A fifth letter, concerning the sacred Trinity in answer to what is entituled, the Arians vindication of himself against Dr. Wallis's fourth letter on the Trinity / by John Wallis ...

A fifth letter, concerning the sacred Trinity in answer to what is entituled, the Arians vindication of himself against Dr. Wallis's fourth letter on the Trinity / by John Wallis ...

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A FIFTH LETTER Concerning the Sacred Trinity.

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A FIFTH LETTER Concerning the Sacred Trinity.

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[Page]

SIR,

I Have met with an Answer to my Fourth Letter. It is not Long, and my Reply shall be but short. There is very little in it concerning the Merits of the Cause, (save that he resolves to hold the Conclusion:) and as to Personal Reflections, or Disdainful Expressions, I do not think fit to trouble the Reader with a long Reply. For those, I think, do not hurt me so much, as him that useth them.

He is not pleased, pag. 1. that I said, I had Argued Calmly, without Scurrillous Language, or Reproachful Terms. And I appeal to the Reader, [Page] whether it be not so. Nor doth he deny it. And if his Language were so too, he needed not to have made the Reader an Apology, to excuse his Expressions, that he might avoid the Character of a Common Railer, p. 1.

But, he says, Abating the little Subtilties and Artifices, incomparably witty, there is not the least Grain of weight in my Letter. Of this the Reader is to be Judge, both as to the Weight, and as to the Wit.

He says, It seems, a Socinian wrote against me. (True. And it seems he knew it: For he cites him.) And that himself wrote as an Arian. I think he should rather have said, He wrote, first as a Socinian (in his first Ten pages,) and then as an Arian, (in the other Ten.) For I do not find any thing, till toward the end of his Tenth page, whereby I could judge him other than a direct Socinian. And I think it will so appear to any other Reader.

He takes to himself the name of Unitarian; by which I do not find the Arians were wont to be called. But it is a new Name which the Socinians have taken up, to distinguish themselves both from Us, and from the Arians. For the Arians are rather Pluritarians, as holding more Gods than One. And the Book to which himself [Page] refers us, p. 4. is intituled, The History of the Unitarians, otherwise called Socinians. And, in p. 11. where he first mentions the Arians, he doth introduce it with a Preface, minding me, that I write against Arians as well as Socinians: As having, till then, spoke for the Socinians only, not for the Arians. And even in his tenth page, (toward the beginning of it) what had been said of the Socinians by name, and of Socinus in particular, he takes to himself, as if one of that Party. He seems (saith he of me) to insinuate an aspersion on US, that WE believe not Angels.

He tells us now, p. 3. He doth believe them; and I will suppose also, that he doth believe the Soul's Immortality. But, when he there says, that I bring a World of Arguments to prove the Immortality of the Soul; he mistakes again. For those Arguments were brought against Socinus, not to prove the Soul's Immortality; but, that the Soul, in its separate condition, was capable of Pain or Pleasure: which Socinus denied.

For requital to this, he tells me, he had a good mind to prove the Existence of a Deity, for that he had heard of some men of the Profession of the Church of England, that have almost been Atheists at the heart. And truly if he should do so, I should not think it much amiss: For I have heard, the same suspected of some Socinians.

[Page] He now tells me, p. 2. He never was a Socinian in his Life. Of what he had been in the former part of his Life, I had said nothing. (For I knew no more what it was, than who he is.) But (p. 37.) of what he was in the beginning of his Discourse. And 'tis plain he there writes like a direct Socinian (as was shewed but now,) though as an Arian some time after.

He tells me (p. 2.) that he is neither the Socinian, nor his Friend, who assisted in his first Book. Neither did I say, that he is: but, that he might be for ought I knew. But whether he be or not, 'tis the same thing to me; for I am yet to fight in the dark with I know not whom.

He says, He is not concerned to defend Socinus, or any man who hath dropt imprudent words. Nor did I require it of him. And, whether he were, or were not the same man who wrote before; yet, since here he acts another Person, I left it free for him (p. 1, 2.) to decline, if he pleased, what was said before; to grant what was there denied, or deny what was there granted.

But then, he thinks, p. 1. I should not charge him with writing Contradictions, because such things may possibly be found in the others Answer. Nor do I. (This is only a piece of his wonted Artifice of Mis-reciting me.) I tell him indeed, it is hard to [Page] please them both, when they do not agree amongst themselves? And I did observe, (and argue from it) what he grants, though the other had denied it. But I never charge him with what the other had said. And (if he look it over again) he will find, that I did not confront him (to shew thence a contradiction) with what the other had said: But did confront what himself had said in his ten first pages, with what he says in the other ten. And 'tis manifest, that in the first ten, he acts the Socinian; and in the latter ten, the Arian. But, in whether of the twain he acts his own part, it was not easie to determine; till he now tells us, he is an Arian.

He had argued, p. 8, 14. That the Trinity are Persons, as really, and as properly, and fully personally distinct, as Three Angels. And each Person (both Son and Holy-Ghost by name) compleat and intire in himself, with as compleat Personal distinction as that in Men and Angels. From whence when I inferred his owning the Personality of the Holy-Ghost: He fearing, it seems, he had over-shot himself, now tells us, p. 4. just as much as becomes on Arian. But if he own him to be as much a Person, as a Man, or Angel is a Person: it is as much, or perhaps more, than we need contend for in this point.

[Page] I had charged him also with mis-reciting me in many other things. As when I am introduced (very often) as talking of Two Gods, Three Gods, Personal Gods, of adding several Persons to our one God, and the like; (according as here also, he says, p. 7. that I say, you your self own Two Gods, and why may not I then Three?) when he knows very well, this is not my Language; nor is any thing of all this said by me. To this he now says, p. 5. 'Tis true enough he doth so; but that he doth it by Inference. But he should then speak it as his Inference, not cite it as my words.

I might have taken notice (amongst a great many gross mistakes,) that where I had mentioned, the Lords and Commons of England, declaring the Prince of Orange, to be King of England, France and Ireland; he mis-recites it, p. 4. King of England, Scotland, and France; as if the Parliament of England, had taken upon them to dispose of the Kingdom of Scotland, and not that of Ireland. But of this, and a many more, I passed over, without reflecting on it. Because, in his Language, he is so very negligent and careless, (and otherwise obnotions) that it were endless to reflect on all.

But I was obliged to take notice (because it [Page] quite alters my Argument) of what he says, p. 4. that I say, Three sides make one Cube, &c. which is neither true, nor are they my words. I argued not from three sides, but from the three Dimensions of a Cube. This he calls Trifling; and would perswade us that side and dimension, differ no more than Muting and—his other word, which is fitter for his mouth than mine. But though he perhaps know-no difference between them; yet he should not have cited it as my words (and say, that I say so, when I did not.) For I ought to know better; and that a Cube hath six sides, though but Three Dimensions. Nor did I argue from the six sides, but from the Three Dimensions. Yet I can forgive him this (rather than when he doth it willfully) though it mis-recite my Argument: Because I believe it to be out of pure Ignorance, not of Malice.

He doth not like, p. 6. either This, or any other Simile's; and would have me no more to insist upon them. (But he must excuse me from taking his advice herein, unless he understood it better, than, by what was now said, he seems to do.) Because, if he be not mistaken (as I think he is) they are very far from my purpose. That is, He thinks, they do not prove the Trinity. True: These, alone, do not prove it (nor was it intended [Page] they should.) But they prove (what they were brought to prove) that it is not a Contradiction, or Inconsistent with Reason, that there may be three somewhats (which we call Persons) that are but one God. And thus much he had before granted, and doth now again confirm it, p. 3, 4. 'Tis true indeed (he says) I cannot say that there is a Contradiction in holding that there may be three Persons in God. For, saith he, There be two sorts of Contradictions; The one Express, the other Implyed. I cannot say, there is a Contradiction in holding it: Because I have not the Definition of the word God so exact, as to raise an implied contradiction: And, for an express contradiction, I do not pretend to it. If therefore there be no Contradiction, either Express, or Implied: It is what I was to prove.

But, saith he, The dispute shall not end here. He will be allowed the Privilege (and no body doth deny it him,) to fetch in the First Commandment, to define the word God. With all my heart. I was never against it. (For what he says, more than once, p. 3, 4. that I meanly cry, he flies to Scripture, is but another piece of his wonted Art of mis-reciting. There is nothing to that purpose in any thing of mine.) I do sometime blame him for changing the state of the Question: As, when he would have me prove by Reason, that It is so: I [Page] tell him, That is not the Question, (nor is that to be proved by Reason:) The Question is, whether there is any thing in Reason, why it cannot be so. Now, let him keep to the Question; and then, if he think he can prove, from Scripture, that it is Inconsistent with Reason, for Three somewhats to be One God; or, that it is a Contradiction, for God the Creator, and God the Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, to be the same God; or, that it is Impossible for the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Iacob, to be One and the same God: Let him try his skill. And, let him make what use he can of the First Commandment, to Define the word God, so as to prove this a Contradiction. But, when he had claimed this Privilege, (and no body doth deny it) He makes no use of it for any such Definition.

The truth is, I had already granted him, from that Commandment, (p. 23, 24, 25, 28, 29.) more than he was willing I should grant: That we are to have NO OTHER GOD (Great or Little, Equal or Unequal,) but the Lord God of Israel.

Yes, says he; There is one Supreme God, another Creature-God; But that this is not to have Two Personal Gods. How so? If these be Two Gods, and each of them a Person, (compleat and entire of [Page]himself; as really, and properly, and fully, and personally distinct, as a Man or Angel, as he had before told us at p. 8. 14.) they must needs be Two Personal Gods. But we, according to the First Commandment, acknowledge but One God; and those three somewhats (whom in a metaphorical sense we call Persons) not so to be distinct as to become Three Gods.

He hopes however to avoid the First Commandment, by saying that, though they be Two Gods, they are not two Gods Co-equal, p. 5. and that they worship the Son, not: with supreme Worship; with Mediation, not Adoration, p. 6. What he means by his two Worships; of Mediation, and Adoration; I do not well understand: unless they be new Names for Doulia and Latria. Nor do I remember, that I have before heard of a worship of Mediation. That Christ is our Mediator, I know; but did not know that he is our Worshipper.

And what doth he think of the Israelites, when they Worshipped the Golden Calf? Surely they did not think this Calf to be Co-equal with the Supreme God. Nor did they think it to be (Deus natus) a God by Nature; but (Deus factus) a Made God: (for themselves had made it, just before:) Yet I never knew, that this did excuse them from Idolatry.

[Page] He doth not own Christ to be the True God, (for such there is but One, the only true God,) nor yet a false God; but a Mean between both, p. 6. Now 'tis true, the Heathen had (their Deos medioxumos) their Middling Gods: But I never knew that we could worship such, without Idolatry. Thou shalt Worship the Lord thy God (the Supreme God) and Him ONLY shalt thou serve, was our Saviour's Doctrine, Mat. 4. 10. And St. Iohn expresly calls him the True God, 1 Joh. 8. 20. (not a Middling God, between True and False) and therefore the same God with the Father, the Only true God.

To that Character of Christ, Rev. 1. 8, 11. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, (the First and the Last) saith the Lord, which IS and WAS and is TO COME, the Almighty. He says, This stile is given him in opposition to Gods simpler one, I AM. But he should have observed, that the same title is, at ver. 4. given to God, in Contradistinction to Christ, [...], &c. And if it were there a Character of the Supreme God, it is so here. And if he think the simpler term [...], I AM, to be more expressive of the Supreme God; we have that also Emphatically given to Christ, Rom. 9. 5. [...], He [Page]which IS, or the Being, over all; the Supreme Being.

To what further I had brought, p. 30, 31, 32, 33. to prove him to be the Supreme God, the same God with the Father, (not a Middling, or Titular God,) he makes no Reply: which therefore stands as it was; nor need I repeat it, because it may be read there. And it is so full and clear, that I need add no more to it.

To what I had said of Ioh. 17. 3. To know Thee (not Thee Only, or Only Thee,) the Only True God. He saith, He hath Answered already. And I have already Replied; nor need I repeat it. Their Argument from thence is just in this form: The God of Abraham is the only true God; therefore, not the God of Isaac, or the God of Iacob. Yes, say I, the God of Isaac, and the God of Israel, is the same God, but under another consideration. So here; God the Creator (or God the Father) is the Only true God; therefore not God the Redeemer, nor God the Sanctifier. Yes; God the Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, is the same God, the only true God. In like manner, Ier. 16. 14, 15. It shall no more be said, The Lord liveth that brought up the Children of Israel out of the land of Egypt; But, The Lord liveth, that brought up the Children of Israel out of the[Page]North Country. Now, saith the First Commandment, I am the Lord thy God, which brought thee out of the land of Egypt; Thou shalt have No Other God but Me: Therefore not the God which brought them out of the North Country. Yes, say I, even this God also. Which is not another God; but the same God; though considered as the Author of another Benefit.

There be many other things, both in his first and second Paper (his Answer and his Vindication) which lie very open to be Reflected on, if it were worth the while: But I think, I have said enough already; and, he thinks, too much, (that I have been too stiff, too hard with him, p. 8.) which things I shall therefore omit, to save my self, and the Reader, the labour.

But three things he calls me to account for omitting; His Reproof of my false Idea of the Personality of God, the Impossibility and Blasphemy of his Incarnation, and of the Death of God, p. 8. Now when I had proved the things to be True; I thought that had been a sufficient Answer, to his calling them False, Impossible, and Blasphemous. For they are never the more so, for his calling them so. And I know not what further Answer he should expect, unless he would have me say, 'Tis foul-mouthed Blasphemy in him, to [Page] call it Blasphemy. But if I should answer him all along at this rate, according as his language deserves; we should, instead of Disputing fall to right down Railing; which is the Character he was afraid of, pag. 1.

However (to gratify him once more,) That by the Word, Joh. 1. is meant, Christ, himself owns: and, That this Word was God from the beginning; That he made the World, and all things; and that without him was not any thing made which was made; (and therefore, say I, Himself was not made; unless our Arian would have us think, He made Himself) That this God, is the Supreme God, we have proved at large, (if he deny it to be proved, we must leave it to the Reader to judge of the Arguments:) and this Word was made Flesh. (I hope I need not tell him, that to be made Flesh, and to be Incarnate, is all one; for every one understands this who know that Caro carnis is Latin for Flesh.) Therefore this is no Blasphemy.

Again; That God in Christ suffered and died; and that we are Redeemed by the Blood of God, he had before told us, p. 13, 14. That this is the True God, we have proved at large (as was but now said;) Therefore the Death of God (that is, of him that was God as well as Man,) is no Blasphemy.

[Page] Yet again; I do not take his Reproof (as he calls it) to be a Proof, that my Idea of Personality is False. And therefore I did not think it deserved an Answer; having proved the thing before. Yet I thought I had Answered it (as much as it need to be answered) when (at my pag. 36.) I told him (nor doth he deny it) that he seemed well pleased at his p. 20. that I owned the word Person to be but Metaphorical; though at his p. 7. (which is the Reproof he means) he did not like it. For tid after pag. 7. he acted the Socinian, and did not come to act the Arian, till afterward; and then he seemed, at p. 20. to like it well enough.

I shall yet add somewhat more upon that point, which if it may not satisfy him, (who seems to intimate p. 8. that he will not be satisfied,) may give some further satisfaction to the Reader.

The word Person (persona) is originally a Latin word; and doth not properly signify a Man (so as that another person must needs imply another Man,) for then the word Homo would have served, and they needed not have taken in the word Persona: But rather, one so Circumstantiated. And the same Man, if considered in other Circumstances (considerably different,) is reputed another Person. And that this is the true [Page] notion of the word Person, appears by those noted Phrases, personam induere, personam deponere, personam agere, personam sustinere, sustineo unus tres personas, and many the like in approved Latin Authors. Thus the same Man may at once sustain the Person of a King and of a Father; if he be invested both with Regal and Paternal Authority. Now because the King, and the Father, are for the most part not only different Persons but different Men also (and the like in other cases) hence it comes to pass, that another Person is sometimes supposed to imply another Man: but not always, nor is that the proper sense of the word. It is Englished in our Dictionaries, by the state, quality, or condition, whereby one Man differs from another: and so, as the Condition alters, the Person alters, though the Man be the same. Our School-men of later Ages, do sometimes apply the word Persona to Angels as well as Men; but even that is but Metaphorical; nor do I find that it ever was so used, in approved Latin Authors, either for Angels, Genii, or their Heathen Gods; but for the different state or condition of Men only.

Now when the same Man doth thus sustain two Persons, as that of a King, and that of a Father; he may as to one thing act as a King, [Page] by his Regal Authority; as to another thing as a Father, by his Paternal Authority. And these Authorities, may be in subordination one to the other, though the Man be the same. And what is done in either capacity, may indifferently be said to be done by the Man, or by the King: (as that David, or the King, pardoned Absolom;) and in like manner, by the Man, or by the Father.

This being the true and proper notion of the word Person, we are next to consider what it is to signify in the present case. Where we are to consider, that the word Person is not applied in Scripture to these three so called: It is not there said, These three Persons are one, but only These three are one. 'Tis but the Church's usage that gives to these three somewhats, the name of Persons.

And therefore our Arian was much mistaken, when he tells us, p. 20. that the word Person is the Hinge of the Controversy. The Hinge of the Controversy, is that notion concerning these three somewhats, which the Fathers (who first used it) did intend to design by the name Person. So that we are not from the word Person to determine what was that Notion; but, from that Notion which they would express, to determine [Page] in what sense the word Person is here used. And if the word Person do not well fit that sense; all that can be thence inferred, is no more, but that they have made use of an Unfit Name to express their Notion. It is no more but as if a Cruel Pope take the name of Clement; or a wicked one the name of Pius; or if a Man be named Willson, whose Father's name was Thomas. And in all such cases, certitudo Rei tollit errorem Nominis. And if we know who is the Man designed by such a Name, 'tis a Ridiculous exception, to say, This is not the Man, because that Name doth well agree with his Nature.

Now Two of these Three being represented in Scripture, as Father and Son; and this Father said to Beget the Son, and all these in a sense metaphorical; (not in such sense as those words do properly signifie amongst Men;) they thought it not unfit (in continuation of the same Metaphor) to call them Persons. Because as the word Person doth properly agree to the relations of Father and Son in a proper sense; so doth the word Person in a metaphorical sense, to the Father and Son so taken metaphorically; and the word Beget, by a like Metaphor.

When therefore it is certain, that the Notion which the Ancient Fathers had concerning these [Page] Three, which in a metaphorical sense they called Person, was this, That there is a Distinction between them, greater than that of the Divine Attributes, but not so great as to make them Three Gods: it is manifest that they took the Metaphor, not from that abusive sense of the word Person, when (amongst us) it is put for Man; but from that proper sense of the word Persona, wherein it signifies the State, Condition, Office, or Relation of a Man, as variously circumstantiated with reference to others; whereof the same Man may sustain more than One. As when David, was the Son of Iesse, the Father of Solomon, and the King of Israel. So if we say of any, that he is a Person of Honour, a Person of Worth, and a Person of Interest: That same Man may be all this, without becoming Three Men.

Now this our Arian may call this (if he please) a Quirk, a Criticism, an undermining the very Idea of the word Person, as he did in his, p. 7, 15, 17. (or may neglect it, if he pleases:) But the sober Reader (who understands it better) will have better thoughts of it.

And therefore I shall not take his advice, p. 7, 8. to say that God is the name of an Office, that so he might know how to attack me, (as he says,) which while I talk so warily, he knows [Page] not how to do. I say, God is the name of the Nature; but if he will have Christ to be the name of an Office (the Mediatory Office,) and the Comforter, or even the Creator, the Redeemer, the Sanctifier, to be names of Work or Office, it will not be much amiss.

Now, when I had said this Doctrine of ours is as old at least as the New Testament, (because I can prove it from thence;) he will have it (p. 5.) no older than the disputes of Alexander and Athanasius; which the Primitive Church knew nothing of. But he barrs Quotations all along. And therefore I must not prove it (to be known to the Church before that time,) but leave it to the Judgment of Readers versed in Church-History, whose word must pass in this case; his or mine.

To his Question, p. 6. Did the Iews ever hear of it before Christianity? I think they had some Intimations of it, as they had of the Resurrection: But not so clearly (either of them) as to be generally understood of all; nor so fully as in the New Testament. And I think it was from those notices of it amongst the Jews, that not only Plato derived much of his Philosophy, but other Heathens also much of their Mythology; though they did much disguise, and sometimes [Page] Ridicule the notices they had thence, as our Arian now doth that of the Trinity. But this is not the business now before us.

Toward the close, he is so kind as not to desire Arianism to be imposed on others, any more than Trinitarianism on him, p. 8. But neither is this business before us; who are but Disputants, not Law-makers.

But so constant he means to be to his cause, that he will be content to be perswaded out of his Name with his Opinion. (I think there is reason why he should change his Opinion, but as to the changing of his Name, he may use his discretion.) But having said much (that he might not be thought to desert it) he thinks it advisable to drop the cause. Which he may, if he please, and leave it to the Reader to judge of what is said.

I conclude as he doth; It is impossible but offences will come; but wo unto him through whom they come. It were better for him that a Millstone, &c.

Febr. 14. 1690/1.

Yours, &c. I. Wallis.

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A Fifth LETTER, Concerning the Sacred Trinity; IN ANSWER To what is Entituled, The Arians Vindication of himself against Dr Wallis's Fourth Letter ON THE TRINITY.

By IOHN WALLIS, D. D.

LONDON: Printed for Tho. Parkhurst, at the Bible and Three Crowns, in Cheapside, 1691.

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THE Life of Faith, in Two Sermons to the University of Oxford, at St. Mary's Christ-Church, Oxford; On Ianuary 6. 168frac34;, and Iune 29. following: By the same Author, Dr. Iohn Wallis. Sold by Tho. Parkhurst at the Bible and Three Crowns in Cheapside.

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A fifth letter, concerning the sacred Trinity in answer to what is entituled, the Arians vindication of himself against Dr. Wallis's fourth letter on the Trinity / by John Wallis ...

Wallis, John, 1616-1703.

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1691

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2004-08 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

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A67389

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Wing W582

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ESTC R18175

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12212195

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56328

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— A fifth letter, concerning the sacred Trinity in answer to what is entituled, the Arians vindication of himself against Dr. Wallis's fourth letter on the Trinity / by John Wallis ..., Wallis, John, 1616-1703..

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[2], 21, [1] p.

Printed for Tho. Parkhurst ...,. London :: 1691.. (Reproduction of original in Huntington Library.) (Advertisement: p. [1] at end.)

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