The Armies dutie; or, Faithfull advice to the souldiers: given in two letters written by severall honest men, unto the Lord Fleetwood Lieutenant-Generall of the Armie, and now published for the instruction of the whole Armie, and the good people of this Common-wealth.

The Armies dutie; or, Faithfull advice to the souldiers: given in two letters written by severall honest men, unto the Lord Fleetwood Lieutenant-Generall of the Armie, and now published for the instruction of the whole Armie, and the good people of this Common-wealth.

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To the Reader.

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THE ARMIES DUTIE; OR, FAITHFULL ADVICE to the Souldiers: GIVEN In two Letters written by severall honest men, unto the Lord FLEETWOOD Lieutenant-Generall of the ARMIE, and now Published for the Instruction of the whole Armie, and the good People of this Common-wealth.

LONDON, Printed, and are to be sold in Popes-head Alley, S. Pauls Church-yard, and Westminster Hall, 1659.

To the Reader.

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REader, Whoever thou art, 'tis fit thou should know that the following Letters were sent to the Lord Fleetwood, and read by him before the calling of the late Parliament, but were not intended to be published, because those that wrote them, hoped that this advice would have been followed, and they so much wished the Lord Fleetvvoods Honor, that they desired the good he should do might appear to be from the impulse of his own mind, but now finding that our Country hath languished so many months since, and seeing the distraction and confusion, that his neglect hath now brought upon us, and finding the general Counsel of Officers, to have expressed their sense of our dangers and impending ruine; and to have interposed in the dissolving the Parliament: when they found by experience, [Page] that a settlement would not be made by them, we thought fit to make these Letters publick, hoping that it may in some measure quicken up the Lord Fleetvvood himself, upon a second reading of them, and also those Officers that are now concerned by the utmost perill of their lives, to procure a settlement of that common freedome, which hath cost so much bloud and treasure, we have only to request your reading these Letters, with respect to the season wherein they were written, and without prejudice upon your minds, and the Lord: Cause you to understand and do the things that belong to our Countreys Peace and Welfare.

H. M.

H. N.

I. L.

I. W.

I. I.

S. M.

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My Lord,

YOu have long been the object of many good mens pity and prayers, who have judged in charity that the temptations of your late Fathers Court have been too mighty for you. But now you are become the object of their prayers and great expectations; hitherto they thought you unable to prevent the wickednesse and apostacy which you have often seemed to mourn for in secret. But now the chief military power derived from any lawfull authority being fallen upon you, and all such Officers and Souldiers in the Army as have any sense of justice and honesty in their use of arms, being ready to be commanded by you, and to rejoyce in their return to their first principles. They believe that God hath made your way plain before you to vindicate the profession of Religion from the black reproaches that rest upon it, to restore the peoples liberties, the Armies honour, and price of their bloud. And therefore they hope and pray that the Lord may say effectually to you upon this opportunity: Be thou strong and of a good courage in this my work, and I will be with thee. But if you should now sit still, they think as Mordecai said to Esther that deliverance and enlargement shall arise to the people from another; but you and your fathers house shall be destroyed. Now my Lord, do not imagine us either vain Enthusiasts or busie bodies that thus mind you, what is expected from you. We are such as engaged with you in the war against the late King, and do believe that you and we must render an account to the dreadfull God of the justice and sincerity of our intentions therein, and our souls are deeply afflicted to behold our righteous ends perverted, the bloud of our friends shed in the quarrell, trampled upon, the binding power of trusts, promises, and oaths, slighted, and the same (if not worse) principles of Arbitrary power, Tyranny, and oppression exercised, asserted, and maintained, against which we have so earnestly contended with a prodigall expence of our bloud and estates; and our hearts are wounded to hear our old cause [Page] now made a mock and by▪word by our enemies, and to see such a black brand of infamy set upon all the Parliaments adherents, as if they had been all the vilest hypocrites, who made pretences of Religion, and faithfulnesse to their Countries Laws and Liberties, to be only a cloak for the blackest wickednesse, as if none of them had ever intended any more, then by force and fraud to fat up themselves upon the bloud and ruines of other families. But your Lordship knows, that the Kings invasion of our properties and liberties, by taxes, illegall imprisonments, and opposition of the Parliament in their supreme trust of ordering the Militia for the peoples safety, did necessitate us to defend it by arms, as our native right, that the trust of the peoples safety and welfare, their strength, and purses, was only in the hands of their successive Parliaments, and that they ought to be governed only by the Laws: And their consciences, persons, or estates, to be at no mans will or mercy; And doubtlesse the defence of these Liberties is essentially necessary to the well being of any Nation, and to the being of publick morall righteousness amongst men. And your Lordship knows that all the successes and victories have been owned, as from the wonderfull appearance of God for his people in this honest cause, and that you caused the exercise of the chief Magistracie in England by a single person to be abolish'd, because it was dangerous to this righteous cause, as well as uselesse and burdensome. Now my Lord, let us appeal to your conscience whether we ought not to expect those things we do, we are unwilling lest it should wound too deep to make a comparison between the principles of Tyrannie and oppression that were attempted to be practised by the late King, and were declared by you to be begotten by the blasphemous arrogance of Tyrants upon their servile parasites, and those that have been practised & avowed since God gave us victorie in the defence of our Liberties (and though we confesse the greatest number of honest men have hitherto least smarted under them, yet they will infallibly have the greatest weight of them upon their backs hereafter, should those principles get root amongst us, they being the only likely men to [Page] destroy them, and however, injustice against Enemie ought to be abhorred by righteous Men.) But let us tell your Lordship that it is the secret sigh of every honest heart: Oh that God would now take away the reproach from this People, and their eyes are much upon you in it, and shoud you slight our eyes and expectations in this case, assuredlie the blood of our friends shed in the Cause, will crie aloud for vengeance against you.

We have better thoughts of your Lordship, then that you should seek to shelter your self in your omission of so great a Dutie, or in your proceeding in the evils begun under those vain subterfuges which have been used of late: Oh be not deceived with pretences of Providences of God, leading you from your old Cause into things not to be justified by the morall Lawes. The holie God directs his People only into the paths of Righteousnesse, that is such Actions as agree with his Lawes, 1, Iohn 3. 7, 8, 10. He that doth not Righteousness is not of God, His Providences and his Lawes alalwaies speak the same things, neither let any man deceive you with pretence of necessitie that constrains you to desert your old Principles for the People of Gods sake and to advance Christs Kingdome; For 'tis not possible there should be necessitie to transgresse a Divine naturall Law that is Eternall, there may be cases of extream inevitable necessitie, that may disoblige a man from some Divine positive Lawes, because a Superior that is a Divine, naturall Law may oblige him in that case; Therefore in everie case of highest necessities, the immutable Lawes of Nature ought to be Guides and Commanders of what is to be done: And if your Lordship can make your Actions or Omissions consist with those, neither God nor his People will blame you. And in so doing onelie, you can advance Christs Kingdome: For then is he exalted when supream Reverence, and absolute subjection is given to his Fathers Lawes in the deniall of our selves in all Countermands and Temptations, and when the sword of the Spirit is used to increase the number of such Subjects: For this Scepter, Throne and Wars are of and in Righteousness.

[Page] Therefore, we beseech your Lordship without hesitation or delay, pursue the exaltation of Christ and his Kingdom, in following in simplicity and integrity of heart after those righteous ends you proposed and declared in the late warre, and unto which you have obliged your self by all the sacred Bonds of humane societie: be not affrighted with some Parasites, bugbears of Confusion, if you shake the Diana, by which they hope to subsist, fear not assistance from every honest heart in England, and though some pretenders to honesty, may out of cowardise, or ambition, or covetousness, cry, ther's a Beare and a Lion in the way, yet even they shall run after you when they see you forward in your way; And to avoid delayes, let us beseech your Lordship first to examine your conscience presently what you can answer to the blood of any poor Saint shed, that cries in your ears to settle that Libertie and Justice in his Countrie for which he shed his blood under your command.

Secondly, what you can answer to the blood of Thousands of the enemies, which are esteemed by God as murdered by you if the Iustifick cause of the war be not effectually prosecuted. Will not their blood crie to God, and say, Lord, this Fleetwood killed us upon pretence that we should have destroied the Liberties of the People of God, in imposing Arbitrarie power upon them, which we did ignorantlie? And he hath done the same thing, and made or suffered more heavie Yokes to be imposed; Pray remember it, The Scripture saith, Thinkest thou O Man, that judgest another, and doest the same things thy selfe, that thou shalt escape the iudgement of God, Rev. 1. 3, 4.

Thirdly, We beseech you to examine what Cause you now maintain with constant expence of blood, and the Peoples Estates, and how you can give an account to God for it. Remember what are the causes for which God alloweth mens blood to be shed without blood-guiltinesse in him that causeth it; and trie whether that be one, to make a Nation greater slaves to Iohn a Styles and his Confederates, then they would have been to Iohn a Nokes. But we praie your Lordship if it be possible that anie pretence can be found for it, [Page] state a justifick Cause of your present posture of Arms, that thousands of tender consciences may be satisfied how to pray for you in any of your present designes, if God should not honour you in the work which they now expect from You.

Now My Lord, if we would plead with you by worldly Arguments or motives, that concern your self, it were easie to evince, that safetie, honour, and greatness to your self, and familie, can be certainlie compassed by no other means, then by returning to the Principles from whence you are fallen, your daily tenors that now attend you and your Counsells, would soon vanish, you might have above threescore thousand men of honest principles that would take themselves concern'd to be in armes at an houres warning to assist you, and this without second charge, and an armie of praiers 2. times as great, indeed who would or could hurt you, if you were a naked sincere follower of that which is good. We appeal to your conscience, whether you do not believ that your late Father was more safe with a Foot-boy onelie following him in the streets when he was believed to intend that good that your Lordship may if you please effect, then he was afterwards (when he was believed to intend his own ambition) invironed with Guards, and enclosed with locks, and bolts without number; Indeed the onelie meanes of safetie for such as will exercise great power over a people to the subjection of their liberties, is a mercenarie Armie. And if that consists of some of the same people, their interest will change as often as they get estates that are of more value then their pay, and then they will be readie to conspire with any of the people to provide libertie and securitie of their estate for their children, and then the power of the Tirants shake, And of how manie slaughters of the Kings of Israell do we read by their own service; & if mercenarie strangers be intended to be Guards for Rulers in England, our Ancestors taught us the way, when they were not so well instructed in their libertie to ridd our selves of them in a night, But if your own person could be secure for a while; what will be the portion of your familie, if th eir persons and estates be left to the mercie of him that gets uppermost, And if you expect greatnesse or honor, consider whose names are delivered to us from former ages with reverence, and esteem, and who have been most admired, honored, [Page] and obeyed, by their countrey and people: Can a Dionysius compare, command or fain with a Tymoleon; was ever great Cyrus or Alexander obeyed like the poor young Fisher-boy Massinello in Naples, whil'st the people imagin'd he sought a settlement of their libertie? But we suppose the sense and remembrance of your dutie to God and his people, should be of greater weight in your Lordships heart then all the conceits of the earth, & therefore we also forbear to mind you of the improbabilitie of setling this Nation according to the rules of pollicie, upon anie other basis then their libertie; the lands & interests of this Nation being so dispersed & with so much equalitie, that whosoever shall attempt to invade our liberties will not find an interest able to overballance the peoples interest, and therefore cannot long maintain a Dominion over them; But we forbear to mention this Capital politick consideration to your Lordship at present, onlie let us beg your serious consideration how much the honor of the profession of the Gospel is concerned in what we move your Lordship to, & expect from you; And that you would say to your self, is it not better that I & mine perish, then that a publick scandal be brought upon Gospel profession by my injustice & treacherie to my Countrie under a shew of holiness; & if we shall observe by your Lordships actions from henceforth that there are some apearances, that God hath begun to imprint upon your heart the sense of your publick dutie, and that he will put that honor & greatness upon you to be the restorer of his peoples liberties in this Nation, we shall then think our selves obliged to write again to your Lordship or wait upon you to strengthen your hands; In the interim, we shall praie without ceasing, that wisdom, courage and strength may be given you from the Father of all mercies, and that out of his fulness you may be in all things prepared for the accomplishing his own work of righteousness; And if in judgement to this Nation your heart should be hardned by these poor lines, your Lordship will be left more inexcusable, and however some satisfaction in the discharge of your duties will arise to the Conscices of

My Lord,

Your Lordships
Most affectionate humble servants
So far as you follow Christ—

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My Lord,

WE presumed lately to mind your Lordship of your present oportunity, and most important duty, and our souls wish that the the secrets of your thoughts upon it were revealed, that our hearts and prayers might be towards you, and for you accordingly we must tell your Lordship that you have since wounded the hearts of many precious Saints, by conducting your Armie officers, in an action of such gross hypocrisie, and palpable flattery, as that addresse you made to your new Protector, we have reason to believe that it had been impossible for your Lordship to have said privately to an honest man without blushing, what you have said there to the world under your hand, and if your Lordship will remember (with God in your eye) what is said of your father, and your brother in it, and of an unknown connexion between his person and your cause, which a lso you cannot now, and as now (state to your own conscience as just,) we are confident your heart will smite you, and if your own heart condemn you, God is greater then your heart, and must much more condemn you. Truly my Lord, we were much startled in our hopes from you, and praiers for you, (and we hear the same of others) when we saw that addresse, yet our remembrance of your secret expressions even with tears, of your sense of the Armies backslidings, and your earnest intreaties of us to pray for you, together with the great respect we have, for your Lordship hath inclined us strongly to the best thoughts of you, sometimes saying one to another, surely he had not read our letter before his Addresse, yet we have been so stumbled, that we had troubled your Lordship no farther in this kind, if God had not so placed the interest of his cause and people upon our spirits, that we are restlesse within our selves, untill we have said so much, as may be either effectuall upon your heart, or at least discharge our consciences, and leave you inexcusable. If therefore the Lord hath made us his remembrancers to you, and revived his fear in your heart, whilest you considered what we sent you, we have reason to conclude [Page] that you are come to these resolves in your owne breast, viz. 1. That the peoples arms of this nation have been committed to your charge in your severall capacities, as a steward of that high trust for them, to imploy them for their benefit, in preserving their rights and freedome, and that you must give an account to the eternall God of that stewardship.

2. That you are under all possible sacred and indispensable obligations to be faithfull in your trust.

3. That the cause for which you were trusted was to defend and maintain the peoples right to make laws for themselves, and thereby provide for their own welfare and safety, by such persons as they should chuse, and that without the negative controule of the King, and also to defend the freedome of their consciences, persons, and estates, in being over the only government of their own laws, without subjection to the will or mercie of any man.

And we suppose you may also conclude that you have now power and oportunitie cast upon you to secure this libertie unto Gods people, according to humane prudence beyond the reach of wicked men, and that if you should hide your talent of power, in the napkins of fear, cowardise, ambition, or self-interest, you will be condemned from the mouth of your own conscience, for an unprofitable and unfaithfull servant.

Now if God hath enabled your Lordship thus to consider, with a pure understanding, and with integritie of heart thus to resolve, we know you are continually saying within your self, men and brethren what shall I doe, to shew my faithfulnesse to the cause of God, and the people, and to vindicate my possession from scandall; and in hopes that God hath thus disposed your heart, we shall endeavour to inquire into your particular dutie.

And in our search we may assert this generall maxime, as an infallible pillar to guide you in your present dutie to your generation, viz. that the peoples liberties cannot be lastingly secured to them by any other means, then an institution of sense, wise order or method, wherein the people may make and execute their own laws, and use their own arms and strength, [Page] for the common good of the whole societie. This may direct all your Lordships thoughts and debates, about a settlement, and keep in your eieperpetually the white mark wherein all your designes and contrivances of publick concernment, ought to centre; this may prepare you, to passe a quick sentence upon all the ambitious proposals of your Court-parasites, this may cut off all those Court debates, about impowering a Prince, to check and controul the people by his negative, in their making their laws. It ought to be no question, whither the people should make their own laws, God himself having resolved it, the very point being the single point whereupon you joyned Battell at first with the King, you defending that the Parliaments Ordinance for the Malitia, was a Law without the Kings consent, and he denying it to be of any force, and affirming those Traitors, that obeied that, and not his Commissions of Array (this by the Kings Confession was the first quarrel) this libertie then being their bloud, cannot be taken from them, but by the highest robberie and contempt of Obligations to God and Man. Therefore your Lordships dutie is no more then to contrive the best, most prudent form, and order, wherein the people may injoy their own, with the least hazard of being preyed upon by Tirants, or being disquieted by their own ignorant disorders and confusions: Your dutie to the people, is like to that of a Guardian to an Heir, Not to give them an Estate, but to set down rules, how it shall be ordered for them, and they put in quiet Possession of it, to their most advantage and securitie, and this dutie is the more incumbant upon you, because you have broken, and trampled to pieces, beyond repair all those old Christian forms, wherein they formerly injoyed their liberties, though with continuall Disputes, and subject to daily injuries and oppressions.

Now before we propose to your Lordship any Form or Order to be settled, it is fit that we discover to you the Errours and inconsistencies, of your present practices, and appearing design, both in themselves, and in relation to the peoples liberties.

[Page] First, it's a grand errour in the foundation, if you imagine it possible to secure libertie or justice to the people, onelie by advancing good men to power over them, and trusting to the grace in their hearts, to rule in righteousnesse, good men upon the single account of mortalitie, can be no lasting bottom, whereupon to settle liberty and justice. It's beyond the wisdome of man, to contrive an infallible provision, in the present age that the ruling power in the succeeding age, shall fall onelie into good mens hands, but what age ever produced men of such enlightned pure minds? that of themselves could discern right at all times, without the least cloud of their private interest upon their understandings, and also pursue such dictates of their minds, without interruptions by corrupt affections; we mention this, not as if our Souls did not wish, that all powers were vested in the best of men, but because we know that every man is vanitie, and a Lie; and yet we believe, it is often whispered in your eares, by some weak well meaning men, that honest mens liberty would then be secure, and they satisfied, if they could see good men put into power, saying we should then need no lawes, for they would be a law to themselves, having Gods law in their hearts, but those that thus by consequence beg advancement, know not what they ask, scarce intending to be the peoples lords and to rule them as their slaves, which is necessarily employed in the arbitrarie power they ask; neither do they apprehend, what horrid impietie it is, for any man in England now to erect, and exercise an arbitrarie power, they see not the blasphemous arrogancy of such as rule without lawes, being indeed, an attempt to erect their throne, in it's kind, higher then Almightie Gods, who rules and judges onelie according to his lawes, without which there is neither justice, nor injustice in things humane, or divine, therefore the peoples security of libertie, and justice, must be founded upon excellent lawes, or constitutions, for the continued order, from generation to generation, wherein the people shall chuse their own lawes and magistrates, and if good men in power, will in simplicitie and integritie joyn heads, hearts, and hands to establish such an order, or forme of Government, they will be worthilie esteemed the founders, though [Page] not the foundation of our Liberties.

Secondlie, 'tis a grosse mistake, to think that the securing the peoples Liberties, and the creating of a Soveraign Prince over them, (under whatsoever title) can consist together, we mean such a Prince or Potentate, the tenure of whose power, shall not be upon the people, and who shall not be subject, and accomptable to the Lawes of this Commonwealth, doubtlesse the people may not be free, where there shall be a chief Magistrate, whose deserved real honour and greatnesse, may justly make him disdain to look down upon the Throne of the greatest Monarch, yet if he shares in the Soveraigntie, he subverts Libertie and the foundation of his own glorie: the very essence or formall reason of a Nations freedom, consists in the peoples making their own Lawes and Magistrates, and therefore it is a contradiction to say, we are free under a Prince controling our Lawes in their Creation, or Execution, and imposing his Officers upon us at his will and the consequence of that practice, even in our late Kings, hath caused all our present bloudie ruines, his Officers being naturally inclined, and resolved to serve their Creator, to the subversion of our Lawes and Liberties; besides, if a Prince be invested with the least Punctilio of the Soveraigntie, it is exceeding vain to imagine, that he should not naturally aspire to the top of it: every thing having an innate desire of its owne perfection, and there being no other visible meanes to preserve from the peoples reach, that part which hee hath, but the destruction of their Libertie, you may as well suppose, fire not to ascend, as such a Prince not to be wishing and aspiring to be an absolute Lord, if he had neither ambition, nor pride in himself, nor in his appendixes, his Court Parasites, yet the unavoydable reciprocall fear, in the people, and such a Prince, least each should dispoil the other of his share of Soveraigntie, will compell the Prince to provide for his own securitie, and do your Lordship think he will believe himself safe, untill he hath set himself above the peoples reach, and brought them to depend upon his [Page] will? It may be he that you would create Prince with a small share of Soveraginty, would at first thinke his power great, yet in continuance he would esteem it smal, men naturally reaching beyond what they have attained; Liberty therefore and Principalitie, are incompatible, and can never last together: It seems strange to a People, that they should be free, and yet serve, and be imposed upon it's strange to a Prince, that he should be chief Lord and not command; The meane of Libertie, is the Mother of Murder, and Tyrannie; any Freedome from Princes Commands being intollerable to them, they by Violence take it away, or attempt it, and that forceth a Violent brutish Tyrany, instead of Government, We need not look farre for an instance of this, the bloud and sufferings of our Ancestours, and our own Age, witnesse it, hath not our Princes and Ancestours been alwayes strugling for four hundred yeares, and thousands perished in it, that are known, besides the ruine of many Worthies which no History durst mention, unlesse with Infamie, to please the Tyrants, And your Lordship hath seen, with what an Earth-quake, Libertie subverted Principalitie, when it found Opportunitie. Therefore, if you wish us, and our Posterities no greater good then onely Quiet, it behooveth you to make us wholly Free, or wholly Slaves.

Thirdly, It is no small fayler of foresight, that you may imagine it feasible in this Nation, at this time, to establish a Principalitie, or Monarchie, of any probable continuance, unlesse you can destroy all present Reall Properties and vest all, or most of the Lands of ENGLAND, in your Monarch. Every Princes Power of Command must arise either from a voluntarie Submission, and willingnesse of a People to serve him, as their Lord, or from a Violent Compulsion, of them to be subject to Him, and both those are founded upon an inequalitie, between him and them, either reall or apparent. A Peoples willingnesse to serve a Prince (if any such be) ariseth from their apprehension [Page] of some great inequality and dispropor [...]ion between him and them, either in vertue, interest, or power. The two first are proper to a Prince in his native countrey▪ or one that hath dominion over only a sovereign Prince▪ who may be thought powerfull to one people, the last may be proper to protect a people, and that may be chosen a s the least of some impudent mischiefs; but if any people ever were, or shall be voluntarily subject to a Prince, upon their high opinion of his unequall transcendent vertue, that related only to his person, and never was or can be a solid foundation for an hereditary Monarchy, but an unequall interest in the lands, may be, and is the common cause, either of a voluntary or constrained subjection: no man serves for nought, 'tis the need that people have of the Lords interest, that procures him servants, and enables him to compell subjection: so Joseph that new moulded the Egyptian Monarchy, devised a way for the King to get all the possessions into his hands, that so the people might serve Pharaoh, which was a necessary consequence. 'Tis evident that the relation of masters and servants would soon be banished the world, if all mens interests, vertues▪ and strength were equall, and much sooner would the names of princes and subjects be for ever razed out of memory; surely then (my Lord) 'tis beyond dispu e that if you intend to settle a Monarchy over us, it must be by violence, for it cannot enter into your heart, to imagine, that you shall find a man, whose glorious vertues shall be as a Sun amongst the stars compared with all the vertues in this nation, and those also to be surely intailed upon his heirs, neither can your Lordship pretend, to find any family, whose interest in the lands is now so unequall, to the bulk of the people, that the nation should be induced by their interest to serve them.

Now that a compulsive subjection to a Monarchy, must be the product of an unequall power, is as good as written with a Sunbeam, he that forceth must be stronger then-he that is forced, and 'tis as evident▪ that such a power is the only naturall fruit of an unequall interest in the lands, upon which the beast of force must graze, that bears the Monarch power to force a nation, cannot be inherent in a single person, and multitudes of hands, neither can nor will serve him to subj [...]ct a nation, unlesse they be h [...]red, (Christ himself says no man goes to warfare at his own charge) and nothing can afford [Page] the constant growing hire of the Princes own, but his interest in the lands, and if he put the hirelings to rob and pilfer for their own [...]ire, upon the fruits of the lands, which the people esteem their own, (that is by taxes) the basis and root of the power, by which the forces live, hath not an appearance to be in the Monarch, nor do his forces seem to have a necessary dependance upon him, but may as well rob for themselves, and at best, they must remain a fluctuating body without root, the Monarch not being able to plant them upon his lands with condit [...]ons of service; and therefore they will be esteemed of the land owners, only as the common thieves, whose hands are against every man, and ought to have every mans hand against them, and the robbery being in such a case, to be renewed continually upon the land-owners, and the wound alwaies smarting, 'tis of more constant danger, to subvert the Monarch, then it were for him to cut the throats of ten thousand land-owners at once, and possesse the lands, to plant his forces upon, as their standing-quarters upon their masters own lands, either for their lives, or during his pleasure. Surely (my Lord) it's not to be denied, that a Monarch in his domestick dominions, hath no greater rooted continuing power over a nation, then he hath an interest in the lands, surmounting in value, the interest of the whole people, as that interest grows, by murders, oppression, and the other common artifices of Princes, (unlesse the wrath of God interposeth) so doth his power root, and flourish, all other seeming power of a Monarch, hangs as the ignorant use to say, by Geometry, and is without bottome; 'tis a tree whose root is dead, and may be kept up a little while by dead props that decays with it. 'Tis like an armies foraging into an enemies countrey▪ and plundering, not being able to gain the possession of a town, castle, or house there, as a root of power over it. Indeed, no form of domestick government can be establisht to be of duration, in a nation, chiefly living upon their lands, if property in the land do not accompany the Empire, that is, if that order which governs (be it one man, or the few, or the people) do not possesse a greater share of the land of that countrey, then the rest of the people that are governed; and therefore where the Administration is most popular; servants, and all such as have no estates are reckoned to have no share, or voices in the government. And we conceive, thatt the [Page] founders of governments, have either framed their models, according to the ballance of property, which they found amongst the people, or else have divided the property, and reduced it to their form. And your Lordship may remember when God himself formed the people of Israel, by Moses hand, into a free Common-wealth, there was not only a suitable division of the lands at the first, but a perpetuall law of Jubilee, to prevent alienation of lands, and the growth of any to such unequall interest, as his power might be dangerous to the government, and when that people rejected Gods form of their Common wealth for a Monarch, he foretold them, 1 Sam. 8. 11. 17. that the first work of their King would be to alter the modell of property in the lands, settled by God and take away the best of their fields, vineyards, and olive-yards, and give them to his servants, for strengthening himself, and so they should become his servants. And if we should not trouble your Lordship too much, we would shew from History, that all the lasting Monarchies that ever were in the world, have been built upon this foundation, of possessing the greatest interest in their countreys lands, either immediately, or by their Peers and their powers, being the naturall result of that, they have had their births, decays, and deaths together. Some kingdomes we say have been founded upon the Monarchs immediate interest, or property in the lands, as many ancient Eastern Kings, and the Turk, with other Eastern Princes at this day, who are sole proprietors or Landlords of the whole Territories where they reign, and the people their tenants at will, or at best for life, upon conditions of service in war, proportionable to the value af their farms, whereby the Turk keeps an absolute power over his subject by their dependance upon his will for their bread, and with his own proper revenue is able also to maintain an army of strangers to strengthen the other tie, he hath upon his vassalls, and upon this root of his property, (to the eye of humane reason) his power has grown to that monstrous height Others kingdomes have been built upon the property in the lands, which the Monarchs, Peers, have had joyntly with and under him: so were these Western dominions after their conquest by the Northern people, who divided a land, when conquered, into so many parcels, as they had great Officers, leaving the choice of the best and largest share to their Prince or leader, he becoming their King, and the [Page] chief Officers, holding their large shares on him by some small acknowledgements, became his Dukes, Counts, and Earls; and the common souldiers (who came indeed to seek a countrey to inhabit) holding together with the poor natives some small parcels of land under those g eat-men upon such conditions as made them wholly dependant upon their Landlords, and thus these Dukes and Earls paying homage and fealty and small acknowledgements to the Prince, became princes in their own divisions, and thus the interest of the King and his Peers over-weighed the properties of all other the Inhabitants, whereupon the power of our ancient Monarchy was founded, and the Kings chief Officers were the tenants and vassalls of his Peers, to whom he sent upon occasion of trouble forreign or domestick to leavy arms, who gathered their vassalls together, and either assisted the King, or fought against him as they l [...]ked the quarrell, their souldiers never daring to dispute their Lords commands knowing no immediate Lord but them.

Thus was the Kings power lesse or greater, as he agreed with his Peers they having been able (as your Lord ship knows) to make and unmake Kings of England as they pleased, and if their propertie in the lands had so remained, nothing could have shaken the Monarchs power, if he had kept an union with them, but the inferiour people grew by degrees to better their tenures, and to make some of their estates hereditary upon easie fines at every change, as our coppy-holders of inheritance and some to have their estates their own free hold, and in fine they came to abolish in England the tenures of vassailage & vill [...]uinage, which is yet in practice amongst our neigh-bour natiōs, (whose Monarchies stand by so much the stronger) and the people having got a better interest in the lands, soon obtained some share in the government they were then thought fit to be summoned to the national meetings then called Gamont, since a Parliament, to consider what way to supply their King with money, which was to come only from their purses and properties (the nobles then (as now in France) payiny no Tax or Tollage) and the sense they had of their own properties in the lands made them soon after challenge it as their right, that their King could take no tax, toll, or tollage, unlesse they were pleased to give it him in their Parliaments, and then the peoples yoakes, growing more easy, their wealth increased, and lands being commonly [Page] suffered to be alienated, the multitude became the purchasers, and some bought off their serviccs that still remained due to their Lords, and others bought their Lords lands, who proved prodigalls, and as occasion was offered, the Churches lands, and this together with some Kings endeavours to abate the power of their Peers in their Countreys, reduced the English Peerage to an empty name, the greatest quantity of the lands, and with those, the power being fallen into the Commons hands, before the Warr, who being then sensible, they neither depended upon the King nor his Peers for their Bread, conceived themselves obliged to serve none but God, and therefore ought not to be commanded, or to have lawes imposed upon them by the King or his Peers, judging it the right of a people, whose property rendred them free, and independent to chuse their own lawes and Magistrates, being intended onely for the preservation of their own properties and liberties; and thus did our House of Commons gradually grow to that power which in latter time proved formidable to the Kings, there wanting nothing to the destructon of the Throne, whose pillars were broken, but an occasion for the people to feel the power they had, & this was the naturall cause of our late Kings projecting to have brought German Horse, or an Irish Army into England, a mercenary Army being the last refuge of a Monarch, devested of his Nobility, (though that also will prove but a violent dead prop, and soon rotten, unlesse he can suddainly reassume a greater property, & give them root by an interest in the lands upon conditions of serving him) And this was the cause of the Kings raising his Guard at York, and leaving the VVarre; being the last means to support his power; therefore we may say, that the dying pangs of a Monarchial power in England, caused our VVarrs, as his violent stranglings for life, much rather, then that the VVarre caused the destruction of Monarchiall power; the Parliaments Army did indeed prevent a possibility of the resurrection of that power, by a forcible changing the property in the lands, and so reviving a new Monarchy; but the old was dead by a kind of natural desolution before the Parlament voted it uselesse, burdensome, and dangerous; for surely 'tis neither of the three, where, and so long as it's single property in the lands, or in union wlth his Nobility, makes the people live upon him and them, though 'tis most certainly all the [Page] three, where it must be fed upon the peoples properties; like the Snake in the Rustick's house, till it be able to oppresse them.

My Lord, wee hope it will be clear to your Lordship, that England is now become an unnatural soyl for a Monarch. The Governor of the World by various providences hath so divided the land amongst the bulk of the people, that they can live of themselves without serving, and it is preposterous to impose a Monarch upon us, as to make a law, that the weaker shall alwaies binde the stronger; we believe it no less impossible to establish a lasting Monarch in England without alteration of the interest, the multitude hath in the lands, and naturall power, then it were to settle a firm lasting free State, or Commonwealth in the Turkish Territories, suffering the Ottoman to Family to remain the sole Landlord of the Territories, as now he is; and we suppose, that obvious objection, that England hath been a Monarchy for many hundred years, is clearly answered, from what we have said, if you will take us as conquered, as much by your Army, as by the Normans, and think to settle a Monarchy like theirs, in a new line; you see the Materialls, for your building and theirs, are of a different form, and can never make a like building; England then yielded earth to the Conqueror, by vast Earldomes, and Baronies, for the plantation of his new Potentates, and a few confiscations or forfeitures made his own and his creatures interest in the lands to exceed all the rest; besides, the temper of the people, to whom any property in the land was left, was much different from that you now finde, they being then bred to learn, and know no better; now being bred in some liberty, and the continuall claim of the whole. Neither can your Lordship with reason hope to prop up a new Monarchy, by an Army of Natives, to be paid by Taxes, if you consider how soon their Estates of inheritance and naturall love to posterity, with their independency upon the Monarch, a disgust of the universall Odium, they must live under by extorting Taxes, will make them espouse the nationall interest as their own, as did the forreign plants of the Normans, when rooted in lands of inheritance, so that no sort of Armes, to be maintained by a meet Tax, can long support a Monarch, because the very Tax, if nothing else, create's and maintain's him Enemies that have roots in his dominions, [Page] when his friends have none: we could now shew your Lordship invincible difficulties (as our Case is) to found a Monarchy though you should confiscate to your selves most of the peoples ends, to make your land property over weigh al the rest but we believe the confiscation of a people, that have never fought against you, but whose armes you have borne, to be an act so unnaturall and so full of blacknesse and horrour, that it can never be admitted room in your thoughts, and therefore we shall say nothing of it.

Fourhly, but my Lord thereis a fourth mistake that deserves the first place in the file of Errors, that is, to conceive it possible to settle your Brother Richard and his heirs as our Prince, to share in the Sovereign power, if the wounds of Monarchiall power in England, were not mortall, doubtlesse his art and experience renders not him to be a Surgeon fit for the cure; it was poverty and famine that shot his deadly arrow into the heart of our Monarchy, and no plaister can heal it, but Mammon to make it self new friends, and do your Lordship judge his estate and property sufficient to make him friends enough to compell this Nation to subjection? what can a prudent man fancy as a foundation of his Empire? wherein is the equality between him and the people, even in your opinion, or the dictates of the present Armies conscience? it was said in the last Parlament frequently, that he was a stranger to the people of God, unknown to the Army, having never actually drawn sword, and one that was never observed to have had any affection for the Parlaments Cause; if your Lordship please to consider it, you will finde such disadvantages attends your Brother, in his aspiring to the Throne, as would render his settlement very doubtfull, if the basis for Monarchy stood firm in England; We pray your Lordship think of the primary of his Education, the tenderness of his years, the meanenesse of hisnatural Authority, the slenderness of his reputation as soldier, or Counseller, and above all, the hatred and contempt the people hath conceived him; either of which, is sufficient to ruine a settled Prince; and adde unto these, the claime and pretence he sets up, by pretending to be our Prince, for Charles Stewart against himselfe: (whose interest and friends forreign and domestique may at the least be put in the ballance with your Brothers) which gives life to a growing root of a civill Warr; and adde farther, your rendring all knowing [Page] conscientious men desperate of their liberty bought with their bloud, & then remember the feeble interest and repute of his Lords, who in stead of supporting his Throne, as their predecessours did their Princes have need to be supported by it. And once more adde, that his onely hope and refuge being an army for Gods assistance in such designes, ought not to be expected) that those are natives, not his servants, nor obliged to any dependance upon him, who must against their trust and oarhs, fight against their own countrey, and their own interest, (which is to transmit to posterity their estates in security and fr [...]dome) and that all their pay must be extorted from the people (wherein their relations are concerned) by taxes and collages, and that your Brother must have the greatest share of them to subsist upon in his pomp, and that many of those think their own merit and value equall to your Brothers, and may not be full proof against ambition, and that they will not discern what aid he contributes to the paying of the taxes, whereof he spends so much; nor what need have they of him. Then your Lordship will passe a deliberate resolve, whether it be probable to settle your Brother as your Monarch, especially if your Lordship remember w th what difficulty fear and danger your father was supported for three or foure years only under most of the contrary advantages, and above all his pretence to army and people (believed by many) that he abhorred the thoughts of the reviving the old Monarchy, and intended to procure a settlement of true liberty.

Now my Lord, when we think upon these things, and the work you are called to, 'tis evident to us that God hath hedged up all the by-waies from your duty with thorns, or rather seas and mountains of difficulties, and made the path of righteousnesse plain and easy. 'Tis your duty to restore the people to their liberty, and lay solid foundations of common right and justice amongst them, and in the natural course and order of things, it appears almost impossible to make them slaves. Oh then give glory to God, vindicate the profession of religion, and make your own name as sweet odours to all generations in doing your duty, as a freewill-offering, chearfully and speedily, least your own necessities, and the peoples confusions should extort it from you. Your only businesse then my Lord) is to settle the order for the continuall successive assemblies of the people, to [Page] make their own laws and Magistrates, all present forms being broken by you, and an absolute necessity upon you, to appoint what shall be next, though you would return back to that imperfect form of Parliaments that's now become unsuitable for us as a free people. For it is essentially necessary to the securitie of freedome, that the same assemblie should never have the debating and finally resolving power in them, least it suddenly degenerates into an Oligarchie or Tyrannie of some few, that assembly being in such a case able to perpetuate themselves. Of this the providence of God hath given as an experiment in the long Parliament, who exercising both the debating and determining power, were strongly tempted to have made themselves perpetually legislators, and what else they please, and to have governed according to their private interests, which if it had taken effect, would have as much destroyed the common interest and common right, vertue and liberty, as the same power exercised by a single person, who doth also naturally make his whole government, centre in his particular interest. Therefore the order that hath alwaies been in effect amongst free people, (although with some variation of names and circumstances) hath been this: They have ranked themselves into three orders, the people, the Senate, and the Magistrate, whereby they have made themselves partakers of all the benefit of the naturall Democracy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy; that is, they have had the good effects of all the excellent endowments for rule and order, which God hath dispensed to any of their people, and by the wise distribution of the power amongst them, with controuls to every of their corrupt affections, unto which they were prone, they have prevented the mischiefs apt to ensue, when the governing power happened to be placed solely in any of the three. By the people is to be understood, (in large populous places where the body of the people is too large to meet) the popular assembly chosen by the body of the people of interests and estates, who have right of sufferage amongst us. This Counsell or Assembly ought to be numerous, as one thousand or more, and [Page] their function ought to be, to give their affirmative or negative to all laws, matters of peace, warre, and leveys of money, and that without debate, or arguing, which would bring in confusion in so great an assembly. Therefore the matters ought always to be proposed by the Senate, a convenient time before, that the popular assembly may be fully advised of them, before their meeting, and then they are to be summoned to meet, by one of their own choice for that purpose: and therefore they ought to reside near the chief Citie, for the time of their power, which may be for two or three years, one third going out of Office every year the Assembly being filled by a new choice, and this is called the Power of the Common wealth; The Senate is the wisedom and Authoritie of the Common-wealth, which is a select Company, not very numerous, chosen by the whole People at the same time and in the same manner with the popular Councell, and to continue for the same space, with the same changes and recruits: The Office of this Councell, is to manage affairs of Peace and Warrs, when the people hath Decreed it, and to prepare all Lawes and Decrees, ready for their Sufferage, to command the Forces by Sea and Land, according to such Lawes and Orders as shall be either Fundamental to the Government, (for there ought to be an Instrument of Government) or made from time to time by the Senate, and the people. So that the Senate is to debate and propose, and the people to Decree and resolve all Lawes going in the name of both of these Deputies, both Senate and People ought to have moderate Sallaries allowed them, to prevent corruption, and in some recompence for the neglect of their private affairs, those of the popular Assembly may have fourty shillings per week, & those of the Senate may have five hundred pound per annum, their pains, care, and expence, being to be probably much greater, regard being also had to their qualitie, now if it should not be provided in the foundation, that the Popular Assembly should not assume the debate, it would come to an Anarchie; but Athens, which perished by that means: and if the Senate should take upon them the result, it would soon be an Oligarchy, (or Tyranny of a few) For they might [Page] with a Vote perpetuate themselves, and govern the Nation according to their private interest; but both Counsels can never agree to perpetuate themselves, for the popular Assemblies Office, being not of profit, but burden, and being acpable when out of that Office, to be chosen into the Senate, which is of more profit and authoritie, it would be against their interest, which is the most certain Bond upon Mankind) to perpetuate themselves, and the yearly change of a third in each Councels, bringing the whole number by Successive Changes, so suddenly into their private Capacities, to enjoy the Good, or suffer the harmes of what is done by the Councell, in an equalitie with the whole people, it is of naturall impulse, that the whole Government, should be onely according to the publicke reason and interest, and cannot be imagined to deviate from the proper ends of Government, neither can any Brazen-wall, be so firm and lasting, against the private Interest and Pretence of Charles Stuart, as the moulding the people into these Orders, there being no danger, that the Senate and people should agree to de-throne themselves, to be yoaked by a Monarch: And we may safely say, that no people formed into these Orders, if their number held any neer proportion to lie under Monarchie, were ever yet subdued by a Monarch, from the beginning of the World, untill this Day, unlesse they were first broken in pieces by themselves, through some inequalitie in the Constitution of their Orders, but mightie Monarchs have been often led Captives by such people.

The third Order, is the Magistracy, wherein some are Chiefe, some subordinate, some Senatorian, some Popular, and are chosen accordingly, being all changeable, at certain times, and wholly subject to the Lawes and Order of the Common-wealth. And the Office of these, is to execute impartially all the Lawes made as is before expressed. It is possible it may consist with the Common Interest, to have one chiefe Magistrate, in whom the Title & Honour of the Common-wealth, may reside in publicke Solemnities and addresses; So that no publick Action bee [Page] left to his discretion, We shall not mention the Excellent Order of Armes, that is the Consequence of Casting a People into this Forme, whereby they subsist, and become invincible by their own Armies, not by Mercinaries. We onely mention the first Forme, wherein the Foundation of Libertie to a people ought to be laid, that is by Establishing the Popular Assembly, the Senate, and the Magistracy; these are Essentiall unto true Libertie, the Superstructures have differed amongst severall free People, according to divers accidents, We shall not presume so well of our selves as to offer any Direction to your Lordship in them: but if God shall prepare your heart for such a Worke of Righteousness and Honour, we shall readily throw in our Mite of Advice to your Treasury.

My Lord, We have now not onely Cleared it to be your Lordships Duetie, to make us free, but shewed wherein the Foundation of our Libertie must be laid, and the ground is digged to your hand, the Lands being so distributed, that no one Man, or small number of Men can over-power the whole People, by their possessions, If we thought it needfull to quicken your Affections to your Duetie, we could tell you from Reason and Experience how strangely such a settlement of Libertie would transforme the manners of the people; Luxurie would Change into Temperance, Haughtinesse and Envie into Meeknesse, and mutuall Love and Emulation of Goodnesse, servilitie aud basenesse of minde, into Noblenesse and Generositie. Who would not follow Vertue for the Love? When neither alliance, flattery or any Vice, could make great, but a Generall Sentence from Popular Assemblies of Worth and Goodnesse, we might tell you it would wash foure Garments from the staines of bloud, and the Armies honour from the black reproach that now covers it, and above all the profession of religion from scandall and infamy; this would shew that you had nobler ends then yet the world believes to be in Christians: If ambition pricks in your breast, for your self or your [Page] brother; in thus doing you may set him upon a Throne more noble, lofty, and commanding, then ever the Stuarts possessed or designed. His free conjunction with your Lordship in this work may give him merit of greatnesse in the souls of those that now disdain him, you may make your swords shine with a radiant glory beyond those of Alexander and Caesar, whose honour was only the same with that of the Plague and Pestilence to destroy mankind, yours may restore liberty to England, and propagate it to mankind. And what should hinder your Lordship, surely you can fear no resistance in giving the people their right, when you feared none in many destructive attempts to their right & freedomes, besides you have an Army whose interests, consciences, ingagements, yea their very passions and affections lead them this way, and in doing this you may extinguish all fears, and secure against all plots, and make all knowing men your voluntary vassalls in thankfulnesse for their liberty. But if your private interest should blind your Lordships eies, and lead you out of the paths of mercie, righteousnesse and peace, to hew out a bloudy way to empire against the naturall course of things. We believe it will not be long before oppression and confusion, the consequences of such violent actings wil extort that from you, which with little more trouble then to moddle the elections for a Parliament (as they ought) you might give us above to your eternal honour. So wishing the God of mercy and peace to direct you, we remain

My Lord,

Your affectionate servants in Christ.

FINIS.

Information about this book

Title statement

The Armies dutie; or, Faithfull advice to the souldiers: given in two letters written by severall honest men, unto the Lord Fleetwood Lieutenant-Generall of the Armie, and now published for the instruction of the whole Armie, and the good people of this Common-wealth.

Edition statement

1659

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Text Creation Partnership,

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Date

2009-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

ID [DLPS]

A89323

ID [STC]

Wing M28

ID [STC]

Thomason E980_12

ID [STC]

ESTC R202841

ID [EEBO-CITATION]

99863001

ID [PROQUEST]

99863001

ID [VID]

115182

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(EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A89323)

Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 115182)

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Source

— The Armies dutie; or, Faithfull advice to the souldiers: given in two letters written by severall honest men, unto the Lord Fleetwood Lieutenant-Generall of the Armie, and now published for the instruction of the whole Armie, and the good people of this Common-wealth., H. M., Fleetwood, Charles, d. 1692..

Extent

29, [3] p.

printed, and are to be sold in Popes-head Alley, S. Pauls Church-yard, and Westminster Hall,. London :: 1659.. ("To the reader" signed: H.M. [and 5 others].) (The last leaf is blank.) (Annotation on Thomason copy: "May 2d".) (Reproduction of the original in the British Library.)

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