A Disingag'd Survey OF THE Engagement. In relation to publike Obligations.

  • 1. Precedent,
  • 2. Present,

In the Oaths of Allegiance and Supre­macy, the Protestation, and Covenant, and under the present juncture of affaires.

Bucer in Rom. 13. Summun jus omnium potestatum, regum, principum, & Ma­gistratuum in eo situmest, quod à Deo ordinatae sunt. Et hujus ordination is Vnum & indubitatum [...] est, esse po­testates.

Pacem debet habere voluntas bellum necessitas. Aug.

If it be POSSIBLE, as much as lyeth in YOU, live peaceably with all men. Rom. 12.18.

London printed for John Wright, at the Kings Head in the Old-Bayley. 1650.

A Disingag'd Survey OF THE Engagement, IN Relation to publike Obligations.

FUlly to satisfy Conscience concerning the present Engagement, two Questions would be propoun­ded and cleared.

  • 1. Whether ex Licito of right we may subscribe when calld to it.
  • 2. Whether ex dibito of duty we must subscribe when calld to it.

For as we sinne by way of Commission if we sub­scribe, when of right we ought not: so we sinne by way of Omission if we subscribe not when of duty we ought [Page 2]to doe it. The reason of the first Question is, because it is objected that we are under the obligation of precedent Engagements, which beare a contrariety to the present. The reason of the second is, because it is asserted that the present Ingagement comes to us in the name of Au­thority, and as an Act in law. The first reason stands upon [...], First the Contrariety: Secondly the Ob­ligation. Of these neither can stand if either faile, but both, with the whole weight of the objection must of necessity fall to the ground. For if those former En­gagements be either contrary, but not binding; or bind­ding, buy not contrary, nothing can hinder but that we may as lawfully subscribe the present Engagement as if they were neither binding nor contrary.

The former Engagements which minister matter of scru­ple concerning the present, are the Oathes of Allegiance and Supremacy, the Protestation and Covenant.

The Oathes of Allegiance and Supremacy considered.The first scruple arises from the Oaths of Allegiance, and Supremacy; both in effect one. Their parts are two 1. Declaratory. 2, Promissory. The Declaratory part consisting of an Act meerely transient leaves no ground of doubt; the Promissory part is onely scrupled, and therein the word Heires (or as the Oath of Supremacy) Lawfull beires and Successors, for what concern'd the King is extinct with his person.

The doubt may be thus stated, Whether a promise made and sworne to beare faith and true Allegiance to, id est. (as tis afterwards interpreted) to defend the Kings lawfull heires and Successors, their Crown and dignity, to uttermost power, be not contrary to and obliging against a promise to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth as it is now established with­out a King? for the Lords in this place signifie nothing.

The parts of the quere are two. 1. the Contrariety, 2, the Obligation. And first for satisfaction to the point of Contrariety. It may be considered that all Oaths being to be taken in their sence that give them, the intention of [Page 3]the first giver, must certainely be the most proper key to open their true meaning. And therefore such subsequent emergencies, as at first had no place in the intention of the giver, ought not afterwards to be scru'd into the meaning of an Oath; seeing they doe not properly fall under it, but rather beyond, or beside it. Now the intenti­on of the giver will appeare from two things. First, from the Occasion. Secondly, From the equity of the Oath. The one shews us what first was; the other, what still should be in the intent of the giver. And first for the occasion, 'tis evident concerning the present Oathes, that they were at first occasioned by, and by consequence intended against the frequent and pernicious attempts of Papists chiefely, and collaterally other Delinquents, by forraigne invasions and domesticke Conspiracies, against the then peaceably established Princes in Conjunction with Par­liaments; And certainely that Parliaments should pro­vide by Oath, for the security of Princes joyning with Parliaments, against Papists and other Delinquents, is but reason and justice: but that the same provision should also intend Princes joyning with Papists and other De­linquents, against Parliaments, or their Heires and Suc­cessors, in courses of that nature, can no way stand with either. Fortis plaine that such case neither did, could, nor ought to fall under the intention of the Legislators; and therefore must fall beyond and beside the meaning of these Oathes. So that when Princes prove untrue, and unfaithfull to their places; 'tis of right that wee may, and of duty, that wee must be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth, though established without them, (yea and bless God that we have an establishment) notwith­standing any thing really intended; however pretended, in these Oathes to the contrary.

Secondly, It is to bee considered, that where the Letter bindes to a thing that is dubious, and cannot stand with reason and justice, not it, but the equity of a Law is to be [Page 4]regarded. In omni dubio praesumendum est pro aquitale legis. And the reason is, because the Letter is variable; but the equity is immutable and eternall. Now it's impossible that two pretending to the [...] or publike authority, commanding things contrary, should both command things just at once in the same place; and therefore the equity of the Law (in which both the pre­cedent and present engagements agree) requires us (in order of the Salus of that Society, whereof we are Mem­bers) to be true and faithfull to the obtaining [...] or publike authority, commanding things lawfull and just, because in the peace thereof, our selves shall have Peace. And the truth of this will further appeare, if we consider that the obligation in the Oathes scrupled, so farre as it concernes the persons, must be taken onely Conjunction with the Crowne and Dignity. i. e. the [...] or publike authority, because the formalis ratio, under which they are capable either of requiring, or receiving the perfor­mance, is, qua invested with the [...] or publike authority; for the persons that act the Authority, give nothing to, but take all from it; and therefore without it, are not the formall object, to whom the obligation ought to be performed. Whereupon it followes, that in case the King, his Heires, and Successors shall divide, and se­parate their persons from the Crown and Dignity; and prostitute them to the patronage of the most opposite in­dignities, they put themselves into an incapacity of re­ceiving the obligation, in the Oathes in question. Which division & separation; The Parliaments of both Na­tions have long since declared to have beene the case of the Father, and the Kirke of Scotland have lately de­clared to be the case of the Sonne. And indeed upon this account, it was that when the person of the King re­moved with Papists, and Delinquents to Oxford; the conscientious of the Nation thought it their duty▪ (not­withstanding any obligations in the Oaths now scrupled, [Page 5]and then pretended by the other side, to the contrary) to abide with the Crown & dignity at Westm. judging it more agreeable to their Obligation in the Oaths mentioned; thus to keepe it in the intention and equity, by seemingly breaking it (if it must needes be called so) in some part of the expression and letter; then otherwise really to breake it upon a bare pretence of keeping it. Although now (such is the power of passion, or interest, or both) some of the same persons could almost perswade them­selves, that the Crowne and Dignity which remain'd at Westminster, while the person of the late King kept Gar­rison at Oxford, hath of late (I know not by what winde) taken saile for the Ile of Jersey, which if in any thing it differ from Oxford, it is in this; That as it hath not any more of the thing, so it hath much lesse (if any thing at all) of the appearance of the Crowne and Dignity. For really if men were free to use their owne reason, they might easily discerne that as to the Crowne and Dignity in a right acceptation, neither is any thing present THERE, nor any thing absent HERE, but an empty name. Neither certainely can any satisfactory reason be given, why we may not with as little contrariety to the present Oathes,Master Pym's speech at a con­ference. promise to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth, as now establisht without a King, as formerly engage to, and with the Parliament exercising the [...] or publike Authority wholly without him;Votes against Hamiltons Army yea and in some things without the Lords. And which comes up fully to the present case, avowing the doing the like in all cases, if they should finde it requisite for the good and safety of the Nation. And if it shall be objected, that however they never changed the Government, but left a doore open for the King to enter in at; 'Tis an­swered in the first place, That makes the matter worse, ra­ther then better; for to acknowledge a part of the [...] or publike Authority in the King, and to make addresses to him accordingly, and yet to exercise the whole wholly with­out [Page 6]him, however it could not, the cause duly consider­ed, render such Engagements any thing the less lawfull, yet it could not (at the first appeareance) but render them so much the more doubtfull; and the adverse party constantly endeavoured to make advantage of it accor­dingly.

Secondly, As they left a door open, so they prepared su­ficient locks for that door, and (not without cause neither) to shut him up fast enough when entred; so as he had as much share in the [...] or publike authority, without doores, as he was like to have had within. But to speake the truth in plaine English, or rather Scotish; hath not the Kirke of Scotland lately told their proclaimed King, that unlesse he intend to be forever shut out, he must make his enterance into that Kingdome, by the doore of the Covenant, and an universall compliance with the reli­gious Party there. Which when it shall be cordially per­formed, with a Demonstration of the sincerity thereof, cleare and convincing, then there may be some shew per­haps of a ground to scruple the point in hand, but till then it may well become all peaceably godly men, not to scruple, to promise to be true and faithfull to the pre­sent Government, untill they see a better; for at present, there appeares none other; and if that returne which is by some desired, it is like to prove worse, (if there can be a worse) then none?

The result of all that hath beene said, is, That the r [...]-Oathes of Allegiance, and Supremacy, so farre as they are binding, which is according to the legislators inten­tion, and their owne equity, are not contrary to the pre­sent Engagement; but as in the one respect not contra, but praeter, so in the other neither, but rather full for it: which may satisfie as to the point of contrariety.

The second part of the quaere, was concerning the Ob­ligation of the premis'd Oathes; And 'tis whether bind­ging or not binding, so farre as it crosses the present En­gagement. [Page 7]In which Particular to arrive at the truth; we must set out at the consideration of such cases as have power to null the Obligation of an Oath. Not to speake of any but what are pertinent, and unquestionable; When the performance becomes either; First, unlawfull: or Se­condly, Impossible. In these two cases the obligation is rendred null. For as to binde to what ought not to bee done, makes sinne a duty; so to binde to what cannot be done, makes duty a sinne; because tis a duty that the creature aswell willingly, as of necessity, containe him­selfe within those lists, wherewith, in actions of this na­ture, the providence of God, ordering things contingent to us, by a power and wisedome infinitely above us, con­trary to our expectations, is pleased to circumscribe it.

The unlawfulnesse may arise two waies, either in re­spect of the persons first to to whom; or secondly, by whom, the Obligation is to be performed. First, to whom, As put case a Ship designed to publique service, putting forth to Sea, the whole company (other Officers and Marriners) sweare to be true and faithfull to the Cap­taine, and to defend his person, Place and Authority. Afterwards the Captaine with others of the company, forsake their own Vessel, and shipping themselves with the common Enemy; the Captaine require the rest of the company, with their Ship to attend his person, and submit to his authority, by vertue of the Obligation of the former Oath: Meane while the other Officers joy­ning together in the Government of the Ship, require the rest of the Marriners to enter into an engagement, to be true and faithfull to the publique service under their Government. Can it be doubted that the obligation of the first Oath, in this case became null? And need it be scrupled, whether it be lawfull to enter into the se­cond? And is not the reason evident, because if the for­mer Oath should oblige in the letter, against the inten­tion and equity; a necessity would be laid upon them by [Page 8]pretended fidelity to their late Captaine, to be really false to their Countrey. Now a Ship being as it were a little Common-Wealth, and a Common-wealth, no o­ther but a great Ship; the application will need no ex­plication, especially the case to which the allusion looks being sufficienty knowne, and decided both by God and Man.

Secondly, The performance may be unlawfull, and consequently the obligation null in respect of those by whom it is to be performed: And that in two cases, when way must be made to the performance by them; either first through the Commission of a greater evill, then the non-performance. Or secondly, through the omission of a greater good, then the performance.

For first, if no Obligation can binde to that which is evill, much less of two evills, can it binde to the greater. And therefore when God hath given a Nation the sub­stantials of Government, Righteousness and Peace, to throw them into bloud and confusion, for that which is but a circumstantial (or scarce so much) the bare Title of a pretender, is that which the world by sad experience can witness to be the continued practice of tyranicall Princes, but never can be proved, to be the duty of true Christians, upon pretence of any obligation whatsoever. Neither can it be deny'd, that in such a case, were the cause of the pretender never so just, yet it were not to be prosecuted by a cruelty so unjust; but rather in reason and Religion (if either could be expected from such) a strong obliga­tion would lye upon him, to desist from his claime; but not the least show of any obligation upon that people, by meanes so inconsistent with humanity, to be assisting (not so much to his cause, in a condition so desperate) as to their owne miserable and unavoidable ruine. But then put case the pretenders cause be unjust in it selfe, how desperately wicked will it be rendered by the ac­cession of that guilt which will eternally cleave unto it by [Page 9]so horrid a prosecution! Were the non-performance of such an Obligation, to such a pretender in regard of the justnesse of his cause evill, as was said before, yet it ought to be chosen before an evill, so beyond all controversie greater; But when not the non-performance, but the performance is the evill (as tis in an unjust cause) then 'tis to endeavour to set the Crowne upon the head of wickedness, and by a violence no lesse bloudy then unjust to attempt, to place unjustice in the throne of righ­teousness. Concerning the cause of the present Pretender, continuing in those waies wherein he is so deeply and desperately engag'd, there needs no more but this, if it be (as certainely 'tis) the same now that was at first; it either then was unjustly, or now may be as justly, as for­merly oppos'd.

But secondly, An Obligation may be rendered Null, because unlawfull, when the performance cannot be, but by omission of a greater good; that is, Of a duty more immediately necessary. Tis of immediate necessity that there be a Government; a duty immediately necessary, that they that live under it, be true and faithfull to it; otherwise neither Governours nor Government can bee secured against fraud and force, in the discharge of their duty; but that this Government must be continued; be­cause once begun in the name of such a Family, though entering and possessing the place with approved justice, is no way necessary; no nor when providence hath other­wise determined it, lawfull, for the Kingdomes of the Earth are the Lords, and he gives them to whomsoever he pleases; neither can any Obligation binde against his determination; which appeares to us onely by ex­ternall providences. For secret things belong to God, but to us things revealed. And whereby can providence reveale the minde of God [...]ore clearely, then by devest­ing the former, and investing the present Governours; with the plenary possession of the [...], that publique [Page 10]Authority, which is the foundation and formall object of all publike Obligations of this nature, which we are there, and there onely to performe where the Almighty, who is the Lord Paramount, shall bee pleased to fix it. Wherefore to neglect a present duty by an over-ruling providence fastned upon us, upon pretence of ormer ob­ligations to the contrary, when notwithstanding, God hath raz'd the foundations of those Obligations; what can it be but to rebell against the Ordinances, out onely of men, but of God himselfe, against the universall good (with the universall confusion, if not ruine) of a Nati­on, against our Obligation, to that [...] that publike Authority, under whose shadow we sit downe in peace, and may (if our owne frowardness hinder not) enjoy all the Ordinances of Righteousnesse, both divine and humane; and in a word, against that gratitude and obedi­ence which we owe to divine dispensations. To con­clude; if the bare Title of a Pretender though just, can­not oblige against an immediate and necessary duty to present authority; much lesse where the cause is doubt­full, or apparently unjust: Seeing that were to pull down that ruine upon our owne heads, (by our owne breach of duty) from which a divine hand hath in mercy res­cu'd us, without leaving our selves the excuse of so much at a good intention. Which whether it be the present case let the impartiall judge.

The second thing which nulls the Obligation of an Oath, is the Impossibility of performance. Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia. To which beside what hath been said, as to the unlawfulness (for id tantum possumus quod jure possu­mus) Vpon which ground the limitation in the Oathes scrupl'd to uttermost power) was inserted. We may then lawfully conclude, that God hath shut men up under an impossibility, when he hath not onely deprived them of all naturall meanes and power, but also destroy'd the foundotion, upon which the Obligation was built, and [Page 11]substituted another in its stead. And this also is more evi­dent in the present case, then to need a demonstration, which yet will be more fully evinc't, when we come to speake of the present Authority.

And so we have done with the Oathes of Allegiance, and Supremacy, wherein we havee beene the more large, because all that is scrupl'd in the other Ingagements, save what concernes the Priviledges of Parliament, is built upon the same foundation.

The Protest. considered.The next Scandall at which Conscience stickes, and untill it be removed, cannot finde its way cleare to enter into the present Ingagement, is taken from the Protesta­tion and Covenant. And first for the Protestation; It promises the preservation and defence of five particulars: The Doctrine of the Church of England, The Kings Person, Honour and Estate, The Power and Priviledges of Parliament, The Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and lastly, The Union and Peace of the three Kingdoms; But with this limitation, To the power of the party protesting, and as farre as lawfully he may. The first, the last, and the second Branch (so farre as it concernes the Person of the King) are not here at all concern'd. What concernes the Kings Honour and Estate, if it be to be understood of the Heires of his Person, hath alrea­dy been considered in the Oaths of Allegiance and Su­premacy. Neither may we, by the expresse Limits of the present Protestation, lawfully defend them in wayes long since and still condemned for unlawfull; or not lawfully be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without them, when their owne posture will not admit us to be true and faithfull (in a right sense) to them with it. But if it be (as in reason it may be) understood of the Pub­lique Authority, resulting from, and exercised by the Lawes of the Nation, 'tis involv'd in the Common-wealth, and so this Branch in effect speakes the same Language with the Ingagement. And for the thied and [Page 12]fourth: First, in a generall consideration (if the substance of things, not circumstance of persons, be, as they must be, principally minded) why the Power and Priviledges of Parliament should not be capable of the firmest preser­vation and fullest improvement, without a King or House of Lords (especially proving opposite) cannot easily sinke into the head of any impartiall man, that shall without prejudice consult the free vote of his owne reason, toge­ther with the constant experience of former times. For 'tis reason to believe, That the Lords Temporall (in this personall consideration) are no more essentiall to the Po­wer of Parliaments, then the Lords Spirituall, nor the King, then either. And what can be more plaine, if we consider that in the Coronation Oath, the Office of the King (and the Lords his Creatures have for the most part the same) is neither to enact nor repeale Lawes, save onely by giving (pro forma, for he is bound by Oath to do it) his consent to both; both which (things thus stand­ing) necessarily must, and possibly may be done without them, with more expedition and advantage, and lesse delay and difficulty. For 'tis well knowne, though by ill experience, that both King and Lords, partly by assu­ming to themselves in the House of Peeres, an Arbitrary Jurisdiction over the Persons and Estates of the free Peo­ple of this Nation; and partly by the perverse Engine of a Negative Voyce, have exercised a power of their owne, to enervate at their pleasure the power of Parliaments, both obstructing the progresse of the best Lawes, and measu­ring out the Rights and Liberties of the People, by the Line of their owne Wils and Interests. It remaines that to a reall and substantiall observation of these two Bran­ches (especially when the circumstantiall is not in our po­wer) no better way appeares then cordially to enter into the present Engagement. For from what hath last been said, thus much doubtlesse may with sufficient evidence of truth be affirmed, That the Power of Parliaments ab­stractly [Page 13]considered, and the Rights and Liberties of the People, may be preserved and defended by being true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without (at least) AS WELL as with a King or House of Lords; and if the present Juncture of affaires will not admit it to be done with them, it not onely may, but must be done without them; else it were to throw away the substance, because the circumstance cannot be preserved. But secondly, the onely question therefore being concerning the Priviledges as vesting some part of the exercise of the Power in the King and House of Lords, for there is nothing in the present Ingagement, but what makes rather for then against the Preservation and Defence of other Privi­ledges. And first for that part which concernes the King, it referres to what hath formerly been consi­dered in the preceding Discourse, and shall be fur­ther in the succeeding, when wee come to the Co­venant, as being more expresse in that particular. The true state of the question therefore will onely be: Whether having protested to preserve the Priviledges of Parlia­ment, and by consequence inclusively the House of Lords, to our power, and so far as lawfully we may; whether, I say, we may without breach of Protestation, promise to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without them? Now to come to a cleare resolution in the question; first let it be observed, that the present Protestation supposes the House of Lords actually in BEING, and accordingly the promise is to preserve and defend it. Neither is it possible to per­forme such a promise to that which IS NOT. And this is generally observable concerning the Engagements scrupl'd, that they all promise a preservation and de­fence of things as in BEING, not as surceasing to BE. Wherefore to conclude, either the House of Lords is not now actually in BEING, and then it must be a strong obligation indeed, that shall binde to preserve and defend that which is not: Or if it have yet a being, [Page 14]why doth it not appeare? why is it not operative? for Non apparere & non operari sunt nec esse. To us, what ap­peares not, acts not, IS NOT. Now to be true and faithfull to that which is not, and not to be true and faithfull to that which is; but by being untrue and un­faithfull to that which is, to be true and faithfull to that which is not; is such a riddle of absurdities, as I know no solution fitter to be given it then this: That the onely way to be true and faithfull in preserving that which is not, is not to do any thing in its preservation; and so there may be a freedome left to be true and faithfull to that which is.

But secondly, put case the House of Lords were in a capacity of receiving, it must further be showne that the obliged also are in a capacity of giving their assistance in order to their preservation and defence. Now where is that power Naturall or Morall, that warrant from Au­thority Divine or Humane, by which they may be arm'd both with might and right sufficient for such a worke? If there be any, why is it not us'd? if there be none, why is the Obligation of this and other Engagements urg'd, which binde the obliged but to their power, and so far as lawfully they may? And lastly, if they be free in this re­spect from others, why not free to the present Engage­ment?

Thirdly, supposing there were both might and right sufficient; it would still remaine a question, Whether we might (or rather it would be out of question, that we might not) enter into blood to contend against the substance, the Authority, and peace of the Nation, for a circumstance (the exercise of some part of that Au­thority by some peculiary persons in such a peculiar manner) a circumstance I say so much out of our po­wer, as tis not a little doubtfull whether it will ever be within, or (if so) any way worth our recovery at so deare a rate. Beside in such a wretched, if not wicked pursuit of a circumstance, we runne the present losse of [Page 15]the substance, the Government and peace, under which Providence hath plac't us, and with so gracious a hand, that we feele not any want of the Circumstance lost, but rather enjoy the benefit of our losse, a freedome from the superfluous and unnecessary burdens of an Arbitrary Jurisdi­ction, and the obstructions of a Negative Voyce.

Lastly, if there may be a Delinquency deserving a dis­solution, what might be thought of theirs, who have in the face of the Nation refus'd to dis-owne and declare against an Army of Forraigners in the bowells thereof, dis-own'd and declar'd against not onely by the Kirke of Scotland, and all the well-affected there, but also by the Commons in Parliament here, and own'd them by Votes, &c. made publike to the view of the whole world? And thus farre shall suffice to have considered the Protestation.

The Covenant considered.In the last place, among former Engagements, though not least urg'd against the present, comes the Solemne League and Covenant, and the Scruples therein. The occasion seemes to be taken from some expressions in the Preamble and the third Article: For the Covenanters having in the Preamble profest an intention to advance the Honour and Happinesse of the King & his Posterity; and in the third Article, no intention to diminish his just Power and Greatnesse; and covenanted to preserve and defend his Person and Authority; apprehend that they cannot with truth and faithfulnesse to the Covenant in these particulars, promise to be true and faithfull to the Common-wealth without a King. This is the first scru­ple. Now that we may come to a right understanding in the Premisses, it would be soberly considered, that from present intentions to positive execution, in things de futu­ro, and of a contingent nature, we may not draw con­clusions absolute and peremptory; but with subordina­tion to the Divine Majesty, many times contrary to our expectations, by an over-ruling power, Wisdome and goodnesse interposing. Man purposes but God disposes, and frequently things fall out between the intention and [Page 16]execution, which may justly alter the one, and hinder the other, by rendring the performance either unlawfull or impossible: Neither is an intention simply as such an Obligation. Wherefore that in this case we may come to a cleare issue, two things would be remembred: First, That there is a tacite condition necessarily imply'd in all intentionall Promises. Secondly, That there is an ex­presse limitation annext with this. Was it not upon the ac­count of a tacite condition, that Solomon when he had promis'd his Mother not to refuse her request, not onely refus'd to performe his promise, but vow'd the capitall punishment of the party for whom the request was made, 1 Kin. 2.20, 24. And certainly if (in a case of the like nature) Herod had deni'd the Baptists head, he had been true to his duty, without being false to his Oath. Tis true therefore, the intent of the Covenanters was, to advance the honour and happinesse of the King and his Posterity; but with this condition, That in their respe­ctive capacities they should cooperate and assist, at least, not obstinately persist to resist the effectuall meanes there­unto conducing. For what were it but to put our selves upon a contradictory impossibility, if we should intend the honour and happinesse of persons in wayes directly opposite to, and inconsistent with either. Tis said, Luke 7.30. That the Pharisees and Lawyers rejected the Coun­cell of God against themselves: And may not the Coun­cels of men concerning the honour and happinesse of others, though never so really intended, be much more rejected by them against themselves? Shall the reall intention of the Phisician, for the recovery of his Patient be questioned; if the Patient obstinately joyne with the distemper of his disease, against the advice of the Phisi­cian to his owne ruine? But secondly, What if the King and his posterity will not be so true and faithfull, as could be wisht, to their owne honour and happiness; must that hinder us from being true and faithfull to the honour and happiness of the Common-Wealth without [Page 17]them? Must the Common-Wealth be miserable, be­cause they will not be happy? What if nothing will con­tent others, but an unjust power and greatness; must the Common-Wealth loose any part of its greatness, for want of the exercise of a just power, which may be a terrour to evill doers, and apraise to them that do well? And can any thing be more equall and reasonable, then that they that are careful to see this just power executed, should be secured against turbulent spirits, and practises in the execution of this power, not onely just but ne­cessary? The truth is, this is so farre from being a questi­on in the true intent and meaning of the Covenant, That the Covenant it selfe puts it clearely out of questi­on, as will evidently appeare, if in the second place we consider the limitation annext. For when the Covenan­ters professe in the preamble, that they enter into this Covenant, having before their eyes, the honour and happinesse of the King, and his posterity, it followes conjunctim, and the true publike liberty, safety, and peace of the Kingdomes. And accordingly in the third Article (which mutually interprets, and is interpreted by the preamble) they ingage to preserve and defend the Kings person and authority, but how? In the preservation and defence of the liberties of the Kingdome.

Vpon the foundation of which expressions, we may fairely and firmely raise a two-fold conclusion. First, That according to the sence of the Covenant, the liberties of the Kingdome are the greater, and more worthy part of this branch: and secondly, That thererefore they ought to have the precedence, in point of preservation and defence; For that which comprehends, is greater then that which is comprehended; and that which limits is greater, and more excellent then that which is limitted; and by consequence in case of competition to be prefer­red before it. When therefore persons ingage for the dis­charge of duties different in their worths, but yet con­sistent in their performance, at the time of Ingagements; [Page 18]if in processe of time they shall prove wholly inconsistent; both reason and Religion, and the Covenant accordingly obliges to prefer the more excellent and necessary, with the rejection of the lesser. And so wee are come home to the present Case. For the Conscientious of the Nation after, yea and by the taking of the Covenant, accounted themselves obliged to preserve and defend the liberties of the Kingdome, without the Conjunction of, and against the opposition made by the King, and his personall authority, and acted accordingly. In short then, 'tis true, that at the entering into Covenant, such was the modesty and charity of the Covenanters, that they hop'd and desir'd, and with a faithfulness answer­able, a long time endeavour'd, a compliance betweene the King and the peoples concernments. But now, after much patience, being clearely convinc't of their abso­lute inconsistencie, (if the pertinacious opposition of the Father deceas'd; and the pernitious proceedings of the living Son may be beleev'd) no wonder if at last they think it time, to neglect what hath so long, but in vaine beene expected; and provide for what must no longer, if it might be so long neglected, the true publike liberty, safety, and peace of the Nation, though (with as much justice as necessiity) without the concurrence of the active con­stant and implacable opposers thereof; which accor­ding to the Covenant is the chiefe; and according to the present juncture of affaires, the onely duty in their power. And why all that follow peace with holinesse, should not contribute their parts, to the preservation and defence of that true publike liberty, safety, and peace of the Nation, mentioned in the preamble of this Cove­nant, by promising to be true and faithfull to the Com­mon-Wealth, wherein (if any where) it is now involv'd, though without a King or House of Lords; Why, I say, they would not thus far contribute their parts to the pub­like Peace at least, notwithstanding any scruple that may justly be grounded upon this, or any of the Oaths prece­ding in this discourse is difficult, if not impossible to dis­cern, upon a sober & disingag'd survey.

What concernes the Rights and Priviledges of Parlia­ment, hath been spoken to in the Protestation.

The endeavour of the foregoing discourse, hitherto hath beene by a thorow disqusition, manag'd as in a matter of Conscience, with the greatest stricktnes and impartiality, to examine the true state of former En­gagements, whether contrary to, and obliging against the present. And the result upon the whole matter, seemes to afford a three-fold conclusion. First, That as to the substantiall part, their true intention and equity, there is no contrariety, there is an absolute harmony between both: both according to equity joyning in this intenti­on, by a promissory caution to oblige the engaged not to distru [...] by any unlawfull practices, but by all law­full waies against such disturbances, to endeavour to pre­serve the obtaining [...] or publike authority, because tis ever the PRESENT Authority, that gives life to those lawes of the Nation, which by the publike ad­ministration of justice, propagate peace; and by peace the prosperity of the publike, the proper and ultimate end, in to which all Governors and Government ought to be resolv'd. Secondly, That as to the Circumstantiall part, the persons sometime vested with some part of the Authority; No Obligation doth or can lye against the present Engagement, because neither are they now vest­ed with that Authority; the possession and exercise whereof is the sole thing that must both render them the formall object, and furnish them with a capacity of per­forming those reciprocall acts of publike justice and pro­tection, which are the fundamentall reason, of all such relative Obligations, on which alone they do, and with­out which they cannot stand: neither secondly, ought they to be so invested, because engaged in waies incon­sistent and destructive. And thirdly, That therefore no contrariety or obligation of former Engagements hin­ders; but that lawfully wee may subscribe the present. And so answer is given to the first generall question, and way made for the second. viz.

Whether of duty wee must subscribe the present En­gagement (already prov'd lawfull) when call'd there­unto by the present Authority.

For orders sake, that we may proceed with the more clearness, we shal cast the answer into two positions. First, That the authority in question is, de facto, an Authority. 2ly. that an Authority de facto, is to be obey'd, ex debito in things lawfull, and consequently in the matter of the present Engagement. Were it not that daily experience tels us, that men forsake their reason, to follow their affecti­on; it could not with any reason be imagin'd, that any man should be so without all reason in the present con­troversie, as not to grant that the present Authority is, de facto an Authority. For to deny that, is to contradict, not onely our own, but the sence and experience of the whole Nation, who in all matters of commutative and distribu­tive [...] derive all the benefit of the laws of the Land, only by mediation of such publike ministers of State, as de­rive the Commissions by which they act from them, [...] only from them, and their authority. And the truth is to deny the existence de facto, of a publike Authority in a Nation, is the worst kinde of that which men call Level­ling. For if there be no Authority, there can be no Law, (for the Lawes of the Land out of the hand of Authori­ty, signifie no more then the Lawes of Solon or Lycurgus, in a Library or Study) and if there be no Law; neither first can there be any propriety, because tis onely the Law in the hand of Authority, that determines propriety, unless every man may be his own judge; and then he will quickly make his owne law, so farre as his power can reach: neither secondly, if there be no Law, is there any trangression; and so the Judges and Jury &c. that con­demne men for Capitall offences, are all concluded un­der the guilt of murder, which is enough to shew the wicked absurdity of this wretched Doctrine. I shall there­fore leave such erroneous judgements, to be rectified by the pious, and (I hope) peaceable ministers, the Authors [Page 21]of the Proposals, who ingenuously acknowledge a necessity of the existence of a Government de facto in a Nation. (Now a Government without Authority is such an Idoll that as St. Paul speakes, we may say it is nothing.) And therefore I cannot but wonder at those godly and learn­ed Ministers, that when they had gone so farre, as to ac­knowledg the necessity of an authority in a Nation, and an obedience in all things lawfull unto that authority; that (I say) they could not proceed one step further up­on the same ground, to acknowledge the lawfulness and duty of promising to be true and faithfull to the autho­rity in Being, which as it is agreeable to present, so it cannot be contrary to former publike obligations, see­ing nothing can binde to that which is not in Being; un­less they would have those that labour not in, but rather against the proper worke of magistracy, to have the wages of faithfulnes, for being unfaithfull; & those that are tru­ly faithful, the reward of unfaithfulnes; which I am sure they would not. For that were, as if the dumb and scan­dalous Clergi [...], justly sequestred by Parliament, should stil have the double honour of their parishes and places, be­cause of a former title in Law, and those godly ministers that are placed in their stead, and conscienciously labour in the word and doctrine, should be rewarded with dou­ble dishonour. 'Tis therefore a truth, both in reason and religion, that will never want ground sufficient to cleare it, that they that possesse the places and peforme the duty de facto, must de jure and ex debito, receive the dignity an­next to the publike authority. And so we are come to the second position. viz.

That Authority de facto, must be obey'd ex debito. The foundation of this Position hath already been laid, and in a great measure clear'd in the precedent Discourse: For the consequences are co incident, and what lawfully may, of duty must be performed, when we are cal'd to the performance by publique Authority. And therefore (how pro­perly soever the Demurrer was pleas'd to terme it such) it was no ab­surdity in the learned Pen that wrote The lawfulnesse of obeying the pre­sent Government, joyntly to infer those conclusions that were insepera­bly complicated in the premisses that were the cause of those conclusi­ons. [Page 22]And here, as most due, this Testimony must in justice be given to the worthy Author of that Tract, That had his mature abilities▪ and peaceable piety, met with the same spirit of wisdome from above, in the Readers, as breathes in all his works, not onely this controversie might have been ended, upon the advantagious termes of truth and peace, but the Balme of love might by this time have clos'd up and cur'd in a great measure, the never enough to be lamented breathes among the truly godly of this Nation, and render'd them an united and an happy People: From those few gleanings therefore here, the Reader may be pleas'd to have recourse to his fuller harvest, and if himself be as free to receive, as the piously learned Author is furnisht to give sa­tisfaction in the present position, there is no doubt but he may abun­dantly finde wherein to acquiesse, upon the clearest grounds of Scrip­ture and reason, witnest to by the suffrage of the most approv'd Divines, both Antient and Moderne, and the practice of the godly accordingly. But what need we, as to the practice of the godly in the present point, either seek far abroad, or farther at home, then the late dayes of Queen Mary: For which of the godly in her time, after her actuall pos­session of the Crown, scrupl'd obedience to her in civil things, although she were the Issue of an incestuous Marriage, condemn'd by expresse Text of Scripture, and the suffrage of the most eminent Divines of that age, purposely consulted upon it. Wherefore to shut up this position, and with it the present discourse, (though practises may be questioned) with the unquestionable Authority of the Apostle, Ro. 13. If every foule must be subject, then certainly every power must be subjected to, else some soules must not be subject, because some powers are not of right; yea but though they have not a right to make themselves, yet God hath a right to make them powers; and we must be subject, nor because of the subordinate and doubtfull rights of men, but the Supreme and un­doubted Right of God, and so the premisses are as large as the conclusion, which otherwise would be too narrow for it. Again, Every soul must be subject, yea but every soul cannot skill of the Titles of Governors. True, but no soul so ignorant, but can apprehend Gods Title, at least when the Apostle shall have told him, that there is NO Power but of God, and the Powers that BE are ordained of God. And 2. No soule so in the dark, but can on the one side see who hath a power to give him praise for well doing, and to punish him for doing ill, and so bears not the sword in vain; and on the other, who either bears no sword, or in vain, an [...] [...]o no purpose; and lastly, who are continually attending on the work of Government, and who are discontinuers. So that in conclusion, the Apostle gives a rule of subjection, clear and obvious, and suited to the capacity of the meanest Christian; whereas if to examine the rights of Governors be the rule, most Christians would want the means fully to inform themselves; and they that could have the best in such cases to be had, might sooner finde just grounds to scruple all, then to be satisfied in any.

FINIS.

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. Searching, reading, printing, or downloading EEBO-TCP texts is reserved for the authorized users of these project partner institutions. Permission must be granted for subsequent distribution, in print or electronically, of this EEBO-TCP Phase II text, in whole or in part.