The EXCELLENCIE OF A Free-State: OR, The Right CONSTITUTION OF A Common-wealth.

WHEREIN All Objections are answered, and the best way to secure the Peoples LIBERTIES, discovered: WITH Some Errors of Government, AND Rules of Policie.

Published by a Well-wisher to Posterity.

London, Printed for Thomas Brewster, at the three Bibles neer the West-end of Pauls. 1656.

To the Reader.

TAking notice of late with what impudence, and (the more is the pity) confidence, the Enemies of this Commonwealth in their publick Writings and Discourses labour to undermine the dear-bought Liberties and Freedoms of the People, in their declared Interest of a Free-State; I thought it high time, by counter­working them, to crush the Cockatrice in the Egg, that so it might never grow to be a Bird of prey: in order thereto, I have published this following Discourse to the World; that so the Eyes of the People being opened, they may see whether those high and ranting Discourses of personal Prerogative and un­bounded Monarchy, (especially Inspecti­ons. One lately published by Mr. Howel, that struts a­broad with a brazen Face) or a due and [Page] orderly succession of the Supreme Autho­rity in the hands of the Peoples Represen­tatives, will best secure the Liberties and Freedoms of the People from the Incroach­ments and Usurpations of Tyranny, and answer the true Ends of the late Wars.

This Treatise is not intended for a par­ticular Answer to Mr. Howel's said Book, but yet may obviate that part there­of which he calls, Some Reflexes upon Government: for his main design is not so much, (though that be part) to asperse the long Parliament, (and so through their sides to wound all their Friends and Adhe­rents) as to lay a Foundation for absolute Tyranny, upon an unbounded Monarchy: and in order thereunto, he advises his Highness to lay aside Parliaments, (or at best, to make them Cyphers) and to govern the Nation Vi & Armis: not [...]ut of any Honour or respect he bears to his Person, but to bring the old Interest and Fa­mily into more credit and esteem with the People.

His Principles and Precedents, they are purely his own: for I am confident, that the most considerate part of those that did engage for the late King, are so far from [Page] owning his Tenets, that they would rather lay aside the Family and Interest of the Stuarts, and declare for a Free-State, than indure to be yoked and enslaved by such an absolute Tyranny as he pleads for▪ My reason is this: because most of the Nobility and Gentry of this Nation have fair Estates of their own, free, without any dependence upon the Crown; and they would be as unwilling to render up their E­states and Posterities in the paw of the Lion, as the Commoners themselves.

His Precedents are as false as his Prin­ciples are bad: for proof hereof, take one (and that a main one) for all: he saith, That until the Reign of Henry the first, the Commons of England were not called to the Parliament at all, or had so much as a Consent in the making of Laws.

To prove that this is false, there is extant an old Latine Copy speaking of a Parlia­ment in the Reign of King Ethelred; which telleth us, that in it were Universi Anglorum Optimates Ethelredi Regis Edicto: & convocata Plebis multitu­dine collectae Regis Edicto: A Writ of Summons for all the Lords, and for choice [Page] of the Commons: a full and clear Parlia­ment. My Author saith, The proofs of Parliaments, in Canute's time, are so many, and so full, that they tire us al­together. His remarkable Letter from Rome, recorded by the Monk of Malms­bury, runs thus: To the Arch-Bishops, Bishops, &c. Primatibus & toti Genti Anglorum, tam Nobilibus, quam Ple­beis. Hoveden is full in this also; Cujus (Edmundi) post mortem, Rex Canutus omnes Episcopos, Duces, nec non & Principes, cunctosque Optimates Gen­tis Angliae, Lundoniae congregrari jussit. Howel saith Wil­liam the Conqueror first brought the word Parlament A clear summons of Parliament: and the very name of Parliament is found (saith my Author) in his time, in the old Book of Edmunds-Bury. Rex Canutus, Anno Regni 5. cunctos Regni sui Praelatos, Proceresque, ac Magnates, and suum con­vocans Parliamentum. And that it was a full Parliament, we may believe, from the persons we finde there, at the Charter to that Monastery; confirmed by Hardica­nute, but granted by Canute, insuo Publico Parliamento, praesistentibus per­sonaliter in eodem Archi-Episcopis, E­piscopis, Suffraganeis, Ducibus, Comi­tibus▪ [Page] Abbatibus, cum quam plurimis gre­gariis Militibus (Knights of shires it seems) & cum Populi multitudine copiosa (o­ther Commons also) Omnibus tum eodem Parliamento personaliter existentibus. Edward the Confessor refers the repairingMr. Howel would have his Highness lay a Ses­ment for the repairing of Pauls with­out consent of Parlia­ment. of Westminster to the Parliament: at length, cum totius Regni Electione, (they are his own words) he sets upon the decayed Minster.

But they that would know more of the Customs and Constitutions of this Nation, let them repair to those large Volumes, that are so frequent in print upon that Subject; especially that excellent Piece, The Rights of the Kingdom. This may suffice to prove that the Commons were called to Par­liament long before Henry the first.

I believe none will be offended with this following Discourse, but those that are Enemies to publick welfare: let such be of­fended still: it is not for their sakes that I publish this exsuing Treatise; but for your sakes, that have been noble Patriots, fellow-Souldiers; and Sufferers for the Liberties and Freedoms of your Country, that Po­sterity in after-ages may have something to say and shew to (if God shall permit any) [Page] suceeding Tyrants, wherefore their Fathers sacrificed their lives, and all that was dear to them: It was not to destroy Magistracy, but to regulate it; nor to confound Pro­priety, but to inlarge it: that the Prince as well as the People might be governed by Law; that Justice might be impartially distributed without respect of persons; that England might become a quiet Habitation for the Lion and the Lamb to lie down and f [...]ed together; and, that none might make the people afraid: it was for these things they fought and died; and that not as pri­vate persons neither, but by the publick command and conduct of the Supreme Power of the Nation, viz. the peoples Repre­sentatives in Parliament: and nothing will satisfie far all the Blood and Treasure that hath been spilt and spent, make England a glorious Commonwealth, and stop the mouths of all gainsayers; but a due and orderly suc­cession of the Supreme Authority in the hands of the Peoples Representatives.

An INTRODUCTION TO THE Following Discourse.

WHen the Senators of R [...]me, in their publike Decrees and Orations, began to comply with and court the People, calling them Lords of the world; how easie a matter was it then for Gracchus to perswade them to un-Lord the Senate? In like manner, when Athens was quitted of Kings, the Power was no sooper declared to be in the People [...]t immediately they took it, and made [Page 2] sure of it in their own hands, by the advice of Solon, that excellent Law­giver: for, as Cicero saith, There is a natural desire of Power and Sove­reignty in every man: so that if any have once an oportunity to seize, they seldom neglect it; and if they are told it is their due, they venture life and all to attain it.

If a People once conceive they ought to be free, this conception is immediately put in practice; and they free themselves. Their first care is to see, that their Laws; their Rights, their Deputies, their Officers, and all their Dependents, be setled in a state of freedom. This becoms like the Apple of the eye; the least grain, atome, or touch, will grieve it: it is an espoused virgin; they are extreme jealous over it.

Thus strangely affected were the Roman people, that if any one among them (though ne'er so deserving) were found to aspire, they presently fetch'd him down, as they did the gallant Maelius and Manlius; yea, their jea­lousie was so great, that they observ­ed [Page 3] every man's looks, his very nods, his garb, and his gate, whether he walked, conversed, and lived as a friend of Freedom among his neigh­bours. The supercilious eye, the lofty brow, and the grand paw, were accounted Monsters, and no Cha­racter of Freedom; so that it was the special care of the wiser Patri­ots, to keep themselves in a demure and humble posture, for the avoid­ing of suspicion. Hence it was, that Collatinus, one of their Freedoms Founders, and of the first Consuls, living in some more State than ordi­nary, and keeping at too great a di­stance from the people, soon taught them to forget his former merits: in­somuch, that they not onely turned him out of his Consulship, but quite out of the City into Banishment. But his Colleague Brutus, and that wise Man Valerius Publicola, by taking a contrary course, preserved them­selves and their reputation. For, the one sacrificed his Children, those living Monuments of his House, to make the vulgar amends for an inju­ry▪ [Page 4] the other courted them with the Title of Majesty, laid the Fasces, the Ensigns of Authority at their Feet, fixt all appeals at their Tribunals, and levelled the lofty Walls of his own stately House, for fear they should mistake it for a Castle. Thus also did Menenius Agrippa, Camillus, and other eminent Men in that po­pular State: so that by these means they made themselves the Darlings of the people, whilst many others of a more Grandee-humor, soon lost their Interest and Reputation.

Thus you see, that when a Peo­ples Right is once declared to them, it is almost impossible to keep it, or take it from them.

It is pity, that the people of Eng­land, being born as free as any peo­ple in the World, should be of such a supple humor and inclination, to bow under the ignoble pressures of an Arbitrary Tyranny, and so unapt to learn what true Freedom is. It is an inestimable Jewel, of more worth than your Estates, or your Lives: it consists not in a License to do what [Page 5] you list, but in these few particulars: First, in having who esome Laws sured to every Man's state and condi­tion. Secondly, in a due and easie course of administration, as to Law and Justice, that the Remedies of Evil may be cheap and speedy. Thirdly, in a power of altering Go­vernment and Governours upon oc­casion: Fourthly, in an uninterrupted course of successive Parliaments, or Assemblies of the People. Fifthly, in a free Election of Members to sit in every Parliament, when Rules of Election are once established. By enjoying these onely, a people are said to enjoy their Rights, and to be truely stated in a condition of safety and Freedom.

Now if Liberty is the most preci­ous Jewel under the Sun, then when it is once in possession, it requires more than an ordinary art and in­dustry to preserve it. But the great question is, Which is the safest way? whether by committing of it into the hands of a standing Power, or by placing the Guardianship in the [Page 6] hands of the People, in a constant succession of their supreme Assemblys. The best way to determine this, is by observation out of Romane Sto­ries; whereby it plainly appears, that people never had any real Liberty, till they were possess'd of the power of calling and dissolving the Supreme Assemblies, changing Governments, enacting and repealing Laws, toge­ther with a power of chusing and de­puring whom they pleased to this work, as often as they should judge expedient, for their own well-being, and the good of the Publike. This power is said to be the first born of that Peoples Freedom: and many a shrewd fit, many a pang and throw the Commonwealth had, before it could be brought forth in the world: which (Gracchus told them) was a sore affliction from the gods, that they should suffer so much for the igno­rance or negligēce of their Ancestors, who when they drave our Kings, forgat to drive out the Mysteries and inconveniences of Kingly power, which were all reserved within the [Page 7] hands of the Senate. By this means the poor people missing the first op­portunity of setling their freedom, soon lost it again: they were told they were a Free-state; and why? because (forsooth) they had no King, they had at length nev [...]r a Tar­quin to trouble them: but what was that to the purpose, as long as they had a Caius, and an Appius Claudius, and the rest of that gant, who infect­ed the Senators with an humour of Kinging it from generation to gene­ration? Alas, when the Romans were at this pass, they were just such ano­ther Free-state as was that of Sparta, in the days of yore, where they had a Senate too, to pull down the pride of Kings; but the people were left destitute of power and means to pull down the pride of the Senate; by which means indeed they became free to do what they list, whilst the people were confined within straite [...] bounds than ever. Such another Free-state in these daies is that of Venice, where the people are free from the Dominion of their Prince [Page 8] or Duke; but little better than slaves under the power of their Senate: but now in the Common-wealth of A­thens the case was far otherwise; where it was the care of Solon, that famous Law-giver, to place both the exercise & interest of Supremacy in the hands of the people, so that nothing of a publick interest could be imposed, but what passed currant by vertue of their consent and Au­thority: he instituted that famous Council called the Areopagus, for the managing of State-transactions: but left the power of Legislation, or law­making, in a successive course of the peoples Assemblies; so that avoiding Kingly Tyranny on the one side, and Senatical incroachments on the o­ther, he is celebrated by all Posterity, as the man that hath left the onely Patern of a Free-state fit for all the world to follow.

It is also to be observed, when Kings were driven out of Rome, though they were declared and call­ed a Free-state, et it was a long time ere they could be free indeed, in [Page 9] regard Brutus cheated them with a meer shadow and pretence of liber­ty: he had indeed an Ambition high enough, and opportunity faire­nough to have seized the Crown in­to his own hands; but there were many considerations that deterr'd him from it; for he well perceived how odious the name of King was grown: Besides, had he sought to Inthrone himself, men would have judged it was not love to his Coun­try made him take up Arms, but de­sire of Dominion; nor could he for­get, that serene privacy is to be pre­ferr'd before Hazardous Royalty: For what hope could he have to keep the Seat long, who by his own example had taught the people both the Theory and practice of opposing Tyranny? It was necessary therefore that he should think of some other course more plausible, whereby to worke his own ends, and yet pre­serve the love of the people; who not having been used to liberty, did very little understand it, and there­fore were the more easily gul'd out [Page 10] of the substance, and made content with the shadow.

For the carrying on this Design, all the projecting Grandees joyned pates together; wherein, as one ob­serves, Regnum quidem nomen, sed non Regia potestas Româ fuit expulsa: Though the Name of King were exploded with alacrity, yet the Kingly power was retained with all Art and subtilty, and shared under another notion among themselves, who were the great ones of the City. For all Authority was confin'd with­in the walls of a standing Senate, out of which, two Consuls were chosen yeerly; & so by turns they dub'd one another with a new kinde of Rega­lity: the people being no gainers at all by this alteration of Government, save onely, that (like Asses) they were sadled with new Paniers of Sla­very.

But what followed? The Senate having got all power into their own hands, in a short time degene­rated from their first Virtue and In­stitution, to the practice of Avarice, [Page 11] Riot, and Luxury; whereby the love of their Country was changed into a Study of Ambition and Faction: so that they fell into divisions among themselves, as well as oppressions o­ver the people; by which divisions, some leading Grandees, more potent than their Fellows, took occasion to wipe their Noses, and to assume the Power into their own hands, to the number of ten persons. This Form of Government was known by the Name of the Decemvirate; wherein these new Usurpers, joyning Forces together, made themselves rich with the spoiles of the people, not caring by what unlawful means they pur­chased either Profit or Pleasure, till that growing every day more in­supportable, they were in the end by force cashiered of their Ty­ranny.

How the Romans ob∣tained their Rights and Priviledges But what then? The people be­ing flesh'd with this Victory, and calling to minde how gallantly their Ancestors had in like manner banish­ed Kings, began at last to know their own strength; and stomack'd it ex­ceedingly [Page 12] that themselves, on whose shoulders the frame of State was sup­ported, (and for whose sakes all States are founded) should be so much vassalized at the will of others, that they who were Lords abroad, should be Slaves at home: so that they resolved to be ridden no longer under fair shews of Liberty. They raised a Tumult under the conduct of their Tribune Canu [...]eius; nor could they by any perswasion be induced to lay down Arms, till they were put in possession of their Rights and Pri­viledges. They were made capable of Offices of the Government, even to the Dictatorship; had Officers of their own, called Tribunes, who were held sacred and inviolable, as Protectors of the Commons, and re­tained a power of meeting and a­cting with all Freedom in their great Assemblies. Goodneſs preferred before Greatneſs. Now, and never till now, could they be called a Free State, and Commonwealth, though long before declared so: for the way being open to all without exception, vertue, lear­ning, and good Parts made as speedy [Page 13] a Ladder to climbe unto Honours, as Nobility of Birth; and a Good Man as much respected as a Great; which was a rare felicity of the Times, not to be expected again, but upon the dawning of another golden Age.

The main Observation then arising out of this Discourse, is this: That not onely the Name of King, but the Thing King (whether in the hands of one or of many) was pluck'd up root and branch, before ever the Ro­mans could attain to a full Establish­ment in their Rights and Freedoms.

What they did to pre∣ſerve thrit Freedom. Now when Rome was thus declared A Free State, the next work was to establish their Freedom in some sure & certain way: & in order to this, the first business they pitch'd upon, was, not onely to ingage the people by an Oath against the return of Tarquin's Family to the Kingdom, but also a­gainst the admission of any such Of­ficer as a King, for ever, because those brave men, who glorified them­selves in laying the foundation of a Commonwealth, well knew, that in [Page 14] a short Revolution, others of a less publick Spirit would arise in their places, and gape again after a King­dom. And therefore it was the special care of those worthy Patriots, to imprint such Principles in mens mindes, as might actuate them with an irreconcilable enmity to the for­mer Power: insomuch, that the ve­ry Name of King became odious to the Roman People; yea, and they were so zealous herein, that in pro­cess of time, when Caesar took occa­sion by Civil Discords to assume the Soveraignty into his single Hands, he durst not entertain it under the fatal Name of King, but clothed himself with the more plausible stile of Empe­ror; which nevertheless could not se­cure him from the fatal stab that was given him by Brutus in revenge, on the behalf of the people. Our Neigh­bours of Holland traced this exam­ple at the heels, when upon recove­ry of their Freedom from Spain, they binde themselves by Oaths in those dayes were not like an old Almanack. an Oath to ab­jure the Government, not onely of King Philip, but of all Kings for ever.

[Page 15]Kings being cashiered out of Rome, then the Right of Liberty, together with the Government, was retained within the hands and bounds of the Patrician or Senatorian Order of Nobility; the people not being ad­mitted into any share, till partly by Mutinies, and partly by Importuni­ties, they compell'd the Senate to grant them an Interest in Offices of State, and in the Legislative Power, which were circumscribed before within the bounds of the Senate. Hence arose those Officers called Tribunes, and those Conventions called Assemblies of the People, which were as Bridles to restrain the Power and Ambition of the Senate, or Nobility. No Laws impoſed, but with the Peoples Conſent in their Aſ∣ſembles. Before the erection of those, whilst all was in the hands of the Senate, the Nation was ac­counted Free, because not subjected to the will of any single person: But afterwards they were Free indeed, when no Laws could be imposed upon them, without a consent first had in the Peoples Assemblies: so that the Government in the end [Page 16] came to be setled in an equal mixture of both Interests, Patrician and Po­pular; under which Form, they at­tained to the height of all their Glo­ry and Greatness. In this Form of Free-State, we now see the Vene­tian, where the Patrician is predo­minant, and the People a little too much kept under. The same Form is imbraced also by our Neighbours the United Provinces; but the best part of their Interest lies deposited in the hands of the people. Rome kept up their Senate as their stand­ing Councel, for the managing of State-affairs, which require Wisdom and Experience: but as for making of Laws, and the main Acts of Su­premacy, they were reserv'd to the Grand Assemblies; so that the Peo­ple gave Rules whereby to govern, and the secrets of Government were intrusted in the hands of the Senate. And this Commonwealth ever thriv'd best, when the People had most Power, and used most Modera­tion: and though they made use of it now and then to fly out into ex­travagant [Page 17] courses, yet they were no lasting fits, like those distempers that brake out through the Ambition of the Senators. Besides, we cannot but take notice, as long as the Popular Interest continued regular, and more predomi­nant than the other, so long the People were secure of their Liberties: which enjoyment, was a good Allay and Re­compence, for many harsh inconvenien­ces that brake out when they were un­ruly and irregular: The Romans loſe their Rights and Liberties. Whereas, when the Senate afterwards worm'd the People out of Power, as that design went on by degrees, so Rome lost her Liberty; the Senate domineering over the People, and particular Factions over the Senate, till those Factions tearing one another to pieces, at length he that was head of the paramount surviving Faction, by name Caesar, took occasion to usurp over all, swallowing up the Rights and Liher­ties of the Romans, in the Gulph of a single Tyranny.

It was a Noble saying, (though Ma­chiavel's). Not he that placeth-a vertuous Government in his own hands, or family; but he that establisheth a free and la [...]ting [Page 18] Form, for the Peoples constant security, is most to be commended. Whosoever hath this oportunity, may improve his acti­ons to a greater height of glory, than ever followed the fame of any ambiti­ous Idol that hath gras [...]'d a Monarchy: for, as ( [...] saith in Plutarch, Even the greatest Kings, or Tyrants, refar inferiour to those that are emi [...]ent in Free-States and Commonwealths: N [...]r were those mighty Monarchs of old, to be compared with Epimano [...]das, Pericles, Themistocles, Mar­cus Carius, Amilc [...]r, Fahius, and Scipio, and other excellent Captains in Free-States, whi [...]h purchas [...]d themselves a fame, in defence of their Liberties. And though the very name of Liberty was for a time grown odious, or ridiculous among us, having been long a stranger in these and other parts; yet in Ancient time, Nations were wont to reckon themselves so much the more Noble, as they were free from the Regal yoke: which was the cause why then there were so many Free-States in all parts of the world.

The Romans flouriſhed moſt when they were a Free-State. Nor is it onely a meer Gallantry of spirit that excites men to the love of [Page 19] Freedom; but experience assures it to be the most commodious and profitable way of Government, conducing every way to the enlarging a people in Wealth and Dominion. It is incredible to be spoken, (saith Salust) how exceedingly the Romane Commonwealth increased in a short time, after they had obtained Liberty. And G [...]icciard [...]ne affirms, That▪ Free-States must needs be more pleasing to God than any other Form, because in them more regard is to be had to the common good, more care for the impartial distribution of Justice, and the mindes of men are more enflamed there­by to the love of Glory and Vertue, and be­come much more zealous in the love of Re­ligion, than in any other Government what­soever.

It is wonderful to consider, how mightily the Athenians were augmented in a few ye [...]rs, both in Wealth and Power, after they had freed themselves from the Tyranny of Pistratus: but the Romans arrived to such a height, as was beyond all imagination after the expul­sion of their Kings, and Kingly Go ern­ment. Nor do these things happen without special reason; it being usual [Page 20] in Free-States to be more tender of the Publick in all their Decrees, than of particular Interests: whereas the case is otherwise in a Monarchy, because in this Form the Princes pleasure weighs down all Considerations of the Common good. And hence it is, that a Nation hath no sooner lost its Liberty, and stoop'd under the yoke of a single Ty­rant, but it immediately loseth its for­mer lustre, the Body fills with ill humors, and may swell in Titles; but cannot thrive either in Power or Riches, ac­cording to that proportion which it formerly enjoyed, because all new Ac­quisitions are appropriated as the Prin­ces peculiar, and in no wise conduce to the ease and benefit of the Publick.

It was the pride of Richard Nevil the great Earl of Warwick, and he reckon­ed it the greatest of earthly glories, to be called, (as indeed he was) a King­maker, in that he made and unmade Kings at his pleasure: for we read in our Chronicles, how that he first pull'd down the House of Lancaster, and brought King Henry the sixth from a Crown to a Prison; setting up the Title [Page 21] of the House of York, in the person of King Edward the fourth: afterwards, he deposed this Edward, drave him out of England, and restored the same Henry to the Crown, whom he had before de­press'd. But the great Query is, Where­fore, and how this was done? One would have thought, there had been no hope of reconciliation betwixt him and the House of Lancaster, having so highly disobliged them, in casting down and imprisoming the person of Henry. But yet it is very observable of this man, Warwick, being on a sudden discontent­ed with the change that he had made, because he missed of those ends which he aimed at, in bringing it about; and perceived other persons (whom he conceived his inferiours, to partake of the interest and favour of Edward; therefore, out of an emulous impatience of Spirit, he presently cast about to undo all that before he had done; he supprest the new Government, to advance the old.

From which piece of Story, we may very well conclude, how unsafe it is in a new alteration, to trust any man with [Page 22] too great a share of Government, or place of Trust; for such persons stand ever ready (like that Warwick) upon any occasion of discontent, or of serving their own Interests, to betray and alter the Government; especially if they have Warwick's main Guard, that is, if they can (as he did) bring the Prince whom they formerly disobliged, to come in up­on their own terms, and upon such con­ditions as may bridle him, and secure the Power so in their own Hands, that whilst he King it onely in Title, them­selves may be Kings de facto, and leave their old Friends in the lurc [...], or yeeld them up at M [...]rcy, (as Warwick did) to gratifie the Tyrant, and their own Ty­rannical ambition.

How much therefore doth it con­cern every Commonwealth, in such a case, to see and beware, that Warwick's Ghost be not conjur'd up again, to act a Part in some new Tragedie!

The Right Constitution of a Commonwealth.

THe Romans having justly and nobly freed them­selvs from the Tyranny of Kings, and being in time brought to under­stand that the interest of Freedom consists in a due and orderly Succession of the Supreme Assemblies▪ they then made it their care, by all good ways and means, to fortifie the Com­monwealth, and establish it in a free en­joyment of that Interest, as the onely bar to the return of Kings, and their main security against the subtil mining of Kingly humours and usurpations. The pu [...]ike Rostra, or Pulpits, sounded out the commendations of Freedom; their [Page 24] Augurs, or Prophets, found Freedom written in the entrails of Beasts, and collected it from the flight of the auspi­cious bird, the Sun-daring Eagle, spread­ing her wings aloft over the Capitol: the common people also, in their com­mon discourses, breathed nothing but Freedom; and used the frequent men­tion of it, as a Charm against the return of Tyranny.

Nor was it without reason, that this brave and active people were so studi­ously devoted to the preservation of their Freedom, when they had once at­tained it, considering how easie and ex­cellent it is above all other Forms of Government, if it be kept within due bounds and order. The people the beſt Keepers of their own Liberties. It is an undeniable Rule, That the People (that is, such as shall be successively chosen to represent the People) are the best Keepers of their own Liberties; and that for these following Reasons.

I Reaſon, becauſe the people never think of uſurping over other mens Rights First, because they never think of u­surping over other mens Rights, but minde which way to preserve their own. Whereas, the case is far otherwise a­mong Kings and Grandees, as all Na­tions [Page 25] in the world have felt to some pur­pose: for they naturally move within the circle of domination, as in their proper Centre; and count it no less Se­curity than Wisdom and Policy, to brave it over the People. Thus Suetonius tells us, how Caesar, Crassus, and ano­ther, Societatem iniere, requid ageretur in Repub. quod displicuisset ulli e tribus: Made a bargain between themselves, that nothing should be done in the Common­wealth that displeased either of them three. Such another Triumvirate of Grandees was that of Augustus, Lepidus, and Antonie, who agreed to share the world between themselves; and traced the same paths as the other did, to the top of worldly Tyranny, over the ruines of their Countries Liberties: they sav'd and destroy'd, depress'd and advanc'd whom they pleased, with a wet Finger. But whilst the Government remained untouch'd in the peoples Hands, every particular man lived safe, (except the Ambitious) and no man could be un­done, unless a true and satisfactory rea­son were rendered to the world for his destruction.

[Page 26] The peoples care is, that publick Au∣thority be conſtituted for publick ends. Secondly, the People are best Keepers of their own Liberty, because it is ever the Peoples care to see, that Authority be so constituted, that it shall be rather a burthen than benefit to those that un­dertake it; and be qualified with such slender advantages of profit or pleasure, that men shall reap little by the enjoy­ment. The happy consequence where­of is this, that none but honest, gene­rous and publick [...]pirits, will then desire to be in Authority, and that onely for the Common good. Hence it was, that in the Infan [...]y of the Romane Liberty, there was no canvasing of Voices; but single and plain-hearted men were cal­led, intreated, and in a manner forced with importunity to the Helm of Go­vernment, in regard of that great trouble and pains that followed the imploy­ment. Thus Cincinnatus was fetch'd out of the Field from his Plow, and placed (much against his will) in the sublime Dignity of Dictator: so the noble Camillus, and Fabius, and Curius, were, with much adoe, drawn from the recreation of Gardening, to the trouble of Governing: and the Consul-yeer [Page 27] being over, they returned with much gladness again to their private employ­ment.

Succeſſion in power is the grand pre∣ventive of Corruption. A third Reason why the People in their Supreme Assemblies successively chosen, are the best Keepers of their Li­berty, is, because as motion in Bodies natural, so succession in civil, is the grand preventive of corruption. The Truth of this will appear very clearly, if we weigh the effects of every stand­ing Authority from first to last in the Romane State: for whilst they were go­verned by a continued Power in one and the same Hands, the People were ever in danger of losing their Liberty: sometimes in danger of being swal­lowed up by Kingly aspirers, witness the design of Maelius, Menlius, and others; sometimes in danger of a surprise by a Grandee Cabinet or Junta, who by con­tracting a particular Interest, distin [...]t from that which they had in common with the people, so ordered the matter in time, that partly by their own strength, and partly by advantage of Power, to gratifie and curb whom they pleased, and to wind in other Councils [Page 28] and parties to their own, they still brought the lesser into such subjection, that in the end they were forced all ei­ther to yeild to the pleasure of the Gran­dees, or be broken by them. By these practices, they oroduced that upstart Ty­ranny of the Decemviri, when ten men made a shift to enslave the Senate, as well as the people. Lastly, by continu­ing power too long in the hands of parti­cular persons, they were swallow'd up by two Triumvirates of Emperors by turns, who never left pecking at one another, till Julius and Augustus, having beaten all Competitors out of the Field, sub­jected all to the will of a single Empe­rour. If this were so among the Ro­mans, how happy then is any Nation, and how much ought they to joy in the Wisdom and Justice of their Trustees, where certain Limits and Bounds are fixed to the Powers in being, by a de­clared succession of the supreme Autho­ty in the hands of the People!

A ſucceſſion of Supreme Power kills that Canker. worm of a Common∣wealth, to wit, Facti∣on. A fourth Reason is, because a succes­sion of supreme Powers doth not onely keep them from corruption, but it kills that grand Cankerworm of a Com­monwealth, [Page 29] to wit, Faction: for, as Faction is an adhering to, and a pro­moting of an Interest, that is distinct from the true and declared Interest of State: so it is a matter of necessity, that those that drive it on, must have time to improve their slights and projects, in disguising their designs, drawing in Instruments and Parties, and in worm­ing out of their opposires. The effecting of all this, requires some length of time: therefore the onely prevention is a due succession and revolution of Authority in the Hands of the Peo­ple.

That this is most true, appears not onely by Reason, but by Example: if we observe the several turns of Faction in the Romane Government. What made their Kings so bold, as to incroach and tyrannize over the People, but the very same course that heightned our Kings heretofore in England, to wit, a continuation of Power in their own Persons and Families? Then, after the Romans became a Commonwealth, was it not for the same Reason, that the Senate fell into such heats and fits a­mong [Page 30] themselves? Did not Appius Claudius and his Junta, by the same means, Lord it over the Senate? Whence was it, that Sylla and Marius caused so many proscriptions, cruelties, and com­bustions in Rome, but by an extraordi­nary continuation of Power in them­selves? How came it to pass likewise, that Julius Caesar aspired, and in the end artained the Empire? and, that the People of Rome quite lost their Liberty, was it not by the same means? For, had not the Sena [...]e and People so long protracted the Power of Pompey and Caesar; had Pompey had less command in Asia, and Caesar less in Gallia, Rome might have stood much longer in the pos­session of her Liberty.

After the death of Caesar, it was pro­bable enough, they [...]ight then have recovered their Liberty, but that they ran again into the same Error, as be­fore: for by a continuation of Power in the hands of Octavius, Lepidus, and Antonie, the Commonwealth came to be rent and divided into three several Factions; two of which being worn out by each other, onely Octavius re­mained; [Page 31] who considering, that the Ti­tle of perpetual Dictator was the ruine of his Father Julius, continued the Government onely for a set-time, and procured it to be setled upon himself but for ten yeers. But what was the effect of this continuation of Power? Even this, That as the former pro­tractings had been the occasions of Faction, so this produced a Tyranny: for, at the end of every ten yeers, he wanted no pretence to renew a lease of the Government; and by this means so played his Cards, that at length he easily and utterly extinguished the small remains of the Roman Freedom.

The Observation then arising from hence, is this, that the onely way for a people to preserve themselves in the enjoyment of their Freedom, and to a­void those fatal inconveniences of Fa­ction and Tyranny, is, to maintain a due and orderly succession of Power and Persons. This was, and is, good Com­monwealths Language; and without this Rule, it is impossible any Nation should long subsist in a State of Free­dom. So that the Wisdom, the Piety, [Page 32] the Justice, and the self-denial of those Governours in Free-States, is worthy of all honour and admiration, who have, or shall at any time as willingly resign their Trusts, as ever they took them up; and have so far denied themselves, as to prefix Limits and Bounds to their own Authority. This was it that made Brutus so famous in the beginning of the Romane Commonwealth. For this also it was, that History hath left so re­verend a remembrance of Scipio, Ca­millus, and Virginus; as did Cato like­wise of Pompey: whilst the ten Gran­dee Usurpers, with Sylla, and Caesar, and the Names of others that practised the contrary, are left as odious upon the Roman Record, as the Name of Richard the third, will be in our modern Chro­nicle, to all Posterity.

A ſucceſſion of Powers & Perſons is the onely remedy a∣gainſt ſelf-ſeeking. A fifth Reason to prove the Life of Liberty lies in succession of Powers and Persons, is, because it is the onely Remedy against Self-seeking, with all the powerful Temptations and Charms of self-interest: for the attaining of particular ends, requires length of time, as well as the creating and promoting [Page 33] of a Faction: both these designs must lie long in fermentation, or else they can never gain the beloved opportunity to bring matters to perfection. The Truth of this appears likewise in the Story of the Romane State: for, as long as all Authority was confined within the Walls of a standing Senate, they be­ing more studious of their own, than the common good, in a short time the Commonwealth was turned altogether into a private; insomuch, that the peo­ple became not onely incapable of any Honour and Authority; but well-nigh reduced to flat beggery. Hence it was, that so many Quarrels and Combusti­ons arose one after another: for, the Great Ones having made use of their time, in drawing all to themselves, the People were forc'd to live upon bor­rowing; and when they could borrow no longer, they fell into a general Muti­ny, and forsook the City: nor could they be pacified till all Accounts were quitted; and then, with much adoe, they were wrought upon with the E­loquence of Menenius Agrippa, with his excellent Fable of a Mutiny in a [Page 34] natural Body, among the Members a­gainst the Belly.

Thus, as the first Insurrection was occasioned by the Usury and Exactions of the Great Ones; who by their long continuance in Power, had drawn all unto themselves: so the second was oc­casioned by the Lordliness of those ten Persons, who being elected to do Ju­stice, according to the Laws, made use of their time, onely to confirm their Power, and Greaten themselves, by replenishing their own Coffers, in­grossing of Offices, and preferring their own Kindred and Alliances: and at length, improved Self-Interest so high, that they domineered, like absolute Tyrants, advancing and depressing whom they pleased, without respect of Merit or Insufficiency, Vice or Vertue; so that having secured all in their own Hands, they over-ruled their Fellow-Senators at pleasure, as well as the People.

Many more instances of After-times might be given; but these are sufficient whereupon to ground this Observation, That as the first Founders of the Roman [Page 35] Liberty did well in driving out their Kings; so on the other side, they did very ill in setling a standing Authority within themselves: for, by this means, lying open to the Temptations of Ho­nour and Profit, (which are Sails too big for any humane bulk) they were immediately swallowed up of Self; and taking their rise from the opportunity of a continued Power, made use of the Publick onely to advance their Private, whereby they put the Com­monwealth into frequent flames of dis­content and sedition; which might all have been prevented, could they have denied themselves at first, and setled the State Free indeed, (as they ought to have done) by placing an orderly succession of supreme Authority in the Hands of the People.

The end of all Govern∣ment, being the good & eaſe of the people, they beſt know where the ſhooe pin∣ches. A sixth Reason, why a Free-State is much more excellent than a Govern­ment by Grandees or Kings; and, that the People are the best Keepers of their own Liberties, is, because, as the end of all Government is (or ought to be) the good and ease of the People, in a secure enjoyment of their Rights, without [Page 36] Pressure and Oppression: so question­less the People, who are most sensible of their own Burthens, being once put into a capacity and Freedom of Acting, are the most likely to provide Remedies for their own Relief; they onely know where the shooe wrings, what Griev­ances are most heavy, and what future Fences they stand in need of, to shelter them from the injurious Assaults of those Powers that are above them: and therefore it is but Reason, they should see that none be interested in the su­preme Authority, but Persons of their own election, and such as must in a short time return again into the same condition with themselves, to reap the same Benefit or Burthen, by the Laws enacted, that befalls the rest of the People. Then the issue of such a Con­stitution must needs be this, That no Load shall be laid upon any, but what is common to all, and that always by common consent; not to serve the Lusts of any, but onely to supply the Necessities of their Country.

But when it happens, that a supreme Power long continues in the Hands of [Page 37] any Person or Persons; they, by great­ness of place, being seated above the middle Region of the People, sit secure from all windes and weathers, and from those storms of violence that nip and terrifie the inferiour part of the World: whereas, if by a successive Re­volution of Authority, they came to be degraded of their Earthly Godheads, and return into the same condition with other Mortals, they must needs be the more sensible and tender of what shall be laid upon them. The strongest Obligation that can be laid upon any Man in publick Matters, is, To see that he ingage in nothing, but what must ei­ther offensively or beneficially reflect upon himself: for as, if any be never so good a Patriot, yet if his power be prolonged, he will finde it hard to keep Self from creeping in upon him, and prompting him to some Extravagancies for his own private Benefit; so, on the other side, if he be shortly to return to a condition common with the rest of his Brethren, self-Interest bindes him to do nothing but what is Just and Equal; he himself being to reap the [Page 38] good or evil of what is done, as well as the meanest of the people.

This without controversie must needs be the most Noble, the most Just, and the most excellent way of Government in Free-States; without which, it is ob­vious to common sense, no Nation, can long continue in a state of Freedom: as appears likewise by Example out of the Romane Story. For what more noble Patriots were there ever in the World, than the Romane Senators were, whilst they were kept under by their Kings, and felt the same Burthens of their fury, as did the rest of the peo­ple? but afterwards being freed from the Kingly yoke, and having secured all power within the hands of themselves and their posterity, they at length fell into the same Absurdities that had been before committed by their Kings; so that this new yoke became more into­lerable than the former. Nor could the people finde any Remedy, untill they procured that necessary Office of the Tribunes; who being invested with a temporary Authority by the peoples Election, remained the more sensible [Page 39] of their condition, and were as Mode­rators between the Power of the Great Ones, and the Rights of the People.

What more excellent Patriot could there be than Manlius, till he became corrupted by Time and Power? Who more Noble, and Courteous, and Well­affected to the common good, than was Appius Claudius at first? but afterwards, having obtained a Continuation of the Government in his own hands, he soon lost his primitive Innocency and Inte­grity, and devoted himself to all the Practices of an Absolute Tyrant. Many others might be reckon'd up. And there­fore, hence it was, That when the Senate (for some Reasons) though to con­tinue Lucius Quintius in the Consulship longer than the usual time; that gallant Man utterly refused it, and chose rather to deny himself, than that a Precedent so prejudicial to the Romane Freedom should be made for his sake, by a Pre­rogative of Authority in his hands, be­yond the ordinary Custome.

In this Go∣vernment the door of Dignity ſtands open to all that aſcend thi∣ther by the ſteps of Worth and Vertue. A seventh Reason why a people qua­lified with a due and orderly succession of their Supreme Assemblies, are the [Page 40] best keepers of their own Liberties, is, Because, as in other Forms, those per­sons onely have access to Government, who are apt to serve the lust and will of the Prince, or else are parties or com­pliers with some powerful Faction: so in this Form of Government by the People, the door of Dignity stands o­pen to all (without exception) that ascend thither by the steps of Worth and Vertue: the consideration whereof hath this noble effect in Free-States, That it edges mens spirits with an active emulation, and raiseth them to a lofty pitch of designe and action.

The truth of this is very observable in the Romane State: for, during the Vassalage of that People under Kings, we read not of any notable Exploits, but finde them confined within a nar­row compass, oppress'd at home, and ever and anon ready to be swallowed up by their enemies. After this Govern­ment of Kings was abolished, you know that of Grandees in a standing Senate was next erected; under which Form, they made shift to enlarge their bounds a little: but the most they could then do, [Page 41] was only to secure themselves from the attempts of the banished Tarquins, and those petty neighbours that envied the small increase of their Dominion. But at length, when the State was made free indeed, and the People admitted into a share and interest in the Government, as well as the Great Ones; then it was, and never till then, that their thoughts and power began to exceed the bounds of Italy, and aspire towards that prodi­gious Empire. For, while the road of Preferment lay plain to every man, no publike work was done, nor any Con­quest made; but every man thought he did and conquered all for himself, as long as he remained valiant and vertu­ous: it was not Alliance, nor Friend­ship, nor Faction, nor Riches, that could advance men; but Knowledge, Valour, and vertuous Poverty, was preferred a­bove them all.

For the confirmation whereof, we finde in the same Story, how that many of their brave Patriots and Conquerors were men of the meanest Fortune, and of so rare a temper of spirit, that they little cared to improve them, or enrich [Page 42] themselves by their publike employ­ment: so that when they died, they were fain to be buried at the publike charge. We finde Cincinnatus, a man of mean fortune, fetch'd from the Plough, to the dignity of a Dictator: for he had no more than four acres of land, which he tilled with his own hands. Yet so it happened, that when the Roman Con­ful with his whole Army was in great peril, being circumvented and straitned by the Equuns, and the City of Rome it self in a trembling condition; then, with one consent, they pitch'd upon Cincinnatus, as the fittest man for their deliverance: and he behaved himself so well, with so much magnanimity, in­tegrity, and wisdom, that he relieved the Consul, routed and utterly subdued the Enemy, and gave as it were a new life to his Countries Liberties: which work being over, he with all willingness quitted his Authority, and returned to the condition of a painful private life.

This Example might seem strange, but that we know it was ordinary in that State, till it grew corrupt again: for, we read also, how Lucius Tarquin, (not of [Page 43] the Tyrants family) a man of mean for­tune, yet of great worth, was chosen General of the Horse, and drawn to it out of the Country, in which place he surpassed all the Romane youth for gal­lant behaviour. Such another plain Country-fellow was Attilius Regulus, the scourge of Carthage in his time; of whom many eminent points of Bravery were recorded: as were also most of those Heroick spirits that succeeded, down to the times of Lucius Paulus E­milius, by whose Conquests, the first charms and inchantments of Luxury were brought out of Asia to Rome, and there they soon swallowed up the remainders of primitive integrity and simplicity. And yet it is very observa­ble also, that so much of the ancient severity was remaining still even in the time of this Paulus, the famous Gene­ral, that a Silver dish, that was part of the Spoil, being given to a son-in-law of his, who had fought stoutly in that war, it was thought a great reward; and observed by the Historian, to be the first piece of plate that ever was seen in the Family.

[Page 44]This Observation then arises from this Discourse, That as Rome never thrived till it was setled in a Freedom of the People; so that Freedom was preserv­ed, and that Interest best advanced, when all Places of Honour and Trust were exposed to men of Merit, with­out distinction; which happiness could never be obtained, until the people were instated in a capacity of preferring whom they thought worthy, by a Free­dom of electing men successively into their Supreme Offices and Assemblies. So long as this Custome continued, and Merit took place, the people made shift to keep and encrease their Liberties: but when it lay neglected, and the stream of Preferment began to run a­long with the favour and pleasure of particular powerful men, then Vice and Compliance making way for Ad­vancement, the people could keep their Liberties no longer; but both their Liberties and themselves were made the price of every man's Ambition and Luxury.

The People are the beſt Keepers of their Liber∣ty, becauſe they only are concerned in the point of Liberty. The eighth Reason, why the People in their Assemblies are the best Keepers [Page 45] of their Liberty, is, because it is they onely that are concerned in the point of Liberty: for, whereas in other Forms the main Interest and Concernment both of Kings and Grandees, lies ei­ther in keeping the People in utter ig­norance what Liberty is, or else in al­lowing and pleasing them onely with the name and shadow of Liberty in stead of the substance: so in Free-States the People being sensible of their past condition in former times, under the Power of Great Ones, and comparing it with the possibilities and enjoyments of the present, become immediately instructed, that their main Interest and Concernment consists in Liberty; and are taught by common sense, that the onely way to secure it from the reach of Great Ones, is, to place it in the Peoples Hands, [...]adorned with all the Prerogatives and Rights of Supremacy. The Truth of it is, the Interest of Free­dom is a Virgin that every one seeks to deflower; and like a Virgin, it must be kept from any other Form, or else (so great is the Lust of mankinde after do­minion) there follows a rape upon the [Page 46] first opportunity. This being con­sidered, it-will easily be granted, That Liberty must needs lie more secure in the Peoples than in any others hands, because they are most concerned in it: and the careful eyeing of this Con­cernment, is that which makes them both jealous and zealous; so that no­thing will satisfie, but the keeping of a constant Guard against the Attempts and Inchroachments of any powerful or crafty Underminers.

Hence it is, that the People having once tasted the Sweets of Freedom, are so extreamly affected with it, that if they discover, or do but suspect the least Design to incroach upon it, they count it a Crime never to be forgiven for any consideration whatsoever. Thus it was in the Romane State, where one gave up his Children, another his Brother to death, to revenge an Attempt against common Liberty: di­vers also sacrificed their Lives, to pre­serve it; and some their best Friends, to vindicate it, upon bare suspicion; as in the Cases of Maelius, and Manli­us, and others, after manifest viola­tion [Page 47] as in the Case of Caesar.

Nor was it thus onely in Rome; but we finde also as notable instances of re­venge in the Free-People of Greece, upon the same occasion. But the most notable of all, is that which happened in the Island of Corcyra, during the war of Peloponnesus: where the People having been rook'd of Liberty by the slights and power of the Grandees, and after­wards by the assistance of the Free-states of Athens recovering it again, took occa­sion thereupon to clap up all the Gran­dees, & chop'd off ten of their Heads at one time, in part of satisfaction for the Injury: but yet this would not serve the turn; for, some delay being made in executing of the rest, the People grew so inraged, that they ran, and pull'd down the very Walls, and buried them in the ruines and rubbish of the Pri­son.

We see it also in the Free-State of Florence, where Cosmus the first Founder of the Tuscan-Tyranny, having made shipwrack of their Liberty, and seized all into his own Hands; though he en­slaved their Bodies, yet he could not [Page 48] subdue their Hearts, nor wear their past Liberty our of Memory; for upon the first oportunity, they sought re­venge, and a recovery; forcing him to fly for the safety of his Life: and though afterwards he made way for his Return and Re-establishment by Treachery, yet now after so long a time, the old Freedom is fresh in memory, and would shew it self again upon a favourable oc­casion.

But of all Modern Instances, the most strange is that of the Land of Hol­stein; which being deprived of Li­berty, and about seventy yeers since made a Dutchy, and an Appendix to the Crown of Denmark; though the Inhabitants be but a Boorish, poor, silly Generation, yet still they retain a sense of Indignation at the loss of their Liberty; and being given to drink, the usual Complement in the midst of their Cups, is this, Here is a health to the re­membrance of our Liberty.

Thus you see what an impression the love of Freedom makes in the mindes of the people: so that it will be easily concluded, They must be the best [Page 49] Keepers of their own Liberties; being more tender and more concerned in their security, than any powerful pre­tenders whatsoever.

The Go∣vernment of a Free State is leſs Lu∣xurious, than Kings or Grandees The ninth Reason to justifie a Free-State, is, because in Free-States the Peo­ple are less Luxurious, than Kings or Grandees use to be. Now, this is most certain, that where Luxury takes place, there is as natural a tendency to Tyranny, as there is from the Cause to the Effect: for, you know the Nature of Luxury lies altogether in Excess. It is a Universal Depravation of Manners, without Reason, without Moderation; it is the Canine appetite of a corrupt Will and Phant'sie, which nothing can satisfie; but in every Action, in every Imagination, it flies beyond the Bounds of Honesty, Just, and Good, into all Extremity: so that it will easi­ly be granted, That Form of Govern­ment must needs be the most excel­lent, and the Peoples Liberty most se­cured, where Governours are least ex­posed to the baits and snares of Luxury.

The evidence of this may be made out, not onely by Reason, but by Ex­amples [Page 50] old and new. And first, by Rea­son, it is evident, That the People must needs be less luxurious than Kings or the Great Ones, because they are bounded within a more lowly pitch of Desire and Imagination: give them but panem & tircenses; Bread, Sport and Ease, and they are abundantly satisfied. Besides, the People have less means and opportunities for Luxury, than those pompous standing powers, whether in the hands of one or many: so that were they never so much inclined to Vice or Vanity, yet they are not able to run on to the same measure of Excess and Riot. Secondly, as it appears they are less Luxurious; so, for this Cause al­so, it is cleer, They (that is, their suc­cessive Representatives) must be the best Governours; not onely, because the current of succession keeps them the less corrupt and presumptious; but also, because, being the more free from luxuri­ous Courses, they are likewise free from those oppressive and injurious Practices, which Kings and Grandees are most commonly led and forced unto, to hold up the port and splendor of their Ty­ranny [Page 51] and to satisfie those natural appe­tites of Covetousness, Pride, Ambition and Ostentation, which are the perpe­tual Attendants of Great Ones, and Lu­xury. Thus much for Reason.

Now, for Example, we might pro­duce a Cloud of Instances, to shew▪ That Free-States, or the People duely qualified with the Supreme Authority, are less devoted to Luxury, than the Grandee or Kingly Powers: but we shall give you onely a few,

The first that comes in our way is the State of Athens, which, whilst it re­mained free in the Peoples Hands, was adorned with such Governours as gave themselves up to a serious, abstemious, severe course of Life; so that whilst Temperance and Liberty walked hand in hand, they improved the points of Valour and Prudence so high, that in a short time they became the onely Ar­bitrators of all Affairs in Greece. But being at the height, then (after the common fate of all worldly Powers) they began to decline; for, (contrary to the Rules of a Free-State) permitting some men to greaten themselves, by [Page 52] continuing long in Power and Autho­rity, they soon lost their pure Principles of Severity and Libertie: for, up­started those thirty Grandees, (com­monly called the Tyrants) who having usurped a standing Authority unto themselves, presently quitted the old Discipline and Freedom, gave up them­selves first to Charms of Luxury, and afterwards to all the practices of an ab­solute Tyranny. Such also was the condition of that State, when at ano­ther time (as in the dayes of Pistratus) it was usurp'd in the hands of a single Tyrant.

From Athens let us pass to Rome, where we finde it in the dayes of Tar­quin, dissolved into Debauchery. Upon the change of Government, their man­ners were somewhat mended, as were the Governours in the Senate: but that being a standing Power, soon grew corrupt; and first let in Luxury, then Tyranny, till the people being interest­ed in the Government, established a good Discipline and Freedom both to­gether; which was upheld with all Se­verity, till the ten Grandees came in [Page 53] play after; whose Deposition, Liberty, and Sobriety began to breath again, till the dayes of Sylla, Marius, and other Grandees that followed down to Caesar, in whose time Luxury and Tyranny grew to such a height, that unless it were in the Life and Conversation of Cato, there was not so much as one spark, that could be raked out of the ashes, of the old Roman Discipline and Freedom; so that of all the World, onely Cato remained as a Monument of that Temperance, Virtue and Freedom, which flourished under the Government of the People.

Omitting many other Examples, our Conclusion upon these Particulars shall be this, That since the Grandee or Kingly Powers, are ever more luxuri­ous, than the popular are, or can be: and since Luxury ever brings on Tyran­ny, as the onely bane of Liberty; cer­tainly the Rights and Priviledges of the People, placed and provided for, in a due and orderly succession of their Su­preme Assemblies, must needs remain more secure in their own Hands, than in any others whatsoever.

[Page 54] In a Free-State, the People are ever more magnanim∣ous and va∣liant. A tenth Reason, to prove the excel­lency of a Free-State or Government by the People, above any other Form of Government, is, because under this Government, the People are ever in­dued with a more magnanimous, active, and noble temper of Spirit, than under the Grandeur of any standing power whatsoever. And this arises from that apprehension which every particular Man hath of his own immediate share in the publick Interest, as well as of that security which [...]he possesses in the enjoyment of his private Fortune, free from the reach of any Arbitrary Power. Hence it is, that whensoever any good success or happiness betides the Pub­lick, every one counts i [...] his own: if the Commonwealth conquer, thrive in Dominion, Wealth or Honour, he reckons all done for himself; if he sees Distributions of Honour, high Offices, or great Rewards, to Valiant, Vertuous, or Learned Persons, he esteems them as his own, as long as he hath a door left open to succeed in the same Digni­ties and Enjoyments, if he can at­tain unto the same measure of Desert. [Page 55] This it is which makes men aspire unto great Actions, when the Reward de­pends not upon the Will and Pleasure of particular Persons, as it doth under all standing Powers; but is conferred upon Men (without any consideration of Birth or Fortune) according to merit, as it ever is, and ought to be in Free-States, that are rightly constitu­ted.

The Truth of this will appear much more evident, if ye list a little to take a view of the condition of Peo­ple, under various Forms of Govern­ment: for, the Romanes of old, while under Kings, (as you heard before) re­mained a very inconsiderable People, ei­ther in Dominion or Reputation; and could never inlarge their Command very far beyond the Walls of their City. Af­terwards, being reduced unto that stand­ing power of the Senate, they began to thrive a little better, &, for a little time: yet all they could do, was only to struggle that for a subsistence among bad Neigh­bours. But at length, when the People began to know, claim, and pos­sess their Liberties in being govern'd [Page 56] by a sucession of their Supreme Offi­cers and Assemblies; then it was, and never till then, that they laid the Foun­dation, and built the Structure of that wondrous Empire that overshadowed the whole World. And truely the founding of it must needs be more wonderful, and a great Argument of an extraordinary Courage and Magnani­mity, wherewith the People was in­dued in Recovery of Liberty; because their first Conquests were laid in the ruine of mighty Nations, and such as were every jot as free as themselves: which made the difficulties-so much the more, by how much the more free (and consequently, the more couragious) they were, against whom they made opposition: for as in those dayes the World abounded with Free-States, more than any other Form, as all o­ver Italy, Gallia, Spain, and Africa, &c. so specially in Italy, where the Tuscans, the Samnites, and other Emulators and Competitors of the Romane Freedom, approved themselves magnanimous Defenders of their Liberty against Rome, that they endured Wars so ma­ny [Page 57] yeers with utmost extremity, before ever they could brought to bow under the Romane Yoke. This magnanimous State of Freedom, was the cause also why Charthage was enabled so long, not only to oppose, but often to hazard the Romane Fortune, and usurp the Laurel. It brought Hannibal within view, and the Gauls within the Walls of the City, to a besieging of the Ca­pitol; to shew, that their Freedom had given them the courage to rob her of her Maiden-head, who afterwards be­came Mistriss of the whole World. But what serves all this for, but onely to shew, That as nothing but a State of Freedom could have enabled those Na­tions with a Courage sufficient so long to withstand the Romane Power: so Rome her self also was beholden to this State of Freedom, for those Sons of Courage which brought the Necks of her Sister-States and Nations under her Girdle? And it is observable also in after-times, when Tyranny took place against Liberty, the Romans soon lost their ancient Courage and Magnanimi­ty; first under usurping Dictators, then [Page 58] under Emperors, and in the end, the Empire it self.

Now, as on the one side, we feel a loss of Courage and Magnanimity, fol­low the loss of Freedom: so, on the o­ther side, the People ever grow mag­nanimous and couragious upon a Reco­very; witness at present, the valiant Swisses, the Hollanders, and not long since, our own Nation, when declared a Free-State, and a Re-establishment of our Freedom in the hands of the Peo­ple procured, (though not secured) what noble Designs were undertaken and prosecuted with success? The Consideration whereof, must needs make highly for the Honour of all Go­vernours in Free-States, who have been, or shall be instrumental in re­deeming and setting any People in a fulness of Freedom, that is, in a due and orderly succession of their supreme As­semblies.

No deter∣minations are carried but by con∣ſent of the People. The eleventh Reason is, because in this Form no Determinations being carried, but by consent of the People; therefore they must needs remain se­cure out of the reach of Tyranny, and [Page 59] free from the Arbitrary Disposition of any commanding Power. In this Case, as the People know what Laws they are to obey, and what Penalties they are to undergo, in case of Transgression; so having their share and interest in the making of Laws, with the Penalties annexed, they become the more inex­cusable if they offend, and the more willingly submit unto punishment when they suffer for any offence. Now the case is usually far otherwise, under all standing Powers: for, when Govern­ment is managed in the hands of a par­ticular Person, or continued in the hands of a certain number of Great Men, the People then have no Laws but what Kings and Great Men please to give: Not do they know how to walk by those Laws, or how to under­stand them, because the sense is often­times left at uncertainty; and it is reckoned a great Mystery of State in those Forms of Government, That no Laws shall be of any sense or sorce, but as the Great Ones please to expound them: so as by this means, the Peo­ple many times are left as it were with­out [Page 60] Law, because they bear no other construction and meaning, but what sutes with particular mens Interests and Phant'sies; not with Right Reason, or the Publike Liberty.

For the proof of this under Kingly Government, we might run all the world over; but our own Nation affords Instances enough in the Practices of all our Kings: yet this Evil never came to such a height, as it did in the Raign of Henry the seventh, who by usurping a Prerogative of expounding the Laws after his own pleasure, made them ra­ther Snares, than Instruments of Relief, (like a grand Catch-pole) to pill, poll, and geld the Purses of the People; as his Son Harry did after him, to deprive many Gallant Men both of their Lives and Fortunes. For, the Judges being reputed the Oracles of the Law, and the power of creating Judges being u­surp'd by Kings, they had a care ever to create such, as would make the Laws speak in Favour of them, upon any oc­casion. The Truth whereof hath a­bundantly appeared in the dayes of the late King, and his Father James, whose [Page 61] usual Language was this: As long as I have power of making what Judges and Bishops I please, I am sure to have no Law nor Gospel but what shall please me.

This very providing for this Incon­venience, was the great Commendation of Lycurgus his Institution in Sparta; who, though he cut out the Lacedemo­nian Commonwealth after the Grandee fashion, confirming the Supremacy with­in the Walls of the Senate, (for their King was but a Cypher) yet he so or­dered the matter, that he took away the Grandeur; that as their King was of little more value than any one of the Senators; so the Senate was restrained by Laws, walking in the same even pace of subjection with the People; having very few Offices of Dignity or Profit allowed, which might make them swell with State and Ambition; but were pre­scribed also the same Rules of Frugality, Plainness, and Moderation, as were the Common People: by which means immoderate lusts and desires being pre­vented in the Great Ones, they were the less inclined to Pride and Oppres­sion; and no great profit or pleasure [Page 62] being to be gotten by Authority, very few desired it; and such as were in it, sate free from Envie, by which means they avoided that odium and emulation which uses to rage betwixt the Great Ones and the People in that Form of Government.

But now the case is far otherwise in the Commonwealth of Venice, where the People being excluded from all in­terest in Government, the power of making and executing of Laws, and bearing of Offices, with all other Im­munities, lies onely in the hands of a standing Senate, and their Kindred, which they call the Patrocian, or Noble Order. Their Duke, or Prince, is in­deed restrained, and made just such ano­ther Officer as were the Lacedemonian Kings; differing from the rest of the Senate, onely in a Corner of his Cap, besides a little outward Ceremony and Splendor: but the Senators them­selves have Liberty at random, Arbitra­rily to ramble, and do what they please with the people: who excepting the City it self, are so extreamly oppress'd in all their Territories, living by no [Page 63] Law, but the Arbitrary Dictates of the Senate, that it seems rather a Junta, than a Commonwealth; and the Sub­jects take so little content in it, that seeing more to be enjoyed under the Turk, they that are his Borderers take all opportunities to revolt, and submit rather to the mercy of a Pagan-Tyranny. Which disposition if you consider, together with the little Cou­rage in their Subjects, by reason they press them so hard; and how that they are forced, for this cause, to relie upon Forrain Mercenaries in all warlike Ex­peditions, you might wonder how this State hath held up so long; but that we know the Interest of Christendom, being concerned in her Security, she hath been chiefly supported by the Sup­plies and Arms of others.

Therefore our Conclusion shall be this, That since Kings, and all stand­ing Powers, are so inclinable to act ac­cording to their own Wills and in In­terests, in making, expounding, and ex­ecuting of Laws to the prejudice of the Peoples Liberty and Security: and see­ing the onely way to prevent Arbitra­riness [Page 64] is, That no Laws or Domina­tions whatsoever should be made, but by the Peoples Consent and Election: therefore it must of necessity be granted, that the People are the best Keepers of their own Liberties, being setled in a due and orderly succession of their su­preme Assemblies.

A Free-State is moſt ſutable to the Na∣ture and Reaſon of mankinde. A twelfth Reason is, because this Form is most sutable to the Nature and Reason of Mankinde: for, as Cicero saith, Man is a noble Creature, born with Affections to rule, rather than obey; there being in every man a natural appetite or desire of Principality. And therefore the Reason why one man is content to submit to the Government of ano­ther, is, not because he conceives him­self to have less right than another to govern; but either because he findes himself less able, or else because he judgeth it will be more convenient for himself, and that community whereof he is a Member, if he submits unto a­nother's Government. Nemini purere vult animús a naturâ bene informatus, nisi, &c. saith the same Cicero: that is to say, in honest English, A minde well in­structed [Page 65] by the light of Nature, will pay o­bedience unto none, but such as command, direct, or govern, for its good and benefit. From both which passages and expres­sions of that Oracle of Humane wis­dom, these three inferences do natural­ly arise: First, that by the light of Na­ture people are taught to be their own Carvers and Contrivers, in the framing of that Government under which they mean to live. Secondly, that none are to preside in Government, or sit at the Helm, but such as shall be judged fit, and chosen by the People. Thirdly, that the People are the onely proper Judges of the convenience or inconvenience of a Government when it is erected, and of the behaviour of Governours after they are chosen: which three Deductions appear to be no more, but an Explanation of this most excellent Maxime, That the Original and Foun­tain of all just Power and Government is in the People.

This being so, that a Free-State-Go­vernment by the People, that is, by their successive Representatives, or supreme Assemblies, duely chosen, is most na­tural [Page 66] and onely sutable to the Reason of mankinde: then it follows, that the other forms, whether it be of a standing Power in the Hands of a particular per­son, as a King; or of a set number of Great Ones, as in a Senate, are besides the Dictates of Nature, being meer ar­tificial devices of Great Men, squared out onely to serve the Ends and In­terests of Avarice, Pride and Ambition of a few, to a vassalizing of the Com­munity. The Truth whereof appears so much the more, if we consider, That a Consent and free Election of the Peo­ple, which is the most natural Way and Form of governing, hath no real effect in the other Forms; but is either sup­planted by Craft and Custome, or swal­lowed up by a pernicious pretence of Right (in one or many) to govern, onely by vertue of an Hereditary succession. Now certainly, were there no other Argument to prove the excellency of Government by the People, &c. beyond the other Forms; yet this one might suffice, That in the Peoples Form, men have Liberty to make use of that Rea­son and Understanding God hath given [Page 67] them, in chusing of Governours, and providing for their own safety in Go­vernment: but in the other Forms of a standing Power, all Authority being en­tailed to certain Persons and Families, in a course of inheritance, men are al­wayes deprived of the use of their Rea­son about choice of Governours, and forced to receive them blindely, and at all adventure: which course being so destructive to the Reason, common In­terest, and Majesty of that Noble Crea­ture, called Man, that he should not in a matter of so high consequence as Go­vernment, (wherein the good and safe­ty of all is concerned) have a Freedom of Choice and Judgement, must needs be the most irrational and brutish Prin­ciple in the World, and fit onely to be hissed out of the World, together with all Forms of standing Power (whether in Kings, or others) which have served for no other end, but transform Men into Beasts, and mortified man­kinde with misery through all Gene­rations.

The Truth of this is evident all the World over; first, by sad Examples of [Page 68] Monarchy: for, the Kingly form having been retained in a course of Inheritance, men being forced to take what comes next for a Governour, whether it be Male or Female, a wise Man or a Fool, Good or Bad; so that the major part of Hereditary Princes, have been Ty­rannous and Wicked by Nature, or made so by Education and Opportuni­ty: the People have been for the most part banded to and fro, with their Lives and Fortunes, at the Will and Pleasure of some one single unworthy Fellow, who usually assumes the greater confidence in his unrighteous dealing, because he knows the People are tied in that Form to him and his, though he practice all the Injustice in the World. This was it that brought on Tyranny in Rome, first under their Kings, after­wards under Emperors: for it is to be observed out of the Story, that all those Emperors which ruled by right of In­heritance, proved most of them no bet­ter than savage Beasts, and all of them Wicked except Titus. 'Tis true indeed, That a Nation may have some respite and recruit now and then, by the Ver­tue [Page 69] and Valour of a single Prince; yet this is very rare; and when it doth hap­pen, it usually lasts no longer than for his Life, because his Son or Successor (for the most part) proves more weak or vitious, than himself was Virtuous, as you may see in the several Lists of Kings throughout Great Britain, France, Spain, and all the World. But this is not all the Inconvenience, that Heredi­tary Princes have been and are for the most part Wicked in their own Per­sons: for, as great Inconveniences hap­pen by their being litigious in their Ti­tles; witness the bloody disputes be­tween the Princes of the Blood in France, as also in England, between the two Houses of Yorke and Lancaster; to which many more might be reckoned out of all other Kingdoms; which mi­series, the people might have avoided, had they not been tied to one particu­lar Line of Succession. Therefore if any Kingly Form be tolerable, it must be that which is by Election, chosen by the Peoples Representatives, and made an Officer of Trust by them, to whom they are to be accountable. And [Page 70] herein, as Kings are onely tolerable upon this account, as Elective; so these Elective Kings are as intolerable upon another account, because their present Greatness gives them opportu­nity ever to practise such flights, that in a short time, the Government that they received onely for their own Lives, will become entailed upon their Fami­lies, whereby the Peoples Election will be made of no effect further, than for Fashion, to mock the poor People, and adorn the Triumphs of an aspiring Tyranny; as it hath been seen in the Elective Kingdoms of Bohemia, Poland, Hungaria, and Sweden; where the Forms of Election were, and are still retained; but the Power swallowed up, and the Kingdoms made Heredi­tary; not onely in Sweden, by the Ar­tifice of Gustavus Ericus; but also in Poland, and the Empire, where the peoples right of election was soon eaten out by the cunning of the two Families of Casimira and Austria.

Let this serve to manifest, that a Go­vernment by a free Election and Con­sent of the People, setled in a due and [Page 71] orderly succession of their supreme As­semblies, is more consonant to the light of Nature and Reason, and consequent­ly much more excellent than any Here­ditary standing Power whatsoever. To take off all mis-constructions; when we mention the People, observe all along, that we do not mean the confused promis­cuous Body of the People, nor any part of the people who have forfeited their Rights by Delinquency, Neutrality, or Apostacy, &c. in relation to the divided state of any Nation; for they are not to be reckon'd within the Lists of the People.

In this Go∣vernment there are fewer opor∣tunities of Oppreſſion and Tyran∣ny, then un∣der any o∣ther Form. The thirteenth Reason, to prove the excellency of a Free-State above any other Form, is, because in Free-States there are fewer opportunities of Op­pression and Tyranny, than in the o­ther Forms. And this appears, in that it is ever the care of Free-Common­wealths, for the most part, to preserve, not an Equality, (which were irrational and odious) but an Equability of Condi­tion among all the Members; so that no particular Man or Men shall be permitted to grow over-great in Power; nor any Rank of Men be al­lowed [Page 72] above the ordinary Standard, to assume unto themselves the State and Title of Nobility.

The Observation of the former, se­tures the Peoples Liberty from the reach of their own Officers, such as being entrusted with the Affairs of high Trust and Imployment, either in Campe and Council, might perhaps take occasion thereby to aspire beyond Reason, if not restrained and pre­vented.

The Observation of the later, se­cures the People from the pressures and Ambition of such perty Tyrants, as would usurp and claim a Prerogative, Power, and Greatness above others, by Birth and Inheritance. These are a sort of Men not to be endured in any well-ordered Commonwealth; for they alwayes bear a Natural and Implaca­ble Hate towards the People, making it their Interest to deprive them of their Liberty; so that if at any time it happen, that any great Man or Men whatsoever, arrive to so much Power and Confidence, as to think of usurping, or to be in a Condition [Page 73] to be tempted thereunto; these are the first that will set them on, mingle In­terests with them, and become the prime Instruments in heaving them up into the Seat of Tyranny.

For the clearing of these Truths; and first, to manifest the Inconvenience of permitting any persons to be over­great in any State; and that Free-States that have not avoided it, have soon lost their Liberty, we shall pro­duce a File of Examples. In Greece we finde, that the Free-State of Athens lost its Liberty upon that account once, when they suffered certain of the Senators to over-top the rest in power; which occasioned that multi­plied Tyranny, made famous by the name of the thirty Tyrants: at another time, when by the same Error they were constrained, through the power of Pistr [...]tus, to stoop unto his single Tyranny.

Upon this score also, the people of Syracusa had the same misfortune un­der the Tyrant Hiero, as had they of Sicily under Dyonlsius and Agatho­cles.

[Page 74]In Rome also the case is the same too: for during the time that Liberty was included within the Senate, they gave both Malius & Manlius an opportunity to aspire, by permitting them a growth of too much Greatness: but by good fortune escaping their clutches, they afterwards fell as foolishly into the hands of ten of their Fellow-Senators, called the De­cemviri, in giving them so much power as tempted them unto Tyranny. Af­terwards, when the people scuffled, and made a shift to recover their Liberty out of the hands of the Senate, they committed the same Error too, by per­mitting of their Servants to grow over­great; such as Sylla, who by power ty­rannized and made himself Dictator for five yeers, as Caesar afterwards secled the Dictatorship upon himself for ever: and after Caesar's death, they might have recovered their Liberty again, if they had taken care (as they might easi­ly have done) to prevent the growing Greatness of Augustus, who gaining power first, by the courtesie & good will of the Senate and People, made use of it to establish himself in a Tyranny, which [Page 75] could never after be extinguished, but in the ruine of the Roman Empire it self.

Thus also the Free-State of Florence foolishly ruined it self by the greatning of Cosmus; first, permitting him to ingross the Power, which gave him opportunity to be a tyrant; & then as foolishly forcing him to declare himself a Tyrant, by an unseasonable demand of the power back out of his hands. Many more instances might be fetch'd out of Milan, Switzer­land, and other places: but we have one neerer home, and of a later date, in Holland; whereby, permitting the Fa­mily of Orange to greaten a little more than beseemed a Member of a Free-State, they were insensibly reduced to the last cast, to run the hazzard of the loss of their Liberty.

Therefore one prime Principle of State, is, To keep any man, though he have deserved never so well by good success or service, from being too great or popular: it is a notable means (and so esteemed by all Free-States) to keep and preserve a Commonwealth from the Rapes of Usurpation.

In this form all Powers are account∣able for miſ∣demeanours in Govern∣ment. A fourteenth Reason, (and though [Page 76] the last, yet not the least) to prove a Free-State or Government by the Peo­ple, setled in a due and orderly succes­sion of their supreme Assemblies, is much more excellent than any other Form, is, because in this Form, all Powers are accountable for misde­meanors in Government, in regard of the nimble Returns and Periods of the Peoples Election: by which means, he that ere-while was a Governour, being reduced to the condition of a Subject, lies open to the force of the Laws, and may with ease be brought to punish­ment for his offence; so that after the observation of such a course, others which succeed, will become the less daring to offend, or to abuse their Trust in Authority, to an oppression of the People. Such a course as this, cuts the very throat of all Tyranny; and doth not onely root it up when at full growth, but crusheth the Cockatrice in the Egg, destroys it in the Seed, in the principal, and in the very possibli­ties of its being for ever after. And as the safety of the People, is the Sove­raign and Supreme Law; so an esta­blishment [Page 77] of this Nature, is an impreg­nable Bulwark of the Peoples safety, because without it, no certain Benefit can be obtained by the ordinary Laws; which if they should be dispensed by uncontrolable, unaccountable Persons in Power, shall never be interpreted, but in their own sense; nor executed, but after their own Wills and Plea­sure.

Now, this is most certain, That as in the Government of the People, the suc­cessive Revolution of Authority by their consent, hath ever been the onely Bank against Inundations of Arbitrary Power and Tyranny; so on the other side, it is as sure, That all standing Powers have and ever do assume unto them­selves an Arbitrary Exercise of their own dictates at pleasure, and make it their onely Interest to settle themselves in an unaccountable state of Domi­nion: so that, though they com­mit all the injustice in the World, their custome hath been still to per­swade men, partly by strong pretence of Argument, and partly by force, that they may do what they list, and that [Page 78] they are not bound to give an account of their Actions to any, but to God him­self. This Doctrine of Tyranny hath taken the deeper Root in mens mindes, because the greatest part was ever in­clined to adore the Golden Idol of Tyranny in every Form: by which means the rabble of mankinde being prejudicated in this particular, and ha­ving plac'd their corrupt humour or in­terest in base fawning, and the favour of present Great Ones; Therefore if a­ny resolute Spirit happen to broach and maintain true Principles of Freedom, or do at any time arise to so much courage, as to perform a noble Act of Justice, in calling Tyrants to an account, presently he draws all the enmity and fury of the World about him. But in Common­wealths it is and ought to be otherwise; for, in the Monuments of the Grecian and Romane Freedom, we finde, those Nations were wont to heap all the Honours they could invent, by publick Rewards, Consecration of Sta­tues, and Crowns of Laurel, upon such worthy Patriots: and as if on earth all were too little, they inroll'd them [Page 79] in heaven among the Deities. And all this they did out of a Noble sense of Commonweal-interest; knowing that the life of Liberty consists in a strict hand, and zeal against Tyrants and Ty­ranny, and by keeping persons in power from all the occasions of it: which can­not be better done, than (according to the custom of all States that are really free) by leaving them liable to account: which happiness was never seen yet un­der the sun, by any Law or Custom esta­blished, save onely in those States, where all men are brought to taste of Subjection as well as Rule, and the Go­vernment setled by a due succession of Authority, by consent of the People.

In Switzerland the people are free indeed, because all Officers and Gover­nours in the Cantons, are questionable by the People in their successive Assem­blies.

The Inference from the fore-going particulars, is easie, That since Freedom is to be preserved no other way in a Commonwealth, but by keeping Offi­cers and Governours in an accountable state; and since it appears no standing [Page 80] Powers can never be called to an ac­count without much difficulty, or in­volving a Nation in Blood or Misery. And since a revolution of Government in the Peoples hands, hath ever been the onely means to make Governours ac­countable, and prevent the inconveni­ences of Tyranny, Distraction, and Mi­sery; therefore for this, and those o­ther reasons fore-going, we may con­clude, That a Free-State, or Govern­ment by the People, setled in a due and orderly succession of their supreme As­semblies, is far more excellent every way, than any other Form whatsoever.

ALL OBJECTIONS Against the Government of the People, ANSWERED.

COnsidering, That in times past, the People of this Nation were bred up and instructed in the brutish Principles of Monarchy, by which means they have been the more averse from enter­taining Notions of a more noble Form: and remembring, that not long since we were put into a better course, upon the declared Interest of a Free-State, or Commonwealth; I conceived nothing could more highly tend to the propaga­tion of that good Interest, and the Ho­nour [Page 82] of its Founders, than to manifest the Inconveniences and ill Conse­quences of the other Forms; and so to root up their Principles, that the good People, who but the other day were invested in the possession of a more excellent way, may (in order to their re-establishment) understand what Commonwealth-Principles are, and thereby become the more resolute to defend them against the common Ene­my; learn to be true Commonwealths men, and zealous against Monarchick-Interest, in all its appearances and in­croachments whatsoever. To this end we have▪ set down our Position▪ That a Free-State, or Government by the People, setled in a due and orderly suc­cession of their supreme Assemblies, is the most excellent Form of Govern­ment; which (I humbly conceive) hath been sufficiently proved, both by Rea­son and Example: but because many pretences of Objection are in being, and such as by many are taken for grant­ed; therefore it falls in of course, that we may refute them: which being done with the same evidence of Reason and [Page 83] Example, I doubt not but it will stop all the Mouths, not onely of Ignorance, but even of▪ Malice and Flattery, which have presumed to prophane that pure way of a Free-State, or Government by the People.

That Objection of Royalists, and o­thers, which we shall first take notice of, is this, That the erecting of such a Govern­ment would be to set on Levelling an [...] Con­fusion.

A Freeſtate the only pre∣ſervative againſt Le∣velling and confuſion of propriety. For answer, If we take Levelling in the common usage and application of the term in these days, it is of an odi­ons signification, as if it levell'd all men in point of Estates, made all things common to all, destroyed propriety, in­troduced a community of enjoyments among men; which is a Scandal fastned by the cunning of the common Enemy upon this kinde of Government, which they hate above all others; because, were the People once put in possession of their Liberty, and made sensible of the great Benefits they may reap by its injoyment, the hopes of all the Royal Stickler would be utterly extinct, in regard it would be the likeliest means [Page 84] to prevent a return of the Interest of Monarchy: for no Person or Parties seeking or setting up a private Interest of their own, distinct from the Publick, it will stop the Mouths of all Gain-say­ers. But the Truth is, This way of Free-State, or Government by the Peo­ple in their successive Assemblies, is so far from introducing a community, that it is the onely preservative of Propriety in every particular: the Reasons where­of are plain: for, as on the one side, it is not in Reason to be imagined, that so choice a Body, as the Representative of a Nation, should agree to destroy one another in their several Rights and Interests: on the other side, all Deter­minations being carried in this Form by common Consent, every Man's particu­lar Interest must needs be fairly pro­vided for, against the Arbitrary dispo­sition of others; therefore, whatever is contrary to this, is levelling indeed; because it placeth every Man's Right under the Will of another, and is no less than Tyranny; which seating it self in an unlimited uncontrollable Prerogative over others without their [Page 85] Consent, becomes the very bane of pro­priety; and however disquieted, or in what Form soever it appears, is indeed the very Interest of Monarchy.

Now that a Free-State, or successive Government of the People, &c. is the onely preservative of Propriety, ap­pears by Instances all the World over; yet we shall cite but a few.

Under Monarchs, we shall finde ever, That the Subjects had nothing that they could call their own; neither Lives, nor Fortunes, nor Wives, nor any thing else that the Monarch pleased to command, because the poor people knew no re­medy against the levelling Will of an unbounded Soveraignity; as may be seen in the Records of all Nations that have stoop'd under that wretched Form: whereof we have also very sad Examples in France, and other Kingdoms, at this very day, where the People have nothing of Propriety; but all depends upon the Royal Pleasure, as it did of late [...]ere in England. Moreover, it is very observ­able, That in Kingdoms where the People have enjoyed any thing of Li­berty and Propriety, they have been [Page 86] such Kingdoms onely, where the frame of Government hath been so well tem­pered, as that the best share of it hath been retained in the Peoples Hands; and by how much the greater influence the People have had therein, so much the more sure and certain they have been, in the enjoyment of their Propriety.

To pass by many other Instances, consider how firm the Aragonians were in their Liberties and Properties, so long as they held their hold over their Kings in their supreme Assemblies; and no sooner had Philip the second de­prived them of their share in the Go­vernment, but themselves and their properties became a prey (and have been ever since) to the Will and Plea­sure of their Kings.

The like also may be said of Erance, where, as long as the Peoples Interest bore sway in their supreme Assemblies, they could call their Lives and Fortunes their own, and no longer: for, all that have succeeded since Lewis the eleventh, followed his levelling pattern so far, that in short time they destroyed the Peoples Property, and became the [Page 87] greatest Levellers in Christendom. We were almost at the same pass here in England: for, as long as the Peoples Interest was preserved by frequent and successive Parliaments; so long we were in some measure secure of our Proper­ties: but as Kings began to worm the People out of their share in Govern­ment, by discontinuing of Parliaments; So they carried on their levelling de­sign, to the destroying of our Proper­ties; and had by this means brought it so high, that the Oracles of the Law and Gospel spake it out with a good level­ling Grace, That all was the King's and that we had nothing we might call our own.

Thus you see how much Levelling, and little of Propriety, the people h [...]e had certain under Monarchs; and if a­ny at all, by what means, and upon what terms they have had it. Nor hath it been thus onely under Kings; but we finde, the People have ever had as little of Property secure, under all other Forms of standing Powers; which have pro­duced as errant Levellers in this parti­cular, as any of the Monarchies. In the [Page 88] Free-State of Athens, as long as the People kept free indeed, in an enjoy­ment of their successive Assemblies, so long they were secure in their Proper­ties, and no longer. For, to say nothing of their Kings, whose History is very obscure, we finde, after they were laid side, they erected another Form of standing Power, in a single Person, cal­led, a Governour, for Life; who was also accountable for misdemeanours: but yet a Tryal being made of nine of them, the People saw so little security by them, that they pitch'd upon ano­ther standing Form of Decimal Govern­ment; and being oppress'd by them too, they were cashier'd. The like miseries they tasted under the standing power of Thirty, which were a sort of Levellers more rank than all the rest; who put to death, banish [...]d, pill'd, and poll'd whom they pleased, without Cause or Exception; so that the poor people having been tormented under all the Forms of standing Power, were in the end forced (as their last remedy) to take Sanctuary under the Form of a [Page 89] Free - State, in their successive Assem­blies.

And though it may be objected, That afterwards they fell into many divisions and miseries, even in that Form: yet whoever observes the Story, shall finde, it was not the fault of the Government, but of themselves, in swerving from the Rules of a Free-State, by permitting the continuance of Power in particular hands; who having an opportunity thereby to create Parties of their own among the People, did for their own ends, inveigle, ingage, and intangle them in popular Tumults and Divisions. This was the true Reason of their Miscarri­ages. And if ever any Government of the People did miscarry, it was upon that account.

Thus also the Lacedemonians, after they had for some yeers tryed the Go­vernment of one King, then of two Kings at once of two distinct Families; afterwards came in the Ephori, as Super­visers of their Kings: after (I say) they had tryed themselves through all the Forms of a standing Power, and found them all to be Levellers of the Peoples [Page 90] Interest and Property, then necessity taught them to seek shelter in a Free-State, under which they lived happily, till by a forementioned Error of the A­thenians, they were drawn into Parties by powerful Persons, and so made the Instruments of Division among them­selves, for the bringing of new Levellers into play; such as were Manchanidas and Nabis, who succeeded each other in a Tyranny.

In old Rome, after the standing Form of Kings was extinct, and a new one established, the people found as little of safety and property as ever: for, the standing Senate, and the Decemviri, proved as great Levellers, as Kings: so that they were forced to settle the Go­vernment of the People by a due and orderly succession of their supreme As­semblies. Then they began again to recover their propertie, in having some­what they might call their own; and they happily enjoyed it, till, as by the same Error of the Lacedemonians and A­thenians, swerving from the Rules of a Free-State, lengthning of power in par­ticular hands, they were drawn and di­vided [Page 91] into Parties, to serve the lusts of such powerful men as by craft became their Leaders: so that by this means (through their own default) they were deprived of their Liberty long before the dayes of Imperial Tytanny. Thus Cinna, Sylla, Marins, and the rest of that succeeding Gang, down to Caesar, used the Peoples favour, to obtain a con­tinuation of power in their own hands; and then having sadled the people with a new standing Form of their own, they immediately rooted up the Peo­ples Liberty and Property, by Arbi­trary Sentences of death, Proscriptions, Fines, and Confiscations: which strain of levelling, (more intolerable than the former) was maintained by the same Arts of Devillish Policy down to Caesar; who striking in a Favourite of the People, and making use of their Affections to lengthen power in his own hands: at length, by this Errour of the people, gained opportunity to introduce a new levelling Form of standing power in himself, to an utter and irrecoverable ruine of the Romane Liberty and property.

[Page 92]In Florence they have been in the same case there, under every Form of standing power. It was so, when the Great Ones ruled: it was so under Go­derino, it was so under Savanarola the Monk. When they once began to lengthen power by the peoples Favour, they presently fell to levelling and do­mineering, as did Cosmus afterwards, that crafty Founder of the present Dukedom.

Upon the same terms, the Repub­lick of Pisa lost themselves, and became the prey of several Usurpations.

Mantua was once a Free-City of the Empire; but neglecting their successive Assemblies, and permitting the Great Ones, and most Wealthy, to form a standing power in themselves: the people were so vexed with them, that one Pafferimo getting power in his own hands, and then lengthening it by Artifice, turn'd Leveller too, subjecting all to his own will; so that the poor people, to rid their hands of him, were forced to pitch upon another, as bad, and translate their power into a petty Dukedom, in the hands of the Family of Gonzaga.

[Page 93]We may from hence safely conclude against all objecting Monarchs and Roy­alists, of what name and Title soever, that a Free-State or Commonwealth by the people in their successive Assemblies is so far from levelling or destroying propertie, that in all ages it hath been the onely preservative of Liberty and property, and the onely remedy against the Levellings and Usurpations of standing powers: for, it is cleer, That Kings and all standing powers are the Levellers.

A second Objection in the Mouths of many, is this, That the erecting of such a Form in the Peoples hands, were the ready way to cause confusion in Government; when all persons (without distinction) are allowed a right to chuse and be chosen mem­bers of the supreme Assemblies.

A Freeſtate gives no cauſe of confuſion. For answer to this, know, we must consider a Commonwealth in a twofold condition: either in its setled state, when fully stablished and founded, and when all men were supposed Friends to its establishment; or else when it is new­ly founding or founded, and that in the close of a civil War, upon the ruine of [Page 94] a former Government, and those that stood for it; in which case it even hath a great party within it self, that are ene­mies to its establishment.

As to the first, to wit, a Common­wealth in its setled and composed state, when all men within it are presumed to be its Friends, questionless, a right to chuse and to be chosen, is then to be allowed the people, (without distincti­on) in as great a latitude, as may stand with right Reason and Convenience, for managing a matter of so high Conse­quence as their Supreme Assemblies; wherein somewhat must be left to hu­mane Prudence; and therefore that la­titude being to be admitted more or less, according to the Nature, Circum­stance, and Necessities of any Nation, is not here to be determined.

But as to a Commonwealth under the second consideration, when it is founding, or newly founded, in the close of a Civil War, upon the mine of a for­mer Government; In this case, (I say) to make no distinction betwixt men; but to allow the conquered part of the people an equal right to chuse and to [Page 95] be chosen, &c. were not onely to take away all proportion in policy, but the ready way to destroy the Common­wealth, and by a promiscuous mixture of opposite Interests, to turn all into confusion.

Now, that the Enemies of Liberty, being subdued upon the close of a Ci­vil War, are not to be allowed sharers in the Rights of the people, is evident, for divers Reasons: not onely because such an allowance would be a means to give them opportunity to sow the seeds of new Broyls and Divisions, and bring a new hazard upon the Liberties of the People, (which are Reasons derived from Convenience: but there is a more special Argument from the equity of the thing, according to the Law and Custom of Nations, That such as have com­menced War, to serve the Lusts of Ty­rants against the Peoples Interest, should not be received any longer a part of the people, but may be handled as slaves when subdued, if their Sub­duers please so to use them; because by their Treasons against the Majesty of the people, (which they ought to have [Page 96] maintained) they have made forfeiture of all their Rights and Priviledges, as Members of the People; and therefore if it happens in this case at any time, That any Immunities, Properties or En­joyments be indulged unto them, they must not take them as their own by Right, but as Boons bestowed upon them by the peoples courtesie.

The old Commonwealth of Greece was very severe in this particular: for, as they were wont to heap up all Ho­nours they could vent, upon such as did or suffered any thing for the mainte­nance of their Liberty; so, on the other side, they punished the Underminers of it, or those that any wayes appeared a­gainst it, with utmost extremity; perse­cuting them with For Feitures, both of Life and Fortune; and if they escaped with Life, they usually became slaves: and many times they persecuted them, being dead, branding their Memories with an Eternal Mark of Infamy.

In old Rome they dealt more mildly with the greatest part of those that had sided with the Tarquins after their Ex­pulsion: but yet they were not restored [Page 97] to all their former Priviledges. In pro­cess of time, as oft as any conspired a­gainst the Peoples Interest, in their suc­cessive Assemblies; after they had once gotten them, themselves were banish­ed, and their Estates confiscated, not ex­cepting many of the Senators, as well as others; and made for ever incapable of any Trust in the Commonwealth.

Afterwards, they took the same course with as many of Catiline's Fellow-Tray­tors and Conspirators, as were worthy any thing; and had no doubt suffici­ently paid Caesar's Abettors in the same Coin, but that he wore out all opposites with his prosperous Treason. Thus Millain, and the rest of those States, when they were free, as also the Swisses and Hollanders, in the Infancy of the Helvetian and Belgick Freedoms, who took the same course with all those uu­natural Paricides and Apostates, that offered first to strangle their Liberty in the Birth, or afterwards in the Cradle, by secret Conspiracy, or open violence. Nor ought this to seem strange, since if a right of Conquest may be used over a Forain, who onely is to be accounted [Page 98] a fair enemy: much more against such, as against the light of Nature, shall engage themselves in so foul practices, as tend to ruine the Liberty of their Na­tive Country.

Seeing therefore that the people in their Government, upon all occasions of Civil War against their Liberties, have been most zealous in vindicating those Attempts upon the heads of the Con­spirators: seeing also, that upon the close of a Civil War, they have a Right; and not onely a Right, but usually a very great Resolution to keep out those Enemies of Liberty, whom they con­quer, from a participation of any Right in Government: therefore in this case also, as well as the former, we may con­clude, That they in their successive As­semblies, are so far from levelling the Interest of Government into all hands, without distinction, that their principal care is ever to preserve it in their own, to prevent the return of new Wars, old Interests, and Confusion.

But there is a third Objection a­gainst it, drawn from a pretending in­convenience of such a succession; al­ledging, [Page 99] That the management of State-Affairs requires Judgement and Experi­ence; which is not to be expected from new Members comming into those Assemblies upon every [...]lection.

Affairs of State as well mana∣ged under a Free-State as under any Form. Now, because the very Life of Liberty lies in a succession of Powers and Per­sons; therefore it is meet I should be somewhat precise & punctual by way of answer to this particular. Observe then, that in Government two things are to be considered: Act a Imperi, and Ar­can a Imperii▪ that is, Acts of State, and Secrets of State. By Acts of State, we mean the Laws and Ordinances of the Legislative Power: these are the things that have most influence upon a Com­menwealth, to its ill or well-being; and are the onely Remedies for such bad Customes, Inconveniences, and In­croachments as afflict and grieve it. Wherefor [...], matters of grievance being matters of common sense, and such are obvious to the people, who best know where the shooe pinches them; cer­tainly, there is no need of any great skill or judgement in passing or apply­ing a Law for Remedy, which is the [Page 100] proper work of the people in their su­preme Assemblies; and such, as every ordinary▪ Understanding is instructed in by the Light of Nature: so that, as to this, there can be no danger by institu­ting an orderly succession of the peo­ple.

But as for those things called Ar [...]ana Imperii, Secrets of State, or the execu­tive part of Government, during the Intervals of their Supreme Assemblies; these things being of a Nature remote from ordinary apprehensions, and such as necessarily require prudence, time, and experience, to fit men for manage­ment: Mu [...]h in Reason may be said, and must be granted, for the continuati­on of such Trusts in the same hands, as relate to matter of Counsel, or Admi­nistration of [...]ustice, more [...]r less, accor­ding to their good or ill-behaviour. A prudential continuation of these, may (wi [...]hout question) and ought to be al­l [...]wed upon discretion; because, if the [...] do amiss, they are easily account­able to the peoples Assemblies. But now the case is otherwise, as to these Supreme Assemblies, where a few, easie, [Page 101] necessary things, such as common sense and reason instruct men in, are the fittest things for them to apply themselves un­to: and there the Peoples Trustees are to continue, of right, no longer than meer Necessity requires, for their own redress and safety; which being provi­ded for, they are to return into a con­dition of Subjection and Obedience, with the rest of the people, to such Laws and Government as themselves have erected: by which means alone, they will be able to know whether they have done well or ill, when they feel the effects of what they have done. Otherwise, if any thing happen to be done amiss, what way can there be for remedy? since no Appeal is to be had from the Supreme Body of the People, except a due course of Succession be preserved from hand to hand, by the Peoples choice; and other persons thereupon admitted (upon the same terms) into the same Autho [...]ity.

This is the truth, as we have made manifest both by Reason and Example: therefore we shall adde a little to our former Discourse, by way of Illustration.

[Page 102]In Athens, when govern'd by the Peo­ple, we finde, it was their course to up­h [...]ld constant returns and periods of Succession in their Supreme Assemblies, for remedy of Grievances; and they had a standing Council, called the Areo­p [...]g [...], to whom all their Secrets of State were committed, together with the ad­ministration of Government during the Intervals of those Assemblies, at whose return they were accountable; and wa­rily continued, or excluded, as the Peo­ple found cause▪

In Sparta they had the like; as also in Rome, after the People had once got their successive Assemblies, wherein they passed Laws for Government: and not knowing how to be rid of their he­reditary Senate, they permitted them and their sami [...]ies to continue a stand­ing Council; but yet controllable by, and accountable to their Assemblies, who secluded and banished many of them for their misdemeanours: so that by this means▪ the people had an opor­tunity to make use of thei [...] Wisdom, and curb their Ambi [...]ion.

In Florence (when free) the Govern­ment [Page 103] was after the same Mode.

In Holland also, and Switzerland, they have their Supreme Assemblies frequent by Election, with exceeding benefit, but no prejudice to Affairs: for the fre­quencie of those successive Meetings, preserves their Liberty, and provides Laws; the Execution whereof is com­mitted to others, and affairs of State to a Council of their own choice, ac­countable to themselves: where their State-concernments very seldom mis­carry, because they place and displace their Counsellors with extraordinary care and caution.

By these particulars, you may per­ceive the vanity of the aforesaid Ob­jection, and how slender a pretence it is against that excellent course of Suc­cessive Assemblies; since affairs of State are as well disposed (or rather better) under this Form, than any other.

A fourth Objection commonly used Diſcontents & Tumults, no natural effects of a Free-State. against the Constitution of a Free-State, or Government by the People in their successive Assemblies, is this: That such a Government brings great Damage to the [Page 104] Publike, by their frequent Discontents, Di­visions, and Tumults, that arise with­in it.

For answer to this, it is requisite that we take notice of those Occasions which are the common causes of such humours in this Form: which being once known, it will easily appear whence those Inconveniences do arise, and not from any default in the nature of the Government: they are com­monly these three.

First, when any of their fellow-Citi­zens, or Members of the Common­weal, shall arrogate any thing of Power and Priviledge unto themselves, or their Families, whereby to Grandize or greaten themselves, beyond the ordi­nary size and standard of the People. We finde thi [...] to be most true, by the course of affairs in the Romane State, as they are recorded by Livy; who plainly shews, that upon the expulsion of the Tarquins, though the Senate in­troduced a new Government, yet their retaining the power of the old within the hands of themselves and their Fa­milies, was the occasion of all those af­ter-Discontents [Page 105] and Tumults that arose among the People. For, had Brutus made them free, when he declared them so; or had the Senate a little af­ter, followed the advice and example of Publicola, and some others as honest as he; all occasion of Discontent had been taken away: but when the People saw the Senators seated in a lofty po­sture over them; when they felt the weight of that State and Dignity pres­sing upon shoulders that were promised to be at ease, and free; when they found themselves exempted from the enjoy­ment of the same common Priviledges, excluded from all Offices, or Alliance with the Senators; their purses empti­ed of Money, their bellies of Meat, and their hearts of Hope: then it was, that they began to grumble and mutiny; and never until they got a power to bridle the Great ones, by an happie succession of their Supreme Assem­blies.

A second Occasion of the peoples be­ing inclined to Discontent and Tumult, under their Free Form of Government, appears in Story to be this: When they [Page 106] felt themselves not fairly dealt withal, by such as became their Leaders and Generals. Thus in Syracusa, Dionysius cloathing himself with a pretence of the peoples Liberties; and being by that means made their General, and then making use of that power to other ends than was pretended, became the Fire-Brand of that State, and put the peo­ple all into Flames, for the expulsion of him, who had made a Forfeiture of all his glorious pretences.

Thus in Sparta the people were peace­able enough under their own Govern­ment, till they found themselves over­reached, and their credulity abused by such as they trusted, whose designs were laid in the dark, for the converting of Liberty into Tyranny, under Manchani­das and Nabis. In old Rome, under the peoples Government, it is true, it was a sad sight oftentimes to see the people swarming in tumults, their shops shut up, and all trading given over throughout the City, and somtimes the City forsaken and left empty.

But here, as also in Ath [...]ns, the Occa­sion was the same: for, as the people [Page 107] naturally love Peace and Ease; so find­ing themselves often out-witted and a­bused by the slights and fears of the Senate, they presently (as it is their Na­ture upon such Occasions) grew out of all patience. The case was the same al­so, when any one of their Senators, or of themselves, arrived to any height of power by insinuating into the peoples favour, upon specious and popular pre­tences, and then made a forfeiture of those pretences, by taking a contrary course. Thus Sylla of the Senatorian order, and Marius of the Plebeian, both got power into their hands, upon pretence of the peoples good, (as many others did before and after, not onely in Rome, but in other Free-States also) but forfeiting their pretences by taking Arbitrary courses, they were the sole Causes of all those Tumults and Slaugh­ters among the Romanes, the infamy whereof hath most injuriously been cast upon the peoples Government, by the profane pens of such as have been bold in Pension or Relation in the Courts of Princes.

Thus Caesar also himself, striking as a [Page 108] Favorite of the people upon fair pre­tences, and forfeiting them, when in power, was the onely cause of all those succeeding Civil Broyles and Tragedies among the people.

A third Occasion of the Peoples being inclined to Discontent and Tumult in a Free-State, is this, when they are sensible of Oppression. For, I say a­gain, The people are naturally of a peaceable temper, minding nothing, but a free Enjoyment: but if once they finde themselves circumvented, misled, or squeezed by such as they have in­trusted, then they swell like the Sea, and over-run the Bounds of Just and Ho­nest, ruining all before them.

In a word, there is not one precedent of Tumults or Sedition can be cited out of all Stories, by the Enemies of Freedom, against the peoples Govern­ment; but it will appear likewise thereby, that the people were not in fault, but either drawn in, or provoked thereto, by the Craft or Injustice of such fair Pretenders as have had by­ends of their own, and by-designs upon the publick Liberty.

[Page 109]Nevertheless, admit that the people were tumultuous in their own Nature; yet those Tumults (when they happen) are more easily to be borne, than these Inconveniences that arise from the Ty­ranny of Monarchs and Great Ones: for popular Tumults have these three Qua­lities:

First, The Injury of them never ex­tends further than some few Persons; and those (for the most part) guilty e­nough; as were the thirty Grandees in Athens, the Ten in Rome, and those o­ther State-Mountebanks, that suffered for their Practices by the Peoples Fury.

Secondly, Those Tumults are not lasting, but (like fits) quickly over: for, an Eloquent Oration, or Perswasi­on, (as we see in the Example of Mene­nius Agrippa) or the Reputation of some grave or honest Man, (as in the Ex­ample of Virginus, and afterwards of Cato) doth very easily reduce and paci­fie them.

Thirdly, The ending of those Tu­mults, though they have ruined some particulars, yet it appears they have [Page 110] usually turned to the good of the Pub­lick: for we s [...], that both in Athens and Rome, the Great Ones were by this means kept in awe from Injustice; the Spirits of the people were kept warm with high thoughts of themselves and their Liberty (which turned much to the inlargement of their Empire.)

And lastly, By this means they came off alwayes with good Laws for their profit, (as in the case of the Law of twelve Tables, brought from Athens to Rome) or else with an Augmentation of their Immunities, and Priviledges (as in the case of procuring the Tribunes, and their Supreme Assemblies) and af­terwards in the frequent confirmation of them against the Incroachments of the Nobles.

Now the case is far otherwise under the standing power of the Great Ones; they, in their Counsels, Projects, and Designs, are fast and tenacious; so that the Evils under those Forms are more re­mediless. Besides, they reach to the whole Body of a Commonweal: and so the Evils are more Universal. And lastly, those Tumults, Quarrels, and Inconveniences [Page 111] that arise from among them, never tend nor end, but to the farther oppression and suppression of the people in their Interest and Propriety.

For conclusion then: by these parti­culars you may plainly see the vanity of this Objection about Tumults, how far they are from being natural effects of the Peoples Government; insomuch, as by the Records of History, it appears rather that they have been the necessary consequences of such Tricks and Cheats of Great Men, as in the dayes of yore have been put upon the people.

Calumnia∣tion leſs uſed under the peoples Govern∣ment, than under any other Form. A fifth Objection against the Form of a Free-State, or Government by the peo­ple in their successive Assemblies, and which we finde most in the Mouths of Royalists and Parasites, is this, That lit­tle security is to be had therein for the more wealthy and powerful sort of men, in regard of that Liberty which the people as­sume unto themselves, to accuse or ca­lumniate whom they please upon any occa­sion.

For answer to this, know, That ca­lumniation (which signifies ambitious [Page 112] slandering of men, by whisperings, re­ports, or false accusations) was never allowed or approved in this Form of Government. 'Tis true indeed, that such Extravagancies there have been (more or less) in all Forms whatsoever; but in this, less than any: it being most in use under standing Powers of Great ones, who make it their grand Engine to remove or ruine all persons that stand in the way of them and their de­signes: And for this purpose, it hath ever been their common custom to have Instruments ready at hand; as we see in all the Stories of Kings and Gran­dees from time to time; yea, and by Aristotle himself, together with the whole train of Commentators, it is particularly mark'd out inter flagitia Do­minationis, to be one of the peculiar enormities that attend the Lordly inte­rest of Dominion.

The Romane State, after it grew cor­rupt, is a sufficient Instance; where we finde, that not onely the ten Grandees, but all that succeeded them in that do­mineering humour over the People, ever kept a Retinue well stock'd with [Page 113] Calumniators and Informers, (such as we call Knights of the Post) to snap those that in any wise appeared for the Peoples Liberties. This was their constant trade, as it was afterwards al­so of their Emperours. But all the while that the People kept their power entire in the Supreme Assemblies, we read not of its being brought into any constant practice. Sometimes indeed, those great Commanders that had done them many eminent Services, were, by reason of some after-actions, called to an account; and having, by an in­gro [...]ment of Power, render'd them­selves suspected, and burthensome to the Commonwealth, were commanded to retire, (as were both the Scipio's.)

And in the Stories of the Athenian Commonwealth, we finde, that by their lofty and unwary carriage, they stirr'd up the Peoples fear and jealousie so far, as to question and send divers of them into B [...]ishment, notwithstanding all their former merits; as we read of Alcibtades, Themistocles, and others: whereas, if the Rules of a Free-State had been punctually observed, by pre­serving [Page 114] a discreet revolution of Powers, and an equability, or moderate state of particular persons, there had been no occasion of Incroachment on the one part, or of Fear on the other; not could the prying Royalist have had the least pretence or shadow of Invective against the Peoples Government in this particular.

Thus much of Calumniation, which is less frequent under the Peoples Form, than any other.

Now as to the point of Accusing, or liberty of Accusation by the People, before their Supreme Assemblies; it is a thing so essentially necessary for the preservation of a Commonwealth, that there is no possibility of having persons kept accountable without it; and, by consequence, no security of Life and Estate, Liberty and Property. And of what excellent use this is, for the pub­like benefit of any State, appears in these two particulars.

First, it is apparent, that the reason wherefore Kings, and all other standing Powers, have presumed to abuse the People, is, because their continuation [Page 115] of Authority having been a means to state them in a condition of Impunity, the People either durst not, or could not assume a liberty of Accusation; and so have linger'd without remedy, whilst Great Men have proceeded with­out control to an Augmentation of their misery: whereas if a just Liberty of Accusation be kept in ure, and Great Persons by this means lie liable to questioning, the Commonwealth must needs be the more secure; because none then will dare to intrench, or at­tempt ought, against their Liberty; and in case any do, they may with much ease be suppress'd. All which amounts, in effect, to a full confirmation of this most excellent Maxime, recorded in Po­licie: Maximè interest Repub. Liber­tatis, ut liberè possis [...]vem aliquem ac­cusare: It most highly concerns the Freedom of a Commonwealth, that the People have liberty of accusing any per­sons whatsoever.

Secondly, it appears, this Liberty is most necessary, because, as it hath been the onely Remedy against the Injustice of great and powerful persons; so it [Page 116] hath been the onely means to extin­guish those Emulations, Jealousies, and Suspicions, which usually abound with fury in mens mindes, when they see such persons seated so far above, that they are not able to reach them, or bring them (as it becomes all earthly Powers) to an account of their actions: of which Li­berty when the People have seen them­selves deprived in time past, it is sad to consider how they have flown out into such absurd and extraordinary courses, in hope of Remedy, as have caused not onely Distraction, but many times utter Ruine, to the Publike. Most of those Tumults in old Rome, were occasioned for want of this liberty in ordinary; as those that happened under the De­cemviri: so that the People, not having freedom to accuse and question their Justice, were enflamed to commit sud­den Outrages, to be revenged upon them. But when they had once ob­tained power to accuse or question any man, by assistance of their Tribunes; then we meet with none of those heats and fits among them; but they referr'd themselves over, with much content, to [Page 117] the ordinary course of proceeding. A pregnant Instance whereof, we have in the Case of Coriolanus; who having done some injury to the people, they finding him befriended and upheld by the Great ones, resolved to be reven­ged upon him with their own hands; and had torn him in pieces as he came out of the Senate, but that the Tribunes immediately step'd in, and not onely promis'd, but appointed them a day of Hearing against him; and so all was calm again, and quiet: whereas, if this ordinary course of Remedy, in calling him to account, had not been allow'd, and he been destroy'd in a Mutiny, a world of sad Consequences must have befallen the Commonwealth, by reason of those Enormities and Revenges that would have risen, upon the ruine of so considerable a person.

In the Stories of Florence also, we read of one Valesius, who greatning himself into little less than the posture of a Prince in that Republike, he so confirm'd himself, that the people not being able to regulate his extravagan­cies by any ordinary proceedings, they [Page 118] betook themselves to that unhappie re­medy of Arms; and it cost the best blood and lives in that State, before they could bring him down: involving them in a world of Miseries, which might have been avoided, had they taken care to preserve their old Liber­ty of Accusation and Que [...]ion, and be­ing able to take a course with him in an ordinary way of progress.

Thus also in the same State, Sode­rino, a man of the same size, interest, and humour; when the People saw that they had lost their Liberty, in being un­able to question him, ran like mad­men upon a Remedy as bad as the Dis­ease, and called in the Spaniard to sup­press him: so that turned almost to the ruine of the State, which might have been prevented, could they have re­press'd him by the ordinary way of Ac­cusation and Question.

From these Premises, then, let us conclude, That seeing the crooked way of Calumniation is less used under the Peoples Form of Government, than any other: and since the retaining of a Regular course, for admitting and deci­ding [Page 119] of all Complaints and Controver­sies by way of Accusation, is of abso­lute necessity to the safety and well­being of a Commonwealth; There­fore this Objection is of as little weight as the rest, so as in any wise to diminish the Dignity and Reputation of a Free-State, or Government by the People in their successive Assemblies.

Faction, inconſtancy, and ingra∣titude, no natural ef∣fects of the peoples Go∣vernment. A sixth Objection against the Form of a Free-State, or Government by the People; is alleadged by many, to this effect: That People by nature are factious, inconstant, and ungrateful.

For answer, first, as to the point of being Factious, we have already shewn, that this Government, stated in a suc­cession of its Supreme Assemblies, is the onely preventive of Faction; be­cause, in creating a Faction, there is a necessity, that those which endeavour it, must have oportunity to improve their slights and projects, in disgnising their Designes; drawing in Instruments and Parties, and in worming out Op­posites: the effecting of all which, re­quires some length of time; which [Page 120] cannot be had, and consequently, no Faction form'd, when Government is not fixed in particular persons, but ma­naged by due succession and revolution of Authority in the hands of the Peo­ple.

Besides, it is to be considered, that the People are never the first or princi­pal in Faction: they are never the au­thors and contrivers of it, but ever the parties that are drawn into Sidings by the influence of standing Powers, to serve their interests and designes.

Thus Sylla and Marius, Pompey and Caesar, continuing power in their own hands, cleft the Romane Empire at se­veral times into several Parties: as af­terwards it was cleft into three by the Triumvirate; wherein the people had no hand, being (as they are alwayes) purely passive, and passionately divided, according as they were wrought upon by the sub [...]il Insinuations of the prime Engineers of each Faction.

Thus Italy was divided into Guelph and Gib [...]ll [...]ne; and France torn in two by the two Families of Orleance and Burgundi: also, by the Guisians and their [Page 121] Confederates; wherein the people had no further hand, than as they were acted by the perswasions and pretences of two powerful parties.

The case also was the same in England, in times past, when the Grandee-Game was in action between the two Fami­lies of Yorke and Lancaster. So that it is clear enough, The people in their own nature are not inclined to be Factious, nor are they ever ingaged that way, far­ther than as their Nature is abused, and drawn in by powerful persons.

The second particular of this Ob­jection, is Inconstancy; which holds true indeed in them that are debauched, and in the corrupted State of a Com­monwealth, when degenerated from its pure Principles; as we finde in that of Athens, Rome, Florence, and others: but yet in Rome you may see as preg­nant instances of that peoples constan­cy, as of any other sort of men whatso­ever: for, they continued constant irreconcilable Enemies to all Tyranny in general, and Kingly power in parti­cular.

In like manner, when they had once [Page 122] gotten their successive Assemblies, they remained so firm & stiff to uphold them, that the succeeding Tyrants could not in a long time, nor without extraordi­nary cunning and caution deprive them of that onely Evidence of their Li­berty.

Moreover, it is observable of this people, That in making their Elections they could never be perswaded to chuse a known Infamous, Vitious, or unwor­thy Fellow; so that they seldom or never erred in the choice of their Tri­bunes and other Officers. And as in the framing of Laws, their aim was ever at the general Good, it being their own Interest, quatenus the people; so their constancy in the conservation of those Laws was most remarkable: for, notwithstanding all the crafty Devices and Fetches of the Nobles, the people could never be woo'd to a consent of abrogating any one Law, till by the al­teration of Time, Affairs, and other Circumstances, it did plainly appear in­convenient.

But the case hath ever been otherwise under Kings and all standing Powers, [Page 123] who usually ran into all the extreams of Inconstancy, upon every new Project, petty Humour, and Occasion, that seemed favourable for effecting of their by-designs. And in order hereunto, Stories will inform you, That it hath been their Custome, to shift Principles every Moon, and cashier all Oaths, Pro­testations, Promises, and Engagements, and blot out the Memory of them with a wet Finger.

This was very remarkable in the late King, whose inconstancy in this kinde, was beyond compare; who no sooner had passed any Promises, made Vows and Protestations, fix'd Appeals in the High Court of Heaven, in the behalf of Himself and his Family; but presently he forfeited all, and cancell'd them by his Actions.

As to the third point, of Ingratitude, it is much charged upon this Form of Government; because we read both in Athens and Rome, of divers unhandsome Returns made to some worthy Persons that had done high services for those Commonwealths; as Alcibiades, The­ [...]istocles, Phocion, Milt [...]ades, Furius, [Page 124] Camillus, Coriolanus, and both the Scipio's; the cause of whose misfortunes is described by Plutarch and Livy, to be their own lofty and unwary carriage; Having (say they) by an ingrossment of power, rendred themselves suspect­ed and buthensome to the Common­wealth, and thereby stirred up the peo­ples fear & jealousie: where as if they had kept themselves within the Rules of a Free-State, by permitting a disceet Re­volution of power in particular hands; there had been no occasion of incroach­ment on the one part, nor of fear on the other. Of all, the Scipio's indeed were most to be pitied, because their only fault seems to be too much power and grearness, (which indeed is the greatest fault that Members of a Com­monwealth can be guilty of, if seriously considered;) insomuch, that being grown formidable to their Fellow-Se­nators, they were by them removed: and so it appears to have been the act of the Nobles, (upon their own score and Interest) and not of the people. But as for Camillus and Coriolanus, they sufficiently deserved whatsoever befel [Page 125] them, because they made use of the power and reputation they had gotten by their former merits, onely to ma­ligne and exercise an implacable hate towards the peoples Interest. Never­theless, the people restored Camillus again to his Estate and Honour, after some little time of Banishment.

And though this accident in a Free-State hath been objected by many, as a great deffect; yet others again do highly commend the humour: For (say they) it is not onely a good sign of a Commonwealths being in pure and perfect health, when the people are thus active, zealous, and jealous in the behalf of their Liberties, that will permit no such growth of power as may endanger it; but it is also a conve­nient means to curb the Ambition of its Citizens, and make them contain within due bounds, when they see there is no presuming after Inlarge­ments, and Accessions of Powers and Greatness, without incurring the dan­ger and indignation of the people.

Thus much of the Reason why the [Page 126] people many times cast off persons that have done them eminent services: yet on the other side, they were so far from Ingratitude, that they have al­wayes been excessive in their Rewards and Honours, to such men as deserved any way of the Publike, whilst they conformed themselves to Rules, and kept in a posture suiting to Liberty. Witness their Consecration of Statues, Incense, Sacrifices, and Crowns of Lau­rel, inrolling such men in the number of their Deities.

Therefore the crime of Ingratitude cannot in any peculiar manner be fast­ned upon the People: but if we con­sult the Stories of all standing Powers, we may produce innumerable testimo­nies of their Ingratitude toward such as have done them the greatest service; ill recompence being a Mystery of State practised by all Kings and Grandees, who (as Tacitus tells us) ever count themselves disobliged, by the bravest actions of their subjects.

Upon this account, Alexander hated Antipater and Parmenio, and put the la­ter to death. Thus the Emperour Ve­spasian [Page 127] cashiered and ruined the meri­torious Antonies. Thus also was Al­phonsus Atbuquerque served by his Ma­ster the King of Portugal; and Consal­vus the Great, by Ferdinand of Aragon: as was also that Stanley of the House of Derby, who set the Crown upon King H [...]nry the seventh's head. Thus Sylla the Romane Grandee destroyed his choicest Instruments that help'd him into the Saddle; as Augustus served his friend Cicero, and exposed him to the malice and murther of Anthonie.

Innumerable are the Examples of this kinde, which evidence, that such un­worthy dealings are the effect of all standing Powers; and therefore more properly to be objected against them, than against the Government of the People.

Thus having answered all, or the main Objections, brought by the adver­saries of a Free-State; before we pro­ceed to the Errours of Government, and Rules of Policie, it will not be a­miss, but very convenient, to say some­thing [Page 128] of that which indeed is the very Foundation of all the rest; to wit, That the Original of all Just Power and Government is in the PEOPLE.

The Original of all Just Power is in the People.

THose Men that deny this Position, are fain to run up as high as Noah and Adam, to gain a pre­tence for their Opini­on: alledging, That the primitive or first Governments of the World were not instituted by the con­sent and election of those that were governed, but by an absolute Authority invested in the persons governing. Thus th [...] say our first Parent ruled, by a [...] Power and Authority in himself onely, as did also the Patri­archs before and after the Flood too, for some time, becoming Princes by vertue of a paternal right over all the Fa­milies of their own Generation and Ex­traction: so that the Fathers, by reason of their extraordinary long Lives, and the multiplicity of Wives, happened to [Page 130] be Lords of Kingdoms or Principalities of their own begetting.

And so some deriving the Pedigree or Government of this Paternal Right of Soveraignty, would by all means con­clude, That the Original of Govern­ment, neither was nor ought to be in the People.

For answer to this, consider, That Ma­gistracy or Government is to be consi­dered, as Natural, or as Political: Natu­rally he was a true publick Magistrate or Father of his Country, who in those Patriarchal times ruled over his own Children and their Descendants. This Form of Government was only tempo­rary, and took an end not long after the Flood, when Nimrod changed it, and by force combining [...] of di­stinct Families into one Bod [...] [...] sub­jecting them to his own Regiment, did, by an Arbitrary Power, seated in his own Will and Sword, constrain them to submit unto what Laws and Conditions himself pleased to impose on them.

Thus the Paternal Form became changed into a Tyrannical. Neither of these had (I confess) their Original [Page 131] in or from the People, nor hath either of them any relation to that Govern­ment which we intend in our Position.

But secondly, There is a Govern­ment Political, not grounded in Nature, nor upon Paternal Right by Natural Generation; but founded upon the free Election, Consent or mutual Com­pact of men entring into a form of civil society. This is the Government we now speak of, it having been in request in most ages, and still is: whereas the other was long since out of date, being used onely in the first age of the World, as proper onely for that time.

So that to prevent all Objections of this nature, when we speak here of Go­vernment, we mean onely the Political, which is by Consent or Compact; whose original we shall prove to be in the peo­ple. As for the Government of the Israelites, first under Moses, then Joshua and the Judges; The Scripture plainly shews, that they were extraordi [...]nary Governours, being of God's immediate institution, who raised them up by his Spirit, and imposed them upon that peo­ple; whose peculiar happiness it was in [Page 132] cases of this nature, to have so infallible and sure a direction; so that their Go­vernment was a Theocracie, (as some have called it) having God himself for its onely Original: and therefore no wonder we have in that time & Nation, so few visible foot-steps of the peoples Election, or of an institution by Com­pact. But yet we finde after the Judges, when this people rejected this more immediate way of Government by God, (as the Lord told Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but me) and de­desired a Government after the manner of other Nations; then God seems to forbear the use of his Prerogative, and leave them to an exercise of their own natural Rights and Liberties, to make choice of a new Government and Go­vernour by suffrage and compact.

The Government they aimed at, was Kingly: God himself was displeased at it, and so was Samuel too; who, in hope to continue the old Form, and to fright them from the new, tells them, what Monsters in Government Kings would prove, by assuming unto themselves an Arbitrary Power, (not that a King might [Page 133] lawfully and by right do what Samuel describes, but onely to shew how far Kings would presume to abuse their power; which no doubt Samuel foresaw, not onely by Reason, but by the Spirit of Prophecie.) Nevertheless the people would have a King; say they, Nay, but there shall be a King over us: whereupon, saith God to Samuel, Hearken to their voice. Where we plainly see; first, God gives them leave to use their own natu­ral Rights, in making choice of their own Form of Government; but then indeed, for the choice of their Governor, there was one thing extraordinary, in that God appointed them one, he vouch­safing still in an extraordinary and im­mediate manner to be their Director and Protector: but yet, though God was pleased to nominate the person, he left the confirmation and ratification of the Kingship unto the people; to shew, that naturally the right of all was in them, however the exercise of it were superseded at that time, by his Divine pleasure, as to the point of nomination: for, that the people might understand it was their Right, Samuel calls them [Page 134] all to Mizpeh, as if the matter were all to be done anew on their part; and there by lot, they at length made choice of Saul, and so immediately by pro­claiming him with shouts and acclamati­ons: and then having had proof of his valour against the Amorites, they meet at Gilgal, and proclaim him King once a­gain, to shew that (naturally) the vali­dity of the Kingship depended wholly upon the peoples consent and confirma­tion. And so you see the first and most eminent evidence of the institution of Political Government in Scripture doth notoriously demonstrate, that its origi­nal is in or from the people; and there­fore I shall wave any further instances in cases of the like nature out of Scripture, which are not a few. Onely let it be re­membred, that Peter in his first Epistle, calls all Government the Ordinance of man, (in the Original, the creation of man, a Creature of a mans making) to shew, that in all its forms it depends onely upon the will & pleasure of the people.

We might insist farther to evince the Truth of this by strength of Reason; but let this serve to assert the right of the [Page 135] thing; and as for the rest, every man will easily believe it very consonant to reason, if he reflect upon the matter of fact, and consider, that it hath been the unanimous practice of all the Nations of the World, to assert their own Rights of Election and Consent (as often as they had opportunity) in the various turns of institution and alteration of Govern­ment. In Italy of old they had most Free-States, and few Princes; now all Princes, and no Free-States. Naples, after many Revolutions, is under Spain, Rome under a Pope, and under him one Senator, in stead of those many that were wont to be; Venice and Genoa have Senators and Dukes, but the Dukes are of small power; Florence, Ferrara, Mantua, Parma, and Savoy, have no Senators, but Dukes only, and they absolute; Burgundy, Lorain, Gas­coin, and Britany, had once Kings, then Dukes, but now are incorporated into France: so all the Principalities of Ger­many that now are, were once imbodied in one entire Regiment: Castile, Aragon, Portugal, & Barcelona, were once distinct Kingdoms, but now united all to Spain, save Portugal, which fell off the other [Page 136] day: France was first one Kingdom un­der Pharamond, afterwards parted into four Kingdoms, and at last become one again: England consisted of Free-States till the Romans yoked it, afterwards it was divided into seven Kingdoms, and in the end it became one again. Thus you see how the world is subject to shiftings of Government: and though it be most true, that the power of the Sword hath been most prevalent in ma­ny of these changes, yet some of them have been chiefly managed (as they ought) by the peoples Consent; and e­ven in those where the Sword hath made way, the peoples consent hath ever been drawn and taken in afterwards, for cor­roboration of Title; it having been the custom of all Usurpers, to make their in­vestitures appear as just as they could, by getting the Communities Consent ex post sacto, and entring into some compact with them, for the better establishing themselves with a shew of legality: which act of all Tyrants and Usurpers, is a ma­nifest (though tacite) confession of theirs, That de jure the original of all Power and Government, is and ought to be in the people.

Errours of Govern­ment; And Rules of Policie.

HAving proved that the Ori­ginall of all just Power and Government is in the Peo­ple; and that the Govern­ment of the People, in a due and or­derly succession of their supream As­semblies, is much more excellent than any other Form, I suppose it falls in of course, in the next place, to note, and observe those common Errors in Poli­cie, wherein most Countties of the World, (especially that part of it cal­led Christendome) have been long in­tangled; that when the mystery of Tyrannie is undress't, and stript of all its gaudy Robes, and gay Appearan­ces, [Page 146] it may be hiss't out of the Civill part of Mankind into the company of the more barbarous and brutish Nati­ons.

One Errour in Govern∣ment, is a corrupt di∣viſion of a State in o Eccleſiaſti∣cal and ci∣vil. The first Errour that we shall ob­serve in antient Christian Policie, and which hath indeed been a main foun­dation of Tyranny, is that corrupt Di­ [...]ision of a State, into Ecclesiastical and Civil; A fault, whereof our latest Refi­ners of Political Discourse, are as guilty in their Writings, as any o­thers: But that there is the least foot­step, in the Scripture, for Christians to follow such a Division of [...] o [...] to allow of a National way [...] Ch [...] ­ing, which is the Root of [...]at D [...]si­on could never yet be proved by any; and the contrary is very clear from the drift and scope of the Gospel. We read, indeed, of the Common-wealth of Is­rael being thus divided, and that it was done according to Rules and Constitutions of Gods own appoint­ment; it being Gods way then, when he was pleased, to make choice of that peop [...]e onely, out of all the World, to be his own peculiar, and so fixed his Church there in a Nationall Form: Then it was consined and restrained to [Page 147] that particular Nation, excluding all others. But if any man will argue from hence, that it is lawfull for any Nation now under the Gospel to fol­low this pattern; then it behoves him, 1. to prove, that God intended the Jew­ish Government as a pattern for us to follow under the Gospel. And if any man will pretend to this, then in the second place, it will concern him to prove, that we are to follow it in every particular, or onely in some particu­lars. That we are to follow it in every one, no sober man did ever yet affirm: And if they will have us to follow it in some particulars, relinquishing the [...]est, then it concerns him to produce some Rule or Command out of Scri­pture, plainly pointing out what parts of it we are to imbrace, and what not; or else he will never be able to make it appear, that the Form of the Com­monwealth of Israel was ever intend­ed, either in the whole, or in part, as a Pattern for Christians to follow under the Gospel. But never was any such Rule alleadged yet out of Scripture by those that pretend to a Nationall Church.

And therefore, if we seriously reflect [Page 148] upon the Design of God, in sending Christ into the World, we shall find it was to set an end to that Pompous Administration of the Jewish Form; that as his Church and People were formerly confined within the Narrow Pale of a particular Nation, so now the Pale should be broken down, and all Nations taken into the Church: Not all Nations in a lump; nor any whole Nations, or National Bodies to be formed into Churches; for his Church or People, now under the Gospel, are not to be a Body Political, but Spiri­tual, and Mystical: Not a promiscuous confusion of persons, taken in at ad­venture; but an orderly collection, a picking and chusing of such as are cal­led and sanctified; and not a company of men forced in, by Commands and Constitutions, of Worldly Powers and Prudence; but of such as are brought in by the Power and Efficacy of Christs Word and Spirit: for he himself hath said, My Kingdome is not of this World; it is not from hence, &c. And therefore, that hand which hitherto hath presu­med, in most Nations, to erect a Pow­er, called Ecclesiastick, in equipage with the Civil, to bear [...]way, and bind [Page 149] mens Consciences to retain Notions, ordained for Orthodox, upon civill penalties, under colour of prudence, good order, discipline, preventing of Heresie, advancing of Christs King­dome; and to this end; hath twisted the Spiritual Power (as they call it) with the Worldly and secular interest of State: This (I say) hath been the very right hand of Antichrist, opposing Christ in his way: Whose Kingdom, Government, Governours, Officers, and Rulers; Laws, Ordinances, and Statutes, being not of this World, (I mean, jure humano,) depend not upon the helps and devices of Worldly wis­dome.

Upon this score and pretence, the Infant Mystery of Iniquity began to work in the very Cradle of Christiani­ty.

Afterwards it grew up by the indul­gence of Constantine, and other Christi­an Emperours, whom though God used in many good things for the sup­pression of gross Heathen Idolatry, yet (by Gods permission) they were car­ryed away, and their eyes so far dazled, through the glorious pretences of the Prelates and Bishops, that they could [Page 150] not see the old Serpent in a new Form wrapt up in a Mystery; for, Satan had a new Game now to play, which he managed thus: First, he led a great part of the World away with danger­ous Errours, thereby to find an occa­sion for the Prelates, to carry on the mystery of their Profession; and so, un­der pretence of suppressing those dan­gerous errors they easily scrued them­selves into the Civil Power: and for continuing of it the surer in their own hands, they made bold to baptize whole Nations with the name of Christian, that they might (under the same pretence) gain a share of Power and Authority with the Magistrate in every Nation; which they soon effe­cted.

The Infant-being thus nurst, grew up in a short time to a perfect man, the man of sin (if the Pope be the man, which is yet controverted by some:) for, the Prelates having gotten the power in their hands, began then to quarrel, who should be the greatest a­mong them. At length, he of Rome bore away the Bell; and so the next step was, that, from National Churches they proceed to [...] a Mother-Church [Page 161] of all Nations. A fair progress and pitch; indeed, from a small begin­ning: and now being up, they defied all with Bell, Book, and Candle, ex­communicating and deposing Kings and Emperours, and binding mens Consciences still, under the first speci­ous pretence of suppressing Heresie, to believe onely in their Arbitrary Di­ctates, Traditions, and Errours, which are the greatest Blasphemies, Errours, and Heresies, that ever were in the World. Now they were up see what a do there was to get any part of them down again. What a Quarter and Commotion there was in Germany, when Luther first brake the Ice? And the like here in England, when our first Reformers began their Work: These men, in part, did well, but having banished the Popes actual Tyranny, they left the Seed, and Principle of it, still behind, which was, a State Eccle­siastical united with the Civil; for, the Bishops twisted their own interest a­gain with that of the Crown, upon a Protestant Accompt; and by vertue of that, persecuted those they called Puritans, for not being as Orthodox (they said) as themselves.

[Page 152]To conclude, if it be considered, that most of the Civil Wars, and Broiles, throughout Europe, have been occasio­ned, by permitting the settlement of Clergy-Interest, with the Secular, in National Formes, and Churches, it will doubt els be understood, that the Division of a State into Ecclesiasticall and Civil, must needs be one of the main Errors in Christian Policy.

The not preventing the paſſage of Tyranny, out of one Form into another, is a main Er∣ror of Poli∣cie. A second Error which we shall note, and which is very frequent under all Formes of Government, is this; that care hath not been taken at all times, and upon all occasions of Alteration, to prevent the passage of Tyranny out of one Form into another, in all the Na­tions of the World: for, it is most clear, by observing the Affairs and Acti­ons of past-Ages, and Nations, that the interest of absolute Monarchy, and its Inconveniencies, have been visible and fatal under the other Forms (where they have not been prevented) and gi­ven us an undeniable proof of this Maxime▪ by Experience in all Times; That the Interest of Monarchy may re­side in the hands of many, as well as of a single person.

The Interest of absolute Monarchy, [Page 153] we conceive to be an unlimited, un­controlable, unaccountable station of Power and Authority in the hands of a particular person, who governs onely according to the Dictates of his own Will and Pleasure. And though it hath often bin disguised by Sophisters in Policy, so as it hath lost its own name, by shifting Formes; yet really, and effectually, the thing in it self hath bin discovered under the artificial co­vers of every Form, in the various Re­volutions of Government: So that nothing more concerns a People esta­blished in a state of Freedom, than to be instructed in things of this Nature, that the means of its preservation be­ing understood, and the subtil sleight of old Projectors brought into open view, they may become the more zea­lous to promote the one, and prevent the other, if any old game should hap­pen to be plaid over anew, by any suc­ceeding Generation.

It is very observable in Athens, that when they had laid aside their King, the Kingly power was retained still in all the after-turns of Government: for their Decimal Governours, and their Thirty (commonly called the [Page 154] Tyrants) were but a multiplied Mo­narchy, the Monarchal Interest being held up as high as ever, in keeping the exercise of the Supremacy out of the peoples hands, and seating themselves in an unaccountable state of Power and Authority, which was somewhat a worse condition, than the people were in before; for their Kings had Supervisors, and there were also Sena­tick Assemblies, that did restrain and correct them: but the new Governors having none, ran into all the heats and fits, and wild extravagancies, of an un­bounded Prerogative: by which means, Necessity and Extremity open­ing the peoples Eyes, they, at length, saw all the Inconveniencies of King­ship wrapt up in new Forms, and ra­ther increased, than diminished; so that (as the onely Remedy) they dis­lodged the Power out of those hands, putting it into their own, and placing it in a constant orderly Revolution of persons Elective by the Community. And now being at this fair pass, one would have thought there was no shel­ter for a Monarchal Interest, under a popular Form too. But alass, they found the contrary; for, the people not [Page] keeping a strict Watch over them­selves, according to the Rules of a Free State; but being won by specious pre­tences, and deluded by created Neces­sities, to intrust the management of Affairs into some particular hands, such an occasion was given thereby to those men to frame parties of their own, that by this means, they in a short time became able to stand upon their own legs, and do what they list with­out the peoples consent: and in the end, not onely discontinued, but utter­ly extirpated their successive Assem­blies.

In Rome also, the Case was the same under every Alteration; and all occasi­oned, by the crafty contrivances of Grandising Parties, and the peoples own facility and negligence, in suffer­ing themselves to be deluded: for, with the Tarquin's, (as it is observed by Livy, and others) onely the name King was expelled, but not the thing; the Power & Interest of Kingship was still retained in the Senate, and ingros­sed by the Consuls: For, besides the Rape of Lucrece, among the other faults objected against Tarquin, this was most considerable, That he had [Page 154] acted all things after his own head; and discontinued Consultations with the Senate, which was the very height of Arbitrary Power. But yet as soon as the Senate was in the saddle, they forgat what was charged by themselves upon Tarquin, and ran into the same Errour, by establishing an Arbitrary, Hereditary, unaccountable Power in themselves, and their Posterity, not ad­mitting the people (whose interest and liberty they had pleaded, into any share in Consultation, or Go­vernment, as they ought to have done, by a present erecting of their succes­sive Assemblies: so that you seethe same Kingly Interest, which was in one before, resided then in the hands of many. Nor is it my Observation onely, but pointed out by Livy, in his second Book, as in many other places; Cum à Patribus, non Consules, sed Carni­fices, &c. When (saith he) the Sena­tors strove to create, not Consuls, but Executioners, and Tormentors, to vex & tear the people, &c. And in another place of the same Book, Consules, immo­derat â infinita (que) potestate, omnes metus legum, &c. The Consuls having an im­moderate and unlimited Power, turn­ed [Page 157] the terror of Laws and punish­ments onely upon the people, them­selves (in the mean while) being ac­countable to none but to themselves, and their Confederates in the Se­nate.

Then the Consular Government being cashiered, came on the Decem­viri. Cum Consulari Imperio ac Regio, sine provocatione, (saith my Author) being invested with a Consular and Kingly Power, without appeal to any other.

And in his third Book, he saith, De­cem Regum species erat, it was a Form of ten Kings, the miseries of the peo­ple being increased ten times more then they were under Kings, and Con­suls: For remedy therefore, the ten were cashiered also; and Consuls be­ing restored, it was thought fit for the bridling of their Power, to revive al­so the Dictatorship (which was a Temporary Kingship, used onely now and then upon occasion of Necessity) and also those Deputies of the people called Tribunes, which one would have thought had bin sufficient Bars against Monarchick Interest, especially being assisted by the peoples successive [Page 158] Assemblies. But yet for all this, the people were cheated through their own neglect, and bestowing too much confidence and trust upon such as they thought their friends: For when they swerved from the Rules of a Free-State, by lengthning the Dictatorship in any hand, then Monarchick-Interest stept in there, as it did under Sylla, Cae­sar, and others, long before it returned to a declared Monarchal Form; and when they lengthned Commands in their Armies, then it crept in there; as it did under the afore-named persons, as well as Marius, Cinna, and others also; and even Pompey himself, not forgetting also the pranks of the two Triumvirales, who all made a shift: un­der every Form, being sometimes cal­led Consuls, sometimes Dictators, and sometimes Tribunes of the people, to out-act all the Flagitions Enormities of an absolute Monarchy.

It is also evident in the Story of Florence, that that Common-wealth, even when it seemed most free, could never quite shake off the Interest of Monarchy: for, it was ever the business of one Upstart, or other; either in the Senate, or among the People, to make [Page 159] way to their own ambitious Ends, and hoist themselves into a Kingly po­sture through the Peoples favour, as we may see in the Actions of Savana­rola the Monk, Soderino, and the Medi­ces, whose Family did (as we see at this day) fix it self at length in the State of an absolute Monarchy, under the Title of a Dukedome. Nor can it be for­gotten, how much of Monarchy (of late) crept into the United Provin­ces.

Now the use that is to be made of this Discourse, is this, that since it is clear, the Interest of Monarchy may reside in a Consul; as well as in a King; in a Dictator, as well as in a Consul; in the hands of many, as well as of a sin­gle person; and that its Custom hath bin to lurk under every Form, in the various turnes of Government, there­fore as it concerns every people in a State of Freedome to keep close to the Rules of a Free-State, for the turning out of Monarchy (whether simple, or compound, both name and thing, in one or many) by which means onely they will be inabled to avoid this se­cond Error in Policy; so they ought ever to have a Reverent and Noble re­spect [Page 160] of such Founders of Free-States, and Common-wealths, as shall block up the way against Monarchick Tyranny, by declaring for the Liberty of the People, as it consists in a due and or­derly succession of Authority, in their supream Assemblies.

A keeping the people inignorance of the eſſen∣tial wayes and meanes that are ne∣ceſſary for the peoples Liberty, is an Error in a Free-State. A third Errour in Policy, which ought especially notice to be taken of, and prevented in a Free-State, hath bin a keeping of the people ignorant [...] of those ways and means that are essen­tially necessary▪ for the preservation of their Liberty; for, implicite Faith, and blind Obedience, hath hitherto passed currant, and been equally pressed and practised by Grandees▪ both Spirituall and Temporal, upon the People; so that they have in all Nations shared the Authority between them. And though many quarrels have [...]i [...]en in times past between Kings, and their Clergy, touching their several Jurisdictions, yet the mysteries▪ of Domination have been still kept under lock and key: so that their Prerogative remained en­tire ever above the reach and know­ledge of the People: by which means, Monarchs and other standing Powers, have seen their own Interest provided [Page 161] for, as well as in the Popes, in this my­sterious▪ Maxime, Ignorance is the Mo­ther of Devotion.

But these things ought not to be so, among a people that have declared themselves a Free-State: For, they should not onely know what Free­dome is, and have it repre [...]ented in all its lively and lovely Features, that they may grow zealous and jealous o­ver it; but, that it may be a Zeal ac­cording to knowledge and good pur­pose: it is without all question, most necessary, that they be made acquaint­ed, and throughly instructed in the Meanes and Rules of its preservation, against the Adulterous Wiles and Rapes of any projecting Sophisters that may arise hereafter.

And doubtless, this endeavour of mine, in laying down the Rules of preserving a Free-State, will appear so much the more necessary, if we consi­der, that all the Inconveniencies that in Times have happened under this Form, to imbroyl, or ruine it, have proceeded (as we have formerly pro­ved) either from the peoples neglect, or rather ignorance of those Meanes and Rules that should be committed [Page 162] unto them, both for Practice, and Ob­servation: having therefore made brief Collections out of the Monu­ments of this kind of Learning, I shall here insert them, that the People of every Common-wealth, which mean to preserve their Freedom, may be in­formed how to steer their course▪ ac­cording to such Rules as have bin put in practice heretofore by, divers Na­tions.

It hath bin one Rule in all Free States, to abjure a toleration of Kings, and Kingly Govern∣ment. First, it hath bin a Custom, not only to breed up all the young Fry in Prin­ciples of Dislike and Enmity against Kingly Government; but also to cause all that were capable of swearing, to enter into an Oath of Abjuration, to abjure a toleration of Kings, and King­ly Power, in time to come.

Thus Brutus▪ bound the Romans by an Oath against Kings, That they should never suffer any man again to reign at Rome▪

Thus the Hollanders preserved them­selves also, entering into an Oath of Abjuration▪ not onely against King Philip [...] and his Family, but all Kings for ever.

And Brutus▪ to make sure work, did not onely do this, but divided▪ the [Page 163] Royal Revenues among the People; which was a good way to make them resolute to Extremity, knowing, That if ever any King came in play again, He would take all away again by vertue of his Prerogative and Crown: He brake also all the Images and Statues of the T [...]rquint▪ and he levell'd their houses with the ground, that they might not remain as Temptations to any ambitious Spirits▪ Suitable to this Policy, was that of Henry the 8th, who when he disposed of the Reve­nues of Abbies, demolished also the Building▪ osaying, Destroy the Nests, and the Rockes will ne're return again. Which▪ questionless, was a most sure way, both in him, and Brutus, to be imitated, or neglected▪ as there may be occasion. But they thought, in a ease of this Nature, that the conveni­ence in keeping them, could not coun­ter [...]ail the danger.

It hath bin a Rule in all Free-States, not to ſuffer particular perſons to Grandiſe more then ordinary. Secondly, It hath bin usual not to suffer particular persons to Grandise▪ or great [...]n themselves more than or­dinary▪ for that, by the Romans, was called, affectatio Regnt, an aspiring to Kingship: Which being observed in M [...]lius and Manlius, two noble Ro­mans, [Page 164] that had deserved highly of the State, yet their past-merits & services, could not exempt them from the just anger of the People, who made them Examples to Posterity: Yea, the Name of the latter, (though Livy cals him an incomparable man, had he not lived in a Free-State,) was ever after disowned by his whole Family, that famous Family of the Manlii; and both the Name and Memory of Him, and of his Consulship, was rased out of all publike Records, by Decree of the Senate.

The not keeping close to this Rule, had of late like to have cost the Low­countries, the loss of their Liberty; for the Wealth of the House of Orange, grown up to excess, and permitting the last man to match into a Kingly Family, put other thoughts and de­signs into his head, than beseemed a member of a Free-State; which had he not been prevented, by the Provi­dence of God▪ and a dark night, might in all probability, have reduced them under the Yoak▪ of Kingly Power.

A third Rule in po∣licy, not to permit a continuati∣on of Com¦mand and Power in the hands of particus¦lar perſon and fami∣lies. Thirdly, Especial care hath been ta­ken, non Diurnare Imperia, not to per­mit a Continuation of Command [Page 165] and Authority, in the hands of par­ticular persons, or families. This point we have been very large in: The Ro­mans had a notable care herein, till they grew corrupt. Livy, in his fourth Book, saith, Libertatis magna custod [...]a est, [...]si magna Imperia esse non sinas, & temporis modus imponatu [...]: It is a grand preservative of Liberty, if you do not permit great Powers and Commands to continue long▪ and if so be you li­mit, in point of time. To this pur­pose, they had a Law, called, the Emili­an Law, to restrain them; as we find in the Ninth Book, where he brings in a Noble Roman, saying thus: Hoc qui­dem Regno simile est; And this, indeed, is like a Kingship▪ That I alone should bear this great Office of the Censor­ship, Triennium & sex menses, three years and six moneths, contrary to the Emiliam Law. In his third Book al­so, he speaks of it, as of a monstrous bu­siness, That the Ides of May were come (which was the time of their years choice) and yet no new Election appointed: Id-verò Regnum haud dubiè videre, deploratur in perspetuum libertas. It with doubt seems no other than a Kingdom, and Liberty is utter­ly [Page 166] lost for ever. It was Treason for any man to hold that high Office of the Dictatorship in his own hand, be­yond six moneths. He that would see notable stuff to this purpose, let him read Ciceroes Epistles to Atticus, concerning Caesar. The care of that people▪ in this particular, appeared al­so, that they would not permit any man to bear the same Office twice to­gether.

This was observed likewise (as Ari­stotle tells us) in all the Free-States of Greece.

And in Rome we find Cincinnatus, one of the brave Romane Generals, making a Speech unto the People, to perswade them, to let him lay down his Command. Now the time was come, though the Enemy was almost at their Gates, and never more need, than at that time, of his valour and prudence, as the people told him: but no perswasion would serve the turn; resign he would, telling them, There would be more danger to the State, in pro­longing his Power, than from the Enemy, since it might prove a President most per­nicious to the Romane Freedome. Such another Speech was made by M. Ru­tilius [Page 167] Censorinus, to the People, when they forced him to undergo the Office of Censor twice together, contrary to the intent and practice of their Ance­stors; yet he accepted it: but (as Plu­tarch tell us) upon this condition; That a Law might pass against the Title in that, and other Officers, least it should be drawn into President in time to come. Thus the People dealt also with their own Tribunes, the Law being, That none of them should be continued two years together. So tender were the Ro­mans, in this particular, as one princi­pal Rule and Means, for the preserva­tion of their Liberty.

Not to let two of one Family bear Offices of Truſt at one time. A fourth Rule▪ not to let two of one Family to bear Offices of High Trust at one time, nor to permit a Continua­tion of great Powers in any own Fa­mily. The former, usually brings on the latter: And if the latter be pre­vented, there is the less danger in the former: but however, both are to be avoided: The reason is evident, be­cause a permission of them, gives a par­ticular. Family an opportunity, to bring their own private Interest into competition, with that of the Pub­lique▪ from whence presently ensues [Page 168] this grand inconvenience in State, the Affairs of the Commonwealth will be made subservient to the ends of a few persons; no Corn shall be measured. but in their bushel; nor any Materials be allowed for the Publick Work, un­less they square well with the building of a private Interest, or Family. This therefore, was a principal point of State among the Romans, Ne duo vel plures ex una familia magnos Magistra­tus gerant eodem tempore; Let not two▪ or more▪ of one Family, bear great Of­fices at the same time. And a little after it follows, Ne magna Imperia ab unâ familiâ praescribantur, Let not great Commands be prescribed, or continu­ed, by one Family.

That little liberty which was left to the Romans, after that fatal stab given to Caesar in the Senate-house, might have been preserved, had they prevent­ed his Kinsman Octavius from succeed­ing him in the possession of an extra­ordinary Power. The effecting where­of was Ciceroes work, and, indeed, his principal errour: as he often after­wards acknowledged; which may serve to shew, That the wisest man may be sometimes mistaken: For he brought [Page 169] the other into play; whertas had he quitted his spleen, and consulted his brain, he must questionless have seen, that a siding with Anthony had been more convenient, then with the other; who being once admitted into Pow­er, soon drew the Parties, and Interests of his Uncle Julius, to become his own; and with a wet finger, not onely cast off his friend Cicero, but contrived the ruine of the Republick, and Him, both together.

The Florentine Family of the Medi­ces, who hold an absolute Command at this day, made themselves, by con­tinuing Power in their hands, in a short time so considerable, that they durst openly bid defiance to Publick Liberty, which might have continued much longer, had not Casinus been so easily admitted to succeed his Cousin Alexander.

It is observable also, of the same Fa­mily, that one of them being Pope, they then hatched Designs upon seve­ral parts of Italy, not doubting but to carry them by favour of the Pope their Kinsman: but he dying before their Ends were effected, they then made a Party in the Conclave, for the [Page 170] creating of Julian de Medicis, who was Brother to the former Pope, and had like to have carried it, till Pompeius Columba stood up, and shewed them how dangerous and prejudicial it must of necessity prove, to the Liber­ties of Italy▪ that the Popedom should be continued in one house, in the hands of two brothers one after ano­ther.

What Effects the continuation of Power, in the Family of Orange, hath had in the Ʋnited Provinces, is every mans observation; and that Nation sufficiently felt, long before the Pro­ject came to maturity, in this last mans dayes; and had he left a son of sufficient years behind him, to have slept immediatly into his place, per­haps the Design might have gone on: but certainly that People have wisely improved their opportunity, (the Coc­katrice being not flech'd) in reducing that Family into a temper more suita­ble to a State and Interest of Liber­ty.

What made the antient Roman Senate, in a short time, so intollerable to that People, but because they car­ryed all by Families; as the Senate of [Page 171] Venice doth now at this day: where, if the Constitution were otherwise, the people would then (perhaps) be much more sensible what it is to be in a State of Freedom.

The Maje∣ſty and Au∣thority of the Suffra∣ges, or votes of the Su∣pream Aſ∣ſembly to be kept intire. Fifthly, It hath bin usual in Free-States, to hold up the Majesty and Au­thority of their Suffrages, or Votes in­tire▪ in their Senators, or supream As­semblies: for if this were not look'd to, and secured from controle, or in­fluence of any other Power, then Act­um erat de libertate, Liberty and Au­thority became lost for ever. So long as the Roman people kept up their credit and Authority, as sacred, in their Tribunes, and Supream Assemblies, so long they continued really free: but when by their own neglect, they gave Sylla, and his Party, in the Senate, an opportunity of power to curb them, then their Suffrages (once esteemed as sacred) were troden under foot; for immediatly after, they came to debate and act but by courtesie, the Authority left being by Sylla, after the expiration of his Dictatorship, in the hands of the standing Senate, so that it could never after be regained by the People, Nor did the Senate themselves keep it [Page 172] long in their own hands: for when Caesar marched to Rome, he deprived them also of the Authority of their Suffrages; onely in a formal way made use of them, and so under a shadow of legality, he assumed that power unto himself, which they durst not deny him.

Just in the same manner dealt Cos­mus with the Flerentine Senate: he made use of their Suffrages, but he had so plaid his Cards before-hand, that they durst not but yield to his Ambi­tion. So also Tiberius, when he en­deavored to settle himself, first brought the Suffrages of the Senate at his own Devotion, that they durst not but con­sent to his Establishment; and then so ordered the matter, that he might seem to do nothing, not only without their consent; but to be forced to ac­cept the Empire by their intreaty: so that you see, there was an Empire, in Effect, long before it was declared in Formality.

From hence, therefore, we may clearly deduce the necessity of this Rule in a Free-State, from the practice of times past, that no State can preferits Freedom, but by maintaining the free [Page 173] Suffrage of the People in full vigour, untainted with the influence, or mix­ture, of any Commanding Power.

The people are to be continually trained up în the ex∣erciſe of Armes, and the Militia lodged in the hands of thoſe that are firm to the Intereſt of the Nati∣on. A sixth Rule in Practice hath been this; to see, that the people be conti­nually trained up in the Exercise of Arms, and the Militia lodged onely in the Peoples hands; or that part of them, which are most firm to the Inte­rest o [...] Liberty, that so the Power may rest fully in the Disposition of their Supream Assemblies. The happy con­scquence whereof, was ever to this purpose:

That nothing could at any time be imposed upon the people, but by their consent; that is, by the consent of themselves; or of such as were by them intrusted: this was a Rule most strict­ly practised in all the Free-States of Greece: For, as Aristotle tells us, in his fourth Book of Politicks, they ever had special care to place the Use and Exer­cise of Arms in the people: because (say they) the Common-wealth is theirs who held the Arms.

The Sword, and Soveraignty, ever walk hand in hand together. The Ro­mans were very curious in this parti­cular, after they had gained a plenary [Page 174] possession of Liberty in their Tribunes, and successive Assemblies, Rome it self, and the Territories about it, was trai­ned up perpetually in Arms, and the whole Common-weal, by this means became one formal Militia, a generall Exercise of the best part of the people in the use of Arms, was the onely Bul­wark of their Liberty: This was reck­oned the surest way to preserve it both at home, and abroad: the Majesty of the People being secured thereby, as well against Domestick Affronts from any of their own Citizens, as against the forraign Invasions of bad Neigh­bors.

Their Arms were never lodged in the hands of any, but such as had an Inte­rest in the Publick; such as were acted by that Interest not drawn only by Pay; such as thought themselves well paid, in repelling Invaders that they might with Freedome return to their Affairs: For, the truth is, so long as Rome acted by the pure Principles of a Free-State, it used no Arms to defend itself, but, such as we call, sufficient men; such, as for the most part were men of Estate, Masters of Families, that took Arms (only upon occasion) pro [Page 175] Aris & Focis, for their Wives, their Children, and their Countrey. In those days there was no difference, in order, between the Citizen, the Hus­bandman, and the Souldier: for, he that was a Citizen, or Villager yester­day, became a Souldier the next, if the Publick Liberty required it; and that being secured, by repelling of Inva­ders, both Forreign and Domestick, im­mediatly the Souldier became Citizen again: so that the first and best brave Roman Generals, and Souldiers, came from the Plough, and returned thither when the Work was over.

This was the usual course even be­fore they had gained their Tribunes and Assemblies; that is, in the Infancy of the Senate, immediatly after the Expulsion of their Kings: for, then e­ven in the Senatick Assembly, there were some Sparks of Liberty in being, and they took this course to maintain it.

The Tarquins being driven out, but having a Party left still within, that at­tempted to make several Invasions, with confidence to carry all before them: and yet in the Intervalls, we find not any form of souldiery; only [Page 176] the Militia was lodged and exercised in the hands of that Party, which was firm to the Interest of Freedom, who upon all occasions, drew forth at a Nod of the Senate, with little charge to the Publick, and so rescued themselves out of the Clawes of Kingly Tyran­ny.

Nor do we find in after▪times, that they p [...]rmitted a Deposition, of the Arms of the Common-wealth in any other way, till that their Empire in­creasing necessity constrained them to erect a continued stipendary Souldie­ry (abroad in forreign parts) either for the holding, or winning of Provinces. Then Luxury increasing with Domi­nion, the strict Rule and Discipline of Freedome was soon quitted▪ Forces were kept up at home, (but what the consequences were, stories will tell you) as well as in the Provinces a­broad.

The Ambition of Cinna, the horid Tyranny of Sylla, the insolence of Ma­rius, and the self-ends of divers other Leaders, both before, and after them, filled all Italy with Tragdeies, and the World with wonder: so that in the end, the People seeing what misery [Page 177] they had brought on themselves, by keeping their Armies within the bow­els of Italy, passed a Law to prevent it, and to employ them abroad, or at a convenient distance: the Law was, That if any General marched over the River of Rubicon, he should be declared a publike Enemy.

And in the passage of that River, this following Inscription was erect­ed, to put the men of Arms in mind of their duty: Imperator, sive miles, sive Tyrannus armatus quisquis, sistito vex­illum arma (que) deponito, nec citra hunc Amnem trajicitio: General, or Soul­dier, or Tyrant in Arms, whosoever thou be, stand, quit thy Standard, and lay aside thy Arms, or else cross not this River.

For this cause it was, that when Caesar had presumed once to march over this River, he conceived himself so far ingaged, that there was no Re­treat; no Game next, but have at all, advanceth to Rome it self, into a pos­session of the Empire.

By this means it was, the Common­wealth having lost its Arms, lost it self too, the Power being reduced both effectually and formally into the [Page 178] hands of a single Person, and his De­pendants, who, ever after, kept the Armes out of the hands of the Peo­ple.

Then followed the erecting of a Praetorian Band, instead of a Publick Militia, he being followed here in by Augustus, and the rest of his Succes­sors, imitated of latter-times by the Grand Seignor; by Cosmus the first great Duke of Tuscany; by the Musco­vi [...]e, the Russian, the Tartar, and the French, who by that means are all Ab­solute; and it was strongly endeavored here too in England by the late King, who first attempted it by a Design of introducing Forreigners, viz. the Ger­man Horse▪ and afterwards by corrupt­ing of the Natives; as when he labour­ed the Army in the North, in their re­turn to rifle the Parliament, neglected Train-Bands; and at length, flew out him [...]elf into open Arms against the Nation.

So that you see, the way of Freedome hath bin to lodge the Arms of a Com­mon-Weal [...], in the hands of that part of the People, which are firm to its Establishment.

Children educated and inſtru∣cted in the Principles of Free∣dom. Seve [...]hly that Children should be [Page 179] educated and instructed in the Princi­ples of Freedom▪ Aristotle speaks plain­ly to this purpose, saying; That the institution of Youth, should be accommo­dated to that Form of Government, under which they live, forasmuch, as it makes exceedingly for preservation of the pre­sent Government, whatsoever it be. The Reason of it appe [...]s in this; because all the Tinctures and Impression that men receive in their Youth, they re­tain in the full Age, though never so bad, unless they happen (which is very rare) to quell the corrupt Principles of Education by an Excellency of Rea­son, and sound Judgment.

And for confirmation of this, we might cite the various Testimonies of Plutarch, Isocrates, with many more, both Philosophers, Orators, and o­thers, that have treated of this parti­cular, touching the Education of Chil­dren, as it relates either to Domestick, or Civil Government: But we shall take it for granted, without more ado, supposing none will deny, of what effect it is, in all the Concernments of Mankind, either in Conversation, or in Action.

The necessity of this Point, appears [Page 180] from hence, as well as the Reason; That if care be nor taken to temper the Youth of a Common-Wealth, with Princip [...]es and Humours suitable to that Form, no sure settlement or peace, can ever be expected: for Schools, A­cademies with al [...] other Seed-plots, and Seminaries of Youth, will other­wise be but so many Nurseries of Re­bellion, publike Enemies, and unnatu­ral Monsters that will tear the bowels of their Mother-Countrey: And this Neglect, if it follow an alteration of Government, after a Civil War, is so much the more dangerous; because, as long as Youngsters are nuzled up in the old Ways and Rudiments, by the old ill-affected Paedagogues, there will ever be a hankering after the Old Government, which must ever be in a fair probability of return, when new Generations shall be catechised into old Tenets and Affections, contrary to the Establishment of a Free-State: That being taken for the declared Interest of this Nation. Therefore, the con­sequence of such Neglect is clearly this▪ That the Enmity will be immor­tal, a Sett [...]ement impossible: there must be a perpetual Disposition to Civil-War, [Page 181] in stead of Civil Society.

Upon this account it was, that in Plutarch and Isocrates, we find so ma­ny good Testimonies of the great care that was had amongst all the Free-States of Greece in this particular, which tyed up their Paedagogues and Teachers, to certain Rules; and sele­cted certain Authors to be read onely, as Classical, for the Institution of their Youth: And, that it was so in the days of Julius Caesar, even in that bar­barous Country of Gallia, appeares by Caesars own Commentaries, who tells, how that it was the main Office of those famous men amongst them cal­led Druides, to breed up their Youth not onely in Religion, but also to in­struct them in the Nature of a Com­mon-wealth, and mould them with Principles, answerable to the Govern­ment.

If we reflect upon the two Grand Turns of State in Rome, the first, from a Monarchy to a Free-State; and then from a Free-State to a Monarchy a­gain, they minister matter of notable Observation in this particular.

In the first, we find how difficult it was for the Romans to preserve their [Page 182] Freedom when they had gotten it, be­cause most of the Youth had bin educated in Monarchical Principles, and such Tutors were ever inclining that way upon the least opportunity: so that the sons even of Brutus him­self, (who was the Founder of their Liberty) quitted that natural affection which they owed unto their Father, and Councrey; and being sway'd by the Monarchick Principles of corrupt Education, drew in a great part of the Roman Youth, (like themselves,) to joyn with them in a Design for the bringing back of the Tarquins to the Kingdom.

It is very observable also, what a do that Common-wealth had to settle, so long as any of the old stock of Educa­tion were living, because those corrupt points of Discipline and Government, wherewith they were seasoned when young, could not be worn out with Age; but hurried many of them along with the storm of every Insurrection and Invasion of the publike Enemy.

On the other side, in the Turn of a Free-State, to a Monarchy again, we see with what difficulty Caesar met, in set­ling his own Domination over a Peo­ple [Page 183] that had been educated in a Free-State, and in Principles of Freedom: insomuch, that in the end it cost him his life being stab'd for his Usurpation by a combination of some of the Sena­tors, and the Fact applauded not onely by the People, but by Cicero, and all the Roman Writers, and others that had been bred up under the Form of Freedom.

And afterwards, when Augustus took upon him the Inheritance and Title of his Uncle Caesar, he did it, lento­pede, very slowly and warily, for fear of conjuring up the same spirit in the people, that had flown into revenge against his Uncle, for his Rape upon their Liberty.

And it is Noted by Tacitus, that among the other advantages that Augustus had for his Establishment, there was this: That he never declared himself, till, after many delayes and shifts, for the continuation of Power in his own hands, he got insensibly in­to the Throne, when the old men were most of them dead, and the young Ge­neration grown up, having been pret­ty well educated and inured to his Lordly Domination. The words of [Page 184] Tacitus are these: All (saith he) was quiet in the City, the old names of the Magistrates remained unchanged; the young men were all born after Augustus his Victory at Actium: and the greatest part of the old men, du­ring the Civil Wars; when the Free-State was imbroiled and usurpt (in effect, though retained stil in name by powerful and ambitious persons) so that when he assumed and owned the Empire, there was not one man Li­ving, that had so much as seen the an­cient Form of Government of a Free-State; which indeed facilitated his Design very much, the Generation then Living, being by his Artifice and Power, bred up to his own Monarchy-Interest and Devotion.

We might be larger, but this is enough, to shew of what consequence the careful Education of Youth, is, in the Constitution of Government: and therefore, without doubt, it is one es­sential point to be observed in the E­stablishment of a Free-State, that all wayes and meanes be used for their seasoning and instruction in the prin­ciples of Freedom.

Cautions for the peo∣ple to ob∣ſerve. The Eighth Rule, is that which more [Page 185] especially relates unto the People themselves in point of behaviour, viz. That being once possessed of Liberty; they ought to use it with moderation, lest it turn to licentiousness; which, as it is a Tyranny it self, so in the end it usually occasions the corruption and conversion of a Free State, into Mo­narchical Tyranny: And therefore (by way of prevention) it is necessary to set down a few Cautions.

The People are not to uſe the ut∣moſt remedy in all caſes of male ad∣miniſtrati∣on. First, That in a Free State, it is above all things necessary to avoid Civil Dis­sention; and to remember this, That the uttermost Remedy is not to be u­sed upon every Distemper or Default of those that shall be intrusted with the Peoples Power and Authority: for, if one Inconvenience happen in Go­vernment, the correction, or curing of it by violence, introduceth a thousand: And for a man to think Civil War, or the Sword, is a way to be ordinarily used for the recovery of a sick-State, it were as great a madness, as to give strong Waters in a high Feaver: or as if he should let himself blood in the Heart, to cure the aking of his Head.

And therefore, seeing that Enormi­ty of Tumult, Dissention, and Sediti­on, [Page 186] is the main that hath bin objected by Tyrants, & their Creatures, against the Peoples Government, the onely Expedient to confute it is, That those People, that are, or shall be setled, in a State of Freedom, do (upon all occasi­ons) give them the Lie, by a diser [...]e [...] and moderate behaviour in all their proceedings, and a due reverence of such as they have once elected, and made their Superiors.

And as this is most requisite on the one side; so on the other side, if there be just (but they must be sure it be just) cause to use sharp and quick Reme­dies, for the Cure of a Common­wealth, then (seeing all Majesty and Authority is really and fundamental­ly in the people, and but Ministerial­ly in their Trustees, or Representa­tives) it concerns the people by all means to see to the Cure.

And that is in a word, in such cases onely, as appear to be manifest in­trenchments (either in design, or in being) by men of Power, upon the Fundamentals, or Essentials, of their Liberty, without which, Liberty can­not consist.

What those Essentials are, may be [Page 187] collected out of the past-discourse; the sence of all shall be illustrated by one instance.

It is that famous Contention which lasted for three hundred years in Rome betwixt the Senate and the People, about the dividing of such Lands as were conquered and taken from the Enemy.

The Senators; they sharing the lands amongst themselves, allowed little, or none, unto the people; which gave such Discontents, that the people made a Law to curb them; enacting, That no Senator should possess above 500 Acres of Land.

The Senators cryed, it was against their Liberty, thus to be abridged by the people: And the people cryed, it was inconsistent with Liberty, that the Senators should thus greaten themselvs by an ingrosment of wealth and power into their own hands. Livy saith, The people in this, said right, and the Senators did wrong: but that they both did ill, in making it a ground of Civil Dissention; for, in process of time, when the Gracchi, who were sup­posed great Patrons of Liberty, took upon them to side with the people, [Page 188] they did, instead of finding out some moderate wayes and Expedients to reduce the Senators to Reason, pro­ceed with such heat and violence, that the Senate being jealous of their own safety, were forced to chuse Sylla for their General: which being observed by the people, they also raised an Ar­my, and made Marius their General: so that here you see in came to a down-right Civil-War.

The occasion indeed, was given by the Senators; (for, there was no rea­son they should Grandise themselves in so gross a manner as they did) but yet the occasion ought not to have bin so taken, and prosecuted with such vio­lence as it was by the People: for see­ing more temperate-wayes had been practised by their Ancestors, and might have been found out again, to curb the Ambition of their Nobility in the Senate: Therefore, the People ought, first, to have tryed those wayes again, and have used all other means to have brought things about, rather than by a milguided heat and vio­lence to rush into Arms; which as it is the most desperate Remedy, so it ought never to be used, but when all [Page 189] other courses have been tried in vain, and when the Publick Liberty is really concerned by an imminent Danger, or invincible Necessity: For, this Quarrel, which questionless might have been composed was, through in­discretion, made the ground of so bloudy a Civil-war, that what through Fines, Banishment, inhumane Cruel­ties, acted on both sides, Defeats in the open Field, and Massacres within the City, it cost the best Bloud and Estates of the Nobility and Commons; and in the end, it cost them also their Li­berty.

In what Caſe the Romans uſ∣ed the ut∣moſt remedy For it is worthy observation, that out of the Root of this Civil war, sprang that Noble one, which was managed between Pompey and Caesar, and which will serve to illustrate the o­ther part of our discourse, in shewing, When it is that the people may make use of the utmost, remedy; that is, in case of an intrenchment, manifestly designed, & acted upon the Publick Li­berty. For Caesar having given manifest causeso Suspition to the Senat & people, by his acting amongst his Soldiers; and then by a down-right march with them over Rubicon towards Rome, (which was [Page 190] treason by the Law) this was a plain usurpation, and drew an invincible ne­cessity, upon the people, and Senate, to arm form their Liberty and commence a Civil war under the conduct of Pom­pey; so that this last war was necessary as the other was needlesse, if they could have kept within the bounds of pru­dence, and moderation.

We have a very notable instance al­so in our own Nation, which may serue for a Just example to all the world in point of behaviour. If we run over the Catalogue of the late Kings defaults in government, we find ex­traordinary patience in the people, notwithstanding his extraordinary in­croachments from time to time. It were needless to reckon up the several Monopolies, Impositions, and other oppressions of the People, both in soul and body, which are made publick and known to all the World; toge­ther with that highest of all Practices, not onely in dissolving Parliaments abruptly, but professedly designing the ruine of Parliaments, in depriving the People of their due Succession. Yet notwithstanding all this, that despe­rate Remedy of the Sword was for­born, [Page 192] untill invincible Necessi­ty did put it into their hands, for the preservation of themselves, with their Rights and Liberties.

And so by these Examples, any peo­ple in a State of Freedom, may be suf­ficiently instructed how to demean themselves, for the avoiding of Licen­tiousness, Tumult, and Civil Dissen­tion, which are the principal Incon­veniences charged by Royalists, upon Free-States and Common-wealths: from hence, also, may be observed all the necessary points of prudence, and forbearance, which ought to take place in respect of Superiors, till it shall evi­dently appear unto a people, that there is a Design on foot to surprize and seize their Liberties.

A second Caution, is, in relation to their Elective Power, that in all Ele­ctions of Magistrates, they have an e­speciall Eye upon the Publick, in ma­king choice of such persons onely, as have appeared most eminent, and active, in the Establishment and Love of Freedom.

In such hands the Guardianship of Liberty may be safely placed, because such men have made the Publick Inte­rest, [Page 192] and their own, all one; and there­fore will neither betray, nor desert it, in prosperity or adversity; whereas men of another qualification and temper, if they get into Authority, care not to serve the Publick any further, than the publike serves them, and will draw off and on as they find their Op­portunity: Yea, and take this for a certain Rule, that if any person be ad­mitted into Power, that loves not the Common-wealth, above all other considerations, such a man is (as we say) every mans money; any State-Marchant may have him for a Factor: and for good consideration, he will of­ten make Returns upon the Publike Interest, have a stock going in every Party, and with men of every Opini­on, and (if occasion serve) truck with the Common-Enemy, and Common­wealth, both together.

But that you may see, I do not speak without book, it is Aristotles opinion, as well as mine; who saith, in the first of his Politicks, being thus translated, Per negligentiam mutatu [...] status Rei­publicae, cum ad Potestates assumuntur illi qu [...] praesentem statum non amant: The Form of a Common-wealth is then [Page 193] altered by negligence, when those men are taken into Power, which do not love the present Establishment, it is not onely a way to preserve a Com­mon-wealth, to avoid those that hate it, but those also are as much to be avoided, that do not love it; that is, who are not earnestly wedded to it by an inward active principle of Affecti­on: And the reason is very evident, because their Affections being of an indifferent Nature, remain ready to run out into any Form, Interest, or Party, that offers it self upon the least alteration or temptation whatsoever. For this, we might give you instance enough, and too much; but waving them, it may suffice, that most of the Broils, Tumults, and Civil Dissenti­ons, that ever hapned in Free-States, have been occasioned by the Ambiti­ous, Treacherous, and Indirect Practi­ces of such persons admitted into Po­wer, as have not been firm in their hearts to the Interest of Liberty.

The truth of this is (omitting many others) to be seen in the Romane State, after its Liberty was fully setled in a Succession of the Peoples supream Assemblies.

[Page 194]For the Nobility in the Senate, be­ing men of another Interest (however they pretended) and, sometimes by cunning, sometimes by corrupting, getting Trust from the People, did by combination and complyance with their Fellow-Senators, to garble, per­plex, and turmoil the Peoples Affairs, Concernments, and Understandings, that at length, what they could never have done by force, as Opposites, they effected by fraud, as Friends, to de­prive the People of a quiet and com­fortable enjoyment of their Free­dome.

Faction, Alliance, & Affection is to be avoi∣ded in all Elections. A third Caution is, That in all their Elections of any into the Supream Court, or Councels, they be not led by any bent of Faction, Alliance, or Affection, and that none be taken in, but purely upon the account of me­rit.

The former course hath ever bin the occasion of discontents, sidings, and Parties.

The latter, stops the mouths of men, that perhaps are contrary minded, and draws the consent and approbation of all the World, when they see men put in Authority, that have a clear re­putation [Page 195] of transcendent Honesty and Wisdom.

That peo∣ple are to a∣void all falſe char∣ges againſt perſons in Authority. A fourth Caution, is, That as it is the secret of Liberty, that all Magi­strates, and publike Officers, be kept in an accountable state, liable to render an account of their Behaviour and Actions; and also, that the people have freedom to accuse whom they please: so on the other side, it con­cerns them, above all things, to avoid false Charges, Accusations, Calumnia­tions against Persons in Authority, which are the greatest abuses and ble­mishes of Liberty, and have been the most frequent Causes of Tumult and Dissention.

The Banishment, called Ostraoism, among the Athenians, was instituted (at first) upon a just and noble ground: so was that called Petatism, among the Lacedemonians, to turn such out of the Common-wealth, who had rendered themselves suspected against the com­mon Liberty: but yet the abuse of it afterwards proved most pernicious, to the imbroyling of those States with Civil Dissention, whenit was pervert­ed by some petulant spirits, to an op­position of some few (and but few) of [Page 196] their best deserving Citizens.

The Romans also, in their state of Liberty, retained this freedom also, of keeping all persons accountable, and accusing whom they pleased, but then they were very cautious also, to retain that Decree of the Senate, called, Tur­pilianum, in full forde and vertue, whereby a severe-Fine was set on the Heads of all Calumniators, and false Accusers.

The due Observation of this Rule preserved that State a long time from Usurpation by men in power on the one side, and from popular clamour and Tumults on the other side.

As the peo∣ple are to avoid in∣gratitude, ſo likewiſe to have a care not to intruſt any perticular perſons, with an unlimited power. A fifth Caution is, That, as by all means they should beware of Ingrati­tude, and unhandsome Returns, to such as have done eminent services for the Common-wealth; So it con­cerns them, for the publike peace and security, not to impose a Trust in the hands of any person or persons fur­ther, than as they may take it back a­gain at pleasure.

The Reason is, because, (as the Pro­verb saith) Honores mutant mores, Ho­nours change mens manners; Acces­sions, and Continuations of Power and [Page 197] Greatness, expose the mind to temp­tations: They are Sailes too big for any Bulk of Mortality to steer an even course course by.

The Kingdoms of the World, and the Glories of them, are Baites that seldome failes when the Tempter goes a fishing: and none but he, that was more than man, could have refused them. How many Free-States & Com­mon-wealths have paid dear for their Experience in this particular? who by trusting their own servants too far, have been forced, in the end to receive them for their Masters. Nor is it to be wondred at by any, considering that immoderate Power soon lets in high and ambitious thoughts; and where they are once admitted, no Design so absur'd, or contrary to a mans princi­ples, but he rusheth into it, without the least remorse or consideration: for the Spirit of Ambition, is a Spirit of Gid­diness, ir foxes men that receive it, and makes them more drunk than the spi­rit of Wine.

So that were they never so wise, just, and honest before, they afterwards become the contrary, meer sots, non compos mentis, being hurried on with­out [Page 198] fear or wit, in all their underta­kings, And therefore, without questi­on, it highly concerns a People that have redeemed and rescued their Li­berties out of the hands of Tyranny, and are declared a Free-State, so to regulate their Affairs, that all Temp­tations, and Opportunities of Ambi­tion, may be removed out of the way: or else there follows a necessity of Tu­mult and Civil Dissention, the com­mon consequence whereof hath ever been a Ruine of the publike Free­dome.

This Caesar, who first took Arms upon the Publick Score, and became the Peoples Leader, letting in Ambi­tious Thoughts to his unbounded Po­wer, soon shook hands with his first Friends and Principles, and became another man: so that upon the first fair Opportuniry, he turn'd his Armes on the Publick Liberty.

Thus did Sylla serve the Senate, and Marius also the People, being the same Tyrant, in effect, though not in name, nor in an open manner.

Thus did Pisistratus at Athens, Aga­thocles in Sicily, Cosmos, Soderino, and Savaranola in Florence, Castrucio in [Page 199] Luca, and others, in many other pla­ces: Nor must it be forgotten what the Family of Orange would have done in Holland; for upon the very same ac­count have Usurpations bin commen­ced in all Free-States throughout the World.

Treaſon againſt the Peoples Li∣berties, not to be par∣doned. The Ninth, and last Rule, for preser­vation of the Publick Freedome, is this, That it be made an unpardonable Crime, to incur the guilt of Treason against the Interestand Majesty of the People.

And for the clearing of this, it will be requisite to muster up those various Particulars that come within the compass of Treason, according to the Practice, and Opinion of other Nati­ons. The 1. remarkable Treason in old Rome, after its Establishment in a State of Freedome, was that of Brutus his sons, who entered into a formal Con­spiracy for the bringing back of the Tarquins to the Kingdom by force of Arms.

This Brutus was the Founder of the Roman Liberty; and therefore one would have thought the young men might have obtained an easie pardon: But such was the zeal of the Romans, [Page 200] for the preservation of their Freedom, that they were all put to death with­out mercy; and, that all others in time to come, might be deprived of the least hope of being spared upon the like oc­casion, their own Father was the man most forward to bring them to Execu­tion.

This was Treason in gross: but in after-time, there started up more refi­ned pieces of Treason; as may be col­lected out of the Actions of Maelius and Manlius, two persons that had de­served highly of the Common wealth; but especially the latter, who saved it from ruine, when the Gauls had be­sieged the Capitol.

Nevertheless, presuming afterwards upon the People, because of his extra­ordinary Merits, He, by greating him­self beyond the size of a good Citizen; and entertaining Thoughts and Coun­sels of surprising the Peoples Liber­ties, was condemned to death; but yet not without the Peoples pitty (as indeed it was an unhappy Necessity, that they should be forced to destroy him that had saved them from destru­ction) [Page 201] To the same end came Maelius also, upon the like occa­sion.

Another sort of Treason there was contrived likewise against that Peo­ple;

And that was by those Magistrates, called the Decemviri, touching whose Actions, and the Ground of their Condemnation, I onely let you know,

That you may be sufficiently in­formed by other Pens then mine; such as the Historian Livy, Pomponi­us, Dionysius, and others, that have written of the Roman Affaires and Antiquities.

A fourth sort of Treason against that People, was manifest Usurpation, acted over and over, long before the time of Caesar.

Some other Particulars also, there were, of less consideration, that came within the compass of Treason; And in all, they were very strict to vindi­cate the Interest of the Common-Wealth, without respect of Per­sons.

[Page 202]To those passages out of the old Common-wealth of Rome, let us add the rest we have to say about this point, out of the practices of the pre­sent State of Venice, the most exact for Punctillo's of that Nature that ever was in the World; and therefore, que­stionless, it is the most principal cause of her so long continuance: It is, there, Death without mercy, for any man to have the least attempt, or thought, of conspiring against the Common-weal, and in several other Cases, as follow­eth.

Secondly, it is Treason in case any Senator betray Counsels: there it is an unpardonable Crime, and such a mortal sin, that draws on Death with­out mercy.

This severity also, was retained in the Roman State, where such as be­came guilty of this Crime, were either burnt alive, or hanged upon a Gibber: Hereupon, (saith Valerius Max. lib. 2.) when any matter was delivered, or de­bated, it was, as if no man had heard a syllable of what had been said among so many: From whence it came to pass, that the Decrees of their Senate were called Tacita, that is to say; [Page 203] things concealed; because never dis­covered, untill they came to Executi­on.

Thirdly, it is Treason, without mer­cy, for any Senators, or other Officers of Venice, to receive Gifts, or Pensions, from any forreign Prince, or State, up­on any pretence whatsoever. It was an old Proverb among the Heathens, That the gods themselves might be taken with gifts: and therefore the conse­quences must needs be dangerous, in the inferiour Courts of States and Princes; since nothing can be carryed in this Case, according to Native Inte­rest, and Sound Reason; but onely by Pluralities of Forreign Dictates, and Compliances: But in Venice they are so free from this treacherous Impiety, that all States which transact with them, must do it above-board, consult before-hand with their brains, and not their purses: so that (as Thuanus saith) the King of France needs not use much labour to purchase an Inte­rest with any Prince, or State in Italy, unless it be the Venetian Republick, where all Forreign Compliances, and Pensioners, are punished with utmost severity; but escape well enough, in o­ther places.

[Page 204]Fourthly, It is Treason for any of her Senators to have any private Con­ference with Forreign Ambassadors and Agents. It is very observable also, among our Neighbours of the Low-Countries, that one Article of the Charge, whereby they took off Barne­velts head, was, for that he held famili­arity and converse with the Spanish Ambassador, at the same time when Spain was an Enemy.

Thus you have a brief Description of Treason, in the most notable kinds of it, according to the Customes and Opinions of two of the most eminent Free-States, (which may serve instead of all the rest) that hath been in the World; who, as a principal Rule and Means for the preservation of Freedom, made it a Crime unpardonable, to in­cur the guilt of Treason, in any of these kinds, against the Interest and Majesty of the People in a Free-State,

We now return to the former main Point of this Discourse, in tracing out the Remainders of those Errours that have been received in the Practice of Policy.

[Page 205] Reaſon of State pre∣ferred be∣fore Rules of Honeſty, is an Error in policy. A fourth error in Policy & which is indeed Epidemical, hath been the Re­gulation of affaires by Reason of State, not by the strict Rule of Honest. But for fear be mistaken, you are to under­stand, that by Reason of State here, we do not condemn the equitable Results of prudence & right Reason: for upon determinations of this nature depends the safety of all states, and princes; but that reason of state that flowes from a corrupt principle to an indirect end; that reason of state, which is the states mans reason, or rather his will and lust, when he admits Ambition to be a reason, Perferment, Power, Pro­fit, Revenge, and Opportunity, to be reason, sufficient to put him up­on any designe of Action that may tend to the present advantage; though contrary to the Law of God, or the law of common honesty & of Nations.

A more lively description of this strange Pocus called Reason of State, take as followeth. It is the most so­veraign Commudaer, & the most im­portant Counsellor. Reason of State is the Care and compass of the ship, the life of a State. That which answers all objections, and quarrels, about Mall [Page 206] government. That's it, which makes War, imposes Taxes, cuts off Offen­ders, pardons Offenders, sends and treats Ambassadors.

It can say and unsay, do and un­do, baulk the Common Road, make High-wayes to become By-wayes, and the furthest about, to become the nearest Cut. If a difficult Knot come to be untied, which neither the Di­vine by Scripture, nor Lawyer by Case or precedent can untie, then Reason of State, or a hundred wayes more, which Idiots knows not, dissolves it. This is that great Empress which the Italians call Raggione distat [...]. It can rant as a Souldier, complement as a Monfieur, trick it as a Juggler, strut it as a States man and is as changable as the Moon, in the variety of her ap­pearances.

But we may take notice of a more excellent way in oppsition to this san­dy Foundation of Policy, called Reason of State, viz. a simple reliance upon God in the vigorous and present act­ings of all Righteousness, exprest by honest men, in plain language, to this effect; Fiat justitia, & fractus illabatur Orbis; Deal uprightly, walke close [Page 207] and real to your promises, and prin­ciples, though the Fabrick of Heaven and earth should fall, yet God is able to support, he expects but so much faith as will counterpoise a grain of mustard-seed. Besides, in following singly, a just and righteous principle, a man gains this aduantage, that we may go on boldly, with a mind free from that torturing sollicitude of suc­cess, (he is subject to none of those heats and colds, those fits and frights, wherewith men are perpetually vex­ed, for fear of discovery or miscarriage, when they have once intangled them­selves in any by-acting of Engage­ments) he either prospers, to the great good of his Nation, or else dies with honour and triumph.

But those that follow the other principle of Humane Invention, and serve that Italian Goddess, Raggione di Stato, they may live a while as gods, but shall die like men, and perish like one of the Princes.

But because words will not serve the turn, take a few Examples of those many, that might be fetcht from all Ages, and Nations. It was Reason of State, made Pharoah hold the Israe­lites [Page 208] in bondage, and afterwards, when they were freed, to endeavour to bring them back again to their old slavery: but you know what he came to; It was Reason of State, that made Saul to spare Agag, and plot the ruine of Da­vid.

It was Reason of State, that made Jeroboam to set up Calves in Dan and Bethel.

It was Reason of State, (and a shrew'd one too) when Achitophel caused Ab­salom, to defile his Fathers Concu­bines in the sight of all Israel. You know what end they both came to. It was the same, that caused Abner, first, to take part with the house of Saul, and that caused Joab to kil him after he came to be his Rival in Fame, and the Favour of David: their Ends were both bloudy.

Hence it was, that Solomon having pardoned Adonijah, thought fit after­wards to put him to death, upon a very slender occasion.

And Jehu, though he had Warrant from God to destroy all the house of Ahab his Master; yet, because in the Execution of it, he mingled Reason of State, in relation to his own Interest, [Page 209] and minded the Establishment of him­self thereby, more than the Command and Honour of God, in the Execution of Justice: therefore God cursed him for his pains, threatning by the mouth of the Prophet Hosea, to avenge the bloud of Ahabs family upon the house of Jehu.

It was Reason of State, that moved Herod to endeavour the destruction of Christ, as soon as he was born.

It was Reason of State in the Jewes, (lest the Romans should come and take away their Place and Nation) and in Pilate, (lest he should be thought no friend to Caesar) that made them both joyn in crucifying the Lord of Glory, and incur that heavy Curse, which at length fell upon the Jewish Place and Nation.

It is Reason of State, that makes the Pope and the Cardinals stick so close one to another, and binds them and the Monarchs of Christendom in one common Interest, for the greatning of themselves, and the inslaving of the People; for which, a sad destruction doth attend them.

It was Reason of State, that destroyed so many millions of men (forboth) in [Page 210] the Holy War; that so Princes might not have time to take notice of the Popes Usurpation, nor the People lei­sure and opportunity to call their Princes to an account for their un­bounded Tyranny.

It was Reason of State, that was pleaded in behalf of Borgia, to justifie all his Villanies, in wading through so much bloud and mischief to a Princi­pality in Italy; but he escaped not, to enjoy the fruit of all his labour.

It was the same Devil, that made Henry the 4 of France, to renounce his Religion, and turn Papist, to secure himself from Popish Reveng; but God pur [...]sht him, and sent a Popish Dag­ger through his heart.

It made Richard the Third in Eng­land, to butcher his own Nephew; for which vengeance pursued him, being at last tied a thwart a horse back na­ked and bloudy, like a Calf of the Shambles.

It made Henry the 7▪ to extinguish the Line of Plantag [...]n [...]t, and his Son after him, not onely to dabble his hands in the bloud of many, but to persecute the Protestants, not with­standing that he fell heavy also upon the Papists.

[Page 211]It made his Daughter Mary to fill up the measure of her Fathers iniqui­ties, as they could not be expiated by the vertues of her sister, and Successor, whose onely fa [...] was, in following Reason of State so far, as to serve the Interest of Monarchy, above that of Religion, by upholding an Order of Prelacy; so that in her the direct Line of that Family ended.

After this, it was wicked Reason of State, that continued Monarchy, and brought in a Scotch-man upon us. This was James, who was so great an Admirer of Reason of State, that he adopted it for its own Darling, by the name of King-craft: and his Motto, No Bishop no King, shewed, that he pre­fer'd Reason of State, before the Inte­rest of Religion; as in other things, before honesty: witness, among many other, his quitting the Cause of God, and the Patatinate, to keep fair with the house of Austria: for which, and for the same Reason of State, put in practice by his Son Charles, for the ruine of Religion and Liberty, by a bloudly war, the whole Family hath been brought to [...]ad destruction.

These Examples are sufficient to [Page 212] shew that Reason of State, prefer'd be­fore the Rule of Honesty, is an Errour in Policy with a vengeance; as they that will not believe, shall be sure to feel i [...], since it brings unavoidable Ruine, not onely to particular per­sons, but upon whole Families, and Nations.

A uniting of the Le∣giſlative and Execu∣tive Powers in one and the ſame hands, an Errour in Policy. A fifth Errour in Policy hath been this, viz. a permitting of the Legisla­tive and Executive Powers of a State, to rest in one and the same hands and persons. By the Legislative Power, we understand the Power of making, altering, or repealing Laws, which in all well-ordered Governments, hath ever been lodged in a succession of the supream Councels of Assemblies of a Nation.

By the Executive Power, we mean that Power which is derived from the other, and by their Authority trans­fer'd into the hand or hands of one Person, (called a Prince) or into the hands of many (called States) for the administration of Government, in the Execution of those Laws. In the keep­ing of these two Powers distinct, flow­ing in distinct Channels, so that they may never meet in one, save upon [Page 213] some short extraordinary occasion con­sists the safety of a State.

The Reason is evident; because if the Law-makers, (who ever have the Supream Power) should be also the constant Administrators and Dispen­cers of Law and Justice, then (by con­fequence) the People would be left without Remedy, in case of Injustice, since no Appeal can lie under Heaven against such as have the Supremacy; which, if once admitted, were incon­sistent with the very intent and natu­ral import of true Policy: which ever supposeth, that men in Power may be unrighteous; and therefore (presu­ming the worst) points alwayes, in all determinations, at the Enormities and Remedies of Government, on the behalf of the People.

For the clearing of this, it is worthy your observation; that in all King­domes and States whatsoever, where they have had any thing of Freedom among them, the Legislative and Exe­cutive Powers have been managed in distinct hands: That is to say, the Law­makers have set down Laws, as Rules of Government; and then put Power into the hands of others (not their own) to govern by those Rules; by [Page 214] which means the people were happy, having no Governours, but such as were liable to give an account of Go­vernment to the supream Councel of Law-Makers. And on the other side, it is no less worthy of a very serious observation; That Kings and standing States never became absolute over the People, till they brought both the making and execution of Lawes into their own hands: and as this Usur­pation of theirs took place by degrees, so unlimited Arbitrary Power crept up into the Throne, there to domineet o're the World, and defie the Liber­ties of the People.

Cicero, in his second Book de Offic., and his third, de Legibus, speaking of the first institution of Kings, tells us, how they were at first left to govern at their own discretion without Laws. Then their Wills, and their Words, were Law, the ma [...]ing and execution of Lawes was in one and the same hands.

But what was the consequence? Nothing but Injustice, and Injustice without Remedy, till the People were taught by Necessity to ordain Lawes, as Rules whereby they ought to go­vern. [Page 215] Then began the meeting of the People successively in their supream Assemblies, to make Laws; whereby Kings (in such places as continued un­der the Kingly Form) were limited and restrained, so that they could do nothing in Government, but what was agreeable to Law; for which they were accountable, as well as other Officers were in other Forms of Government, to those supream Councels and As­semblies: Witness all the old stories of Athens, Sparta, and other Countries of Greece, where you shall find, that the Law-making, and the Law-execu­ting Powers, were placed in distinct hands under every Form of Govern­ment: For, so much of Freedom they retained still under every Form, till they were both swallowed up (as they were several times) by an absolute Domination.

In old Rome, we find Romulus their first King cut in pieces by the Senate, for taking upon him to make and exe­cute Laws at his own pleasure. And Livy tells us, that the reason why they expel'd Tarquin their last King, was, because he took the Executive and Le­gislative Powers both into his own [Page 216] hands, making: himself both Legisla­tor, and Officer, inconsulto [...] without advice, and in defiance of the Senate.

Kings being cashier'd, then their Standing-Sonates came in play, who making and executing Laws, by De­crees of their own▪ soongrew intole­rable, and put the people upon divers desperate Adventures, to get the Le­gislative Power out of their hands, and place it in their own; that is, in a suc­cession of their Supream Assemblies: But the Executive Power they left, part in the hands of Officers of their own, and part in the Senate; in which State it continued some hundreds of years, to the great happiness and con­tent of all, till the Senate by sleights and subtilties got both Powers into their own possession again, and turned all into confusion,

Afterwards, their Emperors (though Usurpers) durst not at first turn both these Powers into the Channel of their own unbounded Will; but did it by degrees, that they might the more infensibly deprive the people of their Liberty, till at length they openly made and executed Laws at their own [Page 217] pleasures, being both Legislators and Officers, without giving [...] and so there was an end of the Roman Liberty.

To come nearer home, let us look into the old Constitution of the Com­mon-wealths, and Kingdomes of Eu­rope. We find in the I [...]lian States; Ve­nice, which having the Legislative and Executive Power, confined within the narrow Pale of its Nobility in the Senate, is not so free as once Florence was with Siena, Millan, and the rest; before their Dukes, by arrogating both those Powers to themselves, worm'd them out of their Liberty.

Of all those States there, onely Genoa remains in a free posture, by keeping the Power of Legislation onely in their supream Assemblies, and leav­ing the Execution of Law in a titular Duke, and a Councel, the keeping of these Powers asunder within their proper Sphere, is one principal Rea­son why they have been able to ex­clude Tyranny out of their own State, while it hath run the Round in Italy.

What made the Grand Seig­nior absolute of old, but his in­grossing both these Powers? and of late [Page 218] the Kings of Spain and France? In an­cient time the case stood far other­wise; for in Ambrosio Morales his Chronicle you will finde, that in Spain the Legislative power was lodged onely in their supreme Councel, and their King was no more but an e­lective Officer, to execute such Laws as they made, and in case of failing, to give them an accompt, and submit to their judgements, which was the common practice; as you may see al­so in Mariana: It was so also in A­ragon, till it was united to Castile, by the Mariage of Ferdimand, and Isa­bel; and then both States soon lost their liberty, by the projects of Ferdi­mand and his successors, who drew the powers of Legislation and Execu­tion of Law, within the verge and in­fluence of the Prerogative Royall: whilest these two powers were kept distinct, then these States were free; but the ingrossing of them in one and the same hands, was the losse of their Freedom.

France likewise was once as free as any Nation under Heaven, though the King of late hath done all, and been all in all, till the time of Lewis [Page 219] the eleventh: he was no more but an Officer of State; regulated by Law, to see the Laws put in execution; and the Legislative Power (that) rested in the Assembly of the 3. Estates; but Lewis, by snatching both these Pow­ers into the single hands of himselfe, and his successors, rookt them of their Liberty; which they may now recover again, if they have but so much man­hood, as to reduce the two Powers into their ancient, or into better Channels.

This pattern of Lewis was followed close by the late King of England, who by our ancient Laws, was the same here, that Lewis ought to have been in France, an Officer in trust, to see to the execution of the Lawes: but by aiming at the same ends which Lewis attained, and straining, by the ruine of Parliaments, to reduce the Legisla­tive Power, as well as the Executive into his own hands, he instead of an absolute Tyranny, which might have followed his project, brought a swift destruction upon himself and Fami­ly.

Thus you see it appears, that the keeping of these two Powers distinct, [Page 220] hath been a ground preservative of the peoples Interest, whereas their uniting hath been its ruine all along in so many Ages and Nations.

Affairs of State trin∣ſacted by a few, is an Erronr în Policy. A sixth errour in Policy, observa­ble in the practices of other times and Nations, hath been a reducing trans­actions, and in Inetrest of the Pub­lick, into the disposition and power of a few particuler persons. The ill con­sequences where of have ever bin these; that matters were not wont to be car­ried by fair, freindly, and legal debates, but by Design and Surprisal; not by freedom, and consent of the people, in their open Assemblies; but ac­cording to the premeditated Resoluti­ons, and forestalments of Crafty pri­jectors in private Cabinets, and Junto's; not according to the true In­terest of State, but in order to the serv­ing of mens ends; not for the bene­fit, and improvement of the people, but to keep them under as ignorant of true Liberty, as the Horse and Mule; that they might be Bridled and Sadled, & Ridden under the wise pre­tences of being Governed and kept in Order. But the Grand and worse consequences of all, hath been this; [Page 221] that such Collegues, Partners, and In­grossers of Power having once brought about their ends by lying practies up­on the people; have ever [...]a [...]n into fits of Emulation against themselves, and the next design hath ever bin to rook their fellows, and rid themselves of competitors, so that at length they have been their own executioners, and ruined one another. And had it been only the destruction of themselves, the matter were not considerable; but the people having by this means been torn with Civill dissentions, and the miseries of War, by being drawn into Parties, according to their severall humors and affections; the usuall e­vent ever was, that in the end they have been seized as the prey of some single Tyrant.

An example of this there was in the State of Athens, under the Govern­ment of those thirty men, who usurp­ed the power into their own hands, and were afterwards called the thirty Tyrants, for their odious behaviour; for Xenophon tells us, that they drew the determinations of all things into their own Closets, but seemed to ma­nage them calculis & suffragiis Plebis, [Page 222] by the Votes of the people, which they had brought to their own devo­tion in the Assembly, to countenance their proceedings. And their custom was, if any sort of men complained, and murmured at their doings; or ap­peared for the Publique, immediately to snap them off by the losse of life or fortune, under a pretence of being se­ditions, and turbulent fellows against the peace of their Tyranny. These Juncto-men had not been many moneths in possession; but they began to quarrel with one another; and the reason why the game went not on, a­gainst one another, was because the people took it out of their hands, and diverted the course of their spleen a­gainst each other, into a care of mutu­all defence, they being assaulted on e­very side, by popular arme and cla­mors, for the recovery of liberty. So you see the event of these thirty mens combination, was no lesse then a ci­vill War; and it ended in their ba­nishment. But as great a mischief fol­lowed, for a new Junto of ten men got into their places, whose Govern­ment proving little lesse odious than the [...], gave an occasion to new [Page 223] changes, which never left shifting, till at last they fell into a single Tyranny. And the wilder sort of people, having by a sad experience, felt the fruits of their own error, in following the lusts and parties of particular powerful persons, grew wise; and combining with the honester sort, they all as one man, set their shoulders to the work, and restored the primitive Majesty, and Authority of their supreme As­semblies.

Herodotus in his second Book, tells us, that Monarchy being abolished in Egypt, after the death of King Setho, and a Declaration published for the freedom of the people, immediately the Administration of all Affaires, was ingross't in the hands of twelve Grandees, who having made them­selves secure against the people in a few years, fell to quarrelling with one another (as the manner is) about their share in the Government. This drew the people into severall parties, and so a civill Warre ensued; wherein Psummeticus (one of the twelve) ha­ving slain all his Partners, left the people in the lurch, and instead of a free State, seated himself in the pos­session [Page 224] of a single Tyranny.

But of all old instances, the most famous are the two Triumvirates that were in Rome. The first was that of Pomp [...]y, Caesar, and Crassus, who ha­ving drawn the affairs of the Empire, and the whole World into their own particular hands, acting and determi­ning all in a private [...] unto of their own, without the advice or consent of the Senate and people, unless it were now and then to make stalking horses of them, for the more clearly conveyance of some unpleasing de­sign: These men, having made an a­greement among themselves, that no­thing should be done in the Common­wealth, but what pleased their own humor, it was not long ere the spirit of Ambition set them flying at the fa­ces of one another, and drew the whole World upon the Stage, to act that bloody Tragedy, whose Ca [...]astro­phe was the death of Pompey, and the Dominion of Caesar. The second Tri­muvirate was erected after the fatall stab given to Caesar in the Senate, be­tween Octavius (afterwards Emperor by the name of Augustus,) Lopidus, and Antony: these having drawn all [Page 225] Affairs into their own hands, and sha­red the World between them, pre­sently fell abandying against one ano­ther. Augustus picking a quarrell with Lepidus, gave him a lift out of his Authority, and confined him to a close imprisonment in the City. This being done first, he had the more hope and opportunity next for the outing of Anthony: he picks a quarrel with him too, begins a new civill Warre, wherein Rome and a great part of the World was engaged to serve his am­bition; and things being brought to the decision of a Battell, and the ruine of Anthony, he afterwards seated, and secured himself in the injoyment of a single Tyranny.

Omitting many other instances here in England, it is worthy observa­tion, that in the great contest between Henry the third, and the Barons, a­bout the liberties of themselves and the people, the King being forced at length to yield, the Lords instead of freeing the Nation indeed, ingrossed all power into their own hands, un­der the name of the Twenty-foure Conservators of the Kingdom, and behaved themselves like totidem. [Page 226] Tyranny, so many Tyrants acting all in their own Names, and in [...] of their own, wholly neglecting, or else over-ruling Parliaments. But then not agreeing among themselves, there were three or four of them defeated the other twenty, and drew the intire management of Affairs into their own hands, viz. the Earles of Leicester, Gloucester, Hereford, and Spencer; yet it continued so not long; for, Leicester getting all into his own power, fell at enmity with Gloucester, and was de­feated by him.

At length, Leicester putting his For­tune to a Battel, was slain; and the King thereupon, getting all power back again took advantage of that op­portunity for the greatning of himself, and Prerogative.

And so you see, All that the people got by the effusion of their bloud, and loss of their peace, was, That instead of one Tyrant, they had Twenty Four, and then Four; and after them, a single Usurper, (which was Monfort, Earl of Leicester) and he being gone, they were forced to serve their old Tyrant Henry the Third again, who by this means, became the more secure and [Page 227] firm in his Tyranny: wherein if they had dealt like men of honour, and made the Nation as free as they pre­tended, not ingrossing all into their own private hands, but instating the liberty of England, Paramount above the regall prerogative, in a due and constant course of successive Parlia­ments, (without which, liberty is but a meere name and shadow) then all the succeeding inconveniences had been surely prevented: the bloody bickering afterwards might have been avoided, their own persons and ho­nors preserved, Kings either cashiered or regulated; as they ought to have been, and the whole Nation freed from those after-gripes and pa [...]gs; in­flicted by that Henry and his corrupt Line of successors.

The World affords many instances of this kinde, but these are sufficient to manifest the fatall consequences that have happened, in permitting publick [...] and interests to be ingrossed, and rest in the power of a few particuler persons; and that it deserves to be markt (as one faith) with a black Cole, as a most permiti­ons error [...] Policy.


[Page 228] Driving of Faction and Par∣ties, a main Erronr in Policy. A seventh error in Policy, is the driving of Factions and Parties. Now that you may know what Factiou is, and which is the factious Party in any State or Kingdom, afflicted with that infirmity▪ the onely way is first to finde out the true and declared Inte­rest of State; and then if you observe any Designes, Counsels, Actings, or Persons, moving in opposition to that which is the true publick Interest, it may be infallibly concluded, that there lies the Faction; and the facti­ous Party, which is so much the more dangerous, in regard it not only af­flicts and tears Common-wealths with divisions and discords▪ at home, but in the end exposes them to the mercy (or rather) the malice of some publick enemy, either at home, or from abroad, and brings a sad desola­tion, and ruine upon the Estates, lives, and liberties of the people.

There is a notable faction we read of in this Roman story, which was that of the Decemviri, who being in­trusted with the Government, and the time of their trust expired, they in­stead of making a Resignation, com­bined together for the Perpetuation of [Page 229] the power in their own hands, con­trary to the intent of their first Electi­on, and in defiance of that which twelve moneths before had been de­clared the interest of the Common­wealth. The grand Engineer among them was Appius Clandius, who ma­naged his designe by promising the Nobility, that if they would stick to the Decemviri, then the Decemviri would stick to them, and joyn with them, in keeping under the people and their Tribunes, and to defeat them of their successive Assemblies. By this means he sowed the seeds of an immortall enmity between the Senate and the people; though him­self and his Collegues were notwith­standing deceived of their own esta­blishment, and soon casheired from their imperious Domination.

If we consider also what befell Carthage, and how it came to ruine: the story tells us, it was occasioned by their Factions, the whole Senate be­ing divided betwixt two potent Fa­milies of Hannibal and Hanno; by which means they were disinabled, from carrying on their Warre with Unanimity and alacrity, as was requi­site [Page 230] against such wary Gamesters, as the Romans, who made such use of their Civil Dissentions, that they soon laid the glory of that famous Repub­lick in the dust.

It was Faction and Civil Dissenti­on that destroyed Rome it self; that is to say, her Liberty, and made her stoop under the Yoak of Caesar.

And it must not be omitted, that when her Liberty was first established, and Tarquin expelled, he had like to have made his way back again, by rea­son of their Divisions. And though he mist his aym there, yet Pisistratus, another Tyrant, being driven out of Athens, made a shift to get in again, by reason of their mutual Divisions.

It was the same Devil of Faction, and Civil Dissention, (as Philip de Comines tells us) that made way for the Turk into Hungaria, as it let him in before into Constantinople, that admit­ted the Goths and Vandals into Spain and Italy; the Romans into Jerusalem, first under Pompey; and afterwards un­der Vespatian and Titus.

It was the cause why Genoa, for a time was content to submit to the Fa­mily of Sforza, Dukes of Millan. It [Page 231] brought the Spaniard into Sicily and Naples; and the French once into Mil­lain, where they outed the aforenamed Family of Sferza.

From hence, therefore, let us con­clude, that no Errour is more danger­ous, no Treason more pernicious to a Common-wealth, than the driving of Faction.

Breach of Vows and Promiſes, a main Er∣ror in Poli∣cy. An Eighth and last Errour observa­ble in practice of Times, and Nations, hath been a violation of Faith, Princi­ples, Promises, and Engagements, up­on every Turn of Time, and advan­tage. An Impiety that ought to be ex­ploded out of all Nations, that bear the Name of Christians: And yet we find it often pass, among the less discer­ning sort of men, for admirable Policy: and those Impostors that used it, have had the luck to be esteemed the onely Politicians. But yet, lest so many wise men of the World, as have been given up to this monstrous vanity, should be thought to have no reason for it, I re­member, I find it usually exprest in Machiavel, to be this, becaus the great­est part of the world being wicked, un­just, deceitful, full of treachery and circumvention, there is a Necessity [Page 232] that those which are down-right, and confine themselves to the strict Rule of Honesty, must ever look to be over­reached by the Knavery of others. And take this for certain, (saith he) Quise virum bonum omnibus partibus pro­fiteri studet, eum certe inter tot non bo­nos periclituri necesse est.) He which endeavours to approve himself an ho­nest man to all parties, must of necessi­ty miscarry among so many that are not honest: Because some men are wicked and persidious, I must be so too. This is a sad inference, and fit onely for the practice of Italy, where he wrote it.

The antient Heathen would have loathed this; and the Romans (who were the noblest of them all) did in all their actions detest it, reckoning plain honesty to have been the onely Poli­cy, and the foundation of their Great­ness, ( [...]avendo pietati fideique, populus Romanus ad tantum fastigii pervenerit) The people of Rome attained to so great a height, by observing Faith and Piety: whereof you shall see an In­stance or two.

In the War between them, and Porsena King of the Tuscans, it so hap­pened [Page 233] that their City was besieged by Porsena: but peace being made, up­on some advantagious Conditions for the Tuscans, the Romanes, for the per­formance of their Conditions, were forced to yield up divers Noble Vir­gins.

These Virgins, after some time, made an escape from the Tuscans, and came back to Rome, but were demanded a­gain.

Hereupon the Senate, though they were then recovered, and in a posture, able to have defied the Tuscans, and denied the performance of those harsh Conditions, chose rather to preserve their Faith inviolable, then to take the present advantage; and so deliver­ed up the Virgins.

The behaviour also of Attilius Re­gulus, is very memorable, who being prisoner at Carthage, and condemned to a cruel Death, was, notwithstand­ing, permitted to go to Rome, upon his bare Paroll, to propound certain Terms to the Senate; which if they yielded, then he was to have his liber­ty: if not, he was to return again to Carthage, and to suffer.

The Senate not yielding, He, rather [Page 234] then violate his Faith, did return, and suffer, being put into a Barrel spiked with Nails, and tumbled down a Hill by the Carthag [...]nians. No [...] was i [...] the temper onely of a few persons; but ge­neral throughout the whole Nation, as might be shown by innumerable Examples; especially in their Leagues and Treaties with other Nations.

But that you may the better know, and avoid the impious Impostors, I shall represent them in Machiavels own language; who in that unworthy book of his, entituled, The Prince, hath made a most unhappy Description of the Wiles that have been used by those Jugglers; and thereby left a Lesson upon Record, which hath been practised ever since by all the State-Rooks in Christendom. And therefore, since they have made so ill use of it, I suppose the best way to prevent the further operation of the poyson, is, to set it down here before you, (as I shall do verbati [...], without adding or dimi­nishing a syllable) and then make two or three Inferences thereupon, for the practice of the people.

In what manner Princes ought to keep their Words. How commenda­ble [Page 235] in a Prince it is to keep his Word, and live with Integrity, not making use of Cunning and Subtilty, every one knows well: yet we see by Experi­ence, in these our dayes, that those Princes have effected great matters, who have made small reckoning of keeping their words, and have known by their Craft, how to turn and wind men about, and in the end overcome those who have grounded upon the Truth.

You must then know, there are two kinds of Combating or Fighting: the one, by Right of the Laws: the other, meerly by Force. That first way is pro­per to Men: The other is also com­mon to Beasts. But because the first many times suffices not, there is a ne­cessity to make recourse to the second: wherefore, it behoves a Prince to know how to make good use of that part which belongs to a Beast, as well as that which is proper to a Man.

This part hath been covertly shew'd to Princes by antient Writers; who say, that Achilles, and many others of those antient Princes, were intrusted to Chiron the Centaure, to be brought up under his Discipline: The morall [Page 236] of this, having for their Teacher, one that was half a Beast, and half a Man, was nothing else, but that it was need­ful for a Prince to understand how to make his advantage of the one, and other Nature, because neither could subsist without the other.

A Prince then being necessitated to know how to make use of that part be­longing to a Beast, ought to serve him­self of the Conditions of the Fox, and the Lyon; for the Lyon cannot keep himself from Snares, nor the Fox de­fend himself against the Wolves. He had need then be a Fox, that he may beware of the Snares; and a Lyon, that he may scare the Wolves. Those that stand wholly upon the Lyon, under­stand not themselves.

And therefore a wise Prince cannot, nor ought not to keep his Faith gi­ven, when the observance thereof turnes to disadvantage, and the occasi­ons that made him promise, are past: for if men were all good, this Rule would not be allowable; but being they are full of mischief, and will not make it good to thee, neither art thou tied to keep it with them: nor shall a Prince ever want lawfull occasions to [Page 237] give colour to this breach. Very ma­ny modern Examples hereof might be alleadged, wherein might be shew­ed how many Peaces concluded, and how many Promises made, have been [...]olated and broken by Infidelity of Princes: and ordinarily things have best succeeded with him that hath bin nearest the Fox in condition.

But it is necessary to understand, how to set a good colour upon this Disposition, and be able to feign and dissemble throughly; and men are so simple, and yield so much to the pre­sent Necessities, that he who hath a mind to deceive, shall alwayes find a­nother that will be deceived. I will not conceal any of the Examples that have been of late; Alexander the sixth never did any thing else, than deceive men, and never meant otherwise, and always found whom to work upon; yet never was there man that would protest more effectually, nor aver any thing with more solemn Oaths, and observe them less then he: never­theless, his Couzenage thrived well with him, for he knew how to play his part cunningly.

[Page 238]Therefore is there no necessitie for a Prince to be endued with all those above written qualities, but it be­hoves well that he seeme to be so: or rather I will boldly say this, that hav­ing those qualities, and alwaies re­gulating himself by them, they are hurtfull; but seeming to have them, they are advantageous, as to seeme pittyfull, faithfull, milde, religious, and indeed to be so (provided with all thou beest of such a composition, that if need require thee to use the contra­ry, thou canst, and know'st how to apply thy selfe thereto.) And it suffices to conceive this, that a Prince, and especially a new Prince, cannot ob­serve all these things, for which men are held good, he being often forced, for the maintenance of his State, to do contrary to his faith, charity, hu­manity, and religion. And therefore it behoves him to have a mind so dis­posed as to turn and take the advan­tage of all winds and fortunes; and as formerly I said, not forsake the good while he can; but to know to make use of the evil upon necessity. A prince then ought to have a speciall care, that he never let fall any words, but what [Page 239] are all seasoned with the five above written qualities: and let him seem to him that sees and knows him, all pitty, all faith, all integrity, all humanity, all religion; not is there any thing more necessarie for him to seem to have, than the last quality: for all men in generall judge thereof, ra­ther by the sight than by the touch; for every man, may come to the sight of him, few come to the touch and feel­ing of him; every man may come to see what thou seemest; few come to understand and perceive what thou art: and those few dare not oppose the opi­nion of many, who have the Majesty of state to protect them. And in all mens actions, especially those of Princes, wherein there is no judg­ment to appeal unto, men forbear to give their censures till the events, and ends of thing. Let a Prince therefore take the surest courses he can to main­taine his life and state, the meanes shall alwaies be thought honorable, and commended by every one: for the vulgar is ever taken with the ap­pearance and event of a thing, and for the most part of the people, they are but the vulgar, the others that are [Page 240] but few, take place where the vulgar have no subssistance. A Prince there is in these daies, whom I shall not do well to name, that preaches nothing but peace and faith, but had he kept the one and the other, severall times had they taken from him his State and reputation.

This is the old Court Gospel, which hath gained many thousand of Pro­selytes, among the great ones, from time to time, and the inferences a­rising thence in behalfe of the people, in breife are these: That since the great ones of the world, have been very few that have avoyded this do­ctrine, therefore it concerns the peo­ple to keep a strict hand and eie upon them all, and impose not overmuch or long confidence in any.

If the Right of laws be the way of men, and force of beasts and great ones, not onely advised, but in­clined to the latter, then it concernes any Nation or people to secure them­selves, and keep Great men from de­generating into beasts, by holding up of law, liberty, priviledge, birth­right, elective power, against the [Page 241] ignoble beastly way of powerfull do­mination.

If of all beasts, a Prince should some times resemble the Lyon, and somtimes the Fox, then people ought to observe great ones in both the dis­guises, and be sure to cage the Lyon, and unkennel the Fox, and never leave till they have stript the one, and unrais'd the other.

If a Prince cannot, and ought not to keep his faith given, when the ob­servance thereof turnes to disadvan­tage, and the occasions that made him promise, are past; then it is the In­terest of the people, never to trust any Princes, nor ingagements and pro­mises of men in power, but ever to preserve a power within themselves, either to reject them, or to hold them to the performance whether they will or no. And if Princes shall never want occasions to give colour to this breach, then also it concernes the people, ever to make sure of the In­stance, and not suffer themselves to be deluded with colours, shadows, and meere pretences.

Lastly, if it be necessarie for great ones to fain and dissemble throughly; [Page 242] because men are so simple and yield so much to the present necessity (as Machivel saith;) and in regard he that hath a mind to deceive, shall al­wayes finde another that will be de­ceived: then it concerns any people or Nation, to make a narrow search ever into the men, and their preten­ces and necessities, whether they be fained or not; and if they discover a­ny deceipt hath been used, then they deserve to be slaves, that will be de­ceived any longer. Thus I have no­ted the prime Errors of Government, and Rules of Policy. I shall now con­clude with a word of Advice, in order to the chusing of the Supreme Assem­blies.

Since it appears, that the right, li­berty, welfare, and safety of a people, consists in a due succession of their su­preme Assemblies: surely then, the right constitution and orderly moti­on of them, is of the greatest conse­quence that can be, there being so much imbarqued in this Vessel, that if it should miscarry, all is irreparably lost, unless it can be recovered again out of the Sea of confusion. Therefore, as at all times there ought to be an [Page 243] especiall care had to the Composure and Complexion of those great As­semblies, so much more after the con­fusion of a Civil Warre, where it is e­ver to be supposed, there will be ma­ny discontented humours a working, and labouring to insinuate themselves into the body of the people, to under­mine the settlement and security of the Common-wealth, that by gain­ing an interest and share with the better sort, in the supreme Authori­ty, they may attain those corrupt ends of Policy, which were lost by Power.

In this case without question, there are severall men that ought to be ta­ken into a strict consideration▪ There is the old Malignant and the new; a­gainst whom, not only the doores are to be shut, but every hole and cranny ought to be stopt, for fear they creep into Authority. There is likewise a came Beast, more dangerous than the other two, which is that Amphibious animal, the neutrall of Laodicea, that can live in either Element, sail with any winde on every point of the compasse, and strike in with Malig­nants of every sort, upon any occasi­on▪

[Page 244]This is he that will undoe all, if he be not avoided; for in the form of an Angel of Light, he most slightly car­ries on the works of darkness. Let not him then, as to our present case, be so much as named upon an Electi­on. Thus much for the Constitution of the supreme Assembly, or the man­ner of setling Authority upon the close of a Civil Warre, for the recove­ry of Liberty. What remains then, but that upon due caution for exclu­ding the wilde Geese and the came, the Malignant and the Neutrall, such a people may reasonably be put in­to possession of their right and inte­rest in the Legislative power, and of all injoyment of it, in a succession of their supreme Assemblies?

The onely way to preserve liberty in the hands of a people, that have gained it by the Sword, is to put it in the peoples hands, that is, into the hands of such, as by a contribution of their purses, strength, and counsells, have all along asserted it, without the least stain of corruption, staggering [...] ▪ apostasie; for in this case, these only are to be reckoned the people: the rest having either by a trayterous En­gagement [Page 245] Compliance, Neutrality, or Apostasie, as much as in them lies, destroyed the people, and by conse­quence made a forteiture of all their Rights and immunities, as Members of a people. In this case therefore men ought to have a courage; and to have a care of the course of Election, and trust God with the success of a righteous Action; for nothing can be more righteous and necessary, than that a people should be put into pos­session of their native right and free­dom: However, they may abuse it, it is their right to have it, and the want of it is a greater inconvenience, and drawes greater inconveniencies after it, than any can be pretended to arise from the injoyment, though they were presented in a multiplying glasse, to the eyes of discerning men. But now, as this holds true at all times, in all Nations, upon the like occasions of Liberty newly purcha­sed, so much more in any Nation, where freedom in a successive course of the peoples Assemblies, hath once bee [...] solemnly acknowledged and de­clared to be the interest of the Com­monwealth; for, then a depriving [Page 246] the people of their due, is a foundati­on for broils and divisions; and as Cicero defines faction to be a deviati­on from the declared interest of State: so in this case, if it happen that any shall desert a Common-wealth in its declared Interest, they immediately lose the name and honour of Pa­triots, and become Parties in a Facti­on.


There is lately Print­ed these Bookes, and sold by Tho. Brewster, at the Three Bibles, by Pauls, viz.

THE Retired Mans Medita­tions; or, the My­stery and Power of Godliness, shining [Page] forth in the Living Word, to the un­masking the Myste­ry of Iniquity, in the most refined and pu­rest Formes; And withal, representing to view;

1 The Riches and Fulnesse of Christs Person, as Media­tor.

2. The Naturall and Spiritual Man, [Page] in their proper distin­ctions.

3. The Raign, and Kingdom of Christ, in the Nature, Limits, and extent thereof. By Henry Vane, Knight.

A Breviary of the History of the Par­liament of England, in Three Parts: First, the Cause and Be­ginning of the Civil Warres of ENG­LAND.

[Page]Secondly, A short mention of the pro­gress of that Civill Warre.

Thirdly, a Com­pendious Relation of the Originall and Progress of the Se­cond Civil Warre: written by T. May, Esq,

Lazarus and His Sisters Discourse of Paradice: Or, A Conference about [Page] the excellent things of the other World.

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