IN the perusal of divers late printed papers, &c. I found one intituled, The second Beacon fi­red, wherein (as in the first) the zealous and religious Authours (for so they were, however M. Goodwin may fancy, he sees some other hand in it) did seasonably represent to the Lord Protector and Parliament, divers of the reigning sins and spreading errors of the times, among which they had the hap to meet with one (as they might have met with many) out of a certain book that calls M. Goodwin Father, which is this; ‘That in case any assurance of the unchangeablenesse of Gods love were to be found in, or regularly deduced from the Scrip­tures, it were a just ground to any intelligent man to questi­on their Authority, and whether they were from God or no.’ Redemption redeemed, p. 335.

At this M. Goodwin takes fire, and presently an angry Pam­phlet comes out, wherein this great Presbytero-Mastix, and Antisionita (Colledge or Church, chuse you whether, some men think the Church hath fared the worse for the Colledges sake) cries out of Antichristian dealing, falsification; &c. (as M. Goodwin never wants Rhetorick of that strain.)

This furious out-cry made me turn in and see what the matter was; and after search, I found the omission of one word such hath by a strange kind of multiplication produ­ced a thousand, wherein he renders them to the world as guilty of no less then forgery and calumniation.

Possibly some may wonder, that M: Goodwin should cry [Page 4] out of calumniation, who hath so far profited in that Art, that he is not ashamed to prostitute the sentences of Calvin, Piscator, Paraeus, the Synod of Dort, &c. to the maintenance of those Arminian Doctrines, which all the world knows their souls abhorred, except this be the drift of it, That the world may be possessed with an opinion of the grandeur of Master Goodwins parts, who can ex quolibet ligno Mercurium facere, and quidlibet ex quolibet probare; or else this stupendious Con­ciliator hath put an end to this jangling controversie, and made these, hitherto thought irreconcileable (not only per­sons, but causes) to think and speak the same things.

These things when I considered, the desire of relieving op­pressed innocence, a willingness to testifie that my heart is towards those zealous assertours of Gods glory, and oppo­ser of M. Goodwins great Diana, that accursed Idoll of To­leration, a fear lest the truth should suffer upon such a pre­tended mistake, a desire to beget a right understanding in those that possibly may, by M. Goodwins high and mighty confidence, be drawn into this perswasion, that he hath re­ceived some considerable injury; These things have forced me to this present Vindication.

Master Goodwins great charge is, that the Book-sellers proceed à tanto, or tali, ad totum, and because he denies such unchangeableness, they charge him with denying any un­changeableness, which indeed may at first glance seem a per­version of his mind; but if things be impartially weighed, it will evidently appear, that however there is some difference of words, yet the sense is the same.

For 1. I am well assured, having had much conference with the Book-sellers since, &c. that it was not wilfully, or maliciously left out, to deprave his meaning, and render him more odious then he deserved. And in this the Authours of it do solemnly make their appeal to that God to whom they must give an account.

2. The true reason why the word such was left out, was, because it was a relative term, and so if it had been expressed, would have necessitated the transcription of a far larger pro­portion of M. Goodwins words, (who doth not use to write [Page 5] magnum in parvo) then the nature of that work would per­mit.

3. That assurance (which the firers of the Beacon speak of) of the unchangeableness of Gods love, which they im­plicitly assert, and with the denial whereof they charge Mr. Goodwin, is well known (to the Lord Protector, Parliament, and all intelligent men) to be that very same which M. Good­win opposeth, to wit, an unchangeableness of Gods love to such and such particular persons, though possibly they may fall into sin fouly, and lie in sin too long, as was the case of David, Solomon, &c. And this is that which M. Goodwin means by such unchangeableness, though he represents it in more hideous expressions. And this Dilemma M. Goodwin is de­sired to consider of, either that such unchangeableness he speaks of, is the unchangeableness which his adversaries as­sert, or it is not; if it be not, then he calumniates when he fastens it upon them, and draws this horrid inference from it; if it be, then they have done him no wrong, nor is there so much difference betwixt any unchangeableness and any such unchangeableness, as was pretended.

4. Let it be considered, that M. Goodwin doth frequently deny, and his whole dispute is levied against the unchangea­bleness of Gods love (I am not ignorant, he confidently tells us, that in his judgement Gods love is unchangeable, as it is no new thing for a spirit of errour to be accompanied with a spirit of contradiction.) Whether M. Goodwin asserts the unchangeableness of Gods love, as well as we, and so whe­ther the Book-sellers have wronged him, let the impartial Reader judge by these passages, (taken word for word out of his writings, lest he should say he is wronged) c. 13. § 33. pag. 335. Whether any such assurance of the unchange­ablenesse of the love of God towards him that is godly, [...]s the Objection speaks of, can be effectually, and upon suf­ficient grounds given unto men, is very questionable; Yea, I conceive there is more reason to judge otherwise then so. There you see his Scepticism. Yea, he doth not only question that assurance, &c. but the very possibility of it; and c. 10. § 41. p. 207. To reason thus, If God should [Page 6] love a man to day, and hate him to morrow, it would ar­gue a strange inconstancy or mutability in God, or in his love, is a very inconsiderate and weak reasoning. And a little before in the same Section, In case God shall destroy with eternal death, such men and women, whom he some­times truly loved, and respected dearly, this doth not ne­cessarily argue the least change or alteration in any attri­bute of his whatsoever, as either Love, Goodnesse, Mercy, &c. Whether this doth not argue alteration, to love to day, to hate to morrow, I leave to all those to judge that have their senses exercised to discern between good and evil. And whereas M. Goodwins salvo is this, Gods love is the same, he always loves righteousness, and hates unrighteousness, and so there is no alteration in him, but in the person beloved; I answer, there is a twofold love in God, a love to righteous­ness, a love to persons; the former is unchangeable I confess according to M. Goodwin, but the latter (about which the difference lies) M. Goodwin makes changeable, which may appear by this similitude. A Prince that loves a loyal and faithful subject, but when he proves disloyal, he hates him. Will any man deny that the Princes affections are changed? and yet he continues to love loyalty, and hate disloyalty. A Judge that loves righteousness, and hates iniquity unchange­ably, loves his friend, if he be righteous; if he turn wicked, he hates him, and punishes him. Can any deny that there is a change in him? So in this case, if God loves to day, and hates to morrow, is not here a change? It is true, the ori­ginal cause of the change, in all these cases, is the person of­fending, but still the subject of the change, (according to this Hypothesis) is, as the Prince and the Judge, so God him­self; and so God is, according to M. Goodwins doctrine, (as M. Goodwin hath proved himself to be) not unchangeable, [...].

And if God be not altered in this case, M. Goodwin is desi­red to tell us what alteration is, or when a person may be said to be changed in regard of his mind or affections. If Master Goodwin mean to make this good, he must (as he hath done in part) bring into the world a new Philosophy, as he hath done a new Divinity.

Again, this dreadful consequence which is justly charged upon M. Goodwin, not only is hanged upon this such unchan­geableness, (which he would have to be thought to be some other and higher degree of it then men dare to assert) but doth no less truly flow from other passages in his Book, where this word such is not found. I will use but one argu­ment, which is c. 13. § 37. arg. 8. It is too large to transcribe, the sum of it (I appeal to M. Goodwin) is this, That doctrine w^ch evacuates & turns into weakness & folly all that gracious counsel of the H. Ghost, &c. (these are his very words) must needs be a doctrine of vanity and errour: But such is the com­mon doctrine of absolute and infallible perseverance, mark it, he saith the common doctrine; (and who ever doubted that the Book-sellers meant that very thing?) Thence let me use this one Argument, That doctrine which in M. Goodwins judgement, evacuates and turns into weakness and folly all that gracious counsel of the H. Ghost, &c. were it to be found in, or regularly deduced from the Scriptures, it were a just ground to any intelligent man to question their Authority, and whether they were from God or no: But such is the com­mon doctrine of absolute and infallible perseverance, Ergo, I confess the syllogisme is somewhat long, (But M. Goodwin is a Ciceronian, he useth to dispute in words at length, not in figures). The major I know he will grant; the minor he cannot deny, it is his own words; and I hope he will suffer the conclusion to pass peaceably. And if so, M. Goodwin doth stil lie under the just imputation of that odious consequence, which according to these other expressions of his is this; If the Scripture should maintain the common doctrine of abso­lute and infallible perseverance, it were a just ground to any rational man to doubt of its divine Authority; which, let any sober man judge what it differs from the words which the Book-sellers use.

Nay more plainly, That such unchangeableness is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the common doctrine of perseverance, He often saith in his voluminous discourse, and in hIs Letter to M. Caryl, annexed to his last piece, p. 78. upon this very particular occasion, Nor do I wrong your doctrine of perseverance, to the value of the least hair on [Page 8] your head, because evident it is, that without SUCH an UNCHANGEABLENESSE supposed, the said doctrine will neither have footing nor foundation to support it. From hence with M Goodwins favour, I will try one syllogism, If the doctrine of such unchangeableness, and the common doctrine of perseverance are inseparably joined together, and the one inevitably flows from the other, then that consequence which follows from the one, follows also from the other: But the doctrine of such unchangeableness, and the common do­ctrin of perseverance, are inseparably conjoined, &c. nay, are to M. Goodwin one of the same. Ergo, the Book-sellers did him no wrong, when they fastened his odious consequence to the common doctrine of Gods unchangeableness, which he there fastens to such unchangeableness.

Nor doth M. Goodwin wash off the guilt of this consequence in his Letter to M. Caryl, where he hath these wordes; The style of the discourse is built upon this foundation, That God cannot deny himself, he cannot blaspheme himself. If therefore any Book contains any thing blasphemous against God, the divine Authority of it might justly be questioned. But Mr. Goodwin should consider, that it is one thing when a Book contains something which doth expresly or undenyably blas­pheme God, (then M. Goodwins reasoning were tolerable) but if it contain it only doubtfully, and by a remote and con­troverted consequence, it is not modesty (to use no harsher expression) in M. Goodwin to say, if any thing be said in the Scripture which his weak and dark (so all mens are) and pre­judicate apprehehensions conceive repugnant to Gods holi­ness, &c. he may rationally doubt of the divinity of it: And truly Sir, to speak impartially, if any man who believes the truth of the doctrine of perseverance, should use such expres­sions as these, If any unchangeableness of Gods love were to be found in, or regularly deduced from the Scriptures, it were just ground to any rational man to doubt of its divine Authority, I should both question his modesty, and lesse value his judge­ment. And yet I think, nay certain I am, he might shew as fair and fairer cards from reason and rational consequence, a­gainst the doctrine of Gods changeableness, then you can a­gainst the unchangeableness of his love. I could tell Mr. [Page 9] Goodwin of very considerable Authours, that in their highest de­bates on the behalf of the truth, when reason pleads the most strong­ly for their doctrines, yet have so much sobriety, as to put in this Proviso, That if God in Scripture evidently say such a thing, they wil receive it and conclude, that there reason mistook in this, (as it commonly doth in other things) and I do not mean Lutherans nei­ther. And it is observable, the many words you spend to take off the odiousness of your consequence, do not at all prevail with M. Caryl to eat his words, nor in the least to mitigate his censure of this passage. So that all these things considered, M. Goodwin was justly charged with denying, not only such unchangeableness, but Gods unchangeableness, i. e. in that sense in which the Orthodox asserted it.

But I have not yet done, I must needs have a little conference with Mr. Goodwin about some passages in his Book. And first, as for that tartness which you complain of in the language of the let­ter which the Book-sellers sent you, they do ingenuously acknow­ledge their errour in it, and as I have heard from them are ready to retract it, setting you a copy what you ought to do in the like case. M. Goodwins pen it is thought hath been as much dipt in gall as a­nother mans. Your scurrilous language towards the learned and reverend M. Walker, and in particular your bitter recipe which you prescribe for him, as for one that is not cōpos sui; Your elegant vari­ety of taunts, reproaches, & most contumelious expressions towards M. Jenkins, which for the benefit of the Reader, he hath collected together in his Blind Guide, cum multis aliis, may make M. Goodwins cheeks change colour as oft as he chargeth the Book-sellers or any others with scurrilous and unseemly language.

For what you say in favour of all cursed and damnable doctrins, I mean for the toleration and against the suppression of them, I shall hardly think that M. Goodwin is a man of so incompetent judgment, that his own conscience is satisfied with what he hath said, which I am the rather induced to believe, because I remember M. Goodwins [...], (so it was without any [...]) wherein he hath set his wits, and the Scripture too upon the rack to maintain that Mon­ster of universal liberty of conscience, (as it is commonly, though unduely called). This Book M. Edwards did answer satisfyingly and convincingly in the judgement of any impartial man: A solid reply whereunto the world did and doth expect ere ever M. Good­win appeared upon the stage again in that cause, or else by silence [Page 10] a confession (which I am confident is the truth, and so I believe are thousands besides me) that he cannot answer it. For this I have observed to be one of his [...], to answer those Books which are more sinewous and unanswerable, no otherwise then by contempt and silence. And so it seems M. Goodwin resolves to answer those two acute and learned Doctours, Dr. Owen, and Dr. Kendall, whose labours have had the high approbation of di­vers learned men, no whit inferiour to M. Goodwin, nor his con­gregation neither (though it is true, all mens tastes are not of the same temper, & non est disputandum de gustibus.) But, Sir, give me leave to tell you, that if you resolve to answer those two champi­ons in that manner, you will give many more cause to think what some already do, and what Sir Francis Nethersole called you, at least that you are not many miles distant from his [...], self-condemned.

And now I have mentioned that ingenious Knight, I cannot but let the world know what kind of answer they may expect from Mr. Goodwin to Dr. Kendal, &c. by representing one of your an­swers to his charge (by which you may see that Mr. Goodwin ab­horres an ingenuous tractation, as much as he doth an high Pres­byterian): Yet let not M. Goodwin twit me in the teeth with Ca­rolizing, Scotizing, (as he doth M. Jenkins, telling him also of his bands, &c. most disingenuously and barbarously, but most of all unbecoming him, who professeth himself to be a man of most exquisite constitution, and full of humility, ingenuity, &c.) for I mention this only, to shew with what trash M. Goodwin can (at least makes many believe he doth) satisfie himself and his credulous congregation. Sir Francis accused M. Goodwin of inconsistency in his judgement, that in his Anti-Cavalierism, pa. 7. he hath these expressions, As for offering violence to the Kings person, &c. we leave the proof of that to the Jesuites—we conceive it to be the just Pre­rogative of the persons of Kings IN WHAT CASE SOEVER to be secure from the violence of men, and their lives to be as consecra­ted Corn meet to be reaped and gathered only by the hand of God him­self. This passage Sir Francis opposeth to M. Goodwins justificati­on of that design of putting the King to the death. To this Mr. Goodwin replies, not by an ingenuous acknowledgement of his weakness, &c. (which would better have becomed him) but by this profound answer, as you have it in his Pamphlet called The unrighteous Judge, p. 9, 10. That he meant it only of violence of­fered [Page 11] from private men, not from Magistrates, and that what Ma­gistrates do in a way of Justice, God himself may be said to do. Thus M. Goodwins just Prerogative of Kings, (which no man that hath not his senses sodden into Trapezuntius his temper, to use Mr. Goodwins own phrase, doubts but he meant of something [...], proper to them, and I am perswaded his conscience tells him so) is levelled to that universal priviledge, which even the vilest Rogue enjoyes, i. e. that it is unlawful for their lives to be taken away by any other then the hand of the Magistrate. Which is so manifest an [...], or self-contradiction, that he that runs may read it. By this judge of this great Doctours [...], and [...], I will not say [...].

One or two passages more I cannot but observe: 1. His [...], that I say not [...], nor [...], p. 35. He brings in the testimo­ny of one (whom he calls as learned, grave, and judicious as any English born at this day) on the behalf of his Book about the Au­thority of the Scripture; That it was as good a Book as any was written since the Apostles days. This testimony saith M. Goodwin (I confess, if you do not many others do) may be as much too wide on the right hand, as your malignant imputation is on the left. Note how cautelously he speaks it; he dare not say, it is too wide, but it may be, it is not impossible I confess, I thought Mr. Goodwin would have vailed the Bonnet to Mornay, Grotius, (or at least to his Ca­mero upon that subject) though they have not such a [...], nor such a mixture of errours there (that I remember) as Mr. Goodwin hath. But it seems (as he speaks of Dr. Owen in relation to Dr. Kendal, p. 43.) he reserved his high thoughts for his own writings.

2. I Observe his [...], when he is charged with this absurd assertion, That knowledge, &c. is not attributed to God, any otherwise then eyes. It is not (saith he) for want of ignorance, that Dr. Kendall, Mr. Pool, and others contend against me for such a saying. He cites a saying of Austins, We speak few things properly of God. Sed quid hoc [...]. We ac­knowledge this to be a great truth, but this knowledge is one of those few: And for what Mr. Goodwin addes, It argues extream oscitancy for a man to think that they speak more honourably of God, who ascribe unto him knwoledg properly as it is found in men, or other creatures, then they who attribute the same unto him by way of emi­nency [Page 12] and transcendency of perfection, free from all the deficiency in men, &c. But what a piece of oscitancy, what [...], is this, that Master Goodwin should not understand, or else contra­ry to his understanding, relate our opinion? (utrum horum mavis, accipe): Did ever the Orthodox say, that knowledge is in God, as in men? &c. Do they not free it from all imperfections? as much, Yea more, I am sure, then Master Goodwin? wit­nesse his imputing to God ignorance of future contingences, more Sociniano. But Master Goodwin would do well to rub up his Philosophical notions, and to consider, that knowledge is not the lesse properly knowledge, because it is freed from imperfe­ctions, but rather more properly. Shall any man absurdly say, God is not properly holy, just, wise, merciful, because these are not in God as they are in the creature? [...]. I shall trou­ble Master Goodwin no farther, only thus: If he answer me as he hath answered Sir F [...]ancis Nethersole, or Master Jenkins, &c. I shall not trouble either him or the world with any Reply, but that which is his constant refuge in arduous cases, I mean, that of silence. This only being added for parting, if Mr. Good­win doth not moderate the heat of his carriage and expression, let him take heed lest some deal by him as Lubbertus did by Vor­stius (one of his Masters) who wrote a Book and intituled it Non aginta novem errores, &c. The ninety nine errours of Con­radus Vorstius, for some conceive Master Goodwins works will af­ford a Counter-part.