CHAP. I.

FIrst then, I assert against the Ex­ercitator's §. 1. PositionPh. Scr. Int. c. 5. par. 1.; That Hu­mane Reason, or Philosophy is not to be admitted or allowed as the sure and sufficient Interpreter of the Holy Scri­ptures.

[Page 21] For our more clear proceeding, it is requisite I should explain my meaning before I come to the proof of my As­sertion. Let it therefore be consider­ed, That Reason may be three ways taken.

First, For that power and faculty in Man whereby he is enabled to appre­hend, judge, and discourse of such ob­jects as are presented to his understand­ing. Now this falls under a two-fold conception, according to the two-fold state of Man, Innocent or Fallen. Mans Reason as it was originally, when God first made him, was pure and clear, not clouded or blinded, not depraved or distorted, there was nothing to darken or disturb it. It was then a glorious Beam streaming forth from the Eternal Light. But Mans Apostasie, as it vitiated his other faculties, so it benighted his Rea­son, and exposed it to further depra­vation by the prevalency of disordered Passions and sinfull Lusts. Yet even in this state his Reason is not lost, though it be much corrupted I am far from that late Authors mind, that says, Lud. Walzog. in Censura Censur. p. 59. Quae fallet, aut falliter ratio, minimè ratio [Page 22] dicenda. Reason that deceives, or is de­ceived, is not to be called Reason. Mans Reason, notwithstanding its pravity, is still kept in a Capacity to understand his greatest Concerns, by the assistance of those gracious aids that God af­fords him; and hath in all ages been of great use for the good of Mankind, in reference both to mens perso­nal and politick affairs. Therefore I need not fear to say, that next to Holiness, Mans Reason is his greatest Glory.

Secondly, Reason is taken for the exercise of this intellectual Power, in inquiring, discovering, comparing, judg­ing objects propounded. It is by these actings of our Reason that we search after Truth, and make use of it when we have found it, for the conduct and comfort of our lives: and by these it is that we defend the Truth of God against [...]ainsayers.

Thirdly, It is taken for the Princi­ples of Reason, known or knowable by natural light. And these are either Natural, or Acquired. The Natural or [Page 23] Primary Principles of Reason are those that carry their own evidence with them & therefore upon the first represen­tation, are forthwith embraced by our Reason, without any Discourse. And they are called Natural, not as being formally imprinted, or properly engra­ven in our Minds by Nature (for we are not born with Actual Knowledge) but because they are founded in, and do necessarily result from the Nature of things and their mutual Respects, where­in as in a Glass, our Undestanding sees them represented, and is disposed to as­sent to them at the first view. The Secondary or Acquired Principles are those which are not so obvious as the former, but by rational Discourse, are truly and soundly deduced from them.

And here falls in the consideration of Philosophy, which is made up of these Principles methodically digested. And by it I understand that true know­ledge of God and his Works which is attainable in this mortal state, by the improvement of that Light that is Con­natural to the Mind of Man.

[Page 24] This, though it be much inferiour to Scripture-Light, yet it is both an ex­ercise and an advancement, of Rea­son; a noble Study, and of excellent use if rightly managed, not only for the beautifying, but the bettering the Mind of Man, and raising it to an high admiration, and humble adoration of that Infinite Being, whose Wisdom, Power, and Goodness is so eminently conspicuous in all the Works of His Hands. And if there be any such in the World (as some say there are) that de­ny or reproach sound Philosophy, or the Dictates of Right Reason, as I know them not, so neither shall I plead their cause.

Now as to the Case before us,

First, It is undeniable, That for the § 2. Interpreting of Scripture, there is a necessary use of the Faculty of Rea­son, and the several actings of it, as instrumentally subservient to the find­ing out the Sense of Scripture. Faith doth not exclude Reason, but elevate and advance it by giving it a clearer [Page 25] light; it doth not silence, but regulate and conduct it. There is nothing in Re­ligion but what is perfectly rational, and suitable to mans intellectual nature. It is to our Rational Powers that the Scriptures are propounded: and as our belief of them is one of the high­est acts of Reason, so it is by our Reason in its due exercise that we search into them, not only to find out the signi­fication of the Words and Phrases of Scripture, and discern the difference between proper and Figurative Expres­sions, besides many other things that tend to their Verbal Exposition; but likewise to observe the dependence of one Clause on another, and compare the several parts of Scripture together; thereby it is that we gather Conse­quences from Scripture-Principles; and hereby do we instrumentally judge of the Mind of God, as signified to us by the Words of Scripture.

Secondly, We also grant, That the Principles of Reason have their use about those things in Scripture that are discoverable by Natural Light; [Page 28] as that there is a God, and that God is to be worshipped; that the Soul is Im­mortal; that good is to be done, and evil to be avoided; and many such like. But even in these, considered as they are delivered by the Spirit of God in Scripture, I think Reason is not Magisterially and Authoritatively to Judge of them, being (under this notion) to be received as the Decrees of a higher Court, wherein Man's Rea­son is but a Servant. In this Case there­fore, Reason only gives in its suffrage, and ministerially subscribes, by vertue of its own impressed notions to Scripture-Dictates. Aquinas propounding a que­stion Aqu. 2. 2 [...]. Q. 2. [...]. 4. about Mans believing such things as may be proved by Natural Reason; resolves it necessary for Mens more speedy, more common, and more cer­tain attainment of Divine Knowledge, that they should receiveby Faith, not only those things that are above Na­tural Reason, but those also that are discernable by Natural Light. Where­by he plainly gives the pre-eminency to Revelation above Reason, even in [Page 27] the Natural Principles of Religion.

Thirdly, I grant that there is great use of Natural Principles in points of pure Revelation, viz. To shew that these are not against sound Reason, and to disprove the objections that are made against them from a pretended contrariety to Natural Light. It was no small advantage to the Christian Cause in the Primitive Times, that the Ancient Fathers in their Apologies for the Doctrine of Christ, against the Hea­then Philosophers, turned their own Weapons upon them, and repelled their absurd Cavils by their own acknow­ledged Maxims.

Fourthly, I further grant, that no Sense of Scripture is to be admitted for genu­ine, if we do indeed find it to be cer­tainly inconsistent with or contradictory unto any true and undoubted Princi­ple of Reason. For God, who is the Author of all truth, as well natural as supernatural, cannot contradict him­self. This, I confess, is a very ticklish point, and calls for great wariness and circumspection; it being so [...]asie and [Page 28] so ordinary for Men to be swayed by Imagination, Interest, and Prejudice, to call that Reason which is as far from being so, as midnight is from being high noon. And Men may, through Ignorance, Incogitancy, or Pervers­ness, suppose a contradiction where there is none. Nevertheless, this we may safely say, that whatsoever is cer­tainly, and undeniably proved to be a Principle of Reason, there can be no­thing in Scripture that really contra­dicts it.

But, Fifthly, The Knot of the Con­troversie lies here, whether Humane Reason by its own Natural Principles, or those Philosophical Axioms that are thence deduced, as its Supream Com­manding Rule, must guide and deter­mine us in examining and deciding what is the Sense of those parts of Scripture that are purely of Superna­tural Revelation? And this is that which is here denied.

The affirmative is maintained by § 3. some: and indeed it seems to be the great Helena of that sort of Men, [Page 29] who have imbibed the new Divinity of Socinus, and the Foundation of all their Heterodoxies: upon this account it is that they so vehemently oppose the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, the Eternal Deity of our Lord Jesus, the Perso­nality of the Holy Ghost, the Doctrines of Original Sin, of the Satisfaction of Christ, and Justification by his impu­ted Righteousness; with sundry other material points, that are commonly called to the Bar of Humane Reason by these Doctors of the Racovian Faith. Not that they have any sound Reason on their side: for their Novelties are extremely irrational, as hath been a­bundantly demonstrated by those ju­dicious Authors that have dealt with them. But trusting to their own Rea­son and its Dictates in matters so far above Nature, this hath led them into these dangerous precipices.

True it is (whether in pretence to blind the Eyes of others, or out of the conviction of Truth, or out of the usual fate of Error to contradict it self) these Men sometimes let fall that [Page 30] which carries with it a fair appearance of disclaiming the Judgment of Rea­son in Matters of Faith: as may be seen in their great Master Socinus Lib. de Author. Script. cap. 1. p. 16 &c. 4. p. 66. & 71.. And such passages in him and his fol­lowers may possibly give some colour to the Exercitator to charge the Re­formed Divines with wronging the Socinians, in saying they make Mans Reason the Rule of Interpretation Phil Scr. Int. cap. 16 par. 7. & 8. (for himself seems to be ambitious of the honour of finding this out) and it may be they have no where asserted it in Terminis, or spoken it out so broadly as this Gentleman hath done. But notwithstanding all this flourish, when they argue against the forementi­oned Doctrines, received upon clear Scripture-warrant by all the Christian Churches in the World, from the be­ginning of Christianity; their grand objection is drawn from Reason, to which they appeal in all these Contro­versies as to their Oracle; and there­upon set their Wits at work to wrest and winde the Scriptures (alledged in defence of those Doctrines) every way [Page 31] they can imagine, to evade their plain meaning, and fasten on them a Sense of their own making, suitable to their beloved Maxims. Besides many other passages there are of that Party that discover what their Mind is in this point.

But these are not the first that set this presumptuous Doctrine on foot. I find it laid to the charge of the Ma­nichees (as irrational and absurd as their Conceptions were) that they pro­fessedly suspended the Articles of Faith upon the judgment of Reason, and re­quired Men to believe nothing but what they could prove by Reason. So much we learn from him, who was once one of them, but happily deli­vered out of their snare A [...]g. Re­tract. cap. 14 & de utilitate credendi, cap. 1..

CHAP. II.

NOW that Reason or Philoso­phy cannot in the Sense given, be § 1. the Scriptures Interpreter, I prove by the following Arguments:

First, Man's Reason, though fur­nished with the best Principles and Arg. 1. richest Endowments, that Nature af­fords it in this lapsed State, is so dark­ned and depraved, that it not only is much disabled for apprehending the things of God, but sets it self against [Page 33] them; and therefore it is not in a capa­city by its own Principles to interpret Scripture-Doctrines.

Something Natural Light discovers of God; but al as! how little? The Principles of Natural Knowledge are but general and confused, not sufficient to guide Man in the things of greatest concernment. It teacheth Man that there is a God; but when he comes to deter­mine what an one He is, how lame and imperfect, how unsuitable and unbe­coming are Mens natural apprehensions of him! The Apostle says, 1 Cor. 1. 21. that, in the wisdom of God the World by wisdom knew not God. Where he means not the rude and ignorant multitude, but the wisest and most accomplish­ed for Natural Abilities: these, with the study of Philosophy (which is the consideration of Gods infinite Wisdom in Creating and Governing the World) did not arrive at the right knowledge of God. The same Apostle tells us of the unconverted Gentiles, Eph. 4. 18. that they had their understandings dark­ned, and were alienated from the life of [Page 34] God through the ignorance that was in them, &c. and, Rom. 8. 7. he says, the Carnal Mind, [...], the wis­dom of the Flesh, the unrenew'd Mind of Man, is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the Law of God, neither indeed can be.

But I shall especially insist upon that of the said Apostle in 1 Cor. 2. 14. But § 2. the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are fool­ishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discern­ed. By the [...] the Animal or Natural Man the Apostle means him that is in his meer Naturals, having no other wisdom or understanding given him than what is common to him with all Mankind. Such an one receives not the things of the Spirit: that is, he doth not approve of them and embrace them; he finds no relish in them, and therefore rejects them: for they are foolishness unto him; he scorns the myste­ries of the Gospel, as if it were nothing but a heap of phantastick trash, a con­fused [Page 35] medly of absurd unintelligible fan­cies.

Neither can he know them, says the Apostle, because they are spiritually dis­cerned: that is, he cannot (as he is in this unrenew'd state) discern the true beauty and excellency of them, because they are not to be discerned, but by a Spiritual Light, and by a Spiritual Fa­culty, which the Natural Man is wholly destitute of. Or, as the learned Bishop of Down expresseth it, They are taught Du [...]or Dubit [...]. l. 1. c. 2. and perceived by the aids of Gods Spi­rit, Revelation and Divine Assistance and Grace.

Great endeavors have been used to Excepti­on 1. wrest this Scripture. ‘Some think to evade the dint of it, by alledging, that Schlic [...]tin­gi [...]. Vel­ [...]husius, & alii. by [...] is meant one that is led by Fleshly Lusts; because [...] is sometimes taken for the sensitive part of the Soul, in opposition to [...], which is the Rational.’

To this I answer two things,

First, Suppose this that [...] Sol. 1. the Natural Man be taken for one se­duced [Page 36] by corrupt and inordinate affe­ctions; yet this will include all men as they are by nature, and as unregene­rate; witness what the Apostle says, Ephes. 2. 1, 2, 3. And you hath he quickned, who were sometimes dead in trespasses and sins, wherein in time past ye walked accor­ding to the course of the World, accor­ding to the Prince of the Power of the Air, the Spirit that now worketh in the Chil­dren of Disobedience: Amongst whom also we all had our conversation in times past, in the Lusts of our Flesh fulfilling the desires of the Flesh and of the Mind, &c. It is the condition of all Mankind by our first Apostasie from God, to be in bondage to sinful lusts, till the Grace of Christ have set us free. And this none but a Pelagian will deny.

Secondly, It is evident by the context that [...] is in this place opposed to [...], Spiritual: and the natural man is (as the Apostle Jude explains it in his Epistle, vers. 19.) one that is destitute of the Spirit: and consequent­ly he is one that hath no higher inward Principle to guide him than his own [Page 37] Reason. [...], (saith the Learned Grotius) Non est idem quod [...], qui corporis affectibus gubernatur sed est is, qui humanae tantum rationis luce ducitur. The Natural is not the same with the Carnal, who is swayed by the affecti­ons of the Body; but it is he who is led only by the light of Humane Rea­son. Or (as I find the Greek Scholiast cited by a late Author) [...]; the man that is en­dued with meer humane wisdom. Such an one, whatsoever his natural endow­ments may be, and how learned or wise soever, according to the best im­provement of Natures Light, is [...]; So our learned Davinant, Philosophus Expos. ep. ad Coloss. in cap. 2. 8. quà Philosophus nihil aliud est quam ani­malis home; & ipsa Ratio non illumi­nata fide ad hanc animalitatem perti­net.

But let us hear what the Exercita­tor Excepti­on 2. says to this place. The Apostle, says he, speaks not here of a Man that by Na­tural Phil. Scr. Int. cap. 7. par. 4. Light hath attain'd the right know­ledge of Truth and Goodness; for a [Page 38] truely wise Man never censures what he does not discern; whereas the Man here spoken of, is one that knows not the things of the Spirit, and yet accounts them foolishness; which cannot be meant of the true Philosopher; for such an one suspends his judgment of things till such time as he hath attained a clear and distinct per­ception of them. Therefore the Apostle must needs be understood either of a man utterly ignorant, or of one that follows the sway of his blind affections. Such an one, says he, receives not Spiritual Things, that is, the things that belong to the Rational Soul, which is a Spirit.

To this (passing by so much of it as Sol. 1. is met with already in the former Ex­ception) I answer several things.

First, Whereas he says, that by the Animal or Natural Man is not meant he that hath by Natural Light attain'd the right knowledge of truth and goodness. I say so too; for the Apostle means by it, one that hath no other than natural light in searching after truth and goodness; who may there­therefore [Page 39] easily, yea who will certainly mistake, having no better guide.

Secondly, Whereas he says, a true Phi­losopher never is rash in his censure of things, but always suspends his judgment till he hath attained a clear perception of them, and that therefore such an one cannot be thought to judge the things of the Spirit foolishness before he know them; this is all one, as if he had said a true Philosopher is a Chimaera: for (it seems) he is one who never de­termines of any thing till he clearly per­ceives what it is, and then what he de­termines is undoubtedly true: whence it will follow, that every true Philo­sopher is infallible. And where was such an one ever yet to be found? Certain it is, that the most eminent Philosophers (not inferior in their Na­tural Learning to this Exercitator, or any of his Companions) did in the first breaking out of the Gospel, make a mock of the whole Doctrine of Chri­stianity. Thus did the Philosophers at Athens, when they heard St. Paul: and thus did Porphyrie, Celsus, and [Page 40] others, after the Apostles dayes.

Thirdly, When this Author will have no more meant here by things Spiritual, but things belonging to the Rational Soul, which is a Spirit; he is grosly over-seen, to speak no worse. For the Apostles words are [...], the things of the Spirit of God: which certainly is not the Soul of Man, but the Holy Ghost. And when the Apostle Jude describes the [...] sen­sual, or natural, by [...], ha­ving not the Spirit, surely he did not mean they had no Rational Soul; but that they were destitute of the Rege­nerating Spirit of Grace. And that of this Spirit the Apostle Paul is to be understood in the place under present consideration, the whole tenour of his Discourse, from vers. 9, to 15. doth undeniably manifest: If at least (by this Gentlemans good leave) the Scripture might be allowed to interpret it self.

The wofull ignorance and pervers­ness concerning the things of God, that §. 3. [Page 41] discovered it self in the wisest and best civilized part of the World, and such as had improved their natural light to as high a pitch as any other we can read of, is an abundant evidence of what I assert concerning the darkness and pra­vity of Mans Reason. They became (as the Apostle says) vain in their imagina­tions, and their foolish heart was dark­ned: professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, Rom. 1. 21, 22. They acknowledged a Deity, and that God was to be worshipped: but in the manner and way of worship, how wo­fully were they mistaken! yea those times and places that were best culti­vated, and that flourished most in all Humane Learning, were of all other the most sottish in their Idolatrous Worships, giving religious adoration to Brute Creatures, to Dumb Pictures, to Diseases and Humane Passions, yea to Hellish Furies. And whereas, some that were more sagacious than the rest (as Socrates, Cicero, and such like) saw enough to condemn that way of Reli­gion that was then in use (observing [Page 42] the Rites in fashion, tanquam legibus jussa, non tanquam diis grata, as St. Aug. de C. D. l. 61. c. 10. Aug. observes out of Seneca) yet when they came to enquire and determine of the true Religion, they were confes­sedly at a loss, and acknowledged that they could better cry down the wrong than find out the right.

They had what is indelibly planted in all men a desire of happiness: but they were miserably bewilder'd in their search after it. And whereas they were, some of them, sensible of a dread­full blow that Man's Nature had re­ceived, discerning a Combat in them­selves between their Reason and their Sensual Appetite; and saw the World generally over-run with wickedness, and consequently vexed with a conti­nual succession of calamities; yet as they could never by natures light find out the source and spring of all this, and what it was that first brought sin and sorrow upon Mankind; so in vain did they weary themselves in inventing ways of reconciling themselves to God, [Page 43] and procuring his Favour, whom they saw to be displeased, and of curing the Maladies of their disordered and dis­composed Natures: in both which they took such strange and horrid cour­ses, as did but increase the evil they lay under, and exceedingly multiply their own guilts. Now it being thus, how can the Principles of Reason and Philosophy be a safe Rule, whereby to interpret the Holy Scriptures.

CHAP. III.

TO this Argument, all the reply § 1. that I can conceive will be made, may be reduced to a few particulars, which I shall briefly dispatch.

‘It will be said, That this Argu­ment holds of Man's Reason, while Excepti­on 1. he is destitute of the Written Word; but reacheth not them who have the Scriptures to enlighten them.’

To pass by other Answers that may be gathered from what hath been al­ready Sol. said; This Exception yields the Cause: For it supposeth Man's Reason unable to discover the Mind of God without Scripture Light. And if so, then whatsoever Revealed Truth is [Page 45] more darkly delivered in any▪ one part of Scripture, must receive light from the Scripture it self somewhere else, where it speaks more plainly: without which Man's Reason (notwithstanding the best Natural Principles to assist it) would leave him at a loss: consequent­ly it is not the principles of Reason and Philosophy that must be the Rule of Interpretation, but the Scripture it self, as shall be shewn hereafter.

‘But, say some, when we say Rea­son § 2. by its Principles is to Interpret Scripture, we mean it of right Rea­son, Excepti­on 2. proceeding upon sound Princi­ples, and not of Reason depraved, and Principles corrupted.’

I answer, these are smooth Words, but what do they signifie? There were Sol. some colour for this reply, if uncor­rupt Reason (either in the Faculty or the Principles) were infallibly to be found. The Exception speaks of Rea­son abstractly and in the Idea, suppo­sing it freed from all those depravati­ons and entanglements that have cap­tived [Page 46] and debased it: Whereas we are speaking of Reason as it is in Men, who are to make use of it. And we know what is said of Man, Gen. 6. 5. God saw that the wickedness of Man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was onely evil continually. Every Man is thus depraved from his birth; so that we have all need of renewing in our high­est faculties, in the Spirit of our Mind, Eph. 4. 23. And this original depra­vation is increased by a farther con­tracted malignity through vitious ha­bits and deceitfulness of sinfull lusts. In the most it remains wholly thus: and in the best in this life it is but in part renew'd; and therefore in danger to mistake, and that grosly, in things Spi­ritual, when it goes to work onely by its own natural Principles. And where­as it may be thought or said, there is no danger so long as Reason performs it works aright: I reply, how shall that be known? by what Rule shall we ex­amine and find out when Reason pas­seth a right judgment? or how shall the [Page 47] Principles that Reason pretends to use in matters of Revelation, be tryed, if not by the Scriptures? Shall the un­questionable Word of God be brought to the Bar of Man's Reason, and be tryed by its Dictates? and shall these Dictates of our lame and imperfect Rea­son in things of God and Eternity be uncontrolable, and admitted with­out any debate in matters of pure Re­velation, as if they were the only Su­premeLaw, over-ruling all supernatural discoveries of God's Will? do we not know that mens conceptions concern­ing the Principles of Reason are vari­ous? Some say, one thing is a sound Principle of Reason, and others will plead for the contrary: besides, there is as great a difference in the application of the same Principle to particular cases. When Reason alone is the war­rant Duct. Dub. lib. 3. c. 3. and the guide (says the late Bishop of Down) a Man shall not alway find out what [...] pleasing to God: and it will be to no purpose to say, that not every Man's Reason, but Right Reason shall be the Law; for every Man thinks his own [Page 48] Reason right; and whole Nations differ in the assignation and opinons of Right Reason: and who shall be Judge of all but God.

This is certain, that sundry Philoso­phers of old, who were cried up for Men of strong Reason, and many learn­ed Men of late, who profess a high esteem of Reason, and frequently ap­peal to that, in their Novel Opinions, are chargeable with many gross absur­dities in their Tenets, inconsistent with the plainest principles of natural light. Yea, are not many learned Atheists reckoned, by themselves and others, great Masters of Reason? What Natu­ral Principle more clear and undoubt­ed than this, That two contradictions can­not be true at once. Insomuch as it is conceived by some, that all Principles that are not thought fit to be proved in any Natural Science (if they be truely so) may easily be resolved into this one. A thing cannot at once be and not be. And yet even this Principle of Contradictions hath been denied by some: whereof we have a pregnant in­stance [Page 49] in Weigelius and his Followers, and a late Carmelite Frier; beside what Aristotle says of some ancient Philoso­phers. Great is Mans proneness to judge according to his inclinations and interests. It's a known observati­on, Such as a Man is, such he thinks God to be. And according to the pre­vailing bent of his Heart, so are his Conceptions of Truth or Falshood. And it was an old complaint, Scriptu­rarum esse volumus quae nostra sunt. Be it therefore granted, that there are some common Maxims wherein all agree, being such as shine by their own light, and which the Scriptures always sup­pose: Yet these are so general and so few, that they will not reach far, to be sure not beyond those things that are merely natural. And as for those acquired Principles that are drawn by deduction from the former, there is so great variety of Mens ap­prehensions concerning them, that they cannot be allowed in this case for a sufficient or tolerable Rule of Judg­ment. For in these we see that those [Page 50] who are for determining all by Maxims of Reason, are greatly at odds amongst themselves; and some in that variety must needs err, if not all.

‘But perhaps it will be said, That Mens Expositions of Scripture are Inst. likewise various, and many times erro­neous; and yet the Scripture is not re­jected, because that is always the same and incorrupt; so though Mens ap­prehensions about the Principles of Reason be various and mistaking, yet the Principles themselves are the same all the World over, and conti­nue in all Ages uncorrupt; and there­fore may well be admitted for a Rule.’

To this I answer:

As the Scriptures are the same and incorrupt (notwithstanding Mens va­rious Sol. and erroneous apprehensions and Interpretations) so we can tell where to find them, and have recourse to them, and consult with them: they are a standing Record open and ob­vious to our search. But for the Prin­ciples [Page 51] of Reason in matters of Religi­on, though they lie fundamentally in the nature of things; yet if we lay Scri­ture aside, they are not to be found formally existing any where but in the Minds and Writings of Men, who are confessed to be various, and liable to mistake: and accordingly Natural Prin­ciples are variously conceived, and may be dangerously perverted: so that if we had not the Scriptures as a surer Test to try all by, we should be al­ways at great uncertainty, and in ap­parent danger of miscarrying. For I take it to be a certain Truth, that the Bible is the most perfect comprehensi­on of all Principles of Religion, as well Natural as Supernatural: Nor know I any of the former of these (for of the latter no question is made) but what is more evidently and distinct­ly to be seen in the Scripture than in any other Record whatsoever.

‘But Reason, say some, is of God, §. 3. Excepti­on 3. and therefore cannot deceive us.’

[Page 52] I answer:

1. Our Senses also are of God, and yet they may and do deceive us. 2. A­dam's Sol. Reason was of God; and yet that deceived him, even in his first state, much more may ours now. 3. Though Man's Reason be of God (both as to the faculty and all its sound Principles) yet every thing that Man's Reason sug­gesteth is not of God. There is (as the Philosophers complained) a [...] a spurious and adulterate kind of reasoning. And how shall I know whether that which pretends to Rea­son, and to be of God, be so indeed, but by bringing it to the Test of Scri­pture, where God hath made known his Mind about Matters of Religion: (for of them I speak) more plainly and more fully than by the clearest Beams of Natural Light.

‘But it is further replyed, That Truth Excepti­on 4. Phil. Scr. Int. cap. 5. par. 7. &c. 8. par 1. is not contrary to Truth: therefore no­thing in Scripture can be contrary to Reason.’

[Page 53] Understanding it of sound Reason, Sol. this is all granted. But then let it be considered. 1. That every thing is not to be accounted contrary to Rea­son that Reason cannot reach. 2. The former difficulty recurrs; How or where shall we be assured that what is al­ledged for sound Reason, is so indeed, excepting self-evident Principles, which are, as I said but General and Few) where shall it be tried? seeing there have been, and are many Maxims or Axioms commonly received among learned Men, that will not hold. 3. What if there be no contrariety, but only an appearance thereof? It doth not therefore follow, that Scripture is to be controll'd by Reason: but if there seem any opposition, the dictates of Reason are to be reduced and recon­ciled to Scripture. For the Princi­ples of Reason (such I mean as are true and sound) may carry an ap­pearing opposition to some Scripture Assertions, because perhaps the said Principles though generally received, [Page 54] do admit of some limitations and re­strictions, which through the weak­ness and imperfection of our Reason, we are not aware of. In this case it were bold and dangerous to bend the Scripture to those Principles. That which is variable and fallible is to be over-ruled by that which is fixed and unerring, as the Holy Scripture un­doubtedly is: and whatsoever is in­deed contrary to the Voice of God speaking in this Sacred Volume, what­ever pretence it may have of Reason or Philosophy, it is but [...], 1 Tim. 6. 20. It is an honest Speech of Aquinas, which I find quo­ted Qu. disp. de [...]ide art. 8. [...] Davenant de Jud. Contro­ver. cap. 27 by our Judicious and Learned Davenant: Omnis creata Veritas est de­fectibilis, nisi quatenus per veritatem in­creatam rectificatur; unde nec homo nec Angelus infallibiliter ducit in verita­tem, nisi quatenus in iis loquentis Dei testimonium consideratur. To which I shall subjoin the judgement of Carte­sius, whose Authority may perhaps be of more credit with some now, than either that of a Schoolman, or of an [Page 55] Apostle. Memoriae nostrae pro summa Cartes. Prima Philos. par. 1. artic. 76 regula est infigendum, ea quae nobis à Deo revelata sunt, ut omnium certissima esse credenda. Et quamvis fortè lu­men rationis quam maximè clarum, & evidens aliud quid nobis suggerere vide­retur, soli tamen auctoritati divinae po­tius quam proprio judicio, fidem esse ad­hibendam. This (says he) must be firm­ly remembred as our chief Rule, That those things which are revealed to us of God, are to be believed as of all things the most certain. And although perhaps the most clear and manifest light of Reason may seem to suggest to us some other thing; we are nevertheless to give credit to Divine Authority alone, rather than to our own judgment.

CHAP. IV.

MY second Argument is, That there is no proportion between Mans § 1. Arg. 2. Reason, and the Mysteries of Divine Revelation. These are so sublime, they are out of the ken of a Natural Understanding; they are of a far dif­ferent kind from the highest Natural Principles. How little is it that Mans Reason by its own Light can discover of the Nature of God, and his Eter­nal Counsels. The Heathen, who want­ed Scripture Light, did but grope as Men in the dark, Act. 17. 27. How greatly are we to seek in judging of the Wisdom, and Goodness, and Power, and Justice of God, if we have no higher light than Natural Reason to direct us? Nor need this seem strange, when we see how much the most know­ing [Page 57] Men are at a loss concerning them­selves, the nature and faculties of the Soul, and the manner of its union with the Body, and how little insight they have into many of the minuta naturae. Can it then be wondred that Mans Rea­son should be unable by its own light to have a clear view of the Divine Per­fections that are infinite and incom­prehensible? Whence was it that so many of the wisest Heathens were so gravell'd at the proceedings of a Di­vine Providence, when they saw good Men suffer, and bad Men prosper? How did Cato, that severe Moralist, stumble at the success that Julius Caesar had against Pompey? But what shall we say to that great Mistery of Mans Redempti­on by Christ? The line of Mans Rea­son is too short to reach these [...] 1 Cor. 2. 10. Therefore Evangelical 1 Tim. 3. 16. 1 Cor. 2. 7. Rom. 16. 25. 1 Cor. 2. Eph. 3. 10. 1 Pet. 1. 12. Doctrine is frequently called a great Mistery; containing such things as Eye hath not seen, nor Ear Heard, nor have entered into the Heart of Man to conceive; things beyond the reach, not of Men only, but [Page 58] of Angels. It is true, that all Men could not but know God to be very good; they found it and felt it in the daily effects of his sustaining and preserving Providence, and his wonderful patience and forbearance towards them: and they did know also that God is Just, and a Righteous A­venger of Sin; this they might see in the Judgments that he brought upon the World, beside the inward witness of their own accusing Consciences. The wrath of God was revealed from Heaven against all ungodliness and un­righteousness of Men, Rom. 1. 18. And they knew the [...] the righteous judgment of God, that they who do such wickednesses as they were conscious to in themselves, were worthy of death, Rom. 1. 32. But now how to reconcile these two, the Goodness of God to his Creatures, and his severe Indignation against Sinners, so as with any satisfaction to hope for pardon and acceptance with him; here their Prin­ciples of Reason faill'd them. They saw themselves in a very ill case, and that [Page 59] there was a necessity of somewhat to appease the provoked Anger of the Divine Majesty; but how or which way this should be, they could not tell; and therefore lost themselves in a Maze of infinite Mistakes in their attempts about it. Now it being so, it is im­possible that Reason by its Natural Principles should be a competent Judge of Scripture-Revelations. It must therefore submit its own conceptions and Dictates to the Doctrine of Faith contained in the Scripture.

Here possibly it will be replied (as § 2. Excepti­on. before to the precedent Argument) ‘That all this may be granted of those that enjoyed not the Gospel and Written Word: but where this is, Reason may be allowed to judge and determine by its Principles con­cerning the things there revealed.’

To this I answer two things:

First, This implies a contradiction; Sol. 1▪ for it is not the Words or Sentences of Scripture that reveal any Mistery to [Page 60] us further than thereby the Mind of God is made known to us. Now if this cannot be found out from the Scripture it self, but from Principles of Reason, then it is Reason it self that first discovers the Mistery. I grant that Reason (that is the faculty of Rea­son) is and must be the instrument whereby we apprehend what God speaks in the Scripture. But if there be any part of Scripture so dark, as that its meaning cannot be gather­ed from the Words, neither conside­red by themselves, nor compared with other Passages of Sacred Writ; I would know how comes Reason in Interpre­ting such an obscure place (supposing it to be obscure) to find that such and such Words so placed do contain in them such an Assertion, when the Words and Sentences themselves cannot re­solve us? You'll say, our Reason tea­ches us by the light of its own com­mon notions, that this and no other must be the meaning of such a place. Is it not then plain, that Human Reason fetcheth that Truth (if it be a Truth) [Page 61] from it self, and not from the Scriptures? For the Scripture (according to this Hypothesis) gives an, uncertain sound, onely Reason determines it. Remem­ber we are speaking of matters of pure Revelation. Now if the Sentences of Scripture under debate do neither by themselves, nor with the help of any other, clearly and certainly signifie any such thing as is fasten'd upon them; such Arguers cannot say, they have it by Divine Revelation, unless they will pretend to that Enthusiastick Inspira­tion, which they profess to decry, and falsly charge upon their Opposites.

Secondly, I add further, that there are sundry things revealed in Scripture, whereof God gives us no other Rea­son than his own Will. And if our Reason will not rest satisfied with that, it will but weary it self in fruitless in­quiries, and dangerously miscarry by its bold determinations. For instance, what account can our Reason give why God should provide a Saviour for lost Man, and none for the lapsed Angels? Why he should cloath his [Page 62] only begotten Son with our disho­noured nature, and expose him to so bitter Sufferings for the Sin of Man? Why he should [...] severely punish the Crucifiers of his Son, when what they did was fore-determined by himself, in order to Mans Salvation? And why he should suffer so much wickedness to be done, which himself hates, and could, if he pleased, by his Almighty Power hinder? These and many more such instances might be given, where­in Mans Reason is puzzl'd, as not find­ing any thing wherein it can acquiesce, but the Will and pleasure of God that thus it should be. Again, God re­quires we should believe him upon his naked Word, though we know not which way that which he says can be; And accordingly he so manifests to us his Mind, that he will not gratifie our vanity or pride in resolving the que­ries, and satisfying the objections that our curiosity may start about the Truth revealed. It is enough for us to know what he hath said, and to take it upon the Authority of his [Page 63] word without asking how or why? And it is indeed the highest Reason imagina­ble, that we should give absolute cre­dit to what he speaks The Rea­son of Man (saith the Bishop of Down) is a right Judge alway when she is rightly informed: but in many things she knoweth nothing but the face of the Article: and in these cases our understanding is to submit, and not to inquire fur­ther: But if it will not consent to a Revelation, until it see a rea­son of the proposition, it doth not obey at all; for it will not submit till it cannot chuse. Duct. Dubit. li. 1. cap. 2..

God's Sovereignty (saith the learn­ed Verul. d [...] Augm. sciem. l. 9. Lord Verulam) reaches to the whole Man, extending itself no less to his Rea­son than his Will; so that it well becomes man to deny himself universally, and yield up all to him. Wherefore as we are bound to obey the Law of God, notwith­standing the reluctancy of our Will, so are we also to believe his Word, though against the reluctancy of our Reason.

I shall conclude this with the Words of the learned Grotius, who having asserted the Doctrines of Scripture to be no way contrary to sound Rea­son, (but agreeable thereunto) he De Ver. Relig. Christ. lib. 3. he hath this remarkable passage. Ultra haec pro comperto aliquid affirmare, aut de Dei natura, aut de ejus voluntate, [Page 64] solo ductu humanae rationis, &c. How dangerous and deceitfull a thing it is to affirm any thing for certain either of the Nature or Will of God, beyond what we have in Holy Writ, by the sole conduct of Humane Reason, we are taught by the many dissentient opinions, not only of Schools, but of particular Philosophers among themselves. Nor is this any great wonder; for if they ran out into very differing apprehensious when they disputed about the nature of their own Mind, much more must it needs be so with those who are desirous to determine any thing concerning that Supreme Mind that is so far above us. If prudent Men count it dangerous to search into the Counsels of Kings, which by all our search we cannot discover; who is there so sagacious, as can hope by his own con­jectures to find out what God will do, among those things that depend upon his meer pleasure.

CHAP. V.

IN the third place, If the Sense of Arg. 3. Scripture be to be regulated and de­termined by Natural Principles, then the last resolution of a Mans Faith in those points (as to the formal object of it) will be into Man himself and the dictate of his own Reason. For the ultimate reason or ground of our be­lieving in this case will not be the ve­racity of God, speaking in the Scri­pture, but the Voice of our own Rea­son, persuading us from its own Prin­ciples, when we can see nothing in the Words of Scripture to require it. And this plainly falls in with the absurd con­ceit of the Quakers: who commonly profess to own nothing that is laid down in the Bible, as the Mind of God, but what is witnessed by the light within them. Which is no more in [Page 66] other terms than this, That they will take nothing from the Scripture but what is agreeable to their own Rea­son. For the light they speak of, with which they say every Man comes into the World (for which they alledge that in Joh. 1. 9.) is nothing else but Mans Reason, and the common notions of it: which though some of them have heretofore denied, yet now their chief Heads and Leaders do openly avow. And this is that which they make the standing Rule of what they believe and practise, and not the Holy Scriptures. We rather say with an ancient Schoolman, Apud Aristotelem argumentum est ratio rei dubiae faciens Altisiod. apud l. Gerbard Loc. com. de S. Script. c. 11. fidem; sed apud Christum argumentum est fides faciens rationem. The way of arguing in Aristotle's School is by Reason begetting assent; but in Christ's School it is by Faith, which is instead of all Reason.

CHAP. VI.

FOurthly, It will follow from this supposal, That in matters of pure Arg. 4. Revelation, the Mind of God may be better known by the common prin­ciples of Natural Light, than by the Ho­ly Scriptures: which carries with it a palpable contradiction. For matters of pure Revelation are supposed to be su­pernatural; and if these as laid down in Scripture, cannot be understood from the Scripture it self, but must have such a Sense given them, as the Maxim of Na­tural Reason shall determine; then cer­tainly it is not Revelation, but Reason that discovers them: And so what need will there be of Scripture. Indeed this conceit looks very like that absurd dotage of Weigelius (if it be not the same with it) that Mans knowledge of [Page 68] all things whatsoever must be fetcht from within himself, & not from without. Tenôris (says he) & omnia nôris; omnia enim es, non minus quam Deus. i. e. Know thy self and thou know­est all things; for thou art all things no less than God. Which (besides many other prodigious absur­dities) plainly shuts out all supernatu­ral Revelation. And that this lies at the bottom of the Exercitators Dis­course, I find reason enough to suspect, if not conclude For (besides what he says in his sixth Chapter, the first Paragraph which I shall wave insisting on) in his Epilogue at the end of his Book, he propounds an Objection against his whole Discourse, viz. ‘That if Phi­losophy be the Rule of Interpreting the Holy Scripture, then the Scripture is useless and written to no purpose: for seeing the truth of all the Senses of Scripture, which are to be search'd out and tryed by Philosophy, must first be perceived before they be drawn out and examined, to what end is it that we should have recourse to Scripture to learn any thing from it. This is the Objection which himself makes against his own Position.’ In an­swer [Page 69] whereto he runs out into a long Harangue of words, and (as his man­ner is) propounds a frivolous distinction, and tedrously dilates upon it to amuse his Reader. But the sum of all comes to this, That the words of Scripture are of no further use than as they are signs of conceptions and things; and under that consideration they cannot be un­derstood, unless the things signified by them be first known, at least in some gross and confused manner. Whereof he gives us this instance, that where we sind in Scripture that God is Omni­scient, we cannot understand this un­less we first know what God is, and what Omniscience is. Therefore, says he, all the benefit that any can get by any Book that is written, is but this, that it stirs up the Mind of the Reader to reflect upon the clear and distinct Idea's of those things in his Mind which the Book treats of; not that the Book can, of it self bring him to the true know­ledge of things, much less that it can beget any clear or distinct Ideas in his Mind which were not there before. And [Page 70] thus he tells us it is with the Scripture; all the use of it is to stir up the Reader or Hearer to think of the things that it propounds, and inquire into them, and examine them whether they be so as they are there propounded; and that they may do this, they must make use of Philosophy to try what is there writ­ten. Therefore (adds he) the Scripture is to be used, not that it should of it self inform us in the truth, or render the truth more clear and distinct, or make it more firm to us; but that it may give us occasion and matter of meditating on those things which per­haps otherwise we should never have minded. Therefore (says he still) the utility and excellency of the Scriptures above other Books consists onely in this, That the things it speaks of are of so great concernment to our ever­lasting blessedness; not for any use they are of to instruct us in the Truth. This is all the use that he allows the Scripture: from whence I think will inevitably follow that he owns the ne­cessity of no knowledge of God or [Page 71] Religion but what is natural. And so all supernatural Revelation, or at least all necessity of it is denied. And if there be no other use of the Written Word but what this Author assigns it, its put into the same rank with a Crucifix, or a Deaths Head. Indeed the whole de­sign of his Book, and of that other Tractatus Theologi­co-politicus Tract that is prefixed to its latter Edi­tion (written, as is supposed, by the same Author) is utterly to undermine and overthrow the credit of the Scri­ptures. We need not wonder that he so often derides and calumniates the Prote­stant Doctrine of the Spirits internal il­lumination of the Mind, which con­sists in curing the indisposition of the Subject, and fitting it for the right un­derstanding of Heavenly Things: (of which more hereafter in an Appendix to my present Discourse) when he will not allow the necessity of so much as an Enternal Light for the Revelation of Supernatural Objects, as acknow­ledging no such things. And he that is thus principled, must needs be very ignorant of himself, and of the ruines [Page 72] that Sin hath made among the whole Race of Adam, and the woful depra­vation of Mans Nature by his first A­postasie. But for the Readers full sa­tisfaction about the necessity of Super­natural Revelation, I dare commend to his perusal (besides many other useful Discourses that might be named) that excellent Piece of the Eminently-ac­complish'd Sir Charles Wolsly, concern­ing the Reasonableness of Scripture Be­lief.

CHAP. VII.

AGain fifthly, This Assertion lets § 1. loose the Bridle to proud and Arg. 5. wanton Wits to overthrow the Foun­dations of Christian Religion; for though there be not the least real re­pugnancy between the Doctrines of Christianity and the Principles of Right Reason and Sound Philosophy, which undoubtedly there is not (as I have already premised and asserted) yet there being no certain and infallible Record of these Principles, by which, as by the Rule of Judgement, particu­lar Mens Reasonings may be tried; If Scripture Revelation must be interpre­ted by Mens Reasonings, I know not the any Error that hath ever crept into the Church of Christ, either in matter of Faith or Practice, since the first publi­cation of the Gospel, but may be in­troduced [Page 74] anew by this Engine. The heretical Blasphemies of Servetus and Socinus, which sprang up of late years; and those of the Marcionites and Ma­nichees that infested the Church in for­mer times; together with the loath­some impurities of the Gnosticks (who esteemed themselves the only knowing Men, or to speak in the new mode, the onely Rational Divines) have fair way made them by this Trim Device.

First, Let us instance in Matters of Faith, whatsoever is said in Scripture about the Creation of the World, the Conception of our Saviour in a Virgins Womb, the Personal Union of the two Natures, the Resurrection of the Body at the last Day; these, with many more that might be named, let them be brought to the Bar of Reason, and tri­ed by its Principles (as they are to be found in the Minds of Men) and what will it come to? We have seen already what use some Men have made of this way to subvert the weightiest Truths of the Gospel.

[Page 75] But here it will be excepted perhaps Excepti­on. by some, ‘That the Fundamentals of Christian Religion being clear and plain in Scripture, there is no fear of this inconvenience.’

To this I answer:

First, If Divine Revelations must be Sol. 1. no otherwise received or understood, than as Men see ground for them in their own Reason, the plainest and clearest Doctrines of Scripture will be rejected. I shall here give two Instan­ces, as I find them quoted by a late learned Author. The one is of Soci­nus, who says, That he would not be­lieve Lib. de Christo Servatore. Christ to have satisfied for our Sins, though he should read it once and again in Scripture; the infallibility of the Re­vealer not being sufficient to establish it, unless he had declared it by its causes and effects, and so satisfied Mens Rea­son concerning the possibility of it. Smalcius is the other, who says, That Hom. 8. on John 1. he would not believe the Incarnation of the Son of God, though he should meet [Page 76] with it in express terms in the Bible. The same Author says elsewhere, that In prefati­one cont. Frantzium. by Reason alone we determine the possi­bility and impossibility of the Articles of Faith. To which I might add the bold assertion of a late English Re­monstrant in a Volume publish'd some years ago, where he says, I verily believe Redempti­on Redeem­ [...]d cap. 13. sect. 33. that in case any such unchangeableness of Gods love (viz. as should assure the Saints infallible perseverance) were to be found in, or could regularly be dedu­ced from the Scriptures, it were a just ground to any considering Man to questi­on their Authority, or whether they were from God or no. And a late Belgick Tra­ctator, having affirmed that the miracu­lous Tract. The­ologico­pōl. c. 6. Works spoken of in Scripture were not any thing against or besides the established order of nature, absolutely concludes that whatsoever the Scripture affirms to have been done, did all neces­sarily come to pass according to the Laws of Nature: and if any thing contrary to this could be found in Scripture, or truly gathered from any thing in it; that was certainly added to the Scripture by some [Page 77] sacrilegious hand, as being against Na­ture, and therefore against Reason.

Secondly, Men that resolve to make [...]. their Reason the Rule of Interpretation will not stick to charge the Scripture with obscurity in its plainest Propositi­ons, if they suit not with their pre­conceived notions. The experience of the present age puts it past all denial or dispute, that when Men have es­poused an Hypothesis which they are not willing to relinquish, they will quarrel with the most evident Scri­pture, accusing it of obscurity; and to make their charge good, they will en­deavour by their strain'd glosses, to raise a dust, and darken the Sense of it, though it shine never so clearly by its own light to every impartial and un­prejudiced Reader. Hence it is that the Papists do so frequently with open mouth charge the Apostle Paul with obscurity in his Writings; because in­deed he speaks more clearly and plain­ly than they would have him, for that great Doctrine of Justification by the imputed Righteousness of Christ, and [Page 78] against Justification by our own Works. And it may be, some will be as ready to find fault with the same Apostle, when he says, Ephes. 5. 18. Be not drunk with Wine, wherein is excess; but be fil­led with the Spirit: as speaking too darkly; because indeed they think he speaks too broadly against the debau­chery that they practice; and so plain­ly for the Spirit, which they scorn and deride.

Thirdly, Nay more, some are grown to that heighth (as I shall have occasion 3. to shew more fully in my second Part) as to assert that the Scripture is plain in nothing, but universally obscure; and make this their great ground for their setting up Reason and Philoso­phy as the Rule to determine the Sense of the Bible. And let this be granted them, they will soon make the Scri­pture speak whatsoever themselves please: and so the Bible shall be but as a dead Image, and Mans depraved Reason like the Daemon within shall give the Oracle.

[Page 79] 2. Come we next to matters of § 2. Practice. It is easie to instance in se­veral commands of God in Scripture, that are directly opposite to the whole corrupt interest of lapsed nature: As, when he requires the mortifying of our earthly desires, the love of our deadliest Enemies, the denying our of selves in whatsoever is dear to us in this World, even to the laying down of our lives for the defence of his Truth, upon the bare hope of an invi­sible happiness in another World. Now considering how Mans Reason is dark­ned and enslav'd, and no where per­fectly cured, if Mens Reason must by its own Principles interpret the Sense of Scripture, how numerous are the objections that will be made against these and all other Precepts that are not to the Gust of Mans degenerate na­ture? Thus did the Gnosticks of old plead for denying the Faith in persecu­ting times to save their life: for what! (said they) Doth God delight in the death of Men? he stands in no need of our Bloud: Christ came to save Mens [Page 80] lives, and not to expose them to hazard. And with these reasonings they shisted off the-command of owning the Truth in the face of danger. And what the Author of the Leviathan hath written of this, with a specious, though falaci­ous pretence of Reason, is not un­known.

But I shall instance in two extraor­dinary commands given to particular persons. The one is that which God did by immediate Revelation give to Abraham, requiring him to offer up his Gen. 22. onely Son Isaac for a Burnt-offering. What would the Principles of Natural Reason have said to this, might they have been admitted to interpret this Command. ‘What? Can infinite good­ness require such an unnatural act as this, for a Father to lay violent hands on his own Child? Hath not God strictly forbidden Murder? Hath he not always manifested his tender regard to the life of Man? And hath he not planted that ten­der affection in the Heart of a Parent, that makes him abhor to embrue his [Page 81] hands in Childs Bloud? Therefore surely (would Mans Reason say) the meaning of this injunction is something else, far different from what the words seem to sound: there is some more mysterious sense to be found out, and a milder interpretation to be made of this Divine Oracle, such as may consist with those Notions of God which we are taught by that Inter­nal Light that shines in the Hearts of all Men. It is most rational there­fore to interpret it by an Allegory; Isaac must be sacrific [...]d in Effigie, or a Lamb out of the Flock must have Isaac's name put upon it, and so offer'd up to God: or (according to the notation of his name) we must sacri­fice that joy and delight that we have had in our Son Isaac, wherein per­haps we have exceeded, by mortify­ing our affectious to him, and have him hereafter as if we had him not.’ The other instance shall be in the com­mand given by our Saviour to the Rich young Man, to sell all, and give to the Poor, and follow Him in hopes of a [Page 82] Treasure in Heaven. We may proba­bly suppose, by the Mans turning his back, what objections his Reason made against it. ‘Are not my Possessions the good Gifts of God? and shall I unthankfully cast away what he hath given me? I am to love my Neighbor as my self; therefore surely not to strip my self of my subsistence to help my Neighbor, and so lose the use and benefit of what I have.’ True, here is a plain Command. But could not this mans Reason have excogitated some hidden Sense to satisfie the Com­mand, and yet save his Goods? Yes sure, had the Man learnt but this new Art of Interpreting that some have got now adays, he might have thought within himself, ‘That selling all was the disengaging of his affections from them; and giving to the poor, his re­lieving them in a convenient propor­tion, so as still to preserve his Estate; and follow Christ he might in a good and holy life, though he did not al­ways personally attend him.’ But now would not this way of Interpre­tation [Page 83] in either of the forenamed instan­ces, have been a plain eluding of an ex­press command? And yet I am sure the bold attempts of some in our Age, who are great Pretenders to Reason, have in sundry considerable and clear Points of Religion, gone as far as this comes to, and much further, in torturing the Scriptures into a Sense as contrary to that which they fairly give us of them­selves, as darkness is to light. And in­deed by the help of this Engine, what will not be adventured by auda­cious Wits, that have cast off the awe of God, and of his holy Word; Men whose glory it is [...]? Let but others follow the Tract that some have already trodden out to them, and they will make the whole Bible one great Cipher, utterly insignificant of his Mind and Will by whose Au­thority it was endited; and that which Erasmus feared in his time, Ne sub ob­tentu priscae literaturae caput erigere ten­tet Paganismus, may be unhappily fulfilled in our days.

CHAP. VIII.

LAstly, One great end of Scri­pture-Revelation, Arg. 6. is to help our Understandings in matters of Religion, partly by rectifying our mistaken and depraved Reason, and keeping us from being misled in the Things of God by the Principles we have received; part­ly by supplying the defects of Reason, acquainting it with those things, which by its own Natural Light it could ne­ver reach, being by their sublimity and mysteriousness wholly above it. There­fore the Doctrine of Scripture doth in its tendency [...], cast down reasonings, and [...] cap­tivate every Notion or Conception to the obedience of Christ, 2. Cor. 10. 5. For any therefore in matter of doubt [Page 85] or difficulty about the Sense of Scri­pture-Revelation, to run to the Prin­ciples of Reason, is to measure the Rule by that which should be measu­red by it: And what a base dishonour is this to the Sacred Oracles, to subject them to the usurp'd Dictatorship of that which is to be regulated by them, and to submit themselves to its final Judgement.

‘But here the Exercitator replies, Excepti­on. Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 16. par. 9. That in the present case the Divine Oracles are not submitted to the Judgement of Reason or Philosophy; but onely the Letters and Syllables, the Words and Sentences of Scri­ture; which are nothing but loqua­ces soni, aut horum mutae notae, some wordy sounds, or the dumb signs of them, framed for the purpose by Hu­mane Institution, which therefore may without any disparagement be sub­jected to the Judgement of Reason and Philosophy, which are the emi­nent Gifts of God.’ And for the bet­ter managing of this Plea, he makes great use of a Discinction which he [Page 86] elsewhere inculcates, to wit, the con­sideration of the Scriptures Materially or Formally.

To this I answer:

1. Surely had the Ancient Church been of this Gentlemans Mind, they Sol. 1. would never have so severely censu­red the Traditores, that delivered up their Bibles to the Persecuters, to save their own lives in the days of Dicole­sian: and it might have been pleaded in their behalf, that they did not give up the Divine Oracles, but only a heap of Dumb Signs or Characters in Ink and Paper.

2. And the same would have justi­fied the rage of Antiochus in tearing 2. and burning the Books of the Law; 1. Macc. 1. 56. and the madness of the Papists in do­ing the like at several times by the Protestants Bibles: all which might, by the help of this shuffle, have plead­ed for themselves, that they did not burn the Holy Scriptures, (no by no means) but only a bundle of unsens'd Characters.

3. As for the Exercitators distiction 3. [Page 87] (which is the foundation of this con­ceit) I intend to deal with it hereaf­ter, when I come to speak of Scripture being its own Interpreter. Therefore v. 2. par. ch. 12 at present I shall let it pass.

CHAP. IX.

I Come now to examine what was al­ledged by the Adverse Part, and to answer the Arguments whereby they would prove Reason and Philosophy to be the Scriptures best Interpreter.

1. The Exercitator argues from some Positions by him formerly laid down Arg. 1. which he supposes himself to have de­mon Ph. Scr. Int. c. 6. par. 1. stratively proved in his 4th Chap­ter, viz. ‘That the next and immediate Sense of the Scripture is manifold, and whatsoever Truths occur to the Rea­ders Mind in the perusal of any Scri­pture, they are all to be taken for the true intended sense and meaning of that Scripture: and Philosophy being the true, certain, and undoubt­ed knowledge of the nature of things demonstratively deduced from the [Page 89] Principles of Natural Light; there­fore by this the several Truths that lie in the Scripture, may be best drawn out and demonstrated, and all false Interpretations discovered, and con­sequently this is the infallible Rule of Interpretation.’ This is the Sum of his Argument. For answer, Here are Sol. many things crowded together in this captious Sorites, which must be parti­cularly discussed, that the vanity and folly of the whole may the better ap­pear.

1. He supposes the immediate Sense 1. of Scripture to be manifold, and that one and the same Sentence of Scripture affords great variety of different Sen­ses. This I deny: and do maintain with the consentient Judgment of the Reformed Churches, that the Sense of Scripture is but one. Thus much I grant:

1. That there may be varions ap­plications or accommodations made of one and the same Li [...]eral Sense of Scri­pture, so it be done with due caution; and [...]o otherwise can that threefold [Page 90] Sense which some speak of, Allegoricla, Anagogical, Tropological, be allowed.

2. That one single Sentence of Scri­pture may and frequently doth contain many very weighty Truths in it; but these are not Co-ordinate Senses of the same Proposition; this is but one; the rest are but either some Specials included in their General, or some deductions from Scripture Assertions, as of Conclu­sions from their Principles wherein they are virtually comprehended.

3. I further grant, That sundry pas­sages of Scripture (especially in the Old Testament) have a mystical Sense besides the Literal; to wit, when one thing is propounded as a Type repre­senting somewhat else. But then the thing signified by the words of Scri­pture is but one, namely, that onely which the Literal Sense exhibits, which propounds the Type. The Antitype is not signified by the words in those Scriptures, but by the Type, which those words do immediately speak of. For example, when we find in Numb. 21. 8, 9. how by God's command Mo­ses [Page 91] set up a Brazen Serpent upon a Pole for the Bitten Israelite to look on that he might be heal'd; these words that relate the History, signifie no more than what they literally import. But the Brazen Serpent there spoken of did indeed signifie somewhat else; for it did tipically represent the future Cruci­fixion of Christ for the Salvation of Sin­ners, as our Saviour himself hath taught us, Joh. 3. 14.

Indeed this conceit of the multipli­city of Senses serves our Exercitators turn very well, because it helps to render the Scripture ambiguous and thereby obscure; and that is the prin­cipal strength of his Cause; of which I shall speak hereafter in due place. Mean while let us see what he hath to say for this fancy.

Two kinds of proof he uses, the one from Reason, the other from the Testi­mony Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 4. par. 4. of learned Men. His Reasons are drawn from Gods Omniscience and Veracity. God perfectly knows all the several significations of the words that he hath uttered in Scripture, and what­ver [Page 92] the Reader can apprehend in them: and he is also most true and faithful, and therefore would not deceive or delude any by his Words. Hence he gathers, that whatsoever sense may be made of any part of Scripture, if it be in it self a Truth, it must be own'd for the true meaning of the Spirit of God in that place.

To this I answer:

Were all this intended only of the multiplicity of subordinate Senses, de­pending on and deducible from that immediate Sense, which is but one, the Argument will hold firm. For if any thing do truely lie in any Mans words, or by due consequence be deducible from them, which himself did not mean when he spake them, he must needs be charged to be either ignorant or fal­lacious. But being intended (as it is by the Author) of a multiplicity of colla­teral and immediate Senses, his Argu­ment is a miserable inconsequence.

Next he attempts to prove this by the Testimony of Learned Men; and begins with the Jewish Rabbins, whose. [Page 93] childish and absurd conceits need no confutation: witness that instanced by this Author, their proving the multi­plicity of Senses out of Psalm 62. 12. (the 11. in our English Translation) God hath spoken once, twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God. That is, say they, God hath propound­ed one single Speech, but such as I can understand two ways, that is, ma­ny ways (a certain number being put for an uncertain) by drawing several Senses from it: wherein the Power of God consists, that he can so order and dispose his Speech, as thereby to teach men a multitude of Truths. And is not this a goodly gloss upon the Text, and an irrefragable proof of the matter in hand? Whereas the Psalmists twice hearing what God had once spoken, is no more but his diligent and attentive minding of that great and weighty Truth, That Power belongs unto God.

What he further cites out of the Fa­thers concerning the fecundity of Scri­pture, containing much in a few words, is all granted, being understood (as be­fore) [Page 94] of subordinate, not coordinate Senses. For that the Scripture should be as a formless Mass, capable of being turned by Philosophy into a thousand shapes (which this Authors conceit tends to) never was, for ought I can find, any part of their meaning.

2. Whereas he says Philosophy is a true, certain, undoubted knowledge 2. of the nature of things demonstrated by Natural Light; I ask, doth Philosophy comprehend the knowledge of all things? Or, is the nature of all things discernable by Natural Light? There are in Scripture many things Historical, Prophetical, and Dogmatical, the know­ledge whereof depends wholly upon Supernatural Revelation: What can Philosophy do here? And even in those things that are Natural, and belong to the cognisance of Philosophy, how short is that knowledge that the most learned have attained? Therefore, whereas this Author so proudly derides Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 5. par. 4. our Reformed Divines for complain­ing of the darkness of Mans Natural Reason; if he were not too wise to be [Page 95] taught, he might have learnt more mo­desty from the ancient Philosophers, the best and wisest whereof did greatly be­wail the darkness of Mans Understand­ing. Even Aristotle (who never, I think, was judged to have disparaged Humane Reason) acknowledges that our Un­derstandings, even as to the most mani­fest things in nature, are but as the Eyes of the Owl and Bat to the day-light. And though both he and others of them, being unacquainted with Scri­pture, could not clearly discover the true original of this darkness, yet some weak conjectures some of them have made of it, and (whether by any Tra­dition received from the Jews, or by some other means I shall not enquire) some general and confused inti­mation they had, that Man had lost his Primitive Excellency, that the Wings of his Soul (for so they express it) had by some sad fall been so bro­ken, that he could not arrive at any considerable measures of knowledge by his greatest industry. And hence arose that fond mistake among some of [Page 96] them, that the Souls of Men ha­ving had a pre-existence before their union with their Bodies, and having offended in that State, were for a pu­nishment of their Error, thrust into these gross terrestial receptacles and that this caused the imperfection and obscurity of Mens Understand­ings. But to those who own the Scripture, and may learn from thence what Mans Primitive State was, and how he fell, and are any whit acquainted with themselves, methinks it should be no strange Riddle, that the Mind is clouded and benighted even in things Natural, and therefore in Supernatural much more. But where is that Philo­sophy that this Exercitator cryes up for so certain and infallible? and which another Author of like Principles does Lambert. Velthus. de usu rationis in Theolo­gia. with profane boldness, magnifie as equal to the Holy Scriptures for its compleat perfection and infallible certainty? Where is it? In the Clouds? Sure it never was extant among men, save in the crazy conceits of some haughty self-admirers.

[Page 97] 3. As to what our Author speaks of 3. Philosophy being usefull to detect false Interpretations of Scripture; I grant, that where such false Interpretations are given, as do really entrench upon the undoubted Principles of Reason, the weakness and folly of them may well be discover'd by Philosophy: But all corrupt or perverse expositions are not to be so limited; nor is this enough to render Philosophy a suffici­ent Rule of Interpretation. The hea­then Philosophers could discover the error of their vulgar Religion, but could not direct men to the true and right, as I have shewn before. The like may be said in the present case.

4. Whereas our Exercitator further 4. adds in the close of this Argument, that from the beginning of Christiani­ty, those who were the most profound Philosophers, were generally confessed to be the happiest Interpreters of Scri­pture, I am far from being of his mind, none having more corrupted and de­praved the Scriptures, than Men of greatest eminency for Philosophick [Page 98] Learning: which I do not at all im­pute to Philosophy (truly so call'd) but to the rashness and folly of Men, who being desirous to advance that wherein they would be thought to ex­cell, have adventured to make use of their Philosophick Principles in mat­ters of a quite different and more sublime nature. But suppose we the utmost that can be supposed; That an eminent Philosopher were furnished with all the most necessary accom­plishments for the understanding of Scripture, and should duely improve them for that end; yet this would no more prove Philosophy to be the Su­pream rule of Interpretation, than Gram­mar or Rhetorick; which are every whit as necessary and useful to such a Work, if not more. No further doth any thing help us in understanding the Scripture, than it directs us to those [...] or evidences of the true sence that lie within the Scripture it self; that is, by helping us to use the Scripture as the Rule of its own Interpretation,

CHAP. X.

‘EVery one, saith the Exercitator, is the best Interpreter of his own Arg. 2. Words, and God being the Author Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 6. par. 1. of Philosophy, to him is to be as­cribed whatever Interpretation is made of the Scripture by the Maxims of Philosophy, and consequently that is to be owned as the Rule of Inter­pretation.’

But this is a strange way of Argu­mentation Sol. in a Man that pretends to Reason. If he have no better skill in Expounding than he hath in Argu­ing, he will not gain many Proselites to his Interpretations of Scripture a­mongst understanding and considerate Men. For,

1. This Argument may with full as much or more strength, be retorted up­on him, and that two ways;

[Page 100] First, If because God is the Au­thor of Philosophy, therefore Philo­s [...]phy must unfold all the difficul­ties in Scripture: Will it not as well follow, that seeing God is the unque­stionable Author of the Scriptures, therefore the Scriptures are to resolve all the difficulties in Philosophy? If it be said, that the Scriptures are not de­signed for any such end, nor fitted for such an use as to untie the knots of Philosophy; their use and design is of greater and higher concernment. I answer, neither is Philosophy designed to clear doubts in matters of Superna­tural Revelation, its use being limited to matters of an inferior Orb. Again, we may thus also retort the Argument; If God be the best Interpreter of his own Mind, then doubtless the best In­terpretation of his Mind is to be fetcht from that which is the onely certain and undoubted Record of his Mind, and that is the Scripture.

Secondly, That God is the Author 2. of all true and sound Philosophy, I grant; nor needed the Exercitator to [Page 101] have given himself the trouble of spend­ing Ph. Scr. Int. c. 5. par. 3. so many lines to prove it. But I must mind him of some few things to rectifie his mistakes.

1. He is widely out in supposing that the Wisdom spoken of in the Scri­ptures by him alledged, is no other than Philosophy. The Holy Ghost in most, if not all, of those places, speaks of something higher and more excel­lent than meer Natural Knowledge.

2. Whereas among other Humane Testimonies that the Author heaps up to prove Philosophy to be of God, he brings in Lucretius, lib. 5. de rerum natu­ra; the learned Vogelsangius hath dis­covered Indignat. Justa p. 67. his shameful mistake, telling him, that the God whom Lucretius there means, when he says,

is no other than Epicurus; and must Epicurus's Philosophy be the Scriptures Interpreter?

3. This I must add by way of li­mitation to my former concession, that [Page 102] God is not so the Author of Philoso­phy, as he is of the Scripture. He is so far the Author of the Scripture, as that he hath infallibly directed his Ser­vants in penning its several Parts, and preserved them from Error in that Work: But he is not so the Author of Philosophy, as infallibly to direct any Man in the World so as not to Err in his Philosophy. Here therefore is a very great difference: and seeing that this Philosophy (which we acknow­ledge, so far as it is sound and true, to be God's Gift) is no where to be found but in the Minds or Writings of falli­ble Men, by what certain Rule shall we judge of the Maxims of Philosophy in matters of Religion, whether they be undoubtedly true or no? Or which way shall we be assured that the afore­said Maxims (supposing them to be unquestionably true) are duely ap­plied to the matter in controver­sie? Whither shall we go in this case to find out such solid satisfaction as may give sufficient ground for that Divine Faith, that we certainly owe [Page 103] to the Doctrine of Scripture?

Thirdly, Suppose (what is not) that we had a clear and perfect Model or System of Sound Philosophy to have recourse to, so as we may truly say of it, that it is all and every Part and Par­ticle of it of Divine Original, and so complete, that there is no defect in it; yet still we must remember that Philo­sophy hath its Bounds, and discovers nothing to us but those necessary Truths which fall within the compass of na­ture; and so far we might take it for the Voice of God: But as for Superna­tural Verities, the being and discovery whereof depend upon Gods absolute Will and Arbitrary Revelation He ne­ver intended that Philosophy should be our guide in these: But here we are to keep solely and wholly to what he hath said in the Scriptures.

CHAP. XI.

‘WHatsoever, saith the aforesaid Author, is necessary to the Arg. 3. Rule of Interpretation, perfectly a­grees Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 4. par. 10. &c. 6. par. 1. to Philosophy and the Principles of Reason. For they are undoubt­edly true, free from all danger of Er­ror, and therefore cannot deceive, being grounded upon unmoveable Foundations; admitting no appeals, impartial, not inclined to this or that side; in a word, so sure and undoubt­ed, that they will force assent; pro­vided they be not bended or swayed by Mens prejudices, or vicious incli­nations.’

But, as I said before, where is this Philosophy to be found? If it be any Sol. 1. where, how comes it to pass, that those who have in all Ages been most devoted to the study of it, and most perspica­cious [Page 105] and successfull in searching the secrets of it, have yet in many things, especially that concerning Religion, so foully erred, and have been at so great odds, not onely one with another, but each with himself? Certain it is, that the Principles of Reason and Philosophy, let them be never so Sound and Stable, yet they can prevail upon none any further than they are received into the Mind: and they are no where received but according to the disposi­tion and capacity of the Subject; the darkness and imperfection of whose Understanding much alters the con­ception of the soundest Principles.

Besides, my third Answer to the pre­cedent 2. Argument will serve here; for let Philosophy be never so infallible, it must be kept within its own proper sphere, and not be applied to matters Supernatural, that are wholly out of its road, and above its reach. Of all Parts of Philosophy, the Mathematicks are generally esteemed the most demon­strative, and irrefragable. But if any should attempt by Mathematical Prin­ciples [Page 106] to Interpret what the Scripture hath reveal'd about the Creation of the World, the Incarnation of Christ, the Resurrection of the Body, the Be­lievers Union with Christ, or the like, he might well be deem'd to stand in need of a large Dose of Hellebore.

CHAP. XII.

‘BUt (says the Exercitator) there is Arg. 4. no clear and distinct perception Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 5. par. 5, 6. of a thing, but it begets an intimate persuasion in the Conscience of the Truth of what is so perceived; which Perception and Persuasion coming from God as the Cause, it may not unfitly be call'd the Persuasion, Di­ctate, Testimony, Inspiration of the Holy Spirit of God: which Divines commonly, but mistakingly ascribe to that which they call Supernatural Light, out of their low esteem of Reason, and that Natural Light that is in every Man.’

This, I confess, the Author doth not Sol. make use of among the Arguments that he produceth to defend his Cause: yet because it tends to beget a conceit (ac­cording to the drift of his Discourse) [Page 108] that what Men apprehend themselves to have a clear knowledge of by Rea­son or Philosophy, is infallibly cer­tain, and thereby qualified for the sure Interpreting of Scripture, I thought fit not to pass it over without some Ani­madversion.

This Assertion is a piece of wild somewhat (for whether I should call it Philosophy, or Divinity, Sense, of Non­sense, I know not) that if entertain'd, gives ground to Men of corrupt Minds to father their most enormous Conceits upon God and his Holy Spirit. Against it I shall propound a few Considerati­ons.

1. Do not all Ages of the Church bear witness that erring Persons may be as confidently persuaded of their mistaken opinions as others are of the Truth, strongly conceiving what they hold to be most clear and evident, so far as chearfully to lay down their lives in the defence of it? So capable are Men of being deluded by their own darkned and corrupted Reason, when they give themselves up to it as their [Page 109] sole guide, that some have denied to the death those Truths, that are in some degree knowable by Natural Light, as that grand Maxim, which is the Foun­dation of all Religion, That there is a God; witness Caesar Vaninus. But for Doctrines of meer Revelation, how peremptorily they are denied, and up­on what ground we need no farther instance than that of the Socinians, or (as they are otherwise called from a more Ancient Ring-leader) Photinians; who Dr. Pear­son in his Epistle to the Rea­der pre­fixed to his Expo­sition of the Creed of all Hereticks have most perverted the Articles of our Creed, and found out Followers in these latter ages, who have erected a new Body of Divinity in oppo­sition to the Catholick Theology, says the Reverend Bishop of Chester. Yet this new Socinian Body of Heterodoxies, (called by the Clergy of England in their Convocation, Anno 1640. a Com­plication of Heresies,) is by its Fautors maintained with highest confidence, and that under the plausible pretence of clear Perception by the Principles of Reason. Upon this account One of that way denies Gods fore-know­ledge [Page 110] of future contingencies; and up­on Crellius lib. de Deo & attribu­tis c. 24. Ostorodius Instit. cap. 6. the same ground another of them denies the Doctrine of the Trinity, and the two Natures of Christ; because their Reason tells them as clearly and evidently as the Sun shines at Noon, that these things are false.

2. This countenances the absurd opi­nion of some ancient Philosophers, That 2. man is the measure of all things: for accor­ding to this, every thing must be ac­counted true, that a Man is strongly per­suaded to be so: whereas the truth of our Perceptions lies in their consonancy to the nature of things, which must be first supposed before we can apprehend them. And therefore that great Maxim that bears such sway with some, that whatsoever I have a clear and distinct Perception of, is infalliby true, is so far from being a sure Test of Truth and Falshood, that in this dark and degenerate State of Mankind, it infallibly betrays those who trust to it, to innumerable and pernicious mi­stakes. For suppose the Principle it self should be true, That every thing [Page 111] is as we perceive, provided our Perception of it be distinct and clear: which way shall we be resolved whether this Per­ception we have of things be clear and distinct, or dark and confused? seeing experience puts us out of all doubt, that persons as far distant in their ap­prehensions of the same thing as East and West, do yet both of them with much confidence plead the greatest clearness and distinctness imaginable. What shall we think (to pass by other instances) 1 King. 22 of the contest between Micajah and the four hundred false Prophets about A­hab's Expedition? The false Prophets expressed as high a confidence of their being in the Right, when abused by a lying Spirit, as Micajah, who was true­ly guided and acted by the Holy Spirit of God. But the Explication that a Lud. Wel­zog. Cens. Cens. [...]. 68. late Author gives of this so much ap­plauded Rule, viz▪ (That then doth Rea­son clearly and distinctly perceive a thing, when it perceives it as it is in it self) renders it plainly ridiculous, supposing the thing in question. For when I am inquiring how I shall be assured that [Page 112] my apprehension of a thing is certain­ly true; the meaning is, how shall I be sure that I understand the thing to be as it really is (for the verity of my Conception consists in its agreement with the object.) Therefore to make a clear and distinct Perception, the [...] of a true and right apprehension, and to explain this clear and distinct Per­ception by saying it is a Perception of a thing as it is, is to make the same thing the Index of it self, and leaves me as much to seek as at first; for still it will be asked, how shall I know that I perceive a thing as it is, or that my apprehension agrees with the nature of the thing?

3. I might further add, That we are obliged to believe many things, where­of we cannot have a clear and distinct perception, as the Trinity of Persons in the Godhead, the Incarnation of our Saviour, the Hypostatical Union of the Divine and Humane Nature, and such like. Touching which I grant, we must have a clear perception that they are revealed ere we can believe them; [Page 113] but a clear perception of the reveal'd ob­jects themselves we cannot have, they being to us incomprehensible Mysteries: upon which ground both these and sun­dry other Scripture-Doctrines are by some rejected as unintelligible and irra­tional. But here Des Cartes acquits him­self: For he somewhere gives his Readers this Caution, That we should remember Princ. Phi­los. par 1▪ art. 24. God the Maker of all things to be infinite, and our selves finite; and therefore if he reveal any thing to us of himself, or other things, that is above the strength of our Na­tural Wit (such as the Mysteries of the Incarnation and the Trinity) we must not deny them credit, though we cannot clear­ly understand them. Nor should we at all wonder that there are many things both in his immense nature, and in the Crea­tures made by him that exceed our capa­city.

4. This fond conceit of the Exerci­tator 4. borders upon that of the Enthu­siasts; whose high-flown pretences of the guidance of the Spirit, and the in­ternal, living, essential, substantial word within them, comes to no more, when [Page 114] searcht to the quick, but their own dark­ned and besotted Reason, whose absurd Fancies and Blasphemous Dictates they daringly imputed to the Spirit of God. This Clause in our Author brings him under a suspition of complying with those old Libertines, and present Qua­kers (whom he professeth to dislike) onely with this difference: They put their crude Conceptions into a more phantastick dress of great swelling words to amuse the ignorant Vulgar; and this Gentleman hath put his opini­on into a more Manly Garb, to render it the more plausible to the Literate World.

CHAP. XIII.

‘ANother Plea the Exercitator Arg. 5. Ph. Scr. Int. cap. 6. par. 2. useth, is drawn from the Pra­ctice of the Ancients, Justin Martyr, Dionysius Areopagita, Origen, and o­thers, making use of the Platonick or Eclectick Philosophy, to Expound the difficult places of Holy Writ, and of the Schoolmen and others in these latter A [...], making the like use of the Peripat [...]ick Philosophy, which bore the sway in their times.’

To this I answer,

1. Methinks this is a very lose and in­consequent Sol. 1. way of arguing: For though this Author professeth elsewhere cap. 5. par. 2. that in the present controversie he intends not by Philosophy, the opinion of Pla­to or Aristotle, or any other whatever; yet it is plain by his Prologue, and by [Page 116] several passages in the Body of his Dis­course, that he intends the honour of being the Scriptures Interpreter to the Cartesian Philosophy. And in this very Chapter, wherein he alledgeth the fore­mentioned cap. 6. par. 2. examples of Fathers and Schoolmen, he tells us that other Chri­stians, who had forsaken the Romish Church, did, in their Expositions of Scri­pture mostly (though not exactly) tread in the steps of the School­men (who made Aristotle's Philosophy their Rule) till that in this last Age the light of the Cartesian Philosophy shone upon some Divines, Quibus sordescere coeperunt Sacrarum literarum interpreta­menta, quae hujus lucis radiis non illustra­ta prodierunt. It seems the Divines of his way despised and vili [...]ed all In­terpretations of Scripture (whether by Fathers or Schoolmen, or by whomso­ever made) that were not enlightned with the beams of this new-risen Star: so that all Expositions of Scripture that were made before Des Ca [...]tes his happy days, must be condemned to the Dust and Moths, as useless and good for no­thing. [Page 117] Which by the way serves a lit­tle to abate my wonder at the daring folly of some Novelists, in whose Wri­tings I find many absurd, distorted, self­contradicting Expositions of Scripture, not without the highest scorn cast up­on all dissenting Interpreters. It seems they are of this Authors persuasion, and perhaps have lighted their Candle at his dark Lanthorn. But truly, as I do not very well relish the modesty of our Exercitator in this Discourse, so I do as little admire his Logick. For what a wilde consequence is this, be­cause the Ancients used the Platonick or Eclectick Philosophy as their Rule of Interpretation, and the Schoolmen used the Peripatetick as their Rule of Expounding; therefore the Cartesian Philosophy, that differs widely from them all, is the surest and most infallible Interpreter? Let no man mistake me, as if I hereby intended any sinister re­flection on that noble Author, whom the person I am dealing with pretends to follow. I willingly allow him all the honour that his great Parts and Studi­ous [Page 118] Inquiries may have merited, with­out the least detraction: Though I think some of his greatest admirers have done him no small injurie, partly by their Superlative Elogies given to him, together with their ready swallowing, and pertinacious defending all his dictates; but especially by extending his Rules and Methods to matters of Su­pernatural Revelation, beyond his de­clared meaning, if his own word may be taken, which I am not concerned to examine.

2. What use soever former Writers Ancient or Modern have made of their respective Philosophy in expounding Scripture, it doth not yet appear that they own'd it for their Rule: and if they did, I am sure they did amiss. I highly honour the memory of the an­cient Fathers; but I never took them for infallible in their Interpretations, nor did they themselves; nor I suppose doth the Exercitat or, who yet contends for Philosophy to be the Infallible In­terpreter. And for the Schoolmen, him­self cites some Authors, and might have [Page 119] cited many more, and those of great eminency in the Church of Rome it self, who have long since complained of them for corrupting Divinity by mix­ing it with their Philosophick Notions; and yet we never find any of these so absurd as to assert Philosophy to be the Scriptures Interpreter.

3. Lastly, let it be consider'd, whe­ther this Author have not greatly for­gotten and grosly contradicted himself, in using this Argument from Example: for himself professeth to maintain a new and strange opinion in asserting Philo­sophy to be the Interpreter of Scri­pture Ph. Scr. Int. c. 5. par. 1. Novam eam (que) par [...] ­doxam (sententi­am) adstru­ere in prae­sentiarum est animus, scil. hoc munus (interpre­tandi Scri­pturas) competere Philosophiae, hanc (que) esse normam certam a [...] minime fallacem, tam S. libros explica [...]di quam illorum explicationes ex­plorandi.. And in his Prologue, he tells us, that he had consulted with the Di­vines of all Places and Ages (that is, I suppose, with their Writings) to find out what method they used, and what Rule they followed in their Interpre­tation of Scripture; but could find no­thing that would give him satisfaction: and therefore he resolved to lay them [Page 120] all aside, and try what he could do proprio marte, by his own industry; and that after long disquisition, he at last fell upon this onely sure and infallible way, which he here commends to the World. Now I would know how he could speak this, and yet believe what he here alledgeth, that both Fathers and Schoolmen, and other Modern Wri­ters took this course of making Philo­sophy the Rule of Expounding Scri­pture?

CHAP. XIV.

‘IN the next place the Exercitator § 1. argues from instances in some con­siderable Arg. 6. Scripture-Assertions, which Ph. Scr. Int. c. 6. par. 3. (he says) cannot be interpreted but by having recourse to Philosophy as the Rule of Exposition. And here he insists upon three particulars, which I shall examine in order.’

First he instances in those Scriptures 1. that speak of God [...], after the manner of Men, ascribing to him the Members of an Humane Body, and the affections of an Humane Soul; besides Sense and Motion, with many [Page 122] other things not competible to an In­corporeal, much less to an infinite and immutable Being. Touching which Ex­pressions, whereas it is truely cautioned by Divines of all sorts, that these are to be explicated by such Scriptures as speak otherwise of God, suitably to his immaterial and unchangeable Being: this Author boldly affirms, that the Scripture of it self is insufficient to di­rect us; and that there is no way to resolve us which of these different Ex­pressions of Scripture are to be taken properly, and which not, unless we take the Principles of Philosophy and Natural Reason for our guide.

To this I answer: That Gods infinite and immense Perfections are much more Sol. clearly and fully discover'd to us in Scripture than by Natural Light. The Apostle says, 1 Cor. 2. 11. What man knows the things of a Man, save the Spi­rit of Man which is in him; even so the things of God knoweth no man but the Spirit of God. Therefore the best and safest Conceptions we can have of God, [Page 123] are those which we learn from the Spi­rit of God speaking to us in and by the Scripture. And if this Author were not extremely prejudiced by a partial fondness for his own darling conceits, he might know, that plain ordinary Christians, who never had ought to do with Philosophick Learning, have by their sole acquaintance with the Scriptures, come to much clearer and sounder conceptions of God, his Na­ture, and Attributes, than the learnedst Philosopher that ever the World had, could attain by all his Wit and Study without Scripture Light: and that to any Reader that is not prepossessed with false and absurd Notions of God by his own vain imagination, and mis­guided Reason, the Scriptures that speak so differently concerning that Supreme Being, if prudently compared toge­ther, and the circumstances on each side considered, do sufficiently to the satisfaction of sober Minds, discover to us their true and genuine Sense, without giving the least countenance to the sot­tish and irrational conceits of the Anthro­pomorphites; [Page 124] though a cavelling daring Wit may and will find something to quarrel with, where the matter is as clear as the noon-day Sun.

His next instance is, The Words of our Saviour at the institution of his last § 2. Supper, This is my Body: which the Papists interpret for Transubstantiati­on: The Lutherans for Consubstanti­ation: The Reformed Churches deny both, understanding the words tropi­cally; whose Sense he says can be no otherwise defended but by the Prin­ciples of Natural Philosophy.

For answer to this, I grant, That in Sol. clearing this controversie, there is good use of the Principles of Philosophy and Natural Reason; and so there is also of Sense; which undeniably convin­ceth us, that what we see, and feel, and taste, is Bread. Yet sure we are not to make Sense the Rule of Interpreting Scripture. But the true and proper Rule of Interpreting our Saviours Words, [This is my Body] is that which the Scripture it self, and that alone [Page 125] hath taught us; viz. That Christ assumed a true Humane Body: which is a truth that Reason and Philosophy could ne­ver inform us of, it being a matter of pure Revelation. Now this being laid down as the chief Postulatum; the thing to be inquired into is, What is the na­ture of an Humane Body? and what are the essential Properties of all natural Bo­dies? And this Natural Philosophy in­structs us in, as being no matter of Re­velation, but lying within the compass of Natural Light, which teacheth us that every Natural Body is quantitative and divisible, and confined to one cer­tain place; consequently that the Bread in the Sacrament of the Eucharist, can­not be properly and substantially the Body of Christ, which (as Scripture in­forms us) was once nailed to the Cross, but is now glorified in Heaven. Now the force of all this for the expounding of our Saviours Words, lies in the for­mer supposition, That our Saviour assum­ed a true natural Humane Body, together with what was even now mentioned; That the same Body of Christ which he [Page 126] assumed, is at the right Hand of God in Heaven: both which are Scripture-Revelations. Besides, there is a wide difference between these two, a help to overthrow a false Interpretation, and the Rule of establishing the true one. Phi­losophy may do the former, but not the latter. As in this controversie, the Principles of Reason and Philosophy do convincingly assure us that Bread is not, cannot be the Body of a Man. But they cannot assure us what was our Saviours meaning, when holding the Bread in his Hand, he said, This is my Body: this must be resolved by what the Scripture it self speaks either there, or elsewhere.

His third and last instance is the Doctrine of the Trinity, which he says § 3. cannot be cleared without having re­course 3. to Philosophy: and here, having derided the attempts of many to expli­cate and confirm this great Mistery by their Metaphysical Speculations; he highly applauds the learned Kecker­man for his happy endeavors in unfold­ing and demonstrating it, Ex immotis [Page 127] Philisophiae fundamentis, out of the un­moveable Foundations of Philosophy.

To this I answer, That the curious Sol. speculations and Philosophick nice [...]ies of the Schools about the Doctrine of the Trinity, have done it more preju­dice than advantage, and given greater occasion to the adverse part to reject it, when they found so strange and incom­prehensible a Mystery defended by such thin, airy, cobweb notions. It had been much better, if Men had content­ed themselves with those discoveries the Scripture makes of this inexplica­ble Mystery, it being a Doctrine pure­ly of Supernatural Revelation, and not at all discoverable by Natural Light. The Arguments from Reason and Phi­losophy brought for the proof of it, by the learned Keckerman, and by Clau­bergius a late Cartesian, are examined by Vogolsangius in his Indignatio Justa, &c. and discarded as insufficient. I grant, that in this, (as in many other Doctrines) it may be of good use to shew that there is nothing in what the Scripture says of it, that contradicts [Page 128] any sound Principle of Reason. But to go about by the Principles of Rea­son or Philosophy positively to demon­strate the truth of it, is a thing which I take to be impossible. I chuse to say of this Mystery, as one does of the Di­vine Essence, Credendo intelligitur, ado­rando enarratur. It is best understood by believing, and best declared by ado­ring. He (saith the late Bishop of Duct. Dub. li. 1. c. 2. Down) that should go to Revelation to prove that nine and nine make eighteen, would be a Fool: and he would be no less, that goes about to prove a Trinity of persons by natural Reason. Every thing must be derived from its own Fountain. Thus Aquinas tells us, He that by natu­ral Aqu. par. [...]. q. 32. [...]. 1 Reason attempts to prove the Trinity of persons, doth a double prejudice to the Faith. 1. He derogates from its Dig­nity, it being proper to the Doctrine of Faith to be of such things as exceed Mans Reason. 2. He hinders others from em­bracing the Faith, by using such Argu­ments as are not cogent; which renders it obnoxious to the Infidels contempt. This is plain in Scripture, that the Father is [Page 129] God, and the Holy Ghost is God: and that these are three, and all three are but one God: and for other subtle­ties and curious inquiries of busie and presumptuous Wits, without and be­side the Written Word, I think the Truth of God never was, nor ever will be beholden to them.

CHAP. XV.

ONe Argument more I shall touch, which I find alledged by two no­ted Arg. 7. Socinians, Smalcius and Schlichtingi­us (as they are cited by a late learn­ed Author in his Socinianism. Confut.) to prove Reason to be the Rule of deci­ding Controversies of Faith: which may be thought improveable upon the same grounds, to assert that Reason must be the Rule of interpreting Scri­pture. And it is, ‘That of the Apo­stle, where he asserts the Service that God requires of Christians, to be Rom. 12. 1. [...] a reasonable service, that is, say they, a Service agreeable to Reason.’

To this I answer two things,

First, I know no cause to recede from [...]ol. 1. the Sense that is usually given by our Interpreters, seeing it so fairly offers [Page 131] it self from the Words themselves: and therefore do judge, with the learned Dr. Hammond on the place, that the Apostle calling upon Christians to pre­sent their Bodies a living Sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, even their reason­ble service; doth evidently oppose this to the Sacrifices of the Ceremonial Law, which were no other than irrati­onal Creatures, first killed, and then offered up to God. But,

Secondly, Be it given (but not 2. granted) that the Apostles meaning is what these Men put upon it, viz. That the Service God requires of Christians, is agreeable to Reason: I have already premised and asserted, that Christian Religion is perfectly ratio­nal; whence it will undeniably fol­low, that there is an excellent har­mony, a full and complete accord be­twixt Reason and Religion. And although some daring Wits that make high pretences to Reason, have, by their profane Jeers at the Misteries of Chri­stianity, and their turning the Doctrines [Page 132] and Phrases of Holy Scripture into Drollery, contributed not a little to the Atheism of the present age; yet I am past all doubt, that no man is or can be an Atheist, that hath not first baffled and besotted his Reason. If any therefore hath gone about to set Reason and Religion at variance, it hath been through some misprision, ta­king some groundless imagination for Reason, or some corrupt opinion or practice for Religion. But if any shall hence argue, that Mans Reason is to be the Rule of Religion, or that Doctrines of Supernatural Revelation are to be interpreted, and the Sense of them de­termined by Natural Principles, we de­ny the consequence, and leave them to prove it. Our Saviour tells us that his yoke is easie; but if any should thence Ar­gue, that therefore our ease must be the Mat. 11. Rule of interpreting his Commands, I think few would be found so blind or foolish (except Men of profligate and debauched Consciences) that would admit of such an absurd Argumenta­tion: [Page 133] And there is no less absurditity in this, That because Religion is a Rea­sonable Service, therefore our Reason must be the Rule of interpreting the Doctrinces of Rëligion.

CHAP. XVI.

THe Exercitator having (after his manner) asserted his own Posi­tion, § 1. comes, in the seventh Chapter of his Discourse, to answer the Scriptures that some have made use of to oppose it. Before I deal with them, I cannot but take notice of the disingenuity of Ludovicus Wolzogen, who having un­dertaken the Patronage of the Prote­stant Cause against this Adversary, doth so shamefully throw down his Arms, [Page 135] and run out of the Field: For when he comes at this seventh Chapter of his Antagonist (and again at his twelfth) wherein the Exercitator endeavors to evade or enervate the Scriptures Lud. Wol­zog. de Scripturar. Interprete p. 217. brought against him this: valiant Cham­pion not only waves the vindication of them; but for his own more plausi­ble excuse, expresly maintains it to be a preposterous thing in this Contro­versie about the Interpretation of Scri­pture, to use or admit the testimony of Scripture at all; and affirms that the Cause must be decided by Reason: And therefore, as all along his Discourse, he never makes use of Scripture to defend himself, or strike his Adversary; so he lays an imputation of folly upon all our Divines that use this way of argu­ing in the present Case. And he gives two pitiful Arguments to prove this fond Assertion.

1. ‘One is because the Controversie Id. ib. p. 219. is about the Scripture it self, which is not to be heard in its own Cause, un­less such places can be alledged in the explication whereof both parties a­gree.’

[Page 136] To this I answer, Sol.

1. If this be granted, then whatso­ever controversie we have with the Papists about the Authority, Perspicui­ty and Perfection of the Scriptures, though we have never so clear proof in the Scripture it self for these things, they must all be waved as invalid. But these have hitherto been accounted controverted Points of Faith, and conse­quently to be resolved from Scripture the only Rule of Faith: & so is this about the Scriptures Interpretation: however the Exercitator, and with him this Au­thor, denies it; while yet both of them acknowledge it to be a Question, where­in the whole of Religion is concerned, and (next to that of the Scriptures Au­thority) Exercita­tor in Pro­logo, &c. 1. Wolzog. ubi sup. 5. & p. 90. the very foundation on which all Doctrines of Faith and Manners re­lie; and which involves in it whatso­ever Differences or Controversies there are between dissenting parties in Reli­gion, that own the Scriptures. And is it not strange that Men should own this Controversie to be so momentous [Page 137] and fundamental, and yet to deny it to be a matter of Faith, or to be de­termined by Scripture Testimony? But,

2. Why may not the Scripture be heard speak for it self, as well as Rea­son 2. for it self? The Question under debate is whether the Rule of Inter­preting Scripture, be the Scripture it self, or Mans Reason? Does not this as nearly touch Reason as Scripture? And yet must that be allowed to give te­stimony in its own Cause and not the Scripture? It appears by this (as by many other passages in his Book) that this Author is a better friend to the Ex­ercitators opinion, than to the Prote­stant Doctrine. And indeed,

3. This is the very Language of our 3. Popish Adversaries; who tell us, the Scripture cannot be its own Interpreter, because the Question is concerning it self. To which our Writers answer V. Riveti Isagogen, cap. 19. § 30. truely, That the Scripture being the Voice of God, its testimony for it self is above all other whatsoever, even in its own Cause.

[Page 138] His other Argument is, ‘Because till 2. Wolz. ubi sup. p. 247. the dissentient parties have agreed about the Interpreter of the Scriptures alledged, they have no Sense, and therefore can testifie nothing:’ And up­upon this account he condemns those of the Reformed Churches that alledge Scripture in this Controversie, and blames the Exercitator for answering their Allegations.

To this I answer,

1. That any part of Scripture is with­out Sol. its Sense till it have an Interpreter, is a gross absurdity and falshood. The Scripture hath its Sense, whether any Man interpret it or no. Interpretation doth not (I am sure it should not) bring the Sense and put it into the Scripture, but receive it from the Scri­pture.

2. This Author acknowledges some Scriptures to be so clear, that the Sense is obvious: and if such Scriptures can be produced in the present Controver­sie (as no doubt they may) Why should the difference about the Interpreter, preclude them?

[Page 139] 3. Were this Argument allowed, it would for ever debarr us from alledg­ing Scripture against the Romanists in any Controversie that we have with them: it being notorious to all Men, that this is one great difference betwixt us and them, who must be the Supreme In­terpreter of Scripture? which they chal­lenge as the Priviledge of their Church; and we ascribe to the Scripture it self.

But it is a miserable Plea that this § 2. Author makes elsewhere for himself, Lu. Wol. Cens. Cen­surae p. 233 viz. ‘That he had to do with one whom he esteemed to be no Christi­an, but an Heathen (for so he accounts the Exercitator) who would no more regard the Testimony of Scripture in this Case, than a Jew would regard any proof from the New Testament; and therefore it was, that he decli­ned dealing with him about those Testimonies from Scripture.’ It seems then he would make the World be­lieve, that what he had said about this, was onely spoken ad hominem.

[Page 140] By which it plainly appears, that our Author began to see he could not Sol. stand his ground, but was not so inge­nuous as to confess his Error, and there­fore runs behind this Bush to hide him­self. For,

1. His Words, which I quoted be­fore out of his Book, De Scripturarum Interprete, do evidently shew that he speaks according to his own Mind, that it was a preposterous thing in this Con­troversie to alledge the Testimony of Scripture; and that in this Case no such proof was to be allowed, (see him page 217. 219. and 247.) and not only so, but alledges the Reasons beforementi­oned (such as they are) for this wilde Position.

2. He knows very well that the Jews (to whom he compares his Antagonist) do not at all own the Authority of the new Testament, but professedly reject it: Whereas the Exercitator (whatever his Religion be) does avowedly own the Divine Authority of the Scripture, and delcares himself willing to be dealt with [Page 141] in that way, in that he cites our Di­vines Arguments from thence, and en­deavors to answer them; for which this Author reproves him. So that the case is not the same. And yet I ap­peal to the Authors Reason: Should any Jewish Writer either cite any Testimo­nies out of the New Testament for him­self, or endeavor, by his own Interpre­tations, to evade any Testimonies thence alledged against him (which is plainly the Case here) whether should a Chri­stian that pretends to answer him, do well to say, That the New Testament is not here to be heard, and that it were a preposterous thing to alledge it? Should he not rather endeavor to answer the objections that are made, and clear the places cited? And if in case he should do, as this Author doth here, might he not justly be condemned for a Betray­er of the Christian Cause? If it be said, Object. Lu. Wolz. loc. cit. that though the Exercitator acknow­ledge the Divine Authority of the Scri­ptures, yet he holds them to be uni­versally ambiguous and obscure, fur­ther than Humane Reason expounds [Page 142] them; and therefore it was to no pur­pose to use Scripture to him, till they had agreed about the Rule of Interpre­tation. I answer, The Exeroitator does in­deed charge the Scripture with obscuri­ty Sol. because of its ambiguity; but it is up­on this ground, because, hesays, all words whatsoever are ambiguous: If there­fore this should shut out the Scripture from bearing witness in the Contro­versie, then all Arguments from Rea­son, must upon the same account, be ex­cluded too; for they must be made up of Words and Phrases, the ambiguity whereof (according to the Exercita­tors Doctrine) will render them obscure, as well as the Scripture.

Come we now to speak something to §. 3. the Scriptures alledged by our Divines, Ph. Scr. Int. c. 7. which the Exercitator labors to evade. But methinks it is a pleasant thing to see how he betrays his own Cause, by acting against his own Method and Principles. For having all along cried up Philosophy as the onely Interpre­ter of Scripture; when himself comes [Page 143] interpret the Scriptures brought against him, one would think he should bring his own Tools to this Work, and labor, by Philosophick Principles, to make out the Sense that he gives of these Scri­ptures. But he waves this, and seeks to fetch out his own Sense from the Scri­pture it self, by examining the Antece­dents and Consequents, and the Au­thors scope. Now he either takes this way of Interpretation to be right, or he does not: If he do not, he doth but juggle with his Reader, and designs to cheat him: but if he do indeed think it to be right, he yields the Cause, that not Philosophy, but the Scripture it self is the Rule of Interpretation.

Now for the Scriptures alledged: The 1 Cor. 1. 19, 20. 21. 1 Cor. 2. 6. first is that in 1 Cor. 1. 19, 20, 21. where the Apostle speaks very contemptibly of Humane Wisdom; the like may besaid of the next, 1 Cor. 2. 6. Now in these places, saith the Exercitator, the Apo­stle does not go about to deny or con­demn true Wisdom, but the earthly, sensual Wisdom of the World, that is grounded upon vain opinions, and puts [Page 144] Men upon the eager pursuit of earthly things, such as Riches, and Honors, and Sensual Pleasures.

I answer, The Apostle, having to do with those who thought meanly of the Sol. Doctrine of Christ Crucified, and affected a name for that which the world count­ed Wisdom; endeavors to lay all Hu­mane Wisdom in the dust, and to disco­ver its insufficiency to conduct man to true happiness; for which he prefers the Doctrine of the Gospel (which was so derided as foolishness) above that which the World so much admired. This therefore is no impertinent allegation against the Exercitators opinion. That in 1 Cor. 2. 14. I have already pressed in the prosecution of my first Argu­ment; and have vindicated it from the corrupt glosses that some have put up­on it.

The last is that in Coloss. 2. 8. Beware lest any man spoil you through [...]l. 2. 8. Philosophy, and vain deceit. Here, saith the Exercitator, the Apostle doth not condemn sound Philosophy, but that which is vain and useless.

[Page 145] I answer, Undoubtedly he doth not Sol. condemn Philosophy truely so called: But he gives a caution to take heed of being deceived by it; as Men may be, when the use of it is extended beyond its Line, and is not kept within its own proper Bounds. Thus, saith our learn­ed Davenant, Philosophy or Humane Reason, which is the Mother of Philoso­phy, Davenant. in Coloss. 2. 8. is always found vain and deceitfull, when it is carried beyond its proper li­mits, That is, says he, when it attempts to determine of those things, that fall not under the cognisance of Natural Rea­son; such are those that belong to the Worship of God, and to the Salvation of Man, as the Points of Justification, Re­conciliation with God, and other Mat­ters of Faith, that are above the reach of Reason, and depend altogether upon Divine Revelation.

CHAP. XVII.

THE Exercitators next Work is to answer the great Argument, § [...]. which, he says, some urge against his Ph. Scr. Int. [...]. [...]. p. 1 opinion, viz. Philosophy, and conse­quently Humane Reason, asserts many things that are repugnant to Divinity and the Scriptures, and therefore they cannot be allow'd for the Rule of In­terpreting Scripture. He denies the Antecedent; and so do I. What Au­thors they be in the Reformed Churches that thus argue, I know not. But this I know, that it is no uncommon thing for pugnacious Wits, to draw the Sword [Page 147] upon the shadow of a Dream, and make Hector-like declamations against Utopi­an Adversaries. Set aside those Authors, who are engaged by some Atheologi­cal Hypothesis, which they have espou­sed (as the Papists and the Lutherans in the Doctrine of the E [...]charist) I know not any Man of Learning and Understanding, who hath such a thought, that there is any thing in Scri­pture derogatory or contradictory to true Philosophy or Sound Reason; or that believes any thing true in Philo­sophy to be false in Divinity. What­soever is true any where, is true every where. Here therefore our Author may put up his Dagger.

But there is one thing which I can­not § 2. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 8. par. 2. well pass over, That the Exercita­tor pretending to confute those who assert a contrariety between the Prin­ciples of Philosophy and Divinity, and instancing in these two, Ex nihilo nihil fit, and Idem non potest, numericè re­produci, Instead of solving the knot, he cuts it, and plainly affirms both these [Page 148] Principles to be true, absolutely, and without limitation both in Philosophy and Divinity, confidently asserting that the Scripture doth no where teach us, That the World was made of nothing, or that the same numerical Body shall rise at the last day. And here Wolzogen un­worthily deserts the Christian Cause, not vouchsafing to write one word in vindication of these grand Truths a­gainst this bold Adversary; but tells us he is content the Man should enjoy his own opinion, though, he says, he could easily have refuted him: Which makes his silence the more inexcusable, and brings him under greater suspition of Heterodoxy, notwithstanding all his Rhetorical Flourishes. But it is time I should return to our Author, who, if he had not been too much in love with Novelty, might without the least prejudice to his Cause (unless it have some other Monster in the Belly of it that is not yet come to the birth) have answered, that these Axioms are true in a limited Sense both in Philoso­phy and Divinity; viz. That by a fi­nite [Page 149] created Power, nothing can be made of nothing; and that by the like limited power, the same numerical Bo­dy that perisheth, cannot be reprodu­ced. But that nevertheless to an infi­nite Power all things that imply not contradiction are possible.

But it seems by this Authors words, §. 3. that he disowns the received Doctrine of the worlds Creation out of Nothing; and the Reproduction of the same in­dividual Body.

1. By denying the former, he must necessarily maintain the Eternity of Preexistent Matter: whereas if God be the Maker of all Beings besides him­self (as the Scripture sufficiently assures us) then nothing besides himself could be Eternal; but he must in making the World make the Matter whereof the World consists, which Matter there­fore must be made of nothing. The first Article in the most ancient Creeds (as the Reverend Bishop of Chester hath Dr. Pear­son Expos. of the Creed, Art. 1. observed) had instead of these words Maker of Heaven and Earth, or toge­ther [Page 150] with them, this Clause, The Ma­ker of all things visible and invisible, agree­ably to that of the Apostle, Coloss. 1. 16. which distribution is so comprehensive, that it will not admit of any Excepti­on, all things whatsoever being either visible or invisible: and whatsoever can be supposed necessary to the making of the World, it must of necessity come under one of these two Members of the distribution, and consequenly be of Gods making. And indeed if it were otherwise, then something else besides God, must have a necessary, uncreated, independent Being: which carries with it so broad a Contradiction, as Mans Reason left fair to it self cannot al­low. Again,

2. By disclaiming the latter, this Au­thor evidently denies the Resurrection; for that imports the rising again of the same Body that fell, according to that known Speech of Damascen so oft ci­ted by our Divines, [...]. And if the same nu­merical Body rise not, but another is made de novo for the Soul to animate, [Page 513] this is not a Resurrection but a new Creation; and then the first Creation of the World may as aptly be called a Resurrection as that which is so stiled by the Holy Ghost in Scripture. But I think the Scripture speaks plain enough in this Case, (though this Au­thor will not own it) when it says, that at the last day, This corruptible must 1 Cor. 15. 53. put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. And that Phil. 3. 20, 21. our Lord Jesus Christ shall then change our vile Body, that it may be made like unto his glorious Body. And that, If the Rom. 8. 11, Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in us, he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken our mortal bodies by his spirit that dwel­leth in us. Add to this that Argument from the description of the place whence the Resurrection shall begin; which I cannot better represent to the Reader than in the words of the learned Bishop Expos. of the Creed. p. 382. of Chester, They which sleep in the dust of the Earth (Dan. 12. 2.) and they which are in the Graves, (Joh. 5. 28.) shall hear the Voice and Rise. And, Rev. [Page 152] 20. 13. The Sea shall give up the dead which are in it, and Death and the Grave deliver up the dead which are in them. But if the same Bodies did not Rise, they which are in the dust, should not revive; If God should give us any other Bodies than our own, neither the Sea nor the Grave should give up their dead. That shall Rise again which the Grave gives up; the Grave hath nothing to give up, but that Body which was laid into it: therefore the same Body which is Buried, shall at the last day be revived. And whereas the Socinians (who are our Adversaries in this, as well as in many other Articles of our Faith) to evade this Argument, will have the Graves spoken of in Joh 5. 28. to be the Graves of ignorance and impiety there meant; and the Rising to be Mens coming to the knowledge of Christ, &c. the afore­said learned Person answers them, That Christ expresly, speaks of bringing Men to Ibid. in Marg. Judgement, vers. 27. and divides those that are to come out of their Graves into two Ranks, vers. 29. neither of which can be so understood: The first are those [Page 153] which have done good before they come out of their Graves; these therefore could not be the Graves of Ignorance and Impiety, from which no good can come: The se­cond are such who have done evil, and so remain as evil Doers, and therefore cannot be said to come forth of the Graves of Ignorance and Impiety, or to Rise by the Preaching of the Gospel to newness of life, because they are expresly said to come forth to the Resurrection of Damnati­on.

But if the Exercitators Principles will allow him to write after the rate he here doth, I think none that hath any veneration for the Scriptures, will be over-fond of such a corrupt and fallaci­ous Interpreter. But when Men are hammering out a new Divinity, they must either find out a new Scripture, or a new way of Expounding the Old, to countenance their own Dreams, that when, by this Artifice, they have turn­ed out the true Christianity, they may bring us in a Pagan Religion finely set out in the stately dress of Eternal Rea­son.

[Page 154] No wonder they cry out of Systems Lu. Viers in Aug. de C. D. l. 18. c. 41. Novi [...]ominem non tam [...]octum quam arro­gantem [...]actabun­dumque, qui se & scriptu­rum multa profiteba­tur: Et non secus vitaturum quae quis antea dix­isset, quam aspides vel basi­liscos: longe enim malle se scientem pruden­temque falsum pro vero affirmare, quam alienae opinioni acquiescere. as Chains and Fetters to their desulto­rious and volatile Wits. They had ra­ther (as one says of wanton Heads) [...]e the Purchasers of Error than the Heirs of Truth. Of whom the Lord Veru­lam Sermon. fidel. cap. de Veritate, gives us a very fit Character. Certè sunt, qui cogitationum Vertigine delectantur, ac pro servitute habent fide fixa & Axiomatis constantibus restringi, Liberi Arbitrii usum in Cogitando non mi­xùs quam in Agendo affectantes. Verily, says he, there are some who are delight­ed in a giddiness of opinions, and take it for a bondage to be restrained by a fixed Faith and setled Principles, no less affecting the use of their Free Will in thinking than in acting. And so I have dispatcht the first Part of my Work, and proceed to the second.

CHAP. I.

HAving endeavoured to § 2. disprove the new pre­tended Rule of Inter­pretation, I come, in the next place, to assert the Doctrine of the Reformed Churches, [Page 156] and lay down this Proposition, that the Holy Scripture is its own onely sure Interpreter. But before I enter upon the opening and confirming of it, I must remove something that lies in my way. Ludovicus Wolzogen in his two Books de Scripturarum Interprete, attempting to answer the Exercitator, professeth to maintain the received Doctrine of the Protestant Churches in this Point: but pretends to a more clear and distinct handling of it, than hath hitherto been performed by our Divines. Whereas indeed, that which he propounds to maintain is a novel fancy of his own, never yet owned by any Orthodox Divine that I have read or heard of: viz. That the Scripture interprets it self by the Usus loquendi, the custom of speaking; and that this is the onely sure and undoubted Rule of Interpretation. But whereas he most immodestly chargeth all that have gone before him, with confusedness in this Controversie, as not well understanding either it or themselves; his learned self, when he comes to take it in hand, [Page 157] is so intricate and perplex, so various and inconstant, that it's a difficult mat­ter to understand what he would have. He turns himself into so many forms, and winds himself so many wayes, and falls into so many self-contradictions, that he seems to design the entangling of his Reader, and the hiding of him­self in a Castle of Clouds.

First, One while he will have us un­derstand this Usus loquendi, of the vul­gar 1. Wolzog. de Scripturar. Interprete p. 26. & 42. use of speech, common to the Scri­ptures with other Writings: and gives us his Reason why this must be the Rule of Interpretation, because com­mon use is the onely Master of Speech, and the Custome of Speakers and Wri­ters gives Law to the signification of Ib. 46, 47, &c. Words; and that the use of Speech is formed by much and long Custom, which, when it hath at last prevailed, does, as it were, imprint a publick Cha­racter upon Words, which come by tacite consent to be received of all: and Ib. p. 70, 71 72. he professes he sees no Reason why any should deny that the Interpretation of Scripture depends upon this use of [Page 158] Speech: which himself says is founded upon Humane Institution, but adop­ted and approved by the Wisdom of God in Enditing the Scripture. Now that this Usus loquendi should be the Rule of Interpreting the Holy Scri­ptures, is far wide from the Truth, and from the Judgment of all Prote­stants, and as far as I know of all other Expositors. For,

1. When they say the Scripture is its own Interpreter, (or which is all one) the Rule of Interpretation to it self, they understand it of something in the Scripture, that is peculiar to the Scripture, and not any thing that is common to it with other Writings: But the vulgar and customary use of Speech is the same in all Writings, where the same Language is made use of.

2. It is granted on all hands, that this Usus loquendi, or Custom of Speech, hath its place among those means that I spake of in the entrance of my Dis­course, that do remotely conduce to Interpretation; but it reaches no fur­ther nextly and immediately than to [Page 159] Verbal Interpretation (which is called Translation) by guiding us to the right understanding of Words and Phrases, and the several Modes of Speech. But this comes not up to that which we call Real Interpretation, which is the Exposition of the Author's Mind signified by those Words as they are so and so placed. We do not therefore shut out the Use of Speech, but suppose it, and look at something further. For instance, suppose I were to inquire in­to the Sense of that place, Joh. 1. 1. (which is the instance given by Vander Weayen) I may, by the Use of Speech, Advers. Wolzog. li. 2. p. 12. know what these several Words, Begin­ing, and Word, and God, signifie: But I must have something else to guide me to the right meaning of the entire Sen­tence, In the Beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. And Wolzogen himself acknow­ledges, Lu. Wol. li. 2. p. 107. that there is a wide difference between words taken singly, and in their first original, and taken as con­joined in Propositions. I may add with very good reason, that there is [Page 160] also a wide difference between Propo­sitions taken singly, and taken in such or such a contexture of Discourse. Now the use of Speech will not help us to distinguish here.

3. How can the common use of Speech be a Rule in Matters of pure Revelation? I think all acknowledge, that the Sense of Words varies accor­ding to the difference of the subject matter about which they are used. Now matters of pure Revelation are so re­mote from vulgar use, that they had ne­ver been spoken or written by any Men, if the Holy Ghost had not En­dited them, and communicated them to us in the Scripture. And the Apo­stle tells us, that these things are deli­vered not in Words which Mans Wis­dom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth. 1 Cor. 2. 13.

4. If the common use of Speech be so sure a Rule of Interpretation as this Author makes it, I wonder what was in his Mind, to say of the Penmen of Scripture, That if they were now living amongst us, they could not be the suffi­cient [Page 161] Interpreters of their own Writings, because they often wrote they knew not what. Certainly the customary use of Speech which obtained in the times wherein they wrote, must needs be much better known to them than it can be to any now living. Why then might not they interpret their own Writings, if they were now with us, having the best insight into that which this Author cries up for the onely sure Rule of Interpretation?

5. If the customary use of Speech must be the Rule of Interpretation, the inconvenience urged by the Exercitator cap. 11. par. 6. will not easily, if at all, be avoided: viz. the interpreting of Scripture according to the errone­ous apprehension of the Vulgar.

6. If this be so certain a Rule, as he will have it, so as that he who uses it, shall not fail to find out the true Sense of Scripture (for so himself speaksWolzog. [...]. Sc. Int. p. 12.) how is it that the Sense of Scripture may not be found in all parts one as well as another? for the use of Speech is the same in all. And yet he acknow­ledges, [Page 162] that in many things (not neces­sary to Salvation) let the Reader be ne­ver so diligent in his search, he cannot find the meaning of Scripture: and the reason hereof, he says, is to be fetcht, not from the nature of the thing, nor from the darkness of our minds, but ex Id. ib. p. 15, 16 & p. 172, 173, 174. ipsa constitutione Scripturae, from the very frame of Scripture it self.

Secondly, But now, whether this learned Author did not well con­sider 2. what he wrote, or had not well digested his own Notions, or whether he designed to amuse his Reader with intricacies and ambiguities, or whether he were aware of the inconvenience of his former Expressions, and their liableness to exception, or what other were the cause, I shall not inquire: But this is plain to any that attentively reads his Discourse, that when he had once and again given the honour of being the onely sure Rule of Interpretation of Scripture, to the common and customary use of Speech; he afterwards falls to a sin­gular use of Speech, Id p. 76, & 227. distinct from the vul­gar, arising from the different Character [Page 163] of the Writer, the different occasion of Writing, the different nature of the things about which he Treats; and that under this singularity of the usus loquendi, the custom of Speech, we are to consider the Antecedents and the Consequents of a Text, Id. p. 79. and the pa­ralel places. And elsewhere he says, p. 132, & 137. all the circumstances of the place un­der consideration are to be examined: and this he calls, Usus loquendi Scri­pturarius p. 127. the Scripture use of Speak­ing. And when he objects against himself, p. 138. that the customary manner of speaking is dubious and uncertain, he answers it thus, That though it be v. etiam p. 262, 263. so, yet God's manner of Speech in Scri­pture is fixed. So that what was be­fore called the common and vulgar use, is now confined to God's use, and the Scripture-use of Speaking; which cer­tainly does not receive Law from the custom and consent of Men; but is wholly framed and ordered by the disposal of Divine Wisdom, though in it he makes use of such words, as re­ceive their single signification from com­mon use.

[Page 164] Besides, this Author tells us elsewhere Cens. Cens. p. 121 that Usus loquendi, or custom of Speech, includes in it the Analogy of Faith, and all other things that are taken out of Scripture, in order to the finding out of its true Sense. Now if this be indeed the meaning of his Usus lo­quendi, his opinion comes very near to that of the Reformed Churches, if it be not the same with it. But then what needed all this stir, as if our Divines had not discovered their Minds plain­ly and distinctly, but this Author must come and mend it? whereas he hath rather darkned and obscured it by his intricate and inconsistent Discourse. For whoever before him, took Usus loquendi in such a sense as this? And I much wonder that he who is so much for the custom of Speech, should vary so widely from it in his Writing. For I am sure this Phrase Usus loquendi, ac­cording to that mode of Speech that hath hitherto obtained, was never taken so comprehensively as to include the scope of the Text, with the Antecedents and Consequents, and all other circumstan­ces, [Page 165] and the Analogy of Faith, and what ever lies in the Scripture that serves to the discovery of its true sense. Ex­cept Men will assume a power to them­selves of coining a new Sense of Words, I cannot imagine what ground they can have to talk after the rate of this Author.

Our Divines speak much more pro­perly § [...] ▪ and clearly in this business, viz. That the Holy Spirit of God hath, in Enditing the Scripture, so attempered his Speech, and so ordered and dispo­sed the several Parts and Parcels of this Sacred Book, that his Mind (so far as it is necessary for us to know it) may be discovered, either from the obvious sense of the particular Sentences and Propositions of Scripture considered in that Order and dependence wherein they are placed, or by a due compa­rison of one part of Scripture with ano­ther; so as that the Reader may ga­ther the Sense of Scripture from the Scripture it self. This is that which our Divines mean, when they say that [Page 166] the Scripture is its own Interpreter. And when they say at any time, that the Spirit of God is the Interpreter of Scripture, either they speak of the Ob­jective evidence that the Spirit gives of the Sense of Scripture; and then they understand it of the Spirit as speaking in the Scripture; which being the Voice of the Spirit, is to us (as I said) our Supream Rule: Or they speak of the Spirit as the efficient cause of that Sub­jective light [...]hat is let into our Minds inabling us to understand the Scriptures. And this belongs to another inquiry, and doth not concern the Question a­bout the Rule of Interpretation. Now when our Writers say, the Scripture is its own Interpreter, they are to be under­stood Metonymically. As when they say the Scripture is the Supream Judge of all Controversies of Faith, they mean no more but that it is Judex Norma [...]is, or the Supream Rule of Judgement, accor­ding to which Controversies are to be ultimately decided; so by proportion is it in the present Cafe. And as when the Papists speak of the infallible dect­ding [Page 167] of Controversies, whether they say the Pope is the infallible Judge, or the Sentence given by the Pope is the infallible Rule of decision, it comes all to one. So when our Divines say some­times, that the Spirit speaking in the Scripture is the infallible Interpreter of Scripture, and other while, that the Scripture is the infallible Rule of In­terpretation, here is no such difference as should just give occasion to any to say, that our Divines speak variously or un­certainly, or that they agree not one with another, or with themselves; for in the issue the meaning of them all, is one and the same.

Now here I must look back upon what I had said in the Introduction to my Discourse, concerning the special, immediate means of Interpretation; viz. a due observation of the several circumstances of the Scripture to be Expounded; and the comparing of Scripture with Scripture. In the use of which means lies the applying of the right Rule of Interpretation: It is the using of Scripture to expound Scri­pture. [Page 168] And when a dark or difficult Scripture is compared with some other, wherein the same Truth or Doctrine is more clearly and perspicuously deli­vered, this is conceived by many learn­ed Men to be intended in that of the Apostle concerning the Analogy of Faith, Rom. 12. 6. Whether it be so or no, I shall not at present debate, much less determine; No [...] shall I inquire whe­ther that [...] form of sound Words, spoken of by the same Apostle, in 2 Tim. 1. 13. be the same with this [...] as some conceive it is. But this I may have leave to say, that I see no incon­gruity or inconvenience in using the Expression, or in saying that to explain obscure places of Scripture by such as are more clear and easie, is to expound Scripture according to the Analogy of Faith.

Analogy, saith Quintilian, is that which the Latines call Proportion, the force Quintil. [...]i. [...]. c. 6. whereof is this, That what is in doubt may be referred to something like it that is out of question, that so the uncertain [Page 169] may be proved by the certain. And why may not the like use of the Word be allowed in this case? Sure I am, eminent Writers both of the Roman and Reformed Churches have thus used it. Analogie, says Aquinas, is, when the Sum. p. 1. q. 1. a. 10. truth of one Scripture is evidenced not to oppose the truth of another. The Ana­logie Contro­vers. 1. q. 5. c. 9. Analogia fidei nihil aliud est, quam con­stants & perpetua, sententia, Scriptur [...] ▪ in apert [...]s & minime obscuris Scriptur [...] locis. of Faith, saith our learned Whit­aker, is the constant and perpetual Sen­tence of Scripture in those places that are undoubtedly plain and obvious to our Understandings. I might alledge to the like sense many more Authors, whose excellent Worth sets them sufficiently above the contempt of the Exercita­tor, and others of his mind, that jear and deride the Analogy of Faith. But waving the terms, that which I am con­cern'd to assert, is the thing it self; that in expounding Scripture we must be regulated and determined by the Scripture it self: and that whatsoever it speaks darkly and uncertainly in any place, is to be explained by it self in those other places; where it speaks more plainly; which plain pla­ces [Page 170] do sufficiently interpret themselve [...] by their own light.

Now this way of Interpreting Scri­pture by it self, hath been approved of [...] 3. as the best and safest, by most emi­nent Authors Ancient and Modern. Clemens Alexandrinus, Iraeneus, Hilary, and others, are cited to this purpose, by P [...]ret. [...]o. 1. [...]. 16. c, 6. Chamier, Is [...]gog. [...]d S. Sc. c. 18. Rivet, Lection. Gresham. par. 1, Lect. 15. Dr. Holdsworth. As Esdras and his Companions of old, so should we now interpret Scripture by Scripture, comparing among themselves those things that are Endited by the same Spirit, saith the learned De Imp. sum. p [...]t. [...]irc [...] sacra. Grotius, plainly referring to that in Neh. 8. 7, 8. Mr. Ser. on 2. Pet. 3. 16. Hales of Eaton in his Golden Remains says, Other Expositions may give Rules of Direction for understanding their Authors: but the Scripture give [...] Rules to expound it self. When the Fathers (saith the Duct. Dubit. l. 3. c. 3. p. 36 [...]. Bishop of Down) confirmed an Exposition of one place of Scripture by the Doctrine of another, then and then onely they thought they had the [...] the Scripture demon­stration: and Matter of Faith and ne­cessary [Page 171] belief: and that this was the du­ty of the Christian Doctors, Origen doth expresly affirm.

And however, the Roman Doctors (of this latter age especially) have vehe­mently contended against this, that the Authority of their Church may take place; yet we find that in some of them, that comes full up to what we say. I shall give one instance, Li. 3 d [...] Christo revelato c▪ 21. Jose­phus a Costa (as I find him cited by Chamier and Rive [...].) Nihil perinde Scri­pturam videtur ap [...]rire atque ipsa Scriptura. Ita (que) diligens, attenta, fre­quens (que) lectio, [...]um meditatio, & collatio Scripturarum, omnium fumma Regula ad intelligendum [...]ihi semper vis [...]. na [...] ex ali­ [...] Scriptur is aliae optime intellig [...]tur. No­thing seems to me to open the Scripture like the Scripture it self Therefore dili­gent attentive, and frequent Reading, with Meditation, and comparing of Scriptures, hath alway seemed to me the chief Rule of all for understanding; for by some Scriptures others are best understood.

CHAP. II.

I proceed to some Arguments for the confirmation of this Second Propo­sition, I shall pass over many of those that are numerously brought in by other Writers; chusing to insist upon those that I take to be of greatest force; and against which the greatest endea­vours have been used to overthrow them.

My first shall be this▪ The Scripture is of all other best fitted to be the Rule Arg. 1. to guide us in the determining of its own sense and meaning. Nothing else is so well qualified for this use. And this may be evinced by its three pro­perties, its Perfection, Perspicuity, and Authentickness. It is the most Perfect, [Page 173] Perspicuous, and Authentick Record of the Mind of God. Of these Three I must distinctly Treat.

First, this, and this only, is the per­fect Branch 1. Record of the mind of God, fully manifesting it to us so far as it is necessa­ry for us to know it, in order to our duty and our happiness. The Apostle speaks clearly and fully for this, 2 Tim. 3. 15, 16, 17. From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto Salvation, through Faith which is in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is given by inspiration from God, &c. Here two things are evidently Asser­ted, viz. That the Scriptures contain in them what is sufficient both for a Mi­nister of Christ to Teach, and for any Christian to know, to make him wise unto Salvation. Neither of which can be, if there be not that in the Scripture it self, out of which the Mind of God therein deliver'd may be sufficiently un­derstood without the suppliment of some other over-ruling Principle. For 1. How can the Scripture make any man wise unto Salvation, if it fall short [Page 174] in point of objective Evidence necessa­ry to beget that Divine Knowledge, wherein all saving Wisdom consists? 2. How can it sufficiently furnish a Minister for his work of instructing his Hearers▪ and conducting them to Life, if from thence he cannot fetch enough to clear the Truth he is to deliver to them?

CHAP. III.

SEcondly, the Scripture is a perspicu­ous [...] Revelation of God's Will. Whatsoever may be the ignorance or darkness of Men, which hinders them from knowing what God hath said in these Sacred Records; yet the objective perspicuity of them is generally asserted by Protestants against the Romanists. Not that all Truths revealed in Scrip­ture are so low and common as in their own Nature to be obvious to Man's Understanding: but that (as to the manner of their delivery) they are so laid down in the Scripture, as that they may be understood by and from the Scripture: yet we mean not that eve­ry part or passage of Scripture is clear: (For that there are many difficulties therein we acknowledge.) But that the mind of God is somewhere or other in [Page 176] Scripture plainly propounded, so far as it is necessary for us to know it, one part of it giving Light to another; so that the whole Scripture taken together is a Perspicuous Manifestation of his will. This is proved by Moses's words in Deut. 30. 12, 13, 14. Speaking of the Law; and the Apostles words, Rom. 10. 6. &c. Speaking the same of the Gospel. Hence the written Word is frequently compared to a Light, and is Ps. 19. 7. 8. Ps. 119. 105. 130. 2 Pet. 1. 19. 2 Tim. 3. 15 Matt. 22. said to give understanding to the Simple. Had not the Scriptures been Perspicu­ous, how could Timothy in his Child­hood have understood them? How could our Saviour out of them have convinced the Sadduces of the Doctrin of the Resurrection? Or the Apostles, out of them prove irrefragably the Acts. truth of their Doctrin against the gain­saying Jews? Or how could the Be­reans try the Apostles Doctrin by search­ing the Scriptures? These are unde­niable Act. 17. 11. Proofs that the Scriptures are Perspicuous, and that they have a plain and certain sense obvious to a con­siderate Reader. But all this will [Page 177] signifie nothing, if the Scripture have not that Light in it that may discover it self, and clear up its own meaning without borrowing Light from some other Principle.

Now because much of the stress of this Cause lies on this, we must a little consider what is said against it. The late Romanists do generally cry out, that the Scriptures are obscure; partly that they may have the fairer colour to take them out of the Peoples hands, lest they should mistake, or pervert them, (though none among them have been more guilty of that than their Doctors of greatest name for Learn­ing:) partly, that they may bring in their unwritten Traditions, as exposi­tory of Scripture-Revelations; and partly also, that they may establish a necessity of an Infallible, Visible Judge here on Earth to Interpret Scriptures, and decide all Controversies. Yet I know not any of them, but will own that many things in the Scripture are clear. But there is a late Writer, that denies this. My next work therefore [Page 178] shall be to deal with him, and clear the Truth from his exceptions in some of the following Chapters of this Dis­course.

CHAP. IV.

THe Belgick Exercitator whom I have oft mentioned before, that he may make sure work, rises higher in denying the Scriptures Perspicuity, than any that I have ever met with: and with confidence affirms the Scrip­ture to be universally obscure, and that no part of it is of it self clear and Ph. Scr. Int. c. 11. par. 6. Ibid. c. 6. p. 1. & c. 11. par. 9. plain; and thereupon denies, that one part of Scripture can be expounded by another. Yea, this he laies as the foundation of his main Assertion, [Page 179] against the Scriptures Interpreting it self.

And one great Reason he gives, is Exception. 1. (what he hath taken a great deal of te­dious pedantick pains to prove in his third Chapter,) ‘That all speech be­ing made up of Words and Phra­ses is abscure and doubtful, because the words whereof it consists are ca­pable of different significations, and consequently may be taken in a vari­ous sense: and thus it is with the Scri­pture, it is universally ambiguous, and therefore obscure.’

To this I Answer, 1. If this Reason Sol. 1. hold, then there is no Speech or Wri­ting in the World, but will fall under the same unhappy fate. No Law of the Land, no letter of a Friend, no Oral Discourse, no Treatise of what­soever Subject, and how accurately so­ever written, shall be accounted In­telligible. For all Writings and Dis­courses are made up of the same kind of Words and Phrases, and capable of being adorn'd with the same Tropes and Figures that the Scripture is, and [Page 180] every whit as liable to be taken in for different senses. And thus no man shall know how to speak or write any thing that can be clearly understood: and that excellent gift of Speech which God hath bestowed upon men to be an instru­ment of society and converse, shall be of no other use, but to be made an En­gine of deceit and treachery.

Secondly, if things be thus, to what 2. end did this Author trouble himself to Write, and others to read this Book of his? if all Speeches and Writings be ambiguous and obscure, and not to be understood without an Interpreter, of what use is this Jewel of his fancy? Did he hope to lead the whole World of Interpreters out of their Labyrinths into the right path, by such an ignis fatuus, that by its ambiguities and un­certainties may scare and amuse them, and carry them hither and thither ac­cording to the wind of their own ima­ginations? Or hath he attain'd to a faculty above all other Writers? even the best and holiest to write in such Words and Phrases as might open his [Page 181] meaning, without entangling his Rea­ders in ambiguities? If he thinks his Book be free from this blemish, me­thinks he might have had the modesty to conceive, that the Pen-men of Scri­pture knew how to write as well as he: If his thoughts of his Book were other­wise, he might have kept it to himself, and fed the Moths with it.

Thirdly, yet again, if it be thus, that all words in whatsoever contexture be 3. so ambiguous and obscure, what will become of this Infallible Interpreter, which our Author would set up? For whatsoever Interpretation be made of any Scripture, it must be framed in such words as other men use, and as all kind of Writings are drawn up in: and if when all is done, these be ob­scure, what are we the better? For certainly according to this Authors ar­gument, even the first Principles of Na­ture, and the most unquestionable Max­ims of Philosophy, when turn'd into Words and Sentences, will be as ambi­guous, and consequently as dark as the Scriptures.

[Page 182] Fourthly, whereas his impeaching the Scriptures of Ambiguity and Ob­scurity, 4. is not only to disable them from expounding themselves, but that he may set up Philosophy as the only Interpre­ter; he instances in several Scriptures, Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 24. which he says are thus Ambiguous and Obscure; in the clearing whereof Phi­losophy cannot possibly afford us any help. As for Example, when he sup­poseth of our Saviour's Words in Joh. 5. 39. [...], That it's doubtful whether this be to be taken Impera­tively, search the Scripture: or Indica­tively, ye do search the Scriptures. Can any Principle of Philosophy satisfie us whether the Verb [...] there used, be of the Indicative mood, or of the Im­parative? So when he says it's doubt­ful, whether our Saviours words to Peter, John, 21. 16, 17, 18. should be taken Interrogatively, Dost thou love me? Or Affirmatively, Thou dost love me. And his words to his Disciples, Math. 26. 45. Whether they are to be read Imperatively, sleep on now, &c. Or Interrogatively, Do ye sleep on, &c? [Page 183] And so of Pilat's words to our Savi­our, What is Truth? Whether they are a serious question, or an Irony. In these and many other, if the matter and co­herence do not resolve us, Philosophy cannot relieve us. How then do these Allegations serve our Authors end? which is that the Scripture cannot In­terpret it self, but all its Interpretation must be regulated by Philosophy?

Bùt Lastly, I deny this Charge laid 5. against the Scripture, (of its being Universally Ambiguous, and Obscure) as highly contumelious to God the Au­thor of it. For it supposeth, either that he could not, or that he would not speak his Mind to the Sons of Men; (for whose Eternal concerns he designed this Sacred Volume,) in such a manner as they might understand it, and be bet­tered by it. As it was out of Love and Mercy to Sinners that the Scriptures were Endited, that they might have a sure Guide to Blessedness; so they are Written for all sorts and ranks of Men to make use of: and therefore they are for the most part drawn in a vulgar [Page 184] condescending style. But if they can­not be understood without Philosophy (yea a very great insight into Philo­sophy, as this Author sometimes inti­mates) not one of a thousand of them that have the Scriptures, will be able to understand the Mind of God in them: they being (according to this Mans words) so totallydark and doubtful.

CHAP. V.

‘SEcondly, whereas it is usually said Except. 2. by our Divines that such pla­ces of Scripture as are clear and plain in themselves, do Interpret such as Phil. Scr. Int. c. 11. par. 2. 3, 4, 5, 6. are obscure; the great Question is, what do they mean by a place that is clear and perspicuous in or of it self? I have made inquiry about this, (saith the Exercitator) and can find nothing solid or satisfactory.’

To this I answer in few words, That Sol. Place or Text of Scripture is plain and perspicuous in it self, whose sence so fairly riseth out of the Words, and their connexion with what goes before and after, that the Intelligent Reader need not miss of it, if he be not wanting to [Page 186] himself. And I appeal to any man that is not resolved to cavil, whether there be not thousands of Scripture-Sentences whose sense is thus clear and evident.

‘But here the Exercitator Replies, Object. The words whereof Scripture-Pro­positions consist have their significati­on from Humane Institution, and their Ibid. par. 3, 4. 5. sense depends upon common use. If therefore the sense of Scripture be any where so plain as to be known by the Words then it is not Scripture, but Usus Loquendi, the common use of Speech, that is the Rule of Interpre­tation. But this, says he, is of all other the most dangerous and deceitful Rule to go by, causing many monstrous conceptions of God and things Di­vine, suitable to the apprehensions of the Ignorant and besotted Vulgar.’

To this captious Objection I An­swer Sol. 1. Two things.

1. We are now speaking of such Scri­ptures whose sense is obvious, and so (ac­cording Phil. Scr. Int. c. 2. par. 7. to the Exercitators own Rule given in the beginning of his Discourse) need no Interpreter. For he plainly [Page 187] sayes, (if at least there be any plain sayings to be found) that the proper Object of Interpretation is such a Speech as is obscure. This Cavil therefore is here is very disingenuous, being against his own premised Rule.

In Scripture there is somewhat com­mon 2. with other Writings, and something proper to it self, as each particular Wri­ting hath. The words it useth are of the same kind with those of other Wri­tings, and, singly taken, are supposed to have the like signification according to common use. But as those words are framed into Propositions in the Scripture, and those Propositions con­joyned in such a contexture of Dis­course; so they may, and oft do, carry a peculiar Sense, which ariseth not from Humane Institution appointing the sig­nification of such Words, but from Di­vine Ordination placeing those Words in such an Order, without which they would not signifie what they do. And though the several Words and Clauses of Scripture taken separately from the place wherein they stand, may have a [Page 188] dubious or indeterminate Sense; yet take them together, with the whole dis­course to which they belong, and whereof they are parts, and the Sense may be undeniably clear and determi­nate. And this is one way whereby Scripture expounds itself, as the other is, (what hath been most insisted on) by comparing dark places with those that are plain.

Take for instance one of those no­minated by the [...]xercitator; the words P [...]. Scr. [...]t. c. 11. par. 5. of our Saviour in Matth. 5. 34. Swear not at all. What it is to swear is I think well known, (though not seriously con­sidered) by the most. And the Word [...] at all, what it signifies in common use we all know. And if this Clause were taken singly, it would seem to import an absolute▪ Prohibition of Swearing at any time, in any manner whatsoever. But take it as it here stands, as a branch of that whole discourse, that begins at Verse 33. and ends at ver. 37. And so Interpreters understand our Sa­viours meaning, either to forbid all Swearing by the Creature, and in fa­miliar [Page 189] Discourse: or to caution them against the common conceit and practice that then obtain'd, of Swearing rashly and fallaciously by the Creature, upon supposal that such oaths were no [...] ob­liging because the name of God was not interposed.

CHAP. VI.

‘BUT that which is plain to one Except. 3. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 3. may be obscure to another, saith the Exercitator; who there­upon asserts, That there is no Perspi­cuity, or Obscurity, but what is pure­ly Relative to the Understanding of the Reader or Hearer:’ and (accord­ing to his wonted modesty) condemns the Reformed Divines, (and he might have added the Ancient Fathers) for affirming the Scriptures to be in them­selves Perspicuous, though Obscure, in regard of the indisposition of Mens Minds.

I Answer, 1. If there be no Objective Perspicuity, nor any-thing clear in it Sol. 1. self, but only as it relates to the actual ex­ercise of Mens apprehensive Faculties; then it seems there is no difference be­tween a clear day, and a cloudy, but [Page 191] only in reference to our sight: and the Sun must not be said to shine bright, because Men that have lost their Eyes, or are shut up in a Dungeon cannot see it. But I think the vanity of such a conceit is Perspicuous enough, whether the Exercitator see it or not. It hath been hitherto esteem'd by all Men (as far as I know) a considerable excellen­cy in any Writer, that his Speech and Stile is clear and perspicuous; and the contrary, Darkness and Obscurity hath been blamed in those who affect to Speak or Write cloudily and enigmati­cally: which certainly implies, that there is a Perspicuity, and a contrary Obscurity, that is absolutly inhering in the Speech it self. And yet in the de­nial of this, Wolzogen, and his friend Vel­thusius joyn with the Exercitator, asser­ting with him, that there is no Perspi­cuity in the Scripture, but what is Re­lative to those that Read or Hear it. And this they endeavour to confirm or illustrate by Similitudes. A Speech, says Li. 1. de Scr. Int. p. 104. Wolzogen, can no otherwise be cal'd Per­spicuous absolutely in it self, than a Mans [Page 192] Blood can be said to be red while it runs in his Veins, and no Eye sees it; or the Snow that falls in the extream North­parts, where no man feels the horror of it, can be accounted Cold. These, (sayes he) do consist in Sense, without which, we cannot have any Conception of them. And so nothing is Perspicuous further than it is perceived. To the like purpose Vel­thusius De usu Rat. in Theolog. p. 15. speaks; That Light is not in the Object, but in the Sense; as heat is not in the Fire, nor cold in the Ice; but in the Sense of him that Feels either the one or the other; no more than pain is in the Sword or Knife that makes a Wound. So sayes he, neither is clearness in the Object that is to be known, but in the Mindes perception of it. Truely, I do not much admire these Mysteries of the New Philosophy. Hitherto both Light and Colour, Heat and Cold have been esteem'd qualities inherent in their proper Subjects, and not to consist in a Relation. But if it be as these Men say, it seems nothing is Cold or Hot, Light or Dark, save only as and when it is discern'd by one that sees and feels [Page 193] it. But on the contrary (to pass by other Arguments) we find in the History of the Creation, that darkness was upon Gen. 1. 2, 3 the face of the deep. And when God said, Let there be Light, there was Light. Both which were, before there was any sen­sitive Creature in being to discern them. If any shall here say (as some are rea­dy to do when clear Scripture goes cross to their darling Notions) that those words in the History of the Cre­ation are used not according to the reality of the thing, but according to Vulgar Conception; I shall not think such profane boldness worthy a Reply. Perhaps it will be pleaded, that the Scriptures were not written to teach us Natural Philosophy. Be it so; nei­ther were they penned to teach us any falshood, or to deceive us into mistakes concerning God or any of his Works. All the several parts of that Sacred Vo­lume are so ordered, as to have some tendency, immediate or remote, to the great end for which it was End [...]ed, the conducting of us to Happiness. But sure­ly the God of Truth never designed to [Page 194] bring us to Happiness by a Lie. Verily I have little encouragement to trust Mens Reason in matters of Revelation, when I find them talking so absu [...]dly in mat­ters of Natural Cognisance. And yet when all is done, Wolzogen grants, that Li. 1. de Scr. Int. p. 104, 105 the Scriptures are so framed, that no­thing is wanting in them to render them perspicuous. And truely, as far as I understand, this is all that our Pro­testant Divines mean, when they say the Scriptures are perspicuous in them­selves. What's the matter then? why he tells us their meaning is very good, but the Expression is incommodious. Which is but another taste of his Civility; this being his humour throughout his Book to nibble at somewhat or other in the most learned Writers of the Re­formed Churches. But I return to our Exercitator. And,

Secondly, I answer, when the Apo­stle 2. says, 2 Pet 3. 16. that some of those things whereof St. Paul Treats in his Epistles, are hard to be understood, if there be no perspicuity or obscurity but what is Relative, he might as well have [Page 195] said that they are all hard to be un­derstood: for doubtless there are some Men so stupidly ignorant, or obstinate­ly perverse, that they understand none of them. But surely when the Apostle says, that some of them were difficult, he did not intend to say they were all so.

Thirdly, The Apostles preach'd the 3. Gospel in the demonstration of the Spi­rit 1 Cor. 2. 4 and of Power; and did by mani­festation of the Truth▪ commend them­selves 2 Cor. 4. 2. to ever Mans Conscience in the [...]ht of God: with such perspicuity and convincing evidence did they speak. And yet, as the same Apostle intimates, their Gospel might be and was [...]id to them that were lost, in whom Ibid. v. 3, 4 the God of this World had blinded the Minds of them which believe not, lest the Light of the glorious Gospel, which is the Image of God, should shine unto them. There is therefore an absolute objective perspicuity in the Scriptures themselves, whatsoever may be the in­capacity of Mens Understandings.

[Page 196] Lastly, to conclude this, I wonder 4. Ph. Scr. Int c. 3. at this Authors Wit or Memory, that he so grosly contradicts himself in this very Chapter, out of which this Ex­ception is taken. For having premi­sed, that the obscurity of Speech ari­seth chiefly from its ambiguity, and at large discoursed of the several sorts of Amphibolies in Words and Sentences (all which do evidently prove, if any thing, an obscurity that lies in the Speech it self, without respect to the Reader or Hearer) he afterwards ex­presly tells us, that there is a two-fold ambiguity of Speech; the one abso­lute, Cap. Cit. par. 26. considered in it self, and the o­ther Relative, and with respect to us. By which he unravels what he had said in his third Paragraph, acknow­ledging that a Speech may be ambigu­ous, and consequently obscure in it self. And if there be an absolute ob­scurity, there is also an absolute per­spicuity; for which he before derided the Divines of the Reformation.

CHAP. VII.

IT is further Objected by the Exer­citator, Sect. 1. Except. 4. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 4. That the sense of Scripture is two-fold, either sensus simpliciter dictus, or Ver [...]s. And he thus Explains himself: ‘The sense of the Scripture is either the simple sense of the Words, which they of themselves offer to the [Page 998] Reader; or the true sense and mean­ing of the Author in those Words. These sayes he, are seldom the same, but different, yea opposite: and the sense which the words offer may be plain and easie, when the sense that the Author intends by them, which is a clean other thing, is very dark and obscure.’ And so confident is the Gentleman in this conceit, that he superciliously slights Expositors of Scri­pture for not minding this distinction, Ibid. par. 7. and (for want hereof) taking oft times the simple sense for the true one.

To make this wild and senseless distin­on good, he instanceth in several pas­sages of Scripture, wherein he would make us believe this Two-fold sense is to be found. I shall therefore be­fore I proceed, endeavour to clear those Passages, or the principal of them.

Sect. 2. One instance he gives is of those Sect. 2. 1. Ibid. par. 4. expressions in Scripture, The Arme and Finger of God. ‘The simple sense of which Words, and that which they do of themselves offer to the Rea­der, he sayes, is very obvious, being [Page 199] known by common use: but [...]he thinks no Divine so void of Wit, as to take that obvious sense for the true meaning of the Author.’

By this it appears, this Gentleman Sol. conceives, that the sense which those Words of themselves offer, is proper without any Trope or Figure; as if God had a bodily Arme or Finger, as a Man hath. But by his favour, he is greatly out. The Arme and Finger of God, according to common accepta­tion with any that are vers'd in the Scriptures, have no other than an im­proper sense, nor do they signifie any more than the Power of God: though the word Arme or Finger either singly taken, or applyed to Men, signifies some­what else; according to that known Maxime, Verba sunt intelligenda secun­dum subjectam materiam, Words are to be understood according to the sub­ject matter about which they are used. And this holds in all manner of Speeches and Writings whatsoever; the matter in hand directs to the sense of the Words.

[Page 200] A second instance is in Joh. 14. 6. Sect. 3. 2. Ibid. Sol. where our Saviour says, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. What obvi­ous sense it is, that this Author con­ceives from common use of speech to be in these words, different from our Sa­viours meaning, I cannot divine: Nor can I see how they can signifie any more or less to him that is acquainted with the Doctrine of the Gospel, than what our Saviour means by them; who calls himself The Way, by no unapt Me­taphor, because (as himself expounds it in the latter end of the Verse) it is by Him that Sinners are to come to the Father; that is, to Reconciliation with him, and fruition of him. It is by Him, that is, by the Merit of his Blood, by the Light of his Doctrine, by the Conduct of his Pattern, and by the Power of his Spirit. And herein he is The Truth, that is, the Substance and real Completion of all the Types and Shadows under the Law; and con­sequently he is The Life, (by a known Metonyme of the effect for the cause) in that he is the Author, that is, the [Page 201] Purchaser and Bestower of that Eter­nal Life that Sinners come to enjoy in God.

A further instance is given in those 3. Sect. 4. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 3. par. 7. words of our Saviour, This is my Body; where he affirms, ‘That the plain and easie sense which the words of them­selves offer to the Reader, is that which the Romish Church takes them in: but the sense of our Saviour in speaking them, which he grants to be that which the Reformed Churches give of them, this, he says, is dark and obscure.’

But I suppose he cannot be ignorant, Sol. that there are considerable Doctors of the Romish Church, eminent for Learn­ing, who have acknowledged, that they should never have entertained that sense of the words which asserts Tran­substantiation, if the Authority of the Church had not moved them. And our Writers have abundantly mani­fested the gross absurdity of that sense; and among others, Dr. Brevint in his late excellent Discourse of the Mystery of the Romish Mass, hath clearly, and [Page 202] to great satisfaction, proved the Prote­stant sense of that speech of our Savi­ours from the very words themselves. I cannot well understand by this Au­thors discourse, of what setled Perswa­sion he is in matters of Religion. He now and then insinuates something that carries with it a dislike of the Roma­nists and their way: But it is plain enough by this, and many other passa­ges in his Book, that the Reformed Churches are little befriended by him.

Lastly, ‘He instances in those Scrip­tures Ibid. 4. Sect. 5. where God is said to be Lord of Heaven and Earth, the King of Nations, and King of Kings; and where he is said to have begotten a Son, Psal. 2. and to have loved the World, Joh. 3. 16. In all which, he says, the obvious, but mistaken, sense, and that which the Vulgar appre­hend, is, that God, after the manner of men, is a Lord and King, and doth beget and love; which he esteems to be grosly absurd.’ To these I answer distinctly.

[Page 203] 1. As for the places where God is Sol. 1. called Lord and King, and said to Reign over the Nations, with all of like import; in these we are taught, by what we find elsewhere in Scripture, to remove from God whatever savours of imperfection, and to ascribe nothing to him but what suits with a most ex­cellent and most perfect Being. Nor do the aforesaid Expressions, in their plain and obvious sense, signifie either more or less, than that God is the Uni­versal Sovereign of the World, Ruling his Creatures with infinite Wisdom and Power, according to their different natures and conditions; the Inferiour sort by instinct and natural necessity; his Intellectual Creatures by Laws, as the proper Instrument of Moral Go­vernment. And what the Exercitators sentiments are about this, I cannot con­jecture. If he be for that Novel Opi­nion of Thomas Anglus ab Albis, that God doth not properly Govern us by Laws, (as Kings do their Kingdoms) but, as an Engineer doth his Engine, by Physical Motion; and that there­fore [Page 204] he is call'd our Lord and King on­ly in a Metaphorical sense; I must en­ter a dissent against such an absurd and Atheistical conceit, and put him to prove his Assertion, and answer the Arguments that are in print against it.

2. As for the second, Of begetting a Son, Psal 2. 7. Interpreters do much [...]. differ about it. Some conceive the first and immediate sense of the words to respect David, whom God had deli­vered out of his great afflictions, and rais'd to a Kingdom; which delive­rance and exaltation was to him as a second Birth. And this they illustrate by what is said of the Roman Empe­rors, that they had two Birth-days; the one of their Persons, when they came into the World; the other of their Empire, when they were seated in the Throne: and that Christ is here intended only as the Antitype prefigu­red by David. Others understand these words properly and immediately of Christ, and that with respect to one of these two; either, 1. To his Eternal [Page 205] Generation, in reference to which he is called the Eternal and only begotten Son of God. The truth of which Ge­neration we are upon Scripture-testi­mony to receive, without searching into the manner; it being a Mystery infinitely above our reach: which there­fore he that will boldly intrude into, may justly fear to be overwhelm'd with its Glory. Or, 2. To the Temporal Manifestation of that Eternal Genera­tion; a thing being then said to be done, when it is manifested to be done. And so the words are applied by the Apostle Paul to our Saviours Resurre­ction; Act. 13. 33 whereby, as the same Apostle says elsewhere, He was declared to be the Rom. 1. 4. Son of God with power. Though I know there is, who understands those words of Christs Resurrection immedi­ately and in it self; partly because it was, as it were, a second Birth to the Humane Nature; partly because it was, as they conceive, the beginning of his Installment into his Regal Office; which might be called his Birth by Analogy to what was said before concerning the [Page 206] Roman Emperors. I shall not take up­on me to determine, which of these ways of Explication is to be adhered to. But be it what it will, this I need not be afraid to say, that it is Scripture, if any thing, that must clear the diffi­culty, and decide the difference; it is not Philosophy in its highest Exalta­tion that can be a sufficient Rule to re­solve us; the matter in hand being so wholly foreign to the best and clearest Natural Light.

3. Then for the last instance, Joh. 3. 16. where God is said to love the 3. World; though in this (as in all other things) we are not to measure God by our selves; yet this is undoubted, that by Gods love to Mankind, is every where plainly and clearly meant his Will to do them good, discovering it self in answerable effects, and the Com­placency that he takes in the good that he doth for them, or works in them. Nor do I think that any man, who heedfully reads the Scriptures, can take it otherwise. And this is no way un­becoming the Divine Perfections, but [Page 207] fully agreeing to his Nature, and the Manifestations that he hath made of himself both by Natural and Superna­tural Light.

Now as to this distinction which the §. 6. Exercitator so much applauds, con­demning all others that are not as fond of it as himself▪ I find sufficient reason to reject it; and do affirm, that the Words and Sentences of Scripture ta­ken in such a coherence among them­selves, and connexion with the whole, (and otherwise than thus they have no sense that is properly theirs) do exhi­bit to the Reader no other sense than what is indeed the: Authors meaning; being written for no other end but to signifie his mind for our safe guidance to Blessedness. And to think that they have any other sense than what is in­deed the truemind and meaning of the Author, is [...]o charge the Holy Scrip­tures with the vilest Imposture. What Num De [...] vo [...]is & lingu [...] ar­tifex di­f [...]rtè loqui non po [...]st [...] Imò vero su [...]ma providentia c [...]rere fu [...]o voluit [...]a quae divin [...] sunt, ut omnes intelligerent qua ipse omnibus lo­quebatur. Lactant. [...]. 6. de vero cultu, c. 21. would we think of that man, that [Page 208] should either spe [...]k or write so, as that his words should carry one meaning, and himself intend another? Would he not be judged a Deceiver? And shall we dare to fasten such a piece of Hypocrisie upon the Holy God, and that in a business wherein Mans Ever­lasting Happiness is concern'd? What thoughts have these men of God, who can talk thus of the Scriptures that are his acknowledged Word!

But let it be consider'd, before I leave this matter, whether our Author do not by this distinction contradict himself. For, 1. When he is (in pre­paration Ph. Scr. Int. c. 2. Par. 3. 4. Vocabula (circa quae Interpreta­tio versa­tur) ut ha­bet Cic. in Top. sunt rerum no­tae, [...]ut po­tius, ut nos putam [...]s, conceptuum. Primo enim iis utimur, ut quod me [...]te concepi [...], aliis notum faci­amus; cum (que) conceptus nil sint nisi rerum repraesentamina in Intelle­ctu, iisdem secundo etiam illae res denotantur atque designantur. to his future discourse) ex­plaining what he means by the mate­rial Object of Interpretation, he plain­ly asserts, that Words are first and im­mediately the signification of the in­ward Conceptions of the Mind; [...]and because those Conceptions are repre­sentations of things in▪ the Understand­ing, hence the Words that declare those [Page 209] Conceptions, are used to signifie and denote things. Now if so, how comes it about that the Words of Scripture can have a different sense from what the Author intends, seeing (as the Ex­ercitator acknowledgeth) they are signs or notes of the Conceptions of his Mind.

2. This same Author, when he is proving a multiplicity of true senses in the same Text of Scripture, and that Phil. Scr. Int. c. 4. par. 8. whatsoever Interpretations, be they never so many and various, are given, if they be Truths in themselves, they are also the true Expositions of that place, useth this Argument, That else God would be chargeable with decei­ving Men, by using such Words as he knew Men would be ready to take in such different senses, as he never meant▪ This the Author rejects with abhor­rence, as not agreeing with the Di­vine▪ Perfections. How well he agrees with himself, and how this may be re­conciled with the forementioned con­ceit of such a twofold sense as we have been speaking of, the simple sense of [Page 210] the Words of Scripture, and the true sense of the Speaker, let the Reader judge.

CHAP. VIII.

‘IN the next place, it will be said Sect. 1. Except. 5. that the plainest Scriptures are liable to be wrested and perverted by Men of corrupt minds: therefore they are not perspicuous enough to Interpret themselves.’

Suppose what is indeed too true, (and sufficiently made good by our Ad­versaries Sol. in this cause) that the plain­est Scriptures may be perverted. So may the best and truest Principles of Reason and Philosophy. Nor can any Man devise how to speak or write so, but a wicked and malicious Wit may put an absurd or horrid sense upon the [Page 211] most innocent Words. And of this, I think, we have instances enough every day. But what is this to the sense which the Words and Sentences of Scri­pture (in such a Contexture, and with reference to, and dependence upon the Antecedents and Consequents, and the whole Tenour of the Authors Dis­course) do offer to the Reader? That the Scripture thus consider'd, is of it self liable to such ambiguous senses, is a profane and sensless calumny, bring­ing that Holy Volume under the same condemnation with the Devils Oracles, that were purposely contrived by that great Enemy of Mankind, to cheat and abuse the Pagan World.

But, may some say, do not many Object. take the Words of Scripture in a far different sense from what the Author of Scripture intended?

No doubt they do; what then? Sol. That is not, because the Words give them that sense, but because they im­pose that sense upon the Words, to make them comply with their own ap­prehensions.

[Page 212] ‘In the sixth place, the Exercitator Sect. [...]. Except. 6. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 4▪ par. 1. argues against the perspicuity of the Scriptures, from the multitude of Commentaries, Animadversions, In­terpretations, (for he loves to heap up words) written by Learned Men upon the whole Scripture, or the se­veral parts of it: whence he con­cludes it as a thing unquestionable, that the Scripture is obscure, so ob­scure that it cannot Interpret its own sense.’

I answer; That there are some diffi­culties Sol. in Scripture, that may exercise, yea, and exceed the ablest Wits, and that many things in it may be obscure to the Reader, for want of using the right means to understand, is confess'd. But the multitude of Expositions doth not at all prove the Scripture to be so obscure, as to be disabled for being the supreme Rule to Interpret it self▪ For whatsoever Notes▪ or Commentaries are written upon the Bible by▪ Learned▪ Men, they are either such as truly con­duce to the supposed End, the right understanding of the Scripture, and [Page 213] consequently to the due practical im­provement of what is so understood, or they fail of this, and do rather dar­ken and cloud the Text. These of the latter sort do not deserve the Honour to be esteemed Interpretations of Scri­pture; for they render the sense of it more in [...]icate and perplex. And tru­ly it hath been no unusual thing for Men that write only to make ostenta­tion of their Learning, and draw the eyes of others upon them, or to make trial of their Wits in their attempts up­on the Scripture, to vent some odd No­tions, that serve rather to amuse than edifie the Reader, and leave him more in the dark than when he perused the Text alone without their Gloss: as it hath fared with some voluminous Com­mentators upon Aquinas; who under pretence of expounding their Author, have run out into so many intricate and frivolous Questions, that by that time they have done, they have left the Au­thors Text less intelligible than it was before they medled with it: Truly so it is with some that have undertaken to [Page 214] write upon the Holy Scriptures. But I take such Mens Writings rather for Depravations than Expositions. And the chief cause of this evil hath been (what this Exercitator is not well aware of) that they made too much use of their Philosophick Notions in their En­deavours to Interpret Scripture-Reve­lations. On the other hand, if Com­mentaries or Annotations on Scripture be such as do contribute any help to­wards the unfolding of the true sense, this hath been chiefly by collecting and comparing the several parts of Scrip­ture together, and considering the cir­cumstances of each Text expounded, and so fetching the sense of Scripture from the Scripture it self; which is the only sure and warrantable way of In­terpretation.

CHAP. IX.

HAving vindicated the second Sect. 1. Branch of my first Argument, viz. The Scriptures Perspicuity, from the many Exceptions made against it; I proceed to the third and last, viz. That the Scripture is the only Authen­tick Branch 3. Record of the Mind and Will of God. For it is the certain and un­doubted Voice of God himself; and what that speaks, He speaks. And who so fit to Interpret the meaning of his Words as himself? Ejus est Interpr [...] ­tari, cujus est condere, is an approved Rule in the Civil Law; He that made the Law, is fittest to Interpret it. And in the present case the Reason is [Page 216] evident: God best knows his own Mind; and he hath no where so plainly and fully revealed his Mind as in Scrip­ture. Certainly there can be none so sure and infallible Interpreter of these sacred Records, as the Holy Spirit that endited them; and he Interprets them, not by suggesting to us any thing for their understanding which is not there already; but by speaking to us more clearly from some part of Scripture, what is deliver'd more darkly in others. Can any Man, or sort of Men in the World, pretend to know the Mind of God better than himself? or give us better assurance what his Mind is, than the Word which himself hath appointed to be written for this very purpose? Whatsoever sense may be put upon any Scripture-Assertion, and by whomso­ever framed, it cannot challenge our undoubted reception, unless we can discern the Voice of God in it. And that is no where to be heard with evi­dence and assurance, (especially in mat­ters of Supernatural Revelation, which is that we chiefly deal with in this [Page 217] Controversie) but from the Scripture it self.

But here the Exercitator comes in Sect. 2. Except. 1. Ph. Scr. Int c. 13. resp. ad arg. 9. with his Reply: ‘For acknowledging that without controversie God is an Infallible Interpreter, and that the Scripture is the Voice of God; he nevertheless denies that therefore it will follow that the Scripture can be its own Interpreter, or the Rule of Interpretation to it self; because, says he, the same Author may write several Treatises, and yet it follows not that the one should Interpret the other.’

To this I answer, The comparison Sol. is very unequal. Men write of diffe­rent Subjects many times, and for very different Ends; and may withal so far forget themselves, or be so unconstant to themselves, as to cross in one Dis­course what they have written in ano­ther. But God, the Author of Scrip­ture, hath designed that whole Volume to one and the same Use and End, to be a Declaration of his Mind to Men, that they may thereby be directed in [Page 218] their greatest affairs, and have a sure Guide to Happiness. It is therefore every way most consistent with his Wisdom and Goodness so to order the enditing of Scripture in matters of so great excellency and necessity, that his Mind may be known from the Scrip­tures themselves, either by the plain­ness of the particular Sentences, or by the dependence on, and connexion with, the Antecedents and Consequents, or Collation with the more remote parts thereof.

But there is another Author, who Sect. 3. Except. 2. Lud. Wolz. Li. 2. de Scr. Int. p. 202, 203 & p. 250. pretending to maintain the Protestant Cause against the Exercitator, deals less candidly with us than that profess'd Adversary. For in stead of answering the aforesaid Exception, he says again and again, ‘That God is not, nor can properly be said to be the Interpreter of Scripture, or the Expositor of his own Mind therein. And he gives us this strange reason for it: Because to this it's necessary that by an Oracle (that is, I suppose, either by audible Voice, or secret instinct) he should [Page 219] (according to the Enthusiasts fancy) expresly pronounce to us, that this or that is the sense of such or such a Scripture. Unless he do this, he cannot be allow'd by this Dictator to be the Interpreter of the Scriptures.’

To this I reply; Do we not all ac­knowledge Sol. Joh. 7. 38, 42. c. 19. 37. Rom. 4. 3. c. 11. 2. Gal. 3. 30. that the Scripture is the Word of God, and that God speaks to us in it, and that what that says, God says? And is it not the usual Language of the Holy Ghost in the Bible, that the Scripture saith thus and thus? which sure can be no otherwise taken for truth or sense, but as the Scripture is the Voice of God to us. And Wolzo­gen Li. 1. de Scr. Int. p. 26. himself says several times that in the Scripture God speaks to us after the manner of men. And seeing sometimes the Text is so plain, that it speaks clear­ly its own mind, and sometimes what is spoken in one part of Scripture, is explained by what is spoken in ano­ther, (both which himself acknowledg­eth) why may it not with as much pro­priety be said, that God is the Inter­preter of his own Mind in Scripture, [Page 220] though he use no other Voice than that of the Scripture in speaking to us? For how improper soever such an Expres­sion may seem to this Gentleman, it is a­greeable to Scripture-language. And me thinks he who so hotly contends for the Usus loquendi, as to make that the only supreme infallible Rule of expounding Scripture, might give our Reform'd Di­vines leave to speak according to this Use, without his supercilious censure. In the mean time this Author may do well to consider, whose Cause he most favours by such manner of arguing. I know none that can so heartily thank him for it as the Romanists, who use the same way of cavilling against us, when we say that the Scripture, or the Spirit of God in and by the Scripture, is the sole supreme Judge of all Contro­versies of Faith. This, say they, can­not be, unless the Spirit of God do, by an audible Voice, decide the Contro­versie, telling the one party they are in the right, and the other they are in an error. And because he doth not so in the Scripture, therefore they deny him to be [Page 221] the supreme Judge of Controversies by the Scripture. Thus Gretser the Je­suit in the Conference at R [...]tis [...]on Se­venty five years ago: Behold, says he, Ann. 1601. V. J. Ge­rard. Exeg. Tom. 1. loc. com. c. 22. par. 464. & Dan. Chamier. Panstrat. To. 1. Li. 1. c. 14. we are here disputing the Cause: If the Spirit of God do, by the Scriptures, judge and determine Controversies, let him now come, let him come and pass sentence out of this Book, (the Bible that lay before him) and say, Thou Gretser art wrong, and thou H. art in the right. Now what doth Wolzogen by his Argu­mentation, but justifie the profane in­solency of that petulant Jesuite? The Antients were of another mind; they acknowledged God speaking in the Scripture to be the Judge of Contro­versies. Thus speaks one of them to his [...]; Nemo vobis credat, nemo Optat. Miiev. li. 5. cont. Parmen. nobis, de Coelo quaerendus, &c. Let none give credit to us or you; we must seek a Judge from Heaven: but what need we go thither to him, having his Testament here in the Gospel? And if the Spirit of God may, with congruity enough, be said to speak in the Scriptures, as Judge of Controversies, he may with [Page 222] as good congruity be acknowledged to speak in the Scriptures, as Interpreting his own Mind there laid down.

And so I have done with my first Argument.

CHAP. X.

MY next Argument follows: That Arg. 2. which is the only Rule of Faith, is the only Rule to interpret its own sense. But so is the Scripture. That the Written Word of God is the only Rule of Faith, is acknowledged by all that sincerely own the Protestant Cause. Now from hence I thus argue. 1. The supreme Rule of Faith is that which in­fallibly guides and determines us per Modum Objecti, what we are to believe. Now it is the Scripture in its true and genuine meaning that we are bound to believe. Whatsoever therefore obje­jectively determines what we are to be­lieve, must accordingly determine the sense of Scripture. And if any thing else besides the Scripture be the Rule to determine this, that must eo ipso, up­on [Page 224] that very score, be acknowledged for the Rule of Faith. 2. Whatsoever is the Rule of Faith, must be the Rule of deciding all Controversies of Faith: This I think no Man will question. Now let but this be supposed, that the Scripture is the only supreme Rule of deciding all Controversies of Faith, (which no sound Protestant can deny) it will necessarily follow, That it must be the supreme Rule of clearing all Doubts and Difficulties within it self. For where the Scripture is on both sides own'd for the Rule, the knot of the Controversie lies in this, whether this or that be the sense of the Scriptures that are alledged on both sides; for were that agreed, the Controversie would cease; and whatsoever deter­mines that, decides the Cause. Thus Ph. Scr. Int. c. 1. par. 1. much the Exercitator acknowledges. What ever therefore it be that's made the Rule of Interpreting Scripture, and determining the sense of it, is thereby made the Rule of deciding all Contro­versies of Faith, and is to such as so use it, the Rule of their Faith.

CHAP. XI.

AGainst this Argument some may Sect. 1. Except. 1. have the confidence, it may be, to make this Exception, That Scripture is not the only Rule of Faith. The Papists join unwritten Traditions with the Scripture, and will have us take both together for the compleat Rule of Faith. This I shall not deal with, there having been so much said by our Divines about it in the Controversies between us and the Church of Rome. But there is another Generation of Men that join Human Reason with the Scripture, to make up the Rule of Faith. Lambertus Velthusius, one of the Seniors of the Gallo-Belgick Church at Utrech, is charged with this by Van­der Li. t. adv. Wolzog. p. 114. Weayen, who cites this among many [Page 226] other erroneous Positions, out of one of that Authors Belgick Tracts, That Scripture and Reason are the Rule of Faith. So then we have here a new unwritten Word found out to be part of the Canon. So fertile of Monsters is this Novaturient Age. But, I hope, this Doctrine will not be so easily re­ceived as it is boldly obtruded.

Hitherto Principles of Reason and Sect. 2. Sol. Articles of Faith were wont to be con­tradistinguish'd: and though some things knowable by Natural Light, are likewise propounded to our belief in Scripture, yet such were never, that I know of, owned for Points of Faith, otherwise than as they were attested in Scripture. And in all Logick that I have been acquainted with, Arguments à Testimonio are put into one rank, and those that are drawn à Natura rei are put into another; these latter properly belonging to Science, the former to Faith. Our Understandings (saith Medit. de usu & ab. rat. in reb. The [...]l. C. Streso, and after him Deut. Dub. li. 1. c. 2. Dr. Tailor) apprehend things three ways; The first is [...], whereby it receives first Principles. [Page 227] The second [...], whereby it draws Consequences from those Principles. The third is [...], of such things as we as­sent to from Testimony. And it is a known speech of St. Austin, Quod in­telligimus, De util. cred. debemus rationi, quod credi­mus Autoritati: That we understand, we owe to Reason; but that we believe, we owe to Authority. And we have hither­to taken it to be essential to a Christi­ans Faith, that in its Assent it rely up­on the Infallible Veracity of the Re­vealer, as the ratio formalis credendi.

Perhaps it will here be said, (for I Object. cannot imagine what else can be said) ‘That the Principles of Reason are the Word of God, and by him written in our Minds; therefore our Assent to them is a belief of Divine Testimony, as well as our Assent to what is writ­ten in the Bible: and consequently they are part of the Rule of Faith.’

What can be the meaning of this, Sol. that these Principles are written in our Minds, I cannot understand any fur­ther than this, that there is begotten in our Minds a clear perception and [Page 228] firm perswasion of them. But the great Question will be, By what Act doth God write these in our Minds, or beget in us this perception and perswasion of them? Surely, they will not say, that when God creates the Soul of Man, this perception or perswasion of these Principles is concreated by him in and with the Soul: for if so, how is it that during our Infant-state we are such strangers to them, and do so continue, till we come gradually by observation and experience to be acquainted with them? And when we come to discern them, and to be perswaded of them, how come we to be assured that they are of God? There must be some dif­ference between the Testimony and the Thing testified. The Principles of Rea­son are supposed to be the Res testata, the Thing testified. But what is the Testimony, or the Actus Testificandi? My perception or perswasion cannot be it: for if so, then whatsoever I per­ceive and am fully perswaded of, I must believe to come from God: and what will that come to at last? These Prin­ciples [Page 229] of Reason are not Complex Propo­sitions form'd by God in our Minds, or suggested to us by a Divine Afflatus: this would make every Man an Enthu­siast. The best account I can give of them is, that they are such General Truths, as have their foundation in the nature of things, and their mutual ha­bitudes and respects; which our Rea­son apprehending, doth therein disco­ver the aforesaid Principles thence re­sulting. And because it is God alone, who gives to all things their several Be­ings, and constitutes them in such and such habitudes each to other, and hath given us our Reason, whereby we are enabled to discern them; therefore he is said to be the Author of those Prin­ciples, which lie fundamentally in his Workmanship. And we do not take them for Truthus upon the credit of any foregoing testimony that God gives to us of them: but we assent to them propter evidentiam r [...]i, because our Rea­son sees them perfectly agreeable to the nature of things; and thereby finding them to be certainly true, thence it [Page 230] gathers that they are of God, from whom all Truth comes. But now the method of Faith is widely different from this: Here we first own the testi­mony of God speaking in the Scrip­tures, and thence we are perswaded that what the Scripture speaks is true, and so we come to embrace the many severals therein asserted, by yielding a particular assent to them as we find them.

‘But, will some say, before we be­lieve Object. the Scriptures, we must be con­vinced by Reason that these Scrip­tures are of God.’

Very true; but the effect of such a [...]. conviction is not properly Faith, but Knowledge. And when I know by sa­tisfying Grounds of Reason, that the Scripture is indeed the Voice of God, then do I by Faith assent to what that speaks as Gods testimony. And where­as there are some Truths, which are knowable in some measure by Natural Light, and yet are revealed likewise in the Scripture; it is commonly and truly said by our Divines, that as they are [Page 231] received by Natural Light, and upon Rational Grounds, so they are the Ob­jects of Science: but as they are reveal­ed in the Scripture, so, and only so, they are the Objects of Faith: which (as the Apostle tells us) is the evidence Heb. 11. [...]. of things not seen, that is, of things not discernable by Natural Light, whether of Sense or Reason; or at least that are not consider'd as such, when we re­ceive them as Objects of Faith; which therefore is call'd the evidence of them, because it discerns the truth and reality of them in the infallible testimony of the Revealer.

Now besides what hath been alrea­dy said, it may further be proved that Reason is not any part of the Rule of Faith. For

1. Were this granted, it would ne­cessarily 1. follow, that Scripture of it self is an imperfect Rule, and if so, it is no Rule at all. That cannot be own'd for a Rule that is not adequate and commensurate to what is to be re­gulated by it. The known description of a Rule given by Varinus, and so [Page 232] frequently quoted by our best Authors, hath never, that I know of, been que­stioned: [...]. A Rule or Canon is an immutable Law, and an unerring Mea­sure, which at no hand will admit of ad­dition or diminution. This is one great Argument used by our Protestant Wri­ters, to shut out Popish Traditions from being any part of the Rule of Faith, because the Scripture is a per­fect and sufficient Rule of it self, and must be so, or else it cannot be a Rule at all. Of which the Reader may see enough for his satisfaction in the Learn­ed Bishop of Down his Ductor Dubitan­tium, Lib. 2. Cap. 3. Rule 14. p. 359, &c. And the Argument is every whit as good to exclude Reason as Traditi­on in this case. And that the Scripture is a perfect discovery of the Mind of God, (so far as is necessary for us to know it) I have proved before in my first Argument.

2. The Principles of Reason (as I [...]. have formerly shewed in the proof of [Page 233] my first Proposition) have no formal existence any where but in the Minds or Writings of fallible Men, consider­ing them as separate from the Scrip­tures: for set the Bible aside, there is no Infallible and Authentick Record of those Principles, to which we can have recourse. And this utterly disa­bles them for being so much as a partial Rule of a Christians Faith.

3. Principles of Natural Reason, (let us suppose them never so fixt and 3. infallible) are wholly aliene to mat­ters of supernatural Revelation, which are the proper Object of Faith. And to measure these by them, were as ridi­culous as to attempt by a Carpenters Rule to take the distance of the Hea­vens, or to spread a Fowlers Net to catch the Winds. However therefore there is (as hath been already acknow­ledged and maintain'd) great use of Reason and its Principles in subordina­tion and instrumental subserviency to the knowledge of Divine Matters, yet that it is in any degree to be owned as the Rule of our Faith, must not, will [Page 234] not, cannot be allowed by any that are true to the Christian Cause.

CHAP. XII.

BUt here the Exercitator gives us a distinction, which he makes often Except. 2. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 13 par. 1. & [...]. 16. par. 9. use of, as being very fit for his turn, ‘That the Scripture is taken either materially, and so it signifies no more but the bare Words, Phrases and Sen­tences of Scripture: or formally, and so it signifies the sense and meaning of these Words and Sentences. Now, says he, when we say the Scripture is the Rule of Faith, we do not mean the bare words, but the sense; and that is the thing we inquire into by the help of Philosophy; and when we have thereby obtain'd the sense [Page 235] of Scripture-Propositions, that sense we own for the Rule of our Faith, and of deciding Controversies in Re­ligion. But (adds he) when the Reformed Doctors say, the Scripture is its own Interpreter, they can mean only the Words and Sentences of Scripture without the sense: for it is the sense that they are seeking for, and that cannot be the Rule to find out it self.’

To this I answer: 1. The distinction Sol. 1. of the Scripture consider'd materially and formally, or in respect of the mat­ter and form, is generally received: But was never, that I know of, taken in the sense of this Author, but in a far different meaning; viz. The Scri­pture, as to the matter, is the Word of God; and formally consider'd is the same Word as written. But this Gen­tlemans Exposition of it serves his turn very well; viz. That the Words and Phrases of Scripture are as rude matter, till the sense (as the form) be given it by Philosophy, or Humane Reason.

[Page 236] But, 2. The distinction, as here u­sed, 2. is a miserable subterfuge, arguing some Wit, but no Honesty. For when we say, the Scripture is the Rule of Faith, and it is the Rule of Interpreta­tion to it self; in both we mean neither the words, nor the sense separately, but conjointly, For, 1. The Scriptures are no otherwise the Rule of our Faith, than as they are the Revelation of the Mind of God to us. Now the Words or Sentences separated from the true sense, (supposing they could be so se­parated) are not the Mind of God: and the sense separated from the Words and Sentences, (if it might be so sepa­rated) would be no Revelation: for we know not the Mind of God but by the Words; and his Mind as clothed with these Words, or these Words as exhibiting his Mind, so they are our Rule.

Again, 2. When we say the Scrip­ture is a Rule of Interpretation to it self, we mean that if the place under consideration be plain, it delivers its own sense to the Reader that well minds [Page 237] the contexture and dependence; if it be dark, we have recourse to some other plain Scripture, and by the evi­dent sense of that, wherein the Mind of God lies more clearly in the words, we find out his Mind in that other, where it lay more darkly.

The fallacy of this Author in charg­ing us to mean only the Words of Scri­pture, when we say the Scripture is its own Interpreter, lies in this, he would make the World believe that we mean it of one and the same Sentence of Scripture, even where it is most ob­scure. Now, as himself premiseth, Phil. Ser. Int. c. 2. par. 7. that Interpretation supposes some ob­scurity in the thing to be Interpreted; so he could not but know, that in the case of obscurity, we mean it of the Scripture according to its different parts; that the Scripture where it is plain is a Rule of Exposition to it self in those parts that are more in­tricate, (which himself also acknow­ledgeth Ib. c. 11. par. 1. to be our meaning elsewhere in his Book.) And yet we use no such incongruity as he supposeth, in saying [Page 238] the Scripture expounds it self, each part of Scripture being Scripture; no more than in saying that the Civil or Municipal Law expounds it self, when one part of the Law explains ano­ther.

CHAP. XIII.

I Shall now consider what may be fur­ther Sect. 1. Objected against my present Assertion, besides what I have already met with in clearing my foregoing Ar­guments.

And first, the Exercitator Objects, Object. 1. Ph. Ser. Int C. 10. par. 2. ‘That the Divines of the Reformed Churches maintain a necessity of the Spirits Internal Illumination for our right understanding of the Scripture: therefore the Scripture is not a suffi­cient Interpreter of it self.’

[Page 240] I answer; What the Spirits enligh­tening Sol. is, and how far necessary, may be more seasonably discuss'd in ano­ther place, and therefore I intend to speak something to it in an Appendix to this Discourse. But at the present we are to consider, that the Spirit is said to make known to us the Mind of God two ways: 1. Objectively, as it speaks to us in the Scripture, which is of the Holy Spirits enditing. 2. Effe­ctively, as it acts in us to help our weak understandings. Now these two are widely different one from the other. The former notes the Objective Evi­dence that is given us of Gods Mind, which is by the Scripture: and this is enough to render the Scripture a suffi­cient Rule of Interpretation to it self, whether the other were necessary or no; because there is in the Scripture a sufficiency in the nature of an Obje­ctive Light to discover the Will of God; the latter concerns only the Subjective Light which the Spirit affords to our dark understandings, that we may dis­cern what is in the Scripture; the ne­cessity [Page 241] whereof doth not at all impeach the sufficiency of the former; because that which makes this latter necessary, is not any obscurity in the Object, but an indisposition in the Subject or Faculty that is to apprehend it.

But it's further objected, ‘What Sect. 2. Object. 2. Ph. Scr. Int. C. 11. par. 2. correspondency hath one part of Scri­pture with another? or what right or power hath one Pen-man of Scri­pture over the Writings of another, that the words of the one should be Interpreted by the others? Thus ar­gues the Exercitator.’

To which I answer: 1. May we not Sol. 1. with much more reason say, What cor­respondency hath Philosophy with Scripture? Have not the several parts of Scripture, all which were endited by one and the same Infallible Spirit, more correspondency one with ano­ther, than any of them can have with Philosophy, which is the immediate product of fallible Reason?

2. The Author may do well to con­sider 2. what good correspondency there is between the several parts of his own [Page 242] Book, and whether this Objection do not evidence him to be inconsistent with himself. For in his third Chap­ter, Phil. Ser. Int. C. 3. par. 21. when he would prove that the words in 1 Kings 3. 12. concerning the Wisdom of Solomon, are to be un­derstood by an Hebrew Idiotism, and mean no more than that the Wisdom given to Solomon was very eminent, and above the ordinary rate; he ap­peals to two other places that speak of the Piety of Hezekiah and Josiah, and says, Hoc ita se habere, ex duobus aliis ejusdem Scriptoris locis non obscure elu­cescit, &c. That it is so, appears plainly by two other places of the same Writer, viz. 2 Kings 18. 5, 6. and C. 23. 25. Which he says, can no otherwise be truly understood but in this sense, that their Piety was eminent and extraor­dinary. It seems our Author was then in the mind that one part of Scripture may have correspondency with ano­ther, and this so far as that the one may expound the other. But now the case is alter'd. If it be replied in his be­half, That these places by him quoted, [Page 243] were penned by one and the same Wri­ter, and therefore might well have cor­respondency each with other; but this makes nothing for those who interpret one part of Scripture by some other that was not written by the same Hand: I rejoin, That the first and second Book of Kings were endited by the same Spi­rit, I grant, and shall make some use of it in my third Answer to this Au­thors Objection: But that they were both written by the same Hand, or (suppose they were) that the Writer intended by the latter to explain what he had written in the former, is more than he, or any other for him, can prove.

3. The Scriptures, though written 3. by parts, and at several times, and by several persons, yet they all own God for their Author, by whose Spirit they were endited; and they are all toge­ther to be taken for his Counsel to Sinners. And then what injury or in­congruity is there in making use of what one hath written more plainly, to unfold what was more darkly writ­ten [Page 244] by another? When we compare the Evangelists together, to explain what one says more briefly, by what another lays down more fully; we do not in this so much inquire into the sense and meaning of the Evangelists, as into the Mind of God whose Secre­taries they were. The like may be said of the Prophets: If the Prophets or A­postles spake of their own heads, or wrote only a signification of their own private Sentiments, there might be some colour for this Objection. But the Apostle tells us, That no Prophesie of Scripture is of private Interpretation: 2 Pet. 1. 20, 21. that is, This sense is given by Learned Camero, Rivet, Dr. Pearson on the Creed, and I take it for the móst genuine. P [...]. Ser. Int. C. 4. par. 5. the Prophets in their Wri­tings were not the Interpreters of their own Mind, but of the Mind of God by whom they were sent, and by whose Spirit they were acted; as it follows in the next Verse, For Prophesie came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost: And thus much the Exercitator acknowledgeth, where he saith, That God is the Author of the Scri­ptures, and that he did always guide his [Page 245] Amanuenses to write the Truth, giving them the assistance of his unerring Spi­rit; and that whatsoever they wrote [...] pure Truth, free from all mixture of F [...]s­hood or Errour.

But there is another Discourse pre­fixed Tractatu [...] Theologi­co. Polit. cap. 7. to a latter Edition of the so oft-mentioned Exercitation, (and thought by many to come from the same Au­thor) the Writer whereof sticks not to assert this audacious Falshood, That the Prophets in their Narkatives, and in all matters▪ of Speculation, (that is, what­soever was not matter of moral Duty) did disagree among themselves; and [...]on­sequently that what is said by one, is not to be explained by the words of another. Which (with other passages of like im­port) does at once call in question the whole Truth, and consequently the Di­vine Authority of the Scriptures. For if the P [...]men of Scripture elash one against another, in their Writings, ei­ther God was not the Author of wh [...] they wrote, but themselves, or the God of Truth must be charged with Fals­hood; for of two di [...]ent Opini­ons [Page 246] both cannot be true. Whose de­sign it is that the Author of that Theo­logico-Political Tractat drives, except that of the great Enemy of Mankind, I know not: But he sufficiently mani­fests a vile esteem of the Holy Scrip­tures, and a desire to beget the like in others: For he takes very earnest pains, V. Trast, cit. c. 9. 10. with the utmost of his art and skill, to [...]ke up and exagitate their seeming dis­agreements, as real contradictions, cast­ing a great deal of scorn upon all Ex­positors, as Fools or Madmen, that at­tempt to reconcile them. His discourse in this and sundry other odious passa­ges, which I ab [...]or to mention, doth apparently tend to promote the cause of the Antiscripturists; besides the help [...] affords (which is not a little) to the Romish Interest. The Author indeed would seem, by some Expressions here and there, to intimate his dislike of the Pon [...]ifician Party. But we know it is consistent enough with the Politick Principles of Men of that way, to speak much more than he hath done, against that very Cause that they are studi­ously [Page 247] projecting, under that Covert, to advance.

But I return, from this Digression, to what I was about. If any thing in the Laws of a Kingdom be difficult and perplex, and there be something in some other Law of the same Kingdom, (though written or printed by other hands) that speaks more clearly of that matter; what wrong is it to the Law, or the Law-maker, or Printer, if a Learned Council, comparing one with another, expound that which is more dark in one part of the Laws, by that which is more perspicuous in another, both proceeding from the same Autho­rity, and both obliging to the same persons? Judge alike in the present case. This Objection therefore is of no force.

But it is further urged, ‘That there Sect. 3. Object. 3. Ph. Scr. Int. c. 1 par. 7. are some difficult places of Scripture, that are no where explained in any other part; and some things that be­ing but once spoken in Scripture, cannot be explained by any parallel place.’ And here our [...]ercitator re­fers [Page 248] us for instances, to his great Friend Stapleton.

For answer, 1. Whereas it is said, Sol. 1. there are difficulties in some parts of Scripture, that are no where cleared; how does any Man know this? Doth it follow that there is no such thing be­cause we cannot find it? Do we think our selves of so piercing or capacious understandings, that nothing in the Scripture that is intelligible, can escape our discovery? Those who have ac­quainted themselves with Antient and Modern Expositors, do know that ma­ny difficulties which former Interpre­ters have in vain struggled with, and some that they have wholly left un­toucht, (either as not apprehending them to be difficulties, or conceiving them insuperable) have been made ve­ry clear and plain by some later Wri­ters. Verily, God will have us know, that the opening of his Mind doth not depend only or chiefly upon the preg­nancy of Mans Wit, but upon his gra­cious assistance and blessing, which he affords or withholds when and where himself sees fit.

[Page 249] Again, the Scriptures were penn'd not only for the past and present, but 2. for all succeeding Ages of the Church to the end of the World: And as some parts of them, which peculiarly con­cern'd some Ages past, were perhaps better understood in those Ages than they can be by us now (as certainly many things were that belong'd to the Jewish Oeconomy) so I know not but we may rationally suppose, that some other parts of Scripture, which to us seem un­intelligible, may have special reference to the Church in after-Ages, and that those whom they so nearly concern, shall have more light afforded for the understanding of them in their days, than we have in ours: As without doubt some Prophetick Scriptures not yet accomplished will be made clear by the event, when they come to be ful­filled.

If there be any difficulties in any one 3. part of Scripture, which cannot be clear'd from some other by the best in­quiry we can make, it will be a vain thing to attempt the finding of it out [Page 250] any other way: but we must be, in such cases, content to be ignorant of their meaning. Nor yet will those Scriptures be utterly useless or in vain to us, if from their obscurity we can learn this needful Lesson, the more reverently to adore the Majesty of the written Word, and more humbly to acknowledge our own ignorance and weakness. And to this may be referr'd what is objected about the [...], where the sense is not obvious.

Yet again it is objected; ‘If the Scripture be its own sufficient Inter­preter, Sect. 4. Object. 4. Pb. Scr. Int. c. 11. par. 8. what mean those many Rules that Divines give for the right under­standing of Scripture? If the Scrip­ture it self be the only Rule, what need is there of all these?’ Thus the Exercitator, who makes a particular enumeration of several Rules that are given by St. Austin and others.

To this childish Cavil (which the Author brings in by the by) I answer; Whatsoever Rules are given by Divines for the right Interpretation of Scrip­ture, (such as are sound and good) are [Page 251] only to direct the Reader how with most ease and greatest certainty to fetch the sense of Scripture from the Scrip­ture it self. Those Rules therefore be­ing but subordinate and ministerial, do no way contradict or overthrow this which is the Supreme and Auto [...]ratorical. Suppose a Master-workman having a Building to frame, imploy some under him, who are as yet raw and unskilful, till they have gotten some insight into the Carpenters or Masons Art; when he shews them (as they must have a learning) how to use the Square, or the Rule, or the Plumb-line; surely his direction that he gives them doth not at all argue the uselessness or insuffici­ency of those Instruments for the pur­pose to which they are designed; but rather the contrary: so is it in the pre­sent case; those inferiour and subservi­ent Rules that are prescribed by any for the expounding of Scripture, are designed and directed (if they be such as they should be) to teach Men how to make use of the Supreme Rule, the Scripture it self, for the better finding out of the Mind of God in it.

[Page 252] Having confirm'd my Proposition, vindicated my Arguments for it, and answer'd the Objections against it, it is time for me to draw to a Conclusion. As for the Exercitator, with whom I have mostly dealt in this Controversie, when I weigh his Arguments, I cannot but wonder at his confidence. But he who hath no better Weapons, must fight with a Bull-rush. And it is now become the mode of Polemick Writers that have Prurient Wits, to sharpen their dull Arguments with high confi­dence in themselves, and a proud con­tempt of their Antagonists: in both which this Author excels; but it is such an excellency, for which no Wise or so­ber Man will envy him.