Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both.

Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both.

Table of contents

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Title page

TO THE HONOURABLE Sir JOHN FINCH

The Publiſher to the Reader.

[1]

Title page

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TO THE Much Honoured and Ingenious FRANCIS WILLOƲGHBY ESQUIRE.

THE PREFACE.

THE CONTENTS OF LƲX ORIENTALIS.

THE ERRATA Correct thus:

CHAP. I.

CHAP. II.

CHAP. III.

CHAP. IV.

CHAP. V.

CHAP. VI.

CHAP. VII.

CHAP. VIII.

CHAP. IX.

CHAP. X.

CHAP. XI.

CHAP. XII.

CHAP. XIII.

Firſt Pillar.

Second Pillar.

The third Pillar.

The Fourth Pillar.

The Fifth Pillar.

The Sixth Pillar:

The Seventh Pillar.

CHAP. XIV.

The Aereal State.

Terreſtrial State.

The next ſtep of Deſcent, or After-ſtate.

The Conflagration of the Earth.

The General Reſtitution.

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Title page

A LETTER Concerning the Subject and the Author.

SECT. I.

SECT. II.

SECT. III.

SECT. IV.

SECT. V.

SECT. VI.

SECT. VII.

SECT. VIII.

SECT. IX.

SECT. X.

SECT. XI.

SECT. XII.

SECT. XIII.

SECT. XIV.

SECT. XV.

SECT. XVI.

SECT. XVII.

SECT. XVIII.

THE CONTENTS OF THE DISCOURSE of TRUTH.

[3]

Title page

Annotations UPON LƲX ORIENTALIS.

[4]

Title page

THE Annotatour TO THE READER.

Annotations UPON THE Diſcourſe of TRUTH.

THE Devotional HYMN.

Books Printed for, or Sold by Samuel Lownds, over againſt Exeter Exchange in the Strand.

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W. Faithorne Sculp.

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TWO CHOICE and ƲSEFƲL TREATISES: THE ONE LUX ORIENTALIS; OR An Enquiry into the Opinion of the EASTERN SAGES Concerning the PRAEEXISTENCE of SOƲLS. Being a Key to unlock the Grand Myſteries of PROVIDENCE. In Relation to Mans Sin and Miſery. THE OTHER, A DISCOƲRSE of TRƲTH, By the late Reverend Dr. RƲST Lord Biſhop of Dromore in Ireland. WITH ANNOTATIONS on them both.

[...],

Plato.

LONDON, Printed for James Collins, and Sam. Lowndes over againſt Exeter Exchange in the Strand, 1682.

TO THE HONOURABLE Sir JOHN FINCH

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SIR,

YOƲ may well be ſurprized at this unexpected Dedication from one that may ſeem an utter Stranger to your Perſon; but the fame of your ſingular knowledge in the choiceſt parts of Philoſophy, and all other worthy accompliſhments, will make this preſumption of me, the Publiſher of theſe two Treatiſes, as pardonable by your ſelf, ſo, I hope, justifiable to all the World. Not to ſay that it is a peice of indiſpenſable [Page] justice that one of them be Dedicated to you; the Author thereof being that Excellent Perſon the Reverend Dr. Ruſt, late Biſhop of Dromore in Ireland, once fellow of Chriſts Colledge in Cambridge, to which you lately have been ſo Noble a Benefactor. Wherefore in hopes that you will be pleaſed to take the Dedication of this whole Book, the two Treatiſes, and the Annotations thereon in good part, craving pardon for this boldneſs I humbly take leave, and am,

Honoured Sir,

Your moſt obedient and humble Servant. JAMES COLLINS.

The Publiſher to the Reader.

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THeſe two Choice and Uſeful Treatiſes I preſent thee with the name of the Author of the latter of them is ſet down in the Title Page, the Reverend Dr. Ruſt late Lord Biſhop of Dromore in the Kingdom of Ireland; whoſe Vertues Parts and Abilities are copiouſly ſet out in a Letter of Mr. Joſ. Glanvill prefixt to the Diſcourſe it ſelf. And i [...] thou haſt the curioſity to know who is the Author of the former Treatiſe LƲX ORIENTALIS (who then thought fit to conceal his name as himſelf takes notice in his Epiſtle Dedicatory) I can aſſ [...]re thee, that it is the ſaid Mr. Joſ. Glanvill, a perſon reputed one of the moſt ingenious and florid Writers of his Age. But for my own part I muſt ingenuouſly confeſs, that I am no competent J [...]dge, and conſequently can be no fit Encomiaſt of the Abi [...]ities or Performances of Either. Only this I know, that both theſe Treatiſes have ſold very well, and that there is none to be got of the Diſcourſe of Truth; though it is not many years ſince it was Printed. And for LƲX ORIENTALIS, which was Printed about twenty years ago, when the Book grew ſcarce, it was ſo much valued by the more eager and curious ſearchers into the profoundeſt points of Philoſophy, that there was given for it by ſome, four or five times the price for which it was at firſt Sold.

The conſiderations whereof coming into my mind, I thought I ſhould both gratifie the learned World and benefit my ſelf, if I reprinted theſe two Treatiſes together. Which I do the more willingly, [Page] becauſe the former Editions were too too falſe and corrupt, eſpecially of LƲX ORIENTALIS. Which faults of the Preſs, or MSS. are carefully corrected in this.

And beſides that this Edition is more correct than the former, there are alſo Annotations added to each Treatiſe by one not unexercized in theſe kind of Speculations. And in the Annotations upon the Diſcourſe of Truth, there is inſerted a DIGRESSION that contains a brief Anſwer to Mr. Baxters Placid Collation with the learned Dr. Henry More.

And becauſe men uſually have a fondneſs even for the ſmaller Toyes or Trifles of well eſteemed Writers after their deceaſe, I have prefixed a Latin Dedication of LƲX ORIENTALIS (which I opportunely had by me) before the Epiſtle Dedicatory: Which Latin Dedication the Author ſent ſo prefixed, in a Copy to the Party it is made, and I have Printed it in the ſame order it was there found, that it may be one Monument amongſt many other of the Authors Wit and Ingenuity. I have alſo, that nothing may be wanting to thy Content, got a friend to deviſe an Hieroglyphical Frontiſpice, intended more eſpecially for LƲX ORIENTALIS. But I do not profeſs my ſelf able to unriddle the meaning thereof. The beſt Interpreter will be the Book it ſelf. To the reading whereof I leave thee and reſt

Your humble Servant JAMES COLLINS.

LUX ORIENTALIS.

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LUX ORIENTALIS, OR An Enquiry into the Opinion of the Eaſtern Sages Concerning the PRAEEXISTENCE OF SOULS. Being a Key to unlock the Grand Myſteries of PROVIDENCE, In relation to mans Sin and Miſery.

Cardanus.

Quid jucundius quàm ſcire quid ſimus, quid fuerimus, quid erimus, atque cum his etiam Divina illa atque ſuprema poſt obitum mundique Viciſſitudines?

London, Printed for J. Collins, and S. Lowndes over againſt Exeter Exchange in the Strand, 1682.

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Doctiſſimo viro Domino Doctori HENRICO MORO Maximo Purioris Philoſophiae Magiſtro & Sapientiae ORIENTALIS RESTAURATORI In exiguum Summi Affectûs Teſtimonium ET Aeternae Obſervantiae Pignus a ſuis Flammis mutuatam hanc Orientis Scintillam D. D. D. Humillimus Virtutum ejus Et candoris non minùs Quam Doctrinae Cultor; Qui ei exoptat Lucem Sempiternam, & petit ut candidè accipiat LUCEM ORIENTALEM.

TO THE Much Honoured and Ingenious FRANCIS WILLOƲGHBY ESQUIRE.

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SIR,

'TIS likely you will no leſs wonder at this unexpected ſally of my pen; than at my having prefixt your name to a ſmall Trifle, that owns no Author. Of the former, you will receive an account in the Preface. And the latter, if the conſiderations following are not of weight, to attone for; I know you have goodneſs enough to pardon, what I have not reaſon ſufficient to excuſe, or vindicate. Well meaning intentions are Apology enough, where candour, and ingenuity are the Judges. I was not induced then to this Addreſs, [Page] becauſe, I thought, I could oblige you; Worth deſcribes it ſelf in the faireſt Character. But reflecting upon that delight and ſatisfaction, that I have received in diſcourſing with you on ſuch matters; and knowing that your Noble Genius is gratiſied by ſuch kind of ſpeculations; I thought, I could not make more ſuitable payment for my content, or better acknowledge the favour I receive in your acquaintance, then by preſenting you a Diſcourſe about Prae-exiſtence; and giving you a peculiar intereſt in it, as you have in its Author. Not that I would ſuggeſt, that you are a favourer of any ſtrange opinions, or hold any thing in this particular, or any other, that is ſit to be diſcountenanc'd. But I know you love to be dealing in high and generous Theories, even where your ſelf are a diſſenter, Nor is it the leaſt evidence of the greatneſs and Heroick Nobleneſs of your Spirit; that amidſt the ſlowing aboundance [Page] of the World's Bleſſings, with which you are encircled, you can yet Dedicate your ſelf to your beloved Contemplations, and look upon the Furniture and accompliſhments of the mind, as better riches, than the largeſt doals of fortune, and the Wealth and Revenues of an ample inheritance. Andmethinks, while moſt others at the beſt, do but uſe the Donatives of Providence, you enjoy them. And, by a Nobler kind of Chymiſtry, extract from them a pleaſure, that is not to be met with in all the trivial ſports of empty Gallantry. To be reveiwing the Receſſes of Nature, and the Beauteous inſide of the Ʋniverſe, is a more Manly, yea Angelick felicity, than the higheſt gratifications of the ſenſes; an happineſs, that is common to the Youthful Epicure, with his Hounds and Horſes; yea, your ends are more Auguſt and generous, then to terminate in the private pleaſure you take, even in thoſe [Page] Philoſophical Reſearches; For you are Meditating a more general good in thoſe careful and profound inquiries you are making into Animals, and other concerning affairs of nature, which I hope, one day the World will be advantag'd by. But I muſt not ingage in an Encomium, in which I cannot be juſt, but I muſt be troubleſome. For your modeſty is no more able to bear it, then my Pen can reach. Wherefore I ſhall diſmiſs your eyes from this tireſome Attendance; and only beg, that you would aſſure your ſelf that no Man is more your Servant, then

The Authour of Lux Orientalis:

THE PREFACE.

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IT is none of the leaſt commendable indulgences of our Church, that ſhe allows us a latitude of judging in points of Speculation; and ties not up mens Conſciences to an implicite aſſenting to opinions, not neceſſary or Fundamental; which favourable and kind permiſſion, is queſtionleſs a great obligation upon the ingenuous, ſubmiſſively to receive and obſerve her pious appointments for peace and order. Nor is there leſs Reaſon in this parental indulgence, than there is of Chriſtian charity and prudence; ſince to tie all others up to our opinions, and to impoſe difficult and diſputable matters under the Notion of Confeſſions of Faith, and fundamentals of Religion, is a moſt unchriſtian piece of [Page] Tyranny, the foundation of perſecution, and very root of Antichriſtianiſme. So that I have often wondred, that thoſe that heretofore would have forced all men to a compliance with their darling notions, and would have made a prey of them, that could not bow down before the Idol of their new-framed Orthodoxy; ſhould yet have the face to object perſecution and unchriſtian Tyranny to our Church Appointments; when themſelves lie under a deep and Crimſon guilt of thoſe very ſame miſcarriages, which they endeavour to affix upon thoſe more innocent Conſtitutions. For is it not a far more blameable and obnoxious impoſition to frame Syſtems of diſputable Opinions, and to require their admittance into our Creeds, in the place of the moſt ſacred, neceſſary, and fundamental verities; Than it is to appoint ſome harmleſs orders of circumſtance and [Page] ceremony, which in themſelves are indifferent and innocent? And let any equal Man be Judge, which is the greater ſuperſtition, either to Idolize and place Religion in things of diſpute and meer opinions; or conſcientiouſly to obſerve the Sanctions of that Authority we are bound to obey. But how all thoſe ill applyed reproaches of the Church of England, recoyl upon thoſe that diſcharge them, I have fully proved in a Diſcourſe on this Subject, which in its due time may ſee the Light. But for the preſent I go on with what I was about; Therefore I ſay, 'tis a moſt commendable excellency in our Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitutions; which with all due regard ought to be acknowledged; That they lay ſtreſs on few matters of opinion, but ſuch as are of important concernment, or very meridian truths. Which I mention not to this purpoſe, as if [Page] men might therefore indulge themſelves in what conceits and dangerous opinions ſoever their phancies might give birth to, (This were an unpardonable abuſe of that noble and ingenuous Liberty that is afforded us;) But that they might ſee the beauty of thoſe well temper'd Conſtitutions; and that the mouth of obloquy might be ſtopped that ſlanders our Church, as if it yielded no ſcope at all for free inquiry; when I dare ſay there is not a Church in Chriſtendome, that in this regard is leſs taxable.

As for the opinion of Praeexiſtence, the ſubject of the following Papers, it was never determined againſt by ours, nor any other Church, that I know of; And therefore I conceive is left as a matter of School Speculation, which without danger may be problematically argued on either hand. And I have ſo [Page] great confidence in all true Sons of our common Mother, to think, that they will not fix any harſh and ſevere cenſures, upon the innocent Speculations of thoſe, though poſſibly they may be Errours, who own the Authority, Articles, Canons, and Conſtitutions of that Church which they are ſo deſervedly zealous for.

Therefore let me here premoniſh once for all, that I intend no Innovation in Religion, or diſturbance of our eſtabliſhed and received Doctrines, by any thing I have undertaken in this little Treatiſe; But only an innocent repreſentation of an Antient and Probable opinion, which I conceive, may contribute ſomewhat towards the clearing and vindicating the Divine Attributes, and ſo repreſenting the ever bleſſed Deity, as a more fit object of Love and Adoration, than the Opinions of the World make him. And what ever [Page] may be thought of the thing it ſelf, or the manage of this affair, I'm ſure the end and deſign is concerning and important, and deſerves at leaſt a favourable conſtruction of the undertaking. For there is nothing more for the intereſt of Religion, than that God be repreſented to his Creatures as amiable and lovely, which cannot be better done, than by clearing up his Providences and dealings with the Sons of men, and diſcovering them to be full of Equity, Sweetneſs and Benignity; ſo that though I ſhould be miſtaken in the opinion which I endeavour to recommend, yet I expect the candour of the ingenuous, being betray'd into an errour, if it be one, by ſo pardonable an occaſion.

If it be excepted againſt this undertaking, that the Doctrine of Pr [...]eexiſtence hath in a late Diſcourſe been purpoſely handled; beſides [Page] what the learned Dr. More hath written of it; and therefore that this labour may ſeem a ſuperfluous, unneceſſary Repetition: I anſwer, that that very Treatiſe, viz. the Account of Origen, made ſome ſuch thing as this expedient. For though the proof and management of this affair be there unexceptionable, as far as the Author is by his deſign ingaged; yet, he being confined to the reaſons of Origen, and to the anſwering ſuch objections, as the Fathers urged againſt him; hath not ſo fully ſtated and cleared the buſineſs, but that there was room for afterundertakers. And 'tis a great diſintereſt to ſo ſtrange and unuſual a Doctrine as this, to be but partially handled: ſince ſo long, it will not be underſtood, and conſequently be but expoſed to contempt and ignominy. Nor can we hope that the world will be ſo favourable to a Paradox, [Page] or take ſo much pains for the underſtanding of that which they think a groſs abſurdity, as to collect thoſe Principles that are ſcatter'd up and down the writings of that great and excellent Reſtorer of the Platonick Cabbala, and accommodate them to the intereſt of this opinion. So that I thought that till the Reaſons, Anſwers, Principles, and particular State of the Hypotheſis were brought all together, to talk of Praeexiſtence in Earneſt were but to make a mans ſelf ridiculous, and the Doctrine, the common Ludibrium of fools and ignorants.

And yet I muſt confeſs my ſelf to be ſo much a contemner of the halfwitted cenſurers of things they know not, that this Reaſon alone could not have moved my pen the breadth of a letter; But ſome ingenious friends of mine, who were willing to do their Maker right, in a due [Page] apprehenſion of his Attributes and Providences, having read the Letter of Reſolution, and thence being induced to think favourably of Prae-exiſtence, were yet not fully ſatisfied in the proof, nor able to give ſtop to thoſe objections, which their imperfect knowledge of the Hypotheſis occaſioned; wherefore they deſired me to draw up a more full and particular Account of that Doctrine, which they had now a kindneſs for, and which wanted nothing more to recommend it to them, but a clear and full repreſentation. For their ſatisfaction then, I drew up the following Diſcourſe, intending at firſt, that it ſhould go no further than their hands, whoſe intereſt in mine affections had commanded it; but they being more than I could well pleaſure with written Copies, and perceiving others of my acquaintance alſo, to whom [Page] I owe regard and ſervice, to be in the like condition with theſe; I was induced to let this Little Triſle tread a more publick Stage; and to ſpeak my mind to them from the Preſs.

If further reaſon be expected for mine undertaking a buſineſs in which others have been ingaged, I would deſire them to conſider what an infinite of Books are written upon almoſt all ſubjects can be named. And I am confident, if they turn o're Libraries, they'l find no theam, that is of any conſideration, leſs traced than this is. So that no body hath reaſon to call it a Crambe, who conſiders, that there are multitudes, even of Scholars that have never ſeen or heard of any thing of this nature; And there is not, that I know of, any one Book extant in any language beſides this, that purpoſely, ſolely, and fully treats of Praeexiſtence. Wherefore who ever condemns [Page] this as a ſuperfluous ingagement, if he will be juſt, muſt paſs the ſame cenſure upon well nigh every Diſcourſe the Preſs is deliver'd of; for hee'l meet with few written on leſs handled ſubjects. I might urge alſo if there were need on't, that various repreſentations of the ſame thing, fit the variety of phancies and guſts of peruſers; and that may have force and prevalence to perſwade in one, which ſignifies nothing in another. But 'tis enough; he that will judge me on this account, muſt paſs the ſame Award on every Sermon he hears, and every Book he looks on; And ſuch a cenſure will do me as little hurt, as him good, that paſſeth it.

Beſides this exception, 'tis not unlikely that ſome may object, that I uſe Arguments that have already been pleaded in behalf of this opinion; which rightly underſtood, [Page] is no matter of diſrepute; ſince every one elſe doth it that deals in a Subject formerly written of. And I would have him that commenceth ſuch a charge againſt me, to conſult divers Authours who have handled the ſame ſubject; and if he find not the ſame Arguments and Reaſons infinitely repeated every where, let him call me plagiary, and ſpare not. 'Tis true therefore I have not baulk't the reaſons of Origen, Dr. More, or the Authour of the Letter of Reſolution, becauſe they had been uſed already; but freely own the aſſiſtance of thoſe worthy Authours; however I think I have ſo managed, fortified, and ſecured them againſt exceptions, eſpecially the moſt conſiderable, that I may reaſonably expect a pardon, yea and an intereſt in them alſo. For 'tis the backing of an argument that gives it force and efficacy; which I have done to the [Page] moſt weighty of them, at my proper coſt and charges. Nor ſhould I have been faithful to my cauſe, had I omitted any thing that I thought confirm'd it, upon any pretence whatever; ſince poſſibly this diſcourſe may fall into the hands of ſome, who never met with thoſe other Authors. And my deſign being a full proof, defence, and explication of Praeexiſtence, it had been an unpardonable defect to have pretermitted thoſe weighty reaſons by which its learned aſſertors have inforced it.

If any yet ſhould criminate me (as I know ſome did the account of Origen,) for uſing many of the ſame words, and ſome of the ſame phraſes and expreſſions, that thoſe others, who have writ about thoſe matters, have made uſe of; I am not very careful to anſwer them in this matter; and I doubt this engagement [Page] againſt thoſe little ſcruples, will but ſeem importune to the judicious. For no body blames the frequent uſage of words of Art; or thoſe which the firſt Maſters or Reſtorers of any Doctrine have been wont to expreſs their notions by; ſince that ſuch words and expreſſions are beſt underſtood, as have by cuſtome, or the Authority of ſome great Authors, been appropriated to ſuch Doctrines, as they have imployed them in the ſervice of. And ſhould every man that writes on any ſubject, be obliged to invent a-new, all the terms he hath need of, and induſtriouſly to ſhun thoſe proper expreſſive words and phraſes that are fitted to his hands, and the buſineſs he is about; all things will be fill'd with impertinency, darkneſs and confuſion.

It muſt be acknowledged then, that moſt of the peculiar words and phraſes that either I, or any body [Page] elſe that will ſpeak properly and intelligibly in this matter, make uſe of, are borrowed from the judicious and elegent contriver of them, the profound Reſtorer and Refiner of almoſt-extinct Platoniſm: Whoſe invention hath been ſo happy in this kind, that it hath ſerved up thoſe notions in the moſt appoſite, ſignificant, comprehenſive and expreſſive words that could well be thought of. Wherefore 'twere an humourſome piece of folly for any man that deals in theſe matters, induſtriouſly to avoid ſuch termes and expreſſions as are ſo adapted and fitted to this purpoſe, and ſo well known among thoſe that are acquainted with this way of Learning; when without vanity he could not think to be better furniſh't from his own phancy.

If in the following papers I have uſed any expreſſions of others, which [Page] theſe conſiderations will not warrant; I muſt beg pardon for my memory, which doth not uſe to be ſo ſerviceable. And where I writ this Diſcourſe, I had not one of my books within my reach, that treated of this, or indeed any other Subject. Nor am I at leaſure now to examine them and this, to ſee whether I can find any ſuch coincidences; which a mans phancy dealing frequently in ſuch matters, might inſenſibly occaſion. If any there be, let thoſe that find them out, pardon them, as the ſlips of a too officious imagination; or however elſe they treat them, they ſhall not much diſpleaſe the Author.

And now that this Diſcourſe may paſs with leſs controul among thoſe that ſhall light on it, I find my ſelf ingag'd to ſpeak a little to a double ſort of Readers, who are like to be offended at my deſign, and averſe [Page] to the Doctrine aſſerted in theſe Papers. And (1) ſome will boggle at Praeexiſtence, and be afraid to entertain it, upon an apprehenſion that the Admiſſion of this opinion will diſorder and change the Frame of Orthodox Divinity; which, were there cauſe for ſuch a jealouſie, were but a commendable caution; but there's hope this may prove but a panick fear, or ſuch a needleſs terrour as ſurpriſeth Children in the dark, when they take their beſt friends for ſome Bug-Bear that would carry them away, or hurt them. For 'tis but ſuppoſing (as I have ſomewhere intimated in the diſcourſe it ſelf) that God created all ſouls together as he did the Angels; That ſome of them ſinned and fell with the other Apoſtate Spirits; and for their diſobedience were thruſt into a ſtate of ſilence and inſenſibility; That the Divine goodneſs ſo provided for [Page] them, that they ſhould act a part again in terreſtrial Bodies, when they ſhould fitly be prepared for them; And that Adam was ſet up as our great Protoplaſt and Repreſentative, who, had he continued in Innocence and Integrity, we had then been ſharers in that happineſs which he at firſt was inſtated in; but by his unhappy defection and diſobedience we loſt it; and became thus miſerable in our New life in theſe earthly bodies. I ſay the Doctrine of Prae-exiſtence thus ſtated, is, in nothing that I know of, an enemy to common Theology: all things hence proceeding as in our ordinary Syſtems; with this only difference, that this Hypotheſis clears the divine Attributes from any ſhadow of harſhneſs, or breach of equity, ſince it ſuppoſeth us to have ſinned and deſerved all the miſery we ſuffer in this condition before we came hither: [Page] whereas the other which teacheth, that we became both guilty and miſerable by the ſingle and ſole offence of Adam, whenas we were not then in being, or as to our ſouls, as much as potentially in our great Progenitour; bears ſomewhat hardly upon the repute of the Divine perfections. So that if the wary Reader be afraid to venture upon the Hypotheſis, that I have drawn up at the end, (which, I confeſs, I would not give him the leaſt incouragement to meddle with) yet without danger he may admit of Praeexiſtence as accommodated to the Orthodox Doctrine.

Nor ſhould I indeed have medled with the other ſcheme, which is built upon the Principles of meer Reaſon and Philoſophy; but that thoſe friends who drew the reſt of the Diſcour [...]e from me, ingag'd me to give them an Account of the Philoſophical Hypotheſis. In which, I know, I have [Page] not in every particular, followed the mind of the Maſters of the Origenian Cabbala; but kept my ſelf to the conduct of thoſe Principles, that I judged moſt rational; though indeed the things wherein I differ, are very few and inconſiderable. However for that reaſon I thought fit to intitle no body to the Hypotheſis that I have made a draught of, leſt I ſhould have affix't on any one, what he would not have owned. But for the main, thoſe that underſtand it, know the Fountain; and for others, 'tis no great matter if they be ignorant.

Now if any one judge me to be a Proſelyte to thoſe opinions, becauſe I call them not all to nought, or damn not thoſe, that have a favour for them; I know not how to avoid the doom of their ſevere diſpleaſure; having ſaid as much in the place where I treat of thoſe matters, to purge my ſelf of ſuch a ſuſpicion, as I thought neceſſary [Page] to clear me, in the opinion of any competently ingenuous. As for others, let me ſay what I can, I ſhall be what their wiſdoms think fit to call me; And let that be what it will, I am very well content to bear it. I'le only add, to take off the ground of this uncharitable jealouſie, that among the favourers of Praeexiſtence, I know none that are adherers to thoſe opinions; and therefore for me to have declaim'd againſt any, on this account, had been a piece of Knight-Errantry; And thoſe Dons that do ſo make Gyants of the Wind-mills of their own Imaginations.

But, (2) There are another ſort of Readers that I have a word to ſay to, who contemn and laugh at every thing that their narrow noddles comprehend not. This, I confeſs, is a good eaſie way of confutation, and if we may take every fool's ſmile for a [Page] Demonſtration, Praeexiſtence will be routed. But the beſt on't is, to call things by their right names, this is but a vulgar, childiſh humour ariſing from nothing but a fond doating on the opinions we were firſt inſtructed in. For having made thoſe the ſtandard of truth and ſolidity, theſe prepoſſeſt diſcerners preſently conclude every thing that is a ſtranger to their ears and underſtandings, and of another ſtamp from their Education-receptions, [...]alſe and ridiculous; juſt like the common people, who judging all cuſtoms and faſhions by their own, account thoſe of other Nations abſurd and barbarous. 'Tis well for thoſe ſmiling Co [...]uters, that they were not bred in Mahumetiſm, for then without doubt they would have made ſport of Chriſtianity. But ſince they are ſo diſpoſed, let them laugh at the opinion I have undertaken for, till they underſtand [Page] it; I know who in the judgment of wiſe men will prove Ridiculous. It was from this very principle that the moſt conſiderable truths, that ever the world was acquainted with, were to the Jews, a ſtumbling block, and to the Greeks, fooliſhneſs; and 'twas ſuch a ſpirit as reigns in theſe Children of ſelf-con [...]idence, that call'd S. Paul a babbler. And methinks till theſe narrow-ſcull'd people could boaſt themſelves infallible, and all their opinions, an unerring Canon, common modeſty and civility ſhould teach them better manners, than at firſt daſh to judge that a ridiculous abſurdity, which the greateſt and wiſeſt Sages, that inlightned the antient World, accounted ſo ſound and probable a Concluſion. Eſpecially it being a matter not determin'd againſt, but rather countenanc't in Scripture, as will appear hereafter. But Opinionative Ignorance is very weak [Page] and immoral. And till thoſe ſlight and Vulgar diſcerners have learn't that firſt principle of true wiſdom, To judge nothing till they throughly underſtand it, and have weighed it in the Ballance of impartial Reaſon; 'tis to no purpoſe to ſpend ones breath upon them.

THE CONTENTS OF LƲX ORIENTALIS.

[Page]

Chap. 1. THE opinions propoſed concerning the original of Souls. pag. 1

Chap. 2. Daily creation of Souls is inconſiſtent with the Divine Attributes. pag. 3

Chap. 3. (2) Traduction of Souls is impoſſible, the reaſon for it weak and frivolous; The propoſal of Praeexiſtence. pag. 16

Chap. 4. (1) Praeexiſtence cannot be diſproved. Scripture ſaith nothing againſt it: It's ſilence is no prejudice to this Doctrine, but rather an Argument for it, as the caſe ſtandeth. Praeexiſtence was the common opinion of [Page] our Saviour's times. How, probably, it came to be loſt in the Chriſtian Church. pag. 27

Chap. 5. Reaſons againſt Praeexiſtence anſwered. Our forgetting the former ſtate is no argument to diſprove it: Nor are the other Reaſons that can be produc'd, more concluſive. The proof of the poſſibility of Praeexiſtence were enough, all other Hypotheſes being abſurd and contradictious. But it is prov'd alſo by poſitive Arguments. pag. 45

Chap. 6. A ſecond Argument for Praeexiſtence drawn from the conſideration of the Divine Goodneſs, which alwayes doth what is beſt. pag. 51

Chap. 7. The firſt Evaſion, that God acts freely, and his meer will is reaſon enough for his doing, or forbearing any thing, overthrown by four Conſiderations, [Page] Some incident Evaſions, viz. that Gods Wiſdom, or his glory, may be contrary to this diſplay of his goodneſs, in our being made of old, clearly taken off. pag. 55

Chap. 8. A ſecond general Evaſion, viz. that our Reaſons cannot tell what God ſhould do, or what is beſt, overthrown by ſeveral conſiderations. As is alſo a third, viz. that by the ſame Argument God would have been obliged to have made us impeccable, and not liable to Miſery. pag. 61

Chap. 9. A fourth Objection againſt the Argument from Gods goodneſs, viz. That it will conclude as well that the World is infinite and eternal, Anſwered. The concluſion of the ſecond Argument for Praeexiſtence. pag. 71

Chap. 10. A third Argument for Praeexiſtence, [Page] from the great variety of mens ſpeculative inclinations; and alſo the diverſity of our Genius's, copiouſly urged. If theſe Arguments make Praeexiſtence but probable, 'tis enough to gain it the Victory. pag. 74

Chap. 11. Great caution to be uſed in alledging Scripture for our ſpeculative opinion. The countenance that Praeexiſtence hath from the ſacred writings both of the Old and New Teſtament; Reaſons of the ſeeming uncouthneſs of theſe allegations. Praeexiſtence ſtood in no need of Scripture-proof. pag. 82

Chap. 12. Why the Author thinks himſelf obliged to deſcend to ſome more particular Account of Praeexiſtence. The preſumption poſitively to determine how it was with us of old. The Authors deſign in the Hypotheſis that follows. pag. 90

[Page] Chap. 13. Seven Pillars on which the particular Hypotheſis ſtands. 94

Pillar 1. All the Divine deſigns and actions are laid and carried on by pure and infinite Goodneſs. pag. 95

Pillar 2. There is an exact Geometrical Juſtice that runs through the Ʋniverſe, and is interwoven in the contexture of things. pag. 97

Pillar 3. Things are carried to their proper place and ſtate, by the congruity of their natures; where this fails, we may ſuppoſe ſome arbitrary managements. pag. 100

Pillar 4. The Souls of men are capable of living in other bodies beſides Terreſtrial; And never act but in ſome body or other. pag. 102

[Page] Pillar 5. The Soul in every ſtate hath ſuch a body as is fitteſt for thoſe faculties and operations that ſhe is moſt inclined to exerciſe. pag. 105

Pillar 6. The powers and faculties of the Soul are either (1) Spiritual, and intellectual: or (2) Senſitive: or (3) Plaſtick. pag. 107

Pillar 7. By the ſame degrees that the higher powers are invigorated, the lower are conſopited and abated, as to their proper exerciſes, and è contra. pag. 108

Chap. 14. A Philoſophical Hypotheſis of the Souls Praeexiſtence. 113

Her Aethereal State.

The Aereal State. pag. 102

The Terreſtrial State. pag. 122

[Page] The next ſtep of Deſcent, or After-ſtate. pag. 126

The Conflagration of the Earth. pag. 137

The General Reſtitution. pag. 142

THE ERRATA Correct thus:

[Page]

In Lux Orientalis.

For | Read
PAg. 9. lin. 6. For | * For.
pa. 61. l. 3. Reaſons | Reaſon.
p. 78. l. 1. his | this.
p. 126. l. 6. courſe | coarſe.

In the Annotations.

pag. 34. l. 28. promptus | promptos.
p. 38. l. 27. [...] | [...]
p. 45. l. 12. tye | lye.
p. 51. l. 5. Plaiſtick | Plaſtick.
p. 53. l. 7. Zoophiton's | Zoophyton's.
p. 54. l. 29. Unluckly | Unlucky.
p. 56. l. 8. [...] | [...]
p. 62. l. 19. other the [...] | over the [...]
p. 74. l. 8. property | properly.
p. 80. l. 2. doors: for | doors for.
ibid. l. 21. properly | property.
p. 84. l. 2. fitted | ſited.
ibid. l. 21. reſtore | reſolve.
p. 94. l. 15. vigorous | rigorous.
p. 95. l. 8. this humane | his humane.
p. 101. l. 30. [...] | [...]
p. 104. l. 28. corporeal | incorporeal.
p. 106. l. 13. alledged | alledge.
p. 113. l. 20. Pſychopanychites | Pſychopannychites.
ibid. l. 31. to | two.
p. 119. l. 7. [...] | [...]
p. 144. l. 23. ante. Interiiſſe | ante [...]ſſe.
p. 184. l. 26. Nymphs | Nymph.
p. 209. l. 16. [...] | [...].
p. 238. l. 26. ſlawes | flawes.
p. 255. l. 11. ſeſquealtera | ſeſquialtera.
p. 265. l. 3. the ſteady | their ſteady.
p. 268. l. 10. to thoſe | ſo thoſe.
p. 275. l. 2. Heaven's | Haven's.

[Page]LUX ORIENTALIS.

CHAP. I.

The opinions propoſed concerning the original of Souls.

IT hath always been found a matter of diſcouraging difficulty, among thoſe that have buſied themſelves in ſuch Inquiries, To determine the Soul's original. Inſomuch that after all the conteſts and diſputes that have been about it, many of the wiſeſt Inquiſitors have concluded it undeterminable: or, if they have ſate down in either of the two opinions, viz. of it's immediate Creation, or Traduction (which of later ages have been the only competitors); they have been driven to it, rather from the abſurdities of the oppoſite opinion, which they have left; than drawn by any rational alliciency in that which they have taken to. And indeed, if we do but impartially conſider the grand inconveniences [Page] which each party urgeth againſt the others Concluſion, it would even tempt one to think, that both are right in their oppoſition, and neither in their aſſertion. And ſince each ſide ſo ſtrongly oppugns the other and ſo weakly defends it ſelf, 'tis a ſhrewd ſuſpicion that they are both miſtaken. Wherefore if there be a third that can lay any probable claim to the truth, it deſerves to be heard to plead its cauſe; and, if it be not chargeable with the contradictions or abſurdities either of the one or other, to be admitted.

Now though theſe later ages have concluded the matter to lie between immediate Creation, and ſeminal Traduction; yet I find that the more antient times have pitcht upon Praeexiſtence, as more likely than either; For the Platoniſts, Pythagoreans, the Chaldaean wiſe men, the Jewiſh Rabbins, and ſome of the moſt learned and antient Fathers were of this opinion. Wherefore I think we owe ſo much at leaſt to the Memory of thoſe grave Sages, as to examine this Doctrine of theirs, and if neither of the later Hypotheſes can eaſe our anxious minds, or free themſelves from abſurdities; and this Grey Dogma fairly clear all doubts, and be obnoxious to no ſuch contradictions; I ſee no reaſon but we may give it a favourable admittance, till ſomething elſe appear [Page] more concinnous and rational. Therefore let us take ſome account of what the two firſt opinions alledge one againſt another, and how they are proved by their promoters and defendants. Now if they be found unable to withſtand the ſhock of one anothers oppoſition; we may reaſonably caſt our eyes upon the third, to ſee what force it brings to vouch its intereſt, and how it will behave it ſelf in the encounter.

CHAP. II.

Daily creation of Souls is inconſiſtent with the Divine Attributes.

THe firſt of theſe opinions that offers it ſelf to Tryal is, that God daily creates humane ſouls, which immediately are united unto the bodies that Generation hath prepared for them. Of this ſide are our later Divines, and the generality of the Schoolmen. But not to be born down by Authorities, Let us conſider what reaſon ſtands againſt it. Therefore,

(1) If our Souls came immediately out of the hands of God when we came firſt into theſe bodies, Whence then are thoſe enormouſly brutiſh inclinations, that ſtrong natural proclivity to vice and impiety, that are exſtant in the children of men? All the works [Page] of God bear his image, and are perfect in their kind. Purity is his nature, and what comes from him, proportionably to its capacity partakes of his perfections. Every thing in the natural world bears the ſuperſcription of his wiſdom and goodneſs; and the ſame fountain cannot ſend forth ſweet waters and bitter. Therefore 'tis a part of our allegiance to our Maker to believe, * that he made us pure and innocent, and if we were but juſt then framed by him when we were united with theſe terreſtrial bodies, whence ſhould we contract ſuch degenerate propenſions? Some tell us, that this impurity was immediately derived from the bodies we are united to; But, how is it poſſible, that purely paſſive inſenſible Matter ſhould transfuſe habits or inclinations into a Nature that is quite of another Make and Quality? How can ſuch a cauſe produce an effect ſo diſproportionate? * Matter can do nothing but by motion, and what relation hath that to a moral contagion? How can a Body that is neither capable of ſenſe nor ſin, infect a ſoul, as ſoon as 'tis united to it, with ſuch vitious debauched diſpoſitions?

But others think to evade by ſaying, That we have not theſe depravities in our natures, but contract them by Cuſtome, education, and evil uſages. How then comes it about, that thoſe that have had the ſame care and induſtry uſed upon [Page] them, and have been nurtured under the ſame diſcipline and ſevere overſight, do ſo vaſtly and even to wonder differ in their inclinations? * How is it that thoſe that are under continual temptations to vice, are yet kept within the bounds of vertue, and ſobriety? And yet that others, that have ſtrong motives and allurements to the contrary, ſhould violently break out into all kinds of extravagance and impiety? Sure, there is ſomewhat more in the matter than thoſe general cauſes, which may be common to both; and which many times have quite contrary effects.

(2.) This Hypotheſis, that God continually Creates humane ſouls in theſe bodies, conſiſts not with the honour of the Divine Attributes. For,

(1.) How ſtands it with the goodneſs and benignity of that God, who is Love, to put pure and immaculate ſpirits, who were capable of living to him and with him, into ſuch bodies as will preſently defile them, deface his image, pervert all their powers and faculties, incline them to hate what he moſt loves, and love what his Soul hateth; and that, without any knowledge or concurrence of theirs, will quite marre them as ſoon as he hath made them, and of dear Children, render them rebels or enemies, and in a moment from being like Angels transform [Page] them into the perfect reſemblance of the firſt Apoſtates, Devils?

Is this an effect of thoſe tender mercies that are over all his works? And

(2.) Hath that Wiſdom that hath made all things to operate according to their natures, and provided them with whatever is neceſſary to that end, made myriads of noble Spirits capable of as noble operations, and preſently plunged them into ſuch a condition wherein they cannot act at all according to their firſt and proper diſpoſitions, but ſhall be neceſſitated to the quite contrary; and have other noxious and depraved inclinations fatally impoſed upon their pure natures? Doth that wiſdom, that hath made all things in number, weight, and meaſure, and diſpoſed them in ſuch exact harmony and proportions uſe to act ſo ineptly? And that in the beſt and nobleſt pieces of his Creation? Doth it uſe to make and preſently deſtroy? To frame one thing and give it ſuch or ſuch a nature, and then undo what he had done, and make it another? And if there be no ſuch irregular methods uſed in the framing of inferiour Creatures, what reaſon have we to ſuſpect that the Divine Wiſdom did ſo vary from its ſelf in its nobleſt compoſures?

And (3), Is it not a great affront to the Divine J [...]ſtice, to ſuppoſe, as we are commonly taught, that aſ [...]oon as we are born, yea, [Page] and in the Womb, we are obnoxious to eternal wrath and torments, if our Souls are then immediately created out of nothing? For, To be juſt is to give every one his due; and how can endleſs unſupportable puniſhments be due to innocent Spirits, who but the laſt moment came righteous, pure, and immaculate out of their Creators hands; and have not done or thought any thing ſince, contrary to his will or Laws, nor were in any the leaſt capacity of ſinning?

I, but the firſt of our order, our General head and Repreſentative, ſinned, and we in him; thus we contract guilt as ſoon as we have a Being, and are lyable to the puniſhment of his diſobedience. This is thought to ſolve all, and to clear God from any ſhadow of unrighteouſneſs. But whatever truth there is in the thing it ſelf, I think it cannot ſtand upon the Hypotheſis of the Souls immediate Creation, nor yet juſtifie God in his proceedings. For, (1.) If I was then newly Created when firſt in this body; what was Adam to me, who ſinned above 5000 years before I came out of nothing? If he repreſented me, it muſt be as I was in his Loins, that is, in him as an effect in a cauſe. But ſo I was not, according to this Doctrine; for my ſoul owns no Father but God, its immediate progenitour. And what am I concern'd then in his ſins, which had never my [Page] will or conſent, more than in the ſins of Mahom [...]t, or Julius Caeſar? Nay, than in the ſins of Beelzebub or Lucifer? And for my body, 'tis moſt likely, that never an Atom of his, ever came at me; or, if any did, he was no cauſe on't. Beſides, that of it ſelf is neither capable of ſenſe, ſin, guilt, nor puniſhment: or, (2.) Admitting that we become thus obnoxious aſſoon as in the body, upon the account of his default, How doth it comport with the divine Juſtice, in one moment to make ſuch excellent Creatures, and in the next to render them ſo miſerable, by thruſting them into a condition, ſo fatally obnoxious; eſpecially ſince they were capable of living and acting in bodies more perfect, and more accommodate to their new undefiled natures? Certainly, could they have been put to their choice whether they would have come into being upon ſuch termes, they would rather have been nothing for ever. And God doth not uſe to make his Creatures ſo, as that, without their own fault, they ſhall have cauſe to unwiſh themſelves.

Hitherto in this ſecond general Argument I have dealt againſt thoſe that believe and aſſ [...]rt the original depravity of our natures: which thoſe that deny, may think themſelves not pin [...]'t by or concern'd in; Since they think they do no ſuch diſhonour to the divine Attributes, while they aſſert, that we were not made [Page] in ſo deplorable and depraved a condition, but have ſo made our ſelves by our voluntary aberrations. But neither is this a fit Plaiſter for the ſore, ſuppoſing our ſouls to be immediately created and ſo ſent into theſe bodies. For ſtill it ſeems to be a diminutive and diſparaging apprehen [...]ion of the infinite and immenſe Goodneſs of God, that he ſhould detrude ſuch excellent creatures as our ſouls into a ſtate ſo hazardous, * wherein he ſeeth it to be ten thouſand to one, but that they will corrupt and defile themſelves, and ſo make themſelves miſerable here, and to eternity hereafter. And certainly, be we as indifferent naturally to good and evil as can be ſuppoſed; yet great are the diſadvantages to virtue that all men unavoidably meet with, in this ſtate of imperfection.

For conſidering, that our infant and growing age is an age of ſenſe, in which our appetites, and paſſions are very ſtrong, and our reaſons weak, and ſcarce any thing but a chain of imaginations, 'tis I ſay great odds, but that we ſhould be carried to inordinacy, and exceed the bounds the divine laws have ſet us. So that our lower powers of ſenſe and paſſions uſing to have the head, will grow ſtrong and impetuous, and thus 'tis an hundred to one but we ſhall be rooted in vice, before we come to the maturity of our reaſons, or are capable of the exerciſe of virtue. And woful experience [Page] teacheth us, that moſt men run ſo far before they conſider whither they are a-going, that the care and diligence of all their lives after, will ſcarce reclaim them. Beſides, the far greateſt part of the world are led into wickedneſs and all kinds of debauchery, by corrupt and vitious education. And 'tis not difficult to obſerve what an enormous ſtrength, bad education hath to deprave and pervert well diſpos'd inclinations. Which things conſider'd, this way alſo methinks reflects a Diſparagement on the Divine Attributes: Since by creating ſouls daily and putting them into ſuch bodies, and ſuch parts of the world as his infinite Wiſdom ſees will debauch them, and pervert them from the ways of righteouſneſs and happineſs, into thoſe of vice and miſery; he deals with them leſs mercifully than a parent among us would with his Off-ſpring. And to ſuppoſe God to have leſs goodneſs than his degenerate creatures, is to have very narrow apprehenſions of his perfections, and to rob him of the honour due to his Attributes.

(3) It hath been urged with good probability by great and wiſe Sages, that 'tis an unbecoming apprehenſion of the Majeſty on high, * to ſuppoſe him aſſiſtant to unlawful and unclean coitions, by creating a ſoul to animate the impure foetus. And to think, It is in the power of brutiſh luſt to determine Omvipotence to create a Soul, whenſoever a [Page] couple of unclean Adulterers ſhall think fit to join in their beſtial pleaſures; is methinks to have a very mean apprehenſion of the divine Majeſty and Purity. This is to make him the worſt of Servants by ſuppoſing him to ſerve his creature's vices, to wait upon the vileſt actions, and to engage the ſame infinite Power that made the world for the perfecting what was begun by diſſolute Wantons. This Argument was uſed of old by pious and learned Origen, and hath been imployed in the ſame ſervice ſince, by his modern defendents. But I foreſee an evaſion or two, that poſſibly with ſome may ſtand for an anſwer, the removal of which will clear the buſineſs.

It may be pretended that God's attending to create ſouls for the ſupply of ſuch generations, is but an act of his juſtice, for the detection, and conſequently puniſhment, of ſuch lawleſs offenders; which therefore will be no more matter of diſparagement than the waiting of an Officer of juſtice to diſcover and apprehend a Malefactour.

But this Subterfuge cannot elude the force of the Argument, for it hath no place at all in moſt Adulteries; yea great injuſtice and injury is done many times by ſuch illegitimate births; the Child of a Stranger being by this means admitted [Page] to carry away the inheritance from the lawful off-ſpring. Beſides, God uſeth not ordinarily to put forth his Almighty power to diſcover ſecret miſcarriages, except ſometimes for very remarkable and momentous ends, but leaves hidden iniquities to be the objects of his own caſtigations. And if diſcovery of the fault be the main end of ſuch creations, * methinks that might be done at a cheaper rate, that ſhould not have brought ſo much inconvenience with it, or have expoſed his own innocent and harmleſs off-ſpring to undeſerv'd Reproach and Infamy.

But further it may be ſuggeſted, that it is no more indecent for God to create ſouls to furniſh thoſe unlawful Generations, than it is that a man ſhould be nouriſht by meat that he hath unlawfully come by, or that the Cattle which he hath ſtoln ſhould ingender with his own. But the difference of theſe inſtances from the caſe in hand is eaſily diſcernable; in that the nouriſhment and productions ſpoken of, proceed in a ſet orderly way of natural cauſes, which work fatally and neceſſarily without reſpect to moral circumſtances; and there is no reaſon, it ſhould be in the power of a ſinful creature to engage his Maker to pervert or ſtop the courſe of nature, when he pleaſeth. But in the caſe of creating ſouls, God is ſuppoſed to act by explicite and immediate Will, the ſuſpending of which, [Page] in ſuch a caſe as this, is far different in point of credit and decorum, from his altering the ſetled Laws he hath ſet in the Creation, and turning the world upſide down.

I might further add (4ly), That * it ſeems very incongruous and unhandſome to ſuppoſe, that God ſhould create two ſouls for the ſupply of one monſtrous body. And of ſuch prodigious productions there is mention in Hiſtory. That's a remarkable inſtance in Sennertus, of a Monſter born at Emmaus with two hearts, and two heads; the diverſity of whoſe appetites, perceptions, and affections, teſtified that it had two ſouls within that bi-partite habitation. Now, to conceive the moſt wiſe Maker and Contriver of all things, immediately to create two ſouls, for a ſingle body, rather than ſuffer that ſuper-plus of matter which conſtitutes the monſtrous excreſcence to prove effoete & inanimate, is methinks a derogatory apprehenſion of his wiſdom, and ſuppoſeth him to act more ineptly in the great and immediate inſtances of his power, than in the ordinary courſe of nature about leſs noble and accurate productions. Or, if it be pretended, that Souls were ſent into them while the bodies were yet diſtinct, but that afterwards they grew into one: This, I ſay, will not heal the breach that this Hypotheſis makes upon the divine Wiſdom; it tacitely reflecting a ſhameful overſight upon Omniſcience, [Page] that he ſhould not be aware of the future coaleſcence of theſe bodies into one, when he made ſouls for them; or at leaſt, 'tis to ſuppoſe him, knowingly to act i [...]eptly. Beſides, that the rational ſoul is not created till the body, as to the main ſtroaks of it at leaſt, is framed, is the general opinion of the Aſſertors of daily creation; So that then there is no room for this evaſion.

And now one would think that an opinion ſo very obnoxious, and ſo lyable to ſuch grand inconveniences, ſhould not be admitted but upon moſt preſſing reaſons and ineludible demonſtrations. And yet there is not an argument that I ever heard of from reaſon to inforce it, but only ſuch as are brought: from the impoſſibility of the way of Traduction; which indeed is chargeable with as great abſurdities, as that we have been diſcourſing of. 'Tis true, ſeveral Scriptures are preſt for the ſervice of the cauſe; but I doubt much againſt their intent and inclination. General teſtimonies there are to prove that God is the Father and Creator of Souls, which is equally true, whether we ſuppoſe it made juſt as it is united to theſe bodies, or did praeexiſt, and was before them; But that it is juſt then created out of nothing when firſt it comes into theſe earthly bodies, I know not a word in the inſpired Writings that ſpeaks it. For that ſaying of our Saviour, My Father worketh hitherto, and [Page]I work, is by the moſt judicious underſtood of the works of preſervation and providence: Thoſe of creation being concluded within the firſt Hebdomade, accordingly as is expreſt in the Hiſtory, * that God on the ſeventh day reſted from all his works. Nor can there an inſtance be given of any thing created ſince, or is there any pretended, but that which hath been the ſubject of our inquiry; which is no inconſiderable preſumption, that that was not ſo neither; ſince the divine way of working is not parti-colour or humourſome, but uniform and conſonant to the laws of exacteſt wiſdom. So that for us to ſuppoſe that God, after the compleating of his Creation, and the laws given to all things for their action, and continuance, to be every moment working in a quite other way in one inſtance of beings, than he doth in all beſides; is methinks a ſomewhat odd apprehenſion, eſpecially when no Reaſon urgeth to it, and Scripture is ſilent. For ſuch places as this [the God of the Spirits of all fleſh, the Father of Spirits. The ſpirit returns to God that gave it. The ſouls which I have made. We are his off-ſpring. Who formeth the ſpirit of man within him, and the like] ſignifie no more, but that our ſouls have a nearer relation to God than our bodies, as being his immediate workmanſhip, made without any creature-interpoſal, and more eſpecially regarded by him. But to [Page] inferr hence, that they were then produced when theſe bodies were generated, is illogical and inconſequent. So that all that theſe Scriptures will ſerve for, is only to diſprove the Doctrine of Traduction, but makes not a tittle for the ordinary Hypotheſis of Daily Creation againſt Praeexiſtence.

CHAP. III.

(2) Traduction of ſouls is impoſſible, the reaſons for it weak and frivolous, the propoſal of Praeexiſtence.

THus then we have examin'd the [...]irſt way of ſtating the Soul's original, that of continual Creation; and finding no ſure reſting place for our inquiry here, we remove to the ſecond,

The way of Traduction or ſeminal Propagation. And the adherers to this Hypotheſis are of two ſorts, viz. either ſuch as make the Soul to be nothing but a purer ſort of matter, or of thoſe that confeſs it wholly ſpiritual and immaterial. I'le diſpatch the former, briefly ſtrike at the [Page] root of their miſconceit of the Souls production, and ſhew it cannot be matter, be it as pure as can be conceived.

Therefore (1) If the ſoul be matter, then whatever perceptions or apprehenſions it hath, or is capable of, they were l [...] in at the ſenſes. And thus the great Patron of the Hypotheſis ſtates it, in his Leviathan, and other writings. But now clear, it is that our Souls have ſome conceptions, which they never received from external ſenſe: For there are ſome congenite implicit Principles in us, without which there could be no ſenſation▪ * ſince the images of objects are very ſmall and inconſiderable in our brains, comparatively to the vaſtneſs of the things which they repreſent, and very unlike them in multitudes of other circumſtances; ſo that 'twere impoſſible we ſhould have the ſenſible repreſentation of any thing, * were it not that our ſouls uſe a kind of Geometry, or mathematick Inference in judging of external objects by thoſe little hints it finds in material impreſſions. Which Art and the principles thereof were never received from ſenſe, but are pre [...]uppoſed to all ſenſible perceptions. * And, were the ſoul quite void of all ſuch implicit notions, it would remain as ſenſeleſs as a ſtone for ever.

Beſides, we find our minds fraught with principles logical, moral, metaphyſical, which [Page] could never owe their original to ſenſe otherwiſe, than as it gives us occaſions of uſing them. * For ſenſe teacheth no general propoſitions, but only affords ſingulars for Induction; which being an Inference, muſt proceed from an higher principle that owns no ſuch dependence on the ſenſes, as being found i [...] the mind, and not deriv'd from any thing without. Alſo we find in our ſelves mathematical notions, and build certain demonſtrations on them, which abſtract from ſenſe and matter. And therefore never had them from any material power, * but from ſomething more ſublime and excellent. But this Argument is of too large a conſideration to be treated of here, and therefore I content my ſelf with thoſe brief Touches, and paſs on.

(2) If the ſoul be matter, 'tis impoſſible it ſhould have the ſenſe of any thing: for either the whole image of the object muſt be received in one point of this ſenſitive matter; a thing abſurd at firſt view, that ſuch variety of diſtinct and orderly repreſentations ſhould be made at once upon a ſingle atom; or the whole image is impreſt upon every point, and then there would be as many objects as there are points in this matter; and ſo every thing would be infinitely multiplied in our del [...]ſive ſenſes. Or finally, every part of the ſoul muſt receive a proportionable part [Page] of the image; and then, how could thoſe parts communicate their perceptions to each other, and what ſhould perceive the whole? This Argument is excellently managed by the great Dr. H. More, in whoſe writings this fond Hypotheſis is fully triumpht over, and defeated. Since therefore the very loweſt degree of perception, ſingle and ſimple ſenſe, is incompatible to meer body or matter, we may ſafely conclude, that the higher and nobler operations of imagining, remembring, reaſoning, and willing muſt have a cauſe and ſource that is not Corporeal. Thus therefore thoſe that build the ſouls traduction upon this ground of its being only body and modified matter, are diſappointed in the foundation of their concluſion.

But (2) Another ſort of aſſertors of traduction teach the Soul to be ſpiritual and incorporeal, and affirm that by a vertue deriv'd from the firſt benediction, it can propagate its like; one ſoul emitting another as the body doth the matter of Generation. The manner of which ſpiritual production uſeth to be illuſtrated by one Candle's lighting another; and a mans begetting a thought in anothers mind, without diminiſhing of his own. This is the moſt favourable repreſentation of this opinion, that I can think on. And yet, if we nearly conſider it, it will appear moſt abſu [...]d and unphiloſophical. For if one ſoul produce another, [Page] 'tis either out of nothing or ſomething praeexiſtent. If the former, 'tis an abſolute creation, which all philoſophy concludes impoſſible for a Creature. And if it be pretended that the Parent doth it not by his proper natural virtue, but by a ſtrength imparted by God in the firſt bleſſing, Increaſe and multiply, ſo that God is the prime agent, he only the inſtrument: I rejoin, that then either God hath thereby obliged himſelf to put forth a new and extraordinary power in every ſuch occaſion, diſtinct from his influence in the ordinary [...]ourſe of nature: Or elſe (2) he only concurrs by his providence, as he doth to our other natural actions, we having this Ability beſtowed upon our very natures. He that aſſerts the firſt, runs upon all the rocks that he would avoid in the former Hypotheſis of continual Creation, and God will be made the cauſe of the ſin, and miſery of his ſpotleſs and blameleſs Creatures; which abſurdities he cannot ſhun by ſaying, that God, by interpoſing in ſuch productions, doth but follow the rules of acting, which he firſt made while man was innocent. For certainly, infinite goodneſs would never have tyed up it ſelf to ſuch Laws of working, as he foreſaw would preſently bring unavoidable inconvenience, miſery, and ruine upon the beſt part of his workmanſhip. And for the ſecond way, it ſuppoſeth God to have no more to do in this [Page] action than in our eating and drinking. Conſequently, here is a creation purely natural. And methinks, if we have ſo vaſt a power to bring the ends of contradictories together, ſomething out of nothing, (which ſome deny to Omnipotence it ſelf) 'tis much we cannot conſerve in being our Creature ſo produced, nor our own intimate ſelves, ſince conſervation is not more than Creation. And 'tis much, that in other things we ſhould give ſuch few ſpecimens of ſo vaſt an ability; or, have a power ſo divine and excellent, and no faculty to diſcern it by.

Again, (2) if the Soul be immediately produced out of nothing, be the agent who it will, God or the Parent, it will be pure and ſinleſs. For, ſuppoſing our parents to be our Creators; they make us but as natural agents, * and ſo can only tranſmit their natural qualities, but not their moral pravities. Wherefore there can no better account be given from this way how the Soul is ſo debauched and infected aſſoon as it comes into the body, than in the former, and therefore it fails in the main end it is deſigned for.

Thus we ſee then that the traduction of the Soul, ſuppoſing it to be produced out of nothing, cannot be defended.

Nor doth the ſecond general way yield any more relief to this Hypotheſis. For if it be made of any thing praeexiſtent, it is either [Page] of matter or ſpirit. The former we have undermined and overthrown already, in what was ſaid againſt thoſe, that hold it to be body. And if it be made out of any Spiritual ſubſtance, it muſt be the ſoul of the parent, (except we will revive the old enthuſiaſtick conceit of its being a particle of the divine eſſence) which ſuppoſition is * againſt the nature of an immaterial being, a chief property of which, is to be indiſcerpible. Nor do the ſimilitudes I mentioned in the propoſal of the Hypotheſis, at all fit the buſineſs; for one candle lights another, * by ſeparable emiſſions that paſs from the flame of that which is kindled, to the wick of the other. And flame is a body whoſe parts are in continual flux, as a river. But the ſubſtance of the ſoul is ſtable, permanent, and indiviſible, which quite makes it another caſe. And for a mans informing anothers mind with a thought which he had not conceived, it is not a production of any ſubſtance, but only an occaſioning him to exert an operation of his mind which he did not before. And therefore makes, nothing to the illuſtrating, how a Soul can produce a Soul, a ſubſtance diſtinct and without it ſelf: Thus we ſee how deſperate the caſe of the ſouls original is in the Hypotheſis of Traduction alſo. But yet to let it have fair play, we'l give it leave to plead it's cauſe; and briefly preſent [Page] what is moſt material in its behalf.

There are but two reaſons that I can think of, worth the naming: (1) A man begets a man, and a man he is not without a Soul, therefore 'tis pretended that the ſoul is begotten. But this argument is eaſily detected of palpable ſophiſtry, and is as if one ſhould argue, a man is mortal, therefore his Soul is mortal; or is fat and luſty, therefore his Soul is ſo. The abſurdity of which kinds of reaſoning lyes in drawing that into a ſtrict and rigorous affirmation, which is only meant according to vulgar ſpeech, and is true only in ſome remarkable reſpect or circumſtance. Thus we ſay, A man begets a man becauſe he doth the viſible and only ſenſible part of him; The vulgar, to whom common ſpeech is accommodate, not taking ſo much notice of what is paſt the ken of their ſenſes. And therefore Body in ordinary ſpeaking is oft put for Perſon, as here man for the body. Sometimes the nobleſt part is uſed for the whole, as when 'tis ſaid 70 Souls went down with Jacob into Egypt; therefore ſuch arguments as the aſſerters of traduction make uſe of, which are drawn from vulgar ſchemes of ſpeech, argue nothing but the deſperateneſs of the cauſe, that needs ſuch pitiful ſophiſtries to recommend it. Such are theſe proofs which yet are ſome of the beſt I meet with, The ſeed of the Woman ſhall break the Serpents[Page]head; Sixty ſix ſouls deſcended out of Jacobs loins; Adam begat a ſon in his own likeneſs, and ſuch like. According to this rate of arguing the ſcripture may be made ſpeak any thing that our humour ſome phancies pleaſe to dictate. And thus to rack the ſacred writings, to force them whether they will or no to bring evidence to our opinions, is an affront to their Authority, that's next to the denying on't. I might add (2) that begetting alſo hath a latitude, and in common ſpeech ſignifies not a ſtrict and philoſophical production; So that a man [...]egets a man, though he only generates the body, into which fitly prepared deſcends a ſoul. And he that doth that upon which another thing neceſſarily follows, is ſaid to be the cauſe of both.

(2) The adherents to traduction uſe to urge, that, except the whole man, ſoul and body, be propagated, there is no account can be given of our original deſilement. And ſcripture gives evident teſtimony to that early pollution; for we are ſaid to be conceived in ſin, and tranſgreſſors from the Womb.

We have already ſeen that indeed the way of daily creating ſouls, cannot come off but with vilely aſperſing the divine attributes. And it hath been hinted, that neither can Traduction ſolve the buſineſs: for if the Parent beget the ſoul out of nothing, it will be [Page] as pure and clean as if God himſelf were it's immediate Creator; for though a clean thing cannot come out of an unclean, when any thing of the ſubſtance of the producent is imparted to the effect; yet where 'tis made out of nothing, the reaſon is very different: Yea, the ſoul in all the powers that ar [...] concern'd in this production is now as clean and pure as ever 'twas; for it is ſuppos'd to do it by a capacity given, at its firſt creation while pure and innocent; in which reſpect it is not capable of moral contagion; this being an ability meerly natural and plaſtick, and not at all under the imperium or command of the will, the only ſeat of moral good and evil. Or, if our ſouls are but particles and decerptions of our parents, then I muſt have been guilty of all the ſins that ever were committed by my Progenitors ever ſince Adam; and by this time, my ſoul would have been ſo deprav'd and debauch'd, that it would be now brutiſh, yea diabolical. Thus then we ſee, that even upon this reaſon, 'tis neceſſary, to pitch upon ſome other Hypotheſis, to give an account of the pravity of our natures; which both theſe fail in the ſolution of. And, ſince the former commits ſuch violence upon the honour of the divine attributes, ſince the latter is ſo contrary to the nature of things, and ſince neither can give any ſatisfaction in the great affairs of providence and our natures, or have any incouragement [Page] from the Sacred Volume; 'Tis I think, very excuſable for us to caſt our eyes abroad, to ſee if there be no other way, that may probably unriddle thoſe myſteries, and relieve the minds of anxious and contemplative inquirers. In which ſearch, if we light on any thing that doth ſweetly accord with the Attributes of God, the nature of things, and unlocks the intricacies of Providence; I think we have found, what the two former opinions aim at, but cannot make good their pretences to; And may ſalute the truth with a joyful [...]. Wherefore from the modern diſputants, let us look towards the ancient Sages, thoſe Eaſtern Sophi, that have fill'd the world with the fame of their wiſdom; And ſince our inquiries are benighted in the Weſt, let us look towards the Eaſt, from whence 'tis likely the deſired light may diſplay it ſelf, and chaſe away the darkneſs that covers the face of thoſe theories. Therefore it was the opinion of the Indian Brachmans, the Perſian Magi, the Aegyptian Gymnoſophiſts, the Jewiſh Rabbins, ſome of the Graecian Philoſophers, and Chriſtian Fathers, that the ſouls of men were created all at firſt; and at ſeveral times and occaſions upon forfeiture of their better life and condition, dropt down into theſe terreſtrial bodies. This the learned among the Jews made a part of their Cabbala, and pretend to have received [Page] it from their great Law-giver, Moſes; which Hypotheſis, if it appear but probable to an impartial inquiry, will even on that account be preferrible to both the former, which we have ſeen to be deſperate.

CHAP. IV.

(1) Praeexiſtence cannot be diſproved. Scripture ſaith nothing againſt it. It's ſilence is no prejudice to this Doctrine, but rather an Argument for it, as the caſe ſtandeth. Praeexiſtence was the common opinion of our Saviour's times. How, probably, it came to be loſt in the Chriſtian Church.

THerefore let us ſee what title it can ſhew for our aſſent, or whether it can prove it ſelf worthy of the Patronage of thoſe great Authors that have owned it.

(1) Then, Whether this Doctrine be true or no; I'm confident it cannot be proved falſe: for if all Souls were not made together, it muſt be, either becauſe God could not do [Page] it; or becauſe he would not. For the firſt; I ſuppoſe very few have ſuch narrow Conceptions of the divine power, as to affirm that omnipotence could not produce all thoſe beings at firſt, which apart he is ſuppos'd to create daily; which implies no contradiction, or as much as difficulty, to be conceived; and which de facto he hath done in the caſe of Angels. Or, if inconſiſtence with any Attribute ſhould be pretended, that ſhall be prov'd quite otherwiſe hereafter; And the amicable conſiſtence of this Hypotheſis with them, yea, the neceſſity of it, from this very conſideration of the divine Attributes, ſhall be argued in the proceſs.

Therefore, whoever concludes that God made not all ſouls of old, when he produced the world out of nothing, muſt confeſs the reaſon of this aſſertion to be, becauſe he would not. And then I would ask him, how he came to know what he affirms ſo boldly? Who acquainted him with the Divine Counſels? Is there a word ſaid in his revealed Will to the contrary? or, hath he by his holy pen-men told us that either of the other ways was more ſutable to his beneplaciture? Indeed, 'tis very likely that a ſtrong and ready phancy, poſſeſt with a perſwaſion of the falſhood of this Hypotheſis, might find ſome half phraſes in Scripture, which he might ſuborn to ſing to the tune of his imagination. For, in ſuch a [Page] Miſcellaneous piece as the Bible is, it will not be difficult for a man that's ſtrongly reſolv'd againſt an opinion, to find ſomewhat or other that may ſeem to him to ſpeak the language of his phancy; And therefore it ſhall go hard, but that thoſe whom their education or prejudice have engaged againſt this Hypotheſis, will light on ſome obſcure pieces of texts, and broken ſentences or other, that ſhall ſeem to condemn what they diſapprove of. But I am ſecurely confident, that there is not a ſentence in the ſacred volume, from end to end, that ever was intended to teach, that all Souls were not made of old; or that, by a legitimate conſequence, would inferr it. And if any there be that ſeem to look another way, I dare ſay they are collateral, and were never deſigned by the divine Authors for the purpoſe they are made to ſerve, by the enemies of Praeexiſtence. Wherefore not to conceal any thing that with the leaſt ſhew of probability can be pretended from the ſacred volume in diſcountenance of the Doctrine of Praeexiſtence, I'le bring into view whatever I know to have the leaſt face of a Teſtimony to the contrary, in the divine Revelations. That ſo, when it ſhall appear that the moſt ſpecious Texts that can be alledg'd, have nothing at all in them to diſprove the ſouls praeexiſtence, we may be ſecure that God hath not diſcovered to us in his [Page] written will, that 'twas not his pleaſure to create all ſouls together.

Therefore (1.), It may be pretended, that the Doctrine of Praeexiſtence comports not with that innocence and integrity in which the Scripture determines Adam to have been made. Since it ſuppoſeth the deſcent into theſe bodies to be a culpable lapſe from an higher and better ſtate of Life, and this to be a ſtate of incarceration for former delinquencies. To this I anſwer,

(1) No one can object any thing to purpoſe againſt Praeexiſtence from the unconceiveableneſs of it, until he know the particular frame of the Hypotheſis, without which, all impugnations relating to the manner of the thing, will be wide of the mark, and but little to the buſineſs. Therefore, if the Objector would have patience to wait till we come to that part of our undertaking, he would find that there was but little ground for ſuch a ſcruple. But however, to prevent all cavillings, in this place I'le ſhew the invalidity of this objection. Wherefore,

(2) There is no neceſſity from the Doctrine of Praeexiſtence to ſuppoſe Adam a Delinquent, before his noted tranſgreſſion in a terreſtrial body: for conſidering, that his body had vaſt advantages above ours, in point of Beauty, Purity, and Serviceableneſs [Page] to the Soul, what harſhneſs is there in conceiving that God might ſend one of thoſe immaculate Spirits that he had made, into ſuch a Tenement, that he might be his ſteward in the affairs of this lower Family; and an overſeer, and ruler of thoſe other Creatures that he had ordered to have their dwelling upon earth? I am ſure, there is no more contrariety to any of the Divine Attributes in this ſuppoſition, than there is in that, which makes God to have ſent a pure ſpirit, which he had juſt made, into ſuch a body. Yea,

(3) Suppoſing that ſome Souls fell, when the Angels did (which the proceſs of our diſcourſe will ſhew to be no unreaſonable ſuppoſition) this was a merciful proviſion of our Maker, and a generous undertaking for a Seraphick and untainted Spirit. For by this means, fit and congruous matter is prepared for thoſe Souls to reſide and act in, who had rendred themſelves unfit to live and enjoy themſelves in more refined bodies. And ſo thoſe Spirits that had ſinned themſelves into a ſtate of ſilence and inactivity, are by this ſeaſonable means, which the divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs hath contrived for them, put once more into a capacity of acting their parts anew, and coming into play again. Now if it ſeem hard to any to conceive how ſo noble a Spirit in ſuch an advantagious body, [Page] ſhould have been impoſed upon by ſo groſs a deluſion, and ſubmit ſo impotently to the firſt temptation; He may pleaſe to conſider, that the difficulty is the ſame, ſuppoſing him juſt then to have been made; if we grant him but that purity and thoſe great perfections both of will, and underſtanding, which orthodox theology allows him.

Yea, again (4) I might ask, What inconvenience there is in ſuppoſing, that Adam himſelf was one of thoſe delinquent Souls, * which the divine pity and compaſſion had thus ſet up again; that ſo, ſo many of his excellent Creatures might not be loſt and undone irrecoverably; but might act anew, though upon a lower ſtage in the univerſe? A due conſideration of the infinite foecundity and fulneſs of the divine goodneſs will, if not warrant, yet excuſe ſuch a ſuppoſition.

But now if it be demanded, What advantage Adam's ſtanding had been to his poſterity, had he continued in the ſtate of innocence; and how ſin and miſery is brought upon us by his Fall, according to this Hypotheſis? I anſwer, that then among many other great priviledges, he had tranſmitted downwards by way of natural generation that excellent and bleſſed temper of body; which ſhould have been like his own happy craſis. So that our apprehenſions ſhould have been [Page] more large and free, our affections more regular and governable; and our inclinations to what is good and vertuous, ſtrong and vigorous. For we cannot but obſerve in this ſtate, how vaſt an influence the temper of our bodies hath upon our minds; both in reference to intellectual and moral diſpoſitions. Thus, daily experience teacheth us, how that, according to the ebb or flow of certain humours in our bodies, our wits are either more quick, free, and ſparkling, or elſe more obtuſe, weak, and ſluggiſh. And we find that there are certain clean and healthy diſpoſitions of body which make us cheerful, and contented; others on the contrary moroſe, melancholy, and dogged. And 'tis eaſie to obſerves how age or ſickneſs ſowers, and crabbs our natures. I might inſtance in almoſt all other qualities of the mind, which are ſtrangely influenc't and modifyed according to the bodies conſtitution. But none will deny ſo plain a truth; and therefore I forbear to inſiſt further on it. Nor need I mention any more advantages; ſo many, and ſuch great ones, being conſequent upon this. But our great Protoplaſt and repreſentative, falling through his unhappy diſobedience, beſides the integrity and rectitude of his mind, he loſt alſo that bleſſed conſtitution of Body, which would have been ſo great a priviledg to his off-ſpring: ſo that [Page] it became now corrupt, weak, and indiſpoſed for the nobler exerciſes of the Soul; and he could tranſmit no better to us, than himſelf was owner of. Thus we ſell in him, and were made miſerable by his tranſgreſſion. We have bodies conveyed to us, which ſtrangely do bewitch and betray us. And thus we all bear about us the marks of the firſt apoſtacy. There are other ſad effects of his defection, but this may ſuffice for my preſent purpoſe. Thus we ſee how that the derivation of original depravity from Adam is as clear in this Hypotheſis, as can be pretended in either of the other. And upon other Accounts it ſeems to have much the advantage of both of them. As will appear to the unprejudiced in what is further to be diſcourſed of.

Finally, therefore, If the urgers of the Letter of Geneſis of either ſide, againſt this Hypotheſis, would but conſider, That the Souls that deſcend hither, for their praevarication in another ſtate, lye in a long condition of ſilence and inſenſibility, before they appear in terreſtrial bodies; each of them then might, from the doctrine of Praeexiſtence thus ſtated, gain all the advantages which he ſuppoſeth to have by his own opinion, and avoid all thoſe alſurdities which he ſeeth the other run upon. If the Aſſerters of daily Creation think it clear from Scripture that [Page] God is the Father of Spirits, and immediate maker of Souls, they'l find the ſame made good and aſſented to in this Hypotheſis. And if they are unwilling to hold any thing contrary to the Nature of the ſoul, which is immortal and indiſcerpible, the Doctrine of Praeexiſtence amicably cloſeth with them in this alſo.

And if the Patrons of Traduction would have a way, how ſin and miſery may be propagated from our firſt Parent without aſperſing the divine Attributes, or affirming any thing contrary to the phaenomena of Providence, and Nature; this Hypotheſis will clear the buſineſs; It giving us ſo fair an Account how we all dye in Adam, without blotting the Wiſdom, Juſtice, or Goodneſs, of God, or affirming any thing contrary to the Appearances of Nature.

I have been the longer on this Argument, becauſe 'tis like to be one main objection; And we ſee it is ſo far from prejudicing, that it is no inconſiderable evidence of the truth of Praeexiſtence.

And now, beſides this that I have named, I cannot think of any Arguments from Scripture againſt this Doctrine, conſiderable enough to excuſe a mention of them. However, if the candid Reader will pardon the impertinency I'le preſent to view what I find moſt colourable.

[Page] Therefore (2), It may be ſome are ſo inadvertent as to urge againſt our ſouls having been of old, that, Sacred writ ſays We are but of Yeſterday; which expreſſion of divine Scripture, is queſtionleſs to be underſtood of our appearance on this ſtage of Earth. And is no more an Argument againſt our Praeexiſtence, than that other phraſe of his, Before I go hence, and Be no more, is againſt our future exiſtence in an other ſtate after the preſent life is ended. Nor will it prove more the buſineſs it is brought for, than the expreſſion of Rachels weeping for her Children becauſe they were not, will inferr, that they were, abſolutely nothing. Nor can any thing more be made.

(3.) Of that place in Eccleſiaſtes, Yea, better is he than both they, (meaning the dead and living) which hath not yet been; ſince, beſids that 'tis a like ſcheme of ſpeech with the former, it ſeems more to favour, than diſcountenance Praeexiſtence; for what is abſolutely nothing can neither be worſe, nor better. Moreover, we coming from a ſtate of ſilence and inactivity when we drop into theſe bodies, we were before, as if we had not been; and ſo there is better ground in this caſe, for ſuch a manner of ſpeaking, than in meer non-appearance; which yet Scripture phraſeth a Not being.

* And now I cannot think of any place [Page] in the Sacred volume more that could make a tolerable plea againſt this Hypotheſis, of our Souls having been before they came into theſe bodies; except

(4.) Any will draw a negative Argument from the Hiſtory of the Creation, concluding that the Souls of men were not made of old, becauſe there is no mention there, of any ſuch matter. To which I return briefly, That the ſame Argument concludes againſt the being of Angels, of whoſe Creation there is no more ſay'd in the firſt ſtory than of this inferiour rank of Spirits, Souls. The reaſon of which ſilence is commonly taken to be, becauſe Moſes had here to do with a rude and illiterate people, who had few or no apprehenſions of any thing beyond their ſenſes, and therefore he takes notice to them of nothing but what was ſenſible and of common obſervation. This reaſon is given alſo why minerals were omitted. 'Twere an eaſy matter, to ſhew how the outward cortex, the Letter of this Hiſtory is adapted to mean and vulgar apprehenſions, whoſe narrowneſs renders them incapable of ſublimer ſpeculations. But that being more than needs for our preſent purpoſe, I ſhall forbear to ſpeak further of it.

I might (2) further add, that great and learned Interpreters tell us, that all ſorts of Spirits, Angels, and Souls are ſymbollically [Page] meant by the creation of heaven, and light. And, if it were directly in the way of our preſent buſineſs, it might be made appear to be no improbable conjecture. But I referr him that is curious in this particular to the great Reſtorer of the antient Cabbala, the Learned Dr. H. More in his conjectura Cabbaliſtica.

And now from the conſideration of the ſilence of the firſt Hiſtory, we deſcend to the laſt and moſt likely to be urged ſcruple, which is to this purpoſe.

(5.) We are not to ſtep beyond the divine Revalations, and ſince God hath made known no ſuch Doctrine as this, of the Souls Praeexiſtence any where in his word, we may reaſonably deny it, or at leaſt have no ground to imbrace it. This is the moſt important objection of all the reſt, and moſt likely to prepoſſeſs timorous and wary inquirers againſt this Hypotheſis; wherefore I conceive that a full anſwer to this doubt, will prevent many ſcrupulous Haeſitations, and make way for an unprejudic'd hearing of what I have further to alledge in the behalf of this opinion. And

(1.) I wiſh that thoſe that urge Scripture ſilence to diſprove praeexiſtence would conſider, how ſilent it is both in the caſe of Daily Creation, and Traduction; we have ſeen already that there is nothing in Sacred writ [Page] to warrant either, but only ſuch Generals from which the reſpective Patrons of either Doctrine would inferr their own concluſion, though indeed they all of them with better right and congruity prove Praeexiſtence.

(2.) I ſuppoſe thoſe that argue from Scripture-ſilence in ſuch caſes miſtake the deſign of Scripture, which is not to determine points of ſpeculation, but to be a rule of Life and Manners. Nor doth it otherwiſe deſign the teaching of Doctrinals, than as they have a tendency to promote the divine life, righteouſneſs and Holineſs. It was never intended by it's inſpired Authors to fill our Heads with notions, but to regulate our diſorderly appetites and affections, and to direct us the way to a nobler happineſs. Therefore thoſe that look for a ſyſteme of opinions in thoſe otherways-deſigned writings, do like him that ſhould ſee for a body of natural Philoſophy, in Epictetus his morals, or Seneca's Epiſtles.

(3.) Chriſt and his Apoſtles ſpoke and writ as the condition of the perſons with whom they dealt adminiſtred occaſion, as as did alſo the other pen-men. Therefore doubtleſs there were many noble Theories which they could have made the world acquainted with, which yet for want of a fit occaſion to draw them forth were never [Page] upon Record. And we know, ſew ſpeculative truths are deliver'ed in Scripture, but ſuch as were called forth by the controverſies of thoſe times: And Praeexiſtence was none of them, it being the conſtant opinion of the Jews, as appears by that Queſtion, Maſter, was it for this man's ſin or his Fathers, that he was born blind, which ſuppoſeth it of the Diſciples alſo. Wherefore

(4.) There was little need of more teaching of that, which thoſe times were ſufficiently inſtructed in: And indeed, as the caſe ſtands, if Scripture-ſilence be Argumentative, 'twil be for the advantage of Praeexiſtence; ſince it being the then common opinion, and the diſciples themſelves being of that belief, 'tis very likely, had it been an errour, that our Saviour or his Apoſtles would have witneſt againſt it. But there being not a word let fall from them in diſapproval of that opinon, though ſometimes occaſions were adminiſtred (as by the Queſtion of the Diſciples, and ſome other occurrences) 'tis a good preſumption of the ſoundneſs of it.

Now that Praeexiſtence was the common opinion of the Jews, in thoſe times might be made good with full and convictive evidence, were it worth our labour to inſiſt much upon this Inquiry; but this being only a by-conſideration, a brief touch of it will ſuffice us. One of the great Rabbins therefore, [Page] * Mr. Ben Iſrael in his Problems de Creatione, aſſures us, that Praeexiſtence was the common belief of all wiſe men among the Jews, without exception. And the Author of the Book of Wiſdom, who certainly was a Jew, probably Philo, plainly ſuppoſeth the ſame Doctrine in that Speech, For I was a witty Child, and had a good Spirit, wherefore the rather being good, I came into a body undefiled. As alſo did the Diſciples in their Foremention'd Queſtion to our Saviour; For except they ſuppoſed, that he might have ſinned before he was born, the Queſtion had been ſenſleſs and impertinent. Again, when Chriſt askt them, whom men ſaid he was they anſwered, that ſome ſaid John the Baptiſt, others Elias, others Jeremias or one of the Prophets, which ſayings of theirs ſuppoſe their belief of a Metempſychoſis and conſequently of Praeexiſtence. Theſe, one would think, were very proper occaſions for our Saviour to have rectified his miſtaken followers, had their ſuppoſition been an errour, as he was wont to do in caſes not more conſiderable. Therefore if the enemies of Praeexiſtence will needs urge Scriptures ſuppoſed ſilence againſt it; they have no reaſon to take it amiſs if I ſhew them how their Argument recoyls upon themſelves, and deſtroy their own cauſe, inſtead of their Adverſaries.

[Page] (5.) Beſides, there were doubtleſs many Doctrines entertain'd by the Apoſtles and the more learned of their followers, which were diſproportion'd to the capacities of the generality, who hold but little Theory.

There was ſtrong meat for the more grown and manly Chriſtians, as well as milk for babes, and weaker Conſtitutions. Now Scripture was deſigned for the benefit of the moſt, and they could little underſtand, and leſs make uſe of a ſpeculation ſo remote from common conceit, as Praeexiſtence. Among us, wiſe men count it not ſo proper to deal forth deep and myſterious points in Divinity to common and promiſcuous Auditories. Wherefore the Apoſtles and others of their more improv'd and capable diſciples might have had ſuch a Doctrine among them, though it were never expreſly defined in their publick writings. And the Learned Origen and ſome other of the Antients affirm that Praeexiſtence was a Cabbala which was handed down from the Apoſtolick ages, to their times; and we know thoſe were early, and had therefore better advantages of knowing the certainty of ſuch a Tradition, than we at ſo vaſt a diſtance.

Nor need any wonder how it came at length to be loſt, or at leaſt kept but among a few, who conſiders the groſſneſs of ſucceeding ages, when ſuch multitudes could [Page] ſwallow the dull and courſe Anthropomorphite Doctrines; much leſs, if he reflects upon that black night of barbarick ignorance which ſpread it ſelf over this weſtern world, upon the incurſion of thoſe rude and unciviliz'd Nations that 'ore-ran the Empire: out of which darkneſs, 'twas the work of ſome Centuries to recover the then obſcured Region of Civility and Letters. Moreover, it would allay the admiration of any one inquiſitive in ſuch reſearches, when he ſhall have taken notice of the ſtarting up and prevailing of School-Divinity in the world, which was but Ariſtotles Philoſophy theologiz'd. And we know that Philoſophy had the luck to ſwim in the general eſteem and credit, when Platoniſm and the more antient wiſdom, a branch of which, Praeexiſtence was, were almoſt quite ſunk and buried. So that a Theology being now made, out of Ariſtotelian principles, 'tis no wonder that Praeexiſtence was left out, nothing being ſuppoſed to have been ſaid of it, by the great Author of that Philoſophy; and his admiring Sectators were loath to borrow ſo conſiderable a Theory, from their Maſters neglected Rival, Plato.

But (6) at once to remove this ſtone of offence out of the way, I think Scripture is not ſo ſilent in this matter as is imagin'd. And I'm confident, more can be ſaid from [Page] thoſe divine writings in behalf of Praeexiſtence, than for many opinions, that it's oppoſers are very fond of, and think to be there evidently aſſerted. And had this been a commonly received Doctrine, and mens Wits as much exerciſed for the defence on't, as they have been for the common dogmata, I nothing doubt, but that Scriptures would have been heaped up in abundance for it's juſtification, and it would have been thought to have been plainly witneſt too, in the inſpired volume. For, as mens, phancies will readily furniſh them with a proof of that, of whoſe truth they are ſtrongly prepoſſeſſed; So, on the contrary, they'l be very backward to ſee any evidence of that which is ſtrange to them, and which hath alwaies been reputed an Abſurdity. But my Scripture-evidence is not ſo proper for this place, I intending to make it an Argument by it ſelf. Therefore if the urger of this objection, will but have a little patience till I come ſo far on the way of my diſcourſe, I hope he may be ſatisfied that Praeexiſtence is not ſuch a ſtranger to Scripture as he conceits it.

CHAP. V.

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Reaſons againſt Praeexiſtence anſwered. Our forgetting the former ſtate is no argument to diſprove it: nor are the other Reaſons that can be produc'd, more concluſive. The proof of the poſſibility of Praeexiſtence were enough, all other Hypotheſes being abſurd and contradictious. But it is prov'd alſo by poſitive Arguments.

NOw therefore to proceed, let us look back upon our progreſs, and ſo enter on what remains. We have ſeen, that God could have created all Souls at firſt had he ſo pleaſed, and that he hath revealed nothing in his written Will to the contrary. And now if it be found alſo, that he hath not made it known to our Reaſons that 'twas not his will to do ſo, we may conclude this firſt particular, That no one can ſay, that the Doctrine of Praeexiſtence is a falſhhood. Therefore let us call to Account the moſt momentous [Page] reaſons that can be laid againſt it, and we ſhall find that they all have not weight enough in the leaſt to move ſo rational and ſolid an opinion.

(1.) Then, 'tis likely to be urged, that had we lived and acted in a former ſtate, * we ſhould doubtleſs have retain'd ſome remembrance of that condition; But we having no memory of any thing backwards before our appearance upon this preſent ſtage, it will be thought to be a conſiderable praeſumption, that Praeexiſtence is but a phancy.

But I would deſire ſuch kind of reaſoners to tell me, how much they remember of their ſtate and condition in the womb, or of the Actions of their firſt infancy. And I could wiſh they would conſider, that not one paſſage in an hundred is remembred of their grown and riper age. Nor doth there ſcarce a night paſs but we dream of many things which our waking Memories can give us no Account of; yea, old age and ſome kinds of diſeaſes blot out all the images of things paſt, and even in this ſtate cauſe a total oblivion. * Now if the Reaſons why we ſhould loſe the remembrance of our former life be greater, than are the cauſes of forgetfulneſs in the inſtances we have produced, I think it will be clear, that this Argument hath but little force againſt the opinion [Page] we are inquiring into. Therefore if we do but reflect upon that long ſtate of ſilence and inactivity that we emerged from, when we came into theſe bodies; and the vaſt change we under-went by our ſinking into this new and unwonted habitation, it will appear to the conſiderate, that there is greater reaſon why we ſhould have forgotten our former Life, than any thing in this. And if a diſeaſe or old age can raſe out the memory of paſt actions, even while we are in one and the ſame condition of Life, certainly ſo long and deep a ſwoon as is abſolute inſenſibility and inertneſs, may much more reaſonably be thought to blot out the memory of an other Life, whoſe paſſages probably were nothing like the tranſactions of this.

And this alſo might be given as an other Reaſon of our forgetting our former ſtate, ſince uſually things are brought to our remembrance by ſome like occurrences. But

(2.) Some will argue, If this be a ſtate of puniſhment for former miſcarriages, how comes it about then, that 'tis a better condition than that we laſt came from, viz. the ſtate of ſilence and inſenſibility? I anſwer, That if we look upon our preſent terreſtrial condition as an effect of our defection from the higher Life, and in reference to our former happineſs loſt by our own default, [Page] 'tis then a miſery and a puniſhment. But if we compare our now-being with the ſtate of inactivity we were delivered from, it may then be called an After-Game of the divine Goodneſs, and a Mercy. As a Malefactor, that is at firſt put into a dark and diſconſolate dungeon, and afterwards is remov'd to a more comfortable and lightſome priſon, may acknowledge his remove to be a favour and deliverance compared with the place he was laſt conſined to; though with reſpect to his fault and former liberty, even this condition is both a mulct and a miſery. It is juſt thus in the preſent ca [...]e, and any one may make the application.

But it will be ſaid, (3) If our Souls liv'd in a former ſtate, did they act in bodies, or without them? The former they'l ſay is abſurd, and the latter incongruous and unlikely; ſince then all the powers the Soul hath to exert in a body, would have been idle and to no purpoſe. But (1) the moſt that can be argued from ſuch like objections, is, that we know not the manner of the thing; and are no Arguments againſt the aſſertion it ſelf. And were it granted that the paticular ſtate of the Soul before it came hither is inconceivable, yet this makes no more againſt it, than it doth againſt it's after-condition; which theſe very objectors hold [Page] to be ſo, as to the particular modus. But (2) Why is it ſo abſurd that the Soul ſhould have actuated another kind of body, before it came into this? Even here 'tis immediately united to a purer vehicle, moves and acts the groſſer body by it; And why then might it not in its former and purer ſtate of Life have been joyn'd only to ſuch a refined body, which ſhould have been ſuitable to its own perfection and purity? I'me ſure, many, if not the moſt of the Antient Fathers, thought Angels themſelves to be embodied, and therefore they reputed not this ſuch a groſs abſurdity. But an occaſion hereafter will draw our pen this way again, and therefore I paſs it to a third return to this objection.

(3.) Therefore, though it were granted that the Soul lived afore-times without a body, what greater incongruity▪ is there in ſuch a ſuppoſition, than that it ſhould live and act after death without any union with matter or any body whatſoever, as the objectors themſelves conceive it doth? But all ſuch objections as theſe will fly away as miſts before the Sun, when we ſhall come particularly to ſtate the Hypotheſis. And therefore I may be excuſed from further troubling my ſelf and the Reader about them here. Eſpecially ſince, as hath been intimated, they prove nothing at all, but that [Page] the objectors cannot conceive what manner of ſtate that of Praeexiſtence was, which is no prejudice to the opinion it ſelf; that our Souls were extant before theſe earthly bodies.

Thus then I hope I have clearly enough made good that all Souls might have been Created from the beginning; for ought any thing that is made known, either in the Scriptures or our reaſons to the contrary. * And thereby have removed thoſe prejudices that Would have ſtood in the way of our concluſion. Wherefore we may now without controul, from our proof of, That it may be ſo; paſs on to enquire, whether indeed, it is ſo; and ſee, whether it may as well be aſserted, as defended.

And truly conſidering that both the other ways are impoſſible, and this third not at all unreaſonable, it may be thought needleſs to bring more forces into the field to gain it the victory, after its enemies are quite ſcattered and defeated. Yet however, for the pomp and triumph of truth, though it need not their ſervice, we ſhall add ſome poſitive Arguments, whereby it may appear, that not only all other ways are dangerous and unpaſſable, and this irreproveable; but alſo that there is direct evidence enough to prove it ſolid and rational. And I make my firſt conſideration of this kind, a ſecond Argument.

CHAP. VI.

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A ſecond Argument for Praeexiſtence drawn from the conſideration of the Divine Goodneſs, which always doth what is beſt.

(2) THen, whoever conceives rightly of God, apprehends him to be infinite and immenſe Goodneſs, who is alwayes ſhedding abroad of his own exuberant [...]ulneſs: There is no ſtraitneſs in the Deity, no bounds to the ocean of Love. Now the divine Goodneſs referrs not to himſelf, as ours extends not unto him. He acts nothing for any ſelf-accompliſhment, being eſſentially and abſolutely compleat and perfect. But the object and term of his goodneſs is his creatures good and happineſs, in their reſpective capacities. He is that infinite fountain that is continually overflowing; and can no more ceaſe to ſhed his influences upon his indigent dependents than the ſun to ſhine at noon. * Now as the infinite Goodneſs of the deity, obligeth him always to do good, ſo by the ſame reaſon to do that which is beſt; ſince to omit any degrees of good would argue a defect in goodneſs, [Page] ſuppoſing wiſdom to order, and power to execute. He therefore that ſuppoſeth God not always to do what is beſt, and beſt for his Creatures (for he cannot act for his own Good) apprehends him to be leſs good than can be conceived, and conſequently not infinitely ſo. For what is infinite, is beyond meaſure and apprehenſion.

Therefore to direct this to our purpoſe, God being infinitely good, and that to his Creatures, and therefore doing always what is beſt for them, methinks it roundly follows that our ſouls lived and 'njoy'd themſelves of old before they came into theſe bodies. For ſince they were capable of living, and that in a much better and happier ſtate long before they deſcended into this region of death and miſery; and ſince that condition of life and ſelf-enjoyment would have been better, than abſolute not-being; may we not ſafely conclude from a due conſideration of the divine goodneſs, that it was ſo? What was it that gave us our being, but the immenſe goodneſs of our Maker? And why were we drawn out of our nothings, but becauſe it was better for us to be, than not to be? Why were our ſouls put into theſe bodies, and not into ſome more ſqualid and ugly; but becauſe we are capable of ſuch, and 'tis better for us to live in theſe, than in thoſe that are leſs ſutable to [Page] our natures? And had it not been better for us, to have injoy'd our ſelves and the bounty and favours of our Maker of old, as did the other order of intellectual creatures, than to have layn in the comfortleſs night of nothing till t'other day? Had we not been better on't to have lived and acted in the joyful regions of light and bleſſedneſs with thoſe Spirits that at firſt had being, than juſt now to jump into this ſad plight, and ſtate of ſin and wretchedneſs?

Inſinite Power could as well have made us all at once, as the Angels; and with as good congruity to our natures we might have liv'd and been happy without theſe bodies, as we ſhall be in the ſtate of ſeparation: ſince therefore it was beſt for us, and as eaſie for our Creator ſo to have effected it, where was the defect, if it was not ſo? Is not this to [...]lurr his goodneſs, and to ſtrait-lace the divine beneficence? And doth not the contrary Hypotheſis to what I am pleading for, repreſent the God of Love as leſs good and bountiful, than a charitable Mortal, who would neglect no opportunity within his reach of doing what good he could to thoſe that want his help and aſſiſtance?

I confeſs, the world generally have ſuch Narrow and unbecoming apprehenſions [Page] of God, and draw his picture in their imaginations ſo like themſelves, that few I doubt will feel the force of this Argument; and mine own obſervation makes me enter the ſame ſuſpicion of its ſucceſs that ſome others have who have uſed it. 'Tis only a very deep ſenſe of the divine goodneſs can give it any perſwaſive energy. And this noble ſentiment there are very few that are poſſeſt of. However to lend it what ſtrength I can, I ſhall endeavour to remove ſome prejudices that hinder it's force and efficacy; And when thoſe ſpots and ſcum are wiped away, that miſtake and inadvertency have faſtned on it, 'twill be illuſtrious by its own brightneſs.

CHAP. VII.

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This firſt Evaſion, that God acts freely, and his meer will is reaſon enough for his doing, or forbearing any thing, overthrown by four Conſiderations. Some incident Evaſions, viz. that Gods Wiſdom, or his glory, may be contrary to this diſplay of the divine goodneſs, in our being made of old, clearly taken off.

(1.) THerefore, will ſome ſay, God worketh freely, nor can he be obliged to act but when he pleaſeth. And this will and pleaſure of his is the reaſon of our beings, and of the determinate time of our beginning. Therefore if God would not that we ſhould have been made ſooner, and in a better ſtate of life, his will is reaſon enough, and we need look no further. To this evaſion, I thus Reply.

(1.) 'Tis true indeed, God is the moſt Free Agent, becauſe none can compel [Page] him to act, none can hinder him from acting. Nor can his Creatures oblige him to any thing. But then

(2.) The divine liberty and freedom conſiſts not in his acting by meer arbitrarious will, as disjunct from his other Attributes. For he is ſaid to act according to the Counſel of his own will. So that his wiſdom and goodneſs are as it were the Rules whereby his will is directed. Therefore though he cannot be obliged to act by any thing without himſelf, yet he may be the Laws of his own eſſential rectitude and perfection. Wherefore I conceive he is ſaid, not to be able to do thoſe things (which he might well enough by abſolute power) that conſiſt not with his ever bleſſed Attributes. Nor by the ſame reaſon can he omit that which the eternal Law of his moſt perſect nature obligeth him to. The ſumm is, * God never acts by meer will or groundleſs humour, that is a weakneſs in his imperſect Creatures; but according to the immutable Rules of his ever bleſſed eſſence. And therefore,

(3) 'Tis a derogation from his infinite Majeſty to aſſert any thing contrary to his Goodneſs upon pretence of his will and pleaſure. For whatever is moſt ſutable to this moſt bleſſed Attribute, and contradicts no other, that be ſure he willeth. Wherefore

[Page] (4) If it be better, and more agreeable to the divine goodneſs that we ſhould have been in an happier ſtate, before we came into theſe bodies, Gods will cannot then be pretended to the contrary, (eſpecially it having been proved already, that he hath no way revealed any ſuch will of his) but rather it is demonſtratively clear that his will was, it ſhould be ſo. Since as God never acts in the abſence of his wiſdom and goodneſs, ſo neither doth he abſtain from acting when thoſe great Attributes require it.

Now if it be excepted again (2) That 'tis tr [...]e that this Hypotheſis is moſt ſutable to the divine goodneſs, and the conſideration of that alone would inferr it: But how know we but his Wiſdom contradicts it? I return briefly, That if it be confeſt to be ſo correſpondent to, and inferrible from one Attribute, and cannot be prov'd inconſiſtent with another, my buſineſs is determined. Therefore let thoſe that pretend an inconſiſtence, prove it. (2) The Wiſdom of God is that Attribute and eſſential perfection, whereby the divine actions are directed to their end, which is always good, and beſt: Therefore to do that which is beſt, cannot thwart the divine wiſdom, but always includes and ſuppoſeth it: Whence it follows, that what ſo comports with goodneſs, cannot ſtand oppoſite to Wiſdom. [Page] Wiſdom in God being indeed nothing elſe but goodneſs, contriving and directing for the Creature's good and happineſs. For we muſt remember, what was ſaid above, that what is infinitely full and perfect, can have no ends for any ſelf-advantage; and therefore the ends of the divine wiſdom are ſomething without himſelf, and conſequently the good and perfection of his Creatures. So that unleſs it can be proved to have been contrary to ours, or any other Creatures good, that we ſhould have been extant as ſoon as the Light, it cannot be concluded to have any contradiction to the divine wiſdom.

But it will be ſaid again, (3) Gods glory is his great end, for the promoting of which his wiſdom directs all his Actions; and conſequently, that which may be beſt for the Creature, may not be ſo conducive to the divine Glory, and therefore not agreeable with his wiſdom.

Now, though I think the world hath a very miſtaken apprehenſion of Gods glory, yet I ſhall not here ingage in more controverſies, than I muſt needs. 'Tis enough for my preſent purpoſe to intimate; That Gods glory is no by-end or ſelf-accumulation, nor an addition of anything to Him which he was not eternally poſſeſt of; nor yet is it any thing that ſtands in oppoſition to the good of his Creation; But the diſplay and communication[Page]of his excellencies; among the which, his goodneſs is not the leaſt conſiderable, if it be not that moſt divine and fundamental Attribute which gives perfection to all the reſt. So that we may aſſure our ſelves, that when ever his goodneſs obligeth him to action, his glory never ſtands in oppoſition. For even this is his glory, to communicate to his creatures ſutably to his own abſolute fulneſs, and to act according to the direction of his eſſential perfections; yea, though we ſhould ſtate his glory to conſiſt alone, in the honour and renown of his Attributes, yet even then the Hypotheſis of our having been made in the beginning will accumulate to his praiſes, and repreſent him to his creatures as more illuſtrious; ſince it is a more magnificent apprehenſion of his goodneſs, and clears his other Attributes from thoſe ſtains of diſ-repute that all other ſuppoſitions caſt upon them. And though his glory ſhould conſiſt, as too many fondly imagine, in being praiſed and admired by his creatures, even on this account alſo it would have obliged him to have made us all of old, rather than oppoſed it; ſince, then, his excellencies had been ſung forth by a more numerous Quire, in continual Hallelujahs. Now if it ſhould be urged, * that God made all things for himſelf, and therefore is not obliged to conſult the good of his creatures in all his Actions: [Page] I rejoyn, that God's making all things for himſelf, can argue no more than his making all things for his own ends, viz. the ends of goodneſs. Beſides, the beſt Criticks make that place to ſpeak no more but this, That God orders all things according to himſelf; that is, according to the rules of his own nature and perfections.

Thus then, we ſee that for God to do that which is beſt for his Creatures, is neither contrary to his will and pleaſure, his wiſdom, nor his glory, but moſt conſonant to all of them. And therefore ſince the Praeexiſtence of Souls, is ſo agreeable to the divine goodneſs, and ſince nothing elſe in the Deity oppoſeth, but rather ſweetly conſpires with it, methinks this argument were enough to conclude it. But yet there are other Evaſions which would elude this Demonſtration; I ſhall name the moſt conſiderable and leave it to the judicious to determine, whether they can diſable it.

CHAP. VIII.

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A ſecond general Evaſion, viz. that our Reaſons cannot tell what God ſhould do, or what is beſt, overthrown by ſeveral conſiderations. As is alſo a third, viz. that by the ſame Argument God would have been obliged to have made us impeccable, and not liable to Miſery.

WHerefore the ſecond general evaſion is, That our Reaſons cannot conclude what God ſhould do, there being vaſt fetches in the divine wiſdom which we comprehend not, nor can our natural light determine what is beſt. I anſwer (1) Our Saviour himſelf, who was the beſt Judge in the caſe, teacheth us, that the Reaſon of a man may in ſome things conclude what God will do, in that ſaying of his, If ye being evil, know how to give good things to your Children, much more ſhall your Father which is in Heaven give his Spirit to them that ask him: Plainly intimating, that we may ſecurely [Page] argue from any thing that is a perfection in our ſelves, to the ſame in God. And if we, who are imperfectly good, will yet do as much good as we can, for thoſe we love and tender; with greater confidence may we conclude, that God, who is infinitely ſo, will confer upon his creatures whatever good they are capable of. Thus we ſee our Saviour owns the capacity of reaſon in a caſe that is very near the ſame that we are dealing in.

And God himſelf appeals to the reaſons of men to judge of the righteouſneſs and equity of his ways. Ye men of Iſrael and inhabitants of Jeruſalem, judge between me and my vineyard; which place I bring to ſhew that meer natural reaſon is able to judge in ſome caſes what is fit for God to do, and what is ſutable to his eſſence and perfections. And if in any,

Methinks (2) its capacity in the caſe before us ſhould be own'd as ſoon as in any. For if reaſon cannot determine and aſſure us, that a bleſſed and happy Being is better than None at all; and conſequently, that it was beſt for our ſouls to have been, before they were in this ſtate of wretchedneſs; and thence conclude, that it was very congruous to the divine goodneſs to have made us in a former and better condition; I think then (1) That it cannot give us the aſſurance of any thing, [Page] ſince there is not any principle in Metaphy [...]icks or Geometry more clear than this, viz. That an happy Being, is better than abſolute Not [...]eing. And if our reaſons can ſecurely determine this, 'tis as much as we need at preſent. Or [...]f this be not certain, how vain are thoſe Learned men that diſpute whether a ſtate of the extremeſt miſery a creature is capable [...]of, and that everlaſting, be not better than Non [...]entity?▪ (2) If we cannot certainly know that it had been Better that we ſhould have exiſted in a life of happineſs, proportion'd to our natures of old, than have been meer nothing, till ſome few years ſince; we can never then own and acknowledg the divine goodneſs to us in any thing we enjoy. For if it might have been as good for us not to Be, as to Be, and happily; Then it might have been as good for us to have wanted any thing elſe that we enjoy, as to have it; and conſequently, we cannot own it as an effect of God's goodneſs that he hath beſtowed any bleſſing on us. For if Being be not better than Not-being, then 'tis no effect of goodneſs that we are; and if ſo, then 'tis not from goodneſs that we have any thing elſe, * ſince all other things are inferiour to the good of Being. If it be ſaid, It had been better indeed for us, to have lived in a former and happier ſtate; but it may be, it had not been ſo for the univerſe; and the general good is to be preferr'd [Page] before that of particulars;

I ſay then, and it may ſerve for a (3) anſwer to the general objection: If we may deny that to be done by almighty goodneſs, which is undoubtedly beſt for a whole ſpecies of his creatures, meerly on this account, that, for ought we know, it may be for the advantage of ſome others, though there be not the leaſt appearance of any ſuch matter; we can never then argue any thing from the divine goodneſs. It can never then be prov'd from that glorious Attribute, that he hath not made ſome of his creatures on purpoſe that they might be miſerable; nor can it be concluded thence, that he will not annihilate all the pure and ſpotleſs Angels; both which I ſuppoſe, any ſober inquirer will think congruouſly deducible from the divine goodneſs. And if to ſay, for ought we know, It may be beſt for ſome other creatures, that thoſe ſhould be miſerable, and theſe annihilated, be enough to diſable the Argument; on the ſame account we ſhall never be able to prove ought from this, or any other Attribute. I might add,

(2) There is not the leaſt colourable pretence for any ſuch ſuſpicion. For, would the world have been too little to have contain'd thoſe ſouls, without juſtling with ſome others? or, would they by violence have taken any of the priviledges of the other [Page] intellectual Creatures from them? If ſo, how comes it about that at laſt they can all ſo well conſiſt together? And, could other Creatures have been more diſadvantag'd by them, when they were pure and innocent, than they will at laſt, when they are ſo many of them debauched and depraved?

(3) If this be enough to anſwer an Argument, to ſay, for ought we know, it may be thus and thus, when there is not the leaſt ſign or appearance of any ſuch thing, then nothing can ever be proved, and we are condemned to everlaſting Scepticiſm. We ſhould never, for inſtance, from the order, beauty, and wiſe contrivance of the things that do appear, prove there is a God, if it were ſufficient to anſwer, That things are indeed ſo made in this earth, on which we are extant; but, it may be, they are framed very odly, ridiculouſly, and ineptly in ſome other worlds, which we know nothing of. If this be anſwering, any thing might be anſwered. But there is yet another objection againſt mine Argument from the Divine Goodneſs, which looks very formidably at a diſtance, though when we come near it, we ſhall find, it will not bear the tryal. And it may thus be urged.

(3) If the Goodneſs of God always obligeth him to do what is beſt, and beſt for [Page] his Creatures, How is it then, that we were not made impeccable, and ſo not obnoxious to miſery? Or how doth it conſiſt with that overflowing Goodneſs of the Deity, that we were let to lie in a long ſtate of ſilence and inſenſibility, before we came into theſe bodies? This ſeems a preſſing difficulty, but yet there's hopes we may diſpatch it. Therefore,

(1) Had we been made impeccable, we ſhould have been another kind of Creatures than now; ſince we had then wanted the [...] or liberty of will to good and evil, which is one of our eſſential Attributes. Conſequently, there would have been one ſpecies of beings wanting to compleat the univerſe; and it would have been a ſlurre to the divine Goodneſs not to have given being to ſuch Creatures as in the Idea were fairly poſſible, and contradicted no other Attribute. Yea, though he foreſaw that ſome would ſin and make themſelves miſerable, yet the foreſeen lapſe and miſery of thoſe, was not an evil great enough to over-ballance the good the ſpecies would reap by being partakers of the divine Goodneſs in the land of the Living; Therefore however 'twas goodneſs to give ſuch Creatures being. But it will be urged upon us, If Liberty to good and [...]vil be ſo eſſential to our natures, what think we then of the [Page] [...]leſſed ſouls after the Reſurrection; are not they the ſame Creatures, though without the liberty of ſinning? To return to this; I think thoſe that affirm, that the bleſſed have not this natural liberty, as long as they are united to a body, and are capable of reſenting it's pleaſures, ſhould do well to prove it. * Inde [...]d they may be morally immutable and illapſible: but this is grace, not nature; a reward of obedience, not a neceſſary annex of our Beings. But will it be ſaid, why did not the divine Goodneſs endue us all with this moral [...]ability? Had it not been better for us to have been made in this condition of ſecurity, than in a ſtate ſo dangerous? My return to this doubt will be a ſecond Anſwer to the main Objection.

Therefore Secondly, * I doubt not, but that 'tis much better for rational Creatures, that this ſupream happineſs ſhould be the Reward of vertue, rather than entail'd upon our natures. For the procurement of that which we might have miſt of, is far more ſenſibly gratifying, than any neceſſary and unacquired injoyment; we find a greater pleaſure in what we gain by induſtry, art, or vertue, than in the things we were born to. And had we been made ſecure from ſin and miſery from the firſt moment of our Being, we ſhould not have put ſo high a rate and value upon that priviledge.

[Page] (3) Had we been at firſt eſtabliſht in an imp [...]ſſibility of lapſing into evil; Then many choice vertues, excellent branches of the divine Life had never been exercis'd, or indeed have been at all. Such are Patience, Faith, and Hope; the objects of which are, evil, futurity, and uncertainty. Yea,

(4) Had we been ſo ſixt in an inamiſſible happineſs from the beginning, there had then been no vertue in the world; nor any of that matchleſs pleaſure which attends the exerciſe thereof. For vertue is a kind of victory, and ſuppoſeth a conflict. Therefore we ſay, that God is good and holy, but not vertuous. Take away a poſſibility of evil, and in the Creature there is no moral goodneſs. And then no Reward, no Pleaſure, no Happineſs.

Therefore in ſum (5ly), The divine Goodneſs is manifeſted in making all Creatures ſutably to thoſe Idea's of their natures, which he hath in his All-comprehenſive Wiſdom. And their good and happineſs conſiſts in acting according to thoſe natures, and in being furniſht with all things neceſſary for ſuch actions. Now the divine Wiſdom is no arbitrary thing, that can change, or alter thoſe ſetled immutable Idea's of things that are there repreſented. It lopps not off eſſential Attributes of ſome Beings, to in [...]culate them upon others: But diſtinctly comprehending [Page] all things, aſſigns each Being its proper nature, and qualities. And the Divine goodneſs, according to the wiſe direction of the eternal Intellect, in like diſtinct and orderly manner produceth all things: viz. according to all the variety of their reſpective Idea's in the divine wiſdom. * Wherefore as the goodneſs of God obligeth him not to make every Planet a fixt Star, or every Star a Sun; So neither doth it oblige him to make every degree of Life, a rational Soul, or every Soul, an impeccable Angel. * For this were to tye him to contradictions. Since therefore, ſuch an order of Beings, as rational and happy, though free, and therefore mutable creatures, were diſtinctly comprehended in the Divine Wiſdom; It was an effect of God's Goodneſs, to bring them into being, even in ſuch a condition, and in ſuch manner, as in their eternal Idea's they were repreſented.

Thus then we ſee, it is not contrary to the infinite plenitude of the Divine Goodneſs * that we ſhould have been made peccable and lyable to defection. And being thus in our very eſſential conſtitutions lapſible; 'twas no defect in the goodneſs of our Maker that he did not interpoſe by his abſolute omnipotence to prevent our actual praevarication and apoſtaſie. Since his goodneſs obligeth him not to ſecure us upon any terms whatever, but upon ſuch, as may moſt promote the general [Page] good and advantage. And queſtionleſs, 'twas much better that ſuch, as would wilfully depart from the laws of their bleſſed natures, and break through all reſtraints of the divine commands, ſhould feel the ſmart of their diſobedience; than that providence ſhould diſorder the conſtitution of nature to prevent the puniſhment, which they drew upon themſelves: Since thoſe apoſtate ſpirits remain inſtances to thoſe that ſtand, of the divine juſtice, and ſeverity againſt ſinners, and ſo may contribute not a little to their ſecurity. And for that long night of ſilence, in which multitudes ofſouls are buried before they deſcend into terreſtrial matter, it is but the due reward of their former diſobedience; for which, conſidering the happy circumſtances in which they were made, they deſerv'd to be nothing for ever. And their re-inſtating in a condition of life and ſelf-injoyment after ſo highly culpable delinquencies, is a great inſtance of the over-flowing fulneſs of the divine compaſſion and benignity.

Thus then we ſee, That Gods making us lapſible and permitting us to fall, is no prejudice in the leaſt to the infinite fecundity of his goodneſs, and his making all things beſt. So that mine Argument for Praeexiſtence bottom'd on this Foundation, ſtands yet firm and immoveable, notwithſtanding the rude aſſault of this objection. From which I paſs to a fourth.

CHAP. IX.

[Page]

A (4th.) Objection againſt the Argument from God's goodneſs, viz. That it will conclude as well that the World is infinite and eternal, Anſwered. The concluſion of the ſecond Argument for Praeexiſtence.

THerefore fourthly, it will be excepted, If we may argue from the divine goodneſs, which always doth what is beſt, for the Praeexiſtence of Souls; then we may as reaſonably thence conclude, that the world is both infinite and eternal, ſince an infinite communication of goodneſs is better than a finite. To this, becauſe I doubt I have diſtreſt the Readers patience already, I anſwer briefly.

(1) Every one that believes the infiniteneſs of Gods goodneſs is as much obliged to anſwer this objection, as I am. For it will be ſaid, infinite goodneſs doth good infinitely, and conſequently the effects to which it doth communicate are infinite. For if they are not ſo, it might have communicated to more, and thereby have done more good, than now [Page] 'tis ſuppoſed to do, and by conſequence now is not infinite. And to affirm that goodneſs is infinite, where what it doth and intends to do is but finite, will be ſaid to be a contradiction, ſince goodneſs is a relative term, and in God always reſpects ſomewhat ad extra. For he cannot be ſaid to be good to himſelf, he being a nature that can receive no additional perfection. Wherefore this Objection makes no more againſt mine Argument, than it doth againſt the Infinity of the Divine Goodneſs, and therefore I am no more concern'd in i [...] than others. Yea (2ly.) the Scripture affirms that which is the very ſtrength of mine Argument, viz. That God made all things beſt; Very Good, ſaith our Tranſlation: but the Original, [...]; and [...] is a particle of the Superlative. And therefore every one that owns its ſacred Authority is intereſted againſt this Objection. For it urgeth, it had been far more ſplendid, glorious, and magnificent for God to have made the univerſe commenſurate to his own immenſity; and to have produced effects of his power and greatneſs, where ever he himſelf is, viz. in infinite ſpace and duration, than to have confined his omnipotence to work only in one little ſpot of an infinite inane capacity, and to begin to act but t [...]other day. Thus then the late creation, and finiteneſs, of the World, ſeem to conflict with the undoubted oracle of [Page] truth as well as with mine Argument, and therefore the Objection drawn thence is of no validity. (3) Thoſe that have moſt ſtrenuouſly defended the orthodox doctrine againſt the old opinion of the eternity and infinity of the world, * have aſſerted it to be impoſſible in the nature of the thing. And ſure the divine benignity obligeth him not to do contradictions; or ſuch things, as in the very notion of them, are impoſſible. But in the caſe of Praeexiſtence, no ſuch thing can be reaſonably pretended, as above hath been declared; and therefore there is no eſcaping by this Evaſion neither. Nor can there any thing elſe be urged to this purpoſe, but what whoever believes the infinity of the divine bounty will be concern'd to anſwer; And therefore 'twill make no more againſt me, than againſt a truth on all hands confeſſed. Let me only add this, That 'tis more becoming us, to inlarge our apprehenſions of things ſo, as that they may ſuit the Divine Beneficence, than to draw it down to a complyance with our little ſchemes, and narrow models.

Thus then I have done with the Argument for Praeexiſtence drawn from the Divine Goodneſs. And I have been the longer on it, becauſe I thought 'twas in vain to propoſe it, without taking to task the principal of thoſe objections, that muſt needs ariſe in the minds of thoſe that are not uſed to this way of arguing. [Page] And while there was no proviſion made to ſtop up thoſe Evaſions, that I ſaw this Argument obnoxious to; the uſing of it, I was afraid, would have been a prejudice, rather than a furtherance of the cauſe I ingaged it in. And therefore I hope the ingenious will pardon this ſo neceſſary piece of tediouſneſs.

CHAP. X.

A third Argument for Praeexiſtence, from the great variety of mens ſpeculative inclinations; and alſo the diverſity of our Genius's, copiouſly urged. If theſe Arguments make Praeexiſtence but probable, 'tis enough to gain it the Victory.

BUt now I proceed to another Argument. Therefore, Thirdly, If we do but re [...]ect upon what was ſaid above, againſt the Souls daily Creation, from that enormous pravity which is ſo deeply rooted in ſome mens natures, we may thence have a conſiderable evidence of Praeexiſtence. For as this ſtrong natural propenſity to vice and impiety cannot poſſibly conſiſt with the Hypotheſis of the ſouls coming juſt out of Gods hands pure and [Page] immaculate; ſo doth it moſt aptly ſuit with the doctrine of its praeexiſtence: which gives a moſt clear and appoſite account of the phaenomenon. For let us but conceive the Souls of men to have grown degenerate in a former condition of life, * to have contracted ſtrong and inveterate habits to vice and lewdneſs, and that in various manners and degrees; we may then eaſily apprehend, when ſome mens natures had ſo incredibly a depraved tincture, and ſuch impetuous, ungovernable, irreclaimable inclinations to what is vitious; while others have nothing near ſuch wretched propenſions, but by good education and good diſcipline are mouldable to vertue; This ſhews a clear way to unriddle this amazing myſtery, without blemiſhing any of the divine Attributes, or doing the leaſt violence to our faculties.

Nor is it more difficult to conceive, how a ſoul ſhould awaken out of the ſtate of inactivity we ſpeak of, with thoſe radical inclinations that by long practice it had contracted, * than how a Swallow ſhould return to her old trade of living after her winter ſleep and ſilence; for thoſe cuſtoms it hath been addicted to in the other ſtate, are now ſo deeply faſtened and rooted in the ſoul, that they are become even another nature.

Now then, if Praeexiſtence be not the truth, 'tis very ſtrange that it ſhould ſo exactly [Page] anſwer the Phaenomena of our natures, when as no other Hypotheſis doth any whit tolerably ſuit them. And if we may conclude that falſe, which is ſo correſpondent to all appearances, when we know nothing elſe that can yield any probable account of them, and which is not in the leaſt repugnant to any inducement of belief, we then ſtrangely forget our ſelves when we determine any thing. We can never for inſtance, conclude the Moon to be the cauſe of the flux and reflux of the Sea, from the anſwering of her approaches and receſſes to its ebbs and ſwellings. Nor at this rate can the cauſe of any thing elſe be determined in nature.

But yet beſides, (2) we might another way inforce this Argument, from the ſtrange difference and diverſity that there is in mens wits and intellectual craſeis, as well as in the diſpoſitions of their wills and appetites. Even the natural tempers of mens minds are as vaſtly different, as the qualities of their bodies. And 'tis eaſie to obſerve in things purely ſpeculative and intellectual, even where neither education or cuſtom have interpoſed to ſophiſticate the natural [...], that ſome men are ſtrangely propenſe to ſome opinions, which they greedily drink in, as ſoon as they are duly repreſented; yea, and find themſelves burthened and oppreſt, while their education hath kept them in a contrary belief, * when [Page] as others are as fatally ſet againſt theſe opinions, and can never be brought favourably to reſent them.

Every Soul brings a kind of ſenſe with it into the world, whereby it taſtes and reliſheth what is ſuitable to its peculiar temper. And notions will never lie eaſily in a mind, that they are not fitted to; ſome can never apprehend that for other than an Abſurdity, which others are ſo clear in, that they almoſt take it for a Firſt Principle. And yet the former hath all the ſame evidence as the latter. This I have remarkably taken notice of, in the opinion of the extenſion of a ſpirit. Some that I know, and thoſe inquiſitive, free, and ingenuous, by all the proof and evidence that is, cannot be reconciled to it. Nor can they conceive any thing extended, but as a Body. Whereas other deep and impartial ſearchers into nature, cannot apprehend it any thing at all, if not extended; but think it muſt then be a mathematical point, or a meer non-entity.

I could inſtance in other ſpeculations, which I have obſerv'd ſome to be paſſionate Embracers of upon the firſt propoſal; when as no arguments could prevail on others, to think them tolerable. But there needs no proof of a manifeſt obſervation.

Therefore before I go further, I would demand, whence comes this meer notional or [Page] ſpeculative variety? * Were his difference about ſenſibles, yea, or about things depending on the imagination, the influence of the body might then be ſuſpected for a cauſe. But ſince it is in the moſt abſtracted Theories that have nothing to do with the groſſer phantaſmes; ſince this diverſity is found in minds that have the greateſt care to free themſelves from the deceptions of ſenſe, and intanglements of the body, what can we conclude, but that the ſoul it ſelf is the immediate ſubject of all this variety, and that it came praejudiced and praepoſſeſſed into this body with ſome implicit notions that it had learnt in another? And if this congruity to ſome opinions, and averſeneſs to others be congenial to us, and not advenient from any thing in this ſtate, 'tis methinks clear that we were in a former. * For the Soul in its firſt and pure nature hath no idioſyncraſies, that is, hath no proper natural inclinations which are not competent to others of the ſame kind and condition. Be ſure, they are not fatally determin'd by their natures to falſe and erroneous apprehenſions. And therefore ſince we find this determination to one or other falſhood in many, if not moſt in this ſtate, and ſince 'tis very unlikely 'tis derived only from the body, cuſtom, or education, what can we conceive on't, but that our Souls were tainted with theſe peculiar and wrong corruptions [Page] before we were extant upon this ſtage of Earth?

Beſides, 'tis eaſie to obſerve the ſtrange and wonderful variety of our genius's; one mans nature inclining him to one kind of ſtudy and imployment, anothers to what is very different. Some almoſt from their very cradles will be addicted to the making of figures, and in little mechanical contrivances; others love to be riming almoſt as ſoon as they can ſpeak plainly, and are taken up in ſmall eſſays of Poetry. Some will be ſcrawling Pictures, and others take as great delight in ſome pretty offers at Muſick and vocal harmony. Infinite almoſt are the ways in which this pure natural diverſity doth diſcover it ſelf. * Now to ſay that all this variety proceeds primarily from the meer temper of our bodies, is me thinks a very poor and unſatisfying Account. * For thoſe that are the moſt like in the Temper, Air, Complexion of their bodies, are yet of a vaſtly differing Genius. Yea, they that have been made of the ſame clay, caſt in the ſame mould, and have layn at once in the ſame natural bed, the womb; yea whoſe bodies have been as like as their ſtate and fortunes, and their education and uſages the ſame, yet even they do not unfrequently differ as much from each other in their genius and diſpoſitions of the mind, as thoſe that in all theſe particulars [Page] are of very different condition. Beſides, there are all kind of makes, forms, diſpoſitions, tempers, and complexions of body, that are addicted by their natures to the ſame exerciſes and imployments: ſo that to aſcribe this to any peculiarity in the body, is me ſeems a very improbable ſolution of the Phaenomenon. And to ſay all theſe inclinations are from cuſtom or education, is the way not to be believed, ſince all experience teſtifies the contrary.

What then can we conjecture is the cauſe of all this diverſity, but that we had taken a great delight and pleaſure in ſome things like and analogous unto theſe, in a former condition, which now again begins to put forth it ſelf, when we are awakened out of our ſilent receſs into a ſtate of action? And though the imployments, pleaſures and exerciſes of our former life, were without queſtion very different from theſe in the preſent eſtate; yet 'tis no doubt, but that ſome of them were more confamiliar and analogous to ſome of our tranſactions, than others: ſo that as any exerciſe or imployment here is more ſuitable to the particular diſpoſitions that were praedominant in the other ſtate, with the more peculiar kindneſs is it regarded by us, and the more greedily do our inclinations now faſten on it. Thus if a Muſician ſhould be interdicted the uſe of all muſical inſtruments, and [Page] yet might have his choice of any other Art or Profeſſion, 'tis likely he would betake himſelf to Limning or Poetry; theſe exerciſes requiring the ſame diſpoſition of wil and genius, as his beloved Muſick did. And we in like manner, being by the [...]ate of our wretched deſcent hindred from the direct exerciſing our ſelves about the objects of our former delights and pleaſures, do yet as ſoon as we are able, take to thoſe things which do moſt correſpond to that genius that formerly inſpired us.

And now 'tis time to take leave of the Arguments from Reaſon that give evidence for Praeexiſtence. If any one think that they are not ſo demonſtrative, but that they may be anſwered, or at leaſt evaded; I pray him to conſider how many demonſtrations he ever met with, that a good wit, reſolv'd in a contrary cauſe, could not ſhu [...]le from the edge of. Or, let it be granted, that the Arguments I have alledged are no infallible or neceſſary proofs; yet if they render my cauſe but probable, yea but poſſible, I have won what I contended for. For it having been made manifeſt by as good evidence as I think can be brought for any thing, that the way of new creations is moſt inconſiſtent with the honor of the bleſſed Attributes of God: And that the other of Traduction is moſt impoſſible and contradictio [...]s in the nature of things: [Page] * There being now no other way left but Prae-exiſtence, if that be probable or but barely poſſible, 'tis enough to give it the victory. And whether all that hath been ſaid prove ſo much or no, I leave to the indifferent to determine. I think he that will ſay it doth not, can bring few proofs for any thing, which according to his way of judging will deſerve to be called Demonſtrations.

CHAP. XI.

Great caution to be uſed in alledging Scripture for our ſpeculative opinions. The countenance that Praeexiſtence hath from the ſacred writings both of the old and new Teſtament; Reaſons of the ſeeming uncouthneſs of theſe allegations. Praeexiſtence ſtood in no need of Scripture-proof.

IT will be next expected, that I ſhould now prove the Doctrine I have undertaken for, by Scripture evidence, and make good what I ſaid above, That the divine oracles are not ſo ſilent in this matter as is imagined. But truly I have ſo tender a ſenſe of the ſacred Authority of that Holy volume, that I dare not be ſo bold with it, as to force it to ſpeak what I think it intends not; A preſumption, that is too common among our [Page] confident opinioniſts, and that hath occaſioned great troubles to the Church, and di [...]epute to the inſpired writings. For, for men to aſcribe the odd notions of their over-heated imaginations to the Spirit of God, and eternal truth, is me thinks a very bold and impudent belying it. Wherefore I dare not but be very cautious what I ſpeak in this matter, nor would I willingly urge Scripture as a proof of any thing, but what I am ſure by the whole tenor of it, is therein contained: And would I take the liberty to fetch in every thing for a Scripture-evidence, that with a little induſtry a man might make ſerviceable to his deſign; I doubt not but I ſhould be able to [...]ill my Margent with Quotations, which ſhould be as much to purpoſe as have been cited in general CATECHISMS and CONFESSIONS of FAITH, and that in points that muſt forſooth be dignified with the ſacred title of FƲNDAMENTAL. But Reverend ASSEMBLIES may make more bold with Scripture than private perſons; And therefore I confeſs I'm ſo timorous that I durſt not follow their example: Though in a matter that I would never have impoſed upon the belief of any man, though I were certain on't, and had abſolute power to enjoyn it. I think the only way to preſerve the reverence due to the oracles of Truth, is never to urge their [Page] Authority but in things very momentous, and ſuch as the whole current of them gives an evident ſuffrage to. But to make them ſpeak every trivial conceit that our ſick brains can imagine or dream of, (as I intimated) is to vilifie and deflowre them. Therefore though I think that ſeveral Texts of Scripture look very fairly upon Praeexiſtence, and would encourage a man, that conſiders what ſtrong Reaſons it hath to back it, to think, that very probably they mean ſome thing in favour of this Hypotheſis; yet I'le not urge them as an irrefutable proof, being not willing to lay more ſtreſs upon any thing than it will bear. Yea, I am moſt willing to confeſs the weakneſs of my Cauſe in what joynt ſoever I ſhall diſcover it. And yet I muſt needs ſay, that whoever compares the Texts that follow, with ſome particulars mention'd in the anſwer to the objection of Scripture-ſilence, will not chuſe but acknowledge that there is very fair probability for Praeexiſtence in the written word of God, as there is in that which is engraven upon our rational natures. Therefore to bring together here what Scripture ſaith in this matter,

1. I'le lightly touch an expreſſion or two of the old Teſtament, which not improperly may be applyed to the buſineſs we are in ſearch of. And methinks God himſelf in his poſing [Page] the great inſtance of patience, Job, ſeems to intimate ſomewhat to this purpoſe, viz. that all ſpirits were in being when the Foundations of the earth were laid: when ſaith he, the morning ſtars ſang together, and all the Sons of God ſhouted for joy. By the former very likely were meant the Angels, and 'tis not improbable but by the latter may be intended the bleſſed untainted Souls. At leaſt the particle All me thinks ſhould comprize this order of ſpirits alſo. And within the ſame period of diſcourſe, having queſtion'd Job about the nature and place of the Light, he adds, I know that thou waſt then born, for the number of thy days are many, as the Septuagint render it. * And we know our Saviour and his Apoſtles have given credit to that Tranſlation by their ſo conſtant following it. Nor doth that ſaying of God to Jeremias in the beginning of his charge ſeem to intimate leſs, Before I formed thee in the Belly I knew thee, and before thou cameſt out of the womb I gave thee wiſdom; * as reads a very creditable verſion. Now though each of theſe places might be drawn to another ſenſe, yet that only argues that they are no neceſſary proof for Praeexiſtence, which I readily acknowledge; nor do I intend any ſuch matter by alledging them. However I hope they will be confeſt to be applicable to this ſenſe; and if there be other grounds that [Page] ſwade this Hypotheſis to be the truth, 'tis I think very probable that theſe Texts intend it favour, which whether it be ſo or no, we have ſeen already.

2. For the Texts of the New Teſtament that ſeem to look pleaſingly upon Praeexiſtence, I ſhall as briefly hint them as I did the former. * And me thinks that paſſage of our Saviours prayer, Father, Glori [...]ie me with the ſame glory I had with thee before the world began, ſounds ſomewhat to this purpoſe.

The glory which he prays to be reſtored to, ſeems to concern his humane nature only; for the divine could never loſe it. And therefore it ſuppoſeth that he was in his humanity exiſtent before: And that his ſoul was of old before his appearance in a Terreſtrial body. Which ſeems alſo to be intimated * by the expreſſions of his coming from the Father, deſcending from Heaven, and returning thither again, which he very frequently makes uſe of. And we know the Divinity that [...]ills all things, cannot move to, or quit a place, it being a manifeſt imperfection, and contrary to his Immenſity.

I might add thoſe other expreſſions of our Saviour's taking upon him the [...]orm of a Servant, of rich for our ſakes becoming poor, and many others of like import, all which are very clear if we admit the doctrine of Praeexiſtence, but without it ſomewhat p [...]rplex [Page] and intricate: ſince theſe things, applyed to him as God, are very improper and diſagreeing, but appoſitely ſuit his Humanity, to which if we refer them, we muſt ſuppoſe our Hypotheſis of Praeexiſtence. But I omit further proſecution of this matter, * ſince theſe places have been more diffuſely urged in a late diſcourſe to this purpoſe.

Moreover the Queſtion of the Diſciples, * Was it for this mans ſin, or for his Fathers that he was born blind? and that anſwer of theirs to our Saviours demand, whom men ſaid he was; in that ſome ſaid he was John the Baptiſt, ſome Elias, or one of the Prophets; both which I have mentioned before; do clearly enough argue, that both the Diſciples and the Jews believed Praeexiſtence. And our Saviour ſaith not a word to diſprove their opinion. But I ſpake of this above.

Now however uncouth theſe allegations may ſeem to thoſe that never heard theſe Scriptures thus interpreted; yet I am confident, had the opinion of Praeexiſtence been a received Doctrine, and had theſe Texts been wont to be applyed to the proof on't, they would then have been thought to aſſert it, with clear and convictive evidence. But many having never heard of this Hypotheſis, and thoſe that have, ſeldom meeting it mentioned but as a ſilly dream or antiquated abſurdity, 'tis no wonder that they never ſuſpect [Page] it to be lodg'd in the Sacred volume, ſo that any attempt to confirm it thence, muſt needs ſeem rather an offer of wit than ſerious judgment. And the places that are cited to that purpoſe having been frequently read and heard of, by thoſe that never diſcerned them to breath the leaſt air of any ſuch matter as Praeexiſtence, their new and unexpected application to a thing ſo little thought of, muſt needs ſeem a wild fetch of an extravagant imagination. But however unconcluſive the Texts alledged may ſeem to thoſe a ſtrong prejudice hath ſhut up againſt the Hypotheſis; The learned Jews, who were perſwaded of this Doctrine, thought it clearly enough contain'd in the Old Volume of holy writ, and took the citations, named above, for current Evidence. And though I cannot warrant for their Judgment in things, yet doubtleſs they were the beſt Judges of their own Language. Nor would our School-Doctors have thought it ſo much a ſtranger to the New, had it had the luck to have been one of their opinions, or did they not too frequently apply the ſacred Oracles to their own foreconceived notions.

But whether what I have brought from Scripture prove any thing or nothing, 'tis not very material, ſince the Hypotheſis of Prae-exiſtence ſtands ſecure enough upon thoſe P [...]llars of Reaſon, which have their Foundation [Page] in the Attributes of God, and the Phaenomena of the world. And the Right Reaſon of a Man, is one of the Divine volumes, in which are written the indeleble Idea's of eternal Truth: ſo that what it dictates, is as much the voice of God, as if in ſo many words it were clearly expreſt in the written Revelations. It is enough therefore for my purpoſe, if there be nothing in the ſacred writings contrary to this Hypotheſis; which I think is made clear enough already; and though it be granted that Scripture is abſolutely ſilent as to any aſſertion of Prae-exiſtence, yet we have made it appear that its having ſaid nothing of it, is no prejudice, but an advantage to the cauſe.

CHAP. XII.

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Why the Author thinks himſelf obliged to deſcend to ſome more particular Account of Praeexiſtence. 'Tis preſumption poſitively to determine how it was with us of Old. The Authors deſign in the Hypotheſis that follows.

NOw becauſe inability to apprehend the manner of a Thing is a great prejudice againſt the belief on't; I find my ſelf obliged to go a little further than the bare proof, and defence of Praeexiſtence. For though what I have ſaid, may poſſibly induce ſome to think favourably of our concluſion, That the ſouls of men were made before they came into theſe bodies; yet while they ſhall think that nothing can be conceived of that former ſtate, and that our Praeexiſtent condition cannot be repreſented to Humane Underſtanding, but as a dark black ſolitude: it muſt needs weaken the perſwaſion of thoſe that are leſs confirmed, and [...]ill the minds of the inquiſitive with a dubious [Page] trouble and Anxiety. For ſearching and contemplative Heads cannot be ſatisfied to be told, That our ſouls have lived and acted in a former condition, except they can be helpt to ſome more particular apprehenſion of that State; How we lived and acted of old, and how probably we fell from that better life, into this Region of miſery and imperfection.

Now though indeed my Charity would prompt me to do what I can for the relief and eaſe of any modeſt Inquirer; yet ſhall I not attempt to ſatisfie punctual and eager curioſity in things hidden and unſearchable. Much leſs ſhall I poſitively determine any thing in matters ſo lubricous and uncertain. And indeed conſidering how imperfect our now ſtate is, how miſerable ſhallow our underſtandings are, and how little we know of our preſent ſelves, and the things about us, it may ſeem a deſperate undertaking to attempt any thing in this matter. Yea, when we contemplate the vaſt circuits of the Divine Wiſdom, and think how much the thoughts and actions of Eternity and Omniſcience are beyond ours, who are but of Yeſterday, and know nothing, it muſt needs diſcourage Conſidence it ſelf from determining, how the Oeconomy of the world of life was order'd, in the day the Heavens and Earth were framed. There are doubtleſs infinite [Page] ways and methods according to which the unſearchable wiſdom of our Maker could have diſpoſed of us, which we can have no conceit of; And we are little more capable of unerringly reſolving our ſelves now, how it was with us of old, than a Child in the womb is to determine, what kind of life it ſhall live when it is ſet at liberty from that dark incloſure. Therefore let ſhame and bluſhing cover his face that ſhall confidently affirm that 'twas thus or thus with us in the ſtate of our Fore-Beings.

However, to ſhew that it may have been that our Souls did Praeexiſt, though we cannot punctually and certainly conclude upon the Particular State, I ſhall preſume to draw up a conceivable Scheme of the Hypotheſis; And if our narrow minds can think of a way how it might have been, I hope no body will deny that the divine wiſdom could have contriv'd it ſo, or infinitely better than we can imagin in our little models.

And now I would not have it thought that I go about to inſinuate or repreſent any opinions of my own, or that I am a votary to all the notions I make uſe of, whether of the Antient, or more modern Philoſophers. For I ſeriouſly profeſs againſt all determinations in this kind. But my buſineſs only is, by ſome imperfect hints and gueſſes to help to apprehend a little how the ſtate of [Page] Praeexiſtence might have been, and ſo to let in ſome beams of ancient and modern light upon this immenſe darkneſs. * Therefore let the Reader if he pleaſe call it a Romantick Scheme, or imaginary Hypotheſis, or what name elſe beſt fits his Phancy, and he'l not offend me; Nor do I hold my ſelf concern'd at all to vindicate the truth of any thing here that is the fruit of mine own invention or compoſure; Though I confeſs I could beg civilities at leaſt for the notions I have borrowed from great and worthy Sages. And indeed the Hypotheſis as to the main, is derived to us from the Platoniſts: though in their writings 'tis but Gold in Oar, leſs pure and perfect: But a late great Artiſt hath excellently refined it. And I have not much work to do, but to bring together what he up and down hath ſcattered, and by a method-order, and ſome connexions and notions of mine own, to work it into an intire and uniform maſs.

Now becauſe the Frame of the particular Hypotheſis is originally Philoſophical, I ſhall therefore not deprave it by mingling with it the opinions of modern Theologers, or diſtort any thing to make it accommodate to their dogmata, but ſolely and ſincerely follow the light of Reaſon and Philoſophy. For I intend not to endeavour the late alteration of the ordinary ſyſteme of Divinity, nor deſign any [Page] thing in this place but a repreſentation of ſome harmleſs Philoſophical conjectures: In which I ſhall continually guide my ſelf by the Attributes of God, the Phaenomena of the world, and the beſt diſcoveries of the nature of the ſoul.

CHAP. XIII.

(7) Pillars on which the particular Hypotheſis ſtands.

NOw the Fabrick we are going to build, will ſtand like as the Houſe of Wiſdom upon ſeven Pillars; which I ſhall firſt erect and eſtabliſh, that the Hypotheſis may be firm and ſure like a Houſe that hath Foundations. Therefore the firſt Fundamental Principle I ſhall lay, is this

Firſt Pillar.

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(1) All the Divine deſigns and actions are laid and carried on by pure and infinite Goodneſs.

AND methinks this ſhould be owned by all for a manifeſt and indiſputable Truth; But ſome odd opinions in the world are an intereſt againſt it, and therefore I muſt be fain to prove it. Briefly then, Every rational Being acts towards ſome end or other; That end where the Agent acts regularly and wiſely, is either ſome ſelf-good or accompliſhment, or 'tis the good and perfection of ſome thing elſe, at leaſt in the intention. Now God being an abſolute and immenſe fulneſs, that is incapable of any the leaſt ſhadow of new perfection, cannot act for any good that may accrue to his immutable ſelf; and conſequently, whatever he acts, is for the good of ſome other Being: ſo that all the divine actions are the communications of his perfections, and the iſſues of his Goodneſs; which, being without the baſe alloy of ſelf-intereſt, or partial fondneſs, and not compriſed within any bounds or limits, as [Page] his other perfections are not, but far beyond our narrow conception, we may well call it pure and infinite benignity. This is the original and root of all things, ſo that this bleſſed, ever bleſſed Attribute being the Spring and Fountain of all the Actions of the Deity, his deſigns can be no other but the contrivances of Love for the compaſſing the good and perfection of the univerſe. Therefore to ſuppoſe God to act or deſign any thing that is not for the good of his Creatures, is either to phancy him to act for no end at all, or for an end that is contrary to his benign Nature. Finally therefore, the very notion of infinite fulneſs is to be communicating and overflowing; And the moſt congruous apprehenſion that we can entertain of the Infinite and eternal Deity, is * to conceive him as an immenſe and all glorious Sun, that is continually communicating and ſending abroad its beams and brightneſs; which conception of our Maker, if 'twere deeply imprinted on us, would I am confident ſet our apprehenſions right in many Theories, and chaſe away thoſe black and diſmal notions which too many have given harbour to. But I come to erect the

Second Pillar.

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(2) Then, There is an exact Geometrical Juſtice that runs through the Ʋniverſe, and is interwoven in the contexture of things:

THis is a reſult of that wiſe and Almighty Goodneſs that praeſides over all things. For this Juſtice is but the diſtributing to every thing according to the requirements of its nature. And that benign wiſdom that contrived and framed the natures of all Beings, doubtleſs ſo provided that they ſhould be ſuitably furniſht with all things proper for their reſpective conditions.

And that this Nemeſis ſhould be twiſted into the very natural conſtitutions of things themſelves, is methinks very reaſonable; ſince queſtionleſs, Almighty Wiſdom could ſo perfectly have formed his works at firſt, as that all things that he ſaw were regular, juſt, and for the good of the Ʋniverſe, ſhould have been brought about by thoſe ſtated Laws, which we call nature; without an ordinary engagement of abſolute power to effect the [...]. [Page] And it ſeems to me to be very becoming the wiſe Author of all things ſo to have made them in the beginning, as that by their own internal ſpring and wheels, they ſhould orderly bring about whatever he intended them for, without his often immediate interpoſal. For this looks like a more magnificent apprehenſion of the Divine power and Preſcience, ſince it ſuppoſeth him from everlaſting ages to have foreſeen all future occurrences, and ſo wonderfully to have ſeen and conſtituted the great machina of the world, that the infinite variety of motions therein, ſhould effect nothing but what in his eternal wiſdom he had concluded fit and decorous: But as for that which was ſo, it ſhould as certainly be compaſt by the Laws he appointed long ago, as if his omnipotence were at work every moment. On the contrary, to engage Gods abſolute and extraordinary power, in all events and occurrences of things, is m [...]ſ [...]ms to think meanly of his wiſdom; as if he had made the world ſo, as that it ſhould need omnipotence every now and then to mend it, or to bring about thoſe his deſtinations, which by a ſhorter way he could have effected, by his inſtrument Nature. Can any one ſay that our ſuppoſition derogates from the Divine concourſe or Providence? For on theſe, depend continually both the being and operations of all things, [Page] ſince without them they would ceaſe to act, and return to their old nothing. And doubtleſs God hath not given the ordering of things out of his own hands; but holds the power, to alter, innovate, or change the courſe of nature as he pleaſeth. And to act by extraordinary means, by abſolute omnipotence, when he thinks fit to do ſo.

The ſum of what I intend, is, that Gods works are perfect; and as his Goodneſs is diſcover'd in them, ſo is his Juſtice wrought into their very eſſential conſtitutions: ſo that we need not ſuppoſe him to be immediately engaged in every event and all diſtributions of things in the world, or upon all occaſions to exerciſe his power in extraordinary actions, but that he leaves ſuch managements to the Oeconomy of ſecond cauſes. And now next to this, (for they are of k [...]n) I raiſe

The third Pillar.

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(3) Things are carried to their proper place and ſtate, by the congruity of their natures; where this fails, we may ſuppoſe ſome arbitrary managements.

THE Congruity of things is their ſuitableneſs to ſuch or ſuch a ſtate or condition; And 'tis a great Law in the Divine and firſt conſtitutions, that things ſhould incline and move to what is ſuitable to their natures. This in ſenſibles is evident in the motions of conſent and ſympathy. And the aſcent of light, and deſcent of heavy bodies, muſt I doubt when all is done, * be reſolv'd into a principle that is not meerly corporeal. Yea, ſuppoſing all ſuch things to be done by the Laws of Mechanicks, why may we not conceive, that the other rank of Beings, Spirits, which are not ſubject to corporeal motions, are alſo diſpos'd of by a Law proper to their natures, which ſince we have no other name to expreſs it by, we may call congruity? We read in the ſacred Hiſtory that Judas went to his own place; And 'tis very probable that Spirits are conveyed to their [Page] proper ſtates and reſidence, * as naturally as the fire mounts, or a ſtone deſcends. The Platoniſts would have the Soul of the world to be the great Inſtrument of all ſuch diſtributions, as alſo of the Phaenomena, that are beyond the powers of matter: And 'tis no unlikely Hypotheſis: But I have no need to ingage further about this: nor yet to ſpeak more of this firſt part of my Principle, ſince it ſo nearly depends on what was ſaid in behalf of the former Maxim. Yet of the latter we need a word or two.

When therefore we cannot give account of things either by the Laws of Mechanicks or conceivable Congruities, (* as likely ſome things relating to the States of Spirits, and immaterial Beings can be reſolv'd by neither) I ſay then, we may have recourſe to the Arbitrary managements of thoſe inviſible Miniſters of Equity and Juſtice, which without doubt the world is plentifully ſtored with. For it cannot be conceived that thoſe active Spirits are idle or unimployed in the momentous concerns of the Ʋniverſe. Yea, the ſacred volume gives evidence of their interpoſals in our affairs. I ſhall need mention but that remarkable inſtance in Daniel, of the indeavours of the Prince of Perſia, and of Grecia, to hinder Michael, and the other Angel, that were ingaged for the affairs of Judea; Or if any would evade this, what [Page] think they of all the apparitions of Angels in the old Teſtament, of their pitching their Tents about us, and being Miniſtring Spirits for our good. To name no more ſuch paſſages. Now if thoſe noble Spirits will ingage themſelves in our trifling concernments, doubtleſs they are very ſedulous in thoſe affairs that t [...]nd to the good and perfection of the Ʋniverſe. But to be brief; I advance.

The Fourth Pillar.

(4) * The Souls of men are capable of living in other bodies beſides Terreſtrial; And never act but in ſome body or other.

FOr (1.) when I conſider how deeply in this ſtate we are immerſed in the body, I can methinks ſcarce imagin, that preſently upon the quitting on't, we ſhall be ſtript of all corporeity; for this would be ſuch a jump as is ſeldom or never made in nature; ſince by almoſt all inſtances that come under our obſervation 'tis manifeſt, that ſhe uſeth to act by due and orderly gradations, and takes no precipitous leaps from one extream to another. 'Tis very probable therefore, [Page] that in our immediately next ſtate we ſhall have another vehicle. And then, (2.) conſidering that our Souls are immediately united to a more tenuious and ſubtile body here, than this groſs outſide; 'Tis methinks a good preſumption, that we ſhall not be ſtript and diveſted of our inward ſtole alſo, when we leave this dull Earth behind us. Eſpecially (3) if we take notice how the higheſt and nobleſt faculties and operations of the Soul are help'd on by ſomewhat that is corporeal, and that it imployeth the bodily Spirits in its ſublimeſt exerciſes; we might then be perſwaded, that it always uſeth ſome body or other, and never acts without one. And (4) ſince we cannot conceive a Soul to live or act that is inſenſible, and ſince we know not how there can be ſenſe where there is no union with matter, we ſhould me ſeems be induc'd to think, that when 'tis disjunct from all body, 'tis inert and ſilent. * For in all ſenſations there is corporeal motion, as all Philoſophy and Experience teſtifies: And theſe motions become ſenſible repreſentations, by virtue of the union between the Soul and its confederate matter; ſo that when it is looſe and diſ-united from any body whatſoever, it will be unconcern'd in all corporeal motions, (being a penetrable ſubſtance) and no ſenſe or perception will be conveyed by them.

Nor will it make any thing at all againſt [Page] this Argument to urge, that there are N [...] and purely unembodied Spirits in the Ʋniverſe, which live and act without relation to any body, and yet theſe are not inſenſible: For what they know, and how they know we are very incompetent Judges of, they being a ſort of Spirits ſpecifically diſtinct from our order: and therefore their faculties and operations are of a very diverſe conſideration from ours. So that for us to deny what we may reaſonably argue from the contemplation of our own natures, becauſe we cannot comprehend the natures of a ſpecies of creatures that are far above us, is a great miſtake in the way of reaſoning.

Now how ſtrange ſoever this Principle may ſeem to thoſe, whom cuſtomary opinions have ſeaſoned with another belief, yet conſidering the Reaſons I have alledged, I cannot forbear concluding it very probable; and if it prove hereafter ſerviceable for the helping us in ſome concerning Theories, I think the moſt wary and timerous may admit it, till upon good grounds they can diſprove it.

The Fifth Pillar.

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(5) The Soul in every ſtate hath ſuch a body as is fitteſt for thoſe faculties and operations that it is moſt inclined to exerciſe.

'TIs a known Maxim, That every thing that is, is for its operation; and the Contriver and Maker of the World hath been ſo bountiful to all Beings, as to furniſh them with all ſuitable and neceſſary requiſites for their reſpective actions; for there are no propenſities and diſpoſitions in nature, but ſome way or other are brought into actual exerciſe, otherwiſe they were meer nullities, and impertinent appendices. Now for the imployment of all kinds of faculties, and the exerting all manner of operations, all kinds of inſtruments will not ſuffice, but only ſuch, as are proportion'd and adapted to the exerciſes they are to be uſed in, and the Agents that imploy them. 'Tis clear therefore, that the Soul of Man, a noble and vigorous Agent, muſt be fitted with a ſuitable body, according to the Laws of that exact diſtributive Juſtice that runs through the Ʋniverſe; and ſuch a one is moſt ſuitable, as is fitteſt for thoſe [Page] exerciſes it propends to; for the body is the Souls inſtrument, and a neceſſary requiſite of action: Whereas ſhould it be otherwiſe, God would then have provided worſe for his worthieſt Creatures, than he hath for thoſe that are of a much inferiour rank and order. For if we look about us upon all the Creatures of God, that are expoſed to our Obſervation, we may ſeal this Truth with an infallible Induction; That there is nothing but what is ſitted with all ſuitable requiſites to act according to its nature. The Bird hath wings to waft it aloft in the thin and ſubtile aire; the Fiſh is furniſht with fins, to move in her liquid element; and all other Animals have Inſtruments that are proper for their peculiar inclinations: So that ſhould it be otherwiſe in the caſe of Souls, it would be a great blot to the wiſe managements of Providence; and contrary to its uſual methods; and thus we ſhould be diſ-furniſht of the beſt and moſt convictive Argument, that we have to prove that a Prinoiple of exacteſt wiſdom hath made and ordered all things.

The Sixth Pillar:

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(6) The Powers and Faculties of the Soul, are either (1) Spiritual, and Intellectual: (2) Senſitive: Or, (3) Plaſtick.

NOw (1) by the intellectual powers I mean all thoſe that relate to the ſoul, in its naked and abſtracted conception, as it is a ſpirit, and are exerciſed about immaterial Objects; as, vertue, knowledge, and divine love: This is the Platonical N [...]; and that which we call the mind: The two other more immediately relate to its eſpouſed matter: For (2) the ſenſitive are exerciſed about all the objects of ſenſe, and are concerned in all ſuch things as either gratifie, or diſguſt the body. And (3) the Plaſtick are thoſe faculties of the ſoul, whereby it moves and forms the body, and are without ſenſe or Animadverſion: The exerciſe of the former, I call the Higher life; and the operations of the latter, the lower; and the life of the body. Now that there are ſuch faculties belonging to our natures, and that they are exerciſed upon ſuch and ſuch objects reſpectively, plain experience avoucheth, [Page] and therefore I may be excuſed from going about to prove ſo univerſally acknowledged a truth: Wherefore I paſs to

The Seventh Pillar.

(7) By the ſame degrees that the higher powers are invigorated, the lower are conſopited and abated, as to their proper exerciſes, & è contra.

(1) THat thoſe Powers ſhould each of them have a tendency to action and in their turns be exerciſed, is but rational to conceive, ſince otherwiſe they had been ſuperſ [...]uous. And (2) that they ſhould be inconſiſtent in the ſupremeſt exerciſe and inactuation, is to me as probable. For the Soul is a finite and limited Being, and therefore cannot operate diverſe ways with equal intention at once. That is, cannot at the ſame time imploy all her faculties in the higheſt degree of exerciſe that each of them is capable of. For doubtleſs did it ingage but one of thoſe alone, the operations thereof would be more ſtrong and vigorous, than when they are conjunctly exercis'd, their Acts and Objects being very divers. So that I ſay, that theſe faculties ſhould act together [Page] in the higheſt way they are capable of, ſeems to be contrary to the nature of the Soul. And I am ſure it comports not with experience; for thoſe that are endowed with an high degree of exerciſe of one faculty, are ſeldom, if ever, as well provided in the reſt. 'Tis a common and daily obſervation, that thoſe that are of moſt heightned and ſtrong Imaginations, are defective in Judgment, and the faculty of cloſe reaſoning. And your very larg and capacious Memories, have ſeldom or never any great ſhare of either of the other perfections. Nor do the deepeſt Judgments uſe to have any thing conſiderable either of Memory or Phancy. And as there are fair inſtances even in this ſtate of the inconſiſtence of the faculties in the higheſt exerciſe; ſo alſo are there others that ſuggeſt untous,

(3) That by the ſame degrees that ſome Faculties fail in their ſtrength and vigour, others gain and are improved. We know that the ſhutting up of the ſenſes, is the letting looſe and inlarging of the Phancy. And we ſeldom have ſuch ſtrong imaginations waking, as in our dreams in the ſilence of our other ſaculties. As the Sun recedes, the Moon and Stars diſcover themſelves; and when it returns, they draw in their baffled beams, and hide their heads in obſcurity. But to urge what is more cloſe and preſſing; It is an unerring remarque, that thoſe that want the [Page] uſe of ſome one natural part or faculty, are wont to have very liberal amends made them by an excellency in ſome others. Thus thoſe that nature hath deprived of ſight, uſe to have wonderfully tenacious memories. And the deaf and dumb have many times a ſtrange kind of ſagacity, and very remarkable mechanical ingenies: Not to mention other inſtances; for I'le ſay no more than I muſt needs. Thus then experience gives us incouraging probability of the truth of the Theorem aſſerted. And in its ſelf 'tis very reaſonable; for (as we have ſeen) the Soul being an active nature, is always propending to the exerciſing of one faculty or other, and that to the utmoſt it is able, and yet being of a limited capacity, it can imploy but one in hight of exerciſe at once; which when it loſeth and abates of its ſtrength and ſupream vigour; ſome other, whoſe improvement was all this while hindred by this its ingroſſing Rival, muſt by conſequence begin now to diſplay it ſelf, and awaken into a more vigorous actuation: ſo that as the former loſeth, the latter proportionably gaineth.

And indeed 'tis a great inſtance of the divine wiſdom, that our faculties▪ are made in ſo regular and equilibrious an order. For were the ſame powers ſtill uppermoſt in the greateſt hight of activity, and ſo unalterably [Page] conſtituted, there would want the beauty of variety, and the other faculties would never act to that pitch of perfection that they are capable of. There would be no Liberty of Will, and conſequently no Humane Nature. Or if the Higher Powers might have leſſen'd, and fail'd without a proportionable increaſe of the lower, and they likewiſe have been remitted, without any advantage to the other faculties, the Soul might then at length fall into an irrecoverable receſs and inactivity.

But all theſe inconveniences are avoided by ſuppoſing the principle we have here inſiſted on; And it is the laſt that I ſhall mention.

Briefly then, and if it may be more plainly, the higher faculties are thoſe, where by the Soul acts towards ſpiritual and immaterial objects: and the lower whereby it acts towards the Body. Now it cannot with equal vigour exerciſe it ſelf both ways together; and conſequently the more it is taken up in the higher operations, the more prompt and vigorous it will be in theſe exerciſes, and leſs ſo about thoſe that concern the body, & è Converſo.

Thus when we are very deeply ingaged in intellectual contemplations, our outward ſenſes are in a manner ſhrunk up and cramped: And when our ſenſes are highly exerciſed [Page] and gratified, thoſe operations monopolize and imploy us. Nor is this leſs obſervable in relation to the Plaſtick. For frequent and ſevere Meditations do much mortifie and weaken the body; And we are moſt nouriſht in our ſleep in the ſilence of our ſenſes. Now what is thus true in reſpect of acts and particular exerciſes, is as much ſo in ſtates and habits. Moreover, 'tis apparent that the Plaſtick is then moſt ſtrong and vigorous when our other faculties are wholly unimployed, from the ſtate of the womb. For nature when ſhe is at her Plaſtick work, ceaſeth all other operations. The ſame we may take notice of, in Silk-worms and other Inſects, which lie as if they were dead and inſenſible, while their lower powers are forming them into another appearance. All which things put together, give good evidence to the truth of our Axiom.

I'le conclude this with one Remark more, to prevent miſtake; Therefore briefly; As the Soul always acts by the Body; ſo in its higheſt exerciſes it uſeth ſome of the inferiour powers; which, therefore muſt operate alſo. So that ſome ſenſes, as ſight and ſomewhat analagous to hearing may be imployed in conſiderable degree, even when the higheſt life is moſt predominant; but then it is at the command and in the ſervices of thoſe nobler powers; wherefore the ſenſitive life [Page] cannot for this cauſe be ſaid to be invigorated, ſince 'tis under ſervitude and ſubjection, and its guſts and pleaſures are very weak and flaccid. And this is the reaſon of that clauſe in the Principle (as to their proper exerciſes.)

Having thus laid the Foundation, and fixt the Pillars of our building, I now come to advance the Superſtructure.

CHAP. XIV.

A Philoſophical Hypotheſis of the Souls Praeexiſtence.

THE Eternal and Almighty Goodneſs, the bleſſed ſpring and root of all things, made all his creatures, in the beſt, happieſt, and moſt perfect condition, that their reſpective natures rendred them capable of, By Axiom the firſt; and therefore they were then conſtituted in the inactuation and exerciſe of their nobleſt and moſt perfect powers. Conſequently, the ſouls of men, a conſiderable part of the divine workmanſhip, were at firſt made in the higheſt invigoration of the ſpiritual and intellective faculties which were exerciſed in vertue, and in blisful contemplation of the ſupream Deity; wherefore now by Axiom 6 and 7, * the ignobler [Page] and lower powers, or the life of the body, were languid and remiſs.

So that the moſt tenuious, pure and ſimple matter being the fitteſt inſtrument for the moſt vigorous and ſpiritual faculties according to Principle 2, 4, and 5. The Soul in this condition was united with the moſt ſubtile and aethereal matter that it was capable of inacting; and the inferior powers, thoſe relating to the body, being at a very low ebb of exerciſe, were wholly ſubſervient to the ſuperiour, and imployed in nothing but what was ſerviceable to that higher life: So that the ſenſes did but preſent occaſions for divine love, and objects for contemplation; * and the plaſtick had nothing to do, but to move this paſſive and eaſie body, accordingly as the concerns of the higher faculties required. Thus then did we at firſt live and act in a pure and aethereal body; and conſequently in a place of light and bleſſedneſs, by Principle 3d. But particularly to deſcribe and point at this paradiſaical reſidence, can be done only by thoſe that live in thoſe ſerene regions of lightſome glory: Some Philoſophers indeed have adventured * to pronounce the place to be the Sun, that vaſt Orb of ſplendor and brightneſs; though it may be 'tis more probable, that thoſe immenſe tracts of pure and quiet aether that are above Saturn, are the joyous place of our ancient celeſtial abode: [Page] But there is no determination in matters of ſuch lubricous uncertainty, where ever it is, 'tis doubtleſs a place and ſtate of wonderful bliſs and happineſs, and the higheſt that our natures had fitted us to.

In this ſtate we may be ſuppoſed to have lived in the bliſsful exerciſe of vertue, divine love and contemplation, through very long tracts of duration.

But though we were thus unconceivably happy, * yet were we not immutably ſo; for our higheſt perfections and nobleſt faculties being but finite, may after long and vigorous exerciſe, ſomewhat abate and remit in their ſublimeſt operations, and Adam may fall aſleep; In which time of remiſſion of the higher powers, the lower may advance and more livelily diſplay themſelves than they could before, by Axiom 7; for the ſoul being a little ſlackt in its purſuits of immaterial objects, the lower powers which before were almoſt wholly taken up and imployed in thoſe high ſervices, are ſomewhat more releaſt to follow a little the tendencies of their proper natures. And now they begin to convert towards the body, and warmly to reſent the delights and pleaſures thereof; Thus is Eve brought forth, while Adam ſleepeth. The lower life, that of the body is now conſiderably awakened, and the operations of the higher, proportionably abated. [Page] However, there is yet no anomy or diſobedience, for all this is but an innocent exerciſe of thoſe faculties which God hath given us to imploy, and as far as is conſiſtent with the divine laws to gratifie. For it was no fault of ours that we did not unceſſantly keep our ſpiritual powers upon the moſt intenſe exerciſes that they were capable of exerting; * we were made on ſet purpoſe defatigable, that ſo all degrees of life might have their exerciſe; and our Maker deſigned that we ſhould feel and taſte the joys of our congenite bodies, as well as the pleaſures of thoſe ſeraphick aſpires and injoyments.

And me thinks it adds to the felicity of that ſtate, that our happineſs was not one uniform piece, or continual repetition of the ſame, but conſiſted in a moſt grateful variety, viz. in the pleaſure of all our faculties, the lower as well as the higher; for thoſe are as much gratified by ſuitable exerciſes and enjoyments as theſe; and conſequently according to their proportion capable of as great an happineſs: Nor is it any more derogation from the divine goodneſs, that the nobleſt and higheſt life was not always exerciſed to the height of its capacity, than that we were not made all Angels, all the Planets ſo many Suns and all the variety of the Creatures formed into one Species: Yea, as was intimated above; 'tis an inſtance of the divine benignity, [Page] that he produced things into being, according to the vaſt plenitude of Forms that were in his all-knowing mind; and gave them operations ſuitable to their reſpective natures; ſo that it had rather ſeemed a defect in the divine diſpenſations, if we had not had the pleaſure of the proper exerciſe of the lower faculties as well as of the higher. * Yea, me thinks 'tis but a reaſonable reward to the body, that it ſhould have its delights and gratifications alſo, whereby it will be fitted for further ſerviceableneſs. For doubtleſs it would be in time ſpent and exhauſted were it continually imployed in thoſe high and leſs proportioned operations.

Wherefore God himſelf having ſo order'd the matter, that the inferiour life ſhould have its turn of invigoration; it can be no evil in us, * that that is executed which he hath ſo determined, as long as we paſs not the bounds that he hath ſet us. Adam therefore was yet innocent, though he joyed in his beloved Spouſe, yea, and was permitted to feed upon all the fruits of this Paradiſe, the various reſults of corporeal pleaſure, as long as he followed not his own will and appetites contrarily to the divine commands and appointments.

But at length unhappily the delights of the body betray us, through our over indulgence to them, and lead us captive to anomy [Page] and diſobedience. The ſenſe of what is grateful and pleaſant by inſenſible degrees g [...]ts head over the apprehenſion of what is juſt and good; the Serpent and Eve prove ſucceſsful tempters; * Adam cannot withſtand the inordinate appetite, but feeds on the forbidden fruit, viz. the dictates of his debauched will, and ſenſual pleaſure. And thus now the body is gotten uppermoſt, the lower faculties have greater exerciſe and command than the higher, thoſe being very vigorouſly awakened, and theſe proportionably ſhrunk up, and conſopited; wherefore by Axiom 3. and 5. the ſoul contracts a leſs pure body, which may be more accommodate to ſenſitive operations; and thus we fall from the higheſt Paradiſe the bliſsful regions of life and glory, and become Inhabitants of the Air.

Not that we are preſently quite diveſted of our Aethereal ſtate, as ſoon as we deſcend into this leſs perfect condition of life, for retaining ſtill conſiderable exerciſes of the higher life, though not ſo ruling and vigorous ones as before, the ſoul muſt retain part of its former vehicle, to ſerve it as its inſtrument, in thoſe its operations: For the aethereal body contracts craſneſs and impurity by the ſame degrees as the immaterial faculties abate in their exerciſe; ſo that we are not immediately upon the expiring of the higheſt congruity wholly ſtript of all remains [Page] of our celeſtial bodies, but ſtill hold ſome portion of them, within the groſſer vehicle, while the ſpirit, or higher life is in any degree of actuation.

Nor are we to ſuppoſe that every ſlip or indulgence to the body can detrude us from our aethereal happineſs; but ſuch a change muſt be wrought in the ſoul, as may ſpoil its congruity to a celeſtial body, which in time by degrees is effected: Thus we may probably be ſuppoſed to have fallen from our ſupream felicity.

But others of our order have made better uſe of their injoyments, and the indulgences of their Maker; and though they have had their Perigae's as well as their Apogae's: I mean their Verges towards the body and its joys, as well as their Aſpires to nobler and ſublimer objects, yet they kept the ſtation of their Natures, and made their orderly returns, without ſo remarkable a defection: And though poſſibly ſome of them may ſometimes have had their ſlips, and have waded further into the pleaſures of the body than they ought to have done, yet partly by their own timely care and conſideration, and partly by the divine aſſiſtance, they recover themſelves again to their condition of primigenial innocence. But we muſt leave them to their felicity, and go on with the Hiſtory of our own deſcent. Therefore [Page] after we are detruded from our aethereal condition, we next deſcend into the Aereal.

The Aereal State.

NOw our bodies are more or leſs pure in this condition, proportionably to the degrees of our apoſtacy: So that we are not abſolutely miſerable in our firſt ſtep of deſcent; but indeed happy in compariſon of our now condition: As yet there may be very conſiderable remains of vertue and divine love, though indeed the lower life, that of the body be grown very ſtrong and rampant: So that as yet we may be ſuppoſed to have lapſt no lower than the beſt and pureſt Regions of the Air, by Axiom 2 and 3. And doubtleſs there are ſome, who by ſtriving againſt the inordinacy of their Appetites, may at length get the victory again over their bodies, and ſo by the aſſiſtance of the Divine Spirit, who is always ready to promote and aſſiſt good beginnings, may re-enkindle the higher life, and ſo be tranſlated again to their old celeſtial habitations without deſcending lower.

But others irreclaimably perſiſting in their Rebellion, and ſinking more and more into the body, and the reliſh of its joys and pleaſures, theſe are ſtill verging to a lower and more degenerate ſtate; ſo that at the laſt [Page] the higher powers of the Soul being almoſt quite laid aſleep and conſopited, and the ſenſitive alſo by long and tedious exerciſes being much tired, and abated in their vigour, * the plaſtick faculties begin now fully to awaken; ſo that a body of thin and ſubtile air will not ſuffice its now ſo highly exalted energy, no more than the ſubtile Aether can ſuffice us terreſtrial animals for reſpiration; wherefore the aereal-congruity of life expires alſo, and thus are we ready for an earthly body.

But now ſince a ſoul cannot unite with any body, but with ſuch only as is fitly prepared for it, by Principle▪ 3. and there being in all likelyhood more expirations in the Air, than there are prepared bodies upon earth, it muſt needs be, that for ſome time it muſt be deſtitute of any congruous matter that might be joyned with it; And conſequently by Principle 4. 'twill lye in a ſtate of inactivity and ſilence. Not that it will for ever be loſt in that forgotten receſs and ſolitude, * for it hath an aptneſs and prope [...]ſity to act in a terreſtrial body, which will be reduced into actual exerciſe, when fit matter is prepared. The Souls therefore, that are now laid up in the black night of ſtupidity and inertneſs will in their proper ſeaſons be awakened into life and operation in ſuch bodies and places of the earth, as by their diſpoſitions they are [Page] fitted for. So that no ſooner is there any matter of due vital temper, afforded by generation, but immediately a ſoul that is ſuitable to ſuch a body, * either by meer natural congruity, the diſpoſition of the ſoul of the world, or ſome more ſpontaneous agent is attracted, or ſent into this ſo befitting tenement, according to Axiom 2 and 3.

Terreſtrial State.

NOw becauſe in this ſtate too we uſe our ſenſitive faculties, and have ſome, though very ſmall reliques of the higher life alſo; therefore the ſoul firſt makes it ſelf a vehicle out of the moſt ſpiritous and yielding parts of this ſpumous terreſtrial matter, which hath ſome analogy both with its aethereal and aereal ſtate. This is as it were its inward veſt, and immediate inſtrument in all its operations. By the help of this it underſtands, reaſons, and remembers, yea forms and moves the body. And that we have ſuch a ſubtile aery vehicle within this terreſtrial, our manifeſt ſympathizing with that element, and the neceſſity we have of it to all the functions of life, as is palpable in reſpiration, is me thinks good ground for conjecture. And 'tis not improbable but even within this it may have a purer fire and aether to which it is united, being ſome little remain of what it had of old.

[Page] In this ſtate we grow up merly into the life of ſenſe, having little left of the higher life, * but ſome apiſh ſhews and imitations of reaſon, vertue, and religion: By which alone with ſpeech, we ſeem to be diſtinguiſht from Beaſts, while in reality the brutiſh nature is predominant, and the concernments of the body are our great end, our only God and happineſs; this is the condition of our now degenerate, loſt natures. However, that ever over-flowing goodneſs that always aims at the happineſs of his creatures, hath not left us without all means of recovery, but by the gracious and benign diſpenſations which he hath afforded us, hath provided for our reſtauration; which ſome (though but very few) make ſo good uſe of, that being aſſiſted in their well meant and ſincere indeavours by the divine ſpirit, they in good degree mortifie and ſubdue the body, conquer ſelf-will, unruly appetites, and diſorderly paſſions, and ſo in ſome meaſure by Principle 7. awaken the higher life, which ſtill directs them upwards to vertue and divine love; which, where they are perfectly kindled, carry the Soul, when diſmiſt from this priſon, * to its old celeſtial abode: For the ſpirit and nobleſt faculties being ſo recovered to life and exerciſe require an aethereal body to be united to, and that an aethereal place of reſidence, both [Page] which, the divine Nemeſis that is wrought into the very nature of things beſtoweth on them by Principle the ſecond.

But they are very few that are thus immediately reſtored to the celeſtial paradiſe, upon the quitting of their earthly bodies. For others that are but in the way of recovery, and dye imperfectly vertuous, meer Philoſophy and natural reaſon (within the bounds of which we are now diſcourſing) can determin no more, * but that they ſtep forth again into aery vehicles; that congruity of life immediately awakening in them after this is expired. In this ſtate their happineſs will be more or leſs, proportionably to their vertues, in which if they perſevere, (we ſhall ſee anon how they will be recover'd. But for the preſent we muſt not break off the clue of our account, by going backwards before we have arriv'd to the utmoſt verge of deſcent in this Philoſophical Romance, or Hiſtory; the Reader is at his choice to call it which he pleaſeth.

Wherefore let us caſt our eyes upon the Moſt, in whom their life on earth hath but confirmed and ſtrengthened, their degenerate ſenſual, and brutiſh propenſions; And ſee what is like to become of them, when they take their leave of theſe terreſtrial bodies.

Only firſt a word of the ſtate of dying Infants, and I come immediately to the next [Page] ſtep of deſcent. * Thoſe therefore that paſs out of theſe bodies▪ before the terreſtrial congruity be ſpoil'd, weakened, or orderly unwound; according to the tenour of this Hypotheſis, muſt return into the ſtate of inactivity.

For the Plaſtick in them is too highly awakened, to inactuate only an aereal body; And, there being no other more congruous, ready, and at hand for it to enter, it muſt needs ſtep back into its former ſtate of inſenſibility, and there wait its turn, till befitting matter call it forth again into life and action. This is a conjecture that Philoſophy dictates, which I vouch not for a truth; * but only follow the clue of this Hypotheſis. Nor can there any danger be hence conceived that thoſe whoſe congruities orderly expire, ſhould fall back again into a ſtate of [...]ilence and inertneſs; *ſince by long and hard exerciſes in this body, the plaſtick life is well tamed and debilitated, ſo that now its activity is proportioned to a more tenuious and paſſive vehicle, which it cannot fail to meet with in its next condition. For 'tis only the terreſtrial body is ſo long a preparing. But to

The next ſtep of Deſcent, or After-ſtate.

[Page]

TO give an Account of the After-ſtate of the more degenerate and yet deſcending ſouls, ſome fancy a very odd Hypotheſis, imagining that they paſs hence into ſome other more courſe and inferior Planet, in which, they are provided with bodies ſuitable to their ſo depraved natures; But I ſhall be thought extravagant for the mention of ſuch a ſuppoſition; Wherefore I come to what is leſs obnoxious.

When our ſouls go out of theſe bodies therefore, they are not preſently diſcharged of all the matter that belonged to this condition, but carry away their inward and aereal ſtate to be partakers with them of their after fortunes; only leaving the uſeleſs earth behind them. For they have a congruity to their aery bodies, though that which they had to a terreſtrial, is worn out and defaced.

Nor need we to wonder how it can now have an aereal aptitude, when as that congruity expired before we deſcended hither; If we conſider the reaſon of the expiration of its former vital aptitude, which was not ſo much through any defect of power to actuate ſuch a body, but through the exceſs of invigoration of the Plaſtick, which was then grown ſo ſtrong, * that an aereal body [Page] was not enough for it to diſplay its force upon. But now the caſe is altered, theſe lower powers are worn and wearied out, by the toylſome exerciſe of dragging about and managing ſuch a load of fleſh; wherefore being ſo caſtigated, they are duly attemper'd to the more eaſie body of air again, as was intimated before; to which they being already united, they cannot miſs of a proper habitation.

But conſidering the ſtupor, dulneſs and inactivity of our declining age, it may ſeem unlikely to ſome, that after death we ſhould immediately be reſuſcitated into ſo lively and vigorous a condition, as is the aereal, eſpecially, ſince all the faculties of ſenſe and action, are obſerved gradually to fail and abate as we draw nearer to our exit from this Stage; which ſeems to threaten, that we ſhall next deſcend into a ſtate of more ſtupor and inertneſs. But this is a groundleſs jealouſie; for the weakneſs and lethargick inactivity of old age, ariſeth from a defect of thoſe Spirits, that are the inſtruments of all our operations, which by long exerciſe are at laſt ſpent and ſcattered. So that the remains can ſcarce any longer ſtand under their unweildy burthen; much leſs, can they perform all functions of life ſo vigorouſly as they were wont to do, when they were in their due temper, ſtrength, and plenty. However notwithſtanding this [Page] inability to manage a ſluggiſh, ſtubborn, and exhauſted terreſtrial body, there is no doubt, but the Soul can with great [...]aſe, when it is diſcharged of its former load, actuate its thin aery vehicle; and that with a brisk vigour and activity. As a man that is overladen, may be ready to faint and ſink, till he be relieved of his burthen; and then, he can run away with a cheerful vivacity. So that this decrepit condition of our decayed natures cannot juſtly prejudice our belief, that we ſhall be erected again, into a ſtate of life and action in aereal bodies, after this congruity is expired.

But if all alike live in bodies of air in the next condition, * where is then the difference between the juſt and the wicked, in ſtate, place and body? For the juſt we have ſaid already; that ſome of them are reinſtated in their priſtine happineſs and felicity; and others are in a middle ſtate, within the confines of the Air, perfecting the inchoations of a better life, which commenc'd in this: As for the ſtate and place of thoſe that have lived in a continual courſe of ſenſuality and forgetfulneſs of God; I come now to declare what we may fancy of it, by the help of natural light, and the conduct of Philoſophy.

And in order to this diſcovery I muſt premiſe ſomewhat concerning the Earth, this [Page] Globe we live upon; which is, that we are not to conceive it to be a full bulky maſs to the center, but rather that 'tis ſomewhat like▪ a ſuckt Egg, in great part, an hollow ſphere, ſo that what we tread upon, is but as it were, an Arch or Bridge, to divide between the upper and the lower regions: Not that this▪ inward hollowneſs is a meer void capacity, for there are no ſuch chaſms in nature, but doubtleſs repleniſht it is with ſome fluid bodies or other, and it may be a kind of air, fire and water: Now this Hypotheſis will help us eaſily to imagin how the earth may move, notwithſtanding the pretended indiſpoſition of its Bulk, and on that account I believe it will be ſomewhat the more acceptable with the free and ingenious.

Thoſe that underſtand the Carteſian Philoſophy, will readily admit the Hypotheſis, at leaſt as much of it as I ſhall have need of: But for others, I have little hopes of perſwading them to any thing, and therefore I'le ſpare my labour of going about to prove what they are either uncapable of, or at firſt daſh judge ridiculous: And it may be moſt will grant as much as is requiſite for my purpoſe, which is, That there are huge vaſt cavities within the body of the Earth; and it were as needleſs, as preſumptuous, for me to go about to determinemore. Only I ſhall mention a probability, that this groſs [Page]cruſt which we call earth, is not of ſo vaſt a profundity as is ſuppoſed, and ſo come more preſs to my buſineſs.

'Tis an ordinary obſervation among them that are imployed in Mines and ſubterraneous vaults of any depth, that heavy bodies loſe much of their gravity in thoſe hollow caverns: So that what the ſtrength of ſeveral men cannot ſtir above ground, is eaſily moved by the ſingle force of one under it: Now to improve this experiment, 'tis very likely that gravity proceeds from a kind of magnetiſm and attractive vertue in the earth, which is by ſo much the more ſtrong and vigorous, by how much more of the attrahent contributes to the action, and proportionably weaker, where leſs of the magnetick Element exerts its operation; ſo that ſuppoſing the ſolid earth, to reach but to a certain, and that not very great diſtance from the ſurface, and 'tis obvious this way to give an account of the Phaenomenon.

* For according to this Hypotheſis the gravity of thoſe bodies is leſs, becauſe the quantity of the earth that draws them is ſo; whereas were it of the ſame nature and ſolidity to the center, this diminution of its bulk, and conſequently vertue would not be at all conſiderable, nor in the leaſt ſenſible: Now though there are other cauſes pretended for this effect, yet there is none ſo [Page] likely, and eaſie a ſolution as this, though I know it alſo is obnoxious to exceptions, which I cannot now ſtand to meddle with; all that I would have, is, that 'tis a probability, * and the mention of the fountains of the great deep in the ſacred Hiſtory, as alſo the flaming Vulcano's and ſmoaking mountains that all relations ſpeak of, are others.

* Now I intend not that after a certain diſtance all is fluid matter to the center. For the Carteſian Hypotheſis diſtributes the ſubterranean ſpace into diſtinct regions of divers matter, which are divided from each other by as ſolid walls, as is the open air from the inferiour Atmoſphere: Therefore I ſuppoſe only that under this thick outſide, there is next a vaſt and large region of fluid matter, * which for the moſt part very likely is a groſs and fetid kind of air, as alſo conſiderable proportions of fire and water, under all which, there may be other ſolid floors, that may incompaſs and cover more vaults, and vaſt hollows, the contents of which 'twere vanity to go about to determine; only 'tis very likely, that as the admirable Philoſophy of Des Cartes ſuppoſeth, * the loweſt and central Regions may be filled with flame and aether, which ſuppoſitions, though they may ſeem to ſome to be but the groundleſs excurſions of buſie imaginations; yet thoſe that know the French Philoſophy, and ſee [Page] there the Reaſons of them, will be more candid in their cenſures, and not ſo ſevere to thoſe not ill-framed conjectures.

Now then being thus provided, I return again to proſecute my main intendment; Wherefore 'tis very probable, that the wicked and degenerate part of mankind, * are after death committed to thoſe ſqualid ſubterraneous habitations; in which dark priſons, they do ſevere penance for their paſt impieties, and have their ſenſes, which upon earth they did ſo fondly indulge, and took ſuch care to gratifie, now perſecuted with darkneſs, ſtench, and horror. Thus doth the divine juſtice triumph in puniſhing thoſe vile Apoſtates ſuitably to their delinquencies.

Now if thoſe vicious ſouls are not carried down to the infernal caverns by the meer congruity of their natures, as is not ſo eaſie to imagine; we may then reaſonably conceive, * that they are driven into thoſe dungeons by the inviſible Miniſters of Juſtice, that manage the affairs of the world by Axiom 3. For thoſe pure Spirits doubtleſs have a deep ſenſe of what is juſt, and for the good of the univerſe; and therefore will not let thoſe inexcuſable wretches to eſcape their deſerved caſtigations; or permit them to reſide among the good, leſt they ſhould infect and poyſon the better world, by their examples. Wherefore, I ſay, they are diſpoſed of into [Page] thoſe black under-Abyſſes, where they are ſuited with company like themſelves, and match't unto bodies as impure, as are their depraved inclinations. Not that they are all in the ſame place, and under the like torments; but are variouſly diſtributed according to the merits of their natures and actions; ſome only into the upper priſons, * others to the Dungeon: And ſome to the moſt intolerable Hell, the Abyſs of fire. Thus doth a juſt Nemeſis viſit all the quarters of the Ʋniverſe.

Now thoſe miſerable priſoners cannot eſcape from the places of their confinement; for 'tis very likely that thoſe watchful ſpirits that were inſtrumental in committing them, * have a ſtrict and careful eye upon them to keep them within the confines of their goal, that they rove not out into the regions of light and liberty, yea, 'tis probable that the bodies they have contracted in thoſe ſqualid manſions, may by a kind of fatal magnetiſme be chained down to this their proper element. Or, they having now a congruity only to ſuch fetid vehicles, may be no more able to abide the clear and lightſome Air; than the Bat or Owl are able to bear the Suns noon-day beams; or, the fiſh to live in theſe thinner Regions. This may be the reaſon of the unfrequency of their appearance; and that they moſt commonly get them away at the approach [Page] of light. Beſides all this, ſome there are who ſuppoſe that there is a kind of polity among themſelves, which may * under ſevere penalties, prohibit all unlicenſed excurſions into the upper world; though I confeſs this ſeems nor ſo probable, and we ſtand in no need of the ſuppoſition. For though the laws of their natures ſhould not detain them within their proper reſidences; yet the care and overſight of thoſe watchful Spirits, who firſt committed them, will do it effectually. And very oft when they do appear, they ſignifie that they are under reſtraint, and come not abroad, but by permiſſion; as by ſeveral credible Stories I could make good: But for brevity I omit them.

Now though I intend not this Hypotheſis, either for a diſcovery of infallible truth, or declarement of mine own opinions, yet I cannot forbear to note the ſtrange coincidence that there is between Scripture expreſſions in this matter, ſome main ſtroaks of the Orthodox Doctrine, and this Philoſophical conjecture of the ſtate and place of the wicked. 'Tis repreſented in the Divine Oracles as a deep pit, a priſon, a place of darkneſs, fire, and brimſtone; and the going thither, is named a deſcent. All which moſt appoſitely agree with the repreſentation we have made; And the uſual Periphraſis of Hell torments, fire, and brimſtone, is wonderfully applicable [Page] to the place we have been deſcribing; ſince it abounds with fuliginous flames, and ſulphureous ſtench and vapours; And, as we have conjectur'd, the loweſt cavity, is nothing elſe but a vault of [...]re. For the other expreſſions mentioned, every one can make the application. So that when a man conſiders this, he will almoſt be tempted to think, that the inſpired writers had ſome ſuch thing in their fancies. And we are not to run to tropes and figures for the interpretation of plain and literal deſcriptions; except ſome weighty reaſon force us to ſuch a Refuge.

Moreover Hell is believed among the Orthodox to have degrees of torments, to be a place of uncomfortable horror, and to ſtand at the greateſt diſtance from the ſeat and habitation of the bleſſed. All which, and more that I could reckon up, cannot more clearly be made out and explained, than they are in this Hypotheſis.

Thus then we ſee the irreclaimably wicked lodg'd in a place and condition very wretched and calamitous. If any of them ſhould be taught by their miſeries to renounce and forſake their impieties; or ſhould have any diſpoſitions to vertue and divine love re-inkindled in them; meer Philoſophy would conclude, that in time they might then be delivered from their ſad durance; But we know what Theology hath determined. And indeed [Page] thoſe brutiſh Apoſtates are ſo fixt and rooted in their ſenſual and rebellious propenſions, that thoſe who are not yet as far diſtant from their Maker as they can be, are ſtill verging downwards; And poſſibly being quite void of the divine grace, and any conſiderable exerciſes of reaſon and conſcience, they may never ſtop till they have run through all the infernal ſtages, and are arriv'd to the extremeſt degree of miſery, that as yet any are obnoxious to.

Wherefore the earth and all the infernal Regions being thus monſtrouſly depraved; 'tis time for the Divine Juſtice to ſhew ſome remarkable and more than ordinary ſeverity upon thoſe remorſeleſs Rebels; and his goodneſs is as ready to deliver the virtuous from this ſtage of wretchedneſs and impiety. When therefore thoſe have compleated the number of their iniquities, and theſe are ſit for the mercy of ſo great a deliverance; then ſhall the great decree for judgment be executed; which though it cannot be expected that meer Philoſophy ſhould give an unerring and punctual account of, yet we ſhall follow this light as far as it will lead us; not intrenching upon the ſacred rights of Divinity, nor yet baulking what the ancient Eaſtern Cabbala, aſſiſted by later diſcoveries into nature, will dictate; But ſincerely following the Hypotheſis, we ſhall leave all its errours [Page] and miſguidances to be corrected by the more ſacred Canons. So that where we ſhall diſcern the wiſdom of the World to have miſdirected the moſt knowing and ſedulous inquirers, we may duly acknowledge the great benefit of that light which we have received to guide us in matters of ſuch vaſt and concerning ſpeculation,

The Conflagration of the Earth.

THerefore at length, when the time preappointed by the divine wiſdom for this execution, is come; * The internal, central fire ſhall have got ſuch ſtrength and irreſiſtible vigour, that it ſhall eaſily melt and diſſolve that fence that hath all this while incloſed it; And all thoſe other ſmaller fires, which are lodged in ſeveral parts of the lower Regions joyning themſelves with this mighty flame, ſhall prey upon what ever is combuſtible, and ſo rage firſt within the bowels of the earth, beginning the tragick execution upon thoſe damned ſpirits that are there confined; theſe having been reſerved in the chains of darkneſs to the judgment of this great day; and now ſhall their hell and miſery be compleated, and they receive the full reward of their impieties, which doubtleſs will be the moſt intolerable and ſevere torment that can be imagined, theſe fierce and mercileſs [Page] flames ſticking cloſe to, yea, piercing through and through their bodies, which can remove no where to avoid this fiery over-ſpreading vengeance.

And now the ſubterranean vaults being thus all on fire, it cannot be long ere this prevailing cumbuſtion take hold of the upper regions, wherefore at laſt with irreſiſtible violence it breaks forth upon theſe alſo: So that the great pyre is now kindled, ſmoak, fire, darkneſs, horror and confuſion, cover the face of all things. Wherefore the miſerable inhabitants of the earth and inferiour air, will be ſeized on by the devouring Element, and ſuffer in that fire that was reſerved for the perdition of ungodly men.

But ſhall the righteous periſh with the wicked? And ſhall not the Judge of all the earth do right? Will not the ſincere and vertuous both in the Earth and Air be ſecured from this ſad fate? And how can their deliverance be effected? Doubtleſs Providence that in all things elſe hath been righteous and equal, will not fail in this laſt ſcene; but proviſion will be made for their recovery from this vengeance that hath taken hold of the wicked. But all natural cauſes failing here, ſince their bodies are not pure enough to waft them up the quiet regions of the un infeſted aether; and the higher [Page]congruity of life, being yet but imperfectly inchoated; they would be detained priſoners here below by the chains of their unhappy natures, were there not ſome extraordinary interpoſure for their reſcue and inlargement; wherefore when we contemplate the infinite fertility of the divine goodneſs, we cannot think, that he will let thoſe ſeeds of piety and vertue, which himſelf hath ſown and given ſome increaſe to, to come to nought; or the honeſt poſſeſſors of them, fatally to miſcarry: But that he will imploy his power for the compleating what he hath begun, and the deliverance of thoſe, who have relyed upon his mercies. But for the particular way and method how this great tranſaction will be accompliſht, Philoſophy cannot determine it.

Happy therefore are we, who have the diſcoveries of a more certain Light, which doth not only ſecure us of the thing, but acquaints us with the way and means, that the Divine Wiſdom hath reſolv'd on, for the delivery of the righteous. So that hereby we are aſſured that our ever bleſſed Redeemer ſhall appear in the clouds before this fiery Fate ſhall have quite taken hold of the Earth, and its condemned inhabitants. The Glory of his appearance with his Coeleſtial Legions, ſhall raiſe ſuch ſtrong love, joy, and triumph in his now paſſionately [Page] enamoured expectants, as ſhall again enkindle that high and potent principle, the Spirit, which being throughly awakened and excited, will melt the groſſeſt conſiſtence into liquid Aether, ſo that our bodies being thus turned into the pureſt flame, we ſhall aſcend in thoſe fiery Chariots with our Glorious Redeemer, and his illuſtrious and bleſſed Attendants to the Coeleſtial habitations. This is the Reſurrection of the juſt, and the Recovery of our antient bleſſedneſs.

Thus have ſome repreſented this great tranſaction; But I dare warrant nothing in this matter beyond the declarations of the Sacred Scriptures; therefore to proceed in our Philoſophical conjectures, However the good ſhall be delivered, be ſure the wicked ſhall be made a prey to the Scorching Element, which now rageth every where, and ſuffer the Judgment threatned. But yet the moſt degenerate part of Mankind (if we conſult meer Reaſon and the Antient Eaſtern Cabbala) who are detained Priſoners in the now inflamed Atmoſphere, ſhall not for ever be abandon'd to miſery and ruin. For they are ſtill pretended to be under the eye and tender care of that Almighty goodneſs, that made and preſerveth all things, that puniſheth not out of malice or revenge, and therefore will not purſue them to their [Page] utter undoing for ever: But hath ſet bounds to their deſtruction, and in infinite Wiſdom hath ſo ordered the matter that none of his Creatures ſhall be loſt eternally, or indure ſuch an endleſs miſery, than which not Being it ſelf were more eligible. Wherefore thoſe curious contemplators phancy, that the unſupportable pain and anguiſh which hath long ſtuck to thoſe miſerable creatures, will at length ſo conſume and deſtroy that inſenſible pleaſure and congruity that unites Soul and Body, that the thus miſerably cruciated Spirit muſt needs quit it's unfit habitation; and there being no other body within its reach that is capable of a vital union, according to the tenor of this Hypotheſis, it muſt become ſenſeleſs and unactive by Axiom, 4. And ſo be buried in a ſtate of ſilence and inertneſs.

At length when theſe greedy flames ſhall have devoured what ever was combuſtible, and converted into a ſmoak and vapour all groſſer concretions, that great orb of fire that the Carteſian Philoſophy ſuppoſeth to conſtitute the center of this Globe, ſhall perfectly have recovered its priſtine nature, * and ſo following the Laws of its proper motion, ſhall fly away out of this vortex, and become a wandring Comet, till it ſettle in ſome other.

But if the next Conflagration reach not [Page] ſo low as the inmoſt regions of the Earth, * ſo that the central fire remains unconcern'd, and unimploy'd in this combuſtion, this Globe will then retain its wonted place among the Planets. And that ſo it may happen, is not improbable, ſince there is plenty enough both of fiery principles and materials in thoſe Regions that are nearer to the ſurface, to ſet the Earth into a Lightſome flame, and to do all that execution that we have ſpoken of. Some conceive therefore, that the conflagration will not be ſo deep and univerſal as this opinion ſuppoſeth it; But that it may take beginning from a leſs diſtance, and ſpend it ſelf upwards. And to this purpoſe they repreſent the ſequel of their Hypotheſis.

The General Reſtitution.

THoſe thick and clammy vapours which erſtwhile aſcended in ſuch vaſt meaſures, and had fill'd the vault of Heaven with ſmoak and darkneſs, muſt at length obey the Laws of their nature and gravity, and ſo deſcend again in abundant ſhowres, and mingle with the ſubſiding aſhes, which will conſtitute a mudd vegetative and fertile. For thoſe warm and benign beams, that now again begin to viſit the deſolate Earth, will excite thoſe ſeminal principles into action, [Page] which the Divine Wiſdom and goodneſs hath mingled with all things. Wherefore they operating according to their natures, and the diſpoſitions which they find in the reſtored matter, will ſhoot forth in all ſorts of flowers, herbs, and trees; making the whole Earth a Garden of delight and pleaſure; And erecting all the Phaenomena proper to this Element. By this time the Air will be grown vital again and far more pure and pleaſant, than before the fiery purgation. Wherefore they conceive, that the diſbodyed Souls ſhall return from their unactive and ſilent receſs, and be joyned again to bodies of purified and duly prepared Air. For their radical aptitude to matter ſtill remained, though they fell aſleep for want of bodies of fit temper to unite with.

This is the ſumm of the Hypotheſis as it is repreſented by the profoundly Learned Dr. H. More, with a copious and pompous eloquence.

Now ſuppoſing ſuch a receſs of any Souls into a ſtate of inactivity, ſuch a Reſtitution of them to life and action is very reaſonable; ſince it is much better for them to live and operate again, than to be uſeleſs in the univerſe, and as it were nothing for ever. And we have ſeen above, that the Divine goodneſs doth always what is beſt, [Page] and his wiſdom is not ſo ſhallow as to make his Creatures ſo as that he ſhould be fain to baniſh them into a ſtate that is next to non-entity, there to remain through all duration. Thus then will thoſe lately tormented Souls, having ſmarted for their paſt iniquities, be recovered both from their ſtate of wretchedneſs and inſenſibility; and by the unſpeakable benignity of their Maker, placed once more in ſuch conditions, wherein by their own endeavours, and the divine aſſiſtance they may amend what was formerly amiſs in them, and purſue any good Reſolutions that they took while under the laſh of the fiery tortures; Which thoſe that do, when their good inclinations are perfected, and the Divine Life again enkindled, they ſhall in due time re-aſcend the Thrones they ſo unhappily fell from, and be circled about with unexpreſſible felicity. But thoſe that for all this, follow the ſame ways of ſenſuality and rebellion againſt their merciful deliverer, they ſhall be ſure to be met with by the ſame methods of puniſhment; and at length be as miſerable as ever.

Thus we ſee the Air will be re-peopled after the conflagration: but how the Earth will ſo ſoon be reſtored to Inhabitants, is a matter of ſome difficulty to determine, ſince it uſeth to be furniſht from [Page] the Aereal regions, which now will have none left that are fit to plant it. For the good were delivered thence before the conflagration: And thoſe that are newly come from under the [...]iery laſh and latter ſtate of ſilence, are in a hopeful way of recovery; At leaſt, their aereal congruity cannot be ſo ſoon expired, as to fit them for an early return to their terreſtrial priſons. Wherefore to help our ſelves in this rencounter, we muſt remember, that there are continually multitudes of ſouls in a ſtate of inactivity, for want of ſuitable bodies to unite with, there being more that dye to the aery ſtate, than are born into this terreſtrial. In this condition were myriads, when the general Fever ſeiz'd this great deſtemper'd body; who therefore were unconcern'd in the conflagration, and are now as ready to return into life and action upon the Earth's happy reſtauration, as if no ſuch thing had hapned.

Wherefore they will not fail to deſcend into fitly prepared matter, and to exerciſe all the functions proper to this condition. Nor will they alone be inhabitants of the Earth. For all the variety of other Animals, ſhall [...]ve and act upon this ſtage with them; all ſorts of ſouls inſinuating themſelves into thoſe bodies, which are [...]it for their reſpective natures.

[Page] Thus then ſuppoſing habitable congruous bodies, there is no doubt, but there will be humane Souls to actuate and inform them; but all the difficulty is to conceive how the matter ſhall be prepared. For who ſhall be the common Seeds-man of ſucceeding Humanity, when all mankind is ſwept away by the fiery deluge? And to take Sanctuary in a Miracle is unphiloſophical and deſperate. I think therefore, it is not improbable (I mean according to the duct of this Hypotheſis) but that in this renewed youth, of the ſo lately calcined and purified Earth, there may be ſome pure effloreſcences of balmy matter, not to be found now in its exhauſted and decrepit Age, that may be proper vehicles of life, into which ſouls may deſcend without further preparation; And ſo orderly ſhape and form them, as we ſee to this day ſeveral ſorts of other creatures do, without the help of generation. For doubtleſs there will be great plenty of unctuous ſpirituous matter, when the moſt inward and recondite ſpirits of all things, ſhall be diſlodg'd from their old cloſe reſidences, and ſcatter'd into the Air; where they will at length, when the fierce agitation of the fire is over, gather in conſiderable proportious of tenuious vapours; which at length deſcending in a cryſtalline liquor, and mingling with the fineſt parts of the newly modified [Page] Earth, will doubtleſs compoſe as genital a matter as any can be prepared in the bodies of Animals. And the calm and wholeſome Air which now is duly purged from its noxious reeks and vapours, and abounds with their ſaline ſpirituous humidity, will queſtionleſs be very propitious to thoſe tender inchoations of life; and by the help of the Sun's favourable and gentle beams, ſupply them with all neceſſary materials.

Nor need we puzzle our ſelves to phancy, how thoſe Terrae Filii, thoſe young ſons of the Earth will be fortified againſt the injuries of weather, or be able to provide for themſelves in their firſt and tender infancy; ſince doubtleſs, if the ſuppoſition be admitted, * thoſe immediate births of unaſſiſted nature will not be ſo tender and helpleſs as we, into whoſe very conſtitutions delicacy and effeminateneſs is now twiſted. For thoſe maſculine productions which were always expoſed to the open Air, and not cloyſter'd up as we, will feel no more incommodity from it, than the young fry of fiſhes do from the coldneſs of the water they are ſpawn'd in. And even now much of our tenderneſs and delicacy is not natural but contracted. For poor Children will indure that hardſhip that would quickly diſpatch thoſe that have had a more careful and officious nurture. And without queſtion we ſhould do many things [Page] for ſelf-preſervation and proviſion, which now we yield no ſigns of; had not cuſtom prevented the endeavours of nature, and made it expect aſſiſtance. For the Indian Infants will ſwim currently, when aſſoon as they are born, they are thrown into the water. And nature put to her ſhifts, will do many things more than we can ſuſpect her able for the performance of; which conſider'd, 'tis not hard to apprehend, but that thoſe Infant Aborigines are of a very different temper and condition from the weak products of now decayed nature; having queſtionleſs, more pure and ſerviceable bodies, ſenſes and other faculties more active and vigorous, and nature better exerciſed; ſo that they may by a like ſenſe to that which carries all creatures to their proper food, purſue and take hold of that nutriment which the free and willing Earth now offer'd to their mouths; till being advantaged by Age and growth, they can move about to make their choice. * But all this is but the frolick exerciſe of my pen chuſing a Paradox; And 'tis time to give over the purſuit.

To make an end then, we ſee that after the Conflagration the earth will be inhabited again, and all things proceed much-what in like manner as before. But whether the Cataſtrophe of this ſhall be like the former or no, I think is not to be determined. For [Page] as one world hath periſh't by water, and this preſent ſhall by fire, 'tis poſſible the next period may be by the Extinction of the Sun. But I am come to the end of the line, and ſhall not go beyond this preſent Stage of Providence, or wander into an Abyſſe of uncertainties, where there is neither Sun nor Star to guide my notions.

Now of all that hath been repreſented of this Hypotheſis, there is nothing that ſeems more extravagant and Romantick than thoſe notions that come under the two laſt Generals; And yet ſo it falls out, that the main matters contained under them, one would think to have a ſtrange conſonancy with ſome expreſſions in the Sacred Oracles. For clear it is from the divine Volume, that the wicked and the Devils themſelves are reſerved to a further and more ſevere Judgment than yet afflicteth them; It is as plainly declared to be a vengeance of fire that abides them, as a compleatment of their torments: And that the Earth ſhall be burnt, is as explicitely affirmed, as any thing can be ſpoken. Now if we put all theſe together, they look like a probability, that the conflagration of the Earth ſhall conſummate the Hell of the wicked. And * thoſe other expreſſions of Death, Deſtruction, Perdition of the ungodly, and the like, ſeem to ſhow a favourable regard to the State of ſilence [Page] and inactivity. Nor is there leſs appearing countenance given to the Hypotheſis of Reſtitution, * in thoſe paſſages which predict New Heavens and a New Earth, and ſeem to intimate only a change of the preſent.

And yet I would have no body be ſo credulous as to be taken with little appearances, nor do I mention theſe with an intent that they ſhould with full conſent be delivered to intend the aſſerting any ſuch Doctrines; But that there is ſhew enough both in Reaſon and Scripture for theſe Opinions to give an occaſion for an Hypotheſis, and therefore that they are not meer arbitrary and idle imaginations.

Now whatever becomes of this particular draught of the Souls ſeveral conditions of life and action, * the main Opinion of Prae-exiſtence is not at all concerned. This Scheme is only to ſhew, that natural and imperfect Reaſon can frame an Intelligible Idea of it; And therefore queſtionleſs the Divine Wiſdom could form and order it, either ſo, or with infinitely more accuracy and exactneſs. How it was with us therefore of Old, I know not; But yet that we may have been, and acted before we deſcended hither, I think is very probable. And I ſee no reaſon but why Praeexiſtence may be admitted without altering any thing conſiderable of the ordinary Syſteme of Theology. But I ſhut up [Page] with that modeſt concluſion of the Great Des Cartes:

That although theſe matters ſeem hardly otherwiſe intelligible than as I have here explained them:

Yet nevertheleſs remembring I am not infallible, I aſſert nothing; * but ſubmit all I have written to the Authority of the Church of England, and to the matured judgments of graver and wiſer men; Earneſtly deſiring that nothing elſe may be entertained with credit by any perſons, but what is able to win it by the force of evident and victorious reaſon. Des Cartes Princ. Philoſ. lib. 4. ſſ. CVII.

FINIS.

A DISCOURSE OF TRUTH.

§

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A DISCOURSE OF TRUTH. BY THE Reverend Doctor RUST, Late LORD BISHOP of DROMORE in IRELAND.

LONDON, Printed for J. Collins, and S. Louns over againſt Exeter Exchange in the Strand, 1682.

A LETTER Concerning the Subject and the Author.

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SIR,

I Have now peruſed, and returned the Manuſcript you ſent me; it had contracted many and great Errours in the Tranſcription, which I have corrected: I was enabled to do it by a written Copy of the ſame Diſcourſe, which I have had divers years in my Hands. The Subject is of great and weighty importance, and the Acknowledgment of the Truths here aſſerted and made good, will lay a Foundation for right conceptions in the Doctrines that concern the Decrees [Page] of God. For the firſt Errour, which is the ground of the reſt, is, That things are good and juſt, becauſe God Wills them ſo to be; and if that be granted, we are diſabled from uſing the arguments taken from natural Notions, and the Attributes and Perfections of the Divine Nature, againſt the Blackeſt and moſt Blaſphemous Opinions that ever were entertained concerning Gods proceedings with the Sons of Men. If there be no ſettled Good and Evil, Immutable and Independent on any Will or Ʋnderſtanding, then God may have made his reaſonable Creatures on purpoſe to damn them for ever. He may have abſolutely decreed that they ſhould ſin, that he may damn them juſtly; He may moſt ſolemnly and earneſtly prohibit Sin by his Laws, and declare great diſpleaſure againſt it; and yet by his ineluctable Decrees force men to all the ſin that is committed in the [Page] World: He may vehemently proteſt his unfeigned deſire of their Life and Happineſs, and at the ſame time ſecretly reſolve their Eternal Deſtruction; He may make it his Glory and Pleaſure to triumph eternally in the torments of poor Worms, which himſelf hath by his unalterable and irreſiſtible Will made miſerable; yea, (as the diſcourſe inſtanceth) he may after his Decrees concerning the Salvation of the Elect, after the death of his Son for them, and the miſſion of his Spirit to them, and after all the promiſes he hath made to aſſure them; thruſt them alſo at laſt into the dreadful Regions of Death and Woe; I ſay if there be no immutable reſpects in things, but Juſt and Ʋnjuſt, Honourable and Diſhonourable, Good and Cruel, Faithful and Deceitful, are reſpects made by meer arbitrarious Will, it will be in vain to diſpute from Them againſt any ſuch [Page] diſmal Opinions: yea it will be great folly to argue for the Simplicity of the Divine Nature againſt the vile conceits of the old Anthropomorphites, and the Blaſphemies of the preſent Muggletonians, of God's having a Corporal ſhape, Parts and Members, if there be no neceſſary Independent Connexion, betwixt Immenſity, Spirituality and Perfection. But this being eſtabliſhed, that there are immutable reſpects in things, and that ſuch and ſuch are Perfections, and their contrary, Defects and imperfections; hence it will follow, that it is impoſſible the forementioned Doctrines can be true concerning God, who cannot lye, cannot deny himſelf: viz. He being Abſolute and Infinite Perfection, cannot act any thing that is Evil or imperfect; But all the expreſſions in Scripture, that at firſt ſight look towards ſuch a ſenſe, muſt be interpreted by the general [Page] Analogy and courſe of them, which declares his Infinite, Immutable Excellencies, and theſe Notions of himſelf, which he hath written on the Souls of Men.

So that the Subject of this little Diſcourſe, is of vaſt Moment, and the truth aſſerted in it, is, I think, confirmed with an irreſiſtible Strength and force of Reaſoning; and not to be convinced by it, will argue either great weakneſs of Ʋnderſtanding, in not perceiving conſequences that are ſo cloſe and plain; or great obſtinacy of Will, in being ſhut up by prejudices, and preconceiv'd Opinions againſt Light that is ſo clear and manifeſt.

The Author was a Perſon with whom I had the Honour and Happineſs of a very particular acquaintance; a man he was of a clear Mind, a deep Judgment and ſearching Wit: greatly learned in all the beſt ſorts of Knowledge, old and new, a thoughtful and [Page] diligent Enquirer, of a free Ʋnderſtanding, and vaſt Capacity, joyn'd with ſingular Modeſty, and unuſual Sweetneſs of Temper, which made him the Darling of all that knew him: He was a perſon of great Piety and Generoſity; a hearty Lover of God and Men: An excellent Preacher, a wiſe Governour, a profound Philoſopher, a quick, forcible, and cloſe Reaſoner, and above all, a true and exemplary Chriſtian. In ſhort, he was one who had all the Qualifications of a Primitive Biſhop, and of an extraordinary Man. This I ſay not out of kindneſs to my Friend, but out of Juſtice to a Perſon of whom no Commendation can be extravagant. He was bred in Cambridge, and Fellow of Chriſt's Colledge, where he lived in great Eſteem and Reputation for his eminent Learning and Vertues; he was one of the firſt that overcame the prejudices of the Education of the late [Page] unhappy Times, in that Ʋniverſity, and was very Inſtrumental to enlarge others. He had too great a Soul for the trifles of that Age, and ſaw early the nakedneſs of Phraſes and Phancies; He out-grew the pretended O [...] thodoxy of thoſe days, and addicted himſelf to the Primitive Learning and Theology, in which he even then became a great Maſter.

After the return of the Government, the excellent Biſhop Taylor, foreſeeing the vacancy in the Deanery of Connor, ſent to Cambridge, for ſome Learned and Ingenious Man, who might be fit for that Dignity. The motion was made to Dr. Ruſt, which correſponding with the great Inclination he had to be converſant with that incomparable Perſon, he gladly accepted of it, and haſtn'd into Ireland, where he langed at Dublin about Auguſt 1661. He was received with much Reſpect and Kindneſs [Page] by that great and good Biſhop, who knew how to value ſuch Jewels; and preferr'd to the Deanery as ſoon as it was void, which was ſhortly after. He continued in that Preferment during the Biſhops Life, always dearly lov'd, and even admir'd by him.

At his Death (that ſad ſtroke to all the Lovers of Religion and Learning) he was choſen for the laſt ſolemn Office to his Deceaſed Father and Friend; and he Preach't ſuch a Funeral Sermon as became that extraordinary Perſon and himſelf. It hath been ſince publiſhed, and I ſuppoſe you may have ſeen it, upon the lamented Death of Biſhop Taylor, which hapned Auguſt 13th. 1667. The Biſhopricks were divided; Dr. Boyle Dean of Cork, was nominated Biſhop of Downe and Connor; and Dr. Ruſt Dean of Connor, Biſhop of Dromore; he lived in the [Page] Deanery about ſix years, in the Biſhoprick but three; for in December 1670, he dyed of a Fever (in the prime of his years) to the unſpeakable grief of all that knew his Worth, and eſpecially of ſuch of them as had been bleſt by his Friendſhip, and moſt ſweet and indearing Converſation. He was buried in the Quire of his own Cathedral Church of Dromore, in a Vault made for his Predeceſſour Biſhop Taylor, whoſe Sacred Duſt is depoſited alſo there: and what Dormitory hath two ſuch Tenants?

This is the beſt account I can give you of the Work and the Author: and by it you may perceive his Memory deſerves to live, and this product of him: but there is ſo much reverence due to the Manes of ſo venerable a Perſon, that nothing ſhould be haſtily publiſhed under his honour'd name. I know, had he deſigned this Exercitation for the Publick, he would have [Page] made it much more compleat and exact than we now have it; but as it is, the Diſcourſe is weighty, and ſubſtantial, and may be of great uſe. As it goes about now in written Copies▪ it, is (I perceive) exceedingly depraved▪ and in danger of being ſtill worſe abuſed; The Publication would preſerve it from further corruptions. However I dare not adviſe any thing in it, but this, that you take the judgment of that Reverend Doctor you mention (the deceaſed Authors Friend and mine,) and act according as he ſhall direct. I am,

Your real Friend, Joſ. Glanvil.

[Page]A DISCOURSE OF TRUTH.

SECT. I.

That Truth is twofold; In the Object, and in the Subject. That in the Object what it is; And that it is antecedent to and independent of any Will or Ʋnderſtanding whatever.

TRUTH is of aequivocal ſignification, and therefore cannot be defined before it be diſtinguiſh't. It is twofold; Truth in things, which you may call Truth in the Object: and Truth in the Ʋnderſtanding, which is Truth in the Subject. By the firſt I mean nothing elſe but that Things neceſſarily are what they are: And that there are neceſſary mutual reſpects and relations of Things one unto another. [Page] Now that things are what they are, and that there are mutual Reſpects and Relations eternal, and immutable, and in order of Nature * antecedent to any Underſtanding either created or uncreated, is a thing very plain and evident; For it's clearer than the Meridian Light, that ſuch Propoſitions as theſe, Homo eſt animal rationale, Triangulum eſt quod habet tres angulos, are not arbitrarious dependencies upon the Will, Decree, or Underſtanding of God, but are neceſſary and eternal Truths; and wherein 'tis as impoſſible to divide the Subject, and what is ſpoken of it, as it is for a thing not to be what it is, which is no leſs than a Contradiction; And as indiſpenſible are the mutual reſpects and relations of things both in Speculatives and Morals.

SECT. II.

The neceſſity of there being certain Arguments, Means and Objects for certain Concluſions, Ends and Faculties; and that every thing will not ſuit every thing.

FOR can it be imagin'd that every Argument can be made a proportioned Medium to prove every Concluſion? * that any thing may be a ſuitable means to any end? that any Object may be conformable to any [Page] Faculty? Can Omnipotence it ſelf make theſe Propoſitions, That twice two are four, or that Parallels cannot interſect, clear and convincing Arguments to prove theſe grand Truths, That Chriſt came into the World to dye for Sinners, and is now exalted as a Prince and a Saviour at the Right Hand of God? * Is it poſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a kind of Geometry, wherein any problemes ſhould be demonſtrated by any Principles; quidlibet ex quolibet; as that a Quadrangle is that which is comprehended of four right Lines: * Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones?

SECT. III.

An Inſtance or two of groſs and horrid Abſurdities, conſequent to the denying the mutual reſpects and relations of things to be eternal and indiſpenſible.

CAN the infinite Wiſdom it ſelf make the damning of all the Innocent and the unſpotted Angels in Heaven a proportionate means to declare and manifeſt the unmeaſureableneſs of his Grace and Love, and goodneſs towards them? Can Lying, Swearing, Envy, Malice, nay Hatred of God and Goodneſs it ſelf, be made the moſt acceptable Service of God, and the readieſt [Page] way to a mans Happineſs? And yet all theſe muſt be true, and infinitely more ſuch contradiction [...] than we can poſſibly imagin, if the mutual reſpects and relations of things be not eternal and indiſpenſible: which that they are, I ſhall endeavour to prove.

SECT. IV.

The Entrance into the firſt part of the Diſcourſe, which is of Truth in the Object. That the Divine Underſtanding does not make the Reſpects and Relations of its Objects, but finds them or obſerves them.

Firſt, we muſt premiſe that * Divine Ʋnderſtanding cannot be the Fountain of the Truth of things; * nor the Foundation of the references of one to another. For it is againſt the nature of all Underſtanding, to make its Objects. * It is the nature of Underſtanding, ut moveatur, illuminetur, formetur, &c. Of its Object, ut moveat, illuminet, formet. Intellectus in actu primo hath it ſelf unto its object, as the Eye unto the Sun; it is irradiated, inlightned and actuated by it: And Intellectus in actu ſecundo, hath it ſelf unto its Object, as the Image to that it repreſents; and the perfection of Underſtanding conſiſts in being actuated by, [Page] and in an adaequate Conformity to its object, according to the nature of all Idea's, Images or Repreſentations of things. The Sum is this, * No Idea's or Repreſentations are or make the things they repreſent; all Underſtanding is ſuch; therefore no Underſtanding doth make the Natures, Reſpects and Relations of its Objects.

SECT. V.

That the Divine Will does not determine the References and Dependencies of things, becauſe that would ſubvert his other Attributes.

* IT remains then, that abſolute, arbitrarious and independent Will muſt be the Fountain of all Truth; and muſt determine the References and Dependencies of things: * which aſſertion would in the Firſt place deſtroy the nature of God, * and rob him of all his Attributes. For then it's impoſſible that there ſhould be ſuch a thing as Divine Wiſdom and Knowledge, which is nothing elſe but an apprehenſion of common notions, and the natures and mutual reſpects and relations of things. For if the Nature of God be ſuch, that his arbitrarious imagination that ſuch and ſuch things have ſuch and ſuch natures and [Page] Dependencies, doth make thoſe things to have thoſe Natures or Dependencies, he may as eaſily Unimagine that Imagination; and then they that before had a mutual Harmony, Sympathy and Agreement with one another, ſhall now ſtand at as great a diſtance and oppoſition. And thus the Divine Underſtanding will be a mere Protaean Chimaera, a Caſual Conflux of intellectual Atomes: Contradictions are true, if God will underſtand them ſo, and then the foundation of all Knowledge is taken away, and God may as truly be ſaid to know nothing as every thing; nay, * any Angel or Man may as truly be ſaid to know all things, as God himſelf; for then every thing will be alike certain, and every apprehenſion equally conformable to Truth. Theſe are infallible conſequences, and a thouſand more as abſurd as theſe, if contradictory Propoſitions may be both true: and whether they be ſo or no, it's a meer caſual Dependence upon the Arbitrarious pleaſure of God, if there be not a neceſſary immutability and eternal oppoſition betwixt the being and the not being of the ſame thing, at the ſame time and in the ſame reſpect. Likewiſe all thoſe Truths we call Common Notions, (the Syſteme and Comprehenſions of which, is the very Eſſence of Divine Wiſdom; as the concluſions iſſuing [Page] from them, not by any operoſe dèduction, but a clear intuitive light, are the very Nature of Divine Knowledge, * if we diſtinguiſh thoſe two Attributes in God) I ſay, all theſe propoſitions of immediate and indemonſtrable Truth, if theſe be only ſo, becauſe ſo underſtood by God, and ſo underſtood by God becauſe he pleaſed ſo to have them, and not becauſe there is an indiſpenſible relation of Harmony and Proportion betwixt the Terms themſelves; then it is a thing meerly caſual, and at the pleaſure of God to change his former apprehenſions, and Idea's of thoſe Truths, and to make their contradictories as Evident, Radical and Fundamental as themſelves but even now were; and ſo Divine Wiſdom and Knowledge will be a various, ſickle and mutable thing, a meer tumult and confuſion. All theſe conſequences infallibly flow from this certain Principle, That upon a changeable and uncertain Cauſe, Effects muſt needs have a changeable and uncertain Dependence. And there is nothing imaginable in it ſelf, more changeable and uncertain than Will not regulated by the dictates of Reaſon and Underſtanding.

SECT. VI.

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The avoidance of the foregoing ill conſequences by making God immutable, with an Anſwer thereto.

IF any deny theſe Conſequences and Deductions, * becauſe they ſuppoſe that God is mutable and changeable; I anſwer, by bringing this as another abſurdity, that if there be no indiſpenſible and eternal reſpects of things, it will rob God of his Immutability, and unchangeableneſs: for if there be no neceſſary dependence betwixt Ʋnchangeablneſs and Perfection, what ſhould hinder, but that if God pleaſe to think it ſo, it will be his perfection to be changeable? and if Will, as ſuch, be the only principle of his Actions, it is infallibly his Perfection to be ſo. For 'tis the Perfection of every Being to act according to the principle of its Nature, and it is the nature of an arbitrarious Principle to act or not, to do or undo upon no account but its own will and pleaſure; to be determined, and tied up, either by it ſelf, or from abroad, is violent and contranatural.

SECT. VII.

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An hideous, but genuine Inference of a Pamphleteer from this principle, that abſolute and Sovereign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods actions.

AND therefore from this principle, that abſolute and Soveraign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods Actions, it was rightly inferr'd by a late Pamphleteer, that God will one day damn all Mankind, Good and Bad, Believers and Unbelievers, notwithſtanding all his Promiſes, Pretenſions or Engagements to the contrary; becauſe this damning all mankind in deſpight of his Faithfulneſs, Juſtice, Mercy and Goodneſs will be the greateſt advancement of his Soveraignty, Will and Prerogative imaginable. His words are, God hath ſtored up Deſtruction both for the perfect and the wicked, and this does wonderfully ſet forth his Soveraignty; his exerciſing whereof is ſo perfect, that when he hath tied himſelf up faſt as may be, by never ſo many promiſes, yet it ſhould ſtill have its ſcope, and be able to do what it will, when it will, as it will: Here you have this principle improved to the height. And however you may look upon this Author as ſome new Light, or Ignis fatuus of [Page] the times, yet I aſſure you in ſome pieces by him ſet forth, he is very ſober and rational.

SECT. VIII.

That the Denial of the mutual Reſpects and Relations of things unto one another to be eternal and unchangeable, deſpoils God of that univerſal Rectitude of his Nature.

IN the next place, to deny the mutual reſpects and rationes rerum to be immutable and indiſpenſible, * will ſpoil God of that univerſal rectitude which is the greateſt Perfection of his Nature: For then Juſtice, Faithfulneſs, Mercy, Goodneſs &c. will be but contingent and arbitrarious Iſſues of the Divine Will. This is a clear and undeniable Conſequence. For if you ſay theſe be indiſpenſible perfections in God, for inſtance, if Juſtice be ſo, then there is an eternal relation of Right and Equity betwixt every Being and the giving of it that which is its propriety; if Faithfulneſs, then there is an indiſpenſible agreement betwixt a promiſe and the performance of it; if Mercy, then there is an immutable and unalterable ſuitableneſs and harmony between an indigent Creature, and pity and commiſeration; if Goodneſs, then there is an everlaſting Proporti [...]n [Page] and ſymmetry between fulneſs and its overflowing and diſpreading of it ſelf, which yet is the thing denyed: * For to ſay they are indiſpenſibly ſo, becauſe God underſtands them ſo, ſeems to me extream incogitancy; for that is againſt the nature of all underſtanding, which is but the Idea and Repreſentation of things, and is then a true and perfect Image, when it is exactly conformed to its Object: And therefore, if things have not mutual reſpects and relations eternal and indiſpenſible, then all thoſe perfections do ſolely and purely depend upon abſolute and independent Will, as Will; And conſequently, it was and is indifferent in it ſelf that the contrary to theſe, as, Injuſtice, Ʋnfaithfulneſs, Cruelty, Malice, Hatred, Spite, Revenge, Fury; and whatever goes to the conſtitution of Hell it ſelf, ſhould have been made the top and higheſt perfections of the Divine Nature: which is ſuch Blaſphemy as cannot well be named without horror and trembling. For inſtead of being a God, ſuch a nature as this is, joyned with Omnipotency, would be a worſe Devil than any is in Hell. And yet this is a neceſſary and infallible conſequence from the denial of theſe mutual reſpects and relations of things unto one another, to be eternal and unchangeable.

SECT. IX.

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That the Denial of the unchangeableneſs of the ſaid mutual Reſpects and Relations of things to one another, takes away all Knowledge of God and of our own Happineſs, and lays a Foundation of the moſt incurable Scepticiſm imaginable.

AND as by the denial of theſe, the Nature of God is wholly deſtroyed, ſo in the ſecond place, the mind of Man would have no certainty of Knowledge, or aſſurance of Happineſs. He can never come to know there is a God, and conſequently not the Will and Mind of God, which if there be no intrinſecal and indiſpenſible reſpects and relations of things, muſt be the ground and foundation of all Knowledge; for what means or arguments ſhould we uſe to find out, or prove a Divine Nature? It were folly and madneſs to ſit down and conſider the admirable contrivement and artifice of this great Fabrick of the Univerſe; how that all natural things ſeem to act for ſome end, though themſelves take no Cognizance of it: How the Sun by its motion and ſituation, or (which is all one) by being a Centre of the Earths Motion, provides Light and Heat, and Life for this inferiour [Page] World, how living Creatures bring forth a moſt apt compoſure and ſtructure of parts and members, and with that a being endued with admirable Faculties, and yet themſelves have no inſight into, nor conſultation about this incomparable Workmanſhip; how they are furniſhed with Powers and Inclinations for the preſervation of this Body when it is once brought into the World; how without praevious deliberation they naturally take in that Food which without their intention or animadverſion is concocted in their Ventricle, turned into Chyle, that Chyle into Bloud, that Bloud diffuſed through the Veins and Arteries, and therewith the ſeveral Members nouriſhed, and decays of ſtrength repaired; I ſay, the gathering from all theſe (which one would think were a very natural conſequence) that there is a wiſe Principle which directs all theſe Beings unknown to you, in their ſeveral motions, to their ſeveral ends, (ſuppoſing the dependence and relations of things to be contingent and arbitrarious) were a piece of folly and incogitancy; For how can the Order of thoſe things ſpeak a wiſe and underſtanding Being, which have no relation or reſpect unto one another, but their whole agreement, ſuitableneſs and proportion is a meer caſual iſſue of abſolute and independent Will? If any thing may be the cauſe of any effect, and a proportionate [Page] mean to any end, who can infer infinite Wiſdom from the dependence of things and their relations unto one another? * For we are to know that there is a God, and the Will of that God before we can know the mutual Harmony, or Diſproportion of things; and yet, if we do not know theſe principal reſpects that things have among themſelves, it is impoſſible we ſhould ever come to the knowledge of a God: For theſe are the only arguments that any Logick in the world can make uſe of to prove any concluſion. But ſuppoſe we ſhould come to know that there is a God, which, as I have demonſtrated, denying the neceſſary and immutable truth of common Notions, and the indiſpenſible and eternal relations of things, is altogether impoſſible: However, let it be ſuppoſed; yet how ſhall we know that theſe common Notions, and principles of natural inſtinct, which are the foundation of all Diſcourſe and Argumentation, are certain and infallible Truths; and that our Senſes, (which with theſe former Principles, we ſuppoſe this Divine Nature to have given us to converſe with this outward world) were not on purpoſe beſtowed upon us, to befool, delude and cheat us; if we be not firſt aſſured of the Veracity of God? And how can we be aſſured of that, if we know [Page] not that Veracity is a perfection? and how ſhall we know it is ſo, unleſs there be an intrinſecal relation betwixt Veracity and Perfection? For if it be an arbitrarious reſpect depending upon the Will of God, there is no way poſſible left whereby we ſhould come to know that it is in God at all; And therefore we have fully as much reaſon to believe that all our common Notions and Principles of natural inſtinct, whereupon we ground all our reaſonings and diſcourſe, are meer Chimaera's to delude and abuſe our faculties; and all thoſe Idea's, Phantaſms and Apprehenſions of our external ſenſes, we imagine are occaſioned in us by the pre [...]ence of outward objects, are meer Spectrums and Gulleries, wherewith poor mortals are befooled and cheated; as that they are given us by the firſt Goodneſs and Truth to lead us into the Knowledge of himſelf and Nature.

This is a clear and evident conſequence, and cannot be denyed by any that doth not complain of darkneſs in the brighteſt and moſt Meridian Light. And here you have the foundations laid of the higheſt Scepticiſm; for who can ſay he knows any thing, when he hath no baſis on which he can raiſe any true concluſions?

SECT. X.

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That the denying the Eternal and immutable Reſpects of things fruſtrates all the noble Eſſays of the mind or underſtanding of man.

THus you ſee the noble faculties of man, his Mind and Underſtanding, will be to no end and purpoſe, but for a Rack and Torture; for what greater unhappineſs or torment can there be imagined, than to have Faculties, whoſe Accompliſhment and Perfection conſiſts in a due conformation unto their objects, and yet to have no objects unto which they may be conformed; to have a Soul unmeaſurably breathing after the embraces of Truth and Goodneſs, and after a ſearch and enquiry after one and the other, and to find at laſt they are but [...]iery, empty and uncertain Notions, depending upon the arbitrarious determinations of boundleſs and independent Will; which determinations ſhe ſees it beyond her reach ever to come to any knowledge of?

SECT. XI.

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That in the aboveſaid denial are lad the Foundations of Rantiſm, Debauchery, and all Diſſoluteneſs of Life.

HEre you have likewiſe the true Foundations of that we call Rantiſm; for if there be no diſtinction 'twixt Truth and Falſhood, Good and Evil, in the nature of the things themſelves, and we never can be aſſured what is the mind and pleaſure of the ſupream and abſolute Will (becauſe Veracity is not intrinſecally and ex natura re [...], a Perfection, but only an Arbitrarious, if any Attribute in the Deity) * then it infallibly follows, that it is all one what I do, or how I live; and I have as much reaſon to believe that I am as pleaſing unto God, when I give up my ſelf unto all F [...]thineſs, Uncleanneſs and Sin; when I ſwell with Pride, Envy, Hatred and Malice, &c. as when I endeavour with all my Might and Strength to purge and purifie my Soul from all pollution and de [...]ilement both o [...] Fleſh and Spirit; and when I purſue the mortification of all my [...]arnal Luſts and Inclinations: And I have fully as much ground and aſſurance, that the one is the ready Way to Happineſs, as the other.

SECT. XII.

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That our aſſurance of future Happineſs is quite cut off by the Denying of the Eternal and immutable reſpects of things.

ANd this is another branch of this ſecond Abſurdity, from the denial o [...] the intrinfecal and eternal reſpects and relations of things, that a man would not have any aſſurance of future Happineſs; for though it be true indeed, or at leaſt we fancy to our ſelves that God hath ſent Jeſus Chriſt into the world, and by him hath made very large and ample promiſes, that whoſoever believes in him and conforms his life unto his precepts, ſhall be made heir of the ſame Inheritance and Glory which Chriſt is now poſſeſſed of and inveſted with in the Kingdom, of his Father; yet what ground have we to believe that God does not intend only to play with and abuſe our Faculties, and in concluſion to damn all thoſe that believe and live as is above expreſſed; and to take them only into the Injoyments of Heaven and H [...]ppineſs, who have been the great Oppoſers of the Truth, and Goſpel, and Life and Nature of Jeſus Chriſt in the world? For if there be no eternal and indiſpenſible Relation of [Page] Things, then there's no intrinſecal Evil in Deceiving and Falſifying, in the damning the Good, or ſaving obſtinate and contumacious Sinners (whilſt ſuch) notwithſtanding any promiſes or threatnings to the contrary: and if the things be in themſelves indifferent, it is an unadviſed Confidence to pronounce determinately on either ſide. Yea further, ſuppoſe we ſhould be aſſured that God is Verax, and that the Scripture doth declare what is his Mind and Pleaſure; yet if there be not an intrinſecal oppoſition betwixt the Being and not Being of a thing at the ſame time, and in the ſame reſpect; then God can make a thing that hath been done, undone; and that whatever hath been done or ſpoken either by himſelf, or Chriſt, or his Prophets, or Apoſtles, ſhould never be done, or ſpoken by him or them; though He hath come into the world, yet that He ſhould not be come; though he hath made theſe promiſes, yet that they ſhould not be made; though God hath given us Faculties, that are capable of the enjoyment of himſelf, yet that he ſhould not have given them us; and that yet we ſhould have no Being, nor think a thought while we fancy and ſpeak of all theſe contradictions: In fine, it were impoſſible we ſhould know any thing, * if the oppoſition of contradictory terms depend upon the [Page] arbitrarious reſolves of any Being whatſoever. If any ſhould affirm, that the terms of common Notions have an eternal and indiſpenſible relation unto one another, and deny it of other truths, he exceedingly betrays his folly and incogitancy; for theſe common Notions and principles are foundations, and radical truths upon which are built all the deductions of reaſon and Diſcourſe, and with which, ſo far as they have any truth in them, they are inſeparably united. All theſe conſequences are plain and undeniable, and therefore I ſhall travel no further in the confirmation of them.

SECT. XIII.

Several Objections propounded, againſt the ſcope of this Diſcourſe hitherto, from the Independency of the Divine Underſtanding and Will.

AGainſt this Diſcourſe will be objected, that it deſtroys God's Independency and Self-ſufficiency; * for if there be truth antecedently to the Divine Underſtanding, the Divine Underſtanding will be a meer paſſive principle, acted and inlightened by ſomething without itſelf, as the Eyes, by the Sun, and leſſer Objects, which the Sun irradiates: and if there be [Page] mutual congruities, and dependencies of things in a moral ſenſe, and ſo, that ſuch and ſuch means have a natural and intrinſecal tendency, or repugnance to ſuch and ſuch ends, then will God be determined in his actions from ſomething without himſelf, * which is to take away his independency, and Self-ſufficiency. The pardoning of Sin to repenting Sinners ſeems to be a thing very ſuitable to infinite Goodneſs and Mercy, if there be any ſuitableneſs, or agreement in things antecedently to Gods Will; therefore in this caſe will God be moved from abroad, and as it were determined to an act of Grace. This will alſo undermine and ſhake many principles and opinions which are look'd upon as Fundamentals, and neceſſary to be believed: It will unlink and break that chain and method of Gods Decrees, which is generally believed amongſt us. God's great plot, and deſign from all Eternity, as it is uſually held forth, was to advance his Mercy and Juſtice in the Salvation of ſome, and Damnation of others; We ſhall ſpeak only of that part of Gods deſign, the advancement of his Juſtice in the Damnation of the greateſt part of Mankind, as being moſt pertinent for the improving of the ſtrength of the Objection againſt our former Diſcourſe.

SECT. XIV.

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A main Objection more fully inſiſted on, namely how well the advancement of Gods Juſtice in the Damnation of the greateſt part of Mankind conſiſts with the ſcope of this Diſcourſe, eſpecially it being ſtated as is here ſet down.

THat God may do this, He decrees to create man, and being created, decrees that man ſhould ſin; and becauſe, as ſome ſay, man is a meer paſſive principle, not able, no not in the preſence of objects, to reduce himſelf into action; Or becauſe in the moment of his creation, as others, he was impowered with an indifferency to ſtand or fall; Therefore, [...]eſt there ſhould be a fruſtration of God's great deſ [...]gn; he decrees in the next place, infallibly to determine the Will of man unto [...]n, that having ſinned he might accompliſh his Damnation; and what he had firſt, and from all eternity in his intentions, the advancement of his Juſtice. Now if there be ſuch an intrinſecal relation of things, as our former Diſcourſe pretends unto, this Deſign of God will be wholly fruſtrated. For it may ſeem clear to every mans underſtanding, that it is not for the Honour and Advancement [Page] of Juſtice to determine the Will of man to ſin, and then to puniſh him for that ſin unto which he was ſo determined; Whereas if God's Will, as ſuch, be the only Rule and Principle of Actions, this will be an accommodate means (if God ſo pleaſe to have it) unto his deſign. The Summ is, We have ſeemed in our former diſcourſe to bind and tye up God, who is an abſolute and independent Being, to the petty formalities of Good and Evil, * and to fetter and impriſon freedom, and liberty it ſelf, in the fatal and immutable chains, and re [...]pects of things.

SECT. XV.

An Anſwer to that Objection that concerns the Underſtanding of God, ſhewing that the Divine Ʋnderſtanding does not depend upon the natures and mutual reſpects of things, though they be its Objects.

I Anſwer▪ This objection concerns partly the Underſtanding of God, and partly his Will; As for the divine underſtanding, the Caſe is thus; There are certain Beings, or natures of things which are Logically poſſible; it implyes no contradiction that they ſhould be, although it were ſuppoſed, there were no power that could bring them [Page] into being; which natures, or things, ſuppoſing they were in being, would have mutual relations of agreement or oppoſition unto one another, which would be no more diſtinguiſhed from the things themſelves, than Relations are from that which founds them. Now the Divine Underſtanding is a repreſentation, o [...] comprehenſion of all thoſe natures or beings thus logically, and in reſpect of God abſolutely poſſible, and conſequently it muſt needs be alſo a comprehenſion of all theſe Sympathies, and Antipathies, either in a natural or a moral way, which they have one unto another: for they, as I ſaid, do neceſſarily, and immediately flow from the things themſelves, as relations do, poſito fundamento, & termino. Now the Divine underſtanding doth not at all depend upon theſe natures, or relations, though they be its Objects; for the nature of an Object doth not conſiſt in being motivum facultatis, as it is uſually with us, whoſe apprehenſions are awakened by their preſence; but its whole nature is ſufficiently comprehended in this, that it is termination [...] Facultatis; and this preciſely doth not ſpeak any dependency of the faculty upon it, eſpecially in the divine underſtanding; where this objective, terminative preſence flows from the foecundity of the Divine Nature: for the things themſelves are ſo far [Page] from having any being antecedently to the Divine Underſtanding; that had not it been their exemplary pattern, and Idea, they had never been created, and being created they would lye in darkneſs; (I ſpeak of things that have not in them a Principle of underſtanding, not conſcious of their own natures, and that beauteous harmony they have among themſelves) were they not irradiated by the Divine Underſtanding, which is as it were an univerſal Sun that diſcovers and diſplays the natures and reſpects of things, and does as it were draw them up into its beams.

SECT. XVI.

An Anſwer to that Objection which concerns the Will of God, ſhewing, that Liberty in the Power or Principle, is no where a Perfection, where there is not an Indifferency in the things or actions about which it is converſant.

TO the ſecond part of the Objection, the ſtrength whereof is, that * to tye up God in his actions to the reaſon of things, deſtroys his Liberty, Abſoluteneſs, and Independency. I anſwer, it is no imperfection for God to be determined to Good; It is no bondage, ſlavery, or contraction, to be [Page] bound up to the eternal Laws of Right and Juſtice: It is the greateſt impotency and weakneſs in the world to have a power to evil, and there is nothing ſo diametrically oppoſite to the very being and nature of God. Stat pro ratione voluntas, unleſs it be as a redargution and check to impudent and daring Inquirers, is an account no where juſtifiable. The more any Being partakes of reaſon and underſtanding, the worſe is the imputation of acting arbitrariouſly, & pro imperio. We can pardon it in Women and Children, as thoſe from whom we do not expect that they ſhould act upon any higher principle; but for a man of reaſon and underſtanding, that hath the Laws of goodneſs and rectitude (which are as the Laws of the Medes and Perſians that cannot be altered) engraven upon his mind, for him to caſt off theſe golden reins, and to ſet up arbitrarious Will for his Rule and Guide, is a piece of intolerable raſhneſs and preſumption. This is an infallible rule, that liberty in the power or principle is no where a perfection, where there is not an indifferency in the things or actions about which it is conver [...]ant: And therefore it is a piece of our weakneſs and imbecillity, that we have nature ſo indetermined to what is good. Theſe things need no proof, indeed cannot well be proved, otherwiſe than they prove [Page] themſelves: for they are of immediate truth, and prove themſelves they will, to a pure unprejudiced mind.

SECT. XVII.

That the Diſcourſe hitherto does not infer any dependency of God upon any thing without himſelf; But only occaſions are offered to him of acting according to his own intimate nature and eſſence.

2. * OUR former Diſcourſe doth not infer any dependency of God, upon any thing without himſelf; for God is not excited to his actions by any forreign, or extrinſecal motives; what he does, proceeds from the eternal immutable reſpects, and relations, or reaſons of things, and where are theſe to be found, but in the eternal and divine Wiſdom? For what can infinite Wiſdom be, but a ſteady, and immoveable comprehenſion of all thoſe natures and relations? and therefore God in his actions, does not look abroad, but only conſults, (if I may ſo ſpeak) the Idea's of his own mind. What Creatures do, is but the offering a particular caſe, for the reducement of a general principle into a particular action: or the preſentment of an occaſion for God to act according to the principles of his own [Page] nature; when we ſay that God pardoneth Sin upon repentance, God is not moved to an act of Grace from any thing without himſelf; for this is a Principle in the divine Wiſdom, that pardon of Sin to repenting Sinners, is a thing very ſuitable to infinite goodneſs, and this Principle is a piece of the Divine Nature: Therefore when God upon a particular act of repentance puts forth a particular act of grace, it is but as it were a particular inſtance to the general rule, which is a portion of Divine Perfection, when 'tis ſaid, to him that hath ſhall be given, and he ſhall have abundance; the meaning is, He that walks up unto that light, and improves that ſtrength, that God hath already communicated unto him, ſhall have more abundant Incomes of light and ſtrength from God: It doth not follow that God is moved from without to impart his Grace. For this is a branch of Divine Wiſdom; it is agreeable to the infinite goodneſs of God, to take notice of, and reward the ſincere, though weak endeavours of his Creatures, after him; ſo that what is from abroad, is but a particular occaſion to thoſe Divine Principles to exert, and put forth themſelves.

SECT. XVIII.

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The ſecond part of the Diſcourſe, which briefly treats of Truth in the Subject; what it is: What in God, and what in the Creature; And that in both it is, A Repreſentation or Conception in the mind, conformable to the unchangeable Natures and mutual Reſpects of things.

THus have we ſpoken concerning the truth of things, or Truth in the Object. It follows that we ſpeak

Concerning Truth in the power, or faculty, which we called Truth in the Subject; which we ſhall diſpatch in a few words.

* Truth in the power, or faculty is nothing elſe but a conformity of its conceptions or Idea's unto the natures and relations of things, which in God we may call an actual, ſteady, immoveable, eternal Omniformity, as Plotinus calls the Divine Intellect, [...], which you have largely deſcribed by him. And this the Platoniſts truly call the Intellectual World, for here are the natures of all things pure, and unmix'd, purged from all thoſe dregs, refined from all that droſs and alloy which cleave unto them in their particular inſtances. All inferiour and ſublunary things, [Page] not excluding Man himſelf, have their excreſcences, and defects; Exorbitances, or privations are moulded up in their very frames and conſtitutions. There is ſomewhat extraneous, heterogeneous, and preternatural in all things here below, as they exiſt amongſt us; but in that other world, like the moſt purely fined gold, they ſhine in their native and proper glory. Here is the firſt goodneſs, the benign Parent of the whole Creation, with his numerous off-ſpring, the infinite throng of Created Beings: Here is the fountain of Eternal Love, with all its ſtreams, and rivulets: Here is the Sun of uncreated glory, ſurrounded with all his rayes, and beams: Here are the eternal, and indiſpenſible Laws of right and Juſtice, the immediate and indemonſtrable principles of Truth, and goodneſs: Here are ſteady and immoveable rules, for all caſes and actions, however circumſtantiated, from which the Will of God, though never ſo abſolute, and independent, from everlaſting to everlaſting, ſhall never depart one Tittle. * Now all that Truth that is in any Created Being, is by participation and derivation from this firſt underſtanding, and fountain of intellectual light. And that truth in the power of faculty is nothing but the conformity or its conceptions, or Ideas with the natures [Page] and relations of things, is clear and evident in it ſelf, and neceſſarily follows from what hath been formerly proved concerning the truth of things themſelves, * antecedently to any underſtanding, or will; * for things are what they are, and cannot be otherwiſe without a contradiction, and their mutual reſpects and dependences Eternal and unchangeable, as hath been already ſhew'd: ſo that the conceptions and Ideas of theſe natures and their relations, can be only ſo far true * as they conform and agree with the things themſelves, and the harmony which they have one to another.

FINIS.

THE CONTENTS OF THE DISCOURSE of TRUTH.

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Sect. 1. THAT Truth is twofold; In the Object and in the Subject. That in the Object, what it is; And that it is antecedent to and independent of any Will or Ʋnderſtanding whatever. p. 165

Sect. 2. The neceſſity of there being certain Arguments, Means and Objects for certain Concluſions, Ends and Faculties; And that every thing will not ſuit every thing. p. 166

Sect. 3. An Inſtance or two of the groſs and horrid Abſurdities, conſequent to the denying the mutual reſpects and relations [Page] of things to be eternal and indiſpenſible. p. 167

Sect. 4. The Entrance into the firſt part of the Diſcourſe, which is, of Truth in the Object: That the Divine Underſtanding does not make the Reſpects and Relations of its Objects, but finds them or obſerves them. p. 168

Sect. 5. That the Divine Will does not determine the References and Dependences of things, becauſe that would ſubvert his other Attributes. p. 169

Sect. 6. The avoidance of the foregoing ill conſequences by making God immutable, with an Anſwer thereto. p. 172

Sect. 7. An hideous, but genuine Inference of a Pamphleteer from this principle, That abſolute and Sovereign Will is the Spring and Fountain of all Gods actions. p. 173

[Page] Sect. 8. That the Denial of the mutual Reſpects and Relations of things unto one another to be eternal and unchangeable, deſpoils God of that univerſal Rectitude of his Nature. p. 174

Sect. 9. That the Denial of the unchangeableneſs of the ſaid mutual Reſpects and Relations of things to one another, takes away the Knowledge of God and of our own Happineſs, and lays a foundation of the moſt incurable Scepticiſm imaginable. p. 176

Sect. 10. That the denying the Eternal and Immutable Reſpects of things, fruſtrates all the noble Eſſays of the mind or underſtanding of man. p. 180

Sect. 11. That in the aboveſaid Denial are laid the Foundations of Rantiſm, Debauchery, and of all Diſſoluteneſs of Life. p. 181

[Page] Sect. 12. That our Aſſurance of future Happineſs is quite [...]ut off by the denying of the Eternal and Immutable Reſpects of Things. p. 182

Sect. 13. Several Objections propounded, againſt the ſcope of this Diſcourſe hitherto, from the Independency of the Divine Underſtanding and Will. p. 184

Sect. 14. A main Objection more fully inſiſted upon, namely, How well the Advancement of Gods Juſtice in the Damnation of the greateſt part of Mankind, conſiſts with the ſcope of this Diſcourſe, eſpecially it being ſo ſtated as is here ſet down. p. 186

Sect. 15. An Anſwer to that Objection that concerns the Underſtanding of God, ſhewing hat the Divine Ʋnderſtanding does not depend upon the natures and mutual Reſpects of things, though [Page] they be its Objects. p. 187

Sect. 16. An Anſwer to that Objection which concerns the Will of God, ſhewing, That Liberty in the Power or Principle, is no where a Perfection, where there is not an Indifferency in the things or actions about which it is converſant. p. 189

Sect. 17. That the Diſcourſe hitherto does not infer any Dependency of God upon any thing without himſelf; But only occaſions are offered to him of acting according to his own intimate Nature and Eſſence. p. 191

Sect. 18. The ſecond part of the Diſcourſe which briefly treats of Truth in the Subject: What it is. What in God, and what in the Creature. And that in both it is, A repreſentation or conception in the mind conformable to the unchangeable natures and mutual Reſpects of things. p. 193

§

§

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Annotations UPON THE Two foregoing TREATISES, LƲX ORIENTALIS, OR, An Enquiry into the OPINION OF THE EASTERN SAGES Concerning the Prae-exiſtence of Souls; AND THE Diſcourſe of TRUTH. Written for the more fully clearing and further confirming the main DOCTRINES in each TREATISE. By one not unexercized in theſe kinds of SPECULATION.

LONDON: Printed for J. Collins, and S. Lounds, over againſt Exeter-Change in the Strand. 1682.

Annotations UPON LƲX ORIENTALIS.

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THeſe two Books, Lux Orientalis and the Diſcourſe of Truth, are luckily put together by the Publiſher, there being that ſuitableneſs between them, and mutual ſupport of one another. And the Arguments they treat of being of the greateſt importance that the Mind of man can entertain herſelf with, the conſideration thereof has excited ſo ſluggiſh a Genius as mine to beſtow ſome few Annotations thereon, not very anxious or operoſe, but ſuch as the places eaſily ſuggeſt; and may ſerve either to rectifie what may ſeem any how oblique, or illuſtrate what may ſeem leſs clear, or make a ſupply or adde ſtrength where there may ſeem any further need. In which I would not be ſo underſtood as that I had ſuch an anxiety and [Page] fondneſs for the Opinions they maintain, as if all were gone if they ſhould fail; but that the Dogmata being more fully; clearly, and preciſely propounded, men may more ſafely and conſiderately give their Judgments thereon; but with that modeſty as to admit nothing that is contrary to the Judgment of the truly Catholick and Apoſtolick Church.

Chap. 2. p. 4. That he made us pure and innocent, &c. This is plainly ſignified in the general Moſaick Hiſtory of the Creation, that all that God made he ſaw it was good; and it is particularly declared of Adam and Eve, that they were created or made in a ſtate of Innocency.

Pag. 4. Matter can do nothing but by motion, and what relation hath that to a moral Contagion? We muſt either grant that the figures of the particles of Matter and their motion, have a power to affect the Soul united with the Body, (and I remember Joſephus ſomewhere ſpeaking of Wine, ſays, it does [...], regenerate, as it were, the Soul into another life and ſenſe of things) or elſe we muſt acknowledge that the parts of Matter are alterable into qualifications, that cannot be reſolved into mere mechanical motion and figure; whether they be thus altered by the vital power of the Spirit of Nature, or however it comes to paſs. But that Matter has a conſiderable [Page] influence upon a Soul united thereto, the Author himſelf does copiouſly acknowledge in his fourth Chapter of this Book; where he tells us, that according to the diſpoſition of the Body, our Wits are either more quick, free, and ſparkling, or more obtuſe, weak, and ſluggiſh; and our Mind more chearful and contented, or elſe more moroſe, melancholick, or dogged, &c. Wherefore that he may appear the more conſiſtent with himſelf, it is likely he underſtands by this Moral Contagion the very venome and malignity of vitious Inclinations, how that can be derived from Matter, eſpecially its power conſiſting in mere motion and figuration of parts. The Pſalmiſt's deſcription is very appoſite to this purpoſe, Pſal. 58. The ungodly are froward even from their mothers womb; as ſoon as they are born they go aſtray and ſpeak lyes. They are as venomous as the poyſon of a ſerpent, even like the deaf adder that ſtoppeth her ear. That there ſhould be ſuch a difference in the Nativity of ſome from that of others, and haply begot alſo of the ſame Parents, is no ſlight intimation that their difference is not from their Bodies, but their Souls; in which there is ſo ſudden Eruptions of vitious Inclinations which they had contracted in their former ſtate, not repreſſed nor extinct in this, by reaſon of Adam's lapſe, and his loſing the Paradiſiacal body in which he was created, and which ſhould, if it [Page] had not been for his Fall, been tranſmitted to his Poſterity; but that being loſt, the ſeveral meaſures of the priſtine Vitioſity of humane Souls diſcover themſelves in this life, according to the juſt Laws of the Divine Nemeſis eſſentially interwoven into the nature of things.

Pag. 5. How is it that thoſe that are under continual temptations to Vice, are yet kept within the bounds of Vertue, &c. That thoſe that are continually under temptations to Vice from their Childhood, ſhould keep within the bounds of Vertue, and thoſe that have perpetual outward advantages from their Childhood to be vertuous, ſhould prove vitious notwithſtanding, is not rationally reſolved into their free will; for in this they are both of them equal: and if they had been equal alſo in their external advantages or diſadvantages, the different event might well be imputed to the freedom of their Will. But now that one, notwithſtanding all the diſadvantages to Vertue ſhould prove vertuous, and the other, notwithſtanding all the advantages to Vertue ſhould prove vitious; the reaſon of this certainly to the conſiderate will ſeem to lie deeper than the meer liberty of Will in man. But it can be attributed to nothing, with a more due and tender regard to the Divine Attributes, than to the pre-exiſtent ſtate of humane Souls, according to the Scope of the Author.

[Page] Pag. 9. For ſtill it ſ [...]ms to be a diminutive and diſparaging apprehenſion of the infinite and immenſe goodneſs of God, that he ſhould detrude ſuch excellent Creatures, &c. To enervate this reaſon, there is framed by an ingenious hand this Hypotheſis, to vie with that of Pre-exiſtence: That Mankind is an Order of Beings placed in a middle ſtate between Angels and Brutes, made up of contrary Principles, viz. Matter and Spirit, indued with contrary faculties, viz. Animal and Rational, and encompaſſed with contrary Objects proportioned to their reſpective faculties, that ſo they may be in a capacity to exerciſe the Vertues proper and peculiar to their compounded and heterogeneal nature. And therefore though humane Souls be capable of ſubſiſting by themſelves, yet God has placed them in Bodies full of brutiſh and unreaſonable Propenſions, that they may be capable of exerciſing many choice and excellent Vertues, which otherwiſe could never have been at all; ſuch as Temperance, Sobriety, Chaſtity, Patience, Meekneſs, Equanimity, and all other Vertues that conſiſt in the Empire of Reaſon over Paſſion and Appetite. And therefore he conceives that the creating of humane Souls, though pure and immaculate, and uniting them with ſuch brutiſh Bodies, is but the conſtituting and continuing ſuch a Species of Being, which is an Order betwixt Brutes and Angels; into which [Page] latter Order, if men uſe their faculties of the Spiritual Principle in them well, they may aſcend: Foraſmuch as God has given them in their Spiritual Principle (containing Free Will, and Reaſon to diſcern what is beſt) a power and faculty of overcoming all their inordinate Appetites.

This is his Hypotheſis, moſtwhat in his own words, and all to his own ſence, as near as I could with brevity expreſs it: And it ſeems ſo reaſonable to himſelf, that he profeſſes himſelf apt to be poſitive and dogmatical therein. And it might very well ſeem ſo to him, if there were a ſufficient faculty in the Souls of men in this World, to command and keep in order the Paſſions and Appetites of their Body, and to be and do what their Reaſon and Conſcience tells them they ſhould be and do, and blames them for not being and doing. So that they know more by far than they find an ability in themſelves to perform. Extreamly few there are, if any, but this is their condition: Whence all Philoſophers (that had any ſenſe of Vertue and Holineſs) as well as Jews and Chriſtians, have looked upon Man as in a lapſed ſtate, not blaming God, but deploring the ſad condition they found themſelves in by ſome foregoing lapſe or fault in Mankind. And it is ſtrange that our own Conſciences ſhould flie in our faces for what we could never have helped.

[Page] It is witty indeed which is alleadged in the behalf of this Hypotheſis, viz. That the Rational part of man is able to command the lower Appetites; becauſe if the ſuperiour part be not ſtrong enough to govern the inferiour, it deſtroys the very being of moral Good and Evil: Foraſmuch as thoſe acts that proceed out of neceſſity cannot be moral, nor can the ſuperiour Faculties be obliged to govern the inferiour, if they are not able, becauſe nothing is obliged to impoſſibilities. But I anſwer, if inabilities come upon us by our own fault, the defects of action then are upon the former account moral, or rather immoral. And our Conſciences rightly charge us with the Vitioſities of our Inclinations and Actions, even before we can mend them here, becauſe they are the conſequences of our former Guilt.

Wherefore it is no wonder that there is found a flaw in a ſubtilty that would conclude againſt the univerſal Experience of men, who all of them, more or leſs, that have any ſenſe of Morality left in them, complain that the inferiour powers of the Soul, at leaſt for a time, were too hard for the ſuperiour. And the whole maſs of Mankind is ſo generally corrupt and abominable, that it would argue the wiſe and juſt God a very unequal Matcher of innocent Souls with brutiſh Bodies, they being univerſally ſo hugely foiled or overcome in the conflict, if he indeed were the immediate [Page] Matcher of them. For how can that be the effect of an equilibrious or ſufficient Free Will and Power, that is in a manner perpetual and conſtant? But there would be near as many Examples one way as the other, if the Souls of men in this ſtate were not by ſome precedent lapſe become unable to govern, as they ought, all in them or about them that is to be ſubjected to their Reaſon. No fine Fetches of Wit can demoliſh the ſteady and weighty ſtructure of ſound and general Experience.

Pag. 9. Wherein he ſeeth it, ten thouſand to one but that they will corrupt, &c. The Expreſſion [ten thouſand to one] is figurative, and ſignifies how hugely more like it is that the Souls would be corrupted by their Incorporation in theſe Animal or▪ Brutiſh Bodies, than eſcape Corruption. And the effect makes good the Aſſertion: for David of old (to ſay nothing of the days of Noah) and Paul after him, declare of Mankind in general, that they are altogether become abominable; there is none that doth good, no not one. Wherefore we ſee what efficacy theſe Bodies have, if innocent Souls be put into them by the immediate hand of God, as alſo the force of Cuſtom and corrupt Education to debauch them; and therefore how unlikely it is that God ſhould create innocent Souls to thruſt them into ſuch ill circumſtances.

Pag. 10. To ſuppoſe him aſſiſtent to unlawful [Page]and unclean Coitions, by creating a Soul to animate the impure Foetus, &c. This ſeemed ever to thoſe that had any ſenſe of the Divine Purity and Sanctity, or were themſelves endued with any due ſenſibleneſs and diſcernment of things, to be an Argument of no ſmall weight. But how one of the more rude and unhewen Oppoſers of Pre-exiſtence ſwaggers it out of countenance, I think it not amiſs to ſet down for a pleaſant Entertainment of the Reader.

Admit, ſays he, that Gods watchful Providence waits upon diſſolute Voluptuaries in their unmeet Conjunctions, and ſends down freſh created Spirits to actuate their obſcene Emiſſions, what is here done which is not very high and becoming God, and moſt congruous and proportionable to his immenſe Grandeur and Majeſty, viz. To bear a part amongſt Pimps and Bawds, and pocky Whores and Woremaſters, to riſe out of his Seat for them, and by a free Act of Creation of a Soul, to ſet his Seal of Connivance to their Villanies; who yet is ſaid to be of more pure Eyes than to endure to behold Wickedneſs. So that if he does (as his Phraſe is) pop in a Soul in theſe unclean Coitions, certainly he does it winking. But he goes on: For in the firſt place, ſays he, his condeſcenſion is hereby made ſignal and eximious; he is gloriouſly humble beyond a parallel, and by his own Example leſſons us to perform the meaneſt works, if fit and profitable, and to be content even to[Page]drudge for the common bénefit of the World. Good God! what a Rapture has this impure Scene of Venerie put this young Theologer into, that it ſhould thus drive him out of his little Wits and Senſes, and make him ſpeak inconſiſtences with ſuch an affected Grace and lofty Eloquence! If the act of Gods freely creating Souls, and ſo of aſſiſting wretched Sinners in their foul acts of Adultery and Whoredom, be a glorious action, how is it an Abaſement of him, how is it his Humiliation? and if it be an humbling and debaſing of him, how is it glorious? The joyning of two ſuch [...], are indeed without parallel. The creating of an humane Soul immortal and immaculate, and ſuch as bears the Image of God in it, as all immaculate Souls do, is one of the moſt glorious actions that God can perform; ſuch a Creature is it, as the Schools have judged more of value than the frame of the whole viſible World. But to joyn ſuch a Creature as this to ſuch impure corporeal matter, is furthermore a moſt tranſcendent Specimen of both his Skill and Soveraignty; ſo that this is an act of further Super-exaltation of himſelf, not of Humiliation. What remains then to be his Humiliation, but the condeſcending to aſſiſt and countenance the unclean endeavours of Adulterers and Adultereſſes? Which therefore can be no Leſſons to us for Humility, but a Cordial for the faint-hearted in [Page] Debauchery, and degeneracy of Life; wherein they may plead, ſo inſtructed by this rural Theolog, that they are content to drudge for the common profit of the World. But he proceeds.

And ſecondly, ſays he, hereby he elicits Good out of Evil, cauſing famous and heroick perſons to take their Origine from baſe occaſions; and ſo converts the Luſts of ſenſual Varlets to nobler ends than they deſigned them. As if an▪ heroick Off-ſpring were the genuine effect of Adultery or Fornication, and the moſt likely way to People the World with worthy Perſonages. How this raw Philoſopher will make this comply with his Profeſſion of Divinity, I know not; whenas, it teaches us, that Marriage is honourable, but Whoremongers and Adulterers God will judge; and that he puniſhes the Iniquities of the Parents on their Children. But this bold Sophiſt▪ makes God adjudge the nobleſt Off-ſpring to the defiled Bed, and not to puniſh, but reward the Adultery or Whoredom of debauched perſons, by giving them the beſt and braveſt Children: Which the more true it could be found in experience, it would be the ſtronger Argument for Pre-exiſtence; it being incredible that God, if he created Souls on purpoſe, ſhould crown Adultery and Whoredom with the choiceſt Off-ſpring.

And then thirdly and laſtly, ſays he, hereby [Page]he often detects the lewdneſs of Sinners, which otherwiſe would be ſmothered, &c. As if the All-wiſe God could find no better nor juſter means than this to diſcover this Villany. If he be thus immediately and in an extraordinary way aſſiſtant in theſe Coitions, were it not as eaſie for him, and infinitely more decorous, to charge the Womb with ſome Mola or Ephemerous Monſter, than to plunge an immaculato humane Soul into it? This would as effectually diſcover the Villany committed, and beſides prevent the charge Pariſhes are put to in maintaining Baſtards. And now that we have thus ſeen what a mere nothing it is that this Strutter has pronounced with ſuch ſonorous Rhetorick, yet he is not aſhamed to conclude with this Appeal to I know not what blind Judges: Now, ſays he, are not all theſe Actions and Concerns very graceful and agreeable to God? Which words in theſe circumſtances no man could utter, were he not of a craſs, inſenſible, and injudicious Conſtitution, or elſe made no Conſcience of ſpeaking againſt his Judgment. But if he ſpeak according to his Conſcience, it is manifeſt he puts Sophiſms upon himſelf, in arguing ſo weakly.

As he does a little before in the ſame place, where that he may make the coming of a Soul into a baſe begotten Body in ſuch a ſeries of time and order of things as the Pre-exiſtentiaries [Page] ſuppoſe, and Gods putting it immediately upon his creating it into ſuch a Body, to be equally paſſable, he uſes this ſlight Illuſtration: Imagine, ſaith he, God ſhould create one Soul, and ſo ſoon as he had done, inſtantly pop it into a baſe begotten Body; and then create another the matter of an hours ſpace before▪ its precipitation into ſuch a Receptacle: which of theſe Actions would be the moſt dimin [...]tive of the Creators honour? would not the difference be inſenſible, and the ſcandal, if any, the ſame in both? Yet thus lies the caſe juſt betwixt the Pre-exiſtentiaries and us. Let the Reader conſider how ſenſeleſs this Author is in ſaying the caſe betwixt the Pre-exiſtentiaries and him is juſt thus, when they are juſt nothing akin: for his two Souls are both unlapſed, but one of the Pre-exiſtentiaries lapſed, and ſo ſubjected to the Laws of Nature. In his caſe God acts freely, raiſing himſelf, as it were, out of his Seat to create an immaculate Soul, and put into a foul Body; but in the other caſe God onely is a looker on, there is onely his Permiſſion, not his Action. And the vaſt difference of time, he ſalves it with ſuch a Quibble as this, as if it were nothing, becauſe thouſands of Ages ago, in reſpect of God and his Eternity, is not an hour before. He might as well ſay the difference betwixt the moſt glorious Angel and a Flea is nothing, becauſe in compariſon of God both are ſo indeed. Wherefore this [Page] Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary is ſuch a Trifler, that I am half aſhamed that I have brought him upon the Stage.

But yet I will commend his Craft, though not his Faithfulneſs, that he had the wit to omit the propoſing of Buggery as well as of Adultery, and the endeavouring to ſhew how graceful and agreeable to God, how congruous and proportionate it were to his immenſe Grandeur and Majeſty, to create a Soul on purpoſe (immaculate and undefiled) to actuate the obſcene Emiſſions of a Brute having to do with a Woman, or of a Man having to do with a Brute: For both Women and Brutes▪ have been thus impregnated, and brought forth humane Births, as you may ſee abundantly teſtified in Fortunius Licetus; it would be too long to produce Inſtances.

This Opinion of Gods creating Souls, and putting them into Bodies upon inceſtuous and adulterous Coitions, how exceeding abſurd and unbecoming the Sanctity of the Divine Majeſty it ſeemed to the Churches of Aethiopia, you may ſee in the Hiſtory of Jobus Ludolphus. How intolerable therefore and execrable would this Doctrine have appeared unto them, if they had thought of the prodigious fruits of ſucceſsful Buggery? The words of Ludolfus are theſe: Perabſurdum eſſe ſi quis Deum aſtrictum dicat pro adulterinis & inceſtuo [...]is partubus animas quotidie novas creare. Hiſt. [Page] Aethiop. lib. 3. cap. 5. What would they then ſay of creating a new Soul, for the Womb of a Beaſt bugger'd by a Man, or of a Woman bugger'd by a Beaſt!

Pag. 12. Methinks that may be done at a cheaper rate, &c. How it may be done with more agreeableneſs to the Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Juſtice of God, has been even now hinted by me, nor need I repeat it.

Pag. 13. It ſeems very incongruous and unhandſome, to ſuppoſe that God ſhould create two Souls for the ſupply of one monſtrous Body. And there is the ſame reaſon for ſeveral other Monſtroſities, which you may take notice of in Fortunius Licetus, lib. 2. cap. 58. One with ſeven humane heads and arms, and Ox-feet; others with Mens bodies, but with a head the one of a Gooſe, the other of an Elephant, &c. In which it is a ſtrong preſumption humane Souls lodged, but in ſeveral others certain. How does this conſiſt with Gods freſh creating humane Souls pure and innocent, and putting them into Bodies? This is by the aforeſaid Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary at firſt anſwered onely by a wide gape or yawn of Admiration. And indeed it would make any one ſtare and wonder how this can conſiſt with Gods immediately and freely intermeddling with the Generation of Men, as he did at firſt in the Creation. For out of his holy hands all things come clean and neat. Many little efforts he [Page] makes afterwards to ſalve this difficulty of Monſters, but yet in his own judgment the ſureſt is the laſt; That God did purpoſely tye freſh created Souls to theſe monſtroûs ſhapes, that they whoſe Souls ſped better, might humbly thank him. Which is as wiſely argued, as if one ſhould firſt with himſelf take it for granted that God determines ſome men to monſtrous Debaucheries and Impieties, and then fancy this the uſe of it, that the Spectators of them may with better pretence than the Phariſee, cry out, Lord, we thank thee that we are not as theſe men are. There is nothing permitted by God, but it has its uſe ſome way or other; and therefore it cannot be concluded, becauſe that an Event has this or that uſe, therefore God by his immediate and free Omnipotence effected it. A Pre-exiſtentiary eaſily diſcerns that theſe Monſtroſities plainly imply that God does not create Souls ſtill for every humane Coition, but that having pre-exiſted, they are left to the great Laws of the Ʋniverſe and Spirit of Nature; but yet dares not conclude that God by his free Omnipotence determines thoſe monſtrous Births, as ſerviceable as they ſeem for the evincing ſo noble a Theory.

Pag. 15. That God on the ſeventh day reſted from all his works. This one would think were an Argument clear enough that he creates nothing ſince the celebration of the firſt [Page] ſeventh days reſt. For if all his works are reſted from, then the creation of Souls (which is a work, nay a Maſter-piece amongſt his works ſcarce inferiour to any) is reſted from alſo. But the above-mentioned Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence is not at a loſs for an Anſwer; (for his Anſwers being ſlight, are cheap and eaſie to come by:) He ſays therefore, That this ſuppoſeth onely that after that time he ceaſed from creating new Species. A witty Invention! As if God had got ſuch an eaſie habit by once creating the things he created in the ſix days, that if he but contained himſelf within thoſe kinds of things, though he did hold on ſtill creating them, that it was not Work, but mere Play or Reſt to him, in compariſon of his former labour. What will not theſe men fancy, rather than abate of their prejudice againſt an opinion they have once taken a toy againſt! When the Author to the Hebrews ſays, He that has entred into his reſt, has ceaſed from his own works, as God ceaſed from his; verily this is ſmall comfort or inſtruction, if it were as this Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary would have it: for if God ceaſed onely from creating new Species, we may, notwithſtanding our promiſed Reſt, be tyed to run through new inſtances of labours or ſins, provided they be but of thoſe kinds we experienced before. To any unprejudiced underſtanding, this ſence muſt needs ſeem forced and unnatural, thus to [Page] reſtrain Gods Reſt to the Species of things, and to engage him to the dayly task of creating Individuals. The whole Aethiopian Church is of another mind: Qui animam humanam quotidiè non creari hoc argumento aſſerunt, quòd Deus ſexto die perfecerit totum opus Creationis. See Ludolfus in the place above-cited.

Chap. 3. pag. 17. Since the Images of Objects are very ſmall and inconſiderable in our brains, &c. I ſuppoſe he mainly relates to the Objects of Sight, whoſe chief, if not onely Images, are in the fund of the Eye; and thence in vertue of the Spirituality of our Soul extended thither alſo, and of the due qualification of the Animal Spirits are tranſmitted to the Perceptive of the Soul within the brain. But how the bigneſſes and diſtances of Objects are conveyed to our cognoſcence, it would be too tedious to ſignifie here. See Dr. H. Moore's Enchiridion Metaphyſicum, cap. 19.

Pag. 17. Were it not that our Souls uſe a kind of Geometry, &c. This alludes to that pretty conceit of Des Cartes in his Dioptricks, the ſolidity of which I muſt confeſs I never underſtood. For I underſtand not but that if my Soul ſhould uſe any ſuch Geometry, I ſhould be conſcious thereof, which I do not find my ſelf. And therefore I think thoſe things are better underſtood out of that Chapter of the Book even now mentioned.

[Page] Pag. 17. And were the Soul quite void of all ſuch implicit Notions, it would remain as ſenſeleſs, &c. There is no ſenſitive Perception indeed, without Reflection; but the Reflection is an immediate attention of the Soul to that which affects her, without any circumſtance of Notions intervening for enabling her for ſenſitive Operations. But theſe are witty and ingenious Conjectures, which the Author by reading Des Cartes, or otherhow, might be encouraged to entertain. To all ſenſitive Objects the Soul is an Abraſa Tabula, but for Moral and Intellectual Principles, their Idea's or Notions are eſſential to the Soul.

Pag. 18. For Senſe teacheth no general Propoſitions, &c. Nor need it do any thing elſe but exhibit ſome particular Object, which our Underſtanding being an Ectypon of the Divine Intellect neceſſarily, when it has throughly ſifted it, concludes it to anſwer ſuch a determinate Idea eternally and unalterably one and the ſame, as it ſtands in the Divine Intellect, which cannot change; and therefore that Idea muſt have the ſame properties and reſpects for ever. But of this, enough here. It will be better underſtood by reading the Diſcourſe of Truth, and the Annotations thereon.

Pag. 18. But from ſomething more ſublime and excellent. From the Divine or Archetypal Intellect, of which our Underſtanding is the Ectypon, as was ſaid before.

[Page] Pag. 21. And ſo can onely tranſmit their natural qualities. They are ſo far from tranſmitting their Moral Pravities, that they tranſmit from themſelves no qualities at all. For to create a Soul, is to concreate the qualities or properties of it, not out of the Creator, but out of nothing. So that the ſubſtance and all the properties of it are out of nothing.

Pag. 22. Againſt the nature of an immaterial Being, a chief property of which is to be indiſcerpible. The evaſion to the force of this Argument by ſome Anti-Pre-exiſtentiaries is, that it is to philoſophize at too high a rate of confidence, to preſume to know what the nature of a Soul or Spirit is. But for brevities ſake, I will refer ſuch Anſwerers as theſe to Dr. H. Moore's brief Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit, printed lately with Saduciſmus Triumphatus; and I think he may be thence as ſure that Indiſcerpibility is an eſſential property of a Spirit, as that there are any Spirits in the Univerſe: and this methinks ſhould ſuffice any ingenuous and modeſt Oppoſer. But to think there is no knowledge but what comes in at our Senſes, is a poor, beggarly, and precarious Principle, and more becoming the dotage of Hobbianiſm, than men of clearer Parts and more ſerene Judgments.

Pag. 22. By ſeparable Emiſſions that paſs from the flame, &c. And ſo ſet the Wick and Tallow on motion. But theſe ſeparable Emiſſions [Page] that paſs from the flame of the lighted Candle, paſs quite away, and ſo are no part of the flame enkindled. So weak an Illuſtration is this of what theſe Traducters would have.

Chap. 4. pag. 32. Which the Divine Piety and Compaſſion hath ſet up again, that ſo, ſo many of his excellent Creatures might not be loſt and undone irrecoverably, but might act anew, &c. To this a more elegant Pen and refined Wit objects thus: Now is it not highly derogatory to the infinite and unbounded Wiſdom of God, that he ſhould detrude thoſe Souls which he ſo ſeriouſly deſignes to make happy, into a ſtate ſo hazardous, wherein he ſeeth it to be ten thouſand to one but that they will corrupt and defile themſelves, and ſo make them more miſerable here and to eternity hereafter? A ſtrange method of recovering this, to put them into ſuch a fatal neceſſity of periſhing: 'tis but an odd contrivance for their reſtauration to Happineſs, to uſe ſuch means to compaſs it which 'tis ten thouſand to one but will make them infinitely more miſerable. This he objects in reference to what the Author of Lux Orientalis writes, chap. 2. where he ſays, It is a thouſand to one but Souls detruded into theſe bodies will corrupt and defile themſelves, and ſo make themſelves miſerable here and to eternity hereafter.

And much he quotes to the ſame purpoſe [Page] out of the Account of Origen. Where the Souls great diſadvantages to Vertue and Holineſs, what from the ſtrong inclinations of the Body, and what from National Cuſtoms & Education in this Terreſtrial State, are lively ſet out with a moſt moving and tragical Eloquence, to ſhew how unlikely it is that God ſhould put innocent and immaculate Souls of his own creation immediately, into ſuch Bodies, and ſo hard and even almoſt fatal condition of miſcarrying. Upon which this ſubtile Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary: Thus you ſee, ſaith he, what ſtrong Objections and Arguments the Pre-exiſtentiaries urge with moſt noiſe and clamour, are againſt themſelves. If therefore theſe Phaenomena be inexplicable, without the Origenian Hypotheſis, they are ſo too with it; and if ſo, then the reſult of all is, that they are not ſo much Arguments of Pre-exiſtence as Aſperſions of Providence. This is ſmartly and ſurprizingly ſpoken. But let us conſider more punctually the ſtate of the matter.

Here then we are firſt to obſerve, how cunningly this ſhrewd Antagoniſt conceals a main ſtroke of the Suppoſition, viz. That the Divine Pity and Compaſſion to lapſed Souls, that had otherwiſe fallen into an eternal ſtate of Silence and Death, had ſet up Adam for their relief, and endued him with ſuch a Paradiſiacal body of ſo excellent a conſtitution to be tranſmitted to all his Poſterity, and inveſted him, [Page] in vertue of this, with ſo full power non peccandi, that if he and his Poſterity were not in an happy flouriſhing condition as to their eternal intereſt of Holineſs and Vertue, it would be long of himſelf. And what could God do more correſpondently to his Wiſdom and Goodneſs, dealing with free Agents, ſuch as humane Souls are, than this? And the thing being thus ſtated, no Objections can be brought againſt the Hypotheſis, but ſuch as will invade the inviolable Truths of Faith and Orthodox Divinity.

Secondly, We are to obſerve, how this cunning Objector has got theſe two Pre-exiſtentiaries upon the hip for their youthful flowers of Rhetorick, when one ſays, it is hundreds to one; the other, ten thouſand to one, that Souls will miſcarry put into theſe diſadvantages of the Terreſtrial ſtate, by which no candid Reader will underſtand any more, than that it is exceeding difficult for them to eſcape the pollutions of this lower World once incorporated into Terreſtrial Bodies. But it being granted poſſible for them to emerge, this is a great grace and favour of the Divine Goodneſs to ſuch peccant wretches, that they are brought out of the ſtate of eternal Silence and Death, to try their Fortunes once more, though incumbred with ſo great difficulties which the Divine Nemeſis ſuffers to return upon them. That therefore they are at all in a condition [Page] of recovery, is from the Goodneſs and Mercy of God; that their condition is ſo hard, from his Juſtice, they having been ſo foully peccant. And his wiſdom being only to contrive what is moſt agreeable to his Mercy and Juſtice, it is not at all derogatory to the infinite and unbounded Wiſdom of God thus to deal with lapſed Souls. For though he does ſeriouſly intend to make them happy, yet it muſt be in a way correſpondent to his Juſtice as well as Mercy.

Thirdly and Laſtly, Beſides that the Spirit of the Lord pervades the whole Earth ready to aſſiſt the ſincere; there is moreover a mighty weight of mercy added in the Revelation of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt to the world, ſo that the retriving of the Souls of men out of their Death and Silence into this Terreſtrial ſtate, in which there is theſe helps to the ſincere, it is manifeſtly worthy the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs. For thoſe it takes no effect with, (they beginning the world again on this ſtage) they ſhall be judged onely according to what they have done here, there being an eternal obliteration as well as oblivion of the acts of their Pre-exiſtent ſtate; but thoſe that this merciful Diſpenſation of God has taken any effect upon here, their ſincere deſires may grow into higher accompliſhments in the future ſtate. Which may ſomething mitigate the horrour of that ſeeming univerſal [Page] ſqualid eſtate of the Sons of men upon earth. Which in that it is ſo ill, is rightly imputed by both Jews and Chriſtians and the divineſt Philoſophers to a Lapſe, and to the Mercy and Grace of God that it is no worſe. From whence it may appear, that that argument for Pre-exiſtence, that God does not put newly created innocent Souls into ſuch diſadvantageous circumſtances of a terreſtrial Incorporation, though partly out of Mercy, partly out of Juſtice, he has thought fit lapſed Souls ſhould be ſo diſpoſed of, that this I ſay is no aſperſion of Divine Providence.

Pag. 36. And now I cannot think of any place in the ſacred Volume more, that could make a tolerable plea against this Hypotheſis, &c. It is much that the ingenious Author thought not of Rom. 9. 11. [For the Children being not yet born, neither having done either good or evil, that the purpoſe of God according to Election might ſtand, not of works, but of him that calleth.] This is urged by Anti-pre-exiſtentiaries, as a notable place againſt Pre-exiſtence. For, ſay they, how could Eſau and Jacob. be ſaid neither to have done good nor evil, if they pre-exiſted before they came into this world? For if they pre-exiſted, they acted; and if they acted, they being rational Souls, they muſt have done either good or evil. This makes an handſome ſhew at firſt ſight; but if we conſult Gen. 25. we ſhall plainly [Page] ſee that this is ſpoke of Jacob and Eſau yet ſtrugling in the Womb; as it is ſaid in this Text, For the Children being not yet born; but ſtrugling in the Womb, as you may ſee in the other. Which plainly therefore reſpects their actions in this life, upon which certainly the mind of St. Paul was fix'd. As if he ſhould have expreſly ſaid: For the Children being not yet born, but ſtrugling in the Womb, neither having done either good or evil in this life as being ſtill in the Womb, it was ſaid of them to Rebeckah, The elder ſhall ſerve the younger. Which ſufficiently illuſtrates the matter in hand with St. Paul; that as Jacob was preferred before Eſau in the Womb, before either of them was born to act here on the Earth, and that therefore done without any reſpect to their actions; ſo the purpoſe of God touching his people ſhould be of free Election, not of Works.

That of Zachary alſo, Chap. 12. 1. I have heard alledged by ſome as a place on which no ſmall ſtreſs may be laid. The Lord is there ſaid to be the Former of the Spirit of Man within him. Wherefore they argue, If the Spirit of Man be formed within him, it did never pre-exiſt without him. But we anſwer, That [...] is but the ſame that [...]. And then the ſence is eaſie and natural, that the Spirit that is in man, God is the Former or Creator of it. But this Text [Page] defines nothing of the time of forming it. There are ſeveral other Texts alledged, but it is ſo eaſie to anſwer them, and would take up ſo much time and room, that I think fit to omit them, remembring my ſcope to be ſhort Annotations, not a tedious Commentary.

Pag. 41. Mr. Ben Iſrael in his Problems De Creatione aſſures us, that Pre-exiſtence was the common belief, &c. That this was the common opinion of the wiſer men amongſt the Jews, R. Menaſſe Ben Iſrael himſelf told me at London with great freedom and aſſurance, and that there was a conſtant tradition thereof; which he ſaid in ſome ſence was alſo true concerning the Trinity, but that more obſcure. But this of Pre-exiſtence is manifeſt up and down in the Writings of that very ancient and learned Jew Philo Judaeus; as alſo ſomething toward a Trinity, if I remember aright.

Chap. 5. Pag. 46. We ſhould doubtleſs have retained ſome remembrance of that condition. And the rather, as one ingeniouſly argues, becauſe our ſtate in this life is a ſtate of puniſhment. Upon which he concludes, That if the calamities of this life were inflicted upon us only as a puniſhment of ſins committed in another, Providence would have provided ſome effectual means to preſerve them in our memories. And therefore, becauſe we find no remainders of any ſuch Records in our minds, 'tis, ſays he, ſufficient [Page]evidence to all ſober and impartial inquirers, that our living and ſinning in a former ſtate is as falſe as inevident.

But to this it may be anſwered, That the ſtate we are put in, is not a ſtate only of puniſhment, but of a merciful trial; and it is ſufficient that we find our ſelves in a lapſed and ſinful condition, our own Conſciences telling us when we do amiſs, and calling upon us to amend. So that it is needleſs particularly to remember our faults in the other world, but the time is better ſpent in faithfully endeavouring to amend our ſelves in this, and to keep our ſelves from all faults of what nature ſoever. Which is a needleſs thing our memory ſhould diſcover to us to have been of old committed by us, when our Conſciences urge to us that they are never to be committed; and the Laws of holy Law-givers and divine Inſtructers, or wiſe Sages over all the world, aſſiſt alſo our Conſcience in her office. So that the end of Gods Juſtice by theſe inward and outward Monitors, and by the croſs and afflicting Rancounters in this preſent ſtate, is to be attained to, viz. the amendment of Delinquents if they be not refractory.

And we were placed on this ſtage as it were to begin the world again, ſo as if we had not exiſted before. Whence it ſeems meet, that there ſhould be an utter obliteration of all that is paſt, ſo as not to be able by memory [Page] to connect the former life and this together. The memory whereof, if we were capable of it, would be inconſiſtent with the orderly proceedings of this, and overdoze us and make us half moped to the preſent Scene of things. Whenas the Divine Purpoſe ſeems to be, that we ſhould alſo experience the natural pleaſures and ſatisfactions of this life, but in an orderly and obedient way, keeping to the preſcribed rules of Virtue and Holineſs. And thus our faithfulneſs being exerciſed [...] in thoſe things which are more eſtranged from our nobler and diviner nature, God may at laſt reſtore us to what is more properly our own.

But in the mean time, that ſaying which the Poet puts in the mouth of Jupiter, touching the inferiour Deities, may not misbeſeem the mercy and wiſdom of the true God concerning lapſed Souls incorporate into terreſtrial Bodies.

Has quoniam coeli nondum dignamur honore.

Quas dedimus certè terras habitare ſinamus.

Let them not be diſtracted betwixt a ſenſible remembrance of the Joys and Glories of our exteriour Heaven above, and the preſent fruition of things below, but let them live an holy and heavenly life upon Earth, exerciſing their Graces and Vertues in the uſe and enjoyment of theſe lower earthly Objects, till I call [Page] them up again to Heaven, where, after this long ſwoond they are fallen into, they will more ſeaſonably remember their former Paradiſiacal ſtate upon its recovery, and reagnize their ancient home. Wherefore if the remembring or forgetting of the former ſtate depend abſolutely upon the free contrivance of the Divine Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Juſtice, as this ingenious Oppoſer ſeems to ſuppoſe, I ſhould even upon that very point of fitneſs conceive that an utter oblivion of the former ſtate is interwoven into the fate and nature of lapſed Souls by a Divine Nemeſis, though we do not conceive explicitely the manner how. And yet the natural reaſons the Author of Lux Orientalis produces in the ſequel of his Diſcourſe, ſeem highly probable.

For firſt, As we had forgot ſome lively Dream we dreamt but laſt night, unleſs we had met with ſomething in the day of a peculiar vertue to remind us of it, ſo we meeting with nothing in this lower ſtage of things that lively reſembles thoſe things in our former ſtate, and has a peculiar fitneſs to rub up our Memory, we continue in an utter oblivion of them. As ſuppoſe a man was lively entertain'd in his ſleep with the pleaſure of dreaming of a fair Cryſtal River, whoſe Banks were adorned with Trees and Flags in the flower, and thoſe large Flies with blue and golden-colour'd Bodies, and broad thin Wings curiouſly [Page] wrought and tranſparent, hovering over them, with Birds alſo ſinging on the Trees, Sun and Clouds above, and ſweet breezes of Air, and Swans in the River with their wings ſometimes lifted up like ſails againſt the wind. Thus he paſſed the night, thinks of no ſuch thing in the morning, but riſing goes about his occaſions. But towards evening a Servant of a Friend of his preſents him with a couple of Swans from his Maſter. The ſight of which Swans ſtriking his Perceptive as ſenſibly as thoſe in his Dream, and being one of the moſt extraordinary and eximious Objects of his Night-viſion, preſently reminds him of the whole ſcene of things repreſented in his ſleep. But neither Sun, nor Clouds, nor Trees, nor any ſuch ordinary thing could in any likelihood have reminded him of his Dream. And beſides, it was the lively reſemblance betwixt the Swans he ſaw in his ſleep, and thoſe he ſaw waking, that did ſo effectually rub up his memory. The want therefore of ſuch occurrences in this life to remind us of the paſſages of the former, is a very reaſonable account why we remember nothing of the former ſtate.

But here the Oppoſers of Pre-exiſtence pretend that the joyous and glorious Objects in the other ſtate do ſo pierce and tranſport the Soul, and that ſhe was inured to them ſo long, that though there were nothing that reſembled [Page] them here, the impreſſion they make muſt be indelible, and that it is impoſſible ſhe ſhould forget them. And moreover, that there is a ſimilitude betwixt the things of the upper World and the lower, which therefore muſt be an help to memory.

But here, as touching the firſt, they do not conſider what a Weapon they have given into my hand againſt themſelves. For the long inuredneſs to thoſe Celeſtial Objects abates the piercingneſs of their tranſport; and before they leave thoſe Regions, according to the Platonick or Origenian Hypotheſis, they grow cooler to ſuch enjoyments: ſo that all the advantages of that piercing tranſport for memory, are loſt. And beſides, in vertue of that piercing Tranſport, no Soul can call into memory what ſhe enjoyed formerly, but by recalling herſelf into ſuch a Tranſport, which her Terreſtrial Vehicle makes her uncapable of.

For the memory of external Tranſactions is ſealed upon us by ſome paſſionate corporeal impreſs in conjunction with them (which makes them whip Boys ſometimes at the boundaries of their Pariſh, that they may better remember it when they are old men;) which Impreſs if it be loſt, the memory of the thing it ſelf is loſt. And we may be ſure it is loſt in Souls incorporate in Terreſtrial Vehicles, they having loſt their Aereal and [Page] Celeſtial, and being fatally incapacitated ſo much as to conceit how they were affected by the External Objects of the other World, and ſo to remember how they felt them. And therefore all the deſcriptions that men of a more Aethereal and Entheous temper adventure on in this life, are but the Roamings of their Minds in vertue of their Conſtitution towards the nature of the heavenly things in general, not a recovery of the memory of paſt Experience; this State not affording ſo lively a repreſentment of the Pathos that accompanied the actual ſenſe of thoſe things, as to make us think that we once really enjoyed them before. That is onely to be collected by Reaſon; the noble exerciſe of which faculty, in the diſcovering of this Arcanum of our Pre-exiſtence, had been loſt, if it could have been detected by a compendious Memory. But if ever we recover the memory of our former State, it will be when we are re-entred into it; we then being in a capacity of being really ſtruck with the ſame Pathos we were before, in vertue whereof the Soul may remember this was her priſtine condition.

And therefore to anſwer to the ſecond, Though there may be ſome faintneſs of reſemblance betwixt the things of the other State and this, yet other peculiarities alſo being required, and the former ſenſible Pathos to be recovered, which is impoſſible in this State, it [Page] is likewiſe impoſſible for us to remember the other in this.

The ſecond Argument of the Author for the proving the unlikelineſs of our remembring the other State is, the long intermiſſion and diſcontinuance from thinking of thoſe things. For 'tis plain that ſuch diſcontinuance or deſuetude bereaves us of the memory of ſuch things as we were acquainted with in this World. Inſomuch as if an ancient man ſhould read the Verſes or Themes he made when he was a School-boy, without his name ſubſcribed to them, though he pumpt and ſweat for them when he made them, could not tell they were his own. How then ſhould the Soul remember what ſhe did or obſerv'd many hundreds, nay thouſands of years ago?

But yet our Authors Antagoniſt has the face to make nothing of this Argument neither: Becauſe, forſooth, it is not ſo much the deſuetude of thinking of one thing, but the thinking of others, that makes us forget that one thing. What a ſhuffle is this! For if the Soul thought on that one thing as well as on other things, it would remember it as well as them. Therefore it is not the thinking of other things, but the not thinking of that, that makes it forgotten. Ʋſus promptus facit, as in general, ſo in particular. And therefore diſuſe in any particular ſlackens at firſt, and after aboliſhes the readineſs of the Mind to think [Page] thereof. Whence ſleepineſs and ſluggiſhneſs is the Mother of Forgetfulneſs, becauſe it diſuſes the Soul from thinking of things. And as for thoſe ſeven Chronical Sleepers that ſlept in a Cave from Decius his time to the reign of Theodoſius junior, I dare ſay it would have beſotted them without a Miracle, and they would have roſe out of their ſleep no more wiſe than a Wiſp; I am ſure not altogether ſo wiſe as this awkward Arguer for memory of Souls in their Pre-exiſtent ſtate after ſo hugely long a diſcontinuance from it. But for their immediately coming out of an Aethereal Vehicle into a Terreſtrial, and yet forgetting their former ſtate, what Example can be imagined of ſuch a thing, unleſs that of the Meſſias, who yet ſeems to remember his former glorious condition, and to pray that he may return to it again? Though, for my part I think it was rather Divine Inſpiration than Memory, that enabled him to know that matter, ſuppoſing his Soul did pre-exiſt.

Our Authors third and laſt Argument to prove that lapſed Souls in their Terreſtrial condition forget their former ſtate, is from obſervation how deteriorating changes in this earthly Body ſpoils or quite deſtroys the Memory, the Soul ſtill abiding therein; ſuch as Caſualties, Diſeaſes, and old Age, which changes the tenour of the Spirits, and makes them leſs uſeful for memory, as alſo 'tis likely the [Page] Brain it ſelf. Wherefore there being a more deteriorating change to the Soul in coming into an earthly Body, inſtead of an aereal or aethereal, the more certainly will her memory of things which ſhe experienced in that ſtate, be waſhed out or obliterated in this.

Here our Authors Antagoniſt anſwers, That though changes in body may often weaken, and ſometimes utterly ſpoil the memory of things paſt, yet it is not neceſſary that the Souls changing of her body ſhould therefore do ſo, becauſe it is not ſo injurious to her faculties. Which if it were, not onely our Memory, but Reaſon alſo ſhould have been caſheered and loſt by our migration out of thoſe Vehicles we formerly actuated, into theſe we now enliven; but that ſtill remaining ſound and entire, it is a ſigne that our Memory would do ſo too, if we had pre-exiſted in other bodies before, and had any thing to remember. And beſides, if the bare tranſlocation of our Souls out of one body into another, would deſtroy the memory of things the Soul has experienced, it would follow, that when People by death are ſummoned hence into the other ſtate, that they ſhall be quite bereaved of their Memory, and ſo carry neither applauſe nor remorſe of Conſcience into the other World; which is monſtrouſly abſurd and impious. This is the main of his Anſwer, and moſtwhat in his own words. But of what ſmall force it is, we ſhall now diſcover, and how little pertinent to the buſineſs.

[Page] For firſt, we are to take notice that the deteriorating change in the Body, or deteriorating ſtate by change of Bodies, is underſtood of a debilitative, diminutive, or privative, not depravative deterioration; the latter of which may be more injurious to the faculties of the Soul, though in the ſame Body, ſuch a deteriorating change cauſing Phrenſies and outragious Madneſs. But as for diminutive or privative deterioration by change, the Soul by changing her Aereal Vehicle for a Terreſtrial, is (comparing her latter ſtate with her former) much injured in her faculties or operations of them; all of them are more ſlow and ſtupid, and their aptitude to exert the ſame Phantaſms of things that occurred to them in the other State, quite taken away, by reaſon of the heavy and dull, though orderly conſtitution of the Terreſtrial Tenement; which weight and ſtupor utterly indiſpoſes the Soul to recall into her mind the ſcene of her former ſtate, this load perpetually ſwaying down her thoughts to the Objects of this.

Nor does it at all follow, becauſe Reaſon is not loſt, therefore Memory, if there were any ſuch thing as Pre-exiſtence, would ſtill abide. For the univerſal principles of Reaſon and Morality are eſſential to the Soul, and cannot be obliterated, no not by any death: but the knowledge of any particular external Objects is not at all eſſential to the Soul, nor conſequently [Page] the memory of them; and therefore the Soul in the ſtate of ſilence being ſtript of them, cannot recover them in her incorporation into a Terreſtrial Body. But her Reaſon, with the general principles thereof, being eſſential to her, ſhe can, as well as this State will permit, exerciſe them upon the Objects of this Scene of the Earth and viſible World, ſo far as it is diſcovered by her outward ſenſes, ſhe looking out at thoſe windows of this her earthly Priſon, to contemplate them. And ſhe has the faculty and exerciſe of Memory ſtill, in ſuch a ſenſe as ſhe has of ſenſitive Perception, whoſe Objects ſhe does remember, being yet to all former impreſſes in the other ſtate a mere Abraſa Tabula.

And laſtly, it is a mere miſtake of the Oppoſer, or worſe, that he makes the Pre-exiſtentiaries to impute the loſs of memory in Souls of their former ſtate, merely to their coming into other Bodies; when it is not bare change of Bodies, but their deſcent into worſer Bodies more dull and obſtupifying, to which they impute this loſs of memory in lapſed Souls. This is a real death to them, according to that ancient Aenigm of that abſtruſe Sage, [...] We live their death, namely of ſeparate Souls, but are dead to their life. But the changing of our Earthly Body for an Aereal or Aethereal, this is not Death, but Reviviſcency, in which all the energies [Page] of the Soul are (not depreſſed, but) exalted, and our Memory with the reſt quickened; as it was in Eſdras after he had drunk down that Cup offered to him by the Angel, full of Liquor like Fire, which filled his Heart with Underſtanding, and ſtrengthned his Memory, as the Text ſays.

Thus we ſee how all Objections againſt the three Reaſons of lapſed Souls loſing the memory of the things of the other ſtate, vaniſh into ſmoak. Wherefore they every one of them ſingle being ſo ſound, all three put together methinks ſhould not fail of convincing the moſt refractory of this Truth, That though the Soul did pre-exiſt and act in another ſtate, yet ſhe may utterly forget all the Scenes thereof in this.

Pag. 46. Now if the reaſons why we loſe the remembrance of our former life be greater, &c. And that they are ſo, does appear in our Anſwer to the Objections made againſt the ſaid Reaſons, if the Reader will conſider them.

Pag. 50. And thereby have removed all prejudices, &c. But there is yet one Reaſon againſt Pre-exiſtence which the ingenious Author never thought of, urged by the Anti-Pre-exiſtentiaries, namely, That it implies the reſt of the Planets peopled with Mankind, it being unreaſonable to think that all Souls deſcended in their lapſe to this onely Earth of Ours. And if there be lapſed Souls there, how ſhall they [Page] be recovered? ſhall Chriſt undergo another and another death for them? But I believe the ingenious Author would have looked upon this but as a mean and trifling Argument, there being no force in any part thereof. For why may not this Earth be the onely Hoſpital, Noſocomium or Coemeterium, ſpeaking Platonically, of ſinfully lapſed Souls? And then ſuppoſe others lapſed in other Planets, what need Chriſt die again for them, when one drop of his Bloud is ſufficient to ſave myriads of Worlds? Whence it may ſeem a pity there is not more Worlds than this Earth to be redeemed by it. Nor is it neceſſary they ſhould hiſtorically know it. And if it be, the Eclipſe of the Sun at his Paſſion by ſome inſpired Prophets might give them notice of it, and deſcribe to them as orderly an account of the Redemption, as Moſes does of the Creation, though he ſtood not by while the World was framed, but it was revealed to him by God. And laſtly, it is but a raſh and precarious Poſition, to ſay that the infinite Wiſdom of God has no more ways than one to ſave lapſed Souls. It is ſufficient that we are aſſured that this is the onely way for the ſaving of the Sons of Adam; and theſe are the fixt bounds of revealed Truth in the Holy Scripture which appertains to us Inhabitants on Earth. But as for the Oeconomy of his infinite Wiſdom in the other Planets, if we did but reflect upon [Page] our abſolute ignorance thereof, we would have the diſcretion not to touch upon that Topick, unleſs we intended to make our ſelves ridiculous, while we endeavour to make others ſo.

Chap. 6. pag. 51. Now as the infinite goodneſs of the Deity obligeth him always to do good, ſo by the ſame to do that which is beſt, &c. To elude the force of this chief Argument of the Pre-exiſtentiaries, an ingenious Oppoſer has deviſed a way which ſeems worth our conſidering, which is this; viz. By making the Idea of God to conſiſt mainly in Dominion and Soveraignty, the Scriptures repreſenting him under no other notion than as the Supream Lord and Soveraign of the Univerſe. Wherefore nothing is to be attributed to him that enterferes with the uncontroulableneſs of his Dominion. And therefore, ſays he, they that aſſert Goodneſs to be a neceſſary Agent that cannot but do that which is beſt, directly ſupplant and deſtroy all the Rights of his Power and Dominion. Nay, he adds afterwards, That this notion of Gods goodneſs is moſt apparently inconſiſtent, not onely with his Power and Dominion, but with all his other moral Perfections. And for a further explication of his mind in this matter, he adds afterwards, That the Divine Will is indued with the highest kind of liberty, as it imports a freedom not onely [Page]from foreign Violence, but alſo from inward Neceſſity: For ſpontaneity, or immunity from coaction, without indifferency, carries in it as great neceſſity as thoſe motions that proceed from Violence or Mechaniſm. From whence he concludes, That the Divine Will cannot otherwiſe be determined than by its own intrinſick energie. And laſtly, Foraſmuch as no Courtiſie can oblige, but what is received from one that had a power not to beſtow them, if God neceſſarily acted according to his Goodneſs, and not out of mere choice and liberty of Will, there were no thanks nor praiſe due to him; which therefore would take away the duties of Religion. This is the main of his Hypotheſis, whereby he would defeat the force of this Argument for the Pre-exiſtence of Souls, taken from the Goodneſs of God. Which this Hypotheſis certainly would do, if it were true; and therefore we will briefly examine it.

Firſt therefore I anſwer, That though the Scriptures do frequently repreſent God as the Lord and Soveraign of the Univerſe, yet it does not conceal his other Attributes of Goodneſs and Mercy, and the like. But that the former ſhould be ſo much inculcated, is in reference to the begetting in the People Awe and Obedience to him. But it is an invalid conſequence, to draw from hence that the Idea of God does mainly conſiſt in Dominion and Soveraignty; which abſtracted from his other [Page] Attributes of Wiſdom and Goodneſs, would be a very black and dark repreſentation of him, and ſuch as this ingenious Writer could not himſelf contemplate without averſation and horror. How then can the Idea of God chiefly conſiſt in this? It is the moſt terrifying indeed, but not the moſt noble and accompliſhing part in the Idea of the Deity.

This Soveraignty then is ſuch as is either bounded or not bounded by any other Attributes of God. If bounded by none, then he may do as well unwiſely as wiſely, unjuſtly as juſtly. If bounded by Wiſdom and Juſtice, why is it bounded by them, but that it is better ſo to be than otherwiſe? And Goodneſs being as eſſential to God as Wiſdom and Juſtice, why may not his Soveraignty be bounded by that as well as by the other, and ſo he be bound from himſelf of himſelf to do as well what is beſt as what is better. This conſiſts with his abſolute Soveraignty, as well as the other. And indeed what can be abſolute Soveraignty in an intelligent Being, if this be not? viz. fully and entirely to follow the will and inclinations of its own nature, without any check or controul of any one touching thoſe over whom he rules.

Whence, in the ſecond place, it appears that the aſſerting that Gods goodneſs is a neceſſary Agent (in ſuch a ſenſe as Gods Wiſdom and Juſtice are, which can do nothing but what is [Page] wiſe and juſt) the aſſerting, I ſay, that it cannot but do that which is the best, does neither directly nor indirectly ſupplant or deſtroy any Rights of his Power or Dominion, foraſmuch as he does fully and plenarily act according to his own inclinations and will touching thoſe that are under his Dominion. But that his Will is always inclined or determined to what is beſt, it is the Prerogative of the Divine Nature to have no other Wills nor Inclinations but ſuch.

And as for that in the third place, That this notion of Gods Goodneſs is inconſiſtent with all his other moral Perfections, I ſay, that it is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with them, that they cannot ſubſiſt without it, as they reſpect the dealings of God with his Creatures. For what a kind of Wiſdom or Juſtice would that be that tended to no good? But I ſuſpect his meaning is by moral Perfections, Perfections that imply ſuch a power of doing or not doing, as is in humane actions; which if it be not allowed in God, his Perfections are not moral. And what great matter is it if they be not, provided they be as they are and ought to be, Divine? But to fancy moral actions in God, is to admit a ſecond kind of Anthropomorphitiſm, and to have unworthy conceits of the Divine Nature. When it was juſt and wiſe for God to do ſo or ſo, and the contrary to do otherwiſe, had he a freedom to decline [Page] the doing ſo? Then he had a freedom to do unjuſtly and unwiſely.

And yet in the fourth place he contends for the higheſt kind of liberty in the Divine Will, ſuch as imports a freedom not onely from forreign Violence, but alſo from inward Neceſſity, as if the Divine Will could be no otherwiſe determined, than by its own intrinſick Energie, as if it willed ſo becauſe it willed ſo; which is a ſad principle. And yet I believe this learned Writer will not ſtick to ſay, that God cannot tye, cannot condemn myriads of innocent Souls to eternal Torments. And what difference betwixt Impoſſibility and Neceſſity? For Impoſſibility it ſelf is onely a Neceſſity of not doing; which is here internal, ariſing from the excellency and abſolute perfection of the Divine Nature. Which is nothing like Mechaniſm for all that; Foraſmuch as it is from a clear underſtanding of what is beſt, and an unbyaſſed Will, which will moſt certainly follow it, nor is determined by its own intrinſick Energy. That it is otherwiſe with us, is our imperfection.

And laſtly, That Beneficence does not oblige the Receiver of it to either Praiſe or Thankſgiving when it is received from one that is ſo eſſentially good, and conſtantly acts according to that principle, when due occaſion is offered, as if it were as abſurd as to give thanks to the Sun for ſhining when he can do [Page] no otherwiſe; I ſay, the caſe is not alike, becauſe the Sun is an inanimate Being, and has neither Underſtanding nor Will to approve his own action in the exerting of it. And he being but a Creature, if his ſhining depended upon his Will, it is a greater perfection than we can be aſſured would belong to him, that he would unfailingly adminiſter Light to the World with ſuch a ſteadineſs of Will, as God ſuſtains the Creation.

Undoubtedly all Thanks and Praiſe is due to God from us, although he be ſo neceſſarily good, that he could not but create us and provide for us; foraſmuch as he has done this for our ſakes merely (he wanting nothing) not for his own. Suppoſe a rich Chriſtian ſo inured to the works of Charity, that the Poor were as certain of getting an Alms from him, as a Traveller is to quench his thirſt at a publick Spring near the Highway; would thoſe that received Alms from him think themſelves not obliged to Thanks? It may be you will ſay, they will thank him, that they may not forfeit his Favour another time. Which Anſwer diſcovers the ſpring of this Miſconceit, which ſeems founded in ſelf-love, as if all Duty were to be reſolved into that, and as if there were nothing owing to another, but what implied our own profit. But though the Divine Goodneſs acts neceſſarily yet it does not blindly, but according to the Laws of Decorum [Page] and Juſtice; which thoſe that are unthankful to the Deity, may find the ſmart of. But I cannot believe the ingenious Writer much in earneſt in theſe points, he ſo expreſly declaring what methinks is not well conſiſtent with them. For his very words are theſe: God can never act contrary to his neceſſary and eſſential properties, as becauſe he is eſſentially wiſe, just and holy, he can do nothing that is fooliſh, unjuſt, and wicked. Here therefore I demand, Are we not to thank him and praiſe him for his actions of Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Holineſs, though they be neceſſary?

And if Juſtice, Wiſdom, and Holineſs, be the eſſential properties of God, according to which he does neceſſarily act and abſtain from acting, why is not his Goodneſs? when it is expreſly ſaid by the Wiſdom of God incarnate, None is good ſave one, that is God. Which muſt needs be underſtood of his eſſential Goodneſs. Which therefore being an eſſential property as well as the reſt, he muſt neceſſarily act according to it. And when he acts in the Scheme of Anger and Severity, it is in the behalf of Goodneſs; and when he imparts his Goodneſs in leſſer meaſures as well as in greater, it is for the good of the Whole, or of the Ʋniverſe. If all were Eye, where were the Hearing, &c. as the Apoſtle argues? So that his Wiſdom moderates the prompt outflowings of his Goodneſs, that it may not outflow ſo, but that in [Page] the general it is for the beſt. And therefore it will follow, that if the Pre-exiſtence of Souls comply with the Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Holineſs of God, that none of theſe reſtrain his prompt and parturient Goodneſs, that it muſt have cauſed humane Souls to pre-exiſt or exiſt ſo ſoon as the Spirits of Angels did. And he muſt have a ſtrange quick-ſightedneſs that can diſcern any claſhing of that act of Goodneſs with any of the aboveſaid Attributes.

Chap. 7. pag. 56. God never acts by mere Will or groundleſs Humour, &c. We men have unaccountable inclinations in our irregular and depraved Compoſition, have blind luſts or deſires to do this or that, and it is our preſent eaſe and pleaſure to fulfil them; and therefore we fancy it a priviledge to be able to execute theſe blind inclinations of which we can give no rational account, but that we are pleaſed by fulfilling them. But it is againſt the Purity, Sanctity, and Perfection of the Divine Nature, to conceive any ſuch thing in Him; and therefore a weakneſs in our Judgments to fancy ſo of him, like that of the Anthropomorphites, that imagined God to be of Humane ſhape.

Pag. 59. That God made all things for himſelf. It is ignorance and ill nature that has made ſome men abuſe this Text to the proving that God acts out of either an humourous or ſelfiſh [Page] principle, as if he did things merely to pleaſe himſelf as ſelf, not as he is that ſoveraign unſelf-inrereſſed Goodneſs, and perfect Rectitude, which ought to be the meaſure of all things. But the Text implies no ſuch matter: For if you make [...] a Compound of a Prepoſition and Pronoun, that ſo it may ſignifie [for himſelf] which is no more than propter ſe, it then will import that he made all things to ſatisfie his own Will and Pleaſure, whoſe Will and Pleaſure reſults from the richneſs of his eternal Goodneſs and Benignity of Nature, which is infinite and ineffable, provided always that it be moderated by Wiſdom, Juſtice, and Decorum. For from hence his Goodneſs is ſo ſtinted or modified, that though he has made all things for his own Will and Pleaſure who is infinite Goodneſs and Benignity, yet there is a day of Evil for the Wicked, as it follows in the Text, becauſe they have not walked anſwerably to the Goodneſs that God has offered them; and therefore their puniſhment is in behalf of abuſed Goodneſs. And Bayns expreſly interprets this Text thus: Ʋniverſa propter ſeipſum fecit Dominus; that is, ſays he, Propter bonitatem ſuam; juxta illud Auguſtini, DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA, Quia bonus est Deus, ſumus & in quantum ſumus boni ſumus.

But [...] may be a Compound of a Participle and a Pronoun, and then it may ſignifie [Page] [for them that anſwer him] that is, walk anſerably to his Goodneſs which he affords them, or [for them that obey him] either way it is very good ſence. And then in oppoſition to theſe, it is declared, that the Wicked, that is, the Diſobedient or Deſpiſers of his Goodneſs, he has (not made them wicked, but they having made themſelves ſo) appointed them for the day of Evil. For ſome ſuch Verb is to be ſupplied as is agreeable to the matter, as in that paſſage in the Pſalms; The Sun ſhall not burn thee by day, neither the Moon by night. Where [burn] cannot be repeated, but ſome other more ſuitable Verb is to be ſupplied.

Chap. 8. pag. 63. Since all other things are inferiour to the good of Being. This I ſuppoſe is to be underſtood in ſuch a ſence as that ſaying in Job, Skin for skin, and all that a man has, will he give for his life. Otherwiſe the condition of Being may be ſuch, as it were better not to be at all, whatever any dry-fancied Metaphyſicians may diſpute to the contrary.

Pag. 67. Indeed they may be morally immutable and illapſable; but this is Grace, not Nature, &c. Not unleſs the Divine Wiſdom has eſſentially interwoven it into the natural conſtitution of our Souls, that as after ſuch a time of the exerciſe of their Plaiſtick on theſe Terreſtrial Bodies, they, according to the courſe of Nature, emerge into a plain uſe of their Reaſon, [Page] when for a time they little differed from Brutes; ſo after certain periods of time well improved to the perfecting their Nature in the ſenſe and adherence to Divine things, there may be awakened in them ſuch a Divine Plaiſtick faculty, as I may ſo ſpeak, as may eternally fix them to their Celeſtial or Angelical Vehicles, that they ſhall never relapſe again. Which Faculty may be alſo awakened by the free Grace of the Omnipotent more maturely: Which if it be, Grace and Nature conſpire together to make a Soul everlaſtingly happy. Which actual Immutability does no more change the ſpecies of a Soul, than the actual exerciſe of Reaſon does after the time of her ſtupour in Infancy and in the Womb.

Pag. 67. I doubt not but that it is much better for rational Creatures, &c. Namely, ſuch as we experience our humane Souls to be. But for ſuch kind of Intellectual Creatures as have nothing to do with matter, they beſt underſtand the priviledges of their own ſtate, and we can ſay nothing of them. But for us under the conduct of our faith [...]ul and victorious Captain, the Soul of the promiſed Meſſias, through many Conflicts and Tryals to emerge out of this lapſed ſtate, and regain again the poſſeſſion of true Holyneſs and Vertue, and therewith the Kingdom of Heaven with all its Beauty and Glories, will be ſuch a gratification to us, that we had never been capable [Page] of ſuch an exceſs thereof, had we not experienced the evils of this life, and the vain pleaſures of it, and had the remembrance of the endearing ſufferings of our bleſſed Saviour, of his Aids and Supports, and of our ſincere and conſcientious adhering to him, of our Conflicts and Victories to be enrolled in the eternal Records of the other World.

Pag. 69. Wherefore as the Goodneſs of God obligeth him not to make every Planet a fixt Star, or every Star a Sun, &c. In all likelihood, as Galilaeus had firſt obſerved, every fixed Star is a Sun. But the compariſon is framed according to the conceit of the Vulgar. A thing neither unuſual with, nor misbecoming Philoſophers.

Pag. 69. For this were to tye him to Contradictions, viz. to turn one ſpecifical form or eſſence into another. Matter indeed may receive ſeveral modifications, but is ſtill real Matter, nor can be turned into a Spirit; and ſo Spirits ſpecifically different, are untranſmutable one into another, according to the diſtinct Idea's in the eternal Intellect of God. For elſe it would imply that their eſſential properties were not eſſential properties, but looſe adventitious Accidents, and ſuch as the eſſence and ſubſtance of ſuch a Spirit, could ſubſiſt as well without as with them, or as well with any others as with theſe.

Pag. 69. That we ſhould have been made pe [...] cable[Page]and liable to defection. And this may the more eaſily be allowed, becauſe this defection is rather the affecting of a leſs good, than any purſuing of what is really and abſolutely evil. To cavil againſt Providence for creating a Creature of ſuch a double capacity, ſeems as unreaſonable as to blame her for maki [...]g Zoophiton's, or rather Amphibion's. And they are both to be permitted to live according to the nature which is given them. For to make a Creature fit for either capacity, and to tye him up to one, is for God to do repugnantly to the Workmanſhip of his own hands. And how little hurt there is done by experiencing the things of either Element to Souls that are reclaimable, has been hinted above. But thoſe that are wilfully obſtinate, and do deſpite to the Divine Goodneſs, it is not at all inconſiſtent with this Goodneſs, that they bear the ſmart of their obſtinacy, as the ingenious Author argues very well.

Chap. 9. pag. 73. Have aſſerted it to be impoſſible in the nature of the thing, &c. And this is the moſt ſolid and unexceptionable Anſwer to this Objection, That it is a Repugnancy in Nature, that this viſible World that conſiſts in the motion and ſucceſſion of things, ſhould be either ab aeterno, or infinite in extenſion. This is made out clearly and amply in Dr. H. Moore's Enchiridion Metaphyſicum, [Page] cap. 10. which is alſo more briefly toucht upon in his Advertiſements upon Mr. Joſ Glanvil's Letter written to him upon the occaſion of the Stirs at Tedworth, and is printed with the ſecond Edition of his Saduciſmus Triumphatus. We have now ſeen the moſt conſiderable Objections againſt this Argument from the Goodneſs of God for proving the Pre-exiſtence of Souls, produced and anſwered by our learned Author.

But becauſe I find ſome others in an Impugner of the Opinion of Pre-exiſtence urged with great confidence and clamour, I think it not amiſs to bring them into view alſo, after I have taken notice of his acknowledgment of the peculiar ſtrength of this Topick, which he does not onely profeſs to be in truth the ſtrongeſt that is made uſe of, but ſeems not at all to envy it its ſtrength, while he writes thus.

That God is infinitely good, is a Poſition as true as himſelf; nor can he that is furniſhed with the Reaſon of a man, offer to diſpute it. Goodneſs conſtitutes his very Deity, making him to be himſelf: for could he be arayed with all his other Attributes ſeparate and abſtract from this, they would be ſo far from denominating him a God, that he would be but a prodigious Fiend, and plenipotentiary Devil. This is ſomething a rude and uncourtly Aſſeveration, and unluckly divulſion of the Godhead into two parts, and calling one part a Devil. But it is not to be [Page] imputed to any impiety in the Author of No-Pre-exiſtence, but to the roughneſs and boariſhneſs of his ſtyle, the texture whereof is not onely Fuſtian, but over-often hard and ſtiff Buckram. He is not content to deny his aſſent to an Opinion, but he muſt give it diſgraceful Names. As in his Epiſtle to the Reader, this darling Opinion of the greateſt and divineſt Sages of the World viſiting of late the Studies of ſome of more than ordinary Wit and learning, he compares it to a Bug and ſturdy Mendicant, that pretends to be ſome Perſon of Quality; but he like a skilful Beadle of Beggars, lifting up the skirts of her Veil, as his Phraſe is, ſhews her to be a Counterfeit. How this buſie Beadle would have behaved himſelf, if he had had the opportunity of lifting up the skirts of Moſes's Veil when he had deſcended the Mount, I know not. I dare not undertake for him, but that according to the coarſneſs of his phancy he would have miſtaken that lucid Spirit ſhining through the skin of Moſes's face, for ſome fiery Fiend, as he has ſomewhere the Spirit of Nature for an Hobgobling. But there is no pleaſure in inſiſting upon the rudeneſſes of his ſtyle; he is beſt where he is moſt unlike himſelf, as he is here in the reſidue of his Deſcription of the Divine Goodneſs.

'Tis Goodneſs, ſays he, that is the Head and Glory of Gods perfect Eſſence; and therefore when [Page] Moſes importuned him for a Viſion of his Glory, he engaged to diſplay his Goodneſs to him. Could a man think that one that had engaged thus far for the infiniteneſs of Gods Goodneſs, for its Headſhip over the other Attributes, for its Glory above the reſt, nay for its Conſtitutiveneſs of the very Deity, as if this were the onely [...], or God himſelf, the reſt of Him divided from this, a prodigious Fiend, or plenipotentiary Devil, ſhould prove the Author of No-Pre-exiſtence a very contradiction to this Declaration? For to be able to hold No-Pre-exiſtence, he muſt deſert the [...] of God, and betake himſelf to the Devil-part of him, as he has rudely called it, to avoid this pregnant proof for Pre-exiſtence taken from the infinite Goodneſs of God. And indeed he has pickt out the very worſt of that black part of God to ſerve his turn, and that is Self-will in the worſt ſence. Otherwiſe Goodneſs making God to be himſelf, if it were his true and genuine Self-will, it were the Will of his infinite Goodneſs, and ſo would neceſſarily imply Pre-exiſtence.

But to avoid the dint of this Argument, he declares in the very ſame Section for the Supremacy of the Will over the Goodneſs of the Divine Nature. Which is manifeſtly to contradict what he ſaid before, That Goodneſs is the Head and Glory of Gods perfect Eſſence. For thus Will muſt have a Supremacy over the [Page] Head of the Deity. So that there will be an Head over an Head, to make the Godhead a Monſter. And what is moſt inſufferable of all, That he has choſen an Head out of the Devil-part of the Deity, to uſe his own rude expreſſion, to controul and lord it over what is the onely God himſelf, the reſt a Fiend ſeparate from this, according to his own acknowledgment. Theſe things are ſo infinitely abſurd, that one would think that he could have no heart to go about to prove them; and yet he adventures on it, and we ſhall briefly propoſe and anſwer what he produceth.

And this Supremacy of the Will, ſaith he, over the Goodneſs of the Divine Nature, may be made out both by Scripture and other forcible Evidences. The Scriptures are three; the firſt, Pſal. 135. 6. Whatſoever the Lord pleaſed, that did he in heaven, and in the earth, and in the ſeas, and in all deep places. Now if we remember but who this Lord is, viz. he whom Goodneſs makes to be himſelf, we may eaſily be aſſured what pleaſed him, namely, that which his Wiſdom diſcerned to be the beſt to be done; and therefore it is very right, that whatſoever he pleaſed he ſhould do throughout the whole Univerſe. The ſecond place is Mat. 20. 15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? Yes I trow, every one muſt acknowledge that God has an [...] (for [Page] the word is [...] in the Original) to diſpoſe of what is his own; and indeed all is his. No one has either a right or power to controul him. But this does not prove that he ever diſpoſes of any thing otherwiſe than according to his Wiſdom and Goodneſs. If his Goodneſs be ever limited, it is limited by his Wiſdom, but ſo then as diſcerning ſuch a limitation to be for the beſt. So that the meaſure of Wiſdoms determination is ſtill Goodneſs, the only Head in the Divine Nature, to which all the reſt is ſubordinate. For that there are different degrees of the Communication of the Divine Goodneſs in the Univerſe, is for the good of the Whole. It is ſufficient to hint theſe things; it would require a Volume to enlarge upon them. And then for the laſt place, Exod. 33. 19. I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious. This onely implies that he does pro ſuo jure, and without any motive from any one but himſelf, communicate more of his Goodneſs to ſome Men or Nations than others. But that his Wiſdom has not diſcovered this to be beſt for the whole conſtitution of things, I challenge any one to prove. But of this we ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more afterward. Theſe are the Scriptures.

The other forcible Evidences are theſe: The firſt, The late Production of the World. The ſecond, The patefaction of the Law but to one ſingle People, namely, the Jews. The third, [Page] The timing the Meſſias's Nativity, and bringing it to paſs, not in the Worlds Infancy or Adoleſcence, but [...], Heb. 1. 2. in its declining Age. The fourth, the perpetuity of Hell, and interminableneſs of thoſe Tortures which after this life ſhall inceſſantly vex the impious. The fifth and laſt, God's not perpetuating the Station of Pre-exiſtent Souls, and hindering them from lapſing into theſe Regions of Sin and Death. Theſe he pretends to be forcible Evidences of the Soveraignty of Gods Will over his Goodneſs, foraſmuch as if the contrary to all theſe had been, it had been much more agreeable to the Goodneſs of God.

As for the firſt of theſe forcible Arguments, we have diſarmed the ſtrength thereof already, by intimating that the World could not be ab oeterno. And if it could not be ab oeterno, but muſt commence on this ſide of Eternity, and be of finite years, I leave to the Oppoſer to prove that it has not been created as ſoon as it could be; and that is ſufficient to prove that its late Production is not inconſiſtent with that principle, that Gods Goodneſs always is the meaſure of his Actions. For ſuppoſe the World of as little continuance as you will, if it was not ab oeterno, it was once of as little; and how can we diſcern but that this is that very time which ſeems ſo little to us?

[Page] As for the ſecond, which ſeems to have ſuch force in it, that he appeals to any competent Judge, if it had not been infinitely better that God ſhould have apertly diſpenſed his Ordinances to all Mankind, than have committed them onely to Iſrael in ſo private and clancular a manner; I ſay▪ it is impoſſible for any one to be aſſured that it is at all better. For firſt, If this Priviledge which was peculiar, had been a Favour common to all, it had loſt its enforcement that it had upon that leſſer number. Secondly, It had had alſo the leſs ſurprizing power with it upon others that were not Jews, who might after converſe with that Nation, and ſet a more high price upon the Truths they had travelled for, and were communicated to them from that People. Thirdly, The nature of the thing was not fitted for the univerſality of Mankind, who could not be congregated together to ſee the Wonders wrought by Moſes, and receive the Law with thoſe awful circumſtances from Mount Sinai or any Mount elſe. Fourthly, All things happened to them in Types, and them [...]elves were a Type of the true Iſrael of God to be redeemed out of their Captivity under Sin and Satan, which was worſe than any Aegyptian Servitude: Wherefore it muſt be ſome peculiar People which muſt be made ſuch a Type, not the whole World. Fifthly, Conſidering the great load of the Ceremonial Law [Page] which came along with other more proper Priviledges of the Jews, ſetting one againſt another, and conſidering the freedom of other Nations from it, unleſs they brought any thing like it upon themſelves, the difference of their Conditions will rather ſeem ſeveral Modifications of the communicated Goodneſs of God to his Creatures, than the neglecting of any: Foraſmuch as, ſixthly and laſtly, though all Nations be in a lapſed condition, yet there are the Reliques of the Eternal Law of Life in them. And that things are no better with any of them than they are, that is a thouſand times more rationally reſolved into their demerits in their pre-exiſtent ſtate than into the bare Will of God, that he will have things for many Ages thus ſqualid and forlorn, merely becauſe he will. Which is a Womans Reaſon, and which to conceive to belong to God, the Author of No-Pre-exiſtence has no reaſon, unleſs he will alleadge that he was ſtyled [...] of the Ancients for this very cauſe.

Wherefore the Divine Nemeſis lying upon the lapſed Souls of men in this Terreſtrial State, whoſe ſeveral Delinquencies in the other World and the degrees thereof God alone knows, and according to his Wiſdom and Juſtice diſpoſes of them in this: It is impoſſible for any one that is not half crazed in his Intellectuals, to pretend that any Acts of Providence that have been ſ [...]nce this Stage of the [Page] Earth was erected, might have been infinitely better otherwiſe than they have been, or indeed better at all.

Power, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, ſure did frame

This Ʋniverſe, and ſtill guide the ſame;

But thoughts from Paſſion ſprung, deceive

Vain Mortals: No man can contrive

A better courſe than what's been run

Since the firſt circuit of the Sun.

This Poetical Rapture has more ſolid truth in it than the dry Dreams and diſtorted Fancies, or Chimerical Metamorphoſes of earthly either Philoſophers or Theologs, that preſcinding the reſt of the Godhead from his Goodneſs, make that remaining part a foul Fiend or Devil; and yet almoſt with the ſame breath pronounce the Will of this Devil of their own making, which is the moſt poyſonous part of him, to have a Supremacy other the [...], over the Divine Goodneſs; which makes God to be Himſelf, that is, to be God, and not a plenipotentiary Devil. Wherefore we ſee from theſe few ſmall hints, (for it were an infinite Argument fully to proſecute) how feeble or nothing forcible this ſecond Evidence is.

Now for the third Evidence, The timing of the Meſſiah's Nativity, That it was not in the Infancy of the World, but rather in its declining Age, or in the latter times. In which [Page] times the Ancient of Days, according to his counſel and purpoſe, (which the Eternal Wiſdom that was to be incarnate aſſented and ſubſcribed to) ſent his Son into the World, the promiſed Meſſiah. This did the Ancient of Days and the Eternal Wiſdom agree upon. But oh the immenſe Priviledge of Youth and Confidence! The Author of No-Pre-exiſtence ſays, it had been better by far, if they had agreed upon the Infancy of the World. As if this young Divine were wiſer than the Ancient of Days, or the Eternal Wiſdom itſelf. I, but he will modeſtly reply, That he acknowledges that the Ancient of Days and the Eternal Wiſdom are wiſer than he, but that they would not make uſe of their Wiſdom. They ſaw as clearly as could be, that it was far better that the Meſſiah ſhould come in the Infancy of the World; but the Father would not ſend him then, merely becauſe he would not ſend him: That his Will might act freely as mere Will preſcinded from Wiſdom and Goodneſs. This is the plain ſtate of the buſineſs, and yet admitted by him, who with that open freeneſs and fulneſs profeſſes, that preſcind the Divine Goodneſs from the Godhead, what remains is a prodigious Fiend or Devil. What is then: mere Will and Power left alone, but a blind Hurricane of Hell? which yet muſt have the Supremacy, and over-power the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs itſelf. His Zeal againſt Pre-exiſtence [Page] has thus infatuated and blinded this young Writers Intellectuals, otherwiſe he had not been driven to theſe Abſurdities, if he had been pleaſed to admit that Hypotheſis.

As alſo that Wiſdom and Juſtice, and Fitneſs and Decorum attend the Diſpenſation of Divine Goodneſs; ſo that it is not to be communicated to every Subject after the moſt ample manner, nor at every time, but at ſuch times, and to ſuch Subjects, and in ſuch meaſures as, reſpecting the whole compages of things, is for the beſt. So that Goodneſs bears the Soveraignty, and according to that Rule, perpetually all things are adminiſtred, though there be a different Scene of things and particulars in themſelves vaſtly varying in Goodneſs and Perfection one from another as the parts of the Body do. And ſo for Times and Ages, every ſeaſon of the year yield diſſerent Commodities: nor are we to expect Roſes in Winter, nor Apples and Apricocks in Spring. Now the infinite and incomprehenſible Wiſdom of God comprehending the whole entire Scene of his Providence, and what references there are of one thing to another, that this muſt be thus and thus, becauſe ſuch and ſuch things preceded; and becauſe ſuch things are, ſuch and ſuch muſt be conſequent; which things paſt and to come lie not under our eye: I ſay, if this haſty Writer had conſidered this, he need not have been driven to ſuch a rude ſolution of [Page] this preſent Problem, why the Meſſiah came no ſooner into the World, viz. Merely becauſe God willed it ſhould be ſo, though it had been far better if it had been otherwiſe; but he would have roundly confeſſed, that undoubtedly this was the beſt time and the fitteſt, though it was paſt his reach to diſcover the reaſons of the fitneſs thereof.

This as it had been the more modeſt, ſo it had been the more ſolid ſolution of this hard Problem. I but then it had not put a bar to this irrefragable Argument from the Goodneſs of God, for proving Pre-exiſtence: Which he is perſwaded in his own Conſcience is no leſs than a demonſtration, unleſs it be acknowledged that the Will of God has a Supremacy over his Goodneſs; and therefore in ſpight to that abhorred Dogma of Pre-exiſtence, he had rather broach ſuch wild ſtuff againſt the glory of God, than not to purchaſe to himſelf the ſweet conceit of a glorious victory over ſuch an Opinion that he has taken a groundleſs toy againſt, and had rather adventure upon groſs Blaſphemies than entertain it.

The devout Pſalmiſt, Pſal. 36. ſpeaking of the Decrees of God and his Providence over the Creation, Thy righteouſneſs, ſays he, is as the great mountains, thy judgments are a great deep. And St. Paul, Rom. 11. after he has treated of intricate and amazing points, cries out, [...], Oh the depth of the riches both of the wiſdom [Page]and knowledge of God! How unſearchable are his judgments, and his ways paſt finding out! Now according to the rudeneſs of our young Writer, there is no ſuch depth of Wiſdom, or unſearchableneſs in the Judgments and Decrees of God and his Providences in the World that moſt amaze us, but the reaſons of them lie very obvious and ſhallow. Where we fancy that things might have been better otherwiſe, (though of never ſo grand import, as the coming of the Meſſiah is) it is eaſily reſolved into the Supremacy of the Will of God, which it has over his Wiſdom and Goodneſs. He willed it ſhould be ſo, becauſe he would it ſhould be ſo, though it had been ſar better if the Meſſiah had come ſooner. But ſee the difference betwixt an inſpired Apoſtle, and a young hotheaded Theologiſt: This latter reſolves theſe unſearchable and unintelligible Decrees of God and paſſages of Providence, into the mere Will of God, lording it over the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs: But the Apoſtle, by how much more unſearchable his Judgments and Decrees are, and the ways of his Providence paſt finding out, the greater he declares the depth of the richneſs of his Wiſdom, which is ſo ample, that it reaches into ways and methods of doing for the beſt beyond the Underſtandings of men. For moſt aſſuredly, while the depth of the Wiſdom of God is acknowledged to carry on the ways of Providence, it muſt be alſo acknowledged [Page] that it acts like itſelf, and chuſeth ſuch ways as are beſt, and moſt comporting with the Divine Goodneſs; or elſe it is not an act of Wiſdom, but of Humour or Overſight.

But it may be the Reader may have the curioſity to hear briefly what thoſe great Arguments are, that ſhould induce this young Writer ſo confidently to pronounce, that it had been far better that the Meſſiah ſhould have come in the Infancy of the World, than in the times he came. The very quinteſſence of the force of his arguing extracted out of the verboſity of his affected ſtyle, is neither more nor leſs than this: That the World be [...]ore the coming of Chriſt, who was to be the Light of the World, was in very great Darkneſs; and therefore the ſooner he came, the better. But to break the aſſurance of this Arguer for the more early coming o [...] Chriſt,

Firſt, we may take notice out of himſelf, chap. 3. That the Light of Nature is near akin not onely to the Moſaick Law, but to the Goſpel itſelf; and that even then there were the aſſiſtances of the Holy Ghoſt to carry men on to ſuch vertuous Accompliſhments as might avail them to eternal Salvation. This he acknowledges probable, and I have ſet it down in his own words. Whence conſidering what a various Scene of things there was to be [...]rom the Fall of Adam to the end of the World, it became the great and wiſe Dramatiſt not to bring upon the Stage [Page] the beſt things in the firſt Act, but to carry on things pompouſly and by degrees; ſomething like that Saying of Elias, Two thouſand years under the Light of Nature, two thouſand under the Law, and then comes the Nativity of the Meſſiah, and after a due ſpace the happy Millennium, and then the Final Judgment, the compleated Happineſs of the Righteous in Heaven, and the Puniſhment of the Wicked in Hell-fire. But to haſten too ſuddenly to the beſt, is to expect Autumn in Spring, and Virility or Old Age in Infancy or Childhood, or the Cataſtrophe of a Comedy in the firſt Act.

Secondly, we may obſerve what a weak Diſprover he is of Pre-exiſtence, which like a Gyant would break in upon him, were it not that he kept him out by this falſe Sconce of the Supremacy of the Divine Will over his Wiſdom and Goodneſs; which Conceit, how odious and impious it is, has been often enough hinted already. But letting Pre-exiſtence take place, and admitting that there is, according to Divine Providence, an orderly inſemination of lapſed Souls into humane Bodies, through the ſeveral Ages of the World, whoſe lapſes had ſeveral circumſtantial differences, and that men therefore become differently fitted Objects of Grace and Favour; how eaſie is it to conceive God according to the fitneſſes of the generality of Souls in ſuch or ſuch periods of [Page] times, as it was more juſt, agreeable, or needful for them, ſo and in ſuch meaſures to have diſpenſed the Gifts of his ever-watchful and all-comprehending Providence to them, for both time and place. This one would think were more tolerable than to ſay, That God wills merely becauſe he wills; which is the Character of a frail Woman, rather than of a God, or elſe, as this Writer himſelf acknowledges, of a Fiend or Devil. For ſuch, ſays he, is God in the reſt of his Attributes, if you ſeclude his Goodneſs. What then is that action which proceeds onely from that part from which Goodneſs is ſecluded? So that himſelf has dug down the Sconce he would entrench himſelf in, and lets Pre-exiſtence come in upon him, whether he will or no, like an armed Giant; whom let him abhor as much as he will, he is utterly unable to reſiſt.

And thirdly and laſtly, Suppoſe there were no particular probable account to be given by us, by reaſon of the ſhortneſs of our Underſtandings, and the vaſt fetches of the all-comprehenſive Providence of God, why the coming of the Meſſiah was no earlier than it was; yet according to that excellent Aphoriſm in Morality and Politicks, Optimè praeſumendum est de Magiſtratu, we ſhould hope, nay be aſſured it was the beſt that he came when he did, it being by the appointment of the infinite good and all-wiſe God, and cry out with St. [Page] Paul, Oh the depth of the riches of both the wiſdom and knowledge of God! How unſearchable are his judgments, and his ways paſt finding out! And in the Pſalmiſt, Thy judgments are like a great deep, O Lord, thou preſerveſt man and, beaſt. And ſo acknowledge his Wiſdom and Goodneſs in the ordering his Creatures, even there where his ways are to our weak and ſcant Underſtandings moſt inexplicable and unſearchable. Which Wiſdom and Goodneſs as we have all reaſon to acknowledge in all matters, ſo moſt of all in matters of the greateſt concernment, that there moſt aſſuredly God wills not thus or thus merely becauſe he wills, but becauſe his Wiſdom diſcerns that it is for the beſt. And this is ſufficient to ſhew the weakneſs of this third Evidence for proving the Supremacy of the Divine Will over his Wiſdom and Goodneſs.

His fourth Evidence is, The Perpetuity of Hell, and interminableneſs of thoſe Tortures which after this life vex the Wicked. For, ſays he, had the penalties of mens ſins here been rated by pure Goodneſs, free and uncontrouled by any other principle, it is not probable that they ſhould have been puniſhed by an eternal Calamity, the pleaſures of them being ſo tranſient and fugitive. Thus he argues, and almoſt in the very ſame words; and therefore concludes, that the authority of Gods Will interpoſed, and pro ſuo jure, having the [Page] Supremacy over his Goodneſs, over-ſwayed the more benign Decree; and Will, becauſe it would have it ſo, doomed ſinners to theſe eternal Torments. But I would ask this Sophiſter, Did the Will of God in good earneſt ſentence ſinners thus in Decree, merely becauſe he willed it, not becauſe it was either good or juſt? What a black and diſmal Reproach is here caſt upon the Divine Majeſty! That he ſentences ſinners thus becauſe he will, not becauſe it is juſt. The ſence whereof is, So he will do, right or wrong. But the Patriarch Abraham was of another mind, Shall not the Judge of the whole Earth do right? This he ſaid even to Gods face, as I may ſo ſpeak. Wherefore God doing nothing but what is just, does nothing but what is alſo good. For Juſtice is nothing but Goodneſs modified.

Nor is it aſſerted by thoſe that make Goodneſs the meaſure of Gods Providence, that the modification and moderation thereof is not by his Wiſdom and Juſtice. So that this Sophiſter puts [pure] to Goodneſs, merely to obſcure the ſence, and put a Fallacy upon his Reader. The ſins of men here are not rated by pure Goodneſs, but by that modification of Goodneſs which is termed Juſtice; which is not a diſtinct principle from Goodneſs, but a branch thereof, or Goodneſs it ſelf under ſuch a modification, not mere Will acting becauſe it will, right or wrong, good or evil. Wherefore [Page] the ſtate of the Queſtion is not, whether the eternal Torments of Hell are conſiſtent with the pure Goodneſs of God, but with his Juſtice. But if they are eternal merely from his Will, without any reſpect to Juſtice, his Will does will what is infinitely beyond the bounds of what is juſt, becauſe endleſs is infinitely beyond that which has an end. Such groſs Abſurdities does this Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence run into, to fetch an Argument from the ſuppoſititious Supremacy of the Will of God over his Wiſdom and Goodneſs.

But as touching the Queſtion rightly propoſed, whether the Perpetuity of Hell to ſinners conſiſts with the Juſtice of God, a man ought to be chary and wary how he pronounces in this point, that he ſlip not into what may prove diſadvantageous to the Hearer. For there are that will be ſcandalized, and make it ſerve to an ill end, whether one declare for eternal Torments of Hell, or againſt them. Some being ready to conclude from their Eternity, that Religion itſelf is a mere Scarecrow that frights us with ſuch an incredible Mormo; others to indulge to their Pleaſures, becauſe the Commination is not frightful enough to deter them from extravagant Enjoyments, if Hell Torments be not eternal. But yet I cannot but deem it a piece of great levity in him that decided the Controverſie, as the compleſant Parſon did that about the May-pole; they [Page] of his Pariſh that were for a May-pole, let them have a May-pole; but they that were not for a May-pole, let them have no May-pole. But this in ſobriety one may ſay, that the uſe of [...] and [...] in Scripture is indifferent to ſignifie either that which is properly everlaſting, or that which laſts a long time. So that by any immediate infallible Oracle, we are not able to pronounce for the Eternity or Perpetuity of Hell-torments. And the Creeds uſe the phraſe of Scripture, and ſo ſome may think that they have the ſame latitude of interpretation. But it is the ſafeſt to adhere to the ſence of the Catholick Church, for thoſe that be bewilder'd in ſuch Speculations.

But what the Writer of No-Pre-exiſtence argues from his own private Spirit, though it be not inept, yet it is not over-firm and ſolid. But that the Penancies of Reprobates are endleſs, I ſhall ever thus perſwade my ſelf, ſaith he, either the Torments of Hell are eternal, or the Felicities of Heaven are but temporary (which I am ſure they ſhall never be:) for the very ſame word that is uſed to expreſs the permanence of the one, meaſures out the continuance of the other; and if [...] denotes everlaſting life, a bleſſedneſs that ſhall never end, (Mat. 25. ult.) what can [...] in the ſame verſe ſignifie, but perpetual puniſhment, a miſery that ſhall never ceaſe? This is pretty handſomly put together, but as I ſaid, does not conclude firmly what is driven [Page] at. For it being undeniably true that [...] ſignifies as well that which onely is of a long continuance, as what is properly everlaſting; and it being altogether rational, that when words have more ſignifications than one, that ſignification is to be applied that is moſt agreeable to the ſubject it is predicated of, and [...] in that higher ſence of property and abſolutely everlaſting, not being applicable to [...], but upon this Writers monſtrous ſuppoſition that the Will of God has a Supremacy over his Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Juſtice (as if the righteous God could act againſt his own Conſcience, which no honeſt man can do) it is plain, that though [...] in [...] ſignifie properly everlaſting, that there is no neceſſity that it ſhould ſignifie ſo in [...], but have that other ſignification of long continuance, though not of everlaſtingneſs, and that continuance ſo long, as if conſidered, would effectually rouze any man out of his ſins; and Eternity not conſidered, will not move him. This one would think were enough to repreſs the confidence of this young Writer.

But I will adde ſomething more out of his fellow Anti-Pre-exiſtentiary. That Comminations are not, though Promiſes be obligatory. Foraſmuch as in Comminations the Comminator is the Creditor, and he that is menaced the Debtor that owes the puniſhment (with which that Latine Phraſe well agrees, dare poenas) [Page] but in Promiſes, he that promiſeth becomes Debtor, and he to whom the Promiſe is made, Creditor. Whence the Promiſer is plainly obliged to make good his Promiſe, as being the Debtor: But the Comminator, as being the Creditor, is not obliged to exact the puniſhment, it being in the power of any Creditor to remit the Debt owing him if he will. Wherefore in this Commination of eternal fire, or everlaſting puniſhment, though [...] ſignifie here properly everlaſting, as well as in everlaſting life, yet becauſe this latter is a Promiſe, the other onely a Commination, it does not follow, that as ſurely as the Righteous ſhall be rewarded with everlaſting life, ſo ſurely ſhall the Wicked be puniſhed with everlaſting fire, in the moſt proper and higheſt extent of the ſignification of the word. Becauſe God in his Comminations to the Wicked is onely a Creditor, and has ſtill a right and power to remit either part or the whole Debt; but to the Righteous, by vertue of his Promiſe, he becomes a Debtor, and cannot recede, but muſt punctually keep his word.

To all which I adde this Challenge: Let this Writer, or any elſe if they can, demonſtrate that a Soul may not behave herſelf ſo perverſely, obſtinately, and deſpightfully againſt the Spirit of Grace, that ſhe may deſerve to be made an everlaſting Hackſtock of the Divine Nemeſis, even for ever and ever. And if ſhe deſerve it, it is but juſt that ſhe have [Page] it; and if it be juſt, it is likewiſe good. For Juſtice is nothing elſe but Goodneſs modified in ſuch ſort, as Wiſdom and ſenſe of Decorum ſees fitteſt. But the Election of Wiſdom being always for the beſt, all things conſidered, it is plain that Juſtice and the execution thereof, is for the beſt; and that ſo Goodneſs, not mere Will upon pretence of having a Supremacy over Goodneſs, would be the meaſure of this ſentencing ſuch obdurate ſinners to eternal puniſhment. And this eternal puniſhment as it is a piece of vindicative Juſtice upon theſe obdurate ſinners, ſo it naturally contributes to the eſtabliſhment of the Righteous in their Celeſtial Happineſs. Which, this Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence objects ſomewhere, if Souls ever fell from, they may fall from it again. But theſe eternal Torments of Hell, if they needed it, would put a ſure bar thereto. So that the Wiſdom and Goodneſs alſo of God is upon this account concerned in the eternal puniſhments of Hell, as well as his Juſtice. That it be to the unreclaimable, as that Orphick Hemiſtichium calls it,

— [...].

The fifth and laſt forcible Argument, as he calls them, for the proving the Soveraignty of Gods Will over his Goodneſs, is this. If Gods Goodneſs, ſaith he, be not under the command of his Will, but does always what is beſt, why did it not perpetuate the Station of Pre-exiſtent [Page] Souls, and hinder us (if ever we were happy in a ſublimer ſtate) from lapſing into theſe Regions of Sin and Death? But who does not at firſt ſight diſcern the weakneſs of this Allegation? For it is plainly [...], an abſurd thing, and contrary to Reaſon, to create ſuch a ſpecies of Being, whoſe nature is free and mutable, and at the firſt daſh to dam up or ſtop the exerciſe of that freedom and capacity of change, by confining it to a fixt Station. As ridiculous as to ſuppoſe a living Creature made with wings and feet, and yet that the Maker thereof ſhould take ſpecial care it ſhould never ſlie nor go. And ſo likewiſe, that the mere making of ſuch an Order of Beings as have a freedom of Will, and choice of their Actions, that this is misbecoming the Goodneſs of God, is as dull and idiotical a conceit, and ſuch as implies that God ſhould have made but one kind of Creature, and that the moſt abſolutely and immutably happy that can be, or elſe did not act according to his Goodneſs, or for the beſt: Which is ſo obvious a Falſhood, that I will not confute it. But it is not hard to conceive that he making ſuch a free-willed Creature as the Souls of men, ſimul cum mundo condito, and that in an happy condition, and yet not [...]ixing them in that Station, may excellently well accord with the Soveraignty of his Goodneſs, nor any one be conſtrained to have recourſe to the Supremacy [Page] of his Will over his Goodneſs, as if he did it becauſe he would do it, and not becauſe it was beſt.

For what can this freedom of Will conſiſt in ſo much as in a temptableneſs by other Objects that are of an inferiour nature, not ſo divine and holy as the other, to which it were the ſecurity of the Soul to adhere with all due conſtancy, and therefore her duty. But in that ſhe is temptable by other Objects, it is a ſigne that her preſent enjoyment of the more Divine and Heavenly Objects, are not received of her according to their excellency, but according to the meaſure and capacity of her preſent ſtate, which though very happy, may be improved at the long run, and in an orderly ſeries of times and things, whether the Soul lapſe into ſin or no. For acceſſion of new improvements increaſeth Happineſs and Joy. Now therefore, I ſay, ſuppoſe ſeveral, and that great numbers, even innumerable myriads of pre-exiſtent Souls, to lapſe into the Regions of Sin and Death, provided that they do not ſin perverſely and obſtinately, nor do deſpight to the Spirit of Grace, nor refuſe the advantageous offers that Divine Providence makes them even in theſe ſad Regions, why may not their once having deſcended hither tend to their greater enjoyment, when they ſhall have returned to their priſtine Station? And why may not the ſpecifical nature of the Soul be [Page] ſuch, that it be eſſentially interwoven into our Being, that after a certain period of times or ages, whether ſhe ſin or no, ſhe may arrive to a fixedneſs at laſt in her heavenly Station with greater advantage to ſuch a Creature, than if ſhe had been fixed in that ſtate at firſt.

The thing may ſeem leaſt probable in thoſe that deſcend into theſe Regions of Sin and Mortality. But in thoſe that are not obſtinate and refractorie, but cloſe with the gracious means that is offered them for their recoverie, their having been here in this lower State, and retaining the memorie (as doubtleſs they do) of the tranſactions of this Terreſtrial Stage, it naturally enhances all the enjoyments of the priſtine felicitie they had loſt, and makes them for ever have a more deep and vivid reſentment of them. So that through the richneſs of the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, and through the Merits and conduct of the Captain of their Salvation, our Saviour Jeſus Chriſt, they are, after the ſtrong conflicts here with ſin and the corruptions of this lower Region, made more than Conquerours, and greater gainers upon the loſſes they ſuſtained before from their own folly. And in this moſt advantageous ſtate of things, they become Pillars in the Temple of God, there to remain for ever and ever. So that unleſs ſtraying Souls be exceedingly perverſe and obſtinate, the exitus of things will be but as in a [Page] Tragick Comedy, and their perverſeneſs and obſtinacie lies at their own doors: for thoſe that finally miſcarrie, whoſe number this confident Writer is to prove to be ſo conſiderable that the enhanced happineſs of the ſtanding part of pre-exiſtent Souls and the recovered does not far preponderate the infelicitie of the others condition. Which if he cannot do, as I am confident he cannot, he muſt acknowledge, That God in not forcibly fixing pre-exiſtent Souls in the ſtate they were firſt created, but leaving them to themſelves, acted not from the Supremacy of his Will over his Goodneſs, but did what was best, and according to that Soveraign Principle of Goodneſs in the Deitie.

And now for that ſnitling Dilemma of this eager Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence, touching the freedom of acting and mutabilitie in humane Souls, whether this mutabilitie be a Specifick properly and eſſential to them, or a ſeparable Accident. For if it were eſſential, ſays he, then how was Chriſt a perfect man, his humane nature being ever void of that lapſabilitie which is eſſential to humanitie? and how come men to retain their ſpecifick nature ſtill, that are tranſlated to Celeſtial happineſs, and made unalterable in the condition they then are? To this I anſwer, That the Pre-exiſtentiaries will admit, that the Soul of the Meſſiah was created as the reſt, though in an [Page] happie condition, yet in a lapſable; and that it was his peculiar merit, in that he ſo faithfully, conſtantly, and entirely adhered to the Divine Principle, incomparably above what was done by others of his Claſſis, notwithſtanding that he might have done otherwiſe; and therefore they will be forward to extend that of the Author to the Hebrews, chap. 1. v. 8. (Thy Throne, O God, is for ever and ever, the Scepter of Righteouſneſs is the Scepter of thy Kingdom. Thou haſt loved Righteouſneſs, and hated Iniquity; therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the Oyl of Gladneſs above thy Fellows) to his behaviour in his pre-exiſtent ſtate, as well as in this. And whenever the Soul of Chriſt did exiſt, if he was like us in all things, ſin onely excepted, he muſt have a capacitie of ſinning, though he would not ſin; that capacitie not put into act being no ſin, but an Argument of his Vertue, and ſuch as if he was always devoid of, he could not be like us in all things, ſin onely excepted. For poſſe peccare non eſt peccatum.

And as for humane Souls changing their Species in their unalterable heavenly happineſs, the Species is not then changed, but perfected and compleated; namely, that facultie or meaſure of it in their Plaſtick, eſſentially latitant there, is by the Divine Grace ſo awakened, after ſuch a ſeries of time and things, which they have experienced, that now they are [Page] [...]irmly united to an heavenly Body or ethereal Vehicle for ever. And now we need ſay little to the other member of the Dilemma, but to declare, that free will, or mutability in humane Souls, is no ſeparable Accident, but of the eſſential contexture of them; ſo as it might have its turn in the ſeries of things. And how conſiſtent it was with the Goodneſs of God and his Wiſdom, not to ſuppreſs it in the beginning, has been ſufficiently intimated above. Wherefore now foraſmuch as there is no pretext that either the Wiſdom or Juſtice of God ſhould ſtreighten the time of the creation of humane Souls, ſo that their exiſtence may not commence with that of Angels, or of the Univerſe, and that this figment of the Supremacy of Gods mere Will over his other Attributes is blown away, it is manifeſt that the Argument for the Pre-exiſtence of Souls drawn from the Divine Goodneſs, holds firm and irrefragable againſt whatever Oppoſers.

We have been the more copious on this Argument, becauſe the Oppoſer and others look upon it as the ſtrongeſt proof the Pre exiſtentiaries produce for their Opinion. And the other Party have nothing to ſet againſt it but a fictitious Supremacy of the Will of God over his Goodneſs and other Attributes. Which being their onely Bulwark, and they taking Sanctuary nowhere but here, in my apprehenſion they plainly herein give up the cauſe, and eſtabliſh [Page] the Opinion which they ſeem to have ſuch an antipathy againſt. But it is high time now to paſs to the next Chapter.

Chap. 10. p. 75. To have contracted ſtrong and inveterate habits to Vice and Lewdneſs, and that in various manners and degrees, &c. To the unbyaſſed this muſt needs ſeem a conſiderable Argument, eſpecially when the Parties thus irreclaimably profligate from their Youth, ſome as to one Vice, others to another, are found ſuch in equal circumſtances with others, and advantages, to be good; born of the ſame Parents, educated in the ſame Family, and the like. Wherefore having the ſame bodily Extraction, and the ſame advantages of Education, what muſt make this great difference as they grow up in the Body, but that their Souls were different before they came into it? And how ſhould they have ſuch a vaſt difference in the proclivity to Vice, but that they lived before in the ſtate of Pre-exiſtence, and that ſome were much deeper in rebellion againſt God and the Divine Reaſon, than others were, and ſo brought their different conditions with them into theſe Terreſtrial Bodies?

Pag. 75. Then how a Swallow ſhould return to her òld trade of living after her Winter ſleep, &c. Indeed the Swallow has the advantages of Memory, which the incorporate Soul has not in her incorporation into a Terreſtrial [Page] Body after her ſtate of Silence. But the vital inclinations, which are mainly if not onely fitted in the Plaſtick, being not onely revived, but (ſignally vitious of themſelves) revived with advantage, by reaſon of the corruption of this coarſe earthly Body into which the Soul is incorporate, they cannot fail of diſcovering themſelves in a moſt ſignal manner, without any help of memory, but from the mere pregnancie of a corrupt Body, and formerly more than ordinarily debauched Plaſtick in the ſtate of Pre-exiſtence.

Pag. 76. Whenas others are as fatally ſet againſt the Opinions, &c. And this is done, as the ingenious Author takes notice, even where neither Education nor Cuſtom have interpoſed to ſophiſticate their Judgments or Sentiments. Nay, it is moſt certain, that they ſometime have Sentiments and entertain Opinions quite contrary to their Education. So that that is but a ſlight account, to reſtore this Phaenomenon into Education and Cuſtom, whenas Opinions are entertained and ſtiffly maintained in deſpight of them. This I muſt confeſs implies that the aerial Inhabitants philoſophize, but conjecturally onely, as well as the Inhabitants of the Earth. And it is no wonder that ſuch Spirits as are lapſed in their Morals, ſhould be at a loſs alſo in their Intellectuals▪ and though they have a deſire to know the truth in Speculations, it ſuiting ſo well with their pride, that yet they ſhould be ſubject to various errours [Page] and hallucinations as well as we, and that there ſhould be different, yea oppoſite Schools of Philoſophie among them. And if there be any credit to be given to Cardans ſtory of his Father Facius Cardanus, things are thus de facto in the aereal Regions. And two of the Spirits which Facius Cardanus ſaw in that Viſion (left upon Record by him, and of which he often told his Son Hieronymus while he was living) were two Profeſſors of Philoſophie in different Academies, and were of different Opinions; one of them apertly profeſſing himſelf to be an Aven-Roiſt. The ſtory is too long to inſert here. See Dr. H. Moore his Immortality of the Soul, book 3. chap. 17.

So that lapſed Souls philoſophizing in their Aerial State, and being divided into Sects, and conſequently maintaining their different or oppoſite Opinions with heat and affection which reaches the Plaſtick, this may leave a great propenſion in them to the ſame Opinions here, and make them almoſt as prone to ſuch and ſuch Errours, as to ſuch and ſuch Vices. This, I ſuppoſe, the ingenious Author propounds as an Argument credible and plauſible, though he does not eſteem it of like force with thoſe he produced before. Nor does his Oppoſer urge any thing to any purpoſe againſt it. The main thing is, That theſe Propenſities to ſome one Opinion are not univerſal, and blended with the conſtitution of every [Page] perſon, but are thin ſown▪ and grow up ſparingly. Where there are five, ſays he, naturally bent to any one Opinion, there are many millions that are free to all. If ſome, ſays he, deſcend into this life big with aptneſſes and proclivities to peculiar Theories, why then ſhould not all, ſuppoſing they pre-exiſted together, do the like? As if all in the other Aereal State were Profeſſors of Philoſophie, or zealous Followers of them that were. The ſolution of this difficulty is ſo eaſie, that I need not inſiſt on it.

Pag. 78. Were this difference about ſenſibles, the influence of the body might then be ſuſpected for a cauſe, &c. This is very rationally alleadged by our Author, and yet his Antagoniſt has▪ the face from the obſervation of the diverſity of mens Palates and Appetites, of their being differently affected by ſuch and ſuch ſtrains of Muſick, ſome being pleaſed with one kind of Melodie, and others with another, ſome pl [...]aſed with Aromatick Odours, others offended with them, to reaſon thus: If the Bodie can thus cauſe us to love and diſlike Senſibles, why not as well to approve and diſlike Opinions and Theories? But the reaſon is obvious why not; becauſe the liking or diſliking of theſe Senſibles depends upon the grateful or ungrateful motion of the Nerves of the Bodie, which may be otherwiſe conſtituted or qualified in ſome complexions than in other ſome [Page] But for Philoſophical Opinions and Theories' what have they to do with the motion of the Nerves? It is the Soul herſelf that judges of thoſe abſtractedly from the Senſes, or any uſe of the Nerves or corporeal Organ. If the difference of our Judgment in Philoſophical Theories be reſolvible into the mere conſtitution of our Bodie, our Underſtanding itſelf will hazard to be reſolved into the ſame Principle alſo: And Bodie will prove the onely difference betwixt Men and Brutes. We have more intellectual Souls becauſe we have better Bodies, which I hope our Authors Antagoniſt will not allow.

Pag. 78. For the Soul in her first and pure nature has no Idioſyncraſies, &c. Whether there may not be certain different Characters proper to ſuch and ſuch Claſſes of Souls, but all of them natural and without blemiſh, and this for the better order of things in the Univerſe, I will not raſhly decide in the Negative. But as the Author himſelf ſeems to inſinuate, if there be any ſuch, they are not ſuch as fatally determine Souls to falſe and erroneous apprehenſions. For that would be a corruption and a blemiſh in the very natural Character. Wherefore if the Soul in Philoſophical Speculations is fatally determined to falſhood in this life, it is credible it is the effect of its being inured thereto in the other.

Pag. 79. Now to ſay that all this variety [Page]proceeds primarily from the mere temper of our Bodies, &c. This Argument is the leſs valid for Pre-exiſtence, I mean that which is drawn from the wonderful variety of our Genius's, or natural inclinations to the employments of life, becauſe we cannot be aſſured but that the Divine Providence may have eſſentially, as it were, impreſſed ſuch Claſſical Characters on humane Souls, as I noted before. And beſides, if that be true which Menander ſays,

[...]

[...].

That every man, as ſoon as he is born, has a Genius appointed him to be his Inſtructer and Guide of his Life: That ſome are carried with ſuch an impetus to ſome things rather than others, may be from the inſtigations of his aſſiſting Genius. And for that Objection of the Author's Antagoniſt againſt his Opinion touching thoſe inclinations to Trades, (which may equally concern this Hypotheſis of Menander) that it would then be more univerſal, every one having ſuch a Genius; this truth may be ſmothered by the putting young people promiſcuouſly to any Trade, without obſerving their Genius. But the Chineſes ſuppoſe this truth, they commonly ſhewing a Child all the Employs of the Citie, that he may make his own choice before they put him to any.

But if the Opinion of Menander be true, that [Page] every man has his guardian Genius, under whoſe conduct he lives; the Merchant, the Muſician, the Plowman, and the reſt; it is manifeſt that theſe Genii cannot but receive conſiderable impreſſions of ſuch things as they guide their Clients in. And pre-exiſtent Souls in their aereal eſtate being of the ſame nature with theſe Daemons or Genii, they are capable of the ſame Employment, and ſo tincture themſelves deep enough with the affairs of thoſe parties they preſide over. And therefore when they themſelves, after the ſtate of Silence, are incorporated into earthly Bodies, they may have a proneneſs from their former tincture to ſuch methods of life as they lived over whom they did preſide. Which quite ſpoils the beſt Argument our Author's Antagoniſt has againſt this Topick; which is, That there are ſeveral things here below which the Geniuſſes of men purſue and follow with the hotteſt chaſe, which have no ſimilitude with the things in the other ſtate, as Planting, Building, Husbandrie, the working of Manufactures, &c. This beſt Argument of his, by Menander's Hypotheſis, which is hard to confute, is quite defeated.

And to deny nothing to this Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence which is his due, himſelf ſeems unſatisfied, in reſolving theſe odd Phaenomena into the temper of Bodie. And therefore at laſt hath recourſe to a ſecret Cauſality, that is, to [Page] he knows not what. But at laſt he pitches upon ſome ſuch Principle as that whereby the Birds build their Neſt, the Spider weaves her Webs, the Bees make their Combs, &c. Some ſuch thing he ſays (though he cannot think it that prodigious Hobgoblin the Spirit of Nature) may produce theſe ſtrange effects, may byaſs alſo the fancies of men in making choice of their Employments and Occupations. If it be not the Spirit of Nature, then it muſt be that Claſſical Character I ſpoke of above. But if not this, nor the preponderancies of the Pre-exiſtent ſtate, nor Menander's Hypotheſis, the Spirit of Nature will bid the faireſt for it of any beſides, for determining the inclinations of all living Creatures in theſe Regions of Generation, as having in itſelf vitally, though not intellectually, all the Laws of the Divine Providence implanted into its eſſence by God the Creator of it. And ſpeaking in the Ethnick Dialect, the ſame deſcription may belong to it that Varro gives to their God Genius. Genius est Deus qui proepoſitus est, ac vim habet omnium rerum gignendarum, and that is the Genius of every Creature that is congenit to it in vertue of its generation. And that there is ſuch a Spirit of Nature (not a God, as Varro vainly makes it, but an unintelligent Creature) to which belongs the Naſcency or Generation of things, and has the management of the whole matter of the Univerſe, is copiouſly proved to [Page] be the Opinion of the Nobleſt and Ancienteſt Philoſophers, by the learned Dr. R. Cudworth in his Syſtem of the Intellectual World, and is demonſtrated to be a true Theorem in Philoſophie by Dr. H. Moore in his Euchiridion Metaphyſicum, by many, and thoſe irrefutable Arguments; and yet I dare ſay both can eaſily pardon the miſtake and bluntneſs of this rude Writer, nor are at all ſurprized at it as a Noveltie, that any ignorant rural Hobthurſt ſhould call the Spirit of Nature (a thing ſo much beyond his capacitie to judge of) a prodigious Hobgoblin.

But to conclude, be it ſo that there may be other cauſes beſides the priſtine inurements of the Pre-exiſtent Soul, that may ſomething forcibly determine her to one courſe of life here, yet when ſhe is moſt forcibly determined, if there be ſuch a thing as Pre-exiſtence, this may be rationally ſuppoſed to concur in the efficiencie. But that it is not ſo ſtrong an Argument as others to prove Pre-exiſtence, I have hinted alreadie.

Pag. 79. For thoſe that are most like in the Temper, Air, Complexion of their Bodies, &c. If this prove true, and I know nothing to the contrarie, this vaſt difference of Genius's, were it not for the Hypotheſis of their Claſſical Character imprinted on Souls at their very creation, would be a conſiderably tight Argument. But certainly it is more honeſt than [Page] for the avoiding Pre-exiſtence to reſolve the Phaenomenon into a ſecret Cauſality, that is to ſay, into one knows not what.

Pag. 82. There being now no other way left but Pre-exiſtence, &c. This is a juſt excuſe for his bringing in any Argument by way of overplus that is not ſo apodictically concluding. If it be but ſuch as will look like a plauſible ſolution of a Phaenomenon (as this of ſuch a vaſt difference of Genius's) Pre-exiſtence once admitted, or otherwiſe undeniably demonſtrated, the propoſing thereof ſhould be accepted with favour.

Chap. 11. pag. 85. And we know our Saviour and his Apoſtles have given credit to that Tranſlation, &c. And it was the authentick Text with the Fathers of the Primitive Church. And beſides this, if we read according to the Hebrew Text, there being no object of Job's knowledge expreſſed, this is the moſt eaſie and natural ſence: Knoweſt thou that thou waſt then, and that the number of thy days are many? This therefore was reckoned amongſt the reſt of his ignorances, that though he was created ſo early, he now knew nothing of it. And this eaſie ſence of the Hebrew Text, as well as that Verſion of the Septuagint, made the Jews draw it in to the countenancing of the Tradition of the [...], that is, the Pre-exiſtence of Souls, as Grotius has noted of them.

[Page] Pag. 85. As reads a very credible Verſion. R. Menaſſe Ben Iſrael reads it ſo: [I gave thee Wiſdom,] which Verſion, if it were ſure and authentick, this place would be fit for the defence of the Opinion it is produced for. But no Interpreters beſides, that I can find, following him, nor any going before him, whom he might follow, I ingenuouſly confeſs the place ſeems not of force enough to me to infer the concluſion.

He read, I ſuppoſe, [...] in Piel, whence he tranſlated it, Indidi tibi Sapientiam; but the reſt read it in Cal.

Pag. 86. And methinks that paſſage of our Saviours Prayer, Father, glorifie me with the glorie I had before the World began, &c. This Text, without exceeding great violence, cannot be evaded. As for that of Grotius interpreting [that I had] that which was intended for me to have, though it make good ſence, yet it is ſuch Grammar as that there is no School-boy but would be aſhamed of it; nor is there, for all his pretences, any place in Scripture to countenance ſuch an extravagant Expoſition by way of Paralleliſm, as it may appear to any one that will compare the places which he alleadges, with this; which I leave the Reader to do at his leiſure. Let us conſider the Context, Joh. 17. 4. I have glorified thee upon earth, during this my Pilgrimage and abſence from thee, being ſent hither by thee. I have finiſhed the work which thou gavest me to do, [Page] and for the doing of which I was ſent, and am thus long abſent. And now, O Father, glorifie me, [...], apud teipſum, in thine own preſence, with the glorie which I had before the world was, [...], apud te, or in thy preſence. What can be more expreſſive of a Glorie which Chriſt had apud Patrem, or at his Fathers home, or in his preſence before the world was, and from which for ſuch a time he had been abſent?

Now for others that would ſalve the buſineſs by communication of Idioms, I will ſet down the words of an ingenious Writer that goes that way: Thoſe Predicates, ſays he, that in a ſtrict and vigorous acception agreed onely to his Divine Nature, might by a communication of Idioms (as they phraſe it) be attributed to his Humane, or at least to the whole Perſon compounded of them both, than which nothing is more ordinarie in things of a mixt and heterogeneous nature, as the whole man is ſtiled immortal from the deathleſſneſs of his Soul: thus he. And there is the ſame reaſon if he had ſaid that man was ſtiled mortal (which certainly is far the more ordinarie) from the real death of his Bodie, though his Soul be immortal. This is wittily excogitated. But now let us apply it to the Text, expounding it according to his communication of Idioms, affording to the Humane Nature what is onely proper to the Divine, thus.

[Page] Father, glorifie me [my Humane Nature] with the glorie that I [my Divine Nature] had before the world was. Which indeed was to be the Eternal, Infinite, and Omnipotent brightneſs of the Glory of the Father [...]. This is the Glory which his Divine Nature had before the World was. But how can this Humane Nature be glorified with that Glory his Divine Nature had before the world was, unleſs it ſhould become the Divine Nature, that it might be ſaid to have pre-exiſted? (But that it cannot be. For there is no confuſion of the Humane and Divine Nature in the Hypoſtaſis of Chriſt:) Or elſe becauſe it is hypoſtatically united with the Divine Nature; but if that be the Glory, that he then had already, and had it not (according to the Oppoſers of Pre-exiſtence) before the world was. So we ſee there is no ſence to be made of this Text by communication of Idioms, and therefore no ſence to be made of it without the Pre-exiſtence of the Humane Nature of Chriſt. And if you paraphraſe [me] thus, My Hypoſtaſis conſiſting of my Humane and Divine Nature, it will be as untoward ſence. For if the Divine Nature be included in [me] then Chriſt prays for what he has aleady, as I noted above. For the Glory of the eternal Logos from everlaſting to everlaſting, is the ſame, as ſure as he is the ſame with himſelf.

Pag. 86. By his expreſſions of coming from the [Page]Father, deſcending from Heaven, and returning thither again, &c. I ſuppoſe theſe Scriptures are alluded to, John 3. 13. 6. 38. 16. 28. I came down from Heaven not to do my own will, but the will of him that ſent me. I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father. Whereupon his Diſciples ſaid unto him, Lo now ſpeakeſt thou plainly, and ſpeakeſt no Parable. But it were a very great Parable, or Aenigm, that one ſhould ſay truly of himſelf, that he came from Heaven, when he never was there. And as impoſſible a thing is it to conceive how God can properly be ſaid to come down from Heaven, who is alwaies preſent every where. Wherefore that in Chriſt which was not God, namely his Soul, or Humane Nature, was in Heaven before he appeared on Earth, and conſequently his Soul did pre-exiſt. Nor is there any refuge here in the communication of Idioms. For that cannot be attributed to the whole Hypoſtaſis, which is competent to neither part that conſtitutes it. For it was neither true of the Humane Nature of Chriſt, if you take away Pre-exiſtence, nor of the Divine, that they deſcended from Heaven, &c. And yet John 3. 13, 14. where Chriſt propheſying of his Crucifixion and Aſcenſion, ſaith, No man hath aſcended up to Heaven, but he that came down from Heaven, even the Son of man, [ [...]] who was in [Page]Heaven. So Eraſmus ſaith, it may be rendred a Participle of the preſent tenſe, having a capacity to ſignifie the time paſt, if the ſence require it, as it ſeems to do here. Qui erat in Coelo, viz. antequam deſcenderat. So Eraſmus upon the place.

Wherefore theſe places of Scripture touching Chriſt being ſuch inexpugnable Arguments of the Pre-exiſtence of the Soul of the Meſſiah; the Writer of No Pre-exiſtence, methinks, is no where ſo civil or diſcreet as in this point. Where, he ſaies, he will not ſquabble about this, but readily yield that the Soul of Chriſt was long extant before it was incarnate. But then he preſently flings dirt upon the Pre-exiſtentiaries, as guilty of a ſhameful preſumption and inconſequence, to conclude the Pre-exiſtence of all other Humane Souls from the Pre-exiſtence of his. Becauſe he was a peculiar favourite of God, was to undergo bitter ſufferings for Mankind; and therefore ſhould enjoy an happy Pre-exiſtence for an Anti-praemium. And ſince he was to purchaſe a Church with his own most precious Bloud, it was fit he ſhould pre-exiſt from the beginning of the world, that he might preſide over his Church as Guide and Governour thereof; which is a thing that cannot be ſaid of any other ſoul beſide.

This is a device which, I believe, the Pre-exiſtentiaries, good men, never dreamt of, but they took it for granted, that the creation of [Page] all Humane Souls was alike, and that the Soul of Chriſt was like ours in all things, ſin onely excepted; as the Emperour Juſtinian, in his Diſcourſe to Menas Patriarch of Conſtantinople, argues from this very Topick to prove the Non-pre-exiſtence of our Souls, from the Non-pre-exiſtence of Chriſts, he being like us in all things, ſin onely excepted. And therefore as to Exiſtence and Eſſence there was no difference. Thus one would have verily thought to have been moſt ſafe and moſt natural to conclude, as being ſo punctual according to the declaration of Scripture, and order of things. For it ſeems almoſt as harſh and repugnant to give Angelical Exiſtence to a Species not Angelical, as Angelical Eſſence. For according to them, it belongs to Angels onely to exiſt a mundo condito, not to Humane ſouls. Let us therefore ſee what great and urgent occaſions there are, that the Almighty ſhould break this order.

The firſt is, That he may remonſtrate the Soul of the Meſſiah to be his moſt ſpecial Favourite. Why? That is ſufficiently done, and more opportunely, if other ſouls pre-exiſted to be his corrivals. But his faithful adheſion above the reſt to the Law of his Maker, as it might make him ſo great a Favourite: ſo that tranſcendent priviledge of being hypoſtatically united with the Godhead, or Eternal Logos, would, I trow, be a ſufficient Teſtimony of [Page] Gods ſpecial Favour to him above all his fellow Pre-exiſtent Souls.

And then, which is the ſecond thing for his Anti-praemial Happineſs (though it is but an Hyſteron Proteron, and prepoſterous conceit, to fancie wages before the work) had he leſs of this by the coexiſtence of other ſouls with him, or was it not rather the more highly encreaſed by their coexiſtencie? And how oddly does it look, that one ſolitary Individual of a Species ſhould exiſt for God knows how many ages alone? But ſuppoſe the ſoul of the Meſſiah, and all other ſouls created together, and ſeveral of them fallen, and the Soul of the Meſſiah to undertake their recovery by his ſufferings, and this declared amongſt them; ſurely this muſt hugely inhance his Happineſs and Glory through all the whole order of Humane ſouls, being thus conſtituted or deſigned Head and Prince over them all. And thus, though he was rejected by the Jews and deſpiſed, he could not but be careſſed and adored by his fellowſouls above, before his deſcent to this ſtate of humiliation. And who knows but this might be part at leaſt of that Glory which, he ſays, he had before the world was? And which this ungrateful world denied him, while he was in it, who crucified the Lord of life.

And as for the third and laſt, That the Soul of the Meſſiah was to pre-exiſt, that he might preſide over the Church all along from the beginning [Page] of it: What neceſſity is there of that? Could not the Eternal Logos and the Miniſtry of Angels ſufficiently diſcharge that Province? But you conceive a congruity therein; and ſo may another conceive a congruity that he ſhould not enter upon his Office till there were a conſiderable lapſe of Humane Souls which ſhould be his care to recover; which implies their Pre-exiſtence before this ſtage of the Earth: And if the Soul of the Meſſiah, united with the Logos, preſided ſo early over the Church; that it was meet that other unlapſed ſouls, they being of his own tribe, ſhould be his Satellitium, and be part of thoſe miniſtring Spirits that watch for the Churches good, and zealouſly endeavour the recovery of their ſiſter-ſouls, under the conduct of the great Soul of the Meſſiah, out of their captivity of ſin and death.

So that every way Pre-exiſtence of other ſouls will handſomly fall in with the Pre-exiſtence of the ſoul of the Meſſiah, that there may be no breach of order, wherias there is no occaſion for it, nor violence done to the Holy Writ, which expreſsly declares Chriſt to have been like to us in all things (as well in Exiſtence as Eſſence) ſin onely excepted; as the Emperour earneſtly urges to the Patriarch Menas. Wherefore we finding no neceſſity of his particular pre-exiſting, nor convenience, but what will be doubled if other Souls pre-exiſt with [Page] him; it is plain, if he pre-exiſt, it is as he is an Humane ſoul, not as ſuch a particular ſoul; and therefore what proves his ſoul to pre-exiſt, proves others to pre-exiſt alſo.

Pag. 87. Since theſe places have been more diffuſely urged in a late diſcourſe to this purpoſe. I ſuppoſe he means in the Letter of Reſolution concerning Origen, Where the Author opens the ſenſe of Philip. 2. 6. learnedly and judiciouſly, eſpecially when he acknowledges Chriſts being in the form of God, to be underſtood of his Phyſical Union with the Divine Logos. Which is the Ancient Orthodox Expoſition of the Primitive Fathers, they taking this for one notable Teſtimony of Scripture, for the Divinity of Chriſt. Whenas they that underſtand it Politically of Chriſts Power and Authority onely, take an excellent weapon out of the hands of the Church wherewith ſhe uſed to oppoſe the Impugners of Chriſts Divinity. But how can Chriſt being God (verus Deus, as Vatablus expounds [...],) empty himſelf, or any way deteriorate himſelf as to his Divinity, by being incarnate, and taking upon him [...] the form of the terreſtrial Adam? For every earthly man is [...], as the Apoſtle ſeems to intimate, Rom. 8. 21. as this ingenious Writer has noted; and the Apoſtle likewiſe ſeems ſo to expound it in the Text, by adding preſently by way of Exegeſis, [...], and was made in the likeneſs of [Page]men; like that Gen. 5. 3. Adam begot a ſon in his own likeneſs, a terreſtrial man as himſelf was. Wherefore the Incarnation of Chriſt being no exinanition to his Divinity, there was an Humanity of Chriſt, viz. his Soul, in a glorious ſtate of Pre-exiſtence, to which this voluntary exinanition belonged.

Pag. 87. Was it for this mans ſin, or his fathers, that he was born blind? For the avoiding the force of this Argument for proving that Pre-exiſtence was the Opinion of the Jews; and that Chriſt when it was ſo plainly implied in the Queſtion, by his ſilence, or not reproving it, ſeemed to admit it, or at leaſt to eſteem it no hurtful Opinion: They alledge theſe two things: Firſt, That theſe Enquirers having ſome notions of the Divine Preſcience, might ſuppoſe that God foreknowing what kind of perſon this blind man would prove, had antedated his puniſhment. The other is, That the Enquirers may be conceived to underſtand the blind mans original ſin. So that when they enquired whether the man was born blind for his own or his Parents ſin, they might onely ask whether that particular Judgment was the effect of his Parents, or of his own original pravity. This is Camerons.

But ſee what ſorced conceits Learned men will entertain, rather than not to ſay ſomething on a Text. What a diſtorted and prepoſterous [Page] account is that found, that God ſhould puniſh men before they ſin, becauſe he foreſees they will ſin? And he onely produces this example, and a ſlight one too, That Jeroboams hand was dried up as he ſtretched it forth to give a ſign to apprehend the Prophet. And the other is as fond an account, That God ſhould ſend ſuch ſevere Judgments on men for their original Pravity, which they cannot help. And original Pravity being ſo common to all, it could be no reaſon why this particular man ſhould be born blind, more than others. Wherefore Grotius far more ingenuouſly writes thus upon the place: Quoerunt ergo an ipſe peccaverit, quia multi Judoeorum credebant [...] animarum. And as our Saviour Chriſt paſſed it for an innocent Opinion, ſo did the Primitive Church, the Book of Wiſdom being an allowable book with them, and read in publick, though it plainly declare for Pre-exiſtence, Chap. 8. 20.

Chap. 12. p. 93. Therefore let the Reader, if he pleaſe, call it a Romantick Scheme, or imaginary Hypotheſis, &c. This is very diſcreetly and judiciouſly done of the Author, to propoſe ſuch things as are not neceſſary members or branches of Pre-exiſtence, and are but at the beſt conjectural, as no part of that otherwiſe-uſeful Theory. For by tacking too faſt theſe unneceſſary tufts or taſſels to the main Truth, it [Page] will but give occaſion to wanton or wrathful whelps to worry her, and tug her into the dirt by them. And we may eaſily obſerve how greedily they catch at ſuch occaſions, though it be not much that they can make out of them, as we may obſerve in the next Chapter.

Chap. 13. pag. 96. Pill. 1. To conceive him as an immenſe and all-glorious Sun, that is continually communicating, &c. And this as certainly as the Sun does his light, and as reſtrainedly. For the Suns light is not equally imparted to all ſubjects, but according to the meaſure of their capacity. And as Nature limits here in natural things, ſo does the Wiſdom and Juſtice of God in free Creatures. He imparts to them as they capacitate themſelves by improving or abuſing their Freedom.

Pag. 100. Pill. 3. Be reſolved into a Principle that is not meerly corporeal. He ſuſpects that the deſcent of heavy bodies, when all is ſaid and done, muſt be reſolved into ſuch a Principle. But I think he that without prejudice peruſes the Eleventh and Thirteenth Chapters (with their Scholia) of Dr. Mores Enchiridion Metaphyſicum, will find it beyond ſuſpition, that the Deſcent of heavy bodies is to be reſolved into ſome corporeal Principle; and that the Spirit of Nature, though you ſhould call it with the Cabaliſts by that aſtartling [Page] name of Sandalphon, is no ſuch prodigious Hobgoblin, as rudeneſs and preſumptuous ignorance has made that Buckeram Writer in contempt and deriſion to call it.

Pag. 101. As naturally as the fire mounts, and a ſtone deſcends. And as theſe do not ſo (though naturally) meerly from their own intrinſick nature, but in vertue of the Spirit of the Ʋniverſe; ſo the ſame reaſon there is in the diſpoſal of Spirits. The Spirit of Nature will range their Plaſticks as certainly and orderly in the Regions of the World, as it does the matter it ſelf in all places. Whence that of Plotinus may fitly be underſtood, That a Soul enveigled in vitiouſneſs, both here and after death, according to her nature [...], is thruſt into the ſtate and place ſhe is, [...], as if ſhe were drawn thither by certain inviſible or Magical ſtrings of Natures own pulling. Thus is he pleaſed to expreſs this power or vertue of the Spirit of Nature in the Univerſe. But I think that tranſpoſition ſhe makes of them is rather [...], than either [...] or [...], a tranſvection of them, rather than pulſion or traction. But theſe are overn [...]ce Curioſities.

Pag. 101. As likely ſome things relating to the ſtate of Spirits, &c. That is to ſay, Spirits by the miniſtry of other Spirits may be carried into ſuch regions as the Spirit of Nature would not have tranſmitted them to, from the place [Page] where they were before, whether for good or evil. Of the latter kind whereof, I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak more particularly in my Notes on the next Chapter.

Pag. 102. Pill. 4. The ſouls of men are capable of living in other bodies beſides terreſtrial, &c. For the Pre-exiſtentiaries allow her ſucceſſively to have lived, firſt, in an Ethereal body, then in an Aereal; and laſtly, after the ſtate of Silence, to live in a Terreſtrial. And here I think, though it be ſomething early, it will not be amiſs to take notice what the Anti-pre-exiſtentiaries alledged againſt this Hypotheſis; for we ſhall have the leſs trouble afterwards.

Firſt, therefore, they ſay, That it does not become the Goodneſs of God to make Mans Soul with a triple Vital Congruity, that will fit as well an Aereal and Terreſtrial condition, as an Aethereal. For from hence it appears, that their Will was not ſo much in fault that they ſinned, as the conſtitution of their Eſſence: And they have the face to quote the account of Origen, pag. 49. for to ſtrengthen this their firſt Argument. The words are theſe: They being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this terreſtrial matter, it ſeems neceſſary according to the courſe of nature that they ſhould ſink into it, & ſo appear terreſtrial men. And therefore, ſay they, there being no deſcending into theſe earthly bodies without a lapſe or previous ſin, their very conſtitution neceſſitated them to ſin.

[Page] The ſecond Argument is, That this Hypotheſis is inconſiſtent with the bodies Reſurrection. For the Aereal bodie immediately ſucceeding the Terreſtrial, and the Aethereal the Aereal, the buſineſs is done, there needs no reſuſcitation of the Terreſtrial body to be glorified. Nor is it the ſame numerical body or fleſh ſtill, as it ought to be, if the Reſurrection-body be Aethereal.

The third is touching the Aereal Body; That if the ſoul after death be tyed to an Aereal body (and few or none attain to the Aethereal immediately after death) the ſouls of very good men will be forced to have their abode amongſt the very Devils. For their Prince is the Prince of the Air, as the Apoſtle calls him; and where can his ſubjects be, but where he is? So that they will be enforced to endure the companie of theſe foul Fiends; beſides all the incommodious changes in the Air, of Clouds, of Vapours, of Rain, Hail, Thunder, tearing Tempeſts and Storms; and what is an Image of Hell it ſelf, the darkneſs of Night will overwhelm them every four and twenty hours.

The fourth Argument is touching the Aethereal ſtate of Pre-exiſtence. For if ſouls when they were in ſo Heavenly and happy an eſtate could lapſe from it, what aſſurance can we have, when we are returned thither, that we ſhall abide in it? it being but the ſame Happineſs we were in before: and we having the [Page] ſame Plaſtick with its triple Vital Congruity, as we had before. Why therefore may we not lapſe as before?

The fifth and laſt Argument is taken from the ſtate of Silence. Wherein the Soul is ſuppoſed devoid of perception. And therefore their number being many, and their attraction to the place of conception in the Womb being merely Magical, and reaching many at a time, there would be many attracted at once; ſo that ſcarce a Foetus could be formed which would not be a multiform Monſter, or a cluſter of Humane Foetus's, not one ſingle Foetus. And theſe are thought ſuch weighty Arguments, that Pre-exiſtence muſt ſink and periſh under their preſſure. But, I believe, when we have weighed them in the balance of unprejudiced Reaſon, we ſhall find them light enough.

And truly, for the firſt; It is not only weak and ſlight, but wretchedly diſingenuous. The ſtrength of it is nothing but a maimed and fraudulent Quotation, which makes aſhew as if the Author of the Account of Origen, bluntly affirmed, without any thing more to do, that ſouls being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this terreſtrial matter, it ſeems neceſſary, according to the courſe of nature, that they ſhould ſink into it, and ſo appear terreſtrial men: Whenas if we take the whole Paragraph as it lies, before they caſt themſelves into [Page] this fatal neceſſity, they are declared to have a freedom of will, whereby they might have ſo managed their happy Eſtate they were created in, that they need never have faln. His words are theſe: What then remains, but that through the faulty and negligent uſe of themſelves, whilſt they were in ſome better condition of life, they rendred themſelves leſs pure in the whole extent of their powers, both Intellectual and Animal; and ſo by degrees became diſpoſed for the ſuſception of ſuch a degree of corporeal life, as was leſs pure, indeed, than the former; but exactly anſwerable to their preſent diſpoſition of Spirit. So that after certain Periods of time they might become far leſs fit to actuate any ſort of body, than the terreſtrial; and being originally made with a capacity to joyn with this too, and in it to exerciſe the Powers and functions of life, it ſeems neceſſary, &c.

Theſe are the very words of the Author of the Account of Origen, wherein he plainly affirms, that it was the fault of the Souls themſelves, that they did not order themſelves then right when they might have done ſo, that caſt them into this terreſtrial condition. But what an Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence is this, that will thus ſhameleſly falſifie and corrupt a Quotation of an ingenious Author, rather than he will ſeem to want an Argument againſt his Opinion! Wherefore briefly to anſwer to this Argument, It does as much become the Goodneſs [Page] of God to create ſouls with a triple Vital Congruity, as to have created Adam in Paradiſe with free Will, and a capacity of ſinning.

To the Second, the Pre-exiſtentiaries will anſwer, That it is no more abſurd to conceive (nor ſo much) that the ſoul after death hath an Airy body, or it may be ſome an Ethereal one, than to imagine them ſo highly happy after death without any body at all. For if they can act ſo fully and beatifically without any body, what need there be any Reſurrection of the body at all? And if it be moſt natural to the ſoul to act in ſome body, in what a long unnatural eſtate has Adams ſoul been, that ſo many thouſand years has been without a body? But for the ſoul to have a body, of which ſhe may be the [...], certainly is moſt natural, or elſe ſhe will be in an unnatural ſtate after the Reſurrection to all Eternitie. Whence it is manifeſt, that it is moſt natural for the ſoul, if ſhe act at all, to have a body to act in. And therefore, unleſs we will be ſo dull as to fall into the drouzie dream of the Pyſchopannychites, we are to allow the ſoul to have ſome kind of body or other till the very Reſurrection.

But thoſe now that are not Pſychopannychites, but allow good Souls the joys and glories of Paradiſe before the Reſurrection of the Body, let them be demanded to what end the ſoul ſhould have a Reſurrection-body; and what [Page] they would anſwer for themſelves, the Pre-exiſtentiaries will anſwer for their poſition that holds the Soul has an Aethereal body already, or an Aereal one which may be changed into an Aethereal body. If they will alledge any Concinnity in the buſineſs, or the firm promiſe of more highly compleating our Happineſs at the union of our terreſtrial bodies with our ſouls at the Reſurrection; This, I ſay, may be done as well ſuppoſing them to have bodies in the mean time as if they had none. For thoſe bodies they have made uſe of in the interval betwixt their Death and Reſurrection, may be ſo thin and dilute, that they may be no more conſiderable than an Interula is to a Royal Robe lined with rich Furrs, and embroidered with Gold. For ſuppoſe every mans bodie at the Reſurrection framed again out of its own duſt, bones, ſinews and fleſh, by the miraculous Power of God, were it not as eaſie for theſe ſubtile Spirits, as it is in the [...], to enter theſe bodies, and by the Divine Power aſſiſting, ſo to inactuate them, that that little of their Vehicle they brought in with them, ſhall no more deſtroy the individuation of the Body, than a draught of wine drunk in, does the individuation of our body now, though it were, immediately upon the drinking, actuated by the Soul. And the ſoul at the ſame inſtant actuating the whole Aggregate, it is exquiſitely the ſame numerical bodie, [Page] even to the utmoſt curioſity of the Schoolmen. But the Divine Aſſiſtance working in this, it is not to be thought that the ſoul will looſe by reſuming this Reſurrection-body, but that all will be turned into a more full and ſaturate Brightneſs and Glory, and that the whole will become an heavenly, ſpiritual, and truly glorified Body, immortal and incorruptible.

Nor does the being thus turned into an heavenly or ſpiritual Body, hinder it from being ſtill the ſame Numerical body, foraſmuch as one and the ſame Numerical matter, let it be under what modifications it will, is ſtill the ſame numerical matter or body; and it is groſs ignorance in Philoſophie that makes any conceive otherwiſe.

But a rude and ill-natured Oppoſer of Pre-exiſtence is not content that it be the ſame numerical body, but that this ſame numerical body be ſtill fleſh, peeviſhly and invidiouſly thereby to expoſe the Author of the Account of Origen, who, pag. 120. writes thus: That the bodie we now have, is therefore corruptible and mortal, becauſe it is fleſh; and therefore if it put on incorruption and immortality, it muſt put off it ſelf firſt, and ceaſe to be fleſh. But queſtionleſs that ingenious Writer underſtood this of natural [...]leſh and bloud, of which the Apoſtle declares, That fleſh and bloud cannot inherit the Kingdom of God. But as he ſays [Page] [...], There is a natural body and there is a ſpiritual body: So if he had made application of the ſeveral kinds of Fleſh he mentions, of Men, of Beaſts, of Fiſhes, and Birds, he would have preſently ſubjoyned. [...], There is a natural fleſh and there is a ſpiritual fleſh. And 'tis this ſpiritual Fleſh to which belongs incorruption and immortality, and which is capable of the Kingdom of Heaven. But for the [...], the natural fleſh, it muſt put off it ſelf, and ceaſe to be natural fleſh, before it can put on immortality and incorruption.

So little inconſiſtency is there of this Hypotheſis (as touching the ſouls acting in either an Aereal or Aethereal Vehicle, during the interval betwixt the Reſurrection and her departure hence) with the Reſurrection of the bodie. But in the mean time, there is a ſtrong bar thereby put to the dull dream of the Pſychopanychiles, and other harſhneſſes alſo eaſed or ſmoothed by it.

Now as for the third Argument, which muſt needs ſeem a great Scare-crow to the illiterate, there is very little weight or none at all in it. For if we take but notice of the whole Atmoſphere, what is the dimenſion thereof, and of the three Regions into which it is diſtributed, all theſe Bugbears will vaniſh. As for the Dimenſion of the whole Atmoſphere, it is by the skilful reputed about fifty to Italick miles [Page] high, the Convex of the middle Region thereof about four ſuch miles, the Concave about half a mile. Now this diſtribution of the Air into theſe three Regions being thus made, and the Hebrew tongue having no other name to call the Expanſum about us, but [...] Heaven, here is according to them a diſtribution of Heaven into three, and the higheſt Region will be part of the third Heaven.

This therefore premiſed, I anſwer, That though the ſouls of good men after death be detained within the Atmoſphere of the Air, (and the Air it ſelf haply may reach much higher than this Atmoſphere that is bounded by the mere aſcent of exhalations and vapours) yet there is no neceſſity at all that they ſhould be put to thoſe inconveniencies, which this Argument pretends, from the company of Devils, or incommodious changes and diſturbances of the Air. For ſuppoſe ſuch inconveniencies in the middle and loweſt Region, yet the upper Region, which is alſo part of the third Heaven, thoſe parts are ever calm and ſerene. And the Devils Principality reaching no further than through the middle and loweſt Region next the earth, (not to advertiſe that his quarters may be reſtrained there alſo) the ſouls of the departed that are good, are not liable to be peſter'd and haunted with the ungrateful Preſence or Occurſions of the deformed and grim Retinue, or of the vagrant vaſſals [Page] of that foul Feind, that is Prince of the Air, he being onely ſo of theſe lower parts thereof, and the good ſouls having room enough to conſociate together in the upper Region of it.

Nor does that promiſe of our Saviour to the thief on the Croſs, that that very day he ſhould be with him in Paradiſe, at all claſh with this Hypotheſis of Aereal Bodies, both becauſe Chriſt by his miraculous power might confer that upon the penitent thief his fellowſufferer, which would not fall to the ſhare of other penitents in a natural courſe of things; and alſo becauſe this third Region of the Air may be part of Paradiſe it ſelf: (In my Fathers houſe there are many Manſions) and ſome learned men have declared Paradiſe to be in the Air, but ſuch a part of the Air as is free from groſs Vapours and Clouds; and ſuch is the third Region thereof. In the mean time we ſee the ſouls of good men departed, freed from thoſe Panick fears of being infeſted either by the unwelcome company of Fiends and Devils, or incommodated by any dull cloudy obſcurations, or violent and tempeſtuous motions of the Air.

Onely the ſhadowy Vale of the Night will be caſt over them once in a Nycthemeron. But what incommodation is that, after the brisk active heat of the Sun in the day-time, to have the variety of the more mild beams of the [Page] Moon, or gentle, though more quick and chearful, ſcintillations of the twinkling Stars? This variety may well ſeem an addition to the felicity of their ſtate. And the ſhadowyneſs of the Night may help them in the more compoſing Introverſions of their contemplative mind, and caſt the ſoul into ineffably pleaſing ſlumbers and Divine extaſies; ſo that the tranſactions of the Night may prove more ſolacing and beatifick ſometimes, than thoſe of the day. Such things we may gueſs at afar off, but in the mean time be ſure, that theſe good and ſerious Souls know how to turn all that God ſends to them to the improvement of their Happineſs.

To the fourth Argument we anſwer, That there are not a few reaſons from the nature of the thing that may beget in us a ſtrong preſumption that ſouls recovered into their Celeſtial Happineſs will never again relapſe, though they did once.

For firſt, it may be a miſtake that the Happineſs is altogether the ſame that it was before. For our firſt Paradiſiacal Bodies from which we lapſed, might be of a more crude and dilute Aether, not ſo full and ſaturate with Heavenly glory and perfection as our Reſurrection-body is.

Secondly, The ſoul was then unexperienced, and lightly coming by that Happineſs ſhe was in, did the more heedleſsly forgo it, before [Page] ſhe was well aware; and her mind roved after new adventures, though ſhe knew not what.

Thirdly, It is to be conſidered, whether Regeneration be not a ſtronger tenour for enduring Happineſs, than the being created happie. For this being wrought ſo by degrees upon the Plaſtick, [...], with ineffable groans and piercing deſires after that Divine Life, that the Spirit of God co-operating exciteth in us; when Regeneration is perfected and wrought to the full by theſe ſtrong Agonies, this may rationally be deemed a deeper tincture in the ſoul than that ſhe had by mere Creation, whereby the ſoul did indeed become Holy, innocent and happie, but not coming to it with any ſuch ſtrong previous conflicts and eager workings and thirſtings after that ſtate, it might not be ſo firmly rooted by far as in Regeneration begun and accompliſhed by the operation of Gods Spirit, gradually but more deeply renewing the Divine Image in us.

Fourthly, It being a renovation of our Nature into a priſtine ſtate of ours, the ſtrength and depth of impreſſion ſeems increaſed upon that account alſo.

Fifthly, The remembrance of all the hardſhips we underwent in our lapſed condition, whether of Mortification or croſs Rancounters, this muſt likewiſe help us to perſevere when once returned to our former Happineſs.

[Page] Sixthly, The comparing of the evanid pleaſures of our lapſed or terreſtrial life, with the fulneſs of thoſe Joys that we find ſtill in our heavenly, will keep us from ever having any hankering after them any more.

Seventhly, The certain knowledge of everlaſting puniſhment, which if not true, they could not know, muſt be alſo another ſure bar to any ſuch negligencies as would hazard their ſetled felicity. Which may be one reaſon why the irreclaimable are eternally puniſhed, namely, that it may the better ſecure eternal Happineſs to others.

Eighthly, Though we have our triple Vital Congruity ſtill, yet the Plaſtick life is ſo throughly ſatisfied with the Reſurrection-body, which is ſo conſiderably more full and ſaturate with all the heavenly richneſs and Glorie than the former, that the Plaſtick of the ſoul is as entirely taken up with this one Bodie, as if ſhe enjoyed the pleaſures of all three bodies at once, Aethereal, Aereal, and Terreſtrial.

And laſtly, Which will ſtrike all ſure, He that is able to ſave to the utmoſt, and has promiſed us eternal life, is as true as able, and therefore cannot fail to perform it. And who can deny but that we in this State I have deſcribed, are as capable of being fixed there, and confirmed therein, as the Angels were after Lucifer and others had faln?

And now to the fifth and laſt Argument againſt [Page] the ſtate of Silence, I ſay it is raiſed out of mere ignorance of the moſt rational as well as moſt Platonical way of the ſouls immediate deſcent [...]. For the firſt Mover or ſtirrer in this matter, I mean in the formation of the Foetus, is the Spirit of Nature, the great [...] of the Univerſe, to whom Plotinus ſomewhere attributes [...] The firſt Predelineations and prodrome Irradiations into the matter, before the particular ſoul, it is preparing for, come into it. Now the Spirit of Nature being ſuch a ſpirit as contains Spermatically or Vitally all the Laws contrived by the Divine Intellect, for the management of the Matter of the World, and of all Eſſences elſe unperceptive, or quatenus unperceptive, for the good of the Univerſe; we have all the reaſon in the world to ſuppoſe this Vital or Spermatical Law is amongſt the reſt, viz. That it tranſmit but one ſoul to one prepared conception. Which will therefore be as certainly done, unleſs ſome rare and odd caſualty intervene, as if the Divine Intellect it ſelf did do it. Wherefore one and the ſame Spirit of Nature which prepares the matter by ſome general Predelineation, does at the due time tranſmit ſome one ſoul in the ſtate of Silence by ſome particularizing Laws (that fetch in ſuch a ſoul rather than ſuch, but moſt ſure but one, unleſs as I ſaid ſome ſpecial caſualty happen) into the prepared Matter, acting [Page] at two places at once according to its Synenergetical vertue or power.

Hence therefore it is plain, that there will be no ſuch cluſters of Foetus's and monſtrous deformities from this Hypotheſis of the ſouls being in a ſtate of Silence. But for one to ſhuffle off ſo fair a ſatisfaction to this difficulty, by a precarious ſuppoſing there is no ſuch Being as the Spirit of Nature, when it is demonſtrable by ſo many irrefragable Arguments that there is, is a Symptome of one that philoſophizes at random, not as Reaſon guides. For that is no reaſon againſt the exiſtence of the Spirit of Nature, becauſe ſome define it A Subſtance incorporeal, but without ſenſe and animadverſion, &c. as if a ſpirit without ſenſe and animadverſion were a contradiction. For that there is a Spirit of Nature is demonſtrable, though whether it have no ſenſe at all is more dubitable. But though it have no ſenſe or perception, it is no contradiction to its being a Spirit, as may appear from Dr. H. Mores Brief Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit. To which I direct the Reader for ſatisfaction, I having already been more prolix in anſwering theſe Arguments than I intended. But I hope I have made my preſage true, that they would be found to have no force in them to overthrow the Hypotheſis of a threefold Vital Congruity in the Plaſtick of the ſoul. So that this fourth Pillar, for any execution they can do, will ſtand unſhaken.

[Page] Pag. 103. For in all ſenſation there is corporeal motion, &c. And beſides, there ſeems an eſſential relation of the Soul to Body, according to Ariſtotles definition thereof, he defining it [...], that which actuates the boby. Which therefore muſt be idle when it has nothing to actuate, as a Piper muſt be ſilent, as to piping, if he have no Pipe to play on.

Chap. 14. pag. 113. The ignobler and lower properties or the life of the body were languid and remiſs, viz. as to their proper exerciſes or acting for themſelves, or as to their being regarded much by the Soul that is taken up with greater matters, or as to their being much reliſhed, but in ſubſerviency to the enjoyment of thoſe more Divine and ſublime Objects; as the Author intimates towards the end of his laſt Pillar.

Pag. 114. And the Plaſtick had nothing to do but to move this paſſive and eaſie body, &c. It may be added, and keep it in its due form and ſhape. And it is well added [accordingly as the concerns of the higher faculties required] For the Plaſtick by reaſon of its Vital Union with the vehicle, is indeed the main inſtrument of the motion thereof. But it is the Imperium of the Perceptive that both excites and guides its motion. Which is no wonder it can do, they being both but one ſoul.

Pag. 114. To pronounce the place to be the [Page]Sun, &c. Which is as rationally gueſſed by them, as if one ſhould fancy all the Fellows and Students Chambers in a Colledge to be contained within the area of the Hearth in the Hall, and the reſt of the Colledge uninhabited. For the Sun is but a common Focus of a Vortex, and is leſs by far to the Vortex, than the Hearth to the Ichnographie of the whole Colledge, that I may not ſay little more than a Tennis-ball to the bigneſs of the earth.

Pag. 115. Yet were we not immutably ſo, &c. But this mutability we were placed in, was not without a proſpect of a more full confirmation and greater accumulation of Happineſs at the long run, as I intimated above.

Pag. 116. We were made on ſet purpoſe defatigable, that ſo all degrees of life, &c. We being ſuch Creatures as we are and finite, and taking in the enjoyment of thoſe infinitely perfect and glorious Objects onely pro modulo noſtro, according to the ſcantneſs of our capacity, diverſion to other Objects may be an eaſe and relief. From whence the promiſe of a glorified body in the Chriſtian Religion, as it is moſt grateful, ſo appears moſt rational. But in the mean time it would appear moſt irrational to believe we ſhall have eyes and ears and other organs of external ſenſe, and have no ſuitable Objects to entertain them.

Pag. 117. Yea, methinks 'tis but a reaſonable reward to the body, &c. This is ſpoken ſomething [Page] popularly and to the ſenſe of the vulgar, that imagine the body to feel pleaſure and pain, whenas it is the ſoul onely that is perceptive and capable of feeling either. But 'tis fit the body ſhould be kept in due plight for the lawful and allowable corporeal enjoyments the ſoul may reap therefrom for ſeaſonable diverſion.

Pag. 117, That that is executed which he hath ſo determined, &c. Some fancy this may be extended to the enjoying of the fruits of the Invigouration of all the three Vital Congruities of the Plaſtick, and that for a ſoul orderly and in due time and courſe to paſs through all theſe diſpenſations, provided ſhe keep her ſelf ſincere towards her Maker, is not properly any lapſe or ſin, but an harmleſs experiencing all the capacities of enjoying themſelves that God has beſtowed upon them. Which will open a door to a further Anſwer touching the reſt of the Planets being inhabited, namely, That they may be inhabited by ſuch kind of [...]ouls as theſe, who therefore want not the Knowledge and aſſiſtance of a Redeemer. And ſo the earth may be the onely Noſocomium of ſinfully lapſed ſouls. This may be an anſwer to ſuch far-fetched Objections till they can prove the contrarie.

Pag. 118. Adam cannot withſtand the inordinate appetite, &c. Namely, after his own remiſſneſs and heedleſſneſs in ordering himſelf, [Page] he had brought himſelf to ſuch a wretched weakneſs.

Pag. 121. The Plaſtick faculties begin now fully to awaken, &c. There are three Vital Congruities belonging to the Plaſtick of the Soul, and they are to awake orderly, that is, to operate one after another downward and upward, that is to ſay, In the lapſe, the Aereal follows the Aethereal, the Terreſtrial the Aereal. But in their Recovery or Emergency out of the lapſe, The Aereal follows the Terreſtrial, and the Aethereal the Aereal. But however, a more groſs turgency to Plaſtick operation may haply ariſe at the latter end of the Aereal Period, which may be as it were the diſeaſe of the ſoul in that ſtate, and which may help to turn her out of it into the ſtate of Silence, and is it ſelf for the preſent ſilenced therewith. For where there is no union with bodie, there is no operation of the Soul.

Pag. 121. For it hath an aptneſs and propenſity to act in a Terreſtrial body, &c. This aptneſs and fitneſs it has in the ſtate of Silence▪ according to that eſſential order of things interwoven into its own nature, and into the nature of the Spirit of the World, or great Archeus of the Univerſe, according to the eternal counſel of the Divine Wiſdom. By which Law and appoyntment the ſoul will as certainly have a fitneſs and propenſity at its leaving the Terreſtrial body to actuate an Aereal one.

[Page] Pag. 122. Either by mere natural Congruity, the diſpoſition of the ſoul of the world, or ſome more ſpontaneous agent, &c. Natural Congruity and the diſpoſal of the Plaſtick ſoul of the world (which others call the Spirit of Nature) may be joyned well together in this Feat, the Spirit of Nature attracting ſuch a ſoul as is moſt congruous to the predelineated Matter which it has prepared for her. But as for the ſpontaneous Agent, I ſuppoſe, he may underſtand his miniſtry in ſome ſupernatural Birth. Unleſs he thinks that ſome Angels or Genii may be imployed in putting ſouls into bodies, as Gardiners are in ſetting Peaſe and Beans in the beds of Gardens. But certainly they muſt be no good Genii then that have any hand in aſſiſting or ſetting ſouls in ſuch wombs as have had to do with Adulterie, Inceſt, and Buggery.

Pag. 123. But ſome apiſh ſhews and imitations of Reaſon, Vertue and Religion, &c. The Reaſon of the unregenerate in Divine things is little better than thus, and Vertue and Religion which is not from that Principle which revives in us in real Regeneration, are, though much better than ſcandalous vice and profaneſs, mere pictures and ſhadows of what they pretend to.

Pag. 123. To its old celeſtial abode, &c. For we are Pilgrims and ſtrangers here on the earth, as the holy Patriarchs of old declared. [Page] And they that ſpeak ſuch things, ſaith the Apoſtle, plainly ſhew [...], that they ſeek their native country, for ſo [...] properly ſignifies. And truly if they had been mindful of that earthly country out of which they came, they might, ſaith he, have had opportunity of returning. But now they deſire a better, to wit, an heavenly, Hebr. 11.

Pag. 124. But that they ſtep forth again into Airy Vehicles. This is their natural courſe, as I noted above. But the examples of Enoch and Elias, and much more of our ever Bleſſed Saviour, are extraordinary and ſupernatural.

Pag. 125. Thoſe therefore that paſs out of theſe bodies before their Terreſtrial Congruity be ſpoyled, weakened, or orderly unwound, according to the tenour of this Hypotheſis, &c. By the favour of this ingenious Writer, this Hypotheſis does not need any ſuch obnoxious Appendage as this, viz. That ſouls that are outed theſe Terreſtrial bodies before their Terreſtrial Congruity be ſpoiled, weakned, or orderly unwound, return into the ſtate of Inactivity. But this is far more conſonant both to Reaſon and Experience or Storie, that though the Terreſtrial Congruity be ſtill vigorous, as not having run out it may be the half part, no not the tenth part of its Period, the ſoul immediately upon the quitting of this body is inveſted with a bodie of Air, and is in the ſtate of Activity [Page] not of Silence in no ſenſe. For ſome being murdered have in all likelyhood in their own perſons complained of their murderers, as it is in that ſtory of Anne Walker; and there are many others of the ſame nature.

And beſides, it is far more reaſonable, there being ſuch numerous multitudes of ſilent ſouls, that their leaſt continuance in theſe Terreſtrial bodies ſhould at their departure be as it were a Magical Kue or Teſſera forthwith to the Aereal Congruity of life to begin to act its part upon the ceaſing of the other, that more ſouls may be rid out of the ſtate of Silence. Which makes it more probable that every ſoul that is once beſmeared with the unctuous moiſture of the Womb, ſhould as it were by a Magick Oyntment be carried into the Air (though it be of a ſtill-born Infant) than that any ſhould return into the ſtate of Silence or Inactivity upon the pretence of the remaining vigour of the Terreſtrial Congruity of life. For theſe Laws are not by any conſequential neceſſity, but by the free counſel of the Eternal Wiſdom of God conſulting for the beſt.

And therefore this being ſo apparently for the beſt, this Law is interwoven into the Spirit of the World and every particular ſoul, that upon the ceaſing of her Terreſtrial Union, her Aereal Congruity of life ſhould immediately operate, and the Spirit of Nature aſſiſting, ſhe ſhould be dreſt in Aereal robes, and be found [Page] among the Inhabitants of thoſe Regions. If ſouls ſhould be remanded back into the ſtate of Silence that depart before the Terreſtrial Period of Vital Congruity be orderly unwound, ſo very few reach the end of that Period, that they muſt in a manner all be turned into the ſtate of Inactivity. Which would be to weave Penelope's Web, to do and undo becauſe the day is long enough, as the Proverb is, when▪ as it rather ſeems too ſhort, by reaſon of the numeroſity of Silent ſouls that expect their turn of Recovery into Life.

Pag. 125. But onely follow the clew of this Hypotheſis. The Hypotheſis requires no ſuch thing, but it rather claſhes with the firſt and chiefeſt Pillar thereof, viz. That all the Divine deſigns and actions are laid and carried on by Infinite Goodneſs. And I have already intimated how much better it is to be this way that I am pleading for, than that of this otherwiſe-ingenious Writer.

Pag. 125. Since by long and hard exerciſe in this body, the Plaſtick Life is well tamed and debilitated, &c. But this is not at all neceſſary▪ no not in thoſe ſouls whoſe Plastick may be deemed the moſt rampant. Diſ-union from this Terreſtrial body immediately tames it, I mean, the Terreſtrial Congruity of Life; and it [...] operation is ſtopt, as ſurely as a ſtring of a Lut [...] never ſo ſmartly vibrated is ſtreightways ſilenced by a gentle touch of the finger, and another [Page] ſingle ſtring may be immediately made to ſound alone, while the other is mute and ſilent. For, I ſay, theſe are the free Laws of the Eternal Wiſdom, but fatally and vitally, not intellectually implanted in the Spirit of Nature, and in all Humane Souls or Spirits. The whole Univerſe is as it were the Automatal Harp of that great and true Apollo; and as for the general ſtriking of the ſtrings and ſtopping their vibrations, they are done with as exquiſite art as if a free intellectual Agent plaid upon them. But the Plaſtick powers in the world are not ſuch, but onely Vital and Fatal, as I ſaid before.

Pag. 126. That an Aereal body was not enough for it to diſplay its force upon, &c. It is far more ſafe and rational to ſay, that the ſoul deſerts her Aereal Eſtate by reaſon that the Period of the Vital Congruity is expired, which according to thoſe fatal Laws I ſpoke of before is determined by the Divine Wiſdom. But whether a ſoul may do any thing to abbreviate this Period, and excite ſuch ſymptoms in the Plaſtick as may ſhorten her continuance in that ſtate, let it be left to the more inquiſitive to define.

Pag. 128. Where is then the difference betwixt the juſt and the wicked, in ſtate, place, and body? Their difference in place I have ſufficiently ſhewn, in my Anſwer to the third Argument againſt the triple Congruity of Life in the [Page] Plaſtick of Humane Souls, how fitly they may be diſpoſed of in the Air. But to the rude Buffoonry of that crude Oppoſer of the Opinion of Pre-exiſtence, I made no Anſwer. It being methinks ſufficiently anſwered in the Scholia upon Sect. 12. Cap. 3. Lib. 3. of Dr. H. Mores Immortalitas Animae, if the Reader think it worth his while to conſult the place▪ Now for State and Body the difference is obvious. The Vehicle is of more pure Air, and the Conſcience more pure of the one than of the other.

Pag. 130. For according to this Hypotheſis, the gravity of thoſe bodies is leſs, becauſe the quantity of the earth that draws them is ſo, &c. This is an ingenious invention both to ſalve that Phaenomenon, why Bodies in Mines and other deep ſubterraneous places ſhould ſeem not ſo heavy nor hard to lift there, as they are in the ſuperiour Air above the earth; and alſo to prove that the cruſt of the earth is not of ſo conſiderable a thickneſs as men uſually conceive it is. I ſay, it is ingenious, but not ſo firm and ſure. The Quick-ſilver in a Torricellian Tube will ſink deeper in an higher or clearer Air, though there be the ſame Magnetiſm of the earth under it that was before. But this is not altogether ſo fit an illuſtration, there being another cauſe than I drive at conjoyned thereto.

But that which I drive at is ſufficient of it [Page] ſelf to ſalve this Phaenomenon. A Bucket of water, while it is in the water comes up with eaſe to him that draws it at the Well; but ſo ſoon as it comes into the Air, though there be the ſame earth under it that there was before, it feels now exceeding more weighty. Of which I conceive the genuine reaſon is, becauſe the Spirit of Nature, which ranges all things in their due order, acts proportionately ſtrongly to reduce them thereto, as they are more heterogeniouſly and diſproportionately placed as to their conſiſtencies. And therefore by how much more craſs and ſolid a body is above that in which it is placed, by ſo much the ſtronger effort the Spirit of Nature uſes to reduce it to its right place; but the leſs it exceeds the craſſneſs of the Element it is in, the effort is the leſs or weaker.

Hence therefore it is, that a ſtone or ſuch like body in thoſe ſubterraneous depths ſeems leſs heavy, becauſe the air there is ſo groſs and thick, and is not ſo much diſproportionate to the groſſneſs of the ſtone as our air above the earth here is; nor do I make any doubt, but if the earth were all cut away to the very bottom of any of theſe Mines, ſo that the Air might be of the ſame conſiſtency with ours, the ſtone would then be as heavy as it is uſually to us in this ſuperioor ſurface of the earth. So that this is no certain Argument for the proving that the cruſt of the earth is of ſuch [Page] thinneſs as this Author would have it, though I do not queſtion but that it is thin enough.

Pag. 131. And the mention of the Fountains of the great Deep in the Sacred Hiſtory, &c. This is a more conſiderable Argument for the thinneſs of the cruſt of the earth; and I muſt confeſs I think it not improbable but that there is an Aqueous hollow Sphaericum, which is the Baſis of this habitable earth, according to that of Pſalm 24. 2. For he hath founded it upon the ſeas, and eſtabliſhed it upon the flouds.

Pag. 131. Now I intend not that after a certain diſtance all is fluid matter to the Centre; That is to ſay, After a certain diſtance of earthly Matter, that the reſt ſhould be fluid Matter, namely, Water and Air, to the Centre, &c. But here his intention is directed by that veneration he has for Des Cartes. Otherwiſe I believe if he had freely examined the thing to the bottom, he would have found it more reaſonable to conclude all fluid betwixt the Concave of the Terreſtrial Cruſt and the Centre of the Earth, as we uſually phraſe it, though nothing be properly Earth but that Cruſt.

Pag. 131. Which for the moſt part very likely is a groſs and foetid kind of air, &c. On this ſide of the Concave of the Terreſtrial Cruſt there may be ſeveral Hollows of foetid air and ſtagnant water, which may be ſo many particular lodgings for lapſed and unruly Spirits [Page] But there is moreover a conſiderable Aqueous Sphaericum upon which the earth is founded, and is moſt properly the Abyſs; but in a more comprehenſive notion, all from the Convex thereof to the Centre may be termed the Abyſs, or the Deepeſt place that touches our imagination.

Pag. 131. The loweſt and central Regions may be filled with flame and aether, &c. That there was the Reliques of a Sun after the Incruſtation of the Earth and Aqueous Orb, is according to this Hypotheſis reaſonable enough. And a kind of Air and Aether betwixt this diminiſhed Sun and the Concave of this Aqueous Orb, but no craſs and opake concamerations of hard Matter interpoſed betwixt.

Which is an Hypotheſis the moſt kind to the ingenious Author of Telluris Theoria Sacra, that he could wiſh. For he holding that there was for almoſt two thouſand years an opake earthy Cruſt over this Aqueous Orb unbroke till the Deluge, which he aſcribes to the breaking thereof, it was neceſſary there ſhould be no opake Orb betwixt the Central Fire and this Aqueous Orb; for elſe the Fiſhes for ſo long a time had lived in utter darkneſs, having eyes to no purpoſe, nor ability to guide their way or hunt their prey. Onely it is ſuppoſed, which is eaſie to do, that they then ſwam with their backs toward the Centre, whenas as now [Page] they ſwim with their bellies thitherward; they then plying near the Concave, as now near the Convex of this watry Abyſs. Which being admitted, the difference of their poſture will neceſſarilly follow according to the Laws of Nature, as were eaſie to make out, but that I intend brevity in theſe Annotations.

Onely I cannot forbear by the way to advertiſe how probable it is that this Central Fire which ſhone clear enough to give light to the Fiſhes ſwimming near the Concave of this Watry Orb, might in proceſs of time grow dimmer and dimmer, and exceeding much abate of its light, by that time the Cruſt of the Earth broke and let in the light of the Sun of this great Vortex into this Watry Region, within which, viz. in the Air or Aether there, there has been ſtill a decay of light, the Air or Aether growing more thick as well as that little Central Fire or Sun, being more and more inveloped with fuliginous ſtuff about it. So that the whole Concavity may ſeem moſt like a vaſt duskiſh Vault, and this dwindling overclouded Sun a Sepulchral Lamp, ſuch as, if I remember right, was found in the Monuments of Olybius and Tulliola. An hideous diſmal forlorn Place, and fit Receptacle for the Methim and Rephaim.

And the Latin Tranſlation, Job 26. 5. excellently well accords with this ſad Phaenomenon. Ecce Gigantes gemunt ſub Aquis, & qui [Page]habitant cum eis. Here is that [...], or [...], as Symmachus tranſlates the word. And it follows in the verſe, Nudus eſt Infernus coram eo, Hell is naked before God. And Symmachus in other places of the Proverbs puts [...] and [...] together, which therefore is the moſt proper and the nethermoſt Hell. And it will be [...] in the higheſt ſenſe, whenever this lurid Light (as it ſeems probable to me it ſometime will be) is quite extinct, and this Central Fire turned into a Terrella, as it may ſeem to have already happened in Saturn. But we muſt remember, as the Author ſometimes reminds us, that we are embelliſhing but a Romantick Hypotheſis, and be ſure we admit no more than Reaſon, Scripture, and the Apoſtolick Faith will allow.

Pag. 132. Are after death committed to thoſe ſqualid ſubterraneous Habitations, &c. He ſeems to ſuppoſe that all the wicked and degerate ſouls are committed hither, that they may be leſs troubleſom to better ſouls in this air above the earth. But conſidering the Devil is call'd the Prince of the Air, & that he has his Clients and Subjects in the ſame place with him; we may well allow the lower Regions of the Air to him, and to ſome wicked or unregenerate ſouls promiſcuouſly with him, though there be ſubterraneous Receptacles for the worſt and moſt rebellious of them, and not ſend them all packing thither.

[Page] Pag. 132. That they are driven into thoſe Dungeons by the inviſible Miniſters of Juſtice, &c. He ſpeaks of ſuch Dungeons as are in the broken Caverns of the Farth, which may be ſo many vexatious Receptacles for rebellious Spirits which theſe inviſible Miniſters of Juſtice may drive them into, and ſee them commited; and being confined there upon far ſeverer penalties if they ſubmit not to that preſent puniſhment which they are ſentenced to, they will out of fear of greater Calamity be in as ſafe cuſtody as if they were under lock and key. But the moſt diſmal penalty is to be carried into the Abyſs, the place of the Rephaim I above deſcribed. This is a moſt aſtoniſhing commination to them, and they extreamly dread that ſentence. Which makes the Devils, Luke 8. 31. ſo earneſtly beſeech Chriſt that he would not command them [...] to pack away into the Abyſs.

This puniſhment therefore of the Abyſs where the Rephaim or [...] groan, is door and lock that makes them, whether they will or no, ſubmit to all other puniſhments and confinements on this ſide of it. Michael Pſellus takes ſpecial notice how the Daemons are frighted with the menaces [...], with the menaces of the ſending them away packing into the Abyſs and ſubterraneous places. But theſe may ſignifie no more than Cavities that are in the ruptues of the [Page] earth, and they may ſteal out again if they will adventure, unleſs they were perpetually watched, which is not ſo probable. Wherefore they are impriſoned through fear of that great horrid Abyſs above deſcribed, and which as I ſaid is an iron lock and door of braſs upon them.

But then you will ſay, What is the door and lock to this terrible place? I anſwer, The inviolable Adamantine Laws of the great Sandalphon or Spirit of the Ʋniverſe. When once a rebellious Spirit is carried down by a Miniſter of Juſtice into this Abyſs, he can no more return of himſelf, than a man put into a Well fortie [...]athoms deep is able of himſelf to aſcend out of it.

The unlapſed Spirits, it is their priviledge that their Vehicles are wholly obedient to the will of the Spirit that inactuates them, and therefore they have free ingreſs and egreſs every where; and being ſo little paſſive as they are, and ſo quick and ſwift in their motions, can perform any Miniſtries with little or no incommodation to themſelves. But the Vehicles of lapſed Spirits are more paſſive, and they are the very chains whereby they are tyed to certain Regions by the iron Laws of the Spirit of the Univerſe, or Hylarchick Principle, that unfailingly ranges the Matter everie where according to certain orders. Wherefore this Serjeant of Juſtice having once depoſited his Priſoner within [Page] the Concave of the Aqueous Orb, he will be as certainly kept there, and never of himſelf get out again, as the man in the bottom of the Well above-mentioned, For the Laws of the ſame Spirit of Nature that keeps the man at the bottom of the Well (that everie thing may be placed according to the meaſure of its conſiſtencie) will inhibit this Captive from ever returning to this Superiour Air again, becauſe his Vehicle is, though foul enough, yet much thinner than the Water; and there will be the the ſame ranging of things on the Concave ſide of the Aqueous Orb, as there is on the Convex.

So that if we could ſuppoſe the Ring about Saturn inhabited with any living creatures, they would be born toward the Concave of the Ring as well as toward the Convex, and walk as ſteadily as we and our Antipodes do with our feet on this and that ſide of the earth one againſt another. This may ſerve for a brief intimation of the reaſon of the thing, and the intelligent will eaſily make out the reſt themſelves, and underſtand what an ineluctable fate and calamity it is to be carried into that duſkiſh place of dread and horrour, when once the Angel that has the Keys of the Abyſs or bottomleſs pit has ſhut a rebellious Spirit up there, & chained him in that hideous Dungeon.

Pag. 133. Others to the Dungeon, and ſome to the moſt intolerable Hell the Abyſs of fire. The Dungeon here, if it wer [...] underſtood with an [Page] Emphaſis, would moſt properly denote the Dungeon of the Rephaim, of which thoſe parts neareſt the Centre may be called the Abyſs of Fire more properly than any Vulcano's in the Cruſt of the earth. Thoſe ſouls therefore that have been of a more fierce and fiery nature, and the Cauſers of Violence and Bloodſhed, and of furious Wars and cruel Perſecutions of innocent and harmleſs men, when they are committed to this Dungeon of the Rephaim, by thoſe inevitable Laws of the ſub [...]eraqueous Sandalphon, or Demogorgon if you will, they will be ranged neareſt the Central Fire of this Helliſh Vault. For the Vehicles of [...]ouls ſymbolizing with the temper of the mind, thoſe who are moſt haughty, ambitious, fier [...]e, and fiery, and therefore, out of Pride and contempt of others in reſpect of themſelves and their own Intereſt, make nothing of ſhedding innocent bloud, or cruelly handling thoſe that are not for their turn, but are faithful adherers to their Maker, the Vehicles of theſe being more thin and fiery than theirs who have tranſgreſſed in the Concap [...]c [...]ble, they muſt needs ſurmount ſuch in order of place, and be moſt remote from the Concave of the Aqueous Orb under which the Rephaim groan, and ſo be placed at leaſt the neareſt to that Abyſs of Fire, which our Author terms the moſt intolerable Hell.

Pag. 133. Have a ſtrict and careful eye upon them, to keep them within the confines of their [Page]Goal, &c. That this, as it is a more tedious Province, ſo a needleſs one, I have intimated above, by reaſon that the fear of being carried into the Abyſs will effectually detain them in their confinements. From whence if they be not releaſed in time, the very place they are in may ſo change their Vehicles, that it may in a manner grow natural to them, and make them as uncapable of the Superiour Air as Bats and Owls are, as the ingenious Author notes, to bear the Suns Noon-day-Beams, or the Fiſh to live in theſe thinner Regions.

Pag. 134. Ʋnder ſevere penalties prohibit all unlicenſed excurſions into the upper World, though I confeſs this ſeems not ſo probable, &c. The Author ſeems to reſerve all the Air above the earth to good ſouls onely, and that if any [...]ad ones appear, it muſt [...]e by either ſtealth or licenſe. But why bad ſouls may not be in this lower Region of the Air as well as Devils, I underſtand not. Nor do I conceive but that the Kingdom of Darkneſs may make ſuch Laws amongſt themſelves, as may tend to the eaſe and ſafety of thoſe of the Kingdom of Light. Not out of any good-will to them, but that themſelves may not further ſmart for it if they give licenſe to ſuch and ſuch exorbitancies. For they are capable of pain and puniſhment, and though they are permitted in the world, yet they are abſolutely under the power of the Almighty, and of the Grand Miniſter [Page] of his Kingdom, the glorious Soul of the Meſſiah.

Pag. 137. The internal Central Fire ſhould have got ſuch ſtrength and irreſiſtible vigour, &c. But how or from whence, is very hard to concei [...]e: I ſhould rather ſuſpect, as I noted above, that the Fire will more and more decay till it turn at laſt to a kind of Terrella, like that obſerved within the Ring of Saturn, and the Dungeon become utter Darkneſs, where there will be weeping and wailing and gnaſhing of teeth, as well as in the furnace of Fire.

Pag. 141. And ſo following the Laws of its proper motion ſhall fly away out of this Vortex, &c. This looks like an [...]eedleſs miſtake of this ingenious Writer, who though he ſpeak the language of Carteſius, ſeems here not to have recalled to mind his Principles. For the Earth according to his Principles is never like to become a Sun again. Nor if it had ſo become, would it then become a Comet. Foraſmuch as Comets according to his Philoſophie are incr [...] ſtated Suns, and Planets or Earths in a manner, and ſo to be deemed ſo ſoon as they ſettle in any Vortex, and take their courſe about the Centre thereof. Nor if the Earth become a Sun again, is it like to leave our Vortex according to the Carteſian Principles, but rather be ſwallowed down into the Sun of our Vortex, and increaſe his magnitude; the ranging of the Planets according to Des Cartes Mechanical [Page] Laws being from the difference of their ſolidities, and the leaſt ſolid next to the Sun. Whither then can this Sol redivivus or the Earth turned wholly into the Materia ſubtiliſſima again be carried, but into the Sun it ſelf? This ſeems moſt likely, eſpecially if we conſider this Sol Redivious or the Earth turned all into the Materia ſubtiliſſima, in itſelf. But if we take into our conſideration its particular Vortex which carries about the Moon, the buſineſs may bear a further debate which will require more time than to be entred upon here. But it ſeems plain at firſt ſight, that though this Sol Redivivus ſhould by vertue of its particular Vortex be kept from being ſwallowed down into the Sun and Centre of the great Vortex, yet it will never be able to get out of this great Vortex, according to the frame of Des Cartes Philoſophy. So that there will be two Suns in one Vortex, a Planetary one and a fixt one. Which unexpected monſtroſitie in Nature will make any cautious Carteſian more wary how he admits of the Earths ever being turned into a Sun again; but rather to be content to let its Central Fire to incruſtrate it ſelf into a Terrella, there ſeeming to be an example of this in that little Globe in the midſt of the Ring of Saturn; but of an Earth turned into a Sun no example at all that I know of.

Pag. 142. So that the Central Fire remains unconcerned, &c. And ſo [...]t well may, it being [Page] ſo conſiderable a diſtance from the Concave of the Aqueous Orb, and the Aqueous Orb it ſelf betwixt the Cruſt of the Earth and it. But the Priſoners of this Gaol of the Rephaim will not be a little concerned. This Hell of a ſuddain growing ſo ſmothering hot to them all, though the Central Fire no more than it was. And whatever becomes of thoſe Spirits that ſuffer in the very Conflagration it ſelf, yet Ab hoc Inferno nulla eſt redemptio.

Pag. 147. Thoſe immediate births of unaſſiſted nature will not be ſo tender, &c. Beſides, the Air being repleniſht with benign Daemons or Genii, to whom it cannot but be a pleaſant Spectacle to behold the inchoations and progreſſes of reviving Nature, they having the Curioſitie to contemplate theſe births, may alſo in all likelihood exerciſe their kindneſs in helping them in their wants; and when they are grown up, aſſiſt them alſo in the methods of Life, and impart as they ſhall find fit the Arcana of Arts and Sciences and Religion unto them, nor ſuffer them to ſymbolize overmuch in their way of living with the reſt of their fellow terreſtrial Creatures. If it be true that ſome hold, that even now when there is no ſuch need, every one has his [...], his Genius or Guardian Angel, it is much more likely that at ſuch a ſeaſon as this, every tender Foetus of their common Mother the Earth, would be taken into the care of ſome good [Page] Daemon or other, even at their very firſt budding out into life.

Pag. 148. But all this is but the frolick exerciſe of my Pen chooſing a Paradox. And let the ſame be ſaid of the Pen of the Annotator, who has beſtowed theſe pains not to gain Proſelytes to the Opinions treated of in this Diſcourſe, but to entertain the Readers Intellectuals with what may ſomething inlarge his thoughts; and if he be curious and anxious, help him at a pinch to ſome eaſe of mind touching the ways of God and his wonderful Providence in the World.

Pag. 149. Thoſe other expreſſions of Death, Deſtruction, Perdition of the ungodly, &c. How the entring into the ſtate of Silence may well be deemed a real Death, Deſtruction and Perdition, that paſſage in Lucretius does marvelouſly well ſet out.

Nam ſi tantopere eſt animi mutata poteſtas,

Omnis ut actarum exciderit retinentia rerum,

Non, ut opinor, ea ab letho jam longiter errat

Quapropter fateare neceſſe eſt, quoe fuit ante.

Interiiſſe, &c. De Rerum Natura, Lib. 3.

And again in the ſame book he ſays, though we were again juſt as we were before, yet we having no memory thereof, it is all one as if we were perfectly loſt. And yet this is the condition of the ſoul which the Divine Nemeſis [Page] ſends into the ſtate of Silence, becauſe afterwards ſhe remembers nothing of her former life. His words are theſe:

Nec, ſi materiam noſtram collegerit oetas

Poſt obitum, rurſúm (que) redegerit ut ſita nunc eſt,

At (que) iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitoe,

Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quo (que) factum

Interrupta ſemel quom ſit retinentia noſtri.

Pag. 150. In thoſe paſſages which predict new Heavens and a new Earth, &c. I ſuppoſe he alludes eſpecially to that place in the Apocalypſe, Chap. 21. where preſently upon the Deſcription of the Lake of Fire in the precedent Chapter which anſwers to the Conſlagration, it is ſaid, And I ſaw a new Heaven and a new Earth. But queſtionleſs that paſſage, as in other places, is Politically to be underſtood, not Phyſically, unleſs this may be the ingenious Authors meaning, That the Writer of the Apocalypſe adorning his ſtyle with alluſions to the moſt rouzing and moſt notable real or Phyſical Objects (which is obſervable all along the Apocalypſe) it may be a ſign that a new Heaven and a new Earth ſucceeding the Conflagration, is one of thoſe noble Phaenomena true and real amongſt the reſt, which he thought fit to adorn his ſtyle with by alluding thereto. So that though the chief intended [Page] ſenſe of the Apocalypſe be Political, yet by its alluſions it may countenance many noble and weighty Truths whether Phyſical or Metaphyſical. As, The exiſtence of Angels, which is ſo perpertually inculcated all along the Book from the beginning to the ending: The Divine Shechina in the celeſtial Regions: The Dreadful Abyſs in which rebellious Spirits are chained, and at the commination whereof they ſo much tremble: The Conflagration of the Earth; and laſtly, The renewing and reſtoring this Earth and Heaven after the Conflagration.

Pag. 150. The main Opinion of Pre-exiſtence is not at all concerned, &c. This is very judiciouſly and ſoberly noted by him. And therefore it is by no means fairly done by the Oppoſers of Pre-exiſtence, while they make ſuch a pudder to confute any paſſages in this Hypotheſis, which is acknowledged by the Pre-exiſtentiaries themſelves to be no neceſſary or eſſential part of that Dogma. But this they do, that they may ſeem by their Cavils (for moſt of them are no better) againſt ſome parts of this unneceſſarie Appendage of Pre-exiſtence, to have done ſome execution upon the Opinion it ſelf; which how far it extends, may be in ſome meaſure diſcovered by theſe Notes we have made upon it. Which ſtated as they direct, the Hypotheſis is at leaſt poſſible; but that it is abſolutely the true one, or ſhould be [Page] thought ſo, is not intended. But as the ingenious Author ſuggeſts, it is either this way or ſome better, as the infinite Wiſdom of God may have ordered. But this poſſible way ſhews Pre-exiſtence to be neither impoſſible nor improbable.

Pag. 151. But ſubmit all that I have written to the Authority of the Church of England, &c. And this I am perſwaded he heartily did, as it is the duty of every one, in things that they cannot confirm by either a plain demonſtration, clear authority of Scripture, Manifeſtation of their outward Senſes, or ſome rouzing Miracle, to compromiſe with the Deciſions of the National Church where Providence has caſt them, for common peace and ſettlement, and for the eaſe and ſecurity of Governours. But becauſe a fancy has taken a man in the head, that he knows greater Arcana than others, or has a more orthodox belief in things not neceſſarie to Salvation than others have, for him to affect to make others Proſelytes to his Opinion, and to wear his badge of Wiſdom, as of an extraordinarie Maſter in matters of Theory, is a mere vanitie of Spirit, a ridiculous piece of pride and levitie, and unbeſeeming either a ſober and ſtanched man or a good Chriſtian. But upon ſuch pretences to gather a Sect, or ſet up a Church or Independent Congregation, is intolerable Faction and Schiſm, nor can ever bear a free and ſtrict examination [Page] according to the meaſures of the trueſt Morals and Politicks.

But becauſe it is the fate of ſome men to believe Opinions, to others but probable, nor it may be ſo much (as the motion of the Earth ſuppoſe, and Des Cartes his Vortices, and the like) to be certain Science, it is the intereſt of every National Church to define the truth of no more Theories than are plainly neceſſary for Faith and good manners; becauſe if they either be really, or ſeem to be miſtaken in their unneceſſary Deciſions or Definitions, this with thoſe that are more knowing than ingenuous will certainly leſſen the Authority and Reverence due to the Church, and hazard a ſecret enmity of ſuch againſt her. But to adventure upon no Deciſions but what have the Authority of Scripture (which they have that were the Deciſions of General Councils before the Apoſtaſie) and plain uſefulneſs as well as Reaſon of their ſide, this is the greateſt Conſervative of the Honour and Authority of a Church (eſpecially joyned with an exemplary life) that the greateſt Prudence or Politicks can ever excogitate. Which true Politicks the Church of Rome having a long time ago deſerted, has been fain, an horrid thing to think of it! to ſupport her Authority and extort Reverence by mere Violence and Bloud. Whenas, if ſhe had followed theſe more true and Chriſtian Politicks, ſhe would [Page] never have made herſelf ſo obnoxious, but for ought one knows, ſhe might have ſtood and retained her Authority for ever.

In the mean time, this is ſuitable enough, and very well worth our noting, That foraſmuch as there is no aſſurance of the Holy Ghoſt's aſſiſting unneceſſary Deciſions, though it were of the Univerſal Church, much leſs of any National one, ſo that if ſuch a point be determined, it is uncertainly determined, and that there may be ſeveral ways of holding a neceſſary Point, ſome more accommodate to one kind of men, others to another, and that the Deciſions of the Church are for the Edification of the people, that either their Faith may be more firm, or their Lives more irreprehenſible: theſe things, I ſay, being premiſed, it ſeems moſt prudent and Chriſtian in a Church to decline the Deciſion of the circumſtances of any neceſſary point, foraſmuch as by deciding and determining the thing one way, thoſe other handles by which others might take more faſt hold on it are thereby cut off, and ſo their aſſent made leſs firm thereto.

We need not go far for an example, if we but remember what we have been about all this time. It is neceſſarie to believe that we have in us an Immortal Spirit capable of Salvation and Damnation, according as we ſhall behave ourſelves. This is certainly revealed to us, and is of indiſpenſable uſefulneſs. But though [Page] this Opinion or rather Article of Faith be but o [...]e, yet there are ſeveral waies of holding it. And it lies more eaſie in ſome mens minds, if they ſuppoſe it created by God at every conception in the Womb; in otherſome, if they conceive it to be ex Traduce; and laſtly in others, if it pre-exiſt. But the waies of holding this Article ſignifie nothing but as they are ſubſervient to the making us the more firmly hold the ſame. For the more firmly we believe it, the greater influence will it have upon our lives, to cauſe us to live in the fear of God, and in the waies of Righteouſneſs like good Chriſtians.

Wherefore now it being ſuppoſed that it will ſtick more firm and fixt in ſome mens minds by ſome one of theſe three waies, rather than by either of the other two, and thus of any one of the three; It is manifeſt, it is much more prudently done of the Church not to cut off two of theſe three handles by a needleſs, nay, a harmful Deciſion, but let every one chooſe that handle that he can hold the Article faſteſt by, for his own ſupport and Edification. For thus every one laying firm hold on that handle that is beſt fitted for his own graſp, the Article will carry all theſe three ſorts of believers ſa [...]e up to Heaven, they living accordingly; whenas two ſorts of them would have more ſlippery or uncertain hold, if they had no handle offered to them but [Page] thoſe which are leſs ſuitable to their graſp and Genius.

Which ſhews the Prudence, Care, and Accuracy of Judgment in the Church of England, that as in other things, ſo in this, ſhe has made no ſuch needleſs and indeed hurtful Deciſions, but left the modes of conceiving things of the greateſt moment, to every ones ſelf, to take it that way that he can lay the faſteſt hold of it, and it will lie the moſt eaſily in his mind without doubt and wavering. And therefore there being no one of theſe handles but what may be uſeful to ſome or other for the more eaſie and undoubted holding that there is in us an Immaterial and Immortal Soul or Spirit, my having taken this ſmall pains to wipe off the ſoil, and further the uſefulneſs of one of them by theſe Annotations, if it may not merit thanks, it muſt, I hope, at leaſt deſerve excuſe with all thoſe that are not of too ſowre and tetrick a Genius, and prefer their own humours and ſentiments before the real benefit of others.

But now if any one ſhall invidiouſly object, that I prefer the Chriſtian Diſcretion of my own Church the Church of England, before the Judgment and Wiſdom of a General Council, namely, the fifth Oecumenical Council held at Conſtantinople in Juſtinians time under the Patriarch Eutychius, who ſucceeded Menas lately deceaſed, to whom Juſtinian ſent that Diſcourſe [Page] of his againſt Origen and his errours, amongſt which Pre-exiſtence is reckoned one: In anſwer to this, ſeveral things are to be conſidered, that right may be done our Mother.

Firſt, What number of Biſhops make a general Council, ſo that from their Numeroſity we may rely upon their Authority and infallibility that they will not conclude what is falſe.

Secondly, Whether in whatſoever matters of debate, though nothing to the Salvation of mens ſouls, but of curious▪ Speculation, fitter for the Schools of Philoſophers than Articles of Faith for the edification of the people (whoſe memory and conſcience ought to be charged with no notions that are not ſubſervient to the rightly and duly honouring God and his onely begotten Son our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and to the faithful diſcharging their duty to man) the aſſiſtance of the Spirit of God can rationally be expected; or onely in ſuch things as are neceſſary to be profeſſed by the people, and very uſeful for the promoting of Life and Godlineſs. And as Moſes has circumſcribed his Narrative of the Creation within the limits of Mundus Plebeiorum, and alſo the Chronology of time according to Scripture is bounded from the firſt Adam to the coming again of the ſecond to Judgment, and Sentencing the wicked to everlaſting puniſhment, and the righteous to [Page] life everlaſting: ſo whether the Deciſions of the Church are not the moſt ſafely contained within theſe bounds, and they faithfully diſcharge themſelves in the conduct of Souls, if they do but inſtruct them in ſuch truths only as are within this compaſs revealed in ſacred Scripture. And whether it does not make for the Intereſt and Dignity of the Church to decline the medling with other things, as unprofitable and unneceſſary to be decided.

Thirdly, Whether if a General Council meet not together in via Spiritus Sancti, but ſome ſtickling imbitter'd Grandees of the Church out of a pique that they have taken againſt ſome perſons get through their intereſt a General Council called, whether is the aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt to be expected in ſuch a meeting, ſo that they ſhall conclude nothing againſt truth.

Fourthly, Whether the Authority of ſuch General Councils as Providence by ſome notable prodigie may ſeem to have intimated a diſlike of, be not thereby juſtly ſuſpected, and not eaſily to be admitted as infallible deciders.

Fifthly, Whether a General Council that is found miſtaken in one point, anathematizing that for an Hereſie which is a truth, forfeits not its Authority in other points, which then whether falſhoods or truths, are not to be deemed [Page] ſo from the Authority of that Council, but from other Topicks.

Sixthly, Since there can be no commerce betwixt God and man, nor he communicate his mind and will to us but by ſuppoſition, That our ſenſes rightly circumſtantiated are true, That there is skill in us to underſtand words and Grammar, and ſchemes of ſpeech, as alſo common notions and clear inferences of Reaſon, whether if a General Council conclude any thing plainly repugnant to theſe, is the Concluſion of ſuch a Council true and valid; and whether the indeleble Notices of truth in our mind that all Mankind is poſſeſſed of, whether Logical, Moral, or Metaphyſical, be not more the dictates of God, than thoſe of any Council that are againſt them.

Seventhly, If a Council, as general as any has been called, had in the very midnight of the Churches Apoſtaſie and ignorance met, and concluded all thoſe Corruptions that now are obtruded by the Church of Rome, as Tranſubſtantiation, Invocation of Saints, Worſhipping of Images, and the like, whether the Deciſions of ſuch a Council could be held infallible or valid. What our own excellently well Reformed Church holds in this caſe, is evident out of her Articles. For,

Eighthly, The Church of England plainly declares. That General Councils when they be gathered together, foraſmuch as they be an Aſſembly[Page]of men whereof all are not governed with the Spirit and Word of God, they may err, and ſometimes have erred even in things pertaining to God. Wherefore, ſaith ſhe▪ things ordained by them as neceſſary to Salvation have neither ſtrength nor Authority, unleſs it may be declared that they be taken out of Holy Scripture. Artic 21.

Ninthly, And again, Artic. 20. where ſhe allows the Church to have power to decree Rites and Ceremonies, and Authority in Controverſies of Faith, but with this reſtriction, That it is not lawful for the Church to ordain any thing that is contrary to Gods Word written, neither may it ſo expound one place of Scripture that it be repugnant to another: ſhe concludes: Wherefore although the Church be a Witneſs and Keeper of Holy Writ, yet as it ought not to decree any thing againſt the ſame, ſo beſides the ſame ought it not to inforce any thing to be believed for neceſſity of Salvation. What then, does ſhe null the Authority of all the General Councils, and have no deference for any thing but the mere Word of God to convince men of Hereſie▪ No ſuch matter. What her ſenſe of theſe things is, you will find in 1 Eliz. cap. 1. Wherefore,

Tenthly and laſtly, What General Councils the Church of England allows of for the conviction of Hereticks you may underſtand out of theſe words of the Statute: They ſhall not [Page]adjudge any matter or cauſe to be Hereſies, but onely ſuch as heretofore have been adjudged to be Hereſie by the Authority of the Canonical Scriptures, or by the firſt four General Councils or any of them, or by any other General Council wherein the ſame was declared Hereſie by the expreſs and plain words of the ſaid Canonical Scriptures.

By brief reflections upon ſome of theſe ten Heads, I ſhall endeavour to leſſen the Invidiouſneſs of my ſeeming to prefer the Diſcretion of the Church of England before the Judgment of a General Council, I mean of ſuch a General Council as is ſo unexceptionable that we may relie on the Authority of their Deciſions, that they will not fail to be true. Of which ſort whether the fifth reputed General Council be, we will briefly firſt conſider.

For reflecting on the firſt head, It ſeems ſcarcely numerous enough for a General Council. The firſt General Council of Nice had above three hundred Biſhops; That of Chalcedon above ſix hundred: This fifth Council held at Conſtantinople had but an hundred ſixty odd. And which ſtill makes it more unlike a General Council, in the very ſame year, viz. 553, the Weſtern Biſhops held a Council at Aquileia, and condemned this fifth Council held at Conſtantinople.

Secondly, The Pre-exiſtence of Souls being a mere Philoſophical Speculation, and indeed [Page] held by all Philoſophers in the affirmative that held the Soul incorporeal; we are to conſider whether we may not juſtly deem this caſe referrible to the ſecond Head, and to look ſomething like Pope Zacharies appointing a Council to condemn Virgilius as an Heretick, for holding Antipodes.

Thirdly, We may very well doubt whether this Council proceeded in via Spiritus Sancti, this not being the firſt time that the lovers and admirers of Origen for his great Piety and Knowledge, and ſingular good ſervice he had done to the Church of Chriſt in his time, had foul play plai'd them. Witneſs the ſtory of Theophilus Biſhop of Antioch, who to revenge himſelf on Dioſcorus and two others that were lovers of Origen and Anti-Anthropomorphites, ſtickled ſo, that he cauſed Epiphanius in his See, as he did in his own, to condemn the Books of Origen in a Synod. To which condemnation Epiphanius an Anthropomorphite, and one of more Zeal than Knowledge, would have got the ſubſcription of Chryſoſtome the Patriarch of Conſtantinople; but he had more Wiſdom and Honeſty than to liſten to ſuch an injurious demand.

And as it was with thoſe Synods called by Theophilus and Epiphanius, ſo it ſeems to be with the fifth Council. Piques and Heartburnings amongſt the Grandees of the Church ſeemed to be at the bottom of the buſineſs. Binius [Page] in his Hiſtory of this fifth Council takes notice of the enmity betwixt Pelagius, Pope Vigilius's Apocriſiarie, and Theodorus Biſhop of Caeſarea Cappadociae an Origeniſt. And Spondanus likewiſe mentions the ſame, who ſays, touching the buſineſs of Origen, that Pelagius the Popes Apocriſiarie, eam quaeſtionem in ipſius Theodori odium moviſſe exiſtimabatur. And truly it ſeems to me altogether incredible, unleſs there were ſome helliſh ſpight at the bottom, that they ſhould not have contented themſelves to condemn the errours ſuppoſed to be Origens (but after ſo long a time after his death, there being in his writings ſuch choppings and changings and interpolations, hard to prove to be his) but have ſpared his name, for that unſpeakable good ſervice he did the Church in his life-time. See Dr. H. Mores Preface to his Collectio Philoſophica, Sect. 18. where Origens true Character is deſcribed out of Euſebius. Wherefore whether this be to begin or carry on things in via Spiritus Sancti, ſo that we may rely on the Authority of ſuch a Council, I leave to the impartial and judicious to conſider.

Fourthly, In reference to the fourth Head, That true wiſdom and moderation, and the holy aſſiſtance of Gods Spirit did not guide the affairs of this Council, ſeems to be indicated by the Divine Providence, who to ſhew the effect of their unwiſe proceedings in the [Page] ſelf-ſame year the Council ſate, ſent a moſt terrible Earthquake for forty days together upon the City of Conſtantinople where the Council was held, and upon other Regions of the Eaſt, even upon Alexandria it ſelf and other places, ſo that many Cities were levelled to the ground. Upon which Spondanus writes thus: Haec verò praeſagia fuiſſe malorum quae ſunt praedictam Synodum conſecuta, nemo negare poterit quicun (que) ab eventis facta noverit judicare.

This alſo reminds me of a Prodigy as it was thought that happened at the ſixth reputed General Council, where nigh three hundred Fathers were gathered together to decide this nice and ſubtile Point, namely, whether an operation or volition of Chriſt were to be deemed, Ʋna operatio ſive volitio [...], according to that Axiom of ſome Metaphyſicians, that Actio eſt ſuppoſiti, and ſo the Humane and Divine Nature of Chriſt being coaleſcent into one perſon, his volition and operation be accounted one as his perſon is but one; or becauſe of the two Natures, though but one perſon, there are to be conceived two operations or two volitions. This latter Dogma obtained, and the other was condemned by this third Conſtantinopolitan Council: whereupon, as Paulus Diaconus writes, abundance of Cobwebs or Spiders webs fell or rained, as it were, down upon the heads of the people, to their very great aſtoniſhment. Some interpret the Cobwebs of [Page] Hereſies; others haply more rightfully of troubling the Church of Chriſt with overgreat niceties and curioſities of ſubtile Speculation, which tend nothing to the corroborating her Faith, and promoting a good Life; and are ſo obſcure, ſubtile, and lubricous, that look on them one way they ſeem thus, and another way thus.

To this ſixth General Council there ſeemed two Operations and two Wills in Chriſt, becauſe of his two Natures. To a Council called after by Philippicus the Emperour, and John Patriarch of Conſtantinople, conſidering Chriſt as one perſon, there appeared Numeroſiſſimo Orientalium Epiſcoporum collecto Conventui▪ as Spondanus has it: but as Binius, Innumerae Orientalium Epiſcoporum multitudini congregatae, but one will and one operation. And certainly this numerous or innumerable company of Biſhops muſt put as fair for a General Council as that of leſs than three hundred. But that the Authority of both theſe Councils are leſſened upon the account of the ſecond Head, in that the matter they conſulted about tended nothing to the corroboration of our Faith, or the promotion of a good Life, I have already intimated.

Theſe things I was tempted to note, in reference to the tenth Head. For it ſeems to mean undeniable Argument, that our First Reformers, which are the Riſen Witneſſes, were [Page] either exquiſitely well ſeen in Eccleſiaſtick Hiſtory, or the good Hand of God was upon them that they abſolutely admitted onely the four firſt General Councils; but after them, they knew not where to be, or what to call a General Council, and therefore would not adventure of any ſo called for the adjudging any matters Hereſie. But if any pretended to be ſuch, their Authority ſhould no further prevail, than as they made out things by expreſs and plain words of Canonical Scripture. And for other Synods, whether the Seventh, which is the ſecond of Nice, or any other that the Church of Rome would have to be General in defence of their own exorbitant points of Faith or Practice, they will be found of no validity, if we have recourſe to the ſixth, ſeventh, eighth and ninth Heads.

Fifthly, In reference to the fifth Head. This fifth Council loſeth its Authority in anathematizing what in Origen ſeems to be true according to that expreſs Text of Scripture, John 16. 28. (eſpecially compared with others. See Notes on Chap. 11.) I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world; again I leave the world, and go to the Father. He came forth from his Father which is in Heaven, accordingly as he taught us to pray to him (the Divine Shechina being in a peculiar manner there) He leaves the world and goes to the Father, which all underſtand of his Aſcenſion into Heaven, [Page] whence his coming from the Father muſt have the ſame ſenſe, or elſe the Antitheſis will plainly fail. Wherefore it is plain he came down from Heaven (as he ſignifies alſo in other places) as well as returns thither. But he can neither be truly ſaid to come from heaven, nor return thither, according to his Divine Nature. For it never left Heaven, nor removes from one place to another; and therefore this Scripture does plainly imply the Pre exiſtence of the Soul of the Meſſiah, according to the Doctrine of the Jews, before it was incarnate. And this ſtricture of the old Cabala may give light to more places of St. Johns Writings than is fit to recite in this haſte; I will onely name one by the by, 1 John 4. 2. Every Spirit that confeſſeth [...], that Jeſus is the Chriſt come in the fleſh, that is to ſay, is the Chriſt incarnate, is of God. For the Meſſiah did exiſt, viz. his Soul, before he came into the fleſh, according to the Doctrine of the Jews. Which was ſo well known, that upon the above-cited ſaying (John 16. 28.) of our Saviour, they preſently anſwered, Lo, now ſpeakeſt thou plainly, and ſpeakeſt no Parable; becauſe he clearly diſcovers himſelf by this Character to be the expected Meſſias incarnate. Nor is there any poſſible evaſion out of the clearneſs of this Text [...]rom the communication of Idioms, becauſe Chriſt cannot be ſaid to come down from Heaven according to his Humane Nature before [Page] it was there, therefore his Humane Nature was there before it was incarnate.

And laſtly, The Authority of the Deciſion of this Council (if it did ſo decide) is leſſened, in that contrary to the ſecond Head (as was hinted above) it decides a point that Faith and Godlineſs is not at all concerned in. For the Divinity of Chriſt, which is the great point of Faith, is as firmly held ſuppoſing the Soul of the Meſſias united with the Logos before his incarnation, as in it. So that the ſpight onely of Pelagius againſt Theodorus to multiply Anathematiſms againſt Origen, no uſe or neceſſity of the Church required any ſuch thing. Whence again their Authority is leſſened upon the account of the third Head.

Theſe things may very well ſuſpend a careful mind, and loth to be impoſed upon, from relying much upon the Authority of this fifth Council. But ſuppoſe its Authority entire, yet the Acts againſt Origen are not to be found in the Council. And the ſixth Council in its Anathematiſms, though it mention Theodorets Writings, the Epiſtle of Ibas and Theodarus Mopſueſtenus who were concerned in the fifth Council; yet I find not there a ſyllable touching Origen. And therefore thoſe that talk of his being condemned by that fifth Council, have an eye, I ſuppoſe, to the Anathematiſms at the end of that Diſcourſe which Juſtinian the Emperour ſent to Menas. Patriarch [Page] of Conſtantinople, according to which form they ſuppoſe the errours of Origen condemned. Which if it were true, yet ſimple Pre-exiſtence will eſcape well enough.

Nor do I think that learned and intelligent Patriarch Photius would have called the ſimple Opinion of Pre-exiſtence of ſouls [...], but for thoſe Appendages that the injudiciouſneſs and raſhneſs of ſome had affixed to it. Partly therefore re [...]lecting upon that firſt Anathematiſm in the Emperours Diſcourſe that makes the pre-exiſtent ſouls of men firſt to be [...] as if their higheſt felicity conſiſted in having no body to inactuate (which plainly claſhes with both ſound Philoſophy and Chriſtianity, as if the [...] and Rephaim were all one, and they were not [...] till they were [...], grown cold to the Divine Love, and onely gathered body as they gathered corruption, and were alienated from the Life of God; which is point-blank againſt the Chriſtian Faith, which has promiſed us, as the higheſt prize, a glorified body:) And partly what himſelf adds, that one ſoul goes into ſeveral bodies; Which are impertinent Appendages of the Pre-exiſtence of the ſoul, falſe, uſeleſs and unneceſſary; and therefore thoſe that add theſe Appendages thereto, violate the ſincerity of the Divine Tradition to no good purpoſe.

But this ſimple Doctrine of Pre-exiſtence is ſo unexceptionable and harmleſs, that the [Page] third collection of Councils in Juſtellus, which is called [...], though it reckon the other errours of Origen condemned in the fifth Council, omits this of Pre-exiſtence. Certainly that Eccleſiaſtick that framed that Diſcourſe for the Emperour, if he did it not himſelf, had not fully, deliberately and impartially conſidered the Dogma of Pre-exiſtence taken in its ſelf, nor does once offer to anſwer any Reaſons out of Scripture or Philoſophy that are produced for it. Which if it had been done, and this had been the onely errour to be alledged againſt Origen, I cannot think it credible, nay ſcarce poſſible, though their ſpight had been never ſo much againſt ſome lovers of Origen, that they could have got any General Council to have condemned ſo holy, ſo able, ſo victorious a Champion for the Chriſtian Church in his life-time for an Heretick, upon ſo tolerable a punctilio, about three hundred years after his death. What Father that wrote before the firſt four General Councils, but might by the Malevolent, for ſome odd paſſage or other, be doomed an Heretick, if ſuch ſeverity were admittable amongſt Chriſtians?

But I have gone out further than I was aware, and it is time for me to bethink me what I intended. Which was the juſtifying of my ſelf in my ſeeming to prefer the Diſcretion of our own Church in leaving us free to hold the [Page] Incorporeity and Immortality of the ſoul by any of the three handles that beſt fitted every mans Genius, before the Judgment of the fifth General Council, that would abridge us of this liberty. From which Charge I have endeavoured to free my ſelf, briefly by theſe two ways: Firſt, by ſhewing how hard it is to prove the fifth Oecumenical Council ſo called, to be a legitimate General or Oecumenical Council, and ſuch as whoſe Authority we may relie on. And ſecondly, if it was ſuch, by ſhewing that it did not condemn ſimply the Pre-exiſtence of ſouls, but Pre-exiſtence with ſuch and ſuch Appendages. So that there is no real claſhing betwixt our Church and that Council in this.

But however this is, from the eighth and ninth Heads it's plain enough that the Church of England is no favourer of the Concluſions of any General Council that are enjoyned as neceſſary to Salvation, that be either repugnant to Holy Scripture, or are not clearly to be made out from the ſame; which Non-pre-exiſtence of Souls certainly is not, but rather the contrary. But being the point is not ſufficiently clear from Scripture either way to all, and the Immortality of the Soul and ſubſiſtence after death is the main uſeful point; that way which men can hold it with moſt firmneſs and eaſe, her Candour and Prudence has left it free to them to make uſe of.

[Page] And as for General Councils, though ſhe does not in a fit of Zeal, which Theodoſius a Prior in Paleſtine is ſaid to have done, anathematize from the Pulpit all people that do not give as much belief to the four firſt General Councils as to the four. Goſpels themſelves; yet, as you may ſee in the tenth Head, ſhe makes the Authority of the firſt four General Councils ſo great, that nothing is to be adjudged Hereſie but what may be proved to be ſo either from the Scripture or from theſe four Councils. Which Encomium might be made with leſs skill and more confidence by that Prior, there having been no more than four General Councils in his time. But it was ſingular Learning and Judgment, or elſe a kind of Divine Sagacity in our firſt Reformers, that they laid ſo great ſtreſs on the firſt four General Councils, and ſo little on any others pretended ſo to be.

But in all likelihood they being perſwaded of the truth of the prediction of the Apoſtaſie of the Church under Antichriſt how univerſal in a manner it would be, they had the moſt confidence in thoſe General Councils which were the earlieſt, and that were held within thoſe times of the Church which ſome call Symmetral. And without all queſtion, the two firſt General Councils, that of Nice, and that other of Conſtantinople, were within thoſe times, viz. within four hundred years after [Page] Chriſt; and the third and fourth within the time that the ten-horned Beaſt had his horns growing up, according to Mr. Mede's computation. But the Definitions of the third and fourth Councils, that of Epheſus, and that other of Chalcedon (which are to eſtabliſh the Divinity of Chriſt, which is not to be conceived without the Union of both Natures into one perſon; as alſo his Theanthropy, which cannot conſiſt with the confuſion of both Natures into one) were vertually contained in the Definitions of the firſt and ſecond Councils. So that in this regard they are all of equal Authority, and that unexceptionable. Firſt, becauſe their Deciſions were concerning points neceſſary to be decided one way or other, for the ſettlement of the Church in the objects of their Divine Worſhip. And therefore they might be the better aſſured that the aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt would not be wanting upon ſo weighty an occaſion. And ſecondly, in that thoſe two firſt Councils were called while the Church was Symmetral, and before the Apoſtaſie came in, according to the teſtimony of the Spirit in the Viſions of the Apocalypſe.

Which Viſions plainly demonſtrate, that the Definitions of thoſe Councils touching the Triunity of the Godhead and Divinity of Chriſt are not Idolatrous, elſe the Apoſtaſie had begun before the time theſe Oracles declare it did; and if not Idolatrous, then they are moſt [Page] certainly true. And all theſe four Councils driving at nothing elſe but theſe neceſſary points to be decided, and their deciſion being thus plainly approved by the ſuffrage of the Holy Ghoſt in the Apocalypſe, I appeal to any man of ſenſe and judgment if they have not a peculiar prerogative to be believed above what other pretended General Council ſoever; and conſequently with what ſpecial or rather Divine ſagacity our firſt Reformers have laid ſo peculiar a ſtreſs on theſe four, and how conſiſtent our Mother the Church of England is to herſelf, that the deciſions of General Councils have neither ſtrength nor Authority further than the matter may be cleared out of the Holy Scriptures. For here we ſee, that out of the Holy Scriptures there is a moſt ample teſtimony given to the Deciſions of theſe four General Councils. So that if one ſhould with Theodoſius the Prior of Paleſtine in a fit of Zeal anathematize all thoſe that did not believe them as true as the four Evangeliſts, he would not want a fair Plea for his religious fury.

But for men after the Symmetral times of the Church, upon Piques and private quarrels of Parties, to get General Councils called as they fancy them, to conclude matters that tend neither to the confirmation of the real Articles of the Chriſtian Faith, or of ſuch a ſenſe of them as are truly uſeful to life and godlineſs, and herein to expect the infallible [Page] aſſiſtances of the Holy Spirit, either upon ſuch terms as theſe, or for rank worldly intereſt, is ſuch a preſumption as to a free Judgment will look little better than Simony, as if they could hire the aſſiſtance of the Holy Ghoſt for money.

Thus have I run further into the conſideration of General Councils, and the meaſure of their Authority, than was requiſite upon ſo ſmall an occaſion; and yet I think there is nothing ſaid, but if ſeriouſly weighed may be uſeful to the intelligent Reader, whether he favour Pre-exiſtence or not. Which is no further to be favoured than is conſiſtent with the known and approved Doctrines of the Chriſtian Faith, nor claſhes any thing with the ſoundeſt Syſtemes of Divinity, as Dr. H. More ſhews his way of exhibiting the Theorie does not, in his General Preface to his Collectio Philoſophica, Sect. 19. whoſe cautious and caſtigate method I have imitated as near as I could in theſe my Annotations. And he has indeed been ſo careful of admitting any thing in the Hypotheſis that may juſtly be ſuſpected or excepted againſt, that his Friend Mr. Glanvil m [...]ght have enlarged his Dedication by one word more, and called him Repurgatorem Sapientiae Orientalis, as well as Reſtauratorem, unleſs Reſtaurator imply both: It being a piece of Reſtauration, to free an Hypotheſis from the errours ſome may have corrupted it with, and [Page] to recover it to its primeval purity and ſincerity.

And yet when the buſineſs is reduced to this harmleſs and unexceptionable ſtate, ſuch is the modeſty of that Writer, that he declares that if he were as certain of the Opinion as of any demonſtration in Mathematicks, yet he holds not himſelf bound in conſcience to profeſs it any further than is with the good-liking or permiſſion of his Superiours. Of which temper if all men were, it would infinitely contribute to the peace of the Church. And as for my ſelf, I do freely profeſs that I am altogether of the ſelf-ſame Opinion and Judgment with him.

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Annotations UPON THE Diſcourſe of TRUTH. Into which is inſerted By way of DIGRESSION, A brief Return To Mr. BAXTER's Reply, Which he calls A Placid COLLATION With the Learned Dr. HENRY MORE, Occaſioned by the Doctors ANSWER to a LETTER of the Learned Pſychopyriſt. Whereunto is annexed A DEVOTIONAL HYMN, Tranſlated for the uſe of the ſincere Lovers of true PIETY.

LONDON: Printed for J. Collins, and S. Lownds, over againſt Exeter-Change in the Strand. 1683.

THE Annotatour TO THE READER.

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ABout a fortnight or three weeks ago, while my Annotations upon the two foregoing Treatiſes were a printing, there came to my hands Mr. Baxter's Reply to Dr. Mores Anſwer to a Letter of the learned Pſychopyriſt, printed in the ſecond Edition of Saduciſmus Triumphatus: Which Reply he ſtyles a Placid Collation with the Learned Dr. Henry More. I being fully at leaſure, preſently fell upon reading this Placid Collation; which I muſt confeſs is ſo writ, that I was much ſurprized in the reading of it, I expecting by the Title [Page] thereof nothing but fairneſs and freeneſs of Judgment, and calmneſs of Spirit, and love and deſire of Truth, and the proſperous ſucceſs thereof in the World, whether our ſelves have the luck to light on it, or where ever it is found.

But inſtead of this, I found a Magiſterial loftineſs of Spirit, and a ſtudie of obſcuring and ſuppreſſing of the Truth by petty crooked Artifices, ſtrange diſtortions of the ſenſe of the Doctors Arguments, and Falſifications of Paſſages in his Anſwer to the Letter of the Pſychopyriſt. Which ſurprize moved me, I confeſs, to a competent meaſure of Indignation in the behalf of the injured Doctor, and of the Truth he contends for: And that Indignation, according to the Idioſyncraſie of my Genius, ſtirred up the merry Humour in me, I being more prone to laugh than to be ſeverely angry or ſurly at thoſe that do things unhandſomely; And this merry humour ſtirred up, prevailing ſo much upon my Judgment as [Page] to make me think that this Placid Collation was not to be anſwered, but by one in a pleaſant and jocular humor; And I finding my ſelf ſomething ſo diſpoſed, and judging the matter not of that moment as to be buzzed upon long, and that this more lightſome, brisk and jocular way of anſwering the Placid Collation might better befit an unknown Annotatour, than the known Pen and Perſon of the Doctor, I preſently betook my ſelf to this little Province, thinking at firſt onely to take notice of Mr. Baxters Diſingenuities towards the Doctor; but one thing drawing on another, and that which followed being carefully managed and apparently uſeful, I mean the Anſwering all Mr. Baxters pretended Objections againſt the Penetrability or Indiſcerpibility of a Spirit, and all his ſmaller Criticiſms upon the Doctors Definition thereof, in finiſhing theſe three Parts, I quickly completed the whole little Work of what I call the Digreſſion, (inſerted [Page] into my Annotations upon Biſhop Ruſts ingenious Diſcourſe of Truth) which, with my Annotations, and the ſerious Hymn annexed at the end (to recompoſe thy Spirits, if any thing over-ludicrous may chance to have diſcompoſed them) I offer, courteous Reader, to thy candid peruſal; and ſo in ſome haſt take leave, and reſt

Your humble Servant, The ANNOTATOUR.

Annotations UPON THE Diſcourſe of TRUTH.

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Sect. 1. pag. 165. AND that there are neceſſary mutual reſpects, &c. Here was a groſs miſtake in the former Impreſſion. For this clauſe there ran thus: By the firſt I mean nothing elſe, but that things neceſſarily are what they are. By the ſecond, that there are neceſſary mutual Reſpects and Relations of things one unto another. As if theſe mutual Reſpects and Relations of Things one to another were Truth in the Subject, and not Truth in the Object; the latter of which he handles from the fourth Section to the eighteenth, in which laſt Section alone he treats of Truth in the Subject or Underſtanding. The former part of the Diſcourſe is ſpent in treating of Truth in the Object; that is to ſay, of Truth in the nature of things, and their neceſſary Reſpects and mutual Relations one to another. Both which are antecedent in the order of nature to all Underſtandings, and [Page] therefore both put together make up the firſt branch of the Diviſion of Truth. So groſly had the Authours MS. been depraved by paſſing through the hands of unskilful Tranſcribers, as Mr. J. Glanvil complains at the end of his Letter prefixed to this Diſcourſe. And ſo far as I ſee, that MS. by which he corrected that according to which the former Impreſſion was made, was corrupt it ſelf in this place. And it running glibly, and they expecting ſo ſuddainly the propoſal of the other member of the Diviſion, the errour, though ſo great, was overſeen. But it being now ſo ſeaſonably corrected, it gives great light to the Diſcourſe, and makes things more eaſie and intelligible.

Sect. 2. pag. 166. That any thing may be a ſuitable means to any end, &c. It may ſeem a monſtrous thing to the ſober, that any mans Underſtanding ſhould be ſo depraved as to think ſo. And yet I have met with one that took himſelf to be no ſmall Philoſopher, but to be wiſer than both the Univerſities, and the Royal Society to boot, that did earneſtly affirm to me, that there is no natural adaptation of means to ends, but that one means would be as good as another for any end if God would have it ſo, in whoſe power alone every thing has that effect it has upon another. Whereupon I asked him, whether if God would a Foot-ball might not be as good an [Page] Inſtrument to make or mend a Pen withal, as a Pen-knife. He was ſurprized; but whether he was convinced of his madneſs and folly, I do not well remember.

Pag. 167. Is it poſſible there ſhould be ſuch a kind of Geometry, wherein any Problem ſhould be demonſtrated by any Principles? Some of the Carteſians bid fair towards this Freakiſhneſs, whenas they do not ſtick to aſſert, that, If God would, he could have made that the whole ſhould be leſſer than the part, and the part bigger than the whole. Which I ſuppoſe they were animated to, by a piece of raillery of Des Cartes, in anſwering a certain Objection; where, that he may not ſeem to violate the abſolute Power of God for making what Laws he pleaſed for the ordering of the matter of the Univerſe (though himſelf ſeems to have framed the world out of certain inevitable and neceſſary Mechanical Laws) does affirm, that thoſe Laws that ſeem ſo neceſſary, are by the arbitrarious appointment of God, who, if he would, could have appointed other Laws, and indeed framed another Geometry than we have, and made the power of the Hypotenuſa of a Right-angled Triangle unequal to the powers of the Baſis and Cathetus. This piece of Drollery of Des Cartes ſome of his followers have very gravely improved to what I ſaid above of the Whole and Part. As if ſome ſuperſtitious Fop, upon the hearing one being [Page] demanded, whether he did believe the real and corporeal preſence of Chriſt in the Sacrament, to anſwer roundly that he believed him there booted and ſpurred as he rode in triumph to Jeruſalem, ſhould become of the ſame Faith that the other ſeemed to profeſs, and glory in the improvement thereof by adding that the Aſs was alſo in the Sacrament, which he ſpurred and rid upon. But in the mean time, while there is this Phrenſie amongſt them that are no ſmall pretenders to Philoſophy, this does not a little ſet off the value and uſefulneſs of this preſent Diſcourſe of Truth, to undeceive them if they be not wilfully blind.

Pag. 167. Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones; namely, Becauſe a Quadrangle is that which is comprehended of four right lines. It is at leaſt a more operoſe and ambagious Inference, if any at all. The more immediate and expedite is this, That the two internal alternate Angles made by a right line cutting two parallels, are equal to one another: Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right ones, P. Ram. Geom. Lib. 6. Prop. 9. If the reaſoning had been thus: A Quadrangle is that which is comprehended of four right lines, Therefore the three Angles of a Triangle are not equal to two right ones; as the Concluſion is groſly falſe, ſo the proof had been egregiouſly alien and impertinent. And the intention [Page] of the Author ſeems to be carried to Inſtances that are moſt extravagant and ſurprizing; which makes me doubt whether [equal] was read in the true MS. or [not equal] but the ſenſe is well enough either way.

Sect. 4. pag. 168. The Divine Ʋnderſtanding cannot be the fountain of the Truth of things, &c. This ſeems at firſt ſight to be a very harſh Paradox, and againſt the current Doctrine of Metaphyſicians, who define Tranſcendental or Metaphyſical Truth to be nothing elſe but the relation of the Conformity of things to the Theoretical (not Practical) Intellect of God; His Practical Intellect being that by which he knows things as produced or to be produced by him, but his Theoretical that, by which he knows things as they are: but yet in an Objective manner, as Exiſtent objectively, not really. And hence they make Tranſcendental Truth to depend upon the Intellectual Truth of God, which alone is moſt properly Truth, and indeed the fountain and origine of all Truth. This in brief is the ſenſe of the Metaphyſical Schools. With which this paſſage of our Author ſeems to claſh, in denying the Divine Intellect to be the fountain of the Truth of things, and in driving rather at this, That the things themſelves in their Objective Exiſtence, ſuch as they appear there unalterably and unchangeably to the Divine Intellect, and not at pleaſure contrived by it [Page] (for as he ſays, it is againſt the nature of all underſtanding to make its Object) are the meaſure and fountain of Truth. That in theſe, I ſay, conſiſts the Truth in the Object, and that the Truth in the Subject is a conception conformable to theſe, or to the Truth of them whether in the uncreated or created Underſtanding.

So that the niceneſs of the point is this: Whether the Tranſcendental Truth of things exhibited in their Objective Exiſtence to the Theoretical Intellect of God conſiſts in their Conformity to that Intellect, or the Truth of that Intellect in its Conformity with the immutable natures and Relations or Reſpects of things exhibited in their Objective Exiſtence, which the Divine Intellect finds to be unalterably ſuch, not contrives them at its own pleaſure. This though it be no [...] or ſtrife about mere words, yet it ſeems to be ſuch a conteſt, that there is no harm done whetherſoever ſide carries the Cauſe, the two ſeeming ſides being but one and the ſame Intellect of God neceſſarily and immutably repreſenting to it ſelf the natures, Reſpects, and Aptitudes of all things ſuch as they appear in their Objective Exiſtence, and ſuch as they will prove whenever produced into act.

As for example, The Divine Underſtanding quatenns exhibitive of Idea's (which a Platoniſt would call [...]) does of its infinite [Page] pregnancy and fecundity neceſſarily exhibit certain and unalterable Idea's of ſuch and ſuch determinate things, as ſuppoſe of a Cylinder, a Globe and a Pyramid, which have a ſetled and unalterable nature, as alſo immutable properties, references and aptitudes immediately conſequential thereto, and not arbitrariouſly added unto them, which are thus neceſſarily extant in the Divine Intellect, as exhibitive of ſuch Idea's. So likewiſe a Fiſh, a Fowl, and a four-footed beaſt, an Ox, Bear, Horſe, or the like, they have a ſetled nature exhibited in their Idea's, and the properties and aptitudes immediately [...]lowing therefrom. As alſo have all the Elements, Earth, Water and Air, determinate natures, with properties and aptitudes immediately iſſuing from them. Nor is a Whale fitted to fly in the Air, nor an Eagle to live under the Water, nor an Ox or Bear to do either, nor any of them to live in the Fire. But the Idea's of thoſe things which we call by thoſe names being unchangeable (for there are di [...]ferences indeed of Idea's, but no changing of one Idea into another ſtate, but their natures are diſtinctly ſetled; and to add or take away any thing from an Idea, is not to make an alteration in the ſame Idea, but to conſtitute a new one; As Ariſtotle ſomewhere in his Metaphyſicks ſpeaks of Numbers, where he ſays, that the adding or taking away of an Unite quite varies the ſpecies. And therefore as every number, [Page] ſuppoſe, Binary, Quinary, Ternary, Denary, is ſuch a ſetled number and no other, and has ſuch properties in it ſelf, and references immediately accrewing to it, and aptitudes which no other number beſides it ſelf has; ſo it is with Idea's) the Idea's I ſay therefore of thoſe things which we call by thoſe names aboverecited being unchangeable, the aptitudes and references immediately iſſuing from their nature repreſented in the Idea, muſt be alſo unalterable and neceſſary. Thus it is with Mathematical and Phyſical Idea's; and there is the ſame reaſon concerning ſuch Idea's as may be called Moral. Foraſmuch as they reſpect the rectitude of Will in whatever Mind, created or uncreated.

And thus, laſtly, it is with Metaphyſical Idea's, as for example; As the Phyſical Idea of Body, Matter or Subſtance Material contains in it immediately of its own nature or intimate ſpecifick Eſſence real Diviſibility or Diſcerpibility, Impenetrability and mere Paſſivity or Actuability, as the proper fruit of the Eſſential Difference and intimate Form thereof, unalterably and immutably as in its Idea in the Divine Intellect, ſo in any Body or Material Subſtance that does exiſt: So the Idea of a Spirit, or of a Subſtance Immaterial, the oppoſite Idea to the other, contains in it immediately of its own nature Indiſcerpibility, Penetrability, and Self-Activity, as the inſeparable [Page] fruit of the eſſential difference or intimate form thereof unalterably and immutably, as in its Idea in the Divine Intellect, ſo in any Immaterial Subſtance properly ſo called that doth exiſt. So that as it is a contradiction in the Idea that it ſhould be the Idea of Subſtance Immaterial, and yet not include in it Indiſcerpibility, &c. ſo it is in the being really exiſtent, that it ſhould be Subſtance Immaterial, and yet not be Indiſcerpible, &c. For were it ſo, it would not anſwer to the Truth of its Idea, nor be what it pretendeth to be, and is indeed, an exiſtent Being Indiſcerpible; which exiſtent Being would not be Indiſcerpible, if any could diſcerp it.

And ſo likewiſe it is with the Idea of Ens ſummè & abſolutè perfectum, which is a ſetled determinate and immutable Idea in the Divine Intellect, whereby, were not God himſelf that Ens ſummè & abſolutè perfectum, he would diſcern there were ſomething better than Himſelf, and conſequently that he were not God. But he diſcerns Himſelf to be this Ens ſummè & abſolutè perfectum, and we cannot but diſcern that to ſuch a Being belongs Spirituality, which implies Indiſcerpibility, (and who but a mad man can imagine the Divine Eſſence diſcerpible into parts?) Infinity of Eſſence, or Eſſential Omnipreſence, Self-Cauſality, or neceſſary Exiſtence immediately of it ſelf or from it ſelf▪ reſulting from the abſolute and [Page] peculiar perfection of its own nature, whereby we underſtand that nothing can exiſt ab aeterno of it ſelf but He. And laſtly, Omniſcience and Omnipotence, whereby it can do any thing that implies no contradiction to be done. Whence it neceſſarily follows, that all things were Created by Him, and that he were not God, or Ens ſummè perfectum, if it were not ſo: And that amongſt other things he created Spirits (as ſure as there are any Spirits in the world) indiſcerpible as himſelf is, though of finite Eſſences and Metaphyſical Amplitudes; and that it is no derogation to his Omnipotence that he cannot diſcerp a Spirit once created, it being a contradiction that he ſhould: Nor therefore any argument that he cannot create a Spirit, becauſe he would then puzzle his own Omnipotence to diſcerp it. For it would then follow, that he cannot create any thing, no not Metaphyſical Monads, nor Matter, unleſs it be Phyſically diviſible in infinitum; and God Himſelf could never divide it into parts Phyſically indiviſible; whereby yet his Omnipotence would be puzzled: And if he can divide matter into Phyſical Monads no further diviſible, there his Omnipotence is puzzled again; And by ſuch ſophiſtical Reaſoning, God ſhall be able to create nothing, neither Matter nor Spirit, nor conſequently be God, or Ens ſummè & abſolutè perfectum, the Creator and Eſſentiator of all things.

[Page] This is ſo Mathematically clear and true, that I wonder that Mr. Rich. Baxter ſhould not rather exult, (in his Placid Collation) at the diſcovery of ſo plain and uſeful a truth, than put himſelf, p. 79. into an Hiſtrionical (as the Latin) or (as the Greek would expreſs it) Hypocritical fit of trembling, to amuze the populacy, as if the Doctor in his ſerious and ſolid reaſoning had verged towards ſomething hugely exorbitant or prophane. The ignorant fear where no fear is, but God is in the generation of the knowing and upright. It's plain, this Reaſoning brings not the exiſtence of God into any doubt, (For it is no repugnance to either his nature or exiſtence, not to be able to do what is a contradiction to be done) but it puts the Indiſcerpibility of Spirits (which is a Notion mainly uſeful) out of all doubt. And yet Mr. Baxter his phancie ſtalking upon wooden ſtilts, and getting more than a ſpit and a ſtride before his Reaſon, very magiſterially pronounces, It's a thing ſo high, as required ſome ſhew of proof to intimate that God cannot be God if he be Almighty, and cannot conquer his own Omnipotency. Anſ. This is an expreſſion ſo high and in the Clouds, that no ſenſe thereof is to be ſeen, unleſs this be it: That God cannot be God, unleſs he be not Almighty; as he would diſcover himſelf not to be, if he could not diſcerp a Spirit of a Metaphyſical amplitude when he has created it. But it plainly [Page] appears from what has been ſaid above, that this diſcerping of a Spirit, which is immediately and eſſentially of its own nature indiſcerpible, as well as a Phyſical Monad is, implying a contradiction, it is no derogation to the Almightineſs of God that he cannot do it; all Philoſophers and Theologers being agreed on that Maxim, That what implies a contradiction to be done, is no Object of Gods Almightineſs. Nor is he leſs Almighty for not being able to do it. So that the prick- [...]ar'd Acuteneſs of that trim and ſmug ſaying, that ſeemed before to ſhoot up into the Sky, flags now like the flaccid lugs of the over-laden Animal old Silenus rid on when he had a Plot upon the Nymphs by Moon-ſhine. Pardon the tediouſneſs of the Periphraſis: For though the Poet was pleaſed to put old Silenus on the Aſs, yet I thought it not ſo civil to put the Aſs upon old Mr. Baxter.

But he proceeds, pag. 80. Your words, ſays he, like an intended Reaſon, are [For that cannot be God from whom all other things are not produced and created] to which he anſwers, (1.) Relatively, ſays he, (as a God to us) it's true, though quoad exiſtentiam Eſſentiae, he was God before the Creation. But, I ſay, if he had not had the power of creating, he had been ſo defective a Being, that he had not been God. But he ſays (2.) But did you take this for any ſhew of a proof? The ſenſe implyed is this [All things [Page]are not produced and created by God, if a ſpiritual ample ſubſtance be diviſible by his Omnipotencie that made it: Yea; Then he is not God. Negatur conſequentia. Anſ. Very ſcholaſtically diſputed! Would one think that Reverend Mr. Baxter, whom Dr. More for his Function and Grandevity ſake handles ſo reſpectfully, and forbears all ſuch Juvenilities as he had uſed toward Eugenius Philalethes, ſhould play the Doctor ſuch horſe-play, having been uſed ſo civilly by him before? What Buffoon or Antick Mime could have diſtorted their bodies more ill-favour'dly and ridiculouſly, than he has the Doctors ſolid and well-compoſed Argument? And then as if he had done it in pure innocency and ſimplicity, he adds a Quaker-like [Yea] thereunto. And after all, like a bold Scholaſtick Champion, or Polemick Divine, couragiouſly cries out, Negatur conſequentia. What a fardle of freaks is there here, and illiberal Artifices to hide the Doctors ſound Reaſoning in the 28th Section of his Anſwer to the Pſychopyriſts Letter? Where having plainly proved that God can create an Indiſcerpible Being though of a large Metaphyſical amplitude, and that there is nothing objected againſt it, nor indeed can be, but that then he would ſeem to puzzle his own Omnipotency, which could not diſcerp ſuch a Being; the Doctor ſhews the vanity of that Objection in theſe very words▪ The ſame, ſays he, [Page] may be ſaid of the Metaphyſical Monads (namely, that God cannot diſcerp them) and at that rate he ſhall be allow'd to create nothing, no not ſo much as Matter (which conſiſts of Phyſical Monads) nor himſelf indeed to be. For that cannot be God from whom all other things are not produced and created. What reaſon can be more clear or more convincing, That God can create a Spirit in the proper ſenſe thereof, which includes Indiſcerpibility? there being no reaſon againſt it but what is falſe, it plainly implying that he can create nothing, and conſequently that he cannot be God. Wherefore that Objection being thus clearly removed, God, as ſure as himſelf is, can create a Spirit, penetrable and indiſcerpible, as himſelf is, and is expreſly acknowledged to be ſo by Mr. Baxter himſelf, pag. 5 [...]. And he having created Spirits or Immaterial Subſtances of an oppoſite Species to Material, which are impenetrable and diſcerpible of their immediate nature how can theſe Immaterial ſubſtances be any other than Penetrable and Indiſcerpible? Which is a very uſeful Dogma for aſſuring the ſouls perſonal ſubſiſtence after Death. And therefore it is a piece of grand Diſingenuity in Mr. Baxter, to endeavour thus to ſlur and obſcure ſo plain and edifying a Truth, by mere Antick Diſtortions of words and ſenſe, by alterations and mu [...]ilations, and by a kind of ſophiſtick Buffoonry. This is one ſpecimen [Page] of his Difingenuity towards the Doctor, who in his Anſwer has been ſo civil to him. And now I have got into this Digreſſion, I ſhall not ſtick to exemplifie it in ſeveral others.

As ſecondly, pag. 4. in thoſe words: And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf, and miſuſe my underſtanding. Nothing is good for that which it was not made for. Our Ʋnderſtandings, as our Eyes, are made onely for things revealed. In many of your Books I take this for an exceſs. So Mr. Baxter▪ Let me now interpoſe a word or two in the behalf of the Doctor. Is not this a plain piece of Diſingenuity againſt the Doctor, who has ſpent ſo great a part of his time in Philoſophie (which the mere Letter of the Scripture very rarely reveals any thing of) to reproach him for his having uſed his underſtanding ſo much about things not revealed in Scripture? Where ſhould he uſe his Underſtanding and Reaſon, if not in things unrevealed in Scripture; that is, in Philoſophical things? Things revealed in Scripture are Objects rather of Faith than of Science and Underſtanding. And what a Paradox is this, that our Underſtandings, as our Eyes, are made onely for things revealed? When our Eyes are ſhut, all the whole viſible world, by the cloſing of the palpebrae is vailed from us, but it is revealed to us again by the opening of our eyes; and ſo it is with the eye of the Underſtanding. If it be ſhut through [Page] Pride, Prejudice, or Senſuality, the myſteries of Philoſophy are thereby vailed from it; but if by true vertue and unfeigned ſanctity of mind that eye be opened, the Myſteries of Philoſophy are the more clearly diſcovered to it, eſpecially if points be ſtudied with ſingular induſtry, which Mr. Baxter himſelf acknowledges of the Doctor, pag. 21. onely he would there pin upon his back an Humble Ignoramus in ſome things, which the Doctor, I dare ſay, will eaſily admit in many things, yea in moſt; and yet, I believe, this he will ſtand upon, that in thoſe things which he profeſſes to know, he will challenge all the world to diſprove if they can. And for probable Opinions, eſpecially if they be uſeleſs, which many Books are too much ſtuffed withal, he ca [...]s them out as the lumber of the mind, and would willingly give them no room in his thoughts. Firmneſs and ſoundneſs of Life is much better than the multiplicitie of uncertain Conceits.

And laſtly, whereas Mr. Baxter ſpeaking of himſelf, ſays, And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf; He has ſo bewildered and loſt himſelf in the multifarious, and moſtwhat needleſs points in Philoſophy or Scholaſtick Divinity, that if we can collect the meaſures of the Cauſe from the amplitude of the Effect, he muſt certainly have been very preſumptuous. He had better have ſet up his Staff [Page] in his Saints everlaſting Reſt, and ſuch other edifying and uſeful Books as thoſe, than to have ſet up for either a Philoſopher or Polemick Divine. But it is the infelicity of too many, that they are ignorant—Quid valeant humeri, quid ferre recuſent, as the Poet ſpeaks, or as the Pythagoreans— [...]. And ſo taking upon them a part in a Play which they are unfit for, they both neglect that which they are fit for, and miſcarry, by reaſon of their unfitneſs, in their acting that Part they have raſhly undertaken; as Epictetus ſomewhere judiciouſly obſerves.

But if that paſſage, And when I preſume moſt, I do but moſt loſe my ſelf, was intended by him as an oblique Socratical reproof to the Doctor; let him inſtance if he can, where the Doctor has preſumed above his ſtrength. He has medled but with a few things, and therefore he need not envie his ſucceſs therein, eſpecially they being of manifeſt uſe to the ſerious world, ſo many as God has fitted for the reception of them. Certainly there was ſome grand occaſion for ſo grave a preliminary monition as he has given the Doctor. You have it in the following Page, p. 5. This premiſed, ſays he, I ſay, undoubtedly it is utterly unrevealed either as to any certainty or probability, That all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter. See what Heat and Haſt, or ſome worſe Principle has engaged Mr. Baxter to do; to father a down-right [Page] falſhood upon the Doctor, that he may thence take occaſion to beſtow a grave admonition on him, and ſo place himſelf on the higher ground. I am certain it is neither the Doctors opinion, That all Spirits are Souls, and actuate Matter, nor has he writ ſo any where. He onely ſays in his Preface to the Reader, That all created Spirits are [...] [Souls] in all probability, and actuate ſome matter. And his expreſſion herein is both modeſt and true. For though it is not certain or neceſſary, yet it is very probable. For if there were of the higheſt Orders of the Angels that fell, it is very probable that they had corporeal Vehicles, without which it is hard to conceive they could run into diſorder. And our Saviour Chriſts Soul, which actuates a glorified ſpiritual Bodie, being ſet above all the Orders of Angels, it is likely that there is none of them is ſo refined above his Humane Nature, as to have no bodies at all. Not to add, that at the Reſurrection we become [...], though we have bodies then; which is a ſhrewd intimation that the Angels have ſo too, and that there are no created Spirits but have ſo.

Thirdly, Mr. Baxter, pag. 6. wrongfully blames the Doctor for being ſo defective in his ſtudies as not to have read over Dr. Gliſſon De Vita Naturae; and ſays he has talk'd with diverſe high pretenders to Philoſophie, and askt their judgment of that Book, and found that none [Page] of them underſtood it, but neglected it, as too hard for them; and yet contemned it. His words to Dr. More are theſe: I marvel that [...]hen you have dealt with ſo many ſorts of Diſſenters, you meddle not with ſo ſubtile a piece as that of old Dr. Gliſſons, De Vita Naturae. He thinks the ſubtilty of the Book has deterred the Doctor from reading it, as ſomething above his Capacity, as alſo of other high Pretenders to Philoſophie.

This is a Book it ſeems calculated onely for the elevation of Mr. Baxters ſubtile and ſublime wit. And indeed by the benefit of reading this Book he is moſt dreadfully armed with the affrightful terms of Quoddities and Quiddities, of Conceptus formalis and fundamentalis, of Conceptus adaequatus and inadaequatus, and the like. In vertue of which thwacking expreſſions he has fancied himſelf able to play at Scholaſtick or Philoſophick Quarter-ſtaff with the moſt doughty and beſt appointed Wits that dare enter the Liſts with him; and as over-neglectful of his flock, like ſome conceited Shepherds, that think themſelves no ſmall fools at the uſe of the Staff or Cudgil-play, take Vagaries to Fairs or Wakes to give a ſpecimen of their skill; ſo he ever and anon makes his Polemick ſallies in Philoſophie or Divinity to entertain the Spectators, though very oft he is ſo rapt upon the knuckles, that he is forced to let fall his wooden Inſtrument, [Page] and blow his fingers. Which is but a juſt Nemeſis upon him, and he would do well to interpret it as a ſeaſonable reproof from the great Paſtor of Souls, to whom we are all accountable.

But to return to his ſpeech to the Doctor; I will adventure to anſwer in his behalf, That I marvel that whenas Mr. Baxter has had the curioſity to read ſo many Writers, and ſome of them ſure but of ſmall concern, that he has not read that ſound and ſolid piece of Dr. More, viz. his Epiſtola altera ad V. C. with the Scholia thereon, where Spinozius is confuted. Which if he had read he might have ſeen Volum. Philoſoph. Tom. 1. pag. 604, 605, &c. that the Doctor has not onely read that ſubtile Piece of Doctor Gliſſons, but underſtands ſo throughly his Hypotheſis, that he has ſolidly and ſubſtantially confuted it. Which he did in a faithful regard to Religion. For that Hypotheſis, if it were true, were as ſafe, if not a ſafer Refuge for Atheiſts, than the mere Mechanick Philoſophie is: And therefore you may ſee there, how Cuperus, brought up amongſt the Atheiſts from his very childhood, does confeſs, how the Atheiſts now-a-daies explode the Mechanick Philoſophie as not being for their turn, and betake themſelves wholly to ſuch an Hypotheſis as Dr. Gliſſons Vita Naturae. But, God be thanked, Dr. H. More in the fore-cited place has perfectly routed [Page] that fond and foul Hypotheſis of Dr. Gliſſon, and I dare ſay is ſorry that ſo good and old a Knight errant in Theologie and Philoſophie as Mr. Richard Baxter ſeems to be, ſhould become benighted, as in a wood, at the Cloſe of his daies, in this moſt horrid dark Harbour and diſmal Receptacle or Randevouz of wretched Atheiſts. But I dare ſay for him, it is his ignorance, not choice, that has lodged him there.

The fourth Diſingenuity of Mr. Baxter towards the Doctor is, in complaining of him as if he had wronged him by the Title of his Anſwer to his Letter, in calling it an Anſwer to a Pſychopyriſt, pag. 2. 82. As if he had aſſerted that materiality of Spirits which belongs to bodies, pag. 94. In complaining alſo of his inconſiſtency with himſelf, pag. 10. as if he one while ſaid that Mr. Baxter made Spirits to be Fire or material, and another while ſaid he made them not Fire or material. But to the firſt part of this Accuſation it may be anſwered, That if it is Mr. Baxter that is called the Learned Pſychopyriſt, how is the thing known to the world but by himſelf? It looks as if he were ambitious of the Title, and proud of the [...]ivil treating he has had at the hands of the Doctor, though he has but ill repai'd his civility in his Reply. And beſides this, there is no more harſhneſs in calling him Pſychopyriſt, than if he had called him Pſycho-Hyliſt, there being nothing abſurd in Pſychopyriſm but ſo [Page] far forth as it includes Pſycho-Hyliſm, and makes the Soul material.

Which Pſycho-Hyliſm that Mr. Baxter does admit, it is made evident in the Doctors Anſwer, Sect. 16. And Mr. Baxter in his Placid Collation (as he miſ-calls it, for aſſuredly his mind was turbid when he wrote it) pag. 2. allows that Spirits may be called Fire Analogicè and Eminenter, and the Doctor in his Preface intimates that the ſenſe is to be no further ſtretched, than the Pſychopyriſt himſelf will allow.

But now that Mr. Baxter does aſſert that Materiality in created Spirits that belongs to bodies in the common ſenſe of all Philoſophers, appears Sect. 16. where his words are theſe: But cuſtom having▪ made MATERIA, but eſpecially CORPƲS to ſignifie onely ſuch groſſer Subſtance as the three paſſive Elements are (he means Earth, Water, Air) I yield, ſays he, ſo to ſay, that Spirits are not Corporeal or Material. Which plainly implies that Spirits are in no other ſenſe Immaterial, than Fire and Aether are, viz. than in this, that they are thinner matter.

And therefore to the laſt point it may be anſwered in the Doctors behalf, that he aſſuredly does nowhere ſay, That Mr. Baxter does not ſay that Spirits are Material, as Material is taken in the common ſenſe of all Philoſophers for what is impenetrable and diſcerpible. [Page] Which is Materia Phyſica, and in oppoſition to which, a Spirit is ſaid to be Immaterial. And which briefly and diſtinctly ſtates the Queſtion. Which if Mr. Baxter would have taken notice of, he might have ſaved himſelf the labour of a great deal of needleſs verboſity in his Placid Collation, where he does over-frequently, under the pretence of more diſtinctneſs, in the multitude of words obſcure knowledge.

Fifthly, Upon Sect. 10. pag. 21. where Mr. Baxters Queſtion is, How a man may tell how that God that can make many out of one, cannot make many into one, &c. To which the Doctor there anſwers: If the meaning be of ſubſtantial Spirits, it has been already noted, that God acting in Nature does not make many ſubſtances out of one, the ſubſtance remaining ſtill entire; for then Generation would be Creation. And no ſober man believes that God aſſiſts any creature ſo in a natural courſe, as to enable it to create: And then I ſuppoſe that he that believes not this, is not bound to puzzle himſelf why God may not as well make many ſubſtances into one, as many out of one, whenas he holds he does not the latter, &c. Theſe are the Doctors own words in that Section. In reply to which, Mr. Baxter: But to my Queſtion, ſaies he, why God cannot make two of one, or one of two, you put me off with this lean Anſwer, that we be not bound to puzzle our ſelves about it. I think, ſaies he, that Anſwer [Page]might ſerve to much of your Philoſophical diſputes. Here Mr. Baxter plainly deals very diſingenuouſly with the Doctor in perverting his words, which affirm onely, That he that denies that God can make two ſubſtances of one in the ſenſe above-declared, need not puzzle himſelf how he may make one of thoſe two again. Which is no lean, but full and appoſite Anſwer to the Queſtion there propounded.

And yet in this his Placid Collation, as if he were wroth, he gives ill language, and inſinuates, That much of the Doctors Philoſophical Diſputes are ſuch as are not worth a mans puzling himſelf about them; whenas it is well known to all that know him or his Writings, that he concerns himſelf in no Theories but ſuch as are weighty and uſeful, as this of the Indiſcerpibility of Spirits is, touching which he further ſlanders the Doctor, as if it were his mere Aſſertion without any Proof. As if Mr. Baxter had never read, or forgot the Doctors Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit, or what he has writ in the further Defence thereof. See Sect. 26, 28, 30, 31. Thus to ſay any thing in an angry mood, verily does not become the Title of a Placid Collation.

Sixthly, The Doctor in Sect. 11. of his Defence of his Notion of a Spirit, writes thus: I deſire you to conſider the nature of Light throughly, and you ſhall find it nothing but a [Page] certain motion of a Medium, whoſe parts or particles are ſo or ſo qualified, ſome ſuch way as Carteſianiſm drives at. To this Mr. Baxter replies againſt the Doctor, pag. 59. Really, ſaies he, when I read how far you have eſcaped the deluſions of Carteſianiſm, I am ſorry you yet ſtick in ſo groſs a part of it as this is; when he that knoweth no more than motion in the nature of Fire, which is the Active Principle by which Mental and Senſitive Nature operateth on Man and Brutes and Vegetables, and all the Paſſive Elements; and all the viſible actions in this lower world are performed, what can that mans Philoſophie be worth? I therefore return your Counſel, ſtudy more throughly the nature of Ethereal Fire.

Satis pro imperio! very Magiſterially ſpoken! and in ſuch an igneous Rapture, that it is not continuedly ſenſe. Does Mental and Senſitive Nature act on Brutes and Vegetables and all the Paſſive Elements? But to let go that: Is all the Doctors Philoſophie worth nothing if he hold with Des Cartes touching the Phaenomenon of Light as to the Material part thereof? It is the ignorance of Mr. Baxter, that he rejects all in Des Cartes, and Judiciouſneſs in the Doctor, that he retains ſome things, and ſupplies where his Philoſophie is deficient. He names here onely the Mechanical Cauſe of Light, viz. Motion, and duly modified Particles. But in his Enchiridium he intimates an [Page] higher principle than either Fire or Aether, or any thing that is Material, be it as fine and pure as you pleaſe to fancie it. See his Enchirid. Metaphyſ. Cap. 19. where he ſhews plainly, that Light would not be Light, were there not a Spiritus Mundanus, or Spirit of Nature, which pervades the whole Univerſe; Mr. Baxters ignorance whereof has caſt him into ſo deep a dotage upon Fire and Light, and fine diſcerpible Corporeities, which he would by his Magiſterial Prerogative dubb Spirits, when to nothing that Title is due, but what is Penetrable and Indiſcerpible by reaſon of the immediate Oneneſs of its Eſſence, even as God the Father and Creator of all Spirits is one Indiſcerpible Subſtance or Being. And therefore I would adviſe Mr. Baxter to ſtudie more throughly the true nature of a Spirit, and to let go theſe Ignes Fatui that would ſeduce him into thick miſts and bogs. For that univerſal Spirit of Nature is moſt certainly the Mover of the matter of the world, and the Modifier thereof, and thence exhibits to us not onely the Phaenomena of Light and Fire, but of Earth and Water, and frames all Vegetables into ſhape and growth; and Fire of it ſelf is but a dead Inſtrument in its hand, as all is in the hand of God, who is [...]! and [...], as Syneſius, if I well remember, ſomewhere calls him in his Hymns.

Seventhly, That is alſo leſs ingenuouſly done [Page] of Mr. Baxter, when the Doctor ſo friendly and faithfully puts him in a way of undeceiving himſelf, Sect. 17. touching the Doctrine of Atoms, that he puts it off ſo ſlightly. And ſo Sect. 18. where he earneſtly exhorts him to ſtudie the nature of Water, as Mr. Baxter does others to ſtudie the nature of Fire; he, as if he had been bitten, and thence taken with that diſeaſe the Phyſicians call [...], and which ſignifies the fear of Water, has ſlunk away and quite neglected the Doctors friendly monition; and is ſo ſmall a Proficient in Hydroſtaticks, that pag. 68. he underſtands not what greater wonder there is in the riſing of the Dr.'s Rundle, than in the riſing of a piece of Timber from the bottom of the Sea. Which is a ſign he never read the 13th Chapter of the Dr.'s Enchiridion Metaphyſicum, much leſs the Scholia thereon. For if he had, he would diſcern the difference, and the vaſt uſefulneſs of the one above that of the other to prove a Principium Hylarchicum diſtinct from the matter of the Univerſe, againſt all evaſions and tergiverſations whatſoever. But theſe things cannot be inſiſted on here.

Eighthly, Mr. Baxter, pag. 76. charges the Doctor with ſuch a ſtrange Paradox as to half of it, that I cannot imagine from whence he ſhould fetch it. You ſeem, ſays he, to make all ſubſtance Atoms, Spiritual Atoms and Material Atoms. The latter part of the charge the Doctor I doubt not but will acknowledge to [Page] be true: But may eaſily prove out of Mr. Baxter, pag. 65. that he muſt hold ſo too. For his words there are theſe: Tha [...] God is able to divide all matter into Atoms or indiviſible parts I doubt not. And can they be Phyſically divided into parts of which they don't conſiſt? But Mr. Baxter by the ſame reaſon making Spirits diviſible by God, though not by any Creature, makes them conſiſt of Spiritual Atoms, for they cannot but conſiſt of ſuch parts as they are diviſible into. And if they be diviſible by God into larger ſhreds onely but not into Atoms, then every created Spirit, eſpecially particular ones, are ſo many ſubtil living Puppets made up of ſpiritual rags and clouts. But if God can divide them neither into ſpiritual Atoms nor larger ſpiritual parcels, he can't divide them at all. And ſo according to what the Doctor contends for, they will be, as they ought to be, abſolutely indiſcerpible.

I omit here to take notice of another abſurdity of Mr. Baxters, That though the ſubſtance of a Spirit he will have to be diviſible, yet he will have the form indiviſible, pag. 50, 99. and yet both parts to be Spirit ſtill; which implies a contradiction. For then one of the parts will be without the form of a Spirit, and conſequently be no Spirit, and yet be a Spirit according to Mr. Baxter, who makes Spirits diviſible into parts of the ſame denomination, as when water is divided into two parts, each part is ſtill water, pag. 53.

[Page] Ninthly. That which occurrs pag. 48. is a groſs Diſingenuity againſt the Doctor, where Mr. Baxter ſays, And when you make all Spirits to be Souls and to animate ſome matter, you ſeem to make God to be but Anima Mundi. How unfair and harſh is this for you Mr. Baxter, who has been ſo tenderly and civilly handled by the Doctor in his Anſwer to your Letter, he conſtantly hiding or mollifying any thing that occurred therein that might overmuch expoſe you, to repreſent him as a favourer of ſo groſs a Paradox as this, That there is no God but an Anima Mundi, which is the Poſition of the Vaninian Atheiſts, which himſelf has expreſly confuted in his Myſtery of Godlineſs, and declared againſt lately in his Advertiſements on Joſ Glanvils Letter to himſelf, in the ſecond Edition of Saduciſmus Triumphatus? This looks like the breaking out of unchriſtian rancour, in a Reply which bears the Specious Title of a Placid Collation. Which is yet exceedingly more aggravable, for that this odious Collection is not made from any words of the Doctor, but from a fiction of Mr. Baxter. For the Doctor has nowhere Written, nor ever thought that all Spirits, but only all Created Spirits, might probably be Souls, that is to ſay, actuate ſome matter or other. And thoſe words are in his Preface to his Anſwer to the Letter of the Pſychopyrist, as I noted before. I might reckon up ſeveral other [Page] Diſingenuities of Mr. Baxters towards the Doctor in this his Placid Collation; but I have enumerated enough already to weary the Reader, and I muſt remember I am but in a Digreſſion.

I ſhall onely name one Diſingenuity more, which was antecedent to them all, and gave occaſion both to Mr. Baxters Letter, and to the Doctors Anſwer thereto, and to this Reply of Mr. Baxter. And that was, That Mr. Baxter in his Methodus Theologiae (as he has done alſo in a little Pamphlet touching Judge Hales) without giving any reaſons, which is the worſt way of traducing any man or his ſ [...]ntiments, ſlighted and ſlurred thoſe two eſſential Attributes of a Spirit, Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility, which for their certain Truth and uſefulneſs the Doctor thought fit to communicate to the World.

But foraſmuch as Mr. Baxter has in this his Reply produced his Reaſons againſt them, I doubt not but the Doctor will accept it for an amends. And I, as I muſt diſallow of the Diſingenuity of the omiſſion before, yet to be juſt to Mr. Baxter, I muſt commend his diſcretion and judgment in being willing to omit them; they appearing to me now they are produced, ſo weak and invalid. But ſuch as they are, I ſhall gather them out of his Reply, and bring them into view.

Firſt then, pag. 13. It is alledged, That nothing hath two forms univocally ſo called. [Page] But if Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie be added to the Virtus Vitalis, to the Vital Power of a Spirit, it will have two forms. Therefore Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie are to be omitted in the notion of a Spirit. See alſo p. 22.

Secondly, pag. 14. Penetrable and Indiſcerpible can be no otherwiſe a form to Spirits, than Impenetrable and Diſcerpible are a form to Matter. But Impenetrable is onely a modal Conceptus of Matter, and Diſcerpible a Relative notion thereof, and neither one nor both contrary to Virtus vitalis in a Spirit.

Thirdly, pag. 14. He ſees no reaſon why Quantity, and the Trina Dimenſio, may not as well be part of the form of Matter as Diſcerpibilitie and Impenetrabilitie.

Fourthly, pag. 15, 16. Nothing is to be known without the mediation of Senſe, except the immediate ſenſation itſelf, and the acts of intellection and volition or nolition, and what the Intellect inferreth of the like, by the perception of theſe. Wherefore as to the modification of the ſubſtance of Spirits which is contrary to Impenetrabilitie and Diviſibilitie, I may grope, ſays he, but I cannot know it poſitively for want of ſenſation.

Fifthly, pag. 16, 17. If Indiſcerpibilitie be the eſſential character of a Spirit, then an Atom of matter is a Spirit, it being acknowledged to be Indiſcerpible. Wherefore Indiſcerpibilitie is a falſe character of a Spirit.

[Page] Sixthly, pag. 17, 18. [Penetrable] whether actively or paſſively underſtood, can be no proper Character of a Spirit, foraſmuch as Matter can penetrate a Spirit, as well as a Spirit Matter, it poſſeſſing the ſame place. See pag. 23.

Seventhly, pag. 40, 41. Immaterialitie, ſays he, Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie, in your own judgment I think are none of them proper to Spirit. For they are common to diverſe Accidents in your account, viz. to Light, Heat, Cold. And again in his own words,

Eighthly, pag. 77. If your Penetrabilitie, ſays he, imply not that all the ſingular Spirits can contract themſelves into a Punctum, yea that all the Spirits of the world may be ſo contracted, I find it not yet ſufficiently explained. See alſo pag. 52, 78, 89, 90.

Ninthly, pag. 50. Seeing, ſays he, you aſcribe Amplitude, Quantitie, and Dimenſions and Logical Materialitie to the Subſtantialitie of Spirits, I ſee not but that you make them Intellectually diviſible, that is, that one may think of one part as here, and another there. And if ſo, though man cannot ſeparate and divide them, if it be no contradiction, God can.

Tenthly, and laſtly, pag. 90. The putting of Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility into the notion of a Spirit, is needleſs, and hazardous, it being ſufficient to hold that God hath made Spirits of no kind of parts but what do Naturally abhor [Page] Separation, and ſo are inſeparable unleſs God will ſeparate them, and ſo there is no fear of loſing our Perſonality in the other State. But Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility being hard and doubtful words, they are better left out, leſt they tempt all to believe that the very Being of Spirits is as doubtful as thoſe words are.

Thus have I faithfully though briefly brought into view all Mr. Baxters Arguments againſt the Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility of Spirits, which I ſhall anſwer in order as they have been recited.

To the firſt therefore I ſay, that the Doctors Definition of a Spirit, which is [A Subſtance immaterial intrinſecally indued with life and a faculty of motion] where Subſtance is the Genus, and the reſt of the terms comprize the Differentia (which Mr. Baxter calls Conceptus formalis and Forma) I ſay, that this Difference or Form though it conſiſt of many terms, yet theſe terms are not Heterogeneal, as he would inſinuate, pag. 22. but Congenerous, and one in order to another, and eſſentially and inſeparably united in that one ſubſtance which is rightly and properly called Spirit, and in vertue of that one ſubſtance, though their Notions and Operations differ, they are really one inſeparable ſpecifick Difference or Form, as much as Mr. Baxters Virtus vitalis un a-trina is; that is to ſay, they are [Page] ſpecifick knowable terms, ſuccedaneous to the true intimate ſpecifick Form that is utterly unknowable; and therefore I ſay, in this ſen [...]e theſe knowable terms are one inſeparable ſpecifick Difference or Form whereby Spirit is diſtinguiſhed from Bodie or Matter in a Phyſical acception. Which the Univerſality of Philoſophers hold to conſiſt in Impenetrability, and Diſcerpibilitie, and Self-inactivitie. Which if Mr. Baxter would have been pleaſed to take notice of, viz. that a Spirit is ſaid to be a Subſtance Immaterial in oppoſition to Matter Phyſical, he might have ſaved himſelf the labour of a deal of tedious triſling in explication of words to no purpoſe.

But to ſhew that this Pretence of more Forms than one in one Subſtance is but a Cavil, I will offer really the ſame Definition in a more ſuccinct way, and more to Mr. Baxters tooth, and ſay, As Corpus is Subſtantia Materialis (where Materialis is the ſpecifick Difference of Corpus comprized in one term:) ſo Spiritus is Subſtantia Immaterialis (where Immaterialis the ſpecifick Difference of Spiritus is likewiſe comprized in one term, to pleaſe the humour of Mr. Baxter.) But now as under that one term [Materialis] are comprized Impenetrabilitie, Diſcerpibilitie, and Self-Inactivity; ſo alſo under that one term [Immaterialis] are comprized, as under one head, Penetrability, Indiſcerpibility, and Intrinſecal life and motion, [Page] that is, an eſſential facultie of life and motion, which in one word may be called Self-Activity. Whence Penetrability, Indiſcerpibility, and Self-Activity are as much one Form of a Spirit, as Mr. Baxters Vita, Perceptio, and Appetitus, is one Form thereo [...]. For though in both places they are three diſtinct notions, at leaſt as Mr. Baxter would have it, yet they are the eſſential and inſeparable Attributes of one ſubſtance, and the immediate fruit and reſult of the Specifick nature thereof. They are inſeparably one in their Source and Subject.

And this I think is more than enough to take off this firſt little Cavil of Mr. Baxters againſt the Doctors including Penetrability and Inſeparability in the Form or Specifick difference of a Spirit. For all that ſame is to be called Form, by which a thing is that which it is, as far as our Cognitive faculties will reach, and by which it is eſſentially diſtinguiſhed from other things. And if it were not for Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie, Spirit would be confounded with Body and Matter. And Body or Phyſical Matter might be Self-Active, Sentient, and Intelligent.

To the Second I anſwer, That whoſoever ſearches things to the bottom, he will find this a ſound Principle in Philoſophie, That there is nothing in the whole Univerſe but what is either Subſtantia or Modus. And when a Mode or ſeveral Modes put together are [Page] immediately and eſſentially inſeparable from a Subſtance, they are lookt upon as the Form, or the onely knowable Specifick difference of that Subſtance. So that Impenetrability and Diſcerpibility, which are immediately eſſential to, and inſeparable from Body or Matter, and Self-Inactivitie, (as Irrational is made the ſpecifick difference of a Brute) may be added alſo: Theſe, I ſay, are as truly the Form or Specifick difference of Body or Matter, as any thing knowable is of any thing in the world. And Self-Inactivity at leaſt, is contrary to the Virtus vitalis of a Spirit, though Impenetrability and Diſcerpibility were not. So that according to this oeconomy, you ſee how plainly and exquiſitely Body and Spirit are made oppoſite Species one to another. And 'tis theſe Modal differences of Subſtances which we only know, but the Specifick Subſtance of any thing is utterly unknown to us, however Mr. Baxter is pleaſed to ſwagger to the contrarie, p. 44, 62. Where he ſeems to miſ-underſtand the Doctor, as if by Eſſence he did not underſtand Subſtance, as both [...] and Eſſentia uſually ſignifie (eſpecially with the Ancients) but any Being at large.

But of Subſtance it is moſt true, we know it onely by its eſſential Modes, but the Modes are not the Subſtance it ſelf of which they are Modes; otherwiſe the Subſtance would want Modes, or every Subſtance would be more ſubſtances than one. And Mr. Baxter himſelf [Page] ſaith, pag. 62. To know an eſſential Attribute, and to know ipſam eſſentiam ſcientiâ inadaequatâ, is all one. Which inadequate or partial knowledge, ſay I, is this, the knowing of the Eſſential Mode of the Subſtance, and not knowing the Subſtance it ſelf; Otherwiſe if both the Eſſential Modes were known, and alſo the Specifick Subſtance to which the Modes belong (more than that thoſe Modes belong to that Subſtance) the knowledge would be full and adequate, and ſtretcht through the whole Object. So that Mr. Baxters Scientia inadoequata, and the Doctors denying the bare Subſtance it ſelf to be known, may very well conſiſt together, and be judged a mere [...]. Which is an exerciſe more grateful it's likely to Mr. Baxter, than to the Doctor.

To the third I ſay, Any one that conſiders may find a neceſſarie reaſon why Quantitie or Trina Dimenſio ſhould be left out in the Form of Body or Matter, eſpecially why the Doctor ſhould leave it out, becauſe he does profeſſedly hold, That whatever is, has Metaphyſical Quantitie or Metaphyſical Trina Dimenſio; Which no man can denie that holds God is Eſſentially preſent every-where. And no man, I think, that does not dote can denie that. Wherefore allowing Matter to be Subſtance; in that Generical nature, Trina Dimenſio is comprized, and need not be again repeated in the Form. But when in the Forma [Page] or Differentia, Diſcerpible and Impenetrable is added, this is that which makes the Trina Dimenſio (included in the Genus, Subſtantia) of a Corporeal kind, and does conſtitute that Species of things, which we call Corpora. This is ſo plain a buſineſs, that we need inſiſt no longer upon it.

Now to the fourth, I anſwer briefly, That from what knowledge we have by the mediation of the Senſes and inference of the Intellect, we arrive not onely to the knowledge of like things, but of unlike, or rather contrary: As in this very example, we being competently well inſtructed, indeed aſſured by our Senſes, that there is ſuch a kind of thing as Body, whoſe nature is to be Impenetrable and Diſcerpible, and our Reaſon certainly informing us, as was noted even now, that whatever is, has a kind of Amplitude more or leſs, or elſe it would be nothing; hence we are confirmed, that not Extenſion or Trina Dimenſio, but Impenetrabilitie and Diſcerpibilitie is the determinate and adequate nature of what we call Body; and if there be any oppoſite ſpecies to Body, our Reaſon tells us it muſt have oppoſite Modes or Attributes, which are Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility. This is a plain truth not to be groped after with our fingers in the dark, but clearly to be diſcerned by the eye of our underſtanding in the light of Reaſon. And thus we ſee (and many examples more we might accumulate) That by the help of our [Page] Senſes and Inference of our Ʋnderſtanding, we are able to conclude not onely concerning like things, but their contraries or oppoſites. I muſt confeſs I look upon this allegation of Mr. Baxter as very weak and faint.

And as for his fifth, I do a little marvel that ſo grave and grandaevous a perſon as he ſhould pleaſe himſelf in ſuch little [...]irts of Wit and Sophiſtry as this of the Indiſcerpibility of an Atom or Phyſical Monad. As if Indiſcerpibility could be none of the eſſential or ſpecifical Modes or Attributes of a Spirit, becauſe a Phyſical Monad or Atom is Indiſcerpible alſo, which is no Spirit. But thoſe very Indiſcerpibilities are Specifically different. For that of a Spirit is an Indiſcerpibility that ariſes from the poſitive perfection and Oneneſs of the Eſſence, be it never ſo ample; that of an Atom or Phyſical Monad, from imperfection and privativeneſs, from the mere littleneſs or ſmalneſs thereof, ſo ſmall that it is impoſſible to be ſmaller, and thence onely is Indiſcerpible.

The ſixth alſo is a pretty juvenile Ferk of Wit for a grave ancient Divine to uſe, That Penetrability can be no proper Character of a Spirit, becauſe Matter can penetrate Spirit as well as Spirit Matter, they both poſſeſſing the ſame ſpace. Suppoſe the bodie A. of the ſame amplitude with the bodie B. and thruſt the bodie A. againſt the bodie B. the bodie A. will not nor can penetrate into the ſame ſpace [Page] that the bodie B. actually occupies. But ſuppoſe the bodie A. a Spirit of that amplitude, and according to its nature piercing into the ſame ſpace which the bodie B. occupies, how plain is it that that active piercing into the ſame ſpace that the bodie B. occupies, is to be attributed to the Spirit A. & not to the bodie B? For the bodie A. could not get in. Theſe are prettie forc'd diſtortions of Wit, but no ſolid methods of due Reaſon. And beſides, it is to be noted, that the main Character of a Spirit is, as to Penetrability, that Spirit can penetrate Spirit, but not Matter Matter.

And now the Seventh is as ſlight as the Fifth. Diverſe Accidents, ſaith he, penetrate their Subjects, as Heat, Cold, &c. Therefore Penetrabilitie is no proper Character of a Spirit. But what a vaſt difference is there here! The one pierce the matter, (or rather are in the matter merely as continued Modes thereof) the other enters into the matter as a diſtinct Subſtance therefrom. Penetration therefore is here underſtood in this Character of a Spirit, of Penetratio Subſtantialis, when a ſubſtance penetrates ſubſtance, as a Spirit does Spirit and matter, which Matter cannot do. This is a certain Character of a Spirit. And his inſtancing in Light as Indiſcerpible, is as little to the purpoſe. For the ſubſtance of Light, viz. the Materia ſubtiliſſima and Globuli, are diſcerpible. And the motion of them is but a Modus, but the point [Page] in hand is Indiſcerpibilitie of Subſtance.

To the Eighth I Anſwer, That Mr. Baxter here is hugely unreaſonable in his demands, as if Penetrabilitie of Spirits were not ſufficiently explained, unleſs it can be made out, that all the Spirits in the world, Univerſal and particular, may be contracted into one Punctum: But this is a Theme that he loves to enlarge upon, and to declaim on very Tragically, as pag. 52. If Spirits have parts which may be extended and contracted, you will hardly ſo eaſily prove as ſay, that God cannot divide them. And when in your Writings ſhall I find ſatiſfaction into how much ſpace one Spirit may be extended, and into how little it may be contracted, and whether the whole Spirit of the World may be contracted into a Nut-ſhell or a Box, and the Spirit of a Flea may be extended to the Convex of all the world? And again, pag. 78. You never tell into how little parts onely it may be contracted; And if you put any limits, I will ſuppoſe that one Spirit hath contracted itſelf into the leaſt compaſs poſſible; and then I ask, Cannot another and another Spirit be in the ſame compaſs by their Penetration? If not; Spirits may have a contracted Spiſſitude which is not Penetrable, and Spirits cannot penetrate contracted Spirits, but onely dilated ones. If yea; then quaero, whether all created Spirits may not be ſo contracted. And I ſhould hope that the Definition [Page] of a Spirit excludeth not God, and yet that you do not think that his Eſſence may be contracted and dilated. O that we knew how little we know!

This grave moral Epiphonema with a ſorrowful ſhaking of the Head is not in good truth much misbecoming the ſly inſinuating cunning of Mr. Richard Baxter, who here makes a ſhew, ſpeaking in the firſt perſon [We] of lamenting and bewailing the ignorance of his own ignorance, but friendly hooks in, by expreſſing himſelf in the plural number, the Doctor alſo into the ſame condemnation. Solamen miſeris—as if He neither did underſtand his own ignorance in the things he Writes of, but will be ſtrangely ſurpriſed at the hard Riddles Mr. Baxter has propounded, as if no Oedipus were able to ſolve them. And I believe the Doctor if he be called to an account will freely confeſs of himſelf, That in the things he poſitively pronounces of, ſo far as he pronounces, that he is indeed altogether ignorant of any ignorance of his own therein; But that this is by reaſon that he according to the cautiouſneſs of his Genius does not adventure further than he clearly ſees ground, and the notion appears uſeful for the Publick. As it is indeed uſeful to underſtand that Spirits can both Penetrate matter and Penetrate one another, elſe God could not be Eſſentially preſent in all the parts of the Corporeal Univerſe, nor the Spirits of Men and Angels [Page] be in God. Both which notwithſtanding are moſt certainly true, to ſay nothing of the Spirit of Nature, which particular Spirits alſo Penetrate, and are Penetrated by it.

But now for the Contraction and Dilatation of Spirits, that is not a propertie of Spirits in general as the other are, but of particular created Spirits, as the Doctor has declared in his Treatiſe of the Immortalitie of the Soul. So that that hard Queſtion is eaſily anſwered concerning Gods contracting and dilating himſelf; That he does neither, he being no created Spirit, and being more abſolutely perfect than that any ſuch properties ſhould be competible to him. And it is reaſonable to conceive that there is little actually of that propertie in the Spirit of Nature, it being no particular Spirit, though created, but an Univerſal one, and having no need thereof. For the corporeal world did not grow from a ſmall Embryo into that vaſt amplitude it is now of, but was produced of the ſame largeneſs it now has, though there was a ſucceſſive delineation and orderly poliſhing and perfecting the vaſt diſtended parts thereof. And to ſpeak compendiouſly and at once, That God that has Created all things in number, weight & meaſure, has given ſuch meaſures of Spiritual Eſſence and of the facultie of contracting and dilating the ſame, as alſo of Spiritual Subtilty of ſubſtance, as ſerves the ends of his Wiſdom and Goodneſs in creating ſuch a ſpecies of Spirit. [Page] So that it is fond, unskilful, and ridiculous, to ask if the whole Spirit of the world can be contracted into a Nut-ſhell, and the Spirit of a Flea extended to the Convex of the Univerſe. They that talk at this rate err, as Aliens from the Wiſdome of God, and ignorant of the Laws of Nature, and indeed of the voice of Scripture itſelf. Why ſhould God make the Spirit of a Flea, which was intended for the conſtituting of ſuch a ſmall Animal, large enough to fill the whole world? Or what need of ſuch a contraction in the Spirit of Nature or Plaſtick Soul of the corporeal Univerſe, that it may be contrived into a Nut-ſhell?

That it has ſuch Spiritual ſubtiltie as that particular Spirits may contract themſelves in it ſo cloſe together, as to be commenſurate to the firſt Inchoations of a Foetus, which is but very ſmall, ſtands to good reaſon, and Effects prove it to be ſo. As alſo this ſmalneſs of a Foetus or Embryo that particular Spirits are ſo far contracted at firſt, and expand themſelves leiſurely afterwards with the growth of the bodie which they regulate. But into how much leſſer ſpace they can or do contract themſelves at any time, is needleſs to know or enquire. And there is no Repugnancie at all, but the Spirit of Nature might be contracted to the like Eſſential Spiſſitude that ſome particular Spirits are; but there is no reaſon to conceit that it ever was or ever will be ſo contracted, while the World ſtands.

[Page] Nor laſtly is there any Inconvenience in putting indefinite limits of Contraction in a Spirit, and to allow that after ſuch a meaſure of Contraction, though we cannot ſay juſt what that is, it naturally contracts no further, nor does another ſo contracted naturally penetrate this thus contracted Spirit. For as the uſefulneſs of that meaſure of Self-Penetrability and Contraction is plain, ſo it is as plain, that the admitting of it is no incongruitie nor incommoditie to the Univerſe, nor any confuſion to the Specifick modes of Spirit and Bodie. For theſe two Spirits, ſuppoſe, contracted to the utmoſt of their natural limits, may naturally avoid the entring one another, not by a dead [...] as in Bodies or Matter, but by a vital Saturitie, or natural Uneaſineſs in ſo doing. Beſides that, though at ſuch a contracted pitch they are naturally impenetrable to one another, yet they demonſtrate ſtill their Spirituality, by Self-Penetration, haply a thouſand and a thouſand times repeated. And though by a Law of life (not by a dead [...]), they are kept from penetrating one another, yet they both in the mean time neceſſarily penetrate Matter, as undergoing the diverſe meaſures of eſſential Spiſſitude in the ſame. So that by the increaſe of that eſſential Spiſſitude, they may approach near to a kind of Hylopathick diſpoſition of Impenetrability, and thence, by the Matter of the Univerſe (out of which they [Page] never are) be curb'd from contracting themſelves any further, than to ſuch a degree; and I noted at firſt, that ſpiritual Subtilty, as well as Amplitude, is given in meaſure to created Spirits. So that Penetrabilitie is ſtill a ſteadie Character of a Spiritual Eſſence or Subſtance, to th [...] utmoſt ſenſe thereof. And to argue againſt Impenetrability its being the propertie of Matter from this kind of Impenetrability of contracted Spirits, is like that quibbling Sophiſtrie againſt Indiſcerpibility being the propertie of a Spirit, becauſe a Phyſical Monad is alſo indiſcerpible.

The ninth Objection is againſt the Indiſcerpibility of Spirits, and would infer, that becauſe the Doctor makes them intellectually diviſible, therefore by Divine Power, if it imply no contradiction, a Spirit is Diſcerpible into Phyſical parts. But this is ſo fully ſatisfied already by the Doctor in his Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit, and its Defence, to ſay nothing of what I have ſaid already above to prove it does imply a contradiction, that I will let it go, and proceed.

To the tenth and laſt Allegation, which pretends, That theſe two terms Penetrable and Indiſcerpible are needleſs and hazardous in the Notion of a Spirit. But how uſeful or needful Penetrability is, is manifeſt from what we have ſaid to the eighth Objection. And the needfulneſs of Indiſcerpibility is alſo ſufficiently [Page] ſhewn by the Doctor in his Defence of the true Notion of a Spirit, Sect. 30. But now for the Hazardouſneſs of theſe terms, as if they were ſo hard, that it would diſcourage men from the admitting of the Exiſtence of Spirits; It appears from what has been ſaid to the eighth Objection, That Penetrability is not onely intelligible and admittable, but neceſſarily to be admitted, in the Notion of a Spirit, as ſure as God is a Spirit, and that there are Spirits of men and Angels, and that the Souls of men are not made of Shreds, but actuate their whole grown bodie, though at firſt they were contracted into the compaſs of a very ſmall Foetus. And that there is no Repugnancie that an Eſſence may be ample, and yet indiſcerpible, Mr. Baxter himſelf muſt allow, who, pag. 51. plainly declares, That it is the vileſt contradiction to ſay that God is capable of diviſion. So that I wonder that he will call [Penetrable] and [Indiſcerpible] hard and doubtful words, and ſuch as might ſtumble mens belief of the Exiſtence of Spirits, when they are terms ſo plain and neceſſary. Nor can that Ʋnitie that belongs to a Spirit be conceived or underſtood without them, eſpecially without Indiſcerpibilitie. And indeed if we do not allow Penetrability, the Soul of a man will be far from being one, but a thing diſcontinued, and ſcatter'd in the pores of his corporeal conſiſtencie.

[Page] We will conclude with Mr. Baxters Conceit of the Indiviſibleneſs of a Spirit, and ſee how that will corroborate mens faith of their Exiſtence, and put all out of hazard. Various Elements, ſaith he, pag. 50. vary in Diviſibility; Earth is moſt diviſible; Water more hardly, the parts more inclining to the cloſeſt contact; Air yet more hardly; and in Fire, no doubt the Diſcerpibility is yet harder: And if God have made a Creature ſo ſtrongly inclined to the unitie of all the parts, that no Creature can ſeparate them but God onely, as if a Soul were ſuch, it is plain that ſuch a Being need not fear a diſſolution by Separation of parts. Anſ. This is well ſaid for an heedleſs and credulous multitude; but this is not to Philoſophize, but to tell us that God works a perpetual Miracle in holding the ſmall tenuious parts of the Soul together, more pure and [...]ine than thoſe of Fire or Aether; but here is no natural cauſe [...]om the thing it ſelf offered, unleſs it be, that in every Subſtance, or rather Matter, the parts according to the tenuitie and puritie of the Subſtance, incline to a cloſer Contact and inſeparable Union one with another; which is a conceit repugnant to experience, and eaſily confuted by that ordinarie accident of a Spinner hanging by its weak thread from the brim of ones Hat; which [...]eeble line yet is of force enough to divide the Air, and for that very reaſon, becauſe it conſiſts [Page] of thinner parts than Water or Earth. As alſo, we can more eaſily run in the Air than wade in the Water, for the very ſame reaſon. Theſe things are ſo plain, that they are not to be dwelt upon.

But Mr. Baxter is thus pleaſed to ſhew his Wit in maintaining a weak [...]auſe, which I am perſwaded he has not ſo little judgment as that he can have any great confidence in. And therefore in ſundry places he intimates that he does allow or at leaſt not deny but that Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie is contained in the Notion of a Spirit; but not as part of the Conceptus formalis, but as Diſpoſitio or Modus ſubſtantiae, but yet withal ſuch a Diſpoſitio as is eſſential to the ſubſtance that with the Conceptus formalis added, makes up the true Notion of a Spirit. See pag. 30, 32, 61, 85. And truly if Mr. Baxter be in good earneſt and ſincere in this agreement without all equivocation, that Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie is Eſſential to the true Notion of a Spirit, onely they are to be admitted as Diſpoſitio Subſtantiae, not as Pars Formae, I confeſs, as he declares pag. 94. That the di [...]erence betwixt him and the Doctor lyeth in a much ſmaller matter than was thought; and the Doctor I believe will eaſily allow him to pleaſe his own fancy in that. But then he muſt underſtand the terms of Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie in the Doctors ſenſe, viz, of a [Page] Spirits penetrating not inter partes, but per partes materi [...], and poſſeſſing the ſame ſpace with them. And of an Indiſcerpibleneſs not ariſing from thinner and thinner parts of matter, as he imagines Air to be more hardly diſcerpible than Earth or Water, foraſmuch as by reaſon of its thinneſs its parts lye cloſer together, as was above noted; but from the immediate eſſential Oneneſs of ſubſtance in a Spirit, according to the true Idea of an Indiſcerpible Being in the Divine Intellect, which, whether in Idea or in Actual Exiſtence, it would ceaſe to be, or rather never was ſuch, if it were diſcerpible, and therefore implies a contradiction it ſhould be ſo. But if a Spirit be not Penetrable in the Doctors ſenſe, it is really Impenetrable; and if not Indiſcerpible in his ſenſe, it is really Diſcerpible, and conſequently diviſible into Phyſical Monads or Atoms, and therefore conſtituted of them, and the laſt Inference will be that of the Epigrammatiſt:

[...].

[...].

To this ſenſe:

All a vain Jeſt, All Duſt, All Nothing deem,

For of mere Atoms all compoſed been.

And thus the faireſt and firmeſt ſtructures of Philoſophical Theorems in the behalf of the Providence of God, the Exiſtence of Spirits, and the Immortality of the Soul, will become a [Page] Caſtle of Come-Down, and fall quite to the ground. Whence it was rightfully done of the Doctor to lay ſuch ſtreſs upon theſe two terms Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie, they being the eſſential Characteriſticks of what is truly a Spirit, and which if they were taken out of the world, all would neceſſarily be Matter, I mean Phyſical Matter (to prevent all quibblings and fiddlings about words and phraſes) and this Phyſical Matter would be the Subject and Source of all Life whatever, Intellective, Senſitive and Vegetative. And Mr. Baxter did ill in not onely omitting theſe terms himſelf in his Notion of a Spirit, but in publickly ſlighting and diſgracing of the Doctors uſing of them, and afterwards in ſo ſtomaching his vindication of the ſame in publick, whenas we ſee that without them there can be nothing but Phyſical Matter in the world, and God and Angels and the Souls of men muſt be ſuch Matter, if they be any thing a [...] all: and therefore in ſuch an errour as this, Mr. Baxter with Chriſtian patience might well have born with the Doctors calling it, not onely a Miſtake, but a Miſchief. And I hope by this time he is ſuch a proficient in that Vertue, that he will chearfully bear the publication of this my Anſwer in the behalf of the Doctor to all his Objections againſt theſe two eſſential and neceſſarie Characters of a Spirit; and not be offended if I briefly run over his ſmaller Criticiſms [Page] upon the Doctors Definition of the ſame, which do occur, pag. 80, 81. and elſewhere, as I ſhall advertiſe.

The Doctors Definition of a Spirit in his Diſcourſe of that Subject, Sect. 29. is this [A Spirit is a Subſtance immaterial intrinſecally indued with life and the facultie of motion] where he notes that Immaterial contains virtually in it Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility. Now let us hear how Mr. Baxter criticizes on this Definition.

Firſt, ſaies he, pag. 80. Your Definition is common, good and true, allowing for its little imperfections, and the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits. If by [Immaterial] you mean not [without Subſtance] it ſignifieth truth, but a negation ſpeaketh not a formal Eſſence. Anſ. How very little theſe imperfections are, I ſhall note by paſſing through them all; and for the common imperfection of mans knowledge of Spirits, what an unskilful or hypocritical pretence that is, the Doctor hath ſo clearly ſhewn in his Diſcourſe of the true Notion of a Spirit, Sect. 16, 17, 18, 19. that it is enough to ſend the Reader thither for ſatisfaction. But as for [Immaterial] how can any one think that thereby is meant [without Subſtance] but thoſe that think there is nothing but Matter in the Phyſical ſenſe of the word, in the world? As if [Subſtance Immaterial] was intended to ſignifie [Subſtance [Page] without Subſtance]! And laſtly, the Doctor will denie that [In] in Immaterial ſignifies negatively here more than in Immortal, Incorruptible, or Infinite, but that it is the indication of oppoſite properties to thoſe of Phyſical Matter, viz. Impenetrability and Diſcerpibility, and that therefore Immaterial here includes Indiſcerpibility and Penetrability.

Secondly, pag. 81. Spirit it ſelf, ſaies he, is but a metaphor. Anſ. Though the word firſt ſignified other things before it was uſed in the ſenſe it is here defined, yet uſe has made it as good as if it were originally proper. With your Logicians, in thoſe Definitions, Materia eſt Cauſa ex qua res eſt, Forma eſt Cauſa per quam res eſt id quod eſt; Materia and Forma are Metaphorical words, but uſe has made them in thoſe Definitions as good as proper; nor does any ſober and knowing man move the leaſt ſcruple touching thoſe Definitions on this account. To which you may add, that Ariſtotles caution againſt Metaphors in defining things, is to be underſtood of the Definition it ſelf, not the Definitum; but Spirit is the Definitum here, not the Definition.

Thirdly, [Intrinſecally indued with liſe] tells us not that it is the Form. Qualities, and proper Accidents are intrinſecal. Anſ. Mr. Baxter, I ſuppoſe, for clearneſs ſake, would have had Form written over the head of this part of the Definition, as the old bungling [Page] painters were wont to write, This is a Cock, and this a Bull; or as one wittily perſtringed a young Preacher that would name the Logical Topicks he took his Arguments from, ſaying he was like a Shoemaker that offered his Shoes to ſale with the Laſts in them. I thought Mr. Baxter had been a more nimble Logician than to need ſuch helps to diſcern what is the Genus in the Definition, what the Differentia or Forma. And for [intrinſecally indued] I perceive he is ignorant of the proper force and ſenſe of the word Intrinſecùs, which ſignifies as much as [...] not [...] onely, which implies that this life is from the intimate Eſſence of a Spirit quatenus a Spirit, and therefore can be no common qualitie nor a facultie clarted on, as Mr. Baxter fancies God may clart on Life the ſpecifick Form of Spirit, as he himſelf acknowledges, on Matter, though Materia quatenus Materia implies no ſuch thing; but, I ſay; Spiritus quatenus Spiritus does, which is both the Source and proper Subject of life. But it is the effect of an ill perturbed ſight, to fancie flaws where there are really none. And to fancie that a Vis Vitalis, or Power of living can belong to Materia Phyſica immediately, which power muſt neceſſarily be the Reſult of an Eſſence ſpecifically diſtinct from Phyſical Matter, I think may juſtly be called clarting of this Power on a Subject it belongs not to, nor is intrinſecal to it, there being [Page] no new ſpecifick Eſſence from whence it ſhould ſpring.

Fourthly, The [Facultie of motion] ſaies he, is either a Tautologie included in Life, or elſe if explicatorie of Life, it is defective. Anſ. It is neither Tautological nor Exegetical, no more than if a man ſhould define Homo, Animal rationale riſibile. [Riſibile] there, is neither Tautological, though included in Animal rationale; nor Exegetical, it ſignifying not the ſame with Rationale. And the Definition is as true with Riſibile added to it, as if omitted. But the addition of Riſibile being needleſs, is indeed ridiculous. But it is not Ridiculous to add the faculty of motion in this Definition of a Spirit, becauſe it is not needleſs, but is added on purpoſe to inſtruct ſuch as Mr. Baxter, that an intrinſecal facultie of motion belongs to Spirit quatenus Spirit, and indued with Life; whenas yet he, pag. 35. will not admit that ſelfmotion is an indication of Life in the ſubject that moves itſelf, although it is the very prime argument that his beloved and admired Dr. Gliſſon uſeth to prove, that there is univerſally life in Matter. But it is the ſymptome of an over-Polemical Fencer, to deny a thing merely becauſe he finds it not for his turn. In the mean time it is plain the Doctor has not added [the facultie of motion] raſhly out of over ſight, but for the inſtructing the ignorant in ſo important a truth, That [Page] there is no [...] but there is Life and Spirit. This is ſo great a truth, that the Platoniſts make it to be the main Character of Soul or Spirit, to be [...], as you may ſee in Proclus.

Fifthly, No man, ſaith he, can underſtand that the Negative [Immaterial], by the terms, includeth Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie. Anſ. No man that rightly underſtands himſelf but muſt conceive that [Immaterial] ſignifies an oppoſite or contrary condition to [Material]: and he knowing (as who is ignorant of it?) that the proper and eſſential characters of [Material] in ſubſtantia materialis, is to be Impenetrable and Diſcerpible, he will neceſſarily, even whether he will or no, diſcover that [Immaterial] which ſignifies the oppoſite to theſe in ſubſtantia immaterialis, muſt denote Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility.

Sixthly, You do not ſay here, ſaith he, that they are the Form, but elſewhere you do; and the Form ſhould be expreſt, and not onely vertually contained, as you ſpeak. Anſ. What would you have him in the very Definition it ſelf, which is ſo clear an one, ſay, This is the Genus, this the Form, as thoſe bunglers I mentioned above writ the names of the Animals they had ſo badly drawn? And that the Form ſhould be expreſt is true, but it is ſufficient it be expreſt in ſuch a comprehenſive term as contains under it all that belongs to ſuch a [Page] Species. As when we have divided Vivens into Planta and Animal, if we then define Animal to be Vivens ſenſu praeditum, that one word ſenſus, is ſufficient, becauſe it reaches any Species of Animal, and none but Animals. And yet here the Doctor is not ſo niggardly as to pinch the expreſſion of all the Form or Difference, into that one word Immaterial, whereby he here onely intimates Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility; but for fuller explication addeth, Intrinſecally indued with Life and the facultie of motion. But laſtly, For his elſewhere calling Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility the Form of a Spirit, he nowhere makes them the whole Form of a Spirit, but makes the Logical Form or Differentia of a Spirit, to be all that which he has expreſſed in this Definition, viz. [Immaterial] which denotes Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility, and [Intrinſecal life and motion]. And it is evident that when he calls this Differentia in his Definition, Form, that he does not mean the very ſpecifick Subſtance or Eſſence, whereby a Spirit is a Spirit, but onely eſſential or inſeparable Attributes, which onely are known to us, and which are only in an improper ſenſe ſaid to be the Form it ſelf, or ſpecifick Nature. They are onely the Reſult of the Form and Notes of an Eſſence or Subſtance Specifically diſtinct from ſome other Subſtance.

It is not ſo in ſubſtantial Forms as in Geometrical [Page] Forms or Figures, as to Viſibilitie or Perceptibilitie. Dic tu formam hujus lapidis, ſays Scaliger to Cardan, & Phyllida ſolus habeto. But there are inſeparable and eſſential Properties of a ſubſtantial Form, neceſſarily reſulting from the Form it ſelf, as there are in external Forms or Figures. As for example, from the form of a Globe, which is a round Form, defined from the equalitie of all lines from one point drawn thence to the Superficies. From this form does neceſſarily and inſeparably reſult the Character of an eaſie rouling Mobilitie. That a bodie of this Form is the moſt eaſily moved upon a Plain, of any bodie in the world. And ſo from the Form of a piece of Iron made into what we call a Sword; Fitneſs for ſtriking, for cutting, for ſtabbing, and for defending of the hand, is the neceſſarie reſult from this Form thereof. And ſo I ſay that from the intimate and eſſential Form of a Spirit, ſuppoſe, eſſentially and inſeparably reſult ſuch and ſuch properties by which we know that a Spirit is a diſtinct Species from other things, though we do not know the very ſpecifick eſſence thereof. And therefore here I note by the by, that when the Doctor ſaies any ſuch or ſuch Attributes are the Form of a Spirit, he does datâ operâ balbutire cum balbutientibus, and expreſſes himſelf in the language of the Vulgar, and ſpeaks to Mr. Baxter in his own Dialect. For it is the declared opinion [Page] of the Doctor, that the intimate Form of no Eſſence or Subſtance is knowable, but onely the inſeparable Fruits or Reſults thereof. Which is a Principle wants no proof, but an appeal to every mans faculties that has ordinarie wit and ſinceritie.

Seventhly, They are not the Form, ſaith he, but the Diſpoſitio vel Conditio ad formam. Anſ. You may underſtand out of what was ſaid even now, that Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie are ſo far from being Diſpoſitio ad formam, that they are the Fruits and Reſults of the intimate and Specifick Form of a Spirit, and that they ſuppoſe this Specifick Form in order of nature to precede them, as the Form of a Globe precedes the rouling mobilitie thereof. In vertue of a Spirits being ſuch a Specifick ſubſtance, it has ſuch inſeparable attributes reſulting from it, as a Globe has mobilitie. And as the Globe is conceived firſt, and mobilitie inſeparably reſulting from it; ſo the Specifick Nature of a Spirit, which is its true and intimate Form, and made ſuch according to the eternal Idea thereof in the Intellect of God, being one ſimple Specifick ſubſtance or Eſſence, has reſulting from it thoſe eſſential or inſeparable properties which we attribute to a Spirit, itſelf in the mean time remaining but one ſimple ſelf-ſubſiſtent Actus Entitativus, whoſe Penetrabilitie and Indiviſibilitie Mr. Baxter himſelf, pag. 99. ſays is eaſily defendible. And [Page] the Doctor, who underſtands himſelf, I dare ſay for him, defends the Penetrabilitie and Indiviſibilitie of no Eſſences but ſuch.

Eighthly, If ſuch Modalities, ſays he, or Conſiſtence were the Form, more ſuch ſhould be added which are left out. Anſ. He ſhould have nominated thoſe which are left out. He means, I ſuppoſe, Quantity and Trina Dimenſio, which it was his diſcretion to omit, they being ſo impertinent as I have ſhewn above, in my Anſwer to his third Objection againſt the Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie of a Spirit.

Ninthly, Penetrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie are two Notions, and you ſhould not give us, ſays he, a compound Form. Anſ. This implies that Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility are the Form of a Spirit; but I have ſaid again and again, they are but the Fruits and Reſult of the Form. A Spirit is one ſimple Specifick Eſſence or ſubſtance, and that true Specifickneſs in its Eſſence, is the real and intimate Form, or Conceptus formalis thereof, but that which we know not (as I noted above out of Julius Scaliger) though we know the eſſential and inſeparable Attributes thereof, which may be many, though in one ſimple ſpecifick Subſtance, as there are many Attributes in God immediately and inſeparably reſulting from his moſt ſimple ſpecifick Nature.

[Page] Tenthly, Yea you compound, ſaith he, Pe [...]etrabilitie and Indiſcerpibilitie with a quite different notion [life and the faculty of motion], which is truly the Form, and is one thing, and not compounded of notions ſo different as Conſiſtence and Vertue or Power. Anſ. I ſay again as I ſaid before, that neither Penetrability nor Indiſcerpibility, nor Life nor Motion, are the ſpecifick Form it ſelf of a Spirit, which is a ſimple Subſtance, but the Fruits and Reſults of this ſpecifick Form; and all theſe have a proper Cognation with one another, as agreeing in Immateriality or Spirituality: and how the common ſagacitie of mankind has preſaged, that the moſt noble functions of life are performed by that which is moſt ſubtile and moſt one, as Penetrability and Indiſcerpibility makes the conſiſtence of a Spirit to be, the Doctor has noted in his Diſcourſe of the true notion of a Spirit. Mr. Baxter in reading Theological Syſtems may obſerve, That Attributes as much differing among themſelves as theſe, are given to the moſt ſimple Eſſence of God.

Eleventhly, You ſay, ſays he, pag. 82. Life intrinſecally iſſues from this Immaterial Subſtance: But the Form is concreated with it, and iſſues not from it. Anſ. I grant that the Form is concreated with the Spirit. For a Spirit is nothing elſe but ſuch a ſpecifick ſimple Subſtance or Eſſence, the Specifickneſs of whoſe [Page] nature onely is its real intimate Form. And if we could reach by our Conception that very Form it ſelf, it would be but the Conceptus inadaequatus of one ſimple Subſtance, and be the true Conceptus formalis thereof; and the Conceptus fundamentalis, to ſpeak in Mr. Baxters or Dr. Gliſſons language, would be Subſtance in general, which is contracted into this Species by this real intimate Form; which both conſidered together, being but one ſimple Eſſence, they muſt needs be created together, according to that Idea of a Spirit which God has conceived in his eternal mind. And life will as naturally and neceſſarily iſſue from ſuch a Species or Specifick Eſſence, or from Subſtance contracted into ſuch a Species by the aboveſaid Form, as Mobility does iſſue from the form of a Globe. From whence it is plainly underſtood how Life does intrinſecally iſſue from immaterial Subſtance, nor is the Form it ſelf but the Fruit thereof. And as it were but trifling to ſay that the power of eaſie rolling every way on a Plain were the very Form of a Globe, the word Power or Vertue being but a dark, looſe, general, dilute term, and which belongs to every thing, and is reſtrained onely by its Operation and Object; but it is the Form or Figure of the Globe that is the immediate cauſe that that Vertue or Power in general is ſo reſtrained to this eaſie rolling: ſo it is in Mr. Baxters pretended Form of a Spirit, which he [Page] makes Virtus vitalis, a power of living: Power there, is ſuch a dark dilute term, looſe and general. But that it is determined to life, it is by that intimate ſpecifick Form, which we know not; but onely this we know, That it is to the Power of living as the Figure of a Globe is to the Power of eaſie rolling, and that in neither, one can be without the other. There muſt be a Specifick Eſſence, which is the root of thoſe Powers, Properties, or Operations from whence we conclude diſtinct Species of things: For 'tis too coarſe and ſlovenly to conceit, that theſe are clarted on them, but the Specifick Powers ariſe immediately, and inſeparably from the Specifick Nature of the thing; elſe why might they not be other powers as well as theſe?

Twelfthly and laſtly, pag. 32. But do you verily believe, ſaith he, that Penetrability or Subtility is a ſufficient Efficient or Formal cauſe of Vitalitie, Perception and Appetite, and ſo of Intellection and Volition? I hope you do not. Anſ. I hope ſo of the Doctor too; and before this, I hoped that Mr. Baxter had more inſight into the nature of a Formal cauſe and into the Laws of Logick, than once to imagine that any one in his Wits could take Penetrability to be the Formal cauſe of Intellection and Volition. For then every Spirit being Penetrable, every Spirit even of a plant, at leaſt of the vileſt Animalonium, would have Intellection [Page] and Volition. Nor, for the ſame reaſon, can any body think that Penetrability is a ſufficient Efficient cauſe of Intellection and Volition. Nor is it ſo much as the Efficient cauſe of Vitality, Perception, Appetite, much leſs the Formal. So infinitely is Mr. Baxter out in theſe things. But the caſe ſtands thus: The Subſtance of that ſpecies of things which we call a Spirit, and is ſo by that intimate ſpecifick Form which I named before, this ſubſtance is the cauſe of Vitality in ſuch a ſenſe as the round Form of a Globe, or any matter of that Form is, quatenus of that Form, the cauſe of its own rolling Mobilitie. I ſay therefore, that Vitality is as immediate and neceſſarie a Fruit or Effect of the real and intimate Form of a Spirit, as that eaſie mobilitie is of the Form of a Sphere or Globe; And ſuch a kind of Vitality, Vegetative, Senſitive, Intellective of ſuch a Species of Spirit: Theſe kinds of Vitalities are the Fruits or Effects neceſſarie and immediate of the aboveſaid ſo ſpecificated Subſtances; that is to ſay, they are immediately Self-living, and all of them Penetrable and Indiſcerpible of themſelves, quatenus Spirits, all theſe eſſential attributes ariſing from the ſimple eſſence or ſpecificated ſubſtance of every Spirit, of what Claſſis ſoever, created according to its own Idea eternally ſhining in the Divine Intellect.

As for example; In the Idea of a Plaſtick [Page] Spirit onely; Penetrability, Indiſcerpibility, and Plaſtick Vitality, whereby it is able to organize Matter thus and thus, are not three Eſſences clarted upon ſome fourth Eſſence, or glewed together one to another, to make up ſuch an Idea: But the Divine Intellect conceives in itſelf one ſimple ſpecifick Eſſence immediately and intrinſecally of it ſelf, indued with theſe eſſential Properties or Attributes. So that when any thing does exiſt according to this Idea, thoſe three properties are as immediately Conſequential to it, and as effectually, as Mobility to the Form of a Globe. It is the ſpecifick Subſtance that is the neceſſary Source of them, and that acts by them as its own connate or natural inſtruments, fitted for the ends that the eternal Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God has conceived or contrived them for.

For it is manifeſt, that thoſe eſſential Attributes of a Spirit contrarie to Matter are not in vain. For whenas a Plaſtick Spirit is to actuate and organize Matter, and inwardly diſpoſe it into certain forms, Penetrability is needful, that it may poſſeſs the Matter, and order it throughout; As alſo that Oneneſs of Eſſence and Indiſcerpibility, that it may hold it together. For what ſhould make any maſs of Matter one, but that which has a ſpecial Oneneſs of Eſſence in it ſelf, quite different from that of Matter? And foraſmuch as all Souls [Page] are indued with the Plaſtick whether of Brutes or Men, not to add the Spirits of Angels; ſtill there holds the ſame reaſon in all ranks, that Spirits ſhould be as well Penetrable and Indiſcerpible as Vital. And if there be any Platonick [...], that have no Plaſtick, yet Penetrability muſt belong to them, and is of uſe to them, if they be found to be within the verges of the Corporeal Univerſe (and why not they as well as God himſelf?) and Indiſcerpibility maintains their Suppoſital Unitie, as it does in all Spirits that have to do with Matter, and are capable of a vital coaleſcencie therewith. But I have accumulated here more Theorie than is needful. And I muſt remember that I am in a Digreſſion.

To return therefore to the particular point we have been about all this while. I hope by this time I have made it good, that the Dr.'s Definition of a Spirit is ſo clear, ſo true, ſo expreſs, and uſefully inſtructive (and that is the ſcope of the Doctors Writings) that neither he himſelf, nor any body elſe, let them conſider as much as they can, will ever be able to mend it. And that theſe affected Cavils of Mr. Baxter argue no defects or ſlaws in the Doctors Definition, but the ignorance and impotencie of Mr. Baxters Spirit, and the undue elation of his mind, when notwithſtanding this unexceptionableneſs of the Definition, he, pag. 82. out of his Magiſterial Chair of Judicature [Page] pronounces with a gracious nod, You mean well—but all our Conceptions here muſt have their ALLOWANCES, and we muſt confeſs their weakneſs. This is the Sentence which grave Mr. Baxter, alto ſupercilio, gives of the Doctors accurate Definition of a Spirit, to humble him, and exalt himſelf, in the ſight of the populacie. But is it not a great weakneſs, or worſe, to talk of favourable allowances, and not to allow that to be unexceptionable againſt which no juſt exception is found?

But to give Mr. Baxter his due, though the extream or extimate parts of this Paragraph, pag. 82. which you may fancie as the skin thereof, may ſeem to have ſomething of bitterneſs and toughneſs in it, yet the Belly of the Paragraph is full of plums and ſweet things. For he ſaies, And we are all greatly beholden to the Doctor for his ſo induſtrious calling fooliſh Senſualiſts to the ſtudy and notion of inviſible Beings, without which, what a carcaſs or nothing were the world?

But is it not pity then, while the Doctor does diſcharge this Province with that faithfulneſs and induſtrie, that Mr. Baxter ſhould diſturb him in his work, and hazzard the fruits and efficacie thereof, by eclipſing the clearneſs of his Notions of Spiritual Beings, (for Bodies may be alſo inviſible) by the interpoſition or oppoſition of his own great Name againſt them, who, as himſelf tells the [Page] world in his Church-Hiſtory, has wrote fourſcore Books, even as old Dr. Gliſſon his Patron or rather Pattern in Philoſophy arrived to at leaſt fourſcore Years of age? And Mr. Baxter it ſeems is for the common Proverb, The older the wiſer; though Elihu in Job be of another mind, who ſaies there, I ſaid Days ſhould ſpeak, and multitude of Years ſhould teach Wiſdom; But there is a Spirit in man, and the Inſpiration of the Almighty giveth him Ʋnderſtanding. But whither am I going?

I would conclude here according to promiſe, having reſcued the Doctors Definition of a Spirit from Mr. Baxters numerous little Criticiſms, like ſo many ſhrill buſie Gnats trumpeting about it, and attempting to inſix their feeble Proboſcides into it; and I hope I have ſilenced them all.

But there is ſomething in the very next Paragraph which is ſo wrongfully charged upon the Doctor, that I cannot forbear ſtanding up in his juſtification. The Charge is this: That he has fathered upon Mr. Baxter an Opinion he never owned, and nick-named him Pſychopyriſt from his own fiction. As if, ſays he, we ſaid that Souls are Fire, and alſo took Fire, as the Doctor does, for Candles and hot Irons, &c. onely. But I anſwer in behalf of the Doctor, as I have a little toucht on this matter before, That he does indeed entitle a certain Letter (which he anſwers) to a Learned Pſychopyriſt [Page] as the Author thereof: But Mr. Baxters name is with all imaginable care concealed. So that he by his needleſs owning the Letter, has notched that nick-name (as he calls it) of Pſychopyriſt upon himſelf, whether out of greedineſs after that alluring Epithet it is baited with, I know not; but that he hangs thus by the gills like a Fiſh upon the Hook, he may thank his own ſelf for it, nor ought to blame the Doctor. Much leſs accuſe him for ſaying, that Mr. Baxter took Fire in no other ſenſe than that in Candles and hot Iron, and the like. For in his Preface, he expreſly declares on the Pſychopyriſts behalf, that he does not make this craſs and viſible Fire the Eſſence of a Spirit, but that his meaning is more ſubtile and refined. With what conſcience then can Mr. Baxter ſay, that the Doctor affirms that he took Fire in no other ſenſe than that in Candles and hot Iron, and the like, and that he held all Souls to be ſuch Fire? whenas the Doctor is ſo modeſt and cautious, that he does not affirm that Mr. Baxter thinks any to be ſuch; though even in this Placid Collation, he profeſſes his inclination towards the Opinion, that Ignis and Vegetative Spirit is all one, pag. 20, 21. I have oft profeſſed, ſaith he, that I am ignorant whether Ignis and Vegetative Spirit be all one, (to which I moſt incline) or whether Ignis be an active nature made to be the inſtrument, by which the three ſpiritual natures, [Page] Vegetative, Senſitive, and Mental work on the three paſſive natures, Earth, Water, Air.

And again, pag. 66. If it be the Spirit of the world that is the neareſt cauſe of illumination, by way of natural activity, then that which you call the Spirit of the World, I call Fire; and ſo we differ but de nomine. But I have (ſaith he as before) profeſſed my ignorance, whether Fire and the Vegetative nature be all one, (which I incline to think) or whether Fire be a middle active nature between the ſpiritual and the mere Paſſive, by which Spirits work on bodie. And, pag. 71. I doubt not but Fire is a Subſtance permeant and exiſtent in all mixt bodies on Earth. In your bloud it is the prime part of that called the Spirits, which are nothing but the igneous principle in a pure Aereal Vehicle, and is the organ of the Senſitive faculties of the Soul. And if the Soul carry any Vehicle with it, it's like to be ſome of this. I doubt you take the ſame thing to be the Spirit of the world, though you ſeem to vilifie it. And, pag. 74. I ſuppoſe you will ſay, the Spirit of the world does this. But call it by what name you will, it is a pure active Subſtance, whoſe form is the Virtus motiva, illuminativa & calefactiva, I think the ſame which when it operateth on due ſeminal Matter is Vegetative. And laſtly, pag. 86. I ſtill profeſs my ſelf in this alſo uncertain, whether Natura Vegetativa [Page] and Ignea be all one, or whether Ignis be Natura Organica by which the three Superiour (he means the Vegetative, Senſitive, and Intellective Natures) operate on the Paſſive. But I incline moſt to think they are all one, when I ſee what a glorious Fire the Sun is, and what operation it hath on Earth, and how unlikely it is that ſo glorious a Subſtance ſhould not have as noble a formal nature as a Plant.

This is more than enough to prove that Mr. Baxter in the moſt proper ſenſe is inclined to Pſychopyriſm as to the Spirit of the world, or Vegetative ſoul of the Ʋniverſe; that that Soul or Spirit is Fire: And that all created Spirits are Fire, analogicè and eminenter, I have noted above that he does freely confeſs.

But certainly if it had not been for his ignorance in the Atomick Philoſophie which he ſo greatly deſpiſeth, he would never have taken the Fire it ſelf, a Congeries of agitated particles of ſuch figures and dimenſions, for the Spirit of the world. But without further doubt have concluded it onely the inſtrument of that Spirit in its operations, as alſo of all other created Spirits, accordingly as the Doctor has declared a long time ſince in his Immortalitas Animae, Lib. 2. Cap. 8. Sect. 6. And finding that there is one ſuch univerſal Vegetative Spirit (properly ſo called) or [...] of the world, he could not miſs of concluding the whole Ʋniverſe one [Page] great Plant, or if ſome obſcure degree of ſenſe be given to it, one large Zoophyton or Plant-animal, whence the Sun will be endued or actuated as much by a Vegetative Nature as any particular Plant whatſoever; whereby Mr. Baxter might have took away his own difficultie he was entangled in. But the truth is, Mr. Baxters defectiveneſs in the right underſtanding of the Atomick Philoſophy, and his Averſneſs therefrom, as alſo from the true Syſtem of the world, which neceſſarily includes the motion of the Earth, we will caſt in alſo his abhorrence from the Pre-exiſtence of Souls (which three Theories are hugely neceſſary to him that would Philoſophize with any ſucceſs in the deepeſt points of natural Religion and Divine Providence) makes him utter many things that will by no means bear the Teſt of ſeverer Reaſon.

But in the mean time this Deſectiveneſs in ſound Philoſophie neither hinders him nor any one elſe from being able Inſtruments in the Goſpel-Miniſtrie, if they have [...] and [...] in a due meaſure; If they have a firm Faith in the revealed Truths of the Goſpel, and skill in Hiſtory, Tongues and Criticiſm, to explain the Text to the people, and there be added a ſincere Zeal to inſtruct their Charge, and (that they may appear in good earneſt to believe what they teach) they lead a life devoid of ſcandal and offence, as regulated by thoſe Goſpel-Rules [Page] they propoſe to others; this, though they have little of the [...] properly ſo called, that reaches to the deepeſt account of things, (but inſtead thereof, Prudence and Ingenuity) will ſufficiently enable them to be Guides to the people, eſpecially by adhering in Matters of moment to the Ancient Apoſtolick and unapoſtatized Church, and preſuming nothing upon their private ſpirit againſt the ſame. Such, queſtionleſs, will prove able and ſafe Paſtors, and will not fail of being approved of by our Lord Jeſus the great Shepherd and Biſhop of our Souls.

But if any ſuch, as I noted above, for that they conceit themſelves alſo dapper fellows at Cudgils or Quarter-ſtaff, ſhall, leaving their Flocks ſolitary in the fields, out of an itch after applauſe from the Country-Fry, gad to Wakes and Fairs to give a proof of their dexterity at thoſe Rural exerciſes; if they ſhall, I ſay, for their pains return with a bruiſed knuckle or broken pate, who can help it? it will learn them more wit another time. Thus much by way of Digreſſion I thought fit to ſpeak, not out of the leaſt ill-will to Mr. Baxter, but onely in behalf of the Doctor, hoping, though it is far from all that may be ſaid, that yet it is ſo much, and ſo much alſo to the purpoſe, that it will ſave the Doctor the labour of adding any thing more thereto. So that he may either enjoy his Repoſe, or betake [Page] himſelf to ſome deſign of more uſe and moment.

In the mean time, I having diſpatcht my Digreſſion, I ſhall return to the main buſineſs in hand. I think it may plainly appear from what has been ſaid, that it is no ſuch harſh thing to adventure to conclude, That the Truth of the Divine Intellect quatenus conceptive, ſpeculative, or obſervative, which a Platonist would be apt to call [...], as the Divine Intellect exhibitive [...], (for though it be but one and the ſame Intellect, yet for diſtinctneſs ſake we are fain to ſpeak as of two) does conſiſt in its Conformity with the Divine Intellect exhibitive, with the immutable Idea's, Reſpects and References of things there. In conceiving and obſerving them (as I may ſo ſpeak) to be ſuch as they are repreſented in the ſaid Intellect quatenus neceſſarily and unalterably repreſenting ſuch Idea's with the immediate Reſpects and References of them. In this conſiſts the Truth of the Divine Intellect Speculative. But the Tranſcendental Truth of things conſiſts in their Conformity to the Divine Intellect Exhibitive. For every thing is true as it anſwers to the immutable Idea of its own nature diſcovered in the Divine Intellect Exhibitive. To which alſo the ſame Divine Intellect quatenus Conceptive, Speculative, or Obſervative, gives its ſuffrage ſteadily and unalterably, conceiving theſe immutable Idea's [Page] of things in their Objective Exiſtence what their natures will be, with their neceſſary references, aptitudes or ineptitudes to other things when they are produced into act.

From whence we may diſcern, how that ſaying of this ingenious Author of the Diſcourſe of Truth is to be underſtood. Where he writes, It is againſt the nature of all Ʋnderſtanding to make its Object. Which if we will candidly interpret, muſt be underſtood of all underſtanding quatenus merely conceptive, ſpeculative or obſervative, and of framing of its Object at its pleaſure. Which as it is not done in the ſetled Idea of a Sphere, Cylinder and Pyramid, no more is it in any other Idea's with their properties and aptitudes immediately iſſuing from them, but all the Idea's with their inevitable properties, aptitudes, or ineptitudes are neceſſarily repreſented in the Divine Intellect Exhibitive, immutably ſuch as they are, a Triangle with its three Angles equal to two right ones, a right-angled Triangle with the power of its Hypotenuſa equal to the powers of the Baſis and Cathetus both put together: Which things ſeem neceſſary to every ſober man and rightly in his wits, our underſtanding being an Abſtract or Copy of the Divine Underſtanding. But thoſe that ſay that if God would, he might have made the three Angles of a Triangle unequal to two right ones, and alſo the powers of the Baſis and Cathetus [Page] of a right-angled Triangle unequal to the power of the Hypotenuſa, are either Buffoons and Quibblers, or their Underſtandings being but creatural huffineſs of mind and an ambition of approving themſelves the Broachers and maintainers of ſtrange Paradoxes, has crazed their Intellectuals, and they have already entred the ſuburbs of down-right Phrenſie and Madneſs.

And to conclude; Out of what has been inſinuated, we may reconcile this harſh ſounding Paradox of our Author, that ſeems ſo point-blank againſt the current doctrine of the Metaphyſical Schools, who make Tranſcendental Truth to depend upon the Intellectual Truth of God, which they rightly deem the Fountain and Origine of all Truth, whenas he plainly declares, That the Divine Ʋnderſtanding cannot be the Fountain of the Truth of things: But the ſeeming abſurdity will be eaſily wiped away, if we take notice of our diſtinction touching the Divine Underſtanding quatenus merely conceptive, ſpeculative or obſervative, and quatenus neceſſarily (through its own infinite and immutable pregnancie and foecundity) Exhibitive of the diſtinct and determinate Idea's or natures of things, with their immediate Properties, Reſpects or Habitudes in their Objective Exiſtence, repreſenting them ſuch as they certainly will be if reduced into act. His aſſertion is not to be underſtood of the Divine [Page] Underſtanding in this latter ſenſe, but in the former. But being it is one and the ſame Underſtanding, though conſidered under this twofold Notion, our Author, as well as the ordinarie Metaphyſicians, will agree to this truth in the ſenſe explained; That the Divine Underſtanding is the Fountain of the truth of things, and that they are truly what they are, as they anſwer to their Idea's repreſented in the Exhibitive Intellect of God. How the Author himſelf comes off in this point, you will better underſtand when you have read the fifteenth, ſixteenth and ſeventeenth Sections of his Diſcourſe. Let this ſuffice in the mean time for the removing all ſtumbling-blocks from before the Reader.

Pag. 168. Nor the foundation of the references one to another; that is to ſay, The Divine Underſtanding quatenus Conceptive or Speculative, is moſt certainly not the Foundation of the references of things one to another; but the Divine Underſtanding quatenus Exhibitive, that repreſents the Idea's or natures of things in their Objective Exiſtence ſuch as they would be if reduced really into act, repreſents therewith all the references and habitudes they have one to another. Which habitudes are repreſented not as flowing from or arbitrariouſly founded in any Intellect whatſoever, but as reſulting from the natures of the things themſelves that reſpect one another, and are repreſented [Page] in the Exhibitive Underſtanding of God. Which is the main thing that this ingenious Author would be at, and ſuch as will ſerve all his intents and purpoſes.

Pag. 168. It is the nature of Ʋnderſtanding ut moveatur, illuminetur, &c. namely, of Underſtanding quatenus Conceptive or Speculative, not quatenus Exhibitive.

Pag. 169. No Idea's or Repreſentations either are or make the things they repreſent, &c. This Aſſertion is moſt certainly true. But yet they may be ſuch Idea's and Repreſentations as may be the meaſure of the Truth of thoſe things they repreſent: And ſuch are all the Idea's in the Divine Intellect Exhibitive, their ſetled diſtinct natures neceſſarily exhibited there in vertue of the abſolute perfection of the Deitie, though onely in their Objective Exiſtence, are the meaſures of the Truth of thoſe things when they are reduced into act, as I have noted above; but they are not the things themſelves reduced into act, no more than an Autographon is the very Copy.

Ibid. All Ʋnderſtanding is ſuch; that is, Idea's and Repreſentations of the natures of things in their Objective Exiſtence, the Patterns of what and how they are when they Exiſt, and what references and aptitudes they have. I ſuppoſe he means here by Underſtanding, not any power of the mind to conceive any thing, but Underſtanding properly ſo called, [Page] viz. that, whoſe Objects are [...] or [...], as the Platoniſts ſpeak, the Idea's or Repreſentations of ſuch things as are neceſſarily and unalterably ſuch, not fictions at pleaſure. Let the Intellect Speculative be ſuch Idea's or Repreſentations as theſe, and then what it perceives, conceives, or obſerves, it does not make, but it is made to its hand, as not being able to be otherwiſe, nor it ſelf to think otherwiſe. And therefore it is rightly inferred as follows: That no Speculative Underſtanding in that reſtrict ſenſe above-named makes at pleaſure the natures, reſpects and relations of its Objects repreſented in the Intellect Exhibitive in their Objective Exiſtence, but finds them there. Nor does any Intellect whatſoever make them at pleaſure, but they are neceſſarily and unalterably repreſented in the Exhibitive Intellect of the Deitie, both their natures, reſpects, and habitudes, as I noted above.

Sect. 5. pag. 169. It remains then that abſolute, arbitrarious and independent Will muſt be the Fountain of all Truth, &c. It being ſuppoſed that the Divine Underſtanding and the independent Will of God are the onely competitours who ſhould be the Fountain of all Truth, and the former Section proving in a ſenſe rightly underſtood, that the Divine Underſtanding cannot be the Fountain of Truth, it remains that the mere Will of God ſhould be [Page] the Fountain of Truth, and that things are true onely becauſe he wills they be ſo. As if four bore a double proportion to two becauſe God would have it ſo; but if he would that Two ſhould bear a double proportion to Four, it would immediately be ſo.

Ibid. Which Aſſertion would in the firſt place deſtroy the nature of God, &c. Nay, if he will, it deſtroys his very Exiſtence. For if all Truths depend upon Gods Will, then this Truth, That God Exiſts, does. And if he will the contrary to be true, namely, That he does not Exiſt, what becomes of him then?

Ibid. And rob him of all his Attributes. That it robs him of Science and aſſured Knowledge, whoſe Objects are [...], Things immutable and neceſſary, this Section makes good. And that it deſpoils him of his Rectitude of Nature, the Eighth Section will ſhew.

Pag. 170. Any Angel or man may as truly be ſaid to know all things as God himſelf, &c. Becauſe this ſuppoſition takes away all the ſteadie and ſcientifick Knowableneſs in things, it taking away their ſetled, fixt and neceſſary habitudes one to another, as if double proportion of Four to Two did no more belong to it in Truth and Reality than Sub-double, and that Four in Truth were no more the Quaternarie number than the Binary, but indifferently either, as the Will of God will [Page] have it. This plainly pulls up by the roots all pretence of Science or Knowledge in God, Angels, and Men. And much more, flatly to aſſert, That if God will, contradictions may be true. For this plainly implies that there is really no Repugnancy nor Connection of one thing with another, and that therefore no one thing can be proved or diſproved from another.

Pag. 171. If we diſtinguiſh thoſe two Attributes in God, &c. namely, of Wiſdom and Knowledge, as if the one were Noematical, the other Dianoetical; although that diſcurſiveneſs is more quick than lightning, or rather an eternal intuitive diſcernment of the conſequence or coheſion of things at once.

Sect. 6. pag. 172. Becauſe they ſuppoſe that God is mutable and changeable, &c. This can be no allegation againſt the other Arguings, becauſe we cannot be aſſured of the Immutability or Unchangeableneſs of God, but by admitting of what thoſe arguings drive at, namely, That there is an immutable, neceſſary and unchangeable reference and reſpect or connection of things one with another. As for example, of Immutableneſs or▪ Unchangeableneſs with Perfection, and of Perfection with God. For to fancie God an imperfect Being is nonſenſe to all men that are not delirant; and to fancie him Perfect, and yet Changeable in ſuch a ſenſe as is here underſtood, is as arrant [Page] a Contradiction or Repugnancie. Wherefore they that would oppoſe the fore-going Alguings by ſuppoſing God Unchangeable, muſt acknowledge what is aimed at, That there is a neceſſary and unchangeable reſpect and connection betwixt things, or elſe their oppoſition is plainly weak and vain. But if they grant this, they grant the Cauſe, and ſo Truth has its juſt victory and triumph. This Section is abundantly clear of it ſelf.

Sect. 8. pag. 174. Will ſpoil God of that univerſal Rectitude which is the greateſt perfection of his nature, &c. In the fifth Section it was ſaid, That the making the Will of God the Fountain of all Truth robs him of all his Attributes. And there it is proved how it robs him of his Wiſdom and Knowledge. Here it is ſhewn how it robs him of his Juſtice, Mercy, Faithfulneſs, Goodneſs, &c.

Pag. 175. For to ſay they are indiſpenſably ſo becauſe God underſtands them ſo, &c. This, as the Author ſaies, muſt be extream Incogitancy. For the Truth of the Divine Underſtanding Speculative conſiſts in its Conformitie with the Idea's of things and their Reſpects and Habitudes in the Divine Underſtanding Exhibitive, which neceſſarily, unchangeably and unalterably repreſents the natures of things with their Reſpects and Habitudes in their Objective Exiſtence, ſuch as they neceſſarily are when they do really exiſt. As of a Sphere, [Page] Pyramid, Cube and Cylinder. And there is the ſame reaſon of all natures elſe with their Reſpects and Habitudes, that they are as neceſſarily exhibited as the Cube and Cylinder, and their Habitudes and Reſpects one to another, as the proportion that a Cylinder bears to a Sphere or Globe of the ſame altitude and equal diameter. Which Archimedes with incomparable clearneſs and ſubtiltie of wit has demonſtrated in his Treatiſe De Sphaera & Cylindro, to be ratio ſeſquealtera, as alſo the Superficies of the Cylinder with its Baſes to bear the ſame proportion to the Superſicies of the Sphere. And as theſe Idea's are neceſſarily and unalterably with their Reſpects and [...] repreſented, ſo are all Idea's elſe, Phyſical and Moral, as I have noted above. And the nature of Juſtice, Mercy, Faithfulneſs and Goodneſs are with their habitudes and reſpects as ſixedly, determinately and unalterably repreſented in their Idea's, as the Sphere and Cylinder, or any other Form or Being whatſoever.

Sect. 9. pag. 178. For we are to know that there is a God, and the Will of God, &c. That is to ſay, If there be no ſetled natures and reſpects and habitudes of things in the order of Nature antecedent to any Will whatever, Meditation or Contrivance, nor there be any certain nature, reſpects, habitudes, and connections of things in themſelves; it will be neceſſary that we firſt know there is a God, and [Page] what his Will is touching the natures, reſpects and habitudes of things. Whether theſe which we ſeem to diſcern and do argue from are the ſame he means and wills, or ſome other. And ſo there will be a neceſſity of knowing God and his Will, before we have any means to know him; or, which is all one, we ſhall never have any means to know him upon this falſe and abſurd Hypotheſis.

Sect. 11. pag. 181. Then it infallibly follows that it is all one what I do or how I live, &c. This, as the following words intimate, is to be underſtood in reference to the pleaſing God, and to our own future Happineſs. But it is manifeſt it is not all one what I do or how I live (though I did ſuppoſe there were no real diſtinction betwixt Truth and Falſhood, Good and Evil in the ſenſe here intended) in reference to this preſent condition in this World, where the ſenſe of pain and eaſe, of impriſonment and liberty, and of the ſecurity or ſaſety of a mans own perſon will oblige him to order his life in ſuch a manner as hath at leaſt the imitation of Temperance, Faithfulneſs, and Juſtice.

Sect. 12. pag. 183. If the oppoſition of Contradictory Terms depend upon the arbitrarious reſolves of any Being whatſoever. The plainneſs and irrefragableneſs of this Truth, that the oppoſition of contradictory Terms is an affection, habitude or [...] betwixt thoſe terms that no power in Heaven or Earth can aboliſh, [Page] methinks ſhould aſſure any that are not pure Sots or crazie Fantaſticks, that there may be many other ſuch unalterable and immutable habitudes of Terms, Natures or Things that are every jot as unaboliſhable as this. Which is no derogation to the Divine Perfection, but an Argument of it; unleſs we ſhould conceit that it is the height of the Perfection of Divine Omnipotence to be able to deſtroy himſelf. And truly to fancie an ability in him of deſtroying or aboliſhing thoſe eternal, neceſſary and immutable habitudes or reſpects of the natures of things repreſented in their Idea's by the Divine Intellect Exhibitive, is little leſs than the admitting in God an ability of deſtroying or aboliſhing the Divine Nature it ſelf, becauſe ipſo facto the Divine Wiſdom and Knowledge would be deſtroyed, as was ſhewn in the fifth Section, and what a God would that be that is deſtitute thereof!

Wherefore it is no wonder that thoſe men that are ſober and in their wits, find it ſo impoſſible in themſelves but to conceive that ſuch and ſuch natures are ſteadily ſuch and no other, and betwixt ſuch and ſuch natures there are ſteadily and immutably ſuch habitudes and reſpects and no others. Foraſmuch as the Intellect of man is as it were a ſmall compendious Tranſcript of the Divine Intellect, and we feel in a manner in our own Intellects the firmneſs and immutability of the Divine, and [Page] of the eternal and immutable Truths exhibited there. So that thoſe that have their minds ſo crackt and ſhatter'd as to be able to fancy that if God would, he could change the [...] or common notions into their Contradictories, as The whole is leſs than its Part, &c. muſt have very crazy Intellectuals, and have taken their lodging at leaſt in the ſuburbs of downright dotage or Phrenſie, as I noted above.

Pag. 184. If any one ſhould affirm that the Terms of common notions have an eternal and indiſpenſable relation to one another, &c. That this priviledge is not confined to the common notions they are abundantly convinced of, that have beſtowed any competent ſtudy upon Mathematicks, where the connection of every link of the demonſtration is diſcerned to be as firmly and indiflolubly knit, as the Terms of a common notion are the one with the other. And it is our Impatience, Careleſneſs or Prejudices that we have not more concluſions of ſuch certitude than we have in other ſtudies alſo.

Sect. 13. pag. 184. For if there be Truth antecedently to the Divine Ʋnderſtanding, &c. This Objection of the Adverſaries is framed ſomething perverſly and invidiouſly, as if the other party held, That there were Truth antecedently to the Divine Underſtanding, and as if from thence the Divine Underſtanding would be a mere paſſive Principle actuated by ſomething without, as the Eye by the [Page] Sun. But it is a plain caſe, out of what has been declared, that the Divine Underſtanding (though there be ſuch eternal Natures and unchangeable reſpects and habitudes of them repreſented in the Idea's that are in the Exhibitive Intellect of the Deity) that it is, I ſay, before any external Object whatever, and yet always had exhibited to it ſelf the eternal and unalterable natures and reſpects of things in their Idea's. And it was noted moreover, that the Truth of the external Objects, when brought into act, is meaſured by their Conformity to theſe Idea's.

Beſides, the Divine Underſtanding being before all things, how could there be any Truth before it, there being neither Underſtanding nor Things in which this Truth might reſide? Or the Divine Underſtanding be a mere paſſive Principle actuated by ſomething without, as the eye by the Sun, whenas queſtionleſs the Divine Intellect quatenus Exhibitive is the moſt active Principle conceivable; nay, indeed Actus puriſſimus, the moſt pure Act, as Ariſtotle has defined God? It is an eternal, neceſſary, and immutable Energy, whoſe very Eſſence is a true and fixt Ideal Repreſentation of the natures of all things, with their reſpects and habitudes reſulting eternally from the Divine foecundity at once. How then can this, which is ſo pure and pregnant an Energy, be a mere paſſive Principle, or be actuated by any [Page] external Object, when it was before any thing was? But a further Anſwer is to be found of the Authour himſelf in the Fifteenth Section.

Pag. 185. Which is to take away his independency and ſelf ſufficiency. Namely, If there be mutual and unalterable Congruities and Incongruities of things, as if they would determine God in his actions by ſomething without himſelf. Which is a mere miſtake. For the pregnant fulneſs of the Divine Eſſence and perfection eternally and neceſſarily exerting itſelf into an Ideal diſplay of all the natures, properties, reſpects and habitudes of things, whether Congruities or Incogruities, and theſe fixt, immutable, neceſſary and unchangeable in their Ideal or Objective Exiſtence; And in time producing things according to theſe Paradigms or Patterns into actual Exiſtence by his Omnipotence, and ever ſuſtaining, ſupporting and governing them by his unfailing Power and ſteady and unchangeable Wiſdom and Counſel; I ſay, when all things are thus from God, ſuſtained by God, and regulated according to the natures he has given them, which anſwer the Patterns and Paradigms in him, how can any ſuch determination of his Will any way claſh with his Self-ſufficiency or Independency, whenas we ſee thus, that all things are from God and depend of him, and his actions guided by the immutable Idea's in [Page] his own nature, according to which all external things are what they are, and their Truth meaſured by their Conformity with them. But there is a fuller anſwer of the Author's, to this Objection, in the ſixteenth and ſeventeenth Sections.

Sect. 14. pag. 187. And to fetter and impriſon Freedom and Liberty it ſelf in the fatal and immutable chains and reſpects of things, &c. This is a miſconceit that ſavours ſomething of a more refined Anthropomorphitiſm, that is to ſay, Though they do not make the Eſſence of God finite and of an Humane figure or ſhape, yet they imagine him to have two different Principles in him, an extravagant and undetermined luſt or appetite, as it is in man, and an Intellectual or rational Principle, whoſe Laws are to correct the luxuriancies and impetuoſities of the other, and to bridle and regulate them. But this is a groſs miſtake; For there is no ſuch blind and impetuous will in God upon which any Intellectual Laws were to lay a reſtraint, but his whole nature being pure and Intellectual, and he acting according to his own nature, which contains thoſe Idea's and immutable reſpects, Congruities and Incongruities of things there eternally and unalterably repreſented, he acts with all freedom imaginable, nor has any chains of reſtraint laid upon him, but is at perfect liberty to do as his own nature requires and ſuggeſts. [Page] Which is the moſt abſolute liberty that has any ſound or ſhew of Perfection with it, that can be conceived in any Being.

Sect. 15. pag. 189. And does as it were draw them up into its own beams. This is ſomething a ſublime and elevate expreſſion. But I ſuppoſe the meaning thereof is, That the natures and reſpects of the things of this lower Creation, the Divine Underſtanding applies to the bright ſhining Idea's found in his own exalted nature, and obſerves their Conformity therewith, and acknowledges them true and right as they anſwer to their eternal Patterns.

Sect. 16. pag. 189. To tie up God in his actions to the reaſon of things, deſtroys his Liberty, Abſoluteneſs, and Independency. This is ſaid, but it is a very vain and weak allegation, as may appear out of what has been ſuggeſted above. For reaſons of things and their habitudes and references repreſented in the eternal Idea's in their Objective Exiſtence, which is the Pattern of their natures when they exiſt actually, is the very life and nature of the Divine Underſtanding; And as I noted above, the moſt true and perfective libertie that can be conceived in any Being is, that without any check or tug, or lubricity and unſteadineſs, it act according to its own life and nature. And what greater Abſoluteneſs than this? For that which acts according to its own nature, acts alſo according [Page] to its own will or appetite. And what greater Independencie than to have a power upon which there is no reſtraint, nor any modification of the exerciſe thereof, but what is taken from that which has this power? For the eternal and immutable reaſons of things are originally and Paradigmatically in the Divine Underſtanding, of which thoſe in the Creatures are but the Types and tranſitorie Shadows. The Author in this Section has ſpoke ſo well to this preſent Point, that it is needleſs to ſuperadd any thing more.

Sect. 17. pag. 191. In this ſeventeenth Section the Author more fully anſwers that Objection, As if Gods acting according to the reaſons of things inferred a dependency of him upon ſomething without himſelf; Which he does with that clearneſs and ſatisfaction, that it is enough to commend it to the peruſal of the Reader.

Sect. 18. pag. 193. Truth in the power or faculty is nothing elſe but a Conformity of its conceptions or Idea's unto the natures and relations of things which in God we may call, &c. The Deſcription which follows is (though the Author nowhere takes notice of that diſtinction) a Deſcription of the Divine Underſtanding quatenus Exhibitive, not Conceptive or Speculative. The Truth of which latter does indeed conſiſt in the Conformity of its Conception unto the natures and relations of things, but not [Page] of things ad extra, but unto the natures, habitudes and reſpects of things as they are neceſſarily, eternally and immutably repreſented in the Divine Underſtanding Exhibitive, which is the Intellectual World, which the Author here deſcribes, and [...] the vaſt Champion or boundleſs field of Truth. So that in thoſe words [unto the natures and relations of things which in God we call an actual, ſteady, immoveable, eternal omniformity, &c.] Which is to be referred to [the Natures and Relations of things] as is evident to any that well conſiders the place. And with this ſenſe that which follows the deſcription is very coherent.

Pag. 194. Now all that Truth that is in any created Being, is by participation and derivation from this firſt Ʋnderſtanding (that is, from the Divine Underſtanding quatenus Exhibitive) and Fountain of Intellectual Light. That is, according to the Platonick Dialect, of thoſe ſteady, unalterable and eternal Idea's ( [...]) of the natures and reſpects of things repreſented there in the Divine Underſtanding Exhibitive in their Objective Exiſtence; In conformity to which the Truth in all created things and Underſtandings doth neceſſarily conſiſt.

Pag. 195. Antecedently to any Ʋnderſtanding or Will, &c. That is, Antecedently to any Underſtanding Conceptive, Obſervative or Speculative whatſoever, or to any Will; but not antecedently [Page] to the Divine Underſtanding Exhibitive. For that is antecedent to all created things, and contains the ſteady, fixt, eternal, and unalterable natures and reſpects or habitudes, before they had or could have any Being. I ſay it contains the Truth and meaſure of them; nor can they be ſaid to be truly what they are, any further than they are found conformable to theſe eternal, immutable Idea's, Patterns and Paradigms, which neceſſarily and eternally are exerted, and immutably in the Divine Underſtanding Exhibitive. And of theſe Paradigmatical things there, what follows is moſt truly affirmed.

Pag. 195. For things are what they are, and cannot be otherwiſe without a Contradiction, &c. This was true before any external or created things did exiſt. True of every Form in that eternal Omniformity, which the Platoniſts call the Intellectual World, as the Author has obſerved above in this Section. A Circle is a Circle, and a Triangle a Triangle there, nor can be otherwiſe without a Contradiction. And ſo of a Globe, Cylinder, Horſe, Eagle, Whale, Fire, Water, Earth, their Ideal fixt and determinate natures, habitudes, aptitudes, and reſpects neceſſarily and immutably there exhibited, are ſuch as they are, nor can be otherwiſe without a contradiction. And becauſe it is thus in the Divine Nature or Eſſence, which is the root and fountain of the exteriour Creation, [Page] the ſame is true in the created Beings themſelves. Things are there alſo what they are, nor can they be a Globe ſuppoſe, or a Cylinder, and yet not be a Globe or a Cylinder at once, or be both a Globe and Cylinder at once; and ſo of the reſt. As this is a contradiction in the Intellectual World, ſo is it in the Exteriour or Material World, and ſo, becauſe it is ſo in the Intellectual. For the ſteadineſs and immutableneſs of the nature of all things, and of their reſpects and habitudes, ariſe from the neceſſity, immutability, and unchangeableneſs of the Divine Eſſence and Life, which is that ſerene, unclouded, undiſturbed, and unalterable Eternity, where all things with their reſpects and aptitudes, their order and ſeries, are neceſſarily, ſteadily and immutably exhibited at once.

P. 195. As they conform & agree with the things themſelves, &c. The more Platonical ſenſe, and more conformable to that we have given of other paſſages of this learned and ingenious Author is, if we underſtand the things themſelves, at leaſt primarily, to be the [...] of Plato, which is the term which he beſtows upon his Idea's, which are the Patterns or Paradigms according to which every thing is made, and is truly ſuch ſo far forth as it is found to agree with the Patterns or Originals in which all Archetypal Truth is immutably lodged. All created things are but the Copies of theſe, theſe [Page] the Original, the [...] or Writing it ſelf, from whence Plato calls them [...], as if thoſe Archetypal Forms were the forms or things themſelves, but the numerous created Beings here below, only the Copies or Imitations of them. Wherefore no Conception or Idea's that we frame, or any Intellect elſe as Conceptive merely and Speculative, can be true, but ſo far as they agree with theſe [...], in that ſenſe we have declared, or with cre [...]ted things ſo far as they are anſwerable to the [...] or Archetypal things themſelves. And from hence is ſufficiently underſtood the nature of Truth in the Subject.

Theſe few curſory Notes I thought worth the while to make upon theſe two learned and ingenious Writers, the Subjects they have written on being of no mean importance and uſe, and the things written in ſuch a time of their age, as if men be born under an auſpicious Planet, beſt fits their minds for the reliſhing and ruminating upon ſuch noble Theories. For I dare ſay, when they wrote theſe Diſcourſes or Treatiſes, they had neither of them reached ſo much as half the age of man as it is ordinarily computed. Which has made them write upon theſe Subjects with that vigour and briskneſs of Spirit that they have.

For the conſtitution of Youth, in thoſe that have not an unhappy Nativity, is far more heavenly and Angelical than that of more [Page] grown age, in which the Spirit of the World is more uſually awakened, and then begins that Scene which the Poet deſcribes in his De Arte Poetica,

Quaerit opes & amicitias, inſervit honori.

their mind then begins to be wholly intent to get wealth and riches, to enlarge their Intereſt by the friendſhip of great Perſons, and to hunt after Dignities and Preferments, Honours and Imployments in Church or State, and to thoſe more heavenly and Divine Sentiments through diſuſe and the preſence of more ſtrong and filling Impreſſions are laid aſleep, and their Spirits thickened and clouded with the groſs fumes and ſteams that ariſe from the deſire of earthly things; and it may ſo fall out, if there be not ſpecial care taken, that this mud they have drawn in by their coarſe deſires, may come to that opaque hardneſs and incruſtation, that their Terreſtrial body may prove a real dungeon, & caſt them into an utter oblivion of their chiefeſt concerns in the other State.

—Nec auras

Reſpicient clauſi tenebris & carcere caeco.

Which I thought fit to take notice of, as well for the inſtruction of others, as for a due Appretiation of theſe two brief Treatiſes of theſe [Page] florid Writers, they being as it were the Virgin-Honey of theſe two Attick Bees, the Primitiae of their intemerated Youth, where an happy natural complexion, and the firſt Rudiments of Chriſtian Regeneration may ſeem to have conſpired to the writing of two ſuch uſeful Treatiſes.

Ʋſeful, I ſay, and not a little grateful to men of refined Fancies and gay Intellectuals, of benign and Philoſophical tempers, and Lovers of great Truths and Goodneſs. Which natural conſtitution were a tranſcendent priviledge indeed, were there not one great danger in it to thoſe that know not how to uſe it skilfully. For it does ſo nearly ape, as I may ſo ſpeak, the Divine Benignity it ſelf, and that unſelfintereſſed Love that does truly ariſe from no other ſeed than that of real Regeneration (which Self-mortification and a ſerious endeavour of aboliſhing or utterly demoliſhing our own will, and quitting any thing that would captivate us, and hinder our union with God and his Chriſt, does neceſſarily precede) that too haſtily ſetting up our reſt in theſe mere complexional attainments, which is not Spirit but Fleſh, though it appear marvellous ſweet and goodly to the owner, if there be not due care taken to advance higher in that Divine and Eternal Principle of real Regeneration, by a conſtant mortification of our own will, the [...]e may be a perpetual hazzard of this Fleſh growing [Page] corrupt and fly-blown, and ſending up at laſt no ſweet ſavour into the noſtrils of the Almighty. That which is born of the fleſh is fleſh, and that which is born of the ſpirit is ſpirit; And all fleſh is graſs, and the beauty thereof as the flower of the field; but that which is born of the eternal Seed of the living Word, abideth for ever and ever.

And therefore there is no ſafe Anchorage for the Soul, but in a perpetual endeavour of annihilating of her own Will, that we may be one with Chriſt, as Chriſt is with God. Otherwiſe if we follow the ſweet enticing Counſels of mere Nature, though it look never ſo ſmugly on it, it will ſeduce us into a falſe liberty, and at laſt ſo corrupt our Judgment, and blind us, that we ſhall ſcarce be able to diſcern him that is that great Light that was ſent into the world, but become every man an Ignis Fatuus to himſelf, or be ſo ſilly as to be led about by other Ignes Fatui, whenas it is moſt certain that Chriſt is the only way, the Truth and the Life, and he that does not clearly ſee that, when he has opportunity to know it, let his pretence to other knowledge be what it will, it is a demonſtration that as to Divine things he is ſtark blind. But no man can really adhere to Chriſt, and unwaveringly, but by union to him through his Spirit; nor obtain that Spirit of life, but by reſolved Mortification of his own will, and a deadneſs to all [Page] worldly vanities, that we may be reſtored at laſt to our ſolid happineſs which is through Chriſt in God, without whoſe Communion no ſoul can poſſibly be happy.

And therefore I think it not amiſs to cloſe theſe my Theoretical Annotations on theſe two Treatiſes, with that more Practical and Devotional Hymn of A. B. that runs much upon the mortification of our own Wills, and of our Union and Communion with God, tranſlated into Engliſh by a Lover of the Life of our Lord Jeſus.

THE Devotional HYMN.

[Page]

1.

O Heavenly Light! my Spirit to Thee draw,

With powerful touch my ſenſes ſmite,

Thine arrows of Love into me throw.

With flaming dart

Deep wound my heart,

And wounded ſeize for ever, as thy right.

2.

O ſweeteſt Sweet! deſcend into my Soul,

And ſink into its low'ſt abyſs,

That all falſe Sweets Thou mayſt controul,

Or rather kill,

So that Thy will

Alone may be my pleaſure and my bliſs.

3.

Do thou my faculties all captivate

Ʋnto thy ſelf with ſtrongeſt tye;

My will entirely regulate:

Make me thy Slave,

Nought elſe I crave,

For this I know is perfect Liberty,

[Page]

4.

Thou art a Life the ſweeteſt of all Lives,

Nought ſweeter can thy Creature taſte;

'Tis this alone the Soul revives.

Be Thou not here,

All other chear

Will turn to dull ſatiety at laſt.

5.

O limpid Fountain of all vertuous Leare!

O well-ſpring of true Joy and Mirth!

The root of all contentments dear!

O endleſs Good!

Break like a floud

Into my Soul, and water my dry earth,

6.

That by this Mighty power I being reft

Of every Thing that is not ONE,

To Thee alone I may be left

By a firm will

Fixt to Thee ſtill,

And inwardly united into one.

7.

And ſo let all my Eſſence, I Thee pray,

Be wholly fill'd with thy dear Son,

That thou thy Splendour mayſt diſplay

With bliſsful rays

In theſe hid ways

WhereinGods nature by frail Man is won.

[Page]

8.

For joyned thus to Thee by thy ſole aid

And working (whilſt all ſilent ſtands

In mine own Soul, nor ought's aſſay'd

From Self-deſire)

I'm made entire

An inſtrument fit for thy glorious Hands.

9.

And thus henceforwards ſhall all workings ceaſe,

Ʋnleſs't be thoſe Thou doſt excite

To perfect that Sabbatick Peace

Which doth ariſe

When Self-will dies,

And the new Creature is reſtored quite.

10.

And ſo ſhall I with all thy Children dear,

While nought debars Thy workings free,

Be cloſely joyn'd in union near,

Nay with thy Son

Shall I be one,

And with thine own adored Deitie.

11.

So that at laſt I being quite releas'd

From this ſtrait-lac'd Egoity,

My ſoul will vaſtly be encreas'd

Into that ALL

Which ONE we call,

And one in't ſelf alone doth all imply.

[Page]

12.

Here's Reſt, here's Peace, here's Joy and holy Love,

The Heaven's here of true Content,

For thoſe that hither ſincerely move,

Here's the true Light

Of Wiſdom bright,

And Prudence pure with no ſelf-ſeeking mient.

13.

Here Spirit, Soul and cleanſed Body may

Bathe in this Fountain of true Bliſs

Of Pleaſures that will ne're decay,

All joyful Sights

And hid Delights;

The ſenſe of theſe renew'd here daily is.

14.

Come therefore come, and take an higher flight,

Things periſhing leave here below,

Mount up with winged Soul and Spright,

Quick let's be gone

To him that's One,

But in this One to us can all things ſhow.

15.

Thus ſhall you be united with that ONE,

That ONE where's no Duality;

For from this perfect GOOD alone

Ever doth ſpring

Each pleaſant thing,

The hungry Soul to feed and ſatisfie.

[Page]

16.

Wherefore, O man! conſider well what's ſaid,

To what is beſt thy Soul incline,

And leave off every evil trade.

Do not deſpiſe

What I adviſe:

Finiſh thy Work before the Sun decline.

FINIS.

Books Printed for, or Sold by Samuel Lownds, over againſt Exeter Exchange in the Strand.

[Page]

PArtheniſſa, that Fam'd Romance. Written by the Right Honourable the Earl of Orrery.

Clelia, an Excellent new Romance, the whole Work in Five Books. Written in French, by the exquiſite pen of Monſieur de Scudery.

The Holy Court. Written by N. Cauſinus.

Biſhop Saunderſons Sermons.

Herberts Travels, with large Additions.

The Compleat Horſeman, and Expert Farrier, in Two Books: 1. Shewing the beſt manner of breeding good Horſes, with their Choice, Nature, Riding and Dieting, as well for Running as Hunting; as alſo, Teaching the [Page] Groom and Keeper his true Office. 2. Directing the moſt exact and approved manner how to know and Cure all Diſeaſes in Horſes: a Work containing the Secrets and beſt Skill belonging either to Farrier or Horſe-Leach: the Cures placed Alphabetically, with Hundreds of Medicines never before imprinted in any Author. By Thomas de Grey.

Claudius Mauger's French and Engliſh Letters upon all Subjects enlarged, with Fifty new Letters, many of which are on the late great Occurrences and Revolutions of Europe; all much Amended and Refined, according to the moſt quaint and Courtly Mode; wherein yet the Idiom and Elegancy of both Tongues are far more exactly ſuited than formerly. Very uſeful to thoſe who aſpire to good Language, and would know what Addreſſes become them to all ſorts of perſons. Beſides many Notes in the end of the Book, [Page] which are very neceſſary for Commerce.

Paul Feſteau's French Grammar, being the neweſt and exacteſt Method now extant, for the attaining to the Elegancy and Purity of the French Tongue.

The Great Law of Conſideration; a Diſcourſe ſhewing the Nature, Uſefulneſs, and abſolute neceſſity of Conſideration, in order to a truly ſerious and Religious Life. The Third Edition, Corrected and much Enlarged, by Anthony Horneck, D. D.

The Mirror of Fortune, or the true Characters of Fate and Deſtiny, Treating of the Growth and Fall of Empires, the Misfortunes of Kings and Great Men, and the ill fate of Virtuous and handſome Ladies.

Saduciſmus Triumphatus: or full & plain Evidence concerning Witches and Apparitions, in Two parts, the [Page] firſt Treating of their Poſſibility, the ſecond of their Real Exiſtence; by Joſeph Glanvil, late Chaplain to His Majeſty, and Fellow of the Royal Society. The Second Edition. The advantages whereof above the former, the Reader may underſtand out of Dr. Henry More's Account prefixt thereunto. With two Authentick but wonderful ſtories of Swediſh Witches, done into Engliſh by Anthony Horneck, D. D.

French Rogue, being a pleaſant Hiſtory of his Life and Fortune, adorned with variety of other Adventures of no leſs rarity.

Of Credulity and Incredulity in things Divine and Spiritual, wherein (among other things) a true and faithful account is given of Platonick Philoſophy, as it hath reference to Chriſtianity. As alſo the buſineſs of Witches and Witchcraft, againſt a late Writer, fully argued and diſputed. By Merick Cauſabon, D. D. one of the Prebends of Canterhury.

Cicero againſt Catiline, in Four Invective Orations, containing the whole manner of diſcovering that notorious Conſpiracy. By Chriſtopher Waſe.

Cambridge Jeſts, being Witty Alarms for Melancholy Spirits. By a Lover of Ha, Ha, He.

FINIS.

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Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both.

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1682

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2008-09 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

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A70182

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Wing G815

ID [STC]

Wing G833

ID [STC]

Wing M2638

ID [STC]

ESTC R12277

ID [EEBO-CITATION]

12152459

ID [OCLC]

ocm 12152459

ID [VID]

55102

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— Two choice and useful treatises the one, Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages concerning the praeexistence of souls, being a key to unlock the grand mysteries of providence in relation to mans sin and misery : the other, A discourse of truth / by the late Reverend Dr. Rust ... ; with annotations on them both., Rust, George, d. 1670. Discourse of truth., More, Henry, 1614-1687. Annotations upon the two foregoing treatises., Glanvill, Joseph, 1636-1680. Lux orientalis..

Extent

[47], 195, [7], 171, [6], 173-276, [4] p.

Printed for James Collins and Sam. Lowndes ...,. London :: 1682.. ("Lux orientalis, or, An enquiry into the opinion of the Eastern sages ...," "Annotations upon the two foregoing treatises ... / by one not unexercized in these kinds of speculation [i.e. Henry More]" and "Annotations upon the Discourse of truth : into which is inserted by way of digression a brief return to Mr. Baxter's reply, which he calls a placid collation with the learned Dr. Henry More ... : whereunto is annexed a devotional hymn / translated for the use of sincere lovers of true piety, 1683" all have separate t.p.'s.) (Lux orientalis is by Joseph Glanvill. Cf. Wing.) (Errata: p. [47] at beginning.) (Advertisements on p. [1-3] at end.) (This work appears at reel 71:2 as Wing 833, and at reel 844:3 as Wing G815.) (Imperfect: copy at reel 844:3 incompletely filmed.) (Reproduction of originals in British Library and University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign Campus). Library.)

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