THE EXERCITATION ANSWERED, In the Assertions Following made good against it.

  • 1 That the usurpation pretended by the Ex­ercitator is really no usurpation, by any thing that he hath said to prove it such.
  • 2 That former Oaths in controversie oblige not against obedience to present Powers.
  • 3 That obedience is due to Powers in possessi­on, though unlawfully enter'd.

Duobus modis aliquis est Tyrannus; uno, quia licet sit verè Do­minus Reipublicae, injustè eam administrat. Nesas est privatis isium interficere; at pro sui defensione licet; & Respublica quoad capita convenire potest, & deponere & depositum punire.

Tyrannum secundo modo, quivis de Republica potest licitè inter­ficere nisi ex ea interfectione major a mala Reipublicae immine­rent; nam tune contra Reipublicae charitatem peccaret illum in­terficiendo.

Molina de Justitia, Tract. 3. Disp. 6.

LONDON, Printed for John Wright at the Kings Head in the old Bailey. 1650.

THE EXERCITATION answered, in the ASSERTIONS following, made good against it.

CHAP. I. A taste of the Exercitator and Exercitation.

PUblique obedience to Powers ordained by God, next to immediate obedience to God himself ordaining those Powers, is a Duty that should have the first place in the heart, as it hath in the second Table of the Law, which the New Covenant writes in the heart. And therefore he that shall break this Com­mandment of obedience (not one of the least but greatest Commandments) and shall teach men so, had need of a light within him to warrant both himself and his Do­ctrine, as cleer as the Meridian Sun; least while he thinks to resist the usurpations of men, he indeed resist the Ordi­nance of God.

They that favour the Doctrine of disobedience to the present Powers, commend to us as the most cleer and able if not irrefragable Discourse upon that Subject, a Book intituled, An Exercitation &c.

The Author we must professe we know not, nor any [Page 2]thing of his personall ability or integrity, but certainly if in other matters he have had the repute of one defe­ctive in neither, we are sory we are inforc't to say that in this of the Exercitation, He hath shewed a miserable want of both. To make this apparent, we shall not need to tire the Reader or our selves, to follow him in his wilde extravagancies, by a particular enumeration of his tedi­ous impertinencies and manifest contradictions: It will suffice (before we come by an examination of his foun­dation and groundworke, to shake the main Pillars of his Philistine-Fabrick) that we premise a taste, and but a taste (for ex pede Herculem) of the strength and candor of this so much admired Piece.

The Title page runs, An Exercitation, so we may justly expect an accurate Tract; yet page 75. the Exercitator tels us, he hath not by him divers of the Books cited by the Au­thour whom he there undertakes to answer. Hath he not? it may be they are hard to be got; or it may be they are not worth the getting, who are they? let the Reader judge, Bucer, Peter Martyr, Calvin, Gualter &c. these are the Authors that our learned Exercitator saies he hath not by him; and have we not here a proper Exercitator, that thus like a fresh-water Souldier enters the Lists without his Arms? But what want of Arms, where there is no want of con­fidence? for he proceeds magisterially to tell the Reader (and he must believe him gratis, without the least syllable of reason for it) that the Authors sayings set downe by his Antagonist reach not the case at all. And comes he not learnedly off? The Reader need not scruple to be­lieve him that he answers without booke. Such an answer were fitter for Solomon's sluggard, Prov. 26.16. then an Exercitator. For surely Replies of this nature need no great Exercitation, and are like to afford as little satisfa­ction, unlesse it be to such as are so kind hearted to him, that they have before hand resolved to believe him (or indeed any of his Bias) out of pure charity. But you will say, it may be, as he alleadges they were, so they were indeed, impertinently quoted; and what need he trouble [Page 3]himself with them, so long as they speak nothing to the purpose? How much to the purpose they speak, let the Reader judge, when he shal first have heard the Position to be prov'd, and afterward one or two in stead of al the rest, speaking to it in his Antagonists Quotation. The Author of the lawfulnesse of obeying the present Government (with whom our Exercitator in the place in question hath to deale) asserts that a Government unlawfully erected, may yet lawfully be obey'd; and the foundation upon which he builds his judgement in the Position, is Rom. 13. For he argues that the Apostle writing to the Christians of that age, gives them command to be subject to the Powers that then were, because even those Powers were of God, though (as our Author conceives) they were usurp'd Powers, being either Claudius Caesar or Nero, both Romane Empe­rours; from whence he concludes that unlawfull Powers in point of Title, may lawfully be obey'd; and for proofe by way of testimony of the godly reformed Divines con­curring in judgement with himself, cites Peter Martyr, page 8. in these words: It shall not here be scrupulously dis­puted, Nihil hîc anxie disputandum est, quo jure quâve injuriâ, principes adepti­sint potestatem suam. Illud po­tius agendum est, ut Magi­stratus praesen­tes revereamur. Haec enrm Epi­stola scribeba­tur, cum Ro­mant jam adepti essent imperium orbis terrarum, quod eos per vim scimus oc­cupasse, & postea Imperatores artibus nihilo melioribus rerum summam ad se pertrax­isse. Paulus tamen sine omni exceptione praecipit, obediendum esse Magistratilus. Per. Martyr in Rom. 13. by what right or by what wrong Princes have gotten their Power; this rather is to be done, that we reverence the PRE­SENT Magistrates; for this Epistle was written when the Romanes had now gotten the Empire of the world, which we KNOW they did possesse by FORCE; and that afterward, the Emperours by Policies, nothing better, drew to themselves an universall Power; yet Paul doth command that Magistrates, without all exception, must be obey'd. And now let the Rea­der judge, whither it be not so far from being nothing, that indeed nothing can be more to the purpose; for who sees not that he asserts the self same thing, and up­on the same ground with our Authour, without a hairs difference save in expression? And with him doe all the rest agree; but Bucer is more full and peremptory upon the [Page 4]point,Quum igitur quaeritur cui pae­rendum, non est spectandum qua­lis sit qui pote­statem exercer, nec quo jure vel injuriâ quis po­testatem inva­serit, quave ra­tione eam admi­nistret, sed tantum si potestatem haheat; si enim quis potestate pollet, jam indubitatum est il­lum à Deo illam potestatem accepisse, unde sine omni exceptione, illi te permittas oportet, & pareas ex animo. expressing himself in these termes: When a que­stion is made whom we should obey, it must not be lookt at what he is that exercises the power, or by what right or wrong he hath invaded the power, or in what manner he doth dispense it, but onely if be have a power. For if any man doth excell in power, it is now out of doubt that he received that power of God. Where­fore without all exception, thou must yeeld thy self up to him, and heartily obey him.

Tis therefore plain that the reason why the Exercitator makes such a sory shift to rid his hands of those approv'd Divines, was not because they speak too little, but rather too much to the purpose; for being resolv'd, right or wrong, to maintain his own conceit, he knew not how to decline the Authority of opposites so learned and judici­ous, and which no judicious man but himself would have slighted, save by thus turning them out at the back door.

But again, though this Exercitator had wanted Books, (for he saies he had not the Authours by him) he should not have wanted reason for overthrowing the Reasons that were alleadged to maintaine the Position of Obedi­ence which himself did oppose. The Reasons of the Ca­suists, and particularly that of Salon, were at large ex­pressed, so that he needed not to be at charge for Bookes to finde them, being there found to his hands. But in­deed if many Exercitators were in this one, they cannot stand under the weight of those Reasons; and therefore he did wisely not to take these Gates of Azzah on his shoulders, being no Sampson, least he should sinke under the weight of them. But in the meane time, till they be soundly answered, the Position of obedience stands strong and unshaken, and his Discourse doth fall (with Dagon) before it.

And yet our Exercitator superciliously saies (and he thinks it enough, though never so apparently untrue, to say) [Page 5] it reaches not the Case at all. But to returne to our Exer­citation.

We are told in the Title Page, that the Discourse is modestly and inoffensively manag'd, (mens consciences tell them what they should do, and their works tell us what they have done) by one studious of truth and peace. If he be so good a student, 'tis strange he should be so bad a profi­cient. For if we may make a better judgement of him by his works then his words, we doubt not but the Reader will finde him a very truant in the study of truth, at least in the present controversie, when it shall be brought to the Touch-stone. And for the peaceable and inoffensive modesty whereof he would bespeak himself an opinion, let but the heart and designe of the Exercitation be compar'd with the Quotations out of Fenner and Grotius confronting his so candid profession, and they will speak him far from the pretended temper of peace and an inoffensive modesty. The Exercitation endeavours (though in truth by argu­ments no lesse false then frivolous, and as injurious as ei­ther) to fix Ʋsurpation upon the Parliament; and there­upon decries all obedience to them, and cries up disobe­dience as meritorious in the hearts and affections of the people: the Quotations to adde more light and heat to the businesse, must insinuate, That any private person may lawfully kill an usurper. Though in truth he puts a dan­gerous wrong upon the Reader, and indeed upon the Au­thours quoted, whilst he racks their Tenet to so evil an end, and brings forth their words upon the stage by halves, without those Cautions and Qualifications usually annext, and requisite to so tender a point, whereof we have here given a taste.

One well skill'd in Cases of Conscience saies:Id curare debet occisor ita cautè & consultò fa­cere, ut non pejores exitus & scandula ex tali occisione sperentur. Sayr. Cas. Cons. lib. 7. cap. 10. n. 4. He that shall kill a Tyrant, must have a care that he do it with such cau­tion and wisdom, as the killing it self give not cause to seare that worse consequences and scandals may follow thereupon.

And another of no mean esteem for learning,Tyrannus Titu­lo, ut appella­tur, ad tempus est tolerandus; omnibus autem mediis & re­mediis frustra tentaris est tollendus; sed non nisi ab ordinibus five Optimatibus. Alst. Reg. Theol. cap. 23. Artic. 8. and ci­ted by the Exercitator himself, saies: That a Tyrant in Title, as we call it, is to be tolerated for a time; but after all means and remedies tried in vain, is to be taken away; yet by no others then the States or chief Rulers.

And to see the fidelity of this Exercitator; even to that very sentence which himself out of the same Author hath cited page 74.De hoc &c. liceat illunn è medio tollere, st quidem hoc faciat Autori­tate publica. Idem. Syst. Pol. sec. cap. 12. Reg. 4. De hoc &c. there is annext this qualificati­on by him most in juriously omitted, That a private person in taking away a Tyrant, may not act but with publique Au­thority.

Neither hath he dealt altogether faithfully with Fen­ner, Dudl. Fenner Sacr. Theol c. 13 De polit. Civit. p. 80. as he that peruses him will finde in the place cited, whither for brevities sake I refer him.

But of all the rest he hath most palpably abus'd Groti­us. For after divers qualifications and cautions both pre­fixt and affixt by him, but omitted by the Exercitator, yea and some in the very sentence quoted,Maximè autem in re controver­sa judictum sibi privatus sumere non debet, sed POSSESSIO­NEM sequi. Sic tributum solvi Caesari Chrtstus jubebat, quia ejus imaginem nummus praeferebat, id est, quia in possessione erat imperii. Grotius, De jure pacis ac belli, lib. 1. c. 4. §. 20. Grotius thus concludes upon the whole matter: But most certaine it is, that in a controverted case no private person may presume to make himself a Judge, but must give way to POSSESSION. Thus Christ commanded that Tribute should be paid to Caesar, because the money bore his Image, that is, because he was in pos­session of the Empire.

And what can the meaning of the Exercitation in all this be (charity it self being judge) but on the one side to blow the Trumpet to open Rebel [...]ion against the Autho­rity of Parliament in generall? and on the other side to strengthen the hands of private assassines against the lives [Page 7]of the Members in particular? And is not this modestly and inoffensively manag'd? are not these the designes of one studious of peace? 'Tis strange the Exercitation it self should not blush, to pretend to a peaceable and inof­fensive modesty, whilst it exposes the blood of the Powers against whom it disputes, to the lust of every bloody mis­creant. And yet the Exercitators conscience could not but tell him, that many if not most of the Commons now sitting, possesse their seats within those walls by vir­tue of an Election unquestionably, legall, and by the san­ction of a Law to perpetuate them (till themselves shall consent to their own dissolution) as unquestionable. And therefore he might have considered (for being an Exerci­tator, sure he could not be ignorant) that according to that generally known, and as genarally receiv'd Maxime, In re dubia tutior est conditio possidentis; which might have taught him to forbeare such unchristian insinuations in an affair of so solemne and soveraign concernment, both in religious and civil respects.

But we shall now come to particulars, and first to that of the pretended usurpation, and we shall absolve it in the insuing Chapter.

CHAP. II. That the Ʋsurpation pretended is really no Ʋsurpation.

THat the Commons of England assembled in Parlia­ment should be charg'd with Usurpation by any sin­gle person without doors, doubtlesse in all reason cannot but seem very irregular; and therefore it might well have become the Exercitator (whoever he be) by that Analo­gie of our Saviours words, of which he speaks, pag. 3. modestly to have askt himself before he began this work, Who made him a Judge or a Rule-maker over the Commons in [Page 8]Parliament? But 'tis easier sometimes to see a mote abroad then a beam at home. All that he saies to the point of U­surpation (and questionlesse his zeal makes him omit no­thing that he can say) is comprehended in the first Chap­ter, containing both the Charge and the grounds there­of, in the insuing description of Usurpation.

Ʋfurpation (he saies) is an intrusion into the seat of Autho­rity, a presuming to possesse and manage the place and power thereof, without a lawfull calling, right, or title thereunto.

In the prosecution of this description he tels us (though with much ado about nothing) that by Authority hee means that which is supreme, and by a lawfull calling, a calling from the People; and this he saies is so essentiall to a humanely constituted Magistracy, that where it is, it makes a lawfull Magistracy; and the privation or want thereof makes Ʋsurpation. Again tis confest by himself, pag. 5. that by the fundamentall Government of this Nation, the Commons in Parliament have a lawfull Title to supremacy of power joyntly by way of coordination with the other coordinates there mentioned; and by consequence it cannot be deny'd, that they have also a lawfull Title to supremacy of power severally by way of supply without them. Fuller Ans. to D. Ferne. pag. 1. Ibid. pag. 6. For in this particular, the learned Author of the fuller answer to D. Ferne, will tell him that coardinata invicem supplent, coordi­nates supply each other. And he gives this reason after­wards, Because in a coordinate and mixt Government, one parts refusall exempts not the other from its duty, nor must it defraud the whole of its safety; so it should frustrate the very end of that its coordination, which is, supply for the more security of its safety. And he adds further in the same place, That in case of the absence and refusall of the other parts in coordination the supreme power of the whole is virtually in the part supplying. Neither is it materiall if it be objected; that he speaks of both Houses in the place last mentioned, for the reason in point of safety is the same whether both or but one supply, as was clear in the Votes against Hamiltons Army.

From all which grounds thus apparently deduc't from our Exercitators own Doctrine, tis evident that the man is contradictory to himself, whilst he endeavours to bring [Page 9]the Commons in Parliament within the compasse of U­surpation, as exercising the Supreme Power without a lawfull calling; whereas himself hath plainly confest that by way of coordination joyntly, and therefore seve­rally also by way of supply, they have a lawfull calling to the exercise of the Supreme Power. Whats objected to evade this palpable contradiction? Tis alleadg'd, That the Commons now sitting are not a House, and that's the onely subterfuge, the old and thredbare shift of the late Kings Party, of which if we can but uncase him, we shall allow him (besides the whole crowd of his other impertinencies) the Apex, Zenith, and Culmen of his high­flown Rhetorick, with all the Poetica licentia of his tra­gicall American scene; for we must acknowledge he were an Exercitator that deserv'd richly to be whipt, if he could not with some little handsomnesse at least, so tell his own tale, as to make it serve his own turn.

First therefore if they be no house, we would willingly know how they came to be none. We well know that once they were a House, and we know as well how they came to be a House; in a word, by a lawfull calling from the People (to use his owne expression) to constitute them, and the sanction of a Law to continue them a House, till their own consent should dissolve them; which till them­selves shall have declared to be past, we cannot easily be­lieve any other that shall tell us of their dissolution. Yea but they are no House, for he saies they are under a force, and he proves it out of all cry, because they are willing and consenting to that force. Now in truth they deserve to be pitti'd. What to be constrain'd to act against their wils with all their hearts! [...]. Arist. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 1. I dare say tis such a force as never men were under before them. He talks of an usu-pation, but I am sure here's a contradiction to the life. But besides the contradiction, how knows he they were consenting? did they ever tell him so? I am sure they have told the world the contrary, as appears by their Message to the Generall and Councell of Warre. It will be said, that was but a meere formality; and, if they did not consent [Page 10]to the force, why did they not prosecute the Authors of it? I answer, By denying the consequence; neither can the Exercitator, were he as able as his admirers do or possibly can imagine him, ever prove, That to forbeare the prosecution ad summum jus of the Authors, is to con­sent to the evil of an act. For instance, If a man remit a wilfull trespasse, that will beare action in Law to his Neighbour, doth he consent to the evil of that act? or to come a little nearer both to the Exercitator and the pre­sent case: When the Apprentices made a force upon the House, it was afterward mov'd in the House, whereof Mr. Pelham sate Speaker, That the Authors of that force might be prosecuted, and carried in the negative, will the Exercitator say that the House then sitting was there­fore consenting to the force, and consequently was not a House? I am confident he loves them too well to think so. Yet, Aut haec cum illis sunt habenda, aut illa cum his a­mittenda sunt, either he must grant that the House then sit­ting was consenting to the force then, and therefore was not a House, or deny that the House now sitting is consent­ing to the force which is urg'd, and so conclude that they are still a House, notwithstanding the non-prosecution of the Authors of that force. But to help both him and his friends out of this difficulty, who may not perceive that wil, that tis one thing to passe by, and another thing to con­sent to a miscarriage; the latter may not be done upon any consideration whatsoever; the former not onely may, but must be done upon many, when the Reason of the State (which our Author saies,Fuller Ans. pag. 25. the Law makes to residein both Houses joyntly by way of coordination, and severally by way of supply) shall think it fit. And in this finall resolution of the States judgment the people (he saies) are to rest. Ibid. pag. 1. But to give an unquestion­able warrant to this distinction and the practice of the House of Commons upon it,Mica 7.18. tis said of God himselfe, that he passes by the transgressions of the remnant of his people, and yet it were blasphemy to say that he is in the least con­senting to them;The Reader is de­sir'd [...] notice that the misca iage here pretended is only supposd not granted. and can there be a better president to warrant the Commons passing by a miscarriage (with­out [Page 11]out being guilty of consenting to it) rather then by cal­ling for a strict account to sacrifice the peace and safety of the Commonwealth upon the service of those Priviledges, which no man that hath his reason and a freedom to use it can deny to be intended in their own nature and by their first institution to be fences and ornaments for the good of the Common-wealth, not firebrands of contention for its ruine? Priviledges are servants to the good of the publike, not Lords over it, and therefore are to be respected in order to the publike good, and in order to the publike good are to be neglected, according as the Commons in Parlia­ment (whose they are, either to use or not use, and who in such cases as concerne their own priviledges, are the only competent Judges) shall determine. Yea but for all this,As they have with common approbation laid them aside in giving way that Members shall be sub­ject to the suits of Cre­ditors. he saies that the House must be free for all to come to, that their acts may be free and authoritative. If he mean a freedom in respect of any Vote past within doors, to exclude such as shall not conforme to the Orders of the House, nothing can be more apparently untrue; for the House, as tis well known, past severall Votes to exclude those that would not engage in the Vow and Covenant concerning the Lord Generall Essex; and upon the Votes for the taking of the Selemn League and Covenant, divers that before had sate in the House, were actually excluded for refusall. Yet I never heard of any, no not of the persons excluded, that thereupon deny'd the being and Authority of the House. It is therefore unquestionable, that the Commons in Parlia­ment have a power to exclude such of their Members as shall not conform to the Votes and Orders of that House, and yet neither themselves be ever the lesse free, nor their acts any whit the lesse authoritative. But secondly, if he mean that all the Members must be free in respect of any restraint, save what is put upon them by the Votes and Authority of the House; tis absolutely answered so, they are; and let the Exercitator or any of his judgement prove the contrary if they can. Again, let it be granted that divers of the Members were sometimes under a force, can that hinder those from sitting and being a House, [Page 12]who never were either under or consenting to that force? If it could, tis desired the Exercitator would shew how the Commons were a House, and their Acts authorita­tive, when the late King had divers of their Members in prison in his Quarters; for by his Doctrine if one Member be under a force, it nulls the Authority of the House. But who, unlesse he wilfully shut his eyes, canuot see the mountainous grossenesse of these absurdities? Wherefore to conclude this particular,Fuller Ans. pag. 7. our Author in this case will tell him, That an injury cannot take away a right; which though in truth it never can, yet according to our Exer­citators principles it must, if a force upon some of the Members could hinder the rest from being a House. Last­ly, tis objected by the Exercitator, That the Commons now sitting are not the major part. And tis answered, What is that to the purpose, so long as they are a House? what if the major part of the Commons had deserted their trust, and gone to the late King, should that have hin­der'd those that had staid behinde and continued faithfull to their trust, from being a House? The contrary is ap­parent in the Lords, who while they sate, were never lookt on as being ever the lesse a House because the greater part deserted them, and were afterward justly excluded the House by the far lesser number of Lords sitting.

To conclude, the Exercitator acknowledges pag. 7. that if it could be made good, that the whole Nation had in the originall constitution of Government com­mitted the sole power to the House of Commons, there could be no Usurpation. Now it is as apparent as the light by his own grounds, that the whole Nation (for the Lords if they fall not under a Nationall, must fall un­der a personall consideration) hath committed the Su­preme power to the House of Commons joyntly, by way of coordination, and solely by way of supply; and there­fore by his own confession, they can never be concluded under usurpation, as exercising that power without a lawfull calling, for the exercise whereof they have by his own grounds a lawfull calling from the People.

CHAP. III. That the Oathes objected oblige not against obedience to the present Government.

THe Assertion that we are now to make good against the Exercitator, is, That the Oathes by him objected obliges not against obedience to the present Powers. To demonstrate this truth with as much brevity as perspicuity, we shall first lay down certaine generally receiv'd principles, by which as by so many rules, we may evidently discerne in what cases, ex confesso, Oaths do not oblige. Secondly, we shall examine and answer our Exercitators objections, why those Rules should not take place in the Oaths in controversie. And a main reason inducing to the choyce of this method, is, because truth and experience joyntly tells us, that of commenting on words and sentences in controverted Oaths there can never be an end. For the fancy of man being of so various a working, and work­ing a variety, hardly can that word or sentence be pro­pounded, which it will not scrve and wier-draw to its owne sense, if it have not some clear and constant prin­ciples of truth, as a bright but unerring star, both to guide and fix it.

In the first place therefore 'tis generally granted, as a Principle of truth that cannot be deny'd,Dr. Sanders, Pral. 2. §. 11. Juramentum non tollit obli­gationem prie­rem. That no Oath can so oblige, as to take away the obligation of a former duty. The force by which all Oaths are said to binde, is constru­ctive onely, never destructive; they may impose a Duty where they finde none, or dispose of certain circumstan­ces about the performance, but they cannot destroy or take away a duty where they finde it.

As much with as much clearnesse may be said concern­ing the Oaths in controversle, and objected to obstruct [Page 14]our obedience to the present Government. Tis most true, they had a constructive force to oblige according to their severall limitations, to the former Government whilst it did obtain; but as true it is, they never had, nor ever can have a destructive force to oblige to disobedience, and disoblige from obedience to all other Governments in the future actually obtaining. For tis evident, that by such a destructive force they should (which tis confest they can­not) take away the obligation of: a former duty, seeing we are first bound to obey all Government in gener all as the Ordinance of Ged, and so by a Divine right; before we are bound to obey any forme of Government in particular, which is but the Ordinance of man, and so onely by a hu­mane right. Tis observable, that the reason given why no Oath can take away the obligation of a former duty, is, because an inferiour act of the person in duty oblig'd, can­not take away the superiour right of the person to whom the obligation is due. How much lesse then can an infe­riour act of the Creature obliging himself by the Oaths in controversie, take away not the Superiour but Supreme Right of the Creator, by virtue of which he stood obli­ged to God in duty to give obedience to all Government in generall, before he obliged himself to man to give obe­dience to the then obtaining forme of Government in par­ticular? Yet this Supreme Right of God, and the obliga­tion of duty in point of obedience to all Government in generall by virtue of that Right, must actually be taken away, if upon the removall of the former Government and substitution of another in its stead, and both by that Divine hand which may and doth at pleasure dispose of all Governments, the Oaths objected oblige against O­bedience, and inforce a non-subjection to the hand of God in the preceding change, and the Ordinance of God in the present Government. For whilst they still oblige to be subject to the Government that was but is not, and not to be subject to the Government that is, they indeed oblige to be subject to no Government, and consequently to Anarchy and confusion. But such an Obligation must [Page 15]needs be Null, because as is evident from all that hath beene said, unlawfull and wicked.

Whats objected here by our Exercitator? he tells us page 46. All Authority hangs not upon the backe of Vsurpati­on, so he termes the present Government, and saies this [the present Government] may come downe, and that [the former) recover it selfe and stand upright. To which we answer. First, It hath already been shewed that if he have not contradicted the truth in his description of Vsurpa­tion, p. 1. he hath contradicted both himselfe and the Truth, in the Application of it to the present Powers. To which we shall onely adde, that among coordinate states and compeeres such as he hath confest, page 5. the present to have beene, there can be no advantage of right in point of Title, save what arises from the advantage of a better cause, the one side faithfully endeavouring accor­ding to trust, the safety, and prosperity of the Common­wealth; the other faithlesly betraying trust and endea­vouring its ruine and destruction; in which case the Com­mon Tenet is, that the just party hath sufficient Title enough to save the Commonwealth, but the unjust none to destroy it, and therefore may justly be depos'd and pu­nisht by the other coordinate in supremacy of Power. And certainly if in giving a Right judgement of the Me­rits of the present Cause, the interest of the reformed Re­ligion and the publique liberties of the Nation must (as what else must) by honest men be regarded, it cannot in reason be doubted, but al such wil unanimously conclude, if the houre of temptation be not upon them, that the present powers haue so farre the advantage of a better Cause, as the Cause of Christ is better then Antichrists, and the cause of Common liberty better then that of Tyranny. Neither is it probable that they will ever finde Cause to reienquish their judgements in this particular, untill our Exeroitator by a second and more sound Exercitation shall upon infallible evidence substantially and to satis­faction demonstrate, that the bloody & idolatrous Irish, are the best and most cordiall instruments to carry on the [Page 16]worke of Reformation, and the interest of the true refor­med Religion; that prerogative Court-parasites are the truest Patriots and properest champions of the publique li­berty of the Nation; and in a word that Hamiltons Army howeverdisclaim'd by the Kirk, and all the truly religious of Scotland, invaded this Nation out of pure Zeale to the ends of the Covenant, and the interest of all truly religious Covenanters,

At (que) idem iungat vulpes & mulgeat Hircos.

But secondly, to doe our Exercitator a courtesie let it be supposed (because he will needs have it so) that the pretended usurpation is reall; what then? will he then maintaine his ground any better, when he shall lie at his own guard & have the advantage to choose his own wea­pon? Let the Reader judge, Ʋsurpation (he saies) may shortly fall. It may? yes, and it may not; it may not fall shortly, not a long time, many yeares, ages, never; what then? certainly then either all authority must hang on the backe of that which he is pleased to cal V surpation, or else it must all fall to the ground. For by the [may be] of our Exercitators Doctrine, there not only is no authoritie in England at present, but neither himselfe nor any man else knowes, whither ever there will be any to the worlds end. And what is this but by one dash of a ridiculous [may be] to subvert the Ordinance of God in Govern­ment and the Order of Mankinde in obedience to it? The fuller Answer, Fuller Ans. pag. 3. will teach him a better lessen, who according to the truth tells us, that there be in all societyes of men (and theresore in the present amongst us) a go­vernment capable of its end, safety, is out of question Gods in­stitution and morall. Nay indeed he might have taught himselfe a better lesson; for whilest hee defines Vsurpati­on, a presuming to possesse the seat, and manage the power of the supreame Authority, he acknowledges even under Vsurpa­tion a seat fixt, and an actuall Exercise of the supreame Authority, by the fixure of which Seat we see the Nati­on [Page 17]at present establisht in Order, and by the influence of which Authority, publique justice is fully administred, both which being the ordinance of God, can no more be ta­ken away by any act or oath of man, then it could at first have beene instituted by any other then a divine wisedom, or could since have beene constantly maintained, otherwise, then by the powerfull, though secret influence of a Divine and Almighty hand.

And therefore we doubt not but to make it evident as the Day, that however the Exercitator presume to make him­selfe an accuser of others for presuming to the seat of Au­thority, there cannot easily be found a more presumptu­ous Vsurpation, then that whereof he stands guilty, and obnoxious both to God and man. For whereas he char­ges most untruly, and therefore most ungratefully, those to whom he owes his protection, with presuming to the seat of Authority, himself, which is infinetely worse, pre­sumes to overthrow the very seat of Authority, and fling the Authority it selfe wholly out of the Nation, so at once endeavouring to make void the supreame Ordinance of God, for the Civil welfaire of man-kinde, and leave the Nation withont all Order or Government to be swallowed up of Anarchy and confusion, and in this most miserable estate must the Nation by his irreligious [may be] continue even to the worlds end, unlesse the publique enemy for whom he pleades, and upon whose backe he makes all authority to hang, shall be pleased to give leave that Gods Ordinance of Government may againe take place among us.

For the second, to answer him out of his own definiti­on of Usurpation: First, we must distinguish between the Act of Intrusion, and the Person that makes the Intrusion; Its granted that the Act of Intrusion is not the Ordinance of God; but the Person of the intruder considered per se, and in actuall possession of the supreame power, not onely may be, but certainely is the Ordinance of God; whilst by God he is put into a capacity of being a Minister (and accordingly acts) for the good of those over whom the hand of God hath exalted him in place of higher power; although it be but for a time, and onely by way of per­mission [Page 18]otherwise there must necessarily be a breach in that Golden Chaine of Order and Government which God hath ordained, to binde up man-kinde, from inevitably, and by our Exercitators [may be] irrecoverably falling into Anarchy and confusion upon every concussion of State, and the frequent Revolutions of Governours and Governments, of which our own Nation hath not had the least experi­ence. And upon those grounds we even now mention'd, tis, that even they that allow a removall of a Person in po­wer without a Title, allow it onely in an orderly way, and in cleare and untroverted cases, and unquestionably condu­cing to the good of the Common-Wealth. Againe we must distinguish between the Act of Intrusion, and the Au­thority or Supreame power; the former as was granted, before, is not, but the latter ever is the Ordinance of God. For the Seat of authority being from the beginning, fix­ed by the hand of the most High; the authority or supream Power annex'd to, and issuing out of that Seat, can never cease to be the Ordinance of God, by what hand soever he is pleased to dispence it, who may, and doth dispence it by what hand he pleases; and therefore it may not be resisted in the hand of any whom himselfe hath put in possession, though by meanes extraordinary to us, without sin, and incurring the danger of receiving the damnati­on threatned by the Apostle, Rom. 13.2. Neither can the Obligation of any Oath whatsoever, either invalidate a Duty, or inforce a sin in this particular.

But to come to a second principle, It's a rule beyond all exception,Indubijs sequen­dum est partem tutiorem D. Sands. Prael. 2. § 9. that indoubtfull cases the safer part is to be cho­sen. The doubt of which we are now speaking, may be either concerning the Explication, or the Obligation of an Oath; and that part is in all doubts out of all contro­versie the safer, which hath nothing of Sin, and most of Duty in it. The present doubt concerning the Oathes con­troverted, respects their Obligation, whether such as may justly hinder obedience to the present Government; and it hath been asserted against the Exercitator, that the sa­fer part as including nothing of Sin, and most of Duty, is [Page 19]the Negative; that the Oathes objected, neither do nor can bind against obedience to the present Government. The reason is, because its a sin against the fifth Command­ment implicitely, and expressely against Rom. 13.1. to be under no Government; its consequently a necessary Duty to be under some, and no sin to be under any, because all Go­vernment is the Ordinance of God, Rom. 13.1. If there­fore the Oathes in controversie should oblige against obe­dience to the present Government, they should binde from a necessary Duty, to a manifest Sin; but nothing can oblige unto Sinne, and therefore no Oath whatso­ever.

2ly. If it be true that in doubtfull cases the safer part is to be chosen, tis as true that in all such cases,In re dubia turi­or est pars pos­sidentis. the party in possession is the safter part. But that which in the present Contorversie, puts the doubt out of all doubt, is that the party in possession have ever had at least an equall Title, as coordinates (ex confesso) with their Competitors. And there­fore at present have a superiour, or rather indeed the on­ly Title, in regard of the justness of their owne, and the unjustness of the adverse parties cause, unlesse (as was said before) a confederacy with the bloody Irish, and Hamil­tons invasive Army must be justin'd as the juster cause, and withall, as the safer part.

What evasion hath our Exercitator here to extricate himselfe out of this difficulty? His old Tenedian axe still. [...] Vid Erasin. Chiliad. First, the pretended Usurpation, and then that Ʋsurpation is not the Ordinance of God. For the first we have answered it once and again in the preceding part of this discourse; neither shall we write after his Copy, in his frequent and tiresome Tautologies; it were too great an affliction to the Reader to vexe him, us (que) ad nauseam, with his Crambe his millies [...]cta.

But the full prosecution of this will be proper in the third assertion.

We come now to a third principle,In juramento semper jus su­perioris intelli­gitur exceptum. 2 Decret. 24 19 and it speakes as the rest ex confesso, (for we intend such onely) thus. In all Oathes whatsoever the superiours right over the inferiour, is ever [Page 20]understood to stand excepted, as that which can never fall under their Obligation. Or (it may be) more plainely thus, No Oath of an inferiour, can binde against that Right of a Superiour, by which he hath a lawfull Power over him.

There are two Superiours, or rather indeed Suprems, that have a lawfull power over all men, by vertue of a Supreame Right, against which no Oath can oblige; in a word, God and the Common-Wealth. This Right of God to begin with it in the first place, is not onely supreame, but absolute, and therewithall universall, and extends over all men, in all things, by vertue whereof he claimes a lawfull power, Job. 33.13. at pleasure to dispose of all, rendering no man an account of his wayes; but certainely of all that he claimes a power to dispose, there is nothing wherein he is more peremptory, there is nothing which with a more high hand under the name of the Most high, he as­serts unto himself with a more soveraigne majesty and absolute soverainty, then the swaying stroake in the King­dome of Men,Dan. 4.17. [...] Hwnillimum ho­minem. Hier. and an undoubted right to give it to whomsoever he will, and set up over it the humblest of men. When therefore the most High actually puts downe one, and sets up another Power, and so by vertue of his supreame absolute, and universall Right gives the Kingdome to whomsoever, HE, not WEE will, (for such a contra-distinction the solmne inforcement of the words, must of necessity inferre in the eye of any impar­tiall judge;) who can plead a Right against God? or what Oath stand valid to invalidate his Right? Especi­ally seeing all inferiour Rights cease and determine (at least pro tempore) upon the actuall entrance, and inter­position of the Superiour; how much more shall the in­feriour right of man be no right, when not a Superiour on­ly, which yet it selfe might be subordinate and doubtfull, but the supreame absolute and undoubted right of God, by an actuall and powerfull interposition takes place? 'Tis said,Si filius fami­lias jurel se fac­turum aliquid in selicitum; pa­ter autem rei that in case a Sonne being under his Fathers power, shall oblige himselfe by an Oath, to an Act in it selfe law­full; [Page 21]and the Father being ignorant of the thing,ignorus aliud ei faciendum im­peret, quod impe­diat id fieri quod juratum est, filius non tenetur jura­mento: quia lege divina na­turali tenerur parere imperio patris D. Sands Pral. 2. § 10. com­mand somewhat else to bee done, that hinders the ac­complishment of what was sworne; the Oath of the Son is not obliging; because by the law of God and Na­ture, he is bound to obey his Father. How much more then are the Sonnes of men oblig'd to obey the God both of that Law and Nature, the everlasting Father, by sub­jection to the powers that are, because they are Ordai­ned of him: and how much lesse can any Oath binde against Obedience to him by such subjection? Seeing all Oathes at their first taking, are to take in the tacite condition of a salva potestate juperioris, an exemption of the Superiours Right, much more of the Right of the most high, by a si deus permiserit, if God say a men to the Oath taken.

What sayes our Exercitator to all this? God gives no power to Ʋsurpers he sayes; but surely tis safer to say with truth it selfe, Joh. 18.11. They could have no power un­lesse he gave it them. And tis certaine that our Saviour there speakes of a juriciall Power, and to a Person that was an Ʋsurper, if ever yet there were any. For our Sa­viour himselfe (if we will receive the truth out of God­ly and judicious Mr. Perkins mouth) was the true heire,Mr. Perkins Expos. on the Epistle of Jude.and had the onely title of Right to the Crowne and Kingdome of the Jewes. Besides, he must either contra­dict himselfe, and there-withall confesse the truth, or the Scripture in express termes, and therin given his own opinion the fall, whilst he denyes that God gives the Kingdome to Ʋsurpers, whose tis to give to whomsoever he will. For he nndertakes to prove Jereboam an Usurper, page 1. and yet he is not asham'd there to quote 1 King. 11. where at verse 31. The Lord the God of Israel sayes, Behold I wil rend the Kingdom out of theh and of Solomon, and GIƲe ten Tribes unto thee. But our Exercitator not without manifest wrong to the expresse Text sayes; yea suppose it a grant, As if when God had in termes said to Jeroboam, I will give; there were not sufficient ground from the sta­bility of every word that proceeds out of the mouth of [Page 22]God, absolutely to conclude a full Grant. But wee shall not here anticipate that which wee intend hereafter more fully to discusse for the further confirmation of this par­ticular, when wee shall come to the third assertion, whi­ther for the present we must still referre the Reader. Only for a conclusion, take the late judgement of our owne Divines, with learned Mr. Diodati's concurrent in an­swer to the present Objection, in these words on Rom. 13.

Ordained of God, that is instituted of God among man-kinde, to Rule and Governe men in Order as in Gods stead. For God is the Author of this Order in the world: and all those which attaine unto this equity or excellency, doe attaine unto it either by his manifest will and approbation, when the meanes are just and lawfull, or else by his secret providence, with permission and toleration, when the meanes are unlawfull: and it is just and equall that man should approve and tolerate that which God himselfe approves and tolerates: and that he approves and tolerates, which wee cannot by any lawfull meanes apointed by him decline and avoid. All therefore who resist authority, make war after a sort with god himselfe. Ann. on Rom. 13.1. Di­dati. ibid.

A Second Superiour, or to speake more properly, a­mong things of an inferiour ranke under the most high, Supreame, for salus populi suprema lex, is the Common-wealth, bonum publicum. Against the soveraigne Right of this; supe­riour, and that lawfull power which it hath over us, no Oath can oblige, and consequently not the Oathes pre­tended. This is no deny'd by the Exercitator himselfe. For speaking to this Argument urged against the Obli­gation of the present Oathes, by the Author of the law­fulnesse of obeying &c. He grants page 44. If the thing sworn shall become privative of, or opposite to the publike good, or wel­being of the Nation in its owne nature and necessarily, the Oath would be void; for to a sinfull thing there can be no Obligation. But to assume upon his owne concession in the premises, most certaine it is, that where Order and good Govern­ment, publike justice, and peace may be had, and surely [Page 23]it may be, nay it is generally had under the present Go­vernment, witnesse all the publike seates of Justice in the Land, there to resist the powers administring this Order and Government, publike Justice and Peace, is as much in its owne nature, and as necessarily destructive to the publike good and wel-being of the Nation, as disorder and Anarehy is to Order, and Government, or war and consusion to pub­like Justice and Peace; in a word, as much in its owne na­ture, and as necessarily privative of, and opposite to the pub­like good and wel-being of the Nation, as the privation of, and opposition to the proper immediate and necessary meanes is in its owne nature, and necessarily privative of, and opposite to the end it selfe. Whereupon it follows evi­dently and undeniably, that to such a sinfull resistance of the Powers administring, there can be no Obligation; and consequently the Oathes objected in that respect are void by our Exercitators own concession. And to evince this yet more fully (if at least there can be a fuller evicti­on) from his owne principles and expresions. We say on all hands sayes our Exercitator) page 33. The King it for the Kingdome, as the meanes is for the end; and the same in effect we have from the mouth of a King, con­fessing, and therewithall confirming this truth as a Royall Law, that the King is for the Common-wealth, and not the Common-wealth for the King; which granted,King James. if Oathes and Duties (doe, as indeed they must) oblige to respect things concern'd, according to their owne ranke and dig­nity; and the rule hold alwaies true, as indeed it can never faile, that finis quo ultimatior co influxu potentior, the highest end hath the strongest influence; and to that end, (as our Fuller Answer very fully) still all other subordi­nate ends stand but in the Office of meanes; 'tis cleare that as both the Oathes were for the King, and both King and Oathes for the Common-wealth, as subordinate meanes for the ultimate End; so both the one and the other oblige onely as condueing, but neither the one nor the other can oblige as destructive to the Common-wealth, or bonum pub­licum; for so the nature of the meanes, should be to de­stroy [Page 24]the End, which is a contradiction in nature, seeing the very essence and intrinsecall forme of the meanes, consists in this that they are apra nata ad finent, naturally conducing to the End, else they are but equivocally tearm'd meanes. In summe then, we already have the meanes sufficient (by experience) to the End; we have the end as the actuall fruit and effect of these meanes; and therefore if the Oathes objected doe oblige to destroy those mean [...]s, and with them, the end by them already obtain'd; that is, if they oblige on the one side to subvert (and all disobedience tends to subversion) that Order and Government, publike Justice and Peace, which is at present in the Nation; and on the other side in its stead to introduce disorder & Anar­chy, War and consusion which all disobedience naturally tends to introduce; and all this upon pretonce to reob­tain other meanes, if at least truly meanes, though such as according to the present posture of the parties concern'd, probably are never, or if ever to be obtain'd, threatning to prove destructive to the end itself: in such case (and it can­not be deny'd but such is the present case if impartially stated) the Oathes objected apparently binde (if said to binde) to that which in its owne nature, and necessari­ly is privative of, and opposite to the publike good and wel­being of the Nation; and consequently (the Exercita­tor himselfe being Judge) they are to be pronounced void, for to a sinfull thing there can be no Obligation. So it remaines that the true intent of the Oathes in contro­versie, is finally lodg'd in the good of the Common­wealth; neither have they any force to the destruction thereof, but must needs be void if ever so intended.

By this times tis hop'd, wee have sufficiency expedited our selves of the impeditive, which our Exercitator saies will not be granted, and demonstrated the privative part of his distinction. Wee are now at leasure to heare what he sayes further. That of the Gibeonites is no way per­tinent to the present case, the inconvenience of that Oath being quite of another nature, bendes they were made servants, though there lives were span'd, which they acknowledged to be at themercy of the Israelites, who [Page 25]considering their servitude, were at no great losse by them. But that their Oath was unlawfull Vrsums flatly denies nay he positively affirmes,Non ideo serva­tur Gibeonitis iuramen [...]tum quod ad illum obstingantur &c Vrsin. Cas. Tere. Pracept. they were not bound to keepe it. But to passe over his impertinences, and come to his weaknesse; here he tells us, and we had a glance at it before, hat all authority bangs no upon he back of Ʋsorpation. NO? How comes he then to define it an intrusion into the Seat of authority, and a possessing and managing of the place and power thereof? So it seemes though they intrude into the Seat, yet they are out of the Seat; and though they possess and manage the place and power, yet they neither possess nor manage the place and power of Authority; which is a meer contradiction, and so must needs be false, because no contradiction can be true. He is so ingenuous afterwards as to grant the Doctrine of obedience, so much better then his own of disobedience, as that it will afford a little justice, but his own non. Well but he sales wee were not taught this Doctrine of obedience, when the Parlia­men began to stand up, and waken the people to shake off expi­lation and oppression.

Certainly when the Parliament began, wee were not taught by any, but such as pleaded for the cause of that expiration and oppression; whereof he speakes, that the Com­mons in Parliament were no House, were usurpers. And therefore tis plaine, that either this Exercitator from the beginning was one of the Common Enemies against whom wee Covenanted; or else contrary to the expresse Text of the Covenant in the fixt Article; hath made a defection to them, for the takes up their wea­pons and fights their Battels, however he would be thought a champion for he Covenant. Againe. I can­not but wonder at the ignorance of this silly Objection; for had the Expilation which he takes of beene ten-fold more then was, no man that either had Knowledge or Con­science of what he taught, would have taught to have lifted up so much as a finger against the Expilator, had we not had the impreame power of the Nation in peaceable and plenary possession, to call us forth by Authority and Commission us into Order, and a cause unquestionably just to [Page 26] justifie those Commissions; nay, the War on the Parlia­ments side being defensive, not offensive, the end could ne­ver be the subversion of that Order and Government, publike justice and peace which the Nation then actually enjoy'd, as our Exercitators end, though a pretender to be studi­ous of Peace, really is, but indeed by a defence lesse necessary then just, to prevent the subversion of all these, apparently indeavour'd, by the actuall invasion of Delin­quents of all sorts and Sizes. The Doctrine of disobedience then is peculiar to the Exercitator, and the rest of the Parke, not as themselves say of old Puritans, but what might more probably have beeene said, new Pharisees, by the selfe-assuming stil, had they not told us themselves, that they were a company of godly Ministers. But [...]er­tainely for their new Doctrine of disobedience, it hath no affinity, with that of the good old Puritans; but is as contrary to it, as light is to darknesse, as we shall shew hereafter in one of the most eminent.

He tells us with great crye, and little wooll, that Righ­eousnesse exalts a Nation, and the Throne is establisht by righ­eousnesse; what righteousnesse? a Titular righteousnesse without a Reall, nay with a Reall unrighteousnesse? The truth is a Reall righteousnesse, may sometimes establish the Throne without a Tituler, but certainely a Tituler without a Reall, or with a Reall unrighteousnesse never. We may say in some sort, the coneatenations of provi­dence considered,After noones preaching. Book of sports. Innovations Masse it selfe. that if Saul had not raigned in unrigh­teousness, righteous David had never raigned. Had not unrigh­teousnesse beene propagated through the Nation, by the publike suppression, and profanation of what was holy, and authorization of what was wicked and profane; and the almighty thereby provok't as 'twere to his face, possibly the Exercitators Pen might have beene idle, or found a better imployment.

Ʋnder Vsurpation (he saies, meaning the present Go­vernment in the American tongue) we can expect no settle­ment. 'Tis granted, how can we, what need wee expect it? we have a settlement already, and Nthil appetit id quod habet. Desire and expectation end, where fruition and [Page 27]enjoyment begin. Well, but however, hee saies, tis cer­taine to fall. Quod volumus facile credinues. Sure his cer­tainty is but from an uncertaine and simplicite faith, that hath its eye blinded by that ignorance which is the mother of his devotiton to his owne cause. No, for he saies commotion is sure in reasonte follow. Sure enough from such turbulent reason as hee gives us in his Exercitation; for therein he doth what he can to prove himselfe a Pro­phet, as true in his false prediction, as false in his untrue Doctrine: but sure if the reasons for obedience be as tru­ly, as truth would have them followed, commotion in rea­son can never follow. 'Tis such Doctrine as his owne without Religion, however pretending to reason, that raises the evill spirit of Commotion, which the p [...]e and peaceable wised me that is from above, would soon lay and bind up forever. But we shall follow him no farther in these minute impertinences, but returne to the last prin­ciple, which we here intend to insist on.

The case of impossibility is so evident in it selfe, and obvious to the meanest capacity, as no sooner can it be said, then assented to, that no Oath can oblige to doe that which cannot be done. To this our Exercitator page 44. Answers, All reasonable men will grant so far as impossbility lyes, and so long as it continues, the Oath binds not; but this is not to our Authers purose, for to cease from an Act, that is, from obedience, to the present Government, can never bee im­possible.

The impossibility which the Exercitator denyes, and his opposite affirmes, must concerne either the Act to be perform'd, or the lawfulnesse of the performance. If both these be prov'd against him, the Authors argument stands good and the Exercitators exception against it falls to the ground. Now tis certaine as the present case stands, tis both impossible to obey the former Powers, and unlaw­full to disobey the present. The former cannot with the least shadow of reason be deny'd, and indeed the Exer­citator seemes to grant it, whilst he puts the whole stresse of his answer upon a bare cessation, or non-acting in obe­dience to the present Government. For tis plainely as [Page 28]impossible to give actuall obedience to any power there, where there is no power actually to command, as tis for Caius being in the evening at London, to meet Titius thenext morning at Venice; or it you will, as impossible (to come nearer to the present case) as 'tis for caius being in Eng­land, to yeeld subjection there to the soveraigne power of Titius being in Venice; when indeed others are actually and plenarily possest of the soveraigne power in England; and Titius hath actually no part in the soveraigne power there.The Exercita­saies as much, p 9. The reason is evident in the Axiome, Relata mutuò se ponunt ac tellunt, Relatives (and such are sove­rainty and subjection) stand and fall together. Where there is no power to command, it must needs bee impos­sible to obey, because obedience properly presupposes a power commanding, and acommandment to be obey'd. The latter is as truely unlawfull, as the former appa­rently impossible. For tis a sin against Rom. 13.7. Not to render honour, to whom honour is due; but honour is due to those that receive tribute, for they are Gods Ministers, at­tending continually upon this very thing, v. 6. to those that are Ministers under God for our good, and for vengeance and wrath to evil doers, and so both actually beare the Sword, and beare it not in vaine v. 4. to those that being actually Ru­lers, are a terrour to evill workes, and a praise to them that doe well, v. 3. In a word, to those that are Ordained of God, and they are the Powers that are; For there is no power but of God, and the power that are, are ordained of God, v. 1. to those honour is due. Can any thing be spoken more plain­ly for the duty of rendering honour to present powers? Let's see now our Exercitators Doctrine, how agreeable it is to this of the Apostle. Honour, he saies, is not due to those that are Gods Ministers continually attending, not to those that receive tribute, not to those that are Gods Ministers for vengeance and wrath to evill doers; not to those that beare the Sword, and beare it not in vaine; not to those that are Ministers under God for our good, not to those that being actually Rulers, are a terrour to evill workes, and a praise to such as doe well; in a word, [Page 29]not to the powers that are. To those honour is not due No? to whom then? to those, saies our Exercitator, that are not Gods Ministers continually attending, receive not Tribute, are not Gods Ministers for wrath, beare not the Sword, are not Gods Ministers for good; not Rulers, not a terrour to the evill, not a praise to the good; finally to those that ARE NOT, to those ho­nour is due. To those? why to those? why? because according to our Exercitators Doctrine, when the A­postle saies the powers that are, are ordained of God, he meanes the powers that are not; and when he saies, there is NO power but of God, his meaning is, there are some powers (supream powers) that are not of God: lastly, when he saies, let EVERY soul be subject, his mea­ning is, let some soules not be subject. Can any thing be spoken more ridiculously absur'd in it self, more contra­dictorie to the word of God by his Apostle, to the minde of God in his word, or indeed to reason and common sence? But hold a little, why must those that are not, be obey'd, and those that are, disobey'd? Why? be­cause William the Conquerour had a lawfull calling from the people, but the Commons in Parliament have none. And yet the truth is, it may with no lesse evidence then truth, and as much as both of is possible, be asserted, that there is not that supream power this day under the Sun, which hath so expresse and full a calling from the peo­ple; the people in so full a latitude, as the Commons of England in Parliament; unlesse it be among the Maca­riens, not long since brought to light by the discoveries of Raphael, H [...]deaeus. But to return thither whence we digrest, tis evident by every stroke and lineament of the powers, which the Apostledescribes and limnes out to be obey'd, that he meanes powers actually impowred, and not a power actually dis-empowred, and in that respect, a meere Ens rationis. And therefore if honour (which compar'd with the fifth Commandment, takes in the full latitude of obedience) must in duty be given to those, to whom the Apostle saies it is due, and it be due, by the A­postles [Page 30]Doctrine, to the powers that ARE and ACT; it followes, tis impossible to cease from an Act; that is, from obedience to the present Covernment, because, Id tantum possumus quod jure possumus, whatsoever is unlaw­full, is also in that respect impossible, and therefore we may not disobey the present Government, because the word commands to obey them; neither can any Oath disoblige from this duty of obedience, or oblige to the sin of disobedience, for Rei illicitae nu [...]a obligatio. To a sinfull thing (as our Exercitator speakes) there can be no Obligation. So it remaines, that our Authors ar­gument was full, and the Exercitators exception is no­thing to the purpose.

There is yet one Objection behinde, which clear'd, cleares up this part of the controversie. For tis urg'd, that To obey Powers possest by wrong, is to justifie the Possess [...]urs wrong, and wrong the right of the dispossest; and therefore such obedience can be no duty but a sin.

The answer is cleare. Obedience doth indeed justifie, that to which it is properly and formally given. But the Obedience asserted is not so to be given, either to the Act of Usurpation in entring, or the person of the Usur­per, as entring by such an Act into the supreame Power. But the truth is, the obedience maintained, is properly and formally to be given: First, to the Ordinance of God in the hand of the person actually entred. Neither can it, without manifest contradiction to the word of truth, be deny'd, that the Sword or supreame power, which is actually a terrour to evill doers, and a praise to them that doe well, and therefore is not borne in vaine, is truly the Ordinance of God. And secondly obedience (as tis asserted) is properly and formally to be given to the person actually entred; not as entring by Usurpati­on, but as that person to whom the most High thinkes meete to give the Kingdome of men, who by that sove­raigne absolute and universall right which he claimes as sole Lord and maker of All; givesit both from, and to whomsoever he thinkes meete; and who many times for [Page 31]causes best knowne to himselfe, thinks meet, both to give it from those who among men have an acknowledg'd right; and to those who have no other right among men, but what himselfe as the most High, that rules in the Kingdome of men, by vertue of his owne supreame and absolute right, is pleased from his owne actuall gist and donation to confer upon them. And this also is a truth so manifest from the word of truth, in that 27. Chapter of Jeremy; as nothing can be spoken with a more transcendent majesty, both of evidence and autho­rity. For we all know concerning the Kingdome of Ju­dabh, that the unquestionable right, as to man was solely in the house of David: neither can we be ignorant, that therefore as to man, Nebuehadnezzar could have no right in the least to that Kingdome. Yet the most High God having first premised verse. 5. his absolute soverainty, and soverain right, (by vertue of his bringing forth all things, into their respective beings, by the exerted arme of his Almighty power) to the dispensation of all things ac­cording to his pleasure, acquaints us with the pleasure of his dispensation, concerning the Kingdome of Judah, and with it all other Lands that sunke under the weight and force of the victorious Sword of the Babylonian King, in these words vers. 6. And now have I GIVEN all these Lands into the hands of Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon my servant &c. And in the processe, a universall obedience is peremtorily commanded, and disobedience threatned with severest chastisements. From all which it is evident, that God himselfe expresly, both ownes the giving of power to those who have no Title in point of Right; and both commands obedience, and for bids disobedience to those who (though God hath alwaies a designe above them) possesse themselves of power by force and Usurpation. And to the truth of this parti­cular, and the deduction of this truth from the grounds before us, we have the testimony of Mr. Calvin, with that fulnesse as more cannot be said. Speaking of Nebuchad­nezzar, hesaies:

Now What manner of King Nebuchadnezzer was, he that seekt Jerusalem,Jam qualis ren faerit Nebu chadnezar, is qui Jerusalem expugnavit, sa­tis scitur, nempe strenuns alio­rum invasor ac populator. Cal. Inst. lib. 4. Cap. 20. § 26. Videmus quantâ obedientia Do­minus tetrum il­lum ferocem (que) tyrannum coli woluit, non alia ratione nisi quia regnum obtaine­bat. Ibid. § 27 Erustra objiciar quis mandatum illud fuisse Israelitis peeuliare, Observandum enim est quâ ratione ipsum Do­minus stabiliat; Deiuli, inquit, Nebuchadnezari regnum quare servite ills. & vivite. Cui­cuno; erge delatum fuisse regnum constalit, ei serviendum esse ne dubitemas. At (que) semnlac in regium fastigium quempiam evehit Dominus, testatam nobis facis suam voluntatem, quod reg­nare illum velit. is sufficiently known; to wit, a mighty Usur­per, and oen that made speile of others. And after wards speaking to Jerem. 27. We see (saies he) with what great obedience the Lord would have that cruell and fierce Tyrant to be honoured, for no other reason, but because he was in possession of the Kingdome. But that which follows, exceeds what hath been said, and is indeed as much as in the present case can be said. In voine may any one Object, that command­ment [of obedience] was peculiar to the Israelites. For the reason must be consider'd upon which the Lord grounds it; I have given (saies he) the Kingdome to Nebuchadnezzer. Where­fore serve ye him, and live. To whomsoever therefore the su­preame Power shall appeare to be given; let us never doubt but we must obey him. Seeing as soon as the Lord raises any person to a state of soverainty, he gives us to know tis his expresse will that such a one have the Government.

Upon he whole, the conclusion will bee evident in its owne light, and fairely untye the knot of the present Ob­jection. For, to give obedience to the Ordinance of God, can never justifie the disorder of man; neither can a submission to the supreame right of God, be in any sort an injury to the subordinate right of man. Which gran­ted (as it cannot be deny'd) the obedience asserted can never be a Sin, but continues stilll a Duty, against which no Oath hath power to oblige. And thus far shall suf­fice to have asserted this Truth, that The Oathes objected oblige not against Obedience to present Powers.

But before we proceed to the third Assertion, although (as we said in the beginning) our intention is not to en­ter into a Logomachie, or word-wrangle with the Exer­citator, wherein to give him his due, it must be confest he hath deserv'd very well of the whole frye of School-boyes, [Page 33]and given them much light into their true Syntaxis (as he speakes page 48.) in his large and exquisite Com­ments upon the Pronouns and Conjunctions Copulative, and disiunctive; Him and Them, and Her, and Their, and His, and Her, and Or, and And &c. Shewing himselfe a most profound Grammaticaster: Yet seeing his impotence cannot thinke it selfe conspicuous enough in it selfe, without being injurious to others; we cannot but take notice and give the Reader a short account of his injuri­ous, though impotent insinuation repeated (according to his usuall veine of Tautologies) thrice over (Page 18.43, 52.) against the Author of The lawsulnesse of obey­ing &c.

It is to be admired (he saies) That the Author should be­gin with a generall Deliberative [It were good to be con­sidered &c.] And yet end with onely a particular instance in one of the Oathes to be considered.

Admiration (tis usually said) is the childe of Igno­rance; and tis true (if ever) here of our learned Exercita­tors double, if not treble ignorance, in respect both of the present ground of his admiration, and his mistake a­bout the meaning, both of the Author and Oath.

For first, what necessity is, there I pray, that he that propounds matter worthy of generall consideration to others, must therefore himselfe enter into a particular enumeration of particulars? As if hee that should say, it were good to consider, whether the so much applauded Exercitation bee not a piece that deserves better to bee exploded, and instance onely in page 88. where the Ex­ercitator besides his falfifying the History alleg'd, and with it the truth it selfe, shewes himselfe after all his discourse about true Syntaxis, unable to construe his own Latin; should yet bee bound to follow him in a particular investigation of his perplext impertinencies, from his first entrance into his Amercian deserts, Page 5. to Page 88. before mentioned, which shuts up his idle Exercitation. Obut he saies, The Author seemes to fasten on that instance, because he thoughthimselfe best able to loosen [Page 34]its Obligation. A piece of discretion i'le assure you, of which if the Exercitator had beene guilty, he had never undertaken to loosen soules from subjection to the powers that are, by endeavouring to fasten on them the Do­ctrine of disobedience, though he were faine to sneake into America to fetch it. But he leaves the judgement of the Authors performance to the Reader; and so shall wee of his.

But first hee falls into another fit of Admiration. What's the matter! He admires, Seeing the Author ac­counts Oathes sacred Bonds and reverend Obligements; how he feared not to use such enforcement, to the cleare letter of so tender and sacred a thing. Bona verba! If (before we dismisse the Exercitator) we finde not himselfe really guilty of an enforcement to learned Paraeus, not much better (for the nature of enforcement is the same, however the sub­ject differ) then that which is here but pretended, and that too without the least ground given by our Author, but meerely taken from his owne ignorance, and ham­mered out into the deformed piece of perjury in the charge, upon the black forge of his owne mistake; we shall allow him to fall into a third fit of Admiration. In the meane time whilst he endeavours wrongfully to fasten on our Author, an interpretation begotten (like Ixion's Centaures) on the Cloud of his owne mis-ap­prehension, what doth be but create a fault, that he may not want an accusation, though he bring himselfe with­in the guilt of bearing false witnesse against his Neighbour by it, which (as he speakes) borders upon Perjury; and surely is not very agreeable to that Hyperbolcall Cha­racter of the Exercitator, held forth in the glorious bush of the Epistle to the Reader.

Wherefore of show the true intent of our Author, and with all the untrue, charge of this Accuser; Our Author (as we can speake from some that have reason to know) never intended the present Powers, as the Successours in the Oath, at the Exercitator ingorantly, or maliciously, or both (let him take his choice) mistakes him; his [Page 35]intention in truth (and his discourse testifies as much) was onely to inforce a Dilemma, upon those that argue for the Obligation of the Oath. For he reasons, that if Heires and Successors must, (as the Exercitator and all that are of his judgement, say they must,) be under­stood of the same persons, the Obligation of the Oath must needs ceasE upon such a juncture of affaires, where­in neither the Successors are Heires, nor the Heires Suc­cessors. And to take off the Objection of a Succession in Right, though not in Fact; He shew'd that that word usually is, and therefore truly must (as indeed it must) be understood in the Oath of actual Successours; un­lesse a Nation may bee Governed by, and give obedience to a meere Ens rationis; for a Successor in right onely, though never so truely in right, as such, is such or no better. Behold the strength of the perjurious ac­cusation, or more truly the weaknesse of the injurious ac­cuser, after all those solmne aggravations, in which hee hath drest up his accusation, and his grave advice to the Author upon it; whereas indeed had himselfe beene so well advised, as he should have been, he never had laid so heavy a charge upon so light, or in truth, no ground, on a person of whom he confesses to have receav'd so faire a Character from the worthy Author of the religious De­murrer. And now after his threefold attempt on the word Successors, to wound the reputation of our Author, because here (at least) hee thought he had met with a Flaw, what is all he hath gained, save onely a fuller con­firmation, both of our Authors integrity, and the truth asserted by him, and a further discovery both of the weaknesse of his cause, and the greatnesse of his little good-will towards our Author?

— Fragili quaerens illidere dentem, Offendit solido.

But seeing he talkes of an Enforcement to the cleare letter of the Oath (though indeed the true sence of an [Page 36]Oath, more then of the Scripture it selfe, is not alwaies to be finally determined by the Letter) what will he say, if it be prov'd against himselfe, that he is truly guilty of the enforcement, untruly charg'd by him on our Author? may he not then justly bee struck into a worse fit then any of the former, not of Admiration, but astonishment? Yet peradventure this is not a thing altogether impossible nay possibly it may be done in very few words. Wherefore though we assert nothing Magisterially, yet to meet with our Exercitator in the same path which himselfe hath chalk tout, we shall commend the sequele to the seri­ous and impartiall confideration and judgement of the Reader.

Out of his owne mouth shall wee judge our Exercita­tor. For page. 48. He tells us, that by Succession in the Oath, must be intended heires in Succession. It followes then, that by his owne confession, the Oath obliges not to Heires out of Succession. And indeed herein he speakes reason, though afterwards he is so unhappy, as to con­tradict both reason and himselfe, when hee lights upon it; for he would have those termed Successors which doe not actually succeed, which may be with as much pro­priety of speech (for Oathes sure doe not use to speake in Tropes) as Mons may be said à movendo. He pretends that our Authors interpretation borders upon perjury; but I am sure his owne both borders upon it, and falls into the very bosome of non-sence. No he saies, for there is a succession in Right, as well as in Fact. What then? A succession in Right, and not in Fact, is not bet­ter then no succession to the Nation. Doth the Oath binde to actual Obedience to a person that is not an actuall Successor? An evident impossibility to give actuall obedience to a person that doth not actually suicceed.

Incidit in Scillam &c.

But he hath yet another string to his Bow. For hee saies the Oath of Supremacy binds to a lawfull Succes­sor. [Page 37]Much to the purpose. How can he be a lawfull Successor that (as K.) doth not succeed at all? Non entis nul­lo sunt accidentia. But the truth is, it had been good this Author had understood the true state of the Oath of Sa­premacy, before he had adventured upon it. To doe that hee should have consulted with 5. Eliz. and that would have conducted him to an Injunction, in the premonition to which Injunction, hee would have found that this Oath was to bee interpreted and taken In this sence viz. To exnelude all forraigne Iurisdiction. And so he might have spar'd his Logick and Rhetoricke both, concerning this Oath, which as is wholly unconcerned in the present case; for here is no question about Forraigne juisdiction. But to omit this and pro­ceed; what if by the lawes of the Land, a Successor, in Fact, be a lawfull Successor, at least untill he be lawfully rmov'd, hath hee any whit advantaged himselfe by the word Lawfull? Yet that so it is, seemes to be very cleare in the case of H. 7. If we will receive the verdict of the Sages of the Law, the company of Judges assembled in the Exchequer Chamber upon it, even when his Person was actually under an attaindour of Treason, and be­fore the Parliament confer'd that right which the Ex­ercitator contradicting himselfe (as wee shall shew else­where) would pretend; Heart their words as they are gi­ven us by the Lord Verulam; It was (saies he) with una­nimous consent resolved, That the Crowne takes away all de­fects and stops in blood; from the time the King did assume the Crowne, the Fountaine was cleared, and all attaindours and corruptions of blood discharged. What can be more plaine?Bacon H. 7. page 13. From the time he assum'd the Crowne, that is, after his actuall possession of soverainty and Succession to the former King, although his Title had before beene condemned by Parliament in H. 6. and the Succession in right, were then in the Lady Elizibeth, yet the Successour in fact is unanimousy acknowledged a lawfull Successor in the soverainty. Againe, It was (saies our Author) agreed and resolv'd by the same Judges, and their Resolutions [Page 38]were accordingly follow'd by the Parliament then fit­ting; That the Knights and Burgesses should forbeare to come into the House, till a Law were past for the reversall of those attainders, under which he had said before divers of them were, for a acting against, R. 3. whom all the world ac­knowledges to have been an Usurper. Where, beside the confutation of the Exercitators Doctrine, page 7. That, the House must bee free for all to come to, that their Acts may be free and authoritative; It is worth the Readers most serious observation, that by the opinion of the Judges generally assembled, an attainder may be brought in for Treason against an Ʋsurper, and stands good in Law,Nota, Diciair & non negaiur quod proditione facta tempore H. [...]qui fuit usur­per del Crowne le partie sera arraigne de ceau tempore E. 4. vel bujus modi, per compassant le more regis po­et esse pune tem­pere alterius, Regi: Comment que l'un suet Ʋsurp. Brook, Grand Abrigement Tit. Treason. untill by course of Law it be reverst, though the Usurper himself were remov'd. Which proves clearely, that Treason is truly Treason by the Law of the Land, though committed against an Usurper. And to this Brooke, gives a full and cleare testimony; for Note, saies he, It is affirmed beyond contradiction, that for treason committed in the time of H. 6. who was an Ʋsurper of the Crowne, the partie shall be arraigned thereof in the time of Edw. 4. Or such a person may be punisht in the time of an other King, for compassing the death of a King that was an Ʋsurper. By all which it is cleare, that a Successor in Fact, by the Law of the Land, is a lawfull Successor, untill lawfully re­mov'd. And that passage concerning H. 6. is very re­markable. For when Richard Duke of Yorke, had Seated himselfe in the Chaire of State in the Lords house in Parliament, and there laid claime to the Crowne, and made good his claime and Title to the Parliament, tis said, VVhen the Lords and Commons there assembled, had with mature deliberation and good advice, Marting Histo­ry of the Kings and Queens of Engl. pag. 258. soundly debated on this im­portant businesse, it was by them all enacted, that King H. should so long as he lived, retaine the name and honour of a King &c. So great respect had our Ancestours to Successors in Fact, even where the Successor in Right, and of eminent worth and abilities was present, and claiming, and had judgement also given on his side. And upon the ground in Law before mentioned, was the Statute of 11. [Page 39] H. 7. Enacted, which frees from the guilt of Treason, for adhering to Successors in Fact. But the Exercitation espies yet another advantage in the Oath, by which hee makes account easily to elude all this; for he saies the succession is to a Crown and Dignity, but that is abolish; and therefore the Successors which he pretends our Author pleads for, can never be those intended in the Oath. Is it indeed abo­lisht? How then can the Successor which he pleads for, bee the Successor in the Oath, more then they? nay how can he indeed be either Successor or Heire? Hee that is either Heire or Successor to that which is a abolish, is such to that which is not; hee that is such to that which is not, is such to that which is indeed nothing; much good do it him, both with his Heire and Successor-ship; the man hath fairely confuted himselfe. But then againe, doth he know what the Crowne and Dignity he talkes on, is? Doth its essence consist in a Name or Thing? If in a Name, There is no body desires much to take it from him, pro­vided he be contented with that onely. If it consist in a Thing, then the name is onely chang'd, the thing still re­maines, and so they of whom our Author (as he would pretend) speakes, may be the Successors in the Oath, not­withstanding what he Objects to the contrary, concer­ning the abolishing of the Crowne and Dignity. Yet againe he sales, the Oath intends by Heires and Succes­sors the Jame Persons, which he goes about to prove, too ridiculously to neede an answer, and adds, admit them divers, and the Oath will import a contradiction. For he saies, had the persons beene divers, it must have beene Heires [or] not [and] Successors. Right. For you know in a Lease, we must not say Executors, Administrators [and] Assignes, but [or] Assignes, unlesse Assignes meane the same persons, with Executors and Administrators, else it will imply a contradiction. Where's his true Syn­taxis now? will not every Scrivener tell him that this de­serves the Ferula? Againe, admit them divers, and the Oath will import a contradiction. A very weake excepti­on, [Page 40]but a strong contradiction to the truth, and therein a reall inforcement to the cleare Letter of the Oath; his over-hasty zeale making him truely fall into that very crime, which he had before wrongfully charg'd on our Author. For why I pray, may we not swear to performe the duty of the Oath, to divers sorts of persons, at divers times obtaining, and without a contradiction; seeing both cannot obtain at once, if the words beare adifferent signification? And that their signification is indeed differ­ent, The Exercitator himself cannot deny, whilst he grants the word [Successours] even in the present Oath to bee a Terme in Law, Page 50. For every Puisne will tell him that hath but read the first Chapter in Littleton, that words that make a different estate in Law, must in Law have a different signification. Besides reason it selfe will dictate, that they were at first intended different. For the Oath being made by the Kingdome in Parliament, was intended to make provision for the Kingdome, as well as the King; (and not for the King, without the Kingdome, as the Exercitator sondly imagines) in case the line obtaining should faile, or upon other emergen­cies whatever that might insue. To conclude this parti­cular; our Author to shew the ordinary acception of the word Successor, bids aske the question, who was Succes­sour to W. Conqueror. The Exercitator takes him up very Magisterially and saies, tis fallaciously propounded. Rightly, he saies, 'twill be this, Who is to bee his Majesties Successour? But surely hee hath not more fallaciously, then foolishly propounded a question, which Fryer Ba­cons head would hardly have beene able to answer him. For if it must be understood, as he tells us he intends it, Of the suture time, and a thing to be done in it; He that shall give a true answer to the question so propounded, and so understood, must either answer by inspiration, or confesse that our learned Exercitator hath clearely put him to a non-plns.

Before we conclude this Chapter, we cannot but taste [Page 41]of one more dish of Objections serv'd in (as indeed it is somewhat a homely o [...]e) our of a Homily. For hee tells us the Homily is fully and flatly against Subjects re­moving or disposing (sure it should bee deposing) their Princes upon any pretence whatsoever. This Homily he saies is part of the Doctrine of the Church of Eng­land; and this Doctrine of the Church of Eng­land hee saies, wee are bound by Protestation to main­taine; and this sticks very much with him, for he knowes not how the contrary can stand with the Protestation. Well, for this once I shall undertake with his owne, and the helpe of the Fuller Answer to be his Oedipus. I an­swer therefore, If he please to call it to minde, he may re­member he told us, that in his America the House of Commons, were coordinate with the American Prince; now if he doe not understand his owne Termes, the Ful­ler Answer will tell him, that where there is a Coordina­tion, there is no Subordination, but Subjects are Subordi­nate; therefore he addes, that all the Members Collectine in their House, are not Subjects. Againe, our Exercita­tor makes his coordinate Commons, the Fundament Us of his American Government. And in this case the Fuller Answer will tell him againe, Fundamentalls admit not of higher and lower; all foundations are principall alike, there can be therefore no subjection. So it is not much mate­riall, whether his Homily be part of the Doctrine of the Church of England or no, for the practise in America, is not contrary to the Doctrine in England. But certain­ly some that have reason to know, say that those Homi­lies are no part of the Doctrine of the Church of Eng­land: and that the Articles give them onely this Testi­mony, that they containe wholsome Doctrine, and su­table to their times. But enough, if not too much of this we hasten to our third Assertion.

CHAP. IIII. That obedience is due to Powers in possession, though unlawfully entred.

IN answering the Arguments, from the Oathes object­ed in the former Chapter, against obedience to pre­sent Powers, when suppos'd to bee unlawfully entred; there was frequent cause to demonstrate the Duty of such obedience, which properly should have beene the worke of the present Assertion, wherefore having as to the point in hand already spoken so much, so much the lesse will need now to be added.

The Exercitator page 64. acknowledges, The lawful­nesse of obeying &c. hath of all others, spoken most for the obedience to be maintained; and upon that account tels us, he intends to speake most against what was by him spoken. We shall herein follow the path which he hath thus trod out to us, and if we doe but make good our Authors part against his Antagonist, wee shall de­feate his maine Battell by his owne confession.

The first taske he undertakes, is, to prove that the A­postle in the place urg'd by our Author, (Rom. 13.) can onely bee understood of a lawfull Magistracy, and to make that good, compares it (as he had done before, in laying his foundation page 1.) with Hos. 8.4. Where­fore if here we finde his foundation Sandy, his whole edi­fice will sufficiently appeare to be ruinous To proceed then, from the comparison of those two Scriptures he con­cludes page 66. That the former speakes of a legall, the latter of an illegal Magistracie, else they would be con­tradictory. Wherein I am sure he is contradictory to his owne Doctrine, as his owne Doctrine is contradictory [Page 43]to the truth, and consequently needs no other Judge, but his owne mouth to condeme it. For first, he is ap­parently contradictory to himselfs, in that at the be­ginning, he would have Usurpers to be but private persons, Page 9. and Rom. 13. must be understood (how uni­versally soever spoken) of a lagal Magistracy onely; yet in conclusion, he findes a distinction betweene a legall and illegall Magistracy. But why? you will say there may be a faire answer to all this; the contradiction is onely in termes, not in things, in appeareance, not truth; by ille­gall Magistracy, hee meanes no other then Usurpers. Do's he meane Usurpers? then clearely hee confutes, as well as contradicts his owne Doctrine. For if he doe (as indeed he does) here intend Ieroboam and his Successors, whom as here, so before in the entrance of his discourse, he strongly proves to be Usurpers, both by this very Scripture, and the judgement of divers lear­ned Divines upon the place; then certainly the confu­sed pile of the whole discourse, like Babilon is fallen; and we need no other prospect to behold its ruine, then the light and advantage which the present Scripture will afford us. For first, whereas hee would make Usurpers no more but private persons, who sees not that as himselfe here termes them Magistrates, though as to their Title and entrance into the Magistracy, they were illegall and Usur­pers: So this very Scripture which he brings to prove them Usurpers; and their History in Scripture records them by the Name, Title, State, and Dignity, of the Kings and Princes of Israel? And secondly, whereas he would prove that obedience is not due to Usurpers, because as our Exercitator would pretend they are no Ma­gistrates; who knowes not that those Usurping Princes were the Magistrates of Israel, and Obadiah, Eliah, and divers other Prophets and Servanas of God gave obe­dience to them according yes to their Magistrates? Last­ly, what doth he but Nodum in scirpo quaerere, in setting the Scriptures, mentioned at such a distance? Seeing [Page 44] Hos. 8.4. speakes expresly of Powers, in fieri in their en­trance, concerning their making or setting up. But Rom. 13 speakes of Powers in facto esse, in possession and acting, as Ministers for the good of mankinde, from verse 1. to verse 7. And so we may helpe his memory, for by his frequent contradictions he seemes to need it, to untye this knot from his owne words, Page 2. Where he tells us concerning Jeroboam and his Successors, That the Event and effect, that is (or I know not what it is) their actuall possession of Power, and acting in a way of Government, for the good of the soules subject, was from God; as how? certainly the other negative part of the contra-distinction considered, if he speake sence he must meane, by ordination, not permission onely: but (he saies) the sinfull meanes by which it, that is, their actuall posses­sion of Power was accomplished, was not from God; as how? Surely, if he speake reason, reason will say, not by or­dination, but permission onely. As Jacobs actual obtaining of the blessing, was that which God had ordained; but his obtaining it by deceit, was onely by divine permission. And that the Reader may see, that when we affirme that the person of Jeroboam as a Magistrate, though not his practise as an Usurper, was from a divine ordination, and the power in his hand, though an Usurper, the Ordinance of God; we speake not that which none else ever spake before; if the judgement of Paraeus may be of any mo­ment in the point, no man can speake more expresly; for speaking of Gods rending the Kingdome from Rebo­hoam, and setting up the Kingdome of Israel in Jerohoam; hus he delivers himselfe, grounding his judgement up­onNec fortuit ò aut hominnm ta tum concilio & pe-fidia, nec deo inscio aut invito, sed ita volente & ordi­nance illam [...] Regni con [...]itu [...]i onem [...]actam fu­isse, Historia sa [...]a [...]esta [...]u [...], 1 Reg. 11.31.35,37. 1 Reg. 12.15.24, Parae. in Rom. 13. Dub. 3. Ad. 1 the Scripture, the sacred History doth testifie, 1 Kin. 11.31, 35, 37. 1 Kin. 12 15, 14. The constituton of a new Kingdome, came not to passe either by accident, or by the councell and treachery of men onely; neither was it without the knowledge, or against the will of God, but because hee ordain'd and would have it so.

Can any thing be spoken more plaine from the ex­presse [Page 45]Text of Scripture, which was also urg'd before in the preceding Chapter, to prove, that Government though in the hand of an Usurper, is the Ordinance of God? and therefore the person of the Usurper, though not his sinfull entrance by Usurpation, is by a divine ordination; and so a Minister of God for our good, which the Exercitator would denye. Tis cleare then and undenyable, that the Exercitator hath laid in a [...]l [...]e principle, as the Corner-stone of his whole structure, which being once shaken and remov'd, the whole with its whole burthen, like a ruinous building, comes tum­bling to the ground. For if (as hath already beene proved) an Usurper in possession be a Magistrate, though in respect of entrance illegall; and if Government in his hand be (as it hath beene prov'd to be) the Ordinance of God; then it followes beyond contradiction, that the Apostle, Rom 13. speakes of such inclusively; and there­fore such in duty must be obey'd, and cannot without sin be resisted, which confutes the Exercitators Doctrine, and confirmes the assertion of our Author.

What hath our Antagonist to say to the Contrary? he would prove that Usurpers may be resisted; and in­stances most absurdly, in Chedorlaomer and his partici­pants, who never were possest of the Government of So­dom, onely made an invasive War, and tooks some Pri­soners; and who ever denyed that an invader or intru­der, in that action may be lawfully resisted or that to joyn with him in it, were to be equally guilty; but our asser­tion is not against residing au Usurper in the Act of in­trusion, but against resisting Government in the hand of an intruder, when he is actually possest of it, and so is the onely person left us by the providence of God, to be his Minister to us for good, in the dispensation of that Ordinance, to whom wee may be the cleare and generall Dialect of the Scriptures conclude, that the most High, who gives the Kingdome of men to whom be thinkes meet, hath now (to the uttermost that were can judge) thought meet to give it.

His other instances are as absur'd as the former, for they speake onely of a resistance, or rather indeed a de­fensive War manag'd by publike and supreame Magi­strates, and those too, all persons of an extraordinary Call, excepting the Maccabees; whereas if he would have spoken to the purpose, he must have given an instance from Scripture, of some private Saint, resisting a publike Magistrate obtaining, upon pretence, that in his judgement the Title of the Magistrate was not good; but that indeed is a taske too hard for the whole Tribe of Exercitators. In the meane time he hath sufficiently confuted himselfe in the instance concerning Athaliah, for seeing the Text fares expresly, Athaliah reigned six yeares, and all men know there can be no raigning without Subjection, it followes, private persons must be subject to Usurpers in possession. Againe, whereas Jehoiada and those Rulers over hundreds, stirr'd not for Joash his Right, till the end of six yeares; nor then neither, but with such caution as prevented the embroyling of the Common-Wealth, it's cleare that publike persons and chiefe Magistrates, may not remove an Usurper, in the most cleare and un­controverted case, with danger and disturbance to the Common-Wealth. And lastly, whereas tis said Athaliah reigned; tis evident that the Seripture speakes of Usur­pers in possession, as of Magistrates, and not private persons.

But he urges, a lawfull calling from the People, is es­sentiall to a Magistrate. It is answered. First, few King­domes in Europe have beene so begun, or indeed other­wise then by conquest; and if a consent of the people come after, what is that but an effect of force? And here­in is briefly, but clearely answered, all that hee hath said for the lawfull calling of his Romane Emperours; for what Tully (cited by himselfe) saies of one, may with the same truth be said concerning all the rest, He had Attulerat jam liberae civitati, partim meru, partim patien­tia, consuetudi­nem serviendi. Cicero in M.A Philip. 2. Orar. now reduced the Citie [of Rome] from a state of libertie, to a custome of servitude, partly by feare, and partly by suffering. [Page 45]To which adde that notable testimony of Tacitus, con­cerning Tiberius out of his owne mouth. It is recorded (saies Tacitus) That Tiberius as often as he went out of the Senate, was wont to use expressions aloud in Greeke, Memorae prodi­tur, Tiberum, quoties curia egrederetur, gre­cis verbis in bunc modum ele­qui, selitum, OHO MINES AD SERVI­TVIEM PA­RATOS! scili­cet etiam illum, qui libertatem publicam nollet, tamprojectae ser­vient ium pati­entiae taedehat. Tacit. An. l. 3. and to this effect: O men prepared for servitude! the trnth is, though him­selfe were against publike Libertie, yet hee loath'd at their base patience, in submitting themselves to servitude. Behold his owne Conscience condemning him of Vsurpation upon the publike libertie; and yet the Exercitator is not a­sham'd to inforce a Title upon him, though therein he op­pose himselfe to the generally received judgement of the most approved writers of all sorts, as were easie to shew, if time would give leave.

But Secondly, what if it were granted, that the essence of a particular persons call to the office of Magistracy, is such as the Exercitator would have it, yet the essence of Magistracy it selfe, consists not in this call, and may therefore subsist without it; neither can the disorder of man, in the manner or circumstance about the person administring, make the matter or substance of the Or­dinance of God of none effect, no more then the entring into the office of a high Priest among the Jewes, by waies corrupt and unwarantable, did null and make void the Office selfe, Or to give an instance of our owne clear and unquestionable; tis well knowne that persons un­duly chosen Members of Parliament, have properly no Right to fit and Vote in the House; yet their Votes are never the lesse valid, in any Act of the supream Legisla­tive power, though afterwards the undunesse of the electi­on be prov'd, and the persons discharged from further fitting in the House. The like may be said concerning Vsurping Princes of this Nation, whose Acts in Law stand good at this day, and have a great influence into the present Policie among us.

But here the Exercitator replies, thereis a mistake in this argument, for though those Vsurping Princes entred by force, or otherwise unlawfully; yet they had the concurrent or [Page 46]subsequent consent of Parliaments. Was ever man more grosly mistaken, that would pretend himselfe an Aristar­chus over the mistakes of others? For first what power, by his owne grounds hath one that enters by force, or otherwise unlawfully, (that is, an Vsurper) to call a Parliament? an Usurper (if himselfe say true) is no more but a private person; and if a private person by force, or otherwise unlawfully call a Parliament; what is that Parliament but an effect of that force, and unlaw­full Act, and therefore it selfe unlawfull? for the effect followes the nature of the cause. Nay secondly, what power (by his owne grounds) hath a Parliament how­ever call'd to give away the right from him, hat hath it, to him that hath none? The people (or the Exercita­tor is mist ken) have no power to give their Consent, be­ing preing aged to a [...]o [...]he [...]s right; nay their consent (un­lesse the Exercitator be fill, in a mistake) is void and null, and a Parliament (he tells us) hath no power but what the people give them. But thirdly, granting Par­liaments so call'd as hath been said, lawfull; and the usurping Prince legally invested (as the grand corrector of mistakes speaks) by those Parliaments, and granting (which is also his owne) that the Prince must have no hand in conferring any thing to his owne Title, for that were (as he saies) a selfe-created Titles, when all is past, the worst, is to come for the Exercitater; for from the premises, it will inevitably follow. First, that the su­preame power is originally properly, and onely in the House of Commons, for they onely are the representa­tives, and by consequence the trustees of the people, and therefore they onely can give a Prince a legall Title; be­cause (if our Exercitator be not mistaken in his very foundation) a lawfull calling from the people, is essen­tiall to a Magistrate rightly constituted. Secondly, it follows clearely, that the supreame power is so absolutly in the House of Commons, that they may without wrong take the Kingly authority from him, that had the right [Page 47]and give both right and it to him that had none. 3ly. It cannot be deny'd, but if they have (as by the premises the most have) an obsolute power to take the Kingly authority from whom, and give it to whom they thinke meete; they have also a power, when they shall thinke meete, to reserve the exercise thereof to themselves; if they shall judge it meete for the good of the Re­presentees, otherwise they should be unfaithfull to their trust. Lastly it followes, that the Commons sit not by ve [...]tue of the Princes call, but their owne right; for an Usurper (as tis confest such were the Princes in question, at the time of the calling) is but a private person; and no more (witnesse our Exercitator) and therefore hath no power to call a Parliament. And now let the Rea­der judge upon the whole, whether ever there were such a Felo de se, as is this wretched discourse of our Exercita­tor: or whether instead of correcting one, he hath not shew'd himselfe a thing meerly made up of a heap of mistakes.

But to proceed, he tells us page 74 75. That the Au­thor of The lawfulnesse of obeying &c. hath but halfe quoted Paraeus, as well as impertinently; and that, according to Paraeus, unjustly gotten power is not of God, in regard of the person, or man owning it, and consequenly not to be obey'd, by verue of Rom. 13.

To doe the Exercitator right,Nec refert qui­bus medijs vel artibus Nimrod Jeroboam aut alij regra sibi pa-averint. Nam aliud est potestas que à deo est, aliud acquisitio & usus potesta­us, que indis­serens, aliàs le­gitima, aliàs il­legitina, Parae. [...] Rom. 13. we shall take his owne whole quotation of Paraeus; and then let the most parti­all Judge, whether he hath not done Paraeus, and the Author quoting him; and herein the Reader and him­selfe worng, in forcing a sence upon Paraeus, so much at enmity with his words. Paraeus saies, It matters not by what meanes Nimrod, Jeroboam, or others got Kingdoms to themselves; for the power which is of God is one thing, the getting and use of the power is another, which is indifferent, sometimes lawfull, sometimes unlawfull. And againe, dubijs, whether both Paraeus and the Exercitator himself, refers us so the fuller explication of this place: We must discern betwixt the power which is EVER of God, and be­twixt [Page 48]the getting and use of the power, Discernendum test inter potesta em que semper à Deo est, & inter àcquisitionem & usurpationem, que quod homi­nes saepe est in­justissima, non à Deo, sed ad ho­minem affecti­bus & Statnae Malitia. Idem. Ibid. which as to men is often most unjust, not of God, but of mens lusts, and Satans malice. Wherefore to examine the true sence of the premises, and compare them with the Exercitators deduction. It matters not (saies Paraeus) by what meanes or craft Nimrod. Jeroboam or others: what others? Our Exercitator shall answer other Ʋsurper; for such he hath prov'd Jeroboam more then once, besides, such get Kingdoms to them­selves by craft &c. Again, It matters not, saies Paraeus, in what respect matters in not? Reason and truth shal answer in respect of their Authority to command, and the Sub­jects Duty to obey. For in the words immediately fore­going; he was proving that Civil power is the Ordinance of God, and addes, although in the hand of Nimrod, or Je­roboam, as he expresly affirmes, concerning the former Ad. 2. De Nimrodo. And concerning the latter, as expresly Ad 1 Hos. 8.4. Lastly, it matters not, saies Paraeus: Why matters it not? Why? because the Power howsoever, and by whomsoever got, is EVER of God, and con­sequently from him derives its Authority to command; and for him requires our duty to obey, and thus to eye God in our obedience, is to obey according to Rom. 13.5. For Conscience sake, in the judgement of Paraeus, with whom the Annotations of our owne divines concurre. And yet our learned Exercitator saies but Sure he sees not what he saies) Paraeus in your place speakes nothing pro or con of obedience to Ʋsurpers; when notwithstanding having travel'd some then lines further toward the end of that Paragraph, forgeting that hee had said in the be­ginning, (so treacherous is his memory) that Pa­raeus speakes nothing against obedience to Vsurpers, he tells us (from the latter quotation, which himselfe as well as Paraeus makes interpretative to she former) he tells us (most grosly contradicting himself, and the truth) That Paraeus is against obedience to Ʋsurpers, by ver­tue of Rom. 13.Non quecun (que) per vim vel do­lum acquiruntur cum sint per se bona, cessant esse d [...] Deo. Dissere nendum est enim interjus dei quod in res bonas nun quam amittis, à quibuscun (que) teneantur: & teneantur; & inter judicia dei puibus bona sua sic distribuit, ut in eorum acqui suione & usu vitium homi­num aliquando concurrere per­mittat &c. Sic igitur de ac­quisitione etiam imperiorem & regnorum, quoe Perce, quae Gre­ci, quae Roma­ni, iujustice fe­re bellis & op­pressionibas ac­quisiuerunt, est judicandum. Parae. in Rom. 13. Once more and we have done. Paraeus saies: Things that are good in themselves, cease not to be from [Page 43]God, bowever gotten by force or fraud. For we must discerne betwixt the right of God, which he never loose in good things, by whomsoever, and howsoever possest: and betwixt the judge­ments of God, by which he distributes his good things so, as he sometimes suffers the vitiousnesse men to concur in the getting and use of them &c. Thus thereforo are we to judge of the get­ting, even of Empiers and Kingdomes, which the Persians, which the Grecians, which the Romans got, for the most part, by unjust wars and oppressions. And accordingly, Ad 2. De. Nimrodo, not far before the words cited by the Exercita­tor himself, Paraeus saies, However Nimrod were an oppressor and Tyrant, yet it follows not, that HIS power was not of God: Yet nor modest Exercitator blushes not to affirme that Paraeus saies, unjustly gotten Power is not of God, in re­gard of the person, or man owning it. Could any thing be spaken more apparantly, untrue in it self, by one that professes himselfe studious of truth? more injurious be­yond all modesty, both to Paraeus, and the Author quo­ting him, by an Exercitator pretending to modesty? yet if he had answered without booke againe, it had beene tollerable. But to accuse his Antagonist of a partiall and imperninent quotation; and yet himself after a profest consultation with Paraeus, to use such enforcement, to the cleare letter of the Author, in the fairest language that can be given it, tis not faire.

To conclude, tis observable here, that whilest Paraeus maintaines the Authority of Nimrod and Jeroboam to be of God; he neither takes away Usurpation from them, nor gives them a right Title. And accordingly Salon, after he had fully and undeniably prov'd the Duty of obeying the just commands of an Usurper, yet coun­cels the Usurper to leave his Vsurpation, and to get the expresse consent of the people. It is not necessary there­fore (as the Exercitator would infer) that a tacite con­sent of the people to obey, take away Vsurpation. For the consent can justifie no further then it goes, and it goes no further (in this case) then to give Authority [Page 50]to the Usurpers just commands, for the present good of the Common-wealth. And upon this ground, tis that the Law gives Authority to a Lord of M [...]nnour, though a Disseisor, to hold a Court, and the Tenants may sweare Fealty to him, and doe him service, yet nei­ther justifie the Disseisors Tide, nor wrong the Title of the Disseised.

There is therefore a Tacite, and Interpretative consent of the people (which our Author truly asserts, and the Exercitator in vaine denyes) when (as reason wills) they consent that the Power which is peaceably possest should Governe pro tempore, rather then that confution and Warre should destroy the Common-Wealth. And such a consent is sufficient to constitute such a Magi­strate. Wherefore having made good our Assertion a­gainst such Objections in the Exercitation, as are any way materiall; We shall professedly omit the rest. On­ly we cannot but take notice of the wretched folly, and vanitie of his empty challenge Page 75 wherein as he tacitly grants the whole cause; so he doth it in expresse words to any understanding Reader. For it obedi­ence be substantially (as already it hath been) prov'd a Duty; all Circummstantial Objections vanish as a mist before the Sun.

And now for a conclusion, (that our Exercitator may end as ill as he began) he goes about to make good the Title of the Romanes, to the Kingdome of Judaea, even against the Title of the House of David, and of the great Son of David; Christ himself, who, as Mr. Perkins acknow­ledges, was right Heire to the Crowne, and Kingdome of the Jewes. And to bring this to passe, he leapes over the Beames of Massy, and mighty Arguments that lye in his way, and takes up little Motes, and Strawes to binde up this forg'd Title.

First, He passes by the whole Title of the House of David, and that great promise, That there should not want a man to set on his Throne.

Secondly, He takes no notice, how the Maccabees came by the Kingdome, which was by force and power; when there was another King a Successor of Alexander, even of that beast in Daniel, whose Kingdome was devided in­to four parts, yet the Exercitators party condemnes this, if now a Title be thus gotten by Subjects.

Thirdly, He said nothing of the point, whether the High Priest were capable of a Crown, and could bear at once on his head, both a Crown and Mitre; wherein, some say, he was a patterne of Anti-Christ.

Fourthly, He observes not, that there was a Cove­nant of peace and agreement made in the Temple, and bound with Oathes, and confirmed by mutuall em­bracings, betweene Hircanus and Aristobulus; that Aris [...] ­bulus should command the Kingdome; and this was done in the sight of all the People.

Fifthly, He gives no proofe that Hircanus having given away the Kingdome before, could give it after to Pompey; nor th [...]t a King at all can give away a Kingdome, with­out his Kingdomes consent. Yea, he cannot prove that he did it: yet this is one of the motes with which h [...] [...]inds up Pompeyes Title; because Hircmus, whoin his opinion, had the better Title (though perchance none at all) untreated him to come to helpe him, and to judge the controversie betweene him and his Brother: And a second is this, as if Pompey had got the good will of the people, to give the Kingdome to him; whereas himself saith but this, that Pompey, after he had taken Jerusalem, did rather by good turnes then terrors conciliate the People to himselfe, Now this speakes, what Pompey did to please the people, not what the people did to him; much lesse that they gave up the Kingdome to him, which they would have given to none. For the truth is, Iosephus saith; That all the whole Nation [marke the words ALL and WHOLE] were against [Page 32]both Hircanus and Aristobulus, for bringing them under the servitude of a Kingdome; For they said, their Custom was to be Governed by Gods High Priest. But I hope Pompey was no Priest, and therefore they did not chuse him for their Governour.

And for the words of Antipater concerning An­tigonus, when he craved assistance from Caesar, they are very untruly alleaged, they being thus in the author: He, that is Antigonus, craved not mainten­ance for that he wanted, but that he might raise a rebellion among the Jewes; and against them who should bestow any thing upon him; that is against Caesar, if he should give him any reliefe. But the Exercitators Latin, [...] Non propter inopiam desiderare facultatem sed ut in eos qui dedissent Iudaeorum se­ditiones accenderet, is thus construed by him. He sought not reliefe of Caesar, because he was poore; but that he might kindle jewish seditions, against these had made a dedition of themselves. Behold, the foundation of a Kingdome laid upon a false con­struction of Latin. But is it not a desperate bold­nesse, that this man should take upon him to be a writer, who cannot construe his own Latin; yea that he should put his Latin in the Margent, to shame his owne english, especially there being an english Translation, that might have taught him to construe it? But to be short, the story is truly thus, Hircanus living quietly after the forementioned Agreement, between him and his Brother, was con­tinually provok't by Antipater, (the Father of He­rod) to stirre for the Kingdome; to which at last yeilding, and Pompey being in those parts, they sent to Pompey concerning their differences, who [Page 53]gave them audience, and promised to came into their Country, to determine their differences, and told them, that in the meane time, they should live in peace.

But Aristobul us stirring to make himself strong, Pompey comes up and takes Jerusalem and Ari­stobulous also, And theu commits the Priest-hood to Hireanus, and now see the goodly Title of the Romanes in the words of Josephus, thus Hireanus and Arristrbulous through their dissentions and evil broyles were the cause of that servitude and misery [not that voluntary subjection he speakes of] that fell upon the Jewes. For we have lost our liberty and bin subdued by the Romanes. Behold and exellent Ti­tle of the Romanes. Two Brothers being at odds, strive one with another, and desire Pompety to be an Umpier of their controversies, therefore the Romanes by this, have a Title to the Crowne of Judaea; or againe, the two Brothers being at odds, Pompey comes in to helpe one against the other, and conquers him; who (as the Author saies) had the worse Title. Therefore by beating him, he got a good Title to the Romanes; just as if when the Nation desired helpe of the Scots against a Malignant party, the Scots prevaling against that party might get a good Title to this whole King­dome; or because the Scots desired the Lievtenant Generall of England, to come for their assistance into their County against the Malignant party there; he might thereupon, or thereby have got­ten for the English a good Title to Scotland. So upon the whole, the Romanes had no other Title but meere Conquest; as Salon, and many others [Page 54]do truly affirme, we shall now conclude with the resolution of an holy, impartiall, and reverend Author, and Author of our owne above all excep­tion; as he wrote before these times of excepti­ons; hear what he saies, concerning the validity of the commands of an usurped Power and the duty of obeying them.

The fault of the worker is when an action of a lawfull calling is done by one that is not called law­fully, now then when the fault of an action is not in the worke it selfe, but in the person that worketh is; it is not to be reputed a nullity, neither to be re­versed as nothing, &c.

This doctrine is agreed upon by the common consent of Divines, as also by the Lawes, and orders, of Kingdomes, as may appeare plainely in particular. Augustus Caesar a Romane Emperour inv [...]ded the Kingdome of the Jewes, and brought it into a Pro­vince: and thus was he made King of the Jewes, not by lawfull meanes, but by intrusion. For all this the Actions done, and the Commandments given by him, were reputed Commandments of a King, not reversed by any Jew, but obeyed of all. For when he gave Commandment, that all the world; yea the Jewes should he taxed, they yeelded themselves to this Commandment; yea righteous Joseph, and Mary went to their owne Town to be taxed, &c.

VVhereby it is manifest that if there be no fault in the worke the defective calling of the worker, doth not make a mullity of the Action done. For howso­ever the workers sins, in his unlawfull entrance, and in that regard is not to be approved, yet the Actions in the calling, to which he is en [...]red, are the Acti­ons [Page 55]of that calling; For though he be called amisse, yet he stands in the roome of one lawfully called. And we are to make difference betwixt him that is called, though unlawfully, and him that hath no calling at all. For the Actions done without calling, are indeed nul­lities, whereas if there be any calling, though entrance [...]e b [...]dly made, it doth not make the Action void. And whosoever denieth this ground of truth over-turneth the Regiments of Kingdomes, Churches, States, and societies whatsoever.

Perkins Treatise of callings, Page, 742.

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