REASON in some late Treatises being set up Umpire in Religion, challenging Appeals to be made to it, as the highest Tribunal, and being asser­ted with priviledges, which are exalted above Pelagian invention, or what any other Heresie could project. And one Article of the Church of England being threat­ned by some positions which di­rectly oppose it, by saying; That a man may be sav'd by the Law or [Page 2]Sect which he professeth, so that he diligently frame his life according to that Law, and the light of nature. I thought my self obliged to examine the foundation on which this natural infallibility was built, which is supported by these positions, which say; That faith is an assent given to Religious matters, the understanding and will being no otherwise assisted, than they are in drawing other Conclusi­ons.

And that Reason requires no other assistance in the act of faith, than the proposal of that which is to be believed, which the Reasoner calls the near approach of the object being brought nigher by Revelation.

The former account of faith is [Page 3]imperfect, and attended with many false conclusions, which are de­ductions from it; amongst many, let this be considered; That no man (according to that descripti­on of faith) can be an Infidel, who hath readholy Scripture, or its contents or matter proposed to his understanding; And as it is an im­possibility that Euclid should not render the intelligent Reader a Mathematician, so it is equally impossible, that the contents of holy Scriptures proposed to the Infidel, should not make him a Convert: This is necessarily infer­red from the former position, and shall be more illustrated by a sup­position; suppose therefore an Ethnic made so much a Proselite [Page 4]to the true Religion by reading holy Scriptures, that he gives assent to matters of Religion no further, than upon Examination he shall find them agreeable or congenial to his Reason, or (to speak another Phrase,) Reason can confess them to be true: and let him be suppos'd to speak like the Samaritan-Wo­man in another case; saying, I do not believe the Creation of the World, the incarnation of Christ, and other matters of faith, because of the evidence of the Divine Re­cords, but because I presume my belief will be ratifi'd and approv'd by my reason, which is naturally bound to confess them, when they are propos'd, it will appear upon experiment, that he is a wavering [Page 5]and weak Convert, not far re­mov'd from infidelity. This supposition is agreeable to the Reasoners account of faith, and that term of art which expresseth it, calling under standing and will the Elements of which faith is com­pounded. In examining which I intend not to be so critical as he, in interpretation of [...] will equally admit of such criti­cal exercise, but rather take it in the common acceptation. That out of which bodies are made, and into which is their last Return or Resolution; which, being accom­modated to the Reasoners sense, will conclude, that Religious knowledge was no otherwise in mans mind than Idaea's: or some [Page 6]dormantknowledg to be excited by proposal of holy Scriptures, or as letters to make words to be fram'd by the Divine Paedagogy, the Law and Gospel too being in his sense but as a School-master (not ac­cording to the Apostles meaning) to prompt the understanding. This is so false, that it may be con­futed by History, which sayes, ma­ny perused the Mosaical-Scrip­ture, and some past critical judg­ments on them. Longinus, and o­thers, with the Greek Law-givers (though some of their knowledg seems borrowed from them) who must be in the Catalogue of Infi­dels. And later ages give ex­amples of this kind, many men who must be acknowledged to be [Page 7]Masters of reason, being not able to reduce themselves to belief, ac­cording to the former method, which wanting the Divine Testimo­ny to byass their wills and to com­mand assent, left them in desperate Scepticism; for though the con­tents of Religion are such as may be presum'd sufficient to com­mand, or at least win assent; yet the medium which begets this per­swasion is taken of holy Scrip­tures, which saith, Reason in some sense must be laid aside, (which shall be more proved in its proper place) whilst it resigns it self to a more insallible conduct.

Let it be also consider'd, if the will and understanding are the Elements of Faith, that an Ethnic [Page 8]laying aside the Divine Testimony and retiring to his reason, would be more confirm'd in his perswasi­on; As a Chymist asserts his prin­ciples and practical knowledge a­bove that which Theory teacheth, whilst he Analyses or dissolves a body, by which he makes sense a witness of his reason, and gives evidence of the truth by both: or as the Mathematical knowledge challenges greater certainty, than that in other Sciences, which taking a Scheme asunder by demonstra­tion and rebuilding it on the same principles, confidently and justly calls it true; but the success is different in Religious cases, as in some curious contexture, which is defective by its too fine threads, [Page 9]and not far remov'd from no­thing when most tenderly un­woven.

To this, another consideration may be added, how it can be ima­gined that the Heathens should be ignorant of the contents of Reli­gion, at least, so far as practical, seeing Reason is allow'd a Judge naturally qualified for decision of Religious controversies; and con­sequently able to comprehend matters of Faith, and in capacity to frame Religious precepts or notions without any assistance from without, but only furnisht with its own innate faculty. For that as well as he who is set up as judge in all controversies must be suppo­sed to understand the whole Law, [Page 10]though particular cases determine the sentence to some parts of it. Let this be illustrated by that fam'd instance of a Theorem revealed to Pythagoras by a Dae­mon, which although acknow­ledged to be borrowed from Revelation, yet the principles, by which judgment was past on it, were not derived from that kind Spirit, and it may be though pos­sible that the Sophy might have made the discovery without that Monitor, and himself proclaim the [...]. This instance apply'd to the present case will force the Rea­soner to confess: that it was pos­sible that the Ethnic might have luckily discover'd the matter which Religion proposes to be be­liev'd, [Page 11]by his own saculties fol­lowing their natural conduct, which cannot be granted.

If it is objected that a great part of Religion is to be found in Hea­thens writings. It may find an answer from this consideration, that no arguments taken from Pa­gans Books for the proof of the truth of Religion, can be said to prevail otherwise than by being probable and perswasive (and they borrowing their force from Chri­stian Interpretations) and those which have influence on practice, notwithstanding the seeming affi­nity between Reason and Religion, are like Towers or Buildings, which at a great distance seem contigu­ous, which the eye by a nearer [Page 12]approach finds remov'd from their fallacious neighborhood.

That which is said may find another check from the Reasoner's fundamental position; which con­cludes, that it is a sufficient as­sistance to reason in act of faith, if the object be brought nigher by Revelation; which if true, he may impute Heathenish ignorance in matters of Religion, to no other cause but the want of holy Scrip­tures; and retort the force of the former considerations by proposal of this question; whether it is possi­ble that the curious and secret Me­chanism of nature in Animals and other Bodies, could be discern'd without a Microscope, which be­ing deny'd may make it applica­ble [Page 13]to the former case? Revelati­on being as necessary for the be­getting of faith in the Heathen, as a Glass for discerning the small parts of matter. This must not be deny'd, but if by Revelation, the bare proposal of holy Scrip­ture is understood, as sufficient to command assent; this will be a necessary consequence, That the true Religion was not imbrac'd, or believ'd in several Ages, for no other reason than the Sporades (which were confusedly discern'd in the Viá lacteá) were not dis­cern'd till Galilaeus made the dis­covery. For as a Telescope was necessary for the discerning of the one, so the holy Scriptures for be­lieving of the other, the want of [Page 14]which cannot be thought the sole cause of infidelity, the contrary being demonstrable from the pra­ctice of the Jews (who must not altogether by one peremptory sentence be depriv'd of their Rea­son) who have not, and perhaps could not be reduc'd to belief, though conversant with holy wri­tings, this makes way for this Dis­quisition.

Whether in the act of faith, the understanding is enlightned, and consequently the will determined in such manner as it cannot be by a mere natural conduct.

The affirmative of this may be proved, according to the method of the Schools from this Topick of Gods concurse with man, [Page 15]which alwayes leaves goodness as its effect, which must be called perfection, according to the mean­ing of the Character which was given of the whole Creation, that all that was made, was good, viz. Every Creature perfect in its kind, seeing therefore faith is the work of God on the understanding; 'tis past doubt, that it is improv'd, and the sight more perfect.

How it is perfected, shall be de­clared in another disquisition (in this place 'tis enough, if I remove prejudices, which the former asser­tion may create) by saying that the perfection which the Soul hath in the act of faith, is not such as advances its nature to an Angelical degree of knowledge; yet it hath [Page 16]more than could be the result of mere natural powers, guided by their own methods. Neither must this perfection be restrain'd to simple apprehensions or notions, but complex, which would be as Ropes of Sand without any true connexion; which must be such, because matters of Religion tran­scend reasons highest pitch, which knows not how to compound its notions or thoughts, so as to make true propositions, as may appear from an instance in one fundamen­tal. If this question be propo­sed to reason, whether God and Man could be in streight an union as they are in Christ's person, it must remain undetermined. And God and Man must stand in the [Page 17]proposition, as Subject and Praedi­cate, till Divine testimony comes as a Copula. To prevent such misprisions, this explanation may be added, viz. That by the perfe­ction attributed to the Soul in the act of faith, no new faculties are to be suppos'd, that could transform its nature, and remove humanity to another kind. However that which is said, may make way for an objection; if the mind is thus perfected or inlightned to discern the truth of proposition, of which it must be ignorant, whilest guided or inform'd by its own natural evidence and conduct, all believers are Enthusiasts.

This is no necessary conse­quence of the former assertion: [Page 18]For Enthusiasin derives not its name from the Divine concurse with the Soul in some particular acts, but when it comes at times, when it is not expected, and out of the common course and me­thod, or when knowledge which seems extraordinary, such as a man could not attain to by use of his reason; and which he doth not understand when spoken. Now the improvement of the pious mans knowledge, which is ac­quir'd by regular means, which Religion commands to be us'd, deserves not the name of Enthu­siasm. Neither can that extraor­dinary assistance promis'd to holy Councils and Synods, denomi­nate them Enthusiastick in their [Page 19]definitions. But I will not urge this argument, seeing the Reason­ner concludes Councils no other­wise assisted than by Reason, and no better qualified for finding truth than a Senate or Parliament; but further, examine the Reasoners positions, which allows no more Divine assistance to Reason, but the near approach of the object represented in holy Scripture; or to speak in his Metaphor, that the eye of the Soul can discern all spirituals objects, external impe­diments being remov'd, and brought within the Sphere of Vi­sion. This discerning faculty is such, that the Soul can no more pretend to be furnish't with it, than the Batt or Owl can be said [Page 20]to have an eye as quick and as piercing as the Eagle, and as well dispos'd for vision, if nature had not plac'd its proper objects at too great a distance. Some parts of Matter are so small, that it is impossible they should be dis­cern'd; he deserves to Chroni­cled a fool, who observing the dis­coveries made by Microscopes of small bodies (which nature could not see whilest unassisted by art, and she look't with her own eyes,) would attempt an invention of making discoveries of the parts and figures of them, of which the Air or Wind consist. Some ob­jects are not visible, though as near as it is possible they can be. Not to speak much of Atoms and Mathe­matical [Page 21]points, the one not to be discern'd by the eye of the body, the other not distinctly seen by that of the mind, as appears from numerous Controversies which arise from them, which are not so trivial or useless, but, that pru­dence can had hath made them subservient (as the strange Phae­nomena's of the Load-stone sug­gested by the Reconciler) to facili­tate the belief of the existence of a spiritual being; by shewing that there are beings in nature, as well as those which Religion discovers, whose existence must be consess'd, though the object are invisible, and confound both sense and rea­son in their search.

This defect of natural sight [Page 22]proceeds not from the want of the near approach of the object, as is demonstrable from the first prospect Religion takes, viz. The being and nature of God (who being brought as near as imagi­nation can wish or propose; for what object can be so near to the Soul, as an Idaea, which is connate with it, and inseparable from it?) is but confusedly discerned: be­sides the ubiquity of this object implyes, it is near to every faculty which is able to discern it; the World also being as a Theater in every part of which of God is to be seen, yet the notions of God, which natural men frame in their brains, are as ill Representations of him, as Pagans Idols, whose mon­strous [Page 23] Pageantry owes its begin­ning to mans imperfect knowledg of the nature of Spirits, which is so far from comprehending the Supreme, that it cannot conclude the being, or understand the man­ner of the existence of the inferi­our, (the Angels) who are above mere humane knowledge.

But if this may be retorted, by saying, the natural ignorance of the existence and nature of An­gels (whose being, reason cannot necessary conclude) doth not im­ply the ignorance of the Deity, whose existence is more evident, which must be granted; (for as he who cannot discern an Atom, or the smallest visible part of matter, may see a Mountain, or greater ob­ject, [Page 24]so humane Reason ignorant of finite, may discern an infinite spirit) yet it argues the imperfe­ction of the sight, for he who can­not discern a Mote in a Sun-beam, cannot so distinctly discern the vast body of the Sun, and he who knows not the ratio formalis, or es­sence of the least part of matter, knows it not as it lyes in the great Bulk of the Ʋniverse. Let this be concluded, by saying, That as he who cannot distinctly see the small Sands, cannot so distinctly see the vast Sea-shore; so he who knows not the nature of finite, doth not distinctly discern that of an infinite spirit.

To what degree of knowledge, Reason, only following its own con­duct, [Page 25]can lead its follower; and how he can be said to be a THEIST?

Satisfaction will be given to all doubts, which can arise out of this inquiry, if these positions be prov'd. That Reason in its quest concerning the being of God, and the manner of his wor­ship, cannot arrive to a higher pitch of certainty than that of o­pinion. And that such know­ledge is so uncertain, that it can­not be consistent with that firm assent which Religion commands.

For proof of the former, 'tis enough to direct the Reader to the precedent Disquisition, which shews how the Reasoner puts him­self in the condition or quality of an Ethnick. For though Reve­lation [Page 26]is allow'd, as necessary for the setting out his Rational guide, yet, whilst Reason is set up Judge of reveal'd propositions, which must be ratified by appeals made to it, nothing is left of Revelation but the name, and reason Conse­crated by a Heavenly Title.

These premis'd, will make a more easie digression to the exami­nation of the particular method and Rules, which the Reasoner prescribes his guide, viz. Not to assent to any Conclusion, which can­not be prov'd by natural evidence.

This direction observ'd by the guide, will give no better assu­rance of safe-conduct, than that which opinion affords, and in strictness of Language cannot in­title [Page 27]him to the name of Theist, which shall be more largely prov'd. But before I speak to that part of this inquiry, I cannot but suggest my fear, that by this harsh conclusion I might be thought to condemn the great part of the world as Atheists, and to call Gods goodness in question, in not indowing man with such fa­culties, as could discern the Crea­tor and trace a way to happiness, and by this position to take away the satisfactory method of sol­ving doubts in Religion, viz. That there is as much evidence of the Truth of Religion, as the mat­ter of it is capable, which would be insignificant, if Reason were not able to discern it. These [Page 28]prejudices shall be remov'd by the following discourse; I only name them here, least the Reader might think I was not sen­sible how many obstacles were in the way, before I could attempt the proof of the former proposition, and to desire him to pass over them, with a swift touch, as the Traveller tenderly goes over a Quag-mire or Quick-sand, till he can find a more sure bottom, to which he may be conducted by weighing the several arguments Reason hath for the proof of the being of a Deity.

Amongst many, let that of the French Philosopher (who bid defiance to the Sceptick) take place, whose force consists in [Page 29]these particular positions. That the Idaea of God, which is in mans mind, could not be fram'd by his invention; because the Soul can­not contrive the Model of a being, which is more perfect than it self. This being granted, that there is an Idaea of God in mans mind, the truth of it is prov'd from the goodness of God, which cannot be imagin'd to have deluded his Creature with a false draught of himself. This argument is of so great force, that I know none so cogent, if it meet with a mind praedispos'd for the Reception of truth, but is not strong enough to beat the Sceptick off his ground, because the very sinews of this argument borrow their strength [Page 30]from a supposition; one attribute of God being necessarily suppos'd, viz. His goodness, before the Rea­soner can put himself in a capaci­ty of arguing. However it must be granted, that supposition doth not destroy the certainty of find­ing truth: for to suppose Falsity in some cases, is a sure way to find Truth; as in the Rule of false in Arithmetick. But this method fails in this case, for in those Ope­rations the suppositions are raz'd out, and laid by, when the work is perfected; but in this argument the supposition can never be laid aside, for the truth of the Conclu­sion depends on the goodness of God, as known to be such as would not impose on his Creature, which [Page 31]the Sceptick will look on as but suppos'd. If it be urged in favour of the former argument, That Rea­son concludes the being or existence of the Deity, and understands the attributes of God by rules equally certain, with those in the Arith­matical instance, seeing the Souls faculties are as a Standard, by which it can measure the Divine perfections, and find what is goodness or wisdom in God by measuring them with the notion or footsteps of them left in the mind.

The argument thus managed, must be acknowledged to be of great value, and serviceable to the casuist in solution of doubts, but the defect of Reason being necessa­rily supplyed with a supposition [Page 32](in this way of arguing) with­out which mans faculties may be suspected as false, it is not proba­ble the Sceptick will be perswaded out of his affected ignorance.

After this new Method let old arguments be consider'd, which seem more Catholick and easie, being drawn from the common appearance or Phaenomena's of Nature, and observation of Provi­dence, with those from other To­picks, by which the Soul is fetter'd, so that it cannot evade an assent to the existence of God; yet it will appear, that the strength and evi­dence of this argument cannot command that assent without con­fusion of Thoughts, which implyes ignorance, and extravagancy, [Page 33]which are not tolerable in a Guide.

That argument which is most obvious, is drawn from the admi­rable Fabrick of the World, which must be allow'd to have its due force, when it meets with a ductile mind (far remov'd from Sceptical stiffness, made so by a Divine dis­position for receiving Truth) without which it is so far from conducting men to the knowledge of God, that it will rather incline the mind to Idolatry: Heathens practice is an undeniable evidence of this Truth. For it may be a reasonable conjecture, that Idola­try took its rise from the gross consideration of Wisdom and Power, which appear'd in the love­ly [Page 34]frame of the World, and af­terward this power was divided and subdivided into several ranks of Gods and Semi-Gods. That the whole World was but as one great Idol, may appear from Poe­tical sayings (which Authority may pass in this case, Poets being the only Divines in the Heathenish ages who wrapt Religion and that Secular wisdom in verse) who Deified the World under that great name Pan. If it be said that Shepheards had this name given them by Poets, yet it is plain, that the mystery was terminated in higher beings (as Plutarch al­lows Pan to have influence on the Oracles as Superintendent, and some have applyed the story of [Page 35]his death to Christ's suffering) which is enough to shew he was more than a Shepherd, or [...]. For that age, as others before, con­sider'd the World and its Creator in one grosse notion which they expres't by Pan, as may be prov'd from the account which Orpheus gives of that Idoliz'd name in a­nother place further to be consi­der'd: But seeing this way of ar­gument from Practice, may not ap­pear so convincing as that of The­ory, because all do not tread the same steps with equal success, and the question is not, what know­ledge of God hath been, but what may be learn't from the Creati­on.

To this demand a short answer [Page 36]may be return'd. When a man takes a serious prospect of the World, one of these thoughts will arise, either that it had a beginning of it self, or that it was the work of some Architect: if he is inclina­ble to allow the former, all that Reason can do in order to his con­viction, is, to shew the impossibi­lity of the World's being its own cause or maker. This prov'd, can only remove him from Atheism, or at least dispose him for a belief of the existence and knowledge of God. He therefore who ar­rives to this degree of knowledg in strictness and propriety of speech, deserves not the name Theist, any more than a man come­ing out of a Cell or Wilderness, [Page 37]seeing a Diamond or Jewel, hath only so much knowledg to pass sentence, that it is not of the same kind of stones which he treads on, deserves the name of a Jeweller, or seeing a stately Pallace, hath on­ly skill to conclude, that the stones did not meet by mutual consent (as the fabulous story sayes of the building of Thebes for erecting that Fabrick, neither did grow so uniformly out of the Earth), may be said to know an Architect or a Builder.

If in defence of this argument it is said, that he who denyes that a Fabrick can raise it self, tacitly implyes the necessity of the being of some Builder. This granted, will not relieve the Idiot, for the [Page 38]Builder can be no otherwise said to be known by him, than under the general notion of a Cause. Now who will be so ridiculous as to say, that a man understands what an Architect is, and what kind and degree of knowledge gives him that name, who hath only a general notion of him, by which he calls him the cause of a House, which description is so rude, that it can­not be allow'd, except Logick can justifie it by terms of Art unknown to the Idiot, however it cannot acquit him from the imputation of grosse ignorance, which will appear greater when he considers the nice operations of nature. For if Creatures are look't upon which are most expos'd to com­mon [Page 39]view, nature sitting in them as on the stage, it is but little (and that conjectural) knowledge, he can pretend to; let the Heavenly bo­dies be an instance to prove mans ignorance of their nature and in­fluence; who will pretend to know (except from Astrologer as ignorant as bold) for what design the Heavens so regularly muster their forces, till the event shews it, or to determine what dependance the World hath on some of the Stars, and positively conclude, that they are not Worlds; though not of the same frame with this, of which Men are Inhabitants? Now if man is ignorant of the dependance of one part of the Creation or another (as he must [Page 40]be except nature were supplyed with greater assistance than that of Telescopes, or of any device which invention hath yet found) his knowledg must be said to be so imperfect, that it is not probable the argument drawn from the Worlds Harmony, should be pre­valent, when it meets with so much ignorance. To speak all; the lit­tle and uncertain knowledg of natures works, rather disposeth man for admiration, than full sa­tisfaction of all doubts. But that I may not seem to detract from humanity, suppose the harmoni­ous subordination of causes was understood, this only implies, that there is a power which re­strains them from destroying or [Page 41] falling foul one on the other, or makes them subservient to some end, of which the Reasoner is and must be ignorant.

If this assertion seem too rigid, which supposes man in the World as in Cimmercan darkness, let it be granted that the mere Reasoner hath a partial knowledg of God, if he will be content with the name of a partial Theist.

Let it be also consider'd, that it is possible, that the same contri­vance may seem harmonious to one, and appear not to be so to another. The Inhabitants of the Northern Climates may admire and adore the Sun for its warm in­fluence, whilst those between the Tropicks breath imprecations, be­cause [Page 42]it scorches by more direct rays. Let more be granted by saying that the Fabrick of the world is such (if understood) that it must be concluded to be a Divine work; yet seeing there is a possibility that matter and moti­on (as the French Philosophy teacheth) might work it self in­to that order which is to be ad­mir'd in the world, the natural Reasoner will have little satisfacti­on to his doubts from the conside­ration of the worlds Harmony; especially seeing the French Hy­pothesis is consistent with it self, and solveth doubts on its own principles, which will abate the force of the usual arguments a­gainst Chance and the Epicurean [Page 43]Philosophy. It also appears that some have been sensible of the weakness of an argument drawn from this Topick of Harmony, ra­ther proving Gods existence from the gross consideration of matter mov'd, than as it is modeliz'd in­to forms. This way of arguing seems to press the conclusion with greater necessity than the o­ther, but nearly lookt into can make a man no more a Theist, than the Idiot in the former instance. The examination of this argu­ment might end by the citation of a Poetical saying, cited by St. Paul. By him we live, we move and have our being, (which motion (I presume) intended to be con­fin'd [Page 44]to the motion of the parts of mans body) is equally, if not more valid to prove the existence of God, than that argument which is drawn from a more distant To­pick, viz. The first impress on mat­ter.

But before I pass to another na­tural evidence of the being of God, I cannot but confess that the harmonious Fabrick of the world is us'd in holy Scripture, and by the antient Fathers, as a confirma­tion of their doctrine and faith, which might be examin'd and confirm'd by such contemplation; yet I presume I shall not be injuri­ous to Scripture or Fathers, if I say, that Method was us'd, because it is more universal and agreeable [Page 45]to imagination and common rea­son, than other arguments which are more artificial; not that it was thought to be more cogent. Be­sides, it is an easie conjecture, which supposes that such arguments were intended for believers, or at least those who were dispos'd to entertain their Doctrine, not for sceptical Reasoners. If it be fur­ther urged that the holy Fathers have made Converts and confuted Atheism by this method; yet it is not sure to find success with all persons, especially such Reaso­ners as allow nothing to be certain which cannot recommend it self with an undoubted evidence, or impossibility of being otherwise. Suppose this pertinent question [Page 46]was propos'd to the Atheistical Reasoner. If a man should find a Statue or an Altar with an in­scription, whether he would con­clude it was possible some liquid substance (like Aqua fortis cor­roding Iron) might casually ef­fect that which art should do, and by the same reason press't to give his answer, determining whether the World wrought it self into its lovely frame. If the affirmative is answer'd, 'tis true that his con­clusion is enough to denominate him a Mad-man, but he will not value or think himself injur'd by such compellations who sceptical­ly disputes; for he will be so bold as to say that as Religion and true Faith was once preserved by one [Page 47] Athanasius, so may truth be found only in one single person.

To give the Reasoner a fair tryal of his knowledge, let the former instance be reveiw'd with a larger concession, viz. That the Idiot who acknowledgeth the building to have some cause (though the manner of expression is rude) yet implyes the being of a builder, as the saying, the world was not its own cause, doth assert the existence of God. This being granted his ignorance will appear, for it is possible and commonly observ'd, that men may speak sentences and not understand what they imply, or what may be inferr'd from them. How many sayings which fall suddenly from some person, [Page 48]whose sense being measur'd by the bare interpretation of the words, is but trivial or ordinary, but by deduction will bear a higher mean­ing; whence it must be infer'd, that those conclusions which are gather'd as consequences of the words (which seem'd not to im­port so much) cannot be proper­ly call'd his, who spake the words, but must be own'd by him who advanced them to a higher sense. Idiots sometimes are like Oracles and Prophets, whose high effusions are not understood by those who speak, such are the sentences of some Philosophers and Poetical Raptures, which according to the Authors words or sense savour'd of a low and mean degree of wis­dom, [Page 49]till some Christians reading their Books Consecrated them by Comments and Conclusions, of which they could never have thought. Hence it is, that the Books of some ancient Philoso­pher are now like the fam'd Ship, which was so oft repair'd, till no old Plank remain'd. Many wise Conclusions appear in Heathenish writings, but are as mysterious Characters and Cyphers, which only the Religious by comparing them with Revelation can under­stand. These Effata, or sayings, are like signs which Deaf and dumb men make, who neither have advantage of nature to under­stand or speak, whose Interpreters are as Mouths and understanding [Page 50]too, whilst they stretch their Inter­pretations, beyond that which the Significators design'd, or could declare. Hence it appears, that the Reasoner in this particular quest (whilst he utters divine sen­tences not understood by himself, but to be Consecrated by the Com­mentator,) may not be put in the Catalogue of Theists, except it can be imagin'd, implicit Reason, may be allow'd as much as implicit Faith. Hitherto it being consi­der'd what degree of knowledge may be acquir'd by the Idiot (for in this Quest the Reasoner must be content to be so called) from the contemplation of the world, let a man of another apprehension (whose knowledg is more resin'd [Page 51]by industry and art) who appre­hends the Cause, grossly conceiv'd by the Idiot, as an Architect, be Catechiz'd in this Article of his natural faith, he will be found ig­norant. For although the world is a great Glass, in which its Maker may be seen; yet the Lineaments are so scatter'd and confus'd, that it is almost impossible to reduce them to a perfect form, as may ap­pear from the consideration of the method us'd for the proof and knowledge of God, from a pros­pect of the world, which takes all the perfections which lie scatter'd in the Creatures, and then imagins them to be in one most perfect Being, (which implyes a denyal of all imperfections) and all those [Page 52]concentred in that Being, are modo infinito, as the Schools say. This argument bids fair for the disco­very, but will fail, when strictly examin'd. For though it is gran­ted that the perfections which are in the Creatures, are the same, though in an inferiour degree, with those attributed to the Crea­tor, yet the ignorance of the manner how they are in this Being, which is infinite, and consequently incomprehensible, will make him so far fall short of his design'd knowledg (attempting vainly to measure Infinity by his finite Crea­tures) that he deserves no more to be called a Theist, than a man, who hath only seen the Suns image in a drop, & as it is in every part of the [Page 53]Rainbow, or the Stars in a Pool, can own the name of an Astrono­mer. This method is as insigni­ficant, as addition of numbers to numbers; so that is impossible that they can have any denomina­tion, or as an attempt to measure two quantities (one by the other) which in their own nature are in­commensurable, or without any known proportion. By these in­stances I give greater advantage to the cavilling Adversary, than he could reasonably expect, for there is greater disproportion between God and his Creatures, than can be between quantity and quantity, However let it not be thought an unnecessary crowding in instan­ces, if it be said, this method is so [Page 54]far from being infallible, that it falls short of the certainty of operations in Decimals, which are not true, if examin'd by Rules of Demonstration, yet serve in pra­ctice, and the Error is not to be discern'd. But he who attempts to know God by this way of Rea­soning, will fail in practice as much as Thcory. The Heathens, who fram'd a notion of God by this method, and suited their Mo­rals to it, were so notoriously er­roneous, that some of their pre­cepts and Conclusions are not re­concileable with Religious truth.

Another branch of the Reaso­ners argument, is the subordina­tion of Causes, which in this Quest need not be distinguished [Page 55]nicely from Harmony, one being the result of the other, both of which are so far from being Ca­tholick arguments, which may convince all, that there are scarce any, who are able to pass judg­ment on that Harmonious subordi­nation: for he who is a fit judg of the Harmony of the world, must be suppos'd to know all the parts of it and their use, or how they have dependance one on the other, as Causes and Effects. How im­perfect this knowledg is, will ap­pear from a view of natural Phi­losophy, in which most of the discoveries are but conjectures, though called Demonstrations. I do not design to start many old Errors, it will be sufficient to sug­gest [Page 56]this consideration. That the ancient Sophies who took this me­thod to conduct them, had an im­perfect prospect of the World's Harmony, as may be concluded from the Astronomy (which is conversant about the most glori­ous and harmonious part of the World) extant in their ages, the best and most valuable part of which was compriz'd in the sam'd Almagest. Now how monstrous and defective a Ptolomaic System is, is plain from late observati­ons. But omitting these, let it be consider'd, as suiting with that age in which (some discoveries (which destroy it) were not made; yet it will appear to be, if compar'd with the Copernican, as [Page 57]an ill contriv'd Engine which moves with many Wheels, Cycles and Epicycles, when one or few would make it more perfect. This perhaps may be the reason of that saying fastned on Alphonsus, who considering the world's Fabrick in Ptolomie's Sphere, rashly said, that he could contrive the world in a better frame, had he power to Create. Here I may expect a Check from the Reasoner, who may demand, whether I thought any late, or more Harmonious System might more effectually improve this argument? To this question I only say, that late inventions may improve the argu­ment by rendring it more preswa­sive, not much more demonstra­tive. [Page 58]For Harmony is a certain proportion between numbers or magnitudes, which is not called so only for this reason, that some quantities have a mutual alliance, and agree in some third, which is common to both; but as it hath respect to the mind which appre­hends them; as Musick is so called, because it kindly complies with the ear. 'Tis confess'd, that so much may be concluded from this Topick, that the humane Soul and the world ows their original (be­cause of the approbation which Reason gives concerning the ad­mirable contrivance of the worlds Fabrick) to the same Being or Cause; but as to the nature of that cause, a man can conclude nothing, [Page 59]much more distinctly and certain­ly, than the Idiot in the former instance.

The next natural evidence of the existence of God, is from the general consent of all Nations, of which none so barbarous as not to own it, (as it was well observed by that great Oratour, who did not much improve it for his own information, as appears from his Books) yet this argument will find more Barbarism in the Scep­tical Reasoner of this age, than the former was guilty of; For this knowledg of God as it is general­ly found, is not prov'd by the Reasoners method, which unravels and analyses all by reason before it is believ'd, but is rather a common [Page 60]notion, or natural impress, which is on the lowest degree of man­kind, that there is a Being, able to Reward or Punish; yet this is not the conclusion of the discursive facultie; for those who cannot prove a God, give assent to this Conclusion of his existence; which proof consider'd, though in the gross notion of an Idiot is more valid, than the Reasoners argu­ments modeliz'd into Syllo­gisms, and is more agreeable to the account, Revelation gives of God, which only expresses his ex­istence, when he describes himself, by saying I am. Hence it fol­lows, that the natural knowledg of God, so diffus'd over the whole VVorld, is like that of an Idiot, [Page 61]who seeing a Circle can confess it to be so, although he cannot prove it by tryal, whether each ray or line drawn from the Center to the Circumference is equal.

This argument thus managed, will not find any success with the Reasoner, whose Rules oblige him to admit nothing as true (though the will is so inclinable to assent, that it can be sooner confoun­ded than diverted) except it have pass'd the exact Inquisition of the understanding by discourse. Be­sides, he may suppose or doubt, whether that general consent was the result of natural knowledg, or the Doctrine of some wise men, whose open profession of that truth occasioned the vulgar (in [Page 62]process of several ages) to con­clude it natural knowledg. These thoughts in the Reasoner can be look't upon no otherwise than a mere cavil, he being not able to shew, how, when or where this notion was fram'd (as it well observ'd by a late Author) yet the suggestion will not shake the sceptical mind, for he who will be so bold to conclude the whole Worlds Representatives in a Council may err, will not boggle in saying, the general consent of all Nations might be terminated in an Error.

Thus far the World hath been consider'd, as to its Harmony of parts, from which 't will be an ea­sie digression to the Harmonious [Page 63]disposition of mans mind, which inclines him to a civil life. From this Topick no weak arguments are drawn for the proof of the existence of God, seeing mans re­gular, because civiliz'd, life is as great a wonder in Policy, as the subordination of causes in nature, which prevents mutinies amongst the Elements, and hinders mutual destruction. Now this bond of civil Society borrowes its strength from the supream Law-giver, who by his Divine Empire in mans mind, disposeth it, for mutual agreement with equals, and sub­jection to Superiours. This ar­gument must have its allowance of validity, but it must be acknow­ledged, that this, as the former, [Page 64]wants its due force, except the existence of God is suppos'd, which the strict Reasoner will have prov'd, before he will own him, or any deductions which depend on it, For as it is confess'd, that the distinction of Good and Evil is the foundation of humane Socie­ty; so it must be allow'd, that actions are no otherwise called Good or Evil, but as they have re­lation to the natural Conscience, which supposeth the existence of God. Hence the defect of the argument appears, seeing he who proves God's existence by this me­thod, necessarily supposeth a being, which endow'd his mind with such knowledg, which could point out Good and Evil. Seeing there­fore [Page 65]the truth of Conclusions drawn by this method, depends on a supposal of the existence of that being which should be prov'd, it cannot be imagined to have much force to convince the Scep­tick, for he supposition makes him retire to his [...], suspe­cting the whole argument as weak Suppositions and Hypotheses; be­ing like flaccid Nerves, which want spirits to fortifie them, only serving to knit Paralytical mem­bers together, but without strength. If it is said that some Heathens, who had little or no knowledg of God, or at least own'd a false Dei­ty, which is aequivalent to none, did many Heroical and good Acts, which implies the notion of good [Page 66]and Evil. This may be granted, yet their actions could no further be called Good or Evil than they had respect to a Deity, of which they had only a confus'd notion. For the conformity of an action with the Law of nature (which is a Divine impress on the mind) makes it to be good, being the for­mal reason of it, as the disconfor­mity makes it vitious. Hence it follows, that those actions which were good, were not known to be so, but as they were measur'd by the goodness of God, which im­plies the former supposition.

Then next part of this Disquisi­tion shall be the examination of the force of that argument which is drawn from terrours of Consci­ence [Page 67]upon Evil committed, which is of so great force (with a due allowance of Heavenly assistance, Grace and Revelation) that it storms the Atheist's strongest holds, and so beats him off his ground, that he knows not where to secure himself, but without, it is as little forcible as those drawn from other Topicks. For it be­ing prov'd, that no action can be said to be Good or Evil, but as it hath relation to the Divine Good­ness and Will, either as it is written in mans mind in the natural frame of his Soul, or by external con­veyance by revelation; it is a praeposterous proof from that To­pick of fear, that God punisheth Evil, before it is granted (which [Page 68]cannot be) that reason knows what is Evil, without the Conside­ration of a Deity, without which, fear is so far from being a Medium to help the Reasoner in his Con­clusions, that it is more probable to hinder him in his natural Quest. That which leads men to certainty, according to the Reasoners me­thod, must inform the understand­ing, and consequently determine the will after such a free manner as must exclude compulsion, but fear or any argument taken from it (which cannot be so fram'd, but that passion will interpose it self) is so far from doing either, that it cannot determine the will without some kind of violence done to it, so he that acts out of fear, cannot so [Page 69]properly be said to be a free Agent. Neither is it less prejudicial to the understanding, casting a mist be­fore the eye of the mind by its turbulency; The Philosopher was sensible of this, who concluded its removal necessary from the mind in the search of Truth. Si vis lumine claro cernere verum, gaudia pelle, pelle timorem. Boet. de Consol. Phil. Fear is plac't in the Soul as tempests in the lowest Region, through which it is as dif­ficult for the mind to have a free and clear prospect, as for the Sun to discover its lustre through a Cloud. Let it not be argued from Holy Scripture, that sear was a necessary introduction to the knowledg of God, as appears [Page 70]from the apprehension the People had of wonders on Mount-Sinai, and the Mosaical appeal to them, if ever they saw such astonishing wonders. This tends not so di­rectly to justifie the former argu­ment: for it may be reasonably pre­sum'd, that this method was us'd rather to confirm them in the be­lief of a Deity before entertain'd, and to prevent Apostacy, than to be their first Tutor, to instruct them in the first Article of the Jewish, as well as Christian Creed. The most direct way to wisdom, as it re­spects speculation, is not by fear excited in the mind, although it hath great influence on practice, as the sense of that holy saying imports, which calls the fear of [Page 71]God the beginning of wisdom, for in that sentence, the existence of God is suppos'd, before fear takes its place in order to instruction. However it was a necessary defen­sative against Idolatry, to which the Jews were too inclinable. In such particular cases, such turbu­lent passions may usher in Devoti­on: but generally consider'd, ra­ther confound than inform the mind. For it seems not design'd for the Christian, but that part of the world which may be call'd the Devil's Province, in which he is ador'd by numerous votaries, led to that adoration by fear, which gives occasion of considering, how that turbulent passion rather disposeth man for Diabolical wor­ship, [Page 72]than that of the true God. For seeing the Devils can inflict punishments, or rather vex men with Tortures which excite sear, they may possibly terminate mans Devotion in them as Deities. If it is said that this assertion implies impossibilities, whilst a power is allow'd to the Devil of terrifying the Conscience with punishment, which the Reasoner may conclude Eternal, as well as Temporal. A short reply will shew, that this ob­jection cannot be the sense of a man in his pure naturals, except he was assur'd of the immortality of his Soul, of which some Hea­thens spake doubtfully, though they confidently presum'd its eter­nal duration, because they could [Page 73]not imagine, how it should perish by any known causes. Therefore their all-natural Divinity did not conclude eternal Rewards, or Pu­nishments, suitable to the Souls du­ration. 'Tis true Hell is some­times so shadow'd by the Poets, as if their Poems had borrow'd from Revelation, but their Poetical conclusions in this case can be no further credited, than they speak of the Souls immortality, of which there is as little satisfacto­rily said, as in Prose; besides they being the result of fancy, cannot effectually commend themselves as matters of natural faith: For if the Authors of such Poetical sentences, could they be imagin'd to rise again, and take a view of [Page 74]the Conclusions of Mythologists, and those who write Comments on their Poems. I might reasonably doubt, whether several opinions fastned on them by deduction would be own'd as their genuine sense. I need not add this, that some have openly declar'd in verse as much as others in Prose, that they were fabulous fictions, not much to be regarded by minds, not too much byass'd by passion, or superstitious fear. For not only the profane and Atheistical Poet concluded the future state as dubi­ous, saying, Quid Styga, Quid Bara­thrum, Quid nomina vana timetis? but others, whose invention and fancy were more soberly bounded, and free from the extravagancy of [Page 75]more dangerous Raptures. Before I take one step further in this Dis­quisition, 'tis necessary, that an objection be remov'd, which may render what is said less credible, viz. That the Devil hath no pow­er of himself, neither can act any thing by his own absolute Autho­rity, but by Deputation, and it cannot be imagin'd, that he should punish sin with eternal punish­ment, seeing he is a finite Creature, and his business is to promote it. To the first part of this objection, the same answer must be return'd, which was given to the former. That it is such as the mere Reaso­ner cannot start, for Revelation only informs man of the nature of Devils, and the limitation of their [Page 76]power, wherefore seeing reason could not suggest, that it is suffici­ently answer'd by shewing it is impertinent; the other part of it, which threatens the former as­sertion, cannot destroy it; for al­though the Devil cannot be thought inclinable to punish sin properly so call'd, yet practice shews, that he Tortures some as sinners against his Laws, by which he supports his Dominion in the World, which offenders deserve the name of actors of good, as by avoiding vice (according to the plain definition of vertue, virtus est vitium fugere) men become vertuous. The Indian concludes he that offended the supream power, though but Diabolical, [Page 77]when mischief, or any extraordi­nary appearance, threatens his ru­ine. Hence appears the possi­bility of terminating Devotion in a finite being, for it being represen­ted as dreadful, as any deduction from mere reason can make it, 'tis no great wonder if a man look on that power, as infinite (which is not so) seeing it bounds his thoughts, if not transcends all he can imagine, and consequently adore that power, as a God or the supream Being, which is only de­puted, and limited. This may be further prov'd from Sacred story, which sayes, the ignorant mul­titude declar'd the Apostles Gods in humane shape, and were hardly restrain'd from an Idola­trous [Page 78]Worship. This instance is a sufficient evidence of the truth of the former assertion, although it seems to fail, because of the dif­ference between good Apostles and bad Angels; yet both agree in this, that they are Creatures, which shews it is possible, that finite beings may be mistaken for God. For this instance justifying the possibility of adoration given to finite beings, and the inclination of men who are too ready to wor­ship them, when they shew them­selves able to do good in the high­est degree (such as was wrought by the Apostles Miracles). It may be concluded by the same reason, that when any Being manifests it self with such power, which is able [Page 79]to inflict the greatest punish­ment, the Reasoner may own it as God.

Before more is said to prove the former position, 'tis necessary, that some objections be remov'd, one of which may arise out of the in­stance, which said the ignorant multitude in that case were not to be esteemed as rational men, being without the due use of their reason, which could inform them of the impossibility of finite Creatures being Metamorphiz'd to a Deity, or the perfections of it to be com­municated to a Creature. To this a double answer must be given suitable to the parts of the objecti­on, to the first of which it may be said, if the ignorant votaries were [Page 80]so much astonish'd with the Mira­cles that surpriz'd reason knew not how to act; and those which have been conducted by this ar­gument drawn from fear, which confounds the understanding, ap­pear with such confus'd zeal, which savours more of distraction than sobriety of mind, (as it is evident from the Indians pra­ctice,) it may be concluded that the Topick from which they argu­ed, viz. The Emergencies of some extraordinary power put them in that confusion. To the second, 'tis enough to say, that it is not necessary, that it should be deter­mined in this case, whether the Daemons terrifying that part of the World with malicious prodi­gies, [Page 81]are finite, or infinite with a real respect to their natures, but the understanding, which makes esse & apparere, signifie the same in matters of natural faith. This may be further confirm'd from Heathens practice, who ador'd Oracles, which were Devils Resi­dent in some parts of the World, but worshipped as the supreme powers. But perhaps it may be said, that the Heathen esteem'd the Oracles only as Secretaries or mouths of the Deity as the Etymo­logy of [...] and Sibylla implies, yet practice did not make this di­stinction, for Monarchs, who con­sulted them, thought they had taken Advice or Counsel from the supreme power (which was only [Page 82]distinguished by the names of se­veral places where their sentences were utter'd) which Supremacy was boldly written on their Al­tars, till by Christ's coming the glory was buried, and the proud inscription chang'd to an Epitaph, the Oracle being spiritually dead, in that forc't return to Hell, which occasion'd this sad com­plaint to a Votary, who came to consult of future events.

The Oracles were necessitated to make such confessions, it being one part of their pennance to proclaim their own weakness, and necessary subjection to that su­pream Being, of whom they so [Page 83]prophetically spake, as if they had been the Oracles of God, as appears by the answer given by Apollo's Oracle, to one demand­ing what God was

Who could imagine that the Devil was the Authour of this almost sacred verse, were it not consider'd that God layes a necessity on the evil Angels, that they shall proclaim his power, for the Devils in the Caves and Groves, as well as those amongst the Tombs did speak truth con­cerning Christ, though it added to their Torment? This is enough to demonstrate, that those true [Page 84]sayings when spoken by them were extorted, and they (as much as spiritual beings are capable of) put on the rack by such confes­sions. This Oracular cunning (which would not confess Christ but when forc't) occasions a re­mark on the Devils subtilty, who being necessitated to acknowledg him, insinuates this to his Votaries that Oracles are God's Nuncio's, and ally'd to a Deity as Ambassa­dors, whilst the lye is minc't by [...]. If the Reasoner take advantage from this citation of refuting the former position, by saying that they seem'd not to aim at adoration as infinite beings; neither were they esteem'd by wise men as any other than Angels, as [Page 85]appears from Heathen compellati­ons, which speak them Ministers; beside the Oracles more plain con­fession, who would have prayer directed to him in this language [...] Yet it must be observ'd, though the Devil calls himself Daemon or Angel, yet he calls himself om­niscient and owns universal wis­dom, which cannot be allow'd any Creature, and seeing he injoyns a form of Prayer to be directed to him; he tacitly insinuates to his Votaries that he is God, for he to whom Prayers are made must be God according to Heathens Reli­gion, which owns no invocations of Creatures as Mediators.

But let it be granted that the [Page 86]Oracles were Angels, and only Jupiter, Apollo, which some other were ador'd as Deities, this con­cession will be so far from destroy­ing the former position, that it ra­ther confirms it, by allowing ado­ration to finite beings, such as Ju­piter and Apollo, and many other who must be in the Catalogue of men, who made use of Dreams and Oracles to promote their Apo­theosis as Lactant. cap. 8. De ori­gine erroris, argues, Eos ipsos quos docuimus Deos non esse, Majestatem suam ostendisse prodigijs, insomniis, auguriis & Oraculis, &c. More might be cited out of that Chap­ter as pertinent, the design of which (as well as of this Tract) being to shew the use of Reason in [Page 87]Religion, and how much the na­tural man is guilty of folly, who intirely resigns himself to its con­duct; but I am sensible that I must appear tedious in this first Dis­quisition, and inexcusable too, did not the Subject treated off exact the most strict examination, and starting all that can be said against the former position. Wherefore let the Reasoner object in another way of Heathens practice, in shew­ing that they did not always ter­minate their Devotions in that Being in which they found a spe­cimen of Divine power or know­ledg, which may be prov'd from the Sibylls, who appear'd no less Divine than the Oracles; yet were so far from being ador'd, [Page 88]that they scarce found civil Enter­tainment from the greatest Perso­nages in the World; to this obje­ction I will only suggest these con­siderations as an answer. That the disregard and little estimation they had in the World proceeded from the different manner and matter of predictions of the Sibylls and Oracles, the former were to come to pass after many Revoluti­ons of Years and Ages, the latter as ex tempore Prophets spake to every particular question, and their mouths open to each Votary. Now seeing the Sibylls prophesies were to be fulfilled not untill some ages were past, it may be easily imagin'd that active minds would be more prone to adore the Oracles [Page 89]who were as Tutelar Angels to advise in every particular case, than those who spake more gene­rally of what should come to pass at further distance. Another rea­son may be given why the Sibylls were not ador'd; because their Birth and Linage was but humane, it was not probable they should purchase Adoration, for the known humanity was an obstacle which hinder'd worship due to him, to whom all Oracles and Angels sub­mit with fear of that power which was able to silence them. If it is said, that this answer cannot re­move the objection, for the same reason will destroy Heathenish Devotion to Jupiter, and other reputed Deities, who were only [Page 90] men Deifi'd by opinion of some fond Votaries; It must be an­swer'd, that they were esteem'd as eternal, though really they were mortalls; which opinion was enough to denominate them Gods; for in Heathens devotion to be, and to be believ'd to be so, was the same. As Alexander thought it was enough to his purpose, that the Barbarians were perswaded he was a God, though he knew him­self to be but mortal, as he glories in the delusion; whilst he says, [...]. The Idiots conquerd themselves by their false zeal and perswasions: so it answers diabo­lical designs, if Devils are mista­ken for Gods. Besides the Sibylls [Page 91]were so much like Apostl's, that they did not pretend to Worship, due to them, but another, of whom they Prophesied; neither did they, as the Devilish Oracles, require any form of Worship or Prayer to be directed to them; it was as much as they aim'd at, if they were thought (according to the Etymology of their name [...]) to be of the Heavenly Counsel. If that age had been so zealously inclin'd to adore their wisdom, and could be imagin'd to have consider'd their Prophesies as fulfilled; yet the matter of what was foretold, would convince the World that they were not Gods, nor claim'd Adoration. These circumstances consider'd will give satisfaction to [Page 92]the question, how it happend that Sibylls were not Ador'd as Ora­cles? and shew that it is enough to confirm the former position, viz. That Devotion may be terminate in some finite Being, as supreme, though not in all appearances of extraordinary power. These ob­stacles being remov'd, the next argument for the proof of the being of a Deity shall be examin'd, which is taken from that prevail­ling Topick of paternal love and care which is presum'd to be such as would not deceive his Son, by a successive Tradition of the be­ing of God (which is so universal, that Barbarians are not without it) which if false, would be such an unnatural deceit, that Stage nor [Page 93]History can parallel. This argu­ment hath more strength from this consideration, that as the Fathers would not be so unnatural to de­ceive their Sons, so would they not suffer themselves to be deceived in matters of great moment. This is so probable, that it scarce admits of any suspicion of its possibility of being otherwise; yet when it is examined by a Rigid and sub­til inquiry, it will be doubted whether the Forefathers might not commit that out of weakness, which they would not have done out of choice, could their un­derstanding have been better in­form'd.

How much reason fails in its general quest, appears from the [Page 94]consideration of these arguments. I pass now to a more particular Disquisition, how the unity of the Godhead is or can be known by principles of pure or uninlightned Reason.

Although the supposal of Po­lytheism, according to the manner how man frames a notion of God (which is by summing up all per­fections, and then concentring them in one Being after an infinite manner) implyes a contradicti­on, and the plurality of God sup­poses the possibility of more than all, which is so palpable a contra­diction, that the very naming of it is a sufficient confutation; yet in strictness of speech, seeing the Reasoner cannot attain to a clear [Page 95]and distinct knowledg of an infi­nite Being, how can he be said to know God as one God, and it may take place amongst the Theists, he must be seated in the Classis of the Athenian Votaries, and be esteemed no wiser than the inscription which St. Paul cites, makes them who worship an unknown God; in which the Epithet supposes they were ignorant of what they said, for if they had known him they could have distinguished him from other Beings in the universe, for it is so essential to Unity to be distinguished from other Beings, that if it be apprehended as it lies confused, it cannot properly be said to be known, no more than the nature of Gold can be said to be [Page 96]known when it meets with such an Idiots Judgment, which is so far from being a Touchstone, that it can only distinguish the Ore from common Sand. Besides it is more than probable, that the Heathen had (neither can the Reasoner have more on such principles) only a confused notion of power and wisdom in the World, not able to comprehend one being distinct from the rest, so as to be pointed out by any certain and distin­guishing Character, and an assu­rance of all power and wisdom summed up in one being.

I might conclude this Disquisiti­on without any further survey of Heathens opinions, did I not con­sider that authority, though in this [Page 97]case may appear insignificant to my purpose; yet may be urged against my position, if it be sug­gested, that the Heathens, Plato, with many others acknowledged but one God, and therefore by Christian writers both antient and modern cited to confute Poly­theism, which citations, I presume, were rather made use of, to dispose the minds of men for a belief of one God, than as convincing De­monstration, for it is plain that the Heathens in their most refined notions of a Deity have not fram­ed such an exact Idea of one God, as to quit the thoughts of Poly­theism; for when they spake most Divinely, they oftentimes, as if they had forgot what they were [Page 98]speaking of, or at least sensible, that they could not comprehend it, instead of God, say Gods. I cannot but take notice of Socrates, so famous for natural Divinity, for opposing Heathenish Deities, when he speaks of the excellent goodness of the Deity, and how that men were so much the more good as their actions had Confor­mity to the Divine; which sen­tence Erasmus sayes deserved to be called Gospel, had there not been a mistake in the number, say­ing Gods for God.

I might here detain the Reader by citation of opinions of Hea­thens (which is not pleasant to me but when necessary) who may as well spend time in considering [Page 99]such extravagant brain Idols, as viewing those in Pagans Temples, but I shall only refer him to Tully, Seneca, or other famous Heathen Sophists, and he will find, that al­though they speak of the provi­dence, justice, and goodness of the Divine Being, as if they were Secretaries of Heaven; yet these by them are not attributed only to one God but Gods, and Dij in these high accounts of Divinity is as often used as Deus.

To instance but in one cited by Tully, lib. 2. de legib. Thales, who speaks so Divinely, that he owns Providence, ubiquity and eminent power, with Wisdom, which knows our thoughts, to be in some Divine Being; yet at last fastens all these [Page 98] [...] [Page 99] [...] [Page 100]perfections in Dij, how much this favours of Polytheism or confusi­on of thoughts, the Reader will confess when he traces Tully himself (who cites others). All that can be said to exempt them from Polytheism is, that when they said Dij, they intended inferiour Deities; This cannot rescue them from the former imputation, be­cause it is a contradiction to ima­gine Providence, Omniscience, and other Attributes can be communi­cated to any Being which is not infinite. To conclude this part of the Paragraph, all the seeming Divine sentences of Heathens speak promiscuously of God or Gods, and make the Court of Hea­ven speak in the Language of a [Page 101]mortal Monarch (Wee) which though a plural expression without the help of a figure is known to represent a King; they were so unluckily ignorant, that although they had some notion of the Dei­ty, they could not express what they had in confusion conceived, as it too plainly appears from their wild discourses of God, which if they had been on any other Subject, they would have ne­ver intitled the Authors to the names of wise men.

Let it not be objected, that the same may be argued against the Scripturist, which is against the Reasoner; because in holy Writings God is as well represented by an Elohim a plural number, as Jeho­vah [Page 102]which is singular. To this objection it is enough to suggest, that there is not the same reason in Pagan writings to justifie such ex­pressions, which seem to favour Polytheism, as in Holy Scripture. Moses (when he expresses one God by a plural number) his language is suitable to the Hebrew Idiom or way of expression, without the nice and mysterious Criticism to prove a Trinity; as it appears from Heathen Interpreters, as well as those of the Jews, it hath been translated as singular. So Longi­nus, Page 35. Sect. 7. [...], citing Moses's words. Add to this ano­ther consideration, that he who wrote the History of Creation, [Page 103]wrote also the Law, in which man is confined to the worship of one God in the plainest terms, from which command there may be a reasonable conjecture, that man in his corrupt state is more prone to own plurality of Gods than pro­fess one, else why was this command in the front and so early given? I know it is, and may be said, that the Preface as well as the Command was as an Antidote against the poyson of the Egyptians Idola­trous customs; yet Idolatry be­ing then so young (only a few Garden Deities, Leeks and Onions ador'd) it may be imagin'd that this Law was promulged to re­move mens ignorance, which without Divine assistance is invin­cible, [Page 104]for the eye of the Soul in its decai'd state is like one intoxicated, whose we kness multiplies a single object, wherefore it was necessary that Israel, even to improvement of Knowledg as well as Religion, should know there was but one God. Let this also be consider'd, that in Pagan Divinity we find no such distinguishing worship or character given to Jupiter, to shew that he was God. Are the other Dei­ties but Deputies? (as some learned men say) or so reputed, for they were all ador'd: now in Scripture, there is not the least favour or dis­spensation granted to adore any Being but God, no not so much as his Representators, Prophets and Apostles working wonders; This [Page 105]is enough to justifie the expression of God by a plural number in Scripture, though not in Pagan writings; (besides the Grammati­cal help of a singular number with a plural without false Syntax or false sense) The Heathens did ap­prehend God in such a manner, as a plural number best suited with their thoughts, seeing the Universe was their God as appeared by their Deifi'd Pan, of whom there is this account

[...] —

Orpheus in Hymn. This may be further proved by a Testimony of lactantius. lib. 9. De false Religi­one who when he brings in Trisme­gist speaking most Divinely con­cerning [Page 106]the Unity of the God­head, saying [...], which he translates or pa­raphrases on it, Ignitur Deo nomen non est, nec opus est proprio vocabu­lo nisi cum discrimen exigit multi­tudo.

Whence it is plain, that the multi­tude sometimes apprehended God as the general power reigning in the World, though at other times they were more accurate in asking his name.

But not to check inventions or methods, by which men frame the notion of one God, let the Meta­physician think of infinite power, wisdom, justice, &c. And ac­cording to art or rule, put them together, he will make such an Ag­gregate [Page 107]or Sum of perfections which man cannot naturally know, or by what one name to call it, be­side that of infinite, now how pro­perly Infinity in the natural mans sense can be said to be one, hath been said before, it being like Eternity, of which we can speak so little properly, that we can rather say what it is not, than what it is. Add to this, that the Reasoner who frames a notion of a God by sum­ming up perfections, and know­ing not how one Attribute poises another, how power, wisdom, ju­stice and mercy bound one ano­ther, he seems as much a Polytheist as he who own'd power in Jupiter, and wisdom in Apollo, &c. And can no more be said to be a Theist, [Page 108]than one whose education hath ad­vanced him no further than the Alphabet, can be said to be a Phi­lologer, or he who only knows Letters, an Interpreter of words, before they have taken their places to form them. This instance, if it seem not so apposite, yet I hope pardonable, seeing Christ himself disdains not to be called the Word, which without his own exposition would but imperfectly express his nature, and Amelius a Platonist admir'd by Eusebius. lib. 11. de prepar. Evang. cap. 19.

And call'd [...]. Because he so much approved the compellation. Suppose a Novice who hath been only in the Porch of a Geometrical School, and learnt [Page 109]all kind of Lines in their several varieties, of which the most accu­rat draught must consist, shall he be thought worthy of the name of a Painter who knows no proporti­ons of the single lines? this in­stance I presume is so apposite, that it will need no comment on it, and it giving me occasion of a digres­sion from the Metaphysical method of framing a notion of one God to one more suited to all appre­hension by similitude, as Vives, Grotius, Morney, and others, who have illustrated the Unity of the Godhead by Analogy, viz. The Heavens, one Sun, one Primum mo­bile, and other instances of Monar­chy, as it appears in the World. How little impression such instan­ces [Page 110]are like to make on some, who in their Philosophical certainty conclude that there is no such pri­mum mobile in the same Authors sense, neither dare affirm there are no more lights of like nature, and influences, may be guest at by the reception and entertain­ment which later Hypotheses have found.

So he who endeavours to de­monstrate the Unity and Trinity in the Godhead by the three powers which are in one Soul, may ex­pect his argument should be as little prevalent; for that me­thod which obligeth a Peripate­tick to the belief of a Trinity, may perswade the Platonick to believe a Quaternion; for he as zealously contends for that, as ac­commodated [Page 111]to its several degrees of knowledg, as the other was for his [...], or three powers in the rational Soul: and surely the Pla­tonicks did admire the number 4. else it had not been so solemnly used in their Oaths. Let it be urged that God may be known by simili­tude, & although there be but im­perfect and small footsteps of his Being to be traced by the Reasoner; yet according to proportion, by one Attribute there may be disco­very of all, as the proverbiall speech of an Herculean draught from a foot (and if I may stretch the letter of the Proverb) a little finger. If such objections ap­pear to the Readers thoughts, I only desire him to re-collect, or [Page 112]look back to the former part of the Disquisitions, in which it was never granted, that man by reason­ing can have any such knowledg of any Attribute, so as it shall be a Rule to him infallibly to judg of the nature of God without Reve­lation, and the last appeals made to it. I am not ignorant that the primitive Fathers, (to instance in one, Minutius Foelix) made use of similitude to convince the World of the Unity of the Godhead, Dux unus Apibus, Dux unus in Gre­gibus; yet this was intended ra­ther for illustration than strict proof; neither is there violence done to the Divine example, whilst the Reasoner disowns similitudes in case that demonstration is justly [Page 113]expected, for although God is pleased to discover himself by si­militudes, he expects not that his Being should be proved by that method.

The Reconciler who supposes the Being of God and Providence. Page 4. of his Preface, cautions us to beware of similitudes whilst we would have a true conception of him. page 12. Attributes which we cannot possibly know, ex­cept he tell us, and then says, we should not conclude or guess about them by Analogies, to things of a nature infinitely distant from his, or by maxims fram'd according to the nature of inferiour being. Let not this argument which seem; to have its foundation in practice [Page 114]prejudice the Reasoner, for I shall no further make use of it than rea­son must allow, and the authority cited shall have another ratificati­on of its strength, by an appeal to the Reasoner who helps his thoughts by art, and impartial and unbyass'd industry; who by the conduct of his own reason will scarce find out that narrow path which will lead him to the infalli­ble knowledg of one God, for af­ter the utmost perusal of his own arguments concerning him, he will be oblig'd to describe himself by a name suitable to his thoughts, which if he do, he will be in sus­pence whether he ought to be cal­led Theist or Polytheist, this bold presumption is founded on the [Page 115]former position. Viz. That the Reasoner hath only a general knowledg of power undistin­guished in the World. That a gross and imperfect knowledg in a loose and common way of speech is enough to justifie the Language which calls a Being, one which in strictness is not so. As a late Author instances in Rome, which retains its name; although the City is not the same, which first took that name, and there are Protean bodies which each mo­ment change; yet retain the same name. Such comparisons, or such expressions may serve to express things finite, words being as Coin, or rather the Stamp upon it (which oftentimes is so far from represent­ing [Page 116]the person of a King, that there is much necessity of a Motto, to tell whose Image it is; as Pain­ters in the infancy of their Art were forced to supply the defect of their Pencil by their Pens, and make men Readers, not Spectators of Pictures.) But the strict Reaso­ner as he is careful in frameing notions of things, so he will be careful in giving names, or saying any thing concerning number or nature of that Being which he cannot comprehend; Infinite, as infinite is beyond the reach of our understanding, whence it is appa­rent, that when any thing is af­firm'd of an object as infinite, so far the affirmation will be doubted of as uncertain, that assent which [Page 117]passes apprehension, must pass for ignorance, and can only be ad­justed by an implicit faith. Infi­nite would not be infinite, could it be apprehended as an adaequate object of humane knowledg; though it were as nigh as possible. The French Philosopher modestly took the liberty to make a term of Art, a gives the old World a name more suitable to mans ap­prehension, than that which it had been known by in several ages; for finite, calling it indefinite, which is something in its own nature which hath bounds, therefore its dimensions possible to be known; but no man can determine any thing concerning infinity either as to number or quality, seeing the [Page 118]object he judges of is beyond his reach. He who attributes any pro­perty to a Subject, is supposed to un­derstand the nature or form of it: o­therwise, he like the man in the go­spel, who having not fully his sight recovered, may call men Trees, or fasten impossibilities on the Subject, least qualifie it by the notion he frames of it, with a power to make impossibilities not to be so; as the Reconciler of Reason and Religion instances in the French Virtuoso, who concludes the possibility of a Hill without a Valley, not conside­ring that [...]. Alex. Aphrodis. de fato, p. 135. To make such assertions ap­pear [Page 119]plausible, all that can be said, is, that impossibilities cease to be such, when they have relation to God, as the vast bulk of the Earth appears as a point or as nothing, when considered in respect to the motion of some Stars. This as­sertion shews the Authors ingenui­ty and modesty, but gives little satisfaction to the Reasoner: for to conclude God can do impossibili­ties, because he is infinite, is to prove a proposition by a medium equally obscure. It is a difficult task to find truth in general, and he who is nice, will be cautious how he attributes any propertie to a Being, which he doth not under­stand, but more especially when he is to speak of one, whose attributes [Page 120]are so nearly united to his being, that they cannot be distinguished from it. This difficulty of frame­ing the notion of God, made some Heathens look on the Deity as an universal power, or an aggregat of all perfections in the World: for though they seem to speak Di­vinely of God as one, I am apt to think they speak in the Language of Jewellers who call one kind of Margarites unions (because first they were found single) when dai­ly experience shews many are hatcht in the same shell. Here I might make a stop and pity the Ethnic and the secular Reasoner, who like Apodes (Birds on the wing) hover in contemplation without feet to rest on (for whose [Page 121]support, though nature hath made provision; yet with greater diffi­culty and danger than for other familiar works of nature) for though it must be confest as a fa­ther eminent both for Christian and Pagan Oratory, says in his Octavia that the Heathens did al­ways own one God and provi­dence but knew not how to point it out. This confest, helps the Heathen or Reasoner very little; for as it was said in the beginning of this Disquisition, that he who hath such a Roving phancy as not to distinguish God from other be­ings deserv'd not the name of a Theist. If it be again objected that the unity of the God-head hath been known to those who had no [Page 122]opportunity or abilities to read holy Scripture, yet spake sentences which are matter of Christian faith To instance in one famous verse.

[...].

This cannot help the Reasoner in this Article of belief, for it be­ing the saying of a Sibyl it cannot be called the dictate of pure reason, for though we know not how, yet it must be acknowledged, that so much as they spake truly of God and Christ came from Revelation in such a Way as none can deter­mine. Thus far I have endeavou­red to shew Reasons defect in its first and chiefest discoveries, when it puts it self on the rack, stretch­ing [Page 123]only to a Sceptical uncertain­ty. It now remains, that I meet with another objection, which may seem so considerable, that I may not pass it by without taking notice, that it may be retorted from the former part of the Disquisition, that I conclude the Gentiles or Ethnicks had not the true know­ledg of a Deity (neither could properly be called Theists), which assertion seems too cruel and un­reasonable: for some eminent in learning allow, that the Heathens in their Theory and practice, (if not sav'd in some sense, may be exempt from Damnation, because they had a Law from God, and by that Law were to be judged. Add to this, that the Heathens are al­low'd [Page 124]to be Judges of actions mo­rally good and evil, just and unjust, and justice in man is the same with that which is in God, though in an inferiour degree. Let this be granted; It will not help the Rea­soner in setting out his guide, for although the rules of Justice are the same in the Ethnick and the Christian (and some of the Com­mandments being Reasons dictates, promulg'd and made Law by ano­ther Legislation) yet they shall not be judged in the same way and manner, suppose the Heathen ex­actly observe his Legem Talionis, and demands an Eye for an Eye, or a Tooth for a Tooth, as the holy Scripture expresses it, or to speak in the poetical saying which Ari­stotle [Page 125]lays down as a rule approv'd by Rhadamanthus [...]. Arist. lib. 5. Such observation of natures Law will justifie the Heathen, not the Christi­an. The Reasoner may also urge that Tully, Plato, Seneca, and other Sophies have been Authors of such sentences which have such a near alliance to Scripture, that only the Authors names can distinguish them from it. This granted, will not help the Reasoner, for he can­not prove them emanations of a Heathens mind, or convince the World of the certainty of their not being borrowed from Divine Revelation, mixing their own thoughts with some notions taken from Scripture, as some have en­deavoured [Page 126]to prove, which will appear more probable, if the Eth­nick be considered in his confused way of speaking of God, and dif­ferent expressions of him, which will give way for a conclusion, That they certainly knew a Be­ing above themselves, but what it was were uncertain, for had they as certainly known his nature as they seemed assured of his Being, there had not been such variety of opinions concerning him, for these notions in mans mind are unalterable, and although dis­course or artificial ways may con­found them, when conclusions are to be drawn, and so seem variable; yet in themselves considered can­not be changed. Wherefore it be­ing [Page 127]granted, that God is known by pure Reason as to his Being, and some of his attributes; yet by this imperfect notion the Reasoner can be no more called a Theist, and said to know God, than he who seeing some few, or all the propor­tions of a man drawn or painted, can be said to know his Crasis or Constitution, or what humour is predominant. If a similitude may be admitted in this case, it may be said that he who passes judgment of the nature of the Deity by those lineaments of justice and mercy, power and knowledg, which are in man, he will be as ignorant of the nature of God as the other of the Crasis or Constitution of a man, for as the one cannot con­clude [Page 128]by the draught what humour is predominant; neither can the other know in which attribute God takes most delight. Besides, if mere natural evidence is to be set up judg of just and unjust, without respect to the Divine will, a great part of Religion will be disputed, and the Christian Creed contracted into too narrow a compass, some of its Articles (according to the me­thod of passing judgment) being in danger not to be believ'd; and Christianity would not be im­prov'd much above that height which King Agrippa arriv'd at, men being but almost perswaded to be Christians.

Hitherto Reason hath been con­sider'd in its quest, concerning the [Page 129] Ʋnity of the God-head, but before this disquisition is concluded, I cannot but take notice of that fam'd instance in Plato (cited by Eusebius, de praeparat. Evang. lib. undec. c. Dec. tert. who made the unity of the Godhead as a Chara­cteristick or token, by which Di­onysius should discern, whether his Letters or Epistles were jocular or serious. This seems to speak the Author naturally Orthodox, but doth not sufficiently justifie him, and undoubtedly free him from the imputation of Polytheism, or a confus'd notion of the Deity, for it may be doubted whether he us'd that Beginning with one God as a mark of his more serious business, rather than to signifie his setled opi­nion; [Page 130]because it would savour too much of a narrow and envious Spirit, not becoming a Philoso­pher, to have communicated that as a secret to Dionysius, and not so clearly and ingenuously declared it to the rest of the World in the whole series of his Discourses. It may be also a wonder that he could at any time write Jocularly, and playing with the Deities, ma­king the term Gods to be as a Sig­net to seal his more trivial secrecy, or less accurate writings, except it can be thought, that he, as a So­crates, derided and laught at the Heathens Idolatry, being serious when Deus came into his mind, but laughing when he thought of Dij. This may be one plausible [Page 131]way to confirm the usual applica­tion of Plato's Epistolar Mark or Sign, but it is hard to be imagin'd, if his stile and manner of writing is considerd.

That which is said of Heathens ignorance, will not be easily refu­ted by citations taken from Por­phyrius, Proclus or Plotinus, or o­ther Platonists, seeing it may be presum'd, that they entertain'd the same opinion of the Deity which their Master had. Now how far the Platonick Doctrine is to be embraced, may appear from the consideration of the Discourses [...], which some have en­deavoured to accommodate to Christ, the second Person in the Holy Trinity; For the second Principle [Page 132]in Plato's sense implies more, or rather is different from the personal distinction in the Trinity, as it is matter of Christian Belief. If it might be thought proper to vye Authority with Authority, I could instance in Heathens Eminent in Dignity, Morality and Learning, Antoninus and Severus who were not free from the thoughts of Po­lytheism, as may be conjectur'd from the Language of their pub­lick Professor of Philosophy, Alex­and. Aphrod. in his book De fato, p. 135. which speaks of the Dei­ty in a plural number, and attri­butes Omniscience and Prescience (which is the attribute of one and the only true God) to Dij, or Gods [Page 133] [...]. This Language may be presum'd to be suited to the Empe­rours apprehension of the Deity. This also may be considered, Ze­nophon, who in a pleasant Dis­course seems not altogether to speak his own sense or Language, but that which generally was re­ceived, says [...]. which shews that the Unity of this supreme power, was not so apprehended to be infallib­ly denominated one as [...] implies, which may not be translated is, but seems, Zenoph. in convivio. If this citation (as Table Discourse) may seem too familiar to bear the weight of Authority in strict ways of arguing, let the Authour be [Page 134]considered, when he speaks most seriously, and when an extraordi­nary appearance of an Enemy ob­lig'd his thoughts to retirement, and engaged him to Devotion, it will appear doubtful, whether he was Theist or Polytheist, at the same breath confounding Deus and Dij, beginning with the one, and end­ing with the other, saying these words, concluding his Oration to the Souldiers. [...]. Zen. de exped Cyri-pag. 296.

Hitherto the Deity hath been considered, as it may be said to be known to the Reasoner, and the next disquisition is. What certain [Page 135]knowledg of the nature of the Soul and its immortality can be attain'd by mere Reason.

As the Eye cannot see it self without a Mirror or Glass, so the Soul cannot know it self, at least as to its duration or immortality without Revelation. It is a diffi­cult task to prove its existence, much more the eternal continuati­on of it, as appears by the French Philosopher, who seems to glory of his Invention, when he had (as he thought) found a way to convince the Sceptick of its distinct exi­stence from the body. Wherefore (according to the former method) let his argument be examin'd, which concludes the existence of the Soul to be more demonstrable [Page 136]than that of the Body, because that which passes judgment on all other Beings, it self must exist. This consequence may not be deny'd, and it must be also concluded, that the Soul only passes judgment on objects, for the corporeal Organs are so far from discerning other ob­jects, that without the Soul they cannot see themselves, the eyes can see no more than a pair of Spectacles, (if the Soul is not re­sident in them to judg of objects) or the Ear hear any more than an [...] or the Nose smell any more than a Censer can the Incense which is burnt in it. This is enough to convince the Reasoner of the existence of a Spirit or Be­ing in a human body which is di­stinct [Page 137]from it, did not the definiti­on, which says the Soul is res cogi­tans, confound Reason it self whilst it considers it. For he who disputes nicely or sceptically, ac­cording to this definition may doubt whether Brutes may not be res cogitantes, and consequently have Souls of the same kind with the humane only differenc'd by gradual perfection; seeing some in former ages have not been so Dogmatical as to conclude posi­tively that Brutes have no kind of cogitation or petty Reasonings, as appears from Platarch's Discourse with this Title, [...]; and perhaps some in this age would not deny them to be res cogitantes, did not [Page 138]this consequence attend the asser­tion, viz. The immortality of Bru­tish Souls which the Religious man cannot or may not imagine. Let this also be considered, that this ar­gument for the proof of the Souls existence, as much as that above cited to prove the Being of God, will be thought defective, for this, as others, borrows its force from a supposition, which the Sceptic will not allow, neither will the more sober man [...]ook upon that definiti­on of a Soul as perfect, which may be accommodated to other Crea­tures, as it is above suggested. In the next place let an argument of a later Author, one eminent for Learning and Invention be consi­der'd, who says the nature of God [Page 139]is as intelligible as the nature of other Beings (which assertion in some ages of the Church would have been thought a just cause of putting the Author in the Cata­logue of the Anomi or Anomaei, who by some of the Fathers were esteem'd Erronious in a high de­gree, if not Haeretical) and also attempts to make the nature of the Soul as intelligible and as easie to be discern'd as the Sun (from which he borrows instances to ex­press his more refin'd thoughts) whilst he defines a Spirit, a sub­stance which hath self penetration, self contraction, and self dilatati­on in his book of the immortality of the Soul. This seems to help Reason in the conceiving the na­ture [Page 140]of a Spirit, but really the Au­thors notion of extension is not in­telligible, for it supposes the pos­sibility of many Spirits being so contracted, that they must appear to the apprehension as one, so that the mind cannot distinguish them, and it is impossible it can, whilst they are couch't in a single superficies not divisible into another, not so much as in thought, therefore ac­cording to this method the mind must have false apprehensions whilst many Spirits are so contracted, that it must apprehend many Individu­als as one Individual in a more confus'd conception than Genus and Species are conceiv'd, with the numerous Beings which are comprehended in those terms of [Page 141] Art. Let this also be consider'd, that when Myriads of Spirits are confin'd to one extension, that being but one must be a substance com­mon to all, so that the Spirits can­not decide Meum and Tuum, seeing by a kind of coalition they are uni­ted in substance. And it must be also imagin'd that the forms and faculties of those Spirits must be confus'd in one substance or exten­sion, or at least for a time be separa­ted from their proper substance, which is more difficult to be imagin'd, than the Souls taking a farwell from the Body for some short time, (which is very impro­bable) and then return again. It is confest, the Author defends his definition of a Spirit in a plausible [Page 142]way, and perhaps will think these objections inconsiderable, however my design is answered, if it shews how Reason is confounded in framing a notion of a Spirit, which was declar'd so easie to be appre­hended. If it is also said, that this is no new or monstrous assertion; for the Schools and antient Fathers have determined that Thousands of Angels may be present in the least quantity, a point, or if there could be any less extension: let it be consider'd, that these positions were laid down to take off the gross ap­prehension of the vulgar, who could scarce stretch their imagina­tion beyond material Beings, and frame notions of Spirits suitable to them, but did never undertake to [Page 143]explain the manner, or to deter­mine whether Spirits were extended or not. Hitherto the two rational Assertors of the Souls immortality being considered, this Disquisition shall be concluded with this con­sideration, viz. The Souls eternal duration depends on the concourse of Divine Providence, which can conserve it or annihilate it, and this depends on God's pleasure or Will, of which the mere Reasoner must be ignorant; wherefore it is no great wonder, if some antient Sophies spake doubtfully of the Souls immortality. That which is said is enough to shew the un­certainty of the Reasoners know­ledg in this quest concerning the Soul; but perhaps it may be urg'd, [Page 144]that mere Reasoners, Plato and o­thers have concluded its existence and immortality. This may be confest, yet the Divine sentences in their writings, which speak this, seem rather Enthusiastick (or at least an innate or common notion) than the deduction of the discur­sive faculties. For if the Divine sentences which lye scattered in Plato's Books, and the media be weigh'd by which he made those conclusions, they will seem to be a building with a glorious super­structure without a foundation proportion'd to its weight, or like an Arch which Mathematicians speak of, hanging in the Air, poiz'd by its own proportions, without a Buttress or foundation. Plato's [Page 145]sentences may give him the title Divine, but his reasons, by which he proves them, speak him but a man.

Hitherto I have discover'd Rea­sons defect, or dim­sight in discer­ning the nature of God and the Soul, it will now be proper to en­ter on another disquisition, viz.

Whether Grace in the Act of Faith alters the eye-sight, and in what sense Reason is laid aside.

The negative part of the first Clause of this disquisition is the Reasoners position, who concludes that Grace doth not alter the eye-sight, but only brings the Object nigher, allowing the Believer no alteration, or better disposition of the eye of his Soul, by which he [Page 146]thinks he can the better effect what he designs, viz. To set up every private person as an Umpire, as in­fallible in defining matters of faith as a Council. For by the same Reason he will not allow the eye-sight alter'd in a private person, he will deny any alteration of it (which is that which makes it in­fallible) in a Council. Thus ma­king the private Reasoner, and rational members of a Council to discover truth no otherwise than by a mere natural sight (the object being brought nigher) he concludes them equally infallible. This project is built on a weak foundati­on, which will appear to be so, by considering the unaptness or indis­position in the Soul to discern truth [Page 147]from falsehood in Religious de­bates, which is plain from the vain attempts of Reason in the discove­ry of it. And the indisposition of the mind, which is not such as can be removed by frequent acts, which make a habit to facilitate know­ledg in Arts and Sciences; for the Soul in this case, after the utmost of its endeavours to improve its un­derstanding, must be beholding to, or dependent on some power be­sides its own, which must help it as well as bring the object nigher. For if we do but consider the several ways, by which the understanding is improv'd, we must conclude it is not by its own power. For the believers Soul must have Divine aid or assistance either mediate or [Page 148] immediate in the act of Faith which must be call'd Grace; which if it be only suppos'd to dispose the Organs, as there is a necessity of it in mad men, and those which are Fools only by a bodily defect, which renders those parts useless which were designed for the service of the Soul in the exercise of her Functions, it is more than bringing the object nigher. Logicians (which is only a hard name for ra­tional men) say there is potentia prima, which renders a blind man as capable of seeing, if the Or­gans were well disposed, as he who hath a perfect sight. And those who say all Souls are equal, con­clude the fault is in the Organs (if a man after the utmost of industry [Page 149]joyned with advantage) is a Fool for this Reason, because his Soul is as capable of knowledg, as that of the greatest Sophies. This in­stance will agree with the Reaso­ner's case, who will allow no man to be a Spiritual Fool but on his own default, wherefore he stretch­es the interpretation of [...], to signifie the sensual man, which can­not be allowed; for if he mean the debaucht Epicure, then it would follow that every sober man would be assured of finding truth: for if there is not any fault in the eye of Reason (sensuality according to his assertion being removed) what can hinder? for if the eye is well disposed, and the object high, the the eye cannot but see. This is [Page 150]so certain, that there is a natural ne­cessity of it, but the case is other­wise in discerning spiritual truth. For the most sober Heathens heave complained they were in darkness.

The natural frame and indispo­sition of the mind occasioned this invincible ignorance, which may be so call'd, seeing it cannot be re­moved by humane Art or Industry, any more than a mad man can re­store himself to a right mind.

That God can improve the un­derstanding is as evident as he can render it less perfect, which is plain from the punishment of our first [Page 151]forefather, who by his default for­feited much of his Reasoning fa­culty which was less perfect than in innocency; This cannot be deni­ed, although the manner how the natural light was diminisht, may puzle those who will strictly exa­min it: For to diminish the un­derstanding according to those who make cognitation the form of the Soul, is to make it to be less a Soul, which will not be allowed in Legick or Metaphysicks, or according to that opinion which calls it a facul­ty or power of the mind to draw conclusions, it is hard to imagine how it should be disabled, except God uncreate or withdraw some perfection, or at least his Grace or Divine assistance, which is as much [Page 152]if not more necessary for preser­ving it in its due exercise of Rea­son in Religious debates, than the concourse of providence which hinders the World from turning to its first nothing. The former opinion cannot be allowed, the la­ter if granted, will serve for the proof of the former assertion, for if it be (as it must be) allow'd that God hath and can make the Soul less perfect by withdrawing his Grace, he can, and doth im­prove it by supplies of the same; also The truth of this cannot be denyed, although it may seem obscure, if it meet with the Reasoner, who per­haps will be as much puzled with the word Grace, as he is with the word Schism. Which demur will [Page 153]soon be removed if Grace be taken for Divine assistance, which perfects the understanding, although the manner how it is done, cannot be otherwise than conjecturally ex­pressed; For the strict Reasoner says, if the matter of Fact be cer­tain, whats and hows, not and not to hinder assent; wherefore it be­ing proved that there is a necessity of Divine assistance, 'tis not so ne­cessary to examine strictly the manner any more, than when we take it granted, that a Spirit can act on matter though the invention cannot imagine how, It is enough to conclude the truth of the former assertion, if God in the Act of faith do only excite notions in the mind, not only by proposal of objects [Page 154]nigher, but by direction of the wil to give its assent, without which these notions or conclusions would have been dormant, or at least doubtful­ly entertain'd by mere Reason fol­lowing its own conduct. Before I dispatch this part of the Disqui­sition, it is necessary to prevent what may be objected from the for­mer instance, viz. If Adam in his pure naturals had a distinct know­ledg of God, and consequently could have assented to all the Ar­ticles of Religion without any other assistance than the bare pro­posal of them with appeals to his own Reason, laying aside sensuali­ty (which must be allow'd to be the occasion of his fall without straining Cabalistical Divinity, [Page 155]which calls it forbidden fruit) so his posterity may be abstracting their thoughts from sensual objects arrive at the same degree of per­fection: This granted (which can­not be) will not qualifie the Rea­soner for Christian belief; for could he suppose himself indow'd with the same faculties with which innocency was invested, he will be but a Viator (as the Schools say) more imperfect than the Christian, not a Comprehensor of matters of faith. Some Scholasticks have been so far from concluding, that the knowledg which Adam had of God at least as Triunus, was purely natu­ral, that they doubted not to call it infus'd, for this reason (as well as the Authority of St. Austin. lib. [Page 156]undec. de Genesi ad liter. because it is not probable that God would suffer the Protoplast to be ignorant of that which was matter of faith to all his posterity; And it may be safely concluded, that Adam's Christian posterity give assent to the whole Sacred Volume of Scrip­ture by the same method and means by which Adam assented to, and believ'd that Synopsis of the whole Gospel, The seed of the Woman shall bruise the Serpents head. If it is said that Adam's posterity have a measure of knowledg, as much greater than that of their first fore­father, as the second Adam is justly exalted above the first; yet this advance of knowledg owes not its Original to mere natural powers. [Page 157]For though the Christian Believer (without breach of modesty) may be said to know more than his first Forefather; yet that higher degree of knowledg doth not only owe its improvement to a fuller declaration of God's Will in the latter, than in the first Gospel preacht to Adam by God himself, but also to the Divine supplyes, which are proportion'd to the ex­tent of the Revelation; otherwise the Christian could no more be­lieve his large Creed, than it can be imagin'd, Adam could have comprehended the sum of it, de­clar'd to him in few words without Divine interpretation or assistance.

If this instance seem not close to the question, let the will and the [Page 158]understanding be two eyes of faith, though by some one is called blind Caeca potestas, which error is cor­rected by later Philosophy) be examin'd, and they will in their pure naturals be found defective. For as in naturals 'tis not enough that the eye is well disposed, but a certain position of the object, and direction of the eye is necessary for some Discoveries, so although 'tis allow'd that Reason is no more new Reason by Grace, than an eye is a new eye, which by skilful directi­ons discerns that which it saw not before; yet this assistance though it do not frame sight, but direct the eye, 'tis enough to destroy that po­sition which says in spiritual Vision only the object is brought nigher. [Page 159]Add to this the mere disposal of Media in order to perfect Vision and it will give way for this asserti­on, that Divine assistance is neces­sary, for we must acknowledg, that several conclusions have been passed as true which before were doubted of, when a quick and happy inven­tion hath found a fit medium to prove them, or at least render them more easie to be understood. To instance in that which is nearest to man, his own Soul, its existence is better apprehended by being com­pared to some thin air, which hath power, though invisible. Besides it is beyond dispute, that some su­pernatural power infuseth notions in dreams, which the Soul it self could not excite. I dispute not [Page 160]whether there are any such in these days, 'tis enough to shew, that the Divine method without violence to Reason hath made such discove­ries in some ages of the Church, and may continue his assistance (though not in the same manner, for that would not appear consi­stent with the setled and more per­fect state of the Church) to help Reason in giving its assent to Di­vine truth. I need add no more for the confutation of the Reaso­ners position than the proposal of the Discourse in the former disqu­sition, which shews that there is a Beam in the eye of Reason, which if not removed, renders it so dim­sighted that it cannot discern the Elements and first principles of [Page 161]Religion, which are rudely in mans mind, and need some assi­stance for the due composure of the thoughts concerning God and his worship; wherefore let the Reasoner consider Grace but as a Chirurgians hand which couches a Pearl on the eye, or takes away the Gutta serena; Yet by this act the sight is better, and this cannot be without alteration. Add to this the proposal of objects and the disposition of the eye and me­dia (which the eye it self cannot dispose) is enough to shew that Grace by such acts may be said to have alter'd the sight, which might be rendred obscure and confused by default of the medium or Organ; for as the Soul looks through the [Page 162]eye as a Glass, which if sullied or discolour'd by any Disease, the judgment is pass'd according to the tincture which is in the eye, not in the object, and con­sequently is as ill a Judg of co­lours, as he who views objects with colour'd Prospectives or any Catoptrical device to deceive the eye; so in spiritual Vision the Soul looks with the eyes which have the disease, therefore 'tis not probable it should discern its own malady, much less discover truth. To conclude this part of the Dis­quisition, it may be confidently affirmed that Grace alters the sight, though it do but take off a film or scale, as from St. Paul's eyes, [Page 163]which the natural man by his own power is no more able to remove than the eye by dropping tears (a way to put out eyes rather than restore them) can do as much as any eye-water which the Oculist can prepare.

From what is here said, there is an easie digression to the other part of the Disquisition (how Reason is laid aside in some acts of Faith (a question which much exercised the Reconciler) whilst it doth not follow the dictates of its own un­derstanding, but gives it self up to the guidance of another, (the Di­vine knowledg) which advantagi­ously supplies natures defect, which makes way for this conclu­sion, viz. Reason in some cases is [Page 164]as much and may as properly be said to be laid aside, as a Judg who is limited by his Monarch, that he may not pass sentence in all cases on his own judgment, but in some must consult and follow the dire­ctions of the supreme Magistrate, by doing of which he is so far laid aside, that as to that particular case, he may not so properly be called Judg as a Proclaimer of Justice determined by his Superiour. And for the illustration, I cannot but insert a story which I borrow from an Eminent Mathematician who says, a Judg puzled with a Case of two persons who had made ex­change of Fields which were Iso­perimeters, or of equal sides but different figures, one a Rombus or [Page 165] oblique Angled, the other a square or right Angled parallelogram, was necessitated to call a Geometri­cian to discover the Cheat, which discovery in strictness was enough to call the Mathematician Judg, though the sentence was pronoun­ced by another. This is applicable to the Spiritual method of impro­ving the understanding and deter­mining the Will in matters of faith, if God be considered as the [...] to inform Reason which is defective, and as ignorant as the Judg in the former Case.

From this instance 'tis plain and easie to imagine how advantagi­ously Reason is laid aside, being diverted from its usual method in giving assent to propositions [Page 166](which are true) yet in them­selves not sufficiently evident, now evidence of the truth to the Soul in its pure naturals is so necessary, that there is no assent certain with­out it, but it is otherwise in the act of saith, when Divine Testimony supplies the place of natural evi­dence. If it be urged that Reason proceeds according to it's own principles, and when it submits to the Divine Testimony, 'tis because Reason is informed by Revelation, That it is not a Competent Judge of Religious Mysteries; yet that assent being guided by the Divine Testimony instead of evidence, di­verting the faculties of the Soul from their usual method, is enough to assert, Reasons being laid aside.

Yet this will not make way for a cavilling complaint, that the Di­vine determination doth violence to the faculties whilst thus diverted from their usual method, for the Divine concurse which determines them, can no more be said to do vi­olence, than the Mathematicians information of the Judge in the former case can be called compul­sion when he prevailed with him to pass true sentence, which he without the Artist could not have pronounc't.

It is not necessary that matters of belief are clearly and distinctly understood, for faith takes its name from perswasion (which is not al­ways begotten by demonstration,) and from assent more than from the [Page 168]manner how it is wrought; for the Divine method hath several ways to command belief, sometimes it makes an extempore Convert, grace working effectually in a moment, sometimes it operates through the whole course of mans life to per­fect the work. It is enough that men are assured that their assent is terminated in truth, because of the Divine determination which makes the Will like the Load-stone (which instance is much used by the Reconciler) which will cer­tainly conduct the Mariner, though he knows not how it is directed, whether by a materia subtilis, pas­sing through the poles of this low vortex, or any other mysterious way of nature. To speak all, if [Page 169] Sailing had been laid aside till the Pilot could demonstrate its infalli­ble direction from its causes, the greater part of the World would have been unknown, and the terra incognita would take more room in the Mapp than the known part of the World: The same may be concluded of faith, for if all be­lief was to be suspended until the manner how it was wrought was explained, a great part of the World would pass as Infidels.

Thus far the infirmity of the mere natural sight hath been dis­covered, it now remains that I in­quire in what sense the Reconciler, who urgeth belief as an Act of Prudence, by which if he only understand a rational choice ex­cluding [Page 170]grace, the former discourse will equally conclude against him and the Reasoner. For if a man endued with natural Prudence, must necessarily embrace the Chri­stian Religion, because its contents are such as will command assent from the Reasonable man, he shuts out Grace in the Act of Faith, and makes the Holy Scriptures more sufficient, and in another sense than ever they were said to be (for which they are said to be so ( [...], by Athanasius, Cyril, and other holy Fathers) it is to shew they are self-sufficient without the subsidies of Traditions not in any other sense; for although it must be granted that the proposal of Scrip­ture [Page 171]is enough to condemn the In­fidel as imprudent; yet this con­demnation may not be justified on­ly, because the evidence of Scrip­ture was not allow'd, for it is more than probable that the neglect of Petitioning for Grace, and oppo­sing it when offered, to help unbe­lief, doth adjust the severity of that saying, He who believes not shall be damn'd. Natural Pru­dence is not a sufficient qualificati­on for the imbracing Christian Re­ligion, if we take it in Aristotles sense, who defines it an habitual knowledg which can discern what is good and what is evil as they have relation to practice. lib. Sexto Ethicor. ad Nicom. [...].

Prudence thus defin'd can have no place as Antecedent to belief, because that mere Reason in several Cases cannot judge, what is good for man, and what evil, and there­fore will demur at some duties ab­solutely necessary for the attaining of happiness, such as are self-denial and other injunctions which natu­ral prudence will not choose, if left to its own evidence. And if it be considered as subsequent to belief, there is no need of it in discerning what is good in practice and what is evil, for duties in Religion are indispensably enjoyned, which de­stroyes consultation, which deno­minates a man Prudent. I shall [Page 173]conclude this particular with Christ's deciding the Controversie by ranking the Prudent man, in this sense not so wise as a Babe, without Divine assistance. And when it is taken in a better sense, Divine direction and concurse is suppos'd as necessary to supply the defect of the mind (and there­fore may challenge the Etymology which Aristotle gives of [...] whilst he calls it [...]) which God alone is able to do, and make men wise unto Salvation. Add to this another consideration, that a Prudential choice of Religi­on, supposes it and its reward too, to be exposed as a prize, not in the Apostlical sense. So that he who hath the greatest stock of Pru­dence [Page 174]must pass as most Religious, when he who hath the least, be esteem'd a Reprobate.

From all that is said I shall only infer this conclusion, seeing our eye-sight needs alteration and it self is indispos'd, the Believer doth safely resign himself to the conduct of the All-seeing-eye, ac­cording to the Rule of a severe Philosopher (who would not ad­mit any truth, but upon the evi­dence of Reason) who says, we may in some Cases as safely trust others as our selves, [...], Arist. lib. Sext. Ethic. ad Nicom. So far as men follow an unerring conduct, so far they are infallible, though they are not their own Leaders.

Hitherto Reason hath been con­siderd as it is in a single person, but the following Disquisition consi­ders it in a multitude, or an Assem­bly as it attends their Sacred Votes, by which it is made more infalli­ble, than when as a Monarch, it as­serts its seeming priviledges by renouncing all manner of assi­stance in drawing conclusions, but only that, which were nature af­fords, relying on private evidence, which also is suppos'd in every particular Member of a Council. Therefore it is proper to examine whether Reason only, inlightned by apprehending the story and contents of the old and new Testaments, is capable of appeals made to it as Judg, and the last determiner of [Page 176]Controversies, so as it can pass in­fallible judgment on propositions offer'd as Revelation: And whe­ther the fallibility of some Councils renders all so suspicious that the Christian cannot safely rely on Con­ciliary definitions.

The first branch of this inquiry is affirmed by the Reasoner, and the other he will not have deny'd, because it makes way for the proof of the former, for by infinuating that all Councils are fallible, he presumes he may as well appeal to a fallible self, as a fallible multi­tude. But this assertion may be checkt from this consideration; That there is much difference be­tween these propositions; General Councils may err; And, All have [Page 177]been and are lyable to Error. If the latter is granted, it will destroy the certainty of a visible Church at any time since it was founded, if not the being of any truly so called. For that principle which obligeth a man to believe, that all Councils have been fallible, will never put him out of doubt, whe­ther the profession of the Church at any time was agreeable to the truth of Religion. For seeing the Reasoners rule admits of no­thing as certain, further than it is knowable by some faculty of the Soul, independent form Divine assi­stance, it is impossible that he can have any more than conjectural knowledg, Reason being not able to inform him of a Criterion of a [Page 178]true Church by its own evidence, but by Revelation, which says the true faith shall not fail. Now that this true faith is in a doubtful case, must be determin'd by those who have power from God to make a certain discovery of it. That which is said, is so agreeable to the Apostolical rule, no Scripture is of private interpretation, (which must be confest by the Reasoner, though there was no Sacred Authority to confirm that Canon) that it is only necessary that objections are re­mov'd. The first of which may be this, that by the delivery of Reason in private persons to be determin'd by that which prevails in a multitude, is to make or set up a Rational Papacy. For as each [Page 179]Member of the Roman Church is no further esteem'd Orthodox than he delivers up his private rea­son either to the Pope alone, or as he is in juncto with a general Coun­cil, which is said to have such power to determine infallibly, though the interpretation make Scripture to be no Scripture; So every Christian is to be esteem'd Orthodox or Hae­retical according to the sense of the Council, which hath power to inter­pret and make his reason to be no reason.

No such conclusion can follow, and if it did, it would not break the force of the arguments, which confirm the former positions. For suppose the Definitions of Councils as conclusions, which Reason draws [Page 180]from the premises, nor as none can be so rash as to say, Reason makes the conclusion true which was so be­fore, (only it could not commend it to the will and understanding, as an object of natural faith, till the two propositions were brought as witnesses of the truth of the con­clusion,) or that Logick creates truth, but only assists the inventi­on in its search for it; so by the same reason none may say, that Councils make Articles of true Religion, though they are the means of their discovery.

But let this objection be consi­der'd as it relates to Papal Decre­tals. The name Pope will never affright the sober man out of that reverence which is due to just Au­thority, [Page 181] Councils and holy Synods, or if it be found to be so in a single person. For if it could be prov'd (as some have affirm'd) that the Pope was and is the Church Virtu­al, it would be beyond dispute, that infallibility did at some time since Christian Religion was in the World, sit in the Chair, or at least may do, when fundamental con­troversies arise, which threaten the Churches ruine without the impu­tation of making Scripture to be no Scripture by his Authority. It may be safely said by any Christi­an, that he would not give assent to several Doctrines which are urg'd as matters of faith necessarily to be believ'd for the attaining Salvation, did not the Church declare them to [Page 182]be so; yet the same person on the same principle is not oblig'd to think, that which is so defin'd by the Church is made true by its de­finition. Hitherto I have us'd this comparison (which makes the de­terminations of Councils as con­clusions of a Syllogism made by the Heads of the World) to illustrate the answer to an objection; but it being so apposit to another design, it shall be us'd to shew, that the Reasoner in a Council is not capa­ble of making a Syllogism from mere natural Topicks to demon­strate the truth of that which is debated. This will appear to be true from the consideration of the Structure of a Syllogism, which leads us to the knowledg of a pro­position, [Page 183]which was less known, by others which are more evident, and easie to be understood. For the medium (which is an ingredient of both propositions) is as clear and as certain as a common notion, and the truth of the conclusion depends on it, which if mistaken, makes the Syllogism a fallacy. Suppose therefore the Members of a Council as so many Scholasticks arguing, they have no such com­mon notions as Philosophers have, by which as media, they can draw conclusions. Although it must be confest that the understanding by its own evidence can judg of the truth of some propositions (viz. It is impossible, God can do any act which implyes a contradiction, &c. [Page 184]Yet Divine Revelation is the medi­um by which truth in propositions, which are more obscure, is deter­mined. Hence it sollows that the Sanctions and Definitions of Councils must be said to be Hypo­thetically pronounc'd true, as this saying is, viz. If the Moon is Eclipsed, the Earth interposeth it self between it and the Sun. Not unlike this is the way of arguing in a Council, which proves Christ's humanity from his Passion; for if he suffereth, humane nature did in­terpose it self, else he could not suffer. Now as none will say, there is and always was anecessity not in the nature of the Moon, but in the manner of its motion, that it must be Eclipsed at some times (for to [Page 185]say so, is to confine the Almighty's wisdom to one System, and to take away the possibility of the Worlds being in such a frame in which nei­ther Sun or Moon might be Eclips­ed) but when it is seen to be so, it is evident, that the Earths interposi­tion is the cause of that seeming defect. So a Council cannot conclude the necessity of Christs being Man but Hypothetically; For the Divine decrees (which reason cannot know but by Revelation) are as the condition or antecedent which makes Christ's humanity ne­cessary. Let not this assertion seem strange, since it is impossible, but that reason must be defective as it appears from the former instance, as also from this consideration, that [Page 186]the mere Reasoner cannot con­clude the necessity of Christs in­carnation, and will be more at a loss in other mysterious matters of faith. The definitions and con­clusions of Councils thus hypo­thetically drawn are not less cer­tain, because they are such, seeing the Antecedents of their propositi­ons are matters of fact contain'd in holy Scriptures, and those who discourse, have Divine assistance in discerning the connexion and infer­ring the consequences; Now the connexion and sequel is true, be­cause of the Divine direction, as is already prov'd, and the Antecedent, viz. matters of fact, is so, as it ap­pears from the miracles which con­firm'd their truth, which were such [Page 187]as reason might discern to be Di­vine; for Reason may be allow'd a Judg in this case, though not in all doubts which come under de­bate in a Council. The reason of which is this, Miracles being works which exceed mere natural power or ordinary course of nature, it is furnished with faculties which can discern what is natural, and what not, but is at a loss in higher my­steries.

This assertion perhaps may be checkt by an instance in conciliary proceedings in discerning Cano­nical Books of Holy Scripture from Apocryphal, or any falsly so called, in which, judgment is past by mere rational evidence, whilst it distin­guisheth the one from the other by [Page 188]their Contents. This must not be granted; for though the contents of Holy Scriptures are a good argu­ment of their truth; yet they are not the only Characteristicks to distinguish them from others which are not Canonical. When there is any debate in a Council concerning any part of Scripture to be admitted into Canon, appeals are not made to mere Reason to judg of its contents, any further than by comparison of them with those of other Books, which are re­ceived without any controversie. It is the Councils business to argue as the Apostolical Canon says [...] and the Church of England con­cludes the definitions of Councils [Page 189]deductions of Reason (Artic. 21) which admits of this limitation or rather interpretation, that though Reason draws the conclussions; yet their truth is not measur'd by a bare congruity to it, but the recep­tion of it in the primitive Church, or the most free and unbiassed Coun­cils, and so much of its as belongs to the Old Testament by the Jewish Catalogue, and by several other Rules, which are as a Touchstone to discover Gold, and distinguish it from baser Mettals. To speak all, Conciliary Discussions in this case do not inquire how Revelation is agreeable to Reason, but what is to be admitted as Revelation, and what to be rejected, and when that is done, compare one Text with [Page 190]another till they agree, which con­sent is the most infallible evidence of truth. However it is scarce probable, that the Reasoner will be perswaded or argued out of his pretended private infallibility, whilst he concludes, every indivi­dual man may proceed on the same ground which Councils do, because each rational man being in some degree more or less able to draw conclusions by Analogy, or com­paring the several contents of Holy Scriptures. Wherefore let it be suppos'd, that each reasonable man is naturally qualified to find truth; yet seeing the promise of Divine assistance (which is the most sure foundation on which infallibility can rest) is not to a single person, [Page 191]those natural qualifications cannot assure them of finding it.

I am sensible that the Reasoner may take occasion from what is said of urging a question, whether the former assertion doth take the priviledge from every private per­son, so that in any case he cannot interpret Scripture.

The affirmative of this questi­on may be safely maintain'd as it hath respect to private persons who are known Members of the Church, and have opportunity of being acquainted with, and to be in­form'd, what is the interpretation and sense of the Church in general, which must be a direction to those who pass judgment in particular cases, for they may not appeal from [Page 192]Synods to their own private reason, and because truth is certainly to be found in Councils, and there are Rules of finding it.

If it is further demanded, whe­ther a private person who hath nei­ther learning or opportunity to understand the sense of the Church, may not be a safe inter­preter of Scripture in order to his own Satisfaction and Salvation?

As this proposes an extraordi­nary case, so the answer may be dubiously return'd. However it may be said to the first part of the question, that it cannot be well sup­posed, that any illiterate person should of necessity be ignorant of the sense of the Church, seeing he is a known Member of the same, [Page 193]and the pastors are as Mouths to de­clare it. To the other part of the question, which supposes a Chri­stian so unfortunately (amongst the Infidels) plac't, that he cannot have access to Pastors of the Church, it is enough to propose another question, viz. Whether the Thief on the Cross who may be supposed to want time (though nothingmore could be wanting whilst Christ was with him) did give assent to all fundamentals of Religion by faith as explicit as is required of other Chistians who have the advantage of more time and other circumstances? The answer given to this will help the solution of the other doubt.

The manner of Conciliary pro­ceedings [Page 194]being considered, and the unfitness of the mere reasoner for such debates: in he next place the necessity of Councils shall be prov'd, by which the other part of the Disquisition will be better un­derstood.

Such Sacred Assemblies are ne­cessary, though not at all times (for some ages pass't without them) for the exigency of the Church requires such supplies. To ima­gin it could always be without them, is to conclude it exempt from all possibility of erring, and independent as to the Divine con­duct, which is promis'd to lead it and continue it in the way of truth; The former cannot be granted, for Heresies must be, and then there is as [Page 195]great necessity of their condemna­tion. The latter cannot be allow'd, for as it intrenches on the Divine Dominion, so it doth equalize the Church Militant with the Trium­phant, whose greatest Trimuph is ovr Error.

This necessity of Councils is confirm'd from the consideration of different opinions concerning matters of faith, which equally commend themselves to the Chri­stian, and render his Will so in­different, that he knows not to which part to incline, till determi­ned by Authority. It is no strange thing to meet with two opinions in other cases, which plead for them­selves with such equal probability, that the most accurate judgment [Page 196]will rather suspend its belief, than give assent to either; neither let it appear a prodigy, if Religion afford such cases as would render its proselytes or professors sceptically puzled without a more infallible guide than their own Reason.

But it may be said, that in other cases the wise men do not give themselves up to a Sect or Council of Philosophers to be Ʋmpires in dubious matters. This is granted, for it is unreasonable that they should deliver up their Reason to the most fam'd Sophies, but the reason is not the same in Religious debates. For a single person may be qualifi'd for finding truth in Philosophy, with such certainty as may vie with the numerous Sects; [Page 197]but no private member of the Church may pretend to that cre­tainty which must be allow'd in Councils. It is possible that one man may be master of more reason and Philosophy than is to be found in all the World at that time, and one walking Library more valuable than a Vatican; but Religious knowledg is not design'd to be so Monastical as to live in solitude or a single person. Besides, if it could be prov'd that the Philosophers had the same assurance of a true conduct in their doubts by reason, which the Councils have by Divine supplies, he would be unreasonable in a high degree who would not give up or resign his private rea­son to their determinations.

The great assertor of the Roman Church (D. Stap.) was not alto­gether mistaken when he introduc't Divine assistance to help the Church in making a Syllogism (though the manner of its con­veyance seems inconsistent, whilst he makes the Members of it to be discursive in the premifes as mere Reasoners, but infallibly assisted in the conclusion) for Revelation must take place of pure natural inven­tion in the whole matter of Reli­gious debates.

That there is a necessity of the Resignation of Reason to Authori­ty must be granted, and it is urg'd by several methods. Two late Authors (who consider'd and exa­min'd humane Reason) endeavour [Page 199]to convince men of the necessity of giving up our private reason to the publick judgment of other persons, who have better means of knowing of truth than we our selves have, as one expresseth it, and both press it by an instance of an appeal in naturals from sense to rea­son. This way of arguing may be perswasive, but not cogent enough to evince men of the ne­cessity of that which they design'd to prove; for although it is safely concluded that the Members of Councils have better qualifications for discovery of truth than private persons; yet their learning and natural endowments are not that [...] or the foundation on which faith is laid.

Besides the similitude of ap­peals from Sense to Reason is not apposit, and implies a supposition of the senses being erroneous, which in strictness cannot be al­low'd, but let that be suppos'd, it cannot well be accommodated to the case, for sense and reason in man are not so much strangers as the publick Representatives of the Church in Councils are to its par­ticular Members. The same per­cipient is imploy'd in reason and sense, and according to its diffe­rent acts and objects hath distinct compellations, sensual or rational, as the same River takes several names from the Channels through which it runs. For when the Soul perceives material impresses on the [Page 201]Brain without any consideration or reflex act, it is call'd sensation (as when it perceives a body as it is figur'd in that part which nature design'd for Phancy, to be Trian­gular or Globular, red or white, or as it is represented in other figures or colours) but when it deliberates and draws conclusions, such as cannot be the work or result of a naked representation of the object, it challengeth its just title rational. Now to suppose this similitude ex­actly apposit, is to conclude that every private person should have his Soul imployd and acting (as junto which cannot be imagin'd) in every particular debate of a Council as the percipient is in sen­sation and Reasoning.

More arguments might be urg'd to evince the necessity of Councils, but I do not intend to be so volu­minous, but to pass to another in­quiry concerning truth and its cer­tainty of being so, as it is in lawful Councils. Satisfaction will be gi­ven to this inquiry, if it is consi­derd that the true faith was once delivered to the Saints as St. Jude says, and what that true faith is may be found in some conciliary Defi­nitions since Christ's coming into the World, and that it may be safely concluded, that it is found when there is a general consent, which is an infallible [...] and as certain as any medium in Demonstration. Suppose one true opinion in Philo­sophy and a Thousand in which [Page 203]there is truth, but mixt with error; If they all agree in some positions it is an undoubted argument of the truth of those in which all agree. This way of passing judgment on Definitions of Councils upon exa­mination will appear as certain as that which draws conclusions from this rule. Quoe in aliquo tertio con­veniunt inter se conveniunt. That trite saying [...] is more than a proverbial conclusi­on, for it is founded in reason, which must conclude error hath many Moeanders and distracting paths: but truth hath a narrow way, in which only it self can walk. And it must needs be so for this reason; truth being in some Con­ciliary Definitions, they must be [Page 204]as the Center in which, all which are true, necessarily meet. If it is said, that it is possible that those Definitions, which are to be as a Standard to measure others, may not be found, the Church being de­frauded or abus'd by misfortune or cunning, and consequently at a loss in the search for truth, as much as he who sails without a Compass.

This cannot be suppos'd because of the Divine promise of the pre­servation of the truefaith, though not at all times discoverable. But let it be imagin'd that some true Conciliary Definitions may be wanting, then the supposition is de­stroy'd, which implyes a Catholick consent, which cannot be so call'd, if but one Definition is left out: [Page 205]Therefore it may be concluded that Truth is to be found by this Method; though with as much difficulty as Archimedes discove­red the Gold, and the quantity of it in his Princes Crown, which a Cheat had Adulterated with baser Metals.

Religion therefore being in its own frame and nature fitted for the severest Inquisition, it will not stand in fear of the boldest Ad­versary, Authority in its name bids the Reasoner be modest, and its matter which it injoyns further commands him to be so, whilst he speaks of that which transcends his understanding. It may now seem proper to suggest these Ar­guments which seem to invalidate [Page 206]Authority, and render it less valua­ble; This is done by objecting the errors of Councils, and the manner of their Process by Votes or Suffrages; the first of which seems to insinuate to the Christian, the posibility of the body of the Church being altogether dis­jointed, and its total Apostacy with the same reason that a man may conclude that man-kind cannot be exempt from the possi­bility of being Cripples, because that some bones have been out of their proper place, and the other seems to render them more con­temptible, by comparing them with Processes of Courts which are purely humane; both these are as easily confuted as named, and may [Page 207]be more effectually retorted on reason, as it is exercised in the se­veral ways of Government in se­veral ages. For the former obje­ction is removed in the precedent Disquisition, and the other will appear to be weak and disabled, if it is considered that Votes and Suf­frages in holy Councils are as Lots in the choice of an Apostle, which having infallible Direction from God may vie certainty with a De­cree or any way of Election. Matthias was no less an Apostle, neither was his Authority more doubted, with which he was inve­sted by Lots, than that of the other Apostles, who had an oral mission from Christ himself. I might further assert Ecclesiastical [Page 208]Authority, by shewing the safety of relying on the Authority of Councils with a more firm assent than History or the humane Law­giver can challenge; For the Histo­rian (I mean the profane) commits not Annals to posterity upon peril of his own ruine, in case some cunning and political inventions be interwoven in them like some of the History which Zenophon wrote, which seems more like a Romance than an impartial Relation of Cyrus his Life and Education; and those who give precepts to other men, sometimes have a reserve of immu­nity, and exemption from them to themselves: But holy Councils have no such equivocation, which though it may seem pious deceit, [Page 209]cannot sit safely in Sacred As­semblies, neither may any Mem­bers of them as an Arian profess one, and carry another Creed in his Bosome: were it possible that any Member of a true Council might do this safely and without peril of his own ruine, Conciliary Definitions might be rendered more suspicious, but the case is otherwise in such Sacred debates, the Members of Councils as well as private persons of the Church are like St. Paul and his Company in the Ship which could not be secured from the Tempest, If all were not saved, or at least in a capacity of being so, for as the Apostle might not escape upon a [Page 210]Planck alone; neither may the pub­lick representatives of the uni­versal Church promise themselves Salvation, it they willingly define any such matters of faith to the people as may indanger the ma­king Shipwrack of a good Con­science relying on their Authority. For those who out of design define error as matters of faith, are in equal danger, if not more, with those who put their Definitions in practice.

Hence appears the certainty of that knowledg which is the effect of faith, which as much exceeds that which is purely humane, as Science doth Opinion, which is such a low and fickle degree of know­ledg [Page 211]as seems suited for trifling things below Heavenly objects; for God hath disposed of Religious matters in such manner, as that a man may know God, and be in­form'd of his own duty with as great certainty, if not greater, than he can know the objects of natural Science. For the diffe­rence which the Schools make be­tween Faith and Science consists not only in the certainty of the one being greater than the other, but in the manner of Evidence in the objects, which occasions the grand cavil against faith, as being an un­reasonable peice of service im­pos'd on man, and which is to give assent to that which cannot com­mend [Page 212]it self to the understanding with sufficient evidence.

If this is urged, it may be re­torted upon Science, for if nothing must command assent (as it is be­fore said) but what is clearly and distinctly perceiv'd, Euclid's De­monstrations must be less in num­ber, and more maim'd; and there will be only the name of Science of many things left in the world. Besides there is no reason of complaint of want of evidence in the act of faith, for it is evidence enough, that the mind is inform'd that it cannot comprehend its ob­ject, however it ought to give as­sent. Let this be made more plain by a supposition: Suppose a [Page 213] Terra incognita (I do not mean that which Geographers call so, for that in future ages may have a new name in the Map) or some part of the world was so design'd and con­triv'd by the Creator, that it is im­possible it should be known: Or suppose there were Planetary Re­gions habitable, but not intended to be discover'd clearly to man, 'tis enough in this feigned case, that men are inform'd that there are such places, and advis'd of the impossibility that they should be known. This fiction is applicable to more serious and Religious cases, and may stop the mouths of a querulous Generation of seekers, who are content with a low degree [Page 214]of knowledg, which doth not ex­cell opinion in certainty, which kind of knowledg was so little esteem'd amongst some of the Phi­losophers, that it was plac't by them in the imagination, rather than the understanding, as better suiting with the condition of Brutes than men. 'Tis true the Schools have been more kind and curteous to Opinion, and give it a place in the Ʋnderstanding, but being there according to their ac­count of it, sits trembling and in fear it may be deceiv'd, and that which it apprehends to be true may be false; This consider'd will ex­alt faith (which in a loose de­scription, may be call'd Reason [Page 215]Divinely assisted and directed) above mere carnal Reasonings, and justifie the challenge which St. Paul makes in his Christian Armour, where is the Disputer of the World?