An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to The vanity of dogmatizing / by Thomas White.

An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to The vanity of dogmatizing / by Thomas White.

Table of contents

Title page

TO THE YOUNG WITTS Of Both UNIVERSITIES.

THE TABLE.

An exclusion of SCEPTICISM AND SCEPTICKS From all Title to Dispute. First Plea. There is Demonstration and Science.

Second Plea. The Scepticks alledge nothing Sollid.

Third Plea. Tis imprudent to deny the existence of Sciences.

Fourth Plea Refells the Preliminary Objections.

Fifth Plea Refells our Ignorance of the Soul and Sensation.

Sixth Plea Displaies the Pastick vertue, Continuity, Adhesion of Parts, and the Mysteries of Rolling.

Seventh Plea Inquires after the Causes of our Modern Shortness in Science.

Eighth Plea Wards off from Aristotle the Calumny of special Impiety.

Ninth Plea Wipes off the Aspersions on Aristotle's Doctrine and Terms.

Tenth Plea Maintains certain Definitions and Arguings.

Eleventh Plea Refutes some Topicks babbled against Science.

§

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AN EXCLUSION OF SCEPTICKS From all Title to DISPUTE: BEING AN ANSWER TO THE VANITY OF Dogmatizing.

By THOMAS WHITE.

—Sciri hoc sciat alter.

LONDON, Printed for John Williams at the Crown and Globe in S. Pauls Church-yard▪ 1665.

TO THE YOUNG WITTS Of Both UNIVERSITIES.

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THough I doubt not of more powerful and seasonabler provision against that destructive contagion of Pyrronism, which, not long since, has begun to take fresh heart: Yet, hearing no news of any publick Cauterization apply'd to that Tumour of Glanvil's, wch has rag'd now full two years; methought this silence of my Betters turn'd the task upon my weakness, if not to avert, at least to open & expose to be torn in pieces by eloquenter Pens the injustice of that Calumny impos'd on the whole Profession of Philosophers. Reflect then O flourishing Englands fertilest hope! the Joy and Crown of your Mother, whose beholding you - with pleasure swells her silent breast! reflect, I say, and seriously ruminate what you strain to live and grow to; what persons you hope and covet to become hereafter: whether wise and skilful to govern Christian Life and Manners: or a crew of Rhetoricians, pleasantly tattling unknown and uncertain things; and betraying those under your Tuition into all Precipices that fall in their way: For, for [Page] such blind ones, and leaders of the blind, He sets you out to the world, who inculcates to your England the Vanity of Dogmatizing or promising Truths.

I am not angry with the Man, who, with a great deal of wit and an unfordable stream of eloquence (which will ripen with his years) prosecutes what he proposes to himself, and takes for a truth; not without some savour of Modesty: for, neither does he derogote from Faith the power of teaching its Tenets, nor disclaim all hope of attaining Science hereafter through a laborious amassment of Experiments. But, he points to acertain person (whom he owns his Master) that, giving us the Heads of some Books he had written, thus concludes the second, Here it is where the chief Foundations of Pyrronism are laid; and that mainly establisht, that NOTHING IS KNOWN. Well, indeed, may the Future despair, if the pains of so may Ages have brought it but to this, that there's nothing known. Have, then, the so many magnificent structures of your Colledges been devis'd, only to delude the People with a deal of pretty talk, not a jot advancive of Reason? Have so many prodigious wits of your Ancesters been sent abroad over all the Christian World, but to sell Smoak and Bubbles for Jewels & Pearls? Have you yourselves the patience to be till'd on through so many years exercises, only to the like emptiness? Scorn and hate that so foul a reproach should be cast on the Fame of all past Ages, and present industry.

But, what, at length, has enveigled into these conceits that great Interpreter of Epicurus, a Man never to my [Page] hearing, mis-spoken of, either for Wit, or Life and Manners? Since I'm utterly a stranger to his Privy-Councils, I'le tell you what his Book seems to offer. There are two Sciences contested about: Physick and Metaphysick (between which that of the Soul and Morals take their places). The First, content with few experiments, surprises Truth by vertue of Demonstration, and fixes it by that force which alone is inerrable, viz. the power of our spiritual Intellect. This eye alone pierces into the strength of Contradiction; and is onlily certain and necessary, as far as it scapes ore-shadowing by the senses: but, it is not overlavish too, in making use of them; and advances in growth by reflecting on it self its inmost eye. Physick is more florid, and with a Vernal look, as it were, sooth's our spirit inclin'd to Body. 'Tis more abundant in Experiments, and meer Historical almost, unless assisted and forc'd into Rules by this its Companion. That many court this gay one, no wonder, and slight her Elder Sister as 'twere but dry leaves; whereas, yet, on her 'tis the Gallant depends, nor without her help and Principles borrow'd from her, is able scarce to demonstrate any thing and advance by Causes connectedly. The ignorance of this necessity has bin the ruin of this Author, and many great Mens endeavours; nay, and will be, 'till the utter despair of getting forward teach first a retreat back again to settle Principles.

Another rubb is the unbridled Impudence of very many Moderns, who loudly crack of Aristotle and Metaphysick, as oft as there falls occasion of setting themselves [Page] out. They fill the Book-Sellers Shops with mighty Tomes: they counterfeit the Highest knowledge by pompous skirmishes in their own schools; and by wonderful promises enkindle the native ardour of Science. By these Arts they heap on themselves the honours and fruits due to Science; they flourish gayly and are propos'd to be ador'd in the Chairs. Mean while, look but into the matter, and those vast Mountains bring forth this solution of Questions, perhaps I, perhaps No. Histories are related of what the Antients, what the Moderns have thought of any propos'd Thesis; petty reasons for the I or No are shot out at random, as it were, from bands of Slingers or Archers: so their Pages get bredth, their Tomes bulk: but, when they come to give Judgment, out comes an Edict to this purpose, All the Opinions are probable, but, this last seems to me the more probable. What could be look'd for more silly from Midas's ears? What blind Tiresias could not as truly give verdict of Colours, perhaps 'tis white, perhaps not? What wonder now is it, if that ingenious Person derided such solemn trifles? And imagining these men, because none contradicted it, entertainers of Aristotle and his secrets, wholy neglected and contemn'd them.

You, then, O Yong Branches, growing up into Wine to rejoyce the hearts of Men! remembring that Vertue's the Mean hedg'd in by both Extreams, neither disclaim and detest Aristotle, nor superstitiously adore and embrace him. Those things he has demonstrated, though but few and seeming contemptible, yet receive. 'Tis the nature of [Page] Principles to appear vulgar and despicable; but there's not a step can be made in Sciences without them. The foundations of Edifices lye buryed under ground, yet 'tis they sustain the magnificent and towring fabrick. They that slight Aristotle's Grounds must of necessity, being always in quest of Principles, ever fall short of Science. Yet, far worse than these are they who feign and profess themselves Aristotelians, and are Ignorants the while in the Method of Demonstrating, & neglect what He prescribes: Circumventers of Parents, Spiriters of Youth; whom, enveigled with a shew of Philosophy, they betray to vanity and prattle: worst Enemies of the Commonwealth; to which owing Youth adorn'd with Science & Vertue, they pay it foolishly-confident, sophisticate, and fitted by their education to ill and good alike. For you, let Aristotle be your Master, of few things indeed; but those such as fructifie into thousands, viz. The whole race of separated substances, the things necessary to be fore-known to Physical contemplation, and judgment, in fine, of experiments. You have now the Pleas of both sides: 'tis your part to call aside into Council with you that Candour and sollicitude which so weighty an affair deserves.

The most earnest coveter of Your sollid knowledge THOMAS WHITE.

THE TABLE.

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First Plea. THere is Demonstration and Science, page 1

Second Plea. The Scepticks alledge nothing Sollid, page 11

Third Plea. Tis imprudent to deny the existence of Science, p. 17

Fourth Plea Refells the Preliminary Objection, page 24

Fifth Plea Refells our Ignorance of the Soul and Sensation, p. 30

Sixth Plea Displaies the Pastick vertue, continuity, Adhesion of Parts, and the Mysteries of Rolling, page 42

Seventh Plea Inquires after the Causes of our Modern Shortness in Science, page 51

Eight Plea Wards off from Aristotle the Calumny of special Impiety, page 55

Ninth Plea Wipes off the Aspersions on Aristotle's Doctrine and Terms, page 60

Tenth Plea Maintains certain Definitions and Arguings, p. 65

Eleventh Plea Refutes some Topicks babbled against Science, p. 71

An exclusion of SCEPTICISM AND SCEPTICKS From all Title to Dispute.
First Plea. There is Demonstration and Science.

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1. SCepticism, born of Old by an unlucky miscarriage of Nature, for her own Credit, carryed off the Tongues of the Eloquent where it had long been fostred, and buryed by the steddiness of Christian Faith; this Monster snatcht from the Teeth of Worms and Insects, Peter Gassendus, a Man of a most piercing Sagacity, of neat and copious Eloquence, a most pleasing Behaviour and wonderful Diligence, by a kind of Magick has endeavoured to restore again to life. He, a Person (which is the strangest of all) most tenacious of Catholick Faith, and never suspected guilty of mischievous Tenets: whereas, yet, this Scepticism is the Mother [Page] of infinite Errors, and all Heresies, and that very seducing Philosophy and vain fallacy which the Saints, warn'd by the Apostles, have taught us to beware of. Heard, this man, otherwise eminent in his paradoxical Exercitation against the Aristotelians, has dar'd to expose, not vail'd, as before, and wandring like a Quean in the dark, but bold-fac'd and painted, to the Multitude and Market place.

By his Example, the Author of The Vanity of Dogmatizing has produc'd her amongst us beauteously trick'd-up in English: He, too, a great Master of Wit and Eloquence. Nor indeed are vast mischiefs to be dreaded from Vulgar heads. This is the occasion of my undertaking; and this my Design (if Heaven vouchsafe to enlighten and guide my pen) to force back into her Grave this Carcass that would be rivalling Science, and deliver her up a Feast to her former worthy Commoners. Come on then, let's untie the knot of the Question.

3. Since, then, 'tis of Science we are to speak, its genius would in some measure be look'd into. Nature her self, therefore, teaches us, that Man is an Animal endued with Reason, to fit him for governing his Action, and Reason is allowed to be That whereby what before was unknown is rendred known: dayly Experience also convinces that our Action consists for the most part in such things as are subject to an infinite and insuperable mutability and variation: whence it comes to pass, that that Vertue which is immediate to action cannot properly be called Science (since [Page] 'tis not infallible, and the effect of demonstrative Discourse) but a power of conjecturing aptly; and uses commonly to be term'd Prudence, either properly or derivatively; properly, if it be concerning the thing to be done, as to its right proceeding from Reason; analogically, if of the action or thing to be done, as it regards some other inferior Faculty subservient to the dominion of Reason. Now Prudence depends on two previous Powers, Art and Inference or Experiment. Art, though it ows its birth to Experience, yet is sustained by universall and unfailing Rules: But, it self understands not the necessary and indefectible efficacy of its Rule; but is content with the testimony of ever-corresponding effects. Inference, or Experience for the most part is true, but necessitates not assent, because not universal.

4. Setting this therefore aside, 'tis clear the Decrees of Art, since she is veracious, have necessitating and necessarily connected Principles, which force the effect of Art to be not possibly otherwise than as Art teaches 'twill succeed. Whence follows, that the subject Matter of Science and Art is the same; and every Art has a proper Science due to it self, if the nature of Man would stretch to attain it. But, the same warning we gave before concerning Prudence, must be repeated concerning Science. For, as he who behaves himself prudently in any Artifice, is not therefore esteem'd and stil'd a prudent man; but only he who rightly tempers [Page] his Action in as much as 'tis Humane: so, neither is he, with propriety, to be called a knowing man, who skills the demonstration of Duelling, or Versifying; but he that has the demonstration of those things which are Principles for governing our life, in as much as 'tis Humane: The chief whereof is that which has merited the term of Theology, or Metaphysicks: the next is Ethicks: then Physicks, or Natural Science; whether, because all corporeal Natures, or the World, is proposed to the disputation of men; or because, next Metaphysical Contemplation, nothing so much advances our desired Beatitude as Physicks. Nor yet are Mathematicks to be excluded; both because Quantity, their subject, is the Vesture of those bodies which Physicks speculate through; as also, because the Rules, and as it were, the demonstrableness of Natural things at every step depends on them. Out of all which 'tis clear, that in nothing Equivocation more lewdly cheats Man-kind, than in this term of Knowing, or Learned men. For, if Masters in Sciences, analogically so called, are not really worthy this name: how much further off meriting so noble a Title are those, whose ambition streins no higher than, like Parrats, to repeat others sentiments? and how manifestly pernicious are they that have the confidence to apply such learning to the government of humane life; and vent poison, or at best, smoak, under the Reverend name of Science?

[Page] 5. It follows, that such Science 'tis we propose to our selves as is beneficial to Humane life. And concerning this, three things offer themselves to our enquiry. Whether there be at all any certainty attainable, at least of one Proposition or one Reasonment, which we call a Sylogism? At this hangs the next, Whether at least, any Habit, or Series of more Truths traced with certainty (such as generally are esteem'd those which Arithmeticians and Geometricians profess) may be acquired by humane industry? The last Question, by most (at least in practise) disputed (whate're in words they pretend) is limited to Physicks and Metaphysicks; whether about the objects of these any beneficial Multitude of Truths may be spun out connectedly; as the Masters in Mathematicks seem already to have done? And herein consists the usefulness of my discourse; and the desparation or difficulty of this Conclusion compels me to clear the former; which of themselves by their own evidence had stood unscrupled, had not the step, and almost necessary consequence they afford to the third, terrified those who feel such difficulty to yield this last.

6. To work, then; let us fix the first step, and assert, as invincibly known, and unshakable by any Art of the Scepticks, that What is is, or that what terminates and specifies an Identical Proposition as its Object is self-evident: as if we should say, that Peter is Peter, Wood is Wood, a stone is a stone; and whatever [Page] others carry as open-fac'd an Evidence. The Scepticks I imagine, will laugh at this Axiom as foolish: because Identical Propositions use to be excluded from the rank of Scientifical ones, and the Sciences themselves; as nothing at all advancing the understanding. But, by this their very laugh they'l yield us the Victory; as confessing Evidence in these, however they be useless: And therefore that wherever the same necessity shall Intervene, there cannot want Evidence. One thing in this position occurs a little cloudy, obscuring it through a Mist caus'd by the shadow of that most acute Person, Renatus des Cartes; who, severely prying to descry the very first thing falling under knowlege, beat it up at length to this, that the first thing every one knows, is, that Himself thinks. But, the difference of our Opinions, I conceive, has sprung from hence, that, whereas Science may be consider'd both in its Generation and in its Subsistence; He has taken the former Method, I the later. For, really, if we examine by what degrees Science is born in us, we see, the first thing that happens is to have a passion made in us by Bodies; and the first evident thing that strikes us is that we think. But, if, looking upon Science now existing▪ and as its twere at rest in us, we enquire what 'tis that fasten truth to our Minds, so that we cannot doubt or, as were, waver about it: Nothing will appear more simply or originally manifest then that what is is, [Page] wherein, in a manner, is formally included that what is so is, that, whilst it is, it cannot not-be; which, indeed, is, that the understander is certain that the thing is, or has a fixedness concerning the truth which is in him.

7. It being determin'd that an Identical Proposition is evident, 'tis equally determin'd that Propositions term'd self-known are evident: for, if they be look'd into, twill be clearly seen, that a self-known Proposition is in some sort composed of an Identical Proposition and another otherwise evident, or taken for evident. For, there are two sorts of self-known Propositions; one wherein the Generical Notion is predicated of a Species; another wherein the Species are predicated divisively of the Genus. Take these for Examples: A Man is an Animal: the sense is, A Rational Animal is a sort, or one of the Animals: The evidence of the Proposition consists in this, that the word Animal signifies, as it were formally in predication, to be one of the Animals; and the word Rational denotes that whereby a Man is one of the Animals. Wherefore in this Proposition, a Man is an Animal; these two Propositions shrowd themselves, one of the Animals is one of the Animals; and that other, that Rational is a determiner of Animality: Now this later is not affirmed, but taken for granted, either from Sense as it were, or some other way supposed to be known and past doubt; and in force of the former Identification, tis concluded [Page] that a Man is an Animal. In like manner when 'tis said, Number is either even or odd, Bulk is either finite or infinite; and whatever Predicates, contradictorily oppos'd, are predicated divisively of a Subject; two propositions lye in them; one an Identical one, for example, that even and not-even are all, or comprise all the kinds of Number; and another otherwise known, viz. That such a Number, for example, Ten, is a certain Number. This later is known as it were by sense; or suppos'd, not affirm'd: The former is equivalent to this all Number is all Number; and one of all the Numbers, for example; Ten, is affirm'd to be one of the even or odd, because, by force of the contradiction between even and not-even, even and odd must of necessity comprise all Numbers, or even and odd and all Number be the same.

8. The same force of Identity is also clear in a Sylogism: For example, when in the first Mood, or Barbara, two self-known propositions are taken and another truth, unknown before, is concluded out of them. As, when tis argu'd that Every Man is a living Creature, because every Man is an Animal, and Every Animal is a living Creature: there's made an Identification of Man and living Creature; or rather it is discovered by the double Identification of Animal with the Superior and Inferior. The force therefore of the Sylogism whereby it fixes the mind in this Identity, tha [...] Man is a living Creature, lies in nothing but this, tha [...] [Page] through the former two Identifications it rests fixed as to the Premisses. Plain therefore tis, that the light of an Identical Proposition shews it self both in self-known Propositions, and in those which are concluded by Sylogisms: and, which follows, either that the truth of an Identical Proposition is not evident, or else that self-known propositions, and such as are concluded by a legitimate Sylogism are Evident and most certain: and, that it cannot be doubted, so many truths are palpably certain as can be reacht by a legitimate deduction of Sylogisms. Since, therefore, he cannot be esteem'd other than a Mad Sot that should deny the Evidence of an Identical proposition; he cannot be reputed Rational who should at all reject propositions self-known, or collected by legitimate Discourse.

9. Be this, therefore, a Demonstration a priori, as they term it, of this truth, that there is some certainty or Science; that, since tis undenyable that what is is, or, an Identical Proposition is true, and every Proposition, whether self-known or Sylogistically-concluded, has no other necessity than what shews it self in an Identical one; there can be no doubt of these, unless Identical ones, too, be called in question. For, since, in a self-known Proposition, tis Evident, that the thing signified by one Term is that which is signified by the other: And in a Sylogistically-concluded Proposition, it likewise appears, [Page] that because A is B, and B is C, A too is C; or that, unless A be C, A will not be A; for 'tis not A unless it be B, nor B unless it be C: 'Tis Evident that whatever is evinced by a legitimate Sylogism, has the same necessity as an Identical Proposition. Since therefore 'twere meer perversness, and such as cannot fall into humane Nature, to doubt whether an Identical Proposition be true; tis absolutely manifest that whatever is concluded by ligitimate discourse out of self-known Propositions is engrafted, beyond any danger of ambiguity; or, that there is Science of all such like: And therefore that there is some Science, and that, indeed, of many truths. Now, that which either in a self-known or in a Demonstrated Proposition, is assum'd beyond Identical ones is not capable either of truth or falshood; but, in a manner, is taken by way of snpposition; as if 'twere said, if he be a Man; if it be an Animal: I say, for as much as Man or Animal are the subjects of the Propositions or Premisses.

Second Plea. The Scepticks alledge nothing Sollid.

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1. NOw, to the Scepticks, or Scepticism it self. What says the Sceptick? Though, says he, nothing be certain, yet many things appear true to us; and, out of such appearance we proceed to Operation. Thou entanglest thy self, Sceptick! for, how, whilst, in common, it most clearly appears to thee that nothing is true; yet assertest thou, in particular, that this appears to thee true? Can these two stand together; it appears that none of those things proposed us are true; and at the same time, it appears that some of them are true? Besides, if any thing appears true, 'tis because it deceives us with the face and similitude of certain or true, (which two, as to us, speak the same thing; for, we say, that is certain which we know to be true, or which is true to us): But, 'tis clear, we cannot affirm any thing to be like another, if we know not that other: If therefore, there be amongst us no Certainty, or nothing known to be true; nothing can ever be or appear like Certainty amongst Men. 'Tis, therefore, stark folly to joyn these two togther, there is nothing certain, or ther's no Certainty; and yet some things appear certain.

[Page] 2. For all that, the Sceptick will stand to it, that at least this appearance is enough for humane Action: since all Action is singular, that is, in infinite Circumstances upon which Demonstration has no force, but only Prudence, or the power of conjecturing which is to be prefer'd before other. Notwithstanding, if the Action be truly humane, that is, purely and thoroughly govern'd by Reason, this Sceptical appearance is not enough for it. For, first, since Prudence is an Intellectual vertue, it cannot be indifferent to Truth and Falsity; but always tenacious of truth. In Action, therefore, govern'd by Prudence two things fall under consideration; that which is most conspicuous and spy'd by every one is, whether the Action be like to attain its immediate and next end, to which 'tis destin'd: And this for the most part is uncertain; but withall, in this consists not the primary effect of Prudence, but a certain faculty of guessing, which they call Sagacity. The other thing, wherein especially Prudence plays its part, is whether this Action be to be done here and so: For which it suffices that two things be certain; One, that the Actor is led by no Passion; the other, that he has used pains, or disquisition enough; which depends on the former; since that will not fall short, unless some Passion makes the Actor precipitate. But, as far as the soul proves deficient in these two, so much, too, she deviates from the Rule of Prudence. Now, these two may be very [Page] clear to an experienced Person. Farther, this Tenet, again, of the Scepticks fails of sufficiency for Action in the very first root of Acting, viz. Whether any thing be to be done, or whether Action be wholly to be suspended: For, in vain the understanding tugs at it, what Action to perform; unless it be first evident that something is to be acted: They therefore, who profess not so much as this is known, that something sometimes is to be done, cannot be mov'd to Action out of pure understanding. Nor can it be reply'd that it appears to the Sceptick he is to Act: For, since Appearing is common to true and false; Nay, since 'tis known that false is oft-times more probable and apparent, than true; 'tis plain that neither Probability in general, nor the greater Probability can have any force at all to cause Assent. But, if one has not assented to this Universal proposition, something is to be done; 'tis plain that, as to pure Reason, he has no principle of Acting: And, if he has any other principle besides, Reason, the Action, as far as it springs from that, is not Rational. It must therefore be concluded that all action of the Scepticks is utterly not-humane, but only Brutal; as rising purely from sense and imagination: Or, rather worse than Brutal; in as much as they force Reason to submit to and serve sense.

3. But, that which highlyest crosses this Sect is, that Professors of Science much undervallue themselves, [Page] if they vouchsafe to dispute with them or endure to hear them babble. For, since in all humanenature, no Sect is to be found more addicted to prattle, and more greedy of that vanity which follows tinckling Cymbals: At what a distance will they be from their Beatitude, if among the adorers of Science they be not allow'd to vent their trifles? Let us, therefore, fairly weigh this, whether they are to be admitted among the Professors of Learning. Scientifical Persons, then, are either Masters or Disciples; that is, such as have already attain'd the habit of Science, or such as endeavour after it, or are seekers of truth. Since, therefore, tis plain, the Scepticks profess not themselves Possessors of the Science; it remains they are to be reckoned among the seekers; wherefore, since this contradicts it self, that one should seek what he thinks is no where, or at least, which dispairs possible to be found; in vain they declare themselves Candidates or seekers after Sciences. Add to this, that, since they neither admit self-known Propositions, nor any legitimate Consequence of Discourse; they have no way or Method of seeking, or any trace from which to commence their search: But, if they admit any of these two, they cannot but acknowledge something certain.

4. It ought, therefore, be objected, at the very begining, to such contemners of Sciences; what attempt you? what's your aim? How have you the confidence [Page] to attaque any one that's truly a man? For, whence shall what you say derive any appearance? Is it not just to press on you to prove first whatever you assume; and this without ever coming to an end? You therefore, will never be able to assume any thing that can prove our Tenets false or uncertain. Again, will you use any other form of Discourse then Sylogistical? But, this you deny to be evident and certain. You, therefore, come but to deride, sillily to play the Rooks, and chatter figments like Poetical Magpies. You I reply, perhaps, you dispute ad hominem (as they term it), and shew, out of those things which our selves have accepted, that what we teach thereupon has no certainty. What's your meaning? If indeed you endeavoured this in any one Tenet, it might be allow'd you to try what you were able to do: But, if universally you assert us unable to make good Consequences, you call us Beasts and deserve not the hearing. And, you your selves, how will you evince any one Consequence to be ill? Will you tell us how it ought to be, to be good, you I say that grant none to be evident? 'Again, why will ours be false, and yours good? But, if you affirm your own not good neither; what madness possesses you, that you cannot suffer us to rest even in our Error; when you neither can nor strive to exempt us from erring? Tis sweeter, sure, to believe one-self in the light, then to know one-self in darkness and all light hopeless.

[Page] 5. In fine, To what purpose do we amass Arguments against those, who, as far as in them lies, have put off Humane Nature, and made themselves Beasts? For, if to Reason be to advance our selves, out of certain and known things, to things before unknown and uncertain; and nothing be certain: neither is any Reasoning possible; nor consequently any power of reasoning; or Animal endowed with it. But, if nothing be certain, nothing, too, will be true, since that is certain which we see to be true; that is, truth had, our Truth true to us, True by which we are true. For, clear it is, that our Nature is covetous of Truth in it self; that, when we or our understanding is true, being impregnated with this Truth, it may be made operative, and Master of all things without it; or, that it may pursue useful things, fear such as are to be fear'd contemn things contemptible, and reject all manner of counterfeit scare-crows. He frustrates, therefore, the whole bent of Nature, that denies there's any certainty; and utterly evacuates, as Nature her self, so also her most vehement desire and aim. What need I mention Humane Conversation, but especially Negotiation? for, if there can be nothing certain in Humane matters, why do we instruct Infants and Boys? why strive we to perswade Youth into those things which seem True to us? for, if there be no certainty acquirable, tis to be judg'd wholly indifferent what every Youth does, or whither he tends: Especially, since not so much as [Page] this is certain, that one thing is more probable than another; and far less, that what now is more probable will be so when the Boy comes to choose it.

Third Plea. Tis imprudent to deny the existence of Sciences.

1. LEt us raise our Style, and enlarge it to entire Habits. Can it be believed, that men of excellent wits should be so fond as to deny those things that Humane life is full of; and without which there's no living, at least commodiously? I mean Arts. Let's consider what part of our Action or Life is exempt from their service: what Arts go to the providing us Food, Cloaths, Houses, Delights? Our minds are cultivated with Liberal ones: the Fields, Mountains, Seas are mastred by Arts. To conclude, What is there that falls under mans use, wherein some kind of Art is not exercised? Art, therefore, what is it, but a Rule which commonly fails not? This, then (if mens souls but own themselves) is certain, that Art, for the most part, fails not. What if I should say, that it never fails? but either the Artificer is unskilfull, or else, through laziness or knavery follows not the prescription of the Art, as oft as any Error happens. But, be it so, that Art sometimes fails; at least, the whole [Page] course of our actions is grounded on this that, commonly it fails not: Wherefore since what never fails is certain, Art, which in most cases never fails, in most cases is certain; and whoever denies this, either out of ignorance or stomack, opposes himself to very Nature and the Order of things. This is, therefore, a throughly-attested Truth, that there are intire and complete Habits of Certainties: since, both of the several Arts, in common, tis certain that for the most part they attain their effect; and the same is as evident of the several Members and Joints in each Art in particular.

2. The next place Mathematicks challenge, which have gain'd the true name of Science: first, Arithmetick and Geometry, each of so large an extension, that they make up many entire habits; and if they be acknowledg'd for Sciences, they leave no room for opposing others, upon pretence of the abundance of their Doctrines, or the largeness of their Subject. Such, again is the steddiness of Attestatition to these Sciences, of so many Ages, so many eminent Wits, by shewing and perpetuating so many Effects, beyond the estimation of humane Prudence; that there can be no doubt but they winch against Nature it self that calumniate these Sciences. Let's behold the multiplicity of Sylogisms; the derivation of far distant Truths by intermediate Propositions, immediate to one another; and how many Principles or fore-known Truths are sometimes made use of towards the search of some one: and we [Page] shall see these Sciences will not sustain themselvs alone, but extend their power to others also; and perswade, nay, evince, that there's nothing but may be demonstrated, if there want not Industry.

3. Yet I am not ignorant what uses to be urg'd against these Sciences, especially against Geometry: which though in other works I have sometimes repell'd, yet here too, as in their properest place, they are again to be repeated; chiefly because the Scepticks no where, in my judgment deserve more applause. For, plain it is, though nothing be farther from the meaning of the Geometricians than what the Scepticks lay to their charge; yet nothing appears clearer in the Terms they use, than what they mean not: Providence so ordering it, That those things which best guard themselves by their own evidence should be most infesed with prejudices; to warn us, in more obscure points, not to desert evidence, though we be hard put to't with weighty, perhaps, but obscure Argments. For, what's more manifest than that Geometricians require a streight Line to be drawn from one point to another? That they dispute, whole Volumes full, conconcerning Lines and Superficies? That they demand a Line to be drawn out in infinitum? That a Circle be made? An equilateral Triangle? And a thousand such like: That none of all which, yet, can exist in the world, 'tis either certain, or, at least, so ambiguous that it ought not to be presum'd without Demonstration; [Page] whereas the Geometricians neither attempt nor promise any such thing.

4. Notwithstanding in all these, tis no hard matter to satisfie an attentive Reader. For, I ask, whether or why tis not lawful for a Mathematitian to speak universally of his Object, in the same manner as both the Learned and Unlearned talk of theirs? He may then speak of the body proposed to him, as tis long, not treating at all about it, as tis broad; since for a Body to be broad is nothing else, but to be long according to two Dimensions. In like manner, since a Body to be deep signifies it to be long according to three Dimensions; what an envious part 'tis not to allow the same to be considered as broad, abstracting from the third Dimonsion? These things being clear to the utmost pitch of evidence; and so that we cannot speak otherwise according to Nature; let's see wherein lyes the fault of the Geometricians. You urge that they assert there is a Line in being, that is, Longitude without Latitude; I deny it: You prove it, alledging they mark a Line with letters, saying the Line A. B. I demand, to what purpose serves this marking? Is it for any thing but to notifie the Longitude of the Body they measure? If that be all, then the sense which serves the Mathematicians turn in the word is, that the Body propos'd, according to Longitude, is equivalent to the distance between A and B. And, if he assumes any more, it must of necessity be something [Page] impertinent to his Discourse, which Geometricians, of all men, are farthest from.

5. The very same may be said for their manner of speaking concerning a Superficies. But, for Points, the solution is more evident: For, in stead of this word the Point A, or the Point B, put the word End or Term, and there will remain no shadow of difficulty. For, who can doubt but that a Body, as Long, is terminated: and therefore can forbid an End or Term to be assign'd it? For the rest, 'twill easily appear the like Discourse serves: For, when he demands a Line to be produc'd in infinitum, the clear sense of the Geometrician is to have it drawn out as far as is necessary for his work; which never does or can happen to require it actually infinite. Not an infinite, therefore, but an indefinite Line the Geometrician asks; that he may use any as big a part of it as he needs. In like manner, if he demands a Circle or streight Line to be made; 'twere fond to think he expects them scor'd out Mathematically on Paper or Sand: Since the Demonstration he intends is Universal and exists in the understanding only, not in Paper. It suffices therefore, that the accurateness of the Circle or Line be in his Mind, to which the paper yields a phantasm; a weak one, indeed, but fit enough to delineate the rigorous form in his Mind. Some, too, will not allow a Line can be cut just in the middle. Nor do I deny this to be petty work of Geometry: But, neither do I [Page] expect the Scepticks should be able to prove this impossible: And therefore, against a perfect Demonstration, such as Euclid's is, to listen to slight-babling reasons were to trifle, not philosophize.

6. Is not this hugely remarkable, or rather to be admir'd? That those things which advance Geometry, above other Sciences, in a great measure are false; taken for granted in order to use, but not credited for Science: For, Mathematick is not certainer or more evident than other Sciences; but easier and more adapted to fancy, not understanding. For, if in Geometry we were still to use strick Terms, and always to repeat this Body, as long, abstracting from its Latitude, or, as broad, abstracting from its depth, the whole discipline, losing that inveiglement of clearness by which it tills on the reader, would be but tedious work. Now, because we may use the names of Points, Lines, and Superficies, as they were Things; and, according to this gross apprehension, make visible Figures: Geometrical truths strike almost our very corporeal Eyes. Whether as much may be done in other Sciences, at least as to some part, is not yet clear; but, from the way of Algebra, it may be conjectur'd not utterly out of the reach of humane industry.

7. This, at least, may passe for evident, from the manner we have expressed of the Geometricalcontemplation: that the Geometricians use to draw [Page] their Consequences and Positions, not from the sounds of their words, but the Notions in their minds. But, herein kind Nature has been indulgent to those Disciplines; that they are excus'd from any necessity to resolve the Equivocation of their terms: but having once explain'd them, they may, without any rub, proceed, whence we see that if at any time, they are put to explicate their words, Geometry grows even as troublesom as Metaphysick: as appears in that question bandy'd concerning an Angle of Contact; because they reflect not that an Angle speaks a Quantum, whereas yet they confess it cannot exist without a space. Plain then 'tis rendred that the first task in the other Sciences is, to make the question clear between the opposite Parties, not only in Term, but also in meaning: and that this is the main fault of the weak Managers of other Sciences, that they stick obstinately at using the words in a fore-received sense, and that no clear one; nor can be bronght to an agreement about their explication.

8. It must be concluded, that, in Physick also and Metaphysick, there's a capacity of infinite Demonstrations, if industry be not wanting. For, who is so senselesse as pertinaciously to deny, that a formal Sylogism may be made ev'n about the Subjects of these Sciences, or, when made, is of force? It must, therefore, be said, either that the Discoursers in these Disciplines cannot comprehend their own meaning, and [Page] declare what they feel in their mind when they pronounce such words: or else, that they may reduce them into a Sylogism and breed Science. Plain too, it is, that, in that part of Physick, which is truly call'd such, viz. that which treats of sensible Qualities, not so subject to obscurity through the equivocalnesse of the Terms, Demonstration will cost lesse pains: in Metaphysicks 'twill prove harder, because the Commoner the words are, the more they are subject to equivocation. But, on the other side, because, the Commoner the things treated are, the simpler are their Notions, and consequently, more evident the connexion of the terms: Demonstrations in Metaphysicks must needs be most evident and secure, and such as deserve the evidence of all other Sciences should depend on them.

Fourth Plea Refells the Preliminary Objections.

1. NOw we must give ear to the Complaints, (shall I call them?) or rather Reproaches of the Scepticks: though themselves are no slight Causes of those ills which they object to the Lovers of Dogmatizing; who, whilst they even acknowledge it the entire work of a Man, and one minding his [Page] businesse too, to dilate the bounds of any Science; themselves, pursuing mean studies and the applause of a smooth-tongue, strive, under pretence of impossibility, to avert from that Heroick thought the Scientifically-dispos'd Genius of others. Yet, would they do even this but solidly, I should think it pardonable: but, if they fall not on this neither in a legitimate way; how are they not to be exploded? Now, perhaps, the defects of mis-seekers may be more; but Ile content my self with the proposal of three. Let the first be of those who seek things incapable of Truth; or who, of that which has no being at all, enquire how it is or may be made: as if one should require a Triangle, equal to an assign'd Circle, to be inscrib'd in it. Let the second be of those, who complain that those things are unknown, which, though true in themselves, are yet, either, absolutely, or at least as yet, out of the reach of human power: as if one should be angry that the Wars or Government of the Planetary Commonwealths (supposing those Globes planted with Rational Creatures) are unknown to us. For, 'tis fondness to quarrel at our ignorance of such things, for reaching the knowledge whereof Nature has afforded us no Ladder of Accidents. The last defect is of such as lament those things are unknown, which, by honest industry, may be searcht out, and will, if the ardour of inquisition grow ripe. For, 'tis ignorance and importunity to allow no time for encrease of Sciences. [Page] Amongst these I reckon not those self-tormentors, who fret that those things are unknown, which are publickly known to others, but unknown to them; because, upon some extrinsecal prejudice, they neglect inquiring into what others have said: which race of Men is, at this day, most frequent among the Courters of Science; but withall most insufferable: For, what can be viler than to shut the eyes against things most manifest to the understanding; upon the Calumnies of such as profess they know not these things which others constantly affirm are most evidently comprehended?

2. Let now the Complaints themselves speak, viz. Those with which the Contemner of advancing Dogmatically has stuft his 3, 4, 5, and 6 Chapters: But, first lets examine those things which he indulgingly reproaches. They are the two, as it were, acknowledged Ne plus ultra's of Philosophers, viz. The Causes of the Seas Ebbing and Flowing, and of the Wonders of the Load-stone. Ile endeavour to look into them severally. And, as to the first, though that may well be reckoned among the things whose Accidents are not-yet-enough comprehended by us; and therefore I might justly exact that they, who think it incomprehensible, should take care to have the Phoenomena's clear'd, and teach us, by just calculations of Seamen, what dayes, in the several Regions, the Sea Ebbs and Flows happen: Otherwise, I may [Page] deservedly lay the blame on industry, and excuse Philosophy: Yet I will not proceed so rigorously with a courteous Adversary; but argue, that These things may be convinced concerning this vicissitude of the Sea: That the motion is caus'd by an extrinsecal Mover: That that is no other than the winde: That what rules the windes is but various aspects of the Sun and Moon to the divers Climates of the Earth. Which, if they be true, if evident from the Phoenomena's; what remains, but that the Phoenomena's be more acurately traced; and the ignorance of particulars laid to the charge of Industry, not of Art: and so Philosophy scape scot-free?

3. Lets run over our Proposals one by one. The first is that the Seas motion is from something extrinsecal, or without it. This is Demonstrated by Aristotle in his Books of Physicks; as they who have studyed him know: The Dialogues, too, De Mundo have made this some part of their pains; and, if a proper place for it occurs in this Treatise, I shall not be loath of my labour to explicate the same again: here this proposition is to be assum'd, not prov'd. That the Author of this motion is the winde comprehends more than one thing, viz. That the winde is a sufficient stirrer of the Sea; and that it, in particular, concurs to this motion call'd the Flux. As to the first part, (not to mention how many Deluges or overflowings of the Sea have infested the Coasts by the windes help), we need [Page] not travel beyond the Thames; in which, almost every Winter, the Flood happens, sometimes more than once in a day, to be beaten back or pour in more abundantly than ordinary, to the overflowing the Streets in the Subburbs of London, That, again, the Winde causes this course of the Tydes, besides the necessity which the perpetual West-Winde, flowing from the Atlantick Sea to the East-Indies, carries with it; the Six-months strong Currents, which take their turns constantly backward and forward between Africa and America, conformable to the Windes always keeping the vicissitude there, are a manifest testimony. Add to these, that, through the whole Coast of China, certain Tempests, with most vehement Rains and overflowings of Rivers, are daily expected at the New and Full Moons; whence the variation of the Fluxes at the same just periods is encreased. Now, that the Windes and Rains and rising of Storms depend from the Sun and Moon is so notorious that 'tis past contest. These things, then being clear; the causes of Ebbing and Flowing cannot be obscure: though the certain Compasses they fetch be unknown, because the observations of them are not-yet exactly calculated.

4. Nor is the Magnetical Philosophy less evident, if we'l have but patience to look into't by piecemale. For, it cannot be doubted, from the sudden turning of Iron-tools fit for the purpose, and other [Page] Bodies apt for Magnetical direction; but that power of Direction, which we call Magnetical, is attaind by a flux of unperceivable Atoms deriv'd from one Body into another: And as little, that because a perpendicular or horizontally-sidelong position of the Magnetical body is apt to beget in it that vertue; the primarily Magnetical body is the Earth we tread on, or at least the crust of it next us. Nor, again, is it questionable, from the perpetual Motion of corruption and generation of this Magnetical vertue in those bodies; but there is a certain perpetual flux of Atoms upwards and downwards, as also between the Equator and the Poles; whereby this vertue is infus'd and fed. Neither, again, will any stick at it, that the Magnetical Body, if it be set at full liberty, must be carry'd according to the flux of the like Atoms; as that which swims in a River follows the violence of the stream: and consequently, the declination, too, or variation of the Needle point out the Channel of the Earth's Atoms, which are proper to it. All which if we solidly remark, and pursue with a steddy discourse; I see not what great Mistery lies in this Magnetical vertue and operation, beyond possibility of bringing clearly to light. These secrets, therefore, of nature were, heretofore, like the head of Nilus, undiscover'd; but now, themselves attest not the defect but proficiency of Science. These then thus touch'd on, let us fall to the Objections themselves.

Fifth Plea Refells our Ignorance of the Soul and Sensation.

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1. IN the third Chapter, therefore, of his most eloquent Discourse, he objects our ignorance of that thing we ought to be best acquainted with, viz. Our own souls. Concerning which, what a kind of thing 'tis in this our earthly habitation, he neither teaches nor enquires at all, as far as I can discern; only that it is, he asserts, may be most clearly gathered from its effects; but, to ask what it is, he saies is like the mistake of Infants, that look behind the Glass for the Body whose superficies they saw painted on its foreside. And, in my judgment, he had said rarely, had he stopt here: but in his following Questions, he shews his deficiency even in this. For, he asks farther, whence the Soul comes? and how tis united to the Body? He is therefore most manifestly detected, to think that the Soul, lying hid in the Body, is of it self a certain substance, which may directly be made, come, and be joined to another thing: whence he terms it subsistence, which doubtless denotes a Thing and Substance. Now, that this is a most important error in Philosophy none can doubt, that's able to discern the opposition of One and Many. For, tis plain, that either [Page] a Man is not a Thing; or else that his Soul and Body are not two Things; if one thing cannot at once be many, nor many one. Nor am I scar'd with the distinction (which the Boys that gabble Philosophy have always ready in their Budget) of a perfect and imperfect thing: which saies just nothing, unless imperfect signifie to which somewhat is wanting to make it a thing; which suppos'd, an imperfect thing is not a thing, and the distinction vanishes. Otherwise, the same cannot be one thing and more things: Wherefore either a Man is not a Thing, but a Pair of Things consisting of an Intelligence and a Beast; or his Soul and Body are not two things.

2. When, therefore, he asks, Whence comes the Soul? it must be answered with a question, Whether he doubts whence the man comes? For, if whilst the man lives, there be but one only thing which is call'd the Man, 'tis he alone can have come; and he beats the wind that enquires whence the Soul comes? Nor am I shaken with the Authority of our Fore-fathers, though never so Reverend: I mean not of those who profess themselvs unable to grapple with the Question; for these deliver the Candle into the hands of Posterity, advising them to pursue on the same Race, that it may be seen whether any thing purer occur to them than to themselves, ready to Patronize whoever shall clear the Truth. But their opposition I resist, who clamor 'tis the Faith of all Churches that Rational Souls are fram'd by God. For, now I'm accustom'd to it, to distinguish [Page] between what's due to the sincerity of Faith, and what to Scholastical subtilty. If I attribute the Making of Man, as he's Intellectual, to the singular power and operation of God, I have submitted my self to the keys of the Churches Doctrine, and subscrib'd to the Tradition of the Saints. But, whether that action, which is the Generation of Man, consists of two actual parts, or be but one alone, by more notions equivalent to more really-distinct actions, is a purely speculative Question belonging to the Schools. And so it must be said that one Thing, a Man, equivalent to a Beast and an Intelligence, is brought into existence, by one action, equivalent to two, the Generation of an Animal and the Creation of an Intelligence.

3. By this truth we are led to the evident solution of the two following knots; the econd being how the Body and Soul are united? Which, 'tis plain, is herein faulty, that it supposes two things to be united existing either before the Compound, or not destroyd but ty'd together in it: which is clearly false, not only out of the 'fore-declared Truth, but also out the definition of a Part. For, Parts are call'd such, whereof, by a Motion, call'd Composition, one thing is made; or into which, what was one is resolv'd by Division, or destruction of the Unity. Now, Unity, not Union, is the form of what is One: And, in that which is One, to seek for the colligation or [Page] cement, is to seek by what the same is made the same. The same Error runs through the following Difficulty, which laments that 'tis unknown how the soul moves the Body: Which is utterly knock'd on the head, by denying the soul moves the Body. For, true it is, that one animated Member moves another; but not, that any substance, which is a pure soul, moves immediately any Member in which the soul is not. I appeal to other Animals, in which there's frankly denied to be a Soul independent of the Body: and I desire to have shewn me what motion there is in man, which is not in them. I confess freely, that one Member, the Brain especially, moves the rest after another manner in Man, than in other Animals; and this by reason of the difference in their Souls: but first it ought to be made evident by experiments, that a Humane Soul, without the help of the Body, or some Member acting together with it, moves another Member; before we are to enquire into the manner how this either is or can be done.

4. The last darkness which he bemoans in this Chapter lyes in our ignorance of that Motion, whereby the spirits are deriv'd out of the brain into the fit Nerves for the Animal's natural Action. And, if indeed the Objection brandish an Argument common to all Animals, I should soon quit the field: for I confess my self not so skilful in Anatomy, that I can lay before the eyes, why, from the Motion of Anger boyling [Page] in the heart, the spirits should start into those Muscles, by whose streining the Animal is carry'd towards its Adversaries; and, from the Motion of Fear, spirits flow into the opposite Muscles, by which the Animal flies fromwards them; whereas they, in a manner, add strength to and enforce both alike. Yet, I make no question at all but, by force of the Brain's Motion, caus'd by the motion of the heart, it comes to pass that the entrance into one sort of Channels are shut, others opn'd, and that thence comes this admirable and as-yet-not-sufficiently-seen-through direction of the spirits. But, the Authors seems to make Mans case proper to himself; alledging Will, and perhaps Election, to be, as it were, the first Author of this direction. Still, therefore, he slips into the same Error. For, first, he should demonstrate some act of the will, without some either precedent or concomitant Motion of the Heart, (which, when tis violent, we call Passion; when we endeavour at any thing, Desire or Flight, or some other such like we stile it): But, if there be no such, then the cause of this direction is purely Mechanical, as he calls it, and not any certain inexplicable power. Now, that there cannot possibly be any such exempt act of the will, 'tis clear enough to them who allow ther's no knowledge without a beat of Phansies: For, Phansies cannot chuse but both be stird themselves and stir others, by the usual ways of Nature. By Motions, therefore, deriv'd from the heart, whether in [Page] Man or in Animals, all Motions, whether Natural or Free, Universally are perform'd: and, by consequence, are subject to the contemplation and scrutiny of Philosophy and acurate Mechanicks.

5. The fourth Chapter objects that the Natures of Sensation and Memory are inexplicable. As to the former, first he acknowledges the substance of sensation is seated in the Brain alone: Then he inclines to Des Cartes's fantastical conjecture, shall I call it, or deviation from the manifest footsteps of Nature; about Motion's being brought down from the Heav'ns to our Eyes, through the continuedness of a very thin Ether: But, because he esteems Aristotle's conceits, too, not incredible, I may be excus'd from that speculation. At length, therefore, he falls again into the old Error, enquiring how corporeal things can have any force upon a naked Spirit? He supposes therefore, the Soul in the Body to be a kind of thing, not the form or affection of the thing, Man; and so, is upon the same false haunt again, nor needs repeating former discourses to beat him off it. But, left he should say nothing new, he objects that, by sense alone; there's no discerning the Quantities, Distances, Figures and Colours of things. I wonder, I must confess, at these Objections from a curious and ingenious Man; things so clearly explain'd & demonstrated in Opticks. Who is so ignorant, that he knows not that bigger things, at the same distance, strike the eye in a more [Page] obtuse Angle and stronglier? Who knows not that Figure, if plain, as objected to the eye, is nothing else but Quantity more spacious or contracted this or that way? but, if it be a solid one and participate of the third dimension, it borrows its variety from Distance. Again, that Distance is nothing else, but a certain Magnitude spread between the Eye and the Object; which if it be past judging of, neither can the Eye attest the distance. Lastly, that Colour is nothing else, but the confused figuration of a Superficies, according to its parts undistinguisht to sense. Whence it remains clear, that the Eye needs no other Geometry for all these, than what is necessary to judge of a magnitude from the variety of an Angle.

6. His next pains is about Memory. To shew the explication of that impossible, he commemorates and rejects four waies of resolving it. I must take another path than any of those. First, I must weaken this consequence, that If any thing about Memory has not hitherto been explicated, we must therefore make account it never will be, or that 'tis impossible to be explicated. We must be aware too, that alwaies some things will be unknown; either because their trivialness merits not the pains of learning them; or in that at length the bulk of things known will be grown so great, that more will be burthensome to the understanding. Now, to complain of such like is to have forgot human shortness. What, therefore, seems my task in this [Page] Queston is, to bring into play those things which are already establisht and evident about memory; and, for those that are unknown to make an estimate whether, some time or other, they too will come or merit to be known. First, then 'tis evident, we must distinguish what is Memory and what Remembrance. For, Memory is only a Conserving of the impressions made by the objects, whereby the Animal is rendred able to use them when he lists or needs. But, Remembrance is a certain Motion whereby that power of using the impressions is reduc'd into Act and Use. Concerning Memory, therefore, a reason is to be given both of its station or rest, and of the causes or manner of its Motion: and of both, if I be not mistaken, Nature and Experience offer evident footsteps, for tracing them.

7. In the first place, that all things that move the sense have certain minute particles of their body shorn off; as to the Touch, Tast and Smell, is too notorious to abide contest. He that denyes the same force to the Light, returning from the things to our Eyes, must deny, too, that the Sun extracts exhalations from the Earth and Sea: there being no other diversity in the operations, but that the one is greater and stronger, the other weaker and less. Now that these Atoms get up to the Brain, by the waftage of the Spirits, (that is, a certain liquid and most subtil substance) can scarce be denied by one never so pievish, that's but [Page] put in minde how Waters and Oyles are impregnated. These Atoms, therefore, must of necessity strike, not without some violence, upon that part of the Brain, whose being-struck causes perception. Again, that a stream or any thing liquid dasht against a resister should not leap back again is most clearly repugnant, both to experience and reason. And, that a substance any thing viscuous, in a viscuous vessel besides (such as those are about the brain) being repuls'd, should not stick to any thing solid is equally impossible: as also, that a notable part of that stream should not cling together, is against the Nature of gluyness. The Walls therefore, of the empty and hollow places of the Brain must of necessity be all hang'd and furnisht with little threads. Conclude we, then, that through all the senses, except Hearing, the Animal is enabled, by Atoms constantly sticking in it, to make use again of the Impressions made by Objects. In fine, since sound is made by a collision of the Air; 'tis evident by Anatomy, that it drives the Hammer of the Ear to beat upon the Anvil, by which beat 'tis not to be believ'd but certain particles must fly off and strike the Fancy: the orderly storing up▪ therefore, of these is apt to constitute the Memory of sounds. The structure, then, of Memory (if I am not mistaken) is rationally enough declared.

8. I cannot see why the like track may not carry us to the explaining of the Symptoms of Remembrance [Page] too; or why their Solution should be desparate. For, there's nothing clearer than that the fore-explicated motion of the Atoms is set on work by a wind, as it were. For, that Passion is a certain ebullition of Spirits reeking out of the heart, tis visible even to the eies, in Anger, and Love, and Bashfulness. If we make inquisition what effect these motions have on the Fancy, we experience, that those Objects occur to the mind, tumultuously and all on a heap, as it were, which solicite these Passions; so hastily and in a huddle, that they prevent mature weighing. It appears, therefore, that the Atoms, rouz'd from their places by such like vapours, fly about the cognoscitive part, in a kind of confused tumble. If then, there are certain winds and blasts, which we call Motions of the appetitive faculty: is it not plain, that the cavities of the Brain will be brusht, as it were, and the Images sticking to the wals be moved to the place destin'd for attaining their effect? And that these Atoms are carried neither meerly by chance, nor yet in a certain order, is evident by this; that, upon inquisition, the things we seek for do not suddenly and perfectly occur; which were a sign of election; and yet manifestly, such abundance of them suit to our purpose, that tis clear, they could not run thus without any industry at all. As, therefore, when we treated of directing the Spirits into the Nerves, we allowed the several Passions each their waies into certain parts of the Brain: so, here, tis also [Page] manifest, the same Passions have the places and series of some certain Atoms, in a manner more obvious to them, than others.

9. But our new admirer of Nature is perplext, how this multitude of Objects, swimming in the cavities of the Brain, should possibly be, without entangling and confounding one another: and by what Art they shift out of one anothers way, so as to be able to keep humane knowledge distinct. And here, I must confess, I had need crave the help of a Machine: for, really, we have no Candle, nor Spectacles enabling us to look into the subtile paths by which the Atoms avoid and slip by, to escape ruining one another by shocking. But, in exchange, I ask how many Sunbeams (which Philosophy now questions not to be Bodies) pierce streight to our eies, through the vast continuity of Air, and so many little Bodies flying up and down in it? There's no body, if we credit Experience and Reason, without its steams, and a sphere of vapours derived from it: How do these steams find free paths to run in and attain such wonderful effects? The Magnetical, Sympathetical, and smell-producing streams, have not their courses broken, or ends intercepted by one another. They that have not the confidence to deny these, why are they loath to allow the same may happen in the wide passages of the Brain? But you'l reply, that to multiply a difficulty is not to salve it; but to profess the rest of Nature inscrutable, [Page] when tis our task to clear this particular. Well then, thus I cut the very knot asunder: In currents of greater Atoms, where tis easier to make experiment, tis plain, that many are confounded, many lost; yet, out of the very nature of Multitude, that some are preserved entire, and those enough to serve Nature's turn. So it passes even in the Brain: whatever Object enters requires time for affecting the Sense; which, if it be too short, the Object is lost almost before it be perceiv'd; if long, it roots in the knowledge by the multiplicity of the images, and the frequent sight of the same Object does as much; nay, that knowledge often repeated, works the same effect, is evident beyond dispute. This being so, we must conclude, that such is the art of Nature as, for things to be remembred, there shall not want that abundance of images, which is necessary and sufficient to force their way through the Crowd of all others they meet.

10. 'Tis plain that, in this Answer, I have prefer'd the Digbaean Method before the rest: Because that, as neer as is possible, traces Nature step by step. I concern not my self in the rest; as studying Philosophy, out of a design to build, not destroy. Only, I'd remember the ingenious Author that he mis-imposes the third opinion (which relishes nothing of Philosophy) upon Aristotle (who taught the Digbaean way); deceiv'd by the counterfeit stilers of themselves Aristotelians, whereas they are nothingless. In this same Chapter, the Author seems sollicitous [Page] about the will's following the understanding: But, because, he disputes nothing on't, neither will I; only, hint that the will, as spiritual, signifies not any thing else, but the very understanding perfect, or ripe for action to follow out of it. That Mystery of whence comes ill, I deny not, has bin brought down, by the contests of the Ancients, even to our ears; nor question I but 'twill last as long as the bold and ignorant shall endure: But, as the Author mis-insinuates, I doubt not that St. Augustine himself has most clearly convinc'd it; nor can it any longer be troublesome to any, but those who either know not, or neglect his Doctrine.

Sixth Plea Displaies the Pastick vertue, Continuity, Adhesion of Parts, and the Mysteries of Rolling.

1▪ IN his fifth Chapter he falls upon the obscurity of the formation of natural Bodies, especeially living ones: Yet, not so smartly but that what he says may, with ease enough be repuls'd. I say, then, that there are two Methods, by which the formation of living Creatures may be rendred intelligible; without any farther difficulty than what may, without a Miracle, [Page] be refunded into the Wisdome of our Maker. Conceive the first, thus: Let's say the seed of a Plant or Animal conteins invisible parts of all the Animals Members: These, lets say, supply'd with moisture, encrease, with some slight Mutation, whereof the reason may be easily rendred (for example, that some parts dryer and harder, others are more throughly water'd and grow soft); and what great matter will be apprehended in the formation of living things? The other Method is, that, observing the progress in Chymicks, which must of necessity hold the very same in Nature if self, we'd see that things concocted with a Gentle fire result into three more remarkable parts: A kind of thin and, as it were, fiery one, though condensablein to the Species of Water; another Oily and answerable to Air; a third expressing the Nature of Salt and, as it were, hardned water; with all which ther's mingled and lyes at the bottom a fourth, that's dry and of an Earthy quality, however they call it. The same we ought to expect from Nature; since the acting of Heat upon Moisture is the End of both Fornaces. This laid for a ground, suppose, in a proper vessel, a Drop of prepared Liquor, so kept warm and preserv'd that it may be encreas'd, too; is it not plain that, by the very action, some parts will become dryer, others more subtil and liquid? And that the dryer will grow into different figures? Especially into certain hollow Vessels; if, by the beats of the boyling [Page] moisture, they be extended and thrust out in length? And that all of them will cling together, where they begin first to divide? And see you not now the figure of the Animal and its respectively homogeneous parts form'd? And that their connexion and variety, and its other heterogeneous parts follow the variety of either the Fire or Liquor.

2. He that shall comprehend these things well, will not lament that the Plastick vertue is an empty name and a word without a thing. But, if he be ingenious and conveniently at leisure, he'l either, in spring time close-observe the breeding Plants in Gardens or the Fields; or at home pluck up Seeds buried in Pots, just while they are taking life; and daily rake into the bowels of Berries and Seeds: and I dare promise him so manifestly connected steps of advance, that, after many experiments, he shall fore-tel, meerly out of what he sees the day before, what will be the next days issue. Those things which appear wonderful confusedly in the whole, taken asunder discover and fairly offer themselves to view. If one observe the spreading of figures or Colours, he shall find the principles of these founded in the nature of Juice; the reasons of those chalk'd out by some manner of their production: for both Fruits and even slips are, by art, variable into any kind of forms. Much more the figures of different salts or concret Juices spring, not from any intrinsecal nature, but [Page] from their usual generation and the diffidulty or facilness of their place and Motions. Nor let any be scar'd by the talk of Artists, that admire and amplifie those things whose causes they understand not: or of our Authour, amaz'd at the constancy of natural operations; why our Hens should never be colour'd like Peacocks-tails or Parrats. For, in different Regions, great varieties spring from the diversity of Food and Air: And, for what is out of our reach about these things, we must be beholden to time.

3. In the same Chapter he raises two other Questions, which he thinks absolutely inexplicable: to me, on the other side, they seem to have scarce any difficulty in them. The later in Him is concerning the Composition of Bulk or Continuum: A question both debated by the Antients and desperate to the Modern's. The former, though the later in Nature, is concerning the sticking together of parts, or, why one Body is more divisible, another less. The former question supposes another, whether there be parts actually in a Continuum, whereof the affirmative side, though they wrangle in words, yet is commonly taken by the Modern's, as it were a self-or-sensibly-known truth; but, by the whole School of the antient Peripateticks and that of the Thomists following them, hist out, as demonstratively convicted. The issue of the matter is that, about the Composition of Bulk, the Moderns, after a world of laborious trifling, confess Philosophy at a stand: The [Page] Peripateticks deride them as groping in the dark. For, if there be no parts til they are made by division; they are manifestly out of their wits that seek how those should be united which are-not at all? The arguments of those that assert actual parts cite even sense; concerning which ther's nothing certainer than that it cannot discern any part in a Bulk; since the term of each part is invisible, whereas sence requires a notable quantity to judge of. Their other Arguments commonly assume our manner of speaking, and end in Logical trifles, how we ought to speak, not what the thing it self has really in it. Now, this no-very-difficult contest being decided, all the controversie concerning the composition of Bulk is over.

4. About the other question there's even as wise work. The followers of Democritus strive to resolve it into hooks and corner'd hold-fasts: Not seeing, that nothing can be imagin'd so one, or an Atom, as that it self is not compos'd of many parts, concerning which it must be ask'd how they come to stick so fast together? But, this difficulty they, at least, slip over, asserting that these in minutest Bodies, by force of Nature, resist whatever divisive power, not so the Compounds of them: That is, the greatest and invincible coherence of parts they carelesly ascribe to the force and quality of Nature, and are narrowly inquisitive about a less. The first resolution, therefore, 'tis plain, is refunded into Nature it self, and the division of Body [Page] or Bulk into Rare and Dense, or having More and Less of Quantity in equality of Bulk. Which Differences most Demonstrably dividing the Notion of Quantitative and constituting more Species of it in things; there remains no greater Difficulty in the Adhesion of the parts of the same Continuum, than whether there be any such thing or not: For, if there be any, by its very being a Continuum, of necessicity it must be whereof parts may be made, not wherein parts are; else (as we have press'd above) the same thing would be one and many, divided and not-divided, in the same Notion. Therefore 'tis that substance, from its very Quantity, whence it has its refolvableness into parts, has also its easier or harder resolvableness, which they call its parts more or less sticking to one another. But, as soon as ever the speculation is strein'd up to Intellectual Notions, these Naturalists's stomack turns: as if Philosophy enjoyn'd us not to know our own thoughts, and made it unlawful to understand what we speak.

5. His Sixth Chapter is all dedicated to the Motion of Wheels; nor, if we believe an Author that wants for no wit, is it any ways solvable. But, before he attaques that fatal Difficulty, he objects a certain previous one to us, which the Antients object to Aristotle; but he, I confess, in a clearer form. For, he considers a Wheel mov'd about its Center, and plainly concludes that no part of it moves; but the whole is mov'd, and the several parts together change place. [Page] But, what inconvenience this conclusion drags along with it, I am utterly ignorant: For, though he strives to reduce at large, that one part first quits the place before another is in it; yet evidently the words, not the thing, breeds all the contest: For, what hinders that, altogether and at-once, both the quitter should first not-be and the succeeder first be in the same place? Another solution might be given, did the Argument exact it: But, as I said, the quarrel is about the words and manner of speaking, not the thing. The Author subjoyns a second difficulty, how, in a Wheel turn'd about, the parts nearer the Center, in the same time, come to run over so little a space; whereas they are connected with the remoter, which fetch so large a Compass? And, after he has acknowledged it to arise from hence, because they are not carry'd alike swiftly; he infers that, if the swiftness of the Motions be unequal, the straight line drawn from the Center to the Circumference must be crook'd: Whereas 'tis most evident, the right line would be crook'd, if the nearer and distanter parts from the Center were carry'd with equal velocity.

6. At length the Author loftily enters upon his boasted experiment, professing before hand, hee'l stop the mouth of the boldest obstinancy. Thus he proposes it. Let one Axle-tree have three Wheels on it, one at each end, both alike, and a third in the Middle far less. Let the bigger rest upon the floor, the lesse [...] [Page] upon some table. Let them all be drawn in a progressive Motion, till, having fetch'd a full compass, they mark the floor and the table with the very same points, in which, at first, they rested on them. The three scor'd lines will be found equal; whereas the middle one is scor'd out by the contact of a Circle far less than the other two, yet 'tis as long as them: Which, with no likely-hood, can be deny'd impossible; since, 'tis clear, things that touch, as far as they do so, are, necessarily equal. This is the knot; this the evident repugnancy. But, alas! let's observe that Motion is call'd in to help tye the knot the harder; and that the motion is of two kinds, a Right and a Circular, compounding a third progressive motion of the Wheel. Observe we farther, that the Right (or streight) Motion of the three Wheels is equal; and that the Circular Motion of the great Wheels is equal to the Right Motion; but the Circular motion of the Middle little Wheel is less than the Right Motion: And, which follows, that the greater Wheels are mov'd with the same celerity according to both motions; but the lesser is mov'd stronglyer in the Right, than in the Circular. Now, the compounded Motion is not that which is scor'd upon the floor or table, which, 'tis clear, is a simple and purely Right one; but a certain crooked Motion in the Air, making, with the scored Motion, a certain Area (whose quantity, Torricellus has demonstrated): as is manifest beyond dispute [Page] to whoever but takes any one point of the Circle or Wheel; and withall, that the progressive Motion of the bigger Wheels is greater than that of the lesser Wheel. These things thus explicated, there appears nothing in this objection more intricate, than in this simple Proposition, that of two bodies, which are carryed according to one line with equal velocity, one may, at the same time, be carried swiftlyer than the other, according to another line: which is so evident, that any one, that's a Mathematician, cannot doubt of it.

7. Yet still Galilaeus presses closer that, in the circumvolution, the several points of the lesser Circle or Wheel are just fitted, in an immediate succession, to the several points of the space in which 'tis carried: And, therefore, that it cannot be understood how the Right can be longer than the Crooked. But, that which deceived Galilaeus was his not having discussed Aristotle himself, but bin overcredulous to his Modern Interpreters, or rather Corrupters. For, Aristotle has taught us that a Moveable, in actual Motion, alwaies possesses a bigger (and not-equal) place to it self; which is most evident: For, since no part of Motion can be but in Time; and, in every part of time, the thing moved quits some place and gets some new; 'tis plain, there cannot be found any so little motion, wherein the Body moved, has not possessed both the place in which it had rested, and some part of a New one. [Page] This supposed, though the Moveable were conceived indivisible; yet certain it would be that, in whatever determinate part of time, or by however little a part of Motion, it would score out not a space equal to it self, but some line; and, in the conditions of our present dispute every point of the lesser Wheel will draw a line proportionate to a part of the Circle of the greater Wheel. And, since really there are no either instants in Time, or indivisibles in Motion, or Points in a Circular Line: 'Tis evident, this Argument has no force; but in vertue of that false apprehension which we have convinced in the 'fore-alledged defence of Geometry.

Seventh Plea Inquires after the Causes of our Modern Shortness in Science.

1. IN some of the following Chapters he, exquisitely enough, searches into the Causes of Errors and human Ignorance: Yet, me-thinks, I could suggest two which he has over-slipt. One is the Laziness or rather Vanity of this Age: For, whoever has got himself but talk enough to weave a learned story amongst the ignorant or half-learned, such as understandings unaccostomed to Sciences are apt to be dazled with: partly out of irksomness to pursue harder things, [Page] partly out of confidence of his own wit, he slights descending into those Mines whence our Ancestors have dig'd out Science; and to take those pains himself which alone Wisdom regards and follows. Let this Author be my witness; who, about the end of his former Chapter, complains of the Obscurity of our Speculations concerning Motion, Gravity, Light, Colours, Sight, Sound; all which the Digbaean Philosophy makes as clear as day: Whence also (though there they are more copiously and clearly explicated) we have borrowed our Discourses of the Load-Stone, the derivation of the Spirits into the Members, the Memory and Remembrance, the Formation of living Creatures, and whatever almost we have alledged for solving the proposed Difficulties: the very dictates of Nature leading us the way. Such like Philosophers, therefore, read the eminent and highly elaborate Works of others, as if they were Romances invented for pleasure, or as Spectators behold a Comedy: what on the sudden takes them they commend; if any thing more knotty than ordinary occurs, they either out of laziness let it pass unregarded, or break some bitter jest on't.

2. Another cause of Ignorance, wav'd by our Author, appears to me to be a certain special Error in the nature of Demonstration. For, they feign to themselvs a certain Idea of Demonstration, which should not only have this force on the Vnderstanding, to render the Truth [Page] propos'd evident; but, so, besides, that no objection can with any likelihood be oppos'd against it. Which is as much as if they should require this Demonstration to clear whatever follows out of, or any way relates to it; or, that one Demonstration should be a kind of entire Science. For, otherwise, how is it possible but opposition may be rais'd against this, out of things not-yet seen-through and conjoin'd with this Truth? An Understanding then, adapted to Sciences, out of very Principles and what it already knows, is secure of a deduced Truth: nor fears any thing can be infer'd opposite to the Truth it knows; whatever pains it may cost to get out of streights. For, it knows, that those things are certain, which the Vnderstanding, out of a steddy sight that a Thing is a Thing, or that the same is the same, has fixt to and in it self: and patiently waits till the distinction between the entanglements shew it self, and the confusion vanish.

3. In that these Contemners of Sciences endeavour not at fixing any thing in themselves by a severe contemplation of Truth: as soon as any Truth pretends but to evidence, as if they were incapable of owning it, they quit their station, and betake themselves to enquiring whether any one has oppos'd that same: and if they find Impugners, they assume it for most evident, that such a Truth is not evident. For, say they, were it evident, 'twould be so to all; 'twould convince every understanding. But, they may just as well say, [Page] the Sun is not visible, because tis not seen by them who turn their backs on't, or keep their eies shut. For, as in corporeal sight, some corporeal motion is necessary, by which the Ball of the Eye may be set against the Object: no less to see and fix in the mind this very evidence, that the same cannot be and not-be at once, a certain Application, and as it were, opening of the mind is required; even to conceive and give birth to the very evidentest evidence. And, for want of this, so many of the Ancients and Moderns have not own'd, but corrupted, the evidence of that very first and most notorious Principle. Whence they can never attain that Scientifical Method which shines so clear in Arithmetick and Geometry, but are wholly entangled in Logical and Equivocal trifles; and fill babbling Volumes with fopperies. Let these lusty Compilers of Tomes shew the world but one leaf, or one page deduc'd, or, at least, attempted in a Geometrical Method; and then, let them complain there's no Science, or that it lies hid in an unfathomable Well: now the sordid Sluggards, only mettlesome at repaoaches, conceit a Lion in the way, and stir not a foot, so much as to behold the very way.

Eighth Plea Wards off from Aristotle the Calumny of special Impiety.

[Page]

1. ANd now I seem at an end of the Task set me: did not the same persons strein, as enviously as possible, to defame Aristotle, with all manner of Contumelies; that the ignominy of that one man may make way for them to tear Science it self out of the hands of the Learned, and throw it into the dirt of Probability. For, he alone, of all the Ancients, has left any Monument of Demonstration in Metaphysicks and Physicks. The Academicks, where they leave the Peripateticks, were Orators, not Philosophers. For, Socrates himself was meerly a Disputer and a Doubter. Plato and Aristotle divided his School. Plato propos'd to himself, with his wholy-divine Wit and purest Eloquence, to set out Probability, and make himself admir'd for speaking specious things concerning the Principles necessary to Human life. Aristotle very concisely hunting after truth by Experiments, and Marrying with the inspection of Nature, the power of deducing Consequences, design'd to shew the world Science in Physicks and Metaphysicks worthy to vye with Geometry: And, therefore, as long as a Popular form of Common-wealth [Page] nourisht the power of Orators, He was less esteem'd. For, those Famous persons affected to manage Science after the manner of Civil Causes, without a solid and firm Judgment. The Orators at length, wearing out of credit, the Authority of Aristotle grew stronger; and has been deriv'd from the Romans to the Arabians; from them, to our Schools: the Italians first (to our knowledge) re-calling into the West, the Science of the Arabians, which the wars long since had chas'd away.

2. 'Tis highly unjust, and a sign of a Cavilling spirit, to pry into his Life, whose Doctine you go about to impugn: For, these Oratorial preventions of the Reader argue the Writer has no mind a candid Judgment should be given of the Truth; but lyes in wait to distort Justice by stirring the Affections. Wherefore, hissing out those things which are tattled against Aristotles manners, let's trace what's objected against his Doctrine. Peter Gassendus, then, in his Third Exercitation, objects it as certain, that 'tis Aristotles Opinion, in his Book of Metaphysicks, that God is an Animal: Whereas, on the contrary, in the 8. Book of his Physicks, Chap. 6 and 10. He so expresly makes God a substance immaterial, indivisible, immoveable either by himself or by accident; that impudence it self cannot be able to deny God, in his Opinion, not-an Animal. He adds, that God is ty'd to the out-most Superficies of the highest Heaven, which [Page] is extream-heedlesly said in the Peripatetical Way: Whether you construe without Heaven, in imaginary spaces (whereas Aristotle most expresly attests there are no such); or an Indivisible adherent to Heaven; whereas, both the First Mover must necessarily be said to be in that which is first Moveable or Moved; and, tis well known, that, in Aristotle's way, the Superficies is mov'd only through the Motion of the Body whose it is; as also, the Superficies (as we have said above) is a certain being divided, or term, or no-farther of a Body, and not any Entity in which God may be placed.

3. The next accusation argues God bound up to the Laws of Fate and Necessity. But, here, the Calumniator is clearly in an Error. For, there are two kinds of Fate; one a Stoical; their's who assert that whatever things are, exist in force of Contradiction, since, of necessity, every thing must either be or not-be; and this Fate Aristotle rejects: The other Fate is a Course of Causes. Since, therefore, 'tis evident and agreed by all, in the Peripatetical way, that God is the First-Being, and by consequence, the Cause of the whole Series of the rest; most clear it is that, in Aristotle's School, He is not Subject to Fate, but himself the Fate of all other things; which is the most wise Tenet of the Saints, and the marrow of Christian Doctrine. Like this is the other, that He is Subject to Necessity. For, the term, Necessity, is ambiguous: For, as tis attributed [Page] to Animals contradistinctly from Liberty, so it takes away perfect knowledge; which no Peripatetick ever deny'd to God, to whom Aristotles Doctrine forces the very top of knowledge to be attributed. There's another Necessity springing from prefect knowledge; to which nothing lying undiscovered, one perfect in knowledge, and, consequently, God, can take but one way. But, this necessity implying the determination of an Understander to Particulars, out of Common Principles, manifestly speaks Election or liberty actuated.

4. He is farther calumniated to have taught that God knows not despicable and petty things; and, the 12. of his Metaphysicks is cited, where this is not found but by way of doubting: But, his best Interpreters conclude, out of other Texts, that Aristotle attributes the knowledge even of these too, to God. This crimination, therefore, argues an ill will, drawing the words of that excellent person to the worst sense. Yet, at least, He makes the World increated. But this may easily be deny'd. He asserted it, indeed, not-generated, or, impossible to have begun by Motion and the force of Natural Causes; which is most consonant to Christian Faith: But, as to the Creation of the World, he has not a word on't: Yet, 'tis one thing not to have acknowledg'd it, or reacht so high; another, to deny; amongst modest Men that babble not incertainties. Yet, I confess, he thought the World it self [Page] Eternal: But, in his very Error, he shewed himself the chief of Heathen Philosophers. For, whereas, they all with one consent declared, that nothing is made of nothing, 'twas inconsequent for the World to have begun by Motion, which could not exist without Time; and no begining of Time, either out of its own essence, or by the action of moving Causes, could appear. Tis plain, therefore, that this Error of Aristotle's argues his excellency above the rest, who by Chance, and not by Science light on the Truth.

5. The last calumny about his Tenets concerns the Immortality of the Soul, which Gassendus saies, Aristotle in many places denies: but as disfavourably as before; since, his best Interpreters attest that he acknowledged it; and Plutarch records him to have written concerning the Soul, upon Eudemus's death; out of whom is cited that famous Story of a dead man's Soul begging revenge of his Friend. Whence is evidenc'd that those Interpreters err, who, out of Aristotle's Principles, endeavour to conclude the Soul not immortal, and that this was Aristotle's own sence. It hits strangely in fine, that the Author, otherwise very ingenious, should judge this a fit Objection, that Aristotle denyed the Resurrection of the dead: which, tis most certain, the light of Faith first discover'd to Mortals; though, after its acceptation on that account, its conformity also to the progress of Nature might be discern'd. This farther, that he concludes, saying, that Aristotle speaks [Page] many things wholly disagreeable to our H. Orthodox Faith: as if Plato and the rest of the Philosophers had tendred the World none but Tenets agreeable to Faith: which is by so much an unworthier part of Gassendus, in that he himself in his Preface, promises he'l shew that, tis by Faith alone, any thing comes to our knowledge of God and the Intelligences; and that all Arguments about these things, drawn from the light of Nature, are vain. A worthy Epiphonema, indeed, to close up his Sixth Book, design'd against Metaphysick, or the supreme Science.

Ninth Plea Wipes off the Aspersions on Aristotle's Doctrine and Terms.

1. I Must now return from Gassendus to the Author of The Vanity of Dogmatizing; since he has selected the strongest Mediums: justly preferring them before that numerable rabble which Gassendus has heap'd together, even to cloying; out of love to reproaching, rather than Science. Our English Academick, then, first by way of Preface, as it were, seems to decline that envy, which the honourable train of Aristotle's Followers would be apt to procure him; applying that sentence of Seneca's, The Multitude is an [Page]Argument of the worst: so prone we are to err, even in the plainest things. For, tis evident, the Vulgar, in some things, follow men of excellence, as it were, their Captains; in other things are govern'd, or rather hurried by their own judgment. The former Method is that of Nature it self, that many Ignorants may, by the vertue and Authority of a few, be carried to good: But, that the Vulgar should judge of things themselvs know not, and by a tumultuary consent, precipitate the counsels of the prudent; this is opposite to the Laws of Nature and Reason. Here now enquire whence Aristotle has got an Authority with the Vulgar? and twill clearly appear he has been made the Coripheus of Philosophers by the sway of the very Princes of Scholastical Theology: to whom if you compare the Judgments of Orators or Criticks, they'l dwindle away to nothing. The Fathers themselves (those great Persons pardon me if I say so) are of another different Trade; nor have fallen upon any Philosophical Explication of Faith, otherwise than as forc'd to it by the importunity of Hereticks.

2. The Author subjoins, that in the opinion of the wise, Peripeteticism is a mass of Terms that signifie nothing. But this Author knew not that his own Terms are so equivocal, that themselves speak nothing. For, who has sufficiently fifted this, who, or by whose judgment they are called wise, that have pronounced this of the Peripateticks? If we consult Aristotles [Page] Works themselves, or his ancient Emulators, tis clearer than the Sun, none ever of the Philosophers so industriously, and by distributing so many of his Terms into obvious sences, took care for the clearness of his Dictates, and eluded the entanglement of Equivocations. Tis manifest then, the Wise men had little skill in Aristotle. They have mistaken, therefore, for Aristotelians some Apes cloaking themselves with Aristotle's name, and expose other mens Tenets for Peripatetical ones: and (which he seems not to know) in very truth Pyrronians. For, whoever, in mighty Volumes and Questions piled one on another, teaches nothing else, but, that one part, indeed, is more likely, but either side is defensible; in such a World of twattle saies no more, than had he pass'd sentence in one Word, that Nothing is clear. This Calumny, therefore, touches his own Friends, not Aristotle.

3. Then, he prosecutes his Plea against the Peripateticks by certain Doubts; which either are not, or seem not, clear to him, in spight of Reason. The notion of Materia prima, which asserts it to have neither Quiddity, nor Quantity, nor Quality, he contests is a Description of Nothing. 'Strange, that Men be so humorsome! Are there, perhaps, in all Nature more usual words than Being and Power? Who is so sottish, that he speaks not thus of a piece of Brass or Marble assign'd for the purpose, that it is not-yet, [Page] but may or will be a Statue of Mercury? Do they not, peradventure, understand themselves that speak thus; or, when they say, it may be, or has an aptitude to be a Mercury, Do they say the Brass or Marble is Nothing, or, is nothing of Mercury? How, then, besides Mercury, or the Form of Mercury, is there not a certain power or aptitude to be Mercury, which neither is Mercury actually, nor yet a notion of No-thing or No-thing? Or if, in respect of the Figure which constitutes Mercury, there is some aptitude which neither is that, nor yet a Notion of Nothing; why may we not affirm the same of a Quantum or Bulk, and say, a Boy is not yet big, but may be big? For he that asserts this does he not, at the same time, deny Bigness; and yet clearly he names an Aptitude to Bigness? Nor, perhaps, is there any difference in respect to Entity; for we scruple not to say that Tallow or Oile may be Flame, and yet that they are not yet Flame: the Tallow, therefore, or Oil neither are the thing, Flame, which they may be, nor so big as they will be when they are Flame, nor so hot; and yet they may be Flame, they may be greater, they may be hotter: and there is in them a certain power, which neither has Quiddity, Quantity, nor Quality; since they are refer'd to all these, and are in a present state of privation in respect to them. Now whoever professes this unintelligible, directly condemns Mankind for a company of Fools, that know not what they say in their vulgarest speech [Page] and commerces: And, he that denies Matter it self destroys that solemn Maxim of Philosophy, that Nature makes nothing of nothing.

4. There are two other Terms which trouble our Sceptick, Form and being educ'd out of the power of Matter. As for the first, 'tis strangely odd, that too much speculation should so render ingenious men no better than the most stupid. Can any man be born such a Bruit, as not to own that one thing is distinct from another? or, if it be distinct, can he assert tis distinguish'd by nothing? Does the difficulty lie here, that this, by which tis distinguish'd should be called a Form? what a strange unreasonableness is this, not to let me call that a Form, which I see distinguish one from the other? May not I say of two brazen Statues, that they agree in Brass, and are distinguisht by their Figures? Or, if there be a third of Marble, shall I be chid for saying, the brazen ones are distinguisht from the Marble one, in that this is of Stone, those other of Mettal? As, therefore, before, I distinguisht power and being in substance, Quantity, and Quality; I may, now, in the same, find grounds for the denominations of Form and Subject in each of them.

5. As to the later Term, being educ'd out of power, let the ingenious Man reflect whether that which, out of some dark hole, softly and by degrees comes forth n [...]o open view, is improperly said to be educ'd or [Page]brought out. Again, let him remember (if he have ever seen a peece of Marble form'd by a Statuary) how, at first it cannot be imagin'd what the Artist means to form: after a little pains, there appears a confus'd resemblance of a Humane Creature; then, whether it be a Man or Woman; and at length, what Man it is. Behold, how a man, which was potentially in the Marble, and confused in the dark, as it were, is by little and little educ'd by Art out of that confusion into clear light, and the Marble is palpable and expresly made a Caesar. Philosophers consider as much in Nature; whether you observe the seeds of living things, or the Community of the Elements to be mixt into a compound, or the abstraction of Matter from the Elements, whence this Phrase to be educ'd out of the power of Matter signifies Matter out of its aptitude to many, to be determin'd, by the operation of Nature or Art to one certain thing; through a motion from confusion to distinctness: and not to be, as it were, infus'd, with a dependance from the subject, as this Anti-Peripatetick fancies out of I know not what Dreamers. For, there are none of these triflles extant in Aristotle.

Tenth Plea Maintains certain Definitions and Arguings.

1. NExt they shoot at two of Aristotle's Definitions, either of them most exact, and as clear [Page] as can be, to those that understand any thing in his way. The first is the Definition of Light, in these words, Light is the act of a prespicuous thing: which seems obscure to this race of people, because the use of the Word Act is fram'd by Philosophers, and not taken from Tully, or found in Calipine. Let them know, therefore, that Act is deriv'd from Agere, to do, or Agi, to be done, or the Participle Actum, done; and us'd by Philosophers for that, by which what was intended by the Agent at the end of his Action is term'd or demonstrated donc. In Greek, perhaps, 'tis more elegantly call'd [...], as it were, the Operation of the Causes, taking the Operation, not for the Flux of the Action, but, for that which remains introduced by the Operation, which is such a Flux. But, because our language affords not a proper word correspondent to the term, Act; our Sterling Philosopher is all in choller against Aristotle. For, if he had put but ordinary words, instead of terms of Art, saying, Light is a certain perfection of a body, that has this in its Nature, to let coloured things appear through it, making them de facto appear through it; as we experience Objects are seen through illuminated Air, which are not seen through it darkened: what had he found worth making such a wide mouth over? Now because he has spoken most neatly and briefly, poor Aristotle smarts for it.

2. The other Definition has the same fault. The [Page] Definition is this, Motion is the Act of a thing in power, as in power. For, since a thing is said to be in power, to that it may be brought to by Motion; for example; One that's sick, to Health; Wood, to firing, or to be fire: tis plain, that Motion is that perfection, or act with which the subject is affected whilst 'tis yet in power, or, till the sick person be in health, or the Wood be fire; as in power, or in that state by which it may attain the intended perfection. Behold here a most clear and learned Definition, and subject to no other reproach than a certain umbrage, from a ridiculous story concerning the Greek term [...], which I believe fram'd by the Philosopher to express his intention emphatically. The story's this; That a Critick, I know not who, went to one Ciccus, esteem'd a Magician (I imagine, because he wrote of Magick) to enquire of the Devil what was the meaning of that word [...] in Aristotle; and return'd as wise as he went, and mock'd at by the Oracle. That it may appear then what a Dunce Devil our Philosophers have consulted; lte them take notice that [...] is a word made up of three, [...], with the addition of a foeminine termination, which is proper for signifying Abstractions: and so signifies the Manner the subject of Motion is found in at the end of the action; which is the very same thing with the term Act, as tis explicated above.

3. In his seventeenth Chapter there is a new Calumny forg'd against Aristotle; the more unworthily, in that [Page] he; above the rest, has endeavour'd at clearness. His Philosophy is accus'd to be litigious, and through the wavering use of his Terms, confused and obscure. This accusation is found guilty of a double Ignorance: One, of what Aristotle's use is; for he's the carefullest that ever writ, to distinguish and form the significations of his Terms: The other is, that he takes Scepticks for Peripateticks. And, that the Scepticks endeavours are the vainest that can be, I easily grant; that they little trouble themselves about fixing the use of their words, to be left more at liberty to sell any trifles they list for Vanity or profits sake; that they are petty Orators, or rather janglers, not Philosophers; that they take upon them the name of Aristotelians, to corrupt Youth and draw Disciples after them. I deny not that these are to be shun'd like the Plaigue, by all pursuers of Science; nor is any thing of sollidity to be expected from them: this one thing puts me out of patience, that Persons, otherwise ingenious and desirous of knowledge, should be averted by these Cheats, not only from true Science, but from all hope of ever gaining any, in the things most necessary to human life.

4. They back their feigned Plea against the Philosopher out of his own Words and Actions. Their first crack is upon that saying of his, that his Books of Physicks were so publisht, that they were not made publick. The sense whereof was, that the Matter or Subject [Page] handled in them is so abstracted, that, without the assistance of an experienc'd Master, they could not be understood by those unus'd to his way; which we see hold to this day: For, scarce any one comprehends those Books, unless aided by the old Commentators. Whence our Moderns, for the most part, are quite besides the Cushion as to Aristotles meaning; though he himself has spoken, as clearly as possible the brevity He prefixt to himself could bear. The next Calumny is grosser and more luckless; that those things which he has collected, to furnish Logical Disputants, and perfect the Act of Disputing previously to giving Judgment, should be applyed to his Method of Demonstrating, and to his practice not in disputing but defining. For, as, in Plays, 'tis a commendation to entangle the story, that it may come off at last with greater admiration: So, 'tis the task of the Inquirer to confound the Question, with proposing Difficulties before it, that the Demonstrator may clearly Vnidicate it, and, as it were, dispelling the clouds, restore it to Light.

5. This Plea requir'd Instances out of that work of his. The Author presses three: Upon Gassendus's credit, I believe, or some other slight Lookers into it; for, in the Book it self there's nothing to be seen: The first runs thus. He proves the World to be perfect, because it consists of Bodies; that Bodies are perfect, because they consist of a triple dimension; [Page] that a triple dimensions is, therefore, perfect, because consisting of three; and that three is perfect, because two we call both, and never say all till we come to three. Look into his First book De Coelo, Chap. 1. You shall find these last words make no part of the Demonstration, but are additional only: and that the Demonstration, it self is this; Because the World consists of Bodies, the perfection of the World is to be perfect in the Notion of Body. Now, the perfection of Body lies in this, that it be spread every way upon three prependiculars, as the Geometricians demonstrate. And thus are both the several Bodies, and the World; but in a divers manner; For the several Bodies are terminated each to others; whence, though they are spread according to all the lines, yet not to the whole, or utmost extent of them. But, because there is no space beyond or without the World (as 'tis demonstrated in the fourth of his Physicks), the World is spread according to all and the whole lines, or, perfectly every way; and by consequence, must be said perfect in the Notion of Body, and, so, absolutely.

6. The second Instance is, that Aristotle asserts, were there more Worlds, the Moon would fall down upon the Earth. This consequence the Arguer thinks sprung from such a fancy as theirs, that fear the Antipodes should drop into Heaven. But, he reflects not how great pains the Philosopher took to establish [Page] the Center of the World in the Earth: Which granted, this consequence would depend not from fancy but reason, as himself seems to confess.

7. The third Instance, too (drawn out of lib. 2. cap. 5. De Coelo. Is utterly perverted. For, Aristotle teaches not, that the Heav'ns are, therefore, carry'd towards the West, because the West is the Nobler, (as the Argument makes it); but, that the West is the Nobler, because the Heav'ns are carry'd towards it. Now, there's this difference betwixt the two; that in the former Method, 'tis assum'd without proof, that the West is the Nobler; in the later, it follows out of those things which Aristotle had concluded; viz. That there's nothing Accidental in Eternal Things; and, by consequence, that the Motion towards the West is Natural to the Heav'ns; and Natural Motion is to the more honourable: whence it clearly follows, that the West is Nobler than the East. It follows, I say; for, if the Principles were true, 'twere a Noble Demonstration.

Eleventh Plea Refutes some Topicks babbled against Science.

1. ABout the end of the Chapter he expresses indignation, that the learned so employ all their pains upon Logick, Physick, and Metaphysick; that the Sciences, usefuller to human life, viz. concerning the [Page] Heav'ns, Meteors, Fossils, and Animals, but especially Politicks and Oeconomicks, are much neglected. Nor can I deny that these are neglected in the Schools: but, what's guilty on't, but the Scepticism that reigns there? For, if the Sciences were taught in Aristotle's Method, there would be room enough for all; nor would nature be taunted with the usual calumny, that Mans life is too short for the Arts: But, the necessary ones once known, there would advance still a surplusage of leisure, to take abundantly, in any of these Sciences, that delight which human Curiosity should be drawn to. But, they are the Scepticks that envy this happiness to men; confounding all things with endless contests; especially those common truths which Aristotle has demonstrated: such as are Formal Divisibility, that what ever is mov'd is mov'd by another, that a Continuum or Bulk is divisible in infinitum, that there's no vacuum: and such like; without the owning whereof before hand, 'tis in vain to make Experiments for acquiring Science: Since, they will all come at length to be resolv'd into these Principles; or else there will be ever a straining after Science unproffitably, without any Principles at all.

2. In his eighteenth Chapter, he reproves the Peripatetical Doctrine as insufficient to solve Phaenomena's. But, this he does out of Error or Spleen: For, if he takes the Doctrine of our Modern Philosophical Apes to be Aristotle's own, he's strangely in an error; but, if he denyes Aristotle to have taken pains to solve Problem's, [Page] he'l be shewn guilty of Injustice by all his Books of Natural Philosophy, those especially which usually follow his eight Books. Which of the Moderns has more happily unbowel'd Nature than Digby, who at every turn is mindful of Aristotle, and candidly accepts his Dictates? The Adversary urges that the Systeme of Heaven is mis-contriv'd by Aristotle. Open the accusation, you'l find the sum and very knot of it to be, that Aristotle had not an Optick Table: else supposing those Phaenomenas of the Sun, which enlightened Aristotle's Age, his Discourse, in his Books De Coelo, merits all admiration. That the Intelligences are the Movers of the Heav'n is Christian Doctrine. That there is a certain Fire swimming upon our Air is nothing else but des Cartes's Ether, or a kind of rarer Element enbracing the convex of our sky. If Aristotle has err'd in a very few things; why, yet, so much anger? shall we not allow Philosophy its growing time? If, yet, he may be said to Err, and not rather ingeniously, and ingeniously to propose, who professes he conjectures, not Demonstrates; as Aristotle does in his Books De Coelo.

3. His ninteenth Chapter inveighs against Aristotle's Doctrine as unfruitful and barren; but, weakly and falsely. Weakly, because all the inventions he speaks of belong to Artificers and Handy-craft-Men; not Philosophers, whose office 'tis to make use of Experiments for Science, not to make them. Falsly, because [Page] Aristotle's way of Doctrine being about Common Notions, without which there's no comprehending Particulars; nothing is truly invented without it. I, but they are Generals that are found in Aristotle. It must be reply'd, that he and his Disciples deserve thanks for devulging them, and fixing a step to climb thence farther and higher. But, (if my Divination fails me not) I see, were Aristotle's Principles pluck'd up, Philosophy unable to give an Account of ordinary Effects. I'm sure, the Philosophy which admits Vacuities is reducible to no Rules for acting: And des Cartes's Vortices, I shrewdly suspect no way serviceable to invention. Concerning his Tenets, which savour of impiety, we have spoken before. For his contradictions, the places are not cited: but, whoever is skill'd in Aristotle knows, he uses to draw Examples out of others Books and vulgar sayings; and that nothing is to be esteemed his own, which falls not into the Course of his Doctrine. Whence, 'tis no hard matter to find contrary Opinions in his works: but, those things alone are to be ascribed to him, which either are asserted in their proper places, or brought by him for confirmation of his known Tenets.

4. The twentieth Chapter renders manifest the eminence of Peripateticism above all other Methods, by its very impugnation of it. For, it assumes, it cannot be known that one thing is Cause of another, otherwise than because they are found together: which we deny not to be an occasion of suspecting, but no Argument [Page] of Causality; for, if nothing else be clear, 'twill be still-unknown, which of the too is the Cause, which Effect. But, the Peripateticks conclude not A. to be the cause of B. till, defining both, they find, out of their very Definitions, that A cannot be, but it must follow out of its intrinsecals that B is. For example, a Peripaterick collects that Fire is the Cause of Heat; because Heat is nothing else but Atoms flowing from Fire: and on the other side, he knows that Fire cannot exist, but it must send out such particles. Des Cartes's paradox, of Light and the Sun, is just as if we should expect the Skyes falling to catch Larks. That wonderfully ingenious Man is so coelestial, that he has not so much as Sand to found his structures on. Peripateticks chuse rather to collect a few Certainties, acknowledging a Multitude of uncertainties, than, grasping at all, to hold nothing. Sure I am, none more largely pretends Demonstration, than des Cartes: So that, nothing is more unseemly than for his adorers to profess Scepticism.

5. Not a jot stronger, to establish the impossibility of Science, is the argument from the variety of Opinions amongst those that are call'd Philosopers. For first, it must be evident that they are Philosophers: before their judgements deserve esteem in Philosophical matters. Do they profess to Demonstrate? Do they model their Books in Euclid's Method? Do they interweave Definitions with self-known truths? And admit no other for proof? All which may be observ'd [Page] in Aristotle and his antient interpreters, though not express'd in Euclids form. These things if they do, either they are not rational, or all will be of the same mind; as Geometricians are. If they neglect these, 'tis not a pin matter for their judgments in Philosophy. Our Author tells a story of the power of Fancy, which I doubt is imperfect: For, it seems, he would have one Man be able to order anothers thoughts without ever acting by his senses or Fancy: Since, he relates, that one compel'd others, absent from him, to think and speak what he pleas'd. For, though I allow Men to have a very large power over Animals, by the help of their Fancies; for example, to tame or enrage them, by means of sounds or shewing them figures; perhaps, too, to strike them sick or cure them, and such like: Yet, that the Fancy should be mov'd to those things, which move it not by any sense, 'tis hard to believe. For all that, I do not altogether deny the Motion made upon the sense to be every way like, and Univocal to that which is in the mind; and, when it happens, to be deriv'd rather from the vehemencie of the affection, than the pure Motion of the Fancies impressing it.

6. In this twenty first Chapter, he divines of Future Science; particularly, of some not-yet discovered manners of acting at distance: which I'le rather await, than discuss or hope for. About the end of the Chapter, he assumes, that nothing can be known, unless it be resolv'd into the first Causes. Whence, he should have seen [Page] clearly that the First Causes, and Metaphysicks, which treats of them, is most known of all to Nature, or next to our first knowledges: And that Naturalists strive in vain, who negotiate much about the particulars of Nature; and comprehend nothing through their ignorance of Metaphysick. Take for example the stir about Vacuum; which Metaphysicks declare as impossible, as for no-thing to be a thing: about the spring of Rarity and Density; which the Metaphysician most palpably demonstrates is out of, or, extrinsecal to the things that are Rare and Dense, and many such like; whose truth those that essay by Experiments, but without the light of Metaphysick, shall find an endless work on't. Metaphysical Principles must be taken from Aristotle, not des Cartes, though a Person of most eminent Wit. For, Aristotle, by contemplation, form'd into method those things which he found engrafted in nature: Des Cartes, in his Physical principles (as if he meant to prescribe the Creator an Idea) designs in the Air and in the Concave of the Moon, as they say, what himself thought was to be done, according to Art. From which kind of Fabrick there's no benefit to be hoped for by the Reader.

7. The next Chapter is sick of that error, which Aristotle has very often detected and confuted; viz. that nothing is known unless it be perfectly known: for example, that we know not God is, unlesse we see him, that any Man cannot make use, and be sure of that des Cartes's first-known thing or Object of knowledge, I [Page]think, therefore I am, unlesse he comprehends the all things of that I; so, as to know the Nature of his Matter and Form, the Number of his Elements and Members, and the Causes and Motion by which he was begotten, and in short, whatever is connected with him. Which is clearly to professe, he knows not the question in hand: For, none of the Dogmatizers either arrogates to himself or hopes for so perfect a knowledge. 'Tis a piece of the same heedlesnesse, not to know that all that see a white wall have the same apprehension of whiteness, though their several sensations vary the degree and perfection of it. Whence, our Author had done more prudently to have sat down in silence, and pardon'd the affecters of Science their error; than, by meerly Topical and Delusory Reasons, to have averted minds, born to excellent things, from the first desire of Nature, and gathering fruit, at least, in some degree; according to that of the moral Poet,

Though you of Glycons mighty lims despair,

Do not to keep away the Gout forbear.

8. For all that, our Academick makes no scruple, in general, to lay all kind of mischief to those that proceed dogmatically, such Art (as the Philosophers says) it requires to find a mean. First he asserts this Method is the Daughter of ignorance? who would have look'd for this brand from a Sceptick? you that profess your selves to know nothing, do you object ignorance to others?

[Page] Quis tulerit Gracchos de seditione querentes?

Next, he calls it the Inmate of untam'd affections: upon what title? for, if there be any Science, that will

The peaceful Temples keep well fortifi'd,

Built by the Sages Doctrine.—

You that profess you know not whether there be any or no; how rashly do you affirm it to dwell alwayes with untam'd affections? since, if there be none, it dwells no where. The third inconvenience of Dogmatizing is, that it stirs men up to controversies. The rising Sun seems to me guilty of the very same Crime, in disturbin the Slug-a-beds, and summoning every one to their work: For, such a kind of falt it is, to inculcate Truth to those that live in ignorance and error. A fourth crime is, that one who adheres to any Science, lays ignorance to the charge of those that know not his demonstration. I cannot deny it; For, 'tis the Nature and Title of light to reproach those things, as dark, which admit not its beams. But, herein the Demonstrators are modester than the Scepticks, that, at least, they except some, and speak well of Nature; whom, with all her Children, the Scepticks condemn to the Dungeon of Darknesse for ever.

9. Like this is the next, that the confidence of Science in error bars the Gates against the liberty to get possession of truth. How blindly does the Sceptick dispute these things? who freely owns that truth is no where, which men might have the liberty to get possession [Page] of. He concludes at last, the Dogmatizer has a petty and enthrall'd Soul. So strangely things are nicknam'd that are unknown! For, tis Science's part to dilate the Soul, and render it capable of great things: and this the pleasure of one that knows, to look down on Scepticks as all in a tumult below, and ‘Lucret. See them at a loss at every turn, And breathless hunting out the way of life.’ Which to make ones life and Task is the miserablest of all things, and an utter casting off Rationality; and the whole felicity Humanity affords. These things, as they are all most true, and scarce deniable, even by a Sceptick, to follow out of the possibility of Demonstration, that is, if there be any Rational Nature, yet I would not have them so asserted, as to Patronize palliated Scepticks, who admit, indeed, that there is such a thing as some both Physical and Metaphysical Science, in common; but neither tend to it by any legitimate Method, nor own any thing, in particular, demonstrated: and yet, by the press of the Herd, in a society, thrusting one another on, and by loads of Scriblers, they most absurdly fly at and arrogate to themselves the highest degree of Doctorship, and the top of Sciences and name of Wisdom. The Father of Nature grant Mankind may at length be eas'd of this Yoak; which galls the necks of the Sons of Adam: and, that the studious of truth may understand it alike dangerous to think every thing and nothing is demonstrated.

FINIS.

[Page]

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An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to The vanity of dogmatizing / by Thomas White.

White, Thomas, 1593-1676.

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1665

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— An exclusion of scepticks from all title to dispute being an answer to The vanity of dogmatizing / by Thomas White., White, Thomas, 1593-1676..

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Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data.

Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so.

Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor.

The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines.

Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements).

Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site.