CHAP. I. An Answer to the first Section of his Reply.

THE first Section containes his Preface, where p. 2. He Sect. 1 taxes me, that I looke not with a single eye on what he hath written, misconstruing it many times: but whether I have so done or no, it will be manifest in the sequell. Then more then once, he censures me for being engaged. What engagements I have, appeares before in my Preface: But, I set up my rest upon a groundlesse fancie of such a mixture and constitution of this Monarchy, &c. Whose supposals are groundlesse fancies, his or mine, I doubt not will fully appeare in this ensuing dis­course. Neither had I any other purpose to which I have fitted that [Page 2] Treatise then the simple finding out of truth, God knowes how ever the Doctor pleaseth to censure the purposes of my heart, Viewing this Resolvers discourse, for the satisfaction of my conscience, I found it con­fused, and not approaching the Case which now troubles the world: Men enquire about the Lawfulnesse of Resistance of Instruments: He answers concerning Resistance of the King: Men demand, Whether Resistance of subversive Instruments be the Resistance of Gods Ordi­dinance forbidden, Rom. 13. He supposeth that which is the Question; and makes that the ground of his Resolve which is the sole thing at which the conscience scruples. This put me on a Discourse of Monar­chy, that so by a distinct considering of the grounds of true Policie, I might both satisfie my selfe and others: and not suffer mens consci­ences, seriously desiring found information to be either puzled or misled by so confuse and indirect a Resolution. Yet something there is which he likes in me, that is, as much as serves his own turne. I doe with much ingenuity disclaime, and with no lesse reason confute severall Assertions of other writers, &c. in p. 2. Would he could as well have seen my confutation of his, as of other errours: What I have said against him, as it proceeds from the same impartiall spirit, so it containes the same truth; as, I doubt not, the judicious Reader will discerne. But yet I hold the ground on which their Absurd assertions are raised, sc. that the Mixture is in the Supremacie of Power, only I give the King, apicem potestatis, the top or excellency of Power, that is, the King is the crown or top of the head, &c. Thus is he pleased to jeere me, but how justly, it will hereafter appeare. And wheras I place the Authority of determining the last controversies in a mixt Government, not in the two Houses, this he commends in me: but that I doe not ascribe it to the King; This he exclaimes against, as a ready way to confusion, but why, and how it is so, he tells us not; only promiseth to speake of it more below, but where that below is, I cannot find.

Sect. 2 After he hath thus touched upon those things which he is pleased to tax in my Treatise. He proceeds, p. 4. to shew us what his intent was of first undertaking and now proceeding in this Argument. Well: let us heare what it was. The intent of his first Treatise was to resolve the Consciences of misled people, touching the unlawfulnesse of Armes now taken up against the King. He erres in his proposing of the very Case. I believe he knowes no conscience misled touching this matter: The Case which he should have resolved, if he had done any thing, was [Page 3] touching the unlawfulnesse of Armes now taken up against subverting instruments of the Government of the Kingdome; and that the re­sisting of these is a Resisting of the King; No wonder if he who shootes at a wrong marke looseth all his arrowes. This wrong proposing and prosecuting of so weighty a case (which I doubt was purposely done) set me first on work in this businesse. Heare then the case more simply proposed: and I refer me to the consciences of men, whether I come not neerer the truth of it, then this proponent hath done. The Houses declare Religion and established Government to be in apparent dan­ger, by meanes of some subversive Counsellours and Instruments about the King. This being supposed, they proceed according to Vote to the Ordinance and execution of the Militia, so to resist and apprehend those Counsellours and Instruments from whom they had declared the dan­ger to spring. This put on the Doctor to his first booke, to resolve the consciences of men, that it was unlawfull: Now see what course he tels us he took to resolve men in this case. He undertakes to make good two Assertions. 1. Were the King so seduced, it were not safe to beare part in the resistance of Armes now used against him. 2. That the case is not so, as they suppose, but rather apparently contrary. In the proofe of these two, he spends his whole book. Concerning the lat­ter I intend no controversie with the Doctor: Would he could make it cleare to the satisfaction of the consciences of all men; that were the way indeed not only to satisfie mens consciences, but to calme the Kingdome into a blessed peace. But the Doctor is but slight in that part; and sayes nothing, but what, as appeares in the Debate in the end of my Treatise, may soone be answered out of the Declarations of the Houses, and the fresh memory of past occurrents: And in this reply he hath not so much as touched upon that Chapt. of my book: But that which in his first Tract he mainely, and in this Reply he solely labours to make good is the first Assertion, which is a universall one, and wor­thy to be examined in all Ages and Governments, whatsoever becomes of this present contention in this Kingdome. Now concerning that Thesis, in my Treatise of Monarchy I have affirmed and confirmed two things. 1. That if he could make it good, yet it were nothing to the businesse he hath undertook; which is to satisfie the conscience con­cerning the Unlawfulnesse of Resisting Instruments, not the King, of which hee hath spoken very little or nothing at all. 2. That if he could prove that in some Kingdomes where the will of the King is the [Page 4] peoples Law, Resistance of Instruments were unlawfull, if actuated by the Soveraignes will: Yet in Legall and Limited Governments, it doth not follow to be true: yet this he must make good, if in our present case he satisfie mens consciences as he undertakes. These two are the summe of my Answer to the Doctor in that Treatise, and if in this Re­ply he doth any thing, he must speake to these points. Something he hath here spoken concerning the Ordinance of God in Supremacy, Of Cases of Resistance; of Kinds of Monarchy, of the Constitution of this Monarchy; but how truly and satisfactorily, it is my part to examine, and let the world judge.

But as if he had already cleared the matter, he proceeds to give sen­tence before the cause be heard: And doubts not to call the contrary Resolution a Blaspheming of God and the King, p 4. I answer, If there be any which will defend the lawfulnesse of taking Armes against the King, and in any case to resist the Powers, They crosse the evident truth of Scripture, and I condemne them: Yet me thinks the Doctor deales somewhat severely with them, to call them Blasphemers of God, for every errour about the word is not Blasphemie; but a wilfull and obstinate speaking evill of the things of God. Likewise concerning a King, if it be true that he be seduced; then it is no blasphemie, which alwayes is a falshood. If it be false, yet it is inhumane to call it a blas­pheming, when it imputes nothing to him, but to be seduced, which the best and most innocent Prince may be; sure, if it be a blaspheming, it is of the Counsellours and seducers, for to them the evill is imputed.

Then p. 6. He comes to speake of what he intends in this present booke: sc. that he will cleare this point, That the Doctrine teaching that subjects may take Armes against their Soveraigne for the de­fence of Religion and Liberties, when in danger of subversion, is destitute of Scripture and true reason. As I said, still he drives at a vaine scope; to prove that which none denies: Let him prove, that in our Kingdome, Resistance of subversive instruments is a taking Armes against their Soveraigne, and he does the work; else he proves in vaine. But let us see how in the processe of this booke, that will be cleared which none doth deny. First upon examination of places of Scripture it will appeare, that Gods people were continually under Kings which they might not resist, &c. What then? must it needs follow, that all other people must too? But whether the word containes any thing against Resistance, and how far, we shall enquire in the processe of this [Page 5] dispute. Secondly, Ʋpon the examination of Reason, it will appeare how inconsistent such a Power of Resistance in subjects is with Govern­ment, &c. Indeed he will make appeare a great matter; would he would speake something to the Question, and not proceed so indistinct­ly; I hope in the processe of his book he will come neerer to the bu­sinesse then here he promiseth, or else all our labour will be to little purpose.

After he hath told us what great matters we are to expect in his Sect. 3 booke; he complaines how much his expectation hath been deceived by his Adversaries. He confesses, They have great appearance of Reason raised on Aristotles grounds or principles; so that at first sight it see­med unreasonable that subjects should be left without this remedy. If he speake all this of Resistance of their soveraigne, sure it seemes not at all unreasonable, but agreeable to all reason that subjects should be without this remedy: It is directly against the word and all sound reason, that a people lifting up a Person above themselves, and by sacred Covenant giving him a Power above themselves, should afterward on any pretence assume a power of Resisting that Person and power, and violate their own Covenant and Oath of due subjection. But if that Per­son be invested with a limited Power: and he proceed to acts of meere arbitrarinesse without the limits of that Power conferred on him: Then it is all the reason in the world, that the Limiting States should exercise an effectuall restraining Power by resisting instruments of such arbitrary and subversive acts, and we have not a sillable of Scripture contradicting it. But if it seemed so unreasonable to the Doctor, that subjects should be without this remedy; why doth he contradict Rea­son in a businesse within its compasse? He tells you, He found Reason presently checked with that saying of our Saviour, Mat. 10.25. It is enough for the Disciple that he be as his Master. And was this all the check. your Reason had? It is a very weake Reason which would yeeld to such a check. What? is every Christian bound for his outward state to be in no better case then Christ was? If he were pleased to be borne under an absolute Government, to be of low and poore condi­tion, doth this impose a necessity on all to be no freer, no richer then he was? A man would think his Reason were not only checked, but broken, which should so argue. Let it be proved that by the providence of God we are brought forth under such a Governement as our Ma­ster was, then will we hold our selves bound by his example, to abide [Page 6] quietly in that condition we are borne to; but if God, as he hath dis­pensed to many a richer estate then Christ was pleased to have, so hath to us a freer Government; then the Apostle adviseth us to use it ra­ther, and not to be trifled out of it, by a shew of our Masters example, in a case in which it binds no man.

But in what hath his Adversaries so much deceived his expectation? He expected expresse Scripture, but he finds them altogether fayling; only their faith aad perswasion is resolved into an appearance of reason raised upon Aristotles grounds and principles, p. 6. M^r Hooker might have taught him that the intent of the Scripture is to deliver us cre­denda; but in matters within the compasse of Reason, it is enough if we have evident reason for it, Scriptura non contradicente: and I am confident the Scripture hath not a tittle against such a Resistence as I doe maintaine; and we have reason enough for it. The Scripture was not given to prescribe frames of Policie, which are various according to the disposition of people; Generall Rules there are for Govern­ment, which being observed, Particulars, which fall under no setled Rule, are left to reason and the positive Lawes of Nations to deter­mine. Yet we are not wholy destitute of warrant from Scripture, as the Doctor affirmes, but are better furnished then he, as it will appeare in the sequell. If Buchanan, and Junius Brutus, or any else have raised any doctrines on Aristotles grounds which will not consist with Gods Ordinance set downe in Scripture concerning Authority, I am not bound to make good other mens excesses: This Replier knowes, that as I repudiate his Assertions tending to the ruine of all Liberties of States: So I hold it unlawfull to use any force against the person, or Authority of the Supreame, even in the most Legall and limited Mo­narchy. Therefore he doth me exceeding wrong in the close of his first Section, to say, that, I agree with the rest to use what force they can against such a Monarch for suppressing of his tyranny, &c. All I say is, that Force may be used; but neither against the Person nor Authority of the Monarch, which in all Governments of that nature are to be held sacred and inviolate.

CHAP. II. An answer to the second Section concerning Cases of Resistence.

I Could have wished, that if it had pleased this Doctor to reply any thing, he would have followed the steps of my Treatise; but sith he [Page 7] intends no full returne, but doth only catch at here and there a passage, without observing any order, I will frame my Answer to the course of his Reply; and cleare the parcels of my book as I find them assaulted in my reading of his. The Title of this Section being Cases of Re­sistence, the first part of it is spent about such Cases as are put by the Divines who plead for Defensive armes. At length, p. 9, 10. He comes to the alone Case in which I defend Resistence, in the p. 51. of my Tract, where I put the Question of Persons misimployed to serve the illegall de­structive commands of the Prince. And I affirm in such case, and of such Persons Forceable Resistance to be lawfull by the two Estates of Parlia­ment. This I prove by five Arguments, which here the Doctor doth not touch, but referres them to the p. 93. of this Reply. Only here he gives us a Magisteriall determination without any proofe at all. But let us heare his Resolution upon the case. He dares not openly to pronounce it unlawfull: but distinguishes of Persons and Times, as if he would yeeld it lawfull in some, but not in others; Certes, if for any, then for the two Estates; if any, then Instruments of subversion: if simply none, why doth he with so great cautele distinguish. Well, audiamus distinguentem: If by those misimployed persons be understood the Commanders and Souldiers of the Kings Armies, I cannot see (nor any man els, I think) but that the resisting of them by a contrary Mi­litia, is a resisting of the King, and unlawfull, p. 9. I answer, I cannot see, nor any man else, I think, why Commanders and Souldiers should have a priviledge of subverting States and Governments more then other men: Can the Royall Power extend to give them an irresistibi­lity, and not to others? Certes, if others may be resisted, much rather Commanders and Souldiers, because there is greater danger of subver­sion from them then from others: Their being Commanders and Soul­diers makes them more dangerous, but not more priviledged: But, he nor none else can see, how such can be resisted, but it must be a resisting of the King, and unlawfull. Perhaps he is mistaken in others, they may have clearer eyes then he hath: In the p. 52. of my Treatise, I have made it luce clarius, that in a Legall Monarchy it is not a Resisting of the King. Then he proceedeth to another sort of men which I hope may be resisted. But if by those misimployed persons be understood other in­struments of oppression in times of peace, before it come to Armes. What of these, may such be resisted? Here he resolves very cautelously and timorously, after many words, p. 10. without prejudice to other [Page 8] assertions of his of other resistance, He conceives it not unreasonable to say, First, if private men be sodainely assaulted, and life immi­nently endangered, and no meanes of avoiding by flight, then is per­sonall defence lawfull, for such sodaine assault carries no pretence of authority with it. What is this to the matter? we enquire not of re­sisting assailants carrying no pretence of authority with them; but of subverters of Government warranted by the Kings will; and carrying pretence of Authority, though they have none. Secondly, If they come with pretence of Authority, there may be seeking redressement above from Authority, but if that may not be had, yet no resistance. And who then minding to kill or rob, may not make a pretence of Authority, that so he may effect his mischiefe without repugnance? But yet the Do­ctor will give us a little more, The Ministers of Power in each Coun­ty, and the Houses of Parliament also (for with him they be equall) may at first stay, restraine, and commit such misimployed instruments, and so represent the matter againe to the King. But is not this to resist them? No; he tells us, this is not to resist. No? if misimployed in­struments may be staid, restrained, and imprisoned, sure they may be resisted: Else what if they should choose, and will not be committed; The Parliament must not lay hands on them to compell them; for so there may chance to be fight, and slaughter in the apprehension; and then the Doctor would call it Resistance I think. But suppose the Hou­ses of Parliament doe commit such persons and represent the matter to the King, and a King should be so obstinate as to persist in the main­tenance of those illegall courses, and to that end imploy the Militia, it is neither Legall nor Reasonable, they should pursue the opposition to the setting up of a contrary Militia or Power, p. 11. Here we see the upshot of the English freedome, and priviledge of Parliament. This is that which I said; Those men overturne all liberties, The result of their doctrine destroyes all policies, reducing them all to that which is arbitrary: If the King should set Souldiers to destroy Lawes and Par­liaments, They may (if they be able) stay their hands till they goe to the King, and know whether it be indeed his will and pleasure to have them destroyed or no; If he say, Yea; then they must returne and submit to the vilest instruments of subversion, and not lift up a hand to resist them. But let us see, on what weighty reason the Doctor builds this fatall Resolution. This were a contestation of Power with him whose Ministers they are, a levying of warre, an opposing of [Page 9] Armies against Armies. Sure this man doth much abhorre a Civill Warre: I cannot blame him: but yet we may buy an immunity too deare, at the prize of a subversion of Religion, Laws and Government, which is the case in dispute. This were to choose to be killed, rather then to sight: To have a State subverted, rather then disturbed by a warre to prevent it. I grant, There must be no contestation of Power with him whose Ministers they are: But this is the point to be proved, that in this case, it is so: I utterly denie the Royall Power in our State can be communicated to subverting Instruments: And I doe in vaine expect, while the Doctor prooves that, which every where he supposeth: For he builds all on this foundation, sc. That Gods Ordi­nance is an Absolute unlimited Power, investing the whole will of the Su­preame, and cannot be determined in the exercise, but onely morally; the vanitie of which conceit will appeare hereafter, yet note here in the close, that while he pretends a detestation of Civill Warre, he could doe nothing more to foment it, then by defending such Positions of intolerable servitude: Did not such rigid Counsellours of the King of Israel cause the greatest Rent and Civill Warre that ever was made in any Kingdome?

CHAP. III. An Answer to the third Section which concerns severall kinds of Monarchy.

IN my opinion it had been fitter to have treated first of severall kinds Sect. 1 of Monarchy; and then of Cases of Resistance; for the subject in which should precede the Question whereof, in all methodicall proceeding. Here againe in the first place, this Replier would make his Reader be­lieve that penury of Scripture-proofe put me upon distinguishing of severall kinds of Monarchy, That so I might lay all the defence of Resist­ance upon Reason drawne from the severall condition of Monarchies, p. 11. I have sufficiently before discovered my intention in that Treatise. The Resistence which I defend hath as much proofe from Scripture, as a matter of that nature need to have. Then he abuses me, as finding fault with Divines, that pleading for absolutenesse of Monarchicall Power in this Kingdome bring proofes from places of Scripture, p. 12. I complaine not of all Divines, but some, such as this Resolver is: Some, and that but of late yeares; and that but in this kingdome, where such doctrines are the rode to preferments: nor doe I blame them for bringing proofes for subjection, and against Resistance from places of Scrip­ture, [Page 10] as he calumniates me; but I blame their grosse perverting of Scripture; bringing prohibitions of Resistance of Powers against them who condemne it as much as themselves; And of violating the Lords annointed against them who hold them as sacred and inviolate, yea on more solid grounds then themselves doe. And their fraudulent reaso­ning from one kind of government to another, as if all Politicall pro­visions of States for their Liberties did make no variation in the case; but that still they were in the same State, as the people subject to the most absolute vassallage.

Sect. 2 But because he boasts so much of setling mens Consciences on warrant from Scripture, that he expects command or allowance of Resistance from Scripture, p. 6. That his Adversaries resolve all their faith and perswasi­on on an appearance of Reason drawne from Aristotles grounds, ib. and here that I observe there is but little pretence from Scripture for Resistance; and thus would perswade men, as if he had all Scripture for him; we no­thing but a few huskes of reason for us: Let him not thinke to carry it thus away with vaunts and big words: I will professe here once for all. He hath not a sillable of Scripture or right reason to satisfie the consci­ence with in this controversie: If it please this Doctor, let us joyne issue upon it, and put the whole case on this point. The Question be­tweene us is, Whether in a limited Monarchie, Resistance of subversive In­struments be unlawfull. He affirmes, I denie. He undertakes to satisfie mens consciences that it is unlawfull: bringing not one Text of Scrip­ture, which speakes to the point: Something he brings to proove it unlawfull to resist the Ordinance of God: that the Magistrate which is su­preame under God is above all Resistance, p. 84. He doth great matters; who doubts of these things: Then p. 84. he accumulates nine Argu­ments, but all so non concluding, that ninescore of them will not make one sound proving Reason of the point in question, as it will appeare when we come to consider them. On the other side we have both to settle mens consciences on. 1. Examples of Scripture, sc. The peo­ples rescue of Jonathan: Davids armie against the cut-throats of Saul, that is, subversive Instruments: These being particular men, and in an absolute Monarchie proove the point the more strongly, so strongly that the Doctor is faine to flie to that ordinary evasion, of an extraordi­narie priviledge. Besides all those places which prove it lawfull to re­sist private men, seeking to subvert Lawes and Religion, and the pub­like good; sith in a limited State they are but private men, though [Page 11] backed with a Commission from the Kings will and pleasure. 2. Then for Reason; I have set downe five, p. 53. all unanswerably concluding the point in Question, as I doubt not the considerate Reader will ac­knowledge.

He professes, p. 12. That it was never his intent to plead for absolute­nesse of Power in the King, if by absolutenesse of Power be meant a Power of Arbitrary Command. What his intent is I know not, but he hath fully done the thing, or I have no understanding to see when a thing is done. In the precedent Section, he resolves all cases into the Arbi­trium Regis, the meere pleasure of the King: allowing the Houses of Parliament only a power of staying the hands of destroyers, till it be expressely knowne whether it be the Kings pleasure they shall be de­stroyed: And I am confident the meanest apprehension will discerne, that they who make the Monarchs sole Will the last judge of all con­troversies: and simply deny in the last case of subversion, all Power of Resistance of Instruments, even to the supreame Courts of Law and justice, doe without any controversie, resolve all government into an Arbitrarie Absolutenesse. He adds, We allow a distinction of Monarchies and admit the Government of Kingdomes to be of divers kinds, and acknow­ledge a legall restraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdome. Verba datis, rem negatis; you allow indeed a kind of distinction of Mo­narchies, but all within the compasse of Absolute: A legall restraint you seeme to acknowledge; but such an one as resolves into the Arbi­trary Will of the Monarch, as I have made it appeare in my former Treatise; and you will never be able to wipe off by this, or any other Reply. Then he promises that in this Booke certaine points will ap­peare to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reason: sc. That Govern­ment is not the invention of man, but the institution of God: That Gover­nours have their Power not from the people, but from God: That Gover­ning Power is one and the same in all supreames, and can only be limited in the exercise. And that where a Prince stands supreme, and next to God above all the people, there the Subiects may not take armes and make forcea­ble resistance for any exorbitances. These severall Propositions how farre they contain Truth, and how far not, I shall in the sequell make appear.

After these great promises, he proceeds, p. 13. to speake somewhat of the Originall of Governing Power: and accuseth me as if I seemed to Sect. 3 affirme it to be from God; but in the processe of my booke, he finds me de­riving it indeed from the people. I perceiving two contrary opinions [Page 12] concerning the Originall of Government, did in that Treatise endea­vour to reconcile them, and to shew in what sence both are true. To that end, as there is manifest, p 4. I distinguished 3 things. ¹ It's con­stitution; ² It's Limitation to one kind. ³ It's determination to one indi­viduall Person and Family. The first of these I did affirme to be from God: The two latter from Men, and then concluded, In these things we have Doctour Fernes consent. Let us see what exceptions he can take at this peaceable assay of Reconcilement. In the processe of my Discourse he findes me deriving it from the people. What then? Doe I denie it thereby to be from God? as if Subordinates did exclude one a­nother. God hath ordained that Powers should be: People by vertue of that Ordinance give them existence in this or that kind and subiect. The Doctor acknowledges all this, but not in my sence, p. 14. He grants the Designation of the Person, and the Limitation of the Power to severall kinds to be from the consent of the People. I say no more; why doe we not then agree? The plaine truth is, The Doctor will not have Limi­tation of Power to be at all from the people, what ever he pretends: How then the Limitation of the Power to severall kinds is from the people, as the Doctor yeelds, I cannot tell. Is not Limitation of it in­to kinds, Limitation of the Power it selfe? But he is possessed that my sound sence is another sence from his; what other he doth not shew: but it is another which he likes not. Why? Because sometimes I say, the peo­ple reserve a Power to oppose or displace the Magistrate: Sometime they di­vest themselves of all superiority. 'Tis true, I say so, but withall I say, that when they reserve such a Power, they constitute no Monarchy. Is it not so, in the highest Ministers of Power in Aristocracies and Democracies? What can he say against so apparent a Truth? 2. I call them, p. 63. Architectonicall Powers. This he derides and saies, This is the riddle of this Governing Power originally in the people. They are Architectonicall Powers, but build upon foundations laid in the aire, p. 14, Then he gives his reason, For before Government established they have not any politique Power, whereby a Command may be laid upon others, but only a naturall power of private resistance. This is false, that they have onely a naturall power of private Resistance. They have indeed no for­mall politique power, for we speake of a people free from all govern­ment; but they have a virtuall radicall power, by publike consent and contract to constitute this or that forme of Government, and resigne up themselves to a condition of subjection on Termes and after a form [Page 13] of their owne constitution; so the Athenians, Lacedemonians and Ro­mans of old having expelled their Kings: and the Ʋnited Provinces, with others of latter times have done: This is that which I called Architect­onicall Power; and the Replier vainly carpes at the name, when he can­not denie the thing. But I know what he aimes at in all this, sc. That Gods Ordinance is an absolute boundlesse Power in all Supremes, unca­pable of any limitation, but in the exercise. Of which fully afterwards.Sect. 4

At length He takes a nearer view of the Formes of Monarchie, spoken of by me, and makes a few observations upon such particulars at him plea­seth, p. 14. Let us follow his steps. First, for Absolute Monarchie, whereas I say it is, when Soveraignty is so fully in one, that it hath no li­mitation under God, but the Monarches owne will. He approoves my description; but threatens to remember it below, p. 15. Let him doe so; and make his best advantage of it, only here he cannot forbeare one note, that then it is not the deniall of resistance which makes a Mo­narch absolute; but the deniall of a law to bound his Will. I doe grant it; but with all I say, that it is necessariò consequutivum, though it be not constitutivum: for sith a Monarch which is obsolute hath no Law to bound his Will; but his very Will is the Subjects Law, then every act of his Will is Gods Ordinance, and so by consequence it is unresistible. Also, p. 15. He allowes it, when I say, A limited Mo­narch is he who hath a Law besides his owne Will for the measure of his power. But yet he dislikes that I say, He must be limited in the Power it selfe, and not only in the exercise; and I added a reason, for an Absolute Monarch may stint himselfe in the exercise of his Power, and yet remaine absolute. What saies he to this? True, if such a Monarch limit himself and reserve a Power to vary,—but if he fix a Law with promise not to varie, then in those cases he is limited. Note the fraud of this Replier, he alters his terms and puts things as opposite which are not so: He should say, if be li­mit himselfe, and reserve a power to varie; then he is absolute; but if he limit himselfe and reserve no Power to varie (for then the opposition is direct) then he is limited. But in stead of saying (and reserve no pow­er to varie) he saies, but [if he promise not to vary] I say that promise not to vary, if it be a simple promise of not varying, it doth not make him limited in his Power, any more then morally, and so every Absolute Monarch is limited. I affirme still, it is Limitation of the Power it selfe, not barely of the exercise, which constitutes a Limited Monarch: for Monarchy is a state of Power, and therefore it's specificative distincti­on [Page 14] must be from something which distinguisheth Powers, and not the exercise of Powers; but this is enough proved in the 5^t page of that Treatise.

Secondly, he blames me for that I suppose a Limited Monarch must be radically, that is, originally invested with such a measure of limited Po­wer, and that limited, ab externo, and not from the free determination of his owne Will. Here he adds originally of his owne; that so he might seeme to finde a contradiction, when I afterward say, that it may be done by originall constitution, or by after condescent; but yet he con­fesseth, I have a salve, when I make it such a condescent, as is equivalent to an Originall Constitution, because amounting to a change of Title, and a resolution in the Monarch to be subjected to, no other way. I make no salve, nor doe I need any; he who weighes the Uniformity of Truth in that Treatise will see it needs no salves: Onely I distinguish those things which are in their natures distinct, which if the Doctour had done, this Contention either had not been begun, or would soon have an end: Who sees not that a Promise, whereby a Monarch may bind himselfe may either be with a limitation of the bond of subjection, or without: And that this makes a reall difference: for in this the Go­vernment remaines the same, because the Dutie of subjection received no variation; but in that there is for so much a Transitus into a limited condition. But these things cannot be more fully and clearly expres­sed then they are in the page 13. of that Treatise. But he answers, Where there is such a change of Title, it is done at once, and by expresse and notorious resignation of former Power; but it is not necessary that an abso­lute Monarch should come to a limited Condition after that manner. I say, if he will passe into a limited condition, it is necessary there be a limi­tation of his Power, else he is not truly limited: But that all such li­mitation be done at once and by notorious resignation, it is not necessary, as will appeare afterward where this matter of Limitation is more dist­inctly handled.

Sect. 5 His next complaint is against something I have in the page 25. sc. That in a mixed Government (if it be of three) the Soveraign Power must be in all three originally, and from fundamentall constitution. He judges this not necessary, p. 17. and he gives a wonderfull Reason: For as Limitation may be only of the exercise of the Power, and not of the Power it selfe; so mixture is in regard of Persons ioyned to the Monarch for certain acts and purposes; but that they should have any share in the Soveraign power, [Page 15] the nature of Monarchy will not admit. 1. Just so; for as a Monar­chy is not limited unlesse there be a limitation of Power, for Monarchy is a Power; so a Monarchy cannot be mixed, unlesse there be a mixture of Powers, for Monarchy is a Power; and to say a mixt Monarchy, and yet the Power not mixt, is to speake contradictories. 2. If the mixture be not of divers concurrent Powers; wherof is it? He tells us, of the Monarch and certaine other Persons joyned with him for certaine acts and purposes. These joyned Persons, have they any concurring Power to doe those acts for which they are joyned? If not; then the ad­joyning is futulous and vaine, and the Power of Monarchy is mix­ed of a Person having Power, and of others having no Power to doe that for which they are joyned. You will say, They have Pow­er, but not distinct from that of the Monarch: that is, they have none; for in mixture, if it be not distinct, it is none at all. Againe if they have any, it must be distinct, for subordinate it cannot be; if the Acts to which they concurre be supreme Acts, unlesse we should be so absurd as to say, They may concurre to supreme Acts, by a sub­ordinate Power. But let us see, what a maine Reason he hath for aver­ring a conceit subject to such absurdities. Such a mixture would make severall independent powers in the same State or Kingdome, which is most absurd. I grant it is absurd, if he speake of severall complete in­dependent powers; but to affirme severall incomplete independent powers concurring to make up one integrall mixt power, it is no ab­surdity at all for so it is, in all Aristocracies and Democracies, and must be acknowledged in all mixed States, where the supremacie is not wholy in the hands of one person. Yet here we doe not so make them independent, but that we give a large predominancie to One, as, in nature, in all mixed bodies there is, as I have at large explained my selfe in the next Section, if the Doctor had been at leasure to have taken notice of it. I yeild to that which he sayes, p. 17. that it is not neces­sary the Mixture should be so Originall, but that it may also come af­terwards by condescent: It matters not, so it be originall, that is, ra­dicall: of Powers, and not of meere Acts: And indeed, there cannot be a mixture of Acts, unlesse it be also of Powers: for Acts are from Powers: and where Powers are subordinate, there can be no mixture in their Acts; the Acts of causes subordinate, are also subordinate, and not coordinate and mixed. But I there brought two Arguments to prove that in a Mixed Government, the Concurrents must have in­dependent [Page 16] and distinct Powers. Let us see how he answers them. 1. Be­cause else it would be no mixture, but a derivation of Power, which is seen in the most simple Monarchy. He answers, that derivation of Power is either upon substitute Officers supplying the absence of the Monarch in the execution of Power: and this is in the most simple Monarchy. Or else upon Persons whose concurrence and consent is re­quired to certaine Acts of Monarchicall Power; and this makes a mixture, though they have no share in the Power it selfe, p. 17. I an­swer, 1. Absence or presence of the Monarch; whether they Act for him, or with him, varies not the case, If the Power they work by be derived from him, then it is his Power, and so constitutes no Mixture. 2. As if in the most simple Monarchy, the Soveraigne doth mannage the ardua imperij, the weightiest matters of State alone; and not by consent of his Counsell; without whom he is morally bound, (that is, on the sinne of rashnesse) not to transact them, and that is all, which the Doctor yeilds to the Houses of Parliament, sc. that the King is mo­rally bound to their concurrence and consent in certaine Acts. This is nothing but the shadow of a Mixture; If the Power of Acting be so in one, that, if he please, he may doe those Acts without the concur­rence of those adjunct Persons, though he ought not, it is no Mixture, because the Power is simple and One; and mixed Acts cannot flow from one simple Power. This the Doctor sees, and therefore sayes, If this Authour will not call this a Mixture, we cannot help it, p. 18. We doe not enquire of Names, but of things; nor whether it make a difference in Government or no; We treat of a Mixt Governement: and, I think, no man of common sense will affirme, that a Govern­ment can be really mixed, and yet the Power be simple. 2. Because the End of Mixture (which is Effectuall Limitation) cannot be had by a derivate Power. He answers; Though a Derivate Power cannot set new bounds to the Soveraigne Power, yet may it stand to keep in a legall way those bounds which the soveraigne Power hath set to it selfe. Observe, He dares not to say, They may keep: but only stand to keep; nor stand neither, but by advice; that is morally: If he will exceed those bounds, the Act is valid, and hath all its Authority without them: Only he sins, if he doe so; because he hath promised he would not doe it without them: Here's excellent Limitation and Confinement from exorbitancies: A bare promise, without such adoe, in constituting States and Mixtures, would be altogether as good a [Page 17] bounds; but of this we shall have more occasion to speake afterward.

In the close of this Section he turnes back to the p. 21. of my book,Sect. 6 and hath somewhat to say to my Assertions about Monarchy by con­quest. There first I say, If the invasion be made upon pretence of Ti­tle, and the pretender doth prevaile, it is not Conquest properly, but a Vindication of a Title: and then the Government is such as the Ti­tle is by which he claimed. He tells us, He sees no injustice in it, if such a one having prevailed should use such a people as a Conquerour, p. 19. The Lord keep us from this mans justice. What; No injustice? If the Pretenders Title allowed by a great part of the people, he by their aide subdues the rest, shall he for their labour crush them into servitude, and use the power of a Conquerour, without injustice? 2. Suppose the people not convinced of the right of his Title make at first some op­position; but yet the pretence of his Title, and apprehension that he seekes no more power then his Title imports, work a yeilding dispo­sition in them, so that they withstand not so universally, nor so long as they might have done; but at length submit to him on his pretended termes: were it not high injustice to take advantage on such a people, and having them under hatches to desert those termes on which they yeilded, and use the full right of a Conquerour: This was Englands case with Duke William. But the maine thing which sticks by him is some­thing I have delivered, p. 23. It is an uncontrolable truth in policie, that the consent of the people, either by themselves or their Ancestours, is the only meane in ordinary providence, by which soveraignty is con­ferred upon any person or family. Against this he is very angry; and opposeth it in many words; but to my Argument from the Morall bond of subjection, he sayes nothing at all. He termes it good policie, but bad divinity, p. 20. And sets up an Antiposition, that when the invading Prince has perfectly subdued a people (there being no heyre to whom they are bound) and hath setled and constituted a frame of Government, then providence doth sufficiently discover it selfe, and such a people ought to submit and take this Prince as set over them by the hand of providence. As if these two were contrary: I say, They are not bound untill they consent: He sayes, in such a case they are bound to consent, because then providence discovers it selfe: And he brings Calvin at large to prove that which none denies: I grant a people (not preobliged,) fully overcome should much sin against Gods pro­vidence by obstinacie, if on a meere will, they consent not to reasonable [Page 18] termes of subjection: But this I say, There is no morall obligation to Authority, before that consent bind them: Conquest may be an Ante­cedent cause; but the immediate and formall cause is only the consent of the people; which he cannot say against; for that must be morall, and not meerely violent. The call of providence challengeth a con­tented submission, if there be no reason hindring it; but if a precedent Oath or some other sound reason intervene, then it is no call requiring submission: Neither can the fullest conquest make a people debtors, but they remaine free from any morall bond; for the providence of God being of it selfe externall, can induce no morall state; but that providence which on one discovery calls to a submission: on a like dis­covery may free them againe, if nothing else come between, to render them morally bound: A Travellour, by the providence of God shut up into the hands of a Robber, hath his life and protection promised him in his journey, if he will promise to pay him so much money: I say, this Travailor should sin against his own life, and the providence of God, offering him those termes, if obstinately he refuse submission: Yet no man will say he owes the robber so much money, because he hath him at his mercy, untill he by promise make himselfe a debtor: Thus have I made good that maxime of mine to be an uncontrouleable Truth, good Policie, and good Divinity too; maugre all the Doctor hath or can say against it.

CHAP. IV. Wherein the vanity and falshood of the supposals whereon the Doctor hath built all his discourses is made appeare.

Sect. 1 AFter a scattered gleaning of passages in the former Sections, the Doctor undertakes the two great Questions. 1. Of the Constitution of this Monarchy, in his Sect. 4. 2. Of Resistence, in the remainder of his book. Which two, we should now immediately pursue; but that an­other work more conducent to the ending of this contention will for a while divert me.

Errour in the search of controverted truths doth more often arise from the judgement, then from the reason: Men doe more offend in laying false grounds; then in deducing false inferences from true grounds; This I have observed in the Doctors bookes: He truly ar­gues, but from false principles; and then the superstructure must needs be answerable, so that, overthrow his foundations, and then all his buil­ding [Page 19] will of it selfe ruine into apparent falshood. I confesse he every where sayes the same of my Grounds, on which I have built that Trea­tise: He cals them false and groundlesse supposals, and fancies, and what else he pleaseth: I will therefore make him a fayre offer: Let us make a short work of it: let us joyne issue upon our supposals, on which both our discourses are built.

This Doctors supposals which he scarce ever makes shew to prove and on which he hath built his Resolves and Discourses I doubt not to call unsound and false: and doe professe the contrary to be my grounds whose truth I will maintaine. His may be reduced to foure heads. 1. Concerning the Ordinance of God in Soveraignty. 2. Con­cerning the Nature and Quality of Limitation. 3. The Meanes and causes of Limitation. 4. The Constitution of this Monarchy. And ac­cording to this order we will take them into examination.

First, Of the Ordinance of God in Magistracy, Of Gods ordinance in supre­macie. He proceeds on two false principles. 1. That the Governing power is one and the same which God gives and settles upon the person that is supreme, p. 13. that is, it is absolute and unlimited in the power it selfe; and may be limited on­ly in the exercise thereof, p. 17. 2. Which followes from the former, that Consent of people may be the meane of designing the person, and yeilding subjection to him, who else could not challenge it more then an other man; also a meane of limiting that power in the exercise of it; but not the measure of the power it selfe, which in such a measure is given of God to all Soveraignes, p. 41. so then;Question proposed. let this be the Que­stion, Whether it be Gods Ordinance that Governing power in all So­veraignes be one unlimited thing; and can receive no measure from the people? The Doctor affirmes it; and p. 84, tells us he hath often insi­nuated it; but he should once directly prove it, if he be able, so he might have prescribed to the whole controversie; for if he can make this good, in vaine doe we enquire about the constitution of this Mo­narchy; or the lawfulnesse of resistance of subversive instruments of the Princes will. Doth he think a covert insinuation would serve the turne to impose such an Assertion, which frustrates the intent of man­kind in framing limitations of Governing power; and captives all in­to an absolute passive subjection to the vilest instruments of the will of him who is supreme. In all his reply I find but two places which have any shew of proofe of this overbold Assertion. One is p. 14. Before Go­vernment established the people have not any power of a community [Page 20] [...] [Page 21] [...] [Page 20] or politick power whereby a command may be laid upon others; but only a naturall power of private resistance. The other is p. 42. The people have not of themselves out of Government, the maine power, the power of life and death, how then can they give it either for Go­vernment, or reserve it for Resistance? Here be weake foundations to build such an Assertion, and three such insulting books on. What a no­thing this is, I shall make appeare anon.

Question stated.Now I hold the Negative of this Question; and doubt not to ap­prove it firme truth: To that end, first I will premise such things as we agree in, that so the point in question may the more distinctly appeare. Which I apprehend are or may be these. 1. That Governing power is originally from Gods Ordinance. 2. That it being so, is unresistible in its whole latitude, in all the acts which flow from it. This the Apostle is cleare for, Rom. 13. and for no more, that I know. Also that this is true as well in Limited as Absolute Governments; v. g. In absolute Monarchy, where Authority doth invest the whole will; the Monarch is unresistible in all the acts of his reasonable will; because all are acts flowing from Gods Ordinance. So in limited Monarchy, where Autho­rity doth not simply invest the will of a Monarch, but so far forth as it is regulated by such a law, the Monarch is unresistible in all the acts of his will which are according to that law; because they are acts flow­ing from Gods Ordinance: Yea though either of these doe limit him­selfe in the exercise of his power, no way thereby diminishing the ful­nesse of his power; and afterward exceed those limits, yet he is unre­sistible, and to be subjected to actively in lawfull things, and passively in unlawfull: my reason is, because even those acts, notwithstanding limitation, flow from Gods Ordinance of Authority, which remaines the same, and not lessened by such limitation. 3. This governing power is ordinarily conveyed to persons by publick consent, which is a point made good in my former Treatise, and in the former chapter hereof. 4. That this publick consent is not only a meane, but hath a causall in­fluence in conveying Authority to persons. 5. That men working by such consent as second causes, doe necessarily convey such Authority, as God hath ordained; so that, if it can be proved either by Scripture or sound reason, that it is Gods ordinance, that supremacie should be un­limited, and as large as all the acts of his will which hath it, then what­ever men capitulate about limitation of it, is vaine, so that the Doctor need prove only that point; and for my part I will give him the cause. [Page 21] 6. Limitation of Power may be either of Acts, when Power is convey­ed to Persons to doe certaine Acts of Power; but not all. Or else of Manner of working; when Power is conveyed to doe all Acts of Au­thority, but according to such a prescribed Rule. Now I grant the former cannot be in the conveyance of Soveraigne Power, an inferiour Officer may be limited by commission to certaine acts of Power; and have no Authority to do other Acts of power; but when Soveraignty is conveyed, and the Person is set up next to God, above all the people, as the Doctour saith. He must have an unlimited Pow­er in respect of Acts of Government: for Gods Ordinance is not one­ly that there should be Power for such an end; sc. a Peaceable life in godlinesse and honestie; but sufficiencie of Power for the attainment of that end: So that all Power of doing any Act needfull for that end, must be in him who is supreme, and the comprehensive Head of Pow­er to inferiour Magistrates. So that all the Question truly stated is a­bout the other sort of Limitation, sc. Whether Soveraigne Power be so unlimited in its Rule of Acting, that it investeth the whole Reasonable Will of him who hath it: So that all the acts which proceed from him who hath it according to the rule of his owne Reason, be potestative, and from Gods Ordinance.

Secondly, having thus punctually stated the Question,Question determi­ned. the Determi­nation must proceed in a double way, sc. 1. In simple Governments. 2. In mixed Governments. I do maintain the Negative in both: and my proof shall be formed accordingly.

First then, In simple Government, Power is not one Ʋnlimited thing Assert. 1 in the supreme: But may be limited in the very being and root of it. 1. The cause or meane by which alone it is conveyed, if it bestow or Reas. 1 convey only a limited Power, then it is limited in the very Being of it. For there can be no more then is conveyed: Now we know, the people by their publike act of consent and compact, may either bind themselves to a full subjection to the Monarchs Will guided by his owne Reason; or by some constituted rule or law set him to governe by; which latter if they doe, then is his Authority radically limited: For they owing no more subjection; He can have no farther Power. 2. If soveraignty may be so limited, that Active Obedience is not Reas. 1 due to the commands which exceed those limits, but may lawfully be denied to them (as the Doctour acknowledges it may, p. 16.) Then it may be limited in the Power it selfe: For in such case the Power [Page 22] exceeds not the limitation; for if the exceeding Acts were potestative, we owe Active subjection to them, in as much as they are the Ordi­nance of God, to which in omnibus non prohibitis, Active subjection Reas. 3 is due. 3. If Power in the supreme be such, that it cannot be li­mited, then either because it is Gods Ordinance; or else because it is supreme: but its being Gods Ordinance hinders not; for we see, Rom. 13. All Powers as well supreme, as subordinate are Gods Ordinance, yet subordinate Powers may be limited, not only in the Rule of Acting, but in the kind of Acts; as none can denie. Neither its being supreme doth hinder its limitablenesse; indeed, as before it hinders it from be­ing capable of confinement, in the kind of Acts: but in the measure or rule of working, it doth not hinder, in as much as a Soveraigne Power may as well attaine its end, by being confined to another Law from without, as by the Law of its own Reason, if not much better; also we no where finde Gods Word making any difference or giving pow­er to confine subordinate Powers; but forbidding it of Soveraignes. Reas. 4 4. That is to be granted, which denied makes all Soveraignes arbi­trary, and of equall Power; but to affirme that Power is one, unli­mited, and investing all the Acts of the Soveraignes Will doth so, for then is soveraignty arbitrary, not when it hath no morall bounds, for then none were or could be arbitrary; but when Power is so fully in Reas. 5 one that every Act of his Arbitrium or Will is Potestative and sove­raigne. 5. I have the judgement of all the Reformed Churches and Divines in Germany, France, Belgia, Scotland, on my part; who have both allowed and actually used forceable Resistance against sub­versive Instruments of their Soveraignes Will; yea our owne famous Princes Elizabeth, James, and our present Soveraigne, both by edicts, and Assistance have justified the same: which they would not have done, had they been perswaded of such an unlimited Ordinance of God investing all the Acts of the Will of him who is supreme. So that by all this it appears that the Doctors conceit of such an unlimited Or­dinance of God, which he brings not a tittle of Gods word to prove, is a meere chimera and groundlesse conceit.

Object.Now the onely difficulty, which I can thinke on, is this. Gods Or­dinance in soveraignty, as before, is not onely Power to such an end; but sufficiencie of Power to the assecution of that end: now a limited Power seemeth not to be sufficient for the end of Government, because there are two Powers necessary to the end of Government, sc. Power [Page 23] of making and authentique Interpreting of Laws, which are not consi­stent with a Limitation of Power.

I answer: It is true of Limitation in respect of Acts; Sol. and therefore I averre, that such a Limitation cannot be where Power is supreme: but for Limitation to a Rule and defined way of Working, I cannot see how it with-stands the end of Government: So that supposing Pow­er of making and Interpreting Laws be necessary to the end of Govern­ment, yet that they be Absolutely resident in him who is supreme, sc. To make Lawes and Interprete Lawes authoritatively without being bound to follow any Light or Rule therin, but his owne Reason is not necessary to the end of Government: In these Acts a regulated Power is enough in the most simple State, sc. a Power to make new Lawes, if any be needfull; and Interpreting the old, if ambiguous, according to the Rule of the former established Laws; and by the advise of his lear­ned Counsell and Judges of his supreme Courts of Justice. We see in matters spirituall, there is no Legislative Power resident, to ordain or give authentique sence in matters de fide, yet the Church stands well enough; one standing Rule of Scripture being sufficient with a ministe­riall Interpretation: So it is probable a State might, by a complete stan­ding Rule of Law, and a Ministeriall Power of Interpretation, were there no Legislative Power resident in any Supreme Magistrate thereof.

But the matter is farre more cleare in a mixed Government; so that Assert. 2 were it necessary in a simple Government, that the Supreme should be unlimited in his Power, yet in a Mixed (which is enough for us in this Kingdome) evidently it is not so: And to make this appeare, I will lay downe three grounds. 1. Such a Government may be esta­blished that the supreme Power may be placed in many persons, either of the same, or divers condition, that is, in a mixed Subject: else all formes were unlawfull except simple Monarchie. 2. If this su­preame Power be inequally placed in these Persons or States of men; so that a reall sublimity and Principality be given to one, then the de­nomination may be taken from that Principall: and so it is a Monar­chy, or Aristocracy, or Democracy mixed in the Power it selfe; how­ever it pleaseth this Replier to deride it, with the top, or Crowne of the head: of which more hereafter. 3. Where the Supremacy of power is thus in many, although all taken together have an unlimited Power, as in ours, yet neither of them severall by himselfe hath, or [Page 24] can have; for it is a contradiction, that it be resident in many, and yet unlimitedly in One.

Now to those two shewes of Argument, which in the beginning I produced out of this Reply, I say, before Government be establish­ed it is true the people have no formall Politique Power of Life and Death; yet they have a seminall; that is, every one for himselfe, his family and posterity hath a power of resigning up their naturall liber­ty, to be governed by One, or many; after this or that forme as they shall judge fittest. God ordaining that Powers should be to such an end, hath thereby legitimated and ratified any Consent or Contract which people may make of parting with their liberty and giving Ma­gistrates a common Power over them to that end. And Gods not prescribing any Rule or Measure of Power by his Ordinance of Autho­rity, hath left it in the peoples liberty, to resigne up themselves ac­cording to such Rule and Termes, as they judge fittest, so it be such as the end of his Ordinance may be attained thereby. Thus although by it selfe, and excluding Gods Ordinance they have no immediate Power to lay a command on others, nor Power of life and death, yet in vertue of Gods Ordinance their common consent and contract is sufficient to set up such a Power which is endowed with a sufficiency of Command for Government and the end of Government over those which have, each man for himselfe and his, set it up. So although second Causes have no Power by themselves to produce their effects, yet working in vertue of the first Cause they have Power to produce effects, sometimes farre beyond their own Measure. Therefore I de­sire this Doctour either to bring some Ordinance of God expressely for­bidding to set any bounds or Rule of Power upon the Will of the Magi­strate; or else let him suffer Man-kind to use their Right in resigning up that liberty which God and nature hath given them upon such termes and conditions as they apprehend best for their own good: and the due end of Government.

Summe.In the close of this Question, I will lay downe three Conclusions concerning the Ordinance of God, and the Nature of Soveraigntie.

Conclus. 1 1. God hath ordained that in Societies of Men there should be a Politike Power, for a peaceable and godly life: This Ordinance hath put a Semi­nall Power in all the Societies of Men, sc. a Liberty and Power by com­mon Consent to resigne up themselves and theirs to one Supreame; thereby constituting a common Politique Power.

[Page 25]2. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined any kind Conclus. 2 or forme of Power; hath left it to the libertie of Societies of men to choose to which kind they will resigne up themselves, either to a supreme regulated in the Acts of his Will by his owne Reason, as in absolute Government; or to one regulated by a Common Reason or Law constituted by pub­like consent, as in Limited.

3. God in his Ordinance for Government having not determined the sub­ject Conclus. 3 of this Power, hath left it to the choice of Societies to invest with this So­veraigntie, either one Person or many, and those either of the same, or di­vers sorts and rankes of men; Whence arise simple or mixed Govern­ments, and this is the Architectonicall Power left in societies before they are engaged in a Government, which the Doctour doth so caus­lesly deride: Here is the summe of what I do averre concerning Gods Ordinance in Soveraigntie, which I challenge the Doctour or any else to gain-say.

The second sort of the Doctors false supposals respect the Nature and Sect. 2 Quality of Limitation, Of nature and Qua­lity of Li­mitation. where also I observe that he proceeds on two false and fallacious Principles, sc. 1. He every where confounds Mo­rall and Civill or Legall Limitation, so p. 18. 93. 39. 2. That Sove­raignty is capable onely of a morall Limitation, p. 39, 42., So that if a­ny other be in any State ordained, He cannot beleeve but such a conditi­on is unlawfull, and unreasonable against the Order of Government. p. 39. If the nature of Limitation be well knowne, it will appeare that the Doctor hath done very inconsiderately, or rather very fraudulently (for he hath obscured the Truth much by it) in confounding morall and Civill Limitation. We will therefore consider the nature of Li­mitation something more accurately then I have done in my former Treatise; for it will be a great light to the whole controversie.

First, We must consider a distinction of Power, which is either, A Pos. 1 simple Power of Willing or Doing, which is in every Morall Agent. 2. A Power of Authoritative and obligatorie Willing or Doing; so that an act of it, whether a Will of Command or Censure expressed, hath in it a binding power to subjection, this is that which we call Magistracy, of whose Limitation now we treat.

Secondly, concerning Limitation; we must know that it induceth Pos. 2 an absolute necessity of not producing any Act beyond those Limits. For a Power having bounds beyond which it can exceed, if it please, though with difficulty, it is not properly limited, but hindred.

[Page 26] Pos. 3 Thirdly, This necessity of not exceeding those bounds is such as the bounds themselves are; so that it is ever true, That a Power in what way it is limited cannot exceed those limits.

Pos. 4 Of Moral limits.Fourthly, There are of this Power but two sorts of Limits, sc. 1. Mo­rall, and 2. Civill or Politique. Of which two we must distinctly con­sider. 1. Morall Limits is the Morall Will or Law of God; and a Power is said to be limited by this, not when it cannot produce any Act at all: but when it cannot morally produce it, that is, without sin. For the supervening of a morall bond, doth not take away the Power of doing, but of right or sinlesse doing: v. g. in Naturall Powers. Gods prohibition of eating Swines flesh, did not take away from the Jew the naturall Power of eating it; but the power of sinlesse eating it. So in Civill power a prohibition of God comming upon it, doth not take away the Power of Civill and Authoritative Doing; but of lawfull, or sinlesse doing. And hence it followes, 1. That Morall Limitation is only of the Exercise of Power; not of the power it selfe: for the pow­er is not thereby taken away, but remaines equally extense and able to all its acts, as it was before; only now it cannot put forth it selfe un­to certaine Acts without sinne, which it could before: Thus an Ab­solute Monarch who hath a power of doing, as extense as his Reasona­ble Will, promises to doe but this, or in this manner: now he is mo­rally bound, by vertue of this promise; and cannot without sinne doe otherwise: yet if he doe, his Commanding Power is the same, and its act binding to the Subject. And so it is proportionably in Legall Governments. Cyprian Bishop of Carthage hath by the Canons a power of judging Ecclesiasticall causes committed to him: He re­solves and promises to doe nothing of moment herein, but by the con­sent of his Clergie, now he is morally bound: and if afterward he doe a thing by himselfe without their consent, he sins: yet no man will say his Episcopall power is lessened; or the act he so doth, is canoni­cally invalid, and not obligatorie. 2. Yea it followes also that it is not properly a Limitation of the Exercise of power neither: for by a morall bond, the Power is not so bound up, but that it can exercise it selfe, and that validly too, though not without sinne, as appeares before. 3. Also that it is no detraction from Absolutenesse of Pow­er; nor is it sufficient to make a distinction of it into Absolute and Li­mited. For, 1. It causes no reall Limitation of power, either in the nature, or exercise of it. 2. It is not distinctive, being to be found in [Page 27] the most absolute power under heaven,Legall Li­mits. all being bounded by Gods Law, the Law of Equity, and many promises by themselves made.

2. Civill or Legall Limits cause a Civill and Legall definement of Authority, so that, its exceeding acts are not Legall and binding, that is, are non Authoritative: for as a Morall bond induces a necessity of confinement in esse morali; so a Civill and Legall bond doth in esse lega­li & obligatorio. Hence follows, 1. It is these Legall and civill bounds which constitute a Government in a limited condition, not those mo­rall; for this is distinctive and is never found in an absolute Governe­ment, for there the Soveraigne by promise or Oath binding himselfe to a stated course doth put no Law civill upon his power, or the exer­cise of it; for though he sinne in exceeding afterwards, yet his acts are truely Legall and Authoritative. 2. This induceth a reall Li­mitation of power, neither can it be only of exercise; for sith it brings an illegality and unauthoritativenesse on acts exceeding, that is, makes them none in esse civili & politico, it is a limitation of Power it selfe; for when a Power can produce no potentiall acts beyond such limits, then it is limited in the very being. 3. Acts exceeding politique and legall Limitation, being not Legall nor authoritative in that State can give no authoritie to the Instruments, and therefore they may be resisted without resistance or violation of Authoritie. Whereas it is o­therwise in Acts exceeding morall Limitation; for being authoritative, they authorize the Instrument, and give him an unresistance.

In summe: Limitation morall and civill or legall doe differ in three main particulars.

1. Morall, sith it is no politique or Authoritative Act,Conclus. 1 makes no reall detraction either in power or exercise of it, and therefore agrees with the most absolute Government: whereas Legall, being a poli­tique and authoritative Act makes a reall diminution; and so is the ratio formalis, or distinctive conceit constituting Limited government; nor can be found in absolute.

2. Hence, Exceeding Acts notwithstanding morall limitation are Conclus. 2 authoritative, proceed from Gods Ordinance, and challenge subjecti­on: but they are otherwise which exceed a legall limitation.Conclus. 3

3. Exceeding Acts in morall limitation being authoritative have the Sword or compelling power annexed to them, which may not be re­sisted: but in Legall, being not authoritative, they have not the sword or compelling power annexed, and therefore may be resisted in their [Page 28] Instruments: I will illustrate all this by a familiar instance. In our Government, a Iudge hath a Commission to heare and determine Causes according to the Verdict of twelve men. Here is a Power li­mited in the very being, that is Legally and Civilly. This Iudge useth indirect meanes to corrupt the Iurie to bring in an unjust Verdict; but judgeth as his Commission binds him according to their Verdict: Here is a morall exceeding, yet the Act of judgement is Authoritative, because according to his Commission, and must not be resisted. A­gaine, He passeth sentence in another cause expressely against the Ver­dict of the Iury, in an arbitrary way. Here is a Legall exceeding, and the sentence is non authoritative. He having no such Power commit­ted to him, the sentence can have no binding power in it. Hereby it appeares how without any ground of Truth, the former supposals are.

Sect. 3 Thirdly concerning the Causes and Meanes of Limitation the Do­ctors supposals are,Causes & meanes of Limitati­on. 1. That Radicall Limitation, that is, of the Pow­er it selfe requires an expresse and notorious act, it must be done in the be­ginning and at once. p. 15. 24. 39. 2. That a Prince may so limit him­selfe, as not to require to be actively subjected to, and yet be limited only in the exercise, not in the power it selfe, p. 16. 3. That no Limitation by after condescent, is of the Power it selfe, p. 28. this being a consequent from the first. Now that the falshood of these and the like grounds every where scattered in his bookes may appeare; Let us a little more diligently handle the Causes and Meanes of Limitation, which, as be­fore,Causes of Moral Li­mitation. being twofold, Morall and Civill; We will begin with Morall. 1. Now the Formall cause of a meere Morall Limitation, is that which morally bounds or makes sinfull any act of Power. We are therefore to enquire what it is which can doe that. And this is, 1. Principal­ly the Morall Law of God forbidding such an exercise of Power. This is an universall, perpetuall and invincible Limitation of all power of Go­vernment, either absolute or legall, yea of all Active Power of reaso­nable creatures. 2. There is another meane of Limitation morall, sc. a Promise, Oath or positive constitution, whereby a Prince puts a bond upon himselfe, making that now sinfull to be done, which before was not so. This also induces a morall Limitation, as well in absolute as le­gall Governments; as if an Absolute Monarch promise to follow such a Rule, which hath a Power to use any which his reason shall dictate. Or if a Legall promise to abridge himselfe in a course, in which the Law [Page 29] hath left him indeterminate: in this respect, they come under a morall limitation. But concerning this positive meane we must note. 1. This promise, how solemne soever it be, must be a simple bond: It must ex­tend to no diminution of power, or discharge from duty of subjection; for then it is not meerely morall, it makes the exceeding act not only sinfull, but non obliging: whereas it is the note of a meere morall bond, that it extends not to any lessening of Authority, or discharge of duty: as if a Captaine take his enemy prisoner; he to save his life sweares him a full vassalage afterward, his Master promises to command him only such services, never absolving him from his former bond of ab­solute slavery: here is a morall bond; yet still a full debt of subjection in case the Master should breake his word, and put him on other em­ployment. 2. If the matter be more throughly looked into, this po­sitive meane of limitation is either none at all; or else addes nothing to the former, of the morall law of God: For in such promise or Oath whereby a Governour limits himselfe there is an expresse or tacite con­dition, if it conduce to the end of Government, the glory of God, and publick good: For if such Oath or bond hinder the end of Government, it is eo nomine, unlawfull and invalid; but if conduce to it, then it was no more, then was virtually required of him before by the morall Law; this promise or Oath being but a more solemne profession and protesta­tion to doe that which before implicitely he was bound morally unto. Thus we see all that Doctor speakes of Morall and irrevocable limi­tation by promise and oath comes to nothing in the issue: so that this being granted that the Monarchs power in this State were only Moral­ly limited in the Doctors sense; We are as much under and owe as much subjection as the captive slave to his Master; and all our Laws and Statutes being but morall limitations of this second sort, are not so much as morall limitations any farther then the Prince sees them con­duce to the end of Government, if any seem to stand in his way, and hin­der him therein, he is no longer bound to it; but may account it an ill made promise or Oath which is better broke then kept. 2.Causes of Legall li­mitation. Of the Causes and Meanes of Civill and legall limitation, whereby not only the exercise, but the power it selfe is confined. 1. The formall cause hereof is the limitation of the duty of subjection in the people: The duty of subjection is the originall of the power of Authority. People by becomming debtors of subjection doe set up Authority; and by stin­ting and terminating the duty of subjection doe put bounds and termes [Page 30] to the power of commanding. 2. Let us see then by what meanes the duty of subjection may be terminated. I conceive it may be done two wayes. 1. At first, when a people resigning up themselves to a state of subjection doe it not absolutely, but impose only a limited bond on themselves; for if they impose no more duty: the Governour can assume no more power. Now this may be done, not only by positive, expresse and notorious act, as the Doctor speakes; but also by a ne­gative; a meere not imposing of an absolute bond of duty on them­selves is enough: so that if it cannot be proved either by records of the first institution, or present obligation that a people have put themselves into a state of absolute subjection, then it is to be held but limited: For whatsoever is ours by the law of nature, cannot be taken from us but by some positive act done by our selves or Ancestors: Thus in private men; Liberty which is mine by nature, none can take from me, unlesse he can bring a title or right whereby it became his, and I his ser­vant. Nor am I any farther his servant, then he can bring proofe of his right. The same is true of a society of men. In this case it belongs to the challenger, and not to the defendent to bring his positive notorious act for proofe of his title, and measure of his title: So that the Doctors demand is unreasonable, who standing for a full right in our Govern­ment, puts on the peoples part to bring evidence that they have not. Rather it is just, that he should bring some positive and notorious act wherein it appeares that this people have fully resigned up their liberty to an absolute Government; or make it appeare that it is Gods or­dinance that where ever a people doe constitute a soveraigne power, they must make an absolute resignation of their liberty. 2. By after-condescent, for this may be a meane of civill limitation, unlesse any will imagine that a people once putting themselves into absolute sub­jection, are irrevocably so. And thus a Monarch becomes limited, when the promise or Oath he limits himselfe by, is not simple, but a­mounts either expressely or equivalently to a relaxation of the bond of subjection: whether it proceed from meere grace, or conscience of equity, or by Petition, or importunity of the people, it matters not what was the ground of it, if it carry with it a relaxation of the dutie of subjection, it is a meane of civill limitation, in the very root of power; for power can be no larger in the Prince, then duty of subjection is in the people; for these two have a necessary dependence, and relation of equality either to other. Thus if a Monarch, taking advantage of [Page 31] force of armes, impose a new Oath of full subjection on his people, who before were but legally bound; and prevaile so farre, that the whole or major part of his people doe take it for themselves and theirs, here is a chang of Government from Legall into Absolute, an enlargement of power: so on the contrary. And for this matter we need looke no farther, then the Nationall Oath, or Established Lawes; for if they bind the people to an absolute subjection; such is the power; and though it have morall, yet it hath no legall limitation: And so on the contrary if they bind only to a subjection according to the Law; the Government is limited in the very power of it. Hence it appeares to be false which the Doctor hath, p. 16. that a Monarch may so tye him­selfe as to require not to be subjected to but according to such Lawes, and yet not be civilly limited, in his very power; for if he so far re­quire not to be subjected to, that he untye the bond of subjection beyond those Lawes; then is his Authority limited, and can proceed no far­ther; neither are the instruments of his will exceeding those lawes, authorized, but private persons, and resistible: And also false, which he sayes, p. 28. That limitation by condescent cannot be radicall. Now if enquiry be made concerning the simplicity of antient formes of assu­ming into soveraignty, as when the people are said to make one King; to endue him indefinitely with Kingly power; not confining his Go­vernment by any expresse limitations. Ans. I conceive in such case to know how far a people are bound by such an indefinite contract, these things are to be looked into. 1. If the intent of the people can be discovered in such a constitution, for if it can, doubtlesse the contract binds so far, and no farther. Thus Lyra concludes concerning the re­quest of the people of Israel for a King, that it is to be understood of an Absolute King, by that clause in the petition, 1 Sam. 8.5. a King to judge us like all the Nations, for all those Easterne Nations having Absolute Monarchs, they desiring to be governed like them; must be conceived to intend such a government. 2. If there be no expression of their intention: then a light concerning it must be borrowed for circumstances; sc. the kind of government whereunto they have been formerly accustomed; or that of the Nation from which they procee­ded: And thus the Saxons giving Kingly state to their Captaines in this Land, cannot in reason be interpreted to intend any other, then that whereunto they were accustomed, and which was the forme of the Nation whence they came. This Rule is ever to be kept as well in pub­like, [Page 32] as in private contracts of that simple indefinite forme, that they are to be construed, as far as may be, in fovour of the granter.

CHAP. V. An Answer to the Sect. 4. concerning the Constitution of this Monarchy.

Sect. 1 A Fourth sort of the Doctors supposals are concerning the Consti­tution of this Monarchy, which in words he granteth to be limi­ted and mixed, but comming to explaine himselfe, he makes such a li­mitation of it and such a mixture as is indeed none at all, being to be found in the most Absolute and simple governments in the world: for he every where supposeth it limited only morally in the exercise, not in the power: And so mixed, that there is but one simple power; a mixture made of one simple principle, such a one as never was heard of in the world before. And this he delivers on his bare word, never bringing any proofe of it, thinking it enough if he can except against that which I have set downe concerning these things in my Treatise. Among other Assertions which I have there about the state of this Go­vernment: there are two which this Replyer doth oppose. One is p. 31. That the soveraignty of our Kings is radically and fundamen­tally limited: which I have made good by five Arguments, and added a solution to the two chiefe which may be made against it. The other is, p. 39. That the Authority of this Land is of a compounded and mixed nature in the very root and constitution of it. This I have confirmed by three Reasons; and have answered three Objections which may be made against it. Now I desire the Reader impartially to weigh what I have there said; and to compare it with this Doctors Reply; and then judge whether those truths stand not firme against all that is brought to infringe them. But let us see what he opposeth. He proceedes not in any orderly course, to set downe his Antitheses and prove them; and to give Answer to what I have brought on the con­trary; but first spends some time in considering what this Govern­ment was in its Originall; as if it must needs remaine still such as it was at first; and could not receive any alterations, and graduall accom­plishment in processe of time. And then he sets on my Arguments, but how feebly we shall easily discover.

Here the first thing I did tax in the Doctors booke, was that he affir­med things contradictory: for he tells us he is against Absolute power [Page 33] in our Kings; and arbitrary Government: And yet he also affirmes, that our Kings hold by right of conquest, yea of three conquests. And that the Houses of Parliament are more subject to our Kings, then the Senate of Rome was to their Emperours. Also that the finall judgement is in One. Now how these so openly contradictorie Assertions can stand together he doth not shew us. Only he challengeth my ingenuity, if either he proposed this as a conclusion to be proved, that our Kings are absolute, p. 21. Neither doe I affirme that he did: Only I say, he holds things contradictory; that he holds such grounds which make all Kings absolute, sc. that no supreme is or can be more then morally li­mited. Indeed he speakes much of limitation morall; of limitation in the exercise of power; this makes a great noise of limitation, but in­deed are but meere vailes to cover over Absolutenesse, and make it the more passable, which he is ashamed to propose to the world in ex­presse termes. Suppose he did not mention those conquests to win an arbitrary power to the King. Yet sure in affirming more then once, that he hath such a right, he doth as much as if he said he may use an arbitrary power if he will; for if he hath a right of Conquest, he hath an Arbitrary right, by the Doctors own confession, p. 22. and if he hath a right of Arbitrarinesse, it is his lenity he doth not use it. In the Answer to the first Argument which I brought for the Absolutenesse of our Kings (which was that They hold by conquest, and therefore are Absolute.) I do not say, the Doctor drawes such a conclusion: No; but he layes down the Antecedent; and then any body else may draw out the conclusion.

I fetch not the root of succession, so farre backe as the Saxons, Originall of this Monar­chy. as this Replier traduces, to cut off advantages which may be made from the Normans entrance, p. 22. But because himselfe began there to make up a Trinity of Conquests: This drew me on that discourse of the Originall of this Monarchy; nor that the cause had any need of it; for it is his work to prove the Government absolute, if he will have it so; also suppose it were as absolute as the Norman Conquest, by him improved can make it; yet that hinders not, but that it may become really and radically limited afterward, by condescent, as appeares in the former chapter. Concerning the Saxon entrance, I said it was not a conquest, sc. properly and simply, but an expulsion. He answers, This is neither true, nor greatly materiall, p. 22. I say, it is both true and materiall: It is true; for all the Britaines which retained their name and Na­tion, [Page 34] were they many or few, were expelled into Wales: All the rest in gentem, leges, nomen, linquam (que), vincentium concesserunt; as himselfe cites for me out of M^r Cambden. And it is very materiall; for if they which only remained here in gentem & leges vincentium concesserunt; Then the Conquerers, as I said, kept their old forme of Government; the Saxons came not into the condition of the conquered Brittaines; but they into the old liberty of the Saxons. Hereupon grew there a necessity of inquiry into the Government of the Nation, before they came hither; that so we might know what a one they established here; and brought the remaining Brittaines into. And a record of more unquestionable authority then Tacitus I could not imagine; nor a more expresse testimony for a limited forme in the very potestas of it; of which sort he affirmes the Governement of all the Germane Nations was. How ever the Doctor is pleased to call it a conjecture, a dreame and uncertainty; No, the expresse testimony of such an Au­thour is not so: Rather that probability of these Saxons not being then a people of Germany, but did afterward breake out of the Cimbri­ca chersonesus, is so; which himselfe dares call no more then a proba­bility. I say, 1. It is a greater probability, that they were a people of Ger­many before they came in hither; for the Angli which accompanied them in that invasion, were questionles Germanes, and reckoned by Tacitus among that people, doubtlesse they were neighbours in habita­tion which were joyned in that voyage and conquest. 2. Suppose the matter were not cleare of the Saxons, yet is it of the Angli which gave denomination to the Land and people, who no doubt retained their Laws and Government, sayes Cambden; which was limited in the ve­ry royall power saith Tacitus. But this Doctor would make men be­lieve, as if I endeavoured to deduce the very Modell of our present Go­vernment from that Saxon ingresse: Whereas all that I ayme at, is to make it appeare that in semine, in the rude beginnings it is so an­cient; and shall affirme the limited power of the English Kings, and liberty of the subjects to have been from thence continued till now, unlesse he can bring some better proofes of its interruption, and in­duction of an unlimited power, then as yet he hath. Also to shew that the Doctors Tenure by Conquest is vaine in the first of the Three, for the Saxons gave none such to their Princes, but kept their Lawes, and came not under the Title of a conquered people. Next, the Doctor censures my delineation of the present platforme of our Government, [Page 35] p. 44. (for it is nothing with him for advantage to skip over 9. or 10. Pages) that so he might make a shew as if I set down that modell as derived from the Saxons out of Germany; and so spends neere two pages in this unreasonable way of traducing me; Whereas he cannot be ignorant, that in many places, yea at present is forced to confesse, p. 24. that I acknowledge our Government came up to this exactnesse and full height by degrees and in continuance of time; but indeed he had nothing else to say against that Description of this platforme or any one of those 6. Supposals of which it consists; and therefore when he had fained as if I had derived it from the beginning of the Saxon Government in this Land, he calls it a phansie, against the credit of all Histories and Chronicles, p. 24. and so lets it goe. Let the Reader judge, whether I doe not there apparently set it down as a description of our now existent Frame of Government: And whether any thing therein is not according to past historie, and present experience: Yea I chal­lenge the Doctor to except against the least part of it, as not so: if he cannot, he doth wrong so to miscall and deride it. After this Excursion, he returnes back to the 36. page of my Book, and the proper businesse of that Chapt. which was his three Titles by Conquest. I looked that after his first, he should have made good his second Conquest, sc. the Danish, and made good what he had said, that our Kings hold by that too, as one of the three. But not a word of that for shame: He passes p. 26. to the Norman entrance: And to prove that William held this Land by conquest, he cites out of M^r Cambden that in victorie quasi Tropheum, he disposed of the Lands of the Conquered, changed their Tenure, abrogated what English Lawes and customes he pleased, &c. Indeed when he had gotten full possession, he did what he pleased; but sactum non probat jus. I have proved, and the Doctor hath not gain­said, 1. That his Title by which he claimed was a successive and Le­gall Title. 2. That this Title got the favour of a great party, and was a maine Meane facilitating his acquirie. 3. That he was inaugurated by virtue of that Title. 4. After he had gotten the Kingdome, though he did many things arbitrarily, yet he setled himselfe and his succes­sours in the state of Legall Monarches, as the Doctor confesses, p. 27. What then is become of his Triple Tenure by Conquest; when heres not one can be made good; when it comes to a due scanning? That of M^r Cambden, that the Kings of this Land have Potestatem supre­mam, & merum imperium, is no more then that of the Statute which [Page 36] the Doctor speakes of, p. 47. that it is an Empire governed by one su­preme head, which we acknowledge; for that merum imperium must be understood in a moderate sense; else it sayes more then the Doctor himselfe professes to own: Though M^r Cambdens judgement in this case is not of the authority of a proofe.

Sect. 2 Then he passes to my Arguments, p. 28. But, by the way, let me tell him,My Argu­ments for Limita­tion and Mixture vindica­ted. I brought 5. Arguments to prove this Government limited, and 3. to prove it mixed: and it had been meet he should have brought somewhat, beside his bare word, to prove it limited only in the exercise, that is, Absolute in the power; but he brings no proofe, because he had none: Yet perhaps though he had not wherwithall to confirm his own, yet he hath to demolish my Assertions: Let us see therefore his solu­tions of my Arguments. But before we come to weigh them, because he tells us p. 28. it were an Argument fit for a skilfull Lawyer to la­bour in, and slights my endeavour because I bring not History and An­tiquity, but doe goe about to reason him into a beliefe of those Asser­tions, Let me premise something concerning that course of proving them. 1. The work of bringing History and Antiquity doth be­long to him who affirmes such a Title of Power in our Kings; Let him shew how and when it was conveyed to them: He which challenges a right to that which was once undoubtedly mine, must prove his right and he can have no more then he can bring evidence for. 2. On his de­faut, if I undertake a needlesse office to prove my Negative, there are but two wayes imaginable to doe it, one is by records of histories set­ting out the first constitution of a state, and the Termes on which [...] people resigned up their liberty to a subjection. So in the Antient Ro­mane State, the Venetian, the late Belgik Ʋnion, and others which have at once, visibly and lately been composed, it is likely that way might be taken. The other is by demonstrative collections drawn from the institution of the present composure of a State. Thus alone is it pos­sible to discerne and prove the constitution of a Government which springs not up at once, but by unseen degrees and moments, whose fundamentall constitutive acts stand upon no record. This is the con­dition of most Governments in the world which have sprung from small, rude and unknown beginnings. And of this in particular. For 1. A limitation of Royall Power was brought hither by the Saxons and Angli our Ancestours, hath been proved. This was, as those times were, very rude and unpolished, it is likely such as Captaines in Armies [Page 37] have, who can doe nothing of moment without the advise and con­sent of the Counsell of warre. 2. This Limitation of Power and Li­bertie received some more formall and setled bounds afterwards by cu­stomes and Lawes before the Conquest, as appeares by the Common Lawes, which are, as it were, the basis and foundation of this Govern­ment, the Statute Lawes being but after superstructives; These Com­mon Lawes did not grow up at once, but by degrees, and were unwrit­ten Customes and Ʋsages gaining authority by unknowne prescription, above all written Lawes; and were afterward committed to writing by men skilfull in the Lawes. 3. At length, and after the Conquest it was perfected to this Parliamentarie Forme; and even this being at first but rude, grew to this exactnesse by length of Time, and infinite Contentions. This latter way only being left us; that I took, and the Doctour hath no cause to despise it. For when a thing of present State is made evident by Reason drawne for palpable experience of it's pre­sent composure, it is madnesse to denie it to be so, because I cannot tell when it began to be so: Yea when the Question is of present state, it is a surer way to find out the Truth, then by records of its Originall constitution: For in time the Frame of a State may receive reall varia­tions from what it was at first, as the Romane State, and most others have done; for the contracts of men are at pleasure alterable; and an argument drawne from Monuments of first coalition, would then be fallacious.

Well; be the way never so justifiable, which I have taken, yet the Doctor dares pronounce my Arguments insufficient to cleare what I have undertaken. Tis easie to pronounce it; let us see how he makes good his sentence. I proceeded distinctly first to lay down my Arguments proving Limitation, p. 31. Then those which proove Mixture, p. 40. He mingles them together: And to my first, third, fourth and fift proving Limitation, Answers that They prove only limitation in the ex­ercise of power, p. 28. Why so? Neither the Denomination of Liege, nor any prescription can make us believe, that the Limitations of power had any other beginning then voluntary condescent. As if a Government by vo­luntarie condescent might not receive a radicall Limitation. But it lies on him to proove, it was by such condescent; if he can bring no record for it, it must in justice be held originall, and ab initio. Those two de­nominations of Leige Soveraigne: And Liege people doe prove the ve­ry Soveraignty and Subiection Legall; but that is not so which hath on­ly [Page 38] a morall Limitation; the denominations argue the bond 'twixt them to be Legall: And when Subjects have such a Libertie by custome and Law, that they owe no farther subjection, then (when, or how e­ver they came by it) yet the very power of the Monarch is limited, as we heard in the former Chapter, unlesse any will put a vaine power in the Prince, to which no Subjection is due; but of this enough there. Then he passeth to my Reasons proving mixture, which are three, p. 40. of my Treatise. The first is, That it is confessedly mixed of a Monarchie, Aristocracie and Democracie, therefore radically, and in the very Power. He answers, It is not necessarie the mixture should be in the Power: but it is sufficient if there be a concurrence of Persons whose consent is required to the exercise of Power, p. 39. Thus he answers to the conclusion; but sayes nothing to the Antecedent. 1. And indeed if it be mixed of these three, his answer is against common-sense; that a mixture of Monarchie, Aristocracie and Democracie should be satis­fied by annexion of persons to the Monarch, having meere consent: for these are names of Power of Government; for Aristocracie and Demo­cracie are Powers not Persons, as well as Monarchie: therefore a com­position of these three must be all of Powers. 2. And indeed this chimera of a mixture in the exercise of Power, is plaine non-sense. For a mixture in the Acts or Exercise supposeth a mixture in the princi­ples of Action, that is in the very Powers: A mixt Act proceeding from a simple Power is such stuffe that I never heard before. Now if a mixture in Acts argues a mixture in Powers: These Powers must be co­ordinate and supreme: for subordinates make no mixture; also Powers concurrent to supreme Acts, such as Legislation is confessed to be, can­not be but supreme Powers. Neither can any man living cleare that passage which he speaks of p. 45. from pure non-sense, sc. This coordi­nation is but to some Act or Exercise of the Supreme Power, not in the po­wer it selfe: For Concurse to an Act, im [...]lies a Power of Concurrence: and Concurse to a supreme Act, argues a supreme Power; for an inferi­our Power cannot afford a coordinate concurrence to a supreme Act. So that his Over-seers were not mistaken when they checked him for that passage, and said, He granted a coordination of Subjects with his Ma­jestie in the supreme Power. But here he brings a ponderous Reason, so often before urged. If the mixture be in the Supremacie of Power, how can the King be the Only supreme and Head. He cannot salve it with his A­pex potestatis, unlesse the King must be the Crowne or Top of the Head [Page 39] onely; for they also must be our Head and our Soveraignes, if they be mixed in the Supremacie of Power, p. 29. Here I answer once for all to this so frequent an injection. 1. That the Titles of Head and Supreme are fully satisfied by this, that he is the sole Principle and fountaine from whence the execution of all Law and Justice flowes to his people by inferiour Officers and Courts, all whose Authoritie is derivatively from him as its head. 2. That these Titles in proper construction import only Ʋtmost chiefty, nor doe they agree to any kind of right in the fundamentall and radicall Powers of a Kingdome; but to the prin­cipall and transcendent Interest: Another may have a right in the su­preme Power, yet not be supreme, nor Head: because not having a su­premacie in that Power: So it is in the Colledges, the Fellowes have a fundamentall interest in the power of Government, yet that hinders not, but that the Title of Head and Chiefe is given to him who is Go­vernour; will the Doctour jest at it, and say they be Heads and Su­premes too, and the Warden or Master is but the crowne or top of the head. Also in the naturall bodie, from whence the Metaphor of Head is borrowed, are three Fundamentall and radicall powers scituate in the three Principall parts: yet none will say, the Heart and Liver are Heads too, because they partake the supreme Powers of nature. Let not the Doctour therefore straine a Metaphor so farre as to make him­selfe merry with it. Let him really answer my Arguments by which I prove a radicall Limitation and mixture. Let him answer; is not the Legislative Power the supreame? Have not the Houses an Authorita­tive concurrence and Influx into that businesse? If he avoyd a punctuall answer hereto by carping at words, he will prove himselfe a ridicu­lous Argumentatour while he seekes to make others seeme so.

My second Argument for radicall mixture, is from the Legislative Power being in all three. He answers, That Phrase is satisfied and ex­plained by that concurrence and consent in the exercise of supreame Power. It seemes that invention of his must serve all turnes. Is a Legislative Power satisfied by a bare powerlesse consent? I demand: is that Consent causall and Authoritative; or meerly Consiliarie and unauthoritative? And whereas I prove that they have an enacting Authority by that re­ceived and set clause in the beginning of Acts; Be it enacted by the Kings most excellent Majestie, and the Authoritie of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament. He tels us a Vote and Power of assenting is a great Authority, p. 29. I enquire not how great it is: I aske whether that [Page 40] be all; whether that clause, which as expressely as words can, ascribes an enacting Authority to them, be satisfied by such a Power of Assen­ting? He sees it doth not, and therefore tels us of a former phrase which ran thus: The King by the advise and assent of the Prelates, Earls and Barons, and at the instance and request of the Commonaltie hath ordai­ned, &c. Suppose anciently some statutes runne under that forme: that advise and instance, must be understood of an Authoritative and e­nacting advice and instance; as the latter formes explaine it: for it is e­quall that the latter expound the former; and not the contrary, as the Doctor would perversly have it, especially considering the Doctors Exposition cannot stand with the latter; but mine agrees very well with the former. But how bold is this man, when during so many yeares and Parliaments, both Kings and States by this received Forme, have acknowledged and established a concurrent enacting Authoritie in all three, yet he dares argue and oppose so expresse and confessed a truth? But in this answer, he discovers a great deale of superficialnes, in granting the Houses a Power of consenting to the establishment of laws; and yet denie them a Legislative, enacting Power: for such a Power of consenting (if it be necessary) is indeed a Power of enacting; for though in transeunt Acts one may stand by and consent to the doing, and yet not be Efficient; yet in immanent Acts which are done, per immediatam volitionem, by a meere expression of the Will, A concurrence in consen­ting, and a concurrence in doing is one and the same thing: Now Le­gislation is an imminent Act, consisting in a meer expression of an Autho­ritative Will.

My third Argument for Mixture, was from it's end, which was Restraint from excesse. 1. He grants such a Restraint, but morall and legall, not forceable, p. 30. I answer, He deceitfully confounds morall and le­gall, as I shewed before. 2. The End of Mixture in a State, is that there may be a power of restreyning more then sufficient (as his Maje­stie expresses it) but the Doctors meere morall power, is very insuffi­cient; It limits not the Power at all; nor the Exercise properly, no more then an Oath, or Promise without it, would doe: that is, makes it sinne to exceed. But of this before. But here, which is very rare, He doth not onely denie, but give a reason of it. If the fundamentall Constitution had intended them such a Power, it would not have left a pow­er in the Monarch to call, or dissolve them, which would make this power of theirs altogether ineffectuall, p. 30. This Reason seemes to have some [Page 41] weight in it, I will therefore, the more seriously consider it. 1. What­ever strength it hath had in it; now it hath none, because that power of dissolving is now by Law suspended, for this Parliament; and after it, a necessity by Law imposed of reducing that Power of Calling Par­liaments, into Act, every Three yeares. 2. Neither was it true be­fore these Acts, that such a Power was left in the Monarch at pleasure to use or not; for it was by ancient Law determined how often they should be convocated. 3. But being granted that this Power is simply and fully in the Monarch, yet I denie, that hence it followes, that it would make that Power of the Houses altogether ineffectuall; be­cause that de facto, though it hath been in the Monarch so long, yet it never hath made it voyd; but they have exercised a limiting Power, as Histories relate, enough yea and sometimes too much, over the Monarch, notwithstanding his Power of calling and dissolving them. Thus in the Colledges, the Fellowes have an effectuall, and more then morall limiting Power, though the Governour hath the Power of cal­ling and dissolving their meetings. And anciently the prime Patriarch had the power of Calling and dissolving generall Councels, yet they had a Power of limiting, yea of Censuring him for exorbitances for all that. The Reason is, because many things fall out oft in a Government, in­ducing such necessities on the Monarch, that he for their supply will choose to reduce such power into act of Calling, and suspend such po­wer of dissolving, although he know those States will use their Limi­ting Power in reducing such exorbitances, and punishing those dearest instruments which have been used in them. This the Constitutors of this Frame preconsidering might put in the Monarch this Power, and yet intend to the other States a Legall and effectuall power of restraining his exorbitancies, by using Force, not against him, but it's procurers and Instruments. Thus we see, there is no need of entring on that dis­pute, Whether this Power of calling and dissolving the Houses be pla­ced in the Monarch, as all his other are, not absolutely, but with limi­tation of necessary reducing it into act, on the last exigencies of the Kingdome.

After this he returns to my other Arguments for limitation; One of which, drawne from radicall Mixture, he fully omits; but now ha­ving shewed the invalidity of his exceptions against my arguments for it, I have given force to this argument for Limitation, drawne there­from. That which he sets on last is my first for Limitation in the very [Page 42] Power: sc. the Kings owne expresse confession: That the Law is the measure of his power: That the Powers which he hath are vested in him by Law, p. 31. of my Tract. And, as if this were not more then he could answer, the Doctor addes a third for us, in which he ascribes to the Houses a power more then sufficient to restraine his Excesses, p. 30. Here are Authorities as punctuall and expresse as can be imagined. Yet the Doctor resolving not to be reasoned into a beliefe of these things, out faces all this evidence; and to that end frames three Answers such as they are. 1. He sayes, His Majestie had few of his learned Counsell about him. 2. His gracious expressions ought not to be drawne out to his disad­vantage. 3. All that can be gathered from them doth not come up to these Conclusions, p. 31. In the two first he openly enough taxeth his Maje­stie of unadvised expressions, excusing it from absence of his learned Counsellours (you may soone imagine whom he meanes) Thus dis­paraging the Kings judgement and all then about him; and tels us we must not be unjust to set those sayings on the racke; that is, we must not take them in their plaine meaning; but on this mans wrested and sencelesse interpretation: What doe not these men dare doe and say? Before we heard him correcting the expressions of all Moderne Parlia­ments, teaching us to reforme them by the old. Here the King and his Counsell setting out in such a time Declarations to all his Subjects to informe them about the nature and extent of his Royall Power: He compares those serious expresses to Trajans sudden and excessive speech: He will correct Kings, Counsels, Parliaments and all, but he will have his way: To him they must come to learne how to speake, and what powers they have. But let us heare his Doctorall Ex­position of his Majesties expresses. Hee sayes, The Law is the mea­sure of his Power: Wee must understand his meaning to be that his power is bounded by Law: but it doth not follow, that his power wherein it is not limited by Law is not absolute and full, p. 31. Here is pro­found interpreting: If his Power be limited by Law? is there a­ny part of it not limited by Law? If the Law be the mea­sure of it, sure it is even with it; for the measure is equall in extent with the thing measured: Thus he papally interprets against the di­rect meaning of the Text: But he doth not show us how that can be understood, when he saith, His powers are vested in him by Law, if the Law be a limitation only of exercise: Nor how their Restraining po­wer is more then sufficient, if it be only morall; which, how unsuffici­ent [Page 43] a restraint for exorbitance it is, every ones experience can enough testifie. I admire a man who pretends to conscience and judgement should take such liberty of interpreting. Certaine if those Reasons and Testimonies doe not clearly proove a radically limited and mixed Constitution of this Monarchy I shall despair of ever proving any thing by way of Argument any more.

I had an intent to have subnexed other Arguments to make good Sect. 3 those Assertions: but I see it is to no purpose,7 Queries concer­ning this Governe­ment. for he is resolved not to be reasoned into them: He can denie all as failing either in the Antecedent or Consequent, p. 32. The Power of this Kingdome he must have un­limited: He will give no Reason for it; nor heare no Reason against it. Yet, sith he professeth himselfe a Resolver of Conscience, Let me ther­fore be so bold as to propose certaine Cases to him. 1. Why in the late Oath proposed to be taken by all his Majesties Subjects the Power of enacting Statutes is sworne to be joyntly in the Kings Maiestie, Lords and Commons in Parliament. Certes the Doctor writ this Reply before that Oath was printed in Oxford, or else he did not consider of it. He cannot say, I hope there were but few of his counsell about him when that was framed: if the Doctor hath taken it, He hath forsworne this passage of his Reply; and sworne them a joynt enacting power. 2. Why we are enjoyned to sweare that we doe beleeve that the Subiects of England are not obliged by any Act made either by the Kings Maiestie solely, or the Houses solely, &c. Sure the Doctor hath abjured his other Assertion of the unlimited Power of the King, if he hath taken this Oath; for if Power be solely his, then an Act made by him solely is obliging: If they be not obligatorie, they are not Authoritative; and so the mixture and limitation is in the Authority it self. Here is no place left for his distinction of Active and Passion subiection. For, 1. Will any thinke that the intent is to sweare men to be bound not to doe, but to suffer? 2. The Beliefe of a non-Obligation proceeds indifferently and as fully concerning the sole Acts of the King, us the Houses but I be­leeve the Doctour will not say we are obliged to passive subiection to the sole Acts of the Houses. 3. I would know if the States doe li­mit onely morally, what they doe, which is not done without them? A Promise and Oath do limit morally without them. He will say they may admonish him; and denie their consent, and so iudge his Acts invalid: He meanes still morally invalid; and so would they be with­out them. 4. Suppose the Monarch minded to establish a Law, [Page 44] which he judges needfull; and the States being averse, he enacts it without them; Is it not a Law? It hath all the Legislative authoritie in it. He will say it is not duly made. 1. I grant it: but yet it is a Law, for it hath all the Power of a Law. 2. But is it not duly made? Why, the power of last decision is in the King alone: Suppose he define that the Intent of his Predecessours in granting this consenting power to the Houses had no intent to hinder, but further themselves in establish­ing good lawes; and therefore now they not concurring by assent to this needfull Act, He ought not to be hindred, but may lawfully doe it without them. He is the last Judge in this case; and it must be held ever lawfully enacted. So that in the result here is left to these States by the Doctors grounds neither Civill nor Morall Limitation, but at plea­sure. 5. If Limitation in our Government exempt Subjects from a necessity of active Subjection; but not from passive; How is it that our Lawes doe not only determine what the Monarch shall command, but also what he shall inflict: what shall be accounted Rebellion, what Felonie, &c. and what not; also what he shall inflict for this crime, and that crime, and what not? Sith the Lawes limiting what he shall command, doe limit our necessity of active Subiection; it will fol­low, that the Lawes limiting what he shall inflict, doe limit our ne­cessity of passive Subiection. Here's no evasion by saying the Laws do limit him morally what he shall inflict, and if he inflict beyond Law, he sinnes in it; but we must suffer: for the Doctor acknowledges, that the Lawes defining what he shall command doe so limit our active sub­jection, that we have a simple exemption from any necessity of Doing; and therefore also the Laws defining what he shall inflict, doe so limit our passive subjection, that we have a simple exemption from any neces­sity of suffering, beyond those Limitations; for also, if they did not free us from passive subjection, it were unlawfull not only to resist, but also to avoid suffering even by flight. 6. When the liberties of magna Charta, and other grants have been gotten and preserved, and recovered at the rate of so much trouble, sute, expence and bloud, whither by all that adoe was intended only a morall liberty, define­ment in the Monarch, and not also of the power it selfe; only that he might not lawfully exorbitate from established Lawes, and not also that he might have no Authority or Power to exorbitate at all? Sure this was their aime, for the former he could not doe before. 7. The Law granting a writ of Rebellion against him who refuseth to obey the [Page 45] sentence of the Judge, though he have an expresse Act of the Kings will to warrant him: doth it not suppose those exceeding and extrajudiciall Acts of the Kings will to be unauthoritative, and unable to priviledge a man from Resistance?

If the Doctor by his faculty can resolve these Cases, He will doe much in way of satisfaction of my conscience; but if he cannot they will prove so many convincing arguments that the Power of the Mo­narch in this Frame is not unlimited.

Now having made good my Assertions, I expected another worke; sc. an Examination of his Reasons for unlimitednesse, and simplicity of Monarchicall Power, but he is not guilty of my fault, he doth not goe so much as to reason us into a beliefe of it. He doth in vaine expresse a desire hee hath that some skilfull Lawyers or Divines would helpe him at this dead lift; yet he is like to goe alone in this wild untroden path of defending an unresistiblenesse on such supposals: shall we think any Divine will second him, in justifying his unwritten fancie about Gods Ordinance necessarily investing all the acts of his will, who is su­preme? Or any sound Lawyer will overthrow the grounds of his Pro­fession, that the Royall Right, Authority and Government of this Realme is both founded on, and measured by the Laws thereof. Yea it is very remarkeable, that his Majestie in all the Declarations and Ex­presses which I have seen, doth not once touch upon this way, sc. a chal­lenge of such a latitude of Authority as can preserve destructive instru­ments from force; but condemnes the now Resistance, by solemne pro­testations of innocency, and intention of governing by the known Laws.

CHAP. VI. An Answer to his 5. Sect. of Resistance in Relation to severall kinds of Monarchy.

THE residue of his Book is spent about the Question of Resistance; Sect. 1 I might well spare the labour of any farther Answer; for now ha­ving so apparently made good these two Assertions. 1. That soveraign­ty may be limited in the very power. 2. That de facto, it is so in this Government, every one may discerne the necessary truth of these in­ferences, 1. That in this Government, the exceeding Acts of the Prin­ces will, being out of the compasse of his Authority, can not authorize their Instruments. 2. That hereon Resistance of them is no other then of private men, not of Authority, or Gods Ordinance. But because the [Page 46] Doctors chiefe confidence is in this part of his discourse, and he is large in it, I will therefore goe on in my work, and will briefly make appeare that his Reasons are infirme, and his Authorities impertinent, and his Answers very insufficient: for having been so large in making good my supposals, and overthrowing his, I may the more contract my selfe in this remaining businesse. In this Section he proposeth two things. 1. To consider how I state the point of Resistance in the kinds of Go­vernments. 2. To prove that Limitation and Mixture in government doe not imply a forceable constraining Power in subjects, p. 39. I will follow him in both.

My sta­ting the Question vindica­ted.He begins with a charitable censure of my stating the Question, and sayes he finds it to be in a way that lies very open to Rebellion, p. 33. Let the Reader judge: I am sure, his Resolves and Determinations are not in a way to destroy all liberty, and make all Governments Arbi­trary, but directly doe it. Then for my maintaining the Person of the Monarch in all Formes to be above the reach of Force, he approves it; yet sayes I allow subjects to raise Armies, to give battle to those that are about him as his guard. He wrongs me, I say not his guard but subversive seducers and instruments: Those which he called cut-throates in his first booke; now he repents he gave that hard name to his clients, whom he pleades so hard to save harmelesse, and makes them amends with the stile of a Guard. A guard which bring him into grea­ter danger then all his enemies; who bring him into battell to save themselves, where Ordnance and Musket can put no difference: No; They use him as their guard. If harme befall him, which God avert, the guilt and punishment will fall on them who are so prodigall of hazarding his sacred Person, not on those who could desire nothing more then his security, by absence from a multitude, who by underta­king the subversion of Religion and Lawes (for that is the Doctors supposition) bring themselves in danger of condigne destruction.

Then he proceeds to Resistance in an Absolute State. Where I af­firme, If such a Monarch should seeke the destruction of the whole Community, his instruments of such inhumanity may be resisted. He dares not deny it; but would know what I doe meane by the whole community. I meane the whole simely, or the whole interpretatively; that is, the greater part; and therefore his exception of the Jewes in the Kingdome of Ahasuerus, or the Templers in the Westerne King­domes, is not to the purpose: but the instance which I bring of the [Page 47] Law-Countries, comes home: for they were the whole community; but the Replier corrupts it, when he saith the Spanish King intended the extirpation of the Protestants only, p. 34. For he intended not only theirs, but of all, Papists and else, which would not admit the in­troduction of an Arbitrary Government, and the subversion of their li­berties, as the histories thereof make plaine. Here in this 34. page, the Doctor shewes a bad mind: Taking occasion to excuse the Rebels in Ireland, as if they might justifie themselves on these grounds; and in­timating a falshood, as if the Parliament did intend their extirpation, hereby declaring how ill he likes any effectuall course for the rooting out of Popery out of the Kingdomes. Indeed, he sayes, he pleads not for them, but yet he doth it. He finds out arguments for them; and shews them a way, both how to excuse themselves, and accuse the Parliament; and to call a resolution of cleansing that Iland from Popery, an extir­pation of their Nation. He sayes, the example of David proves not this, being but a particular Man. I say, it proves it the more strongly, as shall appeare. Then if a particular mans life be invaded without any plea of reason, I suppose it hard to deny him the liberty of positive re­sistance of agents; and prove it by the instance of the peoples rescue of Jonathan; and Davids of himselfe; where the peoples Oath; and Davids Army, with his enquiry at Keilah doe prove a serious and reall purpose of Resistance, let the Doctor say what he please to the contra­ry; so that these examples come home to justifie resistance in such case, even in an Absolute Monarchy; for here are particular men, in an ab­solute Monarchy, assaulted without plea of reason; for that Jonathan, who had wrought such a deliverance, should die, for tasting in his igno­rance a little honey, there was no colour of reason; the Kings rash oath was none. And that David should be put to death, whom Saul him­selfe oft with his own mouth professed innocent, and absolved, was as much without plea of reason: so that here I need not flie to the Do­ctors shift of an extraordinary case, as he tells me I must, p. 35. I ac­knowledge no extraordinary case in these examples: Take them in their due extent, and they justifie no more then I have asserted; and so much they doe. In my 5. Assertion, p. 11. Of submitting States, Li­berties and Persons to the will of an Absolute Monarch carrying any plea of reason; He faults my Order, and tells me, it should have been first. It seems this mans eye can spie small faults; but why first, he doth not say. I think in stating of the question of resistance I may as [Page 48] well begin with the Affirmative, and shew first when it may be used, and then when it ought not; as on the contrary; but he will make a fault, where he finds none. But what sayes he to the Assertion? He grants it; but dislikes the limitation, so it carry plea or shew of reason: and sayes here the way is open enough to rebellion, p. 36. No opener then himselfe makes it, p. 10. This is usuall with him, when he dislikes a thing: He can speak no lesse words then Rebellion. But why sayes he so? Every man will be ready to think there is no reason nor equity in the will of the Monarch when he is oppressed by him. He may well enough, if hee be oppressed: but yet there may be a plea and colour of equity even for an Act of Oppression; and in an Absolute Monarchy it will little availe a man though he think there is no reason for it: for he must not be his own judge; nor hath he any outward judge to ap­peale to; but the Reasonable will of the Monarch himselfe; if he submit to its determination, there is no feare of Rebellion; if not, I have done with him, in such a Government. Of Saules censure of Jo­nathan and David I have spoken already and made it appeare it had no plea of reason, was not the act of a reasonable will; and therefore I may hold their examples ordinary, without impeachment of this As­sertion.

Then he proceeds to Resistance in limited and mixed Rules, p. 36. Concerning which I said, p. 17. If the exorbitances be of lesse moment they ought to be borne, and p. 18. If mortall and destructive neither can be otherwise redressed, then prevention by Resistance may be used. Here first he challengeth my ingenuity, for words spoken in my 49. page. He said Sect. 1. of his first booke, We may and ought to deny obe­dience to such commands of the Prince as are unlawfull by the Law of God; yea by the established lawes of the Land. I censured this speech, that it is more then should be said, sure, a hainous fault in me: I say more; he hath said more then should be said, by all these three bookes, in which he sayes that which dissolves all frames of Govern­ment into arbitrary, overthrowes all effectuall limitation of Power; and sure that is more then should be said. And for that particular clause; Is it not more? He speakes without restriction: Doth joyne things unlawfull by the law of God, and things unlawfull by the lawes of the Land: And puts the same may and ought to both; if the affir­mation must be understood universally of one, how can it be under­stood otherwise of the other: It cannot be excused from the censure [Page 49] of a confused and unwary speech. He passeth, p. 37. to the Question, Who shall be the ultime judge of subversive exorbitancies. He would know who? I have told him my opinion hereof at large in that Tract: Here I would faine know his; but he would rather carp at mine, then give his own. When I say there can be no Authoritative judge to de­termine it. He commends my ingenuity, p. 37. but I doe not only say it, but at large doe prove it, there p. 67. as well against him, as against those others; why doth he not undertake that Question against me, if he hath any mind to it. He much dislikes when I say, p. 18. The fun­dament all Lawes must judge in every mans conscience. This is, sayes he, a ready way to anarchy and confusion, p. 37. I referre not this case to the consciences of men as to an Authoritative Judge, but a morall principle of discerning Right: And who can deny unto man such a liberty to conceive of right according to the light he hath from the fundamen­tals of a State? Let the judicious reade what I have said here-about, p. 67. of that Tract; and let him then tell how that Question can be otherwise determined, unlesse he overthrow. Monarchy, by giving a finall judgement to the States; or all Liberty, if he give it to the Monarch; and supposing the Ayme at subversion be evident to mens consciences, can we deny them a naturall power of judging accor­ding to that evidence; or liberty of assisting the wronged? So when I say the wronged side must make it evident to every mans conscience: also the appeale must be to the Community, as if there were no Government; and as every man is convinced in conscience he is bound to give assistance, p. 29. of my Tract: He calls this good stuffe, p. 37. Why? because I say, the people are at liberty as if there were no Government; and this ap­peale is disadvantagious to the Monarch; for they will be more ready to believe their representative: This would in the consequence be dangerous, the high way to confusion, p. 38. Answ. 1. I say, not simply, that people are at liberty, as if there were no Government; but in this particular Que­stion; bound still, as before, in all besides. 2. He takes me as if by Community I meant only the Commons; when I expresse it by genus humanum, especially of that Kingdome. 3. He censures the Reason of Man-kind of partiality towards their Representatives. Not so; for in so great a Question Wise men cannot be blinded: Honest men will goe according to their conscience, and Reasonoble men according to evidence, and will see it concernes them as well to avoid Anarchy by aiding a wronged Monarch; as Tyranny by aiding an oppressed [Page 50] State. But sith this Replicant is so bitter an enveigher against an Ap­peale ad conscientiom generis humani, in this last case so uncapeable of an Authoritative decision: 1. Let him consider on what foundation God hath built Monarchy and all other powers, but on the conscien­ces of men, Rom. 13. 2. Let him weigh whether, when he hath said all he can say, such an appeale be avoidable. For, 1. If a controversie arise between the King and a particular person or place; the King shall Judge it in his Courts by his Judges, and the sentence shall be executed by the force and armes of his other subjects. 2. If it be between Him and the Representatives of his whole Kingdome, and supreme Court of Judicature in which the Acts and Persons of all other Courts and Judges are to be judged. The King cannot judge this in his other Courts and by his Judges; nor yet by himselfe; for a King out of his Courts cannot judge in a Legall Government, es­pecially the acts of his supreme Court. But be it so: suppose the Do­ctor and I should agree in this, that the King by himselfe is the ultime Judge of Controversies: Yet it is very like those States with whom the Contention is, will not yeild him so, to judge against them, in his own cause. But suppose they doe not submit to his determination: He will say, then they sin, and rebell against him. Well, let it be granted; yet submit they doe not: I demand in this case, what course the King hath to make effectuall his sentence? It must be by force of armes, by the sword: but of whom? Either the peoples whose representa­tives they are; or other mens: but what shall bind them to afford their Force to make good his sentence? It must be their conscience of his right: Thus when all is done and said, To the consciences of Men must his appeall be; and to them must he make evident his right, in this extreme contention. Yea this man in a controversie of the like nature, is compelled to acknowledge as much: For the Pleaders put the case; If a King be distracted, I may adde, if his Title be dubious, &c. The Doctors answer is, if it be cleare that a King is so, &c. p. 8. but who shall determine this If? must not self-evidence in the conscien­ces of Men? This is all the judiciall power the Doctour can referre us to in these cases. Lastly, He would know what power there is in a Community to make resistance; and answers himselfe, A Parliamentary and Legall; not Military and Forcible, p. 38. Thus he speakes of these as contradistinct, when they are subordinate, Forcible being subser­vient to Legall to make it valid and effectuall, which else were meerely [Page 51] morall and ineffectuall; but this is one of his supposals whose vanity I have before discovered: And p. 51. of my Treatise, in a full dispute have I proved the Parliaments power in resisting destructive instru­ments; which I doubt not, will appeare cleare, notwithstanding any thing said in this Reply. But that is very strange which he affirmes, p. 39. That if they use a Legall restraining power, the Monarch can­not alter the established frame. Sure, by cannot, he understands falla­ciously, as he useth to doe, a morall cannot, that is, not without sin; which is a poor small cannot now adays: if he mean indeed cannot, that is, is not able, it is against reason, by his grounds; for what is not he able to doe, whose lowest, most desperate instrument of pleasure is un­resistible? Let him remember where he said, p. 19. A forcible consent cannot be wanting to a Conquerour, and a Conquerours power is no more then unresistible. Nay; I am senselesse on the Doctors grounds, if he cannot lawfully; for suppose he be pleased to make it a Question, whether he were not better governe by the Civill-Law, as more con­ducent to Gods glory, and the end of Government. He is by Law the last judge of this Question, if he determine it best: then he may law­fully doe it.

Now we are come to the second part of this Section: in which he Sect. 2 undertakes the proofe of this Assertion, His Argu­ments a­gainst power of resistance reserved. answered. that Limitations and Mix­tures in Monarchy doe not imply a forcible constraining power in subjects for the preventing of dissolution, but only a Legall, p. 39. Answ. He failes in the very proposall of his Assertion in three points. 1. He proposeth it of Limitation in generall; whereas I grant it of that which is only in exercise; affirming it only of that which is of the power it selfe. 2. He sayes, Forcible constraining power in sub­jects, when he should have specified against subversive instruments, for I grant it of the Monarch himselfe. 3. He opposeth forcible to Legall, when it should be opposed only to meere Morall, not to Legall, as before. Now let us weigh his Arguments. First, Such a power must be in them by reservation, and then it must be expresse in the con­stitution of the Government and Covenant, or else by implication. I will answer distinctly concerning this Reservation of power of for­cible Resistance. 1. There is a Reservation of liberty, or power of not being subject neither actively nor passively to the exceeding Acts of the Monarchs will: This is by implication, for what they did not resigne up, they did reserve. 2. A power of Authoritative judging [Page 52] and resisting the Monarch thus exceeding. This neither expressely nor implicitly is reserved; not because it is unlawfull, as the Doctor ima­gins, but contradictory to the very institution of a Monarchy, and so, under that intention, impossible. 3. A power of forcible resistance of subversive instruments. This by the Authority of the Law, is, not re­served, but expressely commited, not only to the Houses of Parlia­ment, but all inferiour Courts; for the Law, whose execution the King committeth unto them, commands them not only to resist, but punish its violaters, much more its subverters, without exceptions of Persons, or respect of their number, or ground and reason why they doe it, whe­ther with or against the Kings private and absolute will or Warrant: supposing such men to be without warrant. And this power of jud­ging all violators and subverters of Laws being committed to them, in­cludes a power of imploying the force or Armes of the County, or whole Kingdome, if need be, to make good the sentence of the Law a­gainst them: This power being a necessary attendant to the former. And they who have the power of judging by Commission, have the power of force by implication. To his five Arguments therefore by which he proves this power not reserved by implication; I briefly Answer. 1. Limitation cannot infer it, &c. Answer, Limitation in exercise only doth not: but in the power it selfe doth infer it, as I have often shewed. 2. The inconveniencies of exorbitancie cannot infer it. Answer, They doe not infer it of themselves, for they are the same in absolute Rule: but supposing a people mind in their Frame effectually to prevent those inconveniencies, that doth infer it. 3. The consent and intention of the people, choosing a Monarch cannot infer it, because it is not the measure of the power it selfe. Answer, I have before pro­ved the contrary, and made the Doctors supposall appeare a groundlesse falshood concerning unlimited power by Gods ordinance. 4. The intention of the people in procuring Limitations of power cannot infer it. Answer, If the peoples intention in it, be a greater security from op­pression then in an absolute Government they can have, or a meere mo­rall limitation can give them; then it doth inferre it. 5. If the Architects did intend such a forceable power to these States, they would not have best it in his power to dissolve them, p. 42. This hath had its full satis­faction before. These are poore infirme arguments, as the reader cannot but see, yet he ends in a triumph. Therefore I conclude here as I pro­mised in the second Section, where the Prince stands supreme, &c. [Page 53] there Subjects may not by force of armes resist, though he be exorbitant, &c. p. 43. 'Tis true he concludes as he promised, but he hath not proved, as he promised; nor as we expected; for here is nothing, but that which fals to the ground with his supposals on which they are built; and which I have demolished in the 4th Chapter.

CHAP. VII. An Answer to the 7th Section of his Replie, of places of Scripture out of the old Testament.

HIs sixt Section doth wholly concerne the Authour of the fuller Sect. 1 Answer, which I passe over, because I am chargeable for no more then is my owne. And come to his seventh which containes an Ex­amination of places alledged in this Question out of the old Testa­ment. Where he begins confidently that there is no warrant for Resi­stance, p. 56. and he yeelds two Reasons why. 1. Because the Insti­tution of that Kingdom was such as doth plainly exclude Resistance. 2. Be­cause the Prophets never call for it. Ans. I grant it doth exclude it, as farre as in an absolute Monarchie it may be excluded; and therefore there is no need of answering his Arguments. But yet let us consider them sith he is so large in them.

To shew us the Institution of that Kingdome he brings, 1 Sam. 8.11. Where he sayes we have it. For Samuel is commanded, v. 9. To tell the people (Jus Regis:) Now this jus Regis he makes a great matter of, and tels us it implies not a Right of doing such unjust Acts, but a securitie from Resistance and force, if he does them. p. 56.

Ans. 1. It is no prejudice to the cause I defend, if I should grant all he would worke out of this Text; for it prooves no farther then of that particular Kingdome, inducing no necessitie that all others must have the same Institution. Also that which he concludes is but a se­curitie for the Person of the Prince from force if he doe such unjust Acts: which we grant him not only in that, but all Monarchies, even the most limited.

2. If he have any further reach, and would conclude out of it a ge­nerall binding Ordinance of security from Resistance entending even to subversive Instruments of Will. The world will wonder at him for such an audacious conclusion from such premises. And we will look a little nearer to what he sayes. All is grounded on his Interpretation [Page 54] of Jus Regis. Which he seeks to confirme by Calvins Authority.

First, for his Interpretation. I say the Originall words in this place are not to be translated jus Regis, the Right of the King. Because 1. There is another more fit signification of them: the words are [...] now the word [...] being applied to unjust Acts, as here it is ought not to be rendred jus, but mos, not Right, but manner, as appeares by another place answerable to this, 1 Sam. 27.11. [...] speaking of Davids roving, This will be his manner, 'twere ridiculous to render it, this will be his right or priviledge. This out last Interpreters knowing, did willingly depart from the Ʋulgar La­tine; whose Authour either ignorantly or inconsiderately did render it jus Regis; which this Doctour for his advantage doth here make so much of. 2. That rendring of it, cannot be justified by any other Text of Scripture; for whersoever it is rendred Jus, it imports a mo­rall Right; not a priviledge or securitie in ill doing. I challenge any skilfull in that tongue to bring one place where it is or can be so ren­dred.

Then for Calvins Authority. I answer. 1. What if Calvin or a­ny other deceived by the vulgar Latine, or ignorance of the extent of the Originall word, have rendred it ill; must that be a prescription to others who know a better? 2. Neither doth Calvin, though he follow the Latine and render it jus, meane such a jus as the Doctour doth, sc. An absolute immunity, or security from Resistance: but onely from private men. For after he hath in all those passages, which the Doctour cites, exempted Kings from violence, truly and piously ur­ging patience in Subjects under the injuries of their Princes, at length Instit. l. 4. c. 10. (the same out of the which the Doctor brings his proofes) num. 31. He explaines himselfe, De privatis hominibus sem­per loquor, that all is to be taken of private men; not of the States of a Kingdome, in their publike meetings: never discerning of such a uni­versall immunitie, as the Doctour would put upon him to maintaine. And here I challenge not the Ingenuity, but the Conscience of this Replier, who cites Calvin at large in the former place, as agreeing with him in this case of Resistance, when he cannot be ignorant of the contrary, and therefore conceales his following words in the 31. num. Where he expressely teaches the same Truth which I have asser­ted in my Treatise. Heare him speaking his judgement, De privatis hominibus semper loquor: Nam si qui nunc sunt populares magistratus ad [Page 55] moderandum Regum libidinem constituti (quales olim erant, qui Lacedemonijs regibus oppositi erant, Ephori, aut Romanis Consulibus, Tribuni plebis; aut Atheniensium Senatui, Demarchi; & qua e­tiam forte potestate (ut nunc res habent) funguntur in singulis regnis tres ordines, cum primarios conventus peragunt) adeo illos fenocienti Regum licentiae pro officio intercedere non veto, ut si Re­gibus impotenter grassantibus, & humili plebeculae insultantibus con­niveant, eorum dissimulationem nefaria perfidia non carere affir­mem, quia populi libertatem cui se, Dei ordinatione, Tutores positos norunt, fraudulenter produnt. He is cleare, that the Estates in Par­liament, not only may, but are Gods ordinance for it, and are bound to resist, and not suffer the destruction of liberties, by exorbitating Princes; so that I may justly retort the Doctors words, p. 57. There can be no­thing spoken more plainly for the power of resistance in the Houses of Parliament then this.

Then for his other reason from the 18. verse, Ye shall cry out in that day, and the Lord will not heare you. As in my Treatise I called it in­consequent; so also now: He is a good Logician which can draw his conclusion out of those premises. But he blames me, p. 58. for saying it was an absolute Monarchy, and cannot see how it can be so, according to my description of absolutenesse. Why not? In Absolute Monarchy, there are no limits but the Monarchs own will; but these had a fixed judiciall Law, p. 59. I answer, That judiciall Law was no limits of their power; but of the exercise only; for the non observance of it by the King did not amount to an untying of the bond of subjection in the people. The Judiciall Laws being from God, not from any contract of the people, were in the same nature to that people, and for the time, with the Morall Laws; and in the same manner did limit their Kings, and no otherwise. But for the Absolutenesse of that Monarchy, here Lyra (more faithfully cited,Lyra, in 1 Sam. 8. then he did Calvin above) Constitutio Regis juxta potestatem sibi concessum est duplex.) 1. Plena & legibus absoluta, prout legiste de Imperatore dicere solent. 2. Cum potestate li­mitata. Now sayes he, the people sinned, not simply in asking a King; but in asking a King of the first sort, to judge them as the Nations, that is, absolutely. He is expresse. 1. That limitation of power makes a limi­ted Monarch. 2. That Israel desiring such a Government as the adja­cent Nations, desired an absolute Monarch. And indeed as the define­ment of the morall Law doth not disparage the Absolutenesse of the [Page 56] Monarch, because it is from God, not the people; so did not their judi­ciall, for the same reason.

Sect 2 Next he comes to the peoples rescue of Jonathan, p. 60. He may give their resolute Oath what names pleaseth him, a loving importu­nate violence, a souldierly boldnesse, or the like; it was a peremptory expression of no lesse then an intent of resistance, in case there had been need. Then for Davids purpose in having armed men about him; He says it was only to secure his person against the cut-throates of Saul, that is, against his private Emissaries. But who sees not a large difference betweene securing a mans selfe from private Emissaries, and appea­ring in the field with Armies against the Armies of the Prince, p. 61. Answer, 1. It is against reason, that he should retaine an Army of 600. valiant Souldiers, yea a great Army, like the Host of God, 1 Chron. 12.22. to secure himselfe meerely against private Emissaries. 2. Let us grant him that there is a difference between securing against private Emissaries, and the open Army: yet if he grant it lawfull to use force against one, he grants the cause by it, of all; for a warrant from an act of the Kings will is as valid to secure a few Emissaries, as a whole Ar­my: and Gods Ordinance in one man, is no more resistible, then in a multitude. Then for Davids intent to keep Keylah against Saul, it is so evident, by the history, that I will say no more about it; but doe refer him to that which the Pleaders for defensive Armes say about it. The Doctor seeks divers evasions, to get out of the reach of this ex­ample; but doth not satisfie himselfe, much lesse others, and therefore adds the fourth on which he must rest when all is said, That Davids example was extraordinary: Hereon he brings some things in him which were extraordinary; We grant it in many things; but we de­ny it in this. If the Doctor will prove him to have a speciall priviledge to resist Gods ordinance in his Soveraign, more then other men; he must bring the grant and warrant for it: otherwise David must come under the common condition for this matter: He himselfe acknow­ledges he had none for violating the person of his Prince; and sure then he had none for violating the Authority of his Prince, conferred on pri­vate Emissaries, if they had any. But in his p. 65. He layes hard at me, and challengeth not only my Reason for calling this a shufling An­swer, but also my ingenuity, who confesse the people in that Government might not resist; and yet doe urge these examples for Resistance. An­swer, 1. For my Reason: I have made it appeare I have reason to call [Page 57] it so; is it not a meere evasion, to affirme in him an extraordinary priviledge, and can bring no word, nor warrant for it? 2. For my ingenuity it is without cause challenged by him; for from the lawfull­nesse of Resistance of unreasonable Acts of will, in an absolute Monar­chy, where Reason is the Princes law; I may a fortiori conclude the lawfulnesse of resisting of instruments of illegall Acts in a limited Mo­narchy, where the Law of the Land is the Princes Law and bounds.

CHAP. VIII. The 8. Section concerning Resistance forbidden, Rom. 13. answered.

NOw we are come to his principall strength against Resistance out Sect. 1 of Rom. 13. From whence nothing can be collected against any Resistance, but that which is of the Powers, of the Ordinance: but that which I defend is of neither of them, therefore I have no cause to feare his inferences from that Text. Now supposing the truth which I have made good, that in a limited State the limitation is of the Power it selfe, and not only of the exercise; it followes evidently that in such a State resistance of destructive instruments, is neither of Power nor Gods Ordinance. I might therefore well omit that which at large here he speakes of Resistance of the Powers. The first part of the Section is spent in replying to the Exceptions of the Reverend Divines. The first thing I find which concernes me is, p. 77. I will therefore begin with him there. Where he accuseth me that in my 59, 64, and 66. page of that Treatise, I grant they might not resist in that Monarchy; but affirme that subjects may in this; and he brings me in giving two Reasons for it. 1. Because Religion was then no part of the Lawes, but here it is. 2. Because that was an Absolute Monarchy, this a Limited and mixed, p. 77. But may I not here challenge both the ingenuity and conscience of this Replyer. Did I ever grant that Gods Ordinance of Power might be resisted here; or give any Reasons for so unreasonable an Assertion? It would be tedious to repeate here, what I have said there. Let the Reader see; if he please. I will recite the summe. 1. The Doctor affirmed, that in the Apostles time the Senate of Rome might challenge more then our Parliaments can now, I denied it, and gave my reason, sc. That State was then devolved into a Monarchy by Conquest, &c. of this the Doctor speakes not a word, perhaps he is now ashamed of that comparison. 2. He said, there was greater cause of Resistance then, than now. I answered. There [Page 58] was then no cause at all: Not for Religion, being then, no part of the Law: Not Liberties; because then that was past, the Government changed; and an Oath taken of absolute subjection. Have I by these things granted a liberty of Resistance of Gods Ordinance to this peo­ple; and deny it to those? No; Neither They, nor We; not that en­slaved Senate; nor our free Parliaments, no cause, no priviledge can justifie this. Yea I ascribe more to Gods Ordinance of Power, then He: He sayes that in a limited state we owe only passive subjection to ex­ceeding commands of a Prince by promise limiting himselfe in the use of his power. I say; though he sin in exceeding such promise; yet we owe him also Active obedience in such commands which Gods Law forbids us not to be Active in. Neither doe I bring Doctor Bilsons testimony to prove that Religion was then no part of the Law, as he affirmes I doe, p. 77. but sure he neither heeded what I had written, nor what himselfe wrote. I laid down an Assertion that Gods Ordi­nance of which S^t Paul speakes, is the Power and the Person of him which is supremely invested with that Power; and for this did I bring D^r Bilson; who, explaining the Power there forbidden to be resisted, sayes it is the Princes will not against his Lawes; but agreeing to his Lawes. Here he serves D^r Bilson and other Divines, as before the King, and the Parliaments, teaches them a meaning contrary to their words: They meane such states as may by the knowne Laws use force­able restraint: No such meaning of his words: He makes no distin­ction of states; but expounds the Text in question, speaking of Gods Ordinance in generall, in all Rulers: He knowes it well enough; and therefore addes, They were willing to excuse as much as might be those motions of the Protestants in France and the Low-Countries; but had they lived now, they would have spoken more cautelously. That is, They spake rashly, wronged the truth, and reached their conscien­ces to excuse the commotions and rebellions of those dayes. This is like a Doctor. But he likes the Homilie better then them all, that speakes home, he sayes; but what, he speakes not, nor doe I answer. But he will try the force of this exception, because I professe, with M^r Bur­rowes, against Resisting of Authority though abused: And with D^r Bilson, admit of resisting the Princes will against the Lawes: This is fast and loose, sayes he. How so? In limited Monarchies, where the Prince hath no Authority beyond the Law: there an act beyond the Law is unauthoritative and meerely private; so that it is no abusing of [Page 59] Authority; but an exceeding of Authority. Authority abused to un­due acting of matters within its compasse, M^r Burrowes speakes of, and that must not be resisted. But the Princes will acting against his Law, that is matters without the compasse of Authority is not Gods ordinance, sayes D^r Bilson, and so may be rested in its instruments. I still say, let him prove such acts to proceed from Authority, I will dis­claime Resistance of their instruments, either the meanest Constable in the Land, or Souldier in the army. But how cloudes he this truth which is cleare as the day? 1. In that Government under which the Apostle lived, men might not resist, though the Powers commanded contrary to Law, as oft they did: Not under the Arrian Emperours, though religion was then a part of the law, p. 78. Answer, 1. D^r Ab­bot that learned Bishop of Sarum was of another judgement; De­monstrat. Antichrist, c. 7. In that Government he doth distinguish the Christians carriage according to the distinction of times. At first before Religion was established by Law, caedebantur, non caedebant, but after Constantines time when it was established by Law. Caede­bant, non caedebantur. 2. We may grant it in that Government, because it was absolute, and the Laws were to the Prince but morall limitations of exercise: And, as I have often acknowledged, Acts of the Princes will, exceeding such limitation, are potestative, and must not be resi­sted: but it will not follow that therefore they are so, in governments where the Laws are limitations of the power it selfe, and exceeding acts are not potestative. Sure in those times, as patient as the Christians were, under their persecutours, if their Religion and persons had been assaulted without Authority, they would have made Resistance: And this is all we affirme. 2. He makes two inquiries, 1. Whether the first Parliament in Qu. Elizabeths reigne might have resisted her endea­vours to change the established Religion? Answer, They had sinned in withstanding the introduction of truth, and the Abolition of Falshood; yet civilly and legally they might have done it: and abrogate a Law without the States she could not. But, blessed be God there was no such opposition; but a joynt consent of all three Legislative Powers. 2. How can the putting down of Episcopall Government, be now ju­stified which stands by Law? Answer; It cannot, unlesse there be a confluence of the consent of all three; nor doe I believe it is intended without the Kings consent, Unlesse their constant doctrine and pra­ctise to overthrow the liberties and Government of this Kingdome [Page 60] into Arbitrarines doe prove them in all their sort subversive, and incon­sistent with its safe being: Let therefore the Doctour and the rest of them looke how they continue to maintain such destructive Doctrins: for they will sooner remove themselves out of this Church, then the Subjects out of their ancient and just Liberties.

Sect 2 At length let us see what he sayes against the absolute condition of the Romane Emperours. His other exception is, they were absolute Mo­narches, and therefore not to be resisted, p. 79. Ans. He doth me mani­fest injury: See my Treatise, I no where so argue; nor have I any need; for I equally affirm it of limited, as of absolute power, that they ought not to be resisted; for they are equally Gods Ordinance, w^ch extends to the pow­ers that are: Neither have I any need of that distinction to satisfie the Apostles Text: I asserted not the absolutenesse of the Imperiall autho­ritie for any such reason: but against his false affirmation, That that Senate in S^t Pauls time, might challenge more then our great Councell can now. Here is apparent il dealing. But what can he oppose to what I said about the absolutenes of those Roman Emperours? 1. It cannot be cleared that they were de jure absolute. An. Yes, it can; according to the Doctors own grounds; for, 1. There was a full Conquest made by Julius Caesar in that fatall battell against Pompey not only of him;Seneca. cō ­sol ad Mar­ciam. but in and with him, of the whole Senate, for in eo prima acies senatus fuit, says Seneca. And the strugling remainders of the free Senate were again vanquished in that battle of Octavius against Cassius and Brutus. From that time all being prostrate to his Will. 2. There was a submission to an Absolute yoake. Romae ruere in servitium Consules, Annal. l. 1. s [...]. Patres, Eques, says Tacitus: yea the Se­nate was so forward to it, that Tiberius was wont to say, as oft as he went out of the Court,Ib. l. 3 s 11 O homines ad servitutem natos! 3. There was also an establishment of this subjection by an Oath: for the Senate and Armies were brought under the same bond; and all this before S^t Pauls conversion. That which he brings out of latter Authours, p. 80. of the Lex regia, quâ populus principi omne suum imperium & potesta­tem contulit: and his conjectures of it's not being before Vespasians time, is not worth a looking into: It was a formall complement of flattery to give that to him in words, which he had in power and Ʋse so many yeares before. Also that of their forbearing the Diadem and Title of King, being contented only with that of Prince, was but the putting on a silken vaile upon a rough government. Vnder that smooth Title the people and Senate were held as much under, as the [Page 61] grand seigneur or Persian now hold their Vassals. But they did perquam aiu magnam potestatis partem cum senatu communicare, p. 80. They did so; 'Twas their indulgence, or rather policie to impart it. It is affir­med, not by uncertaine Collections of late Authours; but by Taci­tus, who is instar omneum in this businesse;Annal. l. 1. s. 1. l. 3. s. 10. of Augustus the first and best of them all, Posito Triumviri nomine, consulem se ferens, insurgere paulatim, munia Magistratuum, senatus, Legum inse trahere; and of Tiberius, that imaginem antiquitatis senatui praebebat. They conveyed their will through the old channell of the Senate, that it might relish the better with the people; yet at pleasure did what they listed, by them, and against them. 2. He sayes, The Apostle in his reason a­gainst Resistance hath no respect to the absolute or limited condition of those Roman Emperours. Nor doe I say, he hath: the Reason he ur­geth is the Ordinance of God, which is true without distinction of the whole latitude of Power. 3. A limited condition doth no more in­ferre a lawfullnesse of resistance for exorbitances, then an Absolute, p. 82. I say not, that it doth; no condition can inferre a lawfulnesse of Re­sistance of the Power, though abused; but here is the priviledge of a people under a limited Monarch, his exceeding Acts are not abuses of Power; but simply non potestative; and therefore their Agents may be resisted, without resisting the power; which is not so in an absolute Rule; if there were no priviledge, why did men trouble themselves in constituting Limitations, and Mixtures in a State: In a word, un­lesse he can prove Power in all Limited States, to be illimited: and all the Acts of will in the supreme to flow from Gods Ordinance: He la­bours in vain from that text, or any else to conclude against Resistance of subversive Instruments in a mixed Government.

CHAP. IX. His ninth Section Answered: the Reasons against Resistance satisfied: and those for Resistance vindicated.

WE are now come to his last Section: In examination of which Sect. 1 it will appeare that he hath as little Reason as Scripture a­against that Resistance which I have asserted in my Treatise. Herein he doth two things. 1. Brings his Reasons against Resistance. 2. En­deavours to answer those which I brought for it. But for more evi­dent proceeding about both, we must distinctly call to mind the Que­stion, of what it is. 1. It is of Resistance in this state; that is, a state [Page 62] which I have proved to be limited and mixed in the very power it selfe. 2. It is only of Resistance of destructive Instruments: Therefore if his Reasons doe not reach to such a Resistance, they are not to the pur­pose.

Now against Resistance the Doctour brings no fewer then nine Reasons; In his first booke he had only five, here he hath made up in number, what they wanted in weight. I will in few words answer them distinctly, for many need not. 1. His first is from the wisdom of God putting his people under Kings, without power of Resistance; this should be to us instead of a most forceable Reason, p. 84. Answ. Well it may be instead of one; but it is not one. For 1. It was their desire to be under an Absolute Government, as their neighbour Countries were; and they offended God in it, as Lyra observes; therefore he giving them such a King as they desired; did not in his wisdome in­tend a binding forme for all people: I thinke the Doctour will not af­firme he did. 2. If he meane Resistance of their Prince his Autho­rity and person, I grant they were so put under; and so are we, and all that are put under Monarches; but if he mean the Acts of the Prin­ces will which were not Authoritative; I do denie it, and the former alledged instances prove they were not: and that is all I affirme in o­ther Monarchies.

2. The word of God gives no direction for it. The Prophets call not on the Elders for it: The new Testament commends patience in suffering for well-doing, Answ. 1. In Civill matters negative reasonings from Scrip­ture are not proving. 2. The word gives proving and imitable ex­amples for it, as before: and indeed the Scripture doth every way ju­stifie resistance of cut-throats and private destructive Assaulters of Laws and Liberties, who have no Authority derived to them; and I defend no other.

3. The Apostle forbids Resistance of the Powers, not from any compact of the people, but from the Ordinance of God. 'Tis true: for no com­pact of people could establish an unresistible Power without the Ordi­nance of God. I acknowledge the Apostles ground for it: and there­fore allow no resistance where there is Gods Ordinance to secure them, not for any abuse.

4. To be supreme and next to God implies a security from Resistance, p. 85. I grant all; His Person, his Power is hereby secured: I condemn all rising up against the King: but instruments of subversion, have no­thing [Page 63] of the King in them: not his person nor Authoritie is risen up a­gainst in them. For his conceits about jus Regis I have said enough above. Neither doe I give to the Houses the power of the Lacedemo­nian Ephori. They had an Authority over the very person of the King: which the Houses claime not. I give them no more then Cal­vin doth to the three Estates in their generall meetings. The Doctor well knowes what I will answer him; which he seeks to evade, 1. By affirming that the Resisting of Instruments acting by his Power, which he hath committed to them, is a resisting of him, p. 86. 'Tis true, it is so; but we speake of instruments, which act not by his power, that is, his Authoritie; but by his will in a course exceeding the Limitation of his Authority. Could he prove that a limited Prince could commit Power to doe acts without the bounds of his Power, the Question were an­swered, els he beggs it, but answers it not. 2. He would desire me to look again upon the two Assertions of the Reverend Divines which I reject: He cannot conceive, how I can retaine my owne Assertion, and reject theirs. The Doctour hath a great mind to pick some contradiction in me; but still failes in his endeavour. In good earnest, doth he speake really, when he sayes, he cannot conceive, &c. Well, let us looke a­gaine on the two Assertions which I reject in them. 1. Governours who under pretence of Authoritie from Gods Ordinance disturbe the quiet and godly life, are farre from being Gods Ordinance in so doing. 2. This tyrannie not being Gods Ordinance, they which resist it even with armes, resist not the Ordinance of God. Doe I defend any Assertions e­quivalent to these. Rather I assert in that Treatise, and here also the contrary. 1. Governours whither in absolute or limited States, keeping within the measure of their power, may disturbe the quiet and godly life, and yet be Gods Ordinance in that act, though crossing the end of Gods Ordi­nance in it. 2. Powers though abused, yet being Gods Ordinance, they which resist even in abusive acts of it, resist the Ordinance of God. Is here no difference? Cannot I retaine this Assertion, that exceeding Acts in limited Monarchie are not Gods Ordinance, and may in in­struments be resisted: And yet reject theirs, who maintain resistance of Governours themselves, in all acts of abused power? He makes no dif­ference between Acts exceeding bounds of power: and Acts of abused power: but of this more then enough before. 3. But he will answer more particularly, so he had need. What is it? He that beares the sword, that is, has the supreme Power, gives Commission to under-Ministers for [Page 64] Justice; and to other Officers for the Militia: If therefore the Resistance of those though abusing their Power, be a resistance of the Power; so it is also of these. Answ. I grant all: for it proceeds only of Ministers a­busing Power committed to them: not of Excesses of Power. I will retort it. Like as if when the supreme gives Commission of Justice to a Judge; and he exceeding unto Acts without the compasse of his Com­mission is but a private man in those Acts and may be resisted: so if Commission of Armes be given to a Generall, &c.

5. Subjection is due to a Prince, and the contrary forbidden without di­stinction of a good and bad Prince. I grant it, and give the reason, be­cause they are Gods Ordinance: but the Question is of instruments of exceeding Acts, in which they are not Gods Ordinance.

6. Good reason that he which hath the supreme Trust, should have the greatest securitie, p. 87. Answ. It is so; and so we grant him: for he hath a full security from all violence for both Person and Authoritie, what ever exorbitance he breakes out unto. The people have not so: Every Subject being under the penalty of the Law for it's transgressi­ons. But the Doctor forgets his Clients, He is not arguing for secu­ritie of Soveraignes; but Subiects, if they may be so called, which en­deavour to subvert lawes and governments. But may we not also say, as it is good reason the supreme should have the greatest securitie; so the people also should have some securitie; and not be exposed like bruit beasts to the savage lusts of every instrument of cruelty: having only this to comfort them, that they sin in so doing? and so they doe, which with cruelty destroy even the bruit creatures.

7. From the end and benefits of Government, for the enioying of which, it is good reason we should beare with the exorbitances. Still he speakes good reason; but nothing to the purpose; for we dispute not of exor­bitances of them who have the power; but of them who have no pow­er for what they doe. In exorbitances of lesser nature, their will may secure instruments; but it is against reason that the benefits we have by their Government should cause us to beare with them who would destroy their laws and government, for of such is the Question. I won­der here againe he brings Calvin, when he cannot but know that he is expressely for power of Resistance in the Houses: and no doubt P. Martyr, and the rest follow Calvin in this.

8. Power of Resistance in Subiects would be a remedie worse then the disease, and more subversive of a State, then if it wore left without it, p. 90. [Page 65] Why would it be so? It would be a continuall Seminary of jealousies twixt Prince and people, and confusion through the continuance of the mis­chiefes of Warre. Concerning this Argument of his, see p. 60. of my Treatise, where it is fully satisfied. 1. Who will believe the power of Resisting destructive instruments, should be more destructive, then to let them alone without Resistance? 2. Suppose by abuse of this pow­er those evils should happen (for it so fals out to the best physicke, where the nocumentous humours are prevailing) yet this is but by accident: such Power per se and of its owne nature tends to the pre­venting of subversion. On the contrary by woefull experience, this Doctrine of the unresistiblenesse of such men, hath nursed up a brood of audacious projectours, and where it is taught, a state will never be without them. Whereas, if the Truth were knowne it would re­fraine the spirits of wicked men from paracide and State subversion. Neither can any thing be more mischievous, then to teach an impuni­tie for projectours, and Agents of mischiefe: and he hath not the rea­son of a man who argues otherwise. 3. Neither can this doctrine, as the Replier traduces it, extend to the deposing of Princes, or the de­minishing of their Authority, for it concernes only their Instruments, not their Persons; their Absolute, extra-legall Will; not their Au­thority. And for iealousies, they will be more bred by that Doctrine which gives the Prince a Power to undoe the State, then by that which terminates both; and gives neither a power to subvert the other; Danger is the nurse of jealousie: that which takes away power of hur­ting takes away Danger; and so removes iealousies: but indeed such which have a plot of breaking up the hedge of Government, and bringing lawlesse powers into a State, care not for having such a Po­wer in those Houses whom it would cause them to feare, and looke on with continuall jealousies. The Homily of Rebellion is in vaine ci­ted against that which is no rebellion.

9. The last and weakest of all is that of the hearts of Kings being in Gods hands, Prov 21.1. and that of Gods Covenant with David and his seed, 2 Chron. 6.16. & 7.17. How the Doctor can draw hence a con­clusion against Resistance of subversive instruments, I cannot imagine. Sure if these Texts had any proving force in them, they had not been brought so late: Rather then place had been in the former Section, where in the close he saies, He chose onely to insist on those Texts which are fit to beare argument but here he hath broke his word, yet he is ex­cusable, for he had no better.

[Page 66] Sect. 2 At length he comes to my Arguments brought for Resistance. If they be not more concluding then his, would they had never seen the light, nor come to the eye of any judicious man. Let us see what he hath to say to them.

1. That Resistance is lawfull which is no Resistance of the Ordi­nance of God; but this of subversive instruments is not, being neither of the Person nor Authority of the Prince. He sayes, He hath propo­sed and answered this above under his third and fourth Reasons. And there I doubt not but the invaliditie of his Answer doth plainly appeare.

2. Without this Power of Resistance all limitation of Govern­ment is vaine; and all formes resolve into that which is arbitrary. He tels me, My Argument is inconsequent by my owne description of Abso­lute Monarchie: so that the restraint of a limited Monarch is Legall and Morall, not forceable and Military, p. 93. I answer, I describe li­mited and Absolute Monarchie not by Force; but the having or not having a bounds of Will; but how absurd it is when the distinctive con­ceit in the definition of a limited Monarch, is a Law terminating his will to take it of a morall terminating, which is common to all, not only Monarches but men? Especially sith I explaine my selfe so fully afterwards, as I doe, there p. 7. in the three degrees of absolutenesse. But I have above enough discovered the fraud and falshood of his con­founding of Legall and morall Limitation; and have prooved that to give a Limited Monarch only a morall Limitation, is to resolve all into Absolute and Arbitrary, for the most absolute under heaven hath morall limitation.

3. Such Power is due to a publique State for its preservation which is allowed to a particular person. He answers, this is not universally true. Why not? a State is more worthy, and comprehends a multi­tude of particular men: doth number detract from their priviledge? He would seeme to have reason for his deniall: A private man hath by the law of nature power of selfe-preservation against the force of another private man; yet is this power yeelded up in regard of Civill Power, and not to be used against persons indued with such power, p. 94. 1. He still speakes Truth; but not to the Question: which is not of persons indued with civill power; but such as we have proved to have no power; grant them en­dued with power, neither a particular man: or a whole Community must resist them: but having none, it is much more allowable in a publique state, then a particular person. 2. He speakes of a power yeelded up, [Page 67] as if in all governments the people doe simply yeeld up all power of Resistance into a full subjection unto all Acts of the Princes will: Whereas we have prooved, that in limited Governments it is not so: but to the Princes Will measured and regulated by a Law; and there­fore they have that power still, in respect of all instruments of acts of Will not so regulated.

But it is observable, that p 95. the Doctour is beaten off from his owne grounds, and yeelds up in the Close of his booke a full Victory to Truth. Which will appeare if we looke backe to his first booke, and Sect. 1. where he proposeth the Question in his own termes, whi­ther if a King be bent or seduced to subvert Religion, Laws and Liberties, Subjects may take up armes and resist. He undertakes to maintaine the Negative; and here was the beginning of the controversie. Now see in this Replie how he is sunck and stollen off from that which he un­dertooke to defend; and upon the matter grants us the Cause. For, 1. By bent or seduced to subvert, he tels us, he means not a purpose of the mind, but doing many Acts arbitrarily tending to subuersion; as if he would yeeld, that (supposing him bent, that is purposing and inten­ding it in his mind and course) he might be resisted. 2. Nay, by [bent to subvert] he does not meane so much as Acts subversive; but onely Acts tending to subversion of themselves; for the frame of govern­ment and Lawes cannot be subverted without the consent of the two Houses. So that now the Question is rather, Whither subversion be possible by such instruments; then whether their Resistance be lawfull: Sure it were pitty to disturbe them by Resistance in an impossible worke: Let them run on rather till they see their owne vanity and folly: but sup­pose they should bring it to passe; then it would be too late to come to this Doctor and tell him, he was deceived, and did deceive. Cer­tainly those great Polititians who have had this designe in mana­ging so many yeares, are not of his mind. Yea, suppose it can­not be done without the consent of the Houses; yet the Doctour can tell us in another case, that where there is an unresistible power, Consent cannot long be wanting. What then; will he yeeld us a pow­er of Resistance, if we can proove such a designe possible?

Here also because the Doctor sayes this liberty which I allow a State for its preservation, tends rather to its subversion, p. 94. and every where calumniates me as an inducer of confusion, and Anarchie, and my Assertions as opening a way to Rebellion. It concernes me effectual­ly [Page 68] to vindicate my selfe, and the truth which I maintaine from these as­persions; and make it appeare that the power of Resistance I defend is not a remedy worse then the disease of subversion. Which I can doe no better way, then by a positive setting downe the naked truth which I averre in this and the former Treatise; and shew how it shuts up every way to these evills which he layes uncharitably to my charge. 1. I assert no forceable Resistance in any case but subversive and ex­treme. 2. Subversive and extreme cases respect either particular men; or the whole state and Government. For particular men even in ex­treme cases of state or life, I allow no publike Resistance: but appeale if it may be had; or if not, yet no publike Resistance: for whether the wrong be done him by inferiour or superiour Magistrates, either it is, 1. Under forme and course of Law, and power committed them; and then to resist, is to resist the power. 2. Or without all forme and course of Law and power committed to them: and then a man values his state and life too high, to make publike resistance, and bring on the state a generall disturbance for his private good, and sins, though not against Gods ordinance of Power, in this case, yet against the publike peace and weale. For the whole state or government, and the last cases of its sub­version, of which the Doctor puts the Question. 1. I condemne all force used against the Person of the supreme, or his Power and Autho­rity in any inferiour Ministers thereof. 2. I averre not publike force­able resistance of Ministers of acts of will which are only actuall inva­sions, or excesses of limitation; and not such as plainly argue a bent of subversion, and apparent danger thereof, if prevention be not used: so that the Doctor goes from the Question, and comes home to me, when he sayes here that he speakes only of the former sort. 3. I affirme not force in this utmost case to be assumed by private men against destru­ctive instruments of the Princes will: as if any man were warranted on his own imagination of publike danger to raise forces for preven­tion. But the Courts of Justice, and especially the supreme Court, to whom the conservation of Government and Law is committed, and a Power not only to resist, but also censure and punish its violaters, much more its subverters without regard of number or warrant, (The Law supposing no warrant can be in such case) This is the power of Resi­stance which I have asserted: and it this be inducing of civill warre, or a way to subversion and Rebellion: It is a warre raised by defen­ders of Law, against subverters of Law: A Rebellion raised by Ma­gistrates [Page 69] having Authority, against instruments of arbitrarinesse having no authority: A resistance tending to subversion, but of none but subverters. 'Tis good reason then, it seemes, if destroyers grow to the number and strength of an Army, for Magistrates to let them alone, and not raise armes to suppresse them, lest they open a way to confu­sion and bring on the miseries of a civill Warre. This is the Doctors preservative Doctrine, and my contrary is destructive. 4. I argued from the end of the institution of the Houses, and their interest in ma­king Laws, and preserving the frame. He sayes this is grounded on my false supposall of their being joyned with the King in the very sove­raigne power, p. 96. Answer, I have justified that supposall; and ma­nifested his strange boldnesse in denying it against the Kings, and so many Parliaments direct affirmations; and desire the reader to take notice, that this is Calvins argument for Resistance, in the place above recited, how ever the Doctor doth make so light of it.

5. From the power of inferiour Courts to punish violaters of Law, though pretending a warrant of the Kings will for it. He sayes this Argument is inconsequent to prove power of raysing Armies to oppose the Forces of their Soveraigne. He hastens to a conclusion, and weighs not much what he answers. I say it concludes inevitably: for if the Kings warrant to violate Law, will not priviledge one from force of justice, then not a hundred, not an Army of violaters. Their multitude makes the danger greater, and the Kingdome more unhappy; not Malefactors more priviledged. The forces of the Soveraigne in truth, are the Forces raised to defend his Government; not those which are raised to subvert it. They are his, which have his Authoritative will; not those which have only his arbitrary. If ever Reasons did demon­strate a truth, I am confident these five have made good, The power of the estates in Parliament to resist subversive instruments, be they more or fewer.

Thus have I traced this Authour through his Reply; and whether Sect. 3 I have not sufficiently vindicated my Treatise from it, I referre my selfe to the conscience of every one who hath the understanding of a judicious man; and the impartiality of a just man. In my cap. 8. is a moderate debate of the present contention; and divers Petitions ten­ding to pacification if it had been possible: but he toucheth not on that chapt. His discourse shewes him to have nothing to doe with Mo­deration; nor doth desire Peace, but on the termes of a full dedition [Page 80] into the hands of subversive instruments. I have done with him: He resolved, I Answered. He hath replyed. I have returned on it. I am even with him; and in truth above him, I am sure. Now I desire to spin out this contention no longer. Yet if he, or any else please to re­joyne, I wish he would save himselfe, and me a labour: to let alone the booke; and deale only with the 4^th; and 5^th Chapters concerning the Doctors supposals; if he can make good them; and invalidate mine, as much as in me lieth, I will yeild him the cause: but I judge it im­possible, if I know what is impossible. The God of spirits allay the spi­rits of men from this extreme opposition: And give such a issue to these wofull warrs, that the scepter of Christ, the Gospell of Peace may be fully submitted to and maintained by a King enjoying inviolate his due soveraignty; and a People their due and lawfull liberties, Amen.