I Have sent you here the reasons, which have moved me to change my opinion in some con­troversies of late debated betweene the Re­monstrants and their Opposites.

I do the rather present them unto you.

1 That I may shew the due respect which I beare your Worship with my forwardnesse to answer your desires, as I can with regard to conscience.

2 That you may see that I dissent not without cause, but have reason on my side.

3 That if I can be convinced that my grounds are weak and insufficient, I may thinke better of the opinion which I have forsaken, then I can for the present.

In the delivery of my motives I will proceed in this order.

• 1 I will state the opinion which I dislike.
• 2 I will lay downe my reasons against it.

Touching the first, your Worship knoweth these two things very well.

1 That the mayne [...] and question in these con­troversies, and that on which the rest do hang, is what the decrees of God are touching the everlasting condition of men, and how they are ordered.

2 That the men who have disputed these things, may be reduced to two sorts and sides.

The first side affirmeth, that there is an absolu [...]e and pe­remptory decree proceeding from the alone pleasure of God, without any consideration of mens finall impenitency and unbeleef; by which God casteth men off from grace and glory, and shutteth up the farre greater part, (even of those that are called by the preaching of the Gospell to re­pentance and salvation) under invincible and unavoydable sinne and damnation.

[Page 2]The other side disavowing any such decree, saying, that Gods decree of casting men off for ever, is grounded upon the foresight of their continuance in sinne and vnbeliefe, both avoydable by grace, and consequently inferring no mans damnation necessarily.

The first side is devided, for

1 Some of them present man to God in the decree of reprobation look't on out of, or above the fall: and say,

That God of his meere pleasure antecedent to all sinne in the creature, originall or actuall, did decree to glorifie his soveraignty and justice in the eternall rejection and damna­tion of the greatest part of mankind, as the end; and in their unavoydable sinne and impenitency, as the meanes. And this way goe Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Piscator, Gomarus, and some of our owne Countrimen.

2 The rest of that side, thinking to avoyd the great in­conveniences, to which that supralapsarian way lyeth open, fall downe a little lower, and present man to God in his de­cree of Reprobation, lying in the fall and vnder the guilt of originall sinne, saying,

That God looking vpon miserable mankind lying in Adams sinne, did decree the greatest number of men (e­ven those men whom he calls to repentance and salvation by the preaching of the Gospell) to hell torments for e­ver, and without all remedy, for the declaration of his se­vere justice. This way went the Synod.

The difference between them is not much, and even in their own account too small a discord to cause a breach. Notwithstanding this petty difference therefore, they agree well inough together, as we may see in the Hague confe­rence and Synod.

In the conference at Hague, the Contraremonstrants have these words; Col. Hag. Braud. pag. 37. Quo ad sententiarum diversitatem in hoc argumento, quòd de­us respexit hominem in hoc decreto non­dum creatum, vel cre­atum & lapsum; quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinae non pertinet, libenter alij alios aequitate Chri­stianâ toleramus. As touching the diversitie of opi­nions in this argument, viz. that God lookt at man in this de­cree, not yet created, or created and fallen: because this be­longs not to the foundation of this doctrine; we do in Christian equity beare with one another.

After this in the Synod at Dort, they permitted Goma­rus to set downe his judgement in the upper way. And the Delegates of South-Holland were very indifferent [Page 3] which way they tooke: For these are their words, Acta Syn. per. 3 [...] pag. 48. An Deus in elagēdo cōsideraverit homines ut lapsos, an etiam ut nondum lapsos; existimant non esse necessarium, ut definiatur; modò statuatur Deum in e­ligendo considerasse homines in pari statu. Whether God in choosing, considered men as fallen, or else as not fallen: They (the Delegates of South-Holland) think it is not necessary to be determined; so it bee held, that God in choosing, considered men in a like estate. Antidot. Remon­stra. pag. 32. Maccovius al­so Professor of Divinity at Francker, a violent and stiffe maintainer of the most unsavoury speeches, which have beene uttered in this Controversie, and one that under­tooke in the very Synod to make good against Lubbert his fellow Professor, that God did Velle peccata, ordinare homines ad peccatum, quâ pecca­tum, & neutiquam velle, ut omnes ho­mines salventur, &c. Will sinnes, ordaine men to sinne, and would not at all, that all men bee saved: and besides this, openly and peremptorily affirmed, that Ex­cept these things were hold and maintained by them, they could not possibly keepe their owne ground, but must come over to the Remonstrants. This man was not onely not censured, but publiquely declared in the Synod to be pure and Orthodox, and dismissed onely with this kinde and friend­ly admonition: that hee should hereafter take heed of such words, as might give offence to tender eares, and could not well downe with those, who are yet vncapable of such My­steries.

By these instances it appeareth, that they of the first side can easily beare one with another in this difference. And (to say the truth) there is no reason why they should quarrell about circumstances, seeing they agree in the sub­stance. For they both contend,

1 That the moving-cause of Reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the sinne of man, Originall, or Ac­tuall.

2 That the finall impenitency and damnation of Re­probates are necessary and unavoydable by Gods absolute Decree.

These two things are the [maxima gravamina] princi­pall grievances that the other side sticke at. So that these two paths meet at last in the same way.

Both these opinions of the first side I dislike.

My reasons why, are of two sorts;

• 1 Such as first made me to question the truth.
• 2 Such as convince me of their untruth.

MY reasons of the first sort doe indifferently respect and make against both, and I will set them downe against both together.

My second sort of reasons I will divide, delivering some of them against the upper and more rigid way, o­thers against the lower and more moderate way.

I begin with those reasons, which first moved me to question the truth of absolute Reprobation, as it is taught both wayes.

They are these foure, which follow.

1. Reason, Novelty.1 The Novelty of this opinion. Absolute and inevita­ble Reprobation hath little or no footing in Antiquity. The upper way was never taught or approoved by any of the Fathers (even the stoutest defenders of grace against the Pelagians) for the space of 600 (I may say 800) yeares after CHRIST: nor the lower way till the time of St. Austin, which was about 400 yeares after CHRIST. They did generally agree upon the contrary conclusion, & taught men in their times,

That it was possible for them to be saved, which in the event were not saved; and to have repented which repen­ted not: and that there was no Decree of God, which did lay a necessity of perishing upon any sonne of Adam. This that I say, Mr. Calvin himselfe doth freely acknowledge, speaking of Election and Reprobation according to Gods fore-knowledge: Calv. Iust. l. 3. c. 22. Sect. 1. Neque haec vulgò recepta o­pinio solius vulgi est: habuit enim seculis omnibus magnos au­thores. This commonly received opinion (saith he) of a conditionall respective Decree) is not the opinion onely of the common people, but hath had great Au­thors in all ages. Reverend Beza likewise speaking of the same opinion, hath these words to the same purpose: Beza in cap. 11 ad Rom. v. 35. In quem errorem sanè turpissimum Origi­nes veteres plerosque tum Graecos, tum Latinos adegit: Into which surely most foule error Origen hath driven many of the Ancients both Greeke and Latin. To the same effect also Prosper (St. Austins follower) hath a remark­able speech. Prosper in Epist. ad Aug. prope finem. Pe [...]è omnium parem inveniri & unam sententiam, quâ propositum & praedestinationem dei secundùm praescientiam receperunt [...]ut ob hoc Deus alios vasa contumeliae, alios honoris vasa fecerit; qu [...] finē uniuscujus (que) praeriderit, & sub ipso gratiae adjutorio, in qua futurus esset vo­luntate & actione praescierit. Almost all the Ancients (saith he) did grant with one consent, that God decreed mens ends according [Page 5] to his fore-sight of their actions, and not otherwise. To these speeches let me adde that of Remigius Archbishop of Ly­ons, who to Rabanus Archbishop of Mentz, objecting that St. Austin wrote a booke called Hypognosticon, against Pelagius and Caelestius, wherein he denyed that Reprobates were properly Vsh. hist. Gotto. pag. 107. [praedestinati ad interitum] predestinate to destruction; answereth, that St. Austin said not so: but some other man (as it is supposed) to purge the Church of that calumny, which some ill affected ones did cast upon it: namely, that it taught, that God by his predestination did impose upon men a necessity of perishing, did withdraw the word (Prede­stination) from the point of Reprobates, and gave it onely to the Elect, and so gave great occasion of further error and mi­stake. In this speech of his is cleerely implyed, that it was the constant doctrine of the Church then, that Reprobates lye under no necessitating Decree of Perdition.

The truth of this charge may further appeare by a few particular instances.

Minutius Foelix brings in the Pagans objecting to the Christians, that they held the events of all things to be ine­vitable, and did feigne and frame to themselves an unjust God, who did punish in men their unavoydable Destinies, not their ill choyses. This is the Objection: Min. Foelix pag. 32. Quicquid agi­mus, ut alii fato, ita vos Deo addicitis: i­niquum igitur deum singitis, qui sortem in hominibus pumat, non voluntatem. Whatso­ever we doe, as others to fate, so you ascribe to God: you make therefore to your selves an unjust God, who punisheth in men their lot, not their will. To this he answereth, Illud fatum est, quod de unoquoque Deus fatus est. Christi­ans hold no other Fates, then Gods Decrees; who Min. Foelix p 116 Qui cum universam praescit materiam, pro meritis & qualitati­bus singulorum etiam fata determinat, & i­ta in nobis non geni­tura plectitur, sed in­genii natura punitur. fore-knowing all men and their actions, did accordingly determine their retributions.

St. Hierom an eager opposer of the Pelagians, in many places of his Writings saith the same thing; Hier. ad Galat. c. 1. v. 15. Ex prae­scientiá dei evenit, ut quem justum futurū scit, prius diligat, quā oriatur ex utero, & quem peccatorem, o­derit antequam pec­cet. From the fore-knowledge of God it commeth to passe, that who he know­eth will be righteous, him he loveth before he commeth out of the wombe; and who he knoweth will be a sinner, him he hateth be­fore he sinneth. In another place he speaketh to the same purpose, Ad c. 1. Malac. Dilectio & odium dei, vel ex, praescien­tiâ nascitur futurorū vel ex operibus; alio­quin novimus quod omnia Deus diligat, nec quicquam corum oderit quae creavit. The love and hatred of God, ariseth either from the fore-sight of future things, or from the workes; other­wise we know that God loveth all things, nor doth he hate any thing that he hath made. And in his booke against Pelagius he saith Lib. 3. contr. Pe­lag. [Eligit Deus quem bonum cernit] God chooseth whom he seeth to be good.

[Page 6]The summe of all which speeches is but this, that there is no decree of damning or saving men, but what is built upon Gods fore-knowledge of the evill and good actions of men. Fulgentius is plaine for it too: Fulgent. lib. 1. ad Monimum. Quos praescivit deus hanc vitam in peccato ter­minaturos praedesti­navit supplicio inter­minabili puniendos. Those whom God fore-saw would dye in sinne, he decreed should live in end­lesse punishment. I may take in St. Austin and Prosper also, who are judged to be the Patrons of the absolute decree, as it is set downe the Sublapsarian way: even they doe ma­ny times let fall such speeches, as cannot fairely be recon­ciled with absolute Reprobation.

I will onely cite Prosper (for St. Austin speakes in him) he discoursing of some that fall away [à Sanctitate ad im­munditiem] from Holinesse to uncleannesse, saith Prosp. ad obj. 3. Gall. Non ex co ne­cessitatem percundi habu [...]runt, quia prae­destinati non sunt, sed ideo praedestinati non sunt, quia tales futuri ex voluntariâ praevaricatione prae­sci [...] sunt. They that fall away from holinesse to uncleannesse, lye not under a necessity of perishing, because they were not predestinate; but therefore they were not predestinate, because they were fore­knowne to be such by voluntary prevarication.

Not long after speaking of the same men he saith, Prosper resp. ad Obj. Quia illos rui­turos propriâ volun­tate praescivit, ob hoc à filijs perditionis nul­la praedestinatione discrevit. Be­cause God foresaw they would perish by their owne free-will; therefore he did not by any predestination sever them from the children of perdition. And againe in his answer to the 12th, Objection, he hath these words; Ib resp. ad Ob. 12 Vires obedientiae non ideo cuiquam subtra­xit, quia eum non praedestinavit; sed quia recessurum ab ipsâ obedientiâ esse praevidit, ideo eum non praedestinavit. God hath not with­drawne from any man ability to yeeld obedience, because he hath not predestinated him: but because he foresaw he would fall from obedience, therefore he hath not predestinated him.

I will shut up mine instances of that Age with the judg­ment of the councell at Arles against the Pelagians in the yeare 490. or thereabout. This councell subscribed to the letter which was written by Faustus against Lucidus the Predestinarian, and made the Anathemaes and curses, which therein he denounceth against him and such like to be their own: Some of which were these Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui peri [...]t non accepisse ut salvus esse possit. Cursed be he that shall say that the man that perisheth, might not have been saved: and againe, Anathema illi qui dixerit, quod vas contumeliae non pos­sit affurgere ut sit vas in honorem. Cursed be the man that shall say that a vessell of dishonour, may not rise to be a vessell of honour.

A testimony or two I will borrow likewise from some persons of note, and those St. Austins followers too, who lived about 400 yeares after St Austins time. Remigius the great patron of Gottschalk the zealous preacher and publi­sher [Page 7] of absolute reprobation in those times) in his answer [...]o that epistle, which we suppose to be the Epistle of Raba­ [...]s; to Rabanus saying, that God did Bishop Ʋsher hist. Gotts [...]. p. 53. & 54. Sanabiles facere nationes orbis terra­rum. make the nations [...]f the world healthfull, and that he doth [velle omnes homi­ [...]es salvos fieri] will that all men be saved; he gives such [...]n answer as cannot stand with absolute Reprobation; Et hoc omnino verum est, quia ne­mini deus imponit necessitatem pereun­di, sicut nemini impo­nit necessitatem ma [...] agendi. This (saith he) is very true, because God layeth on no [...]an a necessity of perishing, as he hath layd on none a necessity of [...]inning. And a little after he is plainer, Quos verissimè praescivit impios & iniquos futuros & in­suâ impietate & ini­quitate permansuros, justis & rectissimis de causis decrevit, statuit, & praedestinavit peri­tu [...]os, sicut ipse ait, Qui peccaverit mihi, ipsum delebo de libro meo. Those whom God did foreknow would live and dye in their wickednesse, for reasons most just he decreed should perish, as himselfe saith, Him which sinneth against me, even him will J blot out of my booke.

In the Valentine Synod assembled in favour of Gottschalk we may finde these words,

Can. 2. Nec ipso malos ideò perire, quia boni esse non potuerunt, sed quia boni esse noluerunt, suo que vitio in massâ damnationis, vel me­rito originali vel etiā actuali permāserunt. Therefore do the wicked perish not because they could [...]ot, but because they would not be good, and by theyr owne fault Originall or actuall also, remained in the masse of perdition. And in the end of their third Canon they denounce Ana­ [...]hema to those, that hold that men are so predestinated un­to evill, as that they cannot be otherwise. Can. 3. Verum a­liquos ad malum prae­destinatos esse divinà potestate, ut aliud esse non possint, non solū non credimus, sed e­tiam si sunt, qui tan­tum malum credire velint, cum omni de­ [...]estatione, sicut Ara [...] ­sica Synodus, illis A­nathema dicimus. That any should be (saith the Councell) predestinated to evill by the power of God, so as he cannot be otherwise; we doe not onely not beleeve but also if there be any that will believe so great an evill, with all detestation we denounce them accursed, as the Arausican councill also did. By these testimonies (which are but a few of many) it appeareth that absolute and inevitable Reprobation [...]ound but cold entertainment from Antiquity.

Which considering, I began to call it into question.

For albeit I make not the decisions and determinations of the Fathers or councels the rules of my faith, (because they are but men, and therefore subiect to error:) yet I honour their gray hayres and their grave assemblyes, and do vehemently mistrust those doctrines, which they never taught or approved; but misliked and condemned.

2 Its vnwillingnesse to abide the triall. I finde that the authors and abetters of it have beene very backward to bring it to the standart; not onely when they have beene called upon by their adversaries to have it weighed,2 Reason, Vnwillingnesse to be tryed. but also when they have beene intreated there­to [Page 8] by their chiefe Magistrates, who might have com­pelled them: a shrewd argument (mee thinks) that it is too light.

In the disputation at Mompelgart, anno 1586 held be­tween Beza and Jacobus Andrea, with some seconds on both sides, Beza and his company having disputed with the Lutherans about the Person of CHRIST and the Lords supper, when they came to this poynt, did decline the sifting of it, and gave this reason among others, that it could not then be publiquely disputed of Beza in Coll. Mompel pa. 373. Sine gravi eorum offendi­culo, qui tanti myste­rij capaces non sunt. without the great scandall and hurt of the ignorant, and unacquainted with these high mysteries. Braud Col. Hag. pa. 57. The contraremonstrants also in their Conference with the opposite parties at the Hague in the yeare 1611, could not be drawne to dispute with them about this poynt, but delivered a petition to the States of Holland and West Friezeland, that they might not be urged to it, resolving rather to break off the conference, then to meddle with it.

In the Synod likewise at Dort, in the yeares 1618 and 1619, the Remonstrants were warned by the President of the Synod Act a Syn per 1. pa. 133. Vt de electi­one potiùs quam de odiosa Reprobationis materiâ agerent. That they should rather dispute of the point of Election, then the odious point of Reprobation.

Can this Doctrine be a truth and yet blush at the light, which maketh all things manifest? Especially considering these things:

1 That Reprobation is a principall head of Divinity, by the well or ill stating and ordering of which, the glory of God and the good of Religion, is much promoted or hin­dered.

2 That there is such a necessary connexion betweene the points of Election and Reprobation (both being parts of Praedestination) that the one cannot well bee handled without the other.

3 That the Doctrine of Reprobation was the chiefe cause of all the uproares in the Church at that time.

4 That it was accused with open mouth and challenged of falshood; and therefore bound in Iustice to purge it selfe of the crimination.

5 That the Remonstrants did not at that time desire that it should be talked of among the common people, who [Page 9] might have stumbled at it; but disputed of among the ju­dicious and learned, who (as the thressing Oxen which were to beat the corne out of the huske) are to bolt out those truths which are couched and hidden in the letter of the Scriptures.

That the doctrine which is loth to abide the tryall even of learned men, carrieth with it a shrewd suspicion of falshood, the Heathen Orator shall witnesse for me; who to Epicurus saying that he would not publish his opinion to the simple people, who might happily take offence at it, answereth thus; Cicer. de fin. bon. & malorum, l 2 pag. 115, Aut tu eadem ista dic in judicio, aut si coronam times, dic in Senatu. Nunquam facies. Cur nisi quod turpis est oratio. Declare thine opinion in the place of Judgement, or if thou art afraid of the assembly there, declare it in the Senate-house, among those grave and judicious per­sons. Thou wilt never doe it; and why? but because it is a foule and dishonest opinion.

This striving to lye close, is (peradventure) no infalli­ble argument of a bad cause, yet it is a very probable one. For true Religion (as Vives saith) is not a thing guilded over, but gold it selfe; the more that's scraped and discovered, the brighter and goodlyer it is, and so is the truth. Ʋives de ve [...]. fidei, l. 1. p. 16. Pu­riorem ac nitidiorem illam [...]eddit bellum, quam pax adversus gentes Dispu­tations illustrate and set forth true opinions more then silence can: let's not feare therefore (saith he) lest our Faith when it is layd open, appeare filthy to the eyes of beholders. Metuant hoc aliae religiones falsae & umbranles. Let false and Superficiall religions, in which there is no soundnesse, be afraid of this.

The Iew is loth to reason with the Christian touching his Law; and the Turke is forbidden to dispute of his Al­coran: because their Religions are brittle, like glasse bro­ken with the least touch. But the Christian Ʋives l. 4 page 4 [...]9. Qui veritate suâ sidit, nihil refor­midat examen inge­nii: imo advocat, & quantum potest, exa­cuit. who is confident of the goodnesse of his Faith, feareth no examination, but rather as much as may be, soliciteth and provoketh his Ad­versary to the Combat.

Truth whether it be in men or doctrines, is best, when it is uncovered; it covets no corners, though error doe; but is willing to abide the tryall. Psal. 139.23.24 Search me O Lord and know my heart, try me and know my thoughts: and see if there be any way of wickednesse in me; saith the Prophet Da­vid, knowing his heart to be without guile. And our Sa­viour telleth us, Ioh. 3.20, 21. that every one that doth evill, hateth the light, and commeth not to it lest his deeds should be repro­ved; [Page 10] but he that doth truth, commeth to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God. As St. Paul sayth of an Heretique,Titus 3.11. he is [ [...]] Selfe-condemned; so we may say of Heresie and untruth; it condemneth it selfe, and by nothing more, than by refu­sing the touchstone. He is to be thought an empty Schol­ler, who is loth to be apposed; and his gold to bee light and counterfeit, who will not have it toucht and weighed, and those opinions to be but errors, which would so wil­lingly walke in a mist, and dwell in silence, when it concer­neth the peace of the Church so much to have them exa­mined.

3. Reason. Infamy.3 The Jnfamy of it. It is an opinion (especially as it is defended the upper way) odious to the Papists, opening their foule mouthes against our Church and Religion; ab­horred (mainteyned eyther way) by all the Lutherans: who for this very Tenet call us damned Calvinists, thinke us unworthy to be above ground, and in their writings pro­test, that they will rather unite themselves to the Papists then to us. And it is also distastfull to all the Greeke Chur­ches, which are very many. Molin in his Anatomie, spea­king of the Supralapsarian Doctrine, sayth Molin. Anat. Arm. c. 12. de Praed. If it should be so that God hath reprobated men without the conside­ration of sinne, or hath ordayned them to sinne; yet it is the part of a wise man to conceale these things, or not to know them, rather then to utter them; Quia enunciata injiciunt scrupulos, & ausam praebēt ad­versatiis infamandi veram Religionem. Because when they are taught and defended they fill mens heads with scruples, and give occasion to the Adversaries of defaming the true Re­ligion. The same may as truly be sayd of the Sublapsarian way. For (as I have sayd) they are in substance all one. And Sir Edwyn Sandys is of the same minde too. For in his most excellent Booke called a Survey of the State of Re­ligion in the Westerne parts of the World. Speaking of the deadly division betweene the Lutherans and Calvinists in Germany,Sir Edwin Sandys pag. 172. he hath these words. That though the Pals­grave and Landsgrave have with great judgment and wis­dome, to asslake those flames, imposed silence in that part to the Ministers of their party, hoping the charity and discretion of the other party, would have done the like; yet it falles out otherwise. For both the Lutheran Preachers rayle as bitterly [Page 11] against them in their pulpits as ever, and their Princes and people have them in as great detestation, not forbearing to pro­fesse openly, that they will returne to the Papacie, rather then ever admit that Sacramentary and predestinary Pestilence.

For these two points are the ground of the quarrell, and the latter more scandalous at this day, then the former. And in the same book, pag. 194. and 198. speaking of men whom he commendeth for singular learning and piety (whose iudg­ment he so sets down as that he declareth it to be his own) he sayth, that they think it were no blemish for the reformed Doctors to revise their doctrines, and to abate the rigour of speculative opinions, (for so he is pleased to call them) espe­cially touching the eternall decrees of God: wherein some of their chief authors have run into such an extreame to all Ro­mish doctrine, as to have exceedingly scandalized all other Churches withall, yea and many of their own to rest very ill sa­tisfied.

At the closing up of the conference at Mompelgart,Coll. Momp. pa. 566.567 Ofiand. Hist. Ec­cles pa. 1040. Cent. 16. when Frederick Barle of Wortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza and his company for brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hand; they utterly refused, saying they would pray to God to open their eyes, and would doe them any office of humanity and charity, but they would not give them the right hand of brotherhood, because they were proved to be guilty [errorum teterrimo­rum,] of most pestilent errors, among which they reckon'd for one.

Hemingius left his own side and joyned with us in the poynt of the Sacrament: but he would come no nearer, mainteyning alwayes a distance in this.

And as for the Grecians,pag. 237. we learne also by Sir Edwin Sandys his relation, that they doe mightily d [...]ssent from that doctrine touching the eternall counsels of God, which Cal­vin (as some conceive) first fully revealed or rather introduced into the Christian world; and since, some of his friends and fol­lowers have seconded: as thinking it very injurious to the good­nesse of God, and directly and immediately opposit to his very nature. Jn regard of which, one of their Bishops hath written a Booke against it, which hath been sent to Geneva and there received.

[Page 12]It is a morsell which the greatest part of Christian Churches cannot swallow: and therefore (I think) it should not very easily without suspicion downe with us.

And to say one thing more; by this infamy of it among Christians,pag. 223. 224. it is very probable, that among the too many scandals given to the Iewes by Christians, among whom they dwell; this doctrine is not one of the least rubs in the way of their conversion. For they think it a bad opinion (sayes the same iudicious and learned Gentleman) Which some of great name have seemed to hold, that God in his everlasting and absolute pleasure should affect the extreame miserie of any of his Creatures for the shewing of his justice and severity in tor­menting them; or that the calamity, casting away and dam­nation of some should absolutely and necessarily redound more to his glory, than the felicity of them all, considering that his na­ture is meere goodnesse and happinesse, and hath no affinity with rigour or misery. This is my third reason.

Reason, 4. Affinity to Fate.The fourth, It's affinity with the olde exploded errors of the Stoicks and Manichees.

The opinion of the Stoickes was, that all actions and e­vents were unavoydable, determined either by the revo­lutions of the Heavens, and the qualities of such starres as raigned at mens births, or by the concatenation of naturall things and the disposition of the first matter, all things be­ing so put together from eternity, that one thing must needs follow another, as it doth; and the [prima materia] being so disposed, that things cannot successively come to passe otherwise then they doe, but must of necessity be as they are, even [invito deo] though God would have some things to be otherwise then they are.

The Mani [...]he [...] held, that all mens actions, good or evill were determined too: good actions by a good God, who was the author of all good things that were created, and of all good actions that came to passe in the world; Evill acti­ons by an evill God who was the [primum principium mali] the prime author of all evill things or actions that were ex­tant in the world.

The Maintainers of the Absolute Decree do say one of these two things, eyther that all actions naturall and mo­rall, good and evill, and all events likewise are absolutely [Page 13] necessary; so the Supralapsarians: or that all mens ends (at least) are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their wills; so the Sublapsarians. And this is upon the matter all one with the former. For first, in vaine is our freedome in the actions and meanes, if the end at which they drive, be pitched and determined; sith all actions are for the ends sake, that it might be obtayned by them, which without them could not. And second, the deter­mination of the end doth necessarily involve the meanes that precede that end; as if a man be fore-determined to damnation, he must unavoydably sinne, else he could not be damned.

Now in these 3 opinions we may note two things.

1 The Substance and formality of them, which is an un­avoydablenesse of mens actions and ends whatsoever they be: in this all of them agree, all holding that in all things, at least in all mens ends, undeclinable fates and insuperable necessity do domineere.

And therefore Melancthon doth not sticke sundry times in his common places to call this Absolute Decree [Fatum Stoicum, & tabulas Parcarum] Stoicall fate, and the Desti­nies tables: He also chargeth the Church of Geneva (the great Patron of it) with a labor to bring in the Stoicks er­ror, as we may see in a certaine Epistle of Melancthons to Pencer, where he hath these words. Melanct. in Epist. ad Pen [...]. Scrib [...]t ad me Lelius de Stoico fato usque adeo litem Genevae moveri, ut quidam in ca [...]cerem conjectus sit, propte­rea quòd a Zenone differ [...]et. O misera tempora! Doctrina salutis peregrinis qui­busdam dubitationi­bus obscuratur. Lelius writeth unto me, that in Geneva there is such strife about the Stoicks fate that one was cast into prison, because he dissented from Zeno. O miserable times! &c. And by the Testimony of Beza too, who speaking of Melancthon sayth; Beza in vita Calvini. Philippus de his rebus ita scri­bere caeperat, ut Ge­nevenses quasi Stoicū fatum invehentes no­tare quibusdam vi­deatur. Philip hath so written of these things, as if he meant to taxe the Ge­neva Divines for bringers in of Destiny.

2 We may note the circumstance or the grounds of their opinions; The Stoicks derive this necessity from the Starres or the first matter; The Manichees from two [pri­ma principia, aeterna & [...]aeter [...]] first principles of all things eternall and coeternall. These last, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God.

So that they diffe [...] in their grounds indeed; but in this difference the Stoicks and the Manichees in some respects have the better. For it is better to derive this necessity of [Page 14] evill actions and unhappy events, from an evill God or the course of nature, then from the decree of that God, who is infinitely good. The substance of their opinions is all one, the ground wherein they differ is but accidentall to error.

Which being so, for this very reason alone may this doctrine of absolute Reprobation be suspected: because those dreames of the Stoicks were exploded by the best Philosophers of all sorts; and this of the Manichees was generally cryed downe by the Fathers, not onely as foolish, but as impious and unworthy of entertainment in a Christian heart, or Christian Common-wealth, not so much for any thing circumstantiall in it, as for the substance of the error; because it made all things and events to be ne­cessary, and so plucked up the roots of vertue, planted vice, and left no place for just rewards or punishments.

These are my reasons of the first sort.

THe Reasons that have convinced me of the untruth of absolute Reprobation, now follow. And first of those that fight against the upper way.

They are drawne [ab incommodo] from the great evils and inconveniences, which issue from it naturally: which may be referred to two maine heads.

• 1 The dishonour of God.
• 2 The overthrow of religion and government.

I. Jnconvenience.It dishonoureth God. For it chargeth him deeply with two things, no wayes agreeable to his nature.

• 1 Mens Eternall torments in Hell.
• 2 Their sinnes on Earth.

First, it chargeth him with mens Eternall torments in hell, and maketh him to bee the prime, principall and invincible cause of the damnation of millions of miserable soules: the prime cause, because it reporteth him to have appointed them to destruction, of his owne voluntary dis­position, antecedent to all deserts in them; and the prin­cipall and invincible cause; because it maketh the damnation of Reprobates to be necessary and unavoydable through Gods absolute and uncontrollable Decree: and so necessa­ry, that they can no more scape it, then poore Astyanax [Page 15] could avoid the breaking of his neck, when the Grecians tumbled him downe from the Tower of Troy.

Now this is a heavie charge, contrary to Scripture, Gods nature, and sound reason.

1 To Scripture, which makes man the principall, nay the onely cause (in opposition to God) of his owne ruine. Thy destruction is of thy selfe O Israel, but in me is thy help. Hos. 13.9. As J live, saith the Lord, I will not the death of the wicked, &c. Turne ye, turne ye, why will ye dye? Ezech. 33.11. He doth not afflict willingly, nor greeve the children of men. Lam. 3.33. To which speeches, for likenesse sake, I will joyne one of Prospers. Resp. ad 12. Obj. Ʋincent. Prae­destinatio dei multis est causa standi, ne­mim est causa labēdi. Gods predestination is to many the cause of standing, to none of falling.

2 It's contrary to Gods nature Exod. 34.6. who sets forth him­selfe to be a God mercifull, gracious, long suffering, abundant in goodnesse, &c. and he is acknowledged to be so by King David. Psal. 86.5. Thou Lord art good and mercifull, and of great kindnesse to all them that call upon thee. And by the Prophets Joel, Ionah, and Micah. He is gracious and mercifull, Ioel. 2.13. slow to anger and of great kindnesse saith Ioel. Ionah. 4.22. I know (sayes Io­nah) that thou art a gracious God and mercifull, slow to an­ger, and of great kindnesse. Micah. 7.18. And who (sayth Micah) is a God like unto thee, that taketh away iniquity? &c. be retay­neth not his wrath for ever, because mercy pleaseth him.

3 'Tis contrary also to sound reason which cannot but ar­gue such a Decree of extreame cruelty, and consequently remove it from the father of mercies.

We cannot in reason thinke that any man in the world can so farre put off humanity and nature, as to resolve with himselfe to marry and beget Children, that after they are borne and have lived a while with him, he may hang them up by the tongues, teare their flesh with scourges, pull it from their bones with burning pincers, or put them to any cruell tortures; that by thus tortu­ring them he may shew what his authority and power is over them Much lesse can we beleeve without great violence to reason, that the God of mercy can so far forget himselfe, as out of his absolute pleasure to ordaine such in­finit multitudes of his children made after his own Image, to everlasting fire; & create them one after another, that af­ter [Page 16] the end of a short life here, he might tormēt them with­out end hereafter, to shew his power & soveraignety over thē. If to destroy the righteous with the wicked temporally, be such a piece of iniustice, that Abraham remooveth it from God with an Absit, Wilt thou destroy the righteous with the wicked? Gen. 18.25. That be farre from thee O Lord. Shall not the judge of all the world doe right? How deepely (may we thinke) would that good man have detested one single thought, that God resolveth upon the destruction of many innocent soules eternally in hell fire?

Object. But God (say some) is soveraigne Lord of all creatures and men, they are truely and properly his owne. Cannot he therefore dispose of them as he pleaseth, and doe with his owne what he will?

Answ. The question is not what an Almighty soveraignty pow­er can doe to poore vassalls, but what a power, that is just and good, may doe. By the power of a Lord, his absolute and naked power, he can cast away the whole masse of mankind; for it is not repugnant to omnipotency or sove­veraignty: but by the power of a Iudge, to wit, that actu­all power of his, which is alwayes cloathed with goodnes and justice, he cannot.

For it is not compatible with these properties in God, to appoynt men to Hell of his meere will and pleasure, no fault at all of theirs preexisting in his eternall minde.

1 It is not compatible with justice, which is a constant will of rendring to every one his proper due, and that is, vengeance to whom vengeance belongeth, namely to the obstinate and impenitent. Aust. l. 3. cont. Iu­lian. c. 1 [...]. pag. 164. Bonus est Deus, ju­stus est Deus: potest aliquem sinc bonis mericis liberare, quia bonus est; non potest quenquam sine malis meritis damnare, quia justus est. God is good (saith St. Austin) and God is just: he may without any deserts free men from pu­nishment, because he is good; but he cannot without evill deser­vings condemne any man because he is just. In another place also he saith, Aug. epi. Iob. ad Bonifac. Quemquam verò immeritū & nul­li obnoxiū peccato si Deus damnare credi­tur, alienus ab iniqui­tate non creditur. If God be believed to damne any man that by sinne deserveth it not; he is not believed to be free from injustice.

2 Nor is it compatible with goodnesse, which is an incli­nation of God in communicating that good which is in himselfe to his creatures, as farre as he can without wrong­ing his Justice: and therefore if God be (as the Scripture re­porteth him) good to all; it cannot be that he should of him­selfe without any motive in the reasonable creature pro­vide [Page 17] for it from everlasting the greatest of all miseries, and that before he thought of making it, or bestowing any good at all upon it.

Object. 2 It is further objected,Perk. l. de praed. gag. 25. that we do and may slaughter our beasts for our daily use, without any cruelty or iniustice: & therefore God may as well, nay much more appoynt as ma­ny of us as he pleaseth to the torments of Hell for his glory, and yet be iust and good notwithstanding: for there is a greater disproportion betweene God and us, then between us and beasts.

Answ. 1 1 For answer to this we are first to premise thus much, namely, that our slaughtering of our beasts for our daily use, is by Gods ordnance and appoyntment: We had not this authority of our selves, but God of his bounty towards us, gave it us, as we may see, Gen. 9.2.3. where we may ob­serve, First, that God delivereth up all Creatures, beasts, birds, and fishes into the hands of men. Secondly, that the end why he doth so, is, that they might be meat for men and consequently that they might be slayne.

Which being so, our slaughtering of oxen, sheep, and other creatures for our daily use, is to be accounted Gods doing rather then ours. And therefore the obiection should be made thus; God may without any breach of goodnesse or iustice appoint brute creatures to be slayne for mans use: therefore he may ordeyne men to be cast into hell torments for ever for his owne use, that is for the de­claration of his soveraignty, &c.

This being premised, I answer further, that this com­parison holds not: for there is little proportion between the obiects compared and lesse between the acts.

1 There is but small proportion between the objects, beasts and men, creatures of a different nature and made for a different end. Beasts are voyd of reason and liberty in their actions, creatures whose beings vanish with their breath, made onely for the use and service of men upon Earth: but men are reasonable and understanding creatures, able through the creators bounty to discern between good and evill, and according to their first principles, to choose the good and forsake the evill: they are the very image of Gods purity and eternity, and were made for the service of [Page 18] God alone vpon Earth, and his blessed and everlasting soci­ety in Heaven.

So that albeit there be a very great distance between God and men, yet nothing so great as betweene God and beasts. It followeth not therefore, that if God may appoint beasts to be killed of his own free pleasure for mans use, he may with like equity and reason appoint men of his own will to destruction for his own use. We reade that God re­quired of his people many thousand beasts for Sacrifices, but not one man.

The first borne of other creatures hee challenged for burnt offerings (except they were uncleane beasts;) but the first borne of men were to be redeemed: which sheweth, that he put a wide difference between the blood of men and beasts. Besides, in the 9 of Gen: he giveth men power to kill and feed upon all living creatures, but he straitly for­bids them to shead mans blood, and giveth this rea­son of the prohibition; Man is the Image of God. So that we may well conclude, that there is but small proportion between the objects compared men and beasts, in respect of this act of killing or slaughtering.

2 There is farre lesse or rather no proportion at all be­tween the acts compared, killing and eternall tormenting. A man may kill, but he cannot without barbarous injustice and cruelty torment his beast and prolong the life of it, that he may daily vexe and torture it, to shew what pow­er and soveraignty he hath over it: so I doubt not (though there be some that will not grant it,Ʋid. Molia ei c [...]dat. quaest. graviss. p. 12 [...]. but charge the Armini­nians with contumely against God for affirming it) I doubt not (I say) but God may kill a man of his owne free plea­sure, yea and resolve him into nothing without any cruelty or injustice; because in so doing he doth but take away what he had given him: but he cannot without both these, antecedently decree to keep him alive for ever in Hell, that he may there torment him without end, to shew his soveraignty. For this is to inflict an infinit evill upon a guiltlesse creature, to whom he had given but a fi­nit good. And so is the comparison most unequall too in the acts compared: and therefore proveth just nothing.

Dr. T [...]isse his vindi: gra. l 2. part 1. dig [...]. 1 pag. 17. Edit. 2.But it is replyed by some (who will rather speak unrea­sonably [Page 19] and against common sense, then lay downe the conclusions which they have undertaken to mainteyne,) that it is better and more eligible to be tortured in Hell, then to want or loose a being: for he that wants a being enjoy­eth no good, but he that is tormented in Hell, hath a being; and by consequence some thing that is good. If therefore God may take away a mans being that is innocent, and turne him into nothing for his pleasure; much more may he torment him in hell.

Answ. 1 1 To the first part of this Reply, namely, that it is more desirable to be in Hell, then to be nothing, I oppose three things.

1 The speech of our Saviour concerning Iudas: Math. 26.24. Woe be to that man, by whom the Sonne of man is betrayed: it had beene good for that man, if he had never beene borne. Two things especially are set forth in these words of our Savi­our. First, the misery of Iudas the betrayer of his Lord, Woe be to, &c. Secondly, the greatnesse of his misery, Jt had beene good, &c. It is as much as if our Lord had sayd, Ju­das the Traytor shall be damned; and therefore so wofull will his condition be, that it had beene good and happy for him, if he had never received a being: good in earnest as Interpreters doe generally expound it, not in the opinion and esteeme of weak-minded, faint-hearted men onely, as some few understand it. For,

1 Let it be granted that the Scripture speaketh of things sometimes according to mens opinions; yet without rea­son to fasten such an exposition upon any Scripture, is to doe as Dunses doe in the Schooles, who being not able to answer a place in Aristotle wherewith they are charged, shift it off and say, [loquitur ex aliorum sententia] he speaks according to the opinion of others.

2 This Scripture cannot in reason be thus expounded,

1 Because it is an argument and ground by which CHRIST declareth the truth or greatnesse of the misery of Judas; Woe to the man, &c. And why woe? Because it had been good, &c. But it were no argument to shew his wofull estate by, to say that it had been good for him that he had never been borne, in the opinion of men who mi­stake the case, but not in truth.

[Page 20]2 Because this Exposition would teach and encourage men to be Atheists and Epicures. In the second of Wisdome we reade, how voluptuous men do stir up one another to en­joy the good things that are present, to fill themselves with wine and oyntments, to leave some tokens of their jollity in every place, and to practice all manner of wickednesse: and what is their motive? A false perswasion that they [...] soules should dye with their bodies, and that they should have no being after death. If this conceit could flesh them thus in their impious and voluptuous courses, how freely and eagerly (may we thinke) would they pursue their car­nall and sinfull delights, if they could be but once perswa­ded, that after all their pleasures they shall be in a better case, then if they had no being?

Secondly, I oppose common consent; where shall wee pick out a man, but will say (if he speake from his heart) that he were better to vanish into a thousand nothings, then to be cast into hell? what is the reason why men are so a­frayd of Hell, when they are touched to the quicke with the conscience of their ungodly lives, and the expectation of eternall vengeance, that with Job they curse their birth­day, and wish an hundred times over, that they had never beene, or might cease to be, that so they might not come into the place of torments; but because they judge a being there to be incomparably worse then no being any where? and why are men who are sensible of hell fire, so strongly curbed and held in by the feare of feeling it, even from dar­ling and beloved sinnes, but because they apprehend it to be the most terrible of all terribles! feare of beeing annihilated can never doe that which the feare of Hell doth.

The third thing which I oppose is common sense, which judgeth paines when they are extreame to be worse then death. Hence it is, that Job being tormented in his body by the Devill, cursed his birth-day, magnified the condition of the dead, and wished himselfe in the grave, plainly pre­ferring the losse of his being before that miserable being which he then had.

And hence it is, that men even of stoutest and hardest spirits (as we see by daily experience) would (if they might [Page 21] enjoy their option) choose rather to have no bodyes at all, then bodyes tormented with the stone or gout, or any o­ther sharpe or sensible disease. It is a knowne saying grounded on this judgement of sence, [Praestat semel quàm semper mori] better it is to dye once, then to be alwayes dying.

This the Tyrant Tiberius knew very well: and there­fore he would not suffer those, towards whom he purposed to exercise his cruelty, to be put to a speedy death, but to lingring torments, as Swetonius reporteth of him in that chapter where he reckoneth up his barbarous and cruell practises.

Sueton. vit. Tib [...] cap. 61. Mori volen­tibus vis adhibita vi­vendi. Those (saith he) who through the extremity of their torments would have dyed, he vsed meanes to keepe alive. [Nam mortem adeò leve supplicium putabat] For he accoun­ted death so light a punishment, that when he heard that one Carnulius a man appoynted to torments, had prevented him, he cried out [Carnulius me evasit] Carnulius hath esca­ped my hands. To a prisoner intreating him to put him quickly to death, he gave this answer, [Nondum tecum re­dij ingratiam] I am not yet friends with thee; accounting it great kindnesse to put him quickly to death, whom he might have tortured.

Many that were called into question, did partly wound themselves in their own houses [ad vexationem ignomini­am (que) vitandam] to prevent that paine and ignominy, which they knew they should endure: and partly poyson'd them­selves in the midst of the court, as they were going to their arraignment, for the same cause.Senec Epist. l 17. E­pist. 101. Seneca speaking of one Mecaenas, who was so afraid of being dead, that he sayd he would not refuse weaknesse, deformity, [nec acutam cru­cem] no nor the sharpest crucifying Dummodo inter haec mala spiritus pro­rogetur. so that he might live still in the midst of these extremities; he calleth his desire [tur­pissimum votum] a base and most ignoble and unnaturall wish, and censureth him for a most effeminate and contemptible man; Quia distulit id quod est in malis opti­mum, supplicit finem. because in all his evils he was afraid of that which is the end of all evils, the privation of his being. And cer­tainly we must needs conceive and censure them to be stocks and stones rather then flesh and blood, who can so put off all feeling and sence, as to think a tormented being in Hell to be a lighter and lesser evill then no being at all.

[Page 22] Answ. 2 2 To the reason on which the reply is grounded, which is, [Melius est esse quàm non esse] it is better to be, then to have no being, I answer that it is a sophisme or fallacy, à non di­stributo ad distributū. To be, in it self is better then not to be [...] but it is not universally true in all particulars. Again, it is true in some cases & ex hypothesi, [si caetera sint paria] if there be any equality in the adjuncts. It is so far from being sim­ply true, that our Saviour limiteth it, & putteth a case wher­in it is not true, but the contrary to it is true: and that is the case of Judas, of which we have said somewhat before.

It had been good &c. which words St. Hierom expoun­ding, saith, Hieron comment. in Mat. c. 26. v. 24. Simpliciter dictum est, melius est non subsi­stere quàm malè sub­sistere. It is simply and plainly averred by our Savi­our, that it is better to have no being then an ill being. This was the judgment too of Job cap. 3. v. 11.12.13. Why dyed I not (saith he) in the birth? why did the knees prevent mee? and why did J suck the breasts? for now should I have lyen still and been quiet: I should have slept then and been at rest. In which words he plainely implyeth, that he thought it farre better to have had no birth and being, then such a painefull and miserable being. This was also the o­pinion of Solomon. Eccles. 4.1.2.3. So J returned (saith he) and considered all the oppressions that are done under the Sunne; and behold the teares of such as were oppressed, and they had no Comforter, &c. Wherfore I praised the dead which are alrea­dy dead, more then the living which are yet alive: yea better is he then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evill worke that is done under the Sunne.

The words doe clearely shew, that Solomon did think it better to be dead and to be deprived of being, or to have al­wayes wanted a being, then to be oppressed by the migh­ty and to be without comforters: that is, then to have a miserable and a mournfull being.

Sr. Fr. Bacons colours of good and evill, the last colour.To this assenteth Sir Francis Bacon in his Colours of good and evill, where against this mathematicall position (as he calls it) that there is no proportion between something and no­thing; and that therefore the degree of privation seemeth greater then the degree of diminution: he excepteth, that it is false in sundry cases, and among the rest in this, namely, when the degree of diminution is more sensitive, then the degree of privation. In this case, a totall privation is much better [Page 23] then a diminution: hence these usuall formes of speech, Better eye out then alwayes ake: make or marre, &c.

Some evils and paines (perhaps) eyther for their light­nesse, because they may be well endured; or for their short­nesse, because they are quickly over; are lesse then reso­lution into nothing: and a man had better for a while en­dure them, then lose his being to be rid of them; because his being may afford him presently or afterward such and so many desirable good things, as will more then recompence his paines. But when his paines are so many and violent, that they leave him no other good then a poore being, or so pinch him that he cannot enjoy or joy in the goods that remaine; it were a thousand times better for him to have no being. And such are the paines of Hell, which for their greatnesse are infinite, producing many miserable weepings and waylings, and gnashings of teeth; all symptomes of intollerable griefes: and for their length, eternall; The worme never dyeth, the fire is never quenched: but the breath of the Lord, as a River of brimstone doth kindle it for ever. And therefore it is incomparably better to cease to be, then to live in those torments, which cannot be equalled by any good, which a being can make us capable of: much lesse by that poore little entitative good, which is all the good the damned doe enjoy in Hell.

This sophisticall evasion therefore and all others of the like sort notwithstanding; I doubt not but I may safely say, that the unavoydable damnation of so many millions can­not be absolutely and antecedently intended by God, with­out the greatest injustice and cruelty which may in no wise be imputed to God. Plut. de superst. prope sinem. Plutarch speaking of the Pa­gans who to pacifie the anger of their Gods, did sacrifice to them men and women, sayth; It had beene much bet­ter with Diagoras and his fellowes to deny the being of a God, then confessing a God to think he delighteth in the bloud of men. How much rather may we say, it were better to be an Atheist & deny God, then to beleeve or report him to be a devourer of the soules of men. The like argument is pressed by Eusebius against those cruell and mercilesse Gods of the Pagans; Euseb de prepa­rat. l 4. c 16. p. 161. edit Graecol. Enim­vero, si boni vestigi­um in iis ullum esset, quamobrem bonorū appellationem jure sor [...]itentur eos uti (que) cùm naturâ suâ be­nignos ac salutis om­nium cupidos, tùm verò amantes justi­tiae, hominum (que) stu­diosos ac defensores esse oporteret, &c. Doubtlesse (sayth he) if there were any footstep or sparke of goodnesse in them, for which they might [Page 24] deserve to be called good; they would be disposed to doe good and desirous to save all men: they would love justice, and take a care of men. And being such, how could they delight in their slaughter? &c. Yea, he concludeth that they were Ibid. c. 15. pag. 153 Non bonos sed malos fuisse daemo­nes: vel hac ipsa ra­tione confici existi­mo. Quicquid bonū est prodesse solet; no­cere vero contrarium. Divels or evill spirits; and not Gods or good spirits; because, if they were good, they would doe good, whereas those which are evill use to doe hurt. I will therefore shut up my first reason with the speech of Prosper. Prosp. a [...] Obj. Ʋincent. resp. 3. Om­nium quidem homi­num deus creator est, sed nemo ab eo ideo creatus est, ut periret: quia alia est causa nascendi, alia pere­undi. God is the Creator indeed of all men, but yet of no man for this end, that he might be dam­ned; the reason why we are created is one, and why wee are damned another.

SEcondly, this opinion chargeth God with mens sinnes on earth, and makes him the Author, not of the first sinne onely that entred by Adam into the world, but of all other things that have been, are, or shall be committed to the worlds end: no murthers, robberies, rapes, adulte­ries, insurrections, treasons, blasphemies, heresies, per­secutions, or any other abominations whatsoever, fall out at any time or in any place, but they are the necessary pro­ductions of Gods Almighty decree. The Scriptures, I am sure,Psal. 5.4. teach us another lesson. Thou art not a God (sayth David) that hath pleasure in wickednesse. And the Prophet Esay tells the people, that when they did evill in the sight of the Lord,Esay. 66.4. they did choose the things which he would not. Let no man say when he is tempted; Iam. 1.13.14. I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evill, neyther tempteth he any man; but every man is tempted, when he is drawne away with his owne concupiscence. 1. Ioh. 2.16. And S. John having referred all the sinnes of the world to three heads, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life; telles us that they are not of the Father, but of the world. To which speeches let me adde the speech of Siracides, though not of the same authority: Say not thou it is through the Lord, that I fell away: Ecclesiasticus 15.12 for thou oughtest not to doe the things that he hateth. Say not thou that he hath caused me to erre: for he hath no need of the sinfull man.

Pious antiquity hath constantly sayd the same, and prest it with sundry reasons; some of which are these that fol­low. If God be the Author of sinne, then

[Page 25]1 He is worse then the Divell, because the Divell doth onely tempt and perswade to sinne, and his action may bee resisted: but God (by this opinion) doth will and procure it by a powerfull and effectuall decree, which cannot be resi­sted. This is Prospers argument Prosper resp. ad ad obj. 11. Vincent. who to some, objec­ting that by S. Austins doctrine, when Fathers defile their owne Daughters, and mothers their owne sonnes, servants murder their masters, and men commit any horrible villa­nies; it commeth to passe, because God hath so decreed: answe­reth, that if this were layd to the Divels charge, he might in some sort cleare himselfe of the imputation; Quia etsi de­lectatus est furo [...]e peccantium, probaret tamen se non intulis­se vim criminum. Because though he be delighted with mens sinnes, yet he doth not, he can­not compell them to sinne: Quâ ergo insipi­entiâ, quârè demen­tiâ disinitur ad Dei referendum esse con­silium, quod nec dia­bolo in totum ascribi potest, qui in peccan­tium flagitiis, illece­brarum adjutor, non voluntatum creden­dus est esse generator. What a madnesse therefore is it to impute that to God, which cannot be justly fathered upon the Divell?

2 He cannot be a punisher of sinne: for none can justly punish those offences, of which they are the authors. This is Prospers argument too: Prosp. Resp. ad Obj. 4. Vincent. In­sanum omnirò & cō ­tra rationem est dice­re, damnatorem dia­boli, & ejus famulo­rum, velle ut diabolo serviatur. It is against reason to say, that he which is the damner of the Divell, would have any man to be the Divels Servant. This reason Fulgentius useth likewise. Fulgent lib. 1. ad Monim. c: 19. [Jllius rei Deus ultor est, cujus author non est] God is the avenger of that, which he is not the author. Tertul­lian also before them hath sayd, Tert. l. 2 cont. Marcion. c. 9. Nec idem habendus est delicti author, qui in­venitur interdictor & condemnator. He is not to be accounted the Author of sinne, who is the Forbidder, yea and the Con­demner of it.

3 He cannot be God; because he should not bee just, nor holy, nor the Iudge of the world, all properties essen­tiall to God. And this is S. Basils reason, who hath writ­ten a whole Homily against this wicked assertion. Basil. homil. quòd deus non est, &c. Tantundem est deum asserere esse au­thorem peccati, & ne­gare esse deum. Jt is all one (sayth he) to say, that God is the author of sinne, and to say he is not God.

Vpon these and the like considerations I may well con­clude, that the opinion which chargeth the holy God with the sinnes of men, is neyther good nor true.

But this opinion doth so. For albeit the Writers, that have defended it (Piscator and a few more of the blunter sort excepted;) have never sayd directly and in terminis, that God is the cause of sinne; yet have they delivered those things, from which it must needs follow by necessary consequence, that he is so. For they say,

[Page 26]1 That as the decree of Reprobation is absolute, so it is inevitable: those poore soules which lye under it, must of necessity be damned. Marlor. Comm. in [...]ob. 15. v. 2. S [...]at igitur firma senten­tia: Quemcun (que) de­us ante conditum or­bem elegerit, eum nō posse pe [...]ire; quem verò rejecerit cum nō poss: sal [...]ri, e [...]si omnia sanctorum o­pera fecerit: usque adeo i [...]ratractabilis est sententia. It is (saith Marlorat,) a firme and stable truth, that the man whom God in his eternall coun­sell hath rejected, though he doe all the good workes of the Saints, cannot possibly be saved.

2 That without sinne this decree of Reprobation can­not be justly executed. Piscat. l. contr. Schafin. pag. thes. 27. Deus [...]c consi­lio condidit homines, ut teipso liberentu [...]: quippe cum nisi na­ratione perven [...]e nō p [...]uent, [...]d sines illos s [...]os principales. God (sayth Piscator) did cre­ate men for this very purpose, that they might indeed fall: for otherwise he could not have attained those his principall ends. He meaneth the manifestatiō of his justice in the damnati­on of Reprobates, and of his mercy in the salvation of the Elect. Maccovius also sayth the same: M [...]oc. disp. 17. p. 11. Locus miseri­cordiae & justiu [...] manifesta [...]ae n [...]llus fu [...]let fu [...]s, si pre­catum non ex [...]et. Jf sinne had not beene, the manifestation of Iustice and mercy (which is as much to say, as the damnation of Reprobates) had never been.

3 That therefore God decreed, that Reprobates should unavoydably sinne, and sinne unto death, that his eternall ordinance might be executed and they damned. Zanch lib 5 d [...] nat. dei. c. 2. de praed. part. 4. resp. ad postr. arg. prope finem Da­mus reprobos neces­sitate peccandi [...] eo (que) & pereundi, ex hac dei ordinatione con­stringi, at (que) [...]ta con­stringi, ut nequcant non peccare, atque perire.. Wee gr [...]t (sayth Zanchius) that Reprobates are held so fast un­der Gods almighty decree, that they cannot but sinne and perish. A little after he sayth Non dubitamus itaque confiteri, ex immutabili reprobatione necessitatem peccandi, & quidem sine resipiscentia ad mortem usque pe [...]candi, enque & paenas aeternas dandi reprobis incumbere. We doubt not therefore to confesse, that there lyeth upon Reprobates by the power of their un­changeable reprobation, a necessity of sinning, yea of sinning unto death without repentance, and consequently of perishing everlastingly.

Calvin also saith, that Reprobates obey not the word of God, partly through the wickednesse of their own hearts, and partly because Calv. l. 3 Instit. cap. 24. Sect. 14. Inse utabili de [...] judicio suscitati sunt ad gloriam ejus suâ damnatione illustrandum. they are raised up by the unsearchable judgement of God to illustrate his glory by their damnation. I will end this with that speech of Piscator. Pisc. resp ad dupl. Vorst. part. 1. pag. 220. Reprobri ad utrumque hoe malum à Deo praecise destina [...] sunt, ut in aeternum puniantur, & necessario peccent, & quidem ideo peccent, quo justè puniri possint. Repro­bates are precisely appointed to this double evill, to be punished everlastingly, and to sinne; and therefore to sinne that they might be justly punished.

[Page 27]4 That as he hath immutably decreed that Reprobates shall live and dye in sinne; so he procures their sinnes in due time by his Almighty hand, partly by withdrawing from them grace necessary for the avoyding of sinne, and partly by mooving and enclining them by his irresistible and secret workings on their hearts, to sinfull actions. Calv. Instit. l. 1. c. 17. Sect. 11. Calvin saith, that divels and reprobate men are not one­ly held fast in Gods fetters, so as they cannot do what they would, but are also urged and forced by Gods bridle [ad ob­sequia praestanda,] to doe as he would have them. And in the next chapter there are his words, Ib. v. 18. sect. 1. Quod nihil efficiant homines nisi arcano der nutu, nec quic­quam deliberando a­gitent, nisi quod ipse jam apud se decreve­rit, & arcanâ suâ di­rectione constitua: [...] innumeris & claris testimoniis probatur. that men have nothing in agitation, that they bring nothing into action, but what God by his secret direction hath ordered, is apparent by many and cleare testimonies. In the Section following he sayth, Ib Sect 2. Et cer­tè nisi intus operare­tur in mentibus ho­minum, non rectè di­ [...]u esset, auferre labi­ [...]n à veracibus, & à s [...]nibus prudentiam, &c. And surely unlesse God did work inwardly in the minds of men, t'would not be rightly sayd, that he taketh away wisdome from the wise, &c. In those two chapters, that which he mainely driveth at, is to shew, that God doth not onely behave himself privatively in procuring the sins of men, but doth also put forth powerfull and positive acts in the bringing of them to paste. And in his second Book and 4 chapter after he had sayd, that God may be sayd to harden men, by forsaking them, he putteth in another way, by which God hardneth men, and that (he sayth) commeth a great deale nearer to the propriety of the Scripture phrases; namely by stirring up their wills: Instit. l. 2. c. 4. §. 3 ad exequenda sua ju­d [...]i [...] per minist [...]ū [...]rae suae Satanam, & con­sil [...]a co [...]um d [...]stivat quò visum est, & vo­luntates excitat, & co­natus firmat. God doth not onely harden men by leaving them to themselves, but by appoynting their counsels, ordering their deliberations, stirring up their wills, confirming their purposes and indeavours by the minister of his anger, Satan: and this he proveth by the worke of God on Sihon king of the Amorites, Deut. [...].30. and then insi­nuateth the end too, why God thus hardens men in their wicked courses, which is, that he might destroy them, Quia p [...]ditum Deus volebat, ob [...]ti­n [...]io cordis divina fuit ad ruinam prae­paratio. be­cause God intended his ruine, he prepared him for it by his in­duration.

The summe of all these propositions is this; God, who from all eternity appoynted many miserable men to end­lesse and unavoydable torments, decreed for the bringing a­bout of their intended ruine, that they should without re­medy live and dye in a state of sinne: and what he thus de­creed [Page 28] from everlasting, he doth most powerfully effect in time, so governing, overruling, and working upon the wills of those Reprobates, that they have no liberty or abili­ty at all in the issue, of avoyding their sinnes, but must of ne­cessity commit them.

Thus they teach: and therefore by just consequence they make God the author of sinne; as it will plainly appeare by these following considerations.

1 It is ordinary to impute sinne to those, who have not so great a hand in the production of it, as hath the Almigh­tie by the grounds of this opinion. For,

(1) The divell is called a father of lyes, Joh. 8.44. and by the like reason of all other sinnes; and therefore he that committeth sinne, is sayd to be of the divell, and to be a child of the divell, 1 Joh. 3.8.10. and sinne is called, a work of the divell, which the sonne of God appeared to loose, vers. 8. And why is the divell so called, but because he doth egge and allure men by inward suggestions and outward temp­tations to fall into sinne! This is all he doth or can doe. But God doth much more, if he necessitate and by his decree first, and next by his powerfull and secret working in the soules of men, determine their wills irresistibly to sin. For to determine is infinitely more then barely to perswade; for as much as sin must needs follow the determination, but not the perswasion of the will. God is therefore a truer cause of sinne (by this doctrine) then the Divell.

(2) Wicked men are esteemed authors of their owne offences; because they plot, purpose, choose and commit them, and are immediate agents in the acting of them.

But God (by this opinion) doth more: for he overruleth the projects and purposes of wicked men, and by an un­controllable motion proceeding from an immutable de­cree, carrieth all their deliberations, resolutions, choyses and actions precisely that very way; so as they cannot choose but doe as they doe, whatsoeuer they may think to the contrary. They have indeed [potentiam in se liberam] a power in it self free, to choose what they refuse, or to re­fuse what they choose, to determine themselves this way or that way as liketh them best: but they have not [liberum [...]sum] a free use of this their power. God doth determine [Page 29] their will before it hath determined it selfe; and maketh them doe those onely actions, which his omnipotent will hath determined, and not which their willes out of any ab­solute dominion over their owne actions, have prescri­bed. More rightly therefore, may God be called the Author of those offences; for Opera magis pertinent ad imperā ­tem, quā ad exequen­tem. deeds whether good or bad, are owned more truly by him that over-ruleth them, then by the servile instruments that onely execute and doe them.

3 Wicked counsellers, and they who allure and advise men to sinne, are accounted by God and men to be the cau­ses of those sinnes, to which they are the perswaders; and have beene punished for those misdeeds, which others through their instigations have committed. Jezabell A­habs wife, was reputed and punished as the murderer of Naboth; because she counselled and contrived the doing of it, as we may see 1. Kings. 21.23.25. But what is coun­selling to inforcing? Evill counsels may be refused, but an almighty power cannot be resisted? God therefore that u­seth this (according to their doctrine) in the production of sinnes, is much more an author of them, then hee that onely useth the other.

2 If we could finde out a King that should so carry himselfe in procuring the ruine and the offences of any subject, as (by this opinion) God doth in the effecting of the damnation and transgressions of Reprobates, we would all charge him with the ruine and sinnes of those his Subjects. Molin. Anat. c. 12. de praedest. p. 73 Quis non regem a­bominetur sic loquē ­tem? Who would not abhorre (sayth Moulin) a King speaking thus; Ego hunc homi­nem addico suspendi­o [...] sed ut justè suspen­datur, volo patret homicidium vel pe­culatum. J will have this man hang'd, and that J may hang him justly, I will have him murther or steale? This King (saith he) should not onely make an innocent man miserable, [sed & sceleratum] but wicked too, and should punish him for that offence [cujus ipse causa esset] of which himselfe is the cause. It is a cleere case. Sueton vit. Tib. cap. 61. Tibe­rius (as Suetonius reports) having a purpose to put cer­taine Virgins to death; because it was not lawfull among the Romans to strangle Virgins, caused them all to be de­floured by the Hangman, that so they might bee strangled. Who will not say, that Tiberius was the principall author of the deflouring of those maides? In like manner (say the [Page 30] Supralapsarians) God hath a purpose of putting great store of men to the second death, but because it is not lawfull for him by reason of his justice to put to death men innocent and without blame, he hath decreed, that the Divell shall defloure them; that afterward he may damne them. It followeth therefore, that God is the maine cause of those their sinnes.

3 That God is the Author of mens salvation and con­version, all sides grant: and yet hee doth no more in the procuring of them, then these men report him to do in the Reprobates impenitency and damnation. The salvation and conversion of the Elect (say they) he hath absolutely and antecedently, without the fore-sight of any deservings of theirs, resolved upon, and by irresistible meanes in their severall generations draweth them to beleeve, repent and endure to the end, that so they might be saved, and his ab­solute decree accomplished. On the other side, the damna­tion, the sinnes and the finall impenitency of Reprobates, he hath of his alone will and pleasure peremptorily decreed; this his decree he executeth in time, drawing them on by his unconquerable power and providence from sinne to sinne, till they have made up their measure, and in the end have inflicted on them that eternall vengeance, which he had provided for them. What difference is here in the course which God taketh for the conversion and salvation of the Elect, and the obduration and damnation of Re­probates? And therefore what hindereth, but that God (by their grounds) may as truly be stiled the prime cause and author of the sinnes of the one, as of the conversion of the other?

The Fathers thought it a plaine case: and therefore they did generally make sinne an object of prescience, not pre­destination, and bent the most of those arguments by which they refuted this foule assertion, against an absolute, irresistible, and necessitating decree, as I could easily shew, but that I feare to be overlong. Onely I will cite some few of those Authors words, whom the learned and reve­rend Bishop hath alledged in favour and for the defence of the Predestinarians and the mainteiners of Gotteschalkes o­pinion.

[Page 31]The Church of Lyons in their answer to the positions of Iohannes Scotus which he framed against Gotteschalk, hath these words Bish. Ʋsher. his hist. of Gottesc. pag. 138. Qui vim & ne­cessitatem peccandi deum intuliste homi­ni vel inferre dicit, manifeste horribiliter in deum blasphemat quem ad peccata com­pellendo utique au­thorem peccati osse confirmat. Whosoever sayth, that God hath layd a con­straynt or a necessity of sinning upon any man, he doth manifestly and fearfully blaspheme God, in as much as he maketh him by affirming that of him, to be the very author of sinne. Remi­gius Archbishop of that Church, explaining his Churches opinion in the poynt of prescience and predestination in 7 severall rules; in the 5th. of those rules he hath these words to the same purpose. God (sayth he) by his prescience and predestination hath layd a necessity of being wicked upon no man, Id. ib. p. 173. Hee enim si fecisset ipse utique esset author mal rum, &c. For if he had done this, he should have been the author of sinnes.

And thus (in my judgment) doth it plainly appeare that by absolute Reprobation, as it is taught the upper way, God is made to be the true cause of mens sinnes.

Many distinctions are brought to free the Supralapsarian way from this crimination: all which (me thinke) are no better then meere delusions of the simple and inconsiderate, and give no true satisfaction to the understanding.

There is (say they) a twofold decree.

1 An Operative, Distinction, 1. by which God positively and efficaci­ously worketh a thing.

2 A Permissive, by which he decreeth only to let it come to passe. If God should work sinne by an operative decree, then he should be the author of sinne; but not if he decree by a permissive decree, to let it come to passe. And this one­ly they say they mainteyne.

Answ. 1 It is true, that God hath decreed to suffer sinne: For o­therwise there would be none. Who can bring forth that which God will absolutely hinder? He suffered Adam to sinne, leaving him in the hand of his own counsell. Eccl. 15.14. he suffered the nations in times past to walk in their own wayes, Act. 14.16. and daily doth he suffer both good and bad to fall into many sinnes. And this he doth, not be­cause he stands in need of sinne for the setting forth of his glory: for he hath no need of the sinfull man: Ecclus 15. but partly, because he is [summus provisor,] supreme mode­rator of the world, and knoweth how to use that well which is ill done, and to bring good out of evill: and espe­cially [Page 32] for that reason which Tertullian presseth,Tertull. l. 1. contr. Marcion. namely, be­cause man is made by Gods owne gracious constitution, a [...] a free creature, undetermined in his actions, till he deter­mine himself: and therefore may not be hindred from finning by omnipotency, because God useth not to repeale his owne ordinances.

2 It is true also, that a permissive decree is no cause of sinne, because it is meerly extrinsecall to the sinner, and hath no influence at all upon the sinne: it is an antecedent onely, and such a one too, as being put, sinne followeth not of necessity. And therefore it is fitly contradistinguisht to an operative decree. And if that side would in good earnest, impute no more in sinfull events to the divine power, then the word (Permission) imports, their mayne conclu­sion would fall and the controversie betweene us end. But,

(1) Many of them reject this distinction utterly and will have God to decree sinne [efficaciter] with an energeticall and working will.Colloq. Mompel. 2. par. pa. 177. Witnesse that discourse of Beza, where­in he averreth and laboureth to proove, that God doth not onely permit sinne, but will it also: and witnesse Calvin too, who hath a whole Section against it: calling it.—A carnall di­stinction, invented by the flesh, and [effugium] a meere e­vasion to shift off this seeming absurdity,Calv. Instit. l 14 c. 18 Sect 1 & 2. that that man is made blind [volente & jubente Deo] by Gods will and commandement, who must shortly after be pu­nished for his blindnesse: he calleth it also, [figmentum] a fiction, and sayth they doe [ineptire] play the fooles that use it.

By many reasons also doth he indeavour to lay open the weaknesse of it, taxing those who understand such Scrip­tures as speake of Gods smiting men with a spirit of flum­ber and giddinesse, of blinding their mindes, infatuating and hardening their hearts, &c. of a permission and suffe­ring of men to be blinded and hardned, Id ib l. 21. c. 4. Sect. 3. [Nimis frivola est ista solutio] saith he, this too frivolous a glosse. In another place he blameth those that referre sinne to Gods presci­cience onely, calling theyr speeches [argutia] trickes and quirks, which Scripture will not beare: and those likewise that ascribe it to Gods permission: and sayth, [Page 33] Similiter quod de permissione afferunt, dilutius est quam ut subsistat. What they bring touching the divine permission in this businesse, will not hold water.

2 They that admit the word (Permissive) do willing­ly mistake it, and while (to keep off this blow) they use the word, they corrupt the meaning. For,

(1) Permission is an act of Gods consequent and judiciary will, by which he punisheth men for abusing their free­dome, and committing such sinnes day by day, as they might have avoyded, and to which he proceedeth [lente gradu] slowly and unwillingly, as we may see, Psal. 81.11, 12. Israel would none of me: so I gave them up, &c. Ezech. 18.39. Goe and serve every one his Idoll; seeing ye will not obey me, &c. Rom. 1.21, 24. Because when they knew God, they glorified him not as God: therefore God gave them up to their hearts lust, to vile affections, and to a Reprobate minde. Revel. 22.11 He which is unjust, let him be unjust still. In these places and many more we may see, that persons left to themselves are sin­ners onely; and not all sinners, but the obstinate and wil­full, which will by no meanes be reclaymed. But the per­mission, which they meane, is an act of Gods antecedent will, exercised about innocent men, lying under no guilt at all in Gods eternall consideration.

2 Permission, about whomsoever it is exercised, obsti­nate sinners or men considered without sinne, is no more then a not hindring of them from falling, that are able to stand, and supposeth a possibility of sinning or not sinning, in the parties permitted: but with them it is a withdraw­ing or with-holding of grace needfull for the avoyding of sinne, and so includeth an absolute necessity of sinning: for from the withdrawing of such grace sinne must needs follow, as the fall of Dagons house followed Sampsons pluc­king away the Pillers that were necessary for the upholding of it Maccovins in two disputations, expounding this word (Permission) circumscribes it within two acts:Maccov. coll. theo [...]. disp. 9. pag. 10. the first of which, is a substraction of divine assistance necessary to the preventing of sinne: and having prooved it by two arguments that none may thinke he is alone in this, hee saith, that he is compassed about with a cloud of witnesses, and produceth two: 1 The first of them, is our reverend [Page 34] and learned Whitaker, some of whose words alledged by him are these. Pag. 15. Per­miss [...] p [...]c [...]i est pri­vatio [...]uxilu divini, quo positio peccatum impediretur. Permission of sinne, is a privation of that ayde, which being present, sinne would have been hindred. The second is Pareus, for saying, that Sub [...]racto auxi­lio dei, homo (Ada­mus) istis facultatibus ad standum benè uti non potuit, that helpe (which God withdrew from Adam) being withdrawen, Adam could not so use his endowments as to persevere. And this doctrine (sayth he) is defended by our men, as it appeareth out of Pareus lib. de gratia primi hominis. cap. 4. pag. 46.

Their permission therefore of sinne being a substraction of necessary grace, is equivalent to an actuall, effectuall pro­curing and working of it. (For [causa deficiens in necessariis est efficiens] a deficient cause in things necessary is truly effi­cient) and so is but a meere fig-lease to cover the foulnesse of their opinion.

Distinct. 2.There are two things (they say) in every ill act, —

1 The materiall part, which is the substance of the ac­tion.

2 The formall part, which is the evill or obliquity of it. God is the Author of the action it selfe, but not of the ob­liquity and evill that cleaveth to it; as he that causeth a lame horse to goe, is the cause of his going, but not of his lame going. And therefore it followeth not from their o­pinion, that God is the Author of sinne.

Answ. 1 1 All sinnes receive not this distinction; because of ma­ny sinnes the acts themselves are sinfull, as of the eating of the forbidden fruit, and Sauls sparing of Agag, and the fat beast [...] of the Amalekites.

2 It is not true, that they make the decree of God one­ly of actions and not of their aberrations: for they make it to be the cause of all those meanes that lead to damnati­on, and therefore of sinfull actions as sinfull, and not as bare actions. For actions deserve damnation, not as actions, but as transgressions of Gods law.

3 To the Simile I say, that the rider or master that shall resolve first to flea his horse or knocke him on the head, and then to make him lame that for his halting he may kill him, is undoubtedly the cause of his halting: and so, if God determine to cast men into Hell, and then to bring them into a state of sinne, that for their sinnes he may bring them to ruine, we cannot conceive him to be lesse then the au­thor [Page 35] as well of their sinnes as of those actions, to which they doe inseparably adhere, and that out of Gods intenti­on to destroy them.

The will is determined to an Object two wayes:Distinct. 3.

• 1 By Compulsion, against the bent and inclination of it.
• 2 By necessity, according to the naturall desire and liking of it.

Gods Predestination (say they) determineth the will to sinne this last way, but not the first; it forceth no man to doe that which he would not, but carryeth him towards that which he would: when men sinne, it is true they can­not choose; and it is as true they will not choose. It follow­eth not therefore from the grounds of their doctrine, that Gods decree is the cause of mens sinnes, but their owne wicked wils.

Answ. 1 1 The Ancients made no distinction between these two words (necessity) and (compulsion;)) but used them in this argument promiscuously: and did deny, that God did ne­cessitate men to sinne, lest they should grant him hereby to be the Author of sinne, as I have touched before, and shall intimate againe afterward.

Nor did the Schoolemen put any difference betweene them, as may appeare by the testimony of Mr. Calvin, Calv. Instit. i. 2. c. 2 Sect [...] who speaking of the Schoole-distinction of the willes threefold liberty, from Necessity, from Sinne, from M [...]ery, sayth; This distinction I could willingly receive, but that it con­foundeth necessity with coaction.

2 That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is as truly the cause of sinne, as that which forceth it; because it ma­keth the sinne to be inevitably committed, which other­wise might be avoyded: and therefore, if the divine decree necessitate mans will to sinne, it is as truly the cause of the sinne, as if it did enforce it.

3 That which necessitateth the will to sinne, is more truely the cause of the sinne, then the will is; because it o­ver-ruleth the will, and beareth all the stroke, taketh from it its true liberty, by which it should be Lord of it selfe and disposer of its own acts, and in respect of which, it hath been usually called by Philosophers and Fathers too, [ [...],] a power which is under [Page 36] the insuperable check and controll of no Lord, but it selfe. It over-ruleth (I say) and maketh it become but a servile in­strument, irresistibly subject to superiour command and de­termination: and therefore is a truer cause of all such acts and sinnes, as proceed from the will so determined, then the will is. For when two causes concurre to the produ­cing of an effect, the one a principall over-ruling cause, the other but instrumentall and wholly at the devotion of the principal; then is the effect, in all reasō, to be imputed to the principall, which by the force of its influxe and impression produceth it, rather then to the subordinate and instrumen­tall, which is but a meere servant in the production of it. We shall finde it ordinary in Scripture, to ascribe the effect to the principall Agent. It is not ye, that speak (sayth CHRIST,) but the spirit of my father, that speaketh in you. Math. 10.20. J laboured more abundantly, then they all, yet not J, but the grace of God which was in me. 1. Cor. 15.10. And I live; yet not J, but CHRIST liveth in me, sayth S. Paul. Gal. 2.20.

In these and many other places, the effect or worke spo­ken of, is taken from the instrument, and given to the principall Agent. Which being so, though mans will work with Gods decree in the commission of sinne, and willeth the sinne which it doth; yet seeing what the will doth, it doth by the commanding power of Gods almighty decree, and so it doth that otherwise it cannot doe; the sinne com­mitted cannot so rightly be ascribed to mans will the infe­rior, as to Gods necessitating decree the superior cause.

4 That which maketh a man sinne by way of necessity only; that is, with and not against his will, is the cause of his sinne in a worse manner, then that which constrayneth him to sinne against his will: as he which by powerfull perswa­sions draweth a man to stab, or hang, or poyson himselfe, is in a grosser manner the cause of that evill and unnaturall ac­tion, then he that by force compelleth him, because he ma­keth him to consent to his own death. And so, if Gods de­cree do not onely make men sinne, but sinne willingly too; not onely cause that they shall [malè agere] doe evill, but [malè velle] will evill, it hath the deeper hand in the sinne.

[Page 37]Sinne may be considered as sinne,Distinct. 4. or as a meanes of de­claring Gods justice in mens punishments: God doth not predestinate men to sinne, as it is sinne, but as a means of their punishment. He is not therefore (say they) the Author of Sinne.

Answ. 1 1 A good end cannot moralize a bad action: it remayneth evill, though the end be never so good: [bonum oritur ex integris] end, manner, yea and matter too must be good, or else the action is naught. He that shall steale that hee may give an almes, or commit adultery that he may beget chil­dren for the Church, or oppresse the poore to teach them patience, or kill a wicked man that he may doe no more hurt with his example, or do any forbidden thing; though his end be never so good, he sinneth notwithstanding. And the reason is, because the evill of sinne is greater then any good that can come by sinne; for as much as it is [laesio di­vinae majestatis,] a wronging of Gods majesty, and so [di­vino bono opposita,] directly prejudiciall to the good of Al­mighty God, as much as any thing can be. This S. Paul knew very well: and therefore he telleth us plainly, that we must not doe evill that good may come of it. Rom. 3.8. Whosoever therefore willeth a Sinne though for never so good an end; he willeth that which is truely and formally a Sinne: and consequently God, though he will sinne for ends never so good, yet willing it with such a powerfull and effectuall will, as giveth a necessary being to it, he be­commeth Author of that which is formally sinne.

2 The members of this distinction are not opposite: for Sinne as Sinne and in no other consideration, is a meanes of punishment. If God therefore willeth it as a meanes of pu­nishment, he willeth it as Sinne; his decree is terminated at the very formality of it.

3 This distinction fasteneth upon God a further asper­sion, and loadeth him with three speciall indignities more.

(1) Want of Wisdome and Providence. His counsels must needs be weake, if he can finde out no meanes to glorifie justice, but by the bringing in of sinne, which his soule hateth, into the world, and appointing men to commit it, that so he may manifest justice in the punishment of it.

[Page 38](2) Want of sincerity and plaine dealing with men.

Tiberius (as Suetonius reporteth) having a purpose t [...] put the two Sonnes of Germanicus (Drusus and Nero) t [...] death Suetonius in vit. Tib. cap. 54. Variâ fraude induxit u [...] con [...]tatentur ad con­v [...] S [...]concitati per­de en [...]r. used sundry cunning contrivances to draw them to revile him, that reviling him they might be put [...] death: and herein is justly censured for great Hypocrisie. And so, if God having appoynted men by his absolute wi [...] to inevitable perdition, do decree that they shall sinne that so they may be damned for those sinnes which he decreeth and draweth them into; he dissembleth, because he slaughtereth them under a pretext of justice; for sinne but yet for such sinns onely as he hath by his eternall coun­sell appoynted as the meanes of their ruine.

(3) Want of mercy in a high degree, as if he did so delight in bloud, that rather then he will not destroy mens soules, he will have them live and dye in sinne that he may destroy them; like to those Pagan Princes, of whom I [...]st [...] Mart. apol. 2. two or three leaves from the beginning say­eth Videmini vereri nè omnes celant ju­stitiam, atque ita de­sint, in quos anim­advertaris. Verum haec cuia fuit magis [...]a [...]u a qu [...]m bo­norum principum. They are afraid that all should be just, lest they should have none to punish: But this is the disposition of hangmen, ra­ther then of good Princes. And therefore farre be these foule enormities, and in particular this latter from the God of truth and father of mercies.

And thus notwithstanding these distinctions, it is (in my conceit) most evident, that the riged and upper way maketh God the author of mens sinnes, as well as pu­nishments. And so much for the first generall Inconveni­ence, which ariseth from this opinion, namely the disho­nour of God.

II. Inconvenience.THe second Inconvience is, the overthrow of true reli­gion and good government among men.

To this, this opinion seemeth to tend, for these rea­sons.

1 Because it maketh sinne to be no sinne indeed, but onely in opinion. We use to say, Necessity hath no law: creatures or actions in which necessity beareth sway, are without law. Lyons are not forbidden to prey, birds to fly, fishes to swimme, any bruit creatures to doe according to their kindes, because their actions are naturall and neces­sary: [Page 39] they cannot upon any admonition doe otherwise. A­mong creatures indued with reason and liberty, lawes are given to none, but such as can use their principles of reason and freedome: fooles, mad men, and children, are subject to [...]o law, because they have no liberty. To men that can use their liberty, lawes are not given neither, but in those acti­ons which are voluntary. No man is forbidden to be hun­gry, thirsty, weary, sleepy, to weepe, to laugh, to love or to hate; because these actions and affections are naturall and necessary: the will may governe them, but it cannot sup­presse them.

And so if to deale justly, to exercise charity, &c. with their contraries, be absolutely and antecedently necessary too, whether this necessity flow from a principle within or a Mover without, we are as lawlesse in these, as in the other.

Now if Necessity haue no law, then actions in themselves evill, if under the dominion of absolute necessity, are trans­gressions of no law and consequently no sinnes. For Sinne is a transgression of the Law. 1 Ioh. 3.4.

This that I say, hath been sayd long ago. For Iustin Mar­tyr speaking against destiny, hath these words; Iust. Mart. Apol. 2 a little beyond the middle. Si fato fieret ut [...] aut improbus [...]ut bonus, nec alii quidem probi essent [...] ma [...]. Jf it be by destiny (that is, by absolute necessity, for that the fathers do generally call by the name of Destiny;) that men are good or bad, they are indeed neither good nor bad. A speech like to this he hath a little after Videretur verum esse, [...]l [...] v [...]rtutē nec v [...]um sed opini­one solum bona & m [...] [...]c [...] quae, [...] [...]st m [...]xima impietas & injustiti. Jt would seeme, if this be so, that vertue and vice are nothing; but things are judged to be good or evill by opinion onely, which as good reason teacheth, is very great injustice and impiety. And surely well might he say so: for to what purpose was the Sonne of God made man, and being man made a sacrifice for sinne? why was the Mini­sterie of the word and sacraments ordeyned? to what end are heaven and hell propounded? why are exhortations, disswasions, or any other meanes to hinder men from sinne applyed, if sinne be nothing but a meere opinion?

CHRIST, the Christian faith, the word and Sacraments and whatsoever according to the Scriptures hath been don for the applying of the pardon of sinne, are all but meere sa­bles, nay very impostures, if sinne be nothing. And by con­sequence it is no matter at all, whether men be Christians, [Page 40] Iewes, Turks, or Pagans, of what religion, or whether of any religion at all. Now whither tendeth this, but to the overthrow of religion?

2 Because it taketh away the conscience of sinne.

Why should men be afraid of any sinne that pleaseth or may profit them, if they must needs sinne? or what reason have they to weepe and mourne when they have sinned, seeing they have not sinned truely, because they sinned necessarily?

The Tragedian saith, Fati iita culpa est: nemo fit fato nocens. when a man sinneth, his desti­ny must beare the blame. Necessity freet lo him from all iniqui­ty. Sinnes are either the faults of that irresistible decree that causeth them, or no faults at all. If either: then sorrow, feare, or any other act of repentance whatsoever, may as well be spared as spent. This conceit being once drunke in, religion cannot long continue; for the affections have been the strongest planters, and are the surest upholders of it in the world. Primus in or be Deos fecit timor.

3 Because it taketh away the desert and guilt of sinne.

Offences if fatall, cannot be justly punished. The reason is, because those deeds for which men are punished or re­warded, must be their owne, under their owne power and soveraignty: but such are no fatall actions or events. Nei­ther temporally nor eternally can sinne be punished, if it be absolutely necessary.

(1) Not temporally, as God himselfe hath given us to un­derstand by that law which he prescribed the Iewes. Deut. 22.25. which was, that if a maide commit uncleannesse by constraint, she should not be punished. His reason was, be­cause there was no cause of death in her: what she yeelded to, was through compulsion, being overborne by power; as a man that is wounded to death by his Neighbour, so was a virgin in that case, a sufferer rather then a doer. This particular law is of universall right: no just punishment can be inflicted for sin, where there is no power in the par­ty to avoyd it. The speech of Lypsius, is but a meere crot­chet contrary to reason, [Fatali culpae fatalis paena] Fatall faults must have fatall punishments. Did Magistrates think mens offences unavoydable, they would think it bootless and unreasonable to punish them. Nay not onely so, but [Page 41] we see by dayly experience, that Iudges following the di­rection of reason, have very remissely punished such faults, as have been committed through the power of headstrong and exorbitant passions: Yea, we may reade of some, who have not thought it fit to punish such faults at all. Valeri­us Maximus telleth, that Popilius a Roman Praetor,Val. Max. l. 8. c 1. sit­ting in judgment on a woman who had in a bitter passion slaine her mother, because she had murther'd her children; [neque damnavit, neque absolvit] neyther cleered her nor condemned her. Gell. l. 12. c. 7. And Aulus Gellius reporteth of Dolabella the Proconsull of Asia, that when a woman of Smyrna was brought before him who had poyson'd her husband and son for murdering a son of hers, which she had by a former husband; he turned her over to the Areopagus (which was the gravest & most renowned judgment seat in the world.) The Iudges there not daring to acquit her being stayned with a double slaughter, nor yet to punish her being pro­voked with just griefe; commanded the Accuser and the Offender to come before them 100 yeares after. And so Ne (que) absolutum mulieris venesicium est, quod per leges non licuit; ne (que) no­ [...]ns damnata punita­que quae digna venia fuit. Neyther was the womans fact justified, the Lawes not al­lowing it, nor yet the woman punished; because she was worthy to be pardoned. If wise Magistrates have spared such Of­fenders as have beene over-swayed with passions, which did but incline, not determine them to their irregular ac­tions; they would never have punished any trespassers, if they had thought them to be such by invincible necessity. Or, if offenders did thinke that their offences were theyr Destinies, and that when they Murther, steale, commit a­dultery, make insurrections, plot treasons, or practice any outragious villanies; they doe them by the necessity of Gods unalterable decree, and can doe no otherwise: they would (and might) complaine of their punishments, as un­just; as Ze [...]oes servant did. When he was beaten by his Master for a fault, he told him out of his own grounds that he was unjustly beaten; because he was [fato coactus pec­care] constrayned to make that fault by his undeclin [...] b [...]e fate. The Adrumetine Monkes, misled by S. Austin, Epist. 105. ad Sixtum Presbyterum (which he calleth a Booke, where­in he setteth downe his opinion concerning Gods grace) did so teach grace, that they denyed Free-will. And this [Page 42] S. Austin confuted in his booke De gratia & lib. arb. And thinking the grace of God (as S. Aug. taught) to be such, as could not stand with freedome of will, they thought that no man should be punished for his faults, but rather prayed for, that God would give them grace to do better. Against this, S. Austin directed his other Booke, De Corr. & grat. In which discourse though it be grace that is still named, yet predestination is included.K [...]. in pra [...] a [...]l. Luth. de ser [...] [...]l [...]. For as Kimedoncius sayth truly in his Preface to Luther, de servo arbitr. Betweene Grace and Predestination, there is onely this difference (as S. Aug. teacheth, l. de Praedest. Sanctorū cap. 10.) that Predestination is a preparation of Grace, and Grace a bestowing of Predesti­nation. As Zenoes servant and these Monks did, so would all men judge; did they considerately think that men could not choose but offend. And what would be the resul­tance of such a perswasion, but an inundation of the greatest insolencies, and a dissolution of all good go­vernment!

2 Nor if this be true, can sinne be punished eternally, or that tribunall be just, on which the sentence of eternall fire shall be denounced against the wicked at the last day. To this, I have the Fathers bearing witnesse generally and plainly. Tertullian hath these words, Tertul. lib. 2. Contr. Marcion. Cae­te [...]ùm, nec boni nec mali merces [...]re pē ­sa [...] ei, q [...] aut b [...] ­nus aut malus necci­sitate suit inventus, non v [...]luntate. The recompence of good or evill can with no justice be given to him, who is good or evill, not freely but of necessity.

S. Hierom sayth, Liberi arbi [...]i nos condi [...]t Deus, acc [...]d v [...]tu es nec ad [...]a necessitate trahi­mur: alioquin ubi ne­cessitas est, nec dam­natio, nec corona est. Where necessity domineers, there is no place for retribution. Epiphanius sayth. Epiph. advers. her. l 1. haer 5. num. 3. Sanè quidem justi­ [...] a st [...]lis quae necessitatē priuat, pae [...]ae repetantu [...], quam ab eo qui quod agit ( [...]) necessitate adactus aggreditur. The starres which impose upon men a necessity of sinning, may bee punished with better justice then the men themselves. Aug. l. 2 contr. Faust. c. 5. Et nos quidem sub fato stel­latum nullius hominis genesin ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel male vi­vitur, propter justum Dei judicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus. We place mens nativities under no fatall constellations (sayth S. Aug.) that we may free the will by which a man liveth eyther well or ill, from all bands of necessity, because of the righteous judge­ment of God. Prosper speaking of the judgment of God, by which he decreed to render unto every man according to his workes, Prosp. ad Obj. 10. Ʋinc. Quod judicium futurum omnino non esser, si homines Dei voluntate peccarent. This judgment should never be, if men did [Page 43] sinne by the will and determination of God. Fulgentius also sayth the same Fulgent. l. 1. c. 2. ad Mont: cap. 22. Nec justitia justa dice­tur, si puniendum r [...]um non invenisse, sed fecisse dicatur. Major vero erit inju­stitia, si lapso Deus re­tribuat paenam, quem stantem praedestinas­se dicitur ad ruinam. Jt is great injustice in God to punish him whom he doth not find, but make an offender. This was St. Bernards opinion too, Ber. l. de gra [...] & lib. arb p. 908. Sola voluntas, quoniam profui ingenita libe [...] ­tate aut dissentire sibi aut praeter se in aliquo consentire, nulla vi, nulla cogitur necessi­tate, n [...]n mimerito justum vel injustum beatitudine seu mise­ria dignā ac capa [...]m creaturam c [...]uit, prou [...] scilicet justitiae, injustitiaenè consen­se [...]. It is onely a will free from compul­sion and necessity (saith he) which maketh a creature capable of reward and punishment. Out of these testimonies layed to­gether may be collected 3 things;

1 That the Ancients did use to call a necessity of humane actions good and bad by the name of destiny, from what ex­ternall cause soever this necessity did arise.

2 That they did use these two words [Necessity] and [Compulsion] pro [...]cuously: and therefore thought that necessity as well as compulsion did take away the wills li­berty.

3 (Which is for our present purpose,) that they belee­ved and contended, that the judgements of God on sinners could not be just, if they were held by the Adamantine chaines of any absolute necessity under the power of their sinnes.

I will therefore conclude this argument with the words of Epiphanius writing of the error of the Pharisees, who be­leeved the immortality of the soule, and the resurrection of the Dead, and yet held that all things come to passe by ne­cessity. Epiph. l. 1. adv. h [...]r 1 [...]. p 35. nu 3. Est illud verò extre­mae cujusdam imperi­tiae, ne dic [...]m amen­tiae, cùm resurrectio­nem mortuorum [...]sse fateare, ac justissinaū cujuisque f [...]cts ju [...]i­u [...]o sti [...]utum f [...] nihil [...]u [...] esse [...]ul­lum, [...]ss [...]re [...]e. Qui m [...] [...]st [...] [...]ve­ [...] p [...]s [...]unt, jud [...] atque fatum It is (sayth hee) a Point of extreme ignorance or madnesse rather, for him that confesseth the resurrection of the dead, and the great day appointed for the revelation of Gods righteous judgement, to say, that there is any Destiny, any necessity in mens actions. For how can the righteous judgement of God and destiny comply and stand together? And (let me adde) how can the beliefe of this and true pi­ety stand together? For where this perswasion that mens sinnes are necessary, and that therefore there can be no righteous judgment, is rooted in; religion will quickly be rooted out.

4 It tendeth to religions overthrow, because it maketh the whole circle of a mans life but a meere Destiny. By it all our doings are Gods ordinances, all our imaginations branches of his Predestination; and all events in King­domes and Common-weales the necessary issues of the di­vine [Page 44] decree. All things whatsoever, though they seem to doe somewhat,; yet (by this opinion) they do indeed just nothing: the best lawes restraine not one offender, the sweetest rewards promote not one vertue, the powerful­lest Sermons convert not one sinner, the humblest devoti­ons divert not one calamity, the strongest endeavours in things of any nature whatsoever, effect no more then would be done without them: but the necessitating, over-ruling decree of God doth all. And if lawes doe nothing, wherefore are they made? If rules of Religion doe nothing, why are they prescribed? If the wills of men doe nothing, why are men encouraged to one thing, scared from ano­ther? And if good endeavours and onsets doe nothing (be­ing excited, continued, limited, controlled, and every way governed by an active, absolute and almighty decree) to what purpose are they used? Who seeth not plainely whither these things tend? To nothing more, then the subversion of piety and policy, religion and lawes, society and government? This did the Romans see full well:) and therefore, they banished [Mathematicos] The teachers and aberters of destiny, out of Rome. These and the like incon­veniences which come from the upper way, did worke so with Prosper, as that he cals him no Catholique, who is of this opinion. Prosp. ad [...]a. Gall. s [...]t 1. Quisquis er­go ex p [...]aedestinatio­ne de [...], velu [...] fatali ne­cessitate, homines in peccata compulsos co­gi dicit in mortem, non est Catholicus. Whosoever saith, that men are vrged to sinne and to be damned by the predestination of God, as by a fa­tall (unavoydable) necessity, he is no Catholique.

They did also make the Arausican councell denounce a curse against such. Concil. Ar [...]s 2. Can, 2. Aliques ad malum divina potes­t [...]e praedest [...]tos es­se, non solum non [...] edimus, sed etiam si qui sint, qui tantum m [...]lum credere vel [...]nt, cum onini detestatio­ne illis Anathema di­cimus. That any are predestinated by the di­vine power to sinne, we doe not onely not beleeve, but with the greatest detestation that we can, we denounce Anathema to such (if there be any such) as will beleeve so great an e­vill.

Thus farre of my reasons against the upper and most harsh and rigorous way.

THe Arguments by which for the present I stand con­vinced of the untruth, even of the milder and lower way too, I will take from,

• [Page 45]1 Pregnant testimonies of Scripture, di­rectly opposing it.
• 2 Some principall attributes of God, not compatible with it.
• 3 The end of the word and Sacraments with other excellent guifts of God to men, quite thwarted by it.
• 4 Holy endeavours much hindred, if not wholly subverted by it.
• 5 Grounds of comfort (by which the conscience in distresse should be re­leeved) which are all removed by it.
  It is 1 Repugnant to Scripture.

1 It is repugnant to plaine and evident places of Scrip­ture even in terminis, as will appeare by these instances.Ezek. 33.11.

As J live sayth the Lord, J have no pleasure in the death of a sinner; but that the wicked turne from his wayes and live.

And lest men should say, It is true, God willeth not the death of a repenting sinner; the Lord in another place of the same Prophet,Ezek. 18.32. extendeth the proposition to them also that perish — I have no pleasure in the death of him that dyeth.

In this Scripture we may note three things.

1 Gods affecti­on to men, set forth —

2 The persons in whose destruction God delighteth not: (Wicked men) such as for their rejecting of grace dye and are damned. If God have no pleasure in their death, much lesse in the death of men, eyther altogether innocent or taynted onely with originall sinne.

3 The truth of his affection;Tertull. lib. de paen. c. 4. As I live [Cupit credi sibi] God would f [...]ine have us beleeve him (sayth Tertullian) when he sayth, J will not the death of him that dyeth: and therefore he bindeth his speech with an oath. O beatos nos, quorum causâ Deus ju [...]at. O miserrimos, si nec juranti domino credimus. Happy are we for whose take the Lord vouchsafeth to sweare; but most [...]nhappy, if we beleeve him not when he sweareth.

Now if God delight not in the destruction of wicked men, certainely he never did out of his absolute pleasure seale up so many millions of men lying in the fall under in­vincible [Page 46] damnation: for such a decreeing of men to eter­nall death, is directly opposite to a delight in their repen­tance and everlasting life.

Rom. 11.2. God hath shut up all in unbeleefe, that he might have mercy over all.

In these the Apostles words are two (Alls) of equall extent, the one standing against the other.

An (All) of unbeleevers, and an (All) of objects of mercy: looke how many unbeleevers there be, on so ma­ny hath God a will of shewing mercy. And therefore, if all men of all sorts and conditions, and every man in every sort be an unbeleever; then is every man of every condition under mercy: and if every man be under mercy, then there is no precise antecedent will of God, of shutting up some and those the most from all possibility of obtaining mercy. For these two are [...] and cannot stand toge­ther.

Ioh. 3.16. God so loved the world, that he gave his onely begotten Sonne, that whosoever beleeveth in him should not perish, &c. God loved the world, sayth the Text, that is, the whole lumpe of mankinde: therefore he did not absolutely hate the greatest part of men.

Againe, God loved it fallen into a gulph of sinne and mi­sery. For he so loved them, as to send his sonne to redeem them; and a Saviour presupposeth sinne. He did not there­fore hate the most of them lying in the fall: for love and hatred are contrary acts in God, and cannot be exercised about the same objects.

Many Expositers (I know) doe take [world] here in a restrained sense, and understand by it the company of the Elect, or the world of Beleevers onely, but they have little reason for it (in my opinion;) for,

1 I thinke there can be no place of Scripture alledged, wherein this word [world] especially with the addition of [whole] as 1. Epist. of Joh. cap. 2. v. 2. (a place equiva­lent to this for the matter of it and a comment upon it.) I say no place (I thinke) can be produced, where [world] doth signifie onely the Elect, or onely beleevers; but it signifyeth, eyther all men, or at least the most men living in some certaine place, and at some certaine time, but without [Page 47] distinction of good and bad, or if it be used any where more restraynedly, it is applyed onely to wicked and Reprobate men, who in their affections are wedded to the world and its transitory delights: and therefore do most properly de­serve this name.

2 Suppose it be granted, that (World) in some Scrip­tures is restrayned to the Elect; yet it cannot beare this sig­nification here; — because,

1 The words then would have a sencelesse construction. For thus would they runne; God so loved the Elect that who­soever beleeveth in him should not perish, &c. and if they run thus, this would follow: — There are two sorts of the E­lect, some that do beleeve and shall be saved, others that do not beleeve and shall be damned: which is a division or di­stinction unknowne in Divinity.

2 Beleevers and unbeleevers, damned and saved, com­prehend all mankinde: for there is no man but he is one of these. Now (world) in this place includeth beleevers and unbeleevers, the saved and the damned, as appeareth most plainly to him that layeth the 16, 17. and 18. verses to­gether. Therefore it signifyeth here all mankind without exception of any.

Who would have all to be saved, [...]. Tim. [...].4. and to come to the knowledge of the truth.

In these words, the Apostle delivereth two things:

1 That it is Gods will, that men should enjoy a happy end, and be saved.

2 That it is also his will, they should have the meanes and make a good use of them in comming to the know­ledge of the truth, that so they might be saved. There is no let in God, but that all men may beleeve and be saved: and therefore there is no absolute will, that many thousand men shall dye in unbeleefe and be damned.

Two answers are usually returned, which I confesse give me little satisfaction.

1 That by (All) here we are to understand all sorts, and not every particular man in those sorts.

It is true, that (All) is sometimes so taken in Scripture; but (I beleeve) not here: for the very context sheweth, that we are to understand by it the individuals and not the [Page 48] kinds. In the first verse there is a duty enjoyned. [J will that prayers and supplications be made for all men;] and in this verse the motive is annexed [God will have all to be sa­ved:] As if he should have sayd — Our charity must reach to all whom God extends his love to.

God out of his love will have all to be saved: and there­fore in charity we must pray for all. Now in the duty, (All) signifyeth every man for no man though wicked and pro­phane is to be included from our Prayers.

Pray for them (sayth our Saviour) that persecute you: and pray (sayth the Apostle here) for Kings and all that are in authority; men in those dayes, though the greatest, yet the worst, the very Lyons, Wolves and Beares of the Church: Pray for them. And if for them, then for any o­ther. Thus in the duty it signifieth every man: and there­fore, it must have the same extent in the motive too, or else the motive doth not reach home, nor is strong enough to enforce the duty.

The second answer is, that God will have all to be sa­ved with his revealed will, but millions to be damned with his secret will.

But if this answer stand, then (in my apprehension) these inconveniences will follow.

1 That Gods words (which are his revealed will) are not interpretations of his minde and meaning; and by con­sequence are not true: for the speech which is not the sig­nification of the minde, is a lye.

2 That there are two contrary wills in God, a secret will, that many sonnes of Adam shall irrevocably be dam­ned, and a revealed will, that all the sonnes of Adam may be saved.

3 That one of Gods wills must needs be bad, eyther the secret or the revealed will. For of contraries, if the one be good, the other is bad: and so of Gods contrary wills, if one be good, the other must needs be bad. For, malum est contrarium bono.

[...] 3. [...]. Not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance, &c.

This Scripture is not so liable to the exceptions against the former testimony. For it is a negative proposition and [Page 49] must be taken distributively: and therefore speaketh that in plaine termes, which is contrary to absolute reprobatiō.

That which is usually replyed, is that the persons here spoken of, are the elect onely, and such as truely beleeve: God is not willing that any of them should perish.

But the contrary appeareth in the text. For the persons here mentioned are those, toward whom God exerciseth much patience, and long suffering; as it is in the words next going before. And who are they? Are they the elect, are they beleevers onely? No, but Reprobates rather, who dy for their contempt of grace. For it is apparent by Scrip­tures, that God doth patiently expect the conversion even of them that are never changed, but dye in their sinnes, as we may see, 1 Pet. 3. v. 19, 20. Where we read that the patience of God was exercised toward those, who in the dayes of Noah despised it, and went to prison, that is, to Hell for it. Yea of all men, Reprobates are the truest and most proper objects of Gods patience, as we may see, Rom. 2.4. where St. Paul speaking of such as go on in sinne, and trea­sure up wrath to themselves against the day of wrath, saith; that God useth patience towards them that he might lead them to repentance. And Rom. 9.22. He endureth (saith the text) with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction, In the 5 of Esay, v. 2. and the 65 cap. v. 2. we may see the same thing. Reprobates therefore as well as others, my rather then others, doth Peter here speake of, and saith, that God would have none of them to perish: if they do perish, it is through their owne fault and folly, and not Gods absolute pleasure, who would have no man to perish.

To these testimonies, I may adde these conditionall speeches.

I thou seek him, he will be found of thee: 2. Chron. 28.9. but if thou forsake him he will [...]ast thee off forever.

Jf you se [...]ke him, he will he found of you: 2 Chron. 15. [...]. but if you forsake him, he will forsake you.

If thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? Gen. [...].7. and if thou doest not well, sinne lyeth at the doore.

The just shall live by faith: Heb [...]0.2 [...] but if any man wit [...] [...] selfe, my soule [ [...]] shall have no p [...] [...] [Page 50] shall not like him, he shall be a Reprobate.

By all these and many other places that speake condi­tionally (for ought that I can see) it is cleere, that God for­saketh no man considered simply in the fall, till by actuall sinnes and continuance in them he forsake God. Now if God reject no man from salvation in time and in deed, till he cast off God; then surely he rejected no man in pur­pose and decree, but such a one as he foresaw, would reject and cast off him. For Gods acts in time are regulated by his decrees before time. Ephes. 1.11. He worketh all things (sayth the Apostle) according to the counsell of his own will: and therefore there must be an exact conformity between them, as between [regulam] and [regulatum,] the rule and the thing squared thereby. By whatsoever therefore God doth in the world, we may know what he purposed to do before the world; and by his actuall casting men off when they grow rebellious and impenitent, and not before, we may certainly gather, that he decreed to cast them off, for their foreseen rebellion and impenitency, and not be­fore.

Besides, it is in substance all one, to cast a man off in­deed and to entertaine a resolution to do it. Our velle and facere are all one in Gods account: and the reason is, because where there is a deliberate and setled will, the deed will follow, if nothing hinder. Much more is Gods will and deed all one, seeing his will is omnipotent and irresistible: and whatsoever he willeth directly and absolutely, is cer­tainly done, when the time commeth.

Well: all these plaine and expresse Scriptures, with the whole course and tenour of Gods word, this opinion fla [...]ly contradicting; though it do (perhaps) shrowd it selfe in some darke and obscure speeches of holy writ, I take it to be an untruth. For what S. Austin sayth in another case, I may safely say in this. Nunquid ideo negandum quod ap­tum est, quia com­prehendi non potest quod occultum est. Shall we contradict plain places, because we cannot comprehend the obscure? Secundum plura pauciora sunt intelli­genda, & ne unus sermo subvertat ali­de, secundum omne [...] potius qu [...]m adver­sus omnes intelligen­tus erit. A few Testimonies (sayth Tertullian) must receive an exposi­tion answerable to the current of Scripture, not contrary to it▪

This is my first reason.

SEcondly, it crosseth some principall Attributes of God:2 It is incompa­tible with God Attributes. therefore it cannot be true. For God useth not to make decrees contrary to his own most glorious nature, and such as are incompatible with these excellent Attri­butes, by which he hath discovered part of himselfe to men. [Voluntas Dei semper sequitur naturam suam] is a rule among Divines, Gods will alwayes followes his nature; the reason why, is given by the Apostle, 2. Tim. 2.13. God cannot deny himselfe.

Two things are here to be premised.

1 That Gods chiefe attributes are those perfections, in the manifestation of which by acts conformable to them, God is most glorified; which are Mercy, Justice, Truth and Holinesse. For God is more honoured by the exercise of these among men, then by the putting forth of his unli­mited power and soveraignty; as a King is more renowned among his Subjects for his equity, candor and clemency, then for his dominion and authority, or any thing that is done only for the manifestation thereof. And there is good reason for it. For,

(1) Power is no vertue; but Holines, Mercy, Iustice, and Truth are: acts of power are not morally good in them­selves, but are made good or evill by their concomitants. If they be accompanied with Iustice, Mercy, &c. they are good; if otherwise, they are naught. For [justum oportet esse, quod laudem meretur] Nothing deserveth praise, unlesse it be just.

(2) Power and soveraignty may as well be shewed in barbarous and unjust actions, as in their contraries. Saul shewed his authority and power to the full in sleying the Lords Priests, and Nabuchadnezzar in casting the three Children into the fiery furnace, and Daniel into the Ly­ons Denne; but no Mercy, nor Iustice, nor any thing else that was good.

2 The second thing to be preconsidered, is —

That Iustice, Mercy, Truth, and Holinesse in God are the same in nature with these vertues in men, though infinite­ly differing in degree; (as light in the ayre and the Sunne, are the same in nature, not degree:) and that which is just, upright and mercifull in men, is so in God too: and [Page 52] by these vertues in our selves with acts conformable to them [tanquam ex pede Herculem] we may safely measure what are so in God. For otherwise these things will follow.

(1) The common and received distinction of divine At­tributes into communicable and incommunicable would fall to the ground. For against it this might be sayd, that the ho­linesse, mercy justice and sincerity with other vertues that are in us, are not the perfections of God in a lower degree communicated to us, but things of a different nature.

C [...]n. [...](2) Men cannot be truely sayd to be made according to Gods Image; nor when they are regenerated to be renew­ed after the same image, and to be made partakers of the di­vine nature That picture cannot be the picture of such a man, which doth not in his parts and lineaments truely re­semble him: no more can we be truely called the picture or image of God, if in our graces (in respect of which we are principally so called) there be not a lively resemblance of Gods attributes.

(3) We may not safely imitate God, as we are cōmanded. Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect: Math 5.48. 1. Pet. 1.16. and Be yee holy, as J am holy. Nor when we shew forth holinesse, mer­cy, justice and sincerity in our doings, can we be properly sayd to imitate God, if these be one thing in God and in men another.

These two things being thus premised, viz. Gods holi­nesse, mercy, justice and truth, are foure of his chiefe Attri­butes, in the exercise of which, he taketh himselfe to bee much glorified; and that we are to measure these attributes by the same vertues in our selves.

I come to the proofe of my second reason, against abso­lute Reprobation stated even in the mildest and most plau­sible way.

It opposeth Gods principall Attributes; particularly his

• Holinesse.
• Mercy.
• Iustice.
• Sincerity.

1. Repugnant to Gods Holinesse.FIrst, it sighteth with Gods Holinesse, and maketh him the principall cause of sinne in the greatest number of men. I [Page 53] know that the defenders of it do not thinke so. For the maine reason which moved the Synod at Dort and some o­ther Divines before and since, to bring downe Predestina­tion thus low, and begin their Reprobation after the fall; was, that they might maintaine a fatall and absolute Re­probation of men, and yet avoyd this imputation, as Dr. Twisse his vind. gra [...]. 1. par. 1. c. 4. ini­tio. Dr. Twisse hath noted. But what they intended (for ought that I can see) they have not compassed. For it followeth evi­dent enough, even from their conclusions too, that of all the sinnes of Reprobates, which are the greatest number by many degrees, God is the true and principall author.

Two things they say, which taken together (me thinks) inferre it.

• 1 That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate, in which they cannot avoyd sinne.
• 2 That he leaveth the Reprobate irrecoverably in it.

I. That God of his own will and pleasure hath brought men into an estate in which they cānot possibly avoyd sin: that is, into the state of originall sinne, which consists of two parts: 1 The guilt of Adams transgressions. 2 The corruption of nature. In both these they say mankinde is interessed, not through the force and efficiencie of naturall generation, because we all derive our nature from Adam as our first principle; but by Gods free and voluntary order and imputation. Calv. Instit. l. 3. c. [...]3. Sect. 7 Nō eni [...] factum est natural [...] ­ter, ut à salute exci­derent omnes un [...]us parenus culpâ. It came not to passe by any naturall meanes (sayth Calvin) that all men fell from salvation by the fault of our first parent. Cunctos morta­les in unius ho [...] personâ morti [...]etur­nae mancipatos fu [...]: Scriptura clamat: hoc cum naturae nequeat ascribi, ab admirabili dei consilio profectū esse minime obscu [...]ū est. That all men are held under the guilt of eternall death in the person in the person of one man; it is the cleare and constant voyce of Scripture. Now this cannot be ascribed to any naturall cause: it must therefore came from the wonderfull counsell of God. A little after he hath the same again with as great an Emphasis,- Quomodo factū est, ut to [...] gentes unà cum liberi [...] corum infantibus, [...]ae m [...]ti [...] prolvere lap­sus Ad [...] absque re­medio, anis, quia d [...]o ita [...] est. How is it, that so many nations with their children should be involved in the fall without remedy but because God would have it so? As roundly doth Dr. Twisse affirme the same. Twisse vind gr [...]. l. 1 par. 1 [...]r. 4 viz. prope [...] [...] Or [...]gina­lis p [...] [...], non nisi imp [...]u [...] [...]ious; lu­ [...] [...] propagati­one ad no [...] derivatur; quorum [...] que non nisi a libera Dei c [...] s [...]tutione proficisc [...] ­tur. The guilt of originall sinne is derived to us onely by imputation; the silth onely by propagation: and both these onely by Gods free constitution. A little before hee hath these words — Etenim naturae v [...]ium non est cu [...]que suum voluntate pro­p [...]â contractum, sed solâ imputatione aut propagatione detiva­tum; quarum utraqu [...] ut voluntate Dei, Deus enim nulla necessitate, sed pro me [...]â mâ vo­luntate nobis imputat peccatum Adae The fault of nature commeth from [Page 54] Gods free appointment: for he doth not out of any necessity, but of his meere will onely impute the sinne of Adam to us. To this purpose he speaketh a great deale more in the same place. — To these sayings S. Bernard hath the like: speaking of Adams sinne, he sayth. Bern. Serm. 1. [...]ni. 1. p [...]st S. Epiph. Alien est, quia in Adam omn [...] nesci­entes p [...]ccavimus; no­ster, qui [...] etsi in alio, nos t [...]men peccavi­mus & nobis justo Dei consilio imputa­batur, h [...]lto. Adams sinne is anothers, be­cause we knew not of it; and yet ours, because it was through the just, though secret judgment of God reputed ours.

And this that they say is agreeable to reason. For if we be fallen into the guilt of the first sinne and the corruption of nature, onely because we were in Adams loyns when he sinned, and derive our being from him; then these two things will follow.

1 That we stand guilty of all the sinnes which Adam committed from his fall to his lives end. For we were vir­tually in his loynes as well after his fall as before, and in e­very passage and variation of his life he was still a principle of mankinde. But where doe we reade that we are guilty of any other of his sinnes? To the first sinne onely doth the Scripture entitle that sinne and misery, which entred into the world, and invaded all mankinde, as we may see Rom. 5.15, 16, 17, &c.

2 That children are guilty of the sinnes of all their pro­genitors, especially of their immediate Parents. For they were in theyr loyns when they sinned, and more immedi­ately then in Adams. But children are not guilty of their parents faults, nor obnoxious to their punishments, because they are their children, as we may see, Exod. 20.5. where God saying, that he will visite the sinnes of the Fathers upon the children to the third and fourth gener [...]on in them that [hate] him; plainly implyeth, that children are not sim­ply charged with their fathers sinnes, but conditionally if they be haters of God as their fathers were; if by imita­ting their wicked parents, they become partakers of their sinnes. In Ezek. 18.14. &c. The Lord signifies thus much in his Apology against the Cavill of the Iewes. For first he sayth, that if a wicked man beget a sonne that se­eth his Fathers sinnes, and doth not the like, he shall not dye for the iniquity of his Father. This implyeth, that the derivation of being from the Parent doth not render the child obnoxious to the punishment of the fathers sinne, nor [Page 55] consequently to the sinne. For the good childe is not ob­noxious, and yet the good childe is equally in the fathers loynes with the bad, and equally receiveth nature and be­ing from him.

And then vers. 20. the Lord telleth them expressely thus much, in two propositions.

1 Affirmatively. The Soule that sinneth, it shall dye. And that it may be knowne that he speaketh exclusively, onely the soule that sinneth, shall dye; he delivers his minde.

2 Negatively, The Sonne shall not beare the iniquity of the Father, neither shall the Father beare the iniquity of the Sonne, &c.

Our Saviour in that wofull speech of his to the Phari­sees, Math. 23.32, 34. Fulfill yee also the measure of your Fathers. Behold J send unto you Prophets, &c. them ye shall kill and crucifie, that on you may come all the righteous bloud, &c. Intimateth apparently, that the Pharisees were not inheritors of their Fathers sinnes and punishments by birth; but by the commission and imitation of their fathers sinnes, they came to inherit both their sinnes and plagues. Miserable would our case bee on whom the ends of the world are come, if children should be guilty of all their An­cestors prevarications. What a world of sinnes should we be to answer for, personall sinnes, parents, progenitors sins, to a thousand past generations? A thing with no reason to be imagined.

This is the first thing.

II. Secondly, they say that God hath immutably de­creed, to leave the farre greatest part of mankinde in this impotent condition irrecoverably, and to afford them no power and ability sufficient to make them rise out of sinne to newnesse of life; and this decree he executeth in time; and both these he doth out of his onely will and pleasure.

O this proposition there be three branches.

• 1 God decreeth to leave them.
• 2 He doth leave them.
• 3 He doth both out of his alone pleasure.

1 God (say they) hath decreed to leave them without sufficient grace, and consequently under an everlasting [Page 56] necessity of sinning. This is the very Helen which they fight for, the maine act of that absolute Reprobation, which with joynt consent and endeavour they labour to maintaine.

Most of them cast their Reprobation into two acts: a Negative, which is a peremptory denyall of grace and glory to some men lying in the fall: and a Positive, which they say is a preordination of the men thus left, to the eternall torments of Hell.

Others among them define Reprobation by an act meere­ly negative,Suffr [...]g. Brit. A [...]t. 1. de Repr. thes 1. and call it [Non Electioner, [...]etm [...] quo sta­ruit non [...]o usque miseri, &c.] Thus our Divines in theyr s [...]ffrage [...]fi [...]e it, and in th [...]ir explication on the definition when they give; they say, that the proper acts of Repro­bation, as it standeth oppo [...]d to Election, are no other then a de [...]yall of that same glory and grace, which are pre­pa [...]ed [...]e decree of Election for the Sonnes of God. But in this they all agree, that by the decree of Reprobation, g [...]ce necessary for the avoyding of sinne, is s [...]ly denyed to Reprobates. And if at any time we heare them say, that God hath gratified R [...]probates with some grace; (for so sayth Wa [...]ns, Reprobates are left Wil. defens A­ [...]t [...]rmin [...]e Repr. In sta [...]u p [...]istino & sub exercitio arbitrii sui, & administratio­ [...] m [...]munis provi­ [...]. Vnder the common providence of God, and consequently under some common en­d [...]wments: And our Divines in the Synod say, Suffe. Brit. thes. [...]e Reprob. Hos et­si non [...]s, peici­pe [...]e t [...] mul [...] [...] [...]neg [...]mus. Repro­bates though they are not elected, yet receive many of Gods gra­ces: they are to be understood, of such guifts and graces as are insufficient to make them avoyd sinne, as we may see in these two cyted places and many more.

2 God doth actually according to his eternall and un­changeable decree leave the Reprobates in their severall times and generations, without his grace, under a neces­sity of finall sinne and impenitency.

This is the second branch, of that second proposition.

And this must they needs say. For Gods dec [...] cannot be [...]ustrated: what he purposed before time, without a [...]le he doth in time. I shall not need therefore to prove, that they say so; Neverthelesse, to let it be seene how positive­ly and categorically they say so, I will give an instinc or two. The Divines of Geneva at the Synod among theyr Theses of Reprobation, have this for one — [Page 57] Act. Syn. Suffr. Genev. de Reprob. Easdem personas in tempore, ex eodem placito voluntatis vel non vocat, vel voca­tos in Ecclesiam. Spi­ritu regenerationi [...] non renovat penitis­simè, non inserit Christo mysticè, non justificat, &c. Those whom God hath reprobated, out of the same will by which hee hath rejected them, eyther he calleth not at all, or being called, he reneweth not throughly by the spirit of regenera­tion, ingraffeth not into Christ mystically, nor justifieth, &c. Like to this is the speech of Lubbert, who speaking of Re­probates, sayth; Act Syn. Suffr. Lubbert de Reprob. Iis vel non revelat vi­am salutis, vel non donat cos fide, & cog­nitione Iesu Christi, non regigniteos, non justificat, sed relin­quit cos in peccato & miseria, &c. To them eyther he revealeth not the way of salvation, or giveth not faith and regeneration: but leaveth them in sinne and misery. The same Author, speaking against the position of the Remonstrants, (viz. that God doth supply to all men sufficient and necessary meanes of salvation, with an intention of saving them;) setteth downe this Antithesis, — Deus non submi­nistrat omnibus ho­minibus necessaria & sufficientia media ad salutem, idque cum intenti [...]ne servandi. God doth not administer to all men meanes needfull and sufficient to salvation, and that with an intention of saving them. And to this his Antithesis, Polyan­der, Walaeus, and Thyseus, 3 other professors of divinity in the Low-Countries did set their hands.

3 God both decreeth and executeth this leaving of men to themselves, of his alone absolute will and pleasure.

This is the third branch.

That they say so, witnesse the suffrage of our English Divines. Suffr. Brit. ar [...] 1. de reprob. explic. thes. 1. Orthodox. Hanc non-electionem in libertima dei ve­luntate fundari dici­mus. We affirme, that this non-Election is founded in the most free pleasure of God. And Ib thes. 3. hetero­dox. Nominem post l [...]psum merâ Dei vo­luntate praeteritum osse. that no man lying in the fall is past over by the meere will of God; is num­bred by the same Divines among the Heterodox positions. To this purpose also speake the Ministers of the Palatinate, Act Syn. Iud. Pa­lat thes. 3. Causa re­probationis est liber­rima ac justissima Dei voluntas The cause of Reprobation is the most free and just will of God, — Ib thes 4. Quod Deus nonnullos praeterit granâ praedicati­onis evan [...]elii, ejus causa est idem beneplacitum, sive eadem libera v [...]luntas. That God passeth over some and denyeth them the grace of the Gospell, the cause is the same free pleasure of God.

Iudic. Theol. Hassiac Decrevit deus quosdam in lapsu & mis [...]ia relinquere pro suo beneplacito God decreed to leave some in the fall, of his owne good pleasure. Thus the Divines of H [...]ssen. The proofe of this they fetch from the execution of this decree in time, — Deus in tempore quosdomè genere humino de relinquit in mise [...]â [...]suâ, nec media ad fi [...]ē & conversionē ipsumque etiam salu [...]em obtinendam necessaria eis confert &c idque pro libertiniâ suâ voluntate. God doth in time leave some of mankind fallen and doth not bestow upon them meanes necessary to beleeve, &c. and this out [Page 58] of his most free pleasure. This they joyntly affirme, and prove it by this reason especially; All men were lookt on as sin­ners: If sinne therefore were the cause that moved God to reprobate, he should have reprobated or rejected all.

But he did not reprobate all; therefore for sinne he re­probated none, but for his own pleasure, in which we must rest without seeking any other cause.

Now from these two things layd together, viz.

• 1 That God did bring men into a necessity of sinning.
• 2 That he hath left the reprobates under this necessity: it will follow that he is the author of the reprobates sinnes.

1 Because [Causa causae est causa causati,] The cause of a cause is the cause of its effect, (if there be a necessary subor­dination between the causes and the effect;) whether it be a cause by acts negative, or positive. But God is the chiefe or sole cause (by their doctrine) of that which is the neces­sary and immediate cause of the sinnes of Reprobates, name­ly their impotency and want of supernaturall grace; there­fore he is (by the same doctrine) the true and proper cause of their sinnes.

2 Because [Removens prohibens, &c.] that, which with­draweth or withholdeth a thing, which being present would hinder an event, is the cause of that event: as for ex­ample, he that cutteth a string in which a stone hangs, is the cause of the falling of that stone; and he that withdraweth a pillar, which being put to, would uphold a house; is the true cause in mens account of the falling of that house. But God (by their opinion) withholdeth from Reprobates that power, which being granted them, might keep them from falling into sinne: therefore he becommeth a true mo­rall cause of their sinnes, — Ter [...]ul. l. 1 contr. Marcion. c. 22. In cujus manu est quid ne fiat, ei deputatur, [...]m jam fit. In whose power it is that a thing be not done, to him it is imputed, when it is done, saith Tertullian.

It will not suffice to say, that God by withholding grace from Reprobates becommeth onely an accidentall, not a proper and direct cause of their sinnes. For a cause is then onely accidentall in relation to the effect, when the effect is beside the intention and expectation of the cause. For ex­ample: digging in a feild is then an accidentall cause of the finding a bag of gold, when that event is neither expected [Page 59] nor intended by the husbandman in digging, But when the effect is lookt for and aymed at, then the cause (though it be the cause onely by withholding the impediment) is not accidentall; as a pilot who withholdeth his care, and skill from a ship in a storme, foreseeing, that by his neglect the Ship will be drowned, is not to be reputed an acciden­tall, but a direct and proper cause of the losse of this ship. This being so, it followeth, that God by this act and decree of removing and detayning grace necessary to the avoyding of sinne, from Reprobates, not as one ignorant and care­lesse what will or shall follow, but knowing infallably what mischiefe will follow, and determining precisely that, which doth follow; namely, their impenitency and damnation, becommeth the proper and direct cause of their sinnes.

SEcondly, it opposeth Gods Mercy.

God is mercifull; a part it is of his title. Exod. 34.6.2 Contrary to his Mercy. mercifull and gracious. He is mercy in the abstract, 1 Joh. 4.16. God is love, a Father of mercies, and God of all consolati­ons, 2 Cor. 1.3. a Saviour of men, 1 Tim. 4.10. And thus the Church hath alwayes taken him to be. And therefore hath of old stiled him in her liturgy, A God, whose nature and property is alwayes to have mercy and to forgive.

Two wayes is Gods mercy spoken of in Scripture, abso­lutely and comparatively.

(1) Absolutely, and so it is set out in high and stately termes. It is called rich mercy, Eph. 2.4. great kindnesse. Ionah. 4.2. Abundant mercy, 1 Pet. 1.2. love without height or depth, length or breadth, or any dimensions, — love passing knowledge, Eph. 3.18. So great it is, that Jonah could not in­treat him to punish the little, infant, harmelesse Ninivites with temporall death for the sinnes of their guilty parents Ionah 4.11.

(2) Comparatively: with two things it is compared.

• 1 His owne justice.
• 2 The love that dwelleth in the creature: and is ad­vanced above both.

I. With his owne Iustice it is compared and advanced above it: not in its essence (for all Gods excellencies are [Page 60] infinitely good; and one is not greater then another) but in its expressions, and some things that have relation to it: particularly in these;

(1) In its naturalnesse and dearenesse to God. It is sayd of mercy, it pleaseth him, Micah. 7.18. but justice is called his strange worke [ali [...]num à naturâ suâ] Esay 28.21. He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. La­mentat. 3. 33.

(2) In the frequent exercise of it selfe. He is said to be slow of anger, but abundant in goodnesse. Exod. 34.6. mercies are bestowed every day; judgements inflicted but now and then, sparingly, and after a long time of forbearance, when there is no remedy, 2 Chron. 36.15. All the day long have J stretched out my hands to a gainsaying and rebellious peo­ple, Esay, 65.2. That is, I have been patient a long time, and in that time I have not been idle, but imployed in exhor­ting, promising and shewing mercy, that so I might do you good. God waits a great while for the conversion of sinners, as Marriners doe for theyr tyde: and at last with much adoe, if there be a necessity, he chideth and fighteth.

(3) In its amplitude or objects, to whom it is extended; Visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children to the third and fourth generation, but shewing mercy to thou­sands, Exod. 20.5. In these words God implyeth, that his mercy reacheth farther then his justice, and that, how much 3 or 4 come short of a thousand; so much doth his justice come short of his mercy in the exercise of it.

(4) In the occasions that move God to exercise them. It is a great matter that moveth God to punish, as we may see, Gen. 6.5, 6, 7, 12, 13. when the wickednesse of man was great in the earth, and all flesh had corrupted his way, then God thinketh of a floud. He would not destroy the Amo­rites, till their wickednesse was full. How oft would I have gathered thee? saith CHRIST to Ierusalem, Mathew 23.37. that is, I have not taken advantages against thee, nor upon the first, second, or third unkindnes, cast thee off: small matters have not moved me to destroy thee, O Ierusalem. But how small an occasion doth God take to spare men? when he had examined Sodome, and found their sinnes to [Page 61] be answerable to the cry, yet then, for ten righteous mens sakes would he have spared Sodome, Gen. 18.32. Nay, he would have spared Jerusalem, if the Prophet could by his searching have found one man who did execute judgment and seek the truth. Jer. 5.1. What a slender humiliation made him to spare wicked Ahab and his house a long time? 1. Kings, 21.29. And the repentance of Ninive, whose wic­kednesse cryed to the Lord for vengeance, Ionah. 1.2. did easily procure her a pardon.

Thus is Gods mercy advanced above his justice.

2 It is compared also with the affection of a father to his sonne, of a tender mother to her childe, and of the most affectionate bruits to their brood, and set above them all. It goeth beyond a fathers to his sonne, Mat. 7.11. If you that are evill, can give good guifts to your children; how much more will your heavenly Father give good things to them that aske him? What doth this (quanto magis) imply, but that Gods love out-strips a fathers! And so it doth a mothers too. Esay, 49.15. Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion upon the Sonne of her wombe? yea, they may forget; yet J will not forget thee. Wo­men are compassionate toward their children, because they are the fruit of their wombes, and a part of themselves: but most indulgent are they toward those children, to whom they are Nurses, as well as mothers, to their sucking children. And yet mothers may forget even their sucking children: but as for God, he can never forget his chil­dren.

Againe, God compareth himselfe with one of the most affectionate females among unreasonable creatures, (the Hen) Math. 23.37. O [...]erusalem, how oft would I have gather'd thee, as a Hen gathers her chickens under her wings, &c. No Bird (sayth S. Austin) expresseth such tender love to her young ones, as the [...]en doth; Aug tract 15. in Ioh. pag. 46. Videmu [...] nidi [...]are passeres quos [...]bet ante oculos nostros: hirundines, ciconias, columbas, quotidit videmus ni­dificare; quos nisi quando in nidis vide­mus, parentes esse nō agnoscimus. Gal­lina verò sic infirma­tur in pullis suis, ut etiamsi ipsi pulli non sequantur, filios non videas, matrem tamē intelligas. Ita fit a­lis demissis, plumis hispida, voce rauca, omnibus membris demissa & abjecta; ut (quemadmodū dixi) etfi filios non videas, matrem tamen intel­ligas. No Fowles discover themselves to be mothers, so much as Hens doe. Others, when we see them in their Nests with their young, we know them to be mothers, but no way else: but the Hen disco­vereth her selfe to be so ev [...] when her chickens do not follow her; her feathers stand up, her wings hang downe, she clocketh mournfully and goeth feebly; so that we may know her to be a [Page 62] mother, when yet we cannot see her brood.

Such another speech he hath in another place, and conclu­deth it with these words. Id. in Ps. 58. p. 212. B. C. Quare ergo Dominus, nisi propter hoc, gallina esse voluit, in Sancta Scriptura dicens, O Ierusalem, Ierusalem, quoties volui te con­gregare ut gallina, &c. Our Lord did therefore com­pare himselfe to a Hen rather, then to any other creature, be­cause of her singular expressions of love to her young ones, even when they are out of her sight.

By these things we see how highly the Scriptures speak of Gods mercy, especially in its expressions to mankinde, to whom he hath borne a greater love, and for whom he hath declared himselfe to have done farre greater matters, then for the Angels; the wisdome of God delighting it selfe in the children of men, before the world was. Prov. 8.31 [...] and gratifying them in the fulnesse of time with the assump­tion of their nature. (Heb. 2.16.) and the redemption of their soules with his bloud. 1. Pet. 1. &c.

Now with such a Mercy cannot stand such a decree: ab­solute Reprobation being once granted, we may (me think) more properly call God a Father of cruelties, then of mer­cies, and of [hatred] rather then of [love.] And the Di­vels names [Satan, and [...]] an adversary, a destroy­er may be fitter for him, then [ [...]] a Saviour, which I tremble to think. Doth mercy please him, when he hath made a decree which sheweth farre more severity toward poore men then mercy? Is he slow to anger, when he hath taken such a small and speedy occasion to punish the grea­ter part of men for ever; and for one sinne once commit­ted, hath shut them up under invincible sinne and damna­tion? Is his mercy abundant, doth it reach further then ju­stice; when it is tuckt up so short, limited to a very few selected ones, when a hundred for one at least (take in all parts of the world) are unavoydably cast away out of his onely will and pleasure? Or doth his love passe knowledge, when we see dayly farre greater love, then this in men and other creatures? What Father and mother (that have not only cast off father-hood and mother-hood, but humanity too) would determine their children to certaine death, nay to cruell torments worse then death for one onely offence, and that committed too, not by them in their own per­sons, but by some other, and imputed onely to them?

But to deliver things a little more closely. Foure things [Page 63] (in my conceit) being well and distinctly considered, do make it apparent, that this decree is compatible with Gods mercy.

1 That Adams sinne is the sinne of mans nature onely and no mans personall transgression, but Adams: it was neyther committed nor consented to, by any of his poste­rity in their own persons.

2 That it was the sinne of our nature, not by generati­on (as I have shewed) but by Gods own voluntary im­putation.

3 That God did pardon it in Adam, (for so it is gene­rally beleeved;) who did actually and freely commit it in his own person.

4 That CHRIST came into the world to take away [Peccatum mundi] the sinne of the world. Joh. 1.29. That God eyther did or might have satisfied his wronged ju­stice, in the bloud of the Covenant for all mankind, and without any impeachment to justice, and have opened a way of salvation to all and every man.

These considerations (I think) being well digested, will make any man to think, that eyther there is no decree of ab­solute Reprobation; or that God is not mercifull to men at all: much lesse more mercifull to them then to other crea­tures; but more sharpe a great deale and severe then he is to

• 1 any Creatures in the world.
• 2 the very Divels themselves.

1 Then to any other creatures. For they, even the ba­sest among them, though perhaps they have but a despica­ble being, yet they have such a being as is farre better then no being at all: Whereas men are determined by his omni­potent decree to such a wofull being, as is a thousand times worse then no being at all. What man would have accep­ted of life, when first he entred upon possession of it, if he had knowne upon what lamentable conditions, it was to be tendred? Or (did men firmely beleeve this decree) they would at a venture with Iob curse their birth day, be released willingly from the right of creatures, and desire their immortall soules might vanish into nothing. Malunt extingui penitus, Minut. Felix pag. 113. quam ad supplicia reparari (as Minutius Felix speakes in another case) And Parents out of meere [Page 64] compassion to their children, would wish that they might be borne toads and serpents, rather then men; creatures whose beings at last shall be resolved into nothing, rather then immortall spirits.

2 To the very Diuels also (supposing this decree) is God more mercifull, then to men; and yet the Divels are set forth in Scripture for the greatest spectacles of Gods irefull severity. In one thing, this decree maketh most men and Divels equall, [Vtrisque desperata salus,] they are both sure to be damned: but in three things, men are in a farre worse condition by it.

(1) In their appointment to hell, not for their owne, proper, personall sinnes, for which only the Divels are damned: but for the sinne of another man, that lived and sinned long before they were borne.

(2) In their unavoydable destination to endlesse misery, under a colour of the contrary. The Divels, as they are de­creed to damnation, so they know it, they expect it, they looke for no other. But men, who are appointed to wrath, are yet fed up with hopes of salvation and made to beleeve that the whole businesse is put into their hands; so as if they perish, it is not [defectu misericordiae] because God will have no mercy on them, but [defectu vo­luntatis propriae,] because they will not bee saved: when yet indeed there is no such matter.

Now if it be worse to be deluded in misery, then simply to be miserable; then is the condition of men in this re­spect (by this decree) much worse then the state of Divels.

(3) In their obligation to beleeve, and the aggravation of their punishment by not beleeving. The Divels, because they must be damned, are not commanded to beleeve in CHRIST, nor is their punishment heightned by theyr not beleeving:Senten. super. 8. c. Gall Qui dicit quòd non omnes homines velit deus salvos fie­ri, sed certum nume­rum praedestinatorū; dutiùs loquitur, quā loquendum est de al­titudine infcrutabilis gra [...]ae Dei. but miserable men, who by this decree have no more liberty to escape Hell, thē the Divels, must yet be tyed to beleeve in CHRIST, and have their torments increased, if they beleeve not. These things being so, (I think) I may conclude with the words of Prosper. (x) He which sayth, that God would not have all men to be saved, but a certaine set number of predestinate persons onely: he speaketh more harshly then he should of the height of Gods unsearchable grace. Nay, [Page 65] he speaketh that which cannot stand with his infinite grace and mercy, especially to the sonnes of men.

Nor doth that give me satisfaction, which is usually an­swered, namely, that God by this absolute decree doth fully manifest his justice and mercy too: his justice toward Re­probates, his mercy toward the Elect; and that it is neces­sary his decrees should so be ordered, as that both these may be clearely declared by them. For,

1 Gods mercy is revealed to be rich mercy, abundant, long suffering, surmounting justice, and beyond understanding. Now such a mercy set forth with such titles, clothed with such properties, is no wayes manifested by this decree.

2 Neyther is Gods pure and spotlesse Iustice set forth by it, as I now come to shew: this being my third argument drawne from Gods attributes against absolute Reprobation.

THirdly, this absolute Reprobation is incompatible with Gods Justice. 3 Against Gods Justice.

The Lord (sayth David) is righteous in all his wayes, Psal. 145. The Iudgments of the Lord (sayth Salomon) are weight and measure. Prov. 16.11. Exact and without exception. So apparently just is God, that he offereth the justice of his decrees and wayes to the tryall of humane understanding. E­say, 5.3. Judge I pray you between me and my Vineyard. Those to whom the Vineyard was committed, slew their masters heyre being sent unto them: What will the Lord of the Vine­yard thinke ye (sayth CHRIST) do therefore when he commeth, to those husbandmen? Math. 21.40. In which words hee appealeth to their judgment: nay, he is content to proove himselfe and his dealings to be just by plaine and evident ar­guments, Ezek. 18.25. &c. Are not my wayes equall, and yours unequall, O ye house of Israell? And he permits Abra­ham when he was in his greatest humility acknowledging himselfe to be but dust and ashes, yet to reason with him a­bout the equity of his doings. Wilt thou sley the righteous with the wicked? Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right? Gen. 18.23, 25. And Moses also is suffered to argue Gods ju­stice in the same manner. Shall one man sinne, Numb. 16.22. and wilt thou be wrath with all the Congregation! In a word, so evidently just is God in all his proceedings, that many both good and bad, [Page 66] who have felt his justice, have cleared God, and deeply char­ged themselves. Witnesse Ezra, Nehemiah, and Daniel in their 9th. Chapters: and Adonibezek, Iud. 1.7. And the Emperor Mauricius, who having seene his children butche­red, and waiting every minute for the bloudy stroke of death, brake out into these words. Osiand. Eccl. hist. Cent. S. pag. 261. Iu­stu [...]es domine & ju­stum est ja [...]um tu­u [...]. Righteous art thou O Lord, and just is thy Judgment.

With this inviolable justice of God, cannot absolute Re­probation (of such especially, as are commanded to beleeve and are called to salvation) be reconciled.

My Reasons are these.

1 Because it maketh God to punish the Righteous with the wicked.

The Sublapsarians say directly in plaine termes, that God decreed to destruction men considered without sin, and there­fore yet righteous. And the Sublapsarians say as much in ef­fect; for they say two things.

(1) That God did lay a necessity upon every man of being borne in Originall sinne (as I have noted before.)

(2) That he hath determined for that sinne to cast away the greatest part of mankind for ever: and so they make God to doe that by two acts, the one accompanying the other, which the other say he did by one.

Calv. Instit. 3. cap. 23. §. 23.This is so cleare a case, that Calvin with some others have not stickt to say, that God may with as much justice deter­mine men to Hell the first way, as the latter. (See Jnstit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 7.) Where against those who deny that Adam fell by Gods decree, he reasoneth thus; All men are made guilty of Adams sinne by Gods absolute decree alone: Adam there­fore sinned by this onely decree. Quid eos prohi­b [...]t fateri de uno ho­mine, quod inviti de toto humano genere concedunt? Quid e­nim tergiversando luderent operam? What lets them to grant that of one man, which they must grant of all men? And a little after he sayth: Bonos istos ju­stitiae Dei patronos perplexos haerere in fest [...]â, altas verò trabes superare, ni­mis absurdum est. It is too absurd, that these kind Patrons of Gods Iustice, should thus stumble at a straw and leape over a blocke. God may with as much justice decree Adams sinne and mens damnation out of his onely will and pleasure; as out of that will and pleasure, the involving of men in the guilt of the first sinne and their damnation for it: that is, the sub­stance of his reasoning. To the same purpose, speaketh Mac­covius. From hence we may see (sayth he) what to judge of that opinion of out adversaries: viz. That God, cannot [Page 67] justly ordaine men to destruction without the consideration of sinne. Maccov disp. 18. p. 16. Nam dicant (quaeso) nobis, quid majus sit, imputate alicui culpam alteri­us, & propter ipsam, illum morte aeternâ plectere; an verò or­dinare ad interitum. At hoc potest sine ul­lâ laesione justitiae suae: ergo multò ma­gis potest illud po­sterius. Let them tell me which is greater, to impute to one man the sinne of another, and punish him for it with eternall death, or to ordaine simply, without looking at sinne to destruction: surely no man will deny the first of these to be greater. But this God may doe without any wrong to Justice, much more there­fore may he do the other. To these consenteth Dr. Twisse and sayth. Dr. Twiss. Vind. gra. l. 2. digr. 1. pag. 15. Quod potest De­us intercedente liberâ suà constitutione, il­lud etiam absolutè poterit, vel sine aliqua constitutione inter [...] ­dente. If God may ordaine men to Hell for Adams sin, which is derived unto them by Gods onely constitution, he may as well doe it absolutely, without any such constitution. And it is most true, it is all one in substance, simply to decree the mi­sery of an innocent man, and to involve him in a sinne that he may be brought to misery.

Neyther of these decrees (I take it) are just.

2 The second reason, why it is against Gods justice, is, be­cause it maketh him to require faith in CHRIST of those to whom he hath precisely in his absolute purpose denyed both a power to beleeve, and a CHRIST to beleeve in.

That God bindeth Reprobates to beleeve as well as o­thers, it is the constant doctrine of Divines; among whom Zanchius delivereth it for a Thesis, Zanch. l. 5. de natur, Dei, cap. 2. q. 1. de praed. Sanctorii. Quisque mandato Dei tenetur credere se ad salutem aeter­nam in Christo fuis­se electum; maximè autem is qui fidem in Christum profitetur. Cum dicemus unum­quemque teneri hoc credere neminem, ne Reprobos quidem, qui neque unquam ciedent, nec credere in Christum possunt, excipimus; & nisi credant gravissimè omnium peccant. Every man (especi­ally he that professeth CHRIST) is bound to beleeve, that hee is chosen in CHRIST to salvation; every man without exception (even the Reprobate himselfe:) and if he beleeve it not, he com­mitteth a most grievous sinne above all others. This he proveth by that speech of CHRIST, Ioh. 16.9. The Spirit shall con­vince the world of sinne, because they beleeve not in me. Repro­bates therefore are bound to beleeve. Mr. Perkins also sayth something to the same purpose. Perk lib. de Praed. pag. 89. Obj. 3. Quisque in Ecclesia mandato Dei [cicde Evan­gelio] tenetur credere, se redemptum esse per Christum, etiam improbus, perinde ac Electus, sed aliâ tamen & aliâ ratione: Electus tenetur credere, ut credendo particeps siat electionis; repro­bus, ut non credendo fiat inexcusabilis, etiam ex intentione Dei. Every one in the Church by vertue of this commandement [beleeve the Gospell] is bound to beleeve that he is redeemed by CHRIST, as well the Re­probate as the Elect, though for a different reason: the Elect, that by beleeving he may be saved, the Reprobate, that by not beleeving he may be without excuse: and this out of the very purpose of God.

But now they cannot in justice be bound to beleeve, if they be absolute Reprobates, for three causes.

[Page 68](1) Because they have no power to beleeve: they want it and must want it for ever. God hath decreed they shall never have any to their dying day. [Nemo obligatur ad impossibilia] no man can be justly tyed to impossible performances. Be­cause no man can flye like a bird, or reach heaven with the top of his finger; therefore, God cannot with justice exact of any the performance of these actions: nor can he of Repro­bates the obedience of Faith, if it be not possible to them.

(2) Because it is not Gods unfeyned will they shall be­leeve. No man will say, that it is Gods serious will, that such a man shall live, when it is his will, that he shall never have the concourse of his providence and the act of preservation. Nor can we say, that God doth in good earnest will that those men should beleeve, whom he will not furnish with necessa­ry power to beleeve. It may rather be sayd, it is Gods unfey­ned will they shall not beleeve, because it is his will they shall want power to beleeve. For it is a Maxime in Logique, [Qui vult aliquid in causâ, vult effectum ex istâ causa profluentem.] He who willeth a thing in the cause, willeth the effect that necessa­rily floweth from that cause. Now if it be the certaine will of God, that Reprobates shall in no wise beleeve, hee cannot with reason and equity tye them to beleeve. For then he ty­eth them to an act contrary to his determinate will.

(3) Because they have no object of Faith, no Christ to beleeve in: [Credere jubet, & fidei nullum obiectum ponit.] He commandeth to beleeve, and affordeth no object to beleeve in: this soundeth not well. The Divels have no part in Christ or the new Covenant. We will not therefore say, that God can justly bind them to beleeve, or punish them as transgres­sors of the Covenant; because they beleeve not. How then can we say, that God can justly require faith of Reprobates, or destroy them for not beleeving; if they have indeed no more part in Christ or in the Covenant, then the Divels have? If a man should command his servant to eate and punish him for not eating, and in the meane time fully resolve, that hee shall have no meat to eat; would any reasonable man say, that such a man were just in the command or punishment? Change but the name and the case is the same. Againe, that Christ dyed for Reprobates (by the Doctrine of absolute Reprobati­on) is a lye; and can God justly bind men to beleeve a lye?

This is the second reason.

[Page 69]3 The third reason why the absolute decree infringeth Gods justice is, because it will have him to punish men for o­mission of an act, which is made impossible to them by his owne decree: not by that decree alone, by which he deter­mined to give them no power to beleeve, having lost it; but by that decree also, by which he purposed, that we should partake with Adam in his sinne, and be stripped of all that su­pernaturall power, which we had by Gods free grant bestow­ed upon us in Adam before he fell.

These are the reasons which move me to thinke, that this absolute decree is repugnant to Gods Iustice.

Three things are usually answered.

1 That Gods wayes may be very just, and yet seem unjust to mans erring understanding: and so is this decree, though flesh and bloud will not yeeld it to be so.

This answer I take to be false, and the contradictory to it to be true, namely, that nothing is truely just, which humane understanding purged from prejudice, corrupt affections and customes, hath in all ages, places and persons judged to be unjust. The reason is, because God hath by the light of na­ture, and those generall impressions of good and evill, honest and dishonest, just and unjust, made in the hearts of men, suf­ficiently instructed and enabled them to judge what is just and what is not. When a thing is done, reason so quallified is able to say, This is just, or this is unjust whether it be done by God or man. For (vertues in men being but the image of those perfections that dwell in God) Iustice in men and God are for substance but one and the same thing, though infinitly differing in degree, as the greater and lesser light. That this power is ingraffed in men, God himself (who best knoweth with what endowments he hath beautified his creature,) hath sufficiently signified in those Scriptures, where he calleth on men to be judges of the equity of his wayes. Iudge J pray you between me and my vineyard, Esay 5. Judge, O ye house of Israel, are not my wayes equall and your wayes unequall? Ezek. 18.25. God would never put them upon the tryall of reason, if he had not made it able to examine them. The incarnation of the sonne of God, his birth of a Virgin, his dying, the re­surrection of the body, and such mysteries, as are peculiar to the Gospell, and the proper objects of the Christian faith; [Page 70] God hath not offered to the tryall of our understandings, bu [...] rather derideth those, that presume to judge of them by rea­son. 1 Cor. 1.20. Where is the Scribe? where is the wise? when is the disputer of this world? and the reason is, because, these things being supernaturall, and therefore not discernable by naturall power; man is no competent judge of them by his naturall understanding, nor may adventure upon the tryal and iudgement of them with lesse danger, then Vzzah look into the Ark, for [Scrutator majestatis opprimetur à gloriâ] [...] that pryeth into Gods majestie, will be overwhelmed of his glory. But of the justice of his decrees and wayes, he maketh him a judge; because, the common notions of just and unjust be­ing imprinted in nature, he is able by naturall reason to ap­prehend what is just in divine acts, as well as in his owne.

2 It is answered, that these decrees are set downe is Scripture to be the will of God: and therfore, they must needs be just. For Gods will is the rule of all righteousnesse.

To this answer, I have these things to reply.

(1) This rule in Divinity is much abused by the maintey­ners of absolute Reprobation, and may not be admitted in their sence and meaning. For Gods will is not a rule of justice to himself, as if things were therefore just, because he wil­leth them and worketh them: but his justice rather is a rule of his will and works, which are the expressions of his will. He therefore maketh decrees and executeth them, because they are agreeable to that justice which dwels in the divine nature: as he maketh nothing, which hath not [potentiam objectivam,] a power of being created without implying con­tradiction to himself or any thing in him: so he willeth and doeth nothing, but that which may be willed or done, [sal­vâ justitiâ] without wrong to his justice.Hierom: Pro [...]m. in Hosea. St. Hierom speaking of the Prophet Hoseas taking a wife of fornications, Hosea 1.2. saith it was done [in typo] typically, not really, [quia si fia [...] turpissimum est,] because if had beene indeed done, it had beene a most foule thing. But thou wilt answer (sayth he) [Deo juben­te nihil turpe est] God commanding it, nothing is dishonest. Thus much we say, (sayth the Father,) that God commandeth no­thing but what is honest, but he doth not by commanding dishonest things, make those things honest which are abomi­nable: plainely giving us to see what he thought, viz. that [Page 71] God doth not will a thing and so make it good; but willeth it, because it is in it selfe good antecedently and before the act of Gods will about it.

And thus much doth Zanchy (though a rigid mainteyner of absolute reprobation) not obscurely confesse in his Trea­tise, de nativ. Dei: where he letteth fall such speeches as make Gods justice antecedent to his will; and therefore the rule of it, rather then a thing regulated by it.Zanch. l. 3. de nat. Dei c. 4 q. 9. thes. 2. Neque aliquid vel­le potest, quod justū non sit. Neither can God will anything (sayth he) which is not just. And againe, Quod placet principi, legis habet vigorem. The Prin­ces pleasure hath the strength of a Law; is a rule (sayth he) a­mong the Canonists: but Ibi maxime verū est, ubi rex justus est, & nihil vult nisi ju­stum. Quanto ma­gis in regno Dei, &c. this is true, where the King is just and willeth nothing but what is just. In which words, he plain­ly maketh the iustice of the King antecedent to that will of his, which must be a law. Many more speeches he useth there to the same purpose. Gods will therefore, is not a rule of Iustice to himself. To whom then?

To us. For by it we are, (1) to square all our thoughts, words, and deeds. (2) to examine them when they are spoken and done: [Primum in aliquo genere est regula posteriorum, & supremum inferiorum.]

(2) I reply, that these absolute decrees of mens inevitable salvation and damnation are no parts of Gods revealed will. The Scriptures teach us no such matter.

And therefore to say they are, is but a meere begging of the question. It hath alwayes beene ordinary with false Teachers, to make Gods word a Father to their false opini­ons, that they may stand the faster and winne the greater cre­dit. The Papists ground their transubstantiation, and the Lu­therans their consubstantiation and ubiquity upon the Scrip­ture, [Hoc est corpus meum] This is my body, Math. 26. And the defenders of absolute Reprobation do so too: they make their cause to be Gods, and entitle his word to it; because they see it is the surest way to defend it: being herein like to some contentious people, who being in law and having a bad cause which they are like to lose, they entitle the King to it, that they may the better uphold it.

(3) Absolute Reprobation can be no part of Gods revea­led will. The reason is, because, it is odious to right reason, and begetteth absurdities. For [Nulla veritas parit absurda] no truth begetteth absurdities. Divers truths are revealed in [Page 72] Scripture which are above, but not contrary to right reason, whether they be matters of faith or life: faith and reason, na­ture and scripture are both Gods excellent gifts: and there­fore though there may be a disproportion, yet there can be no repugnancy between them. The worship which God re­quireth, is [cultus [...]] a reasonable service. Rom. 12.2. and the word of God is [ [...],] milke reasonable and without guile. 1 Pet. 2.2.

These things therefore being layd together, it will appeare to be but a meere shift and evasion, when absolute Reproba­tion is proved to be unjust; and therefore unworthy of God; to say, Gods will is the rule of Iustice: this is part of Gods revealed will; and therefore most just, whatsoever reason may cavill and say to the contrary.

3 Their third answer is, that God is not bound to restore men power to beleeve, because they once had it and have lost it through their own fault, as a master is not bound to renew his servants stocke, if he have wasted it by bad hus­bandry.

This answer doth not satisfie me. For I grant, that God is simply and absolutely bound to no man, because he is [agent liherrimum] a most free dispenser of his owne favours, where and what, and to whom he will, and no man is aforehand with God: [Quis prior illi dedit ut retribuatur] Who hath given unto him and it shall be recompensed again? Rom. 11.35.

But yet he is conditionally bound: for he hath determined and tyed himselfe 3 wayes especially.

(1) Decernendo, by decreeing. The Almighty is eternally subject to his own ordinances, or els he should be mutable. And therefore, what gifts soever he hath decreed to men, he is bound to give them by vertue of his own decree.

(2) Promittendo, by promising. We use to say promise is debt, it is Iustice to performe what it was free to promise: and whosoever he be that promiseth and payeth not, is guilty of a trespasse (witnesse Ananias and Sapphira;) and unwor­thy of the kingdome of heaven, Psal. 15.4. If therefore God hath made a promise of any gift or grace to men; his promise bindeth him to performance, Nam semell emissum volat ir­revocabile verbum.

(3) Legem ferendo, by giving men a law to keep; which [Page 73] without supernaturall grace they can no more keepe; then they can eate a rock. By such a law the supreme Lawgiver bindeth himself to his people, to give them such power as may enable them to keep that law, or else he becommeth (as the evill servant in the parable stiled him) a hard master, rea­ping where he sowed not, and the very true and proper cause of the transgression of that law. We shall finde God alwayes giving strength when he giveth a command. When he com­mandeth the creatures, to increase and multiply; he gave them a multiplying vertue: when CHRIST bade the lame man a­rise, take up his bed and walk; he put into his limbs an ability of walking: when Adam had a spirituall law given him to o­bey, which without spirituall strength he could not; God gave him strength answerable to the law, as Divines agree, consenting to that noted speech of St. Austin, that Adam had [posse non cadere] though he never had [non posse cadere] a power and possibility, though no necessity of continuing in o­bedience.

That I may bring this home to my purpose, I say, that God is bound to restore unto men power to beleeve, supposing these things that follow.

• 1 That he hath vouchsafed to enter into a new Covenant of peace with men, when he needed not.
• 2 That in that Covenant, he requireth obedience at mens hands, even at theirs that perish.
• 3 That he promiseth eternall life to every man, if he obey and keepe the Covenant.
• 4 That he punisheth the disobedient with everlasting death.

These particulars supposed, the most free God who is ab­solutely bound to none, is engaged to give ability of beleeving unto men: nor can he justly without this gift punish the dis­obedient any more then a Magistrate having put out a mans eyes for an offence; can command this man with justice to reade a book; and because he readeth not, put him to death: or then a Master (that I may returne the Simile in the answer) when he hath taken away from his servant the stocke which he hath misimployed, can afterward exact of him a just im­ployment of the same stocke, and punish him, because he im­ployeth it not.

[Page 74]I conclude therefore, that the absolute and inevitable re­probation of such men as are called to beleeve in CHRIST, and punished if they beleeve not; is utterly repugnant to the Iustice of God, and therefore can be no part of his word.

4 Opposite to Gods Truth.FOurthly, it oppugneth the truth and sincerity of God.

God is a God of truth, Deut. 32.4. Truth it self, Ioh. 14.6 so called, because he is the fountaine of truth; and the perfec­tion of truth without the least mixture of falshood. The strength of Jsraell cannot lye, Rom. 3.4. 1 Sam. 15.29. Let God be true and every man a lyar (sayth the Apostle;) that he might be justifi­ed in his sayings, and overcome when he is judged, that is, men may lye, (for all men are lyars:) but God can never lye. If any man would goe about to challenge him with untruth, his challenge would easily appeare to be a calumny: the truth of God like the glorious Sunne will break through all the clouds of false accusations, that seek to obscure it. [Simile gaudet Si­mili] Like loveth his like, God loveth such, as are true of heart, Psal. 51.6. and hath an hypocrite in utter detestation: and therefore, he must needs be true himself. No man (for ought I know) doubteth of it. But by absolute Reprobation God is made untrue and Hypocriticall in his dealings with men, and in all matters appertaining to their eternall state; parti­cularly, ¹ in his commands, ² in his offers of grace and glory, ³ in his threats, ⁴ passionate wishes and desires of mens chiefe good, and ⁵ in his expostulations and commiseration also.

1 In his commands. For by this doctrine God command­eth those men to repent and beleeve, whom he secretly pur­poseth shall not beleeve. Though God command Reprobates to beleeve the Gospell, L. contr. schafm. pa. 60. Etsi reprobos mandat Deus ut e­vangelio credant, non vult tamen ut cre­dant. yet he will not have them beleeve; saith Pis­cator. Now whom God commandeth to beleeve and repent, those he willeth outwardly, should beleeve and repent, for by his commandements he signifieth his good will and plea­sure: and he must inwardly and heartily will it too, or els he dissembleth. For words if they be true, are an interpretation of the minde: when they are not, they are meere impostures and simulations.

2 In his offers of grace and glory, which he maketh to such as refuse them and perish for refusing them, as well as to those who do accept them to their Salvation.

This is evident, Esay, 65.2. J have spread out my hands al [Page 75] the day long. To whom? to a rebellious people, and Math. 22. we reade, that those men were invited to the wedding, that came not: and Act. 3.26. there 'tis sayd to the Iewes who had denyed Christ, as vers. 14. To you hath God sent his Sonne IESUS to blesse you, in turning every one of you from your iniqui­ties. How oft (sayth Christ) would J have gathered you? spea­king of such as neglected their visitation, and so lost their sal­vation. It is evident also by reason. For, as many as are un­der the Commandement, are under the Promise too; as wee may see, Act. 2.38, 39. Repent and be Baptized every one of you, and ye shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost: for to you and your children is the Promise made.

In which words, Peter maketh the command and the pro­mise of equall extent, both universall. And there is cause why: for he maketh the Promise his motive to perswade o­bedience to the command: and it would not have reached home, if it had not respected all those, to whom the com­mand was given. No man, Reprobate or other, thinketh any lesse: every man that heareth the Gospell preached; taketh himself to be under the gracious offer of eternall life; and up­on these thoughts hath some desires, some hopes of it, and stirreth up himselfe to forsake some pleasing sinnes, which o­therwise he would not part with, and doe some unwelcome dutyes, which otherwise he would not doe.

But now Gods meaning is [by this doctrine] that the most of those to whom he offereth his grace and glory, shall have neither. And so Piscator saith, — l. de praed. contr [...] schaf. pa. 74. Gratia non [...]ffertur à Deo singulis (licet voca­tis) animo commu­nicandi cam, sed solis Electis. Grace is not offered by God even to those who are called, with a meaning to give it, but to the Elect onely. In the same Booke he hath such another speech. Non vult Deus reprobos credere, li­cet linguâ profiteatu [...] se velle. pag. 143. Though God in words protest hee would have Re­probates to beleeve, yet indeed he will not have them. They make God to deale with men in matters of Salvation, as the Poets feigne the Gods to have dealt with poore Tantalus. They placed him in a cleere and goodly river up to the very chin, and under a tree which beare much sweet and pleasant fruit that did almost touch his lips: but this they did with a pur­pose that he should tast of neyther. For when hee put his mouth to the water to drinke, it waved away from him: and when he reached his hand to the fruit to have eaten of it, it withdrew it self presently out of his reach: so as he could [Page 76] neither eat nor drink. Iust so dealeth God with Reprobates (by their Doctrine:) hee placeth them under the plentifull meanes of Salvation, offereth it to them so plainly, that men would think they might have it when they will; and yet in­tendeth fully they shall never have it, with-holding from them either the first grace that they cannot beleeve, or the se­cond grace that they cannot persevere. Did not those Gods delude Tantalus? yes doubtlesse. And if God doe so with Reprobates; what doth he but delude them, and dissem­ble with them in his fairest and likelyest offers of Salvation that he makes them? And this do Zanchius and Bucer grant by evident consequence, as appeareth by a speech or two of theirs, which cannot stand with their conclusion; and there­fore [I suppose] fell unwarily from them.

Zanch [...]us telleth us roundly, that every man, who is called, is bound to think that he is elected, otherwise he doth offer great injury to God, and Zanch. l. 5. de nat Dei c. 2. Perst in­ger [...] Deum mondacii qui illi in verbo dicit, se velle salurem ejus, & in hunc finem ad Ch [...]istum vocasse. accuse him of lying, w^ch saith to him in his word, that he desireth his Salvation, and for this cause hath called him. In which speech he plainly implyeth, that if God call a man whom he hath absolutely rejected, he doth but de­lude him when he calleth him. The like speech hath Bucer Bucer in c. 8 ad Rom. q. de praed. Primum quod Deo debes, est ut credas esse te ab eo praedes­tinatum. Nam id ni credas, facis eum ti­bi, cum te ad salutem vocat per Evangeli­um, illudere. A man must beleeve that he is predestinate: or else he maketh God to mock him, when he calleth him.

A man therefore that is not predestinate, but an absolute Reprobate; when he is called to Salvation, is but deluded: it is the necessary resultance of their speeches.

If a Creditor should resolve, upon no termes to forgive his Debtor one farthing of his debt, and yet make him offers to remit the whole upon some conditions, and bind his offers with a deep and solemne oath: would not we say, that he were a ranke dissembler and a meere deluder of his poore debtor? We can say no lesse of God, if it be true, that he hath irrevo­cably decreed at no hand to save such particular men, and yet promiseth and sweareth that he will save them, if they will beleeve his promises, and repent. What can such oaths and promises be, but meere delusions of miserable men?

3 In his threats and comminations also (by this doctrine) is God made to be hollow and deceitfull. For against what sinnes are threats denounced? Alwayes against actuall sins; we never read that they are thundered out against us for Ori­ginall [Page 77] sinne: they intimate therefore that the sinnes for which men goe to Hell, are their actuall transgressions. But if it be true that God decreed men to Hell for originall sinne, that which those threats import and signifie is not true, and so God is not sincere in them. Besides, all threatnings imply that the evill threatned may be avoyded. For therefore are they denounced, that men might by them be brought to repen­tance, and so escape the evils threatned. But if some men be peremptorily ordained to destruction, then their destructi­on cannot be prevented: and so the threatnings of damnati­on (in this respect also) do signifie an untruth, and God in them dealeth not plainly with men.

4 In all the other things before mentioned, is God full of guile too (by this opinion;) namely, in his —

(1) Passionate wishes, that even those men might repent, that repent not, and might be saved that through their im­penitency are not saved. Of these we read, Deut. 5.29. O that there were such a heart in them to feare me, that it might goe well with them. And, Psal. 81.11. O, that my people had hearkned, and Israel had walked in my wayes, &c. And, Esay. 48.18. O, that thou hadst hearkned to my Commandements. &c.

(2) In his mournfull Expostulations, Esay. 5.3. Judge (J pray you) between me and my Vineyard, what could I have done more for my Vineyard? And Ieremiah 2. throughout the whole Chapter, especially ver. 31. Have I been a Wildernesse to Israel, or a land of darknesse? And ver. 32. Can a Maid for­get her Ornaments, or a Bride her attire? Yet my people have forgotten me dayes without number. Ezek. 33.11. Turne [...] turne ye: why will ye dye, O house of Israel?

(3) In his melting commiserations of the wofull condition of foolish men, who would not bee reclaymed. How shall I give thee up O Ephraim? How shall J deliver thee O Israell? My repentings are kindled together, my heart is turned within me. Hos. 11.8. O Ierusalem, Ierusalem, which killest the Prophets, and stonest them that are sent to thee, &c.

In all these there is but little sincerity, if there be a secret resolution that the most of those, towards whom those wi­shes, chidings, and pittifull bemoanings are used, shall be dam­ned without remedy. Gods fairest offers, his sweetest invi­tations, his greatest sympathies, and amplest curtesies, (if this [Page 78] doctrine be true) come little short (I think) of Absolom [...] feast, Ioabs congey, the kisse of Iudas, and the Hyaenaes teares. For in all these [aliud animo vult, aliud verbis significat] hee sayth one thing and meaneth another, and therefore dissem­bleth.

Nay, the whole Ministery (wherein God commandeth, of­fereth, chideth, entreateth, lamenteth, &c.) if this be true, is but a meere imposture, a giving of words without any mea­ning of answerable deeds; and an imposture so much the grea­ter, by how much the shew of kindnesse is the heartier. For how can a good thing be offered with stronger shewes of a good meaning, then when it is offered with exhortations and intreaties to accept it, with cleare demonstrations of the excellencies of it, with unfeyned wishes that the parties to whom it is offered, would accept it, and bitter lamentations for their folly in refusing it? With all these inforcements is Gods tender of Salvation to Reprobates accompanied; and therefore in shew most hearty and serious.

In a word, thus speaketh God (by this doctrine) to Repro­bates in the ministery.

‘O ye Reprobates, (once most dearely beloved of me in your father Adam, but now extreamly and implacably hated, and by mine eternal & uncontrollable order Sealed up under invincible sin and misery:) amend your lives, and beleeve in the name of mine onely begotten Sonne. If you repent and beleeve not, there is no remedy, you must be damned: but if you repent and beleeve, you shall bee saved; though your sinnes be as red as Scarlet, I will make them as white as Wooll. Think not that I would have you dye, for I sweare as J live, J will not the death of him that dyeth; I would have no man to perish, but all to come to repentance. I beseech you therefore be reconciled. I have cryed and called unto you, I have a long time waited upon you, that you might repent, and still am I knocking at the doores of your hearts for entrance. O, that there were a heart in you to feare me, and keep my commandements that it might goe well with you for ever. What shall J doe unto you? how shall J in­treat you? Will you not be made cleane? When will it once be?’ Can God speake thus to Reprobates, who by his own decree shall never repent, nor bee saved, without the deepest dissi­mulation?

[Page 79]That which is usually sayd to cleare the absolute decree from this crimination, is, That God wisheth the Salvation of the Reprobate seriously, but not absolutely; he would have those men saved who are not saved, but yet upon condition they will repent and beleeve. And therefore, though they do perish, God is candid and sincere in his offers of Salvation to them. For therefore do they perish, because they performe not the condition, and not because God offereth not Salvati­on seriously unto them.

But this answer is too short: It is true indeed, God will have all men to be saved upon condition onely, that they will beleeve and repent, according to that speech of S. Ambrose, [Deus vult omnes salvari, si & ipsi velint.] God would have all to be saved, if they themselves would: For if he would ab­solutely have it so, what can hinder it? who hath resisted his will? and it is true likewise, that a conditionall promise may be serious as well as an absolute: but then the condition must be possible to them, to whom the promise is made; and the performance of the condition must be a part of Gods will, as well as the Salvation promised: or else the promise cannot be candid and sincere. [Conditio est oblata potestas aliquid e­ligendi] a condition is the offer of a power of choyce. Where there is no liberty of choyce afforded, there is no true condi­tion appointed. In substance it is all one to offer a curtesie un­der a condition not possible, and not to offer it at all; and in circumstance it is much worse.

In substance all one; The Lawyers tell us that a Contract made [sub conditione impraestabili nullus aestimatur] under a condition not possible, is esteemed no bargaine. And the Lo­gicians rule is, that Conditionalis propositio quae habet annexam conditio­nem impossibilem, aequipollet simplici­ter neganti. A conditionall proposition which hath an impossible condition annexed to it, is equivalent to a bare Negation. It is all one for me to offer a peece of mony to one blinde man upon condition he will open his eyes and tell me what peece of money it is, and what stampe it hath; and to deny it flatly to another. For the one hath it no more then the other. And it is all one for a man that hath a daughter to bestow in marriage, to tell her Suiter; I will give you my Daughter, if you will span the Earth, or touch the Heavens with your finger; and to tell him plainly, set your heart at rest, I will never bestow her upon you. For the Suiter spee­deth both wayes alike.

[Page 80]And it is in circumstance a great deale worse. For it is a denyall under colour of the contrary, a denyall joyned with a scoffe, a derision, as was that of the Iebusites, 2. Sam. 5.6. Who told David, that he should not enter into the Fort of Zion, except he tooke away the blinde and the lame. Their mea­ning was, they would never deliver it up unto him: and be­cause they thought it impossible for him to take away the blinde and the lame, they told him if he did so, then they would yeeld it up. It was an Ironicall and scoffing denyall of his demand. If the King should make an unrepealable Law, that no German should be made a Citizen of London, or free Denizen of the Kingdome; and then make a Decree to give some bountifull gratuities, but to the Citizens of London, or to the Subjects of the Kingdome only, and to none but them; and yet for all this should command it to be proclaymed, that he will give them to the Germans upon condition they will be made Freemen of London, or bee incorporated into the Kingdome: would not any man say, that the King in this case did dissemble and delude the poore Dutchmen? and if any should say, there would be no dissembling in it; for if they would become Citizens or Subjects, they should have the promised gratuities: a man might truely answer, that there­fore the King doth counterfeit and cosin them, because hee maketh a tender of them upon a condition not possible by his owne decree. In like manner, if God have made a decree, that such men shall never beleeve, and yet offer them Heaven on condition they will beleeve; it may most truely be sayd, that God doth not onely deny them Heaven, but deny it with a bitter derision, which is farre from that candor and good­nesse that dwelleth in him.

And thus have I shewed the contrariety of this Opinion to foure principall attributes of God, which is my second generall reason against it.

3 It is contrary to the use & end of Gods gifts to men.THirdly, it is contrary to the use and end of Gods gifts bestow'd upon men, which gifts are of two sorts:

(1) Gifts of Nature, our Creation, Sustentation, Pre­servation, together with Health, Strength, Beauty, Wis­dome, &c.

(2) Gifts of Grace, which have a more immediate relati­on [Page 81] to everlasting life, and are meanes eyther of purchasing Salvation or of applying it.

Meanes of purchasing it, are the comming of CHRIST in­to the world, and the sacrificing himselfe on the Crosse.

Meanes of applying it, are the ministery of the word and Sacraments, the long suffering of God, the enlightening of mens understandings, the plantation of many excellent ver­tues in their hearts, with many more of the like sort.

Now of these endowments of Nature and Grace, what the true use and end is, the Scripture doth plainly and parti­cularly shew us.

First, for guifts of Nature, we finde them bestowed upon all that have them, for the encouraging and enabling of them to serve God and save their Soules. For, Act. 14.16, 17. The Apostle saith, that God (even in those times in which he suffered the Gentiles to walke in their own wayes, and with-held from them the light of his holy word) did give un­to the people of the world, raine from Heaven and fruitfull sea­sons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse, and in so do­ing he left not himselfe among them without witnesse. This implyeth, that therefore he gave them these good things, that he might make himself knowen unto them, and so might draw them to glorifie him according to the knowledge which they had of him.

Act. 17.26. The Apostle saith directly, that therefore men are made and placed in this world and appoynted to their se­verall times and dwellings, that they might seeke and finde God: that is, that they might serve him and save their Soules. For what is it to seek God, but to serve him? and what is it to finde God, but to enjoy his face and favour here and in Hea­ven? To this purpose Prosper. Prosper. de voc. Gentium. l. 2. c. 4. p. 8 [...]8. Coelum quippe & terra & marc, om­nisque creatura quae videri & intelligi po­test, ad hanc praeci­puè disposita est hu­mani generis, utilita­tem, ut natura ratio­nalis de contemplati­one tot specierum, de experimentis tot bo­norum, de perceptio­ne tot munerum, ad cultum & delactionē sui imbueretur au­tho [...]is, implente om­nia spiritu Dei in quo vivimus, movemur & sumus. Therefore (sayth he) is every creature made and ordained especially, that Mankind which is endewed with knowledge and ability to discourse, might by the sight of so many goodly sorts of Creatures, and the taste of so many blessings, be drawne to the love and service of his and their maker.

And a little after he sayth, in the same Chapter.

Ibid. Quod ergo in Israel per constitu­tionem legis, & Pro­phetica eloquia gere­batur, hoc in univer­sis nationibus totius creaturae testimonia & bonitatis Dei mi­racula semper egerū [...]. Looke to what use the Law and Prophets were to the Jsraelites; of the same use were the guifts of Creation and Pro­vidence to the Gentiles. God never intended to deale with [Page 82] the Gentiles (as the foule-mouth'd Manichees sayd, he dealt with the Iewes) to feed and fat them up with outward and more common blessings, as so many Hogs and Swine with husks and akornes, but to draw them up by these to an expec­tation of better things and a carefull endeavor to please God, that so they might obtaine them.

The end of all Creatures and of all created gifts bestowed upon man, is subordinate to the end of man. Mans end is to glorifie God upon earth, and enjoy perpetuall society with him in heaven; and the end of those gifts is to direct and encourage men to atchieve that high and excellent end, to which his Creator had appoynted him.

Now for the gifts of Grace, they likewise are given to all them that enjoy them for the same use and end too.

For first, CHRIST came into the world, not that he might be a rock of offence, at which the greater part of men should stumble and fall; but to shed his bloud and by that bloud to purchase Salvation for all mankind, not onely for those who are saved, but for those also who through their wilfull unbe­leefe and impenitency are not saved; as we may see, Joh. 3.17. God sent his Sonne (sayth the Sonne) into the World, not to condemne the world, but that the World through him might be saved. In which words the end of his comming is set down.

• 1 Negatively, [not to condemne the World.]
• 2 Affirmatively, [but that the World through him might be saved:] and therefore very fully.

The like speech we have, Ioh. 12.47. I came not to judge the World, but to save it. These Negations joyned with affir­mations, shew, that the Salvation of all men was the onely end of CHRISTS comming, the end exclusively, no other end was properly intended by it but this. The Sonne of man came to seeke and to save what was lost. Luke, 19.10. Therefore he came to save every man, for every man was lost. And Act. 3.26. To you (sayth S. Peter) hath God sent his Sonne IESVS to blesse you in turning everyone of you from your iniquity; [every one of you] you that reject him, as well as you that receive him. The end of CHRISTS comming into the world was the Salvation of all and every man therein.

2 The ministery of the word and Sacraments is given also and appointed for the same end, and is in its own proper na­ture [Page 83] and use, an instrument of conveying the Spirit of regene­ration to those that live under it and to all those.

Better proofs for this I cannot have, then those which our reverend Divines at Dort gathered to my hand. Esay, 59.21. This is my Covenant with them (sayth the Lord) my Spirit that is upon thee, and my words which J have put in thy mouth, shall not depart out of thy mouth, nor out of the mouth of thy seed, nor seeds seed for ever. Hinc patet (say they) from these words it appeareth, that the word and spirit are joyned in the ministery of the word with an inseparable band, by the promise of God. Hence it is, that the Ministers of the New Testament are called, Mi­nisters not of the letter but of the Spirit; not of the letter that kil­leth, but of the spirit that giveth life. 2. Cor. 3.6. And the ministery of the Gospell is called [...] the mini­stery of the Spirit, in the same place, vers. 8. Hence also is the Gospell called [...], Grace bringing Salvation. Tit. 2.11. And [...], the word of Reconciliation. 2. Cor. 5.19. To these let me adde, 1. Pet. 1.23. Where the word is called, the seed of the new birth: and 2. Cor. 5.20. Where Ministers are called, Embassadors for CHRIST, to beseech men to be reconciled to God. They are so called, to shew that the word preached is by Gods appointment an instrument to make men new creatures, and that the proper matter of Mi­nisters errands is reconciliation with God, and the naturall fruit of it is in Gods intent, not the obduration and destruc­tion, but the conversion and salvation of men. The same Au­thors out of Joh. 15.22. [If J had not come & spoken unto them, they should not have had sin] do say it is evident, that CHRIST in his preaching did administer so much inward grace as was suffi­cient to convince those that rejected the Gospell, of positive unbe­leefe, and render them obnoxious to just punishment: and by good consequence (say I) so much as sufficed by their good husbandry, to have converted and saved them: for that grace leaveth none without excuse, which is not sufficient to con­vert them. I will conclude what they say of this gracious in­tention of God in the ministery of the word, with that speech of Prospers, cyted by them in the same place. Prosper. ad cap Gal. resp. ad. Obj. [...] Non omnes voca [...] ad gratiam eos, qui [...] bus omnibus evang [...]lium praedicatur [...] recte dicitur; etiam si sint qui evangel [...] non obaudiunt. They that say, that all those to whom the Gospell is preached (even those that obey not the Gospell) are not called to grace, they say an untruth. God looked for Grapes (sayes the Text) Esay, 5.2. What [Page 84] doth this imply? but that it was Gods principall ayme in the husbandry which he bestowed upon the Church of Israel, that it should bring forth good fruit, though in the event it did not? How oft would J have gathered you? sayth CHRIST to Ierusalem. Math. 23.37. These things (sayth he) have I spoken to you, that ye might be saved: but ye will not come to me, that ye might have life. Ioh. 5.34, 40. In those words intimating no lesse then this, that it was his full intent by his preaching to gather and to save those very particular men, that in the end were not gathered nor saved, through the contempt or neglect of CHRISTS Ministery.

Touching the Sacraments, this is also the use and end for which they were ordayned; as we may see, Luke, 7.30. Where we have these words; But the Scribes and Phari­sees and expounders of the Law despised the counsell of God a­gainst themselves; and were not baptized of Iohn. In which words thus much is evidently included, that it was Gods counsell and purpose in Iohns Baptisme to bring them to CHRIST, and in him to Heaven. So much also is sayd of his Baptisme, Mark. 1.4. Iohn did baptize in the Wildernesse and preach the baptisme of Repentance, and remission of sinnes. If this were the end of Iohns, much more is it the end of CHRISTS baptisme; it being more excellent then Iohns was, not in substance, but in the fulnesse of grace administred and dispensed by it. All that have been baptized into CHRIST (sayth the Apostle) have been baptized into his death. Rom. 6.3. All yee that have been baptized into CHRIST, have put on CHRIST, Gal. 3.27. The very phrases there used, shew that baptisme is in its originall intention, an instrument of uniting men to CHRIST, and giving them communion with him in the benefits of his death. Except a man be borne againe of water (sayth our Saviour) and of the Spirit, he cannot, &c. Joh. 3.5. In which words are these two things.

1 The necessity of regeneration. [Except a man be borne againe.]

2 The working cause of it: Efficient, the Spirit; instru­mentall the Sacrament of Baptisme, there called Water from the outward matter of it. Baptisme therefore is appoynted to be a meanes of regeneration to all those that are baptized, and doth effect it in all, who do not put an obstacle in the way [Page 85] to hinder it. So much doth the Apostle ascribe to Baptisme, Eph. 5.26. and for this cause doth dignifie it with this title, [The laver of regeneration.] Tit. 3.5.

I will shut up this with Act. 2.38. where Peter sayth, Repent and be baptized every one of you for the remission of sinnes; plainly implying, that therefore is baptisme ordeyned to be received, that those who do receive it, might have their sins remitted.

This is also Gods intent in the Lords Supper. This is my bo­dy (saith CHRIST) and this is my bloud, Math. 26.26, 27. in those words teaching us, that in that Sacrament there is an ex­hibition of CHRIST and his benefits intended on Gods part, and received of those by whom no obstacle is interposed: and therefore doth the Apostle call it in expresse words, 1 Cor. 10.16. The communion of the body and bloud of Christ.

For this end also, is the patience of God (another singular dignation of God) exercised among men, as we may see, Rom 2.4. Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse and forbearance, not knowing that the bountifulnesse of God leadeth thee to repen­tance? but thou after thy hardnesse and heart that cannot repent, heapest up wrath to thy selfe, &c. In these words may be noted for our purpose: (1) Gods intent in forbearing sinners, which is, the leading of them to repentance, and so on to Salva­tion: (for repentance, is per se ordinata ad salutem, by him or­deyned to Salvation as a meanes to the end.) (2) The per­sons, to whom God intendeth this good by his forbearance: and they are, such as despise the riches of his goodnesse, and have hard and impenitent hearts. (3) The issue and event of this their contempt of Gods patience, and that is, a treasuring up of wrath unto themselves against the day of wrath. Out of all which layed together ariseth thus much, that God by sparing wicked men, who have hard and impenitent hearts, intendeth their everlasting good, though they by the abuse of his pati­ence and refusall to repent, doe treasure up unto themselves wrath and misery everlasting. The like to this is delivered in 2 Pet. 3.9. God is not slack (saith Peter) (as some men count slacknesse) but patient toward us? that is us men. And why patient toward us? because he would have none to perish. The end therefore of Gods patience, is mans Salvation and Re­pentance.

[Page 86]In the last place those other gifts of God, by which mens understandings are enlightened, and their soules beautified (namely knowledge, faith, repentance, fortitude, liberality, temperance, humility and chastity, and such like) are bestowed upon all that have them [among whom are ma­ny who prove Reprobates in the end] that by the exercise of them and continuance in them they might come to eter­nall life.

That Reprobates are adorned with many of these graces, appeareth by sundry Scriptures, especially Heb. 6.4. where the Apostle sayth, That it is impossible for them that have bin en­lightened, tasted the heavenly gift, beene made partakers of the Holy Ghost, tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come; if they fall away, should be renewed by repentance. [...] graces which the Apostle here speaketh of, are not ordi­nary and common, but speciall and excellent graces; illumina­tion, faith, a rellish of Gods word and a tast of Heaven; and the persons spoken of, are Apostates, such as are under a pos­sibility of falling away for ever (for upon a danger not possi­ble cannot be built a solid exhortation,) and consequently Reprobates: and the thing intimated, is that upon Apostates & Reprobates are these excellent gifts many times bestowed The like speech we have, Heb. 10.26. For, if we sinne willing­ly after wee have received the knowledge of the truth; there re­maineth no more Sacrifice for sinne, &c. From whence we may collect, that men who sinne willingly and unpardonably, may receive the knowledge of the truth; yea and be sanctified by the bloud of the Testament and the Spirit of grace, vers. 29.

In the 2 Pet. 2.20. They may (sayth Peter) escape the fil­thinesse of the world: that is, be washed from their former sins by repentance. The uncleane spirit may goe out of them, Math. 12.43. They may receive the word with joy, Math. 13.20. And many more excellent graces they may have besides. Now all these vertues and graces are not therefore given then that they might abuse them, and so purchase to themselves the greater damnation; or that they might doe good to o­thers with them, but none to themselves: but rather, that (as by the former gifts of nature, so) by these of grace they may obtayne Salvation. For if God ayme at this in those gifts that are farther off, much more in these, which make those that [Page 87] have them (like the young man in the Gospell) not farre from the kingdome of Heaven. My proofe for this, I borrow of our Divines at the Synod, who in their suffrage have these two positions.

1 Suffrag. Brit pag. 41. thes. 2. & p. 43. thes 3 Sunt quaedam effecta interna ad conversionē praevia, que virtute verbi, spi­ritusque in nondum justificatorum cordi­bus excicantur; qua­lia sunt, notitia vo­luntatis divinae, sen­sus peccati, timor pae­nae, cogitatio de libe­ratione, spes aliqua veniae. There are certain internall works preparing a man for justification, which by the power of the word and Spirit are wrought in the hearts of men not yet justified; such as are the knowledge of Gods will, a sense of sinne, feare of punishment, &c. that is their first.

2 Their second position is this. Quos Deus (me­diante verbo) per Spi­ritum suum in hunc modum afficit, eos ad fidem, conversionem. que verè & seriò vo­cat & invitat. Those whom God by his word and Spirit affecteth after this manner, those he truely and seriously calleth and inviteth to conversion.

Out of these two Theses thus much ariseth, that God wor­keth the knowledge of his will, the sence of sinne, feare of hell, hope of pardon, and consequently many other excellent graces in the hearts of men, that by these, they may be con­verted and so eternally saved.

We see by these things, what end God aymeth at in his gifts to men.

But there are some Scriptures, that seeme to say the con­trary, namely Rom. 1.20. where God is sayd to reveale him­self to the Gentiles by the creatures, [ [...]] that they might be without excuse. And Luke 2, 34. Simeon saith of CHRIST, that he is appoynted for the falling and rising againe of many in Israel. And 1 Cor. 1.23. I preach Christ (saith St. Paul) to the Jewes a stumbling block, 2 Cor. 2.16. We are the favour of death to death, &c. By these places it seemeth, that God giveth these things to some, to make them stumble, and that they might be left without excuse. What shall we say therefore to these places.

Of all these places in generall, I may say this; that they are to be understood of the end, which is many times effected by these gifts of God, and not of the end which is primarily intended in them; and they shew what CHRIST, the word preached, and the gifts of nature and grace are [occasionally] to some men, through their voluntary rebellion against God and his ordinances, and not what they are [intentionally] in Gods first thoughts and resolutions: he intendeth them for their good, though many times they receive them to theyr hurt. It is with Gods ordinances and gifts (and that very of­ten [Page 88] too,) as it is sometimes with physick: it is given by the Physician for the patients good, but many times through the distemper of his body, it doth him hurt. And as it is with the Sunne. God intendeth by the shining of it the enlight­ning and clearing of men and other creatures in this inferiour world; and yet some men are hurt by the light of it, others are scorched by the heat of it; [accidentally] by reason of the climates wherein they live, or the ill affectednesse of theyr eyes and bodyes.

So the blessings of God, which out of his abundant good­nesse are bestowed on men for theyr eternall good; through their ill frame and temper of heart doe effect their hurt, part­ly because lighting on naughty hearts, they lose their edge; (for quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis:) and partly because of the severity of God, who as he hath an an­tecedent and gracious will to doe men good; so hee hath a consequent and judiciary will of giving up obstinate men to their own hearts lusts, and of permitting them to dash against CHRIST and other meanes of eternall life, and so to fall into endlesse misery and mischief, as we may see, Psal. 81.11, 12. and Rev. 22.11. which made Prosper say, Prosp. resp. ad obj. 16. Vincent. Qui voluntatem Dei spre­verunt invitantem, voluntatem Dei sen­tient vindicantem. They that have despised Gods inviting will, shall feele his revenging will.

Now if this be the meaning of these Scriptures, then do they not thwart that which hath bin sayd of Gods gracious intent of promoting the eternall good of men by his blessings bestowed upon them. For, [argumentum ab eventu ad inten­tionem Dei non valet:) because no sinfull event is properly under Gods decree, but his prescience only, or at most under a permissive decree: and many things happen in the world which are beside the antecedent and principall purpose of God; not because there is any want of power in God, but be­cause his will is oftentimes conditionall, and therefore not effected; because the condition is not performed.

But by the opinion of absolute Reprobation, the gifts both of Nature and Grace have another end: eyther God doth not meane them to those that perish (although they doe enjoy them, because they are mingled in the world with the Elect to whom onely they are directed:) or if he doe, hee meaneth they shall have them, and be lifted up by them above the cō ­mon rank of men, [ut lapsu graviore ruant,] that their fall [Page 89] may be the greater. And so much is sayd by the chief defen­ders of it. Calv. Instit. l. 3. 6. 24. n. 13. Ecc [...] vocem ad eos ditigit ut magis obsurdes [...]t; lucem accendit sed ut redantur caeci­cres; doctrinam profe [...]t, sed quâ magi [...] obstup [...]scant; reme­dium ad [...]ibe [...], sed n [...] sanentur. God sendeth his word to Reprobates (sayth Cal­vin) that they might be made more deafe; he setteth up a light before them, to make them the blinder; he giveth them a remedy that they might not be healed. And Bez. praelud in c [...] 9. ad Rom. p. 434 Absurdum videri no [...] debit, deum reprob [...] quibusdam, qui in E [...] clesiâ Dei ve [...]santur gratiam suam in verbo suo, sive etiam pe [...] Sacramenta sua eff [...] [...]e, non eum in finē [...] per eam s [...]ventu [...] sed contrà, ut m [...]ù ha [...] cant excusationi [...] quàm reliqui, & tan [...] [...]é graviùs pu [...]ian [...]ur [...] it should not seem absurd unto us (sayth Beza) that God should offer his grace in the word and Sacraments to some Reprobates in the Church, not to this end that they might be saved by it, but that they might be lesse excu­sable then others, and obnoxious to the sorer punishment. Spee­ches like to these hath Maccovius in his Disputations, Mac. disp 1 [...] pag 11, 12. Pulsa Christus ad ostiu [...] reproborem, quod n [...]vit nec posse ne [...] velle aperire; non u [...] intret, sed p [...] u [...] expr [...] b [...]t [...]llis [...]po­tentiam suâ [...] [...]u [...] culpâ contractū; par­tim ut condēn [...] in illis augeat, &c. CHRIST (sayth he) knocketh at the hearts of Reprobates, who he knoweth neither can nor will open unto him; not that hee may enter in, but partly that he upbrayd them for their impotency, and partly that he may increase their damnation. And immediately after to a place in Iohn, c. 15. v. 22. he giveth this exposition. Nimi [...]um ide [...] locutus est tis, ut ex contemp [...] odi [...] [...]u­si [...] vnigeniti [...]vio condemnatio es [...]e. Therefore did God speake to them, that by the contempt and hatred of his Sonne they might procure the greater damnation. In another place likewise of his disputations he speaketh the same thing foure or 5 times over, very positively. Disp. 2. p. 3. De [...] reprobis verbum [...] proponit non ali [...] fine, quam ut inexcusabiles reddantur God doth propound his word to Reprobates for no other end, then that they might be left without excuse.

p. 1 [...]. Si Evange­lū consideres ratione intentionis Dei, finē ejus esse per se, & non per accidens, inexcusabilitatē ratione reproborum. If the Gospell be considered in respect of Gods intention, the proper end of it, and not the accidentall in reference to Reprobates is their inexcusablenesse. And very consequently doe these writers speake to their maine conclusion. For, how can God intend the meanes or gifts of grace for the Salvation of them, whom he hath by his absolute eternall decree rejected utterly from grace and glory?

More particularly by this Doctrine,

1 CHRIST came not into the world to procure the Salva­tion of them that perish, because they were inevitably ordey­ned to perish.

2 The word of grace is not sent to them: or if it be, it is sent, that they might slight it, or contemne it; and so increase their damnation by contemning of it, which being so, these inconveniences will arise;

(1) That God is a meere deluder of miserable men, whom hee calleth to Salvation in the name of his Sonne by the preaching of the word. For what else can he be that fairely pretendeth theyr good, whom he fully intendeth to ruine?

[Page 90](2) That Ministers are but false witnesses, because in their ministery they offer Salvation conditionally to many, whose damnation is determined absolutely.

(3) The Ministery of the word cannot leave men without excuse. For Reprobates may have this just plea; ‘Lord, doest thou punish us for not beleeving in thy Sonne, when thou didst call us to beleeve by the preaching of thy word? why? Thou didst decree to leave us (wofull men) in A­dams sinne, to give us neither power to beleeve, nor a CHRIST to beleeve in. How canst thou justly charge us with sinne, or increase our punishment for not beleeving in him whom thou didst resolve before the world was, that we should never beleeve in?’ Certainly that Neque enim ea fingi potest homines reddere inexcusabi­les, per verbum & Spiritū vocatio, quae eo tantum fine ex [...] ­betur ut reddat in ex­cusabiles. Suffrag. Brit. de 3 & 4. art. Antecedancis ad Con­vers thes [...] 3. pag 43. Ministery giveth men a faire excuse, that is given for no other end, then to leave them without excuse.

3 The Sacraments also (by this opinion) doe signifie nothing, seale up nothing, conferre nothing to such as are not saved; but are meere blanks and empty ordinances at the best unto them; not through the fault of the men, but by the primary and absolute will of God.

Lastly, Gods other gifts which he bestoweth upon men of what nature soever they be, are to the most that receive them in Gods absolute intention,

(1) Ʋnprofitable, such as shall never do them good in re­ference to their eternall condition.

(2) Dangerous and hurtfull, given them not out of love but extreme hatred; not that they might use them well and be blessed in so doing, but that they might use them ill, and by ill using of them procure to themselves the greater damna­tion. God lifteth them up (as the Divell did CHRIST) to the pynacle of the Temple; that so they might fall: and loa­deth them with knowledge and other goodly endowments, that with the weight of them he might sinke them downe to Hell.

And so by good consequence, Gods choysest gifts are in­tended and used as snares to intrap mens soules. Men that have them, have little cause to be proud of them, (for they are the more unhappy because they have them:) or small rea­son to be thankfull for them, or to love the giver of them, but to hate him rather; because they are but giftlesse gifts, of the [Page 91] same nature with a griping Vsurers bounty, Iaels curtesie, Sauls marrying of Michal to David, or a bayt for a poore fish which she swalloweth with a hooke to boot:

MY fourth generall reason against this absolute Reproba­tion is, It is a hinderance to Piety: 4th. Reason. Jt is prejudiciall to Piety. it is a Doctrine that serveth greatly to discourage holinesse and encourage pro­phanenesse. It maketh Ministers (by its naturall importment) negligent in their Preaching, praying, and other services, which are ordeyned of God for the eternall good of their people. It maketh people carelesse in hearing, reading, pray­ing, instructing their families, examining their consciences, fasting and mourning for their sinnes, and all other godly ex­ercises. In a word, it cutteth a sunder the very sinewes of re­ligion, and pulleth away the strongest inducements to a holy life. Therefore it is no true and wholsome Doctrine.

That it doth so, it will appeare by these reasons that follow.

I. It taketh away [Hope] and [Feare:] Hope of at­tayning any good by godlinesse; feare of susteyning any hurt by wickednesse: and so it taketh away two principall props of Religion.

This reason may be resolved into these two branches.

1 Hope and feare uphold godlinesse. Were it not for these, it would come to ruine: by these, are men strongly led on to vertue, and with-held from vice. Hope doth [excitare] stirre men up to begin, and [corroborare] strengthen them in the doing of any good action begun. By this hope of Heaven did our Saviour stirre up himselfe to endure the Crosse, and despise the shame. Heb. 12.2. By this he heartned his Disciples to doe and to suffer for his sake. Mat. 5, 11. Mat. 10.32. By this have all the godly in all ages encouraged themselves in well doing, as we may see in generall. Phil. 3.20. Col. 1.5. Tit. 2.12, 13: And in particular, Heb. 11. Abraham left his Country and Kindred at Gods call, because he looked for a City, whose builder and maker was God. ver. 8, 9, 10. Moses left all the pleasures and treasures of Egypt, and endured afflic­tions with the people of God, because he saw him that was invisi­ble, and had respect to the recompence of reward, ver. 25.27. [Page 92] The Martyrs endured racks, gibbets, lyons, sword, fire, with a world of other torments, because they looked for a better re­surrection, ver. 35. Paul indeavoureth alwayes to keepe a cleere conscience, through the hope which he had of a blessed resur­rection, Act. 24.15. All the noble and heroicke acts of active and passive obedience, have sprung from the hope of eternall glory. Souldiers, Merchants, Husbandmen, all are whetted on by hope to diligence in their callings, as dai­ly experience sheweth us. Hope, sayth Aquinas [confert ad operationem] conduceth to action: Aquin. 1, 2, q. 40. art. S. and he proveth it: first by Scripture, 1. Cor. 9.10. He which eareth and thresheth, must eare and thresh in hope. And then he proveth it by a twofold reason. 1 From the nature of Hopes object, which is [be­num arduum, & possibile haberi] some excellent good attainable by industry. [Existimatio ardui excitat attentionem] hope to get that by paines, which is conceived to be a thing of worth, stirreth up to p [...]ines taking. 2 From the effect of hope, which is, [detectat [...]o] an inward pleasure, which the par­ty that liveth under hope, is affected with by his hope. There is not any man, which hath an inward contentment and sa­tisfaction of heart in the worke be hath to doe, but goeth on merrily. The hope of Heaven therefore is a great encourage­ment to piety.

The feare of Hell also is a strong curbe to hold men in, from impiety, and therefore (sayth one) God hath planted in men a feare of vengeance, that by it as the ship by the Rudder, the soule may be presently turned aside from any rocks gulfes, or quicksands of sinne, when it is neare them, and may steere its course another way. For this cause feare of God and ab­staining from evill are often joyned together in Scripture, Job. 1.1. Exod. 1.17. And the want of this feare is made the root of all licentiousnesse in sinning. Gen. 20.11. Nor doth feare onely hinder a bad action, but it promoteth a good. It hindereth a bad action [directly] because it is [fuga mali] a flying from that evill of misery which is annexed to the e­vill of sinne: and it promoteth a good action [accidentally,] because men thinke that they are never so safe from the mis­chief which they feare, as when they are exercised in such im­ployments as tend to the getting of a contrary state. Work out your salvation (sayth the Apostle) with feare and trembling; [Page 93] implying that the working out of salvation goeth not on handsomely, except the feare of mi [...]ling it be an ingredient into the worke.

The second branch of this reason is, That by the absolute decree, Hope and feare are taken away. For hope is properly exercised about [bonum possibile haberi] some good thing which may be obtayned, not which must be obtayned of ne­cessity: and the object of feare is [malum possibile vitari,] an evill that may be escaped. For [metus est fuga mali] feare is a fleeing from evill: and therefore supposeth the evill to bee avoydable. For no man will flee from an evill that cannot be prevented, but will yeeld up himselfe to it, as Caesar did his body to the murtherers in the Senate house. Now (by this decree) Heaven and Hell are not objects possible but necessa­ry. Heaven shall unavoydably be obtayned by those that are elected, and Hell must as certainly be endured by those that are reprobated. For men have no power to alter their eter­nall states: all men by this decree are precisely determined ad unum, to one state, to necessary salvation or necessary damna­tion without any power or liberty to choose whether.

And from hence this conclusion is cle [...]e, that the absolute decree taketh away the chiefest inducements to holinesse, and deterrements from wickednesse, and consequently hindereth a godly life exceedingly.

The Injuriousnesse of this doctrine to a godly life may fur­ther appeare by these considerations that follow, one depen­ding upon another.

1 Absolute and peremptory decrees are inevitable, what­soever the things be about which they are exercised: and mens everlasting states if they be absolutely determined, are altogether undeclinable. [Stat fati lex indeclinabius] the law of destiny is undeclinable. And the reason is, because it hath an inevitable cause, the Adamantine decrees of Almighty God, which are indeclinable two wayes.

(1) Jrreversible, lyable to no repeale (as the Statutes are which are made in our Parliaments:) but farre more unalte­rable then the Lawes of the Medes and Persians. A [...] have spoken, so will J bring it to passe: I have purposed, and I will doe it. Esay. 46.11. Men do many times bite in their words a­gaine, because they utter things rashly; and do repeale theyr [Page 94] statutes and ordinances, because they see some inconvenience in them being made, which they could not foresee: but God never calleth in his decrees, because they are all made in great Wisdome.

(2) Jrresistible. It lyes not in the power of any creature to disanull them. Who hath resisted his will? Rom. 9.19. Our God is in Heaven: hee doth whatsoever he will. Psal. 115.3. Whatsoever is once concluded by his absolute will, is no wayes alterable by the will of man. It is more possible for a man to hinder the rising of the Sunne, or to stay his course in the Heaven, to stop the revolutions of the yeare, and over­turne the whole course of nature, then to make the least change in any of Gods absolute decrees.

2 Mens actions about ends and things determined by an absolute decree are vaine and fruitlesse; and the reason is, be­cause they cannot make them otherwise then they are deter­mined to be. It is absolutely decreed, the Divels shall be dam­ned. Were it not a fruitlesse thing in them by prayers, teares, and endeavors to seeke to alter it? It is also simply decreed, that the Soule of man shall be immortall. Is it not a labor in vaine for any man to use meanes that his Soule may be annihi­lated? It is ordained, that the Sunne shall rule the day and the Moon the night; that the one shall finish his proper course in a yeare, the other in a Moneth. Would not a mans indea­vour to make an alteration in these things bee unprofitable and ridiculous? Without doubt it would. So likewise, in vain do men labour to obtaine everlasting life, and avoyd e­ternall death; if there be no power and liberty in their hands to choose life or death, but must of necessity take that which is assigned them, be it life or death. For by their labour they effect just nothing: if they bee absolutely appointed to de­struction; theyr hearing, reading, praying, almes giving, and mourning for their sinnes cannot possibly procure theyr Salvation: damned they must be. And if they be absolutely ordayned to Salvation, theyr neglect of holy duties, their ig­norance, their love of pleasures, and continuance in a course of ungodlinesse cannot bring them to damnation, they must be saved. If so many Soules in a Parish, be in this manner decreed to Heaven or Hell; the Minister preacheth in vaine, and the people heare in vaine. For there cannot one Soule bee saved [Page 95] by all his or their paines, which is ordayned to Hell; nor one Soule be cast away by his or their negligence, which is appoin­ted to Heaven.

Jt is hard for thee (sayd CHRIST to Saul) to kicke against pricks: that is,Acts, 9 5. to indeavour by thy Persecutions & slaughters to root out my Church out of the world; because the preser­vation of it is absolutely decreed in Heaven: Teaching us by that speech, that a mans labour in any thing whatsoever, is never profitable, except it be exercised about an end, attayn­able thereby, and without which the end may be lost.

3 Men are not willing to be employed in fruitlesse actions, if they know it.

I so runne (sayth S. Paul) not as uncertainly; so fight J, 1. Cor. 9.26. not as one that beateth the ayre: but I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest that by any meanes, when J have preached to others, I my selfe should bee a cast-away. The meaning is, I indeavour to keep Gods Commandements, I fight with the temptations of the Divell, the allurements of the world, and mine own corruptions; I keep my body low by watchings, and fastings, and other severe exercises of holy discipline. But cui bono? Do I all this at randome? uncertaine whether I shall obtaine any good or prevent any mischiefe hereby? No, but I do this, as one that is sure, that by so doing, I shall attaine e­verlasting life, and without so doing, I cannot avoyd eternall death: intimating in these words the common disposition of men, which is, to labour, where some proportionable good is to be gotten, or evill prevented: otherwise to spare their heads and hands too.

To be imployed in fruitlesse affaires, is both a folly and a misery.

(1) A folly, for [de necessariis nemo saepiens deliberat.] No man useth deliberation about things necessary, sayth the Philoso­pher. And our Saviour speaking of things above our power; Cur estis soliciti? saith he to his Disciples, Math. 6.27. Luke 12.25, 26. Why take yee thought about such things? which is as much as if he had sayd, It is an argument of folly in you to trouble your self about such things as lye not in your power.

(2) It is a misery in the opinions of all men, as the fable of Sisyphus implyeth, who (as the Poets feigne) is punished in Hell for his Robberies, with the rolling of a great stone to the [Page 96] top of a steep hill, where it cannot rest, but presently tumb downe againe.

The morall of that Fable is, that it is a torment, and a t [...] ment fit for Hell; for a man to be set about any work that fruitlesse and in vaine. Men will rather be exercised in hi [...] and hard imployments that produce proportionable end then pick strawes, play with feathers, or with Domitian spe [...] their times in flapping and killing of flyes, or doe any oth [...] easie worke, which endeth in nothing but ayre and emptin [...] except they be fooles or Selfe-tormentors. And therefo [...] when Balaam once saw that the Lord had fully determined blesse Jsrael, Numb. 24.1. and that all his Sorceries could not effect the co [...] trary; he presently gave over and set no more Enchantment▪ And reason teacheth every man to doe the like. If any m [...] were fully possest with a perswasion that his temporall esta [...] were determined in Heaven, and that hee should be wort [...] just so much, neyther more nor lesse; he would conclude i [...] his thoughts, that his care and paines could nothing prof [...] him, nor his idlenesse impoverish him: and so would quickly be perswaded to take his ease. And were it evident tha [...] every common-wealth had [terminum magnitudinis] a condi­tion appoynted for it which could not be altered, and a fatal [...] period which could nor be avoyded; then would the King call no Parliaments, use no privie Counsellors, make no lawes and Ordinances for the preventing of a Kingdomes ruine, o [...] the procuring of its prosperity and continuance. For it would be to little purpose (as once a famous privie Counsellor told our late Queene Elizabeth) but would follow the Poet [...] counsell:

From these three premisses layed together it followeth di­rectly, that the doctrine of an absolute decree, which deter­mineth mens ends precisely; is no friend at all to a godly life. For if events absolutely decreed be unavoydable; if mens ac­tions about unavoydable ends be unprofitable; if in unprofita­ble imployments men will have no hand willingly: whosoe­ver [Page 97] they be that beleeve and consider this, will have nothing to do with the practice of godlinesse. For their ends being absolutely pitched and therefore unavoydable; they will con­clude that their labour in religion will be unprofitable, and so will not labour in it at all.

That which hath been sayd, may be yet confirmed by two Witnesses. The one of them is Mr. Calvin, who in his In­stitutions hath these words; Instit. l. 3. c. 23. §. 14. Si quis ita ple­bem compellet; Si non creditis, ideo fit, quia jam divinitus exitio praedestinati estis; is non modò ignaviam fovet, sed e­tiam indulget mali­tiae. Jf any man (sayth he) should speake thus to the people; If there be any among you that beleeve not, it is because ye are ordained to destruction; this man would not onely cherish slothfulnesse, but wickednesse also. Which is as much to say (me thinks) as this; If a man should set forth the doctrine of Reprobation in its colours, and explaine it to peo­ple in a cleare and lively fashion, he would hereby open a doore to liberty and prophanenesse.

The other witnesse is a man of another stamp, the misera­ble Landgrave of Thuring, of whom it is recorded by Heister­bachius, that being by his friends admonished of his vitious conversation and dangerous condition, he made them this an­swer; Heist. l. 1. de memor. hist. c. 27. pa. 38. Si praedesti­natus sum, nulla pec­cata proterunt mihi regnum coelorum au­ferre: Si praescitus, nulla opera mihi illud valebunt conferre. Jf I be elected, no sinnes can bereave me of Hea­ven; if I be reprobated, no good deeds can helpe me to Heaven.

I conclude therefore, that by this opinion (which is taught for one of Gods principall truths;) Religion eyther is or may be made a very great looser, which is my fourth generall Reason against it.

But there are three things which are usually answered to vindicate this opinion from this crimination.

First, that many of them which beleeve and defend this doctrine, are holy and good men: and therefore of it selfe it openeth no way for liberty of life, but through the wicked­nesse of men, who use to pervert the sweetest and surest truths of Scripture to their own damnation. The like defence to this, did the Epicures of old make in favour of their sensuall and Swinish doctrine; which was, that happinesse consisted in pleasure. They sayd that many of their Sect were honest men, and so much Tully granteth to be true, but with excep­tion still against their doctrine. Cic. l. 2. de finibus bon. & mal pag 117. Ac mihi quidem vi­detur quòd ipse vir bonus fuit: & multi Epicurei fuerunt, & hodiè sunt, & in ami­citiis fideles, & in om­ni vitâ constantes & graves; nec volup­tate, sed officio con­silia moderantes. I take (sayth he) Epi­curus himselfe to be an honest man, yea and many Epicures have been and are faithfull in friendship, square and constant men in all conditions of life, ordering themselves and their lives, not by [Page 98] pleasure by duty. But, (sayth he) Hoc videtur ma­ [...]s honestatis, mi­nor voluptatis. this proceeded not from the principles of their opinion, but from their own vertuous inclination: and the force of honesty by their so doing, appeared to be more prevailing in them, then the force of pleasure, which they pleaded for. A little after he hath other words to the same purpose; At (que) ut caeteri existimantur dicere mel [...]ùs, quàm facere; sic hi mihi videntur meliùs facere quàm dicere. As other mens doctrines are esteemed to be better then their deeds; so these mens deeds seeme to me to be better then their doctrines.

Like to this answer of Tully to the defenders of Epicurisme, will I shape mine.

It cannot (I confesse) be denyed, that many of this opi­nion are godly men; but it is no thanks to their opinion, that they are so; (the true and naturall genius of which is to be­get sloth, to drowne men in security, and to countenance car­nall liberty:) but to something else, eyther to Gods provi­dence, (who will not suffer this doctrine for his own glories sake and the good of men, to have any great stroke in their lives;) or to mens incogitancy, who think not of reducing it [ad praxim] to practice, and drawing conclusions out of it, but rest in the naked speculation of it, as they do of many others; or lastly, to some good practicall conclusions, which they meet with in the word of God, and apply to their lives (as they do not the former deductions;) such as these are for example; Be ye holy as I am holy. Without Holinesse no man shall see God. Jf ye consent and obey, ye shall eate the good things of the land. Godlinesse hath the promises of this life and of the life to come, &c. And hence we may learne to measure this opinion, not by the lives of some few of the men that hold it, but by the sequels, which the logick even of simple men, if they should apply their braines to consider it, would fetch out of it. No man that hath throughly suckt it in, and under­standeth the force of it, but will eyther quite relinquish it, or live according to the naturall importment of it, that is, li­centiously.

Secondly, it is sayd, that albeit this doctrine teach, That men are absolutely elected, or absolutely reprobated: yet,

(1) It tells no man who in particular is elected, who rejected.

(2) It teacheth that men must get the knowledge of their Election by good works, and so by consequent, doth [Page 99] rather encourage, then stifle holy and honest indeavours:

For answer to the first of these; The ignorance of a mans particular state (in my judgment) doth not alter the case a [...]ot. For he that beleeveth in generall, that many and they the greatest company without comparison, are inevitably ordey­ned to destruction, and a few others to salvation; is able out of these two generall propositions, to make these particular conclusions, and to reason thus with himself: Eyther I am absolutely chosen to grace and glory, or absolutely cast off from both. If I be chosen, I must of necessity beleeve and be saved; if I be cast off, I must as necessarily not beleeve, and be damned.

What need I therefore take thought eyther way about meanes or end? My end is pitched in heaven and the meanes too; my finall perseverance in Faith and my Salvation, or my continuance in unbeliefe and my damnation. If I lye under this necessity of beleeving and being saved, or of dying in un­beliefe and being damned; in vaine doe I trouble my selfe a­bout meanes or end, I have my Supersedeas, I may take mine case and so I will: enough it is for me to sit downe and wait what God will doe unto mee. Thus (it is likely) did Tiberius reason with himself. For Suetonius reports of him, that he was Suet. de vit. Tib. c. 69. p. 180. Circa Deos & religiones negligentior, quippe addictus Mathemati­cae, persuasionisque plenus omnia fato agi. The more negiigent in religion, because he was fully perswaded, that all things came to passe by destiny. And in this manner (it is to be feared) doe too many reason in their hearts, and by this very ground (though they will not per­haps acknowledge it) encourage themselves in prophaneness. Though men cannot hide their wickednes, yet they will hide their grounds, which flesh them in it, either through mode­sty, or to avoyd some further ignominy: The foole hath said in his heart, there is no God. Psal. 14.

To the 2^d. I answer, that men ordinarily will not thinke the getting of the knowledge of their election (if that be all) worth all those painfull duties of religion, that are to be per­formed, and all those sweet and pleasing sinnes which are to be relinquished, they will rest contented without it for a while, rather then pay so dearly for it: and the rather, because

1 When they have gotten it, it is in most but a weak and conjecturall knowledge, obscured with many cloudes and un­certainties.

[Page 100]2 It must be mainteyned with a great deale of paines and care, or else it will be lost againe. To the retaining of it is required a continuall indeavour to keep a cleare conscience, which is irkesom and tedious. Men therefore had need of a stronger motive to obedience then this is, or else they will do nothing.

Thirdly, they that defend and teach this absolute reprobati­tion (say they) doe earnestly exhort men to good works, and deny that any can be saved, except they live honestly.

So much was also sayd in the behalf of Epicurus, viz. That he denyed that any man that lived not honestly, could live pleasantly. But Tully answereth roundly: Cic. offic. l. 3. pro­pe finem. Quasi ego id curem quid ille ai at aut neget? illud quaero, quid ei qui [...]n voluptate summum bonum putat, consen­tantum sit dicere. As if I cared what he affirmeth or denyeth: this I aske, what is meet for him to say who placeth happinesse in pleasure. And so it mattereth not what these men teach, but what they should teach, if they will speak consequently to their own conclusions.

5^th Reason. It is an enemy to true Comfort.I Come now to my last reason against it, drawen from the uncomfortablenesse of it: it is a doctrine full of desperation, both to them which stand, and to those that are fallen, to men out of temptation, and to men in temptation, It

• leadeth into Temptation.
• leaveth in Temptation.

And therefore can be no Doctrine of Gods word, for that is [...], good newes to men, a storehouse of sweet con­solations for us in our [turbidu & lucidis intervallis,] in our best and worse conditions and changes.Rom. 15.4. These things are written (sayth the Apostle) that by patience and comfort of the Scriptures we might have hope: implying that therefore was the word written, & left to the Church, that by the comforts comprised in it, those poore soules that look toward Heaven, might never want in any changes or chances of this mortall life, a sweet gale of hope to refresh them, and to carry-on their Ship full merily toward the Haven.

I. First, this Doctrine leadeth men into Temptation, and into such a one too, as is as sharpe and dangerous as any the Tempter hath. The Divell can easily perswade a man that maketh absolute reprobation a part of his creed, that he is one of those absolute Reprobates: because there are farre more absolute Reprobates (even a hundred for one,) then absolute [Page 101] chosen ones: and a man hath a great deale more reason to think that he is one of the most, then one of the fewest, one of the huge multitude of inevitable castawayes, then one of that little flock, for whom God hath precisely prepared a kingdom. Such a man is not onely capable of, but framed and fashioned by his opinion for this suggestion. Which is a ve­ry sore one, if we may beleeve Calvin, Bucer and Zanchius. Calvin telleth us, Calv. Iustit. l. 3. c 24. § 4. Quod nul­lâ tentatione vel gra­vius, vel periculosius fideles percellit Satan. that the Divell cannot assault a beleever with a temptation more dangerous.

And a little after he sayth, that it is so much thedeadlyer, by how much commoner it is then any other.

Rarissimus est cujus non interdum animus hac cogitatio­ne feriatur, unde tibi salus, nisi ex Dei e­lectione? Electionis autem quae tibi reve­latio? quae si apud quempiam semel in­valuit, aut diris tor­mentis miserum per­petuò excruciat, aut reddit penitus attoni­tum. So ordinary is this temptation, that he which is at all times free from it, is a rare man (we are to conceive that he speaketh of those who hold absolute Reprobation:) and so dangerous it is that if it get strength, he which is under it, is either miserably tormented, or mightily astonished. And a little after he sayth againe; Ergo si naufragi­um timemus, sollicitè cavendum ab hoc scopulo in quem nun­quam sine exitio im­pingitur. He that will not wrack his soule, must avoyd this rock. Bucer also hath a passage like to this. Bucer in 8. ad Rom. q. de praed. Vt caput omnis noxiae tentationis, repellen­da est haec quaestio, Sumusuè praedestina­ti. Nam qui de hoc dubitat, nec vocatum se nec justificatum esse credere poterit, hoc est, nequit esse Christianus. This doubt whether we be predestinate or no; must be repell'd as the head of every pernicious temptation: for he that doubteth of this, cannot beleeve that he is called or justified: that is, he cannot be a Christian. Presumendum i­gitur ut principium fidei, nos omnes esse àdeo prescitos. Every man therefore must presume upon it as a principle of his faith, that he is elected. Zanch. l. 5. de nat. Dei q. de praed. This very speech of Bucers, Zanchy maketh use of to the same purpose.

We see then by the testimonies of these worthy men, that this temptation is very dangerous and ordinary too, to such as think there be absolute Reprobates.

The truth of both will further appeare by the example of of Georg. major in 2 ad Tim. 2. fol. 1109 [...] Petrus Jlosuanus, a Schoolemaster in Hungary, who go­ing to hang himself, signified in a writing which he left in his Study for the satisfaction of his friends and countrimen, the true cause of that his unnaturall fact. In that writing he de­livered these three things.

(1) That he was of Calvins and St. Austins opinion, that men are not dealt withall [secundúm bona aut mala opera] ac­cording to their works good or evill; but that there are [oc­cultiores causae] more hidden causes of mens eternall condi­tions.

(2) That he was one of that wofull Company of absolute Reprobates; [Vas formatum in ignominiam] a vessell prepared to [Page 102] dishonour: and that therefore (though his life had been none of the worst) he could not possibly be saved.

(3) That being unable to beare those dreadfull apprehen­sions of wrath, with which he was affrighted, he hang'd him­selfe. For these are some of his last words there recorded: Discedo igitur ad lacus infernales ae­ternum dedecus pa­triae meae: Deo vos cōmendo, cujus mi­sericordia mihi ne­gata est: I goe to those infernall lakes, an eternall reproach to my Coun­try. I commend you to God, whose mercy is denyed to me.

Out of this example, two things we may safely collect.

1 That men who think there are many whom God hath utterly rejected out of his onely will and pleasure, may be ea­sily brought to think by Satans suggestion that they are of that company.

2 That this Temptation is very dangerous.

I conclude therefore this first part of my last reason, which is; That absolute Reprobation leadeth men into temptation.

II. It leaveth men in Temptation: and this it doth two wayes; by,

• 1 Making the tempted uncapable of true comfort.
• 2 Making Ministers unable to give true comfort.

1 It maketh the Tempted uncapable of true comfort: like a Gorgons head, it doth so trouble their fancies and amaze them, especially in their paroxysmes and fits, that the stron­gest arguments of comfort, applyed with as much art and cunning as may be, will not fasten upon them. With David they say in their feare, that all men are lyars, namely all such as come to comfort them in their temptation. The reason is, because it is an opinion incompatible with any word of com­fort, that can be ministred to the distressed Soule in this temp­tation. Gods love to mankind, CHRISTS death for all men, the calling of poore sinners without exception, to repentance and salvation, with all other grounds of consolation; the tempted will easily elude with the grounds of his opinion.

Which that we may the better see, let us imagine that we heare a Minister and a Tempted Soule, reasoning in this or the like manner.

Tempted. WO is me; I am a Cast-away: I am abso­lutely rejected from Grace and Glory.

Minister. Discourage not thy selfe thou poore afflicted [Page 103] soule: God hath not cast thee off. For he hateth nothing that he hath made, but beareth a love to all men, and to thee a­mong the rest.

Tempt. God hateth no man as he is his Creature, but hee hateth a great many as they are sinners in Adam. And God hath a two-fold love (as I have learned) a generall love, which putteth forth it self in outward and temporall blessings only, and with this he loveth all men: and a speciall love, by which he provideth everlasting life for men; and with this he loveth onely a very few, which out of his alone will and pleasure he singled from the rest. Vnder this generall love am I, but not under the speciall.

Min. Nay but God so loveth all men, as that he desireth their eternall good: for the Apostle sayth, He would have all to be saved, and he would have no man to perish, nor thee in particular.

Tempt. (All) is taken two wayes: for all sorts and con­ditions of men, high and low, rich and poore, bound and free, &c. and for all particular men in these severall sorts and ranks. God would have all men to be saved in the first sense: that is, all sorts; but he would not have all to be saved in the se­cond sense, that is, all particular men of those sorts: some of my country, my calling, my condition of life, but not all and every one, nor me in particular. Or if it be true, that God would have all particular men to be saved; yet he willeth it only with a revealed will, not with a secret: for with that he will have millions to be damned. Vnder this revealed will am I, not under the secret.

Min. Nay but CHRIST came into the world to seek and to save what was lost, and is a propitiation not for our sinnes onely, viz. the sinnes of a few particular men, or the sinnes of all sorts of men, but for the [whole] world. Therefore he came to save thee, and to be a propitiation for thy sinnes: for thou art one of the whole world.

Tempt. The [world] as I have heard, is taken two wayes in Scripture: largely for all mankind, and strictly in a restrai­ned signification, for the elect, or for beleevers. In this lat­ter sense, CHRIST dyed for the world, namely, for the world of the Elect, for the world of Beleevers. Or if it be true, that he dyed for all mankind, yet he dyed for them but after a sort: [Page 104] he dyed for them all [dignitate pretii] he did enough to have redeemed all, if God would have had it so; but he did not dye for all [voluntate propositi.] God never inten­ded that he should shed his bloud for all and every man, but for a few selected ones onely, with whom it is my lot to be numbred.

Min. God hath founded an universall Covenant of peace with men upon the Mediators bloud: and therefore he inten­ded it should be shed for all men universally. He hath made a promise of salvation to every one that will beleeve, and ex­cludeth none, that do not exclude themselves.

Tempt. God purposed that his Sonne should dye for all men, and that in his name should be preached and offered re­mission of sinnes to every one; but yet upon condition they will repent, beleeve, and doe that which hee meaneth the greatest part of men shall never doe, nor me among the rest.

Min. God hath a true meaning that all men who are cal­led, should repent and beleeve; that so they might be saved; as he would have all to be saved, so he would have them come to the knowledge of the truth, and as he would have no man to perish, so he would have all men to repent; and therefore he calleth them in the preaching of the word to the one, as well as to the other.

Tempt. God hath a double call; an outward by the prea­ching of the word in mens eares; an inward by the irresistible work of the Spirit in their hearts.

The outward call is a part of Gods outward will: with that he calleth every man to beleeve: the inward and effectuall call is a part of his secret will; and with that he calleth not every man to beleeve, but a very few onely, whom he hath inevitably ordain'd to eternall life. And therefore by the outward call, which I enjoy among many others, I cannot be assured of Gods good will and meaning, that I should be­leeve, repent and be saved.

By this we may see, that no sound comfort can be fastned upon a poore soule rooted in this opinion, when he lyeth un­der this horrible Temptation.

The example of Francis Spiera an Italian Lawyer, will give some further light and proofe to this. This Spiera about [Page 105] the yeare 1548. against his knowledge and conscience, did openly abjure his Religion and subscribe to Popery, that ther­by he might preserve his life, and goods, and liberty. Not long after he fell into a deepe distresse of conscience, out of which he could never wrestle, but ended his wofull dayes in despaire.

To comfort him came many Divines of worth and note, but against all the comforts which they applyed to him, hee opposed two things especially.

(1) The greatnesse of his sinne: it was a sinne (sayd he) of a deep dye, committed with many urging and aggravating circumstances: and therefore could not be forgiven. This ar­gument they quickly took from him, and convinced him by the example of Peter, that there was nothing in his sinne, that could make it irremissible. Peter that committed the same sinne, and with some more odious circumstances, re­pented and was pardoned, and so (no doubt) might he.

(2) He apposed his absolute Reprobation, and with that he put off all their comforts. Peter (sayth he) repented indeed and was pardoned, because he was elected: as for me I was utterly rejected before I was borne; and therefore I cannot possibly repent or be saved. If any man be elected, he shall be saved, though he have committed sinnes, for number ma­ny, and haynous in degree: but if he be [ex repudiatis] one of the Cast-awayes, [necessario condemnabitur] he shall be ine­vitably condemned, though his sinnes be small and few. Nihil interest an multa, an pauca, an magna, an parva sint, quando nec Dei misericordia, nec. Christi sanguis, quic­quam ad eos pertinet A Reprobate must be damned, be his sinnes many or few, great or little, because Gods mercy and CHRISTS merits belong not to him.

In this Story (recorded by Coelius Secundus and Calvin with some others who lived at that time and wrote of it to theyr friends;) as in a glasse we may see the disconsolate condition of a poore Soule, that is strongly conceited that the greatest part of the world are absolute Reprobates, and that he is one of them: he sticketh so fast in the myre and clay, that he can very hardly be drawne out.

2 It maketh Ministers unable to afford true comfort to the Tempted; and this it doth, because it —

• 1 Taketh from them all solid grounds of comfort.
• 2 Leaveth them onely weak and insufficient grounds.

[Page 106]1 It bereaveth them of all solid arguments of comfort, which are these; The universality of Gods love, of CHRISTS death, and of the new Covenant of grace. That Minister which doth explaine and apply these three things soundly and wisely to him which is tempted in this kinde, doth that which is aboundantly enough for the releeving and releasing of him from this Temptation. And he that doth not apply these, leaveth him as he found him, in the midst of the Temp­tation still; whatsoever may be sayd to the contrary in the heate of Disputation. Mel [...]nct. loc. com. p. 52 c. 1 Pred Et­li male [...] disputantur dum [...]ùs [...]men necesse est in ve [...]o agone ad hanc arcem confuge­re, videlicet, quò i de voluntate dei judicā ­dum sit ex presto ver­bo, & quòd promissi­o sit universalis, & quòd sit mandatum Dei aeternum & im­mutabile, audire filiū & assentiri promissio­ni.. Though (sayth Melancthon) there be many things disputed in this point more harshly; yet when all is done, the universall promise of Grace and Salvation is a Christians onely Bulwark in this temptation and combate. Obtemperemus igitur nè vagentur a­nimi quaerentes e­lectionem extra ver­bū, & relicto Christo & omisso mandato de amplectenda promis­sione; sed teneamus ce [...]â & indubitatâ fi­de promitionē gratiae non inanem esse fa­bulam; sed Deum ve­rè patefecisse volun­tatē suam in promissi­one, & vaerè praestare quod promisit. Let us not therefore (sayth he) leave CHRIST and seek for an Election out of the word: but let us judge of Gods will of sa­ving men by the promise and commandement, which are both universall. And in another place of the same Book he hath these words. P. 230. de prom. Evang. Sicut est ne­cesse scire Evangeliū esse promissione gra­tuitam; ita necesse est scire Evangelium pro­missionem universale esse. Hanc universalē tenere necesse est ad­versus periculosas i­maginationes deprae destinatione, ne dis­putemus hanc pro­missionem ad paucos quosdam alios perti­nere, non pertinere ad nos. Non enim dubi [...]m est, qum omnium animos haec cogitatio exer­ceat. As it is needfull to know that the promise of Salvation is free: so it is needfull to know that it is universall, against some dangerous conceits of Predestination.

By these speeches we see clearely what this learned man thought to be the true balm of Gilead, wherby a woūded soule should be cured; viz. The universality of the promise, and of Gods love and of CHRISTS death; for they all hang to­gether, and cannot be dis-joyned.

The reason why those grounds are able to helpe a man in such a case, is two-fold.

1 Because they are directly contradictory to the tempta­tion: a will to save all, a giving of CHRIST to death for all, a serious offer of grace to all, cannot possibly stand with an absolute antecedent will and intent of casting away the grea­test part of mankind, or to say the truth, of any one man in the world. Vpon this followeth the second reason.

2 Because they serve to convince the Tempted, that hee cannot be in that condition, in which he supposeth himselfe to be. For if two contradictories cannot be true, he that e­vinceth the truth of the one, convinceth the understanding of the untruth of the other: and he that maketh it appeare that this contradictory, [God would have all to bee saved, [Page 107] redeemed and called, to repent and beleeve] is true; putteth it out of all doubt to the understanding, that the other con­tradictory [God will have most men to be absolutely and in­evitably damned] must needs be false, and so rayseth up that poore soule which was pressed downe with an erronious conceit and feare, that it was true. In this manner did Iuni­us, (though not in the same temptation) releeve a woman per­plexed exceedingly with a strong perswasion, that she and all her children should be damned; because she was busied a­bout her children at a certain time when she should have been at Masse. Junius maketh short work with her, telleth her, that her imployment about her children was a duty pleasing to God, but the Masse was a meere will-worship: and so (de­livering her of her error upon which the temptation was built,) giveth her present ease and comfort. In like manner tell a man who feareth himself to be an absolute Reprobate, that there are no such absolute Reprobates, and that his feare is but a meere fancy and his doubt a dreame; convince him once by contradictory grounds, that there is no man in the world in that state in which he thinketh himselfe to be, and you drive out one nayle by another, and expell the temptati­on. These are the sword of Alexander, which will cut a­sunder this Gordion knot of absolute Reprobation; and these are the true Nepenthes of a sicke and sorrow­full soule.

But now these true grounds of hope and comfort no Mi­nister can make use of, that holdeth absolute Reprobation: nor if he do usurp them, can he possibly mainteyne them against the replyes of the tempted, unlesse he relinquish his opinion; because (as I have sayd) there is a plaine contradiction be­tween them, and no man is able to maintain two propositi­ons, which speak contrary things, to be both true, any more then he can make it good, that the same thing may have a be­ing, and no being at the same time. For example, A minister commeth to comfort a man that thinketh himselfe to be an absolute Reprobate, and how doth he set about it? He telleth him, that God would have all to be saved, that CHRIST dy­ed for all, &c.

But what right hath he to these grounds of comfort seeing he holdeth the contrary conclusions, viz. that God will have [Page 108] a great many to be damned, and to have no part in CHRIST? Well: he usurpeth them notwithstanding; but is he able to maintaine them against the answers of the tempted? or can he make a good reply. No certainly, for thus answereth the tempted, God would have all to be saved with a revealed, but not with a secret will: and CHRIST dyed for all men suffici­ently, but not intentionally, or if God did intend that hee should dye for all, yet he intended it upon a condition, which he purposed the most should never performe.

What can the Minister reply to this? If he will make a di­rect reply, which shall take away the answer, he must deny that God hath two wills, the one opposite to the other, a secret will that many shall unavoydably be damned, and a re­vealed will that all men may be possibly saved. And he must also deny, that God had an intent, that CHRIST should not dye for a great many, or that he intended be should dye for all upon condition, they would beleeve or repent, and yet purpose that the most should never beleeve or repent. But can he deny these things? he cannot, except he deny his owne conclusion, which is, that there are many thousands eternally and unavoydably rejected in Gods absolute purpose from grace and glory. For that conclusion is all one with the an­swers of the Tempted, and contradictory to those arguments of comfort, which he is glad to make use of.

Absolute Reprobation therefore bereaveth that Minister who beleeveth it, of all solid grounds of consolation, and so maketh him unable to recover a poore Soule wounded with this temptation.

Secondly, it leaveth a Minister some weak grounds onely and insufficient to quiet the tempted: and therefore it ma­keth him unable to comfort him.

The grounds which it leaveth him, are insufficient, be­cause they cannot convince, and make it evident to the un­derstanding of the Tempted, that he is not that which hee feareth: that is, a Reprobate. Out of temptation probabili­ties will uphold a mans hopes (as they did Manoahs wives. Judg. 13.22.23. Jf the Lord would kill us, he would not have received a burnt offering at our hands, nor shewed us all these things;) because men are not so mistrustfull then: but in temptation men are usually very suspicious and incredulous, [Page 109] like Jacob who would not be perswaded that Ioseph was a­live, and a great man in Aegypt; till he saw the Chariote that were sent to fetch him thither. Gen. 45.25. And like Tho­mas, who would not beleeve that CHRIST was risen, till he saw the print of the nayles and speare. Joh. [...]0.25. They will not beleeve any thing that is spoken for their comfort, till it be made so apparent, that they have nothing to say to the contrary.

My selfe have knowne some, who in their temptations have often put their comforters to their proofs, to their pro­testations, nay to their oathes too, before they would beleeve their words of comfort. And in this temptation (we speake of) men are strongly possest with the feare of eternall rejec­tion from the face of God, that they will not easily without manifest conviction beleeve the contrary.

But grounds convincing and satisfying, a Minister that maintaineth absolute Reprobation, hath not in store: nothing can he say, that is able to make it appeare infallibly and un­deniably to the understanding of the Tempted, that hee is no absolute Reprobate. All that he can say is, Be of good com­fort: you are a Beleever, a truly repenting sinner: therefore no Reprobate. For faith and repentance are infallible fruits of Election, and arguments of a state contrary to what you feare. But this the Tempted will deny: he will say, that he is no beleever, &c. and how will the Minister convince him that he is? He must prove to him by the outward acts of Faith and Repentance, (for they onely are apparent to him;) that he doth repent and beleeve.

But this proofe is not demonstrative, nor doth convince, because [opera virtutum simulari possunt] the externall acts of Faith, Repentance, or any other grace may be counterfei­ted. The Divell may seem to be an Angell of light, Wolves may go in Sheepes clothing, Judas may make the world be­leeve by his preaching and following of CHRIST, that he is a true Apostle; and Simon Magus though he remaine in the gall of bitternesse and bond of iniquity, may be thought by his receiving of baptisme, to be a true beleever: and so may any hypocrite by some exteriour acts of Faith and Re­pentance delude the best discerner of spirits among men, and gaine the opinion and esteeme of a true penitent and belee­ver. [Page 110] Actions externally good, or good in appearance, may be evill indeed for want of a good rule, manner, end, or some o­ther good circumstances, with which an action that is good must be clothed. For [bonum non oritur nisi ex integris:] and so by good consequence cannot certainly prove the man who doth them to be a good man, or to have the grace of Faith, Repentance, or any other truely planted in his heart.

Which being so, I say, that a Minister cannot by the out­ward acts and fruits of faith, and Repentance which he seeth come from him, make it evident to the Tempted (to the si­lencing of all replyes;) that he is without doubt a true be­leever and repenting sinner and consequently no Reprobate. For still the Tempted may say, you may be deceived in me: for you cannot see any thing more in me, then hath been seene in many a Reprobate. And if this be all you can say, to prove me to be none; I am not satisfied, I may be a Reprobate: nay I am a Reprobate, and you are but a miserable comforter, a Physitian of no value.

This that I say, Piscator doth confesse ingenuously in Disput. de Praed. contra Schafmanu: thes. 85. where he sayth,

1 That no comfort can be possibly instilled into the soules of Reprobates afflicted with this horrible temptation: from whence it followeth, that the farre greatest part of men, even an hundred for one must beare their burden, (if they fall into this distemper and trouble,) as well as they can: the Gospell is not able to afford them any solid comfort.

2 That the Elect being in this condition, may indeed be comforted, but it must be by their sense of sinne and theyr desire to be freed of it by CHRIST: which proofs are but on­ly probable to the best, and to a man in temptation no proofs at all: and consequently either no comforts or very small ones.

In the end of the same Thesis also, where he sayth, that a man should reason thus with himselfe; Grace is offered to some with a mind of communicating it unto them: therefore it may be that I am one of those to whom it is so offered. In this place (I say) he implyeth plainly, that the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation, which teacheth the communication of grace to a very few onely, affordeth but a [fieri potest] a per­adventure I am Elected (and that a very poore one too) for a poore soule to comfort himselfe withall.