If it be urged, that the Scriptures, as proceeding from God, are indeed moſt perfectly and entirely true, yet paſſing through the hands of ſo many Men, in various Copies and Verſions, from one Language into another, it cannot be, but ſomething of humane infirmity muſt ſtick to them. This indeed I freely grant; and if any ſuch thing can be made evident in the caſe before us, it will be very fit to be conſidered. In the mean time, there can hardly any two things be named that are more clearly and vigorouſly aſſerted in Scripture, than are Divine Preſcience and Free-will, as well in the places above-mentioned, as in divers others. From whence it will follow, that if thoſe places of Scripture be genuine, and no way corrupted (which we muſt ſuppoſe, till the contrary be made out) God's Fore knowledge and Man's Free-agency are not only true, but perfectly harmonious, and conſiſtent each with other, altho' our limitted ſight and dazled Eyes cannot fully enable us to behold their Agreement.

Nor need we wonder at it, when we conſider, that not only in the Scripture, but in Euclia's Elements, and many other Books approved in their kind, are found divers things, which a great number of Readers, tho' men of good Senſe, cannot eaſily underſtand or reconcile; and ſome things of that difficulty, that the greateſt Maſters of Learning and Reaſon, have more than work enough to overcome; of which, if need required, one might give particular Inſtances. Who will believe that the leaſt Diameter of a Needle's Point ſhould be Diviſible into a Million (or rather infinite) Parts, and yet that a Circle, how large ſoever, can touch a right line but in That is, the right line being drawn as a tangent, but not through the Circle. one point only? And ſince a Globular Body ſet upon a plain, can reach the ſame but in one point, and a point is defined to be that, which hath no part, would it not be a ſtrange Paradox to ſay, Eucl. def. 1 Lib. 3. prop. 36. Lib. 10. prop. 117. A Globe can touch a Plain in no part at all? Yet all this leans upon Mathematical Demonſtration.

It is eaſie to obſerve, that when any difficulty, or ſeeming oppoſition doth occur in Scripture, which common Readers cannot (and even Learned ones not very eaſily) reconcile; two ſorts of People, the Prophane and Superſtitious, take hold of it to very ill purpoſe; the one apprehends it their Intereſt to have no Religion at all, looks upon the Scripture as a State-contrivance to keep the World in Order and Subjection, and hence they aſſume a lewd Liberty of turning it into Burleſque and Ridicule; the other ſort, being for the moſt part over eagerly devoted to ſome Party, have a Religion made up of a few Fractions of Truth, neglecting in the mean time the Sum and Subſtance. Theſe men purſue, to the beſt advantage of their Sect, that part of Scripture which hath the kindeſt Aſpect upon their eſpouſed Notions, and run it off from the main Body of Truth, to that Extream, that it becomes an Errour in Doctrine, and perhaps too a Rent in the Church. For the Body of Truth may not unfitly be reſembled to the Body natural, which cannot live in pieces.

That there are unchangeable Decrees of God, I do not doubt; but if that Doctrine be ſo manag'd as to evacuate Men's Endeavours, this ſurely is an unwarrantable Extream. Iuſtification by Faith is a great truth; but if it be imprudently carried to that height, as to exclude, or make men neglect a good Life, it will become a dangerous Errour. That Chriſt dy'd for all, is a glorious Truth, as it is laid down in Scripture; but if ſome ſtretch that Doctrine to the actual Salvation of all Men, and others thereupon put the whole Buſineſs of Salvation within Man's power, theſe doubtleſs are vitious Extreams, opening a wide paſſage for Pride or Prophaneneſs. The one makes Religion altogether vain, and the other makes the Grace of God not worth looking after. So that whilſt Men run into ſuch violent Extremities, they ſeem to tear off ſome particular Truths from their Unity with the whole, which from thence forward turn into Corruption, whilſt the main Body of Truth is deſerted by them, and becomes uſeleſs.

And this is the caſe not only of the leſs conſidering Sectaries, but even of thoſe who pretend highly to Philoſophy, and aſpire after the Reputation of Wits: One whereof (ſufficiently known) hath improv'd three Syllables to that height, as to render a great part of the Scriptures ridiculous, and the noble Army of Martyrs no other than a Company of wilful and ſuperſtitious Fools, in needleſly expoſing themſelves to flames and tortures. 2 Kings 5.19. Go in pence, ſays the Prophet to Naaman; which ſingle caſe he advances to a general Diſpenſation for any Man to quit his Religion, as oft as it ſhall be difficult, and dangerous for him to profeſs it. And this I take to be the Fountain Cauſe of all the Diviſions that are, or have been among Chriſtians; namely, that Men will not read the whole Scriptures, and give each part its juſt weight and meaſure, duly ballancing and comparing one thing with another; but each Man according to his Complexion or Education, or perhaps ſome predominant Melancholy, lays hold of that part that ſuits him beſt, and makes up a Religion for himſelf, which is little more than the Reſult of his natural temper.

Here I call to mind a paſſage of a Non-jurant, which I happen'd to be preſent at. The Man was reputed among his Neighbours an honeſt plain Man, but ſomewhat raſh, and of no deep conſideration, as may appear by the Story. The Diſcourſe fell out to be about Swearing, and the Perſon could not forbear to Declaim bitterly againſt it, becauſe it is ſaid, Mat. 5.34. Swera not at all. One of the Company urg'd that of the Hebrews, where the Author ſpeaking of God's confirming Hebr. 6.13, 16, 17. his Promiſe made to Abraham, ſeems to intimate ſtrongly the neceſſity of ſwearing in ſome caſes, not vainly, nor in common diſcourſe, but in a ſolemn manner, for the avoiding of Contention, and for confirming of ſome weighty matter. And the Author doth not only alledge it, without any manner of Reproof, as a practice amongſt Men, who uſe to ſwear by the greater, and amongſt whom an Oath for confirmation is an End of Strife; but he adds further, that God himſelf, the more abundantly to ſhew the Immutability of his Counſel, doth condeſcend to that uſage, confirming his promiſe by an Oath. To all which the Perſon ſuddenly replied, the Author was a Lyer in that thing: A deciſion ſomewhat ſurpriſing, and no leſs than blaſhemy; yet had thus much of Ingenuity in it, as to yield the force of the Argument on no eaſier terms to be avoided.

Thus If Men will needs imagine an Incongruity between Preſcience and Free-will, and ſo reject the one, tho' both are equally aſſerted in Scripture, I cannot ſee how they can do it otherwiſe, than by the Non-jurants Argument. But ſurely Men of Reaſon and Sedate Temper, will rather argue thus, that ſince Preſcience and Free-will agree in uno tertio, and that no leſs than the Word of God; they muſt not only be agreed betwixt themſelves, but both true. And therefore if we cannot get them to fadge together in our Minds, the Reaſon muſt not be any mutual jarring of theirs, but want of room in our Underſtandings. If that Sacred Book were impartially read, and Religiouſly attended to, no violence put upon it, but all its parts underſtood, (as they ought to be) in Congruity with the main Bulk and Subſtance of the Doctrine therein contained, it would put an End to this and many other Debates. The Magiſtrates Sword, and the Peoples Conſcience, the Prince's Prerogative, and Subjects Liberty; the Divine Attributes, and the Eſſential Properties of Humane Nature; would all enjoy their full Exerciſe and Latitude, without invading one another. And this leads to the next thing I am to conſider, Namely,

The Harmony of Divine Attributes. Where there are inteſtine Jarrs and ſtrugling Diſcord, there is no Unity, nor any thing like Perfection; but thoſe Natural Notions we have of the Being of a God, do at the ſame time, and with equal Evidence, dictate to us his eſſential Perfection; therefore to talk of an imperfect Deity, is ſo great a piece of Non-ſenſe, as cannot ſufficiently be expos'd; becauſe there is nothing in the World to which it can be reduced, more abſurd than it ſelf. Down-right Atheiſm is indeed a monſtrous thing, yet I think 'tis capabable of a better Colour, than having once acknowledg'd an adorable Supreme Being, at the ſame time conclude him lame, or deficient. He that looks about him into the World, and yet ſays in his heart, Pſal. 14.1. There is no God, is properly a Fool, and that cannot make a rational Inference, and from the things that are made, cannot ſo much as conclude there muſt be a Rom. 1.20. Maker. And when both his Bible and his own Eyes may inform him, that every Houſe is built by ſome Man, yet Heb. 3.4. (as if the World muſt build it ſelf) ſo fooliſh is he as not to conſider, that he that built all things is God. But now, he that thinks God like unto himſelf Pſal. 50., that is, ſubject to Failing and Imperfections, is ſtyled Improbus, 16.21. wicked or deteſtable, which ſeems to be the heavier charge of the two. And I have heard of ſome of the Ancients, Plutarch I think it was, ſpeaking to this effect; I had rather Poſterity ſhould ſay, there never was ſuch a Man, than that Plutarch was an injurious and vile Perſon.

Now this Foundation, which is deep laid both in Scripture and Natural Reaſon, namely; that God is every way perfect, is enough to build my whole Deſign upon: He is perfect in Power, Chron. 20.6. He doth what he will both in Heaven and in Earth; perfect in Juſtice, Gen. 18.25. Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? perfect in Knowledge, Job 36.4. Declaring the End from the Beginning. His Rom. 12.2. Will is perfect, his Pſal. 18.30. Law is perfect, his 2 Sam. 22.31. Work is perfect, all his Ways are Judgment. If the Streams be ſo clear, the Fountain muſt needs be pure. But if any Man now will raiſe a Diſpute amongſt the Divine Perfections (like that of the Diſciples) which ſhould be greateſt; or ſhould give ſo much to one, as to leave nothing for another; he would make ſtrange work. Juſt as if ſome Man ſhould be ſaid to be a very prudent and juſt Perſon in himſelf, yet when he comes to deal with his Neighbour, his Prudence undermines his Honeſty, and ſo he would become a Knave, or on the contrary, ſhould his Honeſty out-go his Diſcretion, that would (in ſome degree) render him a Fool. And this tho' a blunt Compariſon, ſeems to be the very caſe in Debate. We muſt however be careful to ſpeak with Reverence and Decorum, even in applying the moſt juſt Conſequences of other Deut. 32.4. Mens Doctrine unto the divine Majeſty.

The Attributes we are concern'd with in this matter are chiefly two; but by conſequence great many more; God's Wiſdom, and his Goodneſs; the former implies Knowledge, and that includes Preſcience; the latter comprehends Juſtice, in which Freewill is ſtrongly implyed. In reference to the firſt, take but away from God his Foreknowledge of future Events, and you may almoſt as well dethrone him; for beſides that, it doth clearly infer Ignorance and Imperfection, whereby his Wiſdon and Knowledge will come in Queſtion; it carries with it a kind of Impotency, for he that knows not of an Event before it comes, may be ſurpriſed and defeated of his Expectation; and how ſhould he have power to have prevented what he knew not of before? Suarez is poſitive in the place above-mentioned, That had not God a Fore-knowledge of all things, he were not fit to govern the World. And as for the latter, take away from Man his Free-agency, and you bring him under ſuch a fatality, that he is in no ſort Maſter of his own Actions; and then ſaith the Learned Dr. Cudworth, Intellectual World. You take away the foundation of diſtributive Juſtice: For what Equity can there be in the Reward or Puniſhment of thoſe things, wherein Man has no choice, and which could not poſſibly have fallen out otherwiſe? So that here is no denying of either, without rejecting one or more of the Divine Attributes, and ſo rendring the Bleſſed God a lame and imperfect Being; as if he could not be omniſcient, but he muſt be Arbitrary; nor juſt, without being ignorant.

Beſides, how can God be ſaid to ſearch the Heart, Rom. 8.27. and Jer. 11.20. try the Reins, or to what purpoſe ſhould he do it, unleſs he knows the bent and tendency of Men's Minds, and what they will do before they act it? And how can he ſuit his Providences to his bleſſed Rom. 8.28. Ends and Purpoſes, for the good of his People, if he knows not the Exigencies that ſhall befall them? On the other hand, if there be no voluntary Agents in the World, what need any Providence at all? General Laws might ſerve the turn, 'tis but putting the ſeveral Parts and Wheels of the Creation together, and ſet them a moving like a Pendulum, and they will drive on one another; and ſo Epicurus his Doctrine comes in play, that God regards not particular things. What can we expect but confuſion and diſorder, whilſt we invade the Divine Attributes, or labour to ſet them at odds one with another?

But now, if we lay aſide all Perverſeneſs and Prepoſſeſſion, the Harmony of the Divine Perfections will be a moſt pleaſant object of our Conſideration. God doth not impoſe a Neceſſity of ſinning upon any Man, but he knows ſome Men will be ready enough to ſin, out of choice. He doth not puniſh or reward in Men what he acteth himſelf, or what he cauſeth them to act without the Intervention of their Wills; but if ſome will be vertuous, and others vitious, when they might be otherwiſe, God is juſt in puniſhing and rewarding, tho' not ignorant in the mean time, who will deſerve well or ill at his hands. In a word, God doth know, that Man is a Free-Agent, becauſe he made him ſo, and doth daily preſerve him in that Capacity; he alſo knows, that ſome Men will abuſe their Freedom in ſpite of all Invitations and Inducements to the contrary, unleſs he interpoſe his Sovereign Power (as ſometimes I conceive he doth) to move them irreſiſtably unto good.

From what hath been ſaid, the Argument will lye thus. God is perfect in all his Attributes, and harmonious in all his Actings, and Providences, throughout the World: But the denial of Divine Preſcience doth infringe his Wiſdom and Power, and the Denial of Free-will doth obſtruct his Juſtice; therefore it muſt follow, that Man's Freeagency is not only conſiſtent with God's Fore-knowledge of future Events, but both of them are moſt certainly true.

The third thing to be conſidered, is the Non-cauſality of Divine Preſcience. At the time indeed when this Diſcourſe happened, I was laught at by one of the Gentlemen, for uſing that as an Argument, which he would by no means admit for a truth. But I do not look upon laughter as a ſufficient confutation, and oft-times thoſe who carry things at higheſt, are furtheſt out of the way. I ſhall therefore lay down this Propoſition, and run the hazard of Proving it, Namely, that

God's foreſight of what I ſhall hereafter chooſe; hath not any cauſality in it, to determine my choice, nor to infringe at all my liberty of chooſing. If I can make this evident, it will be very material; for the main thing that ſeems to byaſs and miſlead Mens Minds in this matter, is an apprehenſion, that God's Fore-knowledge of any thing muſt needs cauſe the ſame, and that thence all other inferiour cauſes muſt be urged on by ſuch a fatal Neceſſity, that the Effect is put quite without the Verge of Liberum Arbitrium. But this I hope will appear to be a great Extravagancy from the following Conſiderations.

Let us then obſerve firſt, that all Foreſight or Preſcience, is nothing elſe but a ſort of Knowledge, and Knowledge doth ſuppoſe ſomething to be known antecedent thereunto. A Man cannot be ſaid to know, but he muſt know ſomething that was in being before he knew it; and even the Objects of Divine Fore-knowledge have a virtual Exiſtence in God, antecedent in order of Nature thereunto; ſo that as to himſelf it is rather Intuition than Preſcience, but with reſpect unto us, and to the not-yet actual Exiſtence of the Objects, the word Preſcience is proper enough, as was noted before. Knowledge then hath its dependance upon the things known, not they on it; and therefore ſtrictly, Knowledge, conſidered barely as ſuch, is an Effect and no Cauſe at all. As for Example, I know that the Sun warms and refreſhes; but then there was a Sun in being firſt, whoſe influence I have found to have this Effect upon me. I know that the three Angles of every Triangle are equal to two right Angles, becauſe firſt, I have ſeen a Triangle, and then I have ſeen the Theorem demonſtrated; but my knowing it, is no cauſe why it is ſo. I deny not yet, that the knowledge of one thing, is frequently the cauſe of another thing ſubſequent, and emergent thereupon; but never of that particular thing known; for inſtance, my knowledge of a high water makes me decline the Foord, and go about by the Bridge, but it is not therefore the cauſe of the high water. I know that ſuch a Man is crafty, for which cauſe I take care, that he do not over-reach me; but my Knowledge is no cauſe of his craftineſs. Rev. 2, 9. I know the blaſphemy of them which ſay they are Jews and are not; (ſaith he that holdeth the ſeven Stars in his right hand:) But if any Man will ſay, that this knowledge was the cauſe of that blaſphemy, he will go near to be a Blaſphemer himſelf.

Object. But here it will be objected, That theſe Inſtances are only of things already in being, which are not like to be cauſed by a knowledge ſubſequent thereunto; but the Queſtion is about the knowledge of things to come; beſides, if Preſcience be but a ſpecies of Knowledge, and that all Knowledge ſuppoſeth ſomething to be known antecedent to it, as was intimated above, it ſeems there may be a certain Preſcience of a thing antecedent, or which is all one, Fore-knowledge of a thing paſt: But is not this a plain Contradiction?

This Objection will be eaſily anſwered, by conſidering the Nature of Preſcience a little more particularly. And firſt, there is a kind of Fore-knowledge of certain things, that Man is capabe of, as namely, Changes of the Moon, Ecclipſes of both the great Luminaries, various Phaſes, Conjunctions and Conſigurations of Planets, Occultations of Fixed Stars, with divers other Phaenomena: All theſe by Calculation, may be foreſeen for many years, and foretold even to a few Minutes. The King's Obſerver, (for Example) or any other Curious Aſtronomer, knows of theſe Appearances before they come, and when to watch them at the Obſervatory. But is there any Man ſo pleaſant, as to ſay, that the Aſtronomers Skill is the cauſe of an Eclipſe? or, if Monſr. Hevelius can tell when ſome of the fixed Stars will diſappear, that therefore he hides them cunningly, and will not let the World ſee them? Now why ſhould not humane Preſcience, in its kind and degree, have a power of determining the Events foreſeen, as well as Divine? and what's the reaſon that this foreſight has not the leaſt cauſality upon theſe Effects? I ſuppoſe it will be anſwered, becauſe they depend upon certain regular and conſtant Motions of the Celeſtial Bodies, which have been ever ſince the World began; and the like Appearances that are now, have been heretofore; and will be again, ſo long as the World ſhall continue; ſo that this Fore-knowledge is little more than Recollection of what is paſt. For as it would have been a rare thing to have foretold an Eclipſe before ever there was any, ſo would it be an eaſie matter for a Man of ordinary Skill, to predict thoſe that ſhall happen unto the Worlds end, provided he were furniſhed with an exact Hiſtory of all thoſe that have been from the Begining.

Let us now examine whether theſe, or the like Reaſons, may not be of force in the buſineſs of Divine Preſcience; and in order thereunto, let us ſuppoſe ſome point of time, like that of the Julian Period, before the Creation, wherein the World was not yet in being. There was then in God, (1.) The Power and Vertue of educing this ſame World out of Non-exiſtence into Being. (2.) A Will to do it, in ſuch time and manner as ſeemed good unto himſelf. (3.) A perfect Idea or Proſpect of this great Work in all its parts and Succeſſion, and all this from Eternity: This Idea, or Eternal View of all Things and Actions, that have been, or ever ſhall be, is what we call Divine Preſcience; it was antecedent to the actual Exiſtence of the World, but ſubſequent in order of nature unto God's Eternal Purpoſe of creating it. Now I appeal to the Reaſon of Mankind, whether it is the Platform that builds the Houſe, or whether we ought to refer the cauſe of the Worlds production unto this Idea, or rather to the Concurrence of Divine Will and Power.

If it be ſtill urged, That God's Fore-knowledge of Events muſt of neceſſity produce the ſame, ſince what he foreknows is ſure to come to paſs. It may eaſily be anſwered, that what God foreſees, is indeed certain; but ſuch certainty doth not conſiſt in the foreſight, but in the cauſes foreſeen; and tho' the effect will ſurely come to paſs, yet not without its proper cauſes; of which cauſes, foreknowledge can be none at all, unleſs it could be both the Cauſe and Effect of the ſame thing, which is impoſſible.

Obj. But how can God's Fore-knowledge be called an Effect, which doth ever ſuppoſe an antecedent Cauſe? For ſince you grant it to have been from Eternity, if it be an Effect, it muſt be an Eternal One, whoſe antecedent Cauſe muſt therefore be fetcht from beyond Eternity. Nor have you yet ſufficiently explained how far, or whether you admit there may be ſuch a thing, as Fore-knowledge of what is already paſt, which was objected before.

To this laſt part of the Objection I have already ſaid, (if it be conſidered) what amounts to a ſufficient Anſwer; but yet I ſhall endeavour to be a little plainer.

Firſt then, that God did foreknow the things that are now paſt, as well as what are to come, is by no means to be doubted; but to ſay, that he does now foreknow what is already paſt, is Non-ſenſe, becauſe it inmplies the futurity of what is elapſed; as if I ſhould ſay, God fore knows the Deluge, or the Building of Babel; this would be contradiction in point of time, as though the things were yet to come, which are long ſince paſt; but it's proper to ſay, God did foreknow them.

But Secondly, the Notion I aim at, will beſt be apprehended, by remembring always to diſtinguiſh between the real and the vertual Exiſtence of things; the former is brought forth in time, and therefore I ſay, God did foreſee from Eternity; but I cannot ſay ſo of the latter, which being it ſelf Eternal, can admit no priority in point of time. As for inſtance, 10000 years ago the World was not extant, and ſomething doubtleſs will be hereafter, which is not now; but there never was, nor ever will be any thing extant, but what is, or was, Virtually, exiſtant in God, and clearly viſible to his all-ſeeing Eye from all Eternity; therefore God's Omniſcient View, or Idea of all things, being antecedent to the Creation, but ſubſequent in order of Nature to the Vertual Exiſtence of the World, is Foreknowledge with reſpect to the one; but Contemplation or Intuition in reſpect of the other. If we look forward to the Creation, it is Preſcience; but if we look back upon Eternity, it is the reſult of Divine Will and Power, or it is God's beholding in himſelf the Platform of his Deſign, which (as I ſaid before) is an effect of the Divine Purpoſe, to build a world: which Purpoſe is the higheſt Link in the Chain of Cauſality, even as the firſt ſtep of Solomon towards building of the Temple was this, • Rings 5.5. Behold, I purpoſe to build an Houſe unto the Name of the Lord my God. It is true, that God is infinite and Eternal in all his Attributes, and ſo there can be no Precedence amongſt them in order of time, yet in order of Nature there muſt be Priority, ſince God cannot be ſaid to behold a pure Nothing, to ſee, know, and behold, are Relative Terms, and do ever ſuppoſe ſomething to be ſeen, known, or beheld.

Thirdly, As for the other part of the Objection againſt an Eternal Effect, it will lye as hard againſt our Bleſſed Saviour, who is the Eternal Son of God, the brightneſs of his Fathers Glory, the Expreſs Image of his Perſon, and the Effect of his Love to Mankind. Theſe alſo are relative Terms, a Son ſuppoſes a Father; an Image, or Copy, ſuppoſes an Original, yet none ſurely doubts the Eternity of him who laid the foundations of the Earth, and whoſe Throne is for ever and ever.

I put the Queſtion even now, what the reaſon was, that the Aſtronomers Skill and Fore-knowledge of the Celeſtial Phenomema, had not the leaſt influence to cauſe the ſame? and I gave this Anſwer, becauſe theſe Phenomena did depend upon certain Motions of the Heavenly Bodies, which were regular, and had been from the beginning of the World; and ſo it was but enquiring into theſe Motions, and the Fore-knowledge of Eclipſes, Conjunctions, and the like, would follow by conſequence. Let it be now demanded, why Divine Preſcience had not any cauſality or influence upon the Creation? Hebr. 1. v. 3, 8, 10. and I ſhall anſwer this Queſtion juſt after the ſame manner; namely, becauſe the Creation did depend upon the Will and Purpoſe of God, which is the firſt Mover, the Fountain-Cauſe of all things, and was from Eternity. Omnipotence it ſelf, and even infinite Goodneſs, would ſeem barren and unfruitful without a Will to Act, for whatever God made in Wiſdom, and ruleth by his Power, were wrought after the Eph. 1.11. Counſel of his own Will; nor is there any thing in Heaven or in Earth, that can preſcribe (in point of cauſality) unto the Bleſſed Will of God: 'Tis no more then, but Gods beholding, or taking a View of his own Purpoſe, and the Fore-knowledge of the future World muſt follow by conſequence, which Foreknowledge is nothing elſe, but the Proſpect of what was potentially exiſtent in himſelf, from everlaſting, as hath been ſaid.

From the foregoing Diſcourſe it may appear, that Divine Preſcience, as ſuch, cannot in propriety of Speech be ſaid to have created the World, nor to have had any efficacious influence thereupon; and if we conſult the Scripture, we ſhall find the ſame yet more evident: There we find that God ſaid, Gen. 1.3. Let there be light, and there was light. That, Pſal. 33.6. by the Word of the Lord were the Heavens made, Heb. 11.3. and all the hoſt of them by the breath of his Mouth. Heb. 1.3. That the Worlds were framed by the Word of God. Ver. 43, 44. And that He upholds all things by the Word of his Power. Now whether we take the Word of God for his Power, or for his powerful Command, or for the manifeſtation of his Will, (as it is frequently uſed in Scripture under theſe and ſundry other acceptations) it will ſtill come to the ſame thing, and what I am pleading for; but I do not obſerve it ever taken for Preſcience, nor will the Bible (I think) afford an Inſtance of any Cauſality aſcribed thereunto; but on the contrary, many Scriptures do clearly evince Divine Preſcience, and at the ſame time aſcribe the Events foreſeen to other Cauſes, which muſt needs be very much to the matter in hand, I ſhall mention two or three.

Firſt, Our Saviour Chriſt (as was noted before) is ſaid to know all things that ſhould come upon him; and yet his being delivered unto death by the Jews, is attributed to their ignorance; For had they known, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory.

Scondly, In the 29th. Chap. of St. Luke's Goſpel, Ver. 43, 44. our Lord Chriſt foretold (and therefore certainly he foreknew it) that Enemies would caſt a Trench about Jeruſalem, that they would lay it even with the Ground, and not leave one ſtone upon another. Should Preſcience have theſe diſmal Effects, it might be thought to be a very malignant thing; and that which belongs to God as a Divine Perfection, could not be cleared from being the Cauſe of much Evil. But let us not charge God fooliſhly, ſince we are informed of the true cauſe in the very next Words; namely, Becauſe thou kneweſt not the time of thy viſitation.

Thirdly, In the Prophecy of Ploſea, it is ſaid of Iſrael, Ephraim and Judah, Chap. 5. Chap. 13. that they ſhall fall in their Iniquity, and that they ſhall be as Chaff driven with the Whirlwind out of the floor, and as ſmoak out of the Chimney. Was this Fore-knowledge the cauſe of that deſtruction? No; for it is preſently added, O Iſrael, thou haſt deſtroyed thy ſelf.

Again, the Prophet Ezekiel is commanded to ſay unto the Prince of Tyrus, ••• k. 28. That Strangers, the terrible of the Nations, ſhall draw their Sword againſt the Beauty of thy Wiſdom, and they ſhall defile thy brightneſs, and bring thee down to the pit, &c. And ſhall this come upon him becauſe God foreſaw it? No; but becauſe thine heart was lifted up; and thou haſt ſaid, I am a God.

Laſtly, To name no more, St. Paul exhorting 2 Theſ. 2.3. to ſtedfaſtneſs in the Faith, foretells the Coming of the Man of Sin, which would be after the working of Satan, with all Power and Signs, and Lying Wonders; that there would be a falling away from the truth, and men ſhould believe Lyes, that ſo they might be damned. Now ſhould any Man to requite St. Paul for his Care of the Church, as to lay the blame of all theſe ſad Conſequences upon him, I know not whether would be greater, the Folly or Wickedneſs of ſuch a Charge; and it would be yet worſe, to lay the fault upon the Spirit by which he ſpake, as coming near to Blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt. But the Text carries the Cauſe along with the Effect, namely, Verſe 2, 3. Becauſe they received not the love of the Truth, that they might be ſaved, for this cauſe God ſhall ſend them ſtrong Deluſions, &c. When truth has offer'd it ſelf by Miracies, and all poſſible demonſtrations unto the minds of Men, and will not be received, it is a ſignal piece of Juſtice, to give them over to believe a Lye. But here firſt the true Phyſitian of a Chriſtian Soul admoniſheth it's ſafety and it's danger; it's ſafety, not to be ſoon ſhaken; and it's danger of being decieved: Now, if the Soul reject both the Phyſitian and his Advice, and having wilfully put it ſelf into the Hands of an Ignoramus, is deſtroy'd by him; nothing in the World can be more ridiculous, than to blame the timely Warning and Foreſight of the good Phyſitian.

Object. But as concerning theſe and other Prophetick Scriptures, I meet with this Salvo, namely, That whatever God foretells, he doth by his power inforce the accompliſhment and fulfilling of the ſame. For (ſay theſe Perſons) tho' God knows all things knowable, yet ſuch Events as are contingent, or depend upon the fluctuating, and undetermin'd Wills of Men, are never knowable till they are brought to paſs; and therefore God cannot foreknow them. But now, what God will have brought to paſs, and whereof he gives Notice to the World by his Prophets, he doth bend and impel Mens Minds to do them, and by an irreſiſtable influence bring them to effect.

This Argument indeed ſtrikes home; the only danger is, that it goes too far; and will prove what the Patrons of it ſeem highly to oppoſe. None can pretend a greater concern for the Honour of God, than thoſe that declaim againſt what they call Horrendum Decretum; yet this Hypotheſis of theirs will force them to admit the very ſame thing, and will make God the author of Sin with an high hand. For if in reerence to all ſuch things as are foretold by prophecy, there muſt not be admitted any thing contingent, nor purely voluntary, as falls out in other affairs; but all ſuch Events are brought about by abſolute force; what is this but a fatal and inevitable Decree? And how can ſecond Cauſes fall under any blame, ſince they are infallibly predetermin'd by God's Almighty Power? Hence it will follow, that the Jews and the Roman Soldiers, were no more to be blamed for their Injuſtice and Cruelty to the Bleſſed Jeſus, than a Watch is for going too faſt, when the Spring is ſet too high, or made too ſtrong for the Movement. And if the fault be not in ſecond Cauſes, it muſt of neceſſity lye upon the firſt.

It will be in vain to alledge, that they had been grievous Sinners formerly, and therefore God juſtly gave them up afterwards to hardneſs of Heart. For, Rev. 13.8. The Lamb was ſlain from the foundation of the World, tho' not actually, yet ſo as to be the Object of Divine Preſcience, unleſs you will ſay, he was ſlain from the foundation of the World, and yet God knew not of it. It was then foreknown unto God, that the Lamb would he actually ſlain, before they that ſlew him had done good or evil. So that if God do enforce whatever he foreknows, then they who crucified our Saviour, were under a neceſſity of doing it, from the foundation of the World; and they who ſhall be ſeduced by Antichriſt to believe a Lye, and ſo be damned, have been about ſixteen hundred years under a ſatal Decree of Damnation. And even Adam, who all Men grant to have had Free-will, muſt have been under a neceſſity of falling; unleſs we ſhall ſuppoſe, that when God foreordained his dear Son for a 1 Pet. 1.20. Sacrifice, he did not know to what End. But the Lamb ſlain doth ſuppoſe Sin to be attoned, and that implies Sinners: Now there could not be Sinners, but ſome Body muſt ſin firſt, and that being the firſt Man Adam, muſt (by this Argument) have ſinned, not out of choice, but unavoidable neceſſity, which is a moſt horrid and impious abſurdity.

Thus we have at hand three pregnant Inſtances, which do mightily expoſe the weakneſs of the Objection: The Sin of Adam, the Death of Chriſt, the Deſtruction of Jeruſalem. The firſt of theſe appears to have been certainly foreknown unto God, and yet none denies that Adam had power to have ſtood innocent. The ſecond was ſo particularly foretold by our Saviour himſelf, that the very Perſons were pointed out, who were the chief Actors in it; yet Had they known, they would not have cruoified the Lord of Glory. The third likewiſe was largely and punctually prophecied; yet had Mat. 23.36. Jeruſalem known in her day, the things which belonged to her peace, Chriſt ſays, Luke 19.42. He would have gathered her Children together, as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but ſhe would not. So that in theſe great Events, we may eaſily diſcern a reſerv'd condition, and an evident poſſibility of having been otherwiſe, tho' they were all known unto God from the Foundation of the World. For in caſe of right Judgment and Information (poſſible enough to have been attain'd) Adam had not ſinned, Chriſt had not ſuffered, Jeruſalem had not been ruin'd. They were all indeed foreſeen in their Cauſes, and thoſe Cauſes were ſure to produce their proper Effects ſo far as they were permitted; that is, God foreſaw, that Men left to their Liberties and their Luſts, would make a falſe Eſtimate of things, and would be ſure to act accordingly; but yet ſuch foreſight had no Cauſality upon ſuch Actions, as hath been ſaid; nor could there be any inforcement from God upon ſuch Events, whereby the Liberty of free Agents was in the leaſt diminiſhed, if the Scriptures be admitted for truth.

But here I would not be miſunderſtood, as if I thought God to be an unactive beholder of all thoſe Tranſactions which are foretold by Prophecy: Surely he is too much a Cauſe of all things, to be a Nude Spectator of any one Action; and certain Events I grant to have been as well predetermin'd as prophecy'd, of which I ſhall give Inſtance preſently. When God purpoſeth to have any thing brought about, he can eaſily ſet Agents at work, and remove Impediments; he can turn Mens Hearts like Rivers of Water, yet never ſo, as to put any preternatural force upon the Will to do evil.

For the courſe of Divine Providence, (tho' inviſible to us) I conceive to be ſo laid, and things dependent (by God's diſpoſal) in ſuch a Series and Concatenation, that various Cauſes and Contingents ſhall concur to operate upon Mens Faculties, in ſuch ſort, as to make them willing to act their Parts, (unknown oft-times unto themſelves) in order to effect the Almighty's Purpoſe. Upon which Account I am apt to believe, that even in reference to thoſe Events that are under a peremptory Decree, moſt of the Actors that bring them about, are as much free Agents, as is the Husband man in his choice of a fit ſeaſon to plow his ground. But however, the things I mainly inſiſt upon are theſe, that ſince Men derive that ſtrength from God, by which they Blaſpheme his Name, and violate his Laws, God muſt be the primary Cauſe of thoſe Actions, but not of the Will wherewith they are done. That he doth not Enforce the Volitions unto Evil, and yet he fore-knows them: And that in divers Inſtances it doth appear, that thoſe Events and Actions have been foreknown unto God, of which the immediate Inſtruments have been free and voluntary Agents, as hath already been made evident.

There is yet another part of the Objection to be conſidered, namely, That future contingents are not knowable. I confeſs, they are inſcrutable to us, to whom they are contingent, but to God there can be no ſuch thing; for he that makes any thing contingent unto God, leaves him obnoxious to Surprize and Diſappointment, and conſequently under great Difficulty of Governing the World. For the clearing of this point, let us lay down for a ground-work (what I hope is not denied by any that I am concerned with, namely,) that God Almighty knows moſt perfectly all things preſent; and let us ſee whether this will not both infer the knowledge of things to come, and take away all contingency with reſpect unto God. And by the way, let us obſerve the knowledge of Mankind, which tho' very dim and imperfect, even in things now exiſtent, and before our Eyes, yet extends in ſome degree to things both paſt and future. The Hiſtorian is acquainted with many revolutions of former Ages, and from a parity of Reaſon may foreſee ſome that are to come. The Phyſitian, that underſtands in any competent Meaſure the Nature of a Medicine, knows from whence it derives it's Original, what are it's conſtitutent Principles, and how it will operate. The Mechaniſt that underſtands an Engine, knows how it was made, the parts of which it is compoſed, and what Feats it will perform. The Philoſopher, that enquires into the Reaſons of Things, and the Agency of Bodies, with the various Affections of Matter and Motion, can tell before hand the ſucceſs of divers Experiments and Undertakings, which are in the dark to other People. And the Aſtronomer can tell the future Appearances of Heaven, as was noted before. Now if all this, and much more, reſult from Man's imperfect knowledge of a few things, we muſt ſure conclude ſomething further from God's moſt perfect knowledge of all things, eſpecially if we add hereunto, the conſideration of his Dominion and Soveraignty over all Creatures.

The World is a great Machine or Engine, which God made at firſt, and ſtill upholds its Being and Motion by the Word of his Power: Not ſo much as an Atome can ſtir but by Vertue derived from him. Shall we then think that the great Operator knows not the parts of Acts 15.18. his own Work, or can be ignorant of its Motions, or of the Influence that one part hath upon another? It is poſſible a Curious Artiſt may make a piece of Watch work to repreſent all the viſible Motions of the Heavens, and to meaſure out time to an incredible degree of Exactneſs: The Maker of ſuch a piece muſt needs know it's Numbers, how long it will go, how one Motion depends upon another, and one Wheel drives on another; nor can he be ignorant, that if he ſuffer the ſprings to run down, and Wind them up no more, the Motions will ceaſe, and his Contrivance will become altogether uſeleſs: Or if by any other means, he ſtop ſome of the Motions for a time, they cannot ſtir till he gives them liberty, tho' the reſt are going in the mean while. Thus the Divine Architect, that framed the World, knows all it's Parts and Influences, all it's hidden Springs of Motion, all the Cauſes of every Effect, with their Connexion and Dependence, and the Agency of every particle of matter throughout the Univerſe. He knows for what duration he deſign'd it's Motion and Exiſtence, and the time when Mat. 24.36. Heaven and Earth ſhall paſs away. Nor can he be ignorant, that if he withdraw the Springs of Life, his ſupporting providence from any Creature, or from the whole World, it muſt ſink into a ſtate of Inactivity or Annihilation. Now as it would be an idle Fancy to think, that in ſuch a Watch, there ſhould ſtart up ſome new Motion, not deſign'd, and unexpected by the Maker: So it is far more extravagant to talk of any thing contingent in reſpect of God, in as much as his Work is perfect, and he can command a punctual obſervance of thoſe Laws and Rules which he himſelf hath given to the Creation, whilſt Pſalm 148.8. Fire and Hail, Snow and Vapour, Stormy Wind fulfil his Word.

The Sum is this: God Almighty knows moſt perſectly all things preſent; that is, the hidden ſprings of Action, and all the latent cauſes now operating; the Nature and Vertues of all things in being, with the utmoſt extent of their powers and influence, are all manifeſt in his ſight; but ſince natural things do not work in an inſtant, their force and efficacy muſt extend to ſuture time, if I may not ſay, till time ſhall be no more; for one part of Matter will ſtill operate upon another, whilſt Sun and Moon endures. Now ſince God cannot know perfectly the force of any Agent, but (at the ſame time) he muſt know alſo the Effect it will have upon it's Patient, and how far again that Patient will become active upon other things; it will follow, that if God did not know things to come, he muſt of neceſſity be ignorant of a thouſand things preſent; for as the knowledge of Cauſes implies the knowledge of Effects, ſo doth the not knowing of Effects unavoidably infer the ignorance of Cauſes. And as he that draws one Link of an extended Chain, draws the whole, and the Motion of one of the Globuli, moves thoſe that are contiguous, and thoſe again others indeſinitely: So it is impoſſible to know any one thing perfectly without the knowledge of more; and God's moſt perfect knowledge of all things preſent, muſt imply the knowledge of all things future.

It may be ſaid, That all this is true with reſpect unto inanimate Creatures, but Man acts from an internal Principle, and being left to the Liberty of his Will, may either act or ſuſpend his Action; and beſides, there are ſo many things may happen to influence his Will, that 'tis very uncertain whether of the two he will chooſe, until he have effectually choſen.

Uncertain doubtleſs it is to other Men, and oft-times to a Man's ſelf, what he will do in ſome caſes; but unto God it cannot be ſo, for theſe two Reaſons eſpecially:

Firſt, The Heart indeed is ſo deceitful, that for a Man to find out the Subtilties of his own, Jer. 17.9, 10. is no eaſie diſquiſition; and it muſt be yet harder to know another Man's. But 1 Sam. 16.7. God ſees not as Man ſees; he not only looks upon the heart, but he looks into it; Heb. 4.12, 13. He ſearches and tries it; He knows the moſt intimate Secrets of the Soul, and is a diſcerner of the thoughts and intents; all Creatures are manifeſt in his ſight; all naked and open before his Eyes: It is impoſſible then they ſhould deceive him, or act beyond or contrary to his Expectation. For ſince words and actions flow (as ſtreams from a Fountain) out of the abundance of the Heart, it would be ſtrange that God ſhould know ſo exactly what the Fountain-contains, and yet be ignorant what Streams muſt iſſue thence.

Secondly, Since the Principles from whence all humane Actions do proceed, may be reduced to two, namely, thoſe of Nature and Grace, and God muſt know the Efficacy of them both, in as much as the one proceeds from the work of his Hands, and the other from the operation of his Spirit; it muſt follow that God cannot be ignorant how far Truth or Errour, Vertue or Vice, Equity or Injuſtice, Reaſon or Fallacy, Religion or Intereſt will prevail upon any Man, either in his Natural Capacity, or under ſuch a Meaſure of Grace as he beſtows upon him for that purpoſe. For as he knows the force of natural Agents, and the diſpoſition of every Patient to receive, or to repel their Agency; ſo can he not be ignorant of the Efficacy of that Vertue, which proceeds more immediately from himſelf. All which amounts to thus much in ſhort, that God Almighty is the Fountain Cauſe and Soveraign Ruler of all things, both in the Kingdom of Nature and that of Grace; and therefore muſt know the whole Series of Cauſality from the beginning to the End. And ſince that which is an effect of one thing, becomes the Cauſe of another; he muſt equally know the things to come as thoſe preſent; unleſs there be ſome Effects, which proceed not from any Cauſe at all.

Let us now conſider the Nature of a Contingent, and what it is that ſhould make Men think it cannot be ſoreknown. A Contingent (beſides the ſtricter Notion as it ſignifies the effect of a voluntary cauſe) may be, as I apprehend, more ſtrietly taken, for the encountring, or meeting together of ſundry Effects, whoſe Cauſes do not appear to have had any Connexion. As when a Spring-tide, a Land-flood, and a Storm from the Sea, happening at once, do make an Inundation. Or when a Traveller in his Journey meets with a ſhower. Or two Friends ſetting out from ſundry Ports, meet in a far Country, without deſigning it, or knowing one of another. Now a high wind and a Spring Tide, a Journey and a Shower, have each of them Cauſes ſufficient to produce them, but they are contingent each to other, as alſo in reſpect of us, who not knowing that ſuch cauſes were operating, could not foreſee the effects. But the caſe is not ſo with God, it is not yet come to that paſs, that becauſe Men cannot foreſee contingent Events, that therefore we muſt conclude, that God cannot do it neither. For as Wind and Weather are in his Hands, and obey his Will, ſo Voluntary good Actions flow originally from the Holy Spirit, and evil Actions are permitted, as the Devils were to enter into the Swine: Nor can wicked Agents go one hair's breadth beyond their appointed limits. And even permiſſion it ſelf doth imply Fore-knowledge; for how can any one be ſaid to have permitted, what he knew not of before it was done? I hope, that to evade this Argument there's none will ſay, that God gives to wicked men a general Licence to do what they pleaſe, whilſt he in the mean time knows not in particular, what wickedneſs they will commit, until they have acted it. For beſides, that this Character is exactly ſuited unto Satan in his Kingdom of Darkneſs, it deſtroys Divine Providence root and branch; for how can God limit, or over-rule to his own good Ends and Purpoſes, thoſe Events whereof he hath no particular foreſight? or how can he be ſaid in ſuch a caſe to govern the World at all.

But as concerning the Nature of a Voluntary Action, I have ſpoken before; I ſhall only add in this place, that ſince God knows moſt perfectly the heart of Man, and what cauſes are intereſted in forming of his Judgment; how far the Will follows the Dictate of the Underſtanding, and of right Reaſon, or whether it is captivated by Senfual Appetite, and by the luſts that war in his Members: Since God (I ſay) doth infallibly know the Springs of all Actlons, whether from Senſe, from Reaſon, or from Grace, and to what degrees any kind of External or Internal force can bend thoſe Springs; he muſt of neceſſity know what Man (purely leſt to his own Faculties) will do upon any occaſion.

I have inſiſted longer upon this Objection, as alſo upon the Non-cauſality of Divine Preſcience, than ſome perhaps will think to have been neceſſary; but becauſe the ſence of the Objection is ſaid to come from Perſons of very great Learning and Reaſon, and I did my ſelf hear it ſtrongly urged, that Preſcience muſt needs cauſe the things Foreſeen; I thought it not amiſs to enlarge a little upon both the Points, in order to clear them up to common Underſtandings; but whether I have done it to Satisfaction, I muſt leave to the Readers Judgment. The ſum of what I have ſaid in reference to this laſt mentioned (which I diſcourſed of before) is this, that to affirm Divine Preſcience to have a Cauſality, in ſuch ſort, that the Events foreſeen could not poſſibly have fallen out otherwiſe, is Abuſurd, and it is falſe. It is Abſurd becauſe it puts the Cart before the Horſe, and makes that to be a cauſe which is purely an effect; and it is Falſe, becauſe it is contrary to the word of Truth, contained in the Scriptures. I ſhall now conclude this part of my Eſſay, with the words of the Schoolman; Suarez. Neque hinc eriam fit, ut per hanc Praeſcientiam, Deus imponat neceſſitatem aliquam rebus ſic cognitis, quia haec Scientia, ut ſic, non eſt earum cauſa. It doth not follow from hence, that God by his Fore-knowledge impoſeth any neceſſity upon the things ſo known, becauſe this knowledge, as ſuch, is not the Cauſe of them.

But before I come to the laſt part of my Deſign, I muſt make a ſhort Digreſſion, to prevent an Objection that may ariſe from what I ſaid not long ago, namely, That the Divine Will was the fountain Cauſe of all things, as being the firſt Mover; for no doubt God is the firſt cauſe of all Motion, tho' he never determines any, exerted by a free Agent to a wrong. Object; and all things being wrought (as the Apoſtle ſays) after the Counſel of his Will. From hence it may be urged, That tho' Divine Preſcience have no cauſality, yet ſince we grant that the Divine Will is the firſt cauſe of all things; nor can we deny, that whatever God wills, he certainly foreſees; doth it not follow from hence, that all things muſt come to paſs according to the fixed Purpoſe and Preordination of God, in ſuch ſort, that the Will of Man muſt needs be over-rul'd and predetermin'd, and conſequently the free-agency of rational Creatures wholly evacuated?

I anſwer, this will by no means follow, as may appear from the conſideration of the following particulars.

1. Though God foreſees whatever he will have brought to effect, yet we cannot ſay on the contrary, that he wills every thing he foreſees. God, 'tis true, wills even the ſinful Actions, which he foreſees, but with a will permiſſive of them, not effective; perfectly knowing (as a Wiſe Man would ſhrewdly gueſs) what Perſons, ſo and ſo inclined, will do in ſuch and ſuch Circumſtances, being only Inabled, not Impelled, to act, and being left to follow their own Inclinations. And ſo he may certainly foreſee many things, which he never wills by a poſitive and effectively determinative will. He equally foreſees all things that come to paſs, otherwiſe he would be deficient in point of Knowledge; but we muſt not ſay, he wills them Equally. For that would be to approve of evil, and ſo he would be deficient in point of Goodneſs. For inſtance, he predetermin'd Iſrael's Deliverance from Egyptian Bondage, and he likewiſe foretold it: So that herein his Purpoſe and Foreſight run Parallel. But then he foretold Pharaoh's Obſtinacy in detaining the People, at the ſame time when he will'd him to let them go; and herein his Foreſight and expreſs Will are quite contrary. He wills, that Men ſhould fear the Lord, and ſerve him in ſincerity and in truth; and not only ſo, but that they ſhould do it out of Joſh. 24.14, 15. free choice, ariſing from a true Judgment of things; yet he ſoreknows that ſome will be Diſobedient, and Iniquity ſhall abound Mat. 24.12.. He wills, that his choſen People be with him, and ſee his Glory Jo. 17.24., and he knows it ſhall be ſo; he knows that others will dye in their Sins, but he hath ſworn he wills it not Mat. 19.28.. Whatever God hath proclaim'd, is an undoubted Object of Divine Preſcience; but every Object of Divine Preſcience is not therefore preordain'd, nor agreeable to his Will. Good things are equally the Objects of Divine Pleaſure and Foreſight; but we cannot ſay the like of Evil. We may ſay indeed, that God foreſees an Evil Action, but we cannot ſay he would have it done, nor that he hath power to do it; for both theſe would imply a contradiction, ſince 'tis purely inconſiſtent with the Divine Nature to have either Will or Power to do evil.

A ſecond Conſideration is this, That tho' the Divine Will be truly and unchangeably one and the ſame, yet is it diſtinguiſhable according to a threefold difference of things about which it is converſant. As firſt, when God deſigns to bring about ſome ſpecial act of his Providence in the World, as that Promiſe made to Abraham, Gen. 12.7. Ʋnto thy Seed will I give this Land; in this reſpect his Will is Poſitive and Irreſiſtable, nor can all the Powers of Earth and Hell, put one Minutes ſtop unto his Purpoſe or Decree.

But Secondly, when God commands any thing to be done by his People, as their Duty, and for their Good, he deals not with them as inanimate Creatures, but as rational Ones; he propoſes unto them a Rule or Law, with the Benefit of obſerving it; as for Example, Honour thy Father and thy Mother, that thy days may be long in the Land, &c. But he doth not inforce the obſervation of this Law, upon all thoſe to whom it is given; for ſo there would be no Tranſgreſſion. He propounds it to their choice, expecting a Voluntary Obedience upon promiſe of a Reward, which reward cannot be commenſurate to an Obedience upon Force, which properly is no Obedience at all. In this ſenſe therefore his Will is Imperative, but not Irreſiſtable; for the ſtiff-necked are ſaid to reſiſt the Holy Ghoſt. Acts 7.51.

And Thirdly, when God forbids any thing to be done by us, that would diſhonour him, and deſtroy our ſelves, and yet we do it; or when he commands us any thing, wherein we diſobey him, his Will is therein only permiſſive. Thus Sin, tho directly oppoſite to the Command, is permitted. And ſo God is ſaid to have Suffered the peoples manners in the Wilderneſs about forty years, Acts. 13.16. as alſo in times paſt, he ſuffered all Nations to walk in their own ways Acts 14. • 6.. Not that their Ways were acceptable to him, or agreeable to his Will, (in any other ſence than that of permiſſion) much leſs efficaciouſly influenced by him; only they were ſuffered for a time to run their Courſe. For, having ſet before them Life and Death, partly in his Written Law, and partly in their own conſciences, and having employ'd all ſuitable Means, Motives, and Reaſonable Inducements for their chooſing of the one, and refuſing of the other; according to his primary Intention of good unto all Men: If nothing leſs than. Invincible Grace will ſerve the turn, God is not obliged to ſave all thoſe as it were by Miracle, that will not be otherwiſe ſaved; and therefore permitting obſtinate Perſons to reap the fruits of their own Works, his ſecondary intention takes place, namely, the manifeſtation of his Power, Righteouſneſs, and juſt Severity upon impenitent Sinners, whereby alſo the preciouſneſs of Grace and Mercy is the more conſpicuous to thoſe that receive it.

Now, tho' I like not by any means, that diſtinction of the Divine Will into Secret and Revealed, eſpecially when theſe two are made to contradict each other; as if it were God's Secret Will that Men ſhould ſin and be damned, when his revealed Will bids them repent and be ſaved; this is to ſtem the Current of Scripture, and in effect to make void both the Law and Goſpel. I ſay, tho' I approve not this, nor ſhall I borrow any of the School Diſtinctions; yet I think the Scripture will allow us to ſay, that the Divine Will is either Poſitive, Preceptive, or Permiſſive. By Poſitive I mean Irreſiſtable, in reference to what God does himſelf, or what he poſitively determines to be done; Preceptive is with reſpect unto Laws, and Mens voluntary obedience thereunto; Permiſſive in reſpect of Sin. And yet this is ſtill the ſame moſt bleſſed and unchangeable Will, as it is the ſame Sun-beams by which ſome ſort of Bodies are hardned, others melted, and a third calcined.