The first Letter to Master J. G.

WHether or no I possesse honourable and eminent thoughts of your self, I shall refer you to those expressions, which my Conscience commanded me to dictate to you, before my going into the Ar­my, whereby you may judge; and because the ground on which those expressions of mine to you ward, was that of God which I saw in you; I know no bet­ter way whereby to endeavour my retaining intirely my due esteeme of you, then to desire; That by, and in you, the ground thereof may continue firme, and immovable; which in mine eye seemes at present much to flag and stagger, and that from some assertions, which specially the last Sabboth being April 14. 1644. I received from you therefore to prevent the least besieg­ing such an adversary, whose heart lyes fair and open to me, as I well know by experience from that utterly undeserved respect, I have found from you; I shall in the strength of this presump­tion adventure rudely upon the work intended.

Wherein I must necessarily content my self, with signifying to you some particulars, which to me seem evidently lyable to exception, suspending the least taking notice of such things, which possibly, on due consideration may be found to require more exact scrutiny. Whereof as touching what I shall at pre­sent mention, I must satisfie my self to hint things in an indigest­ed, and disorderly manner; having been prevented by the inter­vening of other unexpected occurrences, therefore for most con­cisenesse therein, though I count it my best course, to have extra­cted the substance of all, wherein I am unsatisfied, first intire­ly by it self, yet I may not attempt that, but must onely name [Page 2]such particulars of that kinde, Immediately before what I shall affirme in order, touching each one respectively: wherein not de­siring to depend on mine own Judgement onely, least I might have mistaken you, I by conference, finde some others do conceive you so to have delivered your self in those particulars, as I my self conceive thereof.

You may therefore remember, that the substance of your third motive to naturall men, in reference to their accepting of Grace, according to what you insisted upon, 1 Cor. 1.3. was to this effect, That if such will but ingage themselves, and all within them, ac­cording to their naturall power, to seek for this Grace, they shall not miscarry, but stirring up themselves in good earnest to seek this Grace, they shall surely finde it: Which after your glancing at the Antinomians, you prest more largely, and that by backing this motive with two Texts, John 6. v. 37. and Mat. 7. v. 7.

Which Scriptures you alleadge, to prove, That if men improve their Naturall abilities to the utmost (which is the strength of the motive) in seeking Grace, they shall finde it.

Concerning which Texts I cannot as yet see any such thing proved by them, for the former whereof, John 6.37. Whosoever comes, &c. This you understand indefinitely, whosoever naturall man comes; And in what manner must he come? With, or in the strength of his naturall abilities; such a one Ile in no wise cast out; which you acknowledge, imports affirmatively, I will accept, which might be proved to import so much from, John 5. v. 40. Where life is annexed to comming. Now as touching this Text, 'tis true, that whosoever being a naturall man, shall through the full improvement of naturall powers, so come to Christ, as is here meant, that is, after a saving manner, even with saving saith, which kinde of comming can onely carry life, as this here doth; Such a one assuredly shall not be cast out by Christ, no more then he which doth the Law perfectly shall yet dye: for the Law will keep promise (though none can claim ought thence) namely, That the man that doth them, shall live in them; but this is far from proving, that a man by improving his naturalls shall come to Christ savingly by virtue thereof, no more then a man may do the Laws works, and live in them; concerning which Paul peremptorily and rationally concludes in that Gal. 3.11. That no man can live by virtue of his performing that Covenant: but there [Page 3]will be further occasion ministred by what follows, whence to speak further in reference to this place quoted, which was there but briefly touched for a proof of that, which it seems not in the least to do.

The next alledged is Mat. 7. v. 7. and that for the same purpose to which must refer, as above; concerning which place 'tis most cleer, that that Text importing commands prest, and promises an­nexed, are laid down in most generall tearms, therefore for the true understanding of the nature of our duty, or our right manner of performance thereof, we must consult with other Scriptures where 'tis laid down more particularly, and not understand the words in a strict literall sence. That we must not understand it, as barely exprest, without limitation or qualification, I prove from this; that other Scriptures gain-say such a sence, [...]s that Jam. 4.3. Ye aske and receive not, Why not? not for want of asking, they did aske, yet 'twas not given: so then, To all that aske it shall not be given; men may so aske as that their asking shall ne­ver be given them, the default wherein may be double, from the end of their asking to satisfie lusts. But is that all? No, another default is the want of a due qualification in the asking, which is as necessary as Salvation it self, and that is an asking in faith; so Iam. 1.6. in the fifth verse, he gives out a promise indefinitely, If any of you: of whom? Naturall improvers? No, of you belee­vers, for that he supposed in the third verse, the trying of your faith, they had faith to try; let such aske in faith, acting that power of faith, created by Gods Spirit in them; but let him aske in faith, let him not think it enough to aske in any fash [...]on, but onely in faith, which tearms, but and faith, exclude all oth [...]r ask­ings from receiving: which is plainly exprest in verse 7. Let not that man think to receive, what man? that man whosoever, be he ever so able to improve his naturall abilities in asking, as long as he askes without faith, let not such a one think to receive, for 'tis to think the Scrpture lyes: if then this place quoted, will prove that naturall men improving themselves in good earnest in asking, shall hav [...], as you expresly affirmed, then it follows (as I conceive) that a naturall man may by improving his own power, be inabled to aske in faith, for such an asking onely is sure to receive, but if we will take Pauls judgement, he affirms, Eph. 1.9. That the power by which we beleeve, is not our own fully improved, but [Page 4] that exceeding greatnesse of power, which raised Christ from the dead: faith is by grace, and not naturall improvement; but you will say this is granted, that tis wrought by God; namely, upon naturall improvements: to which I reply, Tis true you exprest that, but yet in these two quotations, you apply or rather subject (as I conceive) these promises under the power of naturall men, whom you make to have power in themselves, to put themselves under these Promises, and within the Covenant, else they could not be so certain, touching Gods performing them to themselves; which to prove, you directly alleadged them; in which places there's no tittle of any such promise, that upon their improve­ment, God will give faith, and so they shall be accepted, and yet you undertake to prove, that they may so performe the condition on their side, as reciprocally to make God bound to receive them into his grace thereupon according to his promise.

Further in reference to that, Mat. 7.7. Aske, &c. but how shall we aske? Iohn 15. verse 16. Whatsoever ye doke in my Name, the Father will give, Acts 4. verse 12. No name under heaven whereby to be saved, or no other power, Therefore no naturall, how ever improved, A [...]sk in my Name, not your own, but so long as we ask by the strength of our naturall abilities, 'tis in our own name and power, and therefore shall not avail, because not in Christs Name.

Object But may not our naturall power be improved to such height, as whereby, and whereupon God may be ingaged by virtue of them, to accept us in Christs Name?

Answ No, in no wise, for then ther's another name or power besides Christs, which can ingage God, which would peremptorily con­tradict the Scripture.

Again, this injunction Aske and it shall be given, is chiefly directed to the Disciples, for 'twas a part of that Sermon Preached to them in speciall, as whereby they might the better know how to deal with the Iews, as the beginning of it shews, chap. 5. verse 1, 2. Yea, the verse immediately foregoing this under censure was primarily in reference to them; Give not that that's holy, Nor cast your Pearls, &c. They were then such as had things that were holy, and pearls, yea to give, and cast; therefore such who not onely had those holy things, but had them as Stewards of the Treasures of heaven, thereby directing them, to whom to [Page 5]give them, to which the following promise, Aske and have, fitly belongs: but this liberty befits not a carnall one, 'tis ill trusting such with such large promises, who have no such holy things or pearls, to give or cast.

But to proceed, you on a fourth sub-divided head, undertook to give out the meaning of that tearm, of being dead in trespasses and sins, which you shewed, was meant of such, as were voyd of all knowledge of God, not as onely being in a state of condem­nation, but in that they had no injoyment of the Spirit of God at all, nor of its workings, which works in some kinde alwayes where-ever the Gospell is preached, Dead, that is, said you, Sate in darknesse, and shaddow of death, destitute of all means of know­ledge, by hearing the Gospell, whereto you added; But you are not so dead, for as much as you live under Gospell light.

As touching which, to me as yet, the main or intire design of the Apostle in that Ephes. 2. to verse 9. is to prove that more par­ticularly, which he had avouched, in chap. 1. verse 19. in generall; namely, that we beleeve through the working of that very excee­ding great power, which raised Christ from the dead, which he demonstrates from the difficulty of the work of faith; not at all shewing by what outward meanes that power wrought, or by what instrument but the great difficulty of the work, in that 'tis no lesse than a quickning from the dead, parallell to Christs, which nothing but an Almighty power could effect; and whether they had the Gospell preached along space to them, or the contrary, that makes nothing to his purpose, for they were quickned by the Gospell, as a means used, and whether God doth it at first hearing as 3000. are conceived to be at once, or whether afterwards; still tis done by the same Almighty power alone, improving that means (for faith comes by hearing) and that in one instant, whe­ther sooner or later. And that they here said to be dead in sins, were such as sate in darkenesse, &c. seems very strange, considering the persons so said to be dead: We were dead; Who? I Paul, and you Ephesians. Whereof concerning Paul, what more contro­dictory, than to say, Paul had not the light of the Gospell as we have, and therefore not so dead: concerning whom 'tis most cer­tain, from his own affirmation of what he did in point of per­secution, that 'twas out of zeal, he followed his light, therefore he so long continued to hear the Gospell, before he persecuted it, [Page 6]as according to his utmost power, to see whether it were fals or true, and after that (seeing ground sufficient, by his light to justifie, yea to require his zealous persecution thereof) for a long time, he was ingaged in a way of persecution, bearing the Office of a Promooter or Informer, carrying letters, &c. to the chief Coun­cells, and how pragmaticall he was in that designe, might be proved at large from Acts 7. the end, and Acts 8. verse 1.2. He must then needs live in the time of the Gospell (when he might have had means of grace, but rejected it all the time wherein he persecuted the Gospell: he could not persecute the Gospell in a time wherein the Gospell was not preached, or professed: he would not fight with his own shaddow; Therefore he sate not in the shaddow of death.

Yea, it seemes easie to prove, he had the Gospell a long time before, and that upon record, which was in great request with him, being written in the Prophets, which he searched; and that in them he read Gospell, is clear from Rom. 1.17. For therein, In what? In the Gospell of Christ, is revealed faith, &c. How proves he this? It follows, as 'tis written; What's written shall testifie to what he asserts, and 'tis written, The just shall live by faith: Where written? In the New Testament? No, that was not written when he spake this; Where then? In the Gospell preached by Habbacuck chap. 2. ver. 4. So this Paul affirms, Rom. 10.11. The Scripture saith, who beleeves on him, even Iesus Christ, shall not be ashamed; namely, notwithstanding all opposers, even by vertue of his justification: and where doth the Scripture say thus, which is the sum of the Gospell, even in Esay 28.11.

As touching the Ephesians, in what sence Paul was dead, so were they; We who were dead, he makes his own and their con­dition joyntly one; and that the Ephesians distinctly conside­red, sate not in darknesse, seemes hence, in that he directed that Epistle To the Saints at Ephesus, as being a place, where men pro­fest the Gospell, and therefore lived under it.

But hence, to proceede to the fifth particular, next ensuing the former, to this effect.

Men that are so dead in sins, &c. have a naturall life, of reason, Iudgement, understanding, conscience, &c. by vertue whereof men are able to weigh and ponder such wayes or means tendred to them, yea such a power they have in them, as whereby (if they will put it [Page 7]forth, and imploy it accordingly,) they may do such things, as unto which God hath by way of promise, annexed grace and acceptation.

For which besides the places mentioned; namely, those already questioned, Iohn 6.37. and Mat. 7.7. you further alleadged, Prov. 2. verse 1, 2, 3. and Ioh. 6.27.

Now in reference to this fifth assertion, I cannot but as yet utter­ly deny naturall men, to be able so to improve naturall power, as to ingage God, &c. according to the affertion prescript.

For which end, I shall first deny the same to be proved in the least, by those other Texts alleadged.

For that in Prov. 2. verse 1.2. &c. I yet see no reason at all, why it should be understood as spoken to naturall men, but good reason whence to conclude it spoken positively of beleevers; My Son, Whose son? Wisedomes son, or the son of Solomon, inspired with the spirit of Wisdome, or of him rather, typisied by Salomon Jesus Christ, the wisedome of the Father; My Son, or thou who art begotten again of Wisedome, and my reason why he means not Naturall men, I deduce out of the first chapter: a great part whereof, even from verse 8. to 20. is directed to beleavers, in op­position to Naturall men, termed sinners, (by which term such are most obviously pointed out in Scripture,) which I gather from verse 7. where, having to the 7. verse, set forth the excellent use of the book, To know Wisdome &c. in the 7. verse he declares to whom they shall become so excellent, or on what terms men at­tain excellency by studdying this book, exprest thus; The fear of the Lord is the beginning of knowledge, but fools, &c. So that the fundamentall qualification, by virtue whereof men come to be proficients in the School of Spirituall wisdome, is this, That they have the fear of the Lord; thats the beginning of all saving know­ledge, the very first lesson, first of all to be learned, as funda­mentall.

But shall not naturall men upon improving naturall abili­ties, attain sound knowledge? No, all besides such as have the ground-work of all layd in them, even the fear of the Lord, are excluded so long from all spirituall and saving know­ledge, as in the terme ensuing, But fools despise, &c. Who are those fools? all without exception, that have not this fear; How is that proved? Because that's the very beginning of knowledge; Therefore so long as they are not as yet Ab [...]darians, [Page 8]having not the beginning of knowledge, they must needs be fools; and that by fools is meant, All that have not the Lords fear in them, and therefore must be a note of exclusion to all that have not this fear, seemes clear, because all are comprehended in these two, such as have feare, and fools; and no medium between. According to which double position laid down in vers. 7. shew­ing who they were that learned wisdome by these Proverbs, and and who not: He directs his Exhortation to him that could learn Wisdome; namely, who is possest with this fear, and that most peculiarly, by way of excluding it from all others: My Son, if sinnes, verse 10. Again, verse 15. My Son walk not thou in the way with them, so that the holy Ghost, that Spirit of Wisdome, makes a mighty difference between him that is his Son, as one be­gotten a new by him; who hath Gods fear, and all others not ha­ving it.

Object But cannot all others attain Spirituall knowledge as well as he, by exact improving naturall abilities? No, for thereby they cannot purchase the ground-work, The fear of the Lord.

Answ But yet in the 22. and 23. verses, she directs her voyce in gene­rall to all in the strees, simple ones, scorners, and fools hating know­ledge, &c. That they would turn from their folly by Wisdomes reproofs, may not such qualifie themselves by their naturall im­provements, that they may assuredly attain saving Wisedome, or turn from their folly at Wisdomes reproofs? No, for in verse 23. having in the first part of it commanded, Fools, Turn ye at my reproof: to prevent an Objection, How shall we turn? The holy Ghost declares how this work is wrought, undertaking it himself; Behold, or take notice how this great overture is brought about, even thus: Ile poure out my Spirit to you, Ile make known my words to you: First, pour out my Spirit, whereby possessing you with the fear of the Lord, and so will make known, &c. after; laying first the foundation of all saving knowledge.

Object But how appeares it that their improving Naturalls did not render them capable by ingaging God, &c. even of saving know­ledge?

Answ Even thus, besides whats before, because those whom wise­dome undertakes to give saving knowledge to, were no otherwise qualified, than the worst of them, against whom he resolvedly protests, never to give saving knowledge to: Behold, Ile pour out [Page 9]my spirit to you; to whom? you who have improved your natu­rall abilities, so as to ingage me? No: to whom then? To you sim­ple ones that love simplicity, scorners delighting in scorning, and to you fools hating knowledge; by which we may judge whether they qualified themselves, or ingaged God by Naturall improve­ments: How is the work done then? even by the Spirits over­powring of such thats the onely ground of the difference be­tween persons in themselves alike qualified; and therefore no precedent improvement, though ever so transcendent, for the lat­ter sort from whom the Spirit will for ever with hold the saving operation, are exprest to have the selfe-same qualifications, to hate knowledge, &c.

Or if by Son you mean men improving their naturall abilities, as that to them the promise is certainly made, it shall be granted you, that be he what he will, Whosoever askes as is there requi­red, he shall have his desire granted; but it follows not therefore that naturall men can so aske: The thing promised on asking you acknowledge to import acceptation with God: but shall it be had upon every asking? No, Tis Wisdome whereof James tells us in the place fore-named, in expresse termes, it cannot be had but upon asking in faith; so that whosoever be meant by Son here, he must aske in faith; without which his naturall improvements ingage not God at all. Not but that such must improve naturall abilities, for 'tis their duty, but yet thereupon 'tis not Gods duty to confer Grace.

Again, for I decline exact method, as not becoming me; the manner after which this duty is to be done, appears expresly to be with greatest attention and intention; Apply thy heart &c. If thou cryest after, liftest up thy voyce, seekest her as silver, &c. Now according to that known saying, Ignoti nulla cupido, 'tis impossi­ble meer naturall men, not possest with the fear of God, which is the very beginning of all saving knowledge; should be able so to apply their hearts, cry after it, seek &c. Taking pains as one digging in a mine for hid Treasures: swine are not wont to take such paines for pearls. As yet therefore I cannot conceive this ex­hortation to be chiefely directed to naturall men, as having a pow­er so to perform the duty, as to ingage God to instate them in the promise, which to prove you bring it, but in strictnesse and pro­priety, as 'tis a promise 'tis onely absolutely given to them that [Page 10]have faith, though the condition on our part so concerns naturall men, as to inform them what their duty is, as all other of Gods Commands do, with making known of which, God is not bound to inable all that know their duty to do it; so that while naturall, 'tis impossible for them to keep any one savingly.

The next Text alledged is, John 6.27. Labour, &c. For that meat which endures to eternall life, which the son of man shall give to you; namely, (said you) Upon labouring, even Naturall mens Labouring, to whom you direct the exhortation, and that to prove the fifth assertion prescribed, to which refer; so that by Labour you understand a mans improving his Naturalls with greatest diligence; on which, God according to his promise will give everlasting meat, or saving Grace, whereby to interest them into Christ, who is life everlasting. But that by Labouring here Christ means not their own full improvement of Naturall abilities, only or chiefely, as whereunto annexing a promise seemes evident; because by Labouring he means true beleeving, which I prove from 28. and 29. verses, Christ having exhorted them to La­bour, &c. Thereupon they perceiving the Exhortation to import Everlasting life, were inquisitive in verse 28. What shall we do, that we might so labour, for the word for Labour in the 27. vers. [...], and that in 28. verse following [...], translated might work, are the same, so that their question propounded was in reference to the duty injoyned before, that they might under­stand the nature of that Command, whereto Christ answers, tel­ling them what labour or work 'twas he required of them; where the word translated work [...], answers the Verb, whence also the Verb is derived, and so joyntly import Labour in all three verses, which work then is to beleeve in Jesus Christ, as is direct­ly laid down in expresse termes, verse 29. If then labouring im­ports the saving work of beleeving, then 'tis more then utmost improvement of Naturalls, because by such improvement, we can­not work the great work of faith: so then by Labour he com­mands more then Naturall improvement. And because 'tis a work far above the reach of mans Naturall improvements, he that giv [...]s it in command undertakes to work his own will, or command in them, which follows, Which the Son of man shall give unto you. So as 'tis here granted, Christ requires them to improve their na­turall abilities, but yet withall, that also which is infinitely above [Page 11]them all, how fully soever improved, even saving faith, Which the Son of man shall give, they must impove, &c. but yet after all, must rest in nothing but Christs gift, they were so to labour by naturall improvement, as to submit to, or rather close with the Spirits ex­ceeding great inspiring power, whereby it works faith.

Object But could they not so labour by naturall improvement, as to ingage Christ to give them everlasting meat, certainly upon their labouring, which 'tis brought to prove?

Answ For Answer, as yet I conceive, that they had no promise made on their meer Labour, though to utmost improving naturall abilities, which I prove thus clearly, because they did labour according to their power, for they took as good a course as naturall reason could prescribe: First, they desired to understand what their du­ty exprest by the tearm Labour did import; next they desired in a most rationall way, some good ground whereon to stablish, or bottome this their duty of beleeving even by some sign, which was an ancient manner of confirming great matters, in answere whereto he declares himself to be the true signe from heaven, the bread of God; whereupon according to the strength of naturall understanding imprinting in them a desire of happinesse, because 'tis again, and again affirmed to be the bread of life, they put forth the utmost of their Naturall abilities in this great request; Lord ever more give us this Bread, whence Christ again declares himselfe to be that Bread, and further tells them who should par­take thereof, even he that comes to me, or beleeves in me, (not eve­ry comming, for these came, yet to them he saith, ye beleeve not) shall never hunger, &c. whereby alluring them to come, and yet after their improvement of naturall abilities in affectionate as­kings, Christ tells them, Ye come not so, as to have life.

But is not their not improving Naturalls given as the reason thereof? Object

Answ No, in no wise, for they improved their Reason, judgement, &c. to the utmost; yet further, to finde out how it should be true, That Christ was the bread of heaven, and that by inquiry into his stem, or Parentage whence he was; the best course their natu­rall light could guide them to, which they followed in verse 41. and 42. but doth Christ hereupon tell them; Ye have not yet ful­ly improved your naturalls, therefore 'tis you beleeve not? or doth he expresse by way of promise, that because you have impro­ved, [Page 12]&c. in reasoning, disputing, begging, &c. Therefore according to my sure promise, ingaging me, Ile second your improvement with grace, I will give it you? No, but contrarily, the reason why they cannot come to life, or beleeve, which he had said in verse 36. he gives them in verse 44. No man can, or hath power to come, Except the Father draw him, which act he was not inga­ged to put forth on them, notwithstanding their most rationall im­provements; Except the Father draw him, not except he draws, or surely ingages the Father by improvements, but there will be ne­cessity of further inlargements on this from what follows; we see here, that insteed of being ingaged by promise by naturall im­provements, we have the contrary; he saith not because you have imployed Naturalls, therefore according to my promise, I will s [...]cond it with grace, but contrarily notwithstanding your utmost improvements; Yet No man (be he ever so accurate in naturall improvements) can come, except the Father draw him, which to do, no improvements can draw God.

You next alleadged another Scripture, Luke 13.24. Strive to enter in; but as touching this I finde no absolute promise of Grace annex­ed, from Gods being ingaged by naturall improvements, therefore not as yet seeing any thing considerable therein, whereof to take notice, shall step over to what appeares to be of greater moment.

Wherein, though I conceive it sufficient to have deposed what I conceive, against the proofs whereon you ground your fifth as­sertion, yet I shall with great presumption on your patience, and candid construction, give my grounds for the contrary; namely, to prove that Naturall men, dead, &c. have not such a power of Reason, Judgement, &c. as whereby if they will accordingly put it forth, they may do such things, as whereunto God hath by promise annexed Grace, which I conceive might be clearly made out from sundry Scriptures, whereof to Name, 2. or 3.

One is, Iohn. 5. verse 39. Search the Scriptures, concerning which, though the first word be usually rendered, as the Impera­tive Mood, Search ye as a Command given to search, yet for my part, as yet (with Submission to the judicious) I finde not, how it may be read with good sence any other way, then as the Indicative Mood, ye do search; which I ground not onely on my own Judgement (though I finde this that the Originall Word [...], Scrutamini, may as properly be so rendered) for as [Page 13]I remember, 'tis the Judgement of Doctor Homes, as in his book Of new Heavens and new Earth, I have seen, though not since divers moneths by-gone: and that it may most properly be thus rendred, may (as I conceive) be most cleerly proved from the context: the occasion of all Christs discourse, from the 19. verse of that 5. chap. seemes chiefely to arise, from whats expres­sed in verse 18. where this is given as one reason, why they sought to kill Christ, because he had said, God was his Father, making himself equall with God, &c. Whereupon Christ all along for­ward, in a most convincing manner, proves the truth of that for which the Jews would needs have slain him, to which purpose telling them, God sent not Christ onely to bear witnesse of him­selfe, but sent his fore-runner John, to bear witnesse, which John ye sent to your selves, verse 33. who accordingly bave witnesse of me; and he was once a man in great credit with you, therefore why might not his Testimony carry it? Yea, after he had named other grounds of testimony from his Works done, and the Fathers own Testimony that sent him, he adds yet a further ground of confirmation in this 39. verse, even from their own practise, as be­fore, in sending to know Johns judgement; so here, from their own diligent inquiry into the Scriptures, ye do search, even your selves do; the scriptures, namely the writings of the Prophets which alone were then written, as of Moses particularly insisted on.

Again, that they did search them is clear from what follows, Moses shall accuse you, verse 45. whose Accusation shall be a suf­ficient witnesse against them without Christs: Why? Because th [...]y perused his writings, and so were rendred inexcuseable: yea further cleer from the concluding clause of that 45. verse, In whom, (viz. Moses) ye trust, or, [...], in whom ye hope: now had they not searched diligently, and conformed to his wri­tings, they would not have built such hope thereon; knowledge must precede confidence. Which acception supposed to be most warrantable, seemes considerable towards the proof of whats affirmed. Ye search which word imports exact and accurate scrutiny, and no marvail, for therefore ye search, [...] because in them, ye think to have eternall life, upon this very ground they searched, and therefore with all their utmost care and diligence, as conceiving to finde life in them; which Paul himself, that strict Pharisee searched so into, as that he thought, he had found [Page 14] life in them, but yet was dead, whiles so alive, Rom. 7, 8, 9. and they are they that testifie of me, those Scriptures which ye think to have life by from the letter of them, testifie of me: what? it must have reference (as I conceive) to what they sought for: namely, eternall life, they testifie then that what life ye think to have in them, must be had in me, they send you from themselves to the Messia, pointed at by them, as John sent such as he baptized with water, to Christ, to be baptized with the Holy Ghost. Notwith­standing your searching, ye will not come to me that ye might have life, which proves that mens naturall improvements do not in­gage God to give them saving faith, without which, through utmost improvements they could only look on the Scripture while pointing to a Messia, but as a covenant of works and learned by all, but to be selfe Justiciaries; which sanctuary of justification by works we most obviously finde was the strongest one, which the profoundest wisdome of the Jewes could erect, Rom. 10.8.

Object But it may be objected, Christ in Verse 40. charges them with this, Ye will not come to have life, or in faith; doth it not hence seem that they might have power to believe or to ingage God to to give faith, which power they did not put forth as they might; and that's the reason why ye believe not?

Answ Whereto for answer, for the former supposition, that they might have power to believe, that you absolutely conclude against. For the latter, which you avouch, that they might so ingage them­selves in improvements as to ingage God to give faith, this must as yet be denied, because here they did improve to their utmost their naturals in searching, even as for life, and yet God added not faith, which is most undeniably proved in Chap. 6. from Verse 28 to 45. Wherein, the whole discourse most inevitably demonstrates that they did as it were put all their naturall powers of reason, judgement, &c. on the wrack, as is before shewed by propound­ing questions, rationall discussing them, praying for, &c. But all this did not make Christ confesse, I see you have done your utmost, therefore Ile perform mine engagements to give saving faith: no, he tearms their strongest reasonings but murmurings, adding no promise thereunto, and therefore not ingaged thereby so to do; and consequently their not improving naturals is not the reason of Gods not giving faith, which I prove plainly from Chap. 6. Verse 44. where after he had said in Chap. 40. ye will not come, that [Page 15]is in faith, being to life, and repeated it more plainly in Chap. 6. Ʋerse 36. ye believe not, after their great reasoning on the matter, Christ tells them the reason of their not believing, to put an end to their murmurings and disputings, murmure not, &c. think not so to prevaile by your reasonings, as if God were bound thereon to give you saving knowledge, or thereby surely to attaine faith: why so? 'tis added Verse 44. because Gods free dispensation is the great reason, No man can come to me except the Father draw him: not, ye cannot come because of not improving naturals. Not­withstanding which, ye come not, because the father must draw, before ye can come savingly, which God is not bound to do by vertue of your improvements, still continuing a free agent in dis­pensing grace. No man can come, &c. No man whosoever, un­der which indefinite tearm he comprehends all howsoever quali­fied, or improved, concluding the ground of all mens being not able, or not having power to come to God, to be Gods not draw­ing them: Gods suspending grace, which he may do from whom he pleases, is given as the ground of the defect of faith in every man whomsoever that wants it, therefore not the want of naturall im­provements, he tells them, no man can come, by which tearme of exclusion he debars all without exception, that are not drawne, that so these that were most inquisitive according to naturall light, might not wonder at their exemption, though they had proceeded in a probable way, and course in order thereto. Non-improve­ment cannot (as I conceive) be a true ground of not believing, because utmost improvement cannot procure believing, and there­fore is no true, or certain ground, or reason of our believing, which you make it (as I conceive) and that by making it to engage God to give faith; whereas the Fathers not drawing is given as the onely reason of it, and not a want of being ingaged by us: Publi­cans and Sinners were as capable of faith as the learned Scribes, and did as much ingage God, though it be commendable for natu­rall men to do their utmost, yea, and most hopefull, for as much as they are in Gods way.

Object Another proof is, Rom. 11.7. Israel hath not obtained grace, but did he seek for't? yes, for 'tis said, what Israel sought for he ob­tained not: did he not, what God required in order thereto?

Answ For answer, what God requires, Math. 7. v. 7. fore toucht on, Seek, &c. that Israel is said to have done here, in respect of the [Page 16]outward performance as naturall men; the command, Seek, in Matthew is of the simple Verbe [...], the duty here acknow­ledged to be done by them, is of the compounded Verbe [...], requiro, as if they had sought with such earnestnesse and confi­dence, as one requiring or commanding, which they might justly have commanded, if by their seeking they could ingage God to accept them, as according to a promise made; for God by the law of his faithfulnesse is bound to performe the law of his promi­ses. Yes, the word here being the compound Verbe seems to im­port, if it might be, greater inteation in seeking then that in Mat­thew, therefore elsewhere translated expeto, as Matth. 12.39. it appears' then they sought with utmost intention, according to na­turall power: but whence is it they fail'd of their end? we shall finde the ground of the difference evidently to be Gods free di­spensation, and that from a double demonstration from the ground given, why others obtained grace, but the election hath obtained; what's the reason why some above others, seeing all are said to have sought for't, even by virtue of their election? which is put in opposition to such as attained not, though carefull seekers alike, shewing, tis not seeking (for he was found of them that sought him not) but Gods free election, that diversified their conditions in respect of grace, who in respect of naturall endeavours, sought one as well as another.

But what's the reason the non-election obtained not? 'tis ad­ded, the rest were blinded: how blinded? thats shewed by rehear­sing, a sore judgement of spirituall blindnesse which God poured on them, denounced in Esay 29.10. God hath given them the spi­rit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, &c. or God hath sus­pended the saving discovery of faith, without which they have onely their own naturall wisdome to improve, which is but as eyes, that cannot see, we finde no other ground given for the clearing of the matter: which place now alleadged being so plain­ly pertinent for expedition sake, I shall commend to your conside­ration for a more rationall and methodicall concluding thence, what's proved thereby, especially, as it may most aptly be consi­dered in opposition to what was asserted from Matth. 7.7. for as much as we here see, there's a seeking which shall never finde. But declining this, shall proceed to another proof; wherefore I might as I conceive as fitly alleadge that in Matth. 11.25. Christ [Page 17]blesses the Father, for that he hid from the wise and prudent, what was revealed to babes: what's the reason? is it because the prudent were lesse able, or diligent? no, that were strange; but the reason is added, even so Father. Why is it so? for it seemed good in thy sight: or thus; because it pleased thee, 'twas the good pleasure of his will; who suspending grace from men most probably capa­ble in the eye of reason, dispended it to Babes, which were in no probable way of attaining it, thereby to honour his own freedome; nothing is said to make the difference between each party but Gods revealing, and that with infinite perfection of freedome, be­cause 'twas agreeable to the good pleasure of his will.

Againe, Matth. 13.10. said the Disciples, Why speakest thou to them in parables? i.e. to the Jewes: Christ answers, Because, to you is given to know the mysteries, and not to them. Christ uttered himself in a dark mysticall way to them; because, God who is a free giver of free-grace suspended the gift of his grace, whereby to magnifie his freedome; and he shewes, he doth this in answer to the prophecy of Esay 6.9.10. where 'tis, Goe tell them, heare ye indeed, and understand not, &c. make their hearts fat, and their eares heavie, &c. According whereto he speaks here mystically, leaving them to their own naturall blindnesse; so that it seemes clear, the ground of the difference was from Gods free dispensa­tion, ye understand they not; because to you, is given, to them not.

Object But it may be objected, did not the Disciples improve their na­turals with greater dexterity then the Jewes, so as to engage God, &c.

Answ For answer, Christ gives this as a full and pertinent answer to the question propounded, by which answer he resolves all, into the free grace of God, in giving it to some, and not to others; and whether or not the Disciples diversified themselves from the Jewes in point of ing [...]ging God, by improvements, let us take the example of that Apostle Matthew, that utters this; who was so farre from improving naturals, whereby to ingage Christ to call him, as that he was call'd sitting at the receir of custome, Mat. 9.9. Which as is generally concluded, was a very injurious oppressing office, or service; and as touching him self a generall, he was a Publican, and such we most obviously finde in Scripture ranked with sinners, as the most nefarious and profane; so far short of [Page 18]the Pharisees in point of naturall improvements, as that they coun­ted it unlawfull for Christ to eat with persons so vile, so Matth. 9.11. 'Tis clear then, that in Matthew it must needs be of free gift, without reference to any ingagement, upon his improvement; and if so, then whatsoever was the reason, why grace was given to Matthew, from the same ground or reason tis given to all the rest; for there Christ gives one reason, for, and concerning, all the Disciples at once; which reason being double, hath no respect to ought done by them, to whom 'tis given, as wherby to be engaged, no nor induced: not to ought undone by them, to whom 'tis not given.

Object But it may be objected, from that of Matthew. 13. vers. 12. Whosoever hath, &c. This seems to have relation to some thing in the persons, but in reference to this, as likewise the next forego­ing; and what may be objected against each, I shall not in the least attempt ought now; because, as I remember, the maine of what may be objected against them, may be collected out of your last Exposition-exercise save one; concerning which, as likewise the last of all, I cannot but as yet much dissent from; though since that, have had no opportunity of perusall at all, though upon near­ing, I could not but immediately purpose by your savour humbly to crave some satisfaction, which now shall totally decline, yea, and yet for some season.

Yet another proof, Rom. 10.1, 2, 3. Paul there utters himself in Israels behalf, as having his bowels [...]ouled within him, for them; expressing his pitifull desires, &c. for their salvation: and what's the reason, he is so exceeding desirous of their good? it immedi­ately followes, for I bear them record, &c. But why is he so con­fident of their zeal as to attest it so peremptorily? Doubtlesse, be­cause he knew it in himself before conversion, as he affirmes. And why not according to knowledge? for they were ignorant of Gods righteousnesse, which is of faith: he here solemnly testifies in the behalf of Israel in generall, they had a zeale of God; which must import most ardent affection in them, according to their power: but were they not sparing of their labour [...] were they in earnest? Yea doubtlesse, zeal must import great ardency, as far as their na­turall knowledge could carry them, but not according to use knowledge: all their fault was, they had not saving knowledge, [Page 19]which is all he charges them with, after he had attested them, to have a zeal of God, or those zealous endeavours after righ­teousnesse, which God required; only th [...] wanted the saving eye of faith, to guide their zeal, for they did endeavour also; there­fore 'tis said, going about to stablish, &c. They went about it, or setled to it as their work. And this was the ground of his hearts desire and prayer to God (who had already pardoned Pauls mis­guided zeal, in persecuting the Church) for them, as putting them­selves in Gods ordinary way; yet in the end of the Chapter, he shewes, most of them miscarried, the reason whereof, the 8 Verse of the succeeding Chapter shewes, was Gods suspending grace, as 'tis dilated on before.

How undeniably might it be proved by the example of Paul, if time would permit, who paralell to us, had the Gospell preached as well as written in the Prophets, to improve, how rationall a man was he, how strict in studying and conforming himself to the writings of the Prophets, the rule of life prescribed? so exact therein, as that he affirmes himself as touching the righteousnesse, which was by the Law blamelesse, so that he was able to justifie himself, after his most rationall and diligent searching the Law, and inviolable observing thereof, concluding himself to be alive to the law in the letter, in respect of his own naturall judgement and account, he could learn no better lesson thence, till the spirit of the Law, or by the law, slew him.

Object But did not this his accuratenesse ingage God to give him saving faith?

Answ No, for the contrary is most evident; for after he had to his ut­most improved himself, God gave him up to that horrible sinne of persecution of the Church, for a great space, as is before shewed: which should never have been done, had he been rightly qualified for faith by naturall improvements: God suspends not grace from subjects meetly prepared for it; nor could God have suspended grace from him, had he by his naturall improvements ingaged God to give him grace thereupon: nay, is it not most manifest, as touching all his naturall improvements, that by how much the more transcendent they were, they set him at a greater distance from any capablenesse of saving grace, being so confirmed and confident in his own righteousnesse so much the more, and so de­spising [Page 20]the righteousnesse of Christ; and therefore God smote him in such a wonderfull manner in order to his conviction: and if Pauls improvement could not ingage God to adde grace, which is most undeniable, then neither shall any mans else, while the world stands: for as much as Paul was as arch an improver as can be imagined, which might be abundantly confirmed, but shall not dare; specially, because it would be but a superfluous labour in a thing so obvious; nor yet to enlarge further on this argument at present, though much might be, as I conceive, needfully added, to signifie the dangerous conseqeunces inevitably deduceable from these assertions, which seem much to abridge or confine free grace, as dispensed on more free tearms to some, then to others: as also the poyson which Formalists may suck out of this, who having improved their naturals (as who not in such time of great know­ledge, and countenancing of Religion?) may conclude they be­lieve, because God is bound thereon to adde it, and will performe his engagements; but I shall at present onely insert this following opinion.

Facienti quod in se est, in viribus naturalibus, Deus tenetur dare gratiam sufficientem adsalutem.

Which, and that not long since was exprest by an able Divine, to be a main maxime of the Arminians, and how to distinguish between the importance of your fifth assertion, and this sentence, I must professe I am utterly unable.

But afterwards you gave a distinction by way of caution: namely, that it followes not, that men have a power in them without Gods assistance to believe. Wherefore you added, they have a power, but not a disposition, and that we must distinguish between having a power and an inclination; to which, I at pre­sent say one word: he that hath not a will, hath not a power, and so wants an executive power; by which I conceive you mean a power whereby to execute, which you affirme a naturall man hath. That such want a power, I prove from John 6. verse 44. and 65. where 'tis exprest that a meer naturall man, without the Fa­thers drawing [...] non potest, hath not power; to do what? to come to life, or in faith: so that 'tis clear, as I conceive, that such want a [...], a power whereby to execute, for he that hath not power to will, hath not power to do, therefore God being [Page 21]said to do all in us, is said to work in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure, 2 Phil. 13. as if the willing an act were the all in all, requisite to produce an act▪ which want of power in man you contradicted, in affirming, All that was wanting in the Jewes, or the reason of their not believing is placed in their will, ye will not come, he saith not, ye have no power, ye cannot come, which cannot come is expresly affirmed twice in John 6.44. & 65. But I must most abruptly desist further enlargement as yet, praying the LORD to prosper it for the end intended, even the propa­gating of truth.

Whereto yet to adde one word; if in any particular here mentioned, any assertion of yours may suffer, blame not me, but your self; of whom I may justly say, if any such cause may be found for it. Tu te ipsum, tuis ipsis armis visisti, for that God hath communicated much of my strength, by the way of your Ministery.

The Second Letter to Mr. J. G. In Reply to the SERMON.

UPon failing in my expectation, of your perusing that Copy of your Sermon, preached April 28. 1644. being the Sabbath next after my giving you in two Sheets of writing (which Copy I left at your house the night before your journeying, about May 15.) I since have commended Copies thereof to the strict view of some of your knowne hearers and writers; who upon comparing it with their Noats, finde it exactly to agree with what you delive­red: which the rather I took care to do, because (as I signified in my Noat left for you, with that Copy the night forementioned) I found by the meer reading, and writing that Copy (which alone I had then done) that 'twas mainly intended by way of answer to the Objections in those two sheets presented; and upon further perusall, I finde you intend it for a full and perfect answer: wherein you give two Arguments, which you affirme, are for the clearing of the whole businesse, being for vindication of your fifth assertion opposed, and afterwards you endeavour to clear it from the opinion of Free-will, and that because 'tis charged there to be the same with a maine maxime of the Arminians there exprest, yea, I can conclude no lesse from your very next Sermon follow­ing, preached May 5. wherein, without the least intimation of any Objections behind not cleared. You intimated your clearing the matter from all Objections, and ther [...]upon proceeded to new matter; and that notwithstanding the Friday b [...]fore; being May 3. upon my speech with you about those Obje [...]ions, you informed me, that in perusall you were much straitned in time, and there­upon, at my desire, you seemed to promise further consideration.

And for as much as I finde, that mine end in that discourse gi­ven you in being wholly for the truths advantage, instead of being [Page 38]accomplished is perverted, in that you have thence taken occasion after a grievous manner to defame that truth, which is there grounded on sundry Scriptures against your errour: I count [...] meet to wards the attaining that first end, to endeavour the [...] ­cation thereof against all aspersions cast upon it; else will my for­mer endeavour continue very injurious to that truth, which it was intended to advantage.

Wherein, before my vindicating the main matter, I cannot but take notice of one passage; that whereas upon your inlargements about your fifth Assertion, you gave such an exposition upon Ephes. 2.5. Dead in sinnes, &c. as is at large proved contradictory to evident reason: yet about the beginning of that clearing Sermon, you rehint the same, in these words [Dead in sinnes, &c. in such a sense, as was formerly explained,] and that without the least ti­tle for its vindication.

Another thing to be observed, is your expression touching your fifth Assertion, which you say in the beginning of that Sermon, is [one passage which it seems some did not so clearly understand] and afterwards [which some could not so well understand or compre­hend;] by which you make the ground of all the Controversie, to be a mis-understanding; whereas you repeat the same in these very expressions wherein 'twas opposed, as namely, thus.

That if men will be willing to do unfeinedly what God hath ap­pointed them in a way of nature, God hath promised successe and ac­ceptation in this way: yea, soon after recited thus, Men putting forth themselves to do according to what God hath inabled them to do in a way of nature, God will meet them with grace and acceptation. Yea, most plainly reitrerated in your after shewing the difference between this, and the opinion of Free-will, in these words. Their opinion asserts not a sufficiency of executive power to do such things as whereto grace is annexed by promise. By which you di­versifie your opinion from theirs, clearly shewing, that Your opi­nion asserts a power to do such things, as whereto grace is annexed by promise, which are the very tearms opposed; now it is hard to conceive, how I should mis-understand, in opposing your expres­sions so often given: whereof you give one various expression; namely, That if men do their utmost, &c. they shall have answerable successe: which expression directly overthrowes your Tenent, That man may so do, as to ingage God to give grace; for if upon [Page 39]improvement God gives answerable successe, then certainly he gives not saving-grace; for there is an infinite disproportion and unanswerablenesse betweene mans naturall improvement, and Gods superadding supernatur all grace: such shall have answera­ble successe; namely, in respect of naturall indowments, they shall have the use of their naturals continued, augmented, and shall not be given up to vile affections, which Rom. 1.26. is the punishment of abusers of naturals, but this is far short of saving-grace, which you make to be but successe answerable. Having therefore recei­ved abundant confirmation that I no way mis-understood the er­rour, I shall now take boldnesse to proceed; wherein, as God shall assist me, I shall endeavour to sound the depths of those two grand clearing Arguments, supposing, that if God shall inable me to levell those Mountaines lying in the way of mine assertion al­leadged against your errour, there will need no further attone­ment for that which you make utterly incurable by any mediation of reason, consideration, distinction, project, &c. one or other: Towards vindication of which mine assertion, (namely, That men naturally have not power to do such things, as whereto God hath pro­mised grace;) I conceive it very meet here to premise a very perti­nent Observation, which I received from your selfe, in a Sermon preached June 12.1639. at Caple; on John 20.31. wherein, when you came to answer Objections, you premised this conside­ration, When men have a truth well grounded on Scripture, though they should meet with a thousand objections, which they could not an­swer, yet they must not therefore cast away the truth, if they can see it through them all, because it is easier to obscure and shadow many truths by objections, then to clear one truth from all objections. See­ing therefore the tenent to be vindicated, hath been bottomed on many Arguments from Scripture, I may not in the least question that truth, till those Scripture-grounds be destroyed, and whether you do not rather shadow a truth then oppose an errour, in that you destroy not one Argument of many, though from Scripture, but only produce two remote Arguments to prove the necessity of your errour, this I commend to any impartiall tryall: as also whe­ther two Arguments alleadged, to arraign and condemne the equi­ty and righteousnesse of Gods proceedings according to his Word (though not to all crosse reasonings) be sufficient to destroy the truth of his Word.

Which being premised, I shall in Gods Name make [...] against those two Arguments, at least, as they oppose the [...] pleaded for.

First then, for the first reason; If men must labour, &c. Then God must destroy man for not doing that which is altogether [...] of his power to doe: which consequence you count most absurd, senselesse, &c.

Touching which consequence so exploded, That God destroyes, &c. that this is fully agreeable with Gods justice, grace; &c. which you say, it so opposeth, I shall prove clearly from your [...] words in your second reason following, viz.

That the Scripture placeth the cause of the equity of Gods pro­ceedings in condemnation still upon mans will, or on some corrupt [...], frowardnesse, or perversenesse found therein.

Whence it thus followes; if it be equity in God no condg [...] man for the sinfulnesse of his will, then God may in equity con­demne man for not doing that which is altogether out of his pow­er to do; but the former you hold and prove true from Scriptures the latter therefore, that God may in equity condemne man, for not doing that which is altogether out of his power to do, inevi­tably followes, because to purifie or rectifie mans will, is altoge­ther out of mans power to do; w^ch thing you peremptorily aff [...] against the tenent of Free-will: so then, that God destroyes men for not doing that, which is altogether beyond their power to do (which here you make so absure, unjust, &c.) this is a direct consequent upon your own ensuing reason; yea, this very reason proves, that Gods destroying man to, is an act of justice and equity.

Object But yet you further objected in discourse, That God destroyes man, not so much for not willing savingly, as for the obstinacy of his naturall will.

Answ For answer whereto; first, this distinction between [...] wi [...]i [...]g savingly, and obstinacy of will, on which you ground the Objecti­on, is of no force at all: for he that wils not savingly, is obstinate in his will: so Rom. 8.7. The carnall minds, or the minding of the flesh, is enmity against God: which tearm flesbly winde, being there opposed to the spirituall minds, takes in every mind that is not spirituall; yea, it includes the will, being a chiese part of the minde: and so every naturall will without exception, is en [...]y, [Page 41]or obstinacy & perversenesse, all which, the tearm enmity imports; so then God destroying man for not willing savingly, doth destroy for obstinacy of will.

Or secondly, wh [...]ther God destroy for enmity of minde, and so of will, or whether for not willing savingly, or according to the expression in that Text, for not subjecting it self to the Law of God; still he destroyes man for not doing that, which is altogether out of his power to do, which is clear from the end of that seventh Verse; where the reason of the mindes, and therein of the wils obstinacy, and of its not becomming subject to Gods law is added, in these words, because it cannot, or because it hath not power, namely to become subject, or to subject it selfe to Gods Law: It must therefore be concluded, that God destroying man upon any of your tearmes, whether for not willing savingly, or for obsti­nacy, perversenesse, &c. doth destroy man for not doing that which is altogether out of his power to do; and consequently, that according to your own grounds, you inevitably plunge your selfe into that very pit of absurdity, which you digg'd; yea, into such an Abysse, as whereout you conclude, No mediation of reason, project, &c. can redeeme: yea, by your very tearms, the justice and equity of God, in such a destroying of man, is undeniably con­firmed: By which reasons, striking so directly the root of your first Argument, I conceive tis clearly removed: neverthelesse be­cause there are such strong holds raised to stand by it, I shall ac­cording to what power God shall vouchsafe me, assault those also.

Wherein, for those high aspersions cast upon the consequent of that opinion, which opposeth yours, which you make so contrary to the tenour, truth of the Gospel, &c. comparing these with what you say after in the conclusion, that [perhapse for the substance of it, tis no more then the truth] which you give as your finall sen­tence past upon the same opinion, I cannot but judge that here you little thought what you should speak after, and at the conclu­sion, you quite forgot what you had said before. But that such a saying rises up with such contradiction against Gods justice, grace, &c. as no principles of reason, common sense, &c. can reconcile, &c. this shall, yea must be granted you, yet all so far from the least disparaging its truth, as that it shal [...] have meat out of this eater: for could the heights and depths of Gods justice in wayes of con­demnation be compast about by the reason and comprehensions of [Page 42]men, yea or Angels, they could not be themselves incomprehensi­ble, whose judgments are past finding out; therefore to say they are without the line or sphear of the largest created understanding, is to give them their due valuation: whereas, to say that cannot be justice in God, which no reason can reach, this is to make his justice comprehensible, and that we must believe nothing of Gods wayes above our reason.

And whereas you affirme, [...]t were as good reason to say, God de­stroyes man for not being God, &c. as for not believing, because man can no more do the one, then the other, &c.

First if it be granted, that man hath no more power to believe, then to become God, &c. it followes not therefore, that us as good reason to destroy man for not being God, or for not creating, as for not believing; for in Adam (in whom you after-say, all his posterity stood) man, in order to his perfect happinesse, had a pow­er to performe what ever might have been by God commanded (for without such a power man-kind, in Adam, could not have had power to stand happy, but had at best bin siable to misery, by diso­bedience, and that through impotency seeing therefore, that while he could haue stood in a state of life, he prophanly changed it for a state of death, with most reason might God require him, to doe as much for recovering his happines, after lost by his own transgressi­on, as before for continuing it, and so may require any act from him (whether faith or any other) who was at first created with a pow­er correspondent; but contrarily, man never had power to be God, nor to create, &c. Therefore 'tis not a like reasonable, to require him to become God, for his recovery, as to believe. Again, 'tis denied, that man hath no more power at all to believe, then to make himself God, &c. For there is such a power in man as may be made a meet subject to receive, and close with Gods work of faith; but man is not made a subject capable of the Godhead, nor of the supremacy of creation.

Next then, to proceed to the chiefe question, whether Adam in innocency had a power of believing, or not. Touching which controversie it seems most necessary to consider strictly, what 'twas for him to have such a power, or wherein it truly consists, that we confound not our selves by compounding it with some other thing; because if we consider not what 'tis simply in it felt, we may conceive it not to be, where 'tis; because some other [Page 43]power or thing, taken, or indeed mistaken for it, may not be there also: Concerning which, a power of believing (according to your own definition) may be said to be that, whereby the soule is inabled cordially to assent to, or intirely to close, with what God shall reveale to be believed. Which cordiall assenting you ex­pound to be an act which the whole heart closeth with, even the understanding, will, and affections, as in your Sermon forementio­ned, preached at Caple, o [...] John 20.31. Which act of closing, whether it may be taken in, without an act of recumbency, which you then understood to be immediately, and as it were inseparably following, or else, as essentially comprehending an act of recum­bency; this needs not be questioned here, both agreeing in this, that a power of believing is a power of entire closing with things re­vealed, and whether only to be closed with, as true, or vvith re­lying also, this rather concernes the manner of propounding or revealing, though to follow your definition would be greater ad­vantage to me; which laid dovvn, may be very usefull tovvards the matter in doubt.

As first, for your first reason against Adam having such a povver, because no necessity thereof, &c. suppose it granted, that he had no need to believe; yet this proves not his not having a povver, for the use or need of a povver given not essence to it, nor is it the essence thereof; there may be a povver to do vvhere no need is, else a man hath not povver to do any thing vvhereof he hath not, need; as not a povver to vvalk, speak, &c. because no need: vvhereas a man hath povver to do thousands of acts needlesse, and God hath a povver to raise of stones children unto Abraham, though it be a needlesse vvork. So that povver is here mis-under­stood in making povver and need to believe, vvhich are tvvo evi­dently distinct things to be in one individuall.

But secondly, by vvay of exception against your Argument, that because he needed not to believe to justification, therefore he needed not a power to believe. This consequence may be denied thus.

If there may be need and use of believing this mysterie, in or a­mong such as have no need, nor use thereof unto justification; then Adams not having need or use of believing to justification, cannot prove his not needing to have believed at all. But the former is true, vvitnesse the Angel Gabriel, Luke. 1.26. Who having no need, nor use of believing to justification, had yet need and use [Page 44]thereof for the testifying the truth of this mysterie, vvhich he could not have done without a true believing it himself. The like might be proved from that company of Angels solemnizing CHRISTS birth, with a song so befitting it, Luke 2.15. The litter therefore plainly followes, that Adams not having need to believe this my­stery unto justification, cannot prove that he could not have need to have believed for some other end.

Yea thirdly, and that partly by way of concession, and partly by way of exception, if it be granted, that Adam needed not to have believed this mysterie to justification, nor for any other end; yet this proves not that he needed not a power to have believed this mysterie: because such a power so excellent might be needfull and usefull to the producing of other acts needfull, though altogether uselesse for this; and that it vvas needfull so, appears from the next particular.

Therefore in the fourth place, the thing to be proved is, that he had both need and use of such a power for other ends; that, what you say against Gods Wisdome, in giving man such a power, may thereby be overthrown; and that he needed such a power, I prove from this your own Argument alleadged to evince the contrary, and that thus: Adam standing righteous by the Law of works (which is your Argument) that he might so do, could not but need a power of true closing with the righteousnesse, holinesse, &c. of God, in every work or command required; for without a right apprehending and acknowledging the excellencies of God, in his commands, he could not have rightly obeyed God in any one com­mand: whence it follows, that in having need of a power of clo­sing with the holinesse, &c. of God in any command, he therein had need of a power of closing with the truth, and faithfulnesse of God in any promise, whether of Christ, or any other; because the self-same power would necessarily have inabled him to each of those acts a-like; for it had been impossible for Adam to have had a power to have acknowledged God in his holinesse, and not by the same to close with his truth and faithfulnesse; both which go together so inseparably, as that we finde God himselfe most fre­quently ratifying the promulgation o [...] great promises by the Pro­phets, by declaring himself the holy One, Thus saith the Lord the holy one of Israel, clearly intimating, that the true apprehending of Gods holinesse is such a prevailing argument, as will inforce [Page 45]men to close with his truth and faithfulness touching the perfor­mance of all his promises.

Yea, for further clearing, Adam had not only need, but use of a power of believing, as appears from Gods method, in stating man in that high office of dominion over the whole creation; where­in, after God had given him command to bear dominion over all creatures, Gen. 1.28. he proceeds in the two following verses to confirme to him that office, by promises as large as that command, Behold I have given to you every Hearb, &c. Which shall be to you for meat: which words are a direct promise, in answer whereto Adam needed a power to believe; because, as God added to the command a promise answerable, and all as needfull for the set­ling of the dominion upon him, so vvas it as needfull for Adam actually to believe that promise, that thereby he might undertake that office, not vvith doubting, but vvith assurance of successe, which could only be confirmed to him, by a promise from the sole Creator, and Lord over all. Yea, contrarily, if he had not regar­ded that promise he had thereby prophaned Gods wisdome in exhibiting it, and not believing he had oppugned Gods truth and faithfulnesse touching performance. Seeing then that Adam had both need and use of a power, whereby to believe the truth, yea, the rich grace of God also, in that great promise, which confirmed his universall Soveraignty over the whole creation, hence it fol­lowes that Adam had both need & use of such a power, as where­by he could have believed the mystery of Christ (though he needed not, by that power to believe that mystery) which may be fully proved from this reason, because Adam being then upright or per­fect, could not but believe that first promise of dominion, from a right principle; namely, from a true apprehension and know­ledge of the faithfulnesse and grace of God, which knowledge (being that spring or fountaine, whence a true believing in Christ doth alwayes, and can alone flow) Adam being furnished with, could not but have believed the mysterie of Christ; because here­by all the Saints have believed: and indeed God acts so fully like himself, that so far as a man knowes, and believes Gods excel­lencies, he cannot but know and believe his revealed acts and contrivances what ever they be: but above all others, the my­sterie of compassing salvation by Christ, holds forth so lively a representation of God, in all his excellencies of Wisdome, [Page 46]grace, righteousnesse, &c. as would have enforced Adam to have beleeved it, who before had a knowledge of Gods excellen [...], in being created in Gods own image, which consisted in know­ledge, as also in righteousnesse and holinesse. By which Arguments, I conceive, that both Adams having need, and use of [...] power, as could have produced a beleeving in Christ, is evinced; and the Wisedome of God therein vindicated, the vindication whereof is a work of such concernment as will I hope, excus [...]y largenesse herein.

But to proceed both to the second and third reason, which are one and the same; The first, because he had not power to fore­know his fall, nor secondly Christs death, &c. which Argument may be thus destroyed.

If the essence of a power of beleeving consists not at all in the knowledge of Gods Will, before revealed by God, then Adam not having power to know the mystery of Christ, before revealed by God, doth no way prove his not having a power of beleeving that mystery; but the former is true, That the essence of a power of beleeving consists not, &c. Because according to your definiti­on [...]is a power of cordiall assenting to the truth of a promise of God, that is to say, a promise revealed, or propounded, which must be presupposed; now a power of closing with the truth of what God reveales is far different from a power of fore-know­ing Gods Will before revealed: for the one, namely the know­ledge of the secrets of God belongs onely to God, while his re­vealed will belongs to men: And so God gives a power of belee­ving to many thousands, and yet reserves his secret Councell from them all; the latter also, That Adams not having power to foreknow, &c. follows inevitably, because when two faculities differ in kind, then the absence of one proves not at all the absence of another.

Next after, you propound an Objection against your selfe, for Answer whereto, you first refer to your fore-going argument against Gods Wisdome, which is already answered at large, after­wards you close up your answer after this manner of reasoning.

First, you say, Christ could not be revealed, because not conveni­ent, &c. And thence you infer, that Therfore doubtles Adam had not a power to have beleeved in Christ; no, not on this supposition, That Christ had been then revealed to him. Which Argument is indeed [Page 47]most contradictory, yea utterly destructive to it selfe: For first, you ground Adams not having such a power upon this reason, be­cause Christ could not be revealed, and afterwards, you quite de­stroy that very reason, by supposing, or granting Christ to have been revealed: so that in Answer to a main and most considerable objection, you onely repeat a former reason, already answered, and adde one new, which you immediately destroy by your own contra-supposition, and so the Objection remaines altogether un­answered.

Next follows your fourth reason, against Adams having such a power, because Christ was not revealed, which may be destroy­ed thus.

If the want of an outward meanes, though necessary to con­cur in producing an act, cannot prove the want of the intrinse call power necessary to that act, then it follows, That Adams wanting the Revelation of the object to be beleeved, cannot prove his wanting an inward power to beleeve: But the former is true, that the want of an outward meanes, &c. cannot prove the inward power wanting, because the outward means, and the inward power are two distinct things: for instance; food, the outward means of feeding is one thing, and the appetite, the inward facul­ty of receiving food, is another; and therefore the having of ei­ther may well consist with the want of either; one man may have an inward faculty of appetite, and want outward food; and ano­ther may have outward food, and want an inward receptive fa­culty: The latter therefore inevitably follows, that Adams wa­ting the Revelation, &c. proves not his wanting an inward pow­er, &c. because the Revelation of the object by promise, the out­ward means of beleeving, being one thing; and faith the inward power of receiving it another thing, distinct from the former: hence it comes to passe, that either of them may be, where either of them is wanting; Adam then might have a power of belee­ving, and want the word of faith, though now faith comes by hearing even as he was created in Gods image, perfectly at once, though Saints now are transformed into the same image gradually and that by means of the Word, 2 Cor. 3.18. and contrarily many now have the Word, and not that power, the Word being not of the essence of that power.

Secondly, another Argument may be this, if Adam had not [Page 48]power to beleeve a thing, or object, because the object was not re­vealed, then 'twill follow that Adam had not a power of sta [...] righteous by the Law of works, for if he had not power to bel [...]ve a thing, because 'twas not revealed, then by the same reason, he had not power at first to obey any command, because 'twas not revealed, for the Revelation of a command is as much necessary to obeying [...]s the Revelation of a promise is necessary to the beleeving therof; and the meer Revelation of a promise would have infused into Adam no more power of beleeving, then the meer Revelation of a com [...]nd would have infused power of obeying: whence it follows, that Adam in his first perfection was so far from having power to stand righteous, by a Law of works, by performing any thing to be commanded, as that indeed, when he was at first created, ac­cording to this your reason, he had not then power to obey any command whatsoever, because his creation was fully finished, be­fore any command was revealed: yea, from that time forward when ever any command had been revealed, he had stood in [...]eed of supply of new power to obey, because before 'twas revealed he had not power to obey. Which consequences utterly over­throw that perfect power by standing righteous by works, which you expresly affirm, Adam had, making him unable to perform any work, by his first created power.

Thus much in Answer to your reasons alleadged against Adams having power of beleeving, &c. which are all grounded upon a mis-understanding of, and swerving from, the true definition of such a power, and so are made up of an indi [...]tinct, and consuled conjumbling of other things with it; for neither the need, use thereof, nor the fore-knowledge, or Revelation of an object, are at all essentially necessary to make up such a power, as hath been proved. Touching which matter I must adde one word, viz. that it must needs be dangerous presumption to charge such a per­son with weaknesse before triall, who for excellency and perfe­ction of nature, is avouched again and again by God himselfe to be created after Gods own Image and likenesse, Gen. 1. and to be made upright, or righteous, Eccles. 7.29. Yea, especially to ground that charge against him upon such reasons, as wholly tend to prove, that he was not in a capacity of being tryed; whether he had such a power of beleeving or not, by which act the grand Ma­ster-peece of Gods whol Creation is without all ground vilified.

Against all which, that I may yet adde one passage; I shall in­deavour to state the question in most cle [...] and full tearmes, which question being, Whether. Adam had a power of beleeving in Christ; (the essence of which power consists in a power to beleeve an object revealed) cannot be truely framed, except with this sup­position, That Christ had been revealed, so that to go about to ex­amine, much more to determine, what his power was to beleeve an object, without supposing that object to be revealed; this is a course inconsistent with the nature of this power, which necessa­rily presupposeth the revelation of an object, for the tryall there­of: for though such a power may be without an outward Object yet there can be no tryall of its being without it, as a man may have an inward appetite, but we cannot rightly examine his having it, but by giving him outward food, which question there­fore may be fairly propounded thus, Whether Adam had a power of believing Christ, supposing, Christ had been revealed? An­swer whereto must be this, That he could not but have such a power, it being essentially necessary to his state of perfection, as appeares by these three consequences.

• First, because without it, upon the revealing of Christ (which is here supposed) Adam must have been miserable by opposing the truth of God in that promise, and that through want of power.
• Or secondly, if upon the revelation of this mystery, he had not had power to have beleeved it, then necessarily he must have, needed supply of new power, whereby to have beleeved, and so upon this revelation (supposed) his condition, would have been the very condition of unbeleevers now, who upon the revealing of this mystery need new power to beleeve it; both which con­sequences are utterly inconsistent with the nature of his first com­pleat power of standing happy.
• Yea thirdly, supposing that Mystery to have been revealed to Adam, to be beleeved, the very revelation hereof would have re­quired, and commanded him to have beleeved it, and his belee­ving would have been a proper act of Obedience to the Law of that promise requiring faith; If therefore he had not a power to have obeyed the law of that promise by beleeving, then it fol­lows, That his first power could not have inabled him to stand by a Law of Works, by perfect obedience, which (as you expresly grant) he was fully able to do.

And yet, before passing from this question, I mi [...]t [...] word to prevent the mistaking mine and in answering it, [...] is, That I have not endeavoured to prove Adams [...]aving [...] power, from this reason, because without it God could not [...] ­stice destroy mankinde; for whether he had a power of beleeving or no, is a Question needlesse and impertiment, touching the [...] ring of Gods justice in mans destruction, as may be made [...] fest thus.

If Adam, in whom (as you acknowledge) all his posterity stood, had such a power, under the first Covenant, as was su [...] ent to justifie God in the death or destruction of man disobeying then to examine, whether Adam had power to beleeve a second Covenant is altogether [...]iceess [...]ry to clear Gods Justice, in [...] ­stroying man, disobeying; But the former is true, this Adam had &c. because God after stating him in his first power, [...] thereupon as a righteous Judge, fore, passe or denounce the [...] ning or sentence of death or destruction upon him, if he sho [...] disobey, Gen. chap. 2. vers. 17. Thou shall surely [...]ye. W [...] threatning could not have been justly denounced against [...] except his first power and perfection, had such an answera­ble proportion thereto, as might justifie that threatning. The latter also, That to examine, &c. is a needlesse question for clearing Gods justice, &c. follows inevitably, because seeing the est [...]ce of Adams first power was sufficient to justifie God in destroying man, disobeying; 'tis therefore needlesse to inquire, what [...] power could produce. Yea, seeing you understand a power of beleeving, as having relation to the second Covenant onely, t [...] therefore could not be at all necessary to the clearing of Gods ju­stice in mans death or destruction, because the threatning of death was denounced against him; onely with relation to the t [...]a [...] of the first Covenant, which alone he know; which threa [...]ing was as just before Gods promising Christ in a second Covenant, upon mans fall, as afterwards, because God made not that pro­mise to clear his justice.

To proceed now to the second sort of reasonings, being on supposition, That Adam had such a power, yet that this would not avail, because God having made a new Govenant, &c. to which I reset. Touching which it must be affirmed. 1. That for God to daprive man of the blessing, &c. As you there expresse, this is [Page 51]wholy [...] with and destructive [...]o the [...]ss [...] of a Co­ve [...] of Univ [...]s [...]ll goo [...], [...] enyes that all [...]e pow­er to obtain Gr [...]ce or intere [...]e thou [...]lves therein, but if we speak of the Covenant of Free-Grace, them the truth is for God that he might not deprive any man of the ob [...]ssing of it, therefore to hold it forth on such tearmes, as are attainable by mans improve­ment, as upon which Go [...]gagi [...] [...]ly by [...] of th [...]s Co­venant, to grant acceptation and grace, (which you assir [...] to up­hold the freedome of his grace) this is [...] and destructive to the very [...] and [...]outh of that Covenant of grace, which con [...]ws saving grace peculiardy [...] so [...] for 'twould be impossible for God [...] not to fa [...]fi [...]e s [...] a Co­venant, as should both promise grace to some [...]ely, and not to there, (which the Covenant of grace doth) and yet also should promise the same grace, after the s [...]e manner, [...] all [...]. It must therefore be [...], that the [...] of the second Co­venant are utterly [...] by [...] utmost power, but yet this no way destroyes the freedome of Gods [...] in that Co­venant, for though God therein [...]ds [...]tai [...]ble conditi­ons from all, yet his promise wherein [...] work those conditions in some, is of Free grace. Gods [...] do [...]t make hi [...] pro­mises of none effect. And touching your instance of a Noble f [...] ­ [...]ly, 'tis wholy impertinent, for all it shews is [...]t this: That the conditions required in the Covenant Gr [...]ce, are such as cannot tender all, no, n [...]r any one capable of grace, by his [...]st indeavour, which is [...]d enviably [...], [...]g th [...] [...] of God, to work such conditions in [...], i [...] [...] of Free Grace, this is still to be proved. By which instance you deny the Gospell to pro­ [...]sse any peculiar thing to some, making it onely to [...] the same conditions from all, whereas i [...]ed its promises and as large to some, as the command [...].

'Tis then most ground le [...]t [...], because the Covenant of Grace is not common to all [...] g [...]lly upon improvement, that therefore 'tis not of grace to some, for grace in i [...] own na­ture is more free and transcend [...], because to some onely and not to others, Which [...] may be p [...]ll [...]ed to the [...]so thus, viz. suppose a Prince [...] a No [...] [...] guilty of high [...] so as that without [...] of justice, he cannot but condemn them, if now lie will give [...] onely son, [...] be [...]c [...]ficed, [...] [Page 52]randome for part of them, from the condemnation, because [...]e findes nothing in them to satisfie his justice without their destru­ction: this betokens abundance of grace; y [...] further, to work also in them that necessary condition, which he requires; because they cannot attain thereto of themselves: this is also a high strain of Free-grace.

Next follows your applying that instance, They that make the s [...] ­ving tearms of the Gospel, &c. Concerning w^ch it must be affirmed, that in respect of obtaining grace to salvation, man by his utmost improvement, cannot tread as much as one sure or steady step in that way; so that his utmost improvement shall of it self at best be successelesse therein. And this is so far from rendring the Go­spel reproach, as that Paul establisheth the freedome of Gods dispensation upon this very ground, Rom. 9.16. Where after ex­amples given to set our the freedome of Gods grace, Verse▪ 11. in choosing and refusing, according to his good pleasure, without any regard had to any improvement or work done, be layes down this as a sure conclusion, Verse▪ 16. So then, tis not of him that wil­leth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that s [...]emeth mercy▪ where Paul, that he might lay down and declare the sure ground of salvation, like a wise builder, he first destroyes the rotten ground of the Arminians, and that by [...]utting off all manner of intailement or ingagement of grace, on mans willing, yea, and running; which tearms cannot but import greatest intention and ext [...]ntion of abilities: he saith not, upon willing or running, God hath promised mercy or grace, but tis not of him, &c. but of God, &c. The Apostle most emphatically expresseth it by the rearme (but) a knowne particle of opposition; thereby cutting off any binding of the latter, Gods mercy to the former, mans improve­ment. The reason of which method is clear: because if it were of him that willeth or runneth, so as that to, and upon it, grace is [...]nexed, then it could not be free, and without respect to mans improvement; which thing Paul is proving, Verse▪ 11. but must then have been of Grace, ingaged upon running.

Touching your next expression, Were I of the judgement of Ar­minius, I could, &c. I must with griefe of heart say thus much; I fear your left hand hath learned too much of this cunning; and indeed there in that enmity in the understanding of reasonable man against the truth, that is may be more easie to represent ma­ny [Page 53]e [...]ours plansible to them, then one truth.

Next followes your second reason, upon supposing Adams ha­ving a power of believing &c. which will not justifie God, &c. because justice stands in a Geometricall proportion, &c.

Which Argument reaches far higher then the tenent it should prove; yea, makes it void: For this proves not that God is in­gaged by promise, &c. but which is far more intolerable, this makes it but an act of justice in God, to give men life, or save them from condemnation upon improvement. For if after mans fal­ling from his perfect power God cannot in equity condemn [...] man, doing his utmost, and that because justice stands in a Geometricall proportion, or in taking an exact accompt or consideration of the persons present power and improvement, in answer to their pow­er lost; which (according to your instances produced, and your direct application of all to Adams case) you understand by those expressions of Geometricall proportion: hence then it followes, that Gods ingaging himself by promise to improvement, is no ne­cessary ground of mans salvation; but Gods justice beholding them and their improvements, is made a necessary ingagement on God to save such improvens: so that without salvation of such his justice cannot be salved, and consequently his grace needs not act in their salvations but for the right improvement of your Argu­ment, I adde this. Mans losing his first perfect power of obedi­ence, &c. cannot but in equity justifie God in his condemning man, doing his utmost according to his power now remaining; and that from your very reason, Because justice stands in a Geo­metricall proportion; or in a strict consideration of persons, their conditions, abilities, &c. For if Gods justice stands in judging acts according to the abilities, where with the person is intrusted, then it must in reference hereto, count what abilities have been gi­ven him: whereupon finding man in Adam, to have been intru­sted with a fulnesse of power; to believe (which power through­out your second reason you suppose and grant) it cannot but re­quire an act correspondent: for as much therefore as man after utmost improvement cannot but fall infinitely short of such an act (which you also grant) Gods justice, upon computing both toge­ther, must needs be so far from rewarding it with grace; as that it cannot but condemne man, for acting no way answerable to the power given; and that in greatest equity, because of the infinite [Page 52] [...] [Page 53] [...] [Page 54]disproportion between each, which [...]ight [...]. If Gods justice in judging the [...], be so [...]ri [...]t [...] comp [...]ng the [...], given [...] person in relation to the act, as that a great sa [...] from a m [...]ied [...] then two [...]iter from a widow, and that because it judgeth according to their respective abilities; then certainly justice weighing spirituall actions, with the power given [...] Ad [...] (which you suppose) cannot but condemn [...], because his actions [...]ct utmost improvement, hold a vast disprop [...]tion with that power.

Againe, according to the parable of the talent, [...]f justice so ex­actly requires by way of [...]ta [...]iation, [...] for [...]alout, two for two, five for five, then open r [...]qui [...]ing acts, answerable to the power, here supposed to be given man in Adam, it m [...]st needs [...] man falling [...] short [...]t best.

So that indeed there is no congruity between the reason and the instances. For first, your reason is mainly grounded on this sup­postion, That man had power in Adam, [...] so [...] it. But the instances import not the least [...]ittle of my power, which [...] the Widd [...]w or Lords servants had and lost.

Againe, the instances prove it a matter of equity to accept of the endeavours of such as act propo [...]ti [...]nably to their [...], but fall infinitely short of proving the acceptance of such as act no way answerable to their talents.

Which instances can only be parallel'd to your second reason, th [...], That [...] the Widow been in [...]sted with a great [...] and [...]ewdly spet [...] all but two [...], yet those m [...]st in justice have been co [...]ted us much as the large contributions of others; because she hath now no more left. And the Lords s [...]rva [...] after [...]osing ten talents, being intrusted with one more, upon his improving that to his power, (though not well) his Lord in justice must [...] such improvement, and not require satisfaction for the [...]; whereas in just sevei [...]ty, h [...]ust his other servant [...] dark­nesse, o [...]ly for not making profit of [...]m single [...]alent, though [...] mis-spent it not, but [...] it up.

Yet I would not here be mista [...]e [...], as if I conceived it matter of mo [...]nt to shew your mis-application of there insta [...]; for could they be proved to be answerable to [...] would no way advantage it; for though you [...] by way [Page 55]of proofe, yet in so doing you pervert the use of instances, which may indeed illustrate a matter, but cannot prove it, according to that approved sentence — Theologia parabolica non est argumen­tativa; or thus, parabolae illustrant non probant.

And touching your applying all to Adams posterity, that, though it be supposed they had a power of believing, &c.

'Twould indeed be tedious work it to reckon up the least part of all the dangerous confequences thereof; for if Adams fallen po­sterity may do that, which may be of more consideration in point of equity, &c. as you expresse. Then it followes, that mans fall is no prejudice at all, but matter of advantage rather.

Againe, hence 'twill follow, that God hath no respect to the state of the person acting, whether he be in a state of acceptation with God, or of rejection; but only to the action done, in that man full of enmity, may do that, which may be of greater consi­deration in the eye of Gods justice, then what spotlesse Adam could doe. Whereas touching the acceptance of the person, in re­lation to the acceptance of acts, 'tis evident from the generall cur­rent of Scripture, that the acceptance or non-acceptance of acts, principally depends on the acceptation or non-acceptation of the person; hence, the prayer of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord, while the prayer of the upright is his delight, Prov. 15.8. so God accepted Abel and his offering; Whence was his offering accepted? even from Gods free accepting the person, and not the person for the offerings sake. But here you make God bound by equity, as much, yea more, to accept an accursted man for his im­provements sake, then Adam a righteous man, and his righteous works: which argument directly maintaines justification by works and merit, in that you say, Man may now do what is as good or better in val [...] then Adam, who then stood by works.

To adde yet one word against the force of all your Arguing, up­on supposition of Adams having a power to beleeve, &c. viz. Man beinging death on himself by breach of the first Covenant, the work of justice hereupon is to inflict death, what ever tearmes therefore are tendered to prevent death, these are all fruies of free-grace: though then those tearmes are unatta [...]able by man fallen; God may, notwithstanding without any injustice, suspend the gift of a power answerable to them, though man perish thereby. God was not bound in justice to offer any tearmes beside those to [Page 56] Adam, Doe thus, else thou shalt surely dye, much lesse is he bound, to give a power correspondent to new tearms.

Next followes your second reason, If men putting forth them­selves, &c. and not finde grace, &c.

Touching which, I must affirme, that though in my former dis­course I gave you no ground to think I feared your opinion to com­ply with the opinion of Free-will in the Gospel sense, yet am I con­strained to affirme, that the force of this second reason, is that ve­ry opinion which may thus be proved.

If mercy putting forth their utmost power, and not finding grace with God, &c. may be destroyed for want of an executive power, without any miscarriage or sinfulnesse at all in the will, then men may so far put forth themselves by their own power without grace, as whereby, they may be without any sinfulnesse at all in the will, which is indeed to have full power of Free-will. The former whereof is the expresse force of your reason; the lat­ter also plainly followes; for he that can by his own power at­tain to a freedome from all sinfulnesse in his will, cannot but have Free-will to close with God; because without such a free closing with God, the will cannot be free from all sinfulnesse: so than man by his own power rendring himself free from, or without any sinfulnesse at all in his will, thereby removeth all that kept him from a power of Free-will; which you afterwards grant in owning that of Augustine, Take away mans will, and take away Hell and all.

Againe, from the conclusion of that your second reason, com­pared with the former part of it, this dangerous consequence un­avoidably proceeds, viz. that man is able of himself to remove all the ground of his condemnation, which appears thus.

If the Scripture placeth Gods justice in condemnation alwayes, upon some sinfulnesse in the will, and man himself by improve­ment be able to free himself from all such sinfulnesse; then man is able of himself to remove all the ground of his condemnation, or to save himself from destruction by his own improvement, not needing grace to salvation. The former, that Gods justice is clea­red from the sinfulnesse of the will, you prove from Scripture. A­gaine, that man can render himself free from all such sinfulnesse; this is the main strength of your reason. The conclusion therefore necessarily followes, that man hath power to take away or re­move [Page 57]the ground of his condemnation. For if God in justice can only destroy man for such sinfulnesse; then man freeing himselfe from all such sinfulnesse, takes away thereby all just ground of condemnation; and so layes a sure ground for salvation, which is only opposed by sin.

And touching those many Texts insuing, what they prove is granted, which is, that mans condemnation is laid upon some sinful­nesse in the will; but these are all far from proving, that man hath power to free himself from all the sinfulnesse of the will, the scope of all which is to set out the obstinacy of the will, in the wicked actings thereof, which is a point distinct from that of shew­ing the main ground of its continuing so perverse: For, there is no necessity of shewing, that man wants power to subdue the per­versenesse of his will in every place, where that perversenesse is spoken of: the grounds therefore of such perversenesse must be sought for there, where the Holy Ghost distinctly expresseth it: one speciall place for which, John 6.36. compared with Verse 44. & 65. was proved to be in the discourse given you. But yet among those many Scriptures, I shall take notice of one, which you main­ly ground upon; which is Acts 7.51. which you thus alleage and open.

Ye have alwayes resisted; now how did they resist, &c. not by any defectivenesse of power, &c.

Whereas 'tis cleare that the former part of the Verse layes down the ground of their perversenesse first, as the precedent article of their condemnation, in this clause, ye uncircumcised in heart; whence indeed their resisting arose; so that the question is, whe­ther they had power to take away this main obstacle, the uncir­cumcision of their hearts; but 'tis certaine they cannot; for this is peculiarly within Gods power, as Deut. 30.6. The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart. Seeing then they resist from the un­circumcision thereof, it followes, that they resist through want of power, for that they need power from above to circumcise their hearts.

And so all those other Texts prove not at all mans not want­ing a power, &c. From all which you would force in this tenent, That man wants no power to reduce his will to Gods, which is to say he hath a power of Free-will, as appears from that, Acts 7.51. whence you say, Man resists not from any want of power; the [Page 58]selfe-same from John 5.40. Ye will not come, they wan [...] not pow­er to come: though it be proved in the discourse given you, that the reason thereof is declared to be a want of power, in Chap. 6.44.

Next you raise a Quere, how your opinion differs from the opinion of Free-will? Which Quere I finde you make from this ground, because your opinion is feared to comply with the Arminian tenent of Free-will, as you expresse soon after the beginning of this clear­ing Sermon. Touching which, what I did, & do fear and finde is this; that your fifth and main assertion impleaded, is the same with that Arminian Maxime, there exprest, facienti quod in se est, &c. Which opinion you take to be that of Free-will; and so in­deed you may, for both are the same in effect: For if man may so do as to ingage God to give grace (which you affirme) he doth thereby that which is as surely effectuall to salvation; as Free-will to act savingly: for God cannot but performe what he hath p [...] ­mised to man upon doing. And that this your opinion is the grand tenent of the Arminians, may be proved by the testimony of Do­ctor Robert Sanderson, in his first Sermon, ad populum, on 3 Kings 21.29. § 26. where he hath this passage.

It appears from the premises, that Gods thus dealing with wick [...]d &c. gives no warrant or strength at all, either to that popish or cur­rupt doctrine of Meritum congrui, in deserving the first grace, by the right use of naturals, or to that rotten principle and foundation of the whole frame of Arminianisme, facienti quod in se est, Deus non potest, non debet denegare gratiam.

Which latter is your very opinion; for, if man may do such things as whereupon God hath promised to give grace (which you affirm) then man may so do, as wherupon God neither ought nor can deny grace; because God for his truth and faithfulnesse sake, nei­ther can, not ought to violate his owne ingagements; so that by maintaining your fifth assertion, as a tenent so necessary, you up­hold the rotten foundation of the whole frame of Arminianisme.

The same also may be further proved out of Dr. Twisse his di­spute about Mr. Perkins and Arminius, where Sect. 2. lib. 3. upon the sixth errour, Mr. Perkins charges the Arminian School [...]men, with this very tenent thus, Si faseret, De [...] adjuvants, quod in se est, Deus illum illuminaret supernaturali gratia.

Yea further, lest it be thought, the Arminians may be wronged, Arminius himself repeats this very tenent, more plainly, in his [Page 59]reply immediately following; yea, which is very considerable, he labours to prove it after that very manner, as you doe, by ma­king God ingaged by promise, as in these words.

Annon isto dicto Christi, babenti dabitur, promissio ista contin [...]a­tur, qua Deus spondet se gratia supernaturali illuminaturum, qui lumine naturali recte utetur, a [...]t salt [...] utetur minus male.

Which text, to him that hath shall be given, Arminius produ­ceth, instead of those Texts of yours, ask and you shall have, &c. whence he affirmes the same with you, saying, that by that pro­mise, to him that hath shall be given; God ingages himselfe to en­lighten with supernaturall grace, such as rightly use naturall light, or at least; who will use it, as much as he can, lesse evilly.

So that touching the great difference you make between your opinion, and that of Free-will, as if yours were not Arminian, 'tis plain, Arminius holds the one as strongly as the other: yours op­posed, he plainly holds, and labours so to prove it, as you do; for instead of perfect free-will, he acknowledgeth some defect in the will, as by that his expression, lesse evilly, whereby granting some sinfulnesse therein.

Yea, that Arminius holds both opinions; how contradictory soever to each other, I finde expresly in Doctor Twisse, in his third book and first digression, touching the sense of that Text, to him that hath shall be given, as appears by this sentence. Quamvis re­quirant gratiam ad r [...]te [...]dum naturalibus, [...]amque supernatu­ralem, tam [...]u i [...]rerd [...] diser [...]e d [...]ce [...], bo [...]inem ista natura vipra­ [...]are posse, which he there proves from C [...]rvinu [...]: It appeats there­fore from these testimonies, that your opinion of ingaging God to give grace, &c. which you go about to quit them from, is most usuall amongst them, being more plausible; and that which de­nies a necessity of supernaturall grace, is but rarely found among them.

And touching your complyance with both these opinions, as their former is your fifth assertion, so the latter of Free-will in the gro [...]st sense, is directly maintained, by the force of your second reason, as is before proved.

Furthermore, seeing you professe your [...]nd in all, to be the pre­v [...]ning of such [...] p [...]essions, [...] are given by the most a­gainst the Arminians ( [...] discourse, [...] in the [...]d of this Sermon [...] intimated) it seems meet to [...]quaint you, [...]ow greatly you [Page 60]have crost your own designe, and that by the second and maine point of difference, which you make between your opinion and theirs. For whereas you there charge them with this, as their main and only tenent, viz. That man hath power to produce a sa­ving act, without any supernaturall assistance, it appears from those words prescript; Quamvis requirant gratiam, &c. supernatura­lem; that when they are their Crafts-masters, they do, and that generally, require supply of supernaturall grace; so that you seem uncharitably to take them alwayes at the worst.

In which alleaging of these testimonies, though I cannot but ac­knowledge my prolixity, yet must I partly justifie it, from the necessity thereof, even to establish that truth by the mouth of two or three witnesses, which being only affirmed before, you did so lightly put by.

And yet must I adde one word, to minde you of your politick method, used about denying your tenent to be Arminian; that whereas their opinion of Gods being ingaged, &c. (given in those words, facienti quod in se est, &c.) is directly yourfifth assertion; and their main maxime you wholly neglect to prove, wherein your opinion differs from that maxime, contenting your self only to shew how it differs from another Arminian opinion, which you were not at all charged with: so that still your opinion lyes under this heavie charge, of being the main [...] foundation of the whole frame of Arminianisme, which is now made good by clear evidence.

Next you raise a question touching the difference between an exe­cutive and willing power, or a principle drawing out that power in­to act, &c.

The occasion of your opening which distinction, I finde to be from a passage in my discourse given you; where 'tis denied, that man hath an executive power to believe, which now you would farther prove.

In opening of which power you seem to contradict yourself, for you take it to be a power, whereby to act, and yet by those in­stances, you understand that to be an executive power, which can­not inable to act: you say A rich man hath an executive power to be liberall, whilst of a penurious disposition, though by that power he is never the nearer being liberall: but how contradictory is it to say, A man by means of such a thing, hath power to ex [...] such a worke, though by that thing be is never the nearer execution [Page 61]thereof; by this you seem to nullifie that power in respect of in­abling to an act, which you call a power to act.

Again, you say he hath an executive power to do, though that power be defective touching doing, but that which is defective in order to an act, cannot be a power to act, for a power to act is in­consistent with defectivenesse, or want of power; power and want of power are contraries.

But for brevity sake, I shall endeavour to grant the utmost extent of your instances, viz. A penurious rich man hath such a power in him, in order to acts of liberality, as an Infant hath principles of reason and understanding, which may of themselves in an ordina­ry way of nature, become executive to answerable acts, without any super-naturall infusion; so a rich penurious man hath such principles as by consideration, councell, &c. may be inclined to liberality, without a super-naturall change of those principles, but yet whilst penuriously disposed, he is as far, or farther, from an executive power, as a willing; as a child is in the case given.

And thus may the rest be understood, As that Gen. 31. [...]9. 'tis in the power, &c. that is, he had a sufficiency of outward strength and such a naturall principle of revenge, as might act revenge, if not hindered by an extraordinary hand, and so, have not I pow­er to eate, &c. man hath a naturall receptive faculty for that end.

The tenour of which instances being thus considered, the maine is to examine; what is in them to serve your purpose, which is to prove, that a man hath an executive power to beleeve: Between which instances, and the things you would prove, there is as vast a dis-proportion, as between naturall and supernaturall acts, for all that these prove, is but that men have an executive power to per­forme such acts, as may be done without supernaturall influence, as to be liberall, to frequent the Ordinances, or (to speak in your own language) to sin, revenge, eate, drink, &c. Now 'twere most unadvised to conclude, because men have an executive power to the externall acts of Religion, frequenting the Ordinances; to acts naturall, eating, drinking; morall, as to be liberall, &c. that therefore they have a like power to supernaturall acts. Of all which instances, the most genuine scope, is to prove mans free-will to beleeve, for the main Argument of both your Sermons, is touching mans power towards attaining faith, which power [Page 62]you call executive, which so called, you demonstrate by making it like that power which those instances hold forth [...] but to all those severall acts, the persons respectively have a power of free will; those concerning men have, because all those acts may be done by man in his pure naturalls, those which concern God are much more within his power to will, as they are acts requiring power, for God is not capable of receptive power (though God wills not [...]se [...]ring acts) therefore in making mans executive power to come to Christ, or beleeve, to be such as those instances have, you necessarily make man to have Free-will [...]o beleeve, else all those instances are to no purpose.

In briefe thou a man cannot be said to have an executive power to any act, but what he can voluntarily do, and is within the li [...]e of that power, so as to stand in need of no ext [...]ordinary divine assistance; 'tis contradictory to say an executive power cannot execute of it selfe, for if a supernaturall power must co-operate to execution, then the other power cannot be executive, but the work of faith cannot be executed, without a divine power infu­sed (which you else-where grant) therefore man cannot have an executive power to beleeve, till he be so inspired; insteed there­fore of a willingnesse to draw out an executive power to act faith which you speak of there must be a putting in a new power, before any drawing out to act can be.

To and this therefore, I desire to know directly what this pow­er is by name, which you call executive, for it forms not imagina­ble, that the name executive should be any other then a nick name of such a power as cannot execute. Who ever then can distin­guish between an executive power, or a principle whereby to act, ( [...]syo [...]pl [...]mit) and such a principle as [...] produce a [...]act, such a one will doubtlesse out the hair indeed.

But yet between your unfolding the distinction of powers, you insert two particulars, one is a quaere about Ar [...] T [...]s, which is for substance the same with your opening the dis [...]ce, between your opinion, and that of free will, which being already [...]ale with, I passe over.

The other particular is an Objection from Joh [...]: 44. Which in the [...]i [...]o [...] given you, is [...]llendged, [...] through was of power; which for answer, you [...]; Now [...] come▪ [...] [Page 63]put forth himself in any such way, wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace.

By which expression, No man can come, you understand can proceed so far in a way of nature, in order to grace, as wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace; but this destroyes the sense, for 'tis most evident, that the expression cometh imports a coming to life with saving grace, which might be proved from many other Texts, some whereof are given in that discourse, as John 5.40. so John 6.37. He that cometh to me, which imports coming with saving faith; which place you have understood so. Now there is a great contrariety between these, for mans doing that wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace, is a do­ing by himself without grace; upon which doing, you say, God meets with grace; but the comming here is a saving comming, or unto life by saving grace; therefore not a comming in the course of naturall abilities, to meet with grace thereupon.

Againe, there appears not the least ground for such an interpre­tation, because here is never a word spoken of pawing forth in a course of nature, but of comming to Christ, or believing (which in the discourse given, are proved to be tearms equivalent) nor yet is there the least tittle of a promise of meeting man with grace upon comming.

And for that clause, except my Father draweth, which you ex­pound, except be interpose with some greater power then ordinary's that you understand thereby, Gods inabling to improve naturals to the utmost, in order to grace, is plaine, in that you make Gods interposing to be a carrying of man so far in a course of nature, as wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace, and so you make Gods drawing to be, but by way of preparation unto grace, promised thereupon; against which 'tis evident, 'tis such a draw­ing as whereby man commeth unto Christ, or believeth both be­ing one; therefore drawing is an act of divine power, working saving-grace, and not a carrying of man so to do, as upon which doing, God will afterwards meet him with the gift of grace. Af­terwards you adde another Exposition, no man hath any foresight of any compleat power of comming; which implyes, man hath in himself a power to come to Christ, before Gods drawing; so that by drawing; God only gives him sight of that power: But this directly opposeth the words which are, no man can or hath a [Page 64]power to come; he saith not, no man hath a sight that he can come.

For establishment of which exposition, you re-assume your di­stinction of powers already dealt with; by opening of which executive power to come to Christ, you make mans power of comming to Christ, or believing, to be a power of Free-will, as is before proved from the instances.

After that, you expresly conclude from what is delivered in that Sermon, The necessity of your fifth assertion, touching Gods promi­sing grace, &c.

Concerning all which, to speak truly supposing these two Ar­guments (which you say are for the clearing of the whole businesse) were unanswerable, yet would they be far from such a clearing; for all the arguing of Men or Angels shall never prove this, with­out bringing a promise of God for it; which throughout this Ser­mon you no where attempt, though all your former texts preten­ded to containe such promises alleaged in your former Sermon, are prowed wholly impertinent, in that discourse given in. The thing you would prove by these Arguments is, That God is inga­ged by promise to naturall improvers; but if this promise be such as God hath been graciously pleased to make (which you affirme) then you cannot prove such a promise by Argument, but only from expresse exhibition; because what God doth of Free-grace, can proceed from no ground or reason, but his own freenesse, for which, being Gods essence, no reason can be given.

Yes, of all grounds, that whereon you build the strength of all your Arguments; namely, the vindication of Gods justice, must needs be most weak: it seems of all reasonings most absurd, to say God cannot but freely promise grace, because his justice binds him to it. And seeing you expresse your maintaining that assertion to be of so great necessity for upholding the truth, &c. of the Gospel. I wonder you omit, both the justifying it, by any one Scripture, after all the Scriptures alleaged are proved contrary; and likewise the vindicating it from those pernicious consequences, which in the discourse given you, are shewed to be most inevitably deduceable thence; because in what degree that suffers, whereon you make the truth, grace, &c. to depend; so much must the truth, grace, and uprightnesse of the Gospel, &c. suffer.

And touching that of Augustine, take away, &c. if it be com­pared with a passage immediately foregoing, which is, that men [Page 65]may be destroyed without any malignancy in their wils, both put together, plainly make man to have power of Free-will; for you make taking away all malignancy of will to be within mans pow­er, which being taken away, nothing hinders from Free-will.

Next you further refer this controversie to your disputes against the Arminians; diverse things, wherein especially in the two last Exercises, seem justly liable to exception, but I shall decline fur­ther dealing there with on this ground, because the substance there­of is repeated in this Sermon: and though I intended to have ad­ded a word about that Text, To him that hath shall be given, I shall wholly omit it, referring to that learned discourse of Doctor Twisse upon the sense thereof, in his Third Book fore-cited.

Touching the use you make of all, in which is implyed your great care in all this, to study out mollifying, and to prevent harsh expressions, which (as you intimated in discourse) are given out by most against the Arminians; I may not unfitly insert a passage which you used against the Arminians, being here fitly applicable, viz. While you go out of the Kings high-way in relation to Free-grace, and seek out by-wayes of mans ingaging God by improve­ment, censuring Gods justice, the freenesse of his grace, &c. you hereby fall into worse wayes, though you endeavour so to pave them, that they may seem most smooth.

And whilest you professe great care against harsh unsavoury ex­pressions, &c. I know not what expressions can be more harsh then such, as belch out such calumny against the justice of God, the freenesse of his grace, &c. of which it may fitly be said, who art thou that repliest against God? nor know I with whom such ex­pressions can be savoury after triall, except with the Arminians themselves.

And touching your Apology, I commend this Quare to serious consideration, whether it would not be a more ingenuous way of Apologizing to disclaime your own errour, and with that mouth to justifie that truth wherby you have condenmed it, rather then to please your self with this saying. If so be we cannot come to expresse our selves, &c. We shall content our selves with some such manner of excuse as this is, That God hath not given us that ability and fa­culty of utterance and expressions, and that we conceive the businesse better in our mindes, then we are able to give account of to others? Which I the rather refer to consideration, because of that fluency [Page 66]of utterance and expression, which God hath vouchsafed you a­bove many.

And seeing you conclude, The Scripture affords suitable expres­sions for this matter, and that such are here most necessary, I won­der you omit searching out such from Scripture; and instead thereof take upon you so hard a task, as to create or frame Go­spel, or promise of grace, out of reason and argument, without any Scripture-proof.

And touching your advice, closing up all; seeing in my former discourse I endeavoured to pleade for the truth of God. I have in this endeavoured (according to Gods assistance vouthsafed) to quallifie that hardnesse, which your Arguments have attempted to cast upon it.

Yet one word more, touching your scope in propounding and maintaing your fifth assertion, seeing you hold it so necessary for the encouraging of naturall men, I wonder you wholly omit to teach them what particular duties are to be done by them in this way of improvement: For whilest you tell them, If they put forth themselves to do what God hath inabled them in a way of na­ture, they may do such things as whereunto God hath promised grace, you neglect to tell them what those things are. Now you know, Dolus latet in generalibus, deceit lyes in generals; and therefore in the issue such generall tearms must needs become snares of de­ceit to naturall men, who after doing ever so much, are still left to seek out what actions they be, upon which God hath promised grace, which tearms (to retort upon you with your own language) are indeed like to the demanding to catch all the fishes in the sea, or foules of the aire; or like the leading men into a Laby [...]inth, o [...] in­to the middle of the boundlesse Ocean, and there leaving them: For you give naturall men a boundlesse task of doing such things as whereto God hath annexed grace by promise; but what or how many those things are, is not at all shewed, but is left to their own judgement; which being wholly erroneous, must necessarily lead them to presumption or dispaire. Much like in some respect to the doctrin of many heretofore, urging in generall a necessity of le­gall terrou [...]s, before any true comfort could be had, by which means multitudes have laid lo [...]ds of per [...] upon themselves one after another; and after all, find [...] no more ground com­fort then at the beginning, because they can sin [...]e not Scripture [Page 67]Standard to measure such qualifications by. Seeing then you count this doctrine (of naturall mens doing such things as whereupon God hath promised grace) so necessary; you may do well in a matter so weighty, not to lead and leave them to be beguiled by generals; but let them know in particular, what, and how many actions they are to do, upon doing whereof God hath promised grace; that so af­ter they have finished such a tale, they may sing a Quietus est to their soules through confidence of their happy state, as the Papists do, upon their Opus aperatum, after they have mumbled over the full tale of their prayers, according to the number of their Beads.

And now in answer to your method, I should shut up all with a word of use, which may be first for caution to such as take up­on them to promote the truth of God, viz. forasmuch as errour is of so bewitching a nature, as that men are apt to maintain one errour by the broaching of others worse, rather then to relinquish and disclaim the first, this should provoke such persons in speciall, to great jelousie against every errour, least one errour received prove an in-let to more and worse.

Or secondly, by way of direction to men, both in improving the meanes of grace, and in tryall of their state.

First, then for direction in improving; first negatively, let no man because he labours, in the strength of his naturalls, to improve the outward meanes of grace, therefore addresse himself to God, with this confidence; Lord I have endeavoured with utmost in­tention, &c. Therefore do thou, according to thy promise made to these improvements, give me saving grace, for this is to mist in lying vanities, and to go to God with a lye in steed of a pro­mise, because God hath made no such promise; but contrarily, in all thine improvements, acknowledge with thankfulnesse Gods long suffering, and freedome of dispensation, who might in justice have hurld thee from out of the womb, the place of thy sinfull conception, into hell the place of endlesse woe, as he hath done multitudes; and may now justly leave thee in all thy improvements, to go with the five foolish Virgins to the gate, through which the wise Virgins entred in, [...]nd yet shut thee for ever out of the bride chamber; neverthelesse waite thou in Gods prescribed way, abhorring thy self in all thine endeavours, as being so far from ingaging God to give grace, as that the loath­somenesse of them all may justly provoke God for ever to sus­pend his grace from thee.

Again, in point of tryall, sing not this requiem to thy soul, I have earnestly laboured to reach the terms of the Covenant of Grace, therefore certainly God hath added thereto the work [...] faith, because otherwise the Gospell could not be a Covenant of Free-Grace; but contratily, examine whether the powers of na­ture in thee, be so carried up above themselves, by divine operati­on as that they renounce, and abhor thy most choyce improve­ments, as having no worth, no comfort in them, and in steed thereof do cleave vigorously, and intirely unto Christ, as the onely fountain of all true comfort; yea, all this done so, as in steed of finding matter of self-boasting in thine own improvements, thou findest great ground of admiring the free dispensation of Gods over-powring grace, working such a change in thee, contrary to, & above thy self; this being found may afford much comfort. But I must totally, though most abruptly, decline further progresse.