THE PASSIONS Of the SOULE In three Books.

The first, Treating of the Passions in Generall, and oc­casionally of the whole nature of man.

The second, Of the Number, and order of the Passions, and the explication of the six Primitive ones.

The third, Of Particular Passions.

By R. des Cartes.

And Translated out of French into English.

LONDON, Printed for A. C. and are to be sold by J. Martin, and J. Ridley, at the Castle in Fleet-street neer Ram-Alley, 1650.

An Advertisement to the Reader by a friend of the Authour.

THis Book having been sent to me by Monsieur des Cartes, with a Li­cence to get it printed, and annex what Preface to it I pleased: I be­thought my selfe, that it was not necessary to put any, unlesse the Letters I have heretofore written to him, to get it from him, seeing they contain many things, fit to be pub­likely known.

The first Letter to Monsieur des Cartes.

SIR, I should have been very glad to have seen you this last Summer at Paris, because I thought you would have come thither on purpose to stay there, and that having more con­veniences there then any where else to try expe­riments, whereof you have intimated you stand in need to finish the Treatises you promised to the world, you would not fail to keep your word [Page]with me, and wee should shortly see them prin­ted; but you have utterly defeated me of that joy, by your return to Holland: and I cannot here refrain from telling you, that I am angry with you, for not letting me (before you took your journey) see the Treatise of the Passions, which, I was told, you had compiled. Besides, reflecting on some words I had read in a Pre­face some two years since ushering the transla­tion of your Principles into French, wherein af­ter you had spoken succinctly of the parts of Philosophy yet to be discovered, before the chief fruit thereof can be gathered, and said, that you do not so much mistrust your own strength, but you dare undertake to make them all known if you had conveniences to try experiments to maintain, and justifie your arguments, you adde, greater expences are necessary for that purpose, than a private man, as you are, is able to dis­burse unless assisted by the publique: but that since you could not expect this assistance, you thought to rest contented from thence forwards with studying for your own private instruction; and that posterity should excuse you, if you left off labouring for them: now I am afraid in good earnest that you will envy the world the rest of your inventions, and wee never shall have any thing else of you, if we let you follow your own inclination. This is the reason why I bethought me to torment you a little with this Letter, and revenge my self of your refusall of [Page]that Treatise of the Passions to me, by ingenuous­ly reproving you for lazinesse and other faults, which, I conceive, hinder you from improving your talent, as you may, and your duty binds you. Upon my word, I cannot think it any thing but your lazinesse, and little care to be serviceable to mankind, which causeth you not to go forwards with your Physicks: for though I very well understand, it is impossible for you to finish them without many experiments, which ought to be defrayed by the publique, because they will reap the profit of it, and a private mans estate is not sufficient to do it; yet I do not be­lieve that is your Remora, for you cannot choose but obtain from the dispencers of the publique treasure, all you can wish to that purpose, if you would but vouchsafe to make known to them how the case stands, as you easily might do, had you a will to it; but you have ever lived in a way so repugnant thereunto, that there is reason to suspect that you would not accept assistance from any one, though it were offered to you; and yet you pretend, posterity shall excuse you, if you take pains for it no more, on a supposition that this assistance is necessary, and you cannot get it; which gives me occasion to think, not on­ly that you are too sparing of your pains, but, it may be, that you have not courage enough to hope to goe through with what they who have read your writings expect of you; and yet you are so vainglorious as to perswade our successors, [Page]that you failed not of it by any fault of your own, but because your vertue was not encouraged as it ought to have been, and you were denyed furtherance in your designes; wherein, I see, your ambition hits the mark it aimed at because they who hereafter shall view your works, will conceive by what you publi­shed a dozen years agoe, that you then had found out all that since hath been seen to come from you, and what remains to be investigated in Physicks, is lesse difficult then what you have already made known: so that you might since have given us all that may be expected from humane reason concerning Physick, and other necessaries of life, if you had had conveniences to make experiments requisite thereunto: nay, that you have found out a good part of them too, but a just indignation against the ingrati­tude of man hath disswaded you from letting them participate of your inventions; so you think that by lying still for ever, you shall ac­quire as much reputation, as if you took pains for it; and, if may be, more, because common­ly good possessed, is more valued then what is desired, or lamented. But I'l debar you from getting reputation without deserving it; and though I doubt not but you knew well enough what you should have done, if you would have been helped by the publique: for indeed, I will cause this Letter to be printed, that you may not pretend ignorance of it; that if here­after [Page]you fail to satisfie us, you may no more impute it to this age; for know, it is not enough to obtaine any thing from the publike, to have blurted out an occasionall word of it in the Preface of a book, not absolutely saying that you desire it, and expect it, nor giving them proofes not only that you deserve it, but that they ought for their own sakes to grant it you, in regard they expect great profit by it; It is usu­ally seen, that they, who think they have any thing in them, make such a noise of it, and so importunately demand what they pretend to, and promise so farre beyond what they can perform, that when a man only speaks modest­ly of himself, and requires nought from any man, nor promises any thing certainly, what proofe soever hee gives otherwise of his suf­ficiencie, hee is neither lookt nor thought on.

You'l say, it may bee, that it goes against your nature to request any thing, or speak advantagiously of your self; because, one seems a mark of a mean spirit, the other of Pride. But, say I, this humour is to be corrected, for it proceeds from an errour of weakness, rather then a becomming shamefacedness and mode­sty; for, for matter of requests, a man hath no reason to be ashamed of any, unlesse such as hee makes meerly for his own peculiar be­nefit, to those from whom in justice hee ought not to exact any. So far should hee be, from [Page]being of those that tend to the publique utilitie and profit of them to whom they are made, that on the contrary hee may extract glo­ry from them, especially when hee hath already bestowed things on them worth much more than hee would obtain of them; and for speaking advantagiously of a mans selfe, it is true, it is a most ridiculous, and blame­able pride, when hee speakes false things of himselfe; and it is even a contemp­tible vanity too, when he speaks only truths, meerly out of ostentation, and so that no good accrew to any one thereby; but when these things so much concern other men to know, it is most certain they cannot be concealed, but out of a vicious humility, which is a sort of baseness, and weakness. Now, it highly con­cerns the publique to be advertised of what you have gathered in Sciences, that thereby judging what you are able to discover in them further, it may be incited to contribute its utmost to help you therein, as in a work whose end is the generall good of mankind, and the things you have already given, the important truths, you have laid down in your Books, are worth in­comparably much more than any thing you can ask for this purpose.

You may also say that your works speak enough, and there is no need of adding promises and brags, which being the merchandize of jug­gling Mountebanks seem not becomming a man [Page]of honour, who only searcheth after truth: but Mountebanks are not blame-worthy for talking high and well of themselves, but for speaking untruths, and things they cannot make good; whereas those which (I urge) you should speak of your self, are so true, and so manifestly pro­ved in your writings, that the strictest rules of modesty give you leave to ascertain them, and those of Charity oblige you thereunto, because it concerns others to know it. For although your writings say enough to those who exa­mine them throughly, and are able to under­stand them; yet that is not sufficient for the designe I would advise you to, because every one is not able to read them, and they who manage the publique affaires can scarce have any leisure to doe it. It may be, some who have read them, tell them of it: but whatsoever a man say to them of it, the little coile, they know, you keep, and the too great modesty you have ever observed in speaking of your self, make them not take any great notice thereof. And indeed because it a usuall thing a­mong them to bestow the highest tearms imaginable on the commendation of very in­different men, they are not apt to receive the immense praises bestowed on you by those who know you, for exact truths; whereas when any man speaks of himself extraordinari­ly, they hearken to him with more attention, especially if hee be a man of good birth, [Page]and they know him to bee neither by na­ture, nor his rank, likely to act the Mounte­bank; and because hee would become ridi­culous if he should use hyperbolies on such an occasion, his words are taken in their true sence: and they who will not believe them are incited at least by their curiosity, or jea­lousie, to examine the truth of them; where­fore it being most certain, and the publique being much concerned in knowing that no man in the world but your selfe (at least whose writings wee have) ever discovered the true principles, and understood the first causes of whatever is produced in nature; and that ha­ving already given an account by these Prin­ciples, of all those things which are most visi­ble, and frequently observed in the world, you need only some particular observations to find out, in like manner, the reasons of whatsoe­ver may be usefull to man in this life, and so give us a compleat knowledge of the nature of all mineralls, the vertues of all Plants, the properties of animals, and generally all that may be beneficiall to Physick, or other arts. And lastly, that these particular observations not being possible to bee all made in a small time without great expence, all people of the earth ought emulously to contribute thereunto, as to the most important thing in the world, wherein they have all an equall interest. This being, I say, most certain, to bee sufficiently [Page]proved by your works already printed, you should talk so lowd of it, publish it with so much care, and put it so punctually in all the Title-pages of your Books, that none hereaf­ter might pretend ignorance. So at least, you would immediately beget a longing in many to examine what the matter is: so that the further they enquired into it, and the more diligently they read your Books, they would the more clearly understand, you not unjustly boasted.

And I would wish you chiefly to clear three things to the world. First, that there are a nu­merous company of things to be found out in Physicks, that may bee extreamly profitable for life: Secondly, that there is great reason to expect the finding them out from you: And thirdly, that the more conveniences you had to make experiments, the more of them you could find out; It is necessary to be informed of the first because most men think there can nothing be found out in the Sciences, better then what hath been found by the Ancients; and some conceive not so much as what the meaning of Physicks is, or what they are good for. Now it is easie to prove that the too great reverence born to antiquity, is an errour extreamly prejudicial to the advancement of Sciences. For it is seen that the savage people of America, and many others who inhabite places lesse remote, have many lesse conveniences of life then wee, and yet their originall is as ancient as ours, so that they have [Page]as much reason as wee to say that they are sa­tisfied with the wisdome of their fathers, and that they believe no man can teach them better than what hath been known and practized a­mong them from all Antiquity. And this opi­nion is so prejudiciall, that till it be rejected, it is impossible any new learning can be acqui­red: besides, experience shewes, that the people whose mind it is deepest rooted in, are they who are yet most ignorant, and least civilized; and because it is frequent enough yet amongst us, that may be one reason to prove, that wee are farre from knowing all wee are capable of; Which may be proved by many exceeding pro­sitable inventions, as the use of the Compasse, the Art of Printing Perspective glasses, and the like, which were not found out till these latter ages, although now they seem ve­ry easie to those that know them. But there is nothing, wherein our necessity of acqui­ring new knowledge is more apparent than in Physick: For although no man doubts that God hath furnished this earth with all things necessary for man, to conserve him therein in perfect health untill an extreame old age; and although there be nothing in the world so desired as these things, so that heretofore it hath bin the study of Kings and Sages; yet experience shews, wee are so far from having it wholly, that of­times a man is chained to his bed by small di­seases, which the most learned Physicians under­stand [Page]not, and onely make them rage more by their remedies, when they undertake to expell them. Wherein the defect of their art, and the necessity of persecting it, is so evident, that for those who understand not what the meaning of Physicks is, it is enough to tell them, that it is the Science which should teach so perfectly to understand the nature of man, and all things that may serve him for nutriments or remedies, that it might be easie for him, thereby to exempt himselfe from all kinds of diseases: for not to speake of any other uses thereof, this alone is weighty enough, to oblige the most insensible to favour the designes of a man, who hath already proved by the things he hath already found out, that there is great reason to expect from him the unfound remainder of that Science.

But there is an extraordinary necessity that the world should know, you have proved that your selfe: and to this end it is requisite you use a lit­tle violence to your own nature, and banish that too great modesty, which hath hitherto hindered you from speaking what you are bound to doe, both of your selfe and others. Yet I meane not not therefore to commit you to the learned of this age; the most part of those, on whom this name is conferred, to wit, those who cultivate (as they commonly call it) good literature, and the Lawyers have not any thing to doe in what I would have have you talk off. Divines and Phy­sicians have as little too, unlesse in the notion of [Page]Philosophers: for Divinity depends not a jot on Physickes, nor yet Physick as at this day it is practised by the most learned and prudent in that Art: they are contented to follow the maximes and rules that a long experience hath taught them, and doe not so much contemne the lives of men, as to leave their judgement, whereon it often depends, on the uncertain ra­tiocinations of Schoole-Philosophy: none then but the Philosophers are unsatisfied, among whom all who have wit are on your side, and would rejoyce to see you manumit truth, so that the malignity of Pedants might not be able to oppresse her: for none but meere Pedants can be angry at what you have to say: and in regard they are the laughing-stock and contempt of most wel-bred men, you need not stand much on their displeasure: besides, your reputation hath made them already as much your enemies as they can be: and whereas your modesty now causeth some of them not to fear to set upon you, I am confident, would you but extoll your selfe as you might, and ought, they would see themselves so far beneath you, that there is not one of them but would be ashamed to undertake you. I see no reason, then that may detaine you from boldly publishing, whatsoever you may judge serviceable to your designe: and no­thing seemes to me better for it then what you have already written in a letter to the reverend Father Dinet, which you caused to be printed [Page]seven yeers since, when he was Provinciall of the Jesuites of France. Non ibi, say you speak­ing of the Essayes you had published five or sixe yeers before, unam aut alteram, sed plus sex­centis quaestionibus, quae sic à nullo ante me fue­rant explicatae; ac quamvis multi hactenus mea scripta transver sis ocul is inspexerint, modisque omnibus refutare conati sunt, nemo tamen, quod sciam, quicquam non verum potuit in iis re­perire: fiat enumeratiò quaestionum omnium, quae in tot saeculis, quibus aliae Philosophiae viguerunt, ipsarum ope solutae sunt, et fortè nec tam multae, nec tam illustres invenientur: quinimò profiteor ne unius quidem quaestionis solutionem, ope prin­cipiorum Peripatetice Philosphiae peculiarium, datam unquam fuisse, quam non possum demon­strare esse illegitimam, et falsam: fiat periculum; proponantur, non quidem omnes (neque enim openae­pretium puto multum temporis in eâ re impen­dere) sed paucae aliquae selectiores, stabo promis­sis, &c. Thus in spight of all your modesty, the force of truth hath compelled you there, to write that you had stated in your first Essayes, which containe nought almost but the Diopticks and the meteors, above 600 questions of Philo­sophy, which none before you knew how to do, and that although many lookt asquint upon your writings, and sought all manner of wayes to confute them, yet you knew not hitherto any who had pickt any untruth out of them: whereto you subjoyn, that if all the questions re­solved [Page]by all other kinds of Philosophying, which have been in vogue since the world began were reckoned up one by one, they would not, it may be, be found so numerous, nor so eminent. Fur­thermore, you assure us, that by those principles, peculiar to the Philosphy attributed to Aristotle, which onely is now taught in the Schooles, no man ever yet knew how to find out the true so­lution of any one question; and you absolutely defie all those who teach it to name any one plainly resolved by them, in the solution where­of you can not demonstrate some errour: now, these things having been written to a Provinciall of the Jesuites, and published above seven yeers since, there is no doubt but some of the ablest of that great society, would have endeavoured to confute them, had not they been perfectly true, or if they could have been but so much as disputed with any colour of reason: for not­withstanding the little noise you make, all men know your reputation is already so great, & they are so much interessed to maintain, that what they teach is not bad, they can not pretend to say they slighted it: but all the learned know well enough, that there is nothing in the Phy­sickes of the School, but what is dubious; and they know withall, that to be dubious in such a matter, is not much better than to be false, be­cause a science ought to be certaine, and de­monstrative: so that they cannot thinke strange, that you assure them their Physickes containe not [Page]the true solution of any one question; for that signifies no more, but that it containes not the demonstration of any unknown truth; and if any one examines your writings to confute them, he finds on the other side, that they containe no­thing but demonstrations, concerning matters formerly unknown to all the world: wherefore being wise and advised, I wonder not that they hold their peace, but I marvell why you have not vouchsafed to take advantage of their silence, because you could not have wished any thing more to make it apparent how much difference there is betwixt your Physickes and others. And it is very important to observe the difference of them, that the ill opinion of those who are em­ployed in the state, and are most successefull usu­ally have of Philosophy, hinder them not from understanding the worth of yours: for they commonly conjecture what shall befall, by what they have already seen to happen; and because they never saw the publike reape any benefit by School Philosophy unlesse that it hath made many Pedants, they cannot imagine better is to be expected from yours, unlesse they are brought to consider that this being altoge­ther true, and that utterly false, their fruits must be different. In earnest, it is a strong argument to prove there is no truth in School Physickes, but to say it is instituted to teach all inventions profitable for life, and neverthelesse, though there have many been found out from time to time, yet it never was by the meanes of any of [Page]these Physickes, but only by chance, or custom: or if any Science have contributed thereunto, it hath been only the Mathematicks: which alone of all humane Sciences hath been able to prove some indubitable truthes. I know well enough, the Philosophers admit that for one branch of their Physickes; but in regard they were almost all of them ignorant in it, and it was no part of it, but on the other side true Physickes were a part of the Mathematicks, this can make no­thing for them: but the certainty already disco­vered in the Mathematicks makes much for you: for it is a Science wherein you are acknowledged to be so excellent, and you have therein so over­topped envy, that even those who are jealous of your estimation for other Sciences, use to say you surpasse all men in this, that by granting a commendation which they knew cannot be disputed, they may be lesse suspected of calumny when they endeavour to rob you of others: and it is seen by what you have published concerning Geometry, that you there so determine how far humane capacity can reach, and which is the way of solving every manner of scruple, that it seemes you have reached the whole harvest, whereof thse who write before you have onely cropped some ears: and your successours can be but gleaners, who shall gather up onely those you were pleased to leave them: besides, you have shewn, by the sudden and easie solution of all questions, which those who have tried you [Page]have propounded to you, that the Method you use for this purpose is so infallible that you never fail to find thereby, what ever the wit of man can, belonging to the things you seek after: so that to make it undoubted that you are able to bring Physicks to the lightest perfection, you are onely to prove, them to be a part of the Mathe­maticks, and you have already proved it plainly enough in your principles: when explaining all sensible Qualities, considering onely their great­nesse, figures, and motions, you shewed that the visible world, which is all the object of Phy­sicks, containes only a small part of the infinite bodies whereof the proprieties or Qualities may be imagined, consists onely of these very things whereas the object of the Mathematickes con­taines all; the same may also be proved by the experience of all ages: for although from time to time many of the best wits, have bestowed their time in the investigation of Physick, as it can not be said that any of them ever disco­vered ought (that is, attained any true know­ledge of the nature of corporeall things) by any principle, that belonged not to the Mathema­ticks: whereas, by those belonging to them, abundance of very usefull things have been found out, to wit, almost all that is known of Astronomy, Chirurgery, and all Mechanicall arts: wherein, if there be any thing more then what belongs to this science, it is not drawne from any other, but onely from certain obser­vations, [Page]whose true causes are unknown; which cannot be considered seriously, but it must be confessed, that the knowledge of true Physicks is to be attained no way but by the Mathema­tickes; and your excellence in this not being doubted, there is nothing but may be ex­pected from you in that; yet there remaines one scruple, for that it is seen that all who have acquired some reputation in the Mathematicks, are not, for all that, capable to find out any thing in Physicks, nay, and some of them lesse comprehend the things you have written there­of, than many who never learnt any Science at all: but it may be answered, that although un­doubtedly they who have wits aptest to con­ceive the truths of the Mathematicks, are they who easiest understand your Physicks, by reason all the arguments of these are deducted from the other; it happens not alwayes that these men have the greatest reputation for the most learned in the Mathematicks; because to acquire this re­putation it is necessary to study the bookes of those who heretofore have written of this Science, which the most doe not, and oftentimes, those who doe, endeavouring to attaine by labour what they cannot by the strength of their wit, tire out their imagination, yea, hurt it, and ac­quire thereby many prejudices, which hinder them much more from conceiving the truths you write, than passing f or great Marhemati­cians: because so few men apply themselves to [Page]this Science, that of times there is but one of them in a whole Country; and though sometimes there be more, they keep a great stir with it, in regard the little they understand hath cost them a great deal of pains. Now, it is not uneasie to apprehend the truths another man hath discovered: it is suf­ficient for that, that the brain be disengaged of all sorts of prejudices, and be willing to afford atten­tion to them; nor is it difficult to find some of a contrary bias to the rest, as heretofore Thales, Py­thagoras, and Achimedes, and in our age Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey, and some others. Lastly, a man may, without much pains, imagine a body of Philosophy, lesse monstrous, and grounded on conjectures more conformable to truth, than that which is extracted from the writings of Aristotle, which hath been done too by some in this age: but to frame one that containes only truths pro­ved by demonstrations as clear and certaine as those of the Mathematicks, there is none but you alone who have shewed us by your writings that you could compasse it. But as when an Architect hath laid all the foundations, & erected the chief walls of some vast building, none doubts that he is able to finish his designe, because it is seen that he hath already done the hardest part of it: so those who attentively have read your book of Principles, considering how you have there laid all the foundations of naturall Philosophy, and how great are the consequences of truths which you have therein exhibited, cannot doubt, that the [Page]Method you use is sufficient, whereby you may make an end of finding out the utmost that can be discovered in Physicks: because the things which you have already made known to wit the nature of the loadstone, fire, aire, water earth, and all that appeares in the heavens, seem not to be lesse difficult then those which may be desire.

Yet I must adde here, that let an Architect be never so expert in his art it is impossible hee should finish the edifice hee hath begun if mate­rials requisite are deficient: in like manner let your method be never so exact, yet you cannot make any further progresse in the explication of naturall causes, unless you be able to make re­quisite experiments to determine their effects; which is the last of the three things, I believe, ought chiefly to be explained, because most men conceive not how necessary experiments are, nor what expence they require; those who, not stir­ring out of their study, nor casting their eyes on any thing but their books, undertake to dis­course of nature, may well tell how they would have created the world, had God given them authority, and power to do it; that is, they might describe Chimera's that have as much A­nalogy with the imbecilitie of their wit, as the admirable beauty of this Universe, with the in­finite puissance of its Maker: but without a spi­rit truly divine, they cannot of themselves, frame an Idea, of things, like that which God had to create them. And though your Method promise [Page]all that may be hoped for from humane wit, concerning the enquiry after truth in the Scien­ces, yet it doth not promise to teach Prophecie; but to deduce from certain things laid down, all truths that may from thence be deducted: and the things laid down in Physicks can be nothing but experiments. Moreover because experi­ments are of two sorts; some easie, that depend only on the reflexion a man makes on things re­presented to the senses of themselves; others, more rare and difficult, which are not attained without some study, and expence: it may bee observed, that you have already inserted in your writings all that seems may be gahtered out of easie experiments, and also the rarest too, that you could learn out of books, For besides your explaining the nature of all qualities that move the senses, and the most ordinary bodies on the earth, as fire, air, water, and some others in them, you have also therein given an account of all that hath been observed hitherto in the heavens, of all the properties of the Loadstone, and many Chymicall observations; So that there is no reason to expect any more from you con­cerning Physicks, till you have made more expe­riments, whereof you might enquire the causes; And I wonder not, that you undertake not to try these experiments at your own charges; For, I know, the enquirie after the smallest things cost a great deal: and not to quote Chymists, nor the rest of the hunters after secrets, who use [Page]to undoe themselves at that trade, I heard say that the Loadstone only cost Gilbert above 50000 crowns, though he were a man of very great parts, as he hath shewed by being the first who discovered the chief properties of that stone. I have also seen the Advancement to Learning, and the New Atlantis, of my Lord Chancellour Bacon, who, of all them that have written be­fore you, seems to me the man who had the best notions, concerning the method to be held to bring the Physicks to their perfection; but the whole Revenue of two or three of the richest Kings on the earth, would not be enough to set all things he requires for this purpose on work. And although I think you doe not need so many sorts of experiments as hee imagines because you may supply many, as well by your dexterity, as the knowledge of truths you have already found: yet considering that the number of par­ticular bodies unexamined, is almost infinite that there is not any one but hath a great many seve­rall properties and whereof severall tryals may be made, to take up the time, and labour of ma­ny men; that according to the rules of your me­thod, it is necessary at once to examine all things who have any affinitie between them, the better to marke their differences, and to make such quantities as you may be assured, that so you may profitably make use at the same time of more severall experiments, than the labour of a great many able men could furnish you withall, [Page]and lastly, that you cannot get these able men but at a great rate, because if some would em­ploy themselves gratis, they would not be obedi­ent enough to your orders, and would only give you occasion to lose time: considering, I say, all these things, I easily comprehend, you cannot handsomly finish the designe you have begun in your principles, that is, particularly to lay open the nature of all Minerals, Plants, animals and man, as you have already done all the elements of the earth, and all observable in the heavens, unlesse the publique defray the expences neces­sary for that purpose; and the more liberall they shall be to you, the better you shall be able to goe through with your designe.

Now, because all these things may be easily comprehended by every one, and are all so true, they cannot be doubted, I am confident, that if you represented them in such a manner, as they might come to the knowledge of those, to whom God hath given power to command the people of the earth, and charge also to doe their utmost to advance the common good, there is none of them but would contribute to a designe so manifestly profitable to the whole world; and though out France, which is your Country, be so mighty a State, that you might easily ob­tain from her alone whatsoever is requisite to this purpose, yet because other Nations are no less interessed therein than shee, I am confident many would be generous enough not to give her [Page]place in that duty: and that there would not any bee so barbarous as not to put in a hand.

But if all that I have written be not enough to make you of another humour, pray, at least oblige me so farre as to send me your Treatise of the Passions, and give me leave to adde a Preface to it, wherewith it may be printed. I will see, it shall be so done, that there shall be nothing you can dislike in it but it shall be so conformable to the resentment of all those who have either wit or vertue, that no man after hee hath read it, but shall participate in the zeale I have to the advancement of Sciences, and to be, &c.

Paris, Nov. 6. 1648.

In answer to the precedent letter.

Sir,

Among the many injuries and taunts I find in the long letter you tooke the paines to write to me, I observe so many things to my advantage, that should you put it to be printed, as you declare you will, I am afraid, it would be imagined there were a greater combination betwixt us than there is, and I had entreated you to insert many things that modesty would not suffer me my self to pub­lish to the world. Wherfore I will not here insist in answering every particular, I will onely tell you two rea­sons that, me thinkes, might deterre you [Page]from it: the first is, I have not any conceit, that the designe, I suppose, you had in writing it can succeed; the second, that I am no whit of that humour you suppose me, that neither indignation nor distaste hath taken away my desire to be ser­viceable to the publick, whereunto I think my selfe very much obliged, for that those things I have already published have been by many favour­ably received. That I did not formerly bestow what I had written of the Passions on you, was because I would not be engaged to let some others see it who would have made no use of it: for since I compiled it to be read onely by a Princesse, whose wit is so far above the common pitch, that she con­ceives without difficulty what seemes hardest to our Doctours; I onely purposed to unfold what therein was new. And that you may not doubt what I say, I promise you to review that tract of the Passions, and to add what I conceive necessary to make it more intelligible, and then, I will send it you, to doe what you please with it: for I am, &c.

Egmont. Dece. 4. 1648.

A second letter to Mousieur des Cartes.

Sir,

It is a long while since you have made me ex­pect your tract of the Passions, which I begin to despaire of, and fancy with my selfe that you promised it to me onely to hinder me from pub­lishing the letter I formerly writ to you: for I have reason to beleeve that you would be vext, if a man went about to barre you of the excuse you make to finish your Physickes, and my designe in that letter was to barre you, since the reasons I have there laid down, are such, that me thinkes they cannot be read by any one who hath the least seruple of respect to honour or vertue, but they will incite him to wish as I doe, that you might obtaine of the publick what is requisite for the experiments you say are necessary; and I hoped it might happily alight into the hands of some who had power to make that desire effectuall, whether because they had accesse to those who dispose the publick treasure, or because they dispence it themselves: so I was confident I should find you doing whether you would or no: for I know you have so great a hart that you would not fail to repay what should thus be given you, with usury, and that would make you absolutely shake off that carelesnesse, [Page]whereof at present I cannot refraine from ac­cusing you, although I am, &c.

July 23. 1649.

In answer to the second Letter.

Sir,

I am very guiltlesse of the slight you are pleased to beleeve I used, to hinder the long Letter you sent me last yeere from being published: for besides, that I cannot thinke it can any whit produce the effect you pretend, I have not such a propension to idlenesse, that the feare of labour whereunto I should be tied, were I to dive into many experiments, could prevaile over the de­sire I have to instruct my selfe, and write any thing usefull for other men, had I from the publick received conveniences to doe it. I cannot so well cleare my selfe of the carelessenesse you charge me with: for I confesse, I have beene longer in reviewing the little tract I send you, than I was in making it, and yet I have added to it but very few things, and have not a whit altered the discourse, which is so plain and briefe, that it will be easily known thereby, my designe was not to lay open the Passions like an Oratour, nor yet a Morall Philosopher, but [Page]onely as a Physician: so I foresee that this tract will have no better successe than my other writ­ings: and although the title (it may be) may invite more people to read it, yet it will not give satisfaction to any b ut them who take the paines to examine it considerately. Such as it is, I com­mit it to you, &c.

Egmont. Aug. 14. 1649.

The Passions of the Soul.

The first part. Of Passions in Generall: and occasio­nally of the Universall nature of Man.

The first Article. That what is Passion in regard of the sub­ject, is alwayes Action in some other respect.

THere is nothing more clearly evinces the Learning which we receive from the Ancients to be defective, than what they have written concerning the Passi­ons. For although it be a mat­ter the understanding whereof hath ever been hunted after: and that it seems to be none of the hardest, because every one fee­ling them in himself, need not borrow forraign observations to discover their nature: yet what [Page 2]the Ancients have taught concerning them, is so little, and for the most part so little credible, that I cannot hope to draw nigh truth, but by keep­ing aloof off from those roades which they fol­lowed. Wherefore I shall here be forced to write in such a sort, as if I treated of a matter never before handled. And first of all I consider, that all which is done, or happens anew, is by the Philosopers called generally a Passion in relation to the subject on whom it befalls, and an Action in respect of that which causes it. So that al­though the Agent and Patient be things often differing, Action and Passion are one and the same thing, which hath two severall names, be­cause of the two severall subjects whereunto they may relate.

The second Article. That to understand the Passions of the soul, it is necessary to distinguish the functions thereof from those of the body.

FUrthermore, I consider that we observe not any thing which more immediately agi­tates our soul, than the body joyned to it, & consequently we ought to conceive that what in that is a Passion, is commonly in this an Action; so that there is no better way to attain to the un­derstanding of our Passions, than by exami­ing the difference between the soul and the [Page 3]body, that we may know to which of them each function in us ought to be attributed.

The third Article. What rule ought to be observed for the purpose.

WHich will not be found a very hard task, if it be taken notice of, that what we experimentally find to be in us, and which we see are in bodies totally ina­nimate, ought not to be attributed to ought else but the body; and contrarily, that all which is within us, and which we conceive cannot in a­ny wayes appertain to a body must be imputed to our soul.

The fourth Article. That heat, and the motion of the members pro­ceed from the Body, and thoughts from the Soul.

VVHerefore since we doe not com­prehend that the body in any manner thinks, 'tis but equitable in us to believe that all sorts of thoughts within us belong to the soul; and since we make no que­stion but there are inanimate bodies which move as many or more severall wayes than ours, and which have as much or more heat (which expe­rience shows us in flame, which alone hath more [Page 4]heat and motion than any of our limbs) we may be assured that heat and all the motions within us, seeing they depend not on the mind, belong onely to the body.

The fifth Article. That it is an errour to believe the Soul gives mo­tion and heat to the body.

WHereby we shall eschew a very conside­rable error which many have faln into so farre, that I believe it the cause of hindering the Passions, and other things which belong to the soul from being explained hitherto. It is this, that seeing all dead bodies are deprived of heat, and consequently of motion, people imagine the ab­sence of the soul wrought this cessation of mo­tion and heat, and so erroniously conceive that our naturall heat, and all the motions of our bo­dy depend on the soul: whereas indeed the con­trary should be supposed that the soul absents it self in death, only because this naturall heat cea­seth, and the organs which seem to move the body are corrupted.

The sixth Article. What is the difference betwixt a living and a dead dody.

THat we may then avoid this errour, Let us consider that death never comes by any defect of the soul, but onely because some [Page 5]one of the principall parts of the body is cor­rupted; and conceive that the body of a living man differs as much from that of a dead one, as a watch or any other AUTOMA (that is any kind of Machine that moves of it self) wound up, having in it self the corporeall principle of those motions for which it was instituted, with all things requisite for its action, and the same watch or other engine when it is broken, and the principle of its motion ceases to act.

The seventh Article. A brief explication of the parts of the body, and of some of its functions.

TO make this more intelligible, I will in few words display the pieces and lineaments, whereof this Machine our body is composed. There is none that doth not already know there is within us, a heart, a braine, a stomach, mus­cles, sinews, arteries, veins, and the like; it is as commonly known, that meats eaten descend in­to the stomack, and bowells, from whence the juice of them trickling into the liver, and all the veines, mixes it self with the blood in them, and by this means augments the quantity thereof. Those who have heard talk never so little of Phy­sick, know besides this, how the Heart is com­posed, and how all the blood of the veines may with facility drop into the hollow vein, on the right side of it, and from thence passe into the [Page 6]Liver, by a vessell called the venous arterie, then return from the liver into the left side of the heart, through the Pipe, called the arterious vein, and at length passe from thence into the great ar­terie, the branches whereof spread themselves all over the body. Yea even all those whom the authority of the Ancients hath not totally blind­ed, and who have vouchsafed to open their eyes to examine the opinion of Harvy, concerning the circulation of the blood, make no doubt but all the veins and arteries of the body are like chan­nells, through which the blood continually and easily glides, taking its course from the right ca­vity of the heart, through the arterious veine, whereof the branches are dispersed into every part of the Liver, and joyned to those of the venous arterie by which it passeth from the Li­ver into the left fide of the heart, from thence go­ing into the great arterie, the branches whereof being scattered over all the rest of the body are joyned to the branches of the hollow vein which cary the same blood again into the right cavity of the heart: so that the two cavities are as it were the sluces of it, through each of which all the blood passes, every round it walks about the body. Moreover it is notorious that all the mo­tions of the members depend upon the muscles, and that these Muscles are opposite to one ano­ther in such a manner, that when one of them shrinks up, it drawes after it that part of the bo­dy whereto it is knit, which causes the muscle [Page 7]opposite to it to stretch forth at the same time: then again if at another time this last shrink up, the first gives way, suffering the other to attract that part it is joyned unto. In fine, it is knowne that all these motions of the muscles, as also all the senses depend on the sinews, which are as little strings, or like small tonnells coming all from the braine, and containing as that does a certain aire, or exceeding subtle wind, which is tearmed the Animall spirits.

The eighth Article. What is the principle of all these functions.

BUt it is not commonly known in what manner these animall Spirits, and nerves contribute to these motions and senses, nor what is the corporeall principle that makes them act: wherefore, although I have already glan­ced upon it in former writings, I will not here omit to say succinctly, that while we live there is a continuall heat in our heart, which is a kind of fire that the blood of the veines feeds, and this fire is the corporeall principle of tall the motions of our members.

The ninth Article. How the motion of the heart is wrought.

THe f irst effect of it is, that it dilates the blood wherewith the cavities of the heart are fill'd: which is the reason that this blood having need [Page 8]of a larger room, passes impetuously from the right cavity into the arterious vein, and from the left into the great arterie; then, this dilatation ceasing, immediately new blood from the hol­low vein enters into the right cavity of the heart, and from the veinous arterie into the left ;for there are little skins at the entrance of these foure vessells so contrived, that they will not let the blood get into the heart, but by the two last, nor come out, but by the other two. The new blood being gotten into the heart is there imme­diately rarified as the former was. Hence onely is that pulse or palpitation of the heart and arte­ries; for this beating is reiterated as often as any new blood gets into the heart. It is also this alone which gives motion to the blood, and cau­seth it uncessantly to run very swiftly in all the arteries and veines; by means whereof it con­veyes the heart acquired in the heart, to all the o­ther parts of the body, and is their nutri­ment.

The tenth Article. How the animall spirits are begotten in the braine.

BUt what here is most considerable is, that all the most lively, and subtle parts of the blood, that heat hath rarified in the heart, continually enter in abundandance into the cavities of the braine, and the reason why they [Page 9]go thither rather than any where else, is, because all the blood that issues out of the heart by the great artery bends its course in a direct line thi­ther ward, and it not being possible for all to get in, because there are none but very narrow pas­sages, those parts thereof that are the most agi­tated, and subtlest, only get in, while the rest is dispersed into all the other parts of the body. Now these very subtle parts of the blood make the animall spirits; and they need not, to this end, undergoe any other change in the brain, but only be separated from the other lesse subtle parts of the blood; for what I here call spirits, are but bodyes, and have no other property, un­lesse tha they are bodies exceeding small, which move very nimbly, as the parts of a flame issuing from a torch: so that they stay not in any one place, but still as some get into the cavities of the brain, some others get out through the pores in the substance of it; which pores convey them into the nerves, and from thence into the muscles, by means whereof they mould the body into all the severall postures it can move.

The 11th Article. How the muscles are moved.

FOR the only cause of the motion of all the members is, that some Muscles shrink up, and their opposites extend, as hath been already said; and the only cause why one muscle [Page 10]shrinkes rather than his opposite, is, that there come (though never so little) more spirits to the one than the other; not that the spirits which flow immediatly from the brain, are alone sufficient to move these Muscles, but they dispose the other spirits, which already are in these two Muscles of sally forth immedi­atly from one of them into the other: by means whereof that from whence they came becomes longer, and flaggier; that wherein they are, be­ing suddenly swelled up by them, shortens and attracts the member appendent to it; which is easily conceived, when it is known that there are but very few animal spirits which proceed continually from the brain to every Muscle, but that there are abundance of others lockt in the same Muscle, which move very swiftly in it, sometimes in whirling round only in the places where they are (this is, when they find no pas­sages open to get out at) and sometimes by slip­ping into the opposite Muscle: For there are little overtures in each of these Muscles through which hese spirits can slide from one to another, which are so disposed too, that when the spirits which come from the brain towards one of them, are but never so little stronger than those going to theother, they open all the entries through which the spirits of the other Muscle can fly in­to this, and in the same instant bar up all those, through which the spirits of this might get into that; whereby all the spirits formerly contained [Page 11]in both Muscles crowd suddenly into one, so swelling it up, and shortning it, while the other extends it self, and gives.

The 12th Article. How outward objects act contrary to the organs of the senses.

IT remains yet to know the causes why the spi­rits slide not from the brain into the Muscles al­ways after one manner, and wherefore they come sometimes more towards some than others; For besides the action of the Soul, which in truth, is in us one of the causes, as I shall shew hereafter, there are yet two besides, which depend not of any thing but the body, which it is necessary to take notice of the first consists in the diversitie of motions, excited in the organs of the senses by their objects, which I have already amply enough explained in the Dioptricks: but that those who see this, may not need to have read ought else, I will here repeat, that there are three things to be considered in the sinews; to wit, their marrow or interiour substance which stret­ches it self out in the form of little threds from the brain the originall thereof, to the extremities of the other members whereunto these threds are fastened; next, the skins wherein they are lapt, which being continuous with those that in­velope the brain, make up litle pipes wherein these threds are enclosed; lastly, the animal spi­rits, [Page 12]which being conveyed through these very pipes from the brain to the muscles, are the cause that these thredds remain there entirely unmole­sted, and extended in such a manner, that the least thing that moves that part of the body, where­unto the extremity of any one of them is faste­ned, doth by the same reason move that part of the brain from whence it comes: just as when a man pulls at one end of a string, he causeth the other end to stirre.

The 13th Article. That this Action of objects without, may diffe­rently convey the spirits into the Muscles.

AND I have made it evident in the Diop­ticks, how all the objects of the sight are not communicated to us any way but thus; they move locally, (by mediation of transparent bo­dies between them and us) those little thredds of the Optick nerves, which are at the bottome of our eyes, and after them, the places of the brain from whence those nerves come: they move them, I say, as many severall kinds of wayes, as there are diversities of objects in things; nor are they immediatly the motions made in the eye, but in the brain, that represent these objects to the Soul: in imitation whereof it is easie to conceive that sounds, odours, heat, pain, hunger, thirst, and generally and objects, as well of our other exteriour senses, as our interi­our [Page 13]appetites, doe also excite some motion in our nerves, which passes by means of them unto the brain; and besides, that these severall motions of the brain create in our soul different resent­ments, it may so be that that without her, the spirits direct their course rather towards some Muscles than others, and so they may move our members; which I will prove here, only by one example. If any one lift up his hand on a sud­den towards our eyes, as if he were about to strike, although we know he is our friend, that he does this only in jest, and that he will be care­full enough not to doe us any hurt, yet wee can scarce refrain from shutting them: which shews it is not by the intermedling of our soul that they shut, since it is against our will, which is the only, or at least the principall Action thereof; but by reason this machine of our body is so composed, that the moving of this hand up to­wards our eyes, excites another motion in our brain which conveys the animal spirits into those muscles that close the eye-lids.

The 14th Article. That the diversity of the spirits may diver­sifie their course.

THe other cause which serves to convey the animal spirits variously into the muscles, is the unequal agitation of these spirits, and the diversity of their parts: for when any of their [Page 14]parts are more gross, and agitated than the rest, they passe forwards in a direct line into the ca­vities, and pores of the brain, and by this means are conveyed into toher muscles, whereinto they should not, had they been weaker.

The 15th Article. What are the causes of their diversity.

ANd this inequality may proceed from the di­vers matters whereof they are composed, as is seen in those, who have drunk much wine. The vapours of this wine entering suddenly into the blood, mount up from the hear to the brain, where they convert into spirits, which being stronger, and more abundant than ordinary, are apt to move the body after many strange fashi­ons. This inequality of the spirits may also pro­ceed from the divers dispositions of the heart, liver, Stomacke, spleene, and all other parts contributing to their production. For it is prin­cipally necessary here to observe certaine little nerves inserted in the basis of the heart, which serve to lengthen, and contract the entries of its concavities: by meanes whereof, the blood there dilating more, or lesse strongly, produces spirits diversly disposed. It is also to be noted, that al­though the blood which enters into the heart, comes thither from all the other parts of the body, yet it falls out often times that more is driven thither from some parts than others, by [Page 15]reason the nerves or muscles which answer to those parts oppresse or agitate it more; and for that according to the diversity of the parts from whence it comes most, it dilates it selfe diverfly in the heart, and at last produces spirits of dif­ferent natures, as for example, that which comes from the lower part of the liver, where the gall is, dilates it selfe otherwise in the heart, than that which comes from the spleene; and this af­ter another manner than that which comes from the veines of the leggs, or armes and lastly, this quite otherwise than the juyce of meats, when being newly come out of the stomack, and bow­els, it passes through the liver to the heart.

The 16th Article. How all the members may be moved by the ob­jects of the sences, and by the spirits, without the help of the Soul.

Lastly, it is to be observed, that the machine of our body is so composed, that all the changes befalling the motion of the spirits may so worke as to open some pores of the braine more than others: and reciprocally, that when any one of these pores are never so little more or lesse open than usuall by the Action of those nerves subservient to the senses, it changes some­what in the motion of the spirits, and causes them to be conveyed into the muscles which serve to move the body in that manner it ordinarily [Page 16]is, upon occasion of such an Action. So that all the motions we make, our will not contri­buting to them (as it often happens that we sigh, walk, eat, and to be short, doe all actions common to us, and beasts) depend onely on the conformity of our members, and the streame which the spirits, excited by the heat of the heart, follow naturally into the braine nerves, and muscles. Just as the motion of a watch is pro­duced meerely by the strength of the spring and the fashion of the wheeles.

The 17th Article. What the functions of the Soul are.

HAving thus considered all the functions be­longing to the body only, it is easie to know, there remaines nothing in us, which we ought to attribute to our Soul, unlesse our thoughts, which are chiefly of two kinds, to wit, some, Actions of the Soul, others, her Passions. Those which I call her actions are all our wills, be­cause we experimentally find, they come direct­ly from our Soul, and seem to depend on nought but it: as on the contrary one may generally call her Passions, all those sorts of apprehensions and understandings to be found within us, be­cause oftimes our Soul does not make them such as they are to us, and she alwayes receives things as they are represented to her by them.

The 18th Article. Of the Will.

Again our Wills are of two sorts. For some are actions of the Soul which terminate in the Soul it selfe, as when we will love God, or generally apply our thought to any object which is not materiall. The other are actions which terminate in our body, as in this case, that we have onely a will to walke, it followes that our legges must stir and we goe.

The 19th Article. Of the Apprehension.

OUr Appprehensions also are of two sorts: the Soul is the cause of some, the Body of the other. Those whereof the Soul is the cause are the apprehensions of our wills, and all the ima­ginations or others thoughts thereon depending. For we cannot will any thing, but we must at the same time perceive that we doe will it. And although in respect of our Soul it be an Action to will any thing, it may be said also a passion in her to apprehend that she wills. Yet because this apprehension, and this will are in effect but one, and the same thing, the denomination comes still from that which is most noble: there­fore it is not customary to call it a Passion, but onely an Action.

The 20th Article. Of Imaginations, and other thoughts framed by the Soul.

WHen our Soul applies her elfe to fancy any thing which is not, as to represent to it selfe an inchanted Palace, or a Chimera; and also when she bends her selfe to consider any thing that is only intelligible, & not imaginable, for example, to ruminate on ones owne nature: the apprehension she hath of things depends ptincipally on the Will which causeth her to per­ceive them. Wherefore it is usuall to consider them as Actions rather than Passions.

The 21 Article. Of Imaginations caused onely by the body.

Among the apprehensions caused by the bo­dy, the greatest part depend on the nerves. But yet there are some that depend not at all on them, which are called Imaginations too, as well as those I lately spoke of, from which neverthelesse they differ herein, that our Will hath no hand in framing them, which is the rea­son wherefore they cannot be numbred among the actions of the Soul, and they proceed from nothing but this, that the spirits being agitated se­verall wayes, and meeting the traces of divers impressions preceding them in the brain, they [Page 19]take their course at haphazzard through some certaine pores, rather than others. Such are the illusions of our dreames, and those dotages we often are troubled with waking, when our thought carelessely roames witout applying it self to any thing of its own. Now, though some of these imaginations be Passions of the Soul, ta­king this word in the genuine and peculiar signi­fication; and though they may be all called so if it be taken in a more generall acception: yet seeing they have not so notorious and determi­ned a cause, as those apprehensions which the Soul receives by mediation of the nerves, and that they seem to be onely the shadow, and re­presentation of the others, before we can well distinguish them, it is necessary to examine the difference between them.

The 22 Article. Of the difference betwixt them and the other apprehensions.

ALL the apprehensions which I have not yet explained come to the Soul by media­tion of the nerves, and there is this diffe­rence between them, that we attribute some of them to the objects from without, that beat upon our senses, some to our body, or some parts of it, and lastly, the rest to our Soul.

The 23th Article. Of apprehensions which we attribute to objects from without us.

Those which we attribute to things without us, to wit, to the objects of our enses, are caused (at least, if our opinion be not false) by those objects, which exciting some motions in the or­gans of the exteriour senses, by intercourse with the nerves, stir up some in the brain which make the soul perceive them. So when we see the light of a torch, and hear the sound of a bell, this sound, and this light are two everall actions, who meerly in this regard that they excite two severall motions in some of our nerves, and by meanes of them, in the brain, deliver the Soul two different Resentments, which we so attri­bute to those Subjects, which we suppose to be their causes, that we think we see the very flame, and hear the bell, not onely feel certain motions proceeding from them.

The 24th Article. Of apprehensions which we attribute to our body.

THe apprehensions which we attribute to our body, or any of the parts thereof, are those we have concerning hunger, thirst, and other our naturall appetites; whereunto may be added paine, heat, and the rest of the affections we [Page 21]feel as in our members, and not in the objects without us. So, we may at at the same time, by the intercourse of the same nerves, feel the coldnesse of our hand, and the heat of the flame it drawes neere to: or contrarily, the heat of the hand, and the cold of the aire whereto it is exposed: and yet there is no difference between the Acti­ons that make us feel the heat, or the cold in our hand and those which make us feel that which is without us: unlesse that one of these Actions succeeding the other, we conceive the first to be already in us, and that which followes, not to be yet in us but in the object that causeth it.

The 25th Article. Of the apprehensions which we attribute to our Soul.

THe Apprehensions attributed only to the Soul are those whereof the effects are felt as in the Soul it selfe, and whereof any neer cause, where­unto it may be attributed is commonly un­known. Such are the resentments of joy, wrath and the like, which are sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves, and sometimes too by other causes. Now, although all our Apprehensions, as well those attributed to objects without us, as those relating to divers affections of our body, be, in truth, Passions in respect of our Soul, when this word is taken in the more generall signification: yet it is usuall [Page 22]to restrain it to signifie onely those attributed to the Soul it selfe. And they are onely these latter which I here undertake to explaine under the notion of Passions of the Soul.

The 26th Article. That the imaginations, which depend onely on the accidentall motion of the spirits, may be as reall Passions; as the apprehensions depending on the nerves.

IT is here to be observed that all the same things which the Soul perceives by intercourse with the nerves, may also be represented to it by the accidentall course of the spirits; and no dif­ference between them but this, that the impres­sions which come from the brain by the nerves, are usually more lively, and manifest than those the spirits excite there, which made me say in the one and twentieth Article, that these are onely as the shadow, and representation of those. It is also to be noted, that it sometimes fals out, this picture is so like the thing it represents, that it is possible to be deceived concerning the appre­hensions attributed to those objects without us, or those referred to any parts of our body, but not to be srved so concerning the Passions, forasmuch as they are so neer, and interiour to our Soul that it is impossible she should feele them, unlesse they were truely such as she doth feel them. So oftentimes when one sleeps, and [Page 23]sometimes too being awake, a man fancies things so strongly that he thinkes he sees them before him, or feels them in his body, though there be no such thing: but although a man be asleep, and doate, he cannot feel himselfe sad ormoved with any other Passion, but it is most true that the Soul hath in it that passion.

The 27th Article. The definition of the Passions of the Soul.

AFter we have thus considered wherein the passions of the Soul differ from all other thoughts, me thinkes they may be generally de­fined thus. Apprehensions, resentments, or emo­tions of the Soul, attributed particularly to it, and caused, fomented, and fortified by some mo­tion of the spirits.

The 28th Article. An explication of the first part of the definition.

THey may be called Apprehensions, when this word is used in a generall sense to signifie all thoughts that are not Actions of the Soul, or the wills: but not then when it onely signifies evident knowledges. For experience shewes us that those who are most agitated by their Pas­sions, are not such as understand them best, and that they are in the Catalogue of those appre­hensions which the strict alliance between the [Page 24]soul and the body renders confused and obscure; they may also be called resentments, because they are received into the soul in the same manner, as the objects of the exteriour senses, and are not otherwise understood by her; but they may justlier be stiled the emotions of the Soul, not only because this name may be attributed to all the mutations befalling her, (that is all the va­rious thoughts thereof) but particularly, because, of all kinds of thoughts that she can have there are none that agitate, and shake it so hard as these Passions doe.

The 29th Article. An explication of the other part.

I Adde that they are attributed particularly to the Soul, to distinguish them from other re­sentments relating, some to exteriour objects, as smells, sounds, colours; the others, to our body, as hunger, thirst, pain. I also subjoyn that they are caused, fomented, and fortified by some mo­tion of the spirits to distinguish them from our Wills, which cannot be called emotions of the Soul attributed to her, but caused by her self: as also to unfold their last, and immediate cause that distinguisheth them (again) from other resentments.

The 30th article. That the Soul is united to all the parts of the body joyntly.

BUt to understand all these things more per­fectly, it is necessary to know, that the Soul is really joyned to all the body, but it cannot properly bee said to bee in any of the parts thereof, excluding the rest, because it is One, and in some sort indivisible by reason of the disposition of the organs, which do all so relate one to another, that when any one of them is taken away, it renders the whole body defective: and because it is of a nature that hath no refe­rence to extension, dimensions, or other proper­ties of matter, whereof the body is composed, but only to the whole masse or Contexture of Organs; as appears by this, that you cannot con­ceive the half or third part of a Soul, nor what space it takes up: and that it becomes not any whit less by cutting off any part of the body, but absolutely withdraws when the Contexture of its organs is dissolved.

The 31th Article. That there is a little kernell in the brain wherein the soul exercises her functions more pecu­liarly than in the other parts.

IT is also necessary to know, that although the foul be joyned to all the body, yet there is [Page 26]some part in that body wherein shee exercises her functions more peculiarly than all the rest; and its commonly believed that this part is the brain, or, it may bee, the heart: the brain, because thither tend the organs of the senses; and the heart, because therein the Passi­ons are felt; but having searched this businesse carefully, me thinks I have plainly found out, that that part of the body wherein the soul im­mediatly exercises her functions is not a jot of the heart; nor yet all the brain, but only the most interiour part of it, which is a certain very small kernell, situated in the middle of the sub­stance of it, and so hung on the top of the con­duit by which the spirits of its anteriour cavi­ties have communication with those of the po­steriour, whose least motions in it cause the course of the spirits very much to change, and reciprocally, the least alterations befalling the course of the spirits, cause the motions of the kernell very much to alter.

The 32th Article. How this kernell is known to be the principall seat of the soul.

THe reason which perswades me that the soul can have no other place in the whole body but this kernell where shee immediatly exercises for functions is for that I see: all the other parts of our brain are paired, as also we have two eyes, [Page 27]two hands, two ears: lastly, all the organs of our exteriour senses are double: and forasmuch as we have but one onely, and single thought of one very thing at one and the same time, it must necessarily be that there is some place where the two images that come from the two eyes, or the two other impressions that come from any single object through the double organs of the other senses, have some where to meet in one, before they come to the soul, that they may not repre­sent two objects in stead of one; and it may bee easily conceived, that these images, or other im­pressions joyn together in this kernell by inter­course of the spirits that fill the cavities of the brain; but there is no other place in the body where they can be so united, unlesse it be granted that they are in this kernell.

The 33th Article. That the seat of the Passions is not in the heart.

FOr the opinion of those who think the soul re­ceives her Passions in the heart, it is not worth consideration, for it is grounded upon this, that the Passions make us feel some alteration there; and it is easie to take notice that this alteration is only felt in the heart by the intercourse of a small nerve, descending to it from the brain; just as pain is felt in the feet, by intercourse of the nerves of the foot: and the starres are percei­ved [Page 28]as to be in the firmament, by the intercourse of their light, and the optick nerves: so that it is no more necessary that our soul exercise her fun­ctions immediatly in the heart to make her Pas­sions be felt there, than it is necessary shee should be in the sky to see the stars there.

The 34th Article. How the Soul and the Body act one against another.

LEt us then conceive that the Soul holds her principall seat in that little kernell in the midst of the brain, from whence she diffu­seth her becames into all the rest of the body by intercourse of the spirits, nerves, yea and the very blood, which participating the Impressions of the spirits, may convey them through the arte­ries into all the members; and remembring what was formerly said concerning this machine our body, to wit, that the little strings of our nerves are so distributed into all parts of it that upon occasion of severall motions excited therein by sensible objects; they variously open the pores of the braine, which causeth the animall spirits con­tained in the cavities thereof, to enter divers wayes into the muscles, by whose means they can move the members all the severall wayes they are apt tomove, and also that all the other causes which can differently move the spirits, are enough to convey them into severall muscles: let [Page 29]us here adde, that the little kernell which is the chief feat of the soul hangs so between the cavi­ties which contain these spirits, that it may be mo­ved by them as many severall fashions as there are sensible diversities in objects; but withall, that it may be moved severall wayes by the soul too, which is of such a nature, that she receives as many various impressions (that is; hath as many severall apprehensions) as there come se­verall motions into this kernell. As also on the other side, the machine of the body is so compo­sed, that this kernel being only divers wayes mo­ved by the soul, or by any other cause whatsoe­ver, it drives the Spirits that environ it towards the pores of the brain, which convey them by the nerves into the muscles, by which means it causeth them to move the members.

The 35th Article. An example of the manner how the impressions of objects unite in the kernell in the middle of the brain.

AS for example; if we see any creature come toward us, the light reflected from his body, paints two images, one in each eye, and these two images beget two others, by intercourse with the optick nerves, in the interi­our superficies of the brain, that looks towards its concavities: from thence by intercourse of the spirits wherewith these cavities are filled, these [Page 30]images glance in such a manner on the little kennell, that these spirits encompasse it, and the motion which composes any point of one of these images tends to the same point of the kernell, to which that motion tends that frames the point of the other image which represents, too, part of this creature: by which meanes the two images in the brain make up but one sin­gle one upon the kernell, which acting imme­diately against the Soul, shews her the figure of that creature.

The 36 Article. An example how the Passions are excited in the Soul.

FUrthermore, if this figure be very strange, and hideous, that is, if it have much simi­litude with such things as have formerly been offensive to the body, it excites in the Soul the Passion of fear, afterwards, that of boldness, or else an affright or scaring according to the various temper of the body, or the force of the soul, and according as a man hath formerly pro­tected himself by defence or flight against noxi­ous things whereunto the present impression hath some resemblance; for this renders the braine so disposed in some men, that the spirits reflected from the image so formed on the kernell, go from thence to fall, part into the nerves, which serve to turn the back, and stirre the legs to run away, [Page 31]and part into those which (as is spoken of be­fore) let out or draw upon together the orifices of the heart, or which else so agitate the rest of the parts from whence the blood is sent, that this blood not being rarified there in the usuall man­ner, sends spirits to the braine that are fitting to maintain, and confirm the passion of fear, that is, such as are proper to hold open, or open a­gain the pores of the brain that convey them in­to the very same nerves; for the meere entry of these spirits into these pores excites in this kernell a particular motion, instituted by nature to make the soul feel that passion; and because these pores relate principally to the little nerves that serve to lock up or open wide the orifices of the heart, this makes the soul feel it, as if it were chiefly in the heart.

The 37th Article. How it appears they are all caused by some motion of the spirits.

ANd because the like happens in all the o­ther Passions, to wit, that they are prin­cipally caused by the spirits contained in the cavities of the brain, seeing they direct their course towards the nerves which serve to enlarge or straiten the orifices of the heart either to thrust the blood in the other parts differently to it, or whatsoever other way it be, to feed the self same Passion: it may be clearly understood by this; wherefore, I formerly inserted in my definition [Page 32]that they are caused by some peculiar motion of the Spirits.

The 38th Article. An example of the motions of the Body that ac­company the Passions, and depend not of the Soul.

MOreover, as the course which these spi­rits take towards the nerves of the heart is sufficient to give a motion to the ker­nell, whereby fear is put into the soul: even so, by the meere going of the spirits, at that time into those nerves which serve to stirre the legges to run away, they cause another motion in the same kernell, by meanes whereof the soul feels and perceives this flight, which may in this man­ner be excited in the body, by the meere dispo­sition of the organs, the soul not at all contri­buting to it.

The 39th Article. How the same cause may excite divers Passions in divers men.

THe same impression that the presence of one formidable object workes upon the kernel, and which causeth fear in some men, may in o­thers rouze up courage; and boldnesse: the rea­son whereof is, that all braines are not alike disposed, for the same motion of the Kernell, [Page 33]which in some excites feare, in others causeth the spirits to enter into the pores of the brain, which convey them, part into the nerves which serve to use the hands for defence, and partly in­to those which agitate, and drive the blood to­wards the heart, in that manner as is requisite to produce spirits proper to continue this de­fence, and retaine a will to it.

The 40th Article. What the principall effect of the Passions is.

FOr it must be observed that the principall ef­fect of all the Passions in men is, they incite, and dispose their Souls to will the things for which they prepare their Bodies: so that the re­sentment of fear incites him to be willing to fly; that of boldnesse, to be willing to fight, and so of the rest.

The 41th Article. What is the power of the Soul in respect of the Body.

BUt the will is so free by nature, that it can never be constrained: and of two sorts of thoughts which I have distinguished in the Soul, whereof some are her Actions, to wit her Wils; others, her Passions, taking that word in its generall signification, which comprehends all sorts of apprehensions: the first are absolutely in [Page 34]her owne power, and cannot, but indirectly, be changed by the body; as on the contrary, the last depend absolutely upon the Actions which produce them, and they cannot, unlesse indi­rectly be changed by the Soul, except then when her selfe is the cause of them. And all the Acti­on of the Soul consists in this, that she meerely by willing any thing can make the little kernell, whereunto she is strictly joyned, move in the manner requisite to produce the effect relating to this Will.

The 42th Article. How the things one would remember are found in the memory.

SO when the Soul would remember any thing, this Will is the cause that the kernell nodding successively every way, drives the spirits towards severall places of the braine, untill they excoun­ter that, where the traces (which were left there) of the object one would remember, are. For these traces are nothing else but the pores of the braine, through which the spirits formerly took their course, by reason of the presence of that object, have thereby accquired a greater facility to be open in the same manner again than the rest can have, by the spirits that come to them: so that these spirits meeting these pores, enter into them easier than the others: whereby, they excite a peculiar motion in the kernell, which re­presents [Page 35]the same object to the Soul, and makes it know, that is it she would remember.

The 43th Article. How the Soul can imagine, be attentive, and move the Body.

SO when one would imagin any thing one hath never seen, this Will hath the power to make the kernell move in the manner requisite to drive the spirits towards the pores of the braine by the opening of which this thing may be represented. So, when one would fix his attention some pretty while to consider, or ruminate on one object, this Will holds the kernell still at that time, lean­ing ever to one side. So, in fine, when one would walk, or move his body any way, this Will causes the kernell to drive the spirits towards the mus­cles which serve to that purpose.

The 44th Article. That every Will is naturally joyned to some mo­tion of the kernell; but that by industry, or habit, itmay be annexed to another.

NOtwithstanding it is not alwayes the Will to excite in us any motion or other effect, that can cause us to excite it: but that changes ac­cording as nature or habit have differently joy­ned each motion of the kernell to each thought; as for example, if one would dispose his eyes to [Page 36]look on an object farr distant, this Will causes the ball of them to dilate themselves: and if one would prompt them to behold an object very neer, this Will contracts them; but if one thinks onely to dilate the ball, he had as good doe no­thing: that dilates it not at all: because nature hath not joyned the motion of the kernell, which serves to drive the spirits to the optick nerve in that manner as is requisite to dilate or contract the ball of the eye, with the will of dilating or contracting it, but with the will of looking on objects remote, or at hand; and then when we speak, we only think the sense of what we would say, yet that makes us move our tongues and lips, much better, and farre readier than if wee thought to move them in all the manners requi­site to pronounce the same words. Forasmuch as the habit we have acquired in learning to speak, hath taught us to joyn the action of the Soul, which by the intercourse of the kernell can move the tongue, and the lipps, with the signifi­cation of the words which follow out of these motions, rather than with the motions them­selves.

The 45th Article. What the power of the Soul is, in respect of her Passions.

OUr Passions also cannot be directly excited, or takenaway by the action of our Will: but they may indirectly, by the representation of [Page 37]things which use to be joyned with the Passions which we will have, and which are contrary to those we will reject; Thus to excite in ones selfe boldness and remove fear, it is not enough to have a will to do so, but reasons, objects, and examples are to be considered of, that perswade the danger is not great that there is ever more security in defence than flight; that there is glo­ry and joy in vanquishing, whereas there is no­thing to be expected but griefe and dishonour in flying, and the like.

The 46th Article. What is the reason that hinders the Soul from disposing her Passions totally.

NOw, there is a peculiar reason why the Soul cannot suddenly alter or stop her Passions: which gave me occasion to put formerly in their definition, that they are not only caused, but so­mented, and fortified by some peculiar motion of the spirits; the reason is, they are almost all coupled with some emotion made in the heart, and consequently in all the blood, and spirits too, so that till this emotion cease, they remain pre­sent in our thoughts, just as sensible objects are present in them, while they act against the or­gans of our senses; and as the Soul being very sattentive on any other thing, may choose whe­ther shewill hear a little noise, or feel a little pain or no, but cannot keep her self from hear­ing [Page 38]thunder, or feeling fire that burns the hand: so shee may easily overcome the smaller Passions, but not the violentest, and strongest, untill after the emotion of the blood and spirits is allayed. The most the Will can doe, while this emotion is in its full strength, is not to consent to its effects; and to restrain divers motions whereunto it dis­poses the body. For example; if wrath makes me lift up my hand to strike, the Will can usually restrain it: if fear incites my legs to fly, the Will can stop them: and so of the rest.

The 47th Article. Wherein consist those contestations which use to be imagined between the superiour, and in­feriour part of the Soul.

ANd it is only in the repugnance of those mo­tions, which the body by its spirits, and the Soul by her Wil, endeavour to excite at the same time in the kernall, that all the contestations which use to be imagined between the inferiour part of the Soul, called sensitive, and the superi­our which is reasonable, or else between the na­turall appetites, and the Will, consist; for there is in us but one Soul only and this Soul hath no di­versity of parts in it; the same which is sensible is rationall, and all her appetites are her Wills. The errour committed in making her act two severall parts, which are usually contrary one to another, proceeds meerly hence, that her functi­ons [Page 39]have not been distinguished from them of the body, to which only all that can be obser­ved in us repugnant to our reason ought to bee attributed; so that there is here no other conte­station, unlesse that the little kernell in the mid­dle of the brain, being driven on one side by the soul, and on the other by the animall spirits (which are only bodies, as I laid down before) it happens oftentimes that these two impulsions are contrary, and that the strongest hinders the operation of the other. Now we may distiguish two sorts of motions, excited by the spirits in the kernell: some represent to the soul the ob­jects which move the senses, or the impressions found in the brain, which use not any violence on the Will; others doe use violence, to wit, such as cause the Passions, or motions of the body concomitant with them. And for the first though they often-times hinder the action of the soul, or else be hindered by it, yet by reason that they are not directly contrary, there is not any conte­station observed in them; it is only taken notice of among the last, and the Wills which resist them: for example; between that violence wherewith the spirits drive the kernell to cause in the soul a desire of any thing, and that where­with the Soul beats it back by the will she hath to avoid the same thing and what chiefly makes this contestation appear, is that the Will having not the power to excite the Passions di­rectly (as hath been already said) is constrained [Page 40]to use art and fall on considering successively di­vers things, if but one wherof chance to be strong enough to alter the course of the spirits one mo­ment, it is possible, that which follows is not, and so the others many immediately resume it a­again, because the disposition preceding in the nerves, heart and blood is not changed: which makes the soul feel her self instigated almost in the same instant to desire and not desire the very same thing. From hence it was, that occasion was taken to imagine two contesting powers in her. Yet there may some kind of contestation be conceived herein, that oft times the same cause which excites some Passion in the soul ex­cites also certain motions in the body whereunto the soul contributes not, and which she stops or strives to sto assoon as ever she perceives them: as is then tried, when that which excites fear­fullnesse causeth also the Spirits to enter into the muscles, that serve to stirre the legges to run a­way, and the Will to be bold, stops them.

The 48th Article. Wherein the strength or weaknesse of souls are known, and what is the misery of the weakest.

NOw it is by the successe of these conte­stations that every one may understand the strength or weaknesse of his soul. For [Page 41]those in whom the Will can most easily conquer the Passions, and stop the motions of the body that come along with them, have without doubt the strongest souls. But there are some who can never try their own strength, because they never let the Will fight with her own wea­pons, but onely with such as are borrowed from some Passions to resist others. Those which I call her own weapons are firm, and determi­nate judgements concerning the knowledge of good and evil, according to which she hath re­solved to steere the actions of her life: and the weakest soul of all is such an one whose Will hath not at all determined to follow certaine judgements, but suffers it self to be swayed with the present Passions, which being often contrary one to the other, draw it backwards and for­wards to either side, and keeping her busie, in contesting against her self, put the soul into the most miserable estate she can be, as, then when fearfulnesse represents death as an extream e­vill, which cannot be shunned but by flight. if, on the other side, ambition represent the infamy of this flight, as a mischief worse than death, these two Passions variously agitate the Will, which obeying now the one, and then the other, continually opposeth its own self, and yields up the soul to slaverie and misfortune.

The 49th Article. That the strength of the soul is not enough with­out the knowledge of truth.

IT is true there are very few men so wake and irresolute, that they will nothing but what their present Passion dictates to them. The most part have determinate judgements ac­cording to which they regulate part of their a­ctions. And though oft times these judgements be false, and indeed grounded on some Passions, by which the Wil hath formerly suffered her self to be vanquished, or seduced; yet because she persevers in following them then when the Pas­sion that caused them is absent, they may be con­sidered as her own weapons, and souls may be thought stronger or weaker according as they do smore or lesse follow these judgements, and resist the present Passions contrary to them. But there is a great deal of difference between the resolu­tions proceeding from some false opinion, and those which are onely held up by the knowledge of the truth: since following these last, man is sure never to acquire sorrow or repentance, whereas following the first, they are inseparably companions, after the errour is discovered.

The 50th Article. That there is no soul so weak, but well mannaged, may acquire an absolute Mastery over her Passions.

IT will be commodious here to know that (as before hath been said) although every motion of the kernell, seem to have been joyned by nature to each of our thoughts, even from the beginning of our life, they may yet he annexed to others by habit, as experience shews in words, that excite motions in the kernell, which according to the institution of nature re­present only to the soul their sound, when they are pronounced by the Will, or by the figure of their letters when they are written, and which yet neverthelesse, by a habit acquired by thinking what they signifie, assoon as ever their sound is heard, or their letters seen, use to make us con­ceive the signification rather then the form of our letters or the sound of their sillables. It is also convenient to know that although the motions, as well of the kernell as the spirits and braine, which represent certain objects to the Soul, be naturally joyned with those that excite certain Passions in her, yet they may by habit be separa­ted, and annexed to others very different; and moreover that this habit may be acquired by one action onely, and requires not a long usuage: as [Page 44]as when a man at unawares meets with any na­sty thing in a dish of meat which he hath a very good stomack to, this accident may so alter the disposition of the brain, thataman shall never afterwards see any such kind of meat without loathing, whereas before he took delight in eating it. The very same thing may be seen in beasts, for although they have no reason, nor it may be any thought, all the motions of the spi­rits and the kernell, which excite Passions in us, yet are in them, and serve to foment and fortifie (not as in us the Passions, but) the motions of the nerves, andmuscles their concomitants. So when a dog sees a Partridge, he is naturally en­clined to run to it, and when he heares a piece go off, this noise incites him naturally to run away: yet neverthelesse, we ordinarily breed up spanni­els so, that the sight of a Partridge makes them couch, and the noise of a discharged piece makes them run to it. Now these things are profitable to know, to encourage every one to study the re­gulation of his Passions. For since with a little art the motions of the brain in beasts, who are void of reason, may be altered, it is evident they may more easily in men, and that even those who have the weakest Souls, may acquire a most absolute Empire over all their Passions, if art, and industry be used to mannage, and govern them.

The Passions of the Soul.
The second part. Of the number, and order of the Passi­ons, and explication of the six chief, or Primitive.

The 51th Article. What are the first causes of the Passions.

IT is knowne by what hath formerly been said, that the utmost, and neerest cause of the Passions of the Soul, is nothing but the agitation, by which the spirits move the little kernel in the middle of the braine. But this is not sufficient to distinguish them from one another: it is necessary therefore to seek after their originalls, and examine their first causes. NOw, although they may sometimes be caused by the Action of the Soul, which de­termines to conceive such or such objects: as al­so by the meere temper of the body, or by the impressions accidentally found in the brain as it oft befalls that a man feels himselfe sad, or merry, not knowing upon what occasion: it ap­pears [Page 46]neverthelesse by what hath been said, that the same may bee excited also by the objects which move the senses, and that these objects are their most oridinary, and principall causes: whence it followes, that to find them all out, it is sufficient to consider all the effects of these ob­jects.

The 52 Article. What is the use of them, and that they may be numbered.

FUrthermore, I observe, that the objects which move the senses, excite not divers Passions in us, by reason of so many diversities in them, but meerly because they may severall wayes hurt sor profit us, or else, in generall, be important to us; and that the use of all the Passions con­sists onely in this, that they dispose the Soul to will the things which Nature dictates are profit­able to us, and to persist in this will; as also the very agitation of the spirits, accustomed to cause them, dispose the body to the motions that fur­ther the execution of those things. Wherefore to calculate them, we are only to examine in order, after how many considerable manners our senses may be moved by their objects. And I will here make a generall muster of all the principall Pas­sions according to order, that so they may be found.

The order, and Numeration of the Passions.

The 53 Article. Admiration.

WHen the first encounter of any object sur­prizeth us, and we judge it to be new, or far different from what we knew before, or from what we supposed it should have been, we ad­mire it, and are astonished at it. And because this may fall out before we know at all whether this object be convenient or no, me thinkes ad­miration is the first of all the Passions. And it hath no contrary, because if the object presen­ted. Have nothing in it that surprizeth us, we are not a whit moved at it, and we consider it without Passions.

The 54 Article. Estimation, Contempt, Generosity, or Pride, and Humility, or Dejection.

TO Admiration is annexed Estimation or con­tempt according to the greatnesse, or small­nesse of the object we admire. So too, we may either esteem of, or contemne our selves, from whence come first the Passions, afterwards, the habits of Magnanimity, or Pride, and Humility, or Dejection.

The 55th Article. Vereration, and Disdaine.

BUt when we esteem or contemn other objects, which we consider as free causes, capable to doe either good or hurt, from Estimation comes Veneration, and from meere contempt Disdain.

The 56th Article. Love, and Hatred.

NOw; all the precedent Passions may be ex­cited in us, and we not any way perceive whether the object that causeth them is good or bad. But when a thing is represented to us as good in relation to us, that is, as being conve­nient for us, this breedes in us love to that: and when it is represented to us as evill or hurtfull, this excites hatred in us.

The 57th Article. Desire.

FRom the same consideration of good, and evill, arise all the Passions, but to ranke them in order, I distinguish of the time, and considering that they encline us more to look af­ter [Page 49]the future, than the present, or part, I be­gin with desire. For not onely than when a man desires to acquire a good which he yet hath not, or eschew an evill which he conceives may befall him; but when he desires onley the con­servation of a good, or the absence of an evil, which is as far as this Passion can extend it self, it is evident that it alwayes reflects upon the fu­ture.

The 58th Article. Hope, Fear, Jealousie, Security and Despaire.

IT is sufficient to thinke that the acquisition of a good, or the avoiding an evil is possible, to sbe incited to desire it: but when a man considers further, whether there be much or small proba­bility that he may obtaine what he desires, that which represents much, excites Hope in us, and that which represents small, excites fear: where­of Jealousie is one Sort. And when Hope is ex­treame it changes its nature, and is called Se­curity or Assurance; as on the contrary, extream fear becomes Despaire.

The 59th Article. Irresolution, Courage, Boldnesse, Co­wardice, Affright.

ANd we may hope, and fear, though the event we expect depends no wayes on us: but when it is represented to us as depending on us; there may be a staggering about the election of meanes, or the execution of them. From the first proceeds Irresolution, which disposeth us to debate, and take councell. This last, Courage or Boldnesse opposes, whereof Emulation is one sort. And Cowardice is contrary to Cour­rage, as Scaring, or Affright to Boldnesse.

The 60th Article. Remorse.

ANd if a man were resolved on any Action, before the Irresolution be taken off that breedes Remorse of conscience: which looks not on the time to come, as the other precedent Pas­sions, but the present, or past.

The 61 Article. Joy, and Sadnesse.

ANd the consideration of a present good ex­cites Joy in us, that of an evill, sadnesse, when it is a good or an evil, represented as be­longing to us.

The 62 Article. Derision, Envy, Pitty.

BUt when it is represented to us as belonging to other men, we may either esteem them wor­thy, or unworthy of them: and we esteeme them worthy, that excites in us no other Pas­sion but joy, seeing it is some good to us that we see things fall out as they should doe. There is only this difference in it; the joy which comes from good is serious: whereas that which pro­ceedes from evil is accompanied with laughing and derision. But if we esteeme them unworthy of it, the good excites Envy, the bad Pitty, which are sorts of Sadnesse. And it is to be noted that the same Passions which relate to goods or evills present, may also oftimes relate to that which are to come, forasmuch as the opinion a man hath, that they will come, represents them as present.

The 63th Article. Satisfaction of a mans selfe, and Repentance.

WE may also consider the cause of good or evill, aswell present as past. And the good which hath been done by us gives us, an inward satisfaction, which is the sweetest of all the Passions: whereas evil excites repentance, which is the bitterest.

The 64th Article. Good-will, and Gratitude.

BUt the good which hath beene by others, causeth us to bear Good-will to them, al­though it were not done to us: and if it be done to us, to Good-will, we adde Gratitude.

The 65th Article. Indignation, and Wrath.

IN the same manner, evil done by others, having no relation to us, breeds only in us Indignati­on against them: and when it relates to us, it moves wrath also.

The 66th Article. Glory, and Shame.

MOreover, the good which is, or hath been in us, in reference to the opinion, other men may have of it, excites glory in us: and the evil, shame.

The 67th Article. Distaste, Sorrow, and Lightheartednesse.

ANd sometimes the contiuance of a good causeth wearinesse, or Distaste whereas that of evill allayes Sorrow. Lastly, from good past, proceeds Discontent which is a sort of Sorrow; and from evil past, Lightheartednesse a sort of Joy.

The 68th Article. Wherefore this Numeration of the Passions, is different from that, commonly received.

THis is the order which seemes best to me for reckoning of the Passions. Wherein I know very well, I digresse from the opinion of all who have written before me: but I doe it not with­out great cause. For they deduce their Numera­tion [Page 54]thus: they distinguish in the sensitive parts of the soul two appetites, the one they call con­cupisscible, the other Irascible. And because I understand not any distinction of parts in the Soul, (as I said before) me thinkes it signifies nothing, unlesse that it hath two faculties, one to desire, another to be angry; and because it hath, in the same manner, faculties to admire, love, hope, fear, and also to admit into it every one of the other Passions, or to doe the Actions, whereunto these Passions impell them, I see not what they meant by attributing them all to De­sire, or Anger. Besides, their Catalogue com­prehends not all the principall Passions, as, I be­leeve, this doth. I speak here onely of the prin­cipall, because one might yet distinguish many more particular ones; and their number is in­definite.

The 69th Article. That there are but six primitive Passions.

BUt the number of those which are simple, and primitive is not very great; for doe but review all those I have cast up, and it may ea­sily be noted, that there are but six such, to wit, Admiration, Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, and Sad­nesse: and that all the other are compounded of some of these six, or are sorts of them. Where­fore, that the multitude of them might not per­plex the readers, I will here treat distinctly of the [Page 55]six primitive ones; and afterwards shew in what manner the rest derive their pedigree from them.

The 70th Article. Of Admiration. The definition, and cause of it.

ADmiration is a sudden surprize of the Soul, which causeth in her an inclination to consi­der with attention the objects which seem rare, and extraordinary to her; it is caused first by an impression in the brain, that represents the object, as rare and consequently, worthy to be seriously considered: after that, by the motion of the spirits, which are disposed by this impression to tend with might and main, towards that place of the brain where it is, to fortifie, and conserve it there; as also they are thereby disposed to passe from thence into the muscles, which serve to hold the organs of the senses in the same scituation they are, that it may be fomented by them, if it bee by them that it was formed.

The 71 Article. That there happens no alteration in the heart, nor in the blood in this Passion.

ANd this Passion hath this peculiar quality; it is observed not to be attended by any al­teration [Page 56]in the heart, and the blood, as the other Passions are; the reason whereof is, that having neither good nor evill for its object, but only the knowledge of the thing admired, it hath no re­lation to the heart, and blood, on which depend all the good of the body, but only with the brain, where dwell the organs of the senses sub­servient to this knowledge.

The 72th Article. Wherein consists the power of Admiration.

THis doth not hinder it from being exceeding powerfull, notwithstanding the surprize, that is, the sudden, and unexpected arrivall of the im­pression that alters the motion of the spirits: which surprize is proper, and peculiar to this Passion: so that it at any time it doe happen to any of the rest, as it usually does to all, and en­creaseth them, it is because Admiration is joyned with them; and the power of it consists in two things, to wit, the novelty, and for that the mo­tion which it causeth, from the very beginning hath its full strength; for it is certain, such a motive is more operative, then those which be­ing eak at first, and growing but by little, and little, may easily be diverted; also, it is certain that those objects of the senses which are new, touch the brain in certain parts, where it used not to be touched, and that these parts being [Page 57]more tender, or less firme then those that fre­quent agitation hath hardned, augments the o­peration of the motions which they excite there; which will not be deemed incredi­ble, if it bee considered, that is the like reason which causeth the soles of our feet, accusto­med to a pretty stubborn touch by the weight of the body they bear, but very little to feel this touch when we goe: whereas another far ligh­ter and softer (when they are tickled) is almost insupportable to us, onely because it is is not usuall.

The 73th Article. What Astonishment is.

ANd this surprize hath so much power, to cause the spirits in the cavities of the brain, to bend their course from thence to the place where the impression of the object admired is, that it sometimes drives them all thither, and finds them such work to conserve this impressi­on, that there are none which passe from thence into the muscles, nor yet so much as deviate any way from the first tracts they followed into the brain: this causes all the body to be unmovea­ble like a statue and that one can onely perceive the first represented face of the object, and con­sequently not acquire any further knowledge of it; it is thus when a man is said to be astonish­ted: [Page 58]for astonishment is an excesse of admiration, which can never be but evill.

The 74th Article. For what use the Passions serve, and what they are naught for.

NOw, it is easie to gather by what hath for­merly been said, that the utility of all the Passions consists only in this; that they fortifie, and conserve in the Soul those thoughts which are good for her, and which may else be easily obliterated; as also all the discommodity they can cause, consists in this, that they strengthen and maintain those thoughts more then is neces­sary: or fortifie, and conserve others, which ought not to be fixed there.

The 75th Article. What is the peculiar use of Admiration.

ANd it may be said peculiarly of Admiration, that it is as beneficiall, for causing us to ap­prehend, and keep in memory things whereof we were formerly ignorant; for we admire nothing but what seems rare, and extraordinary to us: and nothing can seem so to us, but because wee were ignorant of it, or else at least because it differs from those things we knew before: for it [Page 59]is this difference that makes it be called extraor­dinary. Now although a thing unknown to us represent it self newly to our understanding, or our senses, we do not therefore retain it in me­mery unlesse the Idaea we have of it be fortified in our brain by some Passion or other, or at least by application of our understanding, which our Wills determines to a peculiar attention and re­flexion. And the rest of the Passions may serve to make us observe things, as they seem either good or evill; but we admire onely those which seem rare: we see too, that those who have no naturall inclination to this Passion, are commonly very ig­norant.

The 76th Article. Wherein it is hurtfull, and how the want of it may be supplyed and the excesse corrected.

BUt it falls out oftner that a man admires too much, and is astonished, in perceiving things of little or no consideration, then too little, and this may either absolutely take away, or pervert the use of reason. Wherefore although it is good to be born, with some kind of inclination to this Passion, because it disposeth us to the acquisition of Sciences; yet we ought afterwards to endeavour as much as we can to be rid of it. For it is easie to sup­ply [Page 60]the want of of it by a peculiar reffection, and attention, whereunto our Will may alwayes ob­lige our understanding, when we conceive the thing represented is worth the labour. But there is no remedy to cure excessive admiration, but to acquire the knowledge of most things, and to be exercised in the consideration of all such as may seem to be most rare and strange.

The 77th Article. That they are neither the most stupid, nor the men of greatest parts who are most addicted to admiration.

FUrthermore, although none, unlesse block­headed, and stupid people, but are natu­rally addicted to Admiration, I do not say, that they who have the most wit, are alwayes most inclined to it, but chiefly those, who although they have a common sense good e­nough, have no great opinion of their suffici­ency.

The 78th Article. That the excesse of it may be translated to a habit, for want of correction.

ANd although this Passion seem to decrease by use because the more a man meets with rare things which he admires, the more he usually ceases to admire them, and thinks those which may be presented to him afterwards but common. Yet when it is excessive, and causeth the attention to be fixed onely on the first image of the objects represented, not acquiring any far­ther knowledge, it leaves behind it a habit, that disposeth the Soul to stop in the same manner, on all other objects which present themselves, provi­ded they appear never so little new. This pro­longs the disease of those who are blindly inqui­sitive, that is, who seek out rarities only to ad­mire them, and not to understand them, for by little and little they become so full of Admirati­on, that things of no consequence are as apt to puzzle them, as those whose scrutiny is commo­dious.

The 79th Article. The definitions of Love and hatred.

LOve is an emotion of the Soul, caused by the motion of the spirits, which incite it to joyn in will to the objects which seem convenient to her, and hatred is an emotion, cau­sed by the spirits which incite the soul, to will to be separated from objects represented, to be hurtfull to her, I say these emotions are caused by the Spirits to distinguish Love and Hatred which are Passions and depend of the body, as well from the judgements that encline the Soul to joyn in Will to the things she esteems good, and separate from those shee esteemes evill, as from the emotions which these Judgements alone excite in the Soul.

The 80th Article. What is meant by joyning or separa­ting in Will.

FUrthermore, by the word Will, I do not mean here Desire, which is a Passion apart, and relates to the future, that of the con­sent whereby he at that instant considers himself, as it were, joyned to what he loves: so that he imagineth a whole, whereof he thinks himself to be but one part, and the thing beloved another, [Page 63]as on the contrary, in Hatred he considers him­self alone as a Whole, absolutely separated from the thing whereunto he hath an aversion.

The 81 Article. Of the usuall distinction between the Love of Concupiscence and Benevolence.

IT is frequent to distinguish that there are two sorts of Love, one called Benevolence, that is to say, wishing well to what a man loves: the other Concupiscence, that is to say, which cau­feth to desire the thing beloved; but me thinks this distinction belongs to the effects onely, and not the essence of Love. For assoon as a man is joyned in Will to any object, of what nature so­ever it be, he hath a well wishing to it: that is to say, he also thereunto joynes in Willt, he things he believes convenient for it, which is one of the main effects of Love. And if he conceive it a good, to possesse it, or to be associated with him in any other manner than in Will: he desires it: which is also one of the most ordinary effects of Love.

The 82 Article. How different Passions concurre in this that they participate of Love.

NOr is it necessary to distinguish as many sorts of Love, as there are diversitie of objects which may be beloved. For ex­ample, although the Passions of the ambitious man for glory, the avaritious for money, the drunkard for wine, the bestiall for a woman he would violate, the man of honour for his friend, or mistris, and a good father for his children, be in themselves very different, yet, in that they par­ticipate of Love, they are alike, but the foure first beare a Love meerely for the possession of the objects where unto their Passion relates, and none at all to the objects themselves for which they have onely a desire, mingled with other particular Passions. Whereas the Love a good Father bears to his children is so pure, that he desires to have nothing of them, and would not possesse them any otherwise than he does, nor be joyned neerer to them than he is already: but considering them as other Selfes, he seekes out their good as he would his owne, or rather with more care, because, representing to himself that he and they make but one whole, whereof he is not the better part, he oftentimes prefers their interests before his own, and fears not his ruine [Page 65]to save them. The affections which men of ho­nour bear to their friends is of this very same nature, though it seldom be so perfect; and that they bear to their Mistresse participates much of, but it hath also a smatch of the other.

The 83th Article. Of the difference between bare Affection Friendship, and Devotion.

ME thinkes Love may more justly be di­stinguished by the esteeme a man makes of what he Loves in comparison of him­self. For when he vallues the object of his Love lesse then himself, he bears only a bare Af­fection to it: when he rates it equall with himself, it is called friendship; when more, that Passion may becalled Devotion. Thus a man may bear an Affection to a flow, a bird, a horse, but unlesse he have a brain greatly out of tune, he cannot have friendship but for men. And they are so far the object of this passion that there is no man so de­fective, but one may bear a perfect friendship to him, if one but thinke ones selfe beloved by him, and that one have a Soul truly noble, and generous: as shall accordingly be explained in the hundred fifty fourth, and hundred fifty sixt Article. As for Devotion, the principall object thereof is undoubledly the Soveraigne Divinity, whereunto a man cannot chuse but be devout. If he but understand it as he ought to doe. But a [Page 66]man may carry a Devotion to his Prince too, to his Country, to his City, and even to a particu­lar man, when he esteemes him much more than himselfe. Now, the difference betwixt these three sorts of Love, appears chiefly by their effects: for since in all of them a man considers himselfe as joyned and united to the thing beloved, he is ever ready to abandon the least part of all, which to conserve the other, he attones therewith. Ther­fore in bare Affection he alwayes prefers him­self before what he loves: & contrariwise in De­votion he so much prefers the thing before him­selfe, that he fears not to die for the conservation of it. Whereof we have seen frequent examples, in those who have exposed themselves to a certain death for the defence of their Prince, or their City, and sometimes too, of particular Persons to whom they have been devoted.

The 84th Article. That there are not so many sorts of Hatred as Love.

FUrthermore, although Hate be directly op­posite to Love, yet it is not distinguished in­to so many sorts because a man observes not so much the difference between the evils a man is seperated from in Will, as he does betwixt the goods whereunto he is joyned.

The 85 Article. Of Liking, and Horrour.

ANd I find only one considerable distinction, alike in each. It consists in this, that the objects as well of Love, as Hatred, may be re­presented to the Soul by the exteriour senses, or else by the interiour, and ones own reason. For we commonly call that good or evil, which our interiour senses our reason make us judge conve­nient for, or contrary to our nature; but we call that handsome or ugly, which is so represented to us by our exteriour senses, chiefly by the sight, which alone is more considered then all the rest. From whence arise two sorts of Love; that which a man beares to good things, and that he bears to handsome things, whereunto we may give the name of Liking, that we may not confound it with the other, nor yet with Desire, where­unto the name of Love is often attributed. And from hence spring, in the same manner, two sorrs of Hatred, one whereof relates to things evil, the other to ugly: and this last, for di­stinction sake, may be called Horrour, or Aver­sion. But the most observable thing herein, is that these Passions of liking, and Horrour are usually more violent then the other kindes of Love, and Hatred, because that which comes to the Soul by the senses, touches her more to the [Page 68]quicke, then what is represented by her reason; and yet most commonly they have lesse truth. So that of all the Passions, these are the greatest cheaters, whom a man ought most carefully to beware of.

The 86th Article. The Definition of Desire.

THe Passion of Desire is an agitation of the Soul caused by the spirits, which disposeth it to Will hereafter the things that she represents unto her selfe convenient. So a man not onely desires the presence of an absent good, but the canservation of a present: and moreover, the ab­sence of an evil, as well of that he now endures, as that which he beleeves may befall him here­after.

The 87th Article. That it is a Passion which hath no Contrary.

I Know very well that in the Schools, that Passion which tends to the seeking after good, which onely is called Desire, is op­posed to that which tends to the avoiding of evil, which is called Aversion but Secing there is no good, the privation; whereof is not an evil, nor any evil taken in the notion of a positive thing, the privation whereof is not good: for example, that in seeking after riches, a man necessarily es­chewes [Page 69]poverty; in avoiding diseases, he seekes after health; and so of the rest. Me thinkes, it is still the same motion which enclines to the seeking after good, and withall, to the avoyding evil, which is contrary to it, I onely observe this difference, that the desire he hath, when he tends towards some good, is accompanied with Love, and afterwards with Hope, and Joy: whereas the same Desire, when he tends to the avoyding an evil coutrary to this good, is attended with Hatred, Fear, and Sorrow: which is the rea­son why it is conceived contrary to it self. But if it be considered when it relates equally at the same time to a good sought after, and an op­posite evill to shunne it, it may be cleerly per­ceived but one Passion onely which causeth both the one and the other.

The 88th Article. What are the severall kinds of it.

IT were more fit to distinguish Desire into as many severall sorts, as there are severall ob­jects sought after, for example, Curiosity, which is nothing but a Desire to know, differs much from the Desire of glory, and this from the Desire of revenge, and so of the rest. But it is enough here to know, that there are as many sorts of it, as of Love, or Hatred and that the most considerable and strongest desires, are those which are derived from Liking, and Loathing.

The 89th Article. What is the Desire arising from Horrours.

NOW, although it be but one selfe-same De­sire which tends to the seeking after good, and avoyding its contrary, evill, as hath been said already; yet the Desire springing from Li­king, ceases not to be very different from that which ariseth from Horrour, for this Liking and this Horrour, which are in truth, two contraries, are not the good, and the evill which serve for objects to these Desires, but only two serve for objects to these Desires, but only two emotions of the Soul, which dispose it to seek after two very different things. Horrour is instituted by nature to represent a sudden and unexpe­cted death to the Soul; so that if it be some­times no more but the touch of a little worme, the noise of a shaking leafe, or ones own shadow that causeth Horrour, a man immediatly feeles as great an emotion, as if a most evident danger of death were laid before his eyes; this causeth a sudden agitation, which enclines the Soul to em­ploy all her strength to shun an evill, if present; and it is this kind of Desire which is commonly called flight or Aversion.

The 90th Article. What is that arising from Liking.

ON the contrary, Liking is peculiarly insti­tuted by nature to represent the enjoy­ment of what is liked, as the greatest good be­longing to man: which causeth a man very ear­nestly to desire this enjoyment; it is true, there are severall sorts of Liking, and the Desires which arise from them are not all alike power­full; for example, the lovelinesse of flowers in­cite us only to look on them, and that of fruits to eat them; but the chiefe is that which pro­ceeds from the perfections a man imagines in another person, which he thinkes may become another Selfe: for with the distinction of sexes, which nature hath bestowed on man as well as irrationall creatures, she hath also put certain impressions in the brain, which makes a man at a certain age, and at a certain season to look on himself as defective, and as if he were but the halfe of a Whole, whereof a person of the other sex ought to bee the other halfe: so that the acquisition of this halfe is repre­sented to us confusedly by nature, as the greatest of all imaginable goods; and although he see many persors of the other sex, he doth not therefore Desire many at the same time, by rea­son nature makes him conceive that he hath need of no more but one halfe, but when hee [Page 72]observes something in any one, that likes him better then any thing he hath marked at the same time in the rest; that fixes the Soul, to feed all the inclination which nature hath given him to seek after the good, that she represents to him as the greatest hee can possibly possesse on that woman only; and this inclination, or this De­sire which is bred thus by Liking, is called by the name of Love, more commonly then the Passion of Love formerly described; indeed it hath much more strange effects, and this is he that furnisheth all the Writers of Romances, and Poets with stuffe.

The 91 Article. The definition of Joy.

Ioy is a pleasing emotion of the Soul, wherein consists her enjoyment of good, that the im­pressions of the brain represent unto her as her own. I say, in this emotion consists the enjoy­ment of good: for, in truth the Soul receives no other fruit of all the good shee possesses: and when there is no Joy in her, a man may say shee enjoyes it no more then if shee had not any. I also adde, it is of that good which the impressi­ons of the brain represent to her as her own, that I may not confound this Joy, which is a Passi­on, with that Joy purely intellectuall, which comes into the Soul by the sole action of the [Page 73]Soul, and which may be called a pleasing emoti­on in her, excited by her selfe, wherein consists her enjoyment of good, which her understanding represents to her as her own; it is true, while the Soul is joyned to the body, this intellectuall Joy, can hardly be rid of the company of that which is a Passion; for as soon as ever our understand­ing perceives that we possesse any good, although this good may be so farre different from all that belongs to the body, that it be not imaginable, yet will not the Imagination forbear to make immediatly some impression in the brain, where­upon ensue the motion of the spirits which ex­cite the Passion of Joy.

The 92 Article. The Definition of Sadnesse.

SAdnesse is a displeasant languishing, wherein consists the discommodity the Soul receives from evill, or defect, which the impressions of the brain represent unto her, as belonging to her; and there is also an intellectuall Sadnesse, which is not the Passion, but which wants but little of being accompanied by it.

The 93 Article. What are the causes of these two Passions.

NOW, when the intellectuall Joy, or Sadnesse so excites that which is a Passion, their cause is evident enough; and one may see by their de­fintions, that Joy comes from the opinion a man hath that he possesses some good, and Sad­nesse from the opinion of some evill, or defect; but it oft falls out, that a man is Sad, or joyfull, and yet he cannot distinctly observe the good or evill which are the causes of it: to wit, when this good, or this evill make their impressions in the brain without the intercourse of the Soul, sometimes because they belong only to the body, and sometimes too; although they belong to the Soul, because shee considers them not as good or evill, but under some other notion the impression whereof is joyned in the brain with that of good, and evill.

The 94th Article. How the Passions are excited by Goods, and e­vills which only respect the budy: and where­in consists tick ling, and pain.

SO, when a man is in sound health, and the weather is fairer then ordinary, hee feels a lightsomnesse in himselfe, which proceeds not [Page 75]from any function of the understanding, but only from the impressions which the motion of the spirits makes in the brains; and he feels himselfe sad likewise, when his body is indisposed, although he know not that it is. Thus, the tickling of the senses is so closely followed by Joy, and pain by sadness, that most men cannot distinguish them, yet they differ so farre, that a man may somtimes suffer pains with Joy, and receive ticklings that displease: but the cause why Joy commonly fol­lows tickling is, because all that is called tickling or a pleasing touch, consists in this, that the objects of the senses excite some morions in the nerves, which would be apt to hurt them if they had not strength enough to resist it, or the body were not well disposed; which makes an impression in the brain, which being instituted by nature to signi­fie this good disposition, and this strength, repre­sents it to the Soul as a good belonging to her, seeing she is united to the Body, and so excites Joy in her, the cause is almost the same why a man naturally takes delight to feel himself mo­ved to all sorts of Passions, yea, even Sadness,\ and Hatred, when these Passions are caused only by strange adventures, which he sees personated on a stage, or by such like occasions, which not being capable to trouble us any way, seem to tickle the Soul by touching it. And the reason why pain usually produces Sadness, is because that feeling which is called pain, proceeds al­wayes from some action, so violent that it [Page 76]offends the nerves: so that being instituted by na­ture to signifie to the Soul the dammage the bo­dy receives by this action, and its weaknesse-in not being able to resist it, it represents each of them to him, as evils alwayes displeasing, unlesse then when they cause some good things, which she esteems of more than them.

The 95th Article. How they may also be excited by goods, ande­vils which the Soul observes not, though they belong to her, as the delight a man takes to run into a danger. or remember an evil past.

SO the delight which oft-times young men take to undertake difficult things, and ex­pose themselves to great perills, though they do not so much as look for any profit or honour thereby, comes from hence; the conceit they have that they undertake a difficult thing makes an impression in the brain, which being joyned to that which they may make, if they thought it a good thing to be couragious, fortunate, active or strong enough to dare to hazzard so farre, is the reason that they take delight in it, and the content which old men take, when they remem­ber the miseries they suffered, proceeds from hence: they imagine to themselves it is a good thing that they could subsist in spight of them.

The 96th Article. What are the motions of the blood, and spirits, that cause the five preceding Passions.

THe five Passions which I have here begun to explain are so joyned, or opposed to one another, that it is easier to consider them all together, then to treat distinctly of each, as I handled Admiration: and their cause is not like that, in the braine onely, but also in the Heart, Spleen, Liver, and all other parts of the body, in as much as they serve to the producti­on of the blood, and afterwards of the Spirits. For although all the veins convey the blood they contain, into the heart, yet it sometimes falls out, that the blood of some of them is driven with a stronger force than the rest, and it happens also that the overtures through which it enters into he heart, or those through which it goes out, are more dilated or contracted one time than ano­ther.

The 97th Article. The principall experiments conducing to the knowledge of these motions, in Love.

NOW considering the sundry alterations that experience lets us see in our bodies while our Soul is agitated with divers Passions, I observe in Love when it is alone, that is, when it is not ac­companied with any extream Ioy, desire, or Sad­nes, that the beating of the pulse is even, & much greater and stronger than ordinary; that a man feels a gentle heart in his breast, and quick di­gestion ofmeat; so that this Passion is profitable for the health.

The 98 Article. In Hatred.

ON the contrary, I observe in Hatred, that the pulse is uneven, weaker, and of­tentimes faster, that a man feels colds intermingled with (I know not what) sharp and pricking heat in the breast that the stomack cea­ses to do its office, is enclined to vomit, and re­ject the meats he hath caten, or at least corrupt them, and convert them into ill humours.

The 99th Artick. In Joy.

IN Joy, that the pulse is even and quicker than ordinary, but not so strong, nor so great as in Love, and that a man feels a pleasant heat, which is not onely in the breast, but spreads its self o­ver all the exteriour parts of the body, with the blood, which is seen to flow abundantly thither: and the mean while he sometimes loses his ap­petite, because the digestion is lesse than u­suall.

The 100th Article. In Sadnesse.

IN Sadnesse, that the pulse is weak and slow, and that a man feels, as it were, strings about his heart, which bind it close, and Icycles that freez it, and communicate their cold to the rest of the body: yet in the mean while he hath some­times a good appetite, and feels his stomack not failing of its duty, provided there be no Hatred mingled with the Sadnesse.

The 101 Article. In Desire.

LAstly, I observe this peculiar in Desire, that it agitates the heart more violently than any of the other Passions, and furnishes the brain with more spirits; which passing from thence into the muscles, make all the senses quicker, and all parts of the body more agile.

The 102 Article. The motion of the blood, and spirits In Love.

THese observations, and many more too long to insert, gave me occasion to conceive, that when the understanding represents to it self any object of Love, the impression which this thought makes in the brain, conveyes the animal spirits through the nerves of the sixth paire; to the muscles about the intestines, and the stomack, in the manner requisite to make the juice of meats, which convert into new blood, passe suddenly to the heart, without any demurre in the Liver, and which being driven thither with greater force than that which is in the rest of the body, it gets in thither in more abundance, and excites a stronger heat, by reason it is thicker than that which already hath been often rarified by passing and repassing through the heart, which also cau­seth [Page 81]it to send spirits to the brain, whose parts are grosser, and more agitated than ordinary: and these spirits fortifying the impression, that the first thought of the object beloved, stuck there, bind the Soul to fix upon the thought; and herein consists the Passion of Love.

The 103 Article. In Hatred.

CContrarywise, in Hatred the first thought of the object that breeds aversion so con­veyes the spirits in the brain to the muscles of the stomack, and intestines, that they hinder the juyce of meats, from mixing with the blood, by contracting up all the passages through which it is used to runne, and so conveyes it to the small nerves of the spleen and the lower part of the Liver, where the receptacle of choler is, that those parts of the blood which use to be cast out to those places, get out, and runne with that in the branches of the hollow vein, to the heart, which causeth much inequality in the heat of it, seeing the blood that comes from the spleen is not heated nor rarified, but with much difficul­ty; and on the other side that which comes from the lower part of the Liver, where the gall is in­flamed and dilated suddenly, by which conse­quence spirits that go to the brain, have parts ve­ry unequall, and motions very unusuall: from [Page 82]whence it comes, that they there fortifie the Id'aea of Hatred already imprinted and encline the souls to thoughts full of rancour and bitternesse.

The 104th Article. In Joy.

IN Joy, not onely the nerves of the spleen, Li­ver, stomack or intestines act, but those in the rest of the body; and particularly that about the Orifices of the heart, which opening and di­lating these Orifices, enables the blood which the rest of the nerves have driven from the veins to the heart, to get in there, and issue forth in greater quantity then ordinary: and because the blood which then gets into the heart hath often passed and repassed through it, coming from the arteries into the veines; it easily dilates, and produces spirits, whose parts being very equall, and subtle, are fit to form, and fortifie the im­pressions of the brain, which deal lively, and qui­et thoughts to the Soul.

The 105th Article. In Sadnesse.

COntrariwise, in Sadnesse the Orifices of the heart are hugely straitened by the small nerve that environs them, and the blood of the veins is no whit agitated: which causeth but very little to go to the heart, and in the mean while the passages through which the juyce of meats glides from the stomack, and entrailes to the Liver, are open, wherefore the appetite di­minisheth not, unlesse Hatred, which is an or­dinary companion of Sadnesse, close them.

The 106th Article. In Desire.

LAstly, the Passion of Desire hath the peculiar property, that the Will a man hath to attain any good or avoid any evill, sends the Spirits of the brain immediately to all the parts of the body, that may serve any wayes to actions requisire to that purpose; and par­ticularly to the heart, and those parts which sup­ply it with blood most; that receiving it in greater abundance than ordinary, it sends a great num­ber of spirits to the brain, as well to maintain and fortifie the Idaea of this Will as to passe from [Page 84]thence into all the organs of the senses, and all the muscles which may be set on work, to attaine what one desires.

The 107th Article. What is the cause of these motions in Love.

ANd I deduce the reason of all this, from what hath formerly been said, that there is such a tye betwixt our soul and body, that when we have joyned any corporall Action with any thought, one of them never presents if selfe to us afterwards, without the other. As may be seen in such, who with much aversnesse, when they have been sick, have taken some drink; they can neither eat nor drink afterwards but they have the same aversion: nay further, they cannot think of their a version to medecines, but the very same taste comes into their thought. For, met thinks, the first passions our soul admitted when she was first joyned to our Body, came from hence, that sometimes the blood; or some other juyce which got into the heart, was an alimony more convenient than ordinary, to maintain heat there, which is the principle of life: this caused the Soul to joyne in will to this alimony, that is, to love it: and at the same time the spirits trickled from the braine into the muscles, which might presse or agitate the parts, from whence it came to the heart, that they [Page 85]might send more of it thither: and these parts were the Stomack, and entrailes, whose agira­tion augments the appetite, or else the liver, and lungs which the muscles of the Diaphragma may presse. Wherefore the same motion of the spirits ever since accompanies the passion of Love.

The 108 Article. In Hatred.

SOmetimes, on the contrary, some strange juyce came to the heart, which was not good to cherish the heat of it, or which else might ex­tinguish it: wherefore the spirits which ascended from the heart to the braine, excited in the Soul the passion of Hatred. And at the same time also, these spirits went from the braine to the nerves which might drive the blood from the spleene, and the small veines of the liver, to the heart to hinder this noxious juyce from getting in; and more, to those which might repell this juyce to the intrailes, and the stomack, or else, sometimes to make the Stomack disgorge it. From whence it comes, that the same motions are used to accompany the Passion of Hatred. And in the liver one may discern by the eye, that there are inthe liver an abundance of veines, or pipes, indifferent broad, through which the juyce of meates may passe from the Port-veine into the hollow-veine, and from thence to the heart, without stopping any whit at the liver, [Page 86]but that there are also an infinite number of lesser ones where it may stop, which alwayes contain a reserve of blood, as the spleene doth too; which blood being thicker then that which is in the other parts of the Body, may better serve for nutriment to the fire in the heart, when the Stomck and entrailes lack wherewithall to sup­ply them.

The 109th Article. In Joy.

IT hath also come to passe at the beginning of our life, that the blood contained in the veines was an Alimony sufficiently convenient to main­tain the heat of the heart, and they contained so great an abundance of it, that there was no need to exhaust nutriment elsewhere. This hath excited in the Soul the Passion of Joy: and at the same time hath caused the Orifices of the heart to be more open then ordinary; and that the spirits trickling abundantly from the braine, not onely into the nerves which serve to open these Orifices, but also universally into all the rest which drive the blood of the veines to the heart, hinder any from coming a fresh from the the liver, splcen, intrailes, and Stomack. Where­fore these very same motions accompany Joy.

The 110th Article. In Sadnesse.

SOmetimes, on the contrary, it hath happened that the body hath wanted nutriment, and this hath made the Soul feel her first Sadnesse, at least that which hath not been joyned with Hatred. this very thing hath also caused the Ori­fices of the heart to be contracted, because they received but little blood: and that a good quan­tity of this blood came from the spleen, by rea­son that is as the last reserve which serves to sup­ply the heart, when there comes none to it from any where else. Wherefore the same motions of the spirits, and nerves, which so serve to con­tract the Orifices of the heart, and to convey the blood thither from the the spleen, alwayes a c­ompany Sadnesse.

The 111th Article. In Disire.

LAstly, all the originall Desires which the Soul might have, when it was newly joyn­ed to the body, were, to admit things convenient for her, and repell hurtfull. and it was for the same purpose, that, from that instant, the spi­rits began to move all the muscles, and all the [Page 88]organs of the senses, in all manners that they could move. Which is the reason that now, when the Soul desires any thing, the whole body becomes more active, and disposed to move, than usually wichout it, and then it fals out, on the other side that the Body is so disposed, then are the Desires of the Soul more strong, and vehement.

The 112 Article. What are the exteriour signes of these Passions.

WHat I have laid down here, makes the differences of the pulse, and all the other properties which I have here before attributed to these passions, be fufficiently understood, so that I need not stand any further to explaine them. But because I have onely observed in each, what may be remarkable, onely when it is single; and what shewes to know the motions of the blood, and spirits that produce them, it yet remaines that I should treat on divers exteriour signes, which usually accompany them, and which may be better noted when many of them are mixed together, as ordinarily they are, than when they are distinct. The chief of these signes are the gestures of the eyes and face, changes of colour, tremblings, languishing, swouning, laughter, tears groanes, and sighes.

The 113th Article. Of the gestures of the eyes, and face.

THere is no Passion, but some particular gesture of the eyes declare it: and it is so palpable in some, that even the stupidst serving-men by the eye of their master, observe whether he be an­gry with them, or not. But though a man may easily perceive these gestures of the eyes, and know what they signifie, yet it is not an easie matter to describe them, because every one of them is composed of severall alterations, which hap­pen in the motion, and figure of the eye, which are so peculiar, and so small, that each of them cannot be discerned distinctly, though the result of their conjunction be easily marked. The same thing almost, may be said of the gestures of the face, which thus accompany the Passions: for though they be greater then those of the eyes, yet it is difficult to distinguish them; & they so little differ, that there are men almost of the same a­spect when they weep as others when they laugh. It is true, there are some very remarkable; as the wrinkling of the forehead in wrath, and certain motions of the nose, and lips in indignation, and derision: but they seem rather to be volunta­ry then naturall. And generally, all the gestures as well of the face as eyes, may be altered by the Soul, when being willing to conceal her [Page 90]Passion, she strongly imagines one contrary to it: so that they may serve as well counterfeit, as declare Passions.

The 114th Article. Of changing Colour.

A Man cannot so easily refrain from blushing or looking pale, when any Passion disposseth him thereunto: because these changings depend not on the nerves, and muscles, as the former, and because they come more immediately from the heart, which may be called the source of the Passions, seeing it prepares the blood, and spirits to produce them. Now it is certain that the colour of the face comes from nought but the blood, which flowing continually from the heart, through the arteries into all the veines, and from all the veines into the heart, colours the face more or lesse, according as it more or lesse fills the little veines towards the superficies thereof.

The 115th Article. How Joy causes blushing.

SO Joy renders the colour livelyer, and more Vermillion, because by opening the sluces of the heart, it makes the blood flow quicker in all the veines; and becomming hotter, and more subtile, it moderately raiseth up all parts of the face, which makes the aspect of it more smiling, and brisk.

The 116th Article. How Sadnesse makes one look pale.

ON the contrary, Sadness, by contracting the Orifices of the heart, makes the blood flow more slowly into the veins, and that becomming colder and thicker, hath not need of so much room: so that retreating into the largest, which are neerest the heart, it deserts the remotest: the most apparent whereof being those of the face, that makes it look pale and wanne: especially when the Sadness is great, or comes upon one sud­denly, as is seen in Affrights, whose surprizalls augment the action that obstructs the heart.

The 117th Article. How a man looks red oft-times when he is Sad.

BUt it oft-times befalls, that a man does not wax pale when he is Sad, but contrarily be­comes red; this ought to be atributed to other Passions joyned to sadness, to wit, Love, Desire, and sometimes, even Hatred too; for these passi­ons, heating, or agitating the blood which comes from the liver, entrailes, and the rest of the inte­riour parts, drive it to the heart, and from thence through the great Artery to the veines of the face, the Sadness which obstructs the Orifices of the heart on each side not being able to hinder it, un­less when it is mighty excessive; but when it is only moderate, it easily hinders the blood so come into the veines of the face from descending into the heart, while Love, Desire, or Hatred drive other thither from the interiour parts. Where­fore, this blood being setled about the face, makes it look red; and indeed, redder then in Joy, because the colour of the blood appears so much the better, as it flowes quicker, and also because more blood can then get up into the veins of the face, then when the Orifices of the heart are more open; This is more palpable in shame, which is compounded of self-Love, and an ear­nest Desire to shunne present infamy: which [Page 93]causeth the blood to come from the interiour parts to the heart; from thence through the ar­teries into the face: and withall, of a moderate Sadness, which hinders this blood from returning to the heart. The same is also seen ordinarily when a man weeps: for, as I shall say hereafter, it is Love joyned to Sadness, which, for the most part causes tears; it appears also in Anger, or oft-times an eager Desire of Revenge mixed with Love, Hatred, and Sadness.

The 118th Article. Of Tremblings.

TRemblings have two severall causes: one is, that there come sometimes too few spirits from the brain into the nerves; the other, that there come sometimes too many, so that the lit­tle passages of the muscles cannot be duly shut, which as hath been said in the eleventh Article, ought to be shut to determine the motion of the members; the chiefe cause of it appears to be in Sadness, and fearfulness; as also when a man shakes with cold; for these Passions, as well as the cold of the aire, may so thicken the blood, that it may not furnish the brain with spirits enough, to send any into the nerves; the other cause appears often in those who ardently desire any thing, and in those who are moved with wrath, as also in those who are drunk, for these [Page 94]two Passions, as well as Wine, sometimes make so many spirits go into the brain, that they can­not regularly be conveyed from thence into the muscles.

The 119th Article. Of Languishing.

LAnguishing is a disposition to ease ones selfe, and be without motion, which is felt in all the members: it comes, as trembling, because there are not spirits enough in the nerves; but in a different manner; for the cause of trembling is, that there are not enough in the brain, to obey the determinations of the kernell, when that drives them to any muscle: whereas Languish­ing proceeds from hence, that the kernell doth not determine them to goe to some muscles, ra­then others.

The 120th Article. How it is caused by Love, and by Desire.

ANd the Passion which most commonly cau­seth this effect is Love; joyned to the Desire of a thing the acquisition whereof is not imagi­ned possible for the present time for love so busies the Soul in considering the object beloved, that it employes all the spirits which are in the brain to [Page 95]represent the image of it to her, and stops all the motions of the kernell not subservient to this purpose. And it is to be noted concerning De­sire, that the property which I ahve attributed to it, of rendring the body more active, agrees not to it, but when a man imagines the object desi­red to be such, that he may from that very time doe something which may serve to acquire it. For if, on the other side, he imagines it is impossi­ble for him at that time to doe any thing that may conduce thereunto, all the agitation of De­sire remaines in the brain not at all passing into the nerves; and being wholly employed in forti­fying the Idea of the object desired there, leaves the rest of the body languishing.

The 121 Article. That it may also be caused by other Passions.

ITis true, that Hatred, Sadness, yes, and Joy too, may cause some kind of Languishing too, when they are very violent: because they wholly busie the Soul in considering their objects chiefly, when the Desire of a thing to the acquisition whereof a man cannot contribute any thing for the present, is joyned with them. But because hee fixes more on the consideration of the objects which he hath joyned in Will to himself, than those which he hath separated, or any else: and because Languishing depends not [Page 96]on a surprize, but requires some time to be for­med, it is more frequently found in Love, than any other Passion.

The 122 Article. Of Swouning.

THere is not much difference betwixt Swoun­ning, and Death, for a man dies when the fire in his heart is utterly extinguished; and he falls in a Swoune only when it is smothered, so that there remains only some residue of heat, that may afterwards be kindled again. Now, there are divers indispositions of the body, which may make a man fall to fainting, thus: but among the Passions, none but extream joy is observed to have this power; and the manner, whereby, I suppose it works its effect is thus: opening ex­traordinarily the Orifices of the heart, the blood of the veines doth so huddle in, and in so abun­dant a quantity, that it cannot there be rarified by the heat soon enough to lift up the little skins, that shut the entries of those veines; by which means it smothers the fire, which it used to feed, when it came into the heart in fit pro­portion.

The 123 Article. Wherefore a man doth not swoun with Sadnesse.

ONe would think that a great Sadness unex­pectedly falling, might so shut the Orifices of the heart, that it might extinguish the fire: but yet that is not observed to happen, or if it doe very rarely: the reason whereof, I believe, is, that there can scarce be so little blood in the heart, but that it is sufficient to maintain the heat, when the Orifices thereof are almost lockt up.

The 124th Article. Of Laughter.

LAughter consists in this, that the blood which comes from the right cavity of the heart by the arterious veine, blowing up the lungs sud­denly, and at severall fits, constrains the aire they contain to break out impetuously through the gullet, where it formes an inarticulate, and clat­tering sound: and as well the lungs by their blowing, and this aire by breaking forth, shove all the muscles of the Diaphragma, breast, and throat: by which means they cause those of the face, which have some connexion with them, to [Page 98]move; and it is only this gesture of the face, with this inarticulate, and clattering voyce, that is called Laughter.

The 125th Article. Wherefore it doth not accompany the greatest joyes.

NOw, though laughter may seem to be one of the chiefe signes of Joy, yet this cannot cause that, but only when that is mean, and that there be some little Admiration or Hatred mixed with it; for it is found by experience, that when a man is extraordinary Joyfull, the occasion of this Joy never makes him break out into Laughter: and besides, he can never be so easily invited to it, as when hee is Sad; the reason whereof is, that in the greatest Joyes the lungs are continually so full of blood, that they can­not be blown up any more by fits.

The 126th Article. What are the chiefe causes of it.

ANd I can mark but two causes, which blow up the lungs thus suddenly; the first is a sur­prizal of Admiration, which being joyned to Joy may so quickly open the Orifices of the heart, that a great abundance of blood, getting in all together at the right side of it through the hollow [Page 99]veine, is rarified there, and passing from thence through the arterious veine, blows up the lungs; the other is the mixture of some liquour, that augments the rarefaction of the blood; and I find none fit for that purpose but the wheyest part of that which comes from the Spleen, which part of the blood being driven to the heart, by some light emotion of Hatred, assisted by a surprize of Admiration, and mixing there with the blood which comes from the other parts of the body, which Joy causes to enter in thither abundantly, may cause this blood to dilate much more then usual; as we see many hquours swell up over the fire, if one fling but a little vinegar into the vessel where they are; for the wheyest part of the blood which comes from the spleene; is of a nature like vinegar. Experience also shews us, that in all ren­counters producing this lowd Laughter which-comes from the lungs, there is still some little oc­casion of Hatred, or at least of Admiration, and those whose spleens are not sound, are subject not only to be more sad, but by intervalls more mer­ry, and disposed to laughter then others; foras­much as the spleene sends two sorts of blood to the heart, one, thick and grosse, which causeth Sadnesse, the other, exceeding fluid and sub­tile, which causeth Joy. And oft-times, after much Laughter a man feeles himselfe natural­ly enclined to sadnesse, because the most fluid part of the blood of the spleene being exhau­sted, the grosser followes it to the heart.

The 127th Article. What is the cause thereof in Indignation.

FOr that kinde of Laughter which sometimes accompanies, Indignation, it is usually arti­ficiall, and seigned. But when it is naturall, it seemes to come from the Joy a man hath, to see he cannot be hurt by the evil whereat he is offended, and withall that he finds him­selfe surprized by the novelty, or the unexpected encounter of this evil. So that Joy, Hatred, and Admiration contribute to it. Yet I will sup­pose that it may be produced without any Joy, by the meer motion of Adversion, which sends the blood from the spleen to the heart, where it is rarified, and thrust from thence into the lungs, which it easily blowes up when it findes them empty. And generally, whatsoever suddenly blowes up the lungs in this manner, causeth the exteriour Action of Laughter: except when Sadnesse alters it into groanes, and shrickes, that accompany tears. Vives 3 de Anima, cap: de Risu. Writes of himselfe (which is very per­tinent to this) that when he had been a long time fasting, the first bits he put in his mouth made him laugh: which might come from hence; his lungs empty of blood for want of nutriment, was suddenly blowne up by the first juyce that passed from his Stomack to his heart: [Page 101]or else the meer imagination of eating might convey it thither, even before that of the meat might get thither.

The 128. Article. Of the Originall of Teares.

AS Laughter is never caused by the greatest Joyes, so Tears proceed not from an extream Sadnesse, but an indifferent one, and that ac­companied with, or followed by some resent­ment of Love, or also of joy. And to under­stand their originall well, it must be noted, that although abundance of vapours continually issue forth from all parts of our Body, yet there is none from whence there come so much as from the eyes, by reason of the greatnesse of the optick neerves, and the multitude of little arteries through which they come: and that as sweat is made of the vapours, which issuing our of the other parts convert into water on the su­perficies of them, so teares are made of vapours issuing from the eyes.

The 129. Article. Of the manner how vapours turn into water.

NOw as I have written in the Meteors, ex­plaining after what manner the vapours of the aire convert into rain, that is proceeds from their being lesse agitated, or more abundant than ordinary: so, I beleeve, that when those that issue from the Body are farre lesse agitated then usually, although they are not so abundant, yet they may convert to water: which causeth the cold sweats, that sometimes proceed of weaknesse, when a man is sick. And I beleeve that when they are more abundant, provided they be not withall more agitated, they also convert into water, this causeth sweat when one useth exercise. But then the eyes sweat not, be­cause while the Body is exerecised, the greatest parts of the spirits going into the muscles which serve to move it, there go lesse through the op­tick nerve to the eyes. And it is but the same matter which compounds the blood in the veins, or arteries: and the spirits, when it is in the brain, nerves, or muscles: and vapours when it issues out in the likenesse of aire. And lastly, sweat, tears when it thickens into water on the superficies of the Body or the eyes.

The 130. Article. How that which hurts the eye, excites it to weep.

ANd I can see but two causes that make the vapours issuing from the eyes to change into teares. The first is, when the figure of the pores, through which they passe, is changed by any accident whatsoever; for that, retarding the motion of these vapours, and altering their order, may cause them to convert into water. So, there needs only a straw in the eye, to draw out some teares: by reason that exciting paine in it, it altars the disposition of the pores; so that some becoming more narrow, the small parts of the vapours passe lesse quickly through it; and whereas formerly they issued out equally distant the one from the other, and so were separated, They come to meet because the order of these pores is molested, by which meanes they joyn together, and so convertinto teares.

The 131. Article. How one weepes for Sadnesse.

THe other cause is Sadnesse, followed by Love, or Joy, or generally by any cause, which makes the heart thrust much blood into the arte­ries [Page 104]Sadnesse is requisite thereunto because, ma­king the blood cold, it contracts the pores of the eyes. But because, according as it contracts them, it also decreases the quantity of vapours, whereunto they should allow passage, that is not yet sufficient to produce tears, unlesse the quantity of vapours be at the same time aug­mented by some other cause. And there is no­thing that encreaseth it more, then the blood sent from the heart in the Passion of Love. We see also, that they who are sad, do not continually shed tears, but onely by intervalls, when they make any new reflexion on the objects they affect.

The 132. Article. Of the groanes which accompany tears.

ANd then, sometimes, the lungs two are blown up all at once by the abundance of blood which gets into them, and drives away the aire they contained, which breaking forth through the gullet, begets groanes and cryes which usu­ally accompany tears. And these cries are com­monly more sharp than those which accom­pany Laughter, though they be produced almost in the same manner: the reason whereof is, that the nerves which serve to enlarge or contract the organs of the voice to make it stronger or sharper, being joyned to those which open the [Page 105]Orifices of the heart in Joy, and contract them in Sadnesse, cause these organs to be dilated or contracted at the same time.

The 133. Article. Wherefore children, and old men are aptest to Weep.

CHildren, and old men are apter to Weep, than they of a middle age, but for severall reasons. Old men Weep oft-times out of affection, and for Joy: for these two Passions joyned together, send much blood to the heart, and from thence many vapours to the eyes: and the agitation of these vapours is so retarded by their natural coldnesse, that they are apt to convert into tears although no sadnesse preceded. But if some old men are apt to Weep for vexa­tion too, it is not so much the temper of their Body, as that of their mind, which disposeth them thereunto. And this befals only those who are so weak, that they suffer themselves to be ab­solutely overcome by small occasions of griefe; fear, or pitty; the same happens to children, who doe not Weep commonly for Joy, but rather for sadnesse, that unaccompanied with Love. For they ever have blood enough to produce many vapours, the motion of which being retarded by Sadnesse, they convert into Tears.

The 134. Article. Wherefore some children wax pale, in­stead of Weeping.

YEt there are some, who wax pale, instead of Weepig, when they are vexed: which may denote an extraordinary judgement, and courage in them: that is, when it proceeds from the consideration of the greatnesse of the evil, they prepare themselves for a strong resist­ance, as they doe who are elder. But it is ordi­narily a mark of an ill nature; that is, when it proceeds from their inclination to Hatred, or Fear follow: for they are Passions that diminish the matter of tears. And on the contrary, it is seen that those who are prone to Weep, are in­clined to Love, and Pity.

The 135. Article. Of Sighes.

THe cause of Sighes is very different from that of tears, though it, like them, presupposes Sadnesse. For whereas a man is excited to Weep, when the lungs are ful of blood; he is incited to sigh when they are almost empty, and when some imagination of Hope or joy opens the Orifice of the venous artery which Sadnesse had contracted; because then the smal remainder of blood in the [Page 107]lungs, falling all together into the left side of the heart through this venous artery, and driven on by a Desire to attain this Joy, which at the same time agitates all the muscles of the Diaphragma and breast, the air is suddenly blown through the mouth into the lungs, to fill up the vacant place of the blood. And this is called sighing.

The 136. Article. From whence proceed the Passions which are peculiar to certain men.

FUrthermore, that I may here in few words supply all that may be added hereunto con­cerning the several effectts, or causes of the Passi­ons, I am content to repeatthe principle, where­on all that I have written of them is grounded: to wit, that there is such a tye betwixt our Soul, and Body, that when we once have joyned any corporall Action with any thought, one of them never presents it self to us without the other: and that they are not alwayes the same Actions which are joyned to the same thoughts. For this is suf­ficient to give a reason of all that any man can observe peculiar, either in himself, or others, con­cerening this matter, which hath not been here explained. And for example, it is easie to conceive that the strange Aversions of Some, who cannot endure the smell of roses, the sight of a Cat, or the like, come only from hence; that when they were but newly alive they were displeased with [Page 108]some such like objects, or else had a fellow-feeling of their mothers resentment, who was so distasted when she was with child; for it is ceertain, there is an affinity between the motions of the mother, and the child in her womb, so that whatsoever is displeasing to one, offends the other; and the smell of Roses may have caused some great head-ach in the child, when it was in the cradle; or a Cat may have affrighted it, and none took notice of it, nor the Child so much as remem­bred it; though the Idea of that Aversion he then had to Roses, or a Cat, remain imprinted in his brain to his lives end.

The 137th Article. Of the use of the five precedent Passions, as they relate to the body.

NOw the definitions of Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, and Sadness are laid down; and the corporall motions that cause them or accompa­ny them treated of, we have no further to doe, but consider the use of them. Concerning which, it is to be observed, that according to the institu­tion of Nature; they all relate to the body, and are not given to the Soul, but as joyned to it: so that their naturall use is to incite the Soul to consent and contribute to the actions, which may be useful to conserve the body, or make it in some kind more perfect; and in this sense Sad­nesse, [Page 109]and Joy, are the two first that are set on work, for the Soul is immediatly warned of those things that are hurtfull to the body, by the feeling of pain, whch first of all produces the Passion of Sadness in her, then Hatred of that which causes this pain, and in the third place the Desire to be rid of it; as also, the Soul is not im­mediatly advertised of things beneficiall to the body, but by some kind of tickling, which exci­ting the Passion of Joy in her, breeds afterwards Love of that she believes to be the cause of it, and at last Desire to acquire that which may ei­ther cause this Joy to continue in her, or to en­joy after it, another like it; which shews that they are all five very usefull in behalfe of the bo­dy: and indeed, that Sadnesse is in some sort su­periour to, and more necessary than Joy, and Ha­tred than Love: because it is of more moment, to repell things noxious, and destructive, than to acquire such as adde some kind of perfection, without which it is possible to subsist.

The 138th Article. Of their faults, and the means to correct them.

BBut although this use of the Passions be the naturallest they can have, and all irrationall creatures regulate their life only by corporall mo­tions, resembling those which in us use to follow [Page 110]them and whereunto they incite our Soul to consent yet it is not alwayes good, seeing there are many things hurtfull to the body, which at first cause not any Sadness, nor yet conferre Joy: and others beneficiall to it, though at first they be incommodious And besides, they most common­ly make the evills, and goods they represent to us, seem much greater, and weightier then they are; so that they incite us to seek after the one, and avoid the other with more vehemency and anxiety then is convenient; as we see beasts are often entrapped by baits, and to shun little evills they precipitate themselves into greater. Wherefore, wee ought to make use of our ex­perience, and reason to distinguish good from evill, and know their just valew, that we may not take one for the other, nor addict our selves to any thing excessively.

The 139th Article. Of the use of the same Passions, as they relate to the Soul; and first of Love.

THis were sufficient, if wee had only a body, or if that were our better part; but seeing it is the least, we ought chiefly to consider the Pas­sions as they relate to the Soul, in respect whereof Love, and Hatred proceed from Knowledge, and precede Joy, and Sadness: except when these two last hold the place of Knowledge, whereof those are sorts; and when this Knowledge is true, that [Page 111]is, when the things it inclines us to love, are tru­ly good, and those it inclines us to hate are truly evill, then Love is incomparable better then Hatred; nor can it be too great, or fail to produce Joy. I say, this Love is extraordinary good; be­cause joyning true goods to us, it makes us so much the more perfect. I say also, that it cannot be too great; for, what the most excessive can do, is but to joyne us so absolutely to those goods, that we put distinction between the love we bear to that, and our selves; which, I beleeve, cannot be evil. And it is necessarily followed by Joy; because it represents what we love, as a good be-belonging to us.

The 140, Article. Of Hatred.

HAtred, on the contrary, cannot be so small but it hurts, and it is never with­out Sadnesse. I say it cannot be too small, be­cause we are not incited by Hatred to any Action, but what we may be by Love of the good contrary to it; at least, when this good, and evil are enough understood. For I confesse, that the Hatred of evil which is not manifested but by pain, is necessary in respect of the Body; but I speak here of that which proceeds from a more cleare knowledge, and I attribute it on­ly to the Soul. I say also, that it is never with­out Sadnesse; because evill being but a privati­on, [Page 112]it cannot be conceived without some reall subject wherein it is, and there is nothing reall but hath some goodnesse in it; so that the Hatred which make us refrain from evill, doth also make us refrain from the good whereunto it is annexed; and the privation of this good, being represented to our Soul, as a defect in her, excites Sadnesse. For example, the Hatred which makes us refrain from the evill manners of any one, does by the same meanes, make us refrain from his conversation, wherein we might other­wise finde some good, which we are vexed to be deprived of. And so in all other kinds of Hatred, some subject of Sadnesse may be observed.

The 141. Article. Of Desire, Joy, and Sadnesse.

FOr desire, it is evident, that when it proceeds from a true knowledge, it cannot be evill, provided it be not immoderate, and that this knowledge regulate it. It is evident also, that Joy cannot chuse but be good, nor Sadnesse, but be evil, in respect of the Soul: because in the last consist all the inconveniences that the Soul receives by evil, and in the first all the enjoyment of good belonging to her. So that, if we had no Bodies, I durst say, we could not give our selves up too much to Love, and Joy, nor too much shunne Hatred, and Sadnesse. But the [Page 113]corporall motions that accompany them, may be all hurtfull to the health, when they are very violent, and on the other side usefull when they are but moderate.

The 142 Article. Of Joy, and Love, compared with Sadnesse, and Hatred.

FUrthermore, since Hatred and Sadness ought to be rejected by the Soul, even then when they proceed from a true knowledge, much more ought they to be, when they come from any false opinion; but it may be doubted whether Love, and Joy, are good or no, when they likewise are ill grounded; and me thinks, if it be only consi­dered what they are precisely in themselves, in respect of the Soul, it may be said that, although the Joy be less solid, and the Love lesse ad­vantagious, then when they have a better foun­dation, they are at the worst to be preferred be­fore Sadness, and Hatred as ill grounded, so that in the occurrences of life, where we cannot a­void the hazard of being deceived, wee doe al­wayes best to lean to those Passions which tend towards good, then those which have relation to evill, although it be to shun it; Nay, some­times a false Joy is better then a Sadness from a true cause; but I dare not say the same of Love, in relation to Hatred; For when Hatred is just, [Page 114]it removes us not from any thing, but the sub­ject which contains the Evill from which it is good to be separated; whereas unjust Love joyns us to hurtfull things, or at least to such as desire not to be so much considered by us as they are, which devours, and abases us.

The 143 Article. Of the same Passions, as they relate to Desire.

ANd it must be exactly noted, that what I now spake of these foure Passions, takes place only when they are considered precisely in them­selves, and encline us not to any action; for see­ing they excite Desire in us, by whose interposi­tion they regulate our manners, it is certain that all those that come from a wrong cause may hurt, and on the other side, those that come of a just cause may be usefull: and further, that when they are both equally ill grounded, Joy is com­monly more hurtfull then Sadness, because this enduing a man with reservednesse, and Wari­nesse doth in some sort encline him to Prudence, whereas the other render those who give them­selves up thereunto inconsiderate, and rash.

The 144th Article. Of Desires whose events depend only on our selves.

BUt because these Passions cannot sway us to any actions, but by the interposition of the Desire that they excite, it is Desire which wee ought peculiarly to regulate, and therein consists the principall part of Morality. Now, as I said just now, it is alwayes good when it follows a true knowledge, so it cannot chuse but be bad when it is grounded on an errour; and me thinks, the most ordinary errour committed in Desire, is when a man doth not clearly enough distinguish the things which absolutely depend on our selves, from those which doe not. For, concerning those which depend of us, that is of our free disposition, it is enough to know that they are good, not to desire them with too much vehemence; because it is a following of vertue, to doe the good things that depend of us; and it is certain, he cannot have too ardent a De­sire after Vertue. Besides, what we thus desire cannot chuse but be accomplished; since it de­pending only on us, we ever receive the plenary satisfaction wee expect; but the usuall fault herein is, not that we desire too much, but too little, and the soveraigne remedy against that is, as much as in us lies, to ridde the spirit of all kind [Page 116]of Desires less usefull, then to strive to know clearly, and consider with attention, the goodness of that which is to be desired.

The 145 Article. Of those which depend meerly on other causes, and what Fortune is.

FOr those things which depend not any wayes of us, how good soever they be, they ought never to be desired with Passion: not only be­cause they may not befall, and by this means af­flict us so much the more, by how much more they were desired: but chiefly, because when they possesse our thoughts, they divert us from bending our affection to other things, the acqui­sition whereof depends of our selves; and there are two generall remedies against these idle De­sires; the first generosity, which I will speak of hereafter; the second is, that we ought to reflect on divine Providence, and imagine to our selves that it is impossible that any thing happen other­wise then this Providence hath determined from all eternity so that there is a kind of fatality, or unresistable necessity to oppose Fortune to de­stroy her, as a Chimera proceeding only from the errour of our understandings, for wee can desire nothing but what we think in some man­ner possible; and wee cannot suppose things which depend not of as possible, seeing we think [Page 117]they depend not on Fortune: that is wee suppose, they may happen, and the like hath happened formerly. Now, this opinion is only grounded upon this, that wee not undersTanding, all the causes, contributary to every effect; for when a thing which we supposed to depend on Forume doth not fall out, that shewes some of the causes necessary to produce was wanting: and conse­quently that it was absolutely impossible and that the like did never happen, that is, where a like cause of its Production was wanting: so that had wee not been ignorant of that before, we should never have imagined them possible, nor consequently should ever have desired them.

The 146th Article. Of those that depend of us, and others too.

THis vulgar opinion then, that there is without us a Fortune which causeth things to fall out, or not to fall out, according to her pleasure, must be utterly rejected; and it must be under­stood that all things are guided by a divine Pro­vidence, whose eternall decree is so infallible and immutable, that unless those things which the same decree hath pleased to let depend on our free disposition, we ought to think, for our parts, that nothing happens but what of necessity [Page 118]must, as if it were fatall, so that without a crime, we cannot desire it may happen otherwise. But because the most part of our Desires extend to two things which depend not altogether on our selves, nor altogether else-where, we ought ex­actly to distinguish, what in them depends on our selves, that we may not let our Desire ramble any farther then that; and for what is over and above, though we should esteem the successe thereof absolutely fatall, and immutable, that our Desire busie not it selfe thereabout, we should not omit to consider the reasons why it ought lesse or more to be hoped for, that they may serve to regulate our actions. For if for example, wee had any businesse at a place whither wee might goe two severall wayes, one whereof uses to be much safer than the other, although the decree of Providence may be such, that if we go that way which is conceived safest, wee shall not escape robbing; and on the contrary, we might have gone the other way without any danger, yet we ought not therefore to be indifferent which we take, nor rest upon the immutable fatality of this decree; But reason wills us to choose the way which used to be safest: and our Desire here­in ought to be fulfilled, whatsoever evill befall us by following it: because this evill (or mis­chiefe) having been, as to us, inevitable we have no occasion to wish to be exempted from it, but only doe the best our understanding can compre­hend, as, I suppose, we have done; and it is cer­tain [Page 119]that when a man exerciseth himselfe so, to distinguish betwixt Fatallity, and Fortune, he easily habituates himselfe so to regulate his De­sires, that seeing the fulfilling of them depends onely on our selves, they may alwayes give us an absolute satisfaction.

The 147th Article. Of the interiour emotions of the Soul.

I Will onely adde here one consideration, which me thinks is very usefull, to hinder us from receiving any discommodity by our Passions; it is, that our good, and will depends chiefly of interiour emotions, excited in the Soul onely by the Soul her self: wherein they differ from these Passions, which ever depend of some motion of the spirits. And although these emoti­ons of the Soul be often joyned to the Passions resembling them, they may also be often found among other Passions, and even spring from those that are contrary to them. For example, when a husband weeps for his deceased wife, whom (as oft it falls out) it would vex him to see re­stored to life againe: it may be, his heart is straightned by Sadnesse, which the solemnity of the funerall and the absence of a person, whose conversation he was used to, excite in him; and, it may be, some remnants of Love, or Pity, which present themselves to his imagi­nation, [Page 120]draw true tears from his eyes, notwith­standing that in the mean time he feels a secret Joy in the most interiour part of his Soul; whose emotion is so strong that the Sadnesse, and tears accompanying it, cannot diminish any of its force. And when we read strange adventures in a book, or see them personated on a stage, it some­times excites Sadnesse in us, sometimes Joy, or Love, or Hatred, and generally all the Passions, according to the diversity of objects, that offer themselves to our imagination; but withall we take a delight, to feel them excited in us, and this delight is an intellectuall Joy, which may as well spring from Sadnesse, as all the rest of the Passions.

The 148 Article. That the exercise of Vertue, is a Sove­raigne remedy against the Passions.

NOw, forasmuch as these interiour emotions doe touch us neerest to the quick, and con­sequently have more power over us, then the Passions they differ from, which are met withall in them, it is certain, that provided our Soul have wherewithall to content her interiour part, all the troubles, that come from abroad, are not able to hurt her, but rather serve to augment her Joy: in that, seeing she cannot be injured by [Page 121]them, it lets her understand her own perfection. And that our Soul may be thus contented, she need do nothing but exactly follow the track of Vertue. For whosoever hath lived so, that his Conscience cannot hit him in the teeth for fail­ing to doe all things which he judged to be best (which is the thing I mean here by following the track of Vertue) he from thence receives a satisfaction so effectuall to make him happy that the most violent assaults of the Passions, shall never be strong enough to trouble the tranquility his Soul.

The Passions of the Soul.
The third part. Of Particular Passions.

The 149th Article. Of Estimation, and Contempt.

NOw the six Originall Passions are ex­plained which are as the kinds (or Genera) whereof all the rest are but sorts (or Species) I will here suc­cinctly observe what there is peculiar in every one of the rest, and I will keep still the same order wherein I have formerly marshall'd them. The two first are Estimation; and con­tempt. For though they commonly signifie onely the opinions a man hath without any Passion, of the vallue of any thing, yet because from these opinions doe often spring Passions which want peculiar names, me thinkes, these may be attributed to them. And Estimation, as it is a Passion, is an inclination of the Soul, to represent unto her selfe the vallue of the [Page 124]thing esteemed, which inclination is caused by a peculiar motion of the spirits, so conveyed in­to the braine, that they there fortifie the im­pressions belonging to that purpose. As, on the contrary, the Passion of contempt is an incli­nation of the Soul to consider the meannesse or smallnesse of what it contemnes, caused by the motion of the spirits, which fortifie the Idea of this smallnesse.

The 150 Article. That these two Passions are but Sorts of Admiration.

SO both these Passions, are but sorts of Ad­miration. For when we neither admire the greatnesse, nor smallnesse of an object, we make neither more, nor lesse account of it than reason dictates to us we ought to doe: so that we then esteeme, or contemne it without Pas­sion. And though oft-times Estimation be excited in us by Love, and Contempt by Hatred, that is not so alwayes, and proceeds onely from this; that a man is more or lesse inclined to consider the greatnesse or smallnesse of an object, as he hath more or lesse affection to it.

The 151 Article. That a man may esteem, or contemne himselfe.

NOw, these two Passions may generally relate to all sorts of objects: but they are especially remarkable, when we referre them to our selves, that is, when it is our own merit that we either esteem, or contemne, and the motion of the spi­rits which cause them, is then so manifest, that it even changes the countenance, gesture, gate, and generally all the actions of those, who conceive a better, or worse opinion of themselves than ordinary.

The 152 Article. For what cause a man may esteem himselfe.

ANd because one of the chiefe parts of Wis­dome is to know in what manner & for what cause every one ought to esteem, or contemn himself, I will here endeavour to give my opini­on thereof. I observe but one thing in us which may give us just cause to esteem our selves, to wit, the use of our free Disposition, and our empire over our Wills. For only the actions depending on this free Disposition, are those for which wee [Page 126]may justly be praised or blamed: and it makes us in some manner like unto God, by making us masters of our selves, provided wee doe not lose, the priviledges it gives us, by our unworthiness.

The 153 Article. Wherein Generosity consists.

SO, I believe, true Generosity, which causeth a man to set himself at the highest rate he just­ly may; consists only, partly, in knowing there is nothing which truly he can call his own unlesse this free Disposition of his Wills, nor wherefore he ought to be praised or blamed, unlesse for using that well or ill; and partly in feeling a con­stant, and firme resolution in himselfe to use it well, that is, his Will shall never be wanting to undertake, and execute such things as hee shall judge to be best, which is, to follow Vertue abso­lutely.

The 154th Article. That it restraines a man from con­temning others.

THose who have this knowledge, and resent­ment of themselves, are easily perswaded that every other man hath such of himselfe too, because there is nothing in it that depends of any [Page 127]thing else. Wherefore they never contemne any body: and though they oft-times see other men commit errours, that make their weaknesse ap­peare, yet they are evermore enclined to excuse than blame them, and to believe that they doe it rather for want of knowledge, than good will. And as they doe not think themselves much infe­riour to those who have greater estates, honours, nor yet more wit, knowledge, beauty, or gene­rally that surpass them in any other perfections: so they do not esteem themselves much above those whom they surpasse because all these things seem very little considerable to them in comparison of their good Will for which only they esteem themselves, and which they suppose, is, or at least may be in every other man.

The 155th Article. Wherein vertuous Humility consists.

SO the most generous use to be most humble, and Vertuous Humility consists only in this, that the reflexion wee make on the infirmity of our own nature, and the faults we may have for­merly committed, or those we are like to com­mit which are no whit lesse than those commit­ted by others, is the reason why we do not pre­ferre our selves before any body but think that others, who have their free Disposition as well as we, may use it as well.

The 156th Article. What the properties of Genorosity are; and how it serves for a remedy against all unruliness of the Passions.

THey who thus are generous, are naturally ad­dicted to doe great things, and yet to under­take nothing they are not capable of; and be­cause they esteem nothing greater than to doe good to other men, and to contemn their own in­terest on such an occasion, they are exquisitely courteous, affable, and officious to every one. Withall, they are absolutely masters of their Pas­sions: especially of their Desires, Jealousie, and Envie, because there is nothing, the acquisition whereof depends not on them, whose worth they suppose can countervaile a hearty Desire of them: and of Hatred against men, because they esteem them all; and of Feare, because the confidence of their own verture secures them; and lastly, of Wrath because little valuing all things without themselves they never give their enemies so much advantage, as to acknowledge that they are an­gry with them.

The 157th Article. Of Pride.

ALL such as have a good conceit of them­selves for any thing else whatsoever, have not a reall Generosity, but only Pride, which is al­wayes very vitious, though it be so much the more, as the cause for which a man esteems him­selfe is more unjust; and the most unjust of all, is, when he is proud for no reason that is, though no man can see (for all this) any desert in him for which he should be prized: but only because worth is trampled on, and he imagines Renown is nothing but meere usurpation, he believes that they who attribute most to themselves have most. This vice is so unreasonable, and absurd, that I should scarce believe there were any such men, who gave themselves up thereunto, if no body had ever been praised unjustly: but flat­tery is so common every where, that there is no man so deficient, but hee oft sees himselfe estee­med for things which merit not any praise, yea, that even deserve blame, which gives occasion to the more ignorant and stupid to fall into this sort of Pride.

The 158 Article. That the effects thereof are contrary to those of Generosity.

BUt whatsoever be the cause for which a man esteems himself, if it be ought else but the Will he perceives in himselfe, alwayes to use well his free Disposition, from whence I said Generosity came, it ever produces a Pride exceeding blame-worthy, and so different from this true Generosity, that the effects whereof are absolutely contrary. For all other goods, as wit, beauty, riches, honours, &c. Using to be the more esteemed, for being found in fewer persons, and being for the most part of such a nature, that they cannot be communicated to many, therefore proud men endeavour to abase all other men, and being slaves to their desires, their Souls are incessantly agitated with Hatred, Envy, Jealousie, or Wrath.

The 159 Article. Of Dejection.

FOr Dejection, or vitious Humility it consists chiefely in this, that a man perceives him­selfe weak, or little resolute, and, as if he had not the absolute use of his free disposition, he [Page 131]cannot refraine from doing things, whereof he knowes not whether he shall repent or no after­wards: then besides, that he beleeves he cannot subsist of himselfe, nor forgoe many things, whose acquisition depends from without him. So it is directly opposite to Generosity, and it oft befalls that men of a meane spirit, are most anogant and proud, just as the most generous are most modest, and humble. But whereas those of a generous spirit alter not their nature by any prosperity or adversity that befalls them, those who are weake, and abject are onely guided by fortune and prosperity doth not puffe up so high, but adversity brings them down as low. Yea, it is often seen that they abase them­selves shamefully to such as they expect profit or feare evill from, and at the same time lift them­selves up insolently over those from whom they neither hope, nor fear any-thing.

The 160th Article. What the motions of the spirits, in these Passions, is.

MOreover, it is easie to understand that Pride, and dejection are not onely vices but Passions, because their emotion is very palpable exteriourly in those who are sud­denly puffed up or brought down by any new oc­casion. But it may be doubted whether Gene­rosity, [Page 132]and Humility, which are vortues may also be Passions, because their motions appeare lesse, and it seemes, vertue doth not so much Symbolize with Passion, as vice doth. Yet I see no neason why the same motion of the spirits, which serves to fortifie a thought when it hath an ill ground, should not also fortifie it, when it hath a just one. And because Pride, and Generositie, consist onely in the good opinion a man hath of himselfe, and differ onely herein; that the opinion in one is unjust, in the other just me thinkes they may be attributed to one and the same Passion, which is excited by a motion compounded of Admiration, Joy, and Love, as well that a man beares to himselfe, as to the thing for which he doth esteeme himselfe. As on the contrary, the motion that excites Humi­lity, whether vertuous or vitious, is composed of Admiration, Sadnesse, and self Love, mixed with Hatred of those defects which cause one to be contemned. And all the difference that I ob­serve in these motions, is, that that of Admiration hath two properties the first, that the surprize makes it strong from the very beginning: the other, that it is equall in its continuance. That is, the spirits continue moving at the same rate in the braine. Of which properties, the first is found oftner in Pride, and Dejection then in Generositie or vertuous Humility; and on the other side the last is more observed in these than in the others. The reason whereof is, that [Page 133]vice proceeds commonly from ignorance, so that they who least understand themselves are aptest to grow more proud, or become more abject than they ought to bee, because every new thing that befalls them surprizeth them, and causeth them, that attributing it to themselves, they admire and esteeme or contemne them­selves, as they judge that which is befallen them advantagious to them, or not. But because as soon as one thing hath elated them, comes ano­ther that dejects them the motion of their Pas­sion is various. Contrarily, there is nothing in Generositie, incompatible with vertuous Humi­lity, nor any thing extraneous that can alter it: wherefore the motions thereof are firme, con­stant, and ever like themselves. But they proceed not so much from surprizall, because they who in this manner esteem themselves, do very well understand the reasons why they so esteem them­selves Yet it may be said that these causes are so wonderfull (to wit, the power of their free Disposition, which makes them prize them-themselves and the infirmities of the subject in which this power is, which makes them not to vallue themselves too high) that as often as they are presented new, they still cause new Ad­miration.

The 161. Article. How Generosity may be acquired.

ANd it is to be noted, that what commonly are called vertues, are habits in the Soul which dispose it to certain thoughts, so that they are different from these thoughts, but they may produce them, and reciprocally be pro­duced by them. It is also to be noted, that these thoughts may be produced onely by the Soul, but it oft befalls that some motion of the spirits fortifies them, and then they are at the same time actions of vertue, and Passions of the Soul. So though there be no vertue whereunto (me thinks) good birth so much contributes, as that which causeth a man to esteem himselfe accord­ing to his just value; and it be easie to believe, that all Souls which God puts into our bodies, are not equally noble and strong (wherefore I called this vertue Generositie, according to the acception of our language, rather than Magna­nimity, the School tearms that it may be the more unknown) yet it is certain that good educa­tion much conduces to correct the defects of our birth; and that if a man busy himselfe frequent­ly to consider what this free Disposition is, and how great advantages accrue from a stedfast re­solution to use it well; as on the other side, how vain and unprofitable all the cares that puzzle [Page 135]the ambitious are; a man may by exciting the Passion in himselfe, acquire the vertue of Gene­rosity, which being as the key of all the other vertues, and a generall remedy against all the ir­regularities of Passions, me thinkes, this con­sideration ought to be very seriously noted.

The 162. Article. Of Veneration.

VEneration, or respect is an inclination of the Soul not onely to esteeme the object it re­verenceth, but also so submit to it with some kind of fear, to endeavour to make it become gracious to her. So that we bear only a Venera­tion to free causes, which we conceive able to do good or evill to us, without knowing which of the two they will doe. For we bear Love, and Devotion rather than a meer Veneration to those from whom we onely expect good, and we bear Hatred to none but such as we only expect evill from; and if we conceive the cause of this good, or evil not to be free, we do not submit ourselves thereunto to get the goodwill of it. So when the Pagans bore a Veneration to woods, springs, mountains, they did not properly reverence these inanimate things, but the Divinities which they thought presided over them. And t he motion of the spirits that excite this Passion, is compounded of that which excites Admiration and that which excites Fear, whereof I will speak hereafter.

The 163 Article. Of Disdain.

JUst so, that which I call disdaine is an incli­nation of the Soul to contemne a free cause, by judging that though of its own nature it be able to doe either good or evill, yet it is so far beneath us, that it can doe us neither; and the motion of the spirits that excite it, is compoun­ded of phose that excite Admiration, and Securi­ty, or Boldnesse.

The 164th Article. Of the use of these two Passions.

ANd it is either Generosity or Deification and weaknesse of spirit, that determine the good or ill use of these two Passions; for by how much a mans Soul is more noble or generous, so much the more inclination hee hath to give every one his own: and so hath not only an extraordinaty HUmility towards God but without reluctancy bestowes all the honour and respect which are due to men, to each according to the rank, and authority he holds in the world, and contemnes nothing but Vice. On the contrary, they who are of a mean and weak spirit, are apt to sinne in excesses, sometimes by reverencing, and fearing [Page 137]things only worthy of contempt, sometimes by insolently disdaining such as deserve to be reve­renced; and they often slip suddenly from ex­tream impiety to superstition, thence again from superstition to impiety, so that there is no vice, nor irregularity of spirit which they are not subject to.

The 165 Article. Of Hope, and Feare.

HOpe is a disposition of the Soul to perswade her that what she desires shall come to passe, which is caused by a peculiar motion of the spirits, to wit, by those of Joy and desire mixed together; and Feare is another disposition of the Soul which perswades her that it shall not come to passe, and it is to be noted that though these two Passions be contrary to one another, yet a man may have them both together, to wit, when he fancies to himselfe severall reasons, whereof some make him conceive the accomplishment of his Desire is easie, the other make it seeme difficult.

The 166 Article. Of Security, and Despaire.

ANd one of these Passions never accompanies Desire, but it leaves room for the other; for [Page 138]when Hope is so strong, that it utterly expell [...] Fear, it alters the nature thereof, and is called Security; and when a man is sure that what hee desires shall come to pass, though hee still wish that it would come, yet he nevertheless ceases to be agitated with the Passion of Desire, which made him seek after the event with anxietie. In like manner when Fear is so extream, that it takes away all kind of Hope, it converts into Despaire: and this Despaire fancying the thing impossible, clearly extinguisheth Desire, which only is bent on things possible.

The 167th Article. Of Jealousie.

JEalousie is a sort of Feare, relating to the Desire a man hath to keep the possession of some good; and it proceeds not so much from strength of reason, which makes him con­jecture he may lose it as the great value he sets on it which causeth him to dive into the least occasions of suspition, and take them for very considerable arguments.

The 168 Article. Wherein this Passion may be laudable.

ANd because a man ought more carefully to keep great goods, than lesse, this Passion may be just and laudable on some occasions; as for example, A Captain that guards a place of great importance, ought to be jealous of it, that is, mistrust all means whereby it may bee taken: and and honest woman is not to be bla­med for being jealous of her honour, that is, not only beware of doing ill, but also avoid even the least occasions of detraction.

The 169 Article. Wherein it is blameworthy.

BUt a covetous man is to be laught at when he is jealous of his treasure, that is, when hee broods over it with his eyes, and will never be farre from it, lest it should be stollen from him: for money is not worth keeping with so much care; and a man that is jealous of his wife is contemned, because it is an evidence hee loves her not as he should doe, and hath either an ill opinion of himselfe, or her. I say he loves her not as he should doe; for if he bore a true Love to her, hee would never be enclined to mistrust [Page 140]her: but it is not her whom he properly loves: it is only the good he imagines to consist in en­joying her alone to himselfe; and he would not be afraid to lose this good, if he did not either conceive himselfe unworthy of it, or his wife disloyall. Moreover, this Passion relates only to suspicions, and mistrusts: for he is not properly Jealous that endeavours to shun an evill, when he hath just reason to fear it.

The 170 Article. Of Irresolution.

IRresolution also is a sort of Fear, which cau­sing the Soul to waver between severall actions that she may doe, is the cause she cannot execute any, and thereby she hath time to choose before she determines on them. Whereof, truly, some good use may be made; but when it lasts longer than it ought, and it takes up that time to debate, which is required to act, it is very evill. Now, I say it is a sort of Feare, though it may so fall out, when a man hath choyce of many things whose goodnesse is equally apparent, that he may bee at a stand and irresolute, and yet not be afraid. For this sort of Irresolution comes onely from the subject presented, and not from any emotion of the spirits: Wherefore it is not a Passion, un­lesse the sear of failing in his choyce encrease the uncertainty. But this fear is so usuall, and so [Page 141]strong in some, that oftentimes, although they have not any choyce, and though they see only one thing to take, or leave, yet it seizes on them, and causeth them unprofitably to stop there, and search after others; and then it is an excesse of Irresolution, which proceeds from too great a Desire to doe well, and an imbecillity in the un­derstanding, which having no clear, and distinct notions, hath only a great company of confused ones. Wherefore the remedy against this excesse is, to accustome a mans selfe to frame certaine, and determinate Judgements, concerning all things that present themselves, and conceive he doth alwayes doe his duty, when he doth what he conceives to be best, though it may be he con­ceive amisse.

The 171 Article. Of Courage, and Boldnesse.

COurage, when it is a Passion, and not a habit or naturall, inclination, is a certain heat or agitation which disposeth the Soul to addict her powerfully to the execution of the things she will doe, of what nature soever they be; and Boldnesse is a sort of Courage that disposeth the Soul to the execution of things most dangerous.

The 172 Article. Of Emulation.

AND Emulation also is a sort of it, but in another sense; for Courage may be considered as a kind (or Genus) that is divided into as many sorts (or Species) as there are severall objects, and as many more as it hath causes. In the first sence Boldnesse is a sort, in the other Emulation; and this last is nothing else but a heat, which disposeth the Soul to under­take things that she hopes may succeed with her, because shee sees them succeed with o­thers: and so it is a sort of Courage, whose ex­ternall cause is example. I say, the externall cause, because it ought ever (besides that) to have an internall one which consists in this, that the body is so disposed, as Desire, and Hope are stronger to drive abundance of blood to the heart, than Fear or Despaire to hin­der it.

The 173 Article. How Boldnesse depends on Hope.

FOr it is to be noted, that although the object of Boldnesse be difficulty, from whence com­monly ensues Fear, or even Despaire, so that it is in most dangerous and desperate affairs that most Boldnesse and Courage is required; neverthelesse there must be some Hope, or else a man must be assured that the end he propounds to himselfe shall succeed, to oppose himselfe vigorously against the difficulties he shall encounter. But this end is different from this object. For he can not be assured, and despairing of the same thing at the same time. So when the Decij flung them­selves in the midst of their enemies, and ran up­on a certain death, the object of their Boldnesse was the difficulty of keeping their lives in this action, of which difficulty they utterly despaired, for they were sure to die, but their end was to ani­mate their souldiers by their example, and make them winne the victory, of which they had Hope; or else, their end was to get Fame after their death, whereof they were assured.

The 174 Article. Of Cowardice, and fearfulnesse.

COwardice is directly opposite to Courage, and is a Ianguishing or coldnesse which hinders the Soul from addicting her selfe to the execution of things which she would doe, if she were exempted from this Passion. And fearefulnesse or affright, the contrary to Bold­nesse, is not onely a coldnesse, but a distraction and astonishment of the Soul, that robs her of the power to resist evils which she thinks are neer her.

The 175 Article. Of the use of Cowardice.

NOw, although I cannot be perswaded that nature hath bestowed on man any Passion that is alwayes vicious, and hath not some good and laudable use; yet I am very much puzzeled to divine what these two are good for. Only, me thinkes, Cowardice is of some use when it causeth a man to be free from paines, he might be incited to take, for reasons like truths, if o­ther more certain truths which make them be judged unprofitable, had not invited this Pas­sion in him. For besides her exemption of the [Page 145]Soul from these paines, it is then also very use­full to the Body, for that retarding the motion of the spirits, it hinders the forces thereof from being dissipated. But is commonly very hurtfull, because it diverts the Will from profitable Acti­ons. And because it proceeds from hence, that a man hath not Hope, or Desire enough: to correct it, he need onely augment these two Pas­sions in himselfe.

The 176 Article. Of the use of Fearfulnesse.

AS for Fearfulnesse or affright, I see not how it can ever be laudable, or usefull. Neither is it one particular Passion, but onely an excesse of Cowardice, astonishment, and Fear, which is alsayes vicious: as Boldnesse is an excesse of Courage, ever good, provided the end pro­posed be good. And because the chiefe cause of Fearfulnesse is surprize, there is no better way to be rid of it, than to use premeditation, and pre­pare ones selfe against all events, the fear where­of may cause them.

The 177 Article. Of Remorse.

REmorse of conscience is a sort of Sadnesse, which comes from the scruple a man hath, that a thing he hath done, or hath not done, is not good. And it necessarily presupposes doubt. For if he had been absolutely assured that what he did had been evill, he had refrained from do­ing it; since the Will enclines us not to any things but such as have an appearance of good­nesse. And if he were assured that what he hath already done were evill it would breed repent­ance, and not only Remorse. Now, the use of this Passion is to make him examine whether the thing he doubts of be good or no, and to hinder him from doing it another time, if he be not as­sured that it is good. But because it presupposeth an evill, the best way were, never to be subject to feel it; and it may be prevented the same way, as a man may be exempted of Irresolution.

The 178 Article. Of Derision.

DErision is a sort of Joy mingled with Hatred which proceeds from this, that a man per­ceives some little evill in a person, whereof he thinks him worthy. He hates this evil, and rejoyces to see it in one that is worthy of it. And when this comes unexpectedly, the surprize of Admiration causeth him to breake out into laughter, according to what hath formerly been said of the nature of Laughter. But this evill must be a small one: for if it be great, it cannot be thought that he who hath it is worthy of it, unlesse one be of a very ill nature, or bear him a great deal of Hatred.

The 179 Article. Why the most defective men are commonly the greatest Deriders.

ANd it is seen that they who have apparent defects, for example, who are lame, one-eyed, crook backed, or have received some affront publickly, are peculiarly enclined to derision. For desiring to see all other men asmuch disgraced as themselves, they rejoyce at the ills that befall them, and think them worthy of it.

The 180 Article. Of the use of Jeasting.

AS for modest Jeasting, which wholsomely reprehends vices by making them appeare ridiculous, so a man laugh not at them himself, nor shew any hatred against persons, it is not a Passion, but a becoming quality in a man, that makes the livelinesse of his disposition appeare, and the tranquillity of his Soul, which are markes of Vertue; and oftimes the nimblenesse of his wit too, in that he knowes how to set a handsome glosse on things he jeasts at.

The 181 Article. Of the use of Laughter in Jeasting.

ANd it is not unhandsome to laugh at the hearing of another mans jeasts: nay, per­chance they may be such, that it were doltishness not to laugh at them. But when a man jeasts himselfe, it is more seemly to abstaine from it, that he may not seeme to be surprized by the things he speakes, nor admire the dexterity of their invention: and that causeth those who hear them to be surprized so much the more.

The 182 Article. Of Envy.

THat which commonly is called Envy is a vice that consists in a perversnesse of nature, which causeth certaine men to fret at the good, that, they see, befalls other men. But I here use this word, to signifie a Passion which is not alwayes vicious. Envy then, as it is a Passion, is a sort of Sadnesse mixed with Hatred which comes from seeing good betide those we thinke unworthy of it. Which cannot be thought with reason, but of the goods of fortune. For, as for those of the Soul, yea and the Body too, seeing a man hath them by birth; it is to be suf­ficiently worthy of them, that he received them from God before he was capable to commit any evill.

The 183. Article. How it may be just, or unjust.

BUt when fortune sends goods to any one, whereof he is truly unworthy, and Envy is not excited in us but because naturally loving justice, we are vext that it is not observed in the distribution of those goods, it is a zeal that may be excusable; especially when the good a [Page 150]man envyes others, is of such a nature that it may turn to an evill in their hands, as if it be some command or office, in the exercising where­of they may misdemean themselves. Yea, even when he desires that good for himselfe, and can­not get it, because others lesse worthy possesse It. This makes this passion become the more violent: and yet it may be excusible, provided the Hatred in it relate only to the ill distribution of the thing envied, and not to the persons that possesse, or distribute it. But there are few who are so just and generous as to bear no Hatred against those that prevent them, in the acquisition of a good that is not communicable to many, and that they desired it for themselves, though they who acquired it are as much or more worthy of it. And what is most usually envied is Glory. For although that of others doth not hinder us from aspiring thereunto, yet it makes the accesse to it more difficult, and enhaunceth the price.

The 184 Article. From whence it comes that envious men have sallow complexions.

BEsides, there is no vice so banefull to the felicity of man as Envy. For, besides that those who are tainted with it afflict themselves, they also, to the utmost of their power trouble the delight of others. And they have commonly, [Page 151]sallow complexions, that is, a pale mingled with yellow and black, and like blood in a bruise. Whence, Envy is called in Latine Li­vor; which agrees very well with what hath been said here before of the motions of the blood in Sadnesse, and hatred; for this causeth the syellow choler comming from the lower part of the Liver, and the black comming from the Spleen, to spread from the heart through the Ar­teries into all the veines: and that causeth the blood of the veines to have lesse heat, and flow more slowly than ordinarily, which is sufficient to make the complexion livid. But because choler, as well yellow as black, may be also sent into the veines by many other causes, and Envy may not drive enough into them to alter the colour of the complexion, unlesse it be ex­ceeding great, and of long continuance it ought snot to be thought that all those of this com­plexion are thereunto enclined.

The 185 Article. Of Pitty.

PItty is a sort of Sadness, mingled with Love or good will towards those whom we see suffer any evill, whereof we esteem them unworthy; so it is contrary to Envy, because of it, object, and Derision, because it considers them in ano­ther manner.

The 186 Article. Who are most Pittifull.

THose who feel themselves very weak, and subject to the adversities of Fortune, seem to be more enclined to this Passion than any else, because they fancy the evill of another, as possi­ble to befall them, and so they are moved to pit­ty rather out of the love they bear themselves, than that they bear to others.

The 187 Article. How the most generous men are sensible of this Passion.

BUt neverthelesse they who are most generous, and have the greatest spirits, so that they feare not any evill to themselves, and hold themselves above the power of fortune, are not exempted from Compassion, when they see the infirmity of other men, and hear their complaints; for it is a part of Generosity to bear good will to every man: but the Sadness of this Pitty is not bitter, and like that which tragicall actions personated on the stage cause, is more in the exteriours and the senses, than the interiours of the Soul, which in the mean while is satisfied to think she hath done her duty, in that she hath a fellow feeling [Page 153]with the afflicted; and there is this difference in it, that whereas the vulgar pitty those who com­lain, because they think the ills they suffer are very grievous, the principall object of great mens Pitty is the weaknesse of those that they see com­plain: because they esteem not any accident that may befall to be so great an evill, as is the Base­ness of those who cannot suffer constantly; and though they hate the vices, yet they hate not those they see subject to them: they only Pitty them.

The 188 Article. Who those are that are not sensible of it.

BUt there are none but malignant, and envious spirits, who naturally hate all men, or else those who are so belluine, and blinded by good fortune, or desperate through ill, that they think no further evill can befall them, who ar ein ensi­ble of Pitty.

The 189 Article. Why this Passion excites weeping.

NOw, a man weeps easily in this Passion, be­cause Love sending much blood to the heart, causeth many vapours to issue through the eyes; and the coldness of Sadness retarding the agitation of these vapours, converts them into tears, as hath been formerly said.

The 190 Article. Of Satisfaction of ones selfe.

THe Satisfaction that they have, who con­stantly follow the paths of vertue, is a habit in their Soul called Tranquility, or quiet of conscience; but that which a man acquires a­new, when he hath lately done any action that he thinks good, is a Passion, to wit, a sort of Joy, which I believe, is the softest of all, because the cause thereof depends only on our selves; yet when this cause is not just, that is, when the acti­ons from whence we deduct this Satisfaction are not of consequence, or else are vicious, it is ridiculous, and serves only to produce a Pride, and impertinent Arrogance, which may parti­cularly be observed in those who believing themselves to be devout, are only hypocriticall, [Page 155]and superstitious, that is, who under pretence of frequenting the Church, saying, many Prayers, wearing short hair, fasting, giving alms, suppose they are exquisitely perfect, and imagine they are Gods so intimate friends that they can doe no­thing that can displease him, and whatsoever their Passions dictate to them is a good Zeale: although it sometime dictate to them the grea­test crimes that can be committed by men, as betraying of Cities murdering of Princes, exter­minating whole Nations, meerly for this, that they are not of their opinion.

The 191 Article. Of Repentance.

REpentance is directly contrary to Satisfacti­on of ones selfe: and is a sort of Sadnesse proceeding from a beliefe that a man hath done some evill action; and it is very bitter, because the cause comes only from our selves. Yet ne­verthelesse, this hinders it not from being very usefull, when it is true, that the action we repent of is evill, and that we have a certain knowledge thereof because it incites us to do better another time; but it oft-times comes to pass, that weak spirits repent the things they have done, not knowing certainly that they are evill: they per­swade themselves so, only because they fear it is so, and had they done the contrary, they had re­pented [Page 156]too: which is an imperfection in them to be pittied; and the remedies against this defect, are the same that serve to take away Irresolu­tion.

The 192 Article. Of Good-will.

GOodwill is properly a desire to see good be­fall any one hath a Goodwill to: but I use this word here to signifie this Will, as it is excited in us by some good Action of him to whom we bear it; for we are naturally addicted to love those, who do things which we esteem good, al­though no good come to us by them. Goodwill in this sense is a sort of Love, not desire, though the desire of seeing good befall him whom we wish well to, alwayes accompanieth it. And it is ordinarily joyned with pity because the disgraces that, we see, betide the unfortunate, cause us to reflect the more upon their deserts.

The 193 Article. Of Gratitude.

GRatitude is also a sort of Love, excited in us by some Action of him to whom we of­fer, it, and whereby we beleeve he hath done us some good, or at least had an intention to do us some. So it includes all that Goodwill doth, and this besides, that it is grounded on an Acti­on we are very sensible of, and whereof we have a desire to make a requitall. Wherefore it is far more strong, especially in Souls never so little noble and generous.

The 194 Article. Of Ingratitude.

FOr Ingratitude, it is not a Passion: for nature never put any motion of the spirits in us to ex­cite it: but it is onely a vice directly opposite to Gratitude, seeing this is ever vertuous, and one of the principall bonds of humane society. s Wherefore this vice appertaines to none but belluine men, and the foolishly arrogant, who thinke all things their due; or the sottish, who reflect not on the good deeds they receive; or else the weak, and abject, who feeling their own infirmitie and necessity, basely seek assistance [Page 158]from others, and after they have received it hate them: because having no Will to return the like, or despairing ever to doe it, and imagining the whole world as mercenary as themselves, and that none doe good but with Hope of being rewarded for it, they think they have desired it.

The 195 Article. Of Indignation.

INdignation is a sort of Hatred or Aversion, that a man naturally beares to those who doe some evil, of what nature soever it be. And it is often mixed with Envy, or Pity, but yet, the object thereof is altogether different from them. For he carryes an Indignation onely against those who doe good or evil to persons unworthy of it: but he envies those who receive this good, and pities those who receive this evil. It is true, in some respects it is evil to possesse a good whereof a man is not worthy. Which may be the reason wherefore Aristotle and his followers, supposing that Envy is alwayes a vice, have cal­led that Indignation which is not vicious.

The 196 Article. Why it is sometimes joyned with Pity, and sometimes with Derision.

TO doe an evill, is also in some respects to receive one, from whence it comes that some with their Indignation joyn Pity, and others de­rision: according as they bear a good or ill Will towards those whom they see commit faults. Thus the laughter of Democritus, and the weeping of Heraclitus, might proceed from the same cause.

The 197 Article. That it is often accompanied with Admira­tion, and is not incompatible with Joy.

INdignation is also oftimes accompanied with Admiration. For we use to think that all things shall be done in the same manner we conceive they ought to be done, that is, after that manner which we esteem good. Wherefore when it falls out otherwise it surprizeth us, and we Admire it. Nor is it incompatible with Joy, although it most commonly be joyned with Sadnesse. For when the evill we bear an Indignation against cannot hurt us, and we consider that we would not doe the like, it gives us some delight: and [Page 160]this may be one of the causes of Laughter, which sometimes accompanies this Passion.

The 198 Article. Of the use of it.

FUrthermore, Indignation is observed to be more in those who would seem vertuous, than those who really are. For althought they who love vertue cannot without some Aversion look upon the vices of others, they are Passio­nate onely against the great and extraordinary ones. For it is to be nice, and squamish, to have much Indignation for things of little concern­ment; it is to be unjust to have any for those which are not blamworthy; and it is to be im­pertinent and absurd not to confine this Passion to the Actions of men, but extend them to the works of God or nature: as they do who being snever contented with their condition or fortune, dare controule the government of the world, and the secrets of providence.

The 199 Article. Of Wrath.

WRath is also a sort of Hatred or Aversion against those that have done any evill, or endeavoured to hurt, not indifferently any thing whatsoever, but particularly our selves. So it containes all Indignation doth, and this besides, that it is grounded upon an action that we are Sensible of, and whereof we have a Desire to be revenged. For this Desire almost ever accom­panies it, and is directly opposite to Gratitude as Indignation is to Good-will. But it is, with­out compare, more violent than these other three Passions, because the desire to repell things hurtfull, and be revenged, is most vehement of all. It is this desire, joyned to selfe-love, that furnisheth Wrath with all the agitation of blood that Courage and Boldnesse can cause: and Hatred especially causeth the colericke blood, that comes from the spleen, and the little veines of the liver, which receives this agitation, and gets into the heart: or because of its abundance, and the nature of the choler wherewith it is mingled, it excites a sharper and more ardent heat, than can be excited therein either by Love, or Joy.

The 200 Article. Wherefore those, whom it causeth to blush are lesse to be feared, than they whom it causeth to wax pale.

ANd the exteriour signes of this Passion are different, according to the severall tempers of men, and the variety of other Passions that make it up or joyne with it. So some are seen to wax pale, or tremble, when they are in Wrath: others blush or weep. And it is usually thought that the Wrath of those who wax pale is more to be feared, than of those who blush. The rea­son whereof is, that when a man will not, or cannot revenge himselfe with ought but lookes or words, he sets all his heat and strength on work at the very first, when he is moved: be­sides that sometimes sorrow, and selfe Pity hat he cannot revenge himselfe any other way, occasions weeping. And on the contrary they who reserve themselves, and determine on a greater revenge become sad in regard they thinke they ought to be so for the Action that incenseth them: and they sometimes also fear the evils that ensue the resolution they have taken; which makes them instantly become pale, cold, and trembling. But afterwards when they come to execute their revenge, they are so much the more heated, as they were at first cooled: as we see [Page 163]agues that begin with cold fits, are usually the violentest.

The 201 Article. That of these two sorts of Wrath, they who have most goodnesse are most subject to the first.

THis informes us that two sorts of Wrath may be distinguished; one sudden, and exteriour­ly manifest, but yet of small efficacy, and easily appeased; the other not so apparent at first, but that gnawes more on the heart, and hath more dangerous effects. Those who have much good­nesse and Love are the most subject to the first; for it proceeds not from any deep Hatred, but from a sudden Aversion, that surpriseth them, because being addicted to imagine that all things ought to be carried the way they conceive to bee best, as soon as any thing falls out otherwise they admire it, and are angry at it, oftentimes too, when the thing concerns not them in particular, because being full of affection, they interest themselves in the behalfe of those they love, as if it were for themselves; so what would only bee an occasion of indignation to another, is to them of Wrath; and because their inclination to Love makes them alwayes have a great deal of heat and blood in the heart, the Aversion that surpriseth them that drives never so little choler [Page 164]thither, causeth immediatly a great emotion in this blood but this emotion is not lasting, be­cause the strength of the surprize continues not, and as soon as they perceive that the occasion that incenceth them ought not to have moved them so, they repent thereof.

The 202 Article. That weak, and mean soules, suffer themselves most to be swayed with the other.

THe other sort of Wrath, wherein Hatred, and Sadness predominates, is not at first so appa­rent, unless that, it may be, it make the face look pale; but the strength thereof is encreased by lit­tle and little, by the agitation which an ardent Desire of revenge excites in the blood, which be­ing mixed with choler driven to the heart from the lower part of the Liver, and the Spleen, ex­cites therin a very sharp, and pricking hear; and as the most generous souls are fullest of Grati­tude, so they who are proudest, meanest, and lowest give themselues up most to this sort of Wrath; for injuries appear so much the greater, as Pride makes a man esteem himselfe higher: and also seeing how much more a man esteemes the goods they dispile him of, which he values the more, the lower and meaner that his Soul is, because they are extraneous.

The 203 Article. That Generofity is a remedy against the excesses thereof.

BEsides, although this Passion be usefull to conferre vigour on us to repell injuries, never­thelesse, there is not any one, whose excesses ought to be avoided with more care: because by disturbing the Judgement, they oft-times cause a man to commit faults, whereof he afterwards repents: yes, and sometimes hinder him from repelling injuries so well as he might have done, had he had less emotion. But as nothing makes it more excessive than Pride so, I believe, Gene­rosity is the best remedy against the excesses of it: because making a man esteem but very little all such goods as may be taken away, and on the other side highly value the liberty and absolute empire over himselfe, which he ceases to have when any thing can offend him, it makes him only bestow Contempt, or at the most Indigna­tion on the injuries others use to bee offen­ded at.

The 204 Article. Of Glory.

WHat I here call Glory is a sort of Joy, grounded on self-Love, and comes from an opinion or Hope a man hath to be praised by some others. So it differs from inward Satisfacti­on, which proceeds from an opinion of having done a good action: for a man is often applau­ded for things that are not believed to be good, and blamed for those that are believed to be bet­ter; but both of them are sorts of self-Estimati­ons, as well as sorts of Joy, for it is an occasion for a man to esteem himselfe, to see that he is esteemed b others.

The 205 Article. Of Shame.

ON the contrary, Shame is a sort of Sadnesse, grounded also on selfe-Love, and proceeds from an opinion, or a Fear a man hath to be blamed it is besides, a sort of modesty, or Hu­mility and mistrust of ones selfe: for when a man esteems himselfe so highly, that he cannot imagine any one can contemne him, he cannot easily be ashamed.

The 206 Article. Of the use of these two Passions.

NOw, there is the same use of Glory, and Shame, in that they incite us to Vertue, one by Hope, the other by Feare; it is onely needfull to instruct the Judgement, concerning what is truly blameworthy or laudable, not to be asha­med of well-doing, and not to boast of vices, as many doe; but it is not good absolutely to divest our selves of these Passions, as the Cynicks did heretofore: for although the people judge very waywardly, yet since we cannot live without them, and that it behoves us to be esteemed by them, we ought oftentimes to follow their opi­nions rather than our own concerning the exte­riour part of our actions.

The 207 Article. Of Impudence.

IMpudence which is a Contempt of Shame, and oft of Glory, is not a Passion, because there is not any peculiar motion in us that excites it; but it is a vice opposite to Shame, and also to Glory, while either of them are good: as In­gratitude is opposite to Gratitude, and Cruelty to Pitty. And the chiefe cause of Impudence [Page 168]comes from often receiving great affronts; for there is none when he is young, but imagines that Praise is a good, and Infamy an evill, much more important to life than experience finds they are; when having received some eminent affronts, a man sees himselfe utterly degraded of honour, and contemned by every one; wherefore they become impudent, and measuring good and evill only by the conveniences of the body, they see that they enjoy them afterwards as well, Yea, and sometimes better, because they are eased of many hardships, whereunto Honour obliged them: and if the losse of their estate be joyned to their disgrace, yet there are charitable people who will give them some.

The 208 Article. Of Distaste.

DIstaste is a sort of Sadnesse, proceeding from the same cause whereof Joy came before. For we are so made up, that the most part of the things we enjoy, are onely good to us for a season, and afterwards become incommodious. Which especially appears in drinking and eating, which are onely usefull while a man bath a Sto­mack, and troublesome when he hath no more; and because they then leave to be pleasant to the taste, this Passion is called Distaste.

The 209 Article. Of Sorrow.

SOrrow is also a sort of Sadnesse, which hath a peculiar bitternesse in that it is ever joyned to some despaire, and remembrance of the de­light we took in enjoying it: for we are never sor­ry for any goods but those we have enjoyed, and which are so lost that we have no Hope to reco­ver them at that time, and in that manner as we sorrow for them.

The 110 Article. Of lightheartednesse.

LAstly, that which I call Lightheartednesse, is a sort of Joy, which hath this thing pe­culiar to it selfe, that the sweetnesse of it is aug­mented by the remembrance of misfortunes suf­fered, whereof a man feeles himselfe eased as if he felt himselfe discharged of a heavy burden, he had long born on his shoulders. And I see nothing very remarkeable in these three Passions; Nor have I placed them here, but to follow the method of my former enumeration. But, me thinks, this Enumeration was usefull to shew that we have not omitted any, which was worthy of peculiar consideration.

The 211 Article. A generall remedy against the Passions.

ANd now we know them all, we have lesse reason to fear them, than we had before. For we see that naturally they are all good, and that we ought to avoid onely the ill use of them, or their excesses: for which the remedies I have laid down may suffice, if every man were care­full enough to practise them. But because I have put Premeditation and Industry among these remedies, whereby the defects of nature may be corrected, by using to separate the mo­tions of the blood & spirits in ones self, from the thoughts wherewith they use to be joyned. I confesse, few men are thus prepared against all encounters: and that these motions excited in the blood, by the objects of Passions, doe so immediately follow the meere impressions in the brain, and the disposition of the organs, al­though the Soul be no way contributary, that no humane wisdome is able to resist them, when one is not enough prepared so, many cannot re­frain from laughing when they were tickled, though they take no delight in it; for the im­pression, and surprize of Joy that hath made them laugh formerly on the same occasion, being a­wakened in their fancy, makes their lungs be blown up on a sudden whether they will or no, [Page 171]by the blood that the heart sends thither. So they who are much addicted by nature to the emotions of Joy, or Pitty, or Chearfulnesse, or Wrath, cannot refrain from swouning, weeping, trembling, or having the blood stirred as if they had a Fever, when their fancy is throughly sensi­ble by an object of any of these Passions. But what may be done on such an occasion, and what I think to lay down here as the most gene­rall remedy, and the easiest to he practised, a­gainst all exorbitances of the Passions is, that when a man perceives his blood thus moved, he ought to be wary and remember that whatsoe­ver is presented to our Imagination, tends to the delusion of the Soul, and makes reasons that serve to perswade the object of Passions appear farre stronger than they are, and those which serve to disswade, farre weaker. And when Passion perswades things, the execution whereof admits of some delay, he must abstain from giving his judgement thereon immediatly, and divert him­selfe from it to other thoughts, untill time, and rest, have wholly allayed the emotion in the blood. And lastly, when it incites to actions, concerning which resolutions are instantly to be taken, the Will must peculiarly dedicate it selfe to consider and follow the reasons repugnant to those which the Passion represents, although they appear less weighty; as when a man is suddenly assaulted by an enemy, occasion doth not give him leave to waste any time in debate: but what [Page 172]it seems, those who are accustomed to make a reflexion on their own actions, may do; that is, when they feel themselves struck with an Af­fright; they will endeavour to divert their thoughts from the consideration of the danger, by representing to themselves the reasons where­fore there is more safety and honour in resistance than flight; and on the contrary, when they feel the Desire of revenge and Wrath incite them, to rush inconsideratly on those who beset them, they should call to mind, that it is indiscretion to destroy themselves, when they may be sa­ved without dishonour; and if there bee too much odds, it is better to make a handsome re­treat, or take quarter, than savagely to expose themselves to a certain death.

The 212 Article. That from them alone all the good and evil of this life depends.

NOw the Soul may have her delights distinctly by her self: but for those which are common to her with the body, they absolutely depend on the Passions; so that that those men whom they move most may be apt to taste most sweetnesse in this life. It is true, they may also find the most bitternesse, when they doe not understand [Page 173]how to employ them well, and fortune is ad­verse to them. But wisdom is herein especially requisite, that it teach us so to make our selves masters of them, and manage them with so much dexterity, that the evils they cause may be easily endured, and we may even extract Joy from them all.

The End.

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