The first Chapter. What Logick is. How many sorts of Notions there be in the minde of man.

LOGICK is an Art which giueth rules to argue well, and to discerne truth from falshood.

To be able to form an argument, and to frame a good reason, we must [Page 2] know, that all the Notions or Con­ceptions in mans vnderstanding are, either Simple, or Compound.

Simple Notions are such, as are ex­pressed by one word onely; As, horse, man, whitenes, to see, to runne, &c.

Compound Notions are such, as are expressed by an Enuntiation or Proposition, which affirmeth or de­nieth something; As, Man is reasona­ble. God is no lyar.

Of many Propositions knit toge­ther, an Argument or Syllogisme is: made, by those meanes and rules, which shall be set downe hereafter.

The second Chapter. How many sorts of simple Notions there are. Of Things singular and vniversall. Also of Substance and Accident.

THere are as many simple Notions as there be things in the world.

Of Things some be singular, and some vniversall.

Singular things are those, which are one in Number; As, Frederick, Peter, this horse, this tree.

Vniversall things comprehend and containe the Singulars. For an vni­versall is a gathering together of many Singulars vnder one nature common to all. As, horse, man, tree, vnder which words considered in generall, wee comprehend all horses, men, trees.

Singulars are knowne by sense, but vniversals are comprehended by the vnderstanding. Therfore bruit beasts know onely Singular things. Singu­lars in Philosophie are called Indivi­duals, because they cannot be divided into two parts, keeping the same name. As, Alexander cannot be divi­ded into two Alexanders, nor one horse into two horses.

A whole compounded of parts a­like; As, water, blood, wood, are not called Individuals, because they may be divided into parts, which may keepe the name of the whole. For e­very drop of water is water, and of a great peece of wood every parcell is [Page 4] wood. But if you will turne these things into Individuals, you must add the name of the measure. For one pint of water cannot be divided into two pintes, nor one acre of ground into two acres.

All things, whether Singular or Vniversall, are either Substances, or Accidents.

A Substance is that which subsisteth of it selfe; as, man, water, earth, &c.

An Accident is that which cannot subsist by it selfe, but must haue a sub­ject or substance to vphold it, and vn­to which it must adhere; as, whitenes, swiftnes, wisedome, heat. For whitenes can haue no being, if it subsisteth not in some subject; as, in snow, or in the skinne: so heat is an accident to fire; swiftnes is an accident to an horse; wisedome is an accident to the vnder­standing.

Accidents are sometimes expressed by a Substantiue; as, iustice, beautie; and sometimes by an Adjectiue; as, iust, faire. In the first manner, acci­dents are called Abstracts, or Separa­ted; [Page 5] In the second, they are called Concretes, or Conjoyned. For he that names iustice, or beautie, considers ju­stice or beautie without any certaine Subject. But he that names iust or [...]ire, considers justice and beautie, as [...]dhering to a certain Subject that is cloathed therewith.

Common custome oft confounds [...]hese things, saying, the true, the [...]lack the sweet; in stead of saying, the [...]ruth, the blacknes, the sweetnesse.

Now because there are divers and [...]undry kindes of accidents, the Phi­ [...]osophers haue ranked them into [...]ine Orders or Classes of things; vn­ [...]o which Substance being added, [...]here are ten Classes, which the Phi­ [...]osophers call Categories or Predi­ [...]aments. So that there is nothing in [...]he world which is done either by Nature, or by Art, by Councell or Chance, which may not be referred [...]o, and contained in some one of [...]hese Categories.

The third Chapter. The Names of the ten Categories.

The ten Categories are these.

• 1. Substance; as, man, horse.
• 2. Quantitie; as, length, breadth.
• 3. Qualitie; as, swiftnesse, whitenesse, roundnesse.
• 4. Relation or Respect; as, to be a Father, or a Sonne, a Master, or a Servant, &c.
• 5. To Act, or Action; as, to runne, to speake.
• 6. To Suffer, or Passion; as to be driven, to be burned.
• 7. Where; as, here, there.
• 8. When; as, yesterday, to day.
• 9. Situation; as, to sit, to stand, to kneele.
• 10. Habit; as, to haue a cap on, to haue hose on, to haue a cloake on.

The fourth Chapter. Of Substance.

SVbstance is that which subsisteth of it selfe, and is the subject of all Accidents.

Singular Substances, are called, Primary Substances.

Ʋniversall Substances, are called Secondary Substances. Because that [...]ingular substances are first knowne. So children that haue no knowledge but by sense, wanting yet the vse of reason, know nothing but singular [...]hings. This knowledge is common vnto vs with bruit beasts. But after­ward reason gathering divers Singu­lars together, comprehendeth them vnder Vniversall things.

The Sunne, the World, the Moone, are primary and singular Substances; yet in regard that they haue a nature and essence, which might agree with many, if it so pleased God, they are al­so secondary substances.

All substances are either vncreate [...] or created: the vncreated substance i [...] God, all other are created.

Created substances are cloathed with accidents: but God hath no ac­cident. For he is simple, and not compounded: his Attributes beeing his owne proper essence, which we [...] distinguish in regard of their divers effects; but in truth they are but one and the selfe same thing.

Of created substances, some are Im­materiall, as, Angels and Spirits; o­thers are Materiall, namely, Such as haue bodies, whereof here is a more exact Division.

• [Page]Substance is either
  • Vncreated, as God.
  • Created
    • Immateriall
      • Angels.
      • Separated soules.
    • Materiall, called bodies
      • Simple, as
        • Heaven.
        • The foure elements.
          • Fire.
          • Aire.
          • Water.
          • Earth.
      • Compound
        • Perfectly
          • Living
            • Plants, as
              • Herbes.
              • Shrubs.
              • Trees.
            • Animals
              • Man.
              • Beast
                • Perfect, which haue fiue sen­ses, and are either
                  • Airie
                    • Birds.
                    • Insecta, as Flyes.
                  • Earthy
                    • Creeping things.
                    • Foure footed beasts.
                  • Waterie.
                  • Amphybia, that is, of a doubtfull kinde.
                • Imperfect, are such as want some of the senses, as,
                  • Oysters.
                  • Zoophyta, or Plant-Animals.
          • Not li­ving as
            • Stones.
            • Minerals.
        • Imperfectly, which are called Meteors, as, Comets, Windes, Snow, Ice, &c.

Place this Table of Substances betweene Page 8 and 9 at this hand ☞

There can be nothing contrary to substance. Also, no substance is more substance then another, as, one horse is not more a horse then another, al­though it be a better horse. True it is that God and the Deuill are substan­ces, and that there is a contrarietie be­tweene them. As also fire is contrary to water; but this contrarietie is not in the substance, but in the will of the Divel's, and in the qualitie of fire and water.

The fift Chapter. Of Quantitie.

QVantitie is that by which Sub­stances are numbred, measured, or divided; and by which they are e­quall, or vnequall.

There be two sorts of Quantitie.

The one is compounded of seve­red and disjoyned parts, and therfore is called disjoyned Quantitie.

The other is compounded of con­tinued parts, and therefore is called continued Quantitie.

Quantitie disjoyned or severed is called Number, because the parts haue betweene them no Continuitie. This Quantitie cannot be measured, but must be numbred.

Number is of two sorts; either numbring, or numbred.

Numbers numbring are the num­bers of Arithmetick, as, one, three, six, &c. Numbers numbred are the things that are numbred, as, six men, ten hor­ses, &c.

Sometimes the number numbred stands in stead of the number num­bring, as, Counters.

Vnitie is no number, but the be­ginning of number.

The greatest number of all cannot be found or imagined. For a man may still adde to the greatest number that can be given.

Continued Quantitie is that whose parts are joyned together with a con­tinued sequell, and which may be measured. This Quantitie is either, a Line, or a Superficies, or a Mathema­ticall bodie, or Time.

A Line is a length without breadth, as, a myle, a meating wand.

Superficies is a length with breadth, as, the surface of the water, or of an acre of Land.

Vnder the Superficies we compre­hend also the Place, which is nothing els but the interiour Superficies of a bodie, containing another, as, the in­ward Superficies of a Hogs-head of Wine, is the place of the Wine.

A Mathematicall bodie is length, breadth, and depth; this bodie differs from a Physicall or naturall bodie, which is a materiall substance, and not a quantitie. Notwithstanding e­very naturall bodie hath these three dimensions, and cannot be without quantitie.

Time is the measure of the conti­nuance of things. This measure is ta­ken from the motion of the heavens, which maketh dayes and yeares.

Time hath two parts, namely, past, and to come: as for the present it is not time, but it is the instant or run­ning moment, which coupleth toge­ther [Page 12] the time past, with the time to come.

The continuance of God is not called time, but Eternitie, which con­sisteth in two things. First to haue nei­ther beginning nor ending. Second­ly, not to passe away, nor to haue suc­cession of parts. For the life of God consists in rest: because that if the life of God had a flux, or succession of parts, his life were partly past, and partly to come.

As Vnitie is neither number nor quantitie, so a Prick is neither quanti­tie, nor part of a line: as also a mo­ment is no part of time, but the end or extremitie of time past.

Number is ancienter then conti­nued quantitie, as it appeareth by the number of the Persons in the Trini­tie, which is eternall and without be­ginning of time. But continued quantitie had a beginning with the creation of bodies.

Again, number may be counted by it selfe, and without any other helpe, but continued quantitie cannot be [Page 13] measured but by the helpe of the dis­continued quantity. For every length or breadth is measured by the num­ [...]ring of the feet, or inches, or meting­wands, or myles, or degrees.

Nothing is contrary vnto quantitie. For great and little are not contraries, but Relatiues or Respectiues; and one containes the other, which can­not be in contraries. The lesse num­ber is contained vnder the greater, [...]nd is part of it: But heat is no part of [...]olde.

• Quantitie is either
  • Discontinued, w^ch is called Number
    • Numbring
    • Numbred.
  • Continued
    • A Line.
    • A Superficies.
    • A Bodie.
    • Time.

The sixt Chapter. Of Qualitie.

QValitie is that whereby substan­ces are qualified, and made like or vnlike one to another. For as things [Page 14] are said to be the same things, whe [...] they haue one selfe same substance and equall when they agree in quanti­tie: so they are said to be alike, when they agree in qualitie.

There are foure sorts of Qualities. 1. For they are either Actiue quali­ties, which be in the objects of our outward or inward senses, and bring vnto vs some alteration or change in our bodies, or mindes, as, sweetnes in hony, coldnes in snow, beautie in a face, hardnes or roughnes in a stone, or in a bodie, which hurteth the sense of touching, delight in a Comedie. The effects which these qualities do work in vs are called Passion, whilest it is received. For when the smart of bur­ning is over, the marke or blacknes that remaineth, is no longer called Passion.

2. Or els they be naturall qualities or faculties, as, the vertue of hearbs, the faculties of the soule, heavines in lead, heat in fire, and coldnes in water.

3. Or els they be habits, or qualities gotten by studie and exercise, as all [Page 15] Arts are, whether mechanicall or li­berall; and all Sciences. Which when [...] man hath attained vnto, and gotten [...] habit of them, he is thereby made the fitter for any action or exercise.

Bruit beasts that haue hearing, as, dogs, horses, apes, &c. are capable to get a habit, if feare doe not hinder them. For such creatures as are excessiuely [...]imerous cannot be taught, as, mice, &c.

The instruments by which the ha­bit is put into practice may be lost, and yet the habit remaine still, as, the skill of playing on the Lute, when the hand is cut off.

The preparation to a habit is called Disposition, which is when a man hath not as yet gotten a habit, but is in the way to it, and hath besides his inclination some little knowledge.

Naturall faculties are great helpes to get and forme a habit. For he that by nature is vnfit to any Art or stu­die, can never attaine vnto a perfecti­on, whatsoever paines he takes in it. 4. Or els they are Figures and out­ward [Page 16] formes, as, to be square, round, sharp, crooked, wrong, straight.

Qualities are contrary one to ano­ther, as, heat, and coldnes. And natu­rall powers are contrary to impoten­cie, as, sight to blindnes, hearing to deafe­nes. Onely Figures & outward formes haue no contraries. For roundnes dif­fereth from squarenes, but is not con­trary vnto it.

To judge aright of any qualitie, it must be considered in the abstract, and as not being tyed to any certaine subject: So iustice or whitenes are to be considered in themselues, and not the just or the white. Because the consi­deration of the subject in the which justice or whitenes are inherent, doe but trouble & divert mans thought. Therfore if you will consider a thing aright, you must consider it apart and separated.

One substance can haue but one quantitie, but it may haue a great number of divers qualities.

Qualities doe act, but quantities doe not, onely they doe helpe the [Page 17] action of the qualitie, as, the greatnes of a stone encreaseth the weight of it.

A Spirit hath qualities, but no quantities.

The excellencie of qualitie aboue quantitie, consists principally in that the quantitie proceeds from the mat­ter, but the qualitie from the forme. Now the forme is ever more excellent then the matter. For by the forme things are made fit to act; but mat­ter is that which makes them apt to suffer.

Forme and Figure act not, but they helpe and facilitate the action of him that acteth, as, the roundnes of a stone makes it to rowle the easier.

• Qualities are
  • 1. Such as act a­gainst the senses
    • Outward.
    • Inward.
  • 2. Natural power or impotencie.
  • 3. Habits, whose beginning is called Disposition.
  • 4. Outward formes and figures.

The seventh Chapter. Of Relation and Relatiues.

RElatiues are two things which haue a mutuall respect one to a­nother, so as the one cannot be with­out the other, and the one is defined by the other, neither can the one be thought vpon without thinking vp­on the other, as, the Father and the Sonne, the Prince and the Subiects, the master and the servant, the double and the halfe, the equall and the equall.

The mutuall respect between these two things is called Relation. There be many Relatiues which haue the selfe same name, as, friend and friend, like and like, equall and equall.

The relation between two friends is called friendship; the relation be­tween two things alike, is called re­semblance or likenesse.

There be relatiues whose relation is imperfect, namely, when one of the two relatiues dependeth on the other, [Page 19] and cannot be without it, but the o­ther may well be alone, and depen­deth not on his relatiue, as, the Pastor and the flock, the Prince and the people, the sight and the thing visible. For there may be people without a Prince, but no Prince without people.

There be also relatiues, which are not relatiues in their owne nature, but only in regard of vs, and because we make them so to be by our con­ceiving of them: as, the right and the left between two walls, or two trees: but if we turne our selues, then that which was left, is right. For in a tree there is neither right nor left by na­ture.

If a Father haue many sonnes, there are as many sundry relations, as there be sonnes; because the Father is taken divers times as is the center of a Cir­cle, which is taken as often as the lines are drawne from the said center to the circumference.

One and the same thing may haue the name of two relatiues; as, to be Fa­ther and Sonne, to be high and low; but [Page 20] in divers respects. For the same may be Father to one, and Sonne to ano­ther.

There be relations which spring from quantitie, as, the relation which is between the double and the halfe; Others that proceed from Qualitie, as, the relation between two friends. O­thers which come from Action, as, the relation between the mother and the sonne, the Creator and the creature. Others that spring from Situation, as, the right and left, the high and lowe, the formost, and the hindermost; between which Relatiues the relation hath no name.

We call that formost in living things, towards which the naturall motion is made; we call right that part which naturally is fittest for service. In a li­ving creature we call that part high, by which the nourishment is drawne; as, in Plants, the root is the highest part, not in regard of the vniverse, but in regard of the Plant.

Such relations as are grounded vp­on qualitie, admit of contrarietie, as, [Page 21] friendship, likenes: other relations ad­mit of none.

In relations grounded vpon action, as betweene that which heateth, and that which is heated, there is no con­trarietie. For that which heateth, and that which cooleth are contraries; but this contrarietie proceeds from the qualitie, namely, heat, which is the ground of this relation.

Friendship, as it is an affection mo­ving the lover, is a qualitie; but as it is a mutuall respect betweene two friends, it is a Relation.

Although God, as he is Master and Creator, be a relatiue to his servants and creatures, there is not for all that any accident in God: because the re­lation is not in the two relatiues, but between the two relatiues. And there­fore it bringeth in no composition, nor to the substance any naturall change.

It is to be noted that two relatiues are commonly called the two termes of the relation.

• [Page 22]Rela­tiues are
  • Either of their own nature
    • Perfect having
      • the same names.
      • divers names.
    • Imperfect.
  • Or onely in regard of vs.
  • All these relatiues are groū ­ded vpon
    • Quantitie.
    • Qualitie.
    • Action.
    • Situation.

The eight Chapter. Of Acting or Action.

TO Act is to moue it selfe against the patient, and to make it re­ceiue the power of the Agent.

Of Actions some be naturall, as, the panting of the heart, the motion of a stone downeward. Others are volunta­ry, as, to buy, to sell, to paint, to fence; which notwithstanding are not done without the helpe of nature. Others are mixt, that is to say, partly naturall, partly voluntary: as, to eate, to walke, to runne; which indeed are naturall actions, but are guided by the will.

Violent actions and against nature, are such as are contrary to naturall [Page 23] actions, as, the throwing of a stone vp­ward. But those are contrary to vo­luntary actions, which are called for­ced or constrained, as, to be pulled or haled into prison. There be certaine actions that are partly voluntary, partly forced, as, when a Merchant ca­steth his merchandize into the Sea to ease the ship; or when a Patient causeth his arme to be cut off.

The naturall actions and motions are swiftest in the end; as, the falling of a stone downeward. The voluntary actions are swiftest in the middest; as, running. The violent are swiftest in the beginning; as, the casting of a stone; or, shooting of an arrow.

Every action importeth a certaine motion. If the motion be in the sub­stance, it is called Generation, or Cor­ruption. If in the Quantitie, it is cal­led Augmentation or Diminution. If in the Qualitie, it is called Altera­tion. If in the place, it is called Locall motion, or Transportation.

There is no generation without corruption, nor no corruption with­out [Page 24] generation. But we call it gene­ration, when the matter takes a better forme; and corruption, when it pas­seth into a worser.

The locall motion is the chiefest of all motions, without which the rest mooue not at all. And besides there is no other motion belonging to the heavens; where motion is the cause of all other motions, as well in Substance, as in Quantitie, and Qua­litie.

The heavens in regard of the whole doe rest, but in regard of the parts, doe change place, even as a Top that sleepeth turning.

• Actions are
  • Naturall.
  • Voluntary.
  • Mixt.
  • Violent.

• Motion is on the
  • Substance, and is called
    • Generation.
    • Corruption.
  • Quantitie, and is called
    • Augmentation.
    • Diminution.
  • Qualitie, and is called Alteration.
  • Place, and is called Transporting or Local-motion.

The ninth Chapter. Of Suffering or Passion.

TO Suffer is to receiue the power of the Agent.

There are as many kinds of Suffe­ring, as of doing.

Oftentimes the Agent doth suffer in acting, as, when a man rowling a weightie stone tireth himselfe, and sweateth: or when a man hurteth his teeth in cracking a Nut. The Agent doth not suffer, when it is out of the compasse of the Activitie of the Pa­tient, as, the Sunne shining on the water, receiveth not the brightnesse which the water send's back: because it is out of the extent, which limiteth the reflection of the beames sent back againe by the water.

God acteth alwayes, and every where, but never suffereth.

There are Verbs Actiues in Gram­mar, which are Passiues in Philoso­phie, as, to loue, to heare, to learne: for [Page 26] all these are Passions, and are done by receiving. On the contrary, he which is loved or heard, is he that acteth & moueth the lover and the hearer.

There are some Passions perfecting, and others which are corrupting, as, the inlightning in the aire, the receiving of learning in the vnderstanding, or of the images of things in the sight, are Pas­sions, which bring some perfection to the aire, to the vnderstanding, and to the sight.

The corrupting Passions are such as would destroy the Patient, if they did continue their encrease, or did in­crease aboue measure, as, heating, coo­ling, wearisomnesse.

The perfecting Passions are those which perfect a facultie or naturall power, and giue it that perfection for the which God did create it.

The tenth Chapter. Of Where.

VVHERE is not the place it selfe, but it is a designation, [Page 27] or a note of some certaine place. For place is a quantitie, and a space that may be measured: But the Where can­not be measured. When a man put­teth forth a question touching the Place, the demand is, by how much, as for example, how much place doth such a bodie take vp? But here the que­stion is by where or whither, as, where is the King? and, whither goe you?

Concerning Bodies the question may be asked, how much place they take vp: but concerning Angels and soules, that question cannot be asked, but onely this, where they are. This is it which the Philosophers meane when they say, that Bodies are in a place Circumscriptiuely, and Soules de­finitiuely; because Soules are not limi­ted or circumscribed by place, and yet a man may say of them, that they are here, or there, and not els-where.

We cannot say that God is in a place any of these waies. For he is infinite, and so present in all places, as he is neither limited, nor defined by any place. It may be truely said, GOD is [Page 28] here; but it cannot be said, GOD is here, and not there.

The eleventh Chapter. Of When.

VVHEN is not the time it selfe, but it is a designati­on, or a note of a certain time, as, ye­sterday, to day, to morrow, &c.

When we speake of time, and of the continuance of it, the question is, by how long? as, how long lived Noah? how long did the Romaine Empire conti­nue? But here wee aske by When, as, When shall wee haue the Equinoxe? When was Iulius Caesar slaine?

Some things are done in time, which notwithstanding are not measured by time; namely, such as are done in a moment, as, the impression of a Seale; the inlightening of a chamber by the aire at the opening of the windowes; the re­ceiving of the images of things in the eye. Concerning these things, wee aske not in how long time, but when they were done.

The twelfth Chapter. Of Situation.

SItuation is a Position or placing of parts in their whole, whether the situation be naturall; as, the situa­tion of the arme at the shoulders end; or voluntary, as when we sit, or kneele.

The thirteenth Chapter. Of Habit.

BY Habit we doe not vnderstand garments, for they belong to sub­stance; but we meane the applying of garments and other ornaments about the bodie, as, to be cloathed, to be shod, to haue a Cassock or a Cloake on.

Vnder these ten Classes or rankes of things, are contained all things in the world, and all simple Notions. And of these are framed Enuntiati­ons [Page 30] and Arguments or Syllogismes, whereof wee shall speake hereafter. For there is nothing in the world out of which a man may not draw some Argument or Discourse.

The first Chapter. How these simple Notions are of vse for an Argument.

TO shew how these simple Notions en­ter into an Argu­ment, or Syllogis­me, and how they are of vse for Rea­soning & discourse, they must be cloathed with other names. For if wee should consider them no otherwise then as they are handled in the Categories, they would never serue to open a dis­course, and to frame a reason. For as [Page 32] it is one thing to consider Leather or wood in themselues, & another thing to consider them as they are a fit mat­ter to make a shoo or a bench: So it is another thing to consider things as they are in themselues, and another thing to consider them as they are meanes or instruments of reasoning. We haue considered in the Catego­ries things as they are in themselues, now we are to consider them as they may serue to argue and discourse.

And therefore when a man will search out the truth of any question, (as for example, Whether voluptuous­nesse be a good thing) and desires to ga­ther proofes to proue or to impugne the question propounded; all that can be brought, is either,

• 1. The Genus of that which wee desire to proue.
• 2. Or the Species.
• 3. Or the Difference.
• 4. Or the Proper.
• 5. Or some Accident.
• 6. Or the Whole or some part of the Whole.
• [Page 33]7. Or the Definition.
• 8. Or the Division.
• 9. Or some thing coupled vnto it.
• 10. Or the Cause or Effect.
• 11. Or the Etymologie.
• 12. Or something Like or Vnlike.
• 13. Or the Opposit.
• 14. Or a Comparison in the things.
• 15. Or a Comparison in the Proba­bilitie.
• 16. Or some Testimony.

Of all which heads we are now to treat of in particular, that wee may know what they are, and how to make vse of them.

The second Chapter. Of the Genus.

THe Genus is a nature which be­longeth vnto many things diffe­ring in Species. As this word, Ani­mal, is a Genus signifying a nature common both to man and beast: Ani­mal is the Genus; man and beast are [Page 34] the Species. So Plant is the Genus of Trees and of Herbes; and vertue is a Genus whose Species are Iustice, Temperance, &c.

There is a Supreame and most Ge­nerall Genus; and an Inferiour and Subalternall Genus. As Substance is a supreame Genus, which can never be a Species: but Animal is an inferiour Genus. For though it be a Genus to man and beast, yet it is a Species to Bodie: as also Bodie is a Species to Substance. As in this Table;

• Substance
  • without bodie.
  • with bodie
    • liuing
      • Plants.
      • Ani­mals
        • man.
        • beast.
    • not liuing.

Such Genuses are equally attribu­ted to their Species, and vpon the same ground. But there are some Ae­quivocall Genuses, which are attri­buted to divers Species vpon divers grounds. As this word, Wolfe, is attri­buted to a terrestriall devouring crea­ture, and to a Fish, and to a certaine disease.

A Genus Analogicall is that which is attributed to divers Speci [...]ses, though not altogether in regard of the same cause, yet for some respect or similitude. As this word, Foot, is attributed to the foot of a liuing crea­ture, and to the foot of a Table, and of a Verse, and of a mountaine, and of a drinking glasse. So the word healthfull is attributed to the bodie, and to the Aire, and to exercise, and to vrine in divers senses, and yet with some a­greement too. Commonly such a Ge­nus agreeth primarily to some one of the Species, and then secondarily to the rest, by reason of some relation which it hath with them, as may ap­peare by the forenamed examples. For the word Foot, first and properly is said of the foot of a liuing creature, and afterward of the foot of a moun­taine or of a Table by a certaine re­semblance or proportion. So likewise to be healthfull is said first of the body, and then of exercise, and of vrine, because they are helpes or markes of bodily health.

• [Page 36]Genus
  • Supreame
  • Inferiour
    • Vnivocall, as, Ani­mal, Plant.
    • Aequivo­call in
      • whole, as Wolfe.
      • part when there is some relation or agreement a­mong the Species, As, foot, healthfull.

The third Chapter. Of the Species.

SPecies is a nature comprehended vnder the Genus, which beeing joyned with a difference maketh a Species. So man is a reasonable creature: creature is the Genus of man, and the word reasonable is the differēce which distinguisheth man from other sorts of creatures.

There be two sorts of Species. The one most speciall, which can never be a Genus, as, man, lyon, elephant, gold: For such Specieses cannot be divided into other Specieses: but onely into singular Substances or Individuals.

The other is a Subalternall Species, [Page 37] which being compared with an infe­rior Species is a Genus. As, the word, Animal, is a Species in regard of a Bo­die: but a Genus in regard of man.

From the Genus and Species are drawne Arguments for Discourse; and such arguments are grounded vpon these Maximes following.

1. Whatsoever agreeth with the Genus, Maximes. agreeth also with the Species. For what­soever may be said of a tree in gene­rall, may be said also of the Laurell, &c. Excepting that which is attribu­ted to the Genus, as it is a Genus. As to be more generall then the Specie­ses, and to containe them.

2. That which agrees not with the Ge­nus, agrees not with the Species. For that which cannot be said of animal, cannot be said of man.

3. It is not necessary that the Species be wheresoeuer the Genus is. For if such a thing be an animal, it followeth not that it must therefore be a man.

4. But on the other side. Where the Species is, there the Genus must needs be also. For whosoever is a man, is also [Page 38] an animal. And whosoever saith, that this is a lettice, doth by consequent af­firme, that it is an herb.

The fourth Chapter. Of Difference.

DIfference is that, whereby one thing differeth from another.

Of differences some are greater then others. For there are things which differ onely in number; as Peter and Iohn. There be others which differ in the Species, as, man and beast. There be others also which differ in the Genus, as, a man and a stone. But the greatest differēce is, when two things are in two divers Categories, as, a horse and whitenes.

There be also essentiall differences, and accidentall differences. As, a man differeth from a horse in essence, and definition. But a French man differs from a Moore onely in colour and complexion, which are accidents, and not things which make man to be man.

Among the essentiall differences, the principall and most considerable is that, which is called Superficiall, by which the Specieses of the same Ge­nus differ essentially. This difference hath these two properties. That it constitutes the Specieses; And di­vides the Genuses. Thus the life sen­sitiue, is the difference which consti­tutes the animal, and maketh the ani­mal to be Animal. The selfe same dif­ference divideth the Genus; namely, Living. So likewise to be reasonable, is the difference which divideth animal, and constitutes man. And the same perfection which maketh man to be man, is that which maketh him differ from other Animals.

The fift Chapter. Of Proper.

PRoper is of two sorts. For there be some properties most-proper, and others lesse-proper to a thing.

The properties most-proper, are [Page 40] such as are attributed to the singulars of the same Specieses, and with them onely, and that alwayes. As, it is the propertie of the Loadstone to draw I­ron. And it is the propertie of man, to be able to laugh, and speake: and of a horse to neigh: and of an oxe to bel­low.

The properties lesse-proper, are such as agree onely to the singulars of a Species, but neither alwaies, nor to all. As it is proper to a man to be a Philosopher, or a Musician: but nei­ther to every man, nor at all times. So it is the propertie of the Moone to be Eclipsed, but not at all times. And the propertie of Plants to loose their leaues in Winter; but that agrees not with all, nor alwayes: for there be some that are alwayes greene.

Maxime. Wheresoeuer a difference is, there also is the Species, and the propertie most-proper. For these ever goe all toge­ther.

The sixth Chapter. Of the Accident.

BY Accident in this place, we doe not vnderstand whatsoever is in the world, Substance excepted. For Accident so taken at large compre­hendeth also the Proper, and is of no vse to frame a Discourse or Argu­ment.

But by Accident we vnderstand the mutable, or separable circumstances of a Subject, which may be, or not be in a Subject, without destroying the said Subject. As, whitenes in a wall, and valour in a man are accidents, which may be or may not be in a wall, or in a man, and that without destroy­ing either man or wall, or causing them to be more or lesse man or wall.

Of these Accidents compared toge­ther, some goe before, and precede by order of nature the thing which wee intend to proue. Others doe accom­panie the same. And others doe follow [Page 42] it. The first are called Antecedents. As, wearisomnesse, and shaking before an Ague; the foaming of the Sea before a tempest; the dawning of the day before the day: The second are called Con­comitants, that is to say, accompany­ing, because they goe together, As, Pride and folly; The Eclipse of the Moone, and the full Moone: The third are called Consequents. As, raine, after a red morning; an ague after distast and wearisomnesse without former labour.

Antecedents and Concomitants are vsed to proue probably that a thing is, or shall be. As, by palenesse we ar­gue fear [...]: and by blushing shamefast­nesse, or the touch of conscience: and by blunt hornes of the Moone, we con­clude that we shall haue raine: and by the rednes of the same, that wee shall haue winde.

But those proofes are most forcible that are drawne from subsequent ac­cidents, which cannot be vnles some other thing hath gone before. As, we know there hath beene a battell by [Page 43] many slaine bodies lying in a field; and shipwracke by sun [...]ry plankes s [...]o [...]ng on the S [...]a.

The M [...]ximesMaximes. are.

1. The Antecedent being granted, the Cons [...]qu [...]nt [...]th probably follow.

2. The Consequent being granted, the Antecedent must needs haue gone before. E [...]pecia ly when it is such an Effect as cannot be produced, but by one cause: A [...] we proue, that because it is day, the Sunne is ris [...]n. But if it be [...]n Effect, which may arise from divers Causes (As, the corruptions of an E­state; and Agues) the proofe is not necessary.

The seventh Chapter. Of the Whole and Parts.

THe Whole is that which hath all the Parts joyned together in a convenient order and situation. As, the whole and entire of a house is not onely when all the parts are there, but when every part is convenien [...]ly placed.

There be two sorts of Whole: the one which may be divided into for­mall parts; the other into materiall parts.

The Formall parts are those where­of the Definition is compounded. As, the Genus and the Difference are the parts of a Definition. So animal and reason be the two formall parts of a man. So the formall parts of a house, or of an image of stone, are their mat­ter and their externall formes or figures. Such parts may easily be discerned and distinguished by our vnderstan­ding, but cannot be really separated.

The Materiall parts are those which differ in Situation, and which for the most part may really be separated. As the materiall parts of the world are the heavens and the foure Elements: the materiall parts of a house are the foundation, the walles, and the roofe.

Every materiall part hath a situati­on by it selfe, except there be a min­gling or commixtion of the said parts. As when wine is mingled with water, or when the foure Elements are min­gled [Page 45] in a Bodie. Materiall parts are ei­ther alike among themselues (As, the parts of water, Bloud, Butter, Oile:) or els are vnlike, as, the parts of a mans bodie, or of a house. The parts alike a­mong themselues haue no certaine number; because they may be infi­nitely divided.

The parts vnlike are either Inte­grals, or not Integrals.

The Integrall parts are those where­of the whole is immediately com­pounded. As, a Kingdome is immedi­diately compounded of a King & the three estates. The world is compounded of the heavens and the foure Elements. An animal is compounded of a bodie and a soule.

But vnder one of these parts are of­tentimes contained other little parts which are not Integrals: that is to say, whereof the Whole or the En­tire is not immediately compounded. Among which there are some that are not necessary, serving rather for orna­ment and conveniencie, then for ne­cessitie. As, in a Common-wealth, [Page 46] hunters, perfumers, musicians, and Poets. In a house, shuts to windowes, gutters, and weathercockes.

Sometimes in a Common-wealth the more necessary parts are such as appeare least, and are lesse in account then such as are for ornament or pleasure. A [...] Bakers are lesse in ac­count then Cookes, and Plowmen lesse then Goldsmiths.

There are little p [...]rts and not Inte­grall, which are notwithstanding principals, and altogether ne [...]essary. As, the heart and braine in man. A vault hath that prope [...]ie, that all the parts how little soever they be, are principals; because if one of them be taken away, the rest fall to the ground.

There are certaine parts which are not necessary for the being, and yet are necessary for the well and com­modious being. As, the eye in a mans bodie, lockes in a house, Merchant­drapers in a towne.

The Nayles are part of mans bodie, as also the teeth: but haire is not. For it is an excrement.

A small quantitie of our bloud is not accounted a part of the bodi [...]; because though it be taken away, the bodie re­maines compleat, and oftentim [...]s is the more healthfull. But the who [...]e masse of bloud is part of the bodie.

Now to argue and seeke the truth by the helpe of the Whole and Parts, these Maximes are to be vnderstood.

1. Wheresoever the Whole is, Maximes. there also all the Integrall parts requisit to being, must necessarily be. As, where man is, there necessarily is the bodie and soule. 2. Take away any of the Integrall and necessarie parts, and you destroy the Whole. As, take away the foundation or walls, and you destroy the house.

3. Whatsoever is said of the Whole com­pounded of parts alike, may be said also of every severall part. Except that which is said of the Whole, as it is Whole, namely, to containe all the parts. For example, to be salt is said of the whole Sea, and of every part of it: but to encompasse the earth, is attributed onely to the Sea, as it is a Whole: and therefore it is not attributed to any part of the Sea.

• [Page 48]The Whole is compo­sed of parts
  • Formall.
  • Materiall which are among them­selues.
    • alike.
    • vn­like
      • integrall.
      • not in­tegrall
        • neces­sary for
          • being.
          • well-being.
        • not necessary.

The eight Chapter. Of Definition.

DEfinition is a speech which ex­presseth the essence of the thing. The perfect definition of a Sub­stance is that, which is compounded of the next Genus and the specificall difference. As, the definition of a Plant is, to be a bodie liuing a vegetatiue life: of man, to be a reasonable creature. There are but few such Definitions; because the formes and essentiall dif­ferences of substances are not so well knowne vnto vs. God onely who [Page 49] made them, doth exactly know them.

The perfect definition of an Acci­dent is compounded of three parts, namely, of the next Genus, of the proper Subject, and of the next Effi­cient or Finall cause. As for example, death is an accident, whereof the Ge­nus is, the end or destruction of life, the Subject is, a liuing bodie, and the next Efficient cause is, the extinguishing of vitall heat.

This therefore is the perfect defini­tion of death, namely, that it is the de­struction of the life of a liuing bodie by extinguishing the vitall heat. Thus are defined anger, griefe, sicknes, thun­der, earthquake, the Eclipse of the Moone, and that of the Sunne, Civil-warre, respiration, and divers other things, whereof wee shall produce some examples in the end of this Chapter.

Now but Proper Accidents can be thus defined. For mutable and casu­all Accidents, or such as haue no cer­taine knowne cause, or that depend vpon the will of man, cannot be ex­actly [Page 50] defined. And therefore in stead of a Definition, we describe them, as well as we may, expressing their Ge­nus, and some certaine propertie. So whitenes is defined, when we say, that it is a most simple and most cleare colour. And light is defined to be the chiefe of all whitenesses; or, the whitenes of the bodie of the Sunne sending forth his like­nes through transparent bodies.

Naturall instruments, as, the eye, and the hand; or, artificiall, as, a hammer, or ana xe, are defined by their Genus, and by their fitnes for that vse for which they are ordained. So the Eye is the instrument of seeing, and a Ham­mer is an instrument to knocke withall.

Definition serveth to discourse and to argue by the meanes of this Ma­xime.Maxime.

To whatsoever thing the definition a­greeth, vnto that same also the thing de­fined doth agree. And reciprocally, to whatsoever the defined thing agreeth, to the same the definition agreeth also.

• [Page 51]Definiti­on is ei­ther of a
  • Substance which is composed of the
    • Next Genus.
    • Difference.
  • Accident which is
    • Proper defi­ned by the
      • Next Genus.
      • Proper subject.
      • Next cause
        • Efficient.
        • Finall.
    • Improper or casuall, defined as the Substance, so far as may be.

The ninth Chapter. Of Division.

THere are divers sorts of Divisi­ons. For either we divide the Ge­nus [Page 53] into the Species, or the Whole into the Parts, or the Substance into divers Acc [...]dents, or an Accident into divers Subjects, or a Word into di­vers significations.

1. First we divide a Genus into the Species. As, a liuing creature into man and beast. Actions into naturall and vo­luntarie.

2. Or els we divide the Whole into Par [...]s. So man is divided into Soule and bodie. A house into the foundations, walls and roofe. Which division is made either in thought or in deed.

3. Or els we divide the Subject into divers Accidents. As, when we divide men into free and bond, into males or females, into fooles or wisemen.

4. Or els we divide an Accident into other Accidents. As, when we divide Physicians into rich and poore ones: soul­diers into great or little ones, strong or weake.

5. Or els we divide Accidents into divers Subjects, As, sicknes, into the sicknes of the bodie, and sicknes of the soule. So we may divide corruption in­to [Page 54] the corruption of simple bodies, or into the corruption of mixt or com­pounded bodies.

6. Or we divide an Aequivocall word into divers significatiōs, As the word, linke, which signifieth a Sausage, a Torch, and a linke of a chaine.

Rules for Division.1. A good division must haue but few parts, and those opposit, if it may be. As, animal is divided into reasona­ble and vnreasonable; Number into even and odd; A line into straight and crocked. But that is not alwayes pos­sible. As when we divide the externall senses into fiue. And France into seven­teene governements.

2. In a Division nothing must be ei­ther superfluous, or wanting. As, if a man should say, that the senses are, hea­ring, seeing, smelling, and the two eyes; there were in such a Division some­thing wanting and something super­fluous.

3. The parts of a Division must not over-reach one another. As, who should say that all cloathing of the bo­die is either garments, or habillements, [Page 55] or gownes. Or that Iustice consisteth in three things, to liue honestly, to hurt no bodie, to giue every man his owne. In these divisions the parts are but little or not at all differing, and are in a manner the same thing.

• Division is of the
  • Genus into the Species.
  • Whole into the Parts.
  • Subject into Accidents.
  • Accidents into divers Subjects.
  • Aequivocall word into divers significations.

The tenth Chapter. Of things Coupled, called in Latin Conjugata.

COupling is considered either in Words or in Things.

Words coupled or conjoyned are such, as come from the same begin­ning, and differ in termination, As, iust, iustice, iustly: white, whiting, to white, whitenes. The linke and affini­tie of which words is grounded vp­on [Page 56] some affinitie which is in the na­ture of the things signified by these words.

But there are certaine things cou­pled in Nature which are not coupled in Words. As the sleepe, and to slum­ber.

There are also certain words cou­pled, which notwithstanding for matter are not of neces [...]tie linked to­gether. As, buckle and a buckler.

Now for argument and discourse, the coupling and affinitie which is in words is of no vse, except there be al­so affinitie in the thing: but where the affinitie of words proceeds from the affinitie in the thing, we vse this Maxime.

Maxime. To whomsoever one of the Coniugates or things coupled doth belong, the others also belong vnto the same. As, he that lyeth is a lyar. And, to whomsoever it belongeth to doe a iust thing, to him also belongeth iustice, and to liue iustly. And, seeing thou art a knaue, thou must be given vnto knavery.

This Maxime is not without Ex­ception. [Page 57] As, may appeare by the ex­ample of Cambyses, who being very vnjust, did notwithstanding some just actions. As in that he covered the seat of justice with the skinne of an vnjust Iudge, whom he caused to be fl [...]ad, as a warning to all that should sit vp­on the said seat. And so there may be a Prince loving treason, who not­withstanding hateth the traitour.

The eleventh Chapter. Of Causes and Effects.

A Cause is that which bringeth forth an Effect: or that by which or for which any thing is.

There be foure kinds of Causes: the Materiall, the Formall, the Effici­ent, and the Finall. For example, the matter of a house is stones, wood, and tyles: the forme is the structure and manner of building, which ariseth from the placing or ordering of the parts: the efficient cause is the Master-builder: the finall cause is for dwelling or habitation.

The efficient and finall causes are called Externall, because they are out of the thing, and are not parts of it. As the builder is no part of the house: for suppose the builder were shut vp in the house, which he hath built, yet were he still an externall cause, by reason that he is not of the essence or definition of the house, nor any part of it. But the matter and forme are Internal causes, because the thing is composed of them.

The cause Materiall.Matter is that whereof the thing is composed. As, leather is the matter of a shoe, because a shoe is made of lea­ther.

Matter is of two sorts: the one is called matter of Generation, as, the seed is the matter of the Generation of a tree; slime is the matter of the Gene­ration of frogs; so water is the mat­ter of ice. The other is the matter of Composition. As, the foure elements are the matter wherof a bodie is com­posed; wood and stone are the matter of a house.

Sometimes matter is taken impro­perly [Page 59] for the subject whereof we speake or write. Thus battails and loue are the matter of the booke of Ariost. And sometimes for the occasion and subject whereabout man doth la­bour and occupie himselfe. As, num­bers are the matter of an Arithmetici­an, and dangers and troubles are the matter of prowesse and patience.

Forme is that which giueth being to a thing.Formall.

Of Formes some are Naturall. As the forme of an Animal is the sensitiue soule: and the forme of the eye is the facultie of seeing: Others are Artifici­all. As the forme of a statua, of a house, or of a clock.

Naturall formes are part of the sub­stance, and are multiplied by genera­tion. But Artificiall formes are qua­lities, and no parts of the substance, neither are they multiplied by gene­ration or propagation. If we engraue the image of Caesar vpon a nut, that nut being planted will bring forth fruit and nuts, but not the image of Caesar. And thence it is that children [Page 60] are not heires of the learning or piety of their fat [...]ers.

The EfficientEfficient. cause is that by which a thing is. As the Sunne is the efficient cause of the day: and the fire of bur­ning: and sicknes of death: and the in­terposition of the Moone, the cause of the eclipse of the Sunne.

Vnder the Efficient cause we com­prehend the cause which is called Meritorious. As murther is the cause of punishment.

Likewise vnder the Efficient cause we comprehend the cause which is called Defectiue. As the want of sight is the cause of going astray; and the absence of the Sunne, is the cause of night, howsoever by nature it be the cause of day.

All instruments, both naturall, as, the eye and the hand; and artificiall, as, an Axe and a sword, are in some sort Efficient causes. For though they act not by their owne proper power, yet they helpe the action; and without them the naturall action would ei­ther be weake or altogether hindered.

The FinallFinall. cause is that for the which a thing is done. So the end of Physick is to heale the sick, and the end of Studie is to get learning.

We must warily distinguish the scope from the end. As, the scope of walking is health, but the end is the last step; the one is the end of the intention; the other the end of progression.

The finall cause may also be the formall and efficient cause, but [...]n di­vers respects. As, the forme of the house is the end of the builder: and the forme of a horse engendred is the efficient cause of the operations of the same horse, and also the finall cause of the horse engendring. And that which is the final cause, i [...] commonly an effect. As to see is the finall cause, and also the effect of sight.

Of causes the finall is the best, and most excellent: because all the other tend vnto it, and serue it.

The finall cause as it is the last in execution, so it is the first in the in­tention.

Efficient and finall causes bring [Page 62] forth their effects,Causes of themselues, or by acci­dent. either of them­selues and of their owne nature; or by accident. Thus the Sunne giueth light of it selfe, and of his owne na­ture; but by accident it blindeth Owles. And the neighing of Darius his horse was the accidentall cause of his raise to the kingdome. And thirst may be an accidentall cause to saue a man out of the battaile; if being thirstie and gone out of the armie to drinke, it so happened that whilest he was a drin­king, the armie was suddenly discom­fited. So a Musician that buildeth a house, is not the cause of the building as he is a Musician, but as he is an ar­chitect or builder. It is the same of the finall cause. For example, healing is the proper end of Physick, but the gaine of the Physician is an acciden­tall end: the one is the end of the Art, and the other of the person.

Causes next or remote.Againe, there be some next, and some remote causes. For example, the next end of the art of a souldier is warre, and the remote is victory, and the end more remote is a happie peace. [Page 63] So the next efficient cause of death is sicknes, of sicknes excesse, and of excesse bad company.

The same may be said of formes and matters. The next matter of a Ta­ble is the wood, but the remote matter are the foure Elements. The next forme of any thing is that which wee call Specificall; but the remote formes are those of the next or of the remote Ge­nus. So the next forme of a man is to be reasonable, but to haue sense is the forme of a liuing creature, which is the Genus of man, and by conse­quent also is the forme of man, but remote.

Moreover, there be causes,Causes suf­ficient, or not suffi­cient. which are Sufficient of themselues to pro­duce an effect. As, the Sunne is of it selfe sufficient to giue light, and fire to burne, and the favour of God to make a man happie. But there are some cau­ses, which are not of themselues Suf­ficient, & must haue many together. As, to make a fertile soile, the ground must be lustie, it must be well tilled, raine must moisten it, and the Sunne [Page 64] must heat it in due season, and mode­rately. To attaine vnto learning, a man must haue a good wit, good instruc­tions, and be diligent and painefull. So divers things are the causes of vic­tory, experience in the Generall, va­lour in the Souldiers, military Disci­pline, necessary weapons, &c. but a­boue all the will of God.

Now to argue from the causes and effects, these MaximesMaximes. are of vse.

1. That which agreeth with the matter, agreeth also probably with the thing composed of that matter. As, the earth is heavie, and therefore terrestriall bo­dies are heavie. This Maxime is some­times faultie. For example, Ice is hard, yet notwithstanding the matter of it is soft and liquid, namely, water.

2. Where the matter is wanting, there also the thing composed is wanting. As, where there is no iron, a sword cannot be made.

3. The next efficient and necessary cause being granted, or denied, the effect also must be granted, or denied. As, if the Sunne shine, it is day, if it shines nor, [Page 65] it is not day. And this effect being granted, the efficient cause is also granted.

4. When divers causes are necessarily requisit to produce an effect, one of the same causes being wanting, the effect al­so is wanting.

5. Such as is the efficient cause, such commonly are the effects. As of wicked Fathers, come wicked Sonnes: and strong things beget strong things; and Moores haue blacke sonnes. This Maxime is often false, especial­ly in remote and vniversall causes. As the Sunne groweth not, and yet it causeth plants to grow, it hath no sent, and yet causeth flowres to smell sweet, and carions to stinke. And God mooveth all, but yet is immoo­vable. Also in causes which act by accident. As a Whetsto [...]e is not sharpe, yet causeth sharpenesse: the Sunne is not hot, yet warmeth by ac­cident, in clearing and purifying the ayre by the reflection of his beames.

6. If the selfe same qualitie be attri­buted vnto the agent and vnto the pati­ent, [Page 66] it must much more be attributed vn­to the agent. As, the hand is warme by reason of the fire which acteth vpon it, therefore the fire is hotter then the hand. And the Sunne causeth the water to shine, therefore it is brighter then the water.

This Maxime is false in the fourth species of qualitie, namely, in the forme and figure; because this qua­litie receiues neither more nor lesse. As, if the Seale be round, it followeth not that the figure printed in the waxe be lesse round, then the Seale.

7. The end being granted, those meanes also without which the end cannot be at­tained vnto, are likewise granted. As, if you grant that a man liveth, you grant also that he eats, drinkes, and breaths. And happinesse being gran­ted, vertue, and the favour of God are likewise granted.

8. The meanes to attaine vnto the end being granted, it followeth not that the end must therefore alwayes be gran­ted. For it is no good reason to say, Philip hath bookes, therefore he is [Page 67] learned: he hath horses and weapons, therefore he shall obtaine the victory. So also, the end being taken away, the meanes are not alwayes therefore taken away. For many, though they haue the meanes in their hands, never at­taine vnto the end.

9. Causes by chance or hazard are not fit to argue withall.

10. If necessary effects be taken away, the causes also are taken away. I say, ne­cessarie; For there are some causes which act not necessarily, and which do not alwayes produce their effects. As, sicknesse brings not alwayes death.

11. Causes are more excellent then their effects, vnlesse the effect be a finall cause. And therefore, to see, and heare, are things more excellent, then the faculties of seeing, and hearing; be­cause those faculties are ordained onely for these effects, namely, to see, and to heare.

12. The causes ever goe before their effects in the order of nature, but not al­wayes in time. Thus the Sun-beames [Page 68] are as ancient as the Sunne; and the flame is never without clearenesse or brightnesse.

• Causes are
  • Internall
    • Matter of
      • Generation.
      • Composition.
    • Forme
      • Naturall.
      • Artificiall.
  • Exter­nall
    • Effi­cient
      • Properly.
      • Impro­perly, as the cause
        • Meritorious.
        • Instru­mētall
          • natu­rall.
          • artifi­ciall.
    • Finall.
• All causes are either
  • 1.
    • Next. or
    • Remote.
  • 2.
    • By themselues. or
    • By accident.
  • 3.
    • Sufficient. or
    • Insufficient.

The twelfth Chapter. Of Etymologie.

ETymologie is the derivation of a word.

Etymologie in regard of the word, is as a Definition in regard of the thing; and serveth to argue and dis­course. As when we say, Such a one is not a Counsellour, because he giues no Counsell. And Philip cannot be called a Philosopher, because he loues not wise­dome.

Thus by the Etymologie of these names Iesus and Christ, wee gather what our Saviours calling and office is. And wee encourage such as haue a name importing some vertue, in stirring them vp to vertue by the E­tymologie of their names. So Euse­bius and Pius may be exhorted to Pie­tie, and Andrew to valour, and Celesti­nus to giue himselfe to heavenly things, least they belie their names by a con­trary conversation. And so one ga­thereth [Page 70] probably, that all things in times past were common, the Robe excep [...]ed, because when a theft is committed, we vse to say, Such a one hath beene robbed: and that the first Warres were against Beasts, because the Latin word Bellum, cōmeth from Bellua. But these kinde of proofes are very weake, because names are given vnto men, before it can be knowne whether they will be vertu­ous or no; nay, sometimes names are given by contraries, and by way of derision. As, when a dwarfe is called a Goliah.

Good Etymologies in the English tongue, are for the most part taken from the Latin; but such as are drawne from the English tongue are commonly absurd and ridiculous. For example, if a man should say, that the woman is the woe of the man; and beere, quasi, be heere.

The thirteenth Chapter. Of things alike or vnlike.

THose things are called Alike which haue between them some Analogie and correspondencie or proportion.

The analogie is knowne by the end and vse. As the Shepheard in re­gard of his flocke, and the Pastor in re­gard of his Church, are things Alike.

There be certain things differing, which the vulgar take for the same things, and none but Philosophers doe distinguish them. As, loue and friendship; continencie and tempe­rance; the flatterer and the man-plea­ser; memory and remembrance; chance and fortune; hate and envie; whose differences are learned by the Ethicks and Physicks.

Similitudes are rather ornaments of a speech, then any proofes. As, when we say, Even as cracks in a ves­sell are knowne when the vessell is [Page 72] filled with liquor: So the secret vices of the heart are discovered by plentie and prosperitie. And, that Hypo­crites are like vnto Bees which haue hony in the mouth, and a sting in the tayle. And that covetous persons are like vnto Christmas-boxes, out of the which money cannot be gotten [...]efore they be broken. And false frie [...]ds are l [...]ke vnto Swallowe [...], that d [...]part from vs in hard weather.

Metaphors well drawne are simi­litudes reduced to one word. As when we say, to feed the flocke, that is, to teach: and to staine ones reputa­tion, that is to say, to backbite.

Similitudes haue two parts, the proposition and the reddition. The proposition, namely this, even as swal­lowes, &c. The reddition as this; So false friends, &c.

Examples are taken from things done, and from humane actions: but Similitudes are oftentimes drawne from things fained, and from that which is observed in nature.

Now to argue from the like, wee [Page 73] vse this probable Maxime.Maxime. To things alike agree things alike.

The foureteenth Chapter. Of things Opposit.

OPposites are such as cannot stand together in the same sub­ject, at the same time, and in the same regard. As a man cannot be at the selfe same time both white and blacke in the same part of his bodie, and not compared to other things: though he may be blacke and white, in divers parts of his bodie, either at divers times, or comparatiuely, white in re­spect of a Moore, and blacke in re­spect of a Swan.

There are foure sorts of Opposits. 1. Relatiues. 2. Contraries. 3. Priva­tiues. 4. Contradictories.

1. Of RelatiuesRelatiues. wee haue alreadie spoken. lib. 1. cap. 7.

2. ContrariesContraries. are two qualities or two actions which being vnder the selfe same Genus, are most remote one from the other, and are incom­patible. As blacke and white haue the [Page 76] same Genus, namely, colour: Ʋertue and vice are specieses of habits, which being vnder the same Genus are of a contrarie nature.

Contraries are either Mediate or Immediate. Thus, there is a middle between black and white, namely, pale and browne: and between hot and cold there is lukewarme. But between the number even and odd, between the straight and crooked line, there is no third. The middle or meane doth v­sually participate of the two contrary extreames: the meane between good and bad actions excepted. For the meane is that which is called an In­different action, participating neither of good nor evill.

Between two contrary vices, ver­tue is the meane. As between cove­tousnesse and prodigalitie, there is libe­ralitie, and good husbandrie: between rashnesse and cowardnesse, there is va­lour.

This mediocritie or meane partici­pating of two extreames, is not in the vertue it selfe; for that hath no parti­cipation [Page 77] with vice; but it is in those actions and things about which ver­tue is occupied. As, to avoid danger, and to lay out money. For these actions partly imitate the covetous man, and partly the liberall. And it fals out of­tentimes that to each of the extreames there is a contrary vertue: as to pro­digalitie, good husbandry; to cove­tousnesse, liberalitie: so cowardnesse and rashnesse are two extreames; and to co­wardnesse, valour is contrary; and to rashnesse, discretion.

If two contraries happen to be vnder two next differing Genuses, (as, iustice vnder vertue, and iniustice vnder vice) these two Genuses must needs be contraries one to another, and Species of the same Genus. By this meanes all contraries, if they be not vnder the same next Genus, they are vnder the same remote Genus.

Words are sometimes wanting to expresse one of the contraries. Thus we haue no word to expresse the ha­bit contrarie to an ague, nor to a rheume, nor to the Physicks, nor to Grammar.

[Page 78]3. PrivatiuePrivatiues. opposits are a qualitie, and the absence and privation of that qualitie. As, light and darkenes; sight and blindnesse.

There can be no privation, when the subiect is not capable of the con­trary qualitie. Thus in a stone there is no blindnesse, because it is not capa­ble of sight. And a childe in the wombe cannot be said to be blind, nor a whelp before it be nine daies old, because they are not come to that time wher­in they should see.

The privation of Actions may be remedied and recovered. As the pri­vation of the act of seeing is recovered, when he that sleepeth openeth his eyes to see. But the privation of the Facultie of seeing is irrecoverable.

Knowledge and ignorance simple and childish or brutish, are opposits pri­vatiuely. But wilfull ignorance that armes it selfe with reasons against the truth, is opposed vnto knowledge as a contrary, and not as a privation.

4. ContradictoriesContra­dictories. are such be­tweene which there is no meane or [Page 79] middle. As, to be, and not to be; man and no man; horse and no horse. For there is nothing that is not either man or not man; horse or not horse.

Now when we will argue and proue any thing, Opposits are of great vse. The MaximesMaximes. are these.

1. Whosoever grants one of the rela­tiues, doth necessarily grant the other. As he that calleth such a one a father, affirmeth that he hath a childe.

2. One and the same thing may be two relatiues; As, to be a father and sonne, master and servant, right and left: but in divers respects.

3. Contrary things haue a contrary consequence. As, vice makes a man wretched, therefore vertue maketh him happie. Here are excepted such things as doe belong to the Genus of the two contraries. For if blacknesse be visible, it followeth not that white­nesse be invisible; because to be visi­ble, belongeth to the Genus of whitenesse and blackenesse, namely, to colour. We must also except such causes as doe act by accident. As, if a [Page 80] white man buildeth his owne house; it followeth not, that a black man must pull downe his; and if heat doth har­den the ground, it followeth not that frost must soften it.

4. The selfe same cause may bring forth certaine effects, when the action of the cause dependeth from the disposition of the matter against which it acteth. So the Sunne giues a sweet smell to flowers, but it makes a carrion stinke: and fire hardens the earth, and softens waxe.

5. Every subiect that is capable to re­ceiue the one of the contraries, is also ca­pable to receiue the other. Thus, what­soever may be heated, may be coo­led; and whatsoever may be hard­ned, may be softned.

6. One of the contraries being granted, the other is overthrowne. Thus, he that is not free is a bondman. But it follow­eth not that if one of the contraries be de­nied, the other must be granted; except they be such contraries, as haue no meane between them. As, if the bodie be not white, it followeth not that it is black. [Page 81] But in contraries that are without meane, this consequent i [...] good. As, if this line be not straight, it is crooked.

7. Of two good things whereof the one is lesser and the other greater, the con­trary to the greatest good is the greater evill. As, vertue and health be two good things; if vertue therefore be a greater good then health, vice must be a greater evill then sicknesse.

Except when one of the two good things is comprised in the other. As, to haue the skill of reading, and the skill of Philosophie. For though the skill of Philosophy [...]e a greater good, then the skill of reading, yet it fol­loweth not, that not to be skilfull in Philosophie is a greater evill, then not to be skilfull in reading, because the skill of reading is comprehended vnder the skill of Philosophie.

8. Contradictories cannot stand toge­ther, and one of them must of necessity be. As, there is nothing that is not either man or not man; and it is impossible to be both the one and the other, at the same time.

The fifteenth Chapter. Comparison of things.

THings are oft compared accor­ding to their goodnesse and ex­cellency, and then the comparison is made by these Rules or Maximes.Maximes.

1. Whatsoever is desired in regard of it selfe, is better then that which is desi­red onely in regard of some other thing. As, life is better then money, and sight is more to be desired then spectacles, and health then Physick.

2. That which is good to all, is better then that which is onely good to some, and which is vsed but seldome, and for certaine respects. Thus light is better then darknesse, and to haue two armes is better then to be maimed. For dark­nesse is of vse onely for theeues, and debauched persons; and to haue but one arme is of vse onely to beggars, who thereby set forth their misery.

3. That which is good of it owne na­ture, is better then that which is good [Page 83] onely by accident, or which is of vse onely to avoyd a greater evill. Thus, health is better then Physick; and to haue our wares in our ship, is better then to cast them into the Sea; and prudence is bet­ter then chance.

4. One good which when we haue, wee need not the other, is better then that, which when we haue, we haue yet need of the other. Thus to be loved of God, is better then to be loved of men; and to haue the perfect knowledge of an Art, is better then to haue it written in a booke.

5. Of finall causes, the last is ever the best. Thus happinesse is better then vertue, and the skill of managing a horse, is better then the skill to make a spurre.

6. Permanent goods are better then the transitory. As, vertue is better then money.

But in generall without any respect to the goodnesse or excellency of things, they may be compared by these Maximes following.

1.Other Ma­ximes. That which is such of it owne na­ture, [Page 84] is more such then that which is onely such by participation. Thus the Sunne is cleerer then a looking glasse, when the Sunne shineth on it.

2. That which is such of it selfe, is more such then that which is such onely by ac­cident. As, exercise and good nourish­ment is more healthfull, then the cut­ting off of an arme: and the death of the Sonne of God hath beene more beneficiall to salvation, then the trea­son of Iudas, howsoever God vsed it as a meanes for our good.

3. That which is most remote from his contrary, is more such then that which is lesse remote. And therefore the cold in Norway is greater then that in Italy, because it is more re­mote from the South, from whence the heat commeth.

4. That which acteth more forcibly, is commonly more such, then that which acteth more weakely. As, that which hurteth more is worse then that, which hurteth lesse, and that which pricketh more is sharper pointed, then that which pricketh lesse. This [Page 85] rule hath exceptions. Aire and water are equally moist, nay, Aristotle holds the aire to be moister; yet water moi­stens more then aire. So the flame is hot, or rather hotter then the hot i­ron, and yet a hot iron burneth more then the flame doth.

The sixteenth Chapter. Comparison of Probabilitie or Likelihood.

THings are compared in proba­bilitie, when we question whe­ther of the two is the more credible. And this is done, when to proue some one thing, wee bring in another e­qually, or more, or lesse probable, then that which is in question.

This comparison may bee made three manner of wayes.1. Probable alike. For

First when we will proue a thing in question, we may bring in another thing as probable as it. For example, if a Prince hath granted something to one Citizen, another Citizen may [Page 86] pretend, that the like grant ought to be made vnto him also; because he is a Citizen as well as the other, and no­thing inferiour to him. So a fault which is pardoned to some one in re­gard of his youth, must be pardoned to another as young as he. This rea­son is grounded vpon this Maxime.Maxime.

Of two things equally probable, or e­qually iust, the one being granted, makes the other to be easi [...]y beleeved.

2. More pro­bable.Secondly, to proue a thing in que­stion, wee may bring another thing more probable then it, arguing thus. If that which is more probable is not, much lesse shall that be, which is lesse probable. For example, if a Father will not haue his children goe richly apparelled, much lesse will he suffer it in his servants. And if the Apostles were not without sinne, how much lesse are wee; This is called arguing from a more probable to a lesse, and grounded vpon this Maxime.Maxime.

If that which is more possible, and more probable be not; much lesse shall that be which is lesse probable and possible.

The conclusion of such arguments must alwayes be negatiue.

Lastly,3. Lesse pro­bable. we may proue a thing in que­stion, by bringing in another thing that is lesse probable, saying thus: If a thing lesse probable, and harder to be beleeved, is notwithstanding, or hath beene; much more ought we to be­leeue, that which is more probable and easier to be done. So if one at twelue yeares of age can carry a waight of a hundred pound; by a stronger reason one may carry the same weight at the age of twentie yeares. And if Alexander tooke Tyre, much more easily might he haue ta­ken Ierusalem, which was weaker then Tyre, if he had besieged it. This is cal­led arguing from the lesse probable to the greater, grounded vpon this Maxime.Maxime.

If that which is lesse probable and lesse possible may be, much more shall that be, which is more probable and more possi­ble. The conclusion of such argu­ments must alwaies be affirmatiue.

Wee must warily distinguish be­tween [Page 88] the greatnesse of the thing, and the greatnesse of the probabilitie. For greatest things are oft lesse probable, and more difficult. For it were no good argument to say thus. If birds can flie, how much more bulls. And if a threed can goe through the eie of a needle, how much more a cable. And if Michael Angell could paint very excellently, how much more the Emperour Charles the fift.

The seventeenth Chapter. Of Testimony.

TEstimonies are often vsed to ar­gue and proue a thing.

Testimonies are of force and doe perswade, when they be such as may not be denied, by reason of the qua­litie, authoritie, sufficiencie, or multi­tude of persons.

Testimonies are either divine or humane.

Divine testimonies are Oracles, and all that is called the Word of GOD: [Page 89] likewise dreames, visions, miracles, be they true or false, if they be delive­red as true. Also rules to liue well, derived from nature.

Humane testimonies, if the questi­on be about matter of right, are hu­mane lawes, customes, the testimonies of Ancestours, or such as are skilfull in their owne art, the consent of na­tions. But if the question be of fact, then are to be produced schedules, acquittances, confessions, eye or eare witnesses.

Such witnesses, Maxime. as doe not affirme or denie a thing to be or not to be, are of no force. For there is a great difference between these two sayings; God saith not that such a thing is, and God saith that such a thing is not. The latter is a good proofe, but the former hath no consequence or sequel. And likewise this proofe is of no effect: Aristotle hath not said so, therefore it is not so. Or, the Word of God saith not that man is a reasonable creature, and therefore man is not a reasonable creature.

Notwithstanding, if it be a thing [Page 90] which cannot be knowne, but by the testi­monie of one alone, then this kinde of ar­guing is good and firme. Such a one said not [...]o, and therefore you cannot maintaine that it is so. For example, if we had no knowledge of China but by the report of one man onely; who­soever would affirme any thing with­out the warrant of such a one, with­out question would be prooved a ly­ar; or i [...] he spake the truth it were but by chance, and not knowing himselfe whether he spake true or no. So like­wise seeing that nothing that is ne­cessary to salvation can be knowne without warrant from the Word of God; whosoever in things necessarie to salvation, affirmeth any thing not contained in the said word of GOD, ought not to be beleeved, & affirmes that which he knowes not.

The eighteenth Chapter. Of the vse or Practice of the precedent Doctrine.

THis Doctrine contained in the sixteene precedent Chapters is called the doctrine of Places; because it shewes the places whence matter is drawne for argument and furniture for proofes. For example, if wee vn­dertake to proue, that, Death is not to be feared of a vertuous man, wee must runne over these sixteene places, and take notice of such as will best fur­nish vs with matter. To make this plaine we will runne over the said places, and apply them to this exam­ple.

The first Chapter. What an Enuntiation is, and the parts thereof.

THE places or helpes of invention contained in the sixteene precedent Chapters, afford vnto vs abundan [...] [...] [...]ter for proofes and arguments. I [...] n [...]w re­maineth that we giue a forme vnto these proofes or arguments, and shew how to frame an argument, so as it may be of force to proue.

An argument or reasoning is by the Philosophers called a Syllogisme; [Page 106] which is a Grecke word signifying the making vp of an account, or the collecting of a summe. For that which is the making vp of an account, or the totall summe of Additiō or Mul­tiplication in Arithmetick, the same is the conclusion in a Syllogisme, namely, that which resulteth and fol­loweth from the proofe.

Every Syllogisme is composed of two Propositions or Enuntiations, and of a Conclusion.

Enuntiation is a speech, wherein something is affirmed or denied.

Every Enuntiation consists of two words at the least, which the Logici­ans call Termes: as, who would say, the two ends, or the two peeces. For example.

These Enuntiations are compoun­ded of two parts, the one is called the Subject; the other, the Attribute. Fire is the Subject; and burneth is the Attribute; For burning is attributed to fire. God is the Subject; and this word good is the Attribute.

This Verb, Is, is not reckoned as a part of the Enuntiation, but is onely the linke and bond of these two parts.

Wheresoever there is an affirmation or negation, there is an Enuntiation, though it seemeth to be but one word. As when we say in Latin, Cur­ro, we vnderstand, ego curro, I runne. And in English, It raineth, is an vsu­all and common word, which is as much as this Enuntiation, the raine falleth. So when we say, It freezeth, It snoweth, &c.

And when wee aske any body, Sleepe you? He that answereth No, maketh a kinde of secret Enuntiati­on; for it is as much as if he should say, I sleepe not.

When we argue, the Enuntiations must be full and perfect, so as there may be no need of any supplying.

All truth and falshood is expressed by the Indicatiue mood; and there­fore every Enuntiation must be cou­ched in the Indicatiue; because wee affirme or deny a thing onely by that [Page 108] mood. And therefore Imperatiues, Optatiues and Subiunctiues enter not into an E [...]untiation, nor doe any [...]ervice to the Art of Logick, who [...]e end and scope is to search out and discerne the truth. Now t [...]uth is one­ly expressed [...]y the In [...]icatiue. The other moods are left to Rhetorick, and serue onely for ornament.

Sometimes one of the [...] termes or parts of the Enuntiation is expressed by many words; as,

The Verb Substantiue is th [...] [...]ch causeth the Subject to be [...]ed from the A [...]tribute; for [...] between both.

An Enuntiation and a Propositi­on are the same thing; yet out of a Syll [...]gisme we [...] call it Enuntiation, but in a Syllogisme wee call it Pro­position.

The second Chapter. Of the kinds of Enuntiation.

ENuntiations are either Simple or Compounded.

The Simple Enuntiatiō, which also is called Categoricall, when a thing is affirmed or denied simply & with­out condition, and without adding a Whether, or an If; as,

Of these Enuntiations some are V­niversall, and some particular.

Vniversall Enuntiations are such as haue these words, All, or None, joy­ned with them. As,

Particular Enuntiations are such as doe not affirme or denie generally of all, but onely of some in particular. As,

Vnder particular Enuntiations, the Singulars are also comprehended: As,

Enuntiations which haue no note whereby they may be discerned to be vniversals or particulars, are called Indefinites, and in strict dealing must be taken for particulars. Not­withstanding, when the matter is Ne­cessarie, they are of as much force as vniversals. As when I say, Man is reasonable, it is as much as if I should say, All men are reasonable.

But if the matter be contingent and and mutable: as, ‘Man is white,’ they are but as particulars, and is no more then if I should say, ‘Some man is white.’

Againe, Enuntiations are either Af­firmatiue or Negatiue: Affirmatiue; as, God is good. Negatiue; as, God is no lyar.

Thus we see there are foure kinde of Enuntiations. For they are either V­niversall Affirmatiues. As, All men are white. Or Vniversall Negatiues, as, No man is white. Or Particular Affir­matiues, as, Some man is white. Or Par­ticular Negatiues, as, Some man is not white.

The vniversalitie or particularitie of an Enuntiation is called the quan­titie thereof. But to be Affirmatiue or Negatiue maketh the qualitie.

Simple Enuntiations are sometimes modified by certaine circumferences of Necessitie, or Contingency, or Pos­sibilitie, or Impossibilitie; as,

An Enuntiation thus modified or qualified by such circumstances is Negatiue, when the negation is joy­ned to the modification or circum­stance. [Page 112] As when we say, ‘It is not necessarie that Caesar over­come.’ But this Enuntiation, ‘It is necessarie that Pompey overcome not, is affirmatiue.’

Compounded Enuntiations are ei­ther Conditionall or Disjunctiue.

Conditionall Enuntiations are such as neither affirme nor deny simply, but with an If; as,

These Enuntiations are compoun­ded of two parts; the former is cal­led the Antecedent: and the latter the Consequent. And both these may be affirmatiue; as, ‘If it be day, the Sunne is vp.’

Sometimes the one is affirmatiue, and the other negatiue; as, ‘If the Sunne be not vp, it is night. or, If the Sunne be vp, it is not night.’

And sometimes both negatiues; as, ‘If it be not a liuing creature, it is no man.’

Disjoyned or Disjunctiue Enuntia­tions are such as are compounded of opposed parts, whereof the one over­throwes the other; as, either,

These Enuntiations are not true, except both parts be immediately contraries or opposits. For if I should say, ‘This cloake is blacke, or white,’ I might speake against the truth; for the cloake may be gray or tawnie, &c.

The third Chapter. Of the Opposition of Enuntiations.

OF Enuntiations some are neces­sary, and some probable or con­tingent. According to this difference Enuntiations are more or lesse oppo­sit one to another. Necessarie Enun­tiations are either when the Genus is attributed to the Species; as, Man is a liuing creature. Or the difference; [Page 114] as, Man is reasonable. Or the proper­tie; as, All fire is hot. The Contin­gents are when some accident is at­tributed to the Subject; as, The horse is white. Man is a Physician.

The Opposition of Enuntiations is done three manner of wayes. Either as Contraries, or Subcontraries, or Contradictories. In all which Op­positions one of the two opposed Enuntiations must ever be affirma­tiue, and the other Negatiue, and the same termes must still be kept.

Contrary Enuntiations are an vni­versall affirmatiue, and an vniversall negatiue; as,

Which are both false, because the matter is Contingent. But if the mat­ter be Necessary, then the one is true, and the other false; as,

Subcontrarie Enuntiations are two particulars contained vnder two vni­versals, whereof the one affirmeth, [Page 115] and the other denieth; as,

In a necessary matter the one is true, and the other false. But in a contin­gent matter they may both be true.

Contradictory Enuntiations are an vniversall affirmatiue, and a particu­lar negatiue. Or els an vniversall ne­gatiue, and a particular affirmatiue; as,

Or els.

Of these two Enuntiations it is ne­cessary that the one be true, and the other false, in what matter soever it be.

Contraries agree in quantitie, but are opposit in qualitie; as also Sub-contraries: but Contradictories are both.

Two singular Enuntiations cannot be opposed one to another, but Con­tradictorily; as, ‘Peter is white. Peter is not white.’

And therefore of necessitie the one must be true, and the other false.

The fourth Chapter. Of the Conversion of Enuntiations.

TO Convert an Enuntiation, is to change it so as that the subject is turned into the attribute, and the at­tribute into the subject, keeping still the truth. As, No man is a horse. Then if you will convert this Enuntiation, you must say, No horse is a man.

This Conversion is done either Simply, or by Accident.

The Simple Conversion is, when the Enuntiation is changed without altering the quantitie. Thus are vni­versall negatiues converted; as in the example before mentioned.

And so are particular affirmatiues. [Page 118] As, Some man is learned, and, Some learned is a man.

But vniversall affirmatiues cannot be converted Simply. For in turning them so, their truth would be lost. Thus it is true, that, Every man is a li­ving creature: but it is not true, that, Every liuing creature is a man.

Therefore when wee goe about to convert such Propositions, wee take away their vniversall quantitie, and in stead of saying Every man is a living creature, we turne it into a particular Enuntiation, & say, Some living crea­ture is a man. Except when the subject is the species, & the attribute the pro­perty or differēce. For in this case the proposition may bee converted sim­ply. For example, All living creatures haue sense; and, All, that hath sense is a living creature. All bodies haue three dimensions: All that hath three dimen­sions is a bodie.

Particular negatiues are not conver­ted: for example, this Enuntiation, Some man is not a Philosopher, is true. But if you would turne it, it would [Page 119] proue false: Some Philosopher is not a man.

Vniversall affirmatiues may be con­verted into vniversall negatiues, com­posed of two negations. As,

A singular affirmatiue may be con­verted into a particular affirma­tiue. As, This horse is lame: Some lame thing is a horse.

The first Chapter. What a Syllogisme is. Also, what a Conclusion is, and a Question, or Probleme, and the parts thereof.

A Syllogisme is a reason or argument in the which from two Enun­tiatiōs or propositions coupled together by certaine lawes, wee draw and deduce a necessary Conclusion. For example, if wee joyne these two Propositions together,

This conclusion will follow, ‘Therefore all plants haue a soule.’

As Propositions are called Enuntia­tions before they belong to a Syllo­gisme; So the Conclusion before it be proved by a Syllogisme, is not called a Conclusion, but a Question or Proble [...]e.

Now every question or conclusion hath two parts, namely, the Subject, and the A [...]tribute. As in the example aboue mentioned Plant is the Sub­ject, and, to haue a soule, is the Attri­bute. The Philosophers call them the two Termes, whereof the subject is called the lesser Terme, and the at­tribute the greater Terme: because the attribute commonly is more ge­nerall then the subject. And that which in the Mathematicks is said, to containe, in Logick is said, to be at­tributed.

The second Chapter. How to make a Syllogisme, and of the parts of it.

A Syllogisme is thus made. A que­stion or probleme is propoun­ded: For example, let the question be, Whether Philip be a living creature or no? Now he that will proue by a Syl­logisme that Philip is a living crea­ture, must dismember the said questi­on into two parts; the one whereof is the subject, namely, Philip; and the other the attribute, namely, living creature. Then hee must looke out some third thing, which may be joy­ned and fitted to each of these two parts. For example, the word Man; which he must first joyne with living creature, and say, Every man is a l [...]ving creature; and then he must joyne it with Philip, and say, Philip is a man; thence will follow this Conclusion, Therefore Philip is a living creature.

This word man is called the Meane or Link: because by the meanes thereof as by a Link, the two parts of the conclusion are coupled toge­ther. It is of this as of two Rings which are linked together by the meanes of a third, which is placed be­tween both, as,

If the Ring A be joyned with the Ring B and the Ring B with the Ring C, it followeth that the Ring A is joyned with the Ring C.

This may also be illustrated by an example drawne from Numbers, rea­soning thus. Twelue containeth six, and six containeth three, therefore twelue containeth three. For we said before, that that which is said to con­taine in Mathematicks, the same is said to be attributed in Logick.

Therefore every Syllogisme is com­pounded of three parts or Termes, namely, the Subject of the conclusi­on, the Attribute of the conclusion, [Page 125] and the Meane or middle Terme, which knitteth these two parts of the conclusion together.

It is no hard matter so soone as a Syl­logisme is propounded, presently to perceiue which is the Middle terme. For it is all that which is not in the conclusion.

The Meane or middle terme joyned with the attribute of the conclusion, maketh that proposition which is called the Major or Greater: because the attribute of the conclusion which is called the greater terme is there. The same Meane being joyned with the subject, maketh the other propo­sition, which is called the Minor or Lesser; so called because the subject of the conclusion which is called the lesser terme is there. This Minor pro­position is also called the Assumpti­on. Now for more ease in this point, we will call the first proposition sim­ply the proposition, and the second the assumption.

The third Chapter. The naturall reason vpon which a Syllogisme is grounded.

THis structure of a Syllogisme is grounded vpon two naturall Maximes, acknowledged to be true by those of the Meanest capacitie. Whereof the first is. Whatsoever con­taineth any thing, containeth also that which is contained in that thing.

Which Maxime conceived in Lo­gicall termes, is thus to be expressed. Whatsoever is generally attributed to any thing, must also be attributed to such things, as the said thing is attributed vnto. As, seeing that to be a living crea­ture is attributed to all men, it must also be attributed to Philip, because Philip is a man. This first Maxime is the foundatiō of all Syllogismes that conclude affirmatiuely.

The second Maxime is, That which agreeth not to a thing and cannot be at­tributed vnto it, agreeth not likewise to [Page 127] those things which are contained vnder that said thing. As, to be Almightie be­longeth not to any creature; therefore it belongeth not to Angels, because they are creatures. This Maxime is the ground of all Negatiue Syllo­gismes, that is to say, such as con­clude negatiuely.

The fourth Chapter. Of the Figures of a Syllogisme.

BEcause the Meane is diversly joy­ned with the two termes of the conclusion: hence it comes to passe that according to the divers placing of the said Meane, sundry Figures and Formes of Syllogismes doe arise. Now these Figures are three.

The first figure is that wherein the meane is the subject in the propositi­on, and the attribute in the assumpti­on. As, in the examples before na­med; and also in this,

The second figure is when the Meane is the attribute both in the proposition and in the assumption. As,

The third figure is when the Meane is the subject as well in the propositi­on, as in the assumption. As,

The fifth Chapter. Generall Rules, common to all Figures.

ALL Syllogismes that are faultie in any of the Rules following conclude nothing.

The sixth Chapter. Speciall Rules for every Figure, and first for the first.

IN the first figure the proposition must be vniversall, and the assumption affir­matiue: or els the Syllogisme is naught. For example,

This conclusion is false, and follow­eth not from the propositiōs: because the first proposition is particular. And if I argue thus,

This conclusion is false, and follow­eth not from the propositions; be­cause the assumption is negatiue. This rule is grounded vpon the se­cond Maxime set downe in the third Chapter which saith, that in Syllo­gismes concluding negatiuely, one of the propositions must be affirmatiue. Except when the negation doe make a part of the Meane. As if I say,

The evidence of this will appeare, if you frame the assumption thus, ‘This line is a line which is not right.’

For then the assumption is turned into an affirmatiue.

The preeminences & prerogatiues [Page 136] of the first figure are great aboue the two others. For the second figure cannot conclude affirmatiuely, and the third figure cannot conclude vni­versally, but in the first figure we may conclude all manner of wayes, and proue all manner of questions: whe­ther vniversall affirmatiues, or vniver­sall negatiues, or particular affirma­tiues, or particular negatiues.

Vniversall affirmatiues. As we may proue that all covetous persons are theeues, because they withhold other mens goods.

Againe vniversall negatiues. As we may proue that no covetous per­son is free, because he is a slaue to his money.

Wee may also proue in the first fi­gure a particular affirmatiue conclu­sion. As we may proue that some fishes haue lungs, because they breath.

Lastly, we may proue in the first fi­gure a question that is particular ne­gatiue. As, that Iudas and Saul are not saved, because they were impeni­tent.

Moreover, the excellencie of the first figure appeares in this, that the others are reduced vnto it. For by changing something in them, they are reduced to the first figure; as wee shall see hereafter.

Rules for the second Figure.

In the second Figure the Meane is the attribute in both the propositi­ons.

The first proposition in this figure must be vniversall, or els nothing can be concluded. As,

The conclusion is false, and follow­eth not; because the proposition is particular.

Againe, in the second Figure one of the propositions must be negatiue, and consequently the conclusion. For this reason were not good to say,

The naturall reason hereof is appa­rant. For it followeth not, that if one thing be attributed to two other things, that these two things should be the same thing. As, if to be yellow belongs both to hony and to gall, it fol­loweth not therefore that hony is gall: but it followeth well in the negatiue. As,

The naturall reason heereof is, be­cause if one thing belongeth to one of the two termes of the question, and not to the other, it followeth that the two termes agree not together.

How to re­duce t [...]e Syllogismes of this se­cond figure [...]o the first.In this figure when the proposition is negatiue, it is easie to convert and reduce the Syllogisme vnto the first figure. For then we must onely con­vert the proposition simply. As.

You may convert this proposition, [Page 139] saying thus, ‘Nothing that mooues vpward is a ter­restriall body.’

And so you shall haue it in the first figure.

But if the assumption be negatiue, you must put it in the place of the proposition, and then convert simply the conclusion, as also the assumpti­on, which is become the propositi­on. As in this Syllogisme,

You must change the assumption, and say, ‘No living creature is a statua.’

And set it in the place of the propo­sition, thus,

Whence the conclusion followeth well, ‘Therefore no man is a statua.’

Which is the same conclusion, but onely converted simply.

Rules for the third Figure.

In the third figure the Meane is the subject in both propositions.

The assumption must be affirmatiue, as in the first figure.

The conclusion is alwayes particular, and cannot be vniversall.

The naturall reason hereof is, be­cause if two things are attributed to the same thing, it followeth not that these two things agree alwaies toge­ther: but onely it followeth that they agree sometimes and in certaine sub­jects. As, if to be bright and round be­longs to the Sunne, it followeth not that whatsoever is round must bee bright. So to be reasonable and to haue two feet belongs to man; whence it followeth not, that whatsoever hath two feet must be reasonable: but one­ly that something which hath two feet is reasonable.

The Syllogismes of this figure are reduced to the first by converting the assumption. As,

If you convert the assumption,How to re­duce the Syllogismes of the third figure to the first. say­ing, ‘Something that hath foure feet is a horse,’

This Syllogisme will be in the first figure.

But if the proposition be particular, ac in this Syllogisme,

Now to reduce this Syllogisme to the first figure, you must convert the proposition, and say, ‘Some damned persons is an Apostle.’

And then put it in the place of the assumption in this manner,

Which is the very same conclusion, but simply converted.

The seventh Chapter. Certaine artificiall words which serue to shew how many wayes wee may argue in each figure, and how the second and third figure may be conver­ted into the first.

TO helpe the memory Logicians haue found out certaine artifici­all words, which serue to shew how many waies a man may argue in each figure. The words are these;

• 1. BARBARA, CELARENT, DARII, FERIO.
• 2. CESARE, CAMESTRES, FESTINO, BAROCO.
• 3. DARAPTI, FELAPTON, DISAMIS, DATISI, BOCARDO, FERISON.

To vnderstand the vse of these words, you must note that every one of these words hath but three Syllables: the first wherof signifies the proposition, [Page 143] the second the assumption, and the third the conclusion.

Againe, note that in all these words there are but foure Vowels, namely these,

The Syllogismes which are made 1 in the first figure are noted by these words, Barbara, Celarent, Darij, Ferio.

The word BARBARA, intimates, that whensoever the two propositi­ons in the first figure shall be A, that is, vniversall affirmatiue, the conclu­sion shall likewise be A, that is, an v­niversall affirmatiue.

So the word CELARENT sig­nifieth that whensoever the proposi­tion in the first figure shall be E, that is, an vniversall negatiue, and the as­sumption [Page 144] A, that is, an vniversall af­firmatiue; the conclusion shall be E, that is, an vniversall negatiue. So likewise of all the other words.

2 The Syllogismes of the second fi­gure are noted by these words, Ce­sare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco,

The word FESTINO intimates, that whensoever the proposition in the second figure shall be E, that is, an vniversall negatiue, & the assump­tion I, that is, a particular affirmatiue; the conclusiō shall be O, that is, a par­ticular negatiue. As,

Note that in these foure words, the last syllables are alwayes either E or O, to shew that the conclusion must alwayes be negatiue.

3 The Syllogismes of the third figure are noted by these words, Darapti, Fe­lapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo, Fe­rison, and haue the same vse.

For example, the word FELAP­TON signifieth that if the proposi­tion in the third figure be E, that is, an vniversall negatiue, and the as­sumption A, that is, an vniversall af­firmatiue; the conclusion must be O, that is, a particular negatiue. As,

Note that in all these six words, the last syllables haue either I or O, to shew that the conclusion in the third figure must alwayes be particular.

The Consonants of these same words are not without their speciall vse. For they serue to know how the Syllogismes of the second and third figure may be reduced to the first. To this end serveth the first capitall let­ter. For Cesare and Camestres are re­duced to Celarent: Darapti, Disamis, Datisi are reduced to Darij: Festino, Felapton, Ferison are reduced to Fe­rio.

Baroco and Bocardo cannot be re­duced, [Page 146] because one of the propositi­ons is a particular negatiue, which cannot enter into the first figure.

S signifieth that the proposition which is noted with an S, must be simply converted. As in Cesare and Datisi.

P signifieth that the proposition must be converted by Accident, that is to say, that the vniversall affirma­tiue must be converted into a parti­cular affirmatiue. As in Darapti and Felapton.

M signifieth that the propositions must be transposed, and must change their place. As in Camestres and Di­samis, whereof we haue given exam­ples.

The eight Chapter. Of an Enthymeme.

AN Enthymeme is nothing els but a Syllogisme, whereof one of the propositions is suppressed, ei­ther for brevities sake, or for some de­ceipt. [Page 147] For brevitie, as

Or

For deceipt, as,

Or

In these imperfect Syllogismes, that proposition is suppressed which is most odious, and wherein the false­hood lieth, namely, Every Common-wealth, that is, the greatest is the best. As also this, The Gospell troubleth a Common-wealth.

Somtimes to make the speech more smooth and currant, we put the con­clusion in the first place. As,

Rhetoricians call Enthymemes proofes grounded vpon probable signes. As,

Or

These proofes are of no force, ex­cept they be in great number. For signes and conjectures which haue no force being alone, become forci­ble when there are many of them to­gether.

The ninth Chapter. Of Induction, and of Example.

INduction is a Syllogisme wherein divers singulars or particulars are as a Meane to proue an vniversall conclusion. As when I will proue that all living creatures haue feeling; because birds, fishes, serpents, terrestri­all [Page 149] beasts, and Amphibia haue feeling.

Or thus, the Stag, the Doe, the Hare, the Coney, the Mouse haue a great heart in proportion to their bodie: Now the fearfull creatures are the Stag, the Doe, &c. Therefore all fearfull creatures haue a great heart in proportion to their bodies.

By this kinde of discourse all Sci­ences haue beene invented. For ex­ample, Physicians having by the try­all of many plants of Mercurie or of Parietarie observed, that they are laxa­tiue, haue thence gathered a generall rule, that all plants of Mercurie or Parietarie are laxatiue. Thus haue men attained to the knowledge of the causes of Eclipses, of Apoplexies, and of Flouds greater then ordinarie about the Aequinoxes by sundry par­ticular observations.

An Example is an imperfect Indu­ction.Of Exam­ple. For in stead of many particu­lars we vse but one.

In naturall causes Examples are more forcible then in civill and vo­luntary actions: because naturall e­vents [Page 150] are much more alike then civill and voluntary actions, which are subiect to many changes and chaun­ces. As if I should say, Yesterday in the evening the skie being red, the day fol­lowing proved faire: this example hath some likelihood to proue, that seeing the skie is red this evening, to mor­row it will proue a faire day. But if I say, Philip digging his garden found a pot of gold, it followeth not that Alex­ander digging shall haue the same hap.

Orators notwithstanding do much enlarge themselues vpon such exam­ples. And by reason of the mischiefs which haue hapned to any one through drunkennesse, or lying, or anger, they vse to exhort others to shunne the same vices.

The tenth Chapter. Of the Enumeration of parts.

THe Enumeration of parts is also a kinde of Syllogisme, serving to [Page 151] conclude both affirmatiuely and ne­gatiuely.

When we will conclude affirma­tiuely, we make a rehearsall of all the parts: that so having remooved all the parts but one, that one which re­maineth may be concluded or affir­med. As,

What goods soever a man hath, he hath them either by inheritance, or by purchase, or by exchange, or by gift, or by labour, or by play, or because he hath found them, or stollen them. But the goods which you haue, you haue them neither by inheritance, nor by purchase, nor by exchange, nor by gift, nor by labour, nor by play, nor because you haue found them. Therefore you haue stole them.

But when we will conclude nega­tiuely, we remoue all the parts. As, All Frenchmen are either Normans, or Picards, or Champenois, &c. But the Lorrains are neither Normans, nor Pi­cards, nor Champenois, &c. Therefore they are no Frenchmen.

You must ever take heed that the Enumeration be not imperfect; as, [Page 152] when we say that all mankinde is either male or female: Or that every action is either good or bad. For there are Her­maphrodites; and there be some acti­ons that are indifferent. So if I should say that every qualitie is either a natu­rall facultie, or a habit, or an actiue qua­litie in the obiects of the senses, this enu­meration would proue imperfect. For besides these there are formes and fi­gures.

The eleventh Chapter. Of a Dilemma.

A Dilemma is a forked or horned argument, wherein we giue our adversary his choise of two things, to shew him that whether of the two so­ever he chooseth, he is still overcome in both. As, to proue that a man should never marry, wee may argue thus, If thou marriest, thy wife will be either faire or deformed; If faire thou wilt proue iealous; If deformed thou wilt not like her. Therefore it is better not [Page 153] to marry. Or, be not a lawyer, for if thou pleadest for iniustice, thou shalt displease God; If thou pleadest for iustice, thou shalt displease men. Our Saviour Christ made a Dilemma when he was buffe­ted, saying, If I haue ill spoken shew wherein; but if well, why smitest thou me? Thus a man may reason against one that hath dreamed that we must not beleeue dreames: Or that hath sworne that he will forsweare him­selfe. If thou forsweare thy selfe, thou art a periur'd person; If thou doest not forsweare thy selfe, yet art thou still a per­iur'd person; because thou hast sworne that thou wilt forsweare thy selfe.

Carneades gaue twentie crownes to his Master Diogenes to teach him Lo­gick. One day disputing with his Ma­ster according to the rules that he had taught him, his Master told him that he disputed not well; Wherevpon his Scholar made him this Dilemma. I dispute either well or ill: If I dispute well, why blamest thou me? If I dispute ill, giue mee backe my twentie crownes? Such was the disputation betweene [Page 154] Protagoras and his Scholar Evathlus, Gellius. l. 5. c. 10. which example is well knowne, and the recitall would be too too long. You may see it in A. Gellius. lib. 5. cap. 10.

The twelfth Chapter. Of a Sorites, or heaping Syllogisme.

A Sorites is a kinde of argume [...] which knitteth many propositi­ons together, to shew that the subject of the first agreeth with the attribute of the last. As,

So many propositions, so many Syllogismes which haue God for the subiect of the conclusion.

The thirteenth Chapter. Of Conditionall or Hypotheticall Syllogismes.

VVE haue said that Enuntiati­ons are either simple or com­pound; and that of compounded E­nuntiations, some are Conditionall or Hypotheticall, and some Disjun­ctiue.

Hitherto we haue treated of Syllo­gismes consisting of simple propositi­ons, now we are to speake of Condi­tionall and Disjunctiue Syllogismes, whose propositions are conditionall or disjunctiue.

A Conditionall Syllogisme is, whose proposition hath an If. As,

The proposition hath two parts, the first whereof is called the Antece­dent, If there be a God: the second is called the Consequent, He must be served.

There are two Rules for these Syl­logismes.

I. Maxime.The first is, that if the Antecedent be granted, the Consequent is also gran­ted. As,

But you cannot by over-throwing the Antecedent, overthrow the Con­sequent. As,

II. MaximeThe second Maxime is, that if the consequent be overthrowne, the antece­dent is overthrowne also. As,

If the antecedent be the species, and the consequent be the difference or propertie, then you may overthrow the antecedent to overthrow the con­sequent. [Page 157] As,

But such conclusions follow by chance, and not by the force of the Syllogisme.

In these Syllogismes the assumpti­on is part of the proposition, which proposition maketh an entire Syllo­gisme. And it is probable that this word Assumption is borrowed from these Syllogismes, because that in them the second proposition is taken and assumed out of the first.

The foureteenth Chapter. Of Disiunctiue Syllogismes.

DIsjunctiue Syllogismes are such, whose proposition is compoun­ded of two disjunctiue parts or pee­ces, or which are separated by this particle OR. As, It is day or night. This number is even or odd. As thus,

Or els thus,

Or thus,

For those propositiōs are compoun­ded of such parts, the one whereof cannot be granted, without over­throwing the other; Nor can you o­verthrow the one without establi­shing or graunting the other. And for this cause, these two parts must be immediately opposit, so as there may be no third. For example, this argu­ment is not good.

In these Syllogismes to the end that the truth may be evident and with­out exception, the two parts of the proposition must not be contradicto­rie, [Page 159] but must be either contraries, or privatiues, or relatiues. For example, if I argue thus,

This argument is cleere and cer­taine.

But if I argue thus,

From thence wee can draw no conclusion that may haue any likelihood of reason.

The first Chapter. What Science is.

THIS word Science is somtimes taken for the whole bodie of one kind of learning. Thus Ethicks, Physicks, Me­taphysicks, civill Law, are called Sci­ences. Sometimes the word Science signifieth onely the knowledge of a [Page 162] conclusion prooved by Demonstra­tion. And this is it whereof we pur­pose to treat of in this place; which is thus defined.

Science is a certaine knowledge of a thing certaine, whose proofe is drawne from the cause.

To haue the Science of a thing, two certainties are required. The one is, that the thing be certaine of it selfe and vnchangeable. The second is, that the perswasion which wee haue of it be firme and cleare. If either of these two certainties be wanting it is no Science, but opinion. For a man may haue a doubtfull opinion of a thing certaine. As he that doubteth whether there be a God.

And on the contrary, a man may haue a firme and stedfast perswasion of that which is vncertaine and false. As those that suffer death for the de­fence of a false Religion.

And therefore it is not amisse to know the difference between Science, Faith, and Opinion. Science is a cer­taine knowledge of a certaine thing [Page 163] by the next cause. Opinion is a doubt­full or false knowledge. Faith is a firme perswasion grounded vpon the Testimonie of some other.

If a man know certainly a thing be­cause he seeth it, or toucheth it, that is neither called Science, nor Faith, nor opinion; but sense, which know­eth onely things singular: but Sci­ence is of things vniversall.

The second Chapter. What a Demonstration or Demon­stratiue Syllogisme is.

A Demonstratiue Syllogisme is that which giveth or bringeth certaine knowledge of the conclusi­on. If we will define it more exactly, we must define it thus. A demon­stratiue Syllogisme is that which prooveth that the attribute of the conclusion is truely attributed vnto the subject, by a Meane that must be the next efficient or finall cause of the attribute of the said conclusion. [Page 164] These two sorts of causes were called externall, in the Chapter of Causes aboue mentioned: because they are no parts of the effect, nor of the thing compounded, though sometimes the efficient cause be in the very same subject. As, the soule of man is the cause of the sense in man: and the thicknesse of gold is the cause of the weight of it. In these examples the efficient cause and the effect are in the same subject.

The third Chapter. What questions are demonstrable.

SVch questions wherein the attri­bute is a substance, cannot bee prooved by demonstration: because substances haue no certaine efficient cause proper vnto them. For the will of God is an vniversall cause com­mon to all things, and by consequent it can be no Meane in a demonstra­tiue Syllogisme.

Againe, such questions or conclu­sions wherein the attribute is a muta­ble or casuall accident, cannot be proved by demonstration: because these accidents haue no certaine and assured cause. As, Philip is rich. Buce­phalus halteth.

But those questions are demon­strable, whose attribute is a proper and immutable accident, whereof the next efficient or finall cause may be given. For example, these questi­ons may be prooved by demonstra­tion.

For the next efficient or finall cause [Page 166] of the attribute of these questiōs may be given.

The fourth Chapter. What the propositions of a demon­stratiue Syllogisme ought to be.

THe Demonstration must consist of necessary propositions; among which those are the most necessarie, which are called Immediate.

There be two sorts of immediate propositions, that is to say, such as are without any middle. For some are immediate in regard of the sub­ject, and others are immediate in re­gard of the cause.

Immediate propositions in regard of the subject are when the attribute agreeth next of all and immediately to the subject, so as a neerer subject cannot be given. In such propositi­ons the attribute agreeth with the subject, because it is such a subject. For example, if I say that a horse hath [Page 167] sense, this attribute agrees not next and immediately to a horse; for there is a neerer subject, namely, an Ani­mal, vnto the which sense belongeth. But if I say that a horse neigheth, this agreeth next and immediately to a horse, as he is a horse, and not by rea­son of any other neerer subject.

Immediate propositions in regard of the cause are, when an attribute is so neerely joyned to the subject, as that the cause or reason cannot bee yeelded why it should be so. For ex­ample, here is a Demonstration:

In this Syllogisme the conclusion is immediate in regard of the subject, but not in regard of the cause. For in this Syllogisme the Meane is the cause of the conclusion. But the two propositions are immediate, both in regard of the cause, as also of the sub­ject, [Page 168] for nothing can be alledged as a cause of their truths.

Sometimes the efficient and finall causes are linked together with a long chaine. As, ‘Vnder the Aequator the aire is very hot, because it is very subtill; The aire is very subtill, because the Sunne doth rarefie it very much; The Sunne rarefies the aire, because the beames fall in right angles; The beames fall in right angles, because the Sunne is there in the Zenith.’ Thus it is in the finall cause.

So many causes, so many demon­strations. But the last where also the chiefest and last cause stands for the Meane, is the noblest of all: because it can no further be demonstrated: and the two propositions are imme­diate every manner of way.

The fifth Chapter. A speciall note to know a perfect Demonstration.

OF all the markes of a perfect De­monstration, this is the most e­vident, when it may be conver [...]ed or reduced to a definition. For we haue said heretofore that the definition of a proper accident is compounded of three parts; namely,L. 2. c. 8. of the Genus of that which is defined, and of the pro­per subject, and of the cause thereof. As the definition of Death is, the de­struction of the life of the creature by the extinguishing of vitall heat. Out of this definition a demonstration may be framed, making the Subject of this accident to be the subject of the conclusion, the Genus to be the attribute, and the cause the Meane. As thus,

The same may be said of these de­finitions following. Sleepe is the hea­vinesse of a living creature, by the cessa­tion of the common sense. Thunder is a noyse in the clouds, by the breaking out of the fire.

The sixth Chapter. Of an Imperfect Demonstration.

WEE haue shewed that a perfect demonstration is that, which proveth by the next efficient or finall cause of the attribute; that the attri­bute of the conclusion agrees with the subject.

If any of these perfections be wan­ting, the demonstration is the wea­ker, and lesse perfect.

If the Meane be not the next cause of the attribute, but onely a remote cause, then is the demonstration wea­ker, [Page 171] and more imperfect. And such demonstrations for the most part conclude negatiuely. For exam­ple.

Or

In these demonstrations the propo­sitions are not immediate: For the Meane is not the next cause of the at­tribute. To haue no contrary quali­ties is not the next cause of not dy­ing, but a remote cause: for the next cause of not dying in mans body is the continual preservation of the hu­mors in an equall temperature; and the cause hereof is to haue no contra­rietie [Page 172] or combate betweene the ele­mentarie qualities in the bodie.

Thus the cause why Eunuches be­come not bald is, become the radi­call humor of the haires is not spent: and the remote cause is, because they haue but little heat.

In these demonstrations the propo­sitions are not immediate, for the Meane is not the next cause of the at­tribute.

And though the propositions be immediate, yet if the Meane be not the cause, but the effect of the attri­bute, then it shall be a lesse perfect de­monstration; proving not the effect by the cause, but the cause by the ef­fect. This kinde of demonstration shewes not why the conclusion is, but onely that it is. As,

The Meane is to loue God, which is not the cause, but the effect of the [Page 173] loue which God beareth vnto vs; which loue is the attribute of the con­clusion in this demonstration, where­in the cause is proved by the effect: whereas in a perfect demonstration we proue effects by their causes. Therefore this imperfect demonstra­tion proveth onely that the thing is, but sheweth not why it is. The effect may very well be the cause of know­ing, but not of being. As the smoake which we see come out of a chimney may be a cause to make vs know that there is fire in the house: but it is not the cause of the fire, but onely the ef­fect. And the vnequall beating of the pulse is not the cause of the Ague, but it is a cause which makes vs know that such a one hath an Ague.

The first Chapter. Of Fallacies in words.

ALL Fallacies or Sophismes committed in dispu­ting are either in the Words, or in the Mat­ter.

Fallacies in words are of six kindes. 1. Aequivocation. 2. Amphibologie. 3. Deceipt by Composition. 4. De­ceipt by Division. 5. Deceipt in the Accent or Pronuntiation. 6. And de­ceipt in the Figure of the word.

The second Chapter. Of Fallacies in the Matter.

THere are seaven fallacies in the Matter; that is to say, when the deceipt lyeth not in the words, but in the ignorance or disguising of the thing. These fallacies are, 1. The falla­cie by Accident. 2. The fallacie which taketh a thing as spoken simply or ab­solutely, which is true onely in some respect. 3. The Supposing of that which is in question. 4. The fallacie of Inconsequence. 5. The fallacie whereby a thing is taken for a cause which is not a cause. 6. The fallacie which mingleth divers questions as if they were but one. 7. The Igno­rance of that which contradicteth the question.

The third Chapter. The fallacie by Accident.

THe fallacie by Accident is, when from an assumption which is true onely by accident a conclusion is drawne which is absolute, simple, and without restraint. As in this argu­ment:

Therefore the Gospell is pernicious. Thus the Sunne darkeneth the eye­sight: and the law of God hardeneth the sinner. Whence if a man would inferre, that the Sunne were the cause of darkenesse, or, that the Law were the c [...]use of sinne, he should fall into the fallacie of the Accident. For the Gospell of it owne nature stirreth vp no troubles, seing it preacheth peace: but men take occasion thereby to rise vp against it. Neither doth the Sunne [Page 183] blind the eyes by nature, but by acci­dent, when it meeteth with a weake eye-sight.

The fourth Chapter. The fallacie which taketh a thing as simply true, which is not so, but onely in some respect.

THis fallacie is committed, when one of the propositions being true onely in part, or in some respect, wee labour to draw from thence a conclusion to make it true at all times, in all respects, and in every part. As,

The assumption is true in some re­spect onely, and to some men. For riches are not good, but to good men, and to such as can vse them well. And so in this Syllogisme:

The fift Chapter. Of the Supposing of that which is in Question.

VVE suppose that which is in question, when wee make a Syllogisme, wherein one of the pro­positions is the same thing which is in question, though it be couched in other termes. As if I would prooue tha [...] the world was not created, be­cause God made it not. Or, if I would proue that men are iust, because they are without sinne; that were to proue a thing by it selfe.

The sixt Chapter. Of the fallacie of Inconsequence.

THe fallacie of Inconsequence is, when we breake the rules which are set downe in the Chapter of the conversion of Enuntiations, and in [Page 185] the Chapter of Hypotheticall Syllo­gismes. For [...]ample, wee said in the fourth Chapt [...] of the third Booke, that an vniversall affirmatiue enuntia­tion cannot be converted into any o­ther proposition, but into a particu­lar affirmatiue, or into an vniversall, having two negatiues. As, All men are living creatures, is thus converted; Some living creature is a man: Or into this, Whatsoever is not a living creature is not man.

Againe, we said that in Hypothe­ticall Syllogismes we may proceede from the establishing of the Antece­dent, to the establishing of the Con­sequent: And that we may proceede from the over-throwing of the Con­sequent to the over-throwing of the Antecedent.

Now if any would dispute contra­ry to these Rules, saying, All men are living creatures; therefore all living creatures are men. Or, All men are li­ving creatures; therefore all that is not man is not a living creature, he should fall into the fallacie of a bad Conse­quence.

The same fallacie is committed if you argue thus,

Or thus,

For such arguments are against the rules of Hypotheticall Syllogismes, set downe in the thirteenth Chapter of the fourth Booke.

The seaventh Chapter. The fallacie whereby a thing is taken for a cause, which is none.

THe fift fallacie is, when you al­ledge a Meane which seemeth to be the cause of the conclusion, but in­deed is not. Such was the answer of a certaine Pyrate to Alexander the great: who having asked of him what had made him a Pyrate; he answered, [Page 187] that he was a Pyrate, because he had but one Fregat or small Barke; but if he had two hundred Gallies, as Alex­ander had, that then hee should be a King. Such also are these proofes. The Church of Greece is the best, be­cause it is the greatest. Or, This man is learned, because he hath many books. Or, that Charles hath a grey-beard, be­cause he was not hanged ten yeares agoe. Here the ordinary fault is, when the occasion is taken for a cause. For cau­ses doe act, but occasions act not; but are onely the subject and matter of acting. Thus truth breeds hatred, not of it owne nature, but by occasion. So the Law of God hardeneth the hearts of wicked men that oppose thēselues against it. It is not the cause of the hardnesse, but onely the occasion.

The eight Chapter. Of the fallacie which mingleth many Interrogations, as if they were but one.

SOmetimes many Interrogations are cunningly entermingled, that [Page 188] an vntruth may be crowded in a­mongst many truths. As, Cyrus, A­lexander, Caesar were they not valiant Kings? Or, these qualities, to be bay, olde, tall, one-eyde, are they not in this horse?

Some will be ready to grant all this, not marking that Caesar was never King; and that to be one eyde is a pri­vation, and not a qualitie; and that to be olde is not a qualitie, but a quanti­tie or length of time past. Therefore such Interrogations must be answe­red by distinction.

The ninth Chapter. Of the fallacie which is committed by the Ignorance of that which con­tradicteth the Question.

THe fallacie through the Igno­rance of that which contradic­teth, is, when he that argueth against me brings a conclusion which he al­ledgeth as contrary or contradictorie to my position, which notwithstan­ding is nothing prejudiciall vnto it, [Page 189] and may be granted. For example, if I say that God is no lyar; a Sophister will goe about to conclude, that God saith not all the truth: which notwith­standing agrees very well with that which I affirme; neither doth it from thence follow that God is a lyar.

To the end therefore that these be not taken for contradictorie or con­trarie Enuntiations, which indeed are not: we must vnderstand that if we 1 will make two Enuntiations to be cōtradictorie, the termes must be vn­derstood in the same sense in both, and without equivocation. Therfore these two Enuntiations, Every Cocke is living, and, Every Cocke is not living, are not contradictorie: if the one be meant of a living creature, and the o­ther taken for the cocke of a Gunne. Againe, the attribute must agree with 2 the subject in the same part, & accor­ding to the same time. Therefore these two Enuntiations, Man is mor­tall; and, Man is immortall, are not contradictorie: if the one be vnder­stood of the body; and the other of [Page 190] the soule of man. And, The Grecians were valiant, contradicteth not this, The Grecians were not valiant, for both are true, if you consider them at seve­rall times.

3 Againe, the attribute of the Enun­tiation must not be vnderstood in di­vers respects. For Cicero is of great sta­ture; and, Cicero is not of great stature, may both be true, if Cicero be com­pared to divers persons: little in com­parison of a giant, and great in com­parison of a dwarfe.

The tenth Chapter. Of the faults in Syllogismes.

GEnerally all Syllogismes may be faultie, either in the forme, or in the matter. They are faultie in the Forme, when the rules of the figures are not observed, committing a fault, either in the quantitie, or qualitie, or the propositions, or in the placing of the Meane, or if there be more then three termes.

The Syllogisme is faultie in the [Page 191] Matter, when one of the propositiōs, or both, are false, either in the whole, or in part. This faultinesse happeneth sometimes through simplicitie, and without cunning, bu [...] sometimes it is fraudulent and with cunning; such as are the fallacies aboue mentioned. If a Syllogisme be faulty in the forme, it must be brought to the true forme. If it be faultie in the matter, that pro­position which is false must be deni­ed. And if it be doubtfull or true in part onely, it must be distinguished.

But if the fault be neither in the forme, nor in the matter, but onely in the fallacie of the ignorance of that which contradicteth the question, by the which the adversary maintaineth a thing which doth not prejudice the question; in such a case wee must grant all that the adversary saith, and shew him, that in thinking to con­tradict vs, be doth it not.

The end and scope of these fallacies, is not to teach vs how to deceiue, but how to avoide deceipt.