CHAP. I. How the Philosopher came unto the Idiot to learn something of the nature of the Mind. How the Mind is of it self the Mind, and by its Office the Soul, and hath its name from measuring.

WHen many people from every part, flocked to Rome, be­cause of the Jubile, with wonderfull devotion, it was reported that a certain Philosopher, the chiefest of all that then lived, was found [Page 54]upon the bridge, whom the passengers did much admire. A certain Oratour very desirous of knowledge, sought for him carefully, and knowing him by the palenesse of his face, his long robe, and other things that shewed the gravity of a contemplative man, he courteously saluting him, demanded.

What cause is it that holds thee fixed in this place?

Admiration.

Admiration seemes to be the spur of all men that desire to know any thing. And therefore I cannot but imagine, seeing thou art accounted the chief among learned men, that it is some great cause of admiration, that makes thee so attentive.

Thou sayest well, my friend; for when I see innumerable people passe by, from almost all climates, in so great presse, I do wonder at so great a Unifor­mity in the faith of them all, in so great diversity of bodies: For though there be no one of them like another, yet there is one faith of them all, which from the ends of the earth, hath brought them hi­ther with so great Devotion.

Certainty, it must needs be the gift[Page 55]of God, that Idiots do more clearly see and reach by faith, than Philosophers by reason; for thou knowest how great enquiry he hath need of, that doth by reason handle the im­mortality of the soul, which notwithstanding, there's none of all these that doth not, by faith alone, bold most assured; which makes them take such a deal of care and pains, that after death, their souls may be darkened with no sin, and so taken up into a most bright desired lift.

Thou tellest me a great matter, and a true one, O my friend; for I have spent all my time in going about the world, and addressing my self to wise men, that I might be more assured of the immortality of the soul. In as much as the knowledge of a mans self, was, in times past, enjoyned by the Oracle of Delphi, that the mind should know it self, and feel it self conjoyned to the di­vine mind: but to this hour I could ne­ver, by the clearnesse of reason, so per­fectly reach unto that which I desire, as this ignorant people doth by faith.

If I may in civility ask, I pray thee tell me, what moved thee, who seemest a Peri­patetick, to come to Rome? doest thou think[Page 56]to find any man here, by whome thou mayest better thy self?

I had heard that in this place, out of the Temple in the Capitol, dedi­cated by Titus Attilius Crassus to the mind, there were found many writings of wise men concerning the mind: But I have peradventure lost my labour, un­lesse thou, which seemest to me a good and understanding Citizen, help me.

That Crassus dedicated a Temple to the mind, it is certain: but whether there were any books there concerning the mind, and what they were, after so many sackings of Rome, no man can tell. But least thou grieve for thy lost labour, thou shalt hear one that is in my judgement an admirable man, though an Idiot, discourse of what things soe­ver thou, wilt.

I pray thee let me, as soon as e­ver thou canst possibly.

Follow me then.

And when they came near the Temple of Eternity, they went down in­to a little place under ground, and there finding the Idiot making a wooden Spoons, the Oratour thus spake to him.

I am ashamed, Idiot, that thou shouldest be found by this great Philosopher, thus busied about these rustical workes; he will never beleeve that he shall hear any speculati­ons from thee.

I do willingly imploy my self a­bout those exercises which do continu­ally feed both my mind and my body. And if this man whom thou bringest be a Philosopher, I do not think he will despise me ever the more, for being a Spoon-maker.

Thou sayest very well; for even Plato is said to have practised painting between whiles, which it is thought he would never have done, if it had been any hinderance to his contemplation.

It may be too, that Plato had from the Art of painting, familiar examples, by which he made great matters very easie.

So do I, in this my art, symboli­cally enquire and seek for whatsoever I list, and so feed my mind, and then I change my spoons for other necessaries, and refresh my body, and so, as much as is sufficient for me, I get all that I have need of.

It is my fashion, when I come to[Page 58]any man that hath the report of a wise man, to be principally, solicitous and carefull of those things that do most trouble me; and to compare writings of the learned one with an other, and to seek out the meaning of them. But thou being an Idiot, I know not how to get thee to speak, or how to occasion some discourse, that I may see what un­derstanding thou hast of the mind.

I do not think there is any man alive, needs lesse compulsion to speak his mind, than I do; for being that I confesse my self an ignorant Idiot, I ne­ver fear to answer any thing. Learned Philosophers, and such as have the repu­tation of knowledge, deliberate careful­ly, because they have need to fear fal­ling: Therefore if thou wilt plainly tell me, what it is thou wouldest have with me, I shall as plainly answer thee.

I cannot in few words expresse my self; if it please you, let us all sit, and talk together.

It pleaseth me well.

And when they had set stools in a triangle, and placed themselves in or­der, thus spake the

Thou seest, O Philosopher, the sim­plicity and plainnesse of this man, that useth none of the Ceremonies ordinary in the enter­tainment of a man of suck worth : now make triall of him in those things which (as thou sayest) do most trouble thee, he will conceal nothing from thee which he knows, and I think thou wilt confesse thou wert not brought hither in vain.

All these things please me well: Now let us go to the matter: in the mean time be thou silent, I pray thee, and let not our long discourse seem tedious.

Thou shalt find me rather desirous to have you continue your discourse, than as one weary of it.

Tell me then, Idiot, for so thou sayest thy name is, if thou hast any con­jecture of the mind?

I think there is not, nor ever was, any perfect man, that did not frame some conception of the mind, such as it was. I for my part, have a conception, that the mind is the bond and measure of all things; and I conjecture it is cal­led Mens a mensurando, the mind from measuring.

Doest thou think the mind is one thing, and the soul another?

I do certainly think so; for the mind subsisting in it self is one thing, and in the body another. The mind subsist­ing in it self is either infinite, or the i­mage of the infinite. And of these minds which are the image of the infinite, be­ing they are not the greatest, or absolute and infinite, subsisting in it self, I admit that some may animate humane bodies, and then I grant, that the same are, by vertue of their office, souls.

Thou grantest therefore, that the mind and the soul of a man are the same, the mind by its self, the soul by its office?

I grant it, As the sensitive and see­ing part of the eye, in a living Wight, is one power.

CHAP. II. How there is a naturall word, and another imposed according to it; and how there is a simple beginning, which is the Art of arts; and how the eternal Art of the Philosophers is complicated.

THou saidest the mind was so called of measuring; a­mongst all the several deri­vations of the word, I read of no man that holds that point. The first thing therefore I intreat thee is, that thou wouldest open unto me the cause of thy so saying.

If we must diligently enquire of the power of the word, I am of opinion, that that power, which is in us, and no­tionally complicates all the samplars of things, which we call the mind, is not properly named. For as humane reason reacheth not the quiddity of things, so doth not the name; For words are imposed by the motion of reason: For we call one thing by one name, and for a certain reason; and another thing by[Page 62]another, and for another reason: and one tongue hath proper names, and ano­ther more barbarous and remote; there­fore I see, that where the propriety of names is capable of more or lesse, there the precise name is not known.

Thou makest haste to high mat­ters, Idiot; for according to what thou seemest to say, therefore are names [...]esse proper, because they are imposed at plea­sure, as seemed good to every one that imposed them by the motion of reason.

I would have thee understand me more profoundly than so; for although I confesse, that every name is by the com­ming of the form unto the matter united to the thing, it being true, that the form gives the name, that so names are not from the giver, but from Eternall, and the imposition is free: yet I do not think that there is any other than a con­gruous name imposed, although it be not a precise one.

Explain thy self, I pray thee, that I may know what thou meanest.

Very willingly, and now I turn my self to this art of spoon-making. And first I would have thee know, that I do [Page 63]without any haessitation affirm, that al hu­man arts are certain images of the infinite & divine art, I know not whether it seem so to thee, or no.

Thou requirest high matters, and I think it not fit to answer them publickly.

I wonder if ever thou readest any Philosopher that is ignorant of this, that appears so plainly of it self: For it is manifest that no humane art ever reach­ed the precision of perfection; and that every humane art is finite, and bounded; for one art is bounded or limited in its bounds, and another in anothers, and every one is different from the rest, and no one doth complicate all.

What doest thou infer from this?

That every humane art is finite.

Who doubts it?

And it is impossible there should be many infinite things really distinct.

I confesse, that likewise, for the one of them would be bounded, or determined by the other.

If then this be so, is not the one­ly absolute beginning infinite? For be­fore a beginning there is no beginning,[Page 64]as appears by it self, lest the beginning should be principiated. Therefore Eter­nity is onely infinity it self, or the abso­lute beginning.

I admit it.

Therefore the one and onely ab­solute Eternity is infinity it self, which is without beginning: wherefore every finite principiated thing, is from the in­finite beginning.

I cannot deny it.

Therefore every finite Art is from an infinite Art. And so it must needs be, that an infinite Art is the samplar, be­ginning, middle, end, measure, standard, truth, precision, and perfection of all Arts.

Proceed to that which thou ma­kest haste unto; for no man can dissent from thee in these.

I will therefore, out of this Art of Spoon-making, apply symbolical ex­amples, that the things I shall say, may be made more sensible.

I pray thee do so; for I see thou holdest the way to those things after which I labour.

Then the Idiot taking a Spoon in his hand, thus proceeded.

A Spoon befides the Idea of our mind, hath no other samplar: For al­though a Carver, as a painter, do draw examples from things which he goeth about to figure; yet so do not I that of wood make Spoons, and of clay little dishes and pots. For I do not in these imitate the figure or shape of any natu­rall thing whatsoever: for such forms of Spoons, dishes and pots, are perfected by mans art alone; and therefore my art is rather perfecting than imitating created figures, and in this liker un­to infinite Art.

This pleaseth well enough.

Suppose then that I would expli­cate my art, and make sensible the form of Spoonnesse, by which the Spoon is constituted, which though in its own nature, it be by no sense attingible, as being neither white nor black, nor of any other colour, sound, smell, taste, or touch, yet if I will labour to make it sensible in that manner that it may be done. Where­upon by the divers motions of the instru­ments which I use, I do bore and make[Page 66]hollow the matter, that is wood, untill in it the due proportion arise, wherein the form of spoonnesse doth convenient­ly appear. Whereupon the truth and pre­cision of spoonnesse, which is unmulti­pliable, and incommunicable, cannot by any instrument, or any man be made perfectly sensible. And in all spoons no­thing but the simple form it self, after a divers manner, more in one, and in ano­ther lesse, but in none precisely. And al­though the wood it self takes the name from the comming of the form, that as soon as that proportion ariseth, in which spoonnesse appeareth, it is called a spoon, that so the name may be united to the form; yet the imposition of the name was at pleasure, because another might have been imposed. And though it be at pleasure, yet it is not another, and quite divers, from the natural name united to the form, but the naturall name shines (after the comming of the form) in all the divers names by what­soever divers nations imposed. The im­position of the name therefore is done by the motion of reason; for the moti­on of reason is about things which fall[Page 67]under sense, whose discretion, concor­dance, and difference reason makes. So that there can be nothing in reason, which was not first in sense. So there­fore reason imposeth names, and is mo­ved to give one name to one thing, and another to another. But because the form in its truth, is not found among those things about which reason is con­versant, therefore reason ends it self, and determines in conjecture and opinion. Whereupon generals and particulars, genera & species, as they fall under names, are (Entia rationis) beings of reason which reason made to it self, out of the concordance and difference of sensible things: & in that respect, being by nature after the sensible things whereof they are the similitudes, the sensible things being destroyed, those cannot remain. Who­soever therefore, thinks that nothing can fall into the understanding, that falls not into reason, he also thinks that there can be nothing in the understanding that was not first in the sense, and conse­quently he must necessarily say, that the thing is nothing, but as it falls under a name, and his study is in every inquisiti­on, [Page 86]deeply to search after the quid nominis, quiddity of the name. And this enquiry is very pleasing unto man, because it dis­courseth by the motion of reason. This man would deny that forms in themselvs & in their truth separated, are otherwise thā as they are beings of reasō; & would make no account of samplars, and Ideas.

But they that admit something to be in the intelligence of the mind, which was not either in sense or reason; as for example, The exemplar and incommu­nicable truth of forms which shineth in the sensible things, they say that the samplars or Ideas do by nature, go be­fore the sensible things, as the truth goes before the image; And this order they give, that first, according to the order of Nature, is humanity in it self, and of it self, namely without any praejacent mat­ter, and then man by Humanity, and that he falls under a name, and after­wards the species in reason: and that therefore all men being destroyed, hu­manity as it is a species, that falls under a name, and is a being of reason which reason hath found out, by the sinilitude and likelinesse of men, cannot subsist;[Page 69]for it depended of men which are not; but for all this, that humanity by which men were, doth not cease to be, which humanity falls not under the name of species, as names are imposed by the motion of reason, but is the truth of that species that falls under a name: whereupon though the image be de­stroyed, the truth remains in it self.

And all these deny that the thing is nothing but as it falls under a name; for in that manner as it falls under a name, Logick and reasonable discourse considers of them, and accordingly they do logically enquire into the nature of the thing, and commend this way of so doing; but they rest not there, because reason or Logick is onely conversant about the images of the forms. But they that labour Theologically to look in­to matters beyond the power of the name, turn themselves to samplars and Ideas. And beyond these I think there can no more wayes of inquisition be gi­ven. If thou that art a Philosopher, hast read other, thou mayest peradventure know them; but this I think.

Thou doest wonderfully handle[Page 70]all Sects of Philosophers, both Peripa­teticks and Academicks.

All these, and what differences of wayes soever may be imagined, are easily agreed, when the mind lifts it self up to infinity: For (as this Oratour can more at large inform thee, by what he hath heard of me) the infinite form is the one onely and most simple which shi­neth in all things, as the most adequate samplar of all and every thing formable. Whereupon it shall also be most true, that there are not many separate sam­plars and Ideas of things, which infinite form no reason can reach: therefore being unspeakable, it is not comprehen­ded by all names imposed by the motion of reason. And so the thing as it falls under a name, is the image of its un­speakable, proper, and adequate sam­plar. There is therefore one unspeakable word, which is the precise name of all things, as by the motion of reason they fall under a name; which unspeakable name, after its manner, shineth in all things, being the infinite nominability of all names, and the infinite word of all things possible to be by word expressed;[Page 71]so that every name is the image of the precise name; And this was all which they all laboured to say, though perad­venture it might have been better and clearlier spoken: for they all necessari­ly agreed, that there is one infinite pow­er, which we call God, in which all things must needs be complicated. Nor did he mean any other thing, that said humanity as it fals under a name, is the precision of truth, then that unspeak­able infinite forme, which, while we looke upon the forme of man we call the precise samplar thereof; that so the un­speakable, whilest we look upon the images thereof, may be named by the name of all things, and one most simple samplar according to the specificall dif­ferences of things exemplified, and by our reason formed may seeme to be ma­ny samplars.

CHAP. III. How the Philosophers are to be understood, and accorded; of the name, of God and precisi­on; how one precise name being known, all are known; of the sufficience of things knowable; and how the conception of God, and our conception do differ.

THou hast wonderfully ex­plained that saying of Her­mes Trisimegistus, that God may be called by the names of all things and all things by the name of God.

Do but complicate this word To name, into the coincidence of the high­est, by thy understanding, and all things will be plain: for God is the precision of every thing; and therefore if we had precise knowledge of any one thing, we must necessarily have the knowledge of all things: So if the precise name or one thing were known; then would the names of all things be known, because precision cannot be on this side God. Hereupon he that could reach on preci­sion might reach God, who is the truth[Page 73]of all things that may be knowne.

Declare thy self, I pray thee, concer­ning the precision of a name.

Thou knowest, Orator, how we forge mathemeticall figures out of the power of the minde. And therefore when I would make tryangularity visible, I make a figure, in which I make three Angels, that in that figure so habituated and proportioned, triangularity may appear, whehewith the name is united, which let it be supposed to be a Trigo­nus; I say then if Trigonus be the precise name of a tryangulare figure, then I know the precise names of all polygo­nes, or many corner'd figures; for then I know that the precise name of a qua­drangulare figure ought to be a Tetra­gone; and of a five corner'd figure a Pentagone, and so forward: And by the knowledge of one name, I know the figure named and all polygones that may be named, and the differences and concordances of them, and whatsoever else in this point may be known. In like manner I say that if I knew the pre­cise name of one worke of God, I should know all the names of all the workes of [Page 74]God, and whatsoever might be known; And seeing the name of God is the preci­sion, of every name nameable, it is ap­parant, that in that name alone all and every thing may be knowne.

This thou hast after thy fashion pal­pably explained.

Thou hast laid down a strange way, Idiot, to accord all the Philoso­phers: for when I seriously consider, I cannot but agree with thee, that their meaning was no otherwise then thou sayest: by this which none of them all could deny, that God is infinite; in which onely saying are complicated all things that thou hast said, won­derfull is this sufficience of all things knowable, or that may be any wise de­livered. Descend more particularly to the treatise of the mind, and say, suppo­sing that the calling of the mind mens, be from the reason of measuring; what wilt thou have the mind it self to be?

Thou knowest how Divine sim­plicity complicates all things; of this complicating simplicity, the mind is the image: it then thou shalt call this Di­vine infinite simplicity, mind, it shall [Page 75]be the samplar of our mind. If thou call the Divine mind the universality of the truth of things, thou shalt calours the u­niversality of the likenesse of things, that it may be the universality of notions. The conception of the Divine mind, is the production of things, the conception of our mind, the notion of things. If the Divine mind be absolute entity, then the conception thereof is the creation of beings: and the conceptions of our mind the likenesse of beings; for those things that agree to the Divine mind, as to infinite truth, agree to our mind as the nearest image of truth. If all things be in the Divine mind, as in their precise and proper truth; all things are in our mind, as in the image, or si­militude of their proper truth, to wit, notionally; for knowledge is by like­nesse. All things are in God, but there the samplars of things; all things are in our mind, but here the similitudes of things. As God is the absalute entity, which is the complication of all things that are, so our mind is the image of that infinite entity, which is the complicati­on of all images, no otherwise then the [Page 76]first picture of an unknown King, is the samplar of all other copies that are painted according to it: for the know­ledge, or face of God, descends not, but in the mentall nature, whereof truth is the object; and further it descendeth not, but by the mind, so that the mind is the image of God, and the samplar of all the images of God after it self. There­fore look how much all things, after the simple mind, do partake of the mind, so much do they also partake of Gods image; so that the mind of it self is the image of God, and all things after the mind, no wayes but by the mind.

CHAP. IV. How our mind is not the explication, but a certaine image of the eternall complication: how those things that are after the mind are not such an image. How the mind is without notions, and yet hath a conere ate judgement; and why the body it necessary for it.

Hou seemest, out of the great fulnesse of thy mind, as though thou meantest, that[Page 77]as the infinite minde is the absolute for­mative power; so the finite minde is the conformative or configurative power.

I doe indeed for that which is to be said, cannot conveniently be expressed, & therefore is the multiplication of speech very profitable. Now marke further, than an image is one thing, and an explication another; for equality is the image of unitie, for from unitie once ariseth equa­litie. Therefore is equality the image of unitie; yet is not equality but plurality, the explication of unitie : therefore is equally the image of the explication of of unity, not the explication. So doe I meane, that the minde is the most sim­ple image, of the divine minde, amongst all the images of divine complication. And so is the minde the first image of that divine complication, which by his simplicity and power, complicateth all images of complication. For as God is the complication of complications, so the minde which is the image of God, is the image of the complication of com­plications: and after the images, are the plurality of things which explicate the divine complication. As number ex­plicates[Page 78]unity, motion rests, time eter­nity, composition simplicity, time the present, greatness a point, motion a moment, inequality equality, diversity identity, and so of the rest. From hence gather the admirable power of our minde, for in the vertue thereof, is com­plicated the assimulative power of the complication of a point, by which it finds in it self a power, wherein it assimu­lates it selfe to every greatnesse.

So also because of the assimulative pow­er of the complication of unity, it hath power to assimulate it selfe to every mul­titude. And so by the assimulative power of the complication of now or the pre­sent, it hath power assimulate it selfe to all time; and so by the assimulative power of th complication of rests, to all motion; and of simplicity to every com­position, and of identity to all diversity; and of equality to all inaquality, and of conjunctionto every dis-junction. And by the image of the absolute complica­tion, which is the infinite minde, it hath power by which it can assimulate it selfe to every explication: and many such things thou seest of thy selfe, may be [Page 79]said, which our mind hath, because it is a certaine image of the infinite simplici­ty which complicateth all things.

It seemeth then, that onely the mind is the image of God.

So it is properly: because all things that are after, (or beneath) the mind, are not the image of God, but on­ly ly so far forth as the mind shineth, or ap­peareth in them: as it more shineth in perfect living wights, then in imperfect ones; and more insensible things, then in vegetables; and more in vegetables, then in minerals; so that creatures that want the mind, are rather explications, then images of the Divine simplicity: al­though according to the shining or ap­pearing of the mentall image, in expli­cation, they do diversly partake of the image.

Aristotle said, there was no no­tion concreate (or made together with) the minder or soul, because he likened it to a smooth and shaven table: but Plato saith, there were notions concreated with it, yet that for the moles and weights of the body , the soul forgot them; what do'st thou thinke to be the truh

Undoubtedly our mind was, by God, put into this body, to the profit and advantage thereof; and therefore it must needs have from God all that, with­out which it could not acquire that pro­fit and advantage, it is not therefore cre­dible, that there were notions concrea­ted with the soul, which it lost in the bo­dy: but because it hath need of a body, that the concreated power may proceed unto act. As the visive power of the soul cannot see actually, except it be stirred up by the object; and that cannot be, but by the representing of multiplied specis by then esn of the organ, and so it hath need of the eye. Even so the power of the mind, which is the comprehensive and nationall power, cannot porceed to its opperations, except it be stirred up by sensible things, which it cannot be but by the mediation of sensible phantasmis. Therefore it hath need of an organicall body, and such an one, without which it could not be stired up. In this there­fore, Aristotle seems to have thought a­right, that there are no notions of the soul concreated from the beginning, which it lost by being incorporated. But[Page 81]because it cannot profit, if it want all udgement, as a deaf man can never pro­fit to become a lutenist, because he hath in himself no judgement of harmony, by which he may discerne whether he do profit, therefore our soul hath a concre­ated judgement without which it could not profit. This judging power is natu­rally concreated with the mind, by which, of it self it judgeth whether dis­courses be weak, strong, or concluding. Which power if Plato called a concreat­ed notion, he was not out of the way at all.

How clear is thy delivery, which every man that hears, is forced to assent unto. These things must be diligently marked, for we plainly find a spirit in our mind speaking and judging this good, that just, the other true, and re­prehending us, if we decline from the just; which speech and judgement it learned not, and therefore it is connate or concreate.

By this we prove, that the mind is that power which though it want all notionall form, yet being stired up, can assimilate it self to every form, and make[Page 82]notions of all things: like, after a man­ner, to a sound eye which is in darkness, and never saw the light, for it wanteth all actuall notion of visible things; yet comming into light, and being stirred up, it assimilates it selfe to the thing vi­sible, that it may make a notion.

Plato saith, that judgement is then required, when the sence ministers contrary things at once.

He spake subtilly , for when the touch confusedly finds hard and so ft, or heavy and light, one contrary in another, then there is recourse to the understan­ding, that it may judge of the quiddity of both so confusedly perceived, that there are many things discreet.

So when the sight confusedly sees great and little, is there not need of the discre­tive judgement of the understanding; what is great, and what little? but if the sence were of it self sufficient, there would no recourse be had to the judgements of the understanding, as in the sight of that which is light, when there is nothing pre­sented which is contrary to it.

CHAP. V. How the minde is a living substance, created in the body; and of the manner how; whe­ther ther reason be in bruit beast: and how the living minde is the description of the eter­nall wisdome.

ALmost all the Peripateticks say, that the understanding, which thou seemest to call the minde, is a certain power of the Soul; and that to understand is an ac­cident, what sayest thou to it?

The minde is a living substance, which we finde by experience, doth in­wardly speak and judge in us, and which of all spirituall powers, that we finde in our selves, is more then any other power assimulated and made like to the infinite substance, an absolute forme. The of­fice of the mind in this body, to quick­en it, and from hence it is called the soul; wherefore the minde is a substantiall forme, or a power that after its fastion, complicates in it selfe all things; and by quickning the living soul, whereby[Page 84]it animates the body, complicates the vegetative and sensitive life, and the power discoursive, and intellectual, and intelligible.

Wilt thou have the minde, which thou confest to be also the intellectuall soul, to have been before the body, and afterwards incorporated, as Pythagoras, and the Platonists meane?

In nature, not in time; for I com­pared it, as thou hardest, to the sight in darknesse: now the sight was not actu­ally before the eye, but onely in nature; wherefore because the minde is a cer­taine divine seed, that by its own power, doth notionally complicate the Sam­plers of all things; therefore is it by God (from whom it hath this power, in asmuch as it received its being) at the same time placed, and in a convenient earth, where it may bring forth fruit, and of it selfe notionally explicate the uni­versity of things; otherwise this se­minall power had been given it in vaine, if there had not been given withall, op­pertunity to break into act.

Thou speakest weightily. But I much desire to heare how this is done in us.

The divine manners or waies, are never to be reached precisely; yet wee make guesses and conjectures of them, some more cleare, and some more darke ones. I thinke this similitude which I will tell thee, sufficient. For thou know­est that the fight by its owne proper na­ture, doth not discern, but in a certaine Globe, and confusedly perceives the ob­ectacle meeting it within the speare of its motion, the eye which objectacle is generated by the multiplication of the species of the object into the eye. There­fore if the sight be present in the eye with out discretion, as in infants, where the use of discretion is wanting, then the minde comes so to the sensible soul, as discretion to the sight, by which it judg­eth between colours. And as this visive disc etion is found in perfect brute living wights, (as in Dogs that know their owne masters by sight) and is by God given unto the sight, as the perfection and forme of seeing; so unto mans na­ture, besides that discretion which is found in bruits, there is given a higher power, that is unto annimall discretion, ust as that is to the sensible power, so [Page 86]that the minde is the forme of the anni­mall discretion, and the perfection there­of.

Exceedingly well and sweetly, but me thinks thou drawest somewhat near the oppinion of the wise Philo that said there was reason in beasts.

We finde by experience that there is in brute beasts a descretive discourse, without which their nature could not well subsist. Whereupon their discourse, (because it wants the forme, namely the understanding or minde) is confused, for it wants judgement and knowledge; and because all discretion is from reason, therefore Philo seemes to have said as he did not without reason, or absurdly.

Declare I pray thee, how the minde is the forme of the discoursing rea­son.

I have already told thee, that as the sight seeth, and knoweth not what it seeth, without discretion to informe, en­lighten, and perfect it, so reason syllo­gyzeth, and knoweth not what it syllo­gizeth without the minde, but the mind enforms, enlightens, and perfects racio­cination or discourse, that may know[Page 87]what it syllogizeth; as if an Idiot, not knowing the power of words should read some booke; reading proceeds from the force of reason, for he readeth by running through the difference of letters, which he compounds and devideth; and this is the worke of reason, and yet bee knoweth not what he reads: and let there be another, which reads and knowes, and understands what hee reads. This is a certaine similitude of reason confused, and reason formed by the minde, for the minde hath the descretive judgement of the reasons, which reason is good, and which is sophisticall: so that the minde is the discretive forme of reasons, as reason is the discretive forme of sen­ces and imaginations.

From whence hath the minde this judgement, for she seeme to give judgement of all things?

It hath it from hence, because it is the image of the Samplar of all things; for God is the Samplar of all things. Therefore whereas the Smplar of all things shineth in the minde, as the truth in the image, it hath in it selfe, that[Page 88]where it looketh, and according to which it giveth judgement of outward things; as if there were a living Law written, that Law (because living) would read in it self the things that are to be judged. Right so the minde is a living descripti­on, of the eternall and infinite wisdome: but in cur minds, from the beginning, that life is like unto one that is a sleepe, untill it be stirred up by admiration, pro­ceeding from sensible things, to be mo­ved then by the motion of its intellectual life, it finds described in it self that which it seeketh. But thou must understand, that this description is a resplendance or shining of the Samplar of all things, af­ter the same manner that the truth shi­neth in its image.

As if the most simple, and indivisible sharpnesse of the corner of a Diamon, ex­ceeding well pollished, (in which the formes of all things did shine) were a­live, then would it by looking into it selfe, finde the similitudes it might frame, notions of all things.

Thou speakest very strange and delectable things. This example of the[Page 89]sharp pointed Diamond pleaseth excee­dingly; for by how much more sharp and simple, that corner were, by so much more clearely would all things shine therein.

He that considers in himselfe the power of a looking glass, how it is be­fore all quantitie, if he conceive it a­live by an intellectuall life, in which the Samplar of all things shineth, may make a tollerable conjecture of the minde.

I would hear whether thou canst paradigmatically, apply this thy art to the creation of the minde.

Yes I can.

Then taking a faire spoon in his hand, he said.

I would make a glazed spoon: I sought out first a wood exceeding hard and close: I applyed my instruments, and I wrought out a convenient propor­tion, in which the form of a spoon did perfectly appear: afterwards I polish'd the surface of it so, that in the shining form of a spoon, I made the forme of a glasse, as thou seest, for though it be a faire spoon, yet withall it is a glazed[Page 90]spoon. For thou hast in it all kind of glasses, namely concave, connext, straight and calumnare, in the base of the handle straight glasse; in the handle it self a co­lumnar; in the concavity of the spoon a concave glasse; and in the convexity a convex one. The glassie form, then, had no temporall being before the spoon, but to the perfection of the spoon, it was by me added to the first form of the spoon that it might perfect it: so that now the specular form containes in it self the form of the spoon, and yet the specular form is independent of the spoon; for it is not of the essence of a glasse to be a spoon. Therefore though the proportions were broken, without which the form of a spoon cannot be; as put case the handle were seperated from it, it would cease to be a spoon; but yet the form of a glasse would not cease to be. Even so God by the motion of the heaven, out of fit mat­ter hath brought a proportion, wherein animality might shine, after a more per­fect manner, whereunto he afterwards added the mind, as a living glasse by the means which I have said.

CHAP. VI. How wise men, in a simbolical kind of speak­ing, have called number the samplar of things; of the wonderful nature thereof. And how it is from the mind, and the incorru­ptibility of Essences. And how the mind is an harmony, a number moving it self, a compisition of the same and that which is divers.

THou hast aptly appyed it; and in saying there is one intellect, thou openest how the production of things is: and how proportion is the place, or be, or region of forme; and matter the place of pro­portion. And thou seemest to be much of the opinion of Pythagoras, who held all things to be of or from number.

Whether I be a Pythagorean or no, I know not; this I am sure of, that no mans authority moves me, though sometimes it offer to do so. But I thinke the Pythagoreans, which, as thou sayest, do Philosophize all things by numbers, very grave and witty men. Nor do I[Page 92]believe that they meant our mathemati­call number, which proceeds from our mind, for it is manifest, that cannot be the beginning of any thing; they speak sym­bolically and rationally, of the number which proceeds from the Divine minde, of which mathematicall number is but the image. For as our mind is in relati­on to that eternall infinite mind; so the number of our mind, to the number of that mind; and we give that number our name, as we give to that mind, the name of our mind; and we are much de­lighted to be conversant in number, as in our own proper worke.

Lay open, I pray thee the mo­tives, that may move one to say, that numbers are the beginnings of things.

There can be but one infinite be­ginning; and this alone is infinitely simple. But the first thing princi­piated, or that hath a beginning, can­not be infinitely simple (as appears by it self) neither can it be propounded of other things compounding it; for then it were not the first thing that had a be­ginning, but the things that compound it, must in nature go before it. We must[Page 93]therefore admit, that the first thing that had a beginning, is so compounded, that yet it is not compounded of other things, but of it self: and our mind can­not comprehend how any such thing should be, except it be number, or as the number of our mind. For number is compounded, and compounded of it self, (for so eaven and odd, is every number compounded) so, number is compound­ed of it self. If thou sayest that the third number is compounded of three unities, thou speakest as though one should say, that the wales and the roof, do severally make an house: for if the wals be a part, and the roof a part, a house is not com­pounded of them, nor more do three u­nities apart, make the number three. Therefore if thou consider unities as they constitute a ternary, thou considerest them united, and that then three unities united are nothing but a ternary; and so it is compounded of it self, and so of all num­bers: Nay that which is more, while in number I looke upon nothing but unity, I see an uncompounded composition of number, and a coinsidence of simplicity and composition, or of unity and multi­tude;[Page 68]yea, if I yet look more sharply in­to it, I see a compounded unity of num­ber, as in the harmonicall unities, dia­pason, diapente, diatessaron: for an har­monical habitude is a unity, which with­out number cannot be understood. More­over, from the habitude of a semitone, and a doubled mediety, which is as the habitude of the side of a square to the di­amiter, I see a more simple number, then the reason of our minde can reach unto. For habitude (or proportion) is not understood without number, and yet that number must be at once both odd and even, of which, a long discourse, and very plesant might be made, if we did not make hast to other things. We have now therefore learned, how the first thing that was begun, is that whereof number beares the Type. Nor can we by any other meanes come nearer the quid­dity thereof, seeing the precision of the quiddity of whatsoever thing it it be, is by us utterly inattingable, otherwise then in an enigma or figure. For the first thing that had a beginning, we doe symbolically call number, because num­ber is the subject of proportion, for[Page 95]there can be no proportion without number. And proportion is the place of the form; for without a proportion fit and agreeable to the form, the form can in no case shine or appear, as I said, that the proportion befitting a spoon, being broken, the form cannot remain, because it hath no place: for proportion is as it were the aptitude of the specular sur­face to the resplendence of the image, which not abiding, the representation ceaseth. Behold how the infinite unity of the samplar, cannot appear but in an apt proportion, and that is in number. For the eternall mind doth act, as a mu­sitian which would make his concepti­on sensible; for he takes many voices, and brings them into a proportion a­greeing to that harmony, that in that proportion, the harmony may sweetly and perfectly appear, when it is there as in its place, and the respendence of the harmony is varied according to the va­riety of the proportion that is fit for it; and the harmony ceaseth, when the ap­titude of that proportion ceaseth. From the mind therefore is number and all things.

What, is there not a plurality of things without the consideration of our mind?

Yes; but it is from the Divine mind; wherefore as in regard of God, plurality of things is from the Divine mind; so in regard of us, plurality of things is from our minds: for onely the mind numbers, and the mind taken a­way, there is no discrete number. For in that the mind doth singularly and particularly understand one and the same thing , we when we consider it, say it is one thing: in that it doth sin­gularly understand one thing, and that once, it is in truth the equality of unity. But when it understands one thing sin­gularly, and by multiplying it, we judge the things to be more, in saying two: because the mind understandeth that which is singularly one and the same thing, twice, or by doubling it. And so of the rest.

Doth not a ternary consist of a binary and a unity? and we say that number is a collection of singulars; how doest thou then say, that it is of the mind?

Those wayes of speaking must be referred to the way of understanding; because to collect is no more, then to take one and the same common thing, and multiply it about the same things. Therefore when thou seest, that without the multitude of the mind, a binary or ternary is nothing, thou seest well e­nough, that number is from the mind.

How is the plurality of things, the number of the Divine mind ?

Because from that the Divine mine understands one thing so, and another thing otherwise; the plurality of things ariseth. Therefore if thou look narrow­ly into it, thou shalt find the plurality of things to be nothing but the Divine minds manner of understanding: So I conjecture one may without blame say, that the first samplar of things, in the mind of the Creator, is number. This appears by the delight and beauty, that is in all things which consisteth in propor­tion as that in number. Hereupon num­ber is the principall step leading unto wisdome.

The Pythagoreans said so first, then the Platonists, whom also Severinus Boetius imitates.

Likewise, say I, that the samplar of the conceptions of our mind, is num­ber: for without number it can do no­thing. If there were no number, there would neither be assimilation, notion, discretion, nor measure. For without number things cannot be other and o­ther, or discrete: nor can it be under­stood how one thing should be substance, another quantity, and so of the rest. Therefore seeing number is the man­ner of understanding, nothing can be without it understood. For the number of our mind, being the image of the Divine mind the samplar of things, is the samplar of notions. And as unity is before all plurality, and this unity uniting is the uncreated mind, in which all things are one; after one plurality, the explication of the power of that uni­ty, which power is the entity of things, the equality of being, and the connexi­on of entity and equality; and this is the blessed Trinity: So in our mind is the image of that Divine Trinity : for our mind is likewise a unity uniting, be­fore all plurality by the conceptible mind; and after that unity that unites [Page 99]all plurality, is plurality, which is the image of the plurality of things; as our mind is the image of the Divine mind: and plurality explicates the power of the unity of the mind, which power is the image of entity, equality and connexion.

I see that by number thou reach­est to marvellous things. Go too there­fore, because Saint Dionisius saith, that the essences of things are incorrupti­ble, canst thou demonstrate this by num­ber?

When thou considerest that num­ber is made of the multitude of unities, and that alterity doth contingently fol­low multiplication; and markest the composition of number to be of unity and alterity, the same and divers, even and odd, divisible and indivisible: And that the quiddity of all things had its be­ginning from being the number of the Divine mind; then thou mayest after some fashion reach unto it, how the es­sences of things are incorruptible, as unity, whereof is number, which unity is entity. And how things are so or so by al­terity, which is not or the essence of num­ber,[Page 100]but accidentally following the mul­tipliciation of unity. So alterity is of the essence of nothing: for alterity pertains to destruction; because it is division, from whence is corruption, and there­fore it cannot be of the essence of the thing. Thou seest moreover how num­ber is no other thing then the things numbered. From whence thou mayest conclude, that between the Divine mind and things, there mediates no number, which hath any actuall being; but the number of things are the things them­selves.

CHAP. VII. How the minde of it selfe workes out the formes of things, by way of assimilati­on; and reacheth absolute possibilitie or mat­ter.

TEll me I pray thee, doest thou thinke our minde is a harmonie? or a number moving it selfe? or a composition of the same and divers? or of an essence divi­sible[Page 101]and indivisible? or an entelechia? for such manner of speaking the Plato­nists and Peripateticks use?

I doe believe that all they which have spoken of the minde, might use these or the like speeches, moved by those things which they did experimentally finde in the power of the minde; for they found the judgement of all harmo­nie to bee in the minde; and that the minde out of it selfe fashioneth notions, and that it so moves it selfe, as a living discretive number would of it selfe pro­ceed to make discretions. And againe they found that it proceeds in any par­ticular, collectively, or distributively, ei­ther according to the manner of simpli­city, and absolute necessity, or of abso­lute possibility, or necessity of complexi­on, or determinately, or of a possibility determinate, or because of the aptitude of a perpetuall motion. Because of these and the like experiments, it is probably to be beleeved, they said those or the like things of the minde or soul. For to say that the minde is of the same and divers, is to say it is of unity, and alterity; after the same manner that a number is com­pounded[Page 102]of the same, in regard of the common or universall of that which is divers, in regard of singulars, or parti­culars; which both are waies of the minds understanding.

Go on, I pray thee, to declare how the minde may be said to be a num­ber moving it selfe.

I thinke no man can deny, but that the minde is a certaine divine living number, excellently proportioned to the resplendence of manifesting, and shewing of the divine harmony, and com­plicating every sensible, rational, and intellectual harmony; and whatsoever can be better expressed about this matter. Insomuch that every number proportion, and harmony which proceeds from our minde, doth as little reach or come near our minde, as our minde doth to the in­finite minde. For the minde, though it be a divine number, yet it is so a number, that it is a simple unity, by its own pow­er putting forth its number. So that look what proportion there is between God and his workes; the same there is be­tween the workes of the minde, and the minde it selfe.

There are very many that would have our minde to be of the divine na­ture, and most meerly conjoyned to the divine minde.

I doe not think they meant any o­therwise then as I have laid, although they had another manner of speaking. For between the divine minde and ours, there is the same difference, that there is between doing and seeing; for the di­vine minde by conceiving creates, but ours by conceiving assimilates, in ma­king notions or intellectual visions. The divine minde is a power, making things to be; but ours an assimilative power.

I see that the Philosopher hath not time enough to satisfie himselfe, and therefore I have kept silence a long time; I have heard many, and very pleasing things; yet would I faine heare further, how the minde of it selfe, puts forth the formes of things by way of assi­mulation?

The minde is so assimilative, that in the sight it makes it selfe like vi­sible things; and in the hearing to au­dible things; in the taste, to things tast­able; in the smell, to things odorable; [Page 104]in the touch, to things tangible; in the sense, to things sensible; in the ima­gination, to things imaginable; and in the reason, to reasonable things. For the image in the absence of sensible things, is as some sense without the dis­cretion of sensible things; for it con­formes it selfe to sensible things absent, but confusedly, and without discerning of state from state. But in reason it con­formes it selfe to things with discerning of state from state. In all those places our minde, is carried in the spirit of the Arteries; vvhich being stir'd up by mee­ting vvith species multipli'd from the objects to the spirits, assimilates it selfe by the things to the species; that by as­similation it may give judgement of the objects: Whereupon that subtile spirit of the Arteries, which is enlivened by the minde, is so by the minde conform'd un­to the similitude of the species, which was objected to the motion of the spirit; As soft wax is by a man, having the use and art of the minde, configured unto the thing then presently presented to the work-man: for all configurations whe­ther in the art of carving, painting, or[Page 110]hammering, cannot be done without the mind, for it is the mind which terminates all things. Therefore if we could imagine a piece of wax inform'd by the minde; then the minde being within it, would configure it, or make it like to every figure presented unto it; as now the minde of the Artificer, being applied from without labours to doe. So likewise of clay, and every flexible or fashionable thing. So in our body, the minde according to the various flexiblenesse of the spirits of the Arteries in the Organs, makes divers configurations, subtile and grosse; and one spirit is not configurable to that, to which another is; because the spirit in the optick nerve, cannot be met withall, and incountred by the species of sounds, but onely by the species of colours; & there­fore is configurable to the species of co­lours, and not of sounds, and so of the rest.

There is likewise another spirit which is configurable to all sensible species, which is in the Organ of the imagina­tive power, but after a grosse and indis­creet, or undistinguished manner. And there is another in the Organ of the ra­tiocinative,[Page 106]or discursive power, which is configurable to al sensible things, discret­ly and clearly. And all these configura­tions are assimilations to sensible things, when thy are done by the meanes of cor­porall spirits, though never so subtile; wherefore, when the minde makes these assimilations, that it may have the mo­tions of sensible things, and so is drown­ned in the corporall spirit, then it act­eth as the soul animating a body, by which animation the power of a living wight is constituted.

And hereupon the soul of brute beasts makes the like assimilation after its man­ner, (though more confused) that it may after its manner attaine to notions.

But our power of the minde, from such notions as these so elicited & drawn out by assimilation, makes Mechanick arts physicall and logicall conjectures, and reacheth things in the manner, whereby they are conceived in the possibility of be­ing, or matter, and in the manner, where­by the possibility of being, or matter is determined by the forme. Wherefore, see­ing that by these assimilations it reach­eth none but the notions of sensible[Page 107]things, where the formes of things are not true, but shadowed with the variable­nesse of matter: therefore all such no­tions, are rather conjectures then truth; for this cause I say that the notions which are reached by rationall assimila­tions, are uncertain, because they are ra­ther according to the images of formes, then the truths. Afterwards our minde, not as drowned in the body which it ani­mates, but as it is the minde of it selfe; yet in possibility of being united to the body, while it lookes unto its immuta­bility, makes assimilation of formes, not as they are drowned in the matter, but as they are in and of themselves, and conceives the immutable quiddities of things, using it selfe for an instrument, without any organicall spirit. As whilst it conceives that a circle is a figure, from whose center all the lines drawne to the circumference are equall: after which manner of being, a circle without the minde, cannot be in matter; for it is impossible there should be given in matter two equall lines; and it is lesse possible, that such a circle should be figured; and therefore a circle in the[Page 108]mind, is the Samplar and measure of the truth of a circle in the pavement. So wee say that the truth of things in the minde, is in the necessity of complexion; to wit, after the manner that the truth of a thing requireth, as we have said of the circle. And because the minde, as in it selfe, and abstracted from matter, makes these assimilations, therefore it as­similateth it selfe to abstracted formes. And according to this power it shewes or puts forth certain mathematicall sci­ences, and finds its power to bee that it can assimilate it selfe to things, as they are in the necessity of complexion, and make notions; and it is stirred up to these abstractive assimilations, by the Phantasmes or images of formes, which it layes hold on by the assimilations made in the Organs. As by the beauty of an image, one is moved to enquire the beauty of the Samplar; and in this assi­milation the minde is, as if absolute pli­ablenesse, abstracted from Wax, Clay, Mettals, and all other flexible things, were living by a mentall life, that it could of it selfe assimilate it selfe to all figures, as they subsist in themselves, and[Page 110]not in the matter; for such flexibility, in the power of its living flexibility, that is in it selfe, would behold that the noti­ons of all things are, in as much as it could conforme it selfe to all things. And because the minde is not yet satisfied with this, because it sees not the precise truth of all things, but in a certain ne­cessity determined to every thing, as one thing is so, and another thing so, and every thing compounded of its parts: and it sees that this manner of being is not the truth it selfe, but the participa­tion of truth, that one is truly so, and another thing truly otherwise, which al­terity cannot agree to the truth in it self, in its selfe, considered in its owne abso­lute and infinite precision: whereupon the minde looking to its simplicity, to wit, as it is not onely abstracted from matter, but incommunicable to matter, or after the manner of a forme not uni­ble, useth this simplicity as an instru­ment, that it may assimilate it selfe to all things, not onely abstractedly, but also in its simplicity incommunicable to mat­ter. And after this manner it behold­eth all things in its simplicity; as if it[Page 110]should see all greatnesse in a point, and a circle in the center: and there it sees without all composition of parts, and not as this is one thing, and that a­nother, but as all things are one, and one all things. And this is the beholding of absolute truth, as if one could, after the last-before-spoken manner, behold how entity it selfe, is in all beings variously participated. And if after this he could in the manner (of which we now speak) above participation, and all truth, sim­ply behold absolute entity it selfe; such a one might truly, above the determinate necessity of complexion; now see all things which earst hee saw in varietie, without it, in absolute necessity, most simply without number, greatnesse, and any alterity. And in this high­est manner, the minde uses it selfe, as it is the image of God, and as God; which is all things, shineth in it, namely, when, as the living image of God, it doth with all its power, turne it selfe to its Sam­plar. And in this manner, it sees all things one thing, and it selfe the assimi­lation of that one thing, by which it frames notions of the one, that it is all[Page 111]things, and so makes Theologicall specu­lations: where, as in the end of all no­tions, it sweetly resteth, as in the most delectable truth of its life; of which manner, there can never be enough said; but these things which I have thus spo­ken without curiosity, and after a plain manner, thou maist by thy elegant stile make more polite, and wel-come to the reader.

I had no desire, but to beare what I have heard, which thou hast plainly declared; and that will be to them that seek the truth, elegance enough.

I pray thee, declare further, how the mind reacheth indeterminate possibi­lity, which we call matter?

By a certain counterfeit way, and a contrary manner, whereby it passeth from a necessity of complection, to an absolute necessity; for seeing how all bodies have to be formed by corporiety, taking that away it seeth all it law be­fore it as a certaine indeterminate pos­sibility. And those things which before it saw in corporiety distinct and determinate, as being in act, now it seeth confused and indeterminate, in­possibility.[Page 112]And this is the manner of u­niversality, by which all things are seen in possibility; yet it is not the manner of being, because it is not power-being or posse esse.

CHAP. VIII. How it is the same thing, to the mind to con­ceive, to understand notions, and to make assimilations. And how sensations are made, according to the naturalists.

ENough of this, least we ex­ceed our purpose now tell me, if in or to the mind, to conceive, be to understand?

I have said that the mind is the power of conceiving; so that being stir­red up, it moveth it self by conceiving till it understand. Wherefore understan­ding is the perfect motion of the mind.

When is it said to conceive?

When it makes the similitudes of things: or, if thou hadst rather say, notions, or kinds, differences, species, proper, and accident. For God created in the soul the power of conceiving, and[Page 113]the mind doth the things aforesaid; yet are all these one and the same thing, the power of the mind, conception, simi­litude, notion, kind, and species. And although we do not call it the same thing to understand and to conceive, yet whatsoever is understood, is conceived, and whatsoever is conceived is under­stood: but onely that which is actuall is understood, and not conceived.

How meanest thou that?

To conceive is nothing but to comprehend either after the manner of matter, or form, or some other way; but that which is actually, is said to be un­derstood; that is, the property of it is comprehended by the mind. The mind is also said to understand, by which it is moved, and the beginning of the mo­tion is rather called passion; the per­fection of it, understanding. But as a di­sposition and habit are the same, con­sidering a disposition tends to perfection, and after perfection is a habit; so the passion of the mind and the understand­ing are one and the same thing.

Yet the understanding doth not seeme to say, or imply perfection.

Thou sayest well; properly the mind is said to understand when it is moved; although it be not called un­standing, but after perfection.

Are therefore all these one and the same, to wit, the power of concei­ving, conception, similitude, notion, passion, and understanding?

They are so the same, that the power of conceiving is not any of them: because it is called a power, from an ap­titude, which it hath from its creation; a conception, from the imitation, be­cause it imitates the matter or forme, namely, in that it comprehends after the manner of the matter or form of the compound.

And in what respect it is called con­ception, in the same also it is called the similitude or notion of the thing; and these names are truly predicated one of another, and every one of them is called understanding.

I wonder how conception can be called understanding?

Although the conception be cal­led from imitation, and understanding from perfection, yet it is perfection,[Page 115]which is the cause why understanding is called conception: for then doth the mind conceive, when the understanding is lead to perfection.

Paradventure thou wilt likewise admit that the understanding should be called the passion of the mind?

Yes that I will; for the under­standing is the motion of the mind, the beginning whereof is passion.

Therefore conception is a pas­sion too?

It follows not, as thou seest of thy self. In like manner although the kinds and species be the understanding, yet are they not therefore passions of the soul; for the passions of the soul vanish, and yet the kinds and species of things re­maine.

Enough of this, seeing divers men speak diversly thereof. But tell me, how doest thou call that power of the mind by which it sees all things in the necessity of complexion; and that o­ther by which it sees them in an abso­lute necessity?

I that am an Idiot, do not much regard words, yet I thinke that power[Page 116]may conveniently be called discipline, whereby the mind looking to its own immutability, considers the forms of things without matter; because that by discipline and learning men come to this consideration of the form. But that power, by which the mind looking to its own simplicity, doth therein behold all things without composition, may be called intelligence.

It is read, that some men call that power which thou callest doctrine or learning, intelligence; and that which thou callest intelligence, intelligibility.

It doth not displease me; for they may conveniently be so called.

I could wish to hear from thee Phi­losopher, how the Naturalists suppose sensati­ons are done; for in this I thinke thee more skilfull then the Idiot, who will also be glad if thou wilt so do.

I should be glad if I could re­hearse any part of that which I have heard. That which thou required is thus: The Naturalists say, that the soul is mixt with a most thin and subtile spi­rit, scattered clean through the Arteries; so that, that spirit is the carryage of the [Page 117]soul; and the vehiculum or carryage of that spirit, is the blood. There is there­fore one nerve or artery full of that spi­rit, which is directed to the eyes, so that near unto the eyes it is forked, and be­ing filled with that spirit, it comes to the bals of the eyes wherein is the apple; that spirit then so dispersed through the arte­ries, the instrument of the soul, by which it exerciseth the sense of seeing; Two arteries full of the same spirit, are dire­cted to the eares; likewise to the nostrils, and to the palate, are certaine arteries directed; and that spirit is diffused by the marrow even unto the extremities or ends of the joynts. That spirit which is directed to the eyes is most active and nimble: and therefore when it finds any outward objects, the spirit is repercussed or stricken back, and the soul is stirred up, to see that which it meets withall. So in the ear it is repercussed with the voice, and the soul excited to comprehend: and as hearing is done in a most thin aire, so is smelling in a thick or rather fu­mous aire, which when it entreth the no­strils, by its sumosity retards the spi­rit, so that the soul is excited to compre­hend[Page 118]the odour of that fumosity. Like­wise when a spongious humour enters the palate, the spirit is retarded, and the soul excited to taste; So the soul u­seth the spirit diffused through the mar­row, for the instrument of touching: for when any solid thing meets with the body, the spirit is offended, and after a manner retarded, and thence is touch­ing. About the eyes, the soule useth a fiery power, about the ears an aethere­all, or rather a pure ayrie one; about the nostrils a thick and fumous ayrie one; about the palate, a watery power; about the marrow, an earthy one; And this according to the order of the foure elements. That as the eyes are higher then the eares, so the spirit which is di­rected to the eyes, is higher and superi­our, and may after a manner be called fiery. So that in man, the disposition of the senses is in a manner like the disposi­tion of the order of the four elements, whereupon seeing is swifter then hear­ing, and therefore we see the lightning before we hear the thunder, although they be both at once. Moreover the strong subtile and acute direction of the[Page 117]beams of the eyes, makes the aire give way unto it, and nothing can withstand it, except it bee grosse, earthy, or wa­tery. Seeing then the spirit is the instru­ment of the senses, and the eyes, nostrils, and other sensories, are as windowes and wayes by which that spirit may go out to perceive, it is manifest that nothing is perceived but by a let or obstacle, that (as soon as any thing hinders it) that spirit which is the instrument of percei­ving may be retarded, and the soul be­ing as it were retarded, may confusedly by the senses comprehend the thing that hinders it. For the sense, of it self, ter­minates nothing: and if when we see any thing, we put a bound in it, that is not the worke of the sense, but of the ima­gination which is joyned to the sense. There is moreover in the fore part of the head, in the phantasticall cell, a certain spirit much more subtile and nimble then that which is diffused through the Arteries, which when the mind useth as its instrument, it is made more subtile, that though the thing be absent, it can comprehend the form in the matter, which power of the soul is called imagi­nation;[Page 118]because by it, the soul conforms unto it self the image of the thing ab­sent; and it differs in this from the sense, because the sense comprehends the form in the matter, onely while the thing is present; but imagination doth it as well, when the thing is absent, but confused­ly, so that it discernes not the state, but comprehends many states together con­fusedly. But there is in the middle part of the head, to wit, in that cell which is called rationall, a most subtile spirit, thinner far then that in the fantasticall cell, and when the soul useth that spirit as her instrument, it is yet more subtible, insomuch that it discerneth state from state; yet doth it not comprehend the truth of things, because it comprehends formes mingled with matter; but mat­ter confounds the thing formed, so that the truth of it cannot be comprehended. And this power of the soul is called rea­son. After these three manners the soul useth a corporall nstrument. By it self the soul comprehends, when it takes it self into it self (or retires into it selfe) so that it useth it self for an instrument, as we have heard from thee.

CHAP. IX. How the mind measureth all things by making a point, a line, and a surface: how one point it both the complication and explication of a line, and of the nature of complication; and how it makes adequate measure of di­vers things: and by what it is stirred up to do it.

THe Naturalists that after ex­perience have made these things manifest, are much to be commended, cettainely, because they are faire and pleasant things.

So doth a lover of wisdome deserve great praise and thankes.

I see the night drawes on, and therefore I will have thee, Idiot, make haste to many things that are yet behind, and expound unto us, how the mind measureth all things, as thou toldest us in the beginning.

The mind makes a point to be the terme of a line, and a line the terme of a surface; and the surface, it makes the number of the body; therefore multi­tude[Page 120]and magnitude are from the mind, and so it measures all things.

Declare how the mind maketh a point.

Because a line is the joyning of one point to another, or the terme of a line. Therefore when thou wilt thinke a line, thy mind may consider in it self the joy­nings of the two halfs thereof; which if it do, it will be a line of two points, because of the two termes thereof, and the joy­ning of the two halfs which the mind hath propounded to it self. Nor are they divers kinds of points, the terme of a line, and the joyning; for the joyning of the two halfs, is therefore the terme of the lines. And if the mind give unto ei­ther half its proper terme, it will be a line of four parts. So by how many parts soever the fore-imagined line bee divi­ded, look how many termes there are of those parts, of so many points shall the said line be judged to be.

How doth the mind make a line?

In considering length without breadth: and so it makes a surface, in considering breadth without solidity.[Page 121]Although, indeed, neither a point, nor line, nor surface can be actually; seeing onely solidity doth actually exist with­out the mind. So the measure and terme of every thing is from the mind; and though wood and stones, have a tertaine measure and terme besides our mind, yet they have them from the uncreated mind from which every terme of things de­scends.

Dost thou thinke a point to be in­divisible?

I thinke a terminal point indivisi­ble, because of a terme there is no terme; and if that were divisible, then it were not a terme, because it had a terme.

Nor more hath a point any quantity: nor can a quantity be made of points; for of those things that have no quantity, it cannot be made.

Thou agreest well with Boetius, saying, if thou add a point to a point, thou doest no more then if thou add no­thing to nothing.

Therefore if thou joyne together the termes of two lines, thou makest in­deed the line the longer, but yet the con­junction of the termes shall make no quantity.

Dost thou then say, there are ma­ny points?

Neither many points, nor many unities; but seeing a point is the terme of a line, it may everywhere be found in the line: yet there is in it but one point, which being extended is a line.

There is therefore nothing in truth found in a line besides a point?

True; yet for the variablenesse of the matter which is under it, there is there a certaine extension. As there be­ing but one unity, yet is number said to consist of many unities, because of the al­terity of those things that are subjects to unity. A line therefore is the evolution (or flux) of a point; so is a surface of a line, and solidity of a surface: so that take away a point, and all greatnesse fai­leth; take away unity, and all multitude faileth.

How dost thou understand that a line is the Evolution (or unwinding) of a point?

By evolution I mean explication, which is nothing else then for a point to be in many atomes, so that it is in every of them conjoyned and continued. For[Page 123]it is one and the same point in all atomes (or indivisibles) as one & the same white­nesse in all things that are white.

What doest thou understand by an atome?

According to the consideration of the mind, that which is continued is di­vided into that which is ever divisible: and multitude (or number) increaseth into infinity. But dividing them actual­ly, we come to a part, which is actually indivisible, which I call an atome: For an atome is a quantity, which for its lit­tlenesse is actually indivisible. So in the consideration of the mind, multitude hath no end, which yet notwithstanding is actually terminated: for all the mul­titude of things fals under a certaine de­terminate number, though to us un­known.

Is a point the perfection of a line, being it is the terme thereof?

It is the perfection and totality thereof, which complicates in it selfe a line. For to point a thing is to ter­minate it, and where it is terminated, there it is perfected; and the perfection thereof, is the totality of it. Therefore[Page 124]is a point the terme of a line, and its to­tality and perfection, which complicates in it selfe a line, as a line explicates a point. For when I say in Geometry, that the totall perfection of a line, is from this point, A unto B, then before the drawing of the line, from A to B. by by the points A. B. have I already de­signed the totality of the line, namely that the line must not be drawne out any further. Therefore that which actually, or intellectually is to include the totality between this, and this; that it is to com­plicate a line in apoint. And to explicate it, is to draw a line particularly from A to B. and so a line explicates the com­plication of a point.

I had thought a point had been the complication of a line, as unity is of number; because as there is nothing in number but unity, so there is nothing in a line, but a point everywhere.

Thou hast not said amisse. It is the same thing in divers words; and the same manner of speaking, mayst thou use in all complications; for motion is the explication of rest, there being no­thing found in motion but rest. So now,[Page 125](or the instant) is explicated by time, because there is nothing found in time, but nows or instants. So of the rest.

How sayest thou, there is no­thing in motion but rest?

Because to move, is to fall from one state to another; for as long as a thing is in one state, it is not moved, and so there is nothing found in motion but rest. For motion is a departure from one; therefore to be moved, is a depar­ture from one, unto another one: So that to passe from rest to rest, is to bee moved. And to be moved, is nothing but an ordered rest, or rest successively ordered.

He doth much profit himselfe, that seriously considers complications, and their explications; especially, how all complications are images of the compli­cation of infinite simplicity, and not ex­plications thereof, but images, and are under the necessity of complexion. And the minde, the first image of the compli­cation of divine simplicity, by its owne power, comprehending the power of these complications, is the place or re­gion of the necessity of complexion; be­cause[Page 126]those things that truly are, are ab­stracted from the variablenesse of mat­ter, and are not materially but mental­ly; whereof already sufficiently.

I wonder, seeing as thou sayest, Idiot, the minde is the measure of things, why it is carryed to the measure of things, with so great desire?

That it may reach its owne mea­sure; for the minde is a living measure, which by measuring other things, reach­eth its owne capacity. For it doth all things, that it may know it selfe. But though it seeke the measure of it selfe in every thing, yet it finds it not; but where all things are one thing, there is the truth of its precision, because there is the ade­quate Samplar thereof.

How can the minde make it selfe the adequate Samplar of so divers things?

As an absolute face might make it self the measure of all faces; for when thou considerest that the minde is a certaine absolute measure, which can be neither greater, nor lesse, being uncontracted to quantity : And furthermore that it is a living measure, measuring by it selfe, as[Page 127]though aliving paire of compasses, should measure by themselves, then thou reach­est how it maks it self a notion, measure, or samplar, that it might in all things reach it selfe.

I doe understand the like in a compasse, which is of no determinate quantity, because a compasse, yet is ex­tended, and contracted, that it may be like the things determinate. But tell me, doth the minde assimilate it selfe to the manners of being?

Yea to all of them, for it con­formes it selfe to possibility, that it may measure all things possibly: so to abso­lute necessity, that like God, it may mea­sure all things unitedly and simply; so to the necessity of complexion, that it may measure all things in their proper being; and unto determinate possiblity, that it may measure all things as they existe. For it measures symbolically, by way of comparison, as when it useth num­ber, and Geometricall figures and ac­comodates it selfe to the likenesse of such things. Wherefore, to him that looks narrowly into the matter, it appeares, that the minde is a living and uncon­tracted[Page 128]similitude of infinite equality.

CHAP. X. How the comprehension of the truth, is in multitude and magnitude.

LEt it not bee grievous unto thee, to continue thy disourse untill night, my deare friend, that I may still injoy thy presence; for to morrow I must of necessity bee gone; and therefore I pray thee, expound unto me that saying of the learned Boetius, what he meanes when he saith, that the comprehension of the truth of all things, is in multitude and magnitude.

I think that in multitude, he had relation to discretion, and in magnitude to integrity or wholnesse. For hee doth rightly comprehend the truth of a thing, which discerns, or distinguisheth it from all other things; and he also reacheth the integrity or wholnesse of a thing, be­yond which, or short of it, the whole be­ing of a thing cannot subsist. Therefore[Page 129]learning or discipline in Geometry, de­termines the whole being of a Triangle so, that it cannot be either beyond, or on this side, either more or lesse.

In Astronomy it determines the whole being of motion; by the doctrine or dis­cipline of greatnesse is had the terme and measure of the whole being of things; as by that of number, the discretion of things; for number doth much availe to distinguish the confusion of things that are common; likewise to collect the termes and communion of things; But greatnesse is available to comprehend the terme, and measure of the whole being of things.

If magnitude doe distinguish the integrity from all things, there is then nothing knowne, unlesse all things be knowne.

Thou sayest the truth; for the part is not knowne, except the whole be knowne; for the whole measureth the part. For when I doe cut a Spoon out of the wood by parts, one piece after a­nother, while I fit every part, I looke to the whole, that so I may make a well proportioned Spoon; so that the whole[Page 130]Spoon which I have conceived in my minde, is the Samplar which I have an eye unto, while I frame every part there­of. And then can I make a perfect Spoon, when every part keeps its due proportion in order to the whole; like­wise also ought every part compared to part, to observe its integrity or whole­nesse. Therefore it must needs be that to the knowledge of one Spoon, there proceeds the knowledge of the whole, and of the parts thereof. Wherefore if God, who is the Samplar of the universe be not known, there is nothing of the whole university of things known; and if the university bee not knowne, it is manifest that nothing can be knowne of the parts thereof. So that the knowledge of God, & of al things, must go before the knowledge of any thing in particular.

Tell me further, I pray thee, why he saith that without the Quadri­vium (or four wayes in one) no man can righty philosophize?

For the reason aforesaid; for be­cause in Arithmetick, and musick is con­tained the power of numbers, from whence is had the description of things;[Page 131]and in Geometry and Astronomy, is con­tained the Doctrine of greatnesse, from whence flowes all the comprehension of the whole being, therefore can no man Philosophize without the quadrivium.

I wonder whether he meant, that all that is, is either greatnesse or mul­titude?

I doe not think he did, but that all that is, falls under greatnesse or mul­titude, because the demonstration of all things is made according to the power, of the one or the other; for magnitude terminates, multitude discerns. There­fore the definition which terminates and includs the whole being, hath the power of magnitude, and pertaines unto it; and the demonstration of definitions, is necessary according to the power of magnitude; but division, and the demon­stration of divisions according to the multitude; moreover the demonstrati­ons of syllogismes, are made according to the power, both of multitude & mag­nitude. For that of two propositions, the third is concluded, it is of multitude; but that it consists of universals and par­ticulars, it is of magnitude. Hee that [Page 132]had more leasure then we have, might al­so deduce from hence, how quantities and qualities, & the other predicaments, which give us the notice of things, de­scend from multitude; but how this is done, it is hardly known.

CHAP. XI. How all things in God are in a trinity, and likewise in our minde: and how our minde is compounded of the severall manners of comprehending.

THou spakest somewhat a­bove, of the trinity of God, and the trinity of the mind; I pray thee declare how all things are in God in trinity, and likewise in our minde.

You Philosophers doe affirme, that the ten most generall kinds doe contain all things.

Yes without doubt.

Doest-not thou, as thou considerest them in act, see that they are divided?

Yes.

But when thou considerest them before the beginhing of being without division, what else can they be but eter­nity? for connexion is before all divisi­on. Therefore it must needs be, that before all division, they were united and knit together. But connexion which is before all division, is most simple eter­nity, which is God. Furthermore, it cannot be denied, that whereas God is perfect; and perfect is that whereunto nothing is wanting; hereupon it follow­eth, that the universitie of things, is in perfection, which is God. But the high­est perfection requireth that it bee simple and one, without Alterity and diversity; and therefore all things in God are one.

It is a plain and pleasant demon­stration thou makest; but shew how in trinity.

This were to be handled in ano­ther place, that it might be spoken of more clearely; but since I have deter­mined to deny thee nothing to my ut­most power, take it thus. Thou hast already heard, that from eternity all things in God are God. Consider there­fore the university of things in time; and[Page 134]being that nothing impossible is made, doest thou not see that the universitie might have been made from eternall?

My minde assents unto't.

Therefore in thy minde, thou seest all things in that their may-be-made, or posse fieri?

Thou sayest well.

And if they could have been made, there must needs be something that could make them before they were; a posse-facere, before a posse-fieri.

There was.

So before the temporall universi­ty of things, thou seest all things in him, that could make them.

I doe see them so.

Well then, that the unversity of things which thou considerest with the eye of thy minde, in the absolute could-be-made, and the could-make, might come into being, was there not necessary a bond, knot, or connexion betweene them both, the could-be-made, and the could-make; or else that which could-be-made by him that could-make, had never been made?

Thou sayest exceeding well.

Thou seest then before all tempo­rall existence, all things in the knot or bond, proceeding from the absolute could-be-made, and the absolute could-make: but these three absolutes, are be­fore all time simple eternity. And there­fore thou seest all things in simple eter­nity after the manner of a Trinity.

Most sufficiently.

Marke then diligently how the ab­solute could-be-made, and the absolute could-make, and the absolute knot, are but one infinitly absolute, and one deity; And that could-be-made is in order be­fore could-make; for every making pre­supposeth that it could be made, and could-make hath what it hath, namely that it could-make, from could-be-made, and the knot or band from them both. Therefore, whereas order saith that could-be-made precedes, therefore is unity attributed unto it, in which u­nity is precedence: & unto could-make is attributed equality, which presupposeth unity; from both which is the bond or knot: and let these things, if so it seem good, be sufficient of this matter.

Onely one thing more, and that[Page 136]is, whether God do understand as three and one?

The eternal mind understandeth all things in the unity of unity equality, and the bond of both: for how should God understand even in eternity with­out all succession, without entity, the e­quality of entity, and the knot of both? which are Trinity in unity. Not that God pretermits something after the manner of matter, or understands by succession, as wee do; but his under­standing, being his standing, essence, is necessarily in a Trinity.

Now add unto it, whether it be so also in our mind, after the manner thereof?

I hold for certaine, that all things principiated or begun, hold in them­selves the likenesse of their principle or beginning; and that therefore in all things is found a trinity in unity of sub­stance, after the likenese of the true Tri­nity and unity of substance, of the eter­nall beginning. In all things therefore which are principiated, there must needs be found the could-be-made, which de­scends from the infinite power of unity,[Page 137]or absolute entity; the could-make, which descends from the power of abso­lute equality, and the composition of both, which descends from the absolute bond. Whereupon our mind, the image of the eternal mind, in that eternal mind as the similitude in the truth, labours to find out its own measure: For our mind is to be considered as a high power in re­gard it is the similitude or the Divine mind: in which mind of ours to be a­ble to be assimilated, to be able to assimi­late and the knot of both, are in essence one and the same thing. Therefore can­not our mind, except it be one in Trinity, understand any thing, no more then the Divine mind. For first whilest it moves it self that it may understand, it premi­ses something in the likenesse of could­be made or matter, whereunto it joyns another in the likenesse of could-make or forme; and then in the likenesse of that which is compounded of them, both, it understands. And whilest it com­prehends after the manner of matter, it akes kinds; whilest after the manner of forme, it makes differences; and whilest after the manner of the com­pound,[Page 138]it makes species or individuals.

So also whilest it understands after the manner of a proper passion, it makes things proper; & whilest after the manner of something adventitious, makes acci­dents. And it understands nothing ex­cept it knit it together by some manner of matter premised, another manner of forme comming upon it, and the man­ner of the compound. And in this suc­cession, wherein I said some things are premissed after the manner of matter and forme, thou feest our mind understand­eth after the similitude of the eternall mind: for the eternal mind understands all things together, and after all manner of understanding, without succession. But succcession is a descent from eternity, whose image and smilitude it is: there­fore it understands in succession, whilest it united to the body which is subject to succession. For this is atten­tively to be noted, that all things, as they are in our mind, are together in matter, in forme, and in the compound.

The things thou speakest, are ve­ry delightfull; but that which thou saidst last, was so attentively to be noted, [Page 139]I pray thee expound more plainly.

Very willingly. Look upon this na­ture which is an animal, or living wight: for sometimes the minde comprehends it as it is a Genus, or kind, and then it consi­der the nature of a living wight as it were confusedly, and unformedly after the manner of matter: sometimes it considers it as it is expressed by the name of humanity, and that is after the man­ner of formes; sometimes after, the man­ner of the thing compounded of that kind or Genus, and the differences that come unto it, and being so in the mind it is said to be in connexion. So then, that matter, and that forme, or rather that similitude of matter and forme, and that which is considered after the man­ner of the compound, is one and the same notion, and one and the same sub­stance. As when I consider an animal, as matter; and humanity as forme coming upon it, and the connexion of them both, I say that matter, that forme, and that connexion is one substance. Or whilst I consider colour as the matter, white­nesse as the forme comming to it, and the connexion of both, I say that mat­ter, [Page 140]that form, & that connexion of that matter and that form are one & the same accident. And in like manner in al things.

Norl et it move thee, that when the minde makes ten most generall kinds, the first beginnings, that then those most ge­nerall have no common Genus or kinde, which may, as matter be premised unto them; for the minde can consider a thing, after the manner of matter; and the same after the manner of the form coming to it; and the same after the man­ner of the compound: as whilst the mind considers the possibility of being substance or any other of the ten predicaments (for it may rationally be said, that manner is the possibility of being, either substance, or accident) and the minde considers the same as forme comming upon it, as it is matter; and as it is compounded, whe­ther it be substance, or any other of the ten. So that those three are one and the same most generall. In that university therefore of things, which is in the mind, all things are in trinity, and in the uni­ty of trinity, after the similitude, as they are in the eternal minde.

Have not then the ten most ge­nerall,[Page 141]these manners of being, without the consideration of the minde?

Those ten most generals, are not in themselve, but in the minde, and are understood after the manner of the mat­ter, after the manner of the forme, or af­ter the manner of the compound; yet in their inferiours, they are considered to have these manners of beings. Neither if thou rightly marke, can they in them­selves without the minde, be either after the manner of the matter, forme or compound, which thou shalt especially finde true when thou observest, how quality as it is in it self an accident, can­not be said to be but in its inferiours. So as speciall, or particular state, as it is in the minde, after the manner of matter; it may peradventure be said, that it can­not be considered, being the, (speciall, and individuall state is the same, being sundry wayes considered. Wee will therefore say, that peradventure it is not in it selfe, understood after the manner or matter, but in its superiours.

I am content, but I would have thee (shew me, how those things which are in act, are after the manner of a trinity,[Page 142]according to that thou hast said.

That will be easie for thee to see, if thou note that all things as they are actually, are in matter, forme, and con­nexion. For this nature, humanity, as it is a possibilty of being man, is matter. as it is humanity; it is forme; and as it is man compounded of them both, it is the connnexion: so that one, and the same thing, is both possibility of being man, the forme, and the compounded of them both, and there is one nature of the thing. Likewise also this nature, which is ex­pressed the name of whitenesse, as it is a possibility of being whiteness, it is mat­ter; the same otherwise taken, is forme, and the same in the compound of them both; but so, as that that matter, that forme, and that compound of both is by nature the same quality.

If to be in matter, be to be pos­sibly, and to be possible, bee not, how then are all things that are in act said to be in matter?

Let not this trouble thee, which thou mayest conceive how it may be un­derstood without repugnance; for I doe not meane actuall being, as repugnant[Page 143]to being in matter; but it is so to bee understood, that all things as they are in act, that is here and in these things, are in matter; as for example, in wax is the possibility of being a Candle, in copper of being a bason.

Yet one word more, I beseech thee; why is the individuall trinity cal­led one?

In God, from the unity uniting, which is the true substance; in other things, from the unity of nature, which is as it were, a certain image of the unity uniting, which properly is substance.

When it is said, that unity is one, and equality one, whence is that?

From the unity of the substance.

And when our divines take uni­ty for the Father, equality for the Sonne and the knot or bound for the holy Ghost as the Father is one, and the Son is one, whence is that?

From the singularity of the per­son, for there are three singular persons in one divine substance; as I have hereto­fore showne.

To the end I may the better un­derstand the things thou hast told me let[Page 144]me know I pray thee, whether thou thin­kest our mind is, compounded of those manners of comprehending? for then our mind being a substance, those manners must needs be the substancial parts there­of: if this be thy meaning, say so?

Plato would have the mind com­pounded of a divisible, and indivisible substance (as thou (saidst even now) and this he tooke from the manner of com­prehending: for whilest it understands after the manner of forme, then it com­prehends individually; for a thing for­merly. understood, is then individually comprehended. And therefore though we cannot well say humanities, yet we say men, because the thing understood after the manner of the matter, or of the compound, is divisibly understood: for our mind is the power of comprehend­ing, and the whole virtual, compound­ed of all the virtues of comprehending: and therefore every manner, being a sub­stantial part thereof, is verified of the whole mind. But how the manners of comprehending, are substantial parts of that power which is called the mind, it is very hard to say or know.

Help me a little, good Idiot, in this so difficult matter.

The mind doth virtually consist of the power of understanding, reason­ing, imagining, and perceiving; so that the whole mind is called the power of understanding, the power of reasoning, the power of imagining, and the power of perceiving; wherefore of these it con­sists, as of its elements; and the mind af­ter its manner, reacheth all things in all things. And because all things, as they are in act, are in the sense as it were in a Globe, and undistinctly; and the mind in a reason, discreetly or distinctly; hereupon it is the most expresse similitude between the manner of the being of all things, as they are in act, & as they are in the mind; for the power of perceiving in us, is the power of the mind, and therefore the mind it self, as every part of a line, is a line: For greatnesse considered of its self, without matter, is a fit example of what thou demandest; being that every part thereof is verified of the whole, and therefore is of the same entity with the whole.

Seeing the mind is but one, from[Page 146]whence hath it these powers of compre­hending?

It hath them from unity, for that it understands commonly after the man­ner of the matter, or of the compound, it hath it because it is unity uniting; that it understands singularly, it hath it like­wise from unity, which is singularity: that it understands formerly, it hath it from unity, which is immutability; and that it understands divisibly, it hath it from unity; for division descends from unity.

CHAP. XII. How the understanding in all men is not one: and how the number of seperated minds is not numerable by us, but known to God.

THere are yet some things, wherein I would faine know what thou thinkest; some Peripateticks say that the under­standing is one in all men; others, as certaine Platonists, say that there is not one intellective soul, but that our souls are of the same substance with the soul of the world, which, as they say, com­prehends[Page 147]all our souls: yet they say our, souls do differ numerically, because they have a divers manner of operartion; but that they are all after death, resolved in­to the soul of the worlds Tellus what thou thinkest of it?

I affirme (as thou heardest) that the mind is the understanding; but how there should be one mind in all men I cannot conceive. For the mind having an office by which it is called die soul, doth therefore require a convenient ha­bitude of the body adequately proporti­oned unto it; which as it is found in one body, is not to be found in another. As therefore the identity of proportion is unmultipliable; so is the identity of the mind, which without an adequate pro­portion of the body, cannot animate For as the sight of thine eye, could not be the sight of any other, though it were seperated from thine eye, and joyned to anothers eye, because it could not find the same proportion in ano­thers eye, that it had in thine; so neither the discretion which is in thy sight could be the discretion in the sight of another. So neither could the under­stand[Page 148]of that discretion, be the under­standing of an others discretion. There­fore I conclude it not possible that there should be one understanding in all men.

But because number seemes to be ta­ken away, when the variablenesse of the matter is taken away (as appears by that I have already said) and that the nature of a mind, out of the body is free and ac­quited from all variety of matter, there­fore it may be that the Platonists said that our souls are resolved into one soul, which is the common comprehender of all ours. But I do not think this reso­lution true: For although we cannot understand how number should be mul­tiplyed, when the variety of matter it ta­ken away; yet for all this, that purali­ty of things ceaseth not, which is the number of the Divine mind. Therefore the number of seperated sustances, is no more, unto us a number, then it is, no number, because it is so numerable by us, that yet it is neither even nor odd; nei­ther great nor small; nor doth it in any thing agree with a number numerable by us. As if any man should hear an ex­ceeding great voice, made by a mighty[Page 149]army of men; and yet he should not know that it was an army that made it; it is manifest that in the voice which he hears, every mans voice is different and distinct; though he that heard it, could not give judgement of the number, and therefore judgeth it to be one voice, be­cause he hath no means to reach the number. Or as if in one chamber many candles were burning, and the chamber enlightned by them all, yet the light of every candle remaines distinct from the light of another, as we find by experi­ence, when they are carried out of the room one after one, because the light is diminished when every one that is carri­ed out, carrieth his light with it. Sup­pose therefore, that the burning candles in that chamber should be all put out and yet the light remaine, and that one should come into that chamber so en­lightned, he although he saw the light­somenesse of the chamber, yet cannot be possibly reach the distinction and discre­tion of the lights; nay he could not conceive, how there should be plurality of lights there, except he knew that there were the light of many candles put out;[Page 150]and if he did know this, namely that there were many, yet he could never nu­merically discerne or distinguish one light from another. The like examples thou mayest bring in the other senses and help thy self how the impossibility of nu­merical difference, may, in regard of us, stand with the knowledge of plurality: but he that shall more diligently ob­serve, how natures abstracted from all variety of matter, that is any wayes in­telligile by us: yet in regard of God, who is infinitely absolute, are not sim­ply abstracted from all change, seeing they may be by him changed and lead into destruction, in as much as God a­lone doth according to his nature, dwell in imortality; be sees withall that no creature can possibly escape the number of the Divine mind.

CHAP. XIII. How that which Plato called the soul of the worlds and Aristotle nature, is God which worketh all things in all things? and how he crealeth the mind in us.

ENough of this; what saiest thou of the soul of the world?

The time will not suffer all things to be discursed; but I thinke Plato called, that, the soul of the world, which Ari­stotle called nature; and for my part, I suppose that neither that soul nor that nature, are any other thing then God, which worketh all things in all things, and whom we call the spirit of all things.

Plato said that that soul doth in­delibly containe the samplars of things, and move all things. Aristotle said, that it was wise nature that moves all things.

It may be Plato meant, that the soul of the world, is as the soul of a ser­vant that knows the mind of his Lord, and executes his will; and this know­ledge[Page 152]he called notions or samplars, which are never defaced by oblivion, that the execution of the Divine providence may not faile. And that which Plato cals the knowledge of the soul of the world, Arisiotle would have to be the sagacity of nature, which had understanding to fulfill the will of God. Therefore to that soul of nature, they attributed the ne­cessity of complexion, because it is de­terminately necessitated so to doe, as ab­solute necessity commandeth; but that is nothing but the manner of understan­ding, namely when our minde concei­veth God as the Architectonicall Art, whereunto there is another art of exe­cuting subordinate, that the divine con­ception may proceed into being: but in asmuch as all things do necessarily obey the will of the almighty, therefore the will of God needs no other executor, for in omnipotence willing and doing do coincide: As a glasse-maker, whilest he makes glass, blows in a breath which ex­ecutes his will; in which breath is the word or conception, and the power; for unlesse the power and conception of the glasse-maker were in the breath which he[Page 153]sends forth, there would not arise, or be made, such a glasse. Conceive therfore an absolute creative art, subsisting by it self, that the art may be the workman, and the mastery the master; this art hath in its essence necessarily, omnipotence, that nothing can resist it; wisdome, to know what it doth; and the connexion of omnipotence with wisdom, that what it willeth may be done. That connexi­on, having in it self wisdome and omni­potence is the spirit, as it were, will, or desire; for of things impossible, and ut­terly unkown, there is neither will nor desire. So in the most perfect will, there is wisdome and power, and by a certain similitude; it is called a spirit, because motion is not without, spirit; insomuch that whatsoever causeth motion in the mind, and all things else, we call a spi­rit. And by motion, all men do what they will do. Therefore the power of a creative art, which is an absolute and infinite art, or the blesshed God, doth all things in his spirit or will, in the which is the wisdome of the Son, and the om­nipotence of the Father, that his worke may be of one individed Trinity. Of this[Page 154]connexin, spirit, or will, the Platonists were ignorant, which did not see this spirit to be God, but thought it to be principiated by God, and to be the soul of the world, as our understanding soul animates our body. Nor did the Peri­pateticks see this spirit which thought this power to be nature hidden in all things, from which is motion and rest, when indeed it is God absolute blessed for evermore.

How it rejoyceth me to hear so plain an exposition; but I pray thee help us againe with some example, to conceive the creation of our mind in this our body.

Thou hast already heard of this matter; but because variety of exam­ples, makes that which in it self is unex­pressible, somewhat more clear, I will obey thee. Behold, thou knowest that our mind is a certaine power having the image of that Divine art we spake of. Therefore all things which are most tru­ly in the Divine art, are truly in our mind, as the image thereof. Therefore our mind is created by that creating art, as if that art would create it self. And because that infinite art is un-multiply­able,[Page 155]it behooveth that there arise an i­mage thereof even as if a painter would paint himself, and himself being not mul­tiplyable by painting himself, there should rise his image.

And because an image, how perfect soever (if it cannot become more and more perfect, and conformable to the samplar) is never so perfect, as any im­perfect image, which hath power to con­form it self more and more without li­mitation to the unapproachable samp­lar, for in this the image, after the best manner it may, doth imitate infinity. As if a painter should make two pictures of himself; whereof the one being dead, should seem actually more like him; but the other should be alive, and though for the present, lesse like, yet such a one, as being by its object stirred up to motion, could alwayes make it self more and more conformable to the samplar; no man would doubt that this second pi­cture were more perfect, and more ex­pressing the art of the painter: So every mind, yea even ours, though created be­neath all others, hath from God, that as well as it can, it is a perfect, and living[Page 156]image of the infinite art. Therefore it is three and one, having power, wisdome, and the connexion of both, after such a manner, that as a perfect image of the art, being stirred up, it can more and more conforme its self to its samplar; So that our mind, though in the beginning of its creation, it have no actuall resplen­dence of the creating art, in Trinity and unity: yet it hath that concreated pow­er, that being stirred up, it can make it self more and more conformable to the actuality of the Divine art. And there­fore in the unity of its essence, is power, wisdome, and will: And in-its essence do coinside the master, and the mastery, as in a living image ot the infinite art, which being stirred up, can all wayes without end, make it self more and more conformable to the Divine actuality, the inaccessible precision of the infinite art alwayes remaining.

Most wonderfully and plainly; but I pray thee how it the mind infused by creati­on?

Then haft heretofore heard me of this argument: Now take the same thing againe by another example.

Then the Idiot taking a glasse, and letting it hang down between his finger and thumb, he touched the glasse and it gave a found, and after a little while, the glasse was crack'd and the sound ceaseth. Then said the

In this fame hanging glasse, by my power, there arose a certaine power which moved the glasse, whence came sound; and when that proportion of the glasse in the which the sound was, and by consequence the motion resided was dissolved; the motion there ceased, and likewise upon the ceasing of the motion, the sound. But it that power had not depended upon the glasse, and therefore would not have ceased upon the crack­ing of the glasse, but have subsisted with­out the glasse; thou should'st have an example how that power is created in us, which makes motion and harmony, and then ceaseth to make it, when the propor­tion is dissolved, though for all that, it doth not cease to be. As if I, in giving thee a Lute, should in and with the Lute give thee the skill & cunning to play up­on a Lute, if the art and skill did not de­pend upon the given Lute, though given[Page 158]in and with the Lute; then although the Lute were broken, yet the art and skill for all that would not be dissipa­ted, though there were never a Lute found in the whole world that were fit for thee.

CHAP. XIV. How the mind is said to come down from the milky way, through the planets to the body, and so to returne: and how the notions of separated spirits are indelible, and ours de­lible.

THou bringest fit and faire examples, for things so strange, and remote from sense; and because the Sun is ready to set, and so we can stay no longer toge­ther; tell us I pray the what the Philoso­phers mean, in saying that the souls came down from the milky way, through the Planets into bodies, and so return to the milky way againe? and why Aristotle willing to expresse the power of the soul, begins at Reason, saying, that the soul[Page 159]from Reason ascends to doctrine, from doctrine to intellectibility? but Plato, contrarywise, makes intellectibility the beginning, and saith, that by degenera­ting, intellectibility is made doctrine, or intelligence, and intelligence by de­generating becomes Reason.

I know not their writings; But peradventure the first that spoke of the assent and discent of souls, meant the same that Plato and Aristotle did: For Plato looking to the image of the Crea­tor, which is chiefly in intelectibility, where the mind conforms it self to the Divine simplicity; there placed the be­ginning, and made it the subfstance of the mind, which he will have remaine after death, & that by the order of nature pre­cedes the intelligence; but degenerates in­to intelligence, when it goes, back, from the divine simplicity, in which all things are one, and will behold all things in it self, as every thing hath a proper being distinct from another; afterwards the mind doth more degenerate, when by the motion of reafon, it comprehends things not in it self, but as the forme is invariable matter, where it cannot hold [Page 160]the truth, but declines into an image. Now Aristototle, who considered all things, as they fall under names imposed by the motion of Reason, makes Reason the E­lenment or beginning; and peradventure he saith, that Reason by discipline which is done by names, ascends unto intelli­gence, & afterwards higher unto intelle­tibility: And therefore he makes reason the Element to the ascent of the intel­lest: as Plato made intellectibility to the ascent thereof. And so there seem to be no difference between them, save in the manner of considering.

Be this so: But tell me why all the Philosopers say, that every under­standing is of substance and accident; how is this true of God, and the first matter?

The understending concerning God, is an inflexion from the understan­ding of this name, Ens, or being: because the being of not being, that is being im­participably understood is God: And this understanding is the same, with that which is of substance and accident, but another way, that is inflexly considered. Wherefore the understanding conserning[Page 161]God, comprehends all understandings of substance and accidents, but is simple and one; but the understanding which had ot the first matter, is a certain bend­ing from that which is had of a body, for if thou understand abody un-bodily, that is, without all corporeal formes, thou understandest the same thing which signifies a body, but after another man­ne, because un-bodily which is without doubt, the understanding of the mat­ter.

Doest thinke that the celestiall mind's created according to their intel­lectuall dgrees have also indelible noti­ons?

I thinke some Angells intel­lectible, as those of the highest orders; some intelligentiall as of the second, some rationall as of the third; and that in every order there are likewise so many degrees, that there are in the whole nine degrees, or quires; and that our mindes are so beneath the lowest degrees of such spirits; and above every degrees of corporall nature, that they are, as it were, the connexion of the university of things; the terme of perfection of the[Page 162]lower nature, and the beginning of the higher. For I thinke that the mindes of the blessed spirits that are without bodies, doe in rest possesse invariable notions; and such as are not by any oblivion to be defaced, because of the presence of the truth, which in­cessantly offers it self by way of object. And this is the happinesse of those spi­rits, that have attained the fruition of the Samplar of things. But our minds, because of their informitie, doe often forget the things they knew, though there remaine the concreated aptitude to know them again. For although they cannot without a body, be stirred up to an intellectuall progresse; yet because of their carelessenesse, aversions from the object, and distractions to divers and sundry things, and because of the bodi­ly troubles, they lose their notions. For the notions that we get here, in this variable and unstable world, according to the conditions thereof, are not con­firmed. For they are as the notions of Schollers and learners, that begin to profit, but are not yet brought to the Mastery: But the notions here acquired,[Page 163]when the minde proceedeth from the va­riable world to the unyariable, are like­wise translated to the invariable mastery: For when particular notions pass into the perfect mastery, they cease to be variable in the universall mastery, which before were particularly fluid and unfrable. So we are in this world docible, or to be­taught in the other, we are Masters.

CHAP. XV. How our minde is immortally, and imor­ruptible.

IT now remaines that thou speak what thou thinkest of the im­mortality of our minde, that being instructed concerning it, as­much as may be in one day; I may re­joyce that I have profited in so many things.

They that make the intellectabili­tie, the element or beginning of the de­scent of the understanding, doe not think that the minde depends of the body. And they that make reason the begin­ning [Page 164]of the ascent of the understanding, and intellectability the end, doe not ad­mit that the mind dies with the body. But I cannot imagine that they who have any taste of wisdome, would ever deny the immortality of the mind; as I have already, as things came then into my mind, made it plaine to the Orator. So he which considers, that the behold­ing of the mind reacheth to that which is invariable, and that by the mind, forms are abstracted from variability, and are translated, into the invariable region of the necessity of complexion, he cannot doubt, but the nature of the minde is free from all variability. For it attracts to it selfe, what it abstracts from varia­bility; for the invariable touch of Ge­ometricall figures, is found not in pave­ments, but in the minde. And as long as the soul enquires and seekes through Organs, that which it finds is variable: but that which it finds, when it seekes by it selfe, is stable, cleare, bright, and fixed; and consequently not of the na­ture of things variable, which it reach­eth by sense, but of things invariable, which it findeth by it selfe.

[Page 165]Moreover the demonstration of the immortality of the minde, may be hun­ted out by number; for being a living number, that is a number numbering, and every number incorruptible in it selfe, although considered in variable matter, it seeme variable; the number of our minde cannot be conceived cor­ruptible; how then can the Author of an incorruptible numbe seeme corrupti­ble? Nor can any number evacuate the power of the mindes numbering. There­fore, whereas the motion of Heaven is numbered by the minde, and time is the measure of motion; time it selfe shall never evacuate the power of the mind, but that it shall abide as the terme, mea­sure, and determination of all things measureable. The instruments of the heavenly motions, proceeding from the minde of man, doe plainly shew, that motion doth not so much measure the minde, as the minde measures motion; so that the minde by its intellective mo­tions, seemes to complicate all succes­sive motion, the mind puts forth of it self the discursive motion, & so it is the form of moving; seeing then whatsoever is [Page 166]dissolved, is dissolved by motion, how should then the forme of moving be dis­solved by motion? The minde being the intelluali life, moving it selfe, that is, putting forth its life, that is, its un­derstanding; how can it chuse but live alwaies ? A motion moving it self, how can it ever faile? for it hath life inti­mately conjoyned, by which it is al­wayes living; even as asphear which is alwaies round, by a circle compact unto it.

If the composition of the minde bee the same, with a number compounded of it selfe; how is it possible to be resol­ved into that which is no minde? So if the minde be the coincidence of unity, and alterity, as number, how is it divi­sible,? seeing that in it divisibility co­insides with indivisible unity, if the minde doe complicate the same and di­vers, as understanding, divisibly and unitively, how shall it be destroyed? If number be the manner of the minds un­destanding, and in its numbring expli­cation, coincide with complication; how shall it faile? for that power hat in explicating complicates, as it is manifest the minde doth, cannot bee[Page 167]made lesse; for hee that numbers expli­cates the power of unity, and compli­cates number into unity, for a denary is a unity complicated of ten; so hee who numbereth , doth both explicate and complicate.

The minde is the image of eternity, but time the explication. And the ex­plication is alwayes lesse then the image of the complication of eternity. Now he who notes the jndgement of the minde concreated with it, by which it judgeth of all reasons, and that reasons are from the minde, sees that no reason can reach to the measure of the minde, Our minde therefore remaines unmea­surable, infinible, and in terminable by any reason, which onely the uncreated minde measureth, terminateth and boundeth, as the truth doth its living image, which is of it, in its and by it. How should the image perish, which is the respendence of incorruptible truth, unlesse the truth should abolish and put out its shining brightnesse, and resplendence. As therefore it is impos­sible, that infinite truth should with­draw its communicated resplendence, [Page 168]because it is infinite goodnesse; so it is impossible that the image thereof, which is nothing but the conmunicatd resplen­dence of it, should ever faile; as it is im­possible that when the Sun by his shining hath made day, it should ever cease to be day, till the Sun leave shining. The Christian religinon likewise which hath this yeare brought this innumerable people to Rome, and thee, Philosopher in­to a vehement admiration of them, which hath alwaies appeared in the world, though in diversity of manners, proves that the immortality of our minde, is naturally implanted in us, as the humanity of our nature; for we have no more certaine knowledge that we are men, then that wee have immor­tall mind, when the knowledge of both, is the common assertion of men. And these things thus spoken by an Idiot, I pray thee take in good part; and if they be not such, as thou upon the Orators un­dertaking, didst think to have heard, yet some thing there may be, which perad­venture may bring thee some helpe to higher things.

I have beene during all this holy and[Page 169]sweet talke, much admiring thy minde, that hath so profoundly disputed of the minde: And now I finde by a most assured tryall, that the minde is the power that measureth all things, I thanke thee, Idiot, both on mine owne be­halfe, and on the behalfe of this stranger, the Philofopher, whom I brought, who I hope, will goe away much comforted.

I doe not thinke, that ever I li­ved an happier day then this, I know not what will follow; I thanke thee, Crator, and thee, Idiot, whom I know to be a ve­ry speculative man, praying that cur mindes being stirred up with a wonder­full desire, by these dayes conference may be happly brought to the fruition of the eternall mind.