A vindication of A discourse concerning the unreasonableness of a new separation on account of the oaths from the exceptions made against it in a tract called, A brief answer to a late discourse, &c.

A vindication of A discourse concerning the unreasonableness of a new separation on account of the oaths from the exceptions made against it in a tract called, A brief answer to a late discourse, &c.

Table of contents

Title page

TO THE READER

A VINDICATION OF A Discourse concerning the Vnreasonableness of a New Separation, &c.

§. 1. Of Church-Communion and Schism.

§. II. Of the Publick Good.

§. III. Of Obedience to Authority.

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A VINDICATION OF A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE UNREASONABLENESS OF A New Separation, On Account of the OATHS, FROM THE Exceptions made against it in a Tract called, A Brief Answer to a Late Discourse, &c.

LONDON: Printed for Ric. Chiswell, at the Rose and Crown in St. Paul's Church-Yard. MDCXCI.

TO THE READER

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THE last Year there was Publish'd a Discourse concerning the Unreasonableness of a New Separation on account of the present Oaths; in which the Learned Author endeavoured to prevent that Schism which we were then threatned with, and hath since broke out amongst us; begun by some few that were dissatisfied about the Oaths, and upon that account quitted their Preferments; but improved by others (tho thanks be to God, with little Success) who are disaffected to the present Government, and take all ways to render it uneasie. To the foresaid Book at [Page] last Two Answers have been given; the one called, A Brief Answer; the other, An Enquiry into the remarkable Instances of History, used by the Author of the Unreasonableness, &c. The former with much Virulence, and more Heat than Judgment, directly vindicates the New Separation; in the examination of which I have concerned my self; and no further with the Second, than the Reasons there insinuated and touched upon, fall in with the former. As for what concerns the Enquiry into the Instances, and their Vindication against the Cavils of that Pretender to English History (for so I call him, because I find him to be a downright Plagiary from Dr. Brady's Writings), I shall leave it to the Author, who Himself in a short time will give the World an Account of that Matter.

A VINDICATION OF A Discourse concerning the Vnreasonableness of a New Separation, &c.

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THE Author of the Brief Answer, toward the Close of his Paper, thus professeth of himself: For many Reasons, I am unwilling to judge severely of my Brethren, who have sworn; nor hath any Man been more forbearing.

If this Champion of the Cause he appears in, had entred the Lists, and begun his Pamphlet with such a Declaration, there might have been some favourable Construction put upon it; tho' in the process of his Discourse he had been transported beyond his first intention, by a zeal for his own Cause on one hand, and the force of his Adversary's Arguments on the other: But to conclude with an I am unwilling to judge severely, after he had spared neither the Order he professeth himself to be of; nor his Adversary, whose Character, [Page] Dignity, and Learning, he sometimes is pleased to acknowledge, is a sort of refining, not subtil enough to take with the present Age, and a practice too gross to put upon an impartial and considerate Reader.

For, as for those he once in an over-flowing sit of Charity calls Brethren, they are in his Dialect a Pack of Jolly Swearers, pag. 2. Such as betray their Consciences for large Preferments, p. 4. And he might have added, when his hand was in, that damn their Souls by the Perjury he charges them with, p. 7.

As for his Adversary, He is one, according to the Character this Author frames for him, that is old-excellent at mustering up the Ill Presidents, p. 6. That hath despised all sorts of Persons, as ignorant and silly in respect of himself, p. 11. A Man who lays aside all his Divinity, for a little bad Law, and worse History, p. 15. And, to clinch the whole, thus sets him off; A learned Doctor, nay (God be merciful to us!) a Bishop, so stiled, of our Church. This, in his Language, is no severe Judgment; and after all (if you will believe him) no man hath been more forbearing than himself.

So much shall serve for a Proof of his Candour and Sincerity: let us now try how this huffing Philistine, who thus struts over his Adversary, behaves himself in close fighting.

The whole of what he saith, may be reduced to these Three Heads.

I. Church Communion and Schism.

II. Publick Good.

III. Obedience to Authority.

§. 1. Of Church-Communion and Schism.

The Author of the Discourse concerning the Vnreasonableness, &c. professeth, That he was not a little surprized,

[Page] 1. That these New Separatists, that express'd so great a sense of Schism in others, should be so ready to fall into it themselves. 2. That they do it upon the account of scruples, when the difference is only about the Resolution of a Case of Conscience, wherein Wise and Good Men may easily differ.

To the first, the Author of the Brief Answer replies, They do, not fall, but are forced into it: Which I shall consider in its due place, when he undertakes to prove it.

To the second, he gives a spiteful return: But is then a Case of Conscience really so trivial a thing? And after he hath gravely prov'd the contrary for a Column together, concludes with a special piece of Admonition to his Adversary; Therefore, whatsoever our Author may think, I shall desire him henceforward to speak more reverendly of a Case of Conscience, &c.

But here this Author has over-run the Point; for the word Only, is not (as he perversly will have it) as if a Case of Conscience was not a matter of consequence; but that the taking or not taking the Oaths, is only a Case of Conscience, not Matter of Doctrine. For the Dispute is not, Whether an Oath be lawful or not? but, Whether this present Oath be so? Which being a matter of a Civil Nature, must depend upon the knowledge of the Constitution and Laws of this Realm for its resolution; which Wise and Good Men may easily differ in, as the Author of the Discourse observes: and so there can be no reason for those that scruple the Oath, to separate from the Communion of those that take it.

This premised, that learned Author seasonably prevents and removes the Pleas that may be made for such a Separation.

[Page] As,

1. When any thing Unlawful is made a Condition of Communion.

2. That it's unlawful to join with those that have taken the Oaths; and so have done, and continue to do and defend what they, that refuse Communion, account unlawful.

As to the first, the Discourse shews, That the Terms of our Communion are not altered; and that taking the Oaths is made no Condition of Communion with us.

As to the second, It observes, That this is the Scruple about Mix'd Communion, which hath been so long exploded among us.

Upon the first, our Author coldly replies, I could have told him forty things which they are not; and if he should be out in that one he mentions, it would be very unlucky; and that he is so, I shall endeavour in its proper place to prove. But in the mean time, if amongst the forty things the Oaths are not, they shall not be found to be the Condition of Communion, they can be no reason for breaking off from that Communion. And I grant, he may sooner tell of forty things the Oaths are not, than prove that they are made the Conditions of Communion; or that They may separate from the Church for such things as are not made Conditions of Communion with it.

As to the second, The Case of Mix'd Communion, our Author is very careful to pass it over in silence: and instead of that, borrows a sorry Invective from some of his Friends of the Church of Rome, I could tell him of a man, &c. and in the Answer to their Books, he will find the Reply. But he then takes a step back to make a Reflection upon what he thinks may better suit his purpose: For his Adversary having put a Case, Suppose [Page]those who take the Oaths to blame; if they act according to their Consciences therein, what ground is there for a Separation from them for so doing, unless it be lawful to separate from all such who follow the Dictates of an erroneous Conscience? and so there will be no end of Separation, &c. Our Author smartly returns upon him; At this rate; there will be no end of Tristing and Sophistry; for if I am bound to separate from some erroneous conscience, why must it needs be lawful to separate from all? &c. And here, according to his wont when he has none to oppose him, he states and argues the Point out and out.

But this is another of his Blunders. The plain Case is this: His Adversary having just before shew'd the taking of the Oaths to be no Condition of Communion, adds, And if they are not, what colour can there be for breaking Communion on the Account of the Oaths? And then follows, Suppose they are to blame, &c. That is, If the Oaths are not made a Condition of Communion, what imaginable Cause can there be assign'd for a Separation, unless it be because they are to blame, by acting according to an erroneous Conscience? and then this will be endless.

These general Reflections past, the Author of the Vnreasonableness, &c. takes the Main Point into Consideration; viz. Whether there be any reason for those Scruples about the Oaths? For if there be not, it will be granted, That there can be no Obligation for a Separation on the account of them.

But it seems that Author was under a great mistake in his taking it for granted; for our Author stands up in opposition to it, and saith, He hath not fairly and truly stated the Case: For the Question is not nakedly and simply, Whether the Oaths may or may not be lawfully taken? but, Whether Oaths imposed under such unjust and[Page]merciless Penalties, and attended with such fatal Consequences, will not warrant the Non-Swearers in a Separation from such as do?

But this is another of his mistakes; for nothing can be more plain than that, if there be no reason for the Scruples about the Oaths, there can be no reason for their sake to separate from those that take them: And therefore that Author took the most proper course that could be, to prove the Unlawfulness of the present Separation, from the Lawfulness of taking them. For if the Oaths are Lawful, the Penalties, how unjust and rigorous soever, cannot make them Unlawful: and the Consequences cannot be fatal, if those that are now Non-Swearers, are convinc'd of the lawfulness of the Oaths, and so take them.

This brings me to consider his Arguments in justification of the present Separation; and what he hath said confusedly, I think may be commodiously rank'd under these Three Heads.

1. That the Penalties to be inflicted upon them, want nothing of being a Condition of Communion to them, quatenus Ministers, p. 3, 4.

2. That their Authority is from Christ, and so no Secular Power can Vnbishop and Vnpriest, or disable them, p. 4, 5.

3. That they are bound to obey their Bishops and Metropolitan, p. 5, 6.

Arg. 1. The Oaths being imposed under such unjust and merciless Penalties, and attended with such fatal Consequences, will warrant Separation; and want nothing of being made a Condition of Communion, &c.

[Page] Now to speak in his way, There may be forty things we know, which may have the same fatal Consequence; for so it would be if the Clergy should not subscribe to the Service-Book and Articles; if they should not declare their Assent and Consent to all and every thing contained in the Book of Common-Prayer. And so it would have been in former Kings Reigns, if the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy had not been taken. So that there always was upon this Author's Argument, a sufficient warrant for Non Swearers and Non-Conformers, to Separate from those that did swear and did conform. For Papist and Dissenter will join with him in the Clamour, and each for themselves, as he for his own, will complain of unjust and merciless Penalties. Penalties there are, and they are great, but they are neither unjust or merciless, if the Government is not otherwise to be secured. But it doth not seem that they are unjust and merciless, by his way of representing them; for as if he did not believe it himself, he is fain to dress them up with all the Sanbenito's of an Inquisition, and the most extravagant aggravations; for thus he opens the case: — After Six Months warning, and frequent rabling, if we take not the Oaths, we are silenced for Six Months more; so then (mark the consequence) if the Oaths be not taken, all the Churches in England must be shut up. I know not any considerable difference betwixt this and a Popish Interdict; neither matters it much, whether we lie at the mercy of the Pope or a Parliament, whether God shall be worshipped in the Land, or not, &c.

So that it seems by their not taking the Oaths, and their deprivation upon it, we have neither God nor Religion among us, (in the Phrase of their new Liturgy;) or in the Phrase used upon the like occasion by others, the Ark of God is removed, and the Glory departed [Page] from our Israel. But though we pity other mens miseries, and could wish that our Brethren were as we are; yet webless God, that whereas by the Pope's Interdict every Church was required to be shut in the Land, (as it was for above Six Years in the Reign of King John) all ours are open: And though the Few that refuse the Oaths, and now remain deprived, are too many, yet that these neither bear the proportion of the 12000 to the 16000 of the Clergy that were outed in Q. Mary's time, (as M. Parker computes it) nor of the 2000 to the 10000, as it's said was in the Reign of King Charlet II.

But to return to the Point, What, saith he, doth this want of being make a condition of Communion to us, quatenus Ministers?

To this I answer,

1. Suppose it to want nothing of being made a condition of Communion to them, as Ministers, yet what is this to the People, of whom, as Church-Members, that is not required? This is a tender Point, and what he durst not touch upon: For grant that they had cause to separate, yet what would they do without a People? And how would the People justifie their Separation with the Ministers, upon whom no such Obligations were laid, as on the Ministers? So that tho the Nonswearing Clergy might lawfully separate without sin from our Communion, yet they must separate alone; while none of the People could join with them in their Separation, without being guilty of a notorious Schism. For what reason would there have been for the Ministers Separation, if the Oaths had not been required of them? And what reason can there be then for the Peoples Non Communion, who (as Church Members) stand as free from such Obligations, as if no such Revolution [Page] as the present had hapned, and no such Oaths had been at all imposed.

2. Though there be this obligation laid upon Ministers, yet what is this Political Security required of them, to their Communion with the Church? May Persons when grieved by the Secular Power, and deprived of their Livelihoods by an Act of Parliament, revenge it upon the Church? And will they interdict themselves its Communion, and break it in pieces, because they are thus injured, as they suppose?

3. If they are not suffered to officiate as Ministers, yet they may still join in the same Communion as Laymen.

To this he answers,

If no Lay-Power can make or unmake a Bishop, Priest, or Deacon, then the Charge of our Ministry will still lye upon us, notwithstanding this depriving Act, and necessity will lye upon us to discharge it at our Peril.

This leads me to his Second Argument; but before I proceed to it, let him understand, That he proceeds upon a gross mistake, by confounding Deprivation with Degradation. For what Act is there that doth (in his Phrase, p. 5.) Vn Bishop and Vn-Priest men? All that the Civil Power here pretends to, is to secure it felf against the practices of Dissatisfied Persons, and to try who are such, it requires an Oath of Allegiance to be taken to their Majesties, by all in Office, Ecclesiastical, Civil or Military: And in case of Refusal, by Deprivation to disable such, as far as they can, from endangering the Publick Safety. But if the Clergy so deprived think fit to take the Oaths, they are in statu quo, without any New Consecration or Re-Ordination.

Having cleared the Argument of this mistake, I shall now consider it.

[Page] Arg. 2. A Clergy man's Authority is from God; and notwithstanding any Civil Act to the contrary, he is bound to take care of his Office, though the most bitter Persecutions attend him for so doing. And therefore if they will warrant a Civil Act to disable us from doing our Duties, they must excuse us, if we have these dreadful apprehensions of the Account we have to give; That we endeavour to do it as we can at our hazard, when we are not suffered to do it in Communion with them, p. 4.

The Sum of his Argument is, That being they receive their Authority from God, no Civil Power can disable them from the exercise of their duty: And if it doth, they are bound to quit the Communion of the Church, where so disabled. The Force of which may be resolved into these Three Questions.

Q. 1. Whether a Bishop duly Consecrated, or a Minister duly Ordain'd, may not be lawfully suspended and deprived from the execution of his Office, by the Secular Power, where there is sufficient reason for it?

2. Whether a Refusal to give Security to the Secular Power for a peaceable behaviour, and Obedience, by Oath, may not be a sufficient reason?

3. Whether if so deprived, he is notwithstanding bound as a private Member to join in Communion with that Church whereof he was a Minister before; if nothing unlawful be required of him in that Communion; and not to separate from it?

Q. 1. As to the first, Whether a Bishop duly consecrated, &c. our Author is not very clear; but if he is to be understood, he takes away all such Power from the Secular Authority. So p. 5. Our Metropolitan, and several other Bishops, are now actually by a secular Act Deprived. But are they Deprived by any Canons, or Canonical Censures[Page]of the Church? And he makes a sutable Distinction betwixt what he allows to the One, and not to the Other: viz. I shall easily grant, that the Secular Power hath often seized Estates, and imprisoned and banished their Persons: but still they were accounted Bishops of Those Churches, and ceased not to discharge their Duty, &c. And p. 6. Our Author will think to tell us Tales, How Emperours have put our Bishops, &c. But it is one thing to act in pursuance of the Canons of the Church, and another thing to act against them, &c.

Now, in answer to all this ramble, I shall transcribe what the judicious Mason reply'd to two or three Objections of this kind. [De Minist. Angl. l. 3. c. 6.]

Object. Is not the Deposition of a Bishop a Spiritual Censure? how therefore can it be ascribed to Secular Powers?

Answ. The Secular Powers depose a Bishop, not by way of Degradation, but Exclusion. They exclude him, not from his Orders, as if he had them not; but from the Gift, that he may not exercise it. And not from that neither absolutely, but after a sort; that he should not exercise his Office, as to their Subjects, nor in their Dominions. Which the holiest Princes in the Best and Primitive Times have often exercised.

Object. Can a Prince take away what he cannot give?

Answ. He cannot give, and so cannot take away the intrinsick Power of the Word and Sacraments, proceeding from the Keys of Ordination: but the extrinsical Power and License of exercising the Ministerial Office, received by Ordination, he can in his Dominions confer, and again take away, if the Case so requires.

[Page] I leave the rest about an Act of Parliament to this Author's perusal, at his leisure.

Q. 2. Whether it may not be lawful for the Secular Power to deprive Persons in Orders, for Crimes committed against the State, and particularly, upon refusal to give Security to the Government for their peaceable Behaviour, and Allegiance by Oath?

The General, our Author expresly denies; and the Particular Case he will not allow, because it's the reason why the General was maintained. So he saith, p. 5.

Neither the Clergy nor People [in the Primitive Times] renounced their Bishops, unless they were guilty of such Crimes for which the Censures of the Church did depose them, or the Canons ipso facto deprive them. But where's the Heresie? where are any of all these Crimes, for which these our Bishops merit Deposition; or what just Censure of the Church hath pass'd upon them?

Now I answer with Mason, Where was the Act of the Church, in the Deposition of Abiathar? And where was the Ecclesiastical Crime he was charg'd with?

And as to the Oaths, I shall answer again in the words of the same celebrated Author: ‘Not without Cause was there a Law made, That all Magistrates, whether Sacerdotal or Civil, should take an Oath, That the Queen [Eliz.] was Supreme Governour, and under the pain of Deposition: Which Oath since the Popish Bishops refused, they were deprived of their Honours and Churches: nor undeservedly, because they were presumed to be for the Pope's Supremacy.’

And the same parity of reason may hold for Administring and Taking the Oath of Allegiance to King William and Queen Mary, since they that refuse to take That, may be presumed to think their Allegiance due to another.

[Page] And that Author adds further, when the said Oath was tendred to those Bishops by illustrious Persons deputed thereunto, and they would not be perswaded to take it, Episcopatibus suis tandem aliquando juxta legem Parliamentariam sunt abdicati; which I leave to our Author to English.

I think this Case is at an end.

Q. 3. Whether if a Person be lawfully deprived of the exercise of his Ministry, he is notwithstanding bound, as a private Member, to communicate in that Church, &c.

This our Author denies, for he would have it, that they are bound to continue in the exercise of their Office, to do it as they can, when not suffered to do it in Communion with them. Not suffered, he means without taking the Oaths.

The Sum is, That if they are not permitted to exercise their Ministerial Function, they think themselves obliged to set up Conventicles, and maintain a separate Communion.

Now this may make two Questions.

Whether Ordination obliges such an one to the actual exercise of his Office, when forbid by the Magistrate? And then whether for the exercise of his Ministry, he may and is obliged to set up and maintain a separate Communion?

1. Whether Ordination obliges such an one, &c.

To this I answer: If a Magistrate may lawfully deprive, (as I have shewed he may) then the Clerk may be lawfully deprived. And if lawfully deprived, he is bound to submit to such Deprivation. And that in obedience to the Magistrate, whom we are taught (as he knows) not to resist. But to officiate notwithstanding such a Prohibition, is in our way to take up [Page] Arms against him; and in a lower to do what the Pope doth in a higher Station, and to controul his Jurisdiction. Our Author undertakes to tell us what was done in the Primitive Times: but if he had consulted them, he would have found, that when by the Imperial Power Eustathius was put out of Antioch, Athanasius out of Alexandria, and Paulus out of Constantinople, though the Orthodox complained of the Injustice of it, as done upon the malicious suggestion of the Arians, yet they never questioned the Emperour's Power. But supposing that he is not bound in this case; and that he may as lawfully, and is as much obliged to exercise his Office as ever: Yet what is this to a Separation? For is he so obliged, that rather than not officiate, he may and ought to break off from Communion with the Church? It's agreed to by all, that we are to continue in the Communion of the Church we are of as long as we can; and that a Separation from it is like a Divorce; which is the last Extremity, and which nothing can justify but when the Terms of Communion are unlawful. But one deprived of his Ministry may hold Communion with the Church if he will, since there is no change in the Terms, and the Church is as much the same when he is not a Minister in it as when he is: And his officiating as a Minister, being not a Term of Communion, the Communion with it is the same when he is not a Minister as when he is.

This was true Doctrine against the Dissenters when time was; he was a Schismatick who gave this as a reason for his Separation. And if they now proceed on the same Principles with the Dissenters, and take up their Arguments, there is as much reason to charge them with Schism, as they had to charge the Dissenters.

[Page] Arg. 3. He argues from the Subjection the People and Clergy owe to the Bishops, and the Bishops owe to their Metropolitan: So that if Bishops or Metropolitan be deprived, and others substituted in their room, it will unavoidably necessitate a Schism.

Our Author that undertakes to give us an account of the Sense, Judgment, and Practice of the primitive times, would have done well to have given us a touch or two of his Skill that way, by some credible Authorities; and particularly of such a Subjection of the Bishop to the Metropolitan, to the Confutation of some of St. Cyprian's Epistles: And that Bishops after the Proceedings against them by Imperial Authority, were still accounted Bishops of those Churches they before were Bishops of, — and neither Clergy nor People renounced them, unless they were guilty of such Crimes, for which the Censures of the Church did depose them, or the Canons ipso facto deprive them, as Heresie: or that there is no way to free us from the Subjection and Obedience we owe to them, but either Death, Deprivation, or their own Renuntiation; which last, he saith, was never accounted commendable in a Bishop. For the Christian World has hitherto been persuaded, that in sitting Cases both Bishops might be deprived, and both Clergy and People discharged of any Obedience owing to them, by a secular Authority: (as has been shewed) But if what this Author suggests, be a just Enumeration of all the cases for which Bishops may be deprived; then there is no case in reserve for the secular Power to forbid or deprive; and if by the Impetuosity of that Power (as his Words are) a Bishop was set over a Church or Diocess, in opposition to one there canonically placed already, it would always in course produce a Schism. This he saith was, and this [Page] is the case, for our Metropolitan and several other Bishops are now actually by a Secular Act deprived, and because by a secular Act deprived, and for no Crimes for which the Censures of the Church depose them; they are Bishops still, and they are bound to take care of their Churches, and their Churches to live in Subjection to them.

This Subject cannot be thorowly handled without passing some Limits I desire not to transgress, though the way that he has handled it in, and the small Deference he gives to, nay the Contempt he casts upon the secular Power, concerning it self and interposing in the case, deserves a severe Rebuke; and which is so far from doing any real Service to the Right Reverend Persons he takes upon him to defend, that it would be to their Disadvantage, had not the Impertinency of the Person plainly discovered, there are none of them in his Counsel.

But to return to our Author, suppose the case be as he represents it, how comes this to necessitate a Schism with us?

Is it because these venerable Persons stand deprived? Then it is not because of any thing unlawful in the Church, but because of the Bishops that suffer by the State, a Schism may warrantably be made by the Clergy and People.

Is it not for that reason alone, but because others are to be substituted in their room; then why is there a Separation before it; and his Argument proceeds upon this, that they are bound to join and go along with the Bishops.

Why must this necessitate a Schism to all? For are those Diocesses and Clergy, who have their Bishops, equally involved in the same case with those that are deprived of theirs?

[Page] Or why must it necessitate a Schism, when the Metropolitan and Bishops deprived, declare their Aversion to any such Separation?

This Argument will serve either way; for if the Clergy and People are obliged to submit to and obey their Bishops, and the Bishops their Metropolitans; Then those that are of the Province and Diocesses, where their Metropolitan and Bishops have taken the Oaths, are obliged to adhere to their Metropolitan and Bishops, and may as warrantably and as much ought to separate from these that set themselves against Authority, and refuse to swear Allegiance to it, as they on the other side think they may and ought to separate from those that do comply with it.

Again if they are obliged thus to go with their Metropolitan and Bishops; then if the Metropolitan and Bishops, notwithstanding their Deprivation, continue in the Communion of the Church, then they are obliged also to continue; and if they separate when those don't separate, they must by his Argument become Schismaticks.

Lastly, If they separate because they proceed (as he saith) according to the Sense, Judgment, and Practice of the Ancient Church: I would fain understand, when the Christians ever refused Communion with a Church, because of Matters of State; or divided from others, because those they divide from thought it lawful and their Duty to swear Allegiance to the Sovereign Power?

In fine, a Schism it must be, and a Schism they are resolved to make, let there be a reason or none for it: And (as Truth will out) so he hath at last revealed the Mystery, and after all the pretences they make, that it's for not deserting God his Church and their Duty; [Page] there seems to be something else at the bottom, and whether it be so or no, I leave the Reader to judg by what he tells us we must expect, and why: viz. Though they may go clothed in Purple and fine Linen (as some others would have done, or thought to have done, had the happy days of the last Reign continued) and fare sumptuously every day, whilst care is taken that we may be starved; yet they must expect to be Pelted, and then Men will speak and write their Minds freely. For in vain do you imagine, that when Men have nothing to lose, they have any thing to fear. No Sirs, if nothing else will do it, we will humble you, and throw such a Fioe into your Church by the Schism we will make; that you may be sensible you have provoked Men of Spirit, and that if we cannot have Purple and fine Linnen, and sumptuous Fare with you, will make you as miserable as our selves. Look you to it, for betwixt Dissenter and Dissenter, we will grind you to Death, and make you rue that ever we left your Church; or that the Government hath made us thus uneasy under it.

This I take to be but a just Comment on this bold Text of his: But let him and those of his Mind cherish this malignant humour. I am confident no wise or good Man but will think those that are of this Kidney had better be out of the Church than in it: They are such as there was no great reason to oblige, when in our Communion, nor to fear (threaten as they will) when out of it.

But as for those whom by their frantick Zeal and fair Pretences they delude, we ought to pity and to pray for them, and with Meekness to shew them their Error.

Whether our Author hath stated the case righly, I [Page] shall, with him, leave to indifferent Persons to judg: but if he hath not (as I think has been sufficiently proved) then, to use his Words, they may wash their Hands with Pilate, but they cannot wipe of the Crime of Schism, they are by this new Separation justly charged with.

§. II. Of the Publick Good.

But now he opens a new Scene. Before he considered the case with respect to the Church, but now he comes to consider it with respect to the State. His Design before was to vindicate themselves, if he could, from a Schism, and to charge it upon us: But now his Design is to expose the Arguments for the Oaths, and to make those that take them guilty of Perjury. In order to which, he thus states the case for his Adversary; The whole stress of his Discourse, saith he, is founded on this single Point. ‘That the Consideration of the publick Good, doth dissolve the Obligation of an Oath to a Sovereign Prince, rightfully claiming.’ For this he must mean, if he will speak to the Purpose.

In Opposition to this, he saith, That no Pretence of publick Good whatsoever can warrant us to destroy a lawful King, or take off the Obligations of an Oath, whereby we have bound our selves in all things lawful and honest to obey him. And he immediately adds, The contrary our R. Author undertakes to prove; which I cannot reflect upon without Grief; because it seems to me a task, which would much better become a Committee-Man, or Sequestrator, than a Divine of the Church of England. And certainly so it would, if the Author of the Discourse had undertaken to prove what he here [Page] charges him with, viz. That the publick Good will warrant us to destroy a lawful King, &c. But all the while this Man cannot believe himself, and therefore he returns to the Consideration of the Proposition concerning the dissolving of an Oath for the sake of the publick Good: or as the Discourse words it, p. 7. The publick Good is the true and just Measure of the Obligation in publick Oaths. Against which he saith, If we should grant that he had proved it in Thesi, yet he has no where so much as offered to prove it in Hypothesi, and apply it to our particular case.

Surely our Author never read the Book he pretends to answer, or if he did, he must have a bad Memory, or a very bad Conscience: for the Discourse thus proceeds upon it, p. 3.

I shall enquire into two Things.

1. The Nature and Measure and Obligation of political Oaths in general.

2. The Difficulties which relate to our Oaths in particular; upon the last of which he spends two thirds of the Book.

And now let us see what our Author has to offer in Confutation of what is rightly called the single Point, in the Discourse, about the Obligation of Political Oaths, and the Influence the Consideration of the publick Good has in them.

I shall try, in his Phrase, to bring his rambling Arguments into some order; and what he has to say is,

1. That the publick Good is impracticable and liable to be abused.

2. Who shall be the Judg?

3. What is the publick Good?

I hope he will give me leave to begin with the last, if not for the sake of reason and true order, yet for [Page] the quaint Expression of his Friend, that publick or common Good is a common Notion, and signifies nothing unless it be stated and explained, Inquiry, p. 10.

1. What is this publick Good? Our Author enters upon this Point in a fit of Quixotism; I desire to know of our Author where this Divine Beauty dwells, whom all our Knights Errants run mad for, and fill the World with Blood and Slaughter? And he answers for him in a very Metaphysical strain; She is generally made a delicate fine thing in the Abstract, a separate invisible Being, distinguish'd from all personal Interest and Benefit. Now with his good leave, I desire to know of him, where these Platonick Gentlemen live, that doat thus upon Ideas and Abstracts, and run mad for such a separate and invisible Being, which they call Publick Good; that is, in his phrase, good for no body. For I am apt to fancy no body will be found to be for that any more than himself.

But let's see whether he that keeps out of this mad Crew, (as he calls it) and that is willing to put in for a share in it, comes off with any better Success; and whether after all the Knowledg he pretends to have of this Divine Beauty, he can better describe it?

Publick Good, saith he, is a personal Good, and that which makes for the welfare of every one in the Community; and which every Man hath or ought to have a share in. Or if you would have it in the same Quixotian strain, She is a most sweet-natur'd Creature, that doth good to all, &c. To do him right, as to the Notion he is not alone; for the same way goes the Inquirer, p. 10.

Now I very much question this their Notion of Publick Good. I grant that every particular Person [Page] hath his share and right in the Publick. But,

1. That is not as a particular Person, but as a Member of the Publick. And he actually shares in it, when his particular Good and the Good of the Whole, or the General Good, meet together: but if they are separated, and become inconsistent, it then becomes a personal and private Good.

2. Publick Good is so far from comprehending in it the Good of every Individual, or of every Party of Men, that the particular Good of Persons, Parties and Corporations is often destroyed for the Good of the Publick; and they are often undone for the preservation and benefit of the Community: For as the Inquiry (though in contradiction to himself in the Sentence just before) saith, If it be such a Good (or rather such an Evil) as is only for the benefit of a Party, and, in respect of the whole, of the least or a small number, [and much more of a particular Person] 'tis impossible it should be a Publick Good. So that if personal Good and publick Good may be and often are inconsistent, the publick Good is not a personal Good.

3. Publick Good, that makes for the welfare of Every one in the Community, is a Divine Beauty indeed, but it's a delicate fine thing in the Abstract, an invisible Being, not to be met with in this lower World. And when we speak of it as it is, it's in the Discourser's. Language, a General Good only.

And therefore after all, I shall make bold to conclude in that Author's words, [Discourse p. 9.] The Right of a Person is not to be taken as distinct from the Publick Good. For if it be inconsistent with it, there is no ground to set up a personal Interest against a Publick Good.

[Page] 2. He argues against Publick Good's being the measure of the Obligation of publick Oaths; because it's impracticable and very liable to be abused. Thus our Author; How specious soever any Proposition may seem in the Theory; yet, it ought not to be esteemed right or found, if it be impracticable, without filling the World with perpetual Troubles and Confusions, p. 8. And so he runs on for several Columns together in a rant against the Mischiefs this Pretence has ushered into the World, p. 10.

The Sum of all which is, ‘That Publick Good doth not take off the obligation of publick Oaths, or make it lawful to take New, because this Doctrine is impracticable; and it's impracticable, because it's very liable to be abused.’ Now besides the Inconsequence of this, this is a way of arguing that may serve against any thing; and if we put Publick Justice, or Laws, or Religion, or Reformation, into the place of Publick Good, it will hold in any of them as well as the other. As for Example, the Doctrine of reforming the Church [how corrupt soever] ‘is very liable to be abused; for the greatest part of Mankind being wicked and credulous against their Governours, under this pretence a sort of Knaves, with active Fools, may at any time cry up a Reformation, and overturn any Establishment, &c.’

But he may say, it's not the publick Good that doth this Mischief, and makes it impracticable, but the pretence of it. But how shall we know when it really is so, and when so in pretence? Our Author is silent in the case, but the Inquirer has an Answer ready; Nothing can be a Publick Good to any Nation, where the exercise and practice of it is not warranted by the Law, [Page]Custom, and Constitution of that Nation, p. 11, & 20. And with him agrees the Author of the Discourse, p. 8. (excepting in the Nothing can) The Laws, Rights and Customs, are the Standard of the Publick Good of a Country. But then these Two differ about the Constitution, and that is not a Controversy here to be entred into. The Use I make of it is, That the Publick Good is still the measure of the Obligation of Political Oaths, as is at last acknowledged even by the Inquirer. But yet, if after all I should deny the Inquirer's Proposition, that Nothing can be a Publick Good, but &c. and should say, that the Publick Good is above all Law and Custom, I conceive I should not mistake. For what made Custom, Law and Constitution, but the Publick Good? And if a Case should happen, which never happened before, in which the Publick Good is so far concerned, that without some extraordinary Course be presently taken, the Nation and Government will be destroyed, I do not question, but this Case will as much require the Care of the Nation, as any Case now doth require the making of a Law, for which there was no Law before: Or as it's requisite, that there should be a Chancery to adjust those Matters, to which the Letter of the Law doth not reach. For there are such things as Necessity, Equity, and Reason of State, which are Law all over the World; and that are as much the Standard by which all Laws and Customs, in extraordinary Cases and Events, are to be adjusted; as Law and Custom are the Standard by which all ordinary Cases are to be determined, and which are the settled measures of the Obedience we owe to Governours. Such a Case was that in Poland, when Henry of Valois in haste and [Page] with secrecy left the Throne vacant. A Case extraordinary, and which they had no Law to govern them in, but they had that which is a Law to Law; Necessity and the Preservation of the Nation, that soon taught them what was to be done.

This brings me to consider.

3. Who shall be the Judg? that is, Either who shall Judg when the Publick Good is invaded, and when the Laws, Customs and Constitutions, are violated? Or, who shall judg what's fit to de done in such a case, by way of Remedy? As to the former, the Case before us is supposed to be notorious, and what has an evident tendency to the Destruction of the Government: Of which some things are of that Nature, as they are destructive of Government whereever they are, as the Desertion of a Kingdom; or the natural Incapacity of the Governour by Lunacy, &c. Other things there are which are destructive of the National Constitution, and such amongst us has been thought to be an absolute and universal Power of dispensing with the Laws. Now, when the Cases are notorious, this Author might as well have asked, who shall be the Judg, whether the Banks are broken down in an Inundation; or whether there is a Breach in the Walls when they see the Enemy press through it; or the City in the Power of the Enemy, when they see the Fortifications of it dismantled?

But who shall be the Judg, that is again, by way of Remedy? Here our Author thus puts the Case, either that must be the Supream Governour, or some other Man or Body of Men, or the Mobile. The former he chuses for himself; the second he argues out of the way; and the third he gives to his Adversary: For [Page] thus he concludes; After all the matter comes to the Mobile, and every Man must judg for himself:—And have not we extreamly mended the matter, by putting it into the Power of every Subject to depose his King; or at least to endeavour it to his utmost, in case he apprehends it will be for the publick Good? p. 9.

As to the first of these the Supreme Governour, the case we are upon immediately concerns himself; and then either there must be no Judg, or he cannot be the Judg. For suppose the Controversy be about the Succession and Title; suppose about an Incapacity, a Desertion and Vacancy; suppose it be about the Violation and Destruction of the Government and Constitution designed by him; or the Nature and Obligation of the Oaths to him. This is not only to make him a personal Judg in his own case, (which the Law permits net in Suits of Law betwixt Prince and Subject) but to set him above himself, and in our Author's Phrase, to set a Supream above a Supream. And then the Question should be put, not who is the Judg, but whether there is any Judg? But I readily grant that the Supream Governour has no Supream, and whatever has been done in a case extraordinary, doth no more make a Convention or Parliament Judges, (properly so called) than that the Parliament is equal to the King, because he can make no Laws without them.

As for the Case of the People, our Author writes as if he had never read his Adversary, who after he had resolved the Point into the Common Good, saith, I do not hereby go about to set up the Power of the People over Kings, which is in effect to overthrow Monarchy; for then the whole Soveraignty would lie in the People, and Kings would be but their Servants, p. 18.

[Page] And therefore there is the third case remaining, which is that of a Body of M [...]n; and thus the Question is put in the Discourse:

Whether the Law of our Nation doth not bind us to Allegiance to a King and Queen in actual Possession of the Throne, by consent of the Three Estates of the Realm: And whether such an Oath may not lawfully be taken, notwithstanding any former Oath, p. 8.

This he undertakes to prove, p. 13. as that's no other than the Consent of the People, whose true Representatives they are, as he shews.

To this our Author has nothing to say; but the Inquirer, that he may seem to say somewhat, took what served his turn, and left out the rest: (to use his own Words) For this Adversary having said, p. 18. If there be a Rule, the general Consent of the People joyned with the Common Good seems to have been that, which our Ancestors pretended to: he presently runs out upon this in a vehement Expostulation; Where or how can all the People meet? As if the Author he opposes thought of no less than the numbring of the People from Dan to Beersheba: Or as if there was no way of taking the General Consent but by an Vniversal Assembling. He that quoted what was just before and after, could not miss the Explication there given; The Consent of the People that is the Three Estates of the Realm, &c. p. 19. and elsewhere.

I might think here of closing the Discourse upon Publick Good, when he himself grows weary of it; but to give an Answer to what remains, it's fit with him to return to it.

The Author of the Discourse towards the beginning, treating of the Nature and Measure of the Obligation of political Oaths, shew'd.

[Page] 1. That the Obligation was not barely from the Oath, but from somewhat antecedent to it, p. 4.

2. That the Publick Good is that Antecedent, the main End chiefly concerned in the Obligation; and the Obligation to Magistrates is to be in Subordination to that end. p. 5.

3. That an Antecedent and Superiour Obligation voids that which is subsequent and inferiour, when they contradict each other. So that if an Oath to the Person is truly inconsistent with the Welfare of the People, the Obligation cannot continue.

That this is so in other cases, he shews; there being no Relation of Mankind one to another, but there is some good Antecedent, which is the just measure of that Obligation they stand in to each other. Thus he describes it to be between Parents and Children.

(1.) On the Childrens part to Parents: insomuch that if a Vow to God (which is as solemn a thing as an Oath) hinders that Good which Children are bound to do to Parents, it ceaseth to oblige, as our Saviour declares.

To this our Author replies: His Comparison of a Vow and an Oath is nothing to the purpose; for whoever thought that either an Oath or a Vow bound a Man contrary to his real Duty? The Sin in such a case is in making them, not in breaking them, p. 13.

I answer; The Instance is to the purpose; for if the procuring and preserving the publick Good be a Duty; and what a Person hath vowed or sworn, be destructive of it; then the Oath cannot oblige, no more than a Vow not to feed or maintain a Parent, and the Jurant is discharged of the Obligation.

And whereas he saith, The Sin is in making them, &c. That is true where the matter is unlawful in it self (as [Page] when the Jews bound themselves to kill St. Paul) But the Case may happen so, that it may be not only lawful, but a Duty to break that Vow or Oath, which was lawful in its own Nature; or rather the Obligation comes to cease; because by change of Circumstances or of the original reason of that Oath, that which was lawful may become unlawful. Thus it was in things sacred and dedicated to the Service of God, and which could not be alienated from it without Sacriledg, and yet it was lawful to apply them otherwise in case of Necessity, as our Saviour's case of the Shew-bread proves. And so it may happen in the case before us, when that which was before for the Publick Good, and which it was lawful to swear to maintain, may afterwards come to be plainly destructive of it; and so the same reason that there was for swearing to maintain it, may be for the setting it aside. The want of this Consideration led this Author into a Mistake, when he saith, Let our Author speak out, and tell me, that taking an Oath of Allegiance to a lawful Prince is contrary to my Duty, and then, &c. For it might be lawful and his Duty to take an Oath to a lawful Prince; but it follows not that no case could ever happen, in which the Obligation of such an Oath ceases. It was lawful for Jaddus the High-Priest and the rest of the Jews to swear Allegiance to Darius as long as he lived: And yet when Alexander came with a powerful Army against them, and Darius was in no Capacity of defending them, it was lawful, and, as they thought, their Duty, for the Preservation of their Country and themselves, to go out to meet him, and to transfer their Allegiance to him; and certainly they thought themselves discharged from their former Oath to the one, when they took it to the other. So [Page] true is that which the Author of the Discourse observes; That the Resolution of Conscience in this case doth not depend upon the Will and Pleasure of the Person to whom the former Oath was made, but upon the Grounds on which it was made, and from which it had its force to oblige: And if those cease, the Obligation of the Oath ceases together with them, p. 13.

(2.) It is so on the Parents part to Children, as the same Author shews; So that if Parents, instead of regarding the Good of their Children, do openly design their Ruin, none will say but that they are bound to take care of their own Welfare, &c.

To this our Author replies:

1. I know not what a Madman may do, but none will suppose that a Parent in his right Wits will do thus; as it is both unnatural and unreasonable to think, that a King should contrive the Destruction of his Subjects, without whom he hath none to reign over or assist him. This I grant is unnatural, and unreasonable in it self, but not unreasonable to think; for the World too often finds that the Passions, and Lusts, and Interests of Men make them do things unreasonable and unnatural. And our Saviour tells us, how far the Hatred Persons have to the true Religion may transport them, when the Fathers shall betray and deliver their Children to Death.

And if it is so on the part of a Natural, it may be as well supposed on the part of a Political Parent.

That he saith is unreasonable to suppose, because a King by the Destruction of his Subjects, leaves himself none to reign over, or assist him. But whoever was so mad as to mean this, when he puts the case of a Prince's destroying his Nation; for then he must come to do it with his own hand, and his Nation must in Caligula's way have little more than one Neck to serve his Barbarity. [Page] But they thereby mean his Design to destroy the Government, and to destroy those that will not comply with, or oppose such a Design: He choosing rather to have no Subjects than what shall not be his Slaves; or in the modish way of a neighbouring Prince, that will not be of the same Religion with himself.

2. He saith, The Author should have told us, that the Children, in such a Case, might have taken away all the Father's Subsistence, and done their utmost endeavour to starve him, or cut his Throat; and no doubt but this had been an excellent Comment on the Fifth Commandment.

But why should that Author be obliged thus to have told us?

For suppose the Father would alienate the Estate from his Children, which is entail'd upon them; and designs to adopt a Stranger into that Relation, and substitute him in their Place: Suppose again, that a Father has several Tenants that hold of him by ancient Tenures, and by which Tenures, and performing the Conditions belonging to them, their Lands are as much their Propriety, as the Land of Inheritance is their Lord's; and that he notwithstanding seeks to destroy their Tenures, because they oppose him in his Designs against his Children, or in that absolute Power over them which he aims at: Suppose again, that rather than not compass his Designs, he seeks the destruction of his Children, and of the Tenants that adhere to them for their own mutual Preservation and Security: Is there no Mean to be found, but either to let the Father out, and starve his Children, or that the Children must take away all the Father's Subsistance, and do their utmost to starve him? No Mean, but to let the Father cut the Throat of his Children, or [Page] that the Children must cut the Throat of their Father? And may not a Son withdraw from his Parents immediate Care, (as the Discourse saith) and forsake his House, when he cannot stay there but upon the hard terms of being destroyed, or of resigning up the Title of his Inheritance to a supposititious Heir? Or, may not the Son take possession of his Father's House, and the Estate of Inheritance, which the Father abandoned, rather than he would oblige himself to continue the Estate in his Family, and suffer the Tenants to hold their Lands by any other Tenure than that of during Pleasure? May he not, I say, then enter upon the Estate, rather than suffer the House to fall, and the Lands to be wasted, and the Tenants undone for want of a Supervisor and Possessor? And may he not keep the Possession against his Parent in his own, his Families, and Tenants Right, when he comes with an armed Force of Rapperies to enslave his Children and Tenants, and exercise an absolute Power over them, or else destroy them? And may not all this be done, and the Fifth Commandment stand in its full force? If not, we must burn our Law-Books, and take new Measures from these Gentlemen that despise and reproaeh the Common Good, as an Engine fitted (in his phrase) to overturn any Government; and that whilst they pretend to plead for Law, set up a meer Arbitrary Power.

The third Instance in the Discourse of the Relation of Mankind one to another, is that of Masters and Servants, Victors and Captives; in which the Author proves there is a regard had to the benefit of those who are in Subjection.

Here our Author interposes; I know not, saith he, to what purpose he so labours to prove that a Natural Equity[Page]or Common Right is due to Subjects, yea even to Slaves: For whoever thought, that being under Government, Metamorphos'd us into Beasts, or worse.

It's the first time (though there was reason enough for it before) that this Author confesses his Ignorance; and it's pity he should be sent away uninformed.

1. It was necessary, because though being under Government (rightly so called) doth not metamorphose us into Beasts; yet mere Absolute Power comes very near it.

2. It was to the Purpose, because the Author of the Discourse had undertaken to prove, that there is no Relation of Mankind one to another, but there is some Good antecedent, which is the just measure of that Obligation they stand in to each other. Thus it is, saith he, between Parents and Children, Masters and Servants.

Oh, but, saith our Author, he should have proved, that because the Subject has a Common Right, therefore he can receive no wrong; that is, he should have proved Non-sence and Inconsistencies.

Or (as he goes on) if be do [receive wrong] or apprehend he shall, then he may cry out, The Publick Good, and raise Rebellion, and overturn any Government: that is, because he has received a private Injury (in which the Publick is not concerned) he may cry out the Publick Good: It's well he before told us the Publick Good is a personal Good, or else I should have fil'd this up for a new Blunder.

The 4th Relation mentioned in the Discourse is that between Princes and their Subjects: where the Author proved, that the Good of the whole is the just measure of the Obligation they stand in to each other.

1. From what the strictest Casuists have allowed under a State of Vsurpation.

[Page] 2. From the nature of Political Oaths, which are Reciprocal. As to the first of these.

1. In the foregoing Paragraph our Author will needs have his Adversary to have borrowed the worst of Mr. Hobbs's Principles to patch up his Discourse, though he confutes him. And here he will have him displeased with the Casuists, though they agree with him in the main Point, about Publick Good, as he there recites their opinion. It is not denied, saith he, by the strictest Casuists in these matters, but that under a State of Vsurpation, notwithstanding their Oaths to a rightful Prince, Men are bound to do those things which tend to the Publick Safety, as well as their own.

Now what's this but to prove (as far as that Author intended it for) that the Publick Good is the measure of the Obligation, because the strictest Casuists in those matters do not deny, &c.

But however our Author will have it so that they have displeased him; and he gives a very surprizing reason for it, for thus he goes on: In another Paragraph He (the Author of the Discourse) discovers the reason of his Displeasure to be this, that they have not allowed them to do every thing in a State of Vsurpation, which they might do under their lawful Sovereigns.

If I had never read more than two Pages of the Discourse, I durst have adventured as much as our Author would have laid, sometime since, that King William would never pass the Boyn, that there is no such Paragraph, and no such reason in the whole Book: and I dare now vouch after I have read it, that there is no more any such Paragraph, than that King William is still on the other side of the Boyn; or died of the Wound he received there.

But since the Casuists will not be of his Mind, that [Page] Author will it seems be even with them; for (if our Author be to be credited) he roundly condems them all, for founding it on the presumptive Consent of the absent Prince: but it is his own Mistake, for quite contrary, they found the presumptive Consent of the Absent Prince upon the Publick Good.

After all it seems by his own Confession, that the Casuists and his Adversary agree, that under a State of Vsurpation Men are bound to do those things, which tend to the Publick Safety: but they disagree about the reason it's founded upon: For saith the Discourse, the Casuists found it (that is, the Obligation Men are under in that State, to do what's for the Publick Safety) upon a presumptive Consent of the absent Prince. But that's his own Mistabe, saith our Author; for quite contrary, they found the presumptive Consent of the absent Prince upon the Publick Good.

What a Penance have I to undergo, that must teach a Man his A B C; and that puts C for A, and B for C; (for it's no better with him here).

We are now not enquiring, upon what the Consent of the absent Prince is founded; but upon what the Casuists found their Opinion of the Obligation that lies on Mankind to do what tends to the Publick Good under a Usurpation. The former indeed the Casuists found upon the Publick Good, but the latter they found upon the presumptive Consent of the Prince, as is evident from what he himself quotes out of Bishop Sanderson.

The Case then is that those Casuists found their opinion of doing what tends to the publick Safety under an Usurpation, immediately on the absent Prince's Consent; and remotely by him, and for his sake, on the Publick Good. But now the Author of the Discourse [Page] thinks this to be a Mistake; for, saith he, The true Reason is, that Men are in the first place bound to promote the Publick Good, and consequentially and with respect to it, to regard the Will of their Princes, who are appointed by God and Nature for that end. And if such be rendred uncapable of doing it, yet the Obligation on others remains.

2. The Discourse proves, that the Publick Good is the true and just measure of the Obligation of Political Oaths; in that the Oaths are reciprocal. Whereas if only the Good of the Persons, to whom the Oaths of Allegiance are made, were to be our Rule, there would be no mutual Oaths. This that Author proves from the Word Allegiance (which originally signifies a Contract) and from Glanvil and Bracton, &c.

Now this was a noble Subject for our Author to have tried his Skill upon, but as if he had the Spirit of Clinias upon him, he shuts his Eyes, and runs backward from the naked. Weapon as far as he can: At last he is to be found three Pages behind, calling upon no less than two of the Holy Apostles to defend him, p. 12. for thus he saith, To secure the Law on his side, he cites Glanvil and Bracton, but forgets what St. Peter and St. Paul said. Let him take his share with the Lawyers, I will venture my Soul with the Apostles. A good thought! if the Lawyers go one way and the Apostles another. But I never read that St. Paul and St. Peter differed in this matter from Glanvil and Bracton; and that those Holy Apostles ever determined against them, that Political Oaths were not reciprocal; or that the Publick Good is not the true and just measure of the Obligation of such Oaths.

However by this conceit, he has got rid of a troublesom task; I need not, saith he, now answer the Citation: [Page] but how his as and his so come to be a reason for it, I don't well understand. However I dare pass my word for his Adversary (who, he saith, has changed his Divinity for a little bad Law) that he has so much Divinity and Law yet left, as (no less, than our Author) never to be persuaded, that it was lawful upon any pretence whatsoever to rebel, or to countenance Rebellion against a Sovereign Prince; and I am as sure that it is still, as he is, that not long since it was both the Doctrine of the Church of England, and the Law of the Land: which brings me to the last Point.

§. III. Of Obedience to Authority.

After our Author had wearied himself (as he professeth) with discoursing of the Publick Good, and ruined the main Point, that he might yet render it, as Jerusalem, so uncapable of Recovery, that not one Stone should be left upon another that should not be thrown down; he resolves to give a brief Answer. (to make good the Title of his Book) to such other things in the Discourse that may require it. Some of which, as belonging to the Subject of Publick Good, I have already considered. Amongst these, he selects the Answer that is returned in the Discourse to the History of Passiv Obedience. And here I thought, if any where, I should have found him bold and forward to support the Credit of that main Pillar of their Cause; but as if he was sensible of his own Weakness, he crys out abominably of the Answer to it, shifts it off with a silly Comparison; and as if he had raised a Spirit he could not conjure down; runs back as far as he can, without running out of the Book, to the case of Vows (which is before considered) and then as one confounded, bounces forward again, and concludes, I do not remember any thing more in his Discourse material, except a numerous heap of Instances, and in the Van comes the unfortunate Vortigern; which with a little Wipe he sends, as that Prince was, out of the way; and then as if he had been inspired at Montsorrel, takes a leap from p. 13, to p. 34. of the Discourse: and there he meets with somewhat which was not material enough to be remembred: But it seems his Adversary being so elevated about the Determination of our Saviour, of paying Tribute to Tiberius, that he in Zeal cannot forbear to call the Non-Swearers Perjured and Apostates; Our Author conceives he may without any Reflection upon his own Memory call him to an account for it; if it were only for a notable Remark he makes upon it, viz. Some Men surely are not only priviledged, but admired for speaking Contradictions. I was [Page] thinking for some time, where this Contradiction might be, and Dunce as I was, began to look backward and forward for it, whereas I perceived at length it was that the Discourse charged the Non-Swearers with Perjury. But bating the Contradiction, we know who has been sufficiently quit with him for it, in the like charge upon the Jolly Swearers.

After I had found out this Conceit, I was at a loss again to find out the Paragraph where this Contradiction was: and at length discovered it, but found withal our Author true to himself; who for ought I see, may (in his own Words) be priviledged, but I doubt not admired, for his many blundering Mistakes: of which this is one, for he might as well have said, and with as much credit to his own Understanding, that his Adversary called the Non-Swearers Jews, as Perjured and Apostates. For indeed what is said in the Discourse of Perjured and Apostates, is applied to that People, and only to them. The Words are these:

As to the dreadful charge of Perjury and Apostacy which some have made use of against those who hold it lawful to take the Oaths —it would have had more Appearance of Reason, if the Pharisees had urged it against our Saviour's Resolution of the Case about Tribute-Money. After this manner: For, had not God by his own Law setled the Government amongst them? &c. What can it be then less than Perjury and Apostacy to give any Countenance to such an open Violation of this Law?

Who would not pity this Writer of Controversy that cannot see into the Connexion of an Argument for ten lines backward or forward? for what reason I will not determine.

But now comes on a Flourish of Learning; for by an unhappy Parenthesis the Discourse has of Velleius Paterculus about the Senate, he understood there was, I will not say such an Author in the World, but such a Passage in that Author (for he was sensible he might trust his Adversary in that matter) and here he bears up to him, fights him with his own Weapon. To be short, saith he, I think the Testimony of Velleius to be better than our Author's, tho he so scornfully reject him; as if his Adversary had set his own say-so against that of Velleius, whereas he had proved the c [...]ntrary, from Suetonius, Dio and Tacitus; and therefore might well say, Whatever Velleius Paterculus pretends.

We are at last drawing to a close, and therefore he resolves to give his Adversary a parting Blow or two. He boasts, saith he, what he had gained upon the account of the Jews paying Tribute, but it will impose upon none but Fools and Partizans, and I will give [Page]it no particular Answer. Merciful Man! because he misrepresents the case both of the Jews and Tiberius. But it would have been some Satisfaction in this suspicious Age to have given an Instance or two; or else there are a sort of troublesom Inquirers, that will be apt to believe that the best, reason he had why he would not give a particular Answer was, because he could not. As now it will be asked, Wherein doth the Discourse misrepresent the case of the Jews? Was it that Darius was any other than a de factó King over them? or that they did not swear Allegiance to him as long as he lived? Or, did they notwithstanding, not submit to Alexander, and enter into his Service, and transfer their Allegiance to him? Where again doth the Discourse misrepresent the Case of Tiberius? Had he any Right to the Empire? or had he at first any other Title than from the Pretorian Band and Legions? Or, did not the Senate and People swear to him at last, though he was in the Throne before, and a notorious Usurper of it? But though our Author lets his Adversary go for once with his Misrepresentations scot-free; yet by the vertue of some few Particulars he has in reserve, he questions not but to put him to the rout; and then let him (sorry Man as he is, that when girding on his Harness, boasts himself as he that putteth it off) reckon his Gains; And they are these four.

1. That none should rule over the Jews but one of their own Brethren, was designed as a Blessing, and their being given up to a Foreign Power, was a Judgment, &c. What then? Therefore they might not lawfully transfer their Allegiance from their own Blood to a Foreigner. If that be the Consequence, what becomes of Nehemiah who served as Governour under Artaxerxes? What of Jaddus and the Jews of his time with their Oath of Fidelity to Darius? &c. If they did well, the Question is, (as it's in the Discourse) On what Right that Oath is founded?

2. He pleads, They were under a State of Conquest. What follows, but that therefore their Allegiance to their Royal Stem was so far at an end; or they might lawfully transfer their Allegiance to a Foreigner? What now becomes of Succession?

3. He urges, That the Question to our Saviour, was not concerning Oaths but Tribute, which he grants all Casuists do allow, may be paid even to an Vsurper. But he knows, what use and what Gain too his Adversary made of this; the Question is (saith the Discourse) Whether any Act of Subjection be lawful or not? If it be lawful to testify it one way, why not another! If in paying Tribute, why not in solemn promising to pay it? If in promising, why not in swearing, i.e. in calling God to witness that I do it? Thus far then we may go, we may swear to pay Tribute; but on what account? Is it not as a Token of Allegiance, i.e. as a Duty owing on the account of Protection? &c. If this way of arguing will impose upon none but Fools and Partizans; why doth not our Author who is to be sure no Partizan, shew that he is no Fool by answering it, and preventing Fools [Page] from being imposed upon by such a shew of reasoning as here seems to be?

4. He saith, That at that time no Man had jus potius, nor had there been any prior Oaths taken in bar against Tiberius; so that though he calls him an Vsurper, I know not where he will find one with a better Title.

1. He saith no Man had jus potius, a better Right. Surely the Author turn'd over the Page before, where he will find that Agrippa Posthumus was then living, one much nearer to Augustus, and that seemed designed by him to succeed him.

Surely again there was a jus potius in the Senate, from whom even Augustus was willing to receive it; and upon those Rights, the whole was an Invasion; and which was as much as if it had been the Right of a particular Person.

2. No prior Oaths. What thinks he of the Oath of Jaddus to Darius, when yet he went over to Alexander? What thinks he of the Obligation to the Senate, as to the present Case?

3. He saith, I know not where he will find a better Title: that is, than one who intruded himself into the Throne without any Pretence in the World, without the leave of Senate or People. So that in all respects there was hardly a worse Title in the Universe.

But for once I will adventure to set a better Title before him, and that is of one, that when wrong'd by a neighbouring Prince and Relative, and by one resolved against giving him any Satisfaction, to the securing that Right which he had to the Throne after his Decease, and a quiet Possession of it, took up Arms to right himself; upon whose Approach the other left his Throne and Kingdom, which the injur'd Person with the consent of the Estates of the Kingdom entered upon.

Now if Allegiance was lawfully sworn to a Tiberius, a Man of as little Right to the Empire, as of little Vertue: what is not then lawful and due to one that has such a Right and Title to it?

To conclude: If our B. Saviour did allow Tribute to be paid to Tiberius, and there is so little difference between Tribute and an Oath (as the Discourse hath shewn) our Author might have saved his impudent Slander against his Adversary, (which I will not repeat) who, as if he was run mad with the Sectaries he speaks of in Solomon's Phrase, casteth Firebrands, Arrows and Death.

Toward the beginning our Author saith of himself, I have taken a safer course in this matter to appear before the Tribunal of Heaven, than the Jolly Swearers, p. 2. But when I reflect upon his Disingenuity and hard Censures, &c. I thought surely he was then in earnest (which his scornful Title he gives his Brethren there, seems not reconcileable to) he forgot himself for ever afterward; and litttle thought of the Tribunal [...] another World; or that there were any amongst Mankind to inmind ( [...] knows the word) or to call him to an account here for such gross Prevarications.

FINIS.

Information about this book

Title statement

A vindication of A discourse concerning the unreasonableness of a new separation on account of the oaths from the exceptions made against it in a tract called, A brief answer to a late discourse, &c.

Williams, John, 1636?-1709.

Edition statement

1691

Publication

Publisher

Text Creation Partnership,

Place of publication

Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) :

Date

2005-12 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

ID [DLPS]

A66431

ID [STC]

Wing W2738

ID [STC]

ESTC R7770

ID [EEBO-CITATION]

12528814

ID [OCLC]

ocm 12528814

ID [VID]

62727

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This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Early English Books Online Text Creation Partnership. This Phase I text is available for reuse, according to the terms of Creative Commons 0 1.0 Universal. The text can be copied, modified, distributed and performed, even for commercial purposes, all without asking permission.

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Early English books online.

Notes

(EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A66431)

Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 62727)

Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1641-1700 ; 952:11)

Source

— A vindication of A discourse concerning the unreasonableness of a new separation on account of the oaths from the exceptions made against it in a tract called, A brief answer to a late discourse, &c., Williams, John, 1636?-1709..

Extent

[4], 40 p.

Printed for Ri. Chiswell ...,. London :: 1691.. (Reproduction of original in Huntington Library.) (Attributed to John Williams. cf. NUC pre-1956.)

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