OBSERVATION 1.

I Have perused a Book intituled, The Grounds of Obedience, and Government, written by Thomas White Gentleman; wherein self-end or interest is greatly implyed, and though the Author seem to dislike blind obedience, yet he endea­voureth to enslave free men under the Bondage of Boundless Government, or rather Governors. I shall instance and insist upon the Positions of the sixt Ground, not the first, but the fittest to begin withall.

The words are these: We ought therefore to know, that a man, considered in pure nature, looks on all other things, men, and beasts, and insensible creatures, as his [Page 2] subjects to work on; his onely Rule being Reason, which takes nothing to be good, but what is good to himself.

I will examine this Position, first according to the Rule of the Creator, and then according to the Rule of the Creature: All School-men agree, that GOD worketh all things for himself, but they do not all agree touching the formal Reason, why he so worketh: Some hold that GOD worketh meerly because he will so; but this is gross, to say, that God meerly willeth, with­out Non vult Deus quia vult, sed quia velle sapit. the Dictamen of his Divine Knowledge; where­fore the Apostle saith, Rom. 8. 29. Whom he foreknew he also predestinated: as for that touching Esau and Jacob, cap. 9. it onely sheweth, that GODS eternal Decree precedeth matter of Fact, not that his eternal Decree precedeth his Divine Knowledge. Others hold, that GOD worketh to the end he may manifest his Attributes; but this is to say, that GOD hath a self-end dissonant to his Greatness and Goodness. For what doth the manifestation of Attributes add to GOD, whose Greatness and Glory consisteth in Octjectum creationis est Bonitas ipsa Divina ut communica­bilis partici­pative. Gen. 1. 4. 10. 12, &c. Potuit De­us ulterius communicare Participa­tive Bonitatem creaturis pos­sibilibus, Deo tamen visa est sufficieus Existenti­bus commu­ni [...]atio. self-Being, not in self-ends? Nor can an extrinsecal end be the adequate object of the infinite Greatness and Goodness of GOD. Others therefore say, (and that more truly) that GOD worketh to communi­cate his Goodness severally, and this is agreeable as to the Action of Creation, Gen. 1. 4. 10. &c. so to the mystery of Incarnation, of which it is said; John 3. 16. So God loved the world, that he gave his onely be­gotten Son: Now if GOD work to communicate his Goodness, ought not man, considered in pure nature, work (what he may) to communicate good to others, and not meerly or wholly to himself? Ought he not also by the Rule of Reason to take that for good, which is good to others, as well as to himself? Ought [Page 3] not the reasonable creature, considered in pure nature, to follow the Rule of his Creator: Moreover, can a man, considered in pure nature, (and consequently in prudent Reason) look on all other things, men, and beasts, and insensible Creatures, as his subjects to work on? Is there not subjectum per quod, which is the meanes whereby, and subjectum ad quod, which is the adaequate Term, as well as subjectum quod the subject or ground whereon to work? Certainly prudent Reason dictates so. When GOD created Eve he said, Let us make him an help, ut subjectum per quod; he said not, let us make him a subject to work upon, as subjectum quod: And if Adam and his Posterity had persevered in the state of Innocence, doubtless he and they had educated their children (being the adequate Terms of their Propagation, or Generation) in holy contemplation, and some bodily employment (for certainly he and they should not have lived idly, albeit This may be gathered from the 2. of Gen. v. 5. their employment, or work, should have been no toil, or tediousness unto them) so that Adam should not have looked on any of his Posterity in the state of Innocence, or in pure nature, as a subject to work on, but rather as a subject to work for, or to: (other creatures peradventure he might have looked on as subjects to work on) wherefore it is improper, yea, dangerous to say, that a man, considered in pure nature, looketh on men (as well as Beasts, and insensible creatures) as his subjects to work on; it is the way to make men wholly self-ended, and to vilifie others.

In the same Section, or Ground, Mr. White saith; It is true, there is an inclination in man, from Reason, to do another any good I can (so it is printed) without my own prejudice, and to have a desire to keep Peace with all men. But if I do not, it follows not that I wrong him, [Page 4] even though I do him harm, or seek his ruine: But I wrong my self, nature binding me to make my carriage to every one Rational, and becomming a man, for he is no otherwise to me than a piece of cloth or wood, which I cut and shape after my own will, sittingly for my use.

I would know of any Rational man, whether pru­dent Reason (even as Religion) do not dictate this of St. Luke, cap. 6. v. 31. And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise? Certainly prudent Reason, no way over-byassed by pernicious will, dictates, that good is specified of, or by an entire cause, an entire object, an entire end; and therefore prudent Reason dictates also, that GOD is to be lo­ved for his excellency, not for our own ends (as the Devil falsly alleadged against Job) and that man, or all mankind is to be loved for GOD's sake, because he hath dignified him with a Rational soul, and not meer­ly for the use one man hath of another: so that, accor­ding to prudent Reason, I should not onely have an inclination to do another man what good I can, with­out mine own prejudice, but even an Actual Applicati­on of what good I may prudently without my own wrong, if he will accept thereof; however I ought no way to wrong him, but to do unto him, being my equal in nature, as I would have him do unto me: would I have him do unto me good, if I stood in need there­of, albeit I were not able to require it? I ought to do the like. Would I have him do me no harm, nor seek my ruine, by depriving me of my natural liberty, which is an individual power of what is lawful, or by depriving me of my National propriety, which is a legal Relation to a temporal benefit? I ought not to do it to him. Would I have him esteem me no otherwise than a peice of cloth, or wood, and to cut or shape me after [Page 5] his will, fittingly for his use? Why then should I e­steem him no otherwise, or shape him according to my use, unless he freely give his consent thereunto? Bruit beasts have a sensible estimation of those which are of their own species, or kind; kill but an hog, and those of his own kind shall approach shewing their discon­tent by their grunting, and endeavouring what they may to rescue their fellow-creature: Beasts of prey, although they fall out about their prey, will not prey upon those of their kind: Shall a man then prey on another by doing him harm, or seeking his ruine, or en­thralling him against his will, without any Offence or Demerit on his part? Certainly this is so little suta­ble to manhood, that it is worse than bestial; and Mr. White his Positions before recited are so destructive to humane society, that he may seem to some to be an Athenian Timon, an hater of mankind.

And now I think it not amiss to deliver some­what concerning Right or Due. I frame therefore these Definitions.

Jus est Regula rectae Rationi undequa (que) consenta­nea.

Right, or rather righteous dealing, is a Rule every way agreeing to right Reason.

Lex est norma Politica, Protectioni & Ordini conve­niens.

Law is a Politick Rule convenient to Protection, and Order.

By the first every one (having the use of Reason) is tyed to do what good he may to another (not prejudicing himself) and to do as he would be done un­to.

By the first also every man hath a natural or Ra­tinal Propriety to a livelihood: for Adam and Eve [Page 6] had a Natural or Rational Propriety of the Garden Although Paradise in Respect of the Garden it self, was (in the O­pinion of many) but small, yet in Respect of its extent it may seem to have com­prehended the goodli­est part of Asia; more­over GOD could have enlarged it, in case the Posterity of Adam had persevered in Inno­cence. of Eden, or Paradise; GOD excepting, by way of Prohibition, the Tree of good and evil: which Excep­tion made a Propriety, shewing what was theirs, what not: and doubtless, had their Posterity persevered in the state of Innocency, they had had Propriety of Food (peradventure of Rayment and Ornament) Regulated by right Reason without confusion, or con­tention, & probably Paradise might have been propor­tioned to the children of Innocence, as was the Land of Promise to the Children of Israel: but since the fall of Adam, natural or Rational Propriety fals under Legal, and Individual, of which in Or­der.

By this Rule likewise the will of one man (having the use of Reason) is not subject to the will of ano­ther, any further than he subjugateth himself: for al­though conjugal subjection was pronounced against Eve, Gen. 3. 16. as part of her punishment for her disobedience toward GOD (which subjection was As conjugal subjection was from Eve Tradu­ced to her Sex, so from her Potenti­al sub [...]ecti­on, that is to say, that the will of one man might Posi­tively (not naturally) be subject to the will of another) was Tra­duced to all mankind: even as was the Original Aversion of the mind from GOD, and Rebellion of the flesh against the spirit Traduced from Adam. traduced to her Sex) yet neither men, nor women (con­jugal subjection excepted) are De Jure naturali, sub­ject one to another; being by nature equal, as are the Angels in heaven, amongst whom there is onely a su­periority of excellence, no soveraignity of Power one over another, for that would not be agreeable to their free, compleat, and continual fruition of God in the Beatitude of Glory, the most perfect of all states. But some it may be will say, that Children by the Law of Nature are subject to their Parents: In which, I say, there may be a mistake; for if Adam and his Posteri­ty had persevered in the state of Innocence, there had ^d [Page 7] been such an Harmony in nature, that the Child should not have offended the Parent, and then there had been no cause of soveraignty, and subjection, but onely of Paternal Love, and filial Honor, so that Children are not subject to their Parents by the rule of pure nature, but in regard, or respect of depraved nature: Moreover in the Decalogue it is written, Honor thy Father and Mo­ther, as the Instrumētal causes of natural Being; it is not written, be wholly subject to thy father and mother, as to soveraign Lords over thee. We know that sons and daughters (who have attained to the mature Ripe­ness Subjectio Filialis est tantum Re­verentia Naturalis erga Paren­tes in Finem debitum. of convenient Reason) may not onely in matters of Religion, but even in the Latitude of morality, with due Reverence admonish, and reprehend, yea, and le­gally oppose their Parents.

In England, when any one under age is bound Ap­prentice, it is specified, or signified in the Indenture, that he or she were so bound, not onely by consent of their Parents or Friends, but by their own consent, to signifie, that he or shew was not bound but by their own voluntary submission. Thus much of the first Rule.

By the second Politick Rule of Law, men have their several Proprieties of Meum and Tuum Individu­ally; sometimes by way of Legal Possession, which is facultas Positiva aliquod bonum mundanum comprehen­dens; a Positive faculty comprehending a worldly Good: So it is of House, Land, &c. sometimes by way of Legal use, which is Applicatio Positiva alicu­jus Boni mundani; a Positive Application of some worldly Good: and so it is of money and other Chat­tels which a man applieth to his use: Sometimes also by way of Legal Office, which is Potestatis alicujus in finem debitum Referentia Positiva, a Positive Reference [Page 8] (or Relation) of some Power to a due end; such is the nature of all Offices from that of a King, to that of a Constable. Now whosoever shall digress from either of these Rules (much more whosoever shall Actually Transgress) by endeavouring to harm, or seeking the Ruine of another in any of the Particulars forementioned, doth deviate from right Reason, and unmans himself by becomming unhumane.

OBSERVATION II.

IN this Observation I shall be enforced to recite much of what Mr. White states by way of Positive assertion, to ravel out what he hath knit, or rather un­duly knotted together.

He saith (Ground 8.) That the People, as far as they have renounced their own will, so farre they have no power left in them to contradict, or resist the Orders of the Magistracy. I say, So far as the People have submitted their wils: for since this Power is in the Magistrate in vertue of their wils, it cannot extend far­ther than the Peoples promise: so that if the People bind their Magistrate to certain Laws and Limits; he hath [Page 9] no right to transgress such Laws, nor extend himself be­yond the prefixed Limits, by his installation, and the original Power given him: But above all he cannot di­spose of one chip or dispence in one the least Law, far­ther than he apprehends it as fit and necessary to the good of the Common-wealth: Here is to be observed, that the People are not subject but so far as they have sub­mitted their wils; that the Magistrate hath no right to transgress such Laws, or extend himself beyond the Li­mits prefixed to him: So then, if the People bind their supream Magistrate (by Oath, and Promise, or ei­ther) not to make, or repeal Laws, nor impose Tax­es, or the like, without their consent given by their Trustees, Deputies, or Delegates, he hath no Right to do any of them: yea! but saith he; In case the su­pream Magistrate apprehend it fit and necessary to the good of the Common-wealth, he may in somewhat di­spence touching Law: Verily Mr. White his magiste­rial Licence is far worse than Poetical Licence, for this onely maketh words long, or short, but that of his maketh Laws long, or short, at the Magistrates appre­hension.

I demand, whether the supream Magistrate appre­hending somewhat good for the Common-wealth, may not mistake? Whether he may not meerly pretend good to the Common-wealth (as even all self-ended Potentates do) and intend it not? if so; why should a People be subject to his frail, or possibly, yea, pro­bably erring apprehension, or doubtful intention? Should they have thought it fit; they would have submitted their wils, and conferred such Authority up­on their supream Magistrate at his instalment; not thinking it fit, it is clear they Reserved (for what is [Page 10] not conferred is Reserved) to themselves cheifly the power of judging what is fit and necessary to the good of the Common-wealth: So that the supream Magistrate (limited as aforesaid) hath no right to dispence with, or in the least Law, to nul or abrogate it; but he hath onely Power to dispense with matter of execution of the Law in some cases; as to pardon or exempt a Delinquent from Punishment, where the Parties for­mer merits, or hope of future Behaviour, may seem to counterpoise his demerits. Farthermore I con­ceive it dangerous to any People, who desire to live under a certain Rule of Law, to be subject to their su­pream Magistrates uncertain apprehension, and Arbitra­tion, in permitting him (upon any pretence whatsoe­ver) to dispence in the least Law generally beneficial; The su­pream Ma­gistrate may dispense with a Law prejudicial to many, or some, and beneficial to none but himself. for if he find that he may make ruptures in the lesser, he will not want pretences upon seeming (peradven­ture probable) Reasons to break through as many (though of greater importance) as stand in his way, or seem inconvenient unto him. It is said by a great Politician, that tell a good Prince that he may do what he list, ex optimo fit pessimus, he soon becomes from good the worst of all; if he begin to tread upon one Law, he will proceed to trample upon others at his plea­sure.

But some will say, there may be such an exigency in Affairs of the Common-wealth, that the supream Governour may be enforced to do something diffe­rent from Law; as if a sudden invasion happen, he may be constrained to levy forces, and raise money for defence of the Common-wealth, without the im­mediate and explicite consent of the People, or their Trustees.

I answer; That this is a thing seldom not foreseen, so that he may have time enough to require the Peo­ples consent: but if such a thing should unusually hap­pen, he then by raising of forces, and money for De­fensive War, doth not dispense with Law, but onely dis­penseth with matter of Fact, agreeable to the end of Law, which is salus Populi. Otherwise it is when (with­out the consent of the People, or their Trustees) he le­vies forces and raises money for Offensive War, for An unlimi­ted Poten­tate may make war without the consent of his Sub­jects: so also may a limited Po­tentate, if not limited to matter of Peace and War. then (if he be limited as aforesaid) he doth a thing different from Law in propriam Majestatem to advance (it may be) his own Greatness, and to engage the Peo­ple in war without their consent and approbation gi­ven (by their Trustees, or Delegates) touching the cause why, and end what, and meanes how.

I shall now descend from this Discourse to that of slavery: Whether (as Mr. White hath it, Page 59.) a whole Nation may voluntarily submit it self to a Go­vernment, by which it shall have nothing of its own, nor be able to deserve or get any thing; but be entirely at the disposition of the Magistrate it chuseth, without right or propriety:

I say, They may, though imprudently, and unwor­thily, not sutable to the nature of reasonable men, but bruit beasts. Yet I say, that such their slavish sub­mission doth not, nor cannot enslave their Posterity, no more than the Bond of a Father, who hath no Power to sell his Land, doth oblige the Son to per­form his Fathers covenants: for a People cannot de­prive their Posterity of their natural Right, which is (amongst other things) not to be farther subject than they submit their wils; as I have before instanced, and as Mr. White granteth.

I but some will say, a Father (and consequently a People) may deprive a Child of his inheritance, and why not of his Liberty or Freedom?

I say, the case is not alike; for inheritance is Legall Positively, so that according to the Laws of some Nati­ons (though not altogether Rational) a Son may be deprived of his inheritance; but Liberty (such as I instance) is natural inherently, so that a Father cannot deprive a Son of that, because it is the Gift of GOD as the Author of Nature; nor consequently one Ge­neration another, both in regard of its inherency in Nature, and priority by Nature before any written, or conditional Law. Wherefore I affirm, that not onely the Progeny of the Greeks (who are enslaved by force) but also the Progeny of the Muscovites, and such like People (whose Predecessors enslaved them­selves) may free themselves from slavery, in case themselves have not, or do not Actually by their own voluntary submission enslave themselves: Nor in so doing should they oppose the direct end of Power, which is Dignitas Regularis in Ordinis, & Protectionis conservationem: a Regular Dignity to, or for the con­servation of Order and Protection, according to that of St. Paul, Rom. 13. v. 6. but they should onely op­pose the indirect end of violation, or violence, which is Impetus irregularis in oppressionis, & servitutis invo­luntaris impositionem, an irregular force for imposition of oppression, and involuntary, or constrained slavery, destructive to natural inherent Right given by GOD, as aforesaid.

I shall now again revert and reflect upon the pow­er▪ and condition of the high or supream Magistrate, tyed, bound, or concluded by the Peoples Limitations. [Page 13] Mr. White putteth the case (Ground 11. Page 83. & 84.) When some great fault discovers it self in the Limitations, and the end of Government is prejudiced by such a defect; and nevertheless it is no doubt, but tis the intention of the People, or the Trustees of the People, to bind their Magistrate to such conditions; whether in such a case, he be bound to his Orders, and Oath, or whe­ther the duty of a wise and good man doth enfranchise him to do what is truly best for the People, though it be against their wils?

Mr. White seemeth to imply some difficulty in the question, but I can find none: for if any great fault discover it self in any Limitations (being matters ge­nerally well prepondered and debated by the most prudent of the People, or their Trustees) the high Magistrate may in convenient time convene the Tru­stees of the People, to whom he may propound, with whom he may debate, and by whom he may reform, such fault in the Limitations (if any such be) and no doubt but some of them will be as quick-sighted as himself, and as willing to reform any fault for the Peo­ples good: but however he himself is strictly tied to the observation of his Orders and Oath, by the Rule of Religion (if he have any) which teacheth, that so­lemn Covenants are without fraud to be kept, Psalm 14. Moreover the Apostle teacheth us, Rom. 3. 8. That we ought not to do evil that good may come of it: how then may we falsifie an Oath for any humane end, or good? Farthermore Reason dictateth, that to do a Rational man good against his will, is not rationally good, because I violate his will he esteeming it no Ra­tional good.

Mr. White saith (page 61.) But when I speak of a Nation, methinks I speak of Nature it self: And me thinks when I speak of the Trustees of a Nation, I speak of Reason it self; who as they ought not, so they need not have any humane good enforced upon them, themselves being an Epitome of all humane Reason to know, and prosecute or pursue any humane good con­venient to themselves, so that the high Magistrate doth them wrong, if he do them good against their wils.

But Mr. White saith (page 88.) that he is intru­sted to do for the common good: and then proceeds to say, He then of necessity must be false to his Oath, if he do not, according to his Trust, act for the common good what he evidently sees in a high degree to import it: further, because we know, in moral businesses, the end aim­ed at, is more principal than the meanes ordered to it.

I must tell Mr. White, that (according to the pro­verb) he runneth before his horse to market: for a Limited high Magistrate, or Governour, is not intrust­ed to do all good in general to a Common-wealth, but onely such good as is comprehended in his Rules and limitations; even as a General of War is not in­trusted generally in all things touching War, but one­ly in such affairs of War as are contained in his In­structions and Commission; so the high Magistrate is not false to his Oath, if he observe his Limitations, but he is false to his Oath if be exceed them. In Li­mited Government the People in many places Re­serve to, or for their Trustees, a joynt-power Juridi­cent or Law-making (being the greatest ultimate end of their common good) and as they grant, so they tie and bind their high Magistrate by promise and oath [Page 15] to a Power Juritenent or Law-administring (being the greatest meanes to the ultimate end) wherefore the cheifest end a Limited high Magistrate should look upon (as comprehended within the sphere of his Acti­vity) is the best means of Law-administring, leaving the ultimate end of Law-making or common good to the Trustees of the People, and not to undertake what by his Rules and Limitations he is not intrusted with; least he be esteemed an Arbitrary Tyrant, or perfidious enemy to the People (though he intend real good) and be censured, or adjudged accordingly: for the Trustees of the People (to whom Law-making and care of com­mon good is cheifly referred by the People) may cen­sure, or judge an irregular, exorbitant or Tyrannical limited high Magistrate, and not onely depose or dis­place him, but condemn and punish him, as they shall think fit. The Reason is, because the Limited Pow­er of Law-administring is subordinate to the General Power of Law-making, as is the meanes to the accom­plishment and preservation of the end. Yet the Tru­stees of the People are not altogether unlimited (though some suppose otherwise) as I shall hereafter declare.

Whereas the Gentleman saith (page 90.) How ma­ny promises do Divines and Lawyers pronounce null, though they were good and valid when they were made, by reason of the change of accidents following, which could not be foreseen?

The Gentleman must give me leave to tell him, that some subtle Casuists, and crafty Lawyers, do pro­nounce some promises null which ought to be esteem­ed and adjudged valid: indeed not any promise of any thing good and lawful ought to be pronounced or [Page 16] adjudged null, unless it be illegally obtained by force, forgery, or fraud; not through the Promisers volun­tary neglect, or careless mistake: wherefore he that giveth to another all that is in a Trunk [I instance the Gentleman's example, page 90.] wherein himself had put nothing but a Suit of Aparrel, and his servant without his knowledge had taken that out and put in bags of Gold in the same bulk; I say (that unless the Ma­ster can make it appear, that the servant did of purpose put into the Trunk the bags of Gold to defraud his Ma­ster) the person to whom he gave the Trunk withal in it, ought to have and enjoy it; for it was casus fortunae, or more Theologically, the providence of GOD pu­nishing the masters careless neglect, who, if he knew that his servant had such power committed un­to him, as that he might put any thing in or out, should prudently have fore-seen and over-seen it. In like manner, he that promiseth absolutely his Daughter in marriage to another, and afterwards the party is not found to be of such competent means, as the father of the Daughter esteemed him to be (I omit matter of Reli­gion and manners, for those being dissembled may sometimes alter the case) is for his part tied Jure con­tractus civilis to perform his promise, for he might pru­dently and carefully have looked into the parties means, before he had made an absolute promise; how­beit the Daughter is free to dissent, if she have not absolutely given her consent. But neither these cases of imprudence and negligence, nor that of Jephte, can give scope to a Limited high Magistrate for promise, or oath-breaking: for Jephte made a rash and impru­dent vow, he should have prudently considered what had been fit to sacrifice to GOD, and not have rash­ly [Page 17] vowed to sacrifice the first thing that met him from home, which casually might have been one of his neighbours or servants, as it was his onely daughter; and therefore in the Opinion of solid Divines he ought rather to have broken his rash vow, than to have sacrificed his daughter: howbeit in regard he had his daughters consent, and in regard the Scrip­ture reprehendeth it not, and that it might seem a Type of the militant Church submitting her self to martyrdom in honour of the victory of Christ, the fact of Jephte may be argued. But however Jephte his miscarriage, in not breaking, but accomplishing his rash and imprudent vow, cannot (as aforesaid) be a sufficient Warrant for the Limited high Magi­strate to break his Oath or promise made with delibe­ration and according to prudence, that a People might be preserved from slavery, oppression, or meer Arbi­trary Government; so that he is bound by the tie of honesty and fidelity to a strict observation of his Rules and Limitations, nor ought he to exceed them, nor in any thing to violate them, unless he be released of his Oath or Promise by the People, or their Tru­stees, or by them enlarged touching his Rules and Limitations. All understanding men know, that a deliberate and prudent Oath or Promise ought to be kept.

OBSERVATION. III.

IN this place I must tell Mr. White, that he doth either of purpose, or mistake, confound the Power of a Limited high Magistrate, and of an unlimited su­pream Magistrate; for in the places which I have quo­ted his scope is touching a Limited high Magistrate, in other places he instanceth, or induceth the Power of an unlimited supream Magistrate, as in the twelfth Ground, page 98. where he saith; The next thing that occureth is the subjects fact by making this Trust, and that is, that he hath made away all Power of judging and caring for the common good, farther than the eyes and hands of the Magistrate, his Trustee, otherwise they have not made him supream Governour.

Now I intend not to discourse of such an unlimited Magistrate, to whom the People, by making away all Power of judging and caring for the common good, have submitted themselves slaves, to stand to his Judgment, solid, or not solid, and to depend on his conscience, or rather will, good, or bad: but my intent is to discourse of a Limited Magistrate from whom the People have received the chief Power to their Trustees of judging [Page 19] and caring for the common good, and of the Peoples duty to such a Magistrate.

The Gentleman saith (Ground 14. page 112.) Who should ask me, if the Governour exacted for one time all the subject had, so there remained a Ground to work upon a new, and within a little time to live content­edly; I should be troubled to confess, it were a sufficient injury to take up arms against him, because I cannot judge which were the greater mischeif to the subject.

Truly I am no whit troubled to aver, that a Limi­ted Governour, who should deal so enormously with any People, as to exact all they had, leaving them onely a Ground to work upon a new, ought not onely to be by arms (if no other Remedy be left) displaced, or de­posed, but also punished Romano more majorum: for he not onely violateth or breaketh his Promise or Oath, which obliged and tied him to his Limitations, but inhumanly trampleth upon the Rule of Nature it self, to spoil those whom he ought to protect. To Even by the strength of that Power which he ought to defend. omit the Scenes of horrid Tyrants, Christianus the second King of Denmark for oppressions, no way su­table to what Mr. White hath stated, was expelled out of his Kingdom, and could never be admitted to the Government, albeit Charles the fift (his Brother in Law) and some other Princes laboured what they might for his restauration. For my part, I never read that any of the Eastern Monarchs did at any time so Tyrannize over the subjects, as at one time to axact all the subjects had; howbeit those effeminate people, used to the yoak of slavery, do voluntarily or carelesly undergo the burden of Tyranny.

Touching the clause; viz. So there remained a ground to work upon of new, and within a little time to [Page 20] live contentedly; It is a Riddle above my reach, I can­not conceive from what clouds such contentedness should drop, unless pains, and penury, instead of plen­ty and prosperity, should be esteemed contentedness; as amongst the poor Peasants in France.

The Gentleman sayes (page 114.) When evi­dently the Tyranny of the Governour is greater than the mischeif hazarded (viz. of taking up arms against him) when ever this happeneth, be the material condi­tions what they will, the subject is free.

I would know of Mr. White, or any Rational man, whether it were not better for the Subject to take up armes, than to suffer a Tyrant at one time to exact all the subject had, leaving onely a ground to work upon of new, which peradventure may be barely the spade and ground? If the Subject permit a Tyrant at one time, (or, I say, at several times) to exact all, he is accessary to his own wrong, but if he depose and severely punish such a Tyrant, he justly vindicateth himself according Gen. 14. dictateth this: Also the Book of Judges. to his original or primitive Power in the force of Na­ture, which giveth to every People power to free them­selves from any kind of slavery, to which they have not, or do not voluntarily submit: Now it is in Rea­son evident, that the Tyranny of the Governour in exacting all, is greater than the mischeif, hazarded by the subject, in endeavouring by arms to preserve all, by suffering the first, nothing but slavery can be expect­ed, by hazarding the other, freedom may be hoped for, and if lost, yet Rationally and nobly lost: howbeit I think it very Rational to go prudently, and not rash­ly, to work, in so weighty a case.

Mr. White ingeniously confesseth (page 119.) It is clear, there can be no question of the necessity of the [Page 21] resistance; for they are such (speaking of the oppres­sions of a Tyrant) as do put the question beyond all am­biguity in the very conscience of the Magistrate (he should have done well to have added, if he have any) the objects bearing on the subject, in every ones particu­lar, beyond denial and dispute. Such a one, who put­teth his Subjects to such extremities, Mr. White also (page 118.) jugdeth fit, to deserve all the mischeif that may light upon him for it: and withal concludeth that discourse (page 120.) And therefore his either ignorance, or carlesness, or Tyranny, ought to be so evi­dent, that it be beyond all question; or else the subiect must have patience for his own good, which is his aim in putting himself under Government. Now if igno­rance (which may peradventure be but mistake) or carelesness (which may sometimes be but confidence) seeming so evident to the apprehensions of the Peo­ple, as that they be beyond all question, are Grounds (I will not say sufficient) for the Subiect to resist the Magistrate, certainly the Tyranny of exacting all the Subiect had, at one time, leaving onely a ground to work upon of new, (being a case more transcendent in vo­luntary mischief, than ignorance, or carelesness, which may sometimes be involuntary) must needs be a suffi­cient Ground for the subiect, not onely to resist the Magistrate (if he reform not, and make restitution for The Roman Caesars, e­ven Nero, had the Ex­plicite con­sent of the Senate, and the impli­cite consent of the Peo­ple of Rome, at least wise a parte post. such oppression) but also severely to punish him; which thing Mr. White needed not to have been trou­bled in his Judgment to have confessed.

And now I think it not amiss to declare who are Tyrants: whosoever acquireth power or soveraign­ty by meer force, without the explicite or implicite (which some call tacite) consent of a Nation, or [Page 22] People, is a Tyrant: formeer acquisition of Power, or merum Imperium, doth not barely of it self create any Right, no more than doth a forcible Entry, or Possession unduly gotten. Also all and every Pow­er Monarchical, Aristocratical, or Democratical, who I have for­merly in­stanced touching Limited Tyrants, & if unlimited Potentates may be Ty­rants, con­sequently Limited Potentates must be Ty­rants if they transgress their Limi­tations. (albeit they have the Peoples consent explicite, or ta­cite, without Limitation) do transgress the end of Government (which is the Peoples safety and welfare) are Tyrants; the Reason is, because all Government is by the Rule of Reason intended for Protection and Preservation, not any for destruction or desolation; and therefore this is an usual Maxim, viz. ubi nulla Pro­tectio, nulla subiectio; the Reason is, because the final cause or end of subiection (which is Protection) is wanting; to which end St. Paul pointeth at, Rom. 13. 6, Therefore, or to this end, pay ye Tribute, &c. I think it convenient to define Protection, and Subiection, and from thence to deduce some Reasons.

Protectio est Relatio Defensiva superiorum erga infe­riores. That of 1 Pet. 2. 18. is to be un­derstood of froward Masters Protecting and paying wages, or allowing mainte­nance.

Protection is a Defensive Relation of Superiors towards Inferiors.

Subiectio est Relatio submissiva Inferiorum erga Su­periores.

Subiection is a submissive Relation of Inferiors towards Superiors.

Hence it will follow, that the Governour and Go­verned are but as Relatum & Correlatum: that the submissive Relation of Rational Obedience supposeth the Defensive Relation of Rational Justice: we ought Rationally (not blindly) to obey, Rom. 12. 1. we ought Rationally (not rashly) to Judge, Luk. 12. 57. Hence it follows also, that no submissive Relation of [Page 23] Rational obedience is due to such Tyrants (if any such Monsters be amongst mankind) who at will de­prive their vassals of life, or take away from whom they please, what they please, when they please, ad Ar­bitrium; for such do not defend, but destroy; nor can I be of opinion, that any People did at any time sub­mit to, or rather enthral themselves under such Ty­rants voluntarily, but of constraint, which if so, then are they Free (if able) to free themselves; as I have formerly shewed.

But whether or no any People have voluntarily en­slaved themselves I shall not insist upon: Howbeit I will instance the late Government of England, not so unlimited as some have supposed it, and would perad­venture have had it so, but exactly Regulated to the Rational end of Government, until Exorbitances, like briars, over-spread the Land. In England the King had the sole power Juritenent, or of Law-admini­string, but not solely, for in the time of Parliaments they could ioyntly administer Law, and Judge of matter of Fact, even as could the King: In England the King had onely a Joynt-power of Juredicent, or of Law-making, for without the Parliament the King could neither make, nor repeal Laws, nor (Legally) impose Taxes upon the People. Yet the leaving matters of great consequence to the Resolution of the governed Party, did not make them Governours (as Mr. White supposeth, Ground 15. pa. 127.) for the Mem­bers of Parliament were co-ordinate with the King in Law-making, and Law-administring at the times of their Sessions; and in other things, and at other times subordinate to the King. Moreover in England nei­ther the King, nor Parliament (though united in con­sent) [Page 24] could do three things: to wit;

• 1. To deliver over the People of England to a For­rain Government.
• 2. To deliver over the National Benefit of the Peo­ple of England to a People distinct in Law and Govern­ment.
• 3. To deprive the People of England of their own National Law.

That is to say, to judge and determine Meum and Tuum contrary to the Essence of any Law, as long as such Law was in Being. For the Kingly and Parlia­mentary Sacred Scripture is the written Rule of Re­ligion, Law Positive of Govern­ment. Nulled or repealed, &c. power united was but efficiently in Posse, not formally in Esse, above the Law, because the Law obli­ged all, even King and Parliament, until such Law were by Parliament (being the Representative Body of the Nation, and Trustees of the People) nulled or altered. The Reason is, because all Government ought to be Regular for the peoples safety, not any absolutely, or meerly Arbitrary to their Destructi­on.

Wherefore, if the Kingly and Parliamentary pow­er should have granted the Propriety of John to Tho­mas, meerly at their pleasure, contrary to Law in Be­ing; albeit they should therein have violated but the Right of one man Explicitely and Actually, yet they had therein violated the Right of all men in England Implicitely and Potentially, in regard all men had been subject to the like Danger. In such case I should have applied to the King and Parliament what Mr. White applieth to the Magistrate (Ground 15. page 123.) where he sayes; So that in truth, the Magi­strate first by his miscarriages abdicateth himself from being a Magistrate, and becometh a Brigand and Robber, [Page 25] instead of a Defender; And the People, in way of Na­tural Preservation of themselves, make Resistance against him. But Mr. White applieth this to a Magistrate, who should wrong, or Tyrannize over a People in General; and seemeth to deny (page 129.) that any Resistance may be made by a People to vindicate the wrongs of some Particulars; for he saith, If the wrong be done to Particulars, we ought to consider, that acciden­tal harms cannot be prevented neither in nature nor in humane affairs; and so are objects of pitty, rather than of hope to be amended, and to be tolerated rather, in re­spect of the great good which is the common peace, than expose all to such confusion as must be, and ever hath been where the Government is, in part placed in unexpe­rienced hands.

I am not altogether of the Gentlemans opinion; for besides the Rule of Humanity, the Tye of Natio­nal Amity obligeth a whole Nation to vindicate the wrongs of a few, even by arms) if no other Redress can be had) especially when the wrongs done to some Particulars may manifestly seem to presage the Ruine of all. I do not find, that the Israelites had any speci­al warrant from GOD to punish and suppress by Arms the Benjamites for not punishing such as abominably abused the Levites Wife or Condubine (Judges 19. & 20.) yet for the wrong of one or two, the Is­raelites hazarded the good of common Peace, to do the good of Justice; and surely they did Rationally, for the good of Justice is to be preferred before the good of Peace; albeit Peace is highly to be esteemed as a blessing from GOD, yet Justice is to be esteemed as the Rule of GOD Regulating humane Affairs, and though not formally, yet finally omnis virtus; for the [Page 26] Preservation whereof men ought to hazard Peace or Tranquillity, Lives and Livelihoods: as for that of exposing all to confusion, &c. it hath so happened when a giddy Multitude have rashly attempted somewhat against their high Magistate, or superior Rulers, but seldom, or never, when an whole Nation, or People, or the major, or a very considerable part of them, have prudently engaged against an over-lording Oppressor, or Oppressors, as in Switzerland and Hol­land.

I shall now return to instance somewhat more touching the former Government of England, before I conclude the discourse thereof.

In England neither the King nor Parliament were (to speak strictly) the efficient causes of Laws prima­rily, but onely secundarily: The Reason is, because the People tied the King by Oath to conserve the just Laws which the Peogle shall chuse, or (as some contend) have In England the People had a Nati­onal Innate power of E­lecting and Intrusting Representa­tives; The Kings Writ did only ap­point the time and place, not give power, as somehave supposed, & expressed. chosen: The People also nominated, and, as it were, created their representatives in Parliament; and al­though the Kings of England were heretofore born by Descent to their Kingly Office, and so many times admitted thereunto before they took their solemn Oath, yet the People alwayes admitted them with re­ference of their Oaths to be taken, and kept, or performed. I therefore make this Argument.

• 1. All Power which did primarily oblige by Oath, and which did constitute Representatives, was the primary Power of Laws, or of Law-making.
• 2. The People of England were the Power which did primarily oblige the King by [Page 27] Oath, and which did constitute Representa­tives.
  Olim Epis­copi, & qui­dam Ponti­fices, (ut vocantur) a Populo electi fuerunt, ad denotandum Populi libere consensum erga Ec­clesirsti­cos; hoc Hi­storicis no­tum est.
• 3. Therefore, the People of England were the primary Power of Laws, or of Law ma­king.

The major (touching the King) is manifest; for first, not any can oblige another by Oath, but such as have some power over him; wherefore it was truly said of an able Lawyer, that the King was singulis ma­jor, universis minor; for indeed the People are prima­rily, and intensively above any Kingly Power in re­spect Hanc rerum etiam Scrip­tura denotat, de Mathiae, Acts 1. de septem Dia­conis, Acts 6. of the end of Government, which is salus Populi, and therefore to be preferred before Majestas Imperii. Secondly, the Kingly Oath was in nature of Contract, which obligeth between Contractor and Contracted. Both major and minor are also manifest (touching the Representatives) it being evidently known by the Peoples former Indentures to their Trustees.

To apply what I have written touching the for­mer Government of England; I say, where such Government or the like doth continue, as in Holland, The Prince of Orange was State-holder in Holland, &c. but not wholly in­trusted, so were here­tofore some Princes, or Princely Lords a­monst the Switzers. Switzerland, &c. (albeit those People seldom pleni­potentiate their Trustees without Limitations) the Governours and Trustees abdicate themselves from the Government and Trust reposed in them by the People, and are subject to their primary power al­wayes intended and reserved for their preservation: for every Free man hath a natural innate power in him­self of himself, and All united have a national innate power in All of All.

I shall not take upon me to prescribe Rules of Go­vernment; but onely say, that that Government is [Page 28] best for any people, to which the people will willingly submit, and which they may, or have power to reform (by their Trustees or Delegates) if it become greivous or burthensome unto them.

And so far Mr. White seemeth to assent (Ground 1. page 7.) saying, Men are not wont to repine often at what themselves chuse and judge best for themselves; especially if, even after the action performed, and perad­venture the attempt failed, yet the subject re­mains satisfied, that it was best for him, in those circum­stances, to do what he did.

I could wish that all Governours, unlimited as well as limited, would consider this, not prefering their own self-ends, or greatness, before the Peoples self­imbracing Good. Jamque opus exegi.