OUR Tender regard to the Priviledges, and Freedom of Parliament on which our hopes of common Freedome and Right do so much de­pend, and our late experience what Offence many, (even honest men) seem to have taken, and what advantage evill men have made of our least interposing, in any thing of Civill con­sideration to the Parliament, hath made us for a long time hitherto, (as it should alwayes make us even to utmost extremity,) to at­tend in silence the Councels and determinations of Parliament concerning all matters of that nature whatsoever; but finding [Page 4]you to have been of late upon those transactions of highest mo­ment, whereupon the life or death of all our Civill Interest does depend, and that the publique affairs in your hands (not without the influence of forcible Impulsions from your Enemies, and such as have been stirr'd up by them) are brought to the utmost crisis of danger (which calls upon every man to contribute what help he can) and seeing no effectuall help from elsewhere to ap­pear, we cannot be (because in conscience and duty to God and men, we hold our selves Obliged in such case not to be) altoge­ther silent, or wanting in ought we can honestly say or do to hold off impending ruine from an honest people, and a good Cause.

We are not ignorant, that that Rule of Salus populi suprema Lex, is of all others most apt to be abused, or mis-applyed, and yet none more surely true, it is too ordinary, (especially of late times) for men who either from intentions of evill, or inordi­nate temper of spirit, would break those bonds of Law and Ma­gestracie which they finde to restrain them, to frame pretences of publique danger, and extremity thereof, and from thence imme­diatly to assume a liberty to break or else neglect, and flye above the due bounds of Order and Government, and stir up others to the same, pleading priviledge from that vast large rule of Salus populi, &c. from such mis-applications, whereof great distur­bances do oft arise and confusion is indanger'd; and yet we know the same may be justly pretended and followed, and that (where it is from honest publique intentions, and upon cleer grounds) with very happy effects: We have seen, in this our age, seve­rall instances in both kinds, and the hand of God bearing testi­monie, and giving Judgment for some, and yet against others where the pretensions have been the same, or so like as it was hard for humane judgement to distinguish. And indeed since the right or wrong of such proceedings depends chiefly upon the good or ill, publique or selvish, sircere or corrupt intentions of the parties pretending (which humane judgment cannot ordina­rily reach into) and partly upon the justness, or caussesness, ne­cessitie or lightness, of th' occasion taken from those against whem the pretence is (which again depends partly upon their [Page 5]carriages, and partly upon their intentions, the latter whereof is not cleerly or properly under mans judgement and the former without a full knowledge of particulars not easie for man to give a certain judgment of) therefore as the engaging upon such pretences and principles does alwayes imply, and is for most part expresly accompanied with appeals to God for Iudgment, so 'tis the proper work of God to bear true wit­nesse and give righteous judgment in such cases; and as he is alwayes engaged to do it sooner or later, cleerer or darker, so in this Age and part of the world he hath see­med both to make haste to judgment in such cases (to give it quick and speedy) and also to make bare His Arm therein that men may see it; and hath appeared, as a severe avenger against such pretenders, (where it hath been in falshood, and with evill or corrupt intentions) so also a discoun­tenancer thereof (even where't hath been with good intentions, if not necessary in the grounds, or from im­patient temper of spirit,) and yet in other Cases (where, as the ends have been publike and the intentions upright, so the grounds weighty, the case necessary in relation to those ends, and the proceeding sober, temperate, and but proportionable to the ends, grounds, and necessitie) a just assertor and Patron of the Right and Vindicator of the hidden Truth and simplicitie of the pretenders by a glorious presence with them, and successe to them in such proceedings. Neither wants there ground for men to make some judgment therein. For certainly he that engageth upon such pretences really for publique ends, and but upon publique ne­cessitie or extreamitie, and with a sober spirit, (all which must concur to their full justification therein) will both try first all honest wayes possible (with safetie in those ends) whereby he may accomplish them and avoyd the danger (if possible) with due regard to, and by concurrence or with preservation of the Magistracie and Government un­which God hath set him, before he will flye to wayes of extremitie, neither will he (when ingaged therein) pro­ceed further or longer in that way against or without the Magestracie then that first necessitie or some other (emer­gent [Page 6]upon the proceeding) does justly leed, and the securi­tie of the ends require (not driving that pretence of necessity further to serve or advantage himselfe or perpetuate those wayes of extremity) but when the necessitie or danger is over, and the publique ends secured, will return to Magi­stracy and Order again, and mean while so act in all as carefully to avoyd both injury to the innocent and offence to the weak, and as subjecting or expecting, and ready to subject all to an indifferent and equall judgment, (even of men) if and when it can be found and really indeavouring to find it. For our parts both prudentiall considerations, and the experience we have of the danger that is in the least breaking or letting loose or entangling the reines of Order and Government, upon such pretences makes us most ten­der of it, (as that which is never otherwise to be used or admitted, then as a desperate cure in a desperate case, and at the utmost perill as well of them that use it, as of those for whom) and the experiences we have seen of Gods righteous Judgments in such cases as it makes us not apt (without trembling and fear) to think of such procee­dings, so much the more strict to observe all the aforesaid cautions concerning them, and yet where just occasion and a reall publique necessitie calls thereunto, not to fear such appeals to God for any outward difficulties or dangers ap­pearing to our selves therein; But both from divine and humane considerations as we do and ever shall avoyde the occasions by all means possible (even to utmost extremitie) and do pray and hope we may never come to it, so (if ever such extremitie do happen to us) we hope (through the grace of God) we shall be carefull and enabled, both in the engaging and proceeding therein; so to act as before the Lord, and to approve our selves both to God and good men, and as submitting to the judgement of both. And therefore though we are full of sad apprehensions of present dangers to the publicke interest, and the extremity even at hand, yet we shall first in all humblenesse and sobernesse of minde, and with all cleernesse (as God shall inable us) remonstrate to you our apprehensions both of the dan­gers [Page 7]at hand, and of the remedies, with our grounds in both.

First therefore, we must minde You of Your Votes once past concerning no more Addresses to the King, &c. and our Engagement to adhere to you therein: Concerning which we shall not invite you to look back to any grounds thereof, further then to what your selves declared and published thereupon, and what we in that our Engagement did summa­rily lay down as our satisfaction therein: We shall onely wish it may be remembred how free you were therein, and what state You and the Kingdome were in then, and how it fared with You thereupon, untill you began to recede, and how upon and since your receding.

For the first (what ever evill men may slandrously suggest in relation to other matters, yet) in this surely none can say you were acted beyond your own free Judgements, we are sure, not by any impulsion from the Army; since nothing that ever past from us to you before did look with any As­pect that way, but rather to the contrary; (we may speak it with sorrow and shame in relation to that unbeleef or distrust in God, and those carnall feares of publique distur­bance from which we had before been acted, so much the other way) so that in that particular the juster Resolutions of this House did not onely lead us, but help to reclaim us, from thoughts too much wandring the contrary way.

For the latter you may remember, that when you took those resolutions, discontent (even to distraction) did abound all the Kingdome over, in the people, for the bur­then of numerous and unsetled Forces, and the oppression of Free quarter by them, and in the Souldiers for want of pay and satisfaction or securitie in point of Arrears and in­dempnitie (their discontents increasing with their Arrears) and indeed the Souldiery (in regard thereof and of some harsh provocations to them and your former uncertaintie in any way of settlement) something loose towards your selves, and their proper Government, and disposed too much, to disturbances amongst themselves. But upon those [Page 8]Resolutions of yours against any further Addresses to the King, &c. (which all men understood to imply some fur­ther intentions of proceeding in Justice against him and set­ling the Kingdome without him) immediatly the unsetled­nesse of mens minds and jealousies of severall parties (con­cerning ones complyance with and seeking advantage from the Kings partee against the other) were greatly allayed, and (together with his opportunities and advantages to cajole, or insinuate with one or other) did seem to be taken away, and it pleased God, instantly to leade you into such other Councels and wayes, whereby the burthen and grievances of Free quarter were immediatly taken off, supernumerarie Forces disbanded, the rest put into an established way of pay, the Arrears in some measure secured, and further growth thereof prevented, the distempers amongst the souldiery quieted, and they resetled in good Order and Discipline, and their hearts (with all honest and sober mens) firmely knit unto you, and the whole affaires of the Kingdome in an hopefull posture for a settlement.

But when, the House being called (as it were) on purpose for a settlement, in stead thereof, upon what jealousies of some amongst your selves, what private animosities, envy­ings and vindictive desires of others (giving up themselves, with dispending or neglect of the common and publique interest, to minde particular interests and parties, and to seek and take advantages against their opposites even from hoped (if not formed) compliances of common enemies and appearances from Forraign parts on their behalf, where­by to work out revenge against those they immediatly malig­ned,) or from what crafty insinuations of corrupt members and alwayes false to the publique interest or upon what other evill principles, we are unwilling to remember or imagine; when (we say) upon those (instead of a settlement upon the former foundation) you began to entertain motions tending to the unsettlement of what you had resolved, and when by that uncertainty and unsetledness of Councels appearing within your selves, and the answerable insinuations and influences of severall Members (according to their severall bents and desires [Page 9]unto their respective Correspondents and Friends abroad, the mindes of men without also became proportionably unsetled, tos­sed too and fro with various apprehensions & expectations which way things would bend, and all to see such vast uncertainty of any settlement or end of troubles upon the Parliamentary account a­lone: then (and not till then) began the generality of the people to be apt for any new motions, especially such as look'd towards a settlement any way; and then began your enemies to conceive fresh hopes and confidences, and bestirr'd themselves accordingly, to work your trouble, and their own advantages. The most subtill and sober of them (dissembling the interest of their own partie, and reserving that at the bottom, as close and unseen as might be, and taking their rise even from that unsetlednesse, and those grounds of jealousies and division they found amongst your selves, and the severall parties pretending to Parliamentary interest, and from that disposition they found in one party by any means to take advantage and revenge against the other) they made pretences part­ly of publick Interest, and partly of the very particular Interests of that party which they found most discontented amongst your selves, the foundations whereupon to raise new disturbances, and therein to ingage a numerous and mixt party; but upon such grounds, and in such a way, wherein the Interest of the King and his party were so incorporated throughout, as that the pro­secution of all the other Interests pretended (in the way that was laid) should carry on, and at last set up that of the Kings and their own above all others. Thus, the Army (which after all possible tryals and temptations they found would never be won to be their friends, so as to desert the Parliamentary and Publick In­terest to serve their turns,) being therefore industriously by them (with the furtherance of discontented parties amongst your friends) rendered the onely common Enemy, and they themselves (as it were) friends to all but it, and that supposed party in Parlia­ment and Kingdom that cordially upheld it: they and their busie promoters of Petitions (stirred up by their Emissaries or Agents in all Counties, for the engaging and cementing of this new form'd and intended generall party) being all taught the same language, at first professe fair. For the Parliament, or nothing a­gainst it; but to be for a full and free Parliament, and to deliver [Page 10]it from the force of an Army; pretend for the Liberty of the sub­ject also (to free them from the oppression and tyranny of an Army) to be for the Law of the Land against the Arbitrary power of a Faction in parliament setting up and supporting themselves above Law by the power of an Army; (whereas, in truth, their great and latest quarrell against the Army, was, That it would not force the Parliament to comply with the will and interest of the King, to the prejudice of the Kingdoms Liberties, and of the power of Law therein, nor desert the Parliament in their adherence to these against the King.) They pretended like­wise to be much for the ease of the people, to free them from Taxes and Contributions to an Army, to be for the settlement of peace in the Kingdom, that there might be no need of an Army; (whereas, 'twas indeed, their restlesse workings, and watching all advantages, by parties within this Kingdom, or Forraign aids, to set up their own and the Kings Interest, to the ruine of the Parlia­ment, and enslaving of the Kingdom, that did necessitate the Par­liament to continue an Army and taxes to maintain it.) They pre­tended for Religion too, and for Reformation, and the Cove­nant, against an Army of Sectaries and opposers thereof: yea, they yet pretended even for the Army it self (as to the Body of it, and all but a faction of Officers in it, supporting themselves in power and dominion by it) that the Army might be satisfied their Arrears, and go home: And for all these fair ends, (presuming up­on the Parliaments unsetlednesse and weaknesse, as not able, or not knowing how to provide for any of these things of them­selves without the King) a personal Treaty with the King must be held forth as the onely soveraign salve. Thus the people being made to depend mainly upon the King for all, and his Interest made necessary to all, the other pretences were but made use of to serve his ends, and an easie way made to set up him and his Inter­est above all. As to the hypocrisie of these pretences, we need say nothing more; The Lord himself in our silence (even when by such pretexts, and their quick proceedings upon them, they had made such engaging work for us in all parts, as gave us no leisure to say any thing for the undeceiving of men, or vindicating our selves, or so much as to make any publick verball appeal to him for it) hath yet from heaven judged them, and born a cleer testimony a­gainst [Page 11]them in defeating, with a small handful, the numerous parties, they had thus engaged within the Kingdom, and drawn from elsewhere, (under the very same pretexts) to invade it; and breaking the force of those designes, so cunningly and taking­ly laid, and so strongly backt with advantages, as 'twas scarce imaginable (in humane reason,) all things considered, how to avoid them.

But however (working upon that unsetledness in the peo­ples mindes, which the uncertaintie and Divisions in your own Councels had occasioned; and having the advantage of that general disposition, in a burthened and troubled people, to en­tertain any motions, and follow any party, pretending to end their troubles, and ease their burthens, against the present party in power, from whom immediately they apprehend them,) they made a shift to engage multitudes to Petition for these things; and thence, under the pretence of freeing the Parliament from force, to raise Arms and leavy War against it (at best) to inforce their Petitions, and under the notion of freeing the peo­ple from taxes to the Parliament, and quarter to the Army; to make them incur greater charges and burthens, for the King and his party, and (by withholding their taxes from the Parlia­ment) to necessitate free quarter again upon themselves (which before they were delivered from) and under the notion of setling Peace, and the Liberties of the Kingdom, to break that we had, and ingage the people in another War on the Kings behalf, against the Parliament and their own Liberties, and to get his party, (with Commissions derived from him,) into the conduct and manage of it.

But whilest therein (with open force) they do their utmost to destroy and subdue you, they omit not the driving on of that surest part in their designe (a personal Treaty) to deceive you. To promote which, they had (besides numerous, and daily Peti­tioners from all parts, deluded and drawn in by the aforesaid specious pretences) the deluded multitude and rabble about the City, with the old Malignants, new Apostates, and late discon­tented party, both in the City and Parliament it self; the one at your elbows, the other in your bosoms, pressing you incessantly: The Lords, in every thing (relating to the Treaty) closing readily [Page 12]with the desires of the City Malignants, the Prince, and all your Enemies; and in their Votes for the same, going before you, and haling you after (although in things concerning the prosecution of the War in your own, and the Kingdoms necessa­ry defence; (especially in declaring with you against those visible Enemies and Actors therein. (The Scots Army and others) they would neither lead nor follow.) And when, at any thing pro­pounded towards the Treaty (wherein you found the very life of your Cause, and the Kingdoms to be concerned,) you were loath to give up that, and thereupon made some stick; then clamorous Petitions for a concurrence, come thick from the City, with menaces insinuated; many debaucht Reformadoes, the desperate Cavaliers, and rude multitude about the City, ring in your ears with raylings and threats, many faithful Members, particularly frighted, or driven out of Town, forces listed and gathering daily about you; and this, the City, neither taking course to re­strain, nor suffering their Major General to do it; but opposing and incountring his and your Authority, in what he, by it, at­tempted for your safety and freedom; and these courses never ceased, until you had fully agreed to a Personal Treaty, on such terms, as His Majestie Himself was pleased to entertain.

By these means, and such continued usage, from the City, and those in and about it (at whose mercy, you were, while your Army was engaged at distance against your Enemies in arms) by that time God had broke all their forces, delivered most of them into your hands and crusht all their hopes of avayling that way: We finde them at last, drawn into this miserable inconvenience of a personal Treaty with him, and his adherents, who had so long and uncessantly tryed all Interests, and wearied all friends in this, and many forraign Nations, by force, to destroy or sub­due you. In which, though we see more utter and less avoyd­able danger to the Kingdoms Cause, and to all the godly and honest people engaged with you, then before, in your lowest or worst conditions, we ever yet apprehended.

Yet considering the premises, and how great the change is from Votes of no more Addresses, to (not your wonted positive sending of Propositions anew, but) a Treaty, a Personal Trea­ty, without any previous satisfaction or security, and a Treaty [Page 13]upon what Propositions he should make, as well as your own (all which, both Houses, yea, both Kingdoms have so often, and always before declined, voted, and declared against, as delusive and dangerous, yea destructive, while the Parliament was un­questionably most free.)

We cannot but conceive, That at that time, and in those Re­solutions for such a Treaty, the judgment of Parliament, was not with due, and former Freedom. And therefore not dispair­ing, but that (as men drawn or driven into dangerous straits) you may readily entertain, or at least, favorably resent, any thing of Light, or encouragement, that may be offered towards the saving or extricating of your selves, and those you are intrusted for: We shall, with all plainness and faithfulness, represent to you our Conceptions, where the main danger seems to lie, and where any way to escape. And we hope, 'twill be thought no arro­gance in us, or disparagement to your Wisdoms, since lookers on may (possibly) see something, the gamesters do not.

For the evils and dangers of this Personal Treaty, had it been admitted to be indeed with his person in Parliament (especially at London,) and in a full condition of honor, freedom, and safety, (which had implyed, That after all the trouble, loss, hazard, and the expence of blood, and treasure he had put the Kingdom unto, he should be admitted to his Throne, and Office, without any satisfaction before given for what was past, or security against the like in future,) the evil and danger thereof had been so visible, as nothing had need to have been said to unfold it. As it is now admitted and qualified for circumstances (the case being as't has pleased God to make it, That the King has no power in field whereby to take advantages during the Treaty,) we shall say nothing to any dangers of that kinde (supposing no agree­ment) save to wish you consider the opportunities of laying Designes for his escape, or otherwise, and of setling future cor­respondences, which the company and confluence of such per­sons about him does afford: But we shall chiefly consider, the great evil or danger of seeking to him by Treaty, in your present case, and of an agreement or accommodation to be thereby made with him, including his impunity and restitution to his freedom, revenue, dignity, office or government.

Now, as to that, the great Questions will be,

1. Whether (as your, and this Kingdoms Case stands) such an Accommodation would be: (First,) Just or good, and so de­sireable, or (if not,) where the injustice or evillies? (Secondly,) Whether safe, and to be admitted, or (if not) where the danger lies?

2. (Admitting that upon some suppositions, it might be good or safe,) Whether yet it can be so, or such a one can be had in the way and conditions of this Treaty, as the case stands?

If either in the General, or in respect of your and the King­doms present Case, and of the way and conditions of this Treaty, it cannot be safe, then it concerns the Parliament not to admit such an accommodation or agreement upon this Treaty; and (though it might be safe, yet,) if it be otherwise evil, or not good, then you have no reason, but to use any free­dom or just grounds remaining to decline it.

To these Questions therefore, because the safety or danger, good or evil in Question, is chiefly in relation to the Publike Interest of the Kingdom, and not so much to particular mens, (though even the particular safety of such as have engaged for the Publike, is not to be neglected,) to lead our selves and others to the clearer judgment in the point; we shall premise a stating of the Publike Interest in Question, in opposition to the Kings, and of his particular Interest opposed thereto.

The sum of the Publike Interest of a nation, in relation to common Right and Freedom, (which has been the chief subject of our contest,) and in opposition to tyranny and injustice of Kings or others, we take to lie in these things following.

1. That for all matters of supreme trust or concernment to the safety and welfare of the whole, They have a common and supreme Councell or Parliament; and that (as to the common behalf, who cannot all meet together themselves) to consist of [Page 15]Deputies or Representers freely chosen by them, with as much equality as may be, and those Elections to be successive and re­newed, either at times certain and stated, or at the Call of some subordinate standing Officer or Councell entrusted by them for that purpose, in the Intervals of the supreme, or else at both.

2. That the power of making Laws, Constitutions, and Offices, (for the preservation and government of the whole) and of altering or repealing, and abolishing the same (for the remo­vall of any publick grievance therein) and the power of finall Judgment concerning War or peace, the safety and welfare of the people, and all civill things whatsoever, without further Appeal to any created standing power, and the supreme trust in relation to all such things, may rest in that supreme Councell: so as;

1. That the ordinary ordering and Government of the peo­ple may be by such Offices and Administrations, and according to such Laws and Rules, as by that Councell or the Representa­tive body of the people therein, have been prescribed or allowed, and not otherwise.

2. That none of those extraordinary or Arbitrary powers afore-mentioned, may be exercised towards the people by any, as of right, but by that supreme Councell, or the Representa­tive body of the people therein, nor without their advice and consent, may any thing be imposed upon, or taken from the people; or if it be otherwise a tempted by any, That the peo­ple be not bound thereby but free, and th'attempters punish­able.

3. That those extraordinary power or any of them, may be exercised by that supreme Councell, or by the Representative body of the people therein, and where they shall see cause to assume and exercise the same, in a matter which they finde ne­cessary for the safety or wel-being of the people, their procee­dings and determinations therein, may be binding and conclu­sive [Page 16]to the people, and to all Officers of Justice and Ministers of state whatsoever: and that it may not be left in the will of the King or any particular persons (standing in their own interest) to oppose, make void, or tender ineffectuall such their determi­nations or proceedings; and especially (since the having of good constitutions, and making of good laws were of little security or [...], without power to punish those that breake or go about to [...]throw them; and many such cases may happen, wherein one former lawes have not prescribed or provided sufficiently for that purpose, or the ordinary officers entrusted therewith may not be faithfull or not able, duly to execute such punish­ments on many offendors in that kinde; that therefore the same Councell or Representative body therein (having the su­pream trust) may in all such cases where the offence or default is in publike Officers (abusing or failing their trust) or in any person whatsoever (if the offence extend to the prejudice of the publike) may call such offendors to account and distribute pu­nishments to them, either according to the Law, (where it has provided) or their own Judgement (where it has not, and they finde the offence, though not particularly provided against by particular Lawes, yet, against the generall law of reason or Nati­ons, and the vindication of publike interest to require justice) and that in such case, no person whatsoever may be exempt from such account or punishment, or have power to protect o­thers from their judgement or (without their consent) to par­don whom they have judged.

These things contain the sum or main of publike interest, and as they are the ordinary subject of civill contests in all mixt states, where they happen betwixt the people, and those that have assumed or claimed a standing priviledge or prerogative over them, so they have been in this of ours. And against these matters of publike interest this King hath (all along his raign) opposed, and given himself up to uphold and advance the interest of his and his posterities will and power; first, That there might be no such Common Councell (no Parlia­ments) at all, to restrain or check him, but that all these matters of supreme trust concerning safety and all things else [Page 17]might rest in him and his brest alone, without limit from or account to any on Earth, and that all those extraor­dinary and Arbitrary Powers over the people, their Lawes, Liberties, Properties (yea, their persons and consciences too) might bee exercised at pleasure by himselfe, and such as hee pleased to derive the same unto; and as they were assumed, so how vastly and sadly ill they were exercised by him to the prejudice and oppression of the people in gene­rall, and the ruine or persecution of all the godly of the Land; yea, even of those that were but sober and honest to civill Interest, surely (unlesse the greater pressures here hath since wrought himselfe or brought upon us, by ne­cessitating the Parliament thereunto, have swallowed up the former in Oblivion) we need not yet make any verball remembrance: To support himselfe in that state or height of Tyranny and make it absolute, He rais'd his first and second Armes against his people in both Kingdomes, when hee found hee could not keep up to that height, to have all those extraordinary powers and matters of Supreme ab­solute trust in himselfe alone, them be fell to play lower; that at least none of them might bee exercised by any other without him, no not by all the Trustees of the Land, nor in any case though never so necessary for the releife or saving of the people. That if (according to his former claim) his people and Parliament would not admit him positively to oppresse or destroy them at his will, yet by this latter, they should have no power to redresse agrievance, to pro­vide for the freedom welfare, or so much as immediate safety of themselves or the Kingdome, but at and according to his pleasure; and for this (when the Parliament did otherwise assume in point of immediate safety and pu­nishment of Delinquents without him) he rais'd his third Armes, and held them up so long and so much, to the spoyle and neare desolation of the Kingdome, till God wholly broke them, and brought himselfe captive into your hands. And in this, though he raised them with the pretence only of opposing the exercise of those extraordi­nary and Arbitrary Powers by your selves or any other [Page 18]without him, (which would not be allowed himselfe to ex­ercise alone,) yet in the raising and having rais'd that force, he did by it assume and exercise all kinds of absolute and Arbitrary Powers at his own will alone without Parliament; and how much further he would have gone in exercise of the same, (had he prevail'd as you) we may easily imagine. But as to that part of his claime against the publike Interest, viz. That there might be no power in Parliament to provide for immediate safety, or doe ought else for the people but at and according to his will) how obstinately (even since God gave him and his party wholly into your hands) hath he main­tained and persisted in it, (even so long as from forraign parts, or Allies, from Irish, Scots, from your own divisions or discontents of the people (at the burthens he necessi­tated you to continue upon them) he had any hopes by force to prevaile against you or avoid any concession against that claime) and of this his so many denials to the Pro­positions of Peace, which both Houses and both Kingdomes have so often tendred and renewed, yea, of those foure only Bills, (concerning purely that publike Interest, and but a small part of it, together with essentiall precautions for a Treaty,) doe aford abundant evidence; As to which last tender, it is apparent he had no pretext left for refusall, from either scruple of Conscience, matter of harshnesse to his party, or ought else, but the meer Interest of will and power, to himselfe and his, which some Scottish and other correspon­dencies (it seemes) then gave him hopes, yet by force to uphold; insomuch as upon that refusall (added to all the former) you found it necessary at last to take up those reso­lutions of no further addresses to him, but to settle the Peace of the Kingdom without him, and secure it and your selves against him, and in order thereto to keep his person in safe Custody at Carisbrook Castle. But when (his other claimes so farre failing) it came to this, He that before would not have allowed the Parliament or Kingdom a Power for safety but at his will, would (at least,) make you know, that, nor You nor the Kingdome should have any Peace or quiet without him, and that neither Parliament nor any [Page 19]Power on Earth (what ever ills he had done,) might for it attach or meddle with his Sacred Person, no not so much as to secure him from opportunities of doing more; and for this last part of his Interest his fourth Armes, (the last warre) was rais'd (by Commissions from himselfe to the Prince, and from him to as many more as would take any) and for the same, the Scotish Invasion was procured. The pretext or quarrell in this last Engagement, seemed (as it were) to reach no higher then only to rescue his priviledged Person, and force the Parliament, yet in a Personall Treaty, to seek Peace at his will, and to let them see they could not other­wise have it, not might doe ought against his person (no not to secure him from doing further mischief) though he make Warre and refuse Peace never so long: And for this last piece of his Interest (as opposite and destructive to that of the Pub­lick as any of the former) though a Divine Testimony has been born against it, as full and more glorious (if possible) then before, against any of the rest as if God would thereby declare his designing of that Person to Justice; yet the Parliament after all this, restoring him (without any pre­satisfaction or security) unto a kinde of Liberty and State, only that he might appeare in a capacity to Treat, and then by Treaty seeking their Peace, and all their matters (before contended for, and (though God) gained against him) to come now as concessions from his will, doe clearely yeeld back that last piece of his claimed interest into his hands againe, and indeed (therewith) seem to render a more reall acknowledgement and yeelding to him, and against Parli­ament and Kingdome (as to the precedent just right of what ever's now demanded or granted as from him,) then all his verball wrested concessions or confessions will be understood, to be unto Parliament or Kingdome, as to any future clear­ing or assurance of those things.

But (to return to our purpose) The matters aforemen­tioned being the maine parts of publique interest original­ly contended for on your parts, and theirs that ingaged with you, and thus opposed by the King for the interest of his will and power, many other more particular or speciall interests have occasionally faln into the contest on each par­ty; [Page 20]As first on the Parliaments part, to protect and coun­tenance religious men and godlinesse in the power of it, to give freedome and inlargement to the Gospell, (for the en­creasing and spreading of light amongst men) to take away those corrupted formes of an out-side religion and Church government, (whether imposed without Law, or rooted in the Law in times of popish ignorance or idolatry, or of the Gospels dimmer light) by meanes whereof, snares and chaines were layd upon conscientious and zealous men, and the generallity of people held in darknesse, superstition, and a blind reverence of persons and outward things fit for po­pery and slavery; and also to take away or loosen that de­pendance of the Clergy, and Ecclesiasticall affaires upon the King, and that interest of the Clergy in the Lawes and ci­vill affaires, which the craft of both in length of time had wrought for each other; (which severall things were the proper subject of the Reformation endeavoured by the Parli­ament.) Contrary wise on the Kings party, the interest was to discountenance and suppresse the power of godlinesse, or any thing of conscience obliging above or against humane and outward constitutions, to restraine or lessen the preach­ing of the Gospel, and growth of light amongst men, to hold the community of men (as much as might bee) In a darksome ignorance and superstition, or formality in Religi­on, with only an awfull reverence of perions, offices, and out­ward dispensations (rendring them fit subjects for ecclesiasti­call and civill tyranny) and for these ends to advance and set up further formes of superstition, or at least hold fast the old which had any foundation in the Laws, (whereby chains and setters might be held upon, and advantages taken a­gainst such in whom a zeale or conscience to any thing above man should breake forth) and to uphold and maintaine the dependance of the Clergy and Church matters upon the King and greatnesse of the Clergy under him, and in all these things to oppose the Reformation endeavoured by the Par­liament. Also on the Parliaments party, their interest (as well as duty) was to discountenance irreligion, prophanesse, debauchery, vanity, ambition and time serving, and to pre­ser such especially as were otherwise given, [viz. consci­encious, [Page 21]strickt in manners, sober, serious, and of plaine and publique spirits.] Contrary to these, on the Kings party, it was to countenance or connive at prophanesse, loosenesse of manners, vanity, and luxury of life and preferre especially such as had a mixture of ambition, and vain-glory with a ser­vile spirit, rendring them fit to serve anothers power and greatnesse, for the enjoying of some share therein to them­selves; in all or most of which respects, it has been the great happinesse and advantage to Parliamentary and publique in­terest, that it hath been made one (very much) with the in­terest of the godly, or (for the name whereof it has been so much derided) the Saints: as on the otherside the King's, one with their greatest Opposites, by occasion whereof God hath been doubly engaged in the cause, (viz. for that, and for the righteousnesse of it.) And to this indeed (through the fa­vour and presence of God therewith,) the Parliament hath cause to owne and referre the blessing and successe that hath accompanied their affaires, which (accordingly as they have held square, and been kept close to this) have prospered glo­riously, and (wherein, or so oft as this hath been thwarted, swerved from, or neglected in their manage,) have suffered miserable blastings.

Thus have we endeavoured to give a just and plaine state of the Parliamentary or publique interest, and the severall parts of it, and of the Kings in opposition thereto, which have been the grounds or subjects of contests all along this Kings raigne, and especially since this Parliament began, as may appeare in the beginnings, progresse, and severall steps of the contest. And by what hath been occasionally said here­in, some judgement may be made, how far safe or good the accommodation is like to be that can be expected by the pre­sent Treaty But the severall and opposite interests being thus stated, we shall proceed more clearly to speake a little to the questions stated before,

First therefore, as to the goodnesse (which first implies the justnesse) of such an accommodation, we cannot but suppose,

1. That where a person trusted with a limited power to rule according to Lawes, and by his trust (with expresse cove­nant and oath also,) obliged to preserve and protect the [Page 22]Rights and Liberties of the people, for, and by whom hee is intrusted, shall not only pervert that trust, and abuse that power to the hurt and prejudice of the generality, and to the oppression, (if not destruction) of many of them, but also by the advantage of the trust and power he hath, shall rise to the assuming of hurtfull powers which he never had commit­ted to him, and indeed to take away all those foundations of Right and Liberty, and of redresse, or remedy too, which the people had reserved from him, and to swallow up all into his owne absolute will and power, to impose or take away, yea, to destroy at pleasure; and declining all, appeale herein to the establisht equall judgement, (agreed upon as it were betwixt him and his people in all emergent matters of diffe­rence betwixt them,) or to any judgement of men at all, shall flye to the way of force upon his trusting people, and attempt by it to uphold and establish himselfe in that absolute ty­rannicall power so assumed over them, and in the exercise thereof at pleasure; such a person in so doing, does forseit all that trust and power he had, and (absolving the people from the Bonds of covenant and peace betwixt him and them) does set them free to take their best advantage, and (if he fall within their power) to proceed in judgement against him, even for that alone if there were no more.

2. That if (after he is foyld in such an attempt, brought to quit that claym, to confesse his offence therein, and give them some verball and legall assurances of remedy and future security, and his Parliament and people thereupon re­mitting or willing to forbear that advantage against him) the same person, so soon as he finds himselfe a little freed from the advantage which drew those Confessions and Concessions from him, shall go about to avoyd or overthrow all againe, shall deny them necessary redresses or security, stop or oppose them in going thereabout, deny them all power either of re­dresse or immediate safety, but at and according to his will, and assume the power to avoyd and oppose any thing they should doe without him (who had so lately forfeited all the power he had unto them) and for all this fly to force againe, rayse it without limit, by it protect Delinquents from judi­ciall proceeding, and resume and exercise again alone (even [Page 23]fitting a Parliament) all the exorbitant and unlimited powers he so lately disclaymed, proclaym that suppream Councell (by which he ought to govern himselfe and the Kingdom) Tray­tors and Rebels (who had indeed so lately indulged him his first Treason and Forfeiture) and on these termes maintayn a warre many years against them (to the spilling of much blood and desolation or spoyl of a great part of the Kingdom) try all meanes and interests by divisions and parties stirrred up within, and invasions from abroad to lengthen it out longer, and (after he was subdued, wholly in their power, and at their mercy) to revive and renew it, multiplying disturbances, and never ceasing till he had wearied all friends in his owne and neighbour nations, or so long as any hopes were left wherby possibly to prolong it; and all this meerly to uphold the in­terest of his will and power against the common interest of his people; such a person in so doing (wee may justly say is guilty of the highest Treason against the highest Law among men, but however) must needs be the authour of that unjust warre, and therein guilty of all the innocent blood spilt thereby, and of all the evils consequent or concomitant thereunto.

Now (to assume hereupon) whether the King have not, in the same case, acted all these things and more, wee dare appeal to the story and evidence: If he have not, or can justly alleadge and make it appeare, that what he has acted therof has not bin for the interest of his will of power, or not a­gainst the publique in terest of his people; or that the Par­liament or any particular party in the Kingdome have raysed or continued the warre for private interests of their owne, and not for that publique interest of the Kingdome (which wee have before stated) but that they might have had all that cleared and assured to the Kingdome with quietnesse, and would not accept it, let him then be acquitted in judge­ment, and the guilt and blame be laid where else it [...]s due. But if indeed he hath acted such things and in such case (as before exprest) and all for the particular interest of his will and power against the Publick Interest of the Kingdome, then (without mention or consideration of ought he has done against God and godlinesse, or godly men, and though [Page 24]we have toucht but a few of those many morall or civill Evils acted by him, (which have bin judged capitall in se­verall of his predecessors from whom he claymes, yet) from that alone which is before spoken of we may (without need of his late implicite Confession) conclude that he has bin the Authour and Continuer of a most unjust warre, and is conse­quently guilty of all the Treason it contaynes and of all the innocent blood, rapine, spoile, and mischief to the Kingdome acted or occasioned thereby; and if so, how farre the Pub­like justice of the Kingdom can bee satisfied, the blood, ra­pine &c. avenged or expiated, and the wrath of God for the same appeased without judgment executed against him, and consequently, how far an Accommodation with him (implying a Restitution of him, when God hath given him so clearely into your power to doe Iustice) can be just before God, or good men, without so much as a judiciall Tryall, or evident remorse, appearing in him proportionable to the offence: We thus recommend to your saddest and most se­rious consideration, who must one day be accomptable for your Iudgements here on earth, to that which is the highest and most just; indeed both as to the justnesse and Publike benefit of such an Accommodation, wee shall confesse if there were good evidence of a proportionable remorse in him, and that his comming in again, were with a new or changed heart (as to these things he hath formerly fought against, and from those he hath contended for) his offence being first judged according to Righteousnesse, his person might be ca­pable of pitty, mercy and pardon, and an Accommodation with him, with a full and free yeelding on his part, to all the aforesaid parts of Publike and religious interest (in contest) might in charitable construction be just (possibly) safe and beneficiall; or if the heat of War (before God had so clearly given his double judgment against him in the cause, or deli­vered him into your hands for yours) and while affairs stood in some equall ballance, you then in love of peace (which tis good to seek with all men) & for saving of further bloodshed and misery to the kingdom (which in that case you could not otherwise avoid) had upon a full provision for the matters in question, and good security for future against him, made a [Page 25]by Accommodation with him (as by your many Addresses, you indeavoured,) it might have been excuseable in point of prudence, (though you had incur'd a more remote future hazzard, because thereby you had avoyded another more im­mediate and present; yea the hazzard had been lesse, because to what he had then agreed, all men would have accompted him bound, being then unquestionably free,) and the point of Justice had not then been so clearly required at your hands, because not yet altogether in your power: But, as this whole latter Supposition is, by time and the good hand of God to­wards you, excluded the case, so neither is there any color­rable ground for the former, but evidence of the contrary: For, as to that only colour of any change of heart in him, with his implicit confession of a fault, in yeelding to your first Proposition does import; First, how slight and slender that confession is, the tenor of the Proposition may shew; And yet, had he timely, freely and clearly confest but so much, as from conviction, or remorse, or from a sence of the hand of God against him, or had left us but a ground of charity to beleeve it so, we should have thought our selves bound to re­gard it with proportionable tendernesse towards him; or at least, should have thought it not ingenious nor Christian to take advantage, from such confession, the more to prosecute him for it; but having so long and obstinately, both in word and practice, till now, denied it; and never confest it, un­till all his other waies of force, policie, or fraud (whereby he hath attempted to justifie himselfe) had fail'd him, and no other shift left, but by this forc'd (yet seeming yeilding) ac­knowledgement to save himselfe, and delude the people, (untill he can find or work out some new advantage) and confessing it now but conditionally, viz. so as you agree with and satisfie him in other things (which kind of confession, where the matte in question is concerning true or false, just or unjust, and extending to innocencie or horrid sinne, does seem to imply such Hypocrrisie as (we think) was never yet so proclaimed before God and the world) and when, at the same time, while thus in words he confesseth it, yet in practice he denies it still, by his continuing, and not recall­ing his Commissions to the Prince, and other English Rebells, [Page 26]and Revolters; yea to Ormond and his associated Irish Rebells also (all which are so contrary to that verball Confession) and by his trying all Interest still, to make a party, against it; in this case, it were stupidity (rather then Charity) nay in­deed (we think) a wrong to his intentions, to understand that confession as from inward remorse or conviction; so that (as the case stands) it goes only so farr, as may serve for fur­ther ground of condemnation against him, but not at all of satisfaction from him.

And admitting no such change or conviction (even when there are verball confessions and concessions carrying a sem­blance thereof) but that his restitution would be with the same principles and affections, both as to civill and Religious interest, from which he hath acted the past evills; and after some former like acknowledgements and agreement, hath re­turned to the same by asse upon his next advantages; then, be­sides the unrighteousnesse of the Accommodation, and re-ad­mission (which is before already cleared) and besides mat­ter of danger, (which we shall shew in it's place) we desire all good men to consider: As to the other point of good, (viz. the publique benefit (what fruits can be hoped from such a Re-u­nion or renewed communion betwixt those contraries, God hath once so separated, viz. of principles or affections of li­berty, with Principles of Tyranny, Principles of publique In­terest, with Principles of Prerogative and particular interest; principles of zeale, and the power of godlinesse, with prin­ciples of formality and superstition in Religion (we might say indeed, of light with darknesse, of good with evill) as would be implyed in his restitution to be, (as it were your Head) your King again, and to have that high trust and in­fluence in relation to our Peace, Rights, and Liberties (civill and religious) with the same Principles and affections, from which he hath so much and so long opposed them? For, if his Kingly Office be not of use or trust in relation to them, what needs his restitution? if it be, then this doubt holds just.

Next, to the other part of the preceding Question, (viz. Concerning the safety of an Agreement, for his re­stitution, especially supposing no reall remorse, or change, [Page 27]but the same principles and affections) although in the termes of the Accommodation and Restitution, you had a more ample concession of the publique interest in question, then you are like to have when he hath granted all you have demanded, and as full security for future obser­vance of the agreement as words or Letters, (yea Oaths) can give; and though we might suppose him as true and just in the observance of such an agreement as other Kings or Princes (once given up unto, and ingaged upon such principles and waies of tyranny, or selfe-interest) use to be; yet first in ge­nerall we might make a just appeale to the experience of A­ges and Nations, what danger there is in any such Accommo­dations, both to the publique interest in contest, and to the persons or parties that have ingaged for it, and we might challenge all Story for one instance in the like case, viz. where any such King claiming and assuming such Powers and Prero­gatives over a people beyond his bounds, and (upon opposition from the people the rein) flying to force, and in a warre upon them, indeavouring to gaine the same by conquest, but in­stead thereof losing both what he so claimed, and all he had before in a full conquest, on their parts, over him (we say in such case) we would faine see an instance where ever (after so long a warre, so much blood spilt, and such spoile made) the people having at last wholly subdued him, and gained their owne Cause in that way of force and conquest, to which he had so appealed, and having him and his party captivated, and in their power, did either willingly subject all to question a­gaine in a Treaty with him of their owne tendering, or by it seek both that publike interest, (or rather but a slender portion of that which God had so wholly and freely by his righteous judgement given unto them) and even their owne safety and Indemp nitie therewith, to be had (all) as Concessions from that their enemies hand, and (balking him as a person not pu­nishable or acconntable for whatever evill he had indeavoured or done) to restore him upon such Concessions to his Throne a­gaine: we say, we would gladly have a parallell instance, where ever indeed any people before this were in the like case given up to such a preposterous and selfe-deserting way, or an instance of (almost) any Accommodation of like kind at all, [Page 28]with a re-admission of such a person to the same Office, State, and Revenue, (with the least shadow of the same power) or to the least footing therein, upon the same account or claime of right, (on the foundation whereof, he had before assumed such powers) wherever such accommodations proved safe either to the publike interest in contest, or to the persons ingaged there­in, or did not prove ruinous to the one and the other, or at least end, in the irruptions of new and more bloody and bit­ter contests about the same things either in the same or succee­ding age, and those with more hazzard and disadvantage to the publique interest and party adhering thereto, then the for­mer; or where indeed any people contending and once in­gaging in warre against a Tyrant for their Liberties, did ever fully redeem and hold the same with a readmission of him, or without (first or last) disclaiming and renouncing all de­pendence on him, or accord with him for the same, and an ut­ter rejection, expulsion, and deposure, either of his whole race, and all that claimed upon the same account of right, or at least, of his particular person, and execution of justice up­on him, if he fell within their power: With this latter way of proceeding we have heard many instances of people, fully recovering their Liberties, and happily retaining the same; but without it, or in the former way of accommodation and restitution, we have not heard, or read of any so succeeding; there is abundant experience to reach us how ordinary (yea, we may say constant) a thing it hath been for Kings and Prin­ces in such cases, when they could not prevaile in the way of force, to leave that, and apply themselves by fraud to accom­plish their ends and wills upon the people; and when in such contests with them by the Sword they have been brought into straights, then to cry up peace, and under that glorious golden baite, which the people wearied with warre, and the troublesome and chargeable concomitants thereof, are most apt to catch at, having drawne them into waies of accommo­dation, to make some fained yeelding up of those Prerogatives and advantages, they find, they cannot hold, and by large promises, Concessions, and assurances on any termes, to make agreements with them, whereby to quiet the people, and get themselves into the Throne againe; and yet afterwards, up­on [Page 29]on their next advantage, to breake, and make void all againe, and prosecute such advantages to the overthrow both of the publike interest, and those that had ingaged for it, without regard of Faith or Oath, (further then necessity hath held them thereto) where any advantage for the accomplishing of their ends hath lead them to a breach; how apt first such Princes are to this, and next how easie it is for them, when they find advantages, to find occasions also, and pick quarrells to make a breach, even with a colourable saving to their faith and honour, ingaged in such agreements; and lastly, how easie also, after they are so got into the saddle againe, and the peo­ple by their faire Concessions, Promises and Ingagements, lull'd into a security, to find or work out such advantages to themselves, and prosecute them to greater prejudice both of the publike and the particular persons ingaged for it, then be­fore such contests begun, or without such accord thereupon, they could have done, as experiences do abound, so there wants not reason enough to teach us.

For the first: Where a Prince is once given up to that self-in­terest of his Will and Power, so as to make it his highest end, or (at least) to preferre it above the publike Interest, and welfare; yea above the safety and peace of his People (as where he makes Warre against them for it, it is apparent he does,) and to preferre it above Religion too, (as is evident, when he attempts the moulding and forming of Religion to subserve that end,) such a person sure cannot want any prin­ciples of falshood, cruelty, or revenge suitable to such an end; neither in reason is it like, that he will regard any In­gagements of Faith, or Oath; or stop, or boggle at any thing of that kinde, further then necessity does hold him thereto, or where a necessity or advantage, for the accomplish­ing of that his highest end, does lead to a breach: And indeed, when the bonds once accepted by him with unquestionable freedome (at his admission to the Throne) the bonds of Law, yea the fundamentall bonds of trust betwixt him, and his Peo­ple, the very Covenant of peace, yea the Oath of God be­twixt them would not hold him, but of his own mind (with­out occasion before given) have been all violated by him; and [Page 30](to justifie himself, and protect his Instruments in that) the law of Force (admitting no bounds but power) hath been chosen and set up by him, and prosecuted to the utmost in a long and bloudy Warre; how can it be expected, that the bonds of new Concessions and Agreements (with what ever assurances that are but verball, or literall) being imposed by force upon him, or yeelded to from nothing but an invincible or powerfull necessity, can be of more awe or regard with him, or power to hold him, when an advantage to gain what he sought, or recover what he lost, does offer it self? And as for revenge, how naturall it is for a Prince, so given up to that self-interest of will and power, and how necessary to his inte­rest to seek and prosecute revenge against all eminent oppo­sers, and much more the oppugners thereof; we wish your own reason, and the experience of others may rather warn you, then that you should put it to triall in your owne cases.

And hath your and our experience of this King with whom we have to do, given cause to hope better things from him, in these respects, then other Ages or Nations ever found from other Priuces in the like case? First, for point of Faith-keep­ing (besides his first numerous breaches of his originall Faith to his Kingdomes in the whole mannage of his government and trust, before the Warres,) witnesse his Accords with the Scottish Nation, and how he kept them; his seeming com­pliances in part with this Parliament (in the time of his straights) and faigned acknowledgments of past errors, with promises of redresse, and future amendment, untill your bounty, in paying off the Scots and English Armies at that time, had delivered him from those straights; and then, so soone as you came to those particulars which should have effectuated that redresse, and assured future remedy, by ty­ing his hands, and deterring others from the like exorbitan­ces, immediately flying out again to higher and greater; and (first by policie, then by force) going about to overthrow those foundations of remedy which he had granted, in the ascertaining of this Parlinment, &c. And let those many particulars of hypocrisie, dissimulation and trechery, couch­ed [Page 31]under his fairest Overtures, Professions and Protestations, which your selves in severall Declarations have observed and recorded, bespeak what cause there is, to confide in his pro­mises or Ingagements. As to his innocency in point of re­venge, witnesse those petty revenges, after severall Parlia­ments (and yet some of them extending to death through hardship of imprisonment) which were sought and taken a­gainst such Patriots as had, in them, appeared but to assert the common Liberties against his Interest: Witnesse his attempts of higher in the proceedings against the Members hee im­peacht; and let the severall Designations of some to the slaughter, some to exile, others to prisons, all to misery of one sort or other, which, upon any hopes of prevailing in the for­mer or later Warre, have been made against his eminent oppo­sers amongst you, suffice to teach you and your adherents, what mercies might be expected from him and his Partie, if he ever had, or yet shall gain the advantage over you.

Next, for the facility of a Princes finding occasion and quarrell after such an agreement, to make a breach, when he finds his advantage; and yet, with some colourable saving to his Honour: We know, in all mutuall Agreements (where each party grants and takes, and somthing is to be made good on each party towards the other) how easie it is to finde, or pretend a failer of full performance, and thence to avoid the obligation to th' Agreement; and especially, in A­greements of State, if all matters of power, trust and right are not fully cleared and determined so as to state the supreme trust, and conclusive Iudgement to all intents and purposes fully and absolutely in one party or other, but that something be left divided, or at least suspended betwixt them, in such case how easie is it for the party that is looser by the agree­ment to find or faine an intrenchment of the other beyond the stated bounds, and thence to make a new breach when be sees his advantage for it? But however when any thing within the compasse of what was so left suspended does in practise, come to question, and difference, and neither party trusted singly to conclude, there is a clear Foundation for a breach, unlesse they either agree to lay the matter aside, (which perhaps the [Page 32]gaining party cannot, and so (by the loosers meer standing off) may be necessitated to appear the first Actor in a breach,) or else come to a new Agreement upon every such particular: We know besides, what Court Maximes there are amongst the Kings party concerning some fundamentall Rights of a Crown, which the King cannot give away; and their common scruple, whether a King, granting away such or any other he­reditary Crown-Rights, can oblige his Heires or Successors, or exclude their claim; But if all other pretexts faile, their Non-obligation to what is wrested from them by force, in a powerfull Rebellion (as they count it) will serve such a Kings Conscience for a shift, to make a breach, where he findes his advantage. And are not all these occasions or pre­texts obvious in our case? To say nothing of the matters of Supreme Power and trust which (though all your Propositi­ons be granted, will yet be left divided or suspended, not on­ly betwixt the severall Houses, but betwixt them both and the Kings; nor yet of the imperfect bargaining for severall parts of it (which by the tenor of the Propositions are taken some, (as it were,) by Lease, all by grant from the King, so as to confirm rather then weaken his claim of the Originall right to be in him and his,) from both which kinds of defect or un­certainty in th' Agreement there will be left many apt occa­sions and particular grounds for a breach when time shall serve; Is it not apparent, that from that more generall consideration of the condition of the King in this Trea­ty, and the force or necessity lying upon him, a ground of evasion or exception lies to the whole agreement as not obliging to the King, whatever Concessions or assurances are so drawn from him? what account the King and his party do upon that ground make of the Treaty, besides the common voice of them all in all corners, that the King (good man) is meerly forc'd to what he grants, we may see it publike­ly and authentickly avowed by the Prince and his Coun­cell, in his Declaration in answer to the Earle of War­wicks Summons of the revolted Fleet at Goree, where (besides other passages hinting the same thing) the Prince clarely saies: ‘[The KING in truth is still in prison, [Page 33]with such circumstances of restraint, as (to say no more) are not usuall in the case of the most private person, & whose delivery and freedome therefrom all his Subjectes are ob­liged to indeavour, by the Lawes of God and man, to their utmost hazard, and afterwards invites the Earl of Warwick to joyn with his Highnesse in the rescue of his Royall Father from his unworthy imprisonment.’ This, being in answer to that summons, wherein the Earle of Warwick invited the Ships to come in upon that very ground, (that the King and Parliament were in Treaty for Peace) we can take to intend no lesse then a plaine dissavouer of this Treaty, and disclay­mer of whatever shall be concluded thereupon, and (coming from the Prince and his Councell) consider him as heire ap­parent, it serves at least to acquit himselfe and posterity, from being concluded by what his Father in such case shall con­sent unto, to the prejudice of the Crowne; and (consider him as having by his unlimited Commission, as Generalissimo, the highest power of the Kingdome, which the King could devise to give, and so he and his Councell, while the King is in durance, being the next visible head of the Kings party, and having the highest trust in relation to the interest of the King, his Crowne, & party) it is also (on the Kings and their behalfe) the most Authentique Declaration of their sence of the Treaty, which could well be expected in the case (while the King and his Councell here being supposed under force as to all things else cannot be supposed free in that point to declare his reall Judgement) and so it may serve in behalfe of the King, his Heires, and whole partie, as a Protestation against any conclusion by this Treaty, or what ever shall therein be drawne from him to his owne, or their prejudice. And indeed the King himselfe in divers of his Papers, that have come from him to you in relation to this Treaty, ha [...]s (in such loft Language as might befit the condition of your prisoner) insinuated the same sence of the Treaty, and his condition there'n and of the validity or repute of any conclusions thereupon, while his condition should remaine [Page 34]the same, and not more free; And these severall Declara­tions and insinuations hereof being sent, those from the King immediately to your selves, that from the Prince, (his Generall) to your Admirall, and from him to your owne hand and both being sent you during the Treaty be­fore any conclusion upon it, will remaine upon record be­fore you perpetuall witnesses against the validity thereof, or any obligingnesse a to rhema. Nor is it his or their sence alone, or without grounds to gaine beliefe, but (considering he is but so small a step removed from the Castle, where he was your absolute prisoner, and still confined within the Towne or Island, (which is your Garrison) and so remain­ing under the power of your Guards, and even in that con­dition being but upon his Paroll) we doubt the same sence and judgement thereupon will be aptly made and received both by intelligent spectators of this and neighbour Nations, and by ages to come, and that the degree of inlargement you have afforded him (with the pettit State added) will be under­stood but as a Mock-liberty, and counterfeit of State, inten­ded onely to set him up in some colourable Posture and equi­page to be the more handsomly Treated with, but not as a setting him free from your force or leaving him free in what he grants, so as to render it obliging when granted; But though, as to the realitie of the case, there might be free­dome enough to make his concessions in honestie obliging, or his absolution therefrom (at least) disputable, yet hee and the Prince in his behalfe having (as is before exprest) in the b [...]st way they could, declared to you before hand, that their sence to the contrary, as to his on their part (his condition in the Treaty standing as it was,) if you after such faire and timely warning would needs yet proceed in Treaty, without alteration of his condition or the termes of it, and come to conclusions therein to binde up your selves who will not say he and his party had reason so far to comply with your proceeding upon it, and yet account that as to any ob­liging on their part (whether he were really under dures or [Page 35]not, yet) their timely precaution to you concerning their contrary sence of it, was a sufficient acquittall of them, not onely from be­ing bound by any agreement upon it, but from any imputation of deceitfull dealing with you, (though they observe not what shall be so agreed upon) since (after such precaution from them) it was your owne fault, and at your owne perill, if you would pro­ceede with them upon so rotten a foundation, so as if you be cozen'd you cozen your selves and cannot blame them, or any bo­dy else for it.

And truly this consideration as (when we first took notice of those passages in that Declaration from the Prince and the Kings Papers) it did more awaken us to consider your hazards in this Treaty then before, so it serves most clearely to set forth the miserable straights and snare you are thereby intangled in; to look no further into particulars, that great and dangerous evill, of old so much declined and abhorred by you and our Brethren of Scotland, and more lately so much strugled against by your selves in the previous debates concerning this Treaty, (viz. the Kings return to London and to his Parliament and Throne againe, without satisfaction and securitie before given,) is thus, at last like to come upon you, and that upon worse termes (if you proceed in this Treaty to conclude your selves and re-admit him) then if you had let him come without any foregoing agree­ment at all, for had you let him come so, (both your selves, and he being free) if then he had granted any thing of satisfaction or security, all men would have accounted him bound by it, and the concession valid, or if he had denyed you necessary things in that kinde, your further proceeding in other wayes to secure your selves and the Kingdome against him, would have beene thought more necessary, just and cleare, and though (being at liberty) he had personally headed his party in the City, and elsewhere with greater advantages then ever, to assert once more his old quarrell in a new Warre, yet you had knowne the worst ont (viz, To fight it over againe, but so much the sooner,) but in the way you are now ingaged in, the King has the advan­tage to yeeld to any thing at last which he cannot get you to abate, and yet when (having granted all) he gets (upon your [Page 36]owne termes, (to his beloved Sear and Throne againe; behold he is free, (as if he had granted nothing) to take the best advan­tage against you when hee sees his time, and meane while may rest secure in a good condition and waite his advantage, having got your hands bound, till he finding it, shall stricke the first stroke againe, which (tis like) he will make a sure one (if he can) to disable you from a return, and so we proceed to the next considera­tion, Viz. how easie tis for a Prince, after such accomoda­tion (admitting him either not bound, or not conscientious of his bonds, or having occasions or pretexts for a breach) to finde or worke out advantages, whereby to overthrow all he has granted to the publique interests, and (in the ruine of those that engaged against him for it,) to set up his owne above all, which for brevity we shall not so much consider generally in the com­mon advantages which Princes in such case usually have, as particularly in those which this King clearely has or is like to have in this of yours.

The King comes in with the reputation (among the People) of having long graciously sought Peace (although indeed ever since he found you in condition to oppose his Force, It was his inte­rest, and his best play, and especially since you had beaten his Force, it was his necessary and onely play) he comes with the reputation of having long sought it by a Personall Treaty (which at last has proved as he Prophesied, the only effectuall meanes) and so you having so long denied that, and only plyed him with peremptory Propositions, and yet at last granting it, are (in that selfe Condemnation) rendred by his Friends as having deceit­fully, or unnecessarily continued Burthens, and refused Peace so long, in refusing that the Kings way, in which you might as well have had it sooner as now (although the truth is, neither the Treaty, nor the Personality of it have advanced the businesse one jot, since the King grants now the same things, and in the same termes which he has so oft in particular denyed, yea protested and sworne he would not, and the alteration is farre enough from Conviction by Treaty (as is before demonstrated) and vi­sibly from a greater necessity or advantage found now to induce the yeelding then formerly. He comes also, with the reputation of [Page 37]having granted for Peace sake all that you (as unwilling to Peace) have rigidly stood upon (although when 'tis summed up 'twill appeare very little of advantage, or security to Publique in­terest, and (by a trick or reserve that he has) nothing at all as before is shewed, yet however) with the People he carries these and the like points of Reputation before him, and wants not Trumpets every where to blaze them sufficiently to his renowne, and your reproach, and (under such Banners of Love and Honour) He comes in, The only true Father of his People (you being proved their cruell Foster-fathers) he the Repairer of their breaches, (which you had made) the restorer of their beloved Peace, ease, and freedomes, (which you, as his Creatures render it, had ra­visht or cheated them of thus long) the Restorer of their Trade and plenty too (which you had thus long obstructed) He a Con­querour in sufferings and patience, a denyer of himselfe for the good of his People, and what not that's glorious and endearing? And thus would the People be lull'd (and indeed cheated) into a security, as to any further apprehensions of evill from him; yea posseit with acknowledgements and expectations of all their good from him, and their jealousies awaken'd against you and your adherents only. And yet (to heighten the same more into perfect hatred) you (as wise, yea as honest men for their safety and inte­rest, though they see it not) must continue an Army and Garri­sons still (and that) not the lesse, but much more for his com­ming in againe, then if you had taken another course utterly to shut him out (as we shall shew anon) and so you will be necessi­tated, notwithstanding the Accommodation, to continue Taxes and Impositions for the maintenance of that Force, to the bur­then and grievance of the People, and the greater increase of their discontents and hate towards you; For if after this accom­modation to ease and satisfie them, you shall ever disband your Forces (while the King at's liberty, and in's Throne againe) you give him his end or wisht opportunity, in laying your selves, your adherents, and the Publique interest all levell againe with Him and His (as if you had never prevailed, nor had any advan­tage over them) and so for all your satisfaction and security you are at the Kings courtesie still, and (if he will breake) you are [Page 38]but where you were at first, and the Publique interest nothing advantaged or secured, by ought obtain'd or done in the Warre; but the King in the same, and much fairer possibility to re­vive the old Quarrell, renew his Force with greater advan­tage, and put you to Fight it over againe, or rather may carry it without Fighting, since (after so much blood and cost, and trouble for nothing) 'tis not like you'le finde a competent Party, for th' opposing of him ready to ingage againe on the same termes, and if he gaine any strength to appeare for him (which who can doubt when your Forces are disbanded, confidering what a numerous Party he has ingaged to it in interest and necessity, others inclined to it by principles and temper, others in humour and discontent against the present Government) the generality of people wearied with the for­mer Warre (whereof they have found so great misery, and so little fruit) if they see a strength on his part threatning a new Warre, and none ready on your part to ballance it, (which might hold them (at least) in neutrality) will surely be more apt to joyne unanimously with him, or let him have what he will that there may be no Warre, then joyne with you to main­taine another Warre (to so much prejudice, and so little pur­pose as they have found the former.) And if to appease the King, and his enraged Party, a sacrifice of those that oppo­sed him in the former, will serve the turne, the people ('tis like) will be so farre from sticking at that, as 'tis some Que­stion to whom 'twould be more acceptable (the King or them?) the people by the Cavaliers clamourous and cunning suggestions, and the advantages you have given thereto (through the un­setled, endlesse, and fruitlesse wayes of trouble you have held them in) being already pretty well possest, and by that time like to be further perswaded against you, as if in all this Warre you had meerely couzen'd them; so as you are like to have their hate no lesse (as for abusing them) then the Kings for opposing him.

If to secure that little advantage to publique interest (which in the present way you will have gain'd) or rather to prevent a totall losse of all thereupon, you continue a sufficient strength, and therewith Taxes and Impositions to maintaine it; those, as [Page 39]they are alwaies grievous to the people, so they will (after the peace supposed to be setled) be so much the more discontenting by how much they may be then deemed unnecessary; for the King, having in the tearmes of Accommodation, granted what your selves did aske, and therein such supposed security, as that you need not feare new troubles (though few will consider wherein that little security does lye) or at least (by his yeeld­ing as it were for peace sake, to all your demands) having gi­ven (in the peoples apprehensions) such assurances of his love to peace, as that no danger of new warre or trouble seemes to be feared from him; in this case the continuance of Forces and Taxes will surely be thought no further needfull for any pub­lique end (for, in common judgement, if Warre made Soul­diers needfull, then surely Peace must render them needlesse.) And therefore it will be aptly thought (if yet Souldiers be kept up, and Taxes continued) it is sure either for the gaine, or ad­vantage, or some private designe of those that continue them, And upon these grounds (with unwillingnesse and backward nesse to pay Taxes, and discontents at the burthen of them) there must naturally grow up jealousies and heart-burnings against those that require them. These to foment and inflame to the height, and thereby to sweeten and endeare the King with the people, will be his and the Cavaliers surest play, and otherwise to sit that while (if they have the patience) as still as Lambs. How colourable and plausible will it be, for them to suggest, and how apt for the people to receive, That the King is no way to be blamed for any of those burthens, he (Good man) has yeelded to any thing, and done what he could, that there might be no need of them, and now he gives no consent to them, but the Parliament does them without him, and have bound up and excluded him from his wonted Negative Voice therein, otherwise he would refuse and hinder them; but be­ing not in power to helpe the People, he can onely pitty them in these things; And now they may see what they gaine by their Parliaments, or how much it is to their common prejudice (as well as the Kings,) to have the King in any particular ex­ [...]ded from his Negative Voice, and the Parliament free to [Page 40]proceed in ought without him. And thus easily may the peo­ple (from their common unwillingnesse to part with Money (though for their reall safety) be at once inflamed into a refusall and opposition therein, and deluded into a resentment of that which is the Kings interest, as if it were their owne, and so in­gaged with and for him and his Party; as having one common Cause with themselves. And if thus they be once heightned but into a resolved witholding of payments for the maintenance of that necessary strength you keepe, for the common safety and peace, you must then either give the King his End and ad­vantage, (as is before express't) in dissolving your Forces, or else use extraordinary wayes of power and rigour towards the People, to inforce such necessary payments, which will still inrage them higher against you, and serve to endeare and ingage them more to the King and his interest (colourably) in point of their Liberties then, as well as their ease before; untill at last the People (for both) being rais'd against you, and therein joyning with, and being headed by the King and his Party (whose interest so far seemes one with theirs) you (un­lesse you'le give up all) must come to make a Warre against the poore deceived people for that which is really their owne cause: And the King by the People (as it were for their pro­per Liberties and Interest) may make Warre against you, to th'erecting of his owne, and th'overthrow of the common In­terest, both yours and theirs. For solution of which seeming Riddle, much needs not to be said, since that you contend for is, their generall, Fundamentall, and perpetuall Liberties, for the preservation whereof you'le be forc't to presse upon them in particular matters, against their present ease and Freedomes; and the People being ordinarily more affected with the latter (as more immediate and sensible) and lesse with the former (which are more remote and onely intelligible,) The King clo­sing with them under pretence of the latter, (which they can feele) may easily ingage them, to the prejudice of the for­mer, (which they hardly discerne.)

By what wee have here said, it may (by the way) appeare how much it is for the Kings interest and advantage (since he [Page 41]cannot carry all by force or war) to make a Peace on any terms, though in words never so much to the diminution of His Power, if thereby He can but secure Himself, and get into His Seat again; and consequently we may the better guess, how far Conversion or Conviction hath place in His present yield­ing to things He hath so often said and sworn He never would; and in His granting now, at the motion of His English Par­liament, what He hath so oft denied at the pressing instance of both Kingdoms: For, having sufficient proof of your pre­sent Forces, that they will neither be drawn to serve His turn themselves, nor easily suffer others that would; and ha­ving found in the last Summers Design, that it would not perfectly take with the Body of the People, to cry down your Army (though with decrying of Taxes to boot) while no seeming Peace was setled (no, though with the Cry for their Disbanding, they cryed up Peace and a Treaty in order to it) He therefore now sees He must clap up a Peace on what terms soever, and (that done) His way is clear: The Par­liament then may easily and soon be put to it, to denude them­selves of their Strength in a Disbanding, and so set Him even with themselves again, or else (if they refuse) the People may be wrought to undo all for Him (whatever He hath granted) without His appearing for His own Interest to make any breach. And as upon this single ground many Nations before us (by like Accommodations with their beaten Tyrants) have from the fairest attempts and hopes of Liberty, faln to an utter loss of it, yea to an absolute Bondage, and been made the Instru­ments thereof themselves: So by this one consideration (though there were no more) it may appear, how easie it is for any Prince, and particularly for ours (after such an Accommodation made, and Himself restored) to finde, or work out advan­tages, whereby to overthrow what He hath granted, raise His own Interest higher, and depress the Publique lower then ever before: And yet we have touch'd but one of those many ad­vantages that, in such case, lie clear before Him. We might re­flect upon that of His numerous party engaged by Interest, Necessity, and otherwise, to serve Him so long as He remains [Page 42]in possibility to Head them; towards whom proceedings have been such, as have served to imbitter and inrage them unto, and yet not to disable or discourage them from further Attempts against you, and towards whom (by His continuing King) you will be the more necessitated to proceed still upon the same strain in both Respects. We might mention also their great Fa­milies and relations, and their Interest of Influences within the Kingdom, and we might inlarge upon the consideration of the two other Kingdoms He hath to work by, from which we have found such powerful parties ready to serve His Interest, the one to make Prize and Advantage of this Kingdom, the other (at least) to deliver themselves from your Yoke, by helping to put His upon your and our Necks; All which, if they were to be feared, when He hath been in no capacity to Head them (as in the last Summers War) then much more when He shall be; and though they be much to be feared in relation to His heading of them, while He, by His supposed impunity (what ever He does) hath encouragement to make all possible Tryal of them, and they hopes, That if ever He prevail, He may make them a­mends, or procure their impunity at last; yet (that being once confuted by an Example of Justice upon Him for such At­tempts) they would not then be (in Divine considerations) at all, or (in Prudential considerations) not so much to be feared, in relation to His Posterities heading of them. Besides these, we cannot but consider much more the vast possibilities, after His Restitution, to make Parties, Factions and Divisions amongst your selves, and your now Adherents, and to set one against another, to make one betray another, by one to ruine ano­ther, and (by making use of all Interests) to set up His own above all. Have not you found Him at this play all along? And do not all men acknowledge Him most exquisite at it? If He have had the faculty to avail much in this kinde when at distane from you, will He not much more when so near you, amongst you in your Bosoms and Councels?

For Divisions (we speak it with depth of sadness) He needs not come to make any amongst you, but to use them; [Page 43]they abound wofully already: And for His Opportunities of Advantage by them, they are great, beyond conception.

First, From the Jealousies which each party is apt to have of the others strengthening themselves, to the prejudice of the other by Conjunction with Him and His, and which He and His Creatures have a faculty to feed in each of them, Its more then probable, That each party will be apt to strive, which shall most and first comply with Him: Have not you and we seen sad Experiences of this already? Give us leave to be the more affectionately sensible of this, as having had some Experience of Temptations towards it amongst our selves (we say) Temptations towards it from the King and His par­ty, as strong and substile as are imaginable, though (we bless God, by whom) we were preserved in our Integrity, and not given up to, but delivered from such wretched Apostacy. And we can truly say, That although through the Example of others partly necessitating us for the present prevention of that mischief to the Publique they were running into in that kinde, as we apprehended) we were drawn into some Negative Compliances, tending to Moderation (which we thought to be, and in its place is a real good;) yet first, we never sought, but were sought unto, and notwithstanding all Overtures and Temptations, we did abhor the thought of, and still profestly refused any thing of Conjunction with Him or His, in relation to the Affairs of that time, or ought of private Contract or Trust with them.

Secondly, What we declared of Moderation was but Hypo­thetical, with careful Caution, and saving for the publique In­terest (according to our then understanding of it.) And

Thirdly, We aymed not at the strengthening of our selves thereby, to the ruine of any persons or party opposed (nor did drive at any such end) but meerly to prevent any such from strengthening themselves in that kinde (as we feared) to the prejudice of the Publique, as may appear by the tenour [Page 44]of the Cities Engagement, with the Concomitants and Con­sequents thereof, and by our carriage both in relation thereto, and since that Danger was over: And yet however in that degree of Compliance admitted in that kinde, we finde mat­ter of Acknowledgement before the Lord, concerning our Error, Frailty, Unbelief, and Carnal Councels therein, and we bless him that preserved us from worse: But, on the other side, give us leave to fear (and we heartily wish (as to any honest soul) That it may be a caufless and mistaken fear) That from such private Jealousies, and the Animosities or Hate of one party against another (who once seemed to be engaged in one Common Cause against a Common Enemy) there have been on the part of others evil Compliances, Negative and Po­sitive, yea (we doubt) Contracts and Conjunctions too, by some sought, by others entertained with Him and His party (even while the acknowledged Enemy) to the neglect or di­spending of the common publique Interest, meerly for the up­holding or strengthening of their own, and the ruine of the party particularly opposed.

We cannot but be sensible of this, because we have felt the effects of it in the loss of many our dear innocent Friends lives, with the hazard of our own in the last Summers War: For even from this Root (as we have more then conjectural Grounds to understand) The Revolt in Wales had its Rise and Growth, The Scotish Invasion had its Foundation and Invi­tation, The Revolt of the Ships, The Rebellion in Kent, Es­sex, &c. and the several Tumults, Risings and Disturbances in and about London and the Southern parts had their Insti­gation and Encouragement; and from the same this miserable ensnaring Treaty, its conception and birth: And if from the divisions we have, such destructive compliances and conjunctions have been entertained with, and such advantages given to Him and His party, while profest and acknowledged Enemies, what worse may we not expect of that kinde, when by a Peace made, they shall have the Reputation of friends, to give countenance and confidence thereunto?

To conclude this point (concerning His advantages after ac­commodation [Page 45]and restitution, to overthrow or prejudice the pub­like Interest) wee'll confess our greatest fears, from the considerati­on of the Act for this Parliaments unlimitted continuance, where­in (besides divisions amongst those that are, or profess to be for the publike) if He shal ever be able by particular successions of new Burgesses, according to the present constitution, or any other way, to form a prevailing or ballancing party for His Interest in the House of Commons (which even there He seems to have bid fair for already, and as to the Lords, wee'll move no Question) we may then justly yield Englands Liberties for defunct, when that which should be the Conservative, shall be turned indeed the Bane, and yet (it being in the place and repute of the one­ly Conservative) we shall (through that Act) be debarred from change of Medicine, or use of other Remedy, yea, from the renewing or taking fresh choyce of Medicine in the same kinde, but must keep to that old Mass, which such putrifa­ction will have rendred deadly, and will probably vitiate all particular Additions of fresh ingredients that shall be made, while the old leven shall remain predominant. Neither can we see any possible help in the Case after his Restitution, though you should be willing to lay down your power: For indeed, to set a Period to this Parliament, and not therewith pro­vide for a certain succession of Parliaments, and the certainty of their sitting also (without dependance on the Kings will) were to leave the Kingdom without assurance of any remedy, or (at least) of power therein to help at all, and so in like condition as before this Parliament: And to make provision for such a succession, and certainty of sitting of future Parliaments, without like provision for a more due constitution, by more equal Elections (freed from such dependance on prerogative Grants, or from being so subject to prerogative Commands, as now by the number and nature of Burgessships they stand) were to render the succession less hopeful or safe, or (at least) subject to no less corruption in the same kinde, then the Constitu­tion of the present is; And you having not in this Treaty propounded any provision for any of these things (which we dare boldly affirm, are of highest concernment to the [Page 46]vindication and preservation of publique Interest in the very Fun­damentals of it) if you go on to make a Peace upon such terms, as if this Parliament were to continue for ever, and set the rest of all our hopes upon that Basis: We may justly presume, That when a Peace is made, and the King testored, if afterwards you would come to considerations of laying down your Power, and making such provisions for succession, as is before exprest, The King (whose consent you still seem to make necessary to such things (though 'tis like He would readily consent to be rid of this Parliament, so as to have no more but at his Call for their meet­ing, and Will for their continuance; or perhaps so, as to have no better provision for the one, or larger for the other, then the Triennial Bill, yet, as to full certainty in the one, or sufficient enlargement in the other (without relation to His will) and much less as to the taking away of Burgessships dependent on His grant, and subject to His, and His great mens command, and the re­ducing of Elections to full equality and freedom (we say) on such terms we may well presume (from the reason and nature of the Kings Interest) He will not willingly (when after Peace made He needs not) give up His hopes of or against this Parlia­ment; but rather then He will make, or bring upon Himself and Posterity such an Entail of Parliaments as He can never hope to avoid, and those to be so independent on His Will for their meeting or sitting (as he can never hope to avoid) and con­stituted so equally according to the Interest of the people (as He can never hope, or cannot design how to pack to His own) He will prefer and stand to His fairer hopes of making His party good with this Parliament one way or other, viz. Either in and by it (by making a party in it as before exprest) or else against it, by making use of discontents and impatience in the people towards it, and of divisions within it self, at last to destroy and overthrow it, and so to deliver His Crown once for all, from Wardship (as he counts it) to Parliamen­tary power, which, by th'other Conditions might have been perpetual: And if either in the one kinde or the other He prevail upon this Parliament, His Monarchy and our Slavery will be absolute, and (probably) for ever; in the one by seem­ing [Page 47]Authority of Parliament (made immortally the same) in the other by th'utter extinction of it.

But to proceed from probabilities of danger, to shew the cer­tain insecurity and perpetual prejudice to publique Interest, that an Accomodation with Him, and Restitution of Him in the pre­sent case does imply: Suppose the best Constitutions and strict­est Laws imaginable in any State, yet their insufficiency and im­potency, as to the preserving of publike Interest, without a power to punish those that violate it and them, or where per­sons in power to prejudice the same (especially if insixt and lasting power) shall stand priviledged from being punishable what ever they do, is obvious to each considering man (that power of punishment, and the having of it in the most trusty hands, and no particular persons to be exempt from their Ju­stice, being that essential part of publike Interest, which is the fence and guard of all the rest in the depraved state of man­kinde) Now, in our present case, after so many, so great and lasting violations thereto, committed by the King, and by His procurement, and after His so long and obstinate maintenance thereof, and persistence therein, and so many refusals of that poor satisfaction and security you now desire, in so much as you once resolved against any more Addresses (we say, after all this) for you, the Supreme Judicatory of the Kingdom (when He is through the just hand of God in your power to do Justice upon) yet still to decline that way, and in stead thereof, to seek again to Him your Prisoner in the way of Treaty, to receive what satisfaction and security you can get as Concessions from HIm: and thereupon (having onely some few instruments submitted to justice, and that by His Concessi­on too) to readmit Himself to the Throne with Safety, Freedom and Honor: What can this be understood to speak less, then that (as Himself and His party for Him have still expresly assumed, and as the pretence and ways of your proceedings towards Him heretofore, have too much implyed) He is indeed above any humane Justice, and not accountable to, or not punish­able by any power on earth, what ever he does: And to, be­sides the bar to any present proceeding of Justice against Him­self [Page 48](whose one example in that kinde made, and not after­wards made ineffectual again, as others of that kinde have been, by the flattery or degeneration of succeeding ages, would be of more terror and avail, then the execution of His whole par­ty, yea, then all the satisfaction and security, verbal or literal, that you can obtain or imagine without it) you would also (by such exemption of HIm, and in such a case) proclaim the lke per­petual exemption to Him and His Posterity, what ever they shall do, or in what ever case (since none can be imagined more pregnant or ripe for justice then this already is) and would there­in give the most authentique Testimony and Seal that ever was, to all these destructive Court Maxims concerning the absolute impu­nity of Kings, their accountableness to none on earth, and that they cannot erre, do wrong, &c. which principles (in the sence to which they are applyed) as they were begot by the blasphe­mous arrogancy of Tyrants upon servile Parasites, and foster'd onely by slavish or ignorant people, and remain in our Law-Books, as Heir-looms onely of the Conquest; so they serve for nothing but to establish that which begot them (Tyranny) and to give Kings (who so far as they claim otherwise then by Conquest, are but Ministers intrusted for Righteousness and Peace) the highest Priviledge, Encouragement and Invitation to do wrong and make War, even upon their own people, as their corrupt wills or lusts shall prompt them: If therefore our Kings claim by right of Conquest, God hath given you the same a­gainst him, and more righteous, by how much that on their parts was extended to a forcible Dominion over the people (which originally or naturally they had not) and our's but to a deliverance from that Bondage, into that state of Right and Freedom which was naturally and morally due to us before: If they claim from immediate Divine Designation, let them shew it; if from neither, but as by consent intrusted by and for the people, let them then imbrace and partake the conditi­ons of such, and not as if the whole people were made onely for themm, and to serve their lusts, or had (if not their being, yet) all their civil indowments by and from them. But to return to our purpose, if you (by such Proceedings [Page 49]as you are about towards the King in the present case, shall con­firme and harden him and his posterity in their assumed privi­ledges of impunity, &c. (what ever is or shall be done by them) what new agreement, or other Bond of mans framing, can you supose to hold them, and especially himself that has broke the strong [...]st of that kinde already (and we appeale to your con­sciences upon the reasons before given, what inward change you [...]de to be trusted in,) but that he and they (upon the same con­fidence of im [...]unity to themselves, what ever they doe, or how­ever they succeed) will still be ready to take all advantages, and try all meanes (so long as they can finde any Instruments that will serve them) to set up their own interest, to the prejudice of the PUblique, a heretofore, and especially to avenge or vindicate themselves and it against the supposed wrong of enforc't Concessions?

And why shall wee not thinke they will finde Instruments still to venture for them (notwithstanding your punishing of some in that kinde) since while your own proceedings admit themselves unpunishable? Such Instruments may hope that (at the worst of successe) they'll save all, or most of them, as now; and (themselves still surviving to renew the quarrell) it may well be hoped, that if ever they prevaile, the Instruments that shall sur­vive, and heires of the rest will be repaired with honour to boot, so that the adventure of each Instrument in that kinde (being but as of one amongst a multitude, where the most are sure to es­cape,) is of farre lesse hazzard then a Souldiers venture in a field battell, and the hazzard that is (especially to necessitous or am­bitious men,) is abundantly compenst by those hopes which the certaine impunitie (besides probable advantages) of their head does give: Wee are sure, that, as to any Instruments venturing a­gaine for you and the [...]ublique, the hazzards infinitely greater, and in humane considerations, no encouragements comparable to those, which (after [...]ll year Proposition-justice against his In­struments,) will yet, upon this ground, remaine to them for any further Engagements in behalf of their great & unpunishable Ma­ster. And therefore, as in all cases of like rebellions, or civil warres, the prudence of most Nations and ages (as well as the Justice of [Page 50]the thing,) has lead to fix the exemplary punishment, first upon the capitall Leader, and upon others, as nearest to him, and not to punish the inferiours, and exempt the chiefe; so in this your case, 'tis most cleare, that to fix your Justice first upon the head, and thereby let his successors see, what themselves may expect (if they attempt the like,) may hopefully discourage them, from heading any more what Instruments they might finde in the like quarrell, and so is like to be a reall securitie (when such Instru­ments cannot finde an head.) but to punish onely Instruments, and let the head (by whose power, and in whose in terest all has been done,) not onely goe free, but stand in perpetuall privi­ledge and impunitie to head such instruments againe, as oft as he can finde opportunitie, and get any to serve him, is a way so farre from securitie, as it leads indeed to endlesse trou­ble and hazzard, or the perfect losse of all. And besides, in poynt of Justice, with what Conscience inferiour Ministers can be punish'd, and the principall set free, yea, restored to dignitie and honour, for whose onely interest, in whose one­ly quarrell, and by whose Commissions and Commands they have acted, (which they might perhaps conceive to oblige, or at least to excuse them,) for our parts, since wee have seriously weighed it, wee cannot understand; wee are sure it seemes a most unequall and partiall way of Justice, sutable to those aforesaid corrupt or abused Court-Maximes, whereon a­lone it has been grounded, (As that the King can doe no wrong, &c.) And indeed what ever grounds or reasons can be imagi­ned to exempt Kings from humane Justice, or to excuse them when they wilfully give Commissions and commands unto their inferiour Ministers to doe evill, (which wee are sure can be no lesse then something of divinitie, and absolute independencie (as to men,) supposed to be in them,) The same Principles (if admitted and fully weighed) would equally extend to ab­solve and indempnifie those Ministers for what they doe in pursuance of such commissions and Commands, yea and bring those under condemnation too, that should forcibly oppose him or them therein: Wee would at least faine heare one prin­cile sufficient for the one, which would not, by rationall de­duction, extend to both the other. And if there be none such, [Page 51]then, wee beseech you consider, whether your re-admission of the King in the present case and manner (without so much as his subjecting to Judgement or Tryall,) will not be so farre from securitie, as that it will not onely enervate the best fence of publique interest (the power of punishing violators of it,) but in consequence shake the Foundations of all you have done in the warre, and overturne or invalid all you seeme to obtaine in the peace.

Upon this, and the rest of the considerations aforegoing, wee crave leave to beleeve, that an accommodation with the King in the way and Termes you are upon, or any at all, as the case now stands, that shall imply his restitution, or shall not provide for his subjection to Triall and Judgement,

Would first, not be just before God, or man, nor hopefully good; but many wayes evill, and so not desireable by any ho­nest heart that well considers it.

Secondly, would not be safe, but full of hazzard and danger, yea, certaine prejudice, disadvantage, and destruction, both to the publique interest in Question, and to the persons that have engaged for it (except such as, by base Apostacy from it, and treacherous services for the King against it, have or shall have emerited their pardons.

And thirdly, If in another way or case it possibly could be safe, (which wee see not,) yet in the present Treaty, and condi­tion the King's in, it cannot.

Now if any observe and object that the grounds aforegoing (upon which we conclude thus,) would extend as well against a­ny accommodation with him since his Person came into the Par­liaments power, or at least against any restitution of him there­upon (without his first submitting to judgement, and a change of heart and principles) and consequently would have served as wel against that accommodation with him, & restitution of him, which the Army seemed once to plead for; we shall confesse it, as to the maine, and we have only this to say;

1. That your whole pretence and way of proceeding towards him before, and at that time, the state you have kept him in, your particular engagement to the Kingdome of Scotland for a­nother addresse to him, and your preparation towards the same [Page 52]at that time, had wholly led us on in the supposition of an Ac­commodation to be still endeavoured with him, and to that sup­position only, our then Overtures to you were framed, and you had not then (as since) by your votes of No farther Addres­ses, and your Reasons for them, cleared our judgements from that former mist, and led us out to the thoughts of other wayes of security against him, nor had pointed towards the way (as thereupon you have done) in taking off his state, and close im­prisoning his Person.

And wee confesse that since our thoughts have beene thus set free, and led out that way (besides the good reasons you gave, and what they further discovered or implyed, and besides what other pennes have enlarged thereupon) the more wee our selves have considered, the more and further it hath pleased God to let us see, beyond what we did before: So that your bare retra­cting of Votes, or changing your course (without better, or any reasons giving) cannot put out the light which your former Votes with reasons have let in, and God hath given his seale and encrease unto.

2. Your then Counsels and (with them) our thoughts, be­ing so fixt upon that way of Addresses to him, wee thought in lawfull for us to tender to your Consideration some things to be provided for therein, which were of highest and most funda­mentall concernment to the publique interest, and not thought or not toucht on in your former Addresses or then-preparations (as concerning the Succession, Constitution, & clearing the power of Parliaments in future, &c.) which accordingly wee propounded to be taken in with most of your former Propositi­ons, and what ever wee expressed exclusively (as our private o­pinions at that time) yet our whole Overtures being but as Pro­posals to you, and not immediately to the KING; It was far from our Intentions (as it was apparantly from our practise) to pre-judge or pre-clude your Councels from any further or better provision for the publique interest, or in any surer or bet­ter way.

3. Since you had so farre ingaged in the way of Addresses, we had some apprehensions then (as from the Covenant and o­ther Considerations) That to acquit your selves and Adherents [Page 53]before God and the World (in relation to the snare you seemed to be in) It did something lye upon you to make one Addresse for all, upon things concerning purely the publique interest & only Essentials thereunto, without mixture of any by matters, from which either you with safety to the publique could possibly recede, or against which he might have colour to boggle (as it were) from Conscience or other specious pretences, and not his owne interest only; that so you might at once make a full and cleare Tryall, whether you could (with and by his consent) have such security to the publique interest, as that you might with the preservation and safety thereof preserve also His Person and Honour (as in your Covenant) or whether he would refuse that security to publique interest meerely for the upholding of his owne in opposition thereto, without other cavils, pretexts, or evasions: And accordingly, though we may truly say, we never prest you so farre in point of Addresse to him, as that you did ever actually make any, at our instance, or according to our o­vertures; yet (after that he had escap'd from the Army, and quit­ted any pretext of obligation upon it, in relation to their desire of any such Addresse) you did of your selves make such an Ad­dresse in the render only of four Bils, concerning singly the pub­lique interest, and but a small part of it, meerely for necessary security to it, and your selves, in order to a Treaty for all therest; In w^ch tender of yours we found clear satisfaction in our Reasons and Consciences, as to our aforesaid scrupulous apprehensions: And answerably (when you upon his refusall resolved against any more Addresses to him, & began to take another course with him,) wee did upon that very ground declare our acquiescence in your Votes and our Resolutions of adherence to you therein, (as may appear in the Paper then presented to you from the Ar­mie:) And yet when we have said all this, or what ever might more be said in our excuse, we will upon the grounds here before laid downe (which have since beene more clearely made out to Us) acknowledge it our weakenesse, our errour, and our fault, both as to the matter and termes we propounded for an Addresse to him (in respect of deficiency or insufficiency therein;) and also as to our desire of any such ADdresse at all, as the Case then stood (in respect of the needlesnesse and insecurity thereof, and [Page 54]want of Justice therein) although we see and owne the provi­dence of God, who order'd it for the best, that you did make such an one.

Now if yet any shall objet the Covenant, as perpetually obli­ging to endeavour the preservation of the Kings Person and au­thority, and consequently not allowing any such way of security against him, as would be to the hurt of his Person, or prejudice of his Authority, and so concluding us under a necessity of perpe­tuall Addresses to him for security, untill he give it, as being the only way consistent with the preservation of his Person and Authority.

To this we answer; That indeed the covenant, heaping toge­ther severall distinct interests (which are, or possibly may come to be inconsistent, or one destructive to the other, or at least may be so made use of) and yet engaging positively for them all, without expressing clearely and unquestionably, which is chiefe and perpetuall: and (for the rest) how farre, and upon what conditions the Covenanter shall be obliged to them, and what shall disoblige him, we finde it is (as other promissory oather of that kinde) apt to be made a very snare, serving to draw in many of severall judgments and affections, each in respect to that interest therein engaged for, which himselfe does most affect, and so those that make least conscience of the Oath, make but an ad­vantage of it upon all occasions, to cry up that interest which themselves preferre (though to the destruction or prejudice of the rest, yea of that which is really the maine and best,) while those that make most conscience of the Oath, and affect the principall and honestest part in it, are oft with-held from what's just and necessary in relation thereunto, being stagger'd in regard of the prejudice it may be to the rest, to which joyntly they seem obliged. But this Covenant, as it is drawn (though it have some­thing of that ensnaring nature, yet as to this point) ha's not left the takers without an honest way out; or if it had, yet through the providence of God the snare is broken, and they may escape.

For,

1. The Covenant engaging to the matters of Religion, and publick interests primarily and absolutely (without any limita­tion) [Page 55]and after that to the preservation of the Kings Person and Authority; but with this restrict on, [viz. In the preser­vation of the true Religion, and Liberties of the Kingdomes.] In this case, though a Caviller might make it a question, yet who will not rationally resolve it, That the preceding matters of Religion, & the publick Interest, are to be understood as the principall and supream matters engaged for, and that of the Kings Person and Authority; as inferiour and subordinate to the other? And (if so) then we appeale to all reasonable men, whe­ther those words [In the preservation of the true Religion and Liberties] can be understood, as a Restriction of our endeavours for preservation of Religion and Liberties (so as the same may not be endeavoured in any way that would be to the prejudice of his Person or Authority) or not (sure'y) as a restriction to the engagement for preservation of his Person and Authority, (so as to oblige thereto no further, nor in any other way then shall be consistent with the preservation and desence of the true Religion and Liberties of the Kingdomes,) Yea might it not justly be so understood, [...]hat th'obligation to preserve his Person and Authority, should be fulfilled in (as well as not extended further then) the preservation of Religion and Liberties? In some of these senses those words must be understood, or else they have none, but are valne words, making a vain oath; If they were to be understood in the first sense, then (we are sure) the whole proceedings of both Kingdomes in making and maintai­ning warre against him for preservation e [...]ther of Religion or Liberties, were questionable for breach of the Covenant; since that way of preserving them did tend probably to the destru­ction, & was without any safe provision for the defence either of his person or of that authority that can properly be called his, or understood in conjunction with his person, but that therein his person might probably have been destroyed under the sword, or by a bullet (yea was ordinarly endeavoured to be so as well as the persons of others, in Arms with him) & that authority of his was certainly opposed, and endeavoured to bee destroyed thereby in stead of being defended. If these words be to be un­derstood in either of the latter senses, then it followes first, That if, by reason or experience (the ordinary light men are in h [...] ­mane [Page 56]things to walke by) we finde that the making of peace with him, and therein the preserving or restoring of his person or authority, is (as the case happens) either an unrighteous thing (in respect of the blood and spoyle he hath caused in op­posing that Covenant ever since it was made and tendered, and of his never comming in, or ceasing that mischiefe, till by force reduc'd, and by the hand of God delivered into the power of your justice,) and in these or other respects, not consistent with true Religion, or else that (no inward conviction, remorse, or chang of heart and principles rationally appearing in him) it be not safe, but full of visible danger (if not certainly destru­ctive) to Religious or publick interest, or to the persons that have entred into that Covenant, or engaged in the common Cause, then surely (by the Covenant it selfe) the preservation of his person or authority is not to be endeavoured so farre, or in such a way; and consequently such a peace with him, in such a case, is not to be sought, or admitted, or (at least) the Cove­nant obligeth not to it, but against it; and whether the present case and consequences be not such, we referre to our severall Reasons before given. Secondly, from that sense it also fol­lowes, That if, by the same light, we finde, that (supposing no peace to be made with him) the continued preservation of his person in your hands (though close in Carisbrook Castle) or the letting him goe whither hee will to preserve himselfe, and your forbearing to bring him to account or judgment for ought he has done, (when God has so given him into your power, and given you so cleare grounds of proceeding against him) would be either an unrighteous thing, (and so inconfistent with true Religion) or so farre inconsistent with the preservat­on and defence of Religion and Liberties, or with your cove­nanted utmost endevour to preserve them, as that it would visi­bly expose them, and those that have engaged in covenant for them, to perpetuall danger, give perpetuall occasion and ad­vantage so new wars and designes, to the distruction of them, or to the multiplying of blood and oppression upon the king­domes, give the King and his posterity a perpetuall priviledge of impunity, & therin an invitation or incouragement to multiply attempts of the like or greater mischiefs (though to th'overthrow [Page 57]of all Religion and Liberties) yea, would give encouragement also unto Instruments to serve them in such attempts, and thus would harden the hearts both of them and their Instruments in such things to the ruine or perpetuall prejudice and danger of those higher things covenanted for, and persons covenanting, and (lastly) would in consequence debar you from that which is the best fence, yea essential to the defence of publike Liberties, and positively covenanted so (viz. the punishment of any the viola­ters thereof, if his Ministers, and by his Commission) or would render your necessary proceeding against such unequall or scan­dalous, then surely to the exempting of him from justice and continued preservation of his person, so far, or in such a way, and in such a case the Covenant cannot be understood to oblige, but rather to the contrary; Or if it might be so understood, doth it not call for explanation to cleare it from being understood in so wicked a sence? Yea, if it did (by the advantage of words) extend to such a sence past explanation, and if so (through error, inconsideration or deceipt in the framing of it, or through flat­tery, evill custome, or unbeleif and carnal policy in the passing of it,) you had litterally engaged your selves, and drawne in others to be engaged unto so wicked and mischievous a thing; did it not call for Repentance when you finde such wickednesse in it? And rather then unnecessarily to continue your selvs, and hold o­thers under, but a colour of Obligation, to a thing so evill, so full of prejudice and danger unto, and so inconsistent with the secu­rity of so many other unquestionably good things (to which in the same Covenant, as well as by immutable duty you stand ob­liged,) would it not call for your utmost consideration and en­deavour (so farre as providence has left you any occasion, with­out sin or wrong) to extricate and cleare your selves and o­thers from such a snare? In order to which we proceed and say.

2. That whatever, or how expressely soever the Covenant may seeme to have engaged unto, or possibly might have said or purported any thing in the Kings behalfe, or to his onely be­nefit, yet (as God has ordered the businesse) it does not now oblige you at all before God or man, in that matter. For first, (considering it onely as a Covenant betwixt man and man, [Page 58]as for the civill parts it is,) where many or severall persons joyning to make a mutuall Covenant or agreement, do there­in covenant for some things to the good and union of them­selves amongst themselves (who are present and parties to it,) and withall, do make a covenanting clause therein, for something else, to the good or benefit of another person, not present, nor party to the agreement, but whom and whose interest (in regard of some concernment of his in their businesse, or from good affection to him and desire of peace with him) they would willingly provide for as well as for their owne, to the end he might joyne with them in the A­greement, and partake the benefit thereof as well as them­selves, (we say in such case) if the absent party, as he never required it, (so when 'tis tendred to him for his conjuncti­on,) shall not accept the Agreement, but refuse to joyne in it, (and conceiving his Interest prejudiced thereby,) shall op­pose it, and begin, prosecute and multiply contests with all the Covenanters about the matters contained in it; surely that person in so doing (as he keepes himselfe free and no way obliged thereby, as to what concerns the rest, who conclu­ded it of their own heads, so) so he excludes himselfe from any claime to any benefit therefrom at their hands as to what concernes himselfe, while he continues so refusing and op­posing; and by his once refusing upon a faire and full tender (though he had done no worse,) sets the other Covenanters free from any furher obligation, by vertue of that Covenant, as to what concernes his Interest or benefit therein, although the Covenant (as to other matters concerning the right and be­nefit of the Covenanters one from another,) stands still ob­liging and in force; and what ever they shall afterwards do to him, (though indeed,) contrary to the letter or intenti­on of such clause in their Covenant on his behalfe, yet it cannot by vertue of that Covenant, be understood as a wrong to him, and consequently, not a wrong to any o­ther (before God or man,) since none but he (though it had beene made or accepted as mutuall) could challenge the benefit of it. Now whether this be not your case in re­lation to the King in this Covenant, witnesse your making [Page 59]and taking of it without and against his consent; witnesse his oft and continued refusals to accept or joyne in it, his opposing and fighting against your selves and others both in and for the taking and prosecuting of it; and as for the intention of putting that clause concerning him into the Co­venant, (though made in his absence, and without his con­sent) It cannot by the generall nature of such Covenants be understood to be, that by it your selves should be ob­liged to that of his Interest absolutely (whether he would accept or joyne in the Covenant, or refuse and oppose it,) but onely to exhibite your care and show how willing you were (yea, really to go as farre as you could therein) that he and his Interest (so farre as just,) might be provided for therein as well as your owne and the Kingdomes; and that you had no Designe to exclude or prejudice his, if he would accept and joyne in the Agreement as to the other; And even so the words added to and closing up that clause in the Covenant do import, viz. [That the world may bear witnesse with our Consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts or intentions to diminish his Majesties just power and greatnesse.]

Secondly, (considering it as an Oath) the forme of an Oath ad­ded to that of a Covenant, makes it no other then a Covenant stil, but taken as in the presence of God, and only addes the calling of God to witnesse, as to the truth of your intentions and faith­fulnesse of your indeavours to performe what it, as a Covenant, obligeth unto; and look how farre it in the nature of a Cove­nant, (as to any particular matter) obligeth, so farre, and no further, or otherwise, doth that calling of God to witnesse in­gage him the more, to avenge any falshood in your intentions, or unfaithfulnesse in your indeavours to performe it? and this is all the enforcement which that forme of an Oath addeth to that of a Covenant, without obliging to any further matter, or for any longer or more absolute continuance then it; as a Co­venant doth oblige; and therefore wherein, and upon what sup­position soever the Obligation ceaseth as a Covenant, that en­forcement also ceaseth as an Oath; so that if, as a Covenant it [Page 60]oblige not to his benefit upon supposition of his refusall or op­posall, upon the same, it enforceth nought to his benefit as an Oath.

If any object, that in what we have here said, we (who pro­fesse to dislike the imposing of the Covenant with any penaltie or Prosecution against refusers) do seem to take advantage a­gainst his Majesty for refusals; we answer, we say not, for, but upon; And if no other penaltie be ever put upon Covenant-re­fusers, save not to claime benefit by it, we shall ever acknow­ledge that to be most just and reasonable against our selves, (if refusers.)

Having thus endeavoured to Remonstrate the danger and evil of the way you are in, and cleared the way unto what we have to propose, we shall with the same plainnesse and faithfulnesse give you our apprehensions of the remedies; for which purpose upon all the reasons and considerations aforegoing, we proceed to offer, as followeth.

First, we conceive and hope, that from what hath before been said, you may find abundant cause to forbeare any further proceeding in this evill and most dangerous Treaty, and to re­turne to your former grounds in the Votes of Non-addresses, and thereupon proceed to the setling and securing of the king­dome without and against the King, upon such foundations as hereafter are tendred; but if notwithstanding all the evils and dangers remonstrated to lie even in the Treaty it selfe, you will yet proceed in such an evill way, we shall at least de­sire that you make sure to avoid that maine venome and mis­chiefe attending it, viz. The Kings restitution with impunity, &c. and that imperfect bargaining for partiall justice against inferiour offenders; And for the avoidance of these, we pro­pound,

1. That you would reject those demands of the King, sent to you on his and his Parties behalfe, and (especially in re­lation to that concerning his restitution or returne to London [Page 61]with freedome, &c.) that it may be expressely declared and provided by you, that, notwithstanding any thing concluded or to be concluded in this Treaty, the Person of the King may, and shall be proceeded against in a way of justice, for the blood spilt, and the other evils and mischiefs done by him or by his Commission, Command or Procurement, and in order thereto shall be kept in safe custody as formerly.

2. That for other delinquents you would lay aside that par­ticular bargaining Proposition, which as we understand, the King hath refused in the termes you offered, and whereby all your justice and mercy too would be rendred, (both for the matter, qualifications and circumstances thereof) to be depend­ant upon particular contract, with, and grant from the King, and not upon the judiciall power of the Kingdome in Parliament; and that in stead thereof it may be declared and provided by you, that all Delinquents shall subject and submit to the afore­said judiciall power, to be thereby proceeded against, accord­ing to justice, or with mercy, as cause shall appear, and that none shall be exempt or protected therefrom, nor pardonable by any other power, then that of the Kingdome in Parliament, by which they shall be judged; this we propound, to the end that publick justice, and the interest of the Kingdome therein, may be vindicated, salved and satisfied, and yet (when that is so provided for, (and in some fittest examples of justice upon chief offenders,) shall be effectuated) we wish as much mercy and moderation to the generality, upon their submission, as formerly we have both desired and used, or as can con­sist with the publick interest and safety, and with compe­tent satisfaction to those that have engaged and suffered for it.

If (in relation to the former of these Provisions, viz. con­cerning the Person of the King,) it be thought an unreasonable or unbeseeming demand in a Personall Treaty, that one Partie, (after Concessions to the other in all the matters of right, and other things in question,) should agree, besides, to be pu­nished himselfe for having made the past contest about them, [Page 62]we confesse it might be thought so in a Treaty, betwixt Par­ties standing both free, and in an equall ballance of power or possibilities to obtaine the cause; but so farre as a Treaty can rationally or properly be with a Party wholly subdued, captivated and imprisoned, or in the power of the other to such a Treaty, such demands, (if otherwise just) are very su­table and proportionable, and to any Treaty.

It seems surely, no lesse suitable to demand the principall to justice then the accessories, (that were but his necessary and pro­per Agents in the Contest,) especially where he is as much, (if not more) within the other Parties power as they, and where it is not so much a demanding him to justice, as a Proviso, that (being already in the power of their justice,) they will not exempt him from it.

Thus therefore the power of justice and mercy being saved or reserved, we proceed in order to the actuall dispen­sing thereof, in relation to the late wars, and thereby to peace with God, and present quiet amongst men, to propound as followeth,

1. That that capitall and grand Author of our troubles, the Person of the King, by whose Commissions, Commands or Procurement, and in whose behalfe, and for whose interest on­ly, (of will and power,) all our warres and troubles have been, (with all the miseries attending them,) may be speedily brought to justice for the treason, blood and mischiefe, he is therein guilty of.

2. That a timely and peremptory day may be set for the Prince of Wales and the Duke of Yorke to come in and render themselves, by which time (if they do not) that then they may be immediately declared incapable of any Government, or trust in this kingdome, or the Dominions thereunto belonging, or of any kind of Right within the same, and thence to stand exiled for ever, as enemies and Traytors, to dye without mercy, if ever af­ter found and taken therein; (or if by the time limited, they or [Page 63]either of them do render themselves, that then the Prince for his Capitall Delinquency (being in appearance next unto his Fa­thers) may either be proceeded against in justice, or remitted, according as upon his appearance he shall give satisfaction or not; concerning his being drawn into the rebellious engagements, he has appeared to head; and the Duke, as he shall give satis­faction or not concerning his carriage in and since his going out of the kingdome (being without leave) and in opposition or Contempt of the Parliament, and to the prejudice of the pub­lique Peace; may accordingly be considered as to future trust, or not; But (however) that the Estate and Revenue of the Crown may be Sequestred, and all the matter of costly pompe or state suspended for a good number of yeeres, while the desolations and spoyles of the poore people made, by and in behalfe of that family, and for that vaine interest (the state and greatnesse thereof) may be in good measure repaired or reco­vered; And that the Revenue (saving necessary allowances for the Childrens mainteynance, and to old servants and creditors of the Crowne, not Delinquents) and also the 100000. l. per annum, Voted to the Crown in Leiw of the Court of Wards, may for those yeeres be disposed towards publique charges, debts and dammages for the easing and lessening of the peoples Contributions towards the same; so as the Estates neither of the friends to publique interest, nor alone of the inferiour Ene­mies thereto may bear wholly the burthen of that losse and charge, which by and for that Family, the Kingdome or the good people thereof have bin or (for future security) shall be put unto.

3. That for further satisfaction to publique justice, Capitall punishment may be speedily executed upon a competent num­ber of his chiefe instruments also, both in the former and latter Warre, and (for that purpose) that some such, of both sorts, may be pitcht upon to be made examples of justice in that kind, as are really in your hands or reach, so as their exception from pardon, may not be a mockery of Justice in the face of God and men.

[Page 64]4. That exemplary Justice being done in Capitall punishment upon the principall Author and some prime instruments of our late warres, and thereby the blood thereof expiated, and others deterred from future attempts of the like in either capacity; The rest of the Delinquents (English) in relation to the warres, may upon their submission and rendring themselves to Justice, have mercy extended to them for their lives, and that only Fines may be set upon them (with reasonable moderation, but with respect to publique damages) and their persons further censu­red and declared to be incapable of any Office or place of power or publique trust in the kingdome, or of having any voice in Elections thereto (at least) for a competent number of yeers; that also a short and peremptory day may be set, by which time all such Delinquents may have finall warning to come in and render themselves to Justice, and to tender their submissions to such Fines and cesures as aforesaid, and, that such of them as shall so do by the day assigned, and shall (withall) pay in or secure their Fine, according to reasonable time given, may have their Sequestrations taken off, and be restored to their Estates; and that to all such (as also to all those that have already sub­mitted to Fines or Compositions, and paid in, or secured the same) a generall pardon may be granted, made and published by Parliament, extending to absolve them from any further censure, damage, trouble, or question, (either in the behalfe of the publique, or at the suit of any private person,) for any thing said or done in prosecution of, or in relation to the late Warre or troubles, and to restore them to all priviledges, benefits, and immunities equally with other people (excepting only, the ca­pacity to places of power or publique trust, or to voyces in E­lection thereunto as aforesaid) that so they may not (as here­tofore,) after Fines or Compositions to the State for their Delinquencie, remaine subject to any mans action for any particular act of their Delinquencie to their endlesse trouble or undoing, or the driving of them to desperate ways of publike disturbance for their owne preservation; but that such of them as will for future live in peace and subjection to the Lawes and Government of the Nation, may enjoy the benefit thereof, and have quiet and protection under the same & their posterities, [Page 65](yea, or themselves in time) partake fully and equally with o­thers of the common Interest contended for, and obtained. But as for such Delinquents, who (having mercy tendred to them for life, as aforesaid) shall not by the day to be set, come in, and render themselves, submit, and pay, or secure their Fines as afore­said, That it be declared, their Estates shall from that day be ab­solutely Confiscated, and sold, or disposed of wholly to the pub­like use, and their persons to stand perpetually exiled (as Ene­mies and Traytors) and to die without Mercy, if ever after found and taken within the Kingdom, or the Dominions thereto be­longing, and upon their default of appearance, &c. as before, or at the said day, That they be from thenceforth proceeded a­gainst accordingly.

5. That the satisfaction of Arrears to the Souldiery, with other publike Debts, and the competent reparation of publike Damages (especially and primarily of such as voluntarily en­gaged for, and have constantly adhered to the common Cause, and suffered for the same) may be put into some orderly and equall, or proportionable way; wherein (as to Debts and Da­mages) care may be taken for some precedency of satisfaction to such, whose Loans, or losses appear to have been great, and livelyhoods small, so as they can worst bear the want, or delay: And towards these things (not impairing any other security al­ready given for Arrears to the Souldiery, in an equall way, or for just Debts of other kindes) we propound, That the Fines, or Compositions of Delinquents may be disposed of, and im­ployed to those uses only, as also the Confiscations and proceed of their Estates who shalbe excluded from pardon, or not come in by the day to be assigned, as in the last precedent Article.

Now (after publike justice, and therewith the present quieting of the Kingdom thus far provided for) we proceed in order, to the generall satisfaction, and setling of the Kingdom, as fol­loweth:

1. That you would set some reasonable and certain period to your own power, by which time that great and supream trust reposed in you, shall be returned into the hands of the People, from, and for whom you received it; that so you may give them satisfaction and assurance, that what you have contended for, [Page 66]against the King (for which they have been put to so much trou­ble, cost, and losse of blood) hath been only for their Liberties, and common Interest, and not for your own personall Interest, or power.

2. That (with a period to this Parliament, to be assigned as short as may be, with safety to the Kingdom, and publike Inte­rest thereof) there may be a sound settlement of the peace, and future Government of the Kingdom, upon grounds of common Right, Freedom, and safety, to the effect here following:

1. That from the end of this, there may be a certain successi­on of future Parliaments (Annuall, or Bienniall) with secure provision,

1. For the certainty of their meeting, sitting, and ending.

2. For the equall distribution of Elections thereunto, to ren­der the House of Commons, as near as may be, an equall Repre­sentative of the whole People electing.

3. For the certainty of the Peoples meeting (according to such Distributions) to elect, and for their full freedom in ele­ctions, provided, That none who have engaged, or shall engage in War, against the right of Parliament, and interest of the Kingdom therein, or have adhered to the enemies thereof, may be capable of electing, or being elected (at least during a com­petent number of years) nor any other, who shall oppose, or not ioyn in agreement to this settlement.

4. For future clearing, and ascertaining the power of the said Representatives; in order to which, That it be declared, That (as to the whole interest of the People of England) such Repre­sentatives have, and shall have the supream power and trust, as to the making of Laws, Constitutions, and Offices, for the or­dering, preservation, and Government of the whole; and as to the altering, and repealing, or abolishing of the same, the making of War, or Peace; and as to the highest and finall Iudge­ment, in all civill things, without further appeal to any created standing power, and that all the people of this Nation, and all Officers of Iustice, and Ministers of State (as such) shall, in all such things be accountable and subject thereunto, and bound and concluded thereby, provided, That,

1. They may not censure, or question any man after the end [Page 67]of this Parliament, for any thing said or done in reference to the late Wars, or publique differences, saving in execution of such determinations of this Parliament, as shall be left in force at the ending thereof, in relation to such as have served the King against the Parliament.

2. They may not render up, or give, or take away any the foundations of common Right, Liberty or Safety contained in this settlement and Agreement. But that the power of these two things (last mentioned) shall be alwayes understood to be reserved from, and not entrusted to the said Representatives.

5. For liberty of entring dissents in the said Representatives, That, in case of corruption, or abuse in these matters of highest trust, the People may be in capacity to know who are free ther­of, and who guilty, to the end only they may avoid the further trusting of such, but without further penalty to any for their free judgements there.

2. That no King be hereafter admitted, but upon the electi­on of, and as upon trust from the People, by such their Repre­sentatives, nor without first disclaiming and disavowing all pre­tence to a negative voyce, against the determinations of the said Representatives, or Commons in Parliament; and that to be done in some certain form, more clear then heretofore in the Coronation Oath.

These matters of generall settlement (viz. That concerning a period to this Parliament, and the other particulars thencefol­lowing hitherto) we propound, to be declared and provided by this Parliament, or by the authority of the Commons therein, and to be further established by a generall Contract, or Agree­ment of the People, with their subscriptions thereunto, and that (withall) it may be provided. That none may be capable of any benefit by the Agreement, who shall not consent and subscribe thereunto; nor any King be admitted to the Crown, or other person to any Office, or place of publike trust, without expresse accord, and subscription to the same.

We have thus plainly, and faithfully propounded our ap­prehensions, how the evill and danger of the present Treaty may in good measure be avoyded, and our further concepti­ons of a way, wherein, hopefully through the blessing of God [Page 68](if most men be not given up, some to unjust domination, or particular Interest, the rest to servitude) the Kingdome may be quieted, future disturbances prevented, the common Kights and Liberties provided for, and the Peace and Government of the Kingdome setled, to a just publick Interest; and this wee have set forth in such heads and particulars, which (if youl but set aside, for the time, lesse important matters) may most of them be brought to effect, and the rest assured, and put into a good way of effect, within a few Moneths, so as you might then ease the Kingdome from the burthen of the greatest part of that force, which otherwise (in case of Accommodati­on with the King) you will be necessitated, for a much long­er time (probably for many yeares) to keep on, upon the publick charge, unlesse, upon the Accommodation you would give up all to the Kings power againe, and expose those that have engaged against him, as sacrifices to his and the Cavaliers Revenge: And (for our parts) let but that way of Iustice be effectually prosecuted, and the settlement of the pub­lick Interest (upon such foundations as are afore propound­ed) be assured to us and the Kingdome, and put into a course of effect (which as we said before, might well be in a few moneths) and we shall not only imbrace with chearfulnesse, but shall with eagernesse desire discharge from our present service, and shall be most ready to disband all, or part, as shall be thought fit, the Arrears of the soldiery being satisfied. We shall therefore earnestly desire, that these things may be minded, and prosecuted effectually, and that nothing may in­terrupt them, save what shall be for immediate and necessary safety; And that (to avoid interruptions from such things as are not necessary, or lesse proper for Parliamentary considerati­ons or Debates) you would leave all private matters, and things of ordinary Justice and right, to the Lawes and present proper Officers, and Administrations thereof, untill better can be provided, and commit all ordinary matters of State to the mannage of a fit Councell of State (sufficiently impowred for that purpose, and assisted with the addition of some Mer­chants, in relation to the ballancing, security, and advance of Trade) so as you may be the more free for the present, to in­tend [Page 69]those aforesaid Considerations of publique Justice, and the settlement of the Kingdom upon just and safe foundations of publike interest, and that when you have effectuated them, or put them into a way of effect, you may (for the after time of this Parliaments continuance) more entirely apply your Councels to such other things, as are the most proper work of Parliaments, and by, and for which Parliaments have had their esteem in this Nation, and the Kingdom most benefit by them, (viz: the Reformation of evils, or inconveniencies in the present Laws and Administrations thereof, the redresse of abuses, and supplying of defects therein, and the making of better constituti­ons for the well Government, and prosperity of the Nation, as also the due proportioning of rates, and providing of moneys in the most equall, and least grievous wayes for all necessary uses of the publike, and the like,) and in Order to such things, that you would in due time and place (viz. after publike justice, and the generall settlement) consider such speciall overtures of that kinde, as have been tendred to you in the Petitions of wel-wish­ers to publike good, and particularly in that large Petition from many about London, Dated the 11 of September last, and also what shall be tendred of like kinde from others, that so what is really for the remedy of common greivances, or the ad­vancement of common good may not be slighted, or neglected, but that evils in that kinde being removed, and good things ordained, and provided by you, for the ease, benefit, and pro­sperity of the people (in all things possible,) you may (when you come to lay down your trust) leave a good savour behinde you, both to the name of Parliaments, and also of men pro­fessing Godlinesse (so much as this House hath done) and therein (chiefly) to the Honour of Almighty God, who hath (in his rich Grace and mercy) done such wonders for you and us: And for furtherance to all these ends, (since the heart of man is deceitful, and corrupt above all things, and most apt to answer­able Councels and actings, where it can hope to walk in the dark, undiscerned, or undistinguished, though but to the eye of man) we must again desire, That even from henceforth the afore­said liberty of entring dissents (as it is in the Scotch Parliament, where lately there hath appeared a most usefull Effect of it [Page 70]so also) may be admitted amongst you, or (at least) that in these transactions, of such high moment to the publique, and all honest Interests, and in times, so apt to deceit, defection, and Apostasie; that liberty may be taken by all honest faithfull Members, that desire to appear (as their hearts to God, so) their wayes to good men; yet still we wish not (whoever should by that meanes be detected for corrupt Counsells) that for his judgement there, any advantage should be taken with­out doors, but only that men may avoid the further trusting of such persons, and that the innocent may not be unjustly prejudi­ced or suspected.

Thus, as the exigence of the case, and nature of the businesse requires, (being of such vast importance to all Publike, Religi­ous and honest interest, not in this Kingdom only, but in neighbour nations) we have dealt with all plainnesse and cleer­nesse, as God hath enabled us; and now to conclude, we hope, that in an age of so much light, meer will or resolution will not be held forth, or pursued against it; but that, what reason, or righteousnesse there is in the things we have said, will be consi­dered and followed: nor let it finde prejudice with you from any disdain towards those from whom it comes, (being in the condition of an Army, looked upon as servants under you) since servants may speak to their masters, and ought to be heard and regarded, even when they speak for their own right only, and rather when they speak for the good and safety of them they serve, but much more when they speak of that wherein they have some joynt interest with them; and yet more, when (those their immediate masters being themselves also servants, and Trustees for the benefit of others) they speak for the interest of those, for whom both are imployed.