IT is pleaded by some, that the Authority of the late Parliament is still in force, though at present interrupted, and therefore whatsoever Government shall be setled without them, is of no validity; The rather for that (say they) there was an Act made at the beginning thereof, that they should not be dissolved otherwise then by their own consent; For this cause it may be a matter of great Importance to the settlement of mens minds therein, if it shall fully ap­pear that the late Parliament was by their own Act long since dissolved, as to their Parliamentary power, and re­tained since that time onely a ruling power, such as that of Kings and Supream Governors, which amongst all free Nations is capable of resistance and removal by the People, and that the Armies under their Command had power to do as much as the People themselves, being in Arms, might have done in order to the opposing of Usur­pation, as well in their own Rulers as others; And first I shall give you the state of the Case.

The Parliament in their declarations make as large Promises of doing great things for the People, if once they could but get the power into their hands, as almost was possible? They are at first afflicted with several Armies that make it their design to prolong the War, rather then obtain a Conquest; at length many gallant men (not Soul­diers of fortune, and men of mercenary Principles) for the [Page 2]love of their Country, and hopes of the great things pro­mised, expose their lives to hazzard, for maintaining the Parliament in their dominion, follow their business with such uncessant pains, Vigilance and diligence, as is with­out all example of any Army since the World began; They find in every thing success to wonder, acknowledg­ed by friends and enemies to be from a divine presence, they have on a suddain reduced the whole Nation; which is scarcely done, but these men must lay down Arms, that others whose ways tend to persecution and oppression (es­pecially against men of their practices & Judgements) may take them up, and reap all the sweet fruits of these mens losses, of their blood and limbs, of their precious friends slain in the service (and the Widdows and Orphans made thereby) of their incomparable diligence, unexampled ad­ventures, Invincible courage, miserable hardships under­gone by them, and many other things of what moment so­ever, not at all now to be spoken of, but they are doomed to submit all this, yea and their lives, yea and their poste­rities, yea and some things relating to their souls, to the mercy of those that they plainly perceive, do implacably hate them, manifested in this their undeserved cruelty.

These people have now reason to fear that such a bloody and deboist crue as are usually listed in all ordinary Ar­mies, shal again be levied upon the Nation and themselves, to the Plundering and Ruining of the People; and further, that by means thereof themselves, their posterities and all men of the most raised Principles, must be inslaved to the wills of a Generation, whose destructive ways & purposes are sufficiently manifested in this prodigious proceeding, and that the future dominion will by them be secured to such as they in their kindness shall think good enough to rule over them.

From these great endeavours to remove the Militia into the hands of their own Creatures, whereby to be main­tained in ruling, how long and which way they pleased, and their not performing their large promises to the people in their first declarations (to the deluding of these men who would never have undergon the hardships of such a bloody war) meerly to put the feet of some designers into the Stir­rop, they (though required to lay down Arms) demur upon it, humble themselves deeply, seek God solemnly, he re­turns such an answer, as with one heart and Soul they are agreed, That to lay down Arms, would be to forgo their trust.

Hereupon they stand it out, resist the Parliament, and since that time upon like occasions they seclude many members, and at last (finding still the same design more subtilly carryed on) they dissolve the house.

Now the question is, how far these things, though otherwise very equitable, yet being thus acted against the Supream power, were fit to be done at all; and if they were, then whether they might be done by the present Army, in that capacity wherein they stood in relation to them.

For notwithstanding all that hath been said, I must needs confess,Rom. 3.7. 1 Pet. 2.13. Rom. 13, 1, 2. that to do the least evil for obtaining the greatest good, or to resist the higher powers in that sense as the Scripture requires obedience to them, is not in any sort to be justified by honest men, much less by Christians.

And therefore,

Although it is of no less then Divine Institution,Exod. 18.21. Dan. 7.14.18. Isa. 49.23. Exod. 7.4. that men fearing God should have the government (which many of those were not) Though such Magistrates have been of old promised as a great blessing to mankind, and advantage to the truth; Though through the late un­wonted [Page 4]providences, it seems to be now in design, especi­ally here in England; though the whole Creation (shortly to be delivered) groans under those Pharaoh's that will not let the People receive the Gospel,Mat. 24.14. or serve God otherwise then they please; Though the late Parliament have been so frequently attempting to infringe the liberty of the Godly, and that very people, by the price of whose blood they were setled in their power, yet I shall not take sanctu­ary from any of these Considerations,2 Sam. 23.17. to prove either the equity of the aforesaid proceeding, or the Injustice of the Parliaments aforesaid claim, but in order thereunto shall insist only upon these four Particulars.

• 1. That the late Parliament were long since divested of their National power.
• 2. That their ruling power was from a new choice of their own party.
• 3. That their own party had power to lay them aside upon mislike.
• 4. That this power of their own party was in their Ar­mies.

And first for the first, The Parliament having declared against the King, step up into his Throne, by taking upon them the ruling power. So that whereas before they were as the People, ruled; Assembled onely (pro tempore) to con­troul their Rulers, and make Laws for them to rule by; they are now the standing Rulers that are subject to the like controul from the People; For, Both these powers they could not have at once, because there was no Law for it, and it was against equity.

When was there ever any Law made, that in case any King be declared to break his trust by any Parliament, that same Parliament shall succeed him in his dominion, and yet not be subject to the Controul of the People, as the King [Page 5]was; I highly presume such a ridiculous Law as this was never made: and for equity,

1. It makes the Parliament both judge and party in their own cause, whereby they may do what they will, and say it is well.

2. It is otherwise injurious in three respects; First it lays a temptation upon Parliaments to declare against good Kings, that they might obtain their dominion.

2. It makes good Parliaments liable to suspicion for doing their duty against Kings; and lastly it might make other Parliaments neglect their duty for avoyding that suspicion: And thus you see how much this double power is against equity.

Now since that claim which hath no ground either in Law or equity is void; it follows that the Parliament by accepting of the ruling power (since I say there was no Law, (and it was against equity) for them to hold both) dissolved themselves by their own Act, as to their Parlia­mentary or National Power.

2. That their ruling Power was from a new choice of their own Party.

If the People had suspected a meer design in the Par­liament to gain the Kings dominion to themselves (and having shared a good part of the Publike Treasure a­mongst them) in the end to make their peace with the King by betraying those that assisted them unto his lust, (which was a thing possible) yet if the People had been bound up by their first choice, they must either have sub­mitted to the Kings will in not opposing him, or to the Parliaments in being betrayed by them; For a medium betwixt Acting and not Acting cannot be found, but they were free from this exigency: for,

There was no Law to constrain them to chuse the [Page 6]Parliament for a ruling power, who as yet I say are no more then the people ruled, that have power to controul their rulers; And as there was no Law, so there was no equity that they should be constrained to it against their wills, since they were not slaves, but a free People; so that their submitting themselves to the Parliament as a Ruling power, was a new choice of them to a new Office, and that of their own party onely; for Royalists opposed it, and Neuters paid not Contribution but by constraint.

3. Their own party had power to lay them aside upon mislike.

Their ruling power being only of free gift upon liking from their own party, they were but as Tenants at Will, to be laid aside upon mislike, since their own party never gave them power to rule which way, and how long they pleased; and without their gift they could not have it; and if it had been otherwise, they were in a better condition when they had Kings that were controulable.

Again, the Parliaments party could not give the Parli­ament an uncontroulable power though they would; for men are not sole Lords and Masters of their own lives, much less of their posterities, and therefore cannot give that to others which is not their own to give.

And therefore to conclude, if I trust another with the custody of my goods, I may remove them upon suspicion, much more my person; especially when I never indented how long he should keep either; and it is no prejudice to him, since he hath no right to any dominion over me espe­cially if he professes to aim at nothing but my good, and undergoes much trouble therein; which being the very case in hand, it is cleer that the Parliaments own party had power to lay them aside upon mislike.

Object. Since the Royalists and Neuters were reduced to their obedience, their own party could not cast them off without their consent.

Answ. By the same reason they must have had the con­sent of Ireland and Scotland in it also, but especially in dealing with the late King, in whom those Nations had in­terest as well as we; But I say there is no equity at all that those who did not make choice of the Parliament them­selves as a ruling power, should impose them upon others.

Lastly, I deny that the enemy were reduced to the obe­dience of the Parliament as the Objection says; for by that reckoning the Parliament must have sat for ever; but they were reduced to the obedience of that government which the Parliaments party should think fit to set up over them­selves.

Object. The removing of the Parliament was against the late Ingagement.

Answ. Was it at all intended by the late Ingagement that the Parliament should sit for ever? Or did it not rather refer to a being satisfied without King or house of Lords; and in the absence thereof, to be true and faithfull to the present government that was and should be established.

Again, The Parliament men were once all bound as sub­jects to obey the King, and yet as a Parliament they had power to resist him; so every particular person in the Army or elsewhere, as private men might be obliged to submit unto the Parliament, and yet the Army as a joynt body might have power to remove them; which that they had, will appear by what follows.

That this power of their own party was in their Armies.

That the Parliaments party had power to remove the Parliament upon mislike, I have already proved, and now I say that this power of theirs was in their Armies, and that for these reasons:

• 1. Without their Armies they could not Controul them.
• 2. The Souldiery might in their own defence do it.
• [Page 8]3. They are a National Power, as the Parliaments here­tofore.
• 4. Otherwise the Militia would tend to more hurt then good.
• 5. Otherwise the Parliament had been inexcusable in Commissionating of them.

1. Without their Armies they could not controul them.

And that for three reasons: for the rest of the People were,

• 1. Unarmed; therefore could not suppress any resistance that might come therein.
• 2. Dispersed; therefore could not debate or vote what was fit to be done; nor are capable of being trusted with such secrets as relate to advice about great affairs.
• 3. Without Commission; therefore could not warrant their proceedings therein.

Object. Such Commissions were received from the Par­liament, therefore could not be imployed against them.

Answ. It might as well be pleaded The Parliament were Summoned by the Kings Writs, therefore they were to obey his will.

But to both it is answered, that the King granted those Writs, and the Parliament those Commissions (or should have done) in order to their Trust, and not their own wills.

2. The Soldiery might in their own defence do it.

When Parliament men are to be chosen, if those that ap­pear to give in their Votes should be denied the Priviledge, because all that might come are not present, there would be no end of things; but since those that are present can­not help the absence of the rest, it is alwayes thought e­quitable they should proceed without them, and not lose their own freedoms through others default, who if they like not the issue, may thank themselves.

Mat. 6.2. and the latter end.Thus also it is in all Parliaments, Councels, Commit­tees, and such like, wherein absent members are conclud­ed without their consent. Now I say, if there be ground for it in any case, much more in this; for the Armies venture their lives and limbs for freedom (and that not as Soldiers of fortune, but as their design;) others only their mony, be­tween which there is no comparison. Therefore they had no reason from the absence of others to submit to their own slavery, but might in their own defence rescue them­selves, since freedom was due, I say, to them as well as others, and they had paid much more for it then others.

3. They are a National power as the Parliaments heretofore.

By a National Power, I mean a power to Act and do, whatsoever the Nation it self (being present) might do.

This power in a time of peace is in Parliaments, but in a time of War it ought to be in the Trained Bands, or such as are worthy to be Intrusted to Act for them; For in a time of War the National trust is not to be put in Coun­cels but in Armies, (I mean the defensive Trust) Coun­cils may be dissolved by the Adversary or suddain com­motions, whilest if Armies stand and be faithfull, the Na­tion is upheld; but if Armies be dissolved, what becomes of Councels? Again, what can Councels do (though they would oppress) if Armies be so faithfull as they will not obey them? On the other side, what can Councels help, if Armies will be so unfaithfull as to cast off good Rulers and oppress the People? whereas if the people thems (viz. the trained Bands) or such as are intrusted to Act for them, do any of this, and there come any prejudice there­by, they may thank themselves; or they being the People, none else can suffer by it.

Now that the Armies are intrusted to Act and do what­soever the Nation or trained Bands being in Arms might do, is very evident: thus,

Judg. 8.1, 2, 3.The Nation of England is invited to appear in its own defence; the Peoples leisure will not give way, but they permit these to appear for them; and this permission is a trust put upon them to Act in their stead.

Thus in the examples before, when Parliament men are chosen, those that are not present at the Voting, do by their absence permit, and thereby Intrust the rest to Act for them; Thus also in all Parliaments, Councels and Com­mittees, as is said.

Now if this kind of permission be a trust in all other cases, why only to be excepted in this? which is so much the more a trust, by how much mens goods and lives are more immediately concerned in Armies then in Councels: It is evident therefore that the Armies are intrusted for the People (or Trained Bands,) to do in their absence what­soever they being present might have done, and therefore are a National power, such as the Parliaments heretofore, which have Authority to remove evil Rulers if they see cause.

4. Otherwise the Militia would tend to more hurt then good.

Esther. 4.14.If the Nation it self be in Arms (or those that Act in their stead) then though the ruling power would oppress them, yet they can do nothing without the Armies, and the Ar­mies are the Nation whom they would oppress, who will rather remove such rulers then oppress themselves; So that the chief end of the Militia is to Act as if they were the Nation; And therefore if the Army had not done that which the Nation in Arms might undoubtedly have done, they had overthrown the end of their own be­ing, and in neglecting their duty had been more for hurt then good.

5. Otherwise the Parliament had been inexcusable in commis­sionating of them.

The lives and fortunes of a People are subject to the Military force that is raised upon them; therefore the Ru­ling power can by no means be excused, if they do not permit the People themselves to be the Militia (as by their Trained Bands (or if they cannot attend the service) Com­mit it to those that are worthy to be trusted, and do un­dertake to Act in their stead, and to do for them whatso­ever they being personally present might have done, who (as is already proved) might have restrained or removed the late Parliament, being but a ruling power.

By all which it plainly appears what power the present Army had to restrain or remove the late Parlia­ment.