1.

FOrasmuch, as all men as well Inferiours, as Superiours, are by the Lawes, both of God and Nature; as also by Con­stitutions, Civill, and Mili­tary (grounded upon Reason, [Page 2] and Honour) bound to conserve, as much as in them lyeth, their native Country; in which they receive the life of Men, and enjoy the liber­ty of Free-men; the most especiall benefits (speaking morally) of this Lower world: every one therefore is, not to hide his Talent in the ground, but liberally to proffer, for the generall good of his Country, what store soever he pos­sesseth, or enjoyeth, whether or no, it be the en­dowment of Nature, or Fortune: so that per­sons in Authority, are to procure their Coun­tries well-fare by their well-ordered, and dis­creet Commands, and Government, Souldiers by their valour, and Discipline, the rich by their wealth, learned and experienced men by their know­ledge and observation, Inferiours by prompt obedi­ence, all by good-will. To expose these assertions to approbation, I conceive no Author need to be ci­ted, the Dictamen of reason averring them to be so, wherefore I cannot doubt, that much honou­red Superiours (to whose grave censure J sub­mit these my Propositions) will any way be offen­ded, that I have Dedicated to them these subse­quent Considerations, proceeding if not from sufficient reason, yet from intire good-will; so that if J have inserted any one clause, that may give the least distaste; I humbly intreat, that ‘—quis enim succenset amanti? Ovid Epist. Her Helen. &c.’ may excuse it.

2

THE most Politicke- and martiall men have generally esteemed Forts, and strong places, the safety not onely of meane Provinces, but even of the greatest, and most puissant Kingdomes and Empires, the de­fects, and neglects whereof have many (too many) times beene the occasions or rather causes of most irreparable Disasters, in greate and commanding Monarchies, and Estates. The Romane Empire invaded by the Persians, Sa­racens, Goths and Vandalls, the Greeke Empire wholly subverted by the Turks; Spaine over­runne by the Moores (with other Countries) were heretofore most lamentable Presidents of thraldome occasioned chiefly (according to humane principles of State) by noe having their frontiers & ploces of importance strongly for­tified: But to instance provinces, and s part more neere, and notified unto us in these mo­derne times, who knoweth not but that the small remnant of Hungaria, the States of Venice and Holland, the Islands of Sicily, Sardinia, Can­dy and Malta, [...] even all Italy, are all principal­ly conserved (speaking of the instrumentall cause) from forreigne subjection and tyranny by fort and strong places.

MOreover the most flourishing King­domes and Monarchies, both Chri­stian and Mahometan, disdaine not, but rather wholy endeavour to have the bounds and borders of their dominions, if not extraor­dinarily, yet sufficiently strengthned with forti­fications and Garrisons both in peace and war: so do the Roman or German Emperour, and Great Turk (notwithstanding of late the ordinary peace or Truce betweene them) keepe the one the forts (or rather Townes) of Kamorra, Rab &c. the other of Strigonium, Buda &c. exactly main­tained with all necessaries; thereby wiesly pre­venting the sudden events of war, if their ene­mies (albeit they make shew of peace) should upon any distast, or occasion of advantage given them, attempt an invasion: For such places of strength, although they are not always swords (which sometimes they are) to cut off an enemy, yet are they ever Bu [...]klers to defend a Countrie, untill such time, as either sufficient power can be aised to expell them; or that reasonable con­ditions be obtained, if so be that the enemy bee not inviucible in respect of number.

[Page 5] 4. Nor can J, but commend in this point of for­tifying (to omit the Hollanders of all our neighbor nations most carefull) the French and Spanish, but e­specially the French: who, although they need not greatly feare, or at leastwise tremble at any forraine Invasion from their neighbors by Sea, which could impose the yoke of sujection upon them; by reason of their great, and united Land-forces, they are able to make, to expell, and vanquish any such powers, as could by shipping, Gallies, and the like, enter into their continent, yet have they on the Levant, & great Ocean Seas, strong townes, and Castles well furnished with good Garrisons, and necessary provision for de­fence, against a puissant Invader: as to begin on the Levant in France, Tolou, Marseilles, Narbon in Spain, Barcelona, Denia, Alicante, Cartagena de Levanto, Malaga, Gibraltar, Cadiz, the Groine, St. Sebastians, Fonte-Rabia; and againe in France, Baion, Blois sur Garroun, Broige, Rochel quondam, Brest, St. Malos, Mount St. Michael, Grandvill, Cherbourg, Havre-de Grace, Diepe, Cales, &c, so that the consideration of these aforenamed places of importance, strongly e­rected, and warily kept, and repaired by those, and o­ther our neighbouring Nations; have divers times moved me to ponder, whether their care in maintai­ning such Fortifications, or our confidence in omit­ting them, and, as it were, quitting the charge there­of, may be more commendable?

5. First, therefore (not to flatter our selves) J con­ceive, that it must be granted, that none of our best Sea-townes, or Castles, of Barwick, Hull, Yarmouth, [Page 6] Harwich, Sandon, Dover, Portsmouth, Plimouth, &c. are (as they now are contrived, and strengthened) to be compared with most of those in France, and Spaine, aforesaid: For although the situation of some of ours, may be as convenient as some of theirs; yet our manner of fortifying is not to be equalized with theirs; confidering their strong walls and Parapets, Bulwarkes, Halfe-moones, Horne-workes, Ports, Moots, Ditches, Rampiers, and in some places Redouts, and Sconces; as in the Low-Countries: and what J con­ceive to be more worthy of consideration, and more to be looked into; many places of importance in this Kingdome, are in a manner without any Fortifi­cation at all; or else so weakly maintained, or ill composed, that in time of warre (especially with the French our overseeing neighbors) they lye greatly (ac­cording to the Nature, and martiall Discipline of these dayes) exposed to danger,

6. For to instance, Milford Haven is a place of that situation, and convenience; that a great Navie, even the greatest (almost for burden, how soever for number) may arrive there; and being arrived, land what numbers they shall be able without any their eminent, or great danger, there being no place of strength to molest or hinder them, nor a people of any considerable power (although they want no courage) to resist them: and may not an Army out of Spaine, or France (now more to be thought of) not onely there land, but also there fortifie themselves, wasting, and destroying the Countries of Pembroke-shire, Carmarden-shire, Glamorgan-shire, and Cardi­gar [Page 7] shire, before sufficient forces could be raised to resist them, and enforce them to desist? May not great powers likewise, not onely spoyle us, as before said; but also invade the heart of the Kingdome from thence, and that with much convenience to themselves, and inconvenience to us, for having so large, and safe and Haven (as is Milford-haven) for their fleet, if it should be by them well fortifyed, and kept (as that no doubt but they would doe) might they not march a­long the Sea Coast through the plentifull Coun­tries of Pembroke shire, Carmarden-shire, and Clamor­gan-shire aforesaid, and from thence into Monmouth shire, Hereford shire, and so farther according to their Potencie? Which how dangerous it might prove (God of his goodnesse defend it) not onely to the ruine of those Countries, but also disanimating of our people living in, or about them; to the incen­sing of Domesticall discontented factions (if any such should be) with other like Casualties. I leave it to the Consideration of my Superiours.

7 Moreover, not Milford Haven onely (lying upon large, and commodious Seas, and being likewise so situated, as that it may annoy (if once in the hands of a stranger) Ireland, as well as England, and greatly dis­unite them, or at leastwise molest their union; not onely that, I say, but also to omit the mouth of the River of Carmarden, Swanzey, Cardiffe, Newport, and Chepstow, or rather the mouth of the River of Wuy in Monmouth-shire, the mouth of Severn, Kingrode, Mynhead, and some other places in the Severn-Sea; [Page 8] the Ile of Sheppey in Kent, the mouth of Thames, and Tinmouth Castle have need (in respect of future Ca­sualties) to be better looked unto, and strengthened: as likewise the towns of Poole, Waymouth, and Port­land Iland in Dorset shire, are (in my small insight) to be farre better fortifyed then they are. For first, Dorset shire is the nearest Country unto France (Kent onely excepted) of any part of England; next, it is by nature least strong, as lying wholly upon the Sea, having no difficult Cliffes, or Rockes to incum­ber an enemy in landing. Thirdly, it lyeth in the midst of the Southerne Coast, having Eastward Ham­shire, Sussex, and Kent; Westward Devonshire, and Cornwall: and Northward the body of the Kingdome: so that if a potent enemy should stand there, hee might direct his forces Eastward, Westward, or Northward; according to his most advantage: as for the Castles of Waymouth, and Portland Iland, they are not for strength considerable; and yet who know­eth not, but that that Iland, and the land of the Coun­ty, make a large Bay sufficient to containe a great Navie, where likewise they may ride at Anchor in reasonable safety, unlesse the South, or Southeast winds be extraordinarily stirring; so that, if that I­land (let it seeme of what importance it please) should be but taken, and well fortifyed by the French (besides the charge and hazzard of recovering it, or blocking it up) they might shrewdly annoy us, having Normandy so neare.

8 And for that I have intimated the French, it may be thought either hate, or aversion (without [Page 9] fundamentall reason) if I shew not some prudent, or at leastwise, probable cause of suspition in that Na­tion against us; wherefore, I have here briefly set down the particulars, which I conceive of the French proceedings, and greatnesse. First, therefore it is well knowne that France is the greatest, most plentifull, and populous Kingdome in Europe, being at the least foure times bigger then England, and having 5 times as many people. The King thereof is now the most absolute Monarch Christian (except the great Duke of Moscovie, or Emperour of the Abessines, whom we scarcely know) so that the King of France, his Sic volumus, sic jubemus, is in a manner a Law amongst the greatest part of his Subjects; and thereby hee hath of late so augmented his Revenues, that those of France alone, exceed the Incoms of all the large Do­nions of Spaine, and Portugall; or at the least wise, they equalize them: besides, France hath extended it selfe of late, through Lorraine, and in Artois, and Al­satia, Lording as it were over Savoy, and Piemont: the Marquisate of Montferrat, and Dutchy of Mantua in Italy, are likewise under the protection of France: but that which of all things ought most to awake us, is the French Conquest in Artois, aforesaid, so neare unto us, and neerely concerning us, as I take it: the Proverbe is, ‘Tunc tua res agitur, paries cum proximus ardet.’ [Page 10] And is not our neighbors house on fire in the Pro­vinces of Flanders, are not Arras, Aires, and Hesden by the French taken in? for my part were St. Omers, Graveling, and Dunkerk by them likewise subdued, I should account that house burntdown to the ground; and were the French once but Masters of Flanders, I would know whether (according to reason of State) they might not overmaster us, if they should make warre upon us, as 'tis likely they would. If it should be said, and concluded, that in such Case we would, and should enter into a league both Defensive, and Offensive with the Hollanders; and by that meanes be enabled to oppose the French. To this I answer, that it is a question. First, whether, or no, the Hollanders would in such case breake their league defensive, and offensive which they hold with the French, to joyn compact with us: for it may be very likely, that they would not draw upon them, so neere, and powerfull an ene­my; besides, they have of late beene ayded by the F [...]ench, since they have in a manner been quit by us: Moreover, France can live of it selfe without Holland, but Holland can scarce live without France; as ha­ving great store of Corne, wine, and salt, and Canvas from thence: besides, 'tis very likely, that the Hollan­ders would be content to subsist, and to inrich them­selves by trade (as doe the Venetians) and so to live at peace with their neighbors: and to say that they would joyne with us meerly for Religions sake; it may seeme so to a weake Opiniatist, but never to an understanding Statist; who well knoweth that Re­ligion is many times the pretended, but seldome the [Page 12] reall Cause of warre, or leagues: and as for the Hol­landers, J am of opinion, that they will never enter into warre, or league, meerly for Religion.

9 But grant that wee should enter into such a league with the Hollanders; J conceive, notwith­standing that France (if it had but Flanders added to it) would be superiour to them and us by land, & no whit inferiour by Sea; for to say, that the French in respect of their numbers both of horse and foote, would not in such case as aforesaid, be masters of the field, were meerly to flatter our selves, and they that are masters of the field, will in time be masters of as many townes and forts as they can besiege, and en­compasse or block up by land, if such townes cannot otherwise be succoured by Sea; and it may be even of them also: so that the Hollanders having their townes and Forts taken from them, would be infor­sed to breake their league with us, and make their peace with the French: and if it should farther be said, that in such Case, we would not onely make a league with the Hollanders; but also with other Princes, and States, who should assist us. J answer, that this bare saying, or supposition, must not goe for a maxime. For first, it must be considered that, all Nations are most inclinable to them that can stand them in most stead; now great Brittaine, for that it is an Iland, can stand no Nation in any great stead, for the invasion of France (at leastwise by land) and that chiefly, because our shipping (if we should be masters of the Seas) could not transport over any great powers, both of horse and foot (especially of [Page 12] horse) to make a considerable Conquest in so large a Continent, as is France.

10 Nor is it consequence to say, that formerly we have made Conquests in France, with a small power. For 1. it must be considered, that the Nature and Discipline of warre is greatly altered. Secondly, we then had a third part of France, or rather more under our obedience, having not now one foote within the maine Land. Thirdly, France had then many Homagers and Peeres, that durst, were able, and did oppose the King; so that, by that meanes it was disunited; whereas now, there is none of any Potency that dare controle the King, or his commands; or if there be, yet can they not but quickly be reduced into subje­ction, or else expelled as Fugitives, France being now wholly under obedience. Fourthly, it must likewise be considered, that the Forts, Ports, and Citadels of France were not then so strong, as now they are, be­ing now all for the Major part, re-edified according to moderne Fortification. Fiftly, the Revenues of the Crown of France, are far greater then ever they were, as aforesaid, the Revenues of Normandy alone, equa­lizing now the revenues antient, of the whole crown, whereby the King of France is inabled to leavy, and maintaine greater Armies: to all this may be added our long ease (a great Disease I feare) by which wee are of late become unexpert, to attempt any notable designes against so potent a Nation, as is France.

11 So that for the reasons alleadged, we can not stand other Nations in any great stead, for the Invasi­on of France; and therefore 'tis to be thought, that [Page 13] the German Princes, as many as can stand us in any stead, would not decline from France, which doth & may availe them (especially if the House of Austria fall to decay) to incline to us, who can availe them but little; and the Portugals (if they continue in a Kingdome independent from Spaine) will, in any oc­casion of great importance, either wholly devote themselves to France (for that it may assist them a­gainst the Castilians, as likewise for Corne, Canvas, &c.) or else the Portugals will remaine Newtrals: as for Spaine (if they should lose Flanders) they would find enough to doe, to keepe themselves in safety on the other side of the Pyrenans; and besides, they will conceive, it may be, that for as much as we ne­ver throughly assisted them in their Countries of Flanders, &c. that therfore they were no way obliged afterwards to ingage themselves for us; and besides (Flanders once lost) they were not able to doe us a­ny great good; no more were Italy, Denmarke, Po­land, and Swedeland in respect of their remotenesse; and it is most probable also, that those Nations would remaine as Newters betweene the French and us.

So that if France should gaine Flanders, and then fall out with us, 'tis to be feared, that the warre once turned upon us, would come wholly to our shares to beare, and make an end of; and in such case, I hope all will agree that it were very necessary, that all our Ports, and places of importance, were strongly fortified, and securely guarded: and surely it can not be amisse to foresee, and prevent inconveniences by [Page 14] times, and indeed I conceive it now even high time to be looked unto; for albeit that the French have not as yet wholy subdued Flanders, yet are they in a reasonable forwardnesse, & possibility of gaining it but letting that passe to take the event of warre; ad­mit now the French should make a peace or Truce with the Spanish, who (by reason of their many, and great troubles) would 'tis very propable (before all were lost in Flanders) be glad to embrace Peace or Truce; and forasmuch as the French are on the win­ning hand, 'tis very likely therefore, that they would capitulate for their owne advantage: let it therefore be supposed, that it should be concluded betweene the French and Spanish, in a present Truce; that nei­ther should ayd, or assist the enemies of one another during the time of such peace or Truce; which con­dition I beleeve the Spanyards would not refuse if it were urged; because they would not have the Portu­gals, Catalonians, and such like aided against them­selves: if therefore such Truce (as aforesaid) were made between those two Nations, suppose rhe French should even now turne their furies & ambition up­on us, were it not then most requisite, that all our Ports, and places of Importance were securely guar­ded, and strongly fortifyed?

13 If it be said, that we would be Masters of the Sea, and by that meanes we should be able to divert any of the French forces, and not suffer them to land. J answer, that first it is a question whether we could master the French at sea, as they may be provided, and I beleeve, if the Hollanders (being now in a league [Page 15] Defensive, and offensive with them) would joyn with them, wee should bee deceived, and it would be well for us to be equall with them; but admit we should be equall, or somewhat Superiour to the French at sea; what great security could be built upon that: they may draw (if they finde themselves too weak) our ships of warre into one place, by daring us, and making shew of a Conflict with their ships, [...]nd yet with lesser vessels land an Army, or forces in ano­ther place, and there surprize some convenient Port, Towne, or Castle, if not sufficiently fortifyed, and strengthned to make resistance; and how many times have weak places bin suddainly subdued, to the great prejudice of the owners, experience hath shewed to the ruine of many; on the other side strong places (if not betrayed or most negligently kept) have many times foyled an enemy, and secured a whole Pro­vince; for no enemy (except of an investible power) will returne farre into anothers Country, leaving a strong place behind him, to which his enemies may assemble, and joyne themselves against him to make head, and if not fight with him afterwards, yet cut off his succours, and Convoyes, by the helpe of such a place, thereby, by little and little weakning, and dis­inabling him. If it bee farther said, that we need not feare an Invasion from France, or any other Nation; and consequently need not erect any strong Forts, for that a puissant Army of above 20000. 30000. or 40000. at the most, cannot be by shipping transpor­ted, or landed in this Iland, and as for such powers our trained, or Military bands (with other forces soon [Page 16] raised) would be able to overthrow them. I answer to this, that 'tis not good to put such a thing to haz­zard; for (to omit the danger of Combines, &c.) Although I grant our trained, or Military bands to be a very good meanes (I even the best we now have) to preserve us, and to suppresse an enemy: yet foras­much as they are used to fight in jest, not in earnest, they might be foyled by lesser powers of old souldi­ers: such as now are the French, throughly exerci­sed in the warres of Germany, Italy, Spaine, and the Low-Countries: so that I conceive and conclude howsoever, that our Ports, and places of importance are (notwithstanding of our Fleet, & trained Bands) to be strongly secured.

14 It may be some will say, that there is no great feare that the French will at any time molest us, but let such give me leave to tell them, that I could wish it so, as well as they, and that all the world would, if it might be, live and continue in peace, and unity; nor doe J for my part accuse, or say, that the French will, or have an intent to make warre upon us; yet I verily beleeve, J know, that

• 1. The French, in generall, envy our Kings Title to France.
• 2. That they beare unto us, old, and late Grudges for our Ile of Rey's Ʋoyage.
• 3. That they desire to be the chiefe (if they can, the sole) Regents in Christendome; and therefore seeke wholly to dis­invest the house of Austria, that none should be able to oppose them.
• 4. That they have set at variance, the Princes of Germa­ny, and fomented the warres there, to the ruine, and in a manner Desolation thereof.
• [Page 17]5. That they have seized upon the Duke of Lorraines Country, and other places not belonging to them.
• 6. That they have reduced Savoy into the Nature of Ʋas­sallage, and thereby opened a way into Italy.
• 7. That they have animated the Rebellions of Catalonia, and such like.
• 8. That their Cardinall (who is upon the matter, their Dominus fac totum) is a most politick Prelate, &c.

Now thereefor, if in zeale to my Country, J doe but suspect the worst (not insisting upon it vehemently) I con­ceive, I may be by all indifferent men excused. Notwith­standing, I request all (especially my Superiours) to pardon, if I have inserted any thing amisse; hoping, that what I have written concerning Fortifications, or the Fortifying Ports, and other places of importance, will worthily be ta­ken into consideration. For as 'tis truely said, that the Earth is

So may it be as truely said, that a Kingdome or Com­mon-wealth is (or ought to be) by Justice, and Warlike power equally balanced.

1 IF it be objected, that the Fortifying, and maintaining of places of Importance will bee somewhat chargeable to the Kingdome. I answer, beeter some charge, then no security, or safety.

2. If it be objected, that Forts, and strong places, have di­vers times bin, and may be yet the Nests of Rebels: I answer, that such Care, Policy, and Vigilancy, may be used in placing, and displacing Governours, and Officers, as that we may bee as well secured from such dangers, as are the Spanish, Dutch, Ve­netian, and of late, the French, with other Nations.

[Page 18] 3. If it be farther objected, that strong places (if once sur­prized by an enemy) are with greater difficulty regained, where­as weaker places are soone got againe. I answer, that stronger places likewise, are better able to keepe out an enemy: so that they cannot but by more difficulty be Conquered, and weaker (if they once come into the hands of an enemy) will be by them made strong, if they intend farther to invade; so that the recovering of a weake place soone lost, may cost as deare, as of a stronger.