The Divine RIGHT and ORIGINAL OF THE Civill Magistrate From GOD, [As it is drawn by the Apostle S. Paul in those words, Rom. 13.1. There is no Power but of God: the Powers that be are ordained of God] Illustrated and Vindicated In a Treatise (chiefly) upon that Text.

WHEREIN The procedure of Political Dominion from God, by his Ordination; The direct line by which the said Ordination descendeth from him upon the person of the Magistrate, And the way of such a persons becoming and claiming thereby to be the Power in the Text, which is of God, ordained of God, is endevored truly and plainly to be laid open.

Written for the service of that eminent Truth, Or­der, Justice, and Peace which the said Text, in its genuine sense, holdeth forth, and supporteth: And for the dissolving of sundry important Doubts, and mistakes about it.

By Edward Gee Minister of the Gospel at Eccleston in the County Palatine of Lancaster

Zanchius de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. Ad verum enim, legitimum, liberum (que) dominatum constituendum ne­cessarium est liberum, absolutum (que) jus, libera, absolutá (que) potestas, quā Graeci [...] vocant, quâ res quarum dominatū quaeris Tuae fiant

London, Printed for George Eversden, at the Maiden­head in Pauls-church-yard, 1658

THE Diuine Right and ORIGINALL of the ciuill MAGISTRATE from God. Illustrated and Vindicated

By Edward Gee

Sould by Geo: Euersden at ye Maidenhead in St. Paules Church yard

[...]

2. Sam: 18

2. Sam: 20

THE PREFACE.

THis Treatise (it must be confessed) Sect. 1 hath undertaken, as a high, and weighty, so a tender, and quick­sented Subject. Insomuch that at the first blush peradventure the subject may be lookt upon as a burdensome stone, and the discourse upon it as pregnant with an ob­lique design.

To anticipate such unmerited surmises, let me at this threshold advertise the Rea­der, that this Treatise handleth its subject, held forth in the Title, and not the persons of any, nor the interests of any. And its subject is a general truth, or a Scripture-Maxime of perpetual, and commune autho­rity, concernment, and use.

It is true, every such general verity hath its descent to particulars; and hath its con­sequences, both of obligation, and eviction. But, let every man take heed how he buildeth [Page] thereupon; that is, what consequences he draweth thence, what particulars he redu­ceth thereto. Such inferences, and such re­ferences are made by the discourse of man; and are variable according to the ability, or disposition men have to reason. And they all come to this reckoning. They are either native, genuine, and virtually com­prised in the general axiome; or they are aliene, and but imposed. What is genuine to such an abstract Truth, or Doctrine it self will own, as it will also the assertors of it, neither needs the weakest, or lowest avower of it distrust its patronage. But neither it, nor the hand that holds forth it, and no more stands chargeable with either deductions from, or reductions to it, which are of others collection, or effi­ction.

Such a Scripture canon as this, is like the Sun which scatters its light, and beams every way, and upon all: and all its rayes are ever most sound and pure: not one stricture of its influx (whatever Astrolo­gers tell us) h [...]th the least corrupt, or malignant tincture. If any fetide vapor be either discovered, or raised thereby, we must not blame the sun for shining; the rise thereof is from the earth, and the ascent is by its repercussion of the sun-beam, and not from the sun, by any direct emission. And if the sun-rayes conduce by reflexion either to the detection, or drawing up of [Page] any such matter, the earth may fault it self for the breed of such an exhalation, but thank the sun both for the said discovery, and extraction.

That the whole discussion of the follow­ing book is precisely bounded within the premised compasse, and taketh in no more then generall truth, either comprised within the text, or relating to it, I leave the per­usal of it to manifest. And for the intenti­on of the Author, he professeth solemnly, as in the divine presence, and with recog­nition of his giving an account hereof be­fore the same, that (exception of indelibe­rate, and unallowed motions of self-seeking, partiality, and such other incident to hu­mane nature (as now depraved) being ad­mitted) the sole speciall, and immediate aime by him consented unto, proposed and fixed, to be the clearing up of the important doctrine of that Text, and in it the satisfacti­on of conscience: and for more remote, and general ends, those to be no other but such resultancies of this labour as all sorts of lookers into this book will confess to wish and approve.

If it come forth after notable revolutions of State have newly been, or while some Trepidations, or grudgings of distemper, growing upon such occasion, do remain; the Author could not think the publicati­on for that lesse seasonable, or useful And further considereth that the holy Apostle [Page] Paul lived in a time of as great Common­wealth differences and changes, nevertheless he had the confidence, and his prudence di­rected him to write, and publish the politi­call assertions, and precepts, among which the Text lyeth, and is one; and this his writing not only passed (for any thing I presume appears from antiquity) without ill construction of either Superiors or Sub­jects, but doubtlesse was very sutable, ac­ceptable, and advantageous to the Christi­ans, for both their resolution and vindica­tion in the matter it concerns. The like (in its measure) me thinks should a discourse now be, that medleth no further then with an enquiry into the sense of his Text, and dealeth but with the termes of it, and with the expositions, doubts, and arguments that have been upon it; without the least application to, or bringing into question, the title unto the warrant of this Scripture, of any in place of power, or any other person now extant in the world. This man­ner of processe the Author promiseth in this Treatise: and doth thereupon expect in some proportion (though with abatement, for the worsenesse of this age in comparison of the Apostles, and for the far greater disparity of the persons writing) the like successe.

It is certain that when the Apostle com­posed this Epistle, there had been lately, and about the same time were divers contests about soveraignty, and transversions of [Page] Government within the Roman Dominion; some about the whole, others about some parts, or provinces of it: and concerning them there were opposite sidings, and dissa­tisfactions among the people.

There were about, and presently upon the writing of this Scripture several competi­tions for the Empire. Galba in Spain is raised up by Julius Vindex against Nero; and he being confirmed by the Senate, and Nero suppressed, presently Vitellius is set up against Galba. And after Galbas violent death Otho is made Emperour at Rome, whilest Vitellius stands up in Germany. Otho being quickly gone, Vespasian is promoted in Egypt, and Judea; and the competition betwixt Vitellius and him is prosecuted by the sword in Italie, and even in the City of Rome (whither this Epistle was sent) and that with diversity of successe vicissitudinarily to both parties. As to particular Provinces; Vologeses the Parthian takes Armenia from the Romans; thence grew wars betwixt the invader, and the in­vaded. In Judea the Jewes generally rebel against the Roman, and set up an Autonomie. In England the Britains seise on the Roman Colony at Camalodunum (or Maldon in Essex) cut off the Roman Souldiers, and possesse themselves of it. It may be deemed there were Christians in all these controverted places, and under each of the respective contestants. It is certain by Scripture there were in Jewry. And to let passe what [Page] Dorotheus his Synopsis tels us of the Apostle Thomas his preaching the Gospell in Parthia, Media, and Persia; Josephus witnesseth the conversion to Christianity of many in Par­thia Joseph. Ant. lib. 18 cap. 12.; and it is noted out of Augustine that the first Epistle of St. John was called anci­ently the Epistle to the Parthians Dr. Ham­mond in pre­face to that Epistle..

The Christians that then were at Rome, and in those other places were concerned ei­ther as Souldiers, or Subjects in these com­motions, and counterseisures: and as there is no question but they made this concern­ment a matter of conscience, so there is little doubt but they, or some of them, espe­cially in the beginnings of those severall contests, and mutations were scrupled in conscience which way to take. Our query concerning them is not which of the Col­litigants respectively they were to own and obey as their Soveraign Magistrate (for I shall not take in hand the interest of parti­cular persons, to debate the justnesse of any of their causes, or titles) but, what stan­dard, rule, or light of Gods word they had to go by, and by which to determine what to do under the scruple and temptation of contrary demanders of their subjection and assistance. If anything were delivered to them by this Apostle, or any other of their instructions that is not in holy writ we have no record or notice of that: but within the compasse of those Scriptures which were directed to any such Christians in those [Page] times there is none (I think it will be ac­knowledged) so likely to be written for that use, or to afford ground, and matter for their guidance therein as this; wherein the Magistrates authority is not only asserted, but derived, and defined; and as to them, so it may be to others in any the like case.

Having given this account of the subject, Sect. 2 and of the manner of handling it in this Treatise; I shall now touch upon the in­ducements leading to it. In the doing of this, though I shall reflect something upon the late passed occurrents, yet it shall only be on such as are free, and of common appli­cation, not any thing personall, or be­longing to any one party singled out from the rest.

The great subject of debate, difference, exagitation, and contrivement in the late Commotions, that which the most stir hath been about is the matter of Authority. Divers other things, indeed, have (scarce any thing but hath) been in dispute with some, or other. No principle so plain, no right so manifest, but some have been to stand up in question or contradiction of it. But in all the controversies that have risen, there is nothing (to my observation) that hath been so universally, really, and conti­nuedly insisted on as this matter of Power. This hath been singled out as the Helena [Page] of contention, the bone of strife, the hall of litigious agitation, and that which men may be noted to have most generally, cordially, and constantly prosecuted. The Controver­tists, and unquiet spirits in the modern Perturbations, when they have had their short velitations, their slight skirmishes in other points, they have ordinarily set­led, centred, and joyned issue in this subject.

This may be observed by a transient view of the debates in their severall kinds. They have been various both for the manner of managing, and for the matter concerned. For the manner of managing, some have been military, some mentall; some in the field, others in the closet; some acted by the hand, others by the head; some by the sword, others by the pen. But in all these wayes, whatsoever hath been first started, or begun with, the staires of Superiority, and Dignity have been the thronged and beaten rode, the garland of honour, the common and standing mark which the aimes, and altercations of men have at length fixed upon.

And for the matter concerned, some of the differences have been of a Religious, others of a Civill importance. Those in Re­ligion have been either betwixt the Roma­nists, and the Protestants, or of these latter among themselves.

For Popish controversies, the distinct [Page] discussion of the many points of Faith, and Religion (each whereof had formerly its particular, and exact traverse) is now re­duced in a manner to this as the only or main head, the power of the Pope, to wit, the prerogatives of his Crown, and Chair, or the universality, and supremacy of Juris­diction, and the infallibility of judgement he claimeth over the whole world, or over all Christian States and consciences.

In the latter, those of the Protestants among themselves; many uncouth, and He­terodox tenents, and bickerings about the same, there have been raised, especially in these Islands: but the thing which (I think) hath abidden most contention (the most both for the multitude, and vehemency of con­tenders) and which hath been still held up, and disceptations have been continuedly (under some, or other notion) renewed about it, is the matter of Church Order, and Ecclesiasticall Power. One while the que­stion hath referred to the Forme of Go­vernment; another while it hath been about the Censures in the Church, their warrant, kindes, or extent; another while about the Maintenance, another while about the Office and calling of the Ministry.

And for matters Civill, though the oppo­sitions therein were begun upon severall in­terests, as about Laws, about Property, about Liberty, and about Magistratical Prerogative, and Power; yet at length this last hath [Page] taken the place of all the rest, and set it self up alone. And in the upshot, what have the crosse devisings, and debates of mens heads, and tongues fixed upon? and about what have their conflicting, and counterworking hands all clasped, but this rocky Pyramis of worldly power?

Sect. 3 As it cannot be denyed that the conten­tions about this above all others have pro­ved the most generall, violent, multiplying, and lasting; so perhaps it will not be whol­ly impertinent to consult a little what may be the cause, or how it comes to passe so to be. Something, as the reason or rise of this may be observed, in the nature of the thing it self; something in man; and something in what may be probably apprehended to be the fate, or predicted lot of the present times.

In the nature of the thing it self, we may take notice, not only that it is a matter of humane temporall interest (about which through the earthlinesse of men, and every ones partiality of judgement, and immode­ration of affection to himself, men are most subject to precipitancy of passion, and daz­ling of reason, and consequently to mutu­all discord) but that it is that humane in­terest which of all others is most contro­vertible.

It is easie to see that the precepts, and relative duties comprehended in the fifth [Page] Commandement are more then any other of that table subject to diversity and oppo­sition of judgement, practise and claime. When our Saviour would give an instance of the Pharisees wide, and palpable variation from, and elusion of the sound sense of the Commandements of God, he made choice to do it in this of Honour tby Father and thy Mother. Mat. 15.3.

To note the Seminary and spring of this matter a little more particularly.

1. Every humane interest is so much ex­posed to Controversie as it is of worth, or concernment real or reputed. Now the du­ties, and rights of this commandement have in this respect the preeminency. Thence we may take it to be that they have the priority of place in the order of the precepts of the second Table; and deservedly, for the other Commandements of that Table give order about the adjuncts of man, but this dis­poseth of his person to a certain state, rela­tion, and personal obligation. The other Commandements respect each some one in­terest; this hath a supereminent influence upon all, to wit, for their securement to the proprietors, and the mutual communication of them to others behoof, by the superinten­dency of a superior respectively. The other Commandements provide for the interest of men as single, or severall persons, this pro­jecteth for them by and in society.

[Page]2. Another occasion of controversie is the peculiarity, or appropriation of a thing. What every man is in some proportion a partaker, or capable of (such are the mat­ters of the other Commandements) is not so exposed to emulation, and simulty, as what is confined to one, or a few, as is the state of Superiority in this Commandement. That which in this kinde can be owing, and payable only to one is usually desired, and many times claimed by many. It is observed that there were thirty competitors once on foot for one, and the same throne, to wit, that of the Roman Empire, who confounded one anotherSee Matth. Prideaux Pe­riod 4. Sect. 33. pag. 205. It was anno Christi 260. in the time of Galienus the Emperour.. And I think our age hath seen a greater number of aspirers for a nar­rower Territory. Now this comes to create both interruption to him that should re­ceive, and distraction to him that ought to pay duty: when the latter is to strive, not only with his own loathnesse to part with any honour, gain, or labour from himself to another, but with the doubts and dangers arising from contrariety of demandants. In such a case, to avoid wrong to another, and peril, and scruple to himself, to discern whose the right is, and duly to render it, how difficult a thing doth even he finde it whose minde is most honestly, and imparti­ally disposed: and if this cause such demurs, and distractions in an upright breast, how much more will it in partiall and self-intere­sted spirits, who are far the greater number?

[Page]3. It addeth to the controversarinesse of the subject of this Commandement, that the thing injoyned to be yeelded alwayes, or for most part is, that which is out of the hands of the proprietor, and in the hand of him that is to render it to him. Honour, we say, is in the honourer, and not in him that is to be honoured. Other Commandements do assert that to a man, that is, or may be alrea­dy in his occupation, but this attributes that which one man still hath to receive, ano­ther to part with. And besides, much of the return consists not in the transferring, but in the immanent act of him that yeelds it; in which kinde of matter there is prone to be on the one part (his that is to receive ad­vantage, or respect) forwardness, freeness, largenesse of expectation, and claim: on the other (his that is to expend, or part with duty) slowness, delay, and retentive­ness. In the former there is apt to be ca­villing, and jealousie: in the latter a pro­pensness to questioning, and grudging; on both sides an inclination to arbitrariness in favour of it self: all which are the next matter, and seed of division, and strife. So much of rise we find for this had Symptom in the thing it self.

2. But a greater, and stronger reason, or Sect. 4 root of this is in mans nature, viz a keen, and earnest appetite of Rule, which of all other desires in man is most common, and [Page] predominant. The incendiaries, and foment of all contentions among men (the Scri­pture teacheth us) are their lusts. Every man hath an armed, and fighting multitude of these in him ( [...]) But the leader of all these lusts;James 4.1. the com­mander, chief, and master of them is the de­sire of command, chieftainship, and master­dom. Ambition with greatest probability is conceived to have been the first sin, as well of degenerating man, as of the falling An­gels. This is the Captain, and so the most active and domineering of all other lusts; not only by virtue of its first entry (as Joab obtained the Generalship by being first in scaling the fort of the Jebusites;) but from hence, that man being a rationall creature, he would have himself, and others gover­ned by reason; and being in that faculty corrupt, & prejudicate, he esteems his own judgment, whatever it be, to be the only right, and sound reason; and therefore most worthy to take place, and give order to all others. And moreover, this affection hath no little nourishment in him from the sense of the consequents, or attendants on Superiority, which are honour, and glory, things which men are generally excessively in love with; and besides, not only these, but all other things come within the beck, and verge of Government. Dominion (as was said) according to its proportion, be­ing comprehensive of all the acquisitions, [Page] and possessibles of man; and standing seised of the command thereof is furnished to be the purveyor, and accommodator of all o­ther lusts: the which it usually becomes when it is sought, and attained from an in­ordinate principle, and hath strength to its will.

3. An aitiologicall observation likewise Sect. 5 occurreth from what may be taken to be the fate, or predicted lot of the times. It may be probably conjectured that the dayes we live in have a share (if not a peculiar property) in the Scripture predictions which import this event.

As first we are forewarned of the more then ordinary breaking forth of such vitious qualities, as where they prevail do produce this effect, and make it very rife. The A­postle fortelleth that, in the last dayes (and if any shall be latter, these doubtlesse are of the last) men will be boasters, proud, 2 Tim 3.2, 4. disobedient to parents, highminded: and when, not one man only, but men are so, that is the greater sort, or it is the common complexion and mood of mens mindes, how should it be but conten­tions (the natural, and immediate issue of ela­tion, and refractoriness of Spirit) should be very ingruent; and th [...]t, whatever is the object of pride, boasting, immorigerousness to Parents, and highmindednesse (as, if any thing State dominion is) should be the ob­ject of contention?

[Page]
Jo. Barclai Euphorm. par. 1.
— Sedet axe superbo
Infoelix Bellum, motis (que) accenditur Armis.
Ambition is the sturdy beam, above
The which wars-chariot doth sit, and move.
And moving once, the clash of Arms
Beats sparkles out to greater harmes.

To this may be put, that the Apostles Peter and Jude, 2 Pet. 3.2, 10, 14. Jude 8, 11. do both foretell Christians that among them shall be those who will be despisers of Government, presumptuous, self-willed, that are not afraid to speak evill of dignities: and that, many shall follow the pernitious wayes of these, and that, they shall beguile unstable souls; and Jude addeth to their character, the gainsaying of Core. Now these two, the ar­dent affection (even to jealousie) unto Do­minion ordinary in those that are possessed, or candidates of it, and this rebellious, irre­verent, contemptuous, stubborne, and re­proachfull humor, and carriage in them who should yeeld honour and subjection to it, meeting together, cannot chuse but kindle the flames of discord, even to the height of fury.

As the Holy Ghost predicteth this event in the causes, so doth he it in the effect it self. This, as I understand, he doth in the Prophesie of the seven vials, Rev. 16.10. which contain the seven last plagues, in which is filled up the wrath of God, and which is not improbably [Page] applyed by many Expositors to our dayes. The fifth of those Vials is powred out upon the Seat or Throne of the Beast. I cannot receive their interpretation who understand by the seat of the beast, the City of Rome: much lesse can I theirs who take it for a certain form of Church Government. Among other reasons against the former, which is the more common Exposition, this is one, that it placeth the Beast upon that City, as his seat, whereas the best Expositor, the Text it self contrarywise seats the great whore, Rev. 17.1, 3, 7, 9, 18. the woman which it interpreteth to emblemize that great City which reigneth over the Kings of the earth (and which the consent of Expositors both ancient and modern, and of these, both Protestant, and Popish interpret to be the City of Rome) upon the Beast, and makes the Beast to carry her, and the Beasts seven beads to be seven mountains on which the woman, that great City sitteth, and his ten hornes to be those Kings over which she reig­neth. And further, for our rejection of both the aforesaid Expositions, the Text it self gives us very plainly, and appositely ano­ther application of the seat of the beast. For what is the Seat or Throne of the Beast, but that upon, or over which he is set, or placed? But the Angel that first sheweth, and then explaineth the Vision, and myste­ry of the woman, and of the Beast that carry­eth her, and of his seven heads, and ten horns, saith expresly unto John, the waters which thou [Page] sawest, where the whore sitteth (and consequent­ly upon which the beast that carryeth her is placed, the ubi where she sitteth being pro­perly the seat of him that carryeth her.) are peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues, vers. 15. Nay, which makes this yet clearer, in the visionary description of the great whore, which precedeth this expla­nation of the Angel, she is said to sit upon many waters, vers. 1. so that these many wa­ters (so applyed as hath been shewed in vers. 15.) are not only the ubi where, but expresly the seat upon which this woman (this City) sitteth.

It is further to be observed, that in this Vision three seats are attributed to her;

  • 1. She sits upon many waters, vers. 1.
  • 2. She sits upon the Beast, vers. 3.
  • 3. She sits upon seven mountains, sig­nified by the seven heads of that Beast, vers 9.

It may without either shew of contra­diction, or much difficulty be conceived how all this diversity may be accorded. If we take the Angels Exposition of the woman to be the great City, and that City to be Rome, we may thus apply it to those three seats. Those seven heads, as they im­port seven mountains, are the Natural or Topicall seat, or site of that City, the seat on which it standeth, or is built The Beast, that is, the Dominion, Power, or Soveraign­ty [Page] which that City possesseth, and which bears it up (for by the Beast is commonly interpreted the Roman Soveraignty, or Empire) is the immediate politicall seat of that City. And the many waters, explica­ted to our hand, to intend peoples, multitudes, nations, and tongues, are the mediate politi­call seat of that City, that is, they are the seat of the Beast, or they are the severall Communities, or Republiques which once were all one, and belonged to, and were un­der the Dominion of the Roman Empire, possessed by that City. The issue then is, as to our purpose, the Woman, that great City is immediately seated upon the Beast, the Roman Empire, and mediately upon the waters, that is, upon those peoples, and multi­tudes, &c. once (that is, in the Apostles time) under the power of that Empire: and the Beast is immediately seated upon those wa­ters, those people, &c. These then in all like­lyhood (not to say certainly) are to be taken to be the seat of the Beast.

Which the more confidently to affirm, the words next following these in the Nar­ration of this Vial induce me; which are, and his Kingdome was full of darkenesse. It can be no otherwise construed but that the Beasts kingdom [...], and his Seat here, should be both one thing: the one being that on which the Vial is poured out, the other that which is said to be affected by the said pouring out. Now for the word. Kingdom, it both i [...] [Page] Scripture, and in ordinary speech, some­times signifies authority, or government, and sometimes the people, or subjects ru­led, or the governed. The latter significa­tion can only suit here, for the former (as was aforeshewed) is meant by the Beast him­self. The Kingdom ruling is the Beast, the Kingdom ruled is the seat of the Beast; this latter then is the Kingdom here meant, the seat of the Beast, the people governed: and agreably to this sense sound the words fol­lowing, these, and they gnawed their tongues for pain; who can be understood by this re­lative they, but a plurality, a multitude, these are the seat of the Beast upon which the Vial is poured out, his Kingdom which up­on that is full of darkenesse, and those, they, who upon it, gnaw their tongues for pain.

Some clearnesse appearing in this point, what is understood by the seat of the Beast, which is the subject of this Viall, the mea­ning of the effect which it hath upon this seat (for the observing of which, as perti­nent to our purpose, I make this reflexion upon this place) will easily follow. The effect is, that his Kingdome is (or, the people anciently of the Beasts Empire are) full of darknesse, and they gnaw their tongues for pain, and blaspheme the God of heaven because of their pains, and their sores, and repent not of their deeds. This Kingdom-filling darknesse may import a delusive obfuscation, errone­ousnesse, [Page] giddinesse, and dotage, which shall at the time, and in the place of this Vials pouring forth (and may not its time, and place be the present?) possesse, and prevail over the mindes and judgements of men about the matter of Power and Authority, Civill, in the first place, and Ecclesiasticall consequently, and by way of participation. And this darknesse must needs cause a Chaos of confusion, commotion, and contention. The tongue-gnawing pain, and that which fol­lowes, blaspheming, and impenitency, I in­terpret of worldly griefs, and dolours, ari­sing from all sorts of sufferings, and dangers upon bodies, estates, and other temporall interests; and of conscience-tortures by de­ceptions, scruples, and guilt; which the said obscurity will breed unto people; and which being incumbent on them will (especially in the faeces, the worse, the more hardned sort of them) boile up unto extreme vexation, and anguish, yea unto rage, and fury, whence they will break forth into blasphemy against God, by casting (in their spite, and mad­nesse) the blame, and scandall of all their sufferings, and distempers upon the Gospell, Religion, and Reformation, and upon the faithfull, and zealous friends, and followers of the same; accusing them of Rebellion, and bringing ruine upon Church, and State; and charging them as the causes of the pub­lique Commotions, and Convulsions, and of their own private adversities, and agonies [Page] flowing from them; which, indeed, are the fruits of their own error, and the recompen­ces of their own sins; and which should have wrought on them for their repentance, but prove ineffectuall to that, and occasionall to the contrary, the continuation, and heightning of their sin, and an addition to their judgements.

Having upon the occasion of observing this effect gone so far in looking into this Viall, I cannot well let passe the noting (but it shall be in one word) the corre­spondency which is betwixt this, and the next foregoing Viall, and the apt sequency of the one upon the other. That fourth Viall I suppose to bear this sense. The Sun, upon which it is powred out, is the Soveraign or Royall dignity residing in the severall Princes, or Estates signified by those ten hornes, Rev. 17.12. Its effect, to wit, that upon it power is given to the Sun to scorch men with fire, may signifie the passions of those Princes, their inordinate, and bound­lesse appetite of rule, their emulations, and jealousies transporting them above it, their immeasurable aspiring, ambitions and ava­rices, from which they are in speciall stimu­lated, and enflamed to an exorbitant stretch­ing, and heightning of their power, and prerogative over their people, for the ad­vancing, enlarging, and maintaining where­of they proceed to those precipitate coun­sels, and violent courses, which do exceeding­ly [Page] wast, and crush, and in so doing discon­tent, exasperate, and enrage their subjects. And these are the heats, and flames by which men under this Viall (as by a Zenith Sun) are scorched.

Upon that effect of the fourth Viall this of the fifth very sutably, and even naturally en­sues. As the Summer-sun-beames by their glowing heat having a good while together penetrated, and even tosted the earth, thereupon the earth comes to send up many grosse fumes, and vapors to the be­misting, and enveloping of the aire; by which means the Sun being overcast, the earth it self is deprived both of its shine and light; so it is betwixt Potentates and peo­ple. The abuses, and excesses of Princes by which they overtop, gall, and excruciate their Subjects, raise, and retort cloudes up­on themselves, and their own power, and dignity; their people thence conceiving, and venting many blinde, inconsiderate, and grosse mistakes, many heady, and mutinous contestations about their Soveraigns power, and prerogative; and this to the reciprocall, mighty prejudice both of Prince and Sub­jects; the one coming thereby to be eclip­sed, if not disorbed: and the other, while they by such reflexions seek to allay, and cool the heat, darted upon them by the too great elevation, and verticall influence of their Sun, having thereby changed their day into darknesse, are overwhelmed with [Page] confusions, night-wandrings, and horrors, and do pine away in black, pensive, and hope­lesse obscurity.

To this that hath been said of these Vials portending the more then ordinary inclination of the times allotted to them unto disceptations, and clashings about Government, I shall add a touch upon another Prophesie looking somewhat the same way, the rather because much looked upon now by some men. It is part of the matter of the third woe, and seventh Trum­pet,Rev. 11.15. in those words, There were great voices in heaven, saying, the Kingdomes of the world are become the Kingdoms of the Lord, and of his Christ. 1 Cor. 15.24. To which may be joyned that of the Apostle, Then cometh the end, when he shall have put down all rule, and all autho­rity, and power. There is much recourse had to these, and the like prenunciations, now-a-dayes, and strange use made of them. I am none of those that have the confi­dence to define, either the time when, or the means, or manner how these passages shall be accomplished. Much lesse do I sort with those who upon presumption that they shall receive their completion before the worlds end, or while time is yet current, and in a worldly, and temporall manner, and by humane means, and force, do thence conclude it a necessary, and prime duty of Christians, to lend their assistance to the bringing of them to effect, by laying [Page] their heads, and conserting their hands to­gether to plot, and act the pulling down of all Civil Powers humanely constituted, and so to the making way, and entry to that King­dom of God, and of Christ.

But this may be said with sobriety, who knowes what prelude, or preparative may be in, what use the unsearchable wisdome of God may make of, the many unsatisfi­able, and unappeasable stirrings, and jarrings both of the men of this, and of divers other spirits, and principles about Government, to the bringing about of his own counsels predeclared in those Prophetique passages? One thing may be affirmed without pretence of supernaturall light, either from Scri­pture prediction, or from private Enthusi­asme, as that which comes within common experience, and reason; that debates, and competitions about authority (especially when so multiplyed, and obstinate) do bode, and tend to its downfall. The more discussi­ons, and stirs are raised about it; the more climbings up to, and corrivalships for it, the more still the Majesty, and lustre of Authority is defaced, the foundations, and strength of it are shaken, the more it tottereth, and inclineth unto ruine.

Moreover, as this is the natural effect of that, so it may be taken some notice of, that the prevision, and presage of a time of hor­rid violence, and confusion, and of spoile, and expilation by the subversion of all Laws, and [Page] humane Authority, restraint, and reverence, to come upon the latter ages of the world, hath sadly possessed the mindes of many sage, and learned Christians, both ancient, and latter. To give some instance, as that of Tertullian, Est & alia major necessitas nobis orandi pro imperatoribus, etiam pro omni statu imperii, rebus (que) Romanis, quod vim maximam universo orbi imminentem, ipsam (que) clausulam seculi acerbitates horrendas comminantem Romani im­perii commeatu scimus retardati. Ita (que) nolumus experiri, & dum precamur, dif­ferri Romanae diuturnitati favemus. Tertull. Apolog. cap. 32. who declares in behalf of the Christians of his time, that they took themselves bound to pray for the Emperors, and Roman state, though then Heathen, and per­secuting, because that by means of the conti­nuance thereof, the great crash, or conquassation, threatning the worlds ruine, and the most dread­full calamities, was retarded. And Lactan­tius Vide Lactantium in Institut. lib. 7. cap. 15. presageth that a little before the glori­ous restoring of the Church by him divined of to come ere the worlds end, there shall antecede those desperate confusions, and overturnings of order, right, and lawes, as never were before in the world. And in the Harmony of Confes­sions, Confession of Saxony in the Harmony. Artic. 23. of Civil Mag. pag. 596. that of Saxony gives warning, that in this last age of the world great confusion is to be feared.

But enough of the causes of the Tumul­tuations Sect. 6 of the present age about Govern­ment: Let us turn a thought toward some­thing of remedy.

Amidst the many factions about political order (not a few whereof bespeak them­selves religious, but are indeed seditious) my perswasion is, it is not only the worldly mans interest, but the Christians, and not only his interest, but his bounden duty, both to submit to Civill Authority, and to support it: and that (sutably to the con­junction of the second and third petitions of the Lords-prayer) we have no other way of active promoting the coming of the King­dom of God, but by doing his will. The which will I understand to be, not so much, if at all, his dispositive, or decreeing will, unto which his Prophesies belong (for that, in many things, is to-us unrevealed, and that ever shall, and cannot but be done, as well in earth, as in heaven) as his preceptive will, delivered in his Law of nature, and the rules of his word. Which will of his is (as much as for any thing) expresse for the perpetual, and indeterminable, both authorization of Civill Magistracy (viz. that which is by ordi­nary, or humane creation, or constitution) and obligation of all men, all Christians in homage to itNos judicium dei suspicimus in imperatori­bus, qui Genti­bus illos praefe­cit. Id in eis scimus esse quod Deus voluit. Ideo (que) salvum volumus esse quod Deus voluit. Tertull. in Apolog. cap. 32..

For the better disposing, and drawing of mens mindes to the doing of this will of God in this particular, and for the abating of the pernitious contentions abovesaid to be now so incident, and rife about it, and which are the great obstacles of mens per­forming the Divine will in this matter, Two things (I suppose) will be easily admitted to be chiefly desirable, and contributory. One on the part of the Government it self, which is, that it be evidently laid upon a ground of conscience, a just foundation, or which is the same, that it apparently be by divine authority, or according to that rule, or will of God which we are to do. The other (which also is conducible unto that) is on the part of those that are concerned in, or upon its being setled, to wit, that it be clear, and understood wherein consisteth that regularity, and how the divine au­thorization held forth by it is passed, or conveyed unto mens investure in it.

For the requisiteness, and usefulnesse of these two a little may serve to be said. The former is, that Government be laid upon a bot­tom of conscience. This is the only genuine, true, and connaturall, and this is the surest, and firmest groundwork for it. Without this there is little hope for it to prove either beneficial, or permanent, little likelyhood of either a reall regular, or durable sub­jection to it. The discernable standing of Government upon consciencious grounds, [Page] is the only thing that can bring in con­science, and a consciencious submission to it. Conscience (that is, a perswasion of the thing to be done, that it is as it ought to be, or is right and just) is the highest, and most kindly principle of any humane, or morall act. It is both the strongest, and most lasting obligation to any relative duty. It is the strongest, and most inducing tye, be­cause it is the dictate of the supremest facul­ty in man, the [...], his minde, or intellectuall part, and that upon the power­fullest perswasive, a Law received from na­ture, and from God. And it is the most last­ing tie.

1. In being upon a consideration which is in it self certain, and immutable, viz. the everlasting rule of righteousnesse.

2. Inasmuch as it doth most engage the will, and so procures the most volun­tary, and free accord unto that which it imposeth.

There is scarce that thing which is more necessary to mankinde (considered in soci­ety) then Government; but nothing would be more free in its imposall, and reception. It is true, a coercive power is (in the present depravation of man) requisite to it, both for its conservation, and effectuall admini­stration, but this is not proper, nor can it serve to be its procreative, or constitutive, no nor sole conservative cause. It is easie to discerne that the personall strength of one [Page] man or a few Chieftains of a Community is not sufficient to this coercion: and that Magistracy cannot have, or validly put forth without the cordiall concurrence of a mul­titude. For a Magistrate to hold, and put forth this power by the strong hand of a consenting multitude distinct from, and op­posed to that he rules over, who sees not the unnaturalnesse, and unstablenesse of such a command? This will never incorpo­rate the governing, and governed, or joynt them in one politicall body, but shall alway keep them dispartite, and set them in a state of jealousie, discontent, and counter-working each of other. If force be all that interveneth to the relation, and cor­respondency of ruler, and ruled, how should that hold? an aversation of wils, and affe­ctions will work out it self, and either dis­sever, or dash them together. Vim vi repri­mere is a practise which begets the like to it in the other on whom it is practised and that is Vim vi rependere, & repellere. These two are principles, and studies that sit deep, and keep the subject they possesse respectively in continuall motion. He that is up, and stands by the former hath but little ease, and lesse stayednesse; he that is down, and medi­tates the latter is like a vapour under ground swelling, and searching to rend out its pas­sage into the open air, with the breach, or fall of what ever is betwixt it, and its freedom.

The right, and durable basis then that is left unto Magistracy is that which is ce­mented with a composure of the wils of them over whom it is. Now the will is two wayes conciliated, or won. One is by the sense of an external, or temporal accommo­dation, or advantage. The other is the in­notescency of a morall obligation, or tye of conscience. The former is but an inferior, and low attractive, and it is beneath a rati­onall faculty to be taken with it by it self alone, or as the commanding principle. That were as if the servant should govern his master, the beast its rider, or the body over­power its soul. And for the point of con­tinuance; though the motion of it be impe­tuous, and it strongly worketh upon the sensitive conceit, and appetite, yet it parti­cipates of the nature of its object, in being variable, and uncertain. To incline the will to obedience is but accidentall, and contin­gent to the sense of a temporall good, it is as prone to oppose, and withdraw from it, be­ing indifferent, and equally poysed to dispose the minde, either to subjection, or contuma­cy, as the one, or the other may seem to favour its object.

But the latter, the evidence of a consci­ence obligation that's the most weighty, and meriting perswasive, that's alway the same, that takes an immediate, and deeper hold on the rationall faculty, yea, and is of as generall extent, and influence as the other; [Page] all men, and nations retaining some touch of religion, and conscience, and of it as much, and as universally in this of Civill authority, and obedience as in any particular.

And in truth, if we should make a reflexi­on upon our selves in this Nation (which is so naturally addicted to Lawes, and liber­ties, that hath received the knowledge, and profession of the true Religion, that hath been of late so much busied in looking up Scripture mouldes, and dictates of this ar­gument, that hath had almost all the questi­ons that can likely be raised in this behalf laid open, and agitated to, and fro, that hath had so often in this businesse tendred such conscience-pressing adjurations, and engage­ments, and hath shewed (if recitations, urgings, and disputes about them be argu­ments thereof) to be solicitous of them, and lastly, that hath both by words, and actions both declared, and had declared to it a con­scientiousnesse in this matter) it cannot (I s [...]y) be rationally expected that any other way of setling then upon clear grounds of conscience should here take.

The requisitnesse of the first of the two afore proposed expedients appearing, the ne­cessity of the second immediately followes upon it; and is evident by the concession of the other. For if it be admitted needfull that a ground, or principle of conscience be the basis of Government, it will be confessed as needfull that a rule of Gods revealed or [Page] preceptive will (which is the only cynosure, guide, and emperesse of conscience) touching the founding, and erecting of Government be laid forth, and that, both verbo tenus, & re, both the words, and the thing, that is, both which is the rule, where delivered, and also what it saith, or ordereth, or what is its genuine sense, and meaning.

In the want, or uncertainty of this all settlement upon this groundwork will be to seek. Though the thing setled be right, yet the beneficiall influence of that rectitude upon the conscience, and will shall be super­seded; and in stead thereof it will be atten­ded with a disrelish, muttering, and discom­pliance in the same. M [...]ny illusions, and fal­lacies shall be obtruded upon the conscience to bottom it wrong; and many pretensi­ons of conscience will be held forth to the eyes of the world where there is no consci­ence stood upon.

These two things being granted needfull Sect. 7 to the premised end, I would stay my Rea­der no longer in the Introduction, then while I a little more specialize the subject and pro­cedure of the ensuing Discourse in reference to these two. The former of them, which lies on the part of the Government it self, to wit, that it be set upon a consciencious bottoming, I shall intermedle no further with. To see that this, or th [...]t authority be so, or publiquely to determine, or pronounce [Page] any so to be, or not to be, containeth in it matter of fact, and descendeth to a circum­stantiated, and individual case; I passe it over as too high and hard for me, and leave it to the Statesman, as proper to his immediate inspection. The latter, which is the inquiring out of the rule, with its interpretation, and meaning, is that I only take in hand; and this will not be denyed to lie within the pre­cincts of my calling. Might it be evident ere I have done to be as well within the com­passe of my performance, it would be some­thing of satisfaction both to my Reader (possibly) and to my self.

This, I say, is the whole reach and limit of what followeth; and it will be by it self enough. For as the making plain of this will be acknowledged to be singularly conducing to the allay, and pacification of much dis­composure, and to be preparative and pro­ductive of obedience to the will of God in this behalf; so it cannot be denyed, but that the rule it self, the investigation whereof we are upon, falleth under some controversie.

The plainest, and fullest passage of Scri­pture for the holding forth of this rule, and the way how the Divine Authorization is conveyed to particular persons, for their in­vesting thereby with Civil authority, I take for granted to be the prefixed text, [There is no power but of God: the Powers that be are or­dained of God.] And therefore having for that reason, laid down that for the ground, and [Page] center of my discourse, I shall immediately proceed to it.

In the late times of dispute about state government much recourse hath been had to this Scripture. Each different way hath sought to it for patronage, and endevoured to make it of its party. This hath raised a variety of senses, and interpretations, and thereby some obscurity upon it. That which hath been said of some other Scriptures may be of this. This text had been plain, had there not been so many Expositors upon it. I cannot ascribe the controvertiblenesse of it, so much to any Grammatical, or Metaphysical difficulty of the termes, as to the value, which the mat­ter it consisteth of, beareth.

1. The subject of it: nothing higher in place, or more in esteem with men then it, viz. Civill power.

2. The predicate: nothing more sublime can be spoken of any thing (as to its origi­nation) then it, to wit, that it is of God, ordained of God. The desireablenesse of the subject, and the divinenesse of the predicate seem in their conjunction to occasion the disputeablenesse of these words.

In the beginning of our Commotions the sentence next before this [Let every soul be subject to the higher powers] underwent the de­bate: and therein the extent, or latitude of the power, and subjection it asserteth. Since that the question hath passed on to the next, [Page] which are these words, and upon them the main queries are, who the persons are that are here termed the Powers, which are of God, ordained of God? and (in order there­unto) what is meant by the Powers? what by of God and ordained of God?

The exceeding (and in my opinion exces­sive) wide-stretching of this style, The power of God, ordained of God, by some Authors anteceding these times, hath to me seemed strange, and to have given some rise to the late diversity of applications of it. Besides the peculiar (and I am confident the only intended) application of it to the Civill Ma­gistrate there are that have imagined in it much broader accommodations.

That great light of the Church in his times, and since, St. Augustine (the authority of whose example hath perhaps led others to do the like) extendeth this proposition, There is no power but of God, to take in all power whatsoever that can be named, and is in any creature. As the power to put forth any good work, or act of graceAug. de Spir. & lit. cap. 31. To. 3.; the power to do any wrong, or act any sinAug. Enar­rat. in Psalmos, Psa. 32. Conc. 2. To. 8. the power of Satan to tempt, or sway men to evillAug. ad Sim­pli [...]ian. lib. 2. qu. 1. To. 4.. After him comes the Pope with his Doctors, and they make bold to insert into the sense of this text, not only the Papall, with all the rest of their Hierarchies Spiritual, or Ecclesi­asticall power, but the Popes power in Tem­porals over Soveraign Princes. Pope Boniface 8 (who is said to have come into the Popedom [Page] like a Fox, reigned like a Lyon, and dyed like a D [...]g) makes this use of this ScriptureIn extravag de major. & obed. cap. unam Sanctam, &c. So doth Pighius. Bellarmine, and others en­devor to impose their Popes, and Prelates powers, and to defend their Clergy-exempti­ons from the Temporall Magistrate by put­ting that sense upon this TextBellarm. To. 1. Cont. 3. lib. 2. cap. 29.. After these arise the Munsterians, and having expelled their Prince, and taken the power of the City into their hands, and set up of them­selves a pageant King (but too tragicall) they declare, that he is not so much of their as of Gods ordainingRegem non tam ab ipsis quam a Deo constitutum esse scripserant. Jo. Sleiden lib. 10. pag. 256.. And yet farther, and which is more to be regarded, Some of our Pro­testant Divines (and of chiefest note) as Bu­cer, Calvin, and Pareus, have drawn forth the authority of this text to any person that by any means gets in, or hath possession of rule, or the upper hand over a Civil StateBucer, Cal­vin, Pareus in loc..

There is none of those uses of this text, or of the Divine warrant it hold forth to the Civill Magistrate, but (with reverence to those authors of any of them who are ac­knowledged with us to deserve it) I look at as going beyond the just bounds thereof. This Treatise doth not propose the distinct, or particular examination of each of them. But its inquisition into the positive impor­tance of this Text will manifestly discover the disinterestednesse of every one of them therein. And the last, being it is commended by such names; being it hath been taken hold of, and confidently insisted on by many of [Page] late, both upon the account of the deserved esteem of those Authors, and by other argu­ments; being it hath some more shadow, or appearance then the rest of approaching neer the meaning of this Text, and so stan­deth more in our light, or way to the clear view of it; being it hath been currently recei­ved, and patronized by divers; and being it is of the concernment which will easily be dis­cerned to be in it; this Treatise (with all due respect to those who may be entertainers of the said sense, and wish submission to the further sifting of the Judicious) doth profes­sedly deal with, and bring it under a hearing, and Tryall.

I might here insert the allegation of many absurd consequences and pernicious tenden­cies which waite upon the admittance of this sense, to make the profit, and necessity of its discussion the better to appear; as also the recital of sundry other questions of some abstrusenesse, and of speciall use, with other contents, as instances of the usefulnesse of the untertaking in this Book. But these I omit, for the Readers speedier passing on to take his own survey of the things themselves, as they are delated in what followeth. Humbly submitting what I have written to his censure; and com­mitting the same to the blessing of the Al­mighty.

The Author having not opportunity to survey this Impression untill past, humbly requesteth the Readers excuse for, and pains to correct the fol­lowing errors in it.

1. In sentences.

PAge 87. line 15. after particular insert, Persons, and Families are in of publique association, protection, order, and administration of justice, calls men into civil societies, and to the erecting of G [...]v [...]rnment: and more particular, p. 136 l. 19, 20, 21. expurgo. The transactions a­bout them injoyned a rule of right, and equity to be kept, and forbidden.

2. In one, or a few syllables.

Page 2. line 22. f. quality r. quantity, p. 7. l. 10. f. 23. r. 22. p. 10. l. 23 r. offered unto, &c. p. 11. l 13. r. compasse, p. 20. l. 17 r contemned, p. 24. l. 15. r. perswading, ibid. l. 16. r [...], p. 26. l. 19. r. lawfully, p 28. l. 26. r. in the person, p. 29. l. 12. f. awfull r. lawfull, p. 31. l. 12. r. Marcionites, p. 36. l. 40. f. universall r. unjustifiable, p. 37. l. 37. r. and for the matter, p. 43. l. 7. f. proceeding r. producing, p. 45. l. 26. f casually r. casualty, p. 52. l. 2. r. receives, p. 54. l. 4. r. totally, p. 55. l. 24. r. agency, l. 41. r. peculiarly, p. 65. l. 22. f. is r. it, p. 66. l. 15. r. Trade-adventurers, p. 70. l. 36. 37. r. positives, p. 72 l. 1. r. to us, l. 21. r. drowsie, l. 33. r. knew p. 73. l. 2. r. very guilty, p. 76. l. 38. f. 2. r. 4. p. 82. l. 3. 4 expunge or a master, l. 8. f. to r. of, l. 36 after solely insert which, p. 83 l. 40. r. this, or that, p. 84. l. 39. r. not to be taken, p. 85. l. 7. f. whill r. which, l. 23. r. of the thing, p 87. l. 24. r. those whom, p 91. l. 11. r. there be­ing, l. 35. after employing insert force, l. 38. r. founded, l. 39. f. profession r. poss ssion, p. 92. l. 27. r. to be a rule, p. 93. l. 41. r. do come, p. 94. l. 4 f. clear r. clean, p. 95. l. 7. r. uniform, p. 99. l. 33. r. take, p. 103. l. 37. f. or in r. in or, p. 110. l. 33. r. a working, p. 111. l. 15. f. mortality r. morall tye, p. 122. l. 21. f. living r. linage, p. 123. l. 10. after his insert fall, p. 126. l. 24. r. names, p. 136. l. 14. f. and r. be, p. 139 l. 8. r. according to h lawes, l. 14. f. where r. were, p. 140 l. 1. r. inquire, p. 157. l. 31. f. as r. us, p. 159. l. 31. r. of an usurpe, p. 164. l. 5. r. Tractu, p. 165 l. 18 r. it allowes p. 171. l. 4. r. sociatis, p. 173. l. 4 [...]. f. extensively r. exclusively, p. 176. l. 32. r parties, p. 178. l. 8. f. eng ne r. enemy, p. 179. l. 28. expunge to be, p. 183. l. 14. r. distinguisht, p 187. l. 36. f. hold r. take, p. 189 l. 1, 2 r convention, p. 193. l. 14. r. and abstract, l. 33 [...]. the act and the, p. 194. l. 4. r. wherein it is, p. 202. l. 37, 38. [...]. autho [...]ity r. power, p. 206. l. 25. r. determined, l. 34. r. take it. Understand, p 207. l. 17 r. propositions, p. 210. l. 5 r. variety, p. 214. l. 7. r. it the, p 223. l. 14 r. hold, p. 229. l. 38. r. so far as they, p. 235. l. 40. r. indifferen [...], p. 238 l. 32. r. 2 Ki [...]gs, p. 239. l. 4. r. predominant, p. 241. l. 16. r. unpublished, p 248. l 7. r. Gen 9 6. p. 255. l. 8. r. where, p. 257. l. 13. r. Herdonius, p. 259. l. 21. f. sight r. Sit, p. 277. l. 19. r. afford it, p 283. l. 6. r. strictures, p. 291. l. 1, 2. r. command, p. 297. l. 16. r. capacity includes in, p. 300. l. 15. expunge externally.

In Margins.

Page 28 line 9. r. superior est jure, p. 52. l. 2. r. that of same of th [...], p 71. l. 3. r. 9 31. p. 123. r. Pareum. p 13 [...]. r. W [...]ddrington, p. 251. l 5 r. contigit.

A Direction to such Scriptures as are somewhat explained in this Treatise, after the figures noting the Chapters and Verses of the Books of Scripture, the figures that follow signifie the pages, and sometimes the places referred to are noted by Chapters, Sections, and Subsections.

  • Gen. 9.6. p. 20. in marg. &. p. 248. 10.25. p. 175. 49.10. p. 229.
  • Deut. 17.14, 15. Cap. 10. Sect. 4. Subsect. 1. 32.8. p. 33.
  • 1 Sam. 20.26. p. 208.
  • 2 Sam. 7.12. Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subject. 1. prope finem.
  • 1 King. 2.4. Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subs. 1. 19.10. p. 209.
  • 2 King. 2.11. p. 238. 18.7. Cap. 10. Sect. 6.
  • 1 Chron. 29.26, 27. p. 238.
  • Psal. 41.11. p. 72. 115.16. p. 32.
  • Prov 8.15. p. 214.
  • Eccles. 8.4. p. 20. 10. p. 261.
  • Isai. 19.18, 19. p. 49. 42.24. p. 198.
  • Jer. 21.8, 9 27.1. to 18. 28.14, 16. 29.7. 38.17, 20. Cap. 10. Sect. 4. Subsect. 1. 33.7. Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subs. 1. prope finem.
  • Ezek. 21.27. p. 244. 29.21. p. 230.
  • Dan. 11.14. p. 49.
  • Habak. 1.14. p. 287.
  • Matth. 3.15. Cap. 10. Sect. 5. 4.23, 24. p. 208. 5.39, 40, 41. p. 284. 9.10. p. 209. 17.24, 25, 27, Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subsect. 2. 19.6. p. 131. 22.21. Cap. 10. Sect, 2. Subs. 3. 26.52. p. 20, 250.
  • Mar. 1.5. p. 207.
  • Luke 4.6. p. 11.
  • John 8 51. p. 2 [...]8. 10.35. p. 25, 133. 12.32. p. 207. 19.10. p. 8. 11, Cap. 10. Sect. 2. Subs 4.
  • Act. 2.17. p. 208. 11.26. p. 189. 17.26. p. 33.
  • Rom. 12.17, 19. p. 283: 13.1. first part, p. 111, 112, 253, to 263. latter part per totum. 2. p. 114, 263, to 274. 3. p. 117, 274, &c. 4. p. 21, 117, 274, &c. 6. p. 279. &c.
  • [Page]1 Cor. 2.15. p. 209. 6.12. p. 209. 10.25. p. 208. 11.30. p. 73. 12.14. p. 131. 14.33. p. 105. 15.24. Prefac. Sect. 5.
  • Ephes. 6.12. p. 14.
  • Philip. 2.21. p. 207.
  • Col. 2.15. p. 14.
  • 1 Tim. 2.1. p. 213, 208. 6, 8, p. 208. 4.4. p. 208.
  • 2 Tim. 2.4. p. 209.
  • Heb. 5.4. p. 211.
  • Jam. 1.13. p. 59.
  • 1 Pet. 2.13. p. 132.
  • Revl. 11.15. Prefac. Sect. 5. 13.2. p. 11. 4. p. 11. 13. p. 12. 17. p. 12. 16.8. 9, 10, 11, Prefac. Sect. 5. 17.1. 3, 9, Prefac. Sect. 5. 17. pag. 11. 18. Prefac. Sect. 5.

THE ORIGINAL OF THE Civil Magistrate From God, [As it is drawn by the Apostle Paul in those words, ROM. XIII. 1. There is no Power but of God: the Powers that be are ordained of God] Endevored to be Illustrated and Vindicated.

THere is no question but the Apostle doth in these words own and attri­bute the Civil Magistrate unto God, as his Author [...] unto an act of God, as his Production. But it is made a question, How this deduction is from God? or, What this [Page 2] derivation of the Magistrate from God, here called his Ordination or Ordinance, doth mean?

For the discovery of this ou [...] disquisition must be, What the true sense and just extent of these words, There is no power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God, may be.

The Method I have proposed to my self here [...]n is, first, and principally to insist, by way of Exposition, on all the tearms of this sen­tence, one by one, which may seem to bear any part, either in the making up of the sense, or in the extending, or confining of the latitude of it.

Those are,

  • 1. The subject spoken of, Power, the powers.
  • 2. The predicates enunciated of the same.
    • 1. Of God.
    • 2. Ordained of God.
  • 3. The quality of the enunciations, whe­ther universal or indefinite; There is no power but of God the powers that be, &c.
  • 4. The adjunct of being put to the subject of the latter position, the powers that he are ordained of God.

And to then annex some consideration [...] from the context, and from other principles coherent to the assertion of this text.

Each of these forenamed particles, as they have somewhat in them which may deserve either opening or observation; so they, have something said of them by those who have had recourse to this Text by way either of Com­ment, or of Controversie, which may deserve examination. I proceed forthwith to the en­quiry, in the order proposed.

CHAP. I. Of the Subject here spoken of, Power, the Powers.

SECT. I. An Enquiry whether Power be put for the Person invested with Power, or for the abstract, the Office seated in him?

IT may be of some use for the understan­ding of the meaning of this word Power, to take notice whether it be put here for the Officer, or for the Office, for the Magi­strate, or for Magistracy. The Scripture useth the term both wayes. Sometimes in the ab­stract, or for the form, office, or state, which makes and denominates one a Superiour to others. [So Luk. 20.20. Joh. 17.2. Rev. 17.13.] Sometimes in the concrete, or for the person in whom that abstract form, or office is subjected. [So it is Luk. 12.11. Rom. 8.38. Eph. 1.21. & 3.10. & 6.12. Col. 2.15. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 3.22.] That it is this latter way to betaken in this place, not only Com­mentators agree, [for which see Augustin Tom. 4. part. 2. Expos. propos. ex Epist. ad Rom. Piscator, Rollock, Pareus, Dr. Hammond, Essius, Vignerus in loc.] but the Text it self may lead us to resolve. Power in the abstract [Page 4] cannot be the subject, or recipient either of the duties required, and argued for in this text to be payed to the Power therein mentioned, or of the offences forbidden, and threatned (if done) against it: neither can it be the agent, or administrant of those acts which are ascribed to the Power here intended. It cannot be the object of that Fear, nor the author of that Praise mentioned vers. 3. The accident, or abstract power is, indeed, the Reason of mens Obligation to the performance of those duties, and the refraining of those injuries to the per­son empowered; and it is the form, or prin­ciple which those acts do flow from in him. But it cannot be that suppositum which is the object of the one, and the agent of the other. Moreover, that the concrete, the person in power is here meant, may be clear from the following words in the context, in vers. 3. the Apostle puts the title of Rulers, and this of Power identically, Rulers are not a terror, &c. wilt thou not then be afraid of the Power? and in vers. 4, 6, 7, 8. his arguments for the sub­jection to the Power in this vers. injoyned run all upon the person, for he is the Mi­nister of God — he beareth not the sword in vain, &c.

SECT. II. The main enquiry, to wit, What kind of Power it is which the Apostle intends in those words, Power, the Powers.

Subsection 1. Of the force of the word, [...].

POwer signifieth here the person empowe­red. Yet in as much as the Text must needs suppose, imply, and refer unto Power in the abstract, as the form which doth constitute, and denominate the person in whom it is seated a Power, and only he can be said to be the Power, who is endued with that Power: the way to explain this term, and to under­stand who are the Powers here intended, will be, in taking the Apostle to speak of the con­crete, or person, to cast our eye upon the abstract, or the habit of Power placed in him, and to enquire what kind of Power is that which the text presupposeth, and referreth unto, as that endowment which makes the persons here spoken of to be termed the Powers.

The notation of the propriety, or use of the word [...], may be somewhat conducing to this enquiry. The observation of a distin­ction betwixt [...] and [...]; betwixt potentia and potestas, and that the former is of a larger acception, and ordinarily signifies a [Page 6] meer mightiness, or ability; the latter is of a stricter use, and usually signifies such a Power as consists in right, interest, or property, is an observation not only given us by some of late, but avowed by Divines and Criticks of chiefest note, and will upon due search (I believe) be found to hold good.

It must be remembred, that the propriety of a word is not a thing of so precise a nature, as that it is ever and invariably kept, or so as the word may never be observed to be other­wise used. There is not (I think) any term that is frequently made use of, but sometimes it is taken out of its proper and peculiar sense; and so perhaps may be sometimes this word [...]; but as far as I can learn, either by mine own observation, or from the incompa­rably more mature experience, and judgement of other Authors, the propriety of this word is of this measure, that properly taken, it only signifies that power which consists in right, and when it intends a power of Superiority of one person over another, it signifies an Au­thorized power only, or that Superiority which is lawful, or justly intitled to rule. And I believe (if possible) it will not be easie, or obvious to meet with it in any other accepta­tion in the New Testament.

For the former, mine own observation; I shall not trouble the Reader with reciting the places of Scripture in which the word is found, whereby the constant use of it may ap­pear; but shall sum up under a few heads the variety of use which I have noted in the word in respect of divers objects it is apply­ed to, and refer to the several places for per­usall.

I have noted that in the new Testament this word [...] is applyed,

1. Sometimes to things privately posses­sible.

[Page 7]2. Sometimes to matter of action.

3. Sometimes more specially to matter of command, or authority over persons.

1. It is applyed to matters privately pos­sible: and so it signifies a right, or just in­terest in a thing, so as the person in whom the Power is, may lawfully dispose of, or injoy it. [So Job. 1.12. Act. 1.7. & 5.4. & 8.19. Rom. 9.21. 2 Thess. 3.9. Rev. 23.14.]

2. It is applyed to matter of action, and so it signifies a Warrant, Commission, Licence, or Rule, enabling a man to the doing, or ex­ecuting of any action, or work in the said Rule determined. [So Mat. 9.6. & 10.1. & 21.23. Mark. 13.34. Luk. 9.1. Joh. 10.18. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5, 6, 18. 2 Cor. 10.8. & 13.10]

3. It is applyed more specially to matter of Command, or Authority over persons, and so it signifies an Authority, or lawful calling to rule and bear sway over others. [So Mat. 28.18. Mark. 1.27. Luk. 4 36. & 12.5. & 19.17. & 20.20. Joh. 17.2. & 19.10. 1 Cor. 11.20. & 15.24. Col. 2.10. Jud. v. 25. Rev. 17.13.]

These are the several kinds of objects or matters (in my observation) to which the Power signified by this word [...] relateth in Scripture. And by the many instances un­der each of these heads may be gathered the propriety of the word in Scripture-accep [...]ation. And the Reader that will please to search all these tex [...]s, and examine the currantness of my citing of them, will (I doubt not) upon impartial view, finde also these two things true which I shall further observe unto him of them.

First, That in all these places, the sense of this word [...] is confined within the limit of a just and lawful Power, and cannot be [Page 8] extended to the bare act of meer Occupation, or forcible possession, or command: hence it is rendred by our Translators, not alwayes by the word Power, but (in the forecited places) sometimes by this term, Right, [as Joh. 1.12. in marg. Rev. 22.14.] sometimes Authority, [Mat. 21.23. Mark 13.34. Luk. 4.36. & 9.1. & 20.20. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 15.24. 2 Cor. 10.8.] and sometimes Liberty, [as 1 Cor. 8.9.] And further in divers of those Texts it is put to signifie the Right, or Warranted­ness of a thing, when as the point of Right is either questioned, or asserted in a contra­distinction to an arbritrary, and unwarranta­ble assuming, or usurping. [So in that of Mat. 21.23, 24.] the chief Priests and Elders ask Christ, [...]; By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority? The authority here de­manded to be shewn is a warrant; or lawfull commission for the doings of our Saviour; the things done they had seen, his [...], the act of Power, or force he had put forth, in his Doctrine, Miracles, and imperious driving out of the Temple the traffiquing profaners of it; but they call in question, and therefore demand of him, and accordingly he conditio­nally promises to tell them by what authority he did those things, and who gave him that au­thority. So again [in that of Mat. 9.6.] our Saviour asserteth to himself the having, [...], the power on earth to forgive sins; they that were present had heard him executing the act towards the Palsie-sick person, in his saying to him, thy sins be forgiven thee. But they doubted of, or rather denyed his authori­ty or lawfull power to do it, and that was the thing therefore which he there avoweth. In like manner [in that of Joh. 19.10.] Pilate thought Christ now standing before him, and [Page 9] not making any answer to his examinations of him, implyed that he took him to have no lawfull power over him in that cause; and there­fore asks him, Knowest thou not that I have power to crucifie thee, and have power to release thee?

[Where by the way the allegarion which some make of this Text, as though the word here signified an abusive, or unlawful power [...] in as much as what ever power Pilate might have to release Christ, he had none to crucifie him, is utterly impertinent. For it is not mate­riall to the use of the word here to say, what power Pilate really had, or what he had not; but the matter is, what power he thought and meant to assert that he had; for the word there must needs bear that sense which the speaker meant it in: and for that there is no doubt but Pilate looked on himself, as the lawful, Governor of that place, and at Christ as a common person of that Nation, and so intended; that himself was the competent Judge, of the person and cause of Christ then before him, and that he had therefore power to crucifie him, and power to release him, viz. respectively, accordingly as he should finde his cause to deserve.]

So [in that of Rom. 9.21.] the Apostle disputing for the equity and justness of Gods purposes, and proceedings in his acts of Free Election and Reprobation, in order to the be­nefits of his Grace, and in his excutions there­of, he alleadges by way of comparison the example of the Potters power over his clay, to make a vessel of it to what use he pleaseth. Where if the word [...] were ambiguous, and did not clearly signifie right and just power, the argument were of no force or evidence.

Secondly, The other thing I observe is, that this word is in those forequoted places put for such a power, as doth not necessarily [Page 10] import, or require to its being, or depend upon possession, actual tenure, or exercise of the matter, or object of the power, but is in some of those instances de facto separate, and in all separable therefrom; yea in some of them the power is so affirmed, as that the act or exercise of it is expresly secluded, and laid aside, as neither done, nor to be done in the particular case. That universal Power which Christ assumeth to himself [Joh. 17.2. Mat. 28.18.] was then in him in regard of grant and investure, and in respect of right and title to all the things to which it refer­reth, but a jus in re, a seisure or possession of them he had not. For before his passion, be­ing then in the state of humiliation, he was far from an actual dominion, or command over all; nay after his rising again, and his ascending up unto, and session at the right hand of God in heaven; the Apostle saith of him, We see not yet all things put under him, [Heb. 2.8.] That power of Believers to eate of things unto Idols, And that of Paul and Barnabas to marry, and to take with them in their travail Wives, and to receive maintenance for them­selves, and them of the Churches of Corinth and Thessalonica, [1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5. 2 Thess. 3.9.] these were powers inherent in those persons re­spectively, but they were not acted, no nor could lawfully be put forth by them as the case then stood with those Christians.

It is against this Observation of the force of this word objected by some, that [...] is put for a Power unlawful as to title, in two or three places, [viz. Luk. 4.6. Rev 13.2, 4. Ephes. 6.12. Col. 2.14.] Unto which I say,

1. It should still be remembred (what was before said) that the propriety of a word is not a thing of so precise a nature, as that it is ever punctually kept; and that it is to be [Page 11] judged, not by its use once or twice, but by its common and frequent use.

2. Let the Texts brought for this be seve­rally looked into.

For that [of Luke 4.6.] I can see no reason to conclude the word is there used for a right­less power. Who can think but that Satan there intendeth to assume to himself a good ti­tle, and just interest over this worlds kingdoms, and not a false or usurped claim? and according to his intention that speaks must the sense of the word be construed to be. Indeed he lyed in taking that large composs of power to himself, and this he had done whether he had spoken of that power in point of right, or in point of fact, for in neither sense had be all that power either given to him, or to give to others; but his lie had not been so specious or to his purpose, had he not meant of a real and good authority.

For that [of Rev. 13.2, 4.] where it's said The Dragon gave the beast his power, and his seat, and great authority; and the Dragon gave power unto the beast: presupposing that by the Dragon is meant Satan, and by the Beast the Roman Empire, as distributed into ten Kingdoms, or States, upon the dissipation of the Monarchy of the Caesars, by the wars of the Barbarians; which ten are therefore, it may be, called one Kingdom, Rev. 17.17. or that part of the said Empire, which is called the Western Empire, as reduced partly in regard of secular State and Title into the hands of the Exarch of Ravenna first, then of the French, and after of the German Emperor, but acted, and over-swayed by the Pope of Rome See Mr. Mede on Revel. com. part. 2. cap. 13. Napier. Sim­son. Ds. Annot. in loc.. Now where it is said, this Dragon gave this Beast his power, and seat, and great authority, the possessive his, is I take it necessarily to be re­ferred to the Dragon, not to the Beast, for the pronoun [...] carries it to the agent, or giver. [Page 12] Now the Dragon might be said to give his power and authority to the Beast two wayes.

1. By way of surcease, or surrendry. The Devill when he saw the authority of the Hea­then Emperors come to an end, upon the rising up of Constantine, he layd down that sway he had held in the use of them, in whom he had played the Dragon, by instigating them, and their people by them, to grosse Paganish Ido­latry, and to open enmity against Christianity, and now gave way to the Beast.

2. By way of allurement and assistance. Satan seeing he must perforce leave that his way of working, and leading the world which he had long held by means of the Heathenish Empire, he now applies himself to the present Secular powers, the Christian Potentates, risen up in the room of the former, to draw them over to his interest of Idol-worship, and Saint-persecution, though in another forme and me­thod; unto which be makes it his design first to perswade, and then to assist them, in the promoting and executing thereof. In reference, to the latter his assistance, especially, may those words be understood of the Dragons giving his power and authority to the Beast q. d. Satan joy­neth his power unto the Roman State or Ma­gistracy, become Christian, and after a while degenerate in Religion, by Heresie, and Su­perstition, to further them in their way (which was also his own main work) of Blasphemous Idolatries, and cruel persecutions, drawing in also the Nations of the world to follow them therein. A like manner of speech to this we have, Rev. 17.13, 17. where the ten Kings are said to give their power and strength unto the Beast; that is, by way, not of investing it in him, but of assisting him with it. And thus it may be plain how the word [...], is here used. For what is that Power, Seat, and Au­thority which Satan hath in humane affairs? [Page 13] Verily none properly so called; that is, he hath no temporal Government, no formal, profes­sed, open, and acknowledged rule amongst men, either by commanding in word, or compulsion in deed, as Princes have over their Subjects, Masters over their Servants. The term there­fore cannot here be put to signifie any Civil Empire, either lawful or unlawful, as to title. The Devill hath indeed a physical power, or potency in material or elementary things, to produce effects in them above the ordinary course of nature; and there is in him a pro­perly political or governing Power, in relati­on to his fellows, the evill spirits, and hence we read of his Angels; and him called, the prince of Devils: But in moral, and humane proceedings, he hath no more but a suggesting or counselling, a tempting or perswasive power: the only way he hath to sway men after him (that we know) is by illusion and enticement. When therefore we finde these titles, the God, and the Ruler of the darkness of this world, the prince of this world, and the prince of the power of the air, ascribed to him, and here a power, seat, and great authority, which he lends in assi­stance to the Beast; we must take these at­tributions figuratively, and improperly spoken; and to import no more, but that, as it were, and in effect, he is, and hath these things, in as much as by his stratagems, or subtile arts, he leadeth men both of high and low degree, in a manner at his pleasure; and by crafty insi­nuations, he is as prevalent, and bringeth men as wholly to his bent, as if he had a direct Em­pire over them, and they owned him as their Lord. Satans power being then spiritual, not temporal, perswasive or precarious, not im­perious, his giving his power to the Beast, whe­ther by resignation at the Beasts advancement, or by way of assistance to him when in au­thority, and in relation to his use thereof, as [Page 14] it could no way concern the Beasts temporal title, or interest in his civill authority, in point of lawfulness or unlawfulness, so it affords no instance for the taking in of an unentitled Civil power (whether in the Dragon or in the Beast) into the signification of this word, [...].

Lastly, for those places [Eph. 6.12. Col. 2.15.] Principalities, and Powers, are the titles both of good and evill spirits, in reference to other spirits; there being an order, and a distinction of superior and inferior, in respect of dignity and rule, among them by cre­ation; the which the fallen Angels doe still retain among them; and this they do (in all probability) both by virtue of their first ordination, the present dispensation of God, and their own mutual consent: now what power is in any Angel by creation, and primitive institution, cannot be unlawful.

Secondly, for the observation and judgement of the Learned concerning the notation of the word [...], I will not detain my Reader so long as to cite to him all that I have found in such to this purpose, nor to rehearse the words of any, but I shall only mention these following Authors thus interpreting this word, and refer him to the places in them. Zanchius To. 2. de natura Dei, lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. pag. 424. Beza in Marc. 1.27. Piscator, & Elnathan par in Loc. Jansenius Concord. cap. 113. pag. 822. Daniel Heinsius exercit. in Mat. 7.28. Gataker Dissertat. cap. 43. pag. 457. Ms. Leigh. Critic. Sacra in voc.

Subsection 2. Power distinguisht into Natural and Moral.

BUt it is not the meer notation of a word that will lead to the distinct and adequate conception of the matter, or thing there­by signified. Wherefore let us proceed to a more reall consideration of this subject Power.

I will not run through the whole scheme of distinctions upon the word. There are many sorts of Power which may easily ap­pear to be of a remote and disparate conside­ration to what this Text will bear. To omit therefore the Explication of those divisions of Power, into increate and create; of create, into active and passive; of active into imma­nently and transiently active. That Power which is in a created and corporeal substance, and is transiently active, or importeth the in­flux of one body, or suppositum upon another, may be twofold:

  • 1. Natural.
  • 2. Moral
    Of this Distin­ction see Mr. Whites Way to the tree of life, pag. 45. The Treatise of Monarchy part. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 2. pag. 19, 20.

1. Natural, or physical power, is the same which we call (more distinctly) strength, might, and vigor. It consisteth in an abi­lity to enforce or make impression upon another thing, or to cause it to yeeld or give way.

2. Moral power, is that which we call pro­perty or dominion; it consisteth in a right, title or interest, to order, dispose or govern. This Moral Power, as seated in man, may be taken either more extensively, so the object [Page 16] of it may be things inanimate, or brute beasts; for over them man hath a dominion given him of GodGen. 1.2 [...]. Psal. 8.5.: or more strictly, as it respecteth man only; and this Power this related we peculiarly call Authority: And this again is distinguishable according to the diversity of humane societies, some whereof are private, and domestical; and some are more publique. But as it is found in, or re­lated to a publique civill community, or body politique it's tearmed Magistracy, or political power.

That there is a reall difference to be found betwixt those two powers, the Natural, and the Moral; as in general, so as they may be seated in man as the subject, and respect man as the object, and particularly as they are competible to a body politique; and that the difference lies, as was said, herein, that the one consists in a meer impetus, or prepotency, or a suffi­ciency of strength to impose, or make im­pression on another; the other in a right, or imerest to bear sway, may be easie to fe [...].

1. The reality of the difference is evident, Natural power is found not only in man, but in brute beasts, yea in inanimates: Moral is proper to reasonable creatures. Again, al­though reasonable creatures be enduable with both, yet among men the natural and the mo­ral, might, and right to rule may be, and for the most part are distinct or separate each from other in regard of the subject of inherencePotestas in po­pulo, Authori­tat in Senatu. Cicero de leg. lib. 3.. The Natural power is ordinarily in them that do not, ought nor to rule, but to obey and be in subjection. There is a Moral power, or right to rule in Man over the other Creatures, yet in natural power he is inferiour to many of them. And amongst men, in Natural power, that is strength, or might of body, the family in greater then the Master, the Subjects excel [...] [Page 17] their Soveraign, the Souldiert overmatch their Leaders; whereas the Moral power in relation to each of these is in the Master, the Soveraign, the Leader. It is very seldom seen, if ever, in any humane Society, that Natural, and Moral power do meet in the same persons, as the sub­jects of inhesion. Suppose a City or Nation ruled by some strong hand, or a military force: even in that force there must needs be some one head, or councel of a few to guide, and command it, some Pretorian Magistracy to go­vern the Army, and in that head or Pretorian office (far inferior in Natutal power to the Ar­my, as the Army possibly is to the City, or Na­tion under its beck) would the supreme Power lie, and the military force would but be subordi­nate, and ministerial to that command, in like manner as the unarmed people are to that force. And although it be both right, and ne­cessary to the well-being of a political Society, that the Natural and Moral power do concur, the former to serve and support the other, and the discord of these is the high way to the ruine of both; yet it is not simply necessary to the being either of the Moral power, or of the community. Every sudden mutiny, or tem­porary Sedition, which is the Insurrection, and prevalency of the Natural power against the Moral, doth not dissolve the present Society or Magistracy, Political, or Military. The uproar at Ephesus [Act. 19.] was within a few houres quelled, and the City remained in its former state. Although upon the death of Ahaziah [2 Chron. 22.9.] his house had no power (viz. natural) to keep still the Kingdom, but Athaliah usurped it, yet within a few years it removed the usurpresse, and re­possessed both Power and Kingdom as in its former right.

2. And that the difference twixt those two Powers lies (as was said) in the meer forcible­nesse [Page 18] or prevalidity of the one, and the right or legitimacy to command of the other; that the one can, the other only may or ought to rule; the one possibly hath the appetite and act of governing, the other hath only the com­mission and warrant, should me thinks easily be conceived. Natural power we oppose to impotency, weakness; Moral power we op­pose to illicitness or wrong. Thence that say­ing, Id tantum possumus quod jure possumus; whereby it appears that Natural power consists in strength, Moral in rightfulness. And indeed wherein else should the difference be placed? What difference is there to be made betwixt the power of one Brute prevailing over another, or over a Man, and that of the owners ruling over that Brute? or betwixt that of a Man­stealer that hath gotten anothers childe into his hand by stealth, and that of the true father over his childe? or betwixt that of a Rout, or Band of Rogues, or drunken companions that may have assaulted and beaten the Ma­gistrates officers, and perhaps himself too, and that of the Civil Magistrate? each of these may de facto be Master; each of them may be found assuming, and exercising rule; they cannot therefore be distinguished by their acts: The d stinction then betwixt them must be taken from the ground, rise, or principle from which the acts of rule are put forth; which in the one and the other are divers. In the one those acts are from meer force and will; in the other, they are from authority, or a will authorized to prescribe or command. Each of these Powers (I say) may be found exercising rule; for we cannot call any power morall, meerly because it acteth in, or manageth those we call Moral or Civil af­fairs; for that a Natural power in a subject endued with reason may do: there may be an intermedling with Civill matters, where [Page 19] there is no moral power, as in case of Sedition, where they that are to obey will needs rule: as on the other hand there may be a Moral power, that is, a right to command, or dispose where the object is not moral, or civil; such is the power of man, given him of God, over other creatures (animate and inanimate) of disposing according to his reason and will, of their natu­ral acts of feeding, generating, labouring, &c. But that is a moral power in relation to any of these objects or matters about which power is exercised, which hath a moral rise or deducti­on, viz. an authorization, and right, and what hath not so is meerly natural.

The proper character then, or formall diffe­rence of each of these two Powers is, that the Natural power is no other then a brutish pre­dominancy or violencePotentia est id quod per si est effican. — Vit est majoris rei impetus, qui repelli, vel sal­tem ex arbitrio, & commode non potest. Greg. Tholos. Synt. Juris. lib. 11. cap. 2. Sect. 3. & cap. 1. Sect. 4.: the reason of its superiority, is its own might and will; it knows nothing of any civil liberty, order, or right; its proper act is ruere, impetere, or impellere, to rush in upon, assault, or bear down before it what stands in its way: if it use reason so far as to give out commands, to ordain, or proceed by any laws, or to take cognisance of causes by any rule, it is but ad libitum, without any obligati­on, certainty, or constancy, only as far as stands with its own humor or interest; for as its rise is its own force and appetite, so its end is its proper and private accommodation, and safety.

The Moral power (to speak of it only as seated in, and relating to man, and more par­ticularly that of the Civil Magistrate) is a spe­cial state, or function, or administration a­mongst men. Its original is not its own inhe­rent, or adjacent robi [...], or main strength, but positive constitution. It consisteth in, not only an ability, but a right to command. It hath indeed de jure, and should have de facto, a Sword as well as a Scepter; a coactive, as well as [Page 20] a directive power; the Natural power joyned to its Moral: but its Moral power lyeth in its word,Eccl. 8.4. not in its sword; Where the word of a King is, there is power, Solomon saith. It is its reason, not its might which gives law, and its reason is legislative, whereas anothers is not Ratio cujuslibet non est fa­ctiva legis, saith Aquinas Aquinas 1. 2a. quast. 96. artic. 3. & Cajetan in quaest. 96. artic. 5. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 4. pag. 46.. Its proper, primary, and genuine act is to prescribe, guide, and direct: the sword is requisite to it, but ex accidenti, upon occasion of others pravity; compulsoriness is not of its essence, but an after addition to it, for its preservation and efficacyIt's probably conceived that the sword is a super­addition to the Civil power, annext to it, Gen. 9.6. See Dr. Hammond of Re­sisting, &c. pag. 27. It could not be from the be­ginning, for in the state of integrity there was no use of it.. It never useth the sword, but where equity and dignity are consemned; where, by reason of the subjects either vitiousness, or defect of rea­son, bare authority cannot take place. The special reason of its erection by men, is the proneness of some to take the advantage of their natural power to invade, and the inability of others to defend themselves against such; and a prime end of it is to prevent or remedy the [...]xorbitances of Natural power in ill disposed persons; and thereby to secure the community, in order to the general, and each ones particular good. Again, it doth not take the Sword in the sense of our Saviour. [Matth. 26.25.Per accipere gladium in­telligitur propria authorita­te, & voluntate uti gladio. Principes enim, & judices non accipiunt quasi a seipsis, sed concesso sibi gladio a deo utuntur. Cajetan Jentac. 6. quaest. 3.] but beareth it [as Rom. 13.4.] that is, it doth not snatch it up, or wrest it from another to it self, but hath it delivered. It hath the Sword not only in its hand, but in its commission, and the Sword that it hath is not the cause, but the consequent of its superiority: It doth [Page 21] not assume, or hold its authority by vertue of the sword, but it assumes and holds the sword by vertue of its authority. The Scepter goes before the Sword, and is that which legitimates itPotentia vero debet sequi justitiam, non praire. Aug. To. 3. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 13. Observemus jus glad [...]i magistratibus esse a deo datum, tanquam necessarium adminiculum & nervum suae potestatis. Pareus in Rom. 13.4.: when it draweth the sword, the difference betwixt its Sword, and anothers, (that is armed only by natural strength) is, that its edge is not meerly backed with mettal, or in an arme of flesh, and sinews, but with warrant, and commission, and that signed by God.

Let me add by way of Supplement, to what hath been said, to demonstrate both that there is a reall difference betwixt Power Natural, and Moral, and what it is, this further. That even in God we distinguish betwixt his Power by which we mean his arme of strength and might, and his Power by which we signifie his throne of authority, or Soveraign rule: be­twixt his power of command, and his power of efficiency: betwixt his working power, and his legislative or willing power: betwixt the power of his right hand, and the power of his scepter of righteousness: in the Lords-Prayer, Kingdom, and [...], Power, ascri­bed to God are distinguished: and though both be natural, that is essential to God; yet the one we may call his Physical, the other his Moral powerVide Zanchi­um de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. Thes. 3. Arminium Dis. priv. Thes. 22. Sect. 2. & Thes. 27. Sect. 2..

Answerable to this twofold power in Man, there is a twofold subjection; one of the body only, which respecteth the Natural pow­er: the other of the body with the minde also, relating unto the power wich is MoralDuplex est servitus, cor­poris, & animi. vis quippe in corpore, in externis, pro­hibitio autem Juris ani­mum po [...]issinum cogit. Greg. Tholos. Synt. Jer. lib. 11. cap. 1 Sect. 4.. The Mo­rall power layeth an obl [...]gation upon the conscience: to it a man [Page 22] doth or ought to submit, as of right and duty: It may challenge our obedience though, and where it cannot compel to it: and we are to subject though there be nothing to overaw us to it: and this is the property of this Power in distinction from the natural: that which is but natural reacheth not the mind: the acts it putteth forth may lay a coaction on the body, but not a tie on the conscience. What ever be the natural, or armed power of one person, or party above another; no man is under any obligation to obey, nor hath he any claim to rule by virtue of it: if he had, there could be no such thing as Moral power in the world, this being (as was before said) for most part, if not ever, seated in those persons who in re­gard of Natural power, are inferiour to them whom they should reign over. If Natu­ral power could oblige to obedience, the Mo­narch were bound to resign his Crown to the multitude; and the Senate or Parliament must receive laws from the community. Every heady commotion, or rout of a multitude risen up, were to be submitted to, and were not to be re­pressed: the Town-clerk did not well to check the tumult at Ephesius, or to refer the plaintiffs from the present uproare to a court or lawful assembly, he should have let them go on, and have both submitted to, and assisted them. But this is absurd enough to appear so to any man; the commonly received maxime is, By nature men are (in regard of Civill jurisdiction) all equal, no man a Ruler, or servant to anotherHooker Eccl. posit. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26, &c. Ascham Di­scourse, &c. part 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Hobs Elem. part. 1. c. [...]. 1.. So that the effect of a natural power, where it conquereth is but to involve them that are un­der it in an actual subduedness, that they touch down, as a man doth to a Lion being under his paw, or as a traveller doth to a high­way-robber that hath set his pistol to his breast, that is, without either will or duty owed to the prevailer, or obligation to go any further in [Page 23] subjection then self-preservation, or the like considerations (irrespective to the invader) may suggest. This then is the different effect or re­lative state produced by Natural and by Mo­ral power in the persons to whom these respe­ctively are extended; the Natural power in­volveth men in an actual subduedness: the Mo­ral reduceth them to a rational and conscienti­ous subordination.

Subsection 3. That Moral Power only is intended in this word Power in this place.

HAving observed and explained this distin­ction of Power, it may perhaps remain a question with some, Whether this term Power, in the text, be not of so general an extent as to contain both the members of this division, or whether it be to be restrained to Moral power only. The word indeed is put indefinitely, or without express limitation; but it may neverthe­less be doubted whether it can here bear a sense as illimited as the words are. My apprehension is (and I think I shall make it good) that only Moral power can be meant by this Text; that is, not that which meerly hath might, force, or bodily masterdom; but that which, besides that, hath right, title, or warrant to govern.

My Argument for it (besides what shall af­terwards be said) shall here be this; Political, or Magistratical power, or the power of the Civil Ruler only is intended in this Text, but [Page 24] this is only a Moral, warranted, or autho­rized power; Therefore it is only a Moral, or warranted power which is here intended in the Text.

For the first, or Major proposition, That the Political or Magistratical power only is intended in this text; this, I suppose, will not be stuck at. The subject of this Proposition, There is no power but of God, is the same, and of equal extent with that of the rest of the con­text, viz. the discourse from the beginning of the Chapt. to vers. 8. but therein, it is mani­fest, the Apostle speaks only of the Civil Ma­gistrate, as the adequate or the sole object of the duty he is therein perswaded to. What power else can he call [...], Higher Powers, and [...], Rulers? of what power else can it be said, that he beareth the sword, he is the Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, a receiver of tribute, custom, fear, honour? Our Divines both Commentators and Controvertists, do strongly evince this against the Romanists, who would upon this text found the Popes power; and against this text defend a superiority for him over, and an exemption for his Clergy from the power of the Civil Magistrate. Against both which our Protestant Authors do make good that in this text Political, or State power only is intended, and unto it subjection is in­j [...]yned universally, or unto all persons, what­soever other power they be endowed with. Vide Whitakar To. 2. Controv. 4. cap. 3. pag. 647, 648 & quaest 7, 720. Pet. Martyr loc. com. [...]las. 4 cap. 13. Sect. 22. pag. 906. Chamier To. 2 lib. 15. cap. 17. Sect. 8. &c. pag. 637, 638.

For the Minor, that Political or State powe [...] is only a Moral, warranted, or authorize [Page 25] power; or, which is equipollent, all Political or Civil power is Moral, warranted, or au­thorizedFacultas mo­ralis civitatem gubernandi po­testatis civilis vocabulo nun­cupari solet. Grot. de Jure lib. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 6.: this also may be evident. They are called Gods, that is, Civil Magistrates, unto whom the word of God came (saith Christ) [Joh. 10.35.] that is, to whom the commission came to put them in the place wherein they were [So Mr. Burroughes paraphraseth itMr. Bur­roughes on Hos. lect. 1. pag. 10.] and they are Judges of Israel whom God commanded to feed his people, [1 Chron. 17.6.] Political or Civil power (as this text will tell us) is in genere ordained of God, is his ordinance: By Or­dination here (as I shall after undertake to prove) is to be understood the Institution, war­rant, approval, or authorization of God, or his appointment by his revealed Will, Law, or Word: and if Policy or Magistracy in its ge­neral concept or nature be ordained, that is, authorized of God, then is all Political power in specie, and every particular Civil Government, contained under or reducible to this Genus, warranted and authorized by God: and what is by him unwarranted, unauthorized or illegitimate, is in truth, no Political or Ma­gistratical power. When a person becomes a Magistrate, or a M [...]g [...]strate is made, what is the change or effect that is thereby wrought in that man? or what new habit, or endowment doth the investing of a person into Magistra­cy, either by election, succession, or otherwise, produce in him? He hath no more Natural power in him, then he had before; neither hath he ordinarily more understanding, judgement, reason, counsell to govern, then was before in him. Where is the change then? what doth this office add or put into him? why this is it, It gives him a moral capacity, or a warrant, right, authority to rule: it legally empowers, or enables him to command over, and obliges to be subject to his command all the natural power that is in the multi­tude, [Page 26] or body politique, however vastly supe­rior to his own personal, innate, and natural power.

I am confident beyond all doubt, that no man shall be able to give a perfect definition of Civil Magistracy, or Political power, which shall solely belong to it, and distinguish it from all other power, but he must take into his de­finition, warranted, authorized, lawful, or some other term that is equivalent thereto. In this I am confirmed in that I finde the concur­rence of learned Authors in their definitions of Magistracy expresly going this way. I shall give some instances.

Augustinus To. 3. De Trinitate lib. 13. cap. 13. Potentia quippe adjuncta justitiae, vel justitia accedens potentiae, judiciariam potesta­tem facit. Augustine. For Power joyned to Justice, or Justice added to Power, makes a judi­ciary power.

Polanus Partit. Theolog. lib. 1. pag. 330. Est autem Ma­gistratus politicus persona publica, potestatem in subditos legi­time gerens. Polanus. The Political Magistrate is a publique person lawfull bearing sway over the Subjects.

Bucanus Instit. Theolog. loc. 49. quaest. 13. pag. 853. Magistra­tus est officium politicum a Deo institutum, quo ceria persona, vel plures cum dignitate, & potestate legitime ac­cepta, totam Rempub. vel ejus partem, quoad [...] (i. e.) res quae ad hujus vitae usum pertinent, honestis legibus re­gunt. Bucan. Magistracy is a political office, in­stituted of God, by which one certain per­tain person or more do rule, with dignity and power lawfully attained, the Common­wealth whole or part with honest Lawes, as to the things that concern this life.

The professors of Leiden in their Synopsis. Synopsis purio­ris Theolo. per. 4. profess. Leid. Disp. 50. Sect. 29. Forma Ma­gistratus posita est in legitima potestate ipsi a Deo concessa, haec enim inflar anima functioni ejus vitam inspirat, atque efficacitem lar­gitur. The forme of the Magistrate is placed in the law­full power granted to him of God: for this like the soul breathes life into his function, and gives it efficacy.

Zanchius. Zanchius de Nat. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. Ad verum enim, le­gitimum, libe­rum (que) domina­tum constituendum necessarium est liberum, absolutum (que) jus, libe­ra, absolutaque potestas, quam Graeci [...] vocant, qua res quarum dominatum quaeris tuae fiant. For unto the making of a true, lawful, and free dominion, is necessary a free and absolute right, a free and absolute power, which the Greeks call [...], by which the things of which thou wouldest have the dominion, are made thine.

Grotius. Grotius de jure belli, & pacis lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Jus est qualitas mora­lis personae com­petens ad aliquid juste habendum, vel agendum; qualitas autem moralis perfecta, facultas nobis dicitur, minus perfecta, apti­tudo. Sect. 5. Sub facultate continetur potestas, tum in se quae libertas dicitur, tum in alios, ut patria, dominica, &c. Right is a moral quality be­longing to a person, whereby he may have or do a thing justly; a perfect moral qua­lity we call a faculty, an unperfect, an aptitude. Vnder a faculty we comprehend Power, both that which is over a mans self, which is called Liberty, and that which is over others, as the power of the Father, of the Master, &c.

Sect. 6. Sed haec facultas rursum duplex est, vul­garis, sc. qui usus particula­laris causa com­parata est, & eminens, quae superior est in re vulgari, utpote communitati competens in partes, & res partium, bon [...] communis causa. Sic regia potestas sub se habet, & patriam, & dominicam potestatem.But this faculty is again twofold, viz. Vulgar, which is for particular use; and Eminent, which is above the said Vulgar, as that which belongeth to a Community over its members, and their things for the common Good. So the Kingly power hath subject to it that of the Father, and of the Master.

Mr. John White his way to the Tree of Life, Chap. 3. pag. 46, 47.In Scripture as well as in other Authors the name of Authority, and Power are used indif­ferently, as if they were one, and the same thing: although in strictness of signification we may finde a real difference between them; for Power implies that strength by which any thing not only subsists, but withal bears out it self against whatsoever opposeth it, and be­sides is enabled to work any notable effect. Authority being most properly restrained to the government of reasonable creatures, is that power by which a superior hath right to pre­scribe unto such as are under him. By Right in this discription we exclude Tyranny, which is, the usurping of authority without and against right.

To these I may add that of Tacitus, Agricolae vita cap. 10. he speaking of the person of Galgacus our own Countrey man, Ausetre, trucidare, rapere falsis nominibus imperium ap­pellant; To despoil, to kill, to snatch away they miscal by the name of Empire.

Subsection 4. What is required to the making of a Mo­ral Power.

BEing come to this resolution that only Mo­ral, viz. authorized or lawful Power, and that species only of it, to wit, Political, or Ma­gistratical power is meant in the text; It may make for the further illustrating of this sub­ject we are upon, and the confirming of what hath been said upon it, to consider what it is that makes a Moral Power, or a Power to be warranted, authorized, and awful: and for that end to take notice of the divers wayes wherein a power may be said to be warran­ted or unwarranted, lawful or unlawful.

Unto a moral or authorized power, and so to the power intended in the Text, it is ne­cessary not only that the thing to be had and held, or to be acted and done, be in it self law­ful, but that it be lawful to the person in whom you subject the power, that it be lawfully in­vested in him, or that there be a due authorizati­on, or call of the person to it.

For the yet clearer understanding of this, let it be observed that there are four several wayes wherein Power may be said to be lawful or unlawful, warranted or unwar­ranted.

  • 1. In regard of Matter.
  • 2. In regard of Person.
  • 3. In regard of Title.
  • 4. In regard of use.

Let us take notice wherein each of these consisteth, and differeth from the other, and how far they, or any of them conduce to the making up of a Moral power.

First in regard of Matter. Power is in this respect lawful and warranted, when the work or act to be done by it is in its own nature al­lowed, or approved of God to be done by man. The Scripture declares to us a multitude of things which are put into mans power, or are made lawful or warranted to him; as, for in­stance, there is a power to eat, and to drink, to eat flesh, to eat without discriminating betwixt clean and unclean; and to eat without respect to an idol consecration. [1 Cor. 9.4. Gen. 9.3. Rom. 14.14. 1 Cor. 8. [...]. & 10.23, 27.] On the con­trary many things are for their matter unlaw­full, and also the power of them is unwar­ranted or forbidden to men. Such is the power claimed by the Pope many wayes, as the power of dispensing with divine laws, or of making of new in matters of Faith and Religion; the power of judiciary binding the conscience, or forgiving sins; the power of an Ecclesi­astical supremacy over all Christians; the power of disposing of souls in another world: these are super-humane acts, or such as were never concredited to man. Such again is the power of Witchcraft, Sorcery, false miracles, Divination, and the like prestigiatory delusi­ons, or pernicious seats, practised by men from their own presumption with the assistance or instigation of the Devil.

Secondly in regard of Person. There are in Scripture some Powers lawful for the matter of them, but variable in point of warrant as to the person, the tenure of them being allowed to one sort of persons, and inhibited to others; some persons only are made competent, and others are disenabled to assume them; and consequently in the persons capable to hold [Page 30] them they are lawful powers, in others not so. The Priesthood of the Law was invested in the sons of Aaron, with exclusion of all other: if any therefore besides them should have taken to them that function (as did Korah and his company) there was a power unlawful in re­gard of person. The Ministry of the word, or Office of teaching in the Church is expresly forbidden to women.1 Cor. 14.35. 1 Tim. 2.11, 12. If then a woman should take up this work (as some, they say, of late have done, and as the Pepasians, Quin­tillians, and Maxionites are said to allow and practiseAugustine de Haeres. cap. 22, & 27. Et Da­neus in cundem.) there were a power in this sense un­lawful. Master Knox of Scotland held a woman uncapable (otherwise then by extraordinary call) of Civil Magistracy, or Supreme ruleHistory of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland, pag. 220. & 311.. So did the Jews, as Mr. Selden tels usJo. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 7. cap. 6. pag. 812.: and others conceive it simply prohibited by our Saviour unto a Minister of the Gospel, by those words of his [Matth. 20.26.] According to these opinions if a Woman, or if a Minister should undertake the Civill power (however humanely admitted to it) their power would be unlawful in regard of Person.

This is a second way of a powers lawful­ness and unlawfulness. Where note, that under this head the person is considered in specie, or in some common condition, or rank, for as [...]o persons individual warrant, or the want of it, that's reducible to the next parti­cular.

Thirdly, in regard of Title. A power may be in it self, or for matter abstracted from persons lawful, and a person may be in com­mon qualified for investure with it, that is, as capable to receive it as another, but all this makes not this or that man a Moral power. There must be put one thing more to both these to constitute an authorized or lawful, and so a moral power; and that is a right or title to rule.

This is of the nature and essence of Moral power; for what is Authority, but a right to Rule? As private dominion or property con­sists in a right to employ, and dispose of the thing owned; so publique dominion or autho­rity consists in a title to rule.

That right or title is necessary to all tenure, or to Civil dominion in general; or, that such right in most worldly things consists in a spe­cial property, or sequestration of the things from common claim, and use to one, or some peculiar persons, it may seem too much di­gressive and not needful to go about here to prove. For however some things by reason either of their vastness, and inexhaustibleness, or their joint-occupyableness by all without in­terruption to any, are exposed to the common, arbitrary, and promiscuous use of every man, as are the great Ocean, the light, the air; and however at the beginning of the World, and for some time after, by reason of the fewness and simplicity of mank [...]nde, dominion or right, in respect of the objects, was not reduced to distinct property; yet now, upon the multi­plication of occupants (besides the emergent pravity, into which men are lapsed) in most things dominion, or right is stated by sequestra­tion, or peculiar appropriation; and that doubtless agreeably to the law of Nature, and from the dictate of right Reason, and the ge­neral agreement of all men that are but sound witted, and any thing moralized. Yea it is delivered to us by Scripture to be the act of God, The earth hath he given to the children of men, [Psal. 115.16.] he hath given it, as the experience of this, and all precedent ages discoverable to us, tell us, not to be catched up as fodder and harbor are by brute beasts in the Wilderness, among whom the stronger and fiercer seize on what, and where they please, the weaker take only what the other [Page 33] leave them; but under a rule of equity and right ap­portionated or distributed by property: according to that of St. Paul, He hath determined the bounds of thei [...] habitation, [Act. 17.26.] and that of Moses, When the most high divided to the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Ad m, he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel, [Deut. 32.8.]

But to follow this Argument only with applicati­on to our particular subject. Amongst the things that are subjected to property, or a seq [...]estred right, all authority of one person over another must ne [...]ds be one, yea, and that more, or rather then other things. For, though other things in the first age of the world migh [...] have been common: as soon as ever ma­trimony, or other domestick or civill societies were instituted, he rights of the correlatives of these soci­eties were distinguisht, and appropriate; neither could it be other ways: for whereas there was possible to be a community of right, or use at the beginning in things of ordinary and external possession, whether moveable or immoveable, yet in matter of authority this could never be: It is repugnant to the nature of the thing; it cannot exist without the subjection of some determinate persons to it; and you must of necessity put, and tie up authority, and subjection in distinct and several subjects, so as it may be said, this man is to command, and these are to obey; whereupon it is inevitably to be yeelded, that autho­rity consists in a right or title to rule appropriate to one, or some certain persons, & reserved from others.

That to the producing, or constituting of a moral power (whether Civil Magistracy, or any other) there must go the entitling or interesting of the persons to it, or an investing him, or them with a right thereto, may be thus further manifest.

All Moral power is derived from God as the foun­tain or Author. That which the Apostle here saith of the Civil Magistracy in specie; There is no power but of God, the powers that he are ordained of God, is true of all power in general, and he might have so expresly extended it, had his scope in this place [Page 34] been so large. Gods derivation of authority to men must needs import two things.

1. His institution of authority in the general, with the several species of it, as conjugal, parental, herile, magistraticall.

2. His communicating, conferring or convey­ing that power, which he hath so instituted to be, to particular persons.

There must be this latter as well as the former to the real & actual constituting of an authority, or put­ting it into existence. Gods ordaining at the first the conjugal, parental, herile, and political power, that is, his appointing that the husband, parent, master, or prince shal have authority over their respective corre­latives (suppose by those words of the commandment, Honour thy Father, &c.) doth not of it self put any of those authorities in being, or in one person more then another; or it makes no man a husband, fa­ther, master, or Prince. Wherefore, if we will make this good, which cannot be denyed, that all Power, viz. Authority, is derived from God, we must say God doth by some act of his (besides his allowing or prescribing Government, with such and such species of it to be) convey authority to individuals, or particular persons. It must further be acknowledged that this act of God must be such as that by it, not only the person authorized, but the rest that are concerned in that estate, in point o [...] use of it, or duty to it, may understand that such an one is singled out by God to sustain this authority. How else could any in conscience of Gods ordinance, either assume such authority over others to themselves, rather then yeeld it to others, or others attribute it to them rather then to others, or to themselves? Now can it be imagined how such an act of God so humanely intelligible should be passed, but either it must be by his immediate revelation from heaven, and there­by indigitating, or pointing out (as it were) such a person, or persons to such an authority, in such a place; or by chalking out a way to men, or giving rules in general to them, how such and such authori­ties, [Page 35] shall accrew unto men; which wayes or rules shall serve in all cases (unlesse where himself shall immediately interpose) to create superiori­ty, or convey power to men, and to discover the empowered.

The former way, Gods designation of particular persons unto authority by immediate revelation from heaven, is not now exercised or expected, neither was it ever in ordinary, or constant use. The latter therefore is the way remaining to us.

That there are such wayes stated, or rules pre­scribed by God for mens entry into relations of power over others, and those necessary to the being thereof, so as without them all ordinary claims to such conditions are null, is very evident, and con­fessed in the relations of parents, masters, hus­bands, pastors of the Church, and many others; and there is no reason in the earth (to me excogita­ble) to think it is not certainly so also in the Ma­gistratical state; What those rules or wayes in par­ticular are, in reference to Civil Magistracy, here is not the fit place to enter upon the set enquiry, but I shall for this have fuller opportunity (as also for the proving more largely that such rules there are given of God) afterward in this discourse. But if thus much be admitted (as I see not how it will be gainsayed) it sufficeth to prove the thing we are about, viz. that the essence of Moral power consists in a title, or right to rule. For if all power be from God, not only as appointing, the office to be among men, but as appointing the person, or persons to the office: and his ordinary, constant way of appointing the per­son to the office, be the prescribing of a rule for mens ingresse into the authoritative relation, or accession to power, by which way he communicates that power to them which is not in others, and which otherwise is not in them, it must needs be that as such admit­tance unto power most certainly gives right and title to it, so upon mens having, or not having such [Page 36] entrance to it depends the reality, or nullity of the power they to) themselves challenge. We have seen this third kind of lawfulness or warran­tableness of power (viz. in regard of Title) and the necessity of it to the being or constituting of a moral power.

Fourthly, there is yet behind another way where­in power may be said to be lawful, or unlawful, viz. in regard of use. That power which in re­spect both of matter, and of person, and of title is lawful, is yet to undergoe a further qualification to regulate it, which concernes the use, or employ­ment of it: a power lawful, and right for its com­posure must also be legal, and right for its practise; its course, and processe in government must be altogether just▪ it may decree, and do only equal and right things, and in this respect that power is unlawful, or culpable which doth enact, or execute any injustice or wrong. So were those ten Kings, [Rev. 17.13, 14.] who gave their power up to serve the Beast, and to make war with the Lamb.

But among these four wayes of the lawfulness and unlawfulness of a power, which we have thus di­stinguished of and explained, there is this difference to be noted. The three first wayes do concern the being, composition, habit, and constitution of an authority or Moral power; the fourth only concerns the act and exercise thereof: and consequently the three first conditions of lawfulness are simply ne­cessary to the making of the power, the fourth is but accidental; and exterior to its making; an unlawfulness in any of those three respects is incon­sistible with, destructive to the nature of a moral power, and consequently secludeth the power that is in any of those things peccant from any claim to this text; whereas that power which only offends in its use, or acts of power, may well, as to its being, and constitution be moral, and interested in the text, and its universal actings only be accounted forein, or disallowed ground therein. For this is [Page 37] (as far as I have observed) yeelded by all, and is very certain, that every unlawful power, so far as it is unlawful, must be excluded out of the meaning of this textSee the Au­thors quoted by Mr. Prinne, his third part of the Power of Parli­aments, p. 14.. The power therefore that is unlawful as to its being, and constitution, is wholly and ab­solutely secluded; the power that is unlawful only as to exercise may be for its habit, or being inclu­ded in it, and its irregular acts only discarded from it.

To make this observation (if need be) yet more evident, as to that lawfulnesse which concerns the being of a power. Unto the constitution of a power in its individual essence and existence, you must necessary take in these three things:

  • 1. The matter of the power.
  • 2. A subject or person to sustain it.
  • 3. An investure or conveying of that matter of power unto that subject or person.

If all these three must go to the making of a power, then a legitimacy in every of these must go to the making of a Moral power; or a power law­ful in its constitution or being; and an illegiti­macy in any of these is an illegitimacy in the very being, and so a nullity to the power as moral, or a making of it no authority.

1. An unlawfulness in the matter of a power de­stroyes its moral being. The Pope assumes to him­self a power to dispense with the consciences of Christians in divine Lawes. This power, we say, is unlawful for the matter, or in the whole kind of it disallowed to all, and every one of mankinde: and therefore we say it's null; we deny any such power to be in him.

2. An unlawfulness in regard of person evacuates the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themselves the office of the priesthood; this power, lawful in it self, as for the matte, was not law­full, but prohibited to be in them; their Pr [...]est­hood therefore was a nullity, they were indeed no priests.

[Page 38]3. Let there be a power lawful for matter, and a person capable, or induable with it, yet if there be not a lawful investure, or conveyance of this power to this person, there is yet in him no moral power; an unlawful, entry, or tenure nullifies the power in that respect. John Becold (called John of Leyden) takes upon him in Munster to be King, and as King acteth and ruleth all at his pleasure; this King being destitute of a just call, title, or tenure, was therefore but scenical, and nothing as to a mo­ral power, or real magistracy; he was in truth no King, but a traiterous Villain; the unlaw­fulness here is in the constitution of the power; that his having, and holding the pre­tended Soveraignty, that his being in power was unlawful.

In any of these three wayes of unlawful power, you cannot sever the unlawfulness from the being of the power; take away that which is unlaw­ful in any of them, take away the matter, or take away the person, or take away the tenure, and you destroy the very being of the power. For ex­ample, in the third (which most concerns our purpose) where one takes and holds the place of Power without right, or title, the thing which is here unlawful is the very tenure, or holding of power; if then you will take away that which is unlawful, you must take away the persons tenure, or holding of power, and so you take away the being of this power. No otherwise is an unentitled tenure taken away, but either by deposing the unlawful possessor, or by crea­ting to him de novo, a just title, and confer­ring on him a right: now either of these two wayes the power that was unlawfully occupyed ceaseth.

If then it be granted that from this Text is excluded every unlawful power so far as it is unlawful, or whatever in the power is unlaw­ful; Seeing the unlawfulness of a rightless, or unentitled power, is in the being of it, not in [Page 39] the exercise meerly, and for that reason the un­lawfulness is inseparable from the power, it must needs be that an unentitled power is utterly and absolutely excluded from the meaning of this Text: or, in short, seeing the being of the power is unlawful, the being of the power must be shut out of our text. In this respect the reason is the same betwixt an act of injustice of a power lawful as to title or constitution, and an un­just occupants act of being in, or holding the power; betwixt Ahabs seising of Naboths vine­yard, and Athaliahs intruding into Joash his kingdom, the one is an act of Tyranny as to exercise, the other is an act of Tyranny as to title. You cannot otherwise either give admit­tance to the Text, and to the ordination of God, or deny it unto the one, then you may do to the other: if you say the unlawfulness of oppression excludes Ahabs act from this Text, I may with as good reason say the unlawfulness of wrongful occupation excludes Athaliahs act, which is her be­ing in power from the same.

CHAP. II. Of the term of GOD.

THese words, of God, ordained of God, are the two Predicates or things which in this sentence are enunciated, or spoken of the subject, the power. And they are the medius ter­minus, or the bottome or ground of the argument; the first and principal argument which the Apostle in this his discourse of the subjects duty to the Civil Magistrate, bringeth for subjection to the higher powers. And they are a medium of a very great force and authority: being they offer to consideration the highest descent, origination or de­rivation of the powers here pleaded for, viz. that they are of God, ordain'd of God. These terms then are of a very main, and material importance; and the de­fining and clearing of the sense of them cannot but be chiefly necessary and useful.

It will easily be granted only those Powers are here intended unto which these predicates (of God, or­dained of God) are truly, and in the sense of the Apostle in this place attributable. The business then will be to enquire, How these words must be here taken, and what is their special meaning in this place.

Both of these terms refer the subject they are spoken of, the pow rs that be, unto God as the au­thor of them; but the former doth it in a more ge­neral word,Pareus Tolet. the latter more expresly; the latter therefore may be, and is by Expositors taken as the [Page 41] explication and limitation of the former. We will first examine the former, the more general term, of God, and after descend to the following, the more special notification of the powers derivation, ordai­ned of God.

SECT. I. The divers Scripture-acceptations of this term, of God, recited.

THere is no power but of God. This phrase, of God, is of a divers acceptation and use, both in Scripture and in Theology. That we may come the more clearly to the meaning of it in this text, I shall endevour, first to sum up the different uses of it in Scripture, as I have collected them.

In the general all the wayes of the being of things of God may be reduced under two heads, that is, [1. Of his hand. 2. Of his mouth.] or, [1. Of his work. 2. Of his word.] or, [1. Of his doing. 2. Of his declaring.] But then each of these may be subdistinguished.

Of the former, the being of a thing of Gods hand, work, or doing (which we ordinarily call his Provi­dence) we must again distinguish. It may be taken either,

1. In a more general and large sense, so as to im­port only that some disposings or proceedings of God, are the antecedent or occasion upon which certain things come to passe. And thus the sinful actions of the creature are said to be of God.Judg. 14.4. Samsons unlawful desire to have to wife a daughter of the Philistims: 1 King. 12.15. Rehoboams either unjust or imprudent refusal to satisfie the ten tribes in their desire of easement of their former burdens:2 Chron. 25.20. Amaziahs inso­lent, [Page 42] and foolish rejection of the peaceable overture and advice returned him from Joash: these sinful courses of these persons are said to be of or from God; that is, in the same sense wherein God is said to hearden the heart; Exod. 7.11. Ezek. 14.9. 1 King. 22.23. Judg. 9.23. Isa. 29.10. Mat. 6.13. 2 Thess. 2.11. 2 Sam. 16.11. 1 Kin. 11.14, 23, Isai. 10.5. Psal. 105.25. Rev. 17.17. Zeph. 3.5. Jam. 1.13. to deceive; to put a lying spirit in the mouth of some; to send an evil spirit between men; to powre out upon men the spirit of deep sleep, and to close their eyes; to lead men into temptation; to send men strong delusions that they should believe a lie; to bid a wicked man curse a righteous; to stir up and to send men when they enterprise, and go on sinful atchievements; to turn the hearts of men, and to put in their hearts to do evil. Not as if he posi­tively acted these things, or efficaciously infused them into men, he will not do iniquity, he tempteth not any man, but in as much as he leaveth men to themselves and to Satan, he layeth no impediments upon their power, or active restraint upon their wils; yea, he so ordereth outward occurrences, as that they meet with fit occasion and suiteable inducements to those evils, (which his carriage to men he predetermineth before to use for holy ends, and most righteously, and foreseeth infallibly what men will thereupon do) hence therefore their running into those sins is (in a large and lesse proper sense) said to be of God.

2. Secondly, things are said to be of God pro­videntially, or of his hand, worke, and doing, more directly, or in a more proper and positive accepti­on, that is, so as he is the author, or efficient cause of them, or so as they are not meerly from his working providence, as the hint or occasion only, but from him as the worker, or agent producing them, or putting them in rerum naturâ. Thus all positive beings are of God. [Rom. 11.36. 1 Cor. 8.6. Heb. 2.10.] that is, the existence of all individuals or singulars, with all their motions, effluxes or actions, Act. 17.28. whether the agents be irrational, Mat. 10.29 or moral, rational and free, [Isa. 28.29. Prov. 16.1, 9. & 20.24. & 21.1.] and all the conditions, and events; all the evil; and all the good that befals [Page 43] any creature, [Psal. 75.7, 8. 2 King. 6.33. Ia. 1.17.] and these whether they be from second causes advi­sedly and intendedly, or they be meerly casual and contingent in respect of them [Prov. 16.33. 1 King. 22 34. 2 Chron. 22.7. Gen. 50.20.]

And things are this way of God, viz. of his direct and positive proceeding two wayes:

1. By his ordinary providence, or as he work­eth in, and by natural causes, and in a natural course, as in the aforegiven instances.

2. In a way of supernatural efficiency, or work­ing of Grace. So persons are of him in their estate of Grace, [1 Joh. 5.19. 3 Joh. 11.] and so the gracious effects that are in persons, are of him, [2 Cor. 5.18: & 2.17. 1 Chron. 29.14.] the former way the Schools call his general, the latter his special concourse.

Secondly, of God, signifies of Gods mouth, word, or declaring: a thing is said to be of God that pro­ceedeth out of his mouth, or is spoken, or uttered by him. Now we must note, the things that proceed out of the mouth of God are more princi­pally of two sorts, in as much as the mouth or word of God is a declaration of his will, and the will of God is distinguisht by a twofold accep­tation.

1. The first is, his [...], or will of Decree, or that will which himself purposeth to execute, or have to be.

2. The second is his [...], or his Legisla­tive or preceptive will, which delivereth the rule or law which man is to do, or walk by. Hence it is, that the declarations of the mouth of God are suta­bly twofold, and of two sorts of things. [1. Narra­tive or manifesting. 2. Imperative or regula­ting.] Under the first sort are comprised all the discoveries of Gods own wayes, and works, or of what God himself hath done, doth, or will do; all the revelations or prophesies of Gods proceedings, past, present, and to come; all Divine histories, promises, threatnings, or other predictions. That [Page 44] (saith the Prophet) which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, have I declared unto you, [Isa. 21.10.] Under the latter head, the decla­rations of his Imperative, or regulating will, are contained all his Commandements, or concessions unto men; whatsoever God injoynes or allowes man to do, or not to do; all divine warrants, commissi­ons, precepts, or permissions touching humane acti­ons and affairs. According to this last acception that is of God that is authorized by him unto men; that is not of God, which he disapproveth, prohibi­teth, or warranteth not unto men.

Let us, in reference to the latter, the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of declaring his ap­proving or authorizing will, observe, for explica­tions sake, some instances of both sorts, viz. both Positive and Negative out of Scripture.

1. According to this sense both persons and things are affirmed to be of God.

1. Persons are owned thus to be of God; that is, to be authorized, and approved of him to be in their respective states and places. Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God, saith Nicode­mus unto Jesus, [Joh. 3.2.] and Christ saith, He that is of God, he hath seen the Father, [Joh. 6.46.] If this man were not of God, he could do nothing, saith the blind man of Christ, [Joh. 9.33.] And the Apostle John often hath this phrase, Try the spirits whether they are of God, every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God. Ye are of God little children, —we are of God, [1 Joh. 4.1, 2, 4, 6. & 5.19.]

2. As persons, so wayes, doctrines, and practi­ses are in this acceptation said to be of God. If any man (saith our Saviour) will do his will, he shall know of the Doctrine whether it be of God, or whether I speak of my self, [Joh. 7.17.] If this counsel or this work be of God, ye cannot overthrow it, quoth the Doctor in the councel at Jerusalem, [Act. 5.38, 39.] And David said of his enterprise of bringing up the Ark of God to his C [...]ty; If it seem good unto you, and [Page 45] that it be of the Lord our God, Let us send, &c. [1 Chron. 13.2.] A parallel phrase to this of being of God is that of being from Heaven, in distinction from that which is of men. As in that question of our Saviour to the chief Priests, [Mat. 21.25.] The baptism of John, whence was it? from heaven, or of men?

2. Negatively, in this sense many both persons, and things are denyed to be of God.

1. Persons are said not to be of God. Whoso­ever doth not righteousness, is not of God. Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God. He that is not of God heareth not us, [1 Joh. 3.10. & 4.3, 6.] This man is not of God because he keepeth not the Sabbath, [Joh. 9.16.]

2. Wayes are denyed to be of God. All that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, &c. is not of the Father, but is of the world, [1 Joh. 2.16.]

I have thus endevoured to gather together, and lay down distinctly the several wayes wherein per­sons and things may be said to be of God, and so the various senses of this phrase, of God. The sum is, of God is first either of his hand, and providence, and so a thing may be of God, 1. Either occasionally: 2. or, casually. And this latter way things are of God, either, 1. By his general, or, 2. By his special concourse. Or secondly of his mouth, and word, and so a thing, may be of God, 1. Either Narratively: 2. or, Legislatively, and by way of authorization, approbation, or warrant to men. And this last way Scripture declares, 1. Some both per­sons, and wayes, to be of God. 2. And some both persons, and wayes, not to be of God.

SECT. II. For the clearing of the Question which of these acceptations are proper to this Text, divers things discussed.

BUt now the Question is, in which of those senses the term of God must be taken in this Text? Some of these acceptions are so plainly, and remote­ly distant from the purpose of the Apostle, that they need not at all come under this enquity. Of this sort is the being of a thing of Gods hand, or providence occasionally, as the sins of men are, which I shall therefore passe over, as also the being of a thing of Gods mouth narratively, or pro­phetically.

Subsection 1. The difference betwixt the Narative, and the Legislative word of God: and that Scri­pture predictions are not a warrant for us to act upon in the things pre­dicted.

ONly to give this note of difference betwixt the Narrative and Legislative expressions of Gods mouth.

[Page 47]1. The former is the scheme or platform of Gods own wayes, and of his will of purpose or decree so far as he pleaseth to reveal it. And the same things which are of his hand acting, are thus of his mouth declaring, either the history of them, as things done, or the prediction of them as things to be done by him. The latter, that which is Legisla­tive is the model, or rule of mans duty and wayes. This is one difference.

2. The Narrative word is the object or matter of our faith: the legislative of our practice.

These differences are well to be observed. When God reveales in his word that such a thing is, or shall be done by himself; that such things have been or shall come to passe: these revelations are the objects of our faith; we may, yea must believe them to be as they are revealed, either past, or fu­ture. But they are not therefore, or by virtue of such revelation, a rule or warrant for us to walk by; that is, we are not authorized or obliged there­by to act, or put our hand to the effecting, or pro­moting the execution of such thingsVide Amesi­um Medull. Theolog. lib. 2. cap. 1. Sect. 22, 23. Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 22. Sect. 15. cum Anno­tat.. God fore­told he would raise up evill against David out of his own house,2 Sam. 12.11. Luk. 24.46. Act. 3.18. & 13.27. and he would take his wives before his eyes, and give them to his neighbor, and he should lie with them. But this was no allowance for Absalom, Ahitophel, or any of that party to counsel, or act to the accomplishing of these things. The people and Rulers of the Jewes did most wickedly, and undutifully in the sufferings, and death of Christ: But they did nothing therein but what God be­fore had declared he would bring to passe by them.

There are some now a dayes who make it not only lawful, but a duty of the Saints of this pre­sent age, yea their main work or master-piece, to stickle against Civil Powers, both with tongue, and hand, both to cry and to pull them down; and their ground which they lay for this so strange a Position, is this double supposal;

First, That the Prophesies and predictions of Scripture declare the ruine of all eart [...] potentates to be a work which God will effec [...] [...] this time.

Secondly, That whatsoever be not [...]d to us [...]y Scripture prophesie to be the purpose, cour [...] ▪ or di­spensation of God in our generation, that we are bound to act for, and promote to our uttermost, and are to take the said dispensation of God for our call, rule, and warrant for the same. Both these supposals and that conclusion inferred from them, I finde laid down and insisted o [...] in the books of one Mr. Tillinghast The former of the supposals is in his Generation work, part. 1. pag. 42, 55. the latter, pag. 19, 43. 63, 72, 73. and part. 2. pag. 7. The conclusion is in his knowledge of the times, the Appendix, con­clus. 30. pag. 344. and Gener. work part. 1. pag. 55, 66. To debate these positions with him is not my enterprise here. This only will I say to them, The former of his two supposals is a thing to me very inevident, and will (I think) scarse be cleared so well as to be made a principle upon which a practical conclusi­on may be built. The latter is a most unsound and presumptuous positionSee this well discussed in Dr. Sclater his Sermon on 2 King. 9.31. pag. 25, &c.. The Scripture aboun­deth with multitudes of instances of divine predictions, and hu­mane executions; the former expresly owned, the latter as plainly disowned and condemned by God. The examples above given of the sufferings of Da­vid, and of Christ, may serve to be produced instead of all. And I shall add only, that Baasha had a prophesie for all that he did against Jeroboams house, yet is he not excused by that, but condemned neverthelesseSee 1 King. 14.14. & 15.29. & 16.7.. It is very strange that men of sober heads, and savoring of Godlinesse, should in these dayes under the name of Saints, lick up the vomit of Hacket, of Mountzer, and of John of Ley­den See Camdeni Annal. To. 2. p. 37. Joh. Sleiden Comment. lib. 10. pag. 253. Muntzers life in Rosse his [...].. If divine providence and dispensation of it self make out a rule to us to walk by, their horrid [Page 49] miscarriages,CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. and fatal ends should have taught the men of these No ions quite otherwise. I will but make up this (somewhat necessary) digression with a passage in Daniel, and the explication of it given by Expositors. It is said [Dan. 11.14.] Also the robbers of thy people shall exalt themselves, to establish the vision.

This sentence expositors apply to Onias the Priest, and certain Apostate Jewes, who in the dayes of Antiochus the great his reign over Judea fell from him, and went into Egypt, and sided with the King thereof, his enemy, and by petition obtained of him, that they might there in the Countrey of Heliopolis, build a temple, and an altar unto God, like that at Jerusalem. And for this their both civil and religious Apostasie they pre­tended the fulfilling of the prophecy of Isaiah [Cap. 19. v. 18, 19.] In that day shall five Cities in the land of Egypt speak the language of Canaan, and swear to the Lord of Hosts; one of them shall be called the city of Destruction, (in the margent of the Sun, that is, Heliopolis.) In that day there shall be an Altar to the Lord in the midest of the Land of Egypt, &c] And because of the Apostasie of those men upon that pretence the tex saith, (as Commen­tators refer it) they shall exalt themselves to establ sh the vision Divines Anno. & Diodate in loc. Vide Usser Ar­nal. part. post. de M. 3854. Edw. Simsons Chron Cath. A. M. 3853..

Subsection 2. Certain Propositions to explain those several wayes wherein things are said to be of God.

BUt the question will be concerning the being of a thing of Gods hand by way of efficiency, and the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of war­rant, rule or precept; whether both of these, or [Page 50] but one of them, and if but one, then which of them is it which is intended by this clause, of God?

Before I come to determine this question, as it lies betwixt these two in particular, it may be some­what conducible to compare them together, and to explain them a little more, and the reduceableness of things to both, or each of them. For the which observe▪

1. Sometimes a thing is both these wayes of God, viz. both of his mouth authorizing, and of his hand working it. That which his mouth enjoynes, his hand sometimes effects. [2 Chron. 30.12.] In Judah the hand of God was to give them one heart to do the commandement of the King and the Princes by the word of the Lord. The like see [1 Chron. 29.14. Phil. 2.13. 2 Cor. 5 5, 18.]

2. Sometimes a thing is of Gods mouth com­manding, but not of his hand working, God shews, injoynes to men their duty m [...]ny times when as it is not performed in them, [see Jer. 7.23, 24.]

3. A thing is sometimes of Gods hand, but not of his mouth. Many things come to passe by divine providence, or working, which though himself effect, and that by mans agency, yet he allowes not of that agency of man in them. Take for instances Gods sending of Joseph into Egypt, by his Brethrens sel­ling of him [Gen. 45.5, 7, 8. & 50.20.] the ex­pulsion of David out of his Kingdom, and the ra­vishment of his Wives by Absolom, [2 Sam. 12.11, 12.] The destruction and captivity of Judah by Nebuchad­n [...]zar, [Isa. 10.5, 6, 15. Jer. 51.7. & 25.9. com­pared with Chap. 47.6. Jer. 50.17, 18. & 51.24, 34, 35, 36.] The sufferings of Christ by the Jews, [Act. 2.13. & 4.28.] with many other things [as 1 King. 11.14, 23. 1 Sam. 26.19. Judg. 2.14, 15. Hab. 1.6, 13.]

4. Some things are neither of Gods mouth, ap­proving; nor of his hand, acting. So are the sins of men in their formal, precise, or abstract conside­ration, [Jam. 1.13. Gal. 5.8. 1 Joh. 2.15.]

Subsection 3. CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 3. Of Gods working in humane actions, whether good or evill; and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God, and of the other.

FOr the better understanding of these four particu­la [...]s, especially the two last of them, upon which there may lie some obscurity, let these Propositions be thereto added.

1. All beings, or things; whatsoever hath sub­sistence or existence; all events, effects and producti­ons, as to their matter, or positive entity, are of Gods hand, and working, [Rom. 11.36. 1 Cor. 8.6. Ephes. 1.11.]

2. Of those things that are of Gods hand, of working, 1. Some are of him as the sole efficient of them. So are those things which receive their being by creation, regeneration, or other such like supernatural, or miraculous production. 2. Others are so of God, as to be also the work, and effect of second agents. So are all those things which come to passe here below, and in the order of nature, or the ordinary course of providence.

3. In the causing of the latter sort of effects, viz. those wh ch are both of God, and the creature, these two are not coordinate agents, or set collaterally, or in parity, or equality of order; for that would import that both were first, and but partial, sociall causes, and as well the one as the other to be inde­pendent, or to have their causality in, and from themselves alone. But the one is subordinate to the other, that is, God is the supreme and first, the [Page 52] creature is the inferior, and second cause, and is de­pendent on, and receive its physical efficiency, or attingency of the effect from God, and that not par­tially or by way of addition or supply, but wholly. [Act. 17.25, 28. Isa. 54.16. Ezek. 30.24. & 32.3.11, 12.] and this holdeth in all acts of the crea­ture, whether holy or sinful, good or evill, as to the natural being of the action. That which the Apostle saith of his gracious workings, Not I, but the grace of God which was with me, [1 Cor. 15.10.] the same Joseph saith of his brethrens sinful deed, It was not you that sent me hither, but God, [Gen. 45.8.] The creature acteth, yet not it, but the power of God with it.

The creature hath truly, and really in it an active principle, and that principle truly and really exerteth or putteth forth acts, but it hath both the principle, and the activenesse put into it of God. His influence not only toucheth the effect, but the second cause, and moveth itContrary to this some of the Schoolmen. Molina de lib. Arbitrio. qu. 14. Disp. 26. pa. 111. & Disp. 32. pag. 133,. He worketh not only with, but by it, and that though in some sense mediately, in regard of his elevation, and use of the second cause, yet immediately also in regard of his nearest attin­gency, and that both by immediety of person and of virtue.

4. It behoves us to consider the subordinacy of the second to the fi [...]st cause, of the creature to God somewhat more distinctly. Observe therefore it is twofold:

  • 1. Physicall.
  • 2. Morall.

The former simply and absolutely concernes the being of every reall effect, and the vir­tue, or power by which it is produced by any second cause.

The latter respecteth the manner of the procedure of an eff [...]ct f [...]om a rational agent, and the relation, and correspondency it bears to the revealed, and pre­ceptive will of God given unto him.

All creatures in all their actions are physically subordinate to God; but reasonable creatures more­over [Page 53] are, and particularly man is morally subordi­nate to him; viz. as he receives all his activity from him, so he is to act by his Commission, and in a conformity to his direction, or command given forth by word: the ground and reason of the for­mer subordination is his being a creature; for as such he totally depends on God for his being and operation; the latter is from his being a creature endued with reason and will, and therefore working with deliberation and free volition; thence his per­son and actions are qualifiable with a moral good­ness, and evilness, and are capable of being regula­ted by a law, and prosecuted with rewards and pu­nishments. Man therefore in respect of his moral actions, stands in this twofold subordination unto God, physical, and moral.

5. There are divers differences twixt these two subordinations of man unto God, some of which it is to our present purpose to consider. They are different.

1. In the formall respect, or term to which they refer; the physical subordination respecteth Gods will of purpose, and hand of providence; the moral respecteth Gods revealed will, or word of precept.

2. In point of necessity, the physical subordina­tion is certain and immutable, so necessary as that it cannot be otherwise, it is impossible the creature should not be in all things subject to, dependent on Gods decree and hand of providence, both passive­ly and actively: the moral is not so, but may be, and is varied from, though this subordination be necessary de jure, and ought to be kept inviolate, yet it is not de facto, but it is oftentimes infringed. And here comes in sin; what is sin but the crea­tures breach, and transgression of the moral sub­ordination he stands in, and owes unto God his pre­ceptive will or word, either by a non acting, or by a contrary acting to the same?

6. By these differences it may appear (for I shall not strive to take notice of all) that these two sub­ordinations [Page 54] are in humane actions, not only distin­guishable, but separable and dissociable. Man may be subordinate to God physically in those actions wherein he is inordinate morally. And Gods will of purpose, and work of providence may go on, and be done, when his preceptive will takes no place, but is directly crossed, as it is in all the sinful motions of man. And hence it may appear of the sinfull acts of men, as they are something in rerum naturâ, how it may be said (as in the third Proposition above) the thing is of Gods hand working, but not of his mouth warranting it to man.

If it be here asked, Why God makes use of such agents to act by, as are displeasing and crosse to his preceptive will, when as he hath such choice of other ministerial agents, yea, and makes use of his creatures agency meerly of choice, not of ne­cessity?

I answer, though mans sinful acts cannot but be displeasing and dishonorable to him, yet the use he can, and doth make of them, is not so. It is for his honour to work by variety of instruments, and the commendation of his workmanship to bring to passe a straight and perfect work, with crooked and untoward tooles. His providences of this nature are the probations of men, both good and evil; and hereby he both worketh out more good then there is evill in the act of the subordinate agent so peccant, and accomplisheth the just punishment, both of others and of those he so imployes.

7. We must observe in the subordination of the creature to God in its production, though it receive all its efficacy and working from God, yet the causality of the first and second, of the superiour and inferiour cause, and the efflux of the effect as from the one, and the other, are distinguishable. As the creatures essence, and existence are wholly in and from God, yet far enough different, and distinct from Gods: so the creatures power and operation, unto the causing of an effect, is totolly received of God, yet Gods agency therein is one, and the creatures is [Page 55] another. Hence our sense tels us the sun shines, the fire warmes, chalke whitens, and it is so really. If we should say (as many Schoolmen do) that in this subordinate agency of the creature under G d, and their working together unto any effect,Molina. Suarez. the acti­on of God, and the creature is the same strictly and properly, as action is taken for productio activa (for as taken for productio passiva, or the effect, it may be clearly granted) yet, (although I see not why totall dependency, and derivation should more infer, or be a reason for the confounding, or identifying Gods and the creatures actions, then it is for the identifying of their beings) we must understand it of the materiale, and not of the formale of their actions, and so must be forced to put some distincti­on, betwixt the creatures causality, and the virtue by which he causeth; betwixt the divine influx to the creature agent, and the creatures [...], or efflux to the eff [...]ct; betwixt the creatures taking in the concourse of the first cause, and his issuing or putting it forth. That God and the creature are different agents in their producing of the same effect is granted, but how should they be so, if their acti­on or agents were altogether the same? Besides, if it were so, then the same action must be said to be morally good (viz. as from God) and evill (as from man) to be subordinate to a law ( [...]s from man) not subordinate (as from God). Again, if in this concurrence of these two agents to the cau­sing of the same effect, the action of each were wholly the same, then the same action would denominate them both, which we see it doth not. When a stone fals downward, a plant growes, a beast goes, eats, sleeps, we do not (nor can pro­perly) say that God fals, growes, goes, eats, sleeps. For although all these acts are in and from his con­course, yet, as they only are in the creature, as their subject, so they are also from the creatures na­tural principles, from which there is a procedure of these acts different formally from that of the divine cooperation, for which they peculiar denominate [Page 56] the creature and not God. In man, whose actions have a moral [...] different from their physical, and who acteth with deliberation and choice, this dif­ference (though it [...] in all creature act [...]) is more apparent. Let it be granted that in all his actions he is physically [...]ed by God, (though some admit it only of his imperate, transient and productive acti­ons; unto the immanent and illicit acts of his un­derstanding, and will, they will only allow a moral motivenessJo. Cameron Resp. ad Epist. viri Docti. cap. 1. in operibus eius pag. 736. a, & 737. a., but whether way soever it be (let the physical influence be supposed of all) in these hu­mane actions the strength and virtue is from God, the actuosity or agency is formally mans. Though the action be good, and so more peculiarly of God (he not only sustaining the will in the use of its freedom, but determining and carrying it (whether by a physical or moral influence, is not here to be dis­puted) to the willing and working of that good) yet the formal agency is only ascribed to man. Hence he is said to believe, hope, pray, and do the like graci­ous acts, and not God.

Hence it may appear (which is the reason I have travailed so far in these School intricacies) how in the sinful acts of man, the usual distinction betwixt the action and the moral obliquity of it, and that the former is from God, the latter is mans only, may hold. For,

1. Take it only in its natural or physical con­sideration, and so the action is both from God, in as much as from him is the energie, or force that goes to it; and from man also, in as much as he hath an hand, or activity in it, distinct, though inse­parable from that of God.

2. And take it as a moral act, in which the crea­ture oweth subordination and conformity to Gods law, and which floweth from a moral faculty in man, and so it is only from man, from his own will, according to that of our Saviour, That which cometh out of a man that defileth a man, for from within, out of the heart of men proceed evill thoughts, &c. All these things come from within, and defileth man. [Page 57] And that of the Apostle,CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 4. God gave them up to un­cleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dis­honour their own bodies.) God not at all inclining or drawing, or intrinsecally determining the wil in the election of evil, as neither doth he in its act of aver­sation, or refusal of good, or in a sin of omission. And thus it is manifest (according to our fourth proposition above) it may be said that some things (taking the term Thing in a vulgar sense) are neither of Gods mouth (approving) nor of his hand (wor­king.) For mans sinful action, though the matter, virtue, or activity be of Gods hand, yet in its for­mal and moral stamp, it is neither of Gods hand nor mouth.

Subsection 4. How the hand of God is clear from the sin of man when it acteth in mans sinful action, and from injustice in punishing him for that action.

IF it be here asked, How this may be, that God may use, and be the author of those actions, or motions of his creature in subordination to his working providence, which in their formal and mo­ral habitude are evill, and so deordinate or repug­nate to his word, and yet his hand and providence be as clear from the sin, as his word is clear against it: and how the creature is in this case justly puni­shable by God?

I answer briefly:

1. For the former, How God is clear from be­ing the authour of the sin?

[Page 58]1. It is not the sin formally taken which God makes use of to the production of any natural effect, but the physical motion of the creature to which the sin is adherent.

2. Let it be considered how man acteth in this physical subserviency to God. He is not impelled by God, but he moveth of his own accord, and free choice; he is not moved (as I think it may be affirmed) physically of God, till he first move himself morally. Unto every moral act of man that is transient, and productive of any thing, there are required two things to be in him, Will and Power; the power, how great soever, doth nothing of it self, it is the wils injuction that educeth the act; though both concur to the action or effect, yet the power doth not lead or draw forth the will, but the will actuates the p [...]we [...]. The power in it self is neither good nor evill, posse peccare was no fault in Adam, he had it in his integrity; a defecti­bility was both in him, and in the nature of An­gels originally: neither doth the power make the action to which it is exerted, either good or evill; but the moral tincture is wholly from the will, and so intirely doth it result thence, that the will in some sort (whether to good or evill) stands for, or is equivalent to the deed in Gods account. The question then is, Whence is the will moved to this or that sinful act? God indeed useth the creatures hand or power, but who or what is the mover or swayer of the will? The Philosopher saith, and it's true, God is primus motor, the first mover, but this he understands of physical motion, and therefore in the external execution of that deed which is sinful, let it be granted that God begins, but in humane actions, there is a moral act which goes before the natural, an elicite act precedes the imperate, an election of the will before an elevation of the power. Now for the volition of the wil in reference to a sin­ful work, that's of it self, and its counsellor or dicta­tor, the practicall Intellect, as they may be each in their kind morally excited, or induced by their ob­jective [Page 59] attractives without, or the suggestions of Sa­tan; It must necessarily be acknowledged unto an evill course the will is not intrinsecally determined by God: he neither morally perswades, nor physi­cally impels it to such resolution, purpose or choice. God tempteth not any man, &c. [Jam. 1.13.] all, I think, that can be said of God, as to that act of the will, is that he abandons, or leaves the man to him­self, and to his objective and injective temptations, which though it may be an antecedent, yet is not in the least a positive cause of the wills default; and yet he never doth that, but very righteously, both in regard of his disobligation from any debt of as­sistance to his creature, and in regard of just provocation from him, ever since his first de­fection.

3. There are causes imaginable wherein even one man may honestly joyne in the same act with another, when it is to his knowledge in that other a sinful action: the diversity of the principle and end making the concurrence of the one just, of the other wicked. Take for instance Reubens counsel­ling and acting with his brethren in the casting of his brother Joseph into the pit, which they did for a mischief, he for a deliverance to him, [Gen. 37 21.] and Hushaies counsel to Absalom (which Absalom and his companions embraced) in shew for Absaloms service against David, but in intention and real tendency quite contrary [2. Sam. 17.11, &c.] And this is seen in the guiltless concurrence of one that is necessitated to enter into any contract that is unlaw­full in the party voluntarily contracting, whether usury, or otherVide Groti­um de Jure Belli lib. 2. cap. 26. Sect. 5. & lib. 3. cap. 1. Sect. 22..

How much more may it be yeelded to be so be­twixt these two, in this respect, as in other infinitely dispar agents, God and man; especially when we know there is no lesse distance betwixt the end which the one hath, and that of the other: accor­ding as Joseph expresseth it in the case between his brethren and himself. But, as for you, ye thought evill against me, but God meant it unto good to save [Page 60] much people alive, [Gen. 50.20.] could it not be so betwixt man and man; that one might lawfully joyn his hand in that act wherein another joyneth sinfully, yet God, though most righteous, is unconfined to the bounds of mans righteousness: it is his prerogative, as the supreme cause, not to be tyed within those rules, which subordinate agents are.

4. Let it be added, when God useth mans effi­ciency to inflict that upon one which from the sub­ordinate agent is sinfully inferred, as suppose slaughter, robbery, defamation, or the like, there what is wickedly done by man, is alwayes justly from God upon the patient: he no lesse righteously (as to the sufferer) takes away a mans life by the hand of an assassinate, then if he did it by a disease, or any other means: and being so, if we think it no impeachment to the justice of a supreme magi­strate to take away the life of a capital offender by such a judge, or executioner as may act corruptly in it, as doing it with a minde meerly acted by cru­elty, or mercenary respects; much more may we absolve the providence of the Almighty in the im­ployment of a sinful instrument to the accomplish­ment of his most just purpose and act.

2. For the other part of the question, The punisha­bleness of a person by God thus serving his provi­dence by his sinful action: the same things will serve for answer.

1. Man hath a concurrence or agency of his own formally different from Gods in the action.

2. That his concurrence is free, from his own will, without all compulsivenesse.

3. He therein proposeth to himself, not Gods end, or the serving of God in it, but he hath his own proper aim different from, and often contrary to that of GodWho so forlorn or impudent a­mongst miscre­ants as to say, that in his damned ambiti­on, or covetous­ness, or luxury he had respect to the will of God, which no man lightly knows but by the e­vent? Dr. Scla­ter Sermon on 2 King 9.31. pag 27..

CHAP. III. CHAP. III. A Digressive Enquiry concerning the voice, or declarative use of Divine Providence.

I Have here done comparing and explaining those two wayes of the being of things of God, betwixt the which the question lies. But before I can come up to the dissolving of it, there is another question shews it self in the way, which I know not well how to avoid the speaking somewhat to. For whereas our enquiry is, Whe­ther of these two wayes of the being of a thing of God (viz. of his mouth approving, and of his hand working) both, or but one, and if but one, then which of them is meant in the Text? A question may here be started, whether these two be not coincident? that is, whether the working hand of God have not a mouth or voice, or be not vocal, and declarative of the will of God to us, and if it be, then how far, and wherein?

CHAP. III. SECT. I. SECT. I. The usefulness of the said Enquiry.

THe question intervenient, and first to be spoken to then is about the use of Providence in the discovery of Gods preceptive, or approving and dis­approving will. This question I thought not good to omit, being of concernment to the subject we are now upon, and having here a fit place to discusse it, and its discussion being of more then ordinary ne­cessity in these dayes; wherein there is not on­ly much variety and manifold revolutions of Divine Providence in the greatest affairs, and those very unusuall and amazing, but a very frequent, studious, and solemn reference to it, as the voice of God, and as a Guide, Judge, and Interpreter of Gods will of command, or war­rant for the regulating of our perswasions and actions in matters of chiefest difficulty and dif­ference. We see how much Providence is poin­ted at, produced, alledged to justifie and con­demn wayes and causes; and to entitle courses to Gods approval or disapproval, and to induce men upon that account to own or disown per­sons and proceedings. I have long desired hearti­ly, that this question might be religiously, judiciously, and impartially debated. And to occasion it I shall here seriously deliver my weak thoughts upon it. I confesse my self to have entred upon, as a usefull, so an high and intricate question, especially as the tract of mens pens, and notions of their mindes of late hath run: There­in therefore it behoves a man (especially such an one as I) to speak with great caution and hum­ble submission.

SECT. II. CHAP. III. SECT. II. III. In what sense the word Providence is taken in this enquiry.

I Take up the word Providence because it is the or­dinary term; and I take it in the vulgar sense, for meer active, opera [...]ive, or productive providence. Divines do use it in another senseVide Moli­nam de lib. Ar­bitrio qu. 22. Disp. 1. pa. 287. Synopsis profess. Leid. Disp. 11. Sect. 2., (and the genuine signification of the word doth so im­port) viz. for that immanent or internal act in God, whereby he doth within his own thoughts order and contrive the affaires of the world, as they shall be accordingly acted and issued in the creature. But the ordinary acceptation, and so our present use of it, is to mean only effective or eventual Provi­dence; and so I here use it.

SECT. III. The Question discussed, Whether Divine Providence be, and wherein it is re­gulating, or declarative of the will of God to be done by us.

THe question then is, Whether Providence in pro­ducing visible effects in the creature, be legisla­tive, or declare the mind of God by way of rule [Page 64] to men,CHAP. III. SECT. IIII. Subsect. 1. or be a testimony of Gods commanding and prohibiting, approving and disapproving will, which men are to follow, or square their actions by, in like manner as his oracles, or dictates by vision, dream, or inward inspiration were to them that received them so immediately of God, and still are to us that have the record of them in the Scriptures; and if it be, in what things and how far?

Subsection 1. That Providence doth declare something of God.

IT is not to be doubted or denyed that Providence hath a voice, and doth declare something of God to us. As God hath a working word, [Psal. 33.6. & 147.18. Luke 7.7.] so he hath a speaking hand. Hence it is that his works are said to be declarative and instru­ctive, [Psal. 19.1, &c.] to be signes, [Jer. 32.20.] and men are willed to hear the rod, and who hath appointed it, [Mica. 6.9.] to come, and behold the works of the Lord, [Psal. 46.8.] which would not be to any pur­pose if they did not shew us something remarkable of God. But the question is, of what and how these are declarative to us? As it is a sort of Atheism to deny Providence a voice, so it is a great presumpti­on, and high impiety for man to take upon him to assign it its voice, or to make it speak to his own mind and turn; and an error of very dangerous consequence it is to misunderstand Providence, or construe it in any other language then its author im­poseth and annexeth to it. For the discovery there­fore of the truth in this particular, I shall endevor by the light of Scriptures (as well as I can apprehend them) to set down what Providence doth, and what it doth not discover.

Subsection 2. CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 2. That Providence doth declare somewhat of Gods counsels.

1. THe Providence of God is the image or ex­presse of his counsels; It doth therefore dis­close unto us somewhat of Gods will of purpose, counsell or decree. Two wayes God makes known to us his will of Decrees, [...]o wi [...], by Predictions, and by Providences. The fo [...]mer looks at, and reveales the things of Gods Will as future, this latter dis­covers them to us as p [...]st, or present. Providences are the effects, executions, or acomplishments, and so the coppy, print, or transcript of Gods purposes. Our God is in the heavens, he hath done whatsoever he pleased. Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he, [Psal. 115.3.136.6.] First, that is, from all eter­nity, his Will of good pleasure determineth, and then in the foreset time his Providence effecteth things. Only here we are to beware we stretch not this di­scovery beyond its own line, that is, beyond the past and present time. We must not conceit, or pretend to understand from is that of the purpose of God which it tels us not, or to see by it that which it shewes us not. Some there are that will proceed fu [...]ther then this mark, and meerly out of their own airy imagination presume by it to divine of things to come. I mean of moral and contingent futurities: (for where experience hath discovered a natural connexion of causes and effects, there a probable conjecture and expectation of future events neer at hand by the intuition of their particular and im­mediate causes may be gathered; as that a pregnant woman will bring forth a childe; that the evening or morning face of the skie will be followed with [Page 66] such or such weather the day next ensuing:) thus the A [...]rologer, and the self-interested Statist [...]oully over­lash and exceed their bounds in interpreting the pro­vidences of God. The Astrologer pretends a cun­ning to read in the great Ordinances of the hea­vens (whose huge volums in regard of variety, di­stinction, and distribu [...]ion of influences (as to this use doubtless) are to them, as the hand writing of the wall before Belshazzar was to the Caldean Astro­logers, altogether illegible, and unintelligible, yet) they pretend (I say) to read, and to be able to draw out from them a map of the disposition of the aire of every day for whole moneths, and years to come, and of the temper of living bodies, of the successes of Husbandry, Trade-adventurers, and political-enter­prises, yea, and of the very propensions, contrive­ments, counsels of mens mindes about Civill, Church, and spiritual affairs, with the revolutions that will attend mens lives, estates, names, and so­cieties, temporal and ecclesiastical, yea, what will passe not only betwixt man and man, but betwixt God and man; and (which is very strange) this map to be every year new, and for every Countrey, Nation, City, yea for every distinct sort or condi­tion of men, whether they live far dispersed from one another, or promiscuously intermixt with others, yea for each single person, different. The self-interested statist from Gods present proceedings, either in punishing or prospering a way, person, family, profession, or Nation will needs fancy, and confidently conclude that he doth foresee, and can presage what God hath determined, and will do with the same hereafter. Forgetting with what reason Solomon hath cautioned us against boasting of to mor­row, to wit, for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth; and not minding that men, and Nations, even in regard of their visible worldly condition, are in the hands of God, as the clay is in the Pot­ters hand, soon made, and soon marred; now moul­ded into this frame, and quickly turned into ano­ther, and that as the grace of God may suddenly, [Page 67] unexpectedly, and wonderfully change mens hearts,CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 3. or men deprived thereof may strangely alter them­selves, so God hath reserved out of what he hath clearly threatned in his word concerning mens temporal punishments, much more out of what his Providence at present dispenseth, a power to alter his proceeding in an instant.

Subsection 3. That Providence doth declare to us that God is, and what he is.

2. PRovidence is the Index or Character of the Divine Nature, and so it is Doctrinal, or delivers to us matter of faith, or what we are to know, and believe concerning the Divine Essence, to wit, as it is absolutely considered, or abstracted from distinction of personal relations. God is made known by his works, as the workeman is by his artifice, the cause by its effect, [Jer. 32.20. Rom. 1.19, 20. Psal. 19.1, &c. Act. 14.17.] Hence we finde that so frequently added in the prophets to the comminations and promises of God, as the end of the execution of them, and so of his providences, And they shall know that I am the Lord.

CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. Certain distinctions premised for the discovery how far Providence is declarative of the will of God, which we are to do.

3 BUt to come neerer to the thing in question. Providence is in some sort preceptive, and di­rective in matter of practice. Now for the opening of this use of Providence, we must distinguish,

1. Of preceptiveness, or the delivery of Divine precepts to us. This may be, 1. Either by way of original institution. 2. Or by way of abrogation of what is already in force. 3. Or, by way of declaration, remembrance, or monition of that which is already ordained. And again this third may be, 1. Either solitarily, 2. Or joyntly and by way of concurrence with other means, or the delivery of them otherwayes.

2. Of divine precepts, 1. Some are of the law of nature. 2. Others are positive, or subsequently instituted. And of both those, whether natural, or positive, 1. Some contain our duty to God. 2. Some our duty to man.

3. Distinguish of the use of Providence. This is, 1. Either ordinary, which the general rules of the word of God allow and dir [...]ct us in. 2. Or ex­traordinary, the which special [...]arrants in the word, given on special occasions have allowed, or pre­scribed.

4. Distinguish betwixt the giving of a rule, or law, and the determining of it to this or that particu­lar matter, or case.

Subsection 5. CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 5. Five Propositions explaining wherein Provi­dence is, and wherein it is not declarative of Gods will to be done by us.

I Shall apply these distinctions, and make use of them to our purpose in these following propo­sitions.

1. Providence (as I understand) c [...]nnot be said to deliver us the will or precepts of God for our practise by way of original institution: neither can it of it self abolish or make void any rule, or law of God before ordained: or draw a warrant for us to proceed contrary to the same. Suspend it may, or disenable from doing in point of affirma [...]ive precepts, but to the doing of the contrary it cannot dispense, nor can it dissolve a law.

2. Providence may by it self without the help of any other Index or Law-book deliver to us some­what of the law of nature, that is, so much of our duty to God as is contained therein. Divines di­stinguish betwixt cultum naturalem, & voluntarium, Ames. Medul. Theol. lib 2. cap. 5. & 13. seu institutum; the natural worship of God, and that which is voluntary, or instituted. The natural is that which belongs to him as Gods or by virtue of what he is, or the consideration of his nature; and this is taught by the law of nature. The insti­tuted is that which is given him by virtue of his own voluntary appointment. The former is simply ne­cessary and immutable, one and the same in all ages and to all persons. The latter is arbitrary and variable (as he pleaseth to order) and hath been di­versified: It was appointed to be one w [...]y under the Law, another way u [...]d [...]r the Gospel. The for­mer [Page 70] we say Providence my lead to, or (as it were) dictate to us. For in as much as of it self it reveals, that there is a God, and of what nature and perfecti­ons he is, it hence infers, or by force of that princi­ple of faith teacheth us, that he is to be worshipped, and in particular, that he is to be feared, loved, trusted in, called upon, praised, and obeyed, and to receive from us whatsoever else may be deemed an act of his natural worship. And this is all (I conceive) which Providence can of it self, or taken alone, and apart, teach, or inculcate. There being nothing else of duty which can be imagined ne­cessary, and immediately to follow upon that know­ledge of God which Providence reveals. That it goes thus far, will need little proof. The Apostle Paul told the Lystria [...]s that the living God left not himself without witness, Acts 14.7. in that he did good, &c. that is, by his good and merciful Providences he testifi­ed against the Idolatry of the Heathen, and called for their service to be yeelded to himself alone. And he informs the Romans, Rom. 1.20. that the same persons are left without excuse (for their sins, and therefore they must needs be taught somewhat of their duty) by the discovery of the God-head in the creation.

3. For other duties (besides the forementioned general rules which immediately refer to God) whether of the law of nature, to wit, those which respect man, or of positive institution, Providence doth not by it self dictate, or declare them to us. Observe here.

1. I say it doth not declare Gods mind to us in these things. It was before said the works of God, in as much as they discover the Divine nature, they of themselves tell us thus much, that God is to be, obeyed in all his commandments, but what his will- or commands are in particular, as touching the posi [...]tives of his own worship, or concerning either the natural or positive rights and relations which may be between man and man; and what our own con­cernments are; the particulars of these it doth not di­ctate or deliver to us.

[Page 71]2. I say this it doth not solitarily or apart, or by it self, or by its own single light or voice. For this must be acknowledged, though it doth not declare or promulgate, yet it doth confirm; and though it doth nor of it self discover, yet it doth second, and set on that which is before discovered of the mind of God. In reference to the whole revealed will of God Providence hath the use of a Testimony, that is, by way of association, or concurrence:See Dr. Sclater Serm. on 2 Kin. 93.1. pag. 25. though it be not Nomotherick, or Legislative, nor yet in the matters limitted in this proposition the original, or primary dictator of the will of God, yet where a declaration thereof is made, and the same is actu­ally known, understood, end apprehended, there Providence comes in, and gives a secondary sanctio [...].

Let the light of nature, or book of God writ­ten in the heart, or his word in the Scriptures first tell a man, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal; then, if the hand of God remarkeably break out in some notable curse or punishment upon a mur­derer, or thief, this Providence seen and noted doth by way of Item, or Second (in that it holds forth the displeasure of God against theft or murder) pro­hibite, admonish and warn him and others from those sins. But in matters of this natu [...]e Provi­dence solitarily or by it self alone is not significant, or declarative of Gods approving or disapproving will. Where both the law of nature, and the Scriptures are either silent, or (which is all one as to this) not understood, or apprehended, there provi­dence (as to these things) is dumb, or, if it must be said to speak, its language cannot be unde [...]stood.

Providence in these matters may be resembled unto consonants; as these without vowels make not any words, or speech, but compounded with them are vocal, and significative; so Providence in con­currence, and concomitancy with the written law speaks out to us, backing and confirming what the word declares, but of it self, or apart from this it cannot do that office in these things of moral or positive precept. Providence is in this respect like [Page 72] an echo, which reitera [...]es, and resounds to what the word of God in Scripture, or Conscience saith before, it doth rather consignificate, then signifie Gods will to us, When God hath made known to us by his [...], or enunciative word what his mind, or commandement is in this, or that particu­lars, then the providence of God, which before, and of it self could only tell us that God is to be obeyed in all his commandements, now be­speaks our obedience in these particulars, and addes its stampe, or sanction to the commands of God so revealed.

In things which the conscience is already infor­med of to be either agreeable, or repugnant to the law of God, providence coming in with any re­markable, either crosses or blessings, beareth witness to that law, and exciteth the conscience by way of Memento to take special notice of it. And thus it is a good second though not a solitary testimony. It hath vocem tonantem, an awakening, or start­ling efficacy, to rouze up the dowzie consolence to attend to the rule already receivedSee Deut. 4.3, 4. 2 Chron. 30.7. Mal. 3.18.. But this of­fice holdeth only in concurrence with the word. We cannot simply and singly conclude from any providence thus, God crosseth men in this, blesseth them in that way, therefore he disallows that; ap­proves this. But having a precedent light in the conscience from the testimony of Gods law of what he allowes and disallowes, his so crossing or blessing may be an accumulative witness [...]. Thus David ar­gues, By this I know thou favorest me, because mine enemy doth not triumph over me, [Psal. 41.11.] He know before from the written word, and from the particular messages that he had received by the Pro­phets Samuel and Gad both what God had pro­mised, and what he willed him to do; and there­upon this mentioned Providence of God toward him was an additional testimony. And thus Josephs brethen metting with a shrewd and sudden crosse were prompted out of the light, and sentences of their own consciences cleared, and called forth by [Page 73] that crosse Providence (as they took it) in Egypt to say, we are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear: therefore is this distresse come upon us. And Reuben sureably was enabled to say, Spake I not unto you saying, Do not sin against the childe, and ye would not hear? therefore, behold also, his bloud is required, [Gen. 42.21, 22.]

And the reason of the necessity of the anteceden­cy of the knowledge of the will of God unto the voice of Providence is very obvious. For before we can gather, or draw inferences from Providences, we must be able to understand their meaning, and to make an interpretation of them. We must first know for what they come, ere we can say what they direct us unto; but now the word of God, and the conscience in formed thereby, are the interpreters of Providence. It was that sentence of the Apostles Epistle, which expounded the hand of God upon the Corinthians unto them, For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep, [1 Cor. 11.30.] their own sense could tell them of the event that many were weak and sickly, and many dyed among them. And their Religion and conscience touched by it would tell them these evils were of God, and perhaps it might suggest to them that they came for sin; but that they might discern it was for that sin in particular; viz. their eating and drinking unworthily at the Lords-table, and consequently infer, that for this sin they must judge themselves, this they must reform, the word of God must be the expositer of that providence; and therefore did the Apostle write that saying to them.

Having insisted here on the extent of the use of Providence in dictating to man his duty by way of secondary testimony to the word; and of the ne­cessity of a conjuction of the word, or law of God written, or otherwise made known with Providence, that so the voice of Providence in moral, hu­mane and positive duties may be particularly ap­plyed and understood: It will not be impertinent [Page 74] here to note the different wayes wherein Provi­dence is, or hath been added to the word as confirma­tive thereof.

1. This hath been sometimes in a way extrordi­nary, and that,

1. Either when an ordinary act of Providence hath been by an extraordinary and immediate di­rection from God appointed to such use, viz. to back and second his word: as Ezekiels removing his goods out of his house to another place in the peo­ples sight, was a sign to them to confirm his pre­dictions of their captivity. And the Potters disposal of his clay to one mould first, then to another, was an emblem set up by God of his power to order, and alter the conditions of Israel, (and of all other Nations) as he should see good, and as he had declared he would do concerning that people, [Ezek. 12.11. Jer. 18.5, 6, &c.]

2. Or when a Providence extraordinary, or mi­raculous, for nature hath been by expresse assigna­tion of God given unto the ratification of his word. So was unto Moses the turning of his rod into a serpent, and of the Serpent into a rod again, and his hand being made leprous, and whole again by putting it once and again into his bosom. So was unto Gideon his wet and dry Fleece, and the Angels consuming his meat by fire out of the rock. So was unto Hezekiah the return back of the shadow of the Sun upon the Dial of Ahaz. And so were unto the world in the primitive age of Christianity, the miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost given unto the Apostles, [Exod. 4.1, &c. Judg. 6.17, 36, &c. 2 King. 20.10, &c. Heb. 2.4.]

2. This is more often in a way of ordinary dis­pensation, that is without any either miraculousness of the act of Providence, or immediate, particular pointing out of it, by an express word to such or such a use. And this is,

1. Either when Providence is given us for a patt [...]n or [...]op [...]y, and we are required to imi [...]a [...]e it i [...] the same kinde. Thus Mercy, Love, Beneficience unto [Page 75] the evill, and to our enemies are recommended to our practice by the example of Gods own pro­ceedings, [Ephes. 5.1. Luk. 6.36. Mat. 5.44, &c.]

2. Or when Providence is imployed to give a hint unto some duty sutable to it, for us to practise, but not of the same nature as i [...] the act of Provi­dence which speaketh to us. For instance: In the day of prosperity be joyful; but in the day of adversity consider. Is any among you afflicted? let him pray: i [...] any mer [...]y? let him sing Psalms. In that day, viz. in the day of trouble, and of treading down, and of perplexity, did the Lord God of hosts call to weeping and to mourning, &c. [Eccl. 7.14. Jam. 5.13. Isa. 22.12.] When Providence disposeth these conditions into act, it doth call for the respective duties appro­priate to them at their hands whose conditions at any time they are.

But this distinction must be kept; for some acts of Providence are shewed us to imitate them in their very kinde. Some again by reason of the Lords transcendency and absolute power over us may not be paralleld by us. God may do that to man, and make that use of him, which man may not do either to God again, or to another man. Only such unimitable [...] providences may yet be not un­useful, but may dictate respective duties, correspon­dent and seasonable, though not identical in kinde to the act of God.

The difference also must not be confounded be­twixt the two members of the former distinction, viz. the extraordinary and the ordinary use of Pro­vidence in point of backing or reinforcing the will of God already made known; which is, that the latter way God dayly and continually makes use of Providences as memorials and testimonials to assure, and bring to minde his will in matters vulgarly known, and of a moral and ordinary use and importance. The former he hath taken up to illustrate or enforce some commandement of an ex­traordinary nature, or some doctrine or prophesie [Page 76] new, and strange to them to whom the sign is given, and therefore standing more in need thereof to prove its divine authority.

In reference also to the secondariness of the Testi­mony of Providence and the necessity of the ante­cedency of the words light to it in the matters whereof this proposition speaketh, this let me add. Some that have long stood upon the argument of Providence now begin to say, The Spirit makes out by Providence the minde of God without the word▪ Unto this I shall only here interpose this;

1. I see not how this differeth from Quake­rism in the opinion of a sufficiency of light from Christ, which every man hath in him.

2. But I aske; Is not every spirit (that is, every dictate or doctrine fathered on the Spirit, or apprehended by the conceiver thereof to come from the Spirit of God) to be tryed? and is not the word of God in Scripture the rule of Tryall? If any motion come then without expresse directi­on from Scripture, it is not made out, that is, cleared as necessary, or safe for us to follow, or to be of God, untill it be examined or warranted by the word.

3. We usually distinguish of the Spirits spea­king to man, viz.

  • 1. Ordinarily.
  • 2. Extraordinarly.

The former is by the word: the latter is with­out it, solitary or by revelation. And we say the lat­ter is not now afforded to any on ea [...]th; but he that will say it is, and that he hath it, as the layeth claim to a very strange and high thing, immediate, and extraordinary revelation; so he must evi­dence i [...]t [...] others very plainly ere they can credit him in, itThus Luther answered the Seditious Boars of Germany of Muncers and Phifers raising Si mandatum a­liquod habetis a Deo vestri facti necesse est hoc Ips [...]n a vobis a­liquo illustri mi­raculo demon­strari. Apud [...]leid. Comment. lib. 5. pag. 120..

2. Besides the use or significancy of Provi­dence which it hath to confirm, and second a rule, or duty before enacted and declared; it is found (even in matters of a moral or positive nature) [Page 77] sometimes in a further use, viz. to declare the will of God by it self alone, but then it must be with­all said, this is not the general, common, or natu­rall, but a particular, extraordinary, and institutive use of it; this is never but in case, and by virtue of a previous, special warrant or appointment of God, This is not common to all, or usuall in many, but proper to some Providences, unto which it hath pleased God to annex such a use. Where God hath given out his warrant concerning one sort, or one single act of providence, and one singular and circumstantiated case, that in this case such an event or act of Providence shall declare what the minde of God is, there this use of providence ob­tains, and there alone, as far as my observation can go. Some few such dispensations of God to some persons, in some special cases I finde in Scripture, and but some few, yet for distinctions sake I thought it necessary to take notice of this use of Provi­dence.

When God would have the Land of Canaan divided among the Tribes,Num. 6.55. and Families of the Isra­elitish nation, he appointed the distribution to be made by Lot. When therefore Joshua and the heads of the Fathers cast lots upon the several portions of that land, the coming forth of those several Lots to this or that tribe, family, or person severally, was the signification of Gods will concerning such or such a parcel of the Land, and the making over of the property thereof by donation from him, unto such persons.

The same way was appointed, and of the same use was the Providence of God in the di­sposall of the lots at the election of an Apostle in the place of Judas. Act. 1.24, 2 [...].

By a Providence of this sort was the congregation of Israel guided in their journies and stations in the wilderness. God appointed them for their motions and pitchings to attend the setling or moving over them of the cloudy and fiery pillar: hence it is said,Num. 9.18, 20, 23. that they observing that course of the cloud, at the [Page 78] commandement of the Lord they journeyed, and at the commandement of the Lord they pitched.

A like resolution did Abrahams servant obtain of God, when he went by his Masters command, and with his assurance of extraordinary divine conduct to seek a wife for Isaac. When he was come to the City of Nahor he prayed, and the Lord granted him to know what damsell he should choose, and have for that marriage by the token of her granting him water out of the well for himself, and for his Camels, which sign therefore being accomplished in Rebecca, not only he, but Laban and Bethnel her brother and father (when they heard the servants relation of it and of the event) acknowledge the thing (or word) proceeded from the Lord, and that in it the Lord had spokenGen. [...]4.27, 50, 51..

1 Sam. 14.10.Such a sign had Jonathan to go by in his (other­wise desperate) attempt upon the Garrison the Phi­listines. Luk. 22.10. And a token of this nature had Peter and John from Christ to guide them in pitching upon the place where he would have them prepare for his, and their eating of the Passeover.

And as the minde of God for mens practice, so his meaning in matter of faith, when there hath been ambiguity or obscurity in the apprehending thereof, hath this way been discovered. The Shepherds at the birth of Christ, being told by the Angel of the good ti­dings of great joy, Luk. 2.10, 11, 12. viz. the birth of a Saviour Christ the Lord that day in Bethlehem; God gave them by the Angel moreover a providential sign to know him by, to wit, the special place and posture they should then finde him in, In his swadling cloathes, and lying in a manger. So did he point out to the wisemen which came from the east to seek him that was born King of the Jews, Mat. 2.9, 10. how and where they should finde him, by a Star.

But this way of resolution concerning either the will or meaning of God: was even then extraor­dinary, and out of course, and but rarely afforded, much more is it so now, and besides the signifi­cancy which Providence had in these extraordi­nary [Page 79] cases was not by virtue of it self, but from the institution, or special word given forth for it. When God gives no such particular warrant, as in those cases he did (and as now, for any thing I know, he doth not at all) we may not ex­pect, or attempt to finde out Gods will by such means. If we do, it will not be an allowed enquiring, but a tempting of GodVide Ames. medul. Theol. lib. 2. cap. 11. Sect. 18 & cap. 12. Sect. 17, 18, 19. & De con­scient. lib. 4. cap. 23. Sect. 1, [...]..

5. And lastly, there is yet another use of Pro­vidence to be noted. We before distinguished betwixt the delivery of a rule or law, and the de­termining of it to this or that particular. We have said before, Providence is not originally institutive, or preceptive, yet it may deliver us the law, or the will of God already enacted by way of declaration, index, or remembrance; and this in some things solitarily, and in some only joyntly and concur­rently with other means. Besides all this, Provi­dence hath another use in promoting our knowledge and obedience to the will of God; and that is by way of application or determination of the obli­gation, or authority of the Law of God unto par­ticulars. And this use of Providence, together with the way and divers manners of its tending there­unto will here require a distinct discovery, that it may neither lie under a confused notion, nor fall under mistake.

First, That Providence hath this use, to deter­mine general rules to particulars, is very obvious and evident. It brings home the law, which in it self runs in terms universal, or indefinite, to its singular matter, by applying it to particular per­sons, things and times; and by that means that commandement or direction which is delivered ge­nerally to all of the like case and condition, it gives oc­casion or call to this or that man in particular to put in practice. For instance; the law of God com­mands, suum cui (que) tribuere, to do right to every man; now Providence comes with its disposing hand, and distributeth to every man his right in par­ticular, as this house, or field, this honour, dignity [Page 80] or authority to this or that man. And by this hand of Providence so disposing is determined that general rule to these particulars; whereby it comes to passe that every other man is required to yeeld these perquisites, or havings to this or that man, and is forbidden to take, or detain them from him. Again; the word of God saith, Is any among you afflicted? Let him pray. Is any merry? Let him sing Psalmes. As we have opportunity, let us do good. Now Providence comes in, and at this time disposeth this condition of sadness, or that of joy to me, or it putteth into my hand an opportunity of almes-giving, and thereby it comes about that it is, now my part to perform that duty of Prayer, Singing, or giving almes. The word of God hath instituted diversities of estates and relations amongst men, as marriage and single life; Magistracy, and Sub­jection; Mastership, and servitude: not imposing every one, or any one of these c [...]nditions upon every man, for that were not consistible; but ap­pointing one for some, another for other persons. Now besides this institution, God by his Providence immediately (without his word, otherwise then mediately) ordinarily cals men forth parti­cularly, some unto this, others to that estate: and those particular persons, whom his Providence so cals, the general rules of his word concerning those respective conditions come thus to be in force unto, requiring them to undertake those conditions, and to perform the several duties annexed to them respectively. Here then by the intervention of Providence it is that the general rules concerning this or that special state or relation, either the en­trance upon it, or the discharge of the duties of it, become necessary to this, or that man. Provi­dence, under this use I shall call Ordinative, in distinction from that which is meerly Eventual.

Secondly, as it is plain that Providence hath this use, so it will be requisite to enquire how Provi­dence cals men into this or that state or relation, and so effects this determination of general rules to [Page 81] their particulars. For this I shall observe somewhat concerning,

  • 1. The different senses wherein God by his Providence is said to call.
  • 2. The means.
  • 3. The manner.

1. For the different acceptions, or senses wherein God may be said to call men into such a relation or state we say by his Providence God calls to the same, either directive, or constitutive. Either by directing them to such an estate, or by constituting them in it; that is, either by setting before them the estate as requisite for them to enter into: or, by leading and putting them actually into it. The for­mer is when those occasions and inducements, or exigencies are occurrent to a man which (when they are put, or in being) it is his duty according to the rule of Gods word to enter into such a state, or relation. The latter is when by the acting of Providence by those means whereby such a state or relation is produced, or emergent, men are actually brought and placed in that estate.

These two wayes are manifestly different, and ne­cessary to be distinguished. For instance; In the former sense persons are called to the state of mar­riage when they have not the gift of continency, that is, it is their duty then to marry, according to that [1 Cor. 7.9, 36.] and he is called to a single life thus that hath that power over his own will that is mentioned [1 Cor. 7.37. Mat. 19.11.] according to that of our Saviour [Mat. 19.12.] In the lat­ter sense, they are called to a marryed estate that are already bound, or entred into wedlock. He is called into the single estate that is loosed, [1 Cor. 7. [...]4, 27.] And in like manner may it be said of domestical Mastership and servitude; and of political domi­nion and subjection; and of domestical and poli­tical freedom. It is one thing to say a man is by Providence called to be a Master, or a Servant; a Prince, or a Subject the former way; that is, he hath the previous inducements to any such estate pre­sented [Page 82] to him; and another thing to say he is cal­led the latter way, viz. that those acts are passed up­on, or by him which make him a Master, or a Master or a Servant, a Magistrate, or a Subject. By the former he is but invited or directed to such a state, by the latter he is invested or enstated de facto in it.

This distinction is observable in them that di­spute to the validity of absolute conquest, or cap­tivity to make a man a domestick servant, or a mul­titude, the patrimonial kingdom of the conquerer. They say the conquest or captivity doth not make the parties actual servants or subjects, and conse­quently doth not make their conquerers their Ma­sters, or Soveraigns; but it doth lay a duty upon them to give their consent (if they be free from others, and not pr [...]obliged and so can dispose of themselves) to their conquerer or captiver, and so by their own act to contract that relationSee a Book called, A vindi­cation of the Treatise of Mo­narchy. pag. 17, 18. Hobs Elements pag. 92, 93.. As in like manner it is in the case of a single person that hath not the gift of continency, he is called to marriage, but is unmarried, and hath the power, and right to dispose of himself, yet in regard he wanteth the said gift he is obliged to marry as soon as a fit match is offered.

Secondly, concerning the means by which Pro­vidence may call one into any state that is, in­vest, and enstate him in it; for this consideration will have relation to the latter acception only of the providential call, of which even now, viz. that which is constitutive or actually setting a man in a state.

Providence is working in all morall affaires, and civill stations, and conducing to the bringing of men into the several relations they are in, but [...] it is the word, or law of God, and not providence by it self which ordains or authorizeth those states, so ordinarily it is not Providence solely constit [...]tes men therein, but providence imploying and acting by certain means, and those concurring with it. Now the means may (as to our present consideration) be two fold. 1. Some relative states are such as providence cals, that is, brings persons into them, by means ex­trinsecal, [Page 83] as to the persons called, or without the act of their own wils. So persons come into the re­lation and obligation of children to their Parents by procreation, say some; by preservation and education, say othersGrot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 1. Hobs Elements part. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 3.: but by which soever it be, they are passives in incurring that relation and duty. So are others, through the defect of reason, as Orphans, Fools, and Madmen brought into the condition of pupils and minors in relation to Guar­dians and Tutors; and so are Delinquents or Ma­lefactors through their vicious miscarriages, a­gainst their wils, reduced into subjection or sla­veryGrot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 32.. 2. Other relative states Divine Providence leads men into with, and by the will, choice, or consent of the parties in whom the relation is sub­jected. Thus by their own contract persons be­come associates in private Traffique, fellow-citizens are incorporate in one Common-wealth, and Na­tions become confederates in one league: thus two by marriage become man and wife, and persons by arrogation or adoption become the children of those who begat them not. Thus freemen make them­selves servants; and thus Common-wealths, or bodies politique come under this or that form or constitu [...]ion of GovernmentVide Grot. ut suprà Sect. 8, 17.23, 26, 27, 30, 31..

Thirdly, For the manner how (we may say) Providence cals into any estate or relation.

First, In general this is a principle to me most certain. A providential call is included within the rules of Gods word. We have already said (and I take it as a clear truth) that in matters of this nature Providence by it self or alone is neither legislative nor declarative of the law of God. It remains therefore that the utmost use and force it is of in the moral sway of these affairs is either to second and set home the rule already given, and made known, or to apply and determine the ge­neral obligation and authority of such a rule to parti­culars. Hence we must needs yield that the determi­nation of Providence to this of that act, estate or re­lation, as it is not from it self, but by virtue of the [Page 84] rule so it keeps within the bounds, and confines of the rule, and cannot be construed to go any further. This then may be for a general Canon to us. We cannot say Providence cals this, or that man to that, whether act or estate, which the word of God for­bids or warrants not unto him. Providence must not be used as a countermand to the rule, or as a reserve or dormant warrant to carry us out farther then the word goes before us, or to lead us there where the will of God in Scripture revealed opens us not a way. This were by consequent to destroy the authority of the word, and to make the most pure and perfect wayes of God the occasions and patroni­zers of every obliquity.

Secondly, for somewhat more particular resoluti­on concerning a providential call to any underta­king, let these (I suppose plain) Propositions and Cautions be considered, the which I lay down with room reserved for, and submission to the necessary addition, and just correction of the Reader.

1. The matters, or things about which this use of Providence (of applying, or determining the general rule to its particulars) may be con­versant, we may (I suppose) reduce to these heads.

  • 1. Either opportunities inviting.
  • 2. Or necessi [...]ies urging.

1. The former, opportunities inviting, may be,

  • 1. Either to our attaining.
  • 2. Or to our doing good. Or, either to a good of utility to be enjoyed; or to a good of virtue to be done by us.

2. The latter, necessities urging, may be,

  • 1. Either danger of sinning.
  • 2. Or danger of suffering.

2. Every opportunity inviting to, or offering us the attainment of somewhat we esteem good, is not taken to be a determining Providence, or a Pro­vidence calling to the prosecution, and laying hold on that offer. Providence doth ordinarily present [Page 85] us with opportunities to be shunned, as well as with opportunities to be embraced. And by its orde­ring reall evils, with the appearance of good cast upon them by our own mistaken judgments, are set before us, as well as the things that are truly good. There is a proving trying as well as a gui­ding Providence, [see D [...]ut. 8.2, 3. & 13.3. 2 Chr. 32.31.] So that it is a perilous thing for men to be taken and led by the first blush, or fair face, or kinde invitation of every outward occurrence. Many Providences which our heady passions and lusts are apt to account invitatory, our reason and religion should prompt us to be but exploratory, or the trials of our obedience to Gods commandements. Such (for example) may we reckon that opportu­nity to be which David had set before him (and whilh his men would so fain have had him to have taken as eminently held out to him by God) of killing Saul, once in the cave,1 Sam. 23.3. & 26.7. and again in the Camp asleep. The call therefore of Gods Providence must be gathered, not by the facility, commodious­ness, or rarity of the opportunity, but by the lawful­ness of it.

3. Opportunities of doing what is in it self good, whether permissively good, that is, lawfull, or pre­ceptively good, that is, necessary, are not presently of themselves the call of Providence to us, nor un­till it can be determined the good to be done is good to us, or the good we are to do.

4. Thence, and in as much as the goodness of an action with application to individuals ariseth much from the particular state and condition of the person. Somethings belonging to the rich, some­things to the poor; some to the marryed, some to the single; some to the superiour, some to the in­feriour; to be done by them respectively, it be­nooyeth each to know first, not only what is permitted, or imposed on this or that estate, but what is the proper estate, place, or rela [...]ive con­dition we are set in: God neither by word nor by Providence calling any to the act or [Page 86] duty of such a state till he hath called them into that estateSee Mr. Si­monds Case and cure of a Desert Scul cap. 23. pag. 280..

5. Unto every estate there must needs be (the nature of the thing is self requires it) something constitutive or essential to the putting of it, or the enstating of a man in it. There cannot be order or a distinction of estates without somewhat to make the difference. The same authority that ordains different estates among men, appoints to each the peculiar way of entring into, or founding those estates. The different acts which are proper to each estate cannot be constituting or differencing cha­racters of them: both because they are subsequent to, and resulting from the estate, and therefore must needs suppose it in being ere they can flow from it: and because others not called to these estates do sometimes presume to put forth those acts: and because the regularity of those acts must be proved by the persons being in the estate; and therefore his being in the estate cannot be proved by his doing of those acts. That there is such a peculiar foundation or ingresse to every relative state, which gives it bring, and distinguisheth it from other states, hath been partly shewed before, and will be insisted on after. In all domestical, civil, martial, and ecclesiastical relations and orders, the professors of the disciplines of each conclude it so to be. Now this constitutive or formal reason applyed to particu­lars will serve to discover in what station, or place each man stands, and unto what relation or state any man is called of God.

6. Where the divine rule or law of God hath pre­scribed a special way of entring into any estate, and constituting one in it, there providence cannot be understood to call, or lead into it another way, or in a course crosse or subversive to that order.

7. Providence may call a man without the act or concurrence of his own wil into this or that estate, that is, make it his duty (by virtue of the divine rule) to enter into it (as he is thereby called to be a servant, who hath not either wealth or skill whereby [Page 87] to subsist in, and manage a free estate. He is cal­led to marry whose temperament, or complexion leaves him not that power over himself as to con­tain) when neverthelesse it doth not without his own will constitute him in that estate. Where there­fore to the being of a man in any estate, or relati­on is prerequired the act or assent of the party, there Providence (though it invite, order, or give occasion to enter into that estate) doth not anticipate the persons consent. Providence may of it self with­out the said act of will be directive to, but is not constitutive of such an estate. It is (I conceive) no otherwise in the subject matter of this Treatise, in civil policie and Magistracy. Providence by virtue of that need many wayes that particular emergencies of Providence may invite, lead, or call a Nation to make choice of this form of Magistracy before another, or of this, or these persons to rule over them rather then others: but, neverthelesse, people are not incorporate into distinct societies, nor societies re­duced into a moral relation, or subjection unto any particular Magistracy, or Magistrates without their own transaction or agreement, their own I mean transacted, either by themselves or those whom they may be involved in.

8. Where Providence presents with any urging necessity, whether of sin or of harm to be avoided, there we must not think Providence to call, either for the shunning of a harm to commit a sin, or for the avoiding of one sin to run into another. They that thus understand it, in stead of making a virtue of necessity they make a vice of it: and they do not follow Providence, but falsifie it.

9. There is a superseding as well as a leading, a suspending as well as a moving, a recalling as well as a calling Providence, Where to a work or end in it self good, necessary or desireable all prescribed or warranted means, all honest and justifiable ways of advancing, or compassing the same are wanting, Providence there must be underst [...]od to give a stop to our prosecutions; and to determine (during the [Page 88] incumbency of that defect) a surcease of proceed­ings. There Providence (if we will understand it aright) bids stand, go not forward. There we may apprehend Providence meeting us in the way, as the Angel of the Lord in Balaams way, with a drawn sword in his hand. Thus much shall serve to be spoken of the use of Providence which is determining or applicative of the rule to its par­ticular cases, in the general the particular con­ce [...]nments of it unto civil Government, the subject we are upon, will be spoken to in the nex [...] Chapter.

I have thus endevoured to take a particular view of that guidance, light, or instruction that is in Providence, and how far it goes, what of God, and of his will it doth discover to us, and what it doth not. The sum of all that I have gone over is, Pro­vidence is the image, or index of Gods decree, or counsel, that is, as to things that are, or have been, not concerning future things. It makes known that God is, and what he is, and that he is to be honored, served, and in all he commands obeyed. The will of God extraordinarily revealed it doth sometime by special appointment confirm, and that which is known by the ordinary means, it doth constantly, and of or­dinary course second, and set home upon the con­science: yea, in some cas [...]s, by extraordinary de­signation; it hath revealed the will of God de novo, or not otherwise made known. And it doth con­tinually determine, or apply the will of God in ge­neral rules laid down in Scripture, to particular times, and persons; or, the obligation which the law of God hath in it, by it self considered, in actu signato, it brings to be binding in actu exercito, or pro hic, and nunc. But on the other hand, it doth not of it self either enact or annul a divine law, or di­spense with the breach of, or contrary act to it: neither doth it alone, or by it self declare or reveal the will of God, or what Gods approving, or disappro­ving minde, or pleasure is, either in the things of God that are instituted, and of positive precept, or in the rights and relative duties that are morall, or of hu­mane [Page 99] concernment,CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 6. whether they be of the law of nature, or of positive sanction.

So that the negative part of our resolution is this, Where the law of God, either written in the heart of man, or in the book of God, is silent, or prescribes not any thing, either in the matters of God that are institutive, or in any humane rights whatsoever, there Providence regulates not, or is not, either institutive, or declarative of Gods will to be done by us. And where the said law of God doth ordain, or deliver a rule to us, there providence gives no relaxation, allowance, or countermand to the contrary.

Subsection 6. That Dominion is not founded in Eventual Providence.

IN opposition to the negative part of this resolu­tion of the Question about the use of Providence there are two positions, or opinions now on foot, both which would make out a wider, or larger sense, or use of Providence then is here allowed. They are, 1. That Providence of it self may (without extraordinary appointment) in the matters above specified, and specially in humane rights, dues, or transactions, deliver and declare what the will of God is, or may justifie or condemn a way: or, where Scripture evidence is wanting, or a warrant out of the word of God cannot be produced, there we may collect or infer Gods approval, or disapprovall of an humane action, course or proceeding by Pro­vidence. 2. That dominion is, or may be founded meerly in eventual Providence; or, that a person or persons attainment, and occupiation (by whatever means) of sway or command over a people makes him, or them the Sovereign or higher power, [Page 90] which is, of God, the ordinance of God, the minister of God.

For the latter, that Dominion is, or may be founded in eventual Providence, or, (which is all one) in a persons being in place of rule or actual command, the confutation of it, and the vindi­cation of this Text from admitting it, is a main drift and subject of this whole discourse: and therefore I refer the Reader, for his satisfaction about it, to that which is before, and will be after said; only this I shall put in, upon its mention here.

If this be so, It must needs be affirmed (I sup­pose) so to be,

1. Either because possession, or occupation in every case, or in any thing possessible, or in every sort of Tenure gives a title; But this is so wilde an assertion, as I know not who will own it; or,

2. Because God hath declared in his word, or made it a law, that it shall be so in this particular matter of Civill authority, viz. that whosoever is master shall be the Magistrate, or he whom his hand of Providence raiseth up to a domineering preva­lency in any place shall have the authority there, or be interested in the style or office of this text, viz. shall be the higher power, the ordinance, the Mi­nister of God. But unto this;

1. If so it were, it would be not Providences di­sposing possession of rule into this hand that of it self constituteth him a power, but that declaration of God in his word. Providence would be only the de­terminator, or applyer of that general rule to its particular matter.

2. But where is this found, that God hath so ex­pressed or declared himself, or made such a law touching. Civill Magistracy? We must first see such a declaration produced, or proved, ere we may grant it so to be: I know this text is alledged as the only or main place to imply such a declara­tion, but, de hoc quaritur: I hope by this treatise it [Page 91] will be manifest that there is not such a thing to be extracted thence: and in short, I think it will be proved that,

1. By power, is not meant a meer force or strong hand.

2. That by being is not meant a meer act of possession of such a force.

3. That by of God, ordained of God, is not in­tended a meer being by eventual Providence. And to give the Reader here a small earnest of Reason for the improbability of their being either in this, or in any other Scripture any such thing declared by God, I shall suggest these few things in this place.

1. The power of Magistracy may be in one, and actual rule by Providence in another. Gods word hath owned them for the power that have been out of possession, whilest others have had the actual com­mand. Take for instance what is in [2 Chron. 22.9, 12. with Chap. 23.3.]

2. God hath expresly disowned for being of him them that have been in present possession of com­mand, [Hos. 8.4. Isa. 52.4, 5. Joel 3.2, 4. Hab. 2.5, 6.]

3. He hath expresly authorized and owned the act of rising up in armes to expulse them that have been in actual rule, in them that have been de facto, subject to them, the which this text [ver. 2.] expresly and severely forbids in reference to the power here intended [Judg. 2.16, 18. & 3.9, 15. & 4.6. and in many other places of that book, and in other Scriptures.]

4. We have many examples (of unquestionable justifiablenesse) in the word of God of persons taking up and employing for the recovery of persons, goods and countreyes of the hands of them that have had the Mastery and possession of them, which could not be done if dominion were found by God in pro­vidential profession, [Gen. 14.14, &c. 2 Sam. 18.1, &c. 1 Sam. 7. [...], &c, & 13.3. & 14.1, &c. 2 King. 11.3, &c.]

[Page 92] CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 7.5. To yeeld this would be to say that usurpati­tion is no sin; or that in the tenure, or holding of power, or command over others (under the name of civill authority) is, or can be no transgressi­on.) But this shall serve for a touch on this argu­ment here.

Subsection 7. That Providence alone, or without the Rule of Gods word doth not signifie to us the allowing, or disallowing will of God in matters either of humane right, or positive institution.

FOr the eviction of the groundlesness of the for­mer position [that Providence alone, without Scripture evidence (or, extraordinary appointment and warrant) may be, in the matters above specified, the interpreter of Gods will to us, unto the justify­ing or condemning of a way, or unto the significati­on of Gods approval, or disapproval] I would offer these reasons.

1. That which is in this position attributed to Providence is by Scripture plainly denyed to it [Eccl. 9.1, 2.] No man knoweth either love, or hatred by all that is before them [...] all things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked, &c.

2. The putting of any thing to be rule beyond, or further then Scripture goes, or so as to make out such an approving, or disapproving will, or law of God as is not delivered in Scripture, is to de­rogate from, or deny that sufficiency and perfecti­on of the Scripture which the holy Ghost ascribeth [Page 93] thereto, and which we, upon his authority, main­tain against the Papists. The written word of God is affirmed to be perfect [2 Tim. 3.15. Psal. 19.7.] we have very strict prohibitions of adding to, or diminishing ought from it, [Deut. 4.2. Prov. 30.6. Rev. 22.18, 19.] we finde men are sharply blamed by God for doing that his word gave them no command or commission for, [Jer. 7.31. & 19.5. & 32.35.] and persons are challen­ged for following the appearance or promising face of Providence without recourse to him [Isa. 30.1, 2. with 31.1. Josh. 9.14] We upon these and the like au­thorities, conceive that the good, the acceptable and perfect will of God is contained in the Scriptures; that the word of God hath compleatly and unaltera­bly delivered what is necessary, what lawful; and therefore that it appears to be high presumption and strong delusion to set up any thing to be a rule, either by way of crossing, or uttering more then is read in Scripture. Either we must say the Scriptures are imperfect, or the doctrine therein is repealable by Providence; or that there is nothing left for Pro­vidence to declare anew. And which of these to admit, I think is easie to choose.

3. Providences are both in themselves so indi­stinct and various, and in relation to mens wayes, and the rule by which they are to walk, so unan­swerable (for the most part in this life) and dis­proportionable, that it is not (I think) to any man conceiveable how they should be employed for such a signification.

1. They are in themselves so indistinct and various, in respect of rise, end, and manner of proceeding, that they appear altogether unapt for such a use.

1. Providence is many times the same to per­sons and wayes directly contrary; that is, to them that are approved, and to them that are disapproved of God, the course of Providence in present event is all one: the same judgements or evils do befall the same outward benefits to come upon righ­teous [Page 94] and wicked persons and wayes, [Ezek. 21 3. Mat. 5.45.]

2. The same same wayes or proceedings of men may meet with clear contrary Providences, either in the same person at divers times, or in divers persons at the same time. He that followes a course of sin, may at one time prosper, at another time fall in it. The path of the righteous may at sometime be (as Joh speaks) washed with butter, attended with smooth and sweet successes, and at other times be stuck with thornes, entangled with sharpe and piercing crosses: they that walke or joyn hand in hand together in the same wayes or designes whether good or evill may be accosted with quite contrary events at the hands of Providence. Like as it fared with Pharaohs chief Butler, and chief Baker; both it may be guilty in the same offence, and measure, yet the one raised to honour, the other hanged on a tree.

3. The same kind of Providence may proceed from far different or quite contrary dispositions, and intentions in God: the same gift, or outward, and, in our esteem, happy successe, and on the other hand, the same crosse or blow may come from him unto divers persons, to one in favour, to another in displeasure; to one for good, to another for harme.

4. Providences contrary in their face, and vi­sible appearance, may agree, and be coincident, or be the same in respect of the minde of God from which they proceed. Notably good, and notably bad events, both these may spring from his love, and be accompanied with his approval both of the person and of the way upon which they come: and either of these may issue from his hatred, and be at­tended with his dislike both of the person and way.

5. The thing which Providence in bringing good, or evill may respect, reflect upon or aime at in speciall may be, not the present actions or wayes of men, but either those of times past, or those which be probable, and in likelyhood to come: to [Page 95] the former by way of recompence; to the [...], either by way of prevention of a sin; or of in­couragement or furtherance to what is good; or of probation and experiment what men will do, how they will demean themselves.

2. Providences (eventual) as they are in them­selves so u [...]i [...]orm, so they are very often during this life, and in the things of it, found unanswera­ble and disproportionable to mens wayes, and the rule by which they are to walke. Solomons obser­vation in this is commonly verifyed [Eccl. 8. [...]4.] There be just men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked: again, there be wicked men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous. The present visible wayes of God are not in point of retribution corresponde [...] to the wayes of men. It is not alwayes or ordinary to be seen that good men, and actions are presently, and constantly shined upon, speaded, and followed with the promised felicity; neither that the contrary wayes have the contrary fare. All the proceedings of God towards all person [...] and courses are ever most just, but they are not ever juridical: ever most just in that justice which is commensurable to the justice of the divine nature, or will; but not ever juridical or compensatory to men ac­cording to their conformity or difformity to the rule of righteousness he hath enacted for them to live by.

3. And in both these considerations, and the severall particulars reducible to either of them, it may appear how unsutable and insignificant eventual Providence is to the discovery of the will of God in the matters abovesaid, by it self alone, or without a prediscovery by the [...] law of God, what the justifying, or condemning, the allowing or disallowing will of God is.

4. All signes, Testifications, or interpretati­ons of a rational faculty, whether it be the un­derstanding or will of any person; whether the [Page 96] sign be in words, gestures, or actions, have their signification by institution, or voluntary appoint­ment. There is this difference betwixt natural, or necessary and voluntary agents; that of the former the inward principle, appetite, and instinct is discovered by the act, or effect, because the said principles, and operations are alwayes uniform, and the same: but in rational agents, the faculty being free, and indeterminate, and in different to divers or contrary concepti­ons and motions, the outward act cannot na­turally, or necessarily with any certainty, or any otherwise then ad placitum, or by arbitrary imposition and appointment signifie the meaning or dictate of such a faculty.

If then we will say that Providences are the interpreters of Gods will, we must produce an institution for it, or manifest where and how it hath been appointed by God to such a use. Common reason will tell us that arbitrary acti­ons without some known designation intervening are of no aptitude to expresse, or signifie such a thing.

CHAP. IV. CHAP. IV. The Question [how the Text saith, The Power is of God] Stated and Resolved.

HAving taken so large a scope in discussing the Question about the voice and use of Pro­vidence, it is now high time to return to, and to come to some resolution in the enquiry above proposed, concerning the clause of the text under present consideration, (viz. Of God) The several wayes wherein things may be said to be of God, have been above distinguished of, and explicated, and the matter of civill dominion hath been found among the things which eventuall Providence by it self doth not declare: the Question then is, concerning the being of a thing of Gods hand by way of efficiency, and the being of his mouth by way of warrant, or approvall, whe­there both of these, or but one, and if but one, which of them is meant by that clause in this place.

That the Apostle, when he saith, there is no power but of God, may intend to include within his meaning a providential being, or a being of the disposing hand of God, I will not gainsay, but withall I think it must be affirmed, and granted, that such a being of God is not the whole, or spe­ciall meaning of his words; but that he hath some eye (if it be not his primary aime, which I rather [Page 98] think; and let the Reader judge when he hath per­used what shall be said for it) unto a being of the mouth of God, approving, warranting and authori­zing the power.

Moreover, that being of his hand or Providence which may be here intended, I would understand, not after the common notion, viz. of meer even­tual Providence, or a persons bare possessing, or get­ting into the place of rule, and command by any means whatsoever; but I understand it of that course of Providence which is before specified to be ordinative; or such a disposing hand of God as gives the person a call, or an allowing admission to the place; or such a Providence as doth apply and determine the general rule or Warrant of Gods word concerning civill Magistracy to the particu­lar case.

This ordinative course of Providence, in distin­ction from that which is meerly eventual, was in the general opened even now, and in reference to our present subject in particular, to wit, the Civil power, will be illustrated in the next Chapter; un­to which also, and some other following Chapters I shall reserve the proof of this sense that I here give of this clause, to wit, that it imports the being of the power of Gods mouth or word (not excluding the disposur [...] of providence, but taking it in, being understood of such a procedure of Providence as is conjoyned, and concurrent with the authorizing word of God, and is the execution, or effectuating thereof, and that a bare possessory act; or a persons occupancy of the seat of power by a meer eventual Providence, is not the true and proper importance of the words.

Only here, to give some light to the discerning of the difference betwixt those two, and to shew a lit­tle the necessity of understanding the words as I have expressed, take a view of both in a Scripture ex­ample. It is the case as is stood betwixt those two Brothers Solomon and Adonijah in relation to the Kingdom of Israel. The case may well be stated in [Page 99] the words of Adonijah himself unto Solomons Mo­ther, as they are set down [1 King. 2.15.] thou knowest that the kingdom was mine, and that all Israel set their faces on me, that I should reign: Howbeit the Kingdom is turned about, and become my Brothers, for it was his from the Lord. Here are two persons represented as having been claimers and competitors of the same kingdom, at one and the same time. Now let me ask, in as much as both could not be, which of these two must we say was the power which was of God, in the sense of our Text? The one Adonijah, he hath to alledge for himself a being in it by eventual Providence: All Israel set their faces on me that I should reign. This was as much as if he had said, he was gotten into the throne, and had full admission and possession by the people. And so by the story it appears he had [see 1 King. 1.5, 7, 9, 11, 18, 25.] and upon this ground he built to himself a Title; The Kingdom was mine, saith he. On the other hand there was for Solomon the Lords desig­nation of him by word of mouth to David before­hand [1 Chron. 28.5, 6, 7. & 22.9, 10.] and an ordinative Providence of God disposing David first to promise and to swear to Bathsheba his Mother, and after to decree and give out command to Za­dok, Nathan, and Benaiah to anoint him King; though even then Adonijah stood seised of the Kingdom, [1 King. 1.17, 32, &c.] and there­fore Adonijah himself having surceased and become a private person again, upon this ground acknow­ledgeth that Solomon had the better of him in point of title, for it was his from the Lord. Of these two different pleas, if we lake the eventuall Providence by which Adonijah was possessed of the Kingdom to bear the sense of this Text, of a being of God, by virtue whereof every soul is to be subject to the person so being; then must we lay aside Solomon from being the power of God; and the enterprise of David, Bathsheba, Nathan, and the rest of seating him in the throne, must be disal­lowed [Page 100] as contrary to the rule of this Text, and settle Adonijah when he was in: but this were to null and disallow the expresse direction and do­nation of God, appointing the Kingdom to Solomon, and the lawfull proceeding upon it be­fore cited out of the story. On the other hand if we take that warrant of Gods word unto Da­vid, seconded by that his ordinative Providence which moved the persons above mentioned, who in that case were interested, to advance Solo­mon to the Crown, to answer this phrase in our text of the powers being of God, then must we say that a meer eventual Providence is not the right, and proper importance of the words.

But this shall be more at large discussed in the next Chapter, wherein I shall proceed to the ope­ning of the next phrase in the Text, viz. Ordained of God.

CHAP. V.CHAP. V. Of the term, Ordained of God.

HAving in the last Chapter treated of and explicated the former attribute or predicate which in this Text is spoken of the Powers, expressing their author and original, viz. of God: I am now to proceed to the other, which saith, The Powers that be are ordained of God; answerably un­to which in the second verse the power is denomina­ted, the ordinance of God.

This word, Ordained, I take to be a term somewhat more specifical, and definite, and to bring the matter intended by the Text unto a clearer view. Yet be­cause they that seem to have a minde to widen the sense of it, and to make it comprehensive of the power that I suppose to be alien to it, choose rather to bring this clause to the formers indefiniteness (if simply, and by it self taken) then to contract that by any limit which may appear in this, or in the rest of the text and context; I must therefore pro­ceed by steps.

1. Delivering the force of this word ordained, and distinguishing of the several acceptions which it is capable any were to bear.

2. Laying down then positively and particular­ly the sense I understand the phrase here to intend, and the reasons to confirm and conclude that to be the sense.

3. And then explicating (to prevent further doubts) that speciall sense which I ascribe to this clause in this place.

CHAP. V. SECT. I. SECT. I. Of the several acceptions of the word Ordained, being put for an action of God.

THe first thing to be done for the investigation of the meaning of this clause, ordained of God, is to take notice of the force and use of the word Ordained, and the different use of it.

The word [...] or [...] signifies to ordain, con­stitute or appoint. It is commonly applyed,

  • 1. Either to matter of business.
  • 2. Or to persons.

To matter of business or action, and then it is usu­ally put to signifie the appointment or alotment of the circumstances of a thing to be done, as the cer­tain time, or place for it, [as Act. 28.23. Matth. 28.16.]

2. To persons, and then it imports the ordering or setting apart of a person to some special benefit, office, work or ranke among others, [as Act. 13.48. & 22.10. Luk. 7.8. 1 Cor. 16.15.] Here it hath respect to persons (for Powers are put for the per­sons invested with power) the Powers [...], are ordained of God, or ordered, set apart, ap­pointed to their office, work and dignity by him. In the next verse the Apostle saith, the power is [...], the ordinance of God, or, as the word bears, his edict, sanction or constitution. To them that are conversant in Scripture, and other books of Divinity, it is at first sight evident that there is a sense wherein all things that be, or fall out in the world, even the sins of men, are said to be [Page 103] ordered or disposed by God: and there is a sense whereby it is peculiar to some things to be dispo­sed or ordered by him. If we here take the word in the former sense, there is nothing peculiar, no more spoken of, or for the powers here argued and plea­ded for, then is universally extensible to every other matter, and in special to all humane occurrences, or affaires, be they in themselves never so inordinate and irregular. The Magistrate that is here said to be [...] ordained or ordered of God, and the Rebel that is said vers. 2. to be [...] a resister, or opposer of himself to this order of God in the Power, both are in this large acception or­dained of God. Wherefore to me it seems necessary that we think of a more restrained sense of this word, and discern what that is, and for this purpose thus to distinguish of it.

There is a twofold order, ordination or dispo­sition to be ascribed unto God, as set down by him.

1. The order of his counsel, and working, or of his purpose, and proceeding in Providence.

2. The order of his word or law, or the order which he instituteth for his creature, particularly for man.

Of the former, the order of his own counsel, way, and working we read, [Act. 13.48. Psal. 119.91. & 8.2. Jer. 31.35, 36. Isa. 30.33.]

Of the latter, the order of his word, revealed will, or law given to man [1 Cor. 9.14. & 14.30. Col. 2.5. Heb. 7.11. Psal. [...]1.5.]

Of the former we may again distinguish. By the order of his purpose, and providence God or­dereth,

1. Things either effectively or operatively; when by his working will and concourse he posi­tively and immediately acteth to or in upon them; thus he ordereth all positive effects in their natural beings.

2. Or privatively, or by way of permission, or non impedition, and so he is said to order, that is [Page 104] decree and dispose the being of sin, in that he leaves his reasonable creature to himself, under an objective temptation.

And the former of these two, his effective, opera­tive ordination is again distinguishable. He effe­ctually orders things,

1. Either productively, or to the causing of a thing to be.

2. Or directively, that is, by prescribing to the thing that already is, or disposing of its state and course. And thus he is said even to order sin, to wit, in its progress and consequents; for although as to the being of sin, his ordination be only per­missive, or non-impeditive, yet as to its progress, end, and consequents his Providence is effectiveAliud est faci­eus, aliud fa­ctum, aliud u­trum (que) ordi­nans. Qui facit malum facinus, is auctor est ma­li: qui ordinem disponit in faciente & facto malo, is non auctor est mali, sed mali ordi­nator bonus ad bonum. Malum non vult Deus, sed ordinem vult, & servat in malo. A voluntate hominis accessit malum: a Deo ordinatio est universalis, atque singularis providentiae ipsius, etiam quae summe mala sunt disponens, & in ordinem cogens sapientissimè. Junius in Col­lat. cum Arminio, in Arminii oper. pag. 385, 386..

These two, the order of Gods counsel and hand of Providence, and the order of his word, law, or institution given to man, are manifestly different, and in reference to the present subject neces­sary to be distinguisht. The difference may be ta­ken thus:

1. The former order is the rule, model, or platform of Gods own wayes, the latter is to be the rule and patern of mans doings.

2. The former extends to all creatures and beings; the latter only to the reasonable crea­ture, and his moral acts, as being only capable of a law.

3. The former ordination is alwayes accom­plished, and takes place without fail; the latter is not seldom put back and contradictedSee Mr. Caryl on Job c. 11. v. 10. pag. 67..

[Page 105]4. The former orders all actions and things; the latter alwayes appoints that which is good and acceptable in the sight of God, and onely that.

In a word, to illustrate this matter by some in­stances sutable to the subject we have in hand. By the latrer kinde of ordinance, Israel should have continued under Samuels government, when they rejected him, and desired a King. Absalom should have been subject to his father and Soveraign David, when he rose up against him to seise his kingdom. Jeroboam and the ten tribes should have kept in allegiance to Rehoboam, when they cast him off. Athaliah should have yeelded obedience to the posterity of Ahaziah, when she took the Kingdom from them into her own hands. The Kings rulers and people of the earth, of whom [Psal. 2.1. Act. 4.25.] should have payed homage unto Christ when they conspired against him: and by it the Angels that sinned should have kept their first estate (or principality) when as they left their own habitation. Jude 6. For so God had ordained to each of these respective­ly by the order of his law, precept or institution. Unto this ordinance, or order of God is opposed all that atáxie, confusion, and dislocation which any sin brings into the world. And in reference unto this order it is that all indecorum or sedition in any re­lation or society among men is disclaimed of God, and said not to be of him, [1 Cor. 14.33.] For, God is not the author of confusion, but of peace.

Whereas by the former, the ordination of Gods counsel and providence, the contrary to the order of his law, and will revealed to man for his rule of­ten cometh to passe; even the things which (in re­spect of Gods ordinance given to man to observe) are most disordered, confused and preposterous, are doneSee Mr. Caryl on Job c. 9. v. 24. pag. 331.. By this order of God, the Israelites re­jection of Samuel, Absaloms rebellion against Da­vid, Jeroboams, and the ten tribes defection from Rehoboam, Athaliahs usurpation to the dethroning of [Page 106] Ahaziahs children, the confederacie [...] of the [...]lers and people against Christ, yea the Apostasie of the evill Angels, and all other irregularities are (as above was said) ordered and disposed by God. Who know­eth not (saith Job of such events) in all those, Job 12.9, 10. see also vers. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21. that the hand of the Lord hath wrought this? in whose hand is the soul of every living thing, and the breath of all mankind. For although these considered in their own nature, being obliquities and depravements, are most crosse to the order of his word, and to the recti­tude, and holiness of his nature, and therefore as such we cannot (without blasphemy) attribute them to his working will or hand; yet in as much as his wisdom, and power can extract excellent things out of them when once they are occurrent, his justice, and goodness may will their sufferance, and when they are emergent, his wise and powerful hand may direct, bound, terminate, and with other ingredi­ents, so can temperate them, that much good may be educed from them, and therefore so he orders, or or­dains them.

Take for instance of the divine ordination about the evill acts of the creature, and also of the diffe­rence betwixt the order of Gods commandement, and the order of Gods Counsell and Providence above noted, that passage concerning Josephs selling into Egypt by his brethren, [Gen. 45.5, 7, 8. & 50.20.] and peruse the words in the text it self. There was in that event the order of justice, and of that mutual love, care, help which God hath prescribed to Brethren, broken on the part of those sons of Ja­cob, as also that order of Gods counsell concerning Josephs preheminency above his brethren, which God had declared was intended to be broken by them; but the order of Gods counsel about that and other things is by his most wise, potent, and holy Providence therein, yea and thereby kept and per­formed; theirs is an act of selling, Gods is an act of sending Joseph into Egypt; their act is sinful, God [...] is righteous; their act in the intent of it on their part in pernicious to Joseph, Gods act both in [Page 107] the purpose and event of it is most eminently preser­vative and beneficial both to Joseph, to his Father,CHAP. V. SECT. II. to those his sellers, and to the Egyptian King, and people: with many others. Thus the order of Gods commandment may direct one course, the order of his counsel and Providence may steer quite another.

SECT. II. What the special and proper acception of the term Ordained of God, is in this text.

HAving thus expressed the importance in general, and distinguished the several acceptions of this clause, ordained of God; our next work is to discern positively and particularly the purpose of it in this text. There being this variety in the use of it in divers places of Scripture, as it's brought in on di­vers occasions; the question is, how we are here to take it.

For this, my resolution is, that in this sentence of the Apostle, ordained of God, importeth not meerly the proceeding of the things from God providen­tially, as Providence is put to signifie Gods coun­sel and acting, but such a being from God as car­ryeth in it his instituting or appointing of it by the warrant, or sanction of his word, law, precept, or commandment. Although it be true, and may be said, that the rise, the standing, and the falling of every civill power is, as all other occurrences in the world whatsoever, are ordered and disposed by the counsell of Gods will, and the hand of his acting. [Page 108] Yet I conceive this not to be the thing which the Apostle here only, or specially (if at all) takes in, or intends; but the main thing within his porpose, and aime to be the asserting of Gods preceptive ordina­tion of the Civil Magistracy. My assertion then is, that this Proposition, The Powers that be are ordained of God, is a positive declaration of the divine right, property, or title which those powers which are meant in, and are the subject of this text, have to their place of dignity, and rule, and to the obedience of every soul within the Civil state by virtue of the Law, revealed will, or warrant of God delivered in his word, or otherwise promulgated. And this I assert in opposition to that claim or title which some would build upon this text for such as obtain the upper hand, or a prevalent possession, by virtue of a meer eventual Providence, under­standing this term ordained, of such a being of God.

They that would found the power upon meer eventual Providence, by virtue of these words, do not well agree what it is that they would build upon them. Some of them understanding the words to give a title, property or right to any per­son or persons that hold possession of the place of rule, in as much as they are in by Providence. Others admit the meer occupant to be an unwar­ranted, unlawful, unjust Ruler, but they say, he be­ing in place by the order, or ordination of divine Providence, he is therefore a Power to be obeyed. But my assertion stands against both these, affir­ming this ordination of God not meerly to import a providential possession, but withall, and especially a preceptive institution or legislative sanction. Which if it hold and be made good, will infer, that meer eventual Providence doth not by the autho­rity of this text, either create a title, or command obedience to an unentitled power. The Power which this text intends it doth justifie, or imply necessarily to be a lawful, enrighted, or en­titled power: but then it bottometh this right [Page 109] and title, not upon eventual Providence,CHAP. V. SECT. III. or a meer possessory act, but upon the warrant of the word, or law of God, here called his Or­dinance.

SECT. III. Reasons to prove that Gods Ordination of the Power is preceptive, or war­rantative, not meerly providen­tiall.

ANd this now remaineth to be proved, viz. That the ordination of God in this text is an authorizing, warrantative, or preceptive, not meerly a providential dispositive, factive or operative Or­dination.

1. The first thing I shall say for this interpreta­tion is, that it is, as far as I can observe, the sense which our Divines commonly give of this word ordained, in this place. I shall name and refer the Reader to some Commentators upon it, so taking this word, viz. [Beza, Piscator, Melancthon, Are­tius, Willet, (and in him Haymo, Fajus, Hyperius) Tolet, Estius, Pareus, Eluathan Par, and the late An­notations of our English Divines] adding to them these other, that citing the words occasionally, so expound it. Calvin Instit. lib. 4. cap. 10. Sect. 5. fol. 420. B. [and in 1 Pet. 2.14.] Perkins discourse of conc. vol. 1. pag. 527. A. Althamerus Conc. loc. 179. fol. 192. B. Martyr loc. com. clas. 4. cap. 15. Sect. 3. pag. 932. cap. 13. Sect. 17. pag. 904. Synopsi. Theol. Disput. 5. Sect. 17. pag. 752. Grotius De Jure belli. lib. 1. cap. 2. Sect. 2. pag. 23. [Page 110] Jo. White his way to the tree of life, cap. 3. pag. 47. Fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne, pag. [...]8. And let me also note that our Divines do from these words fetch their main ground to prove against the Ana­baptists the warrant and lawfulnesse by the word of God, of the Office of the Magistrate in a Christi­an, and over Christians, which argument were void did not ordained of God, here intend an authoriza­tion by the warrant of his word. Some of them that make this their main ground I shall name. The Harmony of Confessions, in that of Auspurg. Artic. 16. and in that of Saxony Artic. 23. Pisc [...]or in locum in­ter observat. Bucan. loc. 45. quest. 18 pag. 856. Synops. pur. Theologiae. Disput. 50. Sect. 18, 17. pag. 751. But let us passe from humane testimony or opinion unto matter of proof by Reason.

2. The nature of the Power here spoken of, argues this to be the sense of the words, ordained of God. The Power here is not a meer natural or physi­cal, but (as was before shewed) a Moral power. Now the text undertaking to describe to us the procedure, or origination of this power, or to tell us whence it is, viz. of God, and how of him, viz. by way of ordination; it must intend such an ordination of God as is agreeable to the nature of the power, or sutable to produce such a power. But natural power is one way from God, Morall power another. Natural power is from the hand of his providence, his efficiency or active concourse: Mo­ral power is from the mouth of God, from his mouth commanding or authorizing the thing. We ascribe unto God, as two distinct faculties, or qua­lities, dominion, and strength; authority, and a po­tency; right to rule, and ability or mightinesse to act and inforce; a willing or legislative, and working powerSee above Chap. 1. Sect. 3. And Zanch. de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. pag. 424.. And sutably to these two faculties we may attribute to him a twofold act, viz. a Moral, and a Physical act; a morall act proceeding from his supreme dominion, authority, or right to com­mand; and a Physical act issuing from his Almightiness, or infinite potency. The former is [Page 111] the act of his mouth; the latter the act of his hand. And accordingly from these two distinct faculties, and their respective acts in God there is communi­cated to the creature a double power: a Moral power, that is a derivative right, or warrant, or au­thority to have, or to do this or that; and this comes from the said Moral act of God: a Natural, or Physical power, a force, ability, or prevalency to this or that operation, derived from that Physical act of God. Now then, when it is said here, the powers are from God, ordained of God, these powers being moral, the meaning must be they are of Gods mouth, ordained by his precept or word, calling, and autho­rizing them to their dignities, and functions. The truth is, nothing hath any obligation or morality, but by virtue of the law of a Superior; a meer Physical act of it self cannot introduce a moral obli­gation; as Mr Selden, and others have well mani­fested, unto whom I refer my ReaderSelden de Jure Natur. lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 93, 94. & cap. 8. pag. 106, 107. Vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy. cap. 3. Sect. 6. pa. 18..

3. I argue from the subjection which is in this verse commanded to be paid unto the powers here spoken of, to perswade whereunto is the Apostles scope in these words, and for the urging on of the same, this is his first and principal rea­son, The powers to be subjected to, are or­dained of God. Now let be considered what the nature of this subjection is in the intent of the Apostle, and it will help well to lead us to his mea­ning in these words, ordained of God. The subjecti­on injoyned is not a passive succumbency, or patient submissiveness under the thing to be subjected un­to, as under a burden or crosse; but it is a free, wil­ling, voluntary and active submission, or subordi­nation; the former hath an eye directly unto a thing as being by Providence or the hand of God; and were that the sense of the subjection here re­quired of Christians, it would be sutable and con­venient to understand this ordination of God of a meer providential being of him. But evident it is, that the precept, Let every soul be subject to the higher Powers, bears the latter construction, to wit, of a [Page 112] voluntary and active subordination. The verbe [...] so signifies. Divines observe upon the word, it imports a subjection according to order, and such a subjection as is that of persons, that stand in a relative inferiority to their superiours, as wives, children, servants, and subjects to their respective correlatives; who are not only to bear them that are over them, but to be subordinate to them with good will, and in many duties and offices to act un­der and serve them. They note also the word is of the middle voice, and therefore signifies actively, as well as passively, and is therefore in other places translated in the active, as, submit your selves, sub­mitted themselves, &cSee Rom. 10.3. 1 Cor. 16.16. Eph. 5.22. Jam. 47. 1 Pet. 2.13. & 5.5.. The quality of this sub­jection is further characterized in the subsequent verses, as, that it must extend so far as to exclude re­sistance of the power, we may not resist, or cast it off though we could (vers. 2.) Yea, but on the other hand, we are to support and maintain it, we are to minister unto it the materials whereby it may be kept up, and continued to rule over us (vers. 6, 7.) and the subjection to it must be of conscience, as the principle of conscience is contradistinct from terror, and compulsory punishment (vers. 5.) and further the aforesaid support and maintenance must be yeelded to it, as a due, and debt, and that owing not only to God the imposer or ordainer, but of justice to the power it self ordained. Now can a subjection of this nature, containing all these things he built upon the being of a thing by meer eventual Providence? the coming forth of a thing so of God can be no cogent, or solid reason for such a subjecti­on unto it. There are many things thus proceeding from and ordained of God, which we are not bound to acquiesce in, or let be as they are, much lesse to maintain and uphold in their posture; but our wils, our desires, our prayers, our endevors may be, yea of duty must be against them. Death, sickness, perse­cution, wrongs, famines, plagues, predatory wars, and innumerable more things are providentially ordained of God at certain times here, and there [Page 113] to fall, and never come but by such an ordination, yet may they be endevored to be repelled, or removed. And this is the reason which authors commonly give for their understanding the words not of a sole provi­dential, but of an institutive ordinationTolet in loc. & Grotius de Jure Belli lib. 1. cap. 2. Sect. 7. pag. 23.. There is indeed due unto every providence of God, though ne­ver so inflicting or heavy, some kind of subjection, that is patience, or a contented and composed minde and behaviour under it, but there is a great deal of difference betwix this, and the subjection here due to the power. The work or office of the former, viz. of patience, is not to form the minde to will, or desire the being or coming to passe of the thing which is to be born, nor to command the person to a concu [...]rence in procuring or continuing it upon himself, but pre­supposing it must needs be so, it is to frame the heart to bear it in a right manner, to wit, quie [...]ly, and with­out grudging; innocently, and without evill doing, or speaking; confidently, and without despondency or casting away hope in God. And this bearing it bind­eth unto only for present, or during the known in­cumbency of the evil, that is so far as it appears ne­cessary and inevitable, as being from the wil of Gods purpose, and imposition of his hand; which kinde of subjection well admits and consists with the use of means for the repelling, and of remedies for the cea­sing, and ending of the evil sustained, the use of those means, respecting not that which appears to be the wil of Gods counsel, but that which is to come, or that part and duration of the evil which is behind, & there­fore uncertain to the bearer, whether God will have it to be or no. This is the subjection of patience, which therefore properly hath reference to a providential di­vine ordination, but the subjection of a relation of in­feriority in a civil state, whereof the text treats, is of another stampe; it must sway the mind to consent to the power, to act for, & contribute to its standing, and to refrain all counter workings of hand, or spirit a­gainst the same: and the ground hereof is, because it hath respect to a divine ordination of institution, the which institutiō hath prescribed the power both to be, [Page 114] and to have such a posture of subjection yeelded to it.

To say the power is ordained of God providenti­ally, and therefore to be subjected to with a sub­jection of this latter kind, to wit, which bars out all resistance, or attempt to alter, or order any thing against its standing, or proceeding, is to say, that whatever is ordained of God providentially is so to be subjected to: and what were this but to for­bid and put a Supersedeas upon all humane actions, and to bind all the men in the world to be as still and void of motion as if they were dead, so that none of them in any affair may once stir, either hand, foot, tongue or thought? for there can be no motion of any of these, but it must carry in it an alteration, change; or ordering of something other­wise then Providence hath already ordained it. For this we all say; the present posture of all the things in the world, even to the placing of a Sparrow upon the ground, or the hair of a mans head, is orde­red by divine Providence; now no creature can move without altering in some particular the pre­sent posture of things; if then whatever is ordered by Divine Providence, must be so acquiesced in, or under, that none may attempt to counter-order, or alter any thing in it, every man is bound to a surcease of all action, even to the very drawing of his breath.

4. I argue again from the prohibition of re­sistance of the power, and the due and proper sense wherein it is to be understood. For I ask, Is re­sistance absolutely, or in every sense imaginable, or all manner of resistance whatsoever, here for­bidden? There are none but they will, or must confess that some resistance is to be excepted out of this prohibition, and is allowableSee Dr. Wil­lers He [...]capla [...]on Rom. 13. qu. 7. pag. 583.. It is lawful for a Subject to defend himself in person, and estate by Petition, and plea in the Court against his So­veraign. Likewise if his Prince personally and wrongfully assault him to the manifest and imme­diate perill of his life, it is permitted him to ward [Page 115] off, and defensively put back that undeserved, and extrajudicial violence. Yea further, it is not only lawfull, but a duty to deny obedience to some of the Magistrates commands, backed with penalties, and not only so, but to act to the contrary of them, as is manifest by the example of the Apostles doing contrary to the prohibition and th [...]eats of their Rulers, and the warrant they alledged for their so doing [Act. 4.19. & 15.29.] What then is the resistance which is here forbidden, and how to be circumscribed? The ordinary, (and I suppose rati­onal and expedient) restriction put upon the words is, the Power may not be resisted, that is, the law­full being and proceeding of the power, that which is of God, is irresistible; or all resistance is forbidden which can be said to be a resistance of the ordinance of God (as to destroy the person in whom the power is placed by G [...]d, or to deprive him of the autho­rity committed to him, or to hinder the just exercise of it.) Now if we take the words, of God, ordained of God (which are the strongest reason and meetest circumscription of the irresistance here insisted on) to signifie a providential efflux from God, there is no limitation in them, but an absolute illegitima­tion of all acts of resistance, even of those above­said to be generally, and justly allowable, as well as any other, and an imposal of subjection, without any manner of resistance, to all the outrages of the immanest Tyrant. All the injuries and illegalities of every Superiour are providentially disposed of God, and therefore as wrapt up within this term Ordinance, so understood, would be irresistible. It remains necessary therefore that we here take Ordained, and ordinance, in an institutive, or legislative, not in a meer providential way of or­dination.

5. A reason also may be taken from the penalty annexed to that resistance of the ordinance of God which is here disallowed, they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. An ordination of Provi­dence may be resisted, (that is, endevoured to be [Page 116] prevented or altered) and no damnation incurred, yea oftentimes such a resistance is the fulfilling of a mans duty. The evill which God in his secret purpose intends, and his Providence is visibly working to bring or to continue, it may be lawful, yea a duty for us to labour the not falling, or our escape of; as on the other hand we may, and ought to seek the attainment of those good things, which God wils never to bestow upon us. Wherefore if an endevor to resist, and frustrate an ordination of Providence be a matter of no guilt, or demerit of damnation, it must not be simply that; but an or­dination of precept which the Apostle here threatens with that sentence.

6. Once more I argue from the resistance, and the resister of the Power condemned in the second verse. That cannot be the sense of the term ordai­ned of God, which may be said of him that resisteth the power, then when he resisteth, and in respect of his so doing, and that cannot be the sense of that attribute the ordinance of God, which may be spoken of the resisters act of resistance of the power; but to be in the place of power by eventual Provi­dence may be said of the resister of the Power, then when he resisteth, and in respect of his so doing; and the resisters act of resistence of the power, may be said to be by a providential disposal: Therefore a being in the place of power by eventual Provi­dence cannot be the sense of those terms, ordained of God, the ordinance of God. Both the premises I take to be so clear as not to need confirming. If the minor should be stuck at, I would ask what branch of it can be denyed, or counted any thing obscure? I will only illustrate it by instance. Was not Absalom, was not Athaliah in the place of power by eventual Providence? and was not both the one and the other a resister of the power, the former of David, the latter of Joash? and was not their very being in, or occupying the place of power (as they did it, viz. by Trechery and violence) an act of resistance of the power, in that thereby they [Page 117] kept out the power that was truly of God,CHAP. V. SECT. III. viz. David and Joash?

7. To be ordained of God must needs be taken in such a sense as that the term may alwayes be pre­dicated of, or agree to every power that is inten­ded in the Text; but if we take ordained of God to mean an actuall being in possession, or place of rule by divine Providence, this cannot alwayes be predicated of, or agree to every power that is in­tended in the text. As it did appear in the last fore­going argument, that such a being in the place of rule may agree to some that are not the power, but are the resisters of the same; so here it may be evi­dent that it may not agree to them that indeed are the power. The Providence of God doth so order it sometimes, that the Power or Civill Magistrate is not only disturbed and disquieted in, but outed and extruded from actual rule, or possession of the seat of Magistracy, he still remaining the power. That he that is the power may be providentially out of possession will be fully argued a little after. Here I will only point at those two even now men­tioned instances. Who can deny but that David and Joash at what time they were disseised by Absalom and Athaliah, were yet such powers as the Apostle here means to command subjection to, and to per­swade thereto by this argument, because they be of God, ordained of him? and that which befell those two Princes may, at the pleasure of God, be the providential lot of any other. Those whom the precept of God (in this verse) requireth to be obeyed, his Providence may at the same time ordain their disseisure. Wherefore if it cannot be said universal­ly of all the powers included in this text, that they are providentially ordered of God in an actual rule or domination, we must take the text to intend some other kind of ordination, and that will be no other but an injunctive imposal.

8. I argue from the end for which the power is ordained of God, expressed (vers. 3. & 4.) which is to be a terror not to good works, but to the evill. To [Page 118] be a Minister of God to thee for good, to be a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. Commen­tators observing upon the words that the powers in their proceedings do not alwayes hold correspondency to these ends or uses,Calvin. Pareus. but not seldom do act directly counter to them, they therefore rightly tell us, the Apostle herein speaks not what the Magistrate always is, or doth, but what he is ordained to be, and do; not what his action, but what his office or instituti­on is; not what is de facto, but what ever ought to he, and de jure, is his level and scope. Here then is an evident ground to conclude it is not providenti­all, but preceptive ordination which the Apostle intends. Providential ordination doth ever take effect, or indeclinably accomplish its end. The dif­ference (as was before noted) betwixt these two ordinations (preceptive, and providential) is, that the former is often disobeyed, and departed from by men to whom it is given, but the latter holds on its course, and attaineth his purpose without sail; it never comes short, or is defeated of its end. If we will say the ordination here meant is by Provi­dence, and the Providence of God in the giving of all Magistrates proposeth; and makes at this, that they be a terror not to good works, but to the evill, &c. We must thence say, it would then so come to passe, and be universally verified in every power, and in every administration of every power. But the contrary to the whole strain of those two verses (viz. the 3. and 4.) experience findes to be the practise of divers Rulers. Whence I infer the ordination of God here intended is institutive, or preceptive.

9. And lastly, Another argument there is to be raised from the consideration of the end which the Apostle declares the Civill powers to be or­dained for; and it is this, The ordination that is here meant doth set up Powers, to be a terror not to good works, but to the evill; to be a Mi­nister of God to thee for good; to be a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evill: and this we [Page 119] must understand to be their constant, and per­petual end: but Providence doth not seldom or­dain powers (in judgement, and for correction to people) for quite contrary ends to these1 Sam. 8.11, to 18. Hos. 13, 11.. So it is often that Rulers are not a terror to evill workers, but to the good, Ministers of God for evill, executors of wrath not upon the evill, but upon the well-doer. And if so it come to passe, we must needs say it is so ordered by God in his Providence: and if the Providence of God doth so oftentimes intend and dispose that Magistrates are a scourge to virtue, and indulgencers of wicked­ness, then we cannot say, unlesse we may speak contradictories, that the ordination of the powers, by which they are set up constantly, and only for the punishment of evill doers, and the praise of them that do well, is an ordination meerly by Pro­vidence.

Thus I have discharged (as I could) the Second thing I proposed to do for the opening of this term ordained of God, which was to lay down positively the sense which I conceive it to bear in this place, with my Reasons confirming and concluding the same, I goe on to the Third.

CHAP. V. SECT. IV. SECT. IV. Gods preceptive ordination of the Power explained, particularly how it is communicated to this or that par­ticular Magistrate.

GOds ordination of the powers being supposed to be preceptive, or to involve an act of warrant, authorization or commissionating of them by his word or law: The third thing I promised is an ex­plication of this speciall sense which I give of the words, ordained of God.

That which I take to need some explication is, what this act of ordination thus construed imports, and especially how particular powers may be said to be thus ordained of God; or, how Gods preceptive, or legislative ordination descends, or is derived to this, or that individual power, which hath not his express, extraordinary, or immediate nomination to the place of rule, as Saul, David, and some others, found in Scripture, had.

Ordination here, I conceive, intends as much as creation, production, or putting of the power in being. So that when the Apostle saith, the powers that be are ordained of God, his meaning is, they are by him made, created, or put into the state of Powers. Whatsoever therefore goes to the en­stating or erecting of a Magistrate, or the investing of a person in that office, or function, that I take to be imported in this word Ordination, and that I understand by these words to be ascri­bed unto God. This is it then, the Power is [Page 121] ordained of God, that is,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 1. whatsoever is effective or productive of a Magistrate is derived from God.

Subsection 1. Ordination contains Institution, and Consti­tution; and what each of these signi­fies.

THis ordination or creation of the power must needs, I conceive, have in it two things.

The first is institution, or the ordaining of Ma­gistracy to be in the state, or civil society. It is Gods preceptive ordinance that men in every poli­tique body should have, and live under a Govern­ment. In this act of institution may be contained not only the simple appointment of Magistracy to be, but the defining also of the office, or the pre­scribing what shall be the end, and what the mea­sure, compass, or bounds of its authority; how the Soveraign power shall rule, and be obeyed, what shall be necessary or allowable for him to do, and what to have.

The other is Constitution, which is the bring­ing of that Institution into act, and execution in particular states. And this may have ascribed to it two parts.

1. Specification, or the determining of the special kind of Government, comprehensible under that ge­neral institution, or the setting down, which shall be the form [...] of policy pro bic & nunc, or here and now, in this or that state; whether Monarchy, Aristocracy, or another. And unto this Specification may be re­ducible the designment of the proportion, or lati­tude which this or that magistrate shall have. I shall [Page 122] not here enter into the dispute, whether the supreme power be limitable otherwise then the general insti­tution it self confines him. But I will suppose (the which is to me the more probable opinion) that there is a latitude in the allotment of power by that general institution, and as some things are necessa­ry, and of the essence of supreme power, so other things are allowable or lawful; and being so, are left arbitrary, and referred to the choice and agree­ment of the parties concerned in the constitution: and these may be the subject of that designation, or apportionating; as may be also the several shares or measures of power which each party shall have, where the supreme power is either mixt, or compoun­ded of several simple formes, or is distributed into several hands.

2. Individuation; or the investure of the power, or the assignation of it to the person, or persons that shall sustain it, or the concrediting, and committing of it to this or that man, or num­ber of men, or to one living, or stock of persons in whom the designed fram of Government shall reside.

That these acts must necessarily go to the crea­ting or putting of the particular power in being, I think will not be questioned. It remains then to shew that they are, and how they are every one of them from God, and by his ordination, understan­ding ordination in this sense in which we have before construed it.

Subsection 2. CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 2. That Institution of the Power is of God, and whether by the law of Nature in mans Innocency.

FIrst, The institution of the Power; the ordain­ing in general, that Magistracy shall be, and what shall be the office, power, and preeminencies of the Magistrate, this is, with one consent acknowledg­ed to be of God. Whether its institution by God was in mans innocency, or it was since his; whe­ther Magistracy be of God, by the law of nature; or by a positive or postnate law, is not agreed upon by all learned men: but most Divines, (as far as I observe) both antient and modern, Protestants, and of the Scools conclude it to have been instituted of God in the state of mans innocency, and to be from the light and law of na­tureVide Aquin. part. 1. qu. 97 art. 4. Durand. in Sentent. lib. 2. Dist. 44. qu. 2. fol. 157. A. P. Martyr loc. com. clas. 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Bucan. loc. 49. qu. 16. Pareus in hunc loc. Scharp. Symph. Epo. 1. pag. 39. Estium & Willet in loc. Aristot. pol. lib. 1. num. 8, & 17.. And to their authority I may add that of the Prince of Philosophers, and also that of the Jewish Doctors. These (as Mr. Selden tels usSelden de Jure Natur. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 118, 119, 127. & lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 804. Dr. Hammond of Resol. centrov. Quaer. 1. Sect. 7. pag. 6..) deliver seven principal heads of the law of nature, which they call the seven precepts of the Noachidae, and the sixth of them is concer­ning the being of Civill Go­vernment, and of obedience to it, and this tenent of the origi­nal of the law of Magistracy may be confirmed.

1. By this that we finde the duty of all inferiors to their [Page 124] superiors injoyned in the Fifth commandement of the moral law (as it is generally expounded: by which it must needs be presupposed that the being of superiority, in every state is enacted.

2. In that all nations, and people that are, or have been, and have owned reason, and morality, as they have inclined to entertain civill society, and communion, so they have been guided to esteem it necessary to have a Government in every socie­ty, and accordingly have erected, and submitted to it.

3. God hath (as is evident by Scripture) by his law of creation set other reasonable creatures (as spirits) in a distinction of order and superiority of some over others; and there can be no reason given why it should not be so in mankind, by the same original law.

4. Though there appear not what use the state of integrity could have, of punishment, or a coercive sword; yet it is not to me conceivable how there could be either distinction or communion in hu­mane societies, or actions without the commanding and leading power of some over others.

Subsection 3. That constitution of the Power, or putting in of the particular Magistrate is of God, and how, or by what means he doth it.

SEcondly, The constitution of Magistracy, this, both as to the determination of the form, and composure of the Government, and as to the indi­viduation or investure of the person is from God. Yet not alwayes, and in every state after the same manner.

[Page 125]1. We read God did sometime,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 3. unto the Com­mon-wealth of Israel, ordain both the special form of Government, and the particular persons in whom it should reside, by peculiar revelation. So it was in the government of Israel by Moses, Josuah, Gideon, Deborah, Saul, David and his posterity.

2. But besides that way of peculiar Revelation, pro­per to that people, and those persons and such other as are in like manner mentioned in Scripture, God hath another, which is his ordinary, and constant way of determining the special form of Gove [...]nment, and designing the persons for it, to wit, by giving order and direction to men how to proceed in their vacan­cy of Magistracy, and by leading and steering men according to that his order unto the constitution of it among them. For our right understanding, and evi­dencing of this way of Gods ordination of parti­cular Magistrates in particular States, let these few particulars be considered.

1. Gods ordination of Powers must needs im­port Constitution as well as Institution; that is, wherever there is a power ordained of God, not only that Magistracy shall be, but the special form, and particular person is ordained of God; he orde­reth what shall be the platform, and who shall be the Magi­strateExistimo Apostolum primum quidem testari in genere jus ipsum, & potestatem Magistratus a Deo esse; deinde hujus potestatis distributionem eidem Deo vindi­care. Beza in loc. Men have no title to Authority, but by deputation from God, as the Apostle expresly testifies, Rom. 13.1. Jo. White his way, &c. cap. 3. pag. 47.. This is the sense of that which is ordinarily said, that the Magistrate hath his power by deputation from God. And this must needs be acknowledged; otherwise we could not say of the Powers that be, or (as some urge the words) are existent, that they are of God. It is constituti­on that puts Magistracy in being. By virtue of the general rule, or command given to all States, that there be a go­vernment in the Common-wealth, no man is, or c [...]n claim to be the power more then another, nor is this man bound to be a subject more then [Page 126] that;CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 6. nor are the people tied to own, and subject to this man as their Magistrate more then to ano­ther, or then he is to any of them, or is any special form, or kind of government expresly either justi­fiable, or reprovable more then another; nor is the setting up of Magistracy the work or interest of any in particular more then of others: So that if many persons should start up, and claim the seat of Magi­stracy each to himself in peculiar over the same. Com­mon-wealth, or if in it divers parties, either of that body politique, or forein to it, should enterprise the erection of Magistracy, each of them in their own way, and oppositewise to one another, no one of them could be owned, or binding, or entitled to the ordi­nation of God, by virtue of that general com­mand more then another. It were to ascribe to God a bootless, void, frustraneous act to say he hath ordained Civil power to be, but taken no order in whom it shall be, or how it shall be conveyed to any man, without an order or rule for constitution, that law, that there he a Magistracy, may stand writ­ten in the word of God, or in the heart of man by nature, and never take effect or be acted. God doth not ordain name or notions of things, but their beings and realities, and in ordaining them, he must be supposed to ordain the acts, method, and course of their production. We say of his will of decree, and it must hold also of his will of command, God not only ordaines the end, or that a thing be, but the means also, or how, and by whom it shall be. Civil power being one of those things which the law of God both by nature, and in Scriptu [...]e hath subjected to property, or affixed to a peculiar having and holding, by virtue whereof this man is enstated and entitled to this office, and another is not, such a property, or peculiarity of tenure, or reservedness cannot be without a law for the cir­cumscription of mens wils & hands in the acquisition and possession of it. Now if such a law be fixed by God, it must needs be supposed that some rule, or direction is given by him for the founding and [Page 127] transferring of this property,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 7. and for the discovery of it in whom it is. We must therefore come to this conclusion; viz. To say God ordaines the Powers, is to say he regulates, and prescribes by a law mens wils, and actions about it, and in reference to the giving, taking and using of the Magistracy. The words of Pareus (and with him of Willet) upon the place are to this effect, Ordained, [...], Ordinatae, signi­ficat esse po­testates a Deo ordinatas, h [...]e certis limitibus juris, & hone­statis circum­scriptas, intra quas nisi se con­tineant, ab or­dine divino ex­orbitent. Pareus in loc. signifies that the powers are of God ordained, that is, are circumscribed by certain limits and rules of right and honesty, with­in which rules unless they contain themselves they de­generate from the ordinance of God. And this cir­cumscription doubtless must necessarily be admitted as well in relation to the assuming as to the using of the power.

Once more, If it were not so that Gods ordai­ning of the powers doth import, not only that he institutes magistracy to be, but that he constitutes every particular Magistracy, we could not say that an insurrection against this, or any particular Ma­gistrate, or to depose him, and occupy his place were a sin or a trangression, and resistance of Gods ordi­nance (as the Apostles words vers. 2. without que­stion intend) for to take away or controul a parti­cular Magistrate cannot otherwise be an entrench­ment upon Gods ordinance then upon the parti­cular Magistrates being ordained of God. So much (that God institutes Government to be) would stand unshaken by such an act, or would consist well with it; for still, it notwithstanding, it would be undetermined who were the power, and so it would be left as free and lawful for the resister to take the place, as for the resisted to hold it; the institu­tion would be satisfied if any possessed it. Wherefore we must needs suppose God doth in every Common­wealth constitute the proper and particular Ma­gistracy, where ever it can be said to be ordained of God.

2. In regard God doth not ordinarily by any special revelation determine the constitution of the Civil state, that is, point out what shall be the [Page 128] special form of Government,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 3. and who shall be the Governours in this or that place, we must therefore conceive him to manage this matter ordinarily, mediante homine, or by men, and that is, by his defi­ning the way of erecting Magistracy, or giving order, and prescribing rules to men how they shall proceed in the setting up of it, and by mens pro­ceeding accordingly. They that say the law, and light of nature enacteth Government, to be in the Civill society, tell us also that by nature no man is actually constitute a Magistrate more then another, and that nature hath left all men equall, and free, or unenga­ged (in actu exercito, they mean) to any one particul r form or personAristot. pol. lib. 3. num. 102. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 92. Hobs Elements part. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 1. & cap. 4. Sect. 1.. Wherefore it must needs be conclu­ded seeing God by the law of nature hath injoyned government to be, but hath ordered no particular in it with application to singulars, he hath committed it to the positive transaction of men, to be disposed according to certain general rules of justice, and pru­dence given by him. It is not imaginable how God should impose or require any distinct state, or special relation, and order to be amongst a multitude of men, or other his creatures, but be must be said either immediately by himself to create it, or to set down from what causes, or out of what principles it shall arise.

3. For the distinct understanding of the manner, or how many wayes God interposeth and concur­reth in the constitution of particular Magistrates, in regard of which interposal the individual, or par­ticular power may be ascribed to Gods ordination, I shall note.

Some things God doth herein immediately, and some things mediately.

1. Immediately, and by himself he doth declare such, and such formes of Government to be law­full and eligible, and he doth order where and in whom the interest shall be to make choice which of those forms in particular, and who the person or persons shall be that shall be placed over this or that state respectively.

[Page 129]2. Mediately, and by men he doth enstate eve­ry special kind of Government, and every particular Magistrate, that is, he doth set them up according to those rules which we say are immediately given by him.

And this his mediate concurrence is two ways.

1. The authority or warrant of his word, rule or law goeth along with those that act therein ac­cording to the same. And this is his moral con­currence.

2. His work or hand of Providence guideth the wils and exterior actions of them that proceed ac­cording to those rules; and this is his physical con­course.

We do not therefore exclude the Providence of God from the ordination of the powers that be: but we attribute to it its proper place and use; which is to persue, and execute the authority and rule of his word, from which in the production of Magi­stracy we cannot, neither ought by any means to separate or disjoyn it, so as to make it constitutive of a Magistrate. And this act of Providence is far different from that which some would confound with it, and so put as the whole of sole basis of Ci­vill government, as to constitution, to wit, a persons meer possession, or occupation of the seat of Ma­jesty, or a bare physical predominancy: for this may be, and yet no Magistracy; and this, though it be due to the Civil Magistrate, yet it is separable from it, as this discourse I hope will manifest. The act of Providence which (as far as I can appre­hend) may be productive of Civill power is that which disposeth of the title or right, and not of the meer possession of the throne; that which guideth mens wils to consent, or give a call, or con­fer on the one part, and to accept of it on the other; and not that which only swayeth mens hands, on the one side lifting up an arme of force, as a punishment over a people, on the other binding the hands, and leading away captive Princes, and people, that however disagreeing, [Page 130] or relucting they can make no effectual resi­stance.

4. Though God do not by immediate revela­tion assign to every particular State what shall be the special model of their government, and who the persons to sustain it, yet where men do act in the assignation of these for substance according to the prescript or rule given out by God unto all, there is a power ordained of God, and (unless when a special revelation comes from God determining these particulars) there only, or not other­wise.

This Proposition hath two parts, a positive, and a negative.

1. The positive is, when men do act accor­ding to divine rule, in the moulding of govern­ment, and advancing of persons to wield it, there the constitution may be said (according to this text) to be of God, and the particular Government, and Governors to be ordained of God. Imme­diety of designation from God either of platform, or person is not necessary to the bestowing of this style, of God, ordained of God, upon the particular Magistracy. It is in this case as it is in the point of any ordinary right or property. God hath ordained a perpetual law of justice among men (thou shalt not steal) by which every mans property in his goods is required to be reserved to him; and he hath given, either in his word, or by the light, and law of na­ture a sufficient rule to determine, what shall be right, what wrong, and how property in any pos­sessibles shall be acquirable; yet all this by it self invests no man in any right to any goods in particu­lar: it is a humane qualification or transaction which supervening, and being bona fide passed, now enstates men in an actual right to any goods; and when this is emergent, this or that mans title or property in these particular goods is asserted by God, and then it may be said, it is Gods ordinance that this man have and injoy these goods, and a transgression against the same it is for another man without like warrant [Page 131] from God to disseise him of them. The truth is, the most, if not all, the moral precepts of God, and perpetual laws of nature are so made, and delivered to man, as that to the putting of them in practise, or the bringing of their obligation into act there must intervene some positive constitution either from God or man, and most commonly it is from the latter.

The Schools tell us that humane positive consti­tutions do determine the law of nature as the form specificates the matter, or the particular matter de­termines the generallVide Cajetan in Aquin. 1. 2ae. qu. 95. art. 2. Widdingtons Rejoynder cap. 8. num. 20. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 106. Hooker Eccles. polit. lib. 6. pag. 151, 152. Grotius de Jure lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 10.. That wives, children, servants, subjects own their respective superiors, and pay them their duties is the law of God, but there are certain humane acts which are the imme­diate foundation and rise of these relations, and so of persons lying under the duties, which severally be­long to them; which acts once passed the bounds of relation, and duty do take hold of the persons re­spectively by virtue of the divine ordination. Our Saviour saith of marryed persons, What God hath joyned together let no man put asunder. Marriage then in all marryed couples is a conjunction made by God; but how comes that seeing most that marry have no recourse to, or particular direction from God, when, whom, or how to marry, probably never think of any ordinance of God about it, but only to follow their own or others counsels and wils in it? Why thus it is, God in the beginning authorized marriage to be betwixt man and woman, and ap­pointed how it should be transacted, to wit, by the mutual consent, or cleaving together of each par­ty: and enacted other rules concerning it, as touch­ing proximity of bloud, &c. And now by virtue of this his ordinance, what ever couple do accordingly contract, are joyned together by God. The same may be exemplified in the office of the Ministery of the Gospel. Christ hath given commission to cer­tain in the Church to ordain Elders, and when such are accordingly ordained, they a [...]e then the Ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries [Page 132] of God, and are said to be made by the Holy GhostAct. 14.23. 1 Tim. 4.14. & 5 22. Tit. 1.5. 2 Tim. 2.2. with Act. 20.28. 1 Cor. 4.1..

In the natural body God is said to have given more abundant honour to that part which lacked, [1 Cor. 12.24.] How it is said God hath given this honour? it is not by his making that part more comely then other parts, for contrarily the words are spoken of those parts that by making are more uncomely, and lesse honourable then the rest. But, in as much as we by an instinct of nature do repute some parts na­turally lesse honourable, and more uncomely then other, and thereupon do b [...]stow more abundant ar­tificial honour and comeliness upon them, viz. do more cloath, and cover them with dressings; in this regard, what is upon that consideration thought fit by man to be done in the distribution of honour to his natural parts in such an inequality as may fill up the natural disproportion, God is said to do, viz. by directing us by natures instinct to do it.

The Judges of Israel for those 450. years menti­oned by St. Paul, are said to be given them of God, and to be raised up to them of God, and that he com­manded them to feed his people Act. 13.20. Jud. 2.16, &c. 1 Chron. 17.6.: and yet we read not of any immediate particular, expresse call from God given to them all, or to the most of them, none of them, I take it, can upon any evident ground be sup­posed to have had any such, except. Deborah, Gideon, and Sampson; but a mediate call from God, by men, that all of them doubtless had: and of Jeptha his call of this nature the text at large informs usJud. 10.5.. from such an orderly call by men we may therefore take it to have been that they were given, raised up, commissioned to that people of God

We all acknowledge Subordinate Magistrates to be ordained of God, and many of our Commenta­tors include them as well as the supreme in this text, and Mr. Calvin, Calvin in loc. Spanhem. Dub. Evang. part. 3. Dub. 64. pag. 288. Estius in Ro. 13. Spanhemius, and Estius takes those words, [in 1 Pet. 2.13.] sent by him; to refer, not unto the King, but to God as the sender; [Page 133] yet those inferior Magistrates have their election, and deputation from the supreme humane power; but they are notwithstanding, reckoned to be of God, in as much as they are surrogated by them who are empowered by God to do it.

Our Saviour speaking of all Magistrates, saith that unto them the word of God came, that is,Joh. 10.35. as Ex­positors interpret these words, God hath given out to them a warrant, and commission for their offices. But how is that? the speech certainly can have no reference to an immediate designation from God in relation to the most of them, but the word of God comes to, or authorizeth them, who are advanced to the seat of power by men according to his word.

We may take this then for clear, that the conveying of power from man so man, may make a power or­dained of God; only with this proviso be it said, this is not meerly because it is done by men, for neither every humane action, nor every act of any whomso­ever in this matter can entitle this effect to divine ordination; but it is because, and so far forth as this is done of men by virtue of a rule, and warrant from God, and therefore hath the authorization, and seal of God upon it.

Wherever therefore such a platform of Magi­stracy is erected, and such persons are invested with it as God hath declared eligible, and this by them to whom God hath committed this management, and such power placed in the persons, as he hath legiti­mated, there is a power enstamped with this of the Apostle, of God, ordained of God. And this is the sentence of Commentators on the text, and others that treat on this subj [...]ct. As

Peter Martyr.P. Martyr loc. com clas. 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Sometimes this (to wit, the crea­tion of the power) comes to passe by the consent of the Senate, sometime by the suffrages of the people, but these are but instruments, the proper cause of Magistrates is God himself.

Pareus.P [...]reus in loc. sub. dub. 3. Neither do second causes exclude the first. In old time God by an immedia e call advanced some [Page 134] Magistrates, & Kings to the throne, as Moses, &c. But the rest, as the 70. Elders, he by mans act, and coun­sel placed in power, and yet ceaseth not so to do, and that according to the laws and custom received of every people; either by the election and consent of a Senate, as now the Roman Empire; or by the voices of the people, as the Governers of the Cities that are meerly or mixtly democratical, &c.

Tolet in loc.Toler. Of God, as of the first principle, and cause the powers proceed, although by the intervenient wils of men, as heat, cold, and the like are of God, but by inter­mediate second causes.

Estius in loc.Estius. The secular power is mediately of God, by men, who by the instinct of the law of Nature, set over those of whom they may be governed in a community. For this instinct is of God, so that by reason thereof it may be truly and positively said, that this power is not but of God.

Mr. John Selden.Selden [...] de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 108. But whatsoever by that license is constituted variously betwixt men civilly, and duely ac­cording to the several formes of Government, only by way of determination, as the Schoolmen speak, so as not to be contrary neither to the natural, nor the positive law of God; that also receiveth sanction and obligation, ac­cording to the several qualifications of the constitution, from the said law which is both naturall, and divinely positive or written.

Willet upon the place. As the fruits of the earth are brought forth by mans labour, yet are Gods gifts, so is Magistracy, &c.

2. The negative is, Whatever power (so named, or pretended) there may be, or whatsoever persons there be that take upon them to be the Power, or Magistrate over a State, and are not thereto appoin­ted, or therein enstated, as is abovesaid (that is, ei­ther by special expresse revelation from God, or by men proceeding upon, and by virtue of a warrant, or authority from God) they are not a Power ordained of God. This will follow upon what is said already. For if it be so, that to the making of a particular Power, or Magistrate to be Gods ordinance there [Page 135] goes not only a law of God universally enacting Civil Government to be, but a further specificating act of God, whereby be constituteth this special platform for this Common-wealth, and cals forth, or authorizeth this person, or these persons here to bear it; and that this he doth, either by imme­diate revelation, or by the intervention of men qua­lified, and instructed by his set rule to make the said assignation, then it must needs be yeelded that none can be entitled to the plea, and priviledge of being Gods ordinance, but they that come in by that door, or ascend by that scale.

It will (I think) be said by all, that Gods ordain­ing the power doth not necessarily import his d [...]sig­nation immediately, by his own mouth, of the form and persons, but that he committeth the doing of this ordinarily to humane arbitration. And hereupon it will be to be inferred, that either God hath left this determination to men absolutely, indefinitly, and promiscuously, giving way to any that will, in any place whatsoever, to constitute what Magistracy, and whom in it they please, (and who hath so little un­derstanding either of God, or of the matter hereby attributed to him, as to say this?) or else that he hath set a stint, and fixed rule to men in this matter, ap­pointing certain to constitute the Government, and obliging people to the owning of the Government so constituted, as from him, with exclusion, and dis­allowance of any other to determine these things. And if this be the way (as to me it seemeth so clear as that no other is imaginable) then, if in the erecting of government a substantial deviation from it be, as when incompetent, or unallowed per­sons be the advancers of themselves, or others unto the place of power, in as much as in that case there lies the divine disapprobation, and men act besides the said prescript, it may be said there is no ordi­nance of God, but a contradiction, and contraordi­nation to Gods order.

CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. That Gods ordination is conveyed to the par­ticular Magistrate by the consent of the community.

BUt then (perhaps) there will remain one Questi­on, viz. where hath God given out his warrant or rule to any to act, or proceed in this business? and who are they in every State respectively, whom God hath authorized, or qualified to determine the particulars of it?

Unto this my Answer is,

1. That the said rule, or the special way by which men should be called, or attain to the place of Soveraign power, and expresly defined in Scripture is not necessary, or to be, as such, exacted. We all grant that God hath in reference to all the pro­prietable things of this life, and to all transactions about them injoyned a rule of right and equity to be kept, and forbidden the transactions about them, injoyned a rule of right, and equity to be kept, and forbidden the transgression of it, yet he hath not in his written word particularly stated the several wayes by which the right, or title to a thing shall be acquired, nor yet the special lawes, or rules by which the property of persons to such things may be deter­mined, or adjudged. This the law and light of na­ture in mans heart as to many, or most things, or cases, is left to discover: and this it hath done, in most things indifferent clearly, and equally, in so much as the affaires of men about them are ordina­rily, and both by vulgar maxims, and customs, and by publique laws, and judgements regularly compo­sed and determined.

[Page 137]2. And yet we are not without some Scripture­light in this particular. Even it doth not only pre­scribe an orderly call to the administration of Civill power, and condemn the unorderly and violent assumption of it; [Num. 27.26, 27. Luk. 12.14. Hos. 8.4. Jer. 30.21. Ezek. 23.16. Amos 6.13.] but doth also direct the way how men should be ad­vanced to it, and by whom, in case of vacancy of Magistracy. This it doth in the particular case of that nation to whom God at first gave his writ­ten law, which may be a pattern to other Nations in this, as in other matters confessedly it is. See the direction to them, [Deut. 17.14, 15. & 16.18. & 1.13.] In which places the transacting of this affair is by order from God put into the hands of the community, over whom the Magistracy is set. Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes, and they shall judge the people with just judgement. And unto this order seems the speech of that good man, and wise Statist to refer, [2 Sam. 16.18.] Nay but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide. And according to this prescript runs the promise of God to the people of Israel concerning their state after the return of their Babylonish capti­vity, Jer. 30.21. And their Nobles shall be of them­selves, and their Governor shall proceed from the midst of them. And answerable to this rule we finde in­stances of the people constituting their Supreme Governour; as in the advancement of Jeptha, Jud. 10.5, &c. of David, 1 Chron. 11.1, &c. and others. And I would ask them who seem willing to deny that in the Bible any commission is given to a prople to choose themselves Governors, to what purpose is it that the Lord giveth by Moses directi­ons, and rules what manner of person the Israelites should set up to be King over them, as it is [Deut. 17.14, 15, &c.] if they had no interest, or commission given them to set up, or choose any for themselves?

[Page 138]3. Besides this light of the text, the law of Na­ture is judged to dictate the same thing, to wit, that the right power, or interest, to transact this business of the constitution of Magistrates is in the com­munity, or people of each Countrey, or State in relation to their own Magistracy. So that whether we look into the Scriptures, or into the Book of Natures law, the way which God hath chalkt out, the ordinary means he useth for the deputation of persons under himself, and over the people in the office of the Supreme Civil power, is the vote, elective act, or consent of the body politique, or people to be ruled. To testifie the latter, viz. that the law of nature dictates this to men,

1. I shall in stead of many cite a few learned Au­thors of best respect that affirm it.

2. I shall alledge the original, and primi­tive practise of Nations to have been conform thereto.

1. For the affirmation of it, to be so de Jure.

Mr. Richard Hooker.Hooker Eccles. pol. l. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26, 27, 29. lib. 8. pag. 150, 151. To take away all such mu­tual grievance, injuries, and wrongs, there was no way but only by growing upon composition, and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some government publique, and by yeelding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy estate of the rest might be procured, without which consent there was no reason why one man should take upon him to be Lord, or Judge over another. — Over a whole grand multitude, having no such dependency (as is in the family upon the Father) upon any one, and consisting of so many families, as every politique society in the world doth, impossible it is that any should have compleat lawful power, but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not having the natural superiority of fathers, their power must needs be either usurped, and then unlawfull, or if lawful, then either granted, or consented unto by them over whom they ex­ercise the same, or else given extraordinarily from [Page 139] God.— Of this point therefore we are to note that sith men naturally have no full, and perfect power to command whole politique multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort be at no mans commandement living.

Mr. Perkins.Perkins To. 1. pag. 762. A. Treat. of Cal­lings. Every lawful King is placed by God; and by men that are appointed under God to set up Princes over them, according the laws and customs of se­veral Kingdoms.

Mr. John Selden.Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 106, 107. Among these (viz. the acts of the permissive law of nature) every man seeth that the acts of making constitutions, entring into cove­nants, introducing of Customs, and forms of Govern­ment, and of rescinding, revoking, or altering all these, by the choice of those Societies of men whom it concer­ned, where likewise permitted. — In like manner it hath still been granted that by the said permission whatsoever it by men, joyned in Society, limited, forbid­den, or constituted, that they are bound to keep who have so consented, according to the conditions, and qua­lification with which it is prescribed, even as many as have, and so far as they have given their consent. But whence is it that they are so bound? from the authori­ty of a deity, that is of mans superior, even in these things, the rise of the obligation is to be derived, and therefore from some heads of the obligative law of nature. For the acts whereof we speak were allowed to men, so as either they might use them at their plea­sure, or they might by joynt consent prohibit them, and confine their own liberty in them, either by covenant, naturally plighted, or by Princes constituted to govern in those matters; which thing seemeth not sufficiently conceivable how it should be, whilst we alway lock at right, and owing of duty, unlesse then joyn this also to it, that the obligation to the said inhibition, or con­finement of liberty doth accrew from his authority, and command who, as being mans superiour, gives war­rant to it.

Mr. Jeremiah Burroughes.Burroughes on Hos. 1. Lect. 4. pag. 111. see al­so Lect. 3. pa. 65. and on cap. 3. Lect. 2. pag. 704. There is no authority that we are subject to now, but according to the laws and constitutions of the Countrey where we live. We [Page 140] must require whether it be a power: It is not because the man that is in authority commandeth it, except he commandeth it by virtue of that authority which is ac­cording to the nature and condition of the foundamen­tal constitutions of the Countrey where he liveth.—Otherwise we are not bound in conscience: bound we may be in regard of prudence, and in regard of preventing other disturbances, but conscience doth not bind to wils of men, but binds to laws.

The Author of the treatise of Monarchy,Treatise of Mo­narchy chap. 1. Sect. 1. & chap. 3. Sect. 2. & 5. Vindication of that Treatise chap. 3. Sect. 6. (called by one in print, Mr. Hunton) God by no word binds any people to this or that form, till they by their own act bind themselves. They (to wit Soveraigns) attain this determination of authority to their persons by the tacit and virtual, or else expresse, and formal consent of that society of men they govern, either in their own per­sons, or the root of their succession. — I do conceive that in the first original all monarchy, yea any individual frame of Government whatsoever is elective, that is, is constituted, and draws its force, and right from the con­sent, and choice of that community over which it sway­eth. — My reason is, because man being a voluntary agent, and subjection being a moral act, it doth essen­tially depend on cons [...]nt: so that a man may by force, and extremity be brought under the force, and power of ano­ther, as unreasonable creatures are to be disposed of, and trampled on whether they will or no; but a bond of sub­jection cannot be put on him, nor a right to claim obedi­ence, and service acquired, unlesse a man become bound by some act of his own will. I am perswaded it will ap­pear an uncontrouleable truth in policy, that the consent of the people, either by themselves or their ancestors, is the only mean in ordinary Providence by which Soveraignty is conferred on any persons or family: neither can Gods ordinance be conveyed, and people engaged in conscience by any other means.

The author of the fuller answer to Dr. Ferns Fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne [...]ag. 17, 18. Trea­tise, &c. The meaning of the place (Rom. 13.) then must be this, The powers that be (i. e.) so, or so establish­ed by consent of man, are ordained of God to be obeyed; or it is Gods ordinance that men should live under some [Page 141] government, and submit without resistance to that kinde of government they have by consent established: just (as St. Peter follows him) to the ordinance of man for the Lords sake. — There are two kinds, we use to say, of Tyranny, regiminis, & usurpationis; that which is only of government, though never so heavy must be endured. That other kinde, of usurpation, it hath no right, no ordination at all, and so no subjection due to it. In all power of government, Divinity tels us there are four things, the institution, the constitution, the acquisition, and the use. The constitution alwayes from mans consent, the institution alwayes from God.

Mr. Thomas Hobs.Hobs Elements part. 1. chap. 6. Sect. 6, 7. part. 2. chap. 10. Sect. 3. That this may be done (viz. the erection of a common power) there is no way imaginable, but only union, which is the involving, or including the wils of many in the will of one man, or of one counsel. — The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one, and the same man, or to some one, and the same counsel by them all named and determined.

Lastly, Polybius, as cited by Gregory Tholosanus.Greg. Tholos. Syntag. Juris lib. 47. cap. 15. Sect. 22. Neither yet ought every Government of one be presently called a kingdom, but that only which is granted by the subjects consent.

2. Besides these testimonies to confirm that of right, and by the law and light of nature so it is, viz. that the Supreme power be derived by consent of the people. I promised to shew the matter of fact, viz. that so it was in the beginning of the erecti­on of Government. For this I have the testimo­nies of Aristotle, Cicero, Justin, Ludovicus Vives, Polydor Virgil, and Calvin, speaking in general of all nations, and of Livy, Plutarch, and Juvenal, in refe­rence to the Roman.

Aristotle (polit. lib. 3. chap. 10. num. 89.) saith, For when those first heroes had obliged the people with great benefits, as by their invention of arts, or warlike powers, or bringings of men into society, and commerce or inlargement of their territo [...]ies, these were created Kings by the free consent of the people.

Cicero (de legibus lib. 3. pag. 452.) tels us, all the ancient nations in times past subjected themselves unto Kings, the which kinde of Government was first conveyed, and given unto the justest and wisest men. But those who were not pleased with kingly Govern­ment, refuse they did not to submit themselves to any at all, but they were not willing to subject alwayes to one.

Justin. (lib. 1.) informes that, in the beginning the rule of nations was in the hand of Kings, whom not popular ambition, but their moderate carriage ap­proved of the good advanced to that height of ho­nour.

Upon which words of Justin, Ludovicus Vives (in Augustin. de Civit. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 5, 6.) hath this note. In the beginning every family had its King, either the wisest, or the justest of the house; a little after that Kings began to rule over many families, and sometimes there were to one family divers Kings, whom the people elected to themselves as to be guides, governours, and overseers of the publique interest; and they were not compelled to take such a one as happened any way to them: neither did nobility, or the seeking of the party carry it: every mans own private good with the good of the publique was so dear and near to him, that it made him to make choice of none but the best.

Pol. Virgil. de Invent. Rer. lib. 2. cap. 2. Polydore Virgil followeth, and builde [...]h his rela­tion upon Justin. And for the Roman state in par­ticular, it is very evident in Livy, Florus, Stadna upon him, and Plutarch, that their five first Kings, Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Tullus Hostilius, Ancus Martius, and Tarquinius Priscus, were chosen by the Senate, and People; and that their seventh King Tarquinius Superbus was by them removed for his evident usurpation. Neque enim ad jus Regni quicquam praeter vim habebat, ut qui neque popu­li jussu, neque patribus autoribus regnavit; saith Livy.

Unto whose testimonies I may add that of Juve­nal, exprobrating the sloath and degeneracy of the [Page 143] Roman people in falling off from their ancient man­ners, and policy.

Nam qui dabat olim
Imperium, fasces, legiones, omnia,
Juvenal Satyr 10. pag. 94.
nunc se
Continet, atque duas tantum res anxius optat,
Panem, & circenses.
At first the peoples vote swaid all, the Crown,
The rule of Court, and camp; now they sit down,
For those not troubled, only grant, they say,
To us but stomachs fill'd, and leave to play.

Unto all these astipulateth that of Calvin (in Genes. 10.) Notandum in nepotibu [...] Noah tantum re­censeri qui Gentium fuerunt principes. Nam ut quisque inter fratres ingenio, virtute, industria vel aliis dotibus excelluit, sibi peperit nomen, & potentiam, ut alii sub eorum umbrâ quiescentes primatum illis libenter concederent. It is to be observed that of the Grand children of Noah they only are recited who were Princes of the Nations. For as any excelled among his brethren in wisdom, virtue, industry, or other qualities, he purchased to himself name, and power; so that the rest voluntarily granted him the Soveraignty, and rested under his pro­tection.

CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 5. Subsection 5. Three other wayes of conveying unto persons a title to soveraign Magistracy exami­ned; viz. 1. That of Fatherhood, and Primogeniture. 2. That of Conquest. 3. That of voluntary beneficialnesse by protection.

BUt besides this I meet with some other wayes by some held lawful and approved for the entry, and attainment of persons to Soverainty, and con­sequently such as derive the divine ordination to it unto the persons qualified with them. Of these it will happily be expected he that is handling this subject should take some notice; together with what is said for them.

1. That which I shall take notice of, first is, the power or right of Fatherhood, which is supported or pieced out (by the maintainers of it) with that of primogeniture, or of the first born; both of these put together they style (as I understand them) by the name of Genarchy. The drift of their opinion that are for this is to make the rise, and right of Civill Government natural and native, not voluntary, or conventional.

The Question here is not, Whether the Father, and the First-born have not some preeminency over their respective correlatives, to wit, the Father over his Children, the First-born over his younger bre­thren? But whether the preeminency be the same with Civill Magistracy: Or whether the political power in a Common-wealth be not one thing, and that superiority another, and those two be not [Page 145] really and essentially different [...] Neither is the question, whether Fatherhood and primogeniture may not be coincident in regard of the subject with Civil Magistracy, that is, may not meet in the same person? Nor is the question, whether Civil Power may not be he [...]editary, that is, setled and kept in one family, and in it descend from the Father to his first Son, and after that manner successively forward? But the question is, whether Fatherhood and pri­mogeniture, either of them apart, or both of them together be the proper title, basis, or root of Civill Magistracy? or, whether a natural, and original right, and title to political rule be in the Father, and first-born, without any positive voluntary, hu­mane constitution, or consent of the state; so that a person is in soveraign power not by virtue of any such law or paction, but meerly, and originally by his Fatherhood or primogeniture?

First, for the title of Fatherhood to Magistracy, there are these things that impugne it.

1. Although it is granted there is in the Fa­ther a power over his child, yet ever since the erection of the publique State, or Comm [...]n-wealth, as a distinct society from that of a houshold, and com­pounded of a multitude of families, and where ever these two are in being together, the paternal power hath been (and that duly, and necessarily) taken to be another, or a distinct authority from that of the Civil Magistrate, and inferior, or subordinate to it.

2. The power of the Father is in every Father over his children: and if from it you will raise a Civil Political power, then, either it must be said to be in, or to be the right of every Father; and if so, as soon as one begets a child, or becomes a Father, he becomes a Supreme Civil Power, begins a new Common-wealth, and he, and his children are exempt from his Fathers (if living) and all other Civil superiority; and the Fathers power, and the Common-wealth he is over shall be dissolved by his having Nephews, or by his childrens fatherhood: [Page 146] and this will make every family, though but of two persons, to be a Civil State, and that no Common­wealth can consist of more then the children of one Father, and for ever prevent or deny the compoun­ding a Common-wealth of many families, and the distinction of the Common-wealth from the Fami­ly. And by this multiplication of the number, and abridgement of the extent of civil societies you disappoint mankind of that union, strength, securi­ty, and comfortable commerce that nature hath guided men to seek, and the experience of all ages and nations have found in large and populous so­cieties. Or

2. The political power must be said to be in, or to be the right of every Father that is not Pater patratus, or that hath no Father; and this doth dissolve and divide the Common-wealth at the death of such a Father into so many parts as there are left persons fatherlesse, whether they be Wife, Sons, or Daughters, and into so many new Common­wealths as there are left Fathers in it that have not a Father.

3. The right or power of the Father can relate only to the children, and only to his own. Out of the extent then of this dominion, and consequently out of the Common-wealth it belongeth unto, upon this score you must exclude,

1. The Wife, and Servants of this supposed Mo­narch, though he be their superiour, and they in a subordination to him, yet he is not their Fa­ther.

2. All other persons of any other stock; there can be no mixture of races, or linages in this Common-wealth.

4. If Civil power be the right of the Father, then it must necessarily be in him in reference to all his children, wherever placed, or dispersed. So that how far soever Adams progeny must be dissemina­ted, or spread upon the face of the earth, during his life; or Noahs during his life; or any of the long lived Patriarchs during their respective lives, all the [Page 147] posterity that sprang from such a head, must be­long to, and be shut up within one Common-wealth while that common parent lasted. And how will this stand with that distribution of Noahs race into severall Countreys and Nations in his life time, as also with that of Shems, he being living? (of which in the 10 and 12 Chapters of Genesis) and with Abra­hams sending away the sons he had by his Concu­bines into another Countrey while he yet lived? Gen. 25.6.

Unless it will be said, such a Father hath a facul­ty, or warrant to strip himself of this his pa­ternal Civill Dominion, and to transfer it, or any part of it to others during his life, But

1. Thus you unsettle and change the basis, and cause of civil dominion you had laid in the Fathers natural right, and make it separable from it by humane choice, and will: and if you put it once upon arbitrary constitution you make it alienable for ever from that subject, and from that bottom.

2. This cannot be supposed at the confusion of languages (Gen. 11.6, 7.) when as they were one immediately before it; and the end of their building Babel was to prevent their dispersion; and upon that confusion they were scattered from thence upon the face of the whole earth; by which con­fusion, and dispersion the consent, or act of their common head, for the divesting of himself, and for the investing of those who should succeed him, in being the respective Soveraign powers of those several divided Countries and nations, was pre­vented.

Secondly, But the inconveniencies of fixing Civil power in the paternal relation alone they endevour to salve by eeking it out with that of primogeniture. Unto this I say,

1. Primogeniture can never be supposed to de­rive any thing to the childe, but what was in the Father; if the Father be a Supreme power, a Mo­narchy may by it be conveyable to his Son, and [Page 148] not otherwise. Thus primogeniture is not the rise of civil power, but supposeth it to be in being, and is only the mean of continuation, and transmission of it from person to person.

2. The natural right of the first born in succes­sion from the Father, as we finde it in Scripture, seems only to be a better, or double portion of what was his Fathers, in copartnership with his Bre­thren. If then you go by that, you must upon the death of every royal father, that hath a plurality of Sons divide the Common-wealth among them ac­cording to that proportion; whereby it would come to passe that a Kingdom by many descents probably shall be divided into numberlesse minute principa­lities, and every of them still new to be divided by every new succession. The conveying of a Kingdom whole and entire to one of many Sons is not from the law of the first born in Scripture, but is doubt­less from positive institution. And this is to me a st [...]ong argument (and unanswerable to them that allow the transferring of Kingdoms undivided from Father to Childe) that Supreme power is in a person by arbitrary constitution, not by natural right as in a Father or first-born; for if it were, that right by it self would infer a division of Common-wealths according to the multiplication of the Regal stock, and so in time an easie dissolution of them.

3. If Primogeniture must carry it, then the right of Fatherhood a [...]ore insisted on went on no farther then the first man Adam, and was never in any after him; and upon his decease you put an end to, and destroy for ever your paternal right to Poli­tical power. For upon his death either the power must descend upon every one of his children distri­butively, as Fathers in reference to their respe­ctive children as their subjects; and then where is that you call the right of primogeniture, and what politicall power is accrewed by it? or, it must descend upon his first-born only, and then what becomes from thenceforth of the right of fatherhood?

[Page 149]4. If you set the Civill power upon the first born in succession from Adam, and so downward, then you must either set it upon every fi [...]st-born of every Father, and this will bring the absurdities, argued to follow upon setting it upon every father, or, you must fixe it but on one first-born only at once, that is, the eldest Son of the eldest house; and then you make it necessary that all men be kept within one Common-wealth, and that there be but one Mo­narch; for that primogeniture can but be in one race, and in one person still, and how opposite is this, not only to the practise of all ages, even from Noahs time, when the race of man­kinde was divided, as into divers regions, so into several. Nations or politique bodies; but to the state of mankind so far di [...]persed over the whole earth as it is incapable of being one earthly Mo­narchy.

2. Or you must say the first-b [...]rn, as he had in him a right to hold the power, so he had a power to alienate it to his younger brethren, or kin, and did put into act this power to the distribution of the world into many intire States and Principali­ties; but against this it will be said, a right in Adams first begotten, and in every first begotten of the first begotten successively to the power, and a right to alienate the power either in whole, or in part, from descending to the fi [...]st in succession, are inc [...]nsistent; he that alienates and gives away power to any of the younger, unto so much as he gives, he cu [...]s [...]ff [...]he right of the eldest, and puts an end to this title of primogeniture.

5. Let it be considered what is in Scripture the right of the first-born, viz. some domestical pre­eminency, or superiority of the eldest over his Bre­thren within the family, as Gen. 4.7.Vide Cart­wright on Gen. 25.31. The first­born were next in honour to their Parents (saith Ainsworth on Gen. 25.31.) what ever it was, it ap­pears to be that which Cain might have over Abel during the life of their Father Adam; and was not [Page 150] therefore the Supreme Civil Power. It appears the first Son had precedency of place, Gen. 43.33. and a double portion of his Fathers inheritance, Deut. 21.17. but all this, and if there be any thing more, amounts not to a political Power; but in the con­trary we finde it plainly distinguisht, and separated from it. The right of Jacobs first-born descended upon one Son, the right of the Supreme Civil Power upon another, 1 Chron. 5.1, 2. Reuben was Israels first-born; for his incest he lost the birth-right, and Jacob gave it to Joseph, but though the birth-right was Josephs, yet Judah prevailed above his Brethren, and of him came the chief ruler. The blessing of Lordship over his Brethren which Isaac unawares b [...]queathed to Jacob, and the birthright were two distinct things in Esaus repute, Gen. 27.36, 37. Probably in the beginning of mankind, or of a fa­mily ere it was inlarged so far as to cause a full di­vision into distinct Nations, and Civil dominions, and while by reason of paucity of persons, and proxi­mity of habitation there was little difference obser­ved betwixt a Family and Common-wealth, pub­lique power did reside in the Father over all that sprung of him; and after it had so gone on for a time, that communities by union might enjoy more strength, and security, it might by the joynt consent of many families, and the Fathers and Grandsires of them be divolved to one which was the first-born of the eldest house. But that this was by natural right, or that it was set down as a perpetual law, or rule for every Common-wealth, as the only warranta­ble rise or title to Supreme Government; and that it was not as free for them, or such as they, who first reduced themselves under the dominion of the first-born, by agreement, to have with the same agreement constituted the power in another, or a younger stem, will (I suppose) never be proved, neither can hold, for the reasons above given.

[Page 151]6. We finde that in the disposal of Govern­ment among Brethren this birth-order was not sel­dom inverted. As when Jacob was preferred before Esau; Judah before all the elder sons of Jacob; Ephraim before Manasseh; Solomon before Adonijah; 2 King. 23.30, 36. See Divines Annotat. Dio [...]ate, and Jack­son in loc. Jehoabaz the younger, before Jehojakim the elder son of Josiah; and Judas Macca­beus 1 Maccab. 2.66. with vers. 2, 3, 4. the third son of Mattathias be­fore his other elder brethren. And of Simri the son of Hosah, it it said, though he was not the first­b [...]rn, yet his Father made him the chief1 Chron. 26 10.. Yea it was anteverted by a standing law in the c [...]se of the elder brother dying childelessWhereby the hei [...]ship did not descend upon the next Brother who then was his Fathers first-born, but was entailed upon a childe to be begotten by him on the widow of the deceased, which childe was to inherit his Ʋncles estate, and so put by his own Father. Deut. 25 5. Mat. 22.24. If primogeniture had been the con­stant law, and channel of Govern­ment, why was it pronounced as a peculiar curse upon Canaan the son of Ham the younger son of Noah, that he should be a servant to his brethren.

7. Lastly, The preeminence of the first-born is supposed at the first to have been as well in matters Religious, as Secular, and to have comprised the office of Priest-hoodSee the Chal­dee paraphrase on Gen 49.3 Musculus and Ainsworth on the same, and the latter on cap. 15.31.. Yet that was (after a time) taken away from it perpetually, and was under the law put into one tribe, and family in Israel; and ever since the Ecclesiastical function hath been meerly institutive, and not hereditary. Whereby it may appear that the preeminences yeelded to primogeniture in the beginning were not all of them of the unchangeable law of nature, or any moral, or perpetual institution, but some of them (at least) arbitrary, mutable, and tem­porary.

Having argued first the claim of Fatherhood, then that of Primogeniture, I shall add this fur­ther of them laid both together. Whatsoever re­spect, or reverence either the relation of a Father, [Page 152] or of a first-born hath at any time carried any where; and whatsoever power was deferred to them at the beginning, they cannot be imagined to have been intended by God, or ordained by the law of nature as a fixt and constant basis, no nor to be of any permanent use so much as to give us light, either for the beginning; founding, or raising up of a Magistracy where it is wanting, or for the legitimating, or deducing, and deriving of an ori­ginal right, or title to any that is already in being.

1. If we consider the multiplication, division, confusion, and extinction of families that hath been.

1. The multiplication: Now that mankind hath for so long a time been sprung forth into a world of families and kindreds, which are every day sprouting out into more.

2. Division: the stock or family of Adam is, and long since hath been not only multiplied, and dis­seminated into innumerable families, but those have been parted into a multitude of (yea almost innume­rable) Nations, and distinct politique bodies.

3. Confusion: every one of those nations is not only constituted of numberless families, but those are so consounded, and shuffled together, that no distinction of any one stock in a continued descent from Adam, or Noah is left; and so the pri­ority of geni [...]ure as reckoned from either of them, to be in one family, and person in relation to the rest of mankind, or of the same Common-wealth is utterly unknown, and unconjecturable. Length of time, want of records, removal, and shifting of habitations, the identity, variety and change of the names of persons, and places, and many other things have overwhelmed with darke obli­vion all knowledge of such distinction, and pri­ority.

4. Extinction of families: as the persons, so the stocks and linages of men have a mortality upon them, and in time divers of them are worn out, and come to a period.

Now then, when mankind is looked upon as at present, and for some thousands of years it hath been drawn out into so many lines, and races, and those some broken off, others transversed, interwoven, and mingled both in bloud, and dwelling without any pale or difference of stock, or precedency of birth deduced from primitive antiquity, though the Fa­ther, and first-begotten, though both in the house, and in the Common-wealth as far as they are known, retain still a right, and respect at their hands, who stand in the relation of children, and younger brethren to them, and in the latter the title of dominion being once fixed in a stock or fa­mily, the paternal, and protogenial relations are of use to keep it on in succession, and to convey it from person to person, yet they are of no force to bottom, or raise a title to Civil Soveraignty upon, over, or in reference to those who stand not in any known relation of children, or younger brethren, or any juniority of descent to them. This may confidently enough be affirmed, It cannot be said of any person, or family in the world, nor could have been for these many ages, that he, or it claimeth, or holdeth the throne in such a nation by a right of Fatherhood, or Primogeniture derived from the first father, or first eldest son.

2. But if none of these obscurities were, but di­stinction of families, and their order of precedency, and subsequency of descent from the first head of mankind were clear; so that in every nation, or State, one family or race could be pointed out as the eldest, and first of the Nation in descent from Adam, or Noah, yet there shall lie difficulties incident to the pretence of succession by birth-priviledge, even within any one family, not to be extricated by the evidence of a natural pedegree, or any otherwise then by positive constitution. How many questions do Civilians agitate about the right of succession where the linage is known? and what different rules and methods of succession do they observe in several Nations and Kingdoms? He that shall but [Page 154] read one Chapter in Grotius (viz. de Jure belli lib. 2. cap. 7.) may discover that variety of opini­on, and practise in this point of succession that may satisfie him of the entangledness and intricacy of it.

There is one way of succession which they call hereditary, and another lineal, and of the lineal there is one which they term agnatical, wherein males on­ly are admitted, another cognatical in which females are included. There are some questions concerning what children shall succeed their Father, as, whether begotten only, or also adopted; and whether Legi­timate only, or the natural, or bastard childe also. There is a question about the matter into which the succession is to be; to wit, whether if a man have a plurality of issue, the dominion shall passe un­divided to one, or be distributed into many portions, that is, to every childe a share. There is some questi­on of succession to him that hath issue; as, whether a mans first-born dying before him, and leaving issue, the issue of that son, or his own second-born shall inherit. But there are many questions of suc­c [...]ssion to him that hath not issue of his body; as whether his dominion shall go to his own brethren, and their issue in order, or to the brethren of his Father, or to any other of his ancestors upwards; whether his Brothers childe, or his Uncle: whe­ther his Brothers daughter, or his sisters son; whe­ther his younger Brother, or the son of his elder Brother; whether the Daughter of his elder Bro­ther, or his own younger Brother be to be pre­ferred.

These questions, and such like, the positive lawes, constitutions, or customs of Nations do de­termine several wayes, each in reference to their own territories; so that by virtue of them successi­ons may be carryed clearly and quietly. But the pa­ternal, or protogenial right by it self, abstracted from those arbitrary constitutions, and as only laid upon the law of nature, or lookt into by the light thereof, is as to these particulars indeterminate.

The result of all this is, that the authors of this title of Government must be driven to confess it now out of use, and to be an impossible thing, to build any soveraign power that now is, or can be expected to be, or for most of the ages of man­kinde past, hath been in the world, upon it. Hence is it that after all their discourses upon it they tell us, in relation to all Governments that have been since the confusion of families, of an elective primogeniture (a contradiction in adjecto:) and that those Supreme Magistrates the world hath now, or can have, succeed in the place of the Father and first-born.

But if they come into their place, and not by their title, I ask then quo jure? by this it is yeelded that Fatherhood and Primogeniture make out no title to them. And why then are these so much urged as the only original, rise, and claim of all ordinary do­minion; and that exclusively, and in opposition to any other title, and specially against that which is by the vote, consent, and constitution of the people? They that hold these to be the sole rest and basis of Civil Government, and confess that no Governours now extant can be said, or demonstrated to grow, or be built upon these, bring themselves to this reso­lution, that there neither is nor can be by any ordi­nary means, any known, lawful Government in the earth. And accordingly one of them is thus ex­presseObservations of the original of Government, in the Anarchy of a limited, and mixed Monarchy pag. 12.; All Kings that now are, or ever were, are or were either fathers of their people, or the heirs of such fathers, or the usurpers of the right of such fathers. But before he involve all the Princes of the earth that either are, or have been since the earth was divided (about a hundred years as I take it after Noahs flood) under this brand of usurpation, or a suspicion of it so strong as it layes every one of them under the odds of ten thousand to one to be deserving of it, I would desire his title of Father­hood and Primogeniture, both, or either of them might be cleared of the incongruities and incapaci­ties not only of being an evident, and knowable, [Page 156] but of being a practicab [...]e, and possibly ex [...]stent way of carrying on a course, and succession of Go­vernment in the several states of the world from age to age, the which have been above in this paper im­puted, and argued to attend them. I will only take a little notice of the main and cornerstone, which the friends of this opinion lay to found it upon, and so passe from it. This is the universal Monarchy which they presuppose Adam had from God; and which, or any part whereof none of his posterity could have, but by grant, or succession from him.

But let this be supposed, what will be gained by it to their purpose?

1. Touching the universal Monarchy of Adam, it will be questioned how he had, or received it? Whether by natural right, as the Father of all, or by an immediate expresse and positive grant from God.

2. Besides the way of immediate and expresse grant from God, which it may be supposed▪ Adam, and after him some other special persons (as Moses, Saul, David had) there must be acknowledged a me­diate, and ordinary way of Gods advancing of per­sons to authority, and power, which is standing, ge­neral and common to all times, and places. And of this our controversie is. I enquire therefore how this universal Monarchy of Adam passed from him unto others.

1. Whether distributively, and piecemeal to many, that is to his sons, cach a share, or whole, and solid to one?

2. Whether it passed from him to them, or any of them by his arbitrary and positive assignement, or by order, or law of nature, as to the heir, or heirs general.

3. If by his voluntary assignement it passed to whom, and in what proportion he pleased, then the natural right of Fatherhood or Primogeniture took no place at his death, carryed not the Civil power from him, and so cannot challenge to convey it down­wards.

4. If by order or law of nature it passed from him, then the question will be,

[Page 157]1. Whether they that succeeded to him had it by right of Progenitorship, that is, by reason of the Fatherhood which was in them in relation to their posterity, who were therefore their subjects, so that upon that title, every son of Adam was soveraign to the issue that came of him. But then it will be said, this course of deriving Supreme Magistracy could be but temporary, and must needs have a stop, for otherwise it would multiply Common-wealths in infinitum, according to the multiplication of Fa­thers, and confine Common-wealths to extend no further, then to comprise a Father and his children, which (as was argued before) is neither agreeable to the practise of men, even from the time of Noah, nor to the end of a Common-wealth, which is union of a multitude of households for strength, and secu­rity. When therefore this course of Genarchy ceased, what was the way of continuing Govern­ment?

2. Or it passed from Adam by right of inhe­rence, to Adams sons, as his sons, and so as heirs of their Father. And this is a way different from that of Progenitorship, and upon this point the right of Fa­therhood and that of Primogeniture are at odds, and prove (as to the purpose of conveying power from Adam) inconsistible. For if the Civil power went by Fatherhood, then were all Adams sons joynt suc­cessors in it (as was before said) every one in rela­tion to his posterity: if it went by primogeniture, but one of them could by that claim the power, and this will run as upon the necessi y of having but one Monarchy over all mankind, throughout all ages, which was above disproved. Unless we must say the first-begotten could but claim a double portion of power, and then the rest of the sons had each a single part in proportion to his double. But this,

1. Fals again upon the absurdity even now al­leadged of multiplying Common-wealths by the endlesse number of Fathers.

[Page 158]2. Out of what, or whom would you make the eldest son a double portion? without depriving some other of the sons of his single part, and so destroying the right of inheritance, to it you could make no addition to the single share of the first born, or give him dominion over more then he was superiour to by virtue of his own Fatherhood.

To make an end therefore with this point, if the insisting on the meer natural right either of Father­hood, or Primogeniture will not beat us out a clear path for the derivation of Government from Adam, or carrying it on with some justifiableness of title among men, then we must return to that of vo­luntary agreement, and grant; unto which the true natural right of Fatherhood is not repugnant, but may very well be reconciled, yea, and assistant unto the founding, and continuing Civil Government. Some of them that insist on the Fathers power as the only Civil Power in the world, do yet place in him a right to transfer it from himself, unto whom he pleaseth. If this be granted then I will say the way of setling Civil authority by the agreement, or consent of the governed, might thus come in. Sup­pose we Adam to have ruled as sole Monarch during his life; afterward some one of his sons in successi­on to him, or all his sons each over their own pro­geny as distinct societies; after by the confusion of languages they being forced to sever; or when those distinct races of Adam became so numerous, and dispersive over many countries that they were too vast to be continued in one society, they may be supposed each of them voluntarily to withdraw, or part themselves into several Common-wealths, and the Fathers of the families in every of these new erected Common-wealths having in them the in­terest of power each in relation to his children, and family, and agreeing together for themselves, and theirs to some one as their publique civil-head, or King; and thus cometh in Magistracy to be vo­luntarily constituted in that way wherein the right of Fatherhood is preserved, and continued in subordi­nation [Page 159] to the Civil publique power; and this put in such a way, as both it, and politique societies of con­venient amplitude might be kept up, and new ones (as need should require) might be erected; whereas by the meer right of Fatherhood, holding, and exer­cising the power it had in relation to those only who were natural children to it, it could not be, no not with the supplement of Primogeniture, as was be­fore shewed. And with this the Assertors of the sole right of Fatherhood are driven in a sort to complySee the Anar­chy, &c. p. 11..

2. I come to the second way of attaining a title to Government above proposed to consideration, which is, that of Conquest. The jus gladii as it is un­derstood, and qualified by many Grave, Learned, and approved Authors, I shall not here call into question; But that the Sword, and successe of it unto victory, simply, and by it self, whatsoever the cause, or quarrel pursued by it be, or taken, as it may be, separate from, or contradictory to the choice, or consent of the people, can be a sufficient and justifi­catory title to Civil Government, I cannot yield. We know how Augustine August. de Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 4. hath branded this claim with the style of Magnum Latrocinium. In supply of the halts, and defects which at every turn are de­tected to occurre in the title of Fatherhood, and Primogeniture, an Author of that way (I even now quoted) findeth this shift, The obedience which all Subjects yeeld to Kings is but the paying of that duty, which is due to the supreme Fatherhood. Many times by the act either of usurper himself, or of those that set him up, the true heir of a Crown is dispossessed. In such cases the subjects obedience to the Fatherly power must go along and wait upon Gods providence, who only hath right to give, and to take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another Fatherly power The Anarchy, &c. pag. 12.. Hereby the Fatherly right, and power are made a meer Equivocum, or to signifie power en­titled, or coming in any way whatsoever, though it do not only not derive from the right of Fatherhood, [Page 160] but be privatively opposed to, or destructive of it: and thus he confounds, and makes to meet together in one name, and title, the thing that he had argued against, with the thing that he had asserted. And the saying that Providence in dispossessing of a Crown, him that is the true heir (and so hath the right) and dis­posing it to the hands of an unjust invader, doth put a fatherly power in that invader, and adopt the subjects to an obligation to it; is to deny the right both of paternity and birth-right, and of the consent of the people, and of every other special way of conveying a title to Government, and to make the right there­of only to follow, come by, and consist in possession, and to die forthwith in the Father, and heir upon dispossession. And to what purpose then is all his plea for Fatherhood, and primogeniture, or any other mans for any other title? what a void distinction is that of his when he distinguisheth of a natural, and an a usurped right? According to him now there is no Power, but Fatherhood, no Fatherhood, but pos­session.

But let us passe by this laxe, and wide claim to dominion by the sword, which swalloweth up all other titles, and look into that which I noted to be qualified, and cautioned (and so admitted by learned authors ancient and modern) as it is distinguishable from this, and reconcileable with that of the consent of the ruled.

Two wayes I observe the Sword is admitted to conduce, or have influence into the disposal, or placing of Government, but by neither is it made the sole, or the immediate ground, or cause of a right or title to it, or any otherwayes then as concor­dant with that political constitution I have as­serted.

1. Conquest (or the Conquerour rather) is ad­mitted to be interested in Government where it is the effect of a reall and just war. And so it makes no exception against my assertion. That Victory which is acknowledged justly to lay claim to a Crown is the issue of such a war as supposeth the equity and ne­cessity [Page 161] of the war to be on the victors part, and the default and provocation to be on the part of the conquered; and moreover that the default of the conquered is so high as either to detain from the Conqueror his right, or to forfeit into his hands by wrong offered their power, or liberty in the en­joyment, or disposal of the throne, and that there is a necessity on the part of the Conqueror in refe­rence to his attaining and enjoying of his own right, and just security therein, that he take and use that forfeitureVide Gro [...]a Jure [...]elli. lib. 3. ca. 15. Sect. 1..

In this case conquest is only a means to the conque­rers seising and holding of that power, or rule, which was his own before he prevailed, and which the cause, and state of the war (before the successe obtained) entitled him unto. By which it is evident that his right is not founded on his victory, but was in being before it, and had its rise from an antecedent inve­sture or trespass.

Upon this ground it is, that the title of the sword is alledged not by it self alone, but in subjunction to another title. A late Historian tels us that our King Henry the seven [...]h at his coronation was pro­claimed with these titles, Hen [...]icus Rex Angliae, Buckes Histo­ry of Richard the Third, lib. 2. pag. 54, 55. Jure Divino, Jure Humano, & Jure belli. And that the Pope (Innocent the 8.) in his bull to the said King, Anno 1486. hath the [...] words, Hic Rex Angliae de domo Lancastriae originem trahens, ac qui notorio Jure, & indubitato proximo successionis Titulo, & praelato­rum, & procerum Angliae electione, & successione, &c. etiam de Jure belli est Rex Angliae.

And this way of ingresse into the seat of Authori­ty as it is not grounded on conquest as its title, so it is not privative of, or altogether another from that which was before affirmed to be the only ordi­nary way, viz. the consent of the people. Forfeiture as it is a singular exception that lies in many cases, so it presupposeth a law, or constitution that ordains it, and so in a sort involveth their consent of whom it is taken. Though there be no explicite, and pre­sent act of will in the conquered that the Conque­rer [Page 162] shall reign over them, but an utter averseness, and all possible reluctancy against, and that brings the war: yet it is so allowed to be (when that case is put which is presupposed as the cause of the war) by the law of Nations, yea, of Nature: and being so, their wils have antecedently, originally, and im­plicitely subscribed to it, as such, and are therefore in this manner concluded in it. In like manner as we account that to be by a mans will, or consent, which his Predecessors (in whom he is virtually in­cluded) have willed, or himself hath formerly gran­ted, though now he be quite of another minde. He that gives his vote, personally, or by proxie, to any penal law, or act to be binding to the community of which he is, though he do not formally, and ab­solutely will his own punishment, yet he doth it in­terpretatively, consequentially, and conditionally, if he himself shall fall under the provision of that Act: and his will so passed is, upon his offending after it, sufficient to make his punishment not only just in it self, but just ex ore proprio, and to have his own consent.

2. As Conquest may interest a person in Govern­ment by being an attainment of possession in pursu­ance of an antecedent right, so the other sort of conquest, to wit, that which is a seasing of anothers right, or the setting of a man in meet possession, may have some tendency thereto, though not so directly, and that is thus; It may be an inducement to the conquered (if they be indeed free, and unen­gaged to any other) to a submission, and delivery up of themselves to be the subjects of the victor, and to take him for their Soveraign. The former way conquest is postnate and subsequent to the right of the Conquerer, and so doth not give him his title, but only introduce his possession; this lat­ter way it is antecedaneous, previous, and prepara­tory to his title, but is not productive or constitu­tive of it. Of this latter way of conquests leading to a title to dominion, I have spoken before, and refer my Reader thitherChap. 3. Sect. 3. Subsect. 5. Proposition 5..

Only, whereas some object, that the title of the Sword, or Conquest hath been the usuall beginning of the Kingdoms, and principalities which now are, or have been in the world.

I answer,

1. A facto ad jus non valet argumentum. We do not ask, neither is it to the pu [...]pose, what hath been done in the getting of rule, but what ought to be, and what is the rise of that power which can truly derive from God, as his ordinance.

2. I take this assertion to be too broad, that this hath been the usuall beginning of Dominions. Though many unjust inv [...]sions have been, yet that hath not been the constant birth of Soverainty. I have before alledged humane testimony of the best autho­rity to the contrary.

3. And where unlicentiate intrusion into the throne hath been, it hath commonly not continued, but the dominion hath been shortly, either disposses­sed, or setled upon a better ground-work, by the consent of the interested, sufficiently valid (in point of conscience) to such an act.

3. But if the sword by it self cannot create a title, Let us see what the third fore-named way will help,Non enim si quid alicui est utile, id statim mihi licet ei per vim impone­re. Nam his qui Rationis habent usum, libera de­bet esse utilium, & inutilium e­lectio, nisi al [...] ­ri jus quoddam in eos quaesitum sit. G [...]otius de Jure lib. 2. cap. 22. Sect. 12. either added to it, or alone, viz. that of voluntary beneficialness by protection. There are some who would build a kinde of claim to rule upon the con­sideration of the good, or benefit which the Gover­ning may be said to bring to the governed; which they will suppose it equal for him to obtrude upon them, though against their wils, and in recompence of it to exact their obedience to him. But such pre­tences of benefit, besides that they are often withou [...] reality, and are made the visour of proceedings of a q [...]ite contrary tenor; were they never so real, cannot reach to such an effect. The intention, promise, or actual collation of a good [...]urn doth not create a right in the promiser over him, or any thing of his to whom the same is done, witho [...]t his consent, or acceptance of it with such a con­dition.

To bring some colour for this claim of Domini­on, there are by an Author alledged some cases out of the Civill law; they are contained under that head of obligations which they call, ex quasi con­tracta, and particularly they are of those, ex negotiis gestis. There is, saith that law, an obligation, debt, or duty upon a man, when ones business is done, without his consent to his benefit. In this case the obligation is upon the owner of the business done, unto the Gestor or doer of it. The said Author,

1. Urges the case de neg [...]tiorum gestione, in general.

2. Insists on that particular one of the minor to his guardian, which, saith he, is the case of the Common-wealth, according to that maxim, Res publica semper est in curâ, & tutelâ A R ply to Dr. Sandersons Letter, pag. 5..

1. To the case in general, ex negotiis gestis, I say, there is a wide disparity betwixt it, as stated by the Civilian, and this, for which it is alledged.

1. In that case the ground of the obligation, and compensation awarded is because the thing done is behooveful, for the party obliged, to be done, and yet no consent can be possibly given, the person whose business it is being supposed by rea­son of absence, death, nonage, madness, or such like impediment incapable of giving consent. There is no such ground here where the parties he would have ob [...]iged are extant, present, and of age to declare their minde, and do either declare their dissent, or not declare their assent.

2. What is the extent, or matter of the obliga­tion in that, ex negotiis gestis? not the passing of the beneficiary into the dominion of the bene­factor, but only an obligation of debt to the re­payment of such necessary charges, as the gestor hath been at; it being all reason that in doing anothers business commodiously to that other, the doer should be indemnified. But no obligation here to a new personal state of subjection. By the law a Tutor, or Curator may oblige them [Page 165] under his charge without their consent in their goods to defray his layings out for them, but he cannot without their consent oblige them in a personal re­lation, as in marriage, or servitude, which are obli­gations of state.

3. The law acknowledgeth such an obligation as is specified but under those cautions as do exclude, and contradict the conclusion for which they are here brought. As

1. It denies that obligation if a man handle another mans business as his own.

2. If a man act anothers occasions after that other hath forbidden, or disclaimed his acting.

3. If they be acted, no necessity requiring itVide Greg. Thol [...] sa [...]i Syntag. [...]u [...]i [...], lib. [...]9. cap. [...] Sect. [...] 2. Sect. 8, 9, 11..

2. To that of the Minor, or Pupil in parti­cular.

1. Though the Law allowes the Guardian his charges out of the Minor, yet it allwes not any one to be a Curator that will undertake it. That's against the very nature and end of Curatorship, which is to defend the minor from invasors. He that is a Tutor (that is a Guardian of one under the age of 14. years) must be either jure civili datus, or permissus; he must either be T [...]stamentary, that is, assigned by the decaseds will; or Dative, that is appointed by the law, or magistrate. And he that is a Curator, (that is, over one above 14 but under 25 years old) must be chosen by the Minor, and constituted by the Law. The Civill Law expresly provides that they shall not be Tutors of Pupils who put them­selves upon, or offer to buy or make suit for the employment, and lest this office should seem arbi­trarily taken up, or by force put upon the Pupil or Minor, it ordains that military men be excepted from it. It gives both the Pupil, and the right Guardian an action against him that takes upon him that charge, being not lawfully ordai­ned to it; yea, and against those that assist him in possessing, or exercising that place, and con­demnes the false Guardian in as much as the value of that wherein he deals amounts untoIdem cap. 7. Sect. 2. lib. 13. cap. 1. Sect. 4. cap. 3. Sect. 1. cap. 10. Sect. 6, 16, 37, 38, 39. lib. 12. cap. 4. Sect 6.. [Page 166] Let these rules of the saw about Tutorship to a Pupil take place in the case of the Common-wealth, and its Guardian, and this title by ar­bitrary beneficialness will gain little by this pa­rallel.

2. Whereas he saith, the Common-wealth is alwayes in pupillage. It is but an allusive, or comparative speech; and is therefore unapt to be argumentative. A similitude must not be made run of all four. It can only import some­things appertaining to a Pupill may be in way of resemblance attributed to the Common-wealth. But it were easie to shew divers things wherein there is also a dissimilitude,Idem lib. 12. cap. 2. Sect. 2. lib. 13. cap. 10. Sect. 1. A Pupil cannot choose his Tutor, cannot call him to an account during his pupillage. But its generally confest, the Common-wealth may elect its Go­vernours. And it's a publiquely declared principle (I assert it not) the Supreme Power is accountable to the people. And himself breaks the correspon­dency most of all, in saying, the Common-wealth pupillage is everlasting, whereas the Pupill comes to puberty, and out of his pupillage at 14 years old.

Subsection 6. CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 6. A Solution of some Objections made against the passing of Gods Ordination unto the person of the Supreme Magistrate by the consent of the people.

HAving examined those other wayes of conveying over unto persons the title unto Magistracy, and refuted them: It now remains, that we take notice of some allegations against the peoples con­sent, being the ordinary medium of Gods ordinati­on of a person unto the soveraign power; which some, seeing they think them fit to be urged, will judge worthy either to be assented to, or an­swered.

1. Object.The Anarchy, &c. above cited, pag. 8. If no man have power to take away his own life, without the guilt of being a mur­derer of himself, how can the people confer such a power as they have not themselves, upon any one man without being accessories to their own deaths?

Answ. This Reason seems to ground it self upon that common Axiome, Nihil dat quod non habet; whence it argues, the people cannot give the power of capital punishment over them unto any person, because they have it not, cannot inflict it, each upon himself. But it is mis­grounded.

1. Here is ignoratio clenchi. For, as we yeeld it true that the people have not a civill authority every one over his own life, so we do not say, but here deny, that they can confer it upon another. The concession of a power in the people to nominate, [Page 168] or elect their Soveraign doth not infer so much, viz. that they in so doing give, or confer upon him the Magistratical power. They may be subordinate agents, and their vote, or consent may be the me­dium, or instrument used by God to convey that power to the person, but they cannot therefore be said to be the Creators, efficients, authors, or do­nors of that power, for that is the properwork or prerogative of God. When the young Prophet came to Jehu, and poured the oyle upon his head, and said unto him, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I have anointed thee King over the people; can we say, that Prophet made Jehu King? That young man was not the author, but the messenger only of that business. It is very clear in the conveyance of this, and of other powers, one may be the vehi­culum, the hander over of that power to another, which he is not the possessor of himself. A single woman hath not in her the marital power over her self, yet by her consent in marriage she conveyes it to her husband. The people of a Christian con­gregation, or Church have not each the power of a Pastor, or Minister to Preach, administer a Sa­crament, or the Keyes of Discipline to himself, yet by their election they may be instrumentall to convey the same to another. When the King in whom the power of life, and death is, gives com­mission to a Judge to have, and execute it subordi­nately from, and for him, and sends his order to the Keeper of his seal (required by the Law to make such a Commission authentick) to passe and seal the said Commission; we cannot say, the Keeper gives the Judge the said Commission, but it is the King [...]hat conferres it by this Officers hand. That which the peoples consent doth when they agree that this person shall be their Supreme Governour, is to determine the general rule (that every Com­mon-wealth shall have a Magistracy with power of capital punishment) to the particular person in re­lation to that people; but it makes them not to be conferrers efficients, or primary causes of that Ma­gistracy.

When a power or priviledge is by divine instituti­on annexed to the act of the creature, it is not the creatures act properly, or efficiently, but God by his institution that communicates that power, or priviledge.

2. This Objection, in its proper tendency, doth not more argue against he peoples capaci [...]y to c [...]n­fer the power over life upon any person (which is a thing we affirme not) then it doth against the peoples giving their consent, that such a one shall have the said power over them. For upon the same medium it may be argued, if no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a self-murderer, how can any people con­sent to such a power in another without being ac­cessories to their own deaths? But that the people may very lawfully give their consent to such a power in another, I hope the Objector will not deny; If he should, I would say the people of Israel did lawfully give their consent to such a power in Saul, David, Solomon, and others; yea it is the part of every people to consent to the Rulers to have it, unless we must say that all Subjects are to be under their Governors against their wils.

3. But how then must we avoid the Reason, If I may not take away or destroy mine own life, I may not agree that another shall have the power to do it?

I answer, This is a very false assertion, that power which one hath not, and may not himself exercise, he may not consent to in another; If by power be meant (as it must needs be in the Objection) a power that is in its own nature lawful. Indeed that which is simply, or in it self unlawful, (as for instance, Murder) because it is so unlawful, as I may not do it my self, so I may not consent to anothers doing of it: But that which is lawful in it self, but unlaw­ful to me (as many things are) because though good in it self, yet I am not thereto called, or authorized, of that I cannot say, because I cannot do it my self, [Page 170] I may not consent to it in another. The Apostle Paul did give his consent to the taking away of his own life (conditionally if he deserved death, and the objection imports no other consent) when he was in question about it before his JudgeAct. 25.11.. If I be an offen­der, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I re­fuse not to die.

4. From this antecedent, no man hath power to take away his own life without the guilt of self-mur­der, the conclusion would as well be, not only (ergo) the people cannot, but (ergo) no man can confer such a power on another, and thus the argument would run, as against the peoples, so against any others conferring, (or consenting to, as to their sense who make the terms equivalent) such a power in another; so that by this it should be un­lawfull,

1. For a Prince, or any other Supreme power to transmit, resigne, or put off their Government in their life time to another, which yet the Author of this objection allowes.

2. For one that is a subject to no State, to desire or offer himself to, or accept of naturaliza­tion, or incorporatien in any Common-wealth, under any civil power.

3. For one that is a member of a Legislative assembly, and out of it but a subject, to give his vote to an act for the punishing of a crime with death, by which his own life is concerned, as subjected to death by the said act upon his breach of the same. Yet I suppose no man can defend any of these to be unlawful. And for the last it is very ordinary, and generally allowed, and the reason is; Because such a persons vote, and the ordaining of such a law doth not create a power of life, and death, nor confer it de novo on the Magistrate to whom the execution of it is committed. It only doth deter­mine, or apply that power which is already instituted by God, and inherent in the Magistrate, to its par­ticular matter, such a fact: or, make that power which was in him in actu signato, to be in him in actu [Page 171] exercito, in reference to such a crime. As therefore a Parliament mans vote conduceth to determine, or apply that power which was in some sort in being before to its particular matter, this fact; so doth the peoples vote determine that power which was in some sort ordained before, that is, instituted by God, to its particular subject, this person. I have thus dispatched their Herculean argument; let us see what more is said.

2 Object.The Anarchy. &c. pag. 11. This supposed right in the people to choose, or constitute their Government is a thing which it is not possible for them any way lawfully to exercise.

To make this objection good, and to shew the difficulty, or imp [...]ssibility of the said exercise they raise these scruples.

1. Sith nature must be supposed to have left mankind loose, or unreduced into civil, publique societies, how come they distributed into distinct Common-wealths, so as this person, family, or people belong to this State, that to another severally?

Answ. 1. It must be supposed that nature hath ordained (upon supposal of the multiplication, and spreading of men over the several regions of the earth) a partition of men into divers civil Societies, to be under distinct, and peculiar civil Govern­ments. So that in actu signato, or in specie mankinde is naturally bound, and is not in that respect ori­ginally free: but in actu exercito they are naturally free (as to political we mean, not as to paternal subjection) that is, originally the reduction of men into this or that Common-wealth distinct from others is yet to do, the union of them into one, or division into many civill States is yet unmade; and it is yet in facto undetermined of what society this, or that person, family, or people shall be, and so unto what civil Superiour they belong. This is very ap­parent. A Common-wealths Society is made by some act, constitution, or law, which ordinarily is humane, or transacted by men according to that of Augustine, August. de libe­ro Arbitr. lib. 1. cap. 6. Ex hominibus una lege societatis populus [Page 172] constat: there must be men before there can be a family; the being of families is before that of a Common-wealth, the Common-wealth is before the Magistrate; and a distinction of Common-wealths before a plurality of Supreme Magistrates. There must be the matter before the forme, the constituting parts before the constitution, the esse absolutum before the esse relativum of these respective societies, and correlatives; and therefore a natural freedom, or original unengagedness of men in actu exercito. Which yet we must not so understand, as if now every single person still were born free, and so remaineth untill he by his personal act contract an engagement; for in the erection of communities, and Governments in them, the Master of the family, having the rule thereof, representeth all the persons of his house; and the persons then actually incor­porate involve their posterity; so that only they in this respect are free who are not by the act either of themselves, or of their progenitors, or other re­presenters compacted in society with others. They that think it irrational that the Father should re­present & involve the family, must resolve us how the Religious and civill covenants of Israel, and Judah made in Moses, Josuahs, Davids, Asas, Joashes, Hezekiahs, Josiahs, and Nehemiahs dayes did com­prehend, and bind as well the absent as the pre­sent, and their posterity born, and yet unborn; as also how the lawes, and contracts continually passed by some do take in others not personally consenting.

2. Sith the partition of Common-wealths is ac­knowledged by the Objectors as well as by us, and both must say it is not determined, or brought to the actus exercitus by nature, it behoves not us, nor toucheth our assertion that this query be cleared, more then it doth them, and theirs: and possibly if they will resolve this their own Question, we shall accord with them in the Answer. And to make it somewhat more explicate, if they would please t [...] resolve us, how any one Common-wealth hat [...] [Page 173] been (without immediatly divine direction, as was that of Israel) constitute, or raised out of a multi­tude of collateral families destitute of one natural Father, common to them all (as doubtless most, or all that are, or ever were have been) we might (I think) easily agree, how the distribution of mankind into many civil States hath come) and if I must here spend mine opinion it is brought to passe, or effected,

1. Not by Consanguinity, or tye of bloud, for this is in some degree extensive to all mankinde: and for a confinement of it within any certain degrees whereby to make a division of Common-wealths,

1. There is no direction from Nature or Scri­pture, either that any such confinement shall make out the bounds of a Common-wealth, or what such degrees are.

2. There is no ordinary means left, or possibi­lity of knowing what persons (of any number neer to that of a Common-wealth) are within such de­grees, and what without.

3. It is contingent to a Common-wealth (and rarely if ever known) to consist of one distinct kin­dred, or stock: and it is contingent to such a kin­dred to be comprised within one Common-wealth: collateral linages being ordinarily, either dissociated into severall republiques, or but intermixed with, and parcels of one.

2. Not by Cohabitation; for though that be con­venient to be amongst them that are one Common-wealth: yet,

1. It is not alwayes so, one part of a Common-wealth sometimes lying from another beyond the Seas, or beyond another, or divers other Nations, yea some imes one part in Europe, another in East-In­dia or America.

2. How far that cohabitation must go, or to what compasse to be the boundaries of a Common-wealth inclusively, and extensively, is not by any generall rule, much lesse by any dictate of nature [Page 174] defined, or otherwise determined then by humane choice; and so it is not uniformely, or by one con­stant proportion, but variously, and unequally; every Common-wealth being of a different la­titude of place from others; and one, and the same Republique often varying from it self by vicissitudinary contraction, and extension.

3. Naturalization, or Denisonship is not tyed to habitation, but ordinarily, some that live among are not of, and some that are of live not among this, or that Nation, or State.

3. Not by mens appertaining, or subjection to one Soveraign, or Civil head. For

1. A Common-wealth being ens aggregatum, and the term unto which a Magistrate is immediately referred being not a multitude of persons in their individual, or single beings, but as aggregate, and formed into one body politique, the Magistrate cannot be, either in nature, or time, before the aggregation, or the republique union, and relation of the people one to another as one State, and therefore cannot be the procreant, or efficient cause thereof.

2. The same person we know may be the Civil head or Soveraign Lord of divers poli­tique bodies, they under him still remaining divers.

4. It remains therefore to be done (as far as my imagination reacheth) only by con­sent; and this consent to be the consent of all that are interessed in the association, viz. of the parties themselves to be incorporate, and of those whether superiors, or people they are dissociated, or severed from.

It is most congruous to say the distinction of politique societies, or distributing one into ma­ny cometh by the same means, or hath the same efficient, which the first contract, or entring into politique society hath: but that is the vo­luntary [Page 175] accord of the associated: as not only the learned agreeBoterus de Origin. urbium lib. 1. cap. 1. Bodin de Repub. lib. 1. cap. 6. Althusius polit. cap. 4. pag. 24. Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 6. Sect. 4. Dithmars Polit. lib. 1. pag. 20., but plain reason dictates. It is a common principle, which not only Scripture, and humane Authors tell, but our own experience sug­gests to us, That man is a sociable creature, fitted for, and affected to mutual converse, and is by his natural instinct, and bent led to seek acquaintance, cohabitation, and communion with his kinde. To this we may add his necessity in mans vitiated state, of distribu­tive Justice, and defence against occurrent injuriesDum enim haec amittere timent, tenent in his utendis quendum mo­dam aptum, vinculo civitatis, qualis ex hujusmodi hominibus constitui potest. August. de liber. Arbitr. lib. 1. cap. 15.. By these two inducements men were betimes, and still are moved to close toge­ther in large, and populous socie­ties; and then to erect Govern­ment for the upholding of them in union, order, equity and safety; And beginning first with the aggregation of one politique body, when that, by multiplication of mankind, was grown over numerous, and unwieldy to its self and its superiors, if no distemper could have arisen to have made a violent breach; no such immediate, and miraculous hand of God should have interposed as was that of the confusion of tongues; yet meer populousness, and distance of ha­bitation thence ensuing would have perswaded to a partition into more Common-wealths.

It is very probable that the division of the earth made in the dayes of Peleg Gen. 10.25. was a distribution, and alotment thereof unto several Nations, and King­doms, into which mankinde were then severed; and that the first partition of Common-wealths (at least after the floud) was then made: and that it was occasioned by the confusion of Languages at Babel: for immediately before that it is said, the people were one. Occasioned (I say) for that occasion did but prepare men for that reduction into divers communities, in that it did dissolve their union, and [Page 176] parcel, and disperse them abroad upon the face of the earth, by making them uncapable of conversing together (and some of the Hebrew Doctors say, it did set them at oddes and embroyled them in fight, and bloud-shed:Vide Cart­wright. in Gen. 11.7.) but it did not mould, of incorporate the several parties so divided asunded into several communities; no, that was the effect of some other cause, and what should that be but the joynt will and conspiration of the severally languaged, and severed parties each among and for themselves immediately acted? and therefore we read both of the sons of Japhet, and of all the sons of Noah, that they were divided by families, tongues, and lands into distinct nationsGen. 10.5, 31, 32..

But though that were the occasion of the division then made, yet many after divisions in every age (almost) there have been of nations into new Com­mon-wealths; as also unitings of more Republi­ques into one: of which divisions though confusi­on, and discord, not of tongues, but of minds (even as a modern Author would have that at Babel to have been no moreTho Anglus. Instit. peripat. Append. cap. 19. Sect. 5, 6.) hath been as oft as any other thing the occasion, yet such discord could be but the introduction unto, not the former, or founder of new Common-wealths; the associating of them could only be accomplished by the will, and consent of the incorporated.

As for the distinction of property in Lands and other possibles which must needs accompany this partition of Common-wealths when the first divi­sions after the flood, or any since were made, where­by the prrties distributed, left unto those they parted from the Countrey wherein they were, and entred into void regions, there could be no entrench­ment upon the common right of mankinde by such entry; there being a sufficient consent given to it by all others, in that the places were left, and exposed empty in regard both of occupation, and claim. The first property whether National, or personal unto Land or goods accruing, if not by an Expresse de­clared consent, and agreement of the first multitude [Page 177] in whom a common-right promiscuously, or indis­criminately resided, yet doubless by their reall ac­cord, signified by their act of cession, permission, or giving way unto the seisure and enjoyment of the first occupant.Vide Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 2. Sect. 3.

2. This doubt being passed, the next is, Common-wealths being distinguished, how come these, each to set up their Supreme Rulers? In this matter, 1. It is Objected, That either it must be done by a universal con­sent, even to a man nemine contradicente,The same Au­thor and Book, pag. 9. and this is impossible to be; or the major part must conclude the rest: and against this they say, The major part bindes not the whole, unless either men first agree to be so bound, or a higher power so commands.

Unto this I answer, It may be supposed that each community at their first coalition, either judge them­selves bound by the law of nature (which is a supe­riours command) to stand to the vote of the major part, or are so wise as either to constitute that, or some other way of bringing their matters of pub­lique interest unto a result obligatory to the whole. Common reason will guide them to the one at least of these, or rather to both, for if it dictate the for­mer, it must be presumed to bring on the latter, viz. either by tacite, or expresse consent. The dictate of right reason, in materia morali, I suppose must be yielded to be the appointment of nature. But that the major part doth conclude the whole in those af­fairs the determination of which doth necessarily concern the whole, untill su [...] time as they have setled the determination of such affaires to be by other persons, or means, seems to be the plain dictate of right reason. For in this case, the very end of a multitudes associating, and becoming one Common-wealth, and the being, and interest of them as such is concerned that so it be.

1. From a peoples becoming one society, there doth result in them a faculty, and interest to act some things politically: all being is in order to action, and every actus primus is for an actus secun­dus; and a Political being is for Political operation; [Page 178] and although such a body may put off its affairs to be acted not perse totum, immediately, but vicari­ously by particular organs, or members, yet some acts it must needs put forth immediately, viz. such as conduce to the organizing of it self, and such also as are necessary to its own preservation, and cannot be, or are not transected by others; as suppose a common engine, or other calamity be seising on a people destitute of, or neglected by particular subsi­diaries.

2. In those matters that are to be acted imme­diately by the whole community, there must be some way for them to come to a resolution and conclusion about [...]hem. If the concurrence of the whole multi­tude (very numerous and vast) to a single person be not at all, or not ordinarily possible, or likely, then cannot that he the way of determination: and if not that, then some other there must be: and what more obvious, natural, and congruous to reason then this, that the lesser part be swayed, and obliged by the greater?

3. Yea what other expedient can common sense suggest but this? When a thing is proposed to the determination of a multitude which requires a conclusion by them either positive or negative, and there is foreseen likely, or found to be a diversity of sense, and vote among them,

1. In case the major part consent, and the minor deny the thing, either the major part must carry it for the whole, or the negative of the minor by their dissent carries it against the major; which is against all Reason.

2. And if the major be for the negative, and the minor for the affirmative, either the minor must be overruled by the negative of the major, or standing to their affirmative they must secede, and be severed into another Common wealth: for to the nature of a community it is required that there be communio juris: and this secession, as it is unreaso­nable to be made by a lesser party without the others consent, so it, and the occasion of it admit­ted [Page 179] tends to the making void, and ruining of so­cieties.

This course then, of the minor parts obliging the whole, appearing so necessary to the acting, and to the subsistence of a community, why may we not conclude it in the cases, and matter above specified to be the dictate of natureVide Groti­um lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 17.?

2. If the major part be allowed to conclude the whole; it is next asked,Idem pag. 10. How shall the whole people be assembled? Here are two difficulties;

1. Where all are equally interested, and authori­zed what one or more, lesse then the whole hath power to appoint time, or place, or give summons to the rest; without which appointment it is unjust to binde the absent?

R. It is to be presumed this scruple is practically precluded, by the peoples proceeding when they agree to become one people; for, who can imagine but that then they have the end, and immediate necessa­ry acts, for which they joyne to be a community, before them, and in order to them, either they forth­with make choise of the Government they shall be under, and provide for a succession in it, and the means by which it shall be continued; or if that be not at the first instant dispatched, they appoint how they shall come together, or p [...]sse their resolutions on that, or the like publique occasion. We see there is a course to be taken for such assemblies in the polarchies that now are, as in the united Provinces of the Netherlands, in Venice, Genoa, and the rest. Yea the many distinct Republiques of Germany con­federate in one general interest, and band as one great community have their order how to assem­ble, and hold their publique diets; as likewise have the thirteen united Common-wealths of the Switzers; who upon any occasion of universal con­cernment have referred it to the Burgomasters of Zurich to give notice to all the Cantons to meet at Baden. And in the ancient State of Rome, the Consuls summoned the Senate, the Senate the As­sembly of the Centuries; and the Tribunes the [Page 180] Assembly of the Tribes. 2. But suppose this un­certainty setled, and a diet orderly called, with time, and place appointed; another difficulty there is, which may be subdivided into two;

Idem ibid.1. All cannot be present, one is sick, another is lame, a third is aged, a fourth under age: besides many are women, some are Virgins, all these are of the people, and how shall the consent of them be passed, or in­cluded?

R. 1. These natural or personal defects are common to all mankind, and apt to incapacitate persons as much, or more for other humane affaires as for this, which yet are not therefore argued into a fr [...]stration. This occasion of a peoples agreement about politique Government but rarely occurreth, but when a Government is setled, whether by our, or by the Objectors means, the dayly management of it is much more obnoxious to these impediments in the person, or persons in whom it is seated; and when one of them seiseth on such a subject, it is prone to make a greater interruption in publique concernments then all of them are wont to do in this, yet are Salvos in those cases ordinarily found out.

2. We have already seen that some acts at some time must needs be admitted to flow from a poli­tique body immediately; now this objection doth not more lie against this of their agreement of Government then against any other. I say therefore a civill society having in it persons lying under all those occasions of absence, or non acting, and add to them one more, viz. that some list not to come, 'tis not thereby rendred actionlesse to this, or other purposes. But how are the exceptions re­moved?

3. Thus.

1. They that are absent are either incapable of giving a consent to any thing that concernes them, as are infants, and such as want the use of reason, or they are capable.

[Page 181]2. Of these latter, some are not personally in­terested in passing, or giving a vote in matters po­litical, but are involved (as to these) in their Husbands, Parents, Masters, or Guardians; o­thers have an interest personally to concurre in them.

3. Of these some may be necessarily absent, as the sick, lame, decrepit, others are away volun arily.

1. For the necessarily absent. This is the case ordinarily, but of a few single persons in a great body, upon whom nature it self laying a present impediment, must needs be taken to lay a present suspense upon their interest of personal presence, and consent in the publique business, and rather to will the divolving of it upon the other that can meet, then that they, and the whole community should be suspended from attaining, or effecting the dispatch of their publique necessary affaires. As they to whom nature denies the use of reason, so they from she withholds the opportunity of bringing it to po­litical exercise for want of bodily integrity may be comprehended by her in the actings of others in those things that appertain to the whole community they are of.

2. For the voluntarily absent, if some, yea ma­ny that may and should concur will not come, this must not prevent the whole, or the priviledge of others; but rather by their default they put off their right as to the present act, and invest it in the restVide Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 20.. We account (and justly) that a countrey-meeting a [...] which we choose our Parliament men, to which the people therein are called, though the twentieth part of them that are called do not ap­pear.

2. Suppose all present, or the absence of those that are not, dispensed with, how can mary thou­s nds, or some millions of peopl [...], so m [...]et in one place as to communicate their minds to one another, and joyntly deliberate, and come to a resolution in any thing?

R. 1. Common-wealths are usually very small at their beginning, which is the time of setling their Government for succession.

2. When they are come to growth they have another way of acting besides personal presence, and cog­nisance, viz. that of meeting, and transacting their concernments in, and by their Deputies, or re­presentees.

3. As it is not very convenient, so it is not alto­gether impossible for the collective body (I mean those who make a collective assembly, to wit, grown men, and Masters of families, and especially so many of them as are disposed to come) to meet, and treat in an assembly. We have divers instances for it in the nation of Israel, and among the rest, one that was upon occasion of the Levites Concu­bine, mentioned in the history of the book of Judges Cap. 20, & 21. for the numerousness of, and uni­versal accurrence to which assembly, let the Text be observed, Cap. 20. v. 1, 2, 12. Cap. 21. v. 5, 8. And the people of Rome, when come to a very large, and populous Common-wealth, had their meetings of this nature often in campo Martio.

4. And besides the Roman state found out wayes of accommodating the difficulties of so vest an assem­blies treating in one, by distributing themselves one way into distinct classes, and centuries; another way into several tribes, and giving their votes in those di­stinct partitionsVide Tullium de legibus lib. 3. prope finem..

3. Object. It's said, In case of a Common-wealths want of a supreme Magistracy, Idem qui supra, pag. 11, 12. as when a King dies with­out heir, the power shall not escheat to the whole people, but to the supreme heads, and fathers of families, not as they are the people, but quatenus they are Fathers of peo­ple, over whom they have a Supreme power divolved unto them after the death of their Soveraign Ancestor; and if any have a right to choose a King it must be these Fathers by conferring their distinct Fatherly powers upon one man alone. Resp. It is well he acknowledgeth thus much, and we are so far agreed, that in case of a Kingdoms destituteness of a head there is an escheature of the [Page 183] power to some, and that it is to the heads, and Fa­thers of families, so as the right is in them to choose a King: only then upon this he thinks good to cast a thin shadow, or mist to make it seem, as if this were not the same with our tenent, & as it were to suborne another different way of introducing of Magistracy, which in truth hath no reality in it, but what is borrowed from, and built upon that our positi­on. But

1. What means he by that Epithet Supreme, added to the heads, and fathers of families, as if he meant that all heads, and families are not interested in that Escheature, and election, but some only, di­stinguish by that title: And if this be his sense, I leave him to clear first how he differenceth those he cals Supreme from other heads, and Fathers.

2. Why he makes such a distinction, and li­mits the said power to some only of the Fathers under that notion of Supreme.

2. When he saith, The power escheates to the heads, and fathers of families. I ask, what power? the power which was before in the King, viz. a politi­call, Supreme, Regall power? and how escheates, or descends it upon them, unitedly, or conjunctly, as copartners, and joint heirs of that whole, solid power in relation to the Community, or body po­litick? This indeed is the power of which the Que­stion is, and which wants a lineal heir, or subject to bear it, upon the supposed death of the King: And if that descend upon them, it must either be in that manner specified, or else so as each person of them is the adequate possessor of the whole, and solid power, which I suppose will not be said: If that then be his meaning, lo here a Democracy yielded, and set up by him who elsewhere holds there is no ground for any such or any other po­larchical forme of Government, and that Monar­chy is the only warranted form. Or,In his observati­ons on Aristo­tles Polit. doth be mean a private, Domestical, paternall power of each of those heads, and Fathers, not over the Common-wealth, [Page 184] but over their families severally, and respe­ctively? But for this,

1. This is not the power which was in the King, and now by his decease without Lineal heir can be said to Escheat, or passe from him to any.

2. This cannot be said to come anew to them then, but must be acknowledged to have been in them whilest they had their King, to remain in them after they have chosen another in his place.

3 Where's he seems as if he would explain how there comes in this sense a supremeness into those persons, viz. They have a Supreme Power divol­ved unto them after the death of their Soveraign. Still it remains that he tell us what was above asked, viz. what that power is, whether Political, or Oeco­nomical, and how the power of either of those sorts can accrue De novo to them by such death. Indeed that domestical power which was in each of them before in relation to his particular, and private fa­mily they being left destitute of a Superior, or Political head, hath another habitude then it had before, being become negatively Supreme, that is, it hath none actually above it, but it is the same power still; or, if we shall say the power of the Pater familias in this vacancy may be put forth unto some acts in relation to the persons in his house, which he might not exercise while the Common-wealth had a Magistrate, I shall not dispute that, but only say, though the Oeconomi­call power be somewhat larger, in actu exercito, when unsubordinate to a Political Soveraign then it is being subordinate, yet it is within the compasse of Oeconomical still, and the same it was in actu sig­nato. And that which he cals a Power divolved upon the head of the family by the Soveraigns death, is but the drawing forth into act of that which was in him before, but was suspended by the politicall relation, and subjection. That which then can be said to Escheat to the heads of families by such [Page 185] death of their King is a power to dispose of them­selves in subjection to another, and of their votes for the election of him to be their Soveraign toge­ther (if you will, with a larger compass for the ex­ercise of their paternal power in their families) during their want of Magistracy.

3. Whereas he saith, This power accrues to the heads and fathers of families not as they are the people, but quatenus, they are Fathers of people.

1. They are not Fathers, neither is any one of them a Father of a people, that is a Common-wealth, or body politique, but they are Fathers only of their respective families, and of the persons therein respectively; what power therefore is in them as in that relation can be but Domestical, and that which is in every Father.

2. What if those persons where no Fathers, but were single, and unsociate as to such a relation, that is, what if they were not over any other, or if they had no families, or children sprung from, or belonging to them, would not then the said power in the said case Eschear, or belong to them? If he say no, I demand his reason: if he say it would, then he must say it doth not Escheate to them as they are Fathers of peo­ple, but as persons and people of that Common-wealth.

3. Men that are Fathers of families cannot as such be in a capacity of choosing a King over them, they must besides that relation be moreover united, and confederate in one Common-wealth, or else they cannot put forth that act of election. Persons that are either non cives, or extraneae civitatis, have nothing to do in it. Whereby it is very ma­nifest the reason why men have that power of Election of a Magistracy to this, or that Common-wealth is not because they are Fathers, but because they are Denisons, or freemen of that Common-wealth, and not comprehended or represented by any Domestical Superior, but immediately concer­ned [Page 186] to act for themselves in the common interests of the people of that Common-wealth.

4. Where he saith, The Power shall not escheat to the whole people, but to the Supreme heads, and Fathers of families.

I say, in that it escheats, to them (who are every one a part in his own family the Supreme head, or Father, that is, having none in this case above him in the Civil State) and to such as, being without Domestical head, are capable of heading a family, whom I think he will not exclude, it escheates to the whole people; for who are the whole people to this effect, but they that are Masters of families with them who are Masters of themselves? As was before shewed in answer to the second Objecti­on, and the latter branch of it: and they choosing, the whole people choose their Soveraign, they be­ing all the people, either personally, or represen­tatively.

5. In that he sayes, These Fathers choose a King by conferring their distinct, fatherly power upon one;

This is quite mistaken, for

1. They do not put off, or part with their Fa­therly powers, but retain each their own still, when they have chosen their King.

2. The power which upon their election passeth into the hands of the Elected King, is more then all their Fatherly powers laid together, that is, a Supreme, Political, Civil, or Common-wealth power; which is a power of a higher Sphere, and differs not only in measure, but toto genere, or in kinde from that of the Fathers, and unto which the pater­nall still continuing in the Masters of families is subordinate.

6. Lastly, As this Author cannot exempt these his words (if they must bear any sound sense) from a confession of that which he contends against, both in this Treatise against Mr. Hunton, (and in his other of Observations upon Aristotles Poli­ticks) viz. the rise of Government from the [Page 187] peoples consent; so can he not excuse himself think) from down right self-contradiction in some other particulars. As

1. How will his arguing against the peoples capacity to choose their Soveraign by this Argu­ment, That no man hath power to take away his own life, and therefore the people cannot confer this power upon another, consist with the right of the Fathers of families to choose their King, whereas the power to take away their lives is a part of the power to which they choose him?

2. How will this Escheature of the power to the heads of families, and their right thereby to choose their King, stand with what he saith presently after? viz. That all Kings are either Fathers of the people, or heirs of such Fathers or usurpers of the right of such Fathers: And that, when the true heir of a crown is dispossessed by a usurper, the subjects obedience of the Fatherly power must go along, and wait upon Gods Providence who only hath right to give, and take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt subjects to the obedience of another fatherly power. For if the power (in defect of a right heir) escheat to the Fathers of families, then it passeth not to an usurper; and if those have a right to choose their King, he that is chosen by them hath the right to be their King, and not the Usurper; neither can the subjects be adopted to the obedience of another fatherly power supposed to be in him; neither is he that is chosen upon the fail of an ancient Royal line, or stock truly reducible to any of these three sorts, viz. Either a Father of the people, or an heir of such a Father, or an Ʋsurper of the right of such a Fa­ther.

4. Object. The last objection I shall hold up, being the remainder of what I meet with is, But this way of setling Government by the peoples con­sent cannot be proved ever to have been held, or practised. All powers that have reigned, have [Page 188] entred by the sword, or rule by virtue of such en­trance.

Resp. This is a very broad allegation, and the prejudice therein c [...]st upon all powers seems to proceed from partiality to s [...]me. But

1. The way of subjects election of their Go­vernment to have been practised and that antient­ly, or from the first, I have above brought testimo­nies unto from Authors of the best note, to wit, Aristotle, Cicero, Justin, Juvenal, Ludovicus Vives, Polydore Virgil, and Mr. Calvin Viz in this Sect. Subsect. 4.. To these I shall only here add the witness of one of our English Historians, giving a threefold instance of the subjects choice of their Soveraign, to wit, of three Kings. One of the antient British, another of the Saxon, another of the Norman race.

Mr. Speed Speed Hystory, Book 5. Chap. 6. Sect. 2. Book 6. Chap. 2. Sect. 6. Book 8. Chap. 6. Sect. 1. Book 9. Chap. 2. Sect. 54. Chap. 3. Sect. 1, 2. tels us that when Julius Caesar first en­terprised the conqu [...]st of this land, among the many Reguli, or petty Kings that then ruled in the several parts thereof Cassibilan was by a universal vote chosen the Chieftain and supreme. That upon the death of Hardicanute the third Danish King, Edward the Confessor, was by a general consent elected King. And that William the Conquerour appointing no heir at his death, his son William Rufus was by the consent and voices of the States made King.

2. When learned Authors tell us of fundamen­tall laws, and constitutions of nations; and when the late Parliament so often mentioned [...]nd insisted on the fundamental laws, and the antient fundamen­tal constitution, frame, aad government of this Kingdom, in opposition to an arbitrary, and Ty­rannical government, in their publique votes, de­clarations and remonstrances, particularly in their preamble to the Protestation taken by them, and the whole Kingdom, of May the 3. 1641. and in the Declaration of the House of Commons of April 17. 1616. ordered to be published, set up and fix [...]d in every Parish Chu [...]ch, what other thing do they mean thereby but this, to wit, the o [...]igi [...]al establish­ment [Page 189] of policy and government by the mutual con­tention,CHAP. V. SECT. V. Subsect. 6. capitulation, and agreement of Governours and people. Aristotle Aristotelis Po­lit. lib. 3. num. 87. lib. 5. num. 112. often in his Politicks delivers it as the difference betwixt a King, and a Tyrant, a Kingdom, and a Tyranny; that the one is founded upon the will of the Subj [...]cts, the other is against their wils, and held over them by force. Mr. Gre­gory of C. C. observes upon those words, Act. 11.26. And the Disciples were called Christians first at Anti­och; that the word [...], were called, is bor­rowed from a Roman custom, viz. when the Pro­vinces submitted themselves to the imperial Go­vernment, the use was to cause a [...], or pub­lique edict to be drawn up, and proclaimed upon the place. And particularly there was such an one at Antioch, when the City yeelded up it self into the subjection of the Roman Empire, in the time of Julius Cesar: In memory whereof that City fixed their aera or reckoning of time upon the date of that action; which they therefore called [...], because the Emperour did then [...], publiquely entitle them to all the priviledges, immunities, &c. Here is a famous instance which the said Author brings out of Johannes Antiochenus, of the mutual agreement, and close betwixt Prince and People, at the first entrance into that relation.

And I would aske further how it could be otherwayes, then by mutuall consent, that Govern­ment was erected in the several Nations at the confusion of languages; when the several parties were in an instant rent asunder from that one community they were of, and from under that one head which perhaps had been untill then over them, and left to themselves to associate each party into a distinct community, and under a new Government as they were seve­rally languaged: there being no reason, or ground to conclude that to each of them there was still appropriate one natural Grandsire, and that he was by natural right to be the Soveraign, or that [Page 190] in defect thereof there was one eldest house,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 6. and one Parent thereof that was entitled to the regiment of all the other collateral, and younger branches of the same stock. The which supposals have been above refuted? And again, how can it be other­wise at the plantation of a new Colonie, at the ex­tinction of a Royall race, or at the Cession of Kings or States, that is, when a people are deserted of their former Supreme Governors? as the Britains of this Island sometime were by the Roman State, to wit, then when their prefect Aetius withdrew himself, and his legions from this Countrey, upon the decay of the Roman greatness, and exposed the rule of it unto who so might get itSee Speeds History Book 7. Chap. 1. Sect. 1, 2, 3.. And thus it was (some authors tell us) at the translation of the Ro­man Empire to GermanyWiddringtons Theolog. Disput. in Admon. to his Reader Sect. 4..

3. The Governments that either now are, or heretofore have been,

1. Many of them are known to have been established by the peoples consent, as was even now shewed.

2. Of many of them the original, first rise, or bottom, like the head of Nilus, is not known. Of these because nothing to the contrary appears, we have no just reason to think but they stand upon this basis: In all matters of tenure immemorial pos­sesion inculpably held, leads men to take the begin­ning to have been right.

3. Many are known to have a violent, and un­just beginning: Of these,

1. Some, though the entrance of them was such, yet they have after, come to be setled upon a better foundation. Thus it was (saith Fr. Junius Junius Ani­madv, in Bellar­minum Con­trov. 3. lib. 5. cap. 8. Sect. 18. & ca 9. Sect. 20. Mr. Perkins To. 1. Tract. of Cal­lings, pa. 762. A.) in the Empire of Charles the first, as also in that of Julius Caesar, Ex post facto jus invaluit, cujus non ita fuerunt principia justa. Accordingly saith Mr. Perkins, A Prince enters into a Kingdom by war and bloudshed. Now by the bad entrance be is no lawful King—Yet if the people do willingly sub­mit themselves to this usurper, and be content to yield subjection, and the King likewise to rule them by good [Page 191] and wholesome laws, CHAP. V. SECT. V. he is now become a Lawful Prince, though his entrance was but Tyrannical. And to the same sense, Chamier, Chamier To. 2. lib. 15. cap. 16. Sect. 9. Grotius, Grotius de Jure B. lib. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 14. Arnisaeus de Authoritate principis cap. 4. Sect. 14. and Arni­seus speak.

2. Some as they come into power by meer force, and intrusion, so by it they still continue. But the number of these is not great, much lesse so great, as to give violent occupation of Do­minion the plea of a universall practise and cu­stome.

SECT. V. That distinction which some give be­twixt the Power and the Acquisiti­on, or Assumption of the Power; and its aptness to resolve the Question [Whether a violent intruder into Dominion be among the Powers in this Text that are of God, ordai­ned of God] considered.

THe sequel of the last Section, as of some others before it, is that in this Text there can be no room or footing for Usurped Powers. Howbeit, I meet with some Commentators, and others that deal with the text, when the Question cometh in their way (whether the Apostle in asserring the powers that be to of God, ordained of God, taketh in Usurpers;) that which they afford to assoil the dif­ficulty is, a distinction betwixt the Power which they say is of God, is the ordinance of God, and the assumption or acquisition of the Power, which they say [Page 192] is not of God,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. but is of the Devil, as being by dishonest wayes, fraud, violence, and the like. And upon this distinction thus [...]ven, some of them seem to affirm the Question [Seem, I say, for they do not all speak very clearly either way.]

That these two, the Power which is ordained of God, and a violent another usurpati [...]e entry, and holding of the power, are two different things, not to be confounded, I shall easily grant; but that the distinguishing betwixt the power, and the ac­quisition, or assumption of power makes any thing to the answering of the Question, or if it do, that it tendeth to confi [...], or clear that the t [...]xt is inclusive of a Usurper, I can by no means understand, & there­fore crave leave to show my reason for my refusal of that distinction so used.

1. Whereas they distinguish betwixt the Power, and the assumption of the Power, and tell us the former is of God, is his Ordinance; the latter in the Usurper is not of God, nor ordained of God, but being by unlawful means, is of the Devil; I suppose they must either mean that the power in the gene­ral notion, nature, or conception of the thing is of God, his ordinance, but this Power in particular that is pretended, this Usurper is not of God: and thus saying they resolve the Question negatively, and quite exclude the Usurper from ground in this text: and with this sense I have no dispute; only I think they might as well omit their distinguishing, and flatly deny the Question.

Or, 2. They must mean that this individual power, this Usurper, or this Magistracy in particu­lar which he pretends to, is of God, and his or­dinance, but his usurpations or this his way of coming into, and holding of the Power, to wit, Usurpatively, is not of God, is not Gods ordi­nance. But if this be the sense of their distinction, it, as so applyed, can by no means with me be ad­mitted.

If it be asked, Whether unjust Judgement, Theft, Drunkeness, Whoredom, or any such lewd practise [Page 193] be of God, or the ordinance of God, CHAP. V. SECT. V. I should simply deny it; and it were an absurd thing for one in defence of any of these to say, I can distinguish betwixt the Judiciary sentence, which is of God, the ordinance of God, and wrong judgement, which is not of God, and in like manner I can distin­guish betwixt possession, and theevish possession, be­twixt drinking, and drunkennesse, betwixt car­nall, and whorish copulation; the former in each of these distinctions is of God, is ordained of God, but not the latter. For in thus distinguish­ing I should only acknowledge those acts of judge­ment, possession, drinking, copulation in specie, or in their universall an abstract conceipt to be of God, not by any means that this act in particular wherein the judgement is unjust, the possession is theevish, the drinking is excessive, the copulation is adulterous, is of God (in this sense wherein we now speak) or ordained of God. So in that di­stinction betwixt the power, and the assumption of the power all that can be meant, with any favor of truth, is, that power in generall is of God, is the ordinance of God, but of this the question is not; not that it may be said the Usurper, or the power which he assumeth, and usurpeth is of God, is ordained by him, but not the usurpation, or his way of assuming power: no more then it may be said, this wrong judgement, this theevish possession, this excessive drinking is of God, as his ordinance, but not the injustice, the robbery, the drunkennesse, the whoredome, or not the way wherein the agents act those things.

No man (I think) ever yet said that the act, and vitiosity of the act may be so abstracted, or distin­guished from each other, as to say, the one in indi­viduo may be morally good, and so of God, as his ordinance, and the other morally evill. It is easie to see that in an act whose matter is in specie good, or lawfull, but other Ingredients which con­stitute its moral individual state, are evill, I cannot excuse the act in individuo, or entitle it to the Di­vine [Page 194] warrant or ordinance from the goodnesse, or allowablenesse of the matter in specie. And it is as plain that the abstract, and the concrete, the act, or habit, and the subject wherein it must needs have the same, and cannot have a contrary moral predi­cate, or denomination, if lying, or murder be a sin, and of the Devil, the lyar, the murderer is sin­full, and of the Devil tooJo. 8.44., and you cannot say the one is of the Devil, the other of God. In like manner of the Usurper, and of usurpation; if you condemn the one, you must condemn the other also, and you cannot entitle the one to the ordi­nation of God, the other to the will, and work of Satan.

2. When they say (if so they intend to say) this power, the Usurp [...]r, or the authority which he ar­rogates to himself is of God, but not his acqui­sition of the power. I would desire to understand of them, how is he, or it of God? Can he be a power, or a power be in him of God any other wayes, then by his acquiring or receiving his power from God? yet this is that which they deny in the latter branch of their distinction, where they say, His acquisition, or his way of having his power is not of God, but is of the Devill. Let the owners of this distinction bethink themselves how they can distinguish betwixt the being of the power from God, and the acquisition of the power from God, so as to affirm the one, and deny the other. In my dull conceit, the acquisition of a thing is no more, nor no other thing but the way whereby that thing is had, or received; and if the question be, how such a thing is acquired, and it be said it is of such a person, or such an author; this is to describe the acquisition of it. To me then, in those two pro­positions (whereby the distinction is applyed) the power is of God, the acquisition of the power is not of God, but of the Devil, the subject of them is one and the same in sense, and [...]e, and the pre­dicates are contradictory, and so they praedicate contradictories de eodem, of the same thing.

If they again make a refuge from this absurdity of the generall institution; and say in the former proposition they mean the Usurper is of God, his power is of God, in as much as God hath ordained Magistracy, and Magistrates to be; I answer; What is the Usurper the neerer for this, that God hath ordained Magistrates to be? if he receive not his power from God, can it be said neverthelesse his power is of God by vertue of that generall in­stitution? We have forestalled this plea in our last Section, and say again, there is no consequence, or dependency of the one of these upon the other. Gods ordaining Magistrates to be, inferres not this, or that man that is in the place of command (whether justly or unjustly) to be a Magistrate, of God. Nothing can be more weakly or groundlesly said, then to argue this or that man is a power of Gods ordaining, because God hath ordained that there shall be a power, and that some body or other shall be it. We have (I take it) proved before that to the making of a Magistrate to be of God, and to be his ordinance, in actu exercito, there goes, not only the law of God appointing Government to be in each community, but that a person, or persons for his or their particular, be put into that office of God, that is in Gods way, or by his warrant; and this is to say, the persons acquisition of the power must be of God; It must be said of them as Ado­nijah said of Solomons Kingdom, it was his from the Lord.

The former puts not any Government, or Go­vernors in being, makes no man actually either a Prince, or a Subject; notwithstanding it all the Common-wealths in the world may be headlesse, or without Ruler. If a man should start up in the midst of a Kingdome, or a City, or of a Senate, or Parliament, and proclaim himself to be the Su­preme power over that community, and being asked upon what he grounds his claim, he should alledge but this, God hath ordained a Supreme power to be in every State, and that some be Rulers, and now I [Page 196] actually challenge it; how ridiculous would this man and his claim be?

In the time when prophecy and prophets were sent out of God into the world, and into his Church, there were true Prophets, and there were false: the difference betwixt them was, that the one were Pro­phets indeed, were of God, ordained of God; the other indeed were no Prophets, were not of God. [Zech. 23.5. Jer. 23.16, 21, 26.] It would have been a senselesse plea for the latter to have said for them­selves, We are Prophets of God, because God hath ordained prophecy, and hath set in his Church some to be Prophets; And as reasonlesse an allegation it is to say, the Usurper, or the Usurpers power is of God, because God hath instituted powers to be in the Common-wealth. Suppose a couple be suspected to live together in whoredome, and being brought before the Magistrate under that accusation, they shall pretend, for their defence, that they are in a marryed estate, and being required to prove their marriage, they should alleadge that marriage is Gods ordinance, God hath ordained men and wo­men to marry, and they cohabite together as man and wife. Would this passe for truth, that these two are in the state and relation they pretend to?

Much lesse would it serve if the one of the par­ties only should make this pretence, and plea, and the other quite disclaim it; and what's the reason this allegation would not passe, but because there is required, besides the generall rule ordaining mar­riage to be, and the exercise of conjugall acts, that there be an entrance into this estate, and admittance unto these matrimoniall acts, by such a covenant, or consent of the parties, as God hath appointed to be the way, and means of contracting this Re­lation?

But some of the Authors of this distinction thus argue. Riches gotten by usury, extortion, &c. cease not to be good in themselves, yea and the gifts of God: and as the owner of these unjustly procured riches may be [Page 197] said to be a rich man, and he that hath Learning, though procured by unlawfull means, may be said to be a Learned man; so the possessor of a most justly ob­tained authority may be said to be a Magistrate, and in authority.

Unto this Reasoning I have this to say. 1. Riches gotten by usury, and extortion, cease not to be good in themselves; Say they, It's true, but what is this to the usurer, or extortioner, or to his possession of them, or to his denomination of being rich by them? Let it be distinctly observ'd, what the good­nesse of those riches is which ceaseth not by their ill getting. That goodnesse which is in them as con­sidered absolutely, and in themselves, without respect to this, or that owner, or getter, and which was therefore attributable to them before they came in­to the usurers or extortioners hands, they still re­tain, that is a goodnesse in genere entis, or as Crea­tures, and a goodnesse in genere utilis, which is an aptnesse to serve unto a naturally, or civilly profi­table use; but those Goods which taken apart from such, or any other particular owners possession have that goodnesse inherent in them, are more­over susceptible, by way of relative denomination, of another goodnesse, which is not inherent in them, or in their nature, or necessary, and fixed to them, but is to them adventitious, or extrinsecall, and therefore is mutable, so that they are as well capable of an evilnesse opposite to it, as of that good­nesse.

This goodnesse and evilnesse is morall, and it comes, or is imputable to them by means of their adjacency, or relation to their possessor. In this respect riches are said to be sometimes just, some­times unjust, or to be honest, or dishonest accor­ding as they are gotten well, or ill, in this morall, or relative consideration of riches (wherein alone the similitude betwixt them and the matter in hand is pertinent) it is not true that riches gotten by usury and ex ortion are good.Ez [...]k. 22.13. Prov. 10.2. The H. Ghost calls them dishonest gain, and treasures of wickednesse.

[Page 198]2. Neither are unjustly gotten goods the gifts of God, if you mean by the phrase such a gift as con­veyes a title, or right to the Donee, or receiver, which alone, can be strictly and properly called a gift, and can be parallel to the having of a thing of God, as by his ordinance. For, as for that lar­ger acception, wherein things may be said by God to be given into the hands of men, when they are exposed by his providence to them, as their spoyl, or the matter of other their acts of cruelty, or fraud, it is not of any collaterall affinity with that kind of be­ing of God, which the Text (as hath been proved) speaketh of; neither doth it import a deed of gift, such as makes over a property in the thing given to the Donee.Isai. 42.24. Job 12.6. God gave Jacob for a spoyl, and Israel to the Robbers: and Job (whose goods were so given up to the Sabeans and Chaldeans, saith of the tabernacle of Robbers, that God brings into their hands abundantly. Shall we compare these mens havings (in respect of the being of them of God) with the being of the power of God, as his ordinance, intended in this Text?

3. It is evident the Authors of the distinction take the being of the power of God in these words in a stricter sense then is that wherein wealth disho­nestly gotten can be called the gift of God, whilest in the application of their distinction they tell us, the usurpers acquisition of the power is not of God, they would not (doubtlesse) deny it to be the gift of God (and consequently its acquisition to be of God) In the same acception wherein they affirm the gain of usury, and extortion to be the gift of God. Certainly it is not their meaning to make the usurers, and extortioners way, and title to their riches (by so much as the gift of God comes to) better then the usurpers way, and his Title to his power, whilest they say their goods are the gifts of God, but his power is not acquired of God.

4. But then they argue, As the owner of these unjustly procured riches may be said to be a rich man, and he that hath Learning, though procured by unlawfull [Page 199] means, may be said to be a learned man, so the possessor of a most unjustly obtained authority may be said to be a Magistrate, and in authority.

I answer each of these sentences severally.

1. The owner of these unjustly procured riches may be said to be a rich man, say they, but contrarily I say,

1. An unjust procurer and possessor is no owner.

2. Neither do riches denominate their unjust possessor rich.

1. An unjust possessor properly is no owner. There is in truth no propriety in an unjust tenure: for propriety is nothing but a separate right, and right and unjust possession are incompetible. There a [...]e many cases wherein one may have such a possession as the law of man in a sort protects him in, that is, it takes no cognizance of the in­juriousnesse of his holding,Vide Augusti­num de lib. Ar­bitr. lib. 1. cap. 5. Greg. Tholos. Syntag. Juris. lib. 21. cap. 3. Grotium de Jure, lib. 3. cap. 4. Sect, 2. et cap. 10. Sect. 1. & lib. 2. cap. 23. Sect. 13. & lib. 3. cap. 7. Sect. 6. & lib. 3. cap. 20. Sect. 48. but this notwithstan­ding, the possessi [...]n being wrongfull, neither it, nor its humane impunity, or indulgence, can create a right, or property in the p ssessor. There is a difference betwixt a presumed, or supposititious, and a true owner. Civilians confesse, humane, po­sitive lawes do not take notice of all that is just by the law of nature, scripture, and conscience, either to establish it, or to correct the contrary. Hence those distinctions betwixt that licet, quod caret vitio, and that quod impune fit; betwixt licentiam interi­ [...]rem & exteriorem. That is, a lawfulnesse which is free from fault, and the lawfulnesse which is free from punishment: a lawfulnesse which is in­ternall appertaining to the conscience, that is; and that which is externall, or in respect of the Court of man. And in those things wherein the law of man interposeth, there are also many cases, wherein one holding a thing against all right, his possession is therefore irritable, or ejectable, and yet because the title must be first tried, and evicted, the law al­lowes effectum quendam juris, where there is nullum jus; a kind of priviledge of right without right: [Page 200] and for the present looks at him as (titular) pro­prieter, that is, no morall reall, or warrantable pro­prieter, but only fictitious, and therefore upon evicti­on, it ejects him.

2. Neither do riches denominate their unjust possessor rich. This follows upon the former. For seeing the haver of unjustly gotten goods is a bare possessor, or a meer holder, and user of goods, and not the true owner or proprietor of them, he can­not from such riches, be truly termed a rich man. A possessor in fact, (or, in respect of that possession, which the Civilian calls a naturall) deserves not to be called rich, neither is he in many cases vulgarly so esteemed. A thief may by robbery have gotten into his hands a great treasure; yea, a man may be a just occupant of a wealthy estate, he may be a depositary, a mutuary, or an usufructuary thereof, that is, he may have it in his custody, and use by way of trust, hire, or tenantry, yet such a one if he be wise, counts not himself a rich man in any such respect, neither doth the world (understanding how he hath it) so repute him. A meer occupancy that is eftsoon voidable by law, or that is determinable by a little time, or that is accountable, for to ano­ther proprietor, is not wont to denominate the oc­cupant rich. But to make both these points a little clearer, we are to distinguish of injustice, or evil dealing in the getting of wealth. There is some wrong in getting, which is so deep, and intrinsecall to the substance of the title, as that it doth vitiate and destroy its being, and the contract, or other way of procuring the goods by means thereof is null as to the producing of a property to the procurer. And there is some injustice that reacheth not so far as to evacuate the title. Every slip, or deviation from the path of uprightnesse doth not make void a bargain, or title about which it is used. Casuists distinguish therefore betwixt that dolus malus, that evil dealing, which gives cause to the contract, and that which is only incident or circumstantiall to it, and say, the former doth nullifie a contract, but not [Page 201] the latterVide Bonaci­nam, To. 2. Tractat. de Re­stitut. & Con­tract. Disput. 3. qu 1. punct. 2. Sect. 2. Emanuel Sa Tit. Dolus. Alsted Cas. Consc. Cap. 20. Reg. 9. Bp. Halls Re­solut. Decas. 1. Cas. 6.; and hence we must say riches gotten with some failing of the latter sort may truly de­nominate a man an owner, and a rich man; be­cause notwithstanding such an error, or tincture he, and the person of whom he receives them may have made a lawfull contract, or agreement about the property of them, and that bonâ fide, or really; and which is therefore for substance valid. But wealth attained in the former way of injustice can­not entitle a man rich, because the transaction so qualified, doth not truly cause, or make a property: he that hath them but so hath no title to them, con­veyed unto him.

2. They say, He that hath learning, though procu­red by unlawfull means, may be said to be a learned man. Here I say,

1. Learning is no morall habit, and therefore the denomination by it is not concerned by the manner, or means of its acquisition: but a morall habit, as is the having of riches, and the having of civil power, must have a morall constitution. The difference betwixt these two in this matter will easily appear by comparing the naturall relation of father and son, with the morall relation of hus­band and wife. He is truly said to be a father that begets a child, though it be in whoredome, and a bastard is truly called a son. But two cannot be called husband and wife from naturall copulation, but there must be betwixt them, besides that, a con­sent, or contract for substance valid, and lawfull to set them in that relation. The reason of this diffe­rence is, because the former, that of father and son, is a naturall relation, in regard of its rise, or the act by which it is founded: the other is a morall relation as to the way of its production, and there­fore must result from a morall act.

2. Our Philosophy will tell us, it is not every having that doth really denominate, but that only which is properly intended by the denominative, or concrete. We say, a man that is full of wine is drunk; but a Vessel, or Celler being filled is not [Page 202] said to be drunk with wine. A Purse full of gold is not called golden, but we call it golden, if it be wrought with goldAd regulam istam, cui inest abstractum de eo praedicatur concretum, re­quiritur ut ab­stractum eo mo­do infit quem importat concre­tum. Marsupi­um non dicitur aureum, quavis in Marsupio sit aurum. Sthalii Axiomata, Tit. 6. Reg. 4. Sect. 11. pag. 163.. He that hath the arts, and sciences in his study, or in a book in his hand, or meerly in his memory, so as he is able to rehearse the systemes of them by roar, is not said to be a learned man; but he that hath them in his under­standing: and he that hath morall vertues not only in his study, book, or memory, but in his understanding, yet is not said to be vertuous, un­less he have the habits (not the docentes, but the utentes) of them also subjected in his will. In like manner the having of command, or rule over a civil State meerly in ones hand, doth not true­ly denominate one a Magistrate, or in autho­rity.

Having thus discovered the unsutablenesse of the premises to inferre that conclusion, that the pos­sessor of a most unjustly obtained authority may be said to be a Magistrate, and in authority; that conclusion as to support by them, falls of it self: But I may adde, as to the tearms of it, as I said, and shewed before that the unjust possessor of riches cannot be called the owner of them; so may I here reply, those words, [the possessor of a most unjustly obtain'd authority] are a contradicti­on in adjecto. A most unjustly obtained authority there can properly be none: a man cannot be a possessor of authority, that is authority indeed, but by lawfull means. He that holdeth, and ex­erciseth command, rule, or sway most unjustly, (as to title) may pretend to authority, but the command he assumes cannot (but abusively and equivocally) be called authority. Authority (as hath been before made good) consisteth in a right, or call to rule, and is formally, and essen­tially contradistinct to unjustly obtained autho­rity. I speak of that which is held, or standeth meerly by unjust means: for, (as was before noted of injustice in the acquisition of Goods) there may be a miscarriage incident to, which is [Page 203] not of the substance of the Magistrates ingresse into, or tenure of authority. There is a faulti­nesse in the very nature, or essence, and consti­tution; and a faultinesse in some circumstances of the acquisition of authority. A man may come into, or hold the throne by a just title of perso­nal election, or hereditary succession, and yet some indirect, or undue passage may be inter­woven in the election, or the actuating of that succession; which notwithstanding, the election, or succession, being for substance lawfull, there is a true Magistracy, or reall authority descend­ing on that person. But where the place of power is meerly usurped, (or as are the words of that conclusion we are refelling, most unjustly obtained) there is a Magistrate but verbo te [...]us; a style without truth; a barely pretended, no­minal, equivocall authority; and therefore no reall denomination.

CHAP. VI. CHAP. VI. Of the universal negative note, in the words, there is no power but of God.

THey that contrary to the sense I have en­deavoured to give, and make good, of those tearms in this Text I have hitherto handled, would take the subject of this proposition the word power in the largest sense, so as to com­prise any strong hand that by its force lifteth up it self over a community; and by the predicates, of God, ordained of God, would understand any being of God, in what generall, and large accep­tion soever can be imaginable, so as to include whatsoever comes to passe, or occurreth in the world, or hath existence by eventual providence; they also endeavour to improve this universal negative annexed to that subject, no power; and the verb substantive, or rather its participle, in the other proposition, the powers that he, to the same pur­pose, of making way for their broad sense of the tearm power: arguing, that if there be no power but of God, then is an Usurper of God; and if the powers that be, or are in being be ordained of God, then whosoever gets a Kingdome into his hands, by whatsoever unjust means, yet he, seeing he is a power in being, is ordained of God to be the Sove­raign there. Wherefore somewhat I shall also say to these minute particles, no power, the powers that be. Would they be content to let those words [Page 205] (of which already) the power, of God, ordained of God, CHAP. VI. SECT. I. passe in their genuine and proper acceptions, which I suppose I have manifested to belong to them in this place; I should let passe the stretch which they also put upon these particles, and not dispute at all their sense: seeing that, take them as gene­rally, and widely as they [...]an, yet applying them to those main tearms, the subjects and the predicates already opened, in the construction before stated, they could not thereby alter or wrong the sense of the whole sentence, or gain any advantage by it to that large extension of the words. But supposing there were not evidence enough for that stricter, and closer acception of the Apostles saying, which I have offered, I will examine, whether those other terms, which yet remain to be spoken to, must ne­cessarily be taken as widely as they urge them, or as to be any thing complyant to their larger interpre­tation, and use of this place.

The next thing then to be considered is that uni­versall negative, no power.

Here we are to enquire what weight there is in this universall particle, no, in the proposition, there is no power but of God.

SECT. I. The Originall is not in those words, [no power but of God] expressely universall.

THe Originall is somewhat lesse favouring their wider sense then is the translation: for it doth not in terminis sound so fully to an universall nega­tive. It is, [...]. [Page 206] Which word for word signifies thus, The power is not but of God. It saith not absolutely, and simply, there is no power, but relatively, the power is not; looking back to the powers immediately before mentioned in the precept, the higher powers, willed to be subjected unto. Whatsoever power in the civil State can be involved in [...]at style, the higher powers, of it the Apostle saith; it is not but of God. And if every power imaginable is to be so styled, then may the words better passe in an equivalency to an universall, and might be all one as if the Apostle had said, there is no power but of God. But if there be any peculiarity in that phrase, the higher powers (of which something belowChap. 8. Sect. 2.) then must we stick to the relative reading of them, (which in truth is more literally consonant to the Greek, and is followed by those Latin Translations I have to peruse, to wit, those of Beza, Montanus, Tremel [...]us, and the vulgar) and lay aside that universall note. However needs it must be granted the safest, and clearest rendring is that which is word for word to the originall, which expresly amounts not to an universall, but is, for its extent, formally indefinite; and being so, our Logick rule will tell us, that its quantity must be determinate (that is, whether it shall be taken equivalent to an universall, or to a particular proposition) by the matter, to wit, by the necessity, or contingency thereof; and the mat­ter, to wit, the subject, and predicate, being in con­troversie, in what sense (whether in a larger, or a stricter) they shall be taken, it cannot be (untill the sense of those tearms, be concluded to be necessarily thus, or thus) determined thereby. Only thus I take it to understand by the power a morall power, and by the tearms, of God, ordained of God, a pro­ceeding of God by way of authorization, com­mission, call or warrant, and then this indefinite may be answerable to an universall: but cast off those restrictions, (which yet I apprehend naturall, and proper to the Text) and then it cannot be spoken universally, but will amount only to a particular pro­position.

SECT. II. CHAP. VI. SECT. II. The severall qualifications which sen­tences in tearms universall do ad­mit.

BUt admit the proposition to be formally univer­sall, and that the Apostle had in terminis said, there is no power, but of God, or, every power is of God.

Yet we know that each sentence that hath a note of universality put to it must not be understood in the utmost bounds that such a note may sound, or reach unto, at any time, or in any other sentence; words universally spoken must be construed with caution. It is a rule, dicta quantumvis universalis aequitatem recipiunt intepretem. It will behoove us for this purpose to consider a little how universall proposition (whether affirmative, or negative) as in ordinary discourse, so in Scripture very frequently, and familiarly must from the sense intended be qualified, and restrained within a shorter compasse then the universal note would of it self bearVide Bezam in 1 Tim. 2.1. Mr. Needler his notes, p. 262..

1. Sometimes the universall affirmative, or ne­gative meaneth not simply all, and every one under the subject contained, but only the more part, or many, as [Mark 1.5.] there went out unto him all the land of Judea, and were all baptized of him. All, that is, many, not all to a man; [Phil. 2.21.] all seek their own, &c. that is, many, or the most do so. [John 12.32.] I will draw all men unto me: that is, a great number.

2. Sometimes it signifies indiscriminately, in reference to a multiplicity of persons, or things, [Page 208] all, that is, every sort, or of one sort as well as ano­ther; and not distributively every single person, or thing without exception, or not collectively all sin­gulars, so as to leave out none under those sorts comprehensible. [1 Sam. 20.26.] Saul spake not any thing that day; not as if he were quite mute all the day from all discourse, but he spake nothing concerning that matter of Davids absence; [Acts 2.17.] I will pour out of my Spirit upon all flesh; that is, not upon all and every person in the world, but upon all without distinction of nation, Jew as well as Gentile; [1 Tim. 2.1.] That supplications, &c. be made for all men; that is, for men of all ranks, and states, [ver. 6. [...].] Who gave himself a ransome for all. That men pray every where. Christ gave himself for all, that is, for all sorts and conditions of men, and of singulars under all those sorts for some of each, but not for all Individuals, or particular persons unto all those sorts reducible. And men must pray every where, that is, in one place as well as an [...]ther, importing the ceasing of that peculiarity of place, which was under the Law; yet they might not play simply every particular where without exception, they might not goe and pray before an Idoll, or amidst an assembly of Idolaters in the Idols Temple; [1 Cor. 10.25.] Whatsoever is sold, &c. that eat, &c. [1 Tim. 4.4.] Every Creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused. That is, any kind of those Creatures that are good for food might then be eaten; yet if any individuall of those was strangled, or the bloud of any they might not eatAct. 15.29.; [Mat. 4.23.] Jesus went about, &c. healing every sicknesse, and every disease. [and ver. 24.] They brought unto him all sick people; Every, and all, that is, some of each sort, for every disease of every per­son he healed notMark 6.5..

3. The universall Note sometimes signifies every particular, or singular, but not of the Genus, or subject spoken of generally taken, but of one spe­cies, or special kinde only contained under that genus; and so the universality must not be ex [...]ended [Page 209] absolutely, but secundum quid, or to one Classis, or sort only of the things, or persons named. [1 Cor. 6.12.] All things are lawfull unto me; —all things are lawfull for me, all things here means not simply all, not Idolatry, Adultery, Theft, Drunkennesse, which he had been naming but a little before, [verses 9, 10.] and condemned, but all things of naturall use for nourishment, to which point he [in this, and in verse 13.] is speaking. [1 Cor. 2.15] He that is spirituall judgeth all things. Not all things in generall, but all revealed spirituall things, of which things his discourse in that Chapter pro­ceedeth. And again in the same verse, he himself is judged of no man, not simply denying the spirituall man to be subj [...]ct to any humane judgement or cognisance whatsoever; but meaning that negation solely in reference to his spirituall inward estate, [1 King. 19 10.] There is no Nation, or Kingdome under heaven whither my Lord hath not sent to seek thee. Not as if Ahab had sent to seek that Prophet in every Countrey on the earth, but the meaning of it must be, there was no neighbouring nation, or place whither it could be probably thought Elijah to have betaken himself, but he had sent to make en­quiry for him. [Mat. 9.10.] No man putteth a peece of new cloth, &c. not intending absolutely to say, that was never done by any, but no man useth to do it, or no man doth it, that goeth wisely, or with common advisednesse to work. [2 Tim. 2.4.] No man that warreth entangleth himself with the affairs of this life. Doubtlesse of every one that is a Souldier this cannot be denyed, this age hath seen enough of the contrary, but it is denyed only of the just, and faithfull Souldier; no man that warreth regularly, or as he ought behaves himself after the manner that is here denyed.

CHAP. VI. SECT. III. SECT. III. The suteablenesse of some of those qua­lifications of universalls to this (supposed) universall in the Text.

IN this vari [...]ty of limitations to which proposi­tions universall (whether affirmative or negative) are subject, we may reflect upon this sentence under debate, and consider (supposing it to be indeed an universall negative, and that the subject to which it is appendant, the tearm power, as here it is used neither doth carry in it self its own limitation, nei­ther were by any other thing in the Text restrayned to one certain and peculiar acception) whether some of these restrictions may not fitly be put upon it.

I doubt nor, but, looking upon the words under that supposall, the universall note added to them may well, yea must needs admit of the second or third qualification. When therefore it is urged in behalf of a power that meerly standeth by forcible possession, and is destitute of all just title, and call to authority, that this power is by vertue of this Text to be subjected unto, inasmuch as here it saith, there is no power but of God. It may be answered, Scripture universalls oftentimes will not brook to be taken in the larg [...]st extent, to which the word, or thing spoken of doth sometimes reach; but must be understood with some qualification. Particularly, as the universall is to be taken in many Texts, so in this here, it doth not contain simply all power, nor doth it intend to assert that any sort of power whatsoever that can be named, or put forth in any [Page 211] creature, or in any man, is of God, in the sense wherein the Apostle here meaneth, but all that can be thought necessarily to be imported in it is, either,

1. That every lawfull, or (which is all one) every morall power in the civil State is of God, is or­dained of God. And for the congruity of taking this universall not simply, but secundum quid, or, for this one sort, or species of power only, I shall besides the Scripture instances al [...]eady given, here bring two more, which are for form and matter of speciall affinity with this. The first is a universall negative of a parallel subject, or matter, an office of superiority, or rule, wherein though the words run as these are supposed to do, in the generall without any limitation expressed, yet they must be taken in this manner. It is that of [Heb. 5 4] No man taketh this honour unto himself but he that is called of God, as was Aaron. This universall must not be construed to be an absolute, or illimited negation of the fact, as if no man at all doth, or ever did take unto himself the honour of the Priest­hood uncalled of God. For Korah with his compa­ny, and Jeroboams Priests, and King Ʋzziah, and Amaziah the Priest of Bethel did it. But we must take it as intended to be said with this restriction, no man man that legally, rightly, or warrantably proceedeth, takes this honour unto himself, but he that is, as Aaron was, called of God. So here, there is no power but of God; not as if there was never any Dathan, or an Abiram to invade the Ma­gistrates office, as well as there was a Korah to usurp the Priests; or, as if though there were, yet the usurping Dathan and Abiram, were powers of God in the Apostles sense here, though Korah, and such like presumers were not Priests of God: but, ta­king these two places to run very parallel, for like­nesse both of matter, and of universall negativeness, we may say, as that of the Priesthood, so this of the Magistrate must be construed to intend there is no power legally, warrantably, or regularly set up, but [Page 212] it is of God. The Divines Annotations upon that of Heb. 5.4. give us a good rule to understand many such universalls by, to wit, Verbs active in the phrase of the Scripture sometimes import; not the act it self, but duty, or office; no man taketh, that is, ought to take this honour upon himself, but he that is called of God. So here, though every particular power de facto be not of God, yet de jure there is none but that is. The power that is as it ought to be (as the high Priest that is in his office of right) is of God, ordained of God. The other Scripture instance is in the words that lie next to our Text, in the same Verse with it, to wit, the antecedent precept, Let every soul be subject to the higher powers. This universall imperative must not be taken abso­lutely, or to stretch to all men without restriction, for if every soul without exception were to be sub­ject there could be none left to be the higher powers, and, besides, there are, or may be some that are not of, or within any Common-wealth, and perhaps some Common-wealths may be for some time desti­tute of rulers over them, [as Hab. 1.11.] but every soul must be limited within this circumscription, every person that is a member of a body politick, and is in the relation and state of a subject, every such soul must be subject. So in these words, there is no power but of God, that is, there is none in the relation, or state of a Magistrate, no morall, autho­rized or lawfull power, but it is of God, set up, and ordained to it by him.

2. Or indiscriminately, in reference to the di­verse species, sorts and degrees also of lawfull power; of them there is none but is of God; that is, whereas there are divers species of civil power, as Kings, and Potentates, Aristocraticall, and Demo­craticall; and wheras there are divers degrees of powers, that is, supreme, and subordinate, in seve­rall graduall distinctions, and whereas there are di­vers sorts of power in regard of the qualifications of their persons, and governments; as for their Religion, some Christian, some Jewish, some Pagan; [Page 213] and for administration, some being just and pro­pitious, others being unrighteous and persecuting. There are none of these kinds, degrees, or sorts (taking the universall to intend gen [...]ra singulorum, not singula generum) but they are of God; and this is the very construction which both Beza, and Pa­reus give of these words. And this construction, moreover, best suits with that which the whole stream of Interpreters (as far I can observe) judge to be the proper occasion, and scope of the Apostles discourse of this subject, of civil policy, in this place, to wit, that whereas the Christians then, or some of them did, or might make question of subjection to the higher powers, in reference to the Rulers, being unchristian, unjust, and tyrannicall as to exercise of Government, his drift is to charge the duty of obedience upon them with relation even to such Magistrates: and to argue them unto a submission to it as applyed to such, he reasons chiefly from the Divine ordination, and warrant of the powers unto their office, and plainly averres, whatsoever they be for personall qualification, or manner of Govern­ment, yet, if they be higher powers, indeed, they have their place, and calling from God, and there­fore are to be obeyed.

The Apostle elsewhere bespeaking Christians for one particular duty to these higher powers, to wit, to pray, and give thanks for them, he extends this duty universally to all them that are in authority, [1 Tim. 2.1.] yet, as Beza observes, this universall must be taken thus indiscriminately, that is, in re­ference to all sorts, and not distributively to all single persons in authority, to wit, that heathen as well as Christian, misgoverning as well as good Ma­gistrates are to be prayed for. Otherwise (saith he) there may be found some one particular Ruler that may be excepted out of the verge of the Christians prayers (such an one as Julian the Apostate was) who may have sinned the sin un [...]o death.

Me thinks there cannot be a place more parallel to these words, there is no power but of God, ordain [...]d [Page 214] of God, both for subject matter, and for illimited­nesse in tearms, or words then that of Solomon, Prov. 8.15. By me Kings reign, and Princes decree justice: By me Princes rule, and Nobles, even all the Judges of the earth. Whether we understand these words of God, (as usually they are taken) or of Wis­dome, unto him, or if the use, exercise and admini­stration of the power is ascribed as generallly, and indefinitely, as is the being, and ordination of the power attributed unto God in this sentence of the Apostle. But from that indefinite speech of Solomon, no man may gather it was in his intention, and drift to own, or father every act of every King, Prince, Noble, and Judge, upon either God or Wis­dome; the words must needs be understood only of such acts of those persons as are just, righteous, and prudentiall. Certainly there are acts of rule (such as are rehearsed, Psal. 2.2. the Kings, and Rulers of the earth set themselves, and consult a­gainst God, and Christ, and a thousand more un­lawfull courses of such) which must of necessity be excluded from that generall saying. Now as from those indefinite words we must not inferre that all acts of Magistrates are from God, so neither may we conclude from the like indefinitenesse of these words of the Apostle, that simply, and universally every power that is in being (any way whatsoever) is of God, by his ordination.

Whatever any one may judge of the congruity of any of these limitations unto the universall note supposed in this Text, yet I think no considerate Reader but will easily grant that some such restricti­on must be admitted to the words. We have before distinguisht of a fourfold lawfulnesse, and unlaw­fulnesse in powers. Now it must needs be yeelded that powers in some of those four wayes unlawfull must be debarred the Text, and consequently that the propositions in it must receive some limitation unto powers that are lawfull.

Among other false pretenders to power by vertue of the Text, the Pope comes in; and he offereth [Page 215] injury to this place more wayes then one. Among the rest, he, and his Doctors for him, challenge power to make laws to bind the Consciences of all Christians;Bellarmin, To. r. Controv. Gen. 3. i. e. de Rom. Pontif. lib. 4. cap. 16. loc. 6. Whitaker, To. 2. Controv. 4. qu. 7. p. 710 b. Chamier To. 2. lib. 15. cap. 17. Sect. 3. and one warrant pretended to for it by them, is this Text; and in it they urge the indefinitenesse, or unlimitednesse of the words. Non est potestas nisi à Deo, (which they say) is equi­valent to this universall, Omnis potestas est à Deo. All power is of God: and thence they argue, if every power be of God, then the said power of the Pope to rule, and binde the conscience of all Chri­stians is of God. To his claim upon this ground we have no answer if we grant him the words to hold in an absolute universall form. But, to cut off this his forged pretence, we reply, the Text asserts not simply of every power, that it is of God, but of that power which is by other rules of Scrip­ture justifiable, and lawfull. If then to rid our hands of this corrupt glosse we must be driven to confesse the indefinite, (or say it be universall) form of these words must needs admit of a confinement, to lawfull, warranted powers; it is enough to barre out the argument, from the illimitednesse of the proposition. And further, then it will be said this lawfull, must either exclude powers in any sense unlawfull, or in some sense only, if the latter, then some good reason must be given why one sort of unlawfull power should not be shut out of the Text by it as well as another; which I expect will never be assigned: If the former, then is power un­lawfull as to title, or usurped power chashiered the Text.

But this may suffice for the discussion of the uni­versal negative, there is no power but of God.

CHAP. VII. CHAP. VII. Of the being of the Powers, in that proposition, the powers that be are ordained of God.

THE only tearm in the Text remaining to be cleared, and vindicated is the being of the powers, in that indefinite affirmative, the powers that be are ordained of God.

I will not insist on that reading of some which so placeth the words, and putteth the comma, as that it cuts off all pretence to that use of them which some make from this, or any other of the tearms of this Text, in behalf of the unentitled, or usurping powers: Which is this, the powers that be of God, are ordain'd; but take them in their ordinary, and to them most favourable reading: and so the defenders of an obligation to unlawfull powers do much lay hold, and insist on this tearm. For this purpose they observe the word to be in the participle [...], which they translate in being; the powers that are in being, putting an high emphasis upon that word, and urging that the being, or existence in rerum natu­râ of any power brings it into this Text, and under this pred c [...]te of being ordained of God. Whereas [...] is but put for [...], as it is wont often to be, and therefore translated by our Interpreters be. But however let them enjoy this [...], let it be the powers that are in being, there would be in this no colour of an argument at all, did they (as was before said) take [Page 217] the subject spoken of, the powers in its proper sense;CHAP. VII. SECT. I. but let that be set aside also, and try we what they can make of this word.

SECT. I. The question moved, wherein consists the being of the power, or, what it is that makes the power to be.

THe question here will be (in the midst of all the strong urging of it) what must be meant by the being of the power? or, what it is for the power to be? or, wherein the being of the power, the Ratio formalis of it, consists? or, what it is that puts a power in being? There are that tell us the being of a higher power, or that which makes the power to be, or one to be a power, is his actuall prepoten­cy, or his present ruling, or his holding the sword de facto, or his plenary poss [...]ssion of superiority. In this Text (say they) the powers that be are the persons that occupy the place of rule, that have the Militia in their hand, or prevail with their sword, or that hold (however they come by them) the reins of G [...]vernment in their hand. The taking up of this (at first sight or blush without further examining) to be the meaning of the words, is that which hath carryed away some to a strong imagination, either of a Usurpers right, or of a duty of obedience to him, as the ordi­nance of God; and hath staggered others to an unresolvednesse about it. Notwithstanding to me this seems to be an overhasty, raw, and indigested interpretation of the Text.

CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 1. SECT. II. Reasons to prove that prevalency, or actuall possession of the seat of Go­vernment doth not make or inferre one to be the power.

TO pass by what was above noted (Cap. 1. Sect 2.) that in Scripture we finde [...] put for such a power, as doth not necessarily import, or depend upon possession, but is separable from it, and that sometimes, not only de facto, but de jure: my Reasons for what I say of this definition of the being of the powers are these.

Subsection 1. Argument 1. Taken from the nature of existence.

THe being, or existence of a thing is eductio rei extra causas, the putting, or extraction of a thing out of its causes. Its causes, that is, those proper causes, that have a power or faculty to produce that thing. If then actuall possession, or prepo­tency do necessarily carry with it the productive act, or acts of those causes which are qualified to pro­duce the power in the Text, and that it can be said where ever there is a holding of actuall Rule, or a [Page 219] mastering sword over a people, there must needs be the concurrence of those causes which constitute, or create a civil Magistrate, then is it true, that actual prevalency makes, or argues the said power to be in being. But I ask what cause, or efficient of the civil power doth actuall regency necessarily, and individually import, or put into act? a man might be in that condition of actual prepotency if God had never ordained Magistracy to be, or though, having ordained Magistracy to be, yet, he should not have given this man any commission to be the Magistrate, yea though he should ex­pressely have given out a prohibition that he should not be a Magistrate, and though the people over whom he bears sway, and all the world besides, (only himself, and his strong hand by which he car­ries it excepted) were utterly, and professedly dissen­ting, and opposite to it.

That its evident that actual rule may be where there is no concurrence of the causes interested, and capable to produce a civil power, I shall need further to alledge no other medium, but the nature, or definition of Usurpation (as the word hath re­ference to civil policy.) What is usurpation, but the assumption, and use of the preheminencies, and acts peculiar to the office of the Magistrate with­out a lawfull call, title, or admission to that office; which lawfull calling, entitling, or admission to that office is the proper act, or acts of those agents who are competent to conferre this office? If then this be the nature of usurpation, and there be, or can be such a thing as usurpation in the world, there may be actuall rule without the con­course of the causes whose place, and faculty it is to convey the civil power; and consequently it is not actuall rule which doth put the civil power in being, or inferre its existence.

CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. Subsection 2. Argument 2. From the absurdity of ad­mitting Satans, and the Popes usurped powers upon the ground of actual rule.

2. THe command, and rule of some over the Kingdomes of the world actually challenged, and possessed by them will (I doubt not) be dis­claimed by the very authors, and urgers of this large exposition of the being of the power, and not ad­mittab [...]e into this Text; and if so, then they must confesse meer prevalency, or actuall sway doth not give being to, or hold forth that power of which the Text speaks. The antecedent is proved by a double instance, one of Satan, the other of the Pope.

1. Satan we finde claiming to himself the pos­session, and disposall of the power, and glory of all the Kingdomes of the world, [Luke 4.6.] and for the reality of his possession, or actuall pre­dominancy, when he made this challenge, yea, and ever since, certainly it was, and is true, if not of all, yet of many of this worlds Kingdomes: for which reason he is stiled, the God of this world, and prin­cipalities, powers, the rulers of the darknesse of this world, the Prince of the power of the aire. Now if he, or any from him should by vertue of this pos­session, and the authority of this Text so extended, demand the civil subjection of any Kingdome, or person, what should be said to this demand? If you say, though he have possession, yet he hath no right, that is to abandon meer possession from being that which makes or proves one to be the [Page 221] power, and to yield me the question. If you say, being not a humane person, he is not meant in this T [...]xt, this puts a limitation on the words beyond the bare being of one in possession of rule; and I shall require to have proved how a restriction in re­gard of person is more imposeable on the words, then a restriction in regard of title or right.

2. The Pope of Rome, and his Doctors, (both Divines, and Canonists) in his behalf lay claim to a temporall power, direct, or indirect, over all the Nations, and Potentates in the world, (as some of them) over all Christian Kings, and people, (as others say:) and as he claims, so it must not be denyed but he hath generally, over Christendome, possessed and exercised this power, and doth still in many of the European Territories, and elsewhere: and one reason alledged for this his claim is this of possession, continued possession: He prescribes, and challenges to be the powe [...], because he hath obtained, and held it. The Jesuite Parsons urgeth for the Popes temporall power against King James (as appears in his Apology)K. James his Epistle to all Christian Mo­narchs, &c. pag 32. this reason. And it is observable, that at this time, now the argument from actuall predominancy is so much in request, the Papists get hold of, and presse it against us, in this very point of the Popes Supremacy, as ap­pears by Dr. Hammonds reply to the Catholique Gentlemans Answer Dr. Hammond his Reply, &c. cap. 4. pag. 45.. Now if meer actuall pre­validity make, or inferre one to be a civil power, authorized by this Text, my demand is, how shall we avoid the argument, and reject this pretension of the Pope? Either we must suffer these words, the powers that be, to be more confineable then to signifie only a bare act of rule, and sway, or else I am fully confident we shall be to seek for our de­fence against this allegation.

1. If any think to escape it by saying the Pope claims a power unlawfull in it self, or for matter; or what is unlawfull for any man to have. The reply will be ready: whatever be the exorbitant ex ensions, or presumptions of his Ecclesiasticall [Page 222] power, that temporall power which he standeth for is another distinct thing from it (as appears by those Popish Doctors who assert the one, and deny the otherAs Barclay, Widdrington, and others.) and is not in it self unlawfull, it be­ing the same for substance which the Roman Empe­rour held before him, and the German now holdeth within his present precincts in reference to the free Princes and States of that Territory: in which respect the Pope is supposed to be the second Beast, which succeedeth, reviveth, and exerciseth the room, and power of the firstMr. Medes Diatrib. To. 4. pag. 450, 451., [Revel. 13.] and if in any thing he assumeth an excessive power in temporalls, or which is not for matter allowable, this exception would seclude him from so much of his claim only as were in respect of humane com­petency unwarrantable, and leave him the rest. For that a Paramont dominion, or an Imperiall power over a multitude of distinct Common wealths and Soveraign Princes is lawfull in it self, I take to be an uncontroulable truth.

2. If it be further said, the Pope is a person uncapable of civil power; or of being a temporal Lord, as being an Ecclesiasticall person or Clergy­man. To let passe the question of an Ecclesiasticall persons capacity of civil Magistracy; and the urging that many now (and perhaps most of those that are against me in this controversie) deny the distinction of Clergy, and Laity in that very sense wherein this objection intends it. It will suffice to reply against this evasion,

1. That it is not simply necessary to a persons investiture with the Popedome that he be (as they speak) a Priest. One may be chosen and made Pope that is not with them entred into the order of Priesthood. John the 20. (or, according to some the 21.) was of a L [...]y-man chosen PopeChamier, To. 2. l. 16. cap. 16. Sect. 13. Platina in vit. Johan. 21. p. 165. Spondanus ad An Dom. 1024.. Be­nedict the 9. is said to have been chosen Pope at ten years of age, and it is confessed by their own Authors he was no PriestSpondanus ad An. 1033. Onulphrius, An. 1032. Dr. Featly, Ro­ma ruene, p. 18.. I read also of Ama­deus Duke of Savoy, that he was elected Pope by the Councell of Basill when he was but a Lay-man, [Page 223] and that after his election (some distance of time) he received their ordinationFor his ele­ction Platina in vita Eugenii 4. p. 310. Onuph. An. 1439. For his unor­dainednesse see Fox, Acts &c. To. 1. pag. 903. Rosses Hist. l. 4. c. 4. pag. 350, 351.: And though it be true that it's said before his Coronation he took the order, yet that alters not the case as to the reply, their Doctors teaching that a Pope is made, and hath all the rites of his Popedome by his election, and before his inaugurationTolet. de in­struct. Sacerdo­tis, lib. 1. c. 40. Sect. 3. p. 185.. Those Popes there­fore that were chosen Laicks had for that time be­fore their Priesthood none of this objection, lying against their competency for a temporall domi­nion.

2. But suppose he could not be Pope with them that had not their Priesthood, yet they that held it a just exception against a persons capacity of bearing civil Magistracy, that he is a Minister of the Gospel, upon that of our Saviour [Luk. 22 26.] will not (I suppose) acknowledge the Pope by vertue of his Priesthood, or any other means to be a Mini­ster of the Gospel.

3. It is commonly acknowledged by our Pro­testant writers (as far as I understand) that the Pope in the proper Territories belonging to his Signiory, as Romania, and the rest in Italy, called the land of the Church (the means of his Instale­ment therein, whether the consent of the Roman people upon the decay of the Exarchate of Ravenna, or the gifts of King Pepin, and of Charles the great his Son, or of the Countesse of Mathilda, or what­ever else is alleadgedVide Ch [...] ­mier, To. 2. lib. 16. cap. 19. Sect. 7. &c., here is no place to search into) is to be owned, and obeyed as other lawfull Princes are in their dominions, upon the supposall that he is the lawfull Potentate thereofSee Par. on Rom. 13.1. pag. 246.. Accor­dingly then they that hold, that person is to be obeyed, and owned as the power in being, and so of God, in any Countrey that hath possession of the Supream power there, they must acknowledge the Pope to be the power in being, (in the Supream temporall Lordship) in all the Dominions where he actually prevaileth to have it.

Suppose any of us now living had been in the time when the Popes temporall power paramon [...] [Page 224] that of the King, was questioned, and upon que­stioning abolished by an act of State, and our con­sent had been required to the said act, or our oath of abrenunciation of him, what should we in con­science have done? On the one hand the right was confessed to be in the King, on the other possession (by a long accustomed usurpation) was in the Pope. If this were the sense of the Text, meer actuall possession makes one to be the power, to wi [...], that power that is of God, ordained of God, we should have been bound in conscience by this Text to have opposed the King, and State in the same act, and sided with the Pope.

To conclude this argument then, either we must refuse this position, actuall domination makes a civill power, or we must allow to the Pope his Temporall supremacy, both unto the reproof, and condemnation of those Protestants who have cast it off; and to the establishing of him in it wherever he yet possesses it, by the disallowing of those that are de facto still under it to put it off; and these are the fruits of this (truly Popish) Do­ctrine. Shall we suppose him still to be the Anti­christ, the man of sin, the Beast, and his City to be the whore of Babylon; and professe so much to be for the ruine of him under these names, and yet make him so large a Grant in the matter, and point which is most for his promoting, and secu­ring?

Subsection 3. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 3. Argument 3. From the custome of heredi­tary Kingdomes accounting the succeeding to be King in the moment of the decease of his predecessor, without actual investure.

3. I Thus argue. If a government by hereditary suc­cession be lawful, and in it the predecessor dy­ing, or otherwise ceasing, the succeeding heire is immediately the power, or the supream Magistrate, without, or before actual possession, acknowledg­ment, or investure by the Estates, or people over whom he is the power; then it is not actual possession which puts the power in being. But a government by hereditary succession is lawful, and in it the Pre­decessor ceasing, the heire is the power in being with­out further act done by him, or passed by the people, or any other. The first of these premisses is evident, and the latter will need little proof. The first part of it, that an hereditary govergment is lawfull, is attested by Scripture, by the generall consent of Na­tions, expressed both by lawes, and practise, by the lawes of this Land, which have not onely setled this government, but made it Treason to affirme the con­trary, and by the votes, and pens (as of other Au­thors, so) of our best Protestant Writers, Divines, and others unanimously asserting it. And for the later, that in hereditary government the successor is the power in being immediately, and without more adoe, upon the ceasing of his Predecessor, is a poynt also generally subscribed unto.See Hooker his Ecclesiast. pol. li. 8. p. 154. Chamier To 2. li. 15. cap. 10 sect. 19. Treat. of Monar­chy, part 1. cap. 3. sect. 7. Stat. of 1 Jac. 1. King James his Remonstrance against Card. Perron, p. 154.

CHAP. VII. SECT. III. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. Argument 4. From the lawfulnesse and useful­nesse of fundamental Lawes, and provisions for the future continuance of Government by succession, and against encroachers upon the same.

4. IF it be lawful, and necessary (as well as it is the universal practice of Common-wealths) to make and ordain fundamental lawes, constitutions, and provisions about government, for the upholding and continuing of it, and for the transmitting and trans­ferring of it from hand to hand, whether by succes­sion, election, or otherways upon the death, or other change of the present Magistrate, and for the pre­venting, resisting, punishing, and suppressing of the violators thereof, then is it not the meer in being, or actual seising of rule, and command which makes the power. But the aforesaid course is lawful and necessary.

This minor (I suppose) will be uncontested in all the parts of itVide Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 4, sect. 17.. If the latter part, the lawfulnesse of ordaining Laws for the risistance, and prosecution of intruders, and incroachers against fundamental constitutions, be questioned, the generality of this Nation, even every one that hath participated active­ly in the late Wars, (what party soever they have led, or followed) have manifested their consent to it. For the true state of the difference was the intrusions upon the fundamental Laws concerning the interest of government, which each accused other mutually of; which supposed intrusions, and incroachments were in things lawful in themselves, as the power of imposing taxes, disposing of the Militia, and inter­preting lawes, and the like; only the interest therein which on both sides the one assumed, the other deny­ed [Page 227] to belong unto him, or them,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 4. was that which each of the two opposites gave out to be the cause of their debate, and war.

For the consequence of the major that may also easily appear good. For if the actual possessor be the power of God, then it must needs be both unlawful, and a frivolous thing to make such constitutions, and being made to in force, or vindica [...]e them, either by the civil, or martial sword from violation: and, vice ver­sâ, if such Laws be lawful, and necessary, then meer actual possession doth not constitute any one to be the power.

It must (I say) needs be unlawful to make such lawe [...] if the Word of God determine the actual pos­sessor to be the power; for the direct, and proper use, and formal reason of such constitutions is to inhibite all invasion upon the government, or entrance upon it otherwise then according to such constitution, and to disapprove, illegitimate, and condemn it, if it be done; the use then, and nature of such constitutions, is to crosse and thwart that which the Word of God enacteth, and therefore they are in their making un­lawful, and unjust. And it must needs be as frivo­lous, and vain to make them. For let us suppose the fundamental Laws of a Common-wealth to appoint a Prince, or Senate to the Supream power, but for a limited terme, as for a stinted number of dayes, moneths, or years, as the Roman Consuls, the Car­thaginian Kings, and the Theban Boeotarchae wereGreg. Tholos. Syntag. Iuris li. 18. cap. 1. sect. 16, 17.: and at the end of the said terme that Prince, or Senate should declare their will, and resolution to continue still in the power, and should accordingly hold it, notwithstanding such fundamental Law to the con­trary; by this opinion such persons being actually possessed are the power ordained of God; and to what purpose then should such laws be made to confine, or dissolve their power by a prefixed time; & when they are made, of what force, or authority can they be? And if any execution be of such Laws, as if a Senate will, and do sit beyond the time prescribed in the fundamental order, and he, or they that are by it im­powred [Page 228] upon the expiration of the time to dissolve the sitting,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. do undertake to do it, what justifiable­nesse can there be in such an act, seeing they are in possession of Rule, and therefore (according to this opinion) the ordination of God, and therefore to be owned, let to stand, and by no no meanes in or from their power resisted, deposed, or dissolved.

Subsection 5. Argument 5. From the practise of Nations owning them for their Soveraign powers who have not actually ruled.

5. BY the common sentence, and judgement (both of States and Nations, and of Books, and Au­thors of policy) authority, or supream power is se­parable from actual regency, or command. In the generall account they are taken, & acknowledged for the higher powers, who doe not at all exercise any authority, either by themselves, or others, personally, or by proxie. In the case of a P [...]inces deficiency of the use of Reason, as through infancy, madnesse, or dotage, and in case of his want of liberty to exercise government in his Dominion, being dis-inabled by captivity, or expulsion; In such cases, either the standing Lawes of the Kingdome, or the act of the State pro re nata, appoints both the Tutelage of the impotent Prince, if he be with them, and the admi­nistration of his Kingdome, during that his deficien­cy, or restraint unto some others, as Curators, Re­gents, or Protectors in his behalf. Hence they d [...]stin­guish in this case Jus ab usu juris, the right of Magi­stracy from the use of it; and Actum primum ab actu secundo, the first act of power, which is the being of the power, the esse magistratus, from the second, which is the act of Rule.Vide Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 3. sect. 15. & 24. And the case is the same in a disturbed estate, whether it be by intestine com­motion of Subjects against their Soveraign, or by forein, hostile invasion, or by competition of divers [Page 229] titulars to the Throne. In every of these cases the power suspended from exercise, either by an inhe­rent, or an adjacent impediment, is yet in being; and though regnancy, or the second act of Magistracy be interrupted, yet the first act, the relation of So­veraign, and Subjects may ex st, and remain.

For instances of this nature, I shall refer to these few more largely to be found in their respective hi­stories; The people of Israel, who had risen up with, and for Absalom against King David; at the same time when they said, David was fled out of the land, do yet own him for their King, and consult about his reduction from beyond Jordan into the repossession of his Kingdome, as upon that account, or ground: and they that did thus, the Text stiles them, all the people throughout all the t [...]ibes of Israel: and all the men of Israel (it again saith) challenged a part, and right in him, as their King in that condition, yea, ten parts, and more right, in d [...]stinction from the men of Judah; and thereupon they contest with them of Judah that their advice was not first had in b [...]inging backe their King.

During the seventy yeares captivity of Judah un­der the Babylonian, we finde severall persons succes­sively named, and noted as the Princes of Judah: and, which is remarkable, they are put in the pede­gree of Christ, that is drawn down from David: and it is further to be noted, that the line of Christs pe­degree takes in both them and others, who are gene­rally accounted to follow the immediate predecessors to whom they are sub-joyned, not by natural genera­tion, but by way of legal succession; to shew (as it is conceived) that Christ was descended of those who were not only of Davids blood, and stock, but of the Royal dignity, though not alwayes in respect of pos­session, and enjoyment of the throne, yet in title, and right; and in the acknowledgment of the Jewes, so far they could own them: and that the prophesie of Jacob (the scepter shall not depart, &c. Gen. 49.10.) was fulfilled: For, though they had not always Monarchical Government actually swaying in the [Page 230] line of Solomon, nor in any of Davids seed, nor in any of Judah's tribe, yet they had still some kinde of politie, and royalty in being in the Jewish Nation, and kept up, or sustained either by the Eth [...]rohs of Davids stock, as their chief national Magistrates un­der, & after the captivity, or by some of the Jewish na­tion, though of another tribe, as it was by the Mac­cabean race, and after them by some Chieftains of that people, still continuing a dictinct Common-wealth, though in subjection to Herod, or the Romans, until Christ was born, and some time after until the gather­ing of the Gentiles unto Christ, as his Church, & the desolation of the Jewish Church & State by Vesp [...]sian.

Accordingly we finde Jehojakim in Babylon, when he had been in prison there 37 yeares, yet then, and in that condition stiled the King of Judah, and withall, some state and dignity of a King yielded him by the Babylonian Emperour. [2 Kings 25.27. Jer. 52.31.] of which exaltation of Jehojakim the King must (I take it) be understood that of the Prophet [Ezek. 29.21.] In that day will I cause the horn of the house of Israel to bud forth. Which phrase (of the horns budding forth) being interpreted by that of [Psal. 132.17.] There will I make the borne of David to bud] must needs intend the reviving of the royal dignity in Davids family.See Divines Annotat. on E­zek. 29 21.

After him Salathiel still at Babylon is called the captain, or prince of the people. Princeps po­puli. Junius. Dux populi. Usher. Vide Usheri Annal. part 1. p. 138. [2 Esdras 5.16.] and the reason is taken to be, for that he was appointed, and declared by Jeconiah his heir, and next succes­sor.Mr. Lightfoot his Harmony of the O. Test. part 2. pag. 180. & Harmony of N. Test. page 56. This Salathiel (or Shealtiel) is named Je­coniah's son [1 Chron. 3 17. Matth. 1.13.] yet he was not his natural son, for Jeconiah was childlesse [Jer. 22.30.] and Salath [...]el was the natural son of Neri, [Luke 3.27.] but he is reckoned as his son in regard that Solomons line ended in Jeconiah, and then came in Nathans posterity in right of legall succession to the throne of David, of which the next heir then was this Salathiel. See D [...]v. An­not. & Diodat. on 1 Chr. 3.17. Ezr. 10 8. Mat. 1.12. & Luke 3.27.

In like manner Zorobabel succeedeth Salathiel, as the prince of that people, and he was their leader [Page 231] out of Babylon into Judea, and the governour,CHAP. VI. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. and chiefe actor in the restauration there. He is called Shezbazzar the Prince, (for Shezbazzar was his Chaldee name) [Ezra 1.8.2.2.3.2.] and he is sti­led the son of Salathiel, [Ezra 3.2. Matth. 1.12. Luke 3.27.] whereas it appears he was the son of Pedaiah, who was Shealtiels brother, [1 Chron. 3.17, 18, 19.] So that naturally he was Shealtiels nephew, yet he is reckoned his son, as being his heir, and legal succes­sor, in the head-ship of the Nation. Thus we see these three, Jehoiakim, Salathiel, and Zorobabel, suc­cessively sustaining the Princedome of that people during the 70 yeares captivity, and untill the redu­ction. Unto all which we may add that David (that is, the house and successors of David) is sundry times called the King of Israel, and Judah, even then du­ring the captivity, and actual dispossession of the Na­tion, and Princes of Judah, Jer. 30 9. Hos. 3.5.M. Lightfoot Harmony of N. Test. part 1. p. 56.

Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon during his seven yeares frenzie, or brutishness, though then disposses­sed of the use, not onely of his Kingdome, but of his humanity and reason, yet he continued King still, and Historians account those seven years as part of his 43. or 44. years reign: And they suppose that his Wife, or his Son, or his Nobles, or whoever gover­ned the Kingdome during that space, were but as his Vicegerents, and the Protectors of the Realm for him; they expecting the recovery of his reason, and his return thereupon unto his Throne at the end of those years, upon the authority of Daniels interpreta­tion of his dreamVide Chroni­con Catha. Edw. Simsoni. part 3. p. 112. An. M. 3437. Sir W. Rawl. Hist. li 3. 3. cap. 1. sect. 13.. And the Text tels us no lesse, then that the title to the Kingdome remained still to him, and the use of it was to be reserved for him. His dream saying, Yet leave the stump of the roots thereof in the earth (to wit, of the tree deciphering him in his Kingdome) even with a band of iron and brasse. The which Daniel interprets thus, Thy kingdom shall be sure unto thee after thou shalt have known that th [...] heavens doe rule.

Alexander the great, at his death, leaving his Queen Roxane great with childe, his Princes at their consul­tation [Page 232] about his successor determined to expect Rox­ane her bringing forth her child, and presently they elect for it four Protectors, to whom they swear obe­dience.Justin. Histor. lib 13. pag. 145.

Other examples of this kinde the Reader may see in Grotius. Grot. de jure Bel. li. 1. cap. 3. sect. 15. & 24. I will onely adde these few instances coming near to us in place, and time.

In the Kingdome of France, anciently one of the three grand occasions for which the assembly of the three Estates was wont to convene (as their Histori­an tells us) was when it was necessary to provide for the governing of the Realm, during the captivity, or minority of the Kings, or when they wanted the right use of their senses.Historical col­lection, &c in the life of H. 3. page 137.

In England the soveraign power hath often resided in them who could not in any one act exercise it, by reason of their far d [...]stance from home, when the Crown hath descended upon them, or of their capti­vity, or of their childhood; which defect hath been supplyed by the advice, and care of the Chieftaines of the Realm: as it was in the case of King Richard the first, being prisoner to the Emperour of Germa­ny: and in the cases of King Edward the third, Henry the six [...]h, Edward the fifth, and Edward the sixth, be­ing but children at their first coming to the Crown: and in the case of King Edward the fi [...]st, being in War against the Sarazens in Asia, at what time the Kingdome fell to him.Speeds Histor. Book 9. cap. 7. sect. 44. cap. 9. sect. 3. cap. 10. sect. 6. cap. 16. s [...]t. 1. cap. 22. sect. 24.

Quum Roma a Gottis capta est, [...]ccupatio fuit violenta, cui s [...]se interea im­peratores oppo­nebant, quantum patiebatur re­rum status, & pe [...]secerunt de­nique ut ad se rediret. Itaque quemadmodum au [...] olim Carolus 7. occupata ab Anglis, aut nuper Henricus 4. ab Hispanis, Luteria, non d [...]sierunt esse veri Reges Francorum, nec desiit eorum juris esse Luteria, sic nec illi quidem d [...]si­erunt ess [...] Romani imperatores. Chamier panstrat tom. 2. l. 17. c. 4. sect. 17. Chamier observes, when Rome was taken by the Gothes, there was a violent possession, the which in the mean time the Emperours opposed as far as the state of things would permit, and at last prevailed to a reco­very of it to them wherefore as in time past, Paris being seised by the Engl [...]sh, or of late by the Spanyards, Charls the seventh, and Henry the fourth▪ ceased not to be the true Kings of France, neither did Paris cease to be of their Dominion; so neither ceased those to be Em­perou [...]s of Rome.

In the late differences betwixt the King,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 6. and Par­liament, it was often affirmed to be Law, That the King in his civil, or politicall capacity cannot be severed from his Kingdome, or Parliament, how far soever he is distant in person, or in dispesition of minde to act with them. See fuller answer to Dr. Fern, p. 9. Mr. H. Potts his Cordial, p. 15.

And to adde no more, the late Parliament more then once found themselves fallen under force, yet after recovering their liberty did account themselves, and were accounted by the King, and Kingdome the Parliament still, and their constitution and session to have continued both under, and after the said force.

Subsection 6. Argument 6. From another practice of King­domes, viz. their admitting some to the place of supream command whom they ac­knowledge not to be the supream power.

6 AS there are who are generally acknowledged to be the supream power that rule not at all, that doe not actually possesse command, or exercise any act of civill authority; so there are that doe lawfully exercise, and execute the same authority, and yet are not acknowledged, or taken to be the soveraign power, or Magistrate: Such are they who are placed as Protectors, or Vicegerents in the forementioned deficiencies of the Soveraign Prince. One may be the King, another, in regard of that Kings Nonage, absence, durance, or dotage, may be the Regent; the latter executing the supream authority in his behalf, or stead. And where the case is thus; suppose the King dye in the said Condition, though the Protector, or Regent, be found in actuall use, or ex [...]cution of the soveraign power, (whether there be another legall Inheritor, & Successor of the dead [Page 234] King,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 7. or the line faile, and there be none invested with right of succession) yet is not the said Protector the supream power, nor is so taken, or acknowledged to be by the Realm; the right, or title to the Crown having never been conveyed, or made over to him: but rather, he having been but Regent in the name and behalfe of the deceased Prince; that office which he had legally ceaseth upon the death of him in whose name he ruled, and he is now divested of it.

Subsection 7. Argument 7. From the approved custome of determining Controverted titles unto Sove­raignty by Arbitration.

7 IT hath been the custome of Princes, and other supream States, or Potentates, both ancient and modern, when a Controversie hath been raised betwixt two, or more of them, about the title to the Soveraignty of a Kingdome, or Territory, and each part hath been confident of his right, and bent to vindicate his claim by the sword to the uttermost is­sue, and commonly one of them hath been in posses­sion, and the other kept out by him, for the prevent­ing of the miseries, and uncertain events of War, and for the clearer, and safer ending of the difference, to refer the matter to the arbitration of one, or more, as judge, or judges betwixt them. Which way of decision is approved, and commended as the most equall, wise, and moderate, and most becoming Christians. For instance, Atherbal, and Jugurtha, brought their contest about the Kingdome of Numi­dia unto the Romane Senate to be adjudgedSalust. Bel. Iugurth. num. 69. pag. 38.. Tygranes the Father, and Son, referred their strife about the Kingdome of Armenia unto Pompey the Great, for [Page 235] his decisionUsser. Annal part. poster. p. 238.. Hircanus and Aristobulus, the two Asm [...]nian brethren bring their difference about the dominion of Judea before the same Pompey, as the Arbitrator betwixt themIdem page 248, 249. Rosse Hist. Book 1. Chap. 5. page 20..

Archelaus, and Antipas, the two Sons of Herod the Great, after his decease, repair to Rome, unto Au­gustus Caesar, to determine their se­verall claims to their Fathers do­minionsUsser. Annal part. poster. p. 537..

Upon the death of Alexander King of Scotland, the Crown of that Kingdome being subject to the claimes of many Nobles, the chief­est, and probablest of which were those of John Baliol, and Robert Bruce, the determination of this controversie was by all the parties referred to Edward the first, King of England Speeds History. Book 9. chap. 10, Sect. 18. Rosse History, Booke 5. Chap. 3. page 244..

And more examples of this na-may be seeen in Bishop Ʋsher, Usser. Annal. part postr. p. 247. and Hugo Grotius. Grotius de jure B. lib. 2. Cap. 23▪ Sect. 8. Et lib. 3. cap. 20. sect. 46. When the case is thus, the thing re­ferred, and adjudged is not who is in possession, but in whom is the right: If this were a certaine, and clear principle, that he is the power that is in pos­session, the difference were at an end, and would need no Arbitrator, where either of the litigants is in the place. And when it is thus referred, it were a frivolous proceeding for the Arbitrator to hear the arguments, and pleas of the parties, or to enquire into the grounds of each of their claims, by law, de­scent, election, contract, testament, or the like; all that he hath to doe, is to aske which of them is in possession, and to judge for him, or at his own free choice to put the one of them in possession (if nei­ther be already) and so to end the difference. Unto which businesse the parties need not travaile or study to finde out, and repair to the wisest, justest, and mos [...] [...]different Arbitrator: or he to call in the ablest Civilians, or Causuists to assist himAs the Histo­rian saith, the said K. Edward did in the Scottish con­trove [...]sie last mentioned.; The first per­son [Page 236] they may light on,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 8. be he the simplest man on earth, would serve to umpire the cause by that prin­ciple.

Subsection 8. Argument 8. From the expressions of the Ho­ly Ghost in Scripture, owning men for Kings, in relation to the Kingdoms of which they have been unpossessed.

8 THat persons may be out of the seat of rule both personally, and virtually, both in regard of re­sidence, and in regard of actuall command, and yet be higher powers, that is, Kings, and Soveraigns, may appear to be the dictate, not only of wise Sta­tists, and Kingdoms, but of the Holy Ghost in Scrip­ture, and this in that he mentioneth, enstyleth, or owneth persons as Kings, and as reigning, at the time, and in the condition wherein they had no actu­all rule over the places, or people, in relation to which they are said to be Kings, or to reigne. There may be found in Scripture divers instances for this, viz many persons mentioned as Kings in such a place, or said to reign in such a Kingdome; at which time they were either carried away, and held captive, or expulsed out of their Kingdomes, or shut up, and besieged in some one City of their Dominions, and despoyled of the possession, and command of all be­sides by their invaders, and besiegers, or lying secret­ly hid, and unknown of their Subjects where they were, or whether they were alive, or no, or other­wise excluded, whilest others in opposition to their title, and regency possessed the Throne, and rule of their Dominions. I shall produce sundry exam­ples for this.

The sacred story relating to us Davids disseisure of his Kingdome by his Son, and Subjects, doth ne­verthelesse during that his outing mention, and owne him as King. How full, or in how great a measure that dispossession was, both in regard of place, of power, and of the consent of the people, let the words of the Text speak [2 Sam. 10.12, 13, 14.16. Chap. 15, 16, 17, 18. Chap. 17, 1, 2, 3▪ 4.16.21, 22, 24 27. Chap. 19 9, 10, 11.15.6.

By all which passages, it appears that David was wholly ejected, both out of the hearts, and out of the territories of Israel; and that both the land, and the wills of the people were totally given up to Absalom; and yet in this very state of things David is King still, being so reckoned, and stiled all along the story; and that, not onely in those words of the narration which are set down as the Language of them that ad­hered unto him, as his friends, and followers; not onely in that acknowledgment of the other party, that rose up against him, which they made after the battail was lost, and Absalom slaine; when they, both in their consultation among themselves, and in their addresse, as Subjects to David, own him a [...] their King; of which [Chap. 19, 9, 10.41.43] But in the proper words, and sentences of the penman of the story (and so of the Holy Ghost) when he himselfe makes mention of him in his own person, and not in another: In the perusall of the history, I have com­puted David is in this manner 43 times in the nar­ration, betwixt the time of hi [...] fl [...]ght from Jerusalem, and the peoples consent given for his reduction,Viz. Chap: 15.15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27. Chap. 16.2, 3, 4.5, 6.10, 14. Chap. 17.17.21. Chap. 18.2, 4, 5.25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33. Chap. 19 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, [...]4. stiled King. To this we may add the story of the other revolt by the instigation, and under the conduct of Sheba, which followed at the heels of that of Absalom. This was in like manner very generall (as to the ten Tribes) the Text saith, So every man of Israel went up from after David, and fol­lowed Sheba, [Chap. 20.2.] yet David, during the rejection, is reckoned as King still by the sacred Hi­storian, [Verses 3, 4.]

And there is yet another instance for this in David, [Page 238] he is said to reign over Israel, yea over all Israel forty yeares; seven of which he reigned in Hebron, and the other 33 in Jerusalem, [2 Kings 2.11. 1 Chr. 29.26, 27.] within which years there intervened, not onely the space of time in which were the afore recounted interruptions by Absalom's, and Shebah's rebellions, but a fixed confinement of Davids actuall reign to the Tribe of Judah onely, for the first seven years of the 40. in which he reigned in Hebron, for so the Text plainly saith. David was thirty yeares old when he began to reigne, and he reigned forty years in Hebron he reigned over Judah seven yeares, and sixe moneths; and in Jerusalem he reigned thirty-three yeares over all Israel and Judah, [2 Sam. 4.5.] Of the means of this confinement of his actual reign for those seven yeares to that one Tribe, the second and third Chapters of the second Book of Samuel will inform us, to wit, the wars betwixt the houses of David and Saul. The same story will tell us, that within those seven yeares, which were the first part of Davids 40 yeares reign over Israel, Ishbosheth was made King over all Israel, and reigned two years, [see 2 Sam. 2.8, 9, 10, 11.] That Ishbosheth might well be said to be King, and reign over all Israel de facto, though he wanted the actuall obedience of Judah, is easie to conceive, and yeeld; both because he had 11 Tribes of the twelve, and for that the name of Israel is often put to signifie the ten Tribes, in distinction from Judah and Benja­min, much more may it be put for 11 Tribes, inclu­ding Benjamin, as it plainly doth, [2 Sam. 30.10. and 5.5.] but that Israel, and all Israel in the fore­cited places [1 Kings 2.11. 1 Chron. 29.26, 27.] should be put for the Tribe of Judah onely, and divi­ded from all the other Tribes, even then when the other 11 Tribes were in fact a dis-joyned and opposite Kingdome to it, and that under the title of Israel, I see not how it can st [...]nd.

The question then is, how those Texts that reckon to David forty years reign over Israel, can be recon­ci [...]'d to the other that allot to him seven of those 40 to reign over Judah only in Hebron, and give Ishbosheth [Page 239] within that time a reigne over all Israel, as a distinct Kingdome from Judah? I think it can be no other­wise done then thus. Ishbosheth was King, and reigned de facto over, and by actual, & predominate posses­sion held from David the 11 Tribes, whilst David en­joyed onely the Dominion of the Tribe of Judah, but was de jure, or in title and right King over all the rest, which Ishbosheth detained: and therefore David at that time, not onely expected, but justly waged warre upon Ishbosheth, and his partakers, for the reco­very thereof, and therein accordingly daily grew up­on him, and won upon them: and upon this ground might well be that message of Abner to David, saying, whose is the Land? acknowledging David the Proprie­tor where he was not the possessor, [2 Sam. 3.12.] Here then we have two competitory Kings, mention­ed as invested in the same territory at the same time (not as joynt partners, but each as claymer in toto, & in solid [...]m:) with this difference, (for we must not make a contradiction of it) the one is invested with possession, the other with the right; the one is the occupant, the other is the proprietor.

Now if we should bring both these Kings to this Text of the Apostle, and aske which of them during those two yeares of Ishbosheth might be said in refe­rence to the 11 Tribes to be the power in being of God, ordained of God? would not any considerate Reader answer, not Ishbosheth, but David? not the possessor, but the Proprietor? And whereas both are said to have reigned; not he that is onely said to reigne, but he that is said to reigne, and is likewise said to be chosen by God to it, and entred possession by his spe­cial direction, as it is said of David 2 Sam. 5.2.2.2..

Thus we have seen this one King, and that, he who in a style peculiar, and above others is said to be the anointed of the God of Jacob, yeelds us a tre­ble instance of a power in being, yet out of posses­sion.

Next to David was Solomon; yet when he, as Da­vids immediate successor, should be installed, being thereunto assigned both by divine appointment, and [Page 240] by his Father, [1 Chron. 28.5. 1 Kings 1.17.] Ado­nijah, his elder brother, got the start of him, in re­spect of possession; and the said Adonijah not onely exalted himselfe, saying, I will be King; but raised a very strong party, yea obtained (it seems) a generall consent of the State, and thereby got into actual sei­sure of the Kingdome. There stood up for him, and gave him admission to the Kingdome Joab the Gene­rall of the Army, Abiathar the Priest, and all his bre­thren, the Kings sons, and all the m [...] of Judah, the Kings servants: Whereupon Nathan the Prophet, and Ba [...]hsheba tell David, Adonijah doth reigne: and him­selfe said afterward, The kingdome was mine, and all Israel set their faces on me, that I should reigne. [1 King. 1.5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18.25.2.15.] Yet for for all this the Kingdome in right of succession, upon the fore­mentioned title, was Solomons▪ which Adonijah after confessed, It was thine from the Lord, [1 Kings 2.15.] and therefore Adonijah's possession notwithstan­ding, Nathan the Prophet moveth Bathsheba, and they both together move David for Solomons inve­sture; and by his order Zadok, Bendiah, and Na­than, with the Kings guard, proclaim, anoynt, and inaugurate him in the Throne. [1 King. 1.32, 33, 38] The which, if Adonijah had been the power, because he was in possession, and Solomon had not been the power, because fore-stalled, and kept from possessi­on, they could not lawfully have done; but both they, and Solomon, yea, and David also must have acquiesced in the duty of subjection to Adonijah, ac­cording to the Rule of the Apostle in this place, if to be understood as abovesaid. Let us goe on to other examples.

[...] Chr. 22.9. Ahaziah King of Judah being slain by Jehu, the Text saith, his house had no power to keep still the king­dome; yet Joash, his son, and heire, being left alive, though he were powerlesse (both in regard of his own childhood, & Athaliah's strong hand of usurpa­tion over the Kingdome, ceased not therefore to be King. For, whilst he lay hid with his Aunt in the house of the Lord, and was not known abroad so [Page 241] much as to be, being in common repute slaughtered amongst the rest of Ahaziah's sons, and Athaliah reigned over the Land; and when Jehoiadah the Priest, and those of the Levites, and people that were gathered to him in the Temple, were but privately confederating, consulting, and preparing to invest him in the possession of the Kingdome, the Pen­man of the sacred Story styleth him the King. I meane, not onely when the said persons had set the Crown on his head, and observed the other Ceremo­nies of his Inauguration (though all that being done, he neither by vertue thereof, nor other ways, had the visible possession of the Kingdome, or the actuall prevalency over, and reception of the people, all the transactions hitherto being contained within the Verge of the Temple, and published through the Land, or City; yea, so secret as that to Athaliah her selfe, vigilant enough doubtlesse, and who was so neer to the Temple, and so much concerned to take notice, it was utterly unespied, and unheard of untill the closing Plaudite of the people brought the confused sound of it to her eares, and so occasion­ed her looking forth, and knowledge of it) but e­ven while they were yet intending, contriving, and ordering the way how to attempt, and execute their said designe. [See 2 Chron. 23.3.5 7.10.] Here then is a King in being before in actuall possession or regnancy.

The suspensions of Rehoboam, Ʋzziah, Hezekiah, Manass [...]h, Zedechiah, and Hoshea, from the actuall possession, use, and command of their respect [...]ve Kingdomes, through the invasions made upon their Kingdoms by their severall enemies, or by their own incapacities & the consistence thereof with their being Kings, and with the continuance of their Reigns still, as to right, and title, in the compu­tation of Scripture, we shall need to do no more but mention cursorily, having already seen so many ex­amples to this purpose.

In the Reigne of Rehoboam, Shishak King of Ae­gypt entereth Judah with a huge host, and overpow­ers [Page 242] it, taking the fenced Cities thereof, and so com­ing to Jerusalem. Into it Rehoboam and his Princes were retreated for their defence, and were so inclo­sed there by him, as that the Lord tells them by his Prophet, for their forsaking him, he left them in the hand of Shishak. Yet in this condition the Text still ta­keth notice of Rehoboam as the King, and his Prin­ces as the Princes of Judah, [2 Chron. 12.6.]

Ʋzziah is reckoned to reign in Jerusalem 52 years; yet for some part of his time, being smitten with a Leprosie by an immediate hand of God, he was de­prived of all exercise of regall power, and shut out e­ven from civill communion; and his son Jotham administreth the Realm. [2 Kings 15.2, 5. 2 Chron. 26 3, 21.] For how long time was this deprivation of Ʋzziah the Scripture doth not expresly relate; but, in regard in one place Jotham is said to reign 16 yeares, and in another we read of his twentieth yeare, [See 2 Kings 15.13, 33.] It may be supposed that four of those twenty years, Jotham ruled in the life time, and within those 52 years of the reign of his Father, because of his said incapacity.

When Hezekiah was King, Senacherib King of As­syria came up against all the fenced Cities of Judah, and tooke them, and sent his Commanders with a great Army against Jerusalem (wherein was Hezekiah) to summon it; so that he was Master of the whole Ter­ritory of Judah, Jerusalem excepted. [2 Kings 18.13.17. Isa. 36.1.33 8, 9.] yet Hezikiah thus overpow­ered, and shut up is King of Judah still. [2 King. 19 1.5. 2 Chron. 32.9.]

Manasseh is computed to reign 55. years, [2 King. 21.1. 2 Chron. 33.1.] yet, The Lord brought upon him, and his people the Captains of the host of the King of Assyria, who tooke him, and bound him with fetters, and carryed him to Babylon. [2 Chron. 33.11.] In what time of his reign this fell out, & for how long this his dispossession, and captivity lasted, I finde no certain­ty: but from his first seising to his recovery (consi­dering his journey to Babylon, his affliction there, [Page 243] the worke it had upon him, his great humiliation before God, and the c [...]nsequents of it, his prayer, and the Lord working for his release out of the hands of the Babylonian, and his reduction from thence unto Jerusalem) it must needs be taken to have been some considerable space of time. How much soever it was,See Divines Annot. on 2 Kin. 21.1. contained it was (as Expositors agree) within the current of those 55 years of his reign.

Zedekiah is accounted to reign as King of Judah 11 yeares; yet for about two yearesArch-Bishop Usher reckons it 2 years com­pleat. Annal. part. 1. An. M. 3405. of those 11 years he was mured up by the King of Babylons Ar­my in Jerusalem; and the rest of Judea was either possessed, or in like manner besieged by the said ene­mie. [2 Kings 25.4, 5.34.7.]

Hoshea reigned in Samaria over Israel nine yeares: yet, for at least three of those years, he was shut up, and bound in prison, and the whole Land was over-run, and Samaria was besieged untill it was taken by Shal­manezer King of Assyria. [2 Kings 17.4, 5, 6.]

But the number of Scripture precedents already re­cited is sufficient for the purpose before assigned. By all these it is (I hope) fully manifest, that a Sove­raign Prince may be shut up in some strong hold within his Kingdome, or be carryed away prisoner, or expelled out of it, or be forced to lye hid as one out of the wor [...]d, or through some incapacity be ex­cluded from actual regency, and yet be King still, and his reign (in the being, habit, or first act of it) continued. And whereas, during the interruptions of the rule of the severall Princes above mentioned, there were others that, either by the will, & con­sent of them, or their respective Kingdomes, or a­gainst it, bare the actual sway, and command, unto whom the people were subject, yet it was either in behalfe of those dis-inabled Kings, where it was with consent; or by way of compulsory, and passive sub­jectednesse, without any moral tie of allegiance, or of the duty of Subjects incumbent on them in refe­rence to such compulsatory rulers. For, where the dis-inabled Princes power, and reign was yet in be­ing, there must needs be a reservation of the Rel [...] ­tive [Page 244] bond of Allegiance on the peoples part to them: The tye of the Relation, and Liege right being ever mutuall, and recip [...]ocal, so that it remaining in the one, it must needs remain in the other; and when ever the obstruction was removed, there being a postliminium or reduction into act of the one, there would be the same also of the other.

I will shut up this argument, and enumeration of Scripture-instances with that which is found in Ezek. 21.27. I will overturn, overturn, overturn it, and it shall be no more, untill he come whose right it is, and I will give it him. Who is that whose right the Crown of Judah then was? It is usually applyed to Christ, and I shall not gainsay that Exposition: onely I would say that, as the branch of the Cedar­tree which the Lord saith he will set and plant in the mountaine of the height of Israel, Chap. 17.22, 23. is interpreted first of Zerubbabel, in whom the soveraign dignity was restored at the return from the captivity, and then of ChristSo Calvin, Diodate, and the Divines Annotat.: So may this parallel prophecy be understood. But whether we apply it to Zerubbabel, or to Christ, this must needs be granted, that after Zedekiah's removall, and the Lands captivity was consummate by Nebuchadnezzar, a right there was extant, and remaining somewhere, or in some per­son to the Crown, and Kingdome of Judah, though for the present suspended from actuall exercise, both by the hand of Gods providence in the full conquest of Nebuchadnezzar, and by his extraordinary directi­on, and dispensation by word of mouth, sent by his Prophet Jeremiah, as we find, Jer. 27.12, 16.21.8, 9. and that right did not descend upon Christ till he was born; nor then per saltum, or immediately from Zedekiah, or Jehoiakim to him, but by the interposal of those pe [...]sons in whom the race, and line of blood, or inheritance was continued down to Christ.

Subsection 9. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 9. Argument 9. Taken from the nature of Magistracy.

9 REason is to be drawn from the nature of Magi­stracy. It cannot agree thereunto, to say that actuall possession, or rule, gives being to the power, or is an inseparable adjunct, or convertible attri­bute thereof. Magistracy is a r [...]lation of office. E­very relation is founded upon something that is ab­solute. What should be the foundation of the relat [...] ­on of Magistrate, and Subject but the act of consti­tution of such a person, or persons in authority, or to be, and stand in the office of Magistracy to such a people? from this transaction as from its foun­dation results this estate, or relation: and then from this estate or relation result the mutual duties, and acts of Magistrate, and Subject, his actual supe­riority, and their subjection, his rule, and their obedience.

Well then, actuall superiority, and rule, be­ing acts proper to, and resulting out of Magistracy, they must needs presuppose it to be first in being, ere they can be educed. First, (I say) not onely in or­der of nature, but of time; for the civill transacti­ons whereby Magistracy is produced, and the polit­call acts which proceed from it are not immanent, or instan [...]aneous, (such as are those whereby the forms of natural beings do produce their facultie [...], or properties) but transient, and succedaneous, and such as require some [...]l [...]x [...] of time to be put forth in. It must needs be then an incongruous assertion to affi me, that the acts which fl [...]w from Magistracy in tim [...] d [...] g [...]ve being to, or are convertible adjuncts [Page 462] of it. A man is first a man, and then he reasons. A man is first an Artificer, and then he works in his Art. So a man is first a power, and then he rules; possession of the Throne, or Territory, and Regency, or coercion of the people by the sword are after, and latter in time then the Creation, or Investure of the power. Magistracy is the antece­dent, the cause, the principle, the first act; and actual dominion, or coercion is the consequent, the effect, the effluxe, or the second act thereof. Men first are Kings, and then they reign; they rule, because they are the higher powers, and they are not the higher powers, because they rule. As, on the other hand, the state of inferiority in a politicall body is the cause, and principle of the Subjects acts of obe­dience.

Men are first in the relation of Subjects, and then they act, or yield obedience. This precept of the Apostle [Let every soule be subject to the higher powers] though delivered in [...]arms illimitedly universall, is onely intended, and given to them that are in the state of Subjects, and because they are in that estate, therefore it takes hold on them; they that are either su­pream Magistrates, or within no Common-wealth, are not obliged by it. And as every person is not in­volved, so every act of submission which may be done to any kind of power in the civill State, is not that which is comprized in this precept, or contain­ed within the matter of it: It is possible a man may submit out of a principle of humility, or policy, or be forcibly prostrated where he oweth no obedience, but it is a submission ex debito, and that stricti juris, or proper to the conscience of him that is in the state of a Subject that is hereby required.

Let Solomon be our instance to illustrate this. Ha­ving been before designed, and chosen to be his Fa­ther Successor in the Kingdome of Israel, he is thereupon first anointed, and proclaimed King by Zadok, Nathan, and Benaiah; and then after this it is said, He sate on the throne of the King, in stead of David his father, and prospered, and all Israel obeyed [Page 247] him, and all the Princes, and the mighty men, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. and all the sons likewise of K. David submitted themselves unto lomon the King. Here Solomons constitution precedes his actuall possession and rule, and the Subjects sub­mission, and obedience, both in order of nature, and of time, as the ground and reason thereof.

And the same is exemplified in Joshua. When Moses was to dye, he spake unto the Lord, saying, Let the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, set a man [...] ­ver the congregation, which may goe out b [...]fore them, and which may lead them out, and which may bring them in. Here, in this petition there is first desired the setting of one over the Congregation, which is the calling & admitting of him to the Soveraign power, and then follows his leading them out, and bringing them in, his exercise of rule. And according to the order of this Petition, is the method of the Lords concession, and direction upon it. The Lord in the next words commands Moses to take Joshua, and lay his hand upon him, and set him b [...]fore Eleazar the Priest, and before all the congr [...]gation, and give him a charge in their sight, and puts some of his honour upon him, and then it follows, That all the Congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient.

There may be a violent, brutish subduedness [...], but there can be no rational, moral submission, and obe­dience as of Liege-people to their Liege-Lord in any other course. And as to this the case is altogether the same, and there is no d [...]fference, whether the Ma­gistrate come in by extraordinary assignation from God, as Joshua, and Solomon did, or by the ordi­n [...]ry means.

Those commands, and rules that are given in Scripture for the doing of publique, distrib [...]tive j [...] ­stice, as that, Defend the poor, and fatherlesse: do j [...] ­stice to the affl [...]cted, and needy: and deliver the poor and needy: rid them out of the hand of the wicked, Psal [...] 82.3, 4. and many othersSee Levit. 19.15. Deut. 1.16, 17.16.19. 1 Sam. 23.3. 2 Chr. 19.6, &c.. I would aske, [...]o whom they are given? who do they concern? are they spoken to all without exception, or onely to them that are Magistrates, and Governours? I sup­pose [Page 248] the latter.CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 9. By them it doth appear then, that the Scripture supposeth men Magistrates, before they may exercise any civill power: they must fi [...]st be Go­vernours, and then they are called, and enabled to put forth the acts of rule.

Look upon that law given by God unto Noah, [Gen. 6.9.] Whoso sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed. In those words there is both a con­demnation of blood-shedding, and a commandement for it: here is blood-shed strictly forbidden, and capitally judged, to wit, the blood of the innocent; and here is blood-shed commanded, to wit, the blood of the murderer. Here is a prohibition of blood-spil­ling to some, and a commission for it to others. The power of the Sword, or of capitall punishment is neither forbidden to all, nor prostitute to all; but commanded to some, and reserved from some.

The question then is, who are forbidden to shed blood, and who are authorized to shed that blood that may, and must be spilt? The Law, though it run in tearms indefinite, yet must needs be limited; and as in the former words, whoso sheddeth, we must take in this restriction, whoso murderously shed­deth, so in the latter, by man shall his blood be sh [...]d, we must admit this limitation, not by every man that will, and can; not by any private person, but by the Magistrate. They that are not in his office may only prosecute by complaint, and testimony, but must let judgment giving aloneSo Willet, & Pareus in Rom. 13. P. Martyr loc. com. clas. 4. cap. 13 pag. 898 Syropsis pu: Theol. Disp. 50. Sect. 38.. Should we say they that get the sword, can arme themselves with it, may use it, and are the authorized here, this were to set the stronger over the weaker, and to oc­casion (especially where there were any neernesse to an equality, or question which part were the st [...]ong­er) all combustion, and confusion among men, to determine where that authority shall be; and in stead of preventing, or punishing blood-shed, it were to o­pen a gap to an universal, and endlesse ove [...]flow of it, and to make this Law an act of indempnity, and impunity for murder. We must therefore necessarily distinguish betwixt them that can, and them that [Page 249] may, and ought to shed the offendors blood:CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subject. 10. and say, this warrant of the sword, or putting to death (the first we finde given) is onely made to him that then was, and from thence-forward to him that is the Magistrate. A man then must first be a civill power before he can come by this Scripture-way to the sword; he cannot by the sword come to be the civill Power.

Subsection 0. Argument 10. From Gods expresse disal­lowance of some in actual command.

10 THis shall be my last Argument. If some are, or may be in place of actual command, and exercise of rule who are not (in the sense of our Text) of God, ordained of God, therein then it is not that, to wit, actual rule which makes, or proves one to be the power that the Text saith is of God, ordained of God. But this may be, viz. some may be in actual command, and exercise of rule, who are not in the sense of the Text of God ordained of God. This is thus proved.

It is before made evident, and therefore must be here taken for granted, that, of God, ordained of God, signifies appointed, approved, authorized, allowed, or warranted of God. But there may be some in actuall rule and command, who are not thereto appointed, approved, &c. of God. This is very manifest by sun­dry Scriptures, wherein G d doth expp [...]sly disallow, condemn, and threaten with punishment persons that are in actual rule, and command for their so doing, or being. [See Amos 6 13.] Ye which say, have we not taken to us hornes by our owne strength? [Ezek. 33.26.] Ye [...] stand upon your sword—and shall ye possesse [Page 250] the land? CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect 9. Hab. 2.5, 6. He is a proud man, nei­ther keepeth at home; who enlargeth his desire as Hell, and is as death, and cannot be satisfied; but gathereth to him all nations, and heapeth unto him all people. Shall not all these take up a parable against him, and a taunting proverb against him, and say, Woe to him that increaseth that which is not his? &c. Nahum 2.4. Because of the multitude of the whoredoms of the wet-fa­voured harlot, the mistress of witchcrafts, that selleth nations through her whoredomes, and families through her witchcrafts.

By those whoredomes, and witchcrafts of Nineveh, Expositors understand the arts, and policies, by which she subjected the Nations of the earth. But especially would I have observed that of our Saviour unto Peter, [Mat. 26.52.] For all they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword.

It is not questionlesse his drift by these words sim­ply to disallow all use of the sword; but the qualifi­cation, or restriction of the words lies in that word, Take (as Augustine, Cajetan, and Luther (the last of whom applies this Text against the Boo [...]s of Swevia then in arms against their Magistrates, in his answer to their Articles) doe observeAugustinus Tom. 6. contra Manichaeum. li. 22. cap. 70. Cajetani Jen­tac. 6. qu. 3. Lutherus apud Jo: Sleid. Com. lib. 5. pag. 120. 122.) by that tearm the Usurper of the Sword is differenced from the true ownes. The one takes the Sword, the other hath it committed to him.

The one snatcheth it to himselfe, the other hath it coming orderly into his hand. The former it is, and him onely whom our Saviour here condemns, and declares the destructive judgement of God against. Whence it must needs be confessed that one may have the sword in his hand, and be for it disallowed, and threatned of God, and consequently cannot possesse it, as thereunto ordained, appointed, authoriz [...]d by him.

I will conclude this dispute, and section with that of Saint Augustine, wherein he determineth this question to the sense which I have here argued for.

When the Romane Empire under the Emperours Arcadius, and Honorius, was so harassed by the Goths under the conduct of Alaricus, and Radagasus, and specially the Western part by Alaricus, and the City of Rome was taken by him, St. Augustine saith of it in that condition,

Quanquam Romanum imperium afflictum est po­tius quam mutatum, quod et aliis ante Christi no­men temporibus ei con t­git; & ab illâ afflictione recreatum; quod nec istis temporibus desperandum est: Quis enim de hâc re novit voluntatem Dei? Augustine de Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 7.
Although indeed the Roman Empire be rather afflicted, then changed: the which also befell it at other times before Christ, and it was again recovered from that af­fliction; which neither is in these times to be des­paired of; For who know­eth the purpose of God in this matter?

CHAP. VIII. SECT. II. CHAP. VIII. Some Arguments to prove [that by the power in the Text is to be un­derstood a power lawful as to Ti­tle, and not a meer possessory pow­er] taken from the context.

HAving now gone over all the Termes of the Text, and of the description therein of the originall of the civil Magistrate, for the fin­ding out of the true sense, and just extent thereof: and by the discussion of them, having come to this resolu [...]ion, That by the power is meant a power law­full, j [...]st, or warrantable, in respect of Title; and that by the ordination of God is to be understood a legislative, or preceptive ordination; & that the other words, and clauses in the Text do very well comport, and accord with the said sense of these: It now re­maines that, according to the method fi [...]st proposed, I add hereunto what considerations I have further conceived for the further clearing, and confirmation of the same. The which I shall place under two heads.

1. Observations from the other parts of this Tex [...], concerning the civill Magistrate, contained within the seven leading verses of this Chapter.

2. The grounds or principles from other-where colligible, tending to conclude the p [...]esent reso­lution.

The observations from the Context giving light and strength to our conclusion are these.CHAP. VIII.

SECT. I. A consideration of the duty to be yeelded to the power in those words, vers. 1. Be subject.

1. THe first may be from the duty to be yielded to the power, the pressing whereof upon Christi­ans is the plain drift of the Apostle in this discourse. And upon this my observation shall be two-fold.

  • 1. Of the originall terme in which the duty is laid down.
  • 2. Of the thing it selfe thereby evidently in­tended.

1. The terme is Vers. 1. [...], Be sub­ject. Used again, vers. 5. as the powers are [...], ordained of God, and the power is [...], the ordinance of God, and he that resisteth the power is [...], so he that is here instructed in his duty to the power must [...], be subject. They are all words coming from one root. The word [...] signifies to be placed in order un­der another, to be subject according to order, to be under another orderly. Now an orderly subjection relates to an orderly superiority, and looks at them that are above, or over according to order.

But, what is order? The definition of it common in the Schools, and received from Saint Augustine is, Ordo est parium, disparium (que) rerum sua cui (que) loca tribuens dispositio, it is the disposal of things, whether collateral, or subordinate, whether of equall, and even, or of unequall and different ranke, and quality, each [Page 254] to his due, CHAP. VIII. SECT. I. & proper place. To be subject then orderly or according to order, is to submit to him, who is orderly placed over us; or, to be regularly under him that is regularly above; or, to yield just, and lawful precedency, or command unto him, or them that are of right our superiours. The direct oppo­site to order among men is Atopy, desulto inesse, insolency, or undue elation. And, in the civill State, disorder is when men run into tumult, rise up in sedition, or aspire above their place by usurpa­tion. To occupy the sea [...]e of Dignity uncalled, un­authorized, is an ataxie, a breaking, and violating of order, a bringing of the Common-wealth qui [...]e out of order, a casting down them whom order set­teth up, and a lifting up them, whom order placeth beneath. Whereby it may appear, that in relation to an arbitrary Government, there is properly no [...], no orderly subjection. There may be for publique order sake, or in relation to the other parts, and proportionate positions in the Common­wealth, a submission and obedience performed to an unjustly possessing power, and this may be a du­ty, but this is not in behalfe of, or with an eye, and respect to such a power, who being up against, and out of order cannot be the mark, or object of an or­derly subjection.

2. The thing it selfe which is required in those words, Let every soule be subject unto the higher powers, Divines have observed, that under this terme here, Be subject, there is much enjoyned, a multitude of duties are contained, and commanded to be perform­ed toward the Magistrate, to wit, not onely a passive stooping endurance, or irresistance under his impo­sals, but an active inserviency, execution, and ob­servation of his lawfull commands: and further, to contribute our abilities to his support, and mainte­nance; and that both to the acts of his rule, officia­ting, and administration, and to his standing, con­tinuance, and keeping of his seat, and station: and unto these assistances of him are required all our abi­lities both humane and christian; as those of pu [...]se, [Page 255] counsel, arms, and prayers: Moreover,CHAP. VIII. SECT. II. not onely the external act of all these are to be yielded him; but the elicite, and inward motions of the heart, to wit, consent, love, reverence, and honour: and unto all these is to be added a speciall kinde of fidelity or allegiance both in continuance under his jurisdicti­on, in concealing his secrets, and his disadvantages wherd the opening of them may be to his prejudice, and in discovering to him our knowledge of what may import his danger, or securement.

Adde hereunto the strict manner in which this precept of subjection is urged, vers. 2. to wit, under paine of damnation, and the ground, or considerati­on on which it is to be yielded unto the power, vers. 5, 6, 7. to wit, of necessity, not onely for wrath, or terror, that is so [...]ar, and so long as one is constrain­ed by feare, and to avoid a greater evill, or damage, then is the rendring of what is required by him; but for conscience sake, that is out of conscience of du­ty, to wit, both that of piety to God, the ordainer of him to that special Ministry, and Vicegerency under him, and that of equity, and justice to him, whose due, and right in consideration of his office and work it may be.

But now, can it be imagined that the Text doth in this forme, and manner set up any violent, or preda­tory power, any Robber, or Pyrate, any Tory, or Moss-trooper, Turke, or Tartar, Mamaluke, or Cy­clops, that can raise, or steale himself into the Ma­stery over a people? and that it ordains every coun­trey, city, or person to yeeld, and pay a subjection of this extent to every such one that shall seise, and captivate them?

The Roman Histories relate unto us diverse sto­ries of mighty, and strange successes, power, and command, which men of the vilest quality, and ba­sest rank have suddenly attained, and for a time held within the body, and in defiance of the authori­ty of that great Empire. The severall stories of the high feats, and atchievements of the Roman slaves under those three Ring-leaders, Herdonius, Eunus, [Page 256] and Athenio are briefly remembred by Florus: CHAP. VIII. SECT. I. as is also that of the sword-playersQuis aequo animo fe­rat in principe gentium populo bella servorum? quis crederet Siciliam multo cruentius servili quam Punito bello esse vastatam? Quum servi militaverint, Oladiato­res imperaverint: illi i [...] ­fimae sortis homines: hi pessimam auxere ludi­b [...]io calamitatem. Florus lib 3. cap. 19 & 20. Vide Stadium in loca ista Flori. August deciv. Dei, lib. 4. cap. 5.; this last is also men­tioned by St. Augustine, and it was thus: A few slaves, imployed in sword-playing, perswaded by one Spartacus a Thracian, rather to fight for their owne liberty then the spectators plea­sure, and their own mutuall destruction, break out from that bloody sport, raise great Forces, and not only free themselves from their sl [...]very, but under three Cap­tains (Spartacus, Chrysus, and Oenomaus) o­ver-run all Italy, acquire great victories, and rule all at their pleasure, as Kings, and could not be overcome by some Roman Generalls; these mock-kings did for a time absolutely command a great part, and much afflicted, and endangered the whole Roman Empire, when it was grown to its greatnesse, and had subdued many Nati­tions to it selfe. But could these succesful irruptions of those gladiatory slaves entitle them to the style; and dignity of powers ordained of God in the Countreys which they had got the mastery of? And will any man say, that the Roman people within those bounds were obliged to subject to them with a subjection of that siz [...], and qualification, namely, that they were in their hearts to consent to, to love, and honour them as their civill Lords; that they were not onely to acquiesce, and stoop quietly under their prevalency, but be at their beck to fulfill their commands (not in their own nature vitious) that they were to con­tinue under, to assist, uphold, and maintain them in that seat of rule with all their abilities; and that they were to give over, and refrain all correspondency, and intell gence with the Roman State, and disclose to those their new, and strange Conquerours, what­soever might preserve them from, and impeach the designes of the Roman Consul, Senate, and Armies against them; and all this, not only for the terror of their potency; and cruell violence, but out of con­science [Page 257] of their duty to God, and them as placed by heaven in the obliging office of Magistratical admi­nistration over them?

That the subjection of every soule to the higher powers comprehendeth as much as is above-said, I need not make labour to prove in this p [...]ace, the termes of expressing it used by the Apostle in the subsequent verse, and the explication which not on­ly Commentators, and other Divines, but other Scriptures give of this duty, deliver us all those par­ticulars as parcels of the nature of it. And if any man doubt whether all those may not be due to a Spartacus, (or, to an Hordonius, Eunus, or Athenio) that is to an upstart slave by a tumult gotten to over­top a Nation; Let him consider, that, if such an ones tenure of head-ship be injurious, to assist him therein cannot but be so also; and that not only Ab­salom is by Scripture manifestly disapproved in his rising up against King David, but also those Israelites that joyned to maintain him. [Psal. 3.1, 7.] Mr. Bur­roughes (in his fourth Lecture on Hosea, Chap. 1. ver. 10. pag. 111.) teacheth us in reference to the diversi­ty of powers that may be, to distinguish betwixt obedience out of conscience, and obedience out of prudence. Take his own words that are very plain to the present purpose.

Not to the commands, and meere wills of men till it be brought to a law are we bound in conscience to sub­mit, no way, neither actively, nor passively: though it be a good thing that is commanded, conscience doth not binde to it, eâ ratione to yeeld to it because it is com­manded, till it be brought to a law: Now when things are brought into a law, and be according to the agreements and covenants of the place and countrey wherein we live: and then suppose this authority be abused, and there be an ill law made, then (I confesse) if the Law be of force, we must either quit our selves of the Countrey, or else submit or suffer. When then it comes to be a power, to be a law, it is authority though abused, and we must yeeld obedience to it either actively, or pas­sively. But we must enquire whether it be a power, &c. [Page 258] otherwise we are not bound in conscience; bound we may be in regard of prudence, and in regard of preventing other distuabrnces, but conscience doth not bind us to wils of men, but bindes to lawes.

Melancthon Melancthon in loc. upon this Text distinguisheth also be­twixt the extent of subjection to a predatory power, and that which is to a Magistrate. If thou canst escape from the hands of a robber, thou offendest not; but and if thou canst escape the punishment of the Magistrate, yet thou ought not with-draw from his Government, that is that which he saith, not onely for wrath, but also for conscience sake.

He that is a Magistrate indeed, and in authority, the Subjects are to pray, and to give thanks for him, not as a man meerly, but as a Magistrate, that is, for his preservation, and prospering in his Government: accordingly Tertull. in his Apologeticks gives account of the constant, publique practice of Christians. We constantly pray for all the Emperours, that they may have a long life, Precantes sumus semper pro omnibus imperatori­bus, vitam illis prolix­am, imperium securum, domum tutam, exercitus fortes, senatum fidelem, populum probum, orbem quietum, quaecunque ho­minis, & Caesaris vota sunt. Tertul. Apologet. a secure dominion, a safe family, valiant armies, a faithful Se­nate, a good people, a quiet world about them, and whatsoever may be desired by (or for) them, either as men, or as Caesars. But a possessor of power by meere force, the peo­ple of God may complain, and cry out of in prayer, not for his misgovernment only, but for that he governs, and may pray to be delivered from him. This (if it be doub­ted of) may be evident by many Scripture examples of the practice thereof, being of un­doubted warranty for imitation; For instance let these be taken [2 Chron. 6.38, 39. Psal. 79.1.89.42, 44.106.47.126.3. Lam. 5.2, 8.] unto which I shall adde that passage of the Prophet Habakkuk, cap. 2. vers. 6. He is a proud man, neither keepeth at home, &c. Wo to him that increaseth that which is not his. How long, &c. together with Mr. Calvins words upon them. Quousque, quousque? omnes clamant quousque? & clamor iste, quia nascitur ex naturae sen­su, & regula aquitatu, ideo exauditur tandem a deo. [Page 259] Ʋnde fit ut taedio affecti omnes, clamant, quousque? CHAP. VIII. SECT. II. nisi quia agnoscunt non esse tolerabilem hanc perturbatio­nem ordinis & justitiae? sensus autem ille, nonne indi­tus est nobis a deo? perinde est igitur ac si Deus seipsum audiret, cum ita exaudit clamores, & gemitus eorum qui ferre nequeunt in justitiam.

SECT. II. Of the terme higher annexed to the powers, vers. 1.

2 THe second observation shall be upon the Epi­thite higher, given to the powers, [...], Beza renders super-eminent; the vulgar, more sub­lime. Expositors generally note that this word here signifies a superiority of calling, office, or function. One may be said to be higher over, or above another two wayes.

1. He is higher, or above that hath the upper hand, or prevaileth, and is in strength above ano­ther.

2. He is higher that is superior to another in re­gard of place, calling, or office. There is a superio­ri [...]y or celsitude in respect of meer sight, and might; and a superiority in regard of dignity and authority; the former any one may get over a person, or people: the latter is proper to the Magistrate. This word [...] here used occurreth also 1 Pet. 2.13. Phil. 2.3.4.7. And from it come the substantives [...]. Phil. 3.8. and [...], 1 Cor. 2.1. 1 Tim. 2.2. And the use of the words in every of those places is to signifie, not an over-powering act, of posture, but a morall excellency of one person, or thing a­bove another, or such a precellency as draweth to­wards [Page 260] it a Recognition of honour, or an h [...]gh repute, veneration, or valuation of the minde. And this precellency is,

1. Either that of vertue, or absolute worth. As where Christians are required in lowlinesse of minde to esteem each others [...] better then themselves, Phil. 2.3. And where the peace of God is called [...] passing all understanding, Phil. 4.7. So also the Ap [...]stle when he came to the Corinthians, came [...], not with ex­cellency of speech, or of wisdome, 1 Cor. 2.1. And he counted all things but losse [...] for the ex­cellency of the knowledge of Jesus Christ, Phil. 3.8.

2. Or that of office, or relative State, as when Christians are willed to submit themselves to the King [...] supream, or superior in reference to the Governours, Presidents, or subordinate Rulers that are commissioned from, or placed under him.

Though they be more, and stronger in naturall force then he, yet he is [...] superiour to them in regard of order, authority, rank, and dignity, 1 Pet. 2.13. And Magistrates are said to be [...] in authority, 1 Tim. 2.2.

By comparing of those other places with this as to the use of this word it may appear, that [...] is added to [...], for description, and discrimi­nation sake, and to adde some weight to the exhor­tation, [...] signifying the Magistrate, and [...] signifying the honour, and eminent dignity which is annexed to him, and which is a proper and inseparable adjunct to the true magistracy, by which it is distinguisht from meer prepotency, or a predato­ry power. And in this I have the observation of Ex­positors going before me.

Aretius upon the place saith [...], is to excell in dignity, and right Dr. Willet citeth it as Cajetans observation, That this word is added to exclude tyrants who are not excelling Lords, taking the Apostle to speake de legitimis potestatibus. Mr. Prin, in his third part of the power of Parliaments, pag. 114. tells us, Domi­nicus Soto, Cajetan, Pererius, and other Popish Commen­tators of this place observe that Paul adds this Epithite of [Page 261] higher, or excelling powers of purpose to exclude Tyrants, CHAP. VIII. SECT. IV. who are not excelling Lords, nor lawful powers.

Dr. Whitaker (Controver. de Rom. Pontif. Quaest. 4. and 7. pag. 648. a. & 720. b.) insisteth on this terme to prove against Bellarmine (who would finde a ground in this Text for the exorbitant power which the Pope pretends to, and usurpeth) that the words of the Apostle can only be understood of a politicall, or civill power, and not simply of any power what­soever, which he could have no advantage for from this word if it did leave the terme power to signifie superiority at large, so as to take in any predomi­nancy, and did not contain its importance within the bounds of such a superiority as really deserves to be adorned with, and hath of due, and right belong­ing to it civill honour, and veneration; unto which sense agreeth St. Austins explanatory paraphrase upon this term sublimioribus potestatibus in this place. viz. hominibus res humanas cum aliquo honore administranti­bus August. Tom. 4. part 2. p. 727.. Higher powers, that is, men that administer hu­mane affaires with some degrees of honour. The actuall administration of humane affairs, and the degree of honour are two distinct things: the former may b [...] without the latter, but both put together make, and define a higher power. Honour is the attendant, or shadow of reall vertue, and of relative authority, but not of meer predominant force.

Unto this Epithite of super-eminent, or more sublime, seems to be answerable that phrase of Solo­mon styling the seate of Magistracy, the place of the Holy [Eccles. 8.10.] the throne of Majesty is sacred, in that it is peculiar to the Magistrate, and sacred in that it is authorized by God; agreeable whereunto the seat of the lawful Magistrate is called, The Throne of God. [1 Chron. 29.23. 2 Chron. 9.8.] And, his kingdome the kingdome of the Lord [2 Chron. 13. [...]. 1 Chr. 28.5.17.14.] and the Magistrate is said to be King, for the Lord his God, & to b [...] anointed unto the Lord [2 Chr. 9.8. 1 Chr. 29.22.] And this judgment is said to be, the judgement of God, and he judges not for man, but for the Lord. [Deut. 1.17. 2 Chron. 19.6.] And God is said to be with them in the judgement, [Page 262] and to stand in their congregation, CHAP. VIII. SECT. III. and to judge among them. [2 Chron. 19.6. Psal. 82.1.]

All these are the high, and holy, and distinguishing prerogatives of the Magistrates state. Whereas there is a throne of iniquity (contradistinct to this place of the holy, this throne of God) which hath no fellowship with God. [Psal. 94.20.]

SECT. III. Of the whole style Higher Powers, Vers. 1.

3 FRom the Epithite, higher, I will passe to a con­sideration of the whole title, higher powers. By higher powers Expositors understand Magistrates of every degree, or rank, and not onely the supream. So that they understand higher, not to refer by way of contra-distinction to lower powers, but to the peo­ple, to them that are to be subject to them. So Calvin, Beza, Marlorat, Pareus, P. Martyr, Methusius, Dr. Mayer, and Par upon the place. And Chamier (Panstrat. Tom. 3. li. 15. cap. 11. sect. 8.) And in­deed the description of the Magistrate with all the Reasons given in the following words (unto vers. 8.) for subjection to him do as truly, and necessarily ap­pertain to the inferiour and subordinate Magistrate, as to the highest. And the parallel precepts of duty to the power: in other like Scriptures do involve all Magistrates, and some of them nominate the subor­dinate, [as 1 Tim. 2.2. Tit. 3.1. 1 Pet. 2.13, 14.] Now in the subordinate Magistrate we require a commission as a qualification to our receiving, own­ing, yeelding him any duty of subjection. Other­wise [Page 263] we reject him,CHAP. VIII. SECT. IV. if we understand he hath no au­thority from a superior power. If one come to us of his owne accord meerly, and do but take upon him the style, place, and office of a Constable, Justice of the Peace, Sheriffe, Judge, and command our persons, demand our purses, or exact our oaths, we thinke (and that rightly) we may deny him. And if he have strength to extort his demands, yet either we obey him not, or we comply only out of feare, and pru­dential self-consultation, not taking our selves to owe him any subjection, not owning any bond of conscience to him, as to a higher power ordained of God. And why is this? by reason he hath no law­full calling, warrant, or commission. Now if we require this qualification in the subordinate, why not in the Supream Magist a [...]e also? If the Text admit of this caution, and restriction in reference to one sort of higher powers, will it not also admit it in relation to every one?

SECT. IV. Of the Resistance of the power concluded under the penalty of Damnation, vers. 2.

4 THe fourth thing in the Context, offering it selfe to consideration is in Vers. 2. to wit, the unlawfulnesse of resisting that power, which our Text holds forth. This unlawfulnesse is asserted in as much as the resister of that power is charged with the sin of resisting the ordinance of God, and con­cluded under the penalty of Damnation. Mine obser­vation upon it shall be this.

That resistance which undoubtedly is by this place intended, to be disallowed towards the power spo­ken of in our Text, is generally acknowledged to be warrantable, and lawfull to be used towards an in­vasive, or meer possessory power, and consequently it must be as generally acknowledged that a meer pos­sessory power cannot be intended in the text. A resist­ance unto, or for the deposition, repulsing, or removal out of place and rule, and a rescue of persons, and places out of the possession and command of him that occupieth them, will (I doubt not) be concluded to be here forbidden towards, or in relation to that power which the text meaneth. But such resistance is generally admitted to be just and lawful towards an invesor, or a forcible occupant of command and rule. This may be made evident

1. By sufficient testimony, which I shall pro­duce.

I will begin with King James, K. James his Remonst. p. 216. his words in his Remonstrance for the Right of Kings against the Oration of Cardinal Perron. The publique Laws make it lawfull, and free for any private person to enterprise against an usurper of the Kingdome. Every man, saith Tertullian, is a Souldier enrolled to beare Arms against all Traytors, and publique enemies. St. Augustine Aug. de Civ. Dei. li. 5. cap. 26. high­ly commendeth the piety, and fidelity of Theodosius, in that he took into his protection young Valentinian, the brother,Sozomen. Hist. lib. 7. cap. 14. & 24. heire, and successor of Gratian, slain by Maximus the usurper (the Governour of Britain.) against whom Theodosius, though the said usurper was grown terrible by successe, yet, he undertook the cause of Valentinian, Socrates Hist. li 5. cap. 11, 12.24. and destroying Maximus, restored Valentinian to his Empire (in the West:) and in his enterprise he had encouragement, and cer­tain promise of victory from one John an Anachoret endued with a prophetick spirit in Aegypt. And that Valentinian being shortly after, ei [...]her by treachery, or some other accident taken away, another usurper Eugenius, starting up in his place, Theodosius Ruffin. Hist. li. 2. cap. 17. & 31. Theod. Hist. li. 5. cap. 14 & 24. (with the encouragement of the said Prophet) surprised him, against whose [...]xceeding strong Army he fou [...]ht [Page 265] rather by prayers, then strokes. A mighty winde snatching the weapons of his enemies out of their hands, and driving their own darts together with the darts of their Assailants upon them: on which occasion was that written by the Poet Claudian. O nimium dilecte Deo, cui militat aether, Et conjurati ve­niunt ad classica venti.

Chamier At Cives omnes jus ha­bent insurgendi contra Tyrannos qui vi apertâ regna occupant. Cha­mier Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 12. sect. 19. saith, All Citizens, or free Sub­jects have a right, or warrant to rise up a­gainst Tyrants, who by open force possess the Kingdome.

Dr. Willet Dr. Willet his Hexap. on Rom. pag. 592. upon the place, in answer to this question, How far the Civill State may p [...]oceed in resisting a Tyrant? affirmeth, that where the Kingdome is usurped without any right, as by Athaliah; or where the land is oppressed by forein invaders, as in the time of the Maccabees, in these cases there is lesse question to be made of resistance by the generall consent of the States.

Mr. Richard Hooker.Hooker Eccles. polit. Book. 8. pag. 155. In kingdomes he­reditary birth giveth right unto Soveraign Dominion, &c. therefore in case it doth hap­pen that without right of blood a man in such wise be possessed, all these new elections, and investings are utterly voyd: they make him no indefeasible estate: the Inheritor by blood may dispossesse him as an usurper.

Alstedius.Alsted. Caf. Consc. cap. 16. Reg 8. pag. 341. A Tyrant without title, who is an invader, every private person may, and ought to remove; for he is not a King, but a private man, who doth invade the countrey as an Enemie.

Gro [...]ius.Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 16.18. Si bello injusto, & cui juris gentium re­quisita non adsint, imperium artipuerit (sc. Raptor im­perit) neque pactio ulla sequuta sit, aut fides illi data, sed solâ vi retineatur possessio, vide [...]ur manere belli jus, ac proinde in eum licere quod in hostem licet, qui a qua­libet etiam privato jure potest interfici, &c. Nec minus licebit invaso em imperii interficere si deserta authori­tas accedat ejus qui jus verum imperandi habet.

Arnisaeus.Arnisaeus de authorit princi­pis. cap. 4. sect. 12, Of the former (to wit, he who is called a Tyrant in title) the matter is plaine, and determi­ned by all without any difficulty, that he may be law­fully repulsed, or if by force he be gotten into the throne, he may be wa [...]rantably thence removed, because he hath not any [...]o [...] of power which is legitimate, and unto which resistance is forbidden, for the feare of God, and for con­science sake: and therefore he is no further to be looked at then as an enemy.

The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy. Treatis of Mon. part 1. cap. 3. sect. 5. Be they (to wit, a conquered people) captived, or possessed at pleasure, they owe no duty, neither do they sin in not obeying, nor do they resist Gods Ordinance, if at any time of advantage they use force to free themselves from such a violent possession.

Mr. BridgeMr. Bridge a­gainst Dr. Fern sect. 4. pag. 42. his Answer to Doctor Ferne. Which o­pinion of the Doctors (of the right of conquest) for my owne part I must abhor from; what danger will it not expose our Dread Soveraign unto? Did not Athali­ah remain as a Conqueresse six yeares? and who knows not that she was lawfully thrust from the Throne againe by a stronger hand then her owne? meer conquest being no­thing else but an unjust usurpation; and if the Conque­rour rule the whole Kingdome, and keep them under by conquest onely, why may not the Subject rise, and take up arms to deliver themselves from that slavery? Thus doth the Doctor open the doore to greater resistance then those that he disputes against.

Roger Widdrington, Widdrington Theol. Disput. in Admon. to his Reader, sect. 6. in his defence of the supremacy of Princes against the Popes claim of a superiority in temporalls over them, thus argueth (against Schulke­nius, who will needs maintain Athaliah to have been a lawfull Queen, notwithstanding Joas his sur­vivall, and claim to the Crown) Tell me O Schul­kenius, may not every faithfull Subject lawfully, and ought he not in the like case, that is, not by his own pri­vate authority, but by the publique authority of the true King, and who is certainly known to be true King, the Common-wealth also consenting thereunto, kill an Ʋsur­per, [Page 267] who is not onely reputed, but also certainly known to be such a one, and who plotteth Treason against the true King?

Lastly, I observe to this purpose, that the Author, or Authors of Ladensium [...], in the Catalogue of Canterburian maximes of tyranny, do charge this position unto that Party as one tyrannical maxime. That all this, (to wit, absolute) subjection must be used not onely to our Native King, but to any fo­rein usurper who can get footing among us, and it were the Kings of Spain. As also, that the title unto this Kingdome by conquest, attributed by Doctor Ferne unto our late Kings,See vindic. of a Treat. of Mon. chap. 3. sect. 6. is disavowed by the Authors de­fending the Parliaments cause against him, as unrea­sonable, and null, and that which exposeth Princes to the offensive Armes of the Subject.

2 They that state, and determine the question, what is a just ground, or cause of War, lay downe the quarrell, de rebus repetendis, or for the recovery of what is injuriously invaded, or occupyed, as one good, justifiable, and necessary occasion of the ta­king up of armes by a Prince, or people [for this see Augustine Quaest. super Josue lib. 6. cap. 10. in Tom. 4. part. 2. operum. P. Martyr. loc. com. clas. 4. cap. 16. sect. 2. pag. 935. Bucani Theolog. loc. 49. quaest. 46. pag. 873. Grotium de jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 1. sect. 2] But if title followed possession, and all they were the true Proprietors, or Lords, or the powers or­dained of God that have the occupation, or actuall command of persons, and places, it could not be so: there could be no war just for recovery: to dispossess men of what they hold, or to out them of what they are (without present, or actuall superiority of any over them in it) seised on, could be no lawfull enterprize, or warrantable cause of War.

3 Neither is it onely the common Tenent of sound, and learned Writers that the injuri­ous invader and possessor may be resisted unto deposition, and that recuperative arms are just, and lawfull, but we have many instances of the practice hereof in Scripture, not onely of undoubted war­rantablenesse [Page 268] to the persons so acting in the story; but of a cleer exemplarinesse, and imitablenesse to others; as having no other ground, or rise laid for them in the Text, but that which is of a com­mon morall extention. The mention of these may serve.

Upon the warlike conquest, captivity, and spoile of Sodome, Geneses 14. and Gomorrah, by the King of Elam, and his partakers, and their departure, and carrying a­way of what they had there gotten, Abraham toge­ther with his confederates, Aner, Eshcol, and Mamre make out with their Forces in pursuit of their Con­querors, and coming upon, they smite, and chase them, and rescue the people, and goods of Sodome, and Gomorrah, which they had so taken, conveyed away, and held in custody.

The people of Israel during the government of the Judges, did many times under their conduct rise up in armes to cast off, and deliver themselves, and their Countrey from the power of several neigh­bouring Princes, and Nations, who had one after another invaded, and for some time held them under their DominionOf whom in general see Jud. 2.16, 17. & in particular through the rest of that book.. Neither (as far as my observation goes) can any immediate, or ex­traordinary command or word for what they so did be pretended to, or pleaded from the Text for many of them, or for any, save Barak, and Gideon. The same did they in the times, and under the com­mands of Eli, Samuel, Saul, David, and many of their following Kings, from to time untill the Ba­bylonish captivity. And in particular did Hezekiah against the King of Assyria. The Text saith, he rebelled against the King of Assyria, and served him notSee 2 Kings 18.7.. As also did some of the Kings of Judah in re­sistance of the Kings of Israel, as Abijah and Asa 2 Kings ch. 11.2 Chr. ch. 23: the latter of which was reproved by God for the meanes he used (the Syrian Auxiliaries) but not for his standing up against Baasha. Yea, the same did David and Jehoiadah the Priest, with some of Judah combining with them, the one against Absa­lom, the other against Athaliah, the wrongfull pos­sessors [Page 269] of the Crown, and Kingdome of Israel, CHAP. VIII. SECT. V. and of Judah. And thus also did the Jewes under the Asm [...]nean government, against many of the Seleucian KingsSee the Books of the Macca­bees..

SECT. V. The opposition, and distance which the Text puts betwixt him that is the po­wer, and him that is the resister of the power.

5 ANother thing to be observed in the words neighbouring, and coherent to the Text, is the difference, and contra-distinction which this Scripture makes betwixt him that is the power that is, [...], ordained of God, and the [...], the resister of the power, which is such as he that is the one cannot, at the same time, and in re­spect of the same place be the other. The Apostle puts them at so wide a distance, and direct oppositi­on one to another, that it is not possible that they should meet in one person. In relation to one and the same seate, or station of Magistracy, he that is the power ordained of God, cannot be he that resisteth the power, and resisteth the ordinance of God, and he that is this Resister, cannot be that power. If then it will be found, and made good that the meer posses­sor, that comes into the Throne by dispossessing the lawful power, (that still layeth title to the Throne) is this resister of the power, it will thence follow, and be evident he cannot be that power.

That the person in possession resisteth the other that is outed, and still claimeth possession (in respect of his injoyment of the throne) is undenyable. How [Page 270] then can he be denyed to be the resister of the pow­er? the defenders of a meer possessory title will tell us, he that is in place by invasion, or insurrection a­gainst a precedent lawful power, was [...], the resister of the power when he first attempted, and perhaps while he was carrying on his design by some of the first, or lower steps of it; but when he hath brought it to a head, or having come up to the last, or highest step that is, the finishing of it, by out­ing the person he assaulted, and seating himselfe in the place, he is now no longer the resister of the power, but is become that which in his way to that achievement he resisted, to wit, the power him­self.

But this must needs seem strange, that when the Apostle saith plainly, the resisting of the power bringeth damnation to the Author, such an Exposi­tion should be put upon the place as telleth us, that resistance purchaseth to the Author the dominion of that power whom he resisteth: and that he that resi­steth the power in a lower, or lesser degree, doth in so doing fall under the sin, and guilt in those words described; but he that doth it in a higher, and fuller measure is in that act clear from that charge, and stands wholly excused: that the fieri of that act of deposing a lawfull power should be so bad, and pu­nishable, and the finiri, or factum esse, should be so excellent, honourable, and rewardable: that the suc­cesse, and completion of an evill deed should have such a vertue in it as both to release it, and its author of its delinquency (though the deed be not only con­tinued, but heightned) and to turn the scene, or case of the agent, and patient upside down, so as that the resister, and the resisted shall change their places, and morall denominations in the Text: He that was under that brand of resisting the power, and the ordinance of God, and under the doom of dam­nation for it, shall thereby become the power, the ordinance of God; and he that was the resisted power, and ordinance of God, shall now (if he sit not still in his dethronement, but endeavour to repossesse his [Page 271] dignity) incurre the impeachment of resisting the power, and demeriting damnation. And this were a hard censure to be passed upon all ejected Princes, or Potentates that have sought or may seek to recover their Dominions, among whom David, Joash, and Ezekiah have been. But the exposition which makes the strange transversion would be a lit­tle looked into before it be received.

1. Two things must be made very clear ere it can be current.

1. That the supposed resisted power doth by the prevalency of that resistance, and his dispossession thereby cease to be the power.

2. That he that was the resister, by his prosper­ing therein unto the occupation of the place of rule, doth thereby cease to be the resister. The former I have above d [...]provedCap. 7. sect. 2. subsect. 5. & 8. & in the close of the 10., and shall therefore here omit the repetition of its refutation; the rather, be­cause were it not, or could it not be refuted, yet the latter would not hold, and consequently my argument would be good neverthelesse.

For, suppose actual disseisin to put an end to the power that was; or, that a person, or Senate over-powered, and dispossessed, ceaseth to be the power which the Text speaks for, yet the over-powering and disseising party would not therefore cease to be the resister by the Text condemned.

If a man by violence, fraud, or other dishonest meanes get into his hands another mans goods, or estate, though the suffering party dye, yet the inju­stice, and oppression of that injurious person (he keeping still those wrongful acquisitions) ceaseth not. He is still an oppressor in reference to that per­son, and the act committed against him though he be now dead. The reason is, though the wronged per­son, and so the property that was in him to those possessions, (as all accidents inherent in him as a man) be extinct, yet the Law, or rule which for­bad, and condemned that act is still alive, or in force: besides, though the party injured, and so his [Page 272] right to the things unjustly taken from him, be dead, yet it is to be supposed the property, or disposall of them is passed to some other, either by vertue of rela­tion to him, or escheature, and so the oppressors holding of them is a continued, or still renewed act of injustice. Thus it is with him that resisteth the power unto the ejection of him, and enthroning of himself; say the power outed by him were thereby extinguished, yet the act by which he did it still cleaves to him; and while he standeth in that posture, his resistance of the power ordained of God is con­tinuated, and remains upon him: and the reason is, both because the ordinance of God which established that power, and commanded subjection, and prohi­bited resistance to it is still in being; and because that ordinance of God must be supposed to have or­dained a way how a succession of M [...]stracy shall be continued (and by vertue of the same there is ordi­narily either a lawfull Successor assigned, or a course taken for the electing, and substituting one) in opposition unto which (suppose the divesture of the dispossessed power) the intrusive possessor can­not but be confessed to enter, and sit, and so still is in one, or both those respects a resister of the ordi­nance of God.

2. Take an act that is in specie, or kind, one and the same, but may be varyed in regard of degrees; that moral evill, or goodnesse which is attributible to the action in specie may be said of every degree of that act; and especially it cannot be that the lesse, or inferiour degree of such an action should be deno­minated good, or evill, and not the greater, or the full, and compleat act be so denominated. As in this matter, If a lower, or more imperfect degree of withstanding, or opposing the power, or just Magi­gistrate be evill, and be the resistance that is disal­lowed, and condemned in this Text, then the high­er, the perfecting act of that nature must be so also. If for a man to refuse obedience, or to make head against the present lawfull Magistrate, and to draw [Page 273] in others therein to take part with him, and if to check, impeach, interrupt, and somewhat to dimi­nish the authority of that M [...]gistrate, and if to threa­ten, or attempt to rem [...]ve quite out of, and to take his place be a transgression, and a resistance of the ordinance of God here spoken of (as do all agree) then to go on further, and higher in the same kinde, for the [...]aid resister to checkmate that Magistrate, or to add that consummating act, or ex cution of that attempt, by wresting, and holding the whole com­mand from him into his own hand, must needs be as well, or much more the breach and contradiction of the ordinance of God. Can any man say that this rule in the Text, or any commandement of God in any other matter disallows, and condemns the con­sulting, beginning, and carrying on of an underta­king, course, or action, and not the accomplishment, and finishing, or not the continua [...]ion, and uphold­ing of the work when finished, or the persistency in it, when atchieved. The truth is, the resister of the pow­er is never more, nor so much the [...] as when he is possessed of the place; then is he com­pletely counter-ordered, or contra-ordained to the ordinance of God, when he is got into the Throne, and disorderly placed in the Supream command, guarding himselfe with his Military bands against the Title, and entry of him he hath dispossessed.

What is the ratio formalis of this resistance, or the [...], for which the withstander of the power is stiled [...], is it not his taking and holding the reigns, and rule of a civill S [...]a [...]e, a­gainst, and in contradiction to the Law of God? and this is plainly it which the excluder of the law­full Magistrate doth. In that there is a double con­travention to the Law of God; one against that▪ law which forbiddeth every one to rise up against the power ordained of God: Another against that law which commandeth retractation, and restitution of whatsoever wrong hath been committed. The vi­olent occupant, as he should not have seised on the [Page 274] Throne,CHAP. VIII. SECT. VI. so, being in meerly by intrusion, he is bound to surrendry, and redintegration of his injury.

3 It is the observation of Cajetan, and from him of Mr. Elnathan Par upon the words, That in this vers. the word resisteth is three times used; but in the Greek, only the first is in the present, the two last in the time past. As if you should render it: He that re­sisteth the power hath resisted the ordinance of God; and he that hath resisted shall receive damnation.

By which it may be evident that any transient, and by-past act of resistance may terme the person in prae­senti, the resister: and much more is he the resister, who not onely in times past acted a resistance, but stands up still in the same posture.

SECT. VI. Of the worke of the power, described Vers. 3. & 4.

THe next thing I take notice of in this discourse of the Apostle, is the character, or descrip­tion of that power which he intends in the Text, by which he defineth what he is in himselfe, and distin­guisheth him from all others. This description is taken from his proper work, or the peculiar duty of his place, and office. This we have delivered, Vers. 3.4. Rulers are not a terrour to good works, but unto the evill. Doe that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same. He is the Minister of God to thee for good; but if thou doe evill, be afraid, for he hol­deth not the sword in vaine: For he is the Minister of God, and revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evill.

My Collection from these words is; He that is i [...] [Page 275] place of rule, and command in the Common-wealth without a just Title, call, and investure, and solely from his own power, and will, he cannot be the power meant by the Text. And I infer it thus.

He that is the power intended by the Apostle must be susceptible, or capable of all this whole charact [...]r. He must be capable (I say) for I know Expositors do well note upon it, these words intend to describe, not what the Magist [...]ate is alwayes de facto, but what he is de jure: The Magistrate doth not alway in eve­ry proceeding hold correspondence with this Cha­racter, but not seldome acteth contrarily; yet not­withstanding the Character holdeth true, it deliver­ing, not what the Magistrate still doth, but what he should, and ought to doe, what he is called, ordained, and appointed to, what his work, and office is, and consequently what he is capable of being, and doing. But (I assume) he that ruleth without a just title, call, and investure, a self-created power is not capa­ble of this; he, (while he remaineth such) cannot possibly answer this Character; that his tenure of power, and this description are incompetible: it can never be that one should observe, perform, and exe­cute all that is therein said, and yet be an unlawfully possessing power.

The third verse denyeth him to be a terrour to good works, Vide Paraeum in loc. requireth him to be an author of praise to these, and a terrour to evill works. These termes good works, and evill, take in all civill, or political good, and evill actions; whether they extend to all morall actions, as well religious, as secular (according to the usual application of those words of the same Apo­stle (1 Tim. 2.2.) I will not here debate. But this is certain, they take in all civill, or politicall actions, good or evill.

Now usurpation must needs be acknowledged to be an action both politically, and morally evill, and that in a more then ordinary degree, and in relation to many persons. An act it is of manifold oppressi­on, and injustice, to the wrong of the deposed, and [Page 276] of the Common-wealth in its publique order, right, and freedome. It is commonly enterprised, accom­plished, and upheld by a multiplicity of acts of trea­chery, and violence upon them that are expulsed, or brought under by it, yea, with the slaughter, and blood of many innocent persons, and the ruine of their posterity, and dependants, and with the over­turning of publique lawes, and liberties. And as certain it is that one single person cannot beare up or give subsistence, and strength to this management, or, either perpetrate or maintain all or any of those facts, whosoever occupieth such a power must use a multitude of inst [...]uments, and partakers. Now who can imagin that he that is such an occupant of power, that comes in, and stands by such means, and instru­ments can be a terrour to those many evill works, and flagrant off [...]nces which introduce, or establish his usurpation? or that he can be a terrour, a Minister of God, and a revenger to execute wrath upon the actors of them? But, as he is the chiefe au [...]hor of those evils himself, so he must necessarily (while he stands upon that bottome) be of all other a special abettor, yea, the sauior, patron, and Protector of such deeds, and doers. He that doth evill, in this kinde shall not need to be afraid of him, but may expect praise, promotion, and reward from him.

And on the other hand, whereas it cannot be de­nyed to be a good work orderly to endeavour the pre­vention, redress [...], or giving a stop to those evils, he that should attempt any thing of that nature cannot look to have praise (that is, impunity, defence, and reward) of the same, but must expect him to be to such enterprises the highest terrour. The greatest interest, and therefore the constant course of such a power is in those good, and evill works which touch the continuance, or disposall of the sea [...]e whereon he is, to be directly, and wholly crosse, and contradi­ctory to this Character, and rule of the Apostle. And it is not possible he should in every point con­forme to it, and yet continue still his rule upon the basis of usurpation.

Furthermore, the fourth verse asserteth, and requi­reth the Magistrate to be the Minister of God to thee for good. To thee, that is, to every person, or member in the Common-wealth; For good, that is, for his natural, moral, civil, and spiritual good (saith Parae­us) however, for his civil, or temporal good with­out controversie let it be. But it is imp ssible he that beares the Sword in an usurping hand, should in e­very thing procure the civill good of all, that is, ei­ther of the whole joynt community, or of all single persons in their private state. This good hath with­in it involved the vindication, and restoring of the publique, and of every persons rights, and the satis­fying and rectifying of all wrongs.

Now this, and usurpation are together inconsisti­ble. Moses his rule for the Magistrate is,Deut. 16.20. That which is altogether just shalt thou follow; but this an unjust­ly possessed power cannot doe, and stand. Its owne State will not afford i. Yea, the truth is, the violati­on of Justice, in which the foundation of this power is laid, and the root of it is planted, will, and is or­dinarily seen to beget a cacexia, or ill disposition to justice, and propension to unrighte [...]us administra­tion in all causes, and proceedings whatsoever; If a common gift hath such an influence as to blinde the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of the righteous, Vers. 19. (as Moses in that place) what respect of persons, and wresting of judg [...]ment will the dishon [...]st interest of a Kingdome breed in all judiciall administrations? Scarce a man shall bring a cau [...]e before the Tribu­nal, but he will appear under the character, either of a friend, or foe to that interest of jealousie, and accor­dingly be looked at with the eye of partiality or pre­judice. What a generall depravement of Just [...]ce is the ordinary sequell of violent acquisition, and pos­session of Dominion, the words of the Prophet Amos will tell us. To have turned judgement into gall, Amos 6.12, 13. and the f [...]uit of righteousn [...]sse into hemlocke.

But who hath done thus? Ye which rejoyce in a thing of naught, which say, have we not taken to us [Page 278] horns by our own strength? The Magistrat [...]s office is to procure that the Subjects may lead a life in all godlinesse and honesly. The Subjects cannot possibly be upon termes mutually honest, either with him, or with the instruments of his supportance, whose very being in power is injurious, and so they are barred out from living in all honesty: And for living in all godlinesse, both Scripture, and common experience gives that defection of Religion, is the individuall consequent of defection in civill Government: Usur­pation in State, and corruption in Religion are like a couple of Twins, you can seldome, or never take the former without the latter. Let the kingdom of Israel, or of the ten Tribes rent from the house, and Throne of David for all the while of its stand­ing, and the reign of every King thereof be the in­stance for this. Of whom (in this behalfe) not only do perusers of the story observe that, as they were wholly, and all along out in their civill policy; they were q [...]ite, and constantly wrong, and depra­ved in their Religion, but the Lord himselfe makes the same observation, giving us this short, but uni­versall account.Hosea 8.4. They have set up Kings, but not by me: they have made princes, and I knew it not. Of their sil­ver, and their gold have they made them Idols, that they may be cut off. Here we have an Epitome of the whole history of that Kingdome.

S [...]ate-usurpation breeds, and brings in Idolatry in Religion: and as this is the genuine product, and issue of that, so are they both con-causes of that peoples ruineThe same observation makes the sa­cred historian, 2 Kin 17 21. And they made Jeroboam the son of Nebat King. And Je­roboam d [...]ove Israel from fol­l wing the Lord, &c..

Let me but add one word more of the incongrua­bility of this Character to an un-authorized power. The power in this Text is appointed to be the Mi­nister of God to thee for good. Now see how the con­trary is to be said of the Usurper. He is appointed of God to thee for evill. The Scripture holding [...]orth usurpation, or violent, inforced dominion as a judg­ment, [2 Kings 17.20, 11.] and threa [...]ning it as the punishment of a Nation for their transgressions [Page 279] against God,CHAP. VIII. SECT. VII. and ranking it with the penalties of plague, famine, sword, wilde beasts, &c.

As on the other side, the removing of usurpation is promised as a mercy, Isa. 10 27.14.25. And the taking away of Magistracy is threatned as a judgement, Isa. 1.1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Zech. 11.6. Deut. 28.43, 44, 48. Psal. 106.41, 42. Now the giving, sending of a thing to be for the good, advantage, be­nefit of a people, and to be for their harm, punish­ment, and suffering: and the removall of a thing to be promised as a mercy, and to be threatned as a judgement (and these, per se, naturally, primarily, and directly so meant, and not per accidens) both these are such opposites as cannot be praedicates of the same thing. Thus much I have observed from the Texts description of the Magistrates work, and duty.

SECT. VII. Of the Magistrates style, the Minister of God, vers. 4.6.

7 THere is besides another thing to the present purpose observable in this description of the Magistrate, and of his office: to wit, the speciall Title given him, denoting his peculiar relation to, and derivation from God. He is called the Minister of God, and that thrice over (viz. vers. 4, 6.) this style imports, not onely the office, and work of the Magistrate to be a special service, and imployment performed unto God, nor onely it to be instituted, ordered, and imposed to be done in his behalf. But that the authority of managing it is by him [Page 280] invested in the certain person that may intermeddle with it; none can truly assume, or be taken to be in this office, but he that hath received a commission, call, or warrant from God for it. The title [...], not onely signifies action, and labour, but directly, strictly, refers to God as the Author of the persons mission, and deputation to it. We all confesse him onely to be the Minister of a Prince or State unto whom the Prince or State gives a Commis­sion, and not him that of his own accord interpo­seth in the administration of the publique, civill affaires: Now the same dependance that a subordi­nate Minister of State hath upon his Soveraigne for his b [...]coming his Minister, the same hath a sove­raign Magistrate upon God for his being his Mini­ster; It is one thing to call a man Gods instru­ment, his rod, axe, sword, or hammer, another thing to call him Gods Minister. Men may be the former when they get power, and prevalency over others by unlawful meanes, but the latter they are never called that are not lawfully admitted, or authorized to the place, or work.

There is a wide difference (saith Dr. Sclater Dr. Sclater his Serm. on 2 Kin. 9.31. pag. 26.) be­twixt the instruments of Gods providence, and the Mi­nisters of his ordinance; those fulfill his purposes, these also doe his commands. Herod, & Pilate, in the death of our blessed Saviour were unwilling instruments of his providence, no Ministers of his ordinance.

SECT. VIII. CHAP. VII. SECT. VIII. Of the Magistrates bearing the sword, vers. 4.

8 THe last clause, or passage of the context I shall animadvert upon, is that in the same vers. He beareth not the sword in vaine.

1. Who is this He that beareth the sword? The antecedent to which this relative is referred, is, the power, the Ruler. Observe, the Apostle doth not say, he that beareth the Sword, is the power, or Ruler, but he that is the power, or Ruler beareth the Sword. The Sword here, to wit, the power of coer­cive, or punitive justice, ascribed to the Magistrate, is not put as the cause, or constituent of his Magi­stracy, but as a consequent addition, or additament to it. A person hath not this Sword first, and then, or therefore is, or becometh a Magistrate; but he is first a Magistrate, and then, or therefore he hath, or beareth the Sword.

2. This word Sword cannot be put here properly for that material offensive weapon that is made of metall, but (by a Metalepsis) for a faculty of power, whereof that, and other forcible weapons are but in­struments: and not for every faculty of compulsory power neither, for there is the sword of an enemy, the sword of a cut-throat, the sword of a common traveller, but for a faculty of political rule, and au­thoritative judgement; such a sword as imports him that hath it a Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evill.

[Page 282] CHAP. VIII. SECT. VII.3. And of this Sword the civill Magistrate is here asserted to be the hearer. Bearing here cannot intend any whatsoever holding in the hand, or bearing by the side, for a private person; a Sergeant ushering the Magistrate, an Executioner, a Thief may hold a sword in his hand: but it must have a more special and strict sense, and must intend not a corporall, or naturall, but a political act, not a meer manutenancy, or handling of a sword, but a civill tenure of it.

4. And againe, the Magistrate is said to be the bearer, not the founder of the Sword. Gerit gladium, non cudit. He that is a Magistrate indeed, neither makes, nor takes the Sword by the force of his owne arme, but receives, hath it delivered him into his hand, and so weildeth, and useth it.

5. Lastly, he beareth the Sword, not in vaine, [...] by some rendred, without cause, or, in vaine, is by others rendred, rashly. The former interpretation hath reference to the end: in vain, that is, to no end. The latter relates to the principle, and manner of bearing the sword; in vaine, that is, without author, & reason. Neither way doth the Magistrate bear the sword, [...]. For the latter, he bears it not rashly, that is, not without Author, and certain Reason, for he hath not snatched it to him of himselfe, neither hath it happened to him by chance, but it hath been given him into his hands by Gods ordination. So Paraeus upon the place, pag. 103. and Dr. Willet, quest. 11.

CHAP. IX. CHAP. IX. SECT. I. Some other Arguments for the con­clusion insisted on in the former Chapter, taken from other Scrip­tures, and Mediums.

I Have thus gone over the Context, and taken no­tice therein of the generall clauses, or structures in it which adde their light, or strength to clear, or confirme the sense of our Text above concluded on. There is yet another thing promised to be dis­patched, to wit, a super-addition of some other grounds, or Mediums that may further prove the determination aforesaid.

SECT. I. Argueth from the sense of Scriptures, forbidding the Retaliating of wrong.

1 THe first of these may be that which lyes not far from this Text. Let us take notice of the meaning of those prohibitions, Rom. 12.17, 19. Re­compense [Page 284] to no man evil for evill. Dearly beloved, avenge not your selves. The interpretation of these inhibiti­ons (together with those given by Christ, Matth. 5.39, 40, 41.) by the genera [...]l consent of all Orthodox Expositors that I meet with, is, that they doe not simply, or absolutely disallow, or forbid all humane punishment, or vindicative justice to be done by a­ny man; for this is authorized, and commanded by God to be done by certain persons, (as Rom. 13.4.) no, nor every punitive act that may be done by e [...]e in his own case, or behalf, (for that the Magistrate may do:) But that those Scriptures take vindicative justice out of the hands of private persons; who, though they receive, or suffer evill, yet they may not assume the penall sword, or the inflictive vindication of themselves, into their own hands. And to these prohibitions, lest it should seem an over-strait, and harsh confinement of the Christian (as importing a most free exposal of him to all bodily injuries, from all unreasonable men, without any remedy, yea an open invitation of them) the Apostle subjoyneth.

1. An advertisement, what help a Christian hath, what his proper, and allowed remedy is in case of such sufferings. It is to give place unto wrath, viz. to refer the taking punishment unto God, to his judici­all processe, either by his speciall Minister ordained, and set up by him for that work (Cap. 13 4, 6.) or by other meanes he shall please to take (according to that supersedeas of David unto Abishai, 1 Sam. 26.10.)

2. A reason of both the foregoing prohibition of self-revenge, and of the prescrip [...]ion of the awayting the said remedy. For it is written, Vengeance is mine, I will repay it, saith the Lord. This Reason,

1. Asserts the right, and propriety of punitive justice unto God: so that none may meddle with it but himselfe, either by himself, or by them that are expresly war [...]anted, and deputed by him. Vengeance is mine.

[Page 285]2. Engageth his word, or undertaking to per­form it. I will repay, saith the Lord.

If we compare the words of this T [...]xt in this plain sense with what follows after (to wit, Cap 13.4.) For he is the Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath, &c.) We shall finde cau [...]e to distinguish of humane revenge, or that which is done by man, as being one way prohibited, and another way authori­zed: and to say there is,

1. A sinfull, and inhibited. 2. A lawfull, and commanded avengement. The sinfull avenging is private, or that which is a mans revenging of him­self; that is, when a man taketh vengeance, both in his own case, or behalf, and of his own accord, mo­tion, or minde. The lawful, and commanded is that which is taken by him that is the Minister of God to execute it, by vertue of authority derived from God: and the distinction (Let this be observed as that wherein lyes the sinew of the Argument) betwixt these two, is not in the act, or matter done, both may inflict the same kinde, and measure of evill; nor in the having of power, that is, ability, or pre­dominant strength in the hand to do it, for that may be supposed of them both, of the self-avenger, as well as of the other; but in the having of a call, commis­sion, or warrant from God; In regard whereof, in the act of the one, God may be peculiarly said to be the avenger, and repayer, in the other the person may be laid to revenge himself.

If we should understand Gods repaying meerly of his doing it by any providential instrument, this di­stinction betwixt these two were destroyed; for when a private person recompen [...]eth his wrong, it may be said of that way, that God so, that is, providentially repayeth. But if we construe it of, or apply it unto Gods repayment by such an instrument as is by him authorized, commissioned, or warranted to that worke, a revenge, or punishment, by such an one we can clearly call Gods incontradistinction to that which is mans of himselfe. Gods this is, not onely [Page 286] by way of infliction,CHAP. IX. SECT. V. but by his warranty and appro­bation; not mans, or a self-rev [...]nge: for in it, man onely hath the execution, God the appointing; man the acting, God the enacting.

In some cases, indeed, of the publique Magistrates avenging, these two (viz. Gods, and selfs-revenge) may seem to be coincident, to wit, when the Magi­strate punisheth, or judgeth in vindication of his own right; yet even here, in as much as he hath au­thority deputed to him by God, and he is to admi­nister the justice of God to all, and besides him there is none to do it, and the asserting of his right and safety ordinarily no lesse concerneth the pub­lique, and common then his own personal interest, and is of much more importance then that of any o­ther mans, what he doth therein falls not under that self-avengement which there is forbidden, but redu­ceth it selfe to that which is a giving place to the wrath of God, and to his repayment, as contradi­stinct to his own. For, though he here avenge in his own cause, yet, neither doth he it of his own ac­cord, or motion, neither doth he meerly, or formal­ly vindicate himself, neither, if he rightly go about it, doth he therein so much consider, or consult him­self as others.

Now let the clear sense of this prohibition of self-revenge, and the commandement, of giving place to wrath, with the institution of the Magistrate to be a revenger to execute wrath, and the distinction betwixt these two revengings be considered, and the conclusion against the intrusive, unwarranted, meer possessory power will be thence very evident.

SECT. II. CHAP. IX. SECT. II. Argueth from the Prophets comparison of the Jewish State under the preda­tory power of the Chaldean unto that of such Animals as have no Ruler o­ver them.

2 IN the Prophet Habakkuk (Cap. 1.14.) the state of the people of Judah, and of other Na [...]ions under the Chaldean Monarchy is resembled to that of fishes, and creeping things that have no Ruler over them. How were they said to be so, to be without Ruler over them, when the Chaldean actually com­manded, absolutely ruled, and so grievously ensla­ved, and oppressed them? yea, the fishes, and rep­tiles, cannot be said simply to have none ruling over them; for the weaker are overpowered and mastered by the st [...]onger, and fiercer, and by them made, ei­ther to give way, or to become their prey, or food: And in regard of this prevailing of the greater over the smaller by meer force, and impetuosity the con­dition of the Jewes is compared to that of those Brutes. The meaning then is, these creatures have no Ruler over, them by order of nature; and the Jewes had no Ruler [...] the root of that Noune translated, Ru­ler, signifies, jus, authoritatem habuit. Pagninus. Piscator est Nebuchadonozorus, mare orbis uni­versus, pisces sunt homines, rete, sagena, hamus vocàntur copia, vires, artes Chaldaeorum. Nam ut minuti pisces majoribus pro cibo sunt, ita homines infirmi a potentioribus opprimuntu [...]. Drusius in loc. over them, by any right, or any that was properly their Magistrate, or Soveraign, that is, by Divine authority, or ordination set over [Page 288] them;CHAP. IX. SECT. III. but, as it is among the fishes, and creeping things, if any command over other, it is owned by no direction, instinct, or intimation of nature, but wholly impetuous, savage, and by a preternatural encroachment: (understand we this either of those kinds of Animals whom the Text specifies, or inde­finitely of any in respect of Individuals of one spe­cies over-powering those of another; for of some cer­taine kinds, as of Bees, Cranes, and others, it is ob­served there is some image of order, and government among them, to wi [...] [...]ithin, or in relation to those of their own special kinde, and particularly society, or herd:) and so it was with this people, there was none whom they could take as designed, or pointed out by warrant from God to be their Ruler, but meere confused violence tooke place; whoso­ever could, and listed, took the superiority, and bare sway over them. We see then it is one thing for a people to have an arbitrary masterdome, an enthrall­ing tyranny, another to have a true M [...]gistracy, or Principality over them: and that without some ruler of order, and justice, in poynt of constitution of government observed; Cities or Countreys are but as mountains of prey, chases of wilde beast, or pools of silly fish.

SECT. III. Argueth from the nullity of a self-crea­ted power, declared negatively in Christs, positively in Babylons case.

3 OUr Savi [...]ur Christ delivers this as a commonly received, and a true Max [...]me [John 8.51.] [Page 289] If I honour my selfe, my honour is nothing. By which the nullity of a self-created Dignity is against all contradiction asserted. The Jewes (unto whom he spake these words) had objected to him, that the things which he had before declared of himself were but his own presumptions, or arrogations, Whom ma­kest thou thy selfe? unto which he answers; First, by way of concession, if so it were indeed his claims were voyd, and of no forceMonemur his verbis, quicquid gloriae sibi homi­nes a seipsis conciliant frivo­lum esse, ac ni­hili. Calv. in loc.. If I honour my selfe, my honour is nothing.

Secondly, by way of vindication to himselfe of another, a contradistinct, and an indubitable valid title to his dignity, It is my Father that honoureth me. Here then is a two-fold rise of honour distinguished of; the one real, & current, the other supposititious, and null; the one renounced, the other owned by Christ, viz. selfe-honour, and honour which is from God. As the honour which is from ones selfe, is thus in whomsoever disallowed by Christ as frustrate, and nothing, so it is the brand of Babylon, and charged upon her as one of her master-vices, that she glorified her selfe, [Rev. 18 7.] If by Babylon we understand the City of Rome (as not onely our Protestant Ex­positors generally, but Ribera, and other Popish Commentators, yea, and some of the Fathers, as Ter­tullian, and Augustine apply it) that brand doth fitly and notably expresse the usurped power, both Eccle­siasticall, and Civill, which that City, as the sea [...]e, and metropolis of the Pope, and the Pope in it doth claim, and in great measure exercise over all the Do­minions of Christendome, as it is contradistinguisht from, and privative of the power of the respective civill Lords of those Dominions whose right they are: who are therefore said, in discrimination from her, to receive their kingdome, and power, Rev. 17.12.

CHAP. IX. SECT. IV. SECT. IV. Argueth from sundry absurdities follow­ing upon the attributing of a meere possessory power unto God as his ordi­nance.

4 IT is a generally received, and most certain prin­ciple, All dominion, rule, and power of com­mand over any creature, or any of mankind is abso­lutely, and originally in God alone; in the crea­ture onely derivatively, and by communication from him. Whosoever then may claim to himselfe, or be said, and taken by others to be in place of rule, or government over other men (in what society soever) must have and be able to shew a delegation, or substi­tution from God for it.

Now for this it being clearly repugnant, both to the nature of authority, and to divine proceeding a­bout it, to say that God hath ordained it (whether it be that of a Father, or of a Husband, or of a Ma­gistrate, or civill Lord) to be in every man; but contrariwise all must confesse he hath to some appro­priated, to others prohibited it, having commanded these the contradistinct duty of subjection; such a delegation must needs be required as doth fixe such a sort of authority in such a particular man, in relati­on to such a society, or such persons, who are there­upon to yeeld their obedience, by vertue of a divine obligation to him.

But to say God hath appointed any kind of autho­rity, and particularly that of civill Magistracy, to be the certaine, and inseparable result of possession, or to be his that can prevaile, and doth possesse him­selfe [Page 291] (by w [...]at meanes soever) of a supe [...]iour com­maad over people is,

1. To bring a people to a losse, and to put an in­determinateness and disobligation upon them unto any M [...]g [...]stracy whomsoever, when the Throne comes to be de facto unpossessed, whether it be by the death, or absence of the Prince or otherwise, and to impose on them in those cases a continuall uncertainty, and dissettlement of Government, and that as by divine ordination.

2. To give an equall warrant (in case of such va­cancy) to all men to step up to, or stickle for the Throne, and to leave it to be attempted, aspired to, and scuffled for by whosoever pleaseth.

3. To cassate, disannul, and make vaine all those preobligatious, cautions, restrictions, and rules which God himself hath at any time delivered before-hand for the determining, or directing of peoples proceed­ings about the erecting of Magistracy, as he hath gi­ven sundry to Israel, sometimes prescribing them the particular stock they shall fixe uponDeut. 17.15.; and sometimes sending them to the use of Lots1 Sam. 10.18., and sometimes to a certain race, or lineage1 Chron. 28.4, 5. 2 Chron. 23.3., to finde ou [...], and receive thence the determination of their Magistracy.

4. To cancell, make impertinent, and trust ane­ous all other titles, or meanes of any mens coming into authority, and all consultations, provisions, con­stitutions or oaths of Senators, or people that look any other way, or digresse from this path of actual possession, or prevalidity.

Why should Moses have been so solicitous about his successor in the Government of Israel,Numb. 27.15, &c. and so ear­nest with God for the nomination of him before his death, if G [...]d h [...]d ordained (and then no doubt Mo­ses would have known and should have acquiesced in it) that occupation, or possession must determine it. His own experience of the aspirings of Korah, and the rest during his life, would tell him there was like­ly to be no want of a successor after his death, if it might be carryed by usu [...]pation. In like manner, to [Page 292] what purpose did Israel after the death of Joshua aske of God who should be their Leader? Or, did David enquire of God what he should do in relation to his obtaining the K ngdome of Israel before pro­mised him when Saul was dead?Judg. 1.1. 2 Sam. 2.1. he might have known if this had been a received principle, that he had no more to do but gird on his armour, lead on his men, and take possession.

If God hath ordained that possession shall be the basis or bottom of civill power, to what purpose is a­ny State-constitution, law, or decree for the conti­nuation or succession of government? according to this position upon any vacancy, or voidance of the Throne, no person can by such constitution have a­ny right to succeed, neither can any violent intruder be by it illegitimated.

Though a person upon such vacancy come in, and the people receive him as their Magistrate by vertue of an antecedaneous civill constitution, or an oath of allegiance, yet upon that supposal the entry upon this ground, or title is but a Chimaera, a meere con­ceit, or airy phantasme, for it is not in t [...]u [...]h that ti­tle, but his possession which derives, and confers Ma­gistracy upon him. And on the other hand, though a person be destitute of, or come in directly in op­position to, and violation, and eversion of such pre­obligations, yet if he any way get possession, he is a Magistrate true, and good enough; and if a person have all the lawes, conventions, and pactions by man devisable for him, yet if he lack, or loose possessi [...]n, he is no body, all is null. Yea,

5. This is to conclude all such constitutions, and obligations unlawful, and sinful in the making; for to what intent are they made? the very end of their enacting is to circumscribe and sence in the Throne, and to limit the way to it, to pre-dispose the property of it; and to exclude, and prevent, to illegitim [...]te, and condemn the entry of any whomsoever to it in any o her way, or upon other account then that which is prescribed, and limited in the constitution; and [Page 293] therefore to disallow, and bar out one if not the onely way, and title to it which God (if this position say true) hath authorized, to wit, meere prevalency, or intrusive acquisition, and possession.

6 To expose the Common-wealth as a common booty, and prize to all aspiring spirits, and to give an invitation (making God the author of it) to every ambitious, discontented, or disloyal party continually to be hatching, and attempting by power, or policy to undermine, or beare down the present Govern­ment, and to advance a new: by which meanes the civill power shall be alway tottering, as in an Earth­quake; the peoples minds incessantly possessed with expectations of change; and the publique State (to­gether with every mans private) stand in perpetual jeopardy of falling under all violence, spoyle, and confusion. The invitation is, he needs no more to make him the Soveraign Lord, and to lay a tye of subjection upon the consciences of the community unto him, as unto the power ordained of God, but to get into possession, or actuall command of the terri­tory: Unto which the next, and easiest way being the concurrence of the common people, or a strong­er, or more successful party of them, any man that is of a wo [...]king, crafty head, and of a high resolution may at any time be within the possibility, and by ca­sting for it, not seldome have the opportunity of put­ting to a shrewd hazard the effecting thereof: as the example of Absalom, and Sheba in the reign of Da­vid, and of Jeroboam upon the death of Solomon do witnesse.

7. To say that there can be no unjust possessor, no unlawful, or disorderly occupant of rule in the Common-wealth, no such thing as we call usurpa­tion, meaning by it a culpable, or injurious tenure of the place of civill dominion. For he that hath a warrant, ordination, or deputation from God for the place, must needs be rightly in, and authoriz [...]d for it; and if this deputation infallibly come with, and by, and be the result of possession, then he that is in, must needs be rightly in.

CHAP. IX. SECT. V.Upon this account no man can be wrong, or out of his calling (in respect to government) that can get into command, quocunque modo: neither is there any possibility of [...] in this businesse: neither in this matter can any man justly be blamed in the words of Moses to Korah, and his company, Yee take too much upon you. Seeing, let a man take all he can upon him that he can graspe into his hands, he is commissioned by this that he doth take it upon him: neither did Moses do well to charge the said company as those that were gathered together against the Lord, or to defer the determination of the question of usurpation, which they charged upon Aaron, and him, and these again retorted upon them, unto Gods former choice, and consecration of him, or them, or to Gods manifestation of his minde, then to be made at the door of the Tabernacle of the con­gregation; for he should have pleaded, or decided it by possession, at least, so far as the question concern'd Politicall rule.

SECT. V. Argueth from that State-maxime, Po­litical power is originally in the peo­ple, and in the Magistrate, only deri­vatively from them.

5 THat principle, that civill power is originally in the people, or community, and from them passeth to the supream Magistrate (if it may stand) quite overthroweth the possessory title. I shall not undertake to make it good, I had rather say, power [Page 295] is originally in God,CHAP. IX. SECT. VI. and from him passeth by means of the peoples consent to the Magistrate. But this I shall say for it, it hath gone of late for a chief Max­ime in Politicks, and hath been laid downe as the principle to beare up, and justifie the high proceed­ings that have been, and to induce the owning of them; it hath received the stamp of publique avouch­ment, and not onely hath it obtained the said late authority, but it hath had before these times the ap­proval of some of our learnedst men (as Mr. Richard Hooker, Mr. Hooker polit. Book 8. p. 150. & Mr. Banes. Mr. Banes, his Diocesans Tryal. pag 83.) That this principle quasheth the title of the meer possessor is very evident. A meet possessor is one that is in the place of power without any call, consen [...], or constitution of the people, or that is one that is in it only by his owne act. If then the power be originally in the people, and in the Ma­gistrate onely derivatively from them, the meere possessor (whose very being, definition, or ratio for­malis is, that he rules without the peoples consent) is utterly destitute of it.

SECT. VI. Argueth from the Rise, or nature of ci­vill government.

6 THere is nothing more directly opposite, or ab­horrent to the nature of government then this pretension. For, what is government, but the sub­jecting, or resigning up of the community, and of every part therein, whatsoever their ability, or natu­rall power is, to the arbitration, or rule of one, or a few c [...]rtain persons, for peace, and orders sake, and for prevention of those dangers, vexations, and vio­lences, which single persons, private societies, and [Page 296] small parties are continually exposed to, and have no strength to repell, nor authority to over-awe, or reform the authors of them? And for what end is government ordained by God, and set up and upheld by men, but that the stronger may not domineer at pleasure over the weaker? and what is Anarchy, or sedition (the direct contrary to government) but the rising up, and the playing the Rex of a head-strong party of their own minde, and accord, without, or against authority.

It is generally supposed that the mischief of rapine and sedition, or the dominion of the strong hand, was the inducement, and occasion that first led, and as man-kind hath multiplyed, and spread further over the earth, still hath prompted the people of the world to come out of that community, and equality which in the simplicity, and inoffensivenesse of infant-times, and while societies have been but few, and small, they for a time lived in, and to agree upon a distinction of property, and a course of order, and of the politicall superiority, and dominion of some over the rest. And now to lay this principle, that the pre­vailer ought to be, or is the civill power, is to pro­strate that order so erected, to reduce the world to that supposed original parity, and masterlesnesse, and to introduce, or give opportunity to alll those con­fusions, and harms which Government was set up to fence out, to curb, and to suppresse.

SECT. VII. CHAP. IX. SECT. VII. Argueth from the received Distinction betwixt a Soveraigns publique, or le­gall, and his personall, or private capacity.

7 BOth Lawyers, and Divines have found it ne­cessary, in regard of many cases of law, and conscience occurrent to them respectively, to distin­guish of a double capacity of him that is a Magistrate, viz. 1. His legall, civill, politick.

2. His private, personall, and humane capacity. And this distinction is grounded upon that of power before given (in Chap. 1.) to wit, that there is,

1. A naturall, or physical. 2. A moral power. The difference betwixt those two capacities they have assigned to be, that his personall private capacity in it, all that he is, and doth, or may, and can do either naturally, or ethically, that is, by vertue of any na­turall, or morall power distinct from the Civill, or Magistratical. His politick capacity is conferred on him, and exercised by the Law; it is still inclusive of the Law, both as it is originall, and instrument of working; and it signifies onely that which he is, doth, and may doe legally, or by the Lawes of the Land. The necessi [...]y, and use of this distinction is to state the rise, and extent of the Magistrates au­thority, and both the ground, or reason, and the measure, or latitude of the Subj cts obligation un­to the power.

This distinction hath been much used by them that have defended the late Parliaments cause. See it [Page 298] in the fuller answer to Dr. Ferne, pag. 9. 16. And the answer to Dr. Fern's Reply, pag. 36. The vindication of the Treatise of Monarchy, pag. 27. The Answer to Doubts, and Queries upon the Oath, and Covenant, pag. 6. Mr. Burroughs upon Hos. cap. 1. Lect. 4. pag. 111. Yet had it not its effiction from them, but was unto the very same sense delivered by our Divines be­fore; as Bishop Bilson, in his true difference of Christian subjection, &c pag. 520. Dr. Willer Hexap. [...] Rom. cap. 3. quest. 17. pag. 593.

Yea, the substance of this distinction hath been owned by both the Parliaments, and the Royal par­ty. Yea, both by Prince, and People; hence these generally received maximes. The King hath no power in him, but what is invested in him by Law. The Law is the measure, and bottome of the Kings power. He can claim nothing but what the Law gives him. He is our Li [...]ge, (that is, legall) Lord, we his liege, (or, le­gall) Subjects. Whatsoever power is exercised, and is not setled by Law, it is not authoritative. See the Kings Declaration from New-Market, March 9. 1641. Judge JenkinsJudge Jenkins saith, The Kings prerogative, and the Subjects li­berty are determined, and bounded, and measured by the written Law what they are. We doe not hold the King to have any more power, neither doth his Majestie claime any other but what the Law gives him. his vindication, pag 19. Treatise of Mo­narchy, pars 3. cap. 1. and sect. 2. pag 31, 32. and the vindication of that Treatise pag 58, 61.

This distinction, and the import of it (if it may passe for good, as it is no lesse cleare bo [...]h in [...]eason, and Religion then generally acknowledged) doth quit, and clean di [...]claim, and shut out this potation, and title of the possessory power, and that so plainly, as it is supe [...]fluous fu [...]ther to forme, or draw out the argument. For how can you distinguish of these two capacities in a meer possessor? where is his le­gall, civill, politick capacity (to wit, that which is conferred on, or exe [...]cised by him by the Lawes) [Page 299] distinct from his naturall, private,CHAP. IX. SECT. VIII. and personall ca­pacity? and consequently, where is any ground, or rise of the peoples obligation unto obedience to him, as their civill power?

SECT. VIII. Argueth from the being of civill power, by the law of nature.

8 UPon supposal of the truth of that Position, that civill Magistracy is by the Law of nature, (for the proof of which I have said something beforeChap. 5. Sect. 4. Subsect. 2.) I would thus argue, If the law of nature doth, and from the beginning hath dictated that civil Govern­ment be in politick societies; it must also be presu­med to direct, and authorize a way, how in particu­lar communities it may be erected; and that way which it hath determined is to be practised; and no other can (unlesse it derive an expresse positive rule from God) be admitted; especially none that is con­tradictory, or subversive to that: now no man can reasonably imagine that meeer possession, which must be ever supposed to be against the wills of the community, and for the most part is in prejudice, and wrong of anothers title, yea which alway is by unnatural, violent, and dishonest meanes introduced, and maintained, can be by order, or law of natur, or otherwise then by encroachment upon, and violation of it.

CHAP. IX. SECT. IX. SECT. IX. Argueth from the generall solemn dis­claim of Arbitrary Government.

9 ARbitrary rule, & government is a thing that we (to wit, this kingdom generally) did condemn, and decry, as a publique evill; and in opposition to it we entred into a publique, and solemn promise, vow, and protestation (See the Preface to the Protestation of May 3. 1641.) I do not in the least reprehend that action, but upon it I argue. If that were well, and justly done, then is not Arbitrary government an ordinance of God, necessarily to be submitted to, and maintained, and that which may not be resisted: On the other hand, if Arbitrary government be an ordinance of God, &c. then were we externally ex­treamly out in the said action: but then the question is, what is Arbitrary government? and wherein doth it, and that government which we owned, and took upon us to assert and stand for, differ? Doubtless, ar­bitrary, is opposed to lawful, or legal, or that which is setled by National convention, pact, and constitution. The government then we have in that Protestation obliged our selves to, is that established by Law, and that which is otherwise (and without controversie meer possessory dominion is otherwise) we bound our selves from, and against.

SECT. X. CHAP. IX. SECT. X. Argueth from the impossibility of de­termining what measure of possession shall make a power.

10 LAstly, If possession will serve to make a pow­er, and to breed an obligation in the people to it, I aske, what sort, size, or degree of possession is it that will do it? If you say, partial possession will suffice; I reply, possession of a part cannot give title to the whole. For that may at one, and the same time be in divers opposite competitors, as it hath been in England in our late Wars, and is in every Territo­ry, where there are wars for Dominion. One con­trary party may be seised on one City, or Province, another of another within the same Common­wealth.

If then the title follow partiall possession, it may appertain to many at once. But this cannot be; The intire title, or interest over a Kingdome cannot be wholly in divers contra-distinct, and opposite parties, neither can the peoples allegiance be owing, or yielded to many contrary claimers.

1. It hath often come to passe that the forcible oc­cupancy of one part of a Kingdome by one, and ano­ther by another power, hath been the occasion of di­viding the same into severall, and distinct Kingdoms or Principalities. So was the Greek Empire parcel­led after the death of Alexander the Great: and so hath the Roman Empire since been shared into a multitude of distinct soveraignties. Now this could not be, if possession of a part gave a title to the [Page 302] whole; for then, notwithstanding such distinguish­ed possessions, and denominations, the bodie poli­tique would (as when it was united under one Sove­raign) be one still, and would remaine entitled to one Soveraign, though but partiall possessor; and how inconsistent would this be? and therefore we in Europe account that claim of the Turkish Emperour frivolous, and absurd, challenging a right to all the Dominions of the Western Roman Empire, as suc­cessor of Constantine, because he succeeded him in that of Constantinople, which was in Constantines time one Empire with this of the WestKeckermani logic. lib. 1. cap. 23. pag. 203. & the Turkish hi­story in Solymā pag. 615..

2 If it be said, that it must be plenary possession that can give a title, and oblige the people to the pos­sessor, I return: This is so tickle, and momenta­neous a ground, as no civill authority can any while st [...]nd by it. For, how often, how easily is plenary possession interrupted? If a sorein enemy, or an in­testine insurrection, or a small seditious Rout, or a band of Pirates, or Robbers seise but on one Towne or Village in a whole Kingdome in opposi­tion to the supream Lord thereof, this breakes off his plenary possession, and so (by this opinion) an­nuls his Title, and disobeyeth his Subjects. There are few Dominions of any great extent, but are of­ten infested in some part, or other with so much of commotion or invasion as may abate of plenary pos­session in the Soveraign. Witnesse the long continu­ing, or frequently renewed troubles of all, or most of the larger-Principalities of Europe in this age.

Have the Emperours, Kings, and Princes of Ger­many, F [...]ance, Spaine, Italy, &c. been so long di­vested, and deprived of their said Dominions, as their plenary possession hath been impeached in them respectively? But this conceit is utterly rejected by the generall vo [...]e, and use of Nations, who do uni­versally and constantly reckon their government to stand, and their Allegiance to hold notwithstanding partial counter-seisures, yea, or the dismemb [...]ing of some particles. You can scarce finde in Scrip­ture [Page 303] story a King whose reign is historified but at some time, or other, if not often,CHAP. X. and for much of his time he was by some or other occupant imped of plenary possession; yet did not that cut off his reign, or diminish his computed time.

CHAP. X. Answers to some Objections, and Doubts concerning that sense of the Text which the aforegoing Chapters have stated, and con­firmed.

THis last Chapter is to return answer unto such Objections, and Questions, the solution whereof may seeme necessary to the further clearing of that interpretation of this Text which this Trea [...]ise hath hitherto held forth, and ass [...]rted.

CHAP. X. SECT. I. SECT. I. The objection [that this Text comman­deth the Roman Christians obedience to the then Roman Emperour, as the supream power of God ordained in that Empire, and that he was a usur­per] answered.

Object. 1. WHen the Apostle wrote this to the Chri­stians in Rome, the Roman Emperour that then was in the Throne, was an usurper: yet the A­postle, in willing them to subject to the higher powers in this Te [...]t, looks upon him as the higher, supream, or Sove [...]aign power of the Roman State; and meaneth him to be the power of God, ordained of God.

Answ. There are two things, which make up the substance of this Argument, the which, could they be evidenced, would make this objection unanswer­able, and carry the sense of this Text quite contrary to the whole Discourse I have hitherto made of it: But, if either of them be left inevident, or doubt­full, the objection failes, and the sense given stands notwithstanding it.

The two things that must be certain to make the argument good are,

1 That the Apostle in this exhortation unto subje­ction to the higher powers, and this affirmation of the power to be of God, ordained of God, intendeth, or hath his eye upon the Roman Emperour, as the supreame power of the Roman State.

2 That the said Emperour was then an usurper.

As for the former: who so looks into the Roman Histories of those times will understand, that there was then (to wit, in the time of the Emperours Ca­jus, Claudius, and Nero) a Roman Senate in being, a [...]d exercising authority; and that not meerly sub­ordinate, but Soveraign; sometimes without, some­times against, and sometimes in conjunction with the Emperour. Sometimes (I say) without, s [...]me­times against him. Without him, as upon the death of Cajus, and Claudius, and ere their respect ve suc­cessors were invested: against him, as about the depe­sall, and death of Nero.

Yea, Mr. Prin hath undertaken to make good, and hath collected a plentifull store of testimonies out of antiquity, sufficient to render it more then p o­bable to any Reader, that in the Roman State, from the fi [...]st, continually, and par icularly after the Em­perours came in, the supream power resided in the Senate, and people, and not in the Kings, C [...]nsuls, or Emperours. Unto whom I refer the Reader in his f [...]urth part of the Soveraign power, &c. the Appendix, pag 2, &c. and his third part, pag. 109, 110, 111. See also Grotius, de ja [...]e belli lib. 2. cap. 9 sect 11. and his Annotat. on that Section.

If H storians observe there was any debate at any time st [...]rted betwixt the Senate, and the Emp [...]rou s about the title, or exercise of the soveraignty in a y point; or if the Emperou s overtopping the S na e in some things be set against the Sena [...]es acting without, or against the Emperour in o [...]hers, t [...] [...] at the most will cause but the more uncertainty in this poin [...], and leave both the precise matter of fact, or the then constitution of the Roman power, and the question whom the Apostles reflection, or intention was upon as the supream power there, the mo [...]e to us dubitable, & in medio: or rather will induce us to conclude this as certain, that, what ever dispute, or alternatenesse of prevailing there might then be, or may now seem to us (by what the Authors now ex­tant hold forth of th se times) then to have been, [Page 306] betwixt the Emperour, and Senate about the supre­macy; the Ap [...]stle relates not to that matter; med­dles not with the stating, or determining of it; that being a question of civill right, which either might have little matter of doubt in it, as to the Christians practice, or might not be so doubtfull to them that lived in those times, as it is now to us at this distance, or might have other ways of clearing it, in so far as the Christians conscience was concerned, then by the Apostles expresse writ in this Epistle. But taking the government that then was (in complexo) as just, and therefore necessary to be subjected to, he exhorts to that duty towards it, and that with this reason, because, of God, ordained of God.

Indeed the questions which were now on foot a­mong the Christians, in reference to civill obedi­ence, and which lay more upon the Apostle to deale in, and resolve, (by the consent of Expositors, anci­ent, and modern) were not so much in whom the su­premacy was, as, whether Christians were at all bound in obedience to any civill superiours? and, if at all to any, whether to Pagan, and persecuting Magistrates?

For the other, (the presumed usurpation of the Emperour) It is true, sundry Authors, both Prote­stant, and Popish do occasionally instance in the Roman Emperours of this age, as usurpers: but, up­on what evidence? as far as I can trace their censure in antiquity, all their ground for it is, the changes and simulties about Government that had then for a long space troubled that State, and the oppositeness of divers worthy Romans (such as Cato, Brutus, Ci­cero,) to the prevailing parties.

But let the alterations which the first Chieftaines made to the prejudice of the Senatorian, or Consular interest be admitted violent, and illegal, and the power which the first Emperour, or Emperours as­cended to by them to have been in that its first rise, or emergency of the same character; I shall affi [...]me there is yet alledged no good reason to pronounce, [Page 307] that the power of those forenamed Emperours, taken to have been Contemporaries with St. Pauls Apostle­ship, was of that nature: This I deliver, not upon a­ny exactnesse of mine own search of History, but upon this two-fold consideration.

1. The attestation of some Authors of this pre­sent age, very eminent.

As Junius (of whom Scaliger is said have given this highest Elogy, That no age since the Apostles can shew such a Divine Ab Apostolo­rum temporibus hactenus parem Theologum nul­lum vidit secu­lum. Apud Ga­takeri Cinnum, lib 2 cap. 9. pag. 267.) In his controversie with Bellarmine about the Translation of the Romane Empire from the Greeks to Germany, and in them to Charles the great (Bellarmine endeavouring to defend it to have been the act of Pope Leo the third, and to have been done lawfully by him) he first asserts his opinion of that Translation. That a difference is to be put betwixt the translation in doing, and the transla­tion after it was done. In the former there was a fault, which ceased in the latter. Though the beginning was injurious, there was a post-fact which made it right. And then he brings in as a parallel, to illustrate this the case we are upon, the Monarchy of Julius Caesar;Alia est ratio translationis in fieri quam in factum esse. Translatio in fie­ri fuit vitiosa, in quâ, nec Leo tertius, nec populus Romanus, nec ipse Carolus officium fecit. Sed translatio in factum esse desiit vitiosa esse, praesertim cum Irene imperatrix, & Constantinus filius, &c. quorum intererat, cedemes jure suo pacem cum eo statuerunt, &c. Nempe ex post-facto jus invalu­it, cujus non ita fuerunt initia justa. Exemplo esto, si placet, Julii Caesa­ris Monarchia. Haec enim ortu iniqua sic fuit, ut constituta semel Rep. coeperit esse justa. Nec solvi, nisi per in [...]ustum ordinis publici conturbatio­num poterit. Junii Animad. in Bellarmin. Controv. 3. lib. 5 cap. 8. sect. 18. pag. 872. of which he saith, this was so unjust in its beginning, as that being once constituted, to the Common-wealth it became just, neither could be dissolved without an un­just distu [...]bance of the publique order.

Chamier may second this of Junius. Whereas Pig­hius denies Pilate to have had any ordinary, or law­full authority over Judea, or over Christ, because [Page 308] Caesar had not: and Caesar (saith he) had not, because he got his powe [...] both over the Roman Empire, and over Judea unjustly Chamier thus answers him. What then? If that Authority were from bad, and unjust be­ginning, did therefore Christ untruly say it was from a­b [...]ve? Quid tum? si a malis, & inju­justis principiis ea authoritas fuit, an propte­reà falso Christus dixit eam esse [...]? an proptereà perperam docuit Caesari censum solvendum? an verò nulla potestas ab initio injusta, potest posted justa esse? Hoc verò si esset, tum sane aut nulla, aut paucissima regna erunt justa. Chamier panstrat. Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 16. Sect. 8. & 9. pag. 635. did he therefore ill to teach that tribute was to be paid to Caesar? Can no power at first unjust afterward become just? If that were so, then either none, or very few Kingdomes would be just.

Another (to add no more) may be Arnisaeus, he, moving the question, Whether the act of a Tyrant (as to title) may be so rectified by the peoples after-consent, that what was null before may become valid; even as Sylla got himselfe created Dictator for 80 yeares, and Caesar procured the same to himselfe for ever? Absque m [...]tu verò si populus, ad exemplum Romans, depo­nat omnem po­testatem in principem, aut consensum tacitum confirmaris praescriptio immemorialis, quae vim habet privilegii, acquiescendum esse consilio illorum, qui censent inveteratas causas non esse renovandas. Arnisaeus de Authoritate princi­ [...]m. Cap 4 Sect. 14. pag. 127, 128. resolves it thus. If the people, according to that example of the Romans, dispose of the power to the Prince: or if pre­scription of time out of mind convey a tacite consent, that is to be acquiesced in without scruple.

2. The evidences I meet with in Historians of the vote or consent of the Senate, and people, which those Emperours had, giving them a just title, and assoyling their government from the brand of u­surpation.

Chronicon Carionis saith of Julius Caesar, that he was confirmed by a publique decree in the supream pow­er. And the same saith Cluverus of him.Revera Julius Magistratus esset decret [...] publico confirmatus, quo ei tributa erat summa potestas, & quo sanxerat senatus eum esse inviolabilem. Chron. Car. part 1. lib. 2. cap. penult. pag. 187. Tum vero absens (Caesar) Romae Dictator creatus, pacisque & belli Dominus. Cluver. hist. lib. 7. p. 237.

Of Augustus his entrance Tacitus witnesseth, both the Nobles and Provinces assent to it. And for further testimony (very luculent) of the Senates and peo­ples hearty subsequent submission to him from time to time, and their conserting on him the honour, and power that he assumed, yea, and m [...]re then he fought, or accepted, I sh ll refer the Reader to the collections (out of their Historians) of Archbishop Ʋsher, Ʋsseri Annal. part 2 pag. 379. 497, 498, 549, 554. Cluver. hist lib. 7. pag. 240. Em. Thesauri Caesares in Ti­ber. Vide etiam Su­eton. Aug. vita cap. 58. & 70. Greg. Tholos. Synt. juris, lib 47. cap. 15. sect. 21. & cap. 20. sect. 4. in his Annals, and to Cluverus. Unto which let that be noted of the Elogist, Thesaurus. Doluit pat [...]ia cum prin­cipem fecit: gavisa cum habait.

Of Tiberius his admission by the Senate, and peo­ple, let be consulted. Tacitus, Suetonius, Arch bishop Usher, and Emanuel Thesaurus Tacit. Annal. lib. 1. cap. 2. Sueton. in Tiberio. cap. 24. Usseri Annal. pag. 549, 554.. Of whom the last saith, Sponte se Roma tyranno tradidit, tempori serviens, non Regi.

Of the most cheerfull coming in of Cajus Caligula, let Suetonius testifieSueton. in Caio cap. 13, & 14.. And of Claudius, see Josephus, Cluverus, and Mr. Lightfoot Josephus de Bel. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 10. & Antiqu. lib. 19 cap. 3. Cluver. hist. lib. 8. pag. 267. Lightfoot on Acts, Ann. Christi 42. Sect. 4, & 5.. Of Nero, Tacitus Tacit. Annal. lib. 12. cap. 14..

If against the validity of the consent given to any of these it be alledged that it was enforced by armes, and therefore void, It may be said,

1. Unto some of them, as Augustus, Caligula, and Nero, the consent of the Roman S a e, is related to have been such as leaveth no colour for this obj [...]cti­on.

[Page 310]2. It will be a very hard, yea, I think, an impossi­ble thing for any at this distance of time, and in such an imperfection of historical narration of circum­stances to bring sufficient ground upon which to conclude any such awe to have been upon the Senate, and people at the time of their consent given to any, or to such of them as might be in the Throne at the mission of this Epistle, as may serve to make the said consent invalid. Let the definition which Civilians and Casuists give of that terrour which may annull a civill act (to wit, that it must be 1. From a cause extrinsical. 2. Probable. 3. Grievous. 4. Unjust. 5. Impressed on purpose to overawe to such an act Metus 1. Ex­trinsecus. 2. Probabilis. 3. Atrox. 4. In­justus. 5. In­cussus ad hoc. Vide Bonacinam Tom. 2. Tract. 2. de Restit. Disp. 3. qu. 1. punct. 2. sect. 3. Et Tom. 1. Tract. 2. qu. 3. punct. 8. Et Greg. Thol. Synt. Jur. lib. 21. cap. 2. sect. 3. Et lib. 36. cap. 25. sect. 5.) he made out to have been then the case.

There is no great ground of presumption for it that I met with in story, in any of them save in that of Julius Caesar, which will no way concern the title of them that followed, particularly of that Nero, in whose reign the writing of this Epistle is computed to fall.

3. There are that conceive, though in foro civili, promises made under some kind of feare, or force are voyded, that is, are made politically null, yet by the law of nature, and so in the Court of Conscience, a contract, notwithstanding any force impelling the contractor, is obligingGroti­us de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 11. sect. 7..

SECT. II. CHAP. X SECT. II. Subsect. 1. Object. Of Christs paying, and comman­ding Tribute-paying to Caesar: of his owning Pilates power: Of Souldiers serving the Romans without the dis­allowance of the Baptist, Christ, &c.

Object. 2. CHrist himselfe payed, and commanded the Jewes to pay Tribute to Caesar; ac­knowledged Pilates power, which was the Romans, to be of God: and we read of diverse souldiers, and officers under the Romans, with whom John the Baptist, Christ, and his Apostles had to do, and none of them that we read of ever reprehended any of them for, or disswaded them from that service. But the Romans were usurpers over Judea.

Subsection 1. The question, whether the Romans were usur­pers over Judea? discussed, and concluded negatively.

Answer. 1. IF the Romans were usurpers over Judea, there is something of an argument, o­therwise there is none in all this. But how will this [Page 312] be proved? Most of the Authors of this objection do no more for this then cite the names of some learned and good Authors affirming it, and so they take it f [...]r granted. But for their full answer, and the clear­ing of this I shall

1. Scan a little this their common proof by such hu­mane assertion.

2. Then consider what reason may suggest to us in this matter.

3. And then remove some other reasons pretend­ing the conviction of the Romans of usurpation.

For the former, the assertion of sundry learned Authors, that so it was: though such do in transitis, & aliud agentes, affirme the Romanes, in the dayes of our Saviour upon earth, to have been usurpers o­ver Judea [...], yet is not their bare affirmative to be taken for an evidence in such a businesse, viz. sufficient to state the sense of a Scrip­ture in controversie, or to extend, or limit a Scrip­ture rule of practice, such as this is. Their ground for so saying would be seen to such an end, and un­till then I shall with as good authority (I think) deny it. Not that I oppose mine own negation, as to be as firm, and credible as the assertion of any such learned men: but because I have the authority of (I deeme) as learned, and good Authors denying the same, and asserting the lawfulness of the Roman government over the Jewish Nation, by consent ere this given to it, whereby it stood cleared of usur­pation.

There is a little Treatise (printed about 7 yeares since) called An exercitation concerning usurped pow­ers; which (pag. 87, 88.) hath cited some passages out of Josephus to prove the Jewes giving up them­selves to the Roman Dominion antecedently to this time which the objection concerns. I shall refer the Reader to these, adding here one or two more out of the same Author (whose testimony in this matter is absolutely the greatest of humane) and then pro­duce the attestation of others of best note; and after that subjoyn a sh [...]rt vindica i [...]n of what that exerc­ta ion had before given.

A further testimony out of Josephus is in these words of Agrippa, in his oration to the Jewes at Je­rusalem, a little before their siege, and destruction by the Romans for their rebellion.

For servitude is grievous, when new, Joseph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 16. and it seems just to strive to avoid it; but he that is once brought under it, and then makes defection, appears to be rather a rebellious servant then a lover of liberty. Therefore it behoved, when Pompey entred into this Province, to have used all meanes against the Romans entry: but yee that have received an hereditary obedience, and are far inferiour in meanes to those who first submitted, how can ye now thinke of making resistance to the whole Roman Empire?

This passage is clear enough for the Jewes recep­tion of the Roman Rule, under Pompey.

Another may be that which the same Author hath in the relating of an occurrence which happened about seven yeares after this first close of this Nati­on with the Roman in subjection; which was this.

Alexander the son of Aristobulus (who was the head of that party that fell under the force of the Roman sword, and still repined at their govern­ment) beginning to make insurrection against the Romans, was supprest by Gabinius the Governour of Syria, and upon that suppression Gabinius setled the government of the Jewish Common-wealth in ano­ther forme, distributing the Province of Judea into five equall parts, and appointing so many several Ci­ties in each of them for the people respectively to be­long, and repair unto for justice; the which course of government took so well with the Jewes, that the remaining grudges at the Roman Dominion were removed. The words of Josephus upon it are,Joseph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 6. The Jewes being delivered from the government of one a­lone, were willingly governed by severall Chieftaines, or A [...]istocratically. I am to adjoyne now some other W [...]iters testimonies, one of the most learned Anti­q [...]aries, especially in the Jewish affairs we have, is Mr. John Selden. And he hath purposely enquired [Page 314] into, and professedly debated this question: and he resolves it for us thus.

It is not obscure to be seene that in the times of the Empires of the Babylonians, the Persians, the Grecians, and the Romans, the Jewes, upon their respective victo­ries over them, were (soedere, seu deditione subditi) subjects to them by covenant, or surrendring up of them­selves: that by vertue of the said covenants, or dediti­ons, they payed tribute, and they served as Souldiers un­der Alexander the Great. And particularly in refe­rence to the Romans, he saith, concerning the publique acknowledgement of the Right of the Romans by Warre, and armes over this Nation (the Jewes) there is cleare evidence from the leagues, and charters of Princes, which both Josephus, and Philo (in the Book de lega­tione) do hold forth. And that that Nation was recei­ved of the Romans by dedition, or by that league which is betwixt unequals. And that the tribute, which Judas the Galilean stood up to free that people from, was imposed by Augustus, by the law of victory and dediti­on. And that the sedition of those Jewes (mentioned, Acts 5 37.) who mutinied upon occasion of that tri­bute taxed upon them by Augustus, by the law of victo­ry, and dedition, was according to Ga [...]aliels speech dis­allowed of by that Sanhedrim or Councell of the Jewes, as St. Luke relates in that story (Acts 5.40.) as being by the delusion of a seditious incendiary, and not of God. And that the Jewes had yeelded themselves unto, and owned the Roman Dominion in Pompey, Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius, ere this question about tribute-paying was proposed to our Saviour. And that be, from the inspection of that Denarius, the coyne which upon the moving of this question, and his demand to have it sh [...]wen, was produced, raised an irrefragable argument of that dedition, and from thence of their d bt of tri­bute-paying. And that they who ex animo, and really stuck at the payment of it, were a seditious party, dis­senting from the Body of that Nation. All this may be seene more at large delivered by Mr Selden Io. Selden de jure Naturae, &c. lib. 6. cap. 17. pag. 751, &c.. What an act dedition is, let Gro [...]ius informDeditio sponte permittit quod alioqui vis esset ereptura. Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 3. cap. 8. sect. 4. Dedition is a [Page 315] yeelding voluntarily to that which otherwise force would extort.

That there was on the part of the Jewish Nation a rendring of themselves up to the Roman govern­ment, yea, and a covenant of fealty, or subjection entred into by them upon Pompeys coming to Jerusa­lem in assistance to Hircanus, and his besieging and taking the Temple from Aristobulus his party (the opposites of Hircanus, and of the greater part of that nation) another of our most learned, and judicious searchers of Antiquity, Arch-bishop Ʋsher, hath furnished us with divers testimonies out of History. One is of Eutropius, viz. Pompey passing into Jury, tooke Jerusalem, the Metropolis of that Nation, in the third moneth, killing 12 thousand of the Jewes, and re­ceiving the rest into fealty Ad Judaeos transgressus (Pompeius) Hierosolymam caput gentis ter­tio mense cepit; duodecim mili­bus Judaeorum occisis, caeteris in fidem accep­tis. Eutropius.. Another of Orosius, who speaking of Pompey, saith, He sendeth to the City of Je­rusalem Gabinius with his Army, himselfe presently following, and being received of the Fathers into the City, but repulsed by the common sort from the walls of the Temple, he begins to besiege it; and hardly tooke it in three moneths. Thirteen thousand of the Jewes are re­ported there to be slaine. The rest of the people entred into a league of subjection Ad Hierosoly­mam urbem eo­rum Gabinium cum exercitu mittit: ipse continuò subsecutus, & a patribus u [...]be receptus, sed a plebe muro Templi repulsus, oppugnationem ejus intendit, &c. vix tertio mense expugnavit. Tredecim millia Judaeorum ibi caesa narrantur. Caetera mul­titudo in fidem venit. Orosius. Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 262, 263.. Another testimony of the Jewes consent to the Roman authority, the same Arch-bishop gives us out of Josephus, which is that I cited even now, of their willing embracement of an Aristocraticall government setled over them by Ga­binius Usseri Annal. pert 2. pag. 281..

Another witnesse shall be Calvin, who upon the Text mainly referred to in the Objection, saith, The authority of the Romane Empi [...]e was by common use approved, and received among the Jewes; [Page 316] whence it was manifest that the Jewes had now of their owne accord imposed on themselves a law of paying the tribute, because they had passed over to the Romans the power of the sword Romani Im­perii authoritas communi usu probata, receptaque erat, unde constabat Judaeos ipsos jam sibi sponte legem imposuisse solvendi Tributi, quia Ro­manis gladii potestatem concesserant. Calv. in Matth. 22.19..

For this voluntarinesse of the Jewish subjection to the Romans, and consequently the freedome of these from usurpation in relation to them, at what time our Saviour conversed on Earth among them, I have more testimony, of primest worth, but will spare the citing of their words, and shall refer my Reader to Weems, Weems Exposi­tion of the Ju­dic. Law, pag. 52, 53. Grotius, Gro [...]. de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 4. sect. 14. and Dr. Hammond, Dr. Hammond Annot. on Matth. Chap. 22. note B. the last of whom I shall have occasion to bring in by and by; and unto these may be put Chamier, before cited in an­swer to the first Objection.

Let us n [...]xt see what is said in this matter against the exercitation above cited, and the Romans Title to Judea therein asserted, by the Book called, The Exercitation answered.

He (page 51.) objects against the Maccabean title by the consent of one of which (Hircanus) the Romans came into the Dominion of Jew [...]y. But what if none of them of that race that ruled, what if the last of them Hircanus had not any good title? yet, if the Romans had the peoples consent (as the exercitation asserteth they had) their claim might be good. But let us see how he avoids the Maccabean title.

First, he obj [...]cts, That the Maccabees came in by force into the Kingdome, when there was another King, a successor of Alexander. He saith, but proves it not; I answer him.

1 It is no concluding argument of the unlawful­nesse of any power that they come in by force. The question is, whether that force be just, or unjust? whether it be a meer force, or a force b [...]cked with a just title at its entrance? or, if it had no [...], a que­stion [Page 317] will be further, whether it had none subse­quently conferred, by which meanes, though the force were unjust in its entry, yet it might be absol­ved in its continuance from usurpative tenure? But the justifiablenesse of the Maccabean armes against the Syrian Kings is commonly yeelded, and ass [...]rted, although there may be some diversity in the way of making it out, of which the Reader may see in Gro­tius Grot. de jure B [...]l lib 1. cap. 4. sect. 7.. For them there are rendred these reasons.

1 The allowednesse of the Subjects defensive arms against their lawful Soveraign in case of ex [...]ream necessity, as was that of the Jewes under Antiochus. This is a ground undenyable by that answer.

2 But it is further to be said, that at what time Mattathias the Father of the Maccabean brethren, and after him his son Judas, and the other in succession raised armes against, and repelled the Seleucian op­pressions, be that was then reigning of that race (Antiochus Epiphanes) was an usurper, the right of succession being in Demetrius the son of Seleucus, the son of Antiochus the G eat, and elder brother to this Antiochus. And that Demetrius being now an hostage at Rome, and by the Senate there detained from suc­ceeding in the Kingdom, the Jews had some occasion given them to assume the administration of the aff [...]irs of their own nation, especially they being now under Tyran [...] not onely as to title, but as to his imm [...]ne, (or Epimane, as his style is in Athenaeus Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 1. Ro [...]e his hist. lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 2.) govern­ment. And it may be noted also, that this Antio­chus at his end vowed to God to grant the Jewes an Autonomie, that they might thence forward use their own Laws, and constitutions, and moreover wrote supplicatory Letters in behalfe of himselfe, and his son Antiochus, whom he left to succeed him, to pray, and beseech their fidelity to them bothVide Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 47. and 2 Macc. 9 13, &c..

2 As for the freedome of the Maccobeans Domi­nion in reference to their own Nation, Josephus gives very clear testimony of the J wes election, and ad­mission of them, and in particular of the fore-leaders of them, Mattathias, and his sonsIos [...]ph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 1. Et Antiqu. lib. 13. cap 1, & 11..

[Page 318]2. He questions, whether the High Priest were ca­pable both of a Crown, and Mitre, wherein some say he was a pattern of Antichrist.

To this blur of typifying Antichrist, it may be replyed, Antichristianisme is now grown a very common, and stale imputation, many having applyed it to any thing which they please to asperse.

2 It's strange that under the Law not only Christ, but Antichrist should have his types.

3 How will he make it apppeare, that to weare both a Crown, and a Mitre is a property of Anti­chr [...]st, that is, that it doth competere to him, and to him (with his types) alone.

4 It is certain Christ is both King, and Priest, and so, in their modell are all Christians. The Mac­cabees then, if in this they must be typicall, being they were such faithful, and pious, as well as magna­nimous persons, might rather be construed presiden­tiall in this good, then in so soule an application.

2 But to his question, let the examples of Mel­chisedech, Eli, Samuel, and Jehoiada (who sure were no patterns of Antichrist) be considered, as to the lawfulnesse of the conjunction of civill regiment with the Priesthood. Yea, I presume upon better enquiry it will be found that temporall power, to wit, the judgement of civill causes was the ordinary inve­sture of the Priesthood of Aaron by institutionSee Deut. 17.8, 9, 10, 11. & 19.17. 2 Chr. 19.8, 9, 10.. And certainly the Priests that were either presidents, or members of the Jewish supream Councel, or San­hedrim were interested in such a power.

3 As for the pomp, or honour of a Crown, or Kingdome, the former Maccabees never assumed it. The first that did it was Aristobulus, say some, Alex­ander his brother, and next successor, say others; the latter was father to Hircanus, from whose hand the power passed upon Pompeys victory to the Romans; and the said Hircanus sate High Priest nine years ere the Kingdome came to him, which he had not enjoy­ed three moneths (say someMonta [...]us. Ap­paratus 6. Sect. 24, 25, 26. pag. 229. Lightfoot of Temple cap. 4. sect. 3. pag. 29.) when the difference brake out betwixt him, and his brother Aristobulus, [Page 319] which was the occasion of calling in the Romans by Hircanus, and his party, and so of their soveraignty there.

2. He alledgeth, The covenant made betwixt Hir­canus, & Aristobulus importing that the latter should command the Kingdom; the which disinabled Hircanus forgiving away the Kingdome after to Pompey.

Answ. 1. Hircanus indeed forced by Aristobulus, yielded him up the Kingdome by such a covenant; but the Chieftaines of Judea not consen [...]ing, after set up Hircanus again upon d slike of Aristobulus, and by the assistance of Aretas the Arabian King first, and then of Pompey recovered it from himVide I [...]seph. Antiqu. lib. [...]4. cap. 1, 2 7, 8.. And Pom­pey, before his coming in, was sought unto by both those parties to determine the controversie betwixt themVide Usse [...]i Annal. part 2. pag. 249, 250. 163.. Upon which he adjudging for Hircanus, and taking up his cause joyned with him, and his party in the oppugning and suppressing of Aristobulus.

3. He excepteth against the Roman Title by surrend [...]y of Hircanus to Pompey, upon that maxime, a King cannot passe away his Kingdome without their consent. This position is a truth acknowledged by Sta [...]es­menSee K. Iames his Remonstr. &c. p. 207, 208. The [...]rraignment of the powd [...]r-Tr [...]tytors in the Earl of Nor [...]h­ampt. speech, pag. 273, 309, 314. Widd [...]ing. Theolog. Disput. adm. to Reader. sect. 10., and others (save that some distinguish of a constitutive, and a patrimonial Kingdome, and deny it of the latte [...]) and from thence is voided his n [...]xt preceding objection of Hircanus his covenant; which for this reason could be no obligation to the people, or bar to the Romans title, coming in against Aristo­bulus. Neither doth the exe [...]citation at all inf inge that maxime, by founding the Roman claim upon Hircanus his sole act; for it expresly takes in, and brings proof of the consent of the Nation. Which proof now comes in to be defended against this An­swerer.

4. He alledgeth the words of Jos [...]phus, That all the whole Nation were against both Hirc [...]nus, and A­ristobulus for b [...]inging them under the servitude of a Kingdome, for they said their custome was to be governed by Gods High Priest, but I hope (saith the Answerer) Pompey was no Priest, and ther fore they did not choose him for thei [...] Governour.

To this the answer is easie. The exception of the people in this narration of Josephus was not against the government of both those brothers; For the same Author relateth the peoples acception of Hir­canus to the Dominion immediately upon the death of Alexandra. And when he being of an over-sl [...]w, and modest temper, had given way to the turbulent spirit of Aristobulus his younger brother to reigne, they rose up (in assistance of Aretas the Arabian King) for his restoring to the governmentJo [...]eph. Antiq. lib. 14. cap. 3. Usseri Annal. pag. 141.. But they were ill content with their government under the title, pomp, majestie, and expensivenesse of a Kingdome, or they blamed the annexing of a Crown to the moderate Dominion of the ancienter Asmo­neans. This was indeed an innovation (and so dis­pleasing) first introduced by the Father, or Unckle or Hircanus.

2 This complaint of the people against those brethren is no argument to prec [...]ude the peoples con­sent to Pompey afterward, had he taken upon him to be a King over them.

That which a people now disliketh, they doe not ever continue to disaffect or refuse. Who knows not the mutability of a multitudes mindes? Sed quid turba Remi? siquitur fortunam, &c.

3 But as Pompey was no High-priest, so he was no King. Neither doth the Exercitator say they chose him for their King. Neither doth the matter of this complaint make any thing against the complainers Dedition to the Romans. But in truth it did further it; For they affecting rather Hircanus his indulgent rule then Aristobulus an imperious, and warlike man; and not being able to keep down the latter, or enjoy the quiet of their Countrey under him, they submit­ted to the Romans, whereby they recovered Hirca­nus, freed themselves of the other brother, and had their desire of the Romans of being rid of a Crowned High-priest; Pompey gratifying them in leaving Hircanus to govern them, but (secluso Diademate, say Hist [...]r [...]ans exp [...]esly) and in association with An­tipater, [Page 321] as ProcuratorUsser. Annal. pag. 261. Montacut. Ap­paratus, 6. Sect. 26. pag. 229.. And when about six years after Alexander the Son of Aristobulus infested Judea with new broyls, in his Fathers quarrell, Gabinius, the Roman President of Syria, having subdued him, restored Hircanus to the H [...]gh Priest-hood onely, and set over the Countrey certaine prefects in distinct circuits, wherewith the people rested very well sa­tisfiedJoseph. Antiq. lib. 14. cap. 10. & de Bel. lib. 1. cap. 6. Uss [...]r. Annal. p. 281..

5. Whereas to prove the Jewish dedition the Ex­ercitator had brought out of Josephus, the words of Antipater to Caesar concerning Antigonus (the son of the aforesaid Aristobulus) his craving ayd of Caesar against Hircanus, he falls foul upon the Exercitator, and charge h him with a false construction of the La­tine sentence (for the Greek he had not) of Jo­sephus.

In defence of that Exercitator I shall but

1 Present the Reader with the words which the Exercitator had truly cited out of the printed Latine version of Josephus, which are [Non propter inopiam desiderare facultates; sed ut in eos qui dedissent Judae­orum seditiones accenderet.] and with the Exercita­tors Englishing of them; That he sought not reliefe (of Caesar) because he was poor; but that he might kindle Jewish seditions against those which had made a dedi­tion of themselves. I leave the Reader to judge if there be any such fault in the construction: And whether the Answerer hath dealt fairly, either with the Ex­ercitator, in challenging him of very untruly alledg­ing those words of Antipater; or with Josephus, in his undertaking to correct the Exercitators version by translating him thus, He, that is, Antigonus, cra­ved not maintenance for that he wanted, but that he might raise a rebellion among the Jews, and against them who would bestow any thing upon him. Which of these two have more faithfully translated the Latine above set, I need not take the umpirage of.

2 Propose betwixt them, that the concernment of the quotation in the point of validity lyes in the con­gruity of the matter for which it is brought (viz. to [Page 322] prove a dedition of the Jewes to the Romans) to the Greek of Josephus, which is, [ [...].] It may be the Latine (about the englishing of which the answerer quarrels with the Exercitator) follows not the original overstrict­ly, but the main question is, whether Josephus his owne words do not beare a dedition as clearly as the Exercitators English. That this is their importance I will not seem to obtrude my assertion upon the Reader, now he hath the words before him. Onely I shall let him know I am very much confirmed to take it so to be, having found an Antiquary, and Greek Critick of so great sufficiency quoting this ve­ry passage for the same purpose to which the Exerci­tator had done, I meane the singularly learned Dr. Hammond; Dr. Hammond Annot on Math. 22. Note B. who in his Annotations asserts of the Jewes, that they had made a dedition of themselves to the Romans, and for it citeth the same place in Josephus (viz. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 8.) in which place there is nothing to be found that sounds to that purpose, if these words do not. The same Doctors te­stimony to the thing I am arguing for, which should have been given above, I have referred to this place upon this occasion, as being very pertinent.

He affirmes in the same Annotation, That the Jewes, those of them that were of Hircanus party, came under the Roman power by consent, and not by force; by a choice which the factious among themselves put them upon, and by way of dedition: while they of Aristobu­lus party looked upon the R [...]mans as usurpers, and for­cible possessors, and that this difference conntinued till our Saviours time: When of the Jewes some part ac­knowledged, and adhered to the Caesarean, or Roman authority: some part looked upon it as an usurpation, and of this generally were the Pharisees. And that Christs answer is punctually in favour of the Roman Em­perour, especially to those who tooke the tribute to be his right.

Having thus weighed, and I think sufficiently [Page 323] counterpoised the opinion of those who are for the Romans, to have been usurpers over Judea, in the time of our Saviour, by humane testimony, I have only to add,

2. Somewhat of reason against their said opi­nion.

1 Had not so many learned men stood up for the justific [...]tion of the Roman dition over the Jews by their dedition, and agreement, yet it is not with probability supposeable, that their Dominion in Ju­dea having now been continued above 90. yeares, could have been exercised so long, without some consent sufficient to legitimate it to the present ru­lers; that is, either an expresse, or a tacit consent; eit er a reall consent, or such as was to be presumed, having been continued by immemorial usage.

2 To this title of the Romans, the confession of the Jewes themselves made at this time, seems to astipulate.

They said, It is not lawfull for us to put any man to death. We have no King but Caesar. In the former sentence they disavow to be in them the power of ca­pitall punishment, and consequently the supream authority civill; not onely the naturall, or compul­sory, but the legall, and Justifi [...]ble power. In the latter, they own Caesar as their King, with an exclu­sive negation, or abrenunciation of all other.

3 To this also, that appeal of the Apostle Paul unto Caesar, adds some strength. When the Chief­tains of the Jewes had challenged his tryall to belong to them, and F [...]stus also had moved him to agree to have had the cognisance of his Cause taken at Jerusa­lem; in return to them both, he asserteth that both his person, and his cause appertained to Ca [...]sars Tri­bunall; and that not onely in fact, but o [...] right, [...], where I ought to be judged.

But there is one (the Answerer to the exercitation above dealt with) that pretendeth to some more matter of reason to evict the Roman usurpation. He opposeth to the lawfulnesse of their title, two other [Page 324] titles, which by reason of the venerablenesse of their names to whom they are affixed, will seem to deserve an examination ere that of the Romans can passe for indubitable.

1 He alledges the title of the house of David, and that promise, that there shall not want a man to sit on his Throne. Unto this I say, There was indeed such a promise given to David, 2 Sam 7.12. 1 Kings 2 4. which was the basis of the title of that house. But it is to be observed that the same promise was made, Jer. 33.17. with relation to the times after the se­venty years captivity. Now let the obj [...]ctor of this promise shew when, and in what sort this in the Pro­phet did, or was to receive accomplishment after the captivity: and it will easily appear, that the civill dominion, either of the Roman now, or of the Maccabees before, or of any other person was, or would have been no impeachment to that promise taking place, or to that title built upon it: but the one, and the other might we [...]l consist toge [...]her. The event sheweth, that the said promise was applicable to a two-fold fulfilling.

1 Temporall, or literal, in the natural posteri­ty of David, and with relation to Israel that dwelt in Canaan.

2 Spiritual, or mystical in the supernatural seed of David, that is, Christ; and with relation to Is­rael in all Nations, viz. the Church of Christ. And that the time was now come that the latter impletion was to take place; the which superseded not, but rather made way for the civill title of any who might have a faire call to the Throne over that Nation.

2 So far as the promi [...]e, and title was made to David, and his carnall seed, with relation to the Isra­elitish Nation, it was made with an expresse proviso, condition, and limitation, [of which see 1 King. 2.3, 4 Jer. 22 2, 3, 4, 5.] the which having been long ere this entry of the Romans often, and wholly broken, the promise, and title as to that sense of it, was void, and so could not stand as a bar to any other families capacity of that CrowneVide Monta­cut. Apparat. sect. 26 pag. 88..

[Page 325]3 It is evident (what ever had become of that condition) that promise was made concerni [...]g the worldly K ngdome of that Nation to continue no longer in force then to the coming of Christ, in, and by whom the Kingdome of David, and his seed was to be changed from an earthly, to an heavenly Kingdom: which was meant by Iohn Baptists, Christs, and his Apostles preaching the kingdome of h [...]aven. Matth. 3.2.4.17.10.7. By the prophecy of Jacob, the Scepter (to wit, the temporall power) was assured unto Judah, but un­till Shiloh's coming.

2 The other title he brings to nullifie that of the Roman is, of the great son of David, Christ himselfe, who, as Mr. Perkins acknowledgeth, Gen 49.10. was right heire to the Crowne, and kingdome of the Jewes. Let that passe f [...]r cu [...]rant, which is the comm [...]n opinion, that Christ was in a direct line Davids next na [...]ural heir: yet, what ever right might descend upon him, a civil, or temporall title to the Crown, and Kingdome of the Iewes, cannot be concluded to passe unto him thereby. His succession to David (though he took upon him his nature) was not of a civill, or earthly interest: as was before noted from the tenor of his preaching: and is further evident by his own deny­ing the title, and exercise of a worldly Kingdome to belong unto himselfeJohn 18.36. Luke 12.14.. And this, our Divines insist on, denying there was any civill dominion residing in him; in answer to the Popes advocates; who for the maintaining of a temporall power in their Pope, alledge there was a civill title to the K [...]ngdome of Judea in Christ: but this ours im­pugneVide Mont. Apparat 2. sect. 47. pag. 9. Chamier Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 4. Sect. 7, &c. & cap. 16. sect. 3, 4.10.

2 Suppose any right had accrued to him to the temporall Kingdome, yet this could not remain as a b [...]t unto the Roman, in as much as he waved, and receded from it: voluntarily taking upon him a sta [...]e of poverty, and servitude, and shunning the offers of the KingdomeIoh 6.15, 12 36. compared with vers. 18, 19.. Which he doing, either we must say, that he assigned his title to some other certaine person, or persons whereby all other were excluded [Page 326] from it:CHAP. X. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. or that he so declined the use of it himselfe, as that none other might assume it though by the Iewes agreement, but that they were necessarily, and of duty to be thenceforth headlesse, or without civill government; either of which there is no ground to affirme.

Subsection 2 Of Christs paying tribute, Matth. 17.

HAving thus disproved the imputation of usurpati­on to the Roman Government over Judea, upon which the strength of this second Objection lyes; I have yet something to say to the other part of the argument, the particulars brought to confirme the Romanes power to have been of God, and the ordi­nance of God, although in truth, the matter thus con­firmed, is not by me denyed.

1. Christ himself paid tribute, Matth. 17.14.

1 It is a question much agitated for whom that tribute was gathered; whether by Caesars Tribute-gatherers for his use; or by the officers of the Tem­ple for its service. There are very learned men for each of these wayes. That it was for Caesar say those two great Antiquaries,Montacut. O­rig. Eccles. part post pag. 196. Selden de jure Nat lib. 6. c. 18. Baronius ad An. 33. Num. 31. Casaub [...]n Exe [...]cit. 15. Sect. 19. Cameron Myroth in Matth. 27.24. Weems Expos. of judic. Law. pag. 51. Dr. Hammond Annot. on Mat. 17 24. Selden ut supra. Bishop Montague, and Mr. Selden. That it was not at all for him, but for the Temple, is the resolution of Baronius, Cameron, Ca­saubon, Mr. Weems, and Dr. Hammond: besides those whom Mr. Selden citeth in his dispute upon it, to wit, Hillary, Beza, Hottaman, Villalpandus, and Lipsius.

[Page 327]2 That payment was made by our Saviour with such cau [...]ion (expla [...]ning the consideration upon which it was done, to have been,CHAP. X SECT. I. Subsect. 3. not any strict right acknowledged to be in the thing, as from him, but to avoid offence in an act in it selfe unobliging) as leaveth the title of them that claimed it (supposing it was for Caesar) unstated as to civill dominion over the place, or as it would have been if such a thing never had been moved to, or performed by Christ.

Subsection 3. Of Christs commanding tribute-paying to Caesar.

2 CHrists answer to the Question concerning the Iewes payment of tribute to Caesar, was, Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesars, Matth. 22.21.

1. Some are of opinion that the words of Christ do not beare a command in them of that payment to that Emperour of Rome, but a generall precept on­ly, that, whereas the matter in question was a pay­ment by the Law of God due to the serv [...]ce of the Temple, but were now alienated from it by the Ro­man StateVide Calvin in Matth. 22.15. Dioda [...]e in vers. 17. Diete­ricus in Evang. Tom. 2. pag. 601.; and the Pharisees, and Herodians came in seditiously, and captiously upon our Saviour with this question, on purpose to render him by his posi­tive answer to it, obnoxious, either to the Roman State, if he should denySee Luke 20.20, 26. with cap. 23, 2; or to the Iewes, as an e­nemy to their Religion, and freedome, if he should grant it: Our Saviour Christ, being well aware of their conspiracy, and that he might both solve their question, and evade their snare, frames his answer by way of a generall rule, of giving to God, and to Caesar, each their own, without defining, what this in any particular in relation to either of them was, or which of them had the right to the payment in [Page 328] questionFor this inter­pretation see Marlor. in loc. Tostat. in loc. q. 104. Selden de jure Nat. lib. 6. c. 17. pag. 756.. And if it be granted that the tribute was usurped indeed from the service of the Temple to Caesars secular use, this (me thinks) appears the most probable Exposition: and the Text seems to incline to it, making the issue of this answer in them that moved the query to be [Luk. 20.26.] And they could n [...]t take hold of his words before the people: and they marvailed at his answer, and held their peace.

If they had understood in his words an expresse, and positive declaration (to the hypothesis, or parti­cular case) of an obligation to make that payment to Caesar; why? whence did they wonder? in stead of ad­miration, and silence, they would have broke out into exultation, as having obtained their end; and they had not been prevented of a hold upon his words before the people, but had that very handle they wi­shed for, in reference to the stirring up an odium in the multitude against him.

2. They that think otherwise, and suppose that our Saviours speech in these words, accompanied with a demand of a sight of the tribute-money, and an exact taking notice of the image, & superscription upon it to be Caesars, and with his finger (as it were) pointing at the portraicture, and style of Caesar upon the coyne, doth hold forth a precise determination for the payment of the tribute in question unto Cae­sar; withall do, and must understand this his deci­sion to be given in terms, not expressing the affirma­tive of the question, but wrapt up in a general reason for it, the giving to Caesar what-ever is due to Caesar, which laid down, and an assumption made out, from the inspection of the coyn, the engraved name, and figure of the person upon it, with the consideration of the adjunct of it, the Nations act of reception of that coyn, and that which by that act was signified, their entertainment of, and submission to the Roman So­veraignty, would m ke a compleat, and concluding argument for the tribute to be paid to Caesar. Now the prosyllogisme, or proof of the assumption of this a [...]gument (which is that which makes it beare a pa [...] ­ticular [Page 339] determination of the case) doth no lesse ex­presly assoyl the Roman Emperour from usurpation,CHAP. X. SECT. II. Subsect. 4, 5. and assert this title to the Iewish dominion by that Nations consent given, then it doth infer their duty of yielding that tribute, and is so a clear dissolving of the objection we are uponAnd so it is adjudged to be by Calv. in loc. vers. 18. & 21. by Mr. Selden de jure Nat. lib. 6. cap. 17. pag. 761. 763. 765. and by Doctor Hammond in loc..

Subsection 4. Of Christs acknowledging Pilates power to be of God.

3 WHereas the Objectors say, Christ acknowledged Pilates power to be of God, Iohn 19.11. This were someting indeed for them, if it could be proved, that the Romans power over the Iewes was usurped. But the evincing of this I think is forestalled above: And I shall onely adde, as a further testimony of the contrary, the paraphrase of Dr. Hammond upon the words of Christ to Pilate, here cited, which is, All power of the lawfull Magistrate is from God: and such I acknowledge thine to be.

Subsection 5. Of the Souldiers serving the Roman without the disallowance of John the Baptist, of Christ, or of his Apostles.

4 LAstly, for our Saviours, his Apost [...]es and John B [...]ptists, not reprehending their followers that were officers or souldiers of the Romans, for their being so. It may make an argument (though but [Page 330] such a one as is from testimony in matter of fact ne­gativè) for the lawfulnesse of Christians to war,CHAP. X. SECT. III. and to serve, and acknowledge, yea, and to beare civill Magistracy; but this doth not come up to any ad­vantage of the objection: for it neither carryieth in it, or hath added to it any evidence against the Ro­mans title to Judea: neither doth it justifie any act but what might have been done if the Romans had been indeed usurp [...]rs.

SECT. III. The prejudice which the requiring a good title to the making one a pow­er ordained of God may cast upon all Governments (in as much as their beginning is ordinarily either un­known, or known to have been vio­olent) objected, and answered.

Object. 1. BUt if to the making of one a power of God, ordained of God, there must goe, not only possession, or actuall rule, but a Divine authorization by a just title, or orderly calling to the place; consequently to the acknowledging, or owning of one, or more to be such a power, there will be necessary a knowledge, or evidence of his, or th [...]ir just title, or orderly call. But this may suspend, or bring in question the owning of any civill power that is ordinarily to be found, to be of God, as his ordinance, and will make it a very hard matter to avow, or take any to be such. For,

1. It cannot be expected that the common people sh [...]uld be able, nor requisite that they should busie [Page 331] their be [...]ds, to look into the justnesse, or legality of their Soveraigns title, entry, or tenure of his power, or should be perfectly acquainted with the ancient Lawes, or Histories, yea, or the present transactions which concern the disposall of Crowns, and Scep­ters.

2. Divers governments are of a succession, or de­scent so ancient, that their first root, or rise cannot at all, or can but dubiously be discovered, or determi­ned by the learnedst Antiquaries. Besides the cer­tainty of the doings of former ages will be still (in regard of the imperfection, and partiality of Authors of story) dubitable. Yea, the truth, equity, and reason of what is but emergent, and acted in our own time is often in State-affairs of a dark, and intricate appearance.

3. Most, or many governments that now are in being, are by Histories tainted with violence, or other indirect meanes of getting up at their first erection, and yet they are accounted, and passe for powers truly authorized, and to be of God as his Ordi­nance.

Answ. This objection raiseth difficulties of some shew, but little strength. It is in this respect in the holding of Thrones, and publique authority, as it is in private possessions, and patrimonies. There are few, or none holders of lands; or hereditaments that can make out an originall title to them. The usuall titles by which the present owners of them do stand upon (descent, purchase, or gift) are but deri­vative; they do not as such properly bottom a title, but convey, or transferre it. They cannot create a right, or constitute a thing just; onely they trans­fer or convey the same title, which the Ancestor, seller, or donor had; the which, what it was in it selfe in point of justice is, notwithstanding the conveyance, or change of the person possessing, still q [...]estionable; and is to be determined by some other way. And the wayes of stating the justnesse of p [...]i­vate p ss ssions, whether moveable, or immoveable, [Page 332] especially if of any durable, and ancient tenur [...] seem to be altogether under as great obscurities, intri­cacies, and dispu [...]ablenesse, as are those by the obje­ction attr [...]buted to publique places; yea, to some more obscurity, in as much as the originall seisures of these have not the memorials, and recognitions taken of them which the publique have. But though this be generally the state, and account which can be given of mens titles to their possessions now adayes, and so hath been of others before, time out of mind; yet no man scruples his ancient patrimony, or his late purchase, or grant upon this score: and, on the other side, neither may therefore any say, there is no such thing as honesty, or justice in the concern­ment of a mans tenure; actuall possession, or occu­pancy is enough; nothing is to be regarded as requi­site to ones becoming, or discovering the true owner of an estate, or goods, but present possession. No, this would make mad work both in the consciences, and in the dealings of men. But notwithstanding all the darknesse that is upon the originall of titles, and all the inevidence, or disputeableness of subsequent contracts, or conveyances, every man is bound to see to his just, and righteous holding of his estate, and goods;Micah 2.1. and, woe to them that practise iniquity, because it is in the power of their hand. Tell me then how you will ex [...]ricate an honest-meaning conscience from the pinch of the obligation to equity on the one hand, and the obscurity of the matter of fact on the other, in the case of a private possession: and this will facilitate the clearing of most that is in the ob­jection.

Thus the case (as I take it) is commonly to be resolved. It was a true M [...]xime, Quod non disproba­tur, praesumitur. Where no wrong appears, we may ordinarily take it to be right. And again, In re du­biâ potior est conditio possidentis. Continued possessi­on is a title, when it cannot be evicted, or where the beginning is unc [...]rtain. There is security enough in holding that which comes to my hand, and continues [Page 333] in it without detection of injury. If a possession have run in a right current as farre as the notice of him whose conscience is concerned in it can reach, there is usually a satisfactory, or acquiescive title: and he that hath a thing so is called bona fidei posses­sor, an honest owner.

The truth is, that which the Civilians call Ʋsuca­pio, or praescriptio, to wit, an immemor [...] l usage, or an occupancy good as farre as humane knowledge in looking back can goe, stands up in stead [...]f an origi­nall title, where that is out of ken. Not because such a possession may ever be positively concluded to have been originally right, but because nothing to the contrary doth appear, and therefore reason di­ctates, if any thing, this must passe for right. It be­ing to be supposed that the thing possessed either hath come down from the first Proprietor to this hand by a clear transmission, or if any diversion hath been (unwitting to this occupant) the right owner letting it passe so long unclaimed, hath laid aside his title, and given his consent to that alienation of it.

And thus I conceive the aforesaid uncertainties which are usually attendant upon the discovery of the positive ground, or rise of civill right, whether publique, or private, are ordinarily avoydable; so as, on the one hand they shall not impose any reall cause of perplexity to the conscience; on the other, they may not be drawn to patronize the neglect, or over­throw of justice, or order in present transactions, or to shelter what is manifestly, and evincibly wrong. The errour of an act, or possession which lyes hid, and buried in ignorance, or oblivion, Casuists, with one consent, absolve, as being involuntary, and therefore inculpable. Concerning this I shall onely relate the resolution of a Casuist of our own, and well approved; and the rather because his words touch the special matter we are upon, as to the objection. It is Amesius Si quis rem a­liquam suam esse bonâ fide judicet, cum sit aliena, conscien­ti â dictante, po­test, ac debet eâ­dem uti ut suâ. Si quis bonâ fide eum judicet esse suum Magistra­tum qui est Ty­rannus, vel eum esse legitimum magistratum qui titulum il­lum falso sibi vendicat, obedientiam deb [...]tam tenetur ipsi praestare. Ames. de consc. lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 7. Vide etiam Grot. de jure Bel. lib 2. cap. 4. sect. 5, &c..

CHAP. X. SECT. IV. If a man without collusion, or in simplicity of heart, judge a thing to be his owne, when it is not, upon the dictate of his conscience he may, and ought to enjoy it as his owne. If a man, in the same manner, judge one to be his Soveraign who is a Tyrant, or him to be the law­full Magistrate, who falsly claimes that title to himself, he is bound to yeeld him due obedience.

To the last branch of the objection, the tainture of most ancient Governments by history, with vio­lence at their first erection, and yet that they may well now be accounted the ordinance of God, I have returned answer sufficient aboveChap. 5. sect. 4. subsect. 6. in An­swer to objection the last., and shall there­fore, to spare my Reader, forbear repetition here.

SECT. IV. The examples of the Jews submitting to the Babylonian, Persian, and Grecian Kings, and of the Christians to o­thers, and the command the Jewes had of submitting to the Babylonian, objected, and answered.

Objection 4. BUt have we not going before us the examples of the people of God, the Jewes submitting themselves to the Babylonian first, then to the Persian, then to the Grecian powers? this appears in the Prophecies of Ieremiah, and Ezekiel, and in the histories of Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther, and the Maccabees. And were not these usurpers over them? As also the ancient Christians, when there were at sun­d [...]y times those that by no better wayes then murther, force, and bribery ascended to the Roman Empire, [...]hey [Page 335] yeilded obedience to such. Yea,CHAP. X. SECT. IV. Subsect. 1. we finde s [...]verall com­mands, and exhortations which the Jews & with them also other neighbouring Nations had from God for submis­sion to the Babylonian Monarch. And doe not these In­stances imply the present possessor to be the power?

Subsection 1. Of the examples of the Jewes, and Christians submission to these (supposed) usurpers over them.

Answer. THis objection must be answered by pa [...]ts.

1. For the examples of the Jewes sub­mitting to those Kings of Babylon, Persia, and G [...]eece, which the Histories mention, and of the Christians so doing to certain violent intruders into the Roman imperiall dignity.

1 Some submission may be yielded and necessa­ry to the present possessor, when he is not the power of God, ordained of God, yea, and when another is that power: of which divers precedents have been before given out of ScriptureChap. 7. Sect. 2. Subsect. 5. & 8.. As there may be actu­al rule without authority, so there may be actual sub­jection, and no allegiance. But this submission is of another nature, different from that which is proper, and peculiar to divinely constituted powers. Of which difference somewhat ere I conclude.

2 That the Jewes were Subjects by League, and dedition to the Babylonian, Pe [...]sian, Grecian, and Roman Empires successively, was above testified by Mr. Selden, and others in answer to the second objecti­on. And if so, then they were subject to them of right, as to their Magistrates, authorized by God. And whe [...]eas some have objected that rule of Deut. 17.14, 15. enjoyning the Israelites to set to be King over them one of their brethren, and not a stran­ger. [Page 336] To hinder the justnesse of their title, or to ille­gitimate the said submission of the Jewes to those Rulers.

1 If it did so, then is not that their submission to be urged as presidential to others, or as a proof, that those they submitted to were powers over them of Gods ordaining.

2 But I take that of Moses to be no disallowance of the Jewes owning the Babylonian, &c.

1 That rule in Moses seems to point at no other time but their first establishment, or erection of their Kingdome.

2 It respecteth them onely in the condition of the free possession of their owne Land.

3 For their submission to the Babylonian, the Scriptures referred to in the objection, expresly deliver a command from God, the which (if that of Moses were still, and in that condition binding) was a Supersedeas to what was before given.

3 No particular instances are brought when, or who were the Christians that subjected, or, to whom, or who the Emperours that usurped; if any be to be given, either the like answer as is now made to those of the Jewes may suffice, or a further may be to be rendred. But somewhat of the Christians carriage to some of the Roman usurpers will be said anon.

Subsection 2. CHAP. X. SECT. IV. Subsect. 2. Of the commands the Jewes had of submitting to the Babylonian.

2 FOr the commands, and exhortations which the Jewes had to yield to Nebuchadnezzar. 1. Those commands, Jer. 27.1. to the 18.28. 14, 16.38.17, &c. 21.8, 9. seem not to have been delivered untill after the King, and people of Judah had first of their own accord, yielded up themselves to Nebuchadnez­zar. Compare the said passages which reduce them­selves within Zedekiah's reign, with 2 King. 24.1. Jer. 37.2. Ezek. 17.13, &c. 2. If those commands be extended to others besides to whom they were then personally given, they do directly contradict that which they are brought to prove, viz. That a present possessor is to be submitted to, as Gods pow­er, and ordinance. For when these commands were directed out, who was the present p [...]ssessor of rule o­ver the Jewes? not Nebuchadnezzar, for Zedekiah, and his people had rebelled against him after they had sworn allegiance to himKing. 24.20. 2 Chron. 36.13. Jer. 52.3. Ezek. 17.13, 14, 15.: and Zed [...]kiah was now in fact the supream Governour: yet are these commands given, and urged again and again by the Prophet from the Lord, both to Zedekiah to subject himself, and to the Priests, and people (in case Zedekiah would not) to surrender themselves to Nebuchad­nezzar: For which he is therefore complained of to Zedekiah as an author of defectionJer. 38.4..

These commands have been much of late alledged, but they make little for the alledgers purpose: they holding forth one as p [...]oprietor of Dominion, to wit, Nebuchadnezzar, another as possessor, Zedekiah, and enjoyning the Iewes to desert the possessor, and yield themselves to the proprietor, then out of possession.

[Page 338]2. For that command, Jer. 29.7. 1. The mat­ter commanded is no more, but that the Jewes, cap­tives in the City of Babylon, should seek the publique peace of that City, and pray unto the Lord for it. Which may be a duty ordinarily incumbent on the people of God in relation to any City, or Terri­tory, whether themselves reside within, and be actu­ally under the government of it, or not; and upon whatsoever termes the governm [...]nt thereof might stand; according to the Apostles rule2 Tim. 2.1.. But ob­serve, the interest of the present government is not put into into that command, nominately; nor o­therwise implyed then as it might conduce to the Cities peace; neither is the said interest implyed to be necessary to the said publique peace.

2 Such as that precept is, it is apparent to have been but of a temporary nature, and given upon a speciall occasion of their being captives in that City, and of their being declared to be sure so to be, and there to serve the Kings of Babylon untill the end of seventy years, and it being declared they were sent from Judea thither by God for the better place, and their own peace to be bound up in that of Babylon See this Text it selfe, and Jer. 24.5, &c. 25.11.21.8, 9.38.2, 17, &c.. For after the terme of that captivity exp [...]ed, they are called out thence again, and are taught the con­trary carriage towards towards that City, to wit, not onely to depart out of, but to pray against it, use imprecations upon it, and exultations in its ruineJer. 50.8, 28.51.35. Psal. 137.8, 9..

3. It is in like manner to be said of all those fore­mentioned commands of God to the Jewes, and to the other Nations, for their submission to Nebuchad­nezzar, that they were of an extraordinary, and pecu­liar nature, and not binding to others in like condi­tion. They were such speciall Declarations of Gods will, and disposall as do not impose upon any but hose unto whom they were particularly made. I may leave it to the determination of any considerate man, whether if now the Turk, Tartar, Chinaois, or any other Mahometan, o [...] Pagan P [...]ince, yea, or any one of the Princes of Europe, of a warlike spirit, and [Page 339] growing more potent in Armes then the rest, should discover his designes, make preparations, and give out threatnings for the conquest of the Nations a­bout (as then did Nebuchadn [...]zzar in reference to the Kingdomes of Palestina, and others) were the said Princes and States of Europe bound to surrender themselves as servants, or tributaries to him, and his posterity (either for the definite space of 70 yeares, or for the alwayes of his, or their standing up) under payn of destruction from God, if they should not, by vertue of that which God declareth to the Kings, and people of Judah, and other Nations concerning Nebuchadnezzar by the Prophet Jeremiah Jer. 27. per to­tum.. Or, if a Kingdome be invaded by a forein Potentate, and the chiefe City, and strength of it be by him besieged, is the supream Commander, or the people without him, necessarily bound to yield to their Invader, and besieger, because of what is declared, and denoun­ced to Zedekiah, and them of Hierusalem Jer. 21.8, 9.38.17, &c.? Or let the urgers of these instances themselves be judges, whether, because Zedekiah with his people having been (formerly) the subjects of Nebuchadnezzar, and sworn to him, and lately revolted from him, and now summoned by him to re-deliver themselves up to him; and they being reproved by the Prophets, Jeremiah, and Ez [...]kiel, for their revolt, and call'd upon for the said rendition, were thereupon obliged to submit to Nebuchadnezzar: therefore in like man­ner others that have been under the like obligations to a Prince, and have cast him off, are in conscience bound upon summons to render themselves to him by force of those Texts.

CHAP. X. SECT. V. SECT. V. The Objection, from the supposed good­nesse which may be in the administra­tion of a meere possessory power, an­swered.

Object. 5. BƲt though the ingresse, the possession of a power be evill, yet the acts, and ef­fects of that power, viz. The lawes, judiciall proceed­ings, administrations, counsels, and designes thereof may be good.

Answ. 1. What good of profit may be expected from such a power, hath been discoursed of above.

2 A government that is unlawfull as to possession, cannot but be unlawful, and injurious as to exercise and action: The act cannot be good, if the principle be bad. A government for constitution good may for the acts it puts forth be bad; but a government for constitution bad, cannot for the acts it puts forth be good. The act which such a power puts forth may be good for matter, or in specie, or in the uni­versall nature of it abstract from it's circumstances, but it's bad in individuo, or as done by him. The act may be good i. e. profitable to the person to whom it's done, but it's not good morally, or politically, it's still evill to the agent. It may be good to him too comparatively, that is, it's better, if he will govern, to exercise his power, to act what is materially and to others good, then what is per se, vicious, and to others perniciousVide Cajetan Summul. Tit. Remp. Tyran. Et Navarri Compendium Tit. Tyran., but it's not good to him absolute­ly, and in it selfe, for it were simply his duty, if a just title will not be made out to him, to desist.

To make a politicall action good, to wit, just, and [Page 341] legall, there must goe, 1. The warrantablenesse of the matter done. 2. A warrantable calling of the person to do it. The former may be, and often is in the actions of men without the latter; by which meanes it comes to passe those actions are sinfull: yea, and often, or for the most part, are more bane­full then beneficial to others. The note of Sculietus, upon that saying of our Savour, Thus it becometh us to fulfill all righteousnesse, Decet nos im­plere omnem justitiam, h. e. decet me implere meam justitiam, & te implere tuam justitiam. Intelligit autem justitiam particularem, i. e. operas ministerii uniuscujusque: quemadmo­dum Plato justitiam hanc definivit, [...]. Justitia est facere quae sui sunt muneris, & non curiosum esse in al enis negotiis. Scul [...]et. Delic. Evang. cap. 28. pag. 107. See also this point well discoursed in Mr. Symonds his Case, and Cu [...]e, &c. cap. 23. pag. 279. Vide etiam Aquinat. 22 ae. qu. 60. artic. 2. may be here pertinently remembred. We must understand this distributively, that is, it becomes me to fulfill mine, thee to fulfill thy righteousnesse. He meanes of praticular justice, that is, the deed of every ones place respectively: even as Plato hath defined this justice to be, every mans doing his own, and not medling with anothers office.

3. This allegation may be an inducement to the Subject to beare, and improve to the best what he cannot remedy: but it breeds no obligation on him to take such a Ruler to be a power ordained of God: neither gives him a warrant of engaging to the said Ruler as such, in all tyes, and duties refe [...]ring to a Magistrate.

CHAP. X. SECT. VI. SECT. VI. Of the sayings of some Protestant Au­thors, interpreting this Text not on­ly to require obedience to present Ru­lers, what ever their title be, but to justifie their being ordained of God.

Object. 6. BƲt some of our Protestant Divines of chiefe note commenting upon this Text, have given their s [...]nse to be: That obedience in lawfull things is to be yeelded to the present Rulers without respe­cting by what right, or wrong they have gotten into pow­er: and that who ever is in actuall rule is the power of God, ordained of God, and that it appears he is so by his seisure, or possession.

Answer. Here are two positions delivered as the judgement of such Authors.

1. For the former, viz. That obedience is (as lawfull, and in many cases necessary) to be yield­ed, in lawful things to a poss [...]ssory power: (for which are cited Peter Martyr, and Gualter in loc.) I have no dispuse against it. It may be a position allowable in it selfe, though not built upon this Text, unto which I conceive it forein. There are other grounds, besides Gods ordination of the powers that are, and the supposall of a reall Magistracy in him that go­verneth, upon which to found, and warrant such an obedience.

2. For the latter (that, whoever s in actuall rule is the power of God, ordained of God, and is ma­nif [...]sted so to be by such his command) though i [...] may seem to have the judgement, and a thority of Bu [...]er, [Page 343] Calvin, and Pareus, as they are alledged for it, and perhaps of some others, yet it is not the [...]ore to pass. But I shall for reverence sake to those Divines recite their words: and offer that which is (I think) suffi­cient to take off the strength which this argument would borrow from their authority.

Buc [...]rs word [...] are. When therefore it is questioned whom thou must obey, thou must not look what a one he is that exerciseth power, nor by what right or wrong any hath entred into the power, nor how h [...] doth use it, but onely whether he have power: F [...]r if any be possessed of power, it is without doubt he hath received that power from God Quum igitur quaeritur cui pa­rendum, non est spectandum qualis sit qui potestatem ex­ercet, nec quo jure, vel inju­ria quis potesta­tem invaserit, quavè ratione eā administret; sed tantum si potestatem ha­beat. Si enim quis potestate pollet, jam in­dubitatum est illum a deo eam potestatem ac­cepisse. Bucer in loc..

Calvin saith, Whereas men often enquire, by what right they have obtained their power, who have the rule; It should be enough to us that are in Rule. For they have nor ascended to this height by their owne power, but are im­posed by the hand of [...]he Lord Saepe solent inquirere quo jure adeptifuerint po­testatem qui rerum potiuntur: Satis autem nobis esse debet quòd praesunt, non enim conscenderunt sua ipsi virtute in hoc fastigium, sed manu Do­mini sunt impositi. Calv. in loc..

Pareus hath it thus He that hath shed mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed; but not by any man, for the prohibition is, thou shalt not kill: but by a Magistrate ordained of God. Neither matters it by what meanes or arts, Nim [...]od, Jerob [...]am, or others have gotten them Kingdomes. For the power which is of God is one thing, the acquisition, and use of the power is another Qui sanguinem hominis fuderit ejus sanguis etiam fundetur ab homines: non utique à quovis, prohibuit etenim, non occides; sed a Magi­stratu divinitus ordinato. Nec refert quibus modis, vel artibus Nim­rod, Jeroboam, vel alii regna sibi paraverint: nam aliud est potestas quae a Deo est, aliud acquisitio, & usus potestatis. Paraeus in loc..

I shall not controvert the sense of these sentences, or enquire whether they will beare aequivalence with the position. Neither will I take upon me to com­ment upon these Commentators, but having bestow­ed so much labour upon the Text it selfe, which is [Page 344] both their, and my subject, I shall leave the Reader to judge of what is said by either, as he shall finde reason. Onely somewhat to the weight of their au­thority.

1. The opinion, or averment of man (of the best for learning and piety) in a case of conscience, or in an enquiry what is the sense of such a Scripture, or such a divine precept, is not an oracle, neither will it passe for such in any controversie. The truth is, we are very prone to attribute some authority to it, and urge it upon others, so far as we finde it con­current with our owne perswasion. But who is he that will be pre-judged, or concluded by it contrary to the opinion he hath received, or in what he is o­therwlse doubtfull? when we look upon it with an impartial eye, that is, in the case wherein we are not p [...]e-possessed, it bears no other value with us then what is allayed with the imperfections of fallibility in it selfe, and variablenesse from it selfe, and more­over is ordinarily contradicted by other humane te­stimony or sentence, as considerable.

2. This p [...]sition, asserting the power that occu­pyeth his place by unjust acquisition, and tenure to be ordained of God, understanding by Gods ordina­tion his institutive, or preceptive will, Bucer stands charged for it by Pererius, and other Expositors of the best note of that party, as making God the au­thor of SinneSee Dr. Wil­let in loc quest. 5. and Mr. Prin his third part of the Supreme Power, &c. pag. 114.. The assoyling the position of that cha [...]ge I leave to them that may concurre with him in it.

3. This argument from humane authority (though of such persons) in this case can signifie little, being far from universall, or having the ge­nerall, yea, or (as far as I have observed) the com­mon, or the major vote of such Authors. For the satisfaction of those that may lay great weight on the jud [...]ement of those above cited, or may suspect my sense of singularity; I shall here set downe the sentences of other Authors (in greater store, and of speciall esteem) who gainsay that which is said by [Page 345] Calvin, Bucer, and Pareus. In bringing in my Au­thors I shall reduce them to two heads.

1 Those that speak particularly to this Text.

2 Those that speak to the thing without refe­rence to it.

1 Those that speak to the Text, denying it to in­clude every possessory power, and limiting it to the lawfully entitled.

I begin with Chrysostome, Chrysostom. in loc. who commenting upon the Text, hath these words. What sayest thou? is therefore every Prince made of God? this, saith he, I say not; for I doe not speake of this, or that Prince, but of the thing it selfe. — Wherefore he saith not, The Prince is not but of God, but discourseth of the thing it selfe, saying, the power is not but of God.

My next is, Theophylact Theophylact. in loc. upon the Text, who re­peating the words of Ch [...]ysostome, saith further, He speaks of the Princes office, not of the Prince: as when a wise man shall say, a wise is joyned to her husband of God, he doth not say, that what man soever lyeth with a wife, hath her for his wife of God, but God hath joyned her to him that is marryed.

Next I shall bring out of the harmony of the con­fessions of the Christian, and reformed Churches,Harmony of Confess. in Eng­lish, Sect. 19. pag. 588. 592, 593. the confessions of the Protestant Princes, and States of Germany, viz. Those of Auspurge, and Saxony That of Saxony saith: Although there be many horrible confusions, which grow from the Devill, and the mad­nesse of men, yet the lawful government, and society of men is ordained of God. As it is said, Rom. 13.

That of Auspurge hath it thus. Such civill ordinan­ces as be lawfull are the good works and ordinances of God, as Paul witnesseth, The powers that be are or­dained of God. Gods wisdome is declared by order, which is in the discerning of vertues, and vices, and in the society of man-kinde under lawful government.

To these I shall adjoyne these Protestant Wri­ters

Musculus upon the Text. It is to be noted, he doth not say, the [...]e is not a Prince, or King who is not of God, [Page 346] but their power is not but of God. For he speaks not of the abuse of power, and the tyranny which many Princes exercise, nor y t of those who by force break into powers, but of the power it selfe divinely ordained. Although every power be of God, Notandum quod non dicit, non est princeps, vel Rex qui non sit a Deo, sed non est potestas nisi a deo; non enim lo­quitur de abusu potestatis, ac tyrannide quam plerique exercent, neque de iis qui vi i [...]rum­punt in potestates, sed de ipsa potestate divinitus ordinata.— Licet omnis potestas a Deo sit, non tamen mox omnis princeps est a Deo. Scrip­tum est de quibusdam, ipsi regna verunt, & non est a me. Musculus in loc. Officium subditorum erga Magistratus est obedientia, ut illi, si legitimus est, omnes pareant. Rom. 13.1. Nulla potestas, &c. Becanus loc. 49. qu. 13. pag. 853. yet every Prince is not presently of God. It is written of some, They [...]ave reigned, and it is not of me.

Becanus. The duty of Subjects towards the Magistrate is obedience, that, if he be a lawfull Magistrate, they all obey him. Rom. 13.1. There is no power but of God.

Dr. Mayer upon the place. He moveth the questi­on, whether the subjection of the Text be due to any pow­er once up, either by right, or wrong? His answer is, The conscience is not bound to usurpers, but they may be removed againe; as Jehoiada removed Athaliah, and set up the right King. A King by birth, by election, or by law of Armes through conquest is to be served, though he be wicked, and tyrannicall, as being given in Gods anger, for punishment; but a Ʋsurper may be resi­sted, and deposed again.

Dr. Hammond upon the place, in his paraphrase, interpreteth it of obedience to the supream powers right­ly established, and constituted. And that every person un­der government of what ranke soever he be, is to yeeld subjection to the supream Governour legally placed in that Kingdome. And elsewhere he saith, obedience to Superiours is extended indefinitely [...], to the most heathen, provoking, oppressi [...]g (as long as th [...]y be lawfull) powers.

And again. By the words, he beareth not the Sword in vaine, &c. is intimated, that the sword for vengeance, [Page 347] &c. is put into the hands of the lawfull Magistrate, with commission to use it as the constitution of the King­dome shall best direct.

The Author of the fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne.Fuller Answer &c. pag. 17, 18. Mr. Prin his 3d part of the So­veraign power, &c. pag. 104. The powers that be (i. e.) so, or so establisht by consent of man, are ordained of God to be obeyed, or it's Gods ordi­nance that men should live under some government, and submit, without resistance to that kinde of Government they have by consent established. — That other kinde of tyranny (viz. of usurpation) it hath no right, no ordi­nation at all, and so no subjection due to it.— There is in every ordained power, as well Gods institution of it, & injunction of obedience to it, as mans constitution of it.

Mr. Prinne saith, The whole scope of this Text in sum is onely this, that Christians ought in conscience to be subject to all lawfull higher powers, &c. and not resist them in the execution of their just authority.

Mr. Burroughs.Mr. Burroughs on Hos. Chap. 1. Lect. 6. pag. 157. & Lect. 4. pag. 111. & Lect. 3. pag 65. You must observe, that every one is subject to the higher powers. Mark, it is not to man first, but it is to the power. Let every soule be subject to the higher power, where-ever this power lyeth. It is not to the will of man that hath power, but it is to the power of that man. Now the power, the authority is that that a man hath in a legall way.

He elsewhere tells us, There is no authority we are subject to now, but according to the Lawes and Constitu­tions of the Countrey where we live. When things are brought into a Law, and be according to the agreements, and covenants of the place, and Countr [...]y wherein we live, &c. then the power of God is in it, though it be abused (viz. by an ill law made) and we are to be subject to all powers. When it once comes to be a power, to be a Law, it is authority, though abused, and we must ye [...]ld obedience to it, either actively, or passively. But we must enquire whether it be a power.

To these Authors may be added those others whom I cited before, who hold the resistance forbid­den to be made against the power of God, Vers. 2. to be lawfull against an un-entitled, or usurping power: to whom as they are before quotedChap 8 sect. 4., I refer my Reader.

And unto all these I may super-add the judgement of diverse Commentators of the Popish party, yet of best note of that sort among us. Estius I shall recite. An usurped power, Potestas usurpa­ta, cujusmodi est latronum & ti­rannorum, non est absolute po­testas nec supe­rioritas, sicut leges inutiles & mala, non sunt leges, Estius in loc. such as is that of Tyrants, and Rob­bers, is not a power absolutely, neither a superiority. As unprofitable, and evill Lawes are no Laws. Dominicus, Soto, Cajetan, and Pererius I omit to cite in their words. They may be found in Mr. Prinn, and Dr. Willet.

2. And for those that speake to the thing (though not referring to this Text expresly) to wit, the nulli­ty of a meer possessory power, or his no authority, I will for brevities sake but name my Authors, who fully enough speake it, whom my Reader may peruse, or pretermit as he pleaseth.Mr. Prin his third part of the Soveraign Power, &c. p. 114. Dr. Willet in loc. qu. 2.

1 That a Usurper hath no authority in him, is a meer private person, see Alsted. Theolog. Cas. cap. 17. Reg. 8. pag. 34. Grot. de Jure B. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect 11. Arnisaeus de Author. principis. cap. 4. sect. 12. pag. 124.

2 That no obedience is due to an un-entitled, or illegal power. Aquinas 22a. qu. 104. artic. 6. ad 3. Burroughes on Hosea, Cap. 1. Lect. 4. p. 111. and Lect. 3. pag. 65. Vindication of Treatise of Monarchy. Cap. 3. Sect. 6.

3 That the Sword is peculiar to a Magistrate lawfully called. Becanus Instit. Theol. loc. 49. qu. 16. pag. 854.

4 That to the being of a Magistrate is required a lawfull call. See those quoted before in this Trea­tise. Cap. 1. Sect. 2. Subsect. 3.

5 That to the making of a supream Magistrate is to go to the vote, or consent of the people. Take those cited, Cap. 5. Sect. 4 Subsect. 4. To which I will here put in Mr. John Goodwin (as swaying much with some) In his Obstruct. of Justice. Sect. 25. pag. 27.

SECT. VII. CHAP. X. SECT. VII. Many examples given of persons of good account, who have disowned, or opposed meer possessory powers in such Recognitions, or rights as are due to the powers that are ordained of God.

7 IN the next place, is asked, But can any instances be given of any of the people of God, or of such per­sons whose examples are of any commendable, or imita­ble note, who at any time have professedly detrected, or denyed to those in actuall dominion any duty, or acknow­ledgement due unto Magistrates; or that have practised the contrary to what this, or any other Text confessedly delivers to be observed in relation to those who are here entitled to be the powers ordained of God?

Answ. A multitude (doubtlesse) of such examples there have been, as may be evident by the no small number of remarkable instances of this kinde, which my short observation, and memory hath here recol­lected.

1. Of such as have practised the contrary to what is a plain, and confessed duty, or rule to be observed towards those who are the powers ordained of God.

1 And first examples of such as being under the present predominancy of meer possessory powers, and being private persons have either deserted such, and gone over to their opposites, or remaining under them have acted, or assisted against them.

We finde a large list of C [...]ptains, and their men of severall Tribes of Israel, who being actually seated [Page 350] under the Dominion of the house of Saul, fell from it, and turned to David, both during the Reign of Ishbosheth, and upon his death, although there were then many heires left of Sauls line. See for this 1 Chron. 12.22. unto v. 39. We read of Hushai the Archite, of Zadok, and Abiathar the Priests, and of their two sons, Ahimaaz, and Jonathan, who after Davids flight out of Jerusalem, and the maine of the Kingdome both in respect of places, and peo­ple, seised by Absalom, and themselves being fully under the territory and command of Absalom, yet acted for David in his state of ej [...]ction, and against Absalom. 2 Sam. 15.32. to the end, 16.16, 17, 18, 19.17.6. to the 23. vers.

When the men of Israel in distinction from Judah generally had cast off David, and followed Sheba the son of Bichri (upon that variance which fell out be­twixt the Judabites, and the Israelites about Davids return to his Kingdom, and in his way betwixt Jor­dan, and Jerusalem) the wise woman of Abel, and after the people in that City by her perswasion (though they were of those that had deserted David) and set up Sheba, and though he then had the supream com­mand there) consulted, and executed a rendition of themselves, and City to David, and the destructi­on of Sheba upon Joabs pacificatory offer to them. 2 Sam. 20.1, 2.14, 16, &c.

Upon Jeroboams usurpation, and the ten Tribes revolt from the Kingdome of the house of David the Priests, and Levites that were in all Israel, and other people out of all the Tribes of Israel which adhered to the true God, and his worship upheld in the King­dome of Judah, forsook Jeroboam, and his Domini­ons, and joyned themselves to Rehoboam, and so strengthened the Kingdome of Judah, and R [...]hoboam in it, 2 Chr. 11.13, 16, 17. In like m [...]nner did mul­titudes out of Israel fall from Baasha King of Israel unto Asa King of Judah. Although Baasha was an enemy to the Kingdome of Judah, and to that their revolt, and endeavoured by force to prevent it, 2 Chron. 15.9. 1 King. 15.17.

To this I shall add, that the Prophet Jeremiah exhorts the people of Judah from God to relinquish Zedekiah, the present supream G [...]vernor over them, and to yeeld up themselves to Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, Jer. 27.16, &c. 21.8, 9. And the ground of that appears to be,

1. Zedekiah, and his Kingdome had lately beene subject, and tributary to the Babylonian, Ezek. 27. [...]. to 16. and Zedekiah's, and their present standing up against him, by their own force of Armes, and the assistance of the Aegyptian was but rebellion. Ez [...]k 17.6. 2 Kings 24.28.

2 The Lord had given unto the Babylonian the command of that Territory and people for 70 years by his express order and declaration, Jer. 27.12.28.14, 16. And the said seventy yeares were ere this (that is in the fourth yeare of Jehoiakim) begun, ac­cording to the computation of our best Chronolo­gersTo wit, Arch­bishop Usher, Dr. John Rey­nolds, Hugh Broughton, Mr. Mede, The Divines Annot. and Mr. Light. who all of them begin the 70. years the 4. of Jehoiakim.. And unto these exhortations it's probable some hearkned, and those might be they who fell to the Chaldeans, mentioned Jer. 38.19.

To these Scripture-instances I shall adjoyne one, or two observable ones out of other Histories. Am­brose being Bishop of Millain in Italy, at what time Maximus the Tyrant (of whom beforeChap. 8. sect 4) had depri­ved Valentinian of possession of his Empire of the West, he contested with Maximus about his said act, and that very sharply; and twice went Ambassadour to him unto Triers, and pleaded the right of young Valentinian in that Empire against him, the pre­sent possessor. And when he could not so prevaile, he discommunioned Maximus, to his owne mighty pe­rill, for Maximus threatned him with death. Upon which he was forced to to flie to Aquileia: whence he returned not untill the said Maximus was repres­sed, and slain by Theodosius Proximum ei (sc. Ambrosio) certamen cum Maximo fuit Tyranno; apud quem legarum pro Valentinia­no juniore quem ex Galliis Max­imus expulerat, bis egit in Urbe Trovirorum. A­pud quem cùm acerrimè primum contendisser, ne adolescentem, cui successi­onis, & haereditatis jure deberetur regnū, imp [...]rii justa possessione pelleret: deinde communione etiam ei interdixit, non sine ingenti sui periculo: caedem enim ei Maximus minatus est: ob quam Aquileiam Ambros. secedere coa­ctus est: ex quo loco rediit Mediolanum post, cum a Theodosio interfectus Maximus esset. Magdebur. C [...]nt. 4. cap. 10 pag. 1163..

It is also observed of the same Ambrose, that when that Maximus, to ingratiate himselfe by an office so just and good, offered to interpose his power in the defence of Ambrose, against Justina the Arrian Em­presse (the mother of Valentinian whom Maximus dispossessed) she being about to banish him from Millain; Ambrose would not accept of the help of Maximus, whose power he disallowed, and gainsay­edGrot. de jure Belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. sect. 5..

Another is of no long distance from our own time. It is that of the Suffolk men, who were zealous con­fessors of the Gospel, and Protestant faith, and were the first that joyned themselves to the Lady Mary, af­ter the death of King Edward the sixth, and the ad­vancement to the Crown of the Lady Jane. The sum of the Story I shall give out of Mr. Fox, and Mr. Speed in their own expressions.

King Edward did by his Testament (or Letters Patent, signed with his own hand, and sealed with the great Seale, saith the Letter of the Lords to the Lady Mary) in the presence of the most part of the Nobles, Counsellors, Judges, with divers other grave, and sage Personages, assenting, and subscribing to the same, appoint the Lady Jane to be Inheritrix unto the Crown of England. To this order subscribed all the Kings Councell, and the chiefe of the Nobi­lity, the Mayor, and City of London, and almost all the Judges, and chiefe Lawyers of this Realm.

When King Edward was dead, the Lady Jane was established in the Kingdome by the Nobles consent, and was forthwith published Queen by Proclamation at London, and in other Cities where was any great re­sort, and was there so taken, and named. The Lord Maior of London, sixe of the Aldermen, and twelve Commoners Merchants being sent for by the Nobi­lity, take their Oaths for the Lady Jane, and unto her obedience they promise to secure the City. The Lords of the Councell write to the Lady Mary (in answer to her Letter, wherein she had required their owning, and proclaiming her as Queen) telling her that the Lady Jane is, after the death of Edward [Page 353] the six [...]h, invested, and possessed with the just, and right Title in the Imperiall Crown of this Realm, &c.

The Lady Mary upon this Letter of refusall, spee­deth her secretly away far off from the City. The Councell, hearing of her sudden departure, gather speedily a power of men, appoint an Army, and [...]end forth the Duke of Northumberland with it. Mary in the meane time tossed with much travail up and down, &c, w th-drew her selfe into the quarters of Norfolk, and Suffolk [...], and there gathering to her such ayd of the Commons as she might, keepeth her selfe close for a space in Fremingham Castle. To her first of all resorted the Suffolk-men, who being alwayes forward in promoting the proceedings of the Gos­pell, promised her their ayd, so that she would not attempt the alteration of the Religion which her bro­ther King Edward had before established, &c. Thus Mary, being guarded by the power of the Gospe lers, did vanquish the Duke, and all those that came a­gainst her. The Lords after this proclaimed for Queen the Lady Mary, eldest daughter to King Hen­ry the 8th. and appointed by Parliament to succeed King Edward dying without issue.

The brief of this story, as to our present scope, is this. Here we have the Lady Jane in possession of the Crown, by her immediate Predecessors testament by proclamation, and by the consent and actual re­ception of the Chieftains of the Land, and having the first Military power on foot to uphold her there­in. And the Lady Ma [...]y claiming the Crown by ver­tue of lineall succ [...]ssion, the Act of Parliament, and the T [...]st [...]ment of King Henry the 8 h, which laid the ground of her title antecedent to (as well as more speciously (to say no more here) then) any thing the other could challenge, or be invested by. And, notwithstanding the said poss [...]ssion of the o­ther, the Suffolke Gospellers are the fi [...]st comers in to Mary, and undertakers of her assistance, for the vindication of her Title, and the g [...]ining her posses­sion [Page 354] of the Throne: and this before she had any ac­knowledgment, or reception of the Nobles, or Commons, or other ayd appearing for her.

2. Another sort of examples may be of such as being Princes, or communities have cast off, or by Armes repulsed the domination of them who have had present command over them. Scripture exam­ples in this kinde I have given beforeChap. 8. Sect. 4.: and shall therefore here but name them. Such are those of Othniel, Ehud, Deborah, and the rest of the Judges, with the Israelites rising up against Chusanrisha­thaim, Eglon, Jabin, and the other invaders, and captivers of them respectively, of which in the book of Judges. In like manner were the wars of the same people for their liberty against the Philistines, and the Syrian Kings, in the times, and under the con­ducts of Eli, Samuel, Saul, and David in the stories of both the Books of Samuel, and of the Kings; of the same sort were the recuperative Armes of David, and Jehoiada, against Absalom, Sheba, and Athaliah, in the said Books. As also were the stirrings of the Kings, and people of Judah from Solomon, unto the time of their Babylonish captivity, against the Kings of Israel, Syria, Assyria, and other encroachers, re­lated in the second Book of Chronicles. And such, lastly, were the conflicts of the Jewes under the As­monean government, against diverse of the Selen­cian Kings Of all these I will make particular nar­rative but of one, that is, that good King Hezekiah, and of him but shortly thus.

2 King. 18.7.It is said, That he rebelled against the King of Assy­ria, and served him not. Expositors observe the rea­son of these words to be, The kingdome was left to Hezekiah by his father Ahaz, in a subjection to Shal­mantzar King of Assyria; but he being no way bound to serve at his father did, because he used his liberty, and cast that yoke from him, he is said to rebell. Mr. Lightfoot Divines An­notat. in loc. and Mr. Light­foot his Har­mon. of the old Test. pag 117. observes further, that, not onely had Ahaz his father but himselfe reigned as an Homager to the Assyrian; who subdued, and deposed Ahaz, and set up [Page 355] Hezekiah on the Th [...]one in his stead: and, that Heze­kiah being thus under the Assyrian for a time, he would beare it no longer, &c.

A multitude of instances of this sort out of other stories are produceable. Among others, those of the Christian Princes, and Nations, on the Eastern con­fines of Christendome, who bordering upon the Turkish Sultan, have been by him subdued, and held under; and being in that condition, have at several times attempted, and sometimes prosperously effe­cted a recovery from that subjection. As, for in­stance, have done sundry Princes of Hungary, of Macedon, and of Greece, and the State of Venice. Amongst them the atchievements of George Castriot (surnamed Scanderbeg) in his regaining of the Coun­treys of Epirus, and Albania, from which his Father had been oured, and himselfe was excluded by A­murath the sixth: and of John Huniades, the Vayvod of Transylvania (under the shi [...]ld of whose valour, and successe, the Countreys of Moldavia, and Vala­chia rose up for, and recovered their freedome from the same Turkish Signior) are very notable, and ea­sie to be remembred.

3. There may be under this head another sort of examples given, to wit, of such as have not been un­der the command, and actuall subjectednesse of the meer possessory power, but have assailed, and come in upon him from abroad, upon the quarrell of the disseisure of a just title, and for the reinvesting of it, the cause being either their owne, or others, whom they have thought it just, and requisite to assist therein.

The instance of Abrahams arming, pursuing, and fighting in the rescue of his brother Lot, and the peo­ple of Sodome, and Gomorrah, and their goods taken, and carryed away by, and remaining wholly in the possession of Chederlaomer, &c. went before: onely I shall observe here upon it, that Mr. Calvin (in his Sermons on Gen. 14.13, &c. trans [...]ed out of French into English, page 5, 6, 7, 8.) moving this question, [Page 356] Whether these a [...]mes of Abraham were lawfull, or no, being he was neither King, nor Prince, but dwelt in the Land of Canaan as a stranger? An [...]wers thus. How­beit here is one thing fi [...]st to be noted of us: that he had been already constituted, and ordained to be Lord, and Master of this Countrey: and, although the p [...]ss [...]ssion thereof was not yet given him, yet for all tha [...], the right and title thereof belonged to him. By which wo [...]ds, Mr. Calt in pl inly teacheth, that the poss [...]ssion of a Countrey m [...]y be in one, the right thereof in ano­ther, and that the person in whom the right is, may lawfully war upon the poss [...]ssor for the recovery of his said right.

We had also before the instance of Theodosius the Emperour of the East, his coming in the quarrell of Valentinian, fi [...]st upon Maximus, who had took the Western Empire, and held it from Valentinian; and, after the suppression of him, upon Eugenius, who had a while after inju [...]iously se [...]sed the same Em­pireSee before Chap. 8. Sect. 4..

I will here add one more out of Scripture, and a few more out of other H [...]stories. The Scripture in­stance is this.2 King. 3.4. M [...]sha King of Moab rebelling against Jehoram King of Israel, not onely doth Jehoram make an invasive War upon him for the recovery of his Dominion over Mo [...]b, but Jehoshaphat, that good King of Judah, assists him therein in his owne pe [...] ­son: yea, and Elisha the Prophet was with them in that Expedition; and in their great distresse for lack of water enquired of the Lord for them, and from the Lord gave them a promise, and direction for their obtaining, both of water, and of victory in their present War.

The examples out of other H [...]stori s shall be set down but by way of b iefe remembrance. As first, the enterp ize of the Eastern Emper [...]ur Co [...]stantius, his invading, and dest [...]oying Magnentius, who had usurped the West by the murther of Constance the Emperour thereS [...]e Rosse his History, Book 3. chap 1. p. 82.. To this may be annexed the ex­amples of many of the Western, or Italian Christian [Page 357] Emperours, as Honorius, Theodosius Junior, Martian, Leo, and other their Successo [...]s, who b ing disseised of whole Countreys, and Na [...]ions, by the breaking in of the Go [...]bes, &c. into Italy, Spain, and Africa, and sometimes of Rome it self, yet they c aimed, after such their dispossession, their right to those Te [...]rito­ries, and prosecuted the same by force of Armes, wherein they some-while prevailed to a recoveryIdem pag. 92, &c..

I shall refer also to the proceedings of Elubean the Christian King of the Ethiopians against Dunaan the Jew, the usurper of Nargan a City in Arabia, whom in behalf of the Christian people of that Region E­lisb [...]an invaded, and [...]j ctedVide B [...]ron. Annal. ad An. Christi 522, & 523.. As also to the severall wars undertaken by the Christian Princes of Europe for the recovery of Palistine from the Saracens.

Here may be also remembred that when the Ana­baptists of Munst r, had dispossessed the Bishop, who was the civill Lord thereof, and taking into their own hands the rule of all, did after some time of their p pular disorder, put themselves under the ab­solute soveraignty of John Becold; the Protestant P [...]inces of Germany (as the Duke of Saxony, the Lantgrave of Hessen, &c.) joyned in assistance to the said Bishop (a Papist) against the said pretended King in Munster, and his partakers, for the sup­pr [...]ssion of them (then the possessory power there) by the Sword, and for the re-investing of the Bishop, as the rightfull Lord. And that both they, and the Protestant Divines (as Luther, &c.) condemned, and declared against them, as violaters of the civill order of that placeJo. Sleiden Comment. lib. 10. pag. 255..

As also that up [...]n the death of Henry the third of France, when the Kingdome was generally possessed by the Leaguers (the Guisians, the Spanish, and the Popes party) under the command of the D [...]ke of Maine, (who with the pretence of the title of the Cardinall of Bou [...]bon, by him proclaimed King, by the style of Charls the tenth, ruled all, and throwded his owne usurpation) Henry King of Navar, and with him all the Protestant Nobility, and peop [...]e [...]f [Page 358] France stood up for the recovery of that Kingdome out of the hands of those confederates, the possessors, in as much as the Crown of France lineally descended upon the said King of Navar, and Henry the Third had immediately before his last breath nomina ed him his lawfull Heir, and Successor. And unto his ayd in that cause did out Queen Elizabeth send assistance of men, arms, and moneySpeeds Hist. in Q. Eliz. Sect. 259..

The taking up of the cause of the Prince Elector, the Count Pa [...]atine, both the Father, and the Son, by many Protestant Princes, as of England, Sweth­land, Germany, when they were outed of the Palati­nate, and it possessed by the Emperour, and the Ba­varian, for their re-investing therein, is well known, and shall be the last example I will mention of this sort.

For, besides examples, we have it generally ac­knowledged, that the recovery of a disseised title to Dominion is a just cause of wa [...] Vide August. T [...]. 4. part 1. quest. 10. super Josua. Grot. de Jur. B. l. 2. c. 1. Sect. 2.

If it be objected against the alledging of these ex­amples, that being their acts are the acts of persons who are not in actuall subjection to the meer posses­sory power, but such as assaile him ab entra, they come not up to the purpose for which they are brought. I answer,

1. Resistance of that power which is the ordinance of God is in this place (ve [...]s. 2.) disallowed in all, without restriction (whosoever resisteth the power, &c,) and may therefore be ex [...]ended to any, as well Foreiners in regard of State-relation, or of resi­dence, as those who are Members of, or residing in the Common wealth so possessed.

2. Though these be residers other-where, yet in their attempt, or in the act of their assault of the p ssessing power they enter within the bounds of the Common-wealth he is over; and so, were there in­deed a reall Magistracy in the actuall possessor, they would come wi [...]hin the obligation of subjection to him. For this is certain, whosoever are, upon any account, within a Territory, whether as fixed [Page 359] Inhabitants, or as strangers, whether as friendly guests, or hostile invaders, yea, though they be So­veraign Princes in another Countrey, yet, being there, they owe submission to the lawfull power of that Countrey they enter into; they are subditi there, though not cives.

3 They that are actually under the command of another perforce, and they that assist them are invol­ved in the same act. So that, if the former be bound to the duty of Subjects, then it is unlawfull for any, (though Foreiners, yea, though Forein Princes) to ayd them in the violation, or casting off of any such subjection, or the rescue, or restoring of anothers right to it.

2. But enough of exemplification in the point of opposition. In the second place I am to produce some examples of such as have professedly disowned, or de­nyed to those that have had no more but their actual domination to claim by, any of the duties of Subj [...]cts belonging to their civill Magistrates.

It is a known duty of Subjects to their Soveraigns to stand by them (to their power) in defence of them and their possession of the Dominions, and Territo­ries which they hold, against whosoever would de­prive them thereof.Jo. 18.36. Our Saviours acknowledgment to Pilate was; My kingdome is not of this world. If my kingdome were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jewes. But the contrary to this I finde practised in reference to meer possessors.

When the Jewish Nation had before the destru­ction of Jerusalem made a generall defection from the Romans, and had under the conduct of their own Leade [...]s possessed themselves of the Forts and strength of all Judea, and held them against the Ro­mans, and by that meanes had the ruling power then in that Region, the Christians that were in Je­rusalem, deserted the defence of the Jewes, and of their City, and cause, and removed out both of Jeru­salem, and of Judea: so that Historians observe [Page 360] there was at the time of the last siege by Titus not one good Christian left in the CityEuseb. Hist. Eccles. lib. 3. cap. 4. Epiphanius de mensuris, cap. 15. Joseph. de B [...]l. Jud lib. 2. cap. 22. &c. Dr. Simson Chron. Cathol. lib. 7. An. Christi 67. pag. 46. Dr. Hammond Annot. on Matth 24 Note G. and on Revel 7. Note G.. Indeed the grand Sectaries among the Christian professors, the Gno­sticks (as one noteth)Dr. Hammond on 2 Thes. 2. Note K. sided with, and adhered to the Jewes aginst the Romans in that war, and by that meanes perished with them. But the Orthodox wholly relinquished them. Yea it is observed, that many of the more advised, and honest sort of the Jewish, both Nation, and Religion among them deserted their Nations defence against the Romans, yea, and went over to their enemies, and with them took part against the DesendantsUsser. Annal. part. post. pag. 691. 693. and Dr. Simson ut supra..

The Jewes that remained after the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, made a City called Bitter in Ara­bia, the chiefe seate of their Kingdome, and made a Jew one Barcochebas▪ (or Barcochab, or Barcochah, as he is generally styled) their King. Under him they rise up in sedition against Hadrian the Roman Em­perour: and over all Judea, and every where else they cast off the Roman government, and slaughter, and destroy whosoever stands against them. To them also joyne very many other Nations; and for that cause almost all the world are in an uproar. Hadri­an sending out his Forces against them, a great, and continued War thereof ariseth. They say this Barcho­chebas reigned thir [...]y yeares, and a halfe, and that at the last he endured in the siege of Bitter three years and a halfe against the Romans to their great losse, ere he and his Jewes were vanquished That which we chiefly observe in the story is, that this Barcoche­bas, being now the possessing and ruling power over Judea, and many other parts, the Christians that were in his precincts refused (notwithstanding) to owne, or joyn with him against the Romans: yea, though for this refusall he slew them with all kind of tor­tures. [Page 361] Insomuch that Hugo Grotius, and Dr. Hammond t [...]ke him to be the beast that ascendeth out of the bo [...] ­tomlesse pit, and maketh war against the two wit­nesses, and overcometh, and killeth them (Rev. 11.) and answerably the two witnesses to be the Bishops, and Chr [...]stians of the Jewish, and Gentile Churches which were at this time at Jerusalem. Some say in­deed that he moreover gave himselfe out to be the Messi [...]h; others, that he pretended to be that Star in Balaams vision (Num. 24.24.) and true it is that Ju­stin Martyr relateth (who himself was an eye-witness of those Wars, and on that occasion fled the Coun­trey) he persecuted the Christians because they would not deny Christ. But his imposture, and enmity to Christianity was not the sole matter in which the Christians deserted him, or upon which he persecu­ted them. For both Mr. Mede, Dr. Hammond, and Spon­danus observe out of Eusebius, that the Christians de­nyed to ayd him in his defence against the Romans, whose q [...]arrell against him was about civill domini­on; and la [...] downe that their refusall as a distinct cause by it selfe of his persecuting themMr. Mede in Apocalyp. Com. part 1. pa. 43. Dr Hammond in Revel. 11.3, 7. and Note B. &c. M [...]. Calvert his Jew of Moroc­co, pag. 220. Mr. Bogan of Threats. p. 372. Spondanus E­pitome Baron. Ann. 130. sect. 4. He be­ing the present actuall Ruler over them, what-ever his Religion, or his enmity to their Religion was, they were bound to assist him in up [...]olding his civil [...] possession and authority, if indeed the actual posses­sor alwayes be (and conseq [...]ently, he by vertue of present possession then was) the power of God, ordain­ed of God. The then Roman Emperour, and State were no lesse distant in Religion, no nor enemies to the Christian then were Barcochebas, and his Jewes. For under this Hadrian some reckon the continuation of the third, others begin the fourth of the ten per­secutionsSee Mr. Fox Acts. Vol. 1. Prideaux of Hist. pag. 199. Mr. Clarks Martyrol. p. 36.. The reason then of the Christi [...]ns refu­sall of the Jewes assistance against the Romans c [...]n be deemed no other then the civill right of the Ro­man, though disseised, and the nullity, and illegiti­macy of the Jew, though the present All-commander.

Our next example shall be out of Tertullian, who gives us a very remarkable testimony to our purpose, in a threefold instance of the Christians pract [...]se in relation to three possessors of the style, and power of the Roman Emperours, all of them in, or neer about his time: The which he compriseth b [...]iefly (as his manner is) in one short sentence; and he remembers the same twice in his works, viz. in his B [...]ok ad Scapulam, cap. 2. Nanquam Albiniani, nec Nigriani, vel Cassiani inveniri potuerunt Christiani. The Christians could never be found to be Albinians, or Nigrians, or Cassians. And again in his Apologeticus cap. 35. unde Cassii, & Nigri, & Albini, &c. de Romanis ni full [...]r, i e. de non Christianis. Whence arose the Cassu, the Nigri, the Albini, &c of the Romans I take it, that is, of they who were not Christians.

The Scholiasts upon Tertullian, viz. Zephyrus, Rhenanus, and Junius, doe agree that these sayings of his do refer to Avidi [...] Cassius, Pescenius Niger, and Clodius Albinus, their respective standings up, at severall times, as Emperours, and each obtaining to be so named, and to have under their command a vast Territory of the Roman Dominions; but their assumption of the same being violent, as in opposi­tion to other Emperours, who were chosen, in­vested, and received by the Senate, and people of Rome, (which was then the legall entry to the Em­pireFor this Title see Grot. de Ju­re Bel. lib. 2. cap. 9. Sect. 11.:) as Cassius against Marcus Antoninus, Niger and Albinus against Septimius Severus; Tertullians drift in those sentences is to vindicate the Christians from disloyalty, by assoyling them of joyning, ha­ving any h [...]nd with, or aiding any of those pos­sessors, and titular Emperours in the Countreys where they were generally followed, and main­tained by the Roman Legions, and Subjects, against the right and lawfull Emperours of Rome Albinianos, Nigrianos, & Cassianos vocat Tertullianus de­fectionum isto­rum conscios. Rhenanus in loc. ad Scap..

He that shall consult those above named Anno­tators, with the Historians of those times shall finde;

That Avidius Cassius a Nobleman of Rome (of the F [...]mily of that Cassius who was a Conspirator [Page 361] against Julius Caesar) whilest Marcus Antoninus was in his wars in Germany, and the bordering Coun­treys, (those wars where the famous victory and re­lief of water was obtained for him by the prayers of his Christian Souldiers, called upon that the Thundering Legion) gives out that Antoninus was dead; by which means the forces and people of the East, within the Mountain Taurus, generally, supposing the Empire vacant, set up Cassius to be Emperour. After this, Antonine to shew himself alive, and to recover his Empire in the East, marcheth thither against Cassius, whose souldiers perceiving the error they had been caught in by his lye, kill him with his son, and presenting their heads to An­tonine, the sedition is appeasedVide Zephyrū & Rhenanum in loc. Tertul­liani. & Rosse. Histor. Book 2. Chap. 2..

Also that Pescenius Niger Proconsul of Sy [...]ia, and Governour of the whole Eastern part, upon the people of Romes generall discontent at the corrupt entrance and male-administration of the Empire by Didius Julianus, is wished for by them to come, and take the Empire; and is thereto made choice of, and even sued to accept of it by the Roman Legions, and Subjects of the East, and is by them (as far as in them lay) made Emperour at Antioch. But in competition for it, Septimius Severus arises in Pan­nonia, being the praefect there, and by the souldiery and people at Illyricum, is set up as their Emperour; and being so, (whiles Niger taken up with sport and jollity, looseth his time in the East) he marcheth to Rome, and obtains the election of the Senate there; and having so sped, he goes up into the East against Niger, overthrowes his power at Cyzicum, and so suppresseth, and slayeth himVide praeter Zephyr. & Rhe­nan. in Tertull. Herodianum Hist lib. 2. sect. 21, 22, 23, 25, &c. et lib. 3. sect. 3.12, 13, 14. Item Sum. Herod. ex Photii Biblioth. Epist. Herod. praefix. et Brev. lib. 2. Herod. praefix. & Speeds Hist. Book 6. Chap. 22. Sect. 3..

And that Severus the Emperour being upon his enterprise against Niger (as aforesaid) and con­ceiving jealousie of Clodius Albinus the Proconsul of Britain, his stirring against him in the West, [Page 364] during his absence; to make him the surer to him, he creates him Caesar, and after that his co-partner in Government; but having overc me Niger, his jealousie against Albinus is made good, or retorted by Albinus his rising up in Arms against him. This brings the difference to an open warre, which is ended by Severus his vanquishment and dest ucti­on of Albinus Vide Herod. Hist. lib. 2. Sect. 48. lib. 3. Sect. 16, &c. Speeds Hist. Book 6. Chap. 23. Sect. 2. &c..

Of the possession of the East by Cassius first against Antonine, and then by Niger against Severus, and of the West by Albinus against the same Seve­rus, and by their respective accomplices in such man­ner as hath been related, Tertullian saith, None of the Christians were ever found to be Albinianes, Nigri­anes, or Cassianes. That is, they none o [...] them in­terested themselves in the causes of Albinus, Niger, or Cassius, or were partakers with, upholders of, or sticklers for them: which yet it had been their duty to have bin, had their respective Titles been as good as their possession was full in those Territories; or had their possession made them the powers of God, or­dained of God. But contrarywise, these three having none of them any legall investure, and there being lawfull Emperours claiming those Dominions a­gainst them, the Christians declined the poss [...]ss [...]rs in a duty belonging to those who are powers of Gods ordaining, in recognition of the rightfull c [...]aimers against them.

It is likewise to be remembred, that at what time John of Leyden ruled as King in Munster, and stood out in defence of his pretended Kingdome against the Bishop, the Temporall P [...]ince thereof, and his assistants, the Princes of Germany, (as was above related) there were some good men in that City, who would have no hand with him in the maintain­ing thereof in that manner, and causeSee Rosse of Religions in John of Ley­dens life, pag. 18, 19. Jo. Sleiden Comment. l. 10. pag. 258. 259.

These examples produced may be both for num­ber, and pregnancy sufficient to satisfie the query unto which they are returned. For a conclusion of my answer to it, I shall observe, that with these ex­amples of them of the true faith, and religion afore­given, [Page 365] some even of the prudenter Heathen have comported. To this purpose, I shall remember two, one of M ssala Corvinus, and his Heroicall reply to Augustus. He being Colleague with Caesar Octavian in the Roman Con [...]ulship,Plutarchus in vita Bruti sub finem. and Caesar (after his fa­mous victory at Actium over Antony, the which raised him up to his Imperial Throne) taking occasion to give him a publique encomium, hat although in the cause of B utus in the Philippick warre he had been a stout enemy against him, yet now in the battel at Actium he had been his speciall fautor, and aider; he (to wit, this Messala Corvinus) returns this Answer to Caesars Encomiastick. Tu me Caesar s [...]mper sectae, partium (que) invenies meliorum, & justiorum. q. d. Who­ever is the upper, thou shalt ever finde me the friend, and follower of the better, and juster party. The other is that of the honest, and excellent Poet Juve­nal, who thus whips the sordid servility, and com­pliance of the Roman common people in reference to prevalent successe:

Sed quid
Turba Remi? sequitur fortunam, ut semper,
Juvenal Satyr 10.
et odit
Damnatos. Idem populus si Nurscia Thusco
Favisset: si opp [...]essa foret s [...]cura senectus
Principis; hac ipsâ Seianum diceret horâ
Augustum.

But what way goes the Roman rout? they own,
Or 'bandon Princes still, as up, or down
The wheel of Fortune bears them; for if she
The Thuscan S [...]ian favoured had (even he
That first Tibe [...]ius minion was, and then
His Rivall) and his jealous master fallen
The crafty Fox Tiberius; at this hour,
Their crie had been, Sejanus Emperour.

CHAP. X. SECT. VIII. SECT. VIII. Three other Enquiries spoken to, viZ. Whether the power of a meer possessor may not be made use of? whether subjection to it be not lawfull, or necessary? and if it be, whether the subjects conscience, or practice be at all concerned in the justnesse, or the unjustnesse of the power that is over him.

IN the eighth place there comes in this threefold question.

1. But may not some use be made of, and recourse had to a meer possessory power for the obtaining of po­liticall r [...]dresse, and safety?

2. Is not subjection to him lawfull, or necessary?

3. And if so, then is it not all one, as to the sub­jects conscience, or as to his performance of obedience, whether the power be just, or unjust; be the ordinance of God, or be the presumption and in [...]rusion of man?

I answer,

1. For the first quaetie. Such is the necessity of order, justice, and place, and such is every mans title, and interest in them, that there is no scruple (I know) to be made of accepting, or seeking them at the hand of any, who may reach them out to us, though he that conveyes them to us be not interested in the umpirage of them, yet are we, and every man is interested in the benefit, and use of them. And though one may not perswade, assist, [Page 365] or consent to any to take, or appropriate to them­selves the publique place, or office of administration of them to the community, that is not thereto law­fully called, and authorized, yet of them that have unduly possessed themselves of that place, and do exercise the same, they that are under them may re­quest both in reference to publique concernments, and to private, that the administrations which they have assumed into their hands, and are resolved to hold, may (for their matter and use to others) be just, and profitable. This I finde resolved without disputeCajetan. Summul. Tit. Rempub. Tyran. Navarri Com­pend. Tit. Tiran­nus. The Exercitation concer. Ʋsurp. Powers, cap. 3. pag. 23..

2. And for the next, It is also easily admitted, viz. That submission, and complyance with a meer occupant may, and in divers cases ought to be. Such may be the warrantablenesse, or the goodnesse, either in point of profit, or of morall duty, of the things, that obedience, or complyance with the commands of a superiour in them will heare a commission, either of lawfulnesse, or of necessi y.

3. But then it must be said, It is not therefore all one as to the Subjects, either conscience, or act of obedience, whether the power be just, and of Gods ordination, or it be unjust, and of mans pre­varication. For there is a difference to be put be­twixt the submission yieldable to the meer possessor, and that which is payable to a right authority. And the difference may be observed in more respects then one.

1. There is a difference in regard of ground, or in the reason; or consideration upon which it is yeelded. We are to render obedience to a reall authority, or to a lawfull power, or potentate, as owing, or due to him. It is his right, and it belong­eth to him up n the account of strict justice, the people are under that obligation to him which we call Allegiance, and by reason of it we call them his Liege people, and him their Liege Lord. Liege is as much as legall, and Allegiance imports a bond of obedience by vertue of the law; and it may referre [Page 368] either to the ordinative law of G [...]d, or to the con­stitutive law of man. But to the meer occupant there is no such [...]ye: in acts of submission to him it is the matter prescribed, and not the precipient that obligeth: or, it is not the commander, or his commanding, but the condition of the comman­ded which is the rise, or reason of this subjection. Or, yet more distinctly, people may be led [...]o obey such by force of other considerations besides Alle­giance to them: and those may be either the more generall morall ones, common to this with other cases, such as are, the lawfulnesse of the thing to be done in its own nature, or the coincidency of ano­ther just, and obliging authority, and command with that of the occupants; or,

2. And therewithall, such as are peculiarly arising from that state of subduednesse; as, the necessity that is incumbent to do, or part with the thing re­quired for the avoidance of a greater loss, or suffe­ [...]ing to come if the subject detrect that; or, the greater conveniency, safety, or emolument which there is to ones self, to his neighbour, or to the publique, in doing, then in denying, as the cir­cumstances of the imposall, lye, though we [...]e it not so imposed, it would not be eligible. Though we a [...]e obliged to nothing jussu ejus, or upon the in­tuition of his command, yet we may doe many things, ea jubente, he commanding, and shou [...]d doe eo prememe, he enforcing them; and we have ma­ny things to doe, ipso seu volente, seu nolente, whether he will, or forbid the doing of them.

This difference in the ground the Reader may finde set down by H. Grotius de Jure B. lib. 1. cap. 4. Sect. 15. And by the paper of Dr. Sanderson printed by a Replyer to it, in defence of Mr. Ascams Dis­course. And by Mr. Burroughs upon Hosea, Chap. 1. Lect. 3. pag. 65. and Lect. 4 pag. 111. And by the Author of the Observations upon Aristotles Politiques, pag. 46, ad sin. And by the Exercitation conc. usurp. powers, cap. 3. pag. 22.

[Page 369]2. There is also a difference in regard of the ex­tent of the subj [...]ction; and that,

1. In relation to the acts, or attributions which the subjection reacheth to. Whatsoever duty we owe immediately to G [...]d; whatsoever is due from us to the publique safety, or weal; whatever act of justice, or of charity is owed to another; whatso­ever is an office of our station, or place, or which we have any other way a call unto; whatsoever is within the rule of the vertuous culture of our selves, or may make for our own honest interest, without the wrong of any other, that we may, or must doe in concurrence with such a possessors command, yea, and if a necessity of precept lie upon it, though it be to his advantage in his unjust occupancy: a good and necessary action being not to be declined for such an ill effect as is accidentall to it, and ariseth from the use which another makes of it.

But there are sundry, not only personall, but po­liticall acts that may come to be the matter of a civil superiors command, which build not themselves upon any of these considerations; and there are actions which not only are destitute of such a ground to make them good, and necessary, but if done to a meer possessor, they have in them an access rinesse to his unlawfull occupancy: and there may be some things then only to be done when there is for them the warrant, and injunction of a reall authority: and some acts are lawfull, or ne­cessary to be put forth towards, or for a justly en­titled Magistrate, which are warrantlesse, or sinfull towards another, as being derogatory to the said Magistrates, or to the Communities right, or an entrenchment upon the divine institution of Ma­gistracy, or a bringing of the agent into a partici­pation of another mans sin. He that shall take a view of the just prerogatives of the civil M [...]gi­strate, and of the particulars of the subjects duty to him, may finde that such there areSee before Chap. 8. Sect. 1.. In things of this sort there will lie a restriction [Page 370] upon the yieldance of that subjection to a meer possessor which is redditable to a lawfull Sove­raign.

Without particularizing what things are of this nature, that it is so may easily appear, if we but make a comparison by inverting the case, and putting the action on the Magistrates part. Let two persons come before a lawfull Magi­strate, each with his cause, or suit, the one be­ing a denison of the Countrey, the other being a foreiner; or, suppose them both alike for that, but the one having a just cause, or suit, the others being bad. The Magistrate in hearing, and handling these diverse causes, or the cause of these diversly qualified persons, may, and is to doe in some kinde the same things for them all, and to treat them all alike: but in some kindes again he is to observe a difference, and his processe may not be altogether the same to­wards the severalls of them respectively, his du­ty will require him in sundry things to put a difference betwixt the denison and the foreiner; betwixt him that hath a just cause, and him that hath a bad. And thus is it on the sub­jects part, and in his actings: there is in ma­ny things a diversity to be found in the rule of his proceedings in relation to those two sorts of superiors, the just, and the unjust; or the au­thorised power, and the intruder.

2. In relation to the case wherein subjection is performable, the extent of it may be to be diversi­fied in reference to those two. A lawfull, authori­zed Magistrate, one is required to subject himselfe unto voluntarily, frankly, and out of the case of terror, or externall compulsorinesse, and though he had ability to contest, stand our, and make good a refusall; but not so to the meer possessor. It is then only necessary to comply, and sometimes doth a thing then only come to be lawfull in reference to him, when matter of awe or menace is cast into one of the scales of the subjects consultationSee Dr. San­derion, and Grotius as a­bove cited..

SECT. IX. CHAP. X. SECT. IX. The conclusion is with a short view of the question, what kinde of consent of the community it is which is re­quisite to the conveying of Gods or­dination to the power.

HAving thus dispatched answer to these objections, and queries, I intend to proceed no further: but think it time now to close up this Chapter, and with it this Treatise.

There is but one query more that occurred to my observation as for answer here, viz. Seeing we have found the only ordinary mean of conveyance of Gods or­dination to the person who is by that ordination the power of God, to be the consent of the Community As it is layed down Chap. 5. Sect. 4. Subsect. 4. before., what kinde of consent is that to be?

This question ariseth from the diversity of wayes whereof the giving of consent seemeth to be capable of: as,

1. Touching the persons giving, consent may be either of the whole; or of a part; and that whole may, either contain all, and singular the persons united in one minde, or be the major part, admitted in virtue to be the whole.

2. Touching the manner wherein consent is sig­nified; Civilians do deliver severall wayes of con­sent giving, as by word, by action, and by non-acting; and under these are reduced sundry particulars.

3. As to the time, the consent may either fore-run, or follow actuall investure.

4. As to truth, and reality, the consent may be either re [...]ll, or presumed, and pretended.

5. As to the freedome, and consequently as to the valid ty, it is susceptible of differences more then one:

[Page 371]1. There is a naturall, or physicall freedom; and opposite to it a naturall restraint, or confinement. The naturall freedome is a remotion or clearness of outward coaction; and this respecteth,

1. Either the body by actual stop, or impediment,

2. Or the minde, and this relateth to fear, from the menace, or danger of harm, or losse.

2. There is a morall freedome, or a freedome of conscience ( [...]ruly so called). And opposite to it there is a morall restraint, to wit, by a preobligation, tye, or duty of conscience.

The requisitenesse of freedom, as the very formal reason, or constitutive essence of consent, and the re­quisitenesse of both those freedomes, that i<