IT is usuall (I know) for Bookes to have Prefaces, and Playes Prologues; but whosoever peruseth this, must expect nothing but concise reasons; forasmuch as Vnusquisque suo sensu abundat, so let him reflect and cen­sure of this at his pleasure.

The Observator, pag. 1. saith, That power is originally in­herent in the people, &c.

To this the answer is, that power is in God primario & per se, according to that of the Apostle; Rom. 13. and in the King or people, but only secundario & derivative; Power or dominion is not a gift of Nature, that is to say, naturally inherent in us: for if it were, then might all men have equal power, for that by nature we are all equall; but power is a gift of God to Nature, and is gratia gratis data; and yet power is congruous in nature, as was the power of King, and office of Priesthood in Melchisedec: for surely he had them both given, or appointed to him by God, being by in­terpretation King of Righteousnes and King of Peace, Heb. 2.7. And therefore it is not likely that he usurped to him­selfe the Regall title of King, no more then he did of being Priest; and yet it is very probable, that it was also agree­able in Reason and Nature, that although not tyrannicall, yet peaceable Kingly reigne, and sacred Priesthood did fit­ly belong to him: for he is by most Divines thought to have been Sem the eldest sonne of Noah: and by the law of Nature, of Moses, and of most Nations, the eldest is to in­herit, [Page 3]so that what was the right of Adam, Seth, and Noah, Seth and his gene­ration be­gan first to cal up­on the name of the Lord, that is to say, to give to God some set forme of worship as priests did, &c. might belong unto him by birth-right, although it may be God confirmed it unto him extraordinarily. But to re­turne, power or dominion is derived from God, and con­gruous in Nature: but the power is in the people onely when they are absolutely free to chuse to themselves what forme of government they please, as were the Iewes before they subiected themselves to Kings, being formerly freed from the bondage of Egypt by the singer of God. The Romanes when they erected their Senate and Consuls, having rebelliously (for it was no better) shaken off the yoke of Kings. The Venetians, when they first instituted their Common-wealth. But in Monarchies, where the people have been brought into subiection either by the sword, as in Turky, Persia, and the like; or by innate, and prescribing, and prevalent authority, as in Florence, or by both, as in France and Castile; in these Dominions power is not inherent in the people, but in the Prince. And al­though some hereditary Monarkes are more limited then others, as is the King of France more then the great Turk, and the King of England more then the King of France: yet is their power derived immediately from God, and in­herent in themselves, not in the people: for those limita­tions are (in conquered Nations) but mere donatives of grace proceeding from the Prince or his successors to the people, touching certaine immunities and priviledges; so that the Prince his power is the efficient cause of them, and such immunities or priviledges are but as materiall ef­fects. Now as it is most improper to say, that the effect should cause its owne cause, so is it to say, that a priviled­ged people should cause the Princes power, or that Power should remain originally in such a priviledged people.

[Page 4] Some Nations elect their Rings, or Princes, and restrain them farre more by conditionall inaugurations, then he­reditary Monarkes are, or ought to bee restrained or li­mited. Yet have not such Nations power in themselves totally, but onely partially; that is, they have power to conditionare with their Kings or Princes, how farre forth they will be subiect, and by what Rules they will bee go­verned; but they have not power to conditionate with their Kings or Princes, that they will only bee subiect at their owne pleasures, and as themselves shall thinke good; that is to say, if they please at any time, to assume more liberty unto themselves, and to alter and disanull former Constitutions of Government, they may doe it without the consent of their Kings, or Princes. This they cannot doe without treason to their Crownes or Diadems: For although the persons of such Princes bee elective, yet is their power permanent, jure constituto Coronae; which though they claime not as from progenitor, yet are they invested therewith as from predecessors. And therefore being enthroned, they enioy their dignities by prescripti­on; that is to say, what belonged to their predecessors, be­longeth in the same manner to them, being once invested; nor can such Nations revolt from their elected princes, without being reputed rebels.

Now of this nature are the Kings of Poland, Hungary, and some other (to speake nothing of the Duke of Ve­nice, for hee is meerely titulary, and a cypher) and such Kings first and principally claime their authority from God, the authour of all power, who enspheareth them in the Orb of dignity above others.

And secondly, they acknowledge it from the generall consent of the Nation which made choyce of them, and [Page 5]over which they rule. And surely such was the right and title of Saul the first King of Israel: for hee was appoin­ted by God, 1 Sam. Chap. 9. vers. 17. then annointed by Samuel, chap. 10. vers. 1. afterwards approved by the peo­ple, ibid. vers. 24. And finally, confirmed in his King­dome, Chap. 11. vers. 14. And in the same manner was David likewise established in his Kingdome; so that their first and chiefest claime was immediately from God, and their second from the consent of the people. Nor is it of any consequence to alledge, as the Observator seemeth to inferre, page 1. that those Kings had an extraordinary in­stitution from God; and therefore they might more law­fully claime their right, as appointed, and appropriated to them by God. For to such Allegation it will bee answe­red, That there is no power but of God, Rom. 13. So that whether God institute Kings by extraordinary, or ordina­ry meanes, it maketh no matter. For although Saul and David were instituted extraordinarily by Gods speciall appointment; yet most of the Kings of Iudah and Israel reigned after them but by ordinary succession; had they not therefore the same power that Saul and David had? Surely the Scriptures tell us they had. The Priests and Prophets in the old Law had an extraordinary vocation, e­specialy the Prophets: the Priests or Ministers of the Gos­pel have but an ordinary vocation, are they therefore defe­ctive in power to those of the old Law? Or have they not their vocation from God, because they have not extraordi­nary calling? Surly no. For how could Sacraments be ad­ministred, & the word preached? So it is with Monarkes: for though they have but ordinary succession; yet is their power immediatly from God. Our Soveraigne is a free [Page 6](though in some things a limited) Monarch, and deriveth therefore his power immediatly (not mediatly as do other inferior ministers of iustice) from God. And as touching limitations and priviledges, they are nothing else as (afore­said) but acts of grace conferred on this Nation by his Ma­iesties predecessors in severall ages, and at severall times, and some of them lately by his Maiesty himselfe, as the continuation of this present Parliament, the abolishing of the Star-chamber and high Commission censures, and the like. But these priviledges, and others granted to the sub­iects, dis-invest the King of no primary or Birth-right-roy­alty, but only oblige him in honour to observe them as co­venants. A Lord purchaseth a Mannor for himself and his Heires for ever; his son and successors grant certain Fran­chises to the tenants, and oblige their heires for ever to per­forme them: so the tenants live in a more free state and condition then they did in the first purchasers dayes, and paying their rents, and performing their services, they are not altogeher subiect to bee turned out at the pleasure (or rather displeasure) of the Lord: but doth this Franchise­ment or freedome of theirs, cause the Lord to derive his right or title from his tenants? Law and experience tell us no. And this is our Soveraignes case; The conquerour by his sword, or by deed of gift, or rather indeed by both, came in as a Purchaser of the Kingdome of England for himself and his heires for ever, and by the law of Conquest had power to have made greater alteration in the State then he did; and to have induced what forme of govern­ment he had thought good, even as the King of Spain hath done in Navarre and the West Indies; yet hee did not, but only imposed some hard things, as the having of Lawes in the French tongue, which the people generally understood [Page 7]not, Cover-few-bell, and the like, his successors ofterwards did immune and ease the people from such grievances, so that they lived, and live at more liberty, and enioy more se­curely their liberties and properties: But doe therefore such immunities granted to the people, cause the King to derive his power and right from the people? The lawes and customes of all Nations and Kingdomes that live un­der Monarkes, tell us no. The ancient and present Monar­chies of the world being sufficient witnesses therof, besides the Dictamen of Scripture and reason already inserted.

The Observator pag. 2. saith, that it is an errour in some Princes, to strive more to bee great over their people, then in their people. It may be some Princes have committed such an errour; but withall let the observator take notice, that it is convenient for a free Prince to be both, that is to say, to have them wealthy, and yet obedient subiects: for if he be only great in his people, and not over them, hee may resem­ble the now Roman or German Emperour, or the ancient Kings of France, the one whereof is daily in danger to bee dis-invested by commotion and combinations of his Prin­ces; the other were heretofore almost continually mole­sted by factions of their Peeres and people; and surely, the French themselves have greatly occasioned the heavy bur­den of divers tributes & impositions which they undergo: for they ever and anon rising in Armes against their King, gave him occasion to slave them the more, by his reconque­ring of them, or reducing them into his obedience, so that had they subsisted in due allegeance, 'tis likely their King had been as equally great over as in them; which equality or parity in government, is (no doubt) the most happy and blessed co union that any Prince and people can enioy.

The Observator telleth us in the same page, that the King [Page 8]though he be singulis major, yet he is universis minor. But why so? The Head Naturall is not onely singulis, but also universis membris major Dignitate (though it may 'tis not so in universis, as shall be by and by declared) For the Head hath in it selfe all Sences, other Members receive from it, but Feeling onely, and Motion; the Head governeth and directeth the whole Body, and is therefore in dignitie more Noble then all the Members of the Body considered toge­ther: and yet though it be more noble and excellent then them all (for as much as Motion and Feeling dimane from the Braine which is in the Head to them all) notwith­standing in universis, in all things, or Faculties, the Head is not more excellent then all the Members; for the Heart is the Seat of Life (according to most Philosophers (being primum vivens, & ultimum moriens, and from it proceedeth naturall heat; the Stomack likewise administreth suste­nance, and aliment; the Feet goe, and the Hands worke, and without them the Head cannot subsist, yet are they all sub­ordinate to the Head: and even so is it, or ought it to be in the Body Politick, unlesse we must beleeve the Observator, who in his 19. Page sayth, That the Head Politicall re­ceives more subsistence from the Body then it gives, &c. But by his leave, if Priviledges and Immunities are (as they are) matters of Grace, proceeding from free Monarchs (for of such the Treatise is) to the People, doe not such Heads give as much subsistence to the Body Politick, as they receive from it? The Observator telleth us, Page 6. That Edward the First was the first (whether he were, or no, it is not materiall) that repaired the Breaches which the Conquest had made upon this Nation: if so, did not hee, by such his reparation, give as much subsistence to the Com­mon wealth, as he received from the Common-wealth, or [Page 9]Body Politick? And doe not his Successors give likewise as much as they receive, when they conferre the like acts of Grace? Surely, he that considereth rightly Magna Charta, and all other Priviledges and Immunities, which now ex­tend to the free-borne People of this Kingdome, will finde them first to have proceeded from the Grace and Grant of our Kings: and therefore it is improper to say, That the Head Politick doth not give as much subsistence to the Body Politick, as it receives from it.

The Observator sayth likewise in his second Page, That id quod efficit tale, est magis tale; meaning thereby, that the People conferring, as the efficient Cause, Power on the King, have ioyntly more Power in themselves.

It hath beene shewed alreadie, that free Monarchs, such as our King is, derive not their Power from the People, but immediately from God: But suppose, our King did se­cundarily acknowledge his Power from this Nations gene­rall consent; as it may be, doth the King of Poland acknow­ledge his Power in part from the Aristocracie of that Kingdome; and as Saul and David did in part from the Iewes approbation and consent: notwithstanding it fol­lowes not from hence, that the People are the sole efficient Cause of the Kings Power, but onely the secundarie and partiall. Now, when it is said, that id quod efficit tale, est magis tale, it is to be understood of entire and totall causes; but in this case, the People being at the most but the par­tiall cause of the Kings Power, the Axiome of Rule faileth: as for example, the Moone being of her selfe a Body darke, receives her Light (at least wise her chiefest) from the Sunne, as from an entire cause; the Sunne is therefore truly sayd to be more Light, being the totall subordinate cause of Light; in this case therefore it is truly sayd, id quod ef­ficit [Page 10]tale, est magis tale: but the Sunne, mediante homine; producit hominem; & mediante Leone, Leonem; & mediante Planta, Plantam; for that the Sunne affordeth to all sen­sible and vegitable creatures an influx of vigour and natu­rall heat: yet for as much as the Sunne is, in the production of these creatures, but a partiall and not an integrall cause; it were absured to say, that the Sunne were more a man▪ then is a man; or more a Lyon, then is a Lyon; or more a Plant, then is a Plant: and so is it to say, that because a King may acknowledge his Power in part received from the Peoples generall consent, that therefore the People have more Power then himselfe.

The Observator telleth us, Page 3. That the Kings dig­nitie was erected to preserve the Communalty, the Communalty was not created for his service.

This somewhat too harsh, especially if wee consider our King to be, in all Causes, as well Ecclesiasticall as Civill, next and immediately under Christ, supreme Head and Go­vernour: such words would have beene better accommo­dated to a Duke of Venice, then to a King of England. The Iewes, I beleeve, when they asked a King at Gods hands, were somewhat inclining to the Observators opini­on: for they desired a King for their owne ends, chiefely to Iudge them, and to fight their Battailes; not well con­sidering, that if they had a King, hee must and ought to have a Kingly Dominion over them: Whereupon God caused the Prophet Samuel to instruct them concerning the Praeeminence of a King; and, that if they would have a King, a King would be such, and such a man, as is evidently characterized in the first of Samuel, chap. 8. where, amongst other things, verse 17. the Prophet sayth, [Page 11] Hee will take the Tenth of your Sheepe, and yee shall be his servants: Where, by the word will, hee sheweth the Authoritie which Kings would have; and by the word shall, hee sheweth the Obedience that subiects should have: nor did the Prophet speake of some, or to some few onely; but of all, and to all the people (at least-wise to all the chiefest of them) saying, Yee shall be his servants.

I desire therefore, that the Observator and all his other adhaerents, would take more speciall notice of this Text of the Prophet, and that of Saint Pauls confirmation of this Text, Let every soule be subiect to the higher Power: For, though Christian Monarchs ought not, by the Rules of Christianitie, to Tyrannize, nor make our Sonnes their Slaves, or our Daughters their Concubines, and the like; as did many of the Kings of the Gentiles, and some of the Iewes; yet ought they not to be thought so contemptible, as that the Communaltie was no way created for their service.

The Observator sayth in the same Page, That the right of Conquest cannot be pleaded, to acquit Princes of that which is due to the people, as the authors and ends of all Power; for meere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, and frustrate Law; and if it could, there were more reason why the people might iustifie Force to regaine due libertie, then the Prince might to subvert the same.

By the Observators leave, for his first Clause it is answe­red alreadie, That in Monarchies the people are not the authors or ends of Power: for the second Clause, That meere Force cannot alter the course of Nature, or frustrate the tonour of Law; that is to say, that meere Force [Page 12]cannot captivate and debase a people by nature free, & li­ving under a law of common consent. I suppose the words, cannot alter, should have been, cannot, de jure, alter, or ought not to alter, &c. For that force can alter, and de facto hath altered the freedom and lawes of people and nations, is known to most men, Histories and Chronicles testifying to the world, the several alterations & forms of government which conquerors have induced; but whether they ought so to have done, is a question; yet should the Observator and his adherents take advice, that though in Nature there is a parity of mankind, and therefore dominion may not seeme to be intended by nature, yet God the authour of Nature, foreseeing the fall of man, and the depravation in nature, which did ensue thereof, intended power and dominion, and that some should bee masters and or hers servants; some command, and others obey; some should become slaves to tyrants, others subiects to free Monarks; others members of popular Estates: and these things God hath ordained by his divine wisedome, according to his will, and disposes and alters them at his pleasure: But as for the pot, it aught not to say to the Potter, Why hast thou made mee thus? It is enough for it to know, that there is no power but of God, and so to be appliable to the use it was made for; if for hononr, to honour; if for servility, to servility, being subiect for consci­ence sake, Rom 13.5.

Of a strange nature therefore are those words, viz. There were more reason why the people might justifie force to regaine due liberty, then the Prince might to subvert the same. If this doctrine had been good, our Saviour would surely have counselled the Iewes (when they asked him whether it were lawfull to give tribute to Caesar) to have kept their money in their purses, or to have made up a stock of it, and [Page 13]by force to have sought to regaine their due liberty from Caesar, and not have bid them, Give unto Cesar what is Ce­sars. If it be alledged, that in case Christ had counselled the Iewes so, they would have plaid the Iewes inceed, and have accused him of high treason; What then? would Christ have concealed, or did he at any time conceale the truth for seare of the Iewes accusations? When hee was coniured to expresse whether or no hee were the Sonne of God (a thing more hatefull to the Iewes eares, then the de­nying of tribute could have beene to the eares of the Ro­mans) Christ answered, Thou hast said it, which is as much as Yes. But suppose the Iewes would have accused him of high treason, in case hee had denied tribute to Ce­sar, and that God would not have such a vile imputation as treason laid on the redeemer of the world. Yet had regain­ing of due liberty by force been lawfull, Christmight have said, Ye may give tribute to Cesar in the potentiall Mood (in which words no exception could have been taken) and not have said, give tribute to Cesar, or give unto Cesar what is Cesars, in the imperative mood. Or otherwise, when they asked him, whether it were lawful to pay tribute to Cesar, he might only have answered them, Yes; but foreseeing in his divine wisedome, that some indirect constructions might be made of such a single word, as Yes, tis lawfull to pay it, yee may pay it if yee please; tis not against the law of God, if ye doe pay it, &c. therefore Christ bid them shew him a peece of money, and bid them give it unto Ce­sar, informing the covetous minds of that perverse people, that they ought and were obliged to part with their money and substance to Cesar if demanded as a tribute; but [...] let Arguments of Divinity passe, and to induce a few State reasons: If the people may justify force to regaine due liberty, [Page 14]what Monarchy? what Aristocracy? what Popular estate can remain secure? the French subiects being in generall oppressed with taxes, may revolt from their King, if this Tenet be good; and so may the Spanish: the Polish Pea­sants may rebell against the King and their Lords, for that they hold them in villinage: and the Townsmen and Boores in Holland, and the Pisani in Venice against the States, for their imposing on them terrible excizes. This Tenet, or Position, may quadrate, it may bee with the I­rish rebels (for they pretend by force to regaine due liber­ty) but never with loyall subiects. And surely this Tenet or Position aforesaid, is dangerous to all the Monarchies and States of the world, I even to Parliaments themselves, if rightly considered, and opposite also to the law of God & Nations. The Observator telleth us, p. 13. that where the people by publick authority will seek an inocnvenience to them­selves, and the King is not so much interested as themselves, it is more inconvenience to deny it, then grant it. This is a strange assertion, and against all rule of Monarchicall go­vernment. Suppose (for a supposition is no fallasie) that a Christian people should generally (which God forbid) de­sire to revolt from Christianity to Mahometanisme; should their King grant it? they seeme to bee more interes­sed then the King, because it concernes their salvation or damnation, is it iniustice therefore to deny it? Surely no; but most iust and acceptable to God to hinder them from it. Suppose this nation should in generall (wich God of his goodnes prohibit) desire to turn Anabaptist & Brow­nists, whereof there are to many already, is the King bound, or ought he to condescend to their desires? Surely no: but as Gods Vice gerent to oppose such exorbitant inclinati­ons of the people: but if the Assertion of the Observator [Page 15]be good, Pilat seems to be excusable whom the Observator condemneth in the page befoere: for the Iewes sought by authority of the Priests & Elders to crucifie Christ, (an inconvenience enough to themselves) and instanced a law, and that by that law he ought to die, Ioh 1 9.7. and the Iewes were more interested in Christ, (he being their Countrey­man, and subiect to their lawes, as they conceived) then was Pilate: so that according to this assertion of the Observa­tor, it was more inconvenience and injustice for Pilate to have denied to the Iews Christ to have been crucified, then to have granted it. Iudica Deus.

The Observator saith, pag. 17. The name of a King is great, I confesse, and worthy of great honour, but is not the name of a people greater?

The Observator must give me leave to tell him, that in Monarchies where there were or are Kings, the name of a people neither was nor is greater then the name of a King; Senatus populusque Romanus, ceased to be, and gave place to the name of Cesar: The Ottoman name at this day, digni­fies that great Empire subiect to that family; and so doth the name of Sophy the Persian. The name of the House of Austria decorates their dominions; and so doth that of Burbon France. And I see no reason but why the name of Stewart should doe as much in England. If it bee asked, But what availeth the names of these great Monarchs, without their Kingdomes or Dominions? The answer is, that Dominions are to Monarchs, as it were, material sub­iects; themselves (from whom their names result) as Formes. Now as the Forme is more worthy then its mat­ter, so is a free Monarch more worthy then his Empire, in respect of dignity politicall.

[Page 16] And indeed the word Monarch infers as much for Monar­chy, and is derived from Monarch, not Monarch from Mo­narchy. But it may bee some will instance from hence, that if it be so, the good of a Monarch seems to be preser­red before the good of all his subiects in generall, so that a whole Kingdom or Empire should be utterly pillaged, wa­sted and consumed, rather then his treasures bee destroyed. Not so: for though Empires & Kingdoms are but as ma­teriall subiects, and Monarchs as forms politicall, yet even as in nature, formes cannot subsist without matter, (from whose power all formes, except the rationall soule, are edu­ced) so in policy, Monarchy cannot subsist without their people, from whose subiection & obedience their power is educed immediatly from God, as are formes from matter by nature: the good of both therefore must bee consistent together, so that not salus populi alone; as the Observator would have it. but salus Regis & populi, is the true end of Monarchicall government.

Thus have I briefly answered the Observators chiefe arguments, from whence all his other assertions and conclusions are drawne, desi­ring him and all others, rather to study how to produce reasons for obe­dience (where it is due) to Monarchs, then to derogate from Monar­chicall government to endeavour how to incline, & not to disaffect (by nice positions) the distracted mindes of the people towards the King▪ to propound prudent Arguments which might move the King to ac­commodate with his Parliament and not by lessening his authority, to divert him from it. Finally to seeke how to unite the King and Com­monwealth & not to disunite them by impertinent and invalid conclu­sions. God of his goodnes grant co-union as much as in this world may be, between our Soveraigne and his people, that [...] may know truly how to rule, and they to obey.