Subsection 1. Of the force of the word, [...].

POwer signifieth here the person empowe­red. Yet in as much as the Text must needs suppose, imply, and refer unto Power in the abstract, as the form which doth constitute, and denominate the person in whom it is seated a Power, and only he can be said to be the Power, who is endued with that Power: the way to explain this term, and to under­stand who are the Powers here intended, will be, in taking the Apostle to speak of the con­crete, or person, to cast our eye upon the abstract, or the habit of Power placed in him, and to enquire what kind of Power is that which the text presupposeth, and referreth unto, as that endowment which makes the persons here spoken of to be termed the Powers.

The notation of the propriety, or use of the word [...], may be somewhat conducing to this enquiry. The observation of a distin­ction betwixt [...] and [...]; betwixt potentia and potestas, and that the former is of a larger acception, and ordinarily signifies a [Page 6] meer mightiness, or ability; the latter is of a stricter use, and usually signifies such a Power as consists in right, interest, or property, is an observation not only given us by some of late, but avowed by Divines and Criticks of chiefest note, and will upon due search (I believe) be found to hold good.

It must be remembred, that the propriety of a word is not a thing of so precise a nature, as that it is ever and invariably kept, or so as the word may never be observed to be other­wise used. There is not (I think) any term that is frequently made use of, but sometimes it is taken out of its proper and peculiar sense; and so perhaps may be sometimes this word [...]; but as far as I can learn, either by mine own observation, or from the incompa­rably more mature experience, and judgement of other Authors, the propriety of this word is of this measure, that properly taken, it only signifies that power which consists in right, and when it intends a power of Superiority of one person over another, it signifies an Au­thorized power only, or that Superiority which is lawful, or justly intitled to rule. And I believe (if possible) it will not be easie, or obvious to meet with it in any other accepta­tion in the New Testament.

For the former, mine own observation; I shall not trouble the Reader with reciting the places of Scripture in which the word is found, whereby the constant use of it may ap­pear; but shall sum up under a few heads the variety of use which I have noted in the word in respect of divers objects it is apply­ed to, and refer to the several places for per­usall.

I have noted that in the new Testament this word [...] is applyed,

1. Sometimes to things privately posses­sible.

[Page 7]2. Sometimes to matter of action.

3. Sometimes more specially to matter of command, or authority over persons.

1. It is applyed to matters privately pos­sible: and so it signifies a right, or just in­terest in a thing, so as the person in whom the Power is, may lawfully dispose of, or injoy it. [So Job. 1.12. Act. 1.7. & 5.4. & 8.19. Rom. 9.21. 2 Thess. 3.9. Rev. 23.14.]

2. It is applyed to matter of action, and so it signifies a Warrant, Commission, Licence, or Rule, enabling a man to the doing, or ex­ecuting of any action, or work in the said Rule determined. [So Mat. 9.6. & 10.1. & 21.23. Mark. 13.34. Luk. 9.1. Joh. 10.18. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5, 6, 18. 2 Cor. 10.8. & 13.10]

3. It is applyed more specially to matter of Command, or Authority over persons, and so it signifies an Authority, or lawful calling to rule and bear sway over others. [So Mat. 28.18. Mark. 1.27. Luk. 4 36. & 12.5. & 19.17. & 20.20. Joh. 17.2. & 19.10. 1 Cor. 11.20. & 15.24. Col. 2.10. Jud. v. 25. Rev. 17.13.]

These are the several kinds of objects or matters (in my observation) to which the Power signified by this word [...] relateth in Scripture. And by the many instances un­der each of these heads may be gathered the propriety of the word in Scripture-accep [...]ation. And the Reader that will please to search all these tex [...]s, and examine the currantness of my citing of them, will (I doubt not) upon impartial view, finde also these two things true which I shall further observe unto him of them.

First, That in all these places, the sense of this word [...] is confined within the limit of a just and lawful Power, and cannot be [Page 8] extended to the bare act of meer Occupation, or forcible possession, or command: hence it is rendred by our Translators, not alwayes by the word Power, but (in the forecited places) sometimes by this term, Right, [as Joh. 1.12. in marg. Rev. 22.14.] sometimes Authority, [Mat. 21.23. Mark 13.34. Luk. 4.36. & 9.1. & 20.20. Act. 26.12. 1 Cor. 15.24. 2 Cor. 10.8.] and sometimes Liberty, [as 1 Cor. 8.9.] And further in divers of those Texts it is put to signifie the Right, or Warranted­ness of a thing, when as the point of Right is either questioned, or asserted in a contra­distinction to an arbritrary, and unwarranta­ble assuming, or usurping. [So in that of Mat. 21.23, 24.] the chief Priests and Elders ask Christ, [...]; By what authority dost thou these things, and who gave thee this authority? The authority here de­manded to be shewn is a warrant; or lawfull commission for the doings of our Saviour; the things done they had seen, his [...], the act of Power, or force he had put forth, in his Doctrine, Miracles, and imperious driving out of the Temple the traffiquing profaners of it; but they call in question, and therefore demand of him, and accordingly he conditio­nally promises to tell them by what authority he did those things, and who gave him that au­thority. So again [in that of Mat. 9.6.] our Saviour asserteth to himself the having, [...], the power on earth to forgive sins; they that were present had heard him executing the act towards the Palsie-sick person, in his saying to him, thy sins be forgiven thee. But they doubted of, or rather denyed his authori­ty or lawfull power to do it, and that was the thing therefore which he there avoweth. In like manner [in that of Joh. 19.10.] Pilate thought Christ now standing before him, and [Page 9] not making any answer to his examinations of him, implyed that he took him to have no lawfull power over him in that cause; and there­fore asks him, Knowest thou not that I have power to crucifie thee, and have power to release thee?

[Where by the way the allegarion which some make of this Text, as though the word here signified an abusive, or unlawful power [...] in as much as what ever power Pilate might have to release Christ, he had none to crucifie him, is utterly impertinent. For it is not mate­riall to the use of the word here to say, what power Pilate really had, or what he had not; but the matter is, what power he thought and meant to assert that he had; for the word there must needs bear that sense which the speaker meant it in: and for that there is no doubt but Pilate looked on himself, as the lawful, Governor of that place, and at Christ as a common person of that Nation, and so intended; that himself was the competent Judge, of the person and cause of Christ then before him, and that he had therefore power to crucifie him, and power to release him, viz. respectively, accordingly as he should finde his cause to deserve.]

So [in that of Rom. 9.21.] the Apostle disputing for the equity and justness of Gods purposes, and proceedings in his acts of Free Election and Reprobation, in order to the be­nefits of his Grace, and in his excutions there­of, he alleadges by way of comparison the example of the Potters power over his clay, to make a vessel of it to what use he pleaseth. Where if the word [...] were ambiguous, and did not clearly signifie right and just power, the argument were of no force or evidence.

Secondly, The other thing I observe is, that this word is in those forequoted places put for such a power, as doth not necessarily [Page 10] import, or require to its being, or depend upon possession, actual tenure, or exercise of the matter, or object of the power, but is in some of those instances de facto separate, and in all separable therefrom; yea in some of them the power is so affirmed, as that the act or exercise of it is expresly secluded, and laid aside, as neither done, nor to be done in the particular case. That universal Power which Christ assumeth to himself [Joh. 17.2. Mat. 28.18.] was then in him in regard of grant and investure, and in respect of right and title to all the things to which it refer­reth, but a jus in re, a seisure or possession of them he had not. For before his passion, be­ing then in the state of humiliation, he was far from an actual dominion, or command over all; nay after his rising again, and his ascending up unto, and session at the right hand of God in heaven; the Apostle saith of him, We see not yet all things put under him, [Heb. 2.8.] That power of Believers to eate of things unto Idols, And that of Paul and Barnabas to marry, and to take with them in their travail Wives, and to receive maintenance for them­selves, and them of the Churches of Corinth and Thessalonica, [1 Cor. 8.9. & 9.4, 5. 2 Thess. 3.9.] these were powers inherent in those persons re­spectively, but they were not acted, no nor could lawfully be put forth by them as the case then stood with those Christians.

It is against this Observation of the force of this word objected by some, that [...] is put for a Power unlawful as to title, in two or three places, [viz. Luk. 4.6. Rev 13.2, 4. Ephes. 6.12. Col. 2.14.] Unto which I say,

1. It should still be remembred (what was before said) that the propriety of a word is not a thing of so precise a nature, as that it is ever punctually kept; and that it is to be [Page 11] judged, not by its use once or twice, but by its common and frequent use.

2. Let the Texts brought for this be seve­rally looked into.

For that [of Luke 4.6.] I can see no reason to conclude the word is there used for a right­less power. Who can think but that Satan there intendeth to assume to himself a good ti­tle, and just interest over this worlds kingdoms, and not a false or usurped claim? and according to his intention that speaks must the sense of the word be construed to be. Indeed he lyed in taking that large composs of power to himself, and this he had done whether he had spoken of that power in point of right, or in point of fact, for in neither sense had be all that power either given to him, or to give to others; but his lie had not been so specious or to his purpose, had he not meant of a real and good authority.

For that [of Rev. 13.2, 4.] where it's said The Dragon gave the beast his power, and his seat, and great authority; and the Dragon gave power unto the beast: presupposing that by the Dragon is meant Satan, and by the Beast the Roman Empire, as distributed into ten Kingdoms, or States, upon the dissipation of the Monarchy of the Caesars, by the wars of the Barbarians; which ten are therefore, it may be, called one Kingdom, Rev. 17.17. or that part of the said Empire, which is called the Western Empire, as reduced partly in regard of secular State and Title into the hands of the Exarch of Ravenna first, then of the French, and after of the German Emperor, but acted, and over-swayed by the Pope of Rome See Mr. Mede on Revel. com. part. 2. cap. 13. Napier. Sim­son. Ds. Annot. in loc.. Now where it is said, this Dragon gave this Beast his power, and seat, and great authority, the possessive his, is I take it necessarily to be re­ferred to the Dragon, not to the Beast, for the pronoun [...] carries it to the agent, or giver. [Page 12] Now the Dragon might be said to give his power and authority to the Beast two wayes.

1. By way of surcease, or surrendry. The Devill when he saw the authority of the Hea­then Emperors come to an end, upon the rising up of Constantine, he layd down that sway he had held in the use of them, in whom he had played the Dragon, by instigating them, and their people by them, to grosse Paganish Ido­latry, and to open enmity against Christianity, and now gave way to the Beast.

2. By way of allurement and assistance. Satan seeing he must perforce leave that his way of working, and leading the world which he had long held by means of the Heathenish Empire, he now applies himself to the present Secular powers, the Christian Potentates, risen up in the room of the former, to draw them over to his interest of Idol-worship, and Saint-persecution, though in another forme and me­thod; unto which be makes it his design first to perswade, and then to assist them, in the promoting and executing thereof. In reference, to the latter his assistance, especially, may those words be understood of the Dragons giving his power and authority to the Beast q. d. Satan joy­neth his power unto the Roman State or Ma­gistracy, become Christian, and after a while degenerate in Religion, by Heresie, and Su­perstition, to further them in their way (which was also his own main work) of Blasphemous Idolatries, and cruel persecutions, drawing in also the Nations of the world to follow them therein. A like manner of speech to this we have, Rev. 17.13, 17. where the ten Kings are said to give their power and strength unto the Beast; that is, by way, not of investing it in him, but of assisting him with it. And thus it may be plain how the word [...], is here used. For what is that Power, Seat, and Au­thority which Satan hath in humane affairs? [Page 13] Verily none properly so called; that is, he hath no temporal Government, no formal, profes­sed, open, and acknowledged rule amongst men, either by commanding in word, or compulsion in deed, as Princes have over their Subjects, Masters over their Servants. The term there­fore cannot here be put to signifie any Civil Empire, either lawful or unlawful, as to title. The Devill hath indeed a physical power, or potency in material or elementary things, to produce effects in them above the ordinary course of nature; and there is in him a pro­perly political or governing Power, in relati­on to his fellows, the evill spirits, and hence we read of his Angels; and him called, the prince of Devils: But in moral, and humane proceedings, he hath no more but a suggesting or counselling, a tempting or perswasive power: the only way he hath to sway men after him (that we know) is by illusion and enticement. When therefore we finde these titles, the God, and the Ruler of the darkness of this world, the prince of this world, and the prince of the power of the air, ascribed to him, and here a power, seat, and great authority, which he lends in assi­stance to the Beast; we must take these at­tributions figuratively, and improperly spoken; and to import no more, but that, as it were, and in effect, he is, and hath these things, in as much as by his stratagems, or subtile arts, he leadeth men both of high and low degree, in a manner at his pleasure; and by crafty insi­nuations, he is as prevalent, and bringeth men as wholly to his bent, as if he had a direct Em­pire over them, and they owned him as their Lord. Satans power being then spiritual, not temporal, perswasive or precarious, not im­perious, his giving his power to the Beast, whe­ther by resignation at the Beasts advancement, or by way of assistance to him when in au­thority, and in relation to his use thereof, as [Page 14] it could no way concern the Beasts temporal title, or interest in his civill authority, in point of lawfulness or unlawfulness, so it affords no instance for the taking in of an unentitled Civil power (whether in the Dragon or in the Beast) into the signification of this word, [...].

Lastly, for those places [Eph. 6.12. Col. 2.15.] Principalities, and Powers, are the titles both of good and evill spirits, in reference to other spirits; there being an order, and a distinction of superior and inferior, in respect of dignity and rule, among them by cre­ation; the which the fallen Angels doe still retain among them; and this they do (in all probability) both by virtue of their first ordination, the present dispensation of God, and their own mutual consent: now what power is in any Angel by creation, and primitive institution, cannot be unlawful.

Secondly, for the observation and judgement of the Learned concerning the notation of the word [...], I will not detain my Reader so long as to cite to him all that I have found in such to this purpose, nor to rehearse the words of any, but I shall only mention these following Authors thus interpreting this word, and refer him to the places in them. Zanchius To. 2. de natura Dei, lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. pag. 424. Beza in Marc. 1.27. Piscator, & Elnathan par in Loc. Jansenius Concord. cap. 113. pag. 822. Daniel Heinsius exercit. in Mat. 7.28. Gataker Dissertat. cap. 43. pag. 457. Ms. Leigh. Critic. Sacra in voc.

Subsection 2. Power distinguisht into Natural and Moral.

BUt it is not the meer notation of a word that will lead to the distinct and adequate conception of the matter, or thing there­by signified. Wherefore let us proceed to a more reall consideration of this subject Power.

I will not run through the whole scheme of distinctions upon the word. There are many sorts of Power which may easily ap­pear to be of a remote and disparate conside­ration to what this Text will bear. To omit therefore the Explication of those divisions of Power, into increate and create; of create, into active and passive; of active into imma­nently and transiently active. That Power which is in a created and corporeal substance, and is transiently active, or importeth the in­flux of one body, or suppositum upon another, may be twofold:

• 1. Natural.
• 2. Moral
  Of this Distin­ction see Mr. Whites Way to the tree of life, pag. 45. The Treatise of Monarchy part. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 2. pag. 19, 20.

1. Natural, or physical power, is the same which we call (more distinctly) strength, might, and vigor. It consisteth in an abi­lity to enforce or make impression upon another thing, or to cause it to yeeld or give way.

2. Moral power, is that which we call pro­perty or dominion; it consisteth in a right, title or interest, to order, dispose or govern. This Moral Power, as seated in man, may be taken either more extensively, so the object [Page 16] of it may be things inanimate, or brute beasts; for over them man hath a dominion given him of GodGen. 1.2 [...]. Psal. 8.5.: or more strictly, as it respecteth man only; and this Power this related we peculiarly call Authority: And this again is distinguishable according to the diversity of humane societies, some whereof are private, and domestical; and some are more publique. But as it is found in, or re­lated to a publique civill community, or body politique it's tearmed Magistracy, or political power.

That there is a reall difference to be found betwixt those two powers, the Natural, and the Moral; as in general, so as they may be seated in man as the subject, and respect man as the object, and particularly as they are competible to a body politique; and that the difference lies, as was said, herein, that the one consists in a meer impetus, or prepotency, or a suffi­ciency of strength to impose, or make im­pression on another; the other in a right, or imerest to bear sway, may be easie to fe [...].

1. The reality of the difference is evident, Natural power is found not only in man, but in brute beasts, yea in inanimates: Moral is proper to reasonable creatures. Again, al­though reasonable creatures be enduable with both, yet among men the natural and the mo­ral, might, and right to rule may be, and for the most part are distinct or separate each from other in regard of the subject of inherencePotestas in po­pulo, Authori­tat in Senatu. Cicero de leg. lib. 3.. The Natural power is ordinarily in them that do not, ought nor to rule, but to obey and be in subjection. There is a Moral power, or right to rule in Man over the other Creatures, yet in natural power he is inferiour to many of them. And amongst men, in Natural power, that is strength, or might of body, the family in greater then the Master, the Subjects excel [...] [Page 17] their Soveraign, the Souldiert overmatch their Leaders; whereas the Moral power in relation to each of these is in the Master, the Soveraign, the Leader. It is very seldom seen, if ever, in any humane Society, that Natural, and Moral power do meet in the same persons, as the sub­jects of inhesion. Suppose a City or Nation ruled by some strong hand, or a military force: even in that force there must needs be some one head, or councel of a few to guide, and command it, some Pretorian Magistracy to go­vern the Army, and in that head or Pretorian office (far inferior in Natutal power to the Ar­my, as the Army possibly is to the City, or Na­tion under its beck) would the supreme Power lie, and the military force would but be subordi­nate, and ministerial to that command, in like manner as the unarmed people are to that force. And although it be both right, and ne­cessary to the well-being of a political Society, that the Natural and Moral power do concur, the former to serve and support the other, and the discord of these is the high way to the ruine of both; yet it is not simply necessary to the being either of the Moral power, or of the community. Every sudden mutiny, or tem­porary Sedition, which is the Insurrection, and prevalency of the Natural power against the Moral, doth not dissolve the present Society or Magistracy, Political, or Military. The uproar at Ephesus [Act. 19.] was within a few houres quelled, and the City remained in its former state. Although upon the death of Ahaziah [2 Chron. 22.9.] his house had no power (viz. natural) to keep still the Kingdom, but Athaliah usurped it, yet within a few years it removed the usurpresse, and re­possessed both Power and Kingdom as in its former right.

2. And that the difference twixt those two Powers lies (as was said) in the meer forcible­nesse [Page 18] or prevalidity of the one, and the right or legitimacy to command of the other; that the one can, the other only may or ought to rule; the one possibly hath the appetite and act of governing, the other hath only the com­mission and warrant, should me thinks easily be conceived. Natural power we oppose to impotency, weakness; Moral power we op­pose to illicitness or wrong. Thence that say­ing, Id tantum possumus quod jure possumus; whereby it appears that Natural power consists in strength, Moral in rightfulness. And indeed wherein else should the difference be placed? What difference is there to be made betwixt the power of one Brute prevailing over another, or over a Man, and that of the owners ruling over that Brute? or betwixt that of a Man­stealer that hath gotten anothers childe into his hand by stealth, and that of the true father over his childe? or betwixt that of a Rout, or Band of Rogues, or drunken companions that may have assaulted and beaten the Ma­gistrates officers, and perhaps himself too, and that of the Civil Magistrate? each of these may de facto be Master; each of them may be found assuming, and exercising rule; they cannot therefore be distinguished by their acts: The d stinction then betwixt them must be taken from the ground, rise, or principle from which the acts of rule are put forth; which in the one and the other are divers. In the one those acts are from meer force and will; in the other, they are from authority, or a will authorized to prescribe or command. Each of these Powers (I say) may be found exercising rule; for we cannot call any power morall, meerly because it acteth in, or manageth those we call Moral or Civil af­fairs; for that a Natural power in a subject endued with reason may do: there may be an intermedling with Civill matters, where [Page 19] there is no moral power, as in case of Sedition, where they that are to obey will needs rule: as on the other hand there may be a Moral power, that is, a right to command, or dispose where the object is not moral, or civil; such is the power of man, given him of God, over other creatures (animate and inanimate) of disposing according to his reason and will, of their natu­ral acts of feeding, generating, labouring, &c. But that is a moral power in relation to any of these objects or matters about which power is exercised, which hath a moral rise or deducti­on, viz. an authorization, and right, and what hath not so is meerly natural.

The proper character then, or formall diffe­rence of each of these two Powers is, that the Natural power is no other then a brutish pre­dominancy or violencePotentia est id quod per si est effican. — Vit est majoris rei impetus, qui repelli, vel sal­tem ex arbitrio, & commode non potest. Greg. Tholos. Synt. Juris. lib. 11. cap. 2. Sect. 3. & cap. 1. Sect. 4.: the reason of its superiority, is its own might and will; it knows nothing of any civil liberty, order, or right; its proper act is ruere, impetere, or impellere, to rush in upon, assault, or bear down before it what stands in its way: if it use reason so far as to give out commands, to ordain, or proceed by any laws, or to take cognisance of causes by any rule, it is but ad libitum, without any obligati­on, certainty, or constancy, only as far as stands with its own humor or interest; for as its rise is its own force and appetite, so its end is its proper and private accommodation, and safety.

The Moral power (to speak of it only as seated in, and relating to man, and more par­ticularly that of the Civil Magistrate) is a spe­cial state, or function, or administration a­mongst men. Its original is not its own inhe­rent, or adjacent robi [...], or main strength, but positive constitution. It consisteth in, not only an ability, but a right to command. It hath indeed de jure, and should have de facto, a Sword as well as a Scepter; a coactive, as well as [Page 20] a directive power; the Natural power joyned to its Moral: but its Moral power lyeth in its word,Eccl. 8.4. not in its sword; Where the word of a King is, there is power, Solomon saith. It is its reason, not its might which gives law, and its reason is legislative, whereas anothers is not Ratio cujuslibet non est fa­ctiva legis, saith Aquinas Aquinas 1. 2a. quast. 96. artic. 3. & Cajetan in quaest. 96. artic. 5. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 4. pag. 46.. Its proper, primary, and genuine act is to prescribe, guide, and direct: the sword is requisite to it, but ex accidenti, upon occasion of others pravity; compulsoriness is not of its essence, but an after addition to it, for its preservation and efficacyIt's probably conceived that the sword is a super­addition to the Civil power, annext to it, Gen. 9.6. See Dr. Hammond of Re­sisting, &c. pag. 27. It could not be from the be­ginning, for in the state of integrity there was no use of it.. It never useth the sword, but where equity and dignity are consemned; where, by reason of the subjects either vitiousness, or defect of rea­son, bare authority cannot take place. The special reason of its erection by men, is the proneness of some to take the advantage of their natural power to invade, and the inability of others to defend themselves against such; and a prime end of it is to prevent or remedy the [...]xorbitances of Natural power in ill disposed persons; and thereby to secure the community, in order to the general, and each ones particular good. Again, it doth not take the Sword in the sense of our Saviour. [Matth. 26.25.Per accipere gladium in­telligitur propria authorita­te, & voluntate uti gladio. Principes enim, & judices non accipiunt quasi a seipsis, sed concesso sibi gladio a deo utuntur. Cajetan Jentac. 6. quaest. 3.] but beareth it [as Rom. 13.4.] that is, it doth not snatch it up, or wrest it from another to it self, but hath it delivered. It hath the Sword not only in its hand, but in its commission, and the Sword that it hath is not the cause, but the consequent of its superiority: It doth [Page 21] not assume, or hold its authority by vertue of the sword, but it assumes and holds the sword by vertue of its authority. The Scepter goes before the Sword, and is that which legitimates itPotentia vero debet sequi justitiam, non praire. Aug. To. 3. de Trinit. lib. 13. cap. 13. Observemus jus glad [...]i magistratibus esse a deo datum, tanquam necessarium adminiculum & nervum suae potestatis. Pareus in Rom. 13.4.: when it draweth the sword, the difference betwixt its Sword, and anothers, (that is armed only by natural strength) is, that its edge is not meerly backed with mettal, or in an arme of flesh, and sinews, but with warrant, and commission, and that signed by God.

Let me add by way of Supplement, to what hath been said, to demonstrate both that there is a reall difference betwixt Power Natural, and Moral, and what it is, this further. That even in God we distinguish betwixt his Power by which we mean his arme of strength and might, and his Power by which we signifie his throne of authority, or Soveraign rule: be­twixt his power of command, and his power of efficiency: betwixt his working power, and his legislative or willing power: betwixt the power of his right hand, and the power of his scepter of righteousness: in the Lords-Prayer, Kingdom, and [...], Power, ascri­bed to God are distinguished: and though both be natural, that is essential to God; yet the one we may call his Physical, the other his Moral powerVide Zanchi­um de Nat. Dei lib. 4. cap. 8. qu. 3. Thes. 3. Arminium Dis. priv. Thes. 22. Sect. 2. & Thes. 27. Sect. 2..

Answerable to this twofold power in Man, there is a twofold subjection; one of the body only, which respecteth the Natural pow­er: the other of the body with the minde also, relating unto the power wich is MoralDuplex est servitus, cor­poris, & animi. vis quippe in corpore, in externis, pro­hibitio autem Juris ani­mum po [...]issinum cogit. Greg. Tholos. Synt. Jer. lib. 11. cap. 1 Sect. 4.. The Mo­rall power layeth an obl [...]gation upon the conscience: to it a man [Page 22] doth or ought to submit, as of right and duty: It may challenge our obedience though, and where it cannot compel to it: and we are to subject though there be nothing to overaw us to it: and this is the property of this Power in distinction from the natural: that which is but natural reacheth not the mind: the acts it putteth forth may lay a coaction on the body, but not a tie on the conscience. What ever be the natural, or armed power of one person, or party above another; no man is under any obligation to obey, nor hath he any claim to rule by virtue of it: if he had, there could be no such thing as Moral power in the world, this being (as was before said) for most part, if not ever, seated in those persons who in re­gard of Natural power, are inferiour to them whom they should reign over. If Natu­ral power could oblige to obedience, the Mo­narch were bound to resign his Crown to the multitude; and the Senate or Parliament must receive laws from the community. Every heady commotion, or rout of a multitude risen up, were to be submitted to, and were not to be re­pressed: the Town-clerk did not well to check the tumult at Ephesius, or to refer the plaintiffs from the present uproare to a court or lawful assembly, he should have let them go on, and have both submitted to, and assisted them. But this is absurd enough to appear so to any man; the commonly received maxime is, By nature men are (in regard of Civill jurisdiction) all equal, no man a Ruler, or servant to anotherHooker Eccl. posit. lib. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26, &c. Ascham Di­scourse, &c. part 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Hobs Elem. part. 1. c. [...]. 1.. So that the effect of a natural power, where it conquereth is but to involve them that are un­der it in an actual subduedness, that they touch down, as a man doth to a Lion being under his paw, or as a traveller doth to a high­way-robber that hath set his pistol to his breast, that is, without either will or duty owed to the prevailer, or obligation to go any further in [Page 23] subjection then self-preservation, or the like considerations (irrespective to the invader) may suggest. This then is the different effect or re­lative state produced by Natural and by Mo­ral power in the persons to whom these respe­ctively are extended; the Natural power in­volveth men in an actual subduedness: the Mo­ral reduceth them to a rational and conscienti­ous subordination.

Subsection 3. That Moral Power only is intended in this word Power in this place.

HAving observed and explained this distin­ction of Power, it may perhaps remain a question with some, Whether this term Power, in the text, be not of so general an extent as to contain both the members of this division, or whether it be to be restrained to Moral power only. The word indeed is put indefinitely, or without express limitation; but it may neverthe­less be doubted whether it can here bear a sense as illimited as the words are. My apprehension is (and I think I shall make it good) that only Moral power can be meant by this Text; that is, not that which meerly hath might, force, or bodily masterdom; but that which, besides that, hath right, title, or warrant to govern.

My Argument for it (besides what shall af­terwards be said) shall here be this; Political, or Magistratical power, or the power of the Civil Ruler only is intended in this Text, but [Page 24] this is only a Moral, warranted, or autho­rized power; Therefore it is only a Moral, or warranted power which is here intended in the Text.

For the first, or Major proposition, That the Political or Magistratical power only is intended in this text; this, I suppose, will not be stuck at. The subject of this Proposition, There is no power but of God, is the same, and of equal extent with that of the rest of the con­text, viz. the discourse from the beginning of the Chapt. to vers. 8. but therein, it is mani­fest, the Apostle speaks only of the Civil Ma­gistrate, as the adequate or the sole object of the duty he is therein perswaded to. What power else can he call [...], Higher Powers, and [...], Rulers? of what power else can it be said, that he beareth the sword, he is the Minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil, a receiver of tribute, custom, fear, honour? Our Divines both Commentators and Controvertists, do strongly evince this against the Romanists, who would upon this text found the Popes power; and against this text defend a superiority for him over, and an exemption for his Clergy from the power of the Civil Magistrate. Against both which our Protestant Authors do make good that in this text Political, or State power only is intended, and unto it subjection is in­j [...]yned universally, or unto all persons, what­soever other power they be endowed with. Vide Whitakar To. 2. Controv. 4. cap. 3. pag. 647, 648 & quaest 7, 720. Pet. Martyr loc. com. [...]las. 4 cap. 13. Sect. 22. pag. 906. Chamier To. 2 lib. 15. cap. 17. Sect. 8. &c. pag. 637, 638.

For the Minor, that Political or State powe [...] is only a Moral, warranted, or authorize [Page 25] power; or, which is equipollent, all Political or Civil power is Moral, warranted, or au­thorizedFacultas mo­ralis civitatem gubernandi po­testatis civilis vocabulo nun­cupari solet. Grot. de Jure lib. 1. cap. 3. Sect. 6.: this also may be evident. They are called Gods, that is, Civil Magistrates, unto whom the word of God came (saith Christ) [Joh. 10.35.] that is, to whom the commission came to put them in the place wherein they were [So Mr. Burroughes paraphraseth itMr. Bur­roughes on Hos. lect. 1. pag. 10.] and they are Judges of Israel whom God commanded to feed his people, [1 Chron. 17.6.] Political or Civil power (as this text will tell us) is in genere ordained of God, is his ordinance: By Or­dination here (as I shall after undertake to prove) is to be understood the Institution, war­rant, approval, or authorization of God, or his appointment by his revealed Will, Law, or Word: and if Policy or Magistracy in its ge­neral concept or nature be ordained, that is, authorized of God, then is all Political power in specie, and every particular Civil Government, contained under or reducible to this Genus, warranted and authorized by God: and what is by him unwarranted, unauthorized or illegitimate, is in truth, no Political or Ma­gistratical power. When a person becomes a Magistrate, or a M [...]g [...]strate is made, what is the change or effect that is thereby wrought in that man? or what new habit, or endowment doth the investing of a person into Magistra­cy, either by election, succession, or otherwise, produce in him? He hath no more Natural power in him, then he had before; neither hath he ordinarily more understanding, judgement, reason, counsell to govern, then was before in him. Where is the change then? what doth this office add or put into him? why this is it, It gives him a moral capacity, or a warrant, right, authority to rule: it legally empowers, or enables him to command over, and obliges to be subject to his command all the natural power that is in the multi­tude, [Page 26] or body politique, however vastly supe­rior to his own personal, innate, and natural power.

I am confident beyond all doubt, that no man shall be able to give a perfect definition of Civil Magistracy, or Political power, which shall solely belong to it, and distinguish it from all other power, but he must take into his de­finition, warranted, authorized, lawful, or some other term that is equivalent thereto. In this I am confirmed in that I finde the concur­rence of learned Authors in their definitions of Magistracy expresly going this way. I shall give some instances.

Augustinus To. 3. De Trinitate lib. 13. cap. 13. Potentia quippe adjuncta justitiae, vel justitia accedens potentiae, judiciariam potesta­tem facit. Augustine. For Power joyned to Justice, or Justice added to Power, makes a judi­ciary power.

Polanus Partit. Theolog. lib. 1. pag. 330. Est autem Ma­gistratus politicus persona publica, potestatem in subditos legi­time gerens. Polanus. The Political Magistrate is a publique person lawfull bearing sway over the Subjects.

Bucanus Instit. Theolog. loc. 49. quaest. 13. pag. 853. Magistra­tus est officium politicum a Deo institutum, quo ceria persona, vel plures cum dignitate, & potestate legitime ac­cepta, totam Rempub. vel ejus partem, quoad [...] (i. e.) res quae ad hujus vitae usum pertinent, honestis legibus re­gunt. Bucan. Magistracy is a political office, in­stituted of God, by which one certain per­tain person or more do rule, with dignity and power lawfully attained, the Common­wealth whole or part with honest Lawes, as to the things that concern this life.

The professors of Leiden in their Synopsis. Synopsis purio­ris Theolo. per. 4. profess. Leid. Disp. 50. Sect. 29. Forma Ma­gistratus posita est in legitima potestate ipsi a Deo concessa, haec enim inflar anima functioni ejus vitam inspirat, atque efficacitem lar­gitur. The forme of the Magistrate is placed in the law­full power granted to him of God: for this like the soul breathes life into his function, and gives it efficacy.

Zanchius. Zanchius de Nat. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 8. quaest. 3. Thes. 3. Ad verum enim, le­gitimum, libe­rum (que) domina­tum constituendum necessarium est liberum, absolutum (que) jus, libe­ra, absolutaque potestas, quam Graeci [...] vocant, qua res quarum dominatum quaeris tuae fiant. For unto the making of a true, lawful, and free dominion, is necessary a free and absolute right, a free and absolute power, which the Greeks call [...], by which the things of which thou wouldest have the dominion, are made thine.

Grotius. Grotius de jure belli, & pacis lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 4. Jus est qualitas mora­lis personae com­petens ad aliquid juste habendum, vel agendum; qualitas autem moralis perfecta, facultas nobis dicitur, minus perfecta, apti­tudo. Sect. 5. Sub facultate continetur potestas, tum in se quae libertas dicitur, tum in alios, ut patria, dominica, &c. Right is a moral quality be­longing to a person, whereby he may have or do a thing justly; a perfect moral qua­lity we call a faculty, an unperfect, an aptitude. Vnder a faculty we comprehend Power, both that which is over a mans self, which is called Liberty, and that which is over others, as the power of the Father, of the Master, &c.

Sect. 6. Sed haec facultas rursum duplex est, vul­garis, sc. qui usus particula­laris causa com­parata est, & eminens, quae superior est in re vulgari, utpote communitati competens in partes, & res partium, bon [...] communis causa. Sic regia potestas sub se habet, & patriam, & dominicam potestatem.But this faculty is again twofold, viz. Vulgar, which is for particular use; and Eminent, which is above the said Vulgar, as that which belongeth to a Community over its members, and their things for the common Good. So the Kingly power hath subject to it that of the Father, and of the Master.

Mr. John White his way to the Tree of Life, Chap. 3. pag. 46, 47.In Scripture as well as in other Authors the name of Authority, and Power are used indif­ferently, as if they were one, and the same thing: although in strictness of signification we may finde a real difference between them; for Power implies that strength by which any thing not only subsists, but withal bears out it self against whatsoever opposeth it, and be­sides is enabled to work any notable effect. Authority being most properly restrained to the government of reasonable creatures, is that power by which a superior hath right to pre­scribe unto such as are under him. By Right in this discription we exclude Tyranny, which is, the usurping of authority without and against right.

To these I may add that of Tacitus, Agricolae vita cap. 10. he speaking of the person of Galgacus our own Countrey man, Ausetre, trucidare, rapere falsis nominibus imperium ap­pellant; To despoil, to kill, to snatch away they miscal by the name of Empire.

Subsection 4. What is required to the making of a Mo­ral Power.

BEing come to this resolution that only Mo­ral, viz. authorized or lawful Power, and that species only of it, to wit, Political, or Ma­gistratical power is meant in the text; It may make for the further illustrating of this sub­ject we are upon, and the confirming of what hath been said upon it, to consider what it is that makes a Moral Power, or a Power to be warranted, authorized, and awful: and for that end to take notice of the divers wayes wherein a power may be said to be warran­ted or unwarranted, lawful or unlawful.

Unto a moral or authorized power, and so to the power intended in the Text, it is ne­cessary not only that the thing to be had and held, or to be acted and done, be in it self law­ful, but that it be lawful to the person in whom you subject the power, that it be lawfully in­vested in him, or that there be a due authorizati­on, or call of the person to it.

For the yet clearer understanding of this, let it be observed that there are four several wayes wherein Power may be said to be lawful or unlawful, warranted or unwar­ranted.

• 1. In regard of Matter.
• 2. In regard of Person.
• 3. In regard of Title.
• 4. In regard of use.

Let us take notice wherein each of these consisteth, and differeth from the other, and how far they, or any of them conduce to the making up of a Moral power.

First in regard of Matter. Power is in this respect lawful and warranted, when the work or act to be done by it is in its own nature al­lowed, or approved of God to be done by man. The Scripture declares to us a multitude of things which are put into mans power, or are made lawful or warranted to him; as, for in­stance, there is a power to eat, and to drink, to eat flesh, to eat without discriminating betwixt clean and unclean; and to eat without respect to an idol consecration. [1 Cor. 9.4. Gen. 9.3. Rom. 14.14. 1 Cor. 8. [...]. & 10.23, 27.] On the con­trary many things are for their matter unlaw­full, and also the power of them is unwar­ranted or forbidden to men. Such is the power claimed by the Pope many wayes, as the power of dispensing with divine laws, or of making of new in matters of Faith and Religion; the power of judiciary binding the conscience, or forgiving sins; the power of an Ecclesi­astical supremacy over all Christians; the power of disposing of souls in another world: these are super-humane acts, or such as were never concredited to man. Such again is the power of Witchcraft, Sorcery, false miracles, Divination, and the like prestigiatory delusi­ons, or pernicious seats, practised by men from their own presumption with the assistance or instigation of the Devil.

Secondly in regard of Person. There are in Scripture some Powers lawful for the matter of them, but variable in point of warrant as to the person, the tenure of them being allowed to one sort of persons, and inhibited to others; some persons only are made competent, and others are disenabled to assume them; and consequently in the persons capable to hold [Page 30] them they are lawful powers, in others not so. The Priesthood of the Law was invested in the sons of Aaron, with exclusion of all other: if any therefore besides them should have taken to them that function (as did Korah and his company) there was a power unlawful in re­gard of person. The Ministry of the word, or Office of teaching in the Church is expresly forbidden to women.1 Cor. 14.35. 1 Tim. 2.11, 12. If then a woman should take up this work (as some, they say, of late have done, and as the Pepasians, Quin­tillians, and Maxionites are said to allow and practiseAugustine de Haeres. cap. 22, & 27. Et Da­neus in cundem.) there were a power in this sense un­lawful. Master Knox of Scotland held a woman uncapable (otherwise then by extraordinary call) of Civil Magistracy, or Supreme ruleHistory of the Reformation of the Church of Scotland, pag. 220. & 311.. So did the Jews, as Mr. Selden tels usJo. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 7. cap. 6. pag. 812.: and others conceive it simply prohibited by our Saviour unto a Minister of the Gospel, by those words of his [Matth. 20.26.] According to these opinions if a Woman, or if a Minister should undertake the Civill power (however humanely admitted to it) their power would be unlawful in regard of Person.

This is a second way of a powers lawful­ness and unlawfulness. Where note, that under this head the person is considered in specie, or in some common condition, or rank, for as [...]o persons individual warrant, or the want of it, that's reducible to the next parti­cular.

Thirdly, in regard of Title. A power may be in it self, or for matter abstracted from persons lawful, and a person may be in com­mon qualified for investure with it, that is, as capable to receive it as another, but all this makes not this or that man a Moral power. There must be put one thing more to both these to constitute an authorized or lawful, and so a moral power; and that is a right or title to rule.

This is of the nature and essence of Moral power; for what is Authority, but a right to Rule? As private dominion or property con­sists in a right to employ, and dispose of the thing owned; so publique dominion or autho­rity consists in a title to rule.

That right or title is necessary to all tenure, or to Civil dominion in general; or, that such right in most worldly things consists in a spe­cial property, or sequestration of the things from common claim, and use to one, or some peculiar persons, it may seem too much di­gressive and not needful to go about here to prove. For however some things by reason either of their vastness, and inexhaustibleness, or their joint-occupyableness by all without in­terruption to any, are exposed to the common, arbitrary, and promiscuous use of every man, as are the great Ocean, the light, the air; and however at the beginning of the World, and for some time after, by reason of the fewness and simplicity of mank [...]nde, dominion or right, in respect of the objects, was not reduced to distinct property; yet now, upon the multi­plication of occupants (besides the emergent pravity, into which men are lapsed) in most things dominion, or right is stated by sequestra­tion, or peculiar appropriation; and that doubtless agreeably to the law of Nature, and from the dictate of right Reason, and the ge­neral agreement of all men that are but sound witted, and any thing moralized. Yea it is delivered to us by Scripture to be the act of God, The earth hath he given to the children of men, [Psal. 115.16.] he hath given it, as the experience of this, and all precedent ages discoverable to us, tell us, not to be catched up as fodder and harbor are by brute beasts in the Wilderness, among whom the stronger and fiercer seize on what, and where they please, the weaker take only what the other [Page 33] leave them; but under a rule of equity and right ap­portionated or distributed by property: according to that of St. Paul, He hath determined the bounds of thei [...] habitation, [Act. 17.26.] and that of Moses, When the most high divided to the nations their inheritance, when he separated the sons of Ad m, he set the bounds of the people according to the number of the children of Israel, [Deut. 32.8.]

But to follow this Argument only with applicati­on to our particular subject. Amongst the things that are subjected to property, or a seq [...]estred right, all authority of one person over another must ne [...]ds be one, yea, and that more, or rather then other things. For, though other things in the first age of the world migh [...] have been common: as soon as ever ma­trimony, or other domestick or civill societies were instituted, he rights of the correlatives of these soci­eties were distinguisht, and appropriate; neither could it be other ways: for whereas there was possible to be a community of right, or use at the beginning in things of ordinary and external possession, whether moveable or immoveable, yet in matter of authority this could never be: It is repugnant to the nature of the thing; it cannot exist without the subjection of some determinate persons to it; and you must of necessity put, and tie up authority, and subjection in distinct and several subjects, so as it may be said, this man is to command, and these are to obey; whereupon it is inevitably to be yeelded, that autho­rity consists in a right or title to rule appropriate to one, or some certain persons, & reserved from others.

That to the producing, or constituting of a moral power (whether Civil Magistracy, or any other) there must go the entitling or interesting of the persons to it, or an investing him, or them with a right thereto, may be thus further manifest.

All Moral power is derived from God as the foun­tain or Author. That which the Apostle here saith of the Civil Magistracy in specie; There is no power but of God, the powers that he are ordained of God, is true of all power in general, and he might have so expresly extended it, had his scope in this place [Page 34] been so large. Gods derivation of authority to men must needs import two things.

1. His institution of authority in the general, with the several species of it, as conjugal, parental, herile, magistraticall.

2. His communicating, conferring or convey­ing that power, which he hath so instituted to be, to particular persons.

There must be this latter as well as the former to the real & actual constituting of an authority, or put­ting it into existence. Gods ordaining at the first the conjugal, parental, herile, and political power, that is, his appointing that the husband, parent, master, or prince shal have authority over their respective corre­latives (suppose by those words of the commandment, Honour thy Father, &c.) doth not of it self put any of those authorities in being, or in one person more then another; or it makes no man a husband, fa­ther, master, or Prince. Wherefore, if we will make this good, which cannot be denyed, that all Power, viz. Authority, is derived from God, we must say God doth by some act of his (besides his allowing or prescribing Government, with such and such species of it to be) convey authority to individuals, or particular persons. It must further be acknowledged that this act of God must be such as that by it, not only the person authorized, but the rest that are concerned in that estate, in point o [...] use of it, or duty to it, may understand that such an one is singled out by God to sustain this authority. How else could any in conscience of Gods ordinance, either assume such authority over others to themselves, rather then yeeld it to others, or others attribute it to them rather then to others, or to themselves? Now can it be imagined how such an act of God so humanely intelligible should be passed, but either it must be by his immediate revelation from heaven, and there­by indigitating, or pointing out (as it were) such a person, or persons to such an authority, in such a place; or by chalking out a way to men, or giving rules in general to them, how such and such authori­ties, [Page 35] shall accrew unto men; which wayes or rules shall serve in all cases (unlesse where himself shall immediately interpose) to create superiori­ty, or convey power to men, and to discover the empowered.

The former way, Gods designation of particular persons unto authority by immediate revelation from heaven, is not now exercised or expected, neither was it ever in ordinary, or constant use. The latter therefore is the way remaining to us.

That there are such wayes stated, or rules pre­scribed by God for mens entry into relations of power over others, and those necessary to the being thereof, so as without them all ordinary claims to such conditions are null, is very evident, and con­fessed in the relations of parents, masters, hus­bands, pastors of the Church, and many others; and there is no reason in the earth (to me excogita­ble) to think it is not certainly so also in the Ma­gistratical state; What those rules or wayes in par­ticular are, in reference to Civil Magistracy, here is not the fit place to enter upon the set enquiry, but I shall for this have fuller opportunity (as also for the proving more largely that such rules there are given of God) afterward in this discourse. But if thus much be admitted (as I see not how it will be gainsayed) it sufficeth to prove the thing we are about, viz. that the essence of Moral power consists in a title, or right to rule. For if all power be from God, not only as appointing, the office to be among men, but as appointing the person, or persons to the office: and his ordinary, constant way of appointing the per­son to the office, be the prescribing of a rule for mens ingresse into the authoritative relation, or accession to power, by which way he communicates that power to them which is not in others, and which otherwise is not in them, it must needs be that as such admit­tance unto power most certainly gives right and title to it, so upon mens having, or not having such [Page 36] entrance to it depends the reality, or nullity of the power they to) themselves challenge. We have seen this third kind of lawfulness or warran­tableness of power (viz. in regard of Title) and the necessity of it to the being or constituting of a moral power.

Fourthly, there is yet behind another way where­in power may be said to be lawful, or unlawful, viz. in regard of use. That power which in re­spect both of matter, and of person, and of title is lawful, is yet to undergoe a further qualification to regulate it, which concernes the use, or employ­ment of it: a power lawful, and right for its com­posure must also be legal, and right for its practise; its course, and processe in government must be altogether just▪ it may decree, and do only equal and right things, and in this respect that power is unlawful, or culpable which doth enact, or execute any injustice or wrong. So were those ten Kings, [Rev. 17.13, 14.] who gave their power up to serve the Beast, and to make war with the Lamb.

But among these four wayes of the lawfulness and unlawfulness of a power, which we have thus di­stinguished of and explained, there is this difference to be noted. The three first wayes do concern the being, composition, habit, and constitution of an authority or Moral power; the fourth only concerns the act and exercise thereof: and consequently the three first conditions of lawfulness are simply ne­cessary to the making of the power, the fourth is but accidental; and exterior to its making; an unlawfulness in any of those three respects is incon­sistible with, destructive to the nature of a moral power, and consequently secludeth the power that is in any of those things peccant from any claim to this text; whereas that power which only offends in its use, or acts of power, may well, as to its being, and constitution be moral, and interested in the text, and its universal actings only be accounted forein, or disallowed ground therein. For this is [Page 37] (as far as I have observed) yeelded by all, and is very certain, that every unlawful power, so far as it is unlawful, must be excluded out of the meaning of this textSee the Au­thors quoted by Mr. Prinne, his third part of the Power of Parli­aments, p. 14.. The power therefore that is unlawful as to its being, and constitution, is wholly and ab­solutely secluded; the power that is unlawful only as to exercise may be for its habit, or being inclu­ded in it, and its irregular acts only discarded from it.

To make this observation (if need be) yet more evident, as to that lawfulnesse which concerns the being of a power. Unto the constitution of a power in its individual essence and existence, you must necessary take in these three things:

• 1. The matter of the power.
• 2. A subject or person to sustain it.
• 3. An investure or conveying of that matter of power unto that subject or person.

If all these three must go to the making of a power, then a legitimacy in every of these must go to the making of a Moral power; or a power law­ful in its constitution or being; and an illegiti­macy in any of these is an illegitimacy in the very being, and so a nullity to the power as moral, or a making of it no authority.

1. An unlawfulness in the matter of a power de­stroyes its moral being. The Pope assumes to him­self a power to dispense with the consciences of Christians in divine Lawes. This power, we say, is unlawful for the matter, or in the whole kind of it disallowed to all, and every one of mankinde: and therefore we say it's null; we deny any such power to be in him.

2. An unlawfulness in regard of person evacuates the power. Korah and his company arrogated to themselves the office of the priesthood; this power, lawful in it self, as for the matte, was not law­full, but prohibited to be in them; their Pr [...]est­hood therefore was a nullity, they were indeed no priests.

[Page 38]3. Let there be a power lawful for matter, and a person capable, or induable with it, yet if there be not a lawful investure, or conveyance of this power to this person, there is yet in him no moral power; an unlawful, entry, or tenure nullifies the power in that respect. John Becold (called John of Leyden) takes upon him in Munster to be King, and as King acteth and ruleth all at his pleasure; this King being destitute of a just call, title, or tenure, was therefore but scenical, and nothing as to a mo­ral power, or real magistracy; he was in truth no King, but a traiterous Villain; the unlaw­fulness here is in the constitution of the power; that his having, and holding the pre­tended Soveraignty, that his being in power was unlawful.

In any of these three wayes of unlawful power, you cannot sever the unlawfulness from the being of the power; take away that which is unlaw­ful in any of them, take away the matter, or take away the person, or take away the tenure, and you destroy the very being of the power. For ex­ample, in the third (which most concerns our purpose) where one takes and holds the place of Power without right, or title, the thing which is here unlawful is the very tenure, or holding of power; if then you will take away that which is unlawful, you must take away the persons tenure, or holding of power, and so you take away the being of this power. No otherwise is an unentitled tenure taken away, but either by deposing the unlawful possessor, or by crea­ting to him de novo, a just title, and confer­ring on him a right: now either of these two wayes the power that was unlawfully occupyed ceaseth.

If then it be granted that from this Text is excluded every unlawful power so far as it is unlawful, or whatever in the power is unlaw­ful; Seeing the unlawfulness of a rightless, or unentitled power, is in the being of it, not in [Page 39] the exercise meerly, and for that reason the un­lawfulness is inseparable from the power, it must needs be that an unentitled power is utterly and absolutely excluded from the meaning of this Text: or, in short, seeing the being of the power is unlawful, the being of the power must be shut out of our text. In this respect the reason is the same betwixt an act of injustice of a power lawful as to title or constitution, and an un­just occupants act of being in, or holding the power; betwixt Ahabs seising of Naboths vine­yard, and Athaliahs intruding into Joash his kingdom, the one is an act of Tyranny as to exercise, the other is an act of Tyranny as to title. You cannot otherwise either give admit­tance to the Text, and to the ordination of God, or deny it unto the one, then you may do to the other: if you say the unlawfulness of oppression excludes Ahabs act from this Text, I may with as good reason say the unlawfulness of wrongful occupation excludes Athaliahs act, which is her be­ing in power from the same.

Subsection 1. The difference betwixt the Narative, and the Legislative word of God: and that Scri­pture predictions are not a warrant for us to act upon in the things pre­dicted.

ONly to give this note of difference betwixt the Narrative and Legislative expressions of Gods mouth.

[Page 47]1. The former is the scheme or platform of Gods own wayes, and of his will of purpose or decree so far as he pleaseth to reveal it. And the same things which are of his hand acting, are thus of his mouth declaring, either the history of them, as things done, or the prediction of them as things to be done by him. The latter, that which is Legisla­tive is the model, or rule of mans duty and wayes. This is one difference.

2. The Narrative word is the object or matter of our faith: the legislative of our practice.

These differences are well to be observed. When God reveales in his word that such a thing is, or shall be done by himself; that such things have been or shall come to passe: these revelations are the objects of our faith; we may, yea must believe them to be as they are revealed, either past, or fu­ture. But they are not therefore, or by virtue of such revelation, a rule or warrant for us to walk by; that is, we are not authorized or obliged there­by to act, or put our hand to the effecting, or pro­moting the execution of such thingsVide Amesi­um Medull. Theolog. lib. 2. cap. 1. Sect. 22, 23. Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 22. Sect. 15. cum Anno­tat.. God fore­told he would raise up evill against David out of his own house,2 Sam. 12.11. Luk. 24.46. Act. 3.18. & 13.27. and he would take his wives before his eyes, and give them to his neighbor, and he should lie with them. But this was no allowance for Absalom, Ahitophel, or any of that party to counsel, or act to the accomplishing of these things. The people and Rulers of the Jewes did most wickedly, and undutifully in the sufferings, and death of Christ: But they did nothing therein but what God be­fore had declared he would bring to passe by them.

There are some now a dayes who make it not only lawful, but a duty of the Saints of this pre­sent age, yea their main work or master-piece, to stickle against Civil Powers, both with tongue, and hand, both to cry and to pull them down; and their ground which they lay for this so strange a Position, is this double supposal;

First, That the Prophesies and predictions of Scripture declare the ruine of all eart [...] potentates to be a work which God will effec [...] [...] this time.

Secondly, That whatsoever be not [...]d to us [...]y Scripture prophesie to be the purpose, cour [...] ▪ or di­spensation of God in our generation, that we are bound to act for, and promote to our uttermost, and are to take the said dispensation of God for our call, rule, and warrant for the same. Both these supposals and that conclusion inferred from them, I finde laid down and insisted o [...] in the books of one Mr. Tillinghast The former of the supposals is in his Generation work, part. 1. pag. 42, 55. the latter, pag. 19, 43. 63, 72, 73. and part. 2. pag. 7. The conclusion is in his knowledge of the times, the Appendix, con­clus. 30. pag. 344. and Gener. work part. 1. pag. 55, 66. To debate these positions with him is not my enterprise here. This only will I say to them, The former of his two supposals is a thing to me very inevident, and will (I think) scarse be cleared so well as to be made a principle upon which a practical conclusi­on may be built. The latter is a most unsound and presumptuous positionSee this well discussed in Dr. Sclater his Sermon on 2 King. 9.31. pag. 25, &c.. The Scripture aboun­deth with multitudes of instances of divine predictions, and hu­mane executions; the former expresly owned, the latter as plainly disowned and condemned by God. The examples above given of the sufferings of Da­vid, and of Christ, may serve to be produced instead of all. And I shall add only, that Baasha had a prophesie for all that he did against Jeroboams house, yet is he not excused by that, but condemned neverthelesseSee 1 King. 14.14. & 15.29. & 16.7.. It is very strange that men of sober heads, and savoring of Godlinesse, should in these dayes under the name of Saints, lick up the vomit of Hacket, of Mountzer, and of John of Ley­den See Camdeni Annal. To. 2. p. 37. Joh. Sleiden Comment. lib. 10. pag. 253. Muntzers life in Rosse his [...].. If divine providence and dispensation of it self make out a rule to us to walk by, their horrid [Page 49] miscarriages,CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. and fatal ends should have taught the men of these No ions quite otherwise. I will but make up this (somewhat necessary) digression with a passage in Daniel, and the explication of it given by Expositors. It is said [Dan. 11.14.] Also the robbers of thy people shall exalt themselves, to establish the vision.

This sentence expositors apply to Onias the Priest, and certain Apostate Jewes, who in the dayes of Antiochus the great his reign over Judea fell from him, and went into Egypt, and sided with the King thereof, his enemy, and by petition obtained of him, that they might there in the Countrey of Heliopolis, build a temple, and an altar unto God, like that at Jerusalem. And for this their both civil and religious Apostasie they pre­tended the fulfilling of the prophecy of Isaiah [Cap. 19. v. 18, 19.] In that day shall five Cities in the land of Egypt speak the language of Canaan, and swear to the Lord of Hosts; one of them shall be called the city of Destruction, (in the margent of the Sun, that is, Heliopolis.) In that day there shall be an Altar to the Lord in the midest of the Land of Egypt, &c] And because of the Apostasie of those men upon that pretence the tex saith, (as Commen­tators refer it) they shall exalt themselves to establ sh the vision Divines Anno. & Diodate in loc. Vide Usser Ar­nal. part. post. de M. 3854. Edw. Simsons Chron Cath. A. M. 3853..

Subsection 2. Certain Propositions to explain those several wayes wherein things are said to be of God.

BUt the question will be concerning the being of a thing of Gods hand by way of efficiency, and the being of a thing of Gods mouth by way of war­rant, rule or precept; whether both of these, or [Page 50] but one of them, and if but one, then which of them is it which is intended by this clause, of God?

Before I come to determine this question, as it lies betwixt these two in particular, it may be some­what conducible to compare them together, and to explain them a little more, and the reduceableness of things to both, or each of them. For the which observe▪

1. Sometimes a thing is both these wayes of God, viz. both of his mouth authorizing, and of his hand working it. That which his mouth enjoynes, his hand sometimes effects. [2 Chron. 30.12.] In Judah the hand of God was to give them one heart to do the commandement of the King and the Princes by the word of the Lord. The like see [1 Chron. 29.14. Phil. 2.13. 2 Cor. 5 5, 18.]

2. Sometimes a thing is of Gods mouth com­manding, but not of his hand working, God shews, injoynes to men their duty m [...]ny times when as it is not performed in them, [see Jer. 7.23, 24.]

3. A thing is sometimes of Gods hand, but not of his mouth. Many things come to passe by divine providence, or working, which though himself effect, and that by mans agency, yet he allowes not of that agency of man in them. Take for instances Gods sending of Joseph into Egypt, by his Brethrens sel­ling of him [Gen. 45.5, 7, 8. & 50.20.] the ex­pulsion of David out of his Kingdom, and the ra­vishment of his Wives by Absolom, [2 Sam. 12.11, 12.] The destruction and captivity of Judah by Nebuchad­n [...]zar, [Isa. 10.5, 6, 15. Jer. 51.7. & 25.9. com­pared with Chap. 47.6. Jer. 50.17, 18. & 51.24, 34, 35, 36.] The sufferings of Christ by the Jews, [Act. 2.13. & 4.28.] with many other things [as 1 King. 11.14, 23. 1 Sam. 26.19. Judg. 2.14, 15. Hab. 1.6, 13.]

4. Some things are neither of Gods mouth, ap­proving; nor of his hand, acting. So are the sins of men in their formal, precise, or abstract conside­ration, [Jam. 1.13. Gal. 5.8. 1 Joh. 2.15.]

Subsection 3. CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 3. Of Gods working in humane actions, whether good or evill; and the difference betwixt the being of the one of God, and of the other.

FOr the better understanding of these four particu­la [...]s, especially the two last of them, upon which there may lie some obscurity, let these Propositions be thereto added.

1. All beings, or things; whatsoever hath sub­sistence or existence; all events, effects and producti­ons, as to their matter, or positive entity, are of Gods hand, and working, [Rom. 11.36. 1 Cor. 8.6. Ephes. 1.11.]

2. Of those things that are of Gods hand, of working, 1. Some are of him as the sole efficient of them. So are those things which receive their being by creation, regeneration, or other such like supernatural, or miraculous production. 2. Others are so of God, as to be also the work, and effect of second agents. So are all those things which come to passe here below, and in the order of nature, or the ordinary course of providence.

3. In the causing of the latter sort of effects, viz. those wh ch are both of God, and the creature, these two are not coordinate agents, or set collaterally, or in parity, or equality of order; for that would import that both were first, and but partial, sociall causes, and as well the one as the other to be inde­pendent, or to have their causality in, and from themselves alone. But the one is subordinate to the other, that is, God is the supreme and first, the [Page 52] creature is the inferior, and second cause, and is de­pendent on, and receive its physical efficiency, or attingency of the effect from God, and that not par­tially or by way of addition or supply, but wholly. [Act. 17.25, 28. Isa. 54.16. Ezek. 30.24. & 32.3.11, 12.] and this holdeth in all acts of the crea­ture, whether holy or sinful, good or evill, as to the natural being of the action. That which the Apostle saith of his gracious workings, Not I, but the grace of God which was with me, [1 Cor. 15.10.] the same Joseph saith of his brethrens sinful deed, It was not you that sent me hither, but God, [Gen. 45.8.] The creature acteth, yet not it, but the power of God with it.

The creature hath truly, and really in it an active principle, and that principle truly and really exerteth or putteth forth acts, but it hath both the principle, and the activenesse put into it of God. His influence not only toucheth the effect, but the second cause, and moveth itContrary to this some of the Schoolmen. Molina de lib. Arbitrio. qu. 14. Disp. 26. pa. 111. & Disp. 32. pag. 133,. He worketh not only with, but by it, and that though in some sense mediately, in regard of his elevation, and use of the second cause, yet immediately also in regard of his nearest attin­gency, and that both by immediety of person and of virtue.

4. It behoves us to consider the subordinacy of the second to the fi [...]st cause, of the creature to God somewhat more distinctly. Observe therefore it is twofold:

• 1. Physicall.
• 2. Morall.

The former simply and absolutely concernes the being of every reall effect, and the vir­tue, or power by which it is produced by any second cause.

The latter respecteth the manner of the procedure of an eff [...]ct f [...]om a rational agent, and the relation, and correspondency it bears to the revealed, and pre­ceptive will of God given unto him.

All creatures in all their actions are physically subordinate to God; but reasonable creatures more­over [Page 53] are, and particularly man is morally subordi­nate to him; viz. as he receives all his activity from him, so he is to act by his Commission, and in a conformity to his direction, or command given forth by word: the ground and reason of the for­mer subordination is his being a creature; for as such he totally depends on God for his being and operation; the latter is from his being a creature endued with reason and will, and therefore working with deliberation and free volition; thence his per­son and actions are qualifiable with a moral good­ness, and evilness, and are capable of being regula­ted by a law, and prosecuted with rewards and pu­nishments. Man therefore in respect of his moral actions, stands in this twofold subordination unto God, physical, and moral.

5. There are divers differences twixt these two subordinations of man unto God, some of which it is to our present purpose to consider. They are different.

1. In the formall respect, or term to which they refer; the physical subordination respecteth Gods will of purpose, and hand of providence; the moral respecteth Gods revealed will, or word of precept.

2. In point of necessity, the physical subordina­tion is certain and immutable, so necessary as that it cannot be otherwise, it is impossible the creature should not be in all things subject to, dependent on Gods decree and hand of providence, both passive­ly and actively: the moral is not so, but may be, and is varied from, though this subordination be necessary de jure, and ought to be kept inviolate, yet it is not de facto, but it is oftentimes infringed. And here comes in sin; what is sin but the crea­tures breach, and transgression of the moral sub­ordination he stands in, and owes unto God his pre­ceptive will or word, either by a non acting, or by a contrary acting to the same?

6. By these differences it may appear (for I shall not strive to take notice of all) that these two sub­ordinations [Page 54] are in humane actions, not only distin­guishable, but separable and dissociable. Man may be subordinate to God physically in those actions wherein he is inordinate morally. And Gods will of purpose, and work of providence may go on, and be done, when his preceptive will takes no place, but is directly crossed, as it is in all the sinful motions of man. And hence it may appear of the sinfull acts of men, as they are something in rerum naturâ, how it may be said (as in the third Proposition above) the thing is of Gods hand working, but not of his mouth warranting it to man.

If it be here asked, Why God makes use of such agents to act by, as are displeasing and crosse to his preceptive will, when as he hath such choice of other ministerial agents, yea, and makes use of his creatures agency meerly of choice, not of ne­cessity?

I answer, though mans sinful acts cannot but be displeasing and dishonorable to him, yet the use he can, and doth make of them, is not so. It is for his honour to work by variety of instruments, and the commendation of his workmanship to bring to passe a straight and perfect work, with crooked and untoward tooles. His providences of this nature are the probations of men, both good and evil; and hereby he both worketh out more good then there is evill in the act of the subordinate agent so peccant, and accomplisheth the just punishment, both of others and of those he so imployes.

7. We must observe in the subordination of the creature to God in its production, though it receive all its efficacy and working from God, yet the causality of the first and second, of the superiour and inferiour cause, and the efflux of the effect as from the one, and the other, are distinguishable. As the creatures essence, and existence are wholly in and from God, yet far enough different, and distinct from Gods: so the creatures power and operation, unto the causing of an effect, is totolly received of God, yet Gods agency therein is one, and the creatures is [Page 55] another. Hence our sense tels us the sun shines, the fire warmes, chalke whitens, and it is so really. If we should say (as many Schoolmen do) that in this subordinate agency of the creature under G d, and their working together unto any effect,Molina. Suarez. the acti­on of God, and the creature is the same strictly and properly, as action is taken for productio activa (for as taken for productio passiva, or the effect, it may be clearly granted) yet, (although I see not why totall dependency, and derivation should more infer, or be a reason for the confounding, or identifying Gods and the creatures actions, then it is for the identifying of their beings) we must understand it of the materiale, and not of the formale of their actions, and so must be forced to put some distincti­on, betwixt the creatures causality, and the virtue by which he causeth; betwixt the divine influx to the creature agent, and the creatures [...], or efflux to the eff [...]ct; betwixt the creatures taking in the concourse of the first cause, and his issuing or putting it forth. That God and the creature are different agents in their producing of the same effect is granted, but how should they be so, if their acti­on or agents were altogether the same? Besides, if it were so, then the same action must be said to be morally good (viz. as from God) and evill (as from man) to be subordinate to a law ( [...]s from man) not subordinate (as from God). Again, if in this concurrence of these two agents to the cau­sing of the same effect, the action of each were wholly the same, then the same action would denominate them both, which we see it doth not. When a stone fals downward, a plant growes, a beast goes, eats, sleeps, we do not (nor can pro­perly) say that God fals, growes, goes, eats, sleeps. For although all these acts are in and from his con­course, yet, as they only are in the creature, as their subject, so they are also from the creatures na­tural principles, from which there is a procedure of these acts different formally from that of the divine cooperation, for which they peculiar denominate [Page 56] the creature and not God. In man, whose actions have a moral [...] different from their physical, and who acteth with deliberation and choice, this dif­ference (though it [...] in all creature act [...]) is more apparent. Let it be granted that in all his actions he is physically [...]ed by God, (though some admit it only of his imperate, transient and productive acti­ons; unto the immanent and illicit acts of his un­derstanding, and will, they will only allow a moral motivenessJo. Cameron Resp. ad Epist. viri Docti. cap. 1. in operibus eius pag. 736. a, & 737. a., but whether way soever it be (let the physical influence be supposed of all) in these hu­mane actions the strength and virtue is from God, the actuosity or agency is formally mans. Though the action be good, and so more peculiarly of God (he not only sustaining the will in the use of its freedom, but determining and carrying it (whether by a physical or moral influence, is not here to be dis­puted) to the willing and working of that good) yet the formal agency is only ascribed to man. Hence he is said to believe, hope, pray, and do the like graci­ous acts, and not God.

Hence it may appear (which is the reason I have travailed so far in these School intricacies) how in the sinful acts of man, the usual distinction betwixt the action and the moral obliquity of it, and that the former is from God, the latter is mans only, may hold. For,

1. Take it only in its natural or physical con­sideration, and so the action is both from God, in as much as from him is the energie, or force that goes to it; and from man also, in as much as he hath an hand, or activity in it, distinct, though inse­parable from that of God.

2. And take it as a moral act, in which the crea­ture oweth subordination and conformity to Gods law, and which floweth from a moral faculty in man, and so it is only from man, from his own will, according to that of our Saviour, That which cometh out of a man that defileth a man, for from within, out of the heart of men proceed evill thoughts, &c. All these things come from within, and defileth man. [Page 57] And that of the Apostle,CHAP. II. SECT. II. Subsect. 4. God gave them up to un­cleanness through the lusts of their own hearts, to dis­honour their own bodies.) God not at all inclining or drawing, or intrinsecally determining the wil in the election of evil, as neither doth he in its act of aver­sation, or refusal of good, or in a sin of omission. And thus it is manifest (according to our fourth proposition above) it may be said that some things (taking the term Thing in a vulgar sense) are neither of Gods mouth (approving) nor of his hand (wor­king.) For mans sinful action, though the matter, virtue, or activity be of Gods hand, yet in its for­mal and moral stamp, it is neither of Gods hand nor mouth.

Subsection 4. How the hand of God is clear from the sin of man when it acteth in mans sinful action, and from injustice in punishing him for that action.

IF it be here asked, How this may be, that God may use, and be the author of those actions, or motions of his creature in subordination to his working providence, which in their formal and mo­ral habitude are evill, and so deordinate or repug­nate to his word, and yet his hand and providence be as clear from the sin, as his word is clear against it: and how the creature is in this case justly puni­shable by God?

I answer briefly:

1. For the former, How God is clear from be­ing the authour of the sin?

[Page 58]1. It is not the sin formally taken which God makes use of to the production of any natural effect, but the physical motion of the creature to which the sin is adherent.

2. Let it be considered how man acteth in this physical subserviency to God. He is not impelled by God, but he moveth of his own accord, and free choice; he is not moved (as I think it may be affirmed) physically of God, till he first move himself morally. Unto every moral act of man that is transient, and productive of any thing, there are required two things to be in him, Will and Power; the power, how great soever, doth nothing of it self, it is the wils injuction that educeth the act; though both concur to the action or effect, yet the power doth not lead or draw forth the will, but the will actuates the p [...]we [...]. The power in it self is neither good nor evill, posse peccare was no fault in Adam, he had it in his integrity; a defecti­bility was both in him, and in the nature of An­gels originally: neither doth the power make the action to which it is exerted, either good or evill; but the moral tincture is wholly from the will, and so intirely doth it result thence, that the will in some sort (whether to good or evill) stands for, or is equivalent to the deed in Gods account. The question then is, Whence is the will moved to this or that sinful act? God indeed useth the creatures hand or power, but who or what is the mover or swayer of the will? The Philosopher saith, and it's true, God is primus motor, the first mover, but this he understands of physical motion, and therefore in the external execution of that deed which is sinful, let it be granted that God begins, but in humane actions, there is a moral act which goes before the natural, an elicite act precedes the imperate, an election of the will before an elevation of the power. Now for the volition of the wil in reference to a sin­ful work, that's of it self, and its counsellor or dicta­tor, the practicall Intellect, as they may be each in their kind morally excited, or induced by their ob­jective [Page 59] attractives without, or the suggestions of Sa­tan; It must necessarily be acknowledged unto an evill course the will is not intrinsecally determined by God: he neither morally perswades, nor physi­cally impels it to such resolution, purpose or choice. God tempteth not any man, &c. [Jam. 1.13.] all, I think, that can be said of God, as to that act of the will, is that he abandons, or leaves the man to him­self, and to his objective and injective temptations, which though it may be an antecedent, yet is not in the least a positive cause of the wills default; and yet he never doth that, but very righteously, both in regard of his disobligation from any debt of as­sistance to his creature, and in regard of just provocation from him, ever since his first de­fection.

3. There are causes imaginable wherein even one man may honestly joyne in the same act with another, when it is to his knowledge in that other a sinful action: the diversity of the principle and end making the concurrence of the one just, of the other wicked. Take for instance Reubens counsel­ling and acting with his brethren in the casting of his brother Joseph into the pit, which they did for a mischief, he for a deliverance to him, [Gen. 37 21.] and Hushaies counsel to Absalom (which Absalom and his companions embraced) in shew for Absaloms service against David, but in intention and real tendency quite contrary [2. Sam. 17.11, &c.] And this is seen in the guiltless concurrence of one that is necessitated to enter into any contract that is unlaw­full in the party voluntarily contracting, whether usury, or otherVide Groti­um de Jure Belli lib. 2. cap. 26. Sect. 5. & lib. 3. cap. 1. Sect. 22..

How much more may it be yeelded to be so be­twixt these two, in this respect, as in other infinitely dispar agents, God and man; especially when we know there is no lesse distance betwixt the end which the one hath, and that of the other: accor­ding as Joseph expresseth it in the case between his brethren and himself. But, as for you, ye thought evill against me, but God meant it unto good to save [Page 60] much people alive, [Gen. 50.20.] could it not be so betwixt man and man; that one might lawfully joyn his hand in that act wherein another joyneth sinfully, yet God, though most righteous, is unconfined to the bounds of mans righteousness: it is his prerogative, as the supreme cause, not to be tyed within those rules, which subordinate agents are.

4. Let it be added, when God useth mans effi­ciency to inflict that upon one which from the sub­ordinate agent is sinfully inferred, as suppose slaughter, robbery, defamation, or the like, there what is wickedly done by man, is alwayes justly from God upon the patient: he no lesse righteously (as to the sufferer) takes away a mans life by the hand of an assassinate, then if he did it by a disease, or any other means: and being so, if we think it no impeachment to the justice of a supreme magi­strate to take away the life of a capital offender by such a judge, or executioner as may act corruptly in it, as doing it with a minde meerly acted by cru­elty, or mercenary respects; much more may we absolve the providence of the Almighty in the im­ployment of a sinful instrument to the accomplish­ment of his most just purpose and act.

2. For the other part of the question, The punisha­bleness of a person by God thus serving his provi­dence by his sinful action: the same things will serve for answer.

1. Man hath a concurrence or agency of his own formally different from Gods in the action.

2. That his concurrence is free, from his own will, without all compulsivenesse.

3. He therein proposeth to himself, not Gods end, or the serving of God in it, but he hath his own proper aim different from, and often contrary to that of GodWho so forlorn or impudent a­mongst miscre­ants as to say, that in his damned ambiti­on, or covetous­ness, or luxury he had respect to the will of God, which no man lightly knows but by the e­vent? Dr. Scla­ter Sermon on 2 King 9.31. pag 27..

Subsection 1. That Providence doth declare something of God.

IT is not to be doubted or denyed that Providence hath a voice, and doth declare something of God to us. As God hath a working word, [Psal. 33.6. & 147.18. Luke 7.7.] so he hath a speaking hand. Hence it is that his works are said to be declarative and instru­ctive, [Psal. 19.1, &c.] to be signes, [Jer. 32.20.] and men are willed to hear the rod, and who hath appointed it, [Mica. 6.9.] to come, and behold the works of the Lord, [Psal. 46.8.] which would not be to any pur­pose if they did not shew us something remarkable of God. But the question is, of what and how these are declarative to us? As it is a sort of Atheism to deny Providence a voice, so it is a great presumpti­on, and high impiety for man to take upon him to assign it its voice, or to make it speak to his own mind and turn; and an error of very dangerous consequence it is to misunderstand Providence, or construe it in any other language then its author im­poseth and annexeth to it. For the discovery there­fore of the truth in this particular, I shall endevor by the light of Scriptures (as well as I can apprehend them) to set down what Providence doth, and what it doth not discover.

Subsection 2. CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 2. That Providence doth declare somewhat of Gods counsels.

1. THe Providence of God is the image or ex­presse of his counsels; It doth therefore dis­close unto us somewhat of Gods will of purpose, counsell or decree. Two wayes God makes known to us his will of Decrees, [...]o wi [...], by Predictions, and by Providences. The fo [...]mer looks at, and reveales the things of Gods Will as future, this latter dis­covers them to us as p [...]st, or present. Providences are the effects, executions, or acomplishments, and so the coppy, print, or transcript of Gods purposes. Our God is in the heavens, he hath done whatsoever he pleased. Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did he, [Psal. 115.3.136.6.] First, that is, from all eter­nity, his Will of good pleasure determineth, and then in the foreset time his Providence effecteth things. Only here we are to beware we stretch not this di­scovery beyond its own line, that is, beyond the past and present time. We must not conceit, or pretend to understand from is that of the purpose of God which it tels us not, or to see by it that which it shewes us not. Some there are that will proceed fu [...]ther then this mark, and meerly out of their own airy imagination presume by it to divine of things to come. I mean of moral and contingent futurities: (for where experience hath discovered a natural connexion of causes and effects, there a probable conjecture and expectation of future events neer at hand by the intuition of their particular and im­mediate causes may be gathered; as that a pregnant woman will bring forth a childe; that the evening or morning face of the skie will be followed with [Page 66] such or such weather the day next ensuing:) thus the A [...]rologer, and the self-interested Statist [...]oully over­lash and exceed their bounds in interpreting the pro­vidences of God. The Astrologer pretends a cun­ning to read in the great Ordinances of the hea­vens (whose huge volums in regard of variety, di­stinction, and distribu [...]ion of influences (as to this use doubtless) are to them, as the hand writing of the wall before Belshazzar was to the Caldean Astro­logers, altogether illegible, and unintelligible, yet) they pretend (I say) to read, and to be able to draw out from them a map of the disposition of the aire of every day for whole moneths, and years to come, and of the temper of living bodies, of the successes of Husbandry, Trade-adventurers, and political-enter­prises, yea, and of the very propensions, contrive­ments, counsels of mens mindes about Civill, Church, and spiritual affairs, with the revolutions that will attend mens lives, estates, names, and so­cieties, temporal and ecclesiastical, yea, what will passe not only betwixt man and man, but betwixt God and man; and (which is very strange) this map to be every year new, and for every Countrey, Nation, City, yea for every distinct sort or condi­tion of men, whether they live far dispersed from one another, or promiscuously intermixt with others, yea for each single person, different. The self-interested statist from Gods present proceedings, either in punishing or prospering a way, person, family, profession, or Nation will needs fancy, and confidently conclude that he doth foresee, and can presage what God hath determined, and will do with the same hereafter. Forgetting with what reason Solomon hath cautioned us against boasting of to mor­row, to wit, for thou knowest not what a day may bring forth; and not minding that men, and Nations, even in regard of their visible worldly condition, are in the hands of God, as the clay is in the Pot­ters hand, soon made, and soon marred; now moul­ded into this frame, and quickly turned into ano­ther, and that as the grace of God may suddenly, [Page 67] unexpectedly, and wonderfully change mens hearts,CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 3. or men deprived thereof may strangely alter them­selves, so God hath reserved out of what he hath clearly threatned in his word concerning mens temporal punishments, much more out of what his Providence at present dispenseth, a power to alter his proceeding in an instant.

Subsection 3. That Providence doth declare to us that God is, and what he is.

2. PRovidence is the Index or Character of the Divine Nature, and so it is Doctrinal, or delivers to us matter of faith, or what we are to know, and believe concerning the Divine Essence, to wit, as it is absolutely considered, or abstracted from distinction of personal relations. God is made known by his works, as the workeman is by his artifice, the cause by its effect, [Jer. 32.20. Rom. 1.19, 20. Psal. 19.1, &c. Act. 14.17.] Hence we finde that so frequently added in the prophets to the comminations and promises of God, as the end of the execution of them, and so of his providences, And they shall know that I am the Lord.

CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. Certain distinctions premised for the discovery how far Providence is declarative of the will of God, which we are to do.

3 BUt to come neerer to the thing in question. Providence is in some sort preceptive, and di­rective in matter of practice. Now for the opening of this use of Providence, we must distinguish,

1. Of preceptiveness, or the delivery of Divine precepts to us. This may be, 1. Either by way of original institution. 2. Or by way of abrogation of what is already in force. 3. Or, by way of declaration, remembrance, or monition of that which is already ordained. And again this third may be, 1. Either solitarily, 2. Or joyntly and by way of concurrence with other means, or the delivery of them otherwayes.

2. Of divine precepts, 1. Some are of the law of nature. 2. Others are positive, or subsequently instituted. And of both those, whether natural, or positive, 1. Some contain our duty to God. 2. Some our duty to man.

3. Distinguish of the use of Providence. This is, 1. Either ordinary, which the general rules of the word of God allow and dir [...]ct us in. 2. Or ex­traordinary, the which special [...]arrants in the word, given on special occasions have allowed, or pre­scribed.

4. Distinguish betwixt the giving of a rule, or law, and the determining of it to this or that particu­lar matter, or case.

Subsection 5. CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 5. Five Propositions explaining wherein Provi­dence is, and wherein it is not declarative of Gods will to be done by us.

I Shall apply these distinctions, and make use of them to our purpose in these following propo­sitions.

1. Providence (as I understand) c [...]nnot be said to deliver us the will or precepts of God for our practise by way of original institution: neither can it of it self abolish or make void any rule, or law of God before ordained: or draw a warrant for us to proceed contrary to the same. Suspend it may, or disenable from doing in point of affirma [...]ive precepts, but to the doing of the contrary it cannot dispense, nor can it dissolve a law.

2. Providence may by it self without the help of any other Index or Law-book deliver to us some­what of the law of nature, that is, so much of our duty to God as is contained therein. Divines di­stinguish betwixt cultum naturalem, & voluntarium, Ames. Medul. Theol. lib 2. cap. 5. & 13. seu institutum; the natural worship of God, and that which is voluntary, or instituted. The natural is that which belongs to him as Gods or by virtue of what he is, or the consideration of his nature; and this is taught by the law of nature. The insti­tuted is that which is given him by virtue of his own voluntary appointment. The former is simply ne­cessary and immutable, one and the same in all ages and to all persons. The latter is arbitrary and variable (as he pleaseth to order) and hath been di­versified: It was appointed to be one w [...]y under the Law, another way u [...]d [...]r the Gospel. The for­mer [Page 70] we say Providence my lead to, or (as it were) dictate to us. For in as much as of it self it reveals, that there is a God, and of what nature and perfecti­ons he is, it hence infers, or by force of that princi­ple of faith teacheth us, that he is to be worshipped, and in particular, that he is to be feared, loved, trusted in, called upon, praised, and obeyed, and to receive from us whatsoever else may be deemed an act of his natural worship. And this is all (I conceive) which Providence can of it self, or taken alone, and apart, teach, or inculcate. There being nothing else of duty which can be imagined ne­cessary, and immediately to follow upon that know­ledge of God which Providence reveals. That it goes thus far, will need little proof. The Apostle Paul told the Lystria [...]s that the living God left not himself without witness, Acts 14.7. in that he did good, &c. that is, by his good and merciful Providences he testifi­ed against the Idolatry of the Heathen, and called for their service to be yeelded to himself alone. And he informs the Romans, Rom. 1.20. that the same persons are left without excuse (for their sins, and therefore they must needs be taught somewhat of their duty) by the discovery of the God-head in the creation.

3. For other duties (besides the forementioned general rules which immediately refer to God) whether of the law of nature, to wit, those which respect man, or of positive institution, Providence doth not by it self dictate, or declare them to us. Observe here.

1. I say it doth not declare Gods mind to us in these things. It was before said the works of God, in as much as they discover the Divine nature, they of themselves tell us thus much, that God is to be, obeyed in all his commandments, but what his will- or commands are in particular, as touching the posi [...]tives of his own worship, or concerning either the natural or positive rights and relations which may be between man and man; and what our own con­cernments are; the particulars of these it doth not di­ctate or deliver to us.

[Page 71]2. I say this it doth not solitarily or apart, or by it self, or by its own single light or voice. For this must be acknowledged, though it doth not declare or promulgate, yet it doth confirm; and though it doth nor of it self discover, yet it doth second, and set on that which is before discovered of the mind of God. In reference to the whole revealed will of God Providence hath the use of a Testimony, that is, by way of association, or concurrence:See Dr. Sclater Serm. on 2 Kin. 93.1. pag. 25. though it be not Nomotherick, or Legislative, nor yet in the matters limitted in this proposition the original, or primary dictator of the will of God, yet where a declaration thereof is made, and the same is actu­ally known, understood, end apprehended, there Providence comes in, and gives a secondary sanctio [...].

Let the light of nature, or book of God writ­ten in the heart, or his word in the Scriptures first tell a man, thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal; then, if the hand of God remarkeably break out in some notable curse or punishment upon a mur­derer, or thief, this Providence seen and noted doth by way of Item, or Second (in that it holds forth the displeasure of God against theft or murder) pro­hibite, admonish and warn him and others from those sins. But in matters of this natu [...]e Provi­dence solitarily or by it self alone is not significant, or declarative of Gods approving or disapproving will. Where both the law of nature, and the Scriptures are either silent, or (which is all one as to this) not understood, or apprehended, there provi­dence (as to these things) is dumb, or, if it must be said to speak, its language cannot be unde [...]stood.

Providence in these matters may be resembled unto consonants; as these without vowels make not any words, or speech, but compounded with them are vocal, and significative; so Providence in con­currence, and concomitancy with the written law speaks out to us, backing and confirming what the word declares, but of it self, or apart from this it cannot do that office in these things of moral or positive precept. Providence is in this respect like [Page 72] an echo, which reitera [...]es, and resounds to what the word of God in Scripture, or Conscience saith before, it doth rather consignificate, then signifie Gods will to us, When God hath made known to us by his [...], or enunciative word what his mind, or commandement is in this, or that particu­lars, then the providence of God, which before, and of it self could only tell us that God is to be obeyed in all his commandements, now be­speaks our obedience in these particulars, and addes its stampe, or sanction to the commands of God so revealed.

In things which the conscience is already infor­med of to be either agreeable, or repugnant to the law of God, providence coming in with any re­markable, either crosses or blessings, beareth witness to that law, and exciteth the conscience by way of Memento to take special notice of it. And thus it is a good second though not a solitary testimony. It hath vocem tonantem, an awakening, or start­ling efficacy, to rouze up the dowzie consolence to attend to the rule already receivedSee Deut. 4.3, 4. 2 Chron. 30.7. Mal. 3.18.. But this of­fice holdeth only in concurrence with the word. We cannot simply and singly conclude from any providence thus, God crosseth men in this, blesseth them in that way, therefore he disallows that; ap­proves this. But having a precedent light in the conscience from the testimony of Gods law of what he allowes and disallowes, his so crossing or blessing may be an accumulative witness [...]. Thus David ar­gues, By this I know thou favorest me, because mine enemy doth not triumph over me, [Psal. 41.11.] He know before from the written word, and from the particular messages that he had received by the Pro­phets Samuel and Gad both what God had pro­mised, and what he willed him to do; and there­upon this mentioned Providence of God toward him was an additional testimony. And thus Josephs brethen metting with a shrewd and sudden crosse were prompted out of the light, and sentences of their own consciences cleared, and called forth by [Page 73] that crosse Providence (as they took it) in Egypt to say, we are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of his soul, when he besought us, and we would not hear: therefore is this distresse come upon us. And Reuben sureably was enabled to say, Spake I not unto you saying, Do not sin against the childe, and ye would not hear? therefore, behold also, his bloud is required, [Gen. 42.21, 22.]

And the reason of the necessity of the anteceden­cy of the knowledge of the will of God unto the voice of Providence is very obvious. For before we can gather, or draw inferences from Providences, we must be able to understand their meaning, and to make an interpretation of them. We must first know for what they come, ere we can say what they direct us unto; but now the word of God, and the conscience in formed thereby, are the interpreters of Providence. It was that sentence of the Apostles Epistle, which expounded the hand of God upon the Corinthians unto them, For this cause many are weak and sickly among you, and many sleep, [1 Cor. 11.30.] their own sense could tell them of the event that many were weak and sickly, and many dyed among them. And their Religion and conscience touched by it would tell them these evils were of God, and perhaps it might suggest to them that they came for sin; but that they might discern it was for that sin in particular; viz. their eating and drinking unworthily at the Lords-table, and consequently infer, that for this sin they must judge themselves, this they must reform, the word of God must be the expositer of that providence; and therefore did the Apostle write that saying to them.

Having insisted here on the extent of the use of Providence in dictating to man his duty by way of secondary testimony to the word; and of the ne­cessity of a conjuction of the word, or law of God written, or otherwise made known with Providence, that so the voice of Providence in moral, hu­mane and positive duties may be particularly ap­plyed and understood: It will not be impertinent [Page 74] here to note the different wayes wherein Provi­dence is, or hath been added to the word as confirma­tive thereof.

1. This hath been sometimes in a way extrordi­nary, and that,

1. Either when an ordinary act of Providence hath been by an extraordinary and immediate di­rection from God appointed to such use, viz. to back and second his word: as Ezekiels removing his goods out of his house to another place in the peo­ples sight, was a sign to them to confirm his pre­dictions of their captivity. And the Potters disposal of his clay to one mould first, then to another, was an emblem set up by God of his power to order, and alter the conditions of Israel, (and of all other Nations) as he should see good, and as he had declared he would do concerning that people, [Ezek. 12.11. Jer. 18.5, 6, &c.]

2. Or when a Providence extraordinary, or mi­raculous, for nature hath been by expresse assigna­tion of God given unto the ratification of his word. So was unto Moses the turning of his rod into a serpent, and of the Serpent into a rod again, and his hand being made leprous, and whole again by putting it once and again into his bosom. So was unto Gideon his wet and dry Fleece, and the Angels consuming his meat by fire out of the rock. So was unto Hezekiah the return back of the shadow of the Sun upon the Dial of Ahaz. And so were unto the world in the primitive age of Christianity, the miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost given unto the Apostles, [Exod. 4.1, &c. Judg. 6.17, 36, &c. 2 King. 20.10, &c. Heb. 2.4.]

2. This is more often in a way of ordinary dis­pensation, that is without any either miraculousness of the act of Providence, or immediate, particular pointing out of it, by an express word to such or such a use. And this is,

1. Either when Providence is given us for a patt [...]n or [...]op [...]y, and we are required to imi [...]a [...]e it i [...] the same kinde. Thus Mercy, Love, Beneficience unto [Page 75] the evill, and to our enemies are recommended to our practice by the example of Gods own pro­ceedings, [Ephes. 5.1. Luk. 6.36. Mat. 5.44, &c.]

2. Or when Providence is imployed to give a hint unto some duty sutable to it, for us to practise, but not of the same nature as i [...] the act of Provi­dence which speaketh to us. For instance: In the day of prosperity be joyful; but in the day of adversity consider. Is any among you afflicted? let him pray: i [...] any mer [...]y? let him sing Psalms. In that day, viz. in the day of trouble, and of treading down, and of perplexity, did the Lord God of hosts call to weeping and to mourning, &c. [Eccl. 7.14. Jam. 5.13. Isa. 22.12.] When Providence disposeth these conditions into act, it doth call for the respective duties appro­priate to them at their hands whose conditions at any time they are.

But this distinction must be kept; for some acts of Providence are shewed us to imitate them in their very kinde. Some again by reason of the Lords transcendency and absolute power over us may not be paralleld by us. God may do that to man, and make that use of him, which man may not do either to God again, or to another man. Only such unimitable [...] providences may yet be not un­useful, but may dictate respective duties, correspon­dent and seasonable, though not identical in kinde to the act of God.

The difference also must not be confounded be­twixt the two members of the former distinction, viz. the extraordinary and the ordinary use of Pro­vidence in point of backing or reinforcing the will of God already made known; which is, that the latter way God dayly and continually makes use of Providences as memorials and testimonials to assure, and bring to minde his will in matters vulgarly known, and of a moral and ordinary use and importance. The former he hath taken up to illustrate or enforce some commandement of an ex­traordinary nature, or some doctrine or prophesie [Page 76] new, and strange to them to whom the sign is given, and therefore standing more in need thereof to prove its divine authority.

In reference also to the secondariness of the Testi­mony of Providence and the necessity of the ante­cedency of the words light to it in the matters whereof this proposition speaketh, this let me add. Some that have long stood upon the argument of Providence now begin to say, The Spirit makes out by Providence the minde of God without the word▪ Unto this I shall only here interpose this;

1. I see not how this differeth from Quake­rism in the opinion of a sufficiency of light from Christ, which every man hath in him.

2. But I aske; Is not every spirit (that is, every dictate or doctrine fathered on the Spirit, or apprehended by the conceiver thereof to come from the Spirit of God) to be tryed? and is not the word of God in Scripture the rule of Tryall? If any motion come then without expresse directi­on from Scripture, it is not made out, that is, cleared as necessary, or safe for us to follow, or to be of God, untill it be examined or warranted by the word.

3. We usually distinguish of the Spirits spea­king to man, viz.

• 1. Ordinarily.
• 2. Extraordinarly.

The former is by the word: the latter is with­out it, solitary or by revelation. And we say the lat­ter is not now afforded to any on ea [...]th; but he that will say it is, and that he hath it, as the layeth claim to a very strange and high thing, immediate, and extraordinary revelation; so he must evi­dence i [...]t [...] others very plainly ere they can credit him in, itThus Luther answered the Seditious Boars of Germany of Muncers and Phifers raising Si mandatum a­liquod habetis a Deo vestri facti necesse est hoc Ips [...]n a vobis a­liquo illustri mi­raculo demon­strari. Apud [...]leid. Comment. lib. 5. pag. 120..

2. Besides the use or significancy of Provi­dence which it hath to confirm, and second a rule, or duty before enacted and declared; it is found (even in matters of a moral or positive nature) [Page 77] sometimes in a further use, viz. to declare the will of God by it self alone, but then it must be with­all said, this is not the general, common, or natu­rall, but a particular, extraordinary, and institutive use of it; this is never but in case, and by virtue of a previous, special warrant or appointment of God, This is not common to all, or usuall in many, but proper to some Providences, unto which it hath pleased God to annex such a use. Where God hath given out his warrant concerning one sort, or one single act of providence, and one singular and circumstantiated case, that in this case such an event or act of Providence shall declare what the minde of God is, there this use of providence ob­tains, and there alone, as far as my observation can go. Some few such dispensations of God to some persons, in some special cases I finde in Scripture, and but some few, yet for distinctions sake I thought it necessary to take notice of this use of Provi­dence.

When God would have the Land of Canaan divided among the Tribes,Num. 6.55. and Families of the Isra­elitish nation, he appointed the distribution to be made by Lot. When therefore Joshua and the heads of the Fathers cast lots upon the several portions of that land, the coming forth of those several Lots to this or that tribe, family, or person severally, was the signification of Gods will concerning such or such a parcel of the Land, and the making over of the property thereof by donation from him, unto such persons.

The same way was appointed, and of the same use was the Providence of God in the di­sposall of the lots at the election of an Apostle in the place of Judas. Act. 1.24, 2 [...].

By a Providence of this sort was the congregation of Israel guided in their journies and stations in the wilderness. God appointed them for their motions and pitchings to attend the setling or moving over them of the cloudy and fiery pillar: hence it is said,Num. 9.18, 20, 23. that they observing that course of the cloud, at the [Page 78] commandement of the Lord they journeyed, and at the commandement of the Lord they pitched.

A like resolution did Abrahams servant obtain of God, when he went by his Masters command, and with his assurance of extraordinary divine conduct to seek a wife for Isaac. When he was come to the City of Nahor he prayed, and the Lord granted him to know what damsell he should choose, and have for that marriage by the token of her granting him water out of the well for himself, and for his Camels, which sign therefore being accomplished in Rebecca, not only he, but Laban and Bethnel her brother and father (when they heard the servants relation of it and of the event) acknowledge the thing (or word) proceeded from the Lord, and that in it the Lord had spokenGen. [...]4.27, 50, 51..

1 Sam. 14.10.Such a sign had Jonathan to go by in his (other­wise desperate) attempt upon the Garrison the Phi­listines. Luk. 22.10. And a token of this nature had Peter and John from Christ to guide them in pitching upon the place where he would have them prepare for his, and their eating of the Passeover.

And as the minde of God for mens practice, so his meaning in matter of faith, when there hath been ambiguity or obscurity in the apprehending thereof, hath this way been discovered. The Shepherds at the birth of Christ, being told by the Angel of the good ti­dings of great joy, Luk. 2.10, 11, 12. viz. the birth of a Saviour Christ the Lord that day in Bethlehem; God gave them by the Angel moreover a providential sign to know him by, to wit, the special place and posture they should then finde him in, In his swadling cloathes, and lying in a manger. So did he point out to the wisemen which came from the east to seek him that was born King of the Jews, Mat. 2.9, 10. how and where they should finde him, by a Star.

But this way of resolution concerning either the will or meaning of God: was even then extraor­dinary, and out of course, and but rarely afforded, much more is it so now, and besides the signifi­cancy which Providence had in these extraordi­nary [Page 79] cases was not by virtue of it self, but from the institution, or special word given forth for it. When God gives no such particular warrant, as in those cases he did (and as now, for any thing I know, he doth not at all) we may not ex­pect, or attempt to finde out Gods will by such means. If we do, it will not be an allowed enquiring, but a tempting of GodVide Ames. medul. Theol. lib. 2. cap. 11. Sect. 18 & cap. 12. Sect. 17, 18, 19. & De con­scient. lib. 4. cap. 23. Sect. 1, [...]..

5. And lastly, there is yet another use of Pro­vidence to be noted. We before distinguished betwixt the delivery of a rule or law, and the de­termining of it to this or that particular. We have said before, Providence is not originally institutive, or preceptive, yet it may deliver us the law, or the will of God already enacted by way of declaration, index, or remembrance; and this in some things solitarily, and in some only joyntly and concur­rently with other means. Besides all this, Provi­dence hath another use in promoting our knowledge and obedience to the will of God; and that is by way of application or determination of the obli­gation, or authority of the Law of God unto par­ticulars. And this use of Providence, together with the way and divers manners of its tending there­unto will here require a distinct discovery, that it may neither lie under a confused notion, nor fall under mistake.

First, That Providence hath this use, to deter­mine general rules to particulars, is very obvious and evident. It brings home the law, which in it self runs in terms universal, or indefinite, to its singular matter, by applying it to particular per­sons, things and times; and by that means that commandement or direction which is delivered ge­nerally to all of the like case and condition, it gives oc­casion or call to this or that man in particular to put in practice. For instance; the law of God com­mands, suum cui (que) tribuere, to do right to every man; now Providence comes with its disposing hand, and distributeth to every man his right in par­ticular, as this house, or field, this honour, dignity [Page 80] or authority to this or that man. And by this hand of Providence so disposing is determined that general rule to these particulars; whereby it comes to passe that every other man is required to yeeld these perquisites, or havings to this or that man, and is forbidden to take, or detain them from him. Again; the word of God saith, Is any among you afflicted? Let him pray. Is any merry? Let him sing Psalmes. As we have opportunity, let us do good. Now Providence comes in, and at this time disposeth this condition of sadness, or that of joy to me, or it putteth into my hand an opportunity of almes-giving, and thereby it comes about that it is, now my part to perform that duty of Prayer, Singing, or giving almes. The word of God hath instituted diversities of estates and relations amongst men, as marriage and single life; Magistracy, and Sub­jection; Mastership, and servitude: not imposing every one, or any one of these c [...]nditions upon every man, for that were not consistible; but ap­pointing one for some, another for other persons. Now besides this institution, God by his Providence immediately (without his word, otherwise then mediately) ordinarily cals men forth parti­cularly, some unto this, others to that estate: and those particular persons, whom his Providence so cals, the general rules of his word concerning those respective conditions come thus to be in force unto, requiring them to undertake those conditions, and to perform the several duties annexed to them respectively. Here then by the intervention of Providence it is that the general rules concerning this or that special state or relation, either the en­trance upon it, or the discharge of the duties of it, become necessary to this, or that man. Provi­dence, under this use I shall call Ordinative, in distinction from that which is meerly Eventual.

Secondly, as it is plain that Providence hath this use, so it will be requisite to enquire how Provi­dence cals men into this or that state or relation, and so effects this determination of general rules to [Page 81] their particulars. For this I shall observe somewhat concerning,

• 1. The different senses wherein God by his Providence is said to call.
• 2. The means.
• 3. The manner.

1. For the different acceptions, or senses wherein God may be said to call men into such a relation or state we say by his Providence God calls to the same, either directive, or constitutive. Either by directing them to such an estate, or by constituting them in it; that is, either by setting before them the estate as requisite for them to enter into: or, by leading and putting them actually into it. The for­mer is when those occasions and inducements, or exigencies are occurrent to a man which (when they are put, or in being) it is his duty according to the rule of Gods word to enter into such a state, or relation. The latter is when by the acting of Providence by those means whereby such a state or relation is produced, or emergent, men are actually brought and placed in that estate.

These two wayes are manifestly different, and ne­cessary to be distinguished. For instance; In the former sense persons are called to the state of mar­riage when they have not the gift of continency, that is, it is their duty then to marry, according to that [1 Cor. 7.9, 36.] and he is called to a single life thus that hath that power over his own will that is mentioned [1 Cor. 7.37. Mat. 19.11.] according to that of our Saviour [Mat. 19.12.] In the lat­ter sense, they are called to a marryed estate that are already bound, or entred into wedlock. He is called into the single estate that is loosed, [1 Cor. 7. [...]4, 27.] And in like manner may it be said of domestical Mastership and servitude; and of political domi­nion and subjection; and of domestical and poli­tical freedom. It is one thing to say a man is by Providence called to be a Master, or a Servant; a Prince, or a Subject the former way; that is, he hath the previous inducements to any such estate pre­sented [Page 82] to him; and another thing to say he is cal­led the latter way, viz. that those acts are passed up­on, or by him which make him a Master, or a Master or a Servant, a Magistrate, or a Subject. By the former he is but invited or directed to such a state, by the latter he is invested or enstated de facto in it.

This distinction is observable in them that di­spute to the validity of absolute conquest, or cap­tivity to make a man a domestick servant, or a mul­titude, the patrimonial kingdom of the conquerer. They say the conquest or captivity doth not make the parties actual servants or subjects, and conse­quently doth not make their conquerers their Ma­sters, or Soveraigns; but it doth lay a duty upon them to give their consent (if they be free from others, and not pr [...]obliged and so can dispose of themselves) to their conquerer or captiver, and so by their own act to contract that relationSee a Book called, A vindi­cation of the Treatise of Mo­narchy. pag. 17, 18. Hobs Elements pag. 92, 93.. As in like manner it is in the case of a single person that hath not the gift of continency, he is called to marriage, but is unmarried, and hath the power, and right to dispose of himself, yet in regard he wanteth the said gift he is obliged to marry as soon as a fit match is offered.

Secondly, concerning the means by which Pro­vidence may call one into any state that is, in­vest, and enstate him in it; for this consideration will have relation to the latter acception only of the providential call, of which even now, viz. that which is constitutive or actually setting a man in a state.

Providence is working in all morall affaires, and civill stations, and conducing to the bringing of men into the several relations they are in, but [...] it is the word, or law of God, and not providence by it self which ordains or authorizeth those states, so ordinarily it is not Providence solely constit [...]tes men therein, but providence imploying and acting by certain means, and those concurring with it. Now the means may (as to our present consideration) be two fold. 1. Some relative states are such as providence cals, that is, brings persons into them, by means ex­trinsecal, [Page 83] as to the persons called, or without the act of their own wils. So persons come into the re­lation and obligation of children to their Parents by procreation, say some; by preservation and education, say othersGrot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 1. Hobs Elements part. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 3.: but by which soever it be, they are passives in incurring that relation and duty. So are others, through the defect of reason, as Orphans, Fools, and Madmen brought into the condition of pupils and minors in relation to Guar­dians and Tutors; and so are Delinquents or Ma­lefactors through their vicious miscarriages, a­gainst their wils, reduced into subjection or sla­veryGrot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 32.. 2. Other relative states Divine Providence leads men into with, and by the will, choice, or consent of the parties in whom the relation is sub­jected. Thus by their own contract persons be­come associates in private Traffique, fellow-citizens are incorporate in one Common-wealth, and Na­tions become confederates in one league: thus two by marriage become man and wife, and persons by arrogation or adoption become the children of those who begat them not. Thus freemen make them­selves servants; and thus Common-wealths, or bodies politique come under this or that form or constitu [...]ion of GovernmentVide Grot. ut suprà Sect. 8, 17.23, 26, 27, 30, 31..

Thirdly, For the manner how (we may say) Providence cals into any estate or relation.

First, In general this is a principle to me most certain. A providential call is included within the rules of Gods word. We have already said (and I take it as a clear truth) that in matters of this nature Providence by it self or alone is neither legislative nor declarative of the law of God. It remains therefore that the utmost use and force it is of in the moral sway of these affairs is either to second and set home the rule already given, and made known, or to apply and determine the ge­neral obligation and authority of such a rule to parti­culars. Hence we must needs yield that the determi­nation of Providence to this of that act, estate or re­lation, as it is not from it self, but by virtue of the [Page 84] rule so it keeps within the bounds, and confines of the rule, and cannot be construed to go any further. This then may be for a general Canon to us. We cannot say Providence cals this, or that man to that, whether act or estate, which the word of God for­bids or warrants not unto him. Providence must not be used as a countermand to the rule, or as a reserve or dormant warrant to carry us out farther then the word goes before us, or to lead us there where the will of God in Scripture revealed opens us not a way. This were by consequent to destroy the authority of the word, and to make the most pure and perfect wayes of God the occasions and patroni­zers of every obliquity.

Secondly, for somewhat more particular resoluti­on concerning a providential call to any underta­king, let these (I suppose plain) Propositions and Cautions be considered, the which I lay down with room reserved for, and submission to the necessary addition, and just correction of the Reader.

1. The matters, or things about which this use of Providence (of applying, or determining the general rule to its particulars) may be con­versant, we may (I suppose) reduce to these heads.

• 1. Either opportunities inviting.
• 2. Or necessi [...]ies urging.

1. The former, opportunities inviting, may be,

• 1. Either to our attaining.
• 2. Or to our doing good. Or, either to a good of utility to be enjoyed; or to a good of virtue to be done by us.

2. The latter, necessities urging, may be,

• 1. Either danger of sinning.
• 2. Or danger of suffering.

2. Every opportunity inviting to, or offering us the attainment of somewhat we esteem good, is not taken to be a determining Providence, or a Pro­vidence calling to the prosecution, and laying hold on that offer. Providence doth ordinarily present [Page 85] us with opportunities to be shunned, as well as with opportunities to be embraced. And by its orde­ring reall evils, with the appearance of good cast upon them by our own mistaken judgments, are set before us, as well as the things that are truly good. There is a proving trying as well as a gui­ding Providence, [see D [...]ut. 8.2, 3. & 13.3. 2 Chr. 32.31.] So that it is a perilous thing for men to be taken and led by the first blush, or fair face, or kinde invitation of every outward occurrence. Many Providences which our heady passions and lusts are apt to account invitatory, our reason and religion should prompt us to be but exploratory, or the trials of our obedience to Gods commandements. Such (for example) may we reckon that opportu­nity to be which David had set before him (and whilh his men would so fain have had him to have taken as eminently held out to him by God) of killing Saul, once in the cave,1 Sam. 23.3. & 26.7. and again in the Camp asleep. The call therefore of Gods Providence must be gathered, not by the facility, commodious­ness, or rarity of the opportunity, but by the lawful­ness of it.

3. Opportunities of doing what is in it self good, whether permissively good, that is, lawfull, or pre­ceptively good, that is, necessary, are not presently of themselves the call of Providence to us, nor un­till it can be determined the good to be done is good to us, or the good we are to do.

4. Thence, and in as much as the goodness of an action with application to individuals ariseth much from the particular state and condition of the person. Somethings belonging to the rich, some­things to the poor; some to the marryed, some to the single; some to the superiour, some to the in­feriour; to be done by them respectively, it be­nooyeth each to know first, not only what is permitted, or imposed on this or that estate, but what is the proper estate, place, or rela [...]ive con­dition we are set in: God neither by word nor by Providence calling any to the act or [Page 86] duty of such a state till he hath called them into that estateSee Mr. Si­monds Case and cure of a Desert Scul cap. 23. pag. 280..

5. Unto every estate there must needs be (the nature of the thing is self requires it) something constitutive or essential to the putting of it, or the enstating of a man in it. There cannot be order or a distinction of estates without somewhat to make the difference. The same authority that ordains different estates among men, appoints to each the peculiar way of entring into, or founding those estates. The different acts which are proper to each estate cannot be constituting or differencing cha­racters of them: both because they are subsequent to, and resulting from the estate, and therefore must needs suppose it in being ere they can flow from it: and because others not called to these estates do sometimes presume to put forth those acts: and because the regularity of those acts must be proved by the persons being in the estate; and therefore his being in the estate cannot be proved by his doing of those acts. That there is such a peculiar foundation or ingresse to every relative state, which gives it bring, and distinguisheth it from other states, hath been partly shewed before, and will be insisted on after. In all domestical, civil, martial, and ecclesiastical relations and orders, the professors of the disciplines of each conclude it so to be. Now this constitutive or formal reason applyed to particu­lars will serve to discover in what station, or place each man stands, and unto what relation or state any man is called of God.

6. Where the divine rule or law of God hath pre­scribed a special way of entring into any estate, and constituting one in it, there providence cannot be understood to call, or lead into it another way, or in a course crosse or subversive to that order.

7. Providence may call a man without the act or concurrence of his own wil into this or that estate, that is, make it his duty (by virtue of the divine rule) to enter into it (as he is thereby called to be a servant, who hath not either wealth or skill whereby [Page 87] to subsist in, and manage a free estate. He is cal­led to marry whose temperament, or complexion leaves him not that power over himself as to con­tain) when neverthelesse it doth not without his own will constitute him in that estate. Where there­fore to the being of a man in any estate, or relati­on is prerequired the act or assent of the party, there Providence (though it invite, order, or give occasion to enter into that estate) doth not anticipate the persons consent. Providence may of it self with­out the said act of will be directive to, but is not constitutive of such an estate. It is (I conceive) no otherwise in the subject matter of this Treatise, in civil policie and Magistracy. Providence by virtue of that need many wayes that particular emergencies of Providence may invite, lead, or call a Nation to make choice of this form of Magistracy before another, or of this, or these persons to rule over them rather then others: but, neverthelesse, people are not incorporate into distinct societies, nor societies re­duced into a moral relation, or subjection unto any particular Magistracy, or Magistrates without their own transaction or agreement, their own I mean transacted, either by themselves or those whom they may be involved in.

8. Where Providence presents with any urging necessity, whether of sin or of harm to be avoided, there we must not think Providence to call, either for the shunning of a harm to commit a sin, or for the avoiding of one sin to run into another. They that thus understand it, in stead of making a virtue of necessity they make a vice of it: and they do not follow Providence, but falsifie it.

9. There is a superseding as well as a leading, a suspending as well as a moving, a recalling as well as a calling Providence, Where to a work or end in it self good, necessary or desireable all prescribed or warranted means, all honest and justifiable ways of advancing, or compassing the same are wanting, Providence there must be underst [...]od to give a stop to our prosecutions; and to determine (during the [Page 88] incumbency of that defect) a surcease of proceed­ings. There Providence (if we will understand it aright) bids stand, go not forward. There we may apprehend Providence meeting us in the way, as the Angel of the Lord in Balaams way, with a drawn sword in his hand. Thus much shall serve to be spoken of the use of Providence which is determining or applicative of the rule to its par­ticular cases, in the general the particular con­ce [...]nments of it unto civil Government, the subject we are upon, will be spoken to in the nex [...] Chapter.

I have thus endevoured to take a particular view of that guidance, light, or instruction that is in Providence, and how far it goes, what of God, and of his will it doth discover to us, and what it doth not. The sum of all that I have gone over is, Pro­vidence is the image, or index of Gods decree, or counsel, that is, as to things that are, or have been, not concerning future things. It makes known that God is, and what he is, and that he is to be honored, served, and in all he commands obeyed. The will of God extraordinarily revealed it doth sometime by special appointment confirm, and that which is known by the ordinary means, it doth constantly, and of or­dinary course second, and set home upon the con­science: yea, in some cas [...]s, by extraordinary de­signation; it hath revealed the will of God de novo, or not otherwise made known. And it doth con­tinually determine, or apply the will of God in ge­neral rules laid down in Scripture, to particular times, and persons; or, the obligation which the law of God hath in it, by it self considered, in actu signato, it brings to be binding in actu exercito, or pro hic, and nunc. But on the other hand, it doth not of it self either enact or annul a divine law, or di­spense with the breach of, or contrary act to it: neither doth it alone, or by it self declare or reveal the will of God, or what Gods approving, or disappro­ving minde, or pleasure is, either in the things of God that are instituted, and of positive precept, or in the rights and relative duties that are morall, or of hu­mane [Page 99] concernment,CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 6. whether they be of the law of nature, or of positive sanction.

So that the negative part of our resolution is this, Where the law of God, either written in the heart of man, or in the book of God, is silent, or prescribes not any thing, either in the matters of God that are institutive, or in any humane rights whatsoever, there Providence regulates not, or is not, either institutive, or declarative of Gods will to be done by us. And where the said law of God doth ordain, or deliver a rule to us, there providence gives no relaxation, allowance, or countermand to the contrary.

Subsection 6. That Dominion is not founded in Eventual Providence.

IN opposition to the negative part of this resolu­tion of the Question about the use of Providence there are two positions, or opinions now on foot, both which would make out a wider, or larger sense, or use of Providence then is here allowed. They are, 1. That Providence of it self may (without extraordinary appointment) in the matters above specified, and specially in humane rights, dues, or transactions, deliver and declare what the will of God is, or may justifie or condemn a way: or, where Scripture evidence is wanting, or a warrant out of the word of God cannot be produced, there we may collect or infer Gods approval, or disapprovall of an humane action, course or proceeding by Pro­vidence. 2. That dominion is, or may be founded meerly in eventual Providence; or, that a person or persons attainment, and occupiation (by whatever means) of sway or command over a people makes him, or them the Sovereign or higher power, [Page 90] which is, of God, the ordinance of God, the minister of God.

For the latter, that Dominion is, or may be founded in eventual Providence, or, (which is all one) in a persons being in place of rule or actual command, the confutation of it, and the vindi­cation of this Text from admitting it, is a main drift and subject of this whole discourse: and therefore I refer the Reader, for his satisfaction about it, to that which is before, and will be after said; only this I shall put in, upon its mention here.

If this be so, It must needs be affirmed (I sup­pose) so to be,

1. Either because possession, or occupation in every case, or in any thing possessible, or in every sort of Tenure gives a title; But this is so wilde an assertion, as I know not who will own it; or,

2. Because God hath declared in his word, or made it a law, that it shall be so in this particular matter of Civill authority, viz. that whosoever is master shall be the Magistrate, or he whom his hand of Providence raiseth up to a domineering preva­lency in any place shall have the authority there, or be interested in the style or office of this text, viz. shall be the higher power, the ordinance, the Mi­nister of God. But unto this;

1. If so it were, it would be not Providences di­sposing possession of rule into this hand that of it self constituteth him a power, but that declaration of God in his word. Providence would be only the de­terminator, or applyer of that general rule to its particular matter.

2. But where is this found, that God hath so ex­pressed or declared himself, or made such a law touching. Civill Magistracy? We must first see such a declaration produced, or proved, ere we may grant it so to be: I know this text is alledged as the only or main place to imply such a declara­tion, but, de hoc quaritur: I hope by this treatise it [Page 91] will be manifest that there is not such a thing to be extracted thence: and in short, I think it will be proved that,

1. By power, is not meant a meer force or strong hand.

2. That by being is not meant a meer act of possession of such a force.

3. That by of God, ordained of God, is not in­tended a meer being by eventual Providence. And to give the Reader here a small earnest of Reason for the improbability of their being either in this, or in any other Scripture any such thing declared by God, I shall suggest these few things in this place.

1. The power of Magistracy may be in one, and actual rule by Providence in another. Gods word hath owned them for the power that have been out of possession, whilest others have had the actual com­mand. Take for instance what is in [2 Chron. 22.9, 12. with Chap. 23.3.]

2. God hath expresly disowned for being of him them that have been in present possession of com­mand, [Hos. 8.4. Isa. 52.4, 5. Joel 3.2, 4. Hab. 2.5, 6.]

3. He hath expresly authorized and owned the act of rising up in armes to expulse them that have been in actual rule, in them that have been de facto, subject to them, the which this text [ver. 2.] expresly and severely forbids in reference to the power here intended [Judg. 2.16, 18. & 3.9, 15. & 4.6. and in many other places of that book, and in other Scriptures.]

4. We have many examples (of unquestionable justifiablenesse) in the word of God of persons taking up and employing for the recovery of persons, goods and countreyes of the hands of them that have had the Mastery and possession of them, which could not be done if dominion were found by God in pro­vidential profession, [Gen. 14.14, &c. 2 Sam. 18.1, &c. 1 Sam. 7. [...], &c, & 13.3. & 14.1, &c. 2 King. 11.3, &c.]

[Page 92] CHAP. III. SECT. III. Subsect. 7.5. To yeeld this would be to say that usurpati­tion is no sin; or that in the tenure, or holding of power, or command over others (under the name of civill authority) is, or can be no transgressi­on.) But this shall serve for a touch on this argu­ment here.

Subsection 7. That Providence alone, or without the Rule of Gods word doth not signifie to us the allowing, or disallowing will of God in matters either of humane right, or positive institution.

FOr the eviction of the groundlesness of the for­mer position [that Providence alone, without Scripture evidence (or, extraordinary appointment and warrant) may be, in the matters above specified, the interpreter of Gods will to us, unto the justify­ing or condemning of a way, or unto the significati­on of Gods approval, or disapproval] I would offer these reasons.

1. That which is in this position attributed to Providence is by Scripture plainly denyed to it [Eccl. 9.1, 2.] No man knoweth either love, or hatred by all that is before them [...] all things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked, &c.

2. The putting of any thing to be rule beyond, or further then Scripture goes, or so as to make out such an approving, or disapproving will, or law of God as is not delivered in Scripture, is to de­rogate from, or deny that sufficiency and perfecti­on of the Scripture which the holy Ghost ascribeth [Page 93] thereto, and which we, upon his authority, main­tain against the Papists. The written word of God is affirmed to be perfect [2 Tim. 3.15. Psal. 19.7.] we have very strict prohibitions of adding to, or diminishing ought from it, [Deut. 4.2. Prov. 30.6. Rev. 22.18, 19.] we finde men are sharply blamed by God for doing that his word gave them no command or commission for, [Jer. 7.31. & 19.5. & 32.35.] and persons are challen­ged for following the appearance or promising face of Providence without recourse to him [Isa. 30.1, 2. with 31.1. Josh. 9.14] We upon these and the like au­thorities, conceive that the good, the acceptable and perfect will of God is contained in the Scriptures; that the word of God hath compleatly and unaltera­bly delivered what is necessary, what lawful; and therefore that it appears to be high presumption and strong delusion to set up any thing to be a rule, either by way of crossing, or uttering more then is read in Scripture. Either we must say the Scriptures are imperfect, or the doctrine therein is repealable by Providence; or that there is nothing left for Pro­vidence to declare anew. And which of these to admit, I think is easie to choose.

3. Providences are both in themselves so indi­stinct and various, and in relation to mens wayes, and the rule by which they are to walk, so unan­swerable (for the most part in this life) and dis­proportionable, that it is not (I think) to any man conceiveable how they should be employed for such a signification.

1. They are in themselves so indistinct and various, in respect of rise, end, and manner of proceeding, that they appear altogether unapt for such a use.

1. Providence is many times the same to per­sons and wayes directly contrary; that is, to them that are approved, and to them that are disapproved of God, the course of Providence in present event is all one: the same judgements or evils do befall the same outward benefits to come upon righ­teous [Page 94] and wicked persons and wayes, [Ezek. 21 3. Mat. 5.45.]

2. The same same wayes or proceedings of men may meet with clear contrary Providences, either in the same person at divers times, or in divers persons at the same time. He that followes a course of sin, may at one time prosper, at another time fall in it. The path of the righteous may at sometime be (as Joh speaks) washed with butter, attended with smooth and sweet successes, and at other times be stuck with thornes, entangled with sharpe and piercing crosses: they that walke or joyn hand in hand together in the same wayes or designes whether good or evill may be accosted with quite contrary events at the hands of Providence. Like as it fared with Pharaohs chief Butler, and chief Baker; both it may be guilty in the same offence, and measure, yet the one raised to honour, the other hanged on a tree.

3. The same kind of Providence may proceed from far different or quite contrary dispositions, and intentions in God: the same gift, or outward, and, in our esteem, happy successe, and on the other hand, the same crosse or blow may come from him unto divers persons, to one in favour, to another in displeasure; to one for good, to another for harme.

4. Providences contrary in their face, and vi­sible appearance, may agree, and be coincident, or be the same in respect of the minde of God from which they proceed. Notably good, and notably bad events, both these may spring from his love, and be accompanied with his approval both of the person and of the way upon which they come: and either of these may issue from his hatred, and be at­tended with his dislike both of the person and way.

5. The thing which Providence in bringing good, or evill may respect, reflect upon or aime at in speciall may be, not the present actions or wayes of men, but either those of times past, or those which be probable, and in likelyhood to come: to [Page 95] the former by way of recompence; to the [...], either by way of prevention of a sin; or of in­couragement or furtherance to what is good; or of probation and experiment what men will do, how they will demean themselves.

2. Providences (eventual) as they are in them­selves so u [...]i [...]orm, so they are very often during this life, and in the things of it, found unanswera­ble and disproportionable to mens wayes, and the rule by which they are to walke. Solomons obser­vation in this is commonly verifyed [Eccl. 8. [...]4.] There be just men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the wicked: again, there be wicked men unto whom it happeneth according to the work of the righteous. The present visible wayes of God are not in point of retribution corresponde [...] to the wayes of men. It is not alwayes or ordinary to be seen that good men, and actions are presently, and constantly shined upon, speaded, and followed with the promised felicity; neither that the contrary wayes have the contrary fare. All the proceedings of God towards all person [...] and courses are ever most just, but they are not ever juridical: ever most just in that justice which is commensurable to the justice of the divine nature, or will; but not ever juridical or compensatory to men ac­cording to their conformity or difformity to the rule of righteousness he hath enacted for them to live by.

3. And in both these considerations, and the severall particulars reducible to either of them, it may appear how unsutable and insignificant eventual Providence is to the discovery of the will of God in the matters abovesaid, by it self alone, or without a prediscovery by the [...] law of God, what the justifying, or condemning, the allowing or disallowing will of God is.

4. All signes, Testifications, or interpretati­ons of a rational faculty, whether it be the un­derstanding or will of any person; whether the [Page 96] sign be in words, gestures, or actions, have their signification by institution, or voluntary appoint­ment. There is this difference betwixt natural, or necessary and voluntary agents; that of the former the inward principle, appetite, and instinct is discovered by the act, or effect, because the said principles, and operations are alwayes uniform, and the same: but in rational agents, the faculty being free, and indeterminate, and in different to divers or contrary concepti­ons and motions, the outward act cannot na­turally, or necessarily with any certainty, or any otherwise then ad placitum, or by arbitrary imposition and appointment signifie the meaning or dictate of such a faculty.

If then we will say that Providences are the interpreters of Gods will, we must produce an institution for it, or manifest where and how it hath been appointed by God to such a use. Common reason will tell us that arbitrary acti­ons without some known designation intervening are of no aptitude to expresse, or signifie such a thing.

Subsection 1. Ordination contains Institution, and Consti­tution; and what each of these signi­fies.

THis ordination or creation of the power must needs, I conceive, have in it two things.

The first is institution, or the ordaining of Ma­gistracy to be in the state, or civil society. It is Gods preceptive ordinance that men in every poli­tique body should have, and live under a Govern­ment. In this act of institution may be contained not only the simple appointment of Magistracy to be, but the defining also of the office, or the pre­scribing what shall be the end, and what the mea­sure, compass, or bounds of its authority; how the Soveraign power shall rule, and be obeyed, what shall be necessary or allowable for him to do, and what to have.

The other is Constitution, which is the bring­ing of that Institution into act, and execution in particular states. And this may have ascribed to it two parts.

1. Specification, or the determining of the special kind of Government, comprehensible under that ge­neral institution, or the setting down, which shall be the form [...] of policy pro bic & nunc, or here and now, in this or that state; whether Monarchy, Aristocracy, or another. And unto this Specification may be re­ducible the designment of the proportion, or lati­tude which this or that magistrate shall have. I shall [Page 122] not here enter into the dispute, whether the supreme power be limitable otherwise then the general insti­tution it self confines him. But I will suppose (the which is to me the more probable opinion) that there is a latitude in the allotment of power by that general institution, and as some things are necessa­ry, and of the essence of supreme power, so other things are allowable or lawful; and being so, are left arbitrary, and referred to the choice and agree­ment of the parties concerned in the constitution: and these may be the subject of that designation, or apportionating; as may be also the several shares or measures of power which each party shall have, where the supreme power is either mixt, or compoun­ded of several simple formes, or is distributed into several hands.

2. Individuation; or the investure of the power, or the assignation of it to the person, or persons that shall sustain it, or the concrediting, and committing of it to this or that man, or num­ber of men, or to one living, or stock of persons in whom the designed fram of Government shall reside.

That these acts must necessarily go to the crea­ting or putting of the particular power in being, I think will not be questioned. It remains then to shew that they are, and how they are every one of them from God, and by his ordination, understan­ding ordination in this sense in which we have before construed it.

Subsection 2. CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 2. That Institution of the Power is of God, and whether by the law of Nature in mans Innocency.

FIrst, The institution of the Power; the ordain­ing in general, that Magistracy shall be, and what shall be the office, power, and preeminencies of the Magistrate, this is, with one consent acknowledg­ed to be of God. Whether its institution by God was in mans innocency, or it was since his; whe­ther Magistracy be of God, by the law of nature; or by a positive or postnate law, is not agreed upon by all learned men: but most Divines, (as far as I observe) both antient and modern, Protestants, and of the Scools conclude it to have been instituted of God in the state of mans innocency, and to be from the light and law of na­tureVide Aquin. part. 1. qu. 97 art. 4. Durand. in Sentent. lib. 2. Dist. 44. qu. 2. fol. 157. A. P. Martyr loc. com. clas. 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Bucan. loc. 49. qu. 16. Pareus in hunc loc. Scharp. Symph. Epo. 1. pag. 39. Estium & Willet in loc. Aristot. pol. lib. 1. num. 8, & 17.. And to their authority I may add that of the Prince of Philosophers, and also that of the Jewish Doctors. These (as Mr. Selden tels usSelden de Jure Natur. lib. 1. cap. 10. p. 118, 119, 127. & lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 804. Dr. Hammond of Resol. centrov. Quaer. 1. Sect. 7. pag. 6..) deliver seven principal heads of the law of nature, which they call the seven precepts of the Noachidae, and the sixth of them is concer­ning the being of Civill Go­vernment, and of obedience to it, and this tenent of the origi­nal of the law of Magistracy may be confirmed.

1. By this that we finde the duty of all inferiors to their [Page 124] superiors injoyned in the Fifth commandement of the moral law (as it is generally expounded: by which it must needs be presupposed that the being of superiority, in every state is enacted.

2. In that all nations, and people that are, or have been, and have owned reason, and morality, as they have inclined to entertain civill society, and communion, so they have been guided to esteem it necessary to have a Government in every socie­ty, and accordingly have erected, and submitted to it.

3. God hath (as is evident by Scripture) by his law of creation set other reasonable creatures (as spirits) in a distinction of order and superiority of some over others; and there can be no reason given why it should not be so in mankind, by the same original law.

4. Though there appear not what use the state of integrity could have, of punishment, or a coercive sword; yet it is not to me conceivable how there could be either distinction or communion in hu­mane societies, or actions without the commanding and leading power of some over others.

Subsection 3. That constitution of the Power, or putting in of the particular Magistrate is of God, and how, or by what means he doth it.

SEcondly, The constitution of Magistracy, this, both as to the determination of the form, and composure of the Government, and as to the indi­viduation or investure of the person is from God. Yet not alwayes, and in every state after the same manner.

[Page 125]1. We read God did sometime,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 3. unto the Com­mon-wealth of Israel, ordain both the special form of Government, and the particular persons in whom it should reside, by peculiar revelation. So it was in the government of Israel by Moses, Josuah, Gideon, Deborah, Saul, David and his posterity.

2. But besides that way of peculiar Revelation, pro­per to that people, and those persons and such other as are in like manner mentioned in Scripture, God hath another, which is his ordinary, and constant way of determining the special form of Gove [...]nment, and designing the persons for it, to wit, by giving order and direction to men how to proceed in their vacan­cy of Magistracy, and by leading and steering men according to that his order unto the constitution of it among them. For our right understanding, and evi­dencing of this way of Gods ordination of parti­cular Magistrates in particular States, let these few particulars be considered.

1. Gods ordination of Powers must needs im­port Constitution as well as Institution; that is, wherever there is a power ordained of God, not only that Magistracy shall be, but the special form, and particular person is ordained of God; he orde­reth what shall be the platform, and who shall be the Magi­strateExistimo Apostolum primum quidem testari in genere jus ipsum, & potestatem Magistratus a Deo esse; deinde hujus potestatis distributionem eidem Deo vindi­care. Beza in loc. Men have no title to Authority, but by deputation from God, as the Apostle expresly testifies, Rom. 13.1. Jo. White his way, &c. cap. 3. pag. 47.. This is the sense of that which is ordinarily said, that the Magistrate hath his power by deputation from God. And this must needs be acknowledged; otherwise we could not say of the Powers that be, or (as some urge the words) are existent, that they are of God. It is constituti­on that puts Magistracy in being. By virtue of the general rule, or command given to all States, that there be a go­vernment in the Common-wealth, no man is, or c [...]n claim to be the power more then another, nor is this man bound to be a subject more then [Page 126] that;CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 6. nor are the people tied to own, and subject to this man as their Magistrate more then to ano­ther, or then he is to any of them, or is any special form, or kind of government expresly either justi­fiable, or reprovable more then another; nor is the setting up of Magistracy the work or interest of any in particular more then of others: So that if many persons should start up, and claim the seat of Magi­stracy each to himself in peculiar over the same. Com­mon-wealth, or if in it divers parties, either of that body politique, or forein to it, should enterprise the erection of Magistracy, each of them in their own way, and oppositewise to one another, no one of them could be owned, or binding, or entitled to the ordi­nation of God, by virtue of that general com­mand more then another. It were to ascribe to God a bootless, void, frustraneous act to say he hath ordained Civil power to be, but taken no order in whom it shall be, or how it shall be conveyed to any man, without an order or rule for constitution, that law, that there he a Magistracy, may stand writ­ten in the word of God, or in the heart of man by nature, and never take effect or be acted. God doth not ordain name or notions of things, but their beings and realities, and in ordaining them, he must be supposed to ordain the acts, method, and course of their production. We say of his will of decree, and it must hold also of his will of command, God not only ordaines the end, or that a thing be, but the means also, or how, and by whom it shall be. Civil power being one of those things which the law of God both by nature, and in Scriptu [...]e hath subjected to property, or affixed to a peculiar having and holding, by virtue whereof this man is enstated and entitled to this office, and another is not, such a property, or peculiarity of tenure, or reservedness cannot be without a law for the cir­cumscription of mens wils & hands in the acquisition and possession of it. Now if such a law be fixed by God, it must needs be supposed that some rule, or direction is given by him for the founding and [Page 127] transferring of this property,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 7. and for the discovery of it in whom it is. We must therefore come to this conclusion; viz. To say God ordaines the Powers, is to say he regulates, and prescribes by a law mens wils, and actions about it, and in reference to the giving, taking and using of the Magistracy. The words of Pareus (and with him of Willet) upon the place are to this effect, Ordained, [...], Ordinatae, signi­ficat esse po­testates a Deo ordinatas, h [...]e certis limitibus juris, & hone­statis circum­scriptas, intra quas nisi se con­tineant, ab or­dine divino ex­orbitent. Pareus in loc. signifies that the powers are of God ordained, that is, are circumscribed by certain limits and rules of right and honesty, with­in which rules unless they contain themselves they de­generate from the ordinance of God. And this cir­cumscription doubtless must necessarily be admitted as well in relation to the assuming as to the using of the power.

Once more, If it were not so that Gods ordai­ning of the powers doth import, not only that he institutes magistracy to be, but that he constitutes every particular Magistracy, we could not say that an insurrection against this, or any particular Ma­gistrate, or to depose him, and occupy his place were a sin or a trangression, and resistance of Gods ordi­nance (as the Apostles words vers. 2. without que­stion intend) for to take away or controul a parti­cular Magistrate cannot otherwise be an entrench­ment upon Gods ordinance then upon the parti­cular Magistrates being ordained of God. So much (that God institutes Government to be) would stand unshaken by such an act, or would consist well with it; for still, it notwithstanding, it would be undetermined who were the power, and so it would be left as free and lawful for the resister to take the place, as for the resisted to hold it; the institu­tion would be satisfied if any possessed it. Wherefore we must needs suppose God doth in every Common­wealth constitute the proper and particular Ma­gistracy, where ever it can be said to be ordained of God.

2. In regard God doth not ordinarily by any special revelation determine the constitution of the Civil state, that is, point out what shall be the [Page 128] special form of Government,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 3. and who shall be the Governours in this or that place, we must therefore conceive him to manage this matter ordinarily, mediante homine, or by men, and that is, by his defi­ning the way of erecting Magistracy, or giving order, and prescribing rules to men how they shall proceed in the setting up of it, and by mens pro­ceeding accordingly. They that say the law, and light of nature enacteth Government, to be in the Civill society, tell us also that by nature no man is actually constitute a Magistrate more then another, and that nature hath left all men equall, and free, or unenga­ged (in actu exercito, they mean) to any one particul r form or personAristot. pol. lib. 3. num. 102. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 7. pag. 92. Hobs Elements part. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 1. & cap. 4. Sect. 1.. Wherefore it must needs be conclu­ded seeing God by the law of nature hath injoyned government to be, but hath ordered no particular in it with application to singulars, he hath committed it to the positive transaction of men, to be disposed according to certain general rules of justice, and pru­dence given by him. It is not imaginable how God should impose or require any distinct state, or special relation, and order to be amongst a multitude of men, or other his creatures, but be must be said either immediately by himself to create it, or to set down from what causes, or out of what principles it shall arise.

3. For the distinct understanding of the manner, or how many wayes God interposeth and concur­reth in the constitution of particular Magistrates, in regard of which interposal the individual, or par­ticular power may be ascribed to Gods ordination, I shall note.

Some things God doth herein immediately, and some things mediately.

1. Immediately, and by himself he doth declare such, and such formes of Government to be law­full and eligible, and he doth order where and in whom the interest shall be to make choice which of those forms in particular, and who the person or persons shall be that shall be placed over this or that state respectively.

[Page 129]2. Mediately, and by men he doth enstate eve­ry special kind of Government, and every particular Magistrate, that is, he doth set them up according to those rules which we say are immediately given by him.

And this his mediate concurrence is two ways.

1. The authority or warrant of his word, rule or law goeth along with those that act therein ac­cording to the same. And this is his moral con­currence.

2. His work or hand of Providence guideth the wils and exterior actions of them that proceed ac­cording to those rules; and this is his physical con­course.

We do not therefore exclude the Providence of God from the ordination of the powers that be: but we attribute to it its proper place and use; which is to persue, and execute the authority and rule of his word, from which in the production of Magi­stracy we cannot, neither ought by any means to separate or disjoyn it, so as to make it constitutive of a Magistrate. And this act of Providence is far different from that which some would confound with it, and so put as the whole of sole basis of Ci­vill government, as to constitution, to wit, a persons meer possession, or occupation of the seat of Ma­jesty, or a bare physical predominancy: for this may be, and yet no Magistracy; and this, though it be due to the Civil Magistrate, yet it is separable from it, as this discourse I hope will manifest. The act of Providence which (as far as I can appre­hend) may be productive of Civill power is that which disposeth of the title or right, and not of the meer possession of the throne; that which guideth mens wils to consent, or give a call, or con­fer on the one part, and to accept of it on the other; and not that which only swayeth mens hands, on the one side lifting up an arme of force, as a punishment over a people, on the other binding the hands, and leading away captive Princes, and people, that however disagreeing, [Page 130] or relucting they can make no effectual resi­stance.

4. Though God do not by immediate revela­tion assign to every particular State what shall be the special model of their government, and who the persons to sustain it, yet where men do act in the assignation of these for substance according to the prescript or rule given out by God unto all, there is a power ordained of God, and (unless when a special revelation comes from God determining these particulars) there only, or not other­wise.

This Proposition hath two parts, a positive, and a negative.

1. The positive is, when men do act accor­ding to divine rule, in the moulding of govern­ment, and advancing of persons to wield it, there the constitution may be said (according to this text) to be of God, and the particular Government, and Governors to be ordained of God. Imme­diety of designation from God either of platform, or person is not necessary to the bestowing of this style, of God, ordained of God, upon the particular Magistracy. It is in this case as it is in the point of any ordinary right or property. God hath ordained a perpetual law of justice among men (thou shalt not steal) by which every mans property in his goods is required to be reserved to him; and he hath given, either in his word, or by the light, and law of na­ture a sufficient rule to determine, what shall be right, what wrong, and how property in any pos­sessibles shall be acquirable; yet all this by it self invests no man in any right to any goods in particu­lar: it is a humane qualification or transaction which supervening, and being bona fide passed, now enstates men in an actual right to any goods; and when this is emergent, this or that mans title or property in these particular goods is asserted by God, and then it may be said, it is Gods ordinance that this man have and injoy these goods, and a transgression against the same it is for another man without like warrant [Page 131] from God to disseise him of them. The truth is, the most, if not all, the moral precepts of God, and perpetual laws of nature are so made, and delivered to man, as that to the putting of them in practise, or the bringing of their obligation into act there must intervene some positive constitution either from God or man, and most commonly it is from the latter.

The Schools tell us that humane positive consti­tutions do determine the law of nature as the form specificates the matter, or the particular matter de­termines the generallVide Cajetan in Aquin. 1. 2ae. qu. 95. art. 2. Widdingtons Rejoynder cap. 8. num. 20. Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 106. Hooker Eccles. polit. lib. 6. pag. 151, 152. Grotius de Jure lib. 1. cap. 1. Sect. 10.. That wives, children, servants, subjects own their respective superiors, and pay them their duties is the law of God, but there are certain humane acts which are the imme­diate foundation and rise of these relations, and so of persons lying under the duties, which severally be­long to them; which acts once passed the bounds of relation, and duty do take hold of the persons re­spectively by virtue of the divine ordination. Our Saviour saith of marryed persons, What God hath joyned together let no man put asunder. Marriage then in all marryed couples is a conjunction made by God; but how comes that seeing most that marry have no recourse to, or particular direction from God, when, whom, or how to marry, probably never think of any ordinance of God about it, but only to follow their own or others counsels and wils in it? Why thus it is, God in the beginning authorized marriage to be betwixt man and woman, and ap­pointed how it should be transacted, to wit, by the mutual consent, or cleaving together of each par­ty: and enacted other rules concerning it, as touch­ing proximity of bloud, &c. And now by virtue of this his ordinance, what ever couple do accordingly contract, are joyned together by God. The same may be exemplified in the office of the Ministery of the Gospel. Christ hath given commission to cer­tain in the Church to ordain Elders, and when such are accordingly ordained, they a [...]e then the Ministers of Christ, and stewards of the mysteries [Page 132] of God, and are said to be made by the Holy GhostAct. 14.23. 1 Tim. 4.14. & 5 22. Tit. 1.5. 2 Tim. 2.2. with Act. 20.28. 1 Cor. 4.1..

In the natural body God is said to have given more abundant honour to that part which lacked, [1 Cor. 12.24.] How it is said God hath given this honour? it is not by his making that part more comely then other parts, for contrarily the words are spoken of those parts that by making are more uncomely, and lesse honourable then the rest. But, in as much as we by an instinct of nature do repute some parts na­turally lesse honourable, and more uncomely then other, and thereupon do b [...]stow more abundant ar­tificial honour and comeliness upon them, viz. do more cloath, and cover them with dressings; in this regard, what is upon that consideration thought fit by man to be done in the distribution of honour to his natural parts in such an inequality as may fill up the natural disproportion, God is said to do, viz. by directing us by natures instinct to do it.

The Judges of Israel for those 450. years menti­oned by St. Paul, are said to be given them of God, and to be raised up to them of God, and that he com­manded them to feed his people Act. 13.20. Jud. 2.16, &c. 1 Chron. 17.6.: and yet we read not of any immediate particular, expresse call from God given to them all, or to the most of them, none of them, I take it, can upon any evident ground be sup­posed to have had any such, except. Deborah, Gideon, and Sampson; but a mediate call from God, by men, that all of them doubtless had: and of Jeptha his call of this nature the text at large informs usJud. 10.5.. from such an orderly call by men we may therefore take it to have been that they were given, raised up, commissioned to that people of God

We all acknowledge Subordinate Magistrates to be ordained of God, and many of our Commenta­tors include them as well as the supreme in this text, and Mr. Calvin, Calvin in loc. Spanhem. Dub. Evang. part. 3. Dub. 64. pag. 288. Estius in Ro. 13. Spanhemius, and Estius takes those words, [in 1 Pet. 2.13.] sent by him; to refer, not unto the King, but to God as the sender; [Page 133] yet those inferior Magistrates have their election, and deputation from the supreme humane power; but they are notwithstanding, reckoned to be of God, in as much as they are surrogated by them who are empowered by God to do it.

Our Saviour speaking of all Magistrates, saith that unto them the word of God came, that is,Joh. 10.35. as Ex­positors interpret these words, God hath given out to them a warrant, and commission for their offices. But how is that? the speech certainly can have no reference to an immediate designation from God in relation to the most of them, but the word of God comes to, or authorizeth them, who are advanced to the seat of power by men according to his word.

We may take this then for clear, that the conveying of power from man so man, may make a power or­dained of God; only with this proviso be it said, this is not meerly because it is done by men, for neither every humane action, nor every act of any whomso­ever in this matter can entitle this effect to divine ordination; but it is because, and so far forth as this is done of men by virtue of a rule, and warrant from God, and therefore hath the authorization, and seal of God upon it.

Wherever therefore such a platform of Magi­stracy is erected, and such persons are invested with it as God hath declared eligible, and this by them to whom God hath committed this management, and such power placed in the persons, as he hath legiti­mated, there is a power enstamped with this of the Apostle, of God, ordained of God. And this is the sentence of Commentators on the text, and others that treat on this subj [...]ct. As

Peter Martyr.P. Martyr loc. com clas. 4. cap. 13. Sect. 5. Sometimes this (to wit, the crea­tion of the power) comes to passe by the consent of the Senate, sometime by the suffrages of the people, but these are but instruments, the proper cause of Magistrates is God himself.

Pareus.P [...]reus in loc. sub. dub. 3. Neither do second causes exclude the first. In old time God by an immedia e call advanced some [Page 134] Magistrates, & Kings to the throne, as Moses, &c. But the rest, as the 70. Elders, he by mans act, and coun­sel placed in power, and yet ceaseth not so to do, and that according to the laws and custom received of every people; either by the election and consent of a Senate, as now the Roman Empire; or by the voices of the people, as the Governers of the Cities that are meerly or mixtly democratical, &c.

Tolet in loc.Toler. Of God, as of the first principle, and cause the powers proceed, although by the intervenient wils of men, as heat, cold, and the like are of God, but by inter­mediate second causes.

Estius in loc.Estius. The secular power is mediately of God, by men, who by the instinct of the law of Nature, set over those of whom they may be governed in a community. For this instinct is of God, so that by reason thereof it may be truly and positively said, that this power is not but of God.

Mr. John Selden.Selden [...] de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 108. But whatsoever by that license is constituted variously betwixt men civilly, and duely ac­cording to the several formes of Government, only by way of determination, as the Schoolmen speak, so as not to be contrary neither to the natural, nor the positive law of God; that also receiveth sanction and obligation, ac­cording to the several qualifications of the constitution, from the said law which is both naturall, and divinely positive or written.

Willet upon the place. As the fruits of the earth are brought forth by mans labour, yet are Gods gifts, so is Magistracy, &c.

2. The negative is, Whatever power (so named, or pretended) there may be, or whatsoever persons there be that take upon them to be the Power, or Magistrate over a State, and are not thereto appoin­ted, or therein enstated, as is abovesaid (that is, ei­ther by special expresse revelation from God, or by men proceeding upon, and by virtue of a warrant, or authority from God) they are not a Power ordained of God. This will follow upon what is said already. For if it be so, that to the making of a particular Power, or Magistrate to be Gods ordinance there [Page 135] goes not only a law of God universally enacting Civil Government to be, but a further specificating act of God, whereby be constituteth this special platform for this Common-wealth, and cals forth, or authorizeth this person, or these persons here to bear it; and that this he doth, either by imme­diate revelation, or by the intervention of men qua­lified, and instructed by his set rule to make the said assignation, then it must needs be yeelded that none can be entitled to the plea, and priviledge of being Gods ordinance, but they that come in by that door, or ascend by that scale.

It will (I think) be said by all, that Gods ordain­ing the power doth not necessarily import his d [...]sig­nation immediately, by his own mouth, of the form and persons, but that he committeth the doing of this ordinarily to humane arbitration. And hereupon it will be to be inferred, that either God hath left this determination to men absolutely, indefinitly, and promiscuously, giving way to any that will, in any place whatsoever, to constitute what Magistracy, and whom in it they please, (and who hath so little un­derstanding either of God, or of the matter hereby attributed to him, as to say this?) or else that he hath set a stint, and fixed rule to men in this matter, ap­pointing certain to constitute the Government, and obliging people to the owning of the Government so constituted, as from him, with exclusion, and dis­allowance of any other to determine these things. And if this be the way (as to me it seemeth so clear as that no other is imaginable) then, if in the erecting of government a substantial deviation from it be, as when incompetent, or unallowed per­sons be the advancers of themselves, or others unto the place of power, in as much as in that case there lies the divine disapprobation, and men act besides the said prescript, it may be said there is no ordi­nance of God, but a contradiction, and contraordi­nation to Gods order.

CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. That Gods ordination is conveyed to the par­ticular Magistrate by the consent of the community.

BUt then (perhaps) there will remain one Questi­on, viz. where hath God given out his warrant or rule to any to act, or proceed in this business? and who are they in every State respectively, whom God hath authorized, or qualified to determine the particulars of it?

Unto this my Answer is,

1. That the said rule, or the special way by which men should be called, or attain to the place of Soveraign power, and expresly defined in Scripture is not necessary, or to be, as such, exacted. We all grant that God hath in reference to all the pro­prietable things of this life, and to all transactions about them injoyned a rule of right and equity to be kept, and forbidden the transactions about them, injoyned a rule of right, and equity to be kept, and forbidden the transgression of it, yet he hath not in his written word particularly stated the several wayes by which the right, or title to a thing shall be acquired, nor yet the special lawes, or rules by which the property of persons to such things may be deter­mined, or adjudged. This the law and light of na­ture in mans heart as to many, or most things, or cases, is left to discover: and this it hath done, in most things indifferent clearly, and equally, in so much as the affaires of men about them are ordina­rily, and both by vulgar maxims, and customs, and by publique laws, and judgements regularly compo­sed and determined.

[Page 137]2. And yet we are not without some Scripture­light in this particular. Even it doth not only pre­scribe an orderly call to the administration of Civill power, and condemn the unorderly and violent assumption of it; [Num. 27.26, 27. Luk. 12.14. Hos. 8.4. Jer. 30.21. Ezek. 23.16. Amos 6.13.] but doth also direct the way how men should be ad­vanced to it, and by whom, in case of vacancy of Magistracy. This it doth in the particular case of that nation to whom God at first gave his writ­ten law, which may be a pattern to other Nations in this, as in other matters confessedly it is. See the direction to them, [Deut. 17.14, 15. & 16.18. & 1.13.] In which places the transacting of this affair is by order from God put into the hands of the community, over whom the Magistracy is set. Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes, and they shall judge the people with just judgement. And unto this order seems the speech of that good man, and wise Statist to refer, [2 Sam. 16.18.] Nay but whom the Lord and this people, and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be, and with him will I abide. And according to this prescript runs the promise of God to the people of Israel concerning their state after the return of their Babylonish capti­vity, Jer. 30.21. And their Nobles shall be of them­selves, and their Governor shall proceed from the midst of them. And answerable to this rule we finde in­stances of the people constituting their Supreme Governour; as in the advancement of Jeptha, Jud. 10.5, &c. of David, 1 Chron. 11.1, &c. and others. And I would ask them who seem willing to deny that in the Bible any commission is given to a prople to choose themselves Governors, to what purpose is it that the Lord giveth by Moses directi­ons, and rules what manner of person the Israelites should set up to be King over them, as it is [Deut. 17.14, 15, &c.] if they had no interest, or commission given them to set up, or choose any for themselves?

[Page 138]3. Besides this light of the text, the law of Na­ture is judged to dictate the same thing, to wit, that the right power, or interest, to transact this business of the constitution of Magistrates is in the com­munity, or people of each Countrey, or State in relation to their own Magistracy. So that whether we look into the Scriptures, or into the Book of Natures law, the way which God hath chalkt out, the ordinary means he useth for the deputation of persons under himself, and over the people in the office of the Supreme Civil power, is the vote, elective act, or consent of the body politique, or people to be ruled. To testifie the latter, viz. that the law of nature dictates this to men,

1. I shall in stead of many cite a few learned Au­thors of best respect that affirm it.

2. I shall alledge the original, and primi­tive practise of Nations to have been conform thereto.

1. For the affirmation of it, to be so de Jure.

Mr. Richard Hooker.Hooker Eccles. pol. l. 1. cap. 10. pag. 26, 27, 29. lib. 8. pag. 150, 151. To take away all such mu­tual grievance, injuries, and wrongs, there was no way but only by growing upon composition, and agreement amongst themselves, by ordaining some government publique, and by yeelding themselves subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity, and happy estate of the rest might be procured, without which consent there was no reason why one man should take upon him to be Lord, or Judge over another. — Over a whole grand multitude, having no such dependency (as is in the family upon the Father) upon any one, and consisting of so many families, as every politique society in the world doth, impossible it is that any should have compleat lawful power, but by consent of men, or immediate appointment of God; because not having the natural superiority of fathers, their power must needs be either usurped, and then unlawfull, or if lawful, then either granted, or consented unto by them over whom they ex­ercise the same, or else given extraordinarily from [Page 139] God.— Of this point therefore we are to note that sith men naturally have no full, and perfect power to command whole politique multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort be at no mans commandement living.

Mr. Perkins.Perkins To. 1. pag. 762. A. Treat. of Cal­lings. Every lawful King is placed by God; and by men that are appointed under God to set up Princes over them, according the laws and customs of se­veral Kingdoms.

Mr. John Selden.Selden de Jure Nat. lib. 1. cap. 8. pag. 106, 107. Among these (viz. the acts of the permissive law of nature) every man seeth that the acts of making constitutions, entring into cove­nants, introducing of Customs, and forms of Govern­ment, and of rescinding, revoking, or altering all these, by the choice of those Societies of men whom it concer­ned, where likewise permitted. — In like manner it hath still been granted that by the said permission whatsoever it by men, joyned in Society, limited, forbid­den, or constituted, that they are bound to keep who have so consented, according to the conditions, and qua­lification with which it is prescribed, even as many as have, and so far as they have given their consent. But whence is it that they are so bound? from the authori­ty of a deity, that is of mans superior, even in these things, the rise of the obligation is to be derived, and therefore from some heads of the obligative law of nature. For the acts whereof we speak were allowed to men, so as either they might use them at their plea­sure, or they might by joynt consent prohibit them, and confine their own liberty in them, either by covenant, naturally plighted, or by Princes constituted to govern in those matters; which thing seemeth not sufficiently conceivable how it should be, whilst we alway lock at right, and owing of duty, unlesse then joyn this also to it, that the obligation to the said inhibition, or con­finement of liberty doth accrew from his authority, and command who, as being mans superiour, gives war­rant to it.

Mr. Jeremiah Burroughes.Burroughes on Hos. 1. Lect. 4. pag. 111. see al­so Lect. 3. pa. 65. and on cap. 3. Lect. 2. pag. 704. There is no authority that we are subject to now, but according to the laws and constitutions of the Countrey where we live. We [Page 140] must require whether it be a power: It is not because the man that is in authority commandeth it, except he commandeth it by virtue of that authority which is ac­cording to the nature and condition of the foundamen­tal constitutions of the Countrey where he liveth.—Otherwise we are not bound in conscience: bound we may be in regard of prudence, and in regard of preventing other disturbances, but conscience doth not bind to wils of men, but binds to laws.

The Author of the treatise of Monarchy,Treatise of Mo­narchy chap. 1. Sect. 1. & chap. 3. Sect. 2. & 5. Vindication of that Treatise chap. 3. Sect. 6. (called by one in print, Mr. Hunton) God by no word binds any people to this or that form, till they by their own act bind themselves. They (to wit Soveraigns) attain this determination of authority to their persons by the tacit and virtual, or else expresse, and formal consent of that society of men they govern, either in their own per­sons, or the root of their succession. — I do conceive that in the first original all monarchy, yea any individual frame of Government whatsoever is elective, that is, is constituted, and draws its force, and right from the con­sent, and choice of that community over which it sway­eth. — My reason is, because man being a voluntary agent, and subjection being a moral act, it doth essen­tially depend on cons [...]nt: so that a man may by force, and extremity be brought under the force, and power of ano­ther, as unreasonable creatures are to be disposed of, and trampled on whether they will or no; but a bond of sub­jection cannot be put on him, nor a right to claim obedi­ence, and service acquired, unlesse a man become bound by some act of his own will. I am perswaded it will ap­pear an uncontrouleable truth in policy, that the consent of the people, either by themselves or their ancestors, is the only mean in ordinary Providence by which Soveraignty is conferred on any persons or family: neither can Gods ordinance be conveyed, and people engaged in conscience by any other means.

The author of the fuller answer to Dr. Ferns Fuller Answer to Dr. Ferne [...]ag. 17, 18. Trea­tise, &c. The meaning of the place (Rom. 13.) then must be this, The powers that be (i. e.) so, or so establish­ed by consent of man, are ordained of God to be obeyed; or it is Gods ordinance that men should live under some [Page 141] government, and submit without resistance to that kinde of government they have by consent established: just (as St. Peter follows him) to the ordinance of man for the Lords sake. — There are two kinds, we use to say, of Tyranny, regiminis, & usurpationis; that which is only of government, though never so heavy must be endured. That other kinde, of usurpation, it hath no right, no ordination at all, and so no subjection due to it. In all power of government, Divinity tels us there are four things, the institution, the constitution, the acquisition, and the use. The constitution alwayes from mans consent, the institution alwayes from God.

Mr. Thomas Hobs.Hobs Elements part. 1. chap. 6. Sect. 6, 7. part. 2. chap. 10. Sect. 3. That this may be done (viz. the erection of a common power) there is no way imaginable, but only union, which is the involving, or including the wils of many in the will of one man, or of one counsel. — The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by covenant oblige himself to some one, and the same man, or to some one, and the same counsel by them all named and determined.

Lastly, Polybius, as cited by Gregory Tholosanus.Greg. Tholos. Syntag. Juris lib. 47. cap. 15. Sect. 22. Neither yet ought every Government of one be presently called a kingdom, but that only which is granted by the subjects consent.

2. Besides these testimonies to confirm that of right, and by the law and light of nature so it is, viz. that the Supreme power be derived by consent of the people. I promised to shew the matter of fact, viz. that so it was in the beginning of the erecti­on of Government. For this I have the testimo­nies of Aristotle, Cicero, Justin, Ludovicus Vives, Polydor Virgil, and Calvin, speaking in general of all nations, and of Livy, Plutarch, and Juvenal, in refe­rence to the Roman.

Aristotle (polit. lib. 3. chap. 10. num. 89.) saith, For when those first heroes had obliged the people with great benefits, as by their invention of arts, or warlike powers, or bringings of men into society, and commerce or inlargement of their territo [...]ies, these were created Kings by the free consent of the people.

Cicero (de legibus lib. 3. pag. 452.) tels us, all the ancient nations in times past subjected themselves unto Kings, the which kinde of Government was first conveyed, and given unto the justest and wisest men. But those who were not pleased with kingly Govern­ment, refuse they did not to submit themselves to any at all, but they were not willing to subject alwayes to one.

Justin. (lib. 1.) informes that, in the beginning the rule of nations was in the hand of Kings, whom not popular ambition, but their moderate carriage ap­proved of the good advanced to that height of ho­nour.

Upon which words of Justin, Ludovicus Vives (in Augustin. de Civit. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 5, 6.) hath this note. In the beginning every family had its King, either the wisest, or the justest of the house; a little after that Kings began to rule over many families, and sometimes there were to one family divers Kings, whom the people elected to themselves as to be guides, governours, and overseers of the publique interest; and they were not compelled to take such a one as happened any way to them: neither did nobility, or the seeking of the party carry it: every mans own private good with the good of the publique was so dear and near to him, that it made him to make choice of none but the best.

Pol. Virgil. de Invent. Rer. lib. 2. cap. 2. Polydore Virgil followeth, and builde [...]h his rela­tion upon Justin. And for the Roman state in par­ticular, it is very evident in Livy, Florus, Stadna upon him, and Plutarch, that their five first Kings, Romulus, Numa Pompilius, Tullus Hostilius, Ancus Martius, and Tarquinius Priscus, were chosen by the Senate, and People; and that their seventh King Tarquinius Superbus was by them removed for his evident usurpation. Neque enim ad jus Regni quicquam praeter vim habebat, ut qui neque popu­li jussu, neque patribus autoribus regnavit; saith Livy.

Unto whose testimonies I may add that of Juve­nal, exprobrating the sloath and degeneracy of the [Page 143] Roman people in falling off from their ancient man­ners, and policy.

Unto all these astipulateth that of Calvin (in Genes. 10.) Notandum in nepotibu [...] Noah tantum re­censeri qui Gentium fuerunt principes. Nam ut quisque inter fratres ingenio, virtute, industria vel aliis dotibus excelluit, sibi peperit nomen, & potentiam, ut alii sub eorum umbrâ quiescentes primatum illis libenter concederent. It is to be observed that of the Grand children of Noah they only are recited who were Princes of the Nations. For as any excelled among his brethren in wisdom, virtue, industry, or other qualities, he purchased to himself name, and power; so that the rest voluntarily granted him the Soveraignty, and rested under his pro­tection.

CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 5. Subsection 5. Three other wayes of conveying unto persons a title to soveraign Magistracy exami­ned; viz. 1. That of Fatherhood, and Primogeniture. 2. That of Conquest. 3. That of voluntary beneficialnesse by protection.

BUt besides this I meet with some other wayes by some held lawful and approved for the entry, and attainment of persons to Soverainty, and con­sequently such as derive the divine ordination to it unto the persons qualified with them. Of these it will happily be expected he that is handling this subject should take some notice; together with what is said for them.

1. That which I shall take notice of, first is, the power or right of Fatherhood, which is supported or pieced out (by the maintainers of it) with that of primogeniture, or of the first born; both of these put together they style (as I understand them) by the name of Genarchy. The drift of their opinion that are for this is to make the rise, and right of Civill Government natural and native, not voluntary, or conventional.

The Question here is not, Whether the Father, and the First-born have not some preeminency over their respective correlatives, to wit, the Father over his Children, the First-born over his younger bre­thren? But whether the preeminency be the same with Civill Magistracy: Or whether the political power in a Common-wealth be not one thing, and that superiority another, and those two be not [Page 145] really and essentially different [...] Neither is the question, whether Fatherhood and primogeniture may not be coincident in regard of the subject with Civil Magistracy, that is, may not meet in the same person? Nor is the question, whether Civil Power may not be he [...]editary, that is, setled and kept in one family, and in it descend from the Father to his first Son, and after that manner successively forward? But the question is, whether Fatherhood and pri­mogeniture, either of them apart, or both of them together be the proper title, basis, or root of Civill Magistracy? or, whether a natural, and original right, and title to political rule be in the Father, and first-born, without any positive voluntary, hu­mane constitution, or consent of the state; so that a person is in soveraign power not by virtue of any such law or paction, but meerly, and originally by his Fatherhood or primogeniture?

First, for the title of Fatherhood to Magistracy, there are these things that impugne it.

1. Although it is granted there is in the Fa­ther a power over his child, yet ever since the erection of the publique State, or Comm [...]n-wealth, as a distinct society from that of a houshold, and com­pounded of a multitude of families, and where ever these two are in being together, the paternal power hath been (and that duly, and necessarily) taken to be another, or a distinct authority from that of the Civil Magistrate, and inferior, or subordinate to it.

2. The power of the Father is in every Father over his children: and if from it you will raise a Civil Political power, then, either it must be said to be in, or to be the right of every Father; and if so, as soon as one begets a child, or becomes a Father, he becomes a Supreme Civil Power, begins a new Common-wealth, and he, and his children are exempt from his Fathers (if living) and all other Civil superiority; and the Fathers power, and the Common-wealth he is over shall be dissolved by his having Nephews, or by his childrens fatherhood: [Page 146] and this will make every family, though but of two persons, to be a Civil State, and that no Common­wealth can consist of more then the children of one Father, and for ever prevent or deny the compoun­ding a Common-wealth of many families, and the distinction of the Common-wealth from the Fami­ly. And by this multiplication of the number, and abridgement of the extent of civil societies you disappoint mankind of that union, strength, securi­ty, and comfortable commerce that nature hath guided men to seek, and the experience of all ages and nations have found in large and populous so­cieties. Or

2. The political power must be said to be in, or to be the right of every Father that is not Pater patratus, or that hath no Father; and this doth dissolve and divide the Common-wealth at the death of such a Father into so many parts as there are left persons fatherlesse, whether they be Wife, Sons, or Daughters, and into so many new Common­wealths as there are left Fathers in it that have not a Father.

3. The right or power of the Father can relate only to the children, and only to his own. Out of the extent then of this dominion, and consequently out of the Common-wealth it belongeth unto, upon this score you must exclude,

1. The Wife, and Servants of this supposed Mo­narch, though he be their superiour, and they in a subordination to him, yet he is not their Fa­ther.

2. All other persons of any other stock; there can be no mixture of races, or linages in this Common-wealth.

4. If Civil power be the right of the Father, then it must necessarily be in him in reference to all his children, wherever placed, or dispersed. So that how far soever Adams progeny must be dissemina­ted, or spread upon the face of the earth, during his life; or Noahs during his life; or any of the long lived Patriarchs during their respective lives, all the [Page 147] posterity that sprang from such a head, must be­long to, and be shut up within one Common-wealth while that common parent lasted. And how will this stand with that distribution of Noahs race into severall Countreys and Nations in his life time, as also with that of Shems, he being living? (of which in the 10 and 12 Chapters of Genesis) and with Abra­hams sending away the sons he had by his Concu­bines into another Countrey while he yet lived? Gen. 25.6.

Unless it will be said, such a Father hath a facul­ty, or warrant to strip himself of this his pa­ternal Civill Dominion, and to transfer it, or any part of it to others during his life, But

1. Thus you unsettle and change the basis, and cause of civil dominion you had laid in the Fathers natural right, and make it separable from it by humane choice, and will: and if you put it once upon arbitrary constitution you make it alienable for ever from that subject, and from that bottom.

2. This cannot be supposed at the confusion of languages (Gen. 11.6, 7.) when as they were one immediately before it; and the end of their building Babel was to prevent their dispersion; and upon that confusion they were scattered from thence upon the face of the whole earth; by which con­fusion, and dispersion the consent, or act of their common head, for the divesting of himself, and for the investing of those who should succeed him, in being the respective Soveraign powers of those several divided Countries and nations, was pre­vented.

Secondly, But the inconveniencies of fixing Civil power in the paternal relation alone they endevour to salve by eeking it out with that of primogeniture. Unto this I say,

1. Primogeniture can never be supposed to de­rive any thing to the childe, but what was in the Father; if the Father be a Supreme power, a Mo­narchy may by it be conveyable to his Son, and [Page 148] not otherwise. Thus primogeniture is not the rise of civil power, but supposeth it to be in being, and is only the mean of continuation, and transmission of it from person to person.

2. The natural right of the first born in succes­sion from the Father, as we finde it in Scripture, seems only to be a better, or double portion of what was his Fathers, in copartnership with his Bre­thren. If then you go by that, you must upon the death of every royal father, that hath a plurality of Sons divide the Common-wealth among them ac­cording to that proportion; whereby it would come to passe that a Kingdom by many descents probably shall be divided into numberlesse minute principa­lities, and every of them still new to be divided by every new succession. The conveying of a Kingdom whole and entire to one of many Sons is not from the law of the first born in Scripture, but is doubt­less from positive institution. And this is to me a st [...]ong argument (and unanswerable to them that allow the transferring of Kingdoms undivided from Father to Childe) that Supreme power is in a person by arbitrary constitution, not by natural right as in a Father or first-born; for if it were, that right by it self would infer a division of Common-wealths according to the multiplication of the Regal stock, and so in time an easie dissolution of them.

3. If Primogeniture must carry it, then the right of Fatherhood a [...]ore insisted on went on no farther then the first man Adam, and was never in any after him; and upon his decease you put an end to, and destroy for ever your paternal right to Poli­tical power. For upon his death either the power must descend upon every one of his children distri­butively, as Fathers in reference to their respe­ctive children as their subjects; and then where is that you call the right of primogeniture, and what politicall power is accrewed by it? or, it must descend upon his first-born only, and then what becomes from thenceforth of the right of fatherhood?

[Page 149]4. If you set the Civill power upon the first born in succession from Adam, and so downward, then you must either set it upon every fi [...]st-born of every Father, and this will bring the absurdities, argued to follow upon setting it upon every father, or, you must fixe it but on one first-born only at once, that is, the eldest Son of the eldest house; and then you make it necessary that all men be kept within one Common-wealth, and that there be but one Mo­narch; for that primogeniture can but be in one race, and in one person still, and how opposite is this, not only to the practise of all ages, even from Noahs time, when the race of man­kinde was divided, as into divers regions, so into several. Nations or politique bodies; but to the state of mankind so far di [...]persed over the whole earth as it is incapable of being one earthly Mo­narchy.

2. Or you must say the first-b [...]rn, as he had in him a right to hold the power, so he had a power to alienate it to his younger brethren, or kin, and did put into act this power to the distribution of the world into many intire States and Principali­ties; but against this it will be said, a right in Adams first begotten, and in every first begotten of the first begotten successively to the power, and a right to alienate the power either in whole, or in part, from descending to the fi [...]st in succession, are inc [...]nsistent; he that alienates and gives away power to any of the younger, unto so much as he gives, he cu [...]s [...]ff [...]he right of the eldest, and puts an end to this title of primogeniture.

5. Let it be considered what is in Scripture the right of the first-born, viz. some domestical pre­eminency, or superiority of the eldest over his Bre­thren within the family, as Gen. 4.7.Vide Cart­wright on Gen. 25.31. The first­born were next in honour to their Parents (saith Ainsworth on Gen. 25.31.) what ever it was, it ap­pears to be that which Cain might have over Abel during the life of their Father Adam; and was not [Page 150] therefore the Supreme Civil Power. It appears the first Son had precedency of place, Gen. 43.33. and a double portion of his Fathers inheritance, Deut. 21.17. but all this, and if there be any thing more, amounts not to a political Power; but in the con­trary we finde it plainly distinguisht, and separated from it. The right of Jacobs first-born descended upon one Son, the right of the Supreme Civil Power upon another, 1 Chron. 5.1, 2. Reuben was Israels first-born; for his incest he lost the birth-right, and Jacob gave it to Joseph, but though the birth-right was Josephs, yet Judah prevailed above his Brethren, and of him came the chief ruler. The blessing of Lordship over his Brethren which Isaac unawares b [...]queathed to Jacob, and the birthright were two distinct things in Esaus repute, Gen. 27.36, 37. Probably in the beginning of mankind, or of a fa­mily ere it was inlarged so far as to cause a full di­vision into distinct Nations, and Civil dominions, and while by reason of paucity of persons, and proxi­mity of habitation there was little difference obser­ved betwixt a Family and Common-wealth, pub­lique power did reside in the Father over all that sprung of him; and after it had so gone on for a time, that communities by union might enjoy more strength, and security, it might by the joynt consent of many families, and the Fathers and Grandsires of them be divolved to one which was the first-born of the eldest house. But that this was by natural right, or that it was set down as a perpetual law, or rule for every Common-wealth, as the only warranta­ble rise or title to Supreme Government; and that it was not as free for them, or such as they, who first reduced themselves under the dominion of the first-born, by agreement, to have with the same agreement constituted the power in another, or a younger stem, will (I suppose) never be proved, neither can hold, for the reasons above given.

[Page 151]6. We finde that in the disposal of Govern­ment among Brethren this birth-order was not sel­dom inverted. As when Jacob was preferred before Esau; Judah before all the elder sons of Jacob; Ephraim before Manasseh; Solomon before Adonijah; 2 King. 23.30, 36. See Divines Annotat. Dio [...]ate, and Jack­son in loc. Jehoabaz the younger, before Jehojakim the elder son of Josiah; and Judas Macca­beus 1 Maccab. 2.66. with vers. 2, 3, 4. the third son of Mattathias be­fore his other elder brethren. And of Simri the son of Hosah, it it said, though he was not the first­b [...]rn, yet his Father made him the chief1 Chron. 26 10.. Yea it was anteverted by a standing law in the c [...]se of the elder brother dying childelessWhereby the hei [...]ship did not descend upon the next Brother who then was his Fathers first-born, but was entailed upon a childe to be begotten by him on the widow of the deceased, which childe was to inherit his Ʋncles estate, and so put by his own Father. Deut. 25 5. Mat. 22.24. If primogeniture had been the con­stant law, and channel of Govern­ment, why was it pronounced as a peculiar curse upon Canaan the son of Ham the younger son of Noah, that he should be a servant to his brethren.

7. Lastly, The preeminence of the first-born is supposed at the first to have been as well in matters Religious, as Secular, and to have comprised the office of Priest-hoodSee the Chal­dee paraphrase on Gen 49.3 Musculus and Ainsworth on the same, and the latter on cap. 15.31.. Yet that was (after a time) taken away from it perpetually, and was under the law put into one tribe, and family in Israel; and ever since the Ecclesiastical function hath been meerly institutive, and not hereditary. Whereby it may appear that the preeminences yeelded to primogeniture in the beginning were not all of them of the unchangeable law of nature, or any moral, or perpetual institution, but some of them (at least) arbitrary, mutable, and tem­porary.

Having argued first the claim of Fatherhood, then that of Primogeniture, I shall add this fur­ther of them laid both together. Whatsoever re­spect, or reverence either the relation of a Father, [Page 152] or of a first-born hath at any time carried any where; and whatsoever power was deferred to them at the beginning, they cannot be imagined to have been intended by God, or ordained by the law of nature as a fixt and constant basis, no nor to be of any permanent use so much as to give us light, either for the beginning; founding, or raising up of a Magistracy where it is wanting, or for the legitimating, or deducing, and deriving of an ori­ginal right, or title to any that is already in being.

1. If we consider the multiplication, division, confusion, and extinction of families that hath been.

1. The multiplication: Now that mankind hath for so long a time been sprung forth into a world of families and kindreds, which are every day sprouting out into more.

2. Division: the stock or family of Adam is, and long since hath been not only multiplied, and dis­seminated into innumerable families, but those have been parted into a multitude of (yea almost innume­rable) Nations, and distinct politique bodies.

3. Confusion: every one of those nations is not only constituted of numberless families, but those are so consounded, and shuffled together, that no distinction of any one stock in a continued descent from Adam, or Noah is left; and so the pri­ority of geni [...]ure as reckoned from either of them, to be in one family, and person in relation to the rest of mankind, or of the same Common-wealth is utterly unknown, and unconjecturable. Length of time, want of records, removal, and shifting of habitations, the identity, variety and change of the names of persons, and places, and many other things have overwhelmed with darke obli­vion all knowledge of such distinction, and pri­ority.

4. Extinction of families: as the persons, so the stocks and linages of men have a mortality upon them, and in time divers of them are worn out, and come to a period.

Now then, when mankind is looked upon as at present, and for some thousands of years it hath been drawn out into so many lines, and races, and those some broken off, others transversed, interwoven, and mingled both in bloud, and dwelling without any pale or difference of stock, or precedency of birth deduced from primitive antiquity, though the Fa­ther, and first-begotten, though both in the house, and in the Common-wealth as far as they are known, retain still a right, and respect at their hands, who stand in the relation of children, and younger brethren to them, and in the latter the title of dominion being once fixed in a stock or fa­mily, the paternal, and protogenial relations are of use to keep it on in succession, and to convey it from person to person, yet they are of no force to bottom, or raise a title to Civil Soveraignty upon, over, or in reference to those who stand not in any known relation of children, or younger brethren, or any juniority of descent to them. This may confidently enough be affirmed, It cannot be said of any person, or family in the world, nor could have been for these many ages, that he, or it claimeth, or holdeth the throne in such a nation by a right of Fatherhood, or Primogeniture derived from the first father, or first eldest son.

2. But if none of these obscurities were, but di­stinction of families, and their order of precedency, and subsequency of descent from the first head of mankind were clear; so that in every nation, or State, one family or race could be pointed out as the eldest, and first of the Nation in descent from Adam, or Noah, yet there shall lie difficulties incident to the pretence of succession by birth-priviledge, even within any one family, not to be extricated by the evidence of a natural pedegree, or any otherwise then by positive constitution. How many questions do Civilians agitate about the right of succession where the linage is known? and what different rules and methods of succession do they observe in several Nations and Kingdoms? He that shall but [Page 154] read one Chapter in Grotius (viz. de Jure belli lib. 2. cap. 7.) may discover that variety of opini­on, and practise in this point of succession that may satisfie him of the entangledness and intricacy of it.

There is one way of succession which they call hereditary, and another lineal, and of the lineal there is one which they term agnatical, wherein males on­ly are admitted, another cognatical in which females are included. There are some questions concerning what children shall succeed their Father, as, whether begotten only, or also adopted; and whether Legi­timate only, or the natural, or bastard childe also. There is a question about the matter into which the succession is to be; to wit, whether if a man have a plurality of issue, the dominion shall passe un­divided to one, or be distributed into many portions, that is, to every childe a share. There is some questi­on of succession to him that hath issue; as, whether a mans first-born dying before him, and leaving issue, the issue of that son, or his own second-born shall inherit. But there are many questions of suc­c [...]ssion to him that hath not issue of his body; as whether his dominion shall go to his own brethren, and their issue in order, or to the brethren of his Father, or to any other of his ancestors upwards; whether his Brothers childe, or his Uncle: whe­ther his Brothers daughter, or his sisters son; whe­ther his younger Brother, or the son of his elder Brother; whether the Daughter of his elder Bro­ther, or his own younger Brother be to be pre­ferred.

These questions, and such like, the positive lawes, constitutions, or customs of Nations do de­termine several wayes, each in reference to their own territories; so that by virtue of them successi­ons may be carryed clearly and quietly. But the pa­ternal, or protogenial right by it self, abstracted from those arbitrary constitutions, and as only laid upon the law of nature, or lookt into by the light thereof, is as to these particulars indeterminate.

The result of all this is, that the authors of this title of Government must be driven to confess it now out of use, and to be an impossible thing, to build any soveraign power that now is, or can be expected to be, or for most of the ages of man­kinde past, hath been in the world, upon it. Hence is it that after all their discourses upon it they tell us, in relation to all Governments that have been since the confusion of families, of an elective primogeniture (a contradiction in adjecto:) and that those Supreme Magistrates the world hath now, or can have, succeed in the place of the Father and first-born.

But if they come into their place, and not by their title, I ask then quo jure? by this it is yeelded that Fatherhood and Primogeniture make out no title to them. And why then are these so much urged as the only original, rise, and claim of all ordinary do­minion; and that exclusively, and in opposition to any other title, and specially against that which is by the vote, consent, and constitution of the people? They that hold these to be the sole rest and basis of Civil Government, and confess that no Governours now extant can be said, or demonstrated to grow, or be built upon these, bring themselves to this reso­lution, that there neither is nor can be by any ordi­nary means, any known, lawful Government in the earth. And accordingly one of them is thus ex­presseObservations of the original of Government, in the Anarchy of a limited, and mixed Monarchy pag. 12.; All Kings that now are, or ever were, are or were either fathers of their people, or the heirs of such fathers, or the usurpers of the right of such fathers. But before he involve all the Princes of the earth that either are, or have been since the earth was divided (about a hundred years as I take it after Noahs flood) under this brand of usurpation, or a suspicion of it so strong as it layes every one of them under the odds of ten thousand to one to be deserving of it, I would desire his title of Father­hood and Primogeniture, both, or either of them might be cleared of the incongruities and incapaci­ties not only of being an evident, and knowable, [Page 156] but of being a practicab [...]e, and possibly ex [...]stent way of carrying on a course, and succession of Go­vernment in the several states of the world from age to age, the which have been above in this paper im­puted, and argued to attend them. I will only take a little notice of the main and cornerstone, which the friends of this opinion lay to found it upon, and so passe from it. This is the universal Monarchy which they presuppose Adam had from God; and which, or any part whereof none of his posterity could have, but by grant, or succession from him.

But let this be supposed, what will be gained by it to their purpose?

1. Touching the universal Monarchy of Adam, it will be questioned how he had, or received it? Whether by natural right, as the Father of all, or by an immediate expresse and positive grant from God.

2. Besides the way of immediate and expresse grant from God, which it may be supposed▪ Adam, and after him some other special persons (as Moses, Saul, David had) there must be acknowledged a me­diate, and ordinary way of Gods advancing of per­sons to authority, and power, which is standing, ge­neral and common to all times, and places. And of this our controversie is. I enquire therefore how this universal Monarchy of Adam passed from him unto others.

1. Whether distributively, and piecemeal to many, that is to his sons, cach a share, or whole, and solid to one?

2. Whether it passed from him to them, or any of them by his arbitrary and positive assignement, or by order, or law of nature, as to the heir, or heirs general.

3. If by his voluntary assignement it passed to whom, and in what proportion he pleased, then the natural right of Fatherhood or Primogeniture took no place at his death, carryed not the Civil power from him, and so cannot challenge to convey it down­wards.

4. If by order or law of nature it passed from him, then the question will be,

[Page 157]1. Whether they that succeeded to him had it by right of Progenitorship, that is, by reason of the Fatherhood which was in them in relation to their posterity, who were therefore their subjects, so that upon that title, every son of Adam was soveraign to the issue that came of him. But then it will be said, this course of deriving Supreme Magistracy could be but temporary, and must needs have a stop, for otherwise it would multiply Common-wealths in infinitum, according to the multiplication of Fa­thers, and confine Common-wealths to extend no further, then to comprise a Father and his children, which (as was argued before) is neither agreeable to the practise of men, even from the time of Noah, nor to the end of a Common-wealth, which is union of a multitude of households for strength, and secu­rity. When therefore this course of Genarchy ceased, what was the way of continuing Govern­ment?

2. Or it passed from Adam by right of inhe­rence, to Adams sons, as his sons, and so as heirs of their Father. And this is a way different from that of Progenitorship, and upon this point the right of Fa­therhood and that of Primogeniture are at odds, and prove (as to the purpose of conveying power from Adam) inconsistible. For if the Civil power went by Fatherhood, then were all Adams sons joynt suc­cessors in it (as was before said) every one in rela­tion to his posterity: if it went by primogeniture, but one of them could by that claim the power, and this will run as upon the necessi y of having but one Monarchy over all mankind, throughout all ages, which was above disproved. Unless we must say the first-begotten could but claim a double portion of power, and then the rest of the sons had each a single part in proportion to his double. But this,

1. Fals again upon the absurdity even now al­leadged of multiplying Common-wealths by the endlesse number of Fathers.

[Page 158]2. Out of what, or whom would you make the eldest son a double portion? without depriving some other of the sons of his single part, and so destroying the right of inheritance, to it you could make no addition to the single share of the first born, or give him dominion over more then he was superiour to by virtue of his own Fatherhood.

To make an end therefore with this point, if the insisting on the meer natural right either of Father­hood, or Primogeniture will not beat us out a clear path for the derivation of Government from Adam, or carrying it on with some justifiableness of title among men, then we must return to that of vo­luntary agreement, and grant; unto which the true natural right of Fatherhood is not repugnant, but may very well be reconciled, yea, and assistant unto the founding, and continuing Civil Government. Some of them that insist on the Fathers power as the only Civil Power in the world, do yet place in him a right to transfer it from himself, unto whom he pleaseth. If this be granted then I will say the way of setling Civil authority by the agreement, or consent of the governed, might thus come in. Sup­pose we Adam to have ruled as sole Monarch during his life; afterward some one of his sons in successi­on to him, or all his sons each over their own pro­geny as distinct societies; after by the confusion of languages they being forced to sever; or when those distinct races of Adam became so numerous, and dispersive over many countries that they were too vast to be continued in one society, they may be supposed each of them voluntarily to withdraw, or part themselves into several Common-wealths, and the Fathers of the families in every of these new erected Common-wealths having in them the in­terest of power each in relation to his children, and family, and agreeing together for themselves, and theirs to some one as their publique civil-head, or King; and thus cometh in Magistracy to be vo­luntarily constituted in that way wherein the right of Fatherhood is preserved, and continued in subordi­nation [Page 159] to the Civil publique power; and this put in such a way, as both it, and politique societies of con­venient amplitude might be kept up, and new ones (as need should require) might be erected; whereas by the meer right of Fatherhood, holding, and exer­cising the power it had in relation to those only who were natural children to it, it could not be, no not with the supplement of Primogeniture, as was be­fore shewed. And with this the Assertors of the sole right of Fatherhood are driven in a sort to complySee the Anar­chy, &c. p. 11..

2. I come to the second way of attaining a title to Government above proposed to consideration, which is, that of Conquest. The jus gladii as it is un­derstood, and qualified by many Grave, Learned, and approved Authors, I shall not here call into question; But that the Sword, and successe of it unto victory, simply, and by it self, whatsoever the cause, or quarrel pursued by it be, or taken, as it may be, separate from, or contradictory to the choice, or consent of the people, can be a sufficient and justifi­catory title to Civil Government, I cannot yield. We know how Augustine August. de Civ. Dei. lib. 4. cap. 4. hath branded this claim with the style of Magnum Latrocinium. In supply of the halts, and defects which at every turn are de­tected to occurre in the title of Fatherhood, and Primogeniture, an Author of that way (I even now quoted) findeth this shift, The obedience which all Subjects yeeld to Kings is but the paying of that duty, which is due to the supreme Fatherhood. Many times by the act either of usurper himself, or of those that set him up, the true heir of a Crown is dispossessed. In such cases the subjects obedience to the Fatherly power must go along and wait upon Gods providence, who only hath right to give, and to take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt subjects into the obedience of another Fatherly power The Anarchy, &c. pag. 12.. Hereby the Fatherly right, and power are made a meer Equivocum, or to signifie power en­titled, or coming in any way whatsoever, though it do not only not derive from the right of Fatherhood, [Page 160] but be privatively opposed to, or destructive of it: and thus he confounds, and makes to meet together in one name, and title, the thing that he had argued against, with the thing that he had asserted. And the saying that Providence in dispossessing of a Crown, him that is the true heir (and so hath the right) and dis­posing it to the hands of an unjust invader, doth put a fatherly power in that invader, and adopt the subjects to an obligation to it; is to deny the right both of paternity and birth-right, and of the consent of the people, and of every other special way of conveying a title to Government, and to make the right there­of only to follow, come by, and consist in possession, and to die forthwith in the Father, and heir upon dispossession. And to what purpose then is all his plea for Fatherhood, and primogeniture, or any other mans for any other title? what a void distinction is that of his when he distinguisheth of a natural, and an a usurped right? According to him now there is no Power, but Fatherhood, no Fatherhood, but pos­session.

But let us passe by this laxe, and wide claim to dominion by the sword, which swalloweth up all other titles, and look into that which I noted to be qualified, and cautioned (and so admitted by learned authors ancient and modern) as it is distinguishable from this, and reconcileable with that of the consent of the ruled.

Two wayes I observe the Sword is admitted to conduce, or have influence into the disposal, or placing of Government, but by neither is it made the sole, or the immediate ground, or cause of a right or title to it, or any otherwayes then as concor­dant with that political constitution I have as­serted.

1. Conquest (or the Conquerour rather) is ad­mitted to be interested in Government where it is the effect of a reall and just war. And so it makes no exception against my assertion. That Victory which is acknowledged justly to lay claim to a Crown is the issue of such a war as supposeth the equity and ne­cessity [Page 161] of the war to be on the victors part, and the default and provocation to be on the part of the conquered; and moreover that the default of the conquered is so high as either to detain from the Conqueror his right, or to forfeit into his hands by wrong offered their power, or liberty in the en­joyment, or disposal of the throne, and that there is a necessity on the part of the Conqueror in refe­rence to his attaining and enjoying of his own right, and just security therein, that he take and use that forfeitureVide Gro [...]a Jure [...]elli. lib. 3. ca. 15. Sect. 1..

In this case conquest is only a means to the conque­rers seising and holding of that power, or rule, which was his own before he prevailed, and which the cause, and state of the war (before the successe obtained) entitled him unto. By which it is evident that his right is not founded on his victory, but was in being before it, and had its rise from an antecedent inve­sture or trespass.

Upon this ground it is, that the title of the sword is alledged not by it self alone, but in subjunction to another title. A late Historian tels us that our King Henry the seven [...]h at his coronation was pro­claimed with these titles, Hen [...]icus Rex Angliae, Buckes Histo­ry of Richard the Third, lib. 2. pag. 54, 55. Jure Divino, Jure Humano, & Jure belli. And that the Pope (Innocent the 8.) in his bull to the said King, Anno 1486. hath the [...] words, Hic Rex Angliae de domo Lancastriae originem trahens, ac qui notorio Jure, & indubitato proximo successionis Titulo, & praelato­rum, & procerum Angliae electione, & successione, &c. etiam de Jure belli est Rex Angliae.

And this way of ingresse into the seat of Authori­ty as it is not grounded on conquest as its title, so it is not privative of, or altogether another from that which was before affirmed to be the only ordi­nary way, viz. the consent of the people. Forfeiture as it is a singular exception that lies in many cases, so it presupposeth a law, or constitution that ordains it, and so in a sort involveth their consent of whom it is taken. Though there be no explicite, and pre­sent act of will in the conquered that the Conque­rer [Page 162] shall reign over them, but an utter averseness, and all possible reluctancy against, and that brings the war: yet it is so allowed to be (when that case is put which is presupposed as the cause of the war) by the law of Nations, yea, of Nature: and being so, their wils have antecedently, originally, and im­plicitely subscribed to it, as such, and are therefore in this manner concluded in it. In like manner as we account that to be by a mans will, or consent, which his Predecessors (in whom he is virtually in­cluded) have willed, or himself hath formerly gran­ted, though now he be quite of another minde. He that gives his vote, personally, or by proxie, to any penal law, or act to be binding to the community of which he is, though he do not formally, and ab­solutely will his own punishment, yet he doth it in­terpretatively, consequentially, and conditionally, if he himself shall fall under the provision of that Act: and his will so passed is, upon his offending after it, sufficient to make his punishment not only just in it self, but just ex ore proprio, and to have his own consent.

2. As Conquest may interest a person in Govern­ment by being an attainment of possession in pursu­ance of an antecedent right, so the other sort of conquest, to wit, that which is a seasing of anothers right, or the setting of a man in meet possession, may have some tendency thereto, though not so directly, and that is thus; It may be an inducement to the conquered (if they be indeed free, and unen­gaged to any other) to a submission, and delivery up of themselves to be the subjects of the victor, and to take him for their Soveraign. The former way conquest is postnate and subsequent to the right of the Conquerer, and so doth not give him his title, but only introduce his possession; this lat­ter way it is antecedaneous, previous, and prepara­tory to his title, but is not productive or constitu­tive of it. Of this latter way of conquests leading to a title to dominion, I have spoken before, and refer my Reader thitherChap. 3. Sect. 3. Subsect. 5. Proposition 5..

Only, whereas some object, that the title of the Sword, or Conquest hath been the usuall beginning of the Kingdoms, and principalities which now are, or have been in the world.

I answer,

1. A facto ad jus non valet argumentum. We do not ask, neither is it to the pu [...]pose, what hath been done in the getting of rule, but what ought to be, and what is the rise of that power which can truly derive from God, as his ordinance.

2. I take this assertion to be too broad, that this hath been the usuall beginning of Dominions. Though many unjust inv [...]sions have been, yet that hath not been the constant birth of Soverainty. I have before alledged humane testimony of the best autho­rity to the contrary.

3. And where unlicentiate intrusion into the throne hath been, it hath commonly not continued, but the dominion hath been shortly, either disposses­sed, or setled upon a better ground-work, by the consent of the interested, sufficiently valid (in point of conscience) to such an act.

3. But if the sword by it self cannot create a title, Let us see what the third fore-named way will help,Non enim si quid alicui est utile, id statim mihi licet ei per vim impone­re. Nam his qui Rationis habent usum, libera de­bet esse utilium, & inutilium e­lectio, nisi al [...] ­ri jus quoddam in eos quaesitum sit. G [...]otius de Jure lib. 2. cap. 22. Sect. 12. either added to it, or alone, viz. that of voluntary beneficialness by protection. There are some who would build a kinde of claim to rule upon the con­sideration of the good, or benefit which the Gover­ning may be said to bring to the governed; which they will suppose it equal for him to obtrude upon them, though against their wils, and in recompence of it to exact their obedience to him. But such pre­tences of benefit, besides that they are often withou [...] reality, and are made the visour of proceedings of a q [...]ite contrary tenor; were they never so real, cannot reach to such an effect. The intention, promise, or actual collation of a good [...]urn doth not create a right in the promiser over him, or any thing of his to whom the same is done, witho [...]t his consent, or acceptance of it with such a con­dition.

To bring some colour for this claim of Domini­on, there are by an Author alledged some cases out of the Civill law; they are contained under that head of obligations which they call, ex quasi con­tracta, and particularly they are of those, ex negotiis gestis. There is, saith that law, an obligation, debt, or duty upon a man, when ones business is done, without his consent to his benefit. In this case the obligation is upon the owner of the business done, unto the Gestor or doer of it. The said Author,

1. Urges the case de neg [...]tiorum gestione, in general.

2. Insists on that particular one of the minor to his guardian, which, saith he, is the case of the Common-wealth, according to that maxim, Res publica semper est in curâ, & tutelâ A R ply to Dr. Sandersons Letter, pag. 5..

1. To the case in general, ex negotiis gestis, I say, there is a wide disparity betwixt it, as stated by the Civilian, and this, for which it is alledged.

1. In that case the ground of the obligation, and compensation awarded is because the thing done is behooveful, for the party obliged, to be done, and yet no consent can be possibly given, the person whose business it is being supposed by rea­son of absence, death, nonage, madness, or such like impediment incapable of giving consent. There is no such ground here where the parties he would have ob [...]iged are extant, present, and of age to declare their minde, and do either declare their dissent, or not declare their assent.

2. What is the extent, or matter of the obliga­tion in that, ex negotiis gestis? not the passing of the beneficiary into the dominion of the bene­factor, but only an obligation of debt to the re­payment of such necessary charges, as the gestor hath been at; it being all reason that in doing anothers business commodiously to that other, the doer should be indemnified. But no obligation here to a new personal state of subjection. By the law a Tutor, or Curator may oblige them [Page 165] under his charge without their consent in their goods to defray his layings out for them, but he cannot without their consent oblige them in a personal re­lation, as in marriage, or servitude, which are obli­gations of state.

3. The law acknowledgeth such an obligation as is specified but under those cautions as do exclude, and contradict the conclusion for which they are here brought. As

1. It denies that obligation if a man handle another mans business as his own.

2. If a man act anothers occasions after that other hath forbidden, or disclaimed his acting.

3. If they be acted, no necessity requiring itVide Greg. Thol [...] sa [...]i Syntag. [...]u [...]i [...], lib. [...]9. cap. [...] Sect. [...] 2. Sect. 8, 9, 11..

2. To that of the Minor, or Pupil in parti­cular.

1. Though the Law allowes the Guardian his charges out of the Minor, yet it allwes not any one to be a Curator that will undertake it. That's against the very nature and end of Curatorship, which is to defend the minor from invasors. He that is a Tutor (that is a Guardian of one under the age of 14. years) must be either jure civili datus, or permissus; he must either be T [...]stamentary, that is, assigned by the decaseds will; or Dative, that is appointed by the law, or magistrate. And he that is a Curator, (that is, over one above 14 but under 25 years old) must be chosen by the Minor, and constituted by the Law. The Civill Law expresly provides that they shall not be Tutors of Pupils who put them­selves upon, or offer to buy or make suit for the employment, and lest this office should seem arbi­trarily taken up, or by force put upon the Pupil or Minor, it ordains that military men be excepted from it. It gives both the Pupil, and the right Guardian an action against him that takes upon him that charge, being not lawfully ordai­ned to it; yea, and against those that assist him in possessing, or exercising that place, and con­demnes the false Guardian in as much as the value of that wherein he deals amounts untoIdem cap. 7. Sect. 2. lib. 13. cap. 1. Sect. 4. cap. 3. Sect. 1. cap. 10. Sect. 6, 16, 37, 38, 39. lib. 12. cap. 4. Sect 6.. [Page 166] Let these rules of the saw about Tutorship to a Pupil take place in the case of the Common-wealth, and its Guardian, and this title by ar­bitrary beneficialness will gain little by this pa­rallel.

2. Whereas he saith, the Common-wealth is alwayes in pupillage. It is but an allusive, or comparative speech; and is therefore unapt to be argumentative. A similitude must not be made run of all four. It can only import some­things appertaining to a Pupill may be in way of resemblance attributed to the Common-wealth. But it were easie to shew divers things wherein there is also a dissimilitude,Idem lib. 12. cap. 2. Sect. 2. lib. 13. cap. 10. Sect. 1. A Pupil cannot choose his Tutor, cannot call him to an account during his pupillage. But its generally confest, the Common-wealth may elect its Go­vernours. And it's a publiquely declared principle (I assert it not) the Supreme Power is accountable to the people. And himself breaks the correspon­dency most of all, in saying, the Common-wealth pupillage is everlasting, whereas the Pupill comes to puberty, and out of his pupillage at 14 years old.

Subsection 6. CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 6. A Solution of some Objections made against the passing of Gods Ordination unto the person of the Supreme Magistrate by the consent of the people.

HAving examined those other wayes of conveying over unto persons the title unto Magistracy, and refuted them: It now remains, that we take notice of some allegations against the peoples con­sent, being the ordinary medium of Gods ordinati­on of a person unto the soveraign power; which some, seeing they think them fit to be urged, will judge worthy either to be assented to, or an­swered.

1. Object.The Anarchy, &c. above cited, pag. 8. If no man have power to take away his own life, without the guilt of being a mur­derer of himself, how can the people confer such a power as they have not themselves, upon any one man without being accessories to their own deaths?

Answ. This Reason seems to ground it self upon that common Axiome, Nihil dat quod non habet; whence it argues, the people cannot give the power of capital punishment over them unto any person, because they have it not, cannot inflict it, each upon himself. But it is mis­grounded.

1. Here is ignoratio clenchi. For, as we yeeld it true that the people have not a civill authority every one over his own life, so we do not say, but here deny, that they can confer it upon another. The concession of a power in the people to nominate, [Page 168] or elect their Soveraign doth not infer so much, viz. that they in so doing give, or confer upon him the Magistratical power. They may be subordinate agents, and their vote, or consent may be the me­dium, or instrument used by God to convey that power to the person, but they cannot therefore be said to be the Creators, efficients, authors, or do­nors of that power, for that is the properwork or prerogative of God. When the young Prophet came to Jehu, and poured the oyle upon his head, and said unto him, Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, I have anointed thee King over the people; can we say, that Prophet made Jehu King? That young man was not the author, but the messenger only of that business. It is very clear in the conveyance of this, and of other powers, one may be the vehi­culum, the hander over of that power to another, which he is not the possessor of himself. A single woman hath not in her the marital power over her self, yet by her consent in marriage she conveyes it to her husband. The people of a Christian con­gregation, or Church have not each the power of a Pastor, or Minister to Preach, administer a Sa­crament, or the Keyes of Discipline to himself, yet by their election they may be instrumentall to convey the same to another. When the King in whom the power of life, and death is, gives com­mission to a Judge to have, and execute it subordi­nately from, and for him, and sends his order to the Keeper of his seal (required by the Law to make such a Commission authentick) to passe and seal the said Commission; we cannot say, the Keeper gives the Judge the said Commission, but it is the King [...]hat conferres it by this Officers hand. That which the peoples consent doth when they agree that this person shall be their Supreme Governour, is to determine the general rule (that every Com­mon-wealth shall have a Magistracy with power of capital punishment) to the particular person in re­lation to that people; but it makes them not to be conferrers efficients, or primary causes of that Ma­gistracy.

When a power or priviledge is by divine instituti­on annexed to the act of the creature, it is not the creatures act properly, or efficiently, but God by his institution that communicates that power, or priviledge.

2. This Objection, in its proper tendency, doth not more argue against he peoples capaci [...]y to c [...]n­fer the power over life upon any person (which is a thing we affirme not) then it doth against the peoples giving their consent, that such a one shall have the said power over them. For upon the same medium it may be argued, if no man have power to take away his own life without the guilt of being a self-murderer, how can any people con­sent to such a power in another without being ac­cessories to their own deaths? But that the people may very lawfully give their consent to such a power in another, I hope the Objector will not deny; If he should, I would say the people of Israel did lawfully give their consent to such a power in Saul, David, Solomon, and others; yea it is the part of every people to consent to the Rulers to have it, unless we must say that all Subjects are to be under their Governors against their wils.

3. But how then must we avoid the Reason, If I may not take away or destroy mine own life, I may not agree that another shall have the power to do it?

I answer, This is a very false assertion, that power which one hath not, and may not himself exercise, he may not consent to in another; If by power be meant (as it must needs be in the Objection) a power that is in its own nature lawful. Indeed that which is simply, or in it self unlawful, (as for instance, Murder) because it is so unlawful, as I may not do it my self, so I may not consent to anothers doing of it: But that which is lawful in it self, but unlaw­ful to me (as many things are) because though good in it self, yet I am not thereto called, or authorized, of that I cannot say, because I cannot do it my self, [Page 170] I may not consent to it in another. The Apostle Paul did give his consent to the taking away of his own life (conditionally if he deserved death, and the objection imports no other consent) when he was in question about it before his JudgeAct. 25.11.. If I be an offen­der, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I re­fuse not to die.

4. From this antecedent, no man hath power to take away his own life without the guilt of self-mur­der, the conclusion would as well be, not only (ergo) the people cannot, but (ergo) no man can confer such a power on another, and thus the argument would run, as against the peoples, so against any others conferring, (or consenting to, as to their sense who make the terms equivalent) such a power in another; so that by this it should be un­lawfull,

1. For a Prince, or any other Supreme power to transmit, resigne, or put off their Government in their life time to another, which yet the Author of this objection allowes.

2. For one that is a subject to no State, to desire or offer himself to, or accept of naturaliza­tion, or incorporatien in any Common-wealth, under any civil power.

3. For one that is a member of a Legislative assembly, and out of it but a subject, to give his vote to an act for the punishing of a crime with death, by which his own life is concerned, as subjected to death by the said act upon his breach of the same. Yet I suppose no man can defend any of these to be unlawful. And for the last it is very ordinary, and generally allowed, and the reason is; Because such a persons vote, and the ordaining of such a law doth not create a power of life, and death, nor confer it de novo on the Magistrate to whom the execution of it is committed. It only doth deter­mine, or apply that power which is already instituted by God, and inherent in the Magistrate, to its par­ticular matter, such a fact: or, make that power which was in him in actu signato, to be in him in actu [Page 171] exercito, in reference to such a crime. As therefore a Parliament mans vote conduceth to determine, or apply that power which was in some sort in being before to its particular matter, this fact; so doth the peoples vote determine that power which was in some sort ordained before, that is, instituted by God, to its particular subject, this person. I have thus dispatched their Herculean argument; let us see what more is said.

2 Object.The Anarchy. &c. pag. 11. This supposed right in the people to choose, or constitute their Government is a thing which it is not possible for them any way lawfully to exercise.

To make this objection good, and to shew the difficulty, or imp [...]ssibility of the said exercise they raise these scruples.

1. Sith nature must be supposed to have left mankind loose, or unreduced into civil, publique societies, how come they distributed into distinct Common-wealths, so as this person, family, or people belong to this State, that to another severally?

Answ. 1. It must be supposed that nature hath ordained (upon supposal of the multiplication, and spreading of men over the several regions of the earth) a partition of men into divers civil Societies, to be under distinct, and peculiar civil Govern­ments. So that in actu signato, or in specie mankinde is naturally bound, and is not in that respect ori­ginally free: but in actu exercito they are naturally free (as to political we mean, not as to paternal subjection) that is, originally the reduction of men into this or that Common-wealth distinct from others is yet to do, the union of them into one, or division into many civill States is yet unmade; and it is yet in facto undetermined of what society this, or that person, family, or people shall be, and so unto what civil Superiour they belong. This is very ap­parent. A Common-wealths Society is made by some act, constitution, or law, which ordinarily is humane, or transacted by men according to that of Augustine, August. de libe­ro Arbitr. lib. 1. cap. 6. Ex hominibus una lege societatis populus [Page 172] constat: there must be men before there can be a family; the being of families is before that of a Common-wealth, the Common-wealth is before the Magistrate; and a distinction of Common-wealths before a plurality of Supreme Magistrates. There must be the matter before the forme, the constituting parts before the constitution, the esse absolutum before the esse relativum of these respective societies, and correlatives; and therefore a natural freedom, or original unengagedness of men in actu exercito. Which yet we must not so understand, as if now every single person still were born free, and so remaineth untill he by his personal act contract an engagement; for in the erection of communities, and Governments in them, the Master of the family, having the rule thereof, representeth all the persons of his house; and the persons then actually incor­porate involve their posterity; so that only they in this respect are free who are not by the act either of themselves, or of their progenitors, or other re­presenters compacted in society with others. They that think it irrational that the Father should re­present & involve the family, must resolve us how the Religious and civill covenants of Israel, and Judah made in Moses, Josuahs, Davids, Asas, Joashes, Hezekiahs, Josiahs, and Nehemiahs dayes did com­prehend, and bind as well the absent as the pre­sent, and their posterity born, and yet unborn; as also how the lawes, and contracts continually passed by some do take in others not personally consenting.

2. Sith the partition of Common-wealths is ac­knowledged by the Objectors as well as by us, and both must say it is not determined, or brought to the actus exercitus by nature, it behoves not us, nor toucheth our assertion that this query be cleared, more then it doth them, and theirs: and possibly if they will resolve this their own Question, we shall accord with them in the Answer. And to make it somewhat more explicate, if they would please t [...] resolve us, how any one Common-wealth hat [...] [Page 173] been (without immediatly divine direction, as was that of Israel) constitute, or raised out of a multi­tude of collateral families destitute of one natural Father, common to them all (as doubtless most, or all that are, or ever were have been) we might (I think) easily agree, how the distribution of mankind into many civil States hath come) and if I must here spend mine opinion it is brought to passe, or effected,

1. Not by Consanguinity, or tye of bloud, for this is in some degree extensive to all mankinde: and for a confinement of it within any certain degrees whereby to make a division of Common-wealths,

1. There is no direction from Nature or Scri­pture, either that any such confinement shall make out the bounds of a Common-wealth, or what such degrees are.

2. There is no ordinary means left, or possibi­lity of knowing what persons (of any number neer to that of a Common-wealth) are within such de­grees, and what without.

3. It is contingent to a Common-wealth (and rarely if ever known) to consist of one distinct kin­dred, or stock: and it is contingent to such a kin­dred to be comprised within one Common-wealth: collateral linages being ordinarily, either dissociated into severall republiques, or but intermixed with, and parcels of one.

2. Not by Cohabitation; for though that be con­venient to be amongst them that are one Common-wealth: yet,

1. It is not alwayes so, one part of a Common-wealth sometimes lying from another beyond the Seas, or beyond another, or divers other Nations, yea some imes one part in Europe, another in East-In­dia or America.

2. How far that cohabitation must go, or to what compasse to be the boundaries of a Common-wealth inclusively, and extensively, is not by any generall rule, much lesse by any dictate of nature [Page 174] defined, or otherwise determined then by humane choice; and so it is not uniformely, or by one con­stant proportion, but variously, and unequally; every Common-wealth being of a different la­titude of place from others; and one, and the same Republique often varying from it self by vicissitudinary contraction, and extension.

3. Naturalization, or Denisonship is not tyed to habitation, but ordinarily, some that live among are not of, and some that are of live not among this, or that Nation, or State.

3. Not by mens appertaining, or subjection to one Soveraign, or Civil head. For

1. A Common-wealth being ens aggregatum, and the term unto which a Magistrate is immediately referred being not a multitude of persons in their individual, or single beings, but as aggregate, and formed into one body politique, the Magistrate cannot be, either in nature, or time, before the aggregation, or the republique union, and relation of the people one to another as one State, and therefore cannot be the procreant, or efficient cause thereof.

2. The same person we know may be the Civil head or Soveraign Lord of divers poli­tique bodies, they under him still remaining divers.

4. It remains therefore to be done (as far as my imagination reacheth) only by con­sent; and this consent to be the consent of all that are interessed in the association, viz. of the parties themselves to be incorporate, and of those whether superiors, or people they are dissociated, or severed from.

It is most congruous to say the distinction of politique societies, or distributing one into ma­ny cometh by the same means, or hath the same efficient, which the first contract, or entring into politique society hath: but that is the vo­luntary [Page 175] accord of the associated: as not only the learned agreeBoterus de Origin. urbium lib. 1. cap. 1. Bodin de Repub. lib. 1. cap. 6. Althusius polit. cap. 4. pag. 24. Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 6. Sect. 4. Dithmars Polit. lib. 1. pag. 20., but plain reason dictates. It is a common principle, which not only Scripture, and humane Authors tell, but our own experience sug­gests to us, That man is a sociable creature, fitted for, and affected to mutual converse, and is by his natural instinct, and bent led to seek acquaintance, cohabitation, and communion with his kinde. To this we may add his necessity in mans vitiated state, of distribu­tive Justice, and defence against occurrent injuriesDum enim haec amittere timent, tenent in his utendis quendum mo­dam aptum, vinculo civitatis, qualis ex hujusmodi hominibus constitui potest. August. de liber. Arbitr. lib. 1. cap. 15.. By these two inducements men were betimes, and still are moved to close toge­ther in large, and populous socie­ties; and then to erect Govern­ment for the upholding of them in union, order, equity and safety; And beginning first with the aggregation of one politique body, when that, by multiplication of mankind, was grown over numerous, and unwieldy to its self and its superiors, if no distemper could have arisen to have made a violent breach; no such immediate, and miraculous hand of God should have interposed as was that of the confusion of tongues; yet meer populousness, and distance of ha­bitation thence ensuing would have perswaded to a partition into more Common-wealths.

It is very probable that the division of the earth made in the dayes of Peleg Gen. 10.25. was a distribution, and alotment thereof unto several Nations, and King­doms, into which mankinde were then severed; and that the first partition of Common-wealths (at least after the floud) was then made: and that it was occasioned by the confusion of Languages at Babel: for immediately before that it is said, the people were one. Occasioned (I say) for that occasion did but prepare men for that reduction into divers communities, in that it did dissolve their union, and [Page 176] parcel, and disperse them abroad upon the face of the earth, by making them uncapable of conversing together (and some of the Hebrew Doctors say, it did set them at oddes and embroyled them in fight, and bloud-shed:Vide Cart­wright. in Gen. 11.7.) but it did not mould, of incorporate the several parties so divided asunded into several communities; no, that was the effect of some other cause, and what should that be but the joynt will and conspiration of the severally languaged, and severed parties each among and for themselves immediately acted? and therefore we read both of the sons of Japhet, and of all the sons of Noah, that they were divided by families, tongues, and lands into distinct nationsGen. 10.5, 31, 32..

But though that were the occasion of the division then made, yet many after divisions in every age (almost) there have been of nations into new Com­mon-wealths; as also unitings of more Republi­ques into one: of which divisions though confusi­on, and discord, not of tongues, but of minds (even as a modern Author would have that at Babel to have been no moreTho Anglus. Instit. peripat. Append. cap. 19. Sect. 5, 6.) hath been as oft as any other thing the occasion, yet such discord could be but the introduction unto, not the former, or founder of new Common-wealths; the associating of them could only be accomplished by the will, and consent of the incorporated.

As for the distinction of property in Lands and other possibles which must needs accompany this partition of Common-wealths when the first divi­sions after the flood, or any since were made, where­by the prrties distributed, left unto those they parted from the Countrey wherein they were, and entred into void regions, there could be no entrench­ment upon the common right of mankinde by such entry; there being a sufficient consent given to it by all others, in that the places were left, and exposed empty in regard both of occupation, and claim. The first property whether National, or personal unto Land or goods accruing, if not by an Expresse de­clared consent, and agreement of the first multitude [Page 177] in whom a common-right promiscuously, or indis­criminately resided, yet doubless by their reall ac­cord, signified by their act of cession, permission, or giving way unto the seisure and enjoyment of the first occupant.Vide Grotium de Jure Belli. lib. 2. cap. 2. Sect. 3.

2. This doubt being passed, the next is, Common-wealths being distinguished, how come these, each to set up their Supreme Rulers? In this matter, 1. It is Objected, That either it must be done by a universal con­sent, even to a man nemine contradicente,The same Au­thor and Book, pag. 9. and this is impossible to be; or the major part must conclude the rest: and against this they say, The major part bindes not the whole, unless either men first agree to be so bound, or a higher power so commands.

Unto this I answer, It may be supposed that each community at their first coalition, either judge them­selves bound by the law of nature (which is a supe­riours command) to stand to the vote of the major part, or are so wise as either to constitute that, or some other way of bringing their matters of pub­lique interest unto a result obligatory to the whole. Common reason will guide them to the one at least of these, or rather to both, for if it dictate the for­mer, it must be presumed to bring on the latter, viz. either by tacite, or expresse consent. The dictate of right reason, in materia morali, I suppose must be yielded to be the appointment of nature. But that the major part doth conclude the whole in those af­fairs the determination of which doth necessarily concern the whole, untill su [...] time as they have setled the determination of such affaires to be by other persons, or means, seems to be the plain dictate of right reason. For in this case, the very end of a multitudes associating, and becoming one Common-wealth, and the being, and interest of them as such is concerned that so it be.

1. From a peoples becoming one society, there doth result in them a faculty, and interest to act some things politically: all being is in order to action, and every actus primus is for an actus secun­dus; and a Political being is for Political operation; [Page 178] and although such a body may put off its affairs to be acted not perse totum, immediately, but vicari­ously by particular organs, or members, yet some acts it must needs put forth immediately, viz. such as conduce to the organizing of it self, and such also as are necessary to its own preservation, and cannot be, or are not transected by others; as suppose a common engine, or other calamity be seising on a people destitute of, or neglected by particular subsi­diaries.

2. In those matters that are to be acted imme­diately by the whole community, there must be some way for them to come to a resolution and conclusion about [...]hem. If the concurrence of the whole multi­tude (very numerous and vast) to a single person be not at all, or not ordinarily possible, or likely, then cannot that he the way of determination: and if not that, then some other there must be: and what more obvious, natural, and congruous to reason then this, that the lesser part be swayed, and obliged by the greater?

3. Yea what other expedient can common sense suggest but this? When a thing is proposed to the determination of a multitude which requires a conclusion by them either positive or negative, and there is foreseen likely, or found to be a diversity of sense, and vote among them,

1. In case the major part consent, and the minor deny the thing, either the major part must carry it for the whole, or the negative of the minor by their dissent carries it against the major; which is against all Reason.

2. And if the major be for the negative, and the minor for the affirmative, either the minor must be overruled by the negative of the major, or standing to their affirmative they must secede, and be severed into another Common wealth: for to the nature of a community it is required that there be communio juris: and this secession, as it is unreaso­nable to be made by a lesser party without the others consent, so it, and the occasion of it admit­ted [Page 179] tends to the making void, and ruining of so­cieties.

This course then, of the minor parts obliging the whole, appearing so necessary to the acting, and to the subsistence of a community, why may we not conclude it in the cases, and matter above specified to be the dictate of natureVide Groti­um lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 17.?

2. If the major part be allowed to conclude the whole; it is next asked,Idem pag. 10. How shall the whole people be assembled? Here are two difficulties;

1. Where all are equally interested, and authori­zed what one or more, lesse then the whole hath power to appoint time, or place, or give summons to the rest; without which appointment it is unjust to binde the absent?

R. It is to be presumed this scruple is practically precluded, by the peoples proceeding when they agree to become one people; for, who can imagine but that then they have the end, and immediate necessa­ry acts, for which they joyne to be a community, before them, and in order to them, either they forth­with make choise of the Government they shall be under, and provide for a succession in it, and the means by which it shall be continued; or if that be not at the first instant dispatched, they appoint how they shall come together, or p [...]sse their resolutions on that, or the like publique occasion. We see there is a course to be taken for such assemblies in the polarchies that now are, as in the united Provinces of the Netherlands, in Venice, Genoa, and the rest. Yea the many distinct Republiques of Germany con­federate in one general interest, and band as one great community have their order how to assem­ble, and hold their publique diets; as likewise have the thirteen united Common-wealths of the Switzers; who upon any occasion of universal con­cernment have referred it to the Burgomasters of Zurich to give notice to all the Cantons to meet at Baden. And in the ancient State of Rome, the Consuls summoned the Senate, the Senate the As­sembly of the Centuries; and the Tribunes the [Page 180] Assembly of the Tribes. 2. But suppose this un­certainty setled, and a diet orderly called, with time, and place appointed; another difficulty there is, which may be subdivided into two;

Idem ibid.1. All cannot be present, one is sick, another is lame, a third is aged, a fourth under age: besides many are women, some are Virgins, all these are of the people, and how shall the consent of them be passed, or in­cluded?

R. 1. These natural or personal defects are common to all mankind, and apt to incapacitate persons as much, or more for other humane affaires as for this, which yet are not therefore argued into a fr [...]stration. This occasion of a peoples agreement about politique Government but rarely occurreth, but when a Government is setled, whether by our, or by the Objectors means, the dayly management of it is much more obnoxious to these impediments in the person, or persons in whom it is seated; and when one of them seiseth on such a subject, it is prone to make a greater interruption in publique concernments then all of them are wont to do in this, yet are Salvos in those cases ordinarily found out.

2. We have already seen that some acts at some time must needs be admitted to flow from a poli­tique body immediately; now this objection doth not more lie against this of their agreement of Government then against any other. I say therefore a civill society having in it persons lying under all those occasions of absence, or non acting, and add to them one more, viz. that some list not to come, 'tis not thereby rendred actionlesse to this, or other purposes. But how are the exceptions re­moved?

3. Thus.

1. They that are absent are either incapable of giving a consent to any thing that concernes them, as are infants, and such as want the use of reason, or they are capable.

[Page 181]2. Of these latter, some are not personally in­terested in passing, or giving a vote in matters po­litical, but are involved (as to these) in their Husbands, Parents, Masters, or Guardians; o­thers have an interest personally to concurre in them.

3. Of these some may be necessarily absent, as the sick, lame, decrepit, others are away volun arily.

1. For the necessarily absent. This is the case ordinarily, but of a few single persons in a great body, upon whom nature it self laying a present impediment, must needs be taken to lay a present suspense upon their interest of personal presence, and consent in the publique business, and rather to will the divolving of it upon the other that can meet, then that they, and the whole community should be suspended from attaining, or effecting the dispatch of their publique necessary affaires. As they to whom nature denies the use of reason, so they from she withholds the opportunity of bringing it to po­litical exercise for want of bodily integrity may be comprehended by her in the actings of others in those things that appertain to the whole community they are of.

2. For the voluntarily absent, if some, yea ma­ny that may and should concur will not come, this must not prevent the whole, or the priviledge of others; but rather by their default they put off their right as to the present act, and invest it in the restVide Grot. de Jure lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 20.. We account (and justly) that a countrey-meeting a [...] which we choose our Parliament men, to which the people therein are called, though the twentieth part of them that are called do not ap­pear.

2. Suppose all present, or the absence of those that are not, dispensed with, how can mary thou­s nds, or some millions of peopl [...], so m [...]et in one place as to communicate their minds to one another, and joyntly deliberate, and come to a resolution in any thing?

R. 1. Common-wealths are usually very small at their beginning, which is the time of setling their Government for succession.

2. When they are come to growth they have another way of acting besides personal presence, and cog­nisance, viz. that of meeting, and transacting their concernments in, and by their Deputies, or re­presentees.

3. As it is not very convenient, so it is not alto­gether impossible for the collective body (I mean those who make a collective assembly, to wit, grown men, and Masters of families, and especially so many of them as are disposed to come) to meet, and treat in an assembly. We have divers instances for it in the nation of Israel, and among the rest, one that was upon occasion of the Levites Concu­bine, mentioned in the history of the book of Judges Cap. 20, & 21. for the numerousness of, and uni­versal accurrence to which assembly, let the Text be observed, Cap. 20. v. 1, 2, 12. Cap. 21. v. 5, 8. And the people of Rome, when come to a very large, and populous Common-wealth, had their meetings of this nature often in campo Martio.

4. And besides the Roman state found out wayes of accommodating the difficulties of so vest an assem­blies treating in one, by distributing themselves one way into distinct classes, and centuries; another way into several tribes, and giving their votes in those di­stinct partitionsVide Tullium de legibus lib. 3. prope finem..

3. Object. It's said, In case of a Common-wealths want of a supreme Magistracy, Idem qui supra, pag. 11, 12. as when a King dies with­out heir, the power shall not escheat to the whole people, but to the supreme heads, and fathers of families, not as they are the people, but quatenus they are Fathers of peo­ple, over whom they have a Supreme power divolved unto them after the death of their Soveraign Ancestor; and if any have a right to choose a King it must be these Fathers by conferring their distinct Fatherly powers upon one man alone. Resp. It is well he acknowledgeth thus much, and we are so far agreed, that in case of a Kingdoms destituteness of a head there is an escheature of the [Page 183] power to some, and that it is to the heads, and Fa­thers of families, so as the right is in them to choose a King: only then upon this he thinks good to cast a thin shadow, or mist to make it seem, as if this were not the same with our tenent, & as it were to suborne another different way of introducing of Magistracy, which in truth hath no reality in it, but what is borrowed from, and built upon that our positi­on. But

1. What means he by that Epithet Supreme, added to the heads, and fathers of families, as if he meant that all heads, and families are not interested in that Escheature, and election, but some only, di­stinguish by that title: And if this be his sense, I leave him to clear first how he differenceth those he cals Supreme from other heads, and Fathers.

2. Why he makes such a distinction, and li­mits the said power to some only of the Fathers under that notion of Supreme.

2. When he saith, The power escheates to the heads, and fathers of families. I ask, what power? the power which was before in the King, viz. a politi­call, Supreme, Regall power? and how escheates, or descends it upon them, unitedly, or conjunctly, as copartners, and joint heirs of that whole, solid power in relation to the Community, or body po­litick? This indeed is the power of which the Que­stion is, and which wants a lineal heir, or subject to bear it, upon the supposed death of the King: And if that descend upon them, it must either be in that manner specified, or else so as each person of them is the adequate possessor of the whole, and solid power, which I suppose will not be said: If that then be his meaning, lo here a Democracy yielded, and set up by him who elsewhere holds there is no ground for any such or any other po­larchical forme of Government, and that Monar­chy is the only warranted form. Or,In his observati­ons on Aristo­tles Polit. doth be mean a private, Domestical, paternall power of each of those heads, and Fathers, not over the Common-wealth, [Page 184] but over their families severally, and respe­ctively? But for this,

1. This is not the power which was in the King, and now by his decease without Lineal heir can be said to Escheat, or passe from him to any.

2. This cannot be said to come anew to them then, but must be acknowledged to have been in them whilest they had their King, to remain in them after they have chosen another in his place.

3 Where's he seems as if he would explain how there comes in this sense a supremeness into those persons, viz. They have a Supreme Power divol­ved unto them after the death of their Soveraign. Still it remains that he tell us what was above asked, viz. what that power is, whether Political, or Oeco­nomical, and how the power of either of those sorts can accrue De novo to them by such death. Indeed that domestical power which was in each of them before in relation to his particular, and private fa­mily they being left destitute of a Superior, or Political head, hath another habitude then it had before, being become negatively Supreme, that is, it hath none actually above it, but it is the same power still; or, if we shall say the power of the Pater familias in this vacancy may be put forth unto some acts in relation to the persons in his house, which he might not exercise while the Common-wealth had a Magistrate, I shall not dispute that, but only say, though the Oeconomi­call power be somewhat larger, in actu exercito, when unsubordinate to a Political Soveraign then it is being subordinate, yet it is within the compasse of Oeconomical still, and the same it was in actu sig­nato. And that which he cals a Power divolved upon the head of the family by the Soveraigns death, is but the drawing forth into act of that which was in him before, but was suspended by the politicall relation, and subjection. That which then can be said to Escheat to the heads of families by such [Page 185] death of their King is a power to dispose of them­selves in subjection to another, and of their votes for the election of him to be their Soveraign toge­ther (if you will, with a larger compass for the ex­ercise of their paternal power in their families) during their want of Magistracy.

3. Whereas he saith, This power accrues to the heads and fathers of families not as they are the people, but quatenus, they are Fathers of people.

1. They are not Fathers, neither is any one of them a Father of a people, that is a Common-wealth, or body politique, but they are Fathers only of their respective families, and of the persons therein respectively; what power therefore is in them as in that relation can be but Domestical, and that which is in every Father.

2. What if those persons where no Fathers, but were single, and unsociate as to such a relation, that is, what if they were not over any other, or if they had no families, or children sprung from, or belonging to them, would not then the said power in the said case Eschear, or belong to them? If he say no, I demand his reason: if he say it would, then he must say it doth not Escheate to them as they are Fathers of peo­ple, but as persons and people of that Common-wealth.

3. Men that are Fathers of families cannot as such be in a capacity of choosing a King over them, they must besides that relation be moreover united, and confederate in one Common-wealth, or else they cannot put forth that act of election. Persons that are either non cives, or extraneae civitatis, have nothing to do in it. Whereby it is very ma­nifest the reason why men have that power of Election of a Magistracy to this, or that Common-wealth is not because they are Fathers, but because they are Denisons, or freemen of that Common-wealth, and not comprehended or represented by any Domestical Superior, but immediately concer­ned [Page 186] to act for themselves in the common interests of the people of that Common-wealth.

4. Where he saith, The Power shall not escheat to the whole people, but to the Supreme heads, and Fathers of families.

I say, in that it escheats, to them (who are every one a part in his own family the Supreme head, or Father, that is, having none in this case above him in the Civil State) and to such as, being without Domestical head, are capable of heading a family, whom I think he will not exclude, it escheates to the whole people; for who are the whole people to this effect, but they that are Masters of families with them who are Masters of themselves? As was before shewed in answer to the second Objecti­on, and the latter branch of it: and they choosing, the whole people choose their Soveraign, they be­ing all the people, either personally, or represen­tatively.

5. In that he sayes, These Fathers choose a King by conferring their distinct, fatherly power upon one;

This is quite mistaken, for

1. They do not put off, or part with their Fa­therly powers, but retain each their own still, when they have chosen their King.

2. The power which upon their election passeth into the hands of the Elected King, is more then all their Fatherly powers laid together, that is, a Supreme, Political, Civil, or Common-wealth power; which is a power of a higher Sphere, and differs not only in measure, but toto genere, or in kinde from that of the Fathers, and unto which the pater­nall still continuing in the Masters of families is subordinate.

6. Lastly, As this Author cannot exempt these his words (if they must bear any sound sense) from a confession of that which he contends against, both in this Treatise against Mr. Hunton, (and in his other of Observations upon Aristotles Poli­ticks) viz. the rise of Government from the [Page 187] peoples consent; so can he not excuse himself think) from down right self-contradiction in some other particulars. As

1. How will his arguing against the peoples capacity to choose their Soveraign by this Argu­ment, That no man hath power to take away his own life, and therefore the people cannot confer this power upon another, consist with the right of the Fathers of families to choose their King, whereas the power to take away their lives is a part of the power to which they choose him?

2. How will this Escheature of the power to the heads of families, and their right thereby to choose their King, stand with what he saith presently after? viz. That all Kings are either Fathers of the people, or heirs of such Fathers or usurpers of the right of such Fathers: And that, when the true heir of a crown is dispossessed by a usurper, the subjects obedience of the Fatherly power must go along, and wait upon Gods Providence who only hath right to give, and take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt subjects to the obedience of another fatherly power. For if the power (in defect of a right heir) escheat to the Fathers of families, then it passeth not to an usurper; and if those have a right to choose their King, he that is chosen by them hath the right to be their King, and not the Usurper; neither can the subjects be adopted to the obedience of another fatherly power supposed to be in him; neither is he that is chosen upon the fail of an ancient Royal line, or stock truly reducible to any of these three sorts, viz. Either a Father of the people, or an heir of such a Father, or an Ʋsurper of the right of such a Fa­ther.

4. Object. The last objection I shall hold up, being the remainder of what I meet with is, But this way of setling Government by the peoples con­sent cannot be proved ever to have been held, or practised. All powers that have reigned, have [Page 188] entred by the sword, or rule by virtue of such en­trance.

Resp. This is a very broad allegation, and the prejudice therein c [...]st upon all powers seems to proceed from partiality to s [...]me. But

1. The way of subjects election of their Go­vernment to have been practised and that antient­ly, or from the first, I have above brought testimo­nies unto from Authors of the best note, to wit, Aristotle, Cicero, Justin, Juvenal, Ludovicus Vives, Polydore Virgil, and Mr. Calvin Viz in this Sect. Subsect. 4.. To these I shall only here add the witness of one of our English Historians, giving a threefold instance of the subjects choice of their Soveraign, to wit, of three Kings. One of the antient British, another of the Saxon, another of the Norman race.

Mr. Speed Speed Hystory, Book 5. Chap. 6. Sect. 2. Book 6. Chap. 2. Sect. 6. Book 8. Chap. 6. Sect. 1. Book 9. Chap. 2. Sect. 54. Chap. 3. Sect. 1, 2. tels us that when Julius Caesar first en­terprised the conqu [...]st of this land, among the many Reguli, or petty Kings that then ruled in the several parts thereof Cassibilan was by a universal vote chosen the Chieftain and supreme. That upon the death of Hardicanute the third Danish King, Edward the Confessor, was by a general consent elected King. And that William the Conquerour appointing no heir at his death, his son William Rufus was by the consent and voices of the States made King.

2. When learned Authors tell us of fundamen­tall laws, and constitutions of nations; and when the late Parliament so often mentioned [...]nd insisted on the fundamental laws, and the antient fundamen­tal constitution, frame, aad government of this Kingdom, in opposition to an arbitrary, and Ty­rannical government, in their publique votes, de­clarations and remonstrances, particularly in their preamble to the Protestation taken by them, and the whole Kingdom, of May the 3. 1641. and in the Declaration of the House of Commons of April 17. 1616. ordered to be published, set up and fix [...]d in every Parish Chu [...]ch, what other thing do they mean thereby but this, to wit, the o [...]igi [...]al establish­ment [Page 189] of policy and government by the mutual con­tention,CHAP. V. SECT. V. Subsect. 6. capitulation, and agreement of Governours and people. Aristotle Aristotelis Po­lit. lib. 3. num. 87. lib. 5. num. 112. often in his Politicks delivers it as the difference betwixt a King, and a Tyrant, a Kingdom, and a Tyranny; that the one is founded upon the will of the Subj [...]cts, the other is against their wils, and held over them by force. Mr. Gre­gory of C. C. observes upon those words, Act. 11.26. And the Disciples were called Christians first at Anti­och; that the word [...], were called, is bor­rowed from a Roman custom, viz. when the Pro­vinces submitted themselves to the imperial Go­vernment, the use was to cause a [...], or pub­lique edict to be drawn up, and proclaimed upon the place. And particularly there was such an one at Antioch, when the City yeelded up it self into the subjection of the Roman Empire, in the time of Julius Cesar: In memory whereof that City fixed their aera or reckoning of time upon the date of that action; which they therefore called [...], because the Emperour did then [...], publiquely entitle them to all the priviledges, immunities, &c. Here is a famous instance which the said Author brings out of Johannes Antiochenus, of the mutual agreement, and close betwixt Prince and People, at the first entrance into that relation.

And I would aske further how it could be otherwayes, then by mutuall consent, that Govern­ment was erected in the several Nations at the confusion of languages; when the several parties were in an instant rent asunder from that one community they were of, and from under that one head which perhaps had been untill then over them, and left to themselves to associate each party into a distinct community, and under a new Government as they were seve­rally languaged: there being no reason, or ground to conclude that to each of them there was still appropriate one natural Grandsire, and that he was by natural right to be the Soveraign, or that [Page 190] in defect thereof there was one eldest house,CHAP. V. SECT. IV. Subsect. 6. and one Parent thereof that was entitled to the regiment of all the other collateral, and younger branches of the same stock. The which supposals have been above refuted? And again, how can it be other­wise at the plantation of a new Colonie, at the ex­tinction of a Royall race, or at the Cession of Kings or States, that is, when a people are deserted of their former Supreme Governors? as the Britains of this Island sometime were by the Roman State, to wit, then when their prefect Aetius withdrew himself, and his legions from this Countrey, upon the decay of the Roman greatness, and exposed the rule of it unto who so might get itSee Speeds History Book 7. Chap. 1. Sect. 1, 2, 3.. And thus it was (some authors tell us) at the translation of the Ro­man Empire to GermanyWiddringtons Theolog. Disput. in Admon. to his Reader Sect. 4..

3. The Governments that either now are, or heretofore have been,

1. Many of them are known to have been established by the peoples consent, as was even now shewed.

2. Of many of them the original, first rise, or bottom, like the head of Nilus, is not known. Of these because nothing to the contrary appears, we have no just reason to think but they stand upon this basis: In all matters of tenure immemorial pos­sesion inculpably held, leads men to take the begin­ning to have been right.

3. Many are known to have a violent, and un­just beginning: Of these,

1. Some, though the entrance of them was such, yet they have after, come to be setled upon a better foundation. Thus it was (saith Fr. Junius Junius Ani­madv, in Bellar­minum Con­trov. 3. lib. 5. cap. 8. Sect. 18. & ca 9. Sect. 20. Mr. Perkins To. 1. Tract. of Cal­lings, pa. 762. A.) in the Empire of Charles the first, as also in that of Julius Caesar, Ex post facto jus invaluit, cujus non ita fuerunt principia justa. Accordingly saith Mr. Perkins, A Prince enters into a Kingdom by war and bloudshed. Now by the bad entrance be is no lawful King—Yet if the people do willingly sub­mit themselves to this usurper, and be content to yield subjection, and the King likewise to rule them by good [Page 191] and wholesome laws, CHAP. V. SECT. V. he is now become a Lawful Prince, though his entrance was but Tyrannical. And to the same sense, Chamier, Chamier To. 2. lib. 15. cap. 16. Sect. 9. Grotius, Grotius de Jure B. lib. 2. cap. 4. Sect. 14. Arnisaeus de Authoritate principis cap. 4. Sect. 14. and Arni­seus speak.

2. Some as they come into power by meer force, and intrusion, so by it they still continue. But the number of these is not great, much lesse so great, as to give violent occupation of Do­minion the plea of a universall practise and cu­stome.

Subsection 1. Argument 1. Taken from the nature of existence.

THe being, or existence of a thing is eductio rei extra causas, the putting, or extraction of a thing out of its causes. Its causes, that is, those proper causes, that have a power or faculty to produce that thing. If then actuall possession, or prepo­tency do necessarily carry with it the productive act, or acts of those causes which are qualified to pro­duce the power in the Text, and that it can be said where ever there is a holding of actuall Rule, or a [Page 219] mastering sword over a people, there must needs be the concurrence of those causes which constitute, or create a civil Magistrate, then is it true, that actual prevalency makes, or argues the said power to be in being. But I ask what cause, or efficient of the civil power doth actuall regency necessarily, and individually import, or put into act? a man might be in that condition of actual prepotency if God had never ordained Magistracy to be, or though, having ordained Magistracy to be, yet, he should not have given this man any commission to be the Magistrate, yea though he should ex­pressely have given out a prohibition that he should not be a Magistrate, and though the people over whom he bears sway, and all the world besides, (only himself, and his strong hand by which he car­ries it excepted) were utterly, and professedly dissen­ting, and opposite to it.

That its evident that actual rule may be where there is no concurrence of the causes interested, and capable to produce a civil power, I shall need further to alledge no other medium, but the nature, or definition of Usurpation (as the word hath re­ference to civil policy.) What is usurpation, but the assumption, and use of the preheminencies, and acts peculiar to the office of the Magistrate with­out a lawfull call, title, or admission to that office; which lawfull calling, entitling, or admission to that office is the proper act, or acts of those agents who are competent to conferre this office? If then this be the nature of usurpation, and there be, or can be such a thing as usurpation in the world, there may be actuall rule without the con­course of the causes whose place, and faculty it is to convey the civil power; and consequently it is not actuall rule which doth put the civil power in being, or inferre its existence.

CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. Subsection 2. Argument 2. From the absurdity of ad­mitting Satans, and the Popes usurped powers upon the ground of actual rule.

2. THe command, and rule of some over the Kingdomes of the world actually challenged, and possessed by them will (I doubt not) be dis­claimed by the very authors, and urgers of this large exposition of the being of the power, and not ad­mittab [...]e into this Text; and if so, then they must confesse meer prevalency, or actuall sway doth not give being to, or hold forth that power of which the Text speaks. The antecedent is proved by a double instance, one of Satan, the other of the Pope.

1. Satan we finde claiming to himself the pos­session, and disposall of the power, and glory of all the Kingdomes of the world, [Luke 4.6.] and for the reality of his possession, or actuall pre­dominancy, when he made this challenge, yea, and ever since, certainly it was, and is true, if not of all, yet of many of this worlds Kingdomes: for which reason he is stiled, the God of this world, and prin­cipalities, powers, the rulers of the darknesse of this world, the Prince of the power of the aire. Now if he, or any from him should by vertue of this pos­session, and the authority of this Text so extended, demand the civil subjection of any Kingdome, or person, what should be said to this demand? If you say, though he have possession, yet he hath no right, that is to abandon meer possession from being that which makes or proves one to be the [Page 221] power, and to yield me the question. If you say, being not a humane person, he is not meant in this T [...]xt, this puts a limitation on the words beyond the bare being of one in possession of rule; and I shall require to have proved how a restriction in re­gard of person is more imposeable on the words, then a restriction in regard of title or right.

2. The Pope of Rome, and his Doctors, (both Divines, and Canonists) in his behalf lay claim to a temporall power, direct, or indirect, over all the Nations, and Potentates in the world, (as some of them) over all Christian Kings, and people, (as others say:) and as he claims, so it must not be denyed but he hath generally, over Christendome, possessed and exercised this power, and doth still in many of the European Territories, and elsewhere: and one reason alledged for this his claim is this of possession, continued possession: He prescribes, and challenges to be the powe [...], because he hath obtained, and held it. The Jesuite Parsons urgeth for the Popes temporall power against King James (as appears in his Apology)K. James his Epistle to all Christian Mo­narchs, &c. pag 32. this reason. And it is observable, that at this time, now the argument from actuall predominancy is so much in request, the Papists get hold of, and presse it against us, in this very point of the Popes Supremacy, as ap­pears by Dr. Hammonds reply to the Catholique Gentlemans Answer Dr. Hammond his Reply, &c. cap. 4. pag. 45.. Now if meer actuall pre­validity make, or inferre one to be a civil power, authorized by this Text, my demand is, how shall we avoid the argument, and reject this pretension of the Pope? Either we must suffer these words, the powers that be, to be more confineable then to signifie only a bare act of rule, and sway, or else I am fully confident we shall be to seek for our de­fence against this allegation.

1. If any think to escape it by saying the Pope claims a power unlawfull in it self, or for matter; or what is unlawfull for any man to have. The reply will be ready: whatever be the exorbitant ex ensions, or presumptions of his Ecclesiasticall [Page 222] power, that temporall power which he standeth for is another distinct thing from it (as appears by those Popish Doctors who assert the one, and deny the otherAs Barclay, Widdrington, and others.) and is not in it self unlawfull, it be­ing the same for substance which the Roman Empe­rour held before him, and the German now holdeth within his present precincts in reference to the free Princes and States of that Territory: in which respect the Pope is supposed to be the second Beast, which succeedeth, reviveth, and exerciseth the room, and power of the firstMr. Medes Diatrib. To. 4. pag. 450, 451., [Revel. 13.] and if in any thing he assumeth an excessive power in temporalls, or which is not for matter allowable, this exception would seclude him from so much of his claim only as were in respect of humane com­petency unwarrantable, and leave him the rest. For that a Paramont dominion, or an Imperiall power over a multitude of distinct Common wealths and Soveraign Princes is lawfull in it self, I take to be an uncontroulable truth.

2. If it be further said, the Pope is a person uncapable of civil power; or of being a temporal Lord, as being an Ecclesiasticall person or Clergy­man. To let passe the question of an Ecclesiasticall persons capacity of civil Magistracy; and the urging that many now (and perhaps most of those that are against me in this controversie) deny the distinction of Clergy, and Laity in that very sense wherein this objection intends it. It will suffice to reply against this evasion,

1. That it is not simply necessary to a persons investiture with the Popedome that he be (as they speak) a Priest. One may be chosen and made Pope that is not with them entred into the order of Priesthood. John the 20. (or, according to some the 21.) was of a L [...]y-man chosen PopeChamier, To. 2. l. 16. cap. 16. Sect. 13. Platina in vit. Johan. 21. p. 165. Spondanus ad An Dom. 1024.. Be­nedict the 9. is said to have been chosen Pope at ten years of age, and it is confessed by their own Authors he was no PriestSpondanus ad An. 1033. Onulphrius, An. 1032. Dr. Featly, Ro­ma ruene, p. 18.. I read also of Ama­deus Duke of Savoy, that he was elected Pope by the Councell of Basill when he was but a Lay-man, [Page 223] and that after his election (some distance of time) he received their ordinationFor his ele­ction Platina in vita Eugenii 4. p. 310. Onuph. An. 1439. For his unor­dainednesse see Fox, Acts &c. To. 1. pag. 903. Rosses Hist. l. 4. c. 4. pag. 350, 351.: And though it be true that it's said before his Coronation he took the order, yet that alters not the case as to the reply, their Doctors teaching that a Pope is made, and hath all the rites of his Popedome by his election, and before his inaugurationTolet. de in­struct. Sacerdo­tis, lib. 1. c. 40. Sect. 3. p. 185.. Those Popes there­fore that were chosen Laicks had for that time be­fore their Priesthood none of this objection, lying against their competency for a temporall domi­nion.

2. But suppose he could not be Pope with them that had not their Priesthood, yet they that held it a just exception against a persons capacity of bearing civil Magistracy, that he is a Minister of the Gospel, upon that of our Saviour [Luk. 22 26.] will not (I suppose) acknowledge the Pope by vertue of his Priesthood, or any other means to be a Mini­ster of the Gospel.

3. It is commonly acknowledged by our Pro­testant writers (as far as I understand) that the Pope in the proper Territories belonging to his Signiory, as Romania, and the rest in Italy, called the land of the Church (the means of his Instale­ment therein, whether the consent of the Roman people upon the decay of the Exarchate of Ravenna, or the gifts of King Pepin, and of Charles the great his Son, or of the Countesse of Mathilda, or what­ever else is alleadgedVide Ch [...] ­mier, To. 2. lib. 16. cap. 19. Sect. 7. &c., here is no place to search into) is to be owned, and obeyed as other lawfull Princes are in their dominions, upon the supposall that he is the lawfull Potentate thereofSee Par. on Rom. 13.1. pag. 246.. Accor­dingly then they that hold, that person is to be obeyed, and owned as the power in being, and so of God, in any Countrey that hath possession of the Supream power there, they must acknowledge the Pope to be the power in being, (in the Supream temporall Lordship) in all the Dominions where he actually prevaileth to have it.

Suppose any of us now living had been in the time when the Popes temporall power paramon [...] [Page 224] that of the King, was questioned, and upon que­stioning abolished by an act of State, and our con­sent had been required to the said act, or our oath of abrenunciation of him, what should we in con­science have done? On the one hand the right was confessed to be in the King, on the other possession (by a long accustomed usurpation) was in the Pope. If this were the sense of the Text, meer actuall possession makes one to be the power, to wi [...], that power that is of God, ordained of God, we should have been bound in conscience by this Text to have opposed the King, and State in the same act, and sided with the Pope.

To conclude this argument then, either we must refuse this position, actuall domination makes a civill power, or we must allow to the Pope his Temporall supremacy, both unto the reproof, and condemnation of those Protestants who have cast it off; and to the establishing of him in it wherever he yet possesses it, by the disallowing of those that are de facto still under it to put it off; and these are the fruits of this (truly Popish) Do­ctrine. Shall we suppose him still to be the Anti­christ, the man of sin, the Beast, and his City to be the whore of Babylon; and professe so much to be for the ruine of him under these names, and yet make him so large a Grant in the matter, and point which is most for his promoting, and secu­ring?

Subsection 3. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 3. Argument 3. From the custome of heredi­tary Kingdomes accounting the succeeding to be King in the moment of the decease of his predecessor, without actual investure.

3. I Thus argue. If a government by hereditary suc­cession be lawful, and in it the predecessor dy­ing, or otherwise ceasing, the succeeding heire is immediately the power, or the supream Magistrate, without, or before actual possession, acknowledg­ment, or investure by the Estates, or people over whom he is the power; then it is not actual possession which puts the power in being. But a government by hereditary succession is lawful, and in it the Pre­decessor ceasing, the heire is the power in being with­out further act done by him, or passed by the people, or any other. The first of these premisses is evident, and the latter will need little proof. The first part of it, that an hereditary govergment is lawfull, is attested by Scripture, by the generall consent of Na­tions, expressed both by lawes, and practise, by the lawes of this Land, which have not onely setled this government, but made it Treason to affirme the con­trary, and by the votes, and pens (as of other Au­thors, so) of our best Protestant Writers, Divines, and others unanimously asserting it. And for the later, that in hereditary government the successor is the power in being immediately, and without more adoe, upon the ceasing of his Predecessor, is a poynt also generally subscribed unto.See Hooker his Ecclesiast. pol. li. 8. p. 154. Chamier To 2. li. 15. cap. 10 sect. 19. Treat. of Monar­chy, part 1. cap. 3. sect. 7. Stat. of 1 Jac. 1. King James his Remonstrance against Card. Perron, p. 154.

CHAP. VII. SECT. III. Subsect. 4. Subsection 4. Argument 4. From the lawfulnesse and useful­nesse of fundamental Lawes, and provisions for the future continuance of Government by succession, and against encroachers upon the same.

4. IF it be lawful, and necessary (as well as it is the universal practice of Common-wealths) to make and ordain fundamental lawes, constitutions, and provisions about government, for the upholding and continuing of it, and for the transmitting and trans­ferring of it from hand to hand, whether by succes­sion, election, or otherways upon the death, or other change of the present Magistrate, and for the pre­venting, resisting, punishing, and suppressing of the violators thereof, then is it not the meer in being, or actual seising of rule, and command which makes the power. But the aforesaid course is lawful and necessary.

This minor (I suppose) will be uncontested in all the parts of itVide Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 4, sect. 17.. If the latter part, the lawfulnesse of ordaining Laws for the risistance, and prosecution of intruders, and incroachers against fundamental constitutions, be questioned, the generality of this Nation, even every one that hath participated active­ly in the late Wars, (what party soever they have led, or followed) have manifested their consent to it. For the true state of the difference was the intrusions upon the fundamental Laws concerning the interest of government, which each accused other mutually of; which supposed intrusions, and incroachments were in things lawful in themselves, as the power of imposing taxes, disposing of the Militia, and inter­preting lawes, and the like; only the interest therein which on both sides the one assumed, the other deny­ed [Page 227] to belong unto him, or them,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 4. was that which each of the two opposites gave out to be the cause of their debate, and war.

For the consequence of the major that may also easily appear good. For if the actual possessor be the power of God, then it must needs be both unlawful, and a frivolous thing to make such constitutions, and being made to in force, or vindica [...]e them, either by the civil, or martial sword from violation: and, vice ver­sâ, if such Laws be lawful, and necessary, then meer actual possession doth not constitute any one to be the power.

It must (I say) needs be unlawful to make such lawe [...] if the Word of God determine the actual pos­sessor to be the power; for the direct, and proper use, and formal reason of such constitutions is to inhibite all invasion upon the government, or entrance upon it otherwise then according to such constitution, and to disapprove, illegitimate, and condemn it, if it be done; the use then, and nature of such constitutions, is to crosse and thwart that which the Word of God enacteth, and therefore they are in their making un­lawful, and unjust. And it must needs be as frivo­lous, and vain to make them. For let us suppose the fundamental Laws of a Common-wealth to appoint a Prince, or Senate to the Supream power, but for a limited terme, as for a stinted number of dayes, moneths, or years, as the Roman Consuls, the Car­thaginian Kings, and the Theban Boeotarchae wereGreg. Tholos. Syntag. Iuris li. 18. cap. 1. sect. 16, 17.: and at the end of the said terme that Prince, or Senate should declare their will, and resolution to continue still in the power, and should accordingly hold it, notwithstanding such fundamental Law to the con­trary; by this opinion such persons being actually possessed are the power ordained of God; and to what purpose then should such laws be made to confine, or dissolve their power by a prefixed time; & when they are made, of what force, or authority can they be? And if any execution be of such Laws, as if a Senate will, and do sit beyond the time prescribed in the fundamental order, and he, or they that are by it im­powred [Page 228] upon the expiration of the time to dissolve the sitting,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. do undertake to do it, what justifiable­nesse can there be in such an act, seeing they are in possession of Rule, and therefore (according to this opinion) the ordination of God, and therefore to be owned, let to stand, and by no no meanes in or from their power resisted, deposed, or dissolved.

Subsection 5. Argument 5. From the practise of Nations owning them for their Soveraign powers who have not actually ruled.

5. BY the common sentence, and judgement (both of States and Nations, and of Books, and Au­thors of policy) authority, or supream power is se­parable from actual regency, or command. In the generall account they are taken, & acknowledged for the higher powers, who doe not at all exercise any authority, either by themselves, or others, personally, or by proxie. In the case of a P [...]inces deficiency of the use of Reason, as through infancy, madnesse, or dotage, and in case of his want of liberty to exercise government in his Dominion, being dis-inabled by captivity, or expulsion; In such cases, either the standing Lawes of the Kingdome, or the act of the State pro re nata, appoints both the Tutelage of the impotent Prince, if he be with them, and the admi­nistration of his Kingdome, during that his deficien­cy, or restraint unto some others, as Curators, Re­gents, or Protectors in his behalf. Hence they d [...]stin­guish in this case Jus ab usu juris, the right of Magi­stracy from the use of it; and Actum primum ab actu secundo, the first act of power, which is the being of the power, the esse magistratus, from the second, which is the act of Rule.Vide Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 1. cap. 3. sect. 15. & 24. And the case is the same in a disturbed estate, whether it be by intestine com­motion of Subjects against their Soveraign, or by forein, hostile invasion, or by competition of divers [Page 229] titulars to the Throne. In every of these cases the power suspended from exercise, either by an inhe­rent, or an adjacent impediment, is yet in being; and though regnancy, or the second act of Magistracy be interrupted, yet the first act, the relation of So­veraign, and Subjects may ex st, and remain.

For instances of this nature, I shall refer to these few more largely to be found in their respective hi­stories; The people of Israel, who had risen up with, and for Absalom against King David; at the same time when they said, David was fled out of the land, do yet own him for their King, and consult about his reduction from beyond Jordan into the repossession of his Kingdome, as upon that account, or ground: and they that did thus, the Text stiles them, all the people throughout all the t [...]ibes of Israel: and all the men of Israel (it again saith) challenged a part, and right in him, as their King in that condition, yea, ten parts, and more right, in d [...]stinction from the men of Judah; and thereupon they contest with them of Judah that their advice was not first had in b [...]inging backe their King.

During the seventy yeares captivity of Judah un­der the Babylonian, we finde severall persons succes­sively named, and noted as the Princes of Judah: and, which is remarkable, they are put in the pede­gree of Christ, that is drawn down from David: and it is further to be noted, that the line of Christs pe­degree takes in both them and others, who are gene­rally accounted to follow the immediate predecessors to whom they are sub-joyned, not by natural genera­tion, but by way of legal succession; to shew (as it is conceived) that Christ was descended of those who were not only of Davids blood, and stock, but of the Royal dignity, though not alwayes in respect of pos­session, and enjoyment of the throne, yet in title, and right; and in the acknowledgment of the Jewes, so far they could own them: and that the prophesie of Jacob (the scepter shall not depart, &c. Gen. 49.10.) was fulfilled: For, though they had not always Monarchical Government actually swaying in the [Page 230] line of Solomon, nor in any of Davids seed, nor in any of Judah's tribe, yet they had still some kinde of politie, and royalty in being in the Jewish Nation, and kept up, or sustained either by the Eth [...]rohs of Davids stock, as their chief national Magistrates un­der, & after the captivity, or by some of the Jewish na­tion, though of another tribe, as it was by the Mac­cabean race, and after them by some Chieftains of that people, still continuing a dictinct Common-wealth, though in subjection to Herod, or the Romans, until Christ was born, and some time after until the gather­ing of the Gentiles unto Christ, as his Church, & the desolation of the Jewish Church & State by Vesp [...]sian.

Accordingly we finde Jehojakim in Babylon, when he had been in prison there 37 yeares, yet then, and in that condition stiled the King of Judah, and withall, some state and dignity of a King yielded him by the Babylonian Emperour. [2 Kings 25.27. Jer. 52.31.] of which exaltation of Jehojakim the King must (I take it) be understood that of the Prophet [Ezek. 29.21.] In that day will I cause the horn of the house of Israel to bud forth. Which phrase (of the horns budding forth) being interpreted by that of [Psal. 132.17.] There will I make the borne of David to bud] must needs intend the reviving of the royal dignity in Davids family.See Divines Annotat. on E­zek. 29 21.

After him Salathiel still at Babylon is called the captain, or prince of the people. Princeps po­puli. Junius. Dux populi. Usher. Vide Usheri Annal. part 1. p. 138. [2 Esdras 5.16.] and the reason is taken to be, for that he was appointed, and declared by Jeconiah his heir, and next succes­sor.Mr. Lightfoot his Harmony of the O. Test. part 2. pag. 180. & Harmony of N. Test. page 56. This Salathiel (or Shealtiel) is named Je­coniah's son [1 Chron. 3 17. Matth. 1.13.] yet he was not his natural son, for Jeconiah was childlesse [Jer. 22.30.] and Salath [...]el was the natural son of Neri, [Luke 3.27.] but he is reckoned as his son in regard that Solomons line ended in Jeconiah, and then came in Nathans posterity in right of legall succession to the throne of David, of which the next heir then was this Salathiel. See D [...]v. An­not. & Diodat. on 1 Chr. 3.17. Ezr. 10 8. Mat. 1.12. & Luke 3.27.

In like manner Zorobabel succeedeth Salathiel, as the prince of that people, and he was their leader [Page 231] out of Babylon into Judea, and the governour,CHAP. VI. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. and chiefe actor in the restauration there. He is called Shezbazzar the Prince, (for Shezbazzar was his Chaldee name) [Ezra 1.8.2.2.3.2.] and he is sti­led the son of Salathiel, [Ezra 3.2. Matth. 1.12. Luke 3.27.] whereas it appears he was the son of Pedaiah, who was Shealtiels brother, [1 Chron. 3.17, 18, 19.] So that naturally he was Shealtiels nephew, yet he is reckoned his son, as being his heir, and legal succes­sor, in the head-ship of the Nation. Thus we see these three, Jehoiakim, Salathiel, and Zorobabel, suc­cessively sustaining the Princedome of that people during the 70 yeares captivity, and untill the redu­ction. Unto all which we may add that David (that is, the house and successors of David) is sundry times called the King of Israel, and Judah, even then du­ring the captivity, and actual dispossession of the Na­tion, and Princes of Judah, Jer. 30 9. Hos. 3.5.M. Lightfoot Harmony of N. Test. part 1. p. 56.

Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon during his seven yeares frenzie, or brutishness, though then disposses­sed of the use, not onely of his Kingdome, but of his humanity and reason, yet he continued King still, and Historians account those seven years as part of his 43. or 44. years reign: And they suppose that his Wife, or his Son, or his Nobles, or whoever gover­ned the Kingdome during that space, were but as his Vicegerents, and the Protectors of the Realm for him; they expecting the recovery of his reason, and his return thereupon unto his Throne at the end of those years, upon the authority of Daniels interpreta­tion of his dreamVide Chroni­con Catha. Edw. Simsoni. part 3. p. 112. An. M. 3437. Sir W. Rawl. Hist. li 3. 3. cap. 1. sect. 13.. And the Text tels us no lesse, then that the title to the Kingdome remained still to him, and the use of it was to be reserved for him. His dream saying, Yet leave the stump of the roots thereof in the earth (to wit, of the tree deciphering him in his Kingdome) even with a band of iron and brasse. The which Daniel interprets thus, Thy kingdom shall be sure unto thee after thou shalt have known that th [...] heavens doe rule.

Alexander the great, at his death, leaving his Queen Roxane great with childe, his Princes at their consul­tation [Page 232] about his successor determined to expect Rox­ane her bringing forth her child, and presently they elect for it four Protectors, to whom they swear obe­dience.Justin. Histor. lib 13. pag. 145.

Other examples of this kinde the Reader may see in Grotius. Grot. de jure Bel. li. 1. cap. 3. sect. 15. & 24. I will onely adde these few instances coming near to us in place, and time.

In the Kingdome of France, anciently one of the three grand occasions for which the assembly of the three Estates was wont to convene (as their Histori­an tells us) was when it was necessary to provide for the governing of the Realm, during the captivity, or minority of the Kings, or when they wanted the right use of their senses.Historical col­lection, &c in the life of H. 3. page 137.

In England the soveraign power hath often resided in them who could not in any one act exercise it, by reason of their far d [...]stance from home, when the Crown hath descended upon them, or of their capti­vity, or of their childhood; which defect hath been supplyed by the advice, and care of the Chieftaines of the Realm: as it was in the case of King Richard the first, being prisoner to the Emperour of Germa­ny: and in the cases of King Edward the third, Henry the six [...]h, Edward the fifth, and Edward the sixth, be­ing but children at their first coming to the Crown: and in the case of King Edward the fi [...]st, being in War against the Sarazens in Asia, at what time the Kingdome fell to him.Speeds Histor. Book 9. cap. 7. sect. 44. cap. 9. sect. 3. cap. 10. sect. 6. cap. 16. s [...]t. 1. cap. 22. sect. 24.

Quum Roma a Gottis capta est, [...]ccupatio fuit violenta, cui s [...]se interea im­peratores oppo­nebant, quantum patiebatur re­rum status, & pe [...]secerunt de­nique ut ad se rediret. Itaque quemadmodum au [...] olim Carolus 7. occupata ab Anglis, aut nuper Henricus 4. ab Hispanis, Luteria, non d [...]sierunt esse veri Reges Francorum, nec desiit eorum juris esse Luteria, sic nec illi quidem d [...]si­erunt ess [...] Romani imperatores. Chamier panstrat tom. 2. l. 17. c. 4. sect. 17. Chamier observes, when Rome was taken by the Gothes, there was a violent possession, the which in the mean time the Emperours opposed as far as the state of things would permit, and at last prevailed to a reco­very of it to them wherefore as in time past, Paris being seised by the Engl [...]sh, or of late by the Spanyards, Charls the seventh, and Henry the fourth▪ ceased not to be the true Kings of France, neither did Paris cease to be of their Dominion; so neither ceased those to be Em­perou [...]s of Rome.

In the late differences betwixt the King,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 6. and Par­liament, it was often affirmed to be Law, That the King in his civil, or politicall capacity cannot be severed from his Kingdome, or Parliament, how far soever he is distant in person, or in dispesition of minde to act with them. See fuller answer to Dr. Fern, p. 9. Mr. H. Potts his Cordial, p. 15.

And to adde no more, the late Parliament more then once found themselves fallen under force, yet after recovering their liberty did account themselves, and were accounted by the King, and Kingdome the Parliament still, and their constitution and session to have continued both under, and after the said force.

Subsection 6. Argument 6. From another practice of King­domes, viz. their admitting some to the place of supream command whom they ac­knowledge not to be the supream power.

6 AS there are who are generally acknowledged to be the supream power that rule not at all, that doe not actually possesse command, or exercise any act of civill authority; so there are that doe lawfully exercise, and execute the same authority, and yet are not acknowledged, or taken to be the soveraign power, or Magistrate: Such are they who are placed as Protectors, or Vicegerents in the forementioned deficiencies of the Soveraign Prince. One may be the King, another, in regard of that Kings Nonage, absence, durance, or dotage, may be the Regent; the latter executing the supream authority in his behalf, or stead. And where the case is thus; suppose the King dye in the said Condition, though the Protector, or Regent, be found in actuall use, or ex [...]cution of the soveraign power, (whether there be another legall Inheritor, & Successor of the dead [Page 234] King,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 7. or the line faile, and there be none invested with right of succession) yet is not the said Protector the supream power, nor is so taken, or acknowledged to be by the Realm; the right, or title to the Crown having never been conveyed, or made over to him: but rather, he having been but Regent in the name and behalfe of the deceased Prince; that office which he had legally ceaseth upon the death of him in whose name he ruled, and he is now divested of it.

Subsection 7. Argument 7. From the approved custome of determining Controverted titles unto Sove­raignty by Arbitration.

7 IT hath been the custome of Princes, and other supream States, or Potentates, both ancient and modern, when a Controversie hath been raised betwixt two, or more of them, about the title to the Soveraignty of a Kingdome, or Territory, and each part hath been confident of his right, and bent to vindicate his claim by the sword to the uttermost is­sue, and commonly one of them hath been in posses­sion, and the other kept out by him, for the prevent­ing of the miseries, and uncertain events of War, and for the clearer, and safer ending of the difference, to refer the matter to the arbitration of one, or more, as judge, or judges betwixt them. Which way of decision is approved, and commended as the most equall, wise, and moderate, and most becoming Christians. For instance, Atherbal, and Jugurtha, brought their contest about the Kingdome of Numi­dia unto the Romane Senate to be adjudgedSalust. Bel. Iugurth. num. 69. pag. 38.. Tygranes the Father, and Son, referred their strife about the Kingdome of Armenia unto Pompey the Great, for [Page 235] his decisionUsser. Annal part. poster. p. 238.. Hircanus and Aristobulus, the two Asm [...]nian brethren bring their difference about the dominion of Judea before the same Pompey, as the Arbitrator betwixt themIdem page 248, 249. Rosse Hist. Book 1. Chap. 5. page 20..

Archelaus, and Antipas, the two Sons of Herod the Great, after his decease, repair to Rome, unto Au­gustus Caesar, to determine their se­verall claims to their Fathers do­minionsUsser. Annal part. poster. p. 537..

Upon the death of Alexander King of Scotland, the Crown of that Kingdome being subject to the claimes of many Nobles, the chief­est, and probablest of which were those of John Baliol, and Robert Bruce, the determination of this controversie was by all the parties referred to Edward the first, King of England Speeds History. Book 9. chap. 10, Sect. 18. Rosse History, Booke 5. Chap. 3. page 244..

And more examples of this na-may be seeen in Bishop Ʋsher, Usser. Annal. part postr. p. 247. and Hugo Grotius. Grotius de jure B. lib. 2. Cap. 23▪ Sect. 8. Et lib. 3. cap. 20. sect. 46. When the case is thus, the thing re­ferred, and adjudged is not who is in possession, but in whom is the right: If this were a certaine, and clear principle, that he is the power that is in pos­session, the difference were at an end, and would need no Arbitrator, where either of the litigants is in the place. And when it is thus referred, it were a frivolous proceeding for the Arbitrator to hear the arguments, and pleas of the parties, or to enquire into the grounds of each of their claims, by law, de­scent, election, contract, testament, or the like; all that he hath to doe, is to aske which of them is in possession, and to judge for him, or at his own free choice to put the one of them in possession (if nei­ther be already) and so to end the difference. Unto which businesse the parties need not travaile or study to finde out, and repair to the wisest, justest, and mos [...] [...]different Arbitrator: or he to call in the ablest Civilians, or Causuists to assist himAs the Histo­rian saith, the said K. Edward did in the Scottish con­trove [...]sie last mentioned.; The first per­son [Page 236] they may light on,CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 8. be he the simplest man on earth, would serve to umpire the cause by that prin­ciple.

Subsection 8. Argument 8. From the expressions of the Ho­ly Ghost in Scripture, owning men for Kings, in relation to the Kingdoms of which they have been unpossessed.

8 THat persons may be out of the seat of rule both personally, and virtually, both in regard of re­sidence, and in regard of actuall command, and yet be higher powers, that is, Kings, and Soveraigns, may appear to be the dictate, not only of wise Sta­tists, and Kingdoms, but of the Holy Ghost in Scrip­ture, and this in that he mentioneth, enstyleth, or owneth persons as Kings, and as reigning, at the time, and in the condition wherein they had no actu­all rule over the places, or people, in relation to which they are said to be Kings, or to reigne. There may be found in Scripture divers instances for this, viz many persons mentioned as Kings in such a place, or said to reign in such a Kingdome; at which time they were either carried away, and held captive, or expulsed out of their Kingdomes, or shut up, and besieged in some one City of their Dominions, and despoyled of the possession, and command of all be­sides by their invaders, and besiegers, or lying secret­ly hid, and unknown of their Subjects where they were, or whether they were alive, or no, or other­wise excluded, whilest others in opposition to their title, and regency possessed the Throne, and rule of their Dominions. I shall produce sundry exam­ples for this.

The sacred story relating to us Davids disseisure of his Kingdome by his Son, and Subjects, doth ne­verthelesse during that his outing mention, and owne him as King. How full, or in how great a measure that dispossession was, both in regard of place, of power, and of the consent of the people, let the words of the Text speak [2 Sam. 10.12, 13, 14.16. Chap. 15, 16, 17, 18. Chap. 17, 1, 2, 3▪ 4.16.21, 22, 24 27. Chap. 19 9, 10, 11.15.6.

By all which passages, it appears that David was wholly ejected, both out of the hearts, and out of the territories of Israel; and that both the land, and the wills of the people were totally given up to Absalom; and yet in this very state of things David is King still, being so reckoned, and stiled all along the story; and that, not onely in those words of the narration which are set down as the Language of them that ad­hered unto him, as his friends, and followers; not onely in that acknowledgment of the other party, that rose up against him, which they made after the battail was lost, and Absalom slaine; when they, both in their consultation among themselves, and in their addresse, as Subjects to David, own him a [...] their King; of which [Chap. 19, 9, 10.41.43] But in the proper words, and sentences of the penman of the story (and so of the Holy Ghost) when he himselfe makes mention of him in his own person, and not in another: In the perusall of the history, I have com­puted David is in this manner 43 times in the nar­ration, betwixt the time of hi [...] fl [...]ght from Jerusalem, and the peoples consent given for his reduction,Viz. Chap: 15.15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27. Chap. 16.2, 3, 4.5, 6.10, 14. Chap. 17.17.21. Chap. 18.2, 4, 5.25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33. Chap. 19 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 11, [...]4. stiled King. To this we may add the story of the other revolt by the instigation, and under the conduct of Sheba, which followed at the heels of that of Absalom. This was in like manner very generall (as to the ten Tribes) the Text saith, So every man of Israel went up from after David, and fol­lowed Sheba, [Chap. 20.2.] yet David, during the rejection, is reckoned as King still by the sacred Hi­storian, [Verses 3, 4.]

And there is yet another instance for this in David, [Page 238] he is said to reign over Israel, yea over all Israel forty yeares; seven of which he reigned in Hebron, and the other 33 in Jerusalem, [2 Kings 2.11. 1 Chr. 29.26, 27.] within which years there intervened, not onely the space of time in which were the afore recounted interruptions by Absalom's, and Shebah's rebellions, but a fixed confinement of Davids actuall reign to the Tribe of Judah onely, for the first seven years of the 40. in which he reigned in Hebron, for so the Text plainly saith. David was thirty yeares old when he began to reigne, and he reigned forty years in Hebron he reigned over Judah seven yeares, and sixe moneths; and in Jerusalem he reigned thirty-three yeares over all Israel and Judah, [2 Sam. 4.5.] Of the means of this confinement of his actual reign for those seven yeares to that one Tribe, the second and third Chapters of the second Book of Samuel will inform us, to wit, the wars betwixt the houses of David and Saul. The same story will tell us, that within those seven yeares, which were the first part of Davids 40 yeares reign over Israel, Ishbosheth was made King over all Israel, and reigned two years, [see 2 Sam. 2.8, 9, 10, 11.] That Ishbosheth might well be said to be King, and reign over all Israel de facto, though he wanted the actuall obedience of Judah, is easie to conceive, and yeeld; both because he had 11 Tribes of the twelve, and for that the name of Israel is often put to signifie the ten Tribes, in distinction from Judah and Benja­min, much more may it be put for 11 Tribes, inclu­ding Benjamin, as it plainly doth, [2 Sam. 30.10. and 5.5.] but that Israel, and all Israel in the fore­cited places [1 Kings 2.11. 1 Chron. 29.26, 27.] should be put for the Tribe of Judah onely, and divi­ded from all the other Tribes, even then when the other 11 Tribes were in fact a dis-joyned and opposite Kingdome to it, and that under the title of Israel, I see not how it can st [...]nd.

The question then is, how those Texts that reckon to David forty years reign over Israel, can be recon­ci [...]'d to the other that allot to him seven of those 40 to reign over Judah only in Hebron, and give Ishbosheth [Page 239] within that time a reigne over all Israel, as a distinct Kingdome from Judah? I think it can be no other­wise done then thus. Ishbosheth was King, and reigned de facto over, and by actual, & predominate posses­sion held from David the 11 Tribes, whilst David en­joyed onely the Dominion of the Tribe of Judah, but was de jure, or in title and right King over all the rest, which Ishbosheth detained: and therefore David at that time, not onely expected, but justly waged warre upon Ishbosheth, and his partakers, for the reco­very thereof, and therein accordingly daily grew up­on him, and won upon them: and upon this ground might well be that message of Abner to David, saying, whose is the Land? acknowledging David the Proprie­tor where he was not the possessor, [2 Sam. 3.12.] Here then we have two competitory Kings, mention­ed as invested in the same territory at the same time (not as joynt partners, but each as claymer in toto, & in solid [...]m:) with this difference, (for we must not make a contradiction of it) the one is invested with possession, the other with the right; the one is the occupant, the other is the proprietor.

Now if we should bring both these Kings to this Text of the Apostle, and aske which of them during those two yeares of Ishbosheth might be said in refe­rence to the 11 Tribes to be the power in being of God, ordained of God? would not any considerate Reader answer, not Ishbosheth, but David? not the possessor, but the Proprietor? And whereas both are said to have reigned; not he that is onely said to reigne, but he that is said to reigne, and is likewise said to be chosen by God to it, and entred possession by his spe­cial direction, as it is said of David 2 Sam. 5.2.2.2..

Thus we have seen this one King, and that, he who in a style peculiar, and above others is said to be the anointed of the God of Jacob, yeelds us a tre­ble instance of a power in being, yet out of posses­sion.

Next to David was Solomon; yet when he, as Da­vids immediate successor, should be installed, being thereunto assigned both by divine appointment, and [Page 240] by his Father, [1 Chron. 28.5. 1 Kings 1.17.] Ado­nijah, his elder brother, got the start of him, in re­spect of possession; and the said Adonijah not onely exalted himselfe, saying, I will be King; but raised a very strong party, yea obtained (it seems) a generall consent of the State, and thereby got into actual sei­sure of the Kingdome. There stood up for him, and gave him admission to the Kingdome Joab the Gene­rall of the Army, Abiathar the Priest, and all his bre­thren, the Kings sons, and all the m [...] of Judah, the Kings servants: Whereupon Nathan the Prophet, and Ba [...]hsheba tell David, Adonijah doth reigne: and him­selfe said afterward, The kingdome was mine, and all Israel set their faces on me, that I should reigne. [1 King. 1.5, 6, 7, 9, 11, 18.25.2.15.] Yet for for all this the Kingdome in right of succession, upon the fore­mentioned title, was Solomons▪ which Adonijah after confessed, It was thine from the Lord, [1 Kings 2.15.] and therefore Adonijah's possession notwithstan­ding, Nathan the Prophet moveth Bathsheba, and they both together move David for Solomons inve­sture; and by his order Zadok, Bendiah, and Na­than, with the Kings guard, proclaim, anoynt, and inaugurate him in the Throne. [1 King. 1.32, 33, 38] The which, if Adonijah had been the power, because he was in possession, and Solomon had not been the power, because fore-stalled, and kept from possessi­on, they could not lawfully have done; but both they, and Solomon, yea, and David also must have acquiesced in the duty of subjection to Adonijah, ac­cording to the Rule of the Apostle in this place, if to be understood as abovesaid. Let us goe on to other examples.

[...] Chr. 22.9. Ahaziah King of Judah being slain by Jehu, the Text saith, his house had no power to keep still the king­dome; yet Joash, his son, and heire, being left alive, though he were powerlesse (both in regard of his own childhood, & Athaliah's strong hand of usurpa­tion over the Kingdome, ceased not therefore to be King. For, whilst he lay hid with his Aunt in the house of the Lord, and was not known abroad so [Page 241] much as to be, being in common repute slaughtered amongst the rest of Ahaziah's sons, and Athaliah reigned over the Land; and when Jehoiadah the Priest, and those of the Levites, and people that were gathered to him in the Temple, were but privately confederating, consulting, and preparing to invest him in the possession of the Kingdome, the Pen­man of the sacred Story styleth him the King. I meane, not onely when the said persons had set the Crown on his head, and observed the other Ceremo­nies of his Inauguration (though all that being done, he neither by vertue thereof, nor other ways, had the visible possession of the Kingdome, or the actuall prevalency over, and reception of the people, all the transactions hitherto being contained within the Verge of the Temple, and published through the Land, or City; yea, so secret as that to Athaliah her selfe, vigilant enough doubtlesse, and who was so neer to the Temple, and so much concerned to take notice, it was utterly unespied, and unheard of untill the closing Plaudite of the people brought the confused sound of it to her eares, and so occasion­ed her looking forth, and knowledge of it) but e­ven while they were yet intending, contriving, and ordering the way how to attempt, and execute their said designe. [See 2 Chron. 23.3.5 7.10.] Here then is a King in being before in actuall possession or regnancy.

The suspensions of Rehoboam, Ʋzziah, Hezekiah, Manass [...]h, Zedechiah, and Hoshea, from the actuall possession, use, and command of their respect [...]ve Kingdomes, through the invasions made upon their Kingdoms by their severall enemies, or by their own incapacities & the consistence thereof with their being Kings, and with the continuance of their Reigns still, as to right, and title, in the compu­tation of Scripture, we shall need to do no more but mention cursorily, having already seen so many ex­amples to this purpose.

In the Reigne of Rehoboam, Shishak King of Ae­gypt entereth Judah with a huge host, and overpow­ers [Page 242] it, taking the fenced Cities thereof, and so com­ing to Jerusalem. Into it Rehoboam and his Princes were retreated for their defence, and were so inclo­sed there by him, as that the Lord tells them by his Prophet, for their forsaking him, he left them in the hand of Shishak. Yet in this condition the Text still ta­keth notice of Rehoboam as the King, and his Prin­ces as the Princes of Judah, [2 Chron. 12.6.]

Ʋzziah is reckoned to reign in Jerusalem 52 years; yet for some part of his time, being smitten with a Leprosie by an immediate hand of God, he was de­prived of all exercise of regall power, and shut out e­ven from civill communion; and his son Jotham administreth the Realm. [2 Kings 15.2, 5. 2 Chron. 26 3, 21.] For how long time was this deprivation of Ʋzziah the Scripture doth not expresly relate; but, in regard in one place Jotham is said to reign 16 yeares, and in another we read of his twentieth yeare, [See 2 Kings 15.13, 33.] It may be supposed that four of those twenty years, Jotham ruled in the life time, and within those 52 years of the reign of his Father, because of his said incapacity.

When Hezekiah was King, Senacherib King of As­syria came up against all the fenced Cities of Judah, and tooke them, and sent his Commanders with a great Army against Jerusalem (wherein was Hezekiah) to summon it; so that he was Master of the whole Ter­ritory of Judah, Jerusalem excepted. [2 Kings 18.13.17. Isa. 36.1.33 8, 9.] yet Hezikiah thus overpow­ered, and shut up is King of Judah still. [2 King. 19 1.5. 2 Chron. 32.9.]

Manasseh is computed to reign 55. years, [2 King. 21.1. 2 Chron. 33.1.] yet, The Lord brought upon him, and his people the Captains of the host of the King of Assyria, who tooke him, and bound him with fetters, and carryed him to Babylon. [2 Chron. 33.11.] In what time of his reign this fell out, & for how long this his dispossession, and captivity lasted, I finde no certain­ty: but from his first seising to his recovery (consi­dering his journey to Babylon, his affliction there, [Page 243] the worke it had upon him, his great humiliation before God, and the c [...]nsequents of it, his prayer, and the Lord working for his release out of the hands of the Babylonian, and his reduction from thence unto Jerusalem) it must needs be taken to have been some considerable space of time. How much soever it was,See Divines Annot. on 2 Kin. 21.1. contained it was (as Expositors agree) within the current of those 55 years of his reign.

Zedekiah is accounted to reign as King of Judah 11 yeares; yet for about two yearesArch-Bishop Usher reckons it 2 years com­pleat. Annal. part. 1. An. M. 3405. of those 11 years he was mured up by the King of Babylons Ar­my in Jerusalem; and the rest of Judea was either possessed, or in like manner besieged by the said ene­mie. [2 Kings 25.4, 5.34.7.]

Hoshea reigned in Samaria over Israel nine yeares: yet, for at least three of those years, he was shut up, and bound in prison, and the whole Land was over-run, and Samaria was besieged untill it was taken by Shal­manezer King of Assyria. [2 Kings 17.4, 5, 6.]

But the number of Scripture precedents already re­cited is sufficient for the purpose before assigned. By all these it is (I hope) fully manifest, that a Sove­raign Prince may be shut up in some strong hold within his Kingdome, or be carryed away prisoner, or expelled out of it, or be forced to lye hid as one out of the wor [...]d, or through some incapacity be ex­cluded from actual regency, and yet be King still, and his reign (in the being, habit, or first act of it) continued. And whereas, during the interruptions of the rule of the severall Princes above mentioned, there were others that, either by the will, & con­sent of them, or their respective Kingdomes, or a­gainst it, bare the actual sway, and command, unto whom the people were subject, yet it was either in behalfe of those dis-inabled Kings, where it was with consent; or by way of compulsory, and passive sub­jectednesse, without any moral tie of allegiance, or of the duty of Subjects incumbent on them in refe­rence to such compulsatory rulers. For, where the dis-inabled Princes power, and reign was yet in be­ing, there must needs be a reservation of the Rel [...] ­tive [Page 244] bond of Allegiance on the peoples part to them: The tye of the Relation, and Liege right being ever mutuall, and recip [...]ocal, so that it remaining in the one, it must needs remain in the other; and when ever the obstruction was removed, there being a postliminium or reduction into act of the one, there would be the same also of the other.

I will shut up this argument, and enumeration of Scripture-instances with that which is found in Ezek. 21.27. I will overturn, overturn, overturn it, and it shall be no more, untill he come whose right it is, and I will give it him. Who is that whose right the Crown of Judah then was? It is usually applyed to Christ, and I shall not gainsay that Exposition: onely I would say that, as the branch of the Cedar­tree which the Lord saith he will set and plant in the mountaine of the height of Israel, Chap. 17.22, 23. is interpreted first of Zerubbabel, in whom the soveraign dignity was restored at the return from the captivity, and then of ChristSo Calvin, Diodate, and the Divines Annotat.: So may this parallel prophecy be understood. But whether we apply it to Zerubbabel, or to Christ, this must needs be granted, that after Zedekiah's removall, and the Lands captivity was consummate by Nebuchadnezzar, a right there was extant, and remaining somewhere, or in some per­son to the Crown, and Kingdome of Judah, though for the present suspended from actuall exercise, both by the hand of Gods providence in the full conquest of Nebuchadnezzar, and by his extraordinary directi­on, and dispensation by word of mouth, sent by his Prophet Jeremiah, as we find, Jer. 27.12, 16.21.8, 9. and that right did not descend upon Christ till he was born; nor then per saltum, or immediately from Zedekiah, or Jehoiakim to him, but by the interposal of those pe [...]sons in whom the race, and line of blood, or inheritance was continued down to Christ.

Subsection 9. CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 9. Argument 9. Taken from the nature of Magistracy.

9 REason is to be drawn from the nature of Magi­stracy. It cannot agree thereunto, to say that actuall possession, or rule, gives being to the power, or is an inseparable adjunct, or convertible attri­bute thereof. Magistracy is a r [...]lation of office. E­very relation is founded upon something that is ab­solute. What should be the foundation of the relat [...] ­on of Magistrate, and Subject but the act of consti­tution of such a person, or persons in authority, or to be, and stand in the office of Magistracy to such a people? from this transaction as from its foun­dation results this estate, or relation: and then from this estate or relation result the mutual duties, and acts of Magistrate, and Subject, his actual supe­riority, and their subjection, his rule, and their obedience.

Well then, actuall superiority, and rule, be­ing acts proper to, and resulting out of Magistracy, they must needs presuppose it to be first in being, ere they can be educed. First, (I say) not onely in or­der of nature, but of time; for the civill transacti­ons whereby Magistracy is produced, and the polit­call acts which proceed from it are not immanent, or instan [...]aneous, (such as are those whereby the forms of natural beings do produce their facultie [...], or properties) but transient, and succedaneous, and such as require some [...]l [...]x [...] of time to be put forth in. It must needs be then an incongruous assertion to affi me, that the acts which fl [...]w from Magistracy in tim [...] d [...] g [...]ve being to, or are convertible adjuncts [Page 462] of it. A man is first a man, and then he reasons. A man is first an Artificer, and then he works in his Art. So a man is first a power, and then he rules; possession of the Throne, or Territory, and Regency, or coercion of the people by the sword are after, and latter in time then the Creation, or Investure of the power. Magistracy is the antece­dent, the cause, the principle, the first act; and actual dominion, or coercion is the consequent, the effect, the effluxe, or the second act thereof. Men first are Kings, and then they reign; they rule, because they are the higher powers, and they are not the higher powers, because they rule. As, on the other hand, the state of inferiority in a politicall body is the cause, and principle of the Subjects acts of obe­dience.

Men are first in the relation of Subjects, and then they act, or yield obedience. This precept of the Apostle [Let every soule be subject to the higher powers] though delivered in [...]arms illimitedly universall, is onely intended, and given to them that are in the state of Subjects, and because they are in that estate, therefore it takes hold on them; they that are either su­pream Magistrates, or within no Common-wealth, are not obliged by it. And as every person is not in­volved, so every act of submission which may be done to any kind of power in the civill State, is not that which is comprized in this precept, or contain­ed within the matter of it: It is possible a man may submit out of a principle of humility, or policy, or be forcibly prostrated where he oweth no obedience, but it is a submission ex debito, and that stricti juris, or proper to the conscience of him that is in the state of a Subject that is hereby required.

Let Solomon be our instance to illustrate this. Ha­ving been before designed, and chosen to be his Fa­ther Successor in the Kingdome of Israel, he is thereupon first anointed, and proclaimed King by Zadok, Nathan, and Benaiah; and then after this it is said, He sate on the throne of the King, in stead of David his father, and prospered, and all Israel obeyed [Page 247] him, and all the Princes, and the mighty men, CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 5. and all the sons likewise of K. David submitted themselves unto lomon the King. Here Solomons constitution precedes his actuall possession and rule, and the Subjects sub­mission, and obedience, both in order of nature, and of time, as the ground and reason thereof.

And the same is exemplified in Joshua. When Moses was to dye, he spake unto the Lord, saying, Let the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, set a man [...] ­ver the congregation, which may goe out b [...]fore them, and which may lead them out, and which may bring them in. Here, in this petition there is first desired the setting of one over the Congregation, which is the calling & admitting of him to the Soveraign power, and then follows his leading them out, and bringing them in, his exercise of rule. And according to the order of this Petition, is the method of the Lords concession, and direction upon it. The Lord in the next words commands Moses to take Joshua, and lay his hand upon him, and set him b [...]fore Eleazar the Priest, and before all the congr [...]gation, and give him a charge in their sight, and puts some of his honour upon him, and then it follows, That all the Congregation of the children of Israel may be obedient.

There may be a violent, brutish subduedness [...], but there can be no rational, moral submission, and obe­dience as of Liege-people to their Liege-Lord in any other course. And as to this the case is altogether the same, and there is no d [...]fference, whether the Ma­gistrate come in by extraordinary assignation from God, as Joshua, and Solomon did, or by the ordi­n [...]ry means.

Those commands, and rules that are given in Scripture for the doing of publique, distrib [...]tive j [...] ­stice, as that, Defend the poor, and fatherlesse: do j [...] ­stice to the affl [...]cted, and needy: and deliver the poor and needy: rid them out of the hand of the wicked, Psal [...] 82.3, 4. and many othersSee Levit. 19.15. Deut. 1.16, 17.16.19. 1 Sam. 23.3. 2 Chr. 19.6, &c.. I would aske, [...]o whom they are given? who do they concern? are they spoken to all without exception, or onely to them that are Magistrates, and Governours? I sup­pose [Page 248] the latter.CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect. 9. By them it doth appear then, that the Scripture supposeth men Magistrates, before they may exercise any civill power: they must fi [...]st be Go­vernours, and then they are called, and enabled to put forth the acts of rule.

Look upon that law given by God unto Noah, [Gen. 6.9.] Whoso sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed. In those words there is both a con­demnation of blood-shedding, and a commandement for it: here is blood-shed strictly forbidden, and capitally judged, to wit, the blood of the innocent; and here is blood-shed commanded, to wit, the blood of the murderer. Here is a prohibition of blood-spil­ling to some, and a commission for it to others. The power of the Sword, or of capitall punishment is neither forbidden to all, nor prostitute to all; but commanded to some, and reserved from some.

The question then is, who are forbidden to shed blood, and who are authorized to shed that blood that may, and must be spilt? The Law, though it run in tearms indefinite, yet must needs be limited; and as in the former words, whoso sheddeth, we must take in this restriction, whoso murderously shed­deth, so in the latter, by man shall his blood be sh [...]d, we must admit this limitation, not by every man that will, and can; not by any private person, but by the Magistrate. They that are not in his office may only prosecute by complaint, and testimony, but must let judgment giving aloneSo Willet, & Pareus in Rom. 13. P. Martyr loc. com. clas. 4. cap. 13 pag. 898 Syropsis pu: Theol. Disp. 50. Sect. 38.. Should we say they that get the sword, can arme themselves with it, may use it, and are the authorized here, this were to set the stronger over the weaker, and to oc­casion (especially where there were any neernesse to an equality, or question which part were the st [...]ong­er) all combustion, and confusion among men, to determine where that authority shall be; and in stead of preventing, or punishing blood-shed, it were to o­pen a gap to an universal, and endlesse ove [...]flow of it, and to make this Law an act of indempnity, and impunity for murder. We must therefore necessarily distinguish betwixt them that can, and them that [Page 249] may, and ought to shed the offendors blood:CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subject. 10. and say, this warrant of the sword, or putting to death (the first we finde given) is onely made to him that then was, and from thence-forward to him that is the Magistrate. A man then must first be a civill power before he can come by this Scripture-way to the sword; he cannot by the sword come to be the civill Power.

Subsection 0. Argument 10. From Gods expresse disal­lowance of some in actual command.

10 THis shall be my last Argument. If some are, or may be in place of actual command, and exercise of rule who are not (in the sense of our Text) of God, ordained of God, therein then it is not that, to wit, actual rule which makes, or proves one to be the power that the Text saith is of God, ordained of God. But this may be, viz. some may be in actual command, and exercise of rule, who are not in the sense of the Text of God ordained of God. This is thus proved.

It is before made evident, and therefore must be here taken for granted, that, of God, ordained of God, signifies appointed, approved, authorized, allowed, or warranted of God. But there may be some in actuall rule and command, who are not thereto appointed, approved, &c. of God. This is very manifest by sun­dry Scriptures, wherein G d doth expp [...]sly disallow, condemn, and threaten with punishment persons that are in actual rule, and command for their so doing, or being. [See Amos 6 13.] Ye which say, have we not taken to us hornes by our owne strength? [Ezek. 33.26.] Ye [...] stand upon your sword—and shall ye possesse [Page 250] the land? CHAP. VII. SECT. II. Subsect 9. Hab. 2.5, 6. He is a proud man, nei­ther keepeth at home; who enlargeth his desire as Hell, and is as death, and cannot be satisfied; but gathereth to him all nations, and heapeth unto him all people. Shall not all these take up a parable against him, and a taunting proverb against him, and say, Woe to him that increaseth that which is not his? &c. Nahum 2.4. Because of the multitude of the whoredoms of the wet-fa­voured harlot, the mistress of witchcrafts, that selleth nations through her whoredomes, and families through her witchcrafts.

By those whoredomes, and witchcrafts of Nineveh, Expositors understand the arts, and policies, by which she subjected the Nations of the earth. But especially would I have observed that of our Saviour unto Peter, [Mat. 26.52.] For all they that take the sword, shall perish with the sword.

It is not questionlesse his drift by these words sim­ply to disallow all use of the sword; but the qualifi­cation, or restriction of the words lies in that word, Take (as Augustine, Cajetan, and Luther (the last of whom applies this Text against the Boo [...]s of Swevia then in arms against their Magistrates, in his answer to their Articles) doe observeAugustinus Tom. 6. contra Manichaeum. li. 22. cap. 70. Cajetani Jen­tac. 6. qu. 3. Lutherus apud Jo: Sleid. Com. lib. 5. pag. 120. 122.) by that tearm the Usurper of the Sword is differenced from the true ownes. The one takes the Sword, the other hath it committed to him.

The one snatcheth it to himselfe, the other hath it coming orderly into his hand. The former it is, and him onely whom our Saviour here condemns, and declares the destructive judgement of God against. Whence it must needs be confessed that one may have the sword in his hand, and be for it disallowed, and threatned of God, and consequently cannot possesse it, as thereunto ordained, appointed, authoriz [...]d by him.

I will conclude this dispute, and section with that of Saint Augustine, wherein he determineth this question to the sense which I have here argued for.

When the Romane Empire under the Emperours Arcadius, and Honorius, was so harassed by the Goths under the conduct of Alaricus, and Radagasus, and specially the Western part by Alaricus, and the City of Rome was taken by him, St. Augustine saith of it in that condition,

Subsection 1. The question, whether the Romans were usur­pers over Judea? discussed, and concluded negatively.

Answer. 1. IF the Romans were usurpers over Judea, there is something of an argument, o­therwise there is none in all this. But how will this [Page 312] be proved? Most of the Authors of this objection do no more for this then cite the names of some learned and good Authors affirming it, and so they take it f [...]r granted. But for their full answer, and the clear­ing of this I shall

1. Scan a little this their common proof by such hu­mane assertion.

2. Then consider what reason may suggest to us in this matter.

3. And then remove some other reasons pretend­ing the conviction of the Romans of usurpation.

For the former, the assertion of sundry learned Authors, that so it was: though such do in transitis, & aliud agentes, affirme the Romanes, in the dayes of our Saviour upon earth, to have been usurpers o­ver Judea [...], yet is not their bare affirmative to be taken for an evidence in such a businesse, viz. sufficient to state the sense of a Scrip­ture in controversie, or to extend, or limit a Scrip­ture rule of practice, such as this is. Their ground for so saying would be seen to such an end, and un­till then I shall with as good authority (I think) deny it. Not that I oppose mine own negation, as to be as firm, and credible as the assertion of any such learned men: but because I have the authority of (I deeme) as learned, and good Authors denying the same, and asserting the lawfulness of the Roman government over the Jewish Nation, by consent ere this given to it, whereby it stood cleared of usur­pation.

There is a little Treatise (printed about 7 yeares since) called An exercitation concerning usurped pow­ers; which (pag. 87, 88.) hath cited some passages out of Josephus to prove the Jewes giving up them­selves to the Roman Dominion antecedently to this time which the objection concerns. I shall refer the Reader to these, adding here one or two more out of the same Author (whose testimony in this matter is absolutely the greatest of humane) and then pro­duce the attestation of others of best note; and after that subjoyn a sh [...]rt vindica i [...]n of what that exerc­ta ion had before given.

A further testimony out of Josephus is in these words of Agrippa, in his oration to the Jewes at Je­rusalem, a little before their siege, and destruction by the Romans for their rebellion.

For servitude is grievous, when new, Joseph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 2. cap. 16. and it seems just to strive to avoid it; but he that is once brought under it, and then makes defection, appears to be rather a rebellious servant then a lover of liberty. Therefore it behoved, when Pompey entred into this Province, to have used all meanes against the Romans entry: but yee that have received an hereditary obedience, and are far inferiour in meanes to those who first submitted, how can ye now thinke of making resistance to the whole Roman Empire?

This passage is clear enough for the Jewes recep­tion of the Roman Rule, under Pompey.

Another may be that which the same Author hath in the relating of an occurrence which happened about seven yeares after this first close of this Nati­on with the Roman in subjection; which was this.

Alexander the son of Aristobulus (who was the head of that party that fell under the force of the Roman sword, and still repined at their govern­ment) beginning to make insurrection against the Romans, was supprest by Gabinius the Governour of Syria, and upon that suppression Gabinius setled the government of the Jewish Common-wealth in ano­ther forme, distributing the Province of Judea into five equall parts, and appointing so many several Ci­ties in each of them for the people respectively to be­long, and repair unto for justice; the which course of government took so well with the Jewes, that the remaining grudges at the Roman Dominion were removed. The words of Josephus upon it are,Joseph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 6. The Jewes being delivered from the government of one a­lone, were willingly governed by severall Chieftaines, or A [...]istocratically. I am to adjoyne now some other W [...]iters testimonies, one of the most learned Anti­q [...]aries, especially in the Jewish affairs we have, is Mr. John Selden. And he hath purposely enquired [Page 314] into, and professedly debated this question: and he resolves it for us thus.

It is not obscure to be seene that in the times of the Empires of the Babylonians, the Persians, the Grecians, and the Romans, the Jewes, upon their respective victo­ries over them, were (soedere, seu deditione subditi) subjects to them by covenant, or surrendring up of them­selves: that by vertue of the said covenants, or dediti­ons, they payed tribute, and they served as Souldiers un­der Alexander the Great. And particularly in refe­rence to the Romans, he saith, concerning the publique acknowledgement of the Right of the Romans by Warre, and armes over this Nation (the Jewes) there is cleare evidence from the leagues, and charters of Princes, which both Josephus, and Philo (in the Book de lega­tione) do hold forth. And that that Nation was recei­ved of the Romans by dedition, or by that league which is betwixt unequals. And that the tribute, which Judas the Galilean stood up to free that people from, was imposed by Augustus, by the law of victory and dediti­on. And that the sedition of those Jewes (mentioned, Acts 5 37.) who mutinied upon occasion of that tri­bute taxed upon them by Augustus, by the law of victo­ry, and dedition, was according to Ga [...]aliels speech dis­allowed of by that Sanhedrim or Councell of the Jewes, as St. Luke relates in that story (Acts 5.40.) as being by the delusion of a seditious incendiary, and not of God. And that the Jewes had yeelded themselves unto, and owned the Roman Dominion in Pompey, Caesar, Augustus, and Tiberius, ere this question about tribute-paying was proposed to our Saviour. And that be, from the inspection of that Denarius, the coyne which upon the moving of this question, and his demand to have it sh [...]wen, was produced, raised an irrefragable argument of that dedition, and from thence of their d bt of tri­bute-paying. And that they who ex animo, and really stuck at the payment of it, were a seditious party, dis­senting from the Body of that Nation. All this may be seene more at large delivered by Mr Selden Io. Selden de jure Naturae, &c. lib. 6. cap. 17. pag. 751, &c.. What an act dedition is, let Gro [...]ius informDeditio sponte permittit quod alioqui vis esset ereptura. Grot. de jure Bel. lib. 3. cap. 8. sect. 4. Dedition is a [Page 315] yeelding voluntarily to that which otherwise force would extort.

That there was on the part of the Jewish Nation a rendring of themselves up to the Roman govern­ment, yea, and a covenant of fealty, or subjection entred into by them upon Pompeys coming to Jerusa­lem in assistance to Hircanus, and his besieging and taking the Temple from Aristobulus his party (the opposites of Hircanus, and of the greater part of that nation) another of our most learned, and judicious searchers of Antiquity, Arch-bishop Ʋsher, hath furnished us with divers testimonies out of History. One is of Eutropius, viz. Pompey passing into Jury, tooke Jerusalem, the Metropolis of that Nation, in the third moneth, killing 12 thousand of the Jewes, and re­ceiving the rest into fealty Ad Judaeos transgressus (Pompeius) Hierosolymam caput gentis ter­tio mense cepit; duodecim mili­bus Judaeorum occisis, caeteris in fidem accep­tis. Eutropius.. Another of Orosius, who speaking of Pompey, saith, He sendeth to the City of Je­rusalem Gabinius with his Army, himselfe presently following, and being received of the Fathers into the City, but repulsed by the common sort from the walls of the Temple, he begins to besiege it; and hardly tooke it in three moneths. Thirteen thousand of the Jewes are re­ported there to be slaine. The rest of the people entred into a league of subjection Ad Hierosoly­mam urbem eo­rum Gabinium cum exercitu mittit: ipse continuò subsecutus, & a patribus u [...]be receptus, sed a plebe muro Templi repulsus, oppugnationem ejus intendit, &c. vix tertio mense expugnavit. Tredecim millia Judaeorum ibi caesa narrantur. Caetera mul­titudo in fidem venit. Orosius. Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 262, 263.. Another testimony of the Jewes consent to the Roman authority, the same Arch-bishop gives us out of Josephus, which is that I cited even now, of their willing embracement of an Aristocraticall government setled over them by Ga­binius Usseri Annal. pert 2. pag. 281..

Another witnesse shall be Calvin, who upon the Text mainly referred to in the Objection, saith, The authority of the Romane Empi [...]e was by common use approved, and received among the Jewes; [Page 316] whence it was manifest that the Jewes had now of their owne accord imposed on themselves a law of paying the tribute, because they had passed over to the Romans the power of the sword Romani Im­perii authoritas communi usu probata, receptaque erat, unde constabat Judaeos ipsos jam sibi sponte legem imposuisse solvendi Tributi, quia Ro­manis gladii potestatem concesserant. Calv. in Matth. 22.19..

For this voluntarinesse of the Jewish subjection to the Romans, and consequently the freedome of these from usurpation in relation to them, at what time our Saviour conversed on Earth among them, I have more testimony, of primest worth, but will spare the citing of their words, and shall refer my Reader to Weems, Weems Exposi­tion of the Ju­dic. Law, pag. 52, 53. Grotius, Gro [...]. de Jure Bel. lib. 2. cap. 4. sect. 14. and Dr. Hammond, Dr. Hammond Annot. on Matth. Chap. 22. note B. the last of whom I shall have occasion to bring in by and by; and unto these may be put Chamier, before cited in an­swer to the first Objection.

Let us n [...]xt see what is said in this matter against the exercitation above cited, and the Romans Title to Judea therein asserted, by the Book called, The Exercitation answered.

He (page 51.) objects against the Maccabean title by the consent of one of which (Hircanus) the Romans came into the Dominion of Jew [...]y. But what if none of them of that race that ruled, what if the last of them Hircanus had not any good title? yet, if the Romans had the peoples consent (as the exercitation asserteth they had) their claim might be good. But let us see how he avoids the Maccabean title.

First, he obj [...]cts, That the Maccabees came in by force into the Kingdome, when there was another King, a successor of Alexander. He saith, but proves it not; I answer him.

1 It is no concluding argument of the unlawful­nesse of any power that they come in by force. The question is, whether that force be just, or unjust? whether it be a meer force, or a force b [...]cked with a just title at its entrance? or, if it had no [...], a que­stion [Page 317] will be further, whether it had none subse­quently conferred, by which meanes, though the force were unjust in its entry, yet it might be absol­ved in its continuance from usurpative tenure? But the justifiablenesse of the Maccabean armes against the Syrian Kings is commonly yeelded, and ass [...]rted, although there may be some diversity in the way of making it out, of which the Reader may see in Gro­tius Grot. de jure B [...]l lib 1. cap. 4. sect. 7.. For them there are rendred these reasons.

1 The allowednesse of the Subjects defensive arms against their lawful Soveraign in case of ex [...]ream necessity, as was that of the Jewes under Antiochus. This is a ground undenyable by that answer.

2 But it is further to be said, that at what time Mattathias the Father of the Maccabean brethren, and after him his son Judas, and the other in succession raised armes against, and repelled the Seleucian op­pressions, be that was then reigning of that race (Antiochus Epiphanes) was an usurper, the right of succession being in Demetrius the son of Seleucus, the son of Antiochus the G eat, and elder brother to this Antiochus. And that Demetrius being now an hostage at Rome, and by the Senate there detained from suc­ceeding in the Kingdom, the Jews had some occasion given them to assume the administration of the aff [...]irs of their own nation, especially they being now under Tyran [...] not onely as to title, but as to his imm [...]ne, (or Epimane, as his style is in Athenaeus Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 1. Ro [...]e his hist. lib. 1. cap. 1. pag. 2.) govern­ment. And it may be noted also, that this Antio­chus at his end vowed to God to grant the Jewes an Autonomie, that they might thence forward use their own Laws, and constitutions, and moreover wrote supplicatory Letters in behalfe of himselfe, and his son Antiochus, whom he left to succeed him, to pray, and beseech their fidelity to them bothVide Usseri Annal. part 2. pag. 47. and 2 Macc. 9 13, &c..

2 As for the freedome of the Maccobeans Domi­nion in reference to their own Nation, Josephus gives very clear testimony of the J wes election, and ad­mission of them, and in particular of the fore-leaders of them, Mattathias, and his sonsIos [...]ph. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 1. Et Antiqu. lib. 13. cap 1, & 11..

[Page 318]2. He questions, whether the High Priest were ca­pable both of a Crown, and Mitre, wherein some say he was a pattern of Antichrist.

To this blur of typifying Antichrist, it may be replyed, Antichristianisme is now grown a very common, and stale imputation, many having applyed it to any thing which they please to asperse.

2 It's strange that under the Law not only Christ, but Antichrist should have his types.

3 How will he make it apppeare, that to weare both a Crown, and a Mitre is a property of Anti­chr [...]st, that is, that it doth competere to him, and to him (with his types) alone.

4 It is certain Christ is both King, and Priest, and so, in their modell are all Christians. The Mac­cabees then, if in this they must be typicall, being they were such faithful, and pious, as well as magna­nimous persons, might rather be construed presiden­tiall in this good, then in so soule an application.

2 But to his question, let the examples of Mel­chisedech, Eli, Samuel, and Jehoiada (who sure were no patterns of Antichrist) be considered, as to the lawfulnesse of the conjunction of civill regiment with the Priesthood. Yea, I presume upon better enquiry it will be found that temporall power, to wit, the judgement of civill causes was the ordinary inve­sture of the Priesthood of Aaron by institutionSee Deut. 17.8, 9, 10, 11. & 19.17. 2 Chr. 19.8, 9, 10.. And certainly the Priests that were either presidents, or members of the Jewish supream Councel, or San­hedrim were interested in such a power.

3 As for the pomp, or honour of a Crown, or Kingdome, the former Maccabees never assumed it. The first that did it was Aristobulus, say some, Alex­ander his brother, and next successor, say others; the latter was father to Hircanus, from whose hand the power passed upon Pompeys victory to the Romans; and the said Hircanus sate High Priest nine years ere the Kingdome came to him, which he had not enjoy­ed three moneths (say someMonta [...]us. Ap­paratus 6. Sect. 24, 25, 26. pag. 229. Lightfoot of Temple cap. 4. sect. 3. pag. 29.) when the difference brake out betwixt him, and his brother Aristobulus, [Page 319] which was the occasion of calling in the Romans by Hircanus, and his party, and so of their soveraignty there.

2. He alledgeth, The covenant made betwixt Hir­canus, & Aristobulus importing that the latter should command the Kingdom; the which disinabled Hircanus forgiving away the Kingdome after to Pompey.

Answ. 1. Hircanus indeed forced by Aristobulus, yielded him up the Kingdome by such a covenant; but the Chieftaines of Judea not consen [...]ing, after set up Hircanus again upon d slike of Aristobulus, and by the assistance of Aretas the Arabian King first, and then of Pompey recovered it from himVide I [...]seph. Antiqu. lib. [...]4. cap. 1, 2 7, 8.. And Pom­pey, before his coming in, was sought unto by both those parties to determine the controversie betwixt themVide Usse [...]i Annal. part 2. pag. 249, 250. 163.. Upon which he adjudging for Hircanus, and taking up his cause joyned with him, and his party in the oppugning and suppressing of Aristobulus.

3. He excepteth against the Roman Title by surrend [...]y of Hircanus to Pompey, upon that maxime, a King cannot passe away his Kingdome without their consent. This position is a truth acknowledged by Sta [...]es­menSee K. Iames his Remonstr. &c. p. 207, 208. The [...]rraignment of the powd [...]r-Tr [...]tytors in the Earl of Nor [...]h­ampt. speech, pag. 273, 309, 314. Widd [...]ing. Theolog. Disput. adm. to Reader. sect. 10., and others (save that some distinguish of a constitutive, and a patrimonial Kingdome, and deny it of the latte [...]) and from thence is voided his n [...]xt preceding objection of Hircanus his covenant; which for this reason could be no obligation to the people, or bar to the Romans title, coming in against Aristo­bulus. Neither doth the exe [...]citation at all inf inge that maxime, by founding the Roman claim upon Hircanus his sole act; for it expresly takes in, and brings proof of the consent of the Nation. Which proof now comes in to be defended against this An­swerer.

4. He alledgeth the words of Jos [...]phus, That all the whole Nation were against both Hirc [...]nus, and A­ristobulus for b [...]inging them under the servitude of a Kingdome, for they said their custome was to be governed by Gods High Priest, but I hope (saith the Answerer) Pompey was no Priest, and ther fore they did not choose him for thei [...] Governour.

To this the answer is easie. The exception of the people in this narration of Josephus was not against the government of both those brothers; For the same Author relateth the peoples acception of Hir­canus to the Dominion immediately upon the death of Alexandra. And when he being of an over-sl [...]w, and modest temper, had given way to the turbulent spirit of Aristobulus his younger brother to reigne, they rose up (in assistance of Aretas the Arabian King) for his restoring to the governmentJo [...]eph. Antiq. lib. 14. cap. 3. Usseri Annal. pag. 141.. But they were ill content with their government under the title, pomp, majestie, and expensivenesse of a Kingdome, or they blamed the annexing of a Crown to the moderate Dominion of the ancienter Asmo­neans. This was indeed an innovation (and so dis­pleasing) first introduced by the Father, or Unckle or Hircanus.

2 This complaint of the people against those brethren is no argument to prec [...]ude the peoples con­sent to Pompey afterward, had he taken upon him to be a King over them.

That which a people now disliketh, they doe not ever continue to disaffect or refuse. Who knows not the mutability of a multitudes mindes? Sed quid turba Remi? siquitur fortunam, &c.

3 But as Pompey was no High-priest, so he was no King. Neither doth the Exercitator say they chose him for their King. Neither doth the matter of this complaint make any thing against the complainers Dedition to the Romans. But in truth it did further it; For they affecting rather Hircanus his indulgent rule then Aristobulus an imperious, and warlike man; and not being able to keep down the latter, or enjoy the quiet of their Countrey under him, they submit­ted to the Romans, whereby they recovered Hirca­nus, freed themselves of the other brother, and had their desire of the Romans of being rid of a Crowned High-priest; Pompey gratifying them in leaving Hircanus to govern them, but (secluso Diademate, say Hist [...]r [...]ans exp [...]esly) and in association with An­tipater, [Page 321] as ProcuratorUsser. Annal. pag. 261. Montacut. Ap­paratus, 6. Sect. 26. pag. 229.. And when about six years after Alexander the Son of Aristobulus infested Judea with new broyls, in his Fathers quarrell, Gabinius, the Roman President of Syria, having subdued him, restored Hircanus to the H [...]gh Priest-hood onely, and set over the Countrey certaine prefects in distinct circuits, wherewith the people rested very well sa­tisfiedJoseph. Antiq. lib. 14. cap. 10. & de Bel. lib. 1. cap. 6. Uss [...]r. Annal. p. 281..

5. Whereas to prove the Jewish dedition the Ex­ercitator had brought out of Josephus, the words of Antipater to Caesar concerning Antigonus (the son of the aforesaid Aristobulus) his craving ayd of Caesar against Hircanus, he falls foul upon the Exercitator, and charge h him with a false construction of the La­tine sentence (for the Greek he had not) of Jo­sephus.

In defence of that Exercitator I shall but

1 Present the Reader with the words which the Exercitator had truly cited out of the printed Latine version of Josephus, which are [Non propter inopiam desiderare facultates; sed ut in eos qui dedissent Judae­orum seditiones accenderet.] and with the Exercita­tors Englishing of them; That he sought not reliefe (of Caesar) because he was poor; but that he might kindle Jewish seditions against those which had made a dedi­tion of themselves. I leave the Reader to judge if there be any such fault in the construction: And whether the Answerer hath dealt fairly, either with the Ex­ercitator, in challenging him of very untruly alledg­ing those words of Antipater; or with Josephus, in his undertaking to correct the Exercitators version by translating him thus, He, that is, Antigonus, cra­ved not maintenance for that he wanted, but that he might raise a rebellion among the Jews, and against them who would bestow any thing upon him. Which of these two have more faithfully translated the Latine above set, I need not take the umpirage of.

2 Propose betwixt them, that the concernment of the quotation in the point of validity lyes in the con­gruity of the matter for which it is brought (viz. to [Page 322] prove a dedition of the Jewes to the Romans) to the Greek of Josephus, which is, [ [...].] It may be the Latine (about the englishing of which the answerer quarrels with the Exercitator) follows not the original overstrict­ly, but the main question is, whether Josephus his owne words do not beare a dedition as clearly as the Exercitators English. That this is their importance I will not seem to obtrude my assertion upon the Reader, now he hath the words before him. Onely I shall let him know I am very much confirmed to take it so to be, having found an Antiquary, and Greek Critick of so great sufficiency quoting this ve­ry passage for the same purpose to which the Exerci­tator had done, I meane the singularly learned Dr. Hammond; Dr. Hammond Annot on Math. 22. Note B. who in his Annotations asserts of the Jewes, that they had made a dedition of themselves to the Romans, and for it citeth the same place in Josephus (viz. de Bel. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 8.) in which place there is nothing to be found that sounds to that purpose, if these words do not. The same Doctors te­stimony to the thing I am arguing for, which should have been given above, I have referred to this place upon this occasion, as being very pertinent.

He affirmes in the same Annotation, That the Jewes, those of them that were of Hircanus party, came under the Roman power by consent, and not by force; by a choice which the factious among themselves put them upon, and by way of dedition: while they of Aristobu­lus party looked upon the R [...]mans as usurpers, and for­cible possessors, and that this difference conntinued till our Saviours time: When of the Jewes some part ac­knowledged, and adhered to the Caesarean, or Roman authority: some part looked upon it as an usurpation, and of this generally were the Pharisees. And that Christs answer is punctually in favour of the Roman Em­perour, especially to those who tooke the tribute to be his right.

Having thus weighed, and I think sufficiently [Page 323] counterpoised the opinion of those who are for the Romans, to have been usurpers over Judea, in the time of our Saviour, by humane testimony, I have only to add,

2. Somewhat of reason against their said opi­nion.

1 Had not so many learned men stood up for the justific [...]tion of the Roman dition over the Jews by their dedition, and agreement, yet it is not with probability supposeable, that their Dominion in Ju­dea having now been continued above 90. yeares, could have been exercised so long, without some consent sufficient to legitimate it to the present ru­lers; that is, either an expresse, or a tacit consent; eit er a reall consent, or such as was to be presumed, having been continued by immemorial usage.

2 To this title of the Romans, the confession of the Jewes themselves made at this time, seems to astipulate.

They said, It is not lawfull for us to put any man to death. We have no King but Caesar. In the former sentence they disavow to be in them the power of ca­pitall punishment, and consequently the supream authority civill; not onely the naturall, or compul­sory, but the legall, and Justifi [...]ble power. In the latter, they own Caesar as their King, with an exclu­sive negation, or abrenunciation of all other.

3 To this also, that appeal of the Apostle Paul unto Caesar, adds some strength. When the Chief­tains of the Jewes had challenged his tryall to belong to them, and F [...]stus also had moved him to agree to have had the cognisance of his Cause taken at Jerusa­lem; in return to them both, he asserteth that both his person, and his cause appertained to Ca [...]sars Tri­bunall; and that not onely in fact, but o [...] right, [...], where I ought to be judged.

But there is one (the Answerer to the exercitation above dealt with) that pretendeth to some more matter of reason to evict the Roman usurpation. He opposeth to the lawfulnesse of their title, two other [Page 324] titles, which by reason of the venerablenesse of their names to whom they are affixed, will seem to deserve an examination ere that of the Romans can passe for indubitable.

1 He alledges the title of the house of David, and that promise, that there shall not want a man to sit on his Throne. Unto this I say, There was indeed such a promise given to David, 2 Sam 7.12. 1 Kings 2 4. which was the basis of the title of that house. But it is to be observed that the same promise was made, Jer. 33.17. with relation to the times after the se­venty years captivity. Now let the obj [...]ctor of this promise shew when, and in what sort this in the Pro­phet did, or was to receive accomplishment after the captivity: and it will easily appear, that the civill dominion, either of the Roman now, or of the Maccabees before, or of any other person was, or would have been no impeachment to that promise taking place, or to that title built upon it: but the one, and the other might we [...]l consist toge [...]her. The event sheweth, that the said promise was applicable to a two-fold fulfilling.

1 Temporall, or literal, in the natural posteri­ty of David, and with relation to Israel that dwelt in Canaan.

2 Spiritual, or mystical in the supernatural seed of David, that is, Christ; and with relation to Is­rael in all Nations, viz. the Church of Christ. And that the time was now come that the latter impletion was to take place; the which superseded not, but rather made way for the civill title of any who might have a faire call to the Throne over that Nation.

2 So far as the promi [...]e, and title was made to David, and his carnall seed, with relation to the Isra­elitish Nation, it was made with an expresse proviso, condition, and limitation, [of which see 1 King. 2.3, 4 Jer. 22 2, 3, 4, 5.] the which having been long ere this entry of the Romans often, and wholly broken, the promise, and title as to that sense of it, was void, and so could not stand as a bar to any other families capacity of that CrowneVide Monta­cut. Apparat. sect. 26 pag. 88..

[Page 325]3 It is evident (what ever had become of that condition) that promise was made concerni [...]g the worldly K ngdome of that Nation to continue no longer in force then to the coming of Christ, in, and by whom the Kingdome of David, and his seed was to be changed from an earthly, to an heavenly Kingdom: which was meant by Iohn Baptists, Christs, and his Apostles preaching the kingdome of h [...]aven. Matth. 3.2.4.17.10.7. By the prophecy of Jacob, the Scepter (to wit, the temporall power) was assured unto Judah, but un­till Shiloh's coming.

2 The other title he brings to nullifie that of the Roman is, of the great son of David, Christ himselfe, who, as Mr. Perkins acknowledgeth, Gen 49.10. was right heire to the Crowne, and kingdome of the Jewes. Let that passe f [...]r cu [...]rant, which is the comm [...]n opinion, that Christ was in a direct line Davids next na [...]ural heir: yet, what ever right might descend upon him, a civil, or temporall title to the Crown, and Kingdome of the Iewes, cannot be concluded to passe unto him thereby. His succession to David (though he took upon him his nature) was not of a civill, or earthly interest: as was before noted from the tenor of his preaching: and is further evident by his own deny­ing the title, and exercise of a worldly Kingdome to belong unto himselfeJohn 18.36. Luke 12.14.. And this, our Divines insist on, denying there was any civill dominion residing in him; in answer to the Popes advocates; who for the maintaining of a temporall power in their Pope, alledge there was a civill title to the K [...]ngdome of Judea in Christ: but this ours im­pugneVide Mont. Apparat 2. sect. 47. pag. 9. Chamier Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap. 4. Sect. 7, &c. & cap. 16. sect. 3, 4.10.

2 Suppose any right had accrued to him to the temporall Kingdome, yet this could not remain as a b [...]t unto the Roman, in as much as he waved, and receded from it: voluntarily taking upon him a sta [...]e of poverty, and servitude, and shunning the offers of the KingdomeIoh 6.15, 12 36. compared with vers. 18, 19.. Which he doing, either we must say, that he assigned his title to some other certaine person, or persons whereby all other were excluded [Page 326] from it:CHAP. X. SECT. II. Subsect. 2. or that he so declined the use of it himselfe, as that none other might assume it though by the Iewes agreement, but that they were necessarily, and of duty to be thenceforth headlesse, or without civill government; either of which there is no ground to affirme.

Subsection 2 Of Christs paying tribute, Matth. 17.

HAving thus disproved the imputation of usurpati­on to the Roman Government over Judea, upon which the strength of this second Objection lyes; I have yet something to say to the other part of the argument, the particulars brought to confirme the Romanes power to have been of God, and the ordi­nance of God, although in truth, the matter thus con­firmed, is not by me denyed.

1. Christ himself paid tribute, Matth. 17.14.

1 It is a question much agitated for whom that tribute was gathered; whether by Caesars Tribute-gatherers for his use; or by the officers of the Tem­ple for its service. There are very learned men for each of these wayes. That it was for Caesar say those two great Antiquaries,Montacut. O­rig. Eccles. part post pag. 196. Selden de jure Nat lib. 6. c. 18. Baronius ad An. 33. Num. 31. Casaub [...]n Exe [...]cit. 15. Sect. 19. Cameron Myroth in Matth. 27.24. Weems Expos. of judic. Law. pag. 51. Dr. Hammond Annot. on Mat. 17 24. Selden ut supra. Bishop Montague, and Mr. Selden. That it was not at all for him, but for the Temple, is the resolution of Baronius, Cameron, Ca­saubon, Mr. Weems, and Dr. Hammond: besides those whom Mr. Selden citeth in his dispute upon it, to wit, Hillary, Beza, Hottaman, Villalpandus, and Lipsius.

[Page 327]2 That payment was made by our Saviour with such cau [...]ion (expla [...]ning the consideration upon which it was done, to have been,CHAP. X SECT. I. Subsect. 3. not any strict right acknowledged to be in the thing, as from him, but to avoid offence in an act in it selfe unobliging) as leaveth the title of them that claimed it (supposing it was for Caesar) unstated as to civill dominion over the place, or as it would have been if such a thing never had been moved to, or performed by Christ.

Subsection 3. Of Christs commanding tribute-paying to Caesar.

2 CHrists answer to the Question concerning the Iewes payment of tribute to Caesar, was, Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesars, Matth. 22.21.

1. Some are of opinion that the words of Christ do not beare a command in them of that payment to that Emperour of Rome, but a generall precept on­ly, that, whereas the matter in question was a pay­ment by the Law of God due to the serv [...]ce of the Temple, but were now alienated from it by the Ro­man StateVide Calvin in Matth. 22.15. Dioda [...]e in vers. 17. Diete­ricus in Evang. Tom. 2. pag. 601.; and the Pharisees, and Herodians came in seditiously, and captiously upon our Saviour with this question, on purpose to render him by his posi­tive answer to it, obnoxious, either to the Roman State, if he should denySee Luke 20.20, 26. with cap. 23, 2; or to the Iewes, as an e­nemy to their Religion, and freedome, if he should grant it: Our Saviour Christ, being well aware of their conspiracy, and that he might both solve their question, and evade their snare, frames his answer by way of a generall rule, of giving to God, and to Caesar, each their own, without defining, what this in any particular in relation to either of them was, or which of them had the right to the payment in [Page 328] questionFor this inter­pretation see Marlor. in loc. Tostat. in loc. q. 104. Selden de jure Nat. lib. 6. c. 17. pag. 756.. And if it be granted that the tribute was usurped indeed from the service of the Temple to Caesars secular use, this (me thinks) appears the most probable Exposition: and the Text seems to incline to it, making the issue of this answer in them that moved the query to be [Luk. 20.26.] And they could n [...]t take hold of his words before the people: and they marvailed at his answer, and held their peace.

If they had understood in his words an expresse, and positive declaration (to the hypothesis, or parti­cular case) of an obligation to make that payment to Caesar; why? whence did they wonder? in stead of ad­miration, and silence, they would have broke out into exultation, as having obtained their end; and they had not been prevented of a hold upon his words before the people, but had that very handle they wi­shed for, in reference to the stirring up an odium in the multitude against him.

2. They that think otherwise, and suppose that our Saviours speech in these words, accompanied with a demand of a sight of the tribute-money, and an exact taking notice of the image, & superscription upon it to be Caesars, and with his finger (as it were) pointing at the portraicture, and style of Caesar upon the coyne, doth hold forth a precise determination for the payment of the tribute in question unto Cae­sar; withall do, and must understand this his deci­sion to be given in terms, not expressing the affirma­tive of the question, but wrapt up in a general reason for it, the giving to Caesar what-ever is due to Caesar, which laid down, and an assumption made out, from the inspection of the coyn, the engraved name, and figure of the person upon it, with the consideration of the adjunct of it, the Nations act of reception of that coyn, and that which by that act was signified, their entertainment of, and submission to the Roman So­veraignty, would m ke a compleat, and concluding argument for the tribute to be paid to Caesar. Now the prosyllogisme, or proof of the assumption of this a [...]gument (which is that which makes it beare a pa [...] ­ticular [Page 339] determination of the case) doth no lesse ex­presly assoyl the Roman Emperour from usurpation,CHAP. X. SECT. II. Subsect. 4, 5. and assert this title to the Iewish dominion by that Nations consent given, then it doth infer their duty of yielding that tribute, and is so a clear dissolving of the objection we are uponAnd so it is adjudged to be by Calv. in loc. vers. 18. & 21. by Mr. Selden de jure Nat. lib. 6. cap. 17. pag. 761. 763. 765. and by Doctor Hammond in loc..

Subsection 4. Of Christs acknowledging Pilates power to be of God.

3 WHereas the Objectors say, Christ acknowledged Pilates power to be of God, Iohn 19.11. This were someting indeed for them, if it could be proved, that the Romans power over the Iewes was usurped. But the evincing of this I think is forestalled above: And I shall onely adde, as a further testimony of the contrary, the paraphrase of Dr. Hammond upon the words of Christ to Pilate, here cited, which is, All power of the lawfull Magistrate is from God: and such I acknowledge thine to be.

Subsection 5. Of the Souldiers serving the Roman without the disallowance of John the Baptist, of Christ, or of his Apostles.

4 LAstly, for our Saviours, his Apost [...]es and John B [...]ptists, not reprehending their followers that were officers or souldiers of the Romans, for their being so. It may make an argument (though but [Page 330] such a one as is from testimony in matter of fact ne­gativè) for the lawfulnesse of Christians to war,CHAP. X. SECT. III. and to serve, and acknowledge, yea, and to beare civill Magistracy; but this doth not come up to any ad­vantage of the objection: for it neither carryieth in it, or hath added to it any evidence against the Ro­mans title to Judea: neither doth it justifie any act but what might have been done if the Romans had been indeed usurp [...]rs.

Subsection 1. Of the examples of the Jewes, and Christians submission to these (supposed) usurpers over them.

Answer. THis objection must be answered by pa [...]ts.

1. For the examples of the Jewes sub­mitting to those Kings of Babylon, Persia, and G [...]eece, which the Histories mention, and of the Christians so doing to certain violent intruders into the Roman imperiall dignity.

1 Some submission may be yielded and necessa­ry to the present possessor, when he is not the power of God, ordained of God, yea, and when another is that power: of which divers precedents have been before given out of ScriptureChap. 7. Sect. 2. Subsect. 5. & 8.. As there may be actu­al rule without authority, so there may be actual sub­jection, and no allegiance. But this submission is of another nature, different from that which is proper, and peculiar to divinely constituted powers. Of which difference somewhat ere I conclude.

2 That the Jewes were Subjects by League, and dedition to the Babylonian, Pe [...]sian, Grecian, and Roman Empires successively, was above testified by Mr. Selden, and others in answer to the second objecti­on. And if so, then they were subject to them of right, as to their Magistrates, authorized by God. And whe [...]eas some have objected that rule of Deut. 17.14, 15. enjoyning the Israelites to set to be King over them one of their brethren, and not a stran­ger. [Page 336] To hinder the justnesse of their title, or to ille­gitimate the said submission of the Jewes to those Rulers.

1 If it did so, then is not that their submission to be urged as presidential to others, or as a proof, that those they submitted to were powers over them of Gods ordaining.

2 But I take that of Moses to be no disallowance of the Jewes owning the Babylonian, &c.

1 That rule in Moses seems to point at no other time but their first establishment, or erection of their Kingdome.

2 It respecteth them onely in the condition of the free possession of their owne Land.

3 For their submission to the Babylonian, the Scriptures referred to in the objection, expresly deliver a command from God, the which (if that of Moses were still, and in that condition binding) was a Supersedeas to what was before given.

3 No particular instances are brought when, or who were the Christians that subjected, or, to whom, or who the Emperours that usurped; if any be to be given, either the like answer as is now made to those of the Jewes may suffice, or a further may be to be rendred. But somewhat of the Christians carriage to some of the Roman usurpers will be said anon.

Subsection 2. CHAP. X. SECT. IV. Subsect. 2. Of the commands the Jewes had of submitting to the Babylonian.

2 FOr the commands, and exhortations which the Jewes had to yield to Nebuchadnezzar. 1. Those commands, Jer. 27.1. to the 18.28. 14, 16.38.17, &c. 21.8, 9. seem not to have been delivered untill after the King, and people of Judah had first of their own accord, yielded up themselves to Nebuchadnez­zar. Compare the said passages which reduce them­selves within Zedekiah's reign, with 2 King. 24.1. Jer. 37.2. Ezek. 17.13, &c. 2. If those commands be extended to others besides to whom they were then personally given, they do directly contradict that which they are brought to prove, viz. That a present possessor is to be submitted to, as Gods pow­er, and ordinance. For when these commands were directed out, who was the present p [...]ssessor of rule o­ver the Jewes? not Nebuchadnezzar, for Zedekiah, and his people had rebelled against him after they had sworn allegiance to himKing. 24.20. 2 Chron. 36.13. Jer. 52.3. Ezek. 17.13, 14, 15.: and Zed [...]kiah was now in fact the supream Governour: yet are these commands given, and urged again and again by the Prophet from the Lord, both to Zedekiah to subject himself, and to the Priests, and people (in case Zedekiah would not) to surrender themselves to Nebuchad­nezzar: For which he is therefore complained of to Zedekiah as an author of defectionJer. 38.4..

These commands have been much of late alledged, but they make little for the alledgers purpose: they holding forth one as p [...]oprietor of Dominion, to wit, Nebuchadnezzar, another as possessor, Zedekiah, and enjoyning the Iewes to desert the possessor, and yield themselves to the proprietor, then out of possession.

[Page 338]2. For that command, Jer. 29.7. 1. The mat­ter commanded is no more, but that the Jewes, cap­tives in the City of Babylon, should seek the publique peace of that City, and pray unto the Lord for it. Which may be a duty ordinarily incumbent on the people of God in relation to any City, or Terri­tory, whether themselves reside within, and be actu­ally under the government of it, or not; and upon whatsoever termes the governm [...]nt thereof might stand; according to the Apostles rule2 Tim. 2.1.. But ob­serve, the interest of the present government is not put into into that command, nominately; nor o­therwise implyed then as it might conduce to the Cities peace; neither is the said interest implyed to be necessary to the said publique peace.

2 Such as that precept is, it is apparent to have been but of a temporary nature, and given upon a speciall occasion of their being captives in that City, and of their being declared to be sure so to be, and there to serve the Kings of Babylon untill the end of seventy years, and it being declared they were sent from Judea thither by God for the better place, and their own peace to be bound up in that of Babylon See this Text it selfe, and Jer. 24.5, &c. 25.11.21.8, 9.38.2, 17, &c.. For after the terme of that captivity exp [...]ed, they are called out thence again, and are taught the con­trary carriage towards towards that City, to wit, not onely to depart out of, but to pray against it, use imprecations upon it, and exultations in its ruineJer. 50.8, 28.51.35. Psal. 137.8, 9..

3. It is in like manner to be said of all those fore­mentioned commands of God to the Jewes, and to the other Nations, for their submission to Nebuchad­nezzar, that they were of an extraordinary, and pecu­liar nature, and not binding to others in like condi­tion. They were such speciall Declarations of Gods will, and disposall as do not impose upon any but hose unto whom they were particularly made. I may leave it to the determination of any considerate man, whether if now the Turk, Tartar, Chinaois, or any other Mahometan, o [...] Pagan P [...]ince, yea, or any one of the Princes of Europe, of a warlike spirit, and [Page 339] growing more potent in Armes then the rest, should discover his designes, make preparations, and give out threatnings for the conquest of the Nations a­bout (as then did Nebuchadn [...]zzar in reference to the Kingdomes of Palestina, and others) were the said Princes and States of Europe bound to surrender themselves as servants, or tributaries to him, and his posterity (either for the definite space of 70 yeares, or for the alwayes of his, or their standing up) under payn of destruction from God, if they should not, by vertue of that which God declareth to the Kings, and people of Judah, and other Nations concerning Nebuchadnezzar by the Prophet Jeremiah Jer. 27. per to­tum.. Or, if a Kingdome be invaded by a forein Potentate, and the chiefe City, and strength of it be by him besieged, is the supream Commander, or the people without him, necessarily bound to yield to their Invader, and besieger, because of what is declared, and denoun­ced to Zedekiah, and them of Hierusalem Jer. 21.8, 9.38.17, &c.? Or let the urgers of these instances themselves be judges, whether, because Zedekiah with his people having been (formerly) the subjects of Nebuchadnezzar, and sworn to him, and lately revolted from him, and now summoned by him to re-deliver themselves up to him; and they being reproved by the Prophets, Jeremiah, and Ez [...]kiel, for their revolt, and call'd upon for the said rendition, were thereupon obliged to submit to Nebuchadnezzar: therefore in like man­ner others that have been under the like obligations to a Prince, and have cast him off, are in conscience bound upon summons to render themselves to him by force of those Texts.