THere are three kindes of Government amongst men, Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracie and Democracie, and all of these having particular conveni­ences, and inconveniences, the ex­perience and wisdome of our An­cestors hat [...] so moulded this out of a mixture of these as to give to this Kingdome (as farre as hu­mane prudence can provide) the conveniences of all three, without the inconveniences of any one, as long as the ballance hangs eeven betweene the three estates, and they runne jointly on in their pro­per channell (begetting verdure and fertillity in the medowes of either on both sides) and the overflow­ing of either on either side raise no deluge or in­undation.

The ill of absolute Monarchy is Tyranny.

The ill of Aristocracie is Faction and Division.

The ills of Democracie are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiousnesse.

The good of Monarchy is the uniting of a Nation under one head to resist invasion from abroad, and in­surrection at home.

The good of Aristocracie is the conjunction of Councell in the ablest persons of a State, for the publicke benefit.

The good of Democracie is liberty and the cou­rage and industry which liberty begets.

In this Kingdome the Lawes are jointly made by a King, by a House of Peeres, and by a House of Commons, chosen by the people, all having free Votes, and particular priviledges.

The government according to the Lawes is tru­sted to the King, power of treaties of Warre and Peace, of making Peers, of chusing Officers and Councellors for State. Judges for Law, Comman­ders for Forts and Castles, giving Com [...]ssions for raising men to make warre abroad, or to prevent or provide against invasions, or insurrections at home, benefit of confiscations, power of pardoning, and some more of the like kinde, are placed in the King. And this kinde of regulated Monarchy having this power to preserve that authority, which without it would be disabled to preserve Laws in their force, and the Subjects in their liberties and proprieties, is intended to draw to him such a respect and relation from the great ones, as may hinder the ills of Divi­sion and Faction, and such a feare and reverence [Page] from the people as may hinder Tumults, Violence and licentiousnesse.

Againe, that the Prince may not make use of this high and perpetuall power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it, and make use of publick ne­cessity for the gaine of his private favourites and followers, to the detriment of his people, the House of Commons, an excellent conserver of liberty, but never intended for any share in government, or the chusing of them that should govern, is solely intru­sted with the first propositions concerning the le­vies of moneys (which is the sinewes as wel of peace as warre) and the impeaching of those, who for their owne ends, though countenanced by any surrepti­tiously gotten command of the King, have violated that Law, which he is bound (when he knowes it) to protect, and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him, at least not to serve him in the contrary.

And the Lords being tr [...]sted with a judicatory power, ate an excellent s [...]eene and banke betweene the Prince and People, to assist each against any in­croachments of the other, and by just judgements to preserve that Law which ought to be the rule of every one of the three.

This is the exact forme of government establi­shed in the Kingdome of England, which I have published for the satisfaction of all those that desire to be informed of the manner and ground of the go­ver [...]ent of this State.

It being necessary in these troublesome times that all men should know how to obey both King and Parliament, how to maintaine the Kings just and royall Prerogative, and likewise how to defend the just priviledges of Parliament.

For as the three kindes of Government are in a friendly combination united and become one abso­lute government, so the Kings royall Authority, the judicatory power of the Lords, and the just pri­viledge of the Commons, are firmely united to make one absolute power.

Which intimates unto us, that to maintaine one onely, is not our duty, or two, and neglect the third, but to maintaine a firme and inseparable union: for to make a division is the first step to dissolution: wee ought not to maintaine the Kings regall Preroga­tive, to suppresse the judicatory power of the Lords, nor the judicatory power of the Lords to make breach of the priviledges of the Commons, but maintaine each in its proper degree, by that meanes to make up an absolute Monarchy.