YOur Letter of November 27. sent to your friend for satisfaction of his Conscience (scrupling the taking of the Engagement) is come into these parts, and, as may be conjectured, into all parts of the Kingdom, so that it seems your se­cond thoughts were to make every Reader so far your friend, as to help him in case of like irresolution. You observe in your select friend to whom you make your special ad­dress, that he hath been alwayes affected to the Common cause of Liberty, against the designs of tyranny, upon which your Rea­der will soon observe, that such have their hesitancys in this busi­ness, and it is observed not by a few, that almost all such have their scruples, and almost onely such. Others (on what Principles I shall forbear to speak) readily enough for the most part enter up­on it; which confession of yours, seconded with the observati­on of others, doth much amuse your reader, that you should pass so heavy a censure on all that remaining unsatisfied, as yet sus­pend, [Page 2]having your own attestation, that they cordially pursue that which in your thoughts is the end of this, and all other pub­lick Engagements; namely, the intrinsecal good of the Common­wealth. To which also they are ready to subscribe, not with the hand onely, but with the heart likewise, if they were once per­swaded that Covenants and publick promises, bind not at all to ac­cidental forms, (as you stile them) when yet they are made by publick authority, that did impose them the very Letter, or mat­ter of such Covenants or Engagements. Somewhat I shall make bold to speak to your Considerations, to let you see how far in the thoughts of many, they fall short of carrying your Question in the affirmative, in which I shall endeavour to keep me to the principal heads, that tediousness may not be your trouble.

Your first work is to reconcile this Engagement, to the Oath of Allegiance, and the National Covenant, attempting to make it good, that they are not opposite, and in reference hereunto, you lay down as a State maxime, that the obligation of King and Subjects are mutual, and must needs stand and fall together, accord­ing as the condition by which they are begotten, is kept or broken; which is nothing else but the Law, according to which he and his Sub­jects agree, 1 that he shall be their King, and they his Subjects. When this is yielded, yet herein you fall short, that you do not produce that Law (to which he stands obliged) that doth declare this or that act of his, to be a full forfeiture of trust, and ipso facto inflict that penalty of the loss of all his regalities, and disobligation of his Subjects; If such a law were but produced and a transgressi­on proved, it would perhaps serve to quiet many minds. Mr. Cook (if I mistake not) answering the objection, why no Law was made in such case against Kings, instead of producing a Law; onely gives in the answer of Solon, why in his Laws he omitted the punishment of Parricides, freely confessing that as in the one, so in the other a Law was wanting; Those against whom the late war hath frequently been avowed to be made, have also Laws with large penalties in case of transgression made against them, (viz.) all such as are found Counsellors in evil, or as sub­ordinate Officers are Agents in it; which page 13. you seem to grant to be good security, and what hath been still said for the immunity of Kings in this Nation (who act nothing as Kings [Page 3]in their own persons, but by subordinate Agents) You though an Alienigena cannot be ignorant, 2 but you go on and tell us wherein the King hath been unsaithful to his trust, even to the absolving of his people pso facto from their Allegiance; it hath been (you say as you suppose) a perpetual custome in this Nation, for the Commons at all times to ask and propose the making of the Lawes, and for the Lords and King to give consent thereunto; and after a few words of Explication you make your Application; If the King then should set himself wilfully to be above this reason of the Nation, which is the onely Original of the Law, and refuse obsti­nately the Lawes which they shall choose to be setled: he puts himself ipso facto out of the capacity of being a King any more unto them; and if this can be made out to have been the way wherein the late King set himself, and that it was the design of the House of Lords, to uphold and inable him to follow that way, it is evident that so far as he did by that means actually unking himself: so far also they that assisted him in that design, did unlord themselvs in the state thereof. In which sentence of yours all readers, when they compare with it what you lay down for a rule pag. 10. may easily wonder at your great forgetfulness Here you judge definitively in the highest way of the rights which supreme powers have over us, and give in your verdict above all (that I know) hath ever been charged upon them; and there you say, for my own part I have taken this to be a rule whereby all private men, (such as I am) as Christians ought to walk unblameablely under the Superiour powers of this world; namely, that it doth not belong to us to judge definitively of the rights which the Supreme powers in this world pretend to have to their pla­ces, farther you say; It is no part of our Christian profession to be­come Judges of the great ones of this world, in respect of their rights and pretentions to power, for we are to behave our selves as spiritual men in this world by the rule of our profession, and as strangers and pilgrims therein. 3 Which passages how you will be able to recon­cile I cannot reach: And your mistake of the Customes of this Nation (which so punctually you undertake to lay down,) e­quals your forgetfulness of your self, so that here indeed (at least) you appear a stranger; the Lawes are well known to have had still their first rise indifferently from-Lords and Commons, some­times from the one, sometimes from the other: the business of [Page 4]money onely excepted, which alwayes with us begins with the Commons. And I suppose (however it fares with the Lords) Kings have not often been found guilty in refusal of their assent to Bills of Subsidies, Taxes, Pole-money, Tonnage, poundage, &c. And that it hath been a perpetual Custome for Kings and Lords to assent to all that the Cōmons have proposed, is boldly affirm­ed; endeavouring to perswade your reader, that not only de jure it ought to be so (which sure at some conference or other, the Commons for prevention of so many disputes and reasonings, would have charged upon the Lords) but that de facto it hath been so, when all that know any thing of the Custome of this Nation, very well know the contrary, that the Lords have given their assent or dissent to Bills, (sent from the Commons) accord­ing as they have judged it most expedient, and often sent them back with amendments, according as in their sense they have judged them most meet to pass as Lawes; and that Kings instead of yielding assent to Bills sent from Lords and Commons, have often times onely returned a Le Roy avisera; which some­times (as I have heard from singular Patriots) hath turned to the great happiness of the Nation.

And as you pretend to have cleared the meaning of the Oath of Allegiance (which was made in our own age) by the consent as you say of all ages, 4 so you go about a further explanation of it, by the third Article of the Covenant, which is not opposite to the Oath of Allegiance; and this obligeth (you say) to the pre­servation of the Kings Person and Anthority conditionally, and with a limitation onely; namely, in the preservation and defence of the true Religion and Libertyes of the Kingdom; 5 Which Comment of yours upon that Article of the Covenant (turning In into If, to make a condition of it, and changing the whole current of the words from our selves to the Kings, so that they should be meant of the Kings preservation of Liberty and Religion, and not our own (when all before and after mentioned, is our work and not his) is such, so forced and strained, that it will abide the censure of no indifferent and unbiassed reader, and is fully e­nough contradicted in those words which immediatly follow, which you prudently conceale; That the world may bear witness with our Consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts [Page 5]or intentions to diminish his Majesties just power and great­ness.

It was (as is well known) frequently charged upon the Par­liament, that what ever their intendments were, for Religion and the publick Liberties; yet they had an evil eye on his Ma­jesty, not brooking his power and greatness, which was as fre­quently disavowed, as a scandal not sufferable; and in the Cove­nant for this very end this solemn appeal was inserted, in which we have first an acknowledgment that his Majesty stood vested with just power and greatness, and so no such forfeiture made as before you mention; And secondly a serious protestation made that we have no intention to diminish it, but as we resolve to preserve Religion and Liberty: so we oblige our selves to loy­alty to the Kings person, and Authority, and from all thoughts or intentions to diminish his power and greatness, which is the true and clear meaning of it. Upon mention of the Lawes and Liberties of the Kingdom, you say 6 The King either refractori­ly casting them off, or seeming to yield unto them in such a way, that no trust could be given him, that he would keep what he yielded unto, the Parliament did actually lay him aside, and voted that no more addresses should be made unto him; Where you seem unresolved whether it were guilt in his Majesty, or jealousie in the Houses that occasioned those Votes? Whether the King did actually deserve them, or whether there was onely jealousie, that he would render himself worthy of them? The suspected Wife Numb. 5. might not be cast off till her guilt was proved, though some are pleased to put Kings and Wives, both in one condition, to be cast off meerly ad placitum, the one by the husband, the other by the people: which (as to Kings) you seem not to judge unreasonable; Then followes in your Letter from which time for­ward, he was no more an object of your Oath of Allegiance, 7 but to be looked upon as a private man. Yes sure when the Parliament had againe voted addresses to him, ejus est tollere, cujus est ponere, If the Parliament have a legistative, they have also le­gistranslative or repealing power: if Votes can set free, then Votes can reoblige: you go on, and say to an indifferent eye, it, (namely the Engagement) may be thought so far from being op­posite to the true sence of either, that it may be rather a confirmation [Page 6]of the ground for which both the Oath of Allegiance, and third Ar­ticle of the National Covenant was then binding; for confirmati­on of which, you say, this or that outward form of Government is wholly accidental, no wayes essential to any Nation in the world; and therefore is alterable in respect of forms, as is most expedient for their exigent necessities, but to be governed by Lawes, and to have the use of the true Religion, and of the National freedom, is absolute­ly necessary and essential to the being of a Common-wealth, passing by that State Paradox, that to have the use of the true Religion and of the National freedom, is absolutely necessary and essen­tial to the being of a Common-wealth: so there neither is nor ever was any Common-wealth out of Cristendome, nor many in it, (a few only having that happiness,) This takes wholly for granted, that all our Oaths have respected barely the esse of the Nation, or that which (you say) was called the Kingdom, when all that reade them must confess, that they had immediat respect to the bene esse, in their present constitution, and external admini­stration; we swear not barely to the remote end (which is the intrinsecal good as you speak, of the Nation) but to the meanes which (in the judgement of those which you sometimes call the reason of the Nation) had a direct tendency to it, 8 namely the continuance of Monarchy in the present line, any change attempt­ed by men, necessarily in humane reason, tending to the Nations danger, if not ruin and destruction. Consult I pray you casuists, when the oath in the express letter looks at the means, which ap­pears to lead to an end, whether it be enough for the party sworn to intend alone the end, in contradiction to the means, which was the matter of the Oath.

If I come to a Garrison and be there questioned, whether I come from the enemies quarters yea, or no? May I deny upon Oath that I came from thence, when indeed I did? satisfying my self with this, that I will not betray the Garrison where I am, the question whence I came being onely accidental, the safety of the Garrison is the thing the Oath onely intended; and to this in such an Oath I answer, Inquire whether this be not per­jury?

This evasion to eye the end and not look at accidentall forms (as you call them) will facilitate a way to any Oath, and as easily [Page 7]disobliege, rendring the Oath vain as soon as it is entered; Thus it had been safe to have entered the Canon Oath (prescribed by the Convocation in the year that this Parliament did commence) for the establishment of the Hierarchy in Arch-bishops, Bishops, Deans, Deans and Chapters, Chancellours, &c. Seeing we might have entered into it (how opposite soever our judgements were against it) and then have avoided it, explaining our selves that we swore to the end, namely Church-Government, & order for pub­lick edification, without respect to external forms, which is acci­dental; which Government being in our judgment best setled, in an Independant Congregational way (as some think) or in a Presbyterial Classical way (as others) this Oath thus interpreted, is so far from engaging to Prelacy, that it engageth against it, so far from binding to a non consent of the change and alterati­on of it (which was the letter of the Oath) that it binds us to a vigorous endeavour of change and alteration; thus also all Covenanters are disobliged from the second Article in the Co­venant (which is to the extirpation of Prelacy, as there explain­ed) in case they believe (as many do) that Church-Government is best settled, and the Churches edification best provided for in such a constitution, and so Covenanting against it in the letter of the Covenant, they Covenant for it in the end, which you say is onely to be heeded. Neither can any State this way find any se­curity in any Oath prescribed, all may enter; and then evade with this shift of the intrinsecal good of the Common-wealth of the Nation, and plead that the necessity of the publick good calls to the transgression and contradiction of it: Thus Zedeki­ah might have freed himself from his Oath of fealty to Nebucad­nezar; it being (as he might have pleaded) against the intrin­secal good of that Nation, that strangers should rule over them, and they be made a Province to Babylon, his Oath to serve him would have strongly engaged to a revolt from him. And the Oath of the Elders of Israel to the Gibeonites (thus understood) had been null in the very taking of it, evidently tending to the publick dammage, of which the Commons of Israel were very sensible, as appears in their exceptions taken against the Elders, for entring into it. Saul in the act which brought a three years famine upon Israel (if this divinity might take place) had done a [Page 8]work singularly commendable, seeing it was his zeal to the house of Israel and Judah, which alone moved him (against the letter of his Covenant) to the slaughter of those persons, even the publick good so evidently damnified, and endangered by their abode in the midst of the people. Sauls slaughter of these Gibeonites had been as praise-worthy as Davids (his successors) slaughter of the Jebusites, the publick good being Sauls end (the Holy-Ghost bearing witness) as well as Davids; and what good the present State can reap by this Engagement (your in­terpretation being once admitted) I believe you know not which way to demonstrate; the engagers may say, they will be true and faithful to the Common-wealth, as now establish­ed without King or house of Lords, in their endeavour to re­establish a King and house of Lords; which they may think most tends to the honour and peace of it.

You go on to answer a further Objection of your friends, that in the third Article of the Covenant, he is sworn to preserve, the Rights and Priviledges of Parliament, 9 amongst which this is one, that therein should be a house of Lords distinct from the Com­mons; and this another, that all the Members of the Commons should sit and vote freely; for when he swore, he meant a Parliament so constituted and no other.

In answer of which, you first confess, and then endeavour to avoid, and if you did avoid as clearly, as you do confess ingenu­ously, you would give more satisfaction; you confess that these are Priviledges, that the intention of the Covenant, was to preserve these, and that now such intentions cannot be prosecuted; which confession alone, is enough to create a bigger scruple in your friend, then the whole force of all which yet hath appeared in your answer can wipe off. Your way to avoid is, that your friend did what in him lay when time and place was, according to his Cal­ling to prevent these breaches, and so cannot be accused of the infringement thereof; for when a fatal necessity of State, (as you say) in the course of divine justice with a power irresistible, not onely to men of private, but to all that were in publick vocations, did bring about that change upon the Parliament, no particular mens engagements were considerable. This no doubt is a clear justification of your friend, one mans sin pollutes not another, when by opposing, and in his place withstanding, he keeps him­self [Page 9]from guilty participation. But in this excuse of him from breach of Covenant, in the infringement of Parliament Priviledg­es, you do plainly charge that irresistible power (which you speak of) with it, He is therefore innocent because he did what in him lay, in his place to prevent this change; those then can­not be innocent, that being interested and obliged in the same Covenant, did yet with such a power (as you mention) work it; Neither can that supposed fatal necessity of State (which your answer speaks of) acquit that power from breach of their Covenant in such confessed infringement of Parliament-Privi­ledges.

The reason of the Kingdom (as else-where you call it) saw no such necessity as your Paper takes for granted, but with high re­solutions opposed when the power was at their doors, and them­selvs in imminent danger, both Houses judged the way that they were upon, to be the way most conducing to the States safety; and it was their business and no other powers, in such case to give judgement. And in case this necessity had been real, and not imaginary or pretended; yet it were no sufficient plea for such a transgression. Joshua and the Elders of Israel understood no such State-divinity, to break Covenant on such grounds, much less on such pretences. Much might have been said by them to have necessitated a breach with those Gibeonites, with whom they had entred Covenant; Gibeon was one of their Roy­al Cities, and of danger to be possessed by such an enemy: or to have him still in their howels to lay claim to it; the Land was Israels by the gift of God, and too narrow for themselves in such multitudes to inhabit, there was no reason that the fat and the sweet should be devoured and eaten up by strangers. The arguments of Egypt against Israel, might well here have been ta­ken up by Israel, when there falls out any war, they will joyn unto the enemies.

These Reasons or the like of equal or greater strength Saul doubtless saw, when he sought to slay them (not out of any pri­vate spleen but) in his zeal to the house of Israel and of Judah; but none of these did sway with those Covenanters, and God himself acquits them from any mistake in the Obligation of that their Covenant, in his proceeding against the house of Saul be­fore [Page 10]observed, when private men swear to their hurt, they must not change, when States swear they may not change: there is no security without God from any danger; it is more safe to keep with God, though seemingly we run upon peri, I then to quit the wayes of God deserting him for prevention to speak the fairest, these reasonings come from unbelief.

You go on, and say, You see what pinches your friend: He thinks that they that made the change broke the Covenant, 10 and if he engage under this change as is desired, he thinks he breaks the Cove­nant also. To which you answer,

First, That they who made the change will plead for themselves, that they are not guilty of any breach of Covenant notwithstanding the change. But this you leave to them to justifie; And seeing you will not justifie them, I shall not stand to implead them, your Reader being fully satisfied, that your own pen in your former confession hath already done it.

Secondly you answer, For the consequence your friends make from the taking of the Engagement to a breach of the Covenant, it doth not at all follow to your understanding; for the direct and plain matter of the Engagement, binds him onely to procure the good of the Common-wealth as now it stands; and because at all times and in all constitutions thereof, he is bound to do this no less by the Covenant it self, then by the Engagement; therefore his taking of this, to this effect, can be no breach of that, which you endeavour to make good by a comment upon the words of the Engagement; for the negative words, without a King and a house of Lords in the En­gagement, may (as you say) be properly and most obviously taken, as an explication of the words now established, immediatly going be­fore, and not an absolute abnegation of the things looked upon truly, and as in themselves, with more words to the same purpose, which gloss of yours calls for some observation, and well deserves ani­madversion.

First, necessarily implying a high charge of such inconside­rateness, in the heads of those that did devise, and in the power of those that do impose this Engagement, of which none can be­lieve that they are guilty.

1. They knew, that all the Subjects of this Nation, stood be­fore engaged to the intrinsecal good of this Common-wealth, (as by the dictates of nature, the obligation of reason, self-pre­servation, [Page 11]which each one knows is wrapt up in the publick, so also) by an oath prescribed by their power since they entred up­on it, reaching doubtless thus far, and (as some conjecture) in­tended further, that which was already done to their hands (as you say) by so many Oaths and Covenants, which themselves also since their investiture in power had done, they will not do over again, in words not at all further obliging, but onely per­plexing, amusing and insnaring.

2. They know that the Engagement in this sense will nothing tend to their establishment, as before hath been evidenced; yea they know with this gloss upon it, it hath a full tendency to their further danger, not a few being perswaded (how erroneously soever) that the publick good is best provided for, and conse­quently the Engagement answered in their opposition, all of which is so clear to every eye, that it could not be hid from those that imposed this Engagement, so that none can think that they would trouble the consciences of so many thousands in such a needless way to their own non-benefit, yea to their further peril. If the Covenant mentioning Monarchy in a King, do tye us to a republick in a State, (as you before affirm) then the Engage­ment mentioning a republick without King or house of Lords, may tye us to Monarchy by the same reason.

Secondly, This gloss carrys a full contradiction in it self, 11 you say, these words without King & house of Lords, may be properly and most obviously taken, as an explication of the word [as now esta­blished] immediatly going before, and not an absolute negation of the things themselves; when as those words, as now established, do fully imply that abnegation of Kings & Lords, which you there men­tion, now being an adverb of time, the [...] in the Engagement must needs stand in full opposition to the face of things in form­er administrations, it cannot look on the Common-weale ab­stractively as the same, in all revolutions and junctures of times, but as it now stands in a present different posture, as now is a full contradiction to your sense, as ever. And I pray you consider, whether the powers now established without King and Lords, have not voted down both King and Lords, as useless and dan­gerous; and therfore now established, is no other then an abne­gation [Page 12]of Kings and Lords heretofore established; therefore your friend being in this pinched, is not yet eased.

You go on as discerning that what is said will not hold. 12 Sup­pose (say you) that in your apprehens [...] of matters, this Engage­ment doth materially settle some thing in the Common-wealth, which is contrary to the intention which you had in taking the Covenant; yet I say that by giving your assent thereunto, as matters now stand, you break not at all your Covenant, because your obligation to those matters by vertue of the Covenant, was extinguished before you were called upon to take this Engagement; now that which is extinct and made void, cannot be said to oblige any more.

This supposition of yours, is wholly yielded by others, that it is in full opposition to the Covenant and other Oaths, (and so all your labour lost in endeavouring to reconcile them) and this which you now bring, is onely held out for a Plea to carry it in the affirmative, that the Engagement may be entered, malè res agitur, cum tot opus est remediis, is wont to be said; for your Proposition, that that which is extinct and made void, can no more oblige, must be acknowledged as truth; with its just limi­tation, provided that those concerned in the Oath, have no hand in the extinguishing of it, for their own disobligation. David was bound by Covenant unto Jonathan, and his seed after him, had he consented to the death of Mephibosheth the Son of Jona­than, the matter of the Covenant had then been extinct, and yet David had been guilty of the breach of it; for your assump­tion that the matter of the Covenant as to the third Article, is extinct, it being impossible in nature to preserve the Kings life now it is cut off: and the house of Lords now it is put down, I shall not stand upon that maxime, the King never dyes, and so though the man be cut off, yet the King remains and may be preserved; if you please to look into the Preface of the Covenant, there we professed, That we had before our eyes the glory of God, and the advancement of the Kingdom of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, the Honour and Happiness of the Kings Maiesty, and his Posterity. As we dare not shut out the Glory of God, the advancement of the Kingdom of Jesus Christ: no more dare we wholly shut out the Kings posterity from the Covenant; for the Lords [Page 13]though they sit not as Lords in Parliament, yet still they are as Lords, and in a capacity for actual admission. You say, they may have a title to this right, & yet be obliged, even for preservation of that right to suspend it for a time, and many I say are well satisfied, that they for such end do suspend, and yet dare not engage to an opposition of it.

You yet go one step higher, 13 and so you are at the highest in this particular, being willing to perswade your friend, that we are so far from being barred from the Engagement by the Cove­nant, particularly the third Article of it, that we are engaged to it; if the third Article of the National Covenant concerning Privi­ledges of Parl. be yet in force in any degree, you say, then it binds us to preserve the Priviledges of Parliament that now are, as well as those that then were. To which I say, I know no such distinction of Priviledges that are, and were, Parliament Pri­viledges being alwayes the same, admitting of no such chan­ges, though we, have no more Parliament actually existing, then in Winter-time we have Roses; yet as the properties of a Rose are still the same in all seasons, so are the Priviledges of Par­liament: and if there be any remainder of Priviledges in actual being (as you contend) then the third Article that binds to pre­serve them, binds us to perfect them. A Physician cannot preserve unless he recover strength in his weak Patient: You conclude this first general piece of yours with hopes that your friend will find no cause to scruple any further at it, whereas others think that you have small cause of hopes that you have eased him of any of his Scruples.

In your second part, 14 you make it your business to satisfie your friend, concerning the power whereby this present Engagement is tendered, which he takes to be very doubtful, as a power un­lawfully usurped, as also whether by this Engagement he shall make himself accessorie to this usurpation.

For the first, Instead of clearing their title as just and lawful, and acquitting it from usurpation, you make it un­lawful to inquire and determine concerning it; holding out (as you say) the rule whereby you order your conversation, sup­posing him ready (as it seems) in all things to make you his precedent; in which way of yours, how dissonant [Page 14]you are from your self, and how far you have been found a transgressour of your own rule, hath formerly been shewed; yet (wheresoever the guilt lyes) the transgression by you is ag­gravated to that height, as to be one the greatest Characters of the Spirit of Antichrist that exalts himself above all that is called God; and wherein (say you) hath he done this more remarkably to­wards Magistrates who are called Gods among men, then by exalt­ing himself over them, to become a judge of all their rights and pre­tentions to power in this world? where I pray you take into your serious consideration, whether this spirit (that great Character of the spirit of Antichrist) doth manifest it self in the man of sin, in a careful enquirie and diligent search to finde out to what power it is, that he justly owes subjection, and is to bind himself by Oath of feoalty, for faithfulness: or rather in his peremptory determinations of the forfeiture of right, in those that before were possessed of an undoubted title, and disobliging Subjects from their obedience, and to whom this Character of his doth most belong, whether to your friend or some other, I leave you sadly to consider. 15 Yet after a long debate of the inconsistency of the duty which God appointed subjects, with the scrupulosity of this question, you are pleased to allow your friend in the judgement of discretion as a member of this Common-wealth, and concerned in the publick welfare thereof to look upon superiours, to see how they pretend to stand; that is by what apparent right, and with what visible power they possess their place; Which liberty of judg­ment you yet allow with this reservation, that he suffer not his conscience to follow the dictates of it, for so he is bound up in that which follows, which yet you call the bounds of Christian liberty and rationality. Sure to me, blind obedience is to be pre­ferred before such use of light, that when I believe I see my way, I have no allowance to walk in it: 16 You help us by the way with some hints how we may judge who is our Superiour; Such a Superiour (I suppose) you mean whom we must engage to serve with faithfulness; and this we may judge say you, by the dictates of sense, reason and conscience; Sense, will shew him who is actually in possession of all power, and places of Government over him, and by this he will perceive under whom he doth stand; Reason will shew what he who is over him, pretends unto, whether yea, or no his pretences are [Page 15]backed with power, to maintain his right against all advarsaries therein; and whether yea, or no, the use of that power be limitted by Law, or left wholly to his own will without Law and conscience will shew, that he to whom God hath committed the plenary admini­stration of publick affairs with unconfrontable power, is Gods Vice­gerent over the society of those to whom his administration doth ex­tend it self, either by vertue of a contract, which makes a Law, or by vertue of a conquest, which is bound to no Law; but the will of the Conquerour.

As these lead your friend (as you suppose) whither you would have him led: so they would have also led Israel, in their respective junctures of time, to Cushan-Rushathim, to Eg­lon, to Jabin, to the Princes & chief powers of Midian, to Am­mon, Moab and the Philistines. Israel had been thus bound to so many successive, and opposite Engagements: and bound up in bondage from seeking deliverance. No endeavour must e­ver be improved for any recovery of lost right, if this doctrine (in favour of all that are in possession and backed with power) shall take place. All whosoever they be, in case they can get in­to Soveraignty, may keep in: and all must assist in their hold­ing of it, none may attempt any way, or make any plea for the most just recovery of their rights and liberties, so that either Is­rael sinned as oft as they were delivered, or else these dictates of sense, reason and conscience, going this way which you point out, may lead your friend into mistakes, and involve him in fears. Your distinction of administrations by vertue of a con­tract which makes a Law, or by vertue of a conquest which is bound to no Law, but to the will of the conquerour, were worth observation; if you would acquaint us which way the present power doth claim, for contract we know none, when we make any, both they and we ought to be faithful in it; Con­quest (I think) you will not say, so you leave them to their own wills without any other rule in Government; in which you are scarce like to please any party, either those in power or such as are in subjection.

As for the several queries, which you there put to your friend, 17 I leave to your self to finde out (which you can soon do) where the question is miserably begged, and that taken for granted; [Page 16]which men of your friends scrupulosities have never yielded, and in all that I have seen, (in the arguments of those that stand up in defence of present proceedings) I do not finde so much as an attempt for the proof of it.

To the second branch of your friends doubt, you say, that the Engagement being a duty just to be required by the present pow­ers from their Subjects, 18 without the performance of which there is no protection due unto them, and necessary to be performed by all that will not profess themselves desirous to overthrow the present safety, and publick welfāre of the Nation; it cannot make those that take it accessory to the guilt of those that tender it, if any be in them, because, &c. But if the Engagement be not a duty, as men affected to the common cause of liberty (by your own concessions) are per­swaded, then guilt will follow upon such supposition which you have laid down, and here you are very high in passing sentence upon those that (being conscious to themselves of the bonds of former Engagements) have forborn to subscribe in this; that they deserve not to have a being in the Common-wealth.

In which how prudertial it were to proceed in so high a way, 19 I trust those that are in present power (how far soever by some forward spirits put on) will seriously consider. What extreams are apt to beget, we have had sad experience; such wayes have of­ten tended to the unjoynting, and seldom have contributed any thing to the settling of a Nation, and how equal I would have you more deliberately to ponder. You have observed, that the late Kings obligations and his Subjects were mutual; he was bound by Oath, as well as they, here subjects are called to en­gage without any Engagement at all from them in place of So­veraign power, when we are as Subjects tyed, they are free, as Soveraigns; and what example can you finde, when a power is new fet up, to bring in a people for consent under so high a penalty; In Scripture we cannot finde any other consent in such case then voluntary. And in the Conquest of this Nation (and other revolutions of State) we finde capitulations upon terms from either party; To press upon a people as soon as un­der a new power, not onely a Command over their Persons and estates, (which already are in their hands) but also their Consci­ences, is a practice I believe scarce to be paralelled. and having [Page 17]their persons, and purses in their power, they have cause to pro­tect them, though as yet Subjects desire to stand free in their Consciences, protection should be as large as subjection, Per­sons and Estates are already subject, and these ought to be pro­tected for subjections sake.

Here you tell us of the end of the Engagement, 20 which is to give the Supreme power an assurance that we shall not betray it; but that we are willing to maintaine all good intelligence for publick con­cernments with it, notwithstanding the present changes brought upon the Common-wealth. But this gloss of yours, put upon the Engag­ment utterly spoils all assurance that possibly can be given, either to this State or any other, as formerly hath been shewed, and I wish that you would more seriously consider, for if no respect is to be had to outward forms, but to the intrinsecal good of the Common-wealth only; then all are at liberty (notwithstanding such Engagement) where they will to hold intelligence, provi­ded that their judgements tell them, that the publick is best pro­vided for, that way in which they keep correspondence; if for­mer Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy, the Protestation and Co­venant bound not at all to Monarchy there expressed; but to the publick good abstracted from all particular forms, so that our Consciences are still free to subscribe to any platform, then entring this Engagement it doth no more bind to a Republick or Democratie, but leaves us free for Monarchy, as formerly settled and established; and I pray you farther take into your thoughts, which way the publick (as now it stands) by such proceedings can reap advantage, Non-subscibers (held back by conscience dictates) are most unlike to be forward; for their dan­ger being so cautelous before they engage with their pen, they will be equally wary how they engage with their sword: shew­ing themselves so tender of their own inward private peace; they will not be hasty to infest the publick; and as they have so they will still in their place, and to their power withstand de­signs of Tyranny, taking care that Monarchy (if ever again re­established) be kept within its bounds and limits; for those whose hands are gained, I do not understand what security can be expected by it, hearts and hands (we know) do not alwayes hold pace together; and if any have minds bent to the publick, [Page 18]this is a good lurking-hole to hide them from suspition, and those interpretations of the Engagement which are held out to serve them in, together with others, wherewith many subscribers (as I hear) satisfie themselves, will also serve for an expedient to help them out, rendring their Consciences innocent in en­gaging, and freeing them from all Obligation of Conscience be­ing thus engaged.

Your third part (tending to satisfie your friends scruple, 21 that the consequence of the Engagement seems to tend to an opposition a­gainst the lawful Heir of the Crown, and right constitutions of Par­liament) presupposed him to stand satisfied in the two former, and being built upon that bottome in case of dis-satisfaction in those; all this necessarily falls to the ground, and nothing needs to be spoken, that passage in it seems most observable, as for the dissolution of your tye and obligation to the heir of the Crown, I shall refer you to look upon God, whether he hath not dispossessed him wholly by his own doings and Councells, and by the guilt derived from his father and mother upon him, of all his interest in this Kingdom and Commonwealth; for because his aim and the aim of those that are about him, is not for the Common-wealth, but for the Kingdom, that is, not for the good of the society, but for self-greatness; There­fore God who takes and gives the rights of Government, hath done as it seemeth good in his own eyes, both with him who according to men claims the Crown, and with them that were the supporters thereof, &c. All of which (with much more that you have to the same purpose) might be satisfactory, if the work of God and not his word were our rule, if we must observe his hand, to go as he acts, and not his Command, to act what he enjoyns, God may dis­possess him and any Monarchy on earth at pleasure; Such is his Prerogative royal over all: but to infer from thence, that we may therefore engage against him (contrary to Covenant & highest obligation of oath) is that which will at no hand fol­low. A good child seeks his fathers life, at that time when God is upon removal of him by stroke of death: Arguments of this stamp will give us warranty to act in all the evil that can be act­ed in the State, or against it; all evil of this nature (penal, not oriminal) God does and owns, if we follow his hand we shall have ours as high in guilt, as his is in justice; these providences [Page 19](which men in these times make their encour agements) are no other then temptations, and set a dore wide open to sins of all sorts, when they may be done with immunity and impunity of this divinity, will hold Israels spoilers are injuriously by the Pro­phets branded as robbers, when God gave Israel to them, because they had sinned against him.

You further say, that you conceive, 22 that the Prophecy of the Prophet Isaiah, Chapter 24. verse 21. is begun to be fulfilled amongst us, somewhat more remarkably then in other parts of the earth as yet, which is this, And it shall come to pass in that day, that the Lord shall punish the hoast of the high ones that are on high, and the Kings of the earth upon the earth, and they shall be gathered together as prisoners are gathered in the pit, and shall be shut up in prison, and after many days shall be visited; Then the Moon shall be confounded, and the Sun shall be ashamed when the Lord of Hoasts shall reign in Mount Sion, and before his ancients gloriously.

How far God will go on in this way, (on which you suppose he is entered) it is not safe for man to determine, only we know, that when he is doing his work, we must hold to our duty, and seeing there is a time when these thus threatned shall be visited, (as there is foretold) not in judgement, but mercy (as appears in the context, and is confirmed by the consent of interpreters) it should be our work in the way and manner of the people of God of old, (acknowledging divine justice and their guilt) to implore the throne of grace in their behalf, that as in present they suffer what was threatned: so they may be fitted for the mercy promised. In the mean space Prophesies are no rule for our actions but Precepts, not that which God says he will do, but what his will is that we should do, must guide us; There was a Prophecy, that the Messiah should be cut off, and the time laid down, Dan. 9.26. there sin was yet nothing lesse that cut him off, he was delivered by the determinate Councel of God; there were store of Prophecies, that witnessed the suffering of Christ, and yet with wicked hands he was Cr [...]cified and slain, they fulfilled the Prophets in Condemning him. [Page 20] David knew well that he must succeed Saul in the Kingdom, yet he waited Gods time and would have no hand in his remo­val, though providence was more then once urged as an argu­ment for his encouragement, that God had delivered him into his hands; if David had followed this rule, Saul had then dyed, and he over-timely (before Gods approved time) had intruded upon the Throne. After some plain language spoken to those in power (which I wish may take that Prophets may have their mouths open, and with allowance to speak, not Placentia, but Salubria) you give us your Item or admonition that we be not willfully scrupulous in these matters. In which you yet acquit your friend, when you spare not to charge divers others, where I wish you would take into your more serious consideration, 23 if the Engagement be lawful, and a reconciliation possible with o­ther Oaths (by multiplication of distinctions and new rules for their obligation) whether yet all things are so clear and doubts so fully removed, that no cause at all of Scruple remains. If there were no other thing then the multitude of all degrees that rest unsatisfied, (in whom both parts and piety are seen) that alone might be a good inducement, so far to suspect your self, that if not truth, yet evidence on your part is wanting, though I doubt not but in some cases men may act against scru­ples, when the judgement on the other part stands convinced, and the scruples appear reasonless, or with very little of reason in them; yet to act against the dictates of their judgement (as many in this case must, whose reason on the most impartial en­quiry into the state of the question, determins yours in the nega­tive) were to sin against conscience, and to draw guilt upon their souls. 24 You are pleased in your discourse (as also several others) to tell us of the danger of resisting powers, which you say, holds of all in power, usurped powers as well as others, when you might finde in approved Authors, such distinctions of resistance, as may acquit those whom you seem to involve in so high a con­demnation, and render them innocent; and I pray you consider in your self, whether a just power with right unquestionable under a supposed forfeiture, may not challenge as much observance and subjection, and consequently their resistance to these, as danger­ous as to men in power without title, onely by usurpation. [Page 21]That which in conclusion I beg is, that those that see not with your eyes, and cannot warrant all that you approve, (having what to say if called unto it) may obtain from you a more favo­rable & candid censure, then to be judged unworthy of a being in that Common-wealth where by right of birth they have their freedom, and that you would not think that self-interest swayes so many to keep close to the dictates of their Conscience, in a way in all appearance to their present and private ruine; more of Christianity would appear, in affording them your pitty and y our prayers, And the Lord give us a right judgement in all things.

I Shall freely confess, that the Scope of your papers, (put in­to my hands a few dayes ago) is to me very acceptable; for which cause, as I think my self obliged, so in all up­rightness I shall endeavour your further satisfaction; that so farre as the Lord shall inable me to discerne the truth, I may hold it forth, for the manifestation of our duty in the bu­siness of the Engagement.The De­signe of this Dis­course. And if a course of amicable conferen­ces had been more freely taken up heretofore, and regularly fol­lowed upon this subject, amongst godly Brethren, as it ought to have been in the Law of Peace and Truth; I make no doubt but some of these breaches might have been prevented, and per­haps some of the old wasts and ruinous heaps, might also have been repaired: but because these thoughts of healing and of building up, have not been laid to heart; therefore our unset­tlements [Page 22]have not onely continued: but we have therein been led on, unto sad courses of new divisions, and unchristian animo­sities; as for my self, I can call the searcher of all hearts to wit­ness, that I have none other aim but to discharge a good con­science in this business, and for the Gospels sake to seek out a Gospel-Remedy unto our publick evils; for hereunto my thoughts have been many years ago lead forth; and seeing my affections do still continue to prosecute this design, not with humane contrivements, but by the Grace of God in true simpli­city; I may therefore hope that God may be pleased in some­thing happily to make me instrumental to his glory, and my un­partial sollicitations for the wayes of Unity and Peace, may be­come effectual to the comfort of his children: however I shall not cease to concur in true humility with prayers, and supplicati­ons unto the Father of Lights, and the fountain of all good gifts, that in end all who are upright in heart, may according to his Counsel be united in the spirit of Christ, and thereby (not­withstanding some diversities of apprehensions about humane affairs) be fitted more and more in spiritual concernments for his service, and their mutual edification: beseeching him withall, that none of our weaknesses and sinful distances of spirit amongst our selves, may bring any reproach upon the holy profession of the Gospel, and of our Ministery; or open the mouthes of our adversaries, to take advantages against us while they watch for our haltings. It is a sad matter that the Engagement intend­ed for a ground of mutual safety, and an assurance of harmless­ness, and indempnity amongst those that truly intend the intrin­secal good of the Common wealth, should be so far mis-under­stood, as to prove rather an object of strife and division then of an agreement;The an­swer to the Pre­face. and I am sorry that any of my expressions wherein I meant not to censure any body, who is conscionable, week or well-meaning; should be taken in another sense then I did offer them; but whether I have been in the fault by utter­ing them unadvisedly, or others, who through prejudices have mistaken me, I hope upon a further disquiry of these matters, it will in due time sufficiently appear, nor shall I ever (God willing) be found averse from rectifying a fault if I can discern it, when it is laid open to me.

I shall then come to the observations which you offer upon my considerations of the Engagement, and that we may with more brevity, clearenesss, and readiness, have recourse to the heads of matters whereof notice is to be taken; I suppose our best course will be to mark the same with numericall Figures in the margen of our Papers, which shall shew the things which answer each other, and direct us to the places to which we speak,

1. The first thing you take notice of, is; that yeilding an ob­ligation to be settled between a King and his Subjects by a Law. according to which he is to be their King, and they his Subjects; yet you say I produce no such Law in this case:The plea that the King cannot be counted a transgressor of the law. and if either the Law cannot be produced upon the transgression of which he doth ipso facto forfeit his Regalities: or if his transgression of that Law cannot bee proved; that then in this case there is no ground to quiet mens minds concerning that which is befallen him. Now that a Law in this case cannot be produced you as­sert upon Mr. Cooke authority, who gives the reason why no such Law was made, to be the same for which Solon made none to punish Parrioides, and that he cannot be counted a transgres­sor of the Laws, you assert upon this ground; because Kings in this Nation act nothing as Kings in their own persons, but only by subordinate Agents: whence you conclude, that neither such a Law being extant, nor although it were extant, he be­ing in a capacity of being a transgress or against it; the thing which I alleage for dissabling the obligation of his Subjects from him, can be of no force.

To this I shall give this answer.

That in my discourse I did not suppose any particular Positive and expresse Law extant between the King and his People specifying the tenure of their mutual obligation,The answer doth shew what the law is to which a King is bound. how far it should bind or not bind the Subject to him; but I suppose only this much: that there is a natural tacite and implicite law extant, known and presupposed by all men who make any contracts one with another, which is this: that no contract doth other­wise bind but according to the condition upon which it is made. If then a King is a King only upon this condition, that he shall intend to Rule legally, and not by will and force. and if [Page 24]he breake this condition and actually attempt to rule, not le­gally, but by will and force, then he hath ipso facto forfeited his Regality: nor was it needfull that any penalty should be expresly denounced against any such transgression no more then in Solons Common-wealth against Parrieides, not because such a fault (if committed) was not punishable, but because all men by nature know what punishment it may deserve. So then the want of a positive law in this matter doth not make that which I say at all invalid: for although it be granted that there is no particular law declaring this or that act of his, to be a full forfeiture of trust: yet this is a known law to all, that consider him to be under an oath of Ruling legally; that in case he doth set himself to Rule lawlessy, he hath broken his oath, and fully forfeited his trust.

I say then that although in my discourse I named no law, 2 yet my meaning was to produce the law of nature when I said that the Oaths were reciprocall, What ab­solves Sub­jects from al­leagance to Kings. standing & falling together, for this I take to be the law of nature in this case: that if a King doth break the oath of his legality towards his Subjects, his Subjects are absolved from the oath of their allegiance towards him.

Concerning that which you say, 3 that Kings as Kings act nothing in their own persons,What laws Kings are exempted from, & not counted transgressors of in their owne persons, and upon what conditions that exempt­ion is granted them. but only by their subordinat a­gents who alone are punishable when the law is transgressed, I know that this is the law in Cases of particular concernement, wherein some speciall positive laws are transgressed, but of the generall concernement. whereby the whole ground of all le­gal governement is taken away, that law cannot be understood. Besides I conceive, that the positive law which you mention, doth suppose that the King is oliged to give up his subordinate Agents (the transgessors of the laws) unto the course of Justice, and not to take all their faults upon himself, so as to protect them with the shield of his indemnity, or with the force of his word against the execution of vindicative Justice: for if he doth this; then he puts himself as to his own person, out of the case of indemnity wherein the law puts it: nor can that law be counted valid for him against his own will, and against the E­quity of the law of nature; which in this ease doth make him [Page 25]guilty, for if a King as a King, by the intent of the law, doth act nothing in his owne person but by his agents; and yet he will not be counted to have acted by his agents but to have done all their faults in his own person, then he declares ipso facto that he will not have the intent of the law valid as to himself, but that he will stand in his agents roome and be look't upon as in their person and under their guilt, and consequently not as a King but as a transgressor; non quod volenti non fit injuria, est regula juris. Therefore I conceive thus;By 3. wayes the preroga­tives of ex­emption from being a trans­gressor may be lost by Kings. That a King may make void as to himself, and loose the prerogative of the law made in favour to his person three ways. 1. If he set himself directly to disanul the general ground of all laws. For this cannot be imputed to any subordinat agents as their guilt, for they are lookt upon and made punishable only as transgressors in parti­cular matters. 2. If he doth in opposition to the intent of the law made for punishing transgressors, and for exempting his own person from the guilt of particular transgressions; take up on himself all the guilt of particular faults to protect iniquity and illegality; then he doth effectually make void the prero­gative which the law doth give him. 3. If he doth by force take upon him to hinder the execution of the sentence of the su­pream Judicature, for the protecting of transgressors against the law; for to do this; is the highest act of illegal government, and in effect the putting down of all laws. In all which Cases if you can make it appear to me rationally that by your positive law the King is to be meant no transgressor; I shall confess a mistake, but till then give me leave to think that I am no stran­ger to Reason, when I am bold to say, that no positive law of any Nation in the world, can disanul the law of Nature, which in such-like cases, doth present a King even as a King to be in his own person a transgressor to the law-making power of the Nation, which is to be governed legally and not arbitrarily.

The second thing which you take notice of, is a seeming in­consistency between two passages of my discourse. In the one (you think) I Judge definitly in the highest way of the Rights which Supream powers have over us, and in the other which is pag. 10. I declare that it doth not belong to me or to any privat man to Judge definitively of the rights which the Supre [...]me [Page 26]powers in this world pretend to have to their places.

To reconcile this seeming inconsistency, I shall desire you to reflect upon two things,The answer doth shew the grounds of reconcileing it. viz. The direct intent and proper subject of each part of my discourse, whereunto the things seemingly inconsistent do relate; which things in both places being very much different, and bringing a different respect up­on the passages supposed to be opposite, when you shall per­ceive the same, I hope your mistake will be rectified.

For in the first place my purpose is to declare what the funda­mental constitution of the Government of this State is, as I conceive it agreeable to the Universal law of nature; by which all free Common-wealths are settled within themselves. But in the second place viz. pag. 10. my purpose is to declare how my friend ought to behave himself for the quieting of his scrupu­lous Conscience in the doubts which he had concerning the par­ticular present Powers, and the lawfulnes of their coming to their places.

The proper subject of my discourse in the first place, is con­cerning the Legislative power of all Nations, as they are Com­mon-wealths, and how in this Nation that power hath been settled of old: and the proper subject whereof I speak in the second place, is concerning the particular ways by which the present powers are come, and have a right to their places, which are things of a very different nature.

Concerning the first, if you look upon the Universal law of na­ture, I suppose you wil grant that no man ought to be ignorant of it;The applica­tion of the grounds to shew the re­concilement of the passa­ges. & if you look upon the constitution of this State, as that law is observed therein, I hope you will alow me as one in matriculat into the Common-wealth, and concerned as well as others in the common welfare thereof, the judgement of discretion to consider and declare what I observe therein: which at this time I think is my duty to mention, but concerneing the second, I give advice to my friend how he may quiet his spirit about the matters which concern him not, and whereat he seemes to be troubled, and decline to make my selfe a definitive Judge of the particular rights and proceedings of those that God hath set over us to Rule the Common-wealth. So then in the forme [...] I observe what the law is under which we live: and in the latter [Page 27]I refrain from the judicature of particular matters whereun­to I have no calling to be a Iudge:A mistake concerning the Com­mons right to make laws objected. and what inconsistency is between these purposes, and between the discourses, which to this effect I make upon these subjects; I shall refer now to your second thoughts to collect, wherein I hope your imaginary difficultie to reconcile these passages will easily vanish,

Concerning that which I say of the Custome of this Nation, that the Commons at all times have used to aske and propose the making of Laws, & that the Lords & King were wont to give their consent thereunto, you say, I do as far in this mistake as I did forget my self in the other. To this I say, It is well if I am not further mistaken. For I shall not stick to declare ingeniously the truth of my present thoughts, that when I now reflect up­on the expressions which there I have used,The answer shews the ob­jectors mis­take and whence it pro­ceeds. concerning the National Custom, and compare them with what you offer to be considered here (although I see my self not guilty of the mistake wherewith you charge me, but can discern the grounds of your mistaking the drift and sense of my words to have been somwhat of the Printers fault; somewhat of your own inadver­tency of my meaning yet) my words seem to myself somewhat more full then they needed to have been for the end for which I uttered them. For my end was only to shew that the received Custome and liberty, whereby the Commons are wont to pro­pose the making of laws, and the Lords and King are desired to give their assent thereunto, did arise at first, and was since con­tinued upon the just and natural foundation of all laws in a free Nation: which is the reason of the Body thereof in Parliament. which I say hath the sole right to propose and chuse the laws by which the Nation is to be ruled. This drift of mine you do not observe, and the fault of the Printer hath helped your mistake; for in the last Impression which I conjecture you have made use of; the particle where is put in stead of whence which was in the first, intimating the dependance of the custome of the Commons of this Nation upon the law of nature mentioned immediatly before. Now because I intended to point at as much of this right and liberty of nature as I did find extant in the practise of our Parliament, and withall had a mind briefly to intimate the most material differences of Rights, which were in each of the [Page 28]members of Parliament, with reference to the whole Body, ac­cording to the fore-named law of nature; therefore I perceive my expressions did run out, under the generall terme of a Nati­onal Custome, aswel upon that which by right might be practis­ed: or rather by the nature of this constitution of government is proper to be practised, as upon that which de facto was in use amongst us.

I am not ignorant that the laws have had their rise sometimes from the one,How the Laws do rise from the com­mons, and how from the King and Lords deffer­ently sometimes from the other house: but when I said that it was (as I supposed) a perpetual custome in this Nation for the Commons at all times to aske and propose the making of laws, I had an eye to the Coronation-oath, wherein the King is obliged to swear that he shal maintain the laws quas vulgus elege­rit, which doth suppose to my understanding, no less then what I express, viz. that the right of asking and proposing of laws to be made doth originally reside in the people; with a tacite obli­gation in the King to consent thereunto. As antient then as the Coronation-oath is, so long I suppose the Commons do lay claime to this right of chusing laws for themselves, and al­though all this be granted, yet it doth not follow that the King and Lords might not also propose any thing at all, for the ma­king of laws unto the Commons. For to assert this right to be­long originally and primarily to these, doth not wholly exclude the other from it: nor do my expressions import much more then a direct assertion of the right of the Commons which is in practise: which being raised and derived from the law of nature, might be inferred to be de jure primarily practised by them, and truly (though you seeme to deny it, yet) I have been told very credibly and circumstantially, that the Commons since the sitting of this Parliament, have more then once upon special immergencys declared at Conferences to the Lords that this was their right, as they were the representatives of the Nation, and Trustees for common safety. It is also granted that the Lords or King have by a received custome freely given or refu­sed their assent to Bills offered as they have seen cause: this sheweth that they sate not in Parliament as meere servants un­concerned in the maine; but as joynt-Councellors for the main, in the things wherein their service was to be made use of to­wards [Page 29]the State, a man may be in his Principal relation a servant to another, and yet in such a degree of honour, as not to be obliged to do any thing by meere command without his owne free consent: and so I conceive Kings and Lords to be in a free Nation, they may for themselves (if they think not fit to act.) surcease, but they cannot pretend to a negative voice, so as to make it unlawful for those that have a right to order their own affairs, to act without them, they are then to be counted Servi Honorarii non Mancipia legum, and because they may be con­sidered justly as members of the State, who have a considerable State to venture in it, therefore they cannot be in equity de­prived of a consultative vote in the making of laws (except by some faults they make themselves incapable thereof) although the power of chusing & making them doth not primarily belong unto them but to the Commons alone: and to these a right and prerogative to see them kept and executed, for herewith the Representees intrust them.

That which you observe concerning the oath of allegiance (that it was made in our age) is no ways inconsistent with my assertion, that by the consent of all ages, 4 the oath of allegiance ought to be understood as I explain it:In what sense the Oath of alleagance hath been in all ages. for if you observe the strain of my discourse, you will see that I speake of the mean­ing of the oath as it is in the law of nature and Nations, that is, as in all ages such Oaths have been used; for all promises of Fealty and of free subjection unto Kings and liege Lords, in all people and Nations governed rationally by laws, are in my ap­prehension of the same kind with our oath of allegiance: and therefore this particular oath made in our age upon a special e­mergency, ought to be understood no otherwise then that same oath hath been always taken at all other times.

The Comment which you say I make upon the third article of the Covenant, is your mistake of my construction of the Co­venant,Concerning the sence of the third ar­ticle of the Covenant whether the promise to preserve the King be con­ditional yea, or no. and not my mistake of the meaning thereof, for I change not the In into If, as you say I do: for look upon my words again and you shall see that I aleadge the expression as it is in the text of the Covenant, but yet I say that the In of the Covenant doth contain a limitation of the defence and preserva­tion promised to the King and his Authority, for if we promise [Page 30]to defend him and his Authority onely in the defence and pre­servation of Religion and Liberties, then we are neither bound unto him absolutely, nor otherwise but in order to these, so then our meaning is to be bound, first to defend these for them­selves, and then him and his Authority are included therein. But now if it should fall out that be by his own default should not be found in these, if hee should put himself out of the sphere of that protecteion, which we oblige ourselves to maintain towards Religion and Liberty: and if he will not be lookt upon as sub ordinate thereunto, but regarded by us, meerly for him­self: is not then his share of safety due to him this way (but refused by him as thus offered) lest to him, as from our acts of protection, because the intention of defending and preserving him and his just Authority, is taken up and concluded onely as within the bounds of that endeavour, which is to be put forth for the maintaining of Religion and liberty, which is so far from being a forced and corstrained sense of the words that the more strictly you cleave to the letter thereof, the lesse respect is to be had unto him alone for himself, and without due regard to Religion and liberty. I do not say (as you misconsture me) that the words of the Covenant are to be meant of the Kings preservation of Religion & liberty, but I understand them of our preservation thereof, and I grant that with it we are bound to intend his preservation also, yet always so, as to intend him and his interest within that of religion and liberty and not without it, or separate from it, and by itself: nor did I leave out the words immediately following that the world may bear wituess with our Consciences of our loyalty, and that we have no thoughts to dimi­nish his Majesties just power and greatness) upon any such de­sign as you immagine at all: for they do take nothing from the sense of a limited protection which I urge, but rather con­firme the same, by declaring that to include all the respect which we owe to him within our preservation of Religion and Liberty is the conscionable tenure of our true loyalty, and that we pro­fess before all the world, that we acknowledge it not due to him upon any other termes, and that in so doing we foment no purpose to diminish any thing of his just power and greatness because it cannot be imagined that ever any power or greatnes [Page 31]was legally intended to be given him, or justly possessed by him, which is not consistent with the true Religion, and the Liber­ties of the Nations. Whereupon my inference concerning him, (which I perceive you misinterpret, as if I offered it, as the meaning of the words of the Covenant) doth follow, that if he would not concur with the Representatives towards the maintaining of their Religion and Liberties, he put himself out of the protection, which in order thereunto was intended to­wards him.

Here by the way observe a fault in the printing of the Consi­derations; for whereas it is said, none but his subjects are bound to defend his person, it should be none of his Subjects are bound, &c.

I say then upon the whole matter with you, that the things charged against the Parliament, wherein they were accused to have an evil eye against the King were falsly and injuriously charged upon it, and justly disavowed by the Protestations which the Parliament put forth; because it was not possible for the Parliament to look any better way upon the King, then through the prospect of Religion and Liberty; and if he did vanish out of their sight, whiles they did heartily seek him within that prospect; it must not be imputed to the Parlia­ments eye, but unto his own carriage and motions which made him invisible to them there, where they were bound to seek him, and he bound to be found.

Touching the causes why the King was laid aside, you say, 6 that I seem unresolved whether it was guilt in his Majesty, or jealousie in the Houses that occasioned the Votes of Non­addresses. You say well, that I seem unresolved,Concerning the Votes of Nonaddresses whether they came from guilt in the King, or jea­lousie in the Houses. because I was resolved, not to seem a resolver of that business. For I think it contrary to the Rule of my place and Calling, to make my self a Judge of the matter between them.

The Reasons why a private man ought not to judge defini­tively of the proceedings of his Superiours in their places, you will do well in matters of this nature, to follow as you see I do. And if all our Brethren would do so, they would free their spi­rits from great Snares, and find a readier way to do their duty without murmuring, then now they can light upon.

But touching the parallel which you make between the King and Parliament, and a man jealous of his Wife, out of Numb. 5. methinks the Text will not yield the conclusion which you seem to infer from it;Deut. 24.1. Mat. 19.3. for it is clear, that Moses permitted the Jews to give their Wives a Bill of divorce for slight occasions of dislike taken up against them, although they were altogether guiltless: therefore the intent of the Law of jealousie in Numb. 5. seems not to be for ordering of the way of her dismission; for a Bill of Divorce did order that way but only to quiet the spirit of jealousie, in the Husband, by bringing the matter between him and his Wife to some issue by Gods determination of the mat­ter of doubt.

I know not why you say, that I seem to judge it not unreasonable, that the people may cast off their Kings ad placi­tum. It is altogether against my judgment; for except there be a breach of the fundamental trust, I know no placitum to be al­lowable; for there ought to be no more a divorce between the King and his People; for every slight cause, then between a Man and his Wife; and I think you intend not to make the bond stronger between a King and his People, then God hath made it between a Wife and her Husband. If then you will assert that there ought to be no divorce between them, without a breach of the fundamental Relation, which may be called State-Adultery, I shall not contradict you; but if you will go beyond the judgment of discretion peremptorily to define, where and what the first breach of trust was, I am not allowed to follow you, yet without any determinate judicature to look discreetly upon these matters, and to contemplate what may be rational­ly said unto them; I shall not blame you for it, viz. to consider whether the King made not a fundamental breach from the Parliament, when he intended to dissolve it by a Declaration, wherein he condemned them (if I am not mistaken) to be Trai­tors and Rebels? and whether when he called another Parlia­ment at Oxford, he did not actually as it were marry himself to another Wife?

Concerning the Votes of Non-addresses, 7 you say they were re­called, and the King was made thereby an Object of the Oath of Al­legiance.

I say it is true, the Votes were recalled, but yet the repeal [Page 33]was only in order to a Treaty: therefore after the Treaty,In what sence the Votes of Non-addres­ses were re­called. if no full conclusion did ensue, he was to be in statu que prius. The repeal then was not absolute, as the prohibition of addresses was: if therefore the Votes of absolute Non-addresses did dis­solve the obligation as to private persons: and the Votes of conditional addresses for a publick Treaty did not restore it in the event, I see not how he could become an object of our al­legiance by repealing of those Votes.

That which you say against the reasons which I alledge to shew, 8 that the Engagement is so far from being opposite to the Oath of Allegiance, and the National Covenant, that it may rather be a confirmation of the ground for which both the one and the other was binding; runs out upon a great misconstruction of my sence, which easily might have been otherwise understood; for it was very obvious for any body to imagine, that in this case when we speak of a Common wealth, a Christian Common-wealth is to be understood; and upon this presupposal,What are the essentials of a Christian Common-wealth. which I thought no ways obscure, I said, to be governed by Laws, to have the true Re­ligion and the National Freedom, are things absolutely necessary and essential to the being of a Common-wealth, meaning a Christian Common-wealth, and although actually there be few, or have been few such Common-wealths in the world; yet that doth not refute my assertion of the nature of the thing; but that which you add concerning our Oaths that they had a respect not only to the esse, but also to the bene esse of the Nation doth seem some what more material: yet you mistake me wholly,How Oaths concerning means to an end are bind­ing. when you say that I take for granted, that all our Oaths did barely re­spect the esse not the bene esse, or external administration of the Nation; for I grant that we swore not only to the remote end, but also to the means which had a direct tendency thereunto, which then was judged by the reason of the Nation to be the form of Government, which at that time was established: this I freely grant, but withall I conceive, that the intent of all such Oaths was only to oblige unto the means so long, so far, and in quantum as they should have a direct tendency to the main end for which they were taken; and not absolutely whether they should have a tendency to the main end or no, whence this con­sequence will follow, that if the means cease to have such a ten­dency, (which upon emergencies may fall out) or become de­structive [Page 34]to the end for which they were chosen, then the obli­gation to use them for such an end (though setled by an Oath) is no more binding; for if the Oath did bind only as to means for an end, and the things sworn to, do cease to be what they were, viz. means to that end: then to my understanding there is no further obligation in that Oath towards the use of them; and I pray consult your Casuists upon this matter, whether they can shew any reason to contradict this assertion. Now this be­ing to me a clear truth in respect of the obligation in general, of an Oath to the use of any means whatsoever, I shall proceed to state the case somewhat nearer to our present condition, as I un­derstand it, and made it the ground of my discourse. I conceive then,The Case of taking the National Oaths, and the Engage­ment stated. that private men in publick concernments touching the Government of the State; when there is a necessary change in it, and a question, whether this or that form is most conducible to the main end of common safety? and whether the means formerly setled towards that end have any further fitness and tendency thereunto, yea or no? I say, in this matter of delibe­ration and in all concernments of such a publick nature; private men are to be determined by the judgment of the supream pow­er which is over them, for the time: if then I (being a private man) be at one time called upon to declare my faithfulness to the use of the means which my Superiours judge fittest for publick safety, do oblige my self under them to be faithful thereunto: and at another time, be called upon again, to declare my faith­fulness to the use of other means (emergencies in the judgement of the supream powers, having changed the nature of the for­mer) or to declare my constant resolution, to be faithful to the main end of common peace and safety, notwithstanding the changes which they think necessary to make in the means; if I say, I be thus called upon, as one to be determined in such mat­ters, by the supreme powers that are over me, do act without scrupling that which in it self I think just and lawful in my place to do; what blame can I bear, for yielding to different Decla­rations at several times, and upon different and necessary emer­gencies? now if this be the case whereof I speak, and whereinto we are cast (as clearly it is) then your whole discourse concern­ing the intention of a swearer towards the end, in contradiction to [Page 35]the means expressed in his Oath, is to no purpose, and I have cause to wonder that you exspaciat so largely upon a subject whereof there is so little occasion and appearance of ground given from that which I say; for I say nothing but that the sence of the En­gagement to my understanding doth confirm the ground and main end for which the former Oaths were taken. I speak no­thing of any mans private intentions; or of the interpretations which he may make mentally of the Oaths which are put to him, though different from the sence of those that offer them: I am so far from allowing of this in any body, that I conceive all such practices to be a mocking of God and men; but I speak clearly of the proper intent of the Engagement, and how consi­stent the sense thereof is with the main end of the former Oaths. And as for that which the former Oaths did mention touching the forms of Government then in being; I say that I conceive none of them so essential to any Nation, as that upon exigent ne­cessities they may not be altered by the supreme power of that Nation: and how you come to conceive that I think it not un­reasonable for a People to cast off their Kings, or change the forme of their Government meerly ad placitum, when as I so ex­presly limit those alterations to a necessary exigency; I would have some cause to wonder, if I knew not that it is very incident to men forestalled in judgement or affection against others, to be inclined to mis understand their words, and upon imaginary advantages against the opinions fathered upon them, to be wil­ling to triumph over fictitious absurdities. I shall therefore passe by your whole discourse concerning the case of one coming to a Garrison; Concerning the Canan-Oath to confirm the Prelacy. Concerning the second Article of the National-Covenant, Con­cerning the making void of all security in every Oath which the State may prescribe, Concerning Zedekiah and how he might have justified his perjury against Nebucadnezer, Concerning the Elders of Israel, that they might have broken their Oath to the Gibeonites. Concerning Saul, that he might have justified the wrong he did unto them, and concerning the benefit which the present State may reap by the Engagement upon such an inter­pretation thereof as you are willing to put upon it, in my name against my sence.

I say, I shall pass by all these particulars, because they are to no purpose: the whole case and my sence against which you pretend to alleage them, being wholly mistaken, as I have alrea­dy shewed; nor came it ever in my heart to think that any mans private interpretation or intention to some remote end might justifie him to take any Oath in a sence which is disagreeing from the meaning of those that give it; nor is it possible by any consequence to infer any such thing as justifiable, from any thing which I do say; and if you can make it appear that any such thing doth truly follow upon any assertion of mine, I shall as willingly as you condemn it.

My Friends objection from the third Article of the Covenant, 9 you intend to strengthen two ways against the Engage­ment.

First, when I confess that the former intentions to preserve the priviledges of Parliament as then they were setled, cannot now be prosecuted; you tell me, that this alone is enough to create a bigger scruple then there is force in my answer to wipe off.

Secondly, you make use of the plea which I alleage for the justi­fication of my Friend, to condemn those who did that which he could not allow, but rather found himself obliged to prevent and oppose in his place.

Touching the first if you had shewn what the scruple was, which that confession might create, I could have spoken to it, but seeing you conceal it, it is not my work to conjecture what it may be: the rather, because I cannot suspect that you sup­pose it to be a sin, to lay down alterable intentions, when God makes them impossible or sinful to be prosecuted.

Touching the second I do not allow of your inference, viz: That if my friend is excusable from breach of Covenant in the in­fringement of Parliament-Priviledges, because he did contribute no­thing thereunto: that therefore I do plainly charge with breach of Covenant those who brought this change upon the state. I say this consequence doth not follow, because the cases of those that brought this change about, was far different from that of my Friends; and such as by their place might make that to be right in them, which in my Friend would have been wrong: here the saying is morally true, cum duo faciunt idem, non est idem. For al­though [Page 37]though they are engaged into the same Covenant, Whether they who were the Authours of the change of Government, are to be judged guilty of the breach of Covenant yea or no? yet the con­dition of publick and private persons, or persons in trust or without trust, makes a vast difference as to matters of publick concernment: nor am I a competent judge to define what is right or wrong in the management of publick places, whereof the nature and circumstances are unknown to me, nor what the special emergencies of State were, which might justifie their pro­ceedings: therefore I dare not beyond my line take upon me that which you do, to condemn them for Covenant-breakers, and that unheard: surely if in such cases every private man may make himself a Judge of the affairs intrusted unto others in pub­lick places, all Government will be utterly dissolved, and unex­tricable confusions will ensue. The fatall necessity of a State may be seen and apprehended by some that sit at the stern other­wise then by others:Nay, al­though it hap­pen that they are a minor party. and how far a party of Rulers in number less, and yet in point of trust more considerable, may act by their own apprehensions of necessity, contrary to the sence of a major party, is a thing which since the troubles of both Nations and the sitting of this Parliament hath oft times been decided. If you look upon the proceedings of the leading men of both Na­tions, who have ventured upon enterprizes of an extraordinary nature, in extraordinary emergencies, both without the assent, and sometimes against the sence of the major part. Now when men in supream trust most considerable, differ in judgment con­cerning the way of common safety, from others who are in the same trust, but less considerable: what can we who are standers by, not acquainted with the grounds of their deliberations, nor called to the arbitrement of differences between them, do in such a case either as Christians or as rational men; but pray to God that they may agree,How stan­ders-by that look upon publick de­bates be­tween Rulers in chief, should behave the [...] and being peaceable in our own thoughts not to meddle beyond our line to judge either way, or to foment parties, or to provoke and harden one side against an­other; but to perswade all indifferently unto that concurrence and unity of spirit, which in known duties for common concern­ment is out of all doubt most edifying and blameless. If you would joyn with me to follow the Rules of this Divinity, rather then give way to prejudicate imaginations, you would see just [Page 38]cause to suspend your judgment concerning the plea which o­thers have made of necessity, from censuring it in them as ima­ginary and pretended: and if you had a mind to refute the er­ror of any point of (as you call it) State-Divinity to break Cove­nants, you would certainly be inabled to do it more effectual­ly and impartially then hitherto you have done any thing which I have met withall in these papers; for the reasonings which Joshua and the Elders of Israel (as you personate them) might have alledged, and which you think Saul took up to colour his breach of Covenant with the Gibeonites: although indeed as you say, such reasonings come from unbelief; yet if they be not of the same kind with those which have moved the present powers to alter the former Government into this which now is▪ what have you gained to your self by your reproof, but the guilt and discredit of a rash censurer? and what good have you done to him whom you have unadvisedly censured upon a wrong ground, but to make him averse from hearing you any further? as for my self I shall fully grant what you say, that the Rule whereby private men are obliged to keep their Cove­nant, must be observed in States proportionally caeteris paribus, that though they swear to their hurt, How States are bound to their Oaths. they must not change, and that it is more safe to keep with God, although seemingly we run upon peril, then to quit the ways of God for prevention of peril. These maxims I do fully agree unto, and am much perswaded that none of the godly men who have had a hand in this change of Government will contradict the same; and because I am bound to believe this of them so long as nothing doth appear to the contrary: therefore I must represent unto my self, that which also I offer to your ingenuity to consider, that it is more charita­ble to say of them that they intended not to consult with flesh and blood, but with their Conscience and duty, when they took their lives in their hands to see justice executed: and if touch­ing any of them hereafter any thing, contrary to this judge­ment of charity, should break forth as a matter of conviction, fit to be brought home unto his Conscience, I shall be so much the more fit to make him sensible of it, by how much I have had the better opinion, and never was inclined to wrong him by any evil surmises in my thoughts, for why should I think evil in my [Page 39]heart of men unknown to me? of men who are my Superi­ours, in publick trust over me? and of men whose actions can­not only bear some plea; but in the plea (if matters of fact be found true) there is nothing irrational and contrary to the grounds of natural equity.

As for the Example of Joshua and the Elders of Israel, the chief business to be heeded therein (in my apprehension) is this,How Joshua was bound to his Oath made to the Gibe­onites. that we should observe the true account why Joshua and the Elders did stand to their Covenant with the Gibeonites: not­withstanding the murmuring of the Congregation against them; for the Congregation might justly have alledged not those slight and trivial matters which you mention, but the invalidity and nullity of the Oath it self, that it was ipso facto void, as being a transgression of the Commandement of God, Deut. 20.15.16.17. who had forbidden the Israelites to enter into league with any of the people of the Land, or to suffer them to remain alive in it.

Moreover, that the main circumstance and express ground of their contract with the Gibeonites was a meer nullity, and ac­knowledged to be a deceit; for the contract was made with this express condition, that the Gibeonites were none of the People of the Land, which being found otherwise, the contract was void.

To this plea of the Congregation, what you would have an­swered I know not; but some Divines of good note confess up­on these grounds, that the Oath which was made to the Gibeon­ites was void de jure, and that Joshua and the Elders were not bound to keep it, yet that de facto they resolved up­on equitable Considerations to keep it ex parte tantùm; for that it was notkept ex toto is apparent; for it was kept only as to the main matter which was the promise of life, but as to the matter of freedom and confederacy, which is implyed in the termes of Peace, and of a League with them. Josh. 9. verse 15. it was not kept; and yet the promise of free­dom and confederation was no less covenanted with them then that of life. Now the equitable considerations which moved the Princes thus to qualifie the contract, and not to make it whol­ly void, were as I conceive, the respect due to the Oath by the [Page 40]Lord God of Israel, verse 19. and to their own safety, least wrath be upon us, verse 20. say they added the sin of wrath breaking their Oath: they were not free from guilt for swearing with­out taking Councel with God: if now they should seem not at all to respect their Oath, this might heighten that guilt to bring forth a punishment, and I believe we shall do them no wrong, if we conjecture that they did consider also this incon­veniencie, that if they should wholly have disregarded their Oath, a disrespect would have been brought thereby deser­vedly not only upon themselves in point of fidelity, but also up­on the name of God, in point of reverence in the minds of the Nations, who should have heard of this their breach of Oath but not have been able to know the grounds of the justifiableness thereof; for it was not possible suddenly (as matters then stood between them and Neighbour-Nations) to inform them of the just reasons of their not keeping their Oath; and to think that in equity this might have swayed somewhat with them is not un­reasonable. But the main thing which did cast the ballance is clearly that which in the Text is alledged, the equity of saving their life; for being in a strait by reason of their rash Oath, they followed that which was most safe, not wholly to disanul their promise, but to keep that part thereof which was most favoura­ble, viz. to spare their lives; but the other part by which they should have been exempted from the condition of Bond-men, and made Confederates, was made void, although the Oath did no doubt include this promise as well as the other. So that de facto this part of the Oath being altered lawfully, it sheweth that the other de jure might also have been altered, if the just fear of greater inconveniencies which might have followed upon the alteration, then upon the confirmation thereof, had not swayed with them: therefore upon more mature thoughts, this part of the Oath not being altered, but deliberately confirmed, it was made for ever afterward unalterable, and this confirmation of the Oath, as to that part which secured their lives, being viola­ted by Saul for worldly ends, and for such considerations as you wrongfully think my grounds allow, was punished by God up­on his Family; for the promise of life to the Gibeonites, being afterward ratified, not only by the Princes, but by the Congre­gation [Page 41]also, when they had been three hundred years, or there­about in possession of their right, there could be no colour for Saul to persecute them to death; for although they should have had none other plea, but so long a prescription of time for their right to a livelihood in their service, I know not how in e­quity, it could have been taken from them.

I conceive then that the first contract with the Gibeonites was not binding, and that Joshua in dealing afterward with them,Two soveral Contracts with the Gibeonites. did bring them to be sensible of this, as it appeareth by their confession, and the resignation of themselves to his discretion, v. 24.25. begging their lives, and not claiming any right to it by contract: it appeareth also not to have been binding de jure out of v. 14. where the Text saith, they asked not councel at the mouth of God, to intimate the neglect of respect due to God, and the transgression of his revealed will in the business, which clearly made the matter in it self a nullity: So that the Congregation, if they had executed the sentence of death, which God by Moses had denounced against them, could not have been counted transgressors against God, notwithstanding the Oath of Joshua and the Elders; but then it would have been counted cruelty in the Congregation, and breach of Oath in the Elders, and a disrespect in the people towards the Engagement of their Princes, and many other inconveniencies besides would have followed in reference to men and their interpretation of that action, if no equitable temperament had been found in the business, which upon a second Treaty (the first being declared void) was done with the consent of the Congregation: and this second Contract God did ratifie, as appeareth by the punish­ment of Saul for the breach of it.

Thus you have my sense of the Oath of Joshua to the Gibeon­ites; which in many and main things is different from the pre­sent case; only I have been thus large upon it, to prevent your mistake lest you should think (as I know some do) the first con­tract de jure binding, because confirmed by an Oath; and there­upon infer by this president, that an Oath is indissoluble, al­though it be made to establish a thing materially unlawful; and although it may fall out to oblige to something literally, which is contrary to the main intent thereof. Now I hold that if a thing once sworn, become either materially or formerly unlaw­ful [Page 42]or by change of circumstances impossible to be done, that then the Oath is no more binding, but ipso facto extinct.

In that matter which is said to pinch my friend, and my an­swer to it; you consider two things. First, because I say of those who have made this change in the Government, that they will plead for themselves; and because I take not upon me profes­sedly to justifie their proceedings, you conclude (but most ir­rationally) that I condemn them for Covenant-breakers; but there is no equitable and ingenuous Reader, who can construe any thing out of any words of mine, which will yield such a conclusion; for I profess it is wholly against my Conscience, to do as you do, viz. to make my self a Judge, and out of my sphere to define matters this or that way concerning them; but you seem willing to catch at any thing to discredit them, which I see no warrant to do.

Secondly, when I shew my Friend that the consequence which he made (thus if I take (saith he) the Engagement, then I shall be accessory-to the breach of Covenant which I apprehend o­thers are guilty of) was not good; you are much displeased at me for it, and intend to make not only an observation, but an a­nimadversion upon my discourse concerning that matter: let me first represent briefly the substance of my reason which you seem not at all to take notice of, and then I shall take notice of, your animadversion.

I shew that his inference was not good,Why no man by the En­gagement can be acces­sory to other mens sins (if they have a­ny) for make­ing a change in the State. from the direct and plain matter of the Engagement, lookt upon in the letter there­of, which binds us to nothing else, but to procure the good of the Common-wealth as now it stands, and this I say at all times is a duty to be done, however it stands: I say also, that to in­tend and do this, is agreeable to the intent of the Covenant, from whence to my understanding, is clearly inferred, that the taking of the Engagement to this effect, can be no breach of the Covenant which doth allow of this as a duty; for if the plain du­ty of the Engagement is that which the main intent and design of the Covenant doth presuppose, then the obligation to that can be no breach of this, and consequently his inference is not good; for it is clear that the Covenant obliging us to some par­ticular duties of truth and faithfulness towards the Common-wealth, [Page 43]as it was then established with a King and House of Lords, cannot bind us up, from promising and intending to be true and faithful to the whole Common-wealth, as it is now established, without a King and House of Lords. The having or wanting of a King and House of Lords, is but accidental to the main duty of being true and faithful to the Common-wealth, as it is offered to us in the Engagement.

To this matter of reason you say nothing, which yet was the main thing to be spoken to, if you intended an animadversion: But you tell me, that my discourse doth necessarily imply a high charge of inconsiderateness in those that made and imposed the En­gagement, whereof none can believe them guilty; and this you in­tend to make good, by telling me further what they who made and imposed the Engagement knew, as inconsistent with my sense of the Engagement, wherein you follow your ordinary vein, to make the worst construction you can of my sence, and to presume to express their sense and intentions little to their commendation. To dispute with you conjecturally what their thoughts, were is no part of my duty, it is sufficient for my aim, to evince that the plain matter of the Engagement is a clear du­ty not disagreeable to the intent of the Covenant which you o­verthrowe not; and therefore my answer to my friends scruple stands firm; for which cause I think it needless to spend time up­on the rectifying of your misconstruction of my sense of the En­gagement, as if it meant by the duty which I press, only the in­trinsecal good of the Common-wealth, and had no respect at all to the extrinsecal good thereof, and to the clause as it is now esta­blished. Nor shall I insist to make an animadversion upon your misapplication of this misconceived sense of mine, as if I took the Engagement in so large a signification, as that any man might foment under the words thereof what intentions he would, though never so destructive to the present Establishment: these things I shall pass by, because I suppose no candid Reader will so understand me, but will easily perceive that you frame to your self fictious absurdities upon misconstrued notions.

The observation which you make upon my interpretation [Page 44]of the words without a King and House of Lords, which I call an explication of the words (now established) immediatly going before, and not an absolute abnegation of the things lookt upon barely as in themselves, Whether the words with­out a King and House of Lords are an abnegation of them, barely and as in themselves. hath somewhat a better colour of reason, then that which you mentioned before; and although I make no such ac­count of that acceptiō of these words, as to stand confidently up­on it, that they cannot rationally bear any other interpretation; (for suppose they may by some consequence imply an abnega­tion of a King and Lords House, how will that oppose my asser­tion? or prejudice my reasoning with my Friend? yet your ar­guing against the abnegation of them so as I have mentioned, is not valid: for first, you take not up my expressions as they are delivered by me, and so contradict not my assertion, for you contradict only an absolute negation of the things themselves, and I assert, that the words do not mean, an absolute abnegation of the things lookt upon, harely as in themselves. I make a difference be­tween the negation of a thing and the abnegation of it. I may deny a thing to have a being, when it is not existent in rerum natura: and yet not intend to renounce all respect which may be had to it, lookt upon barely in it self. I may confess that a thing is not in this or that respect, and yet not declare that I cast it off, barely in it self, and in all respects. Now I say that the [meaning of the] words of the Engagement in their proper and obvious sence import not the last, but only the first acception, where I would have you to take notice that the sence which you assert is not proper and obvious, but brought in upon ma­ny consequences, which though not irrational, yet not contradi­ctory to what I say. Again in my expressions, the words barely as in themselves (for the word truly is not rightly printed, it should be barely) are reduplicatives, and you take them up without any reduplication, and speak of the things themselves. Now there is a great difference between a thing in a reflexive sense or reduplica­tive consideration, & between the direct notion of it, you take up my words as if I spoke of a King and House of Lords themselves, that is in a direct notion, and I clearly speak of them in a redupli­catve notion, barely as in themselves: therefore you contradict not what I say, although you pretend to shew that my gloss (as you call it) carries a full contradiction in it self: it is true, that your wrong allegation of the gloss doth seem to make it [Page 45]contradictory by way of consequences to the Text; but how it hath a full contradiction in it self, you make it not at all appear. And this is the first point of your mistake in the wrong allegati­on of my words, and the non-observing that I speak of a proper and obvious sense of the Engagement, and not of a sense by con­sequence. The second is the invalidity of your consequence, as to my understanding; for you say, that the words as now establish­ed, do fully imply that abnegation of King and Lords House which I there mention, because the adverb now in the Engage­ment (say you) doth stand in full opposition to the face of things in former Administrations. I grant that now stands in oppositi­on to time past by way of consequence, but not in a direct and proper Notion; for I may look upon things as now established, without looking back and comparing them with that which hath been; but when you say, that as now is a full contradiction to my sense as ever, I confess I understand not that, for if as ever, doth in its proper and obvious notion, and in my sense compre­hend all times past, present and to come, then I know not by what good consequence it can be said to be a full contradiction to that which is present; for that which is ever must needs also be now, or else is not ever. I confess that the Common-wealth as now established, hath voted down the King and Lords house, and declared that at present they are unfit to have any share or hand in the Government of this Common-wealth, and in this sense by the words of the Engagement, we deny them to have a being in this present establishment, which is all that rationally by our Superiours (I speak it with respect) can be desired, and in an ob­vious sense is offered by the words of the Engagement; but from hence doth not follow, that King and Lords are voted down, being lookt upon barely as in themselves; for it is clear, that the Declaration all along hath a respect to the safety of this Com­mon-wealth at present, to shew the inconsistency of a King and Lords House with it; and so much I conceive may be inferred, that the Engagement doth imply by consequence a consent in the Subscribers to this, but that either the Declaration, by which King and Lords were voted down, or the Engagement doth ob­lige any man to assert that Monarchical Government in it self, or Aristocraticall Power mixed with it, and lookt upon in it self, is for ever to be rejected out of a Common-wealth, and that neither [Page 46]of them can consist with the safety thereof, is much more then was ever, (as I conceive) intended by those that made the En­gagement, or then can rationally and equitably (I say again with respect) be imposed upon any men of judgement by their Ru­lers: nor is it at all needful to oblige Subjects to any such as­sertion, for the end for which the Engagement is offered, which is only to give the present powers an assurance of fidelity to the present State; but you and some others of your strain seem wil­ling to scrue up the sense of the words to such irrationalities as these are by forced consequences, that an Odium may fall upon the present Government, as if they were set against Monarchy and Aristocraty, rather for some self-ends, then for the present good of this Common-wealth, which to intend (if there be any such leaven in the bottom) is far from the duty both of a Christian, and of a good Subject, who should make the best construction of the actions of their Superiours, and refer unto them the judi­cature and management of publick affairs, as they shall think it most expedient, which if my Friend would lay to heart as he ought, and practise accordingly he would soon find himself easd of any thing which in this kind might pinch him.

I go on, not (as you say) discerning that which is said will not hold; for you see it holds invincibly, but ex abundanti, yielding some­thing to my Friends weakness, more then perhaps was needful, I suppose in his apprehension of matters, that this Engagement doth materially settle something in the Common-wealth, which is contra­ry to the intention which he had in taking the Covenant; yet I say that by giving his assent thereunto as matters now stand, he doth not at all break his Covenant, because the obligation to those matters by vertue of the Covenant was exstinct, before he was called upon to take the Engagement, to this you say, that this opposition of mine is wholly yielded by others, both that the Engagement is in full opposi­tion to the Covenant and other Oaths (and so all my labour lost in en­deavouring to reconcile them) and that this which I now bring, is only held out for a plea to carry it in the affirmative, that the En­gagement may be entered, malè res agitur (say you) cùm tot opus est remediis. To which I answer, malè cum ijs agitur quibus tot applicanda sunt remedia: it shews that their Disease may be brought to be stubborn, sed benè cum ijs agitur quibus tot suppe­tunt remedia: it shews that no cure is wanting, though the [Page 47]disease may seem desperate; for if the supposition which I make were wholly yielded unto as I make it, there would be no full opposition between the Covenant and other oaths found, o­therwise then in the mistaken apprehensions of some that scare themselves at the Engagement without a just cause my labour therefore is not lost if things misunderstood may be rectified, as surely they may, and I hope by this time in some degree are. You admit, that that which is extinct & made void can no more oblige, with this limitation; provided that those who are obliged have no hand in extinguishing that which doth oblige them,Corcerning the matter of an Oath how it may be ex­tinguished, or not extin­guished. to worke out their own disobligation, this limitation I do admit, and your instance in Davids case to Jonathan for preserving his seed, I al­low. Yet if God had appointed Mephibosheth to dye, and David to have given the sentence in the way of justice, do you thinke that David would have been guilty of the breach of oath made to Jonathan for the preserving of his seed? it is true we say the King dyes not; that is, the supream executioner of Laws dyes not; but the King in his person was Civiliter mortuus, as to his office when he was Voted close prisoner in the Isle of Wight, and if there was just cause for it in the Judgement of the Supreame power of the Nation, their oath for his preservation being limitted to a condition, they will be able to answer before a higher Judge then you or I for what they have done. The case which I suppose is concerning a private man, who is no Judge in publique affaires, who had no hand in sentencing him; and therefore although in the preface of the Covenant, mention is made of the King and his Posterity, yet by his death the mat­ter of the oath relating to him is extinct, and by the cause of his death the Law hath involved his posterity. 13

That which you say here concerning Parliament-Priviledges, being always the same and unalterable, is onely said and not proved; in like mauner when you tell me that we have now no Parliament actually existing, you begge the Question, and over­throw the fundamental position of a full House to be in the number of forty Trustees, which I believe may be six times told in the List of those that now present themselves to that Assem­bly. Your comparison of a Phisitian who cannot preserve, ex­cept he recover strength, doth suppose many things which are [Page 48]not granted; therefore I shall not think them worthy of any larger answer then to tell you, that the Covenant never meant that private men of whom I speak should be Judges of Parlia­ment-priviledges, or Phisitians to the publick diseases of the State. Now whether my friend hath any just cause to scruple further; neither you nor I are competent Judges, but the impartial Reader the third man, to whom, and to your own second thoughts I shall leave this matter.

Upon the second part of my discourse to my friend, you make some observations, 14 wherein you rather touch matters as it were in transcursu, exceptiously, then pitch upon a settled exception.

You tell me first, that in stead of cleering the title of the present Powers as just and lawful, and acquitting it from usurpation, I make it unlawful to inquire and determine concerning it. To this I say,what the du­ty of Sub­jects is to their superi­ors. till you make it appear that it is lawful for every private man to judge definitively of the Titles, Rights and Actions of the Powers that are over him, so as to oblige his Conscience to abstain from all lawful actings in his Calling under them, till he be satisfied in all his scruples concerning them, I must still for mine own part abstain from presuming to be their Judge in such matters, and diswade others from that practise, and per­swade them to do their own affaires quietly, and pray to God for their superiour Powers.

Then you blame me for holding forth the Rule by which I walk; as if I did intend to make my self in all things my friends president, or supposed him to be ready to follow me in all things. I see nothing can be so well meant and done but it may be ill taken, when men seek to make exceptions and not to edifie; I thought the best way of edification was to hold forth the rules by which God doth teach us to walk; and because I would have no man to follow me further then he seeth a Rule, therefore I am interpreted to have an ambition to get followers: truly I shall follow you gladly if you will shew me your Rule to be an­swerable to the word of God, and why shew you not a fault in the Rule it self, if it is lyable to exceptions; but if you can ex­cept nothing against it, why are you not so ingenous as to beare witness to the Truth? but when we hunt after contra­dictions, [Page 49]this is the Genius which leads us; we look not to the thing but to experiences, and in their wrong and worst side, afterward you say that I have been found a transgressor of mine own Rule. I see you allude to that which you said in your second exception but when you shall have answered that which I have said there to rectifie your mistakes, then you will give me cause to think that you have a mind not onely to tell me that I have transressed my Rule, but also to redress either me or my Rule if either be faulty; for which I shall thank you when you intend it as you ought to do.

Concerning the Character of AntiChrist you deny nothing of that which I say, but you desire me to take it into my serious consideration to whom that Character doth belong; whether to those that seek out carefully to what power it is they owe justly sub­jection that they may submit themselves thereunto, or to him who doth peremptorily determine of the forfeiture of Rights in those that before were posessed of an undoubted title, Concerning the spirit that exalts itself above Magi­strates, where it appeares most. and disobliging Subjects from their Obedience.

To this I say that I have considered seriously the matter, and find that the answer is easie, if the Case be stated as you offer it, upon a mistake in the second part, but let the Case be truly stated, and then consider you also where the Character of a Spirit exalting it self above Magistrates doth most appear: whe­ther in him that submits himself to the higher Powers which God hath actualy set over him, and without disputing their title or making himself a Judge of their actions, doth all things just and lawful in his place under them as under the Ordinance of God, because he doth believe that all Supream powers that are actually existent in the world are ordained of God, and ought to be submitted unto as Gods Vice-gerents in their places for Conscience sake? or in him that doth nothing of all this, but making himself a Judge of the Powers that are over him and of their proceedings, doth resist them as Usurp­ers, denying all obedience even in the best and lawfullest things commanded for publick safety by them: doth despise their government, and speak evil of their dignity, and doth admit of none to have the right to Supream power but whom he hath determined should have it? which of these hath most of the [Page 50]spirit of Antichrist judge ye? As for that which you call a peremptory determination of the forfeiture of Right in those that were before posse essed of an undoubted title, I can say this to it, that if you can shew me that I make any peremptory deter­mination of any thing in particular, I shall confess a fault, but if I do nothing more then represent the undenyable cleere & general grounds of natural equity, upon which Rights may be forfeited, without making any special application thereof un­to circumstances, or pronouncing a definitive sentence for or against any, as a Judge in the Case, then your censure will be found unjust and inconsiderate, and to see your errour in it, look upon that which I have said unto your second observation.

To the judgement of Discretion which I allow with a limi­tation, 15 that it ought not to be set up so high within ourselves or over others, as to oblige our Conscience to follow it as the onely Rule, and drown the thoughts of all other rules in point of obedience to the powers who are visibly over us; you say that blind obedience is bet­ter then such use of light, that when I believe I see my way, I have no allowance to follow it. This is a great mistake of my meaning, for so far as I allow to judge, I allow to follow light, I allow to judge, that is to discerne and observe rationally who are in the visible possession of superiority, how they declare their own right, and with what power they stand; these things must be taken notice of, that men may be able to judge their own present station under whom they stand, whom God hath set over them,Concerning the judge­ment of dis­cretion, & a definitive judgement, a­bout what matters they are conver­sant. and unto whom they owe obedience for Consci­ence sake: so far as this judgement doth discover actual superi­ority, I oblige the conscience of every man in his particular act­ions to walk in the light thereof as a dutiful Subject; but I allow him not in the disquiry of matters concerning his superiors to go so far as to judge peremptorily of their proceedings in their places, whether they do right or wrong, and whether their title be good or bad; in these things, because he cannot have that light which is requisit to settle a definitive judgement therein, and because he is not called to be a Judge of such mat­ters, therefore I allow him not to oblige his Conscience to be intangled into any such judicature, or to suspend the acts of his civil and Christian obedience (wherein Conscience is to follow [Page 51]other cleere Rules) upon his own or other mens observations of such things. In a word, I allow all men to seek out their way, and when they have found it to follow it conscionably: but they are to be directed, that in seeking their way they pre­sume not above their line; their Line is to discerne to whom they owe the duty of a Subject, & what the thing is which by their superiours is required of them, whether it be answerable to the Law of God and nature, yea or no? within this line their judgement is to walk for themselves; but beyond this Line to make such observations of their Superiours ways, or to give way to the apprehensions which may be suggested unto them con­cerning the same from others, so far as to make those observa­tions and apprehensions a rule to their conscience to walk by, is in my judgement irregular, and the very snare wherein at this time you and many others are taken in unawares, whiles you distinguish not between your own line and the line of others, and btween the judgement of discretion & peremptory judge­ment, which are to be exercised about different objects and have a different relation unto Conscience, the things whereof I am no competent judge, I may diseern, with an observation of in­differency, 16 leaving the determination thereof unto others to whom the judicature properly belongeth

Concerning the Rule which I give, whereby Superiours may be discerned as agreeable to sense, to reason, and to conscience, you object,

1. That if this Rule were right, Israel whensoever they were made Servants to their enemies, to Cushan Rushataim, to Eglon, to Jabin, to Midian, to Ammon, and to the Philistims, should have been bound up in bondage from seeking deliverance, nor any endea­vour must have been used to recover lost rights. The differ­ence between a State and v private man, in opposing oppressive powers over them.

I answer, that this doth not follow at all.

1. For the case of a private man is not the same with a whole state, this hath a right to govern it self independently, but no pri­vate man in a State can pretend unto this: therefore a State may endeavour to recover its right and liberty whensoever it can get strength to cast off the Government which is over it; but no privat man may intend to make himself independent from all superiour powers; he ought then to take notice of those that [Page 52]God hath set over him, to do his duty towards them.

2. In a whole State, when it is oppressed by Forraigners, as when God sent those enemies to bring Israel into bondage there was no doubt, or need of a Rule to know who were their superiours; but here a particular man is supposed in a civil divi­sion, to be in doubt between two competitors, to whom he is to perform the duty of a Subject: the Rule then is only fitted for this case, and not for the other.

3. In the deliverance of Israel from the oppression of their enemies it is said, that God raised them up Judges, and that he was with the Judge whom he raised, Jud. 2.16.18. therefore it followeth, that he put publick Authority upon their deliverers, and consequently, that he did not allow private men to be o­therwise then in subjection, as when he brought Nebuchadnezar against the Jews, who brought them away Captive into Baby­lon, he did Command all private men to be in subjection, and to pray for the peace of the place where they were Captives; Jer. 29.7. even as the Apostle doth injoyn all Christians to be subject to the Roman Emperours (Rom. 13.) who for the most part were all u­surpers.

Secondly,How Subjects are to behave themselves towards these Powers, whe­ther claiming superiority by Contract or by Conquest. you object against that which I say about a Con­tract which makes a Law between Rulers and Subjects, and a Conquest which is bound to no Law, that it were worth observa­tion, if I would acquaint you, which way the present powers do claim. I answer, my Councel is, which way soever you are to look to your duty, and not to resist the Ordinance of God which is over you: use your own discretion to observe what you can, without making your self a peremptory Judge of their way: and what I advise you to do, I endeavour to observe my self: therefore it is not reasonable that you should desire me to transgress mine own Rule, and go beyond my line to define other mens affairs which they have not called me to determine. I can discern a mixture in their way; to some they use the right of Conquerors, to others they walk by the Rule of a Contract: you may put your self in either relation, for as your behaviour to­wards them is, so you are like to find them.

Concerning the Queries whereof you say the Question is mi­serably begged, 17 I have no more to say, but that I speak there in [Page 53]the name of others, and that it is left to your discretion to con­sider those Queries as the matter of them is offered in the na­ture of a plea for those who are accused of usurpation.

And although you say,Concerning the Queries mentioned in the Conside­rations, how they are to be reflected upon. you have never seen so much as an at­tempt for the proof of that which is taken as granted in these Que­ries; yet I can tell you that I have met with those that have in the presence of many, undertaken the proof thereof, which be­cause it relates to matters of fact, whereof I can bear no infalli­ble witness pro or contra: therefore I must leave it without a definitive sentence, as not being obliged in Conscience this or that way to a judicature, and yet I may rationally with an indif­ferent eye be inclined to assent more one way then another, al­wayes keeping my affection entire to the rule of my duty; for what ever the matters of fact be in other mens administrations, that is no rule to me in my sphere, I must look to the proper rule of mine own work with a respect to the matter and end there­of.

To the second branch of my friends doubt, 18 that which I offer (as a rule whereby to resolve his Conscience in the scruple it had you meddle not withall, but to avoid the evidence of that rule, you put another case and tell me. But if the Engagement be not a duty as men affected to the common cause of liberty (by mine own concessions) are perswaded, then (say you) guilt will follow upon such supposition which I have laid down. Concerning the Engage­ment that it is a Duty; and what doth follow thereupon. To this I an­swer, that no man hath ever yet denyed the Engagement to be a duty in the sence wherein I understand it, nor you yourself, although through prejudice against the present Rulers you are loath they should be understood to tender it in that sense where­in I offer it. Seeing then the Engagement in the sense in which I take it is undoubtedly a duty iust to be required by the present Powers, you deale not rationally to suppose it to be no duty, except you had shewed that either it could not beare the sense wherein I take it, or that that sense is not a matter of duty now to be performed as that it is unjust to be required: nothing of which you having done, and yet taking it for granted to be no duty (onely because I confess that some men well affected to li­berty are so perswaded, though it is cleere that I think them to be in an error) you seeme cleerely to beg the question [Page 54]which is between us after that I have proved it; for having pro­ved the Engagement to be a duty, and such a duty as is fundamental to all other former bonds; I may lawfully make it a ground to build some inferences thereon, and you not having disproved it to be what I say it is, have no ground to build any contrary inferences thereupon. Then also the infer­ence which you make is, to my conception (if I take your mean­ing) needless; If (say you) it is no Duty, then guilt will follow upon such supposition which you have laid down, you had done well to have shewed what the supposition is which you mean, for I cannot well guess at it. If you mean that the guilt of being ac­cessory to other mens faults (whereof the question is) will follow upon the supposition that the Engagement is a duty when as indeed it is none; this may be granted, but is need­lesly mentioned, because my presupposal that the doing of a duty can make no man accessory to another mans personal fault, doth sufficiently include; that if the thing done by him be not a duty, it will not excuse him from being accessory unto his fault.

You take notice of the expression wherein I say of some, that they deserve not to have a being in the Common-wealth, 19 and you call it a high one, and a passing of sentence upon those that have forborn to subscribe this Engagement, being conscious to themselves of the bonds of former Engagemenns. Herein you give us an ex­ample of that way of apprehending things which is in the spirits of all men who are led by prejudice, for although the matter which I deliver is as cleere a truth as any that can be thought upon in the way of morality, and relates to no particular per­sons at all,An instance of a prejudicate way of mis­interpreting plaine truths. but mentions only a general and undenyable maxim, which is a principle of all human societys; yet you cannot looke straightly, and with a single eye upon it as it is delivered, but through the Prospective of your prejudice you not only pervert my meaning, but relat my words otherwise then I do offer them; for I say, that this is a rule of justice, that all men are bound to shew fidelity unto those of whom they desire protection, and that we ure bound to be ready to every good worke towards those with whom we live. which is all that in the present state of this Common-wealth is required of us; which if we desire not to performe. we de­serve not to have a being in it, these truths which I deliver as generall maxims, and apply them to myself as well as to others, [Page 49]and universally to all men in all Common-wealths in the world, because you cannot deny either the premises or their cohe­rrnce. You carp at the clause thereof; you call it a high sentence, and to make me odious you relate it as if I spake it onely of those that have forborne to subscribe the Engagement, which proceeds from a narrowness of spirit, which cannot look upon the face of universal Truths as in themselves they are offered to the understanding, without turning them awry to some parti­al application. And because your discourse which followeth hereupon (concerning the inconveniency of proceeding in so high a way, and concerning other things, whereof you make your self a Judge and a Councellour of State, rather to reprove then to intreat, and in a loving manner to advise that which is equitable) is all grounded upon this distorted apprehension of my words; I shall leave it as a matter in which I am not at all concerned, desiring you to judge equitably whether upon such a tryal of your inclination to misunderstand and misreport plain words, so full of cleere truth contrary to my sense, I have not sufficient cause to warn you, and justly to be jealous over you, least you be no less injurious to your Superiors, and to all that which they do towards the publick by misinterpreting the same towards others then you are to me, and how far such a strain is different from the spirit of Christ, and from the way of doing good to others, I shall seriously refer unto your more quiet and conscionable consideration, desiring you to weigh it by your self at better leasure as in the presence of God. 20

The descourse which you make upon my discription of the end of the Engagement, which you call a gloss; is almost of the same strain with this immediatly going before, the differ­ence is onely, that here the words are not so misreported, but by misconstruction of matters you wrong my meaning as much as you can by Consequences.

I say, that the end of the Engagement is, to give the Supreame Power an assurance that we shall not betray it, but that we are willing to maintain all good intelligence for publique concern­ments with it, notwithstanding the present changes brought upon the Common-wealth.

You say,Concerning the end of the Engagement & what con­sequences fol­low thereup­on. that to intend this doth utterly spoil all assurance that possibly can be given either to this State or any other; and the rea­son you give (referring me to what hath been said before, where I found no reason at all, but uncharitable surmises, viz. in Sect. 10.) is this, that if no respect is to be had to outward forms, but to the intrinsecal good of the Common-wealth only: then (say you) all are at liberty (notwithstanding such Engagement) where they will to hold intelligence; provided, that their judgements tell them that the publick is best provided for, Where the observers consequence is related, & the answer thereunto shews the grounds of his error. that way in which they keep corres­pondency.

Hereunto let me for answer tell you,

First, you never heard from me, that no respect was to be had to outward forms; for I believe that a due and conscionable respect is to be had to all outward forms, by those that are in an orderly way engaged to them, so long as they last; but that any men should be engaged to them after that they are altered and taken away without their default, or should be obliged to practise the maintaining of them to the disturbance of the pub­lick peace and welfare of a Nation, is a thing which I cannot un­derstand, or that any outward form should be accompted essen­tial to any Nation, Concerning the use of outward formes. and more then accidental, so that by the su­preme power thereof it may not be alterable upon exigent ne­cessities, is another thing which doth pass my capacity, and yet except you assert these paradoxes, you will never make out the conclusions which you aim at, for the sense of former Engage­ments, as you make them obligatory to the Conscience at this time in opposition to this Engagement.

Secondly, 2 you never heard from me, that the intrinsecal good of the Common-wealth only was to be intended without the outward good thereof also:Concerning the intrinsecal and extrinse­cal good of the Common-wealth. I believe that in a Common-wealth as in a man, there is a soule and a body, and that in both there is a substantial and accidental good, and that this is alterable, but that that is alwayes in the eye of every one that is faithful to a Common-wealth, unalterably to be sought after, and that the al­terable good of a Common-wealth, depends upon circumstances, and is determinable by the supreme power of every Nation, I suppose you will not deny, and here I shall tell you al­so, lest you mistake my notion of a Common-wealth, that I un­derstand [Page 57]by it, not an abstract form, but a concrete substance consisting of the body of the Nation, as it is taken both col­lectively & representatively; for neither of these are at any time to be understood without the other in my discourses, or with­out some relation to each other. 3

Thirdly, you never heard from me that every private man is to be made a Judge of that which is the publick good,Concerning the judge­ment of pri­vate men, touching the publick good. as if it were free for him to follow any course without controle, which his judgement tells him the publick is best provided for; for I believe that all rational men, and honest Members of a Common-wealth, take that to be best for the publick good which the su­preme powers thereof declare fit to be prosecuted concerning it, according to the trust reposed in them; so that faithful Sub­jects will judge that they ought to be rationally concluded in such matters by their superiours. Upon these assertions I sup­pose you will be able to see how far you wrong my sense of the end of the Engagement; and truly if you would but have been a little ingenuous, and considered that the preface of the Act for taking of the Engagement, doth express in effect the same ends which I mention, you could not with any colour of reason have made the inferences upon it which you make: nay and the very letter of my words is cleerly contradictory to your infer­ence; for I declare the end to be, not to betray the supreme pow­er, and to be willing to maintain with it all good intelligence, and you infer, then all are at liberty, notwithstanding such Engagement to hold intelligence where they will. How can a promise made to these supreme powers, (who are the representative Common-wealth) to be true and faithful to them; that is, not to betray them, but to maintain good intelligence for the publick welfare with them; yield this conclusion, Ergo I am free to hold in­telligence with their enemies against them; if I will understand by the publick welfare their destruction? these are such distor­tions of a plain matter, that I wonder how you should come to strain your wit to beget them. There is much more of this kind of stuff in your following glosses, upon my words, which de­clare the end of the Engagement, to which I think fit to say no­thing, for by what I have said already, you will be able to re­solve [Page 58]your self, of that which I could say unto the remainder of those your discourses.

That which you observe concerning the dissolution of the tye of private men, to the Heir of the Crown, is, that we must not look unto the works of God alone, but also unto his word, to walk by a Rule, which I shall not contradict, but heartily affirm with you, and be ready to shew that by the word as a Rule, we pri­vate men are bound to obey in things good and lawful the su­preme powers immediatly and actually over us under God, and not such as are not over us whom in opposition unto them we may be inclined to chuse. As for the Engagement, it doth clearly oblige us to do our duty to the Common-wealth collectively and representatively without a King; but to my understanding the expression is not so against Kingly-power in it self considered; but that the supreme power of the Nation, may, if they see cause, and the publick safety in their judgements (for they are only the competent Judges thereof) doth require it; set up a King again to morrow. I do not think it in the power of any supreme power; if they will be faithful to their trust to bind their own hands in such a way as not to do and undo; for this would be to oblige themselves to that which is against the nature of their trust; nor is it imaginable that the Covenant or any other ob­ligation of Oath can be so high, as to bind us so to a King or his Heire, that we should not be able lawfully to promise truth and faithfulness to the Common-wealth without them, when they are not in place. The example of a Child to his Father, beggs the Question; and then the Lawes of men bind only to that which the letter directly imports, in respect of outward actions men­tioned in them, and takes no notice of secret inward affections. The Argument taken from Gods way of providence after a thing is done to acquiesce in it, by doing our duty in all other things which the same providence doth offer, can be no occasion to sin, or any snare to do evil, nor do I press it any further in this case, but to acquiesce at things past, which God hath altered, and to do a duty at things present, which God hath setled, and if this Divinity will not hold in reference to private men, I pray shew us some better Rule, and we shall hearken to you in it.

Concerning the place of Isaiah Chap. 24. 22 vers. 21. where it is foretold that the Kings of the Earth shall be punished and after­ward [Page 59]visited; I shall admit of your caveat, for I make onely a probable conjecture of that which God hath done, or intend­eth to do amongst us, and not a peremptory definition of that which shall fall out,Concerning the observa­tion of Pro­phesies what the caveat is. your admonition also concerning the doing of our duty I willingly receive, and grant that Prophe­sies touching that which God will do; are no rules for our actions, but the Precepts touching his will which we should do, must guide us. That which you discourse, of the fulfilling of the Prophesies concerning Christ to be put to death by wic­ked hands, is a Truth; Nay, if men be wicked, and have no re­spect to God in that which they do; although they be sent forth with a special and express command of his own upon their works, yet they do not his prescribed will as their duty, but onely a material work wherein their aim may be undutifull. Jehu is a clear example of this.

That which you bid me take into my serious consideration concerning the Engagement I hope God will inable me to do; 23 I can say it before him; that I am not conscious to my self of want of Charity, and tenderness to those that are scrupled: nor do I think that this Engagement can be so clear to men pre­ingaged in other strong bonds of duty which they cannot seedis­solved, and prepossessed against the way of the change, perhaps more then comes to their share to judge of it, and of the per­sons which have brought it about; I say I think not that this Engagement can be so clear unto them,The grounds of Modera­tion towards dissenters about the En­gagement. as that they should suddenly without any debate in their Spirits, be carried to al­low of it, therefore I have alwayes been Sollicitou fors a mode­ration of proceedings; and for amiable conferences, to beget a good understanding of doubtfull matters whereinto by the necessities of the times we are fallen. I confess that evidence doth not alwayes go along with Truth; for to make a thing evident it must be offered ad modum recipientis; and although men be such in whom both parts and piety are seen, yet sometimes they are so shut up with prejudices wherein corrup­ons work; that they act far below themselves: and I dare not say, that in the proposal of matters to cure them of prejudicate thoughts, there is alwayes that humility, love, Prudency and im­prejudicants used to them which is able to cure their disease without any further distemper and inflammation to their sores, [Page 60]somtimes it may be truly said medice cura teipsum & the Apostles memento, Gal. 6.1. to keep us in a meek temper, lest thou also be tempted is remarkable: therefore God forbid that any should be pressed to act against judgement, & the dictates of their Consci­ence only by Club-law, who seek rationally to consider things belonging to duty in the fear of God.

Concerning the resistance of powers, 24 that which you offer is worth the consideration, and to help you to a decision of that which seemeth doubtful: I pray consider in the Authours which are approved upon that Subject, whether any doth allow that private men without all publick respect,Concerning resistance of Powers. may make such a resi­stance, and about things wholly good and lawful in themselves? as for the other question, what a just power with right un­questionable may challenge, is one thing, and what a private Subject under an usurped power may do in opposition to the power which is actually over him, is another thing: therefore I shall desire you also to consider, that private mens opinions con­cerning forfeitures of rights and usurpations without title, are not warrantable grounds to act towards the unsettlement of the publick in opposition to powers that are, in plenary possession of all places of Government. As for your request in the conclu­sion, that those who see not with my eyes, and cannot warrant all that I approve (having what to say if called unto it) may obtaine from me a more favourable censure then to be judged unworthy of a being in the Common-wealth, where by right of birth-right they have their freedome; I shall profess that it never came in my thoughts so to censure any,Concerning mutual for­bearance, and the equity thereof. although I cannot but assert this to be a fundamental truth without which no Common-wealth can stand: That Protectio trahit allegianciam, and that whoso­ever is not desirous to performe every good work to the Soci­ety wherein he doth live, doth not deserve to have a being therein, although he were a hundred times borne in it. Birth­right can give no man a just title to be an enemy to the Society wherein he hath a being; now he is an enemy to every Society, who is not desirous to performe every good work towards it; But God forbid that any who hath what to say when called to it, should not be heard in the Society where he liveth and is borne. It hath been my earnest work to intreate men to say in a [Page 61]Christian way that which they had to say, and I have used, all the industry I could to bring them without partiality to it, that by the things wherein we agree, we might come to a fur­ther light in that wherein we agree not; but I have reaped no­thing almost but jealousies, reproaches and slanders for my pains; and have been worse rejected here, even by men other­wise Godly, then I have been in Forrain parts amongst the stif­fest Lutherans. Yet I hope that shall never make me weary in well doing, or vary from the Rule, whereby, as I am taught, to judge none before the time; till the secrets of hearts, and hidden designs of self-interest be opened; So I hope the Lord will inable me never to shut the Bowels of pitty & compassion; or to restrain the affection of prayer and supplication against any, whom I shall perceive to be in any dangerous error and ignorance; and the like favour I shall also desire you to afford unto me when you look upon me in my frailtys; and if we would be but truly carefull thus to beare one anothers burdens, rather then to complain and murmur against each other, or to misrepresent each other to the publick, we should find more comfort in our way then now we do. I shall close with you in your last request. The Lord give us a right understanding in all things, and grace to follow the things which we understand, without partiality; which is the upright indeauour,