CIvil Government derives its Being from Heaven: for it is a part of Gods Government over mankind, wherein he useth the Ministery of Angels, and the service of men: yet so, as that he reserves the supreme and universal Power in his own hands, with a liberty to depose the Rulers of the World at will and pleasure, and transfer the Go­vernment of one Nation to another; to lay the foundation of great Empires, and again to destroy them for their iniquity. To think that the sole or principal Cause of the constitution of a civil State is the consent of men, or that it aims at no further end then peace and plenty, is too mean a conceit of so noble an effect▪ And in this particular I cannot excuse Mr. Hobbs, who in the modelling both of a Civil, and also of an Ecclesiastical Common-wealth, proceeds [Page 2]upon principles not only weak, but also false and dangerous. And for this reason I undertake him. This should have been done by some wel-skill'd in Political Learning, and not by me who do not pro­fess, it as being a Divine, and one of the meanest amongst many. And my intention is not to inform my Betters, who know the vanity and absurdity of his discourse, but to undeceive the ignorant Reader, who may too easily be surprized.

• The first Chapter of the second Part, which is the seventeenth of his Book, doth inform us, First, That the end of civil Government, is Secu­rity.
• Secondly, This Security cannot be had in the State of Nature, because it is the state of War; nor by a weak, nor a great multitude, except united by one perpetual judgement.
• Thirdly, A great multitude are thus united, when they conferr all their power and strength upon one man or assembly of men, that may reduce all their wils by plurality of voices to one will, &c. From whence ariseth a Common-wealth.
• Fourthly, This Common-wealth is defined and distri­buted.

Against all this, some thing may be excepted. For First, That the State of Nature is the State of War, may be doubted, if not denied; For man is a rational creature, and if he act according to his nature, he must act rationally: and though he may seek to preserve himself, and that sometimes with the dammage or destruction of another, yet he cannot, may not do this unjustly, but according to the Laws of Nature; which are two: [Page 3]

• The First, Love thy neighbour as thy self.
• The Second, Do as thou wouldst be done unto.

These tend directly unto Peace, not unto War, which is unnatural; and they may be kept by multi­tudes of men not united in a civil State, or under a form of Government. And this is evident from Di­vine and profane Histories. For Families and Vici­nities, which had no dependance one upon another, and also States both by confederation, and without any such thing, have lived peaceably together. When the Apostle saith, The Gentiles which have not the Law, by nature do the things conta [...] in the Law, he doth not mean by [Nature] a Common-wealth, or form of Government civil. Its true, the Apostle brings in a Bill of Indictment against all man­kind, and accuseth them, That their feet are swift to shed blood: Destruction and calamity or misery are in their ways; And the way of peace they have not known, Rom. 3.15, 16, 17. Yet he understands this not of Nature, but the corruption of Nature: and the parties here accused, are not men only as in the state of Na­ture, but also under a Government, and that not only Civil but Ecclesiastical too: For such the Jews here charged, were. So that all that can be either by him evidently proved, or by others granted, is, That if by Nature, he mean corruption of Nature, and the same not only original and native, but also acquired by perpetual acts, so far as to quench the light of Nature, and suppress the vigour of those Principles which God left as reliques of his image, then his Position may be true, That the state of Na­ture [Page 4]is the state of War. Secondly, That by a well-constituted civil Government, to which Nature in­clines man, the Laws of Nature and Peace may be more easily and better observed.

But I hasten to his Definition of a Common-wealth, and it is thus defined by Mr. Hobbs.

A Common-wealth is a Person, of whose acts a great multitude by mutual Covenant one with another have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient for their peace and common de­fence.

G. L.

• 1. This Definition is obscure, and might have been made more plain and easie, and such as we read in other Authors.
• 2. Its imperfect, and only tels us what [pars im­perans] is, and that most poorly, if not falsly too.
• 3. It may agree unto the Head or Captain of a sedition or rebellion, or a company of Thieves and Robbers by Land, or Pirats by Sea; nay but that he speaks of a society or multitude of men, it exactly agrees unto Belzebub the prince of Devils. In a word, it agrees to any unlawful multitude, united to do mischief; For here is no mention of reason, or justice, or law; Aristotle, and other Authors use to qualifie their Definition of a State, with some such term; For they make it [...], legitimam ordinationem, and do not give up all to the soveraigns judgement, which may be blinded; or [Page 5]his will, which may be corrupted; or his power, which may act more like a beast, then like a man.
• 4. A Common-wealth may be defined in another manner, thus; It is a community of men orderly sub­jected to a supreme power civil, that they may live peaceably in all godliness and honesty.

This Definition, or rather Description is not so accurate, yet it is sufficient to inform the Reader of the nature of civil Government somewhat better then the Author hath done. In it we may con­sider,

• 1. The community, as the Matter and Subject.
• 2. The supreme Power civil informing this Mat­ter.
• 3. The orderly Subjection unto it for peace and a good life.

1. The community is the Matter, of which some things may be observed; as

• 1. That the name in Greek is [ [...]] in Latine [Civitas] which is not as the Author saith, a Common-wealth in proper sense: for that in Greek is [ [...]] in Latine [Respublica.]
• 2. That it is a multitude of reasonable Men, not a Leviathan, which is an ir­rational Brute. The number of this multitude may be greater or less, and not certainly determi­nable. For Ragusa a little City, as well as the vast Roman Empire, may be a community to make a per­fect State.
• 3. This community must be associated and united not only in vicinity of place, which is convenient, but also in some stricter bond, before they can be capable of a supreme Power.
• 4. The Members of this Society are by nature free, and by God, to whom they are subject, left at li­berty [Page 6]to choose what Governours or form of Go­vernment they please; yet so that they must desire and endeavour the best, and such as shall be most conducing to Peace and Righteousness.
• 5. Some­times it fals out, and is so ordered by Providence, that a People who have continued for a certain time under a form of Government, return unto their first liberty; yet even then, when God doth offer them an opportunity to establish the best form and consti­tution, that they are fearfully divided. Some are for the former Government, others idolize some new Idea framed in their own brains.

Others in the mean time get the sword into their hands, and once possessed of Power, are unwilling to part with it. Yet these sometimes are dispossessed again; in the mean time the People like so many waves of the Sea, are tossed this way and that way, by contrary winds, like as in Daniels vision, when he saw the four winds strive upon the great Sea, out of which arose the great Empires of the world, Dan. 7.2, 3, &c. And all this comes to pass through the just Judgement of God, and the wilful folly of men, who are enemies to their own Peace. Lastly, In these many alte­rations of Governours and forms of Govern­ment, the Community abides the same, except it be cut off by the sword, as the Amalakites and Ca­naanites were, or destroyed by some extraordinary Judgement, as Sodom and Gomorrha with fire and brimstone from heaven.

The second part of the Definition is [the Supreme Power] And here we must consider,

• 1. The Nature of Power in general.
• 2. The Nature of supreme Power civil.
• [Page 7]3. The Original of it.
• 4. The Subject wherein its fixed.

1. Power, in Latine [Potestas] in Greek [ [...]] is [Jus imperandi] a quality inherent in a Superi­our as such, whereby he can effectually com­mand or bind any person subject, as subject. Imperium or Command is properly an act of a supe­riour Will, whereby the person subject is bound to obedience or punishment: It presupposeth the Un­derstanding and practical Judgement, whereby it is directed: and is to no purpose without an executive power and coactive force, sufficient to protect the Subject obeying, and punish him, if he prove diso­bedient; And because the Judgement may be errone­ous, and the command unjust, therefore there can be no Jus imperandi, without Divine wisdom to di­rect the Understanding, and Justice to regulate the Will, which is to direct the coactive force. And though Superiours may in many things abuse their Superiority, yet they do not cease to be Superiours, though as abusing their power, they are not Supe­riours; because Nulla datur Potestas ad malum; none can have power to bind contrary to Divine Wisdom and Justice.

2. Supreme Power civil, which is in Latine called [Majestas] which is [maxima Potestas in Civitate] may be defined out of Rom. 13.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, &c. and 1 Pet. 2.13. to be a Sword committed by God, unto higher Powers, for to punish the bad, and protect the good. For 1. In all Government civil there must be a sword which is an outward coactive strength and force, and the same sufficient for the end it was ordained and given by God. [Page 8]How otherwise can there possibly be any sufficient protection or punishment within the precincts of the community and territory. And here two things are to be observed.

• 1. That one and the same Sword must protect from enemies without, and unjust Subjects within. For the Sword of War and Justice are but one Sword.
• 2. That there is a plain difference between Civil and Ecclesiastical Power, between the Sword and the Keyes.

For what is bound by the civil Power on Earth, is bound and made good on earth by an earthly Sword: But what is bound on earth by the Spiritual Power is bound in heaven, and made good, and executed by Jesus Christ, and that by a Spiritual force upon a Di­vine Promise.

Secondly this Sword must protect the good, and punish the bad; which implies there must be wise and just Laws. 2. There must be just judgement ac­cording to these Laws. For otherwise there can be no true and certain knowledge of good and bad, for to put a difference between them, that the one may be punished for violation, the other protected for the observation of the Laws. And here again we must note,

• 1. That there is a threefold Power civil, or ra­ther three degrees of that Power. The first is Legi­slative. The second Judicial. The third Executive. For Legislation, Judgement, and Execution by the Sword, are the three essential acts of supreme Power civil in the administration of a State.
• 2. That there is no Power to punish the good and protect the bad. For the Sword must execute according to Judgement, and that must pass according to Laws: and both Judge­ment and Laws must be regulated by Divine Wisdom and Justice.

Thirdly, This Sword must be in the hands and possession of higher or supereminent Governors. For a Title without the possession of a Sword can neither punish nor protect: Therefore in all States of the world, they who have possession of the Sword do rule, let the Title be what it will, neither can it be otherwise. And no Prince can rule, when God hath taken away his Sword.

It hath been declared in some measure:

• 1. What Power in General.
• 2. What Power civil in Parti­cular is. The third thing concerning this supremacy of Power to be examined, is the original of it.

And the same Text of the Apostle Paul tels us, that it is of God; therefore in the Definition I said, That the Sword was committed by God to higher Powers, who become such by this Commission, when God gives them possession of the Sword. So that the Original of this Power is from God, both in respect of the Power, and the persons possessed of Power. For it is he that gives Understanding, Will and Power suf­ficient for to govern: he gives Wisdom and Justice: he commands all Societies that have opportunity to set up a wise and just Government for Peace and Godliness. In respect of the persons, he designs them either in an ordinary or extraordinary way; he inclines the hearts of the people to submit and obey: he prevents seditions, rebellions, treasons, and such like acts as tend to confusion and the ruin of Common-wealths, according to that of the Psalmist, Thou hast delivered me from the strivings of the peo­ple, Psal. 18.43. And it is God that subdueth the people under me, Psal. 47. In this designation, God sometimes useth the consent, tacit or express, [Page 10]sometimes the force and consent of Man.

Fourthly, The Subject of this Power is either standing, or movable. The standing Subject by Na­ture is the community, in whom vertually it resides, and is exercised by a general representative upon ex­traordinary occasions, or at certain determinate times. And this is the best way to preserve liberty, if these general Assemblies be well ordered, and fit persons rightly qualified be chosen. For its dange­rous to trust either one man, or a number of men with too much power, & the constant exercise of the same. This supreme power reserved to the whole communi­ty to be exercised as necessity or occasion shall re­quire, might be called [Realis Majestas] yet every Community is neither so wise nor so happy. For in most States we find only a personal Majesty, or su­preme Power, and the same sometimes Despotical, and too absolute; yet in other Common-wealths, the supreme Governours are limited, and only trusted with the exercise of the power according to certain Rules and fundamental Laws.

Of this Majesty or supreme Power, civil, some Writers have observed, that it must be not only su­preme, but also perpetual and above Laws; [soluta Logibus] That it must be supreme, and above all subordinate power within, and independent upon all other soveraigns without its necessary. It must be also perpetual and fixed, that it may be distin­guished from the extraordinary and temporary pow­ers trusted in the hands of one or more upon extra­ordinary occasions. How far it is absolute or above the Laws, I shall examine hereafter.

After the supreme Power civil is determined and [Page 11]sixed in a certain Subject, Subjection to it follows, which is the third thing in the Definition. Regimen est ordo Imperii & subjectionis. For in all Govern­ment, some must be above and have power to com­mand; some must be below, and be bound to obey. And in a civil State there must be one universal su­preme, to which all others in the Community must subject themselves. This Subjection must be rati­onal, free, and orderly, or else the State cannot continue long, nor be well administred. And wis­dom must determine not only the general order of superiour and inferiour, but also in particular the Community must be divided into parts with a co-or­dination of equals, and subordination of the une­quals, and of every several part unto the whole, that so every one may know his place and rank, that he may keep it. Therefore the Apostle commands eve­ry soul, Rom. 13.1. [...], not barely to be subject any ways but in a certain order; for the Com­munity must be like an Army put in array, that so the supreme Power may the better animate and or­der it: upon which followeth a more regular moti­on of this great body both in the whole and every part, tending the more directly to Peace, Godliness and Honesty.

For there is a twofold end of regular civil Go­vernment; The first is Peace; The second is God­liness and Honesty, to which Peace is subordinate. For the Apostle exhorts us to pray for Kings, and all that are in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all Godliness and Honesty: 1 Tim. 2.1. Government is for Peace, Peace for Godliness, and the performance of our duty towards God, and Ho­nesty: [Page 12]That we may live soberly and justly towards men. When God doth bless a people with a setled Government and an happy peace, (for these are Gods blessings) neither Prince nor people must for­get their God, or live in Luxury, and deal unjustly one with another. For these things offend him, provoke him to anger, and pull down his Judgements upon them. He expects Piety and Honesty from every one, even from the highest to the lowest. And these earthly States are erected, and subordinated to an higher end then peace and plenty here on earth: they should be so ordered as to prepare men for eter­nity: otherwise Regna are but latrocinia, a den of thieves, and a combination of devils. Thus much I thought good to deliver concerning the Nature of a Common-wealth civil. The Distribution fol­loweth.

Mr. Hobbs.

A Common-wealth is either by institution or acqui­sition.

G. L.

This is not the distribution of a Common-wealth either into the integral parts, which are two,

• 1. The soveraign
• 2. The subject: not into the kinds: for those are usually taken from the several manners of disposing the supreme power in one or more to make it Monarchical or Polycratical; but its a distincti­on of the manner of acquiring supreme power. And the ordinary way, or rather means whereby it [Page 13]is acquired, is either by force or consent.

Yet this distinction is imperfect: for there be other means besides these: neither when supreme Power is ob­tained either by force or consent, is a Common­wealth framed. The Power is alwayes derived from God, as before: and he takes it from one, and gives to another, either in an extraordinary or an ordinary way of Providence: as by giving a finall victory, or inclining mens hearts, and that upon several reasons to submit, and sometimes so, that if they had liberty and power, they would not consent at all. And though men may be unjust in de­siring and seeking, yet he is just in giving it. And by the way its to be observed,

• 1. That a Power acquired, and held by force, cannot govern without a tacit con­sent at least, so that all Common-wealths are by consent.
• 2. No man or men can govern any peo­ple long by force, except it be the Will of God to punish and oppress them with an iron rod for their transgressions.

THis Chapter informs us, what the rights of So­veraigns once constituted are. In every Com­mon-wealth there must be a supreme Power fixed in some certain Subject; this is essential to it: yet though this be a principal thing to be done, yet it is not all, neither being done, doth it make a com­pleat Common-wealth. His Covenant of every one with every one for to design a Soveraign, is but an Utopian fancy. For by the best Histories we may understand that many States have attained to a set­led form of Regular Government by degrees in a long tract of time, and that by several alterations intervening; so that the Laws of their constitution are rather customs then any written Charter. Some Communities come under a form of Govern­ment more suddenly, and by a way fortuitous unto man, though not so to God. And in this point the practise of former times, not the fancies and specu­lations of men must instruct us.

T. H.

The first of the twelve Rights of the Soveraign, is, That Subjects cannot change the form of Govern­ment.

G. L.

That Community which hath Power and Liberty to alter the form of Government to the better, do not their duty, or are not wise, if they do it not. And it were wisdom in any people to reserve the Power to the whole body, to be used as occasion, op­portunity and necessity shall require. As they are bound to reform the State when it is corrupted, so they are bound to alter the form, when without an alteration reformation cannot be obtained.

That the Subjects have no power to alter the form of Government may be granted: for Subjects as Subjects, must submit unto the Power established, not take upon them the highest and most transcen­dent Prerogative of all others: yet this is no right of the Soveraign, nor to be reckoned inter Jura Majesta­tis. For the Soveraign himself hath no right of him­self to change the fundamental constitution: Before this can be done, the People must return unto the original State of Liberty, and to a Community, which in England is not a Parliament, but the fourty Counties. Upon this ground some have said that a Parliament cannot alter the Government; what men may do upon a Dissolution, and in a case of real, not pretended necessity, is another matter. But let us hear his reasons.

T. H.

The first upon supposition of no former Obligation, is, That it is a breach of that Covenant whereby they [Page 16]made themselves authours of every act the soveraign doth, or shall judge fit to be done.

• 2. If they depose the Soveraign, that which is his own, and they had formerly given him, they take away unjustly.
• 3. If any attempting to depose his Soveraign, be kil­led or punished, he is Author of his own punishment.
• 4. A new Covenant pretended to be made with God, cannot free them from offence and injustice in their dis­obedience unto their Soveraign; because they can make no Covenant with God, without his Leiutenant, which is the Prince.

G. L.

1. I grant as formerly, that a Subject as such, cannot act to change the Government, or depose his lawful Soveraign.

2. They who set up a Soveraign, and by Covenant advance him to the Throne, must and ought to be free from all former superiour obligations, which cannot stand with this. But what is this to pur­pose? The question is, whether Subjects cannot change the form of Government in any case, and whether the Subjects may not be freed, and that lawfully from their allegiance, and cease to be in the State of Subjects? That it many times fals out so to be, is evident: For by civil wars, by forraign in­vasions, transmigrations, and other wayes it comes to pass, that Subjects are free from their Soveraigns, who cannot protect them; and in such cases, if God give them Power, they may alter the form of Govern­ment, if it may be for the best.

But to come more close unto his first reason, let us suppose as he affirmeth, That a people by Cove­nant have set up a particular person to be a Monarch, and so made themselves authors of all his acts, whe­ther is it lawful for you by a new Covenant to obey another, or cast off Monarchy, or transfer his person upon another without injustice? He saith ye cannot without breach of Covenant do it.

But

• 1. He here presupposeth his former Utopian fancy of a Covenant of every man with every man; whereas its plain, few States of the world now in power, were thus constituted.
• 2. Soveraigns are of two sorts;
  • 1. Such as in whom the supreme power doth constantly and immediately abide.
  • 2. Such as are such only for execution and administration. To these latter, the subjects bind themselves to be faith­ful, so far as they shall be faithful to the Kingdom and the Crown, which is theirs, not [jurc dominii] by absolute right, with a power to alienate them, or de­stroy them. For every subject is first bound to be faithful to their Countrey, then unto their King, who swears to maintain the Laws, Liberty and Religion by Law established. These cannot bind us to do any thing against the Laws of God, of Nature, nor against our Countrey. But with this Author every Monarch is absolute, and in particular the Kings of England amongst the rest.
• 3. Suppose a Covenant with a Soveraign, absolute or limited, be against the Laws of God either moral or positive in force, may not the subjects break this Covenant without in­justice? Nay is it not injustice for to keep it, seeing [Nullum juramentum ligat ad illicitum.]
• 4. If the Soveraigns Acts be directly contray to ju­stice, [Page 18]equity, and the fear of God, must the subjects who gave him no such power, be Authors of these horrid acts, as murther, incest, adultery, blasphemy, as also of his unjust commands and perverse judge­ments?
• 5. To be obedient to another, to transfer his power, to depose him, is not to change the form of government, but to pull down one, and set up another, the form remaining the same.
• 6. Subjects or rather they who are subjects, as subjects, cannot make any such Covenant, as to make one who was no Soveraign to be their Soveraign; If they can make a Soveraign, they must be equal, and equally free in making that Covenant where­by a supreme Governour is constituted.
• 7. If they, who were [aequà liberi] before, and in the time of making this Covenant, and after it is concluded, be­come subjects, afterwards rebel, they cease to be sub­jects, and become [hostes] enemies, and are so to be dealt withall: And what reason can be given why the Soveraign, if he prove a Tyrant in the ad­ministration, and challenge more power then was given him, or could by the Laws of God or Nature be conferred upon him, should not cease to be a So­veraign, and the subjects free from their allegiance to him, seeing he hath violated the essential part of the Covenant, and perverted the main end of all Government? Why should it be otherwise in this then in all other pacts and contracts? This question is the more difficult to be answered by this Author, be­cause he allows the people a power to make a Sove­raign: and if he be such as is one onely for admi­nistration, its unanswerable. This point might have been more clearly determined, if he had instanced in any particulars.

In all this I desire to be understood aright. For,

• 1. That power which the Bishop of Rome doth chal­lenge, and hath sometimes exercised in the excommu­nication and deposition of Princes , and absolving their subjects from allegiance, I detest.
• 2. I desire all Covenants, that are just and justly made, whilest they are in force, to be kept, especially by all sub­jects to their lawful Soveraigns. For no subjects are to be perswaded or encouraged to Treason or Re­bellion.
• 3. I would advise all people to beware how they rise against, or resist the highest powers, though the cause may be just: and because the remedy may prove worse then the disease, and often proves so: and the confusions which follow such commotions, are more mischievous then the former oppressions, and a Tyrannie is better then an Anarchy.

His second reason is, because they had given him the right of Soveraignty, which the cannot take away. Where,

• 1. He grants, That the people give the Soveraign his right; and if so, then they gave it him not as subjects; and when they return to the same occasion again, they may give the power to another.
• 2. I deny that subjects do give any such right.
• 3. Neither can he prove that there is any such Covenant of every man with every man in the constitution of civil States. His third reason is not worth an answer.

But in the end of this paragraph, he seems to take away the pretence and allegation of some new Cove­nanters with God. What Covenant he means, is not here expressed: If he understand the National Co­venant, as its very likely he doth, then let those who pretend it answer for themselves. For that Covenant [Page 20]could not give the least power either to Eng­land, or Scotland, or any in either Nation, entering into it: and in the same they only engaged to use lawful means, to accomplish what they had promised. Yet with him this and all other Covenants are void, if made with God without his Vicegerent, who is their Soveraign. Yet if this were true, then the Co­venant made in Baptism, by the converted Christians under the heathen Emperours cannot be valid. This is evidently false, because every man may voluntari­ly bind himself to God in those things wherein the Laws of God and man have left him free, without the consent or express permission of his civil Sove­raign.

T. H.

The second right of a Soveraign is, he cannot forfeit, the reasons are,

• 1. There is no Covenant made on his part either with them all joyntly or severally: not with them joynt­ly, because they cannot be one person before they subject unto him: Not with them severally, for they Covenant one with another, not with him, and if any one pretend freedom from subjection, there can be no judge of the controversie.
• 2. Words, as all Covenants are, be of no force with­out a sword publick.

G. L.

This is the substance, though not all the words to prove that Soveraigns cannot forfeit. His 1. Reason [Page 21]takes that for granted, which is false, and cannot be proved. For a community is one person moral by si­ction of Law, as they use to speak, or as the Civilians express themselves [persona conjuncta] opposed to [singularis] For a community is the immediate subject of a Common-wealth, and must be associate before they can be capable of a form of Govern­ment; and without union and communion too, it cannot be civitas, societas, populus. As thus united, it may act and covenant by their Deputies, who may be many, or by a Deputy, which may be one: and here they may in the name of the whole, Covenant with the person whom they like for Soveraign, and upon conditions just and reasonable. Thus Israel, a meer community, makes Moses their Deputy and Mediator, to Covenant with God in their behalf. Thus the ten Tribes by some of their principal men capitulate with Jeroboam. Thus the Gileadites by their Messengers offer to contract with Jephtah, and some of the Tribes make the same offer unto Gideon. Thus a free people may invest one man or more ei­ther with original power, or trust him and them only with the administration. And they may put conditions upon them, either to give them an un­limited or limited power, as the wisest men amongst them shall think fit. And there is great reason so to do: For,

• 1. They are free.
• 2. He with whom they purpose to contract, hath no right to command them, no power over them before he be made Sove­raign: He is but a private person, and they are mad men if they will subject themselves upon unreason­able conditions: They are very unwise, who will make a Butcher their Shepherd, or set a Woolf over [Page 22]their Flocks.

And surely its no point of wisdom in any free-people, to trust any one man, or assembly of men, with an absolute unlimited power. If an enemy come in by conquest, they must be content with what conditions he pleaseth, not with such as they desire. For they are not free, because their estates, liberty, lives are in his power; As for the Covenant of every one with every one, its a meer Chimera: there was never any such thing, neither can he give any instance of it, and therefore all that he builds upon it must needs fall.

As for his second reason, wherein he affirms Cove­nants to be but words, and words are but breath and of no force, without a publike sword, its no waies tolerable. By these words he may be proved to be an Atheist, whatsoever he pretends, and to deny the immortality of the soul, all Religion and fear of the Deity, and his providence over the world, and I should be very unwilling to trust his promise upon oath, for any thing I could not recover by Law. The principal force of a Covenant depends upon the will and consent of the immortal soul, which fears a Deity, and believes a supreme Judge of the world, who will render to every man according to their works; yet because Covenants are but words and breath, therefore he inferrs

T. H.

That a Soveraign cannot be made or receive his power by Covenant or upon condition, for so to think is is ignorance.

G. L.

Its true, that we are ignorant fools, if we think, when a Monarch is made such upon condition to which he is sworn, that he will part with his power, though he hath forfeited his right unto it: if he have a long sword, and a broad conscience, he will be pos­sessor as long as he can. And by this passage he seems to affirm, that few Monarchs have any consci­ence or fear of God: For though they lose their right, yet they will not part with their possession, though their own conscience, Laws of God, and the dictates of nature perswade them to keep their Co­venants, and not violate their Oaths. In a word, though Soveraigns be made by Covenant and Oath yet the Obligation is in vain, because the people can­not force them to the observation thereof: for they have parted with their power, and delivered the sword unto their Governors; Yet they never gave them the sword to maintain their injustice, but to protect the just and punish the unjust. Yet in a po­pular State this seems to be clear; That the Sove­raign cannot be made upon condition; for thus he writes,

T. H.

No man is so dull as to say, for example, The people of Rome made a Covenant with the Romans to hold the Soveraignty on such or such conditions, which not performed, the Romans might lawfully depose the Roman people. That men see not the reason to be [Page 24]alike in a Monarchy and a Popular Government, pro­ceedeth from the ambition of some, &c.

G. L.

Men are not so dull as to believe that the reason of not forfeiting the supreme power is alike in a Monar­chy and a Popular State; For we know that in such a Common-wealth, the Community and the Sove­raign are the same, though in some respect different; but in a Monarchy or Aristocraty its far otherwise. In the State of Rome, after that Tarquin was depo­sed, and that Government reduced unto a Repub­lick, every one severally, though never so great, was a subject: and all joyntly was their Soveraign: for in that form [singuli subduntur universis, & universi praesunt singulis] yet the universality of the people, as a Community, could not act and exercise the Soveraignty, and therefore Consuls and other Officers were trusted with great power, but not with the supreme: and these might forfeit and be deposed by the people. In all States we must distin­guish between the constitution and the administrati­on, or as others use to express themselves [Inter Statum & exercitium.] They who are trusted on­ly with the administration, as such, are not su­preme, though they will endeavour to usurp and possess that power. Therefore the Authoreither is ve­ry ignorant, or else goes about to delude his ignorant Reader.

The question therefore is, whether a Soveraign may forfeit? That he cannot, is not at all, by so much as a probable argument yet evinced.

• 1. That he [Page 25]may forfeit unto God there is no doubt.
• 2. That if any forfeit, God will in his due time take the forfeit, pass Judgement upon the party forfeiting, and exe­cute the same, either by himself, or by Angels, or by forrein forces, or by civil wars, or some other way; and in all this God is just, though men may be un­just.
• 3. Monarchs and Princes only trusted with the power of Execution and Administration, may for­feit, and justly be restrained, or reduced, or deposed.
• 4. Absolute Princes may forfeit their right unto the Soveraignty, when they pervert all Laws of God and man, oppress, murther, raise war unjustly against their own subjects, to butcher them as so many wild beasts, violate their Oaths and Covenants without any fear of God or man. For such, as such, are hostes humani generis, rebels against God, and agents for the Devil. All powers are ordained of God, and from him they receive Commssion to pro­tect their subjects, not destroy them, and to punish the bad, not to protect them and advance them, and use them for the destruction of the good. If any man dare plead for these, let him; I dare not.
• 5. If the Author had stated the question, and informed us of the several titles of Soveraigns, which are many, or had instanced in particulars, and informed us of their particular titles, it had been easie to determine the controversie; Princes acquire their power many waies, as by Election, Succession, Marriage, the Sword, and by that, either justly, or unjustly, usurp­ing the power which is not due; and that out of re­venge, or covetousness, or ambition, with a desire to be great, not do good.

The question is not, whe­ther a Soveraign according to the Apostles definiti­on, [Page 26] Rom. 13. can forfeit to his subjects, as his subjects; for so he cannot do: but it is this, whe­ther a Soveraign may not cease to be a Soveraign, and the subjects cease to be his subjects: and to this the Author hath said nothing.

T. H.

No man can without injustice protest against the in­stitution of the Soveraign, declared by the major part.

G. L.

• 1. There are very few Soveraigns thus instituted; and if this be the only way, what title have the greatest part of Soveraigns in the world?
• 2. If they be not thus instituted, whether is it lawful to protest against them or no? of this the Author saith no­thing.
• 3. Suppose the major part be a faction, and institute one of their own party Soveraign, not for publick good so much as for private interest, whe­ther may not the dissenters protest?
• 4. In all As­semblies and Societies, which proceed by way of suf­frage, the major part concludes and determines for the whole, to avoid confusion and dissention, and to preserve unity and order. Yet so that the major part may err; because they are not infallible: and one good reason being evident, should prevail against ten millions of votes; We find that most men in their suffrages, follow the example of some eminent per­son or persons, or their own affection; few are de­termined by reason. And in doubtful matters, men [Page 27]should first debate and throughly examine the thing debated, before they proceed to give their voices; and this is most properly and conveniently done, when after a diligent search, no preponderant reason can be found for either part of the proposition: Mens votes are inferiour to reason and superiour Laws, and are not good because votes, but because agreeable to reason. And whereas he alledgeth two reasons,
  • 1. That to protest against a major part is injustice.
  • 2. It puts the party protesting out of pro­tection; the answer is easie:
    • 1. That a protestati­on is not unjust, because it is against the major part, except it be against reason and right; and no man will be so mad as to assent unto a major against reason, which is above all votes.
    • 2. Its true, that the party protesting puts himself out of the protection of that Soveraign against whom he protests; but this may be a misery, but no injustice.

T. H.

The Soveraigns actions cannot be accused of inju­stice by the subject; because he hath made himself Au­thor of all his actions: And no man can do injustice to himself. The Soveraign may do iniquity, but not in­justice.

G. L.

• 1. The Soveraigns actions are to punish the evil and protect the good: as a Soveraign, he can do no other actions, and these cannot be justly accused.
• 2. Neither can the consent of the people, nor doth a [Page 28]Commission of God give him any power to act con­trary to these.
• 3. When he acts unjustly, (for so he may do, and all iniquity is injustice) neither God nor the people are authors of such actions; for he was set up by them to do justly, and no waies else.
• 4. Civil justice and injustice, as they consist in for­malities, differ much from moral and essential justice and injustice. In this respect a Prince may be civilly just and morally unjust.
• 5. To accuse may be judi­cial, or extra judicial. Judicially, a Prince as a Prince, cannot be accused by his subject, as such. Yet the subject may represent unto his soveraign his saults, and by way of humble petition, desire them to be reformed.

T H.

Whatsoever the Soveraign doth is unpunishable by the subject: because if the subject punish him, he pu­nisheth another for his own actions.

G. L.

• 1. A Soveraign as a Soveraign, cannot be punish­ed by his subject as his subject.
• 2. Yet he that is su­preme only for administration, may be punished and put to death. Thus the Ephori might punish the Lacedaemonian Kings, and the Justice of Arragon the Kings of that Kingdom.
• 3. Absolute Princes may cease to be such, and then they differ not from other men. And it will be an hard task to prove that any consent of man or humane title, can free one from punishment with death, who is guilty of a [Page 29]crime which God hath determined to be capital, and commanded to be punished with death.
• 4. Why should it be lawful for a forrein Prince, warring and proving victorious upon a just quarrel, to put a wic­ked Prince to death: and not for those who have been his subjects, when they have power to do it, and tends to the publick good, which cannot possibly without this act of justice, be preserved? Yet this cannot warrant any cursed Rebels, or Traytors, or the like, to murther Princes: though their pretences may be coloured with piety and justice.

The jura Majestatis, or rights of higher-powers following are truly such. Two things only I take notice of,

• 1. That the Prince is only Judge of Do­ctrines taught, so far as either the matter of right, or manner of teaching may be prejudicial to the State, or beneficial to the same: as the Doctrine of the Gospel wisely taught, alwaies is a blessing.
• 2. Whereas he affirms that there is no propriety be­fore a form of Government be established, its evi­dently false; and civil Laws determine how every man may keep or recover that which is by justice his own.

According to his rules, the institution of a Soveraign takes away all propriety of the sub­ject.

That the rights of Soveraigns are indivisible and incommunicable, is true, if rightly understood. To this purpose Authors distinguish these royalties into the greater and the less, and say, the latter may, the former cannot be divided or communicated. Others affirm, That in a mixt State, they of necessity must; in a pure State, they must not be either divisible, or communicable. This point may be made more clear, [Page 30]if we understand, 1. That these rights or jura, are but so many branches of one and the same power supreme civil, as it may act upon several objects. And all these branches are reducible to three; For supreme power civil is, Legislative, Judicial, Execu­tive, as before; and because it extends to these three acts, therefore it may be said to be threefold. And all these rights reckoned up by him, which are such indeed, are contained under these three, though nei­ther he nor other Authors have much observed it. Amongst these the Legislative is the principal, not only the first but the chiefest, yet the other are ne­cessary, because without them its in vain; for what are Laws without Judgement and Execution? yet even the Laws regulate both. And to know who are Soveraign in any act, the only infallible way is by the Legislation. For in whomsoever the Legislative power originally is, he or they are supreme; for it is not the actual making of certain rules to order all things in a State, but the giving of a binding force unto them, which makes the Soveraign.

This power, not only as it is a power, but as su­preme, cannot be divided. For if you take any es­sential part from it, you destroy it, so that its indivi­sible in it self. 2. In respect of the subject: For whether the subject be the Community, or the Opti­mates, they must be considered as one person moral­ly, though they be many physically: and the rea­son is, they must go all together, otherwise there can be no first mover in a State; for it is one supreme power in it self, and must also be in one subject: yet for the administration it may be divided: be­cause the Soveraign doth exercise this power, and [Page 31]acts severally by several Officers, which are but in­struments animated and acted by him. This power is also incommunicable within one and the same com­munity and territory, except you will constitute more States then one.

T. H. pag. 93.

If there had not first been an opinion recieved of the greatest part of England, that these powers were di­vided between the King, and the Lords and the Com­mons, the people had never been devided, and fallen in­to these civil wars.

G. L.

The cause moral of these wars, was our sins: the Political cause was the male-administration; yet so, that all sides have offended through want of wisdom, and many other waies. The ignorance of Politicks in general, and of our own constitution in particu­lar, cannot be excused or excepted; What the an­cient constitution was, we know not certainly, though some reliques of the same continued till our times: but the whole frame was strangely altered and corrupted. Many different opinions there be concerning our Government; yet three amongst the rest are most remarkable: For one party con­ceives the King to be an absolute Monarch: A se­cond determines, the King, Peers, and Commons to be three co-ordinate powers, yet so that some of them grant three Negatives, some only two: A third party give distinct rights unto these three: yet [Page 32]in this they are sub-divided, and they would be thought to be more rational, who give the Legisla­tive Power unto the Lords and Commons in one house; the judicial, to the Lords in a distinct house, and the executive to the King, who was therefore trusted with the Sword both of War and Justice: None of these can give satisfaction. There is ano­ther opinion, which puts the supreme power radical­ly in the 40. Counties, to be exercised by King, Peers and Commons, according to certain rules, which by Antiquaries in Law, together with some experienced States-men of this Nation, might be found out, but are not. The seeds of this division were sown and begun to appear before the wars; and the opinion, that all these were only in one man, that is the King absolutely, some say, was the greatest cause, not only of the last, but also of other civil wars in former times: And it hath been observed, that every man liked that opinion best, which was most suitable to his own interest. Our several opi­nions in Religion have heightened our differences, and hindered our settlement; yet Religion is but pretended; for every party aims at civil power, not spiritual liberty from sin. And the power to settle us thus wofully distracted, is only in God; and if he ever will be thus merciful unto us, the way whereby he will effect it, will be by giving the greatest power to men of greatest wisdom and integrity, not by re­ducing us unto one opinion, that all the powers civil must be in one, as the Author doth fondly fancy: Let the form be the best in the world, yet without good Governors its in vain.

The subject of this Chapter is [Majestas] [& [Page 33]jura Majestatis] the Rights of Soveraigns, which this Author hath handled very poorly; and if he had but translated that which others had more excellent­ly written in this particular before him, he might have informed us better, given his Reader more sa­tisfaction, reduced them to a better method, and neither have made such to be Rights which are none, nor omitted those which truly are such, as he hath done.

BY these brief contents it appears, that the sub­ject of this Chapter is the distinction of Com­mon-wealths, and Succession to the Soveraign power, in a successive State. In the first part, he

• 1. Reduceth all Common-wealths to three kinds.
• 2. Prefers Mo­narchy, one of them, before all the rest.

T. H.

Other kind of Common-wealths besides Monarchy, Democracy, Aristocracy, there cannot be.

G. L.

This is conceived to be a distribution into species or kinds; yet if we throughly examine it, it is not so; for its but an accidential difference: For it ariseth only from the distinct and different manner of di­sposing the supreme power, in one or more. In more, and these are the [Optimates] some of the best and most eminent, or in the whole Community. Yet in all these the essential acts of Government (and so the Soveraign power) are the same in all States: and they are, as you heard before three, Legislation, Judgement and Execution; for its meerly accidental to the supremacy to be disposed more or more. That it must be disposed in some certain such sect is necessary; and that as the Supremacy is one and indivisible, so the subject must be one also, and that either physically or morally: The great variety of Common-wealths, which is such, that there be not two in the whole world in all things like, ariseth not from the constitu­tion, but from the different manner of administrati­on: Though the Author denies all mixt Common-wealths; yet wise and learned men, which without disparagement to him, may be preferred before him, as in other things, so in State-learning, have said,

• 1. That there is no pure Monarchy, or Aristocracy, or Democracy in the world.
• 2. That not only some, but all Common-wealths are in some measure mixt or tempered and allayed, because they conceive its hardly possible for any pure State to continue long. Against these I find in Mr. Hobbs a verbal contradi­ction, but no real confutation.

And it seems to me [Page 35]he never truly understood them, neither hath he ta­ken notice of the difference between Real and Per­sonal Majesty; or of the Natural or Ethical sub­ject of Supremacy, or of the exercise thereof by certain persons, and the constant inherency of it in a certain subject. And we know by experience, that such as are only trusted with the exercise of supreme power, will by little and little usurp it, and in the end plead prescription. So Lewis the 11. of France, when he violated the Laws of the constitution, re­moved all such as by right ought to have poysed him, could boast, That he had freed the Crown from Wardship. And this hath been the practise of the Princes of Europe, which in the end will prove their ruine, as for the present it hath been their trouble. There is no Common-wealth, but may be reduced to one of these three, in some respect; yet so, that Mo­narchies differ as much from one another, as they differ from the other two: Some are regal, some despo­tical; and there be several sorts of these. But I do not intend at this time to contest with him about this di­stribution but proceed.

T. H.

Tyrannie and Oligarchy are but different names of Monarchy and Aristocracy, not different forms of Go­vernments.

G. L.

These names do not signifie Chimera's, but real Entities; and if any have abused them to signifie [Page 36]forms of Government, let them answer for them­selves; I know them not, they cannot be men of any note; Tyrannie doth not signifie Monarchy, nor Oligarchy an Aristocracy. They signifie the vicious corruption of States degenerate from their original constitution, and that by the wickedness of a Prince, and the faction of an assembly ingrossing power, and enhansing it above that which is due and just, and so become a multitude of Tyrants; and this hath been the cause, why many Nations, when they had power in their own hands, have altered the form of Government, been jealous of trusting one man or assembly of men long with too much power, and the wisest have set their wits on the rack, to find out a way, how to limit and restrain the power of their Governors.

T. H.

Subordinate Representatives are dangerous: And I know not how that so manifest a truth should of late be so little observed, that in a Monarchy, he that had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600. years, was alone called Soveraign, had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects, and was unquestionably taken by them for their King, was notwithstanding never consi­dered as their Representative: that name without con­tradiction, passing for the title of those men, which at his command, were sent up by the people to carry their petitions, and give him (if he permitted) their ad­vice.

G. L.

This man deserves to be a perpetual slave; his in­tention is to make men believe, that the Kings of England were absolute Monarchs, their subjects slaves, without propriety of goods, or liberty of person, the Parliaments of England meerly nothing but shadows, and the members thereof but so many carriers of letters and petitions between home and the Court; What he means by subordinate Repre­sentatives, I know not; I think his intention is to op­pose those, who affirmed King, Peers, and Com­mons to be co-ordinate, not subordinate powers, and all of them joyntly to make up one supreme; Subordinate Representatives or powers he may safe­ly and must grant in all States. The word Represen­tative, he either doth not understand, or if he do, he intolerably abuseth his unwary and unlearned Rea­der by that term. A Representative in the Civil Law, called [...], is one who by his presence supplies the place of another that is absent, for some certain end, as to act that which another should do, but in his own person doth not, yet with the consent of the person represented, so far as that the thing is judged to be done by him. And in this sense, the person representing, is Judged to be one with the person represented by fiction of Law. And one may represent another as a Superiour, who may represent another in any act, so far as that other is in his power: or as an inferiour, by a power derived from his supe­riour; or as an equal by consent, so far as the person [Page 38]will undertake to act for him. In all these represen­tations, the Representeé and the Representer are judged one person. In a free-State, a Parliament is a Representative of the whole body of the people; this we call a general Representative. The reason of this representation is, because the whole body of a people cannot well act personally. What kind of Representative the Parliament of England was, is hard to know, except we knew certainly the first in­stitution, which, by tract of time, and many abuses of that excellent Assembly, is now unknown. It was certainly trusted with the highest acts of Legislation, Judgement, Execution. The whole body consisted of several orders and ranks of men, as of King, Peers, Commons, the Clergy. Whether they might meddle with the constitution or no, is not so clear; its conceived they could not alter it, though they might declare it what it was. Their power was great without all doubt, yet not so great, but that it was bounded, and a later Parliament might alter and re­form what a former had established, which argues, That the 40. Counties, and the whole body of the people whence all Parliaments have their original and being, as they are Parliaments, were above them. In this great assembly, the Knights and Burgesses did represent the Connties and the Burroughs; the Convocation, the whole body of the Clergy; the Peers, by antient tenure, their Families, Vassals, and Dependants. But whom the King should represent is hard to determine. If the Law did consider him as an infant, and this according to the constitution, he could represent no other person or persons. And if this be so, then there is plain reason why he never [Page 39]should have the title of Representative; yet evident reason there is, why the rest should be called a Re­presentative: and the people are not Representers, as he fondly imagines, but the persons represented.

Its affirmed by the Author,

• 1. That our Government is a Monarchy.
• 2. The King had the Soveraignty from a descent of 600. years.
• 3. Was alone called Soveraign.
• 4. Had the title of Majesty from every one of his Subjects.
• 5. Was unquestionably taken by them for their King.

1. Our Government is called a Monarchy] is true, and he himself in this Chapter confesseth that Elective limited Kings are called Monarchs, and their King­doms Monarchies; yet he saith, they are not so. Again, Monarchy is Regal over free-men, Despotical over slaves and servants, not by a Legal but an Arbitrary power. If he say its Regal, then the King is no absolute Monarch as he would have him to be. If he say its Despotical, its false, and we know it so to be false. And the Doctrine of Dr. Sibthorp, and Man­nering, or Martin, affirming this, was condemned by a whole Parliament, and that by men who have been as great Zealots for the King in these civil wars as any other.

2. The King of England had Soveraignty by a descent of 600. years;] But first, what doth he mean by Soveraignty? If he understand an absolute supreme power, its not true: the Kings of England have no such thing. Its true, that many of them did challenge so much power as they could acquire and [Page 40]keep; and as their sword was longer or shorter, so their power in possession was more or less. Yet by the constitution of Law, and the best custom, it was alwaies determined within certain bounds. Secondly, Whence will he commence the date of 600. years? and how will he derive the Soveraignty? If from the Conqueror, the date of so many years is not yet expired, & the Succession is interrupted, if not cut off by the sword upon a civil war. If he derive this pow­er from the Conqueror as Conqueror; all free Eng­lish men will deny it; the Kings themselves durst not challenge it upon those terms, and by consent they never had it. Therefore the Soveraignty, the time of the commencement, the title it self doth vanish. He saith something, proves nothing; that he was called Soveraign, doth neither prove that he was really such, nor that he was absolute, and that by his own confession.

3. The King had the title of Majesty from every one of his subjects] The title or name doth not prove the thing: for we know very well, that the title is constantly given to divers Princes who have not the thing, no more then our Kings had the King­dom of France, though they had the title of the Kings of France: France was so civil as to grant the title and the word, but never part with the thing. The Dukes of Venice (as Contarene tells us) had insignia sed non potestatem regis. Majestas is some­times maxima dignitas, and this no subject denyed to the King. He had his Scepter and his Throne, his Robe and Diadem; but all these are far short of su­preme power: Majestas is Personalis aut Realis. Real he had not, Personal he might have. Yet perso­nal [Page 41]Majesty might be his either in respect of dignity, as it was, or in respect of power; and that also two waies; either in respect of the whole power, and all the acts thereof; or 2. in respect of the executive only, so far as that all Commissions, Judgements, Executions determined by Law, should run in his name, as they did. I remember I have read in the Mirrour something to this purpose, That in the first constitution of this Government of England, in the time of the Saxons, the 40. Counts, of the 40. Shires or Counties set up a King above them, so that he had neither any one his Superiour, nor his Peer; Yet ex obligatione criminis, by his mis-government the 40. Counts joyntly together might judge him, whether in their own names, or the name of the 40. Counties, may be a question. And in this sense I be­lieve is to be understood that saying, Rex singulis major, universis minor. Let these things be so or no, (for they are out of my sphere) its certain the Kings of England had the title of Majesty, yet thats no argument at all that he was invested with the su­preme and universal power.

4. He was unquestionably taken by them for their King.] I grant he both was so taken, and was so truly and indeed. And when our Kings were such as were more tender of the peoples good, then their own greatness, and also governed by the direction of a wise and faithful Council, they found them the most loving and loyal subjects of any in the world. For the English alwaies desired to be governed as men, not as Asses. And this is the quality of all un­derstanding people of other Nations. Some are not capable either of a mild, or moderate power.

Eminent Authors who take upon them to know Law and the power of Kings, have said,

• 1. That the King of England may be judged, so Horn.
• 2. That he is in Law considered as Infans minorennis, as a pupil alwaies in nonage; and as his Courts and Offi­cers can do nothing but in his name, so he can do no­thing but by their heads and hands, and he cannot take away the formalities of judicial proceedings, nor by all his power revoke or make null the Judgement of any Court. So several Authors.
• 3. He hath not Regiam potestatem, sed politicam â populo effluxam; so Fortescue the great Chancellor.
• 4. That he was a King by Law, not above Law, and could not exer­cise any power but according to Law.
• 5. He was sworn corroborare leges, quas vulgus eligeret: where vulgus, is populus, and populus eligit leges; and as the Law-giver, so his Oath.
• 6. No King made a Law without a Parliament, nor could justly impose a Sub­sidy upon the people without a Parliament. These two things forreign writers could observe.
• 7. By the manner of their Coronation, which was turned to a Formality, he derived not his power from the first investiture, as some tell us, the Princes of Ger­many and the Kings of France do; nor from his im­mediate predecessor, but by Election; and this is agreeable to Fortescue, A populo effluxam.
• 8. King Henry 8. desires by an act of Parliament to be em­powered to design by will which of his children he should please, for to succeed him.

What power ei­ther Kings or Parliaments have assumed and exercised de facto, and not de jure, might be observed by some men, and brought into example, yet to little purpose. From all this every one may see what little credit is [Page 43]to be given to Arniseus and Besoldus, and some other outlandish writers, who affirm the Kings of England to be absolute Monarchs. For they took their information either from partial or ignorant men, or from unlearned Histories, as many of our English be. For few of our Historians have been either Antiquaries in Law, or learned and experien­ced States-men, such as Thucidides, Xenophon, Po­lybius, Livy, Tacitus, Guiccardine, Commeignes, and such like have been: These are men that could pe­netrate into the bowels of a State, and discover the inward fabrick of the same.

T. H.

Monarchy is the best form of Government.

G. L.

This is the substance of the next part of this Chapter. And in this particular I will not be tedious, nor answer him word by word. But

• 1. Its certain there is no absolute Monarch but one, and that is the eternal glorious God.
• 2. Monarchy well regulated, may be a good Government amongst men.
• 3. There are several kinds of Monarchies so called, and some better then another.
• 4. Monarchy may be good for some people, bad for another, and sometimes good for the same people, sometimes not.
• 5. To in­fer that Monarchy in general is the best kind of Go­vernment alwaies for all people, because some kind of Monarchy is sometimes good, for some kind of people, is very absurd.

One of our learned Bishops [Page 44]in his answer to Bellarmine, who affirmed Monar­chical Government was the best, and therefore the Government of the Church must be such, saith, that purple is the best colour, yet not the best for the Car­dinals face, so it is in this case. No man (I think) can demonstrate the Government of Angels to be Monarchical. There may be amongst those blessed spirits primatus ordinis, not jurisdictionis. We do not read that God did ever immediately institute a form of Government to any people except to Israel; yet that was not Monarchical. And though Monar­chy were supposed to be the best, yet wise men ha­ving the opportunity, did never institute that form of Government which in it self was best, but the best the people were capable of. I am no enemy to Monarchy, and I desire all Christian States to be con­tent with their present form of Government, espe­cially if they may enjoy peace and the Gospel. If di­vine Providence bring them into such a condition, as that they must, or may lawfully and safely alter, let them use their utmost power to make the alteration so, that it may be a reformation. To endeavour a change in a quiet State, and that out of ambition, or an humour of innovation, or an high conceit of their own State-learning, will much offend God, and bring great misery on man. Alterations in Government, which though they be for the better, if sudden, are dangerous: and should be made insensibly and by little and little; yet so, that if there be any thing in the former old constitution, which is good, it should be retained; what wise Polititians have done in this kind, Histories inform us; as in England if the Com­mon-Law, [Page 45]which so many excellent Lawyers have so highly commended, as next unto the eternal Law, were introduced, it would prove a wonderful com­pendium in the regulation of Justice, and cut off a world of useless Statutes, which are rather an im­pediment, then a furtherance to Justice. There may be many forms of Government, and all good, yet its certain, that is the best, which provides most effe­ctually for good Officers in the administration. If we may believe Contzen the Jesuite, There are amongst others, in the constitution of the Empire of China, two excellent rules constantly put in practise; The one is an Office or Colledge, whose duty is to inform the King of his errours, and never to cease petitioning in the name of the people, till he reform, and return to the observation of the Laws. These also inform the King of the miscarriage of all other Officers, though never so great. The other rule and practise is, every third year to make a severe and rigid inquisition into the administration of all Magistrates, and to put out and punish the unjust, negligent, and unworthy, and to establish the just.

The Author endeavours to prove the excellency of Monarchy above other forms, because it hath con­veniencies proper to it self, and is free from inconve­niencies incident to Aristocratical and Democratical States. Yet this is to little purpose. For,

• 1. The best forms have their imperfections.
• 2. The incon­veniences mentioned, are easily prevented by wise States-men, even in other forms of Government.

The discourse following, concerning elective and limited Monarchies so called, yet are not such, as al­so concerning succession, I omit.

• 1. Because others [Page 46]have discussed these points in their Political systems more accurately.
• 2. Because though some things are both ignorantly and untruly affirmed, yet they are not worthy to be taken notice of, much less of any refutation.

THE method of Politicks is miserably perverted by the Author. For whereas power is first ac­quired before a Common-wealth can be constituted, he first informs us of the several kinds of Constituti­ons, which arise from the different manner of dis­posing the power acquired, and after that of several waies how the power is acquired. And further to be­wray his ignorance of the rules of Government, he confounds Oeconomical power with Political, so that I may truly say, that he is one of the worst that ever wrote either of Civil or Ecclesiastical Politicks.

In this Chapter he undertakes,

• 1. To define a Common-wealth by acquisition, and to shew the difference between it, and that by constitution.
• 2. To declare how dominion is acquired.
• 3. To prove the Soveraign rights out of Scri­pture.
• [Page 47]4. From thence to demonstrate that all Sove­raign power is absolute.

T. H.

A Common-wealth by acquisition, is that where the Soveraign power is acquired by force — And the difference of this from that of constitution is, that in the former, men subject themselves for fear of the Sove­raign. in the latter for fear of one another.

G. L.

This is the substance, though not all his words, where we must observe, That this is no distinction of a Common-wealth, but of the manner how the power, whereby any is made a Soveraign, is acquired: and that all Soveraigns do one way or other acquire their power: for its meerly accidental, no waies es­sential to any man, for to be invested with power. And howsoever the Soveraignty civil be obtained, it makes no difference in the Common-wealth. For in every state the power is acquired, and so there is no Common-wealth but its both by acquisition and constitution too. So that he hath made a distinction without a difference.

T. H.

Dominion is acquired two waies, by Generation and Conquest: The first is Paternal, the latter is De­spotical.

G. L.

This is very defective, as in this place its heteroge­neous and impertinent. What have we to do with Family-power in a Common-wealth? For Familes as they make vicinities, and vicinities a Community civil, are but a remote material part of Politicks. In a Family there is a threefold power acquired; the power of an husband over his wife by marriage, co­venant or contract, the power of parents over their children, by generation; the power of Masters over their servants, acquired several waies; for some ser­vants are slaves, some are free; Slaves are vernae, servants born in the Family: or emptitii, bought with money: such as are free be conductitii: The two former are more subject then the last; and the Master hath more power over the former sort who are born and bought, then over the latter, who are only hired. So that there is a difference of Despoti­cal power even in a Family; the one is more absolute, the other more limited.

Soveraignty civil is acquired several waies, and all may be reduced to two. For men come unto this power either justly or unjustly. Justly, and that ei­ther in an extraordinary way, as by special unction and designation from God: thus Saul, and David, and Davids lawful Successors of his Family were made (the two first by particular nomination, the other by ageneral entail) or in an ordinary manner, and that is either by the Law of Nature, or by insti­tution. By the Law of Nature, when a multitude sufficient for their own protection and government, [Page 49]associate and by union and communion become a Community, the Soveraignty is virtually and emi­nently in themselves, and in the whole body of the people being free: and this is so natural a subject, that upon the defect of succession, it returns unto them again. By institution and more formal con­tract; and that is by a free and full election, or by a submission to a Conquerer, which is so far volun­tary, that if they had power to protect themselves, they would not submit. Unjustly by usurpation, when he or they who have no right, yet take the possession into their own hands in a way contrary to the Laws of God, and the consent of men: yet such an Usurper cannot be a Soveraign without some kind of consent of God and man. In this case fraud or force gets the advantage over the people so far, as that they must submit or do worse. When any ascend the Throne by Marriage, Succession; Election, they are made Governors by institution, with free and full consent. In all this I speak of the supreme, not the subordinate power, which is by Commission derived from the supreme. In all these waies of ac­quiring power, we must distinguish between power of constitution in constitution, and in administrati­on; and also take special notice that there is no power which can govern without consent not only of man, but also and especially of God, who either in justice and severity, or in mercy doth change and alter the Kingdoms of the world at will and pleasure. For he alone doth rule in heaven and earth at all times.

Thus far concerning the acquisition of power, and of the [jura majestatis] rights of Soveraigns, which he conceives to have made clear by reason, and [Page 50]now in the next place undertakes to prove out of Scripture, yet in such a loose and implous abusive manner, that I verily perswade my self, he doth not believe them to be revealed and written from heaven, or that Jesus Christ was an ordinary just man, much less the Eternal Son of God incarnate.

T. H. pag. 105.

Lets now consider what the Scripture teacheth in the same point: To Moses the children of Israel say thus, Speak thou to us, and we will hear thee: but let not God speak to us, lest we die. This is absolute obe­dience to Moses.

G. L.

This is the first Scripture alledged by him; we read it in Exod. 20.19. To understand these words, we must consider,

• 1. That cap. 19.8. That all the people answered together, and said, All that the Lord hath said, that will we do. This was an absolute sub­jection of themselves to God, and a promise to obey him.
• 2. That the Lord said unto Moses, Lo, I come unto thee in a thick cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee, and believe thee for ever, Verse 9. This was to procure authority and credit unto Moses, as a Messenger between God and Israel.
• 3. That the words of Exod. 20.19. quoted by the Author, are expounded, Deut. 5.27. For thus there we read, Go thou near, and hear all that the Lord our God shall say: and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak to thee, and we will [Page 51]hear it and do it.

From all which it is apparent,

• 1. That the people had formerly before they spake these words, subjected themselves to God: and he was their Soveraign, not Moses.
• 2. That they promise to obey the words of God declared by Moses, not as they were the words and Laws of Moses, but of God, they will do them.
• 3. That they promise to believe Moses as a Messenger be­tween God and them, not obey him as their supreme Lord.

Its one thing to believe Moses as a Prophet from God, and to yield him absolute obedience as a King. Believe him as a Prophet they might, obey him as their King they must not. God was their King, and Moses his Messenger and servant. How grosly therefore doth he abuse the place? how ab­surdly and falsly doth he thence infer the peoples pro­mise of absolute obedience to Moses, which was on­ly due and promised unto God?

T. H.

Concerning the right of Kings, God himself by the mouth of Samuel saith, This shall be the right of the King you will have to raign over you, he shall take your sons, &c. 1 Sam. 8.11, 12, &c.

G. L.

• 1. The translation, which he confessed is allowed by his Soveraign and the Church of England, is per­verted. For instead of This will be the manner of the King, he turns it, This shall be the right of the King. There is a great difference between right which is alwaies just, and manner or custom, which [Page 52]is many times unjust.
• 2. If this be a prerogative of Soveraigns, then its a very great misery to be subject to a King; and that in two respects.
  • 1. Because he will take away from his subjects unjustly, that which justly is their own, even the best things.
  • 2. Because by doing thus, he will oppress them so grievously, that having no remedy or redress from man, they will cry unto God for deliverance from a King, as a great and intolerable mischief.
• 3. If it be the right of a King, yet it is but the right of hea­then Despotical Princes, and not of the Kings of Israel. But how can it be the right of heathen Kings, seeing they had no power to oppress and do wrong?
• 4. It could not be the right of the Kings of Israel; for they were bound to act and judge according to the Laws God had made; yet these acts here men­tioned, are directly contrary to those Laws and Rules of Regal Government, delivered by God himself. For he must have a copy of the Laws, and read in it all his life, that he may fear God, keep his Laws, not exalt himself above his Brethren, &c. Deut. 17.18, 19, 20. Neither did the Kings of Judah or Israel, no not wicked Ahab practise or make use of this power, as is evident in the case of Naboths Vine­yard.
• 5. To do according to this power pretended in this place, is directly contrary to the very end of all Government civil, which is to do justice and judgement, to preserve to every one his own, to pro­tect the good, and punish the bad. How shall he pu­nish the Oppressor, when he is the great Oppressor himself? How can he do justice upon thieves, when he is the greatest thief in his Kingdom?
• 6. If this should be the right of the Kings of Israel, and of [Page 53]all Soveraigns, then though the people of Israel were a free people, yet if a King was once set over them, they were meer slaves: neither their Lands, nor their goods, nor their children, nor their servants were their own; and also by this reason, there can be no subjects in any state under heaven, that can have propriety or liberty, but all are meer and absolute servants and slaves. Kings may have potentiam, but not potestatem, force and fraud, but no just power to oppress their subjects, and do such things as are here mentioned. Whereas some say, That God in this place teacheth us what Kings may do, and in Deut. 17.18, 19, 20. what they ought to do, is to little purpose, as being more acute then solid. For id quis­que potest, quod jure potest. And no man, no not the greatest Princes in the world, have any power to do that which is unjust.
• 7. Its a question whether they had such a King as they desired. For they de­sired a King which would offend God, and oppress them: but God gave them such a King as had no power to make Laws, but such as were bound to Judge according to the civil or judicial Laws made by himself; and even in the time of Kings, he reserved the Soveraign Rights in his own hand.

It seems they understood not well, what kind of King they had de­sired; for to maintain the state and pomp of a great Court, and an army in constant pay, was a vast charge, and required such a revenue as could no waies be raised without the great oppression of the people. And this they did not consider, neither would understand till it was too late, and the yoak was upon their necks, and the burden pressed them very sore. When Princes are trusted with an absolute [Page 54]power to raise men and moneys at their will and pleasure, they will not be content with the ordinary Revenue of their Crowns, but what they cannot ob­tain justly by the Laws, and the constitution of the State, they will force by the sword, and so the Go­vernment proves military, and in the end meerly ar­bitrary. Whereas Mr. Hobbs conceives, That to go in and out before them, and Judge the people, con­tains as absolute a power of the Militia and Judica­ture, as one man can possibly transfer unto another, he is much deceived. For both these may be had in a de­spotical, or a Regal way, or by Commission. The first is absolute, the two latter are not so. The Kings of Sparta, Poland, Arraegon, might have both these, and yet be no absolute Soveraigns.

T. H.

Solomon prayed that God would give him under­standing to judge his people, and discern between good and evil, 1 Kings 3.8. therefore he had the Judicial and Legislative power supreme and absolute.

G. L.

This is his meaning, and thus he understands these words, wherein we may observe,

• 1. Solomons place and duty as King of Israel, and that was to judge that people.
• 2. That this duty could not be well performed without wisdom.
• 3. God doth give wis­dom for that purpose: These things are implyed.
• 4. Solomon prases for wisdom to that end. Neither from his place or prayer will it follow that he had the [Page 55]supreme, absolute, legislative power in himself alone: Neither indeed had he any such thing at all, for God had made the Laws both Civil and Ecclesiastical.

And he could neither alter or abrogate them, but was bound precisely and strictly to judge according to them, and neither depart unto the right hand or the left. And suppose Solomon had been invested with this power, doth it therefore follow that all other Kings have the like?

The rest which follow are not worthy any answer. He instanceth,

• 1. In Saul, whom being their Lords annointed, David did not slay, though he was in his power. And what follows hence, but only thus much, That no man in Davids case, and of Davids conscience, dare secretly put to death a King an­nointed by Gods special and immediate Word.
• 2. Servants must obey their Masters, and Children their Parents in all things. And what is this to pur­pose? Doth it hence follow, that all Kings have ab­solute power? what impertinent and absurd illations are these? But,
• 3. Christs Disciples must observe and do all that the Scribes and Pharisees bid them, as sitting in Moses Chair. From hence it cannot be concluded, that they had Soveraign power civil, no more then Ministers of the Gospel have it, because the people must observe and do all that they bid them out of the Gospel.
• 4. Paul chargeth Titus, cap. 3.2. to warn the people of Creet, that they subject themselves to Princes, and to those that are in autho­rity, and obey them. And his gloss is, this is simple obedience. What is this to absolute and supreme power? By this may be as easily proved, that every petty Officer hath supreme power, as well as any [Page 56]other; for an Officer must be obeyed, because he is in Authority.
• 5. Christ commands to give to Caesar the things that are Caesars, and paid taxes himself. All that can be inferred from hence is, That tribute is to be paid, to whom tribute is due: and that it is due from Provinces to their supreme Governors.

The summ of all these places amounts to thus much in. Politicks, That the chief commands in war, just Judgement in peace, or the exercise of Jurisdi­ction belonged unto the Kings of Judah, and tri­bute to the Roman Emperour. How many plain and express places of Scripture might have been produced to prove that there is a Legislative, Judicial, Execu­tive power in every State, and that it is to be exer­cised by some certain persons designed for that pur­pose? And the Author had no need to lay the weight of his praise for these things, upon such places as do but tacitly and by way of intimation, point at some of them. But why he should falsifie the tran­slation, abuse so many texts, make such woful illati­ons from some of them, and so impertinently al­ledge them, I know no reason: and it seems to me intolerable, that in the last example he should make Christ Jesus the civil Soveraign of the Jews in the time of his humiliation, and by vertue of that civil power, to take another mans Ass as his own, which he did but desire to borrow, and use for a little jour­ney with the consent of the owner. That the sin of our first parents, in desiring to be as Gods, knowing good and evil, was an ambition to become civil Sove­raigns, he may perswade us to believe, when he can prove it.

T. H. pag. 106.

Soveraign power ought in all Common-wealths to be absolute.

G. L.

This I read in the margent; and to his understand­ing, its plain both from reason and Scripture, that its as great as possibly a man can be imagined to make it: This is plainly ridiculous. For what can­not men imagine; seeing their imaginations can reach to wonders, impossibilities, and many things far above a civil Soveraign power? And here is a sit oc­casion offered, to examine what absolute power is, and in what respect Soveraignty is absolute. There is no power, as there is no being absolute, but that of Gods, whose power is his being. Civil supreme power is said to be absolute, because its soluta legibus, free from the Laws, and not limited and obliged by them. Yet the Laws from which they are free, as be­ing above them, are only civil Laws made by them­selves, for the administration of the States where they are Soveraign. For they are so strictly bound by the Law of Reason, Nature, God, which are but all one divine Law, as they have not the least power to do any thing either as private persons, or publike Soveraigns against them, except they will dethrone themselves, provoke the wrath of God, and bring his Judgements upon them. They are besides, subject to the Law of Nature, which is above any parti­cular Soveraign, though never so great. They are [Page 58]indeed above their own Laws, and may not only al­ter many things in them, but abrogate them. Yet so as all this tends to the publick good. They may act upon occasion, above and besides them, as the ge­neral good shall require it. They are not bound un­to formalities, but may omit them. Yet all this is but little, and confined to the narrow compass of things indifferent, as they are subordinate to pure morals. Its true, that their power is in some respect arbitrary; yet if they do any thing which either in it self, or in the circumstances only is unjust, they of­fend and transgress the bounds God hath put unto their power. And here we must distinguish between the Soveraign for the Constitution, and the Soveraign for Administration. The former hath more power then the later, who only is above the Laws of ad­ministration, yet both must be just; for they have no power to be unjust. Its certain that Princes desire to be Gods, absolute, independent, above all Laws, and to have a priviledge to do what they list, and a right to do wrong; and its a dangerous thing to flatter them, and make them believe their power to be greater, then indeed it is; for this is the very high-way unto ruine. Wise men have advised all Princes to observe their own Laws made by them­selves, and by their example encourage their subjects to obedience. And this is an effectual means to pro­cure their safety, and confirm them in their power, and the love of their subjects.

THE subject of this Chapter is, as in the argu­ment, the liberty of subjects, which follows the power of Soveraigns in this discourse. And because his method is no method, but rather a confusion, I do forbear to reduce the Chapter either to certain Heads or Propositions, and will only observe some few passages, to manifest that he never understood what liberty is. Liberty of subjects is not Natural, nor Moral, nor Theologicall, but Political and Civil. In the Civil Law, and Politicks, its opposed to servi­tude and bondage, not simply and meerly to obliga­tion by Laws, as he fancieth: for thus he writes.

T. H.

— So men have also made artificial Charms, called Civil Laws, which they themselves by mutual Covenants have fastened at one end to the lips of the Soveraign, at the other to their own ears.

G. L.

The Authors meaning is, That so far as Laws bind the subject, so far they take away his liberty: and men by constitution of a Soveraign over them, give a power absolute to make Laws, and so far as they [Page 60]are virtually subject to his power, and actually bound by his Laws, they cannot be free; yet this well examined, will not prove true. For not any kind of Obligation takes it away; for then the Laws of Nature, by which a man is bound, before he be subject to a civil Soveraign, should deprive him of his liberty, yet they leave him as free a man, as any possibly in a free-State can be. The Obligation of just Laws and wise Edicts do regulate liberty, keep it within its proper bounds, and no waies destroy it, or take it away. Therefore that which follows is que­stionable. For he affirms,

T H.

That the liberty of a subject therefore lieth only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the So­veraign hath pretermitted.

G. L.

But,

• 1. In things left indifferent, because not de­fined by Law, the subject is not only liber, sed domi­nus, and hath not only libertatem, but potestatem. He is not only free, but Lord of those actions, and hath not only liberty, but also an absolute power.
• 2. Though wise and just Laws do regulate actions, yet they do not make the agent a slave or a servant.

For to be a slave or a servant, is to be cast below the condition of a man, and make him subject to some thing below himself. Wisdom and Justice are above the power of the Soveraign, much more above the liberty of a subject. They are particles of the divine [Page 61]perfection, and to be bound by them, is not only a liberty, but an honour. To be free from the domini­on of our own base lusts and sins, and the power of Satan, is true liberty divine; and so not to be subject to the lusts and imperious unworthy commands of absolute Soveraigns, whose wills, though irrational & contrary to justice, must stand for Laws, is civil liber­ty. And then a man is Politically free, when he is so far Master of his life, goods, children, and that which is justly his, that they cannot be taken away from him, but for some crime contrary to just Laws, de­serving such a penalty. In a word, the liberty of a subject is such a state or condition, as that he is nei­ther by the Soveraign power, nor any Laws, bound to do any thing, which a rational and just man would not willingly do, though there were no Laws or Pe­nalties Civil at all. This is not to be free from Laws. And I do not know, who they are, which he saith de­mands any such thing. The rude and ignorant peo­ple, and also all children of Belial, desire to have a licence, not only to do good, but evil too, as they please, and they judge all Laws as heavy burdens, and grievous yoaks. If he mean that the subjects of England demanding the benefit of Magna Charta, and the Petition of Right, did aim at any such extra­vagant liberty, he must needs be a slanderer of his own fellow-subjects, and an enemy to the English liberty, as indeed he is, and that through an errone­ous notion and conceit of absolute power civil. The liberty of the subjects of this Nation is very great, and such, as if we either consider the Laws of the Constitution, or Administration, the ordinary and common subjects of other Nations are but slaves [Page 62]unto them. Our Free-holders have the choice of their Knights and Burgesses for the Parliament, so that neither any Laws can be made, nor moneys im­posed upon them, without their verbal consent, given by their Representatives. In all causes, civil, crimi­nal, capital, no Judgement can pass against them but by the verdict of a Jury made up of their neigh­bours, which in it self is an excellent priviledge. The Civilians say, Libertas est res inestimabilis, and to be redeemed at any rate; much more the English liber­ty is to be valued, and ever was by our ancestors, who obtained it, recovered it, kept it, though with the blood of many thousands. But the question is, whether this liberty is consistent with the Soveraigns power. His opinion is,

T. H.

That by the liberty of the subject, the Soveraigns power of life and death, is neither abolished nor limited.

G. L.

Its certain that the Soveraigns power and the sub­jects liberty are consistent. For the Soveraign may take away the life of his subject, yet according to the evidence of Judgement, agreeable to Law: no otherwise. Yet he presupposeth,

• 1. That the King is supreme, and the primary subject, owner and pos­sessor of the original power, which sometimes may be, yet with us its far otherwise.
• 2. That the power of civil Soveraigns is absolute.

For with him,

T. H.

Nothing the Soveraign representative can do to a subject on what pretence soever, can properly be called Injustice or Injury, because every subject is Author of every act the Soveraign doth, so that he never wanteth right to any thing, otherwise then as he himself is the subject of God, and bound thereby to observe the Laws of Nature. — When Jephtah sacrificed his daughter, and David murthered Uriah, both innocent, yet they did them no injustice, &c.

G. L.

Here he seems to contradict himself. For he grants two things.

• 1. That the Soveraign is subject to God.
• 2. That in that respect he is bound to observe the Laws of nature; yet he saith, he can do no in­justice to the subject, and that he hath right to any thing, yet so as he is limited by subjection to God, and the Laws of Nature.

• 1. If he be Gods subject, as certainly he is, it follows,
  • 1. That in that respect he is but trusted as a servant with the Administrati­on of the power civil.
  • 2. That he is fellow-subject with his subjects.
  • 3. He may do injustice, as one fel­low subject may wrong another.

Secondly, If he be bound to observe the Laws of Nature, which are the Laws of God; then,

• 1. He is not absolute, or solutus legibus. His power is limited and bounded by these Laws.
• 2. Then he hath no power to murther, oppress and destroy his innocent subjects, who are more Gods then his, and [Page 64]only trusted by God in his hands for to be protected; righted in all just causes, and vindicated from all wrongs.
• 3. No Prince or Soveraign can assume, or any people give to any person or persons, any the least power above, or contrary unto the Laws of Nature.

These Laws are the moral precepts of eter­nal justice and equity, from which all civil Laws have their rise, and are either conclusions drawn from them, or certain rules tending to the better observa­tion of them. Which things well considered, do make it very evident how little the power of civil Lords and Princes must needs be. In some few indif­ferent things, they may be absolute, have arbitrary power, and be in some respect above those constitu­tive Laws which they themselves enact.

His instance in Jephtah gives them power above, and contrary to the Laws of God and Nature. Yet who will grant him, that Jephtah sacrificed his daugh­ter? The text will not evince it; for it only saith, that whatsoever cometh forth of my doors to meet me, &c. shall be the Lords, or I will offer it up for a burnt-offering, Judges 11.31. For the particle [...] [Vau] turned by some copulatively for [and] is here, as in many other places, dis-junctive, and sig­nifies [or]. Again, if Jephtah did sacrifice her, he sinned, not only against the Law of Nature, but also the written Law of Moses: For God gave no com­mand, permission or toleration to any that we read of, but only to Abraham, to sacrifice with humane blood; and that Commandment was but to try him; for he would not suffer him to put him to death. Be­sides God threatens ruine and destruction to such as did offer their children to Moloch; and shed their [Page 65]blood. And their sin was not only because they of­fered them to Idols and Devils, but also because they shed innocent blood, without any warrant or Com­mission from God, the only supreme and absolute Lord of life. Further, how could the vow of man, which was but a voluntary Obligation, be above the Law of God, and make that lawful, which by a Su­periour Law was unlawful? I verily believe, she was devoted only, not sacrificed. But suppose he did sa­crifice her to God, to whom he had vowed her, yet he did not this as a Soveraign of her life, but as a sub­ject to God.

The example of David murthering Ʋriah, can much less prove the absolute power of Soveraigns to take away the lives of their innocent subjects. For, David had no such power: for,

• 1. He was no ab­solute Prince, but limited both by the written Laws of God, and also the Natural.
• 2. Neither he nor any other can have any such power, because man cannot, God doth not give any such power.
• 3. Da­vid did not only iniquity, but injustice to Ʋriah.
  • 1. As his fellow-subject in respect of God.
  • 2. As his own subject, whom he was bound as innocent to pro­tect, not to destroy.
  • 4. His proof out of Psal. 51.4. [Against thee only] is invalid. For,
    • 1. Though it be so translated by some, and so understood by Am­brose and others who follow him, yet neither that translation, nor the interpretation thereon, can be evinced either out of the Original, or the Septuagint, or the vulgar, or Junius, or Vatablus.
    • 2. Gene­brard, Vatablus, Junius, Ainsworth and others understand it, that God only was privy to, and knew of this sin: and the words following [And [Page 66]done this evil in thy sight] seem to confirm this sense.
  • 5. Yet suppose it should be turned [against thee on­ly] yet others interpret [onely] to be principally, as supreme Law-giver and Judge, not only to me, but all others; who only hast the Original power of punishing and pardoning, not only me, but others, and that not only temporally, but spiritually and eternally. Yet the exposition of Ambrose is taken up, because Princes desire it, to be so absolute; and both Divines and other men are very ready to slatter such as are in present possession of power.

But to make the point more evident, let me digress a little, and search out the reason and cause of the power of life and death, as in the hands of civil Sove­raigns. To this end observe, That no man hath abso­lute power of his own life, as he hath of his goods: Man may have the use and possession, but not the propriety and dominion of it. Therefore its granted on all hands, that though a mans life be said to be his own, yet he may not be felo de se, and kill him­self; he is not Master of his life so far, as to have any power or liberty to do any such thing. Its true that God, who is Lord of life and death, gives liberty to man in some cases to hazard, in some he commands to lay down his life. He may hazard it in a just war and defence of his own Countrey, and also of himself, against an unjust invader. He must lay down his life, and God commands it for the te­stimony of Christ, in which case he that loseth it shall find it. From all this it follows, that no people can by making a Soveraign, give any absolute power of life and death unto him: For nothing can give that which it hath not: neither can they make them­selves [Page 67]Authors of the unjust acts of their Soveraign, much less of his murthers, and taking away the lives of their innocent subjects. Id enim quisque potest quod jure potest. If thus it be, then they must have power to take away life, from God who alone hath power of life: and this power he only gives in case the subject be guilty of such crimes as by his Laws are capital.

T. H. pag. 110. in the margent.

The liberty which writers praise, is the liberty of So­veraigns, not of private men.

G. L.

By writers, he means the Roman and Greek Hi­storians and Philosophers, who wrote so much of li­berty; amongst the rest, especially Aristotle and Cicero. By this, it seems he never understood these Authors, though he accuse others of ignorance. The liberty which the English have challenged and ob­tained with so much expence of blood, is not the power of Kings, much less of absolute Soveraigns, as he would make the world believe, but that which is due unto us by the constitution of the State, Magna Charta, the Laws, and the Petition of Right. Its but the liberty of subjects, not Soveraigns, when he hath said all he can; we are not willing to be slaves, or sub­ject our selves to Kings as absolute Lords. Neither are we willing that either flattering. Divines, Court-Parasites, or Unjust Ministers of State should wind up the pretended prerogative so high, as to subject our [Page 68]lives and estates, and also our Religion to the arbi­trary, absolute, and unreasonable will of one man, whom they did desire to advance so much for their own interest. There is a difference between the sub­jects liberty, whereby in many things he may com­mand himself, and supreme power which commands others under their Supremacy. By liberty, Aristotle & Cicero meant such a priviledge as every subject might have in a free-State, not that Soveraignty which be­longed to the whole and universal body over several persons; where it is to be noted, that one and the same person, who is a subject, and at the best but a Magi­strate, hath a share in the Soveraign power. Yet this he hath, not as a single person; but as one person joyntly with the whole body, or major part at least of the people. So in our Parliaments, every man there is as a single person, and all of them any waies considered but as the joynt Representative of the people in a certain place, at a certain time, acting according to a certain order, are but subjects; yet in the capacity and habitude of a Parliament, they are no subjects, but in the name of the people have a Legislative power, and exercise the highest acts of Government, excepting those of the Constitution. And this may be one reason, why our English An­cestors have been so careful to maintain and preserve this great Court and Assembly of Parliaments, be­cause they knew upon that depended their liberty, in the vacancy and intervals of Parliaments. For take away this, and our liberty is gone. And wise men know, that the liberty of the English subject de­pends upon these great Assemblies. Some therefore have attempted, either the total extirpation of them, [Page 69]according to the example of France and Spain; or a diminution of their power and priviledges, so as to make them meer shadows. If any say, and infer from all this, that therefore the form of our Government even under Kings is popular, and hath the nature of a free-State. I say, it hath much of a free-State in the Constitution, but not in the Administration. Yet its far different from those four kinds of popular Go­vernments mentioned by Aristotle, Pol. lib. 6. c. 4. The constitution whereof is little better then level­ling. The principal thing aimed at in such forms, as the Author alledgeth out of the Philosopher, cap. 2. Ejusdem libri, was liberty, supposing it could be had no where but in such Governments: and this liber­ty was to do either what they pleased, or to govern by course, fearing lest any person or persons conti­nued long in any eminent place of command, would in time ingross the power. Yet this supposition was false. For liberty might be had without levelling, and free-States might be, and have been better con­stituted and regulated. For no constitution is good, where provision is not made, that Wisdom and Ju­stice, rather then persons may govern: and the mul­titude so kept under, as that they may be subjects, not rebels, and cast off all power. To return unto the matter proposed, and conclude this point.

• 1. The English liberty is their birth-right.
• 2. Its not the power of Soveraigns.
• 3. Its not unlimited, but bounded within reasonable bounds.
• 4. We do not learn it out of the Greek and Roman Histories, nor from the Athenians or Romans, but from our own Laws, which are far different from theirs, and far more agreeable to the written Laws of God, which left [Page 70]the people of Israel under their Judges the freest people of the world, and yet no Levellers.
• 5. Our learning out of Greek and Latine Authors, hath not been bought so dear, or cost so much blood, except out of the breech of School-hoyes: And most of those who have controlled the just acts of their So­veraigns, never read, much less understood those Au­thors.

T. H. pages 111, 112, 113.

The liberty of the subject is in such things as are neither determined by his first submission to the Sove­raign power, nor by the laws.

G. L.

This is the substance of three pages, and amounts to so much as may easily be comprised in a few words. For when a subject is not bound either by the Laws of the Constitution or Administration, he is free according to Mr. Hobbs his judgement. Yet in proper sense in both these cases, he is no subject; but [Dominus] and far more then [liber]. The Ci­vilians do better determine the liberty of the subject to be [potestatem agendi sub publicae defensionis prae­sidio] though this be no perfect definition. As before, so now I say, that liberty here is not opposed to obligation but servitude. For [...]o be subject to a wise Soveraign according to just Laws, is so much liberty as any reasonable man can desire: for in this respect he is rather subject to God then man; and to serve him is doubtless perfect freedom. As no Sove­raign [Page 71]should be denyed so much power as to protect the least, if innocent, and to punish the greatest, if guilty; so no subject should be bound to do evil, which is servitude and bondage indeed, or restrained from doing that good which God commands him. Civil government was never ordained by God, to be destructive either of moral or divine vertues, or of the noble condition of man as a rational creature. Therefore regular submission unto supreme power, will never stand with any obligation unto evil, or contract for protection except in innocency. Paul pleading before Festus saith, If I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die, Acts 25.11. How this can stand with what this Author saith, when he affirmeth that its lawful for a man guilty and condemned to save him­self if he can, I leave to others for to examine. From the Apostles words its evident, he desires no protecti­on, even of himself, as worthy of death, neither hath God given any power to man to save in such a case. And though any person by the Law of nature may defend himself, yet this must be done cum mode­ramine tutelae inculpatae. In case a subject hath made himself capitally guilty, he hath forfeited his life to his Soveraign as Gods Vicegerent, whom he must not resist in the execution of Justice, though he be not bound to kill himself: neither doth the multi­tude or strength of any such capital offenders, any waies give them right to resist their Soveraign in their, own defence, as the Author would have it. For they cannot defend themselves as men, but they must de­fend themselves in this case as guilty men, which is not lawful. How the offer of pardon should take [Page 72]away the plea of self-defence, I understand not, see­ing they had no right before it was offered. The offer of pardon indeed, if the party offering may be safely trusted, may take away all fear, and so all co­lour of any plea by force to defend themselves from that death, which pardon will take away or re­move.

In the close of this discourse concerning liberty of the subject, he grants it a part of this liberty, That the subject may sue his Soveraign, and before a Judge appointed by the said Soveraign. If this be so, then

• 1. The subject hath propriety of goods.
• 2. That he and his Soveraign are two distinct parties, and in this case the Soveraign represents him not as one per­son.
• 3. That the Law in this respect is above the su­preme Governor.
• 4. Therefore the Soveraign is not absolute.
• 5. That the subject may complain of some actions and injustice of the Soveraign, contrary to the Authors fourth right of Soveraigns.
• 6. That to him belongs not all Judicature, in all Causes, as in the eighth, right of majesty he did affirm.

Yet he distinguisheth of the Soveraigns demand as twofold, either by vertue of a Law, or by force; if he de­mand or take away any thing by power or pretence thereof, there lyeth in that case no action of Law, because the subject is made Author of the Soveraigns acts, and therefore the suit against him, is against the Plantiff himself, being his subject. If this answer be good, then the Soveraign may do what he can and will, not what he ought; he may rule according to his strength and power, and not according to Justice: he may borrow, and promise to repay; take away, and engage to restore, and yet do no such thing, but [Page 73]violate his promise and engagement, contrary to the very Law of Nature. He hath a liberty to be unjust and wicked, and that more then any of his subjects, as he hath greater power. I leave him to be a subject of such a Soveraign, and wish all good men a better. The true reason, why a Soveraign may be sued, is, 1. Because in the institution of a Soveraign, especi­ally of administration, the subjects may reserve the propriety of their goods, which may be done with­out any diminution of a lawful supreme power; and in this case, when a Soveraign takes away or detains that which is his subjects, and an action is brought against him, the subject is not his subject, nor he his Soveraign in that respect. Both of them in this par­ticular are but private persons; and he that is subject to him as he is just in his Government, questions him as he is unjust in his actions. Again, propriety belongs unto the Law of nature, which is above civil power. But he proceeds.

T. H.

If a Monarch, or Soveraign Assembly, grant a li­berty to all or any of his subjects, which grant standing, he is disabled to provide for their safety, the grant is void, unless he directly renounce or transfer his Sove­raignty to another.

G. L.

By this we easily understand to what purpose the Treaty in the Isle of Wight with the King was. For though the Parliament had voted his concessions to [Page 74]be satisfactory, in some respect that of Bishops, and he was ready to close with them, yet in the judge­ment of this man, and all that party adhering to the King, the Parliament was accounted no Parliament, the King an absolute Monarch, and the Concessions, ipso facto, void: and for this reason, because the King had disabled himself by granting the Militia to protect his subjects. And the issue of this Treaty to be expected was this, so far as the King had obtained liberty and opportunity, he would declare his Con­cessions void and unreasonable, and so possess himself of the Militia, and proceed against the Treators, as Rebels and Enemies; for so they were account­ed.

Yet this was not a meer grant of liberty, but of power, which in the Treaty is presupposed to be his, though confined and a prisoner, and vanquished in a civil war. But if we will speak properly, the grant of liberty may be such as it may amount to an ex­emption from a sufficient degree of subjection, but it doth not transfer the Soveraign power to another; And this must needs be granted, that to pass away any of the greater rights, is to dethrone. In the conclusion of this Cap. we are informed when the obligation of the subject to the Soveraign doth cease; and it is then when his power to protect doth cease. And there is great reason for it. For whatso­ever his title may be, and how unjustly soever it may be taken away, and howsoever his subjects may stand well affected towards him, yet seeing there can be no protection from wrong within, nor from inva­sion of enemies without, nor administration of Ju­stice, without which any people returns unto the [Page 75]confusion of Anarchy, except there be actual pos­session of power; therefore Obligation for the present must cease, or at least be suspended. There be many waies, whereby a Soveraign may cease to be a Soveraign, as by conquest, death, resignation, cession, &c. and when the Soveraign ceaseth to be such, the Obligation must needs determine, as to such a particular Governor. And here I might take occasion to treat of subalternate Governments, and fiduciary Princes, who are Soveraigns in respect of their subjects, yet acknowledge a superiour, from whom they hold their territory. But seeing he is silent, I will be so too.

I Pass by his divisions and subdivisions of Systems, as being well known to such as are acquainted either with Politicks, or Civil Law. For the subject of Jurisprudentia civilis, being communio, or commu­nitas hominum; wherein the Lawyers out of their institutions observe persons, things and actions both private and publick, that they may the better find out the several rights determined by Law: They distinguish personam in singularem & conjunctam. Persona conjuncta, consists of several persons distinct Physically, yet made one by consent and association Politically. And these Systems and Societies may be considered as parts of the Community, which is the immediate subject of a Common-wealth, and a civil Government. Some of these are natural, as a Fami­ly, some are voluntary and by institution. In a Common-wealth once constituted, all these are sub­ject to the supreme power, and their actions are so far warrantable, as they derive their power from the Soveraign, and are agreeable to the Laws.

Some of these are made by division, co-ordinati­on, and subordination, as Provinces, Counties, Hun­dreds, Allotments, Town-ships, Parishes. Some of them are Ecclesiastical, some Civil. Some are made by Charter and Patent, and have their special privi­ledges, [Page 77]and immunnities, and have their Statutes, and power to make Orders and By-Laws within themselves, and some have jurisdiction within their liberties. Some are more noble, as Colledges, and Universities, and Schools, and all such as are Nur­series of Law and Learning; some less noble, as Corporations, with their several Companies and Officers.

The end of the institution of these, is either for the better and more easie Government of the whole Community: or for the better education of the subjects in learning or trades; or for the mainte­nance, or enriching, or adorning of the State.

And it concerns the supreme Governors of a State, to have a special care of these Societies, to order, regulate and reform them, as they shall see occasion or need. For the good of the Common­wealth doth much depend upon the regulation and wise ordering of them.

MY intention in the examination of the Au­thor, is to manifest,

• 1. That where he hath done ill, none hath done worse. And
• 2. where he hath done well, many before him have done better.

This latter is my work in this part of his Book, as al­so in other passages of his discourse.

The subject of this Chapter is [The Ministers of State] which by some in Latine are called [Offici­ales] in English, Officers; and by the same generally is understood the same with these, who are stiled, and that very fitly [Publick Ministers of the Sove­raign Power.] For in all acts of civil Government, the principal agent is the Soveraign, the instrumen­tal or ministerial are Officers, who are therefore cal­led by some, instrumenta majestatis vicaria, which words imply much, and contain in some sort the de­finition of the Author. For they imply,

• 1. That the Soveraign is the principal agent.
• 2. That they re­present the Soveraign.
• 3. That they are but his in­struments, and act by power derived from him.

The difference between them and the Soveraign is,

• 1. That they are essentially and properly but sub­jects, and accidentally Officers.
• 2. That though they have power, and the same is the Soveraigns, yet as in him its original, supreme, universal in respect of [Page 79]the whole state, in them it is derivative, subordi­nate, particular, or but a part and particle of it.
• 3. That whatsoever the Soveraign acts, is valid im­mediately in it self; but what they act is only good and valid as they are one person with him, and make his will their rule and principle, and do all things in his name.

The reason why there must be Officers in every State, and that of necessity, is given, because no So­veraign, whether one person or more, can see all things with his own eyes, hear all things with his own ears, do all things with his own hands, or be present and acting in every place, where he ought to act. This is proper to God, who yet useth the Ministry both of men and Angels, in the Government of the world, but not out of any necessity, but because its his will and pleasure.

There be two parts of Politicks;

• the 1. Constitu­tion, which disposeth the supreme power in a certain subject, whether one or more; and determines the rights both of the Soveraign and subject.
• The 2. Administration, which is the exercise of that power.

In which Administration, the first act is legislation; and this is the proper place to speak of Laws con­cerning the Administration, as different from those of the Constitution; the next is the making of Offi­cers for the execution of these Laws. This is the method, and here is the proper handling of this subject.

These Officers are either extraordinary or ordi­nary; Extraordinary, are such as are trusted with power for a time limited in some extraordinary exi­gency of the State, as the Dictators amongst the [Page 80] Romans. Ordinary, are such as are usual in all States; and they are either such as by which the Soveraign acts and deals with forrein States, or within his own Dominions. The former are Embassadors, Agents, Messengers, Heralds, Intelligencers. These Embassa­dors are constant and legier, or temporary & occasio­nal. They represent Majesty, and act according to the Laws of Nations. The Officers within the So­veraigns Dominions, are either for war or peace. For war either by Sea or Land: hence Jus Nauticum & Militare; and these are for defence, and act also according to the Laws of Nations. For peace, and they are either for counsel, or judgement, or execu­tion, or the revenue. Hence Councellers, Judges, Sheriffs, Treasurers, and all their servants or subor­dinate Agents and Assistants. Amongst these there is a subordination, till we come to some general Offi­cer, in every several kind next unto the Soveraign. How to reduce the Officers of this or any other State unto these heads, is not my work; and ma­ny have made this reduction in several Common­wealths.

The general rules of these Officers are many, and may be read in several Authors: As

• 1. Any man fit­ly qualified may be forced to do service for his Coun­trey.
• 2. To avoid confusion and charge, they are to be reduced to a certain number and order. The number should be according to the necessity of the State.
• 3. No Officer should be trusted too long with great and transcendent power.
• 4. They should be fitly qualified and advanced for desert, and no other reason.
• 5. Some should be superintendents over others within a certain precinct, and also gene­rall [Page 81]visitors selected of purpose, to enquire into the carriage of all the rest at certain set times.

The Ro­man Censors had some power in this kind, but no Jurisdiction: As the Visitors of China are said to have.

In this Chapter Mr. Hobbs seems to make Mini­sters of the Gospel, such as the Apostle, Eph. 4.11. calls Pastors and Teachers, to be publick Ministers and Officers civil; yet though they be subject to the civil Soveraign as well as other men, yet as Mi­nisters they derive their power from Christ by the Church, and not from any civil Governors, as shall be made good hereafter.

TWO things only in this Cap. I question:

• the 1. Concerning the original of propriety.
• The 2. Concerning a standing revenue of the Crown.

The 1. he deriveth from the Soveraign, in manner as followeth.

T. H.

Propriety in all kinds of Common-wealths belongs to the Soveraign power. And again, propriety is the act only of the Soveraign, who distributes to every man his own by Law; and this distribution is first of Land, as of the Land of Promise by Eleazer and Joshua, &c.

G. L.

This is the summe and brief substance of many more words, and cannot be true. For

• 1. we find propriety of goods and lands in several families, which are of no Common-wealth.
• 2. The Consti­tution of any Common-wealth doth presuppose this propriety, without which there can be no buying, selling, exchanging, stealing, restitution; other­wise the eighth Commandment, Thou shalt not steal, [Page 83]could not be a Law of nature, nor bind any man, ex­cept in a Common-wealth; and so before a Common­wealth be instituted in a Community or people, there could be no sin in stealing.
• 3. All that may be grant­ed in this point, is, That the Soveraign may preserve and regulate propriety, both by Laws and Judge­ments. Yet the Author makes all men brutes, nay wild and ravenous beasts, and birds of prey, until they have made themselves slaves unto some absolute Soveraign, and such they must be, either beasts by the Law of nature, or slaves by the Laws of a civil State.
• 4. As for his instance in the Land of Canaan divided by lots to be chosen before Eleazer the high Priest, and Joshua the general, its impertinent and false. For,
  • 1. Israel before it was molded into a Common-wealth, had propriety in their goods.
  • 2. The propriety of that Land was at the first, and continued in God; for they were but Gods Tenants, in a special and peculiar manner, so as no people in the world was; therefore no man could alienate nor morgage beyond the year of Jubilee: at which time God seemed to renue their Leases, after the Jubilee-Sabbath.
  • 3. When they had in common conquered, and taken possession of the Land, it was theirs, so far as God had conveyed it, in common.
  • 4. It was for peace and order, as also for to preserve the distinction of Tribes divided, yet so as the Sove­raign dividing it was God, who ordered the lot.

Eleazer and Joshua were but Superintendents of the lot, and no Soveraigns; neither had they any the least propriety more then others of the people. The Text expresly saith, That when they had made an end of dividing the Land, they gave Joshua Timnath [Page 84]Serah in Mount Ephra in for his inheritance, Joshua 19.49, 50. where it is to be observed, That the peo­ple gave it him.

T. H.

The propriety of the subject excludes all other sub­jects from the use of them, and not the Sove­raign.

G. L.

It doth not only exclude other subjects, but the Soveraign too. For,

• 1. The Soveraign is bound to observe the Laws of nature, which are the moral Laws of God; and propriety as by the Law of na­ture.
• 2. Imperium nihil aliud esse sapientes definiunt, nisi curam salutis alienae, saith one very well. For civil supreme power was never given by any people to de­stroy their propriety, but to defend it. Otherwise no intelligent people in the world would advance one person or more to take away their goods, and so put themselves in a worse condition then they were by the Laws of nature.
• 3. It may be granted, that the Soveraign hath dominium eminens, so far as to com­mand not only the estates, but the lives of the sub­jects for the publike safety; but what is this to pro­priety properly taken?
• 4. If his assertion were true, then that distinction of Civilians, and the Au­thors of Politicks, whereby they put a difference inter res & possessiones publicas and privatas, were in vain and false; but so it is not.
• 5. By the Sove­raigns in England, he means the Kings, who were [Page 85]no Soveraigns at all, nor could at any time raise any moneys, or impose any subsidy upon the people with­out their consent in Parliament, as not only English men, but forrein Ministers of State, who have either read our Histories, or our Laws, or our practice, do well know, and have made it known to others.
• 6. There may be a device in Law, to pass all the land in England upon the Crown, for to derive all tenures from thence, or to confirm propriety to the subjects, for that every one might not only know, but keep and recover his own the better: Yet this gives the King no more propriety, then a Peoffee in trust may have; and that is none.

T. H.

The publick is not to be dieted: in the Mar­gint.

G. L.

His meaning is, that the Soveraign cannot be con­fined to a certain revenue, as sufficient to defray the publick charge. Yet the wisest States in the world have certainly defined a constant standing revenue for the publick use. For we read of the Dominion of France, which though the Kings could neither alie­nate, nor justly impare, yet Henry the fourth hath wo­fully mangled, and given occasion of those heavy op­pressions of the people of that State; and also we are not ignorant of the Crown lands, and revenue of England. And this is but agreeable to Scripture, where we read that God commanded, in the division [Page 86]of the holy Land, that the Prince should have his portion, that he may no more oppress, Ezek. 45.7, 8. For the Land must be divided into three parts; The first must be for God to maintain the Priests and Levites: The second for the Prince, the third for the people: and thus some say the Land in England was divided in the time of the pious Saxon Kings. Yet it must be confessed, that sometimes the publick charge may be so great, as that a standing revenue cannot defray it, and then the subjects for the gene­ral good and safety, are bound and may be command­ed to contribute. But if this in a time of peace and safety be embezelled and mispent by a prodigal Prince, and his favourites and followers, this will no waies warrant him to fly upon the spoyl, and plun­der his subjects. What William the Conqueror here in England did, it matters not much. For if he did derive his title from Edward the Confessor, as some Histories say he did pretend, then he was no Sove­raign. If he did act as Conquerer, then all compact and right upon Covenant is void, as his successors, who insist upon that title of conquest, give full liber­ty to the English to fight against them, and depose them if they can, and deal with them as enemies.

As for making Laws for the regulation of Traffick, Trade, Exchange, the value, stamp and coining of moneys, the sending out of Colonies for new Plan­tations, as also to make them as Provinces, or ex­empt them from subjection, because they will not al­low protection, I grant all these are prerogatives of the Soveraign.

THE heads of this Chapter are,

• 1. The difference between command, counsel, exhortation, dehortation.
• 2. The difference between counsel and command, made evident out of Scri­pture.
• 3. The qualifications of good Coun­sellors.
• 4. To advise with Counsellors apart, is better then to advise with them open­ly and in assemblies.

1. The difference between counsel, command, exhortation, dehortation, is easily known. For Coun­sel given, is a declaration of the means which tend unto some certain end, and also of the order and manner how they should be used to attain that end. Command is the will of a Superiour made known, whereby the inferiour is bound to obey, or other­wise to suffer. Exhortation presseth the practise of some good to be done; as dehortation is the contrary. Counsel directs, command binds, exhortation endea­vours to stir up or incite the will: dehortation keeps it back. Command is of a Superiour; Counsel, ex­hortation, dehortation are of a superiour, inferiour, equal. For any of these may counsel, exhort, de­hort, [Page 88]as any of them may be counselled, exhorted, dehorted. Its true, that these words are not alwaies taken strictly.

That command should be for the benefit of the party commanding, and counsel for the good of the party counselled, is meerly accidental in waies essen­tial to them. And though sometimes both the inten­tion and the event of both may be such as he deter­mines, yet we know it is many times otherwise. For command may sometimes, nay often, be beneficial to the party commanded, and intended to be so; as counsel may be intended, not only for the good of the party counselled, but also counselling; and also prove so to be. The nature of exhortation, and de­hortation, is as falsly, loosely and impertinently de­fined, as the former.

2. Upon the former supposed difference between counsel and command, he determines, Thou shalt have none other Gods; Thou shalt not make any graven image, &c. to be commands. Yet these are not for the benefit of God, but man keeping them. For in keeping them there is great reward. But, Go and sell all thou hast, &c. is only a counsel with him, because the party shall have benefit, even treasure in heaven if he do so. Yet even this is so a counsel, as it is a command. For man is bound to love God more then the world; and to preferr treasure in heaven, before treasure on earth, and this by command. As it di­rects, its counsel; as it binds, its command.

For one and the same sentence may be a com­mand, a counsel and an exhortation too, yet in dif­ferent respects; as it binds a command, as it directs a counsel, as it incites an exhortation. And very ma­ny [Page 89]exhortations include, or at least presuppose a command, and a counsel. But I wonder why Mr. Hobbs should make these words of Peter, Repent and be baptized, Acts 2.38. a counsel only. Are not all men, especially which hear the Gospel, bound to re­pent? For doth not Saint Paul say, And the time of this ignorance God winked at, but now commandeth all men everywhere to repent, Acts 17.30 And what will he contradict the Apostle, and in express terms? It seems he is but a Divine of the lowest rank, as he is a States-man far under the highest form. His presumption and boldness is very great, but his knowledge and judgement very defective: For if he had known, that repentance had been a principal duty, according to a principal command of the Go­spel, and that it was nothing else but a return to obe­dience, after disobedience, he might have corrected himself, and avoided this errour.

3. In the next place, he undertakes to determine the qualifications of a good Counsellor of State; which hath been done to his hand, and far better then here we read. He is a good Counsellor, who gives good connsel; and that is only good counsel, which is a greeable to the wisdom and justice of God, and tends to the publick good of the State, therefore his first Condition is either imperfect, or else directly false. For the interest and ends of the Counsellor in his counsel, to be consistent with the ends and inte­rest of a Prince counselled, is no waies absolutely good, but may be very wicked and unjust.

The rest of the conditions prescribed by him are good, yet none of the chiefest mentioned by others, omitted by him.

4. In the last part of this Chapter he endeavours to prove, but yet upon very weak, and also very false grounds, That its better to hear Counsellors apart, then in an Assembly. What he means by these words prefixed [supposing the number of them equal] I know not. For he argues against counsel given in Assemblies, without any mention of the equality of their number. Yet this is evident by this rule of God, that the privy Council and Parliaments of England are made useless, unprofitable, at least not so good as a secret pact Juncto. This is very un­worthy and base, and hath been the ruine of many Princes. The Constitution of England required a Parliament, as the great Council of the Kingdom, in arduis regni negotiis; and a standing Privy-Coun­sel (as it was called) in other matters of lesser mo­ment. That both these may be ill constituted, abused and turned into factions, there is no doubt, we have had too woful experience of this. Yet all these in­conveniences, with others mentioned by the Author, may be prevented, and the Counsels rectified. The way to our good, and the welfare of England, is not to take them away and destroy them, but reduce them, if possibly it may be done, to their prime insti­tution. Otherwise we may fear a military Govern­ment, or an absolute Monarch, or a Tyrannie, or an Anarchy. A wise council of Lords standing, and the great Council of the Parliament have been the best supports under God, of the peace and happiness of this Nation. In this I am brief, because here is little that is material, and it more properly belongs to that head of Ministers of State and Officers.

THE principal heads and parts of this Chapter are,

• 1. The definition of a Law civil, with certain conclusions thence deduced.
• 2. The interpretation of Laws.
• 3. The distribution of Laws in gene­ral.

In the administration of a Common-wealth once constituted; the first thing is Legislation; the second is the Execution. In the execution,

• 1. Officers are made.
• 2. Jurisdiction exercised according to those Laws.

Therefore the proper place of treating con­cerning Laws civil in general, is in the first part of administration, which requires first that Laws be made. For God himself did avouch himself to be Israels Lord and King, and they avouch themselves his subjects and people, and this was the constitution of that State. This being done, in the next place he proceedeth to make Laws. And this is the order of all such as will imitate God, and proceed orderly to govern a State, as appears, Exodus 19. and the 20. Chapters, and so forward. This also was Jethroes counsel unto Moses, and approved of God. Thou shalt teach them Ordinances and Laws, and shalt shew them the way wherein they must walk, and the [Page 92]work that they must do. Moreover, thou shalt pro­vide thee of all the people, able men, &c. and place such over them. This was making of Officers, after he had given them Laws, and let them Judge the people. This is jurisdiction, Exod. 18.20, 21, 22. From hence it appears how preposterously, this man and others are that treat,

• 1. Of Magistrates.
• 2. Of Laws.

The difference between Laws Civil in gene­ral, and the Civil Law of the Roman Empire, is more easily known, and learned from the Civilians, who have clearly delivered it, then from him. For Poli­ticks speaks of Civil or Political Laws (made for the Government of State) more generally; and if it mention any Laws of particular States, they are but examples to the general rules concerning Laws. But let us pass by this, and proceed to his definition, which is as followeth.

T H.

Civil Law is to every subject, those rules which the Common-wealth hath commanded him by word, writing, or other sufficient sign of the will to make use of it, for the distinction of right and wrong, that is, of what is contrary, and what is not contrary to the rule.

G. L.

In this definition, the Genus is, its a rule; the ef­ficient cause is the Common-wealth; the party bound is the subject; the end is the distinction of wrong which is contrary, and right which is not [Page 93]contrary to the rule. But

• 1. The Genus is not a rule, which is an act of the understanding; whereas Law is not only an act of the understanding, but the will, which is facultas imperans. Many may give rules by their wisdom, which can make no Laws by their wills.
• 2. The efficient cause is not the Common-wealth, but pars imperans, the Soveraign who is but one part of it.
• 3. The end is not only to declare a distinction between right and wrong, but to bind the subject to do that which is right, and to forbear that which is wrong. For lex est regula obligativa.
• 4. Not content to give the definition, he explains what is right, and that is that which is not contrary to the Law; and wrong, and its that which is con­trary. But what he means by rule is hard to know.

If he mean by rule, Law it self, then its absurd; if he intends some antecedent rule of divine wisdom, manifesting what is just or unjust, before a civil pow­er command it, he is obscure. Though he under­value the Philosopher so much, as far below him, though he was far above him, he might with Mar­sulis of Padua, in his Defensor Pacis, pars 1. cap. 10. have observed out of him a better definition of a Law given, Ethn. ad Nicho. lib. 10. cap. 9. Lex est sententia, doctrina seu judicium universale justorum & conferentium civilium & suorum oppositorum cum praecepto coactivo per poenam aut praemium de ejus obser­vatione in hoc saeculo destribuenda. More briefly, its a coactive precept of the Soveraign binding the sub­ject to obedience, and upon the same to be rewarded, or upon disobedience to be punished in this life; where many things are to be observed.

• 1. The mat­ter of this Law is something in it self just, and con­ducing [Page 94]to the publik good, yet so that it reacheth to the contrary.
• 2. This must be known, and judged to be so, by the wisdom and understanding of the Sove­raign; for all Laws arr made by wisdom Political.
• 3. This judgement of the Law-giver must be made known unto the subject; therefore the Philosopher saith its [...], a word. And he means not only [...], but [...], a word not only inwardly conceived in the mind of the Law-giver, [...], as Aristotle saith, but it must be uttered and made known, as the ten Commandements are called the ten words; therefore its said, Exodus 20. God spake all these words.
• 4. It must be praeceptum, which in­cludes the will of the Soveraign intending to bind the subject, and so declaring himself.
• 5. It must be an universal precept binding the whole community of the subject.
• 6. It must be a coactive precept, and backt with the sword for to make the Obligation effectual. In this respect the Philosopher saith, [...]; the Law must have a coactive force. And the Apostle saith, he beareth not the sword in vain: which words imply, the Law-giver must have a sword.
• 7. This sword pro­tects and rewards the obedient who observe this Law according to their obligation, and it punisheth the disobedient; and for these two ends, the Law must be co-active and armed with a sword.
• 8. These rewards and punishments are to be conferrd and in­flicted in this life; for it cannot reach the soul and the life to come; and this doth difference the civil Laws of men from the Laws of God, which bind men to obedience upon the promise of spiritual and eternal rewards, and for defect of obedience, unto [Page 95]eternal and spiritual penalties.

This hath far more of the definition of a Law then his, and more fully declares the nature of a Law civil. Yet if either he, or any other will improve it, I shall like it well, for I know mine own imperfections. From his definiti­on he infers several conclusions, the first whereof is.

T. H.

The Legislator in all Common-wealths is the Sove­raign: Again, the Common-wealth is the Legislator by the Representative.

G. L.

That pars imperans, is the Legislator in every State, must needs be granted: but that the Common-wealth should be the Legislator, either by or with­out (pars imperans) the Soveraign, I do not under­stand. For it consists of two parts, the Soveraign and the subject; and if the whole Common-wealth make Laws, then the subject as well as the Soveraign is Legislator. In a Republick or free-State, there is a difference between the Soveraign and the subject, much more in other models and forms. Therefore he must needs speak either improperly or untruly, when he saith the State is Legislator.

T. H.

Conclusion 2. The Soveraign is not subject to the civil Laws, because he hath power to make and repeal them at pleasure.

G. L.

That the Soveraign in divers respects, and especial­ly as a Soveraign, is not subject unto, but above the Laws, is a certain truth. For Laws do bind the sub­ject, not the Soveraign, to obey or be punished; but the Soveraign doth command as Superiour, not obey as inferiour; doth punish, is not punished. The power to make a Law, when there is none, and to repeal after that its made, is sufficient evidence of his superiority, as also dispensations in judgement and pardons be. Yet this supreme will Legislative over men, is subject to the superiour will of God, and must neither make, nor repeal Laws, but accord­ing to wisdom and justice.

T. H.

Conclusion 3. Custom is not Law by long continu­ance of time, but by consent of the Soveraign.

G. L.

This follows from the first Conclusion. For if the Soveraign only be the Legislator, then continuance of time and practise of the people, though universal, cannot make a Law. The Soveraign must give either an express, or tacit consent; and this consent is then most evident, when he makes the custom a rule in judgement, and observes it. And the Civilians well observe, that besides con­tinuance of time, and the Soveraigns consent, A third thing is required, and that is, that the beginning of it be reasonable, as the Author here doth note.

T. H.

Conclusion 4. The Law of Nature, and the Civil Law, contain each other, and are of equal extent. For the Laws of Nature, which consist in equity, justice, gratitude and other moral vertues on these depending, in the condition of meer nature, are not properly laws, but qualities, that dispose men to peace and obedience; when a Common-wealth is once actually settled, then are they Laws, &c.

G. L.

• 1. This is no Conclusion from the definition, ex­cept he mean that the rule of right and wrong be the Law of Nature.
• 2. The Laws of Nature are the Laws of God, and not of man; and not only subjects, [Page 98]but Soveraigns are bound by them.
• 3. Therefore they bind not as commanded by the civil Soveraign, but as written by the hand of heaven in the heart of man. Neither is that which afterwards he makes the difference between the Law of Nature, and the Law of civil Governors, any difference at all, that the one is written, the other not. For both are written, one by the hand of man, though every Civil Law be not written, and the other by the hand of God: the one in the heart, the other upon some other material substance; and that which is written in the heart, may be written out of it.
• 4. Equity, justice grati­tude, and other moral vertues, are not Laws of na­ture, but either habitual or actual conformities unto the Laws of Nature.
• 5. How the Laws of Nature, and Laws Civil should be of equal extent, and yet contain one another, and be parts one of another, I do not understand.
• 6. A Law of Nature is only then a civil Law, when its declared to be so by the civil Soveraign, yet its a Law before.
• 7. For the most part learned men do understand by the Laws of Na­ture, certain divine principles imprinted upon the heart of man; by the Laws of Nations, more imme­diate; by the Laws civil, more remote Conclusions of constitutive Laws civil.

T. H.

Seeing all Laws have their authority and force from the will of the Soveraign, a man may wonder whence proceed such opinions as are found in the Books of Law­yers of eminence in several Common-wealths, directly or by consequence, making the Legislative power depend on [Page 99]private men, or subordinate Judges: as for example, That the Common-Law hath no Controuler but the Parliament. Item, That the Common-Law hath two arms, Force and Justice, the one whereof is in the King, the other deposited in the hands of the Parlia­ment.

G. L.

The former Conclusion, which is the fifth in or­der, That the Laws of Princes and Countries sub­dued, depend upon the Soveraign conquering is true. And it is wisdom in the Conquerors to grant them the Laws and Customs of God, and no waies prejudicial to their power. For many are willing to change their Governors, yet unwilling to change their Government. But as concerning the two ma­ximes of Law, I might refer him to the Learned in that profession, who no doubt can make them good against any thing he hath said. They seem to him to be unreasonable, partly because he is ignorant of the Constitution, both of this, and also of other States; partly because they are inconsistent with his Utopian principles. For he presupposeth,

• 1. That the King of England is an absolute Monarch.
• 2. That the Parliament, as a Parliament, is meerly a subject.
• 3. That the King hath power at will and pleasure to call Parliaments, and dissolve them; yet these hath he not made good, neither can he. 1. That our Kings are not absolute Monarchs is well known, the Laws and practice have made it manifest. And what­soever ignorant persons and parasites may say, yet wise men, both English and Forreign States-men, who [Page 100]have dealt with England, have been assured of the contrary; especially when in certain leagues they have required the consent of the Parliament.

Again, the Kings of England never made or repealed a Law, nor levied a subsidie alone themselves, without a Par­liament. And they are sworn [corroborare leges, quas vulgus elegerit] For let [Elegerit] be what tense it will, vulgus, which is populus, non rex, eligit leges; and the late King in his answer to the 19. Pro­positions, did confess that the Lords and Commons had a share in the Legislative power. And it were very much to be wondered at, if that King, who himself alone could never make or repeal a Law, nor levy or impose a subsidie, nor revoke the judgement of any Court, nor alter a word or clause in any Law agreed upon in Parliament, should be an absolute Monarch. Its far more probable he was only trusted with the force for the execution of justice, according to Law and Judgement, according to the second maxime. And if he was no absolute Soveraign, then his second supposition, that the Parliament, as such, is only an Assembly of private men and subjects, and to be considered in no other capacity, is false: As likewise his third, That the King can call and dissolve Parliaments at will and pleasure. For by the Consti­tution, the Laws and practise, he was bound to call them once a year, and oftner as the necessity and exigency of affairs either of peace or war should re­quire. And in such cases to dissolve them before the [ardua Regni] were dispatched, was both dangerous and destructive; and did argue either a bad constitu­tion, or a corruption of the same.

T. H.

Law cannot be against reason, neither is it the letter, but the intention of the Law-giver that is the Law. And this reason is not private of subordinate Judges, but of the supreme Lawgiver.

G. L.

All this is willingly granted, if he understand by Rea­son, not the meer conceit or will of the Soveraign, but that reason which is a ray of divine wisdom shin­ing in the mind of the Law-giver, regulating his judgement, and expressed in the words of the Law. And the sense of a Law given by a learned Judge subordinate, may be very true, yet not authentick: because he that makes the Law, can interpret Law in that manner, and none else. I pass by his discourse concerning promulgation and interpretation of Law, as also the qualification of Judges, which belongs to that Chapter of Officers formerly mentioned. He might have done well to have improved these excel­lent. Treatises of other learned Authors, who have informed us both more accurately, and also more particularly of these things, then he himself hath done. But he conceits himself as far above them, as they surpass ordinary men. Neither is his distribu­tion of Laws worth the examination, as being very crude and indigested, as also heterogeneous. I proceed therefore to his two questions, concerning what assu­rance may be had of, and obedience ought to be given unto divine positive Laws. The questions are,

T. H.

1. How can a man without supernatural revelati­on, be assured of the revelation received by the declarer of those Laws?

2. How can he be bound to obey them?

The answer to the first, By sanctity, miracles, wis­dom, success, without particular revelation, its impos­sible for a man to have assurance of a revelation made to another. Therefore no man can infallibly know by na­tural reason, that another hath had a supernatural re­velation of Gods will, but only a belief.

G. L.

This presupposeth,

• 1. That there is a positive Law of God.
• 2. This positive Law is declared and witnessed to be the Law of God.
• 3. That this testi­mony concerning this Law is divine and infallible.
• 4. That it is such, because its grounded on, and agree­able to an immediate revelation from God of that Law to him that doth declare it, as to Moses, the Prophets or Apostles.

For God formerly spake un­to the Fathers by the Prophets, in the latter times to their children by his Son first, and after by his Apo­stles. The question here is not how we shall attain a demonstrative, clear, or intuitive knowledge of the matter of the Law, nor of the manner of the reve­lation; but how we may be assured that the decla­ration or testimony of him to whom the revelation was made, is divine, that we may believe it as divine and from God. The means whereby the divinity of [Page 103]the testimony was made evident at the first, were ex­traordinary, as signs, wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will, Heb. 2.4. But after that upon these divine at­testations the Gospel was generally received in all Nations, and the prophesies of the Old Testament in this particular fulfilled, these ceased; yet one thing alwaies did, and ever will manifest the testimony and doctrine of the Gospel to be divine, and that is the Holy-Ghost, who (by his powerful working upon the hearts of men, seriously attending to this truth, whereby a great change both inwardly in their hearts, and outwardly in their lives is wrought) doth mightily confirm it. And those who find, and feel in themselves the effects of sanctification and heavenly comfort, can no waies doubt, but are assu­red that God was in the Prophets and Apostles, and did speak by them. Besides when we consider,

• 1. That the more we understand them, the more excellency of wisdom we find in them.
• 2. That these positives are agreeable and no waies contrary to pure morals.
• 3. That they conduce effectually to holiness and eternal life.
• 4. That they were appro­ved, received by the best men in the world, and sealed with the blood of many Martyrs, we must needs be fully satisfied that they are not false, feigned, fan­tastick conceits of deluded men, and not only so, but all these things may perswade any rational man to try upon practise, whether they be divine or no.

And this never any did, but found the Apostles Do­ctrine to be of God. If we had nothing but the universal and perpetual agreement and tradition of the Church of all places and times, affirming the [Page 104]Scripture to be the Word of God, it were sufficient to produce in a rational man a greater measure of be­lief, then any Book or History in the world can pos­sibly require or deserve. For this universal testimo­ny of the best in several parts of the world, at such a distance as that they in their time neither heard of, nor knew one another, makes it more credible then any humane History can be. But to return unto Mr. Hobbs, I say its possible, and not impossible to know the divinity of the testimony or declaration immediately, but not of the revelation or matter re­vealed. Yet that such a revelation, and such a thing revealed there was, is known in some measure by consequence. And the divine Authority of this te­stimony may be infallibly known, and that by natu­ral reason, yet by it as elevated and more perfected by outward representation and inward sanctification. And the matter of the revelation to another, toge­ther with the manner, may be believed, though not known. For when we once know that God hath re­vealed it, we believe the thing revealed to be true, though by artificial and intrinsecal arguments we cannot prove it to be so. For the testimony of God may be evident, though the thing testified be hidden and above our reason. The Conclusion is, That we may have an infallible knowledge of the positive Laws of God, so far as to know that they are from him, and are his Laws, and that without particular revelation, that they were revealed to another.

T. H.

If the divine positive Law be not against the Law of nature, and he undertake to obey it, he is bound by his own act to obey it, but not bound to believe it. For mans belief, and interiour cogitations, are not subject to the commands, but only to the operations of God, ordinary or extraordinary. Faith of supernatural Law, is not a fulfilling, but only an assenting to the same: its not a duty but a gift, &c.

G. L.

His second question was, how a man can be bound to obey supernatural positive Laws, whereof he hath no particular revelation, that they were revealed to others declaring them. To this he answers,

• 1. It must not be against the Law of nature, which is the Law of God. And its true, that the Law of nature is the Law of God, and this is a good rule. For the positive Laws of God are not contrary to his pure moral Laws, which have an intrinsecal rectitude in them.
• 2. He further adds, that if he undertake to obey a supernatural positive Law of God, he is bound to obey it, but not believe it. This is very ob­scure, and very absurd.

For,

• 1. To undertake to obey it, seems to be a promise to obey it: and this is a voluntary Obligation, whereby a man may bind himself to obey it as a divine Law, or as no Law, or if as a Law, yet not as a Law of God; and then he doth not obey as he ought to do.
• 3. It is absurd, To obey it as a positive Law of God, and not be­lieve [Page 106]it to be a Law of God. For if he neither know nor believe it to be a Law of God, he cannot obey it as a Law of God. His obedience is no obedience unto God.
• 4. Whereas its said, That faith is not subject to Gods command, its not a duty, its a gift, this must needs be a gross errour.

For though the active power whereby a man is enabled to believe a divine positive truth, be the gift of God, yet the ex­ercise of this power, and the acts thereof, are sub­ject to the Law of God. Other wise positive unbe­lief of a supernatural divine positive Law, sufficient­ly declared and proposed could be no sin. Its true, that some affirm that the first and natural acts of the soul are not subject to any Law: yet these do grant that all practical operations (and such assent unto divine truths is) be subject unto Law. That faith is a duty, is apparent, because God commands it, ap­proves it, rewards it, and reproves and punisheth unbelief. That we may the better understand the drift of this Author in this discourse, he produceth the examples of Abraham and Moses, declaring po­sitive Laws of God upon revelation made of them, which the posterity of Abraham were to obey upon their declaration, and thence concludes,

T. H.

That it is manifest, and sufficiently appeareth, that in a Common-wealth, a subject who hath no certain and assured revelation particularly unto himself, concerning the will of God, is to obey for such, the command of the Common-wealth.

G. L.

But,

• 1. It was formerly made manifest, that nei­ther Abraham nor Moses were Soveraigns, much less Common-wealths.
• 2. A Soveraign civil may de­clare something to be a Law of God, and yet it may be no such thing; and declare against a Law, and yet it may be (and many times it so falls out to be) a Law of God; and in neither of these cases is the subject bound to obey his Soveraign.
• 3. If that which is declared for a positive Law divine be suffici­ently attested, especially by Miracles and Gifts of the Holy Ghost, by undoubted history and universal tradition, the matter be agreeable to the Law of na­ture, tends to practise of piety, being practised, is conducing to an higher degree of holiness and ju­stice; and by experience constantly found to be ac­companied with rare and excellent effects tending to mans inward and real happiness, it is to be believed and obeyed as a divine Law, though all the Sove­raigns in the world declare against it.

If a subject do accept the Religion established by the civil Laws of his Countrey, he is free from civil penalties of man, yet not from the judgement of God, if that Religion be against the Laws of God. No Laws of man can bind above, much less against the Laws of God; and this all rational men will confess. Austine denies the perfection, and according to Tullies defini­tion, the very being of a Common-wealth to the Roman State, because it commanded subjection un­to, and worship of Devils. By what this Author hath delivered, Christ and the Apostles are made guilty, be­cause [Page 108]they required obedience to the positive Laws of the Gospel, seeing they were contrary to all civil Laws of the world: Upon this account the Rulers of the Jews, heathen Princes, and the Roman Em­perours, who persecuted the Christians, are justifi­able; as all such who received the Christian Religion contrary to their own Laws, are condemnable; but of this you will hear more hereafter. For he makes it indifferent what Religion any man professeth, if it be agreeable to the Laws of the State where he lives.

T. H.

There is also another distinction of Laws, into fun­damental and not fundamental; but I could never see in any Author, what a fundamental Law signifieth, &c. A fundamental Law is that by which the subjects are bound to uphold whatsoever power is given unto the So­veraign, &c.

G. L.

This doth argue his ignorance in Politicks. For fundamental Laws in every State are those which concern the constitution; not fundamental, such as are made immediately to regulate the administrati­on. The former are such as cannot be altered with­out taking asunder and disjoynting the very frame and form of Government; the latter may be alter­ed, and yet the essential frame may stand. The for­mer are the foundation of a State; the latter are but superstructions. The former determine the Sove­raign who he is, and what his power, and also define [Page 109]the bounds of the liberty and subjection of the sub­ject. The golden Bull is said to contain the funda­mental Laws of the German Empire; as the Salick or as some call it. [the Gallick] of excluding fe­males from succession to the Crown, is said to be one of the fundamentals of France.

T. H.

I find lex civilis, & jus civile, promiscuously used for the same thing, even in the most learned Authors, which nevertheless ought not to be. For Jus is Liberty, Lex is Obligation.

G. L.

That they are often taken for the same, and in learned Authors, is certain, and that without any er­rour. But yet Jus doth not properly signifie the li­berty left unto us by the Law; but id quod Justum est, and ought to be the matter of the Law. And when the Civilians take Jura and Leges to be the same, they understand by Jus, not Jus vagum, but Jus à lege determinatum. For the Laws determine what is right, and what is wrong: and in this sense, Jus cannot be liberty, as he doth fondly imagine; but must either be, or at least imply an Obligation.

THE Author in this Chapter is methodical, and cannot much be charged with errours or mis­prisions, as in the former. The proper place for crimes excuses extenuations and aggravations is next to that of Laws. For as the Apostle teacheth us, Where there is no Law, there is no transgression. And herein the Authors of Politicks seem to be de­fective, because, though they treat of Laws and Ju­risdiction, yet they say little or nothing of Crimes. Yet the Civilians in this particular have done their part. He doth distinguish betwixt sins and crimes, and his distinction may be allowed, though hardly in Politicks. Yet the word Crime in Learned Authors is not alwaies taken, as here it is, for an offence, as it is an object or matter of Judgement. And sometimes causes judicial are distinguished into civil, criminal, capital. In which distinction criminals are onely one sort of mules. That which we call [Sin] in Divi­nity is nothing but disobedience to a Law in general, though it be strictly taken for disobedience to divine Law. Disobedience being an anomy, presupposeth a Law, and a Law must have a Soveraign and a Law-giver: and there can be no violation of a Law with­out wrong unto the Law-giver: And those offences are most hainous, which directly oppose and wrong [Page 111]the power of the Soveraign lawfully constituted, be­cause the tend to the rasing of the very foundati­on and constitution of the Government it self. Such are, denying of the supreme power, resisting it, and revolting from it, so as to be Soveraigns our selves, or independent, or subject to another. The first law God gave was for to secure his Soveraignty, Thou shalt have no other Gods but me; as the Septuagint do well and truly turn it. And this by Philo is said to be the Commandment [...] of the supreme power of one God. All other offences are against the Laws of administration, which though they may be hainous, yet are not so hainous as those former against the institution. These offences of disobedi­ence may be considered, either with reference to the Laws antecedent, as violated, or to Jurisdiction fol­lowing, in which sense the Author handles them, and calls them crimes! And these may be reduced unto certain heads, as they have been by Civilians, and also by the Lawyers of particular States; yet this is most exactly done by the Common-Law of Eng­land, which was entire before the Conquest, and fol­lowed the order of the ten Commandments of the moral Law of God. Thus some Antiquaries in Law do inform us.

The Author acquits all motions of the soul ante­cedent to a deliberate consent, resolution, and inten­tion, from being sins; yet this I cannot do. Its cer­tain, that to understand, know and remember that which is evil and unjust, cannot be sin, because God doth so: and all this may be done with a detestation of it; yet to like, approve, incline unto, delight in evil thus known and remembered, though we never [Page 112]yield a deliberate or any formal consent, must needs argue some imperfection, if not corruption in the heart of man, which should never think of evil, but with hatred. The rest of the Chapter is rational, if rightly understood, the greatest part whereof is ta­ken up in that of aggravations, wherein he hath done better then others, yet he is far short of some who have both more largely, and also accurately handled that point out of Scriptures. Its a common theme of Casuists and Civilians, and might have been much improved. The original of all crimes and offences, are either from the understanding or the will, not the passions, as he affirms. From the understanding, either not apprehending, or not judging aright, from the will averse, or enclined another way by reason of corruption. Ignorance and error are from defect, or negligence, or wilfulness, severally or joyntly. And here its to be observed, That the more of meer will there is in any offence, the more hainous it is. The highest degree of wilfulness is in obstinacy, resisting all means and motives used for to rectifie the heart.

UPon obedience or disobedience, follow punish­ments or rewards, determined by Judgement, which is an act of Jurisdiction, and considers the Law as violated or observed. And here comes in ac­cording to order, that head of Jurisdiction in gene­ral, which properly is handled in that part of Poli­ticks we call Administration. And he that undertakes to deliver a model of Politicks, and yet saith nothing of Jurisdiction, but proceeds from crimes to punish­ments, per saltum, as Mr. Hobbs doth, is but a super­ficial Author. But let us hear his definition of pu­nishment.

T. H.

A punishment is an evil inflicted by publick Autho­rity, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is judged by the same Authority to be a transgression of the Law, to the end that the will of men may be thereby better disposed to obedience.

This is a very imperfect definition, and one rea­son is, the Author presumes much of his own judge­ment, and desires to be singular; otherwise he had a better definition made to his hands. For poena est vin­dicta noxae. This punishment is defined in general, as it includes the penalties inflicted by Parents, Masters, or any one who have power to command another: & it reacheth the punishments executed by God. This definition may easily be made so, as fully to express the nature of civil punishment intended by this Au­thor. But for the better understanding of the na­ture of punishment, we must observe, that it may be considered several waies.

• 1. As determined by the Law, which binds the party subject either to obedi­ence or punishment.
• 2. As deserved by the party offending, who is bound to suffer it.
• 3. As defined by the Judge upon judicial evidence.
• 4. As inflicted by the Minister of execution.
• 5. As suffered by the party condemned.
• 6. As prevented by pardon out of meer mercy, or upon satisfaction made and ac­cepted.

The efficient cause of punishing in a Common-wealth, is the Soveraign or higher powers bearing the Sword; and as exercising Jurisdiction either by himself or his Minister. For a Soveraign doth pu­nish as a Judge. The immediate and formal object of this act is noxa civilis, some offence or crime judged upon evidence to be a violation of the Law. The general nature of it is, [...], retribution. The thing retributed or rendred is something that brings hurt or dammage to the delinquent or party offend­ing, [Page 115]who as judged guilty, is the proper subject of it. Its called by some Malum triste, proper malum turpe. The proper act complete and consummate, is the inflicting of this evil determined by just judge­ment, so as that the party condemned doth actually suffer it. All this for the general notion of it, may be observed out of the words of the Apostle, who saith, That God will render to them who are conten­tious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighte­ousness, indignation and wrath: tribulation and an­gnish upon every soul of man that doth evil, Rom. 2.8, 9. For here we have the Judge, the crime Judged to be so, the retribution or rendering, the thing or evil rendred so as to be suffered, the cause why its rendred. In this respect the higher powers are said to bear the sword to take vengeance upon evil doers, Rom. 13.4.

The ends of punishment are many.

• 1. Some of them are to correct and reform the party punished;
• 2. Some for example, that others may hear and fear.
• 3. The end of all punishments in general, is to vin­dicate the power of the Law-giver, and the honour and force of the Law, to manifest Justice and the hatred of evil, and to procure the peace and tran­quillity of the Community.

Before the Author pro­ceed to draw conclusions from his definition, he en­quires how the Soveraign acquired the power of pu­nishing. And resolves,

T. H.

That the-subject in the first constitution, laid aside his power of self-preservation, by hurting, subduing, killing others in his own defence; and so did not give it, but left it to the Soveraign.

G. L.

This is ridiculous, absurd, and grounded upon his false principles. For,

• 1. The Soveraign is the Mini­ster of God, and is bound to do (so that he keep within the compass of his Commission) that which God would do, and that is to punish evil. And as all his power of making Laws, Judgement, Peace, War, &c. are from God, so is this amongst the rest. By whom he is made a Soveraign, from him he hath the sword to punish. Men may give their consent, that such a man, or such a company of men shall raign, but the power is from God, not them.
• 2. In the constitution of a supreme Governor, no man can Covenant to be protected or defended in doing evil.

Neither can any, or all higher powers in the world justly promise to protect any in evil: neither hath any man any power unjustly to preserve him­self. For that of the Author, that in the state of na­ture every man hath right to every thing, is absolute­ly false and abominable. When a man subjects him­self unto a Soveraign ordained of God, not only to protect the good, but punish the evil, he cannot ex­cept himself from his punitive power, if he do ill; because he subjects according to the just Laws of [Page 117]God, and cannot lawfully do any other waies. So that power to punish is given by God, not left by man unto higher powers civil.

After his definition of punishment civil, and deter­mination of the means how power punitive is ac­quired, he

• 1. Draws conclusions from his definition.
• 2. Declares the several kinds of punishment.
• 3. Di­stinguisheth of rewards.

• 1. The conclusions are ei­ther good and pertinent,

or false, or not deducible from the definition, and I will not trouble the Rea­der with the examination of them.

2. His distribution of punishments is tolerable. And here we must observe,

• 1. That punishment civil can only reach the body, and this temporal life of man, for the sword cannot reach the soul.
• 2. That these punishments, as well as spiritual, are either of loss or pain; poena damni aut sensus, privative or po­sitive. The one takes away some good, the other in­flicts some positive evil.
• 3. That some of them take away life, either civil, as banishment, or natural, as death: and some take away such things as make life comfortable, as goods; such are sines, and confisca­tions; or liberty, as imprisonment, bondage; or our honour, as all ignominious penalties. Those which infer some positive evil contrary to nature, are all kind of tortures whatsoever, which cause pain in the body of man: and all these positive punishments tend to the destruction of life, either in part or in whole.
• 4. These penalties are so to be inflicted, and in such a measure and proportion, as that no man may gain by doing evil.
• 5. That though an inno­cent person, as such, cannot be justly punished, yet as he is made one person with the guily, he may just­ly [Page 118]suffer. Some are one person with the guilty by nature; as children with parents, some by consent, as sureties with the principal guilty of non-pay­ment, or by Laws civil, as the subjects with the So­veraign.
• 6. The just execution of judgement is a means to avert Gods wrath, to protect the just, to preserve the State, and procure Gods mercy.

Rewards are contrary to punishments, and are due to such as are loyal and obedient subjects doing well. These either are ordinary, and general, as protection of life, liberty, estate; or extraordinary and more special, and such as enrich or advance, or give priviledges, immunities, and exemptions. And these latter should never be disposed of but accord­ing to desert, and by this means they would encou­rage the subject, and breed gallant men. Thus far his constitution of the Leviathan, the great monstrous animal hath been examined and viewed: and is found to consist of an absolute power, and absolute slavery. The head is an absolute Soveraign, the bo­dy and members absolute slaves.

ALL bodies Politick are truly mortal, as the Author saith, though not so mortal as the in­dividual persons whereof they are constituted be. For by reason of succession of these singular and several persons, they are of longer continuance: and therefore said to be immortal; the proper meaning whereof is, that they are not so mortal. Many States are constituted by degrees, not in a moment, or any short time: and in the like manner, they decay by little and little, until they utterly vanish in a total dissolution. And though both constitution and dis­solution seem sometimes to be fortuitous, yet they are not so: for its God who in his mercy plants and builds: and in his just judgement plucks up, and pulls down. This is the place assigned by Authors to the head of Politicks, which delivers the causes of the alteration, corruption and subversion of States. Al­terations of the forms of Government are sometimes for the better, and so they are a blessing; sometimes for the worse, and so they are the same with corru­ption. Corruption is from man; subversion from God, as the supreme and universal Judge. Corrupti­on goes before, subversion follows. And this corrupti­on is from the sins and crimes of the Governors, or [Page 120]governed, or both. The crimes of Governors are either Personal or Political: Personal are many times the same with the offences of the people: sins of them as men: Political are such as make them guilty as they are Governors, as ignorance, imprudence, negligence, in justice Political; and these not only in assuming and acquiring power, but in the administra­tion of the same. The sins of the people as subjects, are impatiency, when they will not endure the seve­rity of just Governors, good Laws, and impartial Judgement, a desire of innovation and alteration of Government, without just and necessary causes, open rebellion, secret treachery and conspiracy, sedition and such like. The sins of both, which are personal, are impiety against God; injustice and unmerciful­ness towards man, the abuse of peace and plenty to bravery, drunkenness, gluttony, lewdness, and such like Vices. And when in these they become impu­dent, incorrigible, and universally delinquent, their ruine is fatal and unavoidable: the harvest is ripe, and the sickle of Gods vengeance will cut them off.

The Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans, cap. 13. gives a perfect model of the best and most lasting States.

• 1. The higher powers must so ascend the Throne, as that it may be truly said, they were or­dained of God, and advanced not only and meerly by his permission, but Commission and Command.
• 2. They must have a sword, and a sufficient coactive power.
• 3. They must use the same according to just judgement and wholsom Laws, for the protection of the good, and the punishment of the bad.
• 4. The people must be subject not only out of fear, but [Page 121]conscience.
• 5. They must obey their good and wholsom Laws.
• 6. They must give them such al­lowance as shall be sufficient to maintain and make good their just power.
• 7. They must love one ano­ther.
• 8. They must not live in rioting and drunken­ness, chambering and wantonness, nor in strife and envying. In a word, they must be sober in themselves, just towards man, devout towards God.

But when Prince, Priest and people refuse to follow these Laws, they draw Gods judgements from heaven upon the Common-wealth. Idle, filthy, and abominable So­dom must be destroyed: Gold-thirsty and blood­thirsty Babylon cannot stand: Idolatrous and Apo­state Israel and Judah must be wasted with sword, famine, pestilence, their Countrey made desolate, and the remnant carried captives and dispersed in remote parts, and in the midst of their enemies. But let us examine the causes of the weakening and dissolution of States determined by the Author.

T. H.

The 1, is when a man to obtain a Kingdom, is content sometimes with a less power, then to the peace and defence of the Common-wealth is necessarily required.

G. L.

This may prove to be a cause, yet very rarely. Princes and Monarchs (for of them he speaks) of­fend usually on the other hand. If they can, they will assume and challenge far more power then either God will, or man can give them; for they desire to be absolute Lords. Few of them are of brave Theo­pompus his mind, who willingly made his power less, that it might be more lasting. To be Dukes of Venice can in no wise satisfie their vast ambitious desires: The Lacedemiun Ephori are terrible to them: The Justitia Arragoniae cannot be endured; Legislative and judicial Parliaments do too much restrain and li­mit their power [...] with them its treason to affirm that there be any lawful means to reduce them into order, when they apparently transgress the Laws of nature, which are the Laws of God. The people in­deed must be kept in awe and order, and this cannot be without power. But, what is here understood by power? Its not potestas, but potentia, strength and force; which may be great in a Leviathan, yet with­out wisdom and justice can never long keep the peo­ple in subjection. His examples of the Roman and Athenian free-States, are not fully applyed, neither do the applyed come home unto the point. Rome was strong enough to subdue a great part of the world, before she became imperial: and Athens in that Law concerning Salamis had power enough, but wanted wisdom, and therefore were reformed by the wise folly of Solon. That which is here spoken of the power of Kings, is not to derogate the least from [Page 123]that power which is due unto them by the constitu­tion of the State wherein they raign. Some have more, some have less. Yet none should have less then is sufficient for the full discharge of their place: And it is to be wished every one of them would keep the bounds determined by God and the Consti­tution.

T H.

A second cause of weakning and dissolving a State, are certain Doctrines. The first, That every private man is Judge of good and evil actions.

G. L.

Judgement is publick or private; publick no pri­vate man can pass; private he may; and that both of his own actions, and others too. The acts of others are private or publick: of both these he may Judge. Publick acts of the Governors are Laws, Judgements, Execution. Even of Laws he may, he must within himself, so far as they are a rule and bind him, enquire, examine and determine, whether good or evil. Otherwise, he can perform but only a blind obedience to the best: and if he conform unto the unjust, he in obeying man, disobeys God, which no good man will do. In other acts which are ap­parently just, we may judge of them truly as they are, and no otherwise. Yet this must not be done to palliate our disobedience to that which is just, or raise sedition, or rebel; but we may complain to God, and by our humble prayers seek redress.

T. H.

A second Doctrine, That whatsoever a man doth against conscience is sin. The conscience may be errone­ous; and he that is subject to no Civil Law, sins in all he acts against his conscience. Yet to him that is in a Common-wealth, the Law is the publick conscience, by which he hath undertaken to be guided.

G. L.

Conscience is a mans knowledge of his own acts, as agreeable or disagreeable to the Law of God. Its not a faculty, but an act of the soul: and an act, not of the will, but understanding, and the same as practical. The proper act is knowledge; the object is his own acts, and these acts not any way, but as agreeable or disagreeable to the Law of God. For as Aquinas saith, there must be applicatio facti ad legem: Otherwise a mans understanding cannot judge of it as conformable or not unto the Law of God. These acts may be considered as to be done, or done. In the former respect conscience binds as a Law, though it be not the Law, but presupposeth or includeth the knowledge of the Law. In the latter respect it judgeth, and is a kind of judge of himself in some sort as superiour to himself. But before the tribunal of God it is a witness, and doth accuse or ex­cuse. The great Question so much vexed by the Casuists, is whether an erroneous conscience doth bind. But let them determine what they please; an erroneous conscience in proper sense is no consci­ence. [Page 125]For an errour is no knowledge, but a defect of knowledge, or rather a plain want of knowledge, and also an act contrary to knowledge. Conscience is a knowledge in proper sense, and knowledge is true and certain: and its a knowledge of a mans own act or acts as agreeable to the Law of God; this an erroneous conscience cannot be. That con­science is such a knowledge, is made evident by the Apostle, saying, That when the Gentiles not having the Law, do the things contained in the Law, they having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves, who shew the work of the Law written in their heart by their conscience witnessing, &c. Rom. 12.14, 15. Where we may observe,

• 1. That the conscience could not witness, accuse or excuse, except there were something to be accused or excused.
• 2. The thing accused as evil, or excused as good, must be something conformable, or contrary to the Law of God.
• 3. The conscience could not accuse or excuse any thing as good or evil, without knowledge both of the Law, and of the act that was contrary or consentaneous to that Law.
• 4. Therefore the Apostle before he makes mention of the conscience, affirmeth,
  • 1. That they did the things contained in the Law.
  • 2. They were a Law unto themselves.
  • 3. That they did by their conscience witnessing, prove or demonstrate the work of the Law, (that is the work which the Law did command) written in their heart.

To have the work of the Law written in their heart, is to have a certain true knowledge of it, not an erroneous mis­take. But to return to the Author, Conscience in proper sense doth bind, yet not as it is knowledge, nor as knowledge of a mans proper act, nor as know­ledge [Page 126]of the Law in general, but by vertue of the Law known as a rule of his particular act. For man being subject unto God, and under his Laws, cannot bind himself, and be his own Law-giver: but the Law of God, not an errour, truly understood by him doth bind him. But let the erroneous judgement of the practical understanding be called conscience, as by a Trope it may, because there may be something of conscience in it; yet whether can it bind or no? I answer, it cannot bind: for an errour of the un­derstanding, cannot be a binding rule to command the will of man; neither can it be a rule at all. Again, an erroneous judgement, especially practical, is a sin, and against the Law of God; therefore it can no waies bind; only thus far most Casuists do grant, that by it a man is so far bound, as not to act against it; yet this it doth only per accidens, (for per se; he is bound to act otherwise then it doth dictate.) For because God hath made a mans reason his guide, he must needs be much depraved in his will, that will act contrary unto his reason. And he that will not seruple to act against his erroneous judge­ment, will be bold to act against his judgement right­ly informed. But the full debate of this, I refer to another occasion. And these things premised, I re­turn unto Mr. Hobbs that of the Apostle, Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin: and therefore whosoever acts againt saith and conscience, properly so taken, sin­neth: and for him to affirm that the true Doctrine of God revealed in the Scripture, should be either false, or destructive of eivil States and Governments, is no waies tolerable. Whereas he alledgeth, that the Law of the Common-wealth is the publick consci­ence [Page 127]by which the subject hath bound himself to be guided, its too loose and fallacious, if examined. For,

• 1. The Law is not the publick conscience, but the publick rule of conscience in matters civil.
• 2. Its a rule of the subjects obedience, not as its a Law of the Common-wealth, but as it is agreeable and not con­trary to an higher Law, the Law of God. For the Laws civil do not immediately bind the conscience and immortal soul, as the civil Soveraign hath no power to punish it; for his sword cannot reach that spiritual substance; Secondarily and by consequence they may oblige the soul.
• 3. No subject may or ought to make the Law of the State his absolute guide. For the Law may be against the Law of God; and then, how can the subject undertake to obey it, and make it his rule, and not offend God?
• 4. Every subject is first bound and subject unto God, before he be subjected to civil powers: and is first bound to obey God more then man; and as his subjection unto man is but conditional and subordinate to his subjection to God, so his obedience to man is limited, and only to be performed in such things as his su­preme and absolute Lord doth allow him.

And though man may suffer for his disobedience to hu­mane Laws, yet he had better suffer a temporal then an eternal penalty; and offend man rather then God. Neither doth this doctrine any waies prejudice the civil power, nor encourage any man to disobe­dience and violation of civil Laws, if they be just and good, as they ought to be: and the subject hath not only liberty, but a command to examine the Laws of his Soveraign, and judge within himself, and for himself, whether they be not contrary to the Laws of his God.

T. H.

The third Doctrine, That faith and sanctity are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernatural inspiration and infusion.

G. L.

That divine faith wherby we believe on Jesus Christ, and obtain eternal life in him, and that sancti­ty of life whereby we please God, and are accepted of him, are no doubt both merited by Christ, and inspi­red and wrought in us supernaturally by the power of the Holy-Ghost. And there can be no doubt of this to such as believe the Scripture to be the Word of God written, wherein we read, That except a man be born again of water and the spirit, he cannot enter into the Kingdom of God, John 3.5. And no man can come unto me except the Father draw him, cap. 6.44. And to believe that Jesus was the Son of the living God, was not from flesh and blood, but by re­velation of his heavenly Father, Christ himself teach­eth us, Mat. 16.17. This revelation was an inspira­tion or infusion, except we will quarrel with words; and it was not natural; for then it might have been by and from flesh and blood; but it was supernatural and from God revealing, not only outwardly, but inwardly too. It is also further taught us in Scripture, That no man can say, that Jesus Christ is the Lord but by the Spirit, 1 Cor. 12.3. Yet this faith and sancti­ty are so wrought in us, as that ordinarily God makes use of the Scriptures taught, explained, applyed unto [Page 129]mans heart, of hearing, study and meditation, which are acts of reason, and such acts as man may natural­ly perform, and also so neglect them, as to give God just cause to deny the inspiration of his Spirit for to make the word taught, heard, meditated effectual upon his heart. This Doctrine hath been believed and professed in the most peaceable Common-wealths of the world, and did strengthen, not weaken, much less dissolve the same. If he understand by the pro­fessors of this Doctrine, the phanatick Enthusiasts of these times, who pretend so much that Spirit which God never gave them, and upon this pretence boast themselves to be spiritual men, judging all, and to be judged of none, as they use to abuse the Scri­pture, then its true that these are enemies to all Go­vernment, and their Doctrine tends to the dissoluti­on of all order, Ecclesiastical and Civil, and is to be rooted out of all Common-wealths.

T. H.

A fourth opinion repugnant to the nature of a Com­mon-wealth is this, That he that hath the Soveraign power, is subject to the Civil Laws.

G. L.

There is no doubt but this is destructive of Go­vernment, and contrary to the very nature and es­sence of a Common-wealth; the essential parts whereof are, imperans & subditus, the Soveraign and the subject: take this difference away, you con­found all, and turn the Common-wealth into a Com­munity; [Page 130]yet though Soveraigns are above their own Laws, (how otherwise could they dispense with them and repeal them?) wise men have given advice to Princes for to observe their own Laws, and that for example unto others, and good Princes have follow­ed this advice Soveraigns are to govern by Laws, not to be subject unto them, or as Subjects obey them, or be punished by them. But what this man means by Soveraign, in the hypothesis, is hard to know. For he presupposeth all Soveraigns absolute, and all Kings of England such Soveraigns; and so in general it may be granted, that all Soveraigns are above the Laws civil; yet the application of this rule to particular Princes of limited power, may be false and no waies tolerable. The question is not so much concerning the superiority of the Soveraign over the Laws; but whether a Soveraign by Law for Administration, who is not sole Legislator, is not in divers respects inferiour to the Law; or whether an an absolute Soveraign may not cease to be such, and ex obligatione criminis, ex superiore fieri inferior.

T. H.

A fifth Doctrine which tendeth to the dissolution of a Common-wealth is, That every man hath an absolute propriety in his goods, such as excludeth the right of the Soveraign. Every man hath indeed a propriety, that excludes the right of the subject which is derived from the Soveraign, without whose protection every man should have equal right to the same.

G. L.

• 1. If the subject have propriety, as the Author grants, it must needs be absolute, and must needs ex­clude not only the right of the fellow-subject, but of the Soveraign too. For propriety in proper sense is an independent right of total alienation, without any license of a Superiour or any other.
• 2. This pro­priety is not derived from the Soveraign, except he be despotical; and such indeed the Author affirmeth all Soveraigns to be: and in that respect the subjects can neither have propriety nor liberty; therefore he contradicts himself, when he saith in many places, that the Soveraign is absolute, and here, that the sub­ject hath propriety.
• 3. Its to be granted, that even in a free-State, the subjects proprity cannot free from the publick charges: for as a Member of the whole body, he is bound to contribute to the mainte­nance of the State, without the preservation where­of he cannot so well preserve his own private right.
• 4. Propriety is by the Law of Nature and Nations at least agreeable unto both. And when men agree to constitute a Common-wealth, they retain their proper right, which they had unto their goods be­fore the Constitution, which doth not destroy, but preserve propriety, if well ordered.

For men may advance a Soveraign without any aliena­tion of their estates. No man hath any propriety from God, but so as to be bound to give unto the poor, relieve the distressed, and maintain the Sove­raign in his just Government; yet this doth not take away, but prove propriety, because every one [Page 132]gives, even unto the Common-wealth, that which is his own, not another mans, nor his Soveraigns, who may justly in necessary cases, for the preservation of the State, impose a just rate upon the subject.

But if the Reader seriously consider the Authors discourse in other parts of his Book, he may easily know whereat he aims. For,

• 1. He makes all Sove­raigns absolute.
• 2. The Kings of England to be So­veraigns. And
• 3. in that respect to have a power to raise subsidies, and moneys without a Parliament. And
• 4. hath made that a mortal disease of our State, which is a great preservative of our liberty. For the people alwaies bear the purse, and could not by the King be charged with the least, without their con­sent by their Representative in the Parliament.

This did poise and limit the regal power, prevented much riot and excess in the Court, made the Prince frugal, and hindred unnecessary wars. Yet good Princes, and frugal, never wanted money, were freely sup­plyed by their subjects, whilest they required in their need any thing extraordinary above the publick re­venue, in a right way by Parliament.

T. H.

There is a sixth Doctrine plainly and directly against the essence of a Common-wealth, and its this, That the Soveraign power may be divided.

G. L.

The supreme power, as supreme, must needs be one, and cannot be divided. For as in a Natural, so in a Political body, there must be of necessity one on­ly principle of motion. One supreme will directed by one judgement, and strengthened with one force of the sword, must command, judge, execute: Other­wise there can be no order or regular motion. Yet this supreme power may be in many persons, several and distinct physically, but morally reduced to one by the major part agreeing in one suffrage. That some have made in this State of England three Co­ordinate powers, with their several Negatives, and their several distinct rights of Soveraign power, can very hardly be made good by any reason, as I have hinted before. Yet even these do place all the jura Majestatis, in all joyntly. Our form of Govern­ment is confounded by the different opinions of com­mon Lawyers. Civilians and Divines, who neither agree one with another, nor amongst themselves. It hath been declared, That the fundamental Govern­ment of this Kingdom hath been by King, Peers and Commons; yet this can satisfie no man, because there is no certainty what the power of Commons, what the power of Lords, what the power of the King is: Neither whether the house of Commons and of Lords, be two distinct houses or no: Or if they be distinct, wherein they are so distinct. For some affirm, that in Legislation they ought to be but one, though in Judicial acts two. Yet suppose the Lords to have the Judicial power alone, nevertheless [Page 134]its a question what kind of Lords and Barons these should be. We read first of the forty Lords of the forty Counties in the Saxons time: after the Con­quest we find three sorts of Barons in the higher house: and they were Feudarii, rescriptitii, diplo­matici; Barons by Tenure, by Writ, by Patent. Lords by tenure were the first; but afterwards when any were called by the Kings Writ to Parliament, they by that very Writ were made Barons with suf­frage amongst the former; the last were Lords by Patent, and such were most, yea almost all our Lords in latter times. And to multiply the last, was a poli­cy in the King. For by that means, after the supre­macy of the Pope was cast off, the Bishops did whol­ly depend upon the King, and the Barons by Patent were his creatures, and by them he might carry any cause, or at least hinder and cross the desires of the Knights and Burgesses. And herein few of our ordi­nary Histories can help us; because they relate only unto us matter of fact, how sometimes the King, sometimes the Barons, sometimes the Commons were ascendant and predominant, as now they all seem to be descendant. Yet for all this, a free Parliament, of just, wise and good men, might rectifie all this, and unite the supreme power so miserably divided to the hazard of the State.

T. H.

And as false Doctrine, so also often-times the ex­ample of different Government in a neighbouring Na­tion, disposeth men to alteration of the sorm already setled.

G. L.

That this may be a cause of the alteration, and al­so of ruine too, its very possible: and there seems to be some colour of reason in it, because we are bound to follow the best examples. And this may be powerful and prevalent with such as are given to Change and affect novelty. Yet with wise and under­standing men its of no force, because they know full well, that some form of Government, which may be good to one, may prove not to be so to another; and that changes in this kind are dangerous. For to un­settle that which is firm, for to introduce that where­of we have had no experience, may prove the ruine of a State.

T. H.

And as to rebellion in particular against Monar­chy; one of the most frequent causes is the reading of the Books of Policy and Histories of the antient Greeks and Romans, &c.

G. L.

This hath been formerly examined. The reading of these Books cannot do so much hurt, as this Le­viathan may do: For it is far more dangerous and destructive of good government, then any of their Histories, which can do no hurt to any but such as are ignorant and ill-disposed. In those Books they may read of Kings and Emperours, and of Monar­chies [Page 136]as well as free-States; and few are so void of un­derstanding, but that they well know they are bound to their own form of Government, and are not to covet every model they read of. Such men as he do shamefully debase free-States, as forms unlawful in themselves, and so flatter limited Princes, as though they were absolute Lords, and advance Monarchy so high, as though it were the only form of Govern­ment, so instituted by God and commanded; that all Nations were bound unto it, and whosoever doth not bow unto it, is a rebel against God. Yet he never instituted immediately any Common-wealth but one, and that was a free-State; and when a King was de­sired, he was offended, and under a regal govern­ment it came to ruine. Whereas he thinks these Books do teach Regicide and killing of Kings, he is much mistaken. For subjects to murther their law­ful Soveraigns, is an horrid crime, and so much the more to be detested, if done under the name of Ty­rannicide. To plead for Tyrants really such as such, is to be abhorred. They pervert the very end of all government, abuse their power, act contrary to the Laws of God and men, to the ruine of the State, are enemies of mankind, the chiefest agents for the De­vil. The Question is, Whether a people having power in their hands, may not restrain, or remove, or put to death such men, as being guilty of many crimes, which the Laws of God have made universally ca­pital, so that no man in the world can plead exem­ption? Some think that they are to be left to God, and subjects must seek deliverance by prayers and tears; and the truth is, Christians as Christians, have no other remedy: others conceive, they may be re­strained, [Page 137]and that by force, and their own subjects do it: Others give this power only unto Magistrates, or to such as share with them in the supreme power: Others are of a mind, that seeing they cease to be Kings or Soveraigns, they may be lawful­ly tryed, and put to death, as well as private men; and that without any ordinary jurisdiction: Others determine this to be lawful in such States as that of Lacedemon in Grece, and Arragon in Spain. What the Doctrine of the Church of Rome is, cannot be unknown. For the Pope doth arrogate an universal Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, whereby he may excom­municate any Christian King, that shall not obey his Canons and Edicts, and upon this sentence once gi­ven, he may depose him, free his subjects from their allegiance, and command them as Catholicks to rise in rebellion against him; & some of them have taught, that its a meritorious art to poyson, stab, or any other way murther Kings for the promotion of the Catholick cause. This question after the terms there­of clearly explicated, is of very great moment; and let men advise well how they do determine either in their own judgement privately, or before others.

T. H.

There be Doctors, that think, there may be more sorts (that is more Soveraigns) then one in a Com­mon-wealth; and set up a Supremacy against the Sove­raignty; Canons against Laws; and a Ghostly Au­thority, against the Civil, &c.

G. L.

There cannot be any Soveraign but one, in one and the same Common-wealth: and to set up Supre­macy against Soveraignty; Canons against Laws; Ghostly authority against Civil, must needs be a cause of division, confusion, dissolution. Yet this will not prove any inconsistency of an Ecclesiastical independent power with the Civil Soveraignty, in one and the same Community. And the distinction of the power of the keyes given by Christ unto the Church; and the power of the sword, trusted in the hands of the higher powers civil, is real, and sig­nifies some things truly different one from another, though he either cannot or will not understand it. With Mr. Hobbs indeed this distinction can signisie nothing, because he hath given unto the civil Sove­raign an infallible judgement, and an absolute power in all causes Ecclesiastical and Spiritual. His discourse may be good against those Ecclesiastical persons who have usurped civil power; otherwise its impertinent and irrational. And he must know, that it is alike difficult to prove, That the State hath the power of the keyes, as for to evince that the Church hath the power the sword. Its as great an offence for the State to encroach upon the Church, as for the Church to encroach upon the State; The Bishops of Rome have been highly guilty of the one, and many protestant Princes and States of the other. And though men will not see it, yet its clear enough, that one and the same Community is capable both of a Civil and Ecclesiastical Government at one and the [Page 139]same time: and that the Church and State are two distinct Common-wealths, the one spiritual, and the other temporal, though they consist of the same persons. And these persons, as Christians, consider­ed in a spiritual capacity, make up the Commu­nity and Common-wealth Christian, which is the Church: as they are men, having temporal estates, bodily life and liberty, they are members of the civil Community and Common-wealth. The Power, Form of Government, Administration, Laws, Jurisdicti­on, Officers of the Church are distinct and different from those of the State. The sentence of the Church is, Let him be an Heathen, or a Publican, and the exe­cution is expected from heaven according to the promise, Whatsoever you bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven; and this sentence doth take away some spiritual, but no temporal or civil right of the person judged, though the judgement be passed and made valid, both in foro interiore & exteriore. The sentence of the civil State is, Let him be fined, imprisoned, stigmatized, banished, put to death; and its execu­ted by the sword. The several members of a Church National, and the whole Church joyntly, is subject to the civil power; and the civil Soveraign, if a Christian, is subject to the Church, because as a Chri­stian, he is subject to Christ, and bonnd by his Laws. And as a civil Soveraign, he is bound to protect the Church, and he may by civil Laws ratifie the Ecclesi­astical Canons, and then they bind not only under a spiritual, but a civil penalty too. If Church-assem­blies give cause of jealousie to the Civil powers, they may regulate them, and order their proceedings; if they offend, they may punish them. Their persons, [Page 140]lives, estates, are under the sword; and if this be ta­ken from them, because they will not obey them to disobey Christ, they ought to suffer it patiently for Christs sake. In this case the Church may pray and weep, resist and rebel they may not; for Christians as Christians, have no power of the sword against any man, not their own members, much less against the civil Soveraign; whom if they resist, they must do it under another notion, or else they transgress, and can have no excuse. And here it is to be observed,

• 1. That Christ gathered Disciples, instituted Church­discipline, made Laws, and the Apostles executed them in making Officers, Acts cap. 1. & 16. made Laws, cap. 15. passed sentence and executed the same, 1 Cor. 5. and all this without any Commission from any civil Soveraign. Therefore its not true which some learned Divines have affirmed, That the State and Church are one body, endued with two powers or faculties; for they are two distinct bodies Politick. Its true, that if, as some conceive, there were no power but coactive of the sword, then they must needs be one body. But there is another power, as you heard before.
• 2. If a King become Christian, by this he acquires no power, not the least, more then he had before: and if he be Heathen or Mahome­tan, and all his subjects become Christian, he loseth not one jot of his former civil power, which they are bound to submit unto by the very Laws of Christi­anity. If he command any thing contrary to the Laws of Christ, they may and must disobey, but de­ny his power, they may not, they must not. In this case a Christian may be perplexed between the Devil and a Goaler, as some of Scotland were said to be, [Page 141]when if they obeyed the Parliament, and joyned with Duke Hamilton to invade England, the Kirk ex­communicate them, and deliver them up to Satan; if they obeyed the Church prohibiting them, they were cast in prison by the State. The cause of this perplexity is not from this, that the Church and State are two distinct Common-wealths, but because the commands of the one or both may be unjust.

T. H.

Some make the power of levying money depend upon a general assembly; of conduct and command upon one man; of making Laws upon the accidental consent of three. Such government is no government, but a divi­sion of the Common-wealth into three independent fa­ctions, &c.

G. L.

Here again he hath made the Parliament, which is the bulwark of, and best remedy for to preserve our liberty, a disease; and hath turned the King, Peers and Commons into three independent factions; and this Government, he saith, some call a mixt Mo­narchy. Whether there can be a mixt State, is a que­stion in Politicks; yet if we understand what mixture is, and could determine, whether this mixture be in the supreme power as fixed in the Constitution, or exercised in the Administration, we might more ea­sily satisfie our selves. But this hath not been exactly done. For its probable, that in the exercise of the supreme power, in the three acts of Legislation, [Page 142]Judgement, Execution, there might be a mixture, and these brought to a just and regular temperament. But a mixt Monarchy in proper sense there cannot be. Yet a limited and well-poised Monarch there may be. To place the power Legislative, which in­cludes all the rest, in three co-ordinate parties, grant­ing to every one of them severally a negative, to me seems irrational; for it may easily turn them who should be one, into three factions, as here it is affirm­ed: at least it will retard all businesses, which for for dispatch, require secrecy and expedition. But to place the universal power originally in the general assembly without any negative; the judicial in the Lords, and the executive in the King, seems to be far more agreeable to the rules of reason. This some think was our untient Constitution, and the same ex­cellent.

Difficulty of raising moneys necessary for the de­fence and preservation of the State, monopolies, popu­larity in a subject, are diseases which much weaken a State; there is no doubt of this. That one City should in gross the wealth and strength of a Nation, and be so rich and populous as to be able to set forth a potent Army, and maintain it, may be judged very dangerous to a Common-wealth, as Mr. Hobbs in­forms us. By this City in particular, he means Lon­don, which, as some tell us, furnished the Parliament with men and moneys, whereby the King was van­quished and over-thrown. Yet they seldom did assist the Parliament but upon high terms, and advantagi­ous to themselves; in so much as their Petitions were Commands unto the Parliament, which did depend more upon the City, then the City upon them, by [Page 143]which means they might in time engross the whole power, and so rule the Nation. Yet an army of their own did break their strength, and reduce them unto their own terms: and its clear, that City depends much upon the River, both for fuel, merchandize and provision, and by a wise provident counsel may be ea­sily kept in order. And this might the more easily be done, because the Citizens have so many several inte­rests, and the same inconsistent amongst themselves, as that they can hardly be united.

After all these diseases from within, which weaken and may dissolve a Government, he informs of a destructive cause, and that is a forreign or intestine war, wherein the enemy obtains a final victory, so that the Soveraign cannot protect his subjects in their loyalty. This indeed may cut off a line, change the Governors, and alter the form of Government. Yet in all this, the Community may continue, and never be like a subject matter without any form, but the Government may be the same, and the Gover­nors only altered; nay the Constitution may stand firm, and the Administration only varied: or if the the form be changed, yet the privation of the form­er is an introduction of the latter. Here its confes­sed, that when the power of protection faileth in the Soveraign, obligation in the subject is taken away. But he starts a question, though with him no que­stion, whether the right of a Soveraign Monarch can be extinguished by the act of another? He saith it cannot. Yet experience tells us, it may. For a con­quered Monarch, fallen into the power of another, ceaseth to be a Soveraign, and this is by the act of another. And again, if God by another take away [Page 144]his sword, though his person escape, and be at liberty, he hath but the name, and not the thing or real title. If his subjects freed from obligation, because he can give no protection, do submit themselves un­to another, his right is lost. If his life be taken away, and his line cut off, all right is extinct, and in all these cases by the act of another; yet he thinks, that if the power of an assembly be suppressed, their right is extinct. The assembly in an Aristocracy, or De­mocracy, for such he means, may be extraordinary, or ordinary; and the same the immediate subject of the supreme power, or only trusted for a time with the administration and exercise thereof: and the power of an assembly may be suppressed for a time, and so only suspended, the assembly remaining still. Except he let us know what kind of assembly he un­derstands, and what kind of suppression of power he means, he doth nothing. An assembly whose power depends upon a certain place, time, number, may lose their right, if once they be scattered or de­fective in that circumstance.

ITs very expedient for those, whom it concerns, to know what Majesty is, and what be the several rights thereof, as also that in every State it be fixed in a certain subject, person or persons, that every one may know whom to obey and subject himself unto; yet the principal thing is for Soveraigns to exercise their power in the administration of the Common­wealth according to the rules of Wisdom and Justice, without which the best constitution in the world is in vain.

It might be worth the while to examine what the Author hath delivered concerning the office of a So­veraign Representative, if he had informed us in this point of any thing formerly unknown or more ex­cellent, then we read in other Writers. But he is so far from having done any such thing, that he comes much short of others. The duties of all Civil Go­vernors are most exactly taught in the Scriptures, which if this man had followed, he might have gi­ven Princes far more, and more excellent instructions.

In this Chapter we find little but what we heard before; for it consists chiefly in the repetition of his former rules, and his method is not exact. He pre­sumes much of his own knowledge above others, and conceits he hath given us a better model of Govern­ment then ever any had before; and so much he ad­mires his own rules, that he thinks them worthy to be [Page 146]taught in the Universities, and taictly decries all for­mer Politicks, and undertakes to prove his dictates out of Scripture, which he can never do.

Many of his Rules I confess are good, but most of them are such as are very ordinary and common­ly known. But in those points wherein he is singu­lar, he can hardly be excused from error. His first and chiefest care after the good of the people, is, to preserve the absolute power of Rulers, which he as­serts to be their due; and lest they should lose any of them, he renews his Catalogue of them again. These must be taught the people, that they may know themselves to be absolute slaves. And Princes must take heed of tranferring any of their Soveraign Rights unto another. But this was needless; for they have a desire of power before they do obtain it: and after they are once possessed of it, they not only keep that which is due, but also usurp far more then either God or man hath given them. Kings, who are but trusted with a limited power, endeavour to make themselves absolute Lords; and Despotical Sove­raigns must be petty Dieties. The best Princes had always a greater care to exercise their power well, then to enlarge it. And by their Wisdom and Justice have governed more happily then any of these absolute Soveraigns, who desire rather to be great then good, and themselves more honourable then the people happy.

The Errours of this Author, vented in this part, as that Soveraign power Civil is absolute; A civil Law against Rebellion is no Obligation; A good Law is not a just Law, because no Law can be unjust. All his Rules of Government may be proved out of [Page 147]Scripture and other such like, I will not here examine, because some of them are ridiculous; some of them have been formerly answered: and his proof of these in his next part shall be discussed.

THis Chapter is the conclusion of the second part, the Leviathan, and makes way for the third following. The principal subject hereof is the Laws of nature as distinct to laws supernatural. For he truly and wisely makes God the King and Law-giver both in the Kingdom of God by nature, and above nature. That God is the universal King by nature, he seems to prove out of the Scripture.

T. H.

God is King, let the earth rejoyce, saith the Psalmist, Psal. 96.1. And again, God is King, though the nati­ons be angry, and he that sitteth upon the Cherubins, though the earth be moved, Psal. 98.1. Whether men will or not, they must be subject always to the Di­vine Power.

G. L.

In the Allegation of these two places he seems to follow the vulgar Latine and the Septuagint both for the number of the Psalms and the Translation. [Page 148]For with us they are the words of the first verses of the 97. and 99. Psalms, and are turned in another manner. The translations though seemingly differ­ent may agree in the substance. And its agreed on all hands, that the Psalmist speaks of the Kingdom of God; yet seeing there is a kingdom of God as Cre­ator, and a kingdom of God as Redeemer; it may be a question whether his kingdom in general be here meant, or one of the former particular kingdoms. Both ancient and Modern Divines for the most part understand both the Psalms of the kingdom of Christ, and which is more, the Apostle, Heb. 1.6. so expounds the former Psalm, which agrees with Psal. 2. which speaks to the same purpose, and undoubtedly intends the Kingdom of Christ. The Kingdom and Govern­ment of God is most properly so called in respect of Angels and men, as onely capable of Laws, Punish­ments and Rewards, no rational man will deny, yet he by his wisdom doth direct and order all creatures.

T. H.

God declareth his Laws three ways: By natural rea­son, Revelation, and Prophecy. From the difference of the natural and Prophetick Word of God, there may be at­tributed to God a two-fold Kingdom, Natural and Pro­phetick, &c.

G. L.

In the rest of this Chapter we may observe three things.

• 1. The manner how God declares his Laws.
• 2. The distinction of his Kingdom.
• 3. The ground of his Dominion.

1. God doth manifest himself both [Page 149]to Angels and men two wayes; by his Works and his Word. By his works in the Creation and Provi­dence. By his word immediately by Revelation, mediately by Prophesie. In the latter he maketh use of man to speak to man, the same thing he hath spo­ken to man by Revelation: and the word of prophe­sie to man is the word of Revelation from God: and the matter of both is the same. The word of Crea­tion and Providence is received by natural reason; the word of Revelation seems to be apprehended by reason supernaturally elevated and illuminated.

The Kingdom of God is natural, or supernatural, according to the natural or supernatural Laws. The first Kingdom by the rules and dictates of natural reason directs man unto a temporal peace and pro­sperity on Earth: The second by the Laws of Reve­lation orders him to a supernatural and eternal peace and felicity to be enjoyed fully in Heaven. For the former end all civil Policies were instituted: For the second the polity spiritual of the Church. The de­claration of the Laws of Gods Kingdom by nature were universally always declared even to all nations; the Laws of his supernatural Kingdom were revealed universally at the first in the times of Adam, and af­ter in the dayes of Noah. But after a general Apo­stacy, Israel was trusted with the Oracles of life un­till the exhibition of the Messias: and after his Re­surrection the Apostles received a Commission to teach all Nations, and make these Laws known more generally. So that this Author doth bewray his ig­norance in divinity; and pretending to the know­ledge of the Scripture, he little understands them, and much abuseth those heavenly Writings. For the [Page 150]Kingdom of God by Prophesie was in all times, and confined in a more special manner for a time unto the people of Israel for a special reason. And at the first election of them after their deliverance from the Egyptial bondage, he immediately instituted not onely their spiritual but their civil Government. In which respect their civil government might be cal­led in a peculiar manner the Kingdom and Common­wealth of God: and so the government of no Nation in the world could be accounted.

T. H.

The right of Gods soveraignty is not derived from Creation, but from his irresistible Power.

G. L.

This is his great ignorance to think that Gods Soveraignty should be derived from the executive power of force and strength of his Godhead. For Dominion in general is twofold: Possessionis ant re­giminis, of possession or government. That of pos­session we call propriety: in which respect God is absolute Lord of all his creatures, because he createth and preserveth them, so that their very being is more his then theirs. But his soveraign power over man ariseth not onely from propriety in general, but from Gods propriety in him as a rational, intellectual crea­ture, ordinable to an higher end then the inanimate and irrational creature is capable of. For God crea­ted and preserved him a rational creature; and both as a creature and as rational he is wholly his. As he [Page 151]is rational, he is capable of Laws, Rewards, Punish­ments, and hath a power to become Gods subject by voluntary submission and donation of himself, and also to obey his Lord and Maker. This no irra­tional being hath or can have. So that Gods Do­minion over man ariseth from Gods propriety in man as a rational being, and from the voluntary sub­mission of man as a rational creature unto his God who made him such. Gods propriety in man is de­rived from creation and preservation; and both these were not onely from Gods power, as Mr. Hobs ima­gineth, but also from his Understanding and Will. For God by his wisdom made the world as well as by his power, and worketh all things according to the Counsel of his Will. Dominion of government is not onely from power, nor by power alone; for un­derstanding, will and power, must all concur to Government. Therefore how absurd is that asserti­on of his which followeth, If there had been any man of irresistible power, there had been no reason why by that power he should not have ruled. If this were true, a Leviathan, a Dragon, an Elephant hath more power then man; and why should not brutes being stronger rule over men who are weaker? By this rule the strongest man in a Kingdom should be King: and he that hath the strength of Goliah or Sampson, should rule over others, though they have strength without wisdom and integrity.

T. H.

The Kingdom over men, and the right of afflicting them at his pleasure, belongeth naturally to God Al­mighty; [Page 152]not as Creatour and gracious, but as omnipotent.

G. L.

Obedience is due to God not meerly as gratitude to a benefactor, but as a duty unto him as a Law­giver. For as a Creatour he may have a right to command, because by Creation he hath an absolute propriety in his being, which is such as he is capable of a Law. And Creation is not to be considered as any kind of benefit, but such a benefit as his ra­tional being was wholly derived from it, and also wholly and perpetually depends upon his preserva­tion, and his eternal happiness upon his legislation and judgement. And though he may afflict at plea­sure as omnipotent, because as such he can do it, yet he never afflicted any but as a legislatour and Judge, according to his just Laws. Because God is omni­potent he can afflict, but it doth not hence follow that he will afflict. But he instanceth in Job, and the man born blind, both afflicted by God as omnipo­tent: yet Job was upright indeed, but not altoge­ther innocent: and though God did manifest unto him his glorious Majesty and Almighty power in his great works, yet this was not done to shew him the cause why God did afflict Job, but to humble him. And being humbled, he did not plead his integrity, but repented of his infirmity in dust and ashes. For though he was no hypocrite, yet he was a sinner, Job 42.6. And though the blind man, John 9. was born blind, as we might justly be, yet he was con­ceived and born in sin as we are. But neither he nor [Page 153]his parents were guilty of any such notorious crime, as God doth usually recompence with exemplary punishment even in this life.

T. H.

Honour consisteth in the inward thought and opinion of the power and goodness of another; and therefore to honour God is to think as highly of his power and goodness as is possible. And of that opinion, the ex­ternal signs in words and actions of men are called worship.

G. L.

This is the first Law of Gods Kingdom by na­ture in respect of God, that he is to be worshipped. Worship is sometimes an act of the soul terminated upon his Divine excellency and dignity: its called Reverence, and sometimes Adoration. Sometimes its an act terminated upon his supreme and universal Power: And so it is submission to him as Supreme Lord and Law-giver. Sometime for obedience: and in this respect even the performance of our duty to our neighbours, as done in obedience to him as our supreme Lord, is an act of worship. And all acts of the soul terminated upon the Deity immediately are called worship. The worship of Reverence and Ado­ration is given unto God as most glorious and ex­cellent in himself, yet so manifested and apprehended. The worship of submission and obedience is given and ascribed to him as Supreme Lord; and the ob­ject of worship is some excellency apprehended [Page 154]in the party worshipped: And because the excellen­cy of the Deity is Infinite and Eternal, therefore the highest degree of worship is due unto him: even to the annihilation of our selves, the resign­ing of our very being wholly unto him, and the emptying of our selves into the Ocean of his most blessed Being. God deserves and is worthy of all honour, glory and worship as excellent in himself. They may justly be required of the creature as depending solely and wholly upon him as Lord Crea­tor, Preserver. And the creature is bound to wor­ship him by vertue of his Law and Covenant. By performance of this dutie we are capable of Eter­nal bliss in and from him: and by his promise we come to have a right unto Eternal life.

The Excellency of God is his most perfect and blessed Essence, which cannot be known by man as it is in it self; yet its manifested to us by several di­stinct attributes, whereof some may be known by the light of Reason in some measure, but more per­fectly by the Revelation of the Scriptures. These At­tributes are many and distinct, and so given to God by himself: because by one act of Reason we cannot conceive of or understand his Essence; which is but one in it self, but represented to us as different and many, and so apprehended. And by our faith we believe the Divine perfections to be far greater then our Reason can apprehend them to be. They are in himself one infinite being, manifested by his works, and more fully by his Word. And our worship must ascend above our Reason, and must be performed ac­cording to our faith, which is a divine and superna­tural light. For the distinct knowledge of this wor­ship, [Page 155]with the several acts thereof, and the several names, we must not follow the Schoolmen, but search into the Scripture, & diligently observe the use of the words, as they are there applied to signifie the same.

How far Mr. Hobs is from the true understanding of worship in general, and of the worship of God in particular, may easily appear from this, that he makes worship to be nothing else but the outward signification by words and actions of internal ho­nour; which with him is nothing else but the inward thought and opinion of the power and goodness of another. But neither is worship nor honour any such thing as he hath defined them. And his dis­course of worship with the distinctions will be found very poor upon examination, except we allow him a soveraign power over words to impose what signification upon them he pleaseth, and the same different from that wherein they are used in Classical Authors.

Thus he hath finished his Politicks, set forth un­der the name of Leviathan in the Frontispiece: And though many have in this kind of learning far excel­led him: yet he thinks it clear and the best, and most rational, though it neither agree with reason or Reli­gion. And though his hope is not much, yet some hope he hath some Soveraign may put it in pra­ctice. If they have no better directions, they may make use of his principles, as some have done to their ruine. Princes and Ministers of State have no need to be taught them: for they know them too well and follow them too much.

MR. Hobbs in the former part seemed to have some use of his Reason; but in this he is like un­to such as are lunatick, though now and then he hath his Lucida Intervalla. And whether he hath done thus out of ignorance or design, I know not; but this I know that he is deeply guilty of Errour and pre­sumption. He hath taught us little that is good and solid; much which is dangerous and damnable. The judicious Reader (if any such will vouchsafe to read him) will reject and that with scorn and indig­nation, many things in the Book; but some simple giddy fools, especially in these Lunatick times, may be taken with his fooleries, and blasphemies. His design is to take all power from the Church, De­throne Christ, and confer all spiritual power in matters of Religion upon the civil Soveraign, and this directly contrary to express Scripture. He hath turned the Pope out of his infallible Chair, and transformed soveraign civil Princes and Rulers into Popes; and to them in highest points, which concern out eternal salvation, we must captivate our judge­ment. It seems to be a fault to spend any time in an­swering him, and for the same I may be censured, either as a fool, or as one ill-imployed; yet because his doctrine, though it can do no good, yet may do hurt, and that to many, I will, yet but briefly, say something to him.

The very Title of this part is ambiguous, and as he here understands it uncouth. For he determines the subject to be a Christian-Common-wealth, and in that sense as not any other hath taken it. For a Chri­stian-Common-wealth is either a Government of Christians as Christians, and that is called the Church, either as universally considered subject unto Christ her Lord and King, or as it is divided into several particular associations under some form of Disci­pline; and Christian its called most usually, as believ­ing and professing the faith of Christ exhibited: or else its a Common-wealth civil which hath publike­ly received and acknowledged the Christian Faith. Neither of these wayes doth he understand it. For with him a Christian Common-wealth is such a State wherein the people depend upon and must absolute­ly submit unto the soveraign civil professing himself a Christian, as infallible in all matters of Doctrine, Worship, Discipline: and he derives the Authority of the Canon of the Scripture from him: yet neither Reason nor Scripture ever taught him any such Doctrine. But let us hear what he professeth, for thus we read in him.

T. H.

And this Scripture it is out of which I am to take the principles of my Discourse concerning the rights concerning those who are the supreme Governours on earth of Christian-Common-wealths, and of the du­ty of Christian subjects towards their Soveraigns.

This is the substance as it is the Conclusion of his first Chapter. The Rule of all discourse that is true, must be the Word of God either natural or prophe­tick as he expresseth himself. The prophetick word we Christians do affirm to be contained in the Scriptures, which once granted to be the word of God written, must of necessity be believed as infal­libly true by a natural principle. That God is true and truth it self, not accidentally but Essentially; That the Prophets and Apostles knew them immedi­ately to be the word of God, he seems to confess. But how we know them to be so is a question. The signs or Rules to know a true Prophet from a false, he hath assigned to be two.

• 1. The matter of the Revelation.
• 2. The miracles done for confirmation.

But of this in the former part that which is sufficient hath been said. By Scripture we understand the word of God written: to be written is but an adjunct to the word of God, which is the word of God, and may be so though never written; yet it pleased God to cause it to be written, that it might be preserved more pure and entire and be continued as a lasting Monument and record in the Church: and as he directed the Pro­phets and Apostles in the speaking of it to be infal­lible, so he likewise made them infallible in the writ­ing. Words and writings are but signs of that which God revealed, they understood, declared; and that by us being truly understood and rightly applyed according to the intention of the Revelation ought to be our Rule. But if this be misunderstood and [Page 159]misapplyed as by this Author they are, they cannot direct us, mislead us they may.

And here we must distinguish between the entire Canon of the Scripture, and the principal and in­tended matter therein contained as necessary to sal­vation. The Canon is so many ways and so strong­ly confirmed, that no other Book in the world can be in this respect parrallel with it, and it were irra­tional to reject it. The books of this Canon are usually distinguished into three kinds; Historical, Prophetical, Doctrinal. In the Historical part, that which may seem to be most incredible, is far more credible then many things commonly and generally believed in all Religions, and upon far less probable grounds; This the Ancient Fathers and Divines have made evident against the greatest Schollars of the world, who did except against these Books. And in particular Cyril against Julian. The Prophetical hath been proved in a great part by God himself to the least particulars fulfilling what he hath foretold. The Doctrinal part is either Moral or Positive: Mo­rals few rational men do question, because they have some affinity with the internal Principles of natural Reason. The Positives are such as Reason cannot reach, and therefore required at the first publication at least some extraordinary confirmation, that Rea­son might be certain they were revealed by God: These Positives are, that the Son of God was incar­nate, that he by the sacrifice of his body and death upon the Cross did expiate the sin of man: That he rose from the dead, ascended into Heaven; sits at the right hand of God, and Reigns in Heaven and Earth; shall come to judge both quick and dead, &c. [Page 160]The Signs and Wonders done by the Apostles, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and Gods powerful working of the Spirit upon the souls of men upon the preaching, hearing and receiving of these Po­sitives, did sufficiently testifie they were from Hea­ven. For in confirmation of the Positives, not the Morals, these things were done by God. The mat­ter of them is such, as that though no Reason can prove, yet no Reason can contradict justly, be­cause there is nothing in them contrary to the prin­ciples of pure Reason. They are proposed unto us with such credit, and urged upon us as matters of greatest concernment in the world, in so much that he cannot be rational that shall refuse either to give assent unto them, or make trial of them with the sincere heart: which once done, he shall find by reall effects in the heart, not only that God did reveal them as he believed before by an acquired faith, but have an intuitive knowledge that they are Gods testimony, because he who spake by the Scriptures and the Ministers, hath spoken to him immediately by his spirit working in his heart: and then Reason is satisfied and convinced that God hath spoken, and thereupon ceaseth to deny, and oppose, and yields a firm assent. And to conclude this point, whereof [...] had formerly spoken, if we will but consider what kind of men have questioned or opposed the divinity of the Scripture, we shall find it in that very thing to be much honoured [...] and the reason why men do not believe them, is not onely the imperfection but the corruption of Reason and mans will. For most men love darkness rather then the light: and the Doctrine of the Cross of Christ as it declares a deep [Page 161]design of Gods Eternal Wisdom, so its directly contrary to our false notions and base lusts. And this is a plain reason why an acquired faith cannot be sufficient to save any man without the powerful sanctification of the Spirit, both to prepare the heart and work a Divine Faith, which can never take kindly in an heart that is not prepared. These Scrip­tures he pretends to make the rule of his ensuing dis­course, yet its but a bare pretence; for he followes his own fancies and false notions, not the sense and genu­ine mind of God in them. He doth not re ferre sed ferre sensum, as grave Hilary saith. He doth not conform his notions to the Scripture, but wrests it, and makes it to speak that which God never intended.

SEeing he had made the Scripture to be his Rule, he thought good to say something of the Scrip­ture in general. And

• 1. Of the number of the Books; and seeing herein he follows the Church of England, which followed the Ancient Canon: I agree with with him in this, as I have no reason to the con­trary; neither will I debate with him in the second point of Antiquity. Its the most Ancient writing in the world, and the doctrine more ancient then the writing. And its remarkable that though it con­tain the History of 4000. years, yet it was written [Page 162]within the space of 2000.
• 2. That all the Writers of it, if Luke be not excepted, were of the seed of Abra­ham by Jacob, and of no other Nation, all of them according to the flesh kinsmen to our Saviour Christ.
• 3. That the Prophetical part reacheth the end, as the Historical did the beginning of the world, and this no other book in the world doth.
• 4. That nei­ther Jews nor Mahumetans have any thing good, just, and rational, but that which is contained in these books, and retained by them.
• 5. That these Scriptures are found translated into the languages of the most, if not all civil Nations of the world.

The scope of these writings is to direct sinful man unto eternal life. And because this eternal life is vir­tually in God and issues from him as the Fountain and Author thereof, therefore in the same is revea­led the Eternal, Infinite, glorious perfection of God in himself, and also his glorious works of Creation and Preservation, his supreme and universal Domini­on, his Laws and Judgements and special government of man. And because man as sinful and guilty, is no ways capable of eternal life in strict justice, there­fore the Scripture directs him to God as Redeemer in Jesus Christ, that by the observation of the Laws of Redemption he may be for ever blessed. Christ our Lord Redeemer is the principal subject of that Book of books: For Moses and all the Prophets speak of him as well as the writers of the New Te­stament, though not so clearly; and the doctrine of his Laws takes up the greatest part of that Revela­tion, though many other things are therein decla­red yet in reference unto the principal subject and End. In a word, the end of the Scripture is to teach [Page 163]us to believe and obey God the Father, Son, and Ho­ly Ghost, Creating, Redeeming, and Sanctifying us: if it speak of civil Kingdoms, Laws and judge­ments, its upon the by, with reference to the eternal spiritual Kingdom of God Redeemer and Sanctifier: This end and scope is both obscurely and confused­ly declared by the Author, as will more appear here­after.

The Authority of the Scripture is Divine; and so perfect, that it cannot be improved or impaired by all the Laws of all the civil Soveraigns of the world: Neither can the Angels in Heaven add any degree of Authority unto it; but if any of them should (as they cannot) contradict it, they are by the divine Apostle declared to be accursed. That any person or persons do not apprehend it to be Divine, thats accidental, and cannot prejudice it. There­fore how vain, and false is that of Mr. Hobs, when he gives the supreme power of making it to be Law, and interpreting the same so made, unto the Civil Soveraignss? There is a two-fold Law; the one is Divine, and binds the conscience immediate­ly: the other is humane and Civil, and cannot bind the conscience, but per accidens. The Doctrine of the Scripture not onely in Morals but in Posi­tives is Divine; and the precepts thereof, as being the precepts of God do bind the conscience im­mediately: The Laws of Civil Soveraigns may bind their subjects upon peril of civil and tempo­ral punishment to receive them as authentick. But Laws they are and binding to obedience and belief, though there were no civil government in the world. The State and Church may declare them [Page 164]to be Divine, but no wayes make them to be such. And as our Saviour said of his Doctrine, so its true of all the Scripture, that if any man will do the will of God declared therein, he shall know it to be of God. Its not so much the imperfection of our understanding, or the difficulty of the thing to be understood, as our disobedience which is the cause why we do not see the divinity of these bles­sed Books. These things being so, how absurdly and falsly hath he stated the Question concerning the Authority of the Scripture, so as to make it depend either upon the civil Soveraign in his Territory or upon the Pope? For thus he writes, The Question of the Authority of the Scripture is reduced to this, Whether Christian Kings and the Soveraign Assem­blies in Christian Common-wealths, be absolute in their own territories, immediately under God, or subject to one Vicar of Christ, &c. Whereas neither civil Soveraigns nor Popes can make the Scripture to be Law: but all Christians are bound to believe the Scriptures to be the Law of God upon better grounds then civil laws or Ecclesiastical Canon; or else they cannot be saved by them.

A Great part of his discourse in this division of his Book, is spent in the explication of certain words and terms much used in the Scriptures; and as he informs us, the reason of this labour is, to take away the ambiguity of the words, that his inferen­ces from them may be more clear and distinct. Yet he hath done it in that manner that he hath pervert­ed the genuine sense of Gods Word, and so much as in him was, made it more obscure, and which is worse, hath falsifyed the same. These terms have been examined and explained far better by more learned men, which I desire the ignorant to consult and advise with, least they be seduced from the truth; For Mr. Hobbs in this particular work, as in others, is not to be trusted. But let us hear him.

T. H.

Substance and body signifie the same thing, and therefore [substance incorporeal] when they are joyned together, destroy one another, as if a man should say, an incorporeal body.

G. L.

The signification of words, whereby we signifie our minds to others, is of great consequence; and without the distinct knowledge of the several signi­fications of one and the same words, we can neither understand the Scriptures, nor any other rational Author. This signification of words is either proper and Grammatical, or Tropical and Rhetorical. Of some words we have lost the proper sense, and there­fore must understand them according as they are most usually taken in the best Authors. These words [Body, and Substance] wherewith he begins his Scripture-Lexicon, are sometimes taken in the same sense to signifie the same thing, yet neither proper­ly, nor most usually. We find some of the antient Divines affirming Angels to be bodies and bodily creatures; yet by body they meant substance, and yet did acknowledge them to be Spirits. And for my part, I cannot be perswaded that either Angels or souls rational are pure forms, as some, nay many Peripateticks do affirm. Yet they may be spirits, and this nature better expressed by the word [Spirits] then the word [Bodies.] And the vanity and pre­sumption of this man is very much, who would per­swade us, that [incorporeal substance] is a contra­diction. Some have observed, that the word [Guf] in Arabick and Rabbinical Authors, signifies,

• 1. A body.
• 2. A person.
• 3. The substance or principal of a thing; yet no rational man, will hence conclude, that body and substance are the same.

The next word he undertakes to explain is [Spi­rit] of which he saith.

T. H.

That the proper signification of Spirit in common speech, is either a subtile, fluid, invisible body, or a Ghost, or other idol or phantasm of the imagination, But for Metaphorical significations there be ma­ny, &c.

G. L.

One word hath but one proper signification, ac­cording to the first imposition: therefore its not true, that there be three proper significations of this word: and as for the improper, there may be and are many, and the same not only Metaphorical, but Metonymical, Ironical and Synechdochical. Yet he hath observed seven distinct senses of the word [Spirit] in the Scripture. But he fearfully abuseth some of those places alledged by him, doth not reach the multitude of the significations of the same in that holy Book, much less doth he reduce them into any Grammatical, Rhetorical or Natural method. If any man will but search the Scriptures, he shall find the word [Spirit] therein to signifie above twenty several things. The original Concordances will make this apparent to an intelligent Reader, if he look but in the word [Ruach], which the Septua­gint express and turn by 14. several Greek words, the first whereof is [ [...], Spirit] which is used by them most frequently by far, yet so as that by [Page 168]that one word they signifie many things. And this word [ [...], Spiritus] we find in the New Testament about 360. times, and in many places is very differently taken. The Latine use the word [Spiritus] in 15. several senses at least. By which it doth appear that this part of the Chapter cannot be read by Schollars but with disdain and scorn: and especially when he writes;

T. H.

Other significations of [Spirt] I find nowhere any; and where none of these can satisfie the sense of the word in Scripture, the place falleth not under humane understanding, &c as where God is said to be a Spi­rit.

G. L.

He had said, that sometime the word is taken for the disposition or inclination of the mind, and then infers these words; when he doth not tell us whe­ther these be proper significations usual in common speech, as the three former were, or they be Meta­phorical. If he mean, that besides the three proper and these two, he finds none, his observation and so his learning in this kind is very poor. But whereas he will not have the place of Scripture, where its used in another sense, to fall under our understand­ing, he is absurd. For the place, where its said by our Saviour, that God is a [Spirit] may be, and is understood, though we have no demonstrative or intuitive knowledge of the Deity in it self. There is a [Page 169]great difference between a word and the thing signi­fied by the word. The word may be perfectly un­derstood though the thing be not: and we may know something of the thing by some measure of knowledge, though we do not perfectly know it with the most perfect knowledge. Christ by these words did teach us something; and if he did, how can it be said that the place falleth not under our under­standing? For there is nothing teachable, which is not intelligible. And by that place we may easily un­derstand that God is a far more perfect and excellent substance or being, then any inanimate or irrational body can possibly be. The next term to be explain­ed, is that of Angel, whereof he saith.

T. H.

There is no place in the Old Testament, or New, from whence we can conclude that Angels are any thing permanent and incorporeal, or created, or any thing but an extraordinary manifestation of Gods power, especi­ally by dream or vision: and the Angel Gabriel was nothing but a supernatural phantasm. Yet from my feeble understanding, was by the plain texts of the New Testament extorted an acknowledgement and belief, that there be Angels substantial and permanent.

G. L.

Much to this purpose in this part of the Chapter we may read. And in this particular he most woful­ly perverts several texts of Scripture, eludes the plain sense, confutes his own belief, and is in effect a Saddu­cean. [Page 170]To let him and others see his vanity and impie­ty, I will produce one place out of the New Testa­ment, where its written, Let all the Angels of God worship him; And of the Angels he saith. He maketh his Angels Spirits, and his Ministers a flame of fire, Heb. 1.6, 7. where we may observe,

• 1. That An­gels are persons, and so permanent substances; for else how could they worship the Son of God incar­nate? How could they be capable of this command?
• 2. They were Spirits and spiritual substances.
• 3. They were made and created.
• 4. All these words are cited out of the Old Testament; the first out of Psalm 97.7. The second place out of Psal. 104.4. And both the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Psalms are declared to be Canonical, and that by the Church of England, to which he submits himself. This is suffici­ent to discover his ignorance and damnable errours in this particular, and to admonish all such as are ta­ken with him, and esteem him, to beware of him, and in no wise to trust him.

T. H.

Inspiration properly is the blowing into a man some thin and subtile air or wind, &c. or if spirits be not corporeal, but have their existence only in the fancy, it is nothing but the blowing in of some phantasm. For Scri­pture to be inspired or given by inspiration from God, is the inclining of the minds of those men to write, &c. For the holy men of God to speak as they were moved by the holy Spirit, is for these men to receive the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural: For the holy Spirit is nothing else, its not inspiration, &c.

G. L.

More to this purpose you may read in the close of this Chapter, where he undertakes to tell us what in­spiration and infusion are. I will not here quarrel with him about the proper or improper signification of these words, but consider how they are used, & do signifie when they are appropriate unto the spirit, which is God working some special thing in the in­tellectual or rational creature; Significant enim in­effabilem & invisibilem Dei praesentiam, operationem & productionem alicujus effectus specialis & superna­turalis, sive ordinarii sive extraordinarii. They signi­fie,

• 1. A special vertue and power of God in Angel or man.
• 2. His presence in the creation.
• 3. His spe­cial operation.
• 4. His production of some special supernatural effect, either upon the soul as under­standing, or affecting the thing understood, or as they usually speak, upon the understanding by illu­mination, or the will by some sanctification, where­by the soul or spirit is elevated above his natural pitch.

And the word [...], used by the Apostle, and translated in Latine [divinitus inspirata] and in English, [given by inspiration from God] must needs signifie more then a flat and meer inclination. For if God had not immediately by his Spirit dictat­ed unto them, what they should both speak and write, and also in both directed them infal­libly, the holy writings had not been of divine, in­fallible and unquestionable authority, as all Christians (who deserve that name) believe them for to be. Neither could they contain the Word of God, but [Page 172]only the word of man, who in ordinary things is subject unto errour. The same is also to be said of the words of another Apostle, That the holy men of God did speak as they were moved by the Spirit of God, 2 Pet. 1.21. That in this place, by [holy Spirit] should be meant the voice of God in a dream or vision supernatural, cannot be true. The holy Spirit is one thing, the voice of God another thing, vision a third thing distinct from both: and both the voice and vision may be called inspiration either actively, or else passively. For vision sometimes is an act of the party inspired, and an effect of inspirati­on, which is an invisible and wonderful manner of communicating of Gods will and counsels immedi­ately unto the intellectual creature. We are not so sottish as to understand the words [inspiration and infusion] in the Grammatical sense, as they signifie the breathing of one body upon another, or the pouring of water out of one vessel into another. For then the Holy-Ghost should be breath of a bo­dy, and water. But we do understand them Meta­phorically, as they signifie a supernatural communi­cation of gifts.

T. H.

THE Kingdom of God in the writings of Divines, especially in Sermons and Treatises of devotion, is taken most commonly for eternal felicity, and is cal­led the Kingdom of glory, or for sanctification, which is called by them the Kingdom of grace; but never for the Soveraign power of God over any subjects ac­quired by their own consent, which is the proper signifi­cation of Kingdom.

G. L.

The Kingdom of God mentioned in Scripture is threefold,

• 1. The Government of God over men in their spiritual capacity, as they are capable accor­ding to their obedience or disobedience, of an im­mortal estate of felicity or misery.
• 2. His govern­ment over them in respect of their temporallife, liber­ty, estates on earth.
• 3. His special government both Civil and Ecclesiastial over the people of Israel after their deliverance out of Egypt, until the time of the last ruine of Jerusalem, and dispersion of them into all Nations.

The first begun presently upon the fall of man, the second upon the first constitution of [Page 174]civil States; the 3 about 2000 years after the Crea­tion, and continued till the captivity of Babylon, yet did not totally expire till our blessed Saviours ascension into Heaven, and the fatal dissolution of that Policy upon the destruction of the Temple. Who­soever in reading the Scripture doth not observe these three distinct and different Kingdoms, cannot well challenge the name of a learned Divine.

These may properly be called Kingdoms, because in every one of these there is a Soveraign, subjects, Laws, Judgements, and executions. That Divines sometimes understand by the Kingdom of God, eter­nal life, which is the final estate of the subjects of his spiritual Kingdom, they cannot be blamed just­ly; for in the New Testament many times, the term is so taken: yet these exclude either Soveraign, nor subjects, nor laws, nor any thing essential or pro­per to a Kingdom; neither do they any ways by these take away or deny this three-fold difference of Gods Government. But that any of these King­doms should be acquired by the consent of the subjects, they have no reason to affirm. For God as Creatour and Preserver universal, he hath abso­lute power and dominion over mens souls, lives, li­berties, estates; as Redeemer he hath power over their immortal souls, as well as by creation and pre­servation. As he delivered Israel out of Aegypt, he acquired a special and peculiar right unto, and dominion over that people. Their consent and vo­luntary submission did add nothing to Gods power, which before was absolute and as high as could be; yet it did encrease their Obligation.

That which he afterwards affirms, That he finds [Page 175]the Kingdom of God to signifie in most places of Scripture, a Kingdom properly so named, constituted by the Votes of the people of Israel in a peculiar manner, is very false. For 1. That Kingdom of Isra­el was not constituted by the Votes of the people. 2. Suppose it had been so constituted, and the word Kingdom of God used in many places of Scripture to signifie that government, yet in the most places its never found so taken: neither can any man find it most frequently taken in that sense. For this is remarkable, that it hardly ever so signifies in the New Testament, where we have the most frequent mention of the Kingdome of God: and the King­dom of Heaven signifying the spiritual (not any temporal) Kingdome of God Redeemer by Christ.

T. H.

From the Creation, besides his natural reign over all, he had peculiar subjects, whom he commanded by a voyoc. &c. This Kingdom was continued in Noahs family; after this God made a Covenant with Abra­ham, and for memorial ordained the Sacrament of Circumcision. And this was called the Old Covenant or Testament, &c. This Covenant was afterwards renewed by Moses, &c.

G. L.

The Kingdom spiritual is two-fold: the first by the Power and Law of Creation, requiring perfect obedience, without promise of any pardon, or Re­deemer to expiate sin, if man made holy should [Page 176]transgress: but this government lasted not long, be­cause Adam did violate it: and so the second King­dom and government of God Redeemer by promise succeeded. This continued from Adam to Noah, and was renewed to Abraham with the addition of the solemn Rite of Circumcision, and the promise of the Land of Canaan. It was continued from Mo­ses to the exhibition of the Messias, yet with an espe­cial appropriation of it to the people of Israel. All this is clear out of Scripture, and received by the ge­neral consent of all the Orthodox Christians And here by the way observe,

• 1. That he makes no dif­ference between the Kingdom of strict justice ac­cording to the Law of Creation, and of that of Mer­cy in Christ according to the Law of Redemption.
• 2. That with him the Covenant and promise to Abra­ham was the Old Covenant; whereas the Apostle, Rom. 4. and Galat. 3. affirms the contrary: and makes the promise 430 years before the Law of Moses, to be altogether different from the Law.
• 3. That the Old Covenant was that between God and Israel at Mount Sinai: and the New was the Gospel; as may appear, Heb. 8. from vers. 6. unto the end.
• 4. This new Covenant of the Gospel was promised 430 years before the Law, and the Law could not make the promise of none effect. For it continued in force in the time of the Law, which was annexed unto it for certain ends till the Son of God should be incarnate.
• 5. This Kingdom is distinct from Gods special government over Israel and Ju­dah, which was subordinate unto it till the Word should be made flesh, and assume humane nature from the House of David.

Therefore Mr. Hobbs his discourse of Gods King­dom over the Jews is confused, false, and bewrays either his great ignorance, or negligence, or wicked­ness. But he begins to act the Critick, and sits as Judge to pass sentence upon the Translations of those words of Scripture, Exod. 19.5, 6. Thou shalt be a peculiar treasure above all people, and a Kingdom of Priests. For so the Hebrew expresseth the privi­ledge of this people. But he curiously distinguisheth between a peculiar treasure above all people, and a peculiar people: yet these in sense are the same; and also between a sacerdotal Kingdom, and a King­dom of Priests, or Royal Priesthood, yet these do not differ. And whereas the words are a promise of God engaging himself upon condition they will obey him; he makes them a promise of the peoples gi­ving their consent, that God shall be the Lord and Soveraign. But to whom was this promise made? onely unto the Priest, or to the Prince? No such mat­ter, but to the whole Nation, and every several per­son that shall keep the Covenant, and obey God. And this promise doth include the Covenant made with Abraham concerning Christ. by faith in whom to come this promise was fulfilled to the Saints of old; and by faith in him already come, not onely to the believing Jews, but Gentiles it was made good. And so that place of 1 Pet. 2.9. is to be understood, Which Text is not to be taken of Kings and civil Ma­gistrates, but all Christians, truly such indeed. For Christ by one offering hath perfected or consecrat­ed the sanctified for ever, Heb. 10.14. And washing us in his blood, hath made us Kings and Priests to God his Father, Rev. 1.5, 6. from that one place of [Page 178] Exod. 19.5, 6. misinterpreted by two others, one of Paul to Titus 2.14. the other of 1 Pet. 2.9. and all mis-applyed. He concludes that the Kingdom of God is a civil government over the Israelites, wherein God was King: and the high Priest after Moses his death was his sole Viceroy or Lieutenant.

After all this done, in this manner he endeavours to make his opinion good from two places Histori­cal, three Prophetical, out of the old Testament, and two others out of the New Testament. The two first are properly to be understood of the special govern­ment of God over Israel. The three Prophetical pla­ces are meant of the spiritual Kingdom of Christ, and so are the two last, which are most palpably abused. For the first of them relates the Angels words unto the blessed Virgin, signifying, that her son Jesus Christ should sit on the Throne of David, and should reign over the house of Jacob for ever, and of his King­dome there should be no end, Luke 1.32, 33. Which is meant directly of his Spiritual, Heavenly and Eter­nal Kingdom: whereof the Kingdom of David was a Type. For Christ never reigned as a temporal King over Israel according to the flesh. The second place is. Matth. 6.10. Where our Saviour amongst other things directs his Disciples to pray, Thy Kingdom come. By which Kingdom is meant the Reign of Christ Incarnate and exalted at the Right hand of God, which was then to come, but now hath con­tinued 1600 years and upward; and yet all Christi­ans pray for the continuance, encrease, and espe­cially the consummation of the same, when death the last enemy shall be destroyed, and God shall be all in all, and reign most perfectly without any [Page 179]enemy, without any opposition: Yet such is his in­tolerable boldness, that from these places thus abu­sed, he confidently concludes, that the Kingdom of God is a civil government, managed by the Chri­stian Civil Soveraigns of the world.

That Holy is the same with Publick per accidens sometimes is true. But every thing that is holy is not publick, nor every thing that is publick holy. There­fore his interpretation of the word Holy is not usu­al, and at all times very Katachrestical. For he can instance in no place, where its properly so taken, ex­cept it be wrested from the intended sense. The meaning of the words Sacred and Sacraments are known to children out of ordinary Catechisms, and therefore I forbear any further discourse concern­ing them.

T. H.

THe word of God or man may be understood some­times of the speaker; sometimes of the subject, as the book of Chronicles hath the Title Verba Die­rum, for the acts done in such times. So in the Scriptures many times the word of God is not that which is spoken by God, but concerning God, &c.

G. L.

This is the substance, though not the very words of the Author in the beginning of this Chapter: yet we may observe in Scripture according to the Heb e.v and the Greek, That Dabar [...] and [...] Raema signifie things as well as words: and that the word of God is either verbum Dei, or verbum de Deo, or both, or verbum quod est Deus. There is an usual distinction of [...] or [...]. an inward or outward word. An outward word whereby we speak to others: or an inward word whereby we speak unto our selves: This inward word is either of things, or acts out of our selves: [Page 181]or of, acts or operations in our selves, or our own being and essence. Now the word of God, which is God, is his word in himself of himself. And this term [Word] signifying the eternal Son of God and the Messias, is taken out of the Chaldee Para­phrast, as many expressions of the New Testament are: And some learned men have observed, that the Chaldee Paraphrast took that term from the Pro­phet, Esay 40.8. The word of our God shall stand for ever: as also the Title of Messias from Daniel 9.25. Of this word of God its written, John 1.1. In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God: and ver. 14. The word was made flesh. Yet if we may believe Mr. Hobbs, this word is the purpose of God: and then the sense is, the purpose of God is God; and the purpose of God was made flesh, and the purpose of God dwelt amongst us, and we saw the glory of this purpose, as of the onely begotten Son of God. This is his cursed and blasphemous gloss upon these blessed Texts of Scripture, whereupon depends so much our faith and eternal salvation.

If any man would give an accurate account of the several significations of the word of God as its used in Scripture, he ought diligently to observe how oft its used in Scripture, consider the Context and drift of those places where its read; examine the origi­nals, and find out first the Proper signification, se­condly the Tropical, and also distinguish them. The reason why we say the Scripture is the word of God written, is, 1. Because it was revealed by God, and the writers thereof were infallibly directed, And this is the most proper signification: yet secondly by [Page 182]a Metonymie its so called, because it principally speaks of God: and he is the subject of it, to which all particulars may be some ways referred or reduced. But let no man that loves the truth, hearken un­to this man, least he be seduced. For with some truths he mixeth abominable Errours.

T. H.

The name of Prophet in Scripture, signifies some­times a Prolocutor, sometimes a Predictor, &c.

G. L.

In the rest of this Chapter he informs us.

• 1. Of the several senses and significations of the word Prophet.
• 2. Of the several distinct kinds of them.
• 3. Of Rules how to try Prophets.

And his end is to make a civil soveraign Christian the supreme and infallible Judge. Prophets in Scripture are true or false, for false Prophets have the name. True are extraordinary, ordinary. Extraordinary are such as either were Penmen of the Scripture; or such only as whose Prophesies are related in Scripture. These Prophets he divides into supreme and subordinate. Yet the Prophets extraordinary, as such, can admit of no such distinctions. Amongst the supreme he reckons Moses, the high Priests, Kings. Yet the high Priests were neither supreme, nor Prophets, except very rarely.

That God did make use of the Priest with the Ʋrim and Thummim in giving his answers, did not make the Priest a Prophet in proper sense. That David and Solomon were Prophets, seems peculiar to them. That some of the Kings also called for the Priest to con­sult with God, according to the ordinary way In­stituted by God, who promised to give answer, so as he did to no people in the world, it could neither make Kings or Priests supreme. Neither did Solo­mon take the Priesthood from Abiathar, but for his treason suspended him ab offi io. That the Christian Soveraign should now be the supreme Prophet, in whose Judgement all their subjects must acquiesce, is to be derided and rejected as a thing which nei­ther can be proved or approved.

SOmething he hath taught his Reader, that had not learned so much before, concerning the na­ture and end of Miracles. And in this particular he is more Orthodox then in other points. That Mi­racles are immediate works of God, we believe, and such as wherein he doth not make use of natural causes for to do them. Neither can any created cause reach them. These are not ordinary works of God, neither are they usually done, but seldom, and upon some special occasion, and for some special end. This end in general is the same with that of all his works, and that is the manifestation of his glory; yet in a more special manner, to awaken mens sleepy minds and stir up attention, to perswade and confirm the truth of those Doctrines which are above the reach of reason; by this perswasion to work faith and conversion. These Miracles are works either of judgement or mercy, and do really differ and far ex­cell all enchantments, strange works done by natural causes, delusions of the Devil, and such like, which seem to be Miracles, and are not any such thing. And they are never done to confirm an errour, or perswade the doing of evil: For his Almighty power is the immediate cause of them, and is exer­cised according to the counsel of his will, and sub­servient alwaies and only to his truth and glory?

THAT there is eternal life, we believe, as also that it is an excellent, glorious, blessed estate, and the same to be enjoyed by certain persons, &c. in some certain place, and that there shall be no end either of the persons or estate, or the enjoyment, we are fully perswaded; because God hath said it. That the place is not this earth, we have some reason to think, because our Saviour ascended into heaven, and whilest he was on earth made intercession for us, saying, Father, I will that they also whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, John 17.14. And to comfort the hearts of his Disciples, sad and trou­bled because he said he must leave them, he useth these words, In my Fathers house are many mansions, if it were not so I would have told you: I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you to my self, that where I am, there ye may be also, John 14.23. If eter­nal life shall be enjoyed on earth, why need Christ ascend to heaven, there to prepare a place for us? and when he shall return from thence, why will he not stay here, and leave us on the earth, and never trouble himself with any translation of us into any other place, where he shall ever abide, and we be ever with him?

Hell in Scripture, and as we understand God in that Book to teach us, is an estate directly contrary to eternal life. And we believe that it is a most mi­serable condition of such as shall suffer eternal pu­nishments, and that in some certain place: and our chiefest imployment in this life, is to use all means whereby we may be freed from that condition, and enjoy the contrary. Concerning the particular [ubi] and distinct place, we do not, as we need not, much trouble our selves. To prove that both eternal rewards are to be enjoyed, and eternal torments to be suffered perpetually on earth, he doth most wofully wrest and abuse several places of Gods Book, and with so little solidity of judgement, that children may answer him.

And because this eternal life is prepared by God for such as are by reason of their sin, in danger of hell and eternal death; therefore in Scripture its sometime called salvation, and also redemption; which is a freedom and deliverance from all the evil consequents and effects of sin, one and the principal whereof is, to be deprived of eternal bliss, which consists in full communion with our God. Yet the consummation of both these conditions, is reserved by God for the world to come, which will follow the universal resurrection. The times of the Gospel in respect of the Law, may be called [the world to come] and so some understand the words of the Apostle to the Hebrews 2.5. where we read that God hath not unto Angels subjected the world to come, &c. This is [...]. Sometimes its ta­ken for the time following the resurrection and final judgement, as Mark 10.39. Luke 18.30. This [Page 187]is [...] Redemption is taken in another sense, for the expiation of sin, upon satisfaction made by Christ unto his heavenly Father as supreme Judge, who accepted his death as a sufficient penalty to avert his wrath, and procure his mercy for all such as should believe on him. In this Chapter he hath im­posed upon many places of Scripture, a sense never intended; and this may be evident to any that can and will examine the places according to the origi­nals and the context. And he drives at this, to de­prive Christ of his regal power, which at the right hand of God he now doth exercise, and to invest civil powers with it, till such time as he hath brought Christ from heaven, that he may here on earth begin his personal raign. Sr. Thomas Mores Ʋtopia is somewhat rational, this discourse is void of reason, and so much the more unsufferable, as the matter is so sublime, and this sacred Book of God so much profaned by him.

IN the former Chapter he turned heaven and hell into the earth, and in this he hath transformed the Church, which is a spiritual politie, into a civil State; and that will easily appear from his definition of this excellent and divine Society.

T. H.

A Church is a company of men professing Christian Religion, united in the person of one Soveraign, at whose command they ought to assemble, and without whose authority they ought not to assemble.

G. L.

Many are the significations of the word [Eccle­sia] in the Scriptures of the New Testament, as it is applyed to Christians, which he hath in part, yet not fully observed. Yet amongst them all from the be­ginning to the end of the New Testament, its never found to be taken in this sense; for as he hath not, so he cannot alledge one place where it so signifies. [Page 189]This definition is such, as never any gave before; you can read it in no Author, neither can you prove it out of Scripture. Only the first words seem to have something of a description, but its no perfect explication of the quiddity and nature of the Church Christian. For that is a society or community of persons, who believe in Jesus Christ, and subject themselves unto him as their Lord and King. A bare profession will not make a man a subject of this spi­ritual Kingdom. A sincere profession of that faith, which is seated and rooted in the heart, comes up higher, and is more fit to express the being of a Mem­ber of this Church.

This Church as Catholick or Universal, subject unto Christ, is like a similar body, and therefore the parts may bear the name of the whole, as the Church of Corinth, the Church of Ephesus, and the Church in such an house. Some part of this Church is under a form of discipline, to be exercised in foro exteriori, as the School-men and Casuists use to speak; some parts are not so happy. For this is not of the Essence of a Church. Its not of the being, though it tends to the well-being of the same. Some of these are subject unto a civil Soveraign who is a Christian; some are not. For as a Christian State may have Heathen or Mahumetan subjects; so Chri­stians may be under the civil power of an Heathen or Mahumetan Prince. Both these therefore [to be under a form of discipline, and subject to a Chri­stian civil power] are but accidental: and these accidents are separable, and often actually separated; and therefore, I know no reason why they should be part of a perfect desi [...]tion or so much as mentioned [Page 190]in it. This may be sufficient for to discover, the va­nity of the man, and the absurdity of the definition. Yet notwithstanding his definition be faulty, I for my part do grant, that [Jus religionis ordinandae] doth belong to all Civil Governors and powers. But with limitation,

• 1. That no Soveraign hath power to order, maintain, and promote any Religi­on, but that which is instituted from heaven.
• 2. That they must not intermeddle with it for to order it, further then its ordinable by the sword, which can­not reach Religion and Chrstianity but per accidens, so far as the persons who are Christians, are subject to the civil power.

And this care of the Magistrate may do much good, not only in preventing all tu­mults and seditions about Religion, as prejudicial to the peace of the State, and suppress them, but also protect the servants of Christ, and promote Chri­stianity very much. And in this respect only I con­ceive Soveraigns to be in all Causes, as well Ecclesia­stical, as Civil, supreme Governors.

From the definition formerly given he con­cludes.

T. H.

That because in all Common-wealths, that assembly which is without warrant from the civil Soveraign, is unlawful, that Church also which is assembled in any Common-wealth, that hath forbidden them to assemble, is an unlawful assembly.

G. L.

There is a diffecence between warrant, permission, and prohibition, Acts 15. we read of a Church­assembly at Jerusalem, yet without any warrant from the Roman Emperour: and the same did de­bate, determine, engross and publish certain binding Canons, yet I hope he dare not dictate it to be un­lawful, though it had been forbidden. Permission perhaps they had, warrant they had none. There are actions, and such as God commands, and civil Governors forbid, yet the prohibition of man can­not make void the command of God. For we must obey God rather then man: But he tells us

T. H.

That temporal and spiritual Government, are but words brought into the world to make men see double, and mistake their lawful Soveraign.

G. L.

As Government, the thing signified by the word, is a real act, so spiritual and temporal Government, are two, not words, but things really different. For there is a temporal Government, which is not spiritual; and spiritual, which is not temporal. And [Page 192]though he will not give us leave, (yet we will take it) to distinguish between Church and State; tem­poral and spiritual; man and Christian. For he knows, and that certainly, there be men, who yet are no Christians; States which are not Churches: and temporal things which are not spiritual. And those things which not only may be, but actually are separated in existence, must needs be really di­stinct. The rule is infallible, as its evident. And he that will confound these, may build a Babel, but no orderly society. And its a fault, to make that which is double to seem single, as well as make that which is single appear to be double.

HItherto Mr. Hobbs hath abused his Reader in the explication of certain words and terms used in Scripture, and hath bewrayed his gross igno­rance, and abominable errours. And as though he had laid a sure foundation, whereon to ground his fol­lowing discourse, or at least made way for it, he proceeds to prove out of the said holy writings of the Old Testament, the absolute power of Christi­an Soveraigns and States, both in matters of Religi­on, and Civil Government. And this is so done, that there is little fear least any intelligent Reader should he deceived or perswaded by him: because there is so great a distance between his premises and the conclusion, that no wit of man is able to see the connexion, or the illative force of them.

For he argues, That because Abraham in his fa­mily, Moses in Israel, the high Priests after Moses [Page 194]in the times of Judges and the Kings, from Saul to the captivity, had the supreme power Civil and Ecclesiastical; therefore all Christian Governors supreme have the same. For this is the substance of this Chapter. Yet,

• 1. Abra­ham was but the Master of a family, Moses a Mediator between Israel and God, retaining the supreme power both temporal and spiritual in his own hands, not only in his time, but in the raign of Judges and the Kings. The high Priests did only ask counsel of God by the Ʋrim and Thummim, and declared it to the Rulers. The Kings had no power Legislative at all, but on­ly executive according to the Laws of God: they had no right unto the Sacerdotal power. For Ʋzziah usurping that of offering Incense, was smitten with leprosie. Therefore his Assum­ption is notoriously false.
• 2. Abraham, Moses, and some of the Kings were extraordinary Pro­phets, and immediately inspired: Such are not Christian Soveraigns. Neither can they from God in difficult and perplexed cases, receive counsel of God by Ʋrim and Thummim.
• 3. Sup­pose all these had been invested with supreme power Civil and Ecclesiastical, as they were not, yet it doth not follow, that therefore Christian Soveraigns are so: His consequence therefore is no consequence, but false.
• 4. Here its to be observed, That no example can be drawn from the Government of Israel, either under Moses, or Judges, or Kings, because that Government all along was extraordinary. And as no State [Page 195]Christian is bound to follow it, so no State can parallel it And its in vain for Divines or any other writers to argue from that particular form of politie, to any other in the world. Some ge­neral Rules and practises therein may be made use of, for the reproof or reformation of Go­vernment in other States. His innovations and particular false glosses upon several texts are not worthy confutation.

THey who desire to obtain eternal salvation by Christ Jesus, must know both who he is, and what he hath both suffered and done for them. Jesus Christ as Saviour and Redeemer, for person, is the eternal Son of God; for Natures he is God and Man; yet so, that these two Natures remain distinct one from the other, yet personally united; For Office, he is Prophet, Priest, and King: and such he is made as man by Commission from his Heavenly Father. He was Initiated at his Baptism: after which time he began to exercise his three-fold power. And

• 1. Of a Prophet, to manifest that he was their Saviour, and to perswade men to believe in him.
• 2. He per­formed some acts of a King in making Laws and Of­ficers.
• 3. He acted as a Priest at his death, by offer­ing up himself that great sacrifice;
  • first, by inffering and dying on earth:
  • secondly, by entring the Holy place of Heaven, and presenting himself as slain, and so obtained eternal Redemption After his consecra­tion finished upon the Resurrection, he was made a compleat Priest for ever after the Order of Melchi­zedeck.

Upon his Resurrection he was more se­lemnly setled in his Throne as universal and eternal King. And then in a more glorious manner began to act,

• 1. As Prophet to teach not onely Jews, but Gentiles; and that not onely by his word, but by his [Page 197]Spirit powred down from Heaven upon all flesh.
• 2. As a Priest interceding by vertue of his blood.
• 3. Of a King, in all the acts of government in his Universal Kingdom.

By his sacrifice offered on earth and presented in Heaven, he satisfied Gods ju­stice offended by the sin of man; and merited for himself eternal power and glory: and for us eter­nal life, and all effectual means for the certain at­tainment thereof. All the rest of his acts performed by him as King, Priest, and Prophet, tended unto the application of his sacrifice, that we by faith might be partakers of the benefit thereof.

This is the sum of that Doctrine of Redemption delivered clearly and more fully in several places of the Scripture, especially of the New Testament. Yet this Innovatour hath obscured the same several ways, and determines the Kingdom of Christ to begin when the world doth end, because Christ said to Pilate, My Kingdom is not of this world, Joh. 18.36. From whence he concludes

T. H.

That the Kingdom of Christ is not to begin before the general Resurrection.

G. L.

This is a gross mistake, and mis-interpretation of a place which is clear in it self. For by his gloss he makes the Scripture to contradict it self. Christ was [Page 198]then Candidatus imperii; and was King when he gave this answer unto Pilate: yet he began to reign and exercise his Royal power more eminently when he was set at the Right hand of the Father: yet his Kingdom was not of this world, that is, not civil, but spiritual: and as Austin upon the place, It was, Hic non hinc: in the world, not of the world: in the world, yet not worldly, but divine and far more ex­cellent then the Kingdoms of the world. This is the genuine sense of the words. That Christ doth reign now, and hath reigned since his ascension and sitting at the right hand of God, is evident. Before his A­scension he lets his Apostles know that all power in heaven and earth was given him, and according un­to and by vertue of that power he gave Commission to his Apostles to teach and baptize, and perswade men to the obedience of his commands, Mat. 28.18, 19, 20. He that hath an universal power in heaven and earth; who makes officers and gives them pow­er; who makes Laws, Institutes Sacraments, and sends down the Holy Ghost, must needs reign, and his Kingdom is begun already. We read that Christ must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet: and the last enemy that shall be destroyed is death. And when all things shall be subdued unto him, then shall also the Son of man be subject unto him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all, 1 Cor. 15.25, 26, 28. Where first from Psal. 110.1. The Apostle tels us, That Christs Kingdom did Commence at the time of Christs sitting at the right hand of God.

• 2. That with him to sit at the right hand of God is to reign.
• 3. That he must reign by Word, Sacra­ments, Spirit, Ministry, till all enemies, whereof death [Page 199]is the last, be destroyed.
• 4. That when death is de­stroyed, he shall deliver up his Commission and king­dom in respect of this administration by Ordinan­ces.
• 5. That at the Resurrection this manner of reign shall end, when Mr. Hobbs saith it shall begin.
• 6. That then God shall be all in all: that is, reign perfectly in his Saints without any enemy, without opposition, without Ordinances, and more immedi­ately.

Before that time indeed he will not proceed to the final and universal sentence and execution of the same. Yet there are many acts of government be­sides judgement, and many acts of judgement be sides those of the general Assizes and last Sessions. To make Laws, reduce men to subjection, appoint Officers, pass sentence, and execute the same in the very souls of men, are acts of one that reigns; as likewise to subdue enemies, Sin, Satan, and the world, to protect the Church: And in this manner Christ hath reigned since his Ascension. And many Milli­ons do adore him, subject themselves unto him, and obey him to this day. Yet with this man Christ doth not yet reign. Let him read Psalm 2. throughout. It began to be fulfilled upon his Resurrection and A­scension, as appears out of the Acts of the Apostles and their Epistles: And if he or any other shall de­ny the present reign of Christ, they must expect with his Iron Scepter to be dasht in pieces like a Potters Vessel.

AFter he had enthroned Civil Soveraigns, cap. 40. Dethroned Christ in the former Chapter: In this he takes away all power from the Church, and invests the Christian civil powers with it. And here­in it may be a question whether his ignorance or pre­sumption is the greater: for he is highly guilty of both. He that will determine the controversie con­cerning the power of the Church, must distinguist the universal power of God, the spiritual power of Christ incarnate and exalted to the Throne of glory, and the power deligated from Christ unto the Church universal here on earth, as subject unto Christ as Lord and Monarch; and also that which every particular Independent, association of Chri­stians is trusted withal, for to preserve the Society and the Ordinances of God from profanation. This he hath not done, and therefore little or rather no­thing can be expected from him. This last power of particular Churches, is called the power of the keys in foro exteriori, in the particular government of their several combinations; for there is no supreme universal Independent judicatory on earth to which all Churches in the world are bound to appeal in this outward visible administration. General Coun­sels can be no such thing: Neither was there ever any Oecumenical Synod in proper sense since the [Page 201]Gospel was preached to all Nations. This power of outward Discipline is challenged by the Pope, by the Clergy, by the people Christian, and by the States civil and Soveraigns of the world. And in this last party is the Author deeply engaged; but upon what reason I know not, except he intends to side with the strongest, for such are they which bear the sword.

The power of ordaining Ministers, preaching the Word, administring the Sacraments was in the uni­versal Church since the time of the Apostles. And in every particular Church reduced to a form of out­ward discipline, there is a power of making Canons, of jurisdiction, of making Officers so far as shall conduce unto the better ordination of Ministers, the preservation of the purity of Doctrine, and the right administration of the Sacraments, least they be profaned, and Christ offended by the admission of ignorant, scandalous and unworthy persons. There is a power also of disposing and dispensing of those goods which are given to the Church for the main­tenance of Christian Religion. Civil Christian States may and ought to make civil Laws to confirm the just Canons and jurisdictions of the Church. And those Laws may be a fence unto it against these who shall oppose or persecute. Yet when all this is done, those Laws are but Civil, though the object of them be Ecclesiastical matters.

This might suffice for to confute and make void the main body, and break in pieces the main design of this long and tedious Chapter, wherein he is not content to vent his errours, but he must broach his blasphemies. For after he had granted the Ecclesi­astical [Page 202]power to be in the Apostles and their succes­sors for about 300 years, he tels us,

T. H.

That the Trinity is a threefold representation of God.

• 1. By Moses.
• 2. By Christ on earth.
• 3. By the holy Ghost in the Apostles: and this agrees with that of the Divine Apostle.

There are three that bear witness in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and these three are one, 1 Joh. 5.7.

G. L.

This deserves no answer but detestation, because its not onely blasphemous, but also devoid not onely of divine but humane learning: and no ways to be suffered amongst Christians.

Having thus determined the proper and just sub­ject of this power for so long a time, he proceeds to let us know what this power is.

T. H.

The power of the Church is but to teach, to baptize, to absolve, to excommunicate.

G. L.

The foundation and Rule of all Christian doctrine, worship and discipline, is briefly and by a wonder­ful wisdom comprised in those words of our Savi­our, ready to ascend into Heaven: Go and teach all Nations, baptizing them, &c. Mat. 28.19, 20. For in those words we are taught,

• 1. What Doctrine we must believe and profess.
• 2. What worship we must perform unto the Deity, and how, and upon what grounds.
• 3. Who may, and who may not be admitted into Christian society; and who may, and who may not be continued in the same, and enjoy all the priviledges thereof.

Those who being taught, profess their faith in God the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and promise to obey the commands of Christ, may be baptized and solemnly admitted into the Church. They who continued to profess their faith, & to perform their promise of obedience unto Christ, might be continued in this society, and enjoy the priviledges; otherwise not. From which words its evident, there must be a power to teach, baptize, absolve, excommunicate: and also to ordain and design fit persons to do these things, and give rules out of the Gospel how they may be done aright.

This Author first makes void as he conceives, all Bellarmines discourse concerning the form of Ec­clesiastical government: whether it be Monarchi­cal, Aristocratical, or Democratical. 2. They have power but to teach. The reason why Bellarmines discourse is void, is given by him to be this, because [Page 204]the Church hath no coercive power. If he mean co­ercive civil by the sword, its certain there is no such power Ecclesiastical: Neither doth Bellarmine af­firm or challenge it but indirecte & per accidens. Yet he was told before that the execution of the Chur­ches censure is from heaven, as it is passed in the name of Christ and by his power, 1 Cor. 5.4. And he hath promised, whatsoever is bound on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever loosed on earth shall be loosed in heaven, Mat. 18.18. This is not in the name of the civil Soveraign, nor by the power of the sword. And it must be done by some power: and this power must be exercised either by one, or more, or all, according to some certain order. And Government is nothing but ordo imperii & subjecti­onis.

2. That the Church hath but power to teach, perswade, counsel, &c. he proves first by his false supposition that Christ doth not reign until the uni­versal Resurrection: secondly, by that time of Rege­neration, which he bounds within the terms of Christs ascension and his second coming to Judge­ment. The former argument was grounded upon a false interpretation of our Saviours words, and so the later is; for by Regeneration in Mat. 19.28. is meant the Resurrection, and so its printed and distinguish­ed in divers coples, and so the King of Spains Bi­bles read it, as others also: and the sense is, they which have followed me, shall in the Regeneration, that is, Resurrection, sit upon twelve Thrones, &c.

But suppose that regeneration be not the resur­rection. Yet it cannot be a time of that continu­ance as to reach Christs coming to Judgement, but [Page 205]only the time of their following Christ, which can­not extend beyond his ascention. Yet let it be grant­ed, that by it is signified the whole tract of time, from his ascention till his coming to Judgement, it will not follow from that text that Christ doth not raign till that time be expired; for he may, as he doth, raign and exercise many acts of his regal power before he pass the final sentence upon all men and Angels. His other reasons are frivolous, and not ad idem. Yet his last argument save one is, That be­cause Christ hath left to civil Governors their power, therefore he hath left none to the Church. And its true that he hath left no civil power of the sword to the Church; yet it doth not hence follow, that he hath denyed it the spiritual power of the keyes. And here he makes a most abominable digression, affirm­ing that we may deny or profess against our con­science, and comply with civil powers commanding and forbidding, contrary to that which Christ hath commanded and forbidden, and so hath taken away the ground of all Martyrdom, and razed the very foundation of our Christian confession. Besides he seems to put a difference between their power to Preach, and their power to Teach, but he will not let us know what this difference is. And his argu­ments tend to prove, that Ministers have no power to command, no authority: yet the people are com­manded to obey them that rule over them, and sub­mit themselves, because they watch over their souls, Heb. 13.17. And he that heareth them, heareth Christ and God that sent him; and he that despiseth them despiseth Christ, and God that sent him. To that purpose, we read in Luk. 10.17. And how can [Page 206]this possibly be true, if this have no authority? no law, no sin. To teach and preach in such a manner, as they who will not hear and obey, shall be guilty as contemners of the divine Majesty, and so, as that it shall be more tolerable for Sodom in the day of judgement then for them, is to teach with authority and power, and the same no doubt greater then any Prince civil in the world is invested withal. For they cannot command, so as to make the disobedient li­able to eternal penalties.

He granteth further, that they have power to Baptize, and by Baptism admit into Christs King­dom, which is a spiritual naturalization: and also to absolve and excommunicate: yet the former is an act of Legislation, the latter of Jurisdiction: and how can that be performed without power? Thus the man is pleased to confute himself. Yet in the acts of Jurisdiction, we do not affirm the judge­ment of the Church to be infallible, because they can have no infallible knowledge of the inward dis­position of the souls of persons penitent or impeni­tent. Yet sometimes the evidence of the cause is such, that an absolute sentence on earth is made valid from heaven. And this Jurisdiction exercised accord­ing to the Laws of Christ, hath alwaies a real effect upon the party judged, and that without any co-er­cive power civil at all. And the effect was comfort­able or terrible, both unto Believers and Apostates too, according as they should be truly impenitent or penitent. This power is alwaies in the Church, and to be exercised by such as are trusted with that power, and fit for such a work. And this is the plain truth, though the world be on a flame, and so many [Page 207]Christians in a cumbustion, because of their different opinions concerning the subject of this power. But concerning this point I have spoken more at large in another Treatise.

He goes on to teach us the causes of Excomuni­cation, and denies heresie to be any cause, though scandal by his own confession be; yet heresie is the greatest scandal. And here he abuseth that place of Titus, 3.10. where its written, A man that is an Heretick after the first and second admonition reject; where he plainly contradicts the Apostles words. As though he had said, Reject the heresie, not the person; whereas the Apostle commands the rejecti­on of the person, the Heretick, and not only the heresie. That some make Articles of Faith, which God never made, such cannot be excused. After this he determines the persons who are liable to excom­munication, yet so as that he might have been instru­cted better, then he hath instructed us, by those who deserve to be his Masters. He exempts one Church from the jurisdiction of another, so that the one cannot excommunicate the other. Yet he doth not inform us what the extent of a Church-Indepen­dent is, and so leaves the question undecided. He al­so exempts all Soveraign Princes and Assemblies from excommunication, yet so as that he most grosly mis­takes the nature and effect of excommunication. Yet here he staies not: but a subject obeying his Sove­raigns command is not liable to this sentence, neither can it be in this cause and case of any effect, if we may believe him. This in [terminis] is false, ex­cept he mean obedience in licitis. The rest of his dis­course concerning this particular is frivolous. The [Page 208]of the Chapter is taken up and spent in the de­termination of two points. The 1. is making of Scri­pture Canon and Law: The 2. the power of the Pope. The power of making Scripture-Canon is given by him unto the Soveraign civil, being Christi­an. Yet whether he be Christian or no, he hath power to bind his subjects to acknowledge it sub­poena temporali; But the Scripture is Canonical in it self, without any such Law at all. As for the con­troversie concerning the Popes power he undertakes Bellarmine, who had often been answered in a far better manner, and more effectually by many before him. And the truth is, both he and the Cardinal run in extreams, the one on one side, and the other on the other side of the way of truth. For that power which the one arrogates to the Pope, the other gives to Christian civil powers, but both unjustly. For Ecclesiastical power is due in some measure un­to the Pope, but not unto the civil Soveraign. The Pope is a Presbyter, and a Bishop, and some power was due unto him by divine Law. But by that which humane Constitutions gave him, and by his own usur­pation he had ingrossed, he was advanced very high. To be a Patriarch would not serve his turn, but he must be Christs universal Vicar, and in the end by that means at length he hooked in the temporal power of the sword.

But to leave them both in their errours, wherein they have entangled themselves, before I conclude this Chapter, I will say something of Church-offi­cers, and the Church-revenue. The Church-officers may be con [...]dered either according to their Consti­tution or Imployment. According to the first they [Page 209]were extraordinary or ordinary. Extraordinary were such as had their power and gifts more immedi­ately from Christ, as Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists. And here by the way, we may take notice of two er­rours and mistakes of the Author.

• 1. In that he affirms Matthias to be made an Apostle by the As­sembly of an hundred and twenty Brethren assem­bled together. Whereas from the text its apparent, that they did only single out by suffrage two per­sons, whom they conceived so qualified, that one of them might, if God pleased, be made an Apostle for to succeed Judas; and refer the case to God by prayer and lot, that he might determine, whether of the two should be an Apostle, to make up the num­ber of twelve. Upon the reference, God did chuse Matthias, and so, that he made him an Apostle, and refused the other. To make an extraordinary Offi­cer was above the power of the Apostles and the Church, therefore they did not take it upon them.
• 2. The second errour is, That Paul and Barnabas were made Apostles by the Church of Antioch, Acts 13.2, 3. yet Barnabas in strict sense was no Apostle; and Paul was an Apostle before he came to Antioch. He was a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an Apostle, separated to the Gospel of God, Rom. 1.1. His calling to be an Apostle was not of men, nor by man, Gal. 1.1. His separation was twofold,
  • 1. From God, who separated him from his Mothers womb, Gal. 1.15.
  • 2. From man, as by the prayers and fasting of the Church of Antioch: Yet Mr. Hobbs is not afraid to contradict the Scriptures.

Ordinary officers of the Church, who succeeded the extraordinary, were Pastors and Teachers, Eph. [Page 210]4.11. Both the ordinary and extraordinary in re­spect of their employment, were either such as were designed for feeding of the soul, by Prayer, Word, Sacraments, and were to perform the acts of do­ctrine, worship, discipline: or for feeding of the body, and outward relief: and such were Deacons. After that the number of Christians were increased, and devided into Congregations, the Pastors and Teachers were set over their several Congregations and Flocks assigned unto them, and these were cal­led Elders.

Now the Question is, who in a Christian Com­mon-wealth have power to make, constitute, ordain these ordinary Officers? The Common-wealth saith he; the Church, say others. He confesseth that the Church did exercise this power till civil So­veraigns became Christian: and then both the power and exercise thereof ceased to be in the Church, if we may believe him; but his credit is not much, and with me his Authority is none. To determine this question, we must observe that its one thing to be a Pastor, Minister, or Presbyter: another thing to be the Pastor of a certain congregation, and another to have a right to some temporal revenue or dignity annexed. A Minister was constituted in all well-ordered Churches, to this day by the Church. The Church and such as the Church doth trust, doth chuse him, try him, approve him, and ordains him. And by the nomination, approbation, ordination of the Church, according to the will of Christ all Pres­byters are made publick officers of the Church, and separated to their function of publick preaching, praying, administration of the Sacraments. Neither [Page 211]is there any place in all the New Testament, where it can be proved that either Christ or his Apostles, who had this power, did ever derive it to the State or Civil Soveraign, whether Christian or no Christian. That every civil Soveraign hath power to preach, baptize, ordain, and perform all Ministerial acts, and that as a publick Officer, is an impudent assertion, and contrary to the Book of God; & is evident from that reason given by him, why they use not to do these things: which is, because the business of the Com­mon-wealth takes up their whole time. Yet he that will be a Minister, must watch over his flock, be as souldiers, who going to war, must not entangle them­selves with the affairs of this life, 2 Timothy 2.4. As he must have sufficient knowledge in those things which belong unto his calling, and integrity of life, so he must engage himself to Christ and his Church, to lay aside all other employments to feed Christs flock, and this must take up his whole time. To en­tangle himself with other business, and so neglect his charge, is to be unfaithful, and in effect renounce his calling. From this false principle it is, that so many, who have a little more knowledge in Scripture then ordinary Christians of the lowest form, a bold face, and voluble tongue, take upon them to preach, and presume to perform other Ministerial duties, al­though they be souldiers, or civil Magistrates, or Tradesmen, or all together: These will be Elders and Ministers, although they entangle themselves with the affairs of this life, as though the Holy-Ghost had made them Over-seers to feed his Church, purchased by his blood But wo unto them when they shall appear before the tribunal of Christ to give their [Page 212]last account. But consider, a Minister as he hath a temporal right unto some temporal revenue, dignity, jurisdiction, the Church hath nothing to do with him. The Church looks after his spiritual qualifica­tion and capacity. After that Emperours and civil powers endowed the Church with a certain revenue, and annexed unto Bishopricks, civil jurisdictions, and temporal dignities, there was some reason why the presentation and investiture should belong unto them, but there was no such thing from the begin­ning.

The maintenance of the Ministers of the Gospel is determined by this Author to be benevolence: yet at length convinced by the arguments of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 9. He confesseth that it was such a benevolence as was due, and that the Flock was bound to maintain their Pastor. By which confessi­on he hath answered his own allegation, Freely give, because you have freely received, Mat 10.8. which place is abused by him, as it is by the enemies of the Church at this day. For as by him, so by them, its understood and applyed, as though our Saviours meaning had been, That because they gave nothing for their gifts and authority, so they must neither demand, nor receive any thing for the use of them. And by this means they make our Saviour to contra­dict himself, for afterwards he saith, That the workman (and such is every Minister) is worthy of his meat, ver. 10. of his hire, Luk. 10.7. From whence Paul informs us, That Christ ordained, that they which preach the Gospel, should live of the Gospel, 1 Cor. 9.14. And therefore according un­to this Ordinance of Christ he commands, That he [Page 213]who is taught in the Word, communicate to him who teacheth in all good things, Gal. 6.6. From all which its very evident, that maintenance is due to Mini­sters, and that by a Law, and the same divine, and far more obliging then any civilact in the world. And if Christian people had a propriety in their goods, (as of this there can be no doubt) this might easily make this maintenance competent, comfortable, and cer­tain; and that without any Law of the civil power, and they were bound so to do. When Christian Prin­ces endowed the Church with titles, they did but their duty, and they conceived, that no better way of provision could be devised by the wit of man. Neither can any Antidecimarian to this day inform us of a better. Yet if we be once Ministers, we are bound to preach the Gospel, though we beg our bread. But woe unto them who shall deny it, or take it out of our mouths.

IT is evident from our Saviours commission unto his Apostles, Mat. 28.19, 20. That profession of faith and promise of obedience to him, gave any person right unto Baptism, by which we are solemnly admitted into the Church, which is Gods spiritual Kingdom. And faith with obedience, and obedience from faith, makes us capable of eternal life. And because we can neither believe nor obey sincerely without regeneration from heaven, there­fore our Saviour saith, That except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God, John 3.3. If Mr. Hobbs had said no more, but that faith and obedience are necessary for reception into Gods Kingdom, he had done well: but he returns unto his vomit, and resumes some of his former errors formerly confuted. I wish him more knowledge and more modesty.