee Div. Philan. ch. 1. p. 26. Look back al­so on ch. 2. of this book. elsewhere shewed) But what impropriety is that he speaks of? even such as implies a contradiction, and a condemnation of his own Party: for his words are these (and he takes them out of Paraeus) They understand it not of a coaction which destroyes the will of man, but of such an one which proceeds from the fierce impetus and inclination of the sinners will, p. 136. l. 1, 2. Here he miscarries several wayes at once; for first he fights with Doctor Twisse and Doctor Reynolds, and with all the rest of his Party, and with all mankind (except Paraeus) who confers it incompetent to the will to suffer any coaction. 2. If they meant by coaction, the sinners own inclination and impe [...]us of will, they must have said that the sinner compells himself; which had been much better nonsense, then to have said (as they are wont) that God compells him to sin. To say, the will doth suffer coaction by its own inclination, is innocent non-sense in comparison: but to say that God compells men to sin, is a horrid blasphemy. Besides, 3. He again con­fesseth the whole fact, by saying whensoever they use to do so! as before he said, [they use it seldom.] 4. He confesseth they do not alwayes acknowledge any impropriety, be­cause he saith, they do it mostly: so that in some of his Masters, and in some places of their works, he doth ac­knowledge as much guilt as I have ever cha ged their Doctrines with. 5. He doth not rightly translate Paraeus, nay he is not so much as consistent with him; forQui cogit invitos, is est causa p [...]ccati Qui verò cogit volentes, is perse causa est boni, &c. Paraeus in C [...] ­stig. ad lib B [...]ll. de Am [...]ss. Grat. & stat. peccati. Note, th [...]t D [...] Twiss doth consess it to be their custom, to say that men are compel­led by God to sin. Vin. Gra. l. 2. p. 1. c. 1. p. 29. Paraeus [Page 185]talks non-sense in this following sort: [He who compells men against their consents, is the cause of sin; but not he who compells men with their consents.] To exagitate this as it deserves would require a whole Volume. 6. As sad as these salvoes appear to be, they are the best that he could borrow from the ablest Abstersors who went before him. And he concludes with this excuse, that Bellarmine the Jesuite and other Papists, are neer of kin in this case to the Presbyterians. As for the bold and groundless forgery concerning Bellarmine and my self, I pass it by, as being personal, of which I am sure there is enough in the Self-Revenger.

Sect. 28.

Mr. B. turns his back to the chief part of the charge, and ta­citly yields the whole cause. I now expected with great longing, what he would say to my fourth Chapter of the Divine Philan­thropy defended, where he and his Masters are most con­cerned, even from p. 36. to p. 65. But in stead of speak­ing one syllable to those twenty nine whole pages, he onely tells us he needs not do it, sect. 3. p. 137. and pre­tends to render some reasons why. As, 1. for fear of needlesse repetitions: and 2. no body needs be solicitous what becomes of Doctor Twisse or Mr. B's particular expressions: 3. And this task hath been performed by other men (a­gainst his own knowledge, as his partiallest friends will confesse) 4. And what is omitted by himself, he hopes before long will be done by another, p. 138. And thus he thinks he hath done like a brave Abstersor, in refusing to plead to the indictment.

Sect. 29.

1. Of Adam's in­clination to sin before he sinned. Mr. B. being desirous to shew his good will to Mr. Rivet, whom I had proved to be guilty of ma­king God the Author of sin, by saying the very inclination which Adam had to sin, before he sinned, could not chuse but be vitious, and yet of God's making; is fain to com­mit a world of faults for the making a salve to that one sore, from p. 139. to p. 144. The chief ingredients in his salve are those that follow: 1. Rivet was a strong Dispu­tant before Mr. T.P. was brought forth into the world: the [Page 186]same which he had pleaded for Mr. W. (as if the oldest men must needs be-most orthodox, and of quicker sight then their juniors.) 2. Other eminent men have used that argument as well as he: (as if to erre in company, were either to be orthodox, or very neer it.) 3. He speaks of concupiscence, and lust, which are a couple of sins; where­as the question is onely of Adam's inclination before his very first sin. 4. He speaks of lust after the fall, Rom. 7.7. and which was in the will too; whereas the sub­ject of the dispute was before the fall, nor in the will, but in the appetite. And so he either understands not, or wilfully flies from the thing in question. 5. He calls an inclination to sin a weighty plummet inclining; at once an abstract and concrete in one and the same respect. 6. He saith that Adam, even before the fall, had the Devils image upon him, as well as God's, if his inclination to sin was before his first sin; as if he thought that potentia could not be before actus. 7. He confounds temptation to sin with sin. 8. He asks why I should be shie of granting, that Christ had any inclination to sin? (which why should he ask, if he did not think that impious thing which he imputes to Castellio, without the least citation from him?) 9. He confesseth he cannot tell how to salve those absur­dities which I had shewed his opinion must needs betray him into, as progressus in infinitum, and prius primo. 10. He saith (out ofNulla pec­cati Adami in Adamo reddi eausa potest, quae non sit ipsa pecca­tum. Camero contra Epist. viri docti. p. 163. Camero) that there could be no cause of A­dam's sin which was not also it self a sin. And so his party, by consequence, must needs be charged by him and Ca­mero, with the crime of making God to be sin it self, as often as they call him the cause of sin.

2. Concerning the birth & growth of the very first sin; with the very wide dif­ference betwixt the inclinations of the sensitive appetite, and the will. 2. Though I need not say more then what remains unassaulted in my Defence of the Divine Philanthropy (ch. 4. p. 23, 24, 25.) or more then what I have added in the eighteenth Section of this Chapter (Num. 6.) yet be­cause his understanding may be as dark in this Point, as his will crooked, I will endeavour to afford him sufficient light. The inclination of the will to evil, differs much from that of the sensitive appetite, to which the Apple [Page 187]even in Paradise was very grateful. The will (we know) is the middle faculty betwixt the sensitive appetite on one side, and the reasoning faculty on the other. The propension of the will to the sensitive appetite's proposal of what forbidden, was the very beginning of Adam's sin, it having been his first degree of aversion from God unto the creature: thus it was in Eve also, before it was in Adam, and was a sin in her will some insensible time be­fore her eating; but her fulness of consent, and actual eat­ing, and giving her husband to eat also, were all additions to that first sin: which I call the first for this reason, be­cause nothing of sin can be so much as imagined, before the propending of the will to the forbidden object; and because it was in the will before it could be in the hand or mouth. The very next degree of sin to the propending of the will, was Delectation; next, Morosa Cogitatio; next, a plenitude of Consent; next, the actual eating what was forbidden. But now the gratefulness of the sweet to one sense, and of fair to another, is less then the least of those degrees; and the inclination of the sensitive appetite could be no sin at all, remaining onely in the sense, and winning nothing from the will, which continued as yet in its [...]. But when the will of Eve was debauched by her appetite into an [...] (that is, a bending of her will the wrong way,) so as her mind did hang or hanker after the apple, that was clearly the beginning of her transgression.

Sect. 30.

The importance of the word Author. To conclude the whole Chapter, and so to quit the whole subject, I must satisfie a complaint which Mr. B. hath made (c. 3. p. 129.) That I charged him and his Masters with the crime of having said a great deal worse, and in much worse terms, then that God is (verbatim) the Author of sin. Now that he may not complain afresh of his having complained to no purpose, and to the end he may beware of rash complainings for the future, I will prove my charge in such a manner, as not to leave his very abettors the possibility to dissent. The [Page 188]most succinct way to do it, will be to lay down the whole importance of the aequivocal word Author, and then to compare it with those expressions which are confessed by Mr. B. to have been used by his Masters, as well as Bre­thren.

1. Author quan­do que [...] significat, quandoque [...]. Priscian. lib. 5. Idem valet quod [...]. Coel. Sec. Cur. Author est ut sic dicam Fa­ctor, Laur. Val. l. 4. Hortator & Author, Cic. in partit, Orat. 52. Consiliario & Au­thore aliquid inire, legitur apud Cic. ad Alt. l. 14.305.4. Suasor & Author deditionis. Cic. 3. Offic. p. 147. Author est in quo est vis, potestas, & dignitas. Liv. l. 1. ab urbe cond. 72. Impero, Authorque sumut me cuivis castrandum loces, Plaut. Aul. 7.73. suspende, vinci, verbera, Author sum, sino, Idem Poenal. 3.17. Author [...]est à quo quis jus comparavit. Cic. 7. Verr. Authores pupillorum vocantur, in quorum admi­nistratione infirma aetas, resque eorum sunt, Paulus Juriscon. Authores sunt qui Authoritatem suam & decretum interponunt, Liv. l. 1. ab urb. cond. Viae Author qui viam monstrat, aut qui ire jubet. Ovid. 3. Metam. Etiam Duces militum Authores vocabantur, Valla. l. 4.1. Author sometimes doth signifie the first beginner of a work, sometimes him who doth help advance it; some­times a factor, sometimes onely a perswader; sometimes a sole cause, sometimes a concause; sometimes a person of power and dignity, by whose advice or command a thing is done; sometimes him who confers a right; sometimes the guardian of a child under age; sometimes him who doth abet or assert, or uphold another in any action: some­times he that shews the way is said to be the Author of it: sometimes he who appointeth or decreeth any thing, is cal­led the Author of the thing decreed.

2. How the ene­mies of truth say what is worse then that God is (ver­batim) the Au­thor of sin. 2. Now from hence it is apparent, how many wayes Mr. B. and his Praedecessors have not onely made God the Author of sin, but something worse too. Had they onely said in plain terms (as I have shewed they have) God is the Author of sin, they might have sought for some excuse or mitigation of the crime from the softest impor­tance of the word Author. They might have said they meant no more, then that God doth perswade or tempt men to sin, (as Mr. B's word was.) But notwithstanding even that had been sufficiently blasphemous, Mr. B. His confessi­on is to be seen from his p. 133. to his p. 136. confesseth (as I haveLook back on Sect. 27. num. 5. shewed) that they assirm God's impelling and forcing men to sin, his making men sin by coaction, which [Page 189] Prosper professeth to beProsper ad ob­ject. Vincen. 11. p. 341, 342. worse then can be truly spoken of the Devil himself. Now though he who compells a man to sin, is properly called the Author of it; yet be­cause the word Author hath other softer significations, this must needs be much worse then onely to say he is the Author.

3. Mr. Rolloc's strange Salvo. 3. Nay in not many lines (p. 128.) before Mr. B. is so unhappy as to put me on this task, be cites a passage from Mr. Rolloc, thus excusing and mollifying that Par­ties Doctrine; [Non est De­cretum malitiae quà malitia est, sed quà bonita­tis rationem ha­bet. R. Rolloc. in Rom. 8.29. God's decree of sinfulness in the abstract, is not of sinfulness as such, but as it hath the nature of good­ness in it.] His word is malitia, as the abstract of malum, and himself explains it by Anomia, in the two lines go­ing before. To shew how Mr. W. and Mr. B. have stretched the blasphemy to its extremity, by teaching that God doth work sin, as well as will it, and hath a hand in effecting. of it, that he makes it necessary, Dr. Twisse affirmeth, that Gods Incitati­on and Excita­tion to the act of sin doth not onely influere in ipsum actum Creaturae, but also in ipsam voluntatem &c. Vin. Gra. l. 2. par. 1. c. 12. sect. 2. p. 142. excites men to it, is the maker of all reall things without exception, and the cause of the obliquity it self in abstracto; I say, to shew this afresh on this occasion, were [actum agere] to make a needlesse repetition of what hath been the subject of many Sections.

CHAP. IV. A notorious fallacy of Doctor Twisse and his Followers; with seve­rall failings discovered in Mr. VVh.

Sect. 1.

Of the signall Fallacy swal­lowed first by D. Twisse, then by his Followers. MY chief enterprise being performed in so large a manner, and the whole Tree of Error pluck't up by the root, it may seem a superfluity to spend more time upon little twiggs, whose whole subsistence is from the root, and must therefore perish together with it. Yet be­cause Doctor Twisse is a leading man, and hath built the highest Castle, on the most Airy Foundation, of any arti­ficer in the kind; and because Mr. W. was not contented, that the Doctors unhappinesse should go alone, but was desirous to joyn his own too; I will regard him so much as to take him in.

1. Dr. Twisse his important fal­lacy which runs through his book. I had shewed the sad fallacy which Dr. Twisse had put upon himself and his followers, through his misusage or mistake of that Logick Maxime, [What is first intend­ed is last executed.] For either not understanding, or wil­fully dissembling his understanding (I cannot say which, though I am sure of one of the two) what is the scope of that Maxime, and within what limits its truth is bound; he most unreasonably concluded, that because punishment is executed after sin, therefore sin was intended after God decreed punishment. The cause of his fallacy [Page 191]I shall shew anon, and how inconsistent he is with Mr.W. or with himself. I shewed that if the Maxime had uni­versal truth in it, a thousand such absurdities as this would follow; that if I first intend to take ship at Do­ver, and afterwards intend to sail into France, I must (according to that Maxime, as 'tis mistaken by Doctor Twisse) first sail into France, and after that take ship at Dover.

2. Mr. W's essay to cover the fal­lacy in his p. 17, & 18.2. To slubber over the businesse, Mr.Wh. thus talks to admiration; [Is not the journey into France the first thing here intended, and in order to that to take ship at Dover?] Reader, observe to what a prodigie some men are able to tread awry. I had plainly put my case thus, that my first intention is for Dover (not resolving yet to what Countrey I will sail, much lesse to what Port,) and my second inten­tion for France, particularly for Callis; in answer to which Mr. W. asks, Is not France first intended, and Dover next? and what is this but to say, that my first intention is my last, and my second is my first? If he shall say, that France is the first thing intended by him, and Dover the second, he will confesse the absurdity with which I charge him: for I had spoken of my intentions, in putting the case at that time; not at all of any man's else, much lesse of Mr. W's, a year or two after the time that my case was put.

3. The Fallacy shewed in its deformity.3. That he may plead no more for Doctor Twisse his mishaps, nor escape a right apprehension of his own miscarriage, (and that the party may yield their Palla­dium lost) I will illustrate the Case with the greatest per­spicuity I can imagin. Suppose a man here in England taking his life to be in danger, intends to go out of the Kingdom, he cares not whither, for preservation from pre­sent peril: the first thing that he intends, is to take ship at Dover; then it being free to him to go whither he will, as to Flanders, or Holland, or any place else, he at last decrees to go to France: this then is last in his intention, and must therefore (by the Doctrine of Dr. T.) be the first in execution; then which there is nothing more im­possible, [Page 192]and so nothing more absurd. Again, a man intends to build a house, not to let it out to others, but to dwell in it himself, and after that intends to make it sum­ptuous; in doing that he turns Bankru [...]t, and therefore determines to let it out: this is the last in execution, the sumptuous furnishing of it was next before that, build­ing before that; will it now follow (as Dr. T. his Lo­gick would have it) that he lets it out before he fur­nisheth it? and that he does furnish it before he builds it? Once more, A man determines to take a servant; after he hath taken him, he findes him a knave, and so resolves to put him away: must he therefore put him a­way before he takes him, because his intention to take him was before his intention to put him away? yet such is the arguing of Doctor Twisse, whoSi peccati permissio prius intenderetur quàm damna­tio, sequeretur in executione ut damnatio priùs sieret quàm peccati permisso. Twiss. in Praesat. ad Vin. Gr. p. 3. saith, that if God did decree to permit sin, before he decreed to damn men for sin, it would follow they must be damned, be­fore they can so much as be permitted to sin.

4. T [...]e first cause of the whole mistake.4. As the cause of this Error was his taking that Maxime by the left handle, Quod primum in intentione, est ultimum in executione; so the cause of that also was his over-hasty imagination, thatNeque enim ullus intentio­nis ordo est, nisi ratione mediorum & Finis. Id. ibid. there is no order of in­tention, unless in respect of the end and the means; which he dictates tanquam ex Tripode, as an unquestionable truth, though there is nothing more visibly and even pal­pably false. For there being many means to one end, (to wit God's glory) one of these means may be subordinate to another, and so, in mente Dei, before the other. God did not decree to create man to the end that he should sin; nor did he decree that man should sin, to the end he might be damned: but he decreed to create man, and to permit him to sin, and to damn him for sinning, to the end his glory might be advanced. And this isNeque enim damnotio po­test esse finis à Deo intentus, quandoqui­dem D [...]us fa­c [...] omnia propter se. Necesse est ergo ut gloria Dei ejusque patefactio sit finis actionum Divinarum. Idem ibid. acknow­ledged by the Doctor even in that very page.

5. That first cause removed, and the fallacy les [...] naked.5. To remove the Origin of the whole evil, I shall not need to say more then this: God foreseeing that man would voluntarily sin if he were not forcibly hindered, and decreeing not to use any forcible hinderance (which would not suit with the nature of a free and voluntary Agent) he also saw that Adam would make a wrong choice, and there­by fall from his state of Innocence. This state of Adam is to be looked on as a Disease, which stands in need of a Soveraign Remedy. The death of Christ is that Remedy which God decreed. And it cannot be imagined, that the Remedy should be first in intention, before the Dis­ease was foreseen, or the very permission of it decreed; though still the Remedy is to be last in execution, as it was also in the intention. Therefore the Axiom must be so li­mited, as to be onely appliable to those things, whereof the later is the absolute end, and the former decreed as a means to attain it by. But thus it is not in mente Dei; for the permission of sin is not designed by God as a means of bringing in any former decree of giving Christ; but as that which is suitable to Adam's nature, created with a free elective faculty, commonly known by the name of Will. Now God foreseeing that man will do what will be permitted to be done, doth also foresee an opportunity of magnifying his mercy in giving Christ, and according­ly decrees to give him. And that before Adam falls, though not before he decrees to permit his fall, and actually fore­sees that fall of Adam. From whence 'tis clear, thatQuod pri­mum in inten­tione, est ulti­mum in exe­cutione. that Maxime is very absurdly applyed unto the busi­ness of Gods decrees; as by numberless instances might be evinced. For what man will say, that the Creation of the world, which was the first thing in execution, was therefore the last in Gods intention? It was certainly prae­cedaneous, in mente Dei, to the fall of Adam. For how could Adam be considered as an actual sinner, without being considered as something capable of sin? Indeed Mr. Perkins was so unhappy as to teach it for Divinity, Etiam ipso Decreto crean­di prius esse ju­dicavi decre­tum praedesti­nandi tum ad salutem tum ad damnatio­nem. Id. Ib. p. 2. col. 1. That Gods decree of damning was before his decree of creating man. And Doctor Twisse Ibid. confesseth that he was once of [Page 194]that mind. But Arminius clearly confuted Perkins; and Doctor Twisse doth seem to confess as much, calling Per­kins his opinionIbid. rigidiorem sententiam. Let it now be remembred, that there is a priority of order amongst those things whereof neither can be said to be the end of the other, and the original cause of the errour is quite removed.

6. Mr. W's indi­rect course to excuse Doctor Twisse in con­tradiction to him.6. But Mr. W. alledgeth, that Doctor Twisse under­stands the old maxime de finibus ultimis, non interme­diis, p. 18.] If he did not look into the Doctors words, why would he speak thus without any knowledge of the Fact? And if he did, why would he speak against his knowledge? The Doctor applyes the maxime only to sin and damnation, and things on this side damnation, but not to any thing beyond it. And that damnation is not finis ultimus, the Doctor stifly maintains in the place before cited. If Mr. W. think [...] it is, he contradicts the Doctor, whilest he as­serts him. It is agreed on all sides, that the Glory of God is finis ultimus, to which the damnation of the impenitent is but a means. And therefore Mr. W. might have omit­ted his ill language which there he gives me, unless he had found some colour for it. If he did not fear his under­taking, why did he not cite the page or chapter, where I had spoken of the subject, that I and others might easily have found it out? I leave his best friends to judge of such dealings.

7. Doctor Twisse his error of co­ordination, &c.7. But Doctor Twisse saith farther, that the decrees of permitting sin, and of giving Christ, are co-ordinate, Ibid. p. 3.] In saying that, he did well to oppose Mr. Per­kins, although not well to miss the truth: It doth not fol­low that they are not subordinate, because not so as Mr. Perkins feigned them: they are one after another in or­der of nature (though not of time) as the Disease is be­fore the Cure, as well in nature as time; and though both are means to Gods glory, yet still the Remedy must suppose the Disease, and one is naturally conceivable be­fore the other. And so for the punishment of sin, which is another means of Gods glory, it praesupposeth sin by such [Page 195]a necessity of illation, that God cannot be imagined to decree a mans punishment, without regard to some offence, which the nature of punishment doth imply: which being the main thing that I objected to Mr. B. (speaking ofSee D. Phil. ch 1. p. 5, 6. Post-destination) to which he durst not re [...]ly, nor Mr. W. in his behalf, I leave with the rest of this Section, as a full Rejoynder to what he hath in his running Titles, concerning Post-destination, or Negative Reprobation, since the body of his Book is filled with Tergiversati­ons.

Sect. 2.

There being nothing now left of any moment in Mr. W. Mr. M's. forgery of objections in other mens names. I will discover his other failings in the fewest words that I am able. In his p. 43. he makes a syllogisme after an ugly manner in the third figure, and tells his Reader it is mine, nay he pretends to cite it from Philan. c. 4. p. 5. and calls it pitiful Sophistry: yet his own heart and the world shall be my witnesses, that there is no such thing in any part of any book which I have published; much less there where he pretends it. All my redress of such wrongs, is to protest against them, and to require reparations from the person offending, and to direct my Readers to Philanth. c. 4. p. 5. where they will see what it was which made the enemy to sly into such lewd dea­lings for his defence. He and Mr. B. must either prove that Reprobation is no punishment, or else confess their cause is ruined.

Sect. 3.

In Mr. W's. second part, which is all against conditional and universal Redemption, p. 53.Mr. W. of Christs death, p. 53. I observe these things with a running eye. 1. He denies that Christ died for all mankind. Not onely in contradiction to Scri­pture, and the Church of England, but to BishopSent. Daven. p. 10, 11. Da­venant in particular, and even to Dr. Twifs, as Mr. Baxter shewes in his Praef. to his Disp. p. 11, 13, 14. Next, he saith, that there is no conditional Election of all. Who saith there is any election of all? an election of persevering be­lievers is not of all. 3. Election and Redemption are not [Page 196] commensurate, as he affirms. Redemption is not the fruit of Election, witness the poverty of his proofs, p. 54. His first is nothing to Redemption, no nor the second. But on the contrary, Electing in Christ praesupposeth Re­demption, in Gods eternal foresight, and our being con­sidered as believers in Christ. No nor the third, for Re­demption according to rich grace, (Eph. 1.7.) is not of a few; to the more it is extended, the richer 'tis. His fourth from Joh. 3.16. is yet more grosly against himself. God so loved the world, as to give his Son for the world, not the smallest part of it. Had that been the meaning, Saint John had said, God so hated the world, that he denyed his Son to the far greater part of it, that not believing in him they might perish, &c. Mr. W's. proofs p. 55. from the word [ [...], so] are most ridiculous of all; for so is expres­sive of the degree of the love, not exclusive of it, or of any man from it, but inclusive of all, &c. It seems the Pres­byterian love must be inclosed, or good for nothing; whereas sincere love, the more extensive it is, it is ever the greater, not the more restrained. What would he think if one should say, he is so loving a Neighbour, that he hardly loves one in twenty? a man so kind, that he hates more then he loves? Redeeming love tends to eter­nal life, even to them that never come thither: and this is sure the greatest love, as being extended also to enemies, whereas the other is onely to supposed friends. But in­deed betwixt infinites there is no comparison. The compa­rison made Joh. 15.13. is of finite mens loves; and yet even there the greatest is that of laying down a life. Does Mr. W. think there are two greatest?

2. His Answers to that Objection, p. 55. [The world is here the object of this love, therefore it cannot be meant of an electing love] are strangely gross. For (1) special love, with him, is nothing else but electing love: nor is there need in that notion, to say that all are the objects of it. It is but his begging of the Question, to confound Electing with Redeeming love. Gods hating Esau is com­paratively meant, and is but loving him less then his bro­ther [Page 197] Jacob: in which sense we are obliged toLuk. 14.26. hate our Parents, our Wives and Children. EvenLuth. in Gen. 33. Luther andMollerus in Mal. cap. 1. Mollerus did not doubt of Esau's et eternal bliss. Nor durst Oecolampadius to account him a Reprobate, because he knew those words (Rom. 9.) were onely spoken by aOecolam. Edit. Crisp. 1158. Gen. fi­gure. 2. He confessed the world doth either signifie in Scripture the whole universe of men, or the greatest part, which is the worst, (p. 55, 56.) and this most usually he grants. But he ask, why may it not also signifie the few­est and the best too? as if he knew not the Rule, Analo­gum per se positum stat pro famosiori. He saith a heap that hath more chaff then wheat in it, is usually called a heap of wheat, (p. 56.) By deceitful Jobbers no doubt it may be, who cheat the Buyer. But would Mr. W. buy his Corn so? or think the man honest who should so sell a bag of Corrans, where 29. parts of 30. are very trash? Joh. 6.33. there is bread spoken of, giving life to the world, that is to say, to all that eat it. And Rom. 11.15. the world is all except the Jewes, therefore by far the grea­ter part. Then 2 Cor. 5.19. Reconciling the world, is meant of the whole world, but conditionally. The other Texts 2 Pet. 2.5. & 1 Joh. 5.19. which speak of the world, and the whole world, are clearly meant of the grea­test part, not of the least. So all flesh, Joel 2.28. is meant of all Nations, all the earth, as well the Gentiles as the Jewes. Mundus Redemptionis, in Austin, is not mundus simply, but restrained to those that are finally sa­ved; which is not the notion of Redemption of which we are speaking from Joh. 3.16. where God so loved the world (without restraint) that [quicunque vellet credere] whoso­ever would believe, might have life everlasting.

3. His Answer to that Objection, p. 56. [The world is distributed into believers and unbelievers, &c.] is very woful. For 1. Is not the word Believing a restraint of the World? If so, then there are some who are not belie­ving, and then there is a distribution: which Mr. W. de­nies. 2. If those who are uncalled, our Saviour calls by the name of the world, then the world signifies not onely the [Page 198]Elect: for Mr. W. cannot say that all the uncalled are the Elect.

4. What he calls his second Argument, p. 57. is gratis dictum, he crudely affirming, without the least proof, that Christ died for none but whom he approved. Point-blank against Scripture, 2 Pet. 2.1. where Christ is said to have bought them that deny him, and broach damnable heresies, and bring upon themselves swift destruction. Did he approve of such men? or did he not dye for them whom he bought? Alas Mr. W!

5. His third Argument, p. 57. is thus easily retorted; That if it is as he would have it, Christ died for many who were already in Heaven. And his Answer to the Objection, p. 58. is somewhat worse: For as he holds that they in Hell were decreed absolutely to be damned; so he holds that they in Heaven were as absolutely decreed to be saved. In both he is but a beggar of the thing in question: for I affirm those decrees not to be absolute, but respective.

6. As for hisHis Argu­ment is this, If Christ died to purchase Faith, and all oth [...]r things needful, &c. then he did not die to pur­chase salvatton upon condition of believing, &c. fourth (p. 58) I deny the sequel; but he takes leave to prove his Antecedent onely, which no man denies. In his Answer to the Objection, p. 59. he misunderstands the word Condition; which is not resisting, but using and improving Gods gifts and graces: and so God will give them the grace of faith, if they will humbly beg, or thankfully receive it. None can come except the Father draws; but when he draws, all may that will. And though no condition is required to Gods first grace, (p. 60.) yet the receiving of that is required to his giving of more.

7. His fifth Argument, (p. 60, 61.) if granted, proves my conclusion, that Christ died not onely sufficiently, but intentionally for all; for that he died for all, the Scripture saith. But (2.) Christ hath not actually taken away im­penit [...]cy by his death, any farther then by purchasing suf­ficient grace to repent. 'Tis true, the blood of Jesus clean­seth us from all sin, 1 John 1.7. but how? actually? or onely meritoriously? not so, but thus,Locis in [...]rà citandis. Num. 8. saith the late [Page 199]great Primate. He hath redeemed us from iniquity, Tit. 2.14. but by giving us grace to forsake iniquity. (Let Mr. W. mark that.) He saves his people from their sins, (Mat. 1.) but we must be his then by our faithfulness to him, as well as faith, before he will save us from the punishment which our sins will otherwise entail upon us. He hath so far delivered us, (Luke 1.74.) as to give us grace or power whereby to serve him. And though 'tis the pro [...]erty of the flesh to resist the spirit (as Mr. W. saith truly, p. 61.) yet 'tis the work of Christs spirit to mortifie the flesh: which when we have done, even to that very Spirit we im [...]ute our conquest. Whereas he saith, to the great reproch of his Doctrine, A confession to be recorded, as dropping from the p [...]n of the guilty party. [That Christ cannot be said seriously to desire the salvation of those, from whom he will not remove those things which he knows will hinder their salvation, p. 61.] I answer, that he could not seriously desire it, if he did not give them sufficient means: but this ☜ lights heavily upon them who deny such a sufficiency to the most of mankind, and so infer Gods offers to be serious onely to a few. I alwayes teach, that Christ is wanting to none in what is requisite to their safety, if they are not wanting to themselves. But though his desire is serious, it is not passionate, or unreasonable, so as to save men by force, either against, or without their wills. He doth not violently remove whatsoever hinders them from salvation by any acts of meer power, but deals with men as free A­gents, who could not otherwise be fit for reward or pu­nishment. He takes away the heart of stone where it is really taken away, and none but he can do that work: but he does it not irresistibly, and therefore in many the stone remains not taken away, where yet he mercifully at­tempts it by such kind of means, as are wise and congruous, and in themselves sufficient; onely the wilfulness of men doth keep them from being effectual also.

8. His sixth Argument from Tit. 2.14. (in his p. 62.) deserves not any Indignation, but very much Pity. For those Believers whom Christ receiveth, he doth purge and purifie withJam. 4.6. more grace. That all are not purged, is [Page 200]theirEzek. 24.13. See the Pri­mates judgment of Christs death, p. 6. & 21. own fault onely. Christ satisfied for all upon the Cross, but did not actually save them; as his Grace of Armagh doth often say. Application is not a necessary effect of Redemption; and that Mr. W. may also learn from the same Id. ibid. 22, & 16, & 38. writing of the said Primate. Christ doth not leave it unto man onely to make the Application, yet gives him grace whereby to make it. And for what is said p. 63. from 1 Joh. 2.1, 2. I answer thus, There is a two­fold Advocation or Intercession of Christ, one on the Cross, and one in Heaven. Again, one for sinners, that they may repent; another for penitents, that they may finally perse­vere. He had this prayer for his Crucifiers, Father, for­give them. But another for his Disciples; Father, keep those whom thou hast given me, (Joh. 17.11.) That kind of pray­er was was not for the world, but for those who came in from among the worldlings, (Joh. 17.9.) That former prayer was for Rebels who stood out; this later for obedient and loyal Subjects, who were already in his possession.

9. His seventh Argument (p. 63.) from that promise of God, The seed of the woman shall break the Serpents head, (Gen. 3.) is a very strong Argument of the Disputers weakness; and serves for nothing in the world, but to proclaim the grosness of his mistake. For the seed of the woman is Jesus Christ, the object of true belief; not true believers. So that all falls at once, which he hath built on this bottom. Yet I will note one rarity for being a rarity indeed. ☞ Mr. W. saith that the Serpent doth not proper­ly exercise his enmity against all men, but against the Elect onely, (p. 63.) And what moves him to say it, but his be­ing resolv'd to conclude this from it, Ergo, Christ died not for all, but onely for the Elect? But stay, good Sir, is not Satan their enemy, whom he tempts to sin, and possesseth, and makes to cut themselves with stones? or doth he not exercise his enmity against them whom he betrayes to the paines of Hell? Besides, hath he a knowledge of the Elect (before the last audit) or hath he not? If he hath, from whence? or why will he tempt them at all, when he knows 'tis lost labour? If he hath not a knowledge of them, how [Page 201]can he single them out from all the Reprobates, to practice his enmity upon them?

10. His eighth Argument, (p. 64, 65.) is the worst of all, as well as the last, it being nothing but a presump­tion, that all the infants of the Heathen are unavoidably damned. Yet ask him what he thinks of himself and his party (who are exceedingly more sinful then Heathen In­fants) he will tell you they are Elect, and must be saved as unavoidably. Mr. B. is on this pin too, from his p. 144. to p. 147. But having cut them out work inSee Div. Philanth. ch. 4. p. 25, 26. The self-Re­venger, ch. 1. p. 22, &c. and p. 32, 33. other places, I onely pity them in this, beseeching God to endue them with grace and reason. I will but briefly forewarn others against the presumption of passing judgement upon other mens souls, and rudely pressing into Gods secrets. God acquaints us indeed with his manner of proceeding in cer­tain cases, as with those to whom his word is preached; but of his dealing with others we are not qualified to judg, un less as far as we are led by general rules out of Scripture. As for example, [ He hath no pleasure in the death of the wicked. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the chil­dren of men. He is a God ready to pardon, swift to shew mercy, and slow to wrath. His mercy is over all his works. His Commandments are not grievous. The soul that sin­neth it shall dye. The son shall not dye for the iniquity of the Parents. God requireth according to what men have, not according to what they have not.] He condemns not any man for not seeing, to whom he never gave eyes, or who never had light whereby to see. He condems not the deaf, for not hearing the Gospel; nor the tender Infant, for not comprehending it, whilest it is near. And how he will be pleased to deal with others, who are under the same Impossibility for want of preaching, he hath no other­wise told us then by parity of reason, that many are saved by Christs name, who never heard it; and by his merits, who never heard of them. I say not these things, as if the interest of my cause were concerned in it; I am sure it is not: For if all the Heathen are damned for their unbelief, then am I still in the right; it is not because Christ is not [Page 202]offered, but because they will not accept. And if they that are redeemed, are so conditionally, then what can hinder us from believing (especially since God hath so often said it) that the Heathens also were redeemed, as well as Chri­stians? And may it for ever be kept in mind (for many great and weighty reasons) that 'tis not knowledge, but practice, to which the promises are made.

Sect. 4.

How they strengthen So­cinianism, who contract the be­nefit of Christs death. Mr. W. spends his remaining papes in a preten­ded Answer to Objections, in two of which I am con­cerned. The first (beginning p. 71.) I have already shewed to be destructive to what he had positively delivered, p. 19. Or if his p. 19. is owned by him, it is just as destructive to his p. 71, 72. & so I refer him to what I have said, c. 1. sect. 2. p. 4, & 5. But because Mr. B. on the samech. 3. p 84, 85, 86. subject doth also speak the same sense, (if it is sense to say, that all and every man doth signifie very few in respect of all, and that the whole world notes the lesser part onely,) I will adde a few things, to deliver them both at once from the present thraldom they are in.

1. Socinians and Presbyterians compared.1. If the world, and the whole world, shall be permitted to signifie the little flock onely, and not the Universe of men, a way is opened to the Socinians, to persist in their course of robbing the Church of those Texts which we al­ledge for the proof of Christs Divinity. One of the clea­rest Texts we have is Joh. 1.10. The world was made by him: Here by the world, say theVolkel. lib. 5. cap. 10. p. 446. Socinians, is not meant this Fabrick of Heaven and Earth, not yet the Universe of men throughout the world, but the state of Bliss in the life to come, which the Man Christ Jesus hath purchased for us. And they have more to say for it, then the Pres­byterians for their Whimsey, because the Apostle doth call that future state, [...], the world to come, Heb. 2.5. but he never useth the word World to signifie onely the Elect. Nay, as the Learned Daille doth acknowledge, (who is farre from being an Arminian) whensoever the VVorld in Holy Writ doth not signifie Mankind, it clearly signifies the greater [Page 203]andNon solet Scriptura mun­di nomen in figurato sensu absolutè posi­tum in bo­nam, sed in de­teriorem par­tem usurpare. Dallaeus in A­pol. pro Duab. syn. part. 1. p. 16. worser part. Nay Mr. Daille Id. ib. p. 17. gives this for the first and chief reason why Camero and Amyrald, and o­ther eminent Protestants, did depart from their brethren the Calvinists in this particular, and chose rather to sub­mit to the plain Tenor of the Scripture as it was ever un­derstood by the Primitive Church. Besides, he gives notice to Spanhemius, Aperitur au­dacibus inge­niis licentia quoslibet sensus divinis verbis affingendi, quae omnia pro libitu in­vertent, & ad peregrinas significationes detorquebunt, si nobis hoc ipsi permiserimus, ut mundi nomen simpliciter positum pro solis electis sumamus, sensu, ut quivis videt, planè allegorico, & apud hominum, sive Judaeorum, sive Gentilium, Scriptores nove atque inaudito. Id. ib. p. 16., that if we suffer our own selves to understand the world of the Elect onely, (a trick never heard of, saith Daille, from any Writer in the World, whe­ther Jew or Gentile) we shall encourage the bold and licentious people to make God's word a Nose of Wax, and forge up on it what sense they please.

2. Received Rules for the inter­preting of words, and en­ding controver­sies.2. Mr. W. doth confesse p. 72. and Mr. B. p. 84, 85. ‘1. That we must not recede from the literal sense of Scri­pture when it will agree with other Scriptures. And 2. That Scripture-Phrases must be interpreted according to the nature of the matter expressed by them.] The former of these two I shewedSee D. Phil. ch. 4. sect. 26. p. 31. so plainly, that neither of these brethren have offered any thing against it; and so they confesse, in equivalence, that in the literal sense of those expressions [all, every, the whole, &c.] the Texts I cited are to be taken. Then for the later, it is evident that the matter of Christ's procuring a salvability for all without exception, is of aSee the Sinner Impl. part. 2. c. 2. p. 272. to p. 279. favourable nature, both in respect of God and Man. Whereas the matter of God's leaving the far greatest part of mankind under a desperate impossibility of being saved, is of anSee the Sinner Impl. part 2. c. 2. p. 280. to p. 284 odious nature in all respects. Now we have general 1. In non odi­osis, sumenda verba secundum totam proprietatem usus popularis, &c. 2. In favorabilioribus, ver­ba laxiùs sumenda. 3. In odiosis, sermo figuratus admittitur, quo onus vitatur, &c. Grot. de Jure Belli & Pacis, l. 1. cap. 16. Rules for the inter­preting of any matters in dispute, by reason of any ambi­guity which may be pretended to lie in words; and such [Page 204] unquestionable Rules, as the law of all Nations (of what Religion whatsoever) is wont to go by in all Debates, that so Controversies and Jarres may not certainly be end­less; which yet they certainly will be, if there are not some standing Rules, by which the words of all compacts are to be measured and made certain, as to their sense and signification. Such Rules are these in the Civil law, (which is founded upon the Law of Nature.)

  • 1. In things not odious, words are to be taken according to the whole propriety of popular use,
    The first Rule.
    so as the Masculine may include the Foeminine, and the Indefinite the Univer­sal.
  • 2. In matters more favourable, words are to be ta­ken in the most lax and wide signification that they will bear.
    The second Rule.
  • 3. In things of an odious nature, a figurative sense must be admitted,
    The third Rule.
    to avoid rigor or absurdity. And a greater restriction is to be used then for the rigid propriety of the wo [...]d.

Hence it is that as when God is said in Scripture to harden the heart, to pollute his Temple, to profane his San­ctuary, and the like, I say 'tis figuratively spoken, and must be onely understood by the common Hebraism; so when Christ is said to be the Saviour of the world, the Pro­pitiation for the sins of the whole world, the Saviour of all men, and to have tasted death for every man, and the like, I say 'tis meant in the propriety of those universals; and if [whole] in one Text had not been added to [the world] as we know it is 1 Joh. 2.2. yet that Indefinite [the world] must have included the universal: my reasons of both are taken à diversâ ratione materiae odiosae, & favorabilis. But now my Adversaries (on the contrary) do take the words in their propriety where the matter is odious; and they contend for a Synechdoche (such as never was heard [Page 205]of before the broaching of their Heresie) where the matter is the most favourable to be imagined: unlesse they think it no odious thing for God to be concluded the Au­thor of sin; and a thing very odious for the mercy of God to be over all his works, and for other men to be saveable as well as themselves.

3. The extreme ab­surdity of duti­ful misbelief.3. Mr. B. confesseth (p. 87.) that in the general pro­posal of the Gospel to every creature Mar. 16.15. there cannot possibly lurk any mental reservation, or insincerity.] And that an untruth is to be believed by the commandment of him who is the God of truth, the Lord Primate calls theThe Primates Judgment of the true intent and extent of Christs death, p. 24, 25. extreme absurdity into which the Arminians did drive the Calvinists. Nor did he doubt but Mr. Culver­wel was driven to the extremity on the right hand, by the Ib. p. 25. absurdities which he discerned in this extremity on the left. For (saith the Primate) what would not a man flye unto rather then yield that Christ died in no wayes for the Reprobates, and that ‘none but the Elect had any kind of title to him,p. 26. p. 27. and yet many thousand Reprobates should be bound in conscience to believe that he died for them, and tied to accept him for their Redeemer and Saviour, yea, and should be condemned to everlast­ing torments for want of such a faith, (if we may call that Faith which is not grounded on the word of Truth) whereby they should have believed that, which in it self was most untrue, and laid hold of that in which they had no kind of interest? Mr. W's Te­net, that only the least part of the world ought to believe the Gospel. Yet Mr. W. saith plainly that all men are not commanded to believe, but onely the least part of the world, p. 75. thereby inferring, 1. That the greatest part of the World do not sin in not believing, as being not commanded to it; 2. That none of that greatest part are damned for not believing; 3. Or if they are, they are damned for not doing that, which not to do is no sin; 4. Or that they actually do sin without offending against Praecept; 5. And so, by a consequence unavoi­dable, that S. John hath falsely defined sin to be [ [...]] the transgression of the law. He farther saith,His reproch cast upon all Christendom & the Gospel of Christ. See Prosper de vocatione Gen­tium l. 2. c. 1, & 2, & 16. &c proving that God did never leave himself without a wit­ness in any part of the world. Compare Act. 14.17. Psal. 76. & Psal. 118. Isa. 60. that [Page 206] the Gospel is onely preached to the least part of the world, ibid. as if he knew nothing either of Church-History, or Cosmography; nor did believe any truth to be in the Prophe­sies of the Old Testament, or in the oeconomy of the New. It seems the 1. Protestants, and 2. Papists, and 3. Greeks, and 4. Muscovites, 5. the Asiaticks under the Patriarch of Jerusalem, 6. the Melchites under that of Antioch, 7. the Armenians under 100. Bishops, 8. the Jacobites (who are mingled with the Mahumetans through a great part of Asia under their Patriarch at Caramite) 9. the Christians under the Patriarch of Mozul about Assyria, Mesopotamia, Parthia, and Media, (accounted more then all the Papists) 10. the Georgians in Iberia, 11. the Circassians, 12. the Mengrellians, 13. the Christians of all Natolia under the Patriarch of Constantinople, 14. those in the Kingdomes of Cazan and Astracan under the Patriarch of Mosco, 15. the Maronites, 16. the Indians of S. Thome, 17. those under the Pa­triarch of Alexandria, whose jurisdiction hath reached from the Gaditan streights to the River Nile, 18. The Abassin Christians in Aethiopia under their Abunna, 19. those in Congo and Angola, 20. besides all the A­mericans through New Spain, Castella nova, Peru, and Brasile, 21. besides all the English, Dutch, and French Plantations in Mexicana, and the Islands on either side, (that is to say in fewer words) Europe, Asia, Africa, and America, do passe with Mr. W. for the least part of the World. It were easie to teach this bold affirmer (were there time, or necessity for such a work) how much the greatest part of the world was preached to by the A­postles, and Deacons, and other Disciples of Christ, both in the first and succeeding ages of the Church. I have heard of one who thought the Sun never shined out of Spain and Italy. And now I meet with his peer, who thinks the Sunshine of the Gospel doth reach no further then his stunted knowledge of what is done under the Sun. But grant him his dictate, he is still undone in his doctrine: for the Gospel is preached here in England and France, as [Page 207]well to the Reprobates as the Elect; which Reprobates are in duty to believe a lie, or else they are not commanded to believe, and so shall never be punished for want of faith, or shall be punished for that which cannot possibly be a sin. One or more of these things must be admitted by Mr. W. if Christ died onely for the elect, as he positively affirms. Now considering the Tenent of that Tribe, that the Papists are Reprobates, and the Episcopal Pro­testants a kind of Papists (Cassandrian Papists their word is) and Independents of all sorts as bad as either, it may well become a Quaere, whether it is not his opinion, that Christ died onely for Presbyterians, and that none besides are sincerely commanded to believe. But I am not at lei [...]ure to sift him so, as well I might.

Sect. 5.

Universal Re­demption pro­ved from 2 Cor. 5.14. by Saint Austin and Prosper. The last thing I am concerned to consider in Mr. W. and Mr. B. is their nibling at that Rock of demon­stration, which I opposed against their error, in my Notes first p. 19. and next more largely in my Defence of God's Philanthropy, c. 4. p. 28, 29, 30. I mean that Rock of the Apostle, 2 Cor. 5.14. making it good against all opposers, that as sure as all were dead in sin, so sure it is that Christ died for all. This is nibled at tenderly by Mr. W. p. 77. and yet more tenderly by Mr. B. p. 93. by both so ten­derly, as if they discerned it to be a Rock, as firm and hard as the Marpesian, and were fearful to venture their teeth upon it; especially the man with the noysom teeth, as knowing that such would break the soonest. To make short work, I allow Mr. B. his Tergiversation, and am content to be tried by the best Interpreters, 1. Omnes ita­que mortui sunt in pecca­tis, nemine prorsus exce­pto; five in originalibus, sive etiam voluntate additis, vel ignorando, vel sciendo, nec faciendo quod justum est; & pro omnibus mortuis vivus mortuus est unus, i.e. nullū habens omnino peccatum. Ex hoc probavit omnes mortuos esse, quia pro omnibus mortuus est unus.— In illo uno (sc. Adamo) mortui sunt omnes, ut moreretur a­lius unus pro omnibus. Et rursus— A morte justissimae damnationis per unum mediatorem liberatur Genus Humanum.— Unus pro omnibus mortuus est, ergo omnes mortui sunt. Conclusio haec Apostoli invicta est; ac per hoc, quia & parvulis mortuus est, profecto etiam parvuli mortui sunt, &c. (as he pre­tends to be desirous, p. 92.) even by those whom he and Mr. W. shall grant to be the best Interpreters, as to this particular, to wit, S. Austin and Prosper. 1. S. Austin [Page 208]argues from that Text in the very same manner that I did, [viz. That Christ died for all without exception, because all without exception were dead in sin] no lesse then six di­stinct times. Once, lib. 20. de Civ. Dei cap. 6. init. Tom. 5. p. 1340. again, lib. 6. contra Julian. cap. 4. Tom. 7. p. 432. and again, ibid. c. p. 434. and again, ibid. c. 5.9. p. 436. once more, ibid. c. 17. p. 442. col. 2. And in another book a­gainst Julian, although imperfect, l. 1. c. 62. Tom. 7. p. 24. and yet again, lib. de Corrept. & Gratiâ, cap. 16. Tom. 7. p. 541. And to this is consonant what he taught in his Retractations, c. 3. lib. 1. Judaeos & Gentiles, Christi con­temptores, vocatos fuisse eâ vocatione quâ vocati sunt qui noluerunt venire ad Nuptias. And again in his very Re­tractations, Verum est omnino omnes hoc posse si velint, lib. 1. cap. 9. And to the same purpose in his Confessions there is a notable passage, lib. 8. c. 5. Tom. 1.

2. Prosper also doth prove that Christ died for all that were dead in sin, 2. Nulla ra­tiò dubitandi est, Christum pro impiis mortuum, à quorum nume­ro si quis liber inventus est, non est pro omnibus mor­tuus Christus. Sed prorsus pro omnibus est Christus mortuus, &c Prosper de voc. Gen. l. 2. c. 16. p. 144, 145. and so for every son of Adam, unless there is any one of the number free from all sin; for Christ (saith he) died not for such: but he proves there cannot be any such, and therefore none for whom Christ died not; and his chiefest proof is from 2 Cor. 5.14. which he expounds exactly, as I have done from the beginning; and he in­deed was the first in whom I met with it, at least three years before I saw it in S. Austin.

3. To save me the labour of saying more, Mr. B. hath dropped a confession, which he saith is the confession of all my adversaries, That an offer of Christ is made to all unto whom the Gospel is, and by commission ought to be, preached, p. 87. he also confesseth that the offer is sincerely made, ibid. This I lay hold on, though he saith the contrary shortly after, viz. That God in the means of Grace, doth not so much as make an offer of salvation to all, p. 90. A­gain, though he saith at one fit, that there was in Christs death a sufficiency for all, even of a Note, that he had railed at me in his first book, for saying this ve­ry thing; and after blotted out his railing, in the North-hampton Copies of that Print, as resolving to assert, in his second book, what he condemned in his first. thousand worlds, if [Page 209]there were so many, p. 91. yet at another fit he tells us, that God had not an intention to save all, p. 90. and yet in a third fit, he saith, the proposal of the Gospel to every crea­ture is without reservation or insincerity, p. 87. and further yet, that it is pessible, by vertue of Christs merits, for all men to be saved, p. 87. and how so? he saith very truly, in case of true faith and repentance: there he is also for conditional redemption to all the world, as exactly as I am. As for his flat contradictions to the Lord Primate, with whom he professed to concur, and many other misfortunes upon this subject, I refer him to all his concernments in The Self-Revenger exemplified.

Sect. 6.

The Conclusion. I now conclude with some reasons, why I lose no more time in exposing these Authors to more pity, and their Doctrines to more contempt. 1. I am told by men of knowledge, that their books are already become waste pa­per, bought by a few onely of the many, and read con­tentedly by none at all. 2. I am importuned by divers not to consider them over-much, who have not a dange­rous plausibility amongst the vulgar, but to reserve my spare houres for the most popular man of that party, who (as I am credibly informed) is doing his utmost to find me work. 3. They have adventured to nibble, (and but to nibble) at so few things in my Answer, that they do ta­citely grant the greatest part to have left no colour for a Reply. 4. A great part of their performances are visi­ble shifts, rather then serious oppositions; even mean tran­sitions à genere ad genus, easie sneakings ab Hypothesi ad Thesin, at every pinch Ignorationes Elenchi, purposed sittings beside the Cushion, and many times betwixt two stools too, gratis dicta are their very least frailties, as studied forgeries are the greatest; and I confess it is painful, to spend much time (with Domitian) in killing Flies. 5. When they are brought to such straits, that they find not a cre­vice or a key-hole whereat to attempt a creeping out, they yield themselves up, and all for which they have conten­ded, without so much as making any terms of mercy. As [Page 210]for example,Certissimum est nobis, De­crevisse, ut non nisi nolentes atque impii perderentur, Twiss. Vin. Gr. l. 1. p. 100. Mr. B. professeth He doth readily yield, that God did not absolutely decree the Reprobation posi­tive of any creature, but upon praescience and supposition of wilful rebellion and impenitence, p. 70, 71.’ nay he professeth this to be the Doctrine of all Orthodox Wri­ters, ancient and modern, p. 70. And why should He be much talked with, who confesseth all in one breath, which he denieth in another? See the Div. Philanth. ch. 4. p. 4. especially p. 5. yet no sooner gets he loose, but he denies the very thing which the necessity of his affairs had made him confess, and pleads (for want of a better excuse) Lap­sus linguae non est error mentis, p. 77. what cares he how he miscarries, who can so easily make amends? 6. When this evader is so stomachful that he will not yield, and yet so despairing of success that he will not resist a cogent Argument, he makes no scruple to profess a Tergiversa­tion. As for example, when I had pressed him with aSee the Div. Phi. ch. 3. p. 65. Dilemma of huge importance, even evincing out of his mouth, that his Distinction of Positive and Negative Reprobation was but a shift, he contents himself with this return, [Mr. Barlee needs not answer that Dilemma, p. 81.] And so when he knowes not what to say to the convincing points of my reasonings about the general extent and sin­cere intent of Christ's death, he gives me the slip in these words, [ It would be superfluous labour to spend more time and paper in giving more particular answers to his luxu­riant discourses, p. 93.’] 7. Mr. W. and he and Mr. Hobbs are so frequently condemned out of their own mouths, that they would need no Confuters besides themselves, if all their Readers were but attentive. To give a few instan­ces of many, Mr. W. saith p. 29. God is not the Author of evil, because not causa per se, but per accidens. Yet in his extent of Div. Prov. p. 40. he saith that causa per accidens never works till causa per se sets it on work.] Now because it is not man who sets God on work, it is plainly his meaning, that God is causa per se of sin, and sets man on work who is causa per accidens; which others call a deficient cause. Again, he confesseth in his last Work, [Page 211] p. 25. that if it is impossible to separate the sin from the action, then he who is the Author of the one, is also of the o­ther. Yet he also confesseth p. 37. that the modi rerum are not really distinguished from the things themselves, but so neerly conjoined as they cannot be separated. Nor can any reason be rendred why Doctor Twisse should say,Mr. Hobbs his prodigious self-contradictions. that Fornication denoteth sin even secundùm materiale, except this one, that the sin is inseparable from the Act. In like manner Mr. Hobbs, though he saith inOf Lib. and Necess. p. 23. one place, that sins are actions, and inQuaest. Num? 12. p. 105. another place, that God is the cause of all actions, and in aIbid. p. 107. third place, that he is a prin­cipal Agent in the causing of all actions, yet heIbid. p. 105, 106. denies him to be the Author of the actions which he causeth. And his reason for it is more prodigious then all the rest; for God (saith he) cannot be said to be the Author of sin, because he doth but necessitate it, not command or warrant it, p. 105, 106. yet even this last he contradicts too, by saying thatOf Lib. and Necess. p. 22. power irresistible doth justifie all actions. Now that which necessitates is power irresistible, and that which justifies doth warrant, and he saith that that which war­rants is the Author of sin. (Qu. p. 106.) and that sin must needs derive a necessity from God (p. 105.) and the great­est men of his Principle do say that God commands men to sin, which he confesseth is to call him the Author of sin. (p. 106.) Nay heQ. p. 11. l. 7, 8, 9, 10. from the bottom▪ elsewhere professeth, that a man must not SAY, God hath caused him to erre, and it is through the Lord that he fell away, but he may THINK so very well. And wo had been to Ecclesiasticus, had he denied it. Nor is there any thing more common with these men, then to say that sin is necessary as decreed by God, although con­tingent as freely willed by man. Now necessary being that, which cannot chuse but be, and contingent that, which either may or may not be; what is this but to say, it is necessary as decreed, but not necessary as not decreed? It cannot but be, and yet it might possibly not have been: it is contingent, and not contingent: which is as if they should say, we cannot de­ny our Adversaries Premisses, and therefore we must hold the one part of the contradiction; but we will not [Page 212]quit our own conclusion, and therefore we must hold the other part of the contradiction. Thus by their own way of arguing, they are men, and they are not: they are men, as being indued with Reason; and they are not, as being in­dued with none. Sure that sort of men is no longer to be disputed with, who have drank so deeply, and digested, and reduced also to practice, theQuamcun­que duarum viarum primò diversarum homines inic­rint, recta tendunt ad superos. Esco­bar. Theol. Mo­ral. Tom. 1. in prael. cap. 3. See the Myste­rie of Jesui­tisme, Letter 5. p. 59, 60. and Additionals second Edit. p. 70, &c. p. 90, &c. Jesuites doctrine of Pro­bability. 8. Last of all, for Mr. B. who hath spent so many whole sheets in calling me Papist, Arminian, Socinian, Massilian, Pelagian, and what else he listed, though I could make it undeniable, (even to him, and his Conger­rones,) that he hath spoken of each, as if he knew nothing of any one, and could prove him irresistibly (by an Argu­ment ad hominem) to be a Hobbist, a Mahumetan, and of every other Sect of men, with whom he partakes in any kind; yet I shall imitate S. Austin, and take a shorter course with him: When that Father was accused by Se­cundinus for a Manichee, he purged himself in this man­ner; Secundinus saith I am a Manichee, and I say I am not. Let the Reader judge, which of us is herein to be believed. My case is the same, and I will take the same course. Mr. Barlee saith I am a Papist, Pelagian, Soci­nian, Sorcerer, &c. But I say No to all his sayings: I leave it now to the Reader, to believe whom he pleaseth, Mr. Barlee, or Mr. Pierce.

Extende manum, & tange, &c.

(Job. 1.11.)

Id est, permitte ut extendam manum, & tangam cuncta quae possidet; ut saepius in sacris Scripturis tribuuntur Deo Actiones,solùm eas fieri permiserit.

August. ad Simplician. l. 2. q. 2.

Either make the Tree good and his Fruit good, or else make the Tree corrupt and his Fruit corrupt,

Matt. 12.33.

For the Tree is known by his Fruit. Ibid.

An Additional Advertisement To the Reader, July 26.1658.

MY present Tract being finished and wrought off at the Presse, the Stationer sends me (at this instant) a little book of Mr. Baxter's which ad­dresseth it self in the Title-page to no more then three men, to wit, Grotius, the new Tilenus, and Mr. Pierce; but in several passages of the thing his objections reach to many more; though, having onely run it over with a transient eye, I can remember no more particulars then Bishop Bram­hall, Doctor Sanderson, Doctor Heylin, and Doctor Taylor. Had it not come a little too late, and were it not more in my humour, then it seems to be in Mr. Baxter's, [...], to prefer a good speed before a great deal of haste, an hour or two had sufficed to have made a Winding-sheet for him­self, at least as suitable as that which he made for Popery. But as it is, I must declare to all those persons concerned in it with my self, and to Tilenus the second more especially, (whom after all my in­quiries I have not the happinesse to know in the least degree) that till the end of this Summer I shall not bestow the least though upon any part of Mr. Baxter; and that for these ensuing rea­sons.

First, because I am praeengaged in divers matters of greater moment, which will take me up wholly the next three moneths. And if I return to any [Page]Dispute in any kind whatsoever, as it will fall out cross to my inclinations, so I resolve to do it onely at times of leisure and diversion. For whilest my time may be spent in some good imployment, why should I lose it in my least necessary Defences?

Next, I desire to understand what entertainment the thing will find with considering Readers: for if it seems to others what it doth to me, it will tend to nothing but the disparagement of its Author. Nor need I vindicate Mr. Baxter from his severities done unto himself. Besides, that I resolve, never to controvert a subject, untill the most sober un­byass't persons shall think it publickly useful, as well as I.

Thirdly, I think it will be best to expect the fi­nal resolutions of the other persons concerned, espe­cially of the excellent Tilenus junior, whom Mr. Baxter hath blurr'd with his blackest ink: and if he possibly is alive to undertake his own cause, the world will find 'twill be but impar [...] congressus.

Again, I am told that Doctor Reynolds is at last resolved to find me work: and in case it proves true, I shall remember the speech of the King of Syria at Ramoth-Gilead, Fight ye not with small or great, save onely with the King of Israel, 2 Chron. 18.30. He is so worthily reputed the Coryphaeus of that party (if yet he is not too worthy to be in ear­nest one of them) that Mr. Baxter will follow him very contentedly at a very great and humble di­stance.

Fifthly I ought to think twice, before I meddle with Mr. Baxter, because I find him so very liable, (I had almost said in every line,) for as much as I [Page]can judge by my short and cursory perusal of him. And where advantages are too many, some consi­deration is to be had how much of all that abun­dance is to be taken and left: for tis a thanklesse office to acquaint a man with his unhappinesse; and in the doing of that, I would not willingly be endless.

Sixthly, I am to meditate, in what manner of terms I ought to deal with Mr. Baxter. The de­sires of my soul are to use him gently; but consi­dering his guilt, I know not whether my indulgence may not be hurtful to his admirers, who may be apt to think well of his greatest crimes, if they find me (like Eli to his sons) too milde a Censor. Nor am I sure that my softness will not be mischievous to himself; who may mistake my longanimity for carnal fear, and so by sinning yet more, may make a worse thing happen unto him. I say not this without ground, because I find him abusing my former lenity, as if he imagin'd his being terrible had made me courteous. Christian Reader, ob­serve my reason: He doth now acknowledge to all the world, and withal professeth [hePraef. sect. 4. p. 3. must ac­knowledge, both my gentleness, and charity, and bro­therly moderation in dealing with him.] But as if gentleness, and charity, and brotherly moderation were onely fit for a moral man, and were the glittering sins of an Episcopal Divine, he behaves himself so unexpectedly in divers passages of his Book, as if he durst not imitate the best things in me, and (in the point of charity) had thought it his duty to come behind.

I had done no worse, then the clearing of God [Page]from those slanders which the tongue of the wick­ed had raised against him, and the freeing my self from those other slanders which were raised against me for clearing God, (things confessed to be match­less and groundless slanders by the dearest friends of Mr. Barlee, & now at last not denied by himself;) when yet Mr. Baxter thinks fit to say in the depth of his passion and partiality, [Mr. Baxter in his Praef. addressed to Mr. T.P. Sect. 20. towards the end of it. That he had rather die in the state of David before Nathan spake to him, or of Peter after he had denied his Lord, (that is, in the state of an Adulterer, Murderer, and one who projected the drunkenness of Uriah, and continued thus about a year in an impenitent state,) then of Mr. Pierce that hath committed no such sin.] Nor doth he give the least reason, besides my writing that Book, and the rest of my failings which are known to God onely. He doth not pretend to know the least sin in me, excepting my publick Writings against those sins of which I knew not that he was guilty, until (in this his late Book) he revealed it to me from the Presse. And that I have failings known to God (I will add, to my self also) is no more then he might have said even of David and Peter after the times of their repentance. Yet goes he not 5. pages farther, before his eruption into these strange words. [I Ibid. sect. 24. had rather my right hand were used as Cranmers then I should have written against Puritans what you have done:] Yet it is known that I writ against no other Puritans, then such as were defined at Hampton-Court to be Protestants fright­ed out of their wits: Such Puritans as are known to be painted sepulchres, having a form onely of god­linesse without the power of it. Such as were [Page]thought by judicious Hooker to be fit inhabitants for a wilderness, not for a well-ordered City: Such as have ever despised dominion, and spoken evil of dignities, have been commonly Boutefeus and men of blood, the Proverbial Autors and Fautors of Se­dition and violence in Church and State. If Mr. Baxter doth know enough of the ancient Gnosticks and Catharists, the Pharisees of Judaea, and rigid Je­suits at Rome, (besides what I have not now time to name,) he knowes the Puritans against whom I have written.

Lastly, I find him so frequently unmasking him­self to all his Readers, by pretending that the dif­ference between me and my Antagonists is meerly verbal, and so acknowledging himself to be really of my opinions, yet calling me as well as others by the very same names, (Arminian and Pelagian,) which with equal reason are often fastened upon himself, by not a few of his own Tribe; sometimes shewing himself an Advocate for the crimson sins of other men, and not onely an Advocate, but an Encomiast of his own; concluding Grotius to be a Papist, for the very same reasons for which him­self (if he is just) must needs conclude him to be a Protestant, (unless he thinks as hardly of the Augustan Confession, as of the Articles of the Councel of Trent) mistaking at once the whole drift of Grotius his excellent Discussio Apologetici Rivetiani, and parcelling his mistake into a great many Sections towards the making of a book; citing Grotius his Latine, and not translating it into English, or translating it so lamely (to say no worse) as to conceal his true meaning from English Readers; [Page]I say so frequently do I discern Mr. Baxters un­coverings of himself, in these and many more re­spects, that for ought I yet know, these very hints which I have given for the intelligent Reader to inlarge upon unto himself, may be a sufficient [...] against the Contagion of all his Volume. My perusal of his book hath been so hasty (it ha­ving been brought me by the same Carrier by whom I am hastily sending this short account unto the Presse) that although I can say I have run it o­ver, yet I cannot say I have read it all. And therefore my Reader will be satisfied with this one instance of my experience. In his Sect. 21. p. 34, 35. Grotius is brought by Mr. Baxter speaking thus in his Discussio:Quare nunc planè it a sentit Grotius, & multi cum ipso, non posse Prote­stantes inter se jungi, nisi simul jungantur cum iis qui Sedi Romanae cohaerent; sine quâ nullum spera­ri potest in Ecclesiâ Commune Regimen. Ideo optat (mark this good Reader) ut ea divulsio quae evenit, & causae divulsionis tollantur. Inter eas non est Primatus Episcopi Romani secundum Canones, fatente Melancthone. —’

The later part of these words (which are the chief) Mr. Baxter takes no notice of in the En­glish account which he renders of them, onely con­tents himself to say Here you see that Grotius judged that the only way for union was for all Protestants to joyn with them that adhere to the See of Rome.] He is deeply silent as to the causes of the breach, which Grotius did wish might be taken away; and which he charged the Papists with. Vot. pro Pace p. 7, 8.

I have not a minute wherein to say more, then [Page]that for all his medlings and misdemeanours about my last reckoning with Mr. Barlee, (in my [...], or Self-revenger exemplified) I sincere­ly commiserate his passion, I truly pardon his partia­lity, and I heartily pray for his amendment.

ERRATA.

PAge 6. lin 9. in marg. r. libert. c. 13. p. 7. l. 5. from the bottom. r. Mr. Hickman. p. 31. l. 15. after done r. in. p. 40. l. 8. in marg. r. 2 Sam. 12.11, 12. p. 50. l. 1. r. Joh. 15.5. p. 95. l. 3. from the bottom. r. had. p. 102. l. 9. r. himself. p. 113. l. 8. for Mr. W. r. Mr. B. p. 114. l. 28. in marg. for Mr. W. r. Mr. B. p. 149. l. 16. for rest on, r. restore. 163. l. 1. in marg. after of r. in. p. 169. l. 10. for severe r. several. p. 171. l. 1. for. p. 13. r. p. 113. p. 176, l. 5. r. Erinays. p. 187. l. 5. after what, r. was. p. 197. l. 7. in marg. r. in Gen. p 203. 39. in marg. r. vitetur. p. 208. l 13. in marg. r. p. 844, 845.

THE END.

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