I. WHether in the Circle of Government, the People have not had hitherto ample experience of Princely and private Spirits? or where a single Councel hath the power of debate and result, whether or no it can be accounted a Commonwealth, and not an Oli­garchy? In this case will our Grandee Officers of the Ar­my, confederate with some Grandee Ministers of State, give a Government to the Parliament, People, and Army, as they have made and owned a Commander in chief?

II. Why should the Peoples Representatives expect to per­petuate their power otherwayes then by Rotation? for so may not the Legislative authority sit continually, though successively? otherwayes, will not Intervals convert a Com­monwealth into Monarchy, (the Legislative Authority in­termitted) or into Oligarchy, in case they be Govern'd by a Councel?

[Page 2] III. Whether a Councel of State in any Commonwealth, had Executive power, except in the management of a War, or Treaty with forraign States? How contrary then are the Armies Proposals (in the course of popular prudence) to a Commonwealth? nay, how natural▪ is it for any unlimited power to resolve according to their own, rather then the Peoples Interest?

IV. Whether for Brutus to expel Kings, and not to pro­mote popular Liberty, was to lay obligation upon the Peo­ple (in hatred of Oligarchy) to bring back Monarchy? but what end or interest can a supream Councel (thus constitu­ted) have, to destroy it self by setting up Monarchy?

V. Grant civil Liberty, separable from Liberty of conscience, and then show us (who can) what security we shall have for our civil Liberty? was it not the pretence of the late Apostate usurper, that he could see no other means but force and violence to secure the Liberty of conscience? but what incouragement hath liberty of conscience had to trust more unto men then civil Liberty? or what became of civil Liber­ty intrusted to any Prince, or Oligarchy? and where hath the free State, or Commonwealth, been ever known, that gave not Liberty of conscience? in this sence, do they who dare trust men, understand me [...]? or do they who will not trust Laws, understand a Commonwealth?

VI. If Rome, Athens, Sparta, Venice, Holland, &c. were not [Page 3] molested with civil war and sedition, as Germany, France, Spain, England, &c. were▪ why then will men call a Com­monwealth confusion? what confusion had we in England, whilest the Norman Line strove for absolute Power, the Barons for Liberty, York and Lancaster for Royal dignity, Parliaments, People, and Army under the usurped power of the late perfidious single Person? but how probable is it that an equal Commonwealth may be received with im­braces, seeing a Tyranny came not onely in, but was sup­ported without bloodshed?

VII. If Nimrod first broke the first Goverment, which was Pa­ternal, by usurping absolute power to inslave the People by Policy, force, and fraud: if some Families put themselves under the power of one, as a Prince; others▪ under Aristo­cracy, wherein Noblemen▪ &c. bare sway, (as in Venice) or Aristocracies mixt with Democracies, like that of the United Provinces, where the great men consulting of the affairs of the Commonwealth with the Peoples Deputies, are Annual­ly chosen; or Oligarchy, which is the Government of a Commonwealth, consisting of a small number, over powering the People by Policy and force, or who have Supremacy pu [...] upon them by the People: such were the Decemviri, and Triumviri amongst the Romans▪ such the 30. Tyrants in Athens. And why then m [...]y not England, Scotland▪ and Ire­land, be not onely called, but become a Commonwealth?

• 1. By owning the Power to elect their Representatives▪ al­lowing them to sit but one year.
• 2. For that they tru [...]t not the Militia in the hands of one Person, nor the Law­making Power in a State Councel, are they not also sparing in making places too specious for profit, power, titular turns, or duration of time? will now such a constitution be found freer from corruption, oppression▪ &c. then these fore-mentioned wherein Persons Gov [...]r [...]ing, are protected from justice or punishment for their arbitrary usurp [...]ion [...], &c.

[Page 4] VIII. May we not without Intervals of Parliament (by frequent changing of Officers (civil and military,) in a little time, understand how to preserve our selves, without the defective continuation of Persons, Councels, Commanders, Senates? &c. nay, might we not at this very juncture (such qualifications premised) hope to preserve the Interest of the Common­wealth, though we put the absolute freedome of Election into the Peoples power? otherwayes, may not a Physitian force his Patient for the accomplishment of his cure? does not true Liberty stand in need sometimes of necessary limi­tations? or is not just Liberty consi [...]ent with society? and ought we not put our helping hand to hinder the self-Assassination of one, much more of many? who would not endeavour to deprive any one of the Liberty of destroy­ing himself? is it any wickedness to make a People happy against their wills?

IX. Whether the present Parliament (as that publick spirited Patriot Sir Arthur said) (having for these last 5. years been turn'd to grass) ought not now (to wipe away all fore-past misprisions) to act like Men and Christians in all respects, labouring to prevent (for the future) all fore-past usurpa [...]i­ons, in Church, State, and Army, occasioned by plurality in places, exorbitance in Power, exuberance in Titles, or superfluity in pay?

X. Whether those who have Apostatized from the good Old Cause, Protectors, and Instrument-makers, or Promo­ters, &c. such like pursuers of private or Personal im­ports, or such who suffered upon a publick pursuance, [Page 5] abominating the usurpations and cruelties of Oliver Crom­wel, ought to be first restored, or preferred in the Army?

XI. Whether those who have formerly not onely truckled under a single Person, (by making or promoting Instruments of Tyranny and servitude) but have still a Pope in their bel­lies, or a spite to popular Government, the avowed Enemy to their Lordly Gradenrs, which how loath they are to lay aside, is now too well witnessed by their unwillingness to receive their Martial Commissions from the Peoples Re­presentatives in Parliament, &c. or those who are down­right for a free State, and contented without any restaura­tion or▪ reparation (as to places of profit and preferment, to walk in quirpo either in City or Countrey) are fittest (both in Councel and Army) to consider what kinde of settlement is safest and most sutable to the preservation or promotion of publick, popular freedome?

XII. Whether a perpetual Parliament, a single Person, a co-or­dinate Senate, or another House, &c. be not alternate Pa­rents, begetting, and begotten; or however, very near of Kinne? And whether the People are obliged not onely to suspect, but also to prevent the power, or promotion, of all such Aspirers? as whether the Parliament may not by over­prudential procedures with such, weaken both the Hearts and Hands of their best friends? Lastly, whether the Parlia­ment, the good People of these Nations, with all their ho­nest Officers, Soldiers, (both in, and yet out of the Army) be not obliged unanimously to promote the publick, in op­position to all private pursuances?