1. THere bee three things (Good Reader) which my Aduersary M^r. Fitzherbert in the first chapter of his Reply doth wrongfully lay to my charge. The first is, that I haue lame­ly, and fraudulently set downe the summe and substance of his discourse in the two first Chapters of his Supplement; the second, that in relating a supposition of his, I haue vsed two fraudes, the one in the relation of his wordes, and the other in the vse and application of them: the third is, that I haue nei­ther answered probably, nor like a good Catholike. And because the Reader may the better iudge of the sufficiencie, and truth of both our answeres, (for my onely desire is that the trueth in this difficult controuersie may be cleerely knowne) I will obserue the same me­thode, order, and number of Chapters, which he doth; and there­fore my answere to his first accusation, for that he remitteth his Rea­der for proofe thereof to his fift, sixt, and seuenth Chapters, I will also referre to those places, and only his two accusations I will examine with him in this Chapter.

2 To begin therefore with his second accusation, whereas in the beginning of my answere to the substance of M. Fitzherberts discourse, I affirmed,Dis [...] [...]ol. in [...] [...]ect [...] ‘that first of all he supposeth, that thePopes power to excom­municate and depose Princes, (if they deserue it, and the good of the Church, and the saluation of soules doe necessarily require it) is deni [...]d in [Page 2] this oath, whereupon hee concludeth afterwards, that although the oath doth not expressely affirme, that the Kings Maiestie is supreame head of the English Church nor in plaine words deny the Pope so to be; yet it sup­poseth, and implieth both the one, and the other, and thereupon denyeth the Popes authoritie to excommunicate and depose a temporall Prince: and howsoeuer the matter may bee otherwise coloured, it is euident, that the true reason, why the said authoritie of the Pope is impugned by the oath, is no other, but because the Kings Maiestie is held to bee no way subiect to the Pope, yea and to bee himselfe supreame head of the Church of God in England. This being presupposed, hee goeth about to prooue, that this oath is repugnant to the law of God, of Nature of Nations, Ca­non, and Ciuill, &c.’

3 Now M^r. Fitzherbert doeth bouldly, but vntruely affirme, that I haue vsed herein two fraudes, the one in the relation of his wordes, the other in the vse and application of them. For albeit, saith hee,Chap. 1. nu. 7 Wid­drington alleadgeth them truely, and doth not falsifie my text, yet hee relateth them in such sort, that his Reader must needes conceiue, that I lay them downe in the very beginning of my Discourse for the onely foundation, and ground of all my building; and therefore as soone as he hath cited them, he saith, hoc posito probare contendit, &c. this being supposed, hee la­boureth to prooue, that this oath is repugnant to the Diuine, and Naturall law, to the law of Nations, Ciuill, and Canon. So hee, and then hee pro­ceedeth to the abridgement of all my Discourse, beginning with the law of God in the olde Testament, and so goeth on with the rest, and impug­neth my supposition, as the onely foundation of all my Discourse and ar­guments.

4. But the trueth is, hee findeth those words of mine in the 66. page of my Supplement, (as it may appeare by his owne quotation thereof) af­ter I haue discoursed of the law of God in the old, and new Testament, and of the lawes of Nature, and Nations, and of the Ciuill law, in the conclusion whereof I haue those words, referring them to the Ciuill law onely: for ha­uing prooued, that the said law confirmeth and establisheth the Popes su­premacie, I inferred, that it cannot fauour, and much lesse enioyne, and iustifie the oath for two reasons; the one, because the said oath is in part groun­ded vpon the beliefe, that the Kings Maiestie is supreame head of the Church of God in England, and no way subiect to the Pope (which is repugnant to the Ciuill law) and the other, because the Ciuill law acknowledging the subiection of temporall Princes to the Pope in matters belonging to their soules, and to the good of the Church, doth by a necessarie consequent ac­knowledge, that they may bee punished by him temporally in their persons and states, where the good of soules and the seruice of God doeth require it, according to the rule of the law, Accossorium sequitur principale, the accessorie followeth the principall. Then, I say, I argued in the [Page 3] place, which he citeth, and I remitted my Reader for the confirmation of this second reason to a more ample Discourse thereof before in the same chap­ter. Nu 66. & 56. Now then it appeareth (as I haue said) that hee hath dealt fraudu­lently with me two wayes, the one in referring my supposition to all the lawes, whereof I treated, whereas I referred the same expresly, and only to the Ci­uill law: the other, &c. Thus M^r. Fitzherbert.

5 But truly I cannot but wonder, that this my Aduersarie should at the very first beginning of his Reply be so inconsiderate, as in wrong­fully accusing me of fraude, to deale so vntruly and fraudulently him­selfe, which could not but greatly empaire his credit with the [...]udicious Reader, and cause him to be iealous of his sinceritie in the rest of his Replyes, when at the very first entrance hee should finde in him such fraudulent proceeding. For that which I affirmed is very true, and I meruaile, that M^r. Fitzherbert doth not blush to deny the same, to wit, that hee did first of all, that is, at the very first beginning of his Dis­course in the sixt page of his Supplement, before hee began to prooue the oath to bee repugnant to any law Diuine, or Humane, suppose that the Popes power to excommunicate and depose Princes (if they deserue it, and the good of the Church, and the saluation of soules doe necessarily require it) is denied in this oath. For these be his expresse words in the sixt page, and ninth number of his Supplement.

6 Therefore I thinke good to let him vnderstand heere, that my mea­ning is not to contradict any article of the oath, that concerneth meerely Ci­uill obedience to our Soueraigne, but such clauses only, as doe either direct­ly, or indirectly preiudice the authoritie of our spirituall supreame Pastour, and namely those which doe exempt temporall Princes from excommunication and deposition by the Pope, when iust occasion shall be giuen by them, and the necessitie of the Church, and the good of soules require it: to which purpose I will prooue (marke well these words) that this new oath in respect of such clauses is repugnant to all lawes Humane, and Diuine, and therefore iustly condemned by his Holinesse, and refused by Catholikes. First then I will speake of the law of God, &c. So he.

7 Wherefore it is apparant, that M^r. Fitzherbert in the very be­ginning of his Discourse referreth his aforesaid supposition to all lawes both Humane, and Diuine, and yet now to taxe mee of fraude, hee doth not blush to say, that I haue dealt fraudulently with him in refer­ring his aforesaide supposition to all the lawes whereof hee treateth, whereas, saith he, hee referred the same expresly and onely to the Ciuill law: Which errour of his I would not willingly haue construed in the wor­ser sense but attribute it only to his obliuion, and forgetfulnesse of what he himselfe had written in the beginning of his Discourse, and not to any fraude in him, but that my wordes which hee himselfe doth relate, are so plaine, that he cannot bee excused either from manifest fraude, or [Page 4] from so palpable an errour, which no man of vnderstanding can scarce­ly commit. For marke my words, which he himselfe setteth downe. First of all he [M. Fitz.] supposeth that the Popes power to excommunicate, and depose Princes, is denyed in this oath; wherupon afterwards (to wit, in the 66. page, as it is euident by my quotation) hee concludeth, that al­though the oath doth not expresly affirme, that the Kings Maiestie is su­preame head of the English Church, nor in plaine words deny the Pope so to be, yet it supposeth, and implieth both the one, and the other, and thereupon denyeth the Popes authoritie to excommunicate and depose a temporall Prince, &c.

8 Now who seeth not, that I did cleerely distinguish betwixt first of all, and afterwards, betwixt his supposition, which I referred to first of all, and to the beginning of his discourse in the sixth page, before he began to treat of any of the lawes, as also it may euidently appeare by those words of mine, This being supposed hee laboureth to prooue, &c, and be­twixt his conclusion, which I referred to afterwards, and quoted the 66. page, where he treateth in particular of the Ciuill law. But because I quoted onely the place, where my Aduersarie maketh the aforesaide conclusion, for that the Reader could otherwise hardly finde it out, vn­lesse he should read 66. pages together, and did not quote the place, where hee made his supposition, for that by those words of mine, first of all he supposeth, and those other, This being supposed he laboureth to prooue, that this oath is repugnant to the law of God, of Nature, of Nations, Ciuill and Canon, the Reader might easily perceiue, that this supposition of his was in the beginning of his discourse, before he beganne to treat of any of the lawes; Belike my Aduersarie thought, that hee might easily from hence haue some colour to taxe me of fraudulent procee­ding at the very first beginning, little imagining that my words should be so narrowly scanned, and that the Reader would easily conceiue the difference betwixt first of all, and afterwardes, betwixt his supposition in the beginning of his discourse, page 6. and his conclusion, page 66. but guile hath heerein beguiled it selfe, and whilest my Aduersarie by tax­ing mee of fraud, thought to discredite mee at the very first entrance, hee hath cleerely prooued himselfe to bee guiltie both of fraude and falshood.

9 The second fraude, which my Aduersarie Widdrington hath vsed, saith M^r. Fitzherbert,Nu. 6. is, for that he laboureth, as it seemeth, to perswade his Reader, that all my arguments and reasons are grounded vpon a false sup­position of my owne, which hee sayth, I doe not any way prooue, but suppose as knowen of it selfe, and this hee seemeth to gather out of my owne wordes alleadged by him, as you haue heard, wherein I affirme, that the new oath supposeth and implieth a deniall of the Popes supremacy, although it bee not expresly denied therein (hee should haue said, wherein I affirme, that the [Page 5] oath denieth the Popes authoritie to excommunicate and depose a temporall Prince, for this is that, which I said, hee did suppose, and no way prooue) When neuerthelesse Nu. 9. hee could not but see, euen in the verie same place, from whence hee tooke my wordes, that I did not prooue the oath to be vnlawfull by that supposition onely, but also by the subordination, and sub­iection of temporall things to spiritual, when the good of soules, and the seruice of God requireth it: Besides that, it is most euident in my discourse concer­ning diuers of those lawes, that I deduced the vnlawfulnesse of the oath, from the very substance of them, as it will manifestly appeare heereafter, when I shall come to touch them in particular. Thus M^r. Fitzherbert.

10 But that I haue vsed no fraud at all in my wordes, as my Ad­uersary vntruely affirmeth, and that rather that imputation of fraude may bee retorted backe vpon himselfe, it is very apparant. For in the beginning of his discourse, to wit, in the sixt page of his Supplement, he supposeth, as you haue seene, that the Popes power to excommuni­cate and to depose Princes is denied in this oath, which also afterwards in the 66. page he confirmeth, and in regard onely of these two clauses, hee taketh vpon him to prooue, that the Popes spirituall authoritie is denied therein: VVhich his supposition, for as much as concerneth his power to excommunicate, and consequently his spirituall Supremacie, for that the former is according to the doctrine of all Catholikes in­cluded in this latter, as a particular in the vniuersall, I shewed in my Theologicall Disputation against Cardinall Bellarmine, Fa. Gretzer, Disputatio Theol. c. 4. sect. [...] and Lessius to be cleerely false, and withall, in my answere to the sub­stance of this my Aduersaries discourse, I affirmed, that hee doth not prooue it with any one argument at all, but supposeth it as knowne of it selfe: which any man that will but sleightly run ouer his discourse, may presently perceiue to be true.

11 For albeit he doeth boldly affirme, and suppose, that the Popes power to excommunicate, and to depose Princes is denied in this oath, and consequently, if the Popes power to excommunicate Princes be not denied therein, his position, or copulatiue proposition is false, for that to the truth of a copulatiue proposition it is required, that both parts of the copulation bee true, and to make it false, it sufficeth that one onely part of the copulation be false, yet he bringeth no one argument in his whole Discourse to prooue, that the Popes power to excommunicate Princes is denied in the oath, but cunningly passeth ouer to his power to depose, which all men confesse to be expresly denied therein. Nei­ther can any man, who is not desirous of set purpose to misconstrue my wordes, and meaning, imagine that I intended either to deny that the Popes power to depose Princes is impugned in the oath, for that my whole Disputation, and also my answere to this my Aduersaries Dis­course, doth plainely shew the contrary, or to affirme, that my Aduer­sarie [Page 6] doth suppose as knowne of it selfe, and by no reason at all endea­uour to prooue, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, and that therefore the oath in regard of this clause, which is expresly denied therein, is vnlawfull, for that I haue briefly related and answered ma­ny of his arguments to this purpose, and those words of mine, which he himselfe relateth, This being supposed, he goeth about to prooue, that the oath is repugnant to the law of God, &c. doe cleerely conuince the same.

12. But my onely intention and meaning was to affirme, as the Reader may plainely gather from my words, that my Aduersarie at the verie first entrance of his Discourse supposeth, that the oath doth con­taine in it a deniall of the Popes power to excommunicate and to depose Princes, and that to these two generall heads hee promised to reduce all the arguments and exceptions, which hee should bring against the oath; And that although he hath endeuoured by the subordination of temporall things to spirituall, and by many other arguments drawne from diuine and humane lawes, to prooue, that the Pope hath power to depose Princes, yet concerning his power to excommunicate, which all Catholikes doe beleeue to bee graunted to him by Christ, that hee bringeth no one argument, or shew of an argument, to prooue, that it is denied in this oath, but supposeth it, as being graunted, or knowen of it selfe.

13 Whereby it is apparant that I am free from all fraude in this point, and that my Aduersarie cannot bee excused from fraudulent proceeding, both for wrongfully accusing mee of fraude, and also for taking vpon him in the beginning of his Discourse to impugne the oath, as being repugnant to all lawes humane and diuine, for that it containeth a deniall of the Popes power to excommunicate and to de­pose Princes, and yet not bringing any one argument to prooue that his power to excommunicate is denyed therein, but supposing it as knowne or granted, and cunningly passing ouer to his power to de­pose: which considering It hath euer beene a great controuersie, saith Fa. Azor, Tom. 2. l. 11. cap. 5. q. 8. betwixt Emperours and Kings on the one part, and the Bishops of Rome on the other, and the Schoolemen, saith Trithemius,In Chronico Monast. Hir­saug. ad annum. 1106. doe contend about the same, it is no hard matter for a man of meane Theologicall learning to scrape together, as M^r. Fitzherbert hath done, out of so ma­ny Authors, who haue written in fauour of the Popes power to depose Princes, some colourable arguments to prooue the same; all which neuerthelesse haue beene heeretofore by mee, and others very cleerely answered.

14 Considering therefore, that neither his Maiestie did intend to deny in this oath the Popes power to excommunicate him, although the lower house of Parliament, as his Maiesty himselfe affirmeth,In his Pre­monition. p. 9. at the first framing thereof, made it to containe as much, which hee forced them to re­forme, [Page 7] neither is there any one clause in the oath, from which it may bee gathered, that the saide power to excommunicate is denied there­in, neither did my Aduersary bring any one argument, or shew of an argument to prooue the same, although in the very beginning of his Discourse hee promiseth to prooue, that the oath in respect of this clause is repugnant to all lawes humane and diuine: for this cause I vsed these words, which now my Aduersary carpeth at, That it is a won­der that learned men do not blush to affirme with so great confidence, that to be his Maiesties meaning, which hee himselfe in publike writings doth expresly professe not to be his meaning, and to inculcate so often and so coldly without any solide proofe, that very argument (concerning the deniall of the Popes power to excommunicate) which both by his Maiestie, and many others hath beene so often very soundly confuted.

15 Now M^r. Fitzherbert taketh great exceptions against these wordes, and groundeth vpon them his third accusation, that I haue neither answered probably, nor like a good Catholike. Whereto I answere first, saith hee,Nu. 14. concerning his vaine bragge of the sound confutation of our argument, that seeing the same hath no other ground or proofe heere, but his owne word, and idle affirmation, it deserueth no other answere for this place, but a flat deniall. But I might likewise returne his owne answere of his vaine brag and idle affirmation, to those words of his,Nu. 10. 11. 12. That the oath implieth the deniall of the Popes Supremacy, and that hee and others haue amply prooued, that whosoeuer abiureth the Popes power to depose Princes, doth consequently abiure his spirituall authoritie: yet I will abstaine from such bitter termes, and whether it bee a vaine bragge of my owne, and an idle affirmation, or rather a very true assertion, that their argument concerning the deniall of the Popes power to excommunicate, where­of in that place I did onely speake, hath beene sufficiently confuted or no, the Reader by my answeres may easily perceiue.

16 For Cardinall Bellarmine, Fa. Lessius, Gretzer, and this my Aduersary doe affirme the oath to be vnlawfull, and to deny the Popes spirituall authoritie, for that it denieth his power to excommunicate, which all Catholikes graunt to bee included in his spirituall Primacy. That his power to excommunicate is denied in this oath, Fa. Gretzer, and my Aduersarie doe suppose as manifest, neither doe they bring any one argument for the proofe thereof, and therefore their assertion, or rather supposition may with a meere deniall bee as easily confuted. Cardinall Bellarmine also at the first did barely, & without any proofe, but onely by the way of an interrogation affirme, or rather suppose the same. And being taxed by his Maiestie of falshood, for affirming so boldly, That the Popes power to excommunicate are hereticall Kings, is plain­ly denied in the oath, seeing that this point converning the Popes power to ex­communicate, was in this oath purposely declined by his Maiesty, yet Cardi­nall [Page 8] Bellarmine afterwards in his Apologie, Cap. 15. bringeth no other proofe for cleering himselfe of that imputation, then which in effect hee had brought before.

17 That I did truely affirme, saith he, that the Popes power to excom­municate euen hereticall Kings is denied in that forme of oath, it is manifest by those wordes of the oath. Also I doe sweare from my heart, that not­withstanding any declaration, or sentence of Excommunication or de­priuation made or granted, or to bee made or granted by the Pope or his Successours, &c. I will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Ma­iestie, his Heires, and Successours. But whosoeuer sweareth that he will obey an hereticall King, notwithstanding the Popes excommunication, doth not hee together sweare, that he acknowledgeth not in the Pope power to ex­communicate hereticall Kings? for otherwise it were not an oath, but sacri­ledge, to sweare, that hee will not obey the sentence of Excommunication made by the Pope against an hereticall King, if he should beleeue, that the Pope hath power to excommunicate hereticall Kings.

18 To this argument I gaue two answeres.In Disput. Theol. cap. 4. sect. 1. The first was, that a Catholike man either terrified with feare, or mooued for hope of gaine, may sweare, that he will not obey a iust Excommunication, and by so swearing commit sacriledge, who neuerthelesse doth beleeue, that the Pope hath power to excommunicate: And therefore from those words of the oath [notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunica­tion, &c. I will beare true allegiance to his Maiestie, &c.] or to speake more plainly from these words [notwithstanding aiust Excommunication I will not obey it] it cannot bee rightly inferred, that I therefore deny the Popes power to excommunicate. But whosoeuer sweareth in that manner, saith Cardinall Bellarmine, either denyeth the power to excommunicate, or committeth sacriledge. Be it so. But if this se­cond were freely granted him, this neuerthelesse being granted, I cannot in any wise perceiue that to bee true, which hee before did absolutely, and without any disiunction affirme; In this branch of the oath the Popes power to excommunicate hereticall Kings is plainly denied.

19 My second and principall answere was the very same in effect, which his Maiestie before had giuen, to wit, that by swearing the foresayde branch, neither the Popes power to Excommuni­cate is abiured, nor any sacriledge committed. For hee who swea­reth, that notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication to be denounced against the King, he will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, although hee doth sweare, that hee will obey the King being excommunicated, because Excommunication hath not power to depriue Kings of their temporall dominions and Iurisdiction,Apol. nu. 346.as Be­canus with many other learned Diuines, whom I cited in my Apologie, doth affirme, yet he doth not sweare, that hee will not obey a iust Ex­communication, [Page 9] as Cardinall Bellarmine doth ill conclude. For albeit he beleeueth, that the Pope hath authoritie to excommunicate hereti­call Kings, yet hee doth not beleeue, that Excommunication, being a spirituall Censure, worketh this temporall effect, to depriue hereticall Kings of their Royall authoritie, to make Kings no Kings, or to take away from subiects their naturall and ciuill obedience, which by the law of God, according to Cardinall Bellarmines owne doctrine,In tract. con­tra Barcl. cap. 21. pag. 202.is due to all Kings, although they be heretikes, so long as they remaine Kings.

20 Nowe Fa. Lessius argued in this maner. You will say, saith he that the power to excommunicate is not here denyed, but onely a certaine effect of Excommunication, which is, that notwithstanding a Prince be ex­communicated, yet shall not the subiects be released from the bond of their al­legiance. But this effect doth necessarily follow the sentence of Excommunica­tion, as the practise of the Church for the space of more then twelue hundred yeeres doth shew. To this argument I answered, that by no practise at all of the Church it can be prooued, that the absoluing of subiects from the bond of their alleagiance, which by the law of God is due to all ab­solute Princes, is an effect of Excommunication, but at the most ano­ther punishment, although sometimes imposed together with Excom­munication, as Becanus with many other learned Catholikes doe ac­knowledge: concerning which punishment, whether it may for any crime be imposed by the Popes authoritie vpon absolute Princes, or onely vpon inferiour Princes by the consent of absolute Princes, to whom they are subiect in temporals, it hath euen bene and is also now a controuersie among learned Catholikes, as by the testimonie of those two Authours, whom I cited a little before,Nu. 13.and also of many others cited by me else where,in Apolog. nu. 4 & seq. and in this Treatise, part. 1. per to­tum. Becanus in q. de fide haereti­cis seruanda cap. 8. nu. 16. Becan. in Con­trou. Angl. cap. 3. q. 2. Suarez tom. 5. disp. 15. sec. 6. nu. 3.it doth cleerely appeare.

21 From hence it is very apparant, sayth Becanus, that heretikes by this precisely that they are excommunicated, are not depriued of their domi­nion or iurisdiction either ouer their subiects, or ouer their temporall goods, but this depriuation is a distinct punishment, and inflicted by a distinct law. And againe, It is one thing, sayth he, to excommunicate a King, and ano­ther thing to depose him, or to depriue him of his kingdome, neither is the one necessarily, connected with the other. Many Kings and Emperours haue bene excommunicated, and yet not therefore deposed, and contrariwise many deposed and yet not therefore excommunicated.

22 ‘Excommunication sayth Suarez, can not haue this effect (to take away the dominion of a kingdome, or of a people, and the paying of tributes, and doing seruices which are answearable thereunto) concerning such sub­iects,vnlesse an other thing be first supposed, which is, that the Lords be de­priued of their dominion, or the vse thereof, because the dominion remayning still in it force, it can not be, but that the subiects are bound to obey and con­sequently [Page 10] to communicate at leastwise as much as is necessary to fulfill their obligation, according to the chapter Inter alia desentent. excommun. But Excommunication of it selfe hath not this effect, because as it doth not depriue of the dominion of other temporall things, nor of the vse of them, so it doth not depriue of this dominion, because there is no more reason of that, nei­ther is there any law, wherein this is specially ordained of Excommunication; I say of Excommunication, because this is sometimes ordained in the law con­cerning some excommunicated persons, as heretikes, yet by this speciall ordi­nation we may vnderstand, that Excommunication of it selfe hath not this ef­fect; for when this effect is to follow, it is necessarie, that it be specially expres­sed in the law or sentence. And therefore when this effect is adioyned, I doe not call it an effect of Excommunication, but a peculiar punishment imposed together with Excommunication, as when an heretike is excommunicated, and depriued of the dominion of his goods, this depriuation is not an effect of Ex­communication, but a certaine punishment ioyned together with Excommuni­cation. Thus Suarez.’

23 We haue therefore out of Becanus, and Suarez, that the de­priuing Princes of their dominion, or iurisdiction is not an effect of Excommunication, contrarie to that which Fa. Lessius saide; Wee haue also out of Cardinall Bellarmine, Bellar. in. trac. contra Barcl. cap. 21. Pag. 202. and the same Suarez, that subiects are not released from the bond of their obedience, vnlesse the Prince be depriued of his dominion, or iurisdiction, for that to deny obedience to a Prince, sayth Cardinall Bellarmine, so long as he remaineth Prince, is repugnant to the law of God; and the dominion or iurisdiction of a Prince, sayth Suarez,Suarez in De­fens. fidei Cath. lib. 6. cap. 3. nu. 6.remayning in its force, and not being taken away, it can not be, but that the subiects are bound to obey, because the obligation of obedi­ence, sayth hee, in any degree or state whatsoeuer doth so long endure in the subiect, as the dignity, or power, and iurisdiction doth endure in the Superiour, for these are correlatiues, and the one dependeth vpon the other. So that you see how well these learned Diuines of the Societie of Iesus doe agree amōg themselues in assigning the reason, for which this oath of allegiance doth containe in it a manifest deniall of the Popes power to excommunicate, and of his spirituall Supremacie. And whether En­glish Catholikes for so weake and slender arguments, and wherein our learned Aduersaries doe not agree among themselues, are bound to ha­zard their perpetuall libertie,In Append. part. 2. sect. 4.and whole estate, with the vtter ruine of their posteritie, I remit to the iudgement of the pious and prudent Rea­der. Thus I answered in my Theologicall Disputation, which afterwards in my Appendix to Suarez I did more fully explaine. Now let the Rea­der iudge, whether this my answere to their argument be a vaine brag, and an idle affirmation of my owne, or a solid confutation thereof, and whether I had not reason to affirme, that learned men doe not blush to inculcate so often and secoldly without any solid proofe that very ar­gument, [Page 11] which both by his Maiestie, and many others hath bene very soundly confuted, considering that my Aduersary doth so boldly affirme, that the oath is vnlawfull and repugnant to all lawes humane and diuine, for that it denyeth the Popes power to excommunicate, and yet he bring­eth no argument at all to prooue the same, but it must, forsooth, be sup­posed as certaine, and besides he concealeth what I before at large had answered to the aforesaid argument. And thus much concerning his first answere and exception.

24 Secondly, saith my Aduersary, Nu. 14 touching the declaration of his Maiesties mind in this point; I cannot but meruaile, that such a learned man, as this Authour is held to bee, cannot distinguish betwixt the contents of the oath, and the end or intention of him that ordained it. For I will not deny, but that his Maiestie might intend nothing else by ordaining this oath, but to exact of his subiects a profession of their obedience vnto him, and yet neuerthelesse hee that should take the oath should thereby abiure the Popes Supremacie (for the reasons before declared) notwithstanding his Maie­sties protestation of his intention. This will be euident, See these rea­sons beneath, nu 33. & seq. if we turne the case to a like oath of the Popes part, as for example; if the Pope should exact an oath of Catholikes to sweare, that the King cannot depriue a lawfull Bi­shop of Canterbury, and should withall protest, that he meaneth not thereby to make them abiure, or deny the Kings authoritie, but only to professe their dutie and obedience to the Sea Apostolike, I make no doubt, but that the Protestants would say according to their grounds, that this protestation and declaration of the Popes mind, could not excuse the takers of such an oath from the deniall of the Kings Royall authoritie, because his Ecclesiasticall Supremacie is (according to the Protestants opinion) so necessarily included in his Regall, or Kingly power, that whosoeuer denieth the one, doth conse­quently deny the other. In which respect, I say, the Popes protestation of his meaning, or intention could not in the Protestants opinion, warrant the swearers from periurie.

25 And so say we in this case of his Maiesties publike profession, and declaration of his intention, that it cannot alter the nature of the oath, or de­rogate any thing from the contents thereof, or from the Popes Supremacie, or from his Maiesties beleefe concerning the same, and much lesse can it make any thing in the oath lawfull, which is otherwaies vnlawfull: and therefore I say, that seeing the Popes power to depose Princes, is necessarily included (according to our doctrine and beliefe) in the Popes Ecclesiasticall Supre­macie, that the takers of the new oath cannot be excused from the deniall of the Popes supreame authoritie, nor consequently from periurie, notwith­standing any protestation of his Maiestie to the contrary: for if he should pro­test, that he doth not force the takers of the oath to abiure the Popes Suprea­macie, it were Protestatio contraria factis, a protestation contrary to his deeds, which the Lawyers hold to be nothing worth.

[Page 12]26 But first my Aduersarie could not but cleerely see, howso­euer here he is pleased to babble, that I, who as he scoffingly saith, am held to be so learned a man, not only could distinguish, it being no such difficult point of wit, or learning, but also did oftentimes in my Apo­logie, Apologeticall answere, Theologicall Disputation, and in my Appen­dix to Suarez in expresse wordes distinguish betwixt the ende of the worke and of the worker, of the Art, and Artificer, of the law and pre­cepts therein contained, and of the Lawmaker: and shewed, that when the words of any law are ambiguous, they are to be vnderstood accor­ding to the intention and meaning of the Lawmaker, and that neither the intention of his Maiestie was to deny in this oath the Popes power to excommunicate, or any other his spirituall authoritie, but onely to require of his Catholike subiects a profession of that temporall and ciuill obe­dience, which all subiects by the law of God and nature do owe to their lawfull Prince, neither in the oath is contained any clause, which by learned Catholikes is not thought to belong to temporall, & ciuill obedience.

27 Wherefore there is a great disparitie betwixt the oath, which the Pope should exact concerning his Maiesties power not to depriue a lawfull Bishop of Canterburie, and this new oath of allegiance concer­ning the Popes authoritie not to depose his Maiesties: because that Ec­clesiasticall Supremacie, which his Maiestie doth challenge, is, accor­ding to the opinion of all Protestants, necessarily included in his Re­gall or Kingly power, insomuch that whosoeuer denieth the one, doth consequently, in the opinion of all Protestants, deny the other: but the Popes authoritie to depose Princes is not, according to the opinion of all Catholikes, necessarily included in the Popes spirituall Supre­macie, for that many learned Catholikes doe hold, that the Pope hath no such power to depose Princes, and therefore hee that denieth his power to depose, doth not consequently, according to the opinion of all Catholikes, deny his spirituall Supremacie. And albeit M^r. Fitzher­bert doeth boldly affirme, that, according to his beliefe, the Popes power to depose Princes is necessarily included in the Popes Ecclesiasti­call Supremacie, yet I will be bold to say, that his beliefe herein is not Catholike, or Vniuersall, but a particular beliefe or rather an opinion of his owne and of some other Catholikes, the contrarie doctrine being, as I said, euen to this day maintained by many learned and vertuous Catholikes. And therefore vntill he bring some better ground for his beliefe, then his bare I say, I will also be bold to say, that the takers of the new oath are according to the doctrine of learned Catholikes excu­sed from the deniall of the Popes supreame authoritie, seeing that, accor­ding to the opinion of many learned Catholikes, the Pope hath no such power to depose, and so neither is his Maiesties protestation repugnant to his deeds, nor his intention disagreeable to the contents of the oath.

[Page 13]28. Secondly, although my Aduersary to prooue the oath vnlaw­full, and to containe a deniall of the Popes Supremacy, doth seeme now to fly from his Maiesties intention to the contents of the oath, and ex­presly saith, That he will not deny, but that his Maiestie by ordaining this oath, might intend nothing else but to exact of his subiects a profession of their obedience, and temporall allegiance, and not of his Ecclesiasticall Suprema­cie; neuerthelesse he seemeth before to affirme, that his Maiesties inten­tion, opinion, and vnderstanding is, that the Popes spirituall authoritie is abiured in this oath, and his Ecclesiasticall Supremacie is acknow­ledged therein, which the iudicious Reader may plainely gather both by those wordes in his Supplement before related, wherein hee auou­chethSee his words be­neath, Nu. seq. 29. That it is euident enough that the true reason why the Popes autho­ritie to excommunicate and depose a temporall Prince is impugned by the oath, is no other, but because the Kings Maiestie is helde (both by himselfe and other Protestants) to be no way subiect to the Pope, yea and to be him­selfe supreme head of the Church of God in England, and also by the first of these two reasons, which he bringeth heere in his Reply, why he suppo­posed, that the oath implieth a deniall of the Popes Supremacy.

29 And as for my supposition, saith he,Nu. 10. that the Oath implieth the de­niall of the Popes Supremacy (he should haue said of the Popes autho­ritie to excommunicate and depose a temporall Prince, for this was his supposition, as I cleerely shewed before) Thou shalt vnderstand, good Reader, that I was mooued thereto by two reasons, which are manifest e­nough in the very place, which Widdrington citeth: The one was, because it is euident, that the faith and beliefe of all English Protestants is, that the Kings Maiestie is no way subiect to the Pope, but that hee is himselfe su­preame head of the Church of God, in England. Whereupon it may with great reason bee inferred, that the deniall of the Popes power to depose his Maiestie, which is expresly contained in the oath, is supposed and implied therein, as a necessary consequent of their beliefe, who ordained it.

30 For it is great reason to interprete all assertions, positions, lawes, or decrees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine and be­liefe of the Authors thereof, for it is to bee presumed, that euerie one spea­keth, writeth, and decreeth, according to the grounds and principles of his beliefe and Religion, as euery Artisan worketh according to the grounds and principles of his Art. And therefore, as the positions, assertions, and decrees of knowne and professed Catholikes are to bee interpreted according to the grounds of the Catholike faith, so also the positions of all Sectaries whatsoe­uer are to be vnderstood according to the different doctrines of their Sects: In so much, that if a Catholike and a Protestant should affirme both of them one thing (which might be controuersed in respect of Religion) the sense and meaning of either of them is to be interpreted according to their different Re­ligions, and their different grounds, and sense thereof. And vpon this conside­ration [Page 14] I made no doubt to affirme, that the new oath, denying the Popes power to depose his Maiestie implieth the deniall of the Popes Supremacie; for that not onely his Maiestie, but also all they of the Parliament which de­creed it, doe holde and beleeue, that the Pope can not depose his Maiestie, because hee hath no authoritie at all in England, and especially ouer his Maiestie.

31 My other reason was the same that I touched before, concerning the necessary deduction of the Popes power to depose Princes from his Ecclesiasti­call Supremacy: for albeit the Supremacy of the Pope be not expresly abiu­red, or denied by this oath, yet it is denied couertly by a necessary consequent, because his authoritie to depose Princes (which is necessarily deduced from the supreame power that Christ gaue him) is denied thereby: as in like case, if wee should deny that his Maiestie hath any lawfull power to suspend, or de­priue the Arch-bishop of Canterburie, all Protestants would say, that we deny not onely his Ecclesiasticall Supremacy, but also his temporall and Kingly authoritie, because the power to suspend and depriue Bishops within his Realme, is included therein, and necessarily deduced from it in the opinion of all Protestants. And in like manner we say with much more reason, that who­soeuer abiureth the Popes power to depose Princes, hee doth consequently ab­iure his spirituall authoritie, because the former is included in the later, and doth necessarily follow of it, as it hath beene amply prooued by diuers, and namely by me in my Supplement, Chap. 5.6 & 7 whereof I shall haue further occasion to lay downe the particulars heereafter. Thus M^r. Fitzherbert.

32 But first of all, good Reader, I wish thee to consider, how cunningly this my Aduersary concealeth the first part of his supposi­tion concerning the denyall of the Popes power to excommunicate, whereof onely I vnderstood those words whereon hee groundeth his third accusation. In the beginning of his Discourse he supposed, as you haue seene, that the Popes spirituall Supremacie is denyed in this oath, for that his power to excommunicate and depose Princes is denyed therein. And because his Maiesty had in expresse words publikely af­firmed, that his intention was not to denie in this oath the Popes power to excommunicate, answering also the argument, which Cardinall Bel­larmine out of those words of the oath (notwithstanding any sentence of Excommunication &c.) brought to prooue the contrarie: and because my Aduersarie did also without any proofe at all, suppose, as Fa. Gretzer had done before him, that the Popes power to excommunicate, and consequently his spirituall Supremacie is denyed therein, for this cause I vsed those words, that truely it is a wonder, that learned men doe not blush &c. which my Aduersary a little before carped at. Now, forsooth, he pretending to yeeld a reason of his supposition, yet yeeldeth none at all concerning this parte thereof touching the Popes power to ex­communicate, for which onely I vsed the aforesaid words, and which [Page 15] if he could sufficiently prooue to be denyed in this oath, all Catho­likes would forthwith graunt him, that the oath containeth a denyall of the Popes spirituall Supremacie, which includeth as a generall the particular authoritie to inflict spirituall Censures, but he cunningly passeth ouer to the Popes power to depose Princes, which no man doubteth, but is denyed in this oath, & yeeldeth two reasons, such ones as they be, why he supposed the oath to containe a denyall of the Popes Supremacy, for that the Popes power to depose Princes is denied therein.

33 His second reason (for thereof I will speake in the first place) which he tooke from the contents of the oath, is the same, which hee touched before concerning the necessarie deduction, according to his beliefe and doctrine, of the Popes power to depose Princes from his Ec­clesiasticall Supremacie: But his beliefe and doctrine herein, as also I touched before, is not Catholike, but a particular beliefe, or rather opinion of himselfe and some other, and not generall of all Catho­likes, for that many learned Catholikes, as I shewed before, are of opi­nion, that Christ hath not giuen to S. Peter or to the Church, authoritie to depose Princes, or to inflict temporall punishments, as death, exile, priuation of goods, or imprisonment, but onely Ecclesiasticall or spi­rituall Censures. And therefore there is a great disparitie in the simi­litude, which my Aduersarie bringeth betwixt his Maiesties authoritie to suspend, or depriue the Arch-bishop of Canterburie in the opinion of Protestants, and the Popes power to depose Princes in the opinion of Catholikes, for that al Protestants do beleeue, that his Maiesties power to suspend or depriue an Arch-bishop (taking suspension in that sense, wherein the Protestants doe hold, that his Maiestie hath power to sus­pend and depriue) is necessarily included in his Regall authoritie, but all Catholikes doe not beleeue, (whatsoeuer my Aduersary and some few others doe) that the power to depose Princes is necessarily inclu­ded in that spirituall Supremacie, which Christ hath giuen to S. Peter and his Successours, as hath bene amply prooued by me and diuers o­thers, and what particulars M^r. Fitzherbert hath laide here, or in his Supplement concerning this point, we will beneath in their due places examine.

34 His first reason he deduced from the grounds and principles of the Protestants Religion, and from the doctrine and beliefe of his Maiesty, and those of the Parliament, who made the oath. But how silly and insufficient this reason is, yea and repugnant to his owne grounds, and also of Fa. Parsons, in whose defence hee wrote his Supplement, any man of iudgement may quickly perceiue. For behold his reason: It is great reason, sayth he, to interprete all assertions, positions, lawes or de­crees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine, and beliefe of the Authours thereof, for it is to be presumed, that euery one speaketh [...] [Page 16] and decreeth according to the grounds and principles of his beliefe and Religion, but it is an assertion, position, and the beliefe, not onely of his Ma­iestie, but also of the Parliament, which decreed the oath, that the Pope cannot depose his Maiestie, because he hath no authoritie at all in England, and especially, ouer his Maiestie, therefore it is great reason to affirme, that the new oath denying the Popes power to depose his Maiestie, implieth a deniall of the Popes Supremacie.

35 But first his Minor proposition is very vntrue: For neither his Maiestie, nor the Protestants doe hold, that the Pope can not depose his Maiestie, because he hath no authoritie at all in England, and espe­cially ouer his Maiestie. This indeed is the reason, why they hold, that the Pope cannot excommunicate his Maiestie, because he hath no autho­ritie at all in England, and especially ouer his Maiestie. But the reason, why they hold that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose his Maiesty, is, for that deposition, being not an Ecclesiasticall or spirituall, but a ciuill and temporall censure or punishment, for what crime soeuer it be imposed, can not be inflicted by any Ecclesiasticall or spirituall autho­ritie. For which reason the Protestants doe holde, that although the Protestant Bishops of this Realme haue Ecclesiasticall and Episcopall authoritie herein England, yet they haue no authoritie by vertue of their Episcopall power to depose or depriue his Maiestie of his tempo­rall dominions, for that they take deposition, or any such temporall violence, as his Maiestie affirmeth,In his Pre­monition. pag. 9. to be farre without the limits of such a spirituall Censure, as Excommunication is.

36 And although this be sufficient to shew the insufficiencie of this my Aduersaries reason, yet graunting him onely for Disputation sake, which he in his Minor proposition vntruely affirmeth, that his Maiestie, and the Parliament should hold, that the Pope can not depose his Maiestie, because he hath no authoritie at all in England, his reason neuerthelesse is both insufficient, and also repugnant to that, which Fa. Parsons, and he himselfe suppose to be true. For albeit Fa. Parsons doth confidently affirme,In his booke intituled, The iudgement of a Catholike English man &c. part. 1. nu. 22. pag. 13. and 16. that there is no man who sticketh or maketh difficul­tie to acknowledge our Soueraigne to be true King, and rightfull Lord ouer all his Dominions, for that euery English Catholike will sweare and acknow­ledge most willingly all those parts and clauses of the oath, that doe any way appertaine to the ciuill and temporall obedience due to his Maiestie, whom hee acknowledgeth to be his true and lawfull King, and Soueraigne ouer all his Dominions, and the same in effect doth my Aduersarie in his suppo­sition affirme, as you haue seene before,Nu. 6. yet, according to this his rea­son, neither he, nor any other Catholike can acknowledge King Iames to be our true and lawfull Soueraigne, nor can promise to yeeld him all temporall alleagiance, nor to defend him from all treasons, and trai­terous conspiracies, nor to disclose them, when they shal come to their [Page 17] knowledge, when any such acknowledgement shall be demanded at their hands by the Protestant Magistrate: for that in the opinion of all Protestants, the Ecclesiastical Supremacy of his Maiesty, as my Ad­uersary himselfe confesseth, is included, and necessarily deduced from his temporall and Kingly authoritie: and all reconcilements to the Pope, and all returnings of Priests into this land made by the Popes authoritie, are by the lawes of this Realme made treasons, and traite­rous conspiracies.

37 Seeing therefore, to vse my Aduersaries wordes, It is great reason to interprete all assertions, positions, lawes or decrees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine, and beliefe of the Authors thereof, for it is to bee presumed, that euery one speaketh, writeth, and de­creeth according to the principles and grounds of his beliefe and Religion, it is cleere, that if my Aduersaries argument be good, neither he, nor any other Catholike can acknowledge King Iames to be their true and law­full Soueraigne, and that they will yeeld him all temporall allegiance, and defend him from all treasons, and disclose them when they shall come to their knowledge, for that, in the opinion of all Protestants, his Ecclesiasticall Supremacy, as my Aduersary himselfe confesseth, is included in his Regall and Kingly authoritie, and according to the lawes of this Realme all reconcilements to the Pope, and all returnings of Priests into this land, made by the Popes authority, are treasons and traiterous conspiracies. So that you see what contradiction there is in my Aduersaries sayings, and what a prettie argument hee hath made to prooue himselfe a traytour, seeing that according to his owne grounds, hee can not acknowledge King Iames to be his true and lawfull Soue­raigne, nor promise to yeeld him all temporall allegiance, if it should be exacted by the Protestant Magistrate, for that in the opinion of all Protestants his Maiesties spirituall Supremacy is included in his Re­gall and Kingly authoritie.

38 But secondly, if M^r. Fitzherbert had beene pleased out of the desire of truth to handle this question betweene him and mee sincere­ly, and not with a flourish of words to obscure the difficulty, and blind the vnderstanding of simple and scrupulous Catholikes, he might ey­ther out of his owne iudgement, or at lest wise from of that, which I in my Theologicall Disputation did answere to the arguments of Gret­zer, Disputatio Theol. c. 2. sect. 1 who thought it vnlawfull to acknowledge King Iames to bee our Soueraigne Lord in temporals, and of Capellus, Ibid. c. 6. sect. 5. who also thought it vnlawfull for any Catholike to promise, that he will disclose all trea­sons and traiterous conspiracies for the reasons aforesaide, and also from that, which out of the doctrine of Suarez, Ibid. c. 1. I declared in what manner wee ought to interprete the wordes of any law, hee might, I say, haue quickely perceiued the weakenesse of his reason, and in what [Page 18] sense his Maior proposition, and the proofe, which he bringeth there­of to make it true are to be vnderstood.

39 For to repeate againe his wordes, It is indeede great reason to interprete all assertions, positions, lawes, and decrees (especially such as touch Religion) according to the doctrine and beliefe of the Authors thereof, whensoeuer the wordes are doubtfull, and vnlesse the Author doe in expresse wordes declare his meaning to be the contrary. For it is to bee presumed, that euery one, vnlesse he declare the contrary, doth common­ly speake, write, and decree according to the grounds and principles of his be­liefe and Religion, as euery Artisan doth vsually worke according to the grounds and principles of his Art, vnlesse hee will take vpon him to doe some worke belonging to another Art; as if a Physitian will take vpon him to measure land, then hee must worke according to the grounds of Geometrie, and not of Physicke: And if a Protestant will speake, write, or decree like a Catholike, and vpon Catholike grounds, hee must obserue the principles of Catholike Religion, and likewise a Ca­tholike, if he will speake, write, or decree like a Protestant, and vpon Protestant grounds, must obserue the principles of the Protestant Religion. And therefore, as the positions, assertions, and decrees of knowen, and professed Catholikes, are to be interpreted according to the grounds of the Catholike faith, vnlesse they declare to haue a contrary meaning; so al­so the positions of all Sectaries are to be vnderstood according to the different doctrines of their Sects, vnlesse they declare their meaning to bee other­wise: in so much that if a Catholike, and a Protestant should affirme both of them one thing, which might be controuersed in respect of Religion, the sense and meaning of either of them is to bee interpreted according to their diffe­rent Religions, vnlesse they declare the contrary. And in this sense my Aduersaries Maior proposition is true, otherwise it is false; for doubt­full, and ambiguous wordes are euer to bee vnderstood according to the declaration of the speaker, and the wordes of euery law, whensoe­uer they are doubtfull, are to bee taken in that sense, which the Law­maker shall declare his meaning to be.

40 Now his Maiestie, who with the Parliament deuised this new oath, not for the Protestants, but to make a triall how his Catholike sub­iects stand affected towards him in point of their loyaltie and due obedience, hath oftentimes, as my Aduersary could not but see in my Theologicall Disputation, publikely declared his meaning,In an Act of Parliament anno septimo ca. 6. and in his Premonition pag. 9. and in his Apologie pag. 2. nu. 2. & pag. 246. and that hee intended in this oath to exact of his Catholike subiects nothing else, then the profession of that temporall allegiance and ciuill obedience, which all subiects (what religi­on soeuer they professe) by the law of God doe owe to their lawfull Prince, with a promise to disclose all contrary vnciuill violence, and to make a di­stinction, not betwixt Catholikes and Protestants, but betwixt ciuilly obedient Catholikes, and such Catholikes, as are the disciples of the Powder-treason: [Page 19] And therefore his Maiestie caused the lower house of Parliament to re­forme that clause, which contained the deniall of the Popes power to ex­communicate him. So carefull was hee that nothing should bee contained in this Oath, except the profession of naturall allegiance, and ciuill and temporall obedience. Hee saide [in this oath] for as the oath of Supre­macie, saith his Maiestie, was deuised for putting a difference betweene Papists, and them of our profession, so was this oath ordained for making a difference betweene the ciuilly obedient Papists, and the peruerse disciples of the Powder-Treason. And againe, This oath, saith his Maiestie, was ordained only for making of a true distinction betweene Papists of quiet dis­position, and in all other things good Subiects and such other Papists, as in their hearts maintained the like violent bloodie maximes, that the Powder-Traitors did. The same also but in more ample wordes affirmeth his Maiestie in his Apologie for the oath.

41 Seeing therefore that his Maiestie hath so often, and so pub­likely declared, that he intended by this oath nothing else, but to make a true distinction, not betwixt Catholikes and Protestants, but betwixt Catholikes and Catholikes, and to vrge them only to make a profession of that naturall and ciuill obedience, which all Subiects, of what Re­ligion soeuer they bee, doe by the law of God owe to their lawfull Prince, there is no reason to draw an argument from his Maiesties intention or beliefe, and from the grounds and principles of the Pro­testants Religion, but only from the contents of the oath it selfe, to proue it to be vnlawfull, and to containe in it any thing which is re­pugnant to Catholike faith and Religion. And that this is a probable answere, and not a vaine bragge, and idle affirmation of my owne, it is so euident, that I dare aduenture to remit it to the iudgement of my Aduersarie himselfe, albeit he sticketh not at this time to affirme, that I haue neither answered probably, nor like a good Catholike.

42 Concerning which last accusation hee writeth thus:Nu. 17. Now then to conclude this point, whereas Widdrington saith, as you haue heard, that it is meruaile, that learned men blush not to affirme the Kings minde to be that, which his Maiestie hath declared to be no part of his meaning, I may well say, that it is a farre greater wonder, that hee professing to be a Catho­like, and knowing and confessing as he doeth in his Epistle Dedicatorie, In Principio. and after in his Theologicall Disputation,Cap 10 sec. 2. nu. 1. & 2. that his Holinesse in two Breues hath declared his mind concerning this oath, palam & ex professo, openly and expresly (to wit, that it containeth many things which are manifestly re­pugnant to the Catholike faith and saluation of soules) it is, I say, an ex­treame wonder that he blusheth not extreamely to defend the said oath cōtra­ry to the expresse & strickt cōmandement of his spiritual Pastour, whose voi [...]e he is bound to heare and obey if he bee a sheepe of Christs fold, and child of the Catholike Church. And therefore I conclude, that hee sheweth him­selfe [Page 20] not only impudent, but also impious in preferring the declaration of a tem­porall Prince (which neuerthelesse being well weighed, doeth nothing helpe his cause, or preiudice ours) before an Apostolicall decree of S. Peters Suc­cessour, whose obedient child hee professeth and ought to be, wherein he shew­eth sufficiently how good a Catholike he is, and whom he holdeth for his Su­preame head in Ecclesiasticall causes, as also what probabilitie we may expect of him hereafter for the confirmation of the rest of his assertions, seeing that wee haue found him at the very first so fraudulent, friuolous, and contrarie to his owne profession, as you haue heard in this Chapter. Thus you see with what bitternesse M^r. Fitzherbert concludeth his first Chapter.

43 But if hee had beene pleased to haue dealt vprightly, and as hee hath in a most spitefull manner vrged against me this obiection, which is taken from his Holinesse Breues, so also he had set downe the answere which in the tenth Chapter of my Theologicall Disputation I gaue thereunto, the Reader would presently haue perceiued, that my Aduersarie hath passed the bounds of Christian charitie and iustice in wrongfully accusing me of impudencie, impietie, and disobedience to the Apostolicall decree of S. Peters Successour, whose obedient child I did there, and also I doe heere professe my selfe to be, and am readie to obey in all those things, wherein, according to the grounds of Ca­tholike Religion, hee hath authoritie to command: Neither can my Aduersarie without blushing affirme, either that the Popes Holi­nesse, albeit hee bee Saint Peters Successour, cannot erre in his par­ticular commands and decrees, which are not propounded to the whole Church, but to particular Churches or Kingdomes, or that any Catholike is bound to obey him in those things, wherein, according to the doctrine of learned and vertuous Catholikes, hee hath no au­thoritie to command.

44 First therefore I shewed in that place out of the doctrine of Fa. Suarez, that there are two sorts of humane precepts, as well Ec­clesiasticall, as Ciuill. The one is called a constitutiue precept, which of it selfe maketh that thing, which it forbiddeth to bee vnlawfull, which otherwise if that precept were not, would not bee vnlawfull: as the eating of flesh in Lent, and the doing of seruile workes vpon Sundaies, and Holidayes, which if they were not forbidden by hu­mane lawes, would not be vnlawfull. And although a constitutiue pre­cept of humane power may sometimes binde with danger of some great temporall losse, as of goods, libertie, yea also of life, yet the Ec­clesiasticall law, setting aside scandall and contempt, which are forbid­den by the law of God, and nature, doe seldome or neuer binde with very great temporall harme: and therefore wee are not bound to ab­staine from flesh in Lent, or from doing seruile workes vpon Sun­daies [Page 21] and holidaies, when we are like to incurre thereby any probable danger of some great temporall hurt.

45 The other is called a declaratiue precept, which doth not of it selfe make, but suppose and declare the thing, which it forbiddeth to be vnlawfull, as being before prohibited by some other former law, as theft, murder, drunkennesse and such like, which are otherwise forbid­den by the law of God and nature. And this kind of precept, as well obserueth Suarex, dependeth onely vpon the reason, for which the act is commanded, or forbidden, or, which is all one, vpon the prece­dent law, from whence all the obligation of the declaratiue precept doth proceed. Insomuch that if the reason be not true, and that there is no such precedent law, or obligation, as the declaratiue precept affir­meth to be, the declaratiue precept hath no force to binde at all: and with the same certaintie, or probabilitie we are bound, or not bound to obey a declaratiue precept, as it is certaine or probable, that there is, or is not any other former bond and obligation.

46 As for example, his Holinesse doth by his Breues forbidde all English Catholikes to take the new oath of allegiance, for that therein are contained many things, which are cleerely repugnant to faith and saluation. If therefore it be certaine, or probable, that nothing is con­tained in this oath which is repugnant to faith, or saluation, it is also certaine or probable, that this declaratiue precept of his Holinesse, which is grounded vpon this reason, that something is contained therein contrary to faith and saluation, is, according to the doctrine of Suarez, of no force to bind, neither are English Catholikes by vertue of this declaratiue prohibition bound to refuse the said oath.

47 Secondly, I also shewed in that place, that this declaratiue com­mand of his Holinesse forbidding Catholikes to take the oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and saluation, is such a declaratiue precept, which is not grounded vpon any infallible reason, or definition of the Church, but onely vpon his opinatiue iudgement, that his reason is true, and that either his power to excommunicate, and consequently his spirituall Supremacie is denyed in this oath, which is very vntrue, or that his power to depose Princes, which is denyed in the oath, is a cleere point of faith, and necessarily included in his spiri­tuall Supremacie, and consequently the denyall thereof is plainly re­pugnant to Catholike faith. Which being so, it is manifest, that wee are no further bound to obey this declaratiue prohibition of his Holi­nesse, then we are bound to follow his opinion, and to belieue, that ey­ther his power to excommunicate, or some such like is denyed in the oath, or that whosoeuer denyeth his power to depose Princes, denyeth the Catholike faith.

48 Whereupon I concluded, that considering neither his power [Page 22] to excommunicate, or any such like is denyed in this oath, as I haue prooued at large against Card. Bellarmine, and others, nor that his pow­er to depose Princes, which is expressely denyed in the oath, is certaine and of faith, the contrary doctrine being probable and also maintained by many learned Catholikes, as partly also I haue already prooued by the testimonie of learned Catholikes before alledged, and heere beneath by answering all my Aduersaries obiections I will make it more manifest,Part. 1. per. t [...] ­tum. there can bee made no doubt, but that any En­glish Catholike may with a safe conscience, or without any crime of disobedience to his supreme spirituall Pastour, or any preiudice to Catholike faith, refuse to obey his Holinesse declaratiue command which is onely grounded vpon such an opinion, which, considering the contrary is probable, and defended by many learned Catholikes, may without any note of impudencie, impiety or disobedience be re­iected by Catholikes.

49 Thirdly, I also affirmed in that place, that no Catholike doth onely for this cause take the oath, or thinke it to be lawfull, because the Kings Maiestie, being of a contrarie Religion doth command it, or thinke it to be lawfull, as though those Catholikes, who take the oath, doe it onely vpon the Kings bare word affirming the oath to be law­full, and seeme thereby to preferre the opinion of a Protestant Prince in things, which in some sort doe belong to Religion, before the opi­nion of our supreme spirituall Pastour, but because the Kings Maiestie being our lawfull Prince, and Soueraigne Lord in temporals, what re­ligion soeuer hee professeth, hath established an oath of allegiance to make a triall how his Catholike subiects stand affected towards him in point of their loyaltie and due obedience, and commanded all Ca­tholikes to take the same, which oath learned Catholikes for probable reasons doe thinke to be truely in oath of temporall allegiance, and to containe nothing which is repugnant to faith and saluation, therefore English Catholikes to obey the iust command of their Prince doe take the oath, and thinke it to be lawfull, both for that they hauing duely examined all the clauses of the oath, doe find nothing therein contra­rie to faith and saluation, and also for that many learned Catholikes, whose opinion they may lawfully follow, albeit other Diuines with the Popes Holinesse doe thinke otherwise, doe constantly maintaine the same.

50 Neither doe I giue more credite to his Maiestie, then to his Holinesse, but both of them with all dutifull respect I doe honour, and also beleeue in those things, which they of their certaine knowledge doe affirme to be true: And therefore, as I beleeue his Maiesties Royall word affirming, that his intention was not by this new oath of allegi­ance to deny the Popes power to excommunicate; so also I beleeue, that [Page 23] first Breue of his Holinesse was not surreptitious and written without his knowledge or priuitie, for that in his second Breue he doth auerre as much. But as for the first Breue, wherein English Catholikes are com­manded not to take the oath, for that it containeth many things flat contrary to faith and saluation, it being, as I saide, onely a declaratiue precept, and grounded vpon a fallible, and in my iudgement, a very false opinion, that either the Popes power to excommunicate is denied in the oath, or that it is a point of faith, that the Pope hath power so depose Princes, it is euident, according to Suarez doctrine, that no Ca­tholike is bound to obey this his declaratiue precept, vnlesse hee be also bound either to beleeue, that the Popes power to excommunicate is de­nied in the oath, which is apparently vntrue, or to follow his opinion concerning the certainety of his power to depose, which being in con­trouersie among Schoolemen, and learned Doctours, and as yet not decided by the Iudge, as no man is bound according to the com­mon doctrine of Vasquez, and many others, to follow it, so also no man is bound, according to the approued doctrine of Suarez, to obey his declaratiue precept, which is grounded thereon.

51 Lastly, I obserued in that place, that if his Maiestie should by Act of Parliament commaund all his Catholike subiects to acknow­ledge by oath, that the Pope is not by the institution of Christ the di­rect temporall Lord of this Kingdome, or of any other, and that hee hath no direct power to depose his Maiestie, and that they will beare faith and true allegiance onely to his Maiestie, as to their direct Lord, and Soueraigne, &c. and his Holinesse following the Canonists opini­on who hold it hereticall to affirme, that the Pope hath not direct do­minion ouer the whole Christian world, should by his Apostolicall Breues, forbid all English Catholikes to take such an oath, for that it containeth (as the Canonists imagine) many things contrary to faith and saluation, (as Pope Sixtus the fifth, if any credit may bee giuen to the Iesuites themselues did intend to condenme, if he had liued, Cardi­nall Bellarmine his first tome of controuersies for impugning the Popes direct dominion in temporals) the very same inuectiue, which M^r. Fitzherbert maketh against mee, accusing me of impudencie, impietie, disobedience, and of being no good Catholike, for not obeying the Popes declaratiue precept, which is only grounded vpon such an opi­on, which no Catholike is bound to follow, for that the contrary is maintained by many learned Diuines, hee might also make a­gainst all those Catholikes, who following heerein Cardinall Bellar­mine, and the common doctrine of Diuines, should take that oath, and thinke it to bee lawfull, notwithstanding the Popes declaratiue precept to the contrary. And doubtlesse Cardinall Bellarmine who vehemently impugneth the Canonists opinion, would easily [Page 24] in the like manner as I haue cleered my selfe, defend those Catholikes from all imputation of impudency, impietie, disobedience, or any o­ther crime, notwithstanding the Popes declaratiue precept to the contrarie.

52 Thus did I answere to this obiection taken from his Holinesse Breues, but more amply in my Theologicall Disputation, shewing also by sundry examples, that diuers Popes haue in their Apostolicall Breues, or decretall letters registred in the Canon law, maintained false opinions, and which now are flat hereticall, and that therefore their opinions, and consequently their declaratiue precepts grounded thereon, are not alwaies to bee followed by Catholikes, and withal, that many learned Diuines haue impugned diuers decrees of Popes concerning the licen­ces, which they haue giuen to Priests to minister the Sacrament of Confirmation, and their dispensations in the solemne vow of religious chastitie, and in marriage not consummate, who were not therefore ac­counted impudent, impious, or disobedient children of the Catholike Church, for that such decrees were not grounded vpon any infallible definition, but onely vpon the Popes fallible opinion, which they of set purpose did impugne,Sot. in. 4. dist. 27. q. 1. ar. 4. insomuch that learned Sotus feareth not to confesse, that the Popes, who haue dispensed in marriage not consum­mate, did erre, following therein the Canonists opinion, and which he boldly affirmeth to haue no shew or colour of probabilitie, notwithstan­ding so many practises of sundry Popes who haue dispensed therein.

53 But this my answere my Aduersary doth heere altogether conceale, compelling me for cleering my selfe, to repeate a great part thereof, which if he had beene pleased sincerely to haue set downe, the Reader would presently haue perceiued, that the voyce of our supreme Pastour is not alwaies to be followed, & that it is no great wonder for a sheepe of Christs fold, and childe of the Catholike Church to disobey without blushing, the declaratiue commaund of his supreme Pastour, when it is onely grounded vpon such an opinion, which no Catholike is bound to follow, for that the contrary is maintained by learned and vertuous Catholikes, as is this, which denieth the Popes power to de­pose Princes to be a point of faith, and the contrary improbable, and that the Popes power to excommunicate is impugned in the oath. By which it is euident, how iniuriously M^r. Fitzherbert to disgrace mee with his Reader, hath accused me of the aforesaid ignominious crimes, which rather may be retorted vpon himselfe. And so I will conclude with him this chapter, remitting to the consideration of the iudicious Reader, what probabilitie and sinceritie we may expect of him heere­after for the confirmation of the rest of his Replies and answeres, see­ing that wee haue found him at the very first so fraudulent, friuolous, and repugnant to himselfe, as you haue heard in this Chapter.

1. MY Aduersarie in this Chapter goeth on with the like bitternesse as he did in the former, and as before hee taxed me of fraude, impudencie, impietie, and of being no good Catholike, but how wrongfully you haue alreadie seene, so now he boldly affirmeth, that my arguments, and answeres are partly repugnant to my owne doctrine, and partly malicious, improbable, im­pertinent, foolish and ridiculous, but how vndeseruedly you shall pre­sently perceiue. He tooke vpon him, as you haue seene, to proue in his Supplement, that the oath is vnlawfull, and repugnant to all lawes humane and diuine, in respect of two clauses, to wit, that it doth ex­empt temporall Princes from Excommunication, and deposition by the Pope, and that therefore it was iustly condemned by his Holinesse, and refused by Catholikes, although for this later hee could not bee igno­rant, that where one Catholike hath refused it, a hundred haue taken it. And as for the first clause concerning excommunication hee passeth it ouer altogether with silence, neither doth he bring any one argument, or shew of argument to proue that the Popes power to excommunicate is denied in the oath, for which cause I affirmed in my Admonition to the Reader, that M^r. Fitzherberts supposition, for so much as concerneth the Popes power to excommunicate Princes, and consequently his Pri­macie in spiritualls, which he doth not proue with any one reason to be denied in the oath, but supposeth it as manifest, is very vntrue.

2 But as for the second clause concerning the Popes power to de­pose Princes, which is expresly denied in the oath, he maketh a long Rhetoricall discourse, labouring in vaine to prooue, that according to all lawes humane and diuine the Pope hath power to depose Princes and to dispose of all their temporals. And because the breuitie of that Admonition, which was made after my Theologicall Disputation was in the presse, would not permit to examine in particular all the argu­ments, which he brought to prooue the same, I thought good to [Page 26] answere briefly such arguments, as seemed most plausible, and withall to insinuate a certaine distinction, which I had oftentimes in my for­mer bookes declared more at large, betweene the Popes power to com­mand temporals, and to dispose of temporals, to command or impose temporall penalties, and to inflict temporall penalties, or to punish tem­porally by way of coercion, which distinction doth plainly declare the true state of the question, which he seeketh to obscure, and quite ouer­throweth all his chiefest grounds.

3 Among the rest of his proofes he brought one from this vul­gar rule of the law, Accessorium sequitur principale, The accessorie follow­eth the principall, from whence hee inferred,Cap. 1. Suppl. nu. 67. that seeing not only the bo­dy, but also temporall goods and states are inferiour to the soule, and ordained for the seruice thereof, it must needes follow, that the Church hauing power and authoritie ouer the body for the benefite of the soule, hath also power ouer temporall goods and states, when it is necessarie for the good of the soule, and for the glory of God, for the which our soules, bodies, goods, states, and all things else were created, and ordained, according to that rule of the law, The accessorie followeth the principall.

In Ad. nu. 154 To this inference I answered briefly in this manner. Second­ly, euery learned man may perceiue, how vaine that consequence is, which this Authour deduceth, The accessorie followeth the principall, there­fore the Church hauing power ouer the soule, hath consequently power ouer the body and goods, except it be vnderstood of the power to command corporall things so farre foorth as they serue to spirituall things: For we might also from that principle argue thus: The acces­sorie followeth the principall, therefore he that is Lord of all horses, is Lord of all bridles, The Pope hath power ouer the soule of the Prince, therefore also ouer his life. Let this Authour explicate, what the Lawyers vnderstand by the name of accessorie, and what by the name of principall, in that axiome of theirs, which suffereth many ex­ceptions, and is limited by them diuers wayes, In the meane time wee deny his consequence, [not consequent,] as M^r. Fitzherbert translateth. So that it is manifest, that I did not deny that consequence, if it had beene vnderstood of the power to command temporals in order to spiri­tuall good, but because the words are generall, and so may comprehend both, and M^r. Fitzherbert also meant of both, therefore I did absolutely deny his consequence.

5 Now my Aduersarie will needs haue me forsooth both to contradict my selfe in this answere, and also to ouerthrow my owne arguments. For hauing set downe my answere, hee replyeth thusNu. 2. Wherein I wish it to be noted, first what Widdrington granteth, and after what he denyeth, and I doubt not but it will easily appeare, that he ouerthrow­eth his owne arguments, and contradicteth himselfe. He granteth, as you see, [Page 27] that my consequence is not vaine, if it be vnderstood of a power in the Pope to command corporall things, so farre forth as they are to serue spirituall things, & yet he denyeth my consequence, albeit I doe not thereby suppose in the Pope any other power ouer bodies, and goods, then such as followeth of their subor­dination to the soule, which is in effect the same relation, and limitation that he maketh thereof, to wit, so far forth as corporall & temporall things are to serue spirituall things, as it may euidētly appeare by the discourse, which I make con­cerning the same in my Supplement, from whence he taketh my argument: and therefore I thinke good to repeate here, what I haue said there touching this point, whereby I hope I shall not onely fortifie, and prooue my consequence, which he denyeth, but also explicate fully, what I meane by the name of acces­sorie, and principall, as you see he commanded me to doe; he should rather haue said, as I wished him to doe. Thus M^r. Fitzherbert.

6 And I also wish the Reader to obserue first, what my Aduersa­rie pretendeth to prooue, and after what he prooueth, and I doubt not, but it will easily appeare, that I doe neither ouerthrow my owne argu­ments, nor any way contradict my selfe. He pretendeth to prooue, that the Pope, as Pope, hath power in order to spirituall good to depose temporall Princes, to punish them by depriuing them of their king­domes, and by disposing of all their temporals, and not onely to com­mand or enioyne, but also to inflict temporall punishments, as it appea­reth by the whole scope of his Discourse, both in his Supplement, and also in this Treatise, whereupon a little beneath in this chapterNu. 10. he cal­leth that distinction, which I made betwixt the power to command corporall things, and to punish corporally by way of coercion, a friuo­lous distinction, and afterwarde especially in the sixt chapter,nu. 14. 15. 16. 17. hee laboureth to impugne the same, and to prooue, that if the Pope may command corporall and temporall things, as they serue the spirituall, and are reduced thereto, he may also punish his subiects in their bodies or temporall goods, and dispose of all their temporals for the same respect.

7 And neuerthelesse neither out of holy Scriptures, nor from this rule of the law, the Accessorie followeth the principall, nor from the subiection of temporall things to spirituall, nor by any other argument doth my Aduersarie sufficiently prooue, that the Pope hath power to dispose of temporals, or to punish temporally by way of coercion, which he pretended, and would seeme to his Reader to prooue, but onely that the Pope as Pope hath power in order to spirituall good to command temporall things, and to punish by way of coercion Christian Princes and people with spirituall or Ecclesiasticall Censures. By which it will easily appeare, whether I doe contradict my selfe in my answere, and ouerthrow my owne arguments or no: For I granted, that the consequence was not vaine, if it were vnderstood of a power [Page 28] in the Pope to command corporall things in order to spirituall good, but because he pretended to prooue, that the Pope as Pope, can not onely command or impose, but also dispose of temporals, not onely enioyne tem­porall penalties, but also inflict them, or punish temporally by way of temporall constraint, therefore I did absolutely deny his consequence, or the consequence as it was vnderstood by him.

8 And if it had pleased my Aduersarie, after he saw, that I gran­ted the consequence, if it were vnderstood of the power to command temporall things, as they are to serue spirituall, to haue set downe plainly, what he intended to prooue by that consequence, and whe­ther he meant of the power onely to command temporall things, or also to dispose of temporals, as to dispose is distinguished from to command, the Reader would quickly haue perceiued his fraude, and that I doe neither contradict my selfe, nor ouerthrow my arguments: but to blind the eies of his Reader, he doth neither affirme the one, nor the other in this place, but he vseth, as you haue heard, such generall Words, which may be applyed to both. For whereas to cleere the vnderstanding of his Reader, he should haue declared of what power he meant, for that I granted the consequence, if it were vnderstood of the power to com­mand temporals, but if it were vnderstood of the power to dispose of temporals, in which sense he must needs vnderstood it, if be will speake to purpose, then I denyed his consequence, yet he onely affirmeth, that he doth not thereby suppose in the Pope any other power ouer bodies, or goods, thē such as followeth from the subordination to the soule, which is in effect the same relation and limitation that Widdrington maketh thereof, to wit, so farre forth, as corporall and temporall things are to serue spirituall. But if he had expressed, that according to his doctrine and not mine, from the subordination and relation of the soule to the body, and of temporall things to spirituall, it necessarily followeth, that the Pope hath power not onely to command or impose temporall things, but also to dispose of temporall things, not onely to enioyne temporall penalties, but also to punish temporally by depriuing men of their temporals, the Reader would presently haue perceiued both the weakenesse of his argument, and the sufficiencie of my answere.

9 For it is very apparant, and my Aduersary knoweth it right well, that I alwaies denied, that either from the subordination, subiecti­on, or relation of temporall things to spirituall things, of temporall ends to spirituall ends, of temporall power to spirituall power, of tem­porall Princes to spirituall Pastours, or from any other ground, rule, or principle, it doth necessarily follow, that the Pope as Pope, and by his Pastorall office, hath power to dispose of temporall things, to depose temporall Princes, to inflict temporall punishments, or which is all one, to punish temporally by way of temporall constraint, as by depri­uing [Page 29] any man of his goods, libertie, or life, although I euer graunted, that the Pope as Pope hath power to commaund or impose temporall things, and to enioyne corporall or temporall punishments in order to spirituall good, or, which is all one, so farre foorth as temporall things are to serue spirituall things, that is, are to be vsed to the honor of God, and the good of soules: and to compell, by the inflicting of spirituall censures or punishments, all Christians to obey his iust command. And therefore with good reason, and conformably to my owne doctrine I graunted the consequence, if it were vnderstood of the power to com­mand temporals, and also denied it, if it were vnderstood, as my Aduer­sarie must needes vnderstand it, of the power to dispose of temporals, and to punish temporally by way of temporall constraint. Neither doth my Aduersary by that Discourse, which hee made in his Supple­ment, and now repeateth againe, prooue any other thing, then that the Pope by the ordinary power of his Pastorall office, may command tem­porall things, and enioyne temporall penalties in order to spirituall good: And therefore it had beene needlesse to set downe heere his wordes, but that the Reader shall see that I am not willing to conceale any one of his arguments. Thus therefore he writethNu. 3.:

10 Hauing discoursed in my Supplement,Supplem. c. 1 nu. 65. of the written Law of God deliuered to vs in the New Testament, and prooued thereby, that our Sauiour made Saint Peter the supreame Pastour and Gouernour of his Church, I prooued also the extension of his spirituall power to temporall things thus: The spirituall Pastour, said I, hauing power ouer the soule, must needes haue authoritie ouer the body, and temporall goods or states so farre foorth, at lest, as it shall bee conuenient for the good of the soule, according to the rule of the Law, to wit, hee that hath the greater power hath the lesse: By the which reason the Apostle iustified his dealing with temporall affaires, yea with such as appertained to politicall gouernment, when hee aduised the Co­rinthians to constitute and appoint Iudges among themselues, to decide their controuersies, rather then to haue recourse to the tribunals of Infidels. Ne­scitis, &c. Know you not, saith he, 1. Cor. 6. that we shall iudge Angels, how much more secular things? as who would say, Seeing wee haue the grea­ter and more eminent authoritie, haue wee not also the lesse? if we haue power ouer spirituall things, shall wee not haue power ouer temporall and secular things? Thus argueth the Apostle, and thereupon doubted not to inter­meddle in the temporall and politicall gouernement, which then belonged to the Pagan Emperours.

11 But how weake, and altogether insufficient is this Discourse of his, to prooue the Popes power to depose temporall Princes, to dis­pose of all their temporals, and to punish temporally by way of coerti­on, which is the maine marke, at which my Aduersary aymeth, any man of indifferent vnderstanding and learning may easily perceiue. [Page 30] For first, although it be true, that the spirituall Pastour hath that spiri­tuall power, ouer the soule and body, which for as much as appertai­neth to the power it selfe, and not in regard of all other things, which are requisite, that the power shall haue effect, is sufficient and necessa­rie to the eternall saluation of soules, yet that hee must needes haue euen ouer the soule, and much lesse ouer the body, and temporall goods, and states all that power, which is conuenient for the good of soule, as my Aduersary heere affirmeth, is very vntrue: for this were a too too large extension of the Popes pastorall power ouer the soule and body, and would cleerely prooue, that the Pope should haue power to doe miracles, as the Apostles had, and by miraculous operations to bring actually all Christians to the kingdome of heauen. For no man, as I thinke, can make doubt, but that the Pope to haue all that power, whereby all Christians shall bee actually saued, is very conuenient for the good of soules. Neither will my Aduersarie be euer able to prooue, that it is necessary to the saluation of soules, or to the gouernment of the Church, as it was instituted by Christ to bee a spirituall, and not a tem­porall Common-wealth, to haue power to dispose of temporals, and to depriue temporall Princes of their kingdomes and liues.

12 Secondly, that proposition, he that hath the greater power hath the lesse, which my Aduersary vntruely saith to bee a rule of the Law, for that it is not to bee found among the rules either of the Canon, or Ciuill Law, is very vntrue, if it bee taken in those generall wordes, and without due limitations, which my Aduersary doth not declare, as might be conuinced by infinite examples, whereof some may be seene in the next Chapter, where wee shall treate of this Maxime more at large: and for the present this onely shall suffice, that if it were vniuer­sally true, it would cleerely conuince, that the Pope, who by the insti­tution of Christ hath spirituall power, which is the greater power, should also haue temporall power, which is the lesse, which my Ad­uersarie, as I thinke, will hardly grant, vnlesse hee will now become a Canonist, and affirme, that the Pope as Pope hath both temporall and spirituall power, and is both a temporall and spirituall Prince, which is repugnant to the common doctrine of the Diuines of his owne Societie.

13 True it is, that if the lesse be taken for that, which is contai­ned in the greater either actually and formally, or vertually, he that hath the greater power hath formally, or vertually, also the lesse, as be­cause a hundred crownes is actually contained in a hundred pounds, and foure degrees of heate is actually contained in eight, and heate is vertually contained in light, therefore from those rules of the law, (which rather may bee called rules of naturall reason for that they are grounded vpon the light of nature)De regulis iuris in 6. re­gula 35. & 80. Plus semper continet in se quod est [Page 31] minus, & into to partem non est dubium contineri, The greater doth alwaies containe in it the lesse, and there is no doubt but that a part is contained in the whole, we may rightly inferre, that he, who can giue a hundred pounds, can giue a hundred crownes, and the fire, which can produce eight de­grees of heate, can produce foure, and the Sunne, that hath power to produce light, hath also power to produce heate. But temporall power is neither formally, nor vertually contained in the spirituall power of the Pope, although it be vertually and supereminently, contained in the spi­rituall power of God almightie, in whom all create powers are vertu­ally in an infinite and superexcellent manner contained. That which is obiected, saith Ioannes Parisiensis, he that hath power to doe the greater, Ioan. Paris. de potest. Regia & Papali cap. 17. ad 17. hath power to doe the lesse therefore the Pope, who hath power in spiritualls, hath also power in temporalls, it is true in the greater and lesser which are per se subordained, as because a Bishop hath power to ordaine a Priest, there­fore he hath also power to ordaine a Deacon: but it doeth not hold in those things which are of a diuerse order or kind; as because my father could beget a man, therefore hee can also beget a dogge: or because a Priest can absolue from sinne, therefore hee can also absolue from the debt of money.

14 Thirdly, neither is that true, which my Aduersary affirmeth, that S. Paul by that proposition, he that hath the greater power hath the lesse, did iustifie his dealing with temporall affaires, when hee aduised the Corin­thians to constitute and appoint Iudges amongst themselues to decide their controuersies, rather then to haue recourse to the tribunalls of Infidells, which Iudges S. Chrysostome vpon this place calleth Arbiters, and accorders, or reconcilers. For S. Paul foreseeing, that some might easily obiect, as S. Chrysostome obserueth, that those Corinthians, who were new­ly become Christians, were for the most part rude, ignorant, and vn­noble, and therefore might seeme to bee men vnfit and vnworthie to intermeddle in secular controuersies, therefore to preuent this obiecti­on, he vseth an argument which the Logicians call a maiori ad minus, from the greater to the lesse, which argument is not grounded in that maxime, he that hath the greater power hath the lesse, but in this, hee that is worthie to haue the greater power, is not vnworthie to haue the lesse. To preuent therefore that obiection S. Paul argueth in this maner: Know you not that the Saints shall iudge of the world? and if the world shall bee iudged by you, are you vnworthie to iudge (especially as Arbitratours) of the least things? Know you not that wee shall iudge Angels, how much more secular things?

15 This therefore is the force of the Apostles argument, as Benedictus Iustinianus a learned Iesuite vpon this place doeth well de­clare. The Apostle, saith he, argueth a maiori from the greater: Be [...]ed. Iustin: in 1. Cor. 6. For if the Saints are accounted worthie to be appointed Iudges of the whole world, [Page 32] who can thinke them vnworthie to bee ouer the meanest and least iudge­ments? If to your iudgement the world shall be subiect, are you to bee ac­counted vnworthie to decide and compose the least controuersies and strifes of your brethren? If we shall iudge the Angels (these bee the wordes of Photius related by Iustinian) how much more shall wee bee fit to compose the strifes and controuersies which arise concerning things necessarie to mans life? whereupon the Apostles argument doth well conclude saith Iustinian, that those who are appointed Iudges of the world, cannot bee accounted vn­worthie to haue charge of humane iudgements, if they bee appointed by them who haue this authoritie, or who may by right subiect themselues to their iudgements, as those, who are in suite may to Arbitratours. Nei­ther is this repugnant, saith Iustinian, to the publike authoritie of Iudges and Magistrates, for no man is compelled to goe to the Magistrate, if by other waies he may peaceably maintaine his owne right.

16 Neither were those Iudges, whom the Apostle commanded, or aduised the Corinthians to appoint any other then Arbiters, or Arbi­tratours in power, although we should grant, that they were to be cho­sen by common consent, and not by the parties only, who were in suite, which neuerthelesse cannot be conuinced by the Apostles words. For albeit the Apostle doeth not say (which is the onely reason that D. Schulckenius bringeth to prooue,D. Schulck. in Apol. ad nu. 269 pag. 445. that they were to be chosen by com­mon consent) that euery man must choose to himselfe an Arbiter, for Arbiters are not to be chosen by the consent of one only partie, but by the consent of both, yet the Apostle doeth not say, that the whole Church of the Corinthians is by common consent of all to choose the Iudges of such causes, as D. Schulckenius without any sufficient ground affirmeth, but rather Saint Paul saith the cleane contrarie. For these bee his words: If therefore you shall haue secular iudgements, the con­temptible that are in the Church set them to iudge; wherefore the Apostle speaketh only to those Corinthians who shall haue secular iudgements, that is, as Iustinian well expoundeth, who shall haue controuersies & strifes to bee debated, and not to the whole Church, vnlesse we suppose that the whole Church shall bee at strife among themselues, and also hee speaketh with a condition, that if the Corinthians shall bee at strife, they shall appoint men to decide their controuersie, so that the parties, who shall bee at strife, and not the whole Church, vnlesse the whole Church shall bee at strife, are, according to the Apostles command or aduise, to appoint men to iudge or decide their controuersie.

17 But be it so, that the Apostle should not say, if you shall haue secular iudgements, appoint contemptible persons to iudge and decide your controuersies, but he should say, because it may be, and it is very like to fall out, that you shall haue now and then secular iudgements, therefore I will haue you to choose before hand by common consent [Page 33] same contemptible persons to iudge and decide those controuersies, which shall heereafter arise among you, which neuerthelesse were to wrest the words of the Apostle, which of themselues are very plaine, yet it is cleere, that these Iudges were in power meere Arbiters, or Arbi­tratours, and had no publike and lawfull authoritie of themselues to giue iudgement, to which the parties were in iustice bound to stand, but they receiued their power and authoritie to giue iudgement, and to make a finall end of controuersies from the parties, who were at strife, and who for the auoyding of scandall, which the infidels might take, seeing their strifes and contentions, submitted themselues to their de­cision and arbitrement.

18 That they were Arbiters, or Arbitratours, S. Chrysostome, Chrysost. in 1. Cor. 6 Almain. de potest. Eccle. & Laica. q. 1. cap. 10. Abulens. q 96. in cap. 20. Mat. Salmeron tom. 14. disp. 9. Ia­cobus Almainus, Abulensis, and Salmeron, a learned Iesuite doe in ex­presse words affirme. And also that they had no publike power, but onely priuate, and, if we may so call it, compromissorie, which they re­ceiued from those priuate persons, who werein suite, and by their mu­tuall promise and consent gaue power to those Arbiters to iudge, and make a finall end of their controuersies,in Apol. nu. 271. I prooued by the authoritie of S. Thomas, and the glosse of Nicolaus de Lyra vpon that place, for that, according to their doctrine, the appointing of those arbitrarie Iudges did nothing derogate from the subiection and obedience, which the Christians did owe to Heathen Princes, and that they were bound to appeare before the Heathen Magistrate, and consequently to stand to his iudgement, when they should be called to his tribunall, and that the Apostle doth onely forbid the faithfull Corinthians to goe willingly, and haue recourse to Heathen Iudges in those causes, which may bee determined by the faithfull.

19 From whence it euidently followeth, that the power of these Iudges was onely priuate, arbitrarie, or compromissorie, and not pub­like, for if they had publike authoritie to decide Secular causes without the expresse or tacite consent of the Secular Prince, it must needs dero­gate from the subiection, which they did owe to the Secular Prince, neither could the Heathen Iugdes haue lawfull power to reuerse that sentence, which was giuen by those Christian Iudges, if the cause had b [...]ne before decided by sufficient and publike authoritie of a more emi­nent power and tribunall: which must also be a derogation to their au­thoritie, and to the subiection which in Secular causes is due to Secu­lar Princes. And this also Benedictus Iustinian doth very plainly insi­nuate, when he affirmeth, that by this any man may easily vnderstand, that the Apostle doth not speake of lawfull iudgements, which are exercised by Magistrates, and publike Iudges by publike authoritie, but of those, who by the common consent (to wit of those who are at strife) are appointed deba­ [...]rs of ciuill controuersies: and that this right and authoritie of the Apostle [Page 34] to command humane and ciuill things doth not repugne to the publike au­thoritie of Iudges and Magistrates, for that no man is compelled to goe to the Magistrate, if by other waies he may peaceably maintaine his owne right.

20 By which it is euident, that this manner of iudging, which the Apostle commands, was not legall, or done by publike authoritie, and that these Iudges were not Magistrates, and who had publike au­thoritie. And therefore although these arbitrarie Iudges were appoin­ted by the declaratiue commandement of the Apostle for the auoyding of scandall, yet their power was only priuate and compromissorie, and was giuen them by the mutuall consent of both parties, in so much, that if either of the parties who were in suite, would not haue obeyed the Apostles commandement, & admitted of those Arbiters, but would haue had recourse to the tribunal of the Heathen Magistrate, although by disobeying the Apostles commandement, and by scandalizing Chri­stian Religion he should haue greatly offended, yet he should not haue offended against iustice, in wronging either of those Christian Iudges, or the other partie that would not willingly goe to the Heathen Ma­gistrate, against which without doubt he should haue offended, if hee had refused to obey the sentence of his lawfull and legall Iudge, and who had full power and authoritie, to decide and end the cause.

21 And by this it is very cleere, that my Aduersaries conclusion is very vntrue, to wit, that the Apostle did intermeddle in the temporall and politike gouernment, which then belonged to the Pagan Emperour, for this had bene to derogate from the ciuill subiection due to temporall Princes, but he did onely intermeddle with the priuate and peaceable composition of secular controuersies among the faithfull Corinthians, which euery Christian without any publike authoritie, or any preiu­dice to the same might doe, and which the Apostle by his Apostolicall and spirituall power might command the Christians to doe, and by spirituall Censures compell them so to doe, when otherwise they should scandalize the Christian faith and religion. And this very an­swere did I giue in my Apologie to this text of holy Scripture, which was vrged by Card. Bellarmine to prooue, that the Pope had power to depose and put downe Secular Princes, as the Apostle had power to appoint and set vp new Iudges in Secular causes: for I denyed his con­sequence, because the appointing and setting vp of those Iudges did no­thing derogate from the subiection due to Secular Princes, for that they were onely Arbiters, or peaceable composers of secular causes with the consent of the parties who were at strife, but the putting downe of Princes, or depriuing them of their Royall authoritie, doth greatly derogate, or rather quite ouerthrow and abolish their tempo­rall soueraigntie.

[Page 35]22 To which answere of mine, D. Schulckenius onely replieth,In Apolog. pag. 444. That although these Iudges whom the Apostle commanded the Corinthi­ans to appoint, had not indeede vim coactiuam in foro externo, a coactiue power in the externall Court, and that if either partie would not obey the Apostle, and goe to the Iudges appointed by the Church, but would bring his cause to the publike tribunals of the heathen Magistrates, the other par­tie was bound there to appeare, and there to debate his cause, yet they were not meere Arbiters or voluntary Iudges: For Arbiters are chosen by the parties, but these were chosen by the common consent of the Church, and were appointed by publike authoritie, by the command of the Apostle, who was a spirituall Prince. Besides, none are bound to admit Arbiters, vnlesse they will, but Christians were bound to admit these Iudges, and were forbidden to goe to the tribunals of Infidell Princes. Moreouer the Saints are not to iudge the world and Angels, as Arbiters chosen by them, but as true Iudges, and as sitting with Christ the supreame Iudge.

23 But all this is easily satisfied by that which I said before: For although the faithfull Corinthians were by the publike spirituall autho­ritie of the Apostle commaunded to choose those Iudges, or Arbiters, yet it doth not from thence follow, either that those arbitrarie Iudges were to bee chosen by the whole Church, and not onely by the par­ties that were at strife, or that the Apostle, for that he was a spirituall Prince, had either himselfe publike authoritie to decide secular causes, or could giue the same to any other. But because the Christians were bound by the Law of God to compound their controuersies among themselues, by way of arbitriment, and not to bring their causes to the hearing of Heathen Iudges, in case they should thereby scandalize the Christian Religion, therefore the Apostle might by his publike spiri­tuall and Pastorall power command them, and also with spirituall Cen­sures compell them so to doe.

24 And although these arbitrarie Iudges, were to be chosen by the whole Church, and by the common consent of all the faithfull Corinthians, which neuerthelesse can not bee sufficiently gathered from the Apostles wordes, yet it doth not therefore follow, that they were not meere Arbiters, or voluntarie Iudges in power, or, which is all one that they had more then arbitrarie, priuate or compromissorie power. For it is not materiall by whom a publike, or legall Iudge, or else an Arbitratour, or compromissorie Iudge bee chosen, but from whom they receiue their authoritie to iudge: as a true, proper, and publike Iudge may sometimes bee chosen by the people, as is the Re­corder of London by the Citie, and the Chancellours of Oxford and Cam­bridge by the Vniuersities, but it is the Kings Maiesty that giueth them publike authoritie to iudge: And Achiters, or voluntary Iudges may be chosen by the common consent of the people to decide by way of [Page 36] arbitrement, or voluntarie submission all ciuill controuersies, which shall arise among them, yet seeing that they are onely Arbiters, or haue onely arbitrarie, voluntarie, priuate, or compromissorie power, the parties onely who are at strife doe giue power to iudge, and to make a finall end of their controuersies. And although abstracting from scan­dall none are bound to admit Arbiters, vnlesse they will, yet if by not admitting them they should scandalize the Christian Religion, as the Corinthians did, they are bound to admit them, or which is all one, to giue them arbitrarie, voluntrary, or compromissorie power to decide and determine their controuersies.

25 True also it is, that the Saints are not to iudge the world, or the bad Angels, as Arbiters, yet in what manner they are to iudge, whether by onely assisting our Sauiour, and approouing or applau­ding his sentence, or by being Assessores supremi Iudicis Christi, by sit­ting in seates of honour with Christ the supreme Iudge, as Noble men, and Iustices of peace do sit vpon the bench, with the chiefe Iudge of Assises, or in any other more peculiar manner, it is a controuersie among Catholike Diuines, although it be certaine, that the Saints shall not be true and proper Iudges, as Iudges are properly taken, howsoe­uer D. Schulckenius doth seeme heere to affirme the same, for that to iudge, and to giue iudgement, doth properly signifie an act of Iuris­diction, and superiority of power to giue the definitiue sentence pro, or contra, which Iurisdiction in respect of the last iudgement of soules, is onely communicated to Christ. Se [...]. Suarez tom. 2. disp. 57. sect. 4. But howsoeuer it be, the argument of Saint Paul, whereby he intended to prooue, that Christians were not vnworthy to iudge Secular causes, which he calleth the least things, is of force, as I declared before, for if they be not vnworthy to iudge the world and Angels, much lesse are they to be accompted vn­worthy to decide by way of arbitrement Secular causes, or the least things.

26 And whereas D. Schulckenius affirmeth, that those Iudges had no coactiue power in the externall Court, and that if one of the parties should call the other to the tribunall of the Infidell Magistrate, he were bound to appeare, and debate his cause before the Heathen Iudge, this doth make nothing against that which I haue said, but is rather a confirmation, that these Iudges were onely Arbitratours, and voluntary Iudges in power to decide Secular causes. For if they had beene true and pro­per Iudges, and had not onely priuate and arbitrary power, but also publike authority to iudge, why should they not haue (as all other true and proper Iudges haue) both a commanding and also a coactiue power either temporall or spirituall, according as D. Schulckenius will haue them to be temporall or spiritual Iudges? And if they were true Iudges, and not onely Arbitratours, how could the faithfull Corinthians bee [Page 37] bound in conscience to leaue their tribunalls, and goe to a Heathen Iudge to haue their cause decided by him, if they should be called thi­ther although against then willes, seeing that they should thereby of­fend, not only by reason of scandall, but also against obedience, and against legall and morall iustice, by declining the iudgement of their lawfull Superiours and Iudges, and by wronging their Aduersarie in drawing him against his will from the tribunall of his lawfull Iudge, and who had good and sufficient authoritie to make a small end of his suite?

27 But considering that these Iudges, whom the Apostle com­manded the Corinthians to appoint, were not lawfull and proper Supe­riours and Iudges, but only Arbaratours, and consequently to whose iudgement they were not bound to stand by vertue of any subiection and obedience due to them, but only by reason of scandall, whereon the declaratiue precept of the Apostle was only grounded, and which scandall being taken away the commandement of the Apostle doth also cease, this difficultie is easily cleared. For albeit it was very scandalous, and therefore iustly reprehended by the Apostle, that the faithfull Co­rinthians should of their owne accord without any necessitie (for in that case,Disp. Theol. c. 10. s. 3. nu. 10. Salmer. tom. 8. tract. 29. in Euang. as I obserued in my Theologicall Disputation out of Alphonsus Salmeron the actiue scandall doth cease, and if it be any scandall it is not giuen, but taken) goe to the tribunalls of Heathen Magistrates, yet it is not scandalous to appeare before them when they are called, for in this case they must of necessitie by vertue of their subiection appeare, and so the scandall ceaseth, which would still remaine by their appea­ring, if those Iudges, whom the Apostle commanded the Corinthians to appoint, had beene true and lawfull Superiours and Iudges, for then they had also beene bound by vertue of their subiection, not to forgoe the iudgement of their lawfull Superiours and Iudges, and consequent­ly not to appeare before the tribunall of the Heathen Magistrate in derogation of the authoritie of their Christian Superiour and Iudge. And this may suffice for this point.

28 Moreouer we read in the old Testament, saith M^r. Fitzherbert, Nu. 4. pa. 31 3 Reg. 18. that Elias the Prophet had power to inflict temporall punishment, yea death vpon the false Prophets of Achab, whom he commanded the people to kill in his presence: as also he caused fire to fall from heauen, and consume the two Captaines of King Ochozias and their troupes. 4 Reg. 1. In like manner wee reade in the new Testament, that the Apostles S. Peter and S. Paul extended their spirituall authoritie to the temporall punishment of the body, when it seemed to them conuenient for the glory of God, and good of soules: and therefore S. Peter stro [...]ke Ananias and Saphyra with suddaine death, Act. 6. and S. Paul depriued Elymas the Magician of his sight, Act. 13. 1. Cor. 5. and deliuered the incestuous Corinthian to the deuill to be bodily [...] and tormented for the [Page 38] example and terrour of others, vt spiritus saluus fiat, that his soule might be saued: and the same iudgements, and corporall punishments these Apo­stles might (no doubt) as lawfully haue executed vpon any Prince in the world, if hee had then beene a Christian, and giuen the like occasion.

29 But who would not wonder, that any man of ordinarie iudg­ment should from an extraordinarie, and miraculous power of the A­postles, yea and of the Prophets who were no Priests, or from a speciall command or inspiration of God to kill men, and to doe other mira­cles, inferre that the Pope hath an ordinarie Pastorall and Episcopall power to doe the like: as are those examples, which my Aduersarie bringeth of Elias the Prophet, who was no Priest and by the comman­dement of God,3. Reg. 18. ver. 36. Abul. in 3. Reg. 18. q. 35 and not by any ordinarie authoritie or iurisdiction caused the false prophets of Ashab to be slaine, and by miracle caused fire to fall from heauen to consume the two captaines of King Ocho­zias and their troupes; and of S. Peter, who by miracle either killed Ananias and Saphyra, or foretold their death, and of S. Paul, who also by miracle depriued Elymas of his sight, or foretold his blindnesse, and deliuered the incestuous Corinthian to the deuill to bee bodily vex­ed, and tormented, which manner of deliuering men to Satan did proceede from an extraordinarie and miraculous power giuen to the Apostles, and not from any ordinarie power which was to descend to all their Successours: But of these examples I shall haue occasion to speake againe beneathCap. 6.

30 And the same iudgements and corporall punishments saith M^r. Fitzherbert, might (no doubt) these Apostles as lawfully haue executed vp­on any Prince in the world, if hee had beene a Christian, and giuen the like occasion. But first, I meruaile, why he addeth that condition [if he had then beene a Christian] for the example of Elymas, who was no Chri­stian, doth proue, that the same iudgements and corporall punishments they might haue executed not only vpon Christians, but also vpon in­fidels. Besides, if any one will reduce those examples to a dialecticall forme of arguing, hee will easily perceiue, that they are very weake, and insufficient, not to vse those his foule and vnseemely wordes of absurd, impertinent, foolish and ridiculous, to proue, that the Pope by his ordinarie Pastorall power can doe the like. As that because Elias, who was no Priest, had an extraordinarie commission and power giuen him by God to kill the false Prophets, and to cause fire to fall from heauen to consume those two Captaines, and their troopes therefore the Pope by his ordinarie Episcopall and Pastorall office hath power to doe the same in the like cases, and so of the rest, that because S. Peter and S. Paul had an extraordinarie power giuen them, &c.

31 And all this, saith my Aduersarie, Nu. 5. may be confirmed by the [Page 39] common custome, and practise of the Primitiue Church to enioyne bodily pe­nance to publike penitents, as to attend to continuall fasting and prayer, Tertull. de pe­nitent. Ambros. ad virg. lap. sam. cap. 28. and to lye vpon sackcloth and ashes (as it may be seene in Tertullian, S. Am­brose and others) whereupon it followeth, that if the Church may chastise a man in his body for the good of his soule, much more may she chastise him in his goods, and temporall state, which are ordained by the law of nature to serue both the body and the soule, as the Philosophers touch, & namely Plato,Plato epist. 8. ad Dionys. who therefore aduised a Law-maker to procure by his lawes, that the three kinds of goods (to wit, of the mind) the body, and fortune) be sought and pos­sessed in due and ordinate manner, that is to say, that the goods of the mind be preferred before the other two, and the goods of the body esteemed only so farre forth, as they may serue the mind, and lastly that the goods of fortune (which are honour, dignitie, wealth and temporall states) be accounted no better then ministers and seruants of both the other.

32 But first I doe willingly graunt, that it may be confirmed by the common custome and practise of the Primitiue Church, that not onely the Pope, but also inferiour Bishops, yea and Priests had power to command, or enioyne bodily penances to their penitents, as fasting, prayer, lying vpon sackcloth and ashes, yea and giuing of almes in satis­faction of their sinnes, as the building of Churches, Colledges, Hospi­tals or Religious Houses, according to the greatnesse of their offence, and the qualitie, condition, and abilitie of the penitent, or to vse the tearme of Diuines, cla [...]e non errante, the key not erring: For if such penances should be enioyned without discretion and due regard of the greatnesse of the offence, or of the state and condition of the penitent, the key should erre, and would not haue force to bind. Secondly, I doe also graunt, that there is an order and subordination in worth and dig­nitie betwixt spirituall, corporall and temporall goods, or of the soule, of the body and of fortune, and that, according to the light of nature, the goods of the soule being most worthy are to be preferred and estee­med before the other two, and that the goods of the body, bodily life, health, libertie, and such like bodily contentments are to be preferred before the goods of fortune, which are honour, dignitie, wealth and temporall states, and that all of them are with due order to be referred to the seruice and glorie of God, and to the eternall saluation both of body and soule. But what followeth from all this?

33 Whereupon I inferre, saith my Aduersarie,pag. 33. nu. 5.6. (according to the axiome of the law, accessorium sequitur principale) that seeing not onely the body, but also temporall goode, and states are inferiour to the soule, and ordained for the seruice thereof; a must needs follow, that the Church ha­uing power and authoritie ouer the body for the benefite of the soule, hath also power ouer temporall goods and states, when it is necessarie for the good of the soule, and for the glorie of God, for the which [...] bodies, goods; [Page 40] states and all things else were created and ordained. And this me thinkes our aduersaries should not deny, seeing that their Ecclesiasticall discipline admitteth not onely corporall chastisements by imprisonment, but also pecu­niaris mulcto and penalties. Therefore vpon this I inferre, that Christian Princes being sheepe of Christs flocke, and consequently to be fedde and go­uerned by the supreme Pastour of the Church, may also be chastised by him in their temporall states, when it shall be necessarie for the glorie and seruice of God, the benefite of soules, and good of the whole Church, whereto all Christian Kingdomes, Isa 60. and Empyres are subordinate, and subiect, as I haue prooued before out of the holy Scripture, and will prooue also after a while by the very law of nature, and light of reason.

34 But first touching the consequent, or conclusion of his in­ference or argument, to wit, that the Pope hauing power ouer the soule, hath power also ouer the body and goods, when it is necessarie for the good of the soule and glory of God, I doe willingly graunt the same, if it be vnderstoode of a power not to dispose of corporall and temporall goods, but to command and enioyne them in order to spirituall good, albeit my Aduersarie did vnderstand it of both, as I shewed before. But as concerning the consequence, inference or argument, which hee draweth from that rule of the law,De Regulis Iuris in 6. re­gula. 42. The accessorie followeth the principall, or as it is in the Canon law, Accessorium naturam sequi congruit princi­palis: It is fit, or conuenient that the accessorie follow the nature of the prin­cipall: which rule, as the Glosse there affirmeth, is taken from that rule of the Ciuill law,ff. de Regulis Iuris regula 138. Cum principalis causa &c. When the principall cause is not consisting, for the most part neither those things that follow haue place, there can be no conuincing, or demonstratiue argument (as all my Aduersaries arguments must be, if hee will prooue by them, that the oath cannot with a safe and probable conscience be taken by any Ca­tholike, and that the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes is a point of faith) be drawen from that generall rule of the law, which hath so many exceptions, restrictions, and limitations, and which are not as yet made sufficiently knowen by the Lawiers, as neither what is vniuersally meant by Accessorie, and what by Principall, and what is to follow the nature of the principall.

35 And therefore not without cause doth the rule of the Ciuill law, from which this rule of the Canon law is taken, adioyne that word [plaerunque, for the most part] and the rule it selfe of the Canon law, doth not absolutely say, that the Accessorie must follow, or doth follow the nature of the principall, but it is fit or conuenient, that the accessorie doe fol­low the nature of the principall, to signifie, that it doth not alwaies, and of necessitie but for the most part, and of congruitie follow the principall, and that Iudges ought for the most part follow this rule in their iudge­ments, if they haue no speciall reasoned meaning [...] to the contraries [Page 41] And therefore, as the marginall Glosse vpon the Ciuill law doth well obserue,Leg. Et si is quem Cod. de praedijs & alijs. &c. The accessorie doth not follow his principall, when in the accessorie there is not the same reason, which is in the principall.

36 Secondly therefore, I would gladly know of my Aduersarie, whether he will haue this rule to be grounded onely in humane law, and hath it force and strength onely from thence, so that if the Ciuill, or Canon law had not made and ordained that rule, it would not be of force and validitie, or else it is grounded also in the law of God, or na­ture. If he graunt the first, as commonly the Lawiers doe, and there­fore some things, which seeme of their owne nature to be accessorie, as a saddle, and bridle are to a horse, are not accessorie according to hu­mane law, and therefore he that selleth a horse, doth not consequently sell the bridle and faddle, and somethings, which are not accessorie of their owne nature, as a dowrie is not necessarily annexed to marriage; are made accessorie according to humane lawe, and therefore he that marrieth a woman with the consent of her parents, hath right to a dowrie, and the parents are bound by the Ciuill Law to giue a dowrie, if they be able: wherefore the Glosse vpon the aforesaid rule of the Ci­uill law doth obserue, that the word [plaerunque, for the most part] was purposely added to that rule of the law, for that sometimes that rule doth faile, to which purpose he alledgeth many texts of the Ciuill law. If my Aduersarie, I say, will graunt the first, he can not but easily per­ceiue, that there can no forcible argument be drawne from the afore­said rule to prooue, that the Pope by the institution of Christ hath a dis­posing power ouer the body, and ouer corporall and temporall goods, because he hath power ouer the soule; both for that the aforesaid rule is not generally true, and especially, as I obserued out of the Glosse, when in the accessorie there is not the same reason which is in the princi­pall, as there is not the same reason, that a spirituall Pastour can dispose of the bodie, and of corporall or temporall goods, because he can dis­pose of the soule and of spirituall goods, but chiefly for that our Saui­our Christ gaue to S. Peter and his Apostles all their spirituall and Pa­storall power long before that rule of humane law was ordained, and whether it were ordained before or after, it is manifest, that our Saui­our was not tyed to giue any power to S. Peter and the Apostles by force and vertue of any humane law, neither can the institution of Christ depend vpon any rule, which is grounded onely in humane law.

37 But if my Aduersaries meaning bee, that the aforesaid rule, The accessory followeth the principall, is grounded in the Law of God, or nature, so that abstracting from all humane lawes, yet either by the in­stitution of Christ, or by a necessary sequell or consequence drawne from the light of naturall reason, it is alwayes true (I say alwaies true, for otherwise if the rule be not generally true, there can no inuincible [Page 42] argument be concluded from that rule to prooue, that hee who hath the principall, must of necessity haue the accessory, or who hath power ouer the principall, must of necessity haue power ouer the accessory) then this rule may rather be called a rule, or Maxime of Logike, then a rule of Law, and it is taken from that Topike place, which the Logici­ans call, The place of Antecedents, and in sense it is all one with this dia­lecticall axiome, Posito antecedenti necesse est poni consequens, the Ante­cedent being put, the consequent must of necessitie be put, or follow; or if we call the antecedent the principall, and the consequent, the accessory, the principall being put, the accessory must of necessity follow, or which is all one, the accessorie doth necessarily follow the principall.

38 But in this sense neither can bridles be said to be accessory to horses, for that horses, can consist without bridles, neither can any separable accident (to vse the Logicians terme) be said to bee accessory to the substance, and so neither musicke, physicke, or any other Art can be said to be accessory to the soule, for that the soule can consist without any of these Arts, neither can the mortall body it selfe be said to be ac­cessorie to the immortall soule, for the soule can consist without the body, neither can the goods of fortune, as honour, dignitie, riches, earthly kingdomes, &c. nor the goods of the body, as health, libertie, and other bodily contentments be said, as my Aduersary would haue them, to be accessory in any man to the good of his soule and his eter­nall saluation, which is the last end, to which hee ought to referre all his corporall and temporall goods and miseries, for that any man may attaine to eternall saluation, and haue spirituall and iustifying grace, which is the onely meanes to attaine thereunto, without any worldly riches or preferments, and without any bodily comforts, and content­ments, albeit in another sense all the former inferiour things may bee called accessory, for that they are ordained and referred to the other more worthy, noble, and principall things.

39 Neuerthelesse I doe not deny, as I haue often said, that Christ our Sauiour hath giuen to Saint Peter and his Successours suffici­ent power to gouerne his Church by spirituall meanes, and conse­quently power to command both spirituall and temporall things in or­der to spirituall good, and to chastise the transgressours of his iust com­mand with spirituall and Ecclesiasticall Censures, for that all these are spirituall meanes, and comprehended in spirituall gouernment: And because the commanding of spirituall and temporall things in order to spirituall good is by the institution of Christ annexed to spirituall go­uernment, or the power to command temporall things, which is the lesse noble, and therefore may be called accessorie, is by the institution of Christ annexed to the power of commanding spiritual things, which being the more noble, may be called the principall: therefore from that [Page 43] maxime of the Logicians there may be drawen a good argument, suppo­sing the institution of Christ, that if the Pope hath power to command spirituall things in order to spirituall good, he hath power also to com­mand temporall things in order to the same spirituall good, not for that temporall things are per se, and of their owne nature subiect and subordained to spirituall things, except onely in worth and nobilitie, or that temporall things are the accessorie, and spirituall things the prin­cipall, taking accessorie, and principall, as I haue before declared, but for that the power to command spirituall things is the principall, or antece­dent, and the power to command temporall things in order to spiri­tuall good is the accessorie or consequent, and by the institution of Christ annexed to the power of commanding spirituall things.

40 But for all this I vtterly deny, that the power to dis­pose of temporall goods is by the institution of Christ annexed to spirituall gouernment, or to the Popes power of commanding ei­ther spirituall or temporall things, for that the disposing of temporall things, for what ende soeuer it bee, is not a spiritu­all but a temporall action, and doeth belong to a temporall or ciuill power, which by the institution of Christ hath it acts, offices, dignities, meanes, and ends distinguished from the spirituall power: both which, as they are supreame in their degree and order, and conse­quently independent one of the other in those things, which are pro­per to either of them, so they cannot intermeddle with the actions of each either: and as the supreame spirituall power doth reside in spiri­tuall Pastours, so the supreame temporall power doth reside in tempo­rall Princes: and as spirituall Pastours are by spirituall power, spiri­tuall lawes, spirituall actions, and spirituall meanes and punishments bound to bring all men, as much as lyeth in them, to euerlasting hap­pinesse, so also Christian Princes, are bound, as much as lyeth in them, by temporall power, temporall lawes, temporall actions, and temporall meanes and punishments to bring their subiects to the kingdome of heauen, which is the last end, to which all Christians ought to referre all that they haue, or are.

41 Wherefore if that, which M^r. Fitzherbert doeth lastly in­ferre, that Christian Princes being sheepe of Christs flocke may bee chasti­sed by the supreame Pastour of the Church in their temporall states, bee so vnderstood, that hee may by way of direction or command enioyne them temporall penalties or punishments, as to fast, to pray, to giue almes or the like in satisfaction of their sinnes, or for some other great spirituall good, this is very true, and I haue affirmed the same too too often; and this only he hath prooued by this Discourse which he hath here repeated out of his Supplement, albeit this bee not the marke, at which he aimeth, and which hee pretended to prooue: for as I haue [Page 44] shewed before,Nu. 6. his chiefe drift and purpose was to proue, that the Pope hath power not onely to command temporals in order to spirituall good, but also to dispose of temporals, not only to command christi­ans, that in satisfaction of their sinnes or in defence of the Church they will dispose of their temporall goods according to the qualitie of their offence, and the necessitie of the Church shall require, and their abili­tie doth extend, but also to depriue them of the right, power, and domi­nion, which they haue ouer their temporall goods and states, if they shall refuse to obey his iust command, which my Aduersarie by this Discourse in his Supplement hath not, as you haue seene, so much, as probably confirmed, and neuerthelesse, as I haue often said, not onely probable arguments, but conuincing authorities, or demonstrations are required to prooue his doctrine for the Popes power to depose Prin­ces, and to dispose of their temporals, to bee certaine, and a point of faith, and that the oath cannot lawfully, and with a safe consci­ence be taken by any Catholike. And thus much concerning the Dis­course which M^r. Fitzherbert hath made in his Supplement. Now you shall see what from thence he doth inferre.

42 Thus did I discourse, saith he,Pag. 34. nu 7 and argue in my Supplement, whereby my Aduersarie Widdrington may perceiue first, what I meane by the accessorie, and by the principall; as that the soule of man, and the seruice, and glory of God are the principall, and that the accessory is the body, goods, and all temporall states whatsoeuer, because they are sub­ordinate to the soule, and ordained for the seruice thereof, and for Gods glory.

43 And my Aduersarie also by that, which I haue heere an­swered to his Discourse may perceiue, that although the soule of man, and the spirituall good thereof, and the seruice and glory of God may in some sense bee called the principall, and bodily and tempo­rall goods the accessorie, for that they are the lesse worthy, and lesse noble, and therefore though not of their owne nature referred, yet by the intention and will of man ought to bee referred to the eternall good and saluation of the soule, as to the last end of man, in which sense temporall good may bee said to be subiect and ordained to the su­pernaturall good of the soule, whereof I haue treated more at large aboue in the second part: Yet in that sense, as antecedent and consequent, principall and accessorie are taken in that maxime, the spirituall good of the soule, eternall saluation, and the supernaturall seruice and glo­rie of God cannot be called the principall or antecedent, nor corporall goods and temporall states, as health, wealth, honour, &c. the ac­cessorie or consequent, for that God may bee serued and glorified, and the soule saued, without hauing any such corporall, or temporall contentments, yea rather they doe hinder then promote the good of [Page 45] the soule, for that according to our Sauiours owne wordes,Matth. 19. A rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdome of heauen: For they 1. Tim. 6. that will be made rich, fall into tentation and the snare of the Deuill, and many desires vnprofitable and hurtfull, which drowne men into destruction and perdition; and By many tribulations Act. 14. we must enter into the kingdome of God.

44 Neither did I desire my Aduersary to declare, what he vnder­stood in particular by the names of principall and accessory, for I knew right well, that hee tooke the good of the soule for principall, and the goods of the body and of fortune to be the accessory, for that they are referred and ordained to the good of the soule, in which sense the words principall and accessory are not taken in that maxime, as I shewed before, and it will more cleerely appeare beneath, but I desired him to declare, what the Lawyers vnderstood in generall by the names of principall and accessory in that rule of the Law, for that the nature and definition of principall and accessory being once knowne, we might the better descend to particulars, and more easily perceiue whether the good of the soule was to bee taken for principall, and all other corpo­rall and temporall goods for accessory in that rule of the Law, and with­all he should also haue explained, if hee had meant to cleere and satisfie the vnderstanding of his Reader, what the Lawyers vnderstood by those wordes, [to follow the nature of the principall] all which my Aduersary hath, as you haue seene, neglected to declare.

45 Secondly, Widdrington may see, saith M^r. Fitzherbert,Pag. 34. nu. 8 the force and validitie of my consequence, to wit, because the Church hath power ouer the soule, (which is the principall) therefore it hath power also ouer the accessorie, that is to say, ouer the body, temporall goods, and states, when it is necessarie for the good of the soule, and the glorie of God, for which our soules, bodies, goods, states, and all things else were ordained.

46 And hee also may see, in what manner his consequence is of force, if it be onely vnderstood of a power to commaund temporall things in order to spiritual good, to wit, not for that the Church hauing power ouer the soule (which he calleth the principall) must also haue power ouer the body and temporall goods, (which he calleth the ac­cessorie) when it is necessarie for the good of the soule, and the glory of God, because temporall goods and states are not necessarie for the good of the soule, and the glorie of God, but rather lets, and hinderan­ces thereof, seeing that soules may be saued, and God glorified without the enioying of such corporall or temporall goods, and therefore tem­porall goods, and states can not rightly be called the accessory or conse­quent, as accessory or consequent ought to be taken in that maxime: But the force of his consequence can onely consist in this, that because Christ our Sauiour hath giuen to Saint Peter and his Successours, suf­ficient authority to gouerne the Church by spirituall meanes, and in [Page 46] order to spirituall good to command not onely spirituall things, which is the more noble and principall, but also temporall things, which power is the lesse noble, and so by the institution of Christ annexed to the spirituall power of gouerning the Church, and of commaun­ding spirituall things, for which cause it may well be called the ac­cessory or consequent, therefore from that rule, or maxime not of the law, but of the Logicians, The accessory, or consequent doth necessarily follow the principall or antecedent, it may be well inferred, that the Pope hauing power to command spirituall things, hath also power to com­mand temporall things in order to spirituall good, for that this power to command temporall things, is by the institution of Christ annexed and adioyned to the spirituall power of gouerning the Church and of commanding spirituall things: I say, by the institution of Christ, for that there is no absolute, necessarie, or naturall connexion betwixt the power to command spirituall things and temporall things: and there­fore it was in our Sauiours absolute power and choice to haue graunted to Saint Peter and his Successours a power to command onely spiritu­all things and not temporall, euen in order to spirituall good, as he hath granted him a power to dispose onely of spirituall things and not of temporall, but the disposing of temporall things for what end soe­uer it be, he hath left to the temporall power of Secular Princes, who in temporals acknowledge no Superiour on earth.

47 Thirdly, Widdrington may note his absurditie, saith M^r. Fitzher­bert, Nu. 9. pag. 34 in denying the consequence, and yet granting it in effect. For gran­ting, as hee doth, that the body, and temporall goods are ordained to serue spirituall things, Supra nu. 1. and that therefore the Pope hath authoritie to command corporall and temporall things in order to spirituall, he granteth conse­quently, as much as I require, to wit, that the Pope hath power to punish corporally and temporally, when it shall be conuenient for the good of soules, and Gods glorie: for he can giue no sufficient nor probable reason why the Pope can doe the one, and not the other, seing that it can not be denyed, but that the Church hath alwaies vsed to enioyne bodily penance to her penitents, as fasting prayer, and lying vpon sackcloth and ashes, which was vsually imposed euen in the primitiue Church, Supra. nu. 5. as I shewed in the place alledged a little before out of my Supplement.

48 Whereupon I inferre, sayth he,nu. 10. that if the Church may punish a man in his body for the good of his soule, it may punish him in his goods to the same end, seeing that temporall goods are inferiour to the body, and ordained for the seruice of the body and soule, Supra. nu. 5. as I haue before declared by the opinion of the Philosophers themselues. But because he will giue me a better occasion hereafter infra cap. 5. nu. 1. 2. &c. 39. Item cap. 6. nu. 13. 14. 15. 16. & seq. to treate more amply of this point, and to confute a friuoulous di­stinction of his, of the power to command corporall things, and to punish cor­porally, I wil now say somewhat to the instances, that he bringeth against my [Page 47] consequence which he impugneth, by drawing two other consequences from the same principle, and confronting them with mine to shew some absurdity therein.

49 But M^r. Fitzherbert may also note, that I haue committed no absurdity in denying absolutely the consequence, and also graunting it with a condition, for so I doe not graunt it in that sense wherein I doe deny it. I graunt that the consequence is not in vaine if it bee vnderstood of the Popes power to commaund temporalls in order to spirituall good, but because my Aduersarie did vnderstand it not onely of the Popes power to command temporals, but also to dis­pose of temporals, and to inflict temporall punishments, or punish temporally, not onely by the way of command, but also by the way of temporall constraint, therefore I did absolutely deny his consequence. And therefore albeit I did grant this consequence, The accessorie or con­sequent followeth the principall or antecedent, (being so vnderstood, as I declared before) therefore the Pope hauing power to gouerne the Church by spirituall meanes, and to command spirituall things in or­der to spirituall good, hath consequently (supposing the institution of Christ) power also to commaund corporall, and temporall things in order to the same spirituall good, yet I did not grant these consequen­ces; The accessory or consequent followeth the principall or antecedent, there­fore the Pope hauing, by the institution of Christ, power to commaund spirituall things in order to spirituall good, hath consequently power to dispose of temporall things in order to the same spirituall good, nor this: The accessorie or consequent followeth the principall or antece­dent, therefore the Pope hauing power to dispose of spirituall things in order to spirituall good hath consequently power to dispose of tem­porall things in order to the same spirituall good.

50 Obserue therefore, good Reader, how cunningly M^r. Fitzher­bert, to make thee imagine, that my answere is absurd & repugnant to my selfe, endeauoureth to delude thee, and to cast a myst before thine eies, whilest he affirmeth, that I graunting, that the body and temporall goods are ordained to serue spirituall things, and that therefore the Pope hath authoritie to command corporall and temporall things in order to spiri­tuall good, doe consequently graunt so much, as he requireth, to wit, that the Pope hath power to punish corporally and temporall when it shalbe conuenient (a large extension of the Popes spirituall power to depriue Princes of their kingdomes) for the good of soules, and Gods glorie: as though, for­sooth, he requireth nothing else, but that the Pope may only command temporall things and not dispose of temporall things, may punish cor­porally and temporally by way onely of commanding or enioyning temporall and corporall penalties, and not also by inflicting them, or by way of temporall coercion, and by depriuing Christian Princes and subiects of their temporal states and corporall liues, whereas the whole [Page 48] scope of his Discourse, as I shewed before, and concerning depriuing them of their liues you shall see beneath,Nu. 65. tendeth to prooue the cleane contrarie: and in this very place he plainly signifieth as much, in pro­mising to confute beneath a friuolous distinction of mine, as he tearmeth it, of the power to command corporall things, and consequently corporall punishments, and of the power to punish corporally, not by the way of command, for this power I haue graunted aboue an hundred times, but by way of corporall coercion and constraint: Which distinction doth breake the necke of a great part of his Discourse, and also declareth the true state of the maine question betwixt him and me, and therefore he might haue done well hauing so fit an occasion offered him to haue confuted in this place that distinction, and not to leaue his Reader in suspense touching this point, which is the maine controuersie betwixt him and me, and which distinction being once ouerthrowen, and pro­ued to be friuolous, this whole question concerning the Popes power to depose Princes and to inflict temporall and corporall punishments would presently be ended.

51 But the plaine trueth is, that neither in the fift chapter (for there hee barely repeateth what he saide heere concerning this distin­ction) nor in the sixt chapter doth he bring any one probable proofe to confute this distinction, as I will cleerely shew in that place. In the meane time without interrupting the order, which hee obserueth in his Chapters, and withall not to leaue thee, good Reader, altogether in sus­pence, thou maiest easily gather some ground and reason of this dist­inction, partly from that, which hath beene said a little before, partly from the words which I related out of S. Bernard, See aboue, part. 2. cap. 8. that the Pope may command, but not vse the materiall sword, and partly by the compari­son, which Cardinall Bellarmine out ofSee aboue, part. cap. 9. S. Gregorie Nazianzene did make betwixt the soule and body, and betwixt the spirituall and tempo­rall power or common wealth. For as the soule hath power to com­mand coporall actions for the good both of the body and soule, but she hath not power of her selfe without the concurrance of the body to do or exercise corporall actions euen for the good of the soule, so also the spirituall power or common wealth may comand temporal actions in order to spirituall good, but shee cannot of herselfe without the con­currance of the temporall power exercise any temporall action be­longing to temporall gouernment, although it bee neuer so much with order or reference to spirituall good: neither doeth the re­ference of a temporall or bodily action to a spirituall ende alter, or change the nature of the action, for as a bodily action, although it bee done for the good of the soule, is still a bodily action, and doth not by that reference become a spirituall action, so a temporall action, although it bee done for a spirituall end, doth still remaine a temporall [Page 49] [...]tion, and vertue and vice may bee found as well in temporall, as in [...]irituall actions.

52 Now you shall see, how soundly M^r. Fitzherbert impugneth the two instances I brought against his consequence, which were these: The accessorie followeth the principall, therefore he who is Lord of all horses is Lord of all bridles: The Pope hath power ouer the soule of a Prince, and therefore ouer his life. To which he replieth in this manner.Pag. 35. nu. 11.12. But of these two instances I must needes say, that the former is ridiculous, and the later malicious; for by the former hee impugneth himselfe, and not mee: You haue heard him before admit my consequence, so that it bee vnderstood of power to command corporall things in order to spirituall; for he saith that my consequence is vaine except it be vnderstood in this manner, and there­fore being vnderstood so, hee alloweth it for good. And if we vnderstand it so then it must needes follow according to his owne ground, that hee who is Lord of all horses (which are the principall) may command all bridles, be­cause they are the accessorie.

53 Now then hee must either grant his owne argument or deny it; if be grant it, hee prooueth nothing thereby against mee, but rather fortifieth my consequence (which is, as hee himselfe relateth it, that the Church ha­uing power ouer the soule, hath power also ouer the body and goods, because the accessorie followeth the principall) If hee deny it, hee denieth his for­mer grant, which was, as you haue heard, that whosoeuer hath power to com­mand the principall, may command the accessorie, for seeing that all hor­ses are the principall, and all bridles the accessorie (according to his owne supposition in his argument) hee that denieth the Lord of all horses to bee the Lord of all bridles, denieth that hee who hath power to command the principall may command the accessorie, which is the same that hee hath granted already, as you haue heard; so as I see not to what purpose this his argument serueth, but to discouer his owne folly, and yet forsooth hee will haue vs to beleeue in any case, that all his arguments are probable at least.

54 But I must needes say, good Reader, that my Aduersarie hath small reason, for these two instances, which I brought against that rule, or maxime, The accessorie followeth the principall, as it was vnder­stood by him, to vse such vndecent tearmes, for whose folly is disco­uered, and who is the ridiculous and malicious, you shall foorth with perceiue. It is true, that I granted the consequence not to be vaine, if it were only vnderstood of a power in the Pope to command spiritu­all things, and to punish temporally by way of command in order to spitituall good: but from hence it doeth not follow according to my ground, but according to his owne, that he who is Lord of all horses, may consequently command all bridles, yea and it followeth accor­ding to his ground, that hee who can dispose of all horses, can dis­pose [Page 50] of all bridles, and that hee who buyeth all horses, doeth conse­quently buy all bridles: For first, by his consequence hee doth intend not only to prooue, that the Pope hath power to command tempo­rall things, or to punish temporally by way of command, but also to dispose of temporalls, to depose temporall Princes, and to inflict tem­porall punishments, as I shewed beforeNu 6. and hee in the next para­graphes doth expresly affirmeNu. 13.14.15.16.. Secondly, according also to his owne ground, and not mine, a bridle is accessorie to a horse, for that it is or­dained to serue a horse, for which cause hee affirmeth, that temporall things are accessorie to spirituall things, for that they are ordained to serue spirituall things. And therefore according to his owne ground these consequences are good: The accessorie followeth the principall, there­fore he who is Lord of all horses is Lord of all bridles, therefore hee who can command all horses can command all bridles, therefore hee who can dispose of all horses can dispose of all bridles, therefore hee who buyeth all horses, which are the principall, must consequently buy all bridles, which are the accessorie.

55 But I doe not graunt, that a bridle is accessorie, or consequent to a horse, or that corporall and temporall goods are accessorie or con­sequent to the spirituall good of the soule, in that sense as accessorie is and ought to be taken in that maxime, The accessorie or consequent must follow the principall or antecedent, or which is all one, if the principall or an­tecedent be supposed or graunted, the accessorie or consequent must of necessitie follow: and my reason is, for that a horse can be without a bridle, and the spirituall good or life of the soule can be without corporall goods, or temporall honour and riches, yea and better without them, then with them. Neuerthelesse I doe graunt, that the power to command temporall things in order to spirituall good is, according to the institu­tion of Christ, accessorie or consequent to the power to command spiri­tuall things in order to spirituall good, for that both of them are, by the institution of Christ, connected and conioyned in the spirituall Pastour of the Church: and because the power to command spirituall things is the more noble and worthy, and the power to command tem­porall things the lesse noble and worthie, as spirituall things are more noble then temporall, therefore the power to commaund spirituall things may be well called the principall, and the power to command temporall things the accessorie, and which, by the institution of Christ, doth follow the first and more noble power as the principall.

56 And by this, that Dilemma, which he maketh, is easily an­swered. For I graunt the consequence in that forme of words, as he setteth it downe, in one sense, and I denye it in an other. I graunt it, if it be vnderstood of the Popes power to command temporals, and to enioyne temporall penalties in order to spirituall good, and if he had [Page 51] intended nothing else then this, I should indeed haue prooued nothing against him, but should haue fortified his consequence; But because in his consequence he spake of a power in the Church in generall ouer the soule, body and goods, therefore the Church, sayth he, hauing power ouer the soule, hath power consequently ouer the body and goods, which power may be vnderstood not onely of a power to command, but al­so to dispose, not onely to enioyne spirituall and temporall punish­ments, but also to inflict them, and because the Pope in order to spiri­tuall good hath a power not only to command spirituall punishments, but also to inflict them, and by a iuridicall sentence to depriue men of certaine spirituall goods and benefites, therefore by his consequence it might seeme to be rightly inferred, that the Pope hath also in order to spirituall good a power to dispose of the bodie and of temporall goods, euen as temporall Princes haue in order to temporall good a power not onely to command, but also to dispose thereof, and to depriue by a iuridicall sentence their subiects of their temporall goods, and also of their corporall liues, and because my Aduersaries drift and meaning was to prooue thus much by his consequence, therefore in this sense, which his words did beare, and he also intend, I did absolutely denye his consequence. Now what repugnance or contradiction, trow you, can all his skill in Logike (although it were farre greater then most men that know him suppose it to be) find in granting his consequence in one sence, and denying it in an other, and whose folly is discouered, and whether my instance or his Reply be ridiculous I dare aduenture to remit euen to his owne iudgement.

57 But my Aduersarie perceiuing, as it seemes, that according to the vulgar axiome, ducere ad inconueniens non est soluere argumentum, to draw one to an inconuenience is not to solue the argument, endeauoureth to answere my instance, abstracting from my grant: But let vs set aside, sayth he,nu, 13. pag. 36▪ Widdringtons graunt, and consider how probable is the instance that he maketh against me by this argument considered in it selfe, and com­pared with mine. The accessorie, sayth he, followeth the principall, and therefore he who is Lord of all horses is Lord of all bridles, which no doubt is true, if he speake of such a one, as hath a supreme dominion, or power, as I doe in my argument, when I speake of the Pope, who being supreme head of the Church, and in that respect hauing the direct charge of mens soules, hath also indirectly the care and charge of whatsoeuer is accessorie to the soule, and subordinate thereto, so farre forth, I meane as is requisite for the good of soules: as also in like manner a supreme temporall Prince, albeit he be not directly the Lord of all horses and bridles in his kingdome or State, yet hauing directly the charge and care of the whole common wealth, he may dispose not onely of all the horses, but also of all the bridles in the com­mon-wealth, when it shall vndoubtedly be conuenient, and necessarie for the publike good thereof.

[Page 52]58 True it is, that this consequence, The accessorie, or consequent doth necessarily follow the principall or antecedent, therefore a supreme tem­porall Prince, who is Lord of all horses is also Lord of all bridles, or which is all one, who may for the common good dispose of all the horses in his king­dome, may also for the same good dispose of all the bridles, is a true and good consequence, but not for that a bridle is accessorie or necessarily annexed, and consequent to a horse, as my Aduersarie affirmeth; for then it must be true not onely in a Prince, but also in all other men, who haue power to dispose of the principall: and moreouer this conse­quence would also be good, The accessorie followeth the principall, there­fore a supreme temporall Prince, who buyeth all horses, which according to my Aduersaries doctrine are the principall, must consequently buy all bri­dles, which are the accessorie: But the aforesaid consequence is there­fore good, for that to be a supreme temporall Lord of all bridles is ac­cessorie or consequent to be a supreme temporall Lord of all horses, which is the more noble, principall, or antecedent, and so the power in a temporall Prince to dispose of all horses is necessarily connected with his power to dispose of all bridles.

59 Wherefore, according to my opinion, who doe not make bridles to be accessory to horses in that sense, as accessory is taken in that maxime, but a supreme power to dispose of all bridles to bee accessory, or consequent to a supreme power to dispose of all horses, for that a su­preme power to dispose both of horses and bridles, is necessarily in­cluded in a supreme power to dispose of all temporall things, as a part in the whole, the aforesaid argument, speaking of a supreme temporall Prince is good, not onely vi consequentis (to vse the termes of Logi­cians) by vertue of the consequent, but also vi consequentiae, by vertue of the consequence, or, which is all one, not onely the consequent is true, but also the consequence is good. But he that will grant the argument to be good in regard that bridles are accessorie to horses, as my Aduersarie doth, he can not maintaine that argument to be good in a supreme temporall Prince by vertue of the consequence, or, which is all one, by vertue of that maxime, The accessorie followeth the principall, but by vertue of an other maxime, which is, that euery part is contained in the whole, and therefore a temporall Prince, who for the common tem­poral good hath power to dispose of all temporall things, hath power to dispose of all horses, bridles, and all other temporall things.

60 Now although I did grant this consequence in the Pope, that because the accessory or consequent doth follow the principall or antece­dent, therefore the Pope hauing power to commaund spirituals, hath also power to command temporals in order to spirituall good, not for that temporals are accessory, or consequent to spirituals, in that sense as accessory and consequent are taken in that maxime, but for that a power [Page 53] in the Pope to commaund temporals in order to spirituall good, is, by the institution of Christ, accessory and consequent to his power of com­manding spirituals, yet I vtterly denyed this consequence, The accessory followeth the principall, therefore the Pope hauing power to commaund, and to dispose of spirituals, or to inflict spirituall punishments, hath also power to dispose of temporals, and not onely to command or inioyne, but also to inflict temporall punishments, or to punish temporally by way of constraint. For although temporals are ordained to spirituals in that sense, as I haue often declared, and for that cause may be called accessory to spirituals, yet as accessory is taken in that maxime, they are neither accessory to spi­rituals, for that spirituall good may in any man be very well without them, neither is the Popes pretended power to dispose of temporalls in order to spirituall good, and to punish with temporall punishments by way of constraint, accessory or consequent to his power to dispose of spirituals, or to punish with spirituall punishments, or Ecclesiasti­call censures.

61 And by this is easily answered that, which M^r. Fitzherbert saith in the next Paragraph concerning priuate men. And if wee consi­der, saith he,Nu. 14. p. 3 [...]. also Widdringtons argument euen in particular and priuate men, it may haue a very true sense, and will fortifie mine; for whosoeuer is Lord of any horse, is Lord also of the bridles that belong to that horse, be­cause (according to Widdringtons supposition) they are accessory of the said horse, and therefore according to my axiome, doe follow their principall: and the same must needes bee granted in this our case, seeing that the Pope doth no otherwise dispose of temporall goods then the same doe belong to par­ticular men, whom he hath occasion to chastise for the benefit of their soules, and the publike good of the Church; and therefore when he punisheth any Prince temporally, hee neither doth, nor can doe it in other mens goods, but onely in those goods, or states, which belong to that Prince, as a Lord of a horse disposeth not of other mens bridles, but of the bridles that belong to his owne horse; for as other mens bridles are not accessory of that horse, so neither are other mens goods accessory to the Prince, who is to be punished, but such goods or states onely as belong to him, and may consequently be disposed of by his supreme Pastour, when his and the publike good of the Church shall ne­cessarily require it: So as you see how well Widdrington argueth for mee, and therefore the probabilitie that I see in this his argument, is no other, but that he playeth, as I may say, booty with me, and helpeth vnder hand to defend my cause. Thus much for the first argument.

62 But first it is vntrue, that I according to my owne doctrine doe suppose that bridles are accessory to horses, as accessory is taken in the aforesaid maxime, but I doe suppose, and that truely, according to my Aduersaries doctrine, that bridles are accessory to horses, for that they are made and ordained for horses, in which sense hee taketh acces­sorie [Page 54] in that maxime, and therefore he affirmeth, that corporall and tem­porall goods are accessory to the spirituall good of the soule, for that they are ordained and referred to the said spirituall good.

63 Secondly, it is also vntrue, that the argument, which I made against his consequence, if it be considered in particular and priuate men, can haue a very true sense, as it is grounded in that rule or maxime, the accessory followeth the principall, and that it doth fortifie his conse­quence. For whosoeuer, saith he, is Lord of any horse, is Lord also of the bridles that belong to that horse, because (according to his owne supposi­tion, and not mine) they are the accessory of the saide horse. Obserue now, good Reader, how cunningly this man would shift off the argu­ment, or instance, which I made against his consequence, and delude thee with ambiguous words. For what can any man imagine my Ad­uersary to vnderstand by these wordes [the bridles that belong to that horse] for surely no man can be so simple, as to thinke, that any bridle can be said to belong to a horse, as to the true owner thereof, or so proper to a horse, that the horse can not be without that bridle, for so indeede it would very well follow from that maxime, that he, who is Lord of that horse, is also Lord of that bridle, and he that should buy that horse, should also buy that bridle which belongeth to that horse. And therefore either it must be said, that such a bridle doth belong to such a horse for that the bridlemaker did make it serue such a horse, and for this respect it can not be truely said, that he, who is Lord of that horse, is Lord also of that bridle, for the bridlemaker, and not he who is owner of that horse, may be Lord and owner of the bridle: or else for that such a bridle is, for the most part, or alwaies vsed for such a horse; neither for this respect, or any such like can it be truly said, that he who is Lord of that horse is consequently Lord of that bridle, and can dispose thereof, because that bridle may be lent for the vse of that horse by some other man, who is the true Lord and owner of that bridle, and consequently may dispose thereof, and not of the horse.

64 It remaineth therefore, that for this cause onely, as my Aduer­sary himselfe here insinuateth, such a bridle can bee said to belong to such a horse, for that the same man, who is the true Lord, and owner both of the horse and bridle, and consequently hath power to dispose of them both, doth appoint that bridle to serue that horse; and al­though in this sense that consequent bee true, to wit, that hee who is Lord of any horse, is also Lord, and can dispose of the bridles, which belong to such a horse, or to speake more properly, which belong to the Lord of such a horse, for that the same man is Lord of them both, yet it is not true by vertue of the consequence, or by vertue of that maxime, The accessory followeth the principall, or for that the horse is the principall, and the bridle the accessorie, in that sense as principall and ac­cessorie [Page 55] ought to be taken in that maxime, for then it must also follow, that hee who buyeth that horse, and consequently can dispose thereof, as being the true owner of that horse, hath also power to dispose of that bridle, for that the accessorie must follow the principall, which conse­quence is false, but the consequent is true not by vertue of that maxime, The accessorie followeth the principall, but by vertue of another maxime, which is, that he who is the true Lord, or owner of any horse, bridle, or of any such like temporall thing hath power to dispose thereof.

65 Wherefore it is apparant, that my aforesaid instance, argu­ment, or consequence, The accessorie followeth the principall, therefore hee who is Lord of all horses, is consequently Lord, and can dispose of all bridles, is neither true in Soueraigne Princes, nor in priuate men, vnderstan­ding, as my Aduersarie doth, that bridles are accessorie to horses, neither doth that consequent, although it bee true, not by vertue of that maxime, The accessorie followeth the principall, but by vertue of this, that hee who is Lord of any bridle hath power to dispose thereof, or he that is Lord and can dispose of all temporall things, hath consequently power to dispose both of all horses, and all bridles, fortifie my Aduersaries argument concer­ning the Popes power to dispose of all temporall things, vnlesse it bee first prooued, as hitherto it hath not beene, that the Pope is Lord both in temporalls and spiritualls, in such sort, that for the common spiritu­all good hee may dispose of all temporall things, as it is certaine, that absolute Princes may for the common temporall good dispose of all temporalls, and priuate men may dispose of those goods, which are their owne. And therefore the comparison, which my Aduersarie heere maketh, betwixt the Lord of a horse, who only disposeth of his owne bridles, and not of another mans, and the Pope, who to pu­nish a Prince disposeth only of the Princes goods and states, and not of other mens, is to little purpose, for that it doth suppose that which is in question, and which hitherto hee hath not prooued, to wit, that the Pope hath power to dispose of the temporall goods, states, and bo­dies of all Christians, and that the publike good of the Church doth necessarily require, that the Pope haue power to dispose of all tempo­ralls. And thus much concerning my first instance, wherein whether I haue plaid bootie with them, and helped vnder-hand to defend his cause, and whether it be foolish, ridiculous, and repugnant to my owne doctrine, I remit to the iudgement of any learned man.

66 Now you shall see, how well M^r. Fitzherbert replyeth to my second instance: His other argument, or instance saith he,Pag. 38. nu. 15. 16. 17. is, as I haue said no lesse malicious then his last was foolish and ridiculous. The Pope, saith hee, hath power ouer the Princes soule, ergo, ouer his life, because the accessorie followeth the principall: wherein you see hee seeketh to draw vs to an odious question touching the liues of Princes. Neuerthelesse to say [Page 56] somewhat vnto his argument, and yet not to enter into such an odious matter, let him make the case his owne, and I will not deny, but that the Pope ha­uing power ouer his soule, and being withall supreame Gouernour of the whole Church, hath power also ouer his life, so farre foorth as it may be con­uenient for the good of the Church, I meane not, that the Pope hath power to take his life without iust cause, or by vniust, or vnlawfull meanes (which neither the temporall Prince, who hath direct power ouer his body can doe) but vpon iust occasion giuen by him, and according to the ordinarie manner prescribed by the Ecclesiasticall Canons, that is to say, by deliuering him o­uer to the secular Iustice, S. Leo epist. ad Turbium Ast­ [...]ricens. Episc. because the Church, as S. Leo saith, refugit cru­entas vltiones, doth fly bloodie punishment, and therefore the Church vseth not by her owne ministers to giue, and much lesse to execute the sentence of death vpon any, though shee might doe it, if shee would; for seeing there is nothing that hindreth it, but Ecclesiasticall Canons, the Pope being head of the Church, might dispence therewith, and make it lawfull, if iust occasion required.

67 And how true it is, that the Pope hath power ouer the life of any Christian (with the circumstances and limitations before mentioned) I feare me my Aduersarie Widdrington might find to his cost, if hee were heere, and would not recant his doctrine, euen in this point, to wit, that the Church cannot inflict temporall and corporall punishments, whereby hee impugneth not only the ancient, and vniuersall practise and custome of the Church, but also the Ecclesiasticall Canons, Cap. ab ab­olendam cap. vergentis. cap. excommuni­camus extra de haeretic. & cap. licet de voto, & cap. 1. de homici­dio in 6. & Concil. Trid. sess. 24. c. 8. & 25. cap. 3. and decrees of many Councells and Popes, and finally of the Councell of Trent, as I shall haue good occasion to shew more particularly heereafter Inf. c. 11. nu. 3. & 9. item c. 12. nu. 6. 7. & s..

68 In the meane time hee is to vnderstand, that granting as hee doeth, that the body is subordinate and subiect to the soule, and that all corporall and temporall things are to serue spirituall things, yea and to bee commanded by the supreame spirituall Pastour to that end (and consequently that they are accessorie in the respect of the soule and good of the Church) hee cannot with reason deny the consequence of my argument, to wit, that forasmuch as the accessorie followeth the principall, therefore he that hath power o­uer the soule, and all other spirituall things, hath power also ouer all things that are accessorie thereto, namely the temporall goods, states, and bodies of all Christians, when the good of soules, and of the whole Church doth necessa­rily require it, as shall bee further declared after a while Cap. 5. nu. 37. & 38. item c. 6. nu. 12. 13. 14. & seq. vpon further oc­casion giuen by my Aduersarie.

69 Heere you see, that M^r. Fitzherbert doeth not deny my con­sequence, but alloweth it for good in those his wordes. And how true it is, that the Pope hath power ouer the life of any Christian, (and conse­quently of Christian Kings) with the circumstances and limitations be­fore mentioned, to wit, so farre foorth as it may be conuenient for the good of the Church (a large and intollerable extension of the Popes spirituall [Page 57] power to take away the liues of Christian Princes and subiects) and vp­on iust occasion giuen by him: and againe, that the Pope hath power ouer the temporall goods, states and bodies of all Christians, (and consequently of Christian Princes) when the good of soules, and of the whole Church doth necessarily require it. So that you see he graunteth my argument to be good, but yet to be malicious, that I speake the trueth, but of ma­lice. But truely it is strange to what virulent and slanderous speeches some intemperate spirit hath drawen the libertie of this mans pen. If he imagine, that with any colourable reply he can except against my aunswere, then it is friuolous, impertinent, foolish and ridiculous: if he can not, then it is malicious. God almightie, who is the onely searcher of all mens hearts, knoweth herein my innocencie, and that zeale to the Catholike religion, desire to know the trueth, loue to my Prince and countrey, and not any splene or malice hath mooued me to write both this, and all the rest: and therefore I humbly beseech his Diuine Maiestie to forgiue him, and to graunt him true repentance for that which is past, and that hereafter he may haue a more milde and temperate spirit.

70 But wherefore, trow you, is my argument malicious? because it draweth him, sayth he, to an odious question: as though, forsooth, the propounding of euery odious argument, although it be neuer so good and conuincing, must needs proceed from malice. I confesse indeed, that this doctrine concerning the killing of Christian Princes is odi­ous, abominable, false, scandalous, neuer taught in the Church of God before these later yeeres; and which all good subiects ought with all their hearts to detest and abhorre, and Princes more narrowly to looke vnto, and whether this doctrine for the Popes power to depose Chri­stian Princes be a point of faith, from whence such an odious, scanda­lous and detestable doctrine doth necessarily follow, I hope all good Catholikes, and true hearted subiects will heereafter more diligently consider.

71 And how true it is, sayth my Aduersarie, that the Pope hath power ouer the life of any Christian (with the circumstances and limitations before mentioned) I feare me, my Aduersarie Widdrington might finde to his cost, if he were here at Rome, and would not recant his doctrine euen in this point, to wit, that the Church can not inflict corporall and temporall punishment, whereby he impugneth &c. But first, that the Pope hath power at Rome ouer the liues of those who are his temporall subiects, no man calleth in question, for that he is now the temporall Prince of Rome. But this prooueth not, that the Pope as he is Pope, and by vertue of his spirituall power hath authoritie to put any man to death. If my Ad­uersarie could bring but one example, that the Pope before he was a temporall Prince, and when the Citie of Rome was subiect in temporals [Page 58] to the Roman, Grecian, French or German Emperours did by vertue of his spirituall power put any man to death, then he should say some­thing to the purpose, if the facts and examples of Popes were a sufficient argument to prooue their right and authoritie.

72 Secondly, although it be true, that the Church by vertue of her spirituall power hath authoritie to command, impose or enioyne corporall and temporall punishments, as I haue often said, and the an­cient and generall practise of the Church doth confirme the same, yet that Ecclesiasticall authoritie is, by the institution of Christ, extended to the disposing of temporals, or to the inflicting of corporall and tem­porall punishments, as death, exile, priuation of goods, imprisonment, very many Doctours with Iacobus Almaine, Almainus in libro de Do­minio natu­rali, ciuili & Ecclesiastico in probatione secundae conclu­sionis. as I haue often said, doe ex­presly deny; neither hath the contrarie as yet by any approoued pra­ctise and custome of the Church, or by any other conuincing argu­ment bene sufficiently prooued, and what my Aduersarie doth parti­cularly bring to that purpose from the Ecclesiasticall Canons, and de­crees of any Councell or Pope, and from the late Councell of Trent, you shall see in those places, where he promiseth to shew it more par­ticularly.

73 In the meane time to conclude this Chapter with my Ad­uersarie, he is also to vnderstand, that albeit I doe graunt, the body to be subordinate and subiect to the soule, and that all corporall and tem­porall things are to serue spirituall things in that manner, as I haue at large declared in the second part, and in the beginning of the next chap­ter will briefly insinuate againe, and therefore to be commanded by the supreme spirituall Pastour in order to spirituall good, yet with good reason I did deny the consequence of his argument, to wit, that for as much as the accessorie followeth the principall, therefore he that hath power ouer the soule and all other spirituall things, hath power also ouer the temporall goods, states, and bodies of all Christians, when the good of soules and of the whole Church doth necessarily require it, if he vnderstand, as it is cleere he doth, of a power not onely to commaund, enioyne, or im­pose, but also to dispose of temporals, and to inflict temporall punish­ments: for that temporall states and bodily goods are not accessorie to the spirituall good of the soule, and of the Church, as accessorie is and ought to be taken in that maxime, because the spirituall good of soules and of the Church may bee without such temporall goods and states, yea and in euery particular man perchance better without them, then with them: Neither is it necessarily required to the good of soules or of the whole Church, that the Pope haue power to dispose of the tem­porall goods, states or bodies either of Christian Princes or subiects; and therefore the Reader may also well coniecture, what he is to ex­pect from my Aduersarie in the rest of his Replies, when in this, where [Page 59] he maketh a shew to haue so great aduantage against my answere, that hee feareth not to call it friuolous, impertinent, foolish, ridiculous, and contrary to my owne doctrine, yet all his exceptions are so impro­bable, that his virulent speeches might very truely, if Christian mode­stie, and charitie would permit, be retorted backe vpon himselfe.

M ^r. Fitzherbert in his third Chapter proceedeth with the like bitternesse, and yet with as little probabilitie as hee did in the former; For after I had made two instances against his argument, drawne from that rule of the Law, The accessory followeth the principall, I brought foure instances against another like consequence of Fa. L [...]ssius, taken from another maxime. The like argument, said I,In Admonia. nu. 15. Fa. Lessius doth vrge. ‘The Pope, saith he, hath power to excom­municate Kings, and therefore he hath also power to depose them, because hee that hath power to inflict a greater punishmēt, hath also power to inflict a lesse. We might also conclude thus, if it were lawfull to transcend from one thing to another of a diuers kinde and nature, The Pope hath power to excommu­nicate Kings, therefore also to kill them, because he that can doe the greater, can doe the lesse. A man hath power to vnderstand, therefore also to flye. A priuate Priest hath power to absolue from sinnes, therefore also from debts. He hath power by force of the Sacraments to giue the kingdome of heauen, therefore also to giue an earthly kingdome. Are not these and such like good­ly arguments to perswade English Catholikes to cast away prodigally all their goods, and to deny their allegiance to their Prince?’ Thus I argued in that place.

[Page 60]2 Now my Aduersarie, after he had repeated my words, replieth against these instances in this manner.Nu. 1. 2. & seq. Thus saith Widdrington, scof­fing and cogging, as you see, and shewing his malicene lesse then before. But how sincerely and truely he alledgeth the argument of Lessius, I know not, for I haue not his booke, neither did I euer reade it, and I make no doubt, but if it had beene laid downe, together with the circumstances thereof, it would haue beene cleere enough of it selfe, and not haue needed any defence or explication of mine: And truely although it were as bare, and naked as he makes it, yet the consequence would be good and sound for ought he saith against it, seeing he saith nothing in effect, but that which may be vrged in like manner against the Apostle Saint Paul for the like argument, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, where commanding them to constitute, and ap­point Iudges amongst themselues to decide their controuersies, he said, Nesci­tis quoniam angelos iudicabimus, quanto magis secularia? Doe you not know, that we shall iudge Angels, and much more secular things? as who would say, seeing wee haue the greater and more eminent power, haue we not also the lesse? if we haue power ouer spirituall things, haue we not also power ouer temporall or secular things? Thus argued the Apostle vpon the same ground that Lessius doth, to wit, vpon this principle, qui potest maius, potestetiam minus.

3 And now will this graue Sophister scoffe at the Apostles argument, and say, that he might as well haue concluded, that Qui potest intelligere, potest volare, Hee which can vnderstand can flie? for what can bee more different in kinde and nature, then Angels, and secular things? and yet ne­uerthelesse the Apostle prooued soundly by an argument a maiori ad minus, that the Church might ordaine, and dispose of secular iudgements, because it had a greater power to iudge of Angels: and the reason, that mooued him thereto, was the same that mooued Lessius, to wit, the subordination of secu­lar and temporall things to spirituall: for albeit spirituall and temporall things are of different kinde and order, being considered in their owne natures, yet if they be respected and conioyned in one Ecclesiasticall, or mysticall body, and referred to one last end (which is Gods seruice and glory) they are subordinate the one to the other, and therefore are not of diuers orders in that respect.

4 And if hee grant not this, how will he make good his owne former grant, that the Pope hath power to command corporall and temporall things, quatenus spiritualibus deseruiunt, so farre forth as they serue spirituall things? doth he not therein acknowledge this subordination, and thereupon grant that power in the Pope, as a consequent of his spirituall power? why then doth he deny the argument of Lessius, grounded vpon the same conside­ration, seeing he argueth a maiori ad minus, concerning things subordinate one to another? as who would say, that for as much as spirituall things are su­periour in order and dignitie to temporall things, and all of them principally ordained and referred to Gods glory and seruice, therefore he that hath su­preame [Page 61] power ouer the spirituall (which is the greater and higher) hath power also ouer the temporall (which is the lesse and inferiour) to dispose thereof, as shall be requisite for Gods glorie and seruice, where to both spirituall and tem­porall things are ordained.

5 Whereupon it also followeth, that the Pope hauing power to excom­municate Kings, may depose them, as well because the power to excommuni­cate is greater then the power to depose, as also because the temporall state, whereof the Pope depriueth the Prince, is ordained to serue the spirituall, and therefore to be disposed by the supreame spirituall Pastour, so far forth as shall be necessarie for Gods seruice, and the good of the Church. So that you see the argument of Lessius (if he made any such) hath a good conse­quence. Thus M^r. Fitzherbert.

6 But to omit his bitter and slanderous words, the maine sub­stance of his reply in this chapter is, as it was also in the former chap­ter, grounded vpon the subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, and of temporall things to the eternall saluation of soules, whereof I treated at large aboue in the second part, which if the Reader will be pleased to peruse, he will easily perceiue, that all my Aduersaries reply in this chapter is of little worth, and that from this subordination no sound argument can be drawne to prooue, that the Pope hath pow­er to dispose of temporall things. For albeit the temporall power may be said to be subiect to the spirituall, or rather temporall Princes are in spirituals, and in temporals as they are reduced to spirituals, subiect to the direction or command, and to the spirituall coercion, or correction of the supreame spirituall Pastour: And albeit temporall goods and states both of the body, and of fortune may be said to be subordained, or rather ordained to the eternall saluation of soules, although not of their owne nature, as I declared in that place, but in this sense, that all Christians, as well Laikes, as Clerkes, Kings, as Popes, are bound to refer all their powers and actions to the eternall saluation of their soules, in so much that as spirituall Pastours are bound to referre and ordaine their spirituall power, and the vse thereof to the eternall saluation of their own soules, & of those who are subiect to them, so Christian Prin­ces are bound to refer their temporall power, & the vse thereof to the e­ternall saluation of their own soules & of their subiects: Neuerthelesse, considering that Christ hath left in the Christian world, or common­wealth, as it containeth both temporall & spiritual power, earthly king­domes, & the spirituall kingdome, or Church of Christ, two distinct & supreme powers, & consequently independant one vpon the other, and therfore neither subordained, or subiect one to the other in those things which are proper to each other, as the disposing of spiritual things, and spiritual coercion or correction are proper & do belong to the spiritual power, so the disposing of temporall things, and temporall coercion or [Page 62] correction are proper, and doe only belong to the temporall power.

7 So that although it belongeth to the supreame spirituall Pastour to direct and instruct a temporall Prince in his temporall power, as it is Christian, that is, to instruct him in what manner hee ought to vse his temporall power according to the grounds of Christian Religion, and to command him to vse his temporall power, and to dispose of tempo­ralls in that manner as Christ hath ordained, to the benefit of his owne soule, and of his Subiects, and also to command him that he doe com­pell his Subiects by meanes of his temporall power, or with temporall punishments to the obseruing of the lawes of Christ, and of his Church, and if the Prince refuse to obey the iust commandement of his spirituall Pastour, it belongeth also to the spirituall Pastour, to compell him thereunto by meanes of his spirituall power, or with spirituall punishments and Ecclesiasticall Censures, in that manner as the inflicting of Ecclesiasticall Censures may bee called a compulsion, yet the vsing of temporall power, the disposing of temporall things, the compelling with temporall punishments, or the inflicting of tem­porall punishments, and punishing temporally by way of constraint, are only proper, and doe belong to the temporall power, for which cause S. Bernard, as I shewed before, did affirme, that the materiall sword is, according to our Sauiours command, to be vsed for the Church, but not by the Church, with the hand of the Souldier, not of the Priest, at the booke, or direction of the Pope, but at the command of the Emperour.

8 Now to come to my Aduersarie; although he hath not, as he saith, Lessius booke, nor euer reade it, yet I haue both seene it, and reade it, and I haue alleadged truly his expresse words as they lye, and I doubt not but that my Aduersarie may easily get a sight thereof. But howsoeuer, that which hee saith, is very vntrue, that I say nothing in effect against Lessius argument, but that which may bee vrged in like manner against the Apostle Saint Paul: for that Saint Pauls argu­ment, as I shewed before in the former chapter, was not grounded vp­on this maxime, hee that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, whereon Lessius groundeth his argument, for this maxime is very vntrue, vnlesse the greater doeth actually, or vertually include and imply the lesse, or which I take for all one, vnlesse the greater and the lesse be of the same kind or order. But S. Pauls argument was grounded vpon this max­ime, hee that is not vnworthie to doe the greater, is not vnworthie to doe the lesse. For S. Paul intended only to prooue, as I shewed before, that Christians were not vnworthie to iudge of secular things, because they were to iudge the world, and the Angels, and therefore by the argu­ment a maiori ad minus they were not to be accounted vnworthie to de­cide secular causes. Neither hath euery man that power, whereof hee is not vnworthie, but he hath onely that power, which hee, who hath [Page 63] authoritie to giue that power, hath granted, although perchance he be not vnworthie to haue a greater power; as to be Lord Chancellour is a more great and eminent authoritie, then to be Lord Chamberlaine, and yet it is not lawfull thus to argue from that maxime, he that hath the greater authoritie hath the lesse, therefore he who is Lord Chancellour is al­so Lord Chamberlaine, albeit we might rightly thus conclude, as the Apostle did, a maiori ad minus, he that is not vnworthie to be Lord Chancellour is not vnworthy to be Lord Chamberlaine, for that he, who is not vnworthie to haue the greater authoritie, is not vnworthie to haue the lesse.

9 If therefore I had denied the Pope to haue authoritie to dispose of temporall things, because he had beene vnworthy to haue that au­thoritie, then I had indeede disprooued the Apostles argument, but see­ing that I doe onely for this cause deny the Pope to haue authoritie to dispose of temporall things, for that Christ our Sauiour hath not gran­ted this authoritie to him, but onely to temporall Princes, I doe not goe against the Apostles argument. Neither did the Apostle goe about to prooue, that the Church might ordaine and dispose of secular iudge­ments, taking secular iudgements for such, as doe proceed from pub­like authoritie, and can not be done by priuate power, but hee onely commanded the Corinthians for auoiding of scandall to appoint arbi­trarie Iudges among themselues, which they might doe by their owne priuate power, and without any derogation to the temporall Magi­strate, and in case of scandall they ought also so to doe, and he onely intended to prooue, that because they were not vnwoorthy to iudge the Angels and the world, much more were they not vnworthy to be Ar­bitrarie Iudges in secular causes. Wherefore Saint Paul did not in­tend to prooue, either by the subordination of the temporall power to the spirituall, or by any other argument, that the Church might or­daine or dispose of those secular iudgements, which belong to tempo­rall authoritie, neither can there be drawne any good argument from this subordination to prooue the same, as I haue shewed more amply in the second part.

10 Neither did I graunt, that the spirituall Pastour hath power to command corporall and temporall things, quatenus spiritualibus de­seruiunt, so farre forth as they serue spirituall things, for that corporall and temporall things are ordained to spirituall things, and to the eter­nall saluation of soules, as my Aduersary vntruely affirmeth, for then indeede I must also haue granted, that the Pope hauing power to dis­pose of spirituall things, hath consequently power to dispose of tempo­rall things, so farre soorth as they are to serue spirituall things, but my reason was, as you haue seene in the former chapter, because the power to command temporall things in order to spirituall good is a spirituall [Page 64] power, and agreeable to a spirituall Pastour and Gouernour, as he is in­stituted by Christ, but the power to dispose of temporall things, whe­ther it be in order to temporall, or to spirituall good, is a temporall power, and therefore not agreeable to a spirituall Pastour, according at our Sauiour hath in the Christian world or common wealth institu­ted, ordained, and distinguished these two supreme powers temporall and spirituall by their proper acts, functions and dignities.

11 And albeit both spirituall and temporall things are referred to one last end (which is Gods honour and glorie) as to the center, to which both of them ought to tend, yet from hence it can not be right­ly concluded, that the temporall power is subordained to the spirituall, or that temporall things, as temporall lawes, temporal actions, tempo­rall punishments and the like, are subordained to spirituall things, as to spirituall lawes, spirituall actions, spirituall punishments and the like, but that both of them are, I doe not say, subordained one to the other, but ordained to one and the selfe same end, which is the glorie and seruice of God, and the saluation of soules, which is as it were the center, to which the temporall power by temporall lawes, and by dis­posing of temporals, and the spirituall power by spirituall lawes, and by disposing, or dispencing of spiriruall things ought to tend. By which it is apparant, that although it were supposed, that the disposing of temporall things, and the vsing of temporall power, were in some cases necessarie to the honour and seruice of God, to the good of the Church, and to the saluation of soules, yet it can not be performed but by the temporall power, for that our Sauiour Christ hath giuen to spi­rituall Pastours onely spirituall power to promote and maintaine by spirituall meanes the good of the Church, and to bring soules to hea­uen, and temporall meanes, and temporall power he hath left to the disposition of temporall Princes, whom he forsaw, and preordained to be Nurses, Patrons and Protectours of his Church.

12 Wherefore although my Aduersarie did endeauour, as you haue seene in the former chapter, to prooue by the subordination of temporall things to spirituall, that the Pope, because he hath power to command, and to dispose of spirituall things (which as he said are the principall and to which temporall things are subordained) hath power also to dispose of temporals, and thereupon grounded his argument vpon that rule of the law, The accessorie followeth the principall, which argument neuerthelesse how weake and insufficient it is, I haue shewed in that place, yet Lessius doth not ground his argument vpon that rule, The accessorie followeth the principall, but vpon this maxime, He that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, from whence he concludeth, that the Pope, because he can excommunicate a King, which is the greater pu­nishment, can also depose a King, which is the lesse. But this argument [Page 65] also is very insufficient, for that the aforesaid maxime is not generally true, as I prooued by foure instances, except the lesse be actually or ver­tually included in the greater, as deposition, or the power to depose a King, is neither actually nor vertually included in excommunication, or in the power to excommunicate. Therefore vnlesse it be first proo­ued, as hitherto it hath not bene, that deposition is actually or vertually included in excommunication, or the power to depose in the power to excommunicate, it is euident, that no good argument can be drawne from that maxime, He that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, to proue that the Pope, because he hath power to excommunicate a King, which is the greater, hath power also to depose him, which is the lesse.

13 Now you shall see, how well M^r. Fitz. confuteth the foure instan­ces I brought against Lessius argument. This being so, saith he,Nu. 67. pag. pag. 33. let vs ex­amine a little what goodly arguments Widdring. hath made to confront with the former, to discouer the absurdity, which he supposeth therein. The first is; Potest Papa Reges excommunicare, ergo occidere, The Pope may ex­communicate Kings, and therfore he may kill them: whereto I answere, as I did in the like before, that he bewrayeth herein his malice, seeking to draw vs to a most odious question supposing, as it seemeth, and maliciously insinuating, that wee hold and teach that the Pope hauing excommunicated, and deposed a King, may murther him or cause him to be murthered and that some Popes haue practised the same (as some shamelesse Sectaries haue impudently affir­med) wherein he sheweth his good affection to Catholike Religion, and the re­uerend respect he beareth to the Sea Apostolike.

14 But if he vnderstand nothing else by the word, occidere, but to take away the life of a delinquent by lawfull meanes, I haue answered him already, that if hee make the case his owne (for with Princes liues I will not meddle) I make no doubt but the Pope hath power ouer his life: and therefore I also say further now concerning the argument whereof we treate, that the consequence thereof is good in him and such a hee: for seeing that it is a greater power to take away the life of the soule by excommunication, then of the body by tem­porall death, it followeth that the supreame Pastour hauing the greater power, hath the lesse, by reason of the subordination of the body to the soule, and his su­preame power to dispose of the body for the good of the soule, and the publike be­nefite of the Church. And thus much for this point.

15 But to this Reply I will at this time answere no otherwise then I did before, that in very deede it is a most odious question, and the doctrine is worthie to bee hated and detested by all good Catholikes, and whether such an odious & detestable doctrine can be a most plaine & necessarie cosequence of an vndoubted point of the Catholike faith, as my Aduersaries will needes haue the doctrine for the Popes power to depose Princes, and consequently to kill them, which by an euident, and necessarie consequence followeth from the former, to be an infallible [Page 66] point of Catholike faith, I remit to the consideration of any iudicious man. Neither is it true, that I did vrge this argument of malice, God is my witnes and therefore in this my Aduersarie doth greatly wrong me, neither doe I suppose, or maliciously insinuate, that some Popes haue practised the murthering of Kings, as this vncharitable man vntruly af­firmeth, thinking thereby to perswade his Reader, that I beare no good affection to Catholike Religion, nor any reuerend respect to the Sea Apostolike; but that, which I suppose and insinuate is, that he, & the rest of his Societie, who hold that the Pope hath power to dispose of all the temporals both of Princes and subiects in order to spirituall good, in as ample a maner as temporal Princes haue power to dispose of all the tem­porals of their subiects in order to temporall good, must consequently hold, that the Pope hauing excōmunicated & deposed by his sentence an heretical King, yea also without excōmunicatiō or deposition, if the Pope shal think that neither of them wil preuaile, but cause the said King to be more watchful, may, which I speak with horror, murther him, or cause him to be murthered, that is, may kil him, or cause him to be slaine by all those meanes publike or secret, by which a temporal Prince hath power to murther, or cause to be murthered, that is, to kill, or cause to be slaine any traiterous subiect, or manifest rebel, that cānot easily be apprehēded

16 And this I did demonstrate in myNu. 43 & s. Apologie against Cardi­nall Bellarmine, to which my demonstration D. Schulckenius In Apol ad nu. 43 p. 144. an­swereth no otherwise then with a transeat, let it passe. For whither all this doth tend, saith hee, euery man seeth: neither is it hard to solue the arguments: Let them passe, as making nothing to the matter: and then hee maketh a long discourse to shew, that neuer any Pope hath beene the cause of the death of any King, which is nothing to the purpose: so that in effect he granteth my argument, and Suarez In Defens. &c. l. 9. c. 4. n. 10 See my Appen. against Sua­rez part. 1. sec. 9. hath now more ex­presly taught the same, and my Aduersarie also doth heere plainly con­firme as much: for although, forsooth, with the liues of Princes he will not intermeddle, because it is an odious question, yet he maketh no doubt, but that the Pope hath power ouer my life, and ouer the life of any Christian (marke these generall words) for that he hath power to take away the life of my soule by excommunication, and consequently the life of my body by corporall death; which his reason proueth also the same of Christian Princes, who, according to his own grounds, can be excōmunicated by the Pope: But I'meruaile where this man hath learned this new diuinity, that the Pope hath power to take away the life of the soule by excommunication. The ancient, and true Catholike doctrine is, that excommunication doth not take away the life of the soule, but supposeth, that it is before taken away, and therefore it cannot be inflicted but for a mortall sin, and it is applied as a wholsome medicine to restore the life of the soule againe, neither is it in the Popes power to take away the life of the soule from [Page 67] any Christian; concerning which life, that vulgar saying of S. Chrysost. Is most true, nemo laeditur nisi a semetipso, no man is hurt but by himselfe. S. Chrysost. tom. 5. in libro, Quod qui se­ipsum non lae­dit, nemo lae­dere possit. If I should haue vttered so grosse and palpable an errour, which no here­tike, for ought I know, euer taught, what outcries would my Aduersarie haue made against me, what nicknames would he haue giuen me?

17 To my second instance, which was this: whosoeuer hath power to doe the greater, hath power to do the lesse, therefore a man who hath power to vnderstand, hath power also to flie; M^r. Fitzherbert replyeth thusNu. 8. pag. 44.. But who seeth not the disparitie, and Widdringtons absurditie therein? for what dependance, subordinatiō, or connexion can be imagined betwixt vnder­standing, and flying? whereas he him selfe granteth a subordination of tem­porall things to spirituall, and therefore is also forced, as you haue heard, to ac­knowledge a power in the Pope to command temporall things in order to spi­rituall whereby he conuinceth him selfe of extreame folly in framing this ar­gument, which hath no affinitie with the other.

18 But who seeth not, that there is no formal disparity, nor any ab­surdity committed by me in this argument? For first, what dependance, subordination, & connexion is betwixt excommunication, & depositi­on. It is one thing, saith Becanus, In Contro­uersia Angli­cana cap. 3. q. 2. nu. 1. to excommunicate a King, and an other thing to depose him, or depriue him of his kingdome; neither is the one necessari­ly connected with the other. But marke the fraudulent dealing of this man: Widdrington granteth, saith he, a subordination of temporall things to spi­rituall, and therefore is forced to acknowledge a power in the Pope to com­mand temporall things in order to spirituall. It is true, that I doe grant an or­dination both of temporall, and of spirituall things to the honour of God, and the saluation of soules, in that manner as I haue before decla­red, but it is not true, that I do either graunt a subordination, or ordina­tion of deposition to excommunication, or that by reason of the ordi­nation of temporall things to the honor & seruice of God, & the salua­tion of soules, I doe grant a power in the Pope to command temporall things in order to spirituall, (as my Aduersarie saith I doe) but for that reason, which I haue more at large declared in the former chapter.

19 Seeing therefore that there is no dependance, subordination, or connexion betwixt excommunication, and deposition, what connexion, or affinitie can my Aduersarie require betwixt vnderstan­ding and flying, to shew a formall disparitie betwixt Lessius argument, and the instance, which I made against it? And if hee say, that, albeit excommunication and deposition, temporall things and spirituall are of a distinct kinde and order beeing considered in their owne natures, yet if they bee respected as they are referred to one last end (which is Gods seruice and glorie) they are not of diuers orders, but are connected in that respect: it may also be replied, that vnderstanding and flying, and all things whatsoeuer are referred to Gods seruice and glorie, as to the last end, [Page 68] and therefore in this respect they are not of diuers orders, but they haue herein a coherence and connexion. If therefore by reason of the or­dination and reference of excommunication and deposition to Gods seruice and glorie, it may be rightly inferred, that because the Pope for Gods seruice, and glorie, can excommunicate, which is the greater, he can also for the same end depose which is the lesse, for the same ordina­tion and reference of vnderstanding and flying to Gods seruice and glo­rie, it may also be rightly inferred, that because the Pope for Gods seruice and glory hath power to vnderstand, which is the greater, he hath also for the same end, power to flie, which is the lesse.

20 But secondly and principally, obserue, good Reader, how cunningly M^r. Fitzherbert would shun the difficulty, and change the state of the question, & the force of Lessius his argument: For the question between me & Lessius only is, whether this consequence, The Pope can excommu­nicate, therefore he can depose, be good by vertue of that maxime, he that can do the greater can do the lesse, for this is Lessius argumēt: Now my Ad­uersarie altereth this question, and would make Lessius argument to be, that the Pope can excommunicate, therefore he can depose, because temporall things are subordained to spirituall things, whereas this is not Lessius argu­ment, which I did there impugne, but it is an other framed by my Ad­uersarie and taken from an other medium, to wit, the subordination of tempotall things to spirituall, & grounded in that maxime, the accessorie followeth the principall, whereof I haue spoken enough in the former chapter. For Lessius his argument hath an other medium, to wit, that maxime, he that can do the greater can doe the lesse, which I contend to be no good argumēt, for that it would likewise follow from that maxime, that the Pope, because he can vnderstand, which is the greater, can also she which is the lesse. For as excommunication, & deposition, although they doe materially disagree, for that they are of a diuerse kinde & order, yet they do formally agree in that maxime, he that can do the greater can do the lesse, because excommunication is the greater & deposition is the lesse, so also although there be a materiall disparitie betwixt vnderstanding & flying, for that they are of a diuerse kind & order, yet they do formal­ly agree in that maxime of Lessius, because vnderstanding is the greater, and flying is the lesse. And therefore the extreame folly, wherewith my Aduersarie chargeth me, may more truly, if it were decent for me to vse such vndecent words, be returned vpon himselfe, in that hee taking vpō him to defend Lessius argument, cleane changeth the argument, & frameth an another out of his owne braine, which hath a distinct medi­um, & is grounded vpon another maxime from that which Lessius vsed.

21 To my third instance, which was this: He that can doe the grea­ter can doe the lesse, theref [...]re a priuate Priest, who can absolue from sinnes, can also absolue from debts, M^r. Fitzherbert replyethNu. 9. 10. 11. pag. 45. that Widdrington [Page 69] altereth the case in making his instance in priuate Priests, whose power is much limited, when the argument, which he impugneth speaketh of the Pope, who is the supreame spirituall Pastour, and hath plenitudinem potestatis, a ple­nitude, or fulnesse of power; and therefore albeit we teach, that the Pope may excommunicate and depose a Prince, yet no man holdeth, that a priuate Priest can doe either of them both, yea and wee see, that in the great Coun­cell of Lateran (where the deposition of Princes was ordained to be practi­sed in some cases) the sentence of their deposition was reserued to the Pope himselfe, though the Metropolitan might excommunicate him.

22 Besides that, it is to be considered concerning the absolution of sinnes, and debts, that as neither Priest, nor Pope can absolue from sinnes in all ca­ses (as when the sinner is not penitent, or will not make restitution of fame, or goods, when he may conueniently doe it) so may the Pope absolue from debts in some cases for the very same reason, and in the very same case that he may depose a Prince, to wit for the iust punishment of an offender, when the same shall be very necessarie for the benefite of the whole Church; for in such a case all priuate respects of temporall good or harme ought to yeeld to the common good of soules, and the publike weale of the Church; as in like manner all ci­uill obligations cease, when they are encountred, and ouerweighed with the consideration of some great benefite, or inconuenience to the whole common wealth, for which respect the temporall Prince might in such a case iustly ordaine, that a debter should bee discharged in law from the pay­ment of his debt, whereby the sayde debter should bee also discharged in conscience.

23 And much more may the supreame spirituall Pastour of the Church discharge a man from all obligation in conscience to pay a debt, when the same shall bee necessarie for the spirituall good, and publike be­nefite of the Church, whereto all temporall things ought to yeeld; so as the Pope may in some cases absolue from debts, as well as from sinnes; and when hee cannot, the reason is such, as doth nothing derogate from his supreame au­thoritie, and power to depose Princes; and therfore this argument of my Ad­uersarie is as impertinent as the former.

24 But it is too too apparant, that I haue not any way altered the case or question. For the case and question betweene mee and Lessius is not at this present, whether the Pope can excommunicate, or whether he can depose, or whether this consequence; The Pope can excommunicate, therfore he can depose, be good by reason of the Popes plenitude of power, but whether it be good by vertue of that maxime, He that can doe the greater can doe the lesse: and I affirme his conse­quence not to be good, because that maxime is not true in those gene­rall wordes, as it is set downe. So that the onely case and question be­tweene mee and Lessius now is, whether that maxime, He that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, be true, and that therefore hee doeth from [Page 70] thence rightly inferre, that because the Pope can excommunicate, which is the greater, hee can also depose, which is the lesse. And that this generall maxime of Lessius is not true, I prooued by the two former instances, and also by this, for that if it bee true, that whosoeuer can doe the greater can doe the lesse, as Lessius affirmeth, it doeth conse­quently follow, that a priuate Priest, who can absolue from sinnes, which is the greater, can also absolue from debts, which is the lesse. If Lessius maxime had beene, euery Pope that can doe the greater can do the lesse, and I would haue impugned this maxime by priuate Priests, for that priuate Priests who can do the greater, as to absolue from sins, cannot doe the lesse, as to absolue from debts, then indeede I should haue altered the case, in transferring the question from Popes to priuate Priests, who are not contained in the subiect of that maxime, euery Pope, &c. but seeing that Lessius maxime is generall, qui potest maius, potest minus, he that can (which includeth Clerkes, and Laikes, Kings, and Subiects, Pope and Priests, and all other men whatsoeuer) doe the greater can doe the lesse, it is sufficient to prooue this maxime to bee false, without altering the case, if I can bring but one particular instāce, whether it be of Pope or Priest, King or subiect, wherein this maxime is not true.

25 And if I should haue argued in this manner, hee that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, therefore a priuate Priest who can build a Church can build a Chappell, would my Aduersarie, trow you haue said, that I had altered the case, for that he speaketh of the Pope, and I speake of priuate Priests? and I would wish also my Aduersarie to call to mind, what hee said a little before, that S. Paul argued from that max­ime, which Lessius did, hee that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, and yet I thinke hee will not say that either S. Paul, or Lessius altered the case, although Lessius spake only of the Pope in his consequent, and S. Paul of priuate men. Also I would gladly learne of my Aduersarie in what manner the maior proposition, or antecedent of any argument, and consequently the argument or consequence it selfe may, accor­ding to his skill in Logicke, bee impugned without altering the case, as whether to impugne the maior proposition of this syllogisme he that was neuer taught Logicke, cannot bee a good Logician, but F. T. was neuer taught Logicke, therefore F. T. cannot bee a good Logician, it bee not sufficient, without altering the case to bring this instance, M^r. T. F. was neuer taught Logicke, and yet hee is a good Logician, and therefore that Maior proposition, hee that was neuer taught Logicke can­not bee a good Logician, is not true, and so the consequence deduced from it cannot bee good, which Maior proposition whether it bee sufficiently impugned or no, without altering the case, albeit I trans­ferre the subiect of the minor proposition from F. T. to T. F. M^r. [Page 71] Thomas Fitzherbert knoweth full well.

26 Wherefore it is sufficient without altering the case to impugne any vniuersall proposition, which is the antecedent of any consequence, and thereby to impugne the consequence it selfe, which is grounded vpon that antecedent, by bringing any one instance, wherein that an­tecedent proposition is not found to be true, although that instance be different either in subiect, or in praedicate, or in both from the con­sequent of the former argument or consequence, so that the instance be contained in that antecedent proposition as a particular in the vniuersall. And herein M^r. Fitzherbert doth bewray his want of of Logicke, as be­fore he bewrayed his want of Diuinitie, in affirming, that the Pope by Excommunication doth take away the life of the soule. For if his skill in Logicke had beene but meane, he would quickly haue perceiued, that if one impugne the antecedent proposition of any consequence, or argu­ment, by altering the consequent, he doth not alter the case, so that the praedicate and subiect of the consequent, which is brought to impugne the antecedent, be contained in the praedicate and subiect of the antecedent, as a particular in the vniuersall.

27 And therefore I haue sufficiently without altering the case confuted that maxime, he that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, by this instance of a priuate Priest, who is contained in that subiect (hee that can) as a particular in the vniuersall, for that a priuate Priest can doe the greater, to wit, can absolue from sinnes, and yet he can not doe the lesse, to wit, absolue from debts: from whence it followeth, that the a­foresaid generall maxime is not true, and therefore neither the conse­quence of that argument concerning the Popes power to excommuni­cate, and consequently to depose, which consequence is grounded vp­on that generall maxime, can be good. By which it is apparant, that from that maxime it can not be rightly concluded, that because the Pope hath power to excommunicate, which is the greater, he hath power ei­ther to depriue Princes of their kingdomes, or to absolue subiects from their debts, which are the lesse.

28 Neither is the deposing of Princes, or the discharging of sub­iects from paying their debts necessary for the spirituall good, and pub­like benefite of the Church, or which is all one to the saluation of soules; & although they were necessary yet seeing they are temporall, and not spirituall actions, they must be performed for the same spiritu­all end by temporall and not spirituall power: And therefore that ar­gument, which my Aduersarie vseth a maiori ad minus, that because a temporall Prince may absolue his subiect from the payment of his debt, therefore much more the supreame spirituall Pastour of the Church may doe the same, is of little worth, for that the disposing of temporall things, and the inflicting of temporall punishments, as is the [Page 72] discharging of subiects from paying their debts, doe belong only to the temporall power of Secular Princes, and not to Ecclesiasticall autho­ritie, which, by the institution of Christ, is not extended to the infli­cting of temporal punishments, as death, exile, priuation of goods, &c. but only of Ecclesiasticall or spirituall censures, as I haue shewed more at large in the first part.

29 To my fourth and last instance, which was this, He that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, therefore a priuate Priest who hath power to giue the kingdome of heauen, to wit, by vertue of the Sacraments, hath power to giue an earthly kingdome, M^r. Fitzherbert answereth as before,Nu. 12. 13. pag. 46. that Widdrington changeth the state of the question, transferring it from the Pope to a priuate Priest; for albeit this argument holdeth not in priuate Priests, yet it is good in the Pope, if we change the consideration of the force of the Sacraments (whereto my Aduersarie Widdrington ascribeth the Popes power) to the plenitude of power, by the vertue whereof the Pope hath a supreame authoritie; and therefore the argument would be good thus: Potest Papa per plenitudinem potestatis, &c: The Pope may by the plenitude of his power giue the heauenly kingdome, and therefore he may giue an earthly, for the later being a necessarie consequent of the former, is ne­cessarily comprehended in it, because the Pope by the plenitude of his power hath as much authoritie and iurisdiction, as is necessarie for the gouernment and good of the Church. Whereupon it followeth, that whensoeuer it shall be absolutely necessarie and behoouefull for the Church, that he change or trans­ferre a kingdome or Empire, he may doe it, and giue not only the Kingly or Imperiall title, but also the right to the crowne, as Leo the third, &c.

30 But M^r Fitzherbert doth also in this answere bewray his igno­rance and want of Logicke, as he did in the former: for it is cleere, that he himselfe, and not I, doth alter the case, and change the state of the question. For the question is not concerning the consequent of Lessius argument, but concerning the consequence, or that antece­dent proposition, and maxime, hee that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, whereon his consequence or argument is grounded: and there­fore by changing the consequent, the case or state of the question is not altered, when the consequent is included in the antecedent propo­sition as a particular in the vniuersall: as in the former part of this ar­gument, a Priest can giue the kingdome of heauen, is included in the for­mer part of that maxime, he that can doe the greater, and the second part, therefore he can giue an earthly kingdome, is included in the second part of that maxime, therefore he can doe the lesse; for that to giue the king­dome of heauen is greater then to giue an earthly kingdome. And to make the case more plaine to the vulgar sort, put the case that I should argue thus, Euery white thing is pleasant to the taste, therefore sugar is plea­sant to the taste, the consequent you see is true, yet the consequence is [Page 73] not good, for that the antecedent proposition is false: And if my Ad­uersarie should impugne my consequence, and prooue my antecedent proposition to be false by this instance, Euery white thing is pleasant to the taste, therefore chalke is pleasant to the taste, and I should reply to this instance, and say, that he altereth the case, & changeth the state of the question, in transferring it from sugar, which is sweet, to chalke, which is vnsauoury, would not my Aduersarie, trow you, according to his ac­customed manner affirme, that my reply is impertinent, absurd, foo­lish, and ridiculous, and send me backe to learne Logicke againe?

32 Now you shall see, how plainely M^r. Fitzherbert, whiles hee vntruely chargeth mee, as you haue seene, with altering the case, and changing the state of the question, he doth alter, and change it him­selfe. For albeit, saith he, this argument holdeth not in priuate Priests, yet it is good in the Pope, if wee changet he consideration of the force of the Sacraments (whereto Widdrington ascribeth the Popes power) to the plenitude of power, by the vertue whereof the Pope hath a supreme autho­ritie, &c. But first it is vntrue, and I wonder that M^r. Fitzherbert blush­eth not to say, that I ascribe the Popes power to the force of the Sacra­ments, seeing that I speake not one word in my instance of the Pope, but onely of priuate Priests. And if I had ascribed the Popes power to remit sinnes, and to giue iustifying grace, whereby we are made chil­dren of God, and heires to the kingdome of heauen, to the force and vertue of the Sacraments, had this beene, forsooth, any vnsound or bad doctrine? Will my Aduersarie ascribe the Popes power to remit sinnes, and to giue iustifying grace not to the force and vertue of the Sacra­ments, but to the plenitude of his power, as though the Pope by the plenitude of his power could without the Sacraments remit sinnes, and giue iustifying grace? If this be his meaning, all Catholikes know, what Censure this doctrine deserueth, and it is in some sort agreeable to that, which he said a little before, that the Pope by excommunica­tion doeth take away the life of the soule, which is iustifying grace.

32 Secondly, obserue, good Reader, how my Aduersarie himselfe altereth the case, and changeth the state of the question, and the reason, or principle, whereon Lessius consequence or argument which I did impugne, was grounded. For Lessius his argument was this: The Pope can excommunicate Kings, therefore he can depose them, because hee that can inflict the greater punishment can inflict the lesse, which proposition supposeth that generall maxime, he that can doe the greater, can doe the lesse, and this maxime was the reason and ground of his consequence or argument. Now my Aduersary changeth this reason and ground, and flieth to another. The Pope, saith hee, may giue the heauenly kingdome, and therefore hee may giue an earthly, but for what reason thinke you? I expected, that he would haue yeelded Lessius reason, because hee that [Page 74] can doe the greater can doe the lesse, which reason by those foure instances I did impugne, but he flyeth from this reason to another, because the Pope, saith he, hath a plenitude of power, by which hee may giue the hea­uenly, and consequently an earthly kingdome. Before he affirmed, as you haue seene, that the Pope hauing power to excommunicate Kings may de­pose them, as well because the power to excommunicate is greater then the power to depose, and this was Lessius his reason, which I impugned in this Chapter, as also because the temporall state, whereof the Pope de­priueth the Prince, is ordained to serue the spirituall, and therefore to bee disposed by the supreme spirituall Pastour, so farre soorth as shall be neces­sarie for Gods seruice, and the good of the Church, and this is the reason, which my Aduersary brought in the former Chapter, and was groun­ded in that rule of the Law, The accessory followeth the principall, which I impugned in that place: Now he yeeldeth another reason, which is taken from the plenitude of power, which the supreme spirituall Pa­stour hath.

33 So that you see how he himselfe now changeth the state of the question, and flyeth from Lessius reason, which I impugned, to wit, that hee that can doe the greater can doe the lesse, to the plenitude of the Popes power, which reason neuerthelesse is of small force, and it is rather petitio principij, or, a giuing that for a reason, which is the questi­on: For albeit I doe not deny, that the supreme spirituall Pastour hath in spirituals a plenitude of power, that is, a full spirituall power to go­uerne the Church, which is the spirituall kingdome of Christ, as like­wise all Soueraigne Princes haue in temporalls a plenitude of power, that is, a full temporall power to gouerne their temporall kingdomes, yet how farre this plenitude, or fulnesse of spirituall power is extended, whether to the disposing of temporall things, and to the giuing, or depriuing of temporall kingdomes in order to spirituall good, as my Aduersaries imagine, or onely to the disposing or dispensing of spiritu­all things, as many other learned Catholikes are of opinion, this is that, which is now in controuersie betwixt mee, and M^r. Fitzherbert, and which he taketh vpon him by all lawes humane, and diuine cleerely to conuince, and therefore to giue that for a reason, which is the que­stion, is to commit that fault, which the Logicians call petitio principij.

34 If M^r. Fitzherbert had argued in that manner, as Lessius did, to wit, that the Pope by the plenitude of his power may giue the heauenly king­dome, and therefore hee may giue an earthly, because hee that can doe the greater can do the lesse, then he had not altered the state of the questiō, or changed Lessius medium or reason, but then I would also haue denied his consequence, and haue impugned that reason of maxime, by those foure instances, and infinite other, which might be brought, which do cleerely & directly confute and ouerthrow that maxime. But seeing [Page 75] that he flyeth from that maxime, which Lessius brought for his medium or reason, to the plenitude of the Popes power, he both altereth the state of the question, and also giueth that for a reason, which is the question: For I vtterly deny, that the Pope by that plenitude of power, which Christ hath graunted to his Church, can, I doe not say command, im­pose, or enioyne temporall things, as temporall penalties, but dispose of temporall things, or inflict temporall punishments, although it bee imagined, that they are necessary, as they are not, to the good of the Church and the saluation of soules, it belonging only to the temporall power of Secular Princes, whom Christ hath appointed to be Prote­ctours of his Church, to vse the temporall sword, to inflict temporall punishments, and to dispose of temporall things.

35 Wherefore, neither the plenitude of spirituall power in the supreme spirituall Pastour to giue the heauenly kingdome doth neces­sarily inferre a power in him to giue an earthly kingdome, as a necessa­rie consequent of the former, as my Aduersarie heere affirmeth, al­though the supreme spirituall Pastour by the plenitude of his spirituall power hath as much spirituall authoritie, and iurisdiction, as is necessa­rie for the gouernment and good of the Church, as it is instituted by Christ our Sauiour, neither is the changing, transferring, or giuing of an earthly kingdome, and the disposing of all temporall things abso­lutely necessarie for the spirituall good of the Church, or, which is all one, for the sauing of soules, as also my Aduersarie here supposeth, from which necessitie, for the most part, he draweth an argument to prooue, the aforesaid power to dispose of all temporall things to be in the Pope, (although sometimes he graunteth,cap. 2. nu. 3. that the Pope hath the aforesaid power ouer temporall goods and States, yea and of the bodies of all Christi­ans, so farre forth, at least, as it shall be conuenient for the good of the soule, and of the Church, which is a too too large and exorbitant extension of the Popes plenitude of power to take away the kingdomes and liues of Christian Princes, and to dispose of all temporals) for that, as Card. Bellarmine himselfe confesseth, it is not absolutely necessarie, for the good of the Church to resist the common enemie, as is the Turke. For if the Church, sayth he,lib. 1. de. Concil. cap. 10 could conuerse conuersari. vnder the most cruell persecutions of Nero, Domitian, Decius and Diocletian, why may it not also vnder the persecutiō of the Turks? And although the disposing of temporal things, the changing, transferring, giuing and taking away of temporall king­domes were necessary for the spiritual good of soules, or of the Church, yet they being temporall actions, and proper to the temporall power, as God almightie hath distinguished in the Christian world, or com­mon-wealth, the temporall and spirituall power by their proper acti­ons, functions and dignities, they can not be performed by the spiri­tuall, but onely by the temporall and ciuill power, which Chri­stian [Page 76] Princes are by the law of Christ bound to vse in defence of the Church, and for the necessarie good of their owne soules, and of their subiects.

36 Neither doe those examples, or facts or Popes, which my Ad­uersarie here bringeth, or any such like, sufficiently prooue a power in the Pope, as he is a spirituall Pastour, to change, transferre, giue, or take away earthly kingdomes, for that it is one thing, sayth Card. Bellarmine, in Resp. ad A­polog. pag. 157. Edit. Colon. to relate the facts of Kings, (and so likewise of Popes) and an other thing to prooue their power, right and authoritie. As Leo the third Pope of that name, pag. 47. nu 13 Egmarth. in vita Caroli. Annales Fran­cof. anno 801. Paul. Diacon. lib. 23. Zona­ras tom. 3. An­nal. Cedrenus in vita Con­stant. & Irene. sayth my Aduersarie, gaue to Charles the great the Empyre of the West, which was acknowledged by the Greeke Emperours themselues to be the Popes gift, &c.

37 But to this example I did fully and clecrely answer in my Apologie, nu. 414. & seq. to wit, that the Romane Empire was not translated from the Grecians to the Germans by the onely authoritie of the Pope, but also by the common consent, suffrages, ordinance, decree, and authoritie of the Senate, and people of Rome, both Clerkes, and Laikes, with the ta­cite consent at least wise of all others, to whom it did belong, amongst whom the chiefest of all was the Bishop of Rome, who did not by his spirituall or Pontificall authoritie, which he as Pope receiued from Christ, cause that translation, but as he being the principall member, and citizen of Rome, and of the Romane Empire, did by his aduise, con­sent, solliciting, procurement, suffrage and authoritie chiefly set for­ward that translation, and as he was Pope did by his Pontificall autho­ritie approoue it to be lawfull, and no way repugnant to the law of God or nature, for which causes he is said by many writers to haue transferred that Empire, as the chiefe and principall Authour, procu­rer, and approouer thereof.

38 And this I did sufficiently prooue in that place both by the grounds of Card. Bellarmine himselfe, and also by the testimonies of those Authours, whom he alledged. ‘For nothing can be concluded, saith he,lib. 2. de Rom. Pont. cap. 8. by arguments taken from authoritie negatiuely. For it doth not follow, Luke, Paul and Seneca doe not say, that S. Peter was at Rome, therefore S. Peter was not at Rome; For these three were not bound to say all things, and more credite is to be giuen to three witnesses affirming, then to a thousand saying nothing, so that these doe not deny, what the others doe affirme. See­ing therefore that none at all of those thirtie two Authours, whom Card. Bellarmine brought for witnesses of the translation of the Empire made by the Pope, doth deny, that the aforesaid translation was done by the authoritie of the Senate and people of Rome, and not onely three of Card. Bellarmines Authours, but also many more whom I ci­ted there, doe most plainly affirme, that both the authoritie of the Pope, and also the consent, decree, ordinance, suffrage and authoritie of the [Page 77] Senate and people of Rome did concurre to that translation, more credite is to be giuen to them, who doe affirme, that the Empire was translated by the Pope, Senate, & people of Rome, then to all the rest, al­though they were a thousand, who albeit they say that this translation was done by the Pope, yet they doe not deny, that it was also done by the Senate, and people of Rome. Thus and much more to the same purpose did I answere in my Apologie See Apologie 427. & seq..’

39 Now you shall see how cunningly and insufficiently D. Schulckenius doth shift of this my answere. For whereas he is very di­ligent for the most part to set downe my words, and text in particular, when hee imagineth, that with any colourable Reply hee can con­fute them, yet here he relateth Cardinall Bellarmines argument drawne from the translation of the Romane Empire to the French men, but hee altogether concealeth my answere thereunto, and so passeth ouer twentie pages of my Apologie, wherein both by his owne grounds, & by his owne Authours, and many others I cleerly proued, that this transla­tion was done not onely by the authoritie of the Pope, but also of the Senate, and people of Rome: and onely with a flourish of words hee endeuoureth to prooue by a Dilemma, which, as you shall see, is nei­ther to the question betwixt me, and Cardinall Bellarmine, and which I also answered in that place, That I must either approoue Card. Bellar­mines opinion, or else cleerely contradict my selfe in my answere. Where­fore although D. Schulckenius maketh this title of his foureteenth Chapter, The answere of Widdrington to the rest of the examples, which are taken from the facts of Leo the third &c. is examined, yet hee neither examineth my answere to that fact of Leo, nor setteth it downe at all, albeit he confesseth, that I haue at large disputed thereof: But this is all that he repliethSchulck. in Apol. cap. [...] pag. 597. 598..

40 And of the translation of the Empire, Cardinall Bellarmine hath exactly, soundly, and diligently written three bookes of a iust bignesse, in so much that nothing doth seeme can be added thereunto. Onely at this time I doe make this argument against my Aduersary Widdrington. Either that translation was true, or faigned: If hee say it was faigned, hee will bee ouer­whelmed with the voyces of all Historiographers, and hee will take away all humane faith out of the world. But if hee say it was truely done, I aske againe, whether it was done iustly, or vniustly? if hee say it was done vniust­ly, first he will contradict almost all Catholike Writers: for onely the Magde­burgian Heretikes doe blame it as one of the miracles of Antichrist: Be­sides that hee will wrong all the Latin Emperours, who from that time haue beene, & shall be, as though their Empire is not grounded vpon a sound foun­dation: Lastly, he will reprehend all the people of the West, yea all the world, who haue hitherto honoured the Latin Emperour, as a true and lawfull pos­sessour of the Empire. For also the Grecians themselues with their Em­perour, [Page 78] and the Persians, as wee haue related out of Bellarmine in the former Chapter, Ad nu. 390. haue acknowledged the Latin Emperours, as true and lawfull Emperours.

41 But if Widdrington say that it was done iustly, I demand whe­ther it was done by the authority of the Romane Bishop, the Citizens of Rome assenting, or also requesting it, or whether it was done by the autho­ritie of the people of Rome, the Pope assenting, and crowning, and blessing the Emperour chosen by the people, or whether it was done by the authoritie of the Pope and of the people of Rome together. If he will say that it was done by the authoritie of the Bishop of Rome, the Citizens of Rome assen­ting and requesting it, he will agree both with the truth of the fact, and with Bellarmine, and with almost all Historiographers, and he will confirme the argument drawne from this example, which hee endeuoureth to weaken. For Bellarmine doth not reiect the Authors which my Aduersary citeth, who doe adioyne the people of Rome to the Pope of Rome in the worke of the translation of the Empire, so that the true power, and authoritie of transfer­ring the Empire be giuen to the Pope alone, and assent, desire, request, and acclamation be giuen to the people. But if he will say, that it was done by the authoritie onely of the people, the Pope onely assenting, and crowning the Emperour chosen by the people, or also by the authoritie of the people, and of the Pope together, he will most manifestly contradict himselfe, for that in this whole booke he hath repeated a thousand times, that the people are bound by the Law of God to obey their Prince, and that neither in the case of Heresie, nor in any other case, ciuill obedience can by the people be deuied to the Prince, whom once th [...]y haue had and therefore that the people, who by the Law of God are subiect, cannot depose their Prince. Let my Aduersary Widdring­ton choose what part he will, and hee will be compelled either to agree with us, or to contradict himselfe.

42 Thus you see, what a braue flourish D. Schulckenius hath made, especially to those who haue not read my Apologie, as though forsooth he had said something to the question which was betwixt mee, and Cardinall Bellarmine, or had brought some new argument, which was not answered by me in that place, whereas it is as cleere as the Sun, that this his Dilemma is a meere euasion, and shift, and altogether im­pertinent to the question, and that I did fully satisfie it in that very place, both by the grounds of Cardinall Bellarmine, and also by those authorities, which hee alledged without contradicting my selfe at all. For the maine question betweene mee and Cardinall Bellarmine was, whether this translation of the Empire was done by the authoritie onely of the Pope, or by the authoritie both of the Pope, and also of the people, and I proued cleerly by Cardinal Bellarmines owne grounds, and also by his owne Authors, that it was done both by the Pope, and also by the Senate and people of Rome. Now D. Schulckenius saith [Page 79] little or nothing to this question, but flyeth to another by-question, to wit, whether it was done iustly or vniustly, whereas the principall que­stion was onely of the fact, to wit, by whom the fact was done, whe­ther by the Pope alone, or also by the people, and not whether the fact was iust or vniust. So that you see heere be two questions, the first is of the fact, to wit, whether there was any such fact, and by whom, and in what manner it was done, with all other circumstances, which belong to that particular fact: the second is of the iustice or in­iustice of the fact, to wit, whether that particular fact considered with all particular circumstances belonging thereunto was iustly or vniustly done.

43 The first question, as D. Schulckenius himselfe affirmeth,Pag. 591. is to be decided by the testimonies of Historiographers, to whom it apper­taineth to write barely, simply and truely the facts of men; and the second, which doth necessarily suppose the first, by Diuines or Lawyers, to whom it appertaineth to decide what is right or wrong. Marke now how cunningly D. Schulckenius to confound his Readers vnderstanding in­uerteth the order of these questions, and putting, as it were, the Cart before the horse, demandeth that first, which he should do last, and that last, which he should first. For first he demandeth, whether that fact, to wit, the translation of the Romane Empire from the Grecians to the French, was iustly or vniustly done; and secondly he demandeth, whe­ther it was done by the authoritie of the Pope alone, or of the people alone, or of the Pope and people together; as though one should decide a case of conscience before it be knowen and agreed vpon what the case is, and what be all the praticular circumstances, which doe alter the case, belonging thereunto. For it is one case or question, to put the translation of the Empire to be done by the Pope alone, an other by the people alone, a third by the Pope and people together. Also it is one case, if it be done by the Pope and people together, when the Empire is forsaken and abandoned by the Emperour, or which is all one, with the expresse or tacite consent of the Emperour, for that he refuseth to rule or reigne ouer the people any longer, and an other case, when the Empire is not forsaken by the Emperour, or which is all one, against the Emperours will and consent, for that he will stil remaine to be their Emperour. Now if D. Schulckenius had either put downe the case or question plainly with all particular circumstances belonging thereun­to, it would easily haue beene answered, or else if it had pleased him to haue set downe my words, and the case as I did put it, and prooue it to be lawfull, the Reader would presently haue seene, that D. Schulcke­nius might well haue spared to make his aforesaid argument, or Dilem­ma, for that I did fully answere it in that place, and that neither I con­tradicted my selfe, nor that he did answere at all my argument, but that [Page 80] rather by his silence, he did sufficiently acknowledge, that he could not answere it at all.

44 For first I did affirme, that the Romane Empire was transla­ted from the Grecians to the French by the authoritie, decree, ordi­nance, consent and suffrage both of the Pope, and also of the people, and not of the Pope alone; and this I proued by Card. Bellarmines owne grounds, and also by his owne Authours and diuers others; to whom also may be addedLib. 1. hist. Guylielmus Malmesburiensis, In vita Leo­nis tertij. A [...]astasius Bibliothe­carius, lib. ad annum 781. Siffridus, In libro Au­gustali anno 801. Beneuutus de Rambaldis, Ennead. 8. lib. 8. in fine. Sabellicus In Annalibus Galliae. Nicolaus Gillius, Lib. 4. de reg­no Italiae. Carolus Sigonius, and many more. Secondly, I affirmed, that the Em­perours of Greece had the Romane Empire as forsaken and abandoned by them, and that they refused to rule, gouerne and protect them any longer, and consequently that the translation done with those circum­stances was iust, and without any wrong done to the Grecian Empe­rours; Neither in affirming this did I contradict my selfe. For albeit I did oftentimes affirme, that subiects are bound by the law of God, to obey in ciuill causes their temporall Prince, and that in no case they haue power to iudge him, or to withdraw their temporall allegiance from him, for that in no case an inferiour can iudge his Superiour, as Card. Bellarmine himselfe confesseth,lib. 2. de Concil. cap. 18. for which cause he affirmeth, that the Church in no case can iudge an vndoubted Pope, so long as he is Pope, Neuerthelesse I neuer affirmed, that when the Emperour doth abandon and forsake his Empire and people, and refuseth to be their Emperour any longer, but leaueth them to themselues, it is not in their power to choose them an other Emperour, or to change the Imperiall Monarchie into Aristocratie or Democratie, for that then the su­preme temporall power and authoritie is immediately in the people, and this also I prooued in that place out of Card. Bellarmines owne principles.

45 Wherefore when D. Schulckenius a little aboue affirmed, that I doe oftentimes graunt, that the people cannot in any case deny ciuill obe­dience to that Prince whom once they haue had, if his meaning be, that I doe graunt, that he who is once a Prince, can not of his owne accord leaue to be a Prince, and can not resigne his kingdome to the next heire, and that the people are bound to yeeld ciuill obedience to him, who was once their Prince, but now of his owne accord, hath resigned his king­dome to the next heire, he doth greatly wrong me, and abuse his Rea­der; for to affirme this were foolish and ridiculous, and contrarie to all reason and practise: but that which I affirmed was, that it is very probable, and defended by many graue and learned Catholikes, that the people, who are subiect, can in no case, nor for any cause iudge or depose their Soueraigne Prince against his will, and my reason was the same, which Card. Bellarmine oftentimes vseth, to prooue that the [Page 81] Church, or a Generall Councell can not iudge or depose the Pope, for that it is contrarie to all reason for an inferiour or subiect to iudge his Superiour, and therefore those Catholikes that holde a Generall Coun­cell may in some cases iudge the Pope, doe also holde that it is superiour, and aboue the Pope.

46 That the Grecian Emperours had the Romane Empire as for­saken and abandoned by them, I affirmed in these words: ‘Seeing there­fore that (as Lupoldus, or Ludolphus writeth, and diuers other Authors, as Nauclerus, Aeneas Siluius, and Michael Coccinius doe insinuate) the Emperours of Greece in the time of Charles the great, and also before his time, to wit, in the time of his father Pipine and of his grandfather Charles Martellus, did reigne in the West Empire only in name, neither could the Church of Rome, nor other Churches of Christ, or also any others, being by the Longobards vniustly oppressed in the same Empire haue iustice by them, or by their authoritie, and so the aforesaid Em­perours had the West-Empire in a manner forsaken, by gouerning therein only in name, as it appeareth by diuers Chronicles, the Pope, Senate, and people of Rome, at leastwise by the tacite consent of all other Westerne men, who were subiect to the Empire, had euen accor­ding to the doctrine of Cardinall Bellarmine but now related, full right and power (which they could loose by no custome or translation of the Imperiall Seate, as being to them connaturall, and due by the law of nature) to choose themselues a new Emprour, and consequently to transfer the Empire, which the Grecians kept in the Westerne parts only in name, to Charles the great, and his Successours, the Imperiall Seate being in those parts at that time, as it were vacant, or without an Em­perour. Thus I wrote in my Apologie Nu. 438..’

47 And moreouer, that the Greeke Emperours had the Westerne Empire and people for forsaken, and abandoned, and gaue, at leastwise, their tacite consent, according to that rule of the law, qui tacet con­sentire videtur, that they might choose to themselues another Empe­perour, at leastwise in power and authoritie, it is apparant, for that they did neuer repugne, contradict, or gainesay, that Charles the great should rule ouer them, although perchance it displeased them that hee should haue the name of Emperour. Yea, and as Cardinall Bellarmine himselfe writeth, when the Empresse Irene heard, that Charles was called, and crowed Emperour by Pope Leo, shee did not onely gainesay, but also she would haue married Charles, and had done, if certaine perfidious Eu­nuches had not hindered her, as Zonaras and Cedrenus doe write in the life of the said Irene. Afterwards, Irene being dead, Nicephorus the Em­perour, who did succeede her, sent Ambassadours to Charles as to an Em­perour, as writeth Ado in this Chronicle of the yeere 803. And a little af­ter Nicephorus being dead, Michael suceeding him sent Ambassadours to [Page 82] Charles, who likewise did publikely honour him as an Emperour, as writeth Ado in his Chronicle of the yeere 810. All which doe sufficiently con­firme, that the Greeke Emperours did not gainesay this translation, nor conceiue it to be a wrong done to them, and in preiudice of their Im­periall right and Soueraigntie.

48 By all which it is manifest first, that I doe not any wrong at all to the Latin Emperours, who haue beene, and shall be from the time of that translation, as though their Empire were not grounded vpon any sound title or foundation; for that all writers, and Cardinall Bel­larmine himselfe doe agree in this, that the Pope together with the rest of the people haue power to choose them another Emperour, in case the Emperour will no longer reigne ouer them, because in that case the supreame temporall power and authoritie is onely in the people, or whole multitude, but rather Card. Bellarmine as also I obserued in that place,Nu. 462. doth call in question, and make doubtfull the right and title, which the Latin Emperours haue to the Empire, in that hee affirmeth, that they haue all their right and title from the Pope alone, seeing that there be many learned and graue Authours, who make a great doubt, whether the Pope alone hath, by the institution of Christ, any such power and authoritie to transfer Empires, but no Authour, not so much as Card. Bellarmine himselfe according to his doctrine, which I related in that place, doeth deny, that the whole multitude hath full power, and authoritie to transfer the Empire in the aforesaide case, to wit, when the Emperour doth abandon the Empire, and will no longer reigne ouer the people.

49 Secondly, it is also manifest, that I haue not any way contra­dicted my selfe in my answere, and that I haue cleerely prooued by Card. Bellarmines owne grounds, and by his owne Authours, that the aforesaide translation was done by the authoritie, decree, ordinance, and suffrages both of the Pope and of the people, and consequently that the people did more then onely request, applaude, and assent to that translation: to which D. Schulckenius maketh no answere at all: and therefore his silence herein is both an euident signe, that hee was not able to impugne my answere, and that although hee doeth so highly commend his owne booke of the translation of the Empire, as exactly, soundly, and diligently written, yet his owne conscience, for as much as concerneth this question, seeth now the contrarie, for that hee being so plainly conuinced both by his owne principles, and also by his owne Authours, and diuers others, that this translation was not done by the authoritie only of the Pope, as hee pretended to prooue in that his booke of the translation, but also of the people, hee was engaged for the sauing of his credit to haue in some sort cōfuted my answere, but to passe it ouer cunningly with a Dilemma not belonging to the principall [Page 83] question, and which was also fully satisfied by mee in that place, with­out setting downe any one word of my answere, and so omitting con­trarie to his accustomed manner aboue twenty pages of my text toge­ther, doth argue no good and sincere proceeding. And lastly it is also manifest what the Reader may thinke of my Aduersaries sinceritie, who in this place doth so barely, and nakedly repeate againe this argument, without taking any notice of the answere, which in my Apologie I gaue to the same.

50 But the Empire of the West, saith M^r. Fitzherbert Nu. 13. p. 47 was acknow­ledged by the Greeke Emperours themselues to be the Popes gift; and there­fore Emanuel CommenusBlond. dec. 2. l. 5. Platina in Alex. 3. Nau­clerus generat. 39. pag. 848. Emperour of Constantinople in the time of Fridereke the first, vnderstanding of the dissention betwixt him, and Pope Alexander the third, sent Ambassadours to the Pope, and offered him not only a great army with great summes of money, but also to reunite the Greeke Church with the Latin, if hee would restore that Empire of the West to the Emperours of Constantinople.

51 But neither Emanuel Commenus, nor any other Greeke Empe­rour (although from the particular fact of some one Emperour, espe­cially who was desirous to enlarge his Empire, no good argumēt can be drawne to proue a right) did acknowledge the Empire of the West to be the Popes gift, in any other manner, then they had read, or heard from Historiographers, to wit, that the Pope was indeede the chiefe and prin­cipall, but not the onely Authour of that translation. And therefore Blondus one of Cardinall Bellarmines owne Authours doeth well affirme it to be manifest,Blond decad. 1. l. 3. in principle. that the first translation of the Roman Empire frō the Constantinopolitans to the French Princes was done by the authoritie and consent, not only of the Pope, Clergy, & people of Rome, but also by the suf­frages of the people, and principall men of all Italie. Neither did Emanuel Commenus desire of Pope Alexander the third, that he alone without the consent, and suffrages of the Princes and people would restore the Empire of the West to the Emperours of Constantinople, but that he would be a meanes that it might be restored, or translated to them againe, as he was a chiefe meanes, and principall Authour that it was translated from the Grecians to the French.

52 In like manner, saith M^r. Fitzherbert, Nu. 13. p. 47. the second translation of the West Empire from the French (that is to say from the familie of Charles the great vnto the Germans) was made especially by the autho­ritie of the Sea Apostolike,Bell. l. 2. c. 2. & 3. as Card. Bellarmine prooueth cleerely in his Treatise of the translation of the Empire. If my Aduersarie had said, only by the authority of the Sea Apostolike, he had spoken to the pur­pose, but that word [especially] cleane ouerthroweth his argument: For I will not contend with him at this present, whether it was done especially by the authoritie of the Sea Apostolike, in that manner as I granted be­fore, [Page 84] that the first translation from the Grecians to the French was done especially, chiefly, or principally by the Popes authoritie, but that either the first, or second translation was done only by the authoritie of the Sea Apostolike, and not also of the people, this I vtterly deny: neither hath Card. Bellarmine in the aforesaid Treatise by any one sufficient argu­ment prooued, or is able to prooue the same.

53 We reade also, saith M^r. Fitzherbert, that Clodoueus,Papyrius Maso in vita Henrici primi See Bozius de signis Ecclesiae lib. 10. cap. 12. the first Christian King of France, being desirous after his Baptisme, to make good, and establish his right and title to that kingdome, professed to receiue the same from the hands of the Archbishop of Rhemes by authoritie and commission of the Sea Apostolike. But truly it is strange, to see what strange argu­ments, and voide of all probabilitie my Aduersaries dare bring for proofe of so great a matter, as is the giuing, taking away, translating of Kingdomes and Empires. For what Historiographer euer wrote, that Clodoueus, the first Christian King of France, had no good right and ti­tle to his kingdome before he became Christian; or that hee receiued his title, right, and authoritie to reigne from S. Remigius by commissi­on of the Sea Apostolike, and that he himselfe professed as much, or that it belongeth to the Archbishop of Rhemes to choose the King of France, if we will speake properly of choosing, as though the Kings of France, were Kings by election, and not by hereditatie succession, or that the right and title which the Kings of France haue to their kingdome de­pended vpon the election of the Archbishop of Rhemes, or the Sea A­postolike? If my Aduersarie were in France, and would affirme thus much, I feare me, he would be glad to recant his doctrine in this point, or to interpret his words in a better sense, or else he might perchance, to vse his owne words, finde it to his cost.

54 Neither doth Papirius Maso affirme, as my Aduersarie and Bozius say, that King Clodoueus, or Lewis the first, did professe to receiue his kingdome, or his right and title thereunto from the hands of S. Remigius Archbishop of Rhemes by authoritie and commission of the Sea Apostolike, neither could he with truth professe the same, for that he was long be­fore King of France, and had true right, and lawfull title to that king­dome, before he was baptized by S. Remigius; neither doth baptisme make good rights and titles to temporall kingdomes, but as it de­priueth no man of his temporall right and dominion, so it giueth no man any temporall right or dominion, but giueth him only a spirituall right, and maketh him heire to the kingdome of heauen. But all that Papirius Maso doth affirme is, that when Philip the first of that name being but seauen yeares old was by the Archbishop of Rhemes consecrated and elected future King of France, and to succeede his Father Henry then liuing, and present at his consecration, the Archbishop, after he had de­clared the Catholike faith vnto him, and Philip had professed the same, and [Page 85] taken his oath to defend the Church, and his kingdome, taking S. Remigius staffe into his hands, did quietly and peaceably discourse, how the election and consecration of the King did belong chiefely to him, from the time, that S. Remigius did Baptize and consecrate King Lewis. Hee did also discourse, how by that staffe Pope Hormisda gaue to S. Remigius this power con­secrating, and the whole principalitie, or Primacie of France, and how Pope Victor did grant it to him, and his Church. Then his Father Henry becko­ning he chose him to be King after him.

55 This is all that Papirius Maso writeth: So that all the diffi­cultie of these words consisteth in that word [election] which cannot be vnderstood properly, and for that election, whereby one is made King, or heire apparant to the crowne, who was not King, or heire apparant before the election: For the Kings of France before that time, and euer since haue their right, and title to the crowne not by election, but by he­reditarie succession, but it is taken for the religious ceremonie of conse­cration, and a solemne declaration of the Archbishop, that the person, whom he consecrateth, is chosen, or rather acknowledged, and accepted by the whole kingdome for King, or heire apparant to the crowne. Neither doth the consecration and declaration, or if we will improper­ly call it election of the Archbishop, giue any more right, authoritie, or Soueraignitie to the King of France, then he had before, neither if hee were not consecrated, elected, or declared to be King by the Archbishop, should he want any temporall right, authoritie, or Soueraignitie, for that the Kings authoritie & Soueraignitie doth not necessarily depend on the Archbishops consecration, election, or declaration, although some of the vulgar sort of people may perchance imagine, that he is not a perfect King, before he be consecrated and annointed.

56 As likewise the Pope, after he is chosen by the Cardinals, is true Pope, and hath all Papall power, and iurisdiction, before he is consecra­ted or crowned Pope: neither doth his Papall authoritie necessarily de­pend vpon his coronation, which belongs only to a religious ceremo­nie, and a complementall, but not needfull, solemnitie. But this I vn­derstand for this present only of those Kings, who haue their right, and title by hereditarie succession, and not of those, who are Kings by ele­ction, as is the Romane Emperour, and the King of Polonia. For it is a question among the Lawyers, whether the Emperour before he bee crowned by the Pope, or by his commission is truly Emperour, and hath full Imperiall power, or no, whereof and from whence this may pro­ceede I will not now dispute, and so it may perchance be a custome a­mong the Polonians, that the King elect, is not accounted a complete and perfect King, before he be crowned, and consecrated by the Metro­politan; but this may proceede originally, and chiefely from the peo­ple or Kingdome, in whom the supreme. Regall authoritie doth reside, [Page 86] vntill they haue chosen a King, in which time of vacancie they may ex­tend, or limite his authoritie, or make him with what conditions they please, yea and if they will change the Monarchie into Aristocratie, or Democratie, which cannot be likewise said of those Kingdomes, which haue their Kings not by election, but by hereditarie succession, of whom that vulgar saying is verified, that the King doth neuer die.

57 Also when Boleslaus King of Polonia, saith M^r. Fitzherbert, had killed the holy Bishop Stanislaus, Pope Gregorie the seuenth did not only excommunicate and depose him, but also commanded the Bishops of that Realme, that they should not annoint and crowne any King of Polonia without his expresse leaue, and order, whereby he that succeeded Boleslaus had but the title of Duke, which remained also to his Successours for the space of two hundred and fiftie yeares. So as this matter is cleare not only in reason, but also in practise and so hath been for many ages, whereby it appea­reth, that the Pope may giue as well the earthly, as the heauenly kingdome for the good of the Church, by the same reason, and power, that he may de­priue Princes of their states, when they deserue it, and the good of the Church requireth it.

58 And thus thou seest, good Reader, how probably this man Wid­drington hath impugned the argument of Lessius, seeing that of foure argu­ments that he hath scoffingly framed to counterfeit the same, and to prooue a bad consequence therein, there is not any one to his purpose, and some of them being truly vnderstood, and vrged according to the true state of the questi­on (which he hath changed in them) doe make directly for vs; so that his scoffes doe fall vpon one but himselfe, and his owne ridiculous arguments; and therefore whereas he concludeth them with a gybing demand, asking, whe­ther these, and the like are not goodly arguments to perswade the Eng­lish Catholikes to cast away prodigally their goods, and to deny their fidelitie to their Prince? I may with much more reason demand of him, whether these and such other answeres and arguments of his, are not goodly ones to mooue the English Catholikes to be so prodigall of their soules as to cast them away vpon his word, by denying fidelitie, and obedience to their spiritu­all Pastour, who hath the charge of their soules.

59 But it seemeth that his minde and hand is altogether vpon his halfe penny (as the prouerbe speaketh) seeing that he hath so great care of the Catholikes goods, and so little of their soules, that he would haue them ven­ter and hazard their eternall saluation to saue their temporall goods: but I hope God will inspire them to be wiser, and alwaies to remember the golden sentence of our Sauiour, Marc. 8. Luc. 9. quid prodest homini, &c. What doth it profit a man to gaine all the world if he loose his soule? Thus M^r. Fitzherbert endeth this chapter.

60 But as for the example and practise of Pope Gregory the se­uenth, I doe freely acknowledge, that hee was the first Authour and [Page 87] Writer that did in expresse wordes teach, that the Pope hath authoritie to depose temporall Princes, & also that he was the first Pope, who con­trary to the custome of his Ancestours, as Onuphrius witnesseth,Li. 4. de varsa creat. Rom. Pont. did practise the same, but first he did practise it, and then he endeuoured to prooue, that he might lawfully doe it: since which time it hath indeede beene practised by many Popes: Neuerthelesse both the doctrine, and the practise was not knowne to the ancient Fathers, and also it hath euer beene resisted, and contradicted by Catholike Princes, and people both Diuines and Lawyers, and therefore it cannot rightly bee called the practise of the Church. And although the Pope might for sufficient cause command the Bishops of Polonia, that they should not consecrate any King without his expresse leaue, and order, it being onely a religi­ous ceremony, yet it cannot bee sufficiently prooued, either that the Pope hath authoritie to depriue by way of sentence, (for of his power to depriue by way of command I doe not now dispute) any Countrey of the title and name of a Kingdome, without the consent of the Countrey, or of him to whom the Countrey is subiect in temporalls, it being no spirituall, but a meere temporall title, and therefore belong­ing to temporall, and not to spirituall power; or that the Successours of Boleslaus had onely the title of Dukes, for that the Pope depriued them by way of a iuridicall sentence of the title of Kings; but this might proceed either from the people themselues, who by reason of that hey­nous fact of Boleslaus (in killing that holy Bishop Stanislaus with his owne hands in the Church whiles he was saying Masse, and after he had miraculously cleered himselfe, by raising a man from death in o­pen Parliament to giue testimony, whether he had iniutiously taken from that dead man certaine lands, or no, whereof he was falsly accu­sed by the King in a publike assembly of the Realme) would not giue any longer that title of Kings; or for that the Emperour, to whom that kingdome was perchanceDubranius l. 5. & Aeneas Siluius, cap. 19. Bohemiae, who relateth that in the time of Otho the first Empe­rour, the king­dome of Polo­nia was subiect to the Romane Empire. then feudarie, would not suffer them by reason of the execrable crime, to haue any longer that title of Kings, but onely of Dukes.

61 Wherefore neither by any sufficient reason, or approoued practise it can bee prooued, that the Pope as Pope hath power to giue earthly kingdomes for the good of the Church, or to depriue Princes of their states, although they should deserue it, and the good also of the Church should require it, which last supposition ne­uerthelesse is vntrue, for that to depriue Princes of their temporall States is not necessary for the good of the Church, and the saluation of soules, as I haue shewed before; and although it were necessary, yet considering that it is a temporall or ciuill, and not a spirituall action, for what end soeuer we suppose it to be done, it cannot be performed by a spirituall, or Ecclesiasticall, but by temporall, or ciuill power.

[Page 88]62 And thus thou seest, good Reader, (to conclude this Chap­ter with my Aduersary) how soundly, and without any scoffing I haue confuted Lessius argument, and that generall maxime, whereon his consequence was grounded, by those foure instances, which I haue heere examined, and cleerely prooued that they are all to the purpose, and doe not any whit alter the state of the question, but that my Ad­uersarie himselfe in impugning them doth alter the case, and change the state of the question, or medius terminus, which Lessius vsed, and flyeth from his argument to others of his owne inuenting, wherein he discouereth his great ignorance in Logicke, and that therefore all those vnseemely nickenames of absurd, impertinent, foolish, ridiculous, and malicious, agree to none so much as to himselfe. All which being duly considered, I referre to the iudgement of any indifferent man, whe­ther I had not reason, without any cogging, scoffing, gibing, or malice, (as my Aduersary is pleased to vnburden his fowle and bitter stomacke) but with a sincere compassion of the miserable state of poore English Catholikes in soule, body, goods, and credit, (into which this man seeketh to draw them headlong) and with an earnest desire, that they should, according to our Sauiours commandement, Render to God and Caesar that which is their due, to affirme by way of interrogation, that these and such like reasons are no good arguments to mooue the English Catholikes prodigally to cast away their goods, and to deny their allegiance to his Maiestie.

63 Neither is it my desire, that Catholikes should bee prodigall of their soules, or should deny their fidelitie and due obedience to their spirituall Pastour: neither is it true, that I haue greater care of their goods, then of their soules, or that I would haue them vente [...] and hazard their eternall saluation to saue their temporall goods, as M^r. Fitzherbert (little caring what he saith, so that by his saying he may any way disgrace me) very vntruely, God forgiue him, affirmeth; For I doe chiefly respect, God is my witnesse, their eternall saluation, and I would haue them to render all due obedience both to their spiri­tuall Pastour, and also to their temporall Prince, but my desire is, that they will sincerely consider, that not onely in denying spirituall obe­dience to their spirituall Pastour, but also in denying temporall allegi­ance to their temporall Prince, they doe venter and hazard their eter­nall saluation, for that they are bound by the expresse commaunde­ment of our Sauiour, and vnder paine of eternall damnation, to render both to God and Caesar that which is their due. But it seemeth that my Aduersaries minde is all vpon the Pope, and little vpon his Prince, seeing that he hath so great care to enlarge the Popes Monarchy, and so little to maintaine his Kings Soueraigntie, but I hope God will inspire English Catholikes to be wiser, and not to runne headlong on either side, but [Page 89] to examine and weigh their temporall and spirituall fidelity with an equall ballance, and to consider, that they may as well offend and ha­zard their saluation in giuing too much as too little to their spiri­tuall Pastour, as also in giuing too little, as too much to their tem­porall Prince.

64 Wherefore my humble request to English Catholikes is, that seeing this controuersie of their temporall and spirituall obedience be­tweene their temporall Prince, and spirituall Pastour doth so neerely concerne their eternall saluation, they will not venter their soules vpon any mans bare word, nor giue credit either to my sayings, or the say­ings of my Aduersaries without examining sincerely the reasons on both sides, and the substance and manner of both our writings, and di­ligently considering how farre forth they are bound to obey the com­mand of their spirituall Pastour, when it is only declaratiue and groun­ded vpon no sure definition, against the commandement of their tem­porall Prince, who is in lawfull possession of his kingdome, from which the Pope, the matter being as yet in controuersie, and not decided, pre­tendeth to haue power to exclude him. For neither ignorance, nor pretence of zeale to the Sea Apostolike, can now in my opinion excuse them from not examining what duty they owe both to their spirituall Pastour, and also to their temporal Prince, and to what things both their temporall and also spirituall obedience doth extend; for now they ha­uing so many and so sufficient causes prudently to doubt (both in re­gard of so many bookes that haue beene written, and also of the strange carriage of my Aduersaries in commanding me to purge my selfe vnder paine of Censures, and not telling of what, and forbidding my bookes, and not declaring for why, although I haue often desired to know some one particular thing whereof I should purge my selfe, or which is blame worthy in my bookes, faithfully promising to purge whatsoeuer is to be purged, and to recall whatsoeuer I haue written amisse) they are bound according to the doctrine of all Diuines to examine the truth, so farre forth as the learning and capacitie of euery man will per­mit, otherwise their ignorance will bee wilfull and damnable, and their zeale, albeit they shall thinke to doe God good seruice, will be Phari­saicall, sinfull, and inexcusable; and therefore I hope they will be wiser, and not suffer themselues to bee carried away hoodwinkt with blinde obedience, which is most dangerous, when their obedience to man may be a disobedience to God, but that they will alwaies remember that golden sentence of our Sauiour, Render to Caesar the things that are Cae­sars, and the things that are Gods, to God.

ALl that M^r Fitzherbert obiecteth in this Chapter I haue aboue in the end of the second part of this Treatise fully, and verbatim already confuted, and therefore I thinke it superfluous to re­peate here the same againe.

BEcause this Chapter will be somwhat longer then the rest, for that my Aduersarie hath scraped here together many authorities out of the law of God, especially in the old Testament to prooue, that the spirituall power not onely in the new law, but also in the old hath euer been the supreme power on earth and might chastise Princes temporally, and not onely command, impose and enioyne temporall penalties, but also dispose of temporals, and inflict temporall punishments, I thinke it not amisse to diuide it into three parts or sections. In the first I will treate especially of those authorities, which he hath brought out of the olde law before the institution of the Kings of Israel; In the second I will confute those examples, which he alledgeth out of the said olde Testament since the institution of those Kings; and in the third I will examine those texts of holy Scripture, which he hath taken out of the new Testament.