HAving, out of a tender respect of my dear Coun­try, wherein I have enjoyed many comforts in this life, and care of the honour of that Religi­on whereby I hope to attaine a crowne in the life to come, represented, with a Letter, an ab­stract of the Armies formerly publisht over­tures for accommodation, to their Officers assembled in Councell. And being uncertaine, whether the said Paper were delivered ac­cording to my directions, or if it were, being certaine that it was not regarded, but instead of pursuing their former offers for Peace, we meet with an over-ly acknowledgment of their errour therein, and an high attempt to frustrate this Treaty; first pre­sented to the Parliament, and after to the people in Print: I thought it my duty, to compare their former pretences for Peace, with their present propositions for disturbance, to see which in the ballance of reason, and Scripture, may seeme more ponde­rous, to weigh downe the judgement of an indifferent obser­ver.

And first of all it is to be observed, how apparently contrary their present is, to former Remonstrances. The former clearly de­claring no Peace probable to be firme, and lasting, without pro­vision [Page 2]for the quiet, safety, and Honour of the King, and His Royall Family, and indulgence likewise to His Party. This is ite­rated to be the way to conquer hearts, to remove seeds of fewds, and future War. But the latter, like the Lawes of Draco, is writ in blood, breathing out Tryall or Execution against the King, Prince, and Duke of Yorke, and and all rigour to their partakers. The former was well made out to us by a double experience: for first, while these things were held out by the Army, all hearts were quiet, and expectations fixt to see whether such faire pro­posals would not put a happy period to our miserable distra­ctions.

But when all these overtures proved but empty flashes▪ or gol­den dreames: and insteed of happy Peace, with some satisfacti­on to all interests, to make it lasting; Behold the King first im­mured in a remote Castle, afterwards laid aside with Votes of no more Addresses, and those that erewhile (when they needed Him) interposed so gloriously for Him, voluntarily ingaging to beare out those Votes against Him, and all others: what follow­ed, but heart Land, and Sea commotions, whence such a dange­rous flame, that if God had not wonderfully interposed, to try us with one more lucidum intervallum, to see whether we would be wiser, and honester actum esset: there had been an end of our hopes, whether of Reformation or contended for Liberty, if the King be so minded as they afterwards represent Him. And though the Land be now quieted, yet Sea, and hearts remaine still troubled. The Parliament awaken'd by this, plainly saw that the state of the Nation would not be setled without the King, nor the hearts of the Nation quiet, without the Kingdome be setled: for till setling, the Husband-man, Grasier, and Trades­man, the support of a Nation for subsistence, and wealth, live in fear, and labour in vaine. And though the disease be quasht, the cause not being removed, a little time must of necessity bring a relapse, and the danger of relapses naturall, or civill, Physitions and States-men very well know. The Parliament finding by sad experience the errour of the Vote for no more Addresses, re­solved upon a Personall Treaty with the King. And though back­ward to it, while all was in combustion: yet after God had cleared the coasts, they proceed with more celerity, and alacrity, [Page 3]and things are very far, and faire for a good issue: And yet in Treaty all things are proposed, that both Nations thought requi­site for the freedome, and happinesse of both Kingdomes; for which they had ingaged so deepely. And it is very observable that during the late second War, rumours were spread abroad (whether true, or ad faciendum populum to please the people, let God judge) that the. Officers of the Army had seene their er­rours too, and if things were quieted, it should appear, that they would hereafter know their sphere and acquiesce in the Parlia­ments determinations: Yet now when upon so good tearmes peace is at our doores, Behold a thundering Declaration against His Majesty, and His Royall Family, to breake Treaty, and alter the forme of present government, with other things, which boade nothing but perpetuall distractions, to necessitate a perpe­tuall Army, knowing they must be the men, and so still be in a cir­cumstance to over-awe all that shall dare to crosse their designes, wils and humours. And now a query put upon all Treaty, espe­cially this present Treaty, resolved to be neither just nor safe: but upon what grounds comes now to be examined.

And first after many tedious circumlocutions, apt not to in­struct, but to distract the Reader, They grate upon the House, the ingrate remembrance of the Vote of no more Addresses. But the Houses have learned that secundae cogitationes meliores, second thoughts are wiser: but our wise Ancestors left us no pro­verbe for third thoughts. That were indeed to manifest that in­stability, that is inconsistent with solid sagacity. After this as te­dious paines is taken to make it seeme probable, that the Parlia­ment went not into this Treaty voluntarily, but inforced: But all that can in truth be asserted in this particular will I beleeve but amount to this.

That the discontent and danger that did arise from the Vote of [no Addresses] did convince them, that that was not the way to settle the Nation in assured peace, and quiet: And so that a Personall Treaty was more for the Publique good, then the Vote of no Addresses: for, had the Parliament entertained the motion of a Personall Treaty through feare onely, then would they have Treated, where those they feared, desired it; that is, in, or about London. But they would not condescend to it any where but in [Page 4]the Isle of Wight: Whence we gather but that the Parliament were free from force in the thing, because they over-ruled the place: And that the People were free from designe, otherwaies then for setlednesse by Treaty, because they did acquiesce in a Treaty any where.

After our Remonstrants, proceed pag. 14, 15. to dispute the Ju­stice and Safety of this Treaty: But usher it in with the state of the Question. And first, because the Safety in question relates to Publique interest, they set downe the summe of the publique in­terest of a Nation, in relation to common Right, and Freedome; and therein first, lay downe, that for all matters of Supream trust, they have a Common and supreame Councell, to consist of Deputies, or Representees freely chosen by themselves, &c. But here's a great stumble at the threshold, and essentiall errour in the very en­trance: for they are not to set downe (if they will speak to purpose) the interest of an Eutopia, an imaginary People; but what is the Publique interest of this Nation, as it now stands, having a supreame Councell, partly of Commons Elect, partly of Lords Hereditary: and by the continued constitution of our Parliaments, the Power, and Priviledges of the House of Peers, is superiour to that of the Commons: and those Rights and Pri­viledges of both Houses they have protested, sworne, and cove­nanted to maintaine in generall. And particularly, (and that if I mistake not, to draw on their consent to the Votes of no Addresses) the Army, by some of their Officers, did declare to the Lords at their Barre, (and after to all the world) that they would main­taine and defend the Priviledges of the Peers of England. It's appa­rent then, that the state of the Question which these have drawn, will not consist with the fundamentall constitution of the Go­vernment of England, which the Parliament have often declared, and all have protested not to alter; and therefore, how imperti­nent their Arguments must needs be on such a false foundation, the intelligent Reader will easily judge: For the same errour runs along, in all the particulars of the state of the Question, that are given of an Imaginary people, not of this People of England, under that frame of Government which is already establish'd a­mongst them.

In the application of this to the state of our National affairs, they [Page 5] ascribe to the King an indeavour by severall Warres to maintain an Absolute interest in Himselfe, against that Publique interest laid downe by them, which they say was asserted by the Parliament: which two particulars, both King, and Parliament have publique­ly disavowed. The King in His Answers to the 19 Propositions delivered at Beverly, clearly acknowledging this Monarchy not to be pa [...]e, but mixt with Aristocracy, and Democracy; the wisdome of Our Auncestors, having in Our constitution, gathered what was good, avoided what was evill, in all the three. And further, that the Monarchy was not absolute, but Regular in its administration. And the Parliament all along declaring, that they would not violate the just Right or Greatnesse of the King, nor alter the frame of Go­vernment established. And how can it be imagined, that the Lords should ingage for such an Interest, as despoiles them of all part in the Supreame trust, wherein they have the largest ingagement, and an Hereditary right?

After, pag. 20. they tell us of some particular Interests incident with the generall, both to King and Parliament: wherein in my judgment, they are as much mistaken in what is said in reference to the King, as they were in the generall, for they say, it was His interest to suppresse the power of Godlinesse, or any thing of Conscience obliging, above, or against humane constitutions, &c. for, what is the interest of a King, but to get the peoples hearts? and how is that better gotten then by countenancing Godlinesse? And a King that hath a Nation ingaged to him by Oath upon Oath, the greatest tie to Conscience. And a King that pretends but to be a Regular Monarch, what can more advance His interest, then to countenance conscientiousnesse? So many plaine precepts ly­ing obvious in Gods word, for Christians to be obedient and sub­ject to such for conscience sake. But to let that alone, and come to the dispute, where two things are supposed, 1. That where a Person is trusted with a Limited tower, and obliged by Oath, to rule according to Lawes, and breaks that Oath and trust, &c. He doth thereby forfeit all that power and trust he had, and sets the People free to take their best advantage, and to proceed in judgment against him. But first of all, this supposition, that abuse of Power is in this case a forfeiture, must not be assented unto. There is a Limited power, that is delegatory, sub poena, under paine of forfei­ture: [Page 6]and there is a Limited power Hereditary, which descends absolutely, but is not to be exercised without limits, and those confirmed by Oath. Our Kings trust is of the latter sort, He is King, and so proclaimed, that is Heire, assoone as His Predeces­sour is dead, and exercises all Regall power, and other Officers their inferiour powers under Him, some yeares sometimes be­fore Coronation, and so before His Oath. Besides, in the Oath of Allegiance, we absolutely sweare to maintaine the King in His Regality, and His Heires after Him. Though therefore because He is to be regulated, we may tie His hands to prevent future Ty­ranny, yet we cannot strip Him of His just Regall power, because he holds not on condition of forfeiture.

The second supposition is, of a King breaking His trust, and fayling in His attempt, brought to quit His claim to absolutenesse, but afterwards shall indeavour by force to overthrow all againe, and so raise Warre, &c. Then he must be guilty of the highest Treason, at least of all the bloudshed in the unjust Warre, pag. 22.23. And then it is inferr'd that all this the King hath done, &c. But here I desire candour to be used, and consideration to be had, to what His Ma­jesty held forth, and what probability there might be of His sin­cerity therein.

First, in all the late businesse He never pretended to absolute­nesse, but onely to maintaine the Lawes, and Legall Rights of Himself and Subjects.

2. The Oath that He had taken at Coronation for the pro­tection of His people, and in speciall the Clergy, did carry a very probable show to make him hold fast the Militia, without which He could not protect them; and to ingage Him to use His power for protection of Bishops, whose standing He thought lawfull, and whose immunities He had sworne to maintaine.

3. As the Parliament had Jealousies of Him, so was He not without faire colours of Jealousies from them, of their intend­ment to overthrow Monarchy, which such courses as are in this Remonstrance, may more confirme Him in.

These things considered, He wants a great deale of charity, yea justice, that shal not acquit the King of any wilful murther: Gods knowes His heart, but His pretences were faire, and He had very probable grounds to lead him to these pretences, to [Page 7]stand on His Guard, to maintaine His legall Rights, and the Rights of those His Subjects, that were afraid of too much alte­ration in Religion; which I beleeve were the greater part for number.

As therefore if He had conquered, though the letter of the Law had made His Opposites, Traytours; yet because the Law had proved them to have been Traytours onely in action, not in intention, they might have expected favour, and it had been un­just to have dealt with them, as in a case uncontroverted, where there had been wilfull transgression.

So should it now be considered in the case of the KING, and His Party: and therefore in laying the case, the KING is not onely unjustly, but uncharitably used.

Neither so farre as my reason extends is it truly said, that a few of those many evils that our King hath acted were judged capitall in severall of His Predecessours.

We read indeed of some of His Predecessours basely, and wickedly murthered, but never any suffering death as the result of any judgment pass'd upon Him. From this mistaken supposi­tion ariseth that want of change or remorse, which they com­plaine of in the King.

The fault they here lay to His charge, He will confesse, were He guilty of it, He hath cause to abhorre Himself in dust, and ashes. But He will deny their supposition, and that He intended no slavery in people, nor absolutenesse in Himself, but defence of Himself and those of His People, that craved His protection in their Legall Rights. And His errour was to be jealous of those that He should have confided in: And from this errour hath growne these sad consequences. But so long as the Army go on with such Declarations, they will free Him from errours, justifie His jealousies, countenance His defence.

But yet nearer, for the justice of accommodation with the King without triall, or punishment: I think it rests in this, when the Law acquits, civil Judges may acquit; but the Law acquits the Persons of our Kings: Therefore civil Judges may. You confesse such maximes as give absolute impunity to Kings, and that the Kings of England can do no wrong, are found in Law-books, (though you say) as Heireloomes of the Conquest. But if they be in our Law-books, [Page 8]books, they are legall Priviledges, and preheminences by our Lawes, and then those that have taken the Oath of Supremacy, and sworne to maintaine all the preheminencies, and Priviledges of the Crowne, (as all Parliament men have at their admission) cannot punish the Person of the King, because its an infringing of a legall priviledge.

I might adde such Judiciary proceeding against, or without Law, will not stand with their Oaths, that have sworne to main­taine Law and legall Rights of all.

But pag. 50. they say, they cannot see how it may stand with justice, to punish the Ministers, and let the Head go free: nay, they fur­ther say, what ever grounds may be brought to exempts Kings from humane justice, or excuse them when they wilfully give commissi­on &c. The same reason will serve to absolve, and indempuifie their Ministers, &c. At least, they say, they would faine heare one prin­ciple for the one, which would not by rationall deduction, extend to the other.

I Answer, first, it cannot be denied but that in evill things, he that gives the Commission, and command, is deepest in trangres­sion; so on their supposition, a King must deserve more blame and punishment then His Instruments: But then secondly, it is to be considered, that humane Lawes and penalties look at safety, as well as demerit; now to punish a King is like to set all on a flame, and so to endanger the Weal publike, therfore though their guilt be great, yet they are left to God to avoid inconvenience. But now Ministers deserve punishment though not so much, and the punishment of them, may free the Common wealth from danger for future, for if the King can have no Instruments, He can doe no mischief.

To conclude this point, about the justice of accommodation: let me aske them this Question, have they not read what David did, in his Civil Wars both with Ishbosheth and Absalom? closing them up without any trial, or execution, (though much blond was shed in both.) And if Kings may accommodate with Subjects without any trying, and punishing them, to avoid future In [...] ­ctions; why may not Subjects for the same reason, & on the same tearmes, accommodate with their Kings, and be blamelesse? an Argument from a Scripture example is cogent, where the reason [Page 9]is the same, else our Saviour would not have used it, Mat. 12.3, 4.

Why did this Army themselves gives pardons to that nest of those in Oxford, whom they accounted the originall Delinquents? But to prevent blood, and danger by losse of time: why may not the Parliament then passe by the errours of the King, to prevent the blood-shed, that will inevitably follow, upon rigour, and execution?

But now to the second question touching the safety of this accommodation; against which they argue: First, from experi­ence, that seldome or never have such accommodations proved ease to the people: for answer, I would demand againe, where the reje­ction of a King, and His posterity, hath not proved the fatall cause of endless civill War? and whether that be not as destructive to publique interest as any thing to be feared from accommoda­tion? After the Deposing of Richard the Second, how long did this Nation continue in blood, and how endlesse was the contention? till an accommodation in the union of the divided Houses by the marryage of their heires: nor would that serve when there was but a suspition of anIn Perkin Worbeeke. Heir male of the House of Yorke surviving. And so is it like still to be. They have not now all the seed Roy­all in their hands, if they would with Athaliah destroy them. Nor are they like to have, sith they propose such a way of sum­mons to the Prince, and Duke of Yorke, as if it be not intended to discourage Them from returning, yet must it needs have that effect. And they so banisht for such a cause, viz. ingagement to free their Father from so close Imprisonment: on what heart will not move pitty, that hath either the sence of humanity, or the af­fection of a father, or a son in him? And so draw on Forreigne force, to joyne with a discontented, and oppressed party here, which they confesse to be numerous: which is a danger that can neither be avoided, nor parallel'd on the other hand.

Next for their arguing the likely-hoods of the Kings willingness to breake all those concessions, which He shall grant: We may argue with more probability to the contrary. Kings that intend to breake, care not what they grant, so it be not of things that dis­able them from breaking. But our King in the late Treaty, hath been most free, and speedy in passing away His owne power, and tenacious onely in those things wherein not onely consci­ence [Page 10]was pretended, but without great uncharitablenesse we can­not question but that he was really scrupled about them. And he that will adventure life and all, rather then grant one thing against conscience, why shall not we hope, that He will be as tender in keeping, when conscience is once ingaged in other things?

For what is held forth that the King may pretend His non in­gagement to His concessions, because under force. I Answer as be­fore, if the King had any such thought, He would not care what He granted, because all were nullities. Besides, though there be a dispute in Law, whither promises or obligations, made under restraint, be binding, yet all Divines know, that to a conscienci­ous man its sinfull to take the oath he intends not, or is not law­full for him to keepe, and if the thing covenanted be lawfull, and intended to be kept: he that makes conscience of any thing, will make conscience of such a covenant: by taking whereof though he suffer some damage, yet he purchaseth life, and liberty to him­selfe.

After there is a long discourse of the advantages the King shall have, to undoe all if He have a mind to it. And if the King after all these concessions, (which are more in many things then the far greater part of His people do desire) shall be rejected and fall, will there not be that pitty to the suffering, that indignation against the exe­cutioner, that will cause more dangerous rising then ever, when any Forraigne helpe is brought by the Princes either to relieve, or revenge their Fathers sufferings? Therefore for ought I see, the dangers of accommodation are but probable, and scarce that. The dangers of rejection, and execution inevitable. I would therefore propose it seriously to the consciences of these men, whether it be truely the fear of danger to the publique interest of the Nation, that makes them so averse to accommodation, or rather to the private interests of them, and a party in the Nation; and in that, feare not so much of suffering evill, as losing either those great hopes or holds, that by the present distractions they enjoy.

Afterwards they proceed to their owne excuse for formerly being so forward for Accommodation, and Moderation to the King and His Party, which they now so much oppose. And in­deed they did then hold forth such good grounds for publique [Page 11]interest, as to root out seeds of future war, to conquer hearts, &c. That it will never be beleeved, but either then they were not reall: but did onely pretend, to strengthen themselves with his party, which done, they shewed themselves in their colours, or else that now private interest doth carry them against that of the publike, which they really followed, when their owne private was invol­ved with it. But they tell us, they were cleared in their judgements by the Parliaments Votes of No Addresses, and the Reasons of it. As though there were any thing therein now, which had not been known, and murmured long before, even during the time of Ad­dresses.

But they then come to answer an Objection from the Covenant in­gaging to a perpetuall care to endeavour the preservation of the Kings Person and Authority, &c. and so concluding under a necessity of per­petuall Addresses. And to this,

First, they say, the Covenant, as other promissory Oathes, heaping together severall distinct interests, which may be inconsistent, and yet ingageth positively to them all, may become a snare.

I would they would consider this in the Kings Coronation Oath, wherein mixt interests intangled him, that it might move some pity in them, as looking on him under a snare by his Oath, and not take all in the worst sense, as though all the opposition he made had flowed from wicked principles in him.

Secondly, they say, the undertaking for the King in the Covenant, was not absolute, but conditionall to preserve His Person and Power in maintenance of Religion and Liberties, &c.

I Answer, Though there be such a clause in the Scotch Cove­nant, yet in the Protestation, in the Oath of Allegeance and Su­premacie, there was no such condition, for evasion: and I hope our English Oathes are as binding as the Scotch Covenant: I would therefore know how they can answer either for execution or deposition to the obligation of those oathes.

Secondly, they say, the Covenant, as for the civill part of it, is be­tweene man and man; and the King not concurring, we stand not in­gaged to him.

This is a grand mistake, for the whole Covenant is to and with God, though in some things in it, we engage to performe duties to man. And though in Covenants betweene man and man, that [Page 12]are mutuall and conditionall, one stands not bound, unlesse the other accept: yet the case was not so in this Covenant, but both Nations to cleere themselves from any evill intentions towards the King, and to approve their loyaltie, doe professe to men, and covenant to God, these things, not with the King, but for the King, and his interest. And therefore an ingagement lyes be­fore God, though the King never take the Covenant.

But I would put a question to them upon another branch of this Covenant, and the Protestation, which is against all Popery. And I would know of them, what point of Popery hath been more fully, or cleerly opposed by Protestants, English and others, then that Jesuiticall one of murthering, and deposing Princes? And I would know of them, how they will excuse their way of deposition, and execution, from symbolizing with that point of Popery so condemned? I doubt not then but I may lawfully conclude, that the Army have more cause to repent of their pre­sent, then former Remonstrances; and may doe well to inter­pose onely for the interest of themselves, and party, to be consi­dered in the closure: but desist from their indeavour of an abso­lute breach.

I will shut up all with a story in our English Chronicle, which hath often been in mine eye, wishes, and hopes too, mutatis mu­tandis, since the beginning of our Warre: Our Henry the third, having first lost the love of his people, and after faine into their power: And being by meanes of his sonne delivered, he reflect­ed (warn'd by smart and danger) on his former errors, refor­med them: And being exalted, studied not revenge, but the ex­alting of his throne by righteousnesse, and thereby made his peo­ple happy, and himselfe glorious. And lived to fashion hisEdw. the 1. styled Englands Justinian: for though as ma­ny awes were made in his, as any other kings time; yet none of his were ever abolisht by fol­lowing Parlia­ments. son and successour to make him partner of his owne experience and authority, so framed him to affect vertue and glory, that he ever shewed himselfe in all his actions, capable to command not the Realme onely, but the whole world. Vid. Sir Rob: Cottons Hist. of Hen. 3. pag. 39. to the end. If we have so much faith and piety to pray, why may we not have so much charity as to hope that our King restored by Accommodation, will apply those incompara­ble abilities, that in his suffering he hath made demonstration of, [Page 13]so to promote the happinesse of His people, as may be a full re­paration of Himself in Honour, and them in damages. So prayeth a lover of his Country, a Zelot (onely in the way of conscience,) for his King, and a friend to the Army in regard of that piety that many of them professe, and he humbly begs them all to stu­dy to practise and honour: and that by avoiding all such courses that may give suspition, that men that pretend highest to piety, and the publique, do yet deviate from the rules of both to uphold themselves and their private interest.

And thus have I adventured to give my sense of some part of this Declaration so farre as it contradicts their former overtures for accommodation, to the maintenance of which I was some­what ingaged by what I had formerly done.

And this I hope will not be altogether uselesse, till some man of more leisure, depth, and insight of state affaires, shall fully shew how weak and impolitick they are in their whole Declarat.

Yet one thing further I cannot but touch, to wit, that Propo­sall, pag. 66. The summe whereof is this, That it be declared, That such Representatives (that is, of the House of Commons) have, and shall have the Supreame power and trust, as to the making of Lawes, Constitutions, and Offices, &c. and as to the altering, and repealing the same, the making of Peace, and Warre, and to be the highest finall judgment, in all civill things without any appeale, &c. And after this, and other Proposals, is this clause added, pag. 67. That n [...]e may be capable of any benefit, by the agreement, who shall not consent or subscribe thereunto.

Here note first, that both King and Lords are excluded from any share in the Supremacy: now I would faine know with what modesty such a thing can be propounded to the House of Com­mons, and that by diverse, themselves Members of that House, when they know, that all the Members of the House of Com­mons take an Oath of Supremacy to the King, at their admission, and all that have taken either Covenant, or Protestation, are bound by those Oathes to maintaine the Priviledges of both Houses of Parliament? And who knoweth not that by the present constitution of our Parl. The House of Peers is in many things su­periour to that of the Commons: will they propose things for civill advantage, which will involve both themselves, and those [Page 14]to whom they propose them in plaine perjury the first day? Is this consistent with piety? Nay with common honesty? And yet here is a further mischief still, for if the Major part of them should through fear, or delusion become so vile as to receive, and promote these proposals, then the agreement contained in them must be subscribed by all, and non-subscribers, be excluded from any benefit by the agreement. And then I would know of them in what condition these free people shall be in, that for want of subscribing, shall be excluded the benefit of the agree­ment? shall they not loose the benefit of Free borne subjects? and what if they cannot in conscience subscribe it? As if they have ta­ken, and make conscience either of Protestation, or Covenant, or Oath of Supremany, (as far as I can see) they cannot, would they impose such a penalty to inforce conscience?

Sure this makes me remember that which was fore-told me many years agoe: That if these great pretenders for liberty of con­science, could once be possest of power, they would be the greatest op­pressours of conscience, that ever were in England since the Reforma­tion. And sure the Bishops imposed subscription onely on Ministers, and on penalty of losing Ecclesiasticall livings onely: but these would have a subscription imposed on all, upon penalty of losing the Priviledge of Free Denisens. Doth not this call upon City and Country to awake, and to Petition the Parliament for, and to stand by them in the rejection of such Proposals, as will either ingage to the defiling of their consciences by a grievous sin, or expose them to greatest misery, and slavery? or else I may con­clude with sorrow. Fuimus Angli.