I Happened a while ago, to be present at a Discourse between two Gentle­men, concerning the fatal Period of Man's Life, or the fixed certainty of Future Events: The one affirming it, from the consideration of God's Fore­knowledge; the other denying it, from the evident certainty of Man's Free-will. The former urged; what God Foresees, cannot but come to pass; the latter plead­ed, Man cannot choose, nor refuse, the doing of that, which is certain to be done. I thought there was truth in what they both grounded their Arguments upon, but certain inferences, pretended to be drawn from thence, which this Discourse pro­duced, [Page 2]I could by no means approve of, I did therefore interpose a little for an ac­commodation, but with so ill success, that I have a mind to try, if I can do any better in this Paper. Not that I will pre­sume to moderate betwixt two Persons, each of them better Learned, and of far greater Abilities than my self. But since their Discourse hath so fix'd the Subject in my mind, that I cannot easily remove it, I will only attempt to clear the Notion a little to my own Apprehension, by setting my thoughts in some kind of order in reference to this matter. I shall therefore endeavour these three things.

1. To assert from Scripture, that God foresees future Events; and that neverthe­less, Man is a free and voluntary Agent.

2. To shew, how these two things a­gree together; and detect the fallacy of those Reasonings that represent them in­consistent.

3. To answer some of those Objections, that are wont to occur in this Debate.

I begin with the first, and easiest part of my Task, namely, to assert God's Fore­knowledge, and Man's Free-will, out of the Scriptures. These are indeed two several subjects, and might challenge each of [Page 3]them a distinct Head of Discourse: yet I rather chose to manage them both in one, by linking Scriptures together in such sort, that of each couple, the one shall make out Divine Prescience, and the other Hu­mane Freedom; and being consider'd to­gether, shall evince, that both these have oft-times been conversant about the same particular event; that is, one Text shall prove God's Fore-knowledge of, and ano­ther shall evidence Mans Freedom in, doing or refusing the same individual Action.

But first, that I may clear my way as much as I can, I must explain the Terms, or give some account, at least, how I understand them. Some indeed except against the word Prescience, and tell us, that God doth not properly fore-see any thing, since he beholdeth all things as present; but this I count is Criticism without Necessi­ty; for the word is frequently used, as 'tis taken in this Discourse, and is proper e­nough with respect unto us, and to such things as are not yet in being. What shall be a thousand years hence, is indeed po­tentially in God, but not yet actually existent: So that his knowledge of such things, is not unfitly called Prescience, as [Page 4]also the respect and consideration of some­what that is distant, is called Providence. Now as God's Omnipotence did vertually comprehend from Eternity, all the Crea­tures that were to be produced in Time; So his Omniscience gives him an entire View and Prospect of all their Actions. They cannot act but by a Power derived from him; how then should they do any thing unknown to him? He knows what himself will bring to pass in spite of all opposition; and he knows what Latitude he will allow his Creatures in their Actions. Since therefore God Almighty knows his own Will, and since Nothing can ever come to pass without his Will, either po­sitive or permissive; it must follow, that he sees and knows all things and events, which are to come, and not yet actually existent, with equal certainty as if they were present. And this is what I mean by Divine Prescience.

I must now fix my Notion of Free-will, and herein I shall carefully avoid all School Controversies about it, or about Com­mon and Efficacious Grace: As also those Dominican Fancies about a thing they call ^* Next Power, which is next to none, [Page 5]and Sufficient Grace, which some think altogether insufficient. These and such like questions I leave to be beaten into Atoms between the Jesuites and Jansenists.

And whereas some contend, that it is in every Man's power to do what the Gospel enjoyns: For should God require of any man what is impossible to be done by him, he must needs appear to be a hard Master.

Others deny that any man can, or ever will effectually believe and repent without special Grace, which wherever it comes, makes a thorow work of Conversion in the heart, and therefore can never be lost, nor the person in whom it is finally mis­carry.

Others again say, there is a sufficiency of Grace, which with pious endeavours will bring a Man to happiness, yet under a pos­sibility of Apostatizing, in which case God may and doth sometimes relinquish the Person to final Destruction.

And others, to name no more, say, there is a Common Grace, or Universal Talent given to all Men, which tho' of it self, it is by no means sufficient, yet up­on a conscientious improvement thereof, with earnest Prayer for further, daily Sup­plies, it will please God to bestow such a [Page 6]Measure, as shall be sufficient to Salva­tion; whilst those who were intrusted with the same stock, having laid it up in a Napkin, are through their own Default, utterly ruin'd. Yet they add withal, that there are a certain Number, more pecu­liarly called the Elect, whom Efficacious Grace does seize upon, some in a high Carreer of Wickedness, others at first even against their Will, tho' in the day of Gods Almighty Power, they become a willing People, to that degree, that they desire nothing more than to lay out their lives, to spend and be spent (as St. Paul said) for the advancement of that Grace and Truth whereby they are subdu'd and purified: But these (they say) are not the Rule and Measure of God's dealing with Mankind in general, but are to be look't upon, as certain high and noble Instances of the Freeness and Efficacy of Divine Grace, and of God's exercising an Al­mighty Prerogative in choosing a Raging Persecutor, or some Atheistical Debau­chee, to be made a peculiar Favorite and chosen Vessel to himself.

Whereas (I say) there are these (and perhaps some other) Opinions, that are wont to fall under consideration, when the [Page 7]business of Free-will is in debate; I shall not trouble my self to determine which is best, nor is it material to my design: 'Tis not impossible, but with a due Respect unto Persons, Times and Circumstances, there may be something of Truth in them all, and each of them perhaps may be good or bad, according as 'tis manag'd. Truth and Er­rour I look upon as Gold and Dross: The one is a pure and splendid thing, but may be adulterated or abused, and seldom is without alloy; the other, tho' base and ignoble, contains for the most part some­thing of true mettal, if duly separated from the rest.

This only (under submission) I shall ad­venture to say as my own present thoughts about this matter, and so proceed; name­ly, that most men, however under a state of Nature, may do much moral good, which shall not pass unrewarded, and some­thing too (for ought they can know to the contrary) towards acceptance with God. That many men through the Divine Good­ness shall be saved, that neither know punctually the time of their Conversion, nor certainly whether they be converted or not. That few there are who attain to that compleat assurance, as to banish at [Page 8]all times, all manner of Dubitation. That it is all mens duty to seek that they may find, and to wait upon God in the use of those means appointed by him in his word; and we have his promise for success. And, that no man can truly say now, or shall be able to plead at the last day, that he hath used his utmost endeavours, and found them unsuccessful. These and the like con­siderations may be ground enough for men to be doing good at present, and for their Relyance upon the Goodness of God for the future. But on the other hand, since there is a spiritual as well as a fleshly Wickedness, and Satan is transform'd sometimes into an Angel of Light, and lest Man should be lifted up with an ap­prehension of certain fine things that he can do; let him remember, that 'tis God who worketh in him both to will and to do of his good pleasure; that of himself he can do nothing, and that all his righ­teousness is but filthy raggs. And this will help to poise him at the Center between the two Extreams of fainting and presuming, and will discover a necessity of an humble attendance at the Throne of Grace, that God would supply unto him those Divine Aids, and Spiritual Powers, by which he [Page 9]may be enabled to encounter opposition, and find acceptance in Christ Jesus.

And herein perhaps may consist the nar­rowness of the way that leads to life. For one man, supposing he can do nothing ac­ceptable to God, resolves to take his ease, until the Spirit, that Wind which blow­eth where it list, breath upon him; ano­ther thinks he is able and willing, to do all that God requires; he admires his own good husbandry in the improvement of his Talent, and thanks God, he is not like o­ther men. Now the way lying in the middle betwixt these Extremities, the least step towards a Carnal Liberty one the one hand, or a Pharisaical Righteousness on the o­ther, must needs be a deviation from the right path, as this collateral Discourse is a digression from what I intend. But I now return, and do say, that let men establish what Doctrine they please concerning Grace, it will not import the matter in hand, since I shall confine my Notion of Free-Will to those things that are on all hands acknowledged to be within Man's power, supposing only the ordinary con­currence of God's providence thereunto.

I consider then, that Man above other Creatures hath knowledge to judge and [Page 10]distinguish of things commodious or in­convenient, beneficial or noxious to him, in the concerns of his Life; and it would be a strange Solaecism in Nature, if he had not the Liberty of choosing the one, and re­fusing the other. What doth it advantage a Man, to know the difference between a Sheep and a Wolf, if he want the Power or the Will, to make a benefit of the one, and avoid the mischief of the other? Nay I do not see, but this might render Man of all Creatures most miserable, since his knowledge of Good could be no other to him than Gall and Bitterness; whilst he finds himself fatally carried on to Evil. And suppose he had been always predetermined to Good, his knowledge of Evil then had been in vain, or rather indeed it had been impossible; since Man could not have come to the knowledge of Evil, but by doing it. And what could Man under a necessity of always doing good, signifie, more than a good Watch? which tho' it moves regu­larly, yet is it altogether involuntary, cannot do otherwise, knows not that it moves at all; and consequently is inca­pable of Praise or Encouragement, Reward or Punishment. Thus if we take away from Man his Faculties of Judging and [Page 11]Choosing, we make the Lord of the Creation the most contemptible thing in Nature, and put him under the Feet of those Brutes he was made to rule over. So that without voluntary Agency, that is, without a Will and the proper Exer­cise thereof, Man becomes little better than a Sensless Machine.

But now on the contrary, we see plain­ly, that, by the good Providence and Di­sposal of Almighty God, men have power to do many things, as namely, to culti­vate the Earth, to build Houses, to pro­vide against Hunger and Cold, to educate their Children, to exercise several Arts and Trades, for the Benefit of Humane Life, and to manage all these according to cer­tain Rules, Methods and Observations, arising partly from Experience, and part­ly from Mens consulting one another. I say, in all these, and a thousand more par­ticulars, Men do consider and deliberate, and then pursue their several Designs, some with greater, others with a lesser share of Prudence, but each Imploying his Measure, and accordingly determining to choose this, and refuse the other.

In short, I conceive, that God having indued Man with an Understanding to [Page 12]judge, and a Will to choose, and con­tinually supplying him with power to act according to his Nature, he doth not or­dinarily over-power, or impel his Faculties, but leaves him to the free Use and Exer­cise thereof in things within his proper Sphere. And this is what I mean by Free­will. Now I address to my Province, which is to assert this, together with God's Fore-knowledge of future Events from the Scriptures.

The first pair of Scriptures that I im­ploy for this Service, shall be out of Exo­dus, ^* where Moses is appointed of God to go unto Pharaoh, and say unto him, Let us go, we beseech thee, into the Wilder­ness, &c. It is not easily to be imagined, but that Pharaoh had power to have grant­ed this Request at first, and the very Re­quest it self doth strongly imply a Liber­ty of granting it. No good Master will require any thing of his meanest Servant, with intention to punish him severely for not doing it, and yet secretly contrive means to prevent and disable him, that he cannot do it. To say, that God should send Moses to make a request unto Pharaoh, say­ing, Let us go, we pray thee, that he should [Page 13]destroy him at last for refusing, and in the mean time should bind up his heart by some irresistable influence, from all possibility of granting it: This would not only excuse Pharaoh from the guilt of sin, but make an odious representation of the Ever blessed God; as if his Wisdom were exercis'd in laying snares for the innocent, and his pow­er in their destruction. Should a Writing-Master guide his Scholars hand, to make a blot, or some ill Character, and then beat him for it, whereas being left to himself he would have done better, what could be thought of such behaviour in a Master? and how just would be the Scholar's indignation against him?

The sinfulness of an Action consists in this, that it is voluntary, and against the Com­mand; the nature of a voluntary action is, that 'tis done out of choice and deliberation, when otherwise it might be forborn. Now, either Pharaoh sinn'd in detaining the People, or he did not; if not, wherefore was he destroy'd? ^* Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? If he did, he acted out of Choice, and consequently he might have dismissed the Israelites sooner, if he had pleased. Hence it will also follow, that there [Page 14]could be no secret Influence, nor any prede­termining Concourse from God, to bind his Faculties, or take away his Free-agen­cy; only the Pride of his Heart, despising God's Message to him, and his domineer­ing Ambition to keep the People in Slavery, did out-weigh (in his unjust Ballance) the other Motives he had to dispense with them.

And herein consisteth the nature of Electi­on, that of two things proposed, with Mo­tives on either part, a man freely chooseth that which likes him best, in his present Apprehension, tho' at the same time (if he thought good) he might choose the o­ther. Thus did Pharaoh choose to detain the People, there's his Choice; yet before ever the matter was propounded to him, God himself says, ^* I am sure he will not let you go; here is Fore-knowlege: Therefore Di­vine Prescience and Humane Liberty are consistent, and have been conversant about the same individual Action.

But here an Objection may arise from the seventh Chapter, and the third verse, where God says, ^† He will harden Pharaoh's heart: From whence it might be supposed, that Pharaoh could not act voluntarily, nor be said to have any real Freedom of Will. To this I answer,

[Page 15] 1. I will not deny, but that in considera­tion of Pharaoh's former Wickedness, in dealing so barbarously with the People of Is­rael, God might sorsake him, and give him over to hardness of Heart. But then,

2. I deny that this hardness of heart, by whomsoever, or in what manner so ever it was wrought, could deprive him of the Li­berty of doing a Civil Act within his power. He might for some self End, or with some ill design, have dismissed the Israelites, and yet still have retained his hard heart; it was but a word speaking, and the business had been done. And it is observable, that while the smart was upon him, he could say, ^* I and my People are wicked; and pro­mised too, to let the Israelites go; but still, as he found respite, (thinking perhaps the storm was over) he retracted. On the one hand, there was the danger of perishing, or having at least) his Kingdom ruin'd by those Judgments God sent upon him: On the other hand, there was the lust of tyran­nizing over an enslaved People, and the be­nefit of their Labours in making Brick. These two weights being opposed each to other in the Scales, sometimes the one, and then presently the other preponderates. And [Page 16]this purely is deliberation, the result where­of is choosing, and choosing is the undoubt­ed property of a free Agent.

3. Concerning the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, the Apprehensions of Learned Men are different; that which to me appears the most reasonable is to this effect, name­ly, that this induration is not to be under­stood as any positive Act, or immediate Efficiency from God, whereby Pharaoh's heart was made hard, (much less his Will Predetermin'd) directly and properly, no more than it is to be understood that our Saviours coming was directly and properly to fill the World with Dissentions, because he himself saith expresly, that ^* He came not to bring peace on the Earth, but rather division. The primary intention of the Gospel, no doubt, was Peace and Good Will towards men; but meeting with vari­ous tempers, and sundry degrees of Cor­ruption in the hearts of men, it could not choose but occasion dissention and a sword upon the Earth. In like manner the primary intention of God's Judgments, is to reform the World, and bring men to Repentance, whilst in some Persons they have a quite contrary effect. So that, as the Gospel of [Page 17]Peace was the accidental cause of War, so might God's dealing with Pharaoh tend to harden his Heart, and yet to sosten a less rebellious one, as the same Sun beam melt­eth Wax and hardeneth Clay. And as sin by the commandment becomes exceeding sin­ful,^*in so much that the Commandment it self, which was ordained unto life, is found to be unto death: So Pharaoh's stubborness, under the Divine Hand, becomes the more exceeding stubborn; and that Chastisement, which was ordained unto Reformation, did the more effectually promote his destructi­on. Hence it is highly probable, that, I will harden his heart, may import no more than this, I will bring such things to pass, and in such a manner, as shall through his own Corruptions, render him much more obdurate.

That the natural and direct tendency of God's dealing with Pharaoh was to convince him, seems very apparent from these Con­siderations: 1. He orders Moses to try him with Innocent Miracles, afterwards with smarting ones, by such degrees, till it come at last to the death of his First-born. 2. While the Plagues lay heavy upon him, he gave some signs of a yielding and re­lenting [Page 18]temper, but ever in the Intervals he contracted a greater obdurateness. 3. The Judgments of God had their proper Effect upon the Egyptians, so far, that they would gladly have the Israelites dismissed sooner, and at last, were not only urgent to have them gone in haste, but willing to part with their ^* Jewels into the bargain. These consi­derations (I say) seem very much to fa­vour the forementioned sense of the Place, but whether that be the only true meaning of it, I shall not contend, so long as I can make it good, that Pharaoh was a Free Agent in that particular thing which was foretold by God Almighty.

The next double Testimony shall be out of ^† Ezekiel, where the Prophet is sent to the Israelites, and words put into his Mouth, to warn and dehort them from their wicked ways, lest they should dye. Hence I argue thus; either the House of Israel might have obeyed God's message to them by the Pro­phet, or else not: If not, how shall we clear the sincerity of God's dealings with them? Or will his message to them appear any more than a Complement? Let us have a Care of intrenching upon Blasphemy. But, if they might have humbled themselves at [Page 19]the Prophet's voice, as Nineveh did in the like case, it will follow, that they were not by any previous necessity divested of their Liberum Arbitrium, as is also evident from these words so often repeated in the Pro­phet's Commission, Whether they will hear, or whether they will forbear? which is as much as to say, they have their free choice. And what follows? ^* But the House of Israel will not hearken unto thee. God doth not only afford Liberty and Opportunity of Re­pentance, but he urges the same by strong pleadings and inducements; and yet at the same time, he foresees a contrary Event. And this is what I undertook to assert from the Scriptures.

Again, in the 5th. of Hosea, ^† God foretells, that Israel and Ephraim shall fall in their iniquity, Judah also shall fall with them; yet in the 6th. Chapter ^‖ he exhorts to Repentance. This indeed might have its proper effect too, upon some small remnant that should escape ^(a) and remember God among the Nations whither they were to be carried captives. But now there is the same means afforded to those that should fall in their Iniquity, as to the few that should escape; nor doth God's Fore-know­ledge [Page 20]of the several Events impose a neces­sity upon either. He grants Liberty unto both, which he knows a Remnant will make good use of, whilst the greater Number will abuse it to their ruin. Thus it is evi­dent, that Liberty and Prescience are con­sistent.

It is moreover prophesied, that by ^* rea­son of Idolatry, they shall be as Chaff dri­ven with a whirlewind out of the Floor, and as smoke out of the Chimney; yet after­wards, we read in the same Chapter, O Is­rael thou hast destroyed thy self. We do not use to say, a man destroys himself, that is unwillingly run down by external force, or some inevitable necessity; nor can he that ruines himself charge the fault upon another. If Israel destroys himself, he is surely the Agent of his own destruction; and if so, he is either a Voluntary or an Involuntary Agent; if Involuntary, he cannot be said to destroy himself, no more than a House burns it self when fire is set to it by an In­cendiary. An Involuntary Agent, as a Sword or a Hammer, can only act as 'tis mannag'd by Hands, and those govern'd by the Will. It remains then, that Israel was the voluntary Agent of his own Ruine; and ^† [Page 21]since this is foretold of God by the Prophet, it must follow (if the Scriptures be true) that Divine Prescience doth not any way in­fringe the Liberty, or Free-agency of ra­tional Creatures.

God foresaw, that wicked Hands would be forward enough to deliver up the Divine Person unto Death, who was the ^* Lord of Life; nay, his determinate Counsel did con­cur with his Fore-knowledge, so far as to let it proceed to Execution, as the Learned Mr. Howe observes. And our Saviour ^† himself, not only describes particularly the manner and circumstances of his own Death, when yet it was not near at hand, but is said also to ^‖ know all things that should come upon him. Yet if the Actors of this wickedness had been rightly informed what they were about, they would have left their work for other hands. That's very strange (says one of our Disputants) here is an Event secur'd by the determinate counsel of God, here is the place where, the manner how, and the Persons by whom it should be brought to pass, describ'd before hand by our Saviour; can any thing that is so infal­libly certain admit of an If? Yes, in St. Paul's account it may, and he is a person that de­serves [Page 22]some regard. And indeed, his Asser­tion will appear highly reasonable, when we consider the Princes of this World, so sadly misinformed as they were, and im­pos'd upon by all the wicked Artifice ima­ginable, yet we do not find them very eager to be concern'd in the Blood of that just per­son, when the principal Agent pretends ^* to wash his hands of it, and professes ^† he found no cause of death in him. And had it not been for the impetuous Clamours of a wretched People, and the danger of a Tu­mult, 'tis probable that the malicious con­trivance of the Priests, and their sham Evi­dence, would not have weighed against Pi­late's Native Clemency. What must we then think had been doue, in case of a right information? Why the Apostle tells us; ^‖ Had they known it, they would not have cru­cified the Lord of Glory. This puts it out of all doubt, that they were under no other force than the Result of their own Delibe­ration. On the one hand, there was the meekness of the Prisoner, the clemency of the Judge, and the disagreement of the Witnesses: On the other hand, there was the influence of the Priests, the ignorance of the Court, and cries of the Multitude; which [Page 23]kept the business for a while in Equilibrio, but then the fear of a tumult superadded, cast the Scales. Nor were they under any further Necessity of crucifying our Saviour, by means of such a Divine Foresight, that he should be crucified, than they would have been under, in case it were to be sup­posed, that God had not so punctually fore­seen, or foretold the same.

There are many other places of Scripture, that do evidently prove there is in Man a free Election. Solomon is commended for asking Wisdom, ^* when he might have asked Riches, length of Days, or Revenge upon his Enemies; and Ananias ^† is the more condemned for falsity about the price of the Land, because that even after it was sold, it was in his own power.

^‖ If a Wife make a Vow, it is left to her Husbands choice, either to establish it, or to make it void.

^(a) Choose you this day whom you will serve.

^(b) God and say unto David, thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three things; choose thee one of them, that I may do it unto thee.

These Scriptures are so clear, they need no Commentary, nor do they admit of any [Page 24]Objection. And I think there is no less Evi­dence for Divine Prescience, since all Pro­phecies and many other Places of Scripture, do either directly, or by just consequence put it beyond Dispute, with all that acknow­ledge the Authority of that sacred Book. I shall mention no more but this one, and therewith close up this first part of my Un­dertaking: It is so direct and full to the pur­pose, as if the Holy Ghost had design'd it to remove all Scruple and Hesitation about that matter. ^* I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done.

Had I Leasure now, or Opportunity, to consult the Fathers or Schoolmen; I am in­clinable to believe, I should have their ge­neral Suffrage in this matter; but truly those Gentlemen are none of my Familiars, and and I was loath to trouble them. Yet meeting by accident with two of them, which are esteemed no less than Oracles, I made bold to ask them their Opinions in the case. I confess, I was not displeased to find them so very civil, and favourable to the Notions, I had already sormed, and in part written down, concerning this Subject. One of [Page 25]these was the Learned Suarez, who first of all disputing copiously about Man's capacity of acting freely, he brings it last to this issue: ^* Experimur enim evidenter, situm esse in no­stra potestate aliquid agere vel omittere, & ad hoc utimur ratione & discursu ac consultatio­ne, ut in unam partem potius quàm in aliam in­clinemur: Est ergo Electio positiva in nostro arbitrio, alioqui fuisset nobis data superfluè, haec deliberandi & consultandi vis. For we find by evident Experience, that it is in our power ei­ther to do a thing or leave it undone, therefore we reason, argue and deliberate, in order to choose one thing rather than another, 'tis therefore in our power to make a positive choice, or else we have this Capacity given us in vain. This comes close to that point. And then in the next place, he doth no less vigorously maintain God's Fore knowledge of all E­vents and Actions, whether voluntary, or contingent, the Sum of which is thus.

^† ‘God cannot (saith he) be ignorant of what he himself doth, or will do, be­cause he knows his own Will and his power to effect what he wills. Nor can can he be ignorant of what his Creatures do now, or what they shall do hereafter, because whatever is positively good in [Page 26]their Actions, is by immediate influence from himself; and what there is of pri­vation or defect, cannot be without his permission, and therefore he cannot be ignorant of mens sinful and wicked acti­ons. He goes on to shew, that unless God did fore-know from Eternity whatever was, or is to come to pass in time, he could neither be omnipotent nor immu­table. Not omnipotent, because in refe­rence to those things whereof he had no foresight, his Providence and Govern­ment of Affairs must needs be defective. Not Immutable, because something must daily occur to his knowledge which he knew not before.’

Atque hinc sequitur Deum habere hanc Scientiam Creaturarum quae fiunt in tempore ex aeternitate sua, ut totam illam simul hae­beat sine successione, quia non potest in se vari­ationem admittere; item quia non posset Deus habere perfectam providentiam in rebus admi­nistrandis, nisi haberet omnium praescientiam. Thus far that Eminent Schoolman.

The other is the Angelical Thomas Aqui­nas, as some are pleased to style him. He in his Sum of Theology dispatches me in a few words. For having first described Providence to be a respect to somewhat that is distant, [Page 27]according to which the occurrences now present are to be ordered, which doth there­fore necessarily include prescience: He saith afterwards, Providentia Dei est omnium sin­gularium, nec tamen à rebus excludit contin­gentiam, nec casum, nec fortunam, nec liberum arbitrium: That the Providence of God ex­tendeth to all particulars, not excluding Con­tingency, Chance, Fortune, or Free-will.

Add hereunto, that it was allowed St. Au­gustine as a Maxime, that God by his fore­knowledge, doth not necessitate, or constrain, the coming to pass of the things foreknown by him. These Testimonies, as they are of un­questionable Authority, so are they clear, direct, and full to the purpose; and this is all I design for the first general Head.

I am now in the second place to attempt certain reasons, or considerations, whereby to accommodate the difference, or at least to lessen the opposition, that seems to be be­tween Prescience and Free-will. The Heads to be insisted on for that purpose are these three: Namely, The truth of the Holy Scrip­tures, The Harmony of the Divine Attributes, and the Non-causality of Divine Prescience.

First then, I argue from the verity of the Scriptures; for I am not designing to confute [Page 28]an A theist, writing only to such as do ac­knowledge the Truth and Authority of those Sacred Letters; but chiefly (as I said be­fore) for my own satisfaction. Some young Divines indeed I have observed, who in their first setting out to preach the Word, affect to preach altogether without it, and seem to Triumph in dispelling the darkness of Athe­ism and Irreligion, by the Gloworm-light of corrupt Nature. Others there are, that prove their Doctrines out of Terence, Tully and Se­neca; whether it is, because they have not read the Bible, or that they preser the Au­thority of Heathen Writers before it, or that they would be thought to be profoundly learned, I shall not dispute; but I find other more experienc'd Work-men, who do not trouble themslves to dig below the true foundation, but think the Rock of Ages safe enough for them to build upon. Now, as that Comical sort of Preaching, to vulgar Ears, doth rather Amuse than Edifie: So this Essay (which is not like to be regarded by the Learned) if it should happen to take the Country air, would look very thin with­out Scripture-Evidence. But if indeed the Scriptures do clearly speak the Substance of what is herein contained, this ought to have the force of a Reason, with all those [Page 29]that acknowledge the Authority of that Book. Nor will it be material to object, that this Argument doth not sufficiently make out the reasonableness of what is here pleaded for: For as there are several Ranks of Pri­viledg'd things, which will not condescend to Common Reason, so there are several de­grees of Reason also, of which the lower ought to yield to the Superiour; and it is the highest reason sure, that God is true, tho' every Man should be found a Lyer.

I am by no means against it yet, that Atheism should be encountred upon its own principles, if at least it can be said to have any principles at all; but every Stripling is not a fit Champion for an overgrown Phi­listine: And I had rather have that Province entirely lest to such as can manage it, than have the Truth to suffer by weak Patronage As for those therefore, that expect better proof than from the Word of God, and those natural consequences arising thence, I shall leave them to the discipline of their own Consciences; for if they are not convinced by what Bp. Wilkins, Bp. Ward, Mr. Boyle, Dr. Cudworth, Sir Cha. Wolsely, and some others have already said against Atheism, I shall never hope to give them satisfaction.

But as for those two Gentlemen, betwixt [Page 30]whom the Controversie was starred, upon which occasion I scribble down these hasty Notes, they are both of them (I hope) seri­ous Christians, not doubting in the least the truth of the Scriptures, yet differing vastly in their apprehensions about this matter. One of them is firm in the belief of Divine Prescience, but somewhat Hesitant as to the business of Free-will: The other is so much a Free-willer, that he seems to cashier Di­vine Prescience; ‘For (says he) if God offer me any good thing, and knows in the mean time I will not accept of it, I am nothing beholding to him for his kind­ness.—’

This manner of expression concerning God, is over-bold and fawcy; for we may not speak of him with such a Liberty, as is allowable in other matters. Besides, let us observe the consequence, and we shall find it to be this, that either God Almighty has no knowledge at all of future Events; or else, that all conditional Promises, throughout the whole Scripture, are no more than sha­dows; the former of which consequences strikes at the Perfection of the Divine Na­ture, and the latter blurrs the sincerity of the inspired Writings. To which it may be added, that such Doctrine is false, and [Page 31]injurious to the Goodness of God: For his Benefits offered to Mankind are not to be valued by his Fore-knowledge of Non-ac­ceptance, but by their own intrinsick worth, and by Man's Capacity of enjoying them if he will. And tho' God doth assuredly know, who will not accept of his kindness, yet he knows at the same time, the fault is in themselves; nor is their refusal any further necessary from any such Divine Foresight, than otherwise it would have been. So that some Persons will indeed seem to have a great Veneration for the Scriptures, and yet own such Principles as render a great part of them insignificant: For, if God's Fore-knowledge necessitate all Events, so that nothing could have fallen out otherwise than it doth; then all Divine Precepts and Rules of Life, all Promises and Threatnings upon certain conditions, are no more but Cheats and empty Formalities. But now, to those that sincerely acknowledge the Di­vine Authority and Truth of the Scriptures, (as all Christians ought to do) the Argument will lye thus: ‘What ever is entirely true, is also harmo­nious and self-consistent. But the Scrip­tures are true. Ergo, &c.’

If it be urged, that the Scriptures, as pro­ceeding from God, are indeed most perfect­ly and entirely true, yet passing through the hands of so many Men, in various Copies and Versions, from one Language into ano­ther, it cannot be, but something of humane infirmity must stick to them. This indeed I freely grant; and if any such thing can be made evident in the case before us, it will be very fit to be considered. In the mean time, there can hardly any two things be named that are more clearly and vigorously asserted in Scripture, than are Divine Pre­science and Free-will, as well in the places above-mentioned, as in divers others. From whence it will follow, that if those places of Scripture be genuine, and no way cor­rupted (which we must suppose, till the con­trary be made out) God's Fore knowledge and Man's Free-agency are not only true, but perfectly harmonious, and consistent each with other, altho' our limitted sight and dazled Eyes cannot fully enable us to behold their Agreement.

Nor need we wonder at it, when we con­sider, that not only in the Scripture, but in Euclia's Elements, and many other Books approved in their kind, are found divers [Page 33]things, which a great number of Readers, tho' men of good Sense, cannot easily under­stand or reconcile; and some things of that difficulty, that the greatest Masters of Learn­ing and Reason, have more than work e­nough to overcome; of which, if need re­quired, one might give particular Instances. Who will believe that the least Diameter of a Needle's Point should be Divisible into a Million (or rather infinite) Parts, and yet that a Circle, how large soever, can touch a right line but in ^* one point only? And since a Globular Body set upon a plain, can reach the same but in one point, and a point is de­fined to be that, which hath no part, would it not be a strange Paradox to say, ^† A Globe can touch a Plain in no part at all? Yet all this leans upon Mathematical De­monstration.

It is easie to observe, that when any dif­ficulty, or seeming opposition doth occur in Scripture, which common Readers cannot (and even Learned ones not very easily) re­concile; two sorts of People, the Prophane and Superstitious, take hold of it to very ill purpose; the one apprehends it their Interest [Page 34]to have no Religion at all, looks upon the Scripture as a State-contrivance to keep the World in Order and Subjection, and hence they assume a lewd Liberty of turning it in­to Burlesque and Ridicule; the other sort, being for the most part over eagerly devo­ted to some Party, have a Religion made up of a few Fractions of Truth, neglecting in the mean time the Sum and Substance. These men pursue, to the best advantage of their Sect, that part of Scripture which hath the kindest Aspect upon their espoused No­tions, and run it off from the main Body of Truth, to that Extream, that it becomes an Errour in Doctrine, and perhaps too a Rent in the Church. For the Body of Truth may not unfitly be resembled to the Body natural, which cannot live in pieces.

That there are unchangeable Decrees of God, I do not doubt; but if that Doctrine be so manag'd as to evacuate Men's Endea­vours, this surely is an unwarrantable Ex­tream. Iustification by Faith is a great truth; but if it be imprudently carried to that height, as to exclude, or make men neglect a good Life, it will become a dangerous Errour. That Christ dy'd for all, is a glo­rious Truth, as it is laid down in Scripture; but if some stretch that Doctrine to the actu­al [Page 35] Salvation of all Men, and others there­upon put the whole Business of Salvation within Man's power, these doubtless are vitious Extreams, opening a wide passage for Pride or Prophaneness. The one makes Religion altogether vain, and the other makes the Grace of God not worth look­ing after. So that whilst Men run into such violent Extremities, they seem to tear off some particular Truths from their Uni­ty with the whole, which from thence for­ward turn into Corruption, whilst the main Body of Truth is deserted by them, and be­comes useless.

And this is the case not only of the less considering Sectaries, but even of those who pretend highly to Philosophy, and aspire after the Reputation of Wits: One whereof (sufficiently known) hath improv'd three Syllables to that height, as to render a great part of the Scriptures ridiculous, and the noble Army of Martyrs no other than a Company of wilful and superstitious Fools, in needlesly exposing themselves to flames and tortures. ^* Go in pence, says the Pro­phet to Naaman; which single case he ad­vances to a general Dispensation for any Man to quit his Religion, as oft as it shall be [Page 36]difficult, and dangerous for him to profess it. And this I take to be the Fountain Cause of all the Divisions that are, or have been a­mong Christians; namely, that Men will not read the whole Scriptures, and give each part its just weight and measure, duly bal­lancing and comparing one thing with ano­ther; but each Man according to his Com­plexion or Education, or perhaps some pre­dominant Melancholy, lays hold of that part that suits him best, and makes up a Religion for himself, which is little more than the Result of his natural temper.

Here I call to mind a passage of a Non-ju­rant, which I happen'd to be present at. The Man was reputed among his Neighbours an honest plain Man, but somewhat rash, and of no deep consideration, as may appear by the Story. The Discourse fell out to be a­bout Swearing, and the Person could not forbear to Declaim bitterly against it, be­cause it is said, ^* Swera not at all. One of the Company urg'd that of the Hebrews, where the Author speaking of God's con­firming ^† his Promise made to Abraham, seems to intimate strongly the necessity of swearing in some cases, not vainly, nor in common discourse, but in a solemn manner, [Page 37]for the avoiding of Contention, and for confirming of some weighty matter. And the Author doth not only alledge it, without any manner of Reproof, as a practice a­mongst Men, who use to swear by the great­er, and amongst whom an Oath for confir­mation is an End of Strife; but he adds fur­ther, that God himself, the more abundant­ly to shew the Immutability of his Counsel, doth condescend to that usage, confirming his promise by an Oath. To all which the Person suddenly replied, the Author was a Lyer in that thing: A decision somewhat surprising, and no less than blashemy; yet had thus much of Ingenuity in it, as to yield the force of the Argument on no easier terms to be avoided.

Thus If Men will needs imagine an Incon­gruity between Prescience and Free-will, and so reject the one, tho' both are equally asserted in Scripture, I cannot see how they can do it otherwise, than by the Non-jurants Argument. But surely Men of Reason and Sedate Temper, will rather argue thus, that since Prescience and Free-will agree in uno tertio, and that no less than the Word of God; they must not only be agreed betwixt themselves, but both true. And therefore if we cannot get them to fadge together in [Page 38]our Minds, the Reason must not be any mu­tual jarring of theirs, but want of room in our Understandings. If that Sacred Book were impartially read, and Religiously at­tended to, no violence put upon it, but all its parts understood, (as they ought to be) in Congruity with the main Bulk and Sub­stance of the Doctrine therein contained, it would put an End to this and many other Debates. The Magistrates Sword, and the Peoples Conscience, the Prince's Prerogative, and Subjects Liberty; the Divine Attributes, and the Essential Properties of Humane Na­ture; would all enjoy their full Exercise and Latitude, without invading one another. And this leads to the next thing I am to con­sider, Namely,

The Harmony of Divine Attributes. Where there are intestine Jarrs and strugling Discord, there is no Unity, nor any thing like Perfection; but those Natural Notions we have of the Being of a God, do at the same time, and with equal Evidence, dictate to us his essential Perfection; therefore to talk of an imperfect Deity, is so great a piece of Non-sense, as cannot sufficiently be expos'd; because there is nothing in the World to which it can be reduced, more ab­surd than it self. Down-right Atheism is in­deed [Page 39]a monstrous thing, yet I think 'tis capa­bable of a better Colour, than having once acknowledg'd an adorable Supreme Being, at the same time conclude him lame, or de­ficient. He that looks about him into the World, and yet says in his heart, ^* There is no God, is properly a Fool, and that cannot make a rational Inference, and from the things that are made, cannot so much as con­clude there must be a ^† Maker. And when both his Bible and his own Eyes may inform him, that every House is built by some Man, yet ^‖ (as if the World must build it self) so foolish is he as not to consider, that he that built all things is God. But now, he that thinks God like unto himself ^(a), that is, sub­ject to Failing and Imperfections, is styled Improbus, ^(b) wicked or detestable, which seems to be the heavier charge of the two. And I have heard of some of the Ancients, Plutarch I think it was, speaking to this ef­fect; I had rather Posterity should say, there never was such a Man, than that Plutarch was an injurious and vile Person.

Now this Foundation, which is deep laid both in Scripture and Natural Reason, name­ly; that God is every way perfect, is enough [Page 40]to build my whole Design upon: He is per­fect in Power, ^* He doth what he will both in Heaven and in Earth; perfect in Justice, ^† Shall not the Judge of all the Earth do right? perfect in Knowledge, ^‖ Declaring the End from the Beginning. His ^(a) Will is perfect, his ^(b) Law is perfect, his ^(c) Work is perfect, all his Ways are Judgment. If the Streams be so clear, the Fountain must needs be pure. But if any Man now will raise a Dispute amongst the Divine Per­fections (like that of the Disciples) which should be greatest; or should give so much to one, as to leave nothing for another; he would make strange work. Just as if some Man should be said to be a very prudent and just Person in himself, yet when he comes to deal with his Neighbour, his Prudence undermines his Honesty, and so he would become a Knave, or on the contrary, should his Honesty out-go his Discretion, that would (in some degree) render him a Fool. And this tho' a blunt Comparison, seems to be the very case in Debate. We must however be careful to speak with Reverence and Decorum, even in applying the most just Consequences of o­ther ^(d) [Page 41]Mens Doctrine unto the divine Majesty.

The Attributes we are concern'd with in this matter are chiefly two; but by conse­quence great many more; God's Wisdom, and his Goodness; the former implies Know­ledge, and that includes Prescience; the lat­ter comprehends Justice, in which Free­will is strongly implyed. In reference to the first, take but away from God his Fore­knowledge of future Events, and you may almost as well dethrone him; for besides that, it doth clearly infer Ignorance and Im­perfection, whereby his Wisdon and Know­ledge will come in Question; it carries with it a kind of Impotency, for he that knows not of an Event before it comes, may be surprised and defeated of his Expectation; and how should he have power to have pre­vented what he knew not of before? Suarez is positive in the place above-mentioned, That had not God a Fore-knowledge of all things, he were not fit to govern the World. And as for the latter, take away from Man his Free-agency, and you bring him under such a fatality, that he is in no sort Master of his own Actions; and then saith the Learn­ed Dr. Cudworth, ^*You take away the foun­dation of distributive Justice: For what E­quity [Page 42]can there be in the Reward or Pu­nishment of those things, wherein Man has no choice, and which could not possibly have fallen out otherwise? So that here is no denying of either, without rejecting one or more of the Divine Attributes, and so rendring the Blessed God a lame and im­perfect Being; as if he could not be omni­scient, but he must be Arbitrary; nor just, without being ignorant.

Besides, how can God be said to search the Heart, ^* and ^† try the Reins, or to what purpose should he do it, unless he knows the bent and tendency of Men's Minds, and what they will do before they act it? And how can he suit his Providences to his bles­sed ^‖ Ends and Purposes, for the good of his People, if he knows not the Exigencies that shall befall them? On the other hand, if there be no voluntary Agents in the World, what need any Providence at all? General Laws might serve the turn, 'tis but putting the several Parts and Wheels of the Creati­on together, and set them a moving like a Pendulum, and they will drive on one ano­ther; and so Epicurus his Doctrine comes in play, that God regards not particular things. What can we expect but confusion and disor­der, [Page 43]whilst we invade the Divine Attributes, or labour to set them at odds one with ano­ther?

But now, if we lay aside all Perverseness and Prepossession, the Harmony of the Di­vine Perfections will be a most pleasant ob­ject of our Consideration. God doth not impose a Necessity of sinning upon any Man, but he knows some Men will be ready e­nough to sin, out of choice. He doth not punish or reward in Men what he acteth himself, or what he causeth them to act without the Intervention of their Wills; but if some will be vertuous, and others viti­ous, when they might be otherwise, God is just in punishing and rewarding, tho' not ignorant in the mean time, who will de­serve well or ill at his hands. In a word, God doth know, that Man is a Free-Agent, be­cause he made him so, and doth daily pre­serve him in that Capacity; he also knows, that some Men will abuse their Freedom in spite of all Invitations and Inducements to the contrary, unless he interpose his Sove­reign Power (as sometimes I conceive he doth) to move them irresistably unto good.

From what hath been said, the Argument will lye thus. God is perfect in all his At­tributes, and harmonious in all his Actings, [Page 44]and Providences, throughout the World: But the denial of Divine Prescience doth in­fringe his Wisdom and Power, and the De­nial of Free-will doth obstruct his Justice; therefore it must follow, that Man's Free­agency is not only consistent with God's Fore-knowledge of future Events, but both of them are most certainly true.

The third thing to be considered, is the Non-causality of Divine Prescience. At the time indeed when this Discourse happened, I was laught at by one of the Gentlemen, for using that as an Argument, which he would by no means admit for a truth. But I do not look upon laughter as a sufficient confutati­on, and oft-times those who carry things at highest, are furthest out of the way. I shall therefore lay down this Proposition, and run the hazard of Proving it, Namely, that

God's foresight of what I shall hereafter choose; hath not any causality in it, to determine my choice, nor to infringe at all my liberty of choos­ing. If I can make this evident, it will be very material; for the main thing that seems to byass and mislead Mens Minds in this matter, is an apprehension, that God's Fore-know­ledge of any thing must needs cause the same, and that thence all other inferiour causes must be urged on by such a fatal [Page 45]Necessity, that the Effect is put quite with­out the Verge of Liberum Arbitrium. But this I hope will appear to be a great Extra­vagancy from the following Considerations.

Let us then observe first, that all Foresight or Prescience, is nothing else but a sort of Knowledge, and Knowledge doth suppose something to be known antecedent thereun­to. A Man cannot be said to know, but he must know something that was in being be­fore he knew it; and even the Objects of Divine Fore-knowledge have a virtual Ex­istence in God, antecedent in order of Na­ture thereunto; so that as to himself it is ra­ther Intuition than Prescience, but with re­spect unto us, and to the not-yet actual Ex­istence of the Objects, the word Prescience is proper enough, as was noted before. Knowledge then hath its dependance upon the things known, not they on it; and there­fore strictly, Knowledge, considered bare­ly as such, is an Effect and no Cause at all. As for Example, I know that the Sun warms and refreshes; but then there was a Sun in being first, whose influence I have found to have this Effect upon me. I know that the three Angles of every Triangle are equal to two right Angles, because first, I have seen a Tri­angle, and then I have seen the Theorem de­monstrated; [Page 46]but my knowing it, is no cause why it is so. I deny not yet, that the know­ledge of one thing, is frequently the cause of another thing subsequent, and emergent thereupon; but never of that particular thing known; for instance, my knowledge of a high water makes me decline the Foord, and go about by the Bridge, but it is not therefore the cause of the high water. I know that such a Man is crafty, for which cause I take care, that he do not over-reach me; but my Knowledge is no cause of his craftiness. ^* I know the blasphemy of them which say they are Jews and are not; (saith he that holdeth the seven Stars in his right hand:) But if any Man will say, that this knowledge was the cause of that blasphemy, he will go near to be a Blasphemer himself.

Object. But here it will be objected, That these Instances are only of things already in being, which are not like to be caused by a knowledge subsequent thereunto; but the Que­stion is about the knowledge of things to come; besides, if Prescience be but a species of Know­ledge, and that all Knowledge supposeth some­thing to be known antecedent to it, as was in­timated above, it seems there may be a certain Prescience of a thing antecedent, or which is [Page 47]all one, Fore-knowledge of a thing past: But is not this a plain Contradiction?

This Objection will be easily answered, by considering the Nature of Prescience a lit­tle more particularly. And first, there is a kind of Fore-knowledge of certain things, that Man is capabe of, as namely, Changes of the Moon, Ecclipses of both the great Lu­minaries, various Phases, Conjunctions and Consigurations of Planets, Occultations of Fixed Stars, with divers other Phaenomena: All these by Calculation, may be foreseen for many years, and foretold even to a few Minutes. The King's Observer, (for Exam­ple) or any other Curious Astronomer, knows of these Appearances before they come, and when to watch them at the Ob­servatory. But is there any Man so pleasant, as to say, that the Astronomers Skill is the cause of an Eclipse? or, if Monsr. Hevelius can tell when some of the fixed Stars will disappear, that therefore he hides them cun­ningly, and will not let the World see them? Now why should not humane Prescience, in its kind and degree, have a power of deter­mining the Events foreseen, as well as Di­vine? and what's the reason that this fore­sight has not the least causality upon these Effects? I suppose it will be answered, be­cause [Page 48]they depend upon certain regular and constant Motions of the Celestial Bodies, which have been ever since the World be­gan; and the like Appearances that are now, have been heretofore; and will be again, so long as the World shall continue; so that this Fore-knowledge is little more than Recollection of what is past. For as it would have been a rare thing to have foretold an Eclipse before ever there was any, so would it be an easie matter for a Man of ordinary Skill, to predict those that shall happen unto the Worlds end, provided he were furnish­ed with an exact History of all those that have been from the Begining.

Let us now examine whether these, or the like Reasons, may not be of force in the bu­siness of Divine Prescience; and in order thereunto, let us suppose some point of time, like that of the Julian Period, before the Creation, wherein the World was not yet in being. There was then in God, (1.) The Power and Vertue of educing this same World out of Non-existence into Being. (2.) A Will to do it, in such time and man­ner as seemed good unto himself. (3.) A perfect Idea or Prospect of this great Work in all its parts and Succession, and all this from Eternity: This Idea, or Eternal View [Page 49]of all Things and Actions, that have been, or ever shall be, is what we call Divine Pre­science; it was antecedent to the actual Ex­istence of the World, but subsequent in or­der of nature unto God's Eternal Purpose of creating it. Now I appeal to the Reason of Mankind, whether it is the Platform that builds the House, or whether we ought to refer the cause of the Worlds production unto this Idea, or rather to the Concurrence of Divine Will and Power.

If it be still urged, That God's Fore-know­ledge of Events must of necessity produce the same, since what he foreknows is sure to come to pass. It may easily be answered, that what God foresees, is indeed certain; but such certainty doth not consist in the fore­sight, but in the causes foreseen; and tho' the effect will surely come to pass, yet not with­out its proper causes; of which causes, fore­knowledge can be none at all, unless it could be both the Cause and Effect of the same thing, which is impossible.

Obj. But how can God's Fore-knowledge be called an Effect, which doth ever suppose an antecedent Cause? For since you grant it to have been from Eternity, if it be an Effect, it must be an Eternal One, whose antecedent Cause must therefore be fetcht from beyond [Page 50]Eternity. Nor have you yet sufficiently ex­plained how far, or whether you admit there may be such a thing, as Fore-knowledge of what is already past, which was objected before.

To this last part of the Objection I have already said, (if it be considered) what a­mounts to a sufficient Answer; but yet I shall endeavour to be a little plainer.

First then, that God did foreknow the things that are now past, as well as what are to come, is by no means to be doubted; but to say, that he does now foreknow what is already past, is Non-sense, because it inm­plies the futurity of what is elapsed; as if I should say, God fore knows the Deluge, or the Building of Babel; this would be contra­diction in point of time, as though the things were yet to come, which are long since past; but it's proper to say, God did foreknow them.

But Secondly, the Notion I aim at, will best be apprehended, by remembring always to distinguish between the real and the vertual Existence of things; the former is brought forth in time, and therefore I say, God did foresee from Eternity; but I can­not say so of the latter, which being it self Eternal, can admit no priority in point of time. As for instance, 10000 years ago the [Page 51]World was not extant, and something doubtless will be hereafter, which is not now; but there never was, nor ever will be any thing extant, but what is, or was, Vir­tually, existant in God, and clearly visible to his all-seeing Eye from all Eternity; there­fore God's Omniscient View, or Idea of all things, being antecedent to the Creation, but subsequent in order of Nature to the Vertual Existence of the World, is Fore­knowledge with respect to the one; but Contemplation or Intuition in respect of the other. If we look forward to the Creation, it is Prescience; but if we look back upon Eternity, it is the result of Divine Will and Power, or it is God's beholding in himself the Platform of his Design, which (as I said be­fore) is an effect of the Divine Purpose, to build a world: which Purpose is the highest Link in the Chain of Causality, even as the first step of Solomon towards building of the Temple was this, ^* Behold, I purpose to build an House unto the Name of the Lord my God. It is true, that God is infinite and Eter­nal in all his Attributes, and so there can be no Precedence amongst them in order of time, yet in order of Nature there must be Priority, since God cannot be said to behold [Page 52]a pure Nothing, to see, know, and behold, are Relative Terms, and do ever suppose something to be seen, known, or beheld.

Thirdly, As for the other part of the Ob­jection against an Eternal Effect, it will lye as hard against our Blessed Saviour, who is the Eternal Son of God, the brightness of his Fathers Glory, the Express Image of his Per­son, and the Effect of his Love to Mankind. These also are relative Terms, a Son suppo­ses a Father; an Image, or Copy, supposes an Original, yet none surely doubts the Eter­nity of him who laid the foundations of the Earth, and whose Throne is for ever and ever.

I put the Question even now, what the reason was, that the Astronomers Skill and Fore-knowledge of the Celestial Phenomema, had not the least influence to cause the same? and I gave this Answer, because these Phe­nomena did depend upon certain Motions of the Heavenly Bodies, which were regular, and had been from the beginning of the World; and so it was but enquiring into these Motions, and the Fore-knowledge of Eclipses, Conjunctions, and the like, would follow by consequence. Let it be now de­manded, why Divine Prescience had not any causality or influence upon the Creati­on? ^* [Page 53]and I shall answer this Question just af­ter the same manner; namely, because the Creation did depend upon the Will and Pur­pose of God, which is the first Mover, the Fountain-Cause of all things, and was from Eternity. Omnipotence it self, and even infinite Goodness, would seem barren and unfruitful without a Will to Act, for what­ever God made in Wisdom, and ruleth by his Power, were wrought after the ^* Coun­sel of his own Will; nor is there any thing in Heaven or in Earth, that can prescribe (in point of causality) unto the Blessed Will of God: 'Tis no more then, but Gods behold­ing, or taking a View of his own Purpose, and the Fore-knowledge of the future World must follow by consequence, which Fore­knowledge is nothing else, but the Prospect of what was potentially existent in himself, from everlasting, as hath been said.

From the foregoing Discourse it may ap­pear, that Divine Prescience, as such, can­not in propriety of Speech be said to have created the World, nor to have had any ef­ficacious influence thereupon; and if we consult the Scripture, we shall find the same yet more evident: There we find that God said, ^† Let there be light, and there was light. [Page 54]That, ^* by the Word of the Lord were the Hea­vens made,^†and all the host of them by the breath of his Mouth. ^‖ That the Worlds were framed by the Word of God. ^(a) And that He upholds all things by the Word of his Power. Now whether we take the Word of God for his Power, or for his powerful Command, or for the manifestation of his Will, (as it is frequently used in Scripture under these and sundry other acceptations) it will still come to the same thing, and what I am pleading for; but I do not observe it ever taken for Prescience, nor will the Bible (I think) afford an Instance of any Causali­ty ascribed thereunto; but on the contrary, many Scriptures do clearly evince Divine Prescience, and at the same time ascribe the Events foreseen to other Causes, which must needs be very much to the matter in hand, I shall mention two or three.

First, Our Saviour Christ (as was noted before) is said to know all things that should come upon him; and yet his being delivered unto death by the Jews, is attributed to their ignorance; For had they known, they would not have crucified the Lord of Glory.

Scondly, In the 29th. Chap. of St. Luke's Gospel, ^(a) our Lord Christ foretold (and [Page 55]therefore certainly he foreknew it) that E­nemies would cast a Trench about Jerusalem, that they would lay it even with the Ground, and not leave one stone upon another. Should Prescience have these dismal Effects, it might be thought to be a very malignant thing; and that which belongs to God as a Divine Per­fection, could not be cleared from being the Cause of much Evil. But let us not charge God foolishly, since we are informed of the true cause in the very next Words; namely, Because thou knewest not the time of thy visita­tion.

Thirdly, In the Prophecy of Plosea, it is said of Israel, Ephraim and Judah, ^*that they shall fall in their Iniquity, and that they shall be as Chaff driven with the Whirlwind out of the floor, and as smoak out of the Chimney. Was this Fore-knowledge the cause of that destruction? No; for it is presently added, O Israel, thou hast destroyed thy self.

Again, the Prophet Ezekiel is command­ed to say unto the Prince of Tyrus, ^†That Strangers, the terrible of the Nations, shall draw their Sword against the Beauty of thy Wisdom, and they shall defile thy brightness, and bring thee down to the pit, &c. And shall this come upon him because God foresaw it? [Page 56]No; but because thine heart was lifted up; and thou hast said, I am a God.

Lastly, To name no more, St. Paul ex­horting ^* to stedfastness in the Faith, fore­tells the Coming of the Man of Sin, which would be after the working of Satan, with all Power and Signs, and Lying Wonders; that there would be a falling away from the truth, and men should believe Lyes, that so they might be damned. Now should any Man to requite St. Paul for his Care of the Church, as to lay the blame of all these sad Consequences upon him, I know not whether would be greater, the Folly or Wickedness of such a Charge; and it would be yet worse, to lay the fault upon the Spirit by which he spake, as coming near to Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. But the Text carries the Cause along with the Effect, name­ly, ^† Because they received not the love of the Truth, that they might be saved, for this cause God shall send them strong Delusions, &c. When truth has offer'd it self by Miracies, and all possible demonstrations unto the minds of Men, and will not be received, it is a signal piece of Justice, to give them over to believe a Lye. But here first the true Phy­sitian of a Christian Soul admonisheth it's [Page 57]safety and it's danger; it's safety, not to be soon shaken; and it's danger of being deciev­ed: Now, if the Soul reject both the Phy­sitian and his Advice, and having wilfully put it self into the Hands of an Ignoramus, is destroy'd by him; nothing in the World can be more ridiculous, than to blame the time­ly Warning and Foresight of the good Phy­sitian.

Object. But as concerning these and other Prophetick Scriptures, I meet with this Sal­vo, namely, That whatever God foretells, he doth by his power inforce the accomplishment and fulfilling of the same. For (say these Persons) tho' God knows all things knowable, yet such Events as are contingent, or depend upon the fluctuating, and undetermin'd Wills of Men, are never knowable till they are brought to pass; and therefore God cannot foreknow them. But now, what God will have brought to pass, and whereof he gives Notice to the World by his Prophets, he doth bend and impel Mens Minds to do them, and by an irresistable influence bring them to effect.

This Argument indeed strikes home; the only danger is, that it goes too far; and will prove what the Patrons of it seem highly to oppose. None can pretend a greater concern for the Honour of God, than those that de­claim [Page 58]against what they call Horrendum De­cretum; yet this Hypothesis of theirs will force them to admit the very same thing, and will make God the author of Sin with an high hand. For if in reerence to all such things as are foretold by prophecy, there must not be admitted any thing contingent, nor purely voluntary, as falls out in other affairs; but all such Events are brought a­bout by absolute force; what is this but a fatal and inevitable Decree? And how can second Causes fall under any blame, since they are infallibly predetermin'd by God's Almighty Power? Hence it will follow, that the Jews and the Roman Soldiers, were no more to be blamed for their Injustice and Cruelty to the Blessed Jesus, than a Watch is for going too fast, when the Spring is set too high, or made too strong for the Move­ment. And if the fault be not in second Causes, it must of necessity lye upon the first.

It will be in vain to alledge, that they had been grievous Sinners formerly, and there­fore God justly gave them up afterwards to hardness of Heart. For, ^* The Lamb was slain from the foundation of the World, tho' not actually, yet so as to be the Object of Divine Prescience, unless you will say, he [Page 59]was slain from the foundation of the World, and yet God knew not of it. It was then foreknown unto God, that the Lamb would he actually slain, before they that slew him had done good or evil. So that if God do enforce whatever he foreknows, then they who crucified our Saviour, were under a necessity of doing it, from the foundation of the World; and they who shall be sedu­ced by Antichrist to believe a Lye, and so be damned, have been about sixteen hun­dred years under a satal Decree of Damna­tion. And even Adam, who all Men grant to have had Free-will, must have been un­der a necessity of falling; unless we shall sup­pose, that when God foreordained his dear Son for a ^* Sacrifice, he did not know to what End. But the Lamb slain doth suppose Sin to be attoned, and that implies Sinners: Now there could not be Sinners, but some Body must sin first, and that being the first Man Adam, must (by this Argument) have sinned, not out of choice, but una­voidable necessity, which is a most horrid and impious absurdity.

Thus we have at hand three pregnant In­stances, which do mightily expose the weakness of the Objection: The Sin of [Page 60] Adam, the Death of Christ, the Destructi­on of Jerusalem. The first of these appears to have been certainly foreknown unto God, and yet none denies that Adam had power to have stood innocent. The second was so particularly foretold by our Saviour him­self, that the very Persons were pointed out, who were the chief Actors in it; yet Had they known, they would not have cruoified the Lord of Glory. The third likewise was largely and punctually prophecied; yet had ^* Jerusalem known in her day, the things which belonged to her peace, Christ says, ^† He would have gathered her Children to­gether, as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but she would not. So that in these great Events, we may easily dis­cern a reserv'd condition, and an evident possibility of having been otherwise, tho' they were all known unto God from the Foundation of the World. For in case of right Judgment and Information (possible enough to have been attain'd) Adam had not sinned, Christ had not suffered, Jerusa­lem had not been ruin'd. They were all indeed foreseen in their Causes, and those Causes were sure to produce their proper Effects so far as they were permitted; that [Page 61]is, God foresaw, that Men left to their Li­berties and their Lusts, would make a false Estimate of things, and would be sure to act accordingly; but yet such foresight had no Causality upon such Actions, as hath been said; nor could there be any inforce­ment from God upon such Events, where­by the Liberty of free Agents was in the least diminished, if the Scriptures be admit­ted for truth.

But here I would not be misunderstood, as if I thought God to be an unactive be­holder of all those Transactions which are foretold by Prophecy: Surely he is too much a Cause of all things, to be a Nude Spectator of any one Action; and certain E­vents I grant to have been as well predeter­min'd as prophecy'd, of which I shall give Instance presently. When God purposeth to have any thing brought about, he can ea­sily set Agents at work, and remove Impedi­ments; he can turn Mens Hearts like Ri­vers of Water, yet never so, as to put any preternatural force upon the Will to do evil.

For the course of Divine Providence, (tho' invisible to us) I conceive to be so laid, and things dependent (by God's dispo­sal) in such a Series and Concatenation, that various Causes and Contingents shall con­cur [Page 62]to operate upon Mens Faculties, in such sort, as to make them willing to act their Parts, (unknown oft-times unto themselves) in order to effect the Almighty's Purpose. Upon which Account I am apt to believe, that even in reference to those Events that are under a peremptory Decree, most of the Actors that bring them about, are as much free Agents, as is the Husband man in his choice of a fit season to plow his ground. But however, the things I main­ly insist upon are these, that since Men de­rive that strength from God, by which they Blaspheme his Name, and violate his Laws, God must be the primary Cause of those Actions, but not of the Will wherewith they are done. That he doth not Enforce the Vo­litions unto Evil, and yet he fore-knows them: And that in divers Instances it doth appear, that those Events and Actions have been foreknown unto God, of which the immediate Instruments have been free and voluntary Agents, as hath already been made evident.

There is yet another part of the Objection to be considered, namely, That future con­tingents are not knowable. I confess, they are inscrutable to us, to whom they are con­tingent, but to God there can be no such [Page 63]thing; for he that makes any thing contin­gent unto God, leaves him obnoxious to Surprize and Disappointment, and conse­quently under great Difficulty of Governing the World. For the clearing of this point, let us lay down for a ground-work (what I hope is not denied by any that I am concern­ed with, namely,) that God Almighty knows most perfectly all things present; and let us see whether this will not both in­fer the knowledge of things to come, and take away all contingency with respect un­to God. And by the way, let us observe the knowledge of Mankind, which tho' very dim and imperfect, even in things now existent, and before our Eyes, yet ex­tends in some degree to things both past and future. The Historian is acquainted with many revolutions of former Ages, and from a parity of Reason may foresee some that are to come. The Physitian, that under­stands in any competent Measure the Nature of a Medicine, knows from whence it de­rives it's Original, what are it's constitutent Principles, and how it will operate. The Mechanist that understands an Engine, knows how it was made, the parts of which it is composed, and what Feats it will per­form. The Philosopher, that enquires into [Page 64]the Reasons of Things, and the Agency of Bodies, with the various Affections of Mat­ter and Motion, can tell before hand the success of divers Experiments and Under­takings, which are in the dark to other People. And the Astronomer can tell the future Appearances of Heaven, as was no­ted before. Now if all this, and much more, result from Man's imperfect knowledge of a few things, we must sure conclude some­thing further from God's most perfect knowledge of all things, especially if we add hereunto, the consideration of his Do­minion and Soveraignty over all Creatures.

The World is a great Machine or Engine, which God made at first, and still upholds its Being and Motion by the Word of his Power: Not so much as an Atome can stir but by Vertue derived from him. Shall we then think that the great Operator knows not the parts of ^* his own Work, or can be ignorant of its Motions, or of the Influ­ence that one part hath upon another? It is possible a Curious Artist may make a piece of Watch work to represent all the visible Motions of the Heavens, and to measure out time to an incredible degree of Exact­ness: The Maker of such a piece must needs [Page 65]know it's Numbers, how long it will go, how one Motion depends upon another, and one Wheel drives on another; nor can he be ignorant, that if he suffer the springs to run down, and Wind them up no more, the Motions will cease, and his Contrivance will become altogether useless: Or if by any other means, he stop some of the Mo­tions for a time, they cannot stir till he gives them liberty, tho' the rest are going in the mean while. Thus the Divine Archi­tect, that framed the World, knows all it's Parts and Influences, all it's hidden Springs of Motion, all the Causes of every Effect, with their Connexion and Dependence, and the Agency of every particle of matter throughout the Universe. He knows for what duration he design'd it's Motion and Existence, and the time when ^* Heaven and Earth shall pass away. Nor can he be ignorant, that if he withdraw the Springs of Life, his supporting providence from any Creature, or from the whole World, it must sink into a state of Inactivity or Anni­hilation. Now as it would be an idle Fan­cy to think, that in such a Watch, there should start up some new Motion, not de­sign'd, and unexpected by the Maker: So it [Page 66]is far more extravagant to talk of any thing contingent in respect of God, in as much as his Work is perfect, and he can com­mand a punctual observance of those Laws and Rules which he himself hath given to the Creation, whilst ^* Fire and Hail, Snow and Vapour, Stormy Wind fulfil his Word.

The Sum is this: God Almighty knows most persectly all things present; that is, the hidden springs of Action, and all the la­tent causes now operating; the Nature and Vertues of all things in being, with the ut­most extent of their powers and influence, are all manifest in his sight; but since natu­ral things do not work in an instant, their force and efficacy must extend to suture time, if I may not say, till time shall be no more; for one part of Matter will still ope­rate upon another, whilst Sun and Moon en­dures. Now since God cannot know per­fectly the force of any Agent, but (at the same time) he must know also the Effect it will have upon it's Patient, and how far a­gain that Patient will become active upon other things; it will follow, that if God did not know things to come, he must of necessity be ignorant of a thousand things present; for as the knowledge of Causes im­plies [Page 67]the knowledge of Effects, so doth the not knowing of Effects unavoidably infer the ignorance of Causes. And as he that draws one Link of an extended Chain, draws the whole, and the Motion of one of the Globuli, moves those that are contiguous, and those again others indesinitely: So it is impossible to know any one thing perfect­ly without the knowledge of more; and God's most perfect knowledge of all things present, must imply the knowledge of all things future.

It may be said, That all this is true with respect unto inanimate Creatures, but Man acts from an internal Principle, and being left to the Liberty of his Will, may either act or suspend his Action; and besides, there are so many things may happen to influence his Will, that 'tis very uncertain whether of the two he will choose, until he have effectually chosen.

Uncertain doubtless it is to other Men, and oft-times to a Man's self, what he will do in some cases; but unto God it cannot be so, for these two Reasons especially:

First, The Heart indeed is so deceitful, that for a Man to find out the Subtilties of his own, ^* is no easie disquisition; and it must be [Page 68]yet harder to know another Man's. But ^* God sees not as Man sees; he not only looks upon the heart, but he looks into it; ^† He searches and tries it; He knows the most intimate Secrets of the Soul, and is a discern­er of the thoughts and intents; all Creatures are manifest in his sight; all naked and open before his Eyes: It is impossible then they should deceive him, or act beyond or con­trary to his Expectation. For since words and actions flow (as streams from a Foun­tain) out of the abundance of the Heart, it would be strange that God should know so exactly what the Fountain-contains, and yet be ignorant what Streams must issue thence.

Secondly, Since the Principles from whence all humane Actions do proceed, may be reduced to two, namely, those of Na­ture and Grace, and God must know the Efficacy of them both, in as much as the one proceeds from the work of his Hands, and the other from the operation of his Spirit; it must follow that God cannot be ignorant how far Truth or Errour, Vertue or Vice, Equity or Injustice, Reason or Fallacy, Re­ligion or Interest will prevail upon any Man, either in his Natural Capacity, or un­der [Page 69]such a Measure of Grace as he bestows upon him for that purpose. For as he knows the force of natural Agents, and the disposi­tion of every Patient to receive, or to repel their Agency; so can he not be ignorant of the Efficacy of that Vertue, which proceeds more immediately from himself. All which amounts to thus much in short, that God Almighty is the Fountain Cause and Sove­raign Ruler of all things, both in the King­dom of Nature and that of Grace; and therefore must know the whole Series of Causality from the beginning to the End. And since that which is an effect of one thing, becomes the Cause of another; he must equally know the things to come as those present; unless there be some Effects, which proceed not from any Cause at all.

Let us now consider the Nature of a Con­tingent, and what it is that should make Men think it cannot be soreknown. A Con­tingent (besides the stricter Notion as it sig­nifies the effect of a voluntary cause) may be, as I apprehend, more strietly taken, for the encountring, or meeting together of sundry Effects, whose Causes do not appear to have had any Connexion. As when a Spring-tide, a Land-flood, and a Storm from the Sea, happening at once, do make an [Page 70]Inundation. Or when a Traveller in his Journey meets with a shower. Or two Friends setting out from sundry Ports, meet in a far Country, without designing it, or knowing one of another. Now a high wind and a Spring Tide, a Journey and a Shower, have each of them Causes sufficient to pro­duce them, but they are contingent each to other, as also in respect of us, who not knowing that such causes were operating, could not foresee the effects. But the case is not so with God, it is not yet come to that pass, that because Men cannot foresee con­tingent Events, that therefore we must con­clude, that God cannot do it neither. For as Wind and Weather are in his Hands, and obey his Will, so Voluntary good Actions flow originally from the Holy Spirit, and evil Actions are permitted, as the Devils were to enter into the Swine: Nor can wicked Agents go one hair's breadth beyond their appointed limits. And even permission it self doth imply Fore-know­ledge; for how can any one be said to have permitted, what he knew not of before it was done? I hope, that to evade this Ar­gument there's none will say, that God gives to wicked men a general Licence to do what they please, whilst he in the mean [Page 71]time knows not in particular, what wick­edness they will commit, until they have acted it. For besides, that this Character is exactly suited unto Satan in his Kingdom of Darkness, it destroys Divine Providence root and branch; for how can God limit, or over-rule to his own good Ends and Pur­poses, those Events whereof he hath no particular foresight? or how can he be said in such a case to govern the World at all.

But as concerning the Nature of a Volun­tary Action, I have spoken before; I shall only add in this place, that since God knows most perfectly the heart of Man, and what causes are interested in forming of his Judgment; how far the Will follows the Dictate of the Understanding, and of right Reason, or whether it is captivated by Sen­fual Appetite, and by the lusts that war in his Members: Since God (I say) doth infallibly know the Springs of all Actlons, whether from Sense, from Reason, or from Grace, and to what degrees any kind of Ex­ternal or Internal force can bend those Springs; he must of necessity know what Man (purely lest to his own Faculties) will do upon any occasion.

I have insisted longer upon this Objection, as also upon the Non-causality of Divine [Page 72]Prescience, than some perhaps will think to have been necessary; but because the sence of the Objection is said to come from Per­sons of very great Learning and Reason, and I did my self hear it strongly urged, that Prescience must needs cause the things Foreseen; I thought it not amiss to enlarge a little upon both the Points, in order to clear them up to common Understandings; but whether I have done it to Satisfaction, I must leave to the Readers Judgment. The sum of what I have said in reference to this last mentioned (which I discoursed of be­fore) is this, that to affirm Divine Presci­ence to have a Causality, in such sort, that the Events foreseen could not possibly have fallen out otherwise, is Abusurd, and it is false. It is Absurd because it puts the Cart before the Horse, and makes that to be a cause which is purely an effect; and it is False, because it is contrary to the word of Truth, contained in the Scriptures. I shall now conclude this part of my Essay, with the words of the Schoolman; ^* Neque hinc eriam fit, ut per hanc Praescientiam, Deus imponat necessitatem aliquam rebus sic cogni­tis, quia haec Scientia, ut sic, non est earum causa. It doth not follow from hence, that [Page 73]God by his Fore-knowledge imposeth any ne­cessity upon the things so known, because this knowledge, as such, is not the Cause of them.

But before I come to the last part of my Design, I must make a short Digression, to prevent an Objection that may arise from what I said not long ago, namely, That the Divine Will was the fountain Cause of all things, as being the first Mover; for no doubt God is the first cause of all Motion, tho' he never determines any, exerted by a free Agent to a wrong. Object; and all things being wrought (as the Apostle says) after the Counsel of his Will. From hence it may be urged, That tho' Divine Prescience have no causality, yet since we grant that the Divine Will is the first cause of all things; nor can we deny, that whatever God wills, he certainly foresees; doth it not follow from hence, that all things must come to pass according to the fixed Purpose and Preordination of God, in such sort, that the Will of Man must needs be over-rul'd and predetermin'd, and consequently the free-agency of rational Crea­tures wholly evacuated?

I answer, this will by no means follow, as may appear from the consideration of the following particulars.

1. Though God foresees whatever he [Page 74]will have brought to effect, yet we cannot say on the contrary, that he wills every thing he foresees. God, 'tis true, wills even the sinful Actions, which he foresees, but with a will permissive of them, not effec­tive; perfectly knowing (as a Wise Man would shrewdly guess) what Persons, so and so inclined, will do in such and such Circumstances, being only Inabled, not Im­pelled, to act, and being left to follow their own Inclinations. And so he may certainly foresee many things, which he never wills by a positive and effectively determinative will. He equally foresees all things that come to pass, otherwise he would be de­ficient in point of Knowledge; but we must not say, he wills them Equally. For that would be to approve of evil, and so he would be deficient in point of Goodness. For instance, he predetermin'd Israel's De­liverance from Egyptian Bondage, and he likewise foretold it: So that herein his Pur­pose and Foresight run Parallel. But then he foretold Pharaoh's Obstinacy in detain­ing the People, at the same time when he will'd him to let them go; and herein his Foresight and express Will are quite contra­ry. He wills, that Men should fear the Lord, and serve him in sincerity and in truth; and [Page 75]not only so, but that they should do it out of ^* free choice, arising from a true Judg­ment of things; yet he soreknows that some will be Disobedient, and Iniquity shall abound ^†. He wills, that his chosen People be with him, and see his Glory ^‖, and he knows it shall be so; he knows that others will dye in their Sins, but he hath sworn he wills it not ^(a). Whatever God hath pro­claim'd, is an undoubted Object of Divine Prescience; but every Object of Divine Prescience is not therefore preordain'd, nor agreeable to his Will. Good things are e­qually the Objects of Divine Pleasure and Foresight; but we cannot say the like of Evil. We may say indeed, that God fore­sees an Evil Action, but we cannot say he would have it done, nor that he hath pow­er to do it; for both these would imply a contradiction, since 'tis purely inconsistent with the Divine Nature to have either Will or Power to do evil.

A second Consideration is this, That tho' the Divine Will be truly and unchangeably one and the same, yet is it distinguishable according to a threefold difference of things about which it is conversant. As first, when [Page 76]God designs to bring about some special act of his Providence in the World, as that Pro­mise made to Abraham, ^*Ʋnto thy Seed will I give this Land; in this respect his Will is Positive and Irresistable, nor can all the Powers of Earth and Hell, put one Mi­nutes stop unto his Purpose or Decree.

But Secondly, when God commands any thing to be done by his People, as their Duty, and for their Good, he deals not with them as inanimate Creatures, but as ratio­nal Ones; he proposes unto them a Rule or Law, with the Benefit of observing it; as for Example, Honour thy Father and thy Mother, that thy days may be long in the Land, &c. But he doth not inforce the observation of this Law, upon all those to whom it is given; for so there would be no Transgression. He propounds it to their choice, expecting a Voluntary Obedience upon promise of a Reward, which reward cannot be commensurate to an Obedience upon Force, which properly is no Obedi­ence at all. In this sense therefore his Will is Imperative, but not Irresistable; for the stiff-necked are said to resist the Holy Ghost. ^†

And Thirdly, when God forbids any [Page 77]thing to be done by us, that would disho­nour him, and destroy our selves, and yet we do it; or when he commands us any thing, wherein we disobey him, his Will is there­in only permissive. Thus Sin, tho direct­ly opposite to the Command, is permitted. And so God is said to have Suffered the peoples manners in the Wilderness about forty years, ^* as also in times past, he suffered all Nations to walk in their own ways ^†. Not that their Ways were acceptable to him, or agreeable to his Will, (in any other sence than that of permission) much less effica­ciously influenced by him; only they were suffered for a time to run their Course. For, having set before them Life and Death, partly in his Written Law, and partly in their own consciences, and having em­ploy'd all suitable Means, Motives, and Rea­sonable Inducements for their choosing of the one, and refusing of the other; accord­ing to his primary Intention of good unto all Men: If nothing less than. Invincible Grace will serve the turn, God is not obli­ged to save all those as it were by Miracle, that will not be otherwise saved; and there­fore permitting obstinate Persons to reap the fruits of their own Works, his seconda­ry [Page 78]intention takes place, namely, the mani­festation of his Power, Righteousness, and just Severity upon impenitent Sinners, whereby also the preciousness of Grace and Mercy is the more conspicuous to those that receive it.

Now, tho' I like not by any means, that distinction of the Divine Will into Secret and Revealed, especially when these two are made to contradict each other; as if it were God's Secret Will that Men should sin and be damned, when his revealed Will bids them repent and be saved; this is to stem the Current of Scripture, and in effect to make void both the Law and Gospel. I say, tho' I approve not this, nor shall I bor­row any of the School Distinctions; yet I think the Scripture will allow us to say, that the Divine Will is either Positive, Precep­tive, or Permissive. By Positive I mean Irre­sistable, in reference to what God does him­self, or what he positively determines to be done; Preceptive is with respect unto Laws, and Mens voluntary obedience thereunto; Permissive in respect of Sin. And yet this is still the same most blessed and unchangeable Will, as it is the same Sun-beams by which some sort of Bodies are hardned, others melted, and a third calcined.

I come now to the last part of my Under­taking, which is to answer some of those Ob­jections, that are wont to puzzle divers People about this matter; but I have an­swered so many already, that have risen by the way, and have enlarged beyond my ex­pectation in what is past, that I would think, it should spare some pains in the remainder. For the strength of what now remains, may be summ'd up in a very few Objections, and answered (I hope) in not many words.

It is matter of easy Observation, that the Objectors do still suppose the thing in Que­stion, and what ought to be proved before the Objections can have any force at all; as namely, that God's foreknowledge of the End makes void the use of Means; whereas it is so far from doing that, that the use of Means and second Causes, is therein suppo­sed and imploy'd, as the Foundation of such Foreknowledge. For if it were possble, that the force and efficacy of Causes could be uncertain unto God, the Foresight of Ef­fects would be so too. Thus, for example, if God foresee that such a Child shall live to be a Man of Eminent Learning, doth this Fore-sight give him leave to be idle, and become a Truant every day? Now the [Page 80]Objectors, according to their manner of arguing; must answer in the affirmative, and leave the Child to be made a Scholar by Miracle. But I answer, No; for such a Fore­sight must have some Foundation; it doth therefore suppose, that God for his part, by his daily providence, will continue unto him a competent measure of health, strength and capacity, and afford him fit means and opportunities of becoming Learned; and that the Boy for his part, will studiously im­ploy and improve the same for the best ad­vantage to that End. Let us now see the full strength of what is wont to be objected in this matter.

Obj. If God's Fore-knowledge doth ascer­rain the End, to what purpose is the use of means? An Event can be no more than cer­tain; and if God foresees that I shall certain­ly dye within a year, all the Medicines in the World will not make me live a day longer. But if he fort sees, I shall live twenty years, I shall not only need no Physick, but I may for diver­sion, leap once a day into a River, or into the Ocean, without any fear of drowning. I can neither fall short of, nor go beyond that fatal Period which is fixed in Divine Prescience.

This Objection seems to make some little noise, and yet at most is but a plausible [Page 81]kind of Fallacy, imploy'd only by vulgar and unthinking heads, but unworthy a Man of good consideration. It is indeed answer­ed in what hath been already said; but I shall add something more in these few par­ticulars. As first,

1. This sort of Reasoning resembles so much that of the Devil to our Saviour, that it may very well seem to challenge the same Author. If God forsees thou shalt live ma­ny years, thou may'st leap into the Sea, or throw thy self down from a Precipice, (says the Objection) for thou must certainly live out thy appointed time. ^* If thou be the Son of God, cast thy self down from this Pin­nacle of the Temple, (says the Devil) for he shall give his Angels charge concerning thee ^†. Now, as the ground of that Secu­rity against Dangers, and sundry Evils men­tioned in the 91st. Psalm, at ver. 8. is omitted in the Devil's Quotation: So the ground of God's Foresight and cause of the Event foreseen, is omitted in the Obje­ction, namely, a prudent care to preserve life: And as the Son of God was never like to fall down and worship the Devil, so any sober Man that lives to a full Age, is not like to attempt desperate ways to destroy [Page 82]himself. The Answer too, given by our Saviour, is proper in this Case; ^* Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God: For if he foresees the End, he foresees also the means conducing thereunto, which means God having graciously put into thine own hands, why shouldst thou tempt him to save thy life by Miracle, when thou may'st preserve it by thy own Discretion? Thus we see, the Devils Argument, and that of the Objecti­on, run exactly Parallel.

Secondly, The Fallacy of this reasoning consists partly in joining a Truth and a Falsi­ty together, and make the one to infer the other, tho' there be no Connexion between them; and partly in leaving out the consi­deration of that which must be suppos'd, to make the sence compleat, whether the in­ference be true or false: For instance, let this be the Argument in short: ‘God foresees the End, therefore it will so come to pass.’

I say here, the Proposition is true, but the inference (without something else suppo­sed) is false; for if the illative Particle there­fore, refer only to the word foresees, there is no good consequence, since Forelight hath not any Causality, as hath (I hope) been [Page 83]proved. That Divine Prescience doth as­certain the End, is true upon this Account, ^* that it beholds the Causes wherein the cer­tainty doth consist, but that it doth so meerly of it self, without supposition of Causes, and proper means to effect that end, is false. God, by his Foresight, lays no necessity up­on the Event; but he foresees it in it's cau­ses, of which humane Endeavours ordinari­ly are no small part. Therefore the sence of the Argument must, in this manner, be com­pleated, before it can be made to conclude any thing.

Thirdly, Let us suppose, that God fore­sees some strong Man, vigorous and health­ful, shall dye within a year, who accord­ing to the Course of Nature might live twen­ty. If this be true, it must be true also, that intemperance, neglect of means, or the like, must bring him to it: Some cause there must be; but naked Foresight is no cause at all. Again, suppose God foresees, that such a [Page 84]person will live twenty years. If that be true, then, that he should attempt every day to destroy himself, must be false; for if God foresees the one, he foresees nor the other, because they are inconsistent. He doth not foresee contradictions to be true, or things to be that will never be; as once a wise Critick would needs maintain, that when Jonah was sent to preach unto Nineveh, God then foresaw, that City would be destroy'd in forty days, tho' it stood many years after. But God doth not foresee that Causes will produce such Effects as are improper and impossible; not that Repentance will pro­duce Destruction, nor that Poison, Drown­ing, or Debauchery, will produce length of days, and vertuous prudence an untimely End. In a word, Divine Prescience beholds not things in parcels, but altogether in one View: Sees the Issues and Periods of all things, not without, but in conjunction with the proper causes conducible thereunto.

Fourthly, It may not be amiss to remem­ber, that as there are some true Propositi­ons, which by leaving out a word or two may be made false: So there are others (and those of Divine Authority) which without something understood, cannot be made out to be true. Of the first sort is [Page 85]this, ^* My Doctrine is not mine; and again, He that believeth on me, believeth not on me. But this is the Devil's way of quoting Scrip­ture, leaving out the Context that should explain it, and in this manner too frequent­ly do some Persons deal with those Wri­tings, they have a mind to cavil at. Of the other sort is this, ^† Yet forty days and Ni­neveh shall be overthrown; And ^‖ Know ye not that the unrighteous shall not inherit the Kingdom of God? Now the Divine Pur­pose for the Destruction of that City, and for excluding ^(a) Fornicators, Idolaters, Thieves, Drunkards, Extortioners, and the like, out of the Kingdom of Heaven, is denounced absolutely without any an­nexed Condition; and yet all acknowledge, that such Threatnings are Conditionally to be understood, and to be executed only in case of Impenitency: And thus it is in our present case. That God Foresees the End, is true; but it is not the whole Truth, nor to be understood exclusive of the Means. It is undoubtedly true, that Christ foresaw the Destruction of Jerusalem; yet we must not thence infer, that he foresaw it with­out any respect to Sin; for thus he com­plains, How often would I have gathered your [Page 86]Children together, &c. and ye would not! How could it be matter of Complaint that they would not, if the Peoples choice be not imply'd? Either God Foresees, that Men will abuse their Liberty, or he doth not; if not, then neither is he Omniscient, nor are the Scriptures true; if he doth, then such Foresight is so far from taking away Mens Liberty, that it confirms it; for Men cannot abuse their Liberty unless they have it; nor can they use it, if the Objection have any force, which supposeth. Mens en­deavours, and the use of Means to be in vain. Thus then I Summ up what hath been said in Answer to the Objection.

^* God that made the World made all things therein, seeing he is Lord of Heaven and Earth, and giveth unto all Life, and Breath, and all things; and hath made of one Blood all Nations of Men to dwell upon the Earth, and Determined the Times before appointed, and the Bounds of their Habitation. We ought not to think, that the Godhead is like unto Stones, or stupid Earth, that he should be ignorant either of his own Off-spring, or of the Work of his Hands, or the Bounty of his Goodness. And having gratiously en­dued Mankind with the Light of Know­ledge, [Page 87]and with a Faculty of choosing things for his good, and avoiding things hurtful; he doth not extinguish that Sight, nor take away such power of Election, unless it be, as a Punishment, for some grievous and long-continued Provocation. But foras­much as he beholds at once in his Omni­sciency, the Nature, Vertue, and Activity of all Creatures, with the Causes, Events and Issues of all Things and Actions, from Everlasting to Everlasting; and since he knows most perfectly the Heart of Man, the Bent of his Affections, his measure of Grace, and prevailing Motives; he must of necessity Foreknow the various Results of Man's choice and Liberty of Will, without the least obstruction to the free Course and Exercise thereof. He Foresees the End, to­gether with the Means, and the Effect de­pending on its proper Cause. He foresees, that some Men shall not live out ^* half their days, but they are such as are bloody and deceitful. He foresees, that ^† The Years of the Wicked shall be shortned; but then he shall fall by his own wickedness. And to con­clude, he foresees, that ^‖ A righteous Man shall prolong his days; not by daily attempts to destroy himself, but (as the Wise Man [Page 88]saith) by the fear of the Lord, and in the way of Righteousness.

Obj. One Objection more, and I have done. It hath been often said in this Discourse, that the Event Foreseen of God, is certain, and will come to pass; and again, it hath been as­serted, that some Events, which have been Foreseen, might possibly not have come to pass; how can these two Notions agree together?

I answer, first, that any thing can be certain and uncertain at the same time, and in the same respects, is granted to be a contradiction; but a thing barely Possible, which may either be, or not be; implies no contradiction at all. For as there are many things Possible to be, which shall never came to pass Actually; so other things shall Actually come to pass, which yet Pos­sibly might not be. Thus it is Possible, I may go to Rome, but 'tis a thousand to one, I shall never come there; and if it Actually so fall out, yet that does not take away the Possibility of going thither; for Learned Men say, ^* Multa futura esse quae non crunt, & multa posse fieri quae non fient. On the o­ther hand, something will Actually (that is certainly) be done this day, which pos­sibly might be deferr'd till to morrow: Illud [Page 89]enim possibile est, quo posito nullum sequitur inconveniens. But all this perhaps will better appear from the consideration of these Par­ticulars.

1. An Event may be certain with respect unto God, which is not so to us; for nothing can be uncertain to him that is Omniscient; but to us, that know but in part, almost every thing Future is obscur'd with some kind of uncertainty.

2. An Event may be certain in it self, on Supposition of certain Causes; and yet sup­posing other Causes, it would fall out quite otherwise. So that

3. The certainty of a future Event is ab­solute in respect of God, Hypothetical in respect of it self, but unknown or uncer­tain in respect of us. That is to say, it can never so fall out, but that he who knows the whole train of Causes leading to it, must of necessity Foreknow it. But it is the Causes (not the Foreknowledge) which make it to be what it is; which being supposed, the Effect certainly follows. Which Certainty extends not to us, who are ignorant of the Causes. Let us see now, how this will ap­pear by instances.

Suppose, the French King, before he dye, turns Protestant; whether it so fall out or [Page 90]not, God knows; for (as Solomon saith) ^* The Kings heart is in the hand of the Lord. If Conviction or Interest oblige him to be­come a Protestant, the Effect will certainly follow; but this is Hypothetical; that is, upon Supposition of prevailing Causes and Motives it must follow. But to us there can be nothing of Certainty, whilst we are ig­norant of that Princes Intentions, neither know how it may please God to work upon him hereafter.

The Captivity of the Jews was certainly Foreknown unto God, and, together with a great Pestilence foretold by the Prophet Jeremiah, in a very remarkable and parti­cular manner: And afterwards, saith the Lord, I will deliver Zedekiah King of Ju­dah, and his Servants, and the People, and such as are left in this City, from the Pesti­lence, from the Sword, and from the Famine, into the hand of Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon, and into the hand of their Enemies, &c. And he adds further, That their City shall be given into the hand of the King of Babylon, and he shall burn it with Fire. Yet the same Prophet is sent to call them to Re­pentance, to prevent even this very Capti­vity, and tells them, ^‖ If ye throughly amend ^†[Page 91]your Ways and your Doings; if ye throughly execute Judgment between a Man and his Neighbour; if ye oppress not the Stranger, the Fatherless and the Widdow, and shed not innocent Blood in this place, neither walk af­ter other Gods to your hurt; then will I cause you to dwell in this place, in the Land that I gave to your Fathers, for ever and ever. We see here a reserved Condition, and fair possibility of preventing that Eminent Cap­tivity, so much noted in Scripture, and so much Prophesied. God grant that we, by the same Method, may earnestly endeavour to prevent another Captivity, which has (they say) been Prophesied too, and which severely threatens England at this day.

I conclude with Adam's Transgression, before-mentioned; which was most cer­tainly Foreknown unto God, forasmuch as ^* Redemption by the Precious Blood of Christ was Foreordained before the foundation of the World; and 'tis no less certain, that Adam had Free Will, and Power to have persisted Innocent, which surely amounts at least to a possibility of not transgressing the Divine Command. And this consideration alone is enough to answer the Objection, and to si­lence any Argument that can be opposed in this matter.

I have now done; the Uses I propound to my self from this Discourse are Special­ly these four: 1. To read the Scriptures Im­partially, and to value them Equally, upon the Account of that Sacred Authority stampt upon the whole, and the Spirit that breaths in every part; not to build an Hypo­thesis upon some few single Expressions, fur­ther than it may appear, to be consentane­ous to the integral Body of Truth contained therein. 2. In all mysterious Points, where­in there appears a difficulty, either to affirm or deny, still to adhere to that side which hath the surer Evidence; and wherein the Word of God is clear and unquestionable, to esteem that the strongest Evidence of all; and unto which all Arguments from humane reason, and even Mathematical Demon­stration, must yield submission. 3. But in such matters, wherein there appears equal Danger in both extreams, and wherein ma­ny Person have err'd on either hand; to take the MIDDLE WAY, and walk in it, with such Caution and Moderation, as to be Friends with them that tread not the very same steps, and always ready to admit any further discovery of Truth. 4. To repre­sent the Ever-blessed God, in the best man­ner that may be thought, and most worthy [Page 93]of so glorious a Being, cloathed with all Perfection, Beauty and Amiableness; not to render him Monstrous, like armed Pow­er without Benignity; nor Contemptible as an ignorant or defective Deity; but es­pecially to think of him according to the Notices he has given of himself in his reveal­ed Will; and not to imagine, that either his Essence, or many times, his Operations can stoop to my little understanding.

And if I were fit to give Advice to others, it should be this, that no Man presume to demolish the Divine Attributes, and out of the ruins thereof, to erect unto himself some groundless Fancy, which like a Castle in the Air, hath nothing Solid to support it; as if God could not be just to his Creatures with­out being imperfect in himself. Neither let any Man stand dismayed at the Considerati­on of the Fatal Period; as if God could not foreknow the Events of things, but either Divine Justice must be Arraign'd, or Man Degraded to a Machine; for as he that doth Righteousness is Righteous, and by perseve­rance therein shall undoubtedly be happy; so he that wilfully persisteth in evil doing, is Wicked; and without Repentance, must ex­pect to be miserable. But as the former of these will look upon Divine Prescience as [Page 94]the Cause of his Happiness; so neither can the latter blame it, as any occasion of his Misery.

Let no Man think to arrest Judgment, by absurdly charging his own Prevarications upon Divine Perfection; as if a Man should urge, that because God is perfect in all his Attributes, he was therefore obliged to be wicked in all his Actions: Who would not blush at the Impudence and Absurdity of such a Plea? Prescience is a Perfection which God cannot want and preserve his Divinity; but to make it a Cause of Mans Misery, were to make it an imperfection. It is no less es­sential to the Divine Nature than Omnipre­sence; and those that will dare to Retort their wickedness upon God, may make this Attribute as Criminal as the other. For if Men will not trust God with the Foreknow­ledge of evil Actions, lest that should infer a necessity of sinning, the next thing (and with equal reason) will be to seclude Divine Presence from the inspection of wicked­ness, lest God should that way become ac­cessary thereunto. If a naked Foreknow­ledge of Evil, be any cause of it, why not actual Presence at the Evil committed?

But the Scripture doth better inform us, concerning the Causes of good and evil, and [Page 95]of Mans Happiness and Infelicity, than the shallow reasonings of some Persons, who yet pretend to be wise above others. There we are taught, that Man's happiness depends upon the Grace of God in Christ Jesus, free­ly offered to reasonable Creatures, and wil­lingly accepted by them. That the Soul, not by any blind fatality, but by rational induce­ments and the use of proper Means, being convinced of the Evil and Danger of Sin, and directed the way to Salvation, is brought to such a Belief of the Gospel, and such a volun­tary Obedience thereunto, as may render the Person acceptable with God through the me­rits of our Blessed Saviour; ^* In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgive­ness of our sins, according to the riches of his Grace.

And then the cause of Man's Sin and Mi­sery doth consist, not in Divine Prescience, but in the Prevalency of Corruption and Temptation, arising partly from an Original Taint, and partly from a wilful Pursuit of ir­regular Appetite after the pleasures of sense; by which means, the Affections being besot­ted, and the heart hardened against Reasons without, and Motions within, there is at last an inveterate and habitual Malignity brought [Page 96]upon the Soul. * But let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with Evil, neither tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own Lust and enticed, Jam. 1.13, 14.

These are such causes of Good and Evil, that a diligent observer may easily see and feel their Efficacy; but how a naked Presci­ence should operate, what others do, I know not. I can by no means understand. But this I conclude for certain, that God is Righte­ous in all his ways, both with respect unto the causes of Good and Evil, and their Re­wards or Consequents. His Judgments will one day appear to be according to Truth, without the least diminution of his other per­fections; namely, † Ʋnto them that are con­tentious and obey not the Truth, but obey Ʋn­righteousness, Indignation and Wrath; but to them who by patient continuance in in well do­ing, seek for Glory and Honour and Immor­tality, Eternal Life, Rom. 2.7, 8.