The Degrees of ardency in Christ's Prayer, &c.

§. 1 I Was very willing to hearken to the seasonable advice of many, and to wholly withdraw my self à foro conten­tioso, to some more pleasing & profitable imployment; but discerning it to be the desire of the Author of the Book, Intituled, A mixture of Scholastical and Practical Divinity, that I should reply to his examination of one passage of mine a­gainst Mr. Cawdrey, I shall make no scruple immediately to obey him, not only because it may be done in very few words, but espe­cially because the doctrine, which he affixeth to mee, seems (and not without some reason) to be contrary to the truth of Scrip­ture, which I am to look on with all reverent submission and ac­quiesce in, with captivation of understanding, and so not assert any thing from my own conceptions, which is but seemingly contrary to it.

section 2 The proposition which he affixes to mee, isOf the fulness of Christ. p. 258. this; That Christs love of God was capable of farther degrees, and that he refutes, as being contrary to that point (a truth of Scripture) which he had in hand, viz. The dwelling of all fulness of habitu­all grace in Christ.

section 3 By this I suppose I may conclude his meaning to bee, that I have affirmed Christs love of God (meaning thereby that habituall grace of divine Charity) to have been capable of further degrees, so as that capacity of further degrees, is the denyall of all fulness of that habitual grace already in him.

section 4 And truly, had I thus exprest my self, or let fall any words, which might have been thus interpretable, I acknowledge I had been very injurious not onely to the verity of God, but also to my own conceptions, and even to the cause which I had in hand, which had not been supported, but betrayed by any such appre­hension of the imperfection of Christs habitual graces.

[Page 2] section 5 This I could easily shew, and withall how cautiously and expresly it was fore-stall'd by mee; But to the matter in hand, it is sufficient, that I professe I never thought it; but deem it a contrariety to expresse words of Scripture in any man who shall think it, and in short, that I never gave occasion to any man to believe it my opinion, having never said it in those words which he sets up to refute in mee, never in any other that may be rea­sonably interpretable to that sense.

section 6 First, I said it not in those words, which he undertakes to refute; These are p. 258. of his Book thus set down by him.

section 7 These words I never said, nor indeed are they to be found in the Passage, which he sets down from mee, and whereon he grounds them; which, saith he, is this:

section 8 Here the Reader findes not the words [Christs love of God is capable of further degrees] and when by deduction he endea­vours to conclude them from these words, his conclusion falls short in one word viz. [further] and 'tis but this,

section 9 This is but a slight charge indeed, yet may be worthy to be taken notice of in the entrance (though the principal weight of my answer be not laid on it) and suggest this seasonable ad­vertisment, that he which undertakes to refute any saying of another, must oblige himself to an exact recital of it to a word, and syllable; Otherwise he may himself become the onely Author of the Proposition, which he refutes.

section 10 The difference is no more than by the addition of the word [further.] But that addition may possibly beger in the Read­ers understanding, a very considerable difference.

section 11 For this proposition [Christs love of God was capable of fur­ther degrees] is readily interpretable to this dangerous sense, that Christs love of God was not ful, but so farre imperfect, as to be capable of some further degrees than yet it had; And thus sure the Author I have now before mee, acknowledges to have un­derstood the words; and accordingly proposeth to refute them from the consideration of the all-fulness of habitual grace in Christ, which he could not doe, unlesse he deemed them a pre­judice to it.

section 12 But those other words, which though he findes not in my papers, he yet not illogically inferres from them [that Christs love of God was capable of degrees, more intense at one time than at ano­ther] are not so liable to be thus interpreted, but onely import that Christs love of God had in its latitude or amplitude severall degrees, one differing from another. See magis & minus, all of them comprehended in that all-full perfect love of God, which was alwayes in Christ so full, and so perfect, as not to want, and so not to be capable of further degrees.

section 13 The Matter is cleare; The degrees of which Christs love of God is capable, are by me thus exprest, that his love was more intense at one time than at another; but still the higher of those de­grees of intensness, was as truly acknowledged to be in Christs love, at some time, viz. in his agonie, as the lower was at [...]; and so all the degrees, which are supposed to be mentioned of [Page 4] his love, are also supposed, and expresly affirmed to have been in him at some time or other; whereas a supposed capacity of further degrees, seems at least (and so is resolved by that Au­thor) to inferre, that these degrees were not in Christ (the direct contradictorie to the former Proposition) and so that they were wanting in him, & the but seeming asserting of that want is just­ly censured, as prejudiciall to Christs fulness. Here then was one misadventure in his proceeding.

section 14 But this is but the proaemial, part of my Reply, there is an­other more material branch of it still behind, which may yet seem necessarie to be added, viz. to mind him of (what he well knowes) the distinction between habits and acts of virtues, or gra­ces; and that love the Genus doth equally comprehend both these species, and that his discourse of all fulness belonging to the habi­tual grace of Christ, I speak distinctly of another matter, viz. of the degrees of that grace discernable in the several acts of it.

section 15 This distinction I thought legible enough before, both in the Tract of Will-worship, and in the Answer to Mr. Caw.

section 16 In the former the p. 259. Refuter confesseth to finde it, reciting these words of mine, It is possible for the same person constantly to love God above all, and yet to have higher expressions of that love at one time than another. Where the expressions at one time, and at another, must needs referre to the severall acts of the same, all-full habituall love. Onely I guesse not what temptation he had to choose that expression, which he there makes use of, viz.

Whereas 1. those of Will-worship being the First papers writ­ten on that subject, are sure very pertinent to ascertain him of the meaning of the latter, written in defense of them; and secondly the early cautelous speaking there, might have made further la­ter caution unnecessary: and 3ly, I could not be said to mince (which to vulgar eares signifies to retract in some degree what I had said before,) and again, speak more cautiously, when that was the first time of my speaking of it.

[Page 5] section 17 Mean-while it is manifest, and his own confession, that there these were my words, and those so cautious, that this sense of the words which he undertakes to refute, could not be affixt on them. And this I should have thought sufficient to have preserved my innocence, and forstalled his Ʋse of Con­futation.

section 18 But the answer to Mr. C. which occasioned it was, I think, as cautious also, 1. In the words recited by the Re­futer, viz. that Christ himself was more ardent in one act of prayer then in another. 2. In the words following in that an­swer, but not recited by him, viz. that the sincerity of this or that virtue exprest in this or that performance, is it we speake of when we say it consists in a latitude and hath degrees; where the [this or that performance] are certainly Acts of the virtue, consisting in a latitude and the having degrees (viz in that lati­tude) no way implies him that hath that virtue in that latitude (viz. Christ) to want at present; and in that sense to be ca­pable of farther degrees.

section 19 I am willing to look as jealously as I can on any pas­sage of my own, which falls under any mans censure; and therefore finding nothing in the words set down by him as the ground of the Refutation) which is any way capable of it, I have reviewed the whole section, and weighed every period, as suspiciously as I could; to observe whether I could draw or wrest that consequence from any other passage, not recited by him.

section 20 And I find none in any degree liable, except it should be this in the p. 221. n. 1. beginning of the Sect. Where setting down the argument, as it lay in the Tr. of Will-wor. I say tis possible for the same person which so loves God (i.e. with all the heart) to love him, and expresse that love more intensely at one time than ano­ther, as appeared by the example of Christ.

section 21 If this be thought capable of misapprehension, by reason of the [and] disjoyning love from the expressions of it, and so the expressions belonging to the acts, the love be deemed to denote the habitual love; I must onely say; that this is a misapprehension, for that by loving with all the heart, in the first place, I certainly meant the sincere habit of Love, by love in the latter place, the [Page 6] inward acts of love, and by the expressions of love, the out­ward expressions of those inward acts, and of those acts onely I speak, and of those expressions, when I say they are more intense at one time then another.

section 22 The word love, as I said, is a genus, equally compre­hending the two species, habitual and actual love, and equally applicable to either of the species, to the acts as well as ha­bit of love. And so when I say love is capable of degrees, the meaning is cleare, The generical word love restrained to the later species, i. e. considered in respect of the acts of love, gradually differenced one from the other, is that respect, ca­pable of degrees, both inwardly and in outward expressions, that act of love, that poured out, and exprest it self in the more ardent prayer, was a more intense act of love, then another act of the same habitual love, which did not so ardently expresse it self.

section 23 I shall explain this by the Refuters own Confession. The death of Christ, p. 259. saith he, was an higher expression of Christs love of us, then his poverty, hunger, or thirst. To this I subjoyn that such as the expression was, such was the act of inward love, of which that was an expression, it being certain that each of these expressions had an act of internal love, of which they were so many proportionably different expressions; And from hence I suppose it unavoidably consequent, that that act of internal love, exprest by his dying for us, was superior to those former acts, which onely exprest themselves in his po­verty, and so the same person that loved sincerely, did also love, and expresse that love more intensly at one time then at ano­ther, which was the very thing I had said in another instance. But this I have added ex abundanti more then the Refuters dis­course required of me.

section 24 It now onely remaines, that I consider whether this Re­futer have in the process of his discourse added any thing, where­in I may be any whit concern'd.

section 25 And 1. saith he, the falsehood of such an assertion is evident from the point there handled and confirmed, the abso­lute fulnesse of Christs grace, which by the general consent of the [Page 7] Fathers and School-men was such, as that it excluded all intensive growth.

section 26 But to this the reply will bee easily foreseen, from the premisses, that as the point by him handled and confirmed was di­stinctly the all-fulness of habituall grace in Christ, so his proofs of it by the consent of Fathers and School-men belong still to that ful­ness of habitual grace.

section 27 Witness one for all, Aquin. is Ser. 3. qu. 7. art. 12. ad secundum, licet virtus divina possit facere aliquid majus & melius quàm sit ha­bitualis gratia Christi, non tamen—though the divine power may make somewhat greater and better, than is the habitual grace of Christ, yet— so 'tis plain he speaks of the fulness of the habituall grace. And ad tertium. In sapientia & gratia aliquis proficere potest dupliciter; uno modo secundùm ipsos habitus sapientiae & gratiae aug­mentatos, & sic Christus in eis non proficiebat. Alio modo secundùm effectus, in quantum aliquis sapientora & virtuosiora opera facit, & sic Christus proficiebat sapientia & gratiâ, sicut & atate, quia secun­dùm processum aetatis perfectiora opera faciebat,—et in his quae sunt ad Deum, et in his quae sunt ad homines. One may increase in wis­dome and grace two waies, one way according to the habits of them increased, and so Christ increased not; another way, according to the effects; when any doth more wise and virtuous workes; and so Christ increased in Wisedome and grace, as he did in age, because accord­ing to the processe of his age, he did more perfect workes, and that both in things belonging to God, and men also.

section 28 And thus are the Schoolmen understood by the Refuter himself, in his producing their testimonies, as appeares by the expresse words [habitual grace p. 260. lin. penult. and holiness, and the Image of God in him] p. 261. lin. 13. And so 'tis most cleare, their consent belongs not, even in his own opinion, to the matter I had, and have in hand, no way denying but asserting a capacity of degrees among the acts of Christs love of God, and the expressions of it.

section 29 Secondly, he will heare the Doctors objection, and con­sider of what weight it is.

Objection? against what? against the fulness of habitual grace▪ [Page 8] in Christ? sure never any was by me urged againstit. And he cannot now think there was. The degrees of intenseness obser­vable in the several acts of Christs love, his praying more ardently at one time then another, was all that I concluded from that text, Luke 22. 44. and that is nothing to his habituall love.

section 30 But even to this he is pleased to frame answers (though I hope his doctrine of the fulnesse of Christs habitual grace be no way concern'd in it) and to these I shall briefly attend him, as my last stage in this no very long voyage.

section 31 And 1. saith he, the vulgar translation renders [...], prolixius; and if this version bee good, then there is no place for the Doctors objection.

But though I seek no advantage by that vulgar reading, yet thinking it a duty of reverence to that version, to take leave ci­villy, whensoever I depart from it (wherein I shall have the suf­frage of Protestants as learned in both the Languages Paulus Fagius, Praf. in Vers. Chal. Paraph. in Pentat. Hebrew andJoh. Boys Eliens. vet, Interpr. cum. Beza-col­lat. Greek, as any) and that I may to the utmost observe the Refuters steps, I shall not utterly reject it.

section 32'Tis certain [...] doth primarily signifie extension, and that properly belongs to length, and so the comparative [...] to a greater degree of that length. And if it bee granted, that it so signifie here, there will yet be place equally for my conclu­sion.

section 33 For in every act of Prayer, be it but the shortest ejacula­tion, sent out by Christ, I suppose (and my Refuter must not doubt of it) there was some degree of ardency or intension; And then sure according to the multiplying of those acts, lengthen­ing that prayer, there must still in Christ (I say not in every one of us) be a proportionable multiplication of those degrees, and so parallel to a greater length; a greater intension.

section 34 This is cleare, and I need not adde (what else I might) that the very multiplication of more acts of any virtue, supposing it equally sincere in the habit (and such is the length of Prayer, when it is in Christ) is more valuable in the sight of God (and that argues it more excellent) than the smaller number of those acts would be, and proportionably more abundantly rewarded [Page 9] by him, who rewardeth every man not onely according to the sincerity of his heart, but also secundùm opera, according to the multiplied acts or workes, the more abundant labour proceeding from this sincerity. And so that will suffice for his first Answer.

section 35 But then 2. Saith he, suppose we stick unto our own translation, yet the place may fairly be so interpreted, as that it may no wayes advantage the purpose of the Doctor. For [...], more earnestly, may be considered in reference unto either the object unto whom he prayed, God; or the matter, a­gainst which he prayed, the evils with which he conflicted in his agony.

1. Then, saith he, he did not in his agony pray more earnestly then at other times, if we consider his prayer in reference unto the object, unto whom it was, God. The Religion, and in­ward worship of his prayer, was for degrees alwayes alike equal. His trust and dependance upon God, love of zeal and devotion towards God, from which all his prayers slowed, were not at one time more intense then at another.

But now 2. He prayed more earnestly in his agony then at other times, in regard of the matter, against which he prayed, the evils which he encountred with, which if they were not grea­ter, then those that he deprecated in the former prayer, v. 42. yet at least they made a greater impression upon his humane na­ture; for they put him into a bloody sweat. Being in an agony, he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood, falling down to the ground.

section 36 These are the words of his second answer, and they are in the second part, the very distinct confession of all that I pre­tend in this matter (and therefore I need not make any re­flections on the first part of them) For whatsoever, or how great soever the occasion of the increase of his intension was (which I am willing to beleeve proportionable to the degree of the intension, a very weighty occasion that thus inflamed his ar­dency) yet still, 'tis confest, that on this occasion, he now prayed more earnestly then at other times, that which now approached made a greater impression on his humane nature; which what is it but a proof of the point by me asserted, that Christ him­self was more ardent in one act of prayer (this in his agonie) then in another.

[Page 10] section 37 As for the greatnesse of the occasion, so confest [...]ly great as to cast him into that prodigious sweat, falling [...], as it were drops of blood, that may testifie, but it can­not prejudge the ardency, which was occasioned thereby.

section 38 Twas not in Christ (he will easily suppose with me) as it is oft discernable in many of us, that those which have re­ally no sincerity of love or zeal to God, can yet like the Mari­ners in the tempest, by some pressing fear or danger be awaked to but formal, and, be they never so loud, but hypocritically zea­lous prayers.

section 39 The ardency in Christ was sincere ardency, accompanied with acts of love and trust of the same temper; and the height­ning it [...], was an addition of degrees to that act of ardency, and so of prayer, and proportionably of love and trust in God, above either what there was, or what there was, oc­casion for, at other times.

section 40 Of this I shall hope it is possible to finde some instan­ces among men (of whose graces it can be no blasphemie to af­firm, that they are capable of degrees) suppose we a sincerely pi­ous man, a true lover of God, and no despiser of his poor perse­cuted Church, and suppose we, as it is very supposeable, that at some time the seas roar, the tempest be at its hight, and the waves boat violently upon this frailbrittle vessel, may it not▪ be a season for that pious mans ardency to receive some growth? for his zeal to be emulous of those, waves, and poure it self out more profusely at such, then at a calmer season? I hope there be some at this time among us, in whom this point is really exem­plified, if it be not, it is an effect of want, not fulness of love. But I need not thus to inlarge; It is not by this Refuter denied of the person of Christ, and that is my intyre [...] in reference either to Mr. C. or to him, the utmost that I under­took to demonstrate then, or to justifie now.

section 41 And so. I shut up this hasty paper, hoping that he which invited, and promised it a welcome, in case it were given him in a fair and Scholastical way, having nothing to accuse in it, as to the first Epithet, will abate somewhat in reference to the second, and allow it a friendly, though being unqualified, it pretend not to a more hospitable reception.

section 1 SInce the publishing that Answer to Mr J. concerning the degrees of ardency in Christ's prayer, I am advertised of another passage in that volume, in which I am concern'd, re­lating to some words of mine in the view of the Directory pag. 19. on the head of Ʋniformity in Gods service, and particularly respecting my rendring of the Apostle 1 Cor. 14. 40. Let all things be done [...].

section 2 These indeed I thus rendred [decently, and according to or­der, or appointment] and affirmed the importance of that place to be, that all be done in the Church according to custome, and appointment, rendring this reason of the former, because it was implied in [...] decently (custome being the onely rule of de­cency &c.) and of the latter, because the words do literally im­port this, [...], i. e. according to order or appointment.

section 3 To the former of these he makes his first exception, thus, [He dares not affirm that this is the immediate sense of the place, but onely that it is implied; It cannot be denied but that decency doth imply such customes, the omission of which necessarily infer [Page 4] indecency, but that the omission of such ceremonies as ours, doth in­fer undecency, the Doctor & all his party can never make good; What undecency can the Doctor prove to be in the administration of Bap­tisme without the Cross, as also in publick prayers and preaching without a Surplice? But of this see farther in Ames in the places but now quoted; The Doctor may perhaps look upon him as an in­considerable adversary. But we shall think his Arguments consi­derable, until the Doctor, or some other of his party give a satisfa­ctory answer unto them. In the mean while let us examine the proof that the Doctor brings for this sense: and it is, because cu­stome is the onely rule of decency.

This prop [...]sition, though very strange▪ is prooflesse; and there­fore we might as well reject it, as the Doctor dictates it. But I shall add a confutation of it from these following arguments.

1. If custome be the onely rule of decency, then nothing else can be a rule thereof besides custome; but this is false, for the light and law of nature, is also a rule thereof, and that infallible.

2. Nothing can be undecent, that is agreeable unto the onely rule of dicency. But divers things are undicent, which yet can plead custome: and this is so evident, as that. I will not so much under­value the Doctors judgment as to endeavour any proofs thereof. It is impossible that the onely rule of decency should be undecent: But yet it is very possible that many customes should be undecent, and therefore I shall conclude that custome is not the onely rule of de­cency.

3. Lastly, unto custome, as you may see in both Aristotle and Aquinas, the frequent usage of a thing is required. But now there may be decency or handsomeness in the first usage of a thing; and of this decency custome is not the rule, and therefore it is not the onely rule of decency.

section 4 The first thing here charged on me is timidity, that I dare not say, what I said not, and this attended with a concession (in a limited sense) of the truth of what I did say; the second, is the impertinence, or unsufficiency of that, in that limited sense, to prove what he conceives I would have from it, viz. that the omission of our ceremonies doth infer indecency; And the proof of this charge twofold, 1. by way of question, founded in two in­stances, the Crosse in Baptisme, and the Surplice in publick pray­er [Page 5] and preaching; 2. by reference to Ames, and resolving to think his arguments considerable, till a satisfactory answer be gi­ven them. And his third charge is, my using an unsufficient proof to prove my interpretation, viz. this because custome is the onely rule of decency] which he confutes by three argu­ment.

section 5 These three charges I shall now very briefly examine, and if I mistake not, clearly evacuate. the first by assuring him, 1. that I did dare to say, and indeed said (as I then thought, perspicucusly) the full of what I meant, but that it was no way incumbent on me, to say either what I did not mean, or what Mr J. or any other should be justly able to charge of want of truth in the least degree. And 2. if what I said cannot, as he confesses, be denied, to have truth in it in one sense, I demand why must it be a not daring (which is wont to signifie timidity, or cowardice) that I affirmed it not in another sense, wherein be doth not consent to it?

section 6 To make short, and prevent all possibility of his, or any mans farther mistaking my words, I shall hasten to tell him the full of my meaning in that passage, that [ [...] decently] im­plies [according to custome] viz. that in such things as these, of which then I spake, gestures, habites and the like circumstan­ces of Gods publick service, wherein the Apostle prescribes care of decency, 'tis necessary to observe the customes of the place wherein we live: This I then thought sufficiently explicated by exemplifying in mens wearing long hair, which the Apostle pro­ved indecent by its being against [...] i. e. saith Suidas, [...], a custome of some continuance in that place (which yet in women there, and in men in other places, where that cu­stome prevail'd not, had nothing indecent in it.)

section 7 But this exemplification of my meaning he thought fit to con­ceal from the Reader, and supply that vacuity onely with an &c. yet reciting at length, to a word, what was immediately before, and after it. His design in so doing I judge not, but shall endeavour to undeceive the Reader for the future, by far­ther inlarging on it.

section 8 All people, I think, in the world have some outward signi­fications, and expressions of Reverence, but all have not the [Page 6] same, but according to Topical customes some different, some contrary to others. We of this, and all our neighbour Nati­ons express reverence by uncovering the head, the Turkes do the contrary. Again among Christians, 'tis customary for men so to express their Reverence, but for women, saith the Apostle, it is not, but the contrary; and so still it is among us. Nay it was once among some hethens (that worshipt Mercury) in act of the highest reverence, even of adoration, to throw stones at their God, among others to cut themselves with lances, when they were a praying to him. And it can be no news to Mr J. that these customes were not observed by other countreys; the Jews that threw stones at Christ, and the Damoniack that cut himself with them, were neither of them interpretable to wor­ship him.

section 9 This therefore was no dark, but visible foundation of what I said; In affigning any rite or ceremony for the service of God, decency, saith the Apostle, was to be observed, the onely rule to judge of that, is, say I, to consider the customes of that particular place, of which we consult. Where bowing the knee, or kneeling on the ground, is customarily used as a token of re­verence, where putting off or keeping off the hat, there the choice of ceremonies must be made with respect to those parti­cular customes; Here 'tis evident that I mean not the frequent usage of that ceremony, in opposition to a first usage of it, as Mr J. is willing to mistake me, and sound one of his arguments on that mistake, but the standing custome of the place, by which, as by an argument or evidence, such a ceremony is demonstrated to be a reverential respect, and so (for the service of God to whom all reverence is due) decent in that place, though in Na­ture, or in the estimation of all other men, it be not so.

section 10 Certainly this is so evident in it self, and so undeniably the importance of my words, that there can be no need farther to inlarge on it, much lesse to examine the weight, or meaning of his concession, that it cannot be denyed but that decency doth imply such customes, the omission of which necessarily infers indecency.]

section 11 This saying of his some Readers may look on with Reve­rence, as not readily comprehending the importance of it, o­thers may chance to despise it under the appearance of a tauto­logie. [Page 7] But upon pondering, it will appeare that the Author had a meaning in it, which he designed should bring in some advan­tage to his cause, and without which he was not likely to ad­vance far, or succeed in it.

section 12 Some customes we know there are, which are so highly de­cent, as that the omission of them necessarily infers indecency; But what are they? why, such as the law of (at least Lapst) nature prescribes, covering of nakednesse, and the like; of which tis evident among all that have not learnt of Carneades industriously to rase out all natural measures of honest and disho­nest, that the omission of them inferres indecency, yea and neces­sarily inferres it, this sort of decency being natural to all men, that ever were, or shall be in the world, born and educated in what nation, or inured to what customes soever, and this the very first houre after our first parents fall, before any custome had been contracted which might recommend it to them.

section 13 And as of these his Rule is true, that the omission of these ne­cessarily inferres undecency, so it is in a manner proper to these, and belongs not to any other sort of things, whose decency flowes but from some positive command though it be of God, or custome or command of men. To such things whose decency flowes from any command either of God or man, this rule can­not be fully applied, for that command might have been not gi­ven, or there might be a space before it was given, or a people to whom it was not given, and then in any of those cases, the omission would not be indecent to whom the law was not given; and so it doth not necessarily and absolutely, but onely depen­dently on that law, and conditionally, inferre indecency; so in like manner the Rule holds not in those things, whose decency is introduced onely by custome, for that, as Mr. I. truely saith, arising from frequency of actions, it must again be granted, that there was a time when that which now is custome, was new, and so not custome, and again there are, or may be nations, with whom that custome (whatsoever can be inflanced in) hath not prevailed, which prejudges still the necessity spoken of, that such omission should inferre indecency.

section 14 And so we see the summe of Mr I. his liberal concession, viz: that decency implies naturall decency, or such customes, [Page 8] which are naturally decent, and so the omission of them natu­rally indecent; and if the Dr. or his party do not prove, or make good, that the administration of baptisme without the crosse, is against the law of nature, that the preaching without the surplice beares analogy to the disclosing of Nakednesse, he is utterly refu­ted by Mr I. in his interpretation of [...], or notion of de­cency.

section 15 That this is indeed his meaning (though somewhat darkned in that his expression) will appear but consequent to the two things, which he hath premised in this matter, from Amesius his notion of decency, p. 64. in Marg: 1. that decency requires not that any sacred things be instituted de novo, but onely that those things which are instituted by God, be used in that man­ner which is agreeable to the dignity of them, 2. that as order so decency belongs to civil offices, as well as sacred things, in which in­decorum est vitium oppositum debito illi modo, qui requiritur ad eorum justum finem et usum consequendum, indecency is a vice opposed to that due manner, which is required to the obtaining the just end and use of those things. Now if in the former of these, the mode, he speakes of, as agreeable to the dignity of those things which are instituted, be it self supposed by him to be instituted by men, then must he acknowledge humane power of instituting ceremonies, which being so contrary to his design, I must resolve not to be intended by him; but rather that as the sacred things are instituted by God, so the mode, which is consentaneous to their dignity is instituted by God also, and that nothing is decent in sa­cris, which is not so instituted. And so likewise on the second head, that of civil offices. For that indecency, which is a vice or sin, must be contrary to some law of Gods, and so also that which is opposed to the due manner which is required, and so is ne­cessary either necessitate medii, or praecepts also, to obteining a just end, this sure is more than the omission of an indifferent cu­stome, which may or may not be continued without any offence against nature, even the omission of strict universal duty, either natural decency, or somewhat that beares proportion with it.

section 16 Now this being thus far explained, it is time to close with Mr I. and mind him, what he cannot but know, that the decency which I said implied custome, is certeinly another thing from na­tural [Page 9] decency, and hath place onely in those things, the omit­ting of which doth not necessarily inferre indecency. That omis­sion which necessarily inferres indecency, inferres it in all that e­ever did, or shall omit it; we know in logick, that no pro­position is necessary, which is not [...], true in the whole species, of all, and every one, and I leave it to his judgement, whether he think the Dr. and his party (i. e. Praelatists, I sup­pose,) do conceive, that Adam (whether in, or out of para­dise) Noah in, or out of the Arke, &c. were obliged to pray in Surplices, under pain of Indecency? And so (in his other in­stance) that John Baptist, that Christ, or (because the text saith that he baptized not but his disciples) that those disciples, even be­fore the death of Christ, might not baptize any without the sign of the Crosse, but under the same penalty?

section 17 Nay ti's allready past question, that Mr I. in his first argu­ment against my dictate (as he calls it) saith, that the light and law of Nature is also a rule of decency, and so not onely custome: And if so, then custome is a rule of decency also, and not onely the Law and light of Nature, and where custome, and not the light of Nature is the rule, there the omission of that doth not necessarily inferre indecency. And of such decency alone it is evi­dent that I spake, on the head of Ʋniformity, (and could not speake sense, if I spake, either of any other, or of the General notion of Decency, which is competible to any other) and from thence it followes demonstratively, that of that Decency of which I spake, (though not of that, of which it is certain I spake not) still Custome is the onely rule of decency.

This therefore I hope may serve in answer to his first charge, that of my timidity, that I dared not say, what I said not; toge­ther with a view of his concession of the truth of what I did say, and the wary limitation of that concession.

section 18 Secondly then to his second charge, the unsufficiency of that limited truth (which is the utmost he will yield my proposition) to prove what I would have from it] It will soon appear of how little force it is, when 1. my meaning was quite another thing from what he affixt to my words, or yielded me in his limited concession, as hath already been largely manifested; and 2. my conclusion is regularly consequent to that which was alone my [Page 10] meaning. This latter the addition of a few words will clear also.

section 19 My conclusion designed in that Section, was the justifying of Ʋnformity of ceremonies in the service of God, and one of the grounds to support that, the decency of those ceremonies, where­in all should joyn, and that decency ruled, and judged of by the custome of the place, in which such or such a ceremony was an usual indication, and expression of that reverence, which being due from all inferiours to their superious, is much more due from all Christians to God.

section 20 In these it is certain, custome is the rule and the onely rule of decency; Neither Nature nor Gods Law obliges all man-kind to this, or that expression of reverence. Several Nations have their several manners of doing it; Onely Nature tells us, that the most reverened manner of treating is best becoming God, and that it cannot be decent, to treat God in that manner as we would not do any superior beside, and Gods own expostulation about the offering polluted bread upon his altar, and of sacrificing the lame & the sick, Mal. 1. 8. is a confirmation of that, Offer it now, saith God, unto thy governour, will he be pleased with thee?

section 21 Apply this to a particular case, to a Nation, where 'tis cu­stomary to address to Kings, kneeling, and there the Analogie will hold exactly, (but not where that is not custome.) Among such I may say, Did ever any man that had his limbs and health, offer a petition to his Prince in the gesture of sitting, or lying along upon a table? and if he did not, then I must, I suppose, regularly conclude from custome, the one rule of decency in such matters, that according to Gods arguing it cannot be decently done in his service, which is the tendring our petitions or requests to that infinite Majesty. And so proportionably in other things.

section 22 This I did not there apply to the Cross in Baptisme, and the Ministers using of the Surplice, as being not pertinent to that place. Another head was set apart for those, and proceeded to §. 28. the Cross expresly named, and the Surplice implied under the title of other ceremonies, of which it may there be seen, what my conclusion was, not what is here deem'd incum­bent on me to prove, that the omission of them infers indecency, [Page 11] but that standing on those grounds, whereon they are known stand, Conscience duly instructed cannot think it necessary or ten­ding to edification to cast them causlesly out of this Church, or the whole Liturgie for their sakes.]

section 23 And yet if Mr J. shall now desire to know what the grounds of those two Ecclesiastical rites are, which alone he is pleased to name, on perswasion, I suppose, that they were as fit, if not fitter then any others, for the disproving my position, of [cu­stom being the onely rule of decency] I shal now render him a brief account of them, such as may in some degree confirm the truth of it.

section 24 And first for the Crosse in Baptisme. 1. 'Tis known to all that our Christian course is a spiritual warfare under Christ our Great General; Now it is, and alwayes hath been customary over the world, that in a Militia there should be some banner, or Insigne, to which every one should resort and fight under it. This hath custome made decent among all, and supposing that custome, the omission of it in an army is indecent, yet not so, as things dishonest, or breaches of the Law of Nature, are in­decent.

section 25 And the Crosse on which Christ was crucified, the Embleme also of that state that every Christian enters into, a constant couragious patience for all afflictions was by the primitive Chri­stians thus used, as their Sign [...] crucis a­ctio Chri­stiana de­scribitur. Aug. de Doctr. Chr. l. 4. symbol or Insigne, and every man that is inrolled in the Christian Militia, is by him that inrols him, signed with it; and this practice being thus founded, and recei­ved in the Church, Saint Augustines words are worth remem­bring, and cannot be denied to have truth in them, In Joh. Tr. 118. Signum crucis nisi adhibeatur, sive frontibus credentium, sive ipsi aquae quâ regeneramur &c. nihil ritè perficitur, unless the sign of the cross be used either to the foreheads of the believers (who are Baptized) or to the water it self by which we are regenerate, it is not duly performed, i. e. with such ceremonies, as by custome of the Church the Rule of decency, belong to it; and, Crucis signo in fronte hodie tanquam in poste signandus es, omnesque Christiani signantur (de Catechiz. rud. c. 20. tom. 4. pag. 915.) thou must be signed now in the forehead with the sign of the Cross, as the Isra­elites on their door-posts, and so must all Christians. In the fore­head [Page 4] head particularly Tom. 10 p. 289. B. in fronte figat ubi sedes pudoris) because the seat of shame is there, which we render in token that the bapti­zed shall rot be ashamed—.

section 26 Secondly, the usage of this ceremony of signing with the Cross, was we also know, frequent in the Church (while the gifts of healing continued) inSee Aug. de Civ. D [...]il. 22. c. 8. curing diseases, and casting out Devils, so that Athanasius fre­quently affirmes of it,De Incarnat. Tom. 1. pag. 84. So pag. 101. D. [...]. And pag. 102. 6. [...]. And contr. Arian. Or. 1. pag. 285. A. [...]. And Praesente signo crucis obmutescit Paganitas. Aug. T. 4. 229. B. And 832 B. Daemonia nominatâ cruce Christi ter­rentur, si impensius fiat, fugantur. Dii Paganprum metu crucis responsa dare non possunt. [...], by the sign of the cross all magick and witchcraft is brought to nought, all the Idol Temples laid waste and empty.

section 27 And then Baptisme being the exorcising of Devils (the an­cient Catechists we know were called exorcists) the rescuing a person from the power of Satan into Gods sonship and family, what can be more proper, or agreeable, or exactly symbolical, then the use of this in Baptisme, according to that of Ter­tullian, de Resurr. Carn. Caro sig­nature ut anima muniatur, the flesh or body is signed, that the soul may be defended or fortified.

section 28 And if instead of theAd omnem progressum frantem crucis sig­naculo terimus. Tertul. de Cor. Mil. c. 3. frequent use of it among the anci­ents, evenVide Narrat [...]. Hippolyti Apostolorum [...], apud Pallad. Hist. Laus. pag. 1049. [...]. before the cumber­some weight of ce emonies came in ( [...], saith the Author of the Quest. and Resp. ascribed to Justin Martyr, Qu. [...] pag. 364. in time of prayer we sign those that have any need of it, those that are any way ill affected) we in this our Church retein it, onely in our solemne [Page 13] entrance into Christs camp, in token that we mean valiantly to fight under his banners, and in confidence that he that thus sign­ed to Constantine victory from heaven ( [...], in this overcome) will thus give grace, and seal to us victory over our ghostly enemies. What question can there ever be of the perfect decency of this usage among us?

section 29 And then for the Surplice: It is no news I hope for se­veral sorts of men to have solemn garments for solemn actions, which they do not use at other times. The Judges upon the Bench, or the Lords at their coming to Parliament, are a suffici­ent evidence of this, who weare not those robes in common occasi­ons which there they do, as betokening their quality and the im­ployments they are about. And then what is thus customarie in civil matters (viz: to difference persons and imployments, yea and dayes by distinction of garments) and is allowed to be de­cent therein, this by analogie undeniable, is as fitly and decently from thence derived to solemne sacred actions also, such are the publick offices of the Priest; and the commands of our Superi­ors being added to this decency of the matter, [...] to [...], it is, I am sure, more than undecent for inferiors to be obstinate, and deny obedience to them. In the choice of the garment there hath been also, as neare as may be, a resemblance observed of those garments, which in Scripture are mentioned for the like solemnities, long, shining, i. e. white robes, or garments; And if the constant usage of other Churches beside this of ours, Eastern as well as Western, for so many centuries together, be conside­red, it will be competently able to establish an Ecclesiastical cust me also, which, in things of this nature, were external or­naments, and formalities, is a more rational ground, and rule or measure of decency, then any Mr J. (or Amesius to boote) will readily be able to produce for the rejecting of them, or breaking, and casting away those bands, which tyed no harder a yoke than this upon their shoulders.

section 30 In this case I believe (though not in the garments them­selves) there is place for that decency, the omission of which ne­cessarily inferres indecency, and for such order the breaking of which must soon end in [...] (which Mr I. saith, St. Paul opposes to [...]) viz: down right confusion.

[Page 14] section 31 Having sa'd thus much ex abundanti, above what was incum­bert on me, I shall flatter my self, that I may now spare any larger paines, in survey of Amesius's arguments, which Mr J. is resolved to think considerable, and to speake very magnificently of them, as proving that the text is 1 Cor. xiv. 40. rightly understood doth not onely not authorize any humane institution of ceremonies, but on the contrary plainly condemnes them, and this, saith he, was so well managed by him, that he hath quite beaten out of the field Bishop Morton and his second, Dr J. Burges:

section 32 Here is triumph indeed. And I suppose the Reader already discernes, what are the grounds of it, viz. that Amesius ac­knowledges nothing decent, but that, the omission of which neces­sarily inferres indecency, i. e. as hath been shewed, nothing but natural decency, the omission of which is a vice contrary to that, by consequence, that there is no such thing, as an indifferent gesture or garment, which either civil, or Ecclesiastical cu­stome, or obedience to our lawfull superiors may render decent; that whatsoever some eternal Law of Nature commands not, the doing of that, if it be but wearing such a garment, which the Canons of any Church prescribe, nay, by parity of reason, a cloake or a buttond doublet, is absolutely unlawfull by force of 1 Cor. xiv. 40.

section 33 This being the bottome of those arguments of Amesius, I may safely tell Mr J. that they could no otherwise beat either Bi­shop Morton, or Dr J. Burgesse out of the field, than that they thought them utterly unworthy their making replies to; He that thinkes there is nothing indifferent, nothing lawfull, the omission of which is not sin, doth certainly use other dictonaries than we do; discernes no difference betwixt lawfull, and neces­sary, and as the Assertors of Fatall production of all things will not allow a cause to be sufficient to produce any effect which it doth not produce, and so produce, that it cannot not produce it, which is to tell me that I sit, and walke at the very time, when I stand still, it being certain, that I am equally able to do both those, when yet I really do the third onely, so he will not al­low any thing morally possible, which is not morally necessary, which is certainly the giving new lawes to words (making the word [lawfull or possible] which was wont to be interpreted [Page 15] that which may or may not be done, to signifie onely that which must be done, and may not be emitted) and not new rea­sons to confirme old paradexes.

section 34 This argument of Amesius against things indifferent, that learned Bishop was well acquainted with, by his familiar confe­rences with Mr. Lapthorne a vehement disputer against ceremo­nies, and whom the Bishop thought fitter to refute by trifling in­stances, of unbuttoning, and buttoning his cass [...]ck; than by more serious attempts of conviction, i.e. in plain termes to de­spise and smile at, than to dread; and if Mr J. have really read Mr Hooker, whom he somwhere intitles our Patrone of ceremonies, he may in him remember a discourse of lawes, which will supersede all necessity, or benefit of my farther inlarg­ing on it.

section 35 Meane while, to the reproch of my great stupidity, I willingly acknowledge, that it cannot enter into my understanding, what sense that text is capable of, which with the best (possible) mana­gery can be taught plainly to condemne all institution of ceremonies in the Church, i. e. by what prosyllogismes, or supplies or advantages of art this Enthymeme shall be rendred concludent. The Apostle commands that all things be done decently and in order. Ergo, He condemnes all institution of Ceremonies for Gods worship. He that can maintain this consequence not onely to be true, but (as Mr J. affirmes of him) plain and evident, will be a formidable adver­sarie indeed, much better deserving that title, than one whom he knowes not, and therefore honours with it.

section 36 His third and last impression now remaines, wherein he un­dertakes to prove by 3. arguments that custome is not the onely rule of decency; and his first argument is, because the light and law of nature is also a rule of decency. To this I answer, that in those things, whereof alone he knowes I there speak, in the §. concerning Ʋniformity, i.e. in things indifferent, gestures and o­ther ceremonies in Gods service, the Law of Nature is no rule at all, and, I suppose, he cannot think; I am sure, he pretends not to prove, or so much as affirme, it is, and therefore though not simply in all sorts of things, of which I spake not, nor can by any rules of discourse be supposed to have spoken, yet as to the matters then before me, wherein Ecclesiastick Conformity [Page 8] consisted, custome and onely custome was the rule of Decency.

section 37 His second argument is wholly deceitfull, and must be disco­vered to be so by reducing it to rules of art. 'Tis by him variou­sly formed into two several Syllogismes. The first is this.

section 38 But this is no regular Syllogisme, 'tis in no mood or figure, nor readily reducible to any, and therefore twas his onely way to presume it evident, and never to endeavour any proof there­of.

section 39 But he hath thought fit to vary this syllogisme, and give it in other termes, and then one might hope it would be exactly form'd. 'Tis thus,

section 40 But this is no syllogisme neither, being far removed from the measure that Logicians exact, and such as by which I will prove any thing true, that is the most distant from it. For example, it is a granted truth, that Law is the onely rule of Justice, yet this I shall disprove by a syllogisme exactly formed by Mr J. his model, Thus,

section 41 To discover this deceit then, the syllogisme which is now no syllogisme must be somewhat better form'd, according to the rules of Logick, and reduced, as near as it can, into a true syllogisme. Thus,

[Page 17] Here before it can be defin'd whether this be a regular syllogism, or no, it must be demanded, quanta est minor, is the assumption Ʋ ­niversal or particular? If it be particular, then either the conclu­sion must be particular also, or else tis a false syllogism. And if the conclusion be particular, then it infers no more then that some un­decent custome cannot be the only rule of decency, which is willingly granted by me, who do not at all affirm it of undecent customes; But if the minor be Ʋniversal, then 'tis a false proposition, for cer­tainly all customes are not indecent. The short is, Nature may be the rule of one sort of decency, & custom the only rule of another; yet if the custom be in it self indecent, then of such indecent custom it is not pretended, that it is either onely, or at all the rule of decency. And so still my proposition may stand good, which as it belonged not to natural decency, so much less to what is by Nature, or in it self undecent, never imagining it reasonable, that what gestures were against those Laws of Nature, or Scrip­ture, or any other Law of decency, or rather of natural comli­ness and honesty, should by pretence of any custome whatever, be introduced into Gods worship; 'Tis sufficient that some cu­stomes may be decent, or in themselves not indecent, and that all decency in the service of God, is to be regulated and judged of by conformity with them: For I said not that all customes were the rule of decency, but that some were, and that there was no other rule, but custome. This, I hope, hath discovered the in­validity of his second argument.

section 42 His last argument [because there is dicency in the first usage of some things] falls upon that mistake of my words, which I dis­coursed of, and cleared at the beginning, for I never said, that a thing must be customary, before it is decent in any kind; (know­ing unquestionably that there is a natural decency) but that the decency of any ceremony in Gods service, wherein God and Na­ture have prescribed nothing particularly, must be regulated ac­cording to those measures, which the customes of any place do allow to be reverential among them; Or, in yet plainer words, the civil customes of any Nation, by which this or that sort of gesture is rendred a token of reverence, are the onely rule, by which the decency of indifferent gestures, &c. is to be judged of, in order to God's service. And so much for the last argument [Page 18] also, and consequently for the first part of his exception, that against my interpretation of [...] decently.

section 43 But there is yet a second charge behind against my rendring of [...], according to appointment] which he hath managed in these words.

section 44 As for the other part of the words, let all things be done in or­der, Ames in the place forementioned sheweth that order requi­reth not such ceremonies as ours, and he giveth this reason, because order requireth not the institution of any new thing but onely the right placing and disposing of things which are formerly institu­ted: and this he makes good from the notation of the word, from the definitions of order, which are given by Philosophers and Di­vines &c. from the context of the chapter, and from the usage of the word elsewhere. But the Doctor, that the words may give some countenance unto our ceremonies, adventureth upon a new in­terpretation of them.

The words [...] (saith he,) literally import according unto appointment, [...] sometimes signifies to appoint, as Mat. 28. 16. Act. 22. 10. and 28. 23. And we may here upon argue à conjuga­tis, that [...] may be sometimes rendred appointment. But because it may sometimes be rendred appointment, will it therefore follow that it must be so rendred in this place?

We may say as will as the Dr. that the words [...] literally import according unto order, as order is taken strictly for the right placing or ranking of things one before, another after, and this we have confessed even by Dr John. Burgesse in his rejoynder unto Ames p. 78. a book published by the special command of the late King. Moreover this sense is favoured by the coherence, for. v. 31. we have a particular instance of order in this acception of the word, ye may all prophesie one by one &c. and not all or many speake at once. 2. We have the opposite of order taken in this sense. 1. v. 33. confu­sion. Let all things be done in order, then is as much as, let all things be done without confusion. And I hope confusion may be avoided in the worship of God without such ceremonies as ours.

But we will for once suppose, though not grant, that the clear importance of the words, is, that all be done in the Church accor­ding to custome and appointment. Yet the Dr hath a hard taske to performe, before he can come nigh his conclusion, that the words [Page 19] of Paul are a proofe of the more than lawfulnesse of prescription of such ceremonies as ours in a Church: For he must prove that cu­stome and order here are taken in such a latitude, as that they include not onely the customes and appointments of the Apostolical Churches▪ but also of all the Churches of God in succeeding ages: and the performance of this he will find not to be so easie, as he may imagine.

I am sensible that I have by this discourse provoked a very learn­ed and formidable adversary, but it is onely love of the truth hath ingaged me in so unequal an incounter, and therefore I hope the Dr will pardon and excuse my boldnesse. If he can by dint of argument prove the truth to be on his side, I shall not be sorry or ashamed to be overcome by him.

section 45 To this my answer will be very briefe, 1. by giving the reason of my rendring, 2. by evidencing, that if the vulgar were ac­knowledged the righter rendring, yet my conclusion would very regularly, follow thence, and that therefore I have no need to contend with any gainsayer, about my rendring.

section 46 For the first, it is manifest to any that knowes but the ele­ments of Greeke, that [...] literally and properly signifies [ac­cording to ordination or appointment] [...] signifies [according to] not [in] and [...] or [...] [an ordinance or constitution] millions of times in authors, and [...] orderly, or in order] lying more consonant with [...], no reason can be rendred, why if that had been the designed meaning, that word should not have been used there.

section 47 That it may so signifie Mr J. acknowledges, and so I have obtained all I seek in my first proposal, which was not, that it must necessarily thus signifie, but that this being the literal re­gular rendring of it, I had sufficient reason to render it thus.

section 48 I proceed then to the second thing, that if what he pretends to be possible also, were indeed the onely possible, or (by way of supposition, but not concession) if [...]] did really import no more than [in order] as that is opposed to disorder or confusion, yet I say, it will soon appear, that the Apostles commanding such order or orderlynesse, and forbidding all confusion in ecclesi­astical affaires, must by consequence be interpreted to command the instituting and observing uniformity of ceremonies in a Church. This I thus deduce.

[Page 20] section 49 First there is no possibility of worshipping God externally and publickly, without use of some ceremonies or circumstances of time, place, and gesture, &c. Secondly there is no possibility of order in a multitude, without uniformity in the same circumstances, Thirdly, there is as little possibility of Ʋniformity among many, without either agreement one with another, or direction of some superior to them all, what shall by all be uniformely performed. Fourthly the agreement one with another, if it be onely volun­tarie, and such, as by which none are obliged, no way secures the end; but if it be such an agreement, that every single person is ob­liged to observe, then still is that a law of that body, as of a Councel, &c. and as truely so, as the constitution of a single Prae­late can be thought to be. And so the conclusion regularly fol­lowes, that to the preserving but of order, or orderlynesse in a Church, it is necessary, there be appointment, what shall by all be uniformely performed; confusion unavoidably coming in, where no certain rules are prescribed for Ʋniformity.

section 50 What can be denyed in this processe, I fore see not, yet when ti's granted, one reserve Mr J. hath still left him. For saith he, if it were granted that [...] signifies appointment or ordination, yet still it will be incumbent on the Dr. to prove, that this extends not onely to the customes and appointments of the Apostolike Churches, but also to the Churches of succeeding ages. And my answer to this will conclude this whole debate.

section 51 First then I acknowledge, that, it is not here necessarily ordained by the Apostle, that all the Churches of God in suc­ceeding ages should institute ceremonies in worship, for, provi­ded those ceremonies were once instituted, all that this text in­forces, is uniforme obedience to them.

section 52 But then secondly, when for many circumstances of Gods wor­ship, there is no order particularly taken by Christ and his A­postles, as in what gesture publick supplication shall be addrest, in what, lauds and hymnes, and confession of the faith, &c. and yet the rule is given by them, that all shall be done according to appointment, and moreover in other places that obedience be paid to those superiors which watch over our souls; and when those rules are not given onely to the persons that then lived in the Church of Corinth, &c. but to all that should ever live [Page 21] in that, and all other Churches, it cannot then be deemed, either that there were no superiors designed to succeed Christ, and his Apostles in the ordering of his Church, or that they should not [...] set in order the things that were wanting, such as the Apostles had left undisposed of, or that inferiors should not be bound to obey them uniformely when they thus gave orders to them.

section 53 When we are commanded to obey our parents, civil as well as natural, by a law given by God to Moses, or by Christ to his disciples, can it be strange, that we that lived not in either of those ages, should thereby be obliged, when God in his providence hath given us fathers of both kinds (as well as them) regularly presiding over us, and making use of that liberty that is presu­med in all parents, viz: to give commands, and expect obedience from their children? Certainly it cannot, and as little can it be doubted, either whether our ecclesiastical parents have power to institute in things omitted, and thereby remitted to their care by the Apostles, or whether we their obedient children, that are commanded to act [...] according to appointment, should from time to time be disobliged, and free to disobey them in whatso­ever they appoint us.

section 54 Tis granted him, if he please, that what Christ, and his A­postles have already prescribed, should not be repealed by those that thus succeed them; should they rashly assume that power, they would not in so doing act [...], whether regularly or according to appointment; but for the [...] in which they have made no rules, but left order to Titus, &c. (i.e. by parity of reason, to the Bishops in every Isl [...]nd) to make them, here what power is left them, may certainly with perfect safety be exercised by them, and that necessarily inferres our obligation to yield obedience to their exercises of them.

section 55 This is all the observance Mr J. seemes to expect of me at this time, unlesse his intimation to all admirers of Mr. Hooker, p. 144. that they should vindicate their great Patrone of Cere­monies, may passe for an admonition to me, who acknowledge my self a thankfull adorer of Gods graces in that Godly learned man, and so exact a few lines more above the regular ac­count.

[Page 22] section 56 This will detain me no longer than whilest I mind the Reader that in a discourse of the ben [...]fits which we receive from Christ in the Sacrament, Eccl. Pal. l. 5. Sect. 55. and otherwise, Mr Hooker undertakes to set down how Christ in his human nature is communicated to us, and so present with us; To this end 3. things he shewes at large, 1. that as nothing created can be unlimited, or receive any such accident from any as may really make it infinite, so neither the soul nor body of Christ, nor Christ as man, nor according to his humane nature, can possibly be every where present, no nor the substance of the body of Christ, which neither hath nor can have any presence but onely local. 2. That this cannot be rendred possible either by the grace of union with Deity, nor by any other possible means, as he at large excellently deduceth it, pag. 300, 301, 302. 3. That it may peradventure be well enough granted in some sense, and after a sort, that Christ is every where present, as man, viz. 1. in respect of the conjunction of the humane nature with the Deity, which conjunction is extended as far as the Deity, the actual position being restrain'd and tied to a certain place, and 2. by cooperation with Deity, and that in all things.

section 57 Now on this third head,p. 139. (without reflecting on the two for­mer, which assure us of the authors meaning in it) two passa­ges Mr J. p. 140. takes hold of, which, if he know any thing in either philosophy or scholastical divinity, are both guilty of a gross mistake, and cannot be sufficiently wondred at by him, that they should fall from so learned a pen.

section 58 But I suppose there is no great skill in either of those learned faculties, required, to distinguish betwixt that which truly and properly is, and that which may in some sense, and after a sort, and in two respects onely (neither of which belong to the pro­priety of being) be well enough granted, and that with a [perad­venture] also, to have influence on all these.

section 59 And what severity is this, to require of every learned man, that hath most largely refuted an adversary, to be so averse from all thoughts of peace and reconcilation with him, that he may not allow him to speak truth, or but perhaps to speak truth in a sort, and in some sense, and in two onely respects? all which are still more than intimations, that he thinks him to be absolute­ly [Page 23] (and in simplicity and propriety of speaking) in a gross errour, impossible even to the power of God to have truth in it.

section 60 If any should chance to say of an eloquent man, that you might hear an Angel speak in him, and I should reply, that it might peradventure be well enough granted in a sort, or in some sense, that when he spake you might hear an Angel, assuring you at large of my opinion, that no bare man can truly be an Angel, nay that it was impossible for God himself to bring to pass, that at the same time he should be an Angel, and not an Angel, a man, and not a man, or which is all one, a bare man, and yet an Angel, or (in fewer words) when Christ saith he is a door, and a vine, if I should say, that in a sort and in some sense, and that in two respects, each of these had truth in them, would Mr J. think fit to leave his subject, and let loose for three leaves to­gether, and pawn all his Philosophy and scholastical (not consi­dering what the consequence also may be to his practical) divi­nity, to accuse and wonder at, and never to give over wonder­ing, and withall solemnly to refute this or that improper figu­rative speech, so perfectly acknowledged by the speakers to be such?

section 61 If he have that great leisure, and any prevalent temptation thus to lay it out, I shall onely assure him, that I have not so much of either, as to attend these his motions, nor any other lover or admirer of Mr Hooker, that I know of, and therefore beseech him contentedly to rest in this general return to his charge of that learned man, without expecting any more explicit [...] or particular survey of it. And so much for Mr H. also.

section 62 I have thus without any other obligation, than what my de­sire to undeceive the Author and his Readers, laid upon me, paid him now this my second observance; And may be allowed to think it time, that he who hath been so liberal of his uses of publick refutation of others words, should find some vacancy for one use of more private (if not reprehension, yet) examination of his own actions; And then I shall offer to his consideration, how much more agreeable to the laws of brotherly kindnesse or can­dor it had been, to have proposed his exceptions in such a manner of friendly address, as might have brought him home the same sa­tisfaction, [Page 24] and saved others the importunity of these uselesse, be­cause personal debates. When he hath sincerely observed in him­self the motive of his other distant choice, I have obtained the end of my charity in mentioning it to him, and have no more to re­turn to him at this time.