The same things examined by Scrip­ture or Gods word, and as ex­pounded by our own Church.

NO constitution of Government can be so happily framed,Soveraign­ty and Non-resistance proved by Scripture. as by its sin­gle fabrick, to secure the peace of a Na­tion; else surely God's Theocracy among the Jews, and paternal Government among the Patriarchs, and Kings of Judah, would have prevented all complaints. When divine as well as prophane History shall be consulted, it will be found, Policy is like Morality, and may be much improved by these two words and precepts, Sustinc & abstine. For the Prince must abstain from violence and rapine, and neither for his pleasures nor ambition, may he suffer himself to prey on his people. And often he must bear with, or sustain their per­verse or froward humors, lest unseasona­bly stirring them, he make a fermen­tation he cannot quiet. And subjects will find, that the blessing of Government flows more from their passive obedience, than from any over nice care of their liberties; [Page 26] for impatience of Subjects has overthrown more States than the Tyranny of Princes, as will be toucht on hereafter; and most commonly God will not send a people good Governors, when they will not fit themselves to bear ill ones. It was therefore not only the wisdom, but the goodness of God towards Subjects, that he made Soveraign Persons only answerable to himself. All other ways are (as Hosea says) setting up of Kings, but not by him; or his Oeconomy pleases them not; and therefore they eat sowre grapes (or frame to themselves false prin­ciples) and their teeth are set on edge, or they destroy the peace they hunt after; for the Politick body like the Natural, that will endure no ail, but have recourse to physick, will soon purge it self out of the world. But nothing of this, that is said, infers, that men should not defend the rights of free born Subjects, but that they defend them in their proper place or judicatures of the land, and not by the sword.

But he that gave a law to every spe­cies of creatures, gave one to mankind, which man less exactly observes, by rea­son of the freedom of his will, and by reason of his lapst nature. But from the law of his nature, or from the Moral law, the best Judicial law is framed, which [Page 27] may be found by observing, how this law among Gods own people, the Israelites, suits with the Moral law, given to, or for all Mankind; but at present we will extend this no further, than to persons ruling or Legislators, and observe, what characters God in his Word puts upon them, and how he fences them from re­sistance, and how he ties all Commonal­ties to them by obedience; for through­out all Scripture, Kings are said not to reign over persons but Nations; therefore called King of Israel, Judah, &c. and Head of the Tribes of Israel, so of all States under him.

Scripture sets forth,Paternal Govern­ment. how the first man was born under Government as God's Sub­ject; how all his posterity were under him, and consequently how Paternal Go­vernment was the original of all Govern­ment, and so all Mankind born under Go­vernment; and therefore the precept of honoring Fathers (or Parents) being a Mo­ral precept, it is a proof, that Government is founded in nature, and was by extracti­on, and not consent. How paternal Go­vernment ceast, hath been already set forth. Nimrod by Sir Water Rawleigh is esteemed a Hunter or Usurper, because he took upon him the Government over others without their consent or voluntary [Page 28] submission or choice; not that he was an ill Prince.

And in Scripture the sanction or reward, that is proposed for performing this duty, shews the benefit of obedience; for it is, that thy days may be long in the land, which the Lord thy God shall give thee; for obedience of inferiors (as hath been like­wise observed) is the most probable way to peace, and peace unto a Societies wel­fare. Hence it is, that men are so strictly charged to reverence their Governors, and Governors to look upon themselves as Ministers of God for good, and as Revengers to execute wrath upon him that doth evil; so as his power must be no terror to good works, but employed for the good and praise (or encouragement) of those that do well.

When the Governor was not a natural Father, to the end that he might not want natural affection unto his people, if the people wanted one, they were not to choose a Stranger; but such a one, as Moses and Joshua, Samuel and Saul, and David, or whom God appointed. See Deut. 17. where the promise of a Prince and virtues of a Prince are set forth, and so Kingly rule a blessing, and promise of God to his Peo­ple from the beginning.

The Prince must have humility,Scripture directions for a King. that his heart be not lifted up above his bre­thren. He must not multiply to himself horses, least power incline him to be op­pressive. He must not give his strength to women; for effeminacy abates courage and industry, and softens and destroys him. And Solomon adds another caution, Let him not drink wine, (i. e. to excess) lest he forget Gods law, or neglect Religion, and pervert judgment; for both these make him lither or wretchless, and unfit for the hardships and difficulties of Government. Nor must he encrease Riches, i. e. for his own private treasure, or by the making his People miserable and poor, make himself opulent, that he may the more securely tyrannize. But rich he must be, since the ambition of Neighbours is at one time or another likely to disturb his Peace; and since the constant charge, and contingent expences of Governors is like to be so great, therefore a full Exchequer becomes a good, as well as a wise and a politick Prince. Lastly, Though human Policy must be used in human affairs, and that it appears too too hard, to expect the same strictness of morality in a King's Office, which belongs to his persons, as a man, (which is too hard a task for one no bet­ter verst in both these two Sciences than [Page 30] my self, to give the limits unto) this may be said, that the Prince is obliged, since Politicks flow from Ethicks, as nigh as possibly he can, to suit his Policies with good Morals, or rather, that he frame them out of (at least never contrary unto) the Word of God; for this will make him truly worship his God, and best teach him how to demean himself with men, or how to govern himself, either in relation to his forreign or home Affairs. Not that there are such rules given in God's Word, but that a Prince's Policies should not warrant any thing that Word forbids, but rather cast him­self on Providence.

Such delineations of a Prince, as these are, will convince men, that not only Go­vernment, but Governors are the ordinance of God; for by me, says God, Kings raign, which Nebuchadnezzar acknowledges, when he says to Daniel, Your God is a God of Gods, and a Lord of Kings, and he rules in the Kingdoms of the earth, and gives it to whomsoever he will, and sets up over it (i. e. whenever a people provoke him to send them that curse) the basest of men; or as Hosea may seem to explain it, they cast off his Government for Governments that men have framed, for, say they, give us a King like the other Nations, or let us cast off King Charles the first for a Cromwell, [Page 31] or Christ for a Barrabbas. Thus people will sometimes set up a King, but not by God; yea, and pull down a King to their own confusion: which God divert them from doing any more.

But that they may not thus mischief themselves, God's Word describes a King's power by his character. A King, against whom there is no rising. And what is said of a King, is said of all Soveraign Persons, be they one or more, a Monarchy, or an Aristocracy, a Kingdom or a Common-weal; for if Subjects, upon discontents and dissatisfactions, might change their setled form of Government, the politick Body, like his Natural, that is always giving Physick to himself, would be surely purg­ed out of its setled peace, and probably in­to its grave: so as Solomon was very wise, and spake as well to the States of a Land, as unto particular persons, when he said, Meddle not with those, who are given to change, &c.

Fear God therefore, and honour the King, and curse not the King, i. e. speak not evil of him, or in discourse revile him. Re­member, he is thy Politick Parent; go backward therefore, and cover his naked­ness. Shimei's cursing was but revilings. Cut not off so much as the lap of his gar­ment, or approach him not with a prophane [Page 32] tongue, or hand, as if he were not the Lord's Anointed, for he cannot be inno­cent, that lessens his dignity, or clouds his Majesty. No, do not this in thine heart, or in thy bed-chamber; no, nor mingle with those, that are given to changes; for their calamities shall rise suddenly, or a Bird, some small or unlook'd-for accident, shall betray thy conspiracy, or, who knows the ruine of them? or it shall fall upon them by some providential accident, and their ruine shall be as swift, as their plots were secret: for if God's Word, in case of oppression, direct men to cry unto him for relief, and not to cry, unto your Tents, O Israel; what is our resistance, but to cast off our dependance on God's providence, and to have recourse unto the Witch of Endor, or our own im­patience: or like an injured man, that will not let the Judge give sentence, nor the Hang-man execute him, that robb'd him, but he will do both offices himself? Rebellion therefore is like the sin of Witchcraft: it removes its dependance on God's Provi­dence, and flies, as has been said, to an ill Spirit, or its own disobedient and vindica­tive humor.

There is no distinction between the King's per­son and his power.Nor must men subtilize by distinguishing betwixt the power and the person; for that Apostle, who says, Be not afraid of the Power, expounds it by the Person, for he is appointed [Page 33] by God, &c. Thus a King's Person and his Power cannot be separate, though they may be distinguished; or his authority may be, where his Person is not, but ne­ver his authority can be wanting, where his Person is. Whoever therefore will not do the law of God, (written in God's book, nor of the King, written in his statutes) let Judgment be executed upon him, whither it be unto death, or banishment, or confiscation, or imprisonment. And if this command comes from Artaxerxes by Ezra, he would not have set it down, but as it was warranta­ble to execute. Nay, the people of Israel themselves say as much to Joshuah, Whosoe­ver resists thy commandments, and will not hearken to thy word, (or Legislative power) he shall be put to death; for whatever thou com­mandest, we will do, and where-ever thou send­est us, we will go. Only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moses; or be careful to rule thy self by God's law, as we will be to rule our selves by thine, or contrary not thou thy will established by a law, by some sudden or passionate resolve.

Yet, as hath been observed before,God, who is the single punisher of Prince's faults, yet permits as a scourge of his Subjects, and Subjects sometimes to be a scourge to their Prince. though God hath reserved Princes for his own Tribunal, yet he hath shewn by several instances in Scripture, very particularly in that of Abimelech, and the men of [Page 34] Shechem, that he often makes Subjects (by permitting it, for it is ever evil in the Sub­ject) to become scourges to their Princes, and both to work each others ruine. As a scourge to David, he lets the greatest part of Israel rise against him, and follow his rebellious son Absalom; and it was of the Lord, (by his permission) that nine Tribes and a half forsook Rehoboam, and followed Jeroboam for Solomons ido­latry.

However, our great Master, born King of the world, acknowledgeth himself in his humanity, born a Subject to Augustus and Tiberius, and doth a miracle to pay a tribute, and gives to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, (outward obedience and observance in matters of a secular and in­different nature) and acknowledges the power of Pontius Pilate over his life, and will not call for the Legions of Angels, as he could, to defend him: nor doth his A­postles tread in other steps, or teach other doctrine. Yet doth not all this security authorize a Prince to be arbitrary or ty­rannous; for God proclaims himself an Avenger; nor doth his Word afford such Princes any other appellation, than that of a Bear, or of a Lion.

When Nebuchadnezzar would have had his golden Image worshipped, what is the [Page 35] answer, Not, let us resist, but, Pardon us in this, O king. Non est nostri juris peccare, pati est. Tyrannus cum titulo is, or may be God's Anointed; Tyrannus sine titulo is an Usurper, and is to be looked on so, by all those, who were born under, or had taken oaths of allegiance to a dethroned Prince. Thus Athaliah was destroyed to restore Joash, and personally Joash proved afterwards not much better than she was; however, in him was preserved the seed of David.

Now Princes in their state of Soveraign­ty (as our Prince in Parliament) are said to be above the laws, because they may change, abrogate, and dispense with them, not, because when it pleases them, they may violate them. If they judge the change conduces unto publick good, they are superior to their laws: but if they remove a law to satisfie a passion, or take off a restraint from themselves, or like Ne­buchadnezzar, will be deifying themselves, they may punish their Subjects for not o­beying those laws, but God will punish them, for abuse of their office; and other remedy the Subjects, by the law of God, have none; but by the false reasonings of a Junius Brutus, and a Buchanan, they have many. So as Subjects adventure not only their peace, but their salvation for their [Page 36] rebellion. Rebellion is not a single sin, but complicates them. It disquiets a whole Nati­on, makes great thoughts of heart; no man sits under his own vine. It involves the in­nocent in the misery, tho' not in the guilt, and tyrannizes over Fellow-subjects, over whom they have no just power or right. The Ship-money, determined by law, (though probably with all its circumstan­ces not warranted so) was far from a justi­fication of arms; but rather than indure a Monopoly or a Loan, a Civil War must give license for plunder unto the Soldiers of both parties. With so Christian a King, as Charles the first was, had his two Hou­ses been of the same temper; or had they not had a malicious and short-sighted po­licy to alter the whole frame of Govern­ment; how easily, both before the war was begun, and after the sword was blooded, might they have composed all things suitable to God's laws, and the laws of the Nation? But these men made themselves Slaves to their Slaves, because they would not be loyal Subjects to their Prince. It is one thing for a Senate (and certainly an honest one, and a dutiful one) to represent grievances, and to with­hold Supplies upon no redress of grie­vances, (but there is nothing a grievance properly, which violates no law in be­ing) [Page 37] but it is rebellion to take up Arms upon such pretences.

As Moses and Christ taught this sub­jection,How rui­nous to a p [...]ople af­fecting new forms of Go­vernment is. so we see both their doctrines differed not from what right reason makes true Policy; for observe, whether the Graecians casting off the tyranny of Mo­narchy, or undermining an Aristocracy to set up a Democracy, or supplanting that with an Oligarchy, or casting off all these for a select 400, or an usurping 30 Ty­rants, bettered their condition, or whe­ther it was not more fatal to them, than the arbitrariness of any one, or any few select persons.

Hence Moses, Christ, and reason, must needs have prevailed with the Apostles, rather to endure the tyranny of the worst of Princes, under whom they lived, (even Nero) than have quitted their sound doctrine, Let every soul be subject to the higher Powers.

And as the Apostles did,How loyal the primi­tive Chri­stians were. so did their Successors, the primitive Bishops, who willingly became Martyrs rather than re­bels He that would satisfie himself here­in, let him but read Tertullian's Apolo­gy, and he will find, it was not weakness, or want of courage, but strength of faith, that kept the primitive Christians quiet un­der the persecution of the most bloody Hea­then Emperors.

But we have lived to read false Teach­ers, that make the doctrine of resistance a new light; which light, is a light that leads to darkness, setting up the passions of the multitude to be their own guides, and their own ruine.

The Romish doctrine of subjection.Our great Adversary, the present Church of Rome, contrary to St. Paul's doctrine to the same, Romans the thirteenth, makes Princes hold their scepters of, and Sub­jects their allegiance to her. And the Scotch Presbytery, with their Lay-interpre­ter Buchanan, De Jure regni apud Scotos, and Junius Brutus subject Princes to the People; (for which there is as much war­rant in Scripture, for Presbyters to Lord it over Princes, as for the Pope.) And so these serpents, casting their tails into their mouths, make extreams meet.

Calvins.But judicious Calvin, however biassed, was convinced of the unwarrantableness by Scripture of such doctrines; therefore a­bout the latter end of his Institutions, de­termines against resistance of Soveraign Princes: though he leaves a gap in his strong hedge, limiting what he had laid down, rather to every single man in a State, than to such orders of men, as are called the States of a Kingdom; for unto these he will neither give warrant (be­cause in no Christian State now is there [Page 39] such a constitution as were those of the E­phori, Demarchi, or Tribunes of the Peo­ple in Athens, Sparta, and Rome) nor yet doth he make a resolution against them.

Luther,Luther. who when the Boors or Pea­sants in Germany were tumultuously re­forming themselves, and casting off their Prince's authority, disclaims their pro­ceedings; I have ever, says he, from the beginning, taught subjection, Sleidans Commenta­ries. and abhorred all sedition, exhorted to obedience to the higher Powers. Yea, even to bear with tyranny and wicked government; though I perceive, that the war is managed on both sides with an evil conscience, as Governors to settle tyranny, and People to gain their desires by sedition. Yet even this happy Instrument of Refor­mation made this faint reply to some Lawyers, who prest upon him, that the laws of the Nation in some cases permit­ted of resistance, that he would not say, that the Gospel did impugne or dissolve, or abolish the politick laws of the Land. Which cer­tainly it doth not; for the Gospel at the same time obliges the King, when it re­strains the Subjects from resistance, but still it warrants not resistance.

Whilst the Church of England,The Church of England. with Moses, Christ, the Apostles, and the pri­mitive Church, countenances no tyranny [Page 40] in the Prince, nor allows any resistance in the Subject; nor recommends any stupid insensibility to them; for she allows their orderly and not terrifying way of petiti­oning; nay, in the Courts, and before the Judges appointed for it, she bids them defend themselves; she bids them not give up their right, but she forbids them to maintain it by force. She secures not the Prince, the subject will not rise against him, since God, being singly and properly his Revenger, may, and often doth make the subjects disloyalty his rod for tyranny; and so as both offend, he will punish both, viz. the one by the other. This Church with what sound reason doth, (on which all sound Politicks are built) and what our own Laws assert, resolves, all single persons are forbid resistance; and then far­ther resolves all Orders or States of men in a Politick body, be the Government Monarchical or Aristocratical, &c. are but as single men in respect of the Head or Soveraign power, for even these in re­spect of him or them are to be reputed, even in their Politick Body, but as single or private men, so can no more resist the soveraign person or persons than a private man. This I believe to be Apostolick do­ctrine. And this the Recognitions made to our own Kings in Acts of Parliament warrant us to say.

Now a Prince, that is thus secured in his Temporals by his own Church, or by the Christian faith in relation to this do­ctrine, had need give some very good ac­count of the advantage he makes in his Spirituals by removing from this commu­nion: but I am assured his loss is equal in both.

Government examined by the Law of the Land.

IF this be the nature of Government in general, and of Soveraign Persons,What the law of Eng­land re­quires about subjection. to whom Government is intrusted, let us in the next place examine, how the Laws of this our own Nation determine the cases.

We all know, that our Government is a mixt Monarchy, and yet by all Foreign­ers (as Bodin, Grotius, and others) is re­puted an absolute Monarchy; for limita­tions, which transfer not the power unto any other, but require only the consent of some other, divest it not of the title of Monarchy, or of the Kings being an abso­lute, tho' not an arbitrary Monarch, as hath been endeavoured to be proved in the foregoing sheets.

Our Laws say then, that

Allegiance sworn to him, not on­ly by single men, but by the three Estates. Allegiance is to be sworn to him, and homage paid, not only by every single person through the Kingdom, but by eve­ry single member of his two Houses of Par­liament; for not one of them can sit there, before he hath taken the oaths of Allegi­ance and Supremacy; and he that reads either of these oaths, needs not seek, where the Soveraignty is lodged. And tho' these oaths were formed principally to disclaim Papal jurisdiction, yet that abated, they are but the old Legal oath of obedience. Nay, the three States of Subjects in the Kingdom, viz. Lords Spiritual and Tem­poral, and Commons, as a politick body, make the same recognition. See the re­cognitions made to the ancient Kings; even the Saxons, and those to Edward 4. Henry 7. and Henry 8. Q. Elisabeth, and especially to King James.

Great (say they to him in an Act of Par­liament) are our blessings by uniting the two ancient Kingdoms, or rather the two Imperial crowns, &c. and upon the knees of our hearts we agnize our most constant faith, obedience, and loyalty, to your Majesty and your Royal Pro­geny. And in this high Court of Parlia­ment, where all the whole body of the Realm, and every particular member there­of, either in person or by representation, (upon their own elections) are by the laws of this Realm deemed to be personal­ly present.

Sir Edward Coke observes by the laws of King Alfred, as well as by those of the Conqueror, the ancient Kings, who were Saxons, had all the lands of England in demeasnes; (Inst. fol. 58.) and the Barons and Lords of Mannors were by the Con­queror enfeoft with all, which the King held not, but they held it for defence of the Realm under the King, and conse­quently, they were to support it in time of danger. This evidenced the Conque­ror had seized the whole land by way of conquest. So as the King was the grand Lord, or Lord paramount, and the Nobi­lity and Gentry but the mean Lords, and all the rest held in vassalage under the King or them. Freeholders came in by the Nobilities ill husbandry, and by their [Page 44] selling part of their land, and enfranchi­zing of it. But still the land was held by some tenure, which obliged the Own­er, Lord, or Commoner, more or less, (as in Capite or free Soccage after the con­quest) for the defence of the land; for in­deed that is the ground-work of all socie­ty. For every man is naturally bound with his All to defend the body Politick, and the constitution of the Government; tho' the quotum, and the manner of the raising it, had the Subjects consent, that it might be the more equally laid, and the more cheerfully paid, and the more order­ly levied, and as an evidence, the Go­vernment was not despotical, but the peo­ple free, and yet thus under subjection.

The limita­tions of the Kings pre­rogative.The raising of money or taxes is one of those particulars, wherein our Monarch is limited, for he cannot raise money upon the Subject, but by his Commons, and with the consent of the Lords, or by con­currence of them both; yet the Commons can raise no money but to give unto the King, or as the King accepts it for such a use.

Which is conviction enough, that all the taxes of the long Parliament were ille­gal, and their power an usurpation.

Many other instances there are of the Kings single Supremacy; but without men­tioning [Page 45] more, (for all are embowell'd in these few) we will conclude with Sir H. Spelmans assertion in his Glossarium, Omnis Regni justitia solius Regis est.

In the next place,The Monar­chy absolute in Parlia­ment. we will consider him in a Parliament, and here his prerogative is unlimited, or he is in his Zenith, or he is entirely Soveraign; for here the purse and the sword are joyned together. Here, or with consent of his Lords and Commons, he makes what laws he finds necessary for publick weal; which are the two great cases, wherein Monarchical prerogative is limited; for lives and liberties are secured to Subjects by the Common and Statute Laws of the Realm; for we are a free People, or we know the Law we walk by. And yet in Parliament, (in matters where­in the publick safety is concerned, or the Princes Person) a new Law may declare, that a treason, which before that new law was not so. But complication of Acts, which were known before, and acknow­ledged of an inferior species to treason, before the making such a law, cannot be made treason by that law, tho' the person for them may suffer as a Traytor.

The great Act of Treason says, nothing should be accounted treason, which was not therein particularly named; yet all [Page 46] this caution was to exclude inferior Courts from so denominating it, but not the King in Parliament. Indeed here prerogative is unlimited, because here whatever is determined, may justly be supposed well weighed, and so provided, as it may not entrench upon liberty in general; tho' for example sake, it fall severe on an indivi­dual Person. But if a Prince be here im­portuned, nay violated, or his Houses advices be prest upon him by rabbles or multitudes of Plebeians, this is as great a crime in that Body towards him, as any fault could be in the person thus brought to judgment, because of the danger in its precedent; since a Prince may as well force the consent of his two Houses by an Army, to declare whom he pleases a Traytor, as they can him by multitudes and numbers of the meanest Tradesmen, to make laws of any kind. This was a case, which God grant may never be drawn into example; for our judicious Historian Daniel says, Where the Prince and States of a Kingdom watch the necessities of each other, that they may obtain their several ends, and make advan­tages, the true interest of the Nation is lost; and as this proceeding is unjust, and not sincere, so it is ever unsuccessful. The Prae­tors edict says, Quod vi factum est, ratum non habebo. And Bartolus hereupon says, [Page 47] Spiritus Sanctus posuit hec verba in ore Prae­toris.

Parliaments are called by the Kings Writ, and are adjourned, prorogued, or dissolved at the Kings pleasure: and his death dissolves them without any further signification. Which shews, how intirely they depend on his Soveraignty, and on his Person.

No Member of it hath priviledge of Parliament for treason, felony, or breach of peace.

The two Houses are to act suitable to the call of his Writ. The Commons are called ad faciendum or cons [...]ntiendum, or to perform and consent; the Nobles to treat and give counsel, or colloquium & tractatum habere; and they are called, not for all, but for some (or such as he shall please to com­municate to them) of his affairs; tho' when they meet, they have liberty to re­present any grievance, which properly is a violation of any law; for that cannot properly be called a grievance, which is no breach of a law in being. And here they may represent, what they suppose would tend to publick utility, submitting it to the Royal pleasure. In a word, the Houses may propose, but it is the King, that determines; for he accepts or rejects, and what he accepts is only a law, and his [Page 48] law only; for his Houses pray a law, but he enacts it; for authority must be single, and therefore our laws call him the begin­ning, head, and end of a Parliament, which surely excludes all pretence to co-ordina­tion.

It is never called the high Court of Par­liament, but with reference to his Royal presence. It is true, it is the highest Court of Judicature, because hither men may appeal from all inferior Courts of West­minster-Hall; but whether they may here begin original process, is inquirable. In this sense it is called the Court of Parlia­ment, but not the high Court of Parlia­ment; for the Lords House is a Court of Record, and can administer oaths and fine, &c. And it is called the Court of Parlia­ment, when the Lords and Commons joyn in an order; but thus never to the House of Commons singly, for they can admi­nister no oath, nor fine, nor imprison, but their own Members, or they may for vio­lation of their own priviledges, commit to their own Serjeant a Forreigner, who hath violated their priviledges. This is said not to diminish their ancient and just ju­risdiction, nor to lessen the great use of them, but to keep each Court within its bounds, which is truly to preserve the ge­neral peace and welfare of the Nation.

In this high Court of Parli­ament the King meets with his three States of the Realm. viz.

• Lords
  • Spiritual,
  • Temporal,
• and Commons.

To have a good intelligence with this Body of men,The necessi­ty of a good intelligence betwixt the King and his two houses of Parlia­ment. surely is one of the greatest policies a Prince can shew; for by them he is best represented unto his people. The supplies they give Him, are best paid, when granted by them. Here appears the good constitution of Government, or that harmonious Justice (as Bodin calls it) of a State, where every order of men see themselves represented, as members of the Politick Body, or have a value put on them; or thus, they are not excluded from having an interest in the State. These are the men who walk the perambulations of the Government, and part of whose charge is to keep the true and old bounda­ries and land-marks of the State, and not to set up new; or who are to guard pre­rogative, priviledge, and liberty; so as none of them intrench upon the other; for Subjects wound themselves as much as [Page 50] they do their Prince, when they invade his prerogatives. And if the people were ca­pable of judging, they would find, as the Government cannot want in some measure, and in some things an arbitrary Power, so when this for some time hath been wrested out of the Prince's hand, it hath been more oppressive upon them in their hands than His.

The useful­ness and unavoida­bleness of arbitrary preroga­tive.It is a piece of ignorance to think, be­cause a decision is arbitrary, therefore it is unjust; for cases, that cannot be foreseen, or that come seldom, and clothed with divers circumstances, or fall under no cer­tain rule, or are of great import or danger, and can stay for no formal council (all these) must have an expedite determinati­on, but still as just a one, and as conform to right reason as may be; for reason of State is to warrant no injustice. Nor can it be limited unto strict forms or process of Law; therefore say the Civilians, Jus pri­vatum vocatur, quia reddendo cuique quod su­um est versatur, & eo quod normae aequalitatis & justitiae congruat. This therefore must be steddy and unalterable, and where it is so preserved, Subjects are happy; for the known laws preserve their own lives, liberties and properties;Wherein preroga­tive is ex­ercised. and the written and known laws are the Standards of all these. But to prevent attempts against [Page 51] the Government and Governors, and in order to the safety of the people, prero­gatives or extraordinary powers were ne­ver wanting, and for these reasons only, laws were subjected to prerogative; and no wise people ever grudged it: for trea­sonable attempts are often perfected, or a Prince assassinated, or a State everted, be­fore formalities of law can be pursued or satisfied; the Government therefore and the Governors must have their security, as well as private men. And better men be terrified from coming nigh the bounds of this mount, than admitted with safety to approach it so nigh, that they may pro­ject a hope to perfect that, which they would venture lives, and all they had, if they saw but a fair possibility to effect. Hence it is, that we say, Jus publicum le­gum convenientiam & aptitudinem semper ex­pedit, sed non semper aquitatem; but this is not to be wrested, or made a patronage for any tyrannical action. Princes ought to be as morally just as private men, but under another law; for what will protect one, will not the other; reason of State should never be made a pretence. Thus we see private Law moves by a standing and formal rule of strict justice, publick by a rule of reason and equity: neither by injustice, oppression, or passion, or ill de­sign, [Page 52] or revenge against any particular man. In Subjects therefore, especially in those Representatives of the Subjects in ge­neral, there ought not to be an indifferen­cy to uphold the State and the chief Go­vernor: for attempts upon these are like some diseases in the natural body, they must be early suspected, and soon taken in hand; for if deferred untill an ordinary judgment can discern them, the wisest Physician will not be able to cure them. Suetonius, in the life of Domitian be­wails Princes condition, Quibus de conjura­tione comperta, non creditur nisi occisis. A State may die of an apoplexy as well as a private man. Government, like a tortoise, must keep its constituent parts under its hard shell, or every child's foot (or the most inconsiderable body) will hurt its render limbs.

The choice of Parlia­ment men.Persons therefore sent as the Peoples Re­presentatives, ought to be chosen out of that number of men, which understand and love the Government setled, or as Aristotle says, Ut ea pars sit potior, quae rempublicam sanam esse vellet, quam ea, quae nollet, or who affect not changes, or who are not popular Orators, with ambitious hearts, designing brains, and smooth tongues, and who would be Ephori, Cura­tors, or Tridunes, or King-Controulers: [Page 53] who are apt to propose violent remedies, or make physick more pernicious than the disease; of whom it may be said, as was said of Sylla, Patriam durioribus remediis quam pericula erant sanavit. Such men as these are apter to make remonstrances to the People, than reasonable representati­ons to a Prince. And our late History of Charles the first will shew their temper; for they, even after they were victorious over the King, upon the stairs of their own Senate-house, wounded and bruised their Soldiers, many of their fellow Sub­jects, and those who lived in their own quarters, for no other reason, than that they petitioned them to make a peace with him. Examine their own Records, what prerogatives these men used over their fel­low Subjects, and there will be little oc­casion to complain of the cruelty, even of a Henry 8. They that teach a multitude to resort to their own strength against their Prince, will live (as London did) to see their own cannon or ordnance by their own Army, turned upon themselves, which they mounted to keep out their Prince. But this sad example terrifies nei­ther side, not the one, from occasions of jealousie about religion or property, nor the other, from entertaining again the the spirit of schism and rebellion. But [Page 54] arise, O Lord, and compose our distracti­ons. Thus if you ask what is a wise man (or a people) without liberty, or quid Cato sine libertate? You may live to answer, What is liberty without a Cato, or quid libertas sine Catone. Tacitus makes menti­on of a Sect, who brought forth the Tube­rones and the Favonians, unpleasing names to the ancient Common-weal, who to o­verthrow the State (says he) pretended Li­berty; but if they had overthrown it, they would have given an assault to have over­thrown liberty likewise. And he com­mends in another place the good counsel of Sanguinius Maximus, a Consul, who desired the Senators not to encrease the Emperor's cares, by hunting after matters of dislike. The wisdom of our Govern­ment makes it an axiome, The King can do no injury, therefore no provocation justifies force against him. His Ministers are answerable to the laws; He is exempt, and all this for the Subjects peace. The states of a land should never represent the grievances of the land by Microscopes; for such magnifying glasses do but exaspe­rate the humors of the whole body, and discourage the Prince from giving reme­dies; for when a Prince discerns a willing­ness in such a body not to misunderstand him, it is the best way to procure a good [Page 55] under­standing with him. Wise men should re­flect on the unavoidable errors or disorders in their own families, before they should aggravate or lay too naked (especially to those that cannot cure them) the failures of a Government. Nor is it excuse for these Zealot-Statesmen to say, they act with good intentions to the publick; for mis­takes of judgment may plead both with God and man for a mitigation of the pu­nishment of the offence, but never for a justification of an evil or illegal act. Thus Nations are often overthrown by impati­ence; so dangerous is an overdoing Refor­mation: but a wise Senate makes a happy people, and a glorious Prince, by consi­dering States, like as they do men, or that they are best, not who have no failures, but who have fewest.

There are times, when men are more willing to cast off the form of Government, than the Governor: and such designs are with most difficulty withstood.

Thus we see Government (or rather the justice of it) is founded upon the law of Nature, secured by the Word of God,Govern­ment how founded. and defended by the Laws of the land. But we have a great Apostle of this Age,Mr. Hobbs considered. or a learned and strong presumptuous brain­ed Leviathan, who not founding it upon nature, makes it arise from necessity and [Page 56] fear: thus making the Government and the Governor rather the brat of a misera­ble and frighted people, than the ordinance of God; so weakning the nature or ori­ginal of Government, and yet one while making the Governor such a Leviathan, that no single Person, or body of men, is to resist him; for he so exalts him, that he may set up what Idol or vain opinions he will for a Religion, and all his Subjects are bound to entertain it, and no other: and no man upon any occasion to rise against him. And yet at last if they do, and pre­uail, he finds means to justifie them. Thus he can blow hot and cold, and we must all submit to his dogma's, or be a foolish generation But many good pens have made remarks upon him, that were it not to frame a little Scheme, principally for my self, I would not meddle with him at all.

How Mr. Hobbs makes the passions, and not the mo­ral vertues the founda­tion of Go­vernment.His Arguments run thus. Government arose upon necessity, and upon the fear one man had of another's power, every man by birth having an equal right unto every thing. So the natural condition of mankind was a State of war or hostility with one another. Now this is very strange, that this learned man should not consider, if wolves and vultures (the fiercest beasts and birds of prey) will [Page 57] not act thus upon their own kind; if na­ture, (which we may believe is this Gen­tleman's God) framed these wild creatures calm to one another; how she should come to be such a Step-dame to mankind. And if this Gentleman perceives man's soul en­dued with moral virtues, as well as natu­ral passions, why should he make Govern­ment arise from the concupiscible passion of desire, and the irascible of fear, and not from the cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, justice and fortitude, with humanity and veracity? Do not these mo­ral virtues evidence, that men were crea­ted not only for a harmless, but a benefi­cial Society? And doth not the necessity, which man hath of help, in relation to his body, shew he was not framed to live a­lone? And in relation to his mind, doth not temperance restrain desire, and forti­tude repress fear? How doth temperance fit him to be contented with a little, and so make needless the invading the rights of others? How doth justice regulate his acti­ons towards other men, and so secure them from any violence from Him? How doth humanity make him apt to relieve anothers necessities, as justice did to preserve his rights? How doth his veracity secure a­nother in his conversation with him? Nor did art or policy beget these virtues in [Page 58] mankind or nature, but a God of nature implanted it in humane nature. And can this Gentleman believe, that the disorders that flowed from injustice, were the mo­ther of justice? though it was often the mother of good civil laws against parti­cularized acts of injustice. Injustice would not have been perceived, but as it was a deflection from natural justice; or why doth he say, every man naturally, upon the fear he had of every other man, was against every other man? which made it reasonable for every man to secure himself by way of anticipation (i. e. as I conceive, without any other provocation or injury, but his own fear) by force and wiles to master all others, till he saw no other power great enough to endanger him. His Master Thucydides sets forth much of this, but allows not the practice. If this be not prodigy, I know not what is; for if this be true, we will repeat it again. What a step-mo­ther is Nature, (for we will not now talk of a God, or intelligent mind distinct from, and antecedent to all visible be­ings, or of invisible powers, which seem to him but as scarr-crows set up to fright fearful and ignorant men) who made this kind of creature, Man, mi­serable, by its, primier designation and [Page 59] yet by or upon experience of his own mi­sery,If Mr. Hobbs way of sta­ting this question be true, the creature is wiser than the Creator. how came a man reasonable enough by law and penalties to find a means lodg­ed in himself to divert the evil, which na­ture had subjected him unto. Thus the effect seems superior to the cause; for if man can thus excel his own nature, how comes it about, that other creatures cannot do the like? or how comes man to be wiser by submitting his own understanding and strength to a Governors, to provide better for himself than Nature did? Did Nature produce him to a state of war, and he find out the benefit of Society in peace? Pray then, why should not a horse do the like, and find he was turned out of the orchyard, where was long grass, into the barren Common, for cropping the trees? Or why should not bees and wasps make leagues together, and one give some of their honey to avoid hostility? By all this we see how fatal it is for men of strong na­tural parts and good literature, to enter­tain false principles; and how false princi­ples about Nature produce falser about po­licy. Judge Hales hath convinced this Gentleman in his Origination of Mankind in point of natural Philosophy; and the Lord Chancellor Hyde hath done it as well about his Politicks; and Dr. Parker in his Ecclesiastical Policy, hath shewed [Page 60] the absurdity of this Gentleman's opinion about Religion and Civil Policy; and therefore I will rather give men warning of him than enter farther the lists; or I would not farther fall upon one, whom so many others have attackt so masterfully, and with success.

God made Government his own ordi­nance, and made Governors owe their Au­thority to him; for it is by him that Prin­ces reign; for Promotion neither comes from the East, nor from the West, for it is God that sets up one, and pulls down another. He cloathed them with power and majesty,God vested Govern­ment with power and majesty. as the necessary supports of all Government; for without these no personal virtues of the Prince would be able to support him, or with a heady and mistaking multitude to gain that obedience, which Government cannot be without.

Power.Power therefore is singly lodged in him, (or them,) in whom the Soveraignty is lodged. And if there be no Soveraignty, or a power, from which there is no ap­peal, there is no Government; for the rights of Soveraignty must be uncontroulable. If God himself were not omnipotent, men would not be guided by his wisdom; for we see men questioning his decrees every day, not content with his justice; for how many disrelish his determination of not re­sisting [Page 61] evil Governors, tho' it were made in behalf of themselves, as the best means to secure their common peace and publick interest? A great part of the office of a Go­vernor is to reward and punish; yet here­in, if power fenced it not, every one would share with his Prince, or dispense these themselves, and become Judges, or give sentence (nay be Executioners too) in their own cases. Where rewards and punish­ments are not well dispens'd, loyalty and faithfulness will both quit a Court. And Boccalini makes those virtues rather to re­tire to a Dog-kennel, than return thither; for that creature, says he, hath some gra­titude and sense of being well used; and therefore these virtues quitted the Court, and went thither. Thus the dispensing rewards and punishments being so eminent a branch of a Princes power, he should trust it in no hand to distribute but his own. All natures, (but Gods) wanting somewhat, are moved or attracted by re­wards, and deterred by punishments; for punishments were added unto laws, that whom conscience would not restrain, pre­sent pain and loss might.

Multitude of subjects in some one, or some nigh Countries, is a foundation of greater greatness than largeness of disperst dominion. This hath enabled France to ruin Spain.

Majesty.Majesty is but the glory of power re­flected, or it is a result of the amplitude of greatness, directed to bring awe and reverence towards authority; for Majesty is but a seeming pageantry, when power upholds it not, and where every one can approach it without respect; for, says the Politicians, Majestas major é longinquo; for when a Prince by some unseeming fa­miliarity of some Favorite abates or lets fall his own Majesty, every one that thinks as well of himself, as the Prince doth of the Favorite, forgets duty and be­comes sawcy. And thus when a Prince abates of the reverence, which ought to be paid to his person, he seldom finds it paid unto his affairs. It is good for a Prince, by a reputation of mildness lodged in him, rather by his discretion, than natural tem­per, to abate in his subjects in general the fear of his power; for that will be thought the juster, when he is sharp upon a parti­cular man, that demerits; but to let fall his Majesty, warrants low thoughts of him among the generality. Thus Princes, tho' as men, they must live as men; yet by reason of the dignity of their office, they must either abstain from, or use these fa­miliarities in private, or be prejudiced in their regal station. And the person, to whom the Prince communicates these fa­vours, [Page 63] if he be either vain or insolent up­on them, (which is a hard task not to be) he draws upon himself an insupportable envy, and on his Masters reputation a great diminution.

The full glory of a Nation (or its ma­jesty) is drawn, as in a burning glass,The Prince the true re­presenta­tive of a Nation. in­to one point, in the person of the King; and therefore if he let it fall himself, or any subject by abuse of his favour darken it, it is an offence against the publick.

The office of a King or supream Gover­nor is to govern multitudes of people; and they are heady, refractory, and un­steady, like horses, apt to be resty, with­out they find their Rider fast in the saddle, and themselves commanded by the bit and spur, or under a power;How his power and majesty are necessary. and thus power is necessary. And common people like children, are delighted with glorious and gay things; and thus Majesty is necessa­ry; so as the reverence of civil Govern­ment is upheld much by the splendor of Majesty; for without this popular fancy will not be pleased nor satisfied; for which reason greatness ever stands in need of some sensible lustre. Thus, as there is a real necessity of power, so considering how strong fancy is in multitudes, there is a necessity, that Majesty be as little neg­lected as Power.

The perso­nal vertues of a Prince.Power and Majesty are the two great supports of Soveraignty, but they are best upheld by two personal virtues, viz. that of Piety, and that of Justice.

Piety.Piety leads a Prince to believe, that he is accountable unto God for the admini­stration of his high office, and it leads the subject to believe, that that prince, who acknowledges a greater power than his own, and that a divine power, is like to use his own unto good ends. It bows his own heart unto God, and his subjects unto himself; or it disposes him to live well, and his subjects to obey willingly. It makes him watchful in the discharge of his own office, and resolute against those, who invade him in it. It is the best di­rectress both of his Power and Majesty; for it keeps power from cruelty, and ma­jesty from disdaining of others. It makes a Prince value the divine Providence, that watches over him more than his Guards; knowing, without this, civil wisdom or military power very often miscarry. In­deed, the vices of Princes always turn un­to their own punishment; for they, that imitate them in their vice, are aptest to disquiet them in their Government; and thus they dishearten good subjects to up­hold them, and encourage ill to rebel against themselves.

Justice, as it flows from piety,Justice. so it is upheld by power. Justice must appear, or be known to be armed; or it is too like to be disputed in its execution. Men entred into Society, that they might enjoy the benefit of it; and when it is obstruct­ed a Common-weal is sick, if generally not administred, the band of Society is dissolved: the execution of it is the life of the laws. No arbitrary power, or de­cision, or reason of state must want justice, for the standing laws, and the arbitrary determinations of Soveraignty must both be reasonable and just; the one may want the formalities or forms of process, which the other is tyed unto; but justice must be the life and spirit of them both. And therefore they are narrow thoughts, that think, what is arbitrary is unjust; for when it is the determination of a good and a wise man, it is very often more perfect than the law it self, because made a rule after the inconvenience of the law is per­ceived; or wise men would make it a law, or give it a sanction as soon as proposed. So as I ever thought the binding the Judg­es, or their binding themselves too strictly unto the letter of the law, and formality of words, and spellings, in pleadings, was like strait ligatures, which hinder just circulation of humors; for it is one thing [Page 66] to leave the Judge too loose, but it is ano­ther (more nocent) to tye him up too strait. This sets up distinct Courts of Equity, and that multiplies suits, and ma­ny other inconveniencies. Keep an ill or corrupt man from being a Judge, soon re­move him, when it is perceived; nay, se­verely punish him, but pinion him not so, as he must sit and see the craft of a Sollici­tor, or an Attorney, evade the true mean­ing of the law; in such a case let him (as well as the party pincht by the subtilty of the plea) have the liberty to put the case to a summary decision of all the Benches, which he finds not fit to determine in his own Court.

Faithful­ness.Faithfulness in a Prince is but a part of his justice. Lying lips, says Solomon, be­come not a Prince; and the reason is, that he that hath a generous heart, will not stand in need of a false mouth. A Prince ought to be cloathed with reputation, which no man inwardly can render to him, on whom he cannot depend; or whose word he cannot rely on.

But because necessarily there must be granted unto men in civil affairs, and in Kingly Policies a greater latitude, than ought to be allowed in common conversa­tion, not of dealing falsely, but of de­meaning a mans self sagaciously, therefore [Page 67] Princes and Ambassadors, who know what weights are used, seldom expect other coin, than that which is mixt with an alloy, which though it debaseth the mettal, yet makes it work the better. Chancellor Ba­con distinguishes well betwixt dissimulati­on and simulation (indeed the distinction is Cicero's in his Offices l. 3.) making the first but an art of State, or an art of life, as Tacitus calls it, i. e. an art of living among men, that dissemble: the other a false profession, by which (I think) he means falsity, when he professes sincerity; which surely is a false Policy, and no ways allowable; the first he assigns unto Au­gustus, the second unto Tiberius. The first is but the art of a well managed horse, who observing the hand, knows how to stop on a sudden. Undoubtedly where a Prince believes he is clearly dealt with, he should be as clear in his dealing: for though their condition exempts them from that openness and round dealing, which is the honor of a private man's nature: yet the importance of their obligations reaching unto the good or harm of so ma­ny private men, they are admitted to have more of the serpentine windings than would become a private man. Equi­vocations must necessarily be disallowed by all men in Treaties; but reservedness [Page 68] in speech, or diversion in discourse, which otherwise would disclose a meaning too soon, a speaking that for his own opinion, which he avers not to be his Master's in­struction, a subtilty of extracting the o­thers thoughts, and yet concealing his own, to be cautious in the beginning of a Treaty, so he be sincere and open in the conclusion of it; all these are seemly in an Ambassador, which would be very blame­able among private men, especially Friends. The best composition, says a great man, is openness in fame, secrecy in habit; for na­kedness, says he, as little becomes a mind, as a body. Histories and Civilians give greater latitude unto Princes to discharge them­selves of the obligation of their Treaties than exact Morality will allow of. I re­member several instances in Dr. Zouch's writings, and particularly of Queen Eli­sabeth, who said plainly, she meant sincere­ly, when she treated; but having promised an assistance, further than would stand with her own treasure and her Peoples safety, she could not bind her self unto the extremity of her Articles. She was ready to shew, she meant not in her Trea­ty to deceive, nor did she then, to bear the ill consequences, which she now dis­cerned. This I relate, this I justifie not; but if frequent examples do justifie it, then [Page 69] we may say, Princes are not deceived, be­cause they expect not the exactness of private men, whose damages reach further than their Persons or private concern. And in Treaties it is now sometimes made an article to make a retrait upon such dis­coveries.

Clemency is a chief part of humanity,Clemency. and should ever be found in a Prince, be­cause most men at one time or other stand in need of a Prince's goodness. But to make it valuable, this virtue should pro­ceed from generosity, not facility of his nature. And he must be careful, that his natural good temper, no, nor his moral clemency, appear to take off the terror of his politick justice. His clemency will sufficiently appear, if it restrain him from frequent severities: for it is neither for the honor of the Prince, nor the Physician, when their Patients are sent in numbers to the burial-places. Clemency withstands not severity, though she endeavors to use it seldom; for a Prince may be very cle­ment in his disposition, nay, in his judg­ment and usual practice, and yet be very severe upon provocations, that warrant the same; for such a well used severity the better illustrates his clemency. But it is much better for a Prince to pardon an of­fence against his Person, than against his [Page 70] Government, or against a private Subject's interest or right And nothing can worse become a Prince's bounty or clemency than to grant pardons to offenders, as dona­tives or rewards to Servants. It is much better to give them the forfeiture of an Of­fender's estate, for that is an Escheat to himself, than a pardon to the Offender, for that is a selling of justice. A pardon is fit not to be given at all, or to be done freely, that so it may be a real act of clemency, and make the Offender grate­ful, or upon a second fault more guilty.

Modesty.Modesty is a virtue of so mean a sound, that it may seem derogatory to attribute it unto a Prince, but if well interpreted, it is a flower in his Crown; for it is a high spirited virtue, tempering greatness or power towards men of inferiour conditi­on, or it is a generous disposition in a Prince, not to dazle a private man with the glory of his Majesty, nor to create in him fear by the terror of his power. So it must needs be attractive both of love and reverence, rendring the Prince accessi­ble, and making him unapt to put a neg­lect or affront upon the meanest man; since the meanest may do the greatest a shrewd turn; for nihil tam firmum est, cui periculum non sit etiam ab invalido.

Besides, Modesty is a great antidote a­gainst flattery, the common bane of Prin­ces, and the flattery, that is made unto their business and affairs, is often greater and more pernicious than that which is made unto their Persons; for the one is but scratching an itch of a prurient temper or blood, but the other is endangering the publick peace or security. Flattery of a Prince's Person is but like a painted flower, that pleases the eye, but offends the smell; but flattery of his business is like a chymical vapor, that stupifies the brain. But in both kinds Princes love to draw it upon them­selves; for such as seem to admire their persons, and applaud or concur in their counsels, they take to be their friends; and the reason of it is, they love rather to have their hopes fortified, than their dan­gers awak't; for they affect to cherish hope, and stifle fear, and are not patient of deliberating or examining a matter by contrary judgments, or of men of seve­ral conceptions, or divers tempers and educations or interests; for opposite opini­ons are like the teeth of a file, it must scrape off, before it can smooth an affair, whilst several concording judgments too often make an affair pleasant and hopeful in the beginning, though more commonly irksome and shameful ar the latter end of [Page 72] it. Xerxes never knew the value of his Councellor Demaratus, until he had made his shameful retreat out of Greece: then he found what the other had told him, that there was much difference between a great multitude and a well disciplined ar­my, whether it were to sight or to subsist; and then he knew the accidents, that at­tended upon the one, in marching through straights, and finding provision, and the usefulness and services of the other. And for the honor of this great King it is, that he valued this single man, more than he did all his other Councellors, when he returned home. But when observations of this kind are never so much multiplied, Princes Courts will never be cured of this King's-evil, but will favour those, who counsel towards what they love, and never have in esteem those, who by projecting the worst, and by foreseeing ill consequen­ces, or cautioning against dangers, evi­dence, that they love their Master's ho­nor and success in affairs, better than they do their own preferments. Fot flattery is the best Court-picklock, and plainness of speech the surest bar against a man's own preferment. Modesty hath this farther good operation upon a Prince, that it minds him of the incertainty of events in the best lay'd and prosecuted designs; [Page 73] there being a common vicissitude or change of fortune, which wise men, like Po­rus, will discern and laugh at even in their captivity, because thereby they dis­cern, quam caduca sit felicitas humana, as Curtius expresses it, or how fading and falling a leaf prosperity is.

Liberality or bounty is much cry'd up in a Prince,Liberality and is very becoming great­ness or Majesty; for men would not love the sun or heavenly bodies for their own glory and heat, if they conveyed not unto them and other creatures cheering light and benign influence. But it requires pru­dence in a high measure to guide it; for if it run into the intrinsick estate of a Prince, or make him poor, that others may be vainly rich, it discredits him more, than it honors him, and looses its name, for 'tis termed prodigality. Even he, that is benefitted by it, despises him for it, look­ing rather on it as a weakness of mind than a greatness. And it obliges unto no thankfulness, if what is loosely or incon­siderately given, obliges to such expences or splendid course of life, (which some Princes affect from those they are thus bountiful unto) that they can lay up no­thing for themselves and children. Mo­ney being like meat; if a man must eat or swallow till he regorge it, he will find a [Page 74] Philosopher's supper better than a Prince's feast. If Favorites of pleasure be the ob­jects of bounty, then the Subjects shut their purse from supplying him, who feeds so many vermin, and on whom such ver­min hang. Let their food be never so good, their mein or countenance never is florid; or if excessive bounty unto some few make Servants loose their small pen­sions, wages, or diets, it aliens the af­fections, and chils the duty of those o­ther many attendants towards their Ma­ster. Indeed bounty unto such men should be only wast water; when the Exchequer can supply the ordinary expences, bounty is then and not until then seemly. Nor should bounty unto Favorites, or expences of pleasure deprive deserving Servants or Subjects of rewards, such as have merited of the State in home or foraign affairs; for for these a Prince may laudably appear rather poor than not bountiful. Yet for these he must not weaken the publick revenue, which in all Nations is reputed Sacred. But the casual revenue, and the offices in the gift of the Crown, the leases even of the Demeasnes, and things of this nature are wisely here disposed: but giving honors and estates in perpetuity, if any one made his reflexions, how many Noble families owed both to the Crown, [Page 75] and yet in this last age have contributed much to pull it down, one would put no great price upon gratitude, or Princes might well think it fit, to put some new rules unto their bounties. Rewards unto some persons, which far exceed the merit of the person, makes others much under­value what they receive, though they re­ceive with an overmeasure. And if their reward come unto them more from the in­terposition of a great man, than the Prince's own disposition, the former will have the thanks: and thus a Prince buys but a Servant for a great man. Sir Dud­ley Digges in his Preface to Secretary Walsingham's Letters observes, that Queen Elisabeth was better served for a Pension of forty pounds per annum, than King James for an annuity of four hundred pounds.

Frugality in a Prince is an universal bounty to all his People;Frugality. for it enables a Prince to live without, or at least to crave less aids, and a Prince's care to promote trade, manufactures, husbandry, &c. or prevent confederacy among men of a trade, as Grasiers, Butchers, &c. or Monopoli­zers, who set the price or dice, as we call it, upon all buyers, is to be numbred a­mong bounties, which reach unto the whole body of the People. So as the [Page 76] Kingly Office is an instrument of bounty and of frugality both; for by one and the same means he inriches his People, and saves his own treasure. Men of this tem­per are least prest upon, for no man judges better, when, and unto whom it is fit to give, than that Prince, that seeks to make his People rich rather by his providence, and by their own industries and frugalities, than by his coffers; for it is a very ill symptom in a State, when every broken fortune hopes to make it self up from a King's Exchequer. Thus frugality is a key unto the Subjects treasure; for the people willingly lend the key of theirs unto a Prince, that keeps the lock of his own: and as unwillingly to one, who spends upon his Favorites what is his own, or what his Subjects supply him with; since the humor of such times and expences in­fects the Country, as well as the Court, and so they will rail against the vices, that are so costly unto them, though they imi­tate them. And if such an expensiveness lead towards a general poverty, it will in a short time draw on a general defection.

Yet Courts must not want their splen­dor: for that is a part of the Prince's ma­jesty, and the very silks and fine linnen of it, the back and the board of a few Courtiers feed the belly, and set on work [Page 77] the hands of many Vulgars. It was ob­served to be impolitick in the Emperor Ju­lian (and accordingly complained of) that he affected to appear in his Court more a Philosopher than a Prince, banishing the Officers of shews and vanity, and of Cooks and Barbers and Taylors, &c.

Love of fame was implanted in men un­to the end they might love virtue;Love of Fame. since there is no greater evidence than that where the one is despised, the other is neg­lected; for though the person of the man in a short time will be forgot, his deeds with reflection on him will be remembred. Hence it is too many men had rather wound their consciences than their fame; yet many make it the cheapest thing they are concerned in. Neglect of fame begets remissness in Government; for he that cares little, how men look upon him, cares less what he doth: says that witty and pleasant, and yet often serious Spaniard, Quevedo; if Christ himself thought fit to ask his Dis­ciples, what say men of me? nay, unto his Apostle St. Peter, what say you of me? it may become the wisdom of the greatest Prince to make the same enquiries. It is disagreeable unto nature to be unconcern'd in fame; since the God of nature made it a restraint upon a vicious course of life, or a means to keep men out of bad company, [Page 78] out of those courses, which expose him to be undervalued; for not only loosness of life, but remissness in affairs, or rash entering upon important actions, and faintly prosecu­ting them, or uncertainty of mind and un­evenness of councels (all which usually are attended with unsuccessfulness) draw down infamy upon a great man. And when a Prince hath lost the inward reverence, which is due unto the generosity of his mind, the outward, which is paid unto his person, will soon appear a shadow, which forsakes the dyal with the sun­shine. It is unloosing the girdle of Go­vernment (solvere cingulum regum) to withdraw an inward esteem from a Prince. Shall jealousie of a Subject's reputation a­waken a Prince? Shall he think it his concern, that this man be not overprized, and yet be unconcerned, that he himself is reputed no way valuable? Since no men are concerned for a Prince they value not, how insecure doth contempt of Fame ren­der him?

Yet Princes or Great men are not to think a lasting fame is a good fame; since the word Famous is an equivocal word, and men may be famous for bad as well as good actions. Judas is as well record­ed as St. Peter, and Herostratus, who burnt Diana's Temple only to keep up his [Page 79] name, lost his esteem among men, and had almost lost his name likewise, Alex­ander the great, and Julius Caesar, and the great and prosperous neighbour Prince of our times affected fame, but they under­stood it not; for her Trumpet sounds and recommends heroick, noble, and virtuous actions, or actions, that benefited mankind, not such, whose effects and prosperity, were only like a storm at sea, or a plaguy year, which are registred in the Kalendar, for the destruction they made and the harm they did. How much more hath a private man to thank God for, that he made him an instrument of a little good unto a few men, than the greatest Prince in the world hath, that he was an univer­sal Pest, and that upon his own choice. The folly of such a conceit appears in this, that he thinks he shall preserve the memory of his person (unto which he is fondly indul­gent) by it; when fame reaches (as that great Boethius says) no farther than unto his actions: so as if they be not beautiful and shapely, though he were another Absalom, fame will but set him out as a Traytor. Boc­calini hath a good representation of the shame and infamy of black successful deeds, when he represents Duke Sforza of Milan demanding a triumph of Apollo, and it being granted him upon the condi­tion, [Page 80] that the families he had unjustly be­trayed and tyrannically ruined, should be placed about the wheels of his Chariot, the shame thereof cured this itch of vanity, and he declined his triumph, that he might conceal the way or means, that enabled him to pretend unto it. This may be a true reason, why God removed the representati­ons of mens persons from fame, and by it en­graved only their actions; for it was the virtues of the mind, which he took care to recommend to posterity, and he designed nothing to be memorable and renowned, but what was fit to be imitated. So as fame, by God's appointment, was to pre­serve the memory of his great and good deeds, unto whose person God designed a reward from himself in another world, if not in this likewise. And yet a good fame makes a man live after his death; for the honor other men pay unto his memory, whose person they have no notion of, ren­ders him to them, as if he was still a liv­ing example of virtue. The appetite of honor is rooted even in nature it self, and therefore if men be careful, how they get it, they may be sollicitous to get it; be­cause alive and dead it benefits others as well as themselves, and because it is ob­servable, that those men, who care not what others think of them, care as little what they do themselves.

Prudence is a Prince's Master-virtue,Prudence. in­deed it is a private man's chief honor. In all Civil, Military, and Ecclesiastical af­fairs it is the great directress. It weighs all circumstances, and foresees the most pro­bable events; for where there is the most of prudence, there is the least of chance: for summa ratione gesta fortuna sequitur.

It is the distraction of a man's mind, that he hath so many several representations of one and the same thing, like a picture if he look upon it by one light, it seems one thing unto him, if by another light, it seems to vary its figure. In its self an affair may be one thing, but cloathed in its various circumstances it is another: so as many ways seem to lead unto it, and yet really there is but one: and this path Prudence only can walk in; for the pru­dent man, like the Chymist, can separate bodies, that are mixt and incorporate toge­ther, and which are indiscernible unto a vulgar eye. In Civil affairs, he is the best Chymist, who hath most experience; for though men may be ingenious with­out it, yet seldom solid or expedite, and yet all the sciences serve him much; for the prudent Prince will stand in need of natural Philosophy, to judge of the natu­ral constitutions and tempers of men, as well as moral, to know how to improve, [Page 82] govern, or restrain the tempers of those, whom he trusts with his affairs; else an impetuosity of temper will blind reason, and transport him, who discerns his own infirmities, and yet hath not been ac­customed to bridle them. An eloquent and designing man will be followed by multitudes, when a sober and well weigh­ing judgment will too often want a com­panion. A prudent man is apter to suspect his own advice, than another man's, of whose integrity he is satisfied; since he may with reason suspect his own judg­ment, because every one needs to see his own thoughts through some other medi­um, than his own way of reasoning; the phansie and the judgment being too nigh of kin to be severe upon each other. Which made Balsac determine, that it was too of­ten the shame and reproach of human wis­dom, that the greatest minds, being whol­ly left unto themselves, in the greatest af­fairs were likeliest to commit the greatest errors. And therefore the prudent man is far from being an overweaning or overcau­tious man, and thus prudence recommends modesty.

Choice of Officers.Nothing therefore more manifests the prudence of a Prince than the choice of his Councellors and subordinate Ministers of State, and Domestick Servants and Favo­rites; [Page 83] for the office of the Prince is well performed in his Person, when he hath chosen good Ministers and Servants; for as hath been said already, He is not the worst Prince, who is the worst man, but he that hath the worst instruments to work by; for the tools usually shew the artist. For a Prince for money or favor to bring undeserving men into offices of great trust, is to gratifie the desire of his enemies; for they wish nothing more.

It is a great evidence of a Prince's own abilities to be able to choose a good Coun­cellor, and of his virtue,Of choice of Counsel­lors about a Prince. not to render such a Counsellor useless unto himself; for he that will receive Counsel, must have no pretincture or preingagement, or no bias, which may draw him off from judg­ing what is said unto him. He must have no petty Counsellors or Favorites of pleasure, to stagger his resolutions by whispers. He must shut his ears unto flatterers; for if he once believe that sort of men in what they say in commendati­on of himself, he will soon believe them in what they say against others. So as Ju­lians reply to a man, that highly commend­ed him, was very remarkable, When, Sir, says he, you have told me as freely of my faults, as you have of the excellencies you pre­tend to see in me, then I will give belief to [Page 84] what you say now. And Aristotle's epistle unto Alexander is most remarkable, where­in he told him, he was most glad to under­stand, that he was not, as too many Princes were, so scornful and so unreasonable, as to make good advice ridiculous. This was worthy of so great a man's taking notice of; for no­thing makes serious men sooner desert a Prince's interest, than to be under a slight­ed character; for Cicero in his Offices ob­serves, many men will lose their lives for a Prince, who will not lose their reputations. I once heard these Buffoons, that thus pleased a Prince, called by a serious Gen­tleman, the Petards of a Court; for, said he, by representing any man in a disguise or mas­querade, they will blow up his credit pre­sently.

If a Prince have a known bias, he will too soon be observed, and a common un­derstanding at Court will make that ap­pear wisdom, which really is but flattery; for there is scarce any one maxim in Poli­cy, which is not combated by some other; therefore they that study their own pre­ferment or security, not their Princes esta­blishment or honor, will soon find, that the weaker reason, that gratifies the stronger passion of a Prince, is ever accep­table and rewarded; whilst the stronger reason is mis-interpreted as a disaffection. [Page 85] Princes therefore must discountenance no man's advice: for a wife Prince, like a good Huntsman, must encourage the dog, that hunts for the sents, as well as he that hits it. And Counsel, that is sincere, must be grateful, and the Counsellor if he speak in private, his Counsel must be kept private: for if the Prince expose him unto a contrary faction, it will create that cau­tion, that he will want freedom of advice, when the other wants his security in ad­vising. Thus Princes must not call their Counsellors to advise, as Xerxes did, and then tell them, he called them to bring obedi­ent minds, not troublesome debates. And if a Prince would be well advised, he must ad­vise early; for there is no comfort to say, Sir, the time is past, or it is too late now to think on it. A Prince should have no Councellor to be so mean, as to be a re­proach unto him, nor so lofty, as to re­proach him; for the very errors of a Prince are to be concealed, or respectfully laid o­pen before him, and to be, as much as may be, concealed from others.

My Lord Bacon says, a Prince should have but few, and those well chosen Counsellors, that they may carry on his business with one spirit of direction; therefore he observes wise Henry the seventh made use only of Bishop Morton and Bishop Fox. Over [Page 86] greatness in one, or over strict combinati­on in a few, may be both dangerous to him. He may keep his ear open unto many, but he must not let them run into factions against one another, if he hope to be served by any; for they will reak their spight against one another at the price of his disservice. If both concur not in his business, he deceives himself, if he thinks he hath use of either. If he carry himself with indifference unto their particular con­cerns, he may make use both of their ad­vices and interest unto his own service. And any other way of managing factions, or keeping them at odds, unto my obser­vation, was never useful unto any Prince. If either of them have a predominancy with him, at least so by turns, as one checks the other, both disserve him.

The best way of a Prince to know the nature of him he would make a Counsel­lor of, is to know him by domesticks, and neighbours, and general vogue; for from these no man can long conceal him­self or his natural inclinations. Enemies will traduce him, friends over value him; but these (if what they say flow naturally from themselves) best discover him. And the Counsellor's nature is as much to be considered, as his abilities: for though Princes most commonly best esteem of [Page 87] subtil men, it is moral good men, who best advance their service; for a mind not sea­soned with morality, like the delicatest wines, will best please the taste for a time, but soon grow prickt or sowre, or some trick they will play at last, harms more than any of their services do good.

When piety therefore is joyned unto natural abilities, ripeness of age,Characters of a Coun­cellor. and good experience, (as early having entred into business) then a Prince may expect not on­ly an able, but a faithful Councellor. If piety be wanting, abilities will turn but unto compliances, and self-ends, or ser­ving some faction rather than the Prince; for moral virtue is the only restraint up­on self-interest. Abilities destitute of pie­ty, seldom advance a Princes service, and he is likeliest best to serve his Prince on earth, who serves his God in heaven; for piety only can restrain the ill effects of ambition or covetousness, or lead a man to prefer his masters service, more than any provision for wise or children. It is the honour of Cardinal Toledo, that he refu­sed to be of the Kings Council, without he might declare Gods will in opposition unto the impiety of modern policies. Without natural abilities in a Councellor, men expect a harvest, without having sowed the field; or if it were sowed, and [Page 88] the seed corn not good, (viz. sowed with principles Epicurean, Machiavilian, or Hob­bian they will never serve to govern a free peop [...]e; they may to render men slaves. If Councellors be not grave and aged persons, they that are to obey their counsels will not reverence them, or cheer­fully submit; for young men must ne­cessarily want experience, and without experience the best abilities will be subject unto gross errors. A Statesman, or indeed, any man in any course of life, must be broken unto business (rompu aux affaires) before any other man can confidently de­pend on him; for he is not to be depend­ed on to guide an affair, that hath not seen both sides of fortune, or met with di­sasters as well as good successes, or obser­ved them carefully in History. When young men give the counsel, the matter of it is most commonly violent; for their tem­per leads either unto rash and daring things, such as may endanger the settlement of the present state, (which no wise Prince for increase of jurisdiction or prerogative should ever adventure) or unto wit and repartees, which are proper for discourses at a table, but not for the gravity of a Council-board: for commonly they gain their esteem by judgments they make on things past, or by reflections on an affair in general, not [Page 89] by councils or determinations on some­what that is present and particular. In­deed, it is a great mistake to think men of wit, with some mixture of Latin and Greek, or foreign languages, make the properest persons for business. A great man both of wit and learning, Thucydi­des, determines against it, Hebetiores, quam viri acutiores, melius Rem-publ. administrant. Young and witty men have too much fancy to examine their own judgments, and their warm temper makes them pro­secute an affair with eagerness at first, and remisness towards the end, acribus initiis, sed incurioso fine, and they are too likely rashly to run into errors, and by unseaso­nable remedies to endeavour their cure, or intempestivis remediis delicta accendunt. I use the Authors words, (tho' the method of writing be out of fashion) because I would strengthen my self with their au­thorities. Besides, young and witty men value themselves much by being not re­strain'd by ancient forms of business; for usually they find some way more expe­dite, and seemingly more reasonable, which usually upon tryal is found other­wise; for they argue their own change, or what they make it is a state of melio­ration, but they foresee not the inconve­niences, which attend upon their own pro­ject: [Page 90] whilst Thucydides observes, the Nations, which were less prone to change their customs, were most commonly esteem­ed the wisest. Besides, men of this age and temper, as they are most enclined to be vain glorious, so less capable of secre­sie, whilst age and experience render men apter to give wholsom than complying counsel; and as not to be too strictly tied unto old forms and customs, so not to part with them but upon great exami­nation. All which is the evidence of a ju­dicious mind.

Nothing therefore characters a Councel­lor better, than that it may be truly said of him, He is a sincere man, or, as we say of a good Common-wealths man, he is one that prefers the Publicks concern before his own private interest; so a good Coun­cellor will in affairs, that are important, rather consider his Masters service than his Masters inclination. And that I may set down all the extremities of integrity at once, (but I am afraid I am describing rara avis in terris) a man that will lose his place, or fortune, or favour, rather than not plainly, and without artifice, tell his Master betwixt them two, what is his opinion. Afterwards, tho' his Masters judgment be like to be his Masters pre­judice, (because Councellors are not Pre­ceptors) [Page 91] that will as industriously obey his Masters commands, as he would have done, if his Masters commands had been grounded upon his own counsel; for he ought to think, that his Masters opinion or inclination may be better than his own. When the Prince cannot admit this free­dom, nor the Councellor (in case there be nothing immoral in it) make this submissi­on, neither of them is fit for the other. If the Princes own counsels cast what is settled into danger, or make it to be ob­tained by extremities (tho' not illegalities) upon his own Subjects, a good man would rather make his retreat, and dye obscure­ly, than see his Master or his Country run a great risque; for it was Callisthenes great honour, not that he is said never to have betrayed his Prince unto others, but because he would never condescend to be­tray him to himself, as most Flatterers do, or concur with him when his opinion dif­fered. Thus it's one thing to obey a Prince, another to counsel him.

This imaginary sincerity (for we may rather describe it than hope to meet with it) in a Princes Councellor will incline him, that thus values simplicity of mind, to avoid all subtil and underhand ways; for a man of this temper is a judging or thinking person, and he knows humane [Page 92] actions are best managed by familiar and easie means; for the plain hearted man, who resolves singly to have his eye upon the nature of the business he is to act in, (and he cannot understand well the nature of an affair, if he totally forgot the con­juncture of the times and persons engaged about it) he will discard subtilty, and not super-refine upon that, which may end well, if he make not new adventures, that it might conclude better; since, as Car­dinal Mazarine observed, the faisons mieux spoiled more business than ever it advan­ced; for subtilty commonly fews thorns, and often is forc'd to walk over them. Machiavels Borgia thus prick'd his own feet, and so did Pope Clement VII. And d'Avila observes, Henry the 3d grew wea­ry of the intrigues his Secretary Villeroy had intangled him in; and Bentivoglio shews Cardinal Granvils dexterities proved Philip the Seconds intanglements. A Prince or Councellor therefore must not consider the advantages the end he propo­ses will get him, and forget, that the com­plexion of the times, and the humours of Subjects may be indomitable, or supera­ble with so much hazard, that it will be no wisdom to put a Princes fortune upon the chance of a die. A Princes greatness should rise like a vegetable, indiscerni­bly; [Page 93] for hasting to be rich, and hasting to be great or absolute, are both alike dangerous.

No man will be long thus sincere or ho­nest, who hath not courage; for it is an act of bravery to seek his Masters advan­tage before his own; for courage frees him from the sollicitude of diving into his Ma­sters inclinations, or scrutining abditos sensus Principis, or being concerned what party stands in opposition unto him, or what harm they can do him; which thoughts take up the whole time of a timerous Councellor, who prostitutes both his Ma­sters and his own honour for a little secu­rity. This temper is ever reclaiming re­bellions by caresses, or expedients, and they, who are of it, spend most of their advice in shoring up the house they plainly see will fall, but hope it will last their time. Their trade is how to observe, which party in a Court prevail, and to be officious towards it, and they care not in what languishing condition their Ma­sters affairs are, so their own post be safe. With the Amsterdam dog, they will at best defend their shoulder of mutton for a time, but when they see the other dogs have pulled it out of the basket, they will go in for their share. It was faintness in councel, that lost both Rome and Constan­tinople, [Page 94] and I may say England or the Monarchy in King Charles the first's time; his armies discipline render'd them not formidable unto the Rebels, and yet the Councellors were afraid of their too great prosperity.

A good Councellor should be steady in his advice, but steadiness differs much from inflexibility. He that adheres to princi­ples is reckoned steady; yet when the conjuncture of affairs requires it, he must strike sail, and he can own it; for says Cicero, as affairs submit themselves often to me, so must I sometimes unto them; Ut mihi res, sic me rebus submittere cogor. And Cato, had he been less positive, had preserved Rome's or the Senates freedom longer. Cato optime sentit, sed saepe Reipubl. nocebat. Probity may be impetuous, and so consequently nocent. Flexibility may suit with judgment, because forc'd by ne­cessity, but instability can no way be justified, because it is a natural inconstan­cy of mind, or weakness of reasoning.

A wise Councellor will not engross too many affairs into his own hands, nor in­croach upon other mens offices; nor be apt to undervalue them in it; or be apt to raise his own credit by the loss of other mens; for he that doth good offices unto others, is in the best way to make hearty [Page 95] friends for himself. And he must be pa­tient to hear other mens advices; nay, with some respectfulness bear their follies; and he must be unconcerned, even when his own councels are not complied with, or are laid aside. Above all, a Privy Councellor should be secret, for without secresie neither arms nor councel are like to be successful. Augustus valued Me­coenas for his secresie; Agrippa for his la­borious patience; and Virgil for his plea­surable and learned conversation. If there be a chink in a Council-Chamber, it dis­covers, or gives as much light, as a win­dow doth in another room. Our great Chancellor Bacon recommends it unto Prin­ces, to beware that they themselves unse­cret not their own affairs; for crafty men will lay trains by discourses of one kind, to find the secret resolutions of another kind; so it is dangerous for Princes per­sonally to treat with foreign Ambassa­dors.

But lest this should seem a Platonick Re­publick, or rather a speculation,How much it is in the power of a Prince to make good Counc [...]llors for himself. than any thing, that was probably practical, or might dishearten Princes from looking af­ter such men to make Councellors of; we will only say, if custom and habits can change nature, Princes can do as much; for if the Prince will chiefly favour men [Page 96] of good natural endowments, and of a moral honesty, (which will soon turn into piety) and if he encourage industry, and let young men perceive, that they must walk up unto preferment by stairs and degrees, and begin with the lower offi­ces, before they can hopefully pretend unto the highest; if he find not good men to serve him, he will make men fit to serve him. So as it is much the Princes own fault, when he thinks a Favourite of pleasure or sports, conversation and diver­tisement, must presently be fit to be made a guide in business; (for he can give the place, but he hath not omnipotency to give the abilities) or when he will look up­on no man himself, but through the glass, or as the image of a man is reflected unto him from a Favourite, or some great Offi­cer; for this is to strengthen their root, and to weaken his own. For here, tho' the gift is his, the obligation is anothers; this makes him have many attendants but few servants; for servants placed about him by great men, are rather their spies than his servants. Such an uncon­cernedness as this, who is about him, makes him appear like a town block'd up, he can freely receive no provisions he stands in need of; and his own servants are disheartened, by perceiving great mens [Page 97] friends and servants every day preferred or gratified before them. This course chills all publick spiritedness, for men in­troduced by Favourites think, they shall last no longer than their Patrons, who are often changed or in the wain; and so they come unto a Court like harvest men, who serve only in a short time to reap that which others ploughed, sowed, and harrowed for; or they work only in fair weather, and when the corn is carrying into the barn. If a Prince therefore have ill servants, he owes much of it unto his own negligence, or not valuing that which he stands most in need of.

And thus from his great Councellors and Ministers of State,A Princes menial Ser­vants or small fami­ly. we will come to reflect upon his menial Servants, and say a little of his little Family or Court, and then of his great Family or Common-Weal, or the several orders of men in the Com­mon-Weal, each of them being to be a part of his Regal study, for by them he may be served, or he may be endangered; and neither Servant nor Subject will be long useful, when he observes there is no observation of what he doth. And no­thing may shew a Prince more his declen­sion, than when both these sorts of men are unconcerned, whether he be pleased or displeased with their service. And [Page 98] very often the irreverence, that is paid him in his own Court, is the mother of the neglect of his commands out of it, or that the discontents of the one breed the male­volence of the other; yet it is a great evi­dence, that a Government is off its hinges, when a few forward and daring men open­ly oppose his affairs, and many cautious ill willers are pleased at it, and scarce any ready to assert his rights; or rather, as Tacitus expresses it in his terms, Is habi­tus animorum fuit, ut pessimum facinus aude­rent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur.

Libels and licentious discourses are ill Symptoms, and false news easily spread; and when men in place speak fearfully, and those that invade the Government boldly, it is a sign reverence is lost. Ta­citus expresses it, when they speak, libe­rius quam ut Imperantium meminissent; or, quando mallent mandata Imperantium interpre­tari quam exequi. Discontents among the Vulgars, and broken estates among the great ones, or if there be other combusti­ble matter, no man knows how small a spark, or from whence it may come, that will set all on fire. When fear is greater than feeling, jealousies will admit of no reasoning. And when there is a general dissolution of manners, there is seldom found authority enough to reclaim that [Page 99] people; but some notable change follows; for there is in a State in some conjuncture of time as discernible a publick madness, as there is in private men; and perchance I have lived to see it abroad, or at home, I think more than once.

A Princes Court is a little Republick, and it is a great sign, that the Prince is in the affection of his people, when his ser­vants are respected through his whole Kingdom for the reverence they bear him. Which if it be paid by some few great men of the place, where they come, it is soon imitated by all the rest of the Country; therefore his Servants usually called Courtiers, must be as courteous and civil in their sphere, as they are willing to be kindly treated, when they are in other mens. So as a Princes family ought to be of persons well chosen, and of good reputation and behaviour; and the nigh­er in relation or service the person is unto the King, the more humanity and kind­ness he should shew to those who come to Court; especially those who come rather to pay a duty, than make a suit; for this last sort are to be answered friendly, but still according unto the nature of their re­quest. Access ought to be easie, and an­swers made with gentleness as well as reasonableness; for the hand of haughti­ness [Page 100] is not to reach even a courtesie; for where the receiver is discontented in the manner of it, the favour conferred is never half acknowledged.

A Prince should not admit about his Person men of bold tempers, and who dare openly avow immoral tenents or principles, for these men will soon call that which is good indifferent, and then they will not be long before they will call that which is vicious reasonable; and artificially in­sinuating into his favour by keeping in­telligence with his passions, they will en­deavour to lead him from vanity unto vice; and the fouler the latter is, if they be but an instrument or companion in it, the securer they are in his grace; for there is at a Court no so ready way unto gain and preferment, as that which is got by some shameful service; and such men be­ing privy unto a Princes clandestine vices, they will never be quiet until they be ad­mitted unto his publick concerns. Scire volunt secreta domus inde (que) timeri. Such tri­vial Servants, or smaller sort of Favorites as these, have politicks sitted to secure themselves. There is nothing (say they) so safe for a Prince, as to make new crea­tures of his own. A Prince must be con­stant, and adhere even unto his errors, rather than be lightly carried over unto [Page 101] other mens Judgments, lest he seem to live upon a borrowed reason. Hence it is, or from such small Favorites as these it is, that some Historians have observed, that when the spring-heads of some Princes councils have been discovered, they are small even to contempt. Darius's expe­dition into Greece, arose either from a Physician unto himself, who told him, what excellent figs grew there, or from his Wives maid, who told her, if the King made a war upon that land, she would have the great Ladies of Greece her slaves. Varro hath the like observation, and Monsieur de Plessis assigns much of the miseries that befell the French Nation up­on the Catholick League, unto the Duke of Guises cheating Monsieur d'Espernon of a Miss. And thus often a Favorites passion begins a war, as well as a Princes publick interest. On the smaller sort of smaller Favorites Boccalini puts a high contempt, when he says, all the money in a Princes treasure will not buy sugar enough to candy or sweeten them. The Abbot D'Escallie, I remember, long since at Brussels told me a very pleasant story, how his wise Master, the Duke of Savoy, (Le viel Renard des montaignes) took from him an elegant Barber that he had, who grew so great a Favorite, that he [Page 102] trusted him in some of his most important Services; in which miscarrying, he com­plained unto the Abbot; Sir, (says the Abbot) concern not me herein, for I put him unto the outside of your head, you put him in­to the inside. A Prince therefore must be very careful in the choice of his Servants, that they be men equal unto their business, and not above it, or under it, and honest minded as well as strong brained; for to serve faithfully is as necessary as to serve ably; since abilities seldom make recom­pences for frauds, and since honest men in favour will seldom want the parts of able men, not yet admitted thereunto. Balzac says truly, the greatness of a Prince must not rob him of the pleasantest part of hu­man passion, i. e. the free and kind conver­sation of some person,A Favorite of pleasure allowable, but not to be made a Favorite of business. whom by some se­cret and unaccountable motion he likes in conversarion; for neither moral virtue nor policy puts any such restraint upon nature; these correct the imperfections of sensual appetites, but gratifie both great and small inclinations in natural and not immoral contentments. But publick Ministers, or such as privately are employed about pub­lick affairs, are to be chosen by reason, not affection. Such choices, as hath been already observed, Augustus made, when he drew into his affection and service Me­cenas, [Page 103] Horace, and Virgil, who were qualified as well to be Councellors as Companions. Besides, an ill Favorite is often a necessary instrument or skreen un­to a worse Prince; for Tacitus observes, Tiberius was worse without Sejanus than with him. Tiberius (says he) vixit obtectis libidinibus, dum Sejanum dilexit & timuit, sed in scelera simul & dedecora prorupit, post­quam remoto pudore & metu, suo tantum inge­nio utebatur. And people reake their ill will rather upon these than on their Prince.

Nothing is meant more here, than that a Favorite of pleasure should not be made a Favorite of business. A Prince should be the Master of the spring-head himself, that he may water whom he pleases; for if he suffer himself to be ingrossed, and passes his influences by another unto all his De­pendants, he may have outward reverence but never inward esteem; for such uncon­troulable Favorites for the most part, as they are very expensive in themselves, so they are very insolent unto others, and therefore upright and able men will not serve under them, Thus they are like Beacons or Lighthouses at sea, which old Sailers know are to be avoided; but young make towards them in the night, and endanger a shipwrack.

A Princes great fa­mily, or or­ders of men in his na­tion.These and many more troublesom con­siderations a Prince hath about his Do­mesticks or little Family. Many more then he must have about his great Fami­ly or Common-weal. For as individuals or single men are to be considered, so every rank or profession of men are to be weighed by him, since his security or his danger hath in several periods of times arisen, as his Nobility or Commons, nay, as his Clergy have been affected and pre­dominant. Nay, he is to observe even the natural and constant clime of his Coun­try, for that will learn him much of the temper of his Subjects in general; for as Barclay says, Haeret quaedam vis inconcussa hominibus pro conditione terrarum. And some ages run unto arms, others unto learning; some unto trade, some unto superstition in their Religion,A spirit of government necessary to a Governor. or Phanaticism. With all these difficulties his spirit of Government must grapple, and without a spirit of Go­vernment he will miscarry; or if he please not himself in the affairs of his Govern­ment; or if it be his task, not part of his pleasure. A Princes Politicks will be as improsperous as his Oeconomicks are, who loves to spend freely, and yet never to look upon an account; but every one meets not with a Richelieu, and a Maza­rine, or Colbert; nor with a Master, who will so treat them.

Come we now unto his great Family, which consists of the Orders or Tribes among his Subjects, viz.

• • 1. Clergy.
  • 2. Nobility.
  • 3. Gentry
  Or his three States made up of these three Or­ders.
• and Commons.

Next of the Professions, viz.

• 1. Divines.
• 2. Lawyers.
• 3. Physicians.
• 4. Soldiers.
• 5. Merchants.
• 6. Seamen.
• 7. Tradesmen.
• 8. Artificers.
• 9. Husbandmen.
• And 10. Vulgars or Multitudes.

Wise States encourage not Book­men in great numbers: for they oftner, both Divines and Lawyers, especially Atturneys, rather raise quarrels, than either prevent or compose them. Li­teras, says an Historian, ad usus saltem discebant, &c. reliqua omnis disciplina erat, ut pulchre parerent, ut labores perferrent, ut in pugna vincerent.

A Government (says Bodin) is made up of an harmonick justice, i. e. of such a structure; that the meanest tribes or profession of men find, that they are considered, and in some measure conside­rable in the Government: even the Mul­titude or Vulgar, or lowest sort of men being very considerable, in respect of their very number.

The Clergy are an order of men set a­part among all Nations for the divine ser­vices of the God of the land;Clergy. for the Gentile and Barbarians never wanted their Brach­mans or their Druides, and every where they were men of prime rank; for the na­tural reverence, that was due to their call­ing, gave such an authority to their per­sons, that most commonly they were con­versant in the most important affairs of the Nation; (for here we mention them only in relation to the Civil society) none being fitter to interpose betwixt Prince and People, than those that interceed with God for both. And the respect that is paid to them, is a reverence paid to God; for upon the same ground Princes Ambassa­dors are treated with those observances they meet with; upon the same are God's Ministers. In this order of men God be­comes in a manner visible unto us; for when we find he hath Servants peculiar to himself, a Court, or Temple, and reve­nues appropriate for maintenance of both, we straight conclude, of a surety God is in this place, or he is the Lord of this people. So as there is no greater evidence, that pi­ety decays in a Nation, than that they are apt to contest or disrespect their Priests or Ministers.

Now as this is a valuation due to the Minister of God's word, so he himself is to pay a respect unto his own calling, and to appear worthy of it, and fitted for it; for duties are reciprocal, and he is God's husbandman, and therefore must cultivate his People; and if he truly discharge his office, in fitting them for another world, he fits them best for society in this world, and for subjection to the Prince: and there is no such way for him to procure the dignity, that is due to himself, as to exercise the proper virtues of his calling. Other tyes or compliances with the hu­mors and manners of a People: or becom­ing like them with them in common con­versation begets familiarities, but not re­verence. Piety in themselves, and en­deavors to make their flock pious, or of or­derly lives, discretion in being friendly and helpful, or ready to advise and do good offices, a private information or admonition at home, or a conversation, which recommends that unto particular men out of the pulpit, which is preached unto them in it; this attracts their good will, whilst being unconcerned with, or conforming their company to the irregular or negligent habit or custom of others, re­moves the inward esteem they should la­bour for. This ought to be very sincerely [Page 109] Pursued; I will no be so uncharitable, as to say, it is artificially so done by some of the Romanists, and by some of the Pres­byterians, (though I believe one gains much of his authority by his indulgences and easie absolutions, and the other by his assurances, that they carry God's brand to mark the elect with:) only I wish our Country Clergy would be more strict to follow the rules they receive, and I have often heard given them by their Bishops in their visitations: for when they influ­ence their flock towards God's service, they lead them the easier to be subject chearfully to their Prince's laws and com­mands. And if this Order of men will expect (as justly they may) the Prince's protection for themselves, they owe it him as a duty, to keep themselves so in esteem and friendship with their congregati­ons, as they may dispose them to his ser­vice; for if they fall into the envy or dis­esteem of their Parishioners, they who should be an ease and coadjutors of their Prince, make their protection a burthen to him, or they become as an useless body. In this quarrelling and examining age the Governors of the Church should endeavour to make matters of faith treated on with plainness, and not mingled with too many distinctions: that matters of good life be [Page 110] taught as much by the example of the teachers, as his expositions or precepts: that their Visitations and Courts of Ju­risdiction be not only formal, or in mainte­nance of Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction or gain, or rather for shewing their Orders, and paying for it, (as I have heard no mean men among themselves say) than for keep­ing them in good order; especially that their excommunications be upon weighty matters, and somewhat that is purely Christian. For though contumacy to a Court be a great fault, and that this Ec­clesiastick Court have no other penal or legal censure: yet when the subject matter, on which the excommunication is grounded, is some civil or mixt concern, then this be­ing a spiritual punishment seems so remote, that it makes excommunication seem light, and draws neglect rather than respect or obedience to the Jurisdiction. These good Fathers should be known to be forward to divert a Prince from laying great or unne­cessary burthens on their Subjects; which if it be perceived by the Subject, then this temper in the Clergy will get such a dis­position in the Layety, as will lead them respectfully to hearken to such doctrines, as invite them patiently to bear grievances or pressures; since it is an eminent virtue in a Christian Subject to bear with the [Page 111] errors of a remiss Government. Thus a Clergy must make themselves as useful as they can in secular affairs both to Prince and People, if they would gain upon them in their spiritual concerns; and this we may say, is an incumbent duty upon them, as they are members of a Politick body. And in this sense it is, that no­thing more concerns a Prince, in respect of the influence this order of men have on his Subjects, than that he provide, (as God hath done for him) that his Clergy depend on no body but himself; for if ei­ther in the Prince's Ecclesiastical affairs, they pretend a Superior authority to his, as making themselves depend on a Pope, and thereby exempting themselves from the Prince's jurisdiction, or that they can wrest themselves into his secular affairs, as they have some relation to Spiritual or Ecclesiastical concerns (which even Pres­bytery hath set up a claim unto) then this Prince's State, and his Subjects obedience will be very precarious and dangerous: and his condition not much bettered, if Ju­nius Brutus and Buchanan, or the School­men and Jesuits be the Interpreters of St. Paul's thirteenth Chapter to the Romans, or of St. Peter's 1. Ep. 2. ch. v. 13. And the like he may expect from an Enthusiastical Teacher, who will be but binding him in [Page 112] chains, and his Nobles in links of iron. He must not be ignorant therefore, that his office supervises theirs, and when he hath not encroached upon that spiritual part of their office, to which they are properly said to be set apart and consecrated, (as administring the publick Offices of the Church, of praying for, and preaching un­to, and administring the Sacraments) then to oversee these Overseers in the good or male-administration of their Offices is his duty and his security. And in this kind, how far an Episcopal Clergy (as acknow­ledged and setled here in England) exceeds all others through the whole world, as best agreeing with Christ's institution, and the Apostles practice, judicious, learned, and Christian Examiners will best and soonest find out. And we will conclude our remarks upon this Order of men with this experiment, that in the year 1640, nothing raised so much the Rabble, as did the Non-conformist Clergy, who from all parts of the Kingdom came most up to the City, and filled most of the pulpits, and the Lecturers residing there; and in this present year 1678, nothing so much secur­ed the peace of that place (nay, we may say of the whole Nation, for Whitehall had one kind of Guards, and the Citizens, true it is, by the King's leave, were their [Page 113] own Guards) as did the Orthodoxy of the Clergy, and the satisfactions the better sort of Citizens took in their own Mini­sters, who so prudently preached down the then suspected designs against the Re­ligion established and secured loyalty by Christian principles.

Nobility is (or of old was) usually the off-spring of virtue, or valor, or industry,Nobility. now it is more commonly the creature of the Prince; for he is the fountain of ho­nor. Their order is like the lesser or pla­netary lights in the firmament, which attend upon the sun; they are to set forth the splendor or majesty of the soveraign throne, yet sometimes they eclipse it. If they withdraw their banks, they often let in an inundation of Populacy, and endan­ger the throne; if they interpose their bo­dies, they sometimes skreen the Populacy from the scorching heat of Soveraignty; but they prey often upon both; for as they are sometimes a restraint upon the Tyrant-Prince, so they are often an en­couragement to the giddy multitude, to be contumacious and refractory: and some­times they have been so unnatural, as to draw over the fickle multitude, and to joyn themselves unto a forreign Prince, against their true Soveraign, as in the time of King John. Which evidences, that [Page 114] the body Politick like the Natural, when the humors and gall overflow, and the parts lose their temperament, the whole looses its health. If the Nobility be few and great, they too often turn the scale of Government, which they should keep upright; if they be many or necessitous, they first peel the Court, and then are Court instruments to peel the people. Nobility is a plant, that will degenerate; and though they often owe their fortunes as well as their qualities unto the Crown; yet we have too many examples among us, that the Sons and posterity of those Fami­lies, which were wholly raised by the Prince, employed themselves most to pull down the cloth of State. Thus the no­blest of men, if they may but gratifie some violent passion, or compass some present advantage, they desert their station, and the meanest things will be done by the greatest men. When their numbers are many, they appear but like a more splen­did Gentry. Henry the seventh did as it were undermine their greatness, which in so mixt a Monarchy as ours is, was not very compatible with Soveraignty in so few hands. From that time this order of men in our Government hath not only been in the wain, but may be supposed much to have degenerated; for the ancient [Page 115] Nobility have much lessened their Estates and have made way for the principles of Oceana; for cutting off the dependencies from themselves, they made the Yeoman­ry free, which bred our multitude of Free­holders, who (says Mr. Harrington) have now the ballance of our land or land-rents, and consequently, in his opinion, of our wealth, and by his arguments, con­sequently of our power: but consult Mr. Wrenn, and Oceana is drowned. And our Reformation did as much for our Church-lands, which seemed a fifth or sixt of the Kingdom. All which contribu­ted unto the late temporary subversion of our Government in our late good, but unfortunate Prince's reign, Charles the first. God did restore us from this capti­vity, but whether he be not drawing up­on us, for the abuse of that mercy, the judgment we generally deserved as Regi­cides, he knows, whose ways are in the depth, and past finding out. This change had never been effected, had not the No­bility forsaken that cloth of State, they owed their dignity unto, and ought to have protected: but infirm must that pa­lace be, whose main beams shrink from the walls; but down will those beams fall, which are withdrawn from what ought to support them. And when our Gentry do [Page 116] the like, our very Soveraignty will fall to be among Mechanicks; and not long af­ter, the vulgar Rabble will have a pros­pect for their ambition, and when paltry Players (both Clerical and Lay) have got the habits of King, and Priest, and Nobles, and Gentry, the mock Comedy for some time will pass for a good form of Govern­ment. But he that rules in heaven can only predict, whilst an honest and con­doling, not upbraiding, spirit may inof­fensively, because rationally, forewarn.

Nobility in all nations, as they have had more honor deferred unto them than other ranks of men, so they have had more priviledges and immunities. Boccalini, I am sure, hath the reflexion: but I remem­ber not whether I follow him step by step; he resembles (as I think) Princes unto shepherds, the Commonalty unto the sheep, and the Nobility (for Nobility were ori­ginally Soldiery) unto the doggs. (This is not a derogatory term, for it is but to follow a Metaphor.) So as, says he, if these be overawed, that they may not bark and fight for their charge (for they are to defend the shepherd as well as the sheep) or, if they be not armed with an iron collar of Generosity, (some extraordinary prehemi­nence or priviledge) but be awed and cow­ed by the shepherds boys, or the rams of [Page 117] the flock, both shepherd and sheep in a time of need, or when some wolfish con­quering King shall invade, or a Home. U­surper undermine both; I say then, such a sort of generous daring Spirits will be wanting, and a bold Fellow, that hath fol­lowed a loaden horse on foot, will think, he is as fit to ride on horseback, (and pro­bably he may be so) as the greatest Lord: for a crab-wine is preferred to support the stomach before vinegar, that sprang from a generous grape, because turned. If No­bility degenerate, Princes should employ men, who have the virtues, not the titles of great men. But if Nobles have both, they are the sittest men to be employed for their extraction; and their already being masters of moderate fortunes makes them have great advantages over men of natural and acquired parts, though never so well exercised or experimented, if new men; for the tree is less envied, that grows from a root, and hath been long in growing, than the mushroom, that was not at night, and shews a head in the morning. Henry the seventh supposed he had strengthened the Crown, when he cut the wings of the Nobility; Henry the eighth vindicated the just rights of the Crown, from the u­surpations of a foreign usurping Bishop; both which acts made great changes in [Page 118] the state of our Government. Queen E­lisabeth both unto Bishop and Nobleman allowed a due honor: but in her time, a novel Schismatical Presbyterian humor crept into the veins of some of all orders; so as too many Presbyters designed to le­vel the Bishops with themselves, and too many Nobles, Gentry, and Commons found fair hopes to set up a real Aristocra­cy with an insignificant or titular Monar­chy. And thus was made an inundation in Charles the first's time, which swept a­way the scepter, and the sword, and the miter; and though the waters are fallen again into their banks, there is yet much slime left behind, and the ill vapor, that not long since gave the Common-weal a syncope, may turn into an apoplexy, if the three Estates be not apt to do right unto one another, and all unto their Prince.

Soldiery.Soldiery may be accounted a lesser sort of Nobility; for arms raised in the first times private men into the rank of No­bles, as usually favor of Princes, and ma­nagement of affairs, or the penny doth now; but honor lost its spirit, or lustre, or esteem among men, since flattery or a sum of money became the current price for it. No man can properly be accounted a Soldier: though he may be a stout and [Page 119] valiant man, who hath not been frequent in dangers, and served some time at the trade.

Gentry are the lesser Nobility,Gentry. and did usually influence the Commons, as the Nobility did usually them: but as they emancipated themselves from dependance on the Lords, so among us the Freehol­ders have withdrawn much of their respect from them. For that last rank of men, since the sale of Church-lands since Henry the eighth's time, and of the Crowns part­ing with much of its desmeasnes, and the Nobility and Gentry both making great sales unto men of professions, of what was theirs, Lawyers, Merchants, and great Traders being now great purchasers, we may justly say the ballance of the Kingdom in our age is much changed from what it was in former ages. And our young Nobles, both of the greater and lesser rank, having rather a forward and a sinical education, viz. rather hastening timely or early to appear superficially men, than ripely and throughly to be so, they often run out of their estates, before considera­tively they know they are in them. And by these often changes, which the ancient Families of most Counties undergo in their estates, the publick concerns or form of Government is less steddy than it ought to [Page 120] be in a well constituted Common-weal. And if a Prince made this a part of the care of his Government, to preserve and countenance the ancient Families both of his Nobility and Gentry, and to discounte­nance such as neither took into arms, nor civil employments: if he obliged them sometimes with offices freely given, or disobliged them not, by conferring digni­ties upon some new Upstarts, who pur­chase in their Counties, and overtop them at first coming, which their wives cannot bear, being to lose their precedence, these sort of men keeping their residence a­mong their neighbors would prove the best security both of a Prince's person and Go­vernment, and their loyalty in the last King's time was most examplary: whilst the men of profession, the Lawyers, and the Merchants were as remiss (to say no more) in their duty. For from men of pleasure may be expected more loyalty, than from men of gain, who are ever apt to follow the tide, which usually turns into profit, whilst the other, content with their own estates, affect securing the present Govern­ment or state of things. Great Ministers of State heretofore were not ashamed to keep a good correspondence with the most considerable and judicious persons of this rank in every County; for they are not [Page 121] only valuable in their Country, but fill up many of those places, which serve in Par­liament, and the Common-weal must be best advanced, when it is served by men, who are best affected unto the established Government. And it must needs be a ge­neral comfort unto the Subject, when a Prince desires to be served by Persons, that are neither mercenary nor factious. These are the men, that in their Countries keep up good order and industry; so as to have a good regard unto them, may not only be reckon among a Prince's policies, but among his virtues. If they find them­selves neglected, whether the disorder a­rise from the great men, or the storm from the multitude, they are not like seasona­bly to interpose: for though duty oblige all men in the politick body, as in the natu­ral, when a vein is opened, to endeavor to stop it, by running towards it, yet the wise Historian hath observed, too many men choose their own security, rather than with hazard to obviate the danger of the Common-weal. Tuta & presentia, quam vetera & periculosa mallent. But this I con­ceive is, when the State wants noble and generous Persons to depend on: for when men of eminency are not on the stage to defend laws, men of loyalty will not be much concerned under what laws they live, [Page 122] and thus most commonly innovations are admitted.

Commonal­ty.Commonalty, if a man draw the lines of their picture from Scripture, or the best Historians, he will Scarce be able to give them a good epithet. Bishop Andrews ob­serves, besides the word, My People, there was nothing but a crooked, a perverse, a stiff-necked, a gain-saying People; and Thu­cydides shews their rashness and temerity; says he, quicquid modestum, ignaviae speciem habet; quod circumspectum & providum, seg­nitiae, quicquid abruptum & praeceps, id forte & virile censetur; for they have no leisure or art to study or think, and therefore act as they are driven or prevailed on, or ac­cording unto example or custom. They therefore are resembled unto waters, which are still and quiet in themselves, if not agitated by winds or popular Orators; or if the Government be weak and declining, they fall from it as waters do, that fall from a descent, and by an irregular mo­tion soon make a torrent, and sweep away all that should bound them, or is before them; the rage of the sea, and the noise of the waves, and the madness or irrationality of the people are joined together. And no cha­racter better fits them than the great Histo­rians, i. e. They either humbly serve or proudly domineer; aut humiliter serviunt, [Page 123] aut superbè dominantur. They run among rocks, and over shelves and shallows, and therefore he need be a good and experienc'd Pilot, that conducts the ship of Govern­ment when they are raised into a storm. Their passions being strong, and their judgments weak, they are more seducible unto a false religion, than apt to be settled or fixt in a true, because the one is found­ed on reason, which they have no measures of, and the other is laid on principles, which relate unto fables and prodigies, or any crafty or obscure notions of some de­signing person. Now there is no way sooner discovers the nature of principles, than the end they serve unto. If they serve not unto the virtues of the mind, you may justly doubt them; If they ad­vance the triumvirate of the world, plea­sure, profit, and ambition, by other means than virtue, (for there is a virtuous plea­sure, profit, and ambition, as they suit with reason, as well as they suit with sense) they are false. But this sort of men having not busied their understandings about such distinctions, they are too too often the un­happy instruments to beat down truth in all kinds, and set up error; for they are not more fickle in their Religion, than they are unto their Government, or rather Governors, from whom they are apt to be [Page 124] seduced. It is the wisdom of a State in these last ages of the world, not to trou­ble them with unrevealed niceties of Religion, or to oblige them unto many rites and ceremonies, the use whereof they cannot penetrate into; for this age, like the former will not take all on trust, but to keep them in employment, and out of ne­cessity by securing their trades and manu­factures, the most probable way to make them good Sons of the Church, and Sub­jects of the State. And let them find they are not despised, but that the Prince some­times communicates himself unto them in splendid shews; (for panem & Circenses the Romans found great use of in pleasing, and by pleasing, in governing their multi­tudes) for as hath been said, multitudes are valuable for their number, and Princes ought to think them very valuable, because if the Prince hath their affection, he is surely safe. Neither great Nobles nor popular Commoners are able to effect any considerable thing without Briareus's hands. But says Cicero, as they have little judgment, so they seldom follow ve­rity: and thus being too prone to suspect their Governors, they are too easily wrought on by popular Officers, or Tri­bunes, who represent them; and being of a mutinous disposition, they brutishly nou­rish [Page 125] factions in a State, for things they do not understand, till they pay the price of it, with their own blood and ruine: not knowing the Demarchi of Athens, and the Ephori of Sparta, and the Tribunes of Rome were set up as the Conservators of the peoples liberty, but were truly the o­verthrow of them all. In a word, the worst men are aptest to dispute their Go­vernors: for pessimus quisque asperrime Recto­rem patitur: and moral and religious men make the best subjects, as being the best judges of the blessings men enjoy under a well ordered Government.

Having said thus much of the before mentioned several ranks and orders of men, whereof their States are made up, it may not be amiss to mention the several professions and their ends,The seve­ral professi­ons in a Na­tion. and how they are of advantage, and how they may be of danger unto a Government; that so the Prince's wisdom may make the true use of them all, and divert the ill conse­quences of their abuses in their call­ings.

Of the Divine we have said much alrea­dy, therefore shall only say here, that he manages the opinions about celestial and moral truths, or the state of men after this life. The Physician is to preserve the health of the body. The Lawyer the [Page 126] concerns of a man's estate. The Soldier is to see justice may be executed. The Merchant exports the staple, and imports the forreign commodities: and the Trades­man vents both by retail. The Artificer manufactures all, and the Husbandman provides food for all, for the King himself lives by the field.

In no profession can any man be truly a good Citizen, that is transported either with pleasure or covetousness. It is a great sentence of Salust's, Nec quisquam extollere se, aut divina attingere potest, nisi omissis pe­cuniae aut corporis gaudiis; for with neither of these two taints or corruptions can the Divine ever be believed, that he means as he says. And with them the Physician and Lawyer will either neglect or beggar their Patients and Clients. The Soldier grows cruel and rapacious, if these vices seize on him, and will sooner lose or sell the place he is to defend and maintain, than keep it. And the Merchant, Trades­man, and Artificer trade unfairly, and not unto their own Countries advantage by covetousness; the one bringing in commo­dities, which serve only unto sensual ap­petites and vanity, or to please the phan­sie; the other either adulterating, or working so slightly his wares, that For­reigners decline the trade; so as all these [Page 127] inconveniences, and the prevention of them, fall under the Prince's care and po­licies, or art of Government. Indeed in the body politick, as in the natural, there not being the least thing done, but requires an influence of the Governors. He must inspirit every profession, or they stag­nate.

None of these professions are superflu­ous; for there must be a Divine,No profes­sion super­fluous. though every man were so knowing, as not to need instruction: since his Office is to be the mouth of the Congregation unto God. A Lawyer cannot be wanting, because two men may mean very justly and sin­cerely, and yet not know how to assure one another in legal terms. A Physician cannot be wanting, because health will impair, and sickness ought to be consider­ed by a man, that is in a state of health: upon which reason a man safely cannot be his own Physician; for sickness often de­prives a man of sense, and disables him to judge his own case. One man's neces­saries must be supplied from various trades, and that makes necessary all the other di­stinct callings. And thus the wisdom of God, that designed men for society, or­dered it, that men could not live with one another, if they had not likewise been to have lived by one another. True it is, [Page 128] the Soldier is but a necessary evil in a Common-weal; for would all men observe justice, there would need to be no force; for force is never to be used, but when reason and law are by violence withstood. It is depraved, not sincere, nature makes this profession necessary; but that necessi­ty makes it very honorable and useful; and as it requires a great courage to exe­cute it, and a great presence of mind: so this is hardly attained without a profession accustomed unto danger. It likewise re­quires great natural strength of body, and moral virtue of the mind; for no order of Theologues, no, nor of Penitents, under­go those hardships, which the fatigues of war bring with them; nor have they fre­quenter occasion of moral vertue, to re­strain ferocity, and to exercise huma­nity.

The great extent of govern­ment.If all this providence and care belongs unto the Regal office in relation to the choice of persons, and the administration of professions, how much further must this providence extend, when it is to weigh such numberless particulars of business, where every case differs almost from ano­ther; falling under various circumstances, which requires a particular act of prudence to determine, and which are too too nu­merous to prescribe rules for.

It is no marvel then, that God, who hath made Princes provinces thus large, hath afforded them his own title of Gods among men: for their providence resem­bles his, in a shadow of the extent of it; and in the various affairs it provides for, they stand in need of an universal wisdom, like his, and of an ability of turning evil to good, i. e. that that which damnifies pri­vate men, may be made use of, or conduce unto publick advantage. Wisdom there­fore built her a house, and fixt it on seven firm pillars, or mankind, who found a na­tural disposition to live ia society, as well as a natural necessity, in respect of the mutual aid one man gives unto another, discerned, that the strongest tye to fasten them unto one another, was the same band or religion, which tyed them unto their God.

Some learned men make this house to be the body natural of man, and the five outward senses to be five pillars of it, and the two inward, phancy and memory, to make up the seven. I shall not presume to say, the Text warrants my application; but in relation unto this discourse I shall make the house to be a body politick, or civil Government, which may be said to be upheld by these seven underwritten pillars, viz.

• [Page 130]1. Religion.
• 2. Justice.
• 3. Council.
• 4. Confederation.
• 5. Commerce.
• 6. Treasure.
• 7. Arms.

Religion.Religion, as it is a pillar by it self to support Government, so it is the basis of all the six other pillars; for as the word imports, it is a tye or band betwixt the divine and the human nature; and no li­gament would have held men together, but that which linked God and man toge­ther. Which commerce or intercourse is the great proof of an intellectual world, God's Spirit here influencing this intel­lectual world, as the sun doth the ele­mentary.

Natural. Instituted.It is usually divided into natural and instituted, or what God writ by creation, in the heart or understanding of man, and so natural religion was essential to man by creation, as instituted, was given by, or written in his Word for man, and prin­cipally designed for the manifestation of that revelation, which relates to redemp­tion.Man natu­rally capa­ble of im­mediate re­velation from God. Man was naturally capable of re­velation from or by an intercourse with God, by such means as his divine wisdom thought fit to communicate himself: [Page 131] for we see before man's fall he received a revelation in that positive prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit; for positive laws, relating only unto things of an in­different nature, are every one of them so many immediate revelations from God. Hence may be observed, how extensive na­tural religion is; shewing the human de­pendence on the divine nature, adoring that majesty and goodness, and eviden­cing its own gratitude by its obedience, exprest by the exercise of those moral vir­tues, viz. piety, justice,The extent of natural religion reaching unto that, which is usually ac­counted [...]n­stitut [...]d re­ligion. and sobriety en­graven in its own nature; and evidenced by that natural conscience, which will disturb even the mightiest Princes, when all the world else flatters and secures their vices: which proves, that men have a prospect of comfort or fear beyond this world. The same natural re igion (or that reasonableness it is grounded upon) shews, why men, who thus admitted a God, thought, that God designed for himself pe­culiar and separate servants, temples, sa­crifices, &c. and all these to be of the choicest persons and things, that were a­mong the sons of men, because they were dedicated unto the supreamest essence. Hence it is we may conceive, that all the religion of the Heathen world was natu­ral; for it was so necessary for man to de­pend [Page 132] upon a superior nature, that other­wise (as the Lord Bacon says) he would not have been able to have supported the frailty of his own nature.The Hea­thens care of religion. Man admitted therefore many Gods, rather than he would be without one; and what were all the opinions of fate and destiny, and Elyzium fields, but an acknowedgment of providence and immortality? and what were all the Philosophers grave precepts about morality, but a groping after the Decalogue, and the dispersed Ethicks in Scripture? How careful was this blind world of their Dianas, and Palladiums, and topical Gods; for herein they thought lay their hope and their strength, and ex­pected not a victory, till they could en­chant or draw over to themselves the God of the place. Plutarch could say, depraved nature runs into superstition or atheism, and then sound reason led unto true religion, which is but an obedience unto God's laws written in mans heart, upon the ground of piety and grati­tude.

No nation would ever allow atheism a­mong them, nor let the divinity of their Gods (though false ones) be invaded; for this among the Athenians cstl Socrates his life, and Diagoras was banished by them for but speaking doubtfully of them; and [Page 133] Marcus Tullius, one of the two Library-keepers of the Sybills books, was sewn into a sack, and flung into the sea, but for making an imbezlement or a rasure. Lucius Albinus flying from the Galls, with his wife and children, seeing the Vestal Virgins on foot, descended from his chariot to save and ease them; and they all agreed in this, that sacriledge was much more heinous than theft, and that though Dionysius the Syracusian prided himself in his prosperity, even by this sin, yet the direful vengeances, which befel his son, were assigned to be judgments on the sa­criledge of the father. It is well known, how erronious the Heathen Divinity was; and yet we cannot but think, that these reverences to false Gods were acceptable to the true. It was the lapse of nature, and the seduction of the evil spirit, and inadvertence and habit in evil, that made men thus grosly mistake the object of their belief; but it was natural reason and re­ligion, that made them determine, there was somewhat in this kind to be believed; and their immoral actions (especially as they were nocent to civil society) fell un­der the correction of those laws, which were framed to make society beneficial.

This is enough to shew us, how even by the light of nature men made civil so­ciety to be supported by religion:Rel [...]gion a [...] of civil soci­ety. for it is not only the cause of good order, but of good success or blessing. For in Vi­tellius's time, wh [...]n the Capitol, wherein was the Temple of their Gods, was burnt, they deplored themselves much more than they did, when the Galls took their ci­ty; for then they said, the seat of Jupiter was unshaken, and their Capitol preserved. All this considered, we, cannot wonder, why the wise men of those ages with A­ristotle determined, that the first care of every State should be that of religion; and with Dion Cassius, that the religion of every country should be but one.

The care of religion.Now the first reason for the first propo­sition is, that religion neglected or despi­sed weakens all other parts of government. Religio neglecta aut spreta trahit secum rem­publicam; for where there is but an indiffe­rency to it, or a want of devotion and inward esteem of it, the soul of moral vir­tue is lost; for men will be rather tempo­rate for health, than for the peace of so­ciety, or to have a fitness by piety to have an intercourse with their God; and justice will be observed rather as an outward com­pliance with laws, than an inward esteem of such a beneficial tye, in relation to so­ciety. [Page 135] For it is the love of justice, which flows from religion, not the fear of its pu­nishments, that inspirits government; for this values the Legislators authority and wisdom, the other dreads only the Lictor's rods. Secondly, Government is never freely and chearfully obeyed, but when it is supposed God's ordinance, and that it is accounted a part of religion so to esteem it; else obedience will be more precarious, than the nature of it will admit. The commission of goverment therefore issues out of God's Chancery, and directs the Prince to direct his government to the benefit of the subject; and yet when he fails therein, leaves no appeal to the subject, but unto his providence, who prescribes to both; for Nero's vices were not half so pernicious to the empire (no, nor to par­ticular men) as were the revolts even from that monster, and from his Successors, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, who were but pestilential breaths of the same ill va­por. When conspiracy had cast out Kings, the Consul's rule seemed so majestick and arbitrary, that the Commonalty must needs be tempering it by Tribunitial power; so as Livy observes, that the cord of go­vernment was so strongly haled at each end, (or extremity) that there was no strength left in the midst; and that strife [Page 136] was more for the management and rule, than for the safety and preservation of the State, and all these revolutions, because government was not supposed God's ordi­nance, but the peoples choice. Thus we see it is religion, that only makes Sove­raignty and liberty sociable, or sets such bounds to majesty in the Prince, as may advance concord among the Citizens. Cast off this temper, and every mistaken judgment will produce such angry hu­mors, as will neither endure the ordinary evils or sores of government, nor the com­mon remedies or salves for its cure. Third­ly, the highest throne, though never so wise, powerful, or sincere, depends upon Providence, which can either by natural or moral causes disappoint all its best laid designs. An earthquake, a storm, or a treachery frustrates all man can do, whilst nothing can withstand heavenly benedicti­ons; and the very opinion men have, that the Gods are propitious to them, gives diligence and courage in all attempts.

These are the reasons, and many more, why government must be supported by religion. Next we will offer a few, why the religion of every Nation should be but one.Religion should be but one. First, Religion is the highest, as well as the strongest obligation upon the mind of man; so as if that admit any [Page 137] principles of liberty, or exemption from Civil authority, disobedience shelters it self, and replies, it is fit to serve God be­fore man, and so grows incorrigible, because reasonably it may justifie it self: (though that be an error as will be soon proved.) Secondly, Men of a su­perstitious temper either infect one ano­ther, or are misled by some subtil knaves, who make good gain of men, who are of a superstitious devotion, and who make conscience of every little thing, and are apt to believe vain and foolish prophesies, or interpret revelations. And thus says Livy in his fourth book, they became a publick offence, insomuch as the Aediles had in charge, that no other Gods should be worshiped, but those of the Romans; nor after any other manner, than had been usual in their native Country,

Indeed if it were rightly considered, the religion of all Nations should be but one, because all should serve but one God, and he by the tradition unto the Patriarchs be­fore the Law, and by his divine prescripts under the Law, and by the revelation of his will by the Messiah and his Apostles af­ter the Mosaic-Law, made his will known in all necessary, natural, moral, and di­vine truths, tending unto salvation, where­of Kings and Priests were the guardians, [Page 138] but not the parents; for they were to deli­ver in matters, immediately relating to salvation, nothing but what they had re­ceived, though in matters relating to de­cency and order in his service, or in mat­ters of civil concern, they were authorized to give the law suitable to their own best judgments, and all subordinate to them were thus to seek an unity in the faith, and a common utility in the State in the band of peace. Thus God is a God of order and not of confusion; and if he made religion a support to government, private men, by framing new axioms of their own, to exempt themselves from o­dedience, or to weaken the sinews of go­vernment, must not distract it. For if a Soveraign may command one thing, which God hath not forbidden, and a high Priest another, which God hath not revealed, or a private person contradict both in those things, which are both true and suitable to their distinct authori­ties, then the reins or girdle of all au­thority, divine, ecclesiastical or civil, is dissolved.

Among the Gentile world instituted religion was no disturber of government, because it consisted principally in outward rites, ceremonies, and observances. But in the Christian religion, God being a jea­lous [Page 139] God of his honor and truth, it hath great influence on government, because the main end of it,Instituted Religion was to re­store natu­ral. as it was to make re­conciliation, and clear the intercourse be­twixt the divine and the intellectual na­ture; so it was to restore natural religion, and to cleanse that polluted stream. There­fore that Church, which upon false glosses on instituted religion introduces corrupti­ons in natural, and weakens civil Sove­raignty, that it may usurp Ecclesiastical, or dispences with moral duties, that men may be the more observant of their cere­monial laws, makes the buttress, which was to support the wall, thrust it down. And those Princes, whom God bridled by his moral law, in the exercise of their Soveraignty, weaken but their own Go­vernments, when they decline those laws, natural religion and common justice re­commended unto them, as to be the basis of all their civil, municipal, and human laws. Nor doth any spirit more weaken go­vernment by pretence of religion, than those Enthusiastical persons, who upon pretence of particular impulses, respect neither hu­man nor divine laws;The ill in­fluences on Govern­ment by se­veral pha­natick principles. for these can fall in love with their own selves and their tribe, and broach doctrines, that we may say turn the world topsie turvy; for one says, 1. Do­minion is founded in grace, and thereby [Page 140] is all Soveraignty overthrown; though the same men at the same time read, that Cy­rus was Gods Anointed as well as David. Another sort of them say, 2. None have right unto the creature, but the godly; though God makes his sun to shine, and his rain to fall on the bad as well as the good: and they will judge likewise, who are those; and then what becomes of the pro­perty of their fellow subjects, whom they account usurpers thereof. 3. An impulse of a brain-sick or vindicative spirit must be by a third sort a command from God, and who then is secure of life? Neither doth there want those, who would be as holy in other mens opinions, as they are are in their own: and therefore their words must be accepted as an oath, and so go­vernment lamed in a principal sinew, and the reverence and awe, which mankind hath ever exprest of God's name to ex­tract truth, must be laid aside, that their sanctity might be justified. But such men as these by their superstitions may contra­dict sense, philosophy, natural and insti­tuted religion, and fall so low in their ve­ry demeanors, (as are our Quakers and Seekers outward carriage) that that which is ridiculous and irrational must be ac­counted religious, or the government must be overthrown. 4. Nay, a soberer [Page 141] sort of men will so venerate their own in­terpretations and dogma's, that if Civil or Ecclesiastical authority restrained the divulging their opinions, though contrary to that of their national Church, their petty and small truths, if truths, must be justifications to them to disquiet the peace of the government. Upon this whole representation, (besides condole­ment) which might lead all these sorts of men unto some modesty, what have we to say, but that all this is contradictory un­to that Gospel-spirit, most of these men pretend unto? for if Christ in his own person, and his Apostles in theirs, would not resist secular Governors, (for that great truth, on which all other Evan­gelical truths depend, i. e. that God was reconciled unto the world by his Son Jesus Christ) but chearfully submit them­selves unto authority, and undergo the pu­nishent that was laid on them: then if Pope, Presbyter, or Phanatick would now think themselves bound to the same submission, it might be well thought, it would prove the best cure for the two first's usurpations, and the last's delusion. But in order to a remedy, if we will hear a wise man's opi­nion, there is no better way to stop the rising of new Sects, than to reform (I have forgot his words) gross and known [Page 142] abuses, or troublesome niceties, and to compound smaller differences, and to pro­ceed mildly, rather by gentleness than vi­olence, and to convert or win over the principal Authors by some countenance or preferment, than to imbitter them by scorns. But all this is to be meant to­wards modest Dissenters, and such as re­vile neither governments; for if God lead his people by the hand of Moses and Aaron, and have ty'd men to them by re­ligion, or religious observances of them, and any sort of men in matters that are not immoral, may rise up against them, and say, ye take too much upon you, ye sons of Le­vy, or what have we to do with Moses? all government is at at end. And when the religion established in a land is rent by discords, and the holiness of the Professors of that religion is much abated and grown hypocritical, and so to honest minds scan­dalous (as it was about Mahomet's time, for then the Nestorian and Arian heresies much abounded both in Asia and Africa) then says this great Chancellor, you may look, not only for a new Sect, but possibly for a new reli­gion. And no disobediences to govern­ment are so dangerous, as those that are grounded upon religion, nor no Sect so likely to prevail, as those, who complain of the present management of affairs, and [Page 143] promise great liberties and exemptions.

I am far from believing,The mind cannot be forced, yet it may be restrained. there is any power in a Prince or a Church to force a man to believe; for no man can force him­self but in civil or ceremonial concerns: if a Prince or a Priest require that, which another thinks not prudent, or is of an indif­ferent nature in it self, Subjects are bound to nothing, or they are bound in matter of this nature to submission; for such com­pliance can never truly wound conscience. A Prince may make a civil law about Hus­bandry, which an experienc'd Husband­man may know will not work its end; and yet he is bound to an obedience; and the Church may enjoyn an imprudent rite, and Christian liberty may censure it so; and nevertheless it requires an outward conformity. And thus we see, how re­ligion conduces to civil quiet, by admit­ting a liberty in judging the injunctions of authority, and yet making innocent the obedience thereunto. For if God, in things relating to his own honor, exempt­ed not the subject from the civil authori­ty, but submitted him to a passive obedi­ence, then it is reasonable to judge, he doth it much more in all things, which concern only mens sociable and civil con­cerns. And this is enough to prove, how strong a pillar religion is unto the house of government.

It is a great observation of Valerius Maximus's, whatever the Augurs declar­ed from the Gods, the Senate determined not against, Religionique summum imperium cessit; omnia namque post religionem nostra ci­vitas duxit, etiam in quibus summae majestatis conspici decus voluit. And they took care religion should be truly taught amongst them: insomuch that they gave to the forreign cities under their government Sons of their Prophets to instruct them; says this good Author, Decem filii singulis Etruriae populis percipiendae sacrorum disciplinae gratia, &c.

Scipio Africanus is said never to have gone about any business, but first he went to the temple.

Governments or bodies politick are as subject to diseases, as bodies natural are; for a State may be free from violent con­vulsive fits, and yet may fall into a paraly­tick or hectick distemper, or an atrophy; for it is an ill sign in a State, when sub­jects dare not rebel, and yet grow sullen; for such mutinies make no noise, and yet loosen all the joynts and ligaments of po­licy. Besides these hardly to be discern­ed sicknesses of State, there are periods of times and revolution of things, which have ripened a State for a death, even when it seems in a good condition of health, or [Page 145] whilst it hath marrow in its bones, or a good condition of plenty and peace; for so was the time of our late change begun in 1640, when we saw in few years after, that there was but one step betwixt the highest and the lowest condition. So as unless Providence keep the City, the Watch­man waketh but in vain; and nothing keeps Subjects out of the way of rebellion, nor Princes in the way of justice, as doth re­ligion.

Justice the next pillar of Government;Justice. religion and justice both spring immedi­ately from God; for it was the eternal wisdom that formed the ligament or bond, which we call religion, which should tye, as by a law, every rational creature to perform the justice of his nature, which other creatures observe by instinction, man by choice. So as a law is but a rule what things the creature should follow, and what fly. Thus the eternal Wisdom wrote natural laws in the very essence or rationality of man, and by this rationa­lity this creature was capacitated to re­ceive from him positive laws. When man offends against the natural law, his con­science checks him, and when he offends against the positive, some known revela­tion, or unquestioned tradition, or writ­ten word of God, must be his accuser. [Page 146] Hence laws usually are divided into Mo­ral, which are those, which flow from the law of nature, or ceremonial, which are those, which flow from some positive law of God, or judicial, which should imitate the justice of Natural laws, and were gi­ven to some men, as unto the Jews, by God himself, or from the law of Nature, and the rationality of man, unto all others, and are framed by men in order to the exercise of justice among themselves, and are made as conformable, as may be, unto the law natural and eternal, and have for their end the common good of that society, which is under the autho­rity of the Head or Soveraign of that so­ciety. So as every such law ought to be honest, and possible to be kept; every such law containing in it two powers, viz. directive in what it prescribes, and co­active in punishing offenders against it.

Justice, na­tural and civil.Now justice is but a performance of some act, which some law requires. And as we said on the former head, religion was either natural or instituted; so we must say on this, it is either natural or ci­vil. Indeed, natural justice is an essential part of natural religion, and so is inbred in man;Why natu­ral justice so far ex­ceeds civil. and that is the reason natural justice so far exceeds civil, or what human laws prescribes. For human laws cannot [Page 147] extend their sanction, or rewards and punishments unto desires and concupi­scences, out of which all civil injustices arise; and some offences or injustices seem unto Legislators so trivial, that there is no law or sanction against them. Yet natural justice prohibits even such offences, which made the great Naturalist and Statesman Cicero say, It was a narrow, or a mean thing, to be just only as far as civil law required; quam angusta est innocentia ad legem bonum esse; or quanto latius officiorum patet, quam juris regula; for humanity and liberality &c. are left out of the pub­lick Tables of the Romans. Indeed both Tables of the Decalogue are but parts of natural justice: so as a man may be a good Citizen, Vir bonus est is, qui consulta Patrum, &c. when he is not a good man, or when he narrows that justice, which he owes to men, unto civil sanctions.

Justice is concerned in

• making,
• executing,
• obeying,

laws.

1st. In making them;Justice in making. for the Legisla­tor must sincerely be convinced, the law is beneficial for the Government and for the Governed; for if it serve only personal ends, as that the Prince and Governors by [Page 148] it singly reap the advantage, and that it conduce not to common good, it wants the best character of a law. The like it doth, if an unruly multitude force a law from him, in prejudice of the good constitution and strength of the Government or Royal­ty. Secondly, if laws be made unto good ends,Executing. and not executed, they become a snare; for usually the breach of a civil law carries with it some profit and advan­tage, and so one man to his loss observes that law, which another through his dis­obedience gains by. And non-execution of laws leads men to the neglect of the Government; for they think it a foolish thing to be tied by that cord,Obeying Laws. which others so easily break. Thirdly, therefore when laws are made, subjects must make a con­science to obey them; for it is a debt they owe unto their Prince, and unto the whole society, and to every particular man of it. So as a Legislator must make a law no snare; a Magistrate must impartially exe­cute it, and a Subject conscientiously obey it.

The law of nature is the rule of all hu­man and civil laws; Tully could say, Nos legem bonam a malà nullà aliâ ratione, nisi Natura norma dividere possumus. And Bal­dus, Imbecillitas est humani intellectus in qua­cun (que) causa legem quaerere, ubi rationem natu­ralem [Page 149] invenires. A law therefore must be suitable to religion, agreeable to the natu­ral (not humorous) disposition of the peo­ple, and must tend unto publick good. And thus civil and judicial laws made by men are manifest proofs of moral laws written by God in man; for they ever confirm those laws, and conform them­selves thereunto, and are adapted to civil cases only.

Laws therefore are made both in defence of the Government and Governors,Laws in de­fence of the Govern­ment and Subject. as well as of the Governed in their several concerns of life, liberty, property and good name, fame or reputation; and the breach of these laws falls under several penalties, higher or lower,Penalties. as the offence is; for it is treason and misprision of trea­son to offend against the Government or Prince; and it is excommunication to of­fend against Ecclesiastical authority; and it is murther and felony, or a capital pun­ishment, to take away a mans life, or rob him of his goods; and he falls under a pecuniary or corporal punishment, that robs a man of his liberty or good name. Thus justice, whether it be political or private, is the defence of the Head and Body in society,How laws oblige the Prince, and how the Subject. and obliges the Prince by the directive part of the law, tho' not the coactive; (for therein he is subject only [Page 150] unto God) to be just unto, and tender of the subject; and by the directive and co­active part of it, obligeth the Subject u­niformly and impartially to honor, aid, and obey him in his government. Nay, a man by it is defended from himself, as well as from others; for men by excesses and penury are often unjust unto them­selves, and unto their relations. And this restrains a man from using even his own to his own private detriment, as well as unto the publicks; for the publick has a right both in his person and private pos­sessions, and all this, ne Respublica capiat a­liquid detrimenti.

This virtue guides men in peace, and regulates them in war, and frames all sound council. It is that in the Politick Body, which consent of parts makes in the Natural: for it gives amongst the members thereof a fellow-feeling of each others state. It makes the foot content to support the body, and the body the head, and the head to influence by its animal spirits all the members. It admonishes the stomach, not wilfully to send up fumes and jealousies to annoy the head, and sup­plicates the head, not to cast down rheumes and catarrhs upon the lungs, least the State be short breathed, and so short liv'd; whilst mutual justice and love, like [Page 151] the harmony and good temper of humors, begets peace, which we may call publick health.Justice distributes rewards and punish­ments e­qually. And thus it becomes the best stay of a common weal, when it distributes justly rewards and punishments, chasing partiality from the dispensation of rewards, and passion or severity from that of punish­ment. We may say of it, it was implan­ted by nature, and cultivated by natural religion, and revived by instituted. Christi­anity, being it self famous for making this a radical principle, that men should do to others as they would be done unto them­selves; obliging men under any kind of government, and in any state, bond or free, to observe their own laws, and not to violate those, by which they held com­merce with any foreigners: Princes even to be content with their own bounds, knowing the possession of a real virtue was much more than the possession of an usurped dominion; since no one person is able to influence the dominion of the whole earth, but he that made it. And even he as man refused it, probably because he would wean the most aspiring minds, and powerfullest Princes from affecting it. Thus making justice a guide to modesty, leav­ing soveraignty to him, who made the whole, and distributes it by parcels to whomsoever he pleases.

Council.Council is a deliberate considering of a particular affair by a man's self, with the help of some other. Every council ought to arise from some knowledge of that af­fair, or of the nature of it, and be ground­ed on experience, and managed by pru­dence with an unbyassed mind: so as tru­ly an ignorant and unexperienced and in­judicious person is not fit either to give or receive council. He that is to receive it, be he Prince or private man, must have weighed and deliberated the matter he takes council upon within himself, or else he will not be capacitated to judge of the advice given him. So as men must habi­tuate themselves in their own affairs, that they may render themselves capable of council;What fits a Prince for Coun­cil. especially a Prince, whose edu­cation, and his own contemplation should have verst him in some general know­ledges, before he can be fit to receive par­ticular advices upon particular affairs. For unless he have considered or studied the nature of mankind, the constitution of his own Government, the genius and inclination of his own people, the power and interest of his neighbouring Princes, and such like general heads, (unto which all determinations of particular affairs should be squared) he himself cannot pro­perly be said to be fit to take council. [Page 153] Besides, (as has been observed before up­on the head of Councellors) if he have not judged of persons, as well as things, his policies will be weakned. Nor will any thing so probably render counsel use­less to him, as a conversation with those, who being not able to give counsel, through the familiarity of their Prince, usually deride council. Princes therefore (who need council most) ought to be most careful with whom they converse; for con­versation insensibly insinuates it self, and a Favorite's folly either becomes a council, as given by him, or makes a Prince disre­lish a sound council given by another; so as few Princes thrive by council, who are misled by conversation. Hence we see, that Princes should busie their minds a­bout determining within themselves their own affairs, that from without themselves they might receive advice; for men most carefully advise them, whom they know to be habited to weigh their own affairs: for if the vessel be empty, they are less care­ful to consider, what liquor they pour in­to it. It is too hard a task for any man to give rules, how to give, or how to take council; since affairs are so various, and particulars depend so much upon their cir­cumstances, no better rule can be given, than not to remove a present evil at the [Page 154] price of a future lasting inconvenience; for it never fares well with those Princes, who conceive,The diffe­rence be­tween an Expedient and a Coun­cil. that an Expedient fills up the place of a council; for such palliate cures are but temporary satisfactions, and bring a State into a friable or crumbling condition for nothing, which wounds the constituent parts of a government, or shakes its foundation, or transfers power from a Prince to any other order of men, is rccompenced by any ingenious Expedi­ents. Belluarum est (says Cicero) vivere in diem, nostra concilia ad sempiternitatem ten­dunt. Wise men foresee remote consequen­ces, and weak men live from hand to mouth. Salust, like a wise Physician of State,The declen­fion of a State. discerned, how the Government fell into a hectick; Ego (says he) ita comperi omnia Regna, &c. or I never observed Kingdom, City, or Nation long prosper, whose councils were not sound; (or deep, or steddy:) for when partiality or favor, fear or pleasure hath corrupted counsel, wealth first decays, then empire weakens, then follows change of Government, then ser­vitude. Thus by the first step the Go­vernment is weakned by it self, after­wards it is fitted to be a prey unto a For­reigner. Great necessity therefore there is, that the pillars of Government be often surveyed; for it serves little to repair the [Page 155] pent-houses, if the beams of the house shrink.

Of the qualifications of a Councellor we have largely spoken already. The wise Chancellor Bacon makes the very modes of consultation advance much the consult, and so neglects not set times, place, as a Council-chamber, the figure of a council-board, whereby men may conveniently hear and be heard, that the state of the question or proposition debated be put up in writing; least Rhetorical speeches lose the question, and so the resolve differ from the matter first proposed. He seems therefore to disallow such figures of speech, as too popular, and unbecoming a Coun­cil-board, or looking upon eloquence and rhetorick, as too amusing and deceitful, and not allowing it, but in order to re­move from the mind of the auditors some prejudice they are prepossessed off; for, says he, sometimes there is a necessity of a fomentation, or warm hand to chafe in the oyl; yet he likewise allows, so they will hold to the question, that a matter may be debated, that is fit to be rejected, so it be in order to find out somewhat, that may be fit upon the first proposition to be agreed unto; and he gives an inge­nious, philosophical, or chymical and lo­gical illustration thereof, saying, a nega­tive [Page 156] is more pregnant of direction than an inde­finite; as ashes are more generative than dust. Thus council should neither be given nor taken in haste; deliberation being essential thereunto, if the affair will any ways per­mit it; otherwise courage must supply council; for no fruit requires more time for ripeness, than doth council. Precipi­tation like the warmth of a chimney, that hath a tree behind it, makes the fruit for­ward and soft, but not mellow and well tasted. And thus it fares with all other matters; for a forced ripeness prejudices both a good taste and nourishment. Coun­cil is no where better set forth than in Ec­clesiasticus, ch. 22. v. 16. and 17. It settles the heart upon a thought of understanding, (or weighs consequences) for, says he, as tim­ber girt and bound together in a building can­not be loosed with shaking, so the heart, that is stablished by advised council, shall fear at no time.

Confedera­tions.A principal work of Council is the de­liberating about confederations, which are leagues made between several Soveraign Princes, independent one on the other. The law of human nature obliges all nati­ons to be just and kind unto one another, so as when ever they have intercourse with one another, they are ty'd unto each o­ther by natural justice, as being of one [Page 157] kind or species; so as though they never know one another, yet they are thus bound to one another, if ever they have intercourse or commerce. And then all their leagues are but political results of natural justice and wisdom: for justice ex­amines the principles of their confederati­on, and wisdom the end of it▪ viz. that it be really for reciprocal and mutual good, or that it be just in the beginning, and wise in the end. And thus from home-affairs we must now transport our selves unto forreign, and weigh those things, which concern peace and war between se­veral Nations. On which subject Groti­us has erected an everlasting monument: so as this small and fresh stream is but to lead a Novice unto the mouth of the arm of that sea.

Nations stood in need of one anothers help,Nations benefited thereby. and were benefitted by one anothers assistance, and interchange of native com­modities, as much as private men of one and the same Nation and City do of one anothers helps in their several trades and professions; for reciprocal advantages are the grounds of all common societies.

Treaties of Peace and War.This is the root of all Treaties, viz. those of

• 1. peace or commerce.
• 2. war
  • offensive,
  • defensive,
  or both by
  • land &
  • Sea.
• 3. and of all other constitutions, and agreements.

All Trea­ties depend on veraci­ty and sin­cerity.If veracity and sincerity, and openness of dealing, and plain heartedness planted in man by his Creator, for the security of society, had not degenerated, and been vitiated by covetousness, ambition, envy, and self-love, the benefits of society had been the chief comforts of man's life, and the whole world had appeared, but as the Creator's great family. But now nighest relations being apt to deceive one another, it is no marvel, that forreign Treaties are for the most part deceitful; so as a modern, learned, and good States-man, the Lord Cherbury gives it for a rule, that in for­reign Treaties, where a present advantage is but little, and a future great, it is the wisest thing to take the less, because too probably, before the time come about, wherein the future and greater advantage is to be reaped, the face of affairs may be [Page 159] so changed, that the stipulated future ad­vantage will be lost. I have forgot his words, but his sense I think I have not altered. Somewhat must be in the mat­ter, when Marcus Aurelius (I may say the best moral heathen Prince) allows in such cases a Prince to be [...] or semi-malus; The diffi­culty of making and keep­ing leagues and as Cicero says, Nec possunt aliter ii, qui­bus commissa est tota Respublica. And yet this good man says in another place, Ne quid insidiosè, ne quid simulatè, ne quid falla­citer: so as treachery and fallacy, and si­mulation are absolutely rejected, whilst dissimulation or a concealing a matter, or using worldly prudence or disguise seems allowable, because unavoidable; for, says another, Non regent, qui non tegent. It is one thing, if a State be so foolish, like an Indian, to part with his gold for a bead, because he is pleased with it, and another, if the Merchant should aver, his bead was of an intrinsick value through the whole world with the others gold. Sure I am, injustice and breach of faith agrees not with humanity; less than will it square with Christianity; the root of man's mise­ry is in not daring to trust himself unto the law of his own nature, and the provi­dence of his Maker.

Equivocal words in Treaties have been very pleasant to the palate of those,Equivocal words. that [Page 160] first gave them, but have been very bitter in the stomack afterwards. Charles the fifth for pressing upon the Landgrave of Hesse an exposition, which suited not with the Duke of Saxe's promise to his Father-in-law, the Landgrave, (though Saxe was made Elector by the same Empe­ror) yet made such a confederation against him, as drove the Emperor out of Ger­many.

If a Prince ignorantly or passionately wave the true interest of his Nation, or too strongly stem the tide of his Peoples inclination, such Treaties never last long; and yet a wise Prince may rather give way unto the torrent of some prosperous Prince, and bow to his fortune, than put matters to the hazard of a doubtful war. Thus such as are drawn from their proper inter­est by an unavoidable necessity, are par­doned for making such abrupt changes, or giving such assistances, as Boccalini says, the smaller Princes of Italy were by Apol­lo; since men of their small interest in the world, though it be an indecent thing, (says he) must chew their meat on both sides their chops. Thus Italy did be­twixt Charles the eighth and Ferdinand, and Charles the fifth and Francis the first. But it is the dishonour of Christianity that Treaties are so solemnly made, nay, and [Page 161] sworn unto, and yet so easily broken, and so [...] by that high Priest, who pre­tends to be the Vicar of the man (nay, of the God) of truth, dispensed with. And therefore after all these ceremonies, some­times Princes are forced to give hostages, and [...] giving hostages, sometimes we find a Prince rather abate of his natural affecti­on, than prejudice his affairs of State. So as Francis the first chose rather to give his Sons for hostages, th [...] twelve of his principal Ministers of State.

Hence it is,The diffi­culties that attend up­on Trea­ties. there is no profession hath more need of artifices, than that of an Ambassador or Secretary of State. The very preliminaries to a Treaty have often­times as much picking work and thorny circumstances, as the Treaty it self; for when two Princes in difference are both weary of their distances or contention, and so both affected towards a reconcilia­tion, some punctilio arises, how they may have a right intelligence, and yet neither seem forwarder to a peace than the other. For then a third Prince must make that to be an act of his good affection, which is a strong desire of them both; and he must make way for some Minister to be admit­ted by either Party al' incognito, and a Car­dinal de Riche [...]ieu will have a Pere Joseph, that shall turn the scale where-ever he [Page 162] comes. And in these disguises the Popish Princes have more advantage than any Protestant, though they sometimes find out a Soldier or a Merchant, that usually frequent­ed that Court, and so can personate a man of one profession, and act, as of another. By such clandestine means as these, a Trea­ty is often ended, before it's known to be begun; and then the real Ambassador is a man rather of pomp than of business. Nay, when Princes find the inconveniencies of former Treaties, as if it were by way of super-fetation, they are kindling of a new Treaty before they are delivered of an old. Thus our Henry the eighth found the French and Spaniard proclaiming a league against him, when at the same time his Ambassador entred . . . . . to de­mand the performance of a former Treaty then in being. And Philip Comines lay at Venice to make a league for Lewis the eleventh with that State, when, whilst he lay there, and perceived it not, the Vene­tians and Spaniards made a league against his Master. And so were the Venetians themselves served at Cambray, where most of the States of Christendom united against them, and they discovered it not, but it was like to have proved very fatal and ru­inous to them; and yet it is observed, that this grave and wise Nation usually [Page 163] recover by Treaties of peace that which they often lose by misadventures of war; whilst the same Comines gives the reverse of this medal to us English men, when he says, We were never happy in our quill, when it was made into a pen; but when the feather was fixt to an arrow. The very manner of treating carries with it a great difficul­ty, and a Master of Ceremonies, who u­sually is, and ought to be a man of good literature, as well as languages, hath a large province, even in adjusting the cere­monies, that belong unto the Ambassadors, in relation to their Masters, and in relati­on to other Princes Ambassadors, resient upon the place. He that inspects our Sir John Finett's observations or memori­als, and Sir Charles Cotterell's explanati­ons or additions thereunto, not published yet, and he that knew both the men, may justly say, they filled their places; and a late Hollander, Monsieur Wickefort, hath written a serious tract, and a necessary upon this subject, and of the priviledges of Ambassadors, as there are many more, who have written large and wise Tracts upon their offices.

When Princes begin Treaties themselves by interviews, they are seldom (and yet sometimes) prosperous; for one appears a comlier person than the other, or is [Page 164] prompt in discourse, more magnificent, less affable, or hath somewhat, which the other wants, which raises emulation or envy, or else their train disagree, and breed ill will betwixt the Masters: and yet Lewis the twelfth and Ferdinand of Arragon, and Charles the fifth and Pope Clement the seventh interviewed and part­ed fairly.

Great caution is to be used, how Princes entertain motions of Treaties, even by themselves or by their Allies, whilst they are in the heat of action; for thus Pope Julio the second, under pretence of a Treaty with the Duke of Ferrara, chilled Lewis the twelfth, or diverted him from those assistances, which he meant to give that Duke, upon supposal they would not have been needful. Therefore in such con­junctures, it is more needful for Princes to strengthen, than lessen their forces.

Arbitration is sometimes a useful, often a frivolous cement of peace; for after much time hath been spent therein, some pretty fetch will make the whole labour insignificant; as when the Venetians de­livered up their sentence betwixt the Pope and Maximilian with a proviso, that if both parties would not ratifie it, neither should be obliged by it.

A Prince Arbitrator ought to be unbyast, and equal in judgment towards both; but to become a party, whilst he is an Arbi­trator, darkens his honour and his justice very much. And a Northern Prince late­ly paid dear for it, being driven out of all those Countries, which his Predecessors had not long before by victories gained, and by Treaties had confirmed unto them, though the prosperity of the Prince, whose party they joyned themselves unto, to his great honour (for there is nothing more honourable fot a Prince, than expencefully and hazardously to be concerned for an Ally) procured them a restitution of all, and yet removed not a dependance upon himself. How it will fare with that State, that in the apprehension they had of their own concerns, made and joyned them­selves to a declining Monarchy, (at least declining in their vicinity) and in that at­tempt lost almost all they had, and then upon the like politick consideration, drew in other great Princes to succor them, which entirely drew from them the whole power they lay subjugated unto; so as their overflown inland, like their sea-coasts, had that tide of fortune drawn from their low grounds, which soon overflowed their higher countries; how these will fare in necessitating the others, to make a very [Page 166] disadvantageous peace, time will mani­fest, not my spirit of prophesie foretel.

Trade.Trade or commerce is the off-spring of confederation, and flows from council, and is to be managed by justice, which is guided by religion. Thus religion is the foundation of all other pillars, and reaches to confederation and trade; for both con­federation and trade require great care and judgment in making the articles con­cerning them, and religion in observing them: for Princes or States confederate for security, and trade for gain; so as trade is a most natural root for raising trea­sure, as treasure is a most natural food for arms. And this is the reason, why in e­recting these pillars of Government, this order of placing them is observed. And indeed the pillars are but so many Profes­sins in a Common-weal, which have been touched on before, viz. The Divine, the Lawyer, Statesman, the Merchant, the Monnoier, and the Soldier.

Trade is either

• Home or
• Foreign.

Home trade is of things men buy,Home trade be­cause they have need of them, or of things they sell, because they have plenty of them, and subsist by them. So as in Oeconomicks it's usually said, a Master of a family should endeavor to make him­self a seller, not a buyer, for usually men buy to loss, sell to gain.

Forreign trade is but the same thing in a market more remote,Forreign trade. and under the laws of another Soveraign.

Every County at home and Country abroad abounds in some one commodity or other, which others want, for venting whereof they have proper markets and seasons, which must be observed, or the gain of the trade is usually lost.The want in one place in the ground of trading with ano­ther. The pro­duct and fruits of the earth are better in some places than in others; even by rea­son of the clime, or by reason of the hus­bandry; and may be assorded cheaper from one part than another, by reason of the multitude of labourers or artists, and the little wages is given in one part of a Country in proportion to another, or by reason of the conveniency of carriage. The King lives by the field, as was said be­fore, therefore husbandry is to be as much cherished, as any trade, for it breeds healthy and strong men, and sit for arms, and so in an island Mariners ought to be a [Page 168] principal care of the State. Every Go­vernment hath an interest in the labours, and in the manner of labouring of their people, and therefore they are to be drawn off from ill customs; or from deceitful working, as the Irish were from fixing their plough to the horse tail, or the Clo­thiers from so working their cloths, as they shrink too much, or over-tenter them, &c. Voiture or making carriage easie by cutting rivers, providing high-ways to be well kept and pastable, nay, providing they be secure against the thieves, ought to be a care of the State, in relation even unto trade; for the industrious man must be secured by the State in his habitation,The things which se­cure trade. and in his passages from place to place with his commodity, least the wasps and drones prey on the hive, and drive the bee from her industry; therefore easie pardons to thieves and highway-men is a destructi­on to trade. Monopolers are another sort of thieves, for they impose what rates they please upon a necessary commodity, and rob the buyer as well as the labou­rer, whom they force to work at their own rates, when they have engrossed a commodity into their own hands. A State must therefore secure the Subjects property, and endeavor to raise his in­dustry, and to countenance his ingenuity [Page 169] in any thing, that promotes trade, as framing engines, or any thing that fur­thers it. It must provide against the rich oppressing the poor Tradesman, that too often must borrow, by not taking too great or biting usury, or such broakage as makes the poor laborious honest man or trader only work for the wealthy idle hard hearted person. It must give immunities, priviledges, and encouragements to all kind of industry. It must in some sort force men to promote publick good; as to prohibit men not to turn their tillage too much into pasturage, for that will de­populate. It may require them to plant woods, and hemp, and flax, or what else may become materials for a manufactury; for where-ever there are most manufactu­ries, there will be most people; and a mul­titude of people is not only the honour of a Prince, and the security of his land, but his wealth. To look after confederacies of men of a trade, as the Grazier by com­bination not to impose prizes on the Butcher, nor the Butcher by arts and wiles, in taking most of the pasturage about a great market town, to cut the grass un­der the Grazier's foot, or becoming of two trades, (or both Grazier and Butch­ers) or by confederacy of these two, both to set the dice on the buyer. The same [Page 170] we may say of Colliers and Wood-men, and such other trades the Common-weal cannot be without; for a confederation a­mong Tradesmen must not enhance the prices on the Gentry and Nobility, as little as the Tradesman must confederate against the Handycraftsman or Manufa­cturer.

Forreign trade.All the former considerations, and ma­ny more than I can think of, belong to home trade. But forreign trade is more nighly to be considered, because if that be not well ballanced, the profit runs to ano­ther Nation. Deceits of home trade im­poverish particular men, but the trea­sure remains in the Kingdom. These have their inconveniencies great enough; for when parts are unequally strong, the whole body is the weaker; for break the order of any thing, and you break its strength; for here is not the overflowing of an humor, but the cutting of a joynt or limb.Most imme­diately be­longing un­to the Sove­raign's care. Unto the Soveraign therefore be­longs the consideration and regulation more immediately of this trade. He there­fore makes leagues of commerce with for­reign Princes; and Treaties of Maritime affairs, or how his subjects shall be used in trade, and on the sea, and reciprocally, how he shall use others: therefore the ports of the sea are his, that he may let in, and [Page 171] let out such commodities only, as he finds benefits his People. The customs, impo­sitions, and rates of commodities are set by him, and are alterable, that trade in general and particular commodities may be ballanced with those carried out; for if the subjects of one Prince have his gain in trading eaten out by the impositions of the other, or if one Nation furnishes com­modities of necessity for the other, and the other for luxury for them, it's soon determined, who will gain by the trade, or who will eat out the other; and the subject is not to be trusted, though it be his own concern in this, but restrained, because few men will avoid those expen­ces, which gratifie their lusts. Our French trade for wines, our Canary trade, which formerly was driven by commodities, and now by money, and so our trade to Zant for currans demonstrates this. It is not so with our India trade: though we carry out even gold and silver for it, because our revending those commodities in other parts brings us as much back in specie, or bills of exchange.What is a thriving trade to a nation. Trade therefore is not to be cherished, as it enriches the Mer­chant, or as it increases the Soveraign's revenue, but as it brings wealth (and a wealth that will remain and stay amongst us) unto the Nation, or as it passes into [Page 172] the habit of the body, not strengthens particularly the head or some member. The trade, that brings in more wealth to stay in the Kingdom, than it carries out, that which having repaid its charges, and leaves a surplusage, that is, a thriving trade to a Nation, or that which brings into it treasure, and no other; for neither Princes nor Merchants gain can compen­sate the loss of the Nations stock; that is properly called the overballance, which thus inriches the Nation.

Neither the nation nor civil men should in­gross trade, or work de­ceitfully.There are few trades in any Nation, but some Forreigner is his rival in them; and therefore if one work his commodity de­ceitfully, and the other substantially (which the wearing will shew) the mar­ket will assuredly run to them. Nothing better secures trade, than the true manu­facturing of its commodities. It is part therefore of the care of a State, that no person or company employ ill or raw workmen: for a pound of wooll, which may cost six or eight pence, if it be well wrought, may be worth two shillings or half a crown; but if ill wrought, not scarce one. Besides, when this is once discerned, the credit of the Nation, as well as of the manufactury decreases. He therefore rightly determined, that said, Better feed your poor, and let them be idle, [Page 173] than permit them slightly to work any manu­factury. Neither must the Merchant be permitted to adulterate or sophisticate his commodity. Nor should any office be set up under pretence of visiting the com­modity, and discovering the abuse, (as with us is the Aulnage) and exercises it self in tolerating it; for it is pernicious, unless the true end of it be preserved, and then it's of good use: for the publick not only in the dishonour, but in the vent of the commodity pays dearly the price of such a Patent. There are too too many more instances to be found; but I fell upon this, because it wounds us in our chief staple commodity. Our State should be more careful of this than other States; for to our shame we must confess it, our Na­tion in its genius (at least in individual persons) is too much given to laziness, and to affect a sudden gain and return, and not to affect publick works, or such as re­quire time to ripen; or such as relate to posterity, or such as conduce to the ho­nour of the Nation, and not present and personal profit. This humor the Physici­ans of our State, by laws and rules of Go­vernment, which should be obeyed, should purge out, and endeavour to raise a pub­lick mindedness in particular men. If Hol­land had had this humor, it had never [Page 174] been rich, but their publick spirit, with their frugality and industry, hath made them valuable in the opinion of a Philoso­pher, as well as considerable in the eye of the whole world.

Had they had our

• scituation.
• many and safe harbors.
• shipping, of such timber, and so well built.
• such staple commodi­ties, as
  • Cloths, Stuffs, Bays, &c.
  • Tin, Lead, and Leather.
  • Corn, Fishing, Saffron:

or, such means to have made free ports or magazines for all Nations upon small customs to have waited for their markets: too too probably they would have eat us out of our Trade; as we, for these last two Kings (the Fathers and the Sons) great care and encouragement of Trade, and by many worthy, knowing, and wealthy Merchants, who have corrected much of our ill National genius, have born up with, and overborn them therein:The advan­tages of trade, ma­nufactu­ries, and shipping. for the trade of England is great and highly valuable; for few rightly consider, how many live on the land by those few, who swim on the sea. How many Factories are employed about building but one ship? The Tim­ber Merchant, the Ironmonger, the Car­penter, the Smith, the Ropemaker, &c. Navigation begets many manufacturies, [Page 175] and is not only a wealth but a security unto a Nation: for the plough or keel at sea breeds as many lusty Lads, and more daring, than those at land. It's a part of the care and wisdom of a State, that their subjects be bred laboriously; especi­ally the poor Lads, that are put out to ap­prentiships, by the charity of Parishes, that they be kept to the plough, or to the keel, and not made Footboys, or idle Tapsters, &c. or multiply small trades, &c. I believe the present great King of the world, who had never been conside­derable at sea, but as he fomented jealou­sies betwixt us and Holland, who like the acorn, covered his first growth under this shrub, till he thrust out his head above it, and then dropt so fast, that he by his own power and ours (craftily managed) endanger­ed both of us: I say,Navigati­on too like­ly to set up the great­ness of France. I believe he had never affected to have been an East and West In­dian Merchant, but as he foresaw with old Rome, in vain it was to affect the univer­sal European land (or Monarchy) without he became considerable at Sea. So as though he sails unto both Indies, yet thereby he hopes to fall upon Holland and England. Nor had he become considerable, but as the jealousies of Holland towards us shrowded him, till he thrust forth a top, that will shade us both, unless we hold a [Page 176] stricter correspondence and confidence in each other, than hitherto we have done: and we have sufficiently smarted for the deceitful assistance he gave us, and they, by the invasion he made upon them, may think, what he then regorged, he may hereafter retain. But he that sets bounds to the sea, can to his prosperity; other­wise, humanly speaking, and considering his policies to divide confederates, and the untempered mortar they have to hold themselves together, we may prophesie hard things without the spirit of prophesie. But upon this subject of Navigation, he came so strongly into my phancy, that I could not decline the folly of saying thus much, because of the future danger.

But to revert to our proper subject mat­ter, trade. No nation can be great or rich, that abounds not in some part of his domi­nions in shipping, or who neglects trade, and who hath not in his own dominions, or imports not materials for manufactu­ries. Yet it is no policy to think to en­gross it, or be monarchs of it, as Holland hath for a time affected and pursued that sea-monarchy, as eagerly as Charles the fifth, or Francis the first did the land mo­narchy: but it is wisdom to divide the pro­fit with neighbour Nations amicably. We throve not, when we could not content [Page 177] our selves with the manufactory of our cloths, but must prohibit the transporting white and undy'd. Merchandizing, like the sea shore, is made smooth and even both among our selves and Forreigners,Companies, or trade managed by them un­der a regu­lation. not by governing all parts of it by Com­panies, or wholly excluding Neighbours. Companies for home and nigh trades are not very advantagious. They are always of most use, when they exclude no pri­vate traders; and yet they cannot subsist, if all Interlopers be under no restraint; therefore it may be well thought, that no man should be permitted freely to trade, where Companies are erected, but under the regulation of that Company, nor that Company make such chargeable by-laws, as should discourage young and free tra­ders; therefore Companies may by a Council of State or Parliaments be well countenanced, if regulated; so as they should admit private Traders upon such rules, as the Council of State, not them­selves, should set down as equal betwixt both. Two Companies we have, viz. that of the East-Indies, and the Turky, which trades would soon fall to irreparable disor­der, if they were not supported by such pillars. The great covetous rapacious Statesmen in either of these Countries and places, would soon dash private Merchants [Page 178] against one another, and one Nations bribes would eat their Neighbours out, if the wisdom of such societies prevented it not.

The East-India Company in Holland is a little monarchy, Amsterdam hath a half, Middlebrough and Zealand a fourth, Horn and Enchuysen a sixth, and the small re­main we may say serves to gratifie such in­terloping persons or places, as they will admit of. The soveraignty of this trade is in the States General, who renew the Charter upon a considerable fine to this Company, usually once in—years.

Had we not a trade in India, and a Company to govern that trade, the Pepper and Callicoes we bring home for nine pence would cost us two shillings or half a crown, if brought us by the Hollanders. And this is proved too clearly unto us, by the Spice trade they have engrossed, and cast us out of, at the price of so much infi­delity and blood. And our East-India and Turky Ships, besides the Mariners, wherewith they must be manned, are a great security to the Nation.

The stan­dard of Coin.A Prince never loses either in his reve­nue or trade, in keeping up the standard of his money; for flutter as much as they will, all trade is reduced to the intrinsick value of the coyn. To cry it up in those [Page 179] conjunctures of [...]e, when a Prince is to pay, and to decry it, when he is to re­ceive, is a kind of robbing his own Bank­ers or Subjects; but it is a short liv'd po­licy, and Strangers will retort it upon himself. But nothing can be more fatal to a State, than to break assignments made on publick faith. It must be the child of some such folly I would not describe. It looks like the despair of some young Gamster, that sets all he is worth upon one hazard.

To get advantages by exchanges of money,Exchange of money or bills. and bills of credit is a politick prudence; for if France overballance us in their particular trade, they will get by us likewise in their exchange of money. Which concerns Ambassadors and Gentlemen tra­velling as well as Merchants to ob­serve.

Government is upheld by treasure,Treasure. and therefore treasure hath many swoln titles given to it, as that it is the sinew both of war and peace, the ornament of the one, and the strength of the other: or the or­gan of motion and action unto both. Nei­ther greatness, nor honour, nor security will be maintained without it. It is like food unto the body, when it fails, sttrength soon doth so, and weakness ap­pears: for, says Tacitus, Diminutionem [Page 180] imperii doces, si fructus, quibus Respublica sustinetur, diminuantur. If neither family nor city can be maintained without it, much less soveraignty over a whole peo­ple. The father of every family, the chief Magistrate of every town must in his person, attendance, habitation, and dyet, ap­pear distinguishable from others by those sensible ensigns of honour, which beget awe and reverence. Princes therefore were Lords paramount of the land they go­verned, which made the Kings of Israel so great Herdsmen, and to have occasion of so many men to reap their harvest. Not only William the Conqueror, but says Sir Edward Cooke, by the laws of King Alfred, the ancient Kings, who were Sax­ons,Patrimo­nial. had all the Lands of England in de­measnes. Princes therefore never more wounded their government, nor lessened their reverence, than when they parted with their Patrimonial estates, and de­pended on subsidiary aids (even for their own subsistance) of their subjects;Subsidiary. for that lessened their honour, and raised the pride, and consequently begot contumacy in their people; for it is natural for men to think, whom they freely give unto, they oblige; not considering, that the same duty be­longs unto the Politick Body, as unto the Natural, where every member must send [Page 181] somewhat unto that, which we call the habit of the body, (or the soveraignty) or else the members themselves will dwindle a­way.

Prerogatives of Princes were a kind of treasure to them:Preroga­tives a kind of treasure. for Tenures and Servi­ces, Wardships, Purveyances, and Carri­ages, &c. were in nature of a revenue, and set forth their honour, eased their charge, and preserved the dependancies of subjects on them. If we would look back into our own History, and consider how either the neglect, or some forced necessity, or some false policy have wrung these from our Princes, we may discern in a great measure our own present distempers. The Conqueror brought in with him great and independent Lords,Lords as­sistant to the Conque­ror. rather as assistants than subjects; or as men to divide the prey with him; and therefore unto many of these, he gave large territories, with that, which the French call Basse Justice; so as their Tenants depended in a manner as much on them, as they did on the King, as Lord paramount. This bred the Ba­rons wars;Barons wars. for though the Barons would tyrannize over their vassals, yet they a­greed, the soveraign Prince must be made as weak and limited, as possibly they could. Then to weaken this crown, un­fortunately rises a dispute of Regal title, [Page 182] even in the Royal family,The dispute of title be­twixt the two Royal families. and the red Rose and the white become ensigns of a long and bloody civil war. And as men took part with either of these, upon suc­cesses, they were to be rewarded, and by the various changes the crown, even by its prosperities, was rather weakned than strengthened. These Lay-quarrels begat a harvest for the then ambitious and gripple Clergy: so as the Crown both by its Lords Spiritual and Temporal was in a great measure lorded over. This made that deep sighted Prince,Henry 7. Henry the se­venth, (brought to the crown by these Powers, who vindicated his Wife's title from an usurping and bloody Uncle, Ri­chard the third) to dread even that pow­er, that had set him up, and so as subtilly as he could, by cherishing the Commons against them, to undermine it: and he foreseeing the necessity of treasure to strengthen the crown, grew a legal Ty­rant. For he then shewed the subject, what a severe rod the penalties of necessa­ry and wholsome laws were in the hands of the Prince, if used without clemency. And could he have renewed his age, or that his long raign had been by time dou­bled, most probably he would have made the crown a substantive.Henry 8. His son Henry the eighth, though he was of as great un­derstanding [Page 183] and greater literature, yet not being equal in King-craft, but transported with vanity and popular glory, whether by accident and passion (which abounded in him) or by design, it is unknown; he fell upon the State Spiritual, as his Father had done on the Temporal, and with more violence shook their greatness, and invad­ed their revenues in the Abbots or the Monasteries and Convents, which had he converted to the maintenance of the crown, as he did by profusely giving away their Lands, unto the maintenance of the acts he had done, or in casting off Papal supremacy: the Father and the Son, we may probably say, would have made the crown for ever stood less in need of the subjects extraordinary supplies, which are seldom free bounties, but often hard bar­gains through the diminution of preroga­tive. The succeeding Princes,Edward 6. Q. Mary. Q. Elisa­beth. the one a Minor, the other two under disputable ti­tles, because condemned even by the Fa­ther, and that in the heighth of his power, by the consent of his two Houses of Parlia­ment; and the one of these Ladies being to restore the religion ejected, and the o­ther to replant that, which was before so excellently reformed,K. James. and the next Succes­sor being a learned and pacifick Prince, and withal addicted much to ease and [Page 184] pleasure, and not a native but a forreigner. All these concussions cast the crown, as we may say, chiefly into the hands of the Commons, the third State of this Realm; and the Lords, who were blinded with the hope of an Aristocracy, or at least some addition of power, which they seemed now to want, so joyned with the Com­mons, as that the usual failures of Go­vernment in Charles the first's time be­came the overthrow both of King and Lords.Charles 1. Such is the destructive torrent of Populacy; and such are the sad conse­quences of Princes negligently parting with their own patrimonial revenues, and as unadvisedly, for a temporary sup­ply, divesting themselves of those prero­gatives, which serve both for their own and subjects security. And such is the de­generacy of Nobility, that when servilely they have served to pull down the crown, they have for their reward a vote of being an useless State.

Thus we see a State loses its health and strength by affecting some unwholsom di­et; but it is an irrational thing in a Sub­ject to expect safety and protection, and yet to have an unwillingness in a Despoti­cal Government, as France is almost now, arbitrarily to be taxed, (for that unwil­lingness or sullen murmuring doth but be­get [Page 185] a sharper tyranny) or in a limited and mixt Monarchy, as England is, to be ever selling their aids; for that is but crumbling the power of Soveraignty, and often ma­king it more severe to the Subject in the hand of some inferiors. For as no Govern­ment can want an arbitrary power, so this is most severely executed, where it is done by a numerous and inferior body. Wit­ness the long Parliament of 1640. when taxes were so multiplied, and various charges laid on the Subject (which Tacitus observes and calls, varia praedandi vocabu­la) that we had monthly taxes, contributions, loanes, fifth and twentieth parts, new ordinan­ces for weekly taxes for the British army in Ireland, for reducing Oxford, (the Sanctuary and place of the Kings residence) distinct taxes for an Eastern and Western Association, and for particular places, as Newark, &c. and for buying in and (as we may call it) selling, or sending out the Scotch army. I dare not look forward, but I pray unto Providence to divert real provocations, if imaginary or light could bring on us so much misery, and that those whom it concerns, may consider how much treasure they have spent of the Nations (besides other sad consequences) by their impatience, and not freely giving a little, when a little would have served, as all King Charles [Page 186] the first's time it would have done. What it cost afterwards, through the whole Par­liamentary Reign or Protectorship, the be­fore-mentioned taxes are proof enough.

I that vent rather strong desires and wishes than write Politicks, would be glad that the Crowns desmeasnes were both plentiful and unalienable, further than for a lease of 40 or 50 years, to reward de­serving Ministers of State, and good Ser­vants; for thô there must be an overflow for some Favorites, (for Princes are but men) yet those fall not under my thoughts to provide for, but that the magnificence and splendor of a Court, and the hospita­lity of a Houshold, and the ordinary and necessary expences of Guards, Garrisons, and standing and usual Navies for the de­fence of the Channel, or conduct of the Merchant, should not be precarious, pro­bably would conduce more unto the safe­ty and peace of the Nation, and prosperity of the Subject, than unto the Princes; but this is not fit for me to descant upon. I would never rob the people by the plenty of a Princes constant revenue, of having the means of shewing their good affection and loyalty by their bounty to their Prince; for it is an evidence they are un­der a free Government, that they are not necessitated to give, as it is an evidence [Page 187] that they are under an unsafe Government, that the Prince must be often forced, for the necessary expences of the Government, to depend on the good-will or humour of his People; for these have their vicissitudes. Res angusta domi will make a Prince often so jealous of his affairs at home, that he will not dare to seek occasion to promote them abroad. I shall harp too often upon that string; but I believe neither French nor Dutch had been able to have changed the ballance of Christendom (as notoriously it is since) if such a good intelligence as I wish, had been kept betwixt the Prince and his three Estates. What 100000 l. per annum would have done in those days in respect of military expences, 500000 l. will not do now; and I believe our Neigh­bors feel it as well as our selves.

Home taxes or subsidies, freely and vo­luntarily given in Parliament, are the fittest supports for all extraordinary expences; but then these should be endeavoured to be laid equally; for Livie calls a Dooms-day book (or equal tax) res saluberrima, magno futura imperio, and it is much better for a Prince, that his Nobles and Commons should give, or lay the tax, by virtue of their liberty, than he receive or take it by virtue of his own Prerogative. For, says Chancellor Bacon, there is a great diffe­rence [Page 188] betwixt a tax raised or given by the Representatives of the People, and one ta­ken by the absoluteness of the Prince; for thô it be all one in the purse, yet it is di­vers in the payment; or it works diversly on the courage and affections of the Peo­ple. One needs Themistocles's two God­desses to raise it, power and perswasion, the other disputes it, or would cast it off, by two as forcible Goddesses, necessity and poverty.

Arms.Arms is as considerable and necessary a pillar of Government, as any of the former, and I have cast it in the last place, because if men would be just, it would be unne­cessary; for the primary laws of justice are built or implanted in sincere nature, and are sufficient for the discharge of all publick and reciprocal duties, if they were observed. But arms or force are but se­condary instruments of justice, and are grounded upon depraved nature; for they are never to be used, but when the Go­vernment cannot reduce the Governed un­to the obedience of justice, but by them. We usually therefore say, they are pro­perly to determine the controversies of beasts, not men; so as among men there ought to be no recourse unto one, until the other is disobeyed; for force is rightly termed ultima ratio Regum, or the last thing [Page 189] a Prince should make use of. This is the irascible faculty in the soul of Govern­ment; or that which resists the ataxia or disorder in the politick Body, or in some member of it; or which gains that by fear, which ought to have been performed by love.

This is that,At home. which fortifies justice at home, by seeing executed the penalties of the Laws, the process of the several Courts, and their sentences and judgments upon the cases before them, whether those sen­tences be capital, pecuniary, or corporal. This is that, which is to reduce the re­fractory to the common justice and laws of the land, to quell insurrections, and to suppress rebellions. And when disobedi­ence comes to any of these heights, every Court of justice hath its proper officers to see its sentences and decrees executed; so in cases of riot, or contumacy backt by numbers, an obligation lies upon a whole County, by the Posse Comitatus or power of that County, which the Sheriff hath the conduct of, to subdue such persons. And in cases of rebellion or insurrections at home, or invasion of Forreigners from abroad, every subject is bound to repress the same at the hazard of his life.Rebellion, tho' it bring on a civil war, is not pro­perly a war.

Arms are the proper instruments of war, but insurrection or rebellion of Subjects is [Page 190] not properly to be called a war, tho' it be a use of force; for war must be made amongst equals, which no persons, nor order of subjects can be to their Soveraign, as hath been proved already. So as all well constituted Governments reject co­ordination as the distracter of all obedi­ence, and the justification of a civil war; therefore the resistance of Subjects is re­bellion, not war. Yet because sometimes the Rebels power is equal with the Princes, such contests have got the name of a civil war.

Civil war.This, of all wars, is most detestable, and it must needs be hateful, where victo­ry it self is odious, and where cruelty is exercised upon consanguinity and affinity, or nighest relations. So as Lucan expresses it well, when he says, Bella ..... nullos habitura triumphos.

Remedies on the sub­jects part against a Civil war.It is much better to give remedies how to prevent it, than rules how to manage it.

Remedies on the Subjects part are, to remember they are born under subjection, and are required of God to be subject, and to pay passive obedience, where they can­not active; therefore to be careful not to multiply grievances by inferences, or to think all will befall them that may, and to consider, that it is very often impatience [Page 191] under small grievances, that throws them into the sufferance of greater. Let the multitude or vulgars consider, without their many hands no great changes or turmoils could be made; and let other well-mean­ing men reflect, how often they are made properties of by cunning Designers and Di­sturbers of a well settled Government, whose abilities serve only to create a mis­understanding between King and People, and to manage the discontent of the subject to their own advantage, and to set forth all the failures of a Prince only to cloud the ill consequences of their own innova­tions, knowing,The hope of Innovators. if they can disturb the settled Government, a People cannot be long without one, and then they, that have been acceptable for the service in pulling down a building, are like to be employed in that, which is to be set up. This might keep the silly fish from too greedily swal­lowing the bait, which will draw him out of his own proper element. The best Histo­rian describes these disturbers very natu­rally, when he says, Honores, quos quietâ Republica desperant, perturbatâ consequi arbi­trantur. And thus the name of Liberty hath very often through the affecting changes brought the subject in general in­to servitude. The soberest and wisest men therefore must not be beguiled herein by [Page 192] indifferency, as are the multitude through giddiness, and the well-meaning through not discerning consequences to hearken to changes. All these being often taken in the common snare of Innovators; for there being seldom such a happy conjuncture of a State, but that somewhat is to be justly condo­led, tho' at the same time the condition of the Subject is in the general very much to be thank't God for. Neuters defer their appearance in behalf of the Government so long, that when they would recover it they cannot, for the malignity of this hu­mor soon infects the mass of blood, and then these men either engage unseasona­bly, and so lose themselves and fortunes, or are lookt upon by the Innovator as sus­pected persons, and so undergo an equal load with those, who worthily and stout­ly from the beginning withstand the inno­vation. Cicero's letters to Pomponius Atticus, and Atticus's life, and Chancellor de Vaire (who lived in Paris in the time of the French league in Henry the thirds time, and Sir Walter Rawleigh upon such a conjuncture, when the Romans and Car­thaginians both strove for Sicily) are parts of Story fit to be consulted, to know how a man should demean himself in such times; which will resolve it self into this, that men should timely assist the settled [Page 193] Government, as obliged thereunto, and ra­ther hope in a change of what is amiss from the erring legal Governors, than ex­pect remedies in the state of the Publick by such, who fly to arms to work refor­mation. The least any man can do in such a conjuncture, is with Pomponius Atticus, who took arms with neither side, yet owned Pompey, tho' not disobliging Caesar, or rather with Cato, tho' he sus­pected Pompeys greatness, yet engaged with him, who engaged for the present state of Government. But whoever takes offices or charge with the Innovators, and thereby promotes their affairs, as Sir Wal­ter Rawleigh concludes, may be reckoned partakers of their crime. It borders too nigh guilt, to let even the consideration of a mans own person (I mean an eminent mans) or family, to sway him so much, as to lead him dully to be passive in such a conjuncture; but it stains both, when the world knows his judgment is one thing, and his practice another; for there is a time, when a man may say, Providence calls to Civil martyrdom, which is often in de­fending the settled state, never by Civil war in changing it.

Remedies on the Princes part are,Remedies on the Prince's part. e­ver to be watchful, that his course of life and councels be not such, as may make [Page 194] him unvaluable in the eyes of his subjects; that he be not found necessitous in his treasure: for if in time of civil sedition, he stand in need of money, in some sort he stands at the courtesie of the subject, whose purse and body both he should not want at one time; for it was Nero's folly, that he stood most in need of the Subjects sup­plies, when he had most need to have eas­ed them therein; for he that hath had no foresight of contingencies, is the unreadi­lier aided. A Prince therefore should ne­ver want a fit force, to keep himself from a surprizal, and a fit subsistance for some time for such a body. And if he be but thus furnished, loyalty will keep them of his party, whom otherwise despair will drive from him; and false Brethren or Intelligencers will come over; especially if the Prince's Ministers be men of a good reputation, so as securely intelligence may be held with them. And by such means as these, discords may be raised among the rebellious, and they may be put upon such rash, or such cautious councils, as may ruine them.

Arms in the Politicks, is like fortitude in the Morals; it is the guard and securi­ty of all the other virtues. Civil justice grounded on, and managed by religion, is the soul of Government; but the insepa­rable [Page 195] prerogatives of it are treasure and arms; for these are properly the sinews, that make the members of Government move. As Government is the ordinance of God, these three are inseparable from soveraignty: therefore none can make laws, but with the Prince, nor raise trea­sure, but for the Prince; for common rea­son shews, men are bound unto the de­fence of Government with life and for­tune; but experience shews, when a cor­rupt degenerate man, (or men) whom Pro­vidence hath given soveraignty un­to, have both the soul and body (as we may call it) of Government in his (or their) hands, or arbitrarily at his (or their) dispose, unwholsome laws may be made, i. e. such as are partial, or ricket­ed, swelling the head too big, or a hectick or preternatural heat of the Soveraignty (be it Monarchy or State) may draw strength too fast from the habit of the bo­dy; therefore divers mixt Governments reserve a general consent to accompany so­veraign authority, both in making laws and raising moneys: (though in neither of these nothing can be done by any but the soveraign persons thus assisted.) But arms or the Militia of the Nation (to shew the danger of co-ordination) is every where singly in the Prince or State; since if any but the Soveraign hath the power of raising [Page 196] the arms, they will be soon supposed to have the power of using them; and there­fore no man, how loyal soever, even for the safety of the Prince's person, can raise arms without his commission.

These remarks may appear trivial and pedantick, yet for want of such a foresight, or some grains of such a powder, I have seen the affairs of a great King in convul­sive sits.

Thus much for arms, as they concern the civil administration of justice, and the repression of rebellion at home, or as these being opposed by subjects, arise unto a ci­vil war.Forreign war. Now we will consider arms, as by them one equal (or who hath no au­thority over the other) endeavours to re­duce the other unto justice, i. e. to ob­serve those laws of Nations which are binding either by the law of Nature or Nations, or which are obligatory by rea­son of some league or treaty of com­merce, made between two Nations. Thus by the law of nature, even when both per­sons are subjects, and under one and the same law, if one by a sudden assault in­vade the other, so as he is in danger of life by him, and cannot have recourse un­to that law, by which both of them are to be judged, nature authorizes the assailed to use a counter-force against the assailant, [Page 197] and to be his own justiciar: (but this is but accidental, and may be properly call­ed a natural authority to repel force by force; or is a private war.) But that which Grotius calls a publick war,O [...] publick war. is be­twixt two equals, who are both Sove­raigns, neither having jurisdiction over the other. Now all Soveraigns are e­quals, though the one be never so much inferior unto the other in territories, wealth, or strength; for where Soveraignty is un­equal in power, it is equal in right: and because these may injure one another, therefore they have a right to exact justice by arms from one another, and this is that which we call publick war.The root of this war springs from injustice [...] The root of war thus springing from injustice, or the lusts of men, it is no marvel, that the fruit is so barbarous and inhuman; and yet even this monster, which is too often an of­fence against justice, cannot be managed but by justice; for Princes ought never to war one upon another, but upon a belief, that the ground of their war is just. Nay,Yet the ground of it must be just. they ought not to begin a war, until sin­cerely they have endeavoured to obtain a satisfaction by way of peace. Humanity then obliges to avoid it, and necessity on­ly warrants the undertaking it. Says Mo­ses therefore, When thou goest to war, enquire of the Lord, or go unto his Oracles or [Page 198] Word, or thine own conscience, and re­flect, whether the occasion of the war be just and lawful. Consult not the pravity of human nature, which would lay land to land, or upon an unreasonable fear, that others will invade thee, (which hath been the common, but improsperous pra­ctice of mankind, (as Mr. Hobbs phrases it.) Anticipate not, or invade not ano­ther's power, who hath not wronged thee, for fear by that power, he may wrong thee, which, as Thucidides sets forth, was such a justifying argument amongst the A­thenians, who warranted themselves there­in, because it was the practice of most men, as if it had been the wisdom and rectitude of the nature of mankind, though they found both the Lacedemoni­ans, and all their smaller Allies confede­rating against them, because they made this their boundless ambition to be a child of justice. Since that could not be the off-spring of justice, which by more men than those that used it, was complained of, as an axiom of injustice. Neither use those modern Policies, which propose a forreign war, as a Scavingry of the sur­plus of the people. Nor let thy plenty arise out of others misery, by keeping two neighbors in the calamity of war, that thou may'st enjoy the plenty of peace. But [Page 199] above all,Several considera­tions rela­ting unto a war. let not thy vanity or thy glory prevail to exercise thy strength up­on thy Neighbors, since it is not power, but justice, that makes a Prince truly glo­rious. True it is, the luxury of one Prince and the covetousness of another State, may be scourged by the rapacity and vain-glory of a third; but God permits what he al­lows not, and Princes are innocent in the acts they do, not from the suitableness of their deeds with his pleasure, but from the conformity of them to his law. Neither was one Prince to surprize another, but first to send his Herauld, and denounce hostility, and to use those other ceremo­nies, which the uprightness of elder times observed, or condemned, when not observ­ed. For since the lives and estates of so many innocent persons are involved in a war, humanity requires, that if possibly it can, it be declined. Since the villainous nature hereof could not avoid the allow­ing frauds, ambushes, false intelligences, and many more stratagems; nay, knew not, how to avoid cruelties and inhumani­ties, and conflagrations, which in all other cases would be abhorred; for the Soldier, like the Huntsman, was allowed his gin as well as his bow, and might corrupt his enemies men, as well as employ his own. All which is to be understood, flagrante [Page 200] bello; for in times of truce and cessation of arms, there ought to be a great restraint upon the former liberty. Methinks, that God made it a great restraint upon the best and wisest Princes, and even upon the most injured, not rashly to run into a war; since conquest gave, or was the mother of a right even unto dominion; so hazardous it was even to vindicate an injury by this inhuman course; for suc­cess did not always attend upon the best cause. And it is a great evidence a Prince had just thoughts, when he began his war, if he appeared apt to end it upon moderate and reasonable conditions, or ne victis quidem praeter injuriae licentiam cripere. Neither doth he grant peace, that grants it not, till he hath ruined his enemy; for that is not, as the Historian says, pacem dare, but solitudinem facere. Among Christians sure I am, it ought to be begun upon great deliberation, and to be managed with tenderness and reluctance even upon the considerations of humanity. And since the event is so uncertain, Mo­ses's councel surely is very reasonable, When thou art to make a war, be sure to keep thy self from every wicked thing; for the Lord walketh in the midst of the camp; and keep it clean free from dung, that there may be salubrity of body and purity of mind.

Princes are to reason with themselves, whether with 10000 they can meet with their enemy that hath 20000; or whether they be supplied by Confederates or Mer­cenaries; for both these are insecure to de­pend on. For Confederates have most commonly separate and single interests of their own, and Mercenaries are without any affection or good will to the cause, having their eye only upon the pay, and that is very often dazled, when the enemy can give them a better. Besides, as they have mercenary bodies, they too often have mercenary minds; for this sort of men in any extremity (which is usual to befal men in a state of war) have not that virtue and generosity to undergo the toil and hazard of their present condition; Besides, this may give Princes caution, how they engage in a war, since their ve­ry prosperity creates them new enemies, and some neuter Prince rises up in behalf of the conquered, and reduces all to some nighness of equality or state, which the war at first was begun upon. If choice or necessity lead them to undertake a war, they can have no wiser councel, than that which the Delphic Oracle gave unto the Lacedemonians, viz, carry it on with all their power, or rather to overdo than un­dergo it; for then there is no retreat with­out [Page 202] great loss or great dishonor; so as fit­ting preparations of all necessaries are not to be sought for, when they are to be used; for that war is sure to continue longest, that is least provided for, when it is first begun. Nor must the Prince for­wardly run into it, upon a probability of his enemies oversight, but upon a confi­dence of his own foresight. Nor should the confidence or forwardness of his coun­cellors, (especially if they have percei­ved in himself a strong inclination to the engagement) lead him to think, he shall meet with a constancy of fervor; for diffi­culties and dangers (which are the con­stant companions of a war) in action change those tempers of mind, which first appeared in councel. Safest therefore it is, and most commonly those Princes thrive best in war, who foresee, and are ablest to digest improsperities. The Germans never thought the Romans invincible, till they found no ill success or misfortune could daunt them. This spirit in the Athenians, after their great losses in Sici­ly, made the Lacedemonians and their Confederates, as much apprehend their stomachfulness, as they had before at any time apprehended their power.

Many considerations therefore attend upon preparation for a war: Viz.

• A well chosen experienc'd General.
  Constituent parts of an army.
• Officers, who have tasted adverse as well as good fortune.
• Commissaries, Providores, Quarter-masters, and Engineers, Chyrur­geons; all expert in their Offices.
• Arms, Armour, Horses, Carriages, Tents, and Artillery, not inferior to the enemies.
• Treasure, as much as any thing, for all these are necessary to inspirit the

Common Soldier: since his fight­ing part is the least part of his duty; it is the fatigue, or the undergoing the necessa­ry toil and labour, as much as the danger of his profession, that makes him valua­ble. To march all day and be weary, and then to quarter in open field, be the wea­ther never so stormy, and no sooner in his quarters, but often finding an enemy to disquiet him, or least he should do so, to be obliged unto a fresh labor, by raising up some works to secure the same; these are the difficulties of his condition, and the unavoidable contingences of it; [Page 204] and therefore, as he is to be chosen of an able body, so he is to be governed by a strict discipline, that he may know it his duty to undergo these labours and dangers often with scarceness of food, and with a patience and obedience, that would be­come a Philosopher. All which he usu­ally with cheerfulness undergoes, when he hath a confidence in his General, as being an experienc'd Commander, well vers'd in stratagems; when he finds his care prevents his own Officers from preying upon him, and defrauding him of his pay; for then he is willing to use his hands, and not to use his tongue; or to be silent in action, that he may the better receive his orders or words of command, when he finds his belly and his back carefully provided for. When he is to fight, if he observes his arms are as good as his ene­mies, and his ground as well chosen to fight on, at least as well as the place will afford, and if his difficulties be great, if he perceive good reserves to second him, this begets that spirit of discipline, which is the true spirit of an army, and makes them willing to keep their just order and rank, and that with silence, that they may hearken to what orders are given them, which is the true strength of an army; and if their pay be not wanting, their du­ty is seldom.

Men may vulgarly discourse, that a good army in an enemies country will maintain it self, and so peradventure it may, if the General receive the spoils in order to di­stribute among the common Soldiers, or for raising their pay; or if by strong par­ties he brings in sufficient provision of food, or ammunition-bread into their camp; but it never fares worse with an army, than when by small parties (or straglers) the common Soldier forrages and provides for himself; for then the spi­rit of discipline, and consequently the strength of the army ceases, and all ad­vantagious opportunities for the enemy seem to begin.

Times there are, when fate and desti­ny seem plainly to be setting up one Na­tion, and pulling down another, as when successes, and that in several places at one and the same time, and that under no promising circumstances, attend on one Prince, and fail another, insomuch as more is to be attributed unto Providence or good fortune, than unto conduct. Such con­junctures as a Prince cannot foresee, yet when he discerns, may fitly lead him to be less obstinate, for usually such prospe­rities are but like a torrent, which carry all before them, but e're long have their ebb; for fortune usually lets no long lea­ses, [Page 206] and the greatest potentates are but her Tenants at will.

Martial-law.Where-ever an Army marches, there is a necessity of Martial law; for this is a body of brush-wood, which one spark sets on fire, and therefore needs such an arbi­trary power, we may say, rather to stifle by a sudden suppressing it, than to extin­guish it by water, or any formal means.

A veterane army; the use and the danger of it.Few kingdoms or places can be reckon­ed safe without some standing veterane army; but this will ever influence the Ci­vil Government; for though armies should wait on laws, and execute upon disobedience the civil decrees, yet the ro­bust servant often endangers the weak e­state of the Master. Rome was in an ill case, when this secret was disclosed, that a Prince could be made elsewhere than with­in her walls, or that too common Soldiers even within her walls could transfer her empire, and give her an Otho for a Gal­ba. Thus the soveraign Person and Go­vernment hath been changed and endan­gered by her own Guards.

The conclu­sion.Having thus laid the foundation, that all civil power, and the Soveraign Persons that execute it, are of divine ordinance, and that the prerogatives belonging to both, are in intuition of the peace and safety of the whole society, and in honour and security [Page 207] of the head of that Politick Body; and therefore that they are not to be resisted, but both power and person to be held sacred, or so set apart, that the power in its pre­script or laws be indisputable, and the person in the execution thereof unquesti­onable; we may say, here is firm ground to raise our pillars or vital principles of Government upon; and on these we may rear the roof of wisdom's house, and assert, that honesty is the best policy; since by the light of nature or common reason, it is agreed as Epictetus says, that the Gods justly and wisely administer all things, and that they have ty'd children and subjects unto Pa­rents and Princes, not as they are good, but as they are Parents and Princes; and therefore for such blessings men are more to depend on their providence, than their own choice or wisdom. For remove Government and Governours from this divine ordinance, and the principles of Policy shall, like the atoms of Lucretius, make mankind of such an unquiet nature, that he shall be govern­ed by his sensitive appetites and present advantages, rather than by those innate principles, which by the moral virtues of his mind, have fitted him to exercise his own goodness, and to bear with other mens (especially Governors) failures, or vices, and rather to pray for a good Prince, than [Page 208] resist a bad. And the same virtues will teach Princes, that there are no such poli­cies, as those that are ethical; others be­ing but like the pleasures of titillation, earnestly sought for or delightfully used, but soon repented of. Marcus Aurelius's fame will be desireable by a thinking man, when Alexanders and Julius Caesars will be esteem'd worthless, and when Neroes and Caligula's will be found ignominious. And when the ambitions of Charles V. and Philip II. and Francis I. and the great Henry's and Lewis's are considered, it may be feared, that Asia and Gentilisme owe more thereunto, than doth Christen­dom or Christianity. Macchiavilian prin­ciples of policy there can be none steady, and yet there may be many prosperous, because they look after the end and despise the means, and most unnaturally they do often make prosperous a vice, by the ex­ercise of some seeming virtue, and thus by some immoral means, drive at some poli­tick end; for quocun (que) modo rem is their axiom. Such sort of men as these think it no dishonour, if they can sweep the stake, tho' they be found playing with false dice. Nor have they any remorse, that by treachery they have deceived their friend or benefactor. Nothing of all this is said to make the Physicians of State so [Page 209] cautious, as not to know how in compo­sition of a cordial to make use of the ser­pents flesh; for a nice piety or a scrupu­lous policy (I think at least) is not ex­pected, even by God himself, from men of this condition, without there were an assurance of a clear openness and integrity on the other part. Therefore Macchiavel and Tacitus, and men of that form, are excellent Authors to give caution, when they are dangerous Guides to follow. The honest man therefore is not the fool, for he can let live in his house the ser­pent, but not in his breast; and he can shake off animal policy, to entertain Ethi­cal. He hath these mixt in his own com­positum; for as in himself he is both ani­mal and rational, so in his politick consti­tution he is made up of the serpent, or sen­sitive part, and the rational and dove-like. These are not to be kept apart in him, but he is to be compounded of; but the dove must be the soul of his policy.

If we would seek another topick to prove all this, we would have recourse to the whole Histories of the world; and through all of them we shall find, that those carnal policies, which are to corrupt mens councels, are very useful to be known, since it is as necessary for a Traveller to be well hatted, booted, and coated against [Page 210] foul weather and ways, as to be well hor­sed, to carry him his direct road. But observe all Histories, and they do as Co­medies do, (or at least should do) discover many treacheries and vices, but in their conclusion they make them improsperous, and give the reward to virtue. And this further light we may borrow from them, that both Greek and Roman, (and if the subtil wit of the one, and the courage of the other could not, or did not prevent it, no succeeding nations or times ever did or will attain it) who most opposed Mo­narchical Power, never attained their Idol liberty, by manacling of Monarchy. Di­sasterous it was to Athens, and it cost more blood, and interrupted more the prosperity of Rome than any thing else; for both Livie and Tacitus set forth, how when Kings abused their soveraignty, that people sought to find their liberty in two Consuls, to whom soveraign authority was necessary to be intrusted; and these (as no men living ever did, or could make their affairs ever prosperous) became soon not only to be complain'd of in improspe­rous times, but to be envied, when they had the most success; for inferiors (especi­ally when they think they create their Su­periors) never want their passion. So as the Consuls fell soon into their displeasure [Page 211] and jealousie, and a short liv'd Decemviri must rectifie (as they did disorder) this state of government, and the people, in whom the soveraign power was said to be lodged, must be protected by Tribunes, chosen from the Commons, and then by Tribunes Military, that might give check untô the Consulary authority. But all this was but a rolling of a sick man in his bed, and the best medicin they ever took was a Dictator, who silenced all other powers, and singly exercised all power; so as here was Monarchy in its heighth or achme; for the Dictator was a Prince bound by no law, nor clogged with any partnership, only it was temporary and short-liv'd; which is proof enough, (thô extremity and necessity teach the doctrine) that all trust is safeliest lodged in one, and that failures in government will attend the best constitution of government, and that variety of changes are but so many infirmities of a state, and at last so dishear­ten all wise and good men, from depend­ing on a populacy, that a Cinna or a Syl­la, a Pompey, a Crassus, or a Caesar, will in a disguise, (or by a barefac'd challeng­ing it) at last so weary and weaken by ci­vil discords the people, that they will ra­ther choose the change of their condition with security, than endeavor to recover [Page 212] their old pretended liberty with danger. It is the want of good eyes, or the weak­ness of the Optick nerve, that makes men not perceive the usefulness of soveraign prerogatives, even in relation to the bene­fit and well governing of subjects. For the terror of power often keeps the State qui­et and secure, when the belief of liberty breeds that irreverence unto the wisdom of Governors, that they kindle those sparks of contumacy, which set all into a flame. Few men have learnt this lesson, but those, who have lived in times of civil distraction; and therefore the conclusion shall be, Go­vernment is an ordinance of God; whose wisdom having designed men to live in society, made politick, like natural, bo­dies, consist of a head and divers members, lodging life in the body, and sense and mo­tion in the head; so as human laws, (grounded on sound reason and adapted to the genius of the people, and unto the various publick and private concerns, and derived (as nigh as might be) from the moral virtues, or the equity of them by nature implanted in mankind) were like the salt in the natural body, which tied all parts together, by prudence promo­ting publick before private good or inte­rest, and by justice preserving the harmo­ny of tenderness and beneficence commu­nicated [Page 213] from the head, and of cheerful and ready obedience yielded from the body; and by patience, a most necessary and eminent virtue in this corrupted and laps'd state of man, (like mortification, on which even religion her self is now founded) each bearing the others infirmities; for with­out such a temper the publick peace or health of state is lost. Unto which tem­per, O Lord, restore this poor giddy Na­tion.