A philosophicall essay towards an eviction of the being and attributes of God. Immortality of the souls of men. Truth and authority of Scripture. together with an index of the heads of every particular part. Ward, Seth, 1617-1689. 1652 Approx. 162 KB of XML-encoded text transcribed from 85 1-bit group-IV TIFF page images. Text Creation Partnership, Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) : 2009-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1). A67569 Wing W823 ESTC R203999 99863739 99863739 115953

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.

Early English books online. (EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A67569) Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 115953) Images scanned from microfilm: (Thomason Tracts ; 176:E1322[2]) A philosophicall essay towards an eviction of the being and attributes of God. Immortality of the souls of men. Truth and authority of Scripture. together with an index of the heads of every particular part. Ward, Seth, 1617-1689. [16], 152 p. Printed by Leonard Lichfield, and are to be sold by John Adams and Edward Forrest, Oxford : 1652. Anonymous. By Seth Ward. In part a reply to: Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. The words "being .. Scripture." are bracketed together on the title page. Annotation on Thomason copy: "Nou. 4.". Reproduction of the original in the British Library.

Created by converting TCP files to TEI P5 using tcp2tei.xsl, TEI @ Oxford.

EEBO-TCP is a partnership between the Universities of Michigan and Oxford and the publisher ProQuest to create accurately transcribed and encoded texts based on the image sets published by ProQuest via their Early English Books Online (EEBO) database (http://eebo.chadwyck.com). The general aim of EEBO-TCP is to encode one copy (usually the first edition) of every monographic English-language title published between 1473 and 1700 available in EEBO.

EEBO-TCP aimed to produce large quantities of textual data within the usual project restraints of time and funding, and therefore chose to create diplomatic transcriptions (as opposed to critical editions) with light-touch, mainly structural encoding based on the Text Encoding Initiative (http://www.tei-c.org).

The EEBO-TCP project was divided into two phases. The 25,363 texts created during Phase 1 of the project have been released into the public domain as of 1 January 2015. Anyone can now take and use these texts for their own purposes, but we respectfully request that due credit and attribution is given to their original source.

Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data.

Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so.

Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor.

The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines.

Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements).

Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site.

eng Hobbes, Thomas, 1588-1679. -- Leviathan -- Early works to 1800. Theology, Doctrinal -- Early works to 1800. God -- Attributes -- Early works to 1800. Authority -- Religious aspects -- Early works to 1800. 2000-00 Assigned for keying and markup 2001-07 Keyed and coded from ProQuest page images 2001-08 Sampled and proofread 2001-08 Text and markup reviewed and edited 2001-11 Batch review (QC) and XML conversion

A Philosophicall ESSAY Towards an Eviction of Being and Attributes of God. Immortality of the souls of men. Truth and Authority of Scripture. TOGETHER With an Index of the Heads of every particular Part.

OXFORD, Printed by Leonard Lichfield, and are to be sold by John Adams and Edward Forrest, 1652.

To the READER.

THE Author of this Book although he had never suffered it to be published, had he not been assured that it is not (for the main) much liable to just exception, and although he hath no further care of the reception & entertainment of it, then the consequence of it may deserve (whereof the Reader and not himself must be the Judge.) And so he is not moved by the common passions of such as use to make Epistles and Prefaces, to their Readers, yet some thing although but for custome only he was willing to premise, and to acquaint the Reader with thus much by way of Apology for himself.

That this was written divers years since without any purpose of ever letting it go abroad, that the chief end of it was to cleer to himself who is a lover of rationall knowledge, an account of the grounds of his own belief, and to that end to lay in order his scattered notions concerning that subject; and this he intends as an Apology for the homelinesse of the stile.

That at the same time when it was written, it was also delivered in a private course of religious exercise, and that will be the excuse for such repetitions as might otherwise seem ill-favoured in the severall Sections of it.

That at the time of his composing it, he was destitute of the assistance of his Bookes, which is one cause that it is not adorned with Testimonies and citations out of Authors, but comes out naked, being supported onely by the order and plainnesse of reason that it trusts to.

That since the composing of this he knows that divers Bookes of the same Argument have been written by men farre more knowing then himselfe, but that he hath not yet read any of them, nor knows whether he doe agree with them or not, which abstinence hath been caused partly for that he is himselfe satisfied by what is here delivered, and partly for that he had no leisure or minde to alter this which he had done, though possibly it might be for the better.

That whereas he speakes of Epicures, Machiavelians, and the like, he makes use of those names onely in a popular way as they are names of Characters well known amongst us, and that he intends not to traduce those Authors or cast any contumely upon them.

Lastly, He must needs acknowledge, that before the edition of this he hath seen M. Hobs his Leviathan, and other Bookes of his, wherein that which is in this Treatise intended as the main Foundation whereon the second Discourse (Of the Souls Immortality) insists, is said to imply a contradiction, viz. That there are any such things as Immateriall or Incorporeall substances. Upon which occasion he thought good onely to say, That he hath a very great respect and a very high esteem for that worthy Gentleman, but he must ingenuously acknowledge that a great proportion of it is founded upō a belief & expectation concerning him, a belief of much knowledge in him, and an expectation of those Philosophicall and Mathematicall works, which he hath undertaken; and not so much upon what he hath yet published to the world, and that he doth not see reason from thence to recede from any thing upon his Authority, although he shall avouch his discourse to proceed Mathematically. That he is sure he hath much injured the Mathematicks, and the very name of Demonstration, by bestowing it upon some of his discourses, which are exceedingly short of that evidence and truth which is required to make a discourse able to bear that reputation.

That in this case M.H. is onely a negative witnesse, and his meaning in denying incorporeall substances, can rationally import no more but this, that he himself hath not an apprehension of any such beings, and that his cogitation (as to the simple objects of it) hath never risen beyond imagination, or the first apprehension of bodies performed in the brain; but to imagine that no man hath an apprehension of the God-head, because he may not perhaps think of him so much as to strip off the corporeall circumstances wherewith he doth use to fancy him; Or to conclude every man under the sentence of being non-sensicall, whosoever have spoken or written of Incorporeall substances, he doth conceive to be things not to be made good by the Authority of M. Hobs.

That whereas very many men do professe an apprehension of such beings, and he in the mean time professes this to be impossible, this Author is hard put to it to excuse this from much incivility, and conceives the import of it to amount to thus much, that he conceives himself in the highest and utmost bound of humane apprehension, and that his reason is the measure of truth, and that what he sees not is invisible, I conceive the case in this to be alike, as if whilest two men are looking at Jupiter, one with his naked eyes, the other with a Telescope; the former should avow that Jupiter had no attendants, and that it were impossible he should have any: the reason why M.H. denies those beings whilest other men apprehend them, is for that he lookes at them with his Fancy, they with their minde.

Many more things he had to say for himself, but he understands not fully the use or benefit of Apologies.

The Contents.
PART. I. SECT. I. Preface. SECT. II. 1. Of the Being of God. Attributes
2. Of the Immortality of the Souls of men. 3. Of the Authority of Scriptures.
SECT. III. pag. 11. SECT. IV. pag. 17.
PART. II. SECT. I. pap. 33. SECT. II. p. 38. SECT. III. p. 43 SECE. IV. p. 51. SECT. V. p. 58. SECT. VI. p. 67.
PART. III.

Concerning the truth and Authority of our Scripture.

SECT. I. p. 75. SECT. II. p. 81. SECT. III. p. 89. SECT. IV. p. 97. SECT. V. p. 206. SECT. VI. p. 119. SECT. VII. p. 124. SECT. VIII. p. 128. SECT. IX. p. 135. SECT. X. p. 138. SECT. XI. p. 149.
PART. I.
Preface. SECT. I.

ALthough I am not without apprehension, that the discourse which I design may be prejudged unprofitable, as pretending to lay again that foundation which hath long since been layed in the mindes of all that will be readers of it; yet when I consider those scandals which the loosenesse of our times have offered even to the religious, and the bold and horrid pride and presumption of Atheists and Epicures, which by a prophane and confident asserting the uncertainty of all things (undervaluing the abilities of our Natures to raise an opinion of their personall excellencies) have laboured to introduce into the world a generall Athiesm, or at least a doubtfull Scepticism in matters of Religion: And when we consider the nature of our mindes, which is upon any ill suggestions apt still to receive some impression (those things being of like operation with Calumny, which if it be confidently and boldly charged, will be sure to leave some scarre behinde it.) When we observe this use and inclination in our selves which is in things where we have not a belief of what is spoken, or do not give perfect credit to an accusation, yet to admit of a suspicion that things may be as they are spoken; and although the strength of our contrary beleef do keep us from a full assenting to the thing in question, yet if it happen that the things concern our selves, and we have happened to crosse our opinions, or our beleef in our way of practise, such is the perversenesse of our hearts, that in such cases they will make use of the beleef of others (especially if they have the reputation of knowing men) to oppose against their own belief, and interpose betwixt the lashes of their consciences and themselves. I say the present condition of Religion, and the corrupted nature of our hearts being such, I cannot think it uselesse, nay not unnecessary, to raise a discourse of Religion even from the common Elements and Fundamentals, and for a while, neglecting the more knowing party of men, to undertake, so far as the argument will bear, to follow the way of demonstration, and leade on the weakest from such things as they themselves cannot deny, to the acknowledgement of the mysteries of our faith, and to the practice of the laws and injunctions of our Religion.

SECT. II.

Of the designe and definition of Religion, the prejudices and pretences against the Christian, the sum of what is in controversie deduced to three Questions.

1. Of the Being of God. Attributes
2. Of the Immortality of the souls of men. 3. Of the Authority of Scriptures.

WE may begin with the consideration of the definition (and the design of our selves in the matter) of Religion; however the practise of the world may contradict it; I hope we may take this definition of Religion as one that is agreeable to the apprehension which all of us have of it. Religion is a resignation of our selves to God, with an expectation of reward; The designe indeed of Religion, however it ought to be meerly obedience to the pleasure and the will of God, and height of it is barely terminated in his glory, (so that the highest act of it is Adoration) yet I say the designe of mens Religion is that it may be well unto themselves, and to bring them to an estate of happinesse. The very definition of Religion supposeth a Godhead, according to that of the Apostle, He that cometh to God must believe that God is. The very designe of it supposeth that both the party worshipping is capable of rewards, and that God likewise doth not neglect his services (in the following words of the Apostle) that he is the rewarder of those that diligently seek him.

Again, the resignation of our selves supposeth the resignation of our supreme faculties, those are our understandings and our wils, viz. our wils to an obedience to his will, to a performance of his injunctions, to a submission to his providence; and a resignation likewise of our understandings to his truth. Now it is agreeable to reason, as well as to the Apostle, that we cannot practise the will of God, unlesse we know it, and that we cannot know it unlesse it be discovered to us. So then in our profession of Religion, there are these supposals. That there is a God; and That he is a rewarder of those that seek him (and that supposeth that they are capable of his way of rewarding;) That the diligence of our seeking must be exercised in a way conformable to his will; and That to this purpose we want not rules for this conformity. These are I say the generall suppositions of every Religion under Heaven. You see that the being of Religion is in self-resignation, but the end of that resignation it is reward (still retaining in minde that caution, that mercenarily to labour for reward is not the supream exaltation of Religious acts, but that it is the ordinary degree of mens Religion, and an allowable and commendable step, and a degree unto the other; it being the strong powerfull motive to Moses to neglect the momentany pleasures of Pharaohs Court, because he had respect unto the recompense of reward:) I say it is the naturall way of reason in every act to look at some or other end, and to undertake no labour without an eye upon reward. Now so it is, that some men who account themselves the wisest, observing as they think the design and issue of Religion, and comparing the labour and the wages, they with much wisedome as they think, conclude that all the businesse of gain which comes by Religion is no way worth the pain and labour. They see that all things come alike to all, there is but one issue to the just, and to the unjust; nay, they think they see that the successe of things it is not equall to the religious and irreligious; but that besides the pleasures and enjoyments which religious men doe fondly deny themselves, besides that melancholy life which they by their strictnesse and precisenesse bring upon themselves, they often anticipate and hinder the thriving and successe of their own designes by a dangerous and prejudiciall scrupulosity: whereas the other party besides the pleasure of their lives in private, they carry matters of state, and either by force or fraud they circumvent and overcome the narrow and feeble spirits of the others; and the successe of things they oft observe to be answerable to this Hypothesis, ready they are to say with those in Mal. 3. 14. Surely it is in vain to serve God, and what profit is it to keep his Ordinances, to walke mournfully before the Lord of Hosts, whereas we see the proud happy, and they that work wickednesse are set up, and they that tempt, God are even delivered? Upon such observations upon the reward, they conclude clean contrary to the suppositions of Religion, God is no rewarder of those that seek him; such as deny themselves the most for him, they have no other reward but sadnesse of soul and debility of body, and exility of fortune: surely if he were a God, he would not thus desert his party, and give them over to the scorn and derision, and miseries of the world: surely therefore there is no God, or surely he sees it not, or tush God cares not for it, and so these mens Religion is vain: or else these men they have not hit upon the true way of worship, the rules they go by they are uncertain, that which they pretend to be the word of God, it is not so, but some bundle of Impostures, devised by some body, and put upon these simple people to delude them, they indeed flatter themselves with expectations when they are dead, but those are but vain, for who knows that the spirit of a man goes upward, and that the spirit of a beast goes downward? as a man dies, so dies a beast, wherefore let us eat and drink, for to morrow we shall die. These are the substance of those allegations which by Atheists, Epicures, and Machivillians are set in competition with Religion: these are those Engines by which the devill hath prevailed to the seduction of many, and to the entertainment of a suspicion by men, otherwise prudent and sober-minded: the main foundations upon which we differ they are these.

1. The Being and providence of God. 2. The Immortality of the soul. 3. The Authority of the holy Scripture.

Before we come therefore to the particular mysteries of faith, it is necessary that these be cleared before we come to settle in particular differences of Religion, that we justifie our selves against the petulances of those men that would laugh and scoff us out of all Religion; crying to every party (as they see the variable chances of the world to give occasion) where is now their God? Indeed if there were not a God to worship, or if God did not see, and regard, and reward our worship, or had we no rule to work by, we should have none encouragement to Religion: Nay, upon all that happens to men in this life, we cannot but allow, that, upon their supposition, they conclude not irrationally. Concurre we must with our Apostle, that If in this life only we had hope, we were of all men most miserable; But we know assuredly that thou God seest, and that thou hast given us thy holy Word to be a light to our feet, and a lanthorn to our paths; and that though now we see but through a glasse darkly, yet the time is coming when we shall see thee face to face. The state of the controversie then is this, which of the parties is in the wisest way; The Atheist thinks that the Religious is a fool; the Religious, that he is a fool that saith in his heart there is no God: The Athiest that the souls of men are mortall as the souls of beasts; the Religious, that the Atheist is a beast to say so, &c. But such kindes of contests are vain, wherefore let's see where the truth lies.

SECT. III.

Of the Being of God evicted by way of demonstration from the Creatures.

THe Question is, Whether or no there be a God?

And here first I must entreat that it may be remembred what that party is which defends the negative, and what is the designe that we are upon, that so the following discourse be not thought uselesse or industriously set out of our ordinary road. Our enemies are Atheists: and that which is to be convinced is the Atheisticall pronenesse of men; so that in the controverted questions it will not be a sufficient way of answering, to say that the Scriptures and the Spirit of God make it evident that there is a God; and again that the Scriptures are evinced to be the Word of God by the Spirit of God bearing witnesse with the heart of man. It is true, that the Scriptures clearly deliver that there is a God, and as true it is that God by his grace doth work the heart of man to a beleeving of the Scriptures: these things they are really true to those who already are beleevers, and each of them conduceth to a confirmation of each other: but to a man that doubts of the Godhead, and denies the Scriptures, to use those arguments for satisfaction, were to minister a scandall to him, and by circular way of reasoning and assuming gratis the matter of the question (for they doe no otherwise who only say, We must beleeve the Scriptures to be the Word of God, because God saies so, and a God we must beleeve because the Scriptures say so) to make them think we have no more to say but this, it is so because it is so: and so confirm them in their Atheism and irreligion. It was a certain observation of Aristotle, that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in every acquisition of knowledge, the understanding doth proceed from premises which were known, to the inference of a new conclusion, which was before unknown: and so was that other Aphorism of his, that there is no disputation unlesse upon principles, which are confessed on both sides, and such only are the common principles of intelligence, and the plain discoveries of the senses there where the mysteries of faith are questioned; it will not be sufficient therefore in the present case, to alledge that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 1. 20. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternall power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: but we must clear, and demonstrate the truth of that allegation, by reasons taken from things visible: however, it may be lawfull for us to make use of the direction of this place, as a canon for our enquiry, although not of the authority of it, as a sufficient argument to enforce a belief from the gainsayer. I say therefore that an eternall power may beevinced from the creation of the world, and that the creation of the world may be demonstrated from the consideration of things visible, so that by Reason as well as Faith (though not so readily) we may be brought to understand that the world was made of things which disappear. I say, that the world was not eternall but created, is demonstrable from things that are visible; our argument shall be from generation: Whatsoever is begotten was begotten of some other, for nothing can possibly beget, or make it self, otherwise it will follow that the same thing is and is not both at one instant, seeing it is both the producer and the thing to be produced: it is to be produced, and so it is not yet, it is likewise a producer, and that supposeth that it is in being: It is therfore in being, and it is not in being, that's a manifest contradiction: Wherefore nothing can generate, or make, or produce it self: Wherefore every thing that is begotten, is begotten of some other, and then the other which begat it either was it self in the same manner begotten, or it was not, if it was not, we are already come to the first principle which was unbegotten, and so have discovered a Godhead: If it was begotten, either we must follow up the course of successive generation to some first production from a cause eternal, or else we must necessarily say that the course of generations had no beginning, and consequently that infinite successions are already past, which is as much as to acknowledge that an infinite number of successions are past, and if past, then they are at an end; so we have found an infinite which hath had an end, that is another contradiction. Again, if any shall affirm that the course of generation had no beginning, but that the number of them hath been infinite, let us put a case and reason with him: we will imagine the generations of Abraham for example, and of Joseph, the sonne of Jacob, the son of Isaack, the sonne of Abraham. I demand therefore whether before the birth of Abraham, there had past an infinite series of generations or not? if the series was finite, the work of generation had beginning, which is the conclusion I contend for, if the series past was infinite, then at the birth of Ioseph 'tis evident that more generations were past, so we have found a number greater then that which was supposed to be infinite, and consequently that was not infinite, so it was both infinite and not infinite, a manifest contradiction: but if we say that Abrahams series was infinite, and that so was Iosephs also, then it will follow that the number of Abrahams was equall to the number of Iosephs, but Abrahams was but a part of Iosephs, wherefore the part is equall to the whole. Else admit that Abrahams was finite, but when it came to Ioseph, that then the number was infinite, it follows then that a finite number added to a finite shall make an infinite, which likewise is against the common light of reason. We see therefore that supposing the eternity of the world, or the infinity of generations doth force the minde to contradictions, and consequently the fiction is vain, and utterly impossible; and as we have argued in the way of generation, so we may likewise in every thing where there is motion or mutation, that is in all the parts of the visible world, the creation therefore of the world from the visible things thereof, is manifest, which was to be demonstrated, and from the creation of the world we may infer those invisible Attributes of the Eternity and Power, and wisedome, and Providence of God, that which rests yet to be demonstrated.

SECT. IV.

Of the Attributes of God, those likewise evicted from the Creatures.

THat which we are yet upon, it is a generall introduction to Religion, and a demonstration of the Necessity of it against Atheists and Epicures, and such as are the despisers of it: that which we pretend is that their rejection of Religion cannot proceed from any considerate solid reasoning of their understanding, but from an evill disposition of their affections, which makes them, we beleeve, rather wish, and so give out that their assertions are true, then that themselves beleeve them to be so; particularly in that grand principle and fundamentall of a God, and of a Providence, from whence the rest will freely and naturally follow: We have by plain and easie demonstration evinced, that from the visible things of this world, the creation of it may be evicted: and that the Apostle, although to such as were initiated in Christianity, he did propose it upon the well attested authority of the Spirit of God, by many mighty signs and wonders declared to be with him: although to them he thought it needlesse any more then to referre them to the naturall principles of their understandings: yet that he was not wanting to the infidels, but by designing to them so ready a topike or medium; from whence to beginne their argument hath not deserved of the unbeleeving that slender estimation which they have been pleased to afford him: there is no action or mutation in any thing visible whatsoever, but it is performed by motion, nor any motion followed home successively through it's causes, but will force the minde of man to a first mover, which is it self unmoved, and though for some reasons I did propose the argument in the name of generation, yet if in the place of it you should have been pleased to substitute motion in generall, or bodily action (for either they are formally the same, or consequent at least to one another) the variation of the terms of the argument would no way have changed the substance of the conclusion: which I intimate to give notice of the sufficiency of that argument, which in it self comprizes a multitude of others more particular, lest any advantage might possibly be made against the want of number in my argument. Well, having concluded the creation, and beginning of the world, we see it follows that thence we conclude the eternall power and God-head, that is, the eternity and power of the Godhead: to which that we may fully convince our Atheist, we will likewise adde the wisedome, and providence, and the immensity, and other attributes of God.

And first for Eternity,Eternity. we have by undeniable consequence resolved all motions in the world into the bosome of a first mover, and if we suppose him a first mover, this supposition will evidently conclude, that he is eternall, that is that he is without beginning of essence, or without any term or limit of duration; for if it had any beginning of essence or duration, that beginning of being presupposeth a priority of not being (that is, that actuall being is not of the essence of it) and so that we may without any contradiction, suppose it not to be yet in being, that is we may bring our understanding without error to the apprehension of it as being yet in the state of power only, or potentiall being, so as things are in their causes: so then let us conceit it in this state, and compare this state with the other when it hath a being, and it evident that this passage or transition from want of being to a being cannot be without a motion, nor motion without an actuall mover: but that which moves a thing from not being to a state of being is necessarily a precedent mover to that which from it receives its being: so then that which we supposed to be the first originall mover, it will have a mover which shall of necessity have gone before it, and consequently it will be both a first and not a first mover, that is a plain and evident contradiction. Instead of multiplying Arguments without necessity, we will only return by the footsteps of our analysis, and so from the being of a first mover conclude the Eternity: If it be a first mover, then it had no former mover, and if so, then it never was produced from not being unto being; and if so, then it never had any beginning of its being, then it is Eternall: therefore whatsoever is the first mover it must of necessity likewise be Eternall. But from the common affections of things visible we did before demonstrate an originall and first mover, wherefore the visible things of this world they likewise do evict the Eternity of the Godhead.

Having demonstrated the Eternity of God, the rest of his Attributes, such as we are able to comprehend in this life, they all of them will follow, his Necessity, Independency, Infinity, Unity, Omnipotency, Omniscience.

And first for his Necessity:Necessity. whereby I mean his Necessity of being, not his Necessity of operation, so as it is opposed to freedom of will and power to act, or to forbear. I say then, that the Godhead is a necessary being, that is, that it is impossible it should fail, and implies a contradiction, that it should not be, that is it which Divines mean, when they say it is eternall, à parte post, as well as à parte antè: for if it be not a necessary being, that is, if necessity of being be not included in the essence of the God-head, then it is not impossible that it should lose his being, that is, it is possible that it should lose his being, that is, it is in the power of something to cause it to lose his being: but nothing can passe from being to not being without a change or motion, so then the motion of it is in the power of some other, and consequently this is not the first originall of motion, but that other; but we supposed this to be the originall of motion, and consequently, It is not possible it should be deprived of its being, that is, it is a necessary being in respect of others, and as impossible it is that it should lose its being of it self. Indeed it is a manifest contradiction, that any thing should have a power over its own essence, and needs no further conviction or opposition, seeing the active power of any thing is founded in the essence of it, and consequently cannot exceed the essence or bring it not to be: However the necessity of the existence of God will be evinced from the SimplicitySimplicity and uncompounded property of his nature, and that from his Eternity; for imagine him to be compounded, then it must be of some principles of Composition, and if so, then those principles must be presupposed to his being, and precede him in a priority of nature: so then there will be somewhat in nature before that which was before evinced, and now supposed to be eternall: and if he be a simple essence and eternall, he must be purely actuall and nothing potentiall, for if in his essence be any thing potentiall, that is, if it be in any possibility, that possibility relates to some superiour and former cause: Whereas we have all this while been reasoning about the first cause and supreme: Simple he is therefore and pure, and a simple act out of the bounds of possibility, and of suffering, and so again we have concluded his necessity of being.

Now as we have demonstrated his Necessity, so likewise we may thence collect his Independency.Independency. We are indeed in a great deal of blindenesse in the contemplation of the God-head, and most humbly crave leave of God to be admitted to enquire and speak after the manner of men: God doth not exact that we should exceed the measure of our understandings in our contemplation of him, or that we should deliver him as he is in himself, or otherwise then he is pleased to reveal himself to our weak and feeble understandings, and so we hope his Majesty will not be offended at us, if after the manner of men we labour to deduce one attribute out of another, if withall we take this caution, that upon our dependency of inference, and the precedency and following in our discourse, we doe not conclude that succession or dependency of attributes in God, and imagine that to be in the object which is only in the Organ. I could not but take this advantage for this caution now, that from his Eternity, Simplicity, and Necessity I am concluding his Independency; this, to our understanding and discourse may well enough (as concerning us) depend upon those other, that is, the supposition of those will force the minde to an acknowledgement of this, but to imagine that order to be in God, were to imagine a contradiction, by putting a dependency upon the attribute of Independency: If he be a simple act and pure, it is impossible he should at all depend upon another for his being: for suppose his being to depend upon another, then that other must necessarily be presupposed, and he the cause likewise of his being; for if it depend upon another for his being, his being cannot be without that other, and so it is presupposed, and therefore it is before this in order, and as in order so in causality, for we speak of a reall and essentiall dependency, not of a Logicall or notionall; wherefore this other, and not the God-head will be a cause and a former cause; and consequently the God-head, unlesse it be independent, will neither be the first cause, nor eternall; contrary to that which was before demonstrated.

Again the Simplicity and the Impassibility of God will necessarily evict him to be incorporeall,Incorporeality. seeing that every body is compounded and passible, nay we may go so farre as to say that corporeity is passibility, for corporeity is quantity, and in the last abstracted notion consists in three dimensions, but quantity is nothing else but divisibility, that is, an aptitude to suffer division, that is passibility; whatsoever therefore is impassible, that likewise is incorporeall which was to be demonstrated.

And if it be incorporeall, then likewise it is unbounded and unlimited by place, for whether place be taken for the surface of some ambient body, or for a space, the very essence of a place consists in relation to a body enclosed; but that which is no body cannot admit of an enclosure, therefore that which is incorporeall is free from the limits and terms of place, so then it is euident that the first cause is free from the limits and restraints of place, before we proved that it was free from any limits of duration, but in the freedome from time and place consists the notion of immensity,Immensity. and so the immensity of God is now demonstrated (or, which is all one, his Infinity.)

But if the God-head be infinite, then likewise it is but one, and so we may demonstrate the UnityUnity. of the essence of the God-head. Now that there cannot be two infinite essences we will demonstrate. But first for the help of our imagination, and to render that serviceable to our understandings, we will imagine two bodies infinite, then thus, either the one of those bodies is in all the space wherein the other body is or it is not: if they be both together in the self same space, then that which is the longitude of the one is the longitude of the other, and their latitude is the same, and so likewise their profundity the same, I say not only equall: for as from filling equallity of spaces we must inferre equality of dimensions, so from identity of space we must conclude them to have the same dimensions, but the last and most abstracted notion of a body is mathematically resolved into those dimensions, wherefore those which fill the self same space are the self same body, and so two bodies they will be but one body, which is a manifest contradiction: but if we shall say that where one of these infinite bodies is, the other is not, then there will be some space where one of these bodies is excluded, and consequently it will be limited and finite, which yet we supposed to be infinite; so then, it will be infinite and not infinite, which is a manifest contradiction: We have demonstrated therefore that there cannot be two infinite bodies, the truth is we ought to demonstrate that there cannot be two infinite essences, but the notion of being and essence is so abstracted and high, that it would strein our understanding to keep it so long intent upon its abstracted object, as were required to goe through a demonstration where infinite simple being should be the subject, and unity the affection to be demonstrated, but if we shall proceed but to other degrees, as for example, of power, or wisedom, or the like, the demonstration will run as clear to the minde, as in the case of bodies it did to the fancy: for either those infinite powers are the same, or not the same; if they by the same, then it is but one power which was vainly imagined to be two: but if the powers be not the same, then one power is where the other power is not (not meaning in ubi of place, but of case) and consequently a case where one of the powers is not, and consequently the power is limited, which yet is supposed to be infinite, there can be therefore but one infinite power, nor any more then one infinite essence, and so we have demonstrated the Unity of the God-head.

It remains that we demonstrate the Omnipotence of God, and his Omniscience:Omnipotence. and first for his Omnipotence, That God was a God of power it was demonstrated then when we found him to be the first cause, and originall mover and the creator of the world, again we demonstrated that he is simple, and free from all manner of Composition, purely actuall, and consequently doth not consist of subject and accidents: his power therefore is no accident to his being, but his power is his being, and his being having been demonstrated to be immense and infinite, his power likewise must be illimited, and infinite, and conseqently he is Omnipotent.

The same argument will prove him likewise to be Omniscient,Omniscience. for as he is the first cause of every thing created; so likewise of all the created knowledge, and consequently all knowledge is derived from him, wherefore it is primitively in him, and then it follows that his knowledge and his essence is the same as well as his power, and his being; therefore as that is infinite, so is this likewise: and so we have evicted his Omnisciency, that is an infinite knowledge, which includes in it the knowledge of all particulars, for if any particular in the world were excluded it were not infinite, but limited; so then the thoughts of the heart are open to the the view of his Omniscience: And thus according to that Canon of direction, which we took from the Apostle, we have proceeded, and that strictly and warily, according to the laws of demonstration, and from the visible things of this world, enforcing our selves first to an acknowledgement of the creation of the world we have thence; taking in only the common principles and common notions ( 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) of intelligence, proceeded higher, to a demonstration of the eternall power and God-head: that is, of those Attributes of the God-head, which by the irreligious and Atheists have been pretended not to be; and actually manifested that the invisible things of God may be discouered by those things which doe appear.

PART. II.
SECT. I.

A Proposall of the Argument for the Immortality of the soul, and a manifestation of the major proposition, that incorporeall substances are immortall.

THe second thing which we pretended to demonstrate as a generall ground-work whereon to build a necessity of Religion in the generall, it is the Immortality of the souls of men; for if in this life only we have hope, then in the judgement of the Apostle, we are indeed of all men most miserable. Now the truth is that we have no absolute necessity of much endeavour to clear the Immortality of the soul, after so clear and demonstrative a discovery of the essence and the attributes of the God-head, seeing that a bare reflexion either upon the generall way of reasoning, whereby we came to those conclusions, or upon those simple objects of the minde, which were the subjects of every particular enquiry, must necessarily prompt us with undeniable arguments, of the spirituall and incorporeall nature of our minde, from whence will necessarily follow the naturall incorruptibility of it, that which is all that we pretend to when we say, that it is immortall: (for it is not our meaning, that in the notion of Immortality is included a necessity of being, such as relating to the power of God should put it out of a capacity of Annihilation.)

Yet considering the darknesse of our mindes, and that inability towards a strict and vigorous reflection, which even in those who are most practised in the contemplation of themselves, and in the scruting of the waies of their own internall operations is overfrequent; and considering how little reason there is to expect it of those who by their way of living are more deeply engaged among things no way exceeding the affections and circumstances of bodies, and bodily motions, and perhaps may think themselves unconce ned to be busy in the knowledge of themselves: It will be requisite that we insist more particularly upon it; that so the matter may be cleared even to the most vulgar apprehensions, supposing only that they can but obtain so much of themselves as w rily to attend to that which is to be delivered.

Now the substance of all that I shall speak towards the demonstration of the souls Immortality shall be summarily comprised in this one Syllogism.

Whatsoever substance is incorporeall it is immortall. But the souls of men are incorporeall substances, Ergo,

The former of these Propositions is indeed in it self undemonstrable, as being a principle evident to a considering minde, and so not resolvible into any former principles, so that all that can be done to a further clearing of it will only be to examine and follow home the terms, to their first originall notions, which they are assigned to represent. Indeed the word mortality, as it is usually apprehended, hath alwaies reference to a compounded substance, or to a body which hath in it self some principle and cause of motion, and signifies no more but a capacity of the materiall and passive part, to be deprived of that inward active principle of its motions, as is evident by those things which we use to say may die, or are dead, as men, and beasts, and plants: but when the question is only of that active principle, it cannot so justly be put in the terms of mortality, as of corruptibility, or a naturall tendency to a corruption: so then that which we are to strive for is the true and accurate notion of corruption, and when we have driven it to the highest, we shall finde that corruption is nothing else but a dissolution of things joyned together, and that this dissolution is nothing but a separation, and that separation is nothing but division, and that division is an immediate and â formall act of quantity, and quantity is nothing else but a mode of corporeity, so as you see that corruptibility doth even in the notion of it include corporeity: whatsoever therefore is incorporeall it is incorruptible, which was to be demonstrated.

SECT. II.

A Proof of this Proposition, that the souls of men are incorporeall substances, by comparing the affections of bodies with those of souls.

BUt the souls of men are incorporeall substances.

That they are substances is evident, seeing that they are subjects of certain properties and affections, which is the very formall notion of a substance. It remains only therefore that we demonstrate them to be incorporeall.

Now for the clearing of this it is requisite that we consider wherein consists the being of a body, and wherein consists the being of an humane soul: nor can we use any possible means to come to an apprehension of their being, but by considering those primary passions and properties whereby they make discovery of themselves: the first and primary affection of a body is that extension of parts whereof it is compounded, and a capacity of division, upon which as upon the fundamentall mode the particular dimensions (that is the figures) and the locall motions doe depend, the figure being nothing but a particular and determined extension of the matter, towards such and such parts, and locall motion being nothing but division, so that whatsoever may possibly be performed by any body, it must have its originall ground-work in divisibility, and its actuall being in division towards which the situation and figure and determined quantity of parts must make the disposition.

Again for the being of our souls if we reflect upon our selves we shall finde that all our knowledge of them resolves into this, that we are beings conscious to our selves of severall kindes of cogitations, that by our outward senses we apprehend bodily things present, that by our Imagination we apprehend things absent, that we oft recover into our apprehensions things past and gone, that upon our perception of things we finde our selves variously affected, sometimes with pleasure or pain for things present, sometimes with hope or despair of things absent, and the like: Nay, we are conscious to our selves of objects, which could not by any bodily impressions be wrought in our fancies or our brain; and of superiour passions answerable to those objects. In one word, we finde that our souls are a kinde of essences which are conscious (or having a sence) of things.

Now then we are to compare together these two properties of a body and a soul, and so conclude either an agreement or a disagreement in the natures of those subjects. And here upon the very first view of a considering minde it will appear that divisibility is not apprehension, or judgement, or desire, or discourse, that to cut a body into severall parts, or put it into severall shapes, or bring it to severall motions, or mix it after severall waies, will not serve to bring it to apprehend or desire; it is not the hammering and filing, and fitting of the wheels of a watch; which can make it apprehend the end for which it serves, or comprehend the motion of the sun which it is made to measure, nor is it materiall whether we take an example in things naturall or artificiall, or upon what principles of mixture we proceed, the conclusion will be still the same; for sence and perception, and apprehension, and desire, &c. they are as great strangers to the obscure notions of heat and cold, and moisture, and drought, and of those elements to which they are assigned, to fire, and air, and earth, and water, as they are to quantity, and scituation, and figure, and motion, and the like, there is no man certainly that can clearly apprehend, that combining any proportion of fire, and air, and water, and earth, should make the lump of it to know or comprehend what is done to it or by it: we see not then any the least inducement in our notion of bodies simple or mixed, or howsoever varied to bring us to an apprehension of cogitation.

Nor yet will our reflection upon our cogitation bring us to any apprehension of corporeity or divisibility: the truth is our sense and apprehension of bodies cannot infallibly assure us that there are any bodies in the world; but we must be forced to an higher principle, whereon to ground that assurance, so farre is cogitation, and apprehension, and the like, from involving in its being any corporeity; nay, we see manifestly, that upon the division of the body the soul remains entire, and undevided: it is not the losse of an hand, or foot, or eye, that can maim the understanding or the will, or cut off the affections: so that we have not any the least inducement under the notion of cogitation to involve division, or under the subject of cogitation to include the subject of division or divisibility, to come then to a conclusion: it doth evidently appear that corporeity consists in divisibility, and that the essence of the soul consists in being a conscious essence, or a cogitative being, to be cogitative is farre different from being divisible or extended: Wherefore the essence of the soul is far different from the essence of a body: Wherefore the souls of men they are incorporeall essences, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉

SECT. III.

A further proof of it by the generall way of apprehension.

NOw although the truth and certainty of propositions depends not upon the multitude of arguments whereby they are concluded, and so we have already sufficiently discharged our undertaking; yet something shall be further added towards the discovery of the spirituality of the soul, to shew that it doth farre exceed the sphere of corporeity, and is not confined by the streightning boundary of sense: this will appear from all the kindes of apprehension of the souls; that is, 1. Way of apprehending. 2. Simple apprehension. 3. Judgement. 4. Discourse.

And first of all from the very way of our apprehensions in the generall, from our apprehensions even of sensible objects, for however we are apt to imagine that those may be performed by bodies, upon an exact scrutiny we shall finde it otherwise: That this may appear we shall do well to observe and take off an errour, which even from our childehood we have taken in: it is a common beleef of ours, that sence is performed in the outward organs, touching, for example in the hand, seeing in the eye, and so of the rest: (In them, I say, and not only by them) and then we put our selves to no further trouble, for to know how sence is made, then only to thinke that something hot toucheth the hand, and so the hand feels heat, that the image of some body appears in the eye, and so the eye sees the body; briefly, that sence is performed either by an immediate contact, as in touching and tasting, or by a resemblance, which by the object is wrought in the organ, and that in the matter of sensible perception there is no exceeding the power of these two bodies, the object, and the organ; nor any superiour operation to that which may be performed by the application of severall bodies: but to take off this imposture of the sences, I shall need to doe no more, but to demonstrate that all our sense is immediatly performed in the brain, and not in the limbs or organs: We will instance only in the sences of feeling and sight.

And first that our feeling is performed in the brain by the mediation of the nerves it is made manifest by our observation of such diseases as take away the sense of feeling, how that the seat of those diseases, it is not in the limbs but in the head, Palseys, Epilepsies, Apoplexes, and the rest: the seat of them is in those parts of the brain from whence doe spring those nerves by which our operations are performed, and the way or remedy for restitution of our feeling, it is to take away those obstructions from the brain, whereupon the effect doth follow; now all this were needlesse, if sence were performed immediatly in the limbs themselves: Indeed it may possibly be imagined, that in those cases we are therefore deprived of sence, because our motion is intercepted, that there is some activity towards sence depending upon the motion of the limbs: although there be no visible strength in this objection, yet there are sufficient instances to take it off, seeing there either are or lately were examples living of such as had no sense at all of feeling, and yet performed their locall motions perfectly. Moreover many unquestionable experiments have been made of such as have affirmed that they have felt in such a finger, and such a toe, and after their hands or their legs have been cut off. Many other instances and arguments may be brought to prove, that the sense of feeling is not performed in the outward limbs.

And secondly, for the sense of seeing, that that likewse is not performed in the eye, it is as evident, the cause why it would seem to be so, is because it is very evident that the images of things do indeed passe thither, and are conveighed after diverse refractions and reflexions through the coats and humours of the eye, to the bottome of that tunicle which is called retiformis. Hence it is obvious to conclude that vision is therefore performed within the eye. But if this were so, beside that no reason could be given why with both our eyes and two images of it, we see but one thing: it would necessarily follow that we could not see any quantity bigger then our eye in its naturall scituation, for if Images were seen in the eye, they would be seen as they are in the eye, but in the bottom of the eye the images of things are inverted, and consequently the things themselves would seem to be inverted, men would seem to us with their heads below and their feet above, that which is on the right hand would seem to be on the left.

Now that the Images are there inverted, besides the demonstrative reasons that so it must be, we may at any time make experiments to attest to those demonstrations. It is impossible but that the visuall beams of larger objects must intersect each other in the eye, and by that cutting one the other, the scituation of the parts must be inverted, and thus much hath ever been apprehended, and confest by all those that have understood the laws of radiation, but some conceiving that by an inverted species an object could not be seen upright, have with mighty industry devised most ingenious errours concerning waies of refraction, whereby the coats and humours of the eye should come to reerect the image before it comes to the nerve, whereby vision is performed, but time and experience have evicted all those witty speculations to have been nothing but snbtile and fine impostures of the fancies of their authours, aery reasons of a vain and ungrounded supposition: for it is evident to him that will take the pains to take off all the muscles and tunicles, which serve for the feeding and motion of the eye, and clear that part only where the visuall nerve is fastened, then darkening a room, and only leaving an hole sufficient to receive this eye, and will stand behinde it, and look through it; to such an one it will be evident, that the images of things without are inverted in the bottome of the eye, at the place where is the passage of the visuall nerve, and consequently as feeling was not performed in the hand, so neither is seeing in the eye, but both of them in the brain. But before things are conveighed to the brain all the corporall similitude will quite be marred, the image of a man cannot be carried whole, through the optive nerve into the hollow of the brain, nor the figure, or other quality of that we touch be carried quite along the nerves, from the fingers ends unto the head, and originall of the nerves: but all that can be imagined to be done in the brain, it is some motion and alteration made either by a vellification of the nerves, or by a vaporous and spirituous substance, passing through them which retains no signature or naturall sculpture of those things which are apprehended by them; all that is done by the bodies, the object and the subject it is utterly of another kinde: there is no naturall similitude betwixt a motion in the forepart of the head, and betwixt an horse which it represents, our apprehensions of things they are farre beyond those means by which they are occasioned, and consequently the subjects of these apprehensions do far exceed the subjects of those poor and grosse productions, that is, the nature of souls is far other and better then that of bodies, which was to be demonstrated.

SECT. IV.

The same further demonstrated from the severall acts of the Soule, from simple Apprehensions.

HAving demonstrated the souls of men to be incorporeall substances, from the comparison of their properties with the affections of bodies, and therein finding no agreement or correspondency, and moreover from the generall way of our operations, which could not possibly proceed from variety, or subtilest applications of bodily substances. It remains that at this time we consider the severall kindes of the cogitations of men, and Simple apprehension, Judgement, Discourse, conclude the immortality thereof.

First of all from simple apprehension, which is the first operation of the understanding of man both in nature and time, and is the taking in of simple objects into the minde, and so furnishing it with materials for judgement and discourse; we shall finde then the souls incorporeity if we shall but reflect upon such simple Ideas in it self which represent things in themselves incorporeall, for a corporeall thing can neither be the Idea of an incorporeall being, neither can an incorporeall, immateriall be subjected in a materiall or corporeall: we found before that the application of bodies could not perform that which we call the sense of bodies, much lesse then can that produce in us Ideas incorporeall, yet such and very many such we finde to be within our souls.

We finde in our selves Ideas of spirituall substances, as of God and Angels and of their simple and incorporeall properties and attributes, it is but returning back and recalling into our remembrances those demonstrations of the severall Attributes of the Godhead, to which we did arise, even from the visible things of this world, and they will satisfie us in this particular: our endeavour there was to demonstrate the truth of them in themselves, here to consider the way and manner of their objective existence in our apprehensions, and the truth of demonstration which satisfies the souls of men: it is that clear agreement betwixt the understanding and the object, that is, that things be in the understanding as they are in themselves. We clearly then demonstrated God to be an immateriall substance, wherefore we gained an apprehension of a substance immateriall and incorporeall, and of immateriall properties, and consequently the notions of the Godhead, and his attributes were in our understandings incorporeally, and so they are incorporeall.

It cannot here be denied but that in our ordinary and transient thoughts and discourses, we are very apt together with spirituall beings to draw into our fancies the images of things corporeall; for example, when we speak of God we are very apt to have in our fancies the visible heavens, and a representation of something sitting or acting in them: when we think or speak of Angels we are apt to call to our remembrances the shapes of beautifull winged, aery bodies, and so when we meditate upon Eternity, we are apt to reflect upon the image of time, of the revolution of the Sun and Starres, which are the usuall measures of it, at leastwise of a successive duration of things, and there are diverse of us which terminate our thoughts in these images, and never obtain a flight beyond them, nor ever come to observe in our souls the difference betwixt imagination and intellectuall apprehension; but yet notwithstanding when we have the patience to stay upon the consideration of these objects, and warily attend to that inward light which we bear about us, we presently reject these images from the essence of God, and Angels, and Eternity, and by discourse we strip off these materiall and grosse representations, and finde that the causes why upon such occasions as these they come into our mindes, is, because we commonly hear of them together, and because of those symbolicall expressions of these beings which have delivered to us the knowledge of these. God Almighty cals himself the ancient of daies, and it is not our custome to imagine any thing but cloathed with circumstances, in some place, and the place that is usually mentioned with God, it is the heavens, and those heavens which are the object of our senses and imagination, it is the place of the Sunne, and Moon, and Starres; and so we are apt to form to our selves an image of God, or at least through incogitancy to let slip into our thoughts a fancy of some reverend image sitting above the Firmament.

Thus likewise the descriptions of the Angels, they are usually made to us in Scriptures by such representations: we see nothing fairer then our own kinde, and so we conceive of them in the fairest shapes we can imagine, (and contrariwise of the devils in the most ugly) assigning to them wings, because under such forms the notion of of them is veiled to us.

And yet at the same time we know, and can perhaps demonstrate evidently, that if God were a body, he could not be a God, that is, that the properties of a bodily substance can no way agree with that notion of the God-head, which is immoveably fastened in the very essence of our souls.

We know habitually that the nature and essense of the Angels that stood, it is the same with those that fell away; however we have fair and pleasant imaginations usually when we speak of those of light; and foul, and ugly, when we think of those that are in chains of utter darknesse: however the name of Michael and his Arch-Angels recall into our mindes the images of the fairest of the children of men, and that of Beelzebub the Image of a Dragon.

So likewise the common measure of the duration of things, wherewith we usually converse, they are hours and daies, and moneths, and years, and these are made by the revolution of the sun, and of the starres, and those are attended with severall positions of them in respect of themselves, and us with light and darkness, cold and heat, Winter and Summer, and those other vicissitudes, and speaking of Eternity we presently think of a long continuance, and so call into our imagination a long continued series of these revolutions and vicissitudes; whereas yet we know that where there is a vicissitude there is a priority, and where there is a priority there must be a beginning, and where there was a beginning that was not eternall: 'tis plain that if in eternity there were such parts as daies and years, there must be as many millions of years, as minutes, and so that a minute were equall really to a thousand years, and so it follows clearly that Eternity even in our notion is an infinite and undivided unsuccessive duration.

These examples are sufficient to shew the difference betwixt the intellectuall apprehension of things, and the imagination which accompanies our superficiall thoughts, our slight and cursory taking them to our mindes and to illustrate that, however in our fancies we may have corporeall representations, attending upon these spirituall beings, yet the Idea's whereby the understanding apprehends those simple essences, are incorporeall, and consequently the understanding part of man is incorporeall.

SECT. V.

From Judgement and Discourse.

ANd now whatsoever of perfection may be evinced to be in the souls of men, from the simple apprehensions of single objects, may much more strongly be concluded from those more perfect operations, exercised in comparing severall things together, and working out the truths, striking forth the light from those collisions. A judgement takes in two severall simple terms, and upon them passeth the sentence of their agreement or disagreement.

A discourse takes into consideration two of the judgements already past and decided by the soul, and from those two draws forth a third, and so brings into act those truths which folded in their causes lie in the secret places of the soule concealed from it self.

Now as the souls of men are conscious to themselves of certain essences within themselves, which neither in their being nor in their operation upon the soul are any way mixed with ought that is corporeall; and so from thence the incorporeity of the soul was immediatly concluded, so here in these second and third operations of the soul, we have this further advantage, that however the simple objects which are the terms in the matters of judgement may be bodies, yet the acts of judging and discerning and reasoning, they are no bodily acts, nor come within the compasse of bodily motions to be performed, and that even in those things which are most obvious to the outward sences or the inward, the understanding part is yet carried away farre beyond the bounds and territories of the sences, and raises it self into the contemplation of causes of the things it either sees or hears, or otherwise perceives and frames to it self consequences and corrolaries, such as are not sensible but are only discoverable by a diviner light, by this diviner faculty it is that seizing upon any thing whatsoever, and fixing it self steddily upon the contemplation of it, it passeth from the most contemptible of creatures up to the incomprehensible creator, it climbs up by degrees, and passing through the continued chain of causes till it comes to that link which is fastened to the chair of God, it rests not in things below, but soars up steddily to immensity and eternity. It is by this faculty, that upon sight of the causes of things, it doth foresee the effects and consequences: and seeing the effects it makes to it self a conclusion of what must be the causes, and by frequent exercise in these contemplations attains to a kinde of mastery over the works of nature, and produceth things strange and wonderfull in operation, it applies the active powers unto the passive (as the Schoolmen speak) and so imitates God and nature in great and marvellous conclusions.

He observes the properties of a despicable stone, and is carried so farre in the contemplation of the consequences of those properties that he dares adventure himself vpon the huge unruly ocean, under the conduct and direction of it, and he findes experience to answer to his contemplation, he gets the mastery of that unruly boisterous element: he rides securely upon the back of the dark waters: he makes a needle touched with a stone to supply the place of the stars of heaven: when the eyes of heaven are veiled from him amidst the darke waters and thicke clouds of the skey; he examines all the chambers of the sun, and imitates him in compassing the world, he goes out from the East, and returns again from the West; returns, and that loaden with the treasures of the world, with the blessings which Moses did assign to Joseph, Deu. 33.13. the precious things of heaven for the dew, and for the deep, that coucheth beneath, the precious fruits brought forth by the Sun, and the precious things put forth by the Moon, the chief things of the ancient mountains, and the precious things of the lasting hils, the precious things of the earth, &c. he settles a correspondency betwixt the utmost distants of the world, and opens a traffique betwixt nations opposite in place, in manners and affections, such as had lien concealed from the knowledge of one another, even almost from the time of the Ark that floted upon the waters, but what do I speak of these things? he displays the banner of Christ in the regions of death and hell; he sheds forth the glorious light of the Gospel to the people that sate in darknesse and in the shadow of death: what sensible analogy or correspondency is there betwixt the scituation or motion of a stone, and the salvation of mankinde, and yet by various consequences he discovers how by the means of that, this likewise may be effected; he discovers it, and puts it in a successefull and happy execution.

What is there more contemptible then a stone? hardly any thing that is a substance, and yet it is much lesse contemptible then a shadow, he observes a shadow, and that carries him aloft to a contemplation, and a discovery of that most glorious creature which comes forth as a Bridegroom out of his Chamber, and rejoyceth as a Giant to runne his course: From the shadow he riseth to the Sunne in the Firmament, and to a perfect understanding of his course in the Ecliptique, and then brings back again his understanding to the shadow, he makes thereby an instrument that shall designe to the eye the daily circuits of its motion: his eye that gave occasion to his minde to discover them in contemplation, and now his minde is impregnated with the light of knowledge, and returns with usury to the senses that occasionall advantage which they afforded it, and gives them the pleasure of the viewing of its practise it gives the eye and hand directions for drawing of lines, which by the regular application of a stick, or wire, stone, or any other body shall discover not only the divisions of the day, the hours that are past, or else to come, but even all the mysteries of the Sunnes motion: how it measures out the night, and in what quantity it dispences out the day: how near are his approaches at noon, and how farre distant he is from us at midnight; by what degrees he draws towards us, and how by eqnall measures he retreats; how he riseth from his greatest southern declination to the North, and from thence returns again to his chambers in the South, having touched the boundaries that he cannot, he must not passe; and how in this his continuall progresse he dispenses the severall seasons of the year, what time he enters into every sign, when he beginnes to rejoyce the hearts of any of the nations by his presence, and what time he leaves them in the darknesse: these are but some few and lesse considerable of those wonders which are performed by that which hath no being.

To insist upon it how the reason and wit of man hath found out severall Arts and Sciences, from principles most contemptible, how it ariseth to most admirable speculations, and upon poor beginnings to what issues it brings; how it can give the height or distance to which it never can approach, how by the application of a piece of wood or other matter to the eye, it can assigne the distances and places and motions, and appearances of the starres of heaven, and foretell the positions and combinations of the Planets, the Ecclipses of the Sunne and Moon to the generations to come: how it corrects the judgements of the senses, and demonstrates that to be farre greater then the world, which the eye presents no bigger then a bushell, nay, no bigger then the rowell of a spurre: to insist upon such things as these, were to be prodigall and superarrogate in proving the incorporeall nature of the souls of men, and yet all these are nothing to those more ordinary things which it performs when it assignes and prescribes to it self laws of mutuall signification by things which have no similitude, when it designes notions to sounds, and sounds to letters, and upon hearing the voice Soule, or seeing the word Man, we call into our mindes the things which I have spoken of him, things which cannot be performed by the collision of atomes, the motions or dispositions of parts or quantities, but must be the issues of spirituall essences: such therefore are the souls of men, and so they are immortall.

SECT. VI.

An Application of the former Propositions to the inference of a Religion in generall, and a proposall of the third in order to the Christian.

THe third thing which I propounded to speak of by way of preparation to the entertainment of the principles of our Religion, it was the authority of the holy Scriptures, that which we have already demonstrated was of a more generall designe, this comes to be more particular, that was against Atheisme and irreligion, this against superstition, and the false religions of the world, the will-worships of the Heathen and the Jews, and of a party of those that do professe the name of Christ. Out of what hath already been delivered, a necessity of Religion in the generall will result, for it is the first consequence of reason from the consideration of the attributes of God, and the condition and properties of the souls of men, for having by necessary force of argument drawn up the vast number of mankinde to one originall cause, even to God as their Creatour, we cannot chuse if we will insist upon that consideration but fall upon a necessity of Religion. For if God have created man he must have done it for some end and purpose, seeing he is an intelligent agent, and such agents as work with understanding, they alwaies work upon designe, and propound some good to themselves in all their actions, for they cannot be supposed to work but upon desire, and the object of desire is only goodnesse; if now we employ all our wit and our invention to discover what good can accrue to the God-head by the Creation of man, we can finde none that is imaginable in the way of profit or of gain: that which the Psalmist hath layed down is a conclusion following from the light of reason as well as from the speciall revelations of the holy Scripture that our goodnesse extendeth not to God, and it was a question, which might with good congruity fall from Eliphaz the Temanite, Job 22. 1. Can a man be profitable to God, as he that is wise may be profitable to himself? Is it any pleasure to the Almighty that thou art righteous? or is it any gaine to him that thou makest thy way perfect? And the matter of gain being excluded from the end of God in our creation, if we runne over all the objects of pleasure which come within the spheres of the souls of men, we shall finde no pretence of reason for any thing of ours to please the Almighty, and so to be assigned as an intelligible cause of our creation, but the delight which the God-head might take in the communication of his goodnes, in the explication or unfolding of those glories which lay enwrapped within it self, in having something (if I may so speak) without and besides it self, which might be apprehensive of the excellencies of it, might be subject and conformed, and might perform towards it the acts of glorification and praise.

So then the glorifying of God is all the end that can be found out why God should ever have created us: and the next thought to this conclusion of our reason must be of the waies and means whereby he may be glorified by us: and there again when we shall have run over all the waies imaginable, we can fasten upon none other then the admiration of his excellency, the adoration of his Majesty, the obedience to his will. And these are the acts and performances of Religion, so that the consideration of the God-head and his Attributes, doe naturally cast us upon a necessity of Religion.

Now as the consideration of the God-head doth naturally enforce a Necessity of Religion, so doth likewise the consideration of the Immortality of the souls of men: for if we shall but consider, that our souls shall never fail of their existence, but continue in being to all Eternity, we can hardly avoid the thoughts of the shortnesse of our duration in this world, or the comparison of the time of our duration here, with that other continuance which doth abide for us hereafter: and if we will have the patience in our thoughts to insist upon the proportion of a few years unto an unlimited, and unmeasurable Eternity, we shall unavoidably fall upon this judgement, that our condition here is no way comparable to that which shall be: that momentany pleasure bears no proportion to eternall happinesse or eternall misery: that these light afflictions which are but for a moment, are not to be compared either to the joys or miseries which are to be expected, and consequently that our care for this life ought not, nor cannot in common prudence equall our care for eternity. So then whatsoever befals us here we shall conclude it requisite to provide that we be not miserable hereafter, and consequently that we make our selves a friend of him that hath the issues of death in his power, and moderates and dispenses the rewards of Eternity: but there is no way to have him propitious to us, but by obedience, no reason to expect that he should satisfie our longing, or fulfill our will to all Eternity, unlesse we fulfill his will for our time of triall in this life, and that is by the exercise of Religion only attainable. So that the consideration of the Souls Immortality will likewise enforce us to a necessity of Religion.

Thus farre the common principles of naturall reason will force us, even the first and most common principles of intelligence, such as are grounds of clear, evident, and perfect demonstration; so that it must be the Fool alone, as the Psalmist speaks, which can be an Atheist, so that they are without excuse whoever glorifie him not as God: thus farre those poor remains of sight which yet is left to the corrupted off-spring of our degenerate Parent will serve to leade us, to the generall necessity of Religion: but here indeed it Jeaves us destitute of the certain waies of pleasing God: and consequently destitute of clear and solid grounds of hope of attaining to eternall happinesse. And here it is that the Scoffers and irreligious men take occasion to reason themselves and others to destruction: seeing that nature hath here deserted us, and left us no infallible Rules of particular waies of devotion, they contend that ther are none such, and consequently that our Religion is vain and uncertain, uncertain in the issue because uncertain in the grounds and principles. And here now against them we pretend that wherein our naturall light hath failed us, the mercy of God hath been pleased to supply us, that God hath not left us without a certain rule and Canon of Religion, not without a light shining to us in this dark place, particularly that he hath given to us his holy Word to be a Light to our feet, and a Lanthorn to our paths, and that the books of the holy Scriptures are that Word of God.

PART. III.

Concerning the truth and Authority of our Scripture.

SECT. I.

Petitions and Cautions premised to the question.

YOu will doe me the favour to consider that our present controversie is against those that deny the Authority of the holy Scriptures, so that we cannot have the advantage of those Arguments which in every other controversie of Religion are the most valid: I mean Arguments drawn from the Authority of the Scriptures themselves, which is the best, if not the only authentike rule of decision of such differences as doe arise; such as doe indeed arise in the Church of God, who all doe agree in a profession of that faith which is delivered in these holy Books, this I say they agree upon in these generall tearms, however with wonderfull heat and distance they vary in their judgements whether or no some particulars be of the recommendation of the Scripture. It is then the common principle of Christians, and the ultimate rule for the judgement of those that are within: but as for them that are without the Church they ae likewise out of the jurisdiction of this Canon, or Judge, and to give over their incredulity (or rather infidelity) as some of our Divines have done with this ill-interpreted axiome for rejection, that they deny our principles, and so are not worthy to be disputed with, or to referre them only to the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of the Scriptures, and to the spirit working with the reading and hearing of them, it might be to prove a scandall to them without; and to such as are weak and wavering within, it were tacitely to imply, that we have no way to gain the question, unlesse our of courtesie the adversary be pleased to yeild it to us, to resolve the motives of our Catholique Faith into private impulses and particular dictates of the Spirit (arguments of very great credit and reputation due to our selves as particular favorites of the holy Spirit, but such as being deserted by the tenor and regiment of our lives, render us dishonourable to that holy Spirit whereto we pretend, whilest in the apprehension of men we doe at least obliquely entitle it to such actions as are inconsistent with it, professing we hold our faith by private revelation, and consequently have our understandings taken up by the holy Ghost at such time as our wils are guilty of enormous sinnes.) A fancy that is the mother of diverse prodigies lately broken into the Church, as that either God sees no sinne in beleevers, that Murther, Adultery, Incest, Sacrilege, (any thing) may be committed, and that these are no sinnes in beleevers, arguing thus, that they which have the holy Spirit are free from sinne, such as do beleeve the Gospel they have the holy Spirit, because there is no other motive sufficient besides a private illumination, so then they cannot be guilty of sinne, but yet they may, and doe commit such things as those we mentioned; wherefore those are no sinnes. Thus doth Satan transform himself into an Angel of light, and act his Tragedies in the likenesse of the holy Spirit: Nay we say, and doe beleeve that the Devils also beleeve and tremble, that the Kingdome of Heaven is like a Net which drew to shore fishes of all sorts, some to be put into vessels, and others to be thrown away. We say and doe acknowledge to the glory of God, that the internall light of the holy Scriptures is sufficient to make the man of God perfect to salvation, and that in some it is the means of generating faith in men, but that the most of those beleevers who have the happinesse to be trained up from their infancy in any part of the Christian Church; by observing the esteem which in their Church is had of those holy Bookes, they doe betimes upon the reputation of their Church receive them with a kinde of veneration, that upon this motive they receive the faith; and that others doe upon other inducements entertain it, and once for all we say, that besides the secret and free illuminations of the holy Spirit, these want not Arguments to enforce the reason of unbvassed men to entertain the Scripture as the Word of God, and that all such as without the engagement of perverse affections shall admit those Arguments in their apprehensions must necessarily be of that belief.

Before I betake my self to the proof of this assertion, I must premise that by the books of the holy Scripture, I mean such books of the old and new Testament as in the Church of England have been accounted Canonicall, and that I intend not here to take up the controversie which is betwixt the Church of Rome, and us concerning the books which are Apocryphall, the drift of my discourse being against those who beleeve too little, and not those who beleeve too much.

Secondly, I must premise that we are not here to expect the necessity of demonstrations, but must content our selves with such arguments as the nature of our subject will admit: there can be no true and perfect demonstration, unlesse the property to be demonstrated do naturally flow from the subject of the demonstration. In matters then depending upon the free election of causes there cannot possibly be any perfect demonstration, and such is the giving of a rule of life in respect of God, so that there cannot be a perfect demonstration of it. So then we must content our selves with arguments falling short of the necessity of demonstration, but such as no man shall be able to deny, without denying some such principles as all men doe acknowledge to be true.

SECT. II.

The Assertion resolved into two Propositions, the former undertaken, that whosoever beleeves the Historicall part of the Scripture must beleeve the Doctrinall.

1. TO beleeve that these Books of Scripture are the Word of God, there are very great and important reasons. 2. To disbeleeve it there are no reasons, or not any sufficient reasons.

And first of all, to prove that those bookes of Scriptures are the Word of God, it is sufficient if we prove the truth of them, because themselves pretend to be of divine inspiration. All Scripture is of divine inspiration, the tenor of the Old Testament runnes generally so, The Lord spake unto Moses or other of the Prophets, such as were the Penmen of the holy Scripture, indeed the generall pretence of those that wrote both Testaments, is, that holy men did speak and write, as they were inspired by the holy Ghost, so then, if this pretence of it be true, it must be true, that it proceeded from the holy Ghost, and consequently to prove the truth of it will conclude that it is the Word of God.

Now as concerning the truch of those writings we have 1. The same Arguments or as great as for the truth of any writings in the world. Nay 2. We have Arguments (morall Arguments) to evince the truth of them, such as no other writings can pretend to. That we may shorten that we have to perform, you may consider that the things delivered to us in the holy Scriptures are either matters of History or Doctrine, and that these are frequently interwoven in the Scripture, so as when Saint Matthew doth in an historicall narration bring in our Saviour preaching in the Mount, and delivering there a summary of his Doctrine, so that it will appear that if the historicall part of the Scripture be undoubtedly true there cannot rationally be any doubt made of those doctrinall rules and precepts which there are delivered. As for the doctrine of any party whatsoever concerning God there is not imaginable any argument so ready to evince the truth of it as God himself, freely attesting to the deliverers of it by mighty signes and wonders, by great and undeniable miracles, such as are instances of the immediate hand of God; such as by skillfull and knowing men are acknowledged to be no way performable by the praestigatory act of Magicians, or by the power of evill spirits. Such were the miracles which are delivered to us by Moses all along the course of Gods bringing the children of Israel out of Egipt to his own land; and afterwards wrought by the Prophets. And such were the works of our blessed Saviour all along the course of his Ministry before his passion, and such and more admirable was his resurrection and ascention. Whosoever doth beleeve, that there was such a man as Moses, that this man Moses did professe himself to have received from God a Law, which was to be delivered to a people, he may hitherto very well doubt, whether or no he was not deceived, in imagining that he had received such a law. But if withall he shall be assured or stedfastly beleeve, that this man Moses, to make good his pretences to Gods revelations, could obtain so much of God as, to the eyes and senses of millions of gainsayers and opposers of what he did deliver, to shew great and palpable miracles: whosoever doth beleeve that he did turn a rod into a serpent, and that back again into a rod; that by stretching forth that rod upon the River Nilus he turned their waters into bloud, and slew their fish: how afterwards he brought frogs upon all the land of Egipt, even into their Kings chambers; how he brought flies, and caterpillars, and lice, and thunder, and lightning, and mighty hail-stones; how he brought botches and murrain amongst men and cattell; how he brought upon all the land of Egypt a darknesse that might be felt, and slew their first-born; afterwards how he divided the Red Sea for the people to passe through it, and when he had served the turn of his party, how the flouds returned and overwhelmed his enemies; he that shall beleeve that after this he brought water out of the rock, sweetned the waters of Marah, brought Quails into the wildernesse, procured Manna to fall about their tents all the week, and none upon the Sabbath; how the fire from Heaven consumed Nadab and Abihu, only for adventuring to offer strange fire, otherwise then he had prescribed them; that the earth opened and swallowed up Korah, and covered the Congregation of Abiram; that at the time of the promulgation of his Laws, God himself appeared visibly, that the glory of his presence overshadowed the Mount, how there were thunder and lightnings, and a thick cloud upon the Mount, Exo. 19. how Mount Sinai was altogether on a smoak, because the Lord descended upon it in fire, and the smoak thereof ascended as the smoak of a furnace, and the whole mountain shaked exceedingly. Whosoever beleeves these works to have been done by the same party that professed a revelation from God, cannot avoid the beleif of his profession, unles he can beleeve that God by so great miracles would attest to Blasphemy and Sacrilegious impostures, a thing which is palpably mad to be beleeved, and is against the light of common sense and reason.

So likewise whosoever doth beleeve that in the daies of Augustus Caesar there was such a man as Jesus of Nazareth, commonly called Christ, and that this man did professe himself the sonne of God, and pretended to deliver to all the world a way of Religion, a Covenant of life eternall, an abrogation of the ceremonies of the former law, and those other things which he professed, there is no necessity that he should beleeve that either he was the Son of God, or that his doctrine was infallible. But if together with these professions he shall take into beleif those things which Jesus did, though for his owne sake he see no reason to beleeve him, yet at least he will beleeve for the works sake, if he shall beleeve that God himself did attest to these professions, he will likewise beleeve those professions of his to have been true, and Gods attestation he will beleeve, if he shall beleeve that a little before his birth a company of Angels appeared to Shepherds and told them of it; that presently after it a starre appeared to wise men in the East, and conducted them to the place of his Nativity: that in his life time he did such works as never man did: how he turned water into wine, commanded the windes and the sea: how he cured all manner of diseases with his Word, how he gave sight to such as were born blinde which was never known since the world began, how he cured most obstinate diseases of long continuance meerly by the touching of his garment: how he cast out devils from such as were possessed: how he raised up the dead to life, and every way demonstrated the power and presence of the God-head, how at the time of his crucifixion the frame of Nature seemed to be dissolved; how the vail of the Temple rent, and the graves opened, and many bodies of the dead, which slept, arose, and came into the holy city, and appeared to many; how there was darknesse over all the earth, the Sunne eclipsed at the time of the Jewish passeover, when the Moon was at the full; and lastly how after three daies he arose again, appeared severall times to his Apostles, gave them power to perform the miracles which he had done, and visibly ascended up into heaven: Whosoever doth beleeve these matters of fact, must of necessity beleeve the doctrines which he beleeved; unlesse he will accuse God of bearing false witnesse, or own some such other detestable and odious incongruity.

You see then, how the matters of fact being cleared, and the historicall narrations being asserted to be true, the doctrinall parts will follow of their owne accord: and that if we can clear such things to have been performed by Moses, and Jesus of Nazareth, and that such doctrines were delivered by them; it follows that those doctrines are true, and are the Word of God.

SECT. III.

The kindes and degrees of the causes of Historicall Faith in generall.

IT remains therefore, that we make it appear that the sacred Histories are true, and that no man, pretending to reason, can justly refuse to admit that principle into his beleef; there 1. The same reason to beleeve those Histories, that there are to beleeve any Histories. 2. More reason to beleeve them then any other.

First then, Whosoever doth deliberate with himself, about that question, whether or no he should give credit to any History propounded, can possibly finde no other considerations to sway his judgement, then such, as either are taken from the thing it self that is delivered, or from the persons which have delivered the relation, and from such qualifications of them as upon the grounds of reason he can discover, if the matter it self doe involve a clear and evident contradiction to some naturall principles, it is not the asseveration of all the men of the world that can work a beleif in the understanding: it not being in the power of man to entertain a beleif contrary to his knowledge, although it may produce in him a doubting, whether or no he have not suffered any fallacy to be imposed upon him, and so be wrought to runne over the matter again unto himself, and follow it with strict and wary attention backwards and forwards in reference to his principles.

But if the thing it self be not incredible, however difficult or strange it be, that which then he doth consider is, the qualities of the relators, and the manner of the relation, and there is not any improbability proceeding from the difficulty or the rarity of the accidents, which may not be outweighed by the known disposition and properties of the Relators.

Those things which men doe consider in the Relators of things in order to yeelding of their belief, they relate either to the of the Relators, Understanding or Will
Sufficiency, or Integrity.

Men usually consider whether or no the things be such as may be certainly and evidently known, and whether these parties had sufficient means to come to the certain knowledge of them, and whether they contain themselves in their relations within the bounds of things liable to certain knowledge: thus then those things which may be certainly known they are the outward events of things, whereas the secret causes may lie concealed, the former are such as are the objects of common sence, and come within the cognizance of all: the later are such as are indiscoverable by any man, they being oftentimes made up of a complexion of actions and dispositions of multitudes of men; or things perfectly to be known, onely of him that sees all things in speculo aeternitatis.

If the History (or Relation) containe it selfe within the bounds of evidence and certainty, the next thing to be considered is, whether or no the party that is Author of the Relation had sufficient meanes of knowledge; whether himself were an eye or eare-witnesse of the things which he relates; or whether the things were so publikely acted and knowne, that he might certainely, and particularly informe himselfe, without any danger of deceit.

If the party be of known ability, both in himself, and in reference to the things, the next question will be of his Integrity, and whether there be sufficient reason to beleeve, that he would not voluntarily deliver a falshood, in stead of truth, and because it is not reason to beleeve that men will lye, unlesse they either be known to be corrupt or some end be visible of gain to them from their lying. Men use to consider these things likewise before they settle upon beleef.

These are the grounds and considerations, and inward discourses whereupon men doe proceed to the receiving of historicall beleef, even of any relations whatsoever: and accordingly as all of these conditions be clear or obscure, doubtfull or certain, such is the strength of his belief; if all of them concurre there remains no reason at all of doubting: if some of them fail, there will follow a debility, answerable in the belief; seeing that the belief of the conclusion can never exceed the force and evidence of the premisses.

That there is or lately hath been such a City as Rome, or Hierusalem, or Paris, there are none of us that doubt, although we have not seen them; because they are things very easily known, as being the objects of the eyes, because the reporters have been there to see them, and because no end or reason can be imagined why or how men should combine to abuse those that have not travelled.

That there have been formerly such Cities as Corinth, and Philippi, and Lacedemon, &c. we make even as little doubt as of the former, because the things in their nature are evidently to be known, and they have all of them been mentioned in the Books of Polybius or Plutarch, or a multitude of Historians that knew them.

That the History of Caesars warre against the Gaules is true, though written by himself, it is beleeved, because of his abilities to know, and because it makes not things appear to be strained in his behalf, because it might have been contradicted if it had been otherwise, and because he is delivered to us in the complexion of Histories as a man of honour that would not write a lye.

That the Histories of Salust are true, it is beleeved because he wrote of things done within the compasse of his time whereof he might well informe himself, he was a man of knowledge and could not gain by any thing that he hath delivered if it were untrue.

That all of these Histories were written by those that bear the name of them, there is hardly any man that doubts, because there is no improbability in reason: they have been constantly so received in the world, and mentioned successively in Authors following one another from their severall generations down to ours.

We see the various degrees of qualifications (some of them) upon which we build an historicall beleif, that this beleif comes short of the clearnesse of our assent to a Mathematicall demonstration is evident, because there is an absolute impossibility that things should be otherwise, there being a contradiction involved in the very tearms, and in adjecto: but here is no impossibility but only an exceeding difficulty which makes up (not indeed a Mathematicall but) a morall impossibility; it is possible that all men may combine together to say that they have seen such things as they have not seen, because every man is a lyar: but how they should come to doe it, or to what end is so invisible and inconceivable, that the matter, taken in the grosse, is altogether incredible. It is absolutely possibly that all those writings which we receive as delivered down from ancient times, may have been of late devised by some men to abuse the world, rnd put upon other names: but to what end, any men should ttke the pains, and how they should fit them with circumstances, and make them all depend upon each other, in a constant succession, agreeing in the mention of persons, places, and actions, is a thing so difficult, as that it would argue madnesse to beleeve, and conclude him to want the use of reason, that should reject the light of all antiquity.

SECT. IV.

An Application of those generall grounds to the History of the New Testament, and a proof of this Assertion, 'That there is as great reason to beleeve the New Testament as to beleeve any other History in the world.

SUch madnesse then, and no lesse it were to reject the Histories of the holy Scriptures; no lesse madnesse? nay, it is much greater, and that not only because they are of more concernment to us then the acts of men of former times, but even because of the advantages of the delivery of those Histories. We will beginne with those of the New Testament.

And here first, The Books of the New Testament were written by those whose Names they bear; that the four Gospels were written by the four Evangelists, and that the Acts of the Apostles were written by Saint Luke, &c.

Now that these Books were written by these men, it is impossible affirmatively to demonstrate; all that can be said is, that there is as great evidence of it as of any other writing in the world; that by whatsoever argument it can be made appear that any Books have been written by those who are reputed for their Authours in antiquity, (that the works of Homer, or Plato, or Aristotle, or Tully are theirs) by the same it may be made evident, that these have proceeded from our Authours.

Have they been successively delivered? so have these: have they been continually mentioned under those names? so have these: have they been acknowledged by all parties? so have these: those that in the primitive times did oppose the doctrine of Christ, yet did it not under the pretence that their Books were spurious, neither Jews nor Pagans had the impudence to make that objection. Julian the Apostate doth freely acknowledge (Cyrill. 10. Grot. 3. ver.) that the Books which by the Christians were received under the names of Peter, Paul, Mathew, Marke, Luke; they were the writings of those Authours.

It is true, that there are some Book received of the Canon of the New Testament, whose Authors are unknown; as the Epistle to the Hebrews, and some others: but concerning them I hope to speake in answering those objections which are made against the Scripture. In the mean time we may justly assume it for granted, that those whereof no question hath been made in ancient times they are the writings of those to whom they are ascribed.

And now this being supposed, which cannot with any pretence of reason be denied, it follows clearly that the things they have related are to be beleeved: for first, the things which they have delivered they were matters easily to be known; in respect of the things themselves, they were matters of fact and speeches performed by our Saviour or by themselves: Secondly, the acts were acted publiquely in the face of the world; and the speeches which they deliver as spoken by others, they were for the most part spoken publiquely, either in the Synagogue, or in the Temple, or to the multitude somewhere gathered together, on a mountain, by the sea-side, in publique places: so as they might have easily been contradicted if they should have delivered a falsehood: Thirdly, the parties which have delivered them had all the opportunities in the world to know the truth of things; they were things done either by themselves, or within their owne sight, or hearing for the greatest part; or at least wise in the times and places where the reporters lived.

Mathew and John the two Evangelists which wrote the History of Christ, they were two of his Disciples: two that were intimately acquainted with his actions, and his words, more familiar with him then the rest; the one was the disciple that Jesus loved, and used to lean in his bosome, as they lay at meat; the other was usually taken with him when most of the rest were left behinde; and hence it follows that they themselves were present at almost all the acts, and speeches which they have delivered.

Marke and Luke the other two Evangelists, they lived in the same territories, at the same time, where and when our blessed Saviour bestowed his conversation; and moreover Saint Marke was (as 'tis very probable) first a Disciple of Saint Paul, who was miraculously chosen to deliver the doctrine of Christ: Afterwards he was undoubtedly a disciple and companion of Saint Peter, who was an Apostle of our Saviour, did live familiarly together with him, was present at almost all things which Marke hath written: and besides whatever is delivered by Saint Marke is to be found in the writings of the Apostles. Luke was an individuall companion of Paul, and so he might learne of him such things as he delivered; besides that he saith, that he spoke with those that were eye-witnesses of the things which he delivered, he was borne near hand, he travelled through Palestina, might converse with those very men, upon whom Jesus had wrought his miracles, such as had seen the life of Jesus, his death and resurrection.

The Acts of the Apostles were likewise written by Saint Luke; and that Book containes some things done by the rest of the Apostles; but the most of it is concerning the actions of Paul after his miraculous conversion: the former it was easie for him to know, either from the Apostles themselves or others: of the latter he could not be ignorant, because he was continually with Paul in all his labours and his journeys, even from the time of his conversion to his imprisonment at Rome.

As for the matters of fact which are delivered in the Epistles of Paul, and Peter, and James, and John, and Jude, they are such, as either were done by themselves, and so they could not possibly be ignorant of them, or by others with whom they held a correspondence, or by our Saviour whose Apostles they were, all but Paul; or else they are things done by others, publiquely and notoriously known.

Lastly, As for the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Revelations, though the authours of them be not certainly known in the Church, yet thus much is plain, that the Authour to the Hebrews saith, that the Gospel of Iesus was preached at first by Christ, and confirmed unto him (Us) by them that heard him, 2. v. 3. and so that he could not be ignorant of that; nor yet was it possible that the Authour of the Revelations should be ignorant, whether or no he had those visions which he hath delivered.

Now these are all the Books of the New Testament, and it appears, that the Authours of them had as much opportunity to know the things which they delivered as is possible to be had: wherefore the businesse is clear in respect of their Sufficiency of knowledge; and all the Question which remains, it must be in regard of their Integrity.

Whosoever challengeth or questions the Integrity of an Historian, and upon that cause refuseth to receive his Testimony, it is requisite that he produce the reasons of his suspition, that he charge the Authours of corruption, and prove the charge which he hath objected; or that he discover and manifest the ends, which he might propound to himself, as the reward of his imposture; that he shew the gain that might accrue, or the losse, or perill, or ignominy that he might avoid; and manifest that his accusation hath not proceeded from malice, but from judgement, from some grounds of reason, and not from perversenesse, or spight, or any inhumanity. Here then it is that we challenge men or Devils to produce the crimes, to detect and prove the villanies of these Writers; nay, to assign the ends which they might have in relating falshood, the gain, the pleasure, the glory, the safety, or whatsoever it is that prevails upon the appetites and lusts of men: and let their infidelity and jealousie out-doe the malice of the grand Apostate. Indeed I think scorn to stand upon this argument, it was the contemplation of these things chiefly that gained from me that second assertion. That there is greater reason to beleeve the Scripture then any other writings in the world: the first Proposition being already demonstrated That we have as great.

SECT. V.

That there is much greater reason to beleeve the History of the New Testament, then any other History.

HAving already demonstrated, that considering the qualifications of the persons who have recorded unto us the New Testament of our Saviour; there is as great reason to give credence to their Histories as to any other ancient Histories in the world, by reason of their means of knowledge, and opportunities for discovery of the truth of those matters of fact, which they have delivered. It follows now that we make good that, which in the second place we propounded concerning them, which was, That we have greater reason to beleeve them then to beleeve any Historians whatsoever, and this now will be manifested to us by these Arguments following, 1. Greater obligation. 2. Their sufferings. 3. Their Miracles. 4. Their predictions.

First then, They were more powerfully obliged to the delivery of the truth then others, not that others were not obliged likewise to deliver nothing but the truth: there is in the conscience of every soul setled a principle dictating unto him, that he ought not not to recede from the truth in his relation; but yet this principle is, in the most of men, very much overclouded and overborn; as is manifest, not only by the fabulous relations of ancient Histories, even after the institution of the Olympiads; but by that inclination which we finde, almost in all men, to make their relations handsome; in order wherunto even the gravest of them, Josephus, Livy, and the rest of those orders of Historians, have often changed the form of Circumstances, and varied from the truth, to make a coherence of things according to their fancy, such as might please their owne imaginations.

The truth is, that which held in the Heathen, so far as they were held within the boundaries of truth, it can be conceived to be no other then a certain magnanimity, and a morall generosity that was actuated and quickned in them by the conceit of a reputation, thereby gained amongst the people, of their own generation, their hopes of perpetuating their owne fame, together with the acts which they recorded, and consecrating them to eternity and immortality; I do not say, that this was all the motive which they had, but that upon the consideration of them, in the whole complexion of their circumstances, I cannot finde out any more powerfull motive, nor any stronger obligation.

But, besides all that these men had to move them, the writers of the New Testament had likewise other motives, as farre beyond these, as the heaven is beyond the earth, either in dignity, or situation: A most severe injunction of their Master, such as they themselves have delivered, such as they could not, neither durst neglect: their writings abound in precepts of truth and of veracity, and that prescribed under far other conditions, and setled upon a far surer foundation, upon the foundation of truth it self, the originall and the Ideall truth of the world; and propounded to them under far other penalties: they knew full well and taught to others, that of every idle word, which men shall speak, an account must be given at the day of judgement: how dreadfull an account then must they have expected, if they should have delivered falshood in the place of truth, if they should have told a lye for God, or lyes of God, or delivered impostures in the name of God? nay verily, the necessity which lay upon them, compared to others, doth as farre exceed it; as the fear of a little disreputation is exceeded by the horrour of eternall torments: and now their practise was also answerable to their obligation, and what they delivered, in their speeches and writings, was fully exampled in their lives. We have before intimated that whosoever will charge an authour with a lye, he must either detect the lewdnesse and corruption of their lives, or at least wise manifest what they might gain by their report; the former could never be by their sworn enemies detected, nay Julian the great Apostate could charge them with nothing but simplicity: now then, all the gain that can be, is reducible Avoidance of evill, and Obtaining of good.

The Goods that are to be obtained Body. Estate. Liberty. Reputation.

First then, What outward evill did they thereby escape, that so they may be judged to have lyed out of fear? consider the state of the world at that time, and tell us, whether or no there was danger in speaking, and writing those things, or in the forbearance? Did the Roman Emperours, or the Governours of Judea, or the Jews, or the Presidents of the adjacent Provinces, or the multitude threaten them to make them speak, or to be silent? Did they by that meanes put themselves into a condition of ease and pleasure, and soft luxury? Did they treasure up gold and silver, and raise themselves a fortune by it? Had they a greater freedome inward or outward, did it let them into larger principles, or procure them a greater scope to gratifie their inordinate desires? Was it the way to advance them to honour and reputation, either with the Governors, or with the people? nay, instead of bodily ease and pleasure active, and passive, they were forced to undertake labours, and travels, and watchings, and the inconveniencies of great and painfull industry: they were daily opposed to hunger and thirst, and cold and nakednesse; nay, to torments and to death: instead of gaining an estate, they were enforced to forsake all that they had to live an ambulatory kinde of life, without any certain being, depending as it were on the Ravens, to provide them their meat from one day to another. Instead of that same freedome and liberty which men affect, they entred into a straighter and more narrow way then the way of the world, they were forced to deny themselves, even such things as they knew were lawfull, and they were abridged even of the common enjoyments of mankinde, not suffered to converse with freedom, or to breath with safety: they no sooner came to a city, but there they were persecuted and forced to fly unto another. That which Saint Paul spoke of himself as he was making his last voyage up to Jerusalem, might have been the common Motto of them all, Now I goe bound in the Spirit up to Jerusalem, not knowing what things shall befall me, only the holy Ghost that testifies in every city that bonds and afflictions abide me there.

As for the matter of honor and reputation, that was all in the hands of their enemies, the Jews, and the Greeks: they preached Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling block, to the Greeks foolishnesse; and all the credit which they obtained at their hands was, to be accounted a company of silly men, contentious for a thing of nothing, a question about names, about one Jesus which was dead, whom they affirmed to be alive: this was the opinion of the Gentiles; and by the Jews they were looked upon as revolters, and so not fit to live: as for this sect we know that it is every where spoken against; and they were hereby rendred the scorn and derision of the world, the offscouring of the people: what shall I more say? they were deprived of all the enjoyments of the world, and cast into all the miseries, or in the words of the Authour to the Hebrews, They wandred about in sheep-skins and goat-skins, being destitute, afflicted, tormented; and all for the delivery of the things contained in those bookes: and if we will sadly consider it we can assigne no cause of this their choice, but the force of truth prevailing on them, and the urging of their conscience, by the continuall instigation of them by that spirit which acted them, making their hearts hot, and kindling a fire within them, a fire in their bosome, which they could not suppresse. We cannot but speake the things which we have seen and heard: they suffered for their profession that, never men did; and so we have greater reason to beleeve them then any other men.

And we have still greater arguments then these, because that God himselfe gave testimony to their words and writings; and that both in their own times, and the times which did succeed them: in their own times by miracles; in the succeeding generations by accomplishing their predictions.

The Apostles then, in confirmation of their doctrine, were endowed with a miraeulous power from on high, and manifested to all the world, that they had received in great abundance their portions of the spirit, from him that had the spirit not by measure: they preached, and as they preached, they confirmed their doctrine by mighty signs and wonders, and evident manifestations of the holy Ghost; so evident, that when they had delivered the relation of them to a gain-saying, a crooked and perverse generation, assigning the times and places, and other circumstances, their spightfull enemies could never detect them of the least imposture; but were forced, though their teeth gnashed while they spake, to confesse, that indeed great miracles were done by them; that this was evident and they were not able to deny it; nay, such was the evidence of the miracles performed by them, that some of them have been recorded in the annals of heathen Authours (Phlegon,) that they were appealed unto by the primitive Christians (in the times next succeeding the Apostles) in all their Apologies for the Christian faith, in their Apologies made to the Heathen Emperours, they are appealed unto as things commonly known by the world, yeelded without contradiction, which could not with any fore-head be denied; they were, I say, appealed unto, and that to the greatest enemies of the Christians, and that by way of challenge to the triall, and that without any reply as to the falshood of them, and without any recrimination; nay, which is yet much more, there were not only by these men themselves, but even at their sepulchres when they were dead, great miracles performed, for divers centuries of years, and that so certainly, that it was confessed by the sorest enemies of the Church, such I mean, as were of the School of Pythagoras, that by Magick Arts strove to out-doe the performances of Christ, particularly by that mad Dogge Porphyrius, and others. Unlesse then, men will deny God the honour due unto him, and make him by his presence, and testimony authorize imposture, there can be no scruple made of the truth of these mens writings, but they must be beleeved before the writings of any others in the world, unlesse they likewise could have done such acts as these have done, unlesse they could have cast out devils by their words, have given the holy Ghost by the imposition of their hands, unlesse they could have healed all manner of diseases, the blinde, the lame, the deaf, the dumb, &c. by words, touch, shaddow; or could have spoke all sorts of Languages, or rather at one speaking could have brought to passe, that men of every language should perfectly have understood their speech, as if it had been their own: Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and Judea, and Cappadocia, Pontus, and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphilia, Egipt, and the parts of Lybia, about Cyrene, strangers of Rome, Jews, and Proselytes, Cretes and Arabians, they all heard them speak in their own tongues.

Nor did it please the Lord of the spirits of all flesh, here to stint the dispensations of his holy spirit to them, he gave them not only the power of miracles, but the spirit of prophecy, he unfolded to them the everlasting rolls, and admitted them into his decrees, and would not hide from them the things, which he meant to bring to passe, in the generations to come: he urged them by his holy Spirit, and they foretold the fates of the world, they foretold it, and God brought it to passe: I cannot stand to reckon up all their prophecies which they delivered, and shortly after they were fulfilled, of the spreading of that leaven, of the growth of that grain of mustardseed, of the mighty and wonderfull propagation of the faith, and the perpetuall enduring of it, of the rejection of it by the Jews, and the receiving of it by the Gentiles, of the hatred of the Jews, and the torments which were to be undergone by the glorious Martyrs, of the destruction of Ierusalem, and the calamities of that faithlesse Nation: all these make it evident that God was with them; that there is infinitely more reason to beleeve the writers of the New Testament then any other writers.

That none can disbeleeve them, without forfeiting his reason, by asserting that God would give testimony to imposture.

SECT. VI.

That the Old Testament is the Word of God. A Proposall of three severall assertions, whereby it is concluded.

HAving demonstrated that the Books of the New Testament are all of them to be received under the authority and credit of the word of God, that the dogmaticall parts are to be received upon the credit of the Histories, and the Histories upon the common principles of reason, and consequently that no man professing to be guided by reason and judgement can refuse them. It remains, that we demonstrate the same of the Old Testament, and that we take off those colours, and answer those Sophisms, which by some men are urged against the Scripture, and so conclude this argument.

Before I proceed to the former of these, I must call to your remembrance that which, in the beginning, I did premise, that under the title of the Books of the Old Testament, I did comprehend those, and those only, which in the Church of England have been admitted, under the name of the Books of the Canonicall Scripture: and that I had no purpose at all to meddle with the controversies, which are betwixt us and the Romane Church, about the books which are Apocryphall: the reason, why the Church hath entertained them only, into the Canon, is, because they onely were of the Canon of the Jews beleef, before the coming of our Saviour, they only being written in the Hebrew tongue, and consigned by Esdras at the return of the Jews from the Babilonish captivity, as is generally beleeved amongst the Jewish Rabbines, whilest the Prophets Haggai, Zachary, and Malachy were yet alive.

Now although the way to demonstrate the truth of them, considering the question apart, and by ic self, be the same with the way, whereby we did demonstrate the truth of the New Testament, by asserting the Authours of them to have been those men to whom they were evermore ascribed; and from the qualities of the things delivered (in matter of History) and the characters of those persons, who have delivered the severall parts of it, to demonstrate, that no reason can be imagined, why such men, as those are and must be supposed to be, should deliver such impostures as those must be, supposing them to be impostures; that no end or motive can be discovered, which they should propound to themselves for their reward, but on the contrary that many reasons are visible, why they should have held their peace, if they durst have concealed those things from the world; the reasons from safety, gain, glory, and the like, as might either jointly or severally be demonstrated, of even all the books of the Law, and of the Prophets, which make up the greatest part (Moses together with the Law having delivered likewise the shame of himself, and Miriam, and Aaron. The Prophets having been all or most of them hardly used: which of the Prophets have not your Fathers persecuted?) Although, I say, this had been the naturall way to demonstrate the matter in question, taken singly and apart by it selfe; yet partly to avoid the similitude of matter, which renders unpleasant even the most profitable discourses, and partly to make a present dispatch of this Argument, I shall content my self to have put you thus in minde, that all those generall arguments, for the truth and credit of those writers, are common to these as well as to the others; and that there needs no variation of them, being to be applied to the question now in hand, any other then the interchanging of their severall names, their personall relations, and qualities, and other accidents: In a word, that the kindes of the Arguments are the same, and the force of reason alike in both, allowing only the difference of gradual and individuall circumstances.

This being premised, the summe of what I shall further say is briefly this, That 1. In the time of our Saviour, and the Apostles, these Bookes were true. 2. That since that time they have not been changed.

From which two Propositions it will follow, that still they are so; and consequently that the Books of the Old Testament, as well as of the New, are the Word of God.

As touching these propositions, the truth of them will be inferred by this ratiocination. 1. The Books, which we now receive, are the same which the Jews do now receive. 2. The Books, which the Jews now receive, are the same which they did formerly receive, even up to the consignation of their Canon. 3. The Books, which then they did receive, were true.

SECT. VII.

The first Assertion proved, That the Books of the Old Testament which we now receive are the same which the Jews doe now receive.

THat those Canonicall Books which we receive are the self same with those which the Jews at the present do receive, is a case so plain, that it needs no manner of proof, but only this, that it is obvious to every man to compare our English or Latine Bibles with the Hebrew Bibles, which are used amongst the Jews at present, and daily put forth by the present Rabbines, residing in the severall parts and dominions of the world; upon such a comparison it will be found, that we do own the self same Books which they do, without any difference in the number or inscriptions, chapters, or verses of those Books: such as do doubt of this, they must take the pains to try, and to resolve themselves by their own experience, or else if they are not able, or not willing to take the pains to make themselves their own resolvers, they must of necessity beleeve the multitude of those, that have already tried it, and finding it to be generally granted, and allowed of all men, and all parties, however differing otherwise amongst themselves, they must upon that account, either beleeve the Proposition, or else devise some way how, and for what end it should be brought to passe, that the learned men of all Nations, and Religions, Jews, Christians, Papists, Protestants, Turks, Pagans, &c. should agree together to impose upon that part of people, that cannot or will not fit themselves, to resolve a question, so easie and of such concernment.

Now, that all these sorts of men doe thus agree, must likewise be beleeved, untill some one instance can be produced to the contrary: the truth is, the thing being a matter liable to the triall of common sence, and obvious to all the world, there is no more controversie made of it, among the learned, then of a principle in Mathematicks.

It is true indeed, that as concerning the interpretation of those books, there is, and almost, ever was a great deal of controversie amongst the learned, (but none as to the number and to the parts of those that are delivered amongst the Jews) and it is likewise true, that the beleif, of farre the greatest number of Christians, doth in its kinde depend upon the questionable fidelity of translators, and that fidelity of theirs, if it be to be tried, that must be done by means which are not exempt from question: all therefore which can be said in this matter is that unlesse we can attain to skill sufficient for our own satisfaction in this question, we take into thought the qualifications of Translators, in respect of skill and of fidelity; and impartially that we consider all those rationall heads and grounds, whereon men use to settle their belief, amongst which no greater evidence can be expected then there is in cases where all agree; and such is the main body of ours, and other translations likewise: this that I have spoken of translations is indeed a digression from the proposition I should demonstrate, seeing when we speak of the sacred authority of the holy Scriptures we mean it not of translations, as they are such, but primarily of the originals, and of translations, only so far as they are consonant to those originals. And thus much is indeed sufficient both for the assertion, and explication of that proposition, that the books which we receive, they are the same which the Jews receive.

SECT. VIII.

That the Bookes, which the Iews do now receive, are the same which they have received ever since the Consignation of their Canon.

BUt secondly, the Bookes which the Jews do now receive, they are the same which they did formerly receive, upwards to the time of our Saviour, and his Apostles; nay, beyond them to the very time of the consignation, or sealing up the Canon of their beleif, that is, their Bookes were never changed nor corrupted.

It is not here my purpose to assert, that never any letter or word hath been changed, or formerly read otherwise then now it is in the Jewish Bibles, (I am not so far unacquainted with their Keri and Chetib, or with the notes of the Massoreth) but that there hath not been made any variation so considerable, as to shake the authority of the present coppies. Of these various readings I hope to speak in the answering objections. In the interim, I am to demonstrate, that they have not received any considerable depravation.

And now this being a negative Proposition, common reason doth presently offer it to every ones judgement, that it cannot be positively proved, the very nature of such propositions, contradicting that manner of proof: the arguments then, which are producible, are some of them taken, from the causes why they could not (morally) be corrupted; the other from signs that de facto they have not been so.

The first argument then is taken from the multitude of copies, which it was impossible to combine together to corrupt upon design, or that they should accidentally agree together in the same casuall corruptions.

It is certainly apparent out of the Histories of the Jews, that after their first and second captivities, they did store themselves with multitudes of copies of the sacred books, and that both publikely and privately; that which, before they were dispersed, either was not so necessary to them, or else was not so apprehended by them: so long as the first Temple was yet unrazed, we reade but of very few (if any) Synagogues of the Jews in other Nations, out of the bounds and terrirores of Iudea: but after by their long and wofull captivity, when their confidence in the protection of their Law and their Temple had, by their sad experience and wofull suffering, worn it self out of their mindes, their Temple being utterly demolished, the best of them began to think that it was possible that even the Law might fail: (Habbakuk) and they now bethought themselves, of making use of the rationall means of the preservation of it; in the mindes of men, and seeing there could not be any readier way thought upon then the erecting of Synagogues, and writing many copies, these were the courses which they took, (they had had experience of the inconvenience of having one only copy, in the losse of that copy, which being found again by Hilkiah the Priest, made King Iosiah to rend his clothes, at the hearing of those things written in the Law) and accordingly we finde, before the coming of our Saviour, many Synagogues erected in forrain places, and the books of the Law, and the Prophets in every Synagogue, reade every Sabbath day; now every dispersion encreased the number of Synagogues and Books. And besides the first captivity of the Tribes carried into Media by the Assyrians, we shall finde them, even after they had licence from Cyrus to return, continuing still abroad, and upon many new occasions again dispersed: those that reade over sacred Histories and prophane, shall finde them seated in most of the Eastern Countries adjacent Iudea, or not farre distant from thence: the Macedonians invited them to Alexandria, the cruelties of Antiochus, the civill warres of the Asmonaei, the armies of Pompey, and Lossius, drove many of them from their habitations: the cities of Cyrene, of Asia, Macedonia, and Lycaonia, the Islands of Cyprus and Crete, and divers others, even Rome it self, they were all of them furnished with Temples and Synagogues of the Jews: now so it is that the Books of all these did agree together amongst themselves, which they could not have done if any, and not all of them should have been corrupted; and that all of them should either casually or by design be corrupted (besides that no end can appear to encourage such a designe) the thing it self makes it impossible.

Besides, had any such thing been, they must, to make a correspondence, have corrupted likewise the Septuagint translation, which for almost three hundred years before our Saviour was extant in Egipt; that I speak nothing of the Chaldee Paraphrase extant before the time of our blessed Saviour: so then, as far as the nature of a morall subject will admit, we have shewed, as from the causes, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament could not be corrupted.

Now as from the signes we have likewise powerfull arguments, that to our Saviours time, they were uncorrupted, because our Saviour never discovers any corruption of the Text, which certainly he would not have spared, at such times as he taxes the Scribes and Pharisees of making the Law of God of none effect, by their traditions.

Now, that the Hebrew Canon hath not been corrupted since our Saviours time, we have this sign likewise, that never any of the ancient Fathers have, in their greatest heat of zeal against the Jews accused them of such corruption, though Justin Martyr complain of wronging the Septuagints Translation; and certainly if they should have corrupted them upon design, either before or since, it would have been in all those places which conclude against them, for Christ, (the true Messiah, that stumbling stone, upon which they stumbled and fell:) but those do remain unaltered.

The truth is, to them were committed the Oracles of God, and they have, by the visible ordination of the providence of God, discovered so much care and diligence that way, as is not to be found to have been bestowed upon any other writings under heaven: witnesse the Criticall notes of their Massoreth, which gives an account of the numbers of of letters in every Book almost, and almost, if not altogether, of every various lection. I conclude then that they have never been corrupted.

SECT. IX.

That in our Saviours time these bookes were true, and consequently were the Word of God.

BUt we, in our Saviours time they were true, and the Word of God, as appears by our Saviours testimony, and the testimony of the Apostles, who still referre to them as being of divine inspiration, as being the truth and Word of God, their using the testimony, almost of every particular Book, as anthenticall, their disputations founded upon their Authority. Particulars in this kinde are so many, and so plain, that without any more speaking I will conclude, that we are to receive the Old Testament upon the credit of the New; and the New Testament (as I have formerly demonstrated) upon greater reason far then any other writings in the world; and consequently that we must receive the Books of the Old Testament upon the same Authority.

We have already discovered some of those many reasons, whereupon we are to receive the Books of the Old Testament and the New, under the credit and authority of the Word of God. Besides those whereupon I have insisted there are many more; some of them taken from the quality of the writers, some from the manner of the writings, the former shewing that those men, from whom they proceeded, were not fit persons to devise such things, they being many if not most of them, simple and unlearned men; the latter manifesting that such things are not, of their nature, obvious to be devised, because they transcend the wit and invention of man; the Majesty and simplicity of the stile, the concord and harmony, the end and scope, the power and efficacy, the antiquity; besides the Testimony of the Spirit in the hearts of men.

But the evidence of truth no way depending upon the multitude of arguments or reasons, and all of these being insisted on in some or other of those Authours which are obvious, I shall at this time finish what remains, of that which at the first I propounded, which was to shew, That as there are many and important reasons, moving wise men to receive them, so there neither are nor can be any sufficient arguments on the contrary, to make men to refuse them.

SECT. X.

That there is no reason to disbeleeve the Scriptures. Objections briefly proposed and answered: first generall Objections against the whole.

'Tis true indeed, that many both of old and later times, have refused either all or severall parts of the holy Canon, and it is not to be hoped or expected, that they should ever be generally received by all the world: there must be heresies, and amongst the rest there alwaies have been, and sure there ever will be Antiscripturians: the greatest part of the world have ever lived according to sence and appetite; and to prove that de facto it is denyed, is not to manifest that there is reason why it is so; yet seeing there are of those disputing and theoreticall hereticks, as well as practicall, to conceal or dissemble the arguments, which are alleadged against the truth, it would be to betray the cause that we have undertaken, and give occasion for some Jealousie, that their Objections are unanswerable.

To come then to an issue, some have rejected All, by reason of   Impossibilities.       Repugnances.       Mutations.   Parts, accusing them as Sine nomine, Authoris.       Dubitati,       Ab intrinseco, matter

Those who refuse the whole Scriptures, they are some of them Atheists, others professe themselves Christians, and yet doe deny the authority of the written word, pretending to private and secret illuminations, as the last rule of their actions: the design of my discourse being against the former, I shall only intimate the frenzy of the later. They pretend, that that, which we call the written word, is not the Word of God, because 1. The Word of God is God himselfe. 2. Christ is the Word of God. 3. The Letter kils. 4. The Word of God is spirit and life.

These are the arguments which, by some Enthusiasts, are used against the written Letter. And for answer to them, we may only observe, how, by arguing against the authority of the Scriptures, these men do tacitely assert it; for taking their arguments out of it, and proceeding no further, either by reason or revelation, to the discovery of their antecedents, but barely resting in the recitall of those words which are there written, they do resolve all the power and force of their argument into the authority of those very writings which they would impugne, and consequently they do at once deny and grant, the authority of the Scripture; which is to deserue the Epithete, which is given them, of fanaticall Enthusiasts.

That the Word of God is God himself (taking the Word of God for the immanent act of the diuine understanding) is indeed a truth attainable by other principles, by those I mean from whence the absolute simplicity of the divine nature is attainable. But that Christ is the eternall word of the Father, and that there is such a spirit and life, as the argument doth imply, and that there is a divine and mysticall meaning of that letter of the word, they either owe their faith unto that word, or else they have not done very charitably in concealing those waies whereby they come to know it, and very improvidently in giving occasion for us to beleeve, that their pretences of illumination are but pretences.

Now for that other party, who doe reject the Scriptures (the whole bulk of them) their Arguments are these, I. Because they deliver things impossible, and consequently incredible, and so they are not to be beleeved. 2. Because they deliver things repugnant, and contradictory to one another. 3. Because the Books of the Old Testament are doubtfull, by reason of the differences of the Text and Margent. And the Books of the New Testament are likewise uncertain, by reason of the various readings of severall copies.

1. Those things which the Atheisticall partie use to object, against the authority of the Scripture as impossible and incredible, they are the miracles performed by Moses and the Prophets, by Christ and his Apostles, but if we shall attentively consider them, we shall finde, that they doe include in them no contradiction, nor any absolute impossibility of the performance; the utmost that can be justly concluded from them, is, that they transcend the ordinary course of the dispensation of that providence, which orders the world, and administers the laws of the government thereof. But, upon the hearing or reading of extraordinary events, presently, (though they have been sufficiently attested) to disbeleeve them, upon conceit of reason to the contrary, discovers palpably the want of the exercise of that reason, whereto they so much pretend: for a man to deny, such matters of fact as he is not able to comprehend the reason of, must either suppose the party, to know the causes of all appearances in nature, or conclude him guilty of childish, and ridiculous incredulity. We have before demonstrated the Omniscience, and the Omnipotence of the Divinity; and that being, as hath been actually proved, clearly and evidently demonstrable, for the contemptible wit, and reasoning of man to prescribe limits, and bounds to that power and knowledge, is no lesse, then to own the acknowledgement of a contradiction, by professing that, to be limited and finite, which the naturall principles of our understandings, will force us to acknowledge of necessity to be immense and infinite.

It cannot be thought a thing impossible, that God should either raise the dead, or command the Sunne to stand still in Gibea, by him that considers, what it is to be the originall of life, or to have created the Universe with the word of his eternall power, the things which are impossible with men, they are possible with God: and consequently we having before concluded the vanity and madnesse of Atheism, shall need to say no more, to evince the frivolous weaknesse of this Argument, from the impossibilities.

2. As for those repugnances and contradictions, which some men vainly please themselves, imagining they have found them in the Scripture, if they be well examined, they will be proved to be but so many instances of the weaknesse, or inadvertancy of the Objectors those which have been made against the Old Testament, have long agoe been found by Rabbi Moses ben Maimoni not to have taken in all those conditions, which have been by Philosophers discovered to be required to make up a perfect contradiction, that is, that contrary assertions be made of the same thing at the same time, according to the same part, or motion, or apprehension: and the same hath been lately performed by Manasseh ben Israel, in his conciliator for the Old Testament. It hath likewise, for the New; been long since performed by many of the Fathers, and of late by diverse of all professions, Papists, Protestants and their severall subdivisions. The matters of Doctrine are easily reconciled by distinguishing the notions of severall terms, so for example, as faith is said by Paul to justifie, and works by Jame., by distinguishing of Justification; and the matters of History are reconciled by attending to times, and places, persons, and forms of speech. Thus are the differences cleared, which are about the Genealogies of our Saviour, delivered by Saint Matthew and Saint Luke. The truth is, there could never any considerable difference, either in matter of doctrine or history, be urged against the Scriptures; yet if some slight and inconsiderable circumstances should seem to us so to differ that we could not reconcile them, it ought rather to confirme our beleef, then any way to shake it; seeing it is the custome of those who designe to impose upon mens beleef, so to contrive all circumstances as they may be sure to have no difference discovered.

Such is, in truth, the agreement and harmony of all these authors, so distant in time, in place, in institution, as is not to be found in any other authours in the world, though of the same sect, either in Philosophy, Law, Physick, or any other faculty; nor yet in any one man with himself; as might be manifested, if either this time or place required it. And so instead of an objection to shake us, we have found an argument to confirm us.

3. The third Argument or objection against the whole Books of Scripture is taken from the Keri and Chetib of the Old Testament; and from the various readings of the New; from those they conclude them to be doubtfull, from these corrupted.

Now the former of these is answered by the Jewish RR Isaac Jacob of old, Elias Levita of later times, who do deny the consequence of that Argument, and make it manifest that those were added for signification of some mystery, and not because the Text was doubtfull: and for proof of their assertion they prove, that the Books of Haggai, Zachary, Malachy, Daniel and Ezra, had those marginall notes added to them by their authours, who all were members of the Synagoga magna, and made the consignation of the Jewish Canon: these could not be doubtfull of the sense of their own writings; and consequently from those marginall notes, the doubtfulnesse of the Old Testament can no way justly be concluded.

As touching the various readings of some places of the New Testament, we cannot deny but that through the failings of some Scribes, there are found in the most ancient copies of those books some differences of letters, or some few syllables, or words; but this we deny, that those are sufficient, from whence to conclude the books not to be credited; for upon the same reason it will be concluded that no Book in the world is to be credited, unlesse they can be manifested to be exempted from the slips and failings of transcribers. Nay, the consideration of those various readings, are very strong arguments that the substance of the writings are incorrupted, and that they were never changed upon design, seeing the differences that are do no way inferre any difference, either in the Doctrine or History of the Testament: it was of the favour and mercy of God to preserve to his Church those various readings, that by comparing them together, and likewise with the rest of the holy Scriptures, both the true sence and the true reading of them might at once be manifested.

SECT. XI.

Objections against particular parts, briefly proposed and answered.

NOw Objections, against particular books of either Testament, will be found likewise inconsiderable: 'tis true that many of them have been either doubted of or rejected by some men, but those who have pertinaciously refused them, have done it rather out of the interest of their passions and corrupt affections, then out of judgement. Briefly,

Ecclestastes hath been rejected by some Written by Solomon in his dotage, Placing felicity in sences.

But the first of these can no way be proved; nay, the contrary appears by the whole tenour of it well considered; and the latter is evidently confuted by the conclusion, Fear Cod, &c. for God shall bring, &c.

The Canticles have been taken for a Love-song, compiled in a complement to Pharaohs daughter; but it had been but a slender complement to tell her, that her eyes were like fish-pools, and her nose like the tower of Lebanon that looketh toward Damascus.

The Prophecy of Daniel hath been charged by Porphyrius, to have been a History written after the things were done, written in the time of Antiochus, and imposed upon the world under the credit of the name of Daniel: but, beside the testimony of our Saviour, it appears out of History, that that Prophecy was shewed to Alexander the great, in his advance towards Jerusalem, 150. years before Antiochus.

New Testament.

Hebrews was rejected by the Latine; Church because the Authour was unknown, and because of some passages especially seeming to favour the Novatian herefie. I answer.

1. It is not the name of an authour which gives credit to his Writings, but that character of his person which is drawn from his abilities and integrity. Now these were never doubted of in that Authour.

2. Those passages are very well to be understood otherwise, then in favour of the Novatians.

3. It was ever received in the Greek Church, and recited amongst the Canonicall Books by the Councels of Nice, Laodicea, and Carthage.

4. If we are to beleeve, the Western Church had grounds to doubt of the credit of it, at such time as it did not admit it, we may as well beleeve, that that Church had reasons which satisfied them of the authority of it, at such time as they did receive it.

The Epistles of Saint James, 2d of St Peter, the second and third of St John, Jude, Revelations, have all of them been doubted of, for some time; by some parties whether or no they were indeed written by those authours, under whose names they are now received: but though they were some time doubted by some, they were alwaies received by others; and those Churches which did refuse them, so long as they were unsatisfied, are to be supposed to have been satisfied when they did receive them; and so we ought to give as great, if not greater cedit to them, then to such others as had not been questioned; inasmuch as that which hath been deliberated, and debated, and then decided, is to be credited, as well as that which silently hath passed on unquestioned.

And now I have with brevity (as I suppose) congruous to such an Essay as I intended, made evident the last assertion which I undertook, That to disbeleeve, either the whole body of Scripture, or any part of it, there is no reason; or not any sufficient reason.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉