Predestination handled and maintained &c.
THE reviving and vigorous Errors of these dayes,Generall Redemption. Free will. too miserably heard asserted, and maintained, from the mouthes of some of those, who even pretend to greater devotion; abetted also with the confident suffrages, and earnest acclamations [Page 2] of their Audients not a few, have somewhat prematurely hastned to the birth, these our newly conceived meditations; which should else have tarried for a more elaborate, and exact Recension. Howsoever, we hope, there's none will reprehend; when he may, with us, consider, this may prove also an occasion to others more able, of appearing in this same defence. And so passe we to the intended matter, that is, Predestination: touching which, for our more orderly progresse, we begin our discourse from its definition: which, in the sense we use it, may thus be formed. Predestination then is Gods designing, and appointing severally, before time, a certaine [Page 3] number of persons, to grace, and glory; and that absolutely and of simple love to them. That this designation is before time, is expresly by the Scriptures intimated: as, he hath chosen us in him, before the Foundation of the VVorld. Eph. 1.4. and 2 Tim. 2.9. &c. And that in the act of Predestination, God had before him, the certaine distinct notions, & particular representations of all the Elect, i. e. of all men that are, or ever shall be glorified; is not onely attested by the Scriptures, but by Reason also. And first, we alledge Scriptures. Revel. 17.8. the words are these: And they that dwell on the Earth, shall wonder, whose Names were not written in the Booke of Life, [Page 4] from the foundation of the World. Here what have we hinted,4 Phil. 3.10. Lu. 20.13 Rev. 8. but a Registrie, or Catalogue of the names of the Elect? whose names were not writen &c. And that before time: For in the occasionally, or accidentally intimating the negation of that priviledge as to some, (a thing quite besides the Authors chiefe purpose) is evidently, and cleerly implyed, a Graunt, and Concession thereof to some others. Againe, Rom. 8.29.30. Whom he foreknew he also did Predestinate, &c. and whom he did Predestinate them he also called &c. Here, by foreknowing what is intended? If the word you will have taken in its vulgar, and ordinary sense, then will it follow, that all being [Page 5] of God foreknowne, all likewise being accounted to the partnership of those glorious dignities, Sanctity, Glory, &c. which sure none of any reason will admit. Some to this word foreknew, would have adjoyned, these words, [would believe] and that in a way of causing. Which whiles they conjecture, how unwarily skip they over a notable absurdity? For (by them) those same God foreknew would of themselves believe, he also makes to believe: unlesse they'l say believing, or faith is not, nor any part of vocation, and Sanctification: nor they of it, which were even to fly from a lesse unto a greater absurditie. We rather conceive the Author by that [Page 6] word, to intend Gods eternall love in Christ to his Saints, reflected upon by him with reference, and in order to those graduall inferences: which love so reflected on, appear'd like a Crowne, intituling those that wore it, to the Royall Preheminences, Calling, Sanctity, Glory. Nor do we want other Scriptures, many, that clearly owne, and confirme out said interpretation; when the undoubted sense thereof doth plainly exact such an understanding of the questioned words, as we have delivered. GOD hath not cast of His People, whom Hee foreknew, Rom. 11.2. and Mat. 25.12. I know you not. See 3 Amos 2. with many others. 'Tis evident then that knowing in the [Page 7] Scriptures Dialect, is put for loving: And as evident it is also, that Calling, Justification, Glorification in the foresaid place mentioned, do receive limits,Act. 2. last v. & 13.48 and measure from that foreknowing, or foreloving: which is in the text assur'd us, by that often repeated Relative, whom. Those Hee foreknew, Hee predestinated, called &c. Those and no others; Those and no more. Which seeing tis so, then vaine and inconsiderate is that opinion of many, who think the number, and persons of the foreknown, were to God in the said act of Predestination not determinate, nor severally considered; but that they lay deepe sunke in the Abysse of obscuritie, and confusion; either necessarily, [Page 8] or willingly by God so suffered to bee: So as any one has in himselfe Free-will, and Power; by believing, to make himself of the number of those Foreknowne. But to passe by this Errour of theirs, we will add to this word foreknowne, another of the same Apostles words us'd in the like matter & that is chosen 1 Eph. 4. an act likewise plac'd before all time: [...], tis in the Greeke cull'd out. Now in chusing, or picking out as it were of some from out of others; is had a discering, and distinction, else 'tis no choosing, no Election, and where choosing is, there is also a taking out of some, a leaving of others. God then did take some for his Sonnes, and heirs of glory, did he not know [Page 9] them? who they would bee?Psal. [...]39.15.16. how many? But he knew Davids substance yet being imperfect, and in his booke were written all his Members, when as yet there was none of them. If you will have this to be spoken of Davids Person, even so it doth make much for us: If of the Elect, (as more probable) then much more; yea then it amounts to no lesse then a cleare and plenarie confirmation of the point we assert.Rom. [...].11.12.13. He knew also Jacob and loved him yet unborne.Lu. [...].15. He knew Iohn the Baptist,Ier. 2.5. and sanctified him in the wombe. And Ieremiah did he know before he formed him in the belly, and before he came forth out of the wombe, he sanctified him, and ordained him a Prophet, &c. All these [Page 10] you'l grant God did foreknow severally,See also 1 Gal 15. Act. 15.18. did he not also know the rest? But known unto God (saith the Apostle) are all his workes from the beginning of the World.
Iohn 1.3. 1 Col. 16. Ephes. 3.9. Act. 4.24.Again, hee formeth and maketh all things; witnesse the Scriptures: From whence we will inferre he foreknew all things; For he does either make things rashly, and without precognition of their future Formes, or contrariwise:See Act. 4.28. but doubtlesse the latter; else shall we put the Creator beneath that perfection he has given his Creature: (for not man sets himselfe to operate, without having a prescript, or preconceiv'd type, and pattern of the work he intends to.) And then this precedencie of knowledge, to operation [Page 11] in God, was before time: for a Creature it is not, but it is in God alone, and so God himselfe, according to the Schoolmen;vvhatsoever is in God, is God himselfe. Quicquid est in Deo est ipse Deus. And secondly, if this precognition was in God not eternall, then did there something from without, occasion and beget the same; (for God is one, simple, entire, and not mixed) and so it will follow, God is passible, imperfect; yea, the first Cause then, shall in a manner bee the effect of a second; of its owne effect; and so there will follow a confusion of Causes: which all are most absurd. The like may be said also of Gods love to men severally, in reference to that of Ieremiah, Chap. 31. Vers. 23. (I have loved thee with an everlasting love) if any would have [Page] it restrain'd to the future only. But an irrefragable place also to our purpose is, that in the Psalms, Psalm. 90. Vers. 1. Lord thou hast been our dwelling place in all Generations. Heb: From Generation, to Generation, the same in sense. What, would hee bee their dwelling place, so long, and yet not know them? doubtlesse no. Wee say again, if God did not severally know, eternally, the persons of those he preordain'd to life eternall, 'twas either because he would not, or because he could not. That wee embrace not the former, the admirable love of God to them exhibited, more especially in the wonderfull act of Redemption. disswadeth: And the latter wee now come to refute by reason.
If God therefore did not [Page 13] know the precise number of his Saints, before the world made, and so upwards, then did he waite untill he should be informed thereof, either from the events, and determinations of his own Actions, or else from some other Minde and Power, and this Minde and Power is either subordinate to God, or co-ordinate with him: If subordinate; (as necessarily) then simply and totally subordinate to him, or not: if not; then still must it be mounted into the throne of a Deitie: but if simply, and totally subordinate, then did it, and doth receive of God the Precepts, formes, rules, and precise measures of all its actions: And other then such an Agent, (if yet even such a one) no man but sees [Page 14] God would not ordaine, to so great a detraction, and blemish, and even emulation of his divine Soveraignty. (we speak of a Power procreative of those wee call Naturall and Substantiall Formes, as such) Nor would we by any meanes admit of such a Preter-divine Agent, directly over the very persons, of men. What may be brought against us out of Genesis 1.11. And God said let the Earth bring forth grasse, &c. Is limitted to things vegitative onely. The 24. verse, where its said, Let the Earth bring forth the living Creature, &c. Is declared by that which followes, viz. And God made the best of the, Earth. &c. We then here finde any Assignation, of delegation of such a Productive [Page 15] Power or Faculty, as to the forme substantiall, extended to man: whose supereminent Dignity is in the same Chapter pointed out in the words; Let us make man, &c. Nor (as for the other member) is God to deduce such a knowledge, from the events, and determinations of his own Actions: For then it may be truly to be said of Him, Hee's about to do he knowes not how much: or he knowes not the quantity of his own intended actions, which were doubtlesse absurd. It will then also be true, if one shall say at the period of humane Generation, or some short time before; Now knowes God somewhat of his noblest Creatures, which before he was ignorant [Page 16] of. Nor may our discourse much stick at that Objection. What then (may some say) did God know before time every blade of grasse that should be? every dust on the earth? &c. To step besides this block (which yet we could undertake to clear the way of) we answer: Our Treatise is of man; whom alone his Creatour would have sublimed above others, by the Impresse even of his own Resemblance: not of Plants or meere Animalls: of Immortalls not mortalls, and amongst these, of the Saints principally: members of the Lords own mysticall body: His Children, His Saints, &c. who, what if we should tell you, have a Seminall or radicall being eternal: which though (as being a thing beside [Page 17] our scope) we shall forbeare, yet is there enough said to marre the consequence, viz. from things inanimate or vegetative onely, to Intellectives: from mortalls, to immortalls; and all this in a certaine respect of Dignity also.
Againe, Whatsoever thing most excellent can incur into, or be devised by the Imagination of man, That ought we to believe to be in God, in some equall, or eminent manner; else would it prove to the disparagement, and indignity of the great Creator that he should have enabled his Creature to imagine that Excellency, which is not in Himselfe; which is above Himselfe. Now this numerical foreknowledge is easily by man both immaginable, and [Page 18] comprehensible. But Eternitie, Infinitude are without all doubt attributed to God: either of them is greater then the contended for prescience of number: we grant him the former, how can we denie him the latter? So much for this point, wherein if we shall seeme to any more prolix then is needefull, let them have this answer. Both they that assent, may have now more ground so to do; and they that dissent, may hereby of this their Errour be the more fully convinced. And now passe we to the other branch of our Definition; namely, That the Predestination aforementioned was absolutely, and of simple love.
Destination, or purpose [Page 19] (largely taken) is an act of the minde, begotten of the understanding and wil concurring, and is related to somthing by the Person to be done. But this definition haply is too large for our purpose, which is to treate of such purposes, as are about things of more considerable moment, and consequence. We shall first therefore devide, and then describe them in more ample, and familiar termes. Purposes then are either more perfect, or lesse perfect; that is absolute or conditionall. The more perfect or absolute are when the Person purposing, having projected or cogitated somthing to be done, and then rising up to a consideration, and pondering of things already hapned, [Page 20] present, or for the future happenable, (to wit) events, cases, non-events, conditions, states of things; forcible and of importance, as to the destroying, or impeding of the thing purposed, doth at length sit downe with a resolution to do or execute. The Imperfect or conditionall are, when the minde, projecting or imaginating somthing to be done, and having made enquiry and estimation of all important and forcible impediments, as to the execution thereof, and then finding some possible but uncertaine intervention, accident, defect, or state of things, or thing, that in the judgement of the Person purposing, ought to or will hinder & forbid execution, drawes at length to this [Page 21] resolution that if this or that intervene, or this or that intervene not, the purpose shall proceed to execution.
To prove that one word, (uncertaine) to be that onely, which gives being to the purpose conditionall, as it is such; and that without this uncertainty, the purpose, if it proceed and abide, must needs be absolute, is an easie taske: For why doth one yet purpose to do this or that, when hee's wel assur'd there hath been, is, or will be somthing that (in this particular) ought and will hinder its accomplishment? which cannot be. For examples sake, A Father purposes to give his sonne by will 100. l. on condition he please him well in the meane time. Here does the [Page 22] Father know or is he certaine, that his sonne will soe please him? or is he not certaine? if he be certaine, to what then serves the condition? (sith default or defect in the condition must destroy the purpose) If he knowes he will not so please him, and yet so purposes, then this is no more a condition, but the purpose may be, notwithstanding this, absolute and prefect. Hence therefore may we with clearnesse deduce this conclusion: That the reason why purposes are conditionall is, a want in foreknowledge, or an uncertainty in the person purposing, of all such things as will and ought to destroy the purpose. So that it also followes to be inconvenient with the [Page 23] properties of God, to purpose, or predestinate conditionally: it being a thing cleare that we ought to allow God such a foreknowledge, especially then too when he does intend to such one; as happeneth in the case of purposes or Predestination. Besides this, also it may be minded, that where a person purposeth or Predestinateeth to do any thing of free will, there the purpose partaketh somthing of desire to execution. God now is both an absolute purposer, and a desirous one too: then what is it can hinder him therein.
Argument.
But if the Predestination aforementioned, was caused by [Page 24] the foresight of Faith to come, (as is by many fancied,) then did the Predestinator foresee some unavoidable, and unfrustrable cause, or series, or order of causes necessarily productive of the faith foreseene: else how could it bee that God should passe a certain act upon, or in reference to an uncertain, and unchangeable respect, or motive? which once granted, it is granted also that God may bee deceived. If any say, this productive cause may be considered of God, though yet to come; such doe but trifle: For there must then also bee granted some preceding cause, equally certain and unfrustrable as to the producing of that; we have therefore added, as above, (Order of Causes.) Now [Page 25] where was this cause, or order of causes before the creation? It must needs bee granted, it was in God alone. So then, the next and immediate cause of faith,Causa causae est causa causati. is but the remote effect of this its first cause.
Argument.
If the same that decreed glory to man, decreed also to work in him faith and grace, then glory depends not really upon the preceding habit of faith. But the former is true: Therfore the latter. Antecedent proved, Rom. 8, 29.30. Eph. 1.4.5.11, &c.
Here me thinks it is by some objected: Though Glory to man simply, depend not upon having of faith: Yet quoad [Page 26] hunc, as concerning this or that particular man, it may depend on his having of faith.
Answ
God did then decree glory. To whom? Doubtlesse to those that are, or shall bee saved. But it is proved above, God knew them severally and all, before they were existent. It will follow then, that God afore decreed glory directly to the severall persons of men: For the indeterminatenesse of all purposes, is of defect of knowledge, as above more at large.
Argument.
That which is not of Man, but is freely the gift of God, [Page 27] cannot, as such, be a motive, or impulsive to God, of conferring another gift; especially that may as much exceed the former, as infinite doth finite.
But faith is not of Man, but is the gift of God.
Ergo, Faith, &c.
There is no ground here from which to fix on God an obligation: If affectation you suggest, that is impious, nor can you with any colour of reason, flie to the merit of the gift. This for the Major.
The Minor is proved, Eph. 2.8. compared with Rom. 3.24.36. EZek. 22.26.27. Phil. 2.13.
Argument.
If we are saved freely, then not upon condition.
But we are saved freely, Ergo &c.
The Minor is proved by the two last cited places, Ephes. and Rom.
Argument.
Those things that are equally related to God, as being their Author, and are the next and immediate effects of the selfe-same cause, cannot properly be said to be the cause, or effect one of the other.
But such are Faith and Glory. Ergo.
For proof of the Minor, turn to Rom. 8.29, 30. Eph. 1.4, 5. & 2.8. Rom. 6. ult. Iam. 1.17, 18. with many others. Where you read both conformity to the Image of Christ, vocation, justification; and glorification [Page 29] as proceeding of the same cause, viz. foreknowing, i. e. fore-loving. There also have you faith called the gift of God; so likewise, eternall life.
Argument.
That, according to which men are saved, was before the world began.
But faith was not before the world began: Ergo, faith is not that, according to which men are saved.
The Major proved, 2 Tim. 1.9. the words these: Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy-calling, not according to our workes, but according to his owne purpose, and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus, before the world began.
Argument.
If Glory proceed from Divine love, as the onely cause, and that freely; then is Faith neither the cause (whether sociall or solitary) nor condition of glory.
But the former is true, therefore the latter.
That love is the onely cause, may hence bee demonstrated. Where good, as good, is destinated to a proper and ultimate object; It is either so destinated from some engagement, obligation, or respect of merit, or else out of pure love. But on God lay no engagement, or obligation of predestinating good to man. Whence should it arise? He was then alone. If you [Page 31] alledge the very purpose itself, what caused such a purpose?
Was it not love still? Nor is there much merit to be found in the Object, Man: of whō the person that predestinated, beareth witnesse, that Every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was onely evill continually. Isaiah also acknowledgeth, that All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags, &c. chap. 64. v. 6. Well then might Paul say, Rom. 3.24. Being justified freely, &c. Yea, and God pronounces, I wil love them freely, Hos. 14.4.
Argument.
For which Objects sake simply, God had ordained, and to which hee properly did referre the greatest accident possibly, [Page 32] the highest demonstration, and most excellent instance of his love could be given. To that Object, it is incongruous, yea, absurd to affirm; He would think much, and refuse to adde also a gift of much lesser value freely.
But for mans sake God hath done the precedents, viz. in the Redemption. Ergo, &c. And this is in substance, the very Argument of the Apostle himselfe, Rom. 8.32. where hee saith: He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all: how shall hee not with him also freely give us all things?
Argument.
To whom God intended the bestowing of a gift, for durance, eternall; for degree, most excellent: to them he did [Page 33] also intend to give a temporall, and far lesse excellent gift; being yet such as ought necessarily to antecede the other.
But to some men God intended the precedent, (glory wee mean:) Ergo, the consequent also: Inherit the Kingdome prepared for you from the foundation of the world, Matth. 25.34. This Kingdome is afterwards called, Life eternall, vers. ult.
Thus then you have it cleared to you from our fore-going dissertation, First, (to wit) That God before time knew the future persons severally, of all those (without exception) that are or shall bee glorified. Secondly; that Gods conferring of glory to the same persons, is, and was free, and absolute, without having respect [Page 34] to any thing (as thereunto requisite) in, of, or for them.
By the first, is refuted that opinion, according to which, even those (all or some) who are dead, andFor they hold not of suffering hells torments, till after the day of judgment. reserved for everlasting woe, might, and had power to have beleeved, and consequently been sav'd eternally. For doubtlesse, such as are reserv'd for hell, were never known of God, as being in the number of those hee ordained to glory, or accounted for such.
By the 2d Conclusion appears the falsity of their other opiniō, namely: That God preordained no man to life eternal, without respect to, and forsake of his future beleeving. So we end.