AN EXAMINATION OF THE OBSERVATIONS Ʋpon His MAJESTIES ANSWERS.

Wherein the absurdities of the OBSERVATORS Positions, and Inferences are discovered.

—Nunquámne reponam
Vexatus toties rauci Theseide Codri?
Juvenal. Sat. 1.

Printed in the Yeare of our LORD. M.DC.XLIII.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE OBSERVATIONS Ʋpon his MAJESTIES ANSWERS.

WE shall for methods sake, first take a generall examination of the Observators chiefest Positions, and their supposed properties: then fall to a stricter examination of them, upon a particular survey of the whole dis­course: not omitting the least argument materially urged by him; which we pur­pose to discusse in that order, the nature of the thing exami­ned and examination doth prompt us to; not limiting our selfe to any particular government, but looking upon all in their efficients and ends: descending to particulars only and as often as the Observator goeth before us: The principall subject of his discourse is, That power is originally inherent in the people, pag. 1. and transferred by them alwayes upon certaine limitations and conditions of reentry, pag. 4, 5. he taketh this admitted and then urgeth the following properties incident to the people.

The people more noble than the King, pag. 3.

He proveth this by two reasons.

  • 1. From the end. The King is for the people instituted, not the people for the King. pag. 3.
  • 2. From the cause. Quod facit tale est magis tale, pag. 2.

    The King is singulis major, universis minor, pag. 2, 44.

    What Parliaments be, and the prayses of them, pag. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.

    Hothams resisting the Kings entrance into Hull is justifyed, pag 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31.

These opinions are maintained, saving that of the Parlia­ment and Hothams act by Cardinall Bellarmine, with all the reasons used by the Observator. L 1. de pont. c. 7. et de Clericis. c 28. and Theologically answered by our late Brittish Solomon of happy memory; the first that I observed of English Pro­testants that seemeth to favour this opinion, is the Gentleman who delivered upon the Earle of Straffords tryal these words, If a King by the right of a Conquerour gives laws to the people, shall not the people by the same reason be restored to the right of the con­quered, to recover their liberty if they can: if indifinitely meant for all people; if by conquered is meant the people, it see­meth to me that he supposeth the originall of all governe­ments to proceed from the people.

The Observators arguments pretend to be drawne from the fundamentals of nature, which shall be discussed in their proper places, a Christian Writer in a businesse of this weight, should haue had his recourse to Scripture, and mea­sured nature by it, which is the true Lydian stone, to distin­guish spurious from genuine principles of nature, the sacred booke is copious and evident in this matter, but because not urged by the Observator, I shall content my selfe to passe by the great advantage Scripture giveth me, and touch it only with that caution I limited my selfe in the ensuing Treatise.

Power you say is originally inherent in the people.

You say so, but offer no proofe of it.

What power? to make Kings? all Kings? or some Kings? at all times? or some times? and is this power originally inherent in them de facto or de jure, if de jure is it divino, naturali, or jure Gentium.

De facto, Ignorance it selfe hath not the face to averre it, dominion is the chiefe ingredient of Royalty: Adam had it, and used it over man and beast, a gift not of man but of God, Genes. c. 1. v. 28. [...] after his likenesse, after his image God created man: his image in the substance, especially soule of man, his likenesse in the qualities he en­dowed man with [...] like God, as he was [...] strong powerfull: strength and power being essentiall properties of soveraignty, the posterity of the first man before the law, when they were a law to themselves, had potestatem vitae et necis derived to their first borne in their generations, the ho­ly booke averreth this: no moderne, no antient authority oppugneth it. Potestas vitae et necis, are infallible markes of Soveraignty, constantly exercised by the first borne before the Law, without limitation without condition or contract had with them over whom they exercised this authority, how then is Power originally inherent in the people, did the constant practise of the first age runne a course contrary to nature in morall businesses for the space of sixteen hundred years: for from the creation to the deluge about so many yeares are reckoned by the best Chronologers: neither is this birth­right of soveraignty during that time suspended, interrupted, or crost in the lyne of Seth, for ought I ever heard or read of: no man I believe is of that unbeliefe, to say, that nature from its cradle was dispossessed of this birth-right, and could not regaine it in so many ages, it is said Naturam expellas furcâ li­cet us (que) recurret, lesse time than this might make custome na­ture, unlesse this custome did crosse [...] prima na­turae, which we shall examine in its proper place: the purity [Page 4]of nature probably in morall actions, grew more corrupted in processe of ages; witnesseth the increase of lawes, occasi­oned by the encrease of vice: After the Deluge, Nimrod put up the first Monarchy; the People had not the chiefe hand to elect him; but you reply, he was a Hunter of men, a Ty­rant, an Inverter of Natures Institutions. what Nature meant, or assented to, shall be examined in one consideration of Inherent power, De jute naturali: that he was a Monarch and not elected by the People, fully satisfieth our present purpose: he is branded with Tyranny, not so properly for usurpation of Soveraignty, but for the unnaturall and in­ordinate exercise of his Dominion; for he in whom Sove­raignty is lawfully vested, be it from People, or Patrimoniall and inheritable from his Ancestours, by the unnaturall ex­ercise of his power is ordinarily and properly stiled a Ty­rant: the World being Peopled, severall Dominions arose of severall natures, one man sometimes, and in some places ingrossing Soveraignty, and some times the people: the pas­sions of depraved Nature still breaking our for their seeming best advantage: to run upon particulars is needlesse, nor much to the purpose, examples of both natures are nume­rous; though questionlesse unequall: the foure Monarchs, and the practice of the first age owne not their births to popular elections: examples parallell to these for antiquity, and fame the continued voyce of History assureth me can­not be found in any election made by the people: hence it is evident, that it cannot without much Immodesty or Igno­rance be alleadged, that Power is originally inherent in the People, de facto, in respect of practice in the People, to make all Kings, and at all times.

Whether this power is originally inherent in the People de jure of right, falleth next to be examined: if this power is originally inherent in the people de jure, it is then so inhe­rent in them jure Divino, by Divine right, naturally by the [Page 5]law of Nature, or jure Gentium, by the law of Nations; to averre the people intituled to this power by any Civill law; that is, by the law of any particular Nation, commeth not to the purpose: for your tenent is indefinite, not limited to any particular government; and endeavoured to be main­tained by indefinite arguments: therefore if the people hath any right to this power we must finde it out in one of the three rights proposed by us, and we will here first enquire after this power in the Divine law.

God is donour of all Dominions witnesseth your selfe, page 1. therefore not the people. but you will say God and the people: to prove this, I finde not one argument drawne from Scripture in all your Observations, and if any text had the least colour of advantage for you, without doubt it had beene urged: and sacred History is most energeticall and too frequent in the mouth of conscious Heterodoxy, we shall to keepe closer to you, decline to examine your Observati­ons according to the rule of Scripture, and keep our discourse to runne within the Channels of naturall Reason; touching only Divinity as we passe along, so far as it descendeth to communicate it selfe with reason: if you must needs there­fore justle in man to share with God in the constitution of Royalnesse, reason (reason and nature being the Idols of your discourse) forceth you to confesse, that God is either the mediate, people immediate; or the people mediate, God the immediate, or both immediately concurre as immediate efficients of principalities: no other sort of operation or in­flux can be assigned to efficient Causes, and reducible to the Observations advantage: if God is made to be mediate, peo­ple immediate efficients, it followeth of necessity, that the people must either be a meer instrument, or a free Agent ena­bled by the first cause, to settle this power in whom they please; and that in an absolute or conditionall estate: a meere instrumentall Cause, I am assured you will deny the [Page 6]people to bee, for Instrumentum non movet nisi motum: and the effects of it, are properly and usually called the effect of the mover, I meane by mover, not the finall cause, but effici­ent or Agent, which indeed hath the most influence upon the effect, and whose quality still specificates and denomi­nates accordingly this efficient, and not the instrument: he that killeth a man with a Sword, is called the man-slayer, not the Sword: a virtuous or vicious exploit is attributed to the man, not the sword wherewith he did it: to take God and people in this state, is to allow God to be the Well from whence doth flow principality, and the people the Conduit­pipe: and he that hath the least drop of Reason, will not a­verre the water to have its being from the Conduit-pipe, that conveyeth it: people in this notion have not the powers dreamed of by the Observations, either originall or inherent in them; nor can your quod fecit tale, est magis tale be applyed to them, that have not sufficiency fit to denominate them ta­le; we shall looke then upon the people as free Agents, ena­bled by God, the mediate or remoter Cause, with power by them grantable and transferrable upon whomsoever their publike voyce and consent electeth; this power is by them grantable absolutely, or conditionally; or both, if they may doe it both wayes; wee will for methods sake looke upon them in their first capacity; if they make an absolute grant, they are irrevocably concluded; neither is it of any purpose to urge, that the nature of the thing granted is incompatible with an absolute conveyance of it, this is to deny our sup­position: neither doth the nature of the thing granted, gain­say an absolutenesse of grant; for power ever lives and e­states, is at most the thing conveyed; which was and may be absolutely and irrevocably given; a free man by the law of this Land, may by confessing himselfe a villaine in a Court of Record, bind himselfe and his heires to servitude and estate to the disposall of their Lord: a man sui juris in [Page 7]the Romane Law, usually called the Civill law, may sub­ject himselfe and posterity to another man, over whom and fortunes he hath an absolute Dominion, Gell. l. 11. c. 8. and Instinian. Institut: de servis; the Jewish Law hath an ex­presse testimony for this addition in 21. Chapter of Exodus, verse 6. his Master, speaking of Servant, he shall boare his eare through with an Awle; and he shall serve him for ever; the Logicke of these examples is evident; by the same rea­son, that one, so many that are sui iuris, may convey to one or more absolute dominion over themselves and posterity. And though I would admit unto you, that it is, pag. 20. Vn­naturall for any Nation to give away its owne propriety in it selfe, and yet this gift is both naturall and necessary to the being of all Societies and States; for if every man reserveth to him­selfe the power given him by nature to resist violence and in­jury; though offered by a Magistrate; then every man would be a law to himselfe, to the extirpation of all Societies and ci­vill Justice.

The inconveniency arising from the supposition of such ab­solute grant objected by the observator faleth to the ground, for conditionall as well as absolute tralation of power is ob­noxious to inconveniences, neither is it insisted so much by us, whether this power is ever or more usually granted; but whether rightfully grantable irrevocably, which no reasona­ble judgement will deny by the examples urged by us, drawn from the Constitutions of those three most considerable Common-wealths, neither is this absolute subjection, as the Observator falsly urgeth, contrary or dissonant to the Law of Nature: by the Law of Nature hee understandeth that which right reason assenteth unto, pag. 44. Naturall reason many times approveth and consenteth to this irrevocable conveyance: poverty sometimes, or inability to defend themselves by the strength of their owne Lawes, compelleth the people irrevocably to subject themselves to another po­wer; [Page 8]and right reason assenteth to this grant, induced there­unto by these or the like exigences of State. Campani (said in­comparable Grotius) olim necessitate subacti, populo Romano se subiecerunt in hunc modum: populum Campanum vrbemque Ca­puam agros, delubra Deum, Divina Humanaque in vestram ditio­nem P. C. dedimus; here is an absolute conveyance over lives and fortunes by the people, without reservations or condi­tions: neither standeth this example single in History: Lear­ned Grotius in his exquisite book De Jure Belli & pacis fol. 49. reckoneth many Conveyances of the same nature, which for brevitie we passe over, referring the scrupulous, if any can be in a matter so evident, to the foresaid cited Author to be ful­ly satisfied, and shall further view the superstructure of your discourse upon the foundation your selfe have laid: Admit Supremacie derived from the people, hence Quod facit tale est magis tale, The people more noble than the King, because he is for them, not they for him instituted. Salus populi Suprema Lex, and the Law of prerogative is subservient to this: the King, sin­gulis major universis minor; the right of conquest cannot bee pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people, as the au­thors and ends of all power; for meere force cannot alter the course of Nature, or frustrate the tenour of Law, and if it could, there were more reason why the people might instisie force to regaine due Liberty, then the King might subvert the same. And this is all I finde in your Observations reducible to maintaine the prin­cipall subject of your observation: the residue being either matter of fact, admonitions or reprehensions, I shall not med­dle with, being Heterogencous to our present purpose, Quod facit tale &c. Wine maketh a man drunk, therefore Wine it selfe is more drunke than man: the inference holdeth not you see in causes by accident. Sol & homo generant hominem; therefore the Sunne is more man then the man generated; this I am assured you will confesse to bee a very bad conse­quence; so then the Maxime is not current in partiall effici­ents; [Page 9]and the people are at most but partiall causes; for you allow God also a sharer of this Supremacie: but I will admit further unto you; Supremacie wholly derived from the peo­ple: the maxime is not true in all totall causes: Adam was the author or cause of sinne; God was the totall Author or cause of Adam, therefore God was more Author or Cause of sinne: your Religion will not allow this Logick; the ax­iome therefore holdeth not in totall free agents, and though I admit you the people to be whole cause of this power, yet I know you will say they are free Agents in conferring of it; and if you allow them that freedome, your Axiome you see is ill applyed. To come yet nearer unto you, a Servant gi­veth the Master the title of Master: Relatives as these are, are Causa sibi invicem doth it follow therefore that the ser­vant is more Master, then he that is made master by him: the passage betweene Valentinian and his Souldiers recorded by Sozom. in his Ecclesiasticall History cleareth the point, Vt me ad imperandum vobis eligeretis, in vestra situm erat potestate ô milites; at postquam me elegistis, quod petitis in meo est arbitrio, non vestro; vobis tanquam subditis competit parere, mihi quae faci­enda sunt cogitare: That I was chosen your Emperour lay in your power, Souldiers, but after I am so chosen by you, what you demand of me, lyeth now in mine, not your power, it befits you as subjects to obey, and me to consider what I am to doe. Your Quod facit iale in point of government hold­eth true in him or them, whose power continually depend­eth upon the will of him or them that gave it, not in them who have it transacted by one Act, bee it absolute or with certaine limitation, that this power is transactable is allowed by your selfe, and that absolutely, some thing is alreadie proved; the conditionall relation of it we shall referre to be further examined, in the second member of the division of immediate efficients; and here we will sift the second pro­pertie you annex to the subject of your discourse, this sup­posed [Page 10]popular Supremacie. The People more noble than the King, because he for them, not they for him is instituted: that universally taken, is apparently false: some Government is onely for the Governour, not the Governed erected; as that between the Master and Servant; whom the Master taketh for his own, not his Servants profit; and though the Servant gaineth by the service, yet his gain was neither the cause nor end of this dominion; not of that gained by conquest, the end and efficient of some Government are both the Gover­nour and Governed; as that between the Husband and the Wife, whose subjection still referreth to her and her Hus­bands goods. So the Campani subjected themselves to Rome for their own safetie, and the Roman Honour and greatnesse; both you see proved the object of this Government; the Conquerour is the efficient and end of his Government; by his contract with the people to limit his power with cer­tain caution over them, maketh them thereby a partiall end of his Supremacie; it is false then that all Kings are erected for the people, and not the people for them; but that you may perceive the weaknesse of your inference, I shall admit unto you, that all Kings are for the people, and not the peo­ple for them; doth it follow therefore, they are more noble than the King: tutorage is instituted for pupillage, not pu­pillage for it; is the pupill therefore more noble than the tutour that hath power over him; the tutour upon misusage of his power over the pupill I confesse is removed; but by a positive Law made by those above him; where that positive Law is, & by whom made, appeareth not in any considerable Monarch of the world. some but sew and inconsiderable Antiquitie make mention of Mezentius in Virgil seemed to be of such conditionall powers.

Ergo omnis furiis surrexit Etruria justis,
Regem ad supp [...]sium prasenti morte reposcunt.

This pretended Nobi [...]itie we have quitted the people of [Page 11]by what is already said. Next your Salus populi, suprema lex, commeth to be discussed: if you mean by People a Com­mon-wealth with all the parts of it, I allow you that Salus populi suprema lex, but if you understand by people the Sub­ject contrà distinguished fom the King, if you take people for the Members without the Head of a Societie, your Salus po­puli is not Suprema lex: if you take Members apart, the wor­thier Member challengeth the first respect, and consequently the King, who is the Head of the Common-wealth, claim­eth in reason the preheminence of the inferior Members: Art imitateth Nature; and if the Reason of Nature giveth it so, Reason of policie being grounded upon that of Nature can­not deny this prerogative: and so much concerning that adjunct. Rex singulis maior, universis minor: you understand maior & minor in respect of Supremacie; and by universis, singulis simul sumptis, all the Subjects, and the representation of them the Parliaments, for they you say are essentially the same, pag. 5. He can command all singly, but all ioyntly can command him. This of all your opinions carrieth most ab­surditie with it. The people you say give a power over them to the King, and yet reserve it to themselves. In the Oath of Supremacie you confesse the King supreme next under God; but by this you introduce an interposition of the people; the representative Bodie of the Kingdom the Parliament which is the Kingdom it selfe, so you terme it, pag. 5. do joyntly and universally in most acts preface the King, with May it please your most Excellent Majestie, if it proceed­eth from an inferiour to his superiour, he cannot choose but take it as a jeare, or at least a complement of ignorance: mis­takes and ignorance are incompatible with that infallibilitie you deifie the Parliament with; the King in respect of the universi, all the Subiects, must of necessitie be considered as Head of them, or a subordinate Member. If a Head, Su­premacie must be incident to it; the Head commandeth the [Page 12]parts to obey; if a Member, He must obey them, to be cut off or left according to the Head, the universi'es Judgement: this is to meet more than halfe way with the Jesuits; let not your popular Kinglinesse stoop to a dishonourable league with the children of Belial. I shall not more enlarge my selfe to con­fute this absurditie, though I conceive this enough to any unpreiudicated man. Another hath gone before me upon this subiect, who did very rationally discover the sillinesse, nay contradiction of this paradox. I shall passe over that of the holy Text, Statuam supra me Samuel, and urge some authori­tie drawn from Heathens, to shame this opinion from a Christian Head; Marcus Aurelius, Magistratus de privatis principes de magistratibus, Deum de principibus judicare, Hor. Regum timendorum in ipsos greges, & in ipsos reges imperium est Jovis.

[...]. Hom. Il. 1. Otanes in Here­dotus, [...], to do what he will, and not bound to give an account to any, Dion Penseensis, [...], So to governe that he is not accomptable to another, Dion lib. 5.3. [...], He is free, ha­ving power over himselfe and Law, so what he pleaseth he doth; what displeaseth him he doth not; this indefinite­nesse of power few Kings at this day have; time and experi­ence upon occasionall reasons of State bring Kings to de­scend to limit their power to certain rules agreed upon by themselves and people: and these rules have divers degrees of latitude, which the positive Lawes of many Countries do manifest and distinguish, but to whom the King is to yeild his accompt for breach of his Covenant, we shall touch hereafter; and here fall to discusse the last remarkable proper­tie your observation attributed to this supposed Ochlo-Su­premacie. The right of Conquest cannot be pleaded to acquit Princes of that which is due to the People as the Authours and ends [Page 13]of all power, for meer force cannot alter the course of nature, or frustrate the tenor of Law, and if it could there were more reason why the People might justifie force to regain due libertie, than the Prince might to subvert the same. People are not the sole end or Authours of this power, and if they were, the nature of the thing granted may be absolutely transferred by them, without expresse or tacit condition, as is fully proved alrea­dy: then it followeth, the right of Conquest may be plead­ed, to acquit Princes of that which is due, you mean to ac­knowledge the people the end and Author of Government, to acknowledge them the Authours of it, with power to cancell the Authoritie given when they please, to acknow­ledge a supremacie in the Prince derived from the People, and neverthelesse still to reside in the People: how then doth meer force alter the course of nature or frustrate the tenor of Law, the Law of Nature you intend, if a Prince gaineth a Principalitie from him upon whom it was abso­lutely conferred, suppose from People? the Conquerours Title standeth firme against all, but the rightfull Owner: and the People if they have a Title or interest in this power, more than seldome conclude them for ever: the examples we have already urged questionlesse force any impartiall Judgement to believe it. The most considerable Monar­chies, (and the greatest Govenments were Monarchies) the present or past age presenteth to us were begun and setled by Conquests; and that these Monarches descended to cove­nant with their Subjects to regulate their power by certain limitation desired and approved by the People, hath more of the Princes bountie than obligation in it, being a free dona­tive bestowed upon the people, and if the Covenant in part or in all is infringed or broken by the King, what advantage the people hath by it, passeth my understanding to appre­hend; a Title of re-entry cannot be reserved by them, from whom no estate passed; and if it did, this reservation must [Page 14]be expressed or implied; we have no expression of it urged by you, and we are assured you cannot produce any popular Charter with this expresse reservation; and if this is impli­ed, this impliednesse you must discover unto us either by reason or authoritie: this Supremacie is of that indifferen­cie, that may be transferred conditionally or absolutely: and I demand of you whether a tacit condition is ever an­nexed naturally, (I mean by the Law of Nature to take off the Constitutions of municipall Lawes therein) to a busi­nesse conveyable with such indifferencie; to affirme it de­stroyeth the nature of all absolute grants. The Jewes claim­ed themselves free from all Pagan Jurisdiction, and Caesar was their King by that right the sword did give him, if that right was not warrantable, the edicts grounded upon that right, might iustly be disobeyed by the Jewes: Christ preached obedience to them, for he paid the generall taxati­on imposed by Caesar upon the Jewes and others in the Ro­man dition, exhorted those to the same actuall obedience, who came with an intent to entrap him; where then is your frequent distinction? All lawfull Powers come from God, and are to be obeyed; unlawfull are not of God, and there­fore not to be obeyed; this power is unlawfull I am assured you are ready to averre in most respects, in respect of title, and in respect of the thing enioyned, for a free Nation to pay a tribute, to part with their goods to a Pagan, to a stran­ger in Israel; yet though the thing commanded, though the title is by your own confession unlawfull, it is enioyned not onely not to be resisted, but unfainedly obeyed by the su­preme Law-giver, and the last Expositour of it our blessed Saviour. The Christians of the first age sealed this obedi­ence with their dearest bloud, here then falleth your exam­ple of the Generalissimo, pag. 4. to be considered, his souldi­ers are exempted from his subiection, if he turneth the Can­nons upon his own people; I grant it, his Commission is de­rived [Page 15]from the King, who giveth him power over his Soul­diers, to destroy or punish them onely, and as often as they do transgresse positive edicts; but they are not his Souldiers or his Subiects in so large a manner as they are to their King; and if they were, the one is entituled to them by God, at least partially, the other wholly by man. Sir Edward Cooke a strong Champion for the English Libertie in his Instituti­ons, l. 1. fol 1. sayth, that the King holdeth the Lands hehath as King immediately from God, because he hath, saith he, no superiour but the Almightie. Bracton is of the same language, Omnis quidem sub eo, ipse sub nullo nisi tantùm deo: Omnis not singuls, to take off your singùlis maior universis minor: and tan­tùm sub deo, spoken negatively, to exclude this eclipse, this interposition of the people. But of this sufficiently already is spoken. It cannot be objected to the Martyrs of the first age, that they could not resist the torture they were at the least seemingly willing to undergo. Tertullian in his Apologie tel­leth the Emperour, the Christians were more in number, and stronger, and able to defend themselves: his Scholar Cypri­an is of the same Language, Quamvis nimins & copiosus noster populus, non tamen adversus violentiam se ulciscitur. Lactantius confirmeth him, lib. 5. and August. in many places of his De Civitate Dei. Of all other the passage between the Thebe­an Legion is most considerable, and the Emperour Maximi­an they consisted of 6666 Souldiers, the Emperour sent un­to them upon pain of death to commit formall idolatrie; they refused to obey his command, they were able enough to resist him and his power, they knew and confessed it, they laid their heads to the blocke, and lifted no hand against him: his command was injust, was impious; by natures dictates they were to conserve themselves; yet they relinquished na­ture, yielded to die. Let us compare Hothams action to this primitive passage, the King would have entred the gates of Hull, a Town within his Dominion, Hotham being within, [Page 16]the Kings alleageance shut the gates against him, resisting his entrance with armed men; Hotham conceived his entrance would put his life in jeopardie, and the Kingdomes safetie endangered; he conceived it probably not inevitably to follow thereupon; suppose the ruine of both had inevitably ensued; yet it is not so farre prest. The Thebean example doth not warrant the resistance, they obeyed to the losse of life: this desire to enter the Town came from the Cavaliers and ill Councellours, not from the King himselfe. Caesars taxation was by his ministers assessed, collected, and proba­bly invented. Maximians servants brought the command to the Thebean Legion to commit idolatrie, they brought the punishment and executed it, and it was very probable they were the authours of both: yet no resistance made against the Emperours command, though delivered by his ministers; yet our King in person, and vivâ voce demanded entrance, and was resisted; and resistance of the Kings authoritie is to resist the King, as was declared by this present Parliament, upon the Earle of Strafford; triall: you will object, the Em­perour had a more absolute Dominion, than our King hath, over his Subjects persons and estates; I confesse it, the Em­perours power was in most things illimited; the Kings li­mited by our municipall Lawes, obliged by a solemne Oath to keep them; and if he commandeth any thing opposite to these Lawes, we are not bound to obey this command; but we are not warranted by this Law to resist the King with force of Armes, if other Christians made a conscience actu­ally to resist their Kings command even in things contrary to the Law of Nature and the divine Law, and those that con­cerned salvation, and can the conscience of our Christiani­tie allow us to raise Armes to resist the Kings commands, supposed by inferences to prove destructive to our positive Lawes? Our Law doth not warrant us, and if it did there is no warrant for that Law given by the supreme Law-giver. [Page 17]But this resistance is approved by Parliament; by Parlia­ment is meant by you the representative Bodie of the Lords and Commons, assembled by the Kings Authoritie. I denie this to be Parliament by the Constitution of this Kingdom without the concurrence of the King, and if it were, I deny that the greater part is conscious of this resistance; and if the greater part were, I deny an infallibilitie tied to them; and if they were infallible, I deny that they alone without the King are competent Judges, makers and declarers of Law; if they were, then they should be both parties and Judges, and disposers of that which belongeth to the King, jure personae, without his consent, himselfe being neither there in person, nor represented by them or any of them; an opinion dissonant to reason or conscience, and the institution of nature for the Members to raise Armes against the Head. Aesop giveth us an example, and the effect of such War; and hereupon we will digresse a little to examine the definition and properties given by your Observations to the Parlia­ment, which you define, pag. 5. to be the essence of the Kingdom, that's false, for a thing cannot be separated from its essence; the Kingdom and Parliament can. A thing hath no being when the essence is destroyed; the Kingdom hath its being when the Parliament is suppressed, dissolved, or not in rerum natura, as in the vacancie of a Parliament: the same numericall qualities that inhere in the Parliament do not inhere in the Kingdom, and so è eontra: the Parliament may be sicke at the time the Kingdom is well, the Parliament may erre, when the Kingdom doth not: in the same manner, that generall Councels the representative Bodie of the militant Church may erre when the Church generall doth not. This representative Bodie is a select number of men intrusted for a greater, with a large Commission to treat and conclude for the trusters good: the trusters are men and subject to er­cour, unlesse a supernaturall assistant spirit of infallibilitie is [Page 18]necessarily pinned to their sleeves: that they are remoter than ordinary Courts from erring I allow you, but not ab­solutely free from it, as you averre, pag. 8. The praises you give to Parliaments swell up most of your Observations: and much are I confesse deservedly attributed. For mine own part, as I was borne under the English Government, so I con­ceive it without affectation the exquisitest I know of: and in these the Parliament shineth above other Constitutions, ut inter ignes Luna minores. Let a Parliament run within its own channell, if it breake the bankes it overwhelmes, it destroy­eth publique Libertie, and looseth its being, and the end for which it was instituted. I love the fundamentall Libertie of this Kingdom, as well as the Observatour doth, but without dotage, as the Observator professeth to love monarchicall Government, pag. 41. Parliaments have done wrong, wit­nesseth the deposall of Richard the Second, therefore it is good Logicke to say they may do wrong. But you say, they were forced by Henry the Fourth his victorious Armie, p. 32. I say so too, then they may be forced, and force we know are of severall nature, I pray God the present be not conscious of it; I leave to the effect ofevery Parliament to elogize it selfe. Parliaments are of a soveraigne good, but as in naturall so in politickes, I believe, Corruptio optimi est pessima: and so much for Parliaments. We shall now reflect upon the next mem­ber of our division that falleth next in order to be discussed: that this Supremacie is grantable and granted by the people upon what condition and limitation best pleaseth them, they are so enabled by expresse or tacit causalitie of the first cause mediate and remoter God: if tacitly, it is an instinct contract­ed with them, and then it falleth properly to be discussed in the Law of Nature, which we shall consider in its due place; if expresly, either it is committed to writing, and so in the sacred Book, or else traditionally practis'd by all ages and confessed by all or most Nations: neither of these is pressed [Page 19]or can be justly by you: hence we have clearly evinced, that the people by the divine Law cannot be the immediate effi­cient of this Supremacie, whether you will consider them as meer instruments or free agents enabled by God the mediate Cause to settle and convey this Principalitie upon whom and in what manner they please. Next we shall enquire, whether the people is the mediate, God the immediate Cause of this power; if you so consider God and man, it followeth that the people worketh through God as a meer instrument or free agent receiving his authoritie from man. To averr either is hardly distinguished from blasphemie; therefore we will pitch upon the last consideration of this Supremacie in the divine Law, and see whether God concurreth as a partiall im­mediate cause with the people to produce and convey this power upon one or many, I shall admit unto you as your last refuge this mutuall and immediate concurrence, the people being but a partiall cause cannot in reason devest; as they did not alone invest this power, without the concurrence of God the sociall cause: unlesse you will say, the forfeiture and po­wer of re-entrie to be onely reserved to the people or ac­cruing to them by Survivership: either of these portents of opinions madnesse it selfe will not own. Again, the Crea­tour and Creature cannot have the same numericall influ­ence, and if it could, the effect still denominateth the worthier cause, therefore unlesse the people be held the worthier cause they cannot properly or justly be called the authour or cause of this Supremacie. Hence is undeniably inferred, that the people are not nor cannot be stiled properly and justly the Cause mediate or immediate of Principalities. God is the Donor of Aristocracie and Monarchie, pag. 1. but few lines after of the same page you retract that opinion; disseize him of the title of Donor, holding God well repaid with the ti­tle of a Confirmer of Principalities: ‘—Quo te mutantem Protea nodo.’

First, a Donor to give a being, then rob him of that, one­ly a Confirmer to give a well being at most; the confirma­tion of a Charter presupposeth a Charter: God is a free Agent, suppose he suspendeth or not at all confirmeth the popular conveyance, Is the conveyance void, or voidable? if void, then either the people giveth no being at all, or this being still floweth, and not otherwise from them at that in­stant that God confirmeth it: and if it must alwayes flow from them at the same instant that God confirmeth it, and not be­fore, escapeth (I believe) any mans reason to finde out. If void­able, then they give a being before God confirmeth it, and then popular election is supposable without divine concur­rence; and if it be, the people prove efficients, and fall to be considered under one of the branches of efficients discussed before, and that they have not there the least shadow to this pretended Soveraigntie is already and clearly evinced. Whether Nature entituleth them to this Royalnesse resteth next to be examined, Ignoratis terminis ignoratur scientia; we shall therefore explain what we mean by the Law of Nature: what dominion ariseth by this Law of Nature, and in whom this dominion is naturally resident, by the Law of Nature we understand [...] statutes, but [...], right, and this is not in so large a sense as the Roman Lawyers use it, for that which is common to man and beast, is improperly applied to beasts, according to that of Hesiod.

[...]
[...]
[...].
God gave mankinde a Law, which is
Deni'd to beast, wing'd fowle, and fish.
These when ere their nature need
Do out upon another feed.

But we restrain this to mankinde, and this restrained we con­sider that which is properly the Law of Nature, which we conceived to be the dictate of right reason commanding or prohibiting an Act by the congruitie or incongruitie of the Act with rationall nature and consequently injoyned or for­bidden by the Authour of Nature: Order and Subornati­on is assigned by most Astronomers to celestiall Bodies, the Inhabitants of Heaven, I am assured by divine Authoritie, the Angels, Archangels, Principalities and Dominions; the Earth and the parts of it are created with subordinate De­pendencie; the meaner Creatures of the Earth as Bees dis­cover in themselves and actions Order and Subalternation in place and Authoritie; to deny this to Man, to whom all earthly Creatures were given; that Anarchie should onely run in Mankinde, cannot be imagined to be intended by Nature or the Authour of it. The Word is [...], so called for Order and Decencie, and shall this be denied to Micro­cosmos the little world, Man? whose parts are guided by the Head, from thence proceed commands to all the Mem­bers. The contemplation of these Subordinations and Offi­ces invite us to consider the World and the things therein with respect to the Head and Monarch of it Man; and in Man the worthier to whom Nature gave a respect and prio­ritie; the Son as Son owing his being to his Father, owed him also Honour: hence Honour thy father, &c. is re-written in the heart the characters that Nature first imprest, being by the corruption of it blotted and defaced. Hereupon, Basil wittily stileth a Parent, [...], a visible Deitie, the Pa­triarchs of the first age, as we have already urged, derived from their Father Adam Supremacie, and left to the first­borne successively in their Generations. The contemplati­on thereof induceth me to believe that had Adam stood in the state of innocencie, one had been subject and subordi­nate to one another, but without tyrannie or oppression on [Page 22]the Commanders part, or reluctancie on the Subject. When rapine and violence the issue of corrupted Nature broke forth, necessitie of safeguard forced men to draw into so­cieties, the easier to protect themselves; and from thence you say sprung all Principalities: but whether the People chose over themselves Governours or Kings, or those Go­vernours and Kings made themselves so at first over the Peo­ple, seemeth to me not so evident, as the confidence of your Observations would have me believe: to lay aside Autho­rities that speak of either, we will enquire after the Truth of this, especially the Principalitie of the first Age by all the meanes reason can discover to us. When oppression ap­peared, probably it began in one, then more, and so in mul­titudes, and proportionably the number of the oppressed did encrease: the oppressour in case he prevailed was Lord over his Captives lives and estates, whose encrease and number encreased his Dominion, swelling by degrees to the extent of a considerable Monarchie: the oppressed whether one or more (it began with few) being not able to resist vio­lence fled without question for succour to him whom they thought was able to defend them: and that he made him­selfe King over them seemeth to me more probable, than that he was made by them; for it will be admitted on both sides, the oppressed hath power to subject himselfe, and the protectour power to command it; for the oppressed sheltreth himselfe probably under a stronger patronage than him­selfe: without question then the Patron would erect and enlarge his Dominion with more speed and will, than the op­pressed would undergo perpetuall slaverie, the one being dissonant to Nature, the other congruous to humane ambiti­on: hence we gather by our consideration of the probable actions of the first oppressours, and oppressed, Principalitie forced by oppression cannot claime in any likelihood its ori­ginall from the People: and Dominion thus gained whilest it [Page 23]is not accompanied with tyrannie cannot be called unnatu­rall, or to crosse the dictates of reason, reason embraceth that which it forseth best to prevent violence and settle qui­etnesse; and that which Nature delighteth most in, can no way be held unnaturall, witnesse the workes of it, all woven in subjection and dependencie, only oppression too frequent a companion of Soveraigntie in corrupted Nature is that which is contrariant to Nature, and the chiefe cause of all contracts between King and people. Lastly, let us see what footing your popular Supremacie hath in the Law of Nati­ons which is defined to be a humane voluntary Law and obligative among all or most Nations, that Law Supremacie was acknowledged by all or most Nations to be the end and efficient of all powers is neither affirmed nor proved by you. Their constant practice as we have touched already disal­lowing your opinion, and if you joyne this issue with me, you will never be able to give in evidence any convincing testimonie, but we shall expect your palinodia, with Tu vi­cisti me & ego errorem, orthodoxally concurring with our opinion, that power is not originally inherent in the people de facto, or by any Law. The result of our discourse is that Monarchies and all other Govenments owe their originall to God, who is the Donor efficient and ultimate end of them, the people are by him made the instrument to convey this, but not all people, nor at all times. The King and peo­ple are the subordinate end of the Government they live in. Kings contracts with their Subjects in a Government, gain­ed by Conquest is more the Princes bounty, than a discharge of his dutie; and if otherwise, Princes so settled cannot be removed or forcibly resisted by the people without trai­terous Rebellion against God and his Deputie. The residue of your discourse is either matter of fact, admonitions, or sarcasmes. for the matter of fact, as I do not disallow the truth of any of them, so I do not much credit a single testi­monie, [Page 24]especially of him whose eyes are infected with [...] Jandize, sees the Kings actions all of one colour. Sarcasme [...] are disallowed by the holy Text against the sacred person or a King, Ne maledices principi in populo tuo, Deuter. 22.28. or foment Rebellion with malitious paradoxes against Gods Annointed; and if by a Pythagorean [...], Thersites li­veth in your Antipathie to Regall Government, most English hearts will with me returne unto you the checke Thersites had; [...].’

FINIS.

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