SECTION I.

FIrst then it is of great concernment to know the nature and integrity of faith: For there begins our first and great mi­stake; Number 1. for Faith although it be of great excellency, yet when it is taken for a habit intellectuall, it hath so little roome and so narrow a capacity, that it cannot lodge thousands of those Opi­nions which pretend to be of her Family.

[Page 6] For although it be necessary for us to believe whatsoever we Numb. 2. know to be revealed of God, and so every man does, that be­lieves there is a God: yet it is not necessary, concerning many things, to know that God hath revealed them that is, we may be ignorant of, or doubt concerning the propositions, and in­differently maintaine either part, when the Question is not concerning Gods veracity, but whether God hath said so or no: That which is of the foundation of Faith, that only is necessary; and the knowing or not knowing of that, the be­lieving or dis-believing it, is that only which in genere cre­dendorum, is in immediate and necessary order to salvation or damnation.

Now all the reason and demonstration of the world convinces Numb. 3. us, that this foundation of Faith, or the great adequate ob­ject of the Faith that saves us, is that great mysteriousnesse of Christianity which Christ taught with so much diligence, for the credibility of which he wrought so many miracles; for the testimony of which the Apostles endured persecutions; that which was a folly to the Gentiles, and a scandall to the Jewes, this is that which is the object of a Christians Faith: All other things are implicitely in the beliefe of the Articles of Gods veracity, and are not necessary in respect of the Constitution of faith to be drawn out, but may there lie in the bowels of the great Articles without danger to any thing or any person, unlesse some other accident or circumstance makes them necessary: Now the great object which I speak of, is Jesus Christ crucified; Con­stitui enim apud vos nihil scire praeter Jesum Christum & hunc crucifixum; so said S. Paul to the Church of Corinth: This is the Article upon the Confession of which Christ built his Church, viz. only upon S. Peters Creed, which was no more but this simple enunciation, We believe and are sure that thou Mat. 16. 19. art Christ, the Sonne of the living God: And to this salvation particularly is promised, as in the case of Martha's Creed, Ioh. 11. 27. To this the Scripture gives the greatest Testimony, and to all them that confesse it; For every spirit that confesseth that Iesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God: And who ever 1 Ioh. 4. 2, 15. confesseth that Iesus Christ is the Sonne of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God: The believing this Article is the end of [Page 7] writing the foure Gospels: For all these things are written, that Ioh. 20. 31. ye might believe, that Iesus is the Christ the Sonne of God, and then that this is sufficient followes, and that believing, viz. this Article (for this was only instanced in) yee might have life through his name: This is that great Article which in genere cre­dendorum, is sufficient disposition to prepare a Catechumen to Baptism, as appeares in the case of the Ethiopian Eunuch, whose Creed was only this, I believe that Iesus Christ is the Sonne of God, and upon this Confession (saith the story) they both went into the water, and the Ethiop was washed and became as white as snow.

In these particular instances, there is no variety of Articles, save only that in the annexes of the severall expressions, such Numb. 4. things are expressed, as besides that Christ is come, they tell from whence, and to what purpose: And whatsoever is ex­pressed, or is to these purposes implyed, is made articulate and explicate, in the short and admirable mysterious Creed of S. Paul, Rom. 10. 8. This is the word of faith which we preach, that if thou shalt confesse with thy mouth the Lord Iesus, and shalt believe in thine heart, that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt bee saved: This is the great and intire com­plexion of a Christian's faith, and since salvation is promised to the beliefe of this Creed, either a snare is laid for us, with a purpose to deceive us, or else nothing is of prime and origi­nall necessity to be believed, but this, Iesus Christ our Redee­mer; and all that which is the necessary parts, meanes, or maine actions of working this redemption for us, and the honour for him is in the bowels and fold of the great Article, and claims an explicite belief by the same reason that binds us to the belief of its first complexion, without which neither the thing could be acted, nor the proposition understood.

For the act of believing propositions, is not for it selfe, Numb. 5. but in order to certaine ends; as Sermons are to good life and obedience; for (excepting that it acknowledges, Gods ve­racity, and so is a direct act of Religion) believing a revea­led proposition, hath no excellency in it selfe, but in order to that end for which we are instructed in such revelations. Now Gods great purpose being to bring us to him by Jesus Christ, [Page 8] Christ is our medium to God, obedience is the medium to Christ, and Faith the medium to obedience, and therefore is to have its estimate in proportion to its proper end, and those things are necessary, which necessarily promote the end, with­out which obedience cannot be encouraged or prudently en­joyn'd: So that those Articles are necessary, that is, those are fundamentall points, upon which we build our obedience; and as the influence of the Article is to the perswasion or engage­ment of obedience, so they have their degrees of necessity. Now all that Christ, when he preach'd, taught us to believe, and all that the Apostles in their Sermons propound, all aime at this, that wee should acknowledge Christ for our Law-Giver and our Saviour; so that nothing can be necessary by a prime necessity to be believ'd explicitely, but such things which are therefore parts of the great Article, because they either encourage our services, or oblige them, such as declare Christs greatnesse in himselfe, or his goodnesse to us: So that al­though we must neither deny nor doubt of any thing, which we know our great Master hath taught us: yet salvation is in speciall and by name annexed to the beliefe of those Articles only, which have in them the indearements of our services, or the support of our confidence, or the satisfaction of our hopes, such as are; Jesus Christ the Sonne of the living God, the Crucifixion and Resurrection of Iesus, forgivenesse of sinnes by his blood, Resurrection of the dead, and life eternall, because these propositions qualifie Christ for our Saviour and our Law-Giver, the one to engage our services, the other to en­deare them; for so much is necessary as will make us to be his servants, and his Disciples; and what can be required more? This only. Salvation is promis'd to the explicite belief of those Articles, and therefore those only are necessary, and those are sufficient; but thus, to us in the formality of Christians, which is a formality super-added to a former capacity, we before we are Christians are reasonable creatures, and capable of a blessed eternity, and there is a Creed which is the Gentiles Creed which is so supposed in the Christian Creed, as it is supposed in a Christian to be a man, and that is, oportet accedentem ad De­um credere Deum esse, & esse remuneratorem quaerentium eum.

[Page 9] If any man will urge farther, that whatsoever is deducible from these Articles by necessary consequence, is necessary to be believed explicitely: I Answer. It is true, if he sees the de­duction and coherence of the parts; but it is not certain that every man shall be able to deduce whatsoever is either imme­diately, or certainly deducible from these premises; and then since salvation is promis'd to the explicite belief of these, I see not how any man can justifie the making the way to heaven narrower then Jesus Christ hath made it, it being already so narrow, that there are few that finde it.

In the pursuance of this great truth, the Apostles or the ho­ly Numb. 7. men, their Contemporaries and Disciples composed a Creed to be a Rule of Faith to all Christians, as appears in Irenaeus, Apol. contr. Gent. c. 47. de veland. virg, c. 1. Ter­tullian, In exposit. Symbol. S. Cyprian, Serm. 5. de tempore, cap. 2. S. Austin, In Symbol. apud Cyprian. Ruffinus, and divers Omnes or­thodoxi Pa­tres affirmant Symbolum ab ipsis Apostolis conditum, Sext. Senensis, lib. 2. bibl. 5. vide Genebr. l. 3. de Trin. others; which Creed unlesse it had contain'd all the intire object of Faith, and the foundation of Religion, it cannot be imagin'd to what purpose it should serve; and that it was so esteem'd by the whole Church of God in all Ages, appears in this, that since Faith is a necessary pre-disposition to Baptism in all per­sons capable of the use of reason, all Catechumens in the Latine Church comming to Baptism, were interrogated concerning their Faith, and gave satisfaction in the recitation of this Creed. And in the East they professed exactly the same Faith, some­thing differing in words, but of the same matter, reason, design, and consequence; and so they did at Hierusalem, so at Aqui­leia: This was that [...]. These Articles were [...]. L. 5. Cod. de S. Trinit. & fid. Cath. Cùm recta. Now since the Apo­stles and Apostolicall men and Churches in these their Sym­bols, did recite particular Articles to a considerable number, and were so minute in their recitation, as to descend to cir­cumstances, it is more then probable that they omitted nothing of necessity; and that these Articles are not generall principles, in the bosome of which many more Articles equally necessary to be believed explicitely and more particular, are infolded; but that it is as minute an explication of those prima credibilia [Page 10] I before reckoned, as is necessary to salvation.

And therefore Tertullian calls the Creed regulam fidei, quâ salvâ & formâ ejus manente in suo ordine, possit in Scriptura Numb. 8. tractari & inquiri si quid videtur vel ambiguitate pendere vel obscuritate obumbrari. Cordis signaculum & nostrae militiae Sacra­mentum, S. Ambrose calls it, lib. 3. de velandis virgin. Compre­hensio fidei nostrae at (que) perfectio, by S. Austin. Serm. 115. Confessio, expositio, regula fidei, generally by the Ancients: The profes­sion of this Creed, was the exposition of that saying of S. Peter, [...], The answer of a good conscience towards God. For of the recitation and profession of this Creed in Baptism, it is that Tertullian de resur. carnis sayes, Anima non lotione, sed responsione sancitur. And of this was the prayer of Hillary, lib. 12. de Trinit. Conserva hanc conscientiae meae vocem ut quod in regenerationis meae Symbolo Baptizatus in Patre, Filio, Spir. S. professus sum semper obtineam. And according to the Rule and Reason of this Discourse (that it may appear that the Creed hath in it all Articles primò & per se, primely and universally necessary) the Creed is just such an explication of that Faith which the Apostles preached, viz. the Creed which S. Paul recites, as containes in it all those things which entitle Christ to us in the capacities of our Law-Giver and our Saviour, such as enable him to the great work of re­demption, according to the predictions concerning him, and such as engage and encourage our services. For, taking out the Article of Christs descent into Hell (which was not in the old Creed, as appeares in some of the Copies I before referd to, in Tertullian, Ruffinus, and Irenaeus; and indeed was omitted in all the Confessions of the Eastern Churches, in the Church of Rome, and in the Nicene Creed, which by adoption came to be the Creed of the Catholike Church) all other Articles are such as directly constitute the parts and work of our redemption, such as clearly derive the honour to Christ, and enable him with the capacities of our Saviour and Lord. The rest engage our services by proposition of such Articles which are rather promises then propositions; and the whole Creed, take it in any of the old Forms, is but an Analysis of that which S. Paul cals the word of salvation, whereby we shall be saved, viz. that we [Page 11] confesse Jesus to be Lord, and that God raised him from the dead: by the first whereof he became our Law-Giver and our Guardian; by the second he was our Saviour: the other things are but parts and maine actions of those two. Now what rea­son there is in the world that can inwrap any thing else within the foundation, that is, in the whole body of Articles simply and inseparably necessary, or in the prime originall necessity of Faith, I cannot possibly imagine. These doe the work, and therefore nothing can upon the true grounds of reason enlarge the necessity to the inclosure of other Articles.

Now if more were necessary than the Articles of the Creed, I demand why was it made the Vide Isidor▪ de Eccles. offic. lib. 1. cap. 20. Suidan. Tur­nebum. lib. 2. c. 30. advers. Venant. For. in Exeg. Symb. Feuardent. in Iren. lib. 1. c. 2. Characteristick note of a Numb. 9. Christian from a Heretick, or a Jew, or an Infidell? or to what purpose was it composed? Or if this was intended as sufficient, did the Apostles or those Churches which they founded, know any thing else to be necessary? If they did not, then either no­thing more is necessary (I speak of matters of meer beliefe) or they did not know all the will of the Lord, and so were unfit Dispensers of the mysteries of the Kingdom; or if they did know more was necessary, and yet would not insert it, they did an act of publike notice, and consign'd it to all Ages of the Church to no purpose, unlesse to beguile credulous people by making them believe their faith was sufficient, having tryed it by that touch-stone Apostolicall, when there was no such matter.

But if this was sufficient to bring men to heaven then, why not now? If the Apostles admitted all to their Communion that Numb. 10. believed this Creed, why shall wee exclude any that preserve the same intire? why is not our saith of these Articles of as much efficacy for bringing us to heaven, as it was in the Churches Apostolicall? who had guides more infallible that might with­out errour have taught them superstructures enough, if they had been necessary: and so they did; But that they did not in­sert them into the Creed, when they might have done it with as much certainty, as these Articles, makes it clear to my un­derstanding, that other things were not necessary, but these were; that whatever profit and advantages might come from other Articles, yet these were sufficient, and however certain [Page 12] persons might accidentally be obliged to believe much more, yet this was the one and onely foundation of Faith upon which all persons were to build their hopes of heaven; this was there­fore necessary to be taught to all, because of necessity to be be­liev'd by all: So that although other persons might commit a delinquency in genere morum, if they did not know or did not believe much more, because they were oblig'd to further disqui­sitions in order to other ends, yet none of these who held the Creed intire, could perish for want of necessary faith, though possibly he might for supine negligence or affected ignorance, or some other fault which had influence upon his opinions, and his understanding, he having a new supervening obligation ex accidente to know and believe more.

Neither are we oblig'd to make these Articles more particular and minute then the Creed. For since the Apostles and indeed Numb. 11. our blessed Lord himselfe promised heaven to them who believd him to be the Christ that was to come into the world, and that he who believes in him, should be partaker of the resur­rection and life eternall, he will be as good as his word; yet because this Article was very generall, and a complexion rather then a single proposition; the Apostles and others our Fathers in Christ did make it more explicite, and though they have said no more then what lay entire and ready form'd in the bosome of the great Article, yet they made their extracts, to great pur­pose, and absolute sufficiency, and therefore there needs no more deductions or remoter consequences from the first great Article, than the Creed of the Apostles. For although whatsoever is certainly deduced from any of these Articles made already so explicite, is as certainly true, and as much to be believed as the Article it selfe, because ex veris possunt nil nisi vera sequi, yet because it is not certain that our deductions from them are certain, and what one calls evident, is so obscure to another, that he believes it false; it is the best and only safe course to rest in that explication the Apostles have made, be­cause if any of these Apostolicall deductions were not demon­strable evidently to follow from that great Article to which sal­vation is promised, yet the authority of them who compil'd the Symboll, the plaine description of the Articles from the [Page 13] words of Scriptures, the evidence of reason demonstrating these to be the whole foundation, are sufficient upon great grounds of reason to ascertaine us; but if we goe farther, besides the easinesse of being deceived, we relying upon our own discourses, (which though they may be true and then binde us to follow them, but yet no more then when they only seem truest,) yet they cannot make the thing certaine to another, much lesse necessary in it selfe. And since God would not binde us upon paine of sinne and punishment, to make deductions our selves▪ much lesse would he binde us to follow another man's Logick as an Article of our Faith; I say much lesse another mans; for our own integrity (for we will certainly be true to our selves, and doe our own businesse heartily) is as fit and proper to be imployed as another mans ability. He cannot secure me that his ability is absolute and the greatest, but I can be more cer­taine that my own purposes and fidelity to my selfe is such. And since it is necessary to rest somewhere, lest we should run to an infinity, it is best to rest there where the Apostles and the Churches Apostolicall rested; when not only they who are able to judge, but others who are not, are equally ascertained of the certainty and of the sufficiency of that explication.

This I say, not that I believe it unlawfull or unsafe for the Numb. 12. Church or any of the Antistites religionis, or any wise man to extend his own Creed to any thing may certainely follow from any one of the Articles; but I say, that no such deduction is fit to be prest on others as an Article of Faith; and that every deduction which is so made, unlesse it be such a thing as is at first evident to all, is but sufficient to make a humane Faith, nor can it amount to a divine, much lesse can be obligatory to binde a person of a differing perswasion to subscribe under paine of loosing his Faith, or being a Heretick. For it is a demonstra­tion, that nothing can be necessary to be believed under paine of damnation, but such propositions of which it is certaine that God hath spoken and taught them to us, and of which it is certaine that this is their sense and purpose: For if the sense be uncertain, we can no more be obliged to believe it in a certain sense, then we are to believe it at all, if it were not certaine that God delivered it. But if it be onely certaine that [Page 14] God spake it, and not certaine to what sense, our Faith of it is to be as indeterminate as its sense, and it can be no other in the nature of the thing, nor is it consonant to Gods justice to believe of him that he can or will require more. And this is of the nature of those propositions which Aristotle calls [...], to which without any further probation, all wise men will give assent at its first publication. And therfore deductions inevident, from the evi­dent and plain letter of Faith, are as great recessions from the obli­gation as they are from the simplicity, and certainty of the Article. And this I also affirm, although the Church of any one denomi­nation, or represented in a Councell, shall make the deduction or declaration. For unlesse Christ had promised his Spirit to protect every particular Church from all errors lesse materiall, unlesse he had promised an absolute universall infallibility etiam in minu­tioribus, unlesse super-structures be of the same necessity with the foundation, and that Gods Spirit doth not only preserve his Church in the being of a Church, but in a certainty of not say­ing any thing that is lesse certain; and that whether they will or no too; we may be bound to peace and obedience, to silence, and to charity, but have not a new Article of Faith made; and a new proposition though consequent (as 'tis said) from an Ar­ticle of Faith becomes not therefore a part of the Faith, nor of absolute necessity, Quid unquam aliud Ecclesia Conciliorum decretis Contra haeres. cap, 32. e [...]isa est, nisi ut quod antea simpliciter credebatur, hoc idem postea diligentiùs crederetur, said Vincentius Lirinensis, whatsoever was of necessary beliefe before is so still, and hath a new degree ad­ded by reason of a new light or a clear explication; but no pro­sitions can be adopted into the foundation. The Church hath power to intend our Faith, but not to extend it; to make our beliefe more evident, but not more large and comprehen­sive. For Christ and his Apostles concealed nothing that was necessary to the integrity of Christian Faith, or salvation of our souls; Christ declared all the will of his Father, and the Apostles were Stewards and Dispensers of the same Mysteries, and were faithfull in all the house, and therefore conceald no­thing, but taught the whole Doctrine of Christ; so they said themselves. And indeed if they did not teach all the Doctrine of Faith, an Angel or a man might have taught us other things [Page 15] then what they taught, without deserving an Anathema, but not without deserving a blessing for making up that Faith intire which the Apostles left imperfect. Now if they taught all the whole body of Faith, either the Church in the following Ages lost part of the Faith (and then where was their infallibility, and the effect of those glorious promises to which she pretends and hath certain Title; for she may as well introduce a falshood as loose a truth, it being as much promised to her that the Ho­ly Ghost shall lead her into all truth, as that she shall be pre­served from all errors as appears, Ioh. 16. 13.) Or if she retaind all the Faith which Christ and his Apostles consign'd and taught, then no Age can by declaring any point, make that be an Ar­ticle of Faith which was not so in all Ages of Christianity be­fore such declaration. And indeed if the Vide Iacob Almain. in 3. Sent. d, 25. Q. Vnic. Dub. 3 Patet ergo, quod nulla ve­ritas est Ca­tholica ex ap­probatione, Ecclesiae vei Papae, Gabr. Biel. in 3. Sent. Dist, 25. q. Unic. art. 3. Dub. 3. ad finem. Church by decla­ring an Article can make that to be necessary, which before was not necessary, I doe not see how it can stand with the charity of the Church so to doe (especially after so long experience shee hath had that all men will not believe every such decision or ex­plication) for by so doing she makes the narrow way to heaven narrower, and chalks out one path more to the Devill then he had before, and yet the way was broad enough when it was at the narrowest. For before, differing persons might be saved in di­versity of perswasions, and now afterthis declaration if they can­not, there is no other alteration made, but that some shall be damned who before even in the same dispositions and beliefe should have been beatified persons. For therefore, it is well for the Fathers of the Primitive Church that their errors were not discovered, for if they had been contested (for that would have been cald discovery enough) vel errores emendassent, vel ab Ec­clesiâ Bellar. de laici [...] l. 3. c. 20. §. ad primam con­firmationem. ejecti fuissent. But it is better as it was, they went to hea­ven by that good fortune, whereas otherwise they might have gone to the Devill. And yet there were some errors, particu­larly that of S. Cyprian that was discovered, and he went to heaven, 'tis thought; possibly they might so too for all this pre­tence. But suppose it true, yet whether that declaration of an Article of which with safety we either might have doubted or beene ignorant, does more good, then the damning of those many soules occasionally, but yet certainely and fore­knowingly [Page 16] does hurt, I leave it to all wise and good men to de­termine. And yet besides this, it cannot enter into my thoughts, that it can possibly consist with Gods goodnesse, to put it into the power of man so palpably and openly to alter the paths and in-lets to heaven, and to streighten his mercies, unlesse he had furnished these men with an infallible judgement and an infallible prudence, and a never failing charity, that they should never doe it but with great necessity, and with great truth, and without ends and humane designes, of which I think no Arguments can make us certaine, what the Primitive Church hath done in this case: I shall afterwards consider and give an account of it, but for the present, there is no insecurity in ending there where the Apostles ended, in building where they built, in resting where they left us, unlesse the same infallibility which they had, had still continued, which I think I shall hereafter make evident it did not: And therefore those extensions of Creed which were made in the first Ages of the Church, although for the matter they were most true; yet because it was not certain that they should be so, and they might have been otherwise, therefore they could not be in the same order of Faith, nor in the same degrees of necessity to be believ'd with the Articles Apostolicall; and therefore whether they did well or no in laying the same weight upon them, or whether they did lay the same weight or no, we will afterwards consider.

But to return. I consider that a foundation of Faith cannot alter, unlesse a new building be to be made, the foundation is Numb. 13. the same still; and this foundation is no other but that which Christ and his Apostles laid, which Doctrine is like himselfe, yesterday and to day, and the same for ever: So that the Articles of necessary beliefe to all (which are the only foundation) they cannot be severall in severall Ages, and to severall persons. Nay, the sentence & declaration of the Church, cannot lay this founda­tion, or make any thing of the foundation, because the Church cannot lay her own foundation; we must suppose her to be a build­ing, and that she relies upon the foundation, which is therefore supposed to be laid before, because she is built upon it, or (to make it more explicate) because a cloud may arise from the Al­legory of building and foundation, it is plainly thus; The Church [Page 17] being a company of men obliged to the duties of Faith and obe­dience, the duty and obligation being of the faculties of will and understanding to adhere to such an object, must pre-suppose the object made ready for them; for as the object is before the act in order of nature, and therefore not to be produc'd or encreased by the faculty (which is receptive, cannot be active upon its proper object:) So the object of the Churches Faith is in order of nature before the Church, or before the act and habite of Faith, and therefore cannot be enlarged by the Church, any more then the act of the visive faculty can adde visibility to the object. So that if we have found out what foundation Christ and his Apostles did lay, that is what body and systeme of Articles simply necessary they taught and re­quir'd of us to believe, we need not, we cannot goe any fur­ther for foundation, we cannot enlarge that systeme or collecti­on. Now then, although all that they said is true, and no­thing of it to be doubted or dis-believed, yet as all that they said, is neither written nor delivered (because all was not ne­cessary) so we know that of those things which are written, some things are as farre off from the foundation as those things which were omitted, and therefore although now accidentally they must be beliv'd by all that know them, yet it is not necessary all should know them; and that all should know them in the same sense and interpretation, is neither probable nor obligatory; but therefore since these things are to be distin­guished by some differences of necessary and not necessary, whe­ther or no is not the declaration of Christs and his Apostles af­fixing salvation to the beliefe of some great comprehensive Articles, and the act of the Apostles rendring them as expli­cite as they thought convenient, and consigning that Creed made so explicite, as a tessera of a Christian, as a comprehension of the Articles of his beliefe, as a sufficient disposition and an ex­presse of the Faith of a Catechumen in order to Baptism: whe­ther or no I say, all this be not sufficient probation that these only are of absolute necessity, that this is sufficient for meer be­liefe in order to heaven, and that therefore whosoever believes these Articles heartily and explicitely, [...], as S. John's expression is, God dwelleth in him, I leave it to be [Page 18] consider'd and judg'd of from the premises: Only this, if the old Doctors had been made Judges in these Questions, they would have passed their affirmative; for to instance in one for all, of this it was said by Tertullian, Regula quidem fidei una omnino est Lib. de veland. Virg, sola immobilis & irreformabilis &c. Hâc lege fidei manente caetera jam disciplinae & conversationis admittunt novitatem correctionis, operante scil. & proficiente us (que) in finem gratia Dei. This Sym­bol is the one sufficient immoveable unalterable and unchange­able rule of Faith, that admits no increment or decrement; but if the integrity and unity of this be preserv'd, in all other things men may take a liberty of enlarging their knowledges and prophesyings, according as they are assisted by the grace of God.

SECT. II.

ANd thus I have represented a short draught of the Object Numb. 1. of Faith, and its foundation; the next consideration in or­der to our maine design, is to consider what was and what ought to be the judgement of the Apostles concerning Here­sy: For although there are more kinds of vices, than there are of vertues; yet the number of them is to be taken by ac­counting the transgressions of their vertues, and by the limits of Faith; we may also reckon the Analogy and proportions of Heresy, that as we have seen who was called faithfull by the Apostolicall men, wee may also perceive who were listed by them in the Catalogue of Hereticks, that we in our judgements may proceed accordingly.

And first the word Heresy is used in Scripture indifferently, in a good sense for a Sect or Division of Opinion, and men Numb. 2. following it, or sometimes in a bad sense, for a false Opinion signally condemned; but these kinde of people were then cald [Page 19] Anti-christs and false Prophets more frequently then Hereticks, and then there were many of them in the world. But it is ob­serveable that no Heresies are noted signantèr in Scripture, but such as are great errors practicall in materâ pietatis, such whose doctrines taught impiety, or such who denyed the comming of Christ directly or by consequence, not remote or wiredrawn, but prime and immediate: And therefore in the Code de S. Tri­nitate & fide Catholica, heresy is called [...], a wicked Opinion and an ungodly doctrine.

The first false doctrine we finde condemned by the Apostles was the opinion of Simon Magus, who thought the Holy Ghost Numb. 3. was to be bought with money; he thought very dishonourably to the blessed Spirit; but yet his followers are rather noted of a vice, neither resting in the understanding, nor derived from it, but wholy practicall; Tis simony, not heresy, though in Simon it was a false opinion proceeding from a low account of God, and promoted by his own ends of pride and covetousnesse: The great heresy that troubled them was the doctrine of the necessity of keeping the Law of Moses, the necessity of Circumcision; against which doctrine they were therfore zealous, because it was a direct overthrow to the very end and excellency of Christs comming. And this was an opinion most petinaciously and obstinately maintain'd by the Jewes, and had made a Sect among the Galathians, and this was indeed wholy in opinion; and against it the Apostles opposed two Articles of the Creed, which serv'd at severall times according as the Jewes chang'd their opinion, and left some degrees of their error, I believe in Jesus Christ, and I believe the holy Catholike Church; For they therefore press'd the necessity of Moses Law, because they were unwilling to forgoe the glorious appellative of being Gods own peculiar people; and that salvation was of the Jewes, and that the rest of the world were capable of that grace, no otherwise but by adoption into their Religion, and becomming Proselytes: But this was so ill a doctrine, as that it overthrew the great be­nefits of Christ's comming; for if they were circumcis'd, Christ profited them nothing, meaning this, that Christ will not be a Saviour to them who doe not acknowledge him for their Law-Giver; and they neither confesse him their Law-Giver nor [Page 20] their Saviour, that look to be justified by the Law of Moses, and observation of legall rites; so that this doctrine was a di­rect enemy to the foundation, and therefore the Apostles were so zealous against it. Now then that other opinion, which the Apostles met at Jerusalem to resolve, was but a piece of that opinion; for the Iewes and Proselytes were drawn off from their lees and sediment, by degrees, step by step. At first, they would not endure any should be saved but themselves, and their Profelytes. Being wrought off from this heigth by Miracles, and preaching of the Apostles, they admitted the Gentiles to a possibility of salvation, but yet so as to hope for it by Moses Law. From which foolery, when they were with much adoe disswa­ded, and told that salvation was by Faith in Christ, not by works of the Law, yet they resolv'd to plow with an Oxe and an Asse still, and joyne Moses with Christ; not as shadow and substance, but in an equall confederation, Christ should save the Gentiles if he was helpt by Moses but alone Chri­stianity could not doe it. Against this the Apostles assembled at Jerusalem, and made a decision of the Question, tying some of the Gentiles (such only who were blended by the Iewes in communi patria) to observation of such Rites which the Iewes had derived by tradition from Noah, intending by this to sa­tisfie the Iewes as farre as might be with a reasonable compliance and condescension; the other Gentiles who were unmixt, in the meane while, remaining free as appeares in the liberty S. Paul gave the Church of Corinth of eating Idoll Sacrifices (expresly against the Decree at Jerusalem) so it were without scandall. And yet for all this care and curious discretion, a little of the leaven still remain'd: All this they thought did so concern the Gentiles, that it was totally impertinent to the Iewes; still they had a distinction to satisfie the letter of the Apostles Decree, and yet to persist in their old opinion; and this so continued that fifteene Christian Bishops in succession Euseb. l. 4. Eccles. hist. c. 5. were circumcised, even untill the destruction of Jerusalem, un­der Adrian, as Eusebius reports.

First, By the way let me observe, that never any matter of Numb. 4. Question in the Christian Church was determin'd with greater solennity, or more full authority of the Church then this Que­stion [Page 21] concerning Circumcision: No lesse than the whole Colledge of the Apostles, and Elders at Jerusalem, and that with a Decree of the highest sanction, Visum est spiritui sancto & nobis. Secondly, Either the case of the Hebrewes in parti­cular was omitted, and no determination concerning them, 2. whether it were necessary or lawfull for them to be circum­cised, or else it was involv'd in the Decree, and intended to oblige the Jewes. If it was omitted since the Question was de re necessaria (for dico vobis, I Paul say unto you, If ye be cir­cumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing) it is very remarkable how the Apostles to gaine the Iewes, and to comply with their violent projudice in behalfe of Moses Law, did for a time Tolerate their dissent etiam in re aliôquin necessariâ, which I doubt not but was intended as a precedent for the Church to imitate for ever after: But if it was not omitted, either all the multitude of the Iewes (which S. James then Act. 21. 20. their Bishop expressed by [...]; Thou seest how many myriads of Jewes that believe and yet are zelots for the Law; and Eusebius speaking of Justus sayes, he was one ex infinit â mul­titudine L. 3. 32. Eccles. Hist. eorum qui ex circumcisione in Jesum credebant,) I say all these did perish, and their believing in Christ serv'd them to no other ends, but in the infinity of their torments to up­braid them with hypocrisie and heresie; or if they were sav'd, it is apparent how mercifull God was and pitifull to humane infirmities, that in a point of so great concernment did pity their weaknesse, and pardon their errors, and love their good minde, since their prejudice was little lesse than insuperable, and had faire probabilities, at least, it was such as might abuse a wise and good man (and so it did many) they did bono a [...]im [...] carrare. And if I mistake not, this consideration S. Paul urg'd as a reason why God forgave him who was a Persecutor 1. Tim. 1. of the Saints, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief, that is, he was not convinc'd in his understanding, of the truth of the way which he persecuted, he in the meane while remain­ing in that incredulity not out of malice or ill ends, but the mistakes of humanity and a pious zeale, therefore God had mercy on him: And so it was in this great Question of circum­cision, here only was the difference, the invincibility of [Page 22] S. Paul's error, and the honesty of his heart caused God so to pardon him as to bring him to the knowledge of Christ, which God therefore did because it was necessary, necessitate medii; no salvation was consistent with the actuall remanency of that er­ror; but in the Question of Circumcision, although they by consequence did overthrow the end of Christ's comming: yet because it was such a consequence, which they being hindred by a prejudice not impious did not perceive, God tolerated them in their error till time and a continuall dropping of the lessons and dictates Apostolicall did weare it out, and then the doctrine put on it's apparell, and became cloathed with ne­nessity; they in the meane time so kept to the foundation, that is, Iesus Christ crucified and risen againe, that although this did make a violent concussion of it, yet they held fast with their heart, what they ignorantly destroyed with their tongue, (which Saul before his conversion did not) that God upon other Titles, then an actuall dereliction of their error did bring them to salvation.

And in the descent of so many years, I finde not any one Anathema past by the Apostles or their Successors upon any Numb. 5. of the Bishops of Jerusalem, or the Believers of the Circum­cision, and yet it was a point as clearly determined, and of as great necessity as any of those Questions that at this day vex and crucifie Christendome.

Besides this Question, and that of the Resurrection, com­menc'd in the Church of Corinth, and promoted with some va­riety Numb. 6. of sense by Hymenaeus and Philetus in Asia, who said that the Resurrection was past already, I doe not remember any other heresy nam'd in Scripture, but such as were errours of impiety, seductiones in materiâ practicâ, such as was particular­ly, forbidding to marry, and the heresy of the Nicolaitans, a doctrine that taught the necessity of lust and frequent for­nication.

But in all the Animadversions against errours made by the Apostles in the New Testament, no pious person was con­demn'd, Numb. 7. no man that did invincibly erre, or bona mente; but something that was amisse in genere morum, was that which the Apostles did redargue. And it is very considerable, that even [Page 23] they of the Circumcision who in so great numbers did heartily believe in Christ, and yet most violently retaine Circumcision, and without Question went to Heaven in great numbers; yet of the number of these very men, they came deeply under censure, when to their errour they added impiety: So long as it stood with charity and without humane ends and secular interests, so long it was either innocent or conniv'd at; but when they grew covetous, and for filthy lucres sake taught the same doctrine which others did in the simplicity of their hearts, then they turn'd Hereticks, then they were term'd Seducers; and Titus was commanded to look to them, and to silence them; For there are many that are intractable and vaine bablers, Seducers of minds, especially they of the Circumcision, who seduce whole houses, teaching things that they ought not, for filthy lucres sake. These indeed were not to be indur'd, but to be silenced, by the conviction of sound doctrine, and to be rebuked sharp­ly, and avoided.

For heresy is not an errour of the understanding, but an er­rour Numb. 8. of the will. And this is clearly insinuated in Scripture, in the stile whereof Faith and a good life are made one duty, and vice is called opposite to Faith, and heresy opposed to ho­linesse and sanctity. So in S. Paul, For (saith he) the end of 1 Tim. 1. the Commandement is charity out of a pure heart, and a good con­science, and faith unfained; à quibus quòd aberrarunt quidam, from which charity, and purity, and goodnesse, and sincerity, because some have wandred, deflexerunt ad vaniloquium. And immediately after, he reckons the oppositions to faith and sound doctrine, and instances only in vices that staine the lives of Christians, the unjust, the uncleane, the uncharitable, the lyer, the perjur'd person, & si quis alius qui sanae doctrinae adversatur; these are the enemies of the true doctrine. And therefore S. Peter having given in charge, to adde to our vertue, patience, tem­perance, charity, and the like; gives this for a reason, for if these things be in you and abound, yee shall be fruitfull in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. So that knowledge and faith is inter praecepta morum, is part of a good life: Quid igitur credulitas vel fides? opinor fidelitèr homi­nem Christo credere, id est, fidelem Deo esse, hoc est, fidelitèr Dei mandata ser­vare. So Salvi­an. And Saint Paul cals Faith or the forme of sound words, [...], the doctrine that is according to god­linesse, [Page 24] 1 Tim. 6. 3. [...]; That's our Religion, or Faith, the whole manner of serving God, C. de sum­mâ Trinit. & fide Cathol. And veritati credere, and in injusti­tiâ sibi complacere, are by the same Apostle opposed, and inti­mate, that piety and faith is all one thing; faith must be [...], intire and holy too, or it is not right. It was the heresy of the Gnosticks, that it was no matter how men liv'd, so they did but believe aright: Which wicked doctrine Tatianus a lear­ned Christian did so detest, that he fell into a quite contrary, Non est curandum quid quisque credat, id tantum curandum est quod quisque faciat; And thence came the Sect Excratites: Both these heresies sprang from the too nice distinguishing the faith from the piety and good life of a Christian: They are both but one duty. However, they may be distinguished, if we speak like Philosophers; they cannot be distinguished, when we speak like Christians. For to believe what God hath comman­ded, is in order to a good life; and to live well is the product of that believing, and as proper emanation from it, as from its proper principle, and as heat is from the fire. And therefore, in Scripture, they are used promiscuously in sense, and in ex­pression, as not only being subjected in the same person, but also in the same faculty; faith is as truly seated in the will as in the understanding, and a good life as meerly derives from the un­derstanding as the will. Both of them are matters of choyce and of election, neither of them an effect naturall and invinci­ble or necessary antecedently (necessaria ut fiant, non necessario facta.) And indeed if we remember that S. Paul reckons here­sy amongst the works of the flesh, and ranks it with all manner of practicall impieties, we shall easily perceive that if a man mingles not a vice with his opinion, if he be innocent in his life, though deceiv'd in his doctrine his errour is his misery, not his crime; it makes him an argument of weaknesse and an object of pity, but not a person sealed up to ruine and re­probation.

For as the nature of faith is, so is the nature of heresy, con­traries having the same proportion and commensuration. Now Numb. 9. faith, if it be taken for an act of the understanding meerly, is so farre from being that excellent grace that justifies us, that it is not good at all, in any kinde but in genere naturae, and makes the understanding better in it selfe, or pleasing to God, just as [Page 25] strength doth the arme, or beauty the face, or health the body; these are naturall perfections indeed, and so knowledge and a true beliefe is to the understanding. But this makes us not at all more acceptable to God; for then the unlearned were certainly in a damnable condition, and all good Scholars should be saved (whereas I am afraid too much of the contrary is true.) But unlesse Faith be made morall by the mixtures of choyce, and charity, it is nothing but a naturall perfection, not a grace or a vertue; and this is demonstrably prov'd in this, that by the confession of all men of all interests and perswasions, in matters of meer belief, invincible ignorance is our excuse if we be deceived, which could not be, but that neither to believe aright is commendable, nor to believe amisse is reprovable; but where both one and the other is voluntary and chosen antecedently or consequently, by prime election or ex post facto, and so comes to be consider'd in morality, and is part of a good life or a bad life respectively. Just so it is in heresy, if it be a design of ambition, and making of a Sect (so Erasmus ex­pounds S. Paul [...], sectarum Alieni sunt à veritate qui se obarmant multitudine. Chryst. authorem) if it be for filthy lucres sake as it was in some, that were of the circumci­sion, if it be of pride and love of preheminence, as it was in Dio­trephes [...], or out of pevishnesse and indociblenesse of disposition, or of a contentious spirit, that is, that their feet are not shod with the preparation of the Gospel of peace; in all these cases the errour is just so damnable, as is its prin­ciple, but therefore damnable not of it selfe, but by reason of its adherencie. And if any shall say any otherwise, it is to say that some men shall be damned when they cannot help it, perish without their own fault, and be miserable for ever, be­cause of their unhappinesse to be deceived through their own simplicity and naturall or accidentall, but inculpable infirmity.

For it cannot stand with the goodnesse of God, who does Numb. 10. so know our infirmities, that he pardons many things in which our wills indeed have the least share (but some they have) but are overborn with the violence of an impetuous temptation; I say, it is inconsistent with his goodnesse to condemn those who erre where the error hath nothing of the will in it, who therefore cannot repent of their errour, because they believe [Page 26] it true, who therefore cannot make compensation because they know not that they are tyed to dereliction of it. And al­though all Hereticks are in this condition, that is, they be­lieve their errous to be true; yet there is a vast difference be­tween them who believe so out of simplicity, and them who are given over to believe a lie, as a punishment or an effect of some other wickednesse or impiety. For all have a conco­mitant assent to the truth of what they believe; and no man can at the same time believe what he does not believe, but this assent of the understanding in Hereticks is caused not by force of Argument, but the Argument is made forcible by something that is amisse in his will; and although a Heretick may peradventure have a stronger Argument for his errour then some true Believer for his right perswasion; yet it is not considerable how strong his Argument is (because in a weak understanding, a small motive will produce a great perswasion, like gentle physick in a weak body) but that which here is considerable, is, what it is that made his Argument forcible. If his invincible and harmlesse prejudice, if his weaknesse, if his education, if his mistaking piety, if any thing that hath no venome, nor a sting in it, there the heartinesse of his perswasion is no sin, but his misery and his excuse: but if any thing that is evill in genere morum did incline his understanding, if his opinion did commence upon pride, or is nourished by covetous­nesse, or continues through stupid carelesnesse, or increases by pertinacy, or is confirmed by obstinacy, then the innocency of the errour is disbanded, his misery is changed into a crime, and begins its own punishment. But by the way I must observe, that when I reckond obstinacy amongst those things which make a false opinion criminall, it is to be understood with some discretion and distinction. For there is an obstinacy of will which is indeed highly guilty of misdemeanour, and when the Schoole makes pertinacy or obstinacy to be the formality of heresy, they say not true at all, unlesse it be meant the ob­stinacy of the will and choyce; and if they doe, they speak imperfectly and inartificially, this being but one of the causes that makes errour become heresy; the adequate and perfect forma­lity of heresy is whatsoever makes the errour voluntary and vi­tious, [Page 27] as is cleare in Scripture, reckoning covetousnesse, and pride, and lust, and whatsoever is vitious to be its causes; (and in habits, or morall changes and productions, whatever alters the essence of a habite, or gives it a new formality, is not to be reckoned the efficient but the forme) but there is also an obsti­nacy (you may call it) but indeed, is nothing but a resolution and confirmation of understanding, which is not in a mans power honestly to alter, and it is not all the commands of humanity, that can be Argument sufficient to make a man leave believing that for which he thinks he hath reason, and for which he hath such Arguments as heartily convince him. Now the persi­sting in an opinion finally, and against all the confidence and imperiousnesse of humane commands, that makes not this cri­minall obstinacy, if the erring person have so much humility of will as to submit to whatever God sayes, and that no vice in his will hinders him from believing it. So that we must carefully distinguish continuance in opinion from obstinacy, confidence of understanding from peevishnesse of affection, a not being convinced from a resolution never to be convinc'd, up­on humane ends and vitious principles: Scimus quosdam quod Lib. 2. Epist. 1. semel imbiberint nolle deponere, nec propositum suum facile mutare, sed salvo inter collegas pacis & concordiae vinculo quaedam propriae quae apud se semel sint usurpata retinere; Qua in re nec nos vim cuiquam facimus, aut legem damus, saith S. Cyprian. And he himselfe was such a one; for hee persisted in his opinion of re­baptization untill death, and yet his obstinacy was not called criminall, or his errour turned to heresy. But to return.

In this sense, it is that a Heretick is [...], selfe con­demn'd, not by an immediate expresse sentence of understand­ing, Numb. 11. but by his own act or fault brought into condemnation. As it is in the Canon Law, Notorius percussor Clerici is ipso jure ex­communicate, not per sententiam latam ab homine, but à jure. No man hath passed sentence pro tribunali, but Law hath de­creed it pro edicto: So it is in the case of a Heretick. The un­derstanding which is judge, condemns him not by an expresse sentence; for he erres with as much simplicity in the result, as he had malice in the principle: But there is sententia lata à jure, his will which is his law, that hath condemn'd him. And this [Page 28] is gathered from that saying of S. Paul, 2 Tim. 3. 13. But evill men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived: First, they are evill men; malice and peevishnesse is in their wills; then they turn Hereticks and seduce others, and while they grow worse and worse, the errour is master of their understanding, they are deceiv'd themselves, given over to be­lieve a lie, saith the Apostle: They first play the knave, and then play the foole; they first sell themselves to the purchase of vaine glory or ill ends, and then they become possessed with a lying spirit, and believe those things heartily, which if they were honest, they should with Gods Grace discover and dis­claime. So that now we see that bona fides in falso articulo, a hearty perswasion in a false article does not alwayes make the errour to be esteemed involuntary; but then only when it is as innocent in the principle as it is confident in the pre­sent perswasion. And such persons who by their ill lives and vitious actions, or manifest designes (for by their fruits yee shall know them) give testimony of such criminall indisposi­tions, so as competent judges by humane and prudent estimate may so judge them, then they are to be declared Hereticks, and avoided. And if this were not true, it were vaine that the Apostle commands us to avoid an Heretick: For no ex­ternall act can passe upon a man for a crime that is not cognoscible.

Now every man that erres, though in a matter of consequence, Numb. 12. so long as the foundation is intire, cannot be suspected justly guilty of a crime to give his error a formality of heresy; for we see many a good man miserably deceiv'd (as we shall make it appeare afterwards) and he that is the best amongst men, cer­tainely hath so much humility to think he may be easily de­ceiv'd, and twenty to one but he is in some thing or other; yet if his error be not voluntary, and part of an ill life, then because he lives a good life, he is a good man, and therefore no Heretick: No man is a Heretick against his will. And if it be pretended that every man that is deceived, is therefore proud, because he does not submit his understanding to the au­thority of God or Man respectively, and so his errour becomes a heresy: To this I answer, That there is no Christian man [Page 29] but will submit his understanding to God, and believes what­soever he hath said; but alwayes provided, he knowes that God hath said so, else he must doe his duty by a readinesse to obey when he shall know it. But for obedience or humility of the un­derstanding towards men, that is a thing of another considera­tion, and it must first be made evident that his understand­ing must be submitted to men; and who those men are, must also be certaine, before it will be adjudg'd a sinne not to sub­mit. But if I mistake not Christs saying [call no man master upon earth] is so great a prejudice against this pretence, as I doubt it will goe neere wholy to make it invalid. So that as the worshipping of Angels is a humility indeed, but it is voluntary and a will-worship to an ill sence, not to be excused by the excellency of humility, nor the vertue of Religion: so is the relying upon the judgement of man, an humility too, but such as comes not under that [...], that obedience of Faith which is the duty of every Christian; but intrenches upon that duty which we owe to Christ as an acknowledge­ment that he is our great Master, and the Prince of the Ca­tholike Church. But whether it be or be not, if that be the Question whether the disagreeing person be to be determined by the dictates of men, I am sure the dictates of men must not determine him in that Question, but it must be settled by some higher principle: So that if of that Question the dis­agreeing person does opine, or believe, or erre bonâ fide, he is not therefore to be judg'd a Heretick, because he submits not his understanding, because till it bee sufficiently made certaine to him that hee is bound to submit, he may innocently and piously disagree, and this not submitting is therefore not a crime (and so cannot make a heresy) because without a crime he may lawfully doubt whether he be bound to submit or no, for that's the Question. And if in such Questions which have influence upon a whole systeme of Theology, a man may doubt lawfully if he doubts heartily, because the authority of men being the thing in Question, cannot bee the judge of this Question, and therefore being rejected, or (which is all one) being questioned, that is, not believed, cannot render the doubting person guilty of pride, and by consequence [Page 30] not of heresy, much more may particular questions be doubted of, and the authority of men examined, and yet the doubting person be humble enough, and therefore no Heretick for all this pretence. And it would be considered that humility is a du­ty in great ones as well as in Idiots. And as inferiours must not disagree without reason, so neither must superiours prescribe to others without sufficient authority, evidence and necessity too: And if rebellion be pride, so is tyranny; and it being in materiâ intellectuali, both may be guilty of pride of understanding, some­times the one in imposing, sometimes the other in a causelesse disagreeing; but in the inferiours it is then only the want of humility, when the guides impose or prescribe what God hath also taught, and then it is the disobeying Gods dictares, not mans, that makes the sinne. But then this consideration will also intervene, that as no dictate of God obliges men to believe it, unlesse I know it to be such: So neither will any of the di­ctates of my superiours, engage my faith, unlesse I also know, or have no reason to dis believe, but that they are warranted to teach them to me, therefore, because God hath taught the same to them, which if I once know, or have no reason to think the contrary, if I disagree, my sinne is not in resisting humane authority, but divine. And therefore the whole busi­nesse of submitting our understanding to humane authority, comes to nothing; for either it resolves into the direct duty of submitting to God, or if it be spoken of abstractedly, it is no duty at all.

But this pretence of a necessity of humbling the understand­ing, is none of the meanest arts whereby some persons have Numb. 13. invaded, and usurpt a power over mens faith and consciences, and therefore we shall examine the pretence afterwards, and try if God hath invested any Man or company of Men with such a power. In the meane time, he that submits his un­derstanding to all that he knowes God hath said, and is ready to submit to all that he hath said if he but know it, deny­ing his own affections and ends, and interests and humane per­swasions, laying them all down at the foot of his great Master Jesus Christ, that man hath brought his understanding into subjection, and every proud thought unto the obedience of [Page 31] Christ, and this is [...], the obedience of Faith, which is the duty of a Christian.

But to proceed: Besides these heresies noted in Scripture, the age of the Apostles, and that which followed, was in­fested Numb. 14. with other heresies; but such as had the same formality and malignity with the precedent, all of them either such as taught practicall impieties, or denyed an Article of the Creed. Egesippus in Eusebius reckons seven only prime heresies that sought to defloure the purity of the Church: That of Simon, that of Thebutes, of Cleobius, of Dositheus, of Gortheus, of Mas­botheus; I suppose Cerinthus to have been the seventh man, though he expresse him not: But of these, except the last, we know no particulars; but that Egesippus sayes, they were false Christs, and that their doctrine was directly against God and his blessed Sonne. Menander also was the first of a Sect, but he bewitched the people with his Sorceries. Cerinthus his doctrine pretended Enthusiasm or a new Revelation, and ended in lust and impious theorems in matter of uncleannesse. The Vid. Hilar. lib. 1. de Trin. E­bionites denyed Christ to be the Sonne of God, and affirmed him [...], begot by naturall generation, (by occa­sion of which and the importunity of the Asian Bishops, S. John writ his Gospel) and taught the observation of Moses Law. Basilides taught it lawfull to renounce the faith, and take false oaths in time of Persecution. Carpocrates was a very bedlam, halfe-witch, and quite mad-man, and practizd lust, which he cald the secret operations to overcome the Po­tentates of the world. Some more there were, but of the same nature and pest, not of a nicety in dispute, not a question of secret Philosophy, not of atomes, and undiscernable propo­sitions, but open defiances of all Faith, of all sobriety, and of all sanctity, excepting only the doctrine of the Millenaries, which in the best Ages was esteemed no heresy, but true Catholike Doctrine, though since it hath justice done to it, and hath suffered a just condemnation.

Hitherto, and in these instances, the Church did esteeme Numb. 15. and judge of herefies, in proportion to the rules and characters of Faith. For Faith being a Doctrine of piety as well as truth, that which was either destructive of fundamentall verity, or [Page 32] of Christian sanctity was against Faith, and if it made a Sect, was heresy; if not, it ended in personall impiety and went no farther. But those who as S. Paul sayes, not only did such things, but had pleasure in them that doe them, and therefore taught others to do what they impiously did dogmatize, they were Here­ticks both in matter and form, in doctrine and deportment, towards God, and towards man, and judicable in both tribunals.

But the Scripture and Apostolicall Sermons, having expres­sed most high indignation against these masters of impious Numb. 16. Sects, leaving them under prodigious characters, and horrid representments, as calling them men of corrupt minds, re­probates concerning the faith, given over to strong delusions to the beliefe of a lye, false Apostles, false Prophets, men al­ready condemned, and that by themselves, Anti-christs, enemies of God; and heresy it selfe, a work of the flesh, excluding from the kingdome of heaven; left such impressions in the minds of all their successours, and so much zeal against such Sects, that if any opinion commenc'd in the Church, not heard of before; it oftentimes had this ill luck to run the same fortune with an old heresy. For because the Hereticks did bring in new opi­nions in matters of great concernment, every opinion de novo brought in was lyable to the same exception; and because the degree of malignity in every errour was oftentimes undiscern­able, and most commonly indemonstrable, their zeale was alike against all; and those Ages being full of piety, were fitted to be abused with an overactive zeale, as wise persons and learned are with a too much indifferency.

But it came to passe, that the further the succession went from the Apostles, the more forward men were in numbring Numb. 17. heresies, and that upon slighter and more uncertain grounds. Some foot-steps of this wee shall finde, if we consider the Sects that are said to have sprung in the first three hundred years, and they were pretty and quick in their springs and falls; fourescore and seven of them are reckoned. They were indeed reckoned afterward, and though when they were alive, they were not condemn'd with as much forwardnesse, as after they were dead; yet even then, confidence began to mingle with opinions lesse necessary, and mistakes in judgement were [Page 33] oftener and more publike then they should have been. But if they were forward in their censures (as some times some of them were) it is no great wonder they were deceiv'd. For what principle or [...] had they then to judge of heresies, or condemn them, besides the single dictates or decretals of private Bishops? for Scripture was indifferently pretended by all; and concerning the meaning of it, was the Question: now there was no generall Councell all that while, no opportunity for the Church to convene; and if we search the communica­tory letters of the Bishops and Martyrs in those dayes, we shall finde but few sentences decretory concerning any Questi­on of Faith, or new sprung opinion. And in those that did, for ought appeares, the persons were mis-reported, or their opi­nions mistaken, or at most, the sentence of condemnation was no more but this; Such a Bishop who hath had the good fortune by posterity to be reputed a Catholike, did condemn such a man or such an opinion, and yet himselfe err'd in as considerable matters, but meeting with better neighbours in his life time, and a more charitable posterity, hath his memo­ry preserv'd in honour. It appears plain enough in the case of Nicholas the Deacon of Antioch, upon a mistake of his words whereby he taught [...] to abuse the flesh, viz. by acts of austerity and selfe denyall, and mortification; some wicked people that were glad to be mistaken and abused into a pleasing crime, pretended that he taught them to abuse the flesh by filthy commixtures and pollutions: This mistake was transmitted to posterity with a full cry, and acts afterwards found out to justifie an ill opinion of him. For by S. Hierome's time it grew out of Question, but that he was the vilest of men, and the worst of Hereticks; Nicolaus Antiochenus, om­nium Ad Ctesiph. immunditiarum conditor choros duxit faemineos. And a­gaine, Iste Nicolaus Diaconus ita immundus extitit ut etiam in praesepi Domini nefas perpetrârit: Accusations that while the Epist. de Fa­biano lapso. good man liv'd were never thought of; for his daughters were Virgins, and his Sons liv'd in holy coelibate all their lives, and himselfe liv'd in chast Wedlock; and yet his memory had rotted in perpetuall infamy, had not God (in whose sight, the memory of the Saints is precious) preserv'd it by the testi­mony [Page 34] of L. 3. Stromat. Clemens Alexandrinus, and from him of L. 3. c. 26. Hist. Euse­bius and Nicephorus. But in the Catalogue of Hereticks made by Philastrius he stands markt with a black character as guil­ty of many heresies: By which one testimony we may guesse what trust is to be given to those Catalogues: Well, This good man had ill luck to fall into unskilfull hands at first; but Ire­naeus, Justin Maryr, Lactantius, (to name no more) had bet­ter fortune; for it being still extant in their writings that they were of the Millenary opinion, Papias before, and Nepos after were censured hardly, and the opinion put into the cata­logue of heresies and yet these men never suspected as guilty, but like the children of the Captivity walkt in the midst of the flame, and not so mcuh as the smell of fire passed on them. But the uncertainty of these things is very memorable, in the Story of Eustathius Bishop of Antioch contesting with Eusebius Pamphilus: Eustathius accused Eusebius for going about to corrupt the Nicene Creed, of which slander he then ac­quitted himselfe (saith Socrates) and yet he is not cleared by L. 1. c. 23. posterity, for still he is suspected, and his fame not cleare: However Eusebius then scap'd well, but to be quit with his Adversary, he recriminares and accuses him to be a favourer of Sabellius, rather then of the Nicene Canons; an imperfect ac­cusation, God knowes, when the crime was a suspition, prove­able only by actions capable of divers constructions, and at the most, made but some degrees of probability, and the fact it selfe did not consist in indivisibili, and therefore was to stand or fall, to be improv'd or lessen'd according to the will of the Judges, whom in this cause Eustathius by his ill fortune and a potent Adversary found harsh towards him, in so much that he was for heresy deposed in the Synod of Antioch; and though this was layd open in the eye of the world as being most ready at hand, with the greatest ease charged upon every man, and with greatest difficulty acquitted by any man; yet there were other suspicions raised upon him privately, or at least talkt of ex post facto, and pretended as causes of his deprivation, least the sentence should seem too hard for the first offence. And yet what they were no man could tell, saith the story. But it is observable what Socrates saith, as in excuse of such proceedings, [Page 35] [...]. L. 1. c. 24. ‘It is the manner among the Bishops, when they accuse them that are deposed, they call them wicked, but they publish not the actions of their impiety.’ It might possibly be that the Bishops did it in tendernesse of their reputation, but yet hardly; for to punish a person publikely and highly, is a cer­tain declaring the person punished guilty of a high crime, and then to conceale the fault upon pretence to preserve his repu­tation, leaves every man at liberty, to conjecture what he pleaseth, who possibly will believe it worse than it is, in as much as they think his judges so charitable as therefore to conceale the fault, least the publishing of it should be his grea­test punishment, and the scandall greater then his deprivati­on. Simplicitèr pateat vitium fortasse pusil­lum, Quod-te­gitur majus creditur esse malum Mar­tial. However this course, if it were just in any, was unsafe in all; for it might undoe more then it could preserve, and therefore is of more danger, then it can be of charity. It is therefore too probable that the matter was not very faire; for in publike sentence the acts ought to be publike; but that they rather pretend heresy to bring their ends about, shewes how easie it is to impute that crime, and how forward they were to doe it: And that they might and did then as easily call Here­tick as afterward, when Vigilius was condemned of heresy for saying there were Antipodes; or as the Fryars of late did, who suspected Greek and Hebrew of heresy, and cald their Profes­sors Hereticks, and had like to have put Terence and Demost­henes into the Index Expurgatorius; sure enough they raild at them pro concione, therefore because they understood them not, and had reason to believe they would accidentally be enemies to their reputation among the people.

By this instance which was a while after the Nicene Coun­cell, where the acts of the Church were regular, judiciall and or­derly, Numb. 18. we may guesse at the sentences passed upon heresy, at such times and in such cases, when their processe was more private, and their acts more tumultuary, their information lesse certaine, and therefore their mistakes more easie and frequent. And it is remarkable in the case of the heresy of Montanus, the scene of whose heresy lay within the first three hundred yeares, [Page 36] though it was represented in the Caralogues afterwards, and possibly the mistake concerning it, is to be put upon the score of Epiphanius, by whom Montanus and his Followers were put into the Catalogue of Hereticks for commanding abstinence from meats, as if they were unclean, and of themselves un­lawfull. Now the truth was, Montanus said no such thing, but commanded frequent abstinence, enjoyned dry diet, and an ascetick Table, not for conscience sake, but for Discipline; and yet because he did this with too much rigour and strictnesse of mandate, the Primitive Church mislik'd it in him, as being too neere their errour, who by a Judaicall superstition abstain'd from meats as from uncleannesse. This by the way will much concern them who place too much sanctity in such Rites and Acts of Discipline; for it is an eternall Rule and of never fail­ing truth, that such abstinences if they be obtruded as Acts of originall immediate duty and sanctity, are unlawfull and super­stious; if they be for Discipline they may be good, but of no very great profit; it is that [...] which S. Paul sayes profiteth but little; and just in the same degree the Pri­mitive Church esteem'd them; for they therefore reprehended Montanus, for urging such abstinences with too much earnest­nesse, though but in the way of Discipline, for that it was no more, Tertullian, who was himselfe a Montanist, and knew best the opinions of his own Sect, testifies; and yet Epiphanus reporting the errours of Montanus, commends that which Montanus truly and really taught, and which the Primitive Church condemn'd in him, and therefore represents that heresy to another sense, and affixes that to Montanus, which Epipha­nius beliv'd a heresy, and yet which Montanus did not teach. And this also among many other things lessens my opinion ve­ry much of the integrity or discretion of the old Cata­logues of Hereticks, and much abates my confidence towards them.

And now that I have mentioned them casually in passing by, I shall give a short account of them; for men are much Numb. 19. mistaken; some in their opinions concerning the truth of them, as believing them to be all true, some concerning their purpose as thinking them sufficient not only to condemn all [Page 37] those opinions, there called hereticall; but to be a precedent to all Ages of the Church to be free and forward in calling He­retick. But he that considers the Catalogues themselves, as they are collected by Epiphanius, Philastrius, and S. Austin, shall finde that many are reckoned for Hereticks for opinions in matters disputable, and undetermin'd, and of no consequence; and that in these Catalogues of Hereticks there are men num­bred for Hereticks, which by every side respectively are ac­quitted; so that there is no company of men in the world that admit these Catalogues as good Records, or sufficient sen­tences of condemnation. For the Churches of the Reformation, I am certain, they acquit Aërius for denying prayer for the dead, and the Eustathians for denying invocation of Saints. And I am partly of opinion that the Church of Rome is not willing to call the Collyridians Hereticks for offering a Cake to the Virgin Mary, unlesse she also will runne the hazard of the same sentence for offering Candles to her: And that they will be glad with S. Austin (l. 6. de haeres. c. 86.) to excuse the D. Thom. l. contr. gent. c. 21. Tertullianists for picturing God in a visible corporall representment. And yet these Sects are put in the black book by Epiphanius and S. Austin, and Isidore respectively. I remember also that the Osseni are cald Hereticks, be­cause they refused to worship toward the East; and yet in that dissent, I finde not the malignity of a heresy, nor any thing against an Article of Faith or good manners; and it be­ing only in circumstance, it were hard, if they were otherwise pious men and true believers, to send them to Hell for such a trifle. The Parermeneutae refused to follow other mens dictates like sheep, but would expound Scripture according to the best evidence themselves could finde, and yet were called Hereticks whether they expounded true or no. The Euthym. part. 1. tit. 21.▪ Epiphan. haeres. 64. Pauliciani for be­ing offended at crosses, the Proclians for saying in a regenerate man all his sinnes were not quite dead, but only curbed and asswaged, were called Hereticks, and so condemned; for ought I know for affirming that which all pious men feele in them­selves to be too true. And he that will consider how numerous the Catalogues are, and to what a volumn they are come in their last collections, to no lesse then five hundred and twenty [Page 38] (for so many heresies and Hereticks are reckoned by Prateolus) may think that if a re-trenchment were justly made of truths, and all impertinencies, and all opinions, either still disputable, or lesse considerable, the number would much decrease; and therefore that the Catalogues are much amisse, and the name Heretick is made a terriculamentum to affright people from their beliefe, or to discountenance the persons of men, and disrepute them, that their Schooles may be empty and their Di­sciples few.

So that I shall not neede to instance how that some men Numb. 20. were called Hereticks by Philastrius for rejecting the translati­on of the LXX. and following the Bible of Aquila, wherein the great faults mentioned by Philastrius, are that he translates [...], not Christum, but unctum Dei, and in stead of Emanuel writes Deus nobiscum. But this most concerns them of the Primitive Church with whom the translation of Aquila was in great reputation, is enim veluti plus à quibusdam ..... intellexisse laudatur. It was supposed he was a greater Clerk and understood more then ordinary; it may be so he did. But whether yea or no, yet since the other Translators by the Confession of Philastrius, quaedam praetermisisse necessitate ur­gente cogerentur, if some wise men or unwise did follow a Translatour who understood the Originall well (for so A­quila had learnt amongst the Jewes) it was hard to call men Hereticks for following his Translation, especially since the o­ther Bibles (which were thought to have in them contradi­ctories; and, it was confessed, had omitted some things) were excused by necessity, and the others necessity of following A­quila, when they had no better was not at all considered, nor a lesse crime then heresy laid upon their score Philastr 99. eos inter hae­reticos nume­rat qui spira­culum vitae in libro Genes. in­terpretantur animam rati­onalem, & non potiùs gratiam Spiritus sancti.. Such another was the heresy of the Quartodecimani; for the Easterlings were all proclaimed Hereticks for keeping Easter after the manner of the East; and as Socrates and Nicephorus report, the Bishop of Rome was very forward to Excommunicate all the Bishops of the lesser Asia for observing the Feast according to the Tradi­tion of their Ancestors, though they did it modestly, quietly, and without faction; and although they pretended, and were as well able to prove their Tradition from S. John, of so observing [Page 39] it, as the Western Church could prove their Tradition deri­vative from S. Peter and S. Paul. If such things as these make up the Catalogues of Hereticks (as we see they did) their accounts differ from the Precedents they ought to have followed, that is, the censures Apostolicall, and therefore are unsafe Precedents for us; and unlesse they took the liberty of using the word heresy, in a lower sense, then the world now doth, since the Councels have been forward in pronouncing Anathema, and took it only for a distinct sense, and a differing perswasion in matters of opi­nion and minute Articles, we cannot excuse the persons of the men: But if they intended the crime of heresy against those opinions as they laid them down in their Catalogues, that crime (I say) which is a work of the flesh, which ex­cludes from the Kingdome of Heaven, all that I shall say against them, is, that the causlesse curse shall return empty, and no man is damn'd the sooner, because his enemy cryes [...], and they that were the Judges and Accusers might erre as well as the persons accused, and might need as charitable construction of their opinions and practices as the other. And of this we are sure they had no warrant from any rule of Scripture or practice Apostolicall, for driving so furiously and hastily in such decretory sentences. But I am willing rather to believe their sense of the word heresy was more gentle then with us it is, and for that they might have warrant from Scripture.

But by the way, I observe that although these Catalogues are Numb. 21. a great instance to shew that they whose Age and spirits were farre distant from the Apostles, had also other judgements concerning Faith and heresy, then the Apostles had, and the Ages Apostolicall; yet these Catalogues although they are re­ports of heresies in the second and third Ages, are not to be put upon the account of those Ages, nor to be reckoned as an instance of their judgement, which although it was in some degrees more culpable then that of their Predecessors, yet in respect of the following Ages it was innocent and modest. But these Catalogues I speak of, were set down according to the sense of the then presentages, in which as they in all proba­bility did differ from the apprehensions of the former Cen­turies, so it is certain, there were differing learnings, other [Page 40] sancies, divers representments and judgements of men depend­ing upon circumstances which the first Ages knew, and the fol­lowing Ages did not; and therefore the Catalogues were drawn with some truth, but lesse certainty, as appears in their differing about the Authours of some heresies; severall opini­ons imputed to the same, and some put in the roll of Here­ticks by one, which the other left out; which to me is an Ar­gument that the Collectors were determin'd, not by the sense and sentences of the three first Ages but by themselves, and some circumstances about them, which to reckon for Hereticks, which not. And that they themselves were the prime Judges, or perhaps some in their own Age together with them; but there was not any sufficient externall judicatory competent to declare heresy that by any publike or sufficient sentence or acts of Court had furnished them with warrant for their Catalogues. And therefore they are no Argument sufficient that the first Ages of the Church, which certainly were the best, did much recede from that which I shewed to be the sense of the Scripture, and the practise of the Apostles; they all contented themselves with the Apostles Creed as the rule of the Faith; and therefore were not forward to judge of heresy, but by analogy to their rule of Faith: And those Catalogues made after these Ages are not sufficient Arguments that they did otherwise; but rather of the weaknesse of some persons, or of the spirit and genius of the Age in which the Compilers liv'd, in which the device of cal­ling all differing opinions by the name of heresies, might grow to be a design to serve ends, and to promote interests, as often as an act of zeale and just indignation against evill persons de­stroyers of the Faith and corrupters of manners.

For whatever private mens opinions were, yet till the Nicene Numb. 22. Councell, the rule of Faith was intire in the Apostles Creed, and provided they retained that, easily they broke not the unity of Faith, however differing opinions might possibly commence in such things in which a liberty were better suffered then prohi­bited with a breach of charity. And this appears exactly in the Question between S. Cyprian of Carthage, and Stephan Bishop of Rome, in which one instance it is easie to see what was law­full and safe for a wise and good man, and yet how others began [Page 41] even then to be abused by that temptation, which since hath invaded all Christendome. S. Cyprian re. baptized Hereticks, and thought he was bound so to doe; calls a Synod in Africk as being Metropolitan, and confirms his opinion by the con­sent of his Suffragans and Brethren, but still with so much mo­desty that if any man was of another opinion, he judg'd him not, but gave him that liberty that he desired himself; Stephen Bishop of Rome growes angry, Excommunicates the Bishops of Asia and Africa, that in divers Synods had consented to re­baptization, and without peace, and without charity condemns them for Hereticks. Indeed here was the rarest mixture and conjunction of unlikelihoods that I have observed. Here was errour of opinion with much modesty and sweetnesse of tem­per on one side; and on the other, an over-active and impetuous zeal to attest a truth, it uses not to be so, for errour usually is supported with confidence, and truth suppressed and discoun­tenanc'd by indifferency. But that it might appear that the errour was not the sinne but the uncharitablenesse, Stephan was accounted a zealous and furious person, and S. Vid. S. Aug. l. 2. c. 6. de baptis. contra Donat. Cyprian though deceiv'd, yet a very good man, and of great sanctity. For although every errour is to be opposed, yet according to the variety of errours, so is there variety of proceedings. If it be against Faith, that is, a destruction of any part of the foun­dation, it is with zeal to be resisted, and we have for it an Apostolicall warrant, contend earnestly for the Faith; but then as these things recede farther from the foundation, our cer­tainty is the lesse, and their necessity not so much, and there­fore it were very fit, that our confidence should be according to our evidence, and our zeal according to our confidence, and our confidence should then be the Rule of our Communi­on; and the lightnesse of an Article should be considered with the weight of a precept of charity. And therefore, there are some errours to be reproved, rather by a private friend then a publike censure, and the persons of the men not avoided but admonished, and their Doctrine rejected, not their Communi­on; few opinions are of that malignity which are to be re­jected with the same exterminating spirit, and confidence of aversation, with which the first Teachers of Christianity con­demn'd [Page 42] Ebion, Manes, and Cerinthus; and in the condemnation of Hereticks the personall iniquity is more considerable then the obliquity of the doctrine, not for the rejection of the Article, but for censuring the persons; and therefore it is the piety of the man that excused S. Cyprian, which is a certain Argument that it is not the opinion, but the impiety that condemns and makes the Heretick. And this was it which Vincentius Lirinensis Adv. haeres. c. 11. said in this very case of S. Cyprian, Vnius & ejusdem opinionis (mi­rum videri potest) judicamus authores Catholicos, & sequaces haere­ticos. Excusamus Magistros, & condemnamus Scholasticos. Qui scripserunt libros sunt haeredes Coeli, quorum librorum defensores detruduntur ad infernum. Which saying, if we confront against the saying of Salvian condemning the first Authors of the Arrian Sect, and acquitting the Followers, we are taught by these two wise men, that an errour is not it that sends a man to Hell, but he that begins the heresy, and is the authour of the Sect, he is the man mark'd out to ruine; and his Followers scap'd, when the Here siarch commenc'd the errour upon pride and ambition, and his Followers went after him in simplicity of their heart; and so it was most commonly: but on the con­trary, when the first man in the opinion was honestly and in­vincibly deceived, as S. Cyprian was, and that his Scholars to maintaine their credit, or their ends, maintaind the opinion, not for the excellency of the reason perswading, but for the be­nefit and accruments, or peevishnesse, as did the Donatisis, qui de Cypriani authoritate fibi carnaliter blandiuntur, as S. Austin said of them; then the Scholars are the Hereticks, and the Master is a Catholike. For his errour is not the heresy for­mally, and an erring person may be a Catholike. A wicked per­son in his errour becomes heretick, when the good man in the same errour shall have all the rewards of Faith. For what­ever an ill man believes, if he therefore believe it because it serves his own ends, be his belief true or false, the man hath an hereticall minde, for to serve his own ends, his minde is prepared to believe a lie. But a good man that believes what according to his light, and upon the use of his morall industry he thinks true, whether he hits upon the right or no, because he hath a minde desirous of truth, and [Page 43] prepared to believe every truth is therefore acceptable to God, because nothing hindred him from it, but what hee could not help, his misery and his weaknesse, which being imperfections meerly naturall, which God never punishes, he stands faire for a blessing of his morality, which God alwayes accepts. So that now if Stephen had followed the example of God Almighty, or retained but the same peaceable spirit which his Brother of Cathage did, he might with more advantage to truth, and reputation both of wisdome and piety have done his duty in attesting what he believ'd to be true; for we are as much bound to be zealous pursuers of peace as earnest con­tenders for the Faith I am sure more earnest we ought to be for the peace of the Church, then for an Article which is not of the Faith, as this Question of re-baptization was not; for S. Cyprian died in beliefe against it, and yet was a Catholike, and a Martyr for the Christian Faith.

The summe is this S. Cyprian did right in a wrong cause (as Numb. 23. it hath been since judged) and Stephen did ill in a good cause; as fame then as piety and charity is to be preferr'd before a true opinion, so farre is S. Cyprian's practise a better precedent for us, and an example of primitive sanctity, then the zeale and indiscretion of Stephen: S. Cyprian had not learn'd to forbid to any one a liberty of prophesying or interpretation, if hee transgressed not the foundation of Faith and the Creed of the Apostles.

Well thus it was, and thus it ought to be in the first Ages, Numb. 23. the Faith of Christendome rested still upon the same foundati­on, and the judgements of heresies were accordingly, or were amisie; but the first great violation of this truth was, when Generall Councels came in, and the Symbols were enlarged, and new Articles were made as much of necessity to be believed as the Creed of the Apostles, and damnation threatned to them that did diffent, and at last the Creeds multiplyed in number, and in Articles, and the liberty of prophesying began to be something restrained.

And this was of so much the more force and efficacy be­cause Numb. 25. it began upon great reason, and in the first instance, with successe good enough. For I am much pleased with the en­larging [Page 44] of the Creed, which the Councell of Nice made, be­cause they enlarged it to my sense; but I am not sure that o­thers are satisfied with it; While we look upon the Article they did determine, we see all things well enough; but there are some wise personages consider it in all circumstances, and think the Church had been more happy if she had not been in some sense constrain'd to alter the simplicity of her faith, and make it more curious and articulate, so much that he had need be a subtle man to understand the very words of the new de­terminations.

For the first Alexander Bishop of Alexandria, in the pre­sence Numb. 26. of his Clergy, entreats somewhat more curiously of the secret of the mysterious Trinity, and Unity, so curiously, that Socra. l. 1. c. 8. Arius (who was a Sophister too subtle as it afterward ap­pear'd) misunderstood him, and thought he intended to bring in the heresy of Sabellius. For while he taught the Unity of the Trinity either he did it so inartificially, or so intricately, that Arius thought he did not distinguish the persons, when the Bishop intended only the unity of nature. Against this Arius furiously drives, and to confute Sabellius, and in him (as he thought) the Bishop, distinguishes the natures too, and so to secure the Article of the Trinity, destroyes the Unity. It was the first time the Question was disputed in the world, and in such mysterious niceties, possibly every wise man may understand something, but few can understand all, and therefore suspect what they understand not, and are furiously zealous for that part of it which they doe perceive. Well, it hapned in these as alwayes in such cases, in things men understand not they are most impetuous; and because suspition is a thing infi­nite in degrees, for it hath nothing to determine it, a suspiti­ous person is ever most violent; for his feares are worse then the thing feared, because the thing is limited, but his feares are not; so that upon this grew contentions on both sides, and Lib. 1. c. 6. tumults, rayling and reviling each other; and then the Laity were drawn into parts, and the Meletians abetted the wrong part, and the right part fearing to be overborn, did any thing that was next at hand to secure it selfe. Now then they that lived in that Age, that understood the men, that saw how quiet [Page 45] the Church was before this stirre, how miserably rent now, what little benefit from the Question, what schisme about it, gave other censures of the businesse, then we since have done, who only look upon the Article determind with truth and appro­bation of the Church generally, since that time. But the Epi­stle of Constantine to Alexander and Arius, tells the truth, and Cap. 7. chides them both for commencing the Question, Alexander for broaching it, Arius for taking it up; and although this be true, that it had been better for the Church it never had be­gun, yet being begun, what is to be done in it? of this also in that admirable Epistle, we have the Emperours judgement (I suppose not without the advise and privity of Hosius Bishop of Corduba, whom the Emperour lov'd and trusted much, and imployed in the delivery of the Letters.) ‘For first he calls it a certain vain piece of a Question, ill begun and more unad­visedly published, a Question which no Law or Ecclesiasticall Canon defineth, a fruitlesse contention, the product of idle braines, a matter so nice, so obscure, so intricate that it was neither to be explicated by the Clergy, nor understood by the people, a dispute of words, a doctrine inexpliable, but most dangerous when taught least it introduce discord or blas­phemy; and therefore, the Objector was rash, and the answerer unadvised; for it concernd not the substance of Faith, or the worship of God, nor any cheife commandment of Scripture, and therefore, why should it be the matter of discord? For though the matter be grave; yet because neither necessary, nor explicable, the contention is trifling and toyish. And therefore, as the Philosophers of the same Sect, though dif­fering in explication of an opinion, yet more love for the uni­ty of their Profession, then disagree for the difference of opi­nion; So should Christians believing in the same God, retaining the same Faith, having the same hopes, opposed by the same enemies, not fall at variance upon such disputes, con­sidering our understandings are not all alike; and therefore, neither can our opinions in such mysterious Articles: so that the matter being of no great importance, but vaine, and a toy in respect of the excellent blessings of peace and charity, it were good that Alexander and Arius should leave contending, [Page 46] keep their opinions to themselves, ask each other forgivenesse, and give mutuall toleration.’ This is the substance of Con­stantine's letter, and it contains in it much reason, if he did not undervalue the Question; but it seems it was not then thought a Question of Faith but of nicety of dispute; they both did be­lieve one God, and the holy Trinity. Now then that he af­terward called the Nicene Councell, it was upon occasion of the vilenesse of the men of the Arian part, their eternall discord and pertinacious wrangling, and to bring peace into the Church; that was the necessity; and in order to it was the determination of the Article. But for the Article it selfe, the Letter declares what opinion he had of that, and this Letter was by Socrates called a wonderfull exhortation, full of grace and sober councels; and such as Hosius himself, who was the mes­senger, pressed with all earnestnesse, with all the skill and Au­thority he had.

I know the opinion the world had of the Article afterward is quite differing from this censure given of it before; and Numb. 27. therefore they have put it into the Creed (I suppose) to bring the world to unity, and to prevent Sedition in this Question, and the accidentall blasphemies, which were occasioned by their curious talkings of such secret mysteries, and by their illiterate resolutions. But although the Article was determin'd with an excellent spirit, and we all with much reason professe to be­lieve it; yet it is another consideration, whether or no it might not have been better determin'd, if with more simplicity; and another yet, whether or no since many of the Bishops who did believe this thing, yet did not like the nicety and curiosity of expressing it, it had not been more agreeable to the practise of the Apostles to have made a determination of the Article by way of Exposition of the Apostles Creed, and to have left this in a rescript, for record to all posterity, and not to have enlarged the Creed with it; for since it was an Explication of an Article of the Creed of the Apostles, as Sermons are of places of Scripture, it was thought by some, that Scripture might with good profit, and great truth be expounded, and yet the expositions not put into the Canon, or goe for Scripture, but that left still in the naked Originall simplicity, and so much the [Page 47] rather since that Explication was further from the foundation, and though most certainly true, yet not penn'd by so infalli­ble a spirit, as was that of the Apostles; and therefore not with so much evidence, as certainty. And if they had pleased, they might have made use of an admirable precedent to this and many other great and good purposes, no lesse then of the bles­sed Apostles, whose Symbol they might have imitated, with as much simplicity as they did the Expressions of Scripture, when they first composed it. For it is most considerable, that although in reason, every clause in the Creed should be clear, and so inopportune and unapt to variety of interpretation, that there might be no place left for severall senses or variety of Expositi­ons: yet when they thought fit to insert some mysteries into the Creed, which in Scripture were expressed in so mysterious words, that the last and most explicite sense would still be latent, yet they who (if ever any did) understood all the senses and secrets of it, thought it not fit to use any words but the words of Scripture, particularly in the Articles of [Christs de­scending into Hell, and sitting at the right hand of God] to shew us, that those Creeds are best which keep the very words of Scripture; and that Faith is best which hath greatest simplicity, and that it is better in all cases humbly to submit; then curiously to enquire and pry into the mystery under the cloud, and to hazard our Faith by improving our knowledge: If the Nicene Fathers had done so too, possibly the Church would never have repented it.

And indeed the experience, the Church had afterwards, Numb. 28. shewed that the Bishops and Priests were not satisfied in all circumstances, nor the schism appeased, nor the persons agreed, nor the Canons accepted, nor the Article understood, nor any thing right, but when they were overborn with Authority, which Authority when the scales turned, did the same service and promotion to the contrary.

But it is considerable, that it was not the Article or the Numb. 29. thing it selfe that troubled the disagreeing persons, but the manner of representing it. For the five Dissenters, Eusebius of Nicomedia, Theognis, Maris, Theonas, and Secundus, believed Christ to be very God of very God, but the clause of [...] [Page 48] they derided as being perswaded by their Logick, that he was neither of the substance of the Father, by division as a piece of a lump nor derivation as children from their Parents, nor by production as buds from trees, and no body could tell them any other way at that time, and that made the fire to burn still. And that was it I said; if the Article had been with more simplicity, and lesse nicety determin'd; charity would have gain'd more, and faith would have lost nothing. And we shall finde the wisest of them all, for so Eusebius Pamphilus was esteem'd, published a Creed or Confession in the Synod, and though he and all the rest believed that great mystery of God­linesle, Vide Sozo­men. lib. 2. c. 18. God manifested in the flesh, yet he was not fully satisfied, nor so soone of the clause of one substance, till he had done a little violence to his own understanding; for even when he had subscribed to the clause of one substance, he does it with a protestation, that heretofore he never had been acquainted, nor accustomed himselfe to such speeches. And the sense of the word was either so ambiguous, or their meaning so uncertain that Andreas Fricius does with some probability dispute that Socrat. lib. 1. cap. 26. the Nicene Fathers by [...], did meane Patris similitudi­nem, non essentiae unitatem, Sylva. 4. c. 1. And it was so well un­destood by personages disinterested, that when Arius and Eu­zoius had confessed Christ to be Deus verbum, without inser­ting the clause of one substance, the Emperour by his Letter approv'd of his Faith, and restor'd him to his Countrey and Office, and the Communion of the Church. And along time after although the Article was believed with Non impru­dentèr dix [...]t, qui curiosae ex­plicationi hu­jus mysterii dictum Aristo­nis Philosophi applicu [...]t, H [...]l­leborus niger si crassiùs su­matur purgat & senat. Quum autum teritur & comminui­tur, suffocat. nicety enough, yet when they added more words still to the myste­ry, and brought in the word [...], saying there were three hypostases in the holy Trinity; it was so long before it could be understood, that it was believed therefore, because they would not oppose their Superiours, or disturb the peace of the Church, in things which they thought could not be understood: in so much that S. Hierom writ to Damasus, in these words: Discerne si placet obsecro, non timebo tres hypostases dicere, si jubetis; and againe, Obtestor beatitudinem tuam per Crucifixum, mundi salutem, per [...] Trinitatem, ut mihi Epistolis tuis, sive tacendarum sive dicendarum hypostaseôn detur authoritas.

[Page 49] But without all Question, the Fathers determin'd the Que­stion Numb. 30. with much truth, though I cannot say, the Arguments upon which they built their Decrees, were so good as the con­clusion it selfe was certain; But that which in this case is considerable, is whether or no they did well in putting a curse to the foot of their Decree, and the Decree it selfe into the Symbol, as if it had been of the same necessity? For the curse, Eusebius Pamphilus could hardly finde in his heart to subscribe, at last he did; but with this clause that he subscribed it be­cause the forme of curse did only forbid men to acquaint them­selves with forraign speeches and unwritten languages, whereby confusion and discord is brought into the Church. So that it was not so much a magisteriall high assertion of the Article, as an endeavour to secure the peace of the Church. And to the same purpose for ought I know, the Fathers composed a Form of Confession, not as a prescript Rule of Faith to build the hopes of our salvation on but as a tessera of that Communion which by publike Authority was therefore established upon those Articles because the Articles were true, though not of prime necessity, and because that unity of confession was judg'd, as things then stood, the best preserver of the unity of minds.

But I shall observe this, that although the Nicene Fathers Numb. 31. in that case at that time, and in that conjuncture of circum­stances did well (and yet their approbation is made by after Ages ex post facto) yet if this precedent had been followed by all Councels (and certainly they had equall power, if they had thought it equally reasonable) and that they had put all their Decrees into the Creed, as some have done since, to what a volume had the Creed by this time swell'd? and all the house had run into foundation, nothing left for super-structures. But that they did not, it appeares 1 that since they thought all their Decrees true, yet they did not think them all necessary, at least not in that degree, and that they published such De­crees, they did it declarando, not imperando, as Doctors in their Chaires, not masters of other mens faith and consciences. 2 And yet there is some more modesty, or warinesse or neces­sity (what shall I call it?) then this comes too: for why are [Page 50] not all controversies determin'd? but even when Generall Assemblies of Prelates have been, some controversies that have been very vexatious, have been pretermitted, and others of lesse consequence have been determind: Why did never any Ge­nerall Councell condemn in expresse sentence the Pelagian heresy, that great pest, that subtle infection of Cristendome? and yet divers Generall Councells did assemble while the heresy was in the world. Both these cases in severall degrees leave men in their liberty of believing and prophesying. The latter proclaimes that all controversies cannot be determind to suf­ficient purposes, and the first declares that those that are, are not all of them matters of Faith, and themselves are not so se­cure, but they may bee deceived; and therefore possibly it were better it were let alone; for if the latter leaves them divided in their opinions, yet their Communions, and there­fore probably their charities are not divided; but the former di­vides their Communions, and hinders their interest; and yet for ought is certain, the accused person is the better Catho­like. And yet after all this, it is not safety enough to say, let the Councell or Prelates determine Articles warily, sel­dome, with great caution, and with much sweetnesse and mo­desty. For though this be better then to doe it rashly, fre­quently and furiously; yet if we once transgresse the bounds set us by the Apostles in their Creed, and not onely preach other truths, but determine them pro tribunali as well as pro cathedra, although there be no errour in the subject matter (as in Nice there was none) yet if the next Ages say they will determine another Article with as much care and caution, and pretend as great a necessity, there is no hindring them, but by giving reasons against it; and so like enough they might have done against the decreeing the Article at Nice; yet that is not sufficient; for since the Authority of the Nicene Councell hath grown to the heigth of a mountainous pre­judice against him that should say it was ill done, the same reason and the same necessity may be pretended by any Age and in any Councell, and they think themselves warranted by the great precedent at Nice, to proceed as peremptorily as they did; but then if any other Assembly of learned men may [Page 51] possibly be deceiv'd, were it not better they should spare the labour, then that they should with so great pomp and solen­nities engage mens perswasions, and determine an Article which after Ages must rescind; for therefore most certainly in their own Age, the point with safety of faith and salvation, might have been disputed and disbelieved: And that many mens faiths have been tyed up by Acts and Decrees of Coun­cels for those Articles in which the next Age did see a liber­ty had better beene preserved, because an errour was de­termined, wee shall afterward receive a more certaine ac­count.

And therefore the Councell of Nice did well, and Con­stantinople did well, so did Ephesus and Chalcedon; but it is Numb. 32. because the Articles were truly determin'd (for that is part of my beliefe;) but who is sure it should be so before hand, and whether the points there determin'd were necessary or no to be believ'd or to be determin'd, if peace had been concern'd in it through the faction and division of the parties, I suppose the judgement of Constantine the Emperour and the famous Ho­sius of Corduba is sufficient to instruct us, whose authority I ra­ther urge then reasons, because it is a prejudice and not a rea­son I am to contend against.

So that such determinations and publishing of Confessions with Authority of Prince and Bishop, are sometimes of very Numb. 33. good use for the peace of the Church, and they are good also to determine the judgement of indifferent persons, whose rea­sons of either side, are not too great to weigh down the pro­bability of that Authority: But for persons of confident and imperious understandings, they on whose side the determination is, are armed with a prejudice against the other, and with a weapon to affront them, but with no more to convince them; and they against whom the decision is, doe the more readily betake themselves to the defensive, and are engaged upon con­testation and publike enmities, for such Articles which either might safely have been unknown, or with much charity di­sputed. Therefore the Nicene Councell, although it have the advantage of an acquir'd and prescribing Authority, yet it must not become a precedent to others, least the inconveniences of [Page 52] multiplying more Articles upon as great pretence of reason as then, make the act of the Nicene Fathers in straightning Pro­phesying, and enlarging the Creed, become accidentally an in­convenience. The first restraint, although if it had been com­plaind of, might possibly have been better consider'd of; yet the inconvenience is not visible, till it comes by way of pre­cedent to usher in more. It is like an Arbitrary power, which although by the same reason it take six pence from the subject, it may take a hundred pound, and then a thousand, and then all, yet so long as it is within the first bounds, the inconve­nience is not so great; but when it comes to be a precedent or argument for more, then the first may justly be complaind of, as having in it that reason in the principle, which brought the inconvenience in the sequell; and we have seen very ill consequents from innocent beginnings.

And the inconveniences which might possibly arise from Numb. 34. this precedent, those wise Personages also did fore-see, and therefore although they took liberty in Nice, to adde some Articles, or at least more explicitely to declare the first Creed, yet they then would have all the world to rest upon that and goe no farther, as believing that to be sufficient. S. Athanasius declares their opinion, [...]. Epist ad Epict. That Faith which those Fathers there confessed, was sufficient for the refutation of all impiety, and the establishment of all Faith in Christ and true Religion. And therefore there was a fa­mous Epistle written by Zeno the Emperour, called the [...] Euagr. l. 3. c. 14. or the Epistle of reconciliation, in which all disagreeing inte­rests, are entreated to agree in the Nicene Symbol, and a promise made upon that condition to communicate with all other Sects, adding withall, that the Church should never re­ceive any other Symbol then that which was composd by the Nicene Fathers. And however Honorius was condemnd for a Monothelite; yet in one of the Epistles which the sixth Synod alledged against him, (viz. the second) he gave them counsell that would have done the Church as much service as the de­termination of the Article did; for he advised them not to be [Page 53] curious in their disputings, nor dogmaticall in their determi­nations about that Question; and because the Church was not used to dispute in that Question, it were better to preserve the simplicity of Faith, then to ensnare mens consciences by a new Article. And when the Emperour Constantius was by his Faction engaged in a contrary practise, the inconvenience and unreasonablenesse was so great, that a prudent Heathen ob­served and noted it in this character of Constantius, Christia­nam religionem absolutam & simplicem [N. B.] anili superstitione confudit. In quâ scrutandâ perplexiùs quam in componendà gra­tiùs, excitavit dissidia quae progressa fusiùs aluit concertatione verborum dum ritum omnem ad suum trahere conatur ar­bitrium.

And yet men are more lead by Example then either by Reason or by Precept; for in the Councell of Constantinople one Numb. 35. Article de novo & integro was added, viz. I believe one Baptism for the remission of sinnes; and then againe they were so confi­dent, that that Confession of Faith was so absolutely intire, and that no man ever after should neede to adde any thing to the integrity of Faith, that the Fathers of the Councell of Ephesus pronounced Anathema to all those that should adde any thing to the Creed of Constantinople. And yet for all this, the Church of Rome in a Synod at Gentilly added the clause of Filioque, to the Article of the procession of the holy Ghost, and what they have done since, all the world knowes, Exempla non consistunt, sed quamvis in tenuem recepta tramitem, latissimè evagandi sibi faciunt potestatem. All men were perswaded that it was most reasonable the limits of Faith should be no more enlarged; but yet they enlarged it themselves, and bound others from doing it, like an intemperate Father, who because he knowes he does ill himselfe, enjoyns temperance to his Son, but continues to be intemperate himselfe.

But now if I should be questioned concerning the Symbol of Numb. 36. Athanasius (for we see the Nicene Symbol was the Father of many more, some twelve or thirteen Symbols in the space of a hundred years) I confesse I cannot see that moderate sentence and gentlenesse of charity in his Preface and Conclusion as there was in the Nicene Creed. Nothing there but damnation [Page 54] and perishing everlastingly, unlesse the Article of the Trinity be believed, as it is there with curiosity and minute particularities explaind. Indeed Athanasius had been soundly vexed on one side, and much cryed up on the other; and therefore it is not so much wonder for him to be so decretory and severe in his censure; for nothing could more ascertain his friends to him, and dis-repute his enemies, then the beliefe of that damnatory Ap­pendix; but that does not justifie the thing. For the Articles themselves, I am most heartily perswaded of the truth of them, and yet I dare not say all that are not so, are irrevocably damnd, because citra hoc Symbolum, the Faith of the Apostles Creed is intire, and he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, that is, he that believeth such a beliefe as is sufficient dispositi­on to be baptized, that Faith with the Sacrament is sufficient for heaven. Now the Apostles Creed does one; why therefore doe not both intitle us to the promise? Besides, if it were considered concerning Athanasius Creed, how many people un­derstand it not, how contrary to naturall reason it seems, how little the Vide Hosum de author. S. Scrip. l. 3. p. 53. & Gordon. Huntlaeum. Tom. 1. con­trov. 1. de ver­bo Dei, cap. 19. Scripture sayes of those curiosities of Explicati­on, and how Tradition was not cleare on his side for the Article it selfe, much lesse for those formes and minutes (how himselfe is put to make an answer, and excuse for the Vide Gretser. & Tanner. in coloq. Ra­tisbon. Eusebium fuisse Arrianum ait Perron. lib. 3. cap. 2. contre le Roy Iaques. Idem ait Originem negasse Di­vinitatem filii & Spir. S. l. 2. c. 7. de Euchar. contra. Duplessis. idem cap. 5. observ. 4. ait. Irenaeum talia dixifle quae qui hodiè diceret, pro Arriano reputaretur. vide etiam Fisher. in resp. ad 9. Quaest. Iacobi Reg. & Epiphan. in haeres. 69. Fathers speaking in favour of the Ar­rians, at least so seemingly, that the Ar­rians appeald to them for tryall, and the offer was declind) and after all this that the Nicene Creed it selfe went not so farre, neither in Article, nor Anathema nor Explication, it had not been amisse if the finall judgement had been left to Jesus Christ; for he is appointed Judge of all the World, and he shall Judge the peo­ple righteously, for he knowes every truth, the degree of eve­ry necessity, and all excuses that doe lessen, or take away the nature or malice of a crime; all which I think Athanasius though a very good man, did not know so well as to warrant such a sentence. And put case the heresy there condemnd be damnable, (as it is damnable enough) yet a man may maintain [Page 55] an opinion that is in it selfe damnable, and yet he not knowing it so, and being invincibly lead into it may goe to heaven; his opinion shall burn, and himselfe be saved. But however, I finde no opinions in Scripture cald damnable, but what are impious in materiâ practicâ, or directly destructive of the Faith or the body of Christianity, such of which S. Peter speaks [bringing in damnable heresies, even denying the Lord that bought them, these are the false Prophets who out of covetousnesse make 2 Pet. 2. 1. merchandise of you through cozening words.] Such as these are truly heresies, and such as these are certainly damnable. But because there are no degrees either of truth or salshood, every true proposition being alike true; that an errour is more or lesse damnable, is not told us in Scripture, but is determind by the man and his manners, by circumstance and accidents; and therefore the censure in the Preface and end, are Arguments of his zeal and strength of his perswasion; but they are extrinse­call and accidentall to the Articles, and might as well have been spared. And indeed to me it seems very hard to put uncharita­blenesse into the Creed, and so to make it become as an Ar­ticle of Faith, though perhaps this very thing was no Faith of Athanasius who if we may believe Aquinas, made this mani­festation of Faitth, non per modum Symboli, sed per modum do­ctrinae, D. Tho. 22^ae. q. 1. artic. 1. ad [...]um. that is, if I understood him right, not with a purpose to impose it upon others, but with confidence to declare his own beliefe; and that it was prescrib'd to others as a Creed, was the act of the Bishops of Rome; so he said, nay, possibly it was none of his: So said the Patriarch of C. P. Meletius about one hundred and thirty years since, in his Epistle to John Douza, Athanasio falsò adscriptum Symbolum cum Pontificum Rom. ap­pendice illâ adulteratum, luce lucidiùs contestamur. And it is more then probable that he said true, because this Creed was written originally in Latine, which in all reason Athanasius did not, and it was translated into Greek, it being apparent that the Latine Copy is but one, but the Greek is various, there being three Editions or Translations rather, expressed by Gene­brard, lib. 3. de Trinit. But in this particular, who list, may better satisfie himselfe in a disputation de Symbolo Athanasii, printed at Wertzburg 1590 supposed to be written by Serrarius or Cleneherus.

[Page 56] And yet I must observe that this Symbol of Athanasius, and Numb. 37. that other of Nice, offer not at any new Articles; they only pretend to a further Explication of the Articles Apostolicall, which is a certain confirmation that they did not believe more Articles to be of belief necessary to salvation: if they intended these further Explications to be as necessary as the dogmaticall Articles of the Apostles Creed, I know not how to answer all that may be objected against that; but the advantage that I shall gather from their not proceeding to new matters, is laid out ready for me in the words of Athanasius, saying of this Creed [this is the Catholike Faith] and if his authority bee good, or his saying true, or he the Authour, then no man can say of any other Article, that it is a part of the Catholike Faith, or that the Catholike Faith can be enlarged beyond the contents of that Symbol; and therefore it is a strange bold­nesse in the Church of Rome, first to adde twelve new Articles, Bulla Pii quar­ti supra forma juramenti pro­fessionis fidei, in fin. Conc. Trident. and then to adde the Appendix of Athanasius to the end of them, This is the Catholike Faith, without which no man can be saved.

But so great an example of so excellent a man, hath been either mistaken or followed with too much greedinesse, all Numb. 38. the world in factions, all damning one another, each party damnd by all the rest, and there is no disagreeing in opinion from any man that is in love with his own opinion, but damnati­on presently to all that disagree. A Ceremony and a Rite hath caused severall Churches to Excommunicate each other, as in the matter of the Saturday Fast, and keeping Easter. But what the spirits of men are when they are exasperated in a Question and difference of Religion, as they call it, though the thing it selfe may be most inconsiderable, is very evident in that request of Pope Innocent the Third, desiring of the Greeks (but reasonably a man would think) that they would not so much hate the Roman manner of consecrating in unleavened bread, as to wash, and scrape, and pare the Altars after a Roman Priest had consecrated. Nothing more furious than a mistaken zeal, and the actions of a scrupulous and abused conscience. When men think every thing to be their Faith and their Religion, com­monly they are so busie in trifles and such impertinencies in [Page 57] which the scene of their mistake lies, that they neglect the greater things of the Law, charity, and compliances, and the gentlenesse of Christian Communion; for this is the great prin­ciple of mischiefe, and yet is not more pernicious then unrea­sonable.

For I demand: Can any man say and justifie that the Apo­stles did deny Communion to any man that believed the Apo­stles Numb. 39. Creed, and liv'd a good life? And dare any man taxe that proceeding of remissenesse, and indifferency in Religion? And since our blessed Saviour promised salvation to him that believeth (and the Apostles when they gave this word the greatest extent, enlarged it not beyond the borders of the Creed) how can any man warrant the condemning of any man to the flames of Hell that is ready to die in attestation of this Faith, so expounded and made explicite by the Apostles, and lives accordingly? And to this purpose it was excellently said by a wise and a pious Prelate, S. Hilary, Non per difficiles nos L. 10. de Trin. ad finem. Deus ad b [...]atam vitam quaestiones vocat, &c. In absoluto nobis & facili est aeternitas; Jesum suscitatum à mortuis, per Deum credere, & ipsum esse Dominum confiteri, &c. These are the Articles which we must believe which are the sufficient and adequate object of that Faith which is required of us in order to Sal­vation. And therefore it was, that when the Bishops of Istria Concil. tom. 4. Edit. Paris. p. 473. deserted the Communion of Pope Pelagius, in causâ trium Ca­pitulorum, he gives them an account of his Faith by recitation of the Creed, and by attesting the four Generall Councels, and is confident upon this that de fidei firmitate nulla poterit esse quaestio vel suspicio generari; let the Apostles Creed, especially so explicated, be but secured, and all Faith is secured; and yet that explication too, was lesse necessary then the Articles them­selves; for the explication was but accidentall, but the Articles even before the Explication were accounted a sufficient inlet to the Kingdome of heaven.

And that there was security enough, in the simple believing Numb. 40. the first Articles, is very certain amongst them, and by their Principles who allow of an implicite faith to serve most persons to the greatest purposes; for if the Creed did contain in it the whole Faith, and that other Articles were in it implicitely, [Page 58] (for such is the doctrine of the Schoole, and particularly of Aquinas) then he that explicirely believes all the Creed, does implicitely believe all the Articles contain'd in it, and then it 22^ae. q. 1. a. 10. cap. is better the implication should still continue, then that by any explication (which is simply unnecessary) the Church should be troubled with questions, and uncertain determinations, and factions enkindled, and animosities set on foot, and mens soules endanger'd, who before were secur'd by the explicite beliefe of all that the Apostles requir'd as necessary, which beliefe also did secure them for all the rest, because it implied the belief of what­soever was virtually in the first Articles, if such beliefe should by chance be necessary.

The summe of this discourse is this, if we take an estimate of the nature of Faith from the dictates and promises Evange­licall, Numb. 41. and from the practice Apostolicall, the nature of Faith and its integrity consists in such propositions which make the foundation of hope and charity, that which is sufficient to make us to doe honour to Christ, and to obey him, and to encou­rage us in both; and this is compleated in the Apostles Creed. And since contraries are of the same extent, heresy is to be judg'd by its proportion and analogy to faith, and that is heresy only which is against Faith. Now because Faith is not only a precept of Doctrines, but of manners and holy life, whatsoever is either opposite to an Article of Creed, or teaches ill life, that's heresy; but all those propositions which are extrinsecall to these two considerations, be they true or be they false, make not heresy, nor the man an Heretick; and therefore however hee may be an erring person, yet he is to be used accordingly, pittied and instructed, not condemned or Excommunicated; And this is the result of the first ground, the consideration of the nature of Faith and heresy.

SECT. III.

GOd who disposes of all things sweetly and according to the nature and capacity of things and persons, had made those Numb. 1. only necessary, which he had taken care should be sufficiently propounded to all persons of whom he required the explicite beliefe. And therefore all the Articles of Faith are cleerely and plainly set down in Scripture, and the Gospel is not hid nisi pereuntibus saith S. Paul; [...], saith Damascen, and that Orthod. fidei. lib. 4. c. 18. so manifestly that no man can be ignorant of the foundation of Faith without his own apparent fault. And this is acknow­ledged by all wise and good men, and is evident, besides the reasonablenesse of the thing, in the testimonies of Saints Super Psal. 88. & de util. cred. c. 6. Austin, Super Isa. c. 19 & in Psal. 86. Hierome, Homil. 3. in Thess. Ep. 2. Chrysostome, Serm de confess. Fulgentius, Miseel. 2. l. 1. tit. 46. Hugo de Sancto Victore, In Gen. ap. Struch p. 87. Theodoret, C. 6. c. 21. Lactantius, Ad Antioch. l. 2. p. 918. Theophilus Antiochenus, Par. 1. q. 1. art. 9 Numb. 2. Aquinas, and the latter Schoole men. And God hath done more; for many things which are only profitable, are also set down so plainly, that (as S. Austin sayes) nemo inde haurire non possit, si modò ad hauriendum devotè ac piè accedat (ubi supra de util. cred. c. 6.) but of such things there is no Question commenc'd in Christendome, and if there were, it cannot but be a crime and humane interest, that are the Authors of such disputes, and therefore these cannot be simple errours, but alwayes here­sies, because the principle of them is a personall sinne.

But besides these things which are so plainly set down, some for doctrine as S. Paul sayes, that is, for Articles and founda­tion of Faith, some for instruction, some for reproofe, some for comfort, that is, in matters practicall and speculative of severall tempers and constitutions, there are innumerable places con­taining in them great mysteries, but yet either so enwrapped with a cloud, or so darkned with umbrages, or heigthened with expressions, or so covered with allegories and garments of [Page 60] Rhetorick so profound in the matter, or so altered or made in­tricate in the manner in the clothing and in the dressing that God may seeme to have left them as tryalls of our industry, and Arguments of our imperfections, and incentives to the longings after heaven, and the clearest revelations of eternity, and as occasions and opportunities of our mutuall charity and toleration to each other, and humility in our selves, rather then the repositories of Faith, and furniture of Creeds, and Articles of beliefe.

For wherever the word of God is kept, whether in Scrip­ture Numb. 3. alone, or also in Tradition, he that considers that the mea­ning of the one, and the truth or certainty of the other are things of great Question, will see a necessity in these things (which are the subject matter of most of the Questions of Christendome) that men should hope to be excused by an implicite faith in God Almighty. For when there are in the Explications of Scripture so many Commentaries, so many senses and Interpretations, so many Volumnes in all Ages, and all, like mens faces, exactly none like another, either this difference and inconvenience is absolutely no fault at all, or if it be, it is excusable, by a minde prepar'd to consent in that truth which God intended. And this I call an implicite Faith in God, which is certainly of as great excellency as an implicite Faith in any man or company of men. Because they who doe require an im­plicite Faith in the Church for Articles lesse necessary, and excuse the want of explicite Faith by the implicite, doe require an implicite Faith in the Church, because they believe that God hath required of them to have a minde prepared to believe whatever the Church sayes; which because it is a proposition of no absolute certainty, whosoever does in readinesse of minde believe all that God spake, does also believe that sufficiently, if it be fitting to be believ'd, that is, if it be true, and if God hath said so; for he hath the same obedience of understanding in this as in the other. But because it is not so certain God hath tyed him in all things to believe that which is called the Church, and that it is certain we must believe God in all things, and yet neither know all that either God hath revealed or the Church taught, it is better to take the certain then the uncertain, to [Page 61] believe God rather then men, especially since if God hath bound us to believe men, our absolute submission to God does involve that, and there is no inconvenience in the world this way, but that we implicitely believe one Article more, viz. the Churches Authority or infallibility, which may well be pardoned, because it secures our beliefe of all the rest, and we are sure if we be­lieve all that God said explicitely or implicitely, we also believe the Church implicitely in case we are bound to it; but we are not certain, that if we believe any company of men whom we call the Church, that we therefore obey God and believe what he hath said. But however, if this will not help us, there is no help for us, but good fortune or absolute predestination; for by choyce and industry, no man can secure himselfe that in all the mysteries of Religion taught in Scripture he shall certainly understand and explicitely believe that sense, that God inten­ded. For to this purpose there are many considerations.

1. There are so many thousands of Copies that were writ by persons of severall interests and perswasions, such different Numb. 4. understandings and tempers, such distinct abilities and weaknes­ses, that it is no wonder there is so great variety of readings both in the Old Testament and in the New. In the Old Te­stament the Jewes pretend that the Christians have corrupted many places, on purpose to make symphony between both the Testaments. On the other side, the Christians have had so much reason to suspect the Jewes, that when Aquila had translated the Bible in their Schooles, and had been taught by them, they rejected the Edition many of them, and some of them called it heresy to follow it. And Justin Martyr justified it to Tryphon, that the Jewes had defalk'd many sayings from the Books of the old Prophets, and amongst the rest, he instances in that of the Psalm, Dicite in nationibus quia Dominus regnavit à ligno. The last words they have cut off, and prevail'd so farre in it, that to this day none of our Bibles have it; but if they ought not to have it, then Justin Martyrs Bible had more in it then it should have, for there it was; so that a fault there was ei­ther under or over. But however, there are infinite Readings in the New Testament (for in that I will instance) some whole Verses in one that are not in another, and there was in some [Page 62] Copies of S. Marks Gospel in the last Chapter a whole verse, a Chapter it was anciently called, that is not found in our Bibles, as S. Hierom. ad Hedibiam, q. 3. notes. The words he repeats, Lib. 2. contra Polygamos. Et illi satis faciebant dicentes, saeculum istud iniquitatis & incredulitatis sub stantia est, quae non sinit per immundos spiritus veram Dei apprehendi virtutem, idcirco jam nunc revela justitiam tuam. These words are thought by some, to favour of Manichaisme, and for ought I can finde were therefore rejected out of many Greek Copies, and at last out of the Latine. Now suppose that a Manichee in di­sputation should urge this place, having found it in his Bi­ble, if a Catholike should answer him by saying it is Apo­cryphall, and not found in divers Greek Copies, might not the Manichee ask how it came in, if it was not the word of God, and if it was, how came it out? and at last take the same liberty of rejecting any other Authority which shall be alledged against him; it he can finde any Copy that may favour him, however that favour be procured; and did not the Ebionites reject all the Epistles of S. Paul upon pretence he was an enemy to the Law of Moses? indeed it was boldly and most unreasonably done; but if one title or one Chapter of S. Mark be called Apocryphall, for being suspected of Ma­nicheisme, it is a plea that will too much justify others in their taking and chusing what they list. But I will not urge it so farre; but is not there as much reason for the fierce Lutherans to reject the Epistle of S. James for favouring justification by works, or the Epistle to the Hebrewes, upon pretence that the sixth and tenth Chapters doe favour Novatianisme; especially since it was by some famous Churches at first not accepted, even by the Church of Rome her selfe? The Parable of the woman taken in adultery, which is now in Joh. 8. Eusebius sayes was not in any Gospel, but the Gospel secundum Hebraeos, and S. Hierom makes it doubtfull, and so does S. Chrysostome and Euthimius, the first not vouchsafing to explicate it in Homilies upon S. John, the other affirming it not to be found in the exacter Copies. I shall not neede to urge that there are some words so neer in sound, that the Scribes might easily mistake: There is one famous one of [...], which yet some Copies [Page 63] read [...], the sense is very unlike though the words be neer, and there needs some little luxation to straine this latter reading to a good sense; That famous precept of S. Paul, that the women must pray with a covering on their head [...], because of the Angels, hath brought into the Church an opinion that Angels are present in Churches, and are Spectators of our devotion and deportment. Such an opi­nion if it should meet with peevish opposites on one side, and confident Hyperaspists on the other, might possibly make a Sect, and here were a cleer ground for the affirmative, and yet who knowes but that it might have been a mistake of the Transcri­bers to double the [...]? for if it were read [...], that the sense be, women in publike Assemblies must weare a vaile, by reason of the Companies of the young men there present, it would be no ill exchange for the losse of a letter, to make so probable so cleare a sense of the place. But the instances in this kinde, are too many, as appears in the variety of readings in severall Copies proceeding from the negligence or ignorance of the Transcribers, or the malicious Graeci cor­ruperunt no­vum Testa­mentum ut te­stantur Tertul. l. 5. adv. Mar­cion. Euseb. l. 5. Hist. c. ult. I­renae. l. 1. c. 29. allu. haerel. Ba­sil. l. 2. contr. Eunomium. endeavour of Hereticks, or the inserting Marginall Notes into the Text, or the neere­nesse of severall words. Indeed there is so much evidence of this particular, that it hath encouraged the servants of the Vulgar Translation (for so some are now adayes) to preferre that Tran­slation before the Originall; for although they have attempted that proposition with very ill successe yet that they could think it possible to be prov'd, is an Argument there is much variety and alterations in divers Texts; for if they were not, it were impudence to pretend a Translation, and that none of the best, should be better then the Originall. But so it is that this va­riety of reading is not of slight consideration; for although it be demonstrably true, that all things necessary to Faith and good manners are preserv'd from alteration and corruption, be­cause they are of things necessary, and they could not be ne­cessary, unlesse they were delivered to us, God in his goodnesse and his justice having oblig'd himself to preserve that which he hath bound us to observe and keep; yet in other things which God hath not oblig'd himselfe so punctually to preserve, in these things since variety of reading is crept in, every reading takes [Page 64] away a degree of certainty from any proposition derivative from those places so read: And if some Copies (especially if they be publike and notable) omit a verse or title, every argument from such a title or verse loses much of its strength and re­putation; and we finde it in a great instance. For when in pro­bation of the mystery of the glorious Unity in Trinity, we al­ledge that saying of S. John [there are three which bear witnesse in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Spirit, and these three are one:] the Antitrinitarians think they have answered the Argument by saying the Syrian Translation, and divers Greek Copies have not that verse in them, and therefore being of doubtfull Authority, cannot conclude with certainty in a Que­stion of Faith. And there is an instance on the Catholike part. For when the Arrians urge the saying of our Saviour, [No man knowes that day and houre (viz. of Judgement) no not the Sonne, but the Father only], to prove that the Sonne knowes not all things, and therefore cannot be God in the proper sense; S. Ambrose thinks he hath answered the Argument by saying, those words [no not the Sonne] was thrust into the Text by the fraud of the Arrians. So that here we have one objection, which must first be cleared and made infallible, before we can be ascertain'd in any such Question as to call them Hereticks that dissent.

2. I consider that there are very many senses and designs of Numb. 5. expounding Scripture, and when the Grammaticall sense is found out, we are many times never the neerer; it is not that which was intended; for there is in very many Scriptures a double sense, a literall and a Spirituall (for the Scripture is a Book wri­ten within and without (Apoc. 5.) And both these senses are sub-divided. For the literall sense is either naturall or figura­tive: And the Spirituall is sometimes allegoricall, sometimes anogogicall, nay, sometimes there are divers literall senses in the same sentence, as S. Austin excellently proves in divers Lib. 12. con­fess, cap. 26. Lib. 11. de Ci­vit. Dei. c. 19. Li. 3. de doctri­nâ Christ. cap. 27. places, and it appears in divers quotations in the New Testa­ment, where the Apostles and Divine Writers bring the same Testimony to divers purposes; and particularly, S. Paul's making that saying of the Psalme, Thou art my Sonne, this day have I begotten thee, to be an Argument of Christs Resurrection, and [Page 65] a designation or ordination to his Pontificate is an instance ve­ry famous in his 1. and 5. chapter to the Hebrewes. But now there being such variety of senses in Scripture, and but few places so mark'd out, as not to be capable of divers senses, if men will write Commentaries, as Herode made Orations [...], what infallible [...] will be left whereby to judge of the certain dogmaticall resolute sense of such places which have been the matter of Question? For put case a Questi­on were commenc'd concerning the degrees of glory in hea­ven, as there is in the Schooles a noted one, To shew an in­equality of reward, Christs Parable is brought of the reward of ten Cities, and of five according to the divers improve­ment of the Talents; this sense is mysticall, and yet very pro­bable, and understood by men for ought I know, to this very sense. And the result of the Argument is made good by S. Paul, as one starre differeth from another in glory; so shall it be in the resurrection of the dead. Now suppose another should take the same liberty of Expounding another Parable to a mysticall sense and Interpretation, as all Parables must be expounded; then the Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard, and though differing in labour, yet having an equall reward, to any mans understanding may seem very strongly to prove the contrary, and as if it were of purpose, and that it were primum intentum of the Parable, the Lord of the Vineyard determin'd the point resolutely upon the mutiny and repining of them that had born the burthen and heat of the day, I will give unto this last even as to thee; which to my sense seems to determine the Question of degrees; They that work but little, and they that work long, shall not be distinguished in the reward, though acciden­tally they were in the work: And if this opinion could but answer S. Pauls words, it stands as faire, and perhaps fairer then the other. Now if we look well upon the words of S. Paul, we shall finde he speaks nothing at all of diversity of degrees of glory in beatified bodies, but the differences of glory in bodies heaven­ly and earthly. There are (sayes he) bodies earthly, and there are heavenly bodies: And one is the glory of the earthly, ano­ther the glory of the heavenly; one glory of the Sun, another of the Moone, &c. So shall it be in the Resurrection; for it is [Page 66] sowne in corruption, it is raised in incorruption. Plainly thus, our bodies in the Resurrection shall differ as much from our bo­dies here in the state of corruption, as one Starre does from ano­ther. And now suppose a Sect should be commenc'd upon this Question (upon lighter and vainer many have been) either side must resolve to answer the others Arguments, whether they can or no, and to deny to each other a liberty of expounding the parable to such a sense, and yet themselves must use it or want an Argument. But men use to be unjust in their own cases; And were it not better to leave each other to their liberty and seek to preserve their own charity? For when the words are capable of a mysticall or a divers sense, I know not why mens fancies or understandings should be more bound to be like one another then their faces: And either in all such places of Scrip­ture, a liberty must be indulg'd to every honest and peaceable wise man, or else all Argument from such places must be wholy declin'd. Now although I instanc'd in a Question, which by good fortune never came to open defiance, yet there have been Sects fram'd upon lighter grounds, more inconsiderable Que­stions, which have been disputed on either side with Arguments lesse materiall and lesse pertinent. S. Austin laught at the Donatists, for bringing that saying of the Spouse in the Canticles to prove their Schism, Indica mihi ubi pascas, ubi cubes in me­ridie. For from thence they concluded the residence of the Church was only in the South part of the world, only in Africa. It was but a weak way of Argument; yet the Fathers were free enough to use such mediums, to prove mysteries of great Hieron. in Matth. 13. concernment; but yet againe, when they speak either against an Adversary, or with consideration, they deny that such my­sticall senses can sufficiently confirm a Question of Faith. But I shall instance in the great Question of Rebaptization of He­reticks, which many Saints, and Martyrs, and Confessors, and divers Councells, and almost all Asia and Africa did once be­lieve and practise. Their grounds for the invalidity of the baptism by a Heretick, were such mysticall words as these, Oleum peccatoris non impinguet caput meum Ps. 140. And Qui baptiza­tur à mortuo, quid proficit lavatio ejus? Ecclus 34. And ab aquâ alienâ abstinete, Prov. 5. And Deus peccatores non exaudit, [Page 67] Joh. 9. And he that is not with me is against me, Luk. 11. I am not sure the other part had Arguments so good. For the great one of una fides, unum baptisma, did not conclude it to their understandings who were of the other opinion, and men famous in their generations; for it was no Argument that they who had been baptized by Johns baptism should not be bap­tized in the name of Jesus, because unus Deus, unum baptisma; and as it is still one Faith which a man confesseth severall times, and one Sacrament of the Eucharist, though a man often communicates; so it might be one baptism though of­ten ministred. And the unity of baptism might not be de­riv'd from the unity of the ministration, but from the unity of the Religion into which they are baptized; though baptized a thousand times, yet because it was still in the name of the holy Trinity, still into the death of Christ, it might be unum baptisma. Whether S. Cyprian, Firmilian, and their Collegues had this discourse or no (I know not) I am sure they might have had much better to have evacuated the force of that Ar­gument, although I believe they had the wrong cause in hand. But this is it that I say, that when a Question is so undeter­min'd in Scripture, that the Arguments rely only upon such mysticall places whence the best fancies can draw the greatest va­riety, and such which perhaps were never intended by the ho­ly Ghost, it were good the rivers did not swell higher then the fountaine, and the confidence higher then the Argument and evidence; for in this case there could not any thing be so certainly proved, as that the disagreeing party should deserve to be condemn'd by a sentence of Excommunication for dis­believing it, and yet they were; which I wonder at so much the more, because they (who as it was since judg'd) had the right cause, had not any sufficient Argument from Scripture, not so much as such mysticall Arguments, but did fly to the Tra­dition of the Church, in which also I shall afterward shew, they had nothing that was absolutely certaine.

3. I consider that there are divers places of Scripture con­taining Numb. 6. in them mysteries and Questions of great concernment, and yet the fabrick and constitution is such, that there is no certain mark to determine whether the sense of them should [Page 68] be literall or figurative; I speak not here concerning extrinsecall meanes of determination, as traditive Interpretation, Councels, Fathers, Popes, and the like; I shall consider them afterward in their severall places; but here the subject matter being con­cerning Scripture in its own capacity, I say there is nothing in the nature of the thing to determine the sense and meaning, but it must be gotten out as it can; and that therefore it is unreasonable, that what of it selfe is ambiguous should be un­derstood in its own prime sense and intention, under the paine of either a sinne or an Anathema; I instance in that famous place from whence hath sprung that Question of Transubstan­tiation, Hoc est corpus meum. The words are plain and clear, apt to be understood in the literall sense and yet this sense is so hard as it does violence to reason, and therefore it is the Question whether or no it be not a figurative speech. But here what shall we have to determine it? What mean soever we take, and to what sense soever you will expound it, you shall be put to give an account why you expound other places of Scripture in the same case to quite contrary senses. For if you expound it literally, then besides that it seems to intrench up­on the words of our blessed Saviour, The words that I speak they are Spirit and they are life, that is, to be spiritually under­stood (and it is a miserable thing to see what wretched shifts are used to reconcile the literall sense to these words, and yet to distinguish it from the Capernaiticall fancy) but besides this, why are not those other sayings of Christ expounded literal­ly, I am a Vine, I am the Doore, I am a Rock? Why doe we flie to a figure in those parallel words? This is the Covenant which I make between me and you; and yet that Covenant was but the sign of the Covenant; and why doe we fly to a figure in a precept, as well as in mystery and a proposition? If thy right hand offend thee cut it off; and yet we have figures enough to save a limb. If it be said because reason tells us these are not to be expounded according to the letter; This will be no plea for them who retaine the literall exposition of the other in­stance▪ against all reason, against all Philosophy, against all sense, and against two or three sciences. But if you expound these words figuratively, besides that you are to contest against [Page 69] a world of prejudices you give your selfe the liberty, which if others will use when either they have a reason or a necessity so to doe, they may perhaps turn all into Allegory, and so may evacuate any precept, and elude any Argument. Well, so it is that very wise men have expounded things Sic S Hieron. In ad [...]es [...]entiâ provocatus ar­dore & studio Scriptuarum allegoricè in­terpretatus sum Abdiam Pro­phetam, cujus historiam ne­sciebam. De sensu Allegorico S. Script. dixit Basilius, [...]. Allegorically, when they should have expounded them literally. So did the famous Origen, who as S. Hierom reports of him, turned Paradise so into an Allegory, that he took away quite the truth of the Story, and not only Adam was turned out of the Garden, but the Garden it selfe out of Paradise. Others expound things literally when they should understand them in Allegory; so did the Ancient Papias understand (Apocal. 20.) Christs Millenary raign upon earth, and so, depressed the hopes of Christianity and their desires to the longing and expectation of temporall pleasures and satisfactions, and he was followed by Justin Mar­tyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian, Lactantius, and indeed the whole Church generally till S. Austin and S. Hierom's time who first of any whose works are extant did reprove the errour. If such great spirits be deceiv'd in finding out what kinde of senses L. 23. de Civit. Dei, c 7. prae­fat. [...]. 19. in Isai. & in c. 36. Ezek. be to be given to Scriptures, it may well be endur'd that we who sit at their feet, may also tread in the steps of them whose feet could not alwayes tread aright.

4. I consider that there are some places of Scripture that Numb. 7. have the selfe same expressions, the same preceptive words, the same reason and account in all appearance, and yet either must be expounded to quite different senses, or else we must renounce the Communion, and the charities of a great part of Christen­dome. And yet there is absolutely nothing in the thing or in its circumstances, or in its adjuncts that can determine it to different purposes. I instance in those great exclusive negatives for the necessity of both Sacraments. Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aquâ &c. Nisi manducaveritis carnem filii hominis, &c. a non introibit in regnum coelorum for both these. Now then the first is urg'd for the absolute indispensable necessity of baptism even in Infants, insomuch that Infants goe to part of Hell if (inculpably both on their own and their Parents part) they misse of baptism, for that is the doctrine of the Church of Rome, which they learnt from S. Austin, and others also [Page 70] doe from hence baptize Infants, though with a lesse opinion of its absolute necessity. And yet the same manner of precept in the same forme of words, in the same manner of threat­ning, by an exclusive negative, shall not enjoyn us to com­municate Infants, though damnation (at least in forme of words) be exactly and per omnia alike appendant to the neglect of holy Baptism and the venerable Eucharist. If [nisi quis re­natus] shall conclude against the Anabaptist, for necessity of baptizing Infants (as sure enough we say, it does) why shall not an equall [nisi comederitis] bring Infants to the holy Commu­nion? The Primitive Church for some two whole Ages did follow their own principles, where ever they lead them; and see­ing that upon the same ground equall results must follow, they did Communicate Infants as soon as they had baptized them. And why the Church of Rome should not doe so too, being she expounds [nisi comederitis] of orall manducation, I cannot yet learn a reason. And for others that expound it of a spirituall manducation, why they shall not allow the disagreeing part the same liberty of expounding [nisi quis renatus] too, I by no meanes can understand. And in these cases no externall determiner can bee pretended in answer. For whatsoever is extrinsecall to the words, as Councels, Tradition, Church Au­thority, and Fathers, either have said nothing at all, or have concluded by their practise contrary to the present opinion, as is plaine in their communicating Infants by vertue of [nisi co­mederitis.]

5. I shall not need to urge the mysteriousnesse of some points in Scripture, which ex natura rei are hard to be under­stood Numb. 8. though very plainly represented. For there are some secreta Theologiae, which are only to be understood by persons very holy and spirituall, which are rather to be felt then dis­coursed of, and therefore if peradventure they be offered to publike consideration, they will therefore be opposed because they runne the same fortune with many other Questions, that is, not to be understood, and so much the rather because their understanding, that is, the feeling such secrets of the Kingdome, are not the results of Logick and Philosophy, nor yet of pub­like revelation, but of the publike spirit privately working, [Page 71] and in no man is a duty but in all that have it, is a reward, and is not necessary for all, but given to some, producing its ope­rations, not regularly, but upon occasions, personall necessities and new emergencies. Of this nature are the spirit of obsig­nation, beliefe of particular salvation, speciall influences and comforts comming from a sense of the spirit of adoption, actu­all fervours and great complacencies in devotion spirituall joyes, which are little drawings aside of the curtaines of peace and eternity, and antepasts of immortality. But the not under­standing the perfect constitution and temper of these mysteries (and it is hard for any man so to understand, as to make others doe so too that feele them not) is cause that in many Questions of secret Theology, by being very apt and easy to be mistaken, there is a necessity in forbearing one another; and this consideration would have been of good use in the Questi­on between Soto and Catharinus, both for the preservation of their charity and explication of the mystery.

6. But here it will not be unseasonable to consider, that Numb. 9. all systems and principles of science are expressed so that either by reason of the Universality of the termes and subject matter or the infinite variety of humane understandings, and these per­adventure swayed by interest, or determin'd by things accidentall and extrinsecall, they seem to divers men, nay to the same men upon divers occasions to speak things extremly disparate and sometimes contrary, but very often of great variety. And this very thing happens also in Scripture; that if it were not in re sacrâ & seria, it were excellent sport to observe how the same place of Scripture serves severall turns upon occasion, and they at that time believe the words sound nothing else, whereas in the liberty of their judgement and abstracting from that occasion, their Commentaries understand them wholy to a differing sense. It is a wonder of what excellent use to the Church of Rome, is [tibi dabo claves:] It was spoken to Peter and none else (sometimes) and therefore it concerns him and his Successors only; the rest are to derive from him. And yet if you Question them for their Sacrament of Penance, and Priestly Absolution, then tibi dabo claves comes in, and that was spoken to S. Peter, and in him to the whole Colledge of the Apostles, [Page 72] and in them to the whole Hierarchy. If you question why the Pope pretends to free soules from Purgatory, tibi dabo claves is his warrant; but if you tell him the Keyes are only for bind­ing and loosing on Earth directly, and in Heaven consequently; and that Purgatory is a part of Hell, or rather neither Earth nor Heaven nor Hell, and so the Keyes seem to have nothing to doe with it, then his Commission is to be enlarged by a suppleto­ry of reason and consequences, and his Keyes shall unlock this dif­ficulty; for it is clavis scientiae as well as authoritatis. And these Keyes shall enable him to expound Scriptures infallibly, to determine Questions, to preside in Councels, to dictate to all the World Magisterially, to rule the Church, to dispence with Oaths, to abrogate Lawes: And if his Key of knowledge will not, the Key of Authority shall, and tibi dabo claves shall an­swer for all. We have an instance in the single fancy of one man, what rare variety of matter is afforded from those plain words of [Oravi pro te Petre] Luk. 22. for that place sayes Bellarmine, is otherwise to be understood of Peter, otherwise of the Popes, and otherwise of the Church of Rome. And [pro te] Bellar. lib. 1. de Pontif. c. 3. § respondeo primò. signifies that Christ prayed that Peter might neither erre personally nor judicially, and that Peters Successors if they did erre personally, might not erre judicially, and that the Roman Church might not erre personally. All this variety of sense is pretended by the fancy of one man, to be in a few words which are as plain and simple as are any words in Scripture. And what then in those thousands that are intricate? So is done with pasce oves, which a man would think were a com­mission as innocent and guiltlesse of designs, as the sheep in the folds are. But if it be asked why the Bishop of Rome calls him­selfe Universall Bishop, pasce oves is his warrant? Why he pretends to a power of deposing Princes, Pasce oves, said Christ to Peter, the second time. If it be demanded why also he pretends to a power of authorizing his subjects to kill him, Pasce agnos said Christ the third time: And pasce is doce, and pasce is Impera, and pasce is occide. Now if others should take the same (unreasonable­nesse I will not say, but the same) liberty in expounding Scripture, or if it be not licence taken, but that the Scripture it selfe is so full and redundant in senses quite contrary, what [Page 73] man soever, or what company of men soever shall use this principle, will certainly finde such rare productions from seve­rall places, that either the unreasonablenesse of the thing will discover the errour of the proceeding, or else there will be a necessity of permitting a great liberty of judgement, where is so infinite variety without limit or mark of necessary deter­mination. If the first, then because an errour is so obvious and ready to our selves, it will be great imprudence or tyranny to be hasty in judging others; but if the latter, it is it that I con­tend for: for it is most unreasonable, when either the thing it selfe ministers variety, or that we take licence to our selves in variety of interpretations, or proclaime to all the world our great weaknesse, by our actually being deceived, that we should either prescribe to others magisterially when we are in errour, or limit their understandings when the thing it selfe affords li­berty and variety.

SECT. IV.

THese considerations are taken from the nature of Scripture it selfe; but then if we consider that we have no certain Numb. 1. wayes of determining places of difficulty and Question, infal­libly and certainly, but that we must hope to be sav'd in the be­liefe of things plaine, necessary and fundamentall, and our pi­ous endeavour to finde out Gods meaning in such places which he hath left under a cloud for other great ends reserved to his own knowledge, we shall see a very great necessity in al­lowing a liberty in Prophesying without prescribing authorita­tively to other mens consciences, and becomming Lords and Masters of their Faith. Now the meanes of expounding Scrip­ture are either externall, or internall. For the externall, as Church Authority, Tradition, Fathers, Councels and Decrees of Bishops, they are of a distinct consideration, and follow after in their order. But here we will first consider the inva­lidity and uncertainty of all those meanes of expounding [Page 74] Scripture which are more proper and internall to the nature of the thing. The great Masters of Commentaries, some whereof have undertaken to know all mysteries, have propounded many wayes to expound Scripture, which indeed are excellent helps, but not infallible assistances, both because themselves are but morall instruments which force not truth ex abscondito, as also because they are not infallibly used and applyed. 1. Sometime the sense is drawn forth by the context and connexion of parts: It is well when it can be so. But when there is two or three antecedents, and subjects spoken of, what man or what rule shall ascertain me that I make my reference true by drawing the relation to such an antecedent; to which I have a minde to ap­ply it, another hath not. For in a contexture where one part does not alwayes depend upon another, Where things of differing natures intervene and interrupt the first intentions, there it is not alwayes very probable to expound Scripture, take its meaning by its proportion to the neighbouring words. But who desires satisfaction in this, may read the observation verified in S. Gregory's moralls upon Job, lib. 5. c. 29. and the in­stances he there brings are excellent proofe, that this way of Interpretation does not warrant any man to impose his Expo­sitions upon the beliefe and understanding of other men too confidently and magisterially.

2. Another great pretence of medium is the conference of places, which Illyricus calls ingens remedium & faelicissimam ex­positionem Numb. 2. sanctae scripturae; and indeed so it is if well and temperately used; but then we are beholding to them that doe so; for there is no rule that can constrain them to it; for com­paring of places is of so indefinite capacity, that if there be ambiguity of words, variety of sense, alteration of circum­stances, or difference of stile amongst Divine Writers, then there is nothing that may be more abused by wilfull people, or may more easily deceive the unwary, or that may amuse the most intelligent Observer. The Anabaptists take advan­tage enough in this proceeding, (and indeed so may any one that list) and when we pretend against them the necessity of baptizing all, by authority of nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aquâ & spiritu, they have a parallel for it, and tell us that Christ [Page 75] will baptize us with the holy Ghost and with fire, and that one place expounds the other; and because by fire is not meant an Element or any thing that is naturall, but an Allegory and figurative expression of the same thing; so also by water may be meant the figure signifying the effect or manner of opera­tion of the holy Spirit. Fire in one place, and water in the other, doe but represent to us that Christs baptism is nothing else but the cleansing and purifying us by the holy Ghost; But that which I here note as of greatest concernment, and which in all reason ought to be an utter overthrow to this topique, is an universall abuse of it among those that use it most, and when two places seem to have the same expression, or if a word have a double signification, because in this place it may have such a sense, therefore it must, because in one of the places the sense is to their purpose, they conclude that there­fore it must be so in the other too. An instance I give in the great Question between the Socinians and the Catholikes. If any place be urg'd in which our blessed Saviour is called God, they shew you two or three where the word God is taken in a depressed sense, for a quasi Deus, as when God said to Moses, Constitui te Deum Pharaonis; and hence they argue, because I can shew the word is used for a Deus factus, therefore no Argument is sufficient to prove Christ to be Deus verus from the appellative of Deus. And might not another argue to the exact contrary, and as well urge that Moses is Deus verus, because in some places the word Deus is used pro Deo aeterno: Both wayes the Argument concludes impiously and unreasonably. It is a fallacy à posse ad esse affirmativè; be­cause breaking of bread is sometimes used for an Eucharisticall manducation in Scripture; therefore I shall not from any testi­mony of Scripture affirming the first Christians to have broken bread together, conclude that they liv'd hospitably and in com­mon society. Because it may possibly be eluded, therefore it does not signifie any thing. And this is the great way of an­swering all the Arguments that can be brought against any thing that any man hath a mind to defend; and any man that reads any controversies of any side, shall finde as many in­stances of this vanity almost as he finds Arguments from Scrip­ture; [Page 76] this fault was of old noted by S. Austin, for then they had got the trick, and he is angry at it, ne (que) enim putare debemus De doctri. Christian. lib. 3. esse praescriptum, ut quod in aliquo loco res aliqua per simili­tudinem significaverit, hoc etiam semper significare credamus.

3. Oftentimes Scriptures are pretended to be expounded by Numb. 3. a proportion and Analogy of reason. And this is as the other, if it be well, its well. But unlesse there were some intellectus universalis furnished with infallible propositions, by referring to which every man might argue infallibly, this Logick may deceive as well as any of the rest. For it is with reason as with mens tastes; although there are some generall principles which are reasonable to all men, yet every man is not able to draw out all its consequences, nor to understand them when they are drawn forth, nor to believe when he does understand them. There is a precept of S. Paul directed to the Thessalonians be­fore they were gather'd into a body of a Church, 2 Thes. 3. 6. To withdraw from every brother that walketh disorderly. But if this precept were now observed, I would faine know whether we should not fall into that inconvenience which S. Paul sought to avoyd in giving the same commandement to the Church of Corinth, 1 Cor. 5. 9. I wrote to you that yee should not company with fornicators; And yet not altogether with the fornicators of this world, for then yee must goe out of the world: And there­fore he restrains it to a quitting the society of Christians li­ving ill lives. But now that all the world hath been Christians, if we should sin in keeping company with vitious Christians, must we not also goe out of this world? Is not the precept made null, because the reason is altered, and things are come about, and that the [...] are the brethren [...] called brethren, as S. Pauls phrase is? And yet either this never was considered, or not yet believed; for it is generally taken to be obligatory, though (I think) seldome practised. But when we come to expound Scriptures to a certaine sense by Argu­ments drawn from prudentiall motives, then we are in a vast plain without any sufficient guide, and we shall have so many senses, as there are humane prudences. But that which goes fur­ther then this, is a parity of reason from a plain place of Scripture to an obscure, from that which is plainly set down in a Text [Page 77] to another that is more remote from it. And thus is that place in S. Matthew forced, If thy brother refuse to be amended, Dic ecclesiae. Hence some of the Roman Doctors argue, If Christ commands to tell the Church in case of adultery or private injury, then much more in case of heresy. Well, sup­pose this to be a good Interpretation; Why must I stay here? Why may not I also adde by a parity of reason, If the Church must be told of heresy, much more of treason: And why may not I reduce all sinnes to the cognizance of a Church tribunall, as some men doe indirectly, and Snecanus does heartily and plainly? If a mans principles be good, and his deductions cer­tain, he need not care whether they carry him. But when an Authority is intrusted to a person, and the extent of his power expressed in his commission, it will not be safety to meddle be­yond his commission upon confidence of a parity of reason. To instance once more; When Christ in pasce oves & tu es Pe­trus, gave power to the Pope to govern the Church (for to that sense the Church of Rome expounds those Authorities) by a certain consequence of reason, say they, he gave all things ne­cessary for exercise of this jurisdiction, and therefore in pasce oves] he gave him an indirect power over temporalls, for that is necessary that he may doe his duty: Well, having gone thus farre, we will goe further upon the parity of reason, therefore he hath given the Pope the gift of tongues, and he hath given him power to give it; for how else shall Xavier convert the In­dians? He hath given him also power to command the Seas and the winds, that they should obey him, for this also is very ne­cessary in some cases. And so pasce oves is accipe donum lingua­rum, and Impera ventis, & dispone regum diademata, & laico­rum praedia, and influentias caeli too, and whatsoever the parity of reason will judge equally necessary in order to pasce ovts; when a man does speak reason, it is but reason he should be heard; but though he may have the good fortune, or the great abilities to doe it, yet he hath not a certainty, no regular in­fallible assistance, no inspiration of Arguments and deducti­ons; and if he had, yet because it must be reason that must judge of reason, unlesse other mens understandings were of the same ayre, the same constitution and ability, they cannot be [Page 78] prescrib'd unto, by another mans reason; especially because such reasonings as usually are in explication of particular places of Scripture, depend upon minute circumstances and particularities, in which it is so easy to be deceived, and so hard to speak rea­son regularly and alwayes, that it is the greater wonder if we be not deceived.

4. Others pretend to expound Scripture by the analogy of Numb. 4. Faith, and that is the most sure and infallible way (as it is thought:) But upon stricter survey it is but a Chimera, a thing in nubibus which varies like the right hand and left hand of a Pillar, and at the best is but like the Coast of a Country to a Traveller out of his way; It may bring him to his jour­neyes end though twenty mile about; it may keep him from running into the Sea, and from mistaking a river for dry land; but whether this little path or the other be the right way it tells not. So is the analogy of Faith, that is, if I understand it right, the rule of Faith, that is the Creed. Now were it not a fine device to goe to expound all the Scripture by the Creed, there being in it so many thousand places which have no more relation to any Article in the Creed, then they have to Tityre tu patula? Indeed if a man resolves to keep the analogy of Faith, that is to expound Scripture, so as not to doe any violence to any fundamentall Article, he shall be sure however he erres, yet not to destroy Faith, he shall not pe­rish in his Exposition. And that was the precept given by S. Paul, that all Prophesyings should be estimated [...], Rom. 6. 12. and to this very purpose, S. Austin in his Ex­position of Genesis, by way of Preface sets down the Articles of Faith, with this design and protestation of it, that if he sayes nothing against those Articles, though he misse the par­ticular sense of the place, there is no danger, or sinne in his Exposition; but how that analogy of Faith should have any other influence in expounding such places in which those Ar­ticles of Faith are neither expressed, nor involv'd, I understand not. But then if you extend the analogy of Faith further then that which is proper to the rule of Symbol of Faith, then every man expounds Scripture according to the analogy of Faith; but what? His own Faith: which Faith if it be questioned, I am no [Page 79] more bound to expound according to the analogy of another mans Faith, then he to expound according to the analogy of mine. And this is it that is complain'd on of all sides that overvalue their own opinions. Scripture seems so clearly to speak what they believe, that they wonder all the world does not see it as clear as they doe; but they satisfie them­selves with saying that it is because they come with prejudice, whereas if they had the true beliefe, that is, theirs, they would easily see what they see. And this is very true: For if they did believe as others believe, they would expound Scriptures to their sense; but if this be expounding according to the analogy of Faith, it signifies no more then this, Be you of my mind and then my Arguments will seem concluding and my Authorities and Allegations pressing and pertinent: And this will serve on all sides, and therefore will doe but little service to the determi­nation of Questions, or prescribing to other mens consciences on any side.

Lastly, Consulting the Originals is thought a great matter Numb. 5. to Interpretation of Scriptures. But this is to small purpose: For indeed it will expound the Hebrew and the Greek, and rectifie Translations. But I know no man that sayes that the Scriptures in Hebrew and Greek are easie and certaine to be understood, and that they are hard in Latine and English: The difficulty is in the thing however it be expressed, the least is in the language. If the Originall Languages were our mother tongue, Scripture is not much the easier to us; and a naturall Greek or a Jew, can with no more reason, nor authority ob­trude his Interpretations upon other mens consciences, then a man of another Nation. Adde to this that the inspection of the Originall, is no more certain way of Interpretation of Scripture now then it was to the Fathers and Primitive Ages of the Church; and yet he that observes what infinite variety of Translations of the Bible were in the first Ages of the Church (as S. Hierom observes) and never a one like ano­ther; will think that we shall differ as much in our Inter­pretations as they did, and that the medium is as uncertain to us as it was to them; and so it is; witnesse the great number of late Translations, and the infinite number of Commentaries, [Page 80] which are too pregnant an Argument that wee neither a­gree in the understanding of the words nor of the sense.

The truth is, all these wayes of Interpreting of Scripture which of themselves are good helps, are made either by de­sign, Numb. 6. or by our infirmites wayes of intricating and involving Scriptures in greater difficulty, because men doe not learn their doctrines from Scripture, but come to the understanding of Scripture with preconceptions and idea's of doctrines of their own, and then no wonder that Scriptures look like Pi­ctures, wherein every man in the roome believes they look on him only, and that wheresoever he stands, or how often soever he changes his station. So that now what was intended for a remedy, becomes the promoter of our disease, and our meat becomes the matter of sicknesses: And the mischiefe is, the wit of man cannot find a remedy for it; for there is no rule, no limit, no certain principle, by which all men may be guided to a certain and so infallible an Interpretation, that he can with any equity prescribe to others to believe his Interpreta­tions in places of controversy or ambiguity. A man would think that the memorable Prophesy of Jacob, that the Scepter should not depart from Judah till Shiloh come, should have been so clear a determination of the time of the Messias, that a Jew should never have doubted it to have been verified in Jesus of Nazareth; and yet for this so clear vaticination, they have no lesse then twenty six Answers. S. Paul and S. James seem to speak a little diversly concerning Justification by Faith and Works, and yet to my understanding it is very easy to recon­cile them: but all men are not of my mind; for Osiander in his confutation of the book which Melanchton wrote against him, observes, that there are twenty severall opinions concer­ning Iustification, all drawn from the Scriptures, by the men only of the Augustan Confession. There are sixteen severall opinions concerning originall sinne; and as many definitions of the Sacraments as there are Sects of men that disagree about them.

And now what help is there for us in the midst of these uncertainties? If we follow any one Translation, or any one Numb. 7. mans Commentary, what rule shall we have to chuse the right [Page 81] by? or is there any one man, that hath translated perfectly, or expounded infallibly? No Translation challenges such a prero­gative as to be authentick, but the Vulgar Latine; and yet see with what good successe: For when it was declared authen­tick by the Councell of Trent, Sixtus put forth a Copy much mended of what it was, and tyed all men to follow that; but that did not satisfie; for Pope Clement reviews and corrects it in many places, and still the Decree remaines in a changed sub­ject. And secondly, that Translation will be very unapt to sa­tisfie, in which one of their own men Isidore Clarius a Monk of Brescia, found and mended eight thousand faults, besides innumerable others which he sayes he pretermitted. And then thirdly, to shew how little themselves were satisfied with it, divers learned men amongst them did new translate the Bible, and thought they did God and the Church good service in it. So that if you take this for your precedent, you are sure to be mistaken infinitely: If you take any other, the Authors them­selves doe not promise you any security. If you resolve to follow any one as farre only as you see cause, then you only doe wrong or right by chance; for you have certainty just proportionable to your own skill, to your own infallibility. If you resolve to follow any one, whether soever he leads, we shall oftentimes come thither where we shall see our selves become ridiculous, as it happened in the case of Spiridion Bi­shop of Cyprus, who so resolv'd to follow his old book, that when an eloquent Bishop who was desired to Preach, read his Text, Tu autem tolle cubile tuum & ambula; Spiridion was very angry with him, because in his book it was tolle lectum tuum, and thought it arrogance in the preacher to speak better Latine then his Translatour had done: And if it be thus in Translations, it is farre worse in Expositions: [Quia scil. Scripturam sacram pro ipsa sui altitudine non uno eodem (que) sensu omnes accipiunt, ut penè quot homines tot illic sententiae erui posse videantur, said Vincent Lirinensis] in which every man knows In Commonit. what innumerable wayes there are of being mistaken, God having in things not simply necessary left such a difficulty up­on those parts of Scripture which are the subject matters of controversy ad edomandam labore superbiam, & intellectum à [Page 82] [...] [Page 83] [...] [Page 80] [...] [Page 81] [...] [Page 82] fastidio revocandum (as S. Austin gives a reason) that all that erre honestly, are therefore to be pityed, and tolerated, be­cause Lib. 2. de doctr. Christian. c. 6. it is or may be the condition of every man at one time or other.

The summe is this: Since holy Scripture is the repository Numb. 8. of divine truths, and the great rule of Faith, to which all Sects of Christians doe appeale for probation of their severall opi­nions, and since all agree in the Articles of the Creed as things clearly and plainly set down, and as containing all that which is of simple and prime necessity; and since on the other side there are in Scripture many other mysteries, and matters of Questi­on upon which there is a vaile; since there are so many Copies with infinite varieties of reading; since a various Interpuncti­on, a parenthesis, a letter, an accent may much alter the sense; since some places have divers literall senses, many have spiritu­all, mysticall and Allegoricall meanings; since there are so many tropes, metonymies, ironies, hyperboles, proprieties and impro­prieties of language, whose understanding depends upon such circumstances that it is almost impossible to know its proper Interpretation; [now that the knowledge of such circumstances and particular stories is irrevocably lost: since there are some mysteries which at the best advantage of expression, are not easy to be apprehended, and whose explication, by reason of our imperfections, must needs be dark, sometimes weak, sometimes unintelligle: and lastly, since those ordinary meanes of expoun­ding Scripture, as searching the Originalls, conference of places, parity of reason, and analogy of Faith, are all dubious, uncer­tain, and very fallible, he that is the wisest and by consequence the likelyest to expound truest in all probability of reason, will be very farre from confidence, because every one of these and ma­ny more are like so many degrees of improbability and incer­tainty, all depressing our certainty of finding out truth in such mysteries and amidst so many difficulties. And therefore a wise man that considers this, would not willingly be prescrib'd to by others; and therefore if he also be a just man, he will not impose upon others; for it is best every man should be left in that liberty from which no man can justly take him, unlesse he could secure him from errour: So that here also there is a [Page 83] necessity to conserve the liberty of Prophesying, and Inter­preting Scripture; a necessity deriv'd from the considerati­on of the difficulty of Scripture in Questions controverted, and the uncertainty of any internall medium, of Interpre­tation.

SECT. V.

IN the next place, we must consider those extrinsecall meanes Numb. 1. of Interpreting Scripture, and determining Questions, which they most of all confide in that restraine Prophesying with the greatest Tyranny. The first and principall is Tradition, which is pretended not only to expound Scripture (Necesse enim est Vincent. Liri­nens. in Com­monitor. propter tantos tam varii erroris anfractus, ut Propheticae & A­postolicae interpretationis linea secundum Ecclesiastici & Catholici sensus normam dirigatur:) but also to propound Articles upon a distinct stock, such Articles whereof there is no mention and proposition in Scripture. And in this topick, not only the di­stinct Articles are clear and plain, like as the fundamentals of Faith expressed in Scripture, but also it pretends to expound Scripture, and to determine Questions with so much clarity and certainty, as there shall neither be errour nor doubt re­maining, and therefore no disagreeing is here to be endured. And indeed it is most true if Tradition can performe these pretensions, and teach us plainly, and assure us infallibly of all truths, which they require us to believe, we can in this case have no reason to disbelieve them, and therefore are certainly Hereticks if we doe, because without a crime, without some humane interest or collaterall design, we cannot disbelieve tra­ditive Doctrine or traditive Interpretation, if it be infallibly prov'd to us that tradition is an infallible guide.

But here I first consider that tradition is no repository of Numb. 2. Articles of Faith, and therefore the not following it is no [Page 84] Argument of heresy; for besides that I have shewed Scripture in its plain expresses to be an abundant rule of Faith and man­ners, Tradition is a topick as fallible as any other; so fallible that it cannot be sufficient evidence to any man in a matter of Faith or Question of heresy.

For 1. I find that the Fathers were infinitely deceived in Numb. 3. their account and enumeration of Traditions, sometimes they did call some Traditions, such, not which they knew to be so, but by Arguments and presumptions they concluded them so. Such as was that of S. Austin, ca quae universalis tenet Ecclesia nec à Con­ciliis Epist. 118. ad Ianuar. De bapt. contr. Donat. lib. 4. c. 24. instituta reperiuntur, credibile est ab Apostolorum traditione descendisse. Now suppose this rule probable, that's the most, yet it is not certaine; It might come by custome, whose Originall was not knowne, but yet could not derive from an Apostolicall principle. Now when they conclude of particular Traditions by a generall rule, and that generall rule not certain, but at the most probable in any thing, and certainly false in some things, it is wonder if the productions, that is, their judge­ments, and pretence faile so often. And if I should but instance in all the particulars, in which Tradition was pretended falsly or uncertainly in the first Ages, I should multiply them to a troublesome variety; for it was then accounted so glorious a thing to have spoken with the persons of the Apostles, that if any man could with any colour pretend to it, he might abuse the whole Church, and obtrude what he listed under the spe­cious title of Apostolicall Tradition, and it is very notorious to every man that will but read and observe the Recognitions or stromata of Clemens Alexandrinus, where there is enough of such false wares shewed in every book, and pretended to be no lesse then from the Apostles. In the first Age after the Apostles, Papias pretended he received a Tradition from the Apostles, that Christ before the day of Judgement should reign a thousand yeares upon Earth, and his Saints with him in temporall felicities; and this thing proceeding from so great an Authority as the testimony of Papias, drew after it all or most of the Christians in the first three hundred years. For besides, that the Millenary opinion is expresly taught by Papias, Justin Mar­tyr, Irenaus, Origen, Lactantius, Severus, Victorinus, Apollinaris, [Page 85] Nepos, and divers others famous in their time, Justin Martyr in his Dialogue against Tryphon sayes, it was the beliefe of all Christians exactly Orthodox, [...], and yet there was no such Tradition, but a mistake in Papias; but I find it nowhere spoke against, till Dionysins of Alexandria confuted Nepo's Book, and converted Coracion the Egyptian from the opinion. Now if a Tradition whose begin­ning of being called so began with a Scholar of the Apostles (for so was Papias) and then continued for some Ages upon the meer Authority of so famous a man, did yet deceive the Church: much more fallible is the pretence, when two or three hundred years after, it but commences, and then by some learned man is first called a Tradition Apostolicall. And so it hapned in the case of the Arrian heresy, which the Nicene Fathers did confute by objecting a contrary Tradition Apostolicall, as Theodoret re­ports; Lib. 1. hist. c. 8. and yet if they had not had better Arguments from Scrip­ture then from Tradition, they would have faild much in so good a cause; for this very pretence the Arrians themselves made, and desired to be tryed by the Fathers of the first three hundred years, which was a confutation sufficient to them who preten­ded Vide Peta [...]: in Epiph. her. 69. a clear Tradition, because it was unimaginable that the Tradition should leap so as not to come from the first to the last by the middle. But that this tryall was sometime decli­ned by that excellent man S. Athanasius, although at other times confidently and truly pretended, it was an Argument the Tradition was not so [...], [...] Matt. di [...]l ad Tryph. Iud. clear, but both sides might with some fairnesse pretend to it. And therefore one of the prime Founders of their heresy, the Heretick Euse. l. 5. c. ult. Artemon having ob­served the advantage might be taken by any Sect that would pretend Tradition, because the medium was plausible and con­sisting of so many particulars, that it was hard to be redargued, pretended a Tradition from the Apostles, that Christ was [...], and that the Tradition did descend by a constant succession in the Church of Rome to Pope Victors time inclusively, and till Zepherinus had interrupted the series and cor­rupted the Doctrine; which pretence if it had not had some appearance of truth, so as possibly to abuse the Church, had not been worthy of confutation, which yet was with care un­dertaken [Page 86] by an old Writer, out of whom Eusebius transcribes a large passage to reprove the vanity of the pretender. But I ob­serve from hence, that it was usuall to pretend to Tradition, and that it was easier pretended then confuted, and I doubt not but oftner done then discovered. A great Question arose in Africa concerning the Baptism of Hereticks, whether it were valid or no. S. Cyprian and his party appealed to Scripture; Stephen Bishop of Rome and his party, would be judged by cu­stome and Tradition Ecclesiasticall. See how much the nearer the Question was to a determination, either that probation was not accounted by S. Cyprian, and the Bishops both of Asia and Africk, to be a good Argument, and sufficient to determine them, or there was no certain Tradition against them; for unlesse one of these two doe it, nothing could excuse them from opposing a known truth, unlesse peradventure, S. Cyprian, Firmilian, the Bishops of Galatia, Cappadocia, and almost two parts of the World were ignorant of such a Tradition, for they knew of none such, and some of them expresly denyed it. And the sixth generall Synod approves of the Canon made in the Councell of Carthage under Cyprian upon this very ground, because in praedictorum praesulum locis & solum se­cundum Can. 2. traditam eis consuetudinem servatus est; they had a particular Tradition for Rebaptization, and therefore there could be no Tradition Universall against it, or if there were they knew not of it, but much for the contrary; and then it would be remembred that a conceal'd Tradition was like a si­lent Thunder, or a Law not promulgated; it neither was known, nor was obligatory. And I shall observe this too, that this very Tradition was so obscure, and was so obscurely delivered, silently proclaimed, that S. Austin who disputed against the Donatists upon this very Question was not able to prove it, but L. 5. de bap­tism. contr. Donat. c. 23. by a consequence which he thought probale and credible, as appears in his discourse against the Donatists. The Apostles, saith S. Austin, prescrib'd nothing in this particular: But this custome which is contrary to Cyprian ought to be believed to have come from their Tradition, as many other things which the Catholike Church observes. That's all the ground and all the reason; nay the Church did waver concerning that Question, and before the [Page 87] decision of a Councell, Cyprian and others might dissent with­out breach of charity. It was plain then there was no clear Tradi­tion Lib. 1. de bap­tism. c. 18. in the Question, possibly there might be a custome in some Churches postnate to the times of the Apostles, but nothing that was obligatory, no Tradition Apostolicall. But this was a supple­tory device ready at hand when ever they needed it; and De peccat. ori­ginal. l. 2. c. 40. contra Pelagi. & Caelest. S. Austin confuted the Pelagians, in the Question of Originall sinne, by the custome of exorcisme and insufflation, which S. Austin said came from the Apostles by Tradition, which yet was then, and is now so impossible to be prov'd, that he that shall affirm it, shall gaine only the reputation of a bold man and a confident.

2. I consider if the report of Traditions in the Primitive Numb. 4. times so neare the Ages Apostolicall was so uncertain, that they were fain to aym at them by conjectures, and grope as in the dark, the uncertainty is much encreased since, because there are many famous Writers whose works are lost, which yet if they had continued, they might have been good records to us, as Clemens Romanus, Egesippus, Nepos, Coracion, Dionysius Areopagite, of Alexandria, of Corinth, Firmilian and many more: And since we see pretences have been made without reason in those Ages where they might better have been confuted, then now they can, it is greater prudence to suspect any later pre­tences, since so many Sects have been, so many warres, so many corruptions in Authors, so many Authors lost, so much ignorance hath intervened, and so many interests have been ser­ved, that now the rule is to be altered; and whereas it was of old time credible, that that was Apostolicall whose beginning they knew not, now quite contrary we cannot safely believe them to be Apostolicall unlesse we doe know their beginning to have been from the Apostles. For this consisting of pro­babilities and particulars, which put together make up a morall demonstration, the Argument which I now urge hath been growing these fifteen hundred years; and if anciently there was so much as to evacuate the Authority of Tradition, much more is there now absolutely to destroy it, when all the particulars, which time and infinite variety of humane accidents have been amassing together, are now concentred, and are united by [Page 88] way of constipation. Because every Age and every great change, and every heresy, and every interest, hath increased the difficulty of finding out true Traditions.

3. There are very many Traditions which are lost, and yet they are concerning matters of as great consequence as most of Numb. 5. those Questions for the determination whereof Traditions are pretended: It is more then probable, that as in Baptism and the Eucharist the very formes of ministration are transmitted to us, so also in confirmation and ordination, and that there were speciall directions for visitation of the sick, and explicite interpretations of those difficult places of S. Paul which S. Pe­ter affirmed to be so difficult that the ignorant doe wrest them to their own damnation, and yet no Church hath conserved these or those many more which S. Basil affirms to be so many that [...]; the day would faile him in the very simple enumeration of all Cap. 29. despir. Sancto. Traditions Ecclesiasticall. And if the Church hath fail'd in keeping the great variety of Traditions, it will hardly be thought a fault in a private person to neglect Tradition, which either the whole Church hath very much neglected inculpably, or else the whose Church is very much too blame. And who can ascertain us that she hath not entertained some which are no Traditions as well as lost thousands that are? That she did entertain some false Traditions, I have already prov'd; but it is also as probable that some of those which these Ages did pro­pound for Traditions, are not so, as it is certain that some which the first Ages cald Traditions, were nothing lesse.

4. There are some opinions which when they began to be publikely received, began to be accounted prime Traditions, Numb. 6. and so became such not by a native title, but by adoption; and nothing is more usuall then for the Fathers to colour their popular opinion with so great an appellative. S. Austin cald the communicating of Infants an Apostolicall Tradition, and yet we doe not practise it, because we disbelieve the Allegation. And that every custome which at first introduction was but a private fancy or singular practise, grew afterwards into a publike rite and went for a Tradition after a while continuance, appears by Tertullian who seems to justifie it, Non enim existimas tu Contra Mar­con. [Page 89] licitum esse cuicun (que) fideli constituere quod Deo placere illi visum De coron. milit. c. 3. & 4. fuerit, ad disciplinam & salutem. And againe, A quocun (que) traditore censetur, nec authorem respicias sed authoritatem. And S. Hierome most plainly, Praecepra majorum Apostolicas Tradi­ones Apud Euseb. l. 5. c. 20. quis (que) existimat. And when Irenaeus had observed that great variety in the keeping of Lent, which yet to be a fourty dayes Fast is pretended to descend from Tradition Apostolicall, some fasting but one day before Easter, some two, some fourty, and this even long before Irenaeus time, he gives this reason, Varietas illa jejunii coepit apud Majores nostros qui non accuratè consue­tudinem eorum qui vel simplicitate quâdam vel privatâ authori­tate in posterum aliquid statuissent, observarant [ex translatione Christophorsoni:] And there are yet some points of good con­cernment, which if any man should Question in a high manner, they would prove indeterminable by Scripture, or sufficient rea­son, and yet I doubt not their confident Defenders would say they are opinions of the Church, and quickly pretend a Tra­dition from the very Apostles, and believe themselves so secure that they could not be discovered, because the Question never having been disputed, gives them occasion to say that which had no beginning known, was certainly from the Apostles. For why should not Divines doe in the Question of reconfirmation as in that of rebaptization? Are not the grounds equall from an indelible character in one as in the other? and if it hap­pen such a Question as this after contestation should be deter­min'd not by any positive decree, but by the cession of one part, and the authority and reputation of the other, does not the next Age stand faire to be abused with a pretence of Tradition, in the matter of reconfirmation, which never yet came to a serious Question? For so it was in the Question of rebaptization for which there was then no more evident Tradi­tion then there is now in the Question of reconfirmation, as I proved formerly, but yet it was carried upon that Title.

5. There is great variety in the probation of Tradition, so that whatever is proved to be Tradition, is not equally and Numb. 7. alike credible; for nothing but universall Tradition is of it selfe credible; other Traditions in their just proportion as they par­take of the degrees of universality. Now that a Tradition be [Page 90] universall, or which is all one that it be a credible Testimony, S. Irenaeus requires that Tradition should derive from all the Lib. 3. c. 4. Churches Apostolicall. And therefore according to this rule there was no sufficient medium to determine the Question about Easter, because the Eastern and Western Churches had severall Traditions respectively, and both pretended from the Apostles. Clemens Alexandrinus sayes, it was a secret Tradi­tion Li. 1. Stromat. from the Apostles that Christ preached but one year: But L. 2. c. 39. Irenaeus sayes it did derive from Hereticks, and sayes that he Omnes Senio­res testantur qui in Asiâ a­pud Iohannem Discipulum Domini con­venerunt id ipsum tradi­disse eis Io­hannem, &c. & qui alios Apo­stolos viderunt haec eadem ab ipsis audierunt, & testantur de ejusmodi relatione. by Tradition first from S. John, and then from his Disciples received another Tradition, that Christ was almost fifty years old when he dyed, and so by consequence preached almost twenty years; both of them were deceived, and so had all that had belie­ved the report of either pretending Tradition Apostolicall. Thus the custome in the Latine Church of fasting on Saturday was against that Tradition which the Greeks had from the Apostles; and therefore by this division and want of consent, which was the true Tradition was so absolutely indeterminable, that both must needs lose much of their reputation. But how then when not only particular Churches but single persons are all the proofe we have for a Tradition? And this often hapned; I think S. Austin is the chiefe Argument and Authority we have for the Assumption of the Virgin Mary; the Baptism of In­fants is called a Tradition by Origen alone at first, and from Salmeron. disput. 51. in Rom. him by others. The procession of the holy Ghost from the Sonne, which is an Article the Greek Church disavowes, de­rives from the Tradition Apostolicall, as it is pretended; and yet before S. Austin we heare nothing of it very cleerly or certainly, for as much as that whole mystery concerning the blessed Spirit was so little explicated in Scripture, and so little derived to them by Tradition, that till the Councell of Nice, you shall hardly find any form of worship or personall addresse of devotion to the holy Spirit, as Erasmus observes, and I think the contrary will very hardly be verified. And for this particu­lar in which I instance, whatsoever is in Scripture concerning it, is against that which the Church of Rome calls Tradition, which makes the Greeks so confident as they are of the point, and is an Argument of the vanity of some things which for no [Page 91] greater reason are called Traditions, but because one man hath said so, and that they can be proved by no better Argument to be true. Now in this case wherein Tradition descends upon us with unequall certainty, it would be very unequall to require of us an absolute beliefe of every thing not written, for feare we be accounted to slight Tradition Apostolicall. And since no thing can require our supreme assent, but that which is truly Catholike and Apostolike, and to such a Tradition is requir'd as Irenaeus sayes, the consent of all those Churches which the Apo­stles planted, and where they did preside, this topick will be of so little use in judging heresies that (besides what is deposited in Scripture) it cannot be proved in any thing but in the Canon of Scripture it selfe, and as it is now received, even in that there is some variety.

And therefore there is wholy a mistake in this businesse; for when the Fathers appeal to Tradition, and with much earnest­nesse, Numb. 8. and some clamour they call upon Hereticks to conform to or to be tryed by Tradition, it is such a Tradition as deli­vers the fundamentall points of Christianity, which were also recorded in Scripture. But because the Canon was not yet perfectly consign'd, they call'd to that testimony they had, which was the testimony of the Churches Apostolicall, whose Bishops and Priests being the Antistites religionis, did believe and preach Christian Religion and conserve all its great myste­ries according as they had been taught. Irenaeus calls this a Tra­dition Apostolicall, Christum accepisse calicem, & dixisse san­guinem suum esse, & docuisse novam oblationem novi Testa­menti, quam Ecclesia per Apostolos accipiens offert per totum mundum. And the Fathers in these Ages confute Hereticks by Ecclesiasticall Tradition, that is, they confront against their im­pious and blaspemous doctrines that Religion which the Apo­stles having taught to the Churches where they did preside, their Successors did still preach, and for a long while together suffered not the enemy to sow tares amongst their wheat. And yet these doctrines which they called Traditions, were no­thing but such fundamentall truths which were in Scripture, [...], is Irenaeus in Eusebius observes, in the instance of Polycarpus, and it is manifest by considering Lib. 5. cap. 20. [Page 92] what heresies they fought against, the heresies of Ebion, Ce­rinthus, Nicolaitans, Valentinians, Carpocratians, persons that Vid. Irenae. l. 3 & 4. cont. haeres. denyed the Sonne of God, the Unity of the God-head, that preached impurity, that practised Sorcery and Witch-craft. And now that they did rather urge Tradition against them then Scripture was, because the publike Doctrine of all the A­postolicall Churches was at first more known and famous then many parts of the Scripture, and because some Hereticks denyed S. Lukes Gospel, some received none but S. Matthews, some re­jected all S. Pauls Epistles, and it was a long time before the whole Canon was consign'd by universall Testimony, some Churches having one part some another, Rome her selfe had not all, so that in this case the Argument from Tradition was the most famous, the most certain, and the most prudent. And now according to this rule they had more Traditions then we have, and Traditions did by degrees lessen as they came to be writ­ten, and their necessity was lesse, as the knowledge of them was ascetained to us by a better Keeper of Divine Truths. All that great mysteriousnesse of Christs Priest-hood, the unity of his Sacrifice, Christs Advocation and Intercession for us in Heaven, and many other excellent. Doctrines might very well be accounted Traditions before S. Pauls Epistle to the He­brews was publish'd to all the World; but now they are written truths; and if they had not, possibly we might either have lost them quite, or doubted of them as we doe of many other Traditions, by reason of the insufficiency of the propounder. And therefore it was that S. Peter took order that the Gospel 2 Pet. 1. 13. should be Writ, for he had promised that he would doe some­thing which after his decease should have these things in re­membrance. He knew it was not safe trusting the report of men where the fountain might quickly run dry, or be corrup­ted so insensibly, that no cure could be found for it, nor any just notice taken of it till it were incurable. And indeed there is scarce any thing but what is written in Scripture, that can with any confidence of Argument pretend to derive from the Apostles, except ritualls, and manners of ministration; but no doctrines or speculative mysteries are so transmitted to us by so cleer a current, that we may see a visible channell, [Page 93] and trace it to the Primitive fountaines. It is said to be a Tradition Apostolicall, that no Priest should baptize without chrism and the command of the Bishop: Suppose it were, yet we cannot be oblig'd to believe it with much confidence, because we have but little proofe for it, scarce any thing but the single testimony of S. Hierom. And yet if it were, this is but a rituall, of which in passing by, I shall give that account: That, Dialog. adv. Lucifer. suppose this and many more ritualls did derive clearly from Tradition Apostolicall (which yet but very few doe) yet it is hard that any Church should be charged with crime for not ob­serving such ritualls, because we see some of them which cer­tainly did derive from the Apostles, are expir'd and gone out in a desuetude; such as are abstinence from blood, and from things strangled, the coenobitick life of secular persons, the colledge of widowes, to worship standing upon the Lords day, to give milk and honey to the newly baptized, and many more of the like nature; now there having been no mark to distinguish the necessity of one from the indifferency of the other, they are all alike necessary, or alike indifferent; if the former, why does no Church observe them? if the later, why does the Church of Rome charge upon others the shame of novelty, for leaving of some Rites and Ceremonies which by her own practice we are taught to have no obligation in them, but to be adiaphorous? S. Paul gave order, that a Bishop should be the husband of one wife; The Church of Rome will not allow so much; other Churches allow more: The Apostles commanded Christians to Fast on Wednesday and Friday, as appeares in their Canons; The Church of Rome Fasts Friday and Saturday, and not on Wednesday: The Apostles had their Agapae or love Feasts, we should believe them scandalous: They used a kisse of charity in ordinary addresses, the Church of Rome keeps it only in their Masse, other Churches quite omit it: The Apostles permitted Priests and Deacons to live in conjugall Society as appears in the 5. Can. of the Apostles (which to them is an Argument who believe them such) and yet the Church of Rome, by no meanes will endure it; nay more, Michael Medina gives Testimony that of 84 Canons Apostolicall which Clemens col­lected, De sacr. hom, continent, li 5. c. 105. scarce six or eight are observed by the Latine Church, [Page 94] and Peresius gives this account of it, In illis contineri multa quae temporum corruptione non plenè observantur, aliis pro temporis & De Tradit. part. 3. c. de Author. Can. Apost. materiae qualitate aut obliteratis, aut totius Ecclesiae magisterio abrogatis. Now it were good that they which take a liberty to themselves, should also allow the same to others. So that for one thing or other, all Traditions excepting those very few that are absolutely universall, will lose all their obligation, and become no competent medium to confine mens practises, or limit their faiths, or determine their perswasions. Either for the difficulty of their being prov'd, the incompetency of the testimony that transmits them, or the indifferency of the thing transmitted, all Traditions both rituall and doctrinall are dis­abled from determining our consciences either to a necessary believing or obeying.

6. To which I adde by way of confirmation, that there are some things called Traditions, and are offered to be proved to Numb. 9. us by a Testimony, which is either false or not extant. Cle­mens of Alexandria pretended it a Tradition that the Apostles preached to them that dyed in infidelity, even after their death, and then raised them to life, but he proved it only by the Testimony of the Book of Hermes; he affirmed it to be a Tra­dition Apostolicall, that the Greeks were saved by their Philo­sophy, but he had no other Authority for it but the Apocry­phall Books of Peter and Paul. Tertullian and S. Basil pretend it an Apostolicall Tradition, to sign in the aire with the sign of the Crosse, but this was only consign'd to them in the Go­spel of Nicodemus. But to instance once for all in the Epistle of Marcellus to the Bishop of Antioch, where he affirmes that it is the Canon of the Apostles, praeter sententiam Romani Pontificis, non posse Conciliae celebrari. And yet there is no such Canon extant, nor ever was for ought appears in any Re­cord we have; and yet the Collection of the Canons is so intire, that though it hath something more then what was Apostoli­call, yet it hath nothing lesse. And now that I am casually fal­len upon an instance from the Canons of the Apostles, I con­sider that there cannot in the world a greater instance be given how easy it is to be abused in the believing of Traditions. For 1. to the first 50. which many did admit for Apostolicall, 35 [Page 95] more were added, which most men now count spurious, all men call dubious, and some of them universally condemned by peremptory sentence, even by them who are greatest ad­mirers of that Collection, as 65. 67. and 8 ⅘ Canons. For the first 50, it is evident that there are some things so mixt with them, and no mark of difference left, that the credit of all is much impared, insomuch that Isidor of Sevill sayes, they were Apoeryphall, made by Hereticks, and published under the Apud Gratian. dist. 16. c. Ca­nones. title Apostolicall, but neither the Fathers nor the Church of Rome did give assent to them. And yet they have prevail'd so farre amongst some, that Damascen is of opinion they should Lib. [...]. c. 18 de Orthod. fide. be received equally with the Canonicall writings of the Apo­stles. One thing only I observe (and we shall find it true in most writings, whose Authority is urged in Questions of Theo­logy) that the Authority of the Tradition is not it which moves the assent, but the nature of the thing; and because such a Canon is delivered, they doe not therefore believe the sanction or proposition so delivered, but disbelieve the Traditi­on, if they doe not like the matter, and so doe not judge of the matter by the Tradition, but of the Tradition by the mat­ter. And thus the Church of Rome rejects the 84 or 85 Canon of the Apostles, not because it is delivered with lesse Authority, then the last 35 are, but because it reckons the Canon of Scripture otherwise then it is at Rome. Thus also the fifth Canon amongst the first 50, because it approves the marriage of Priests and Deacons does not perswade them to approve of it too, but it selfe becomes suspected for approving it: So that either they accuse themselves of palpable contempt of the Apostolicall Au­thority, or else that the reputation of such Traditions is kept up to serve their own ends, and therefore when they encounter them, they are more to be upheld; which what else is it but to teach all the world to contemn such pretences and under­value Traditions, and to supply to others a reason why they should doe that, which to them that give the occasion is most unreasonable?

7. The Testimony of the Ancient Church being the only Numb. 10. meanes of proving Tradition, and sometimes their dictates and doctrine being the Tradition pretended of necessity to be [Page 96] imitated, it is considerable that men in their estimate of it, take their rise from severall Ages and differing Testimonies, and are not agreed about the competency of their Testimony; and the reasons that on each side make them differ, are such as make the Authority it selfe the lesse authentick and more repudiable. Some will allow only of the three first Ages, as being most pure, most persecuted, and therefore most holy, least interested, serving fewer designs, having fewest factions, and therefore more likely to speak the truth for Gods sake and its own, as best complying with their great end of acquiring Heaven in recompence of losing their lives: Others Vid. Card. Petron. lettre an Sieur Casaubon. say, that those Ages being persecuted minded the present Doctrines proportionable to their purposes and constitution of the Ages, and make little or nothing of those Questions which at this day vex Christendome: And both speak true: The first Ages speak greatest truth, but least pertinently. The next Ages, the Ages of the foure generall Councels spake something, not much more pertinently to the present Questions, but were not so likely to speak true, by reason of their dispositions contrary to the capacity and circum­stance of the first Ages; and if they speak wisely as Doctors, yet not certainly as witnesses of such propositions which the first Ages noted not; and yet unlesse they had noted, could not possibly be Traditions. And therefore either of them will be lesse uselesse as to our present affaires. For indeed the Que­stions which now are the publike trouble, were not considered or thought upon for many hundred years, and therefore prime Tradition there is none as to our purpose, and it will be an insufficient medium to be used or pretended in the determina­tion; and to dispute concerning the truth or necessity of Tra­ditions, in the Questions of out times, is as if Historians dispu­ting about a Question in the English Story, should fall on wrangling whether Livie or Plutarch were the best Writers: And the earnest disputes about Traditions are to no better pur­pose. For no Church at this day admits the one halfe of those things, which certainly by the Fathers were called Traditions Apostolicall, and no Testimony of ancient Writers does consign the one halfe of the present Questions, to be or not to be Tradi­tions. So that they who admit only the Doctrine and Testimony [Page 97] of the first Ages cannot be determined in most of their doubts which now trouble us, because their Writings are of matters wholy differing from the present disputes, and they which would bring in after Ages to the Authority of a competent judge or witnesse, say the same thing; for they plainly confesse that the first Ages spake little or nothing to the present Question, or at least nothing to their sense of them; for therefore they call in aid from the following Ages, and make them suppletory and auxiliary to their designs, and therefore there are no Traditions to our purposes. And they who would willingly have it other­wise, yet have taken no course it should be otherwise; for they when they had opportunity in the Councels of the last Ages to determine what they had a mind to, yet they never nam'd the number, nor expressed the particular Traditions which they would faine have the world believe to be Apostolicall: But they have kept the bridle in their own hands, and made a reserve of their own power, that if need be, they may make new pretensions, or not be put to it to justifie the old by the en­gagement of a conciliary declaration.

Lastly, We are acquitted by the Testimony of the Primi­tive Fathers, from any other necessity of believing, then of Numb. 11. such Articles as are recorded in Scripture: And this is done by them, whose Authority is pretended the greatest Argument for Tradition, as appears largely in Irenaeus, who disputes professed­ly for the sufficiency of Scripture against certain Hereticks, who L. 3. c. 2. contr. haeres. affirm some necessary truths not to be written. It was an excel­lent saying of S. Basil and will never be wipt out with all the eloquence of Perron [in his Serm. de fide. Manifestus est fidei lapsus, & liquidum superbiae vitium vel respuere aliquid eorum quae Scriptura habet, vel inducere quicquam quod scriptum non est.] And it is but a poore device to say that every particular Tradition is consigned in Scripture by those places which give Authority to Tradition; and so the introducing of Tradition is not a super-inducing any thing over or besides Scripture, because Tradition is like a Messenger, and the Scripture is like his Let­ters of Credence, and therefore Authorizes whatsoever Tradi­tion speaketh. For supposing Scripture does consign the Autho­rity of Tradition (which it might doe before all the whole [Page 98] Instrument of Scripture it self was consign'd, and then afterwards there might be no need of Tradition) yet supposing it, it will follow that all those Traditions which are truly prime and Apostolicall, are to be entertain'd according to the intention of the Deliverers, which indeed is so reasonable of it selfe, that we need not Scripture to perswade us to it; it selfe is authentick as Scripture is, if it derives from the same fountain; and a word is never the more the Word of God for being written, nor the lesse for not being written; but it will not follow that whatsoever is pretended to be Tradition, is so, neither is the credit of the particular instances consign'd in Scripture; & dolosus versatur in generalibus, but that this craft is too palpa­ble. And if a generall and indefinite consignation of Tradition be sufficient to warrant every particular that pretends to be Tradition, then S. Basil had spoken to no purpose by saying it is Pride & Apostasy from the Faith, to bring in what is not written: For if either any man brings in what is written, or what he sayes is delivered, then the first being expresse Scripture, and the second being consign'd in Scripture, no man can be charged with superin­ducing what is not written, he hath his Answer ready; And then these are zealous words absolutely to no purpose; but if such ge­nerall consignation does not warrant every thing that pretends to Tradition, but only such as are truly proved to be Apostolicall; then Scripture is uselesse as to this particular; for such Tradition gives testimony to Scripture, and therefore is of it selfe first, and more credible, for it is credible of it selfe; and therefore unlesse S. Basil thought that all the will of God in matters of Faith and Doctrine were written, I see not what end nor what sense he could have in these words: For no man in the world except Enthusiasts and mad-men ever obtruded a Doctrine upon-the Church, but he pretended Scripture for it or Tradition, and therefore no man could be pressed by these words, no man con­futed, no man instructed, no not Enthusiasts or Montanists. For suppose either of them should say, that since in Scripture the holy Ghost is promised to abide with the Church for ever, to teach, whatever they pretend the Spirit in any Age hath taught them, is not to super-induce any thing beyond what is writ­ten, because the truth of the Spirit, his veracity, and his per­petuall [Page 99] teaching being promised and attested in Scripture, Scrip­ture hath just so consign'd all such Revelations, as Perron saith it hath all such Traditions. But I will trouble my selfe no more with Arguments from any humane Authorities; but he that is surprized with the beliefe of such Authorities, and will but consider the very many Testimonies of Antiquity to this pur­pose, as of Orat. ad Ni­cen. PP. apud. Theodor. l. 1. c. 7. Constantine, In Matth. l. 4. c. 23. & in Ag­gaeum. S. Hierom, De bono vi­duil. c. 1. S. Austin, Orat. contr. gent. S. Athae­nasius, In Psal. 132. S. Hilary, L. 2. contra. heres. tom. 1. haer. 61. S. Epiphanius, and divers others, all speaking words to the same sense, with that saying of S. 1. Cor. 4. Paul, Nemo sentiat super quod scriptum est, will see that there is reason, that since no man is materially a Heretick, but he that erres in a point of Faith, and all Faith is sufficienly recorded in Scripture, the judgement of Faith and Heresy is to be derived from thence, and no man is to be condemned for dissenting in an Article for whose probation Tradition only is pretended; only according to the degree of its evidence, let every one deter­mine himselfe, but of this evidence we must not judge for others; for unlesse it be in things of Faith, and absolute certain­ties, evidence is a word of relation, and so supposes two terms, the object and the faculty; and it is an imperfect speech to say a thing is evident in it selfe (unlesse we speak of first principles or clearest revelations) for that may be evident to one that is not so to another, by reason of the pregnancy of some appre­hensions, and the immaturity of others.

This Discourse hath its intention in Traditions Doctrinall and Rituall, that is such Traditions which propose Articles new in materiâ; but now if Scripture be the repository of all Divine Truths sufficient for us, Tradition must be considered as its instrument, to convey its great mysteriousnesse to our under­standings; it is said there are traditive Interpretations as well as traditive propositions, but these have not much distinct consideration in them, both because their uncertainty is as great as the other upon the former considerations; as also be­cause in very deed, there are no such things as traditive In­terpretations universall: For as for particulars, they signifie no more but that they are not sufficient determinations of Que­stions Theologicall, therefore because they are particular, con­tingent, and of infinite variety, and they are no more Argu­ment [Page 100] then the particular authority of these men whose Com­mentaries they are, and therefore must be considered with them.

The summe is this: Since the Fathers who are the best Numb. 12. Witnesses of Traditions, yet were infinitely deceived in their account, since sometimes they guest at them and conjectured by way of Rule and Discourse, and not of their knowledge, not by evidence of the thing; since many are called Traditi­ons which were not so, many are uncertaine whether they were or no, yet confidently pretended; and this uncertainty which at first was great enough, is increased by infinite causes and accidents in the succession of 1600 yeares; since the Church hath been either so carelesse or so abused that shee could not, or would not preserve Traditions with carefulnesse and truth; since it was ordinary for the old Writers to set out their own fancies, and the Rites of their Church which had been Ancient under the specious Title of Apostolicall Tra­ditions; since some Traditions rely but upon single Testimo­ny at first, and yet descending upon others, come to be attested by many, whose Testimony though conjunct, yet in value is but single, because it relies upon the first single Relator, and so can have no greater authority, or certainty, then they derive from the single person; since the first Ages who were most competent to consign Tradition, yet did consign such Traditions as be of a nature wholy discrepant from the present Questions, and speak nothing at all or very imperfectly to our purposes; and the fol­lowing Ages are no fit Witnesses of that which was not transmitted to them, because they could not know it at all, but by such transmission and prior consignation; since what at first was a Tradition, came afterwards to be written, and so ceased its being a Tradition; yet the credit of Traditions commenc'd upon the certainty and reputation of those truths first delivered by word, afterward consign'd by writing; since what was certainly Tradition Apostolicall, as many Rituals were, are rejected by the Church in severall Ages, and are gone out into a desuetude; and lastly, since, beside the no necessity of Traditions, there being abundantly enough in Scripture, there are many things called Traditions by the Fathers, which they [Page 101] themselves either proved by no Authors, or by Apocryphall and spurious and Hereticall, the matter of Tradition will in very much be so uncertain, so false, so suspitious, so contradi­ctory, so improbable, so unproved, that if a Question be con­tested and be offered to be proved only by Tradition, it will be very hard to impose such a proposition to the beliefe of all men with any imperiousnesse or resolved determination, but it will be necessary men should preserve the liberty of belie­ving and prophesying, and not part with it, upon a worse merchandise and exchange then Esau made for his birth­right.

SECT. VI.

BUt since we are all this while in uncertainty, it is necessary that we should addresse our selves somewhere, where we Numb. 1. may rest the soale of our foot: And nature, Scripture, and ex­perience teach the world in matters of Question to submit to some finall sentence. For it is not reason that controversies should continue till the erring person shall be willing to con­demn himselfe; and the Spirit of God hath directed us by that great precedent at Jerusalem, to addresse our selves to the Church, that in a plenary Councell and Assembly, shee may synodically determine Controversies. So that if a Generall Councell have determin'd a Question, or expounded Scripture, we may no more disbelieve the Decree, then the Spirit of God himselfe who speaks in them. And indeed, if all Assemblies of Bishops were like that first, and all Bishops were of the same spirit of which the Apostles were, I should obey their Decree with the same Religion as I doe them whole preface was Visum est Spiritui Sancto & nobis: And I doubt not but our blessed Saviour intended that the Assemblies of the Church should be Judges of Controversies, and guides of our perswa­sions [Page 98] [...] [Page 99] [...] [Page 100] [...] [Page 101] [...] [Page 102] in matters of difficulty. But he also intended they should proceed according to his will which he had revealed, and those precedents which he had made authentick by the immediate assistance of his holy Spirit: He hath done his part, but we doe not doe ours. And if any private person in the simplicity and purity of his soule desires to find out a truth of which he is in search and inquisition, if he prayes for wisedome, we have a promise he shall be heard and answered liberally, and therefore much more, when the representatives of the Catholike Church doe meet, because every person there hath in individuo a title to the promise, and another title as he is a governour and a guide of soules, and all of them together have another title in their united capacity, especially, if in that union they pray, and proceed with simplicity and purity; so that there is no disputing against the pretence and promises, and authority of Generall Councels. For if any one man can hope to be guided by Gods Spirit in the search, the pious and impartiall and un­prejudicate search of truth, then much more may a Generall Councell. If no private man can hope for it, then truth is not necessary to be found, nor we are not oblig'd to search for it, or else we are sav'd by chance: But if private men can by vertue of a promise, upon certain conditions be assured of finding out sufficient truth, much more shall a Generall Councell. So that I consider thus: There are many promises pretended to belong to Generall Assemblies in the Church; But I know not any ground, nor any pretence, that they shall be absolutely assisted, without any condition on their own parts, and whether they will or no: Faith is a vertue as well as charity, and therefore consists in liberty and choyce, and hath nothing in it of ne­cessity: There is no Question but that they are obliged to proceed according to some rule; for they expect no assistance by way of Enthusiasme; if they should, I know no warrant for that, neither did any Generall Councell ever offer a Decree which they did not think sufficiently prov'd by Scripture, Rea­son, or Tradition, as appears in the Acts of the Councels; now then, if they be tyed to conditions, it is their duty to ob­serve them; but whether it be certaine that they will observe them, that they will doe all their duty, that they will not sin [Page 103] even in this particular in the neglect of their duty, that's the consideration. So that if any man questions the Title and Au­thority of Generall Councels, and whether or no great pro­mises appertain to them, I suppose him to be much mistaken; but he also that thinks all of them have proceeded according to rule and reason, and that none of them were deceived, be­cause possibly they might have been truly directed, is a stranger to the History of the Church, and to the perpetuall instances and experiments of the faults and failings of humanity. It is a famous saying of S. Gregory that he had the foure first Coun­cels in esteem and veneration next to the foure Evangelists; I suppose it was because he did believe them to have proceeded according to Rule, and to have judged righteous judgement; but why had not he the same opinion of other Councels too which were celebrated before his death; for he lived after the fifth Generall? not because they had not the same Authority; for that which is warrant for one is warrant for all; but because he was not so confident that they did their duty nor proceeded so without interest as the first foure had done, and the following Councels did never get that reputation which all the Catholike Church acknowledged due to the first foure. And in the next Order were the three following generalls; for the Greeks and Latines did never joyntly acknowledge but seven gene­ralls to have been authentick in any sense, because they were in no sense agreed that any more then seven had proceeded re­gularly and done their duty: So that now the Question is not whether Generall Councels have a promise that the holy Ghost will assist them; For every private man hath that promise, that if he does his duty he shall be assisted sufficiently in order to that end to which he needs assistance; and therefore much more shall Generall Councels in order to that end for which they convene, and to which they need assistance, that is, in order to the conservation of the Faith, for the doctrinall rules of good life, and all that concerns the essentiall duty of a Christian, but not in deciding Questions to satisfie conten­tious or curious or presumptuous spirits. But now can the Bi­shops so conven'd be factious, can they be abused with preju­dice, or transported with interests, can they resist the holy [Page 104] Ghost, can they extinguish the Spirit, can they stop their eares, and serve themselves upon the holy Spirit and the pre­tence of his assistances, and cease to serve him upon them­selves, by captivating their understandings to his dictates, and their wills to his precepts? Is it necessary they should per­form any condition? is there any one duty for them to perform in these Assemblies, a duty which they have power to doe or not doe? If so, then they may faile of it, and not doe their duty: And if the assistance of the holy Spirit be conditionall, then we have no more assurance that they are assisted, then that they doe their duty and doe not sinne.

Now let us suppose what this duty is: Certainly, if the Go­spel Numb. 2. be hid, it is hid to them that are lost; and all that come to the knowledge of the truth, must come to it by such meanes which are spirituall and holy dispositions, in order to a holy and spirituall end. They must be shod with the pre­paration of the Gospel of peace, that is, they must have peace­able and docible dispositions, nothing with them that is violent, and resolute to encounter those gentle and sweet assistances: and the Rule they are to follow, is the Rule which the holy Spirit hath consign'd to the Catholike Church, that is the ho­ly Scripture, either Vid. Optat. Milev. l. 5. adv. Parm. Bald­vin. in eun­dem. & S. Au­gust. in Psa. 21. Expos. 2. intirely or at least for the greater part of the Rule: So that now if the Bishops bee factious and pre­possest with perswasions depending upon interest, it is certain they may judge amisse; and if they recede from the Rule, it is certain they doe judge amisse: And this I say upon their grounds who most advance the authority of Generall Coun­cels: For if a Generall Councell may erre if a Pope confirm it not, then most certainly if in any thing it recede from Scrip­ture, it does also erre; because that they are to expect the Popes confirmation they offer to prove from Scripture: now if the Popes confirmation be required by authority of Scripture, and that therefore the defaillance of it does evacuate the Au­thority of the Councell, then also are the Councels Decrees invalid, if they recede from any other part of Scripture: So that Scripture is the Rule they are to follow, and a man would have thought it had been needlesse to have proved it, but that we are fallen into Ages in which no truth is certaine, no reason [Page 105] concluding, nor is there any thing that can convince some men. For Stapleton with extreme boldnesse against the piety of Christendome, against the publike sense of the ancient Relect. cen­trov. 4. q. 1. a. 3 Church, and the practise of all pious Assemblies of Bishops af­firmes the Decrees of a Councell to be binding, etiamsi non confirmetur ne probabili testimonio Scripturarum; nay, though it be quite extra Scripturam, but all wise and good men have ever said that sense which S. Hilary expressed in these words, Quae extra Evangelium sunt non defendam; This was it which the good Emperour Constantine propounded to the Fathers I. 2. ad Con­stant. met at Nice, libri Evangelici, oracula Apostolorum, & veterum Prophetarum clarè nos instruunt quid sentiendum in Divinis, Apud Theodor. l 1. c. 7. and this is confessed by a sober man of the Roman Church it selfe, the Cardinall of Cusa, Oportet qnod omnia talia quae le­gere debent, contineantur in Authoritatibus sacrarum Scriptura­rum: Concord. Ca­thol. l. 2. c 10. Now then all the advantage I shall take from hence, is this, That if the Apostles commended them who examined their Sermons by their conformity to the Law and the Prophets, and the men of Berea were accounted noble for searching the Scriptures whether those things which they taught were so or no; I suppose it will not be denyed, but the Councels De­crees, may also be tryed whether they be conform to Scripture yea or no; and although no man can take cognisance and judge the Decrees of a Councell pro Authoritate publicâ, yet pro in­formatione privatâ they may; the Authority of a Councell is not greater then the Authority of the Apostles, nor their di­ctates more sacred or authentick. Now then put case a Councell should recede from Scripture; whether or no were we bound to believe its Decrees? I only aske the Question: For it were hard to be bound to believe what to our understanding seems contrary to that which we know to be the Word of God: But if we may lawfully recede from the Councels Decrees, in case they be contrariant to Scripture, it is all that I require in this Question. For if they be tyed to a Rule, then they are to be examined and understood according to the Rule, and then we are to give our selves that liberty of judgement which is requisite to distinguish us from beasts, and to put us into a capacity of reasonable people, following reasonable guides. But [Page 106] how ever if it be certaine that the Councells are to follow Scripture, then if it be notorious that they doe recede from Scripture, we are sure we must obey God rather then men, and then we are well enough. For unlesse we are bound to shut our eyes, and not to look upon the Sunne, if we may give our selves liberty to believe what seemes most plaine, and un­lesse the Authority of a Councell be so great a prejudice as to make us to doe violence to our understanding, so as not to disbelieve the Decree, because it seemes contrary to Scrip­ture, but to believe it agrees with Scripture, though we know not how, therefore because the Councell hath decreed it, un­lesse I say we be bound in duty to be so obediently blind, and sottish, we are sure that there are some Councels which are pre­tended Generall, that have retired from the publike notorious words and sence of Scripture. For what wit of man can re­concile the Decree of the thirteenth Session of the Councell of Constance with Scripture, in which Session the halfe Com­munion was decreed, in defiance of Scripture, and with a non obstante to Christs institution. For in the Preface of the Decree, Christs institution and the practise of the Primitive Church is expressed, and then with a non obstante, Communion in one kind is establisht. Now then suppose the non obstante in the form of words relates to the Primitive practise; yet since Christs institution was taken notice of in the first words of the Decree, and the Decree made quite contrary to it, let the non obstante relate whither it will, the Decree (not to call it a defiance) is a plaine recession from the institution of Christ, and therefore the non obstante will referre to that without any sensible error; and indeed for all the excuses to the contrary, the Decree was not so discreetly fram'd but that in the very form of words, the defiance and the non obstante is too plainly relative to the first words. For what sense can there be in the first licet else? licet Christus in utra (que) specie, and licet Ecclesia Primiti­va, &c. tamen hoc non obstante, &c. the first licet being a re­lative terme, as well as the second licet, must be bounded with some correspondent. But it matters not much; let them whom it concernes enjoy the benefit of all excuses they can imagine, it is certaine Christs institution and the Councels sanction [Page 107] are as contrary as light and darknesse. Is it possible for any man to contrive a way to make the Decree of the Councell of Trent, commanding the publike Offices of the Church to be in Latine, friends with the fourteenth chapter of the Corinthians? It is not amisse to observe how the Hyperaspists of that Councell sweat to answer the Allegations of S. Paul, and the wisest of them doe it so extremly poore, that it proclaimes to all the world that the strongest man, that is, cannot eat Iron or swal­low a Rock. Now then, would it not be an unspeakable Ty­ranny to all wise persons, (who as much hate to have their soules enslaved as their bodies imprisoned) to command them to believe that these Decrees are agreeable to the word of God? Upon whose understanding soever these are imposed, they may at the next Session reconcile them to a crime, and make any sinne sacred, or perswade him to believe propositions contradicto­ry to a Mathematicall demonstration. All the Arguments in the world that can be brought to prove the infallibility of Councels, can not make it so certain that they are infallible, as these two instances doe prove infallibly that these were de­ceived, and if ever we may safely make use of our reason and consider whether Councels have erred or no, we cannot by any reason be more assured, that they have or have not, then we have in these particulars: so that either our reason is of no manner of use, in the discussion of this Question, and the thing it selfe is not at all to be disputed, or if it be, we are certain that these actually were deceived, and we must never hope for a clearer evidence in any dispute. And if these be, others might have been, if they did as these did, that is, depart from their Rule. And it was wisely said of Cusanus: Notandum est expe­rimento rerum universale Concilium posse deficere: The expe­rience L. 2. c. 14. Con­cord. Cathol. of it is notorious, that Councels have erred: And all the Arguments against experience are but plain sophistry.

And therefore I make no scruple to slight the Decrees of such Councels, wherein the proceedings were as prejudicate Numb. 3. and unreasonable, as in the Councell wherein Abailardus was condemned, where the presidents having pronounced Damna­mus, they at the lower end being awaked at the noise, heard the latter part of it, and concurred as farre as Mnamus went, and [Page 108] that was as good as Damnamus, for if they had been awake at the pronouncing the whole word, they would have given sen­tence accordingly. But by this meanes S. Bernard numbred the Epist. Abailar­di. ad Heliss. conjugem. major part of voices against his Adversary Abailardus: And as farre as these men did doe their duty, the duty of Priests and Judges, and wise men; so we may presume them to be assisted: But no further. But I am content this (because but a private Assembly) shall passe for no instance: But what shall we say of all the Arrian Councels celebrated with so great fancy, and such numerous Assemblies? we all say that they erred. And it will not be sufficient to say they were not lawfull Councels: For they were conven'd by that Authority which all the world knowes did at that time convocate Councels, and by which (as it is Cusanus, l. 2. cap. 25, Con­cord. confessed and is notorious) the first eight Generalls did meet, that is by the Authority of the Emperour all were cal­led, and as many and more did come to them, then came to the most famous Councell of Nice: So that the Councels were lawfull, and if they did not proceed lawfully, and therefore did erre, this is to say that Councels are then not deceiv'd, when they doe their duty, when they judge impartially, when they decline interest, when they follow their Rule; but this sayes also that it is not infallibly certain that they will doe so; for these did not, and therefore the others may be deceiv'd as well as these were. But another thing is in the wind; for Councels not confirmed by the Pope, have no warrant that they shall not erre, and they not being confirmed, therefore faild. But whe­ther is the Popes confirmation after the Decree or before? It cannot be supposed before; for there is nothing to be confirmed till the Decree be made, and the Article composed. But if it be after, then possibly the Popes Decree may be requisite in solemnity of Law, and to make the Authority popular, publike and humane; but the Decree is true or false before the Popes confirmation, and is not at all altered by the supervening Decree, which being postnate to the Decree, alters not what went before, Nunquam enim crescit ex postfacto praeteriti aesti­matio, is the voyce both of Law and reason. So that it can­not make it divine, and necessary to be heartily believed. It may make it lawfull, not make it true, that is, it may possibly [Page 109] by such meanes become a Law but not a truth. I speak now upon supposition the Popes confirmation were necessary, and requir'd to the making of conciliary and necessary sancti­ons. But if it were, the case were very hard: For suppose a heresy should invade, and possesse the Chaire of Rome, what remedy can the Church have in that case, if a Generall Coun­cell be of no Authority without the Pope confirm it? will the Pope confirm a Councell against himselfe; will he condemn his own heresy? That the Pope may be a Heretick appears in the Dist. 40. Can. si Papa. Canon Law, which sayes he may for heresy be deposed, and therefore by a Councell which in this case hath plenary Authority without the Pope. And therefore in the Synod at Rome held under Pope Adrian the Second, the Censure of the Sixth Synod against Honorius who was convict of heresy, is approved with this Appendix, that in this case the case of he­resy, minores possint de majoribus judicare: And therefore if a Pope were above a Councell, yet when the Question is concer­ning heresy, the case is altered; the Pope may be judg'd by his inferiours, who in this case which is the maine case of all, be­come his Superiours. And it is little better then impudence to pretend that all Councells were confirmed by the Pope, or that there is a necessity in respect of divine obligation, that any should be confirmed by him, more then by another of the Patriarchs. For the Councell of Chalcedon it selfe one of those foure which S. Gregory did revere next to the foure Evangelists, is rejected by Pope Leo, who in his 53 Epistle to Anatolius, and in his 54 to Martian, and in his 55 to Pulcheria, accuses it of ambition and inconsiderate temerity, and therefore no fit Assembly for the habitation of the holy Spirit, and Gelasius in his Tome de vinculo Anathematis, affirms that the Councell is in part to be receiv'd, in part to be rejected, and compares it to hereticall books of a mixt matter, and proves his assertion by the place of S. Paul, Omnia probate, quod bonum est retinete. And Bellarmine sayes the same; In Concilio Chalcedonensi quaedam sunt bona, quaedam mala, quaedam recipienda, quaedam rejicienda; De laicis, l. 3. c. 20. § ad hoc ult. ita & in libris haereticorum, and if any thing be false, then all is Questionable, and judicable and discernable, and not infallible ante­cedently. And however, that Councell hath ex postfacto, and by the [Page 110] voluntary consenting of after Ages obtained great reputation; yet they that lived immediately after it, that observed all the circumstances of the thing, and the disabilities of the persons, and the uncertainty of the truth of its decrees, by reason of the un­concludingnesse of the Arguments brought to attest it, were of another mind, Quod autem ad Concilium Chalcedonense attinet, illud id temporis (viz. Anastasii Imp.) ne (que) palam in Ecclesiis sanctissimis praedicatum fuit, ne (que) ab omnibus rejectum, nam singuli Evagr. lib. 3. cap. 30. Ecclesiarum praesides pro suo arbitratu in ea re egerunt. And so did all men in the world that were not master'd with preju­dices and undone in their understanding with accidentall imper­tinencies; they judg'd upon those grounds which they had and saw, and suffered not themselves to be bound to the imperious dictates of other men, who are as uncertain in their determi­nations as other in their Questions. And it is an evidence that there is some deception, and notable errour either in the thing or in the manner of their proceeding, when the Decrees of a Councell shall have no authority from the Compilers, nor no strength from the reasonablenesse of the decision, but from the accidentall approbation of Posterity: And if Posterity had pleased, Origen had believed well and been an Orthodox per­son. And it was pretty sport to see that Papias was right for two Ages together, and wrong ever since; and just so it was in Councels, particularly in this of Chalcedon, that had a fate alterable according to the Age, and according to the Climate, which to my understanding is nothing else but an Argument that the businesse of infallibility is a later device, and com­menc'd to serve such ends as cannot be justified by true and substantiall grounds, and that the Pope should confirm it as of necessity, is a fit cover for the same dish.

In the sixth Generall Councell, Honorius Pope of Rome was condemned; did that Councell stay for the Popes Confirma­tion Numb. 4. before they sent forth their Decree? Certainly they did not think it so needfull, as that they would have suspended or cassated the Decree, in case the Pope had then disavowed it: For besides the condemnation of Pope Honorius for heresy, the 13^th and 55^th Canons of that Councell are expressely against the custome of the Church of Rome. But this particular is in­volved [Page 111] in that new Question, whether the Pope be above a Councell. Now since the Contestation of this Question, there was never any free or lawfull Councell Vid. postea de Concil. Sin­vessane. §. 6. N. 9. that determined for the Pope, it is not likely any should, and is it likely that any Pope will confirm a Councell that does not? For the Councell of Basil is therefore condemn'd by the last Lateran which was an Assem­bly in the Popes own Palace, and the Councell of Constance is of no value in this Question, and slighted in a just proportion, as that Article is disbelieved. But I will not much trouble the Question with a long consideration of this particular; the pre­tence is senselesse and illiterate, against reason and experience, and already determin'd by S. Austin sufficiently as to this par­ticular, Epist. 162. ad Glorium. Ecce putemus illos Episcopos qui Romae judicaverunt non bonos judices fuisse, Restabat adhuc plenarium Ecclesiae universae Concilium ubi etiam cum ipsis judicibus causa possit agitari, ut si male judicasse convicti essent, eorum sententiae solverentur. For since Popes may be parties, may be Simoniacks, Schismaticks, Hereticks, it is against reason that in their own causes, they should be judges, or that in any causes they should be superior to their judges. And as it is against reason, so is it against all experience too; for the Councell Sinvessanum (as it said) was conven'd to take Cognisance of Pope Marcellinus; and divers Councels were held at Rome to give judgement in the causes of Damasus, Sixtus the III, Symmachus, and Leo III and IV, as is to be seen in Platina, and the Tomes of the Councels. And it is no answer to this and the like allegations to say in mat­ters of fact and humane constitution, the Pope may be judg'd by a Councell, but in matters of Faith all the world must stand to the Popes determination and authoritative decision: For if the Pope can by any colour pretend to any thing, it is to a suprem Judicature in matters Ecclesiasticall, positive and of fact; and if he failes in this pretence, he will hardly hold up his head for any thing else; for the ancient Bishops deriv'd their Faith from the fountaine, and held that in the highest tenure, even from Christ their Head; but by reason of the Imperiall Vide Concil. Chalced act. 15. City it became the principall Seat, and he surpriz'd the highest Judicature, partly by the concession of others, partly by his own accidentall advantages, and yet even in these things [Page 112] although he was major singulis, yet he was minor universis: And this is no more then what was decreed of the eighth Gene­rall Act. ult. can. 21. Synod; which if it be sense, is pertinent to this Question; for Generall Councels are appointed to take Cognizance of Questions and differences about the Bishop of Rome, non tamen audacter in eum ferre sententiam: By audactèr, as is supposed, is meant praecipitanter hastily and unreasonably; but if to give sentence against him bee wholy forbidden, it is non-sense, for to what purpose is an Authority of taking Cognizance, if they have no power of giving sentence, unlesse it were to de­serre it to a superiour Judge, which in this case cannot be sup­posed? for either the Pope himselfe is to judge his own cause af­ter their examination of him, or the Generall Councell is to judge him: So that although the Councell is by that Decree enjoyn'd to proceed modestly and warily, yet they may pro­ceed to sentence, or else the Decree is ridiculous and im­pertinent.

But to cleare all, I will instance in matters of Question and opinion: For not only some Councels have made their Decrees Numb. 5. without or against the Pope, but some Councels have had the Popes confirmation, and yet have not been the more legiti­mate or obligatory, but are known to be hereticall. For the Canons of the sixth Synod although some of them were made against the Popes, and the custome of the Church of Rome, a Pope a while after did confirm the Councell, and yet the Canons are impious and hereticall, and so esteem'd by the Church of Rome her selfe. I instance in the second Canon which approves of that Synod of Carthage under Cyprian for rebaptization of Hereticks, and the 72 Canon that dissolves marriage between persons of differing perswasion in matters of Christian Religion; and yet these Canons were approved by Pope Adrian I. who in his Epistle to Tharasius, which is in the second action of the seventh Synod, calls them Ca­nones divinè & legalitèr praedicatos. And these Canons were used by Pope Nicholas I. in his Epistle ad Michaclem, and by Innocent III. c. à multis. extra. de aetat. ordinandorum. So that now (that wee may apply this) there are seven Ge­nerall Councels which by the Church of Rome are condemn'd [Page 113] of errour. The Vid. Socra. l. z. c. 5. & Sozom. l. 3. c. 5. Councell of Antioch, A. D. 345. in which S. Athanasius was condemn'd: The Councell of Millaine A. D. 354. of above 300 Bishops: The Councell of Arimi­num, consisting of 600 Bishops: The second Councell of Ephe­sus, A. D. 449. in which the Eutychian heresy was confirmed, Gregor. in Re­gist. li. 3. caus. 7. ait. Concilium Numidiae er­rasse. Concili­um Aquisgra­ni erravit. De ra ptore & raptâdist. 20. can. de libellis. in glossâ. and the Patriarch Flavianus kild by the faction of Dioscorus: The Councell of Constantinople under Leo Isaurus, A. D. 730: And another at Constantinople 35 years after: And lastly, the Coun­cel at Pisa 134 years since. Now that these Generall Coun­cels are condemn'd, is a sufficient Argument that Councels may erre; and it is no answer to say they were not confirm'd by the Pope; for the Popes confirmation I have shewn not to be necessa­ry, or if it were, yet even that also is an Argument that Gene­rall Councels may become invalid, either by their own fault, or by some extrinsecall supervening accident, either of which evacuates their Authority; and whether all that is required to the legitimation of a Councell, was actually observ'd in any Councell, is so hard to determine, that no man can be infalli­bly sure that such a Councell is authentick and sufficient probation.

2. And that is the second thing I shall observe, There are so many Questions concerning the efficient, the forme, the Numb. 6. matter of Generall Councells, and their manner of proceeding, and their finall sanction, that after a Question is determin'd by a Conciliary Assembly, there are perhaps twenty more Que­stions to be disputed before we can with confidence either be­lieve the Councell upon its meere Authority, or obtrude it up­on others. And upon this ground, how easy it is to elude the pressure of an Argument drawn from the Authority of a Ge­nerall Councell, is very remarkable in the Question about the Popes or the Councels Superiority, which Question although it be defin'd for the Councell against the Pope by five Gene­rall Councels, the Councell of Florence, of Constance, of Basil, of Pisa, and one of the Lateran's, yet the Jesuites to this day, account this Question pro non definitâ, and have rare pre­tences for their escape; as first, It is true, a Councell is above a Pope, in case there be no Pope, or he uncertain; which is Bel­larmine's answer, never considering whether he spake sense or no, [Page 114] nor yet remembring that the Councell of Basil deposed Eugenius who was a true Pope and so acknowledg'd. Secondly, sometimes the Pope did not confirm these Councels, that's their Answer: (And although it was an exception that the Fathers never thought of, when they were pressed with the Authority of the Councell of Ariminum or Syrmium, or any other Arrian Con­vention;) yet the Councell of Basil was conven'd by Pope Martin V. then, in its sixteenth Session, declar'd by Eugenius the IV. to be lawfully continued and confirmed expresly in some of its Decrees by Pope Nicholas, and so stood till it was at last rejected by Leo X. very many years after; but that came too late, and with too visible an interest; and this Councell did decree fide Catholicâ tenendum Concilium esse supra Papam: But if one Pope confirms it, and another rejects it, as it happened in this case and in many more, does it not destroy the com­petency of the Authority? and we see it by this instance, that it so serves the turns of men, that it is good in some cases, that is, when it makes for them, and invalid when it makes against them. Thirdly, but it is a little more ridiculous in the case of the Councell of Constance, whose Decrees were confirm'd by Martin V. But that this may be no Argument against them, Bellarmine tells you he only confirm'd those things quae facta fuerant Conciliaritèr, re diligenter examinatâ, of which there being no mark, nor any certain Rule to judge it, it is a device that may evacuate any thing we have a mind to, it was not done Conciliaritèr, that is, not according to our mind; for Con­ciliaritèr is a fine new nothing, that may signifie what you please. Fourthly, but other devices yet more pretty they have: As, Whether the Councell of Lateran was a Generall Councell or no, they know not, (no nor will not know) which is a wise and plaine reservation of their own advantages, to make it Generall or not Generall, as shall serve their turns. Fifthly, as for the Councell of Florence, they are not sure, whether it hath defin'd the Question satis apertè; apertè they will grant, if you will allow them not satis apertè. Sixthly and lastly, the Coun­cell of Pisa is ne (que) approbatum ne (que) reprobatum, which is the greatest folly of all and most prodigious vanity; so that by Bellar. de conc. l. 1. c. 8. something or other, either they were not conven'd lawfully, or [Page 115] they did not proceed Conciliariter, or 'tis not certain that the Councell was Generall or no, or whether the Councell were approbatum, or reprobatum or else it is partim confirmatum partim reprobatum, or else it is ne (que) approbatum ne (que) reprobatum; By one of these wayes or a device like to these, all Councels and all Decrees shall be made to signifie nothing, and to have no Authority.

3. There is no Generall Councell that hath determined Numb. 7. that a Generall Councell is infallible: No Scripture hath re­corded it; no Tradition universall hath transmitted to us any such proposition; So that we must receive the Authority at a lower rate, and upon a lesse probability then the things con­signed by that Authority. And it is strange that the Decrees of Councels should be esteem'd authentick and infallible, and yet it is not infallibly certain, that the Councels themselves are infallible, because the beliefe of the Councels infallibi­lity is not prov'd to us by any medium, but such as may de­ceive us.

4. But the best instance that Councels are some and may all be deceived, is the contradiction of one Councell to another; Numb. 8. for in that case both cannot be true, and which of them is true, must belong to another judgement, which is lesse then the solennity of a Generall Councell; and the determination of this matter can be of no greater certainty after it is con­cluded, then when it was propounded as a Question, being it is to be determin'd by the same Authority or by a lesse then it selfe. But for this allegation, we cannot want instances; The Councell of Trent allowes picturing of God the Father; The Councell of Nice altogether disallowes it; The same Nicene Sess. 25. Councell, which was the seventh Generall, allows of picturing Christ in the form of a Lamb; But the sixth Synod by no Act. 2. meanes will endure it, as Caranza affirms: The Councell of Neocaesarea confirm'd by Leo IV, dist. 20. de libellis, and approv'd Can. 82. by the first Nicene Councell as it is said in the seventh Session of the Councell of Florence, forbids second Marriages, and imposes Penances on them that are married the second time, forbidding Priests to be present at such Marriage Feasts: Besides, that this is expresly against the Doctrine of S. Paul, it is also against [Page 116] the Doctine of the Councell of Laodicea which took off such Cap. 1. Penances, and pronounced second Marriages to be free and lawfull: Nothing is more discrepant then the third Councell of Carthage and the Councell of Laodicea, about assignation of the Canon of Scripture, and yet the sixth Generall Synod ap­proves both: And I would faine know if all Generall Councels are of the same mind with the Fathers of the Councell of Car­thage, who reckon into the Canon five Books of Solomon. I am sure S. Austin reckoned but three, and I think all Christen­dome L. 17. de cul. Dei. c. 20. beside are of the same opinion. And if we look into the title of the Law de Conciliis, called Concordantia discordan­tiarum, we shall find instances enough to confirm that the De­crees of some Councels are contradictory to others, and that no wit can reconcile them: And whether they did or no, that they might disagree, and former Councels be corrected by la­ter, was the beliefe of the Doctors in those Ages in which the best and most famous Councels were conven'd, as appears in that famous saying of S. Austin speaking concerning the re­baptizing of Hereticks; and how much the Africans were de­ceived in that Question, he answers the Allegation of the Bi­shops Letters, and those Nationall Councels which confirmed S. Cyprians opinion by saying that they were no finall determi­nation. For Episcoporum literae emendari possunt à Conciliis na­tionalibus, L. 2. de bapt. Donat. c. 3. Concilia nationalia à plenariis, ipsa (que) plenaria priora à posterioribus emendari. Not only the occasion of the Que­stion being a matter not of fact, but of Faith, as being in­stanc'd in the Question of rebaptization: but also the very fa­brick and oeconomy of the words, put by all the answers of those men who think themselves pressed with the Authority of S. Austin. For as Nationall Councels may correct the Bishops Letters, and Generall Councels may correct Nationall, so the later Generall may correct the former, that is, have contrary and better Decrees of manners, and better determinations in matters of faith. And from hence hath risen a Question whe­ther is to be received the former or the later Councels, in case they contradict each other. The former are nearer the fountaines Apostolicall, the later are of greater consideration; The first, have more Authority, the later more reason; The first are more venerable, the later more inquisitive and seeing. [Page 117] And now what rule shall we have to determine out beliefes, whe­ther to Authority, or Reason the Reason and the Authority both of them not being the highest in their kinde, both of them being repudiable, and at most but probable? And here it is that this great uncertainty is such as not to determine any body, but fit to serve every body; and it is sport to see that Bellarmine will by all meanes have the Councell of Carthage preferr'd before the Councell of Laodicea, because it is later, and L. 2. de Conc. c. 8. § respon­deo in primis. yet he preferres the second Nicene Ibid. § de Concilio au­tem. Councell before the Coun­cell of Frankfurt, because it is elder: S. Austin would have the former Generals to be mended by the later; but Isidore in Gratian sayes when Councels doe differ scandum esse antiquiori­bus, the elder must carry it: And indeed these probables are Dist. 20. Can. Domino San­cto. buskins to serve every foot, and they are like magnum & parvum, they have nothing of their own, all that they have is in com­parison of others; so these topicks have nothing of resolute and dogmaticall truth, but in relation to such ends as an interessed person hath a mind to serve upon them.

5. There are many Councels corrupted, and many preten­ded and alledged, when there were no such things, both which Numb. 9. make the topick of the Authority of Councels to be little and inconsiderable: There is a Councell brought to light in the edi­tion of Councels by Binius, viz. Sinvessanum, pretended to be kept in the year 303, but it was so private till then, that we find no mention of it in any ancient Record: Neither Eusebius, nor Ruffinus, S, Hierom, nor Socrates, Sozomen, nor Theodoret, nor Eutropius, nor Bede knew any thing of it, and the eldest allegation of it is by Pope Nicholas I, in the ninth Century. And he that shall consider that 300 Bishops in the midst of horrid Persecutions (for so then they were) are pretended to have con­ven'd, will need no greater Argument to suspect the imposture; besides, he that was the framer of the engine did not lay his ends together handsomely, for it is said that the deposition of Marcellinus by the Synod was told to Diocletian, when he was in the Persian Warre, when as it is known before that time he had return'd to Rome, and triumph'd for his Persian Conquest as Eusebius in his Chronicle reports: And this is so plain that Binius and Baronius pretend the Text to be corrupted & to go to Pro [cum esset in bello Persarum] le­gi volunt [cum reversus esset è bello Persa­rum] Euseb. Chronicon vide Binium in no­tis ad Concil. Sinvessanum. Tom. 1. Concil. & Baron. An­nal. Tom. 3. A. D. 303. num. 107. mend [Page 118] it by such an emendation as is a plain contradiction to the sense, and that so un-clerk-like, viz. by putting in two words and leaving out one, which whether it may be allowed them by any licence lesse then Poeticall let Criticks judge. S. Gregory saith that the Constantinopolitans had corrupted the Synod of I. 5. Ep. 14. ad Narsem. Chalcedon, and that he suspected the same concerning the Ephesine Councell: And in the fifth Synod there was a noto­rious prevarication, for there were false Epistles of Pope Vigilius and Menna the Patriarch of Constantinople inserted, and so they passed for authentick till they were discovered in the sixth Generall Synod, Actions the 12. and 14: And not only false Decrees and Actions may creep into the Codes of Councels; but sometimes the authority of a learned man may abuse the Church with pretended Decrees, of which there is no Copy or shadow in the Code it selfe: And thus Thomas Aquinas sayes that the Epistle to the Hebrewes was reckoned in the Canon Comment. in Hebr. by the Nicene Councell, no shadow of which appears in those Copies we now have of it; and this pretence and the reputation of the man prevail'd so farre with Melchior Canus the learned Bishop of Canaries, that he believ'd it upon this ground, Vir sanctus rem adeo gravem non astrueret, nisi compertum habuisset; and there are many things which have prevail'd upon lesse reason and a more slight Authority. And that very Councell of Nice, hath not only been pretended by Aquinas, but very much abused by others, and its Authority and great reputation hath made it more lyable to the fraud and pretences of idle people: For whereas the Nicene Fathers made but twenty Canons, for so many and no more were received by Con. Car­thag. VI. cap. 9. Cecilian of Carthage, that was at Nice in the Councell; by S. Con. African. Austin, and 200 African Bishops with him, by S. Ibid. c. 102. &c. 133. Cyrill of Alexandria, by Lib. 1. Eccl. Hist. c. 6. Atticus of Constantinople, by Ruffinus, In princ. Con. de Synod. Princ. Isidore and Theo­doret, as Baronius, tom. 3. A. D. 325. n. 156. Tom. 3. ad A. D. 325. n. 62 63. Baronius witnesses, yet there are fourscore lately found out in an Arabian M. S. and published in Latine by Turrian and Alfonsus of Pisa Jesuites surely, and like to be masters of the mint. And not only the Canons, but the very Acts of the Nicene Councell are false and spurious, and are so confessed by Baronius; though how he and Panopl. l. 2. c. 6. Lindanus will be reconcil'd upon the point, I neither know well nor much care. [Page 119] Now if one Councell be corrupted, we see by the instance of S. Gregory, that another may be suspected and so all; because he found the Councell of Chalcedon corrupted, he suspected also the Ephesine, and another might have suspected more, for the Nicene was tampered fouly with, and so three of the foure Generals were fullied and made suspicious, and therefore we could not be secure of any; If false Acts be inserted in one Councell, who can trust the actions of any, unlesse he had the keeping the Records himselfe, or durst swear for the Register: And if a very learned man (as Thomas Aquinas was,) did ei­ther wilfully deceive us, or was himselfe ignorantly abused in Allegation of a Canon which was not, it is but a very fallible Topick at the best, and the most holy man that is, may be abused himselfe, and the wisest may deceive others.

6. And lastly, To all this and to the former instances, by way of Corollary, I adde some more particulars in which it is notorious Numb. 10. that Councels Generall, and Nationall, that is, such as were ei­ther Generall by Originall, or by adoption into the Canon of the Catholike Church did erre, and were actually deceived. The first Councell of Toledo admits to the Communion him that hath a Concubine, so he have no wife besides, and this Councell is approved by Pope Leo in the 92 Epistle to Rusticus Bishop of Narbona: Gratian sayes that the Councell meanes by a Con­cubine, a wife married sine dote & solennitate; but this is Dist. 34. can. omnibus. dawbing with untemper'd mortar. For though it was a cu­stome amongst the Jewes to distinguish Wives from their Concubines, by Dowry and legall Solennities, yet the Chri­stian distinguished them no otherwise, then as lawfull and unlawfull, then as Chastity and Fornication: And besides, if by a Concubine is meant a lawfull wife without a Dowry, to what purpose should the Councell make a Law that such a one might be admitted to the Communion? for I suppose it was never thought to be a Law of Christianity, that a man should have a Portion with his Wife, nor he that married a poore Virgin should deserve to be Excommunicate. So that Gratian and his Followers are prest so with this Canon, that to avoid the impiety of it, they expound it to a signification without sense or purpose. But the businesse then was, that Adultery [Page 120] was so publike and notorious a practise that the Councell did chuse rather to endure simple Fornication, that by such per­mission of a lesse, they might slacken the publike custome of a greater, just as at Rome they permit Stewes to prevent unnaturall sinnes; But that by a publike sanction Fornicators, habitually and notoriously such, should be admitted to the holy Communi­on was an act of Priests, so unfit for Priests, that no excuse can make it white or cleane. The Councell of Wormes does au­thorize a superstitious custome at that time too much used, of Cap. 3. discovering stoln goods by the holy Sacrament, which Part. 3. q 80. a. 6. ad 3 m. A­quinas justly condemns for Superstition. The Can. 72. sixth Synod se­parates persons lawfully married upon an accusation and crime of heresy: The Roman Councell under Can ego Berengar. de consecrat. dist. 2. Pope Nicholas II. defin'd that not only the Sacrament of Christs body, but the very body it selfe of our blessed Saviour is handled and broke by the hands of the Priest, and chewed by the teeth of the Communicants, which is a manifest errour derogatory from the truth of Christs beatificall Resurrection, and glorification in the Heavens, and disavowed by the Church of Rome it selfe: But Bellarmine that answers all the Arguments in the world, whither it be possible or not possible, would faine make the Lib. 2. c. 8. de Concil. matter faire, and the Decree tolerable, for sayes he, the Decree meanes that the body is broken not in it selfe but in the sign, and yet the Decree sayes that not only the Sacrament (which if any thing be, is certainly the sign) but the very body it selfe is broken and champed with hands and teeth respectively; which indeed was nothing but a plaine over-acting the Article in contradiction to Berengarius. And the answer of Bellar­mine is not sense; for he denies that the body it selfe is broken in it selfe (that was the errour we charg'd upon the Roman Synod) and the sign abstracting from the body is not broken, (for that was the opinion that Councell condemn'd in Beren­garius) but sayes Bellarmine, the body in the sign: What's that? for neither the sign, nor the body, nor both together are broken: For if either of them distinctly, they either rush upon the errour which the Roman Synod condemn'd in Be­rengarius, or upon that which they would fain excuse in Pope Nicholas; but if both are broken then 'tis true to affirm [Page 121] it of either, and then the Councell is blasphemous in saying that Christ's glorified body is passible and frangible by natu­rall manducation: So that it is and it is not, it is not this way, and yet it is no way else, but it is some way, and they know not how, and the Councell spoke blasphemy, but it must be made innocent; and therefore, it was requisite a cloud of a distincti­on should be raised, that the unwary Reader might be amused, and the Decree scape untoucht; but the truth is, they that under­take to justifie all that other men say, must be more subtle then they that said it, and must use such distinctions which possibly the first Authors did not understand. But I will multiply no more instances, for what instance soever I shall bring, some or other will be answering it, which thing is so farre from satisfying me in the particulars, that it increases the difficulty in the generall, and satisfies me in my first beliefe: For Illa demùm cis videntur edicta & Con­cilia quae in rem suam fa­ciunt; reliqua non pluris aestimant quam conven­tum mulier­cularum in textrinâ vel thermis. Ludo. Vives. in Scholiis lib. 20. Aug. de Civit. Dei. c. 26. if no De­crees of Councels can make against them though they seeme never so plain against them, then let others be allowed the same liberty, (and there is all the reason in the world they should) and no Decree shall conclude against any Doctrine, that they have already entertain'd; and by this meanes the Church is no fitter instrument to Decree Controversies then the Scripture it selfe, there being as much obscurity and disputing in the sense, and the manner, and the degree, and the compe­tency, and the obligation of the Decree of a Councell, as of a place of Scripture. And what are we the nearer for a Decree, if any Sophister shall think his elusion enough to contest against the Authority of a Councell? yet this they doe, that pretend highest for their Authority, which consideration or some like it might possibly make Gratian preferre S. Hierom's single 36. q. 2. c. pla­cuit. Testimony before a whole Councell, because hee had Scrip­ture of his side; which sayes, that the Authority of Coun­cels is not [...], and that Councels may possibly recede from their Rule, from Scripture; and in that case, a single person proceeding according to Rule is a better Argument; which indeed was the saying of Panormitan, in concernentibus Part. 1. de ele­ction. Et elect. potest. cap. significant. fidem etiam dictum unius privati esset dicto Pape aut totius Concilii praeferendum, si ille moveretur melioribus Argu­mentis.

[Page 122] I end this Discourse with representing the words of Gregory Nazianzen in his Epistle to Procopius; Ego si vera scribere Numb. 11. oportet ita animo affectus sum, ut omnia Episcoporum Concilia Athanas. lib. de Synod. Frusta igitur circum­cursitantes praetexunt ob fidem se Syno­dos postulare, cum sit Divina Scriptura om­nibus poten­tior. fugiam, quoniam nullius Concilii finem laetum faustum (que) vidi, nec quod depulsionem malorum potius quam accessionem & incre­mentum habuerit: But I will not be so severe and dogmaticall against them: For I believe many Councels to have been cald with sufficient Authority, to have been managed with singular piety and prudence, and to have been finished with admirable successe and truth. And where we find such Councels, he that will not with all veneration believe their Decrees, and receive their sanctions, understands not that great duty he owes to them who have the care of our soules, whose faith we are bound to follow (saith S. Paul) that is so long as they fol­low Christ, and certainly many Councels have done so: But Heb. 13. 7. this was then when the publike interest of Christendome was better conserv'd in determining a true Article, then in finding a discreet temper, or a wise expedient to satisfie disagreeing persons; (As the Fathers at Trent did, and the Lutherans and Calvinists did at Sendomir in Polonia; and the Sublapsarians and Supralapsarians did at Dort:) It was in Ages when the summe of Religion did not consist in maintaining the Gran­dezza of the Papacy; where there was no order of men with a fourth Vow upon them to advance S. Peters Chaire; when there was no man, nor any company of men, that esteem'd themselves infallible, and therefore they searched for truth as if they meant to find it, and would believe it if they could see it prov'd, not resolv'd to prove it because they had upon chance or interest believ'd it; then they had rather have spoken a truth, then upheld their reputation, but only in order to truth. This was done sometimes, and when it was done, God's Spirit never fail'd them, but gave them such assistances as were sufficient to that good end for which they were Assembled, and did implore his aid: And therefore it is that the foure generall Councels so called by way of eminency, have gained so great a reputation above all others, not because they had a better promise, or more speciall assistances, but because they proceeded better according to the Rule, with lesse [Page 123] faction, without ambition and temporall ends.

And yet those very Assemblies of Bishops had no Autho­rity by their Decrees to make a Divine Faith, or to constitute Numb. 12. new objects of necessary Credence; they made nothing true that was not so before, and therefore they are to be apprehended in the nature of excellent Guides, and whose Decrees are most certainly to determine all those who have no Argument to the contrary of greater force and efficacy then the Authority or reasons of the Councell. And there is a duty owing to every Parish Priest, and to every Dioecesan Bishop; these are appoin­ted over us and to answer for our soules, and are therefore mo­rally to guide us, as reasonable Creatures are to be guided, that is, by reason and discourse: For in things of judgement and understanding, they are but in forme next above Beasts, that are to be ruled by the imperiousnesse and absolutenesse of Au­thority, unlesse the Authority be Divine, that is, infallible. Now then in a juster height, but still in its true proportion, Assemblies of Bishops are to guide us with a higher Autho­rity, because in reason it is supposed they will doe it better, with more Argument and certainty, and with Decrees, which have the advantage by being the results of many discourses of very wise and good men: But that the Authority of ge­nerall Councels, was never esteem'd absolute, infallible and unlimited, appears in this, that before they were obliging, it was necessary that each particular Church respectively should accept them, Concurrente universali totius Ecclesiae consensu, &c. Vid. S. August. 1. l. c. 18. de bapt. contr. Donat. in declaratione veritatum quae credendae sunt &c. That's the way of making the Deerees of Councels become authentik, and be turn'd into a Law as Gerson observes; and till they did, their Decrees were but a dead letter (and therefore it is that these later Popes have so labour'd, that the Councell of Trent should be received in France; and Carolus Molineus a great Lawyer, and of the Roman Communion disputed So did the third Estate of France in the Convention of the three E­states under Lewis the 13th earnestly con­tend against it. against the recep­tion,) and this is a known condition in the Canon Law, but it proves plainly that the Decrees of Councels have their Au­thority from the voluntary submission of the particular Churches, not from the prime sanction and constitution of the Councell. And there is great reason it should; for as the representative [Page 124] body of the Church derives all power from the diffusive body which is represented, so it resolves into it, and though it may have all the legall power, yet it hath not all the naturall; for more able men may be unsent, then sent; and they who are sent may be wrought upon by stratagem, which cannot happen to the whole diffusive Church; it is therefore most fit that since the legall power, that is, the externall was passed over to the body representative, yet the efficacy of it, and the internall should so still remaine in the diffusive, as to have power to con­sider whether their representatives did their duty yea or no, and so to proceed accordingly: For unlesse it be in matters of justice, in which the interest of a third person is concern'd, no man will or can be supposed to passe away all power from him­selfe of doing himselfe right, in matters personall, proper, and of so high concernment: It is most unnaturall and unreasonable. But besides, that they are excellent instruments of peace, the best humane Judicatories in the world, rare Sermons for the determining a point in Controversy, and the greatest probabili­ty from humane Authority, besides these advantages (I say) I know nothing greater that generall Councels can pretend to with reason and Argument sufficient to satisfie any wise man: And as there was never any Councell so generall, but it might have been more generall; for in respect of the whole Church, even Nice it selfe was but a small Assembly; so there is no Decree so well constituted, but it may be prov'd by an Argument higher then the Authority of the Councell: And therefore generall Councels, and Nationall, and Provinciall, and Dioecesan in their severall degrees, are excellent Guides for the Prophets and directions and instructions for their Pro­phesyings, but not of weight and Authority to restraine their Liberty so wholy, but that they may dissent when they see a reason strong enough so to perswade them, as to be willing up­on the confidence of that reason and their own sincerity, to answer to God for such their modesty, and peaceable, but (as they believe) their necessary disagreeing.

SECT. VII.

BUt since the Question between the Councell and the Pope Numb. 1. grew high, there have not wanted abettors so confident on the Popes behalfe, as to believe Generall Councels to be no­thing but Pompes and Solennities of the Catholike Church, and that all the Authority of determining Controversies is formally and effectually in the Pope. And therefore to appeale from the Pope to a future Councell is a heresy, yea, and Trea­son too said Pope Pius II, and therefore it concerns us now Epist. ad No­rimberg. to be wise and wary. But before I proceed, I must needs re­member that Pope Pius II, while he was the wise and learned Patrum & a­vorum no­strorum tem­pore pauci au­debant dicere Papam esse supra Conci­lium. l. 1. de gestis Concil. Basil. Aeneas Sylvius, was very confident for the preheminence of a Councell, and gave a merry reason why more Clerks were for the Popes then the Councell, though the truth was on the other side, even because the Pope gives Bishopricks and Ab­beys, but Councels give none; and yet as soone as he was made Pope, as if he had been inspired, his eyes were open to see the great priviledges of S. Peters Chaire, which before he could not see, being amused with the truth, or else with the reputation of a Generall Councell. But however, there are many that hope to make it good, that the Pope is the Uni­versall and the infallible Doctor, that he breathes Decrees as Oracles, that to dissent from any of his Cathedrall determina­tions is absolute heresy, the Rule of Faith being nothing else but consormity to the Chaire of Peter. So that here we have met a restraint of Prophecy indeed; but yet to make amends, I hope we shall have an infallible Guide, and when a man is in Heaven, he will never complaine that his choyce is taken from him, and that he is confin'd to love and to admire, since his love and his admiration is fixt, upon that which makes him happy, even upon God himselfe. And in the Church of Rome there is in a lower degree, but in a true proportion as little cause to be troubled, that we are confin'd to believe just [Page 126] so, and no choice left us for our understandings to discover or our wills to chuse, because though we be limited, yet we are pointed out where we ought to rest, we are confin'd to our Center, and there where our understandings will be satisfied, and therefore will be quiet, and where after all our strivings, studies and endeavours we desire to come, that is, to truth, for there we are secur'd to find it, because we have a Guide that is infallible: If this prove true, we are well enough. But if it be false or uncertain, it were better we had still kept our liberty, then be cozened out of it with gay pretences. This then we must consider.

And here we shall be oppressed with a cloud of Witnesses: For what more plaine then the Commission given to Peter? Numb. 2. Thou art Peter, and upon this Rock will I build my Church. And to thee will I give the Keyes. And again, for thee have I prayed that thy faith faile not; but thou when thou art conver­ted confirm thy brethren; And again, If thou lovest me feed my sheep: Now nothing of this being spoken to any of the other Apostles, by one of these places S. Peter must needs be appoin­ted Foundation or Head of the Church, and by consequence he is to rule and govern all. By some other of these places he is made the supreme Pastor, and he is to teach and determine all, and inabled with an infallible power so to doe: And in a right understanding of these Authorities, the Fathers speak great things of the Chaire of Peter; for we are as much bound to be­lieve that all this was spoken to Peters Successors, as to his Person; that must by all meanes be supposed, and so did the old Doctors, who had as much certainty of it as we have, and no more; but yet let's hear what they have said, Irenae. con­tra. haeres. l. 3. c. 3. To this Church by reason of its more powerfull principality, it is necessary all Churches round about should Convene: ..... In this, Tradition Apostolicall alwayes was observed, and therefore to communicate with this Bishop with this Ambr. de obitu Salyri, & l. 1. Ep. 4. ad Imp. Cypr. Ep. 52. Church, was to be in Communion with the Church Catholike: .... Cypr. Ep. 55. ad Cornel. To this Church errour or perfidiousnesse cannot have accesse: .... S. Austin. in Psal. contra. partem. Donat. Against this Sea the gates of Hell cannot prevaile: .... Hieron. Ep. 57. ad Dama­sum. For we know this Church to be built upon a Rock: .... And whoever eats the Lamb not within this House, is prophane; he that is not in the Ark of [Page 127] Noah perishes in the inundation of waters. He that gathers not with this Bishop he scatters; and he that belongeth not to Christ, must needs belong to Antichrist. And that's his finall sentence: But if you would have all this prov'd by an infallible Argu­ment, L. 2. contra. Parmenian. Optatus of Milevis in Africa supplies it to us from the very name of Peter: For therefore Christ gave him the cognomination of Cephas [...], to shew that S. Peter was the visible Head of the Catholike Church. Dignum patellà operculum! This long harangue must needs be full of tra­gedy to all them that take liberty to themselves to follow Scripture and their best Guides, if it happens in that liberty that they depart from the perswasions or the Communion of Rome: But indeed, if with the peace of the Bishops of Rome I may say it, this Scene is the most unhandsomely laid, and the worst carried of any of those pretences that have lately abused Christendome.

1. Against the Allegations of Scripture, I shall lay no grea­ter Numb. 3. prejudice then this, that if a person dis-interested should see them, and consider what the products of them might pos­sibly be, the last thing that he would think of, would be how that any of these places should serve the ends or pretences of the Church of Rome: For to instance in one of the particulars, that man had need have a strong fancy who imagines that be­cause Christ pray'd for S. Peter, that (being he had design'd him to be one of those upon whose preaching and Doctrine he did meane to constitute a Church) that his faith might not faile, (for it was necessary that no bitternesse or stopping should be in one of the first springs, least the current be either spoil'd or obstructed) that therefore the faith of Pope Alexan­der VI, or Gregory, or Clement 1500 years after, should be be preserved by vertue of that prayer, which the forme of words, the time, the occasion, the manner of the addresse, the effect it selfe, and all the circumstances of the action and per­son did determine to be personall: And when it was more then personall, S. Peter did not represent his Successors at Rome, but 22^ae. q. 2. a. 6. ar. 6. ad 3 m. the whole Catholike Church, sayes Aquinas and the Divines of the University of Paris, Volunt enim pro solâ Ecclesiâ esse L. 4. de Ro­man. Pont. c. 3. § 1. oratum, sayes Bellarmine of them, and the glosse upon the Canon [Page 128] Law plainly denies the effect of this prayer at all to appertain to the Pope: Quaere de quâ Ecclesia intelligas quod hoc dicitur quod Caus. 21. cap. à recta. q. 1. non possit errare, si de ipso Papâ qui Ecclesia dicitur? sed certum est quod Papa errare potest—Respondeo ipsa Congregatio fidelium hic dicitur Ecclesia, & talis Ecclesia non potest non esse, 29. dist. Ana. statius 60. dist. si Papa. nam ipse Dominus orat pro Ecclesiâ, & voluntate labiorum suo­rum non fraudabitur. But there is a little danger in this Ar­gument when we well consider it; but it is likely to redound on the head of them whose turns it should serve: For it may be remembred that for all this prayer of Christ for S. Peter, the good man sell fouly, and denyed his Master shamefully: And shall Christs prayer be of greater efficacy for his Successors, for whom it was made but indirectly and by consequence, then for himselfe, for whom it was directly and in the first intention? And if not, then for all this Argument, the Popes may deny Christ as well as their cheife and Decessor Peter. But it would not be forgotten how the Roman Doctors will by no meanes allow that S. Peter was then the chiefe Bishop or Pope, when he denyed his Master. But then much lesse was he chosen chiefe Bishop, when the prayer was made for him, because the prayer was made before his fall; that is, before that time in which it is confessed, he was not as yet made Pope: And how then the whole Succession of the Papacy should be intitled to it, passes the length of my hand to span. But then also if it be supposed and allowed, that these words shall intaile in­fallibility upon the Chaire of Rome, why shall not also all the Apostolicall Sees bee infallible as well as Rome? why shall not Constaentinople or Byzantium where S. Andrew sate? why shall not Ephesus where S. John sate? or Jerusalem where S. James sate? for Christ prayed for them all, ut Pater sanctifi­caret eos sua veritate, Joh. 17.

2. For [tibi dabo claves,] was it personall or not? If it were, then the Bishops of Rome have nothing to doe with it: Numb. 4. If it were not, then by what Argument will it be made evi­dent that S. Peter, in the promise represented only his Suc­cessors, and not the whole Colledge of Apostles, and the whole Hierarchy? For if S. Peter was chiefe of the Apostles, and Head of the Church, he might faire enough be the representative of the [Page 129] whole Colledge, and receive it in their right as well as his own; which also is certain that it was so, for the same promise of binding and loosing, (which certainly was all that the keyes were given for) was made afterward to all the Apostles, Mat. 18. and the power of remitting and retaining which in reason and according to the stile of the Church is the same thing in other words, was actually given to all the Apostles, and unlesse that was the performing the first and second promise, we find it not recorded in Scripture how or when or whether yet or no, the promise be performed: That promise I say which did not per­taine to Peter principally and by origination, and to the rest by Communication, society and adherence, but that promise which was made to Peter first, but not for himselfe, but for all the Colledge and for all their Successors, and then made the second time to them all, without representation but in diffusion, and perform'd to all alike in presence except S. Thomas. And if he went to S. Peter to derive it from him, I know not; I find no record for that, but that Christ convey'd the promise to him by the same Commission, the Church yet never doubt­ed, nor had she any reason. But this matter is too notorious: I say no more to it, but repeat the words and Argument of S. Austin, Si hoc Petro tantum dictum est, non facit hoc Ecclesia: If the Keyes were only given and so promised to S. Peter, that Tra. 50. in Ioann. the Church hath not the Keyes, then the Church can neither bind nor loose, remit nor retaine, which God forbid; if any man should endevour to answer this Argument, I leave him and S. Austin to contest it.

3. For pasce oves there is little in that Allegation, besides the boldnesse of the Objectors; for were not all the Apostles Numb. 5. bound to feed Christ's sheep? had they not all the Commission from Christ, and Christ's Spirit immediately? S. Paul had cer­tainly; did not S. Peter himselfe say to all the Bishops of Pon­tus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia, and Bithinia, that they should feed the flock of God, and the great Bishop and Shepheard should give them an immarcescible Crown; plainly implying, that from whence they derived their Authority, from him they were sure of a reward: In pursuance of which S. Cyprian laid his Argument upon this basis, Nam cum statutum sit omnibus L. 1. Epist. 3. [Page 130] nobis, &c. & singulis pastoribus portio gregis, &c. Did not S. Paul call to the Bishops of Ephesus to feed the flock of God, of which the holy Ghost hath made them Bishops or Over-seers? and that this very Commission was spoken to Peter not in a personall, but a publike capacity, and in him spoke to all the Apostles we see at­tested by S. Austin, and S. Ambrose and generally by all An­tiquity; De agone Christi, c, 30. and it so concern'd even every Priest that Damasus was willing enough to have S. Hierom explicate many questions for him. And Liberius writes an Epistle to Athanasius with much modesty requiring his advice in a Question of Faith, Epist. ad Atha­nas. apud Athanas. tom. 1. pag 42. Pa­ris. [...]. That I also may be perswaded without all doubting of those things which you shall be pleased to command me. Now Li­berius needed not to have troubled himselfe to have writ into the East to Athanasius; for if he had but seated himselfe in his Chaire, and made the dictate, the result of his pen and inke would certainly have taught him and all the Church; but that the good Pope was ignorant that either pasce oves was his own Charter, and Prerogative, or that any other words of Scripture had made him to be infallible, or if he was not ignorant of it, he did very ill to complement himselfe out of it. So did all those Bishops of Rome that in that troublesome and unprofitable Question of Easter, being unsatisfied in the supputation of the Egyptians, and the definitions of the Mathe­maticall Bishops of Alexandria, did yet require and intreat S. Ambrose to tell them his opinion, as he himselfe witnesses; If pasce oves belongs only to the Pope by primary title, in these L. 10. Epist. 83. cases the sheep came to feed the Shepherd, which though it was well enough in the thing, is very ill for the pretensions of the Roman Bishops; and if we consider how little many of the Popes have done toward feeding the sheep of Christ, we shall hardly determine which is the greater prevarication, that the Pope should claime the whole Commission to be granted to him, or that the execution of the Commission should be wholly passed over to others; and it may be there is a my­stery in it, that since S. Peter sent a Bishop with his staffe to raise up a Disciple of his from the dead, who was afterward Bishop of Triers, the Popes of Rome never weare a Pastorall [Page 131] staffe except it be in that Diocesse (sayes Aquinas) for great reason that he who does not doe the office, should not beare the M. 4. Sent. dist. 24. Symbol; but a man would think that the Popes Master of the Ceremonies was ill advised not to assigne a Pastorall staffe to him, who pretends the Commission of pasce oves to belong to him by prime right and origination. But this is not a busi­nesse to be merry in.

But the great support is expected from Tu es Petrus & super Numb. 6. hanc Petram adificabo Ecclesiam, &c. Now there being so great difference in the exposition of these words, by persons dis-inter­ressed, who, if any, might be allowed to judge in this Question, it is certain that neither one sense nor other can be obtruded for an Article of faith, much lesse as a Catholicon instead of all, by constituting an Authority which should guide us in all Faith, and determine us in all Questions: For if the Church was not built upon the person of Peter, then his Successors can challenge no­thing from this instance; now that it was the confession of Peter upon which the Church was to rely for ever, we have wit­nesses very credible, Ad Phila­delph. S. Ignatius, S. Seleuc. orat. 25. Basil, L. 6. de Tri­nit. S. Hilary, De Trini­tate advers. Iudaeos. S. Gregory Nyssen, L. 3. Ep. 33. S. Gregory the Great, In 1. Eph. Ioann. tr. 10. S. Austin. De Trinit. l. 4. S. Cyrill of Alex­andria, L. 1. Ep. 235. Isidore Pelusiot, and very many more. And although all these witnesses concurring cannot make a proposition to be true, yet they are sufficient witnesses, that it was not the Universall beliefe of Christendome that the Church was built upon S. Peters person. Cardinall Perron hath a fine fancy to elude this variety of Exposition, and the consequents of it; For (saith he) these Expositions are not contrary or exclusive of each other, but inclusive and consequent to each other: For the Church is founded causally upon the confession of S. Peter, formally upon the ministry of his person, and this was a reward or a conse­quent of the former: So that these Expositions are both true, but they are conjoyn'd as mediate and immediate, di­rect and collaterall, literall and morall, originall and perpetuall, accessory and temporall, the one consign'd at the beginning, the other introduc'd upon occasion: For before the spring of the Arrian heresy, the Fathers expounded these words of the person of Peter; but after the Arrians troubled them, the Fathers finding great Authority, and Energy in this confession [Page 132] of Peter for the establishment of the naturall siliation of the Son of God, to advance the reputation of these words and the force of the Argument, gave themselves lience to expound these words to the present advantage, and to make the confession of Peter to be the foundation of the Church, that if the Arrians should encounter this Authority, they might with more pre­judice to their persons declaime against their cause by saying they overthrew the foundation of the Church. Besides that this answer does much dishonour the reputation of the Fa­thers integrity, and makes their interpretations lesse credible as being made not of knowledge or reason but of necessity and to serve a present turn, it is also false: For Epist. ad Philadelph. In c. 16. Mat. tract. 1. Ignatius expounds it in a spirituall sense, which also the Liturgy attibuted to S. James cals [...]: And Origen expounds it mystically to a third purpose, but exclusively to this: And all these were before the Arrian Controversy. But if it be lawfull to make such unproved observations, it would have been to better purpose, and more reason to have observed it thus: The Fathers so long as the Bishop of Rome kept himselfe to the limits prescrib'd him by Christ, and indulged to him by the Constitution or con­cession of the Church, were unwary and apt to expound this place of the person of Peter; but when the Church began to enlarge her phylacteries by the favour of Princes, and the Sun­shine of a prosperous fortune, and the Pope by the advantage of the Imperiall Seat, and other accidents began to invade up­on the other Bishops and Patriarchs, then that he might have no colour from Scripture for such new pretensions, they did most generally turn the stream of their expositions from the person to the confession of Peter, and declar'd that to be the foundation of the Church. And thus I have required fancy with fancy; but for the maine point, that these two Expositions are inclusiue of each other, I find no warrant; for though they may consist together well enough, if Christ had so intended them; yet unlesse it could be shown by some circumstance of the Text, or some other extrinsecall Argument that they must be so, and that both senses were actually intended. it is but gratis dictum and a begging of the Question, to say that they are so, and the fancy so new, that when S. Austin had [Page 133] expounded this place of the person of Peter, he reviewes it againe, and in his Retractations leaves every man to his li­berty, which to take; as having nothing certaine in this Article: which had been altogether needlesse if he had be­lieved them to be inclusively in each other, neither of them had need to have beene retracted, both were alike true, both of them might have been believed: But I said the fancy was new, and I had reason; for it was so unknown till yesterday, that even the late Writers of his own side, expound the words of the confession of S. Peter exclusively to his person or any thing else, as is to be seen in Desens. pa­cis part. 2. c. 28. Marsilius, Recommend. sacr. Script. Petrus de Aliaco and the glosse upon Dist. 19. can. ita Dominus, § ut supra, which also was the Interpretation of Phavorinus Camers their own Bishop, from whom they learnt the resemblance of the word [...] and [...], of which they have made so many gay dis­courses, [...].

5. But upon condition I may have leave at another time to Numb. 7. recede from so great and numerous Testimony of Fathers, I am willing to believe that it was not the confession of S. Peter, but his person upon which Christ said he would build his Church, or that these Expositions are consistent with and consequent to each other that this confession was the objective foundation of Faith, and Christ and his Apostles the subjective, Christ prin­cipally, and S. Peter instrumentally; and yet I understand not any advantage will hence accrue to the Sea of Rome: For upon S Peter it was built, but not alone, for it was upon the foundati­on of the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ himselfe being the chief corner stone; and when S. Paul reckoned the Oeconomy of Hierarchy, he reckons not Peter first, and then the Apostles. But first Apostles secondarily Prophets, &c. And whatsoever is first, either is before all things else, or at least nothing is be­fore it: So that at least S. Peter is not before all the rest of the Apostles, which also S. Paul expresly averres, I am in nothing inferiour to the very chiefest of the Apostles, no not in the very being a Rock and a foundation; and it was of the Church of Ephesus, that S. Paul said in particular it was columna & firmamentum veritatis, that Church was, not excluding others, [Page 134] for they also were as much as she; for so we keep close and be united to the corner stone, although some be master builders, Vid. Socrat. l. 1. c. 19. 20. Sozom. l. 2. c 14. Niceph. l. 14. c. 40. yet all may build, and we have known whole Nations converted by Lay-men and women, who have been builders so farre as to bring them to the corner stone.

6. But suppose all these things concern S. Peter in all the Numb. 8. capacities can be with any colour pretended, yet what have the Bishops of Rome to doe with this? For how will it appear that these promises and Commissions did relate to him as a parti­cular Bishop, and not as a publike Apostle? Since this later is so much the more likely, because the great pretence of all seemes in reason more proportionable to the founding of a Church, then its continuance: And yet if they did relate to him as a particular Bishop (which yet is a further degree of improbability, removed further from certainty) yet why shall S. Clement or Linus rather succeed in this great office of head­ship then S. Iohn or any of the Apostles that survived Peter: It is no way likely a private person should skip over the head of an Apostle; or why shall his Successors at Rome more en­joy the benefit of it then his Successors at Antioch, since that he was at Antioch and preached there, we have a Divine Au­thority, but that he did so at Rome at most we have but a hu­mane; and if it be replyed that because he dyed at Rome, it was Argument enough that there his Successors were to inherit his priviledge, this besides that at most it is but one little degree of probability, and so not of strength sufficient to support an Article of faith: it makes that the great Divine Right of Rome, and the Apostolicall presidency was so contingent and fallible as to depend upon the decree of Nero; and if he had sent him to Antioch there to have suffered Martyrdome, the Bishops of that Town had been heads of the Catholike Church. And this thing presses the harder, because it is held by no meane persons in the Church of Rome, that the Bishoprick of Rome and the Papacy are things separable: And the Pope may quit that Sea and sit in another, which to my understanding is an Argument, that he that succeeded Peter at Antioch, is as much supream by Divine Right as he that sits at Rome; both alike, that is, Vid. Camera­cens. Qu. ve­l [...] est. neither by Divine Ordinance: For if the Roman Bishops by [Page 135] Christ's intention were to be Head of the Church, then by the same intention, the Succession must be continued in that Sea, and then let the Pope goe whether he will, the Bishop of Rome must be the Head, which they themselves deny, and the Pope himselfe did not believe, when in a schisme he sate at Avignon; and that it was to be continued in the Sea of Rome, it is but offered to us upon conjecture, upon an act provi­dence, as they fancy it, so ordering it by vision, and this pro­ved by an Author which themselves call fabulous and Apocry­phall, under the name of Linus, in Biblioth. PP. de passione Pe­tri & Pauli: A goodly building which relies upon an event that was accidentall, whose purpose was but infinuated, the meaning of it but conjectur'd at, and this conjecture so uncer­tain, that it was an imperfect aime at the purpose of an event, which whether it was true or no, was so uncertain, that it is ten to one there was no such matter. And yet again another degree of uncertainty is, to whom the Bishops of Rome doe succeed: For S. Paul was as much Bishop of Rome, as S. Peter was; there he presided, there he preach'd, and he it was that was the Doctor of the Uncircumcision and of the Gentiles, S. Peter of the Circumcision, and of the Jewes only; and therefore the con­verted Jewes at Rome, might with better reason claim the privi­ledge of S. Peter, then the Romans and the Churches in her Communion, who doe not derive from Jewish Parents.

7. If the words were never so appropriate to Peter, or also Numb. 9. communicated to his Successors, yet of what value will the consequent be? what prerogative is entail'd upon the Chaire of Rome? For that S. Peter was the Ministeriall Head of the Church, is the most that is desir'd to be prov'd by those and all other words brought for the same purposes, and interests of that Sea: Now let the Ministerall Head have what Dignity can be imagined, let him be the first (and in all Communities that are regular, and orderly there must be something that is first, upon certain occasions where an equall power cannot be exercised, and made pompous or ceremoniall:) But will this Ministeriall Headship inferre an infallibility? will it inferre more then the Headship of the Jewish Synagogue, where clear­ly the High Priest was supreme in many senses, yet in no sense [Page 136] infallible? will it inferre more to us, then it did amongst the Apostles? amongst whom if for orders sake, S. Peter was the first, yet he had no compulsory power over the Apostles; there was no such thing spoke of, nor any such thing put in practise. And that the other Apostles were by a personall priviledge as infallible as himselfe, is no reason to hinder the exercise of ju­risdiction or any compulsory power over them; for though in Faith they were infallible, yet in manners and matter of fact as likely to erre as S. Peter himselfe was, and certainly there might have something hapned in the whole Colledge, that might have been a Record of his Authority, by transmitting an example of the exercise of some Judiciall power over some one of them: If he had but withstood any of them to their faces as S. Paul did him, it had been more then yet is said in his behalfe. Will the Ministeriall Headship inferre any more then when the Church in a Community or a publike capacity, should doe any Act of Ministery Ecelesiasticall, he shall be first in Order? Suppose this to be a dignity to preside in Councels, which yet was not alwayes granted him; Suppose it to be a power of taking cognisance of the Major Causes of Bishops when Coun­cels cannot be called; Suppose it a double voyce or the last decisive, or the negative in the causes exteriour; Suppose it to be what you will of dignity or externall regiment, which when all Churches were united in Communion, and neither the interest of States, nor the engagement of opinions had made disunion, might better have been acted then now it can; yet this will fall infinitely short of a power to determine Controversies infallibly, and to prescribe to all mens faith and consciences. A Ministeriall Headship or the prime Minister cannot in any capacity become the foundation of the Church to any such purpose. And therefore men are causlessely amused with such premises, and are afraid of such Conclusions which will never follow from the admission of any sense of these words that can with any probability be pretended.

8. I consider that these Arguments from Scripture, are too weak to support such an Authority which pretends to give Numb. 10. Oracles, and to answer infallibly in Questions of Faith, because there is greater reason to believe the Popes of Rome have [Page 137] erred, and greater certainty of demonstration, then these places can be that they are infallible, as will appear by the in­stances and perpetuall experiment of their being deceived, of which there is no Question, but of the sense of these places there is: And indeed, if I had as clear Scripture for their in­fallibility, as I have against their halfe Communion, against their Service in an unknown tongue, worshipping of Images, and di­vers other Articles, I would make no scruple of believing, but limit and conform my understanding to all their Dictates, and believe it reasonable all Prophecying should be restrain'd: But till then, I have leave to discourse, and to use my reason; And to my reason, it seemes not likely that neither Christ nor any of his Apostles, S. Peter himselfe, not S. Paul writing to the Church of Rome, should speak the least word or tittle of the infallibility of their Bishops, for it was certainly as convenient to tell us of a remedy, as to foretell that certainly there must needs be heresies, and need of a remedy. And it had been a certain determination of the Question, if when so rare an oppor­tunity was ministred in the Question about Circumcision that they should have sent to Peter, who for his infallibility in or­dinary, and his power of Headship would not only with rea­son enough as being infallibly assisted, but also for his Authority have best determin'd the Question, if at least the first Christians had known so profitable and so excellent a secret; and al­though we have but little Record, that the first Councell at Jerusalem did much observe the solennities of Law, and the forms of Conciliary proceedings, and the Ceremonials; yet so much of it as is recorded, is against them, S. James and not S. Peter gave the finall sentence, and although S. Peter deter­min'd the Question pro libertate, yet S. James made the De­cree, and the Assumentum too, and gave sentence they should abstaine from some things there mentioned, which by way of temper he judg'd most expedient: And so it passed. And S. Peter shewed no sign of a Superiour Authority, nothing of S. Chrysost. hom. 3. in. act. Apost. Superiour jurisdiction, [...].

So that if this Question be to be determin'd by Scripture, it Numb. 11. must either be ended by plaine places or by obscure; plaine [Page 138] places there are none, and these that are with greatest fancy pretended, are expounded by Antiquity to contrary purposes. But if obscure places be all the [...], by what meanes shall we infallibly find the sense of them? The Popes interpretation though in all other cases it might be pretended, in this cannot; for it is the thing in Question, and therefore cannot determine for it selfe; either therefore we have also another infallible guide besides the Pope, and so we have two Foundations and two Heads (for this as well as the other upon the same reason) or else (which is indeed the truth) there is no infallible way to be infallibly assured that the Pope is infallible. Now it being against the common condition of men, above the pretences of all other Governours Ecclesiasticall, against the Analogy of Scrip­ture, and the deportment of the other Apostles, against the Oeconomy of the Church, and S. Peters own entertainment, the presumption lies against him, and these places, are to be left to their prime intentions and not put upon the rack, to force them to confesse what they never thought.

But now for Antiquity, if that be deposed in this Question, there are so many circumstances to be considered to reconcile Numb. 12. their words and their actions, that the processe is more trouble­some, then the Argument can be concluding, or the matter con­siderable: But I shall a little consider it, so farre at least as to shew either Antiquity said no such thing as is pretended, or if they did, it is but little considerable, because they did not believe themselves; their practise was the greatest evidence in the world against the pretence of their words. But I am much cased of a long disquisition in this particular (for I love not to prove a Question by Arguments whose Authority is in it selfe as fallible, and by circumstances made as uncertain as the Question) by the saying of Aeneas Sylvius, that before the Nicene Councell every men liv'd to himselfe, and small respect was had to the Church of Rome, which practise could not well consist with the Doctrine of their Bishops infallibility, and by consequence supreme judgement and last resolution in matters of Faith; but especially by the insinuation and consequent De Rom. Pont. l, 4. c. 2. § se­cunda senten­tia. acknowledgement of Bellarmine, that for 1000 years together the Fathers knew not of the Doctrine of the Popes infallibility, [Page 139] for Nilus, Gerson, Alemain, the Divines of Paris, Alphonsus de Castro, and Pope Adrian VI, persons who liv'd 1400 after Christ, affirm, that infallibility is not seated in the Popes person, that he may erre and sometimes actually hath, which is a clear de­monstration that the Church knew no such Doctrine as this; there had been no Decree nor Tradition, nor generall opini­on of the Fathers, or of any age before them; and therefore this opinion which Bellarmine would faine blast if he could, yet in his Conclusion he sayes it is not propriè haeretica. A device, and an expression of his own without sense or precedent. But if the Fathers had spoken of it and believed it, why may not a disagreeing person as well reject their Authority when it is in behalf of Rome, as they of Rome without scruple cast them off when they speak against it? For as Bellarmine being pressed with the Authority of Nilus Bishop of Thessalonica and other Fathers, he sayes that the Pope acknowledges no Fathers but they are all his children, and therefore they cannot depose against him; and if that be true, why shall we take their Testimonies for him? for if Sonnes depose in their Fathers behalfe, it is twenty to one, but the adverse party will be cast, and therefore at the best it is but suspectum Testimonium. But in­deed this discourse signifies nothing, but a perpetuall uncertainty in such topicks, and that where a violent prejudice, or a con­cerning interest is engag'd, men by not regarding what any man sayes, proclaim to all the world that nothing is certain, but Divine Authority.

But I will not take advantage of what Bellarmine sayes, nor what Stapleton, or any one of them all say, for that will bee Numb. 13. but to presse upon personall perswasions, or to urge a ge­nerall Question with a particular defaillance, and the Question is never the nearer to an end; for if Bellarmine sayes any thing that is not to another mans purpose or perswasion, that man will be tryed by his own Argument, not by anothers: And so would every man doe that loves his liberty, as all wise men doe, and therefore retain it by open violence, or private evasions: But to return.

An Authority from Irenaeus in this Question, and on behalf of the Popes infallibility, or the Authority of the Sea of Rome, Numb. 14. [Page 140] or of the necessity of communicating with them is very fallible; for besides that there are almost a dozen answers to the words of the Allegation, as is to be seen in those that trouble them­selves in this Question with the Allegation, and answering such Authorities, yet if they should make for the affirmative of this Question, it is protestatio contra factum. For Irenaeus had no such great opinion of Pope Victors infallibity, that he be­lieved things in the same degree of necessity that the Pope did, for therefore he chides him for Excommunicating the Asian Bishops [...] all at a blow in the Question concerning Easter day; and in a Question of Faith he expresly disagreed from the doctrine of Rome; for Irenaeus was of the Millenary opinion, and believed it to be a Tradition Apostolicall; now if the Church of Rome was of that opinion, then why is she not now? where is the succession of her doctrine? But if she was not of that opinion then, and Irenaeus was, where was his be­liefe of that Churches infallibility? The same I urge concer­ning S. Cyprian who was the head of a Sect in opposition to the Church of Rome, in the Question of rebaptization, and he and the abettors, Firmilian and the other Bishops of Cappadocia, and the voisinage spoke harsh words of Stephen, and such as become them not to speak to an infallible Doctor, and the supreme Head of the Church. I will urge none of them to the disadvantage of that Sea, but only note the Satyrs of Firmilian against him, because it is of good use, to shew that it is possible for them in their ill carriage to blast the reputation and efficacy of a great Authority: For he sayes that that Church did pretend the Au­thority of the Apostles, cum in multis sacramentis divinae rei, à Epist. Firmili­ani contr. Steph. ad Cy­prian. Vid. eti­am Ep. Cypria­ni ad Pompei­um. principio discrepet, & ab Ecclesia Hierosolymitanâ, & defamet Pe­trum & Paulum tanquam authores. And a little after justè dedignor (sayes he) apertam & manifestam stultitiam Stepha­ni, per quam veritas Christianae petrae aboletur, which words say plainly that for all the goodly pretence of Apostolicall Autho­rity, the Church of Rome did then in many things of Religion disagree from Divine Institution (and from the Church of Je­rusalem, which they had as great esteeme of for Religion sake, as of Rome for its principality) and that still in pretending to S. Peter and S. Paul they dishonoured those blessed Apostles, and [Page 141] destroyed the honour of their pretence by their untoward pre­varication; which words I confesse passe my skill to reconcile them to an opinion of infallibility; and although they were spoken by an angry person, yet they declare that in Africa they were not then perswaded, as now they were at Rome: Nam Cyprian Epist, ad Quintum. [...]. nec Petrus quem primum Dominus clegit vendicavit sibi aliquid insolentèr aut arrogantèr assumpsit, ut diceret se primatum tenere: That was their belief then, and how the contrary hath grown up to that heigth where now it is all the world is witnesse: And now I shall not need to note concerning S. Hierome, that he gave a complement to Damasus, that he would not have given to Liberius, Qui tecum non colligit spargit. For it might be true enough of Damasus who was a good Bishop and a right believer; but if Liberius's name had been put instead of Da­masus, the case had been altered with the name; for S. Hierom did believe and write it so, that Liberius had subscrib'd to Ar­rianism. And if either he or any of the rest had believ'd the De Script, Eccles. in For­tunatiano. Pope could not be a Heretick nor his Faith faile, but be so good and of so competent Authority as to be a Rule to Christen­dome; Why did they not appeale to the Pope in the Arrian Controversy? why was the Bishop of Rome made a Party and a concurrent as other good Bishops were, and not a Judge and an Arbitrator in the Question? Why did the Fathers prescribe so many Rules and cautions and provisoes for the discovery of heresy? Why were the Emperours at so much charge, and the Church at so much trouble as to call and convene in Councels respectively, to dispute so frequently, to write so: se­dulously, to observe all advantages against their Adversaries, and for the truth, and never offered to call for the Pope to determine the Question in his Chaire? Certaindly no way coud have been so expedite, none so concluding and pe­remptory, none could have convinc'd so certainly, none could have triumph'd so openly over all discrepants as this, if they had known of any such thing as his being infallible, or that he had been appointed by Christ to be the Judge of Controversies. And therefore I will not trouble this discourse to excuse any more words either pretended or really said to this purpose of the Pope, for they would but make books swell and the Question [Page 142] endlesse, I shall only to this purpose observe that the Old Writers were so farre from believing the infallibility of the Ro­man Church or Bishop, that many Bishops and many Churches did actually live and continue out of the Roman Communion; particularly Vbi illa Au­gustini & re­liquorum pru­dentia? quis jam ferat cras­sissimae igno­rantiae illam vocem in tot & tantis Pa­tribus? Alan. Cop. dialog. p. 76, 77. Vide etiam Bonifac. 11. E­pist. ad Eulalium Alexandrinum. Lindanum Pa­nopli. l. 4. c. 89. in fine. Sa'me­ron Tom. 12. Tract. 68. § ad Canonem San­der. de visibili Monarchia, l. 7. n. 411. Baron. Tom. 10. A. D. 878. S. Austin, who with 217 Bishops and their Suc­cessors for 100 years together stood separate from that Church, if we may believe their own Records: So did Ignatius of Constantinople, S. Chrysostome, S. Cyprian, Firmilian, those Bishops of Asia that separated in the Question of Easter, and those of Africa in the Question of rebaptization: But besides this, most of them had opinions which the Church of Rome disavowes now, and therefore did so then, or else she hath innovated in her Doctrine, which though it be most true and notorious, I am sure she will never confesse. But no ex­cuse can be made for S. Austins disagreeing, and contesting in the Question of appeales to Rome, the necessity of Commu­nicating Infants, the absolute damnation of Infants to the paines of Hell, if they die before Baptism, and divers other particu­lars. It was a famous act of the Bishops of Liguria and Istria who seeing the Pope of Rome consenting to the fifth Synod in disparagement of the famous Councell of Chalcedon, which for their own interests they did not like of, they renounced sub­jection to his Patriarchate, and erected a Patriarch at Aquileia who was afterwards translated to Venice, where his name re­maines to this day. It is also notorious that most of the Fa­thers were of opinion that the soules of the faithfull did not enjoy the beatifick Vision before Doomesday; whether Rome was then of that opinion or no, I know not, I am sure now they are not; witnesse the Councels of Florence and Trent; but of this I shall give a more full account afterwards. But if to all this which is already noted, we adde that great variety of opi­nions amongst the Fathers and Councels in assignation of the Canon, they not consulting with the Bishop of Rome, nor any of them thinking themselves bound to follow his Rule in enu­meration of the books of Scripture, I think no more need to be said as to this particular.

8. But now if after all this, there be some Popes which were notorious Hereticks, and Preachers of false Doctrine, some that Numb. 15. [Page 143] made impious Decrees both in faith and manners; some that have determin'd Questions with egregious ignorance and stu­pidity, some with apparent Sophistry, and many to serve their own ends most openly, I suppose then the infallibility will dis­band, and we may doe to him as to other good Bishops, believe him when there is cause; but if there be none, then to use our Consciences, Non enim salvat Christianum quod Pontifex Tract. de in­terdict. Com­pos. à Theol. Venet. prop. 13. constantèr affirmat praeceptum suum esse justum, sed oportet illud examinari, & se juxta regulam superius datum dirigere: I would not instance and repeat the errours of dead Bishops, if the ex­treme boldnesse of the pretence did not make it necessary: But if we may believe Tertullian, Pope Zepherinus approv'd the Lib. adver. Praxeam. Prophecies of Montanus, and upon that approbation granted peace to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia, till Praxeas per­swaded him to revoke his act: But let this rest upon the credit of Tertullian, whether Zepherinus were a Montanist or no; some such thing there was for certain. Pope Vigilius denyed Vid. Liberal. in breviatio, cap. 22. Durand. 4. dist. 7. q. 4. two natures in Christ, and in his Epistle to Theodora the Em­presse anathematiz'd all them that said he had two natures in one person; S. Gregory himselfe permitted Priests to give con­firmation, which is all one as if he should permit Deacons to consecrate, they being by Divine Ordinance annext to the higher orders; and upon this very ground Adrianus affirms that the Pope may erre in definiendis dogmatibus fidei. And that we may not feare we shall want instances, we may to secure it Quae. de con­firm. art. ult. take their own confession, Nam multae sunt decretales haereticae sayes Occham as he is cited by Almain, & firmitèr hoc credo 3. dist. 24. q. unica. (sayes he for his own particular) sed non licet dogmatizare op­positum quoniam sunt determinatae. So that we may as well see that it is certain that Popes may be Hereticks, as that it is dangerous to say so; and therefore there are so few that teach it: All the Patriarchs and the Bishop of Rome himselfe subscrib'd to Arrianism (as Baronius confesses;) and Dist. 19. c. 9. L. 4. Ep. 2. Gratian affirms that Pope Anastasius the Second was strucken of God for commu­nicating A. D. 357. n. 44. with the Heretick Photinus. I know it will be made light of that Gregory the Seventh saith, the very exorcists of the Roman Church are Superiour to Princes. But what shall we think of that decretall of Gregory the Third, who wrore [Page 144] to Bonaface his Legate in Germany, quod illi quorum uxores infirmitate aliquâ morbidae debitum reddere noluerunt, aliis pote­rant Vid. C [...]iranz. Sum. Concil. sol. 218. Edit. Antwerp. nubere? was this a Doctrine fit for the Head of the Church, an infallible Doctor? it was plainly, if any thing ever was doctrina Daemoniorum, and is noted for such by Gratian, caus. 32. q. 7. can. quod proposuisli. Where the glosse also in­timates that the same priviledge was granted to the Englishmen by Gregory, quia novi erant in fide. And sometimes we had little reason to expect much better; for, not to instance in that learned discourse in the * Canon Law de majoritate & obedientiâ, where the Popes Supremacy over Kings is proved from the first chapter of Genesis, and the Pope is the Sunne, and the Cap per vene­rabitem. qui filii sint legiti­mi. Emperour is the Moone, for that was the fancy of one Pope perhaps; though made authentick and doctrinall by him; it was (if it be possible) more ridiculous, that Pope Innocent the Third urges that the Mosaicall Law was still to be observed, and that upon this Argument, Sanè, saith he, cum Deuterono­mium secunda lex interpretetur ex vi vocabuli comprobatur ut quod ibi decernitur in Testamento novo debeat observari: Worse yet; for when there was a corruption crept into the Decree called Sancta Romana, where instead of these words Sedulii opus Dist. 15. [...]pud Gratian. heroicis versibus descriptum, all the old Copies till of late read haereticis versibus descriptum; this very mistake made many wise men, (as Pierius sayes) yea Pope Adrian the Sixth, no De Sacord. b [...]b. worse man, believe that all Poetry was hereticall, because (for­sooth) Pope Gelasius whose Decree that was, although he believ'd Sedulius to be a good Catholike, yet as they thought, he concluded his Verses to be hereticall: But these were ignorances; it hath been worse amongst some others, whose errours have been more malitious. Pope Honorius was con­demned by the sixth Generall Synod, and his Epistles burnt, and in the seventh action of the eigth Synod, the Acts of the Romane Councell under Adrian the Second are recited, in which it is said that Honorius was justly Anathematiz'd, be­cause he was convict of heresy. Bellarmine sayes it is probable that Pope Adrian and the Roman Councell were deceived with false Copies of the sixth Synod, and that Honorius was no Here­tick. To this I say, that although the Roman Synod and the [Page 145] eighth generall Synod, and Pope Adrian, altogether are better witnesses for the thing then Bellarmines conjecture is against it, yet if we allow his conjecture wee shall lose nothing in the whole, for either the Pope is no infallible Doctor, but may be a Heretick as Honorius was, or else a Councell is to us no infallible determiner; I say, as to us, for if Adrian and the whole Roman Councell & the eighth Generall were all cozen'd with false Copies of the sixth Synod, which was so little a while before them, and whose acts were transacted & kept in the Theatre and Records of the Catholike Church; he is a bold man that will be confident that he hath true Copies now. So that let which they please stand or fall, let the Pope be a Heretick or the Councels be deceived and palpably abused, (for the other, we will dispute it upon other instances and arguments when we shall know which part they will choose) in the meane time we shall get in the generall what we loose in the particular. This only, this device of saying the Copies of the Councels were false, was the stratagem of Albertus Pighius 900 years after the thing was Vid. diatrib. de act. 6. & 7^ae. Sy­nod. praefatione ad Lectorem & Dominicum Bannes 22^ae. q. 1. a. 10. dub. 2. done, of which invention Pighius was presently admonished, blamed, and wished to recant. Pope Nicholas explicated the Mystery of the Sacrament with so much ignorance and zeale that in condemning Berengarius he taught a worse impiety. But what need I any more instances; it is a confessed case by Baro­nius, by Biel, by Stella, Almain, Occham, and Canus, and ge­nerally by the best Scholars in the Church of Rome, that a Pope Picus Mi­rand. in expo­sit. theorem. 4. may be a Heretick, and that some of them actually were so, and no lesse then three generall Councels did beleive the same thing: viz. sixth, seaventh, and eighth, as Bellarmine is pleased to acknowledge in his fourth book de Pontifice Romano. c. 11. resp. ad Arg. 4. And the Canon si Papadist. 40. affirms it in expresse termes, that a Pope is judicable and punishable in that case. But there is no wound but some Emperick or other will pretend to cure it, and there is a cure for this too. For though it be true that if a Pope were a Heretick, the Church might depose him, yet no Pope can be a Heretick, not but that the man may, but the Pope cannot, for he is ipso facto no Pope, for he is no Christian; so Bellarmine: and so when you think you have L. 2. c. 30. ubi supra. §. est ergo. him fast, he is gone, and nothing of the Pope left; but who [Page 146] sees not the extream folly of this evasion? For besides that out of feare and caution he grants more then he needs, more then was sought for in the Question, the Pope hath no more priviledge then the Abbot of Cluny, for he cannot be a Heretick, nor be deposed by a Councell, for if he be manifestly a Heretick he is ipso facto no Abbot, for he is no Christian; and if the Pope be a Heretick privaetely and occultly, for that, he may be accused and judged sayd the Glosse upon the Canon si Papa dist. 40. And the Abbot of Cluny and one of his meanest Monks can be no more, therefore the case is all one. But Vide Al­phons. à Castr. l b. 1. adv. haeres. c. 4. hoc lemma riden­tem affabrè. this is fitter to make sport with then to interrupt a serious discourse. And therefore although the Canon Sanctae Romana approves all the Decretals of Popes, yet that very Decretall hath not decreed it firm enough, but that they are so warily receiv'd by them, that when they list they are pleased to dissent from them; And it is evident in the Extravagant of Sixtus IV. Com. De reliquiis; who appointed a Vid. etiam In­nocentium Serm. 2. de conserat. Pon­tif. act. 7. 8^ae. Synodi. & Concil. 5. sub Symmadio. vide Collat. 8. can. 12. ubi PP. judicialem sententiam P. vigilii in causâ trium Capitu­lorum damna­runt expressè. Extra. comm. Extrav. grave. Tit. X. Feast of the immaculate conception, a speciall Office for the day, and Indulgences enough to the observers of it: And yet the Dominicans were so farre from believing the Pope to be infalli­ble and his Decree authentick, that they declaim'd against it in their Pulpits so furiously and so long till they were prohibited under paine of Excommunication, to say the Virgin Mary was conceived in Originall sin; Now what sollennity can be more required for the Pope to make a Cathedrall determination of an Article? The Article was so concluded, that a Feast was institu­ted for its celebration, and pain of Excommunication threatned to them which should preach the contrary; Nothing more so­lemne, nothing more confident and severe: And yet after all this, to shew that whatsoever those people would have us to be­lieve, they'll believe what they list themselves: This thing was not determined de fide saith Victorellus; Nay, the Author of the Glosse of the Canon Law hath these expresse words, De festo Conceptionis nihil dicitur quiae celebrandum non est, sicut in multis De Angelo custod. fol. 59. de consecrat. dist. 3. can. pro­nunciand. gloss. verb. Nativit. regionibus fit, & maxime in Angliâ, & haec est ratio, quia in pec­catis concepta fuit sicut & caeteri Sancti. And the Commissaries, of Sixtus V. and Gregory XIII. did not expunge these words, but left them upon Record, not only against a received and more approved opinion of the Jesuites and Franciscans, but also [Page 147] in plain defiance of a Decree made by their visible head of the Church, who (if ever any thing was decreed by a Pope, with an intent to oblige all Christendome) decreed Hâc in per­petuum valitu­râ constitutio­ne statuimus, &c. De reliqui­is, &c. Extrav. Com. Sixt. 4, cap. 1. this to that purpose.

So that without taking particular notice of it, that egregi­ous sophistry and flattery of the late Writers of the Roman Church is in this instance, besides divers others before mentio­ned, clearly made invalid. For here the Bishop of Rome not as Numb. 16. a private Doctor, but as Pope, not by declaring his own opi­nion, but with an intent to oblige the Church, gave sentence in a Question which the Dominicans will still account pro non de­terminatâ. And every decretall recorded in the Canon Law if it be false in the matter, is just such another instance: And Alphonsus à Castro sayes it to the same purpose, in the instance of Celestine dissolving Marriages for heresy, Ne (que) Caelestini error talis fuit qui soli negligentiae imputari debeat, ita ut illum errasse dicamus velut privatam personam & non ut Papam, quoniam hujusmodi Caelestini definitio habetur in antiquis decretalibus in cap. Laudabilem, titulo de conversione infidelium; quam ego ipse vidi & legi, lib. 1. adv. haeres. cap. 4. And therefore 'tis a most intolerable folly to pretend that the Pope cannot erre in his Chaire, though he may erre in his Closet, and may maintaine a false opinion even to his death: For besides that, it is sottish to think that either he would not have the world of his own opinion (as all men naturally would) or that if he were set in his Chaire, he would determine contrary to himselfe in his study (and therefore to represent it as possible, they are faine to flie to a Miracle for which they have no colour, neither instru­ctions, nor insinuation, nor warrant, nor promise; besides that, it were impious and unreasonable to depose him for heresy, who may so easily, even by setting himselfe in his Chaire and reviewing his Theorems, be cured:) it is also against a very great experience: For besides the former Allegations it is most notorious, that Pope Alexander III in a Councell at Rome of 300 Archbishops and Bishops A. D. 1179. condemn'd Peter Lombard of heresy in a matter of great concernment, no lesse then something about the incarnation; from which sentence he was, after 36 years abiding it, absolv'd by Pope Innocent III, [Page 148] without repentance or dereliction of the opinion: Now if this sentence was not a Cathedrall Dictate, as solemn and great as could be expected, or as is said to be necessary to oblige all Chri­stendome, let the great Hyperaspists of the Roman Church be Judges, who tell us that a particular Councell with the Popes confirmation is made Oecumenicall by adoption, and is infalli­ble and obliges all Christendome; so Bellarmine: And therefore he sayes, that it is temerarium, erroneum, & proximum haeresi, to L. 2. de. Con­cil. cap. 5. deny it, but whether it be or not it is all one, as to my purpose: For it is certain, that in a particular Councell confirm'd by the Pope, if ever; then and there the Pope sate himselfe in his Chaire, and it is as certain that he sate besides the cushion and determined ridiculously and falsly in this case: But this is a de­vice De Pontif. Rom. c. 14. § respondeo. In 3. sent. d. 24. q. in conl. 6. dub. 6. in fine. for which there is no Scripture, no Tradition, no one dog­maticall resolute saying of any Father, Greek or Latine, for above 1000 years after Christ: And themselves when they list can acknowledge as much. And therefore Bellarmine's saying, I perceive is believ'd by them to be true: That there are many things in the Proverbiali­tèr olim dictū erat, de De­cretalibus. Ma­lè cum rebus humanis actum esse, ex quo de­cretis alae ac­cesserunt. scil. cum Decretales post decretum Gratiani sub nomine Gre­gorii noni ede­bantur. Decretall Epistles, which make not Articles to be de fide. And therefore, Non est necessariò credendum deter­minatis per summum Pontific [...]m, sayes Almain: And this serves their turns in every thing they doe not like, and therefore I am resolved it shall serve my turn also for some thing, and that is, that the matter of the Pope's infallibility is so ridiculous and impro­bable, that they doe not believe it themselves: Some of them clearly practised the contrary, and although Pope Leo X hath determined the Pope to be above a Councell, yet the Sorbon to this day scorn it at the very heart. And I might urge upon them that scorn that Almain truly enough by way of Argument alledges. It is a wonder that they who affirm the Pope cannot De Authorit. Eccles. cap, 10. in fine. erre in judgement, doe not also affirm that he cannot sinne: they are like enough to say so sayes he, if the vitious lives of the Popes did not make a daily confutation of such flattery: Now for my own particular, I am as confident and think it as certain, that Popes are actually deceived in matters of Chri­stian Doctrine, as that they doe prevaricate the lawes of Christian piety: And therefore L. 1. ca. 4. ad­vers. haeres. e­dit. Paris 1534. In seqq. non expurgantur ista verba. at idem sensus maner. Alphonsus à Castro calls them impudentes Papae assentatores, that ascribe to him infallibili­ty [Page 149] in judgement or interpretation of Scripture.

But if themselves did believe it heartily, what excuse is there Numb. 11. in the world, for the strange uncharitablenesse or supine negli­gence of the Popes, that they doe not set themselves in their Chaire and write infallible Commentaries, and determine all Controversies without errour, and blast all heresies with the word of their mouth, declare what is and what is not de fide, that his Disciples and Confidents may agree upon it; reconcile the Franciscans and Dominicans, and expound all Mysteries? for it cannot be imagined but he that was endued with so supreme power in order to so great ends, was also fitted with proportiona­ble, that is, extraordinary personall abilities, succeeding and de­riv'd upon the persons of all the Popes. And then the Doctors of his Church, need not trouble themselves with study, nor writing explications of Scripture, but might wholly attend to practicall devotion, and leave all their Scholasticall wranglings, the distinguishing opinions of their Orders, and they might have a fine Church, something like Fairy land, or Lucians King­dome in the Moone: But if they say they cannot doe this when they list, but when they are mov'd to it by the Spirit, then we are never the nearer; for so may the Bishop of Angolesme write infallible Commentaries when the holy Ghost moves him to it, for I suppose his motions are not ineffectuall, but hee will sufficiently assist us in performing of what he actually moves us to: But among so many hundred Decrees which the Popes of Rome have made or confirmed and attested (which is all one) I would faine know in how many of them did the holy Ghost assist them? If they know it, let them declare it, that it may be certain which of their Decretals are de fide; for as yet none of his own Church knowes: If they doe not know, then neither can we know it from them, and then we are as uncertaine as ever, and besides, the holy Ghost may possibly move him, and he by his ignorance of it may neglect so profitable a motion, and then his promise of infallible assistance will be to very little purpose, because it is with very much fallibility ap­plicable to practise: And therefore it is absolutely uselesse to any man or any Church, because, suppose it settled in Thesi, that the Pope is infallible, yet whether he will doe his duty, and [Page 150] perform those conditions of being assisted which are required of him, or whether he be a secret Simoniack (for if he be, he is ipso facto, no Pope) or whether he be a Bishop, or Priest, or a Christian, being all uncertain; every one of these depending up­on the intention and power of the Baptizer or Ordainer, which also are fallible, because they depend upon the honesty and power of other men; we cannot be infallibly certain of any Pope that he is infallible, and therefore when our Questions are dermin'd, we are never the nearer, but may hugge our selves in an imaginary truth, the certainty of finding truth out depen­ding upon so many fallible and contingent circumstances. And therefore, the thing, if it were true, being so to no purpose, it is to be presum'd that God never gave a power so impertinent­ly, and from whence no benefit can accrue to the Christian Church, for whose use and benefit, if at all, it must needs have been appointed.

But I am too long in this impertinency: If I were bound Numb. 18. to call any man Master upon earth, and to believe him upon his own affirmative and authority; I would of all men least follow him that pretends he is infallible and cannot prove it. For that he cannot prove it, makes me as uncertaine as ever, and that he pretends to infallibility makes him carelesse of using such meanes which will morally secure those wise persons, who knowing their own aptnesse to be deceiv'd, use what en­deavours they can to secure themselves from errour, and so be­come the better and more probable guides.

Well! Thus farre we are come: Although we are secured in fundamentall points from involuntary errour, by the plaine, Numb. 19. expresse, and dogmaticall places of Scripture, yet in other things we are not but may be invincibly mistaken, because of the ob­scurity and difficulty in the controverted parts of Scripture, by reason of the incertainty of the meanes of its Interpretation, since Tradition is of an uncertain reputation, and sometimes evidently false, Councels are contradictory to each other, and therefore certainly are equally deceiv'd many of them, and therefore all may; and then the Popes of Rome are very likely to mislead us, but cannot ascertain us of truth in matter of Que­stion; and in this world we believe in part, and prophecy in [Page 151] part, and this imperfection shall never be done away till we be translated to a more glorious state; either we must throw our chances, and get truth by accident or predestination, or else we must lie safe in a mutuall toleration, and private liberty of perswasion, unlesse some other Anchor can bee thought upon where wee may fasten our floating Vessels, and ride safely.

SECT. VIII.

THere are some that think they can determine all Questi­ons Numb. 1. in the world by two or three sayings of the Fathers, or by the consent of so many as they will please to call a concurrent Testimony: But this consideration will soon be at an end; for if the Fathers, when they are witnesses of Tradition doe not alwayes speak truth, as it hapned in the case of Papias and his numerous Followers for almost three Ages together, then is their Testimony more improbable when they dispute or write Commentaries.

2. The Fathers of the first Ages spake unitedly concerning Numb. 2. divers Questions of secret Theology, and yet were afterwards contradicted by one personage of great repution, whose credit had so much influence upon the world, as to make the contrary opinion become popular; why then may not we have the same liberty, when so plain an uncertainty is in their perswasions, and so great contrariety in their Doctrines? But this is evident in the case of absolute predestination, which till S. Austine's time no man preached, but all taught the contrary, and yet the repu­tation of this one excellent man altered the scene. But if he might dissent from so Generall a Doctrine, why may not we doe so too, it being pretended that he is so excellent a prece­dent to be followed, if we have the same reason? he had no more Authority nor dispensation to dissent, then any Bishop hath now. And therefore S. Austin hath dealt ingeniously, and [Page 152] as he took this liberty to himself, so he denies it not to others, but indeed forces them to preserve their own liberty: And Sess. ult. therefore when S. Hierom had a great mind to follow the Fa­thers in a point that he fancyed, and the best security he had, was, Patiaris me cum talibus errare, S. Austin would not endure it, but answered his reason, and neglected the Authority. And therefore it had been most unreasonable that we should doe that now, though in his behalfe, which he towards greater per­sonages (for so they were then) at that time judg'd to be un­reasonable. It is a plaine recession from Antiquity, which was determin'd by the Councell of Florence, piorum animas purga­tas, &c. mox in Caelum recipi, & intueri clarè ipsum Deum tri­num & unum sicuti est: As who please to try, may see it dogma­tically resolved to the contrary by Q. 60. ad Christian. Justin Martyr, Lib. 5. Irenaeus, by Hom. 7. in Levit. Origen, Hom. 39 in 1 Cor. S. Chrysostome, In c. 11. ad Heb. Theodoret, In c. 6. ad Apoc. Arethas Caesarien­sis, In 16. c. Luc. Euthymius, who may answer for the Greek Church, and it is plaine that it was the opinion of the Greek Church by that great difficulty the Romans had of bringing the Greeks to subscribe to the Florentine Councell, where the Latines acted their master-piece of wit and stratagem, the greatest that hath been till the famous and superpolitick design of Trent. And for the Latine Church, Lib. 4. adv. Mar. Tertullian, L. 2. de. Cain. c. 2. S. Ambrose, Ep. 111. ad Fortunatia­num. S. Austin, In Psal. 138. S. Hilary, De exeq. desunctor. Prudentius, L. 7. c. 21. Lactantius, In c. 6. Apoc. Victorinus Martyr, and Serm. 3. de om. sanctis. Vid. enim, S. Aug. in Enchir. c. 108. & l. 12. de civit. Dei. c. 9. & in Ps. 36. & in. l. 1. retract. c. 14. Vid. insuper testimonia quae collegit. Spala. l. 5. c. 8. n. 98. de repub. Eccl. & Sixt. Senens. l. 6. annot. 345. S. Bernard are known to be of opinion that the soules of the Saints are in abditis receptaculis, & exterioribus atriis, where they expect the resurrection of their bodies, and the glorifica­tion of their soules, and though they all believe them to be happy, yet they enjoy not the beatifick Vision before the re­surrection: Now there being so full a consent of Fathers (for many more may be added) and the Decree of Pope John XXII, besides, who was so confident for his Decree that he commanded the University of Paris to swear that they would preach it and no other, and that none should be promoted to degrees in Theology, that did not swear the like, (as In oper. 90. dierum. Occham, Serm. de Paschal. Gerson, In 4. sent. q. 13. a. 3. Marsilius and In 4. de Sacram. confirmat. Adrianus report:) Since it is esteemed lawfull to dissent from all these, I hope no man will be so unjust to presse other men to consent to an Authority which he him­selfe [Page 153] judges to be incompetent. These two great instances are enough, but if more were necessary I could instance in the opinion of the Chiliasts, maintained by the second and third Centuries and disavowed ever since: in the Doctrine of communicating Infants, taught and practised as necessary by the fourth and fifth Centu­ries, & detested by the Latine Church in all the following Ages: in the variety of opinions concerning the very form of baptism, some keeping close to the institution and the words of its first sanction, others affirming it to be sufficient, if it be administred in nomine De consecrat dist. 4. c. à quodum Iudaeo Christi; particularly S. Ambrose, Pope Nicholas the First, In c. 10. Act. V. Bede and Ep. 340. S. Bernard besides some Writers of after Ages as Hugo de S. Victore, and the Doctors generally his contemporaries. And it would not be inconsiderable to observe, that if any Synod, Ge­nerall, Nationall, or Provinciall, be receded from by the Church of the later Age, (as there have been very many) then, so many Fathers as were then assembled and united in opinion are esteem­ed no Authority to determine our perswasions. Now suppose 200 Fathers assembled in such a Councell, if all they had writ Books, and Authorities, 200 Authorities had beene alleadged in confirmation of an opinion, it would have made a mighty noise, and loaded any man with an insupportable prejudice that should dissent: And yet every opinion maintained against the Authority of any one Councell, though but Provinciall, is in its proportion such a violent recession and neglect of the Authority and doctrine of so many Fathers as were then assembled, who did as much declare their opinion in those Assemblies by their Suffra­ges, as if they had writ it in so many books; and their opinion is more considerable in the Assembly then in their writings, because it was more deliberate, assisted, united and more dogmaticall. In pursuance of this observation, it is to be noted by way of in­stance, that S. Austin and two hundred and seventeene Bishops and all their Successors Vid. Epist. Bonifacii 11. apud Nicoli­num, Tom. 2. Concil. pag. 544. & exem­plar precum Eulalii apud eundem. ibid. p. 525. Qui a­nathematizat omnes deciso­res suos qui in in ea [...] causa Romae se op­ponendo rectae fidei regulam praevaricati sunt, inter quos tomen fuit Augustinus, quem pro maledicto Caelestinus ta­cite agnoscit, admittendo sc. exemplar precum. Vid. Doctor. Marta. de jurisdict. part. 4. p. 273. & Erasm annot. in Hieron. praefatin Daniel. for a whole Age together did consent in denying appeals to Rome; and yet the Authority of so many Fathers (all true Catholicks) is of no force now at Rome in this Question; but if it be in a matter they like, one of these Fa­thers [Page 154] alone is sufficient. The Doctrine of S. Austin alone brought in the festivall and veneration of the assumption of the blessed Virgin, and the hard sentence passed at Rome upon unbaptized Infants and the Dominican opinion concerning predetermination, derived from him alone as from their Originall: so that if a Fa­ther speaks for them, it is wonderfull to see what Tragedies are stirred up against them that dissent, as is to be seen in that excellent nothing of Campian's ten reasons. But if the Fathers be against them, then Patres in quibusdam non leviter lapsi sunt sayes Berllarmine, and constat quosdam ex praecipuis, it is cer­tain the chiefest of them have fouly erred. Nay, Posa, Sal­meron, De verb. Dei l. 3. c. 10. §. dices. and Wadding in the Question of the immaculate con­ception make no scruple to dissent from Antiquity; to preferre new Doctors before the Old, and to justifie themselves, bring instances in which the Church of Rome had determin'd against the Fathers. And it is not excuse enough to say that singly the Fathers may erre, but if they concurre they are certain Testi­mony. For there is no question this day disputed by persons that are willing to be tryed by the Fathers, so generally attested on either side, as some points are which both sides dislike se­verally or conjunctly. And therefore tis not honest for either side to presse the Authority of the Fathers, as a concluding Ar­gument in matter of dispute, unlesse themselves will bee con­tent to submit in all things to the Testimony of an equall number of them, which I am certain neither side will doe.

3. If I should reckon all the particular reasons against the certainty of this topick, it would be more then needs as to this Numb. 3. Question, and therefore I will abstaine from all disparagement of those worthy Personages, who were excellent lights to their severall Dioceses, and Cures. And therefore I will not instance that Clemens Alexandrinus taught that Christ felt no hunger or thirst, but eat only to make demonstration of the verity of his Strom. l. 3. & 6. humane nature: Nor that S. Hilary taught that Christ in his sufferings had no sorrow; nor that Origen taught the paines of Hell not to have an eternall duration: Nor that S. Cyprian taught rebaptization; nor that Athenagoras condemned second marriages; nor that S. John Damascen said, Christ only prayed in appearance, not really and in truth; I will let them all rest [Page 155] in peace, and their memories in honour; for if I should enquire into the particular probations of this Article, I must doe to them as I should be forced to doe now; if any man should say that the Writings of the School-men were excellent Argu­ment and Authority to determine mens perswasions; I must consider their writings, and observe their defaillances, their contradictions, the weaknesse of their Arguments, the mis-alle­gations of Scripture, their inconsequent deductions, their false opinions, and all the weaknesses of humanity, and the failings of their persons, which no good man is willing to doe, unlesse he be compel'd to it by a pretence that they are infallible, or that they are followed by men even into errors or impiety. And therefore since there is enough in the former instances, to cure any such misperswasion and prejudice, I will not instance in the innumerable particularities that might perswade us to keep our Liberty intire or to use it discreetly. For it is not to be deny­ed but that great advantages are to be made by their writings, & probabile est quod omnibus, quod pluribus, quod sapientibus vi­detur; If one wise man sayes a thing, it is an Argument to me to believe it in its degree of probation, that is, proportionable to such an assent as the Authority of a wise man can produce, and when there is nothing against it that is greater; and so in proportion higher and higher as more wise men (such as the old Doctors were) doe affirm it. But that which I complain of is that we look upon wise men that lived long agoe with so much veneration and mistake, that we reverence them not for having been wise men, but that they lived long since. But when the Question is concerning Authorty, there must bee something to build it on; a Divine Commandment, humane Sanction, excellency of spirit, and greatnesse of understanding, on which things all humane Authority is regularly built. But now if we had lived in their times (for so we must look upon them now, as they did who without prejudice beheld them) I suppose we should then have beheld them, as we in England look on those Prelates, who are of great reputation for lear­ning and sanctity; here only is the difference; when persons are living, their authority is depressed by their personall defail­lances, and the contrary interests of their contemporaries, [Page 156] which disband when they are dead, and leave their credit intire upon the reputation of those excellent books, and monuments of learning and piety which are left behind: But beyond this why the Bishop of Hippo shall have greater Authority then the Bishop of the Canaries, caeteris paribus, I understand not. For did they that liv'd (to instance) in S. Austine's time believe all that he wrote? If they did, they were much too blame, or else himselfe was too blame for retracting much of it a little before his death; And if while he lived, his affirmative was no more Authority, then derives from the credit of one very wise man, against whom also very wise men were opposed; I know not why his Authority should prevaile further now; For there is nothing added to the strength of his reason, since that time, but only that he hath been in great esteem with po­sterity: And if that be all, why the opinion of the following Ages, shall be of more force then the opinion of the first Ages, against whom S. Austin in many things clearly did oppose him­selfe, I see no reason; or whether the first Ages were against him or no, yet that he is approved by the following Ages is no better Argument; for it makes his Authority not to be innate, but derived from the opinion of others, and so to be precaria, and to depend upon others, who if they should change their opinions, and such examples there have been many, then there were nothing left to urge our consent to him; which when it was at the best, was only this, because he had the good Fortune to be believed by them that came after, he must be so still; and because it was no Argument for the old Doctors before him, this will not be very good in his behalfe: The same I say of any company of them, I say not so of all of them, it is to no purpose to say it, for there is no Question this day in contesta­tion, in the explication of which all the old Writers did consent: In the assignation of the Canon of Scripture, they never did consent for six hundred yeares together, and then by that time the Bishops had agreed indiffently well, and but indifferently, upon that, they fell out in twenty more; and except it be in the Apostels Creed, and Articles of such nature, there is no­thing which may with any colour be called a consent, much lesse Tradition Universall.

[Page 157] 4. But I will rather chuse to shew the uncertainty of this Numb. 4. Topick by such an Argument, which was not in the Fathers power to help, such as makes no invasion upon their great re­putation, which I desire should be preserved as sacred as it ought. For other things, let who please read Mr Daillè du vray usage des Peres; But I shall only consider that the Writings of the Fathers have been so corrupted by the intermixture of Hereticks, so many false books put forth in their names, so many of their Writings lost which would more clearly have explicated their sense, and at last an open profession made and a trade of making the Fathers speak, not what themselves thought, but what other men pleased, that it is a great instance of God's providence and care of his Church, that we have so much good preserved in the Writings which we receive from the Fathers, and that all truth is not as clear gone, as is the certainty of their great Authority and reputation.

The publishing books with the inscription of great names be­gan in S. Paul's time; for some had troubled the Church of Numb. 5. Thessalonica with a false Epistle in S. Paul's name against the inconvenience of which he arms them in 2 Thess. 2. 1. And this increased daily in the Church. The Arrians wrot an Epistle to Constantine, under the name of Athanasius, and the Eutychi­ans Apolog. Atha­nas. ad Con­stant. wrot against Cyrill of Alexandria under the name of Theo­doret; and of the Age in which the seventh Synod was kept, Erasmus reports, Libris falso celebrium virorum titulo commen­datis Vid. Baron. A. D. 553. scatere omnia. It was then a publike businesse, and a trick not more base then publick: But it was more ancient then so, and it is memorable in the books attributed to S. Basil, contain­ing thirty Chapters de Spiritu Sancto, whereof fifteen were plainly added by another hand under the covert of S. Basil, as appears in the difference of the stile, in the impertinent digressi­ons, against the custome of that excellent man, by some passages contradictory to others of S. Basil, by citing Meletius as dead before him, who yet lived three Vid. Baron, in Annal. years after him, and by the very frame and manner of the discourse; and yet it was so hand­somly carried, and so well serv'd the purposes of men, that it was quoted under the title of S. Basil by many, but without naming the number of chapters, and by S. John Damascen in [Page 158] these words, Basilius in opere triginta capitum de Spiritu S. ad Amphilochium, and to the same purpose, and in the number L [...]. de imagin. orat. 1. of 27 & 29. chapters he is is cited by Nomocan. tit. 1. cap. 3. Photius, by Euthymius, by Burchard, by Zonaras, Balsamon and Nicephorus; but for this see more in Erasmu's his Preface upon this book of S. Basil. There is an Epistle goes still under the name of S. Hierom ad Demetria­dem vi [...]ginem, and is of great use in the Question of Predesti­nation, with its appendices, and yet a very V. Beda. de gratiâ Christi adv. Iulianum. learned man 800 yeares agone did believe it to be written by a Pelagian, and un­dertakes to confute divers parts of it, as being high and confi­dent Pelagianisme, and written by Julianus Episc. Eclanensis, but Gregorius Ariminensis from S. Austin affirmes it to have been written by Pelagius himselfe. I might instance in too many; Greg. Arim. in 2. sent. dist. 26. q. 1. a. 3. There is not any one of the Fathers who is esteemed Author of any considerable number of books, that hath escaped un­touched; But the abuse in this kinde hath been so evident that now if any interessed person of any side be pressed with an Authority very pregnant against him, he thinks to escape by accusing the Edition, or the Author, or the hands it passed through, or at last he therefore suspects it, because it makes against him; both sides being resolv'd that they are in the right, the Authorities that they admit, they will believe not to be against them; and they which are too plainly against them, shall be no Authorities: And indeed the whole world hath been so much abused that every man thinks he hath reason to suspect whatsoever is against him, that is, what he please; which prooceeding only produces this truth, that there neither is nor can be any certainty, nor very much probability in such Allegations.

But there is a worse mischiefe then this, besides those very many which are not yet discovered, which like the pestilence Numb. 6. destroyes in the dark, and growes into inconvenience more in­sensibly and more irremediably, and that is, corruption of parti­cular places, by inserting words and altering them to contrary senses: A thing which the Fathers of the sixth Generall Synod complain'd of concerning the constitutions of S. Clement, quibus jam olim ab iis qui à sidè aliena sent iunt adulterina quaedam etiam pietate aliena introducta sunt quae divinorum nobis Decretorum Can. 2. [Page 159] elegantem & venustam speciem obscurarunt: And so also have his Recognitions, so have his Epistles been used, if at least they were his at all, particularly the fifth Decretall Epistle that goes under the name of S. Clement, in which community of Wives is taught upon the Authority of S. Luke saying the first Christians had all things common; if all things, then Wives also sayes the Epistle; a forgery like to have been done by some Nicolaitan, or other impure person: There is an Epistle of Cyrill extant to Successus Bishop of Diocaesarea, in which he relates that hee was ask'd by Budus Bishop of Emessa, whe­ther he did approve of the Epistle of Athanasius to Epictetus Bishop of Corinth, and that his answer was, Si haec apud vos scripta non sint adultera: Nam plura ex his ab hostibus Ecclesiae Euseb. l. 4. c. 23. deprehenduntur esse depravata: And this was done even while the Authors themselves were alive; for so Dionysius of Corinth complan'd that his writings were corrupted by Hereticks, and Pope Leo, that his Epistle to Flavianus was perverted by the Greeks: And in the Synod of Constantinople before quoted (the Act. 8. vid. eti­am. Synod 7. act. 4. sixth Synod) Macarius and his Disciples were convicted quod Sanctorum testimonia aut truncârint aut depravârint: Thus the third Chapter of S. Cyprians book de unitate Ecclesiae in the Edition of Pamelius suffered great alteration: These words [Primatus Petro datur] wholly inserted, and these [super Ca­thedram Petri fundata est Ecclesia] and whereas it was before, super unum aedificat Ecclesiam Christus, that not being enough they have made it super [illum] unum. Now these Additions are against the faith of all old Copies, before Minutius and Pame­lius, and against Gratian, even after himselfe had been chastiz'd by the Roman Correctors, the Commissaries of Gregory XIII, as is to be seen where these words are alledged, Decret. c. 24. Q. 1. can. loquitur Dominus ad Petrum. So that we may say of Cyprians works as Pamelius himself said concerning his writings and the writings of other of the Fathers, unde colligimus (saith he) Cypriani scripta ut & aliorum Veterum à librariis variè fuisse Annot. Cypri­an. super. Con­cil. Carthage. n. 1. interpolata. But Gratian himselfe could doe as fine a feat when he listed, or else some body did it for him, and it was in this very Question, their beloved Article of the Popes Supremacy; for de paenit. dist. 1. c. potest fieri. he quotes these words out [Page 160] of S. Ambrose, Non habent Petri haereditatem qui non habent Pe­tri sedem; sidem, not sedem, it is in S. Ambrose; but this errour was made authentick by being inserted into the Code of the Law of the Catholick Church; and considering how little notice the Clergy had of Antiquity, but what was transmitted to them by Gratian, it will be no great wonder that all this part of the world swallowed such a bole and the opinion that was wrapped in it. But I need not instance in Gratian any further, but referre any one that desires to be satisfied concerning this Collection of his, to Augustinus Archbishop of Tarracon in emendatione Gra­tiani, where he shall find fopperies and corruptions good store noted by that learned man: But that the Indices Expurgatorii Vid. Ind. Ex­purg. Belg. in Bertram. & Flandr. Hispan. Portugal. Neo­politan. Roma­num. lunium in praefat. ad Ind. Expurg. Belg. Hasen muslerum, pag. 275. Withring­ton. Apolog. num. 449. commanded by Authority, and practised with publike license professe to alter and correct the sayings of the Fathers, and to reconcile them to the Catholike sense by putting in and lea­ving out, is so great an Imposture, so unchristian a proceeding, that it hath made the faith of all books and all Authors justly to be suspected; For considering their infinite diligence and great opportunity, as having had most of the Copies in their own hands, together with an unsatisfiable desire of prevailing in their right or in their wrong, they have made an absolute de­struction of this Topick, and when the Fathers speak Videat Lector Andream Cri­stovium in Bel­lo Iesuitico, & Ioh. Rei­nolds in hbr. de idol. Rom. Latine, or breathe in a Roman Diocese, although the providence of God does infinitely over-rule them, and that it is next to a miracle that in the Monuments of Antiquity, there is no more found that can pretend for their advantage then there is, which indeed is infinitely inconsiderable: Yet our Questions and uncertainties are infinitely multiplȳed in stead of a proba­ble and reasonable determination. For since the Latines al­wayes complain'd of the Greeks for privately corrupting the Ancient Records both of Councels and Vid. Ep. Ni­colai ad Mi­chael. Imperat. Fathers, and now the Latines make open profession not of corrupting, but of cor­recting their writings (that's the word) and at the most it was but a humane authority, and that of persons not alwayes lear­ned, and very often deceiv'd; the whole matter is so un­reasonable, that it is not worth a further disquisition. But if any one desires to enquire further, he may be satisfied in Erasmus, in Henry and Robert Stephens, in their Prefaces [Page 161] before the Editions of Fathers, and their Observations upon them: in Bellarmine de script. Eccles. in Dr. Reynolds, de libris A­pocryphis, in Scaliger, and Robert Coke of Leedes in Yorkeshire, in his Book De censura Patrum.

SECT. IX.

ANd now after all these considerations of the severall To­picks, Numb. 1. Tradition, Councels, Popes and ancient Doctors of the Church, I suppose it will not be necessary, to consider the au­thority of the Church apart. For the Church either speaks by Tradition, or by a representative body in a Councel, by Popes, or by the Fathers: for the Church is not a Chimaera, not a shadow, but a company of men beleeving in Jesus Christ, which men ei­ther speak by themselves immediately, or by their Rulers, or by their proxies and representatives; now I have considered it in all senses but in its diffusive capacity; in which capacity she cannot be supposed to be a Judge of Controversies, both because in that capacity she cannot teach us, as also because if by a Judge we mean all the Church diffused in all its parts and members, so there can be no controversie, for if all men be of that opinion, then there is no question contested; if they be not all of a mind, how can the whole diffusive Catholike Church be pretended in defiance of any one article, where the diffusive Church being divided, part goes this way, and part another? But if it be said, the greatest part must carry it; Besides that it is impossible for us to know which way the greatest part goes in many questions, it is not alwaies true that the greater part is the best, sometimes the contrary is most cer­tain, and it is often very probable, but it is alwayes possible. And when paucity of followers was objected to Liberius, he gave this in answer, There was a time when but three Children of the Cap­tivity Theod. l. 2. c. 16. hist. resisted the Kings Decree. And Athanasius wrote on pur­pose against those that did judge of truth by multitudes, and in­deed Tom. 2. it concerned him so to doe, when he alone stood in the gap against the numerous armies of the Arrians.

[Page 162] But if there could in this case be any distinct consideration of Numb. 2. the Church, yet to know which is the true Church is so hard to be found out, that the greatest questions of Christendome are jud­ged before you can get to your Judge, and then there is no need of him. For those questions which are concerning the Judge of questions must be determined before you can submit to his judge­ment, and if you can your selves determine those great questions which consist much in universalities, then also you may determine the particulars as being of less difficulty. And he that considers how many notes there are given to know the true Church, no less then 15. by Bellarmine, and concerning every one of them almost whether it be a certaine note or no there are very many questi­ons and uncertainties, and when it is resolved which are the notes, there is more dispute about the application of these notes then of the [...], will quickly be satisfied that he had better sit still then to goe round about a difficult and troublesome passage, and at last get no further, but returne to the place from whence he first set out. And there is one note amongst the rest, Holiness of Doctrine, that is, so as to have nothing false either in Doctrina fidei or morum, (for so Bellarmine explicates it) which supposes all your Controversies, judged before they can be tryed by the authority of the Church, and when we have found out all true Doctrine (for that is necessary to judge of the Church by, that as Saint Austin's councell is Ecclesiam in verbis Christi investigemus) then we are bound to follow because we judge it true, not because the Church hath said it, and this is to judge of the Church by her Doctrine, not of the Doctrine by the Church. And indeed it is the best and only way; But then how to judge of that Doctrine will be afterwards inquired into. In the meane time, the Church, that is, the Governours of the Churches are to judge for themselves, & for all those who cannot judge for them­selves. For others, they must know that their Governours judge for them too, so as to keepe them in peace and obedience, though not for the determination of their private perswasions. For the Oeconomy of the Church requires that her authority be received by all her children. Now this authority is divine in its originall, for it derives immediately from Christ, but it is humane in its mi­nistration. We are to be lead like men not like beasts; A rule is [Page 163] prescribed for the guides themselves to follow, as we are to fol­low the guides; and although in matters indeterminable or am­biguous the presumption lyes on behalfe of the Governours, (for we do nothing for authority if we suffer it not to weigh that part down of an indifferency and a question which she chooses) yet if there be error manifestus, as it often happens, or if the Church-Governours themselves be rent into innumerable sects, as it is this day in Christendome, then we are to be as wise as we can in choosing our guides, and then to follow so long as that reason re­mains for which we first chose them. And even in that Govern­ment which was an immediate sanction of God, I mean the Ec­clesiasticall government of the Synagogue, where God had con­sign'd the High-Priests authority with a menace of death to them that should disobey, that all the world might know the meaning and extent of such precepts, and that there is a limit beyond which they cannot command, and we ought not to obey: it came once to that pass, that if the Priest had been obeyed in his Conciliary decrees, the whole Nation had been bound to beleeve the con­demnation of our blessed Saviour to have been just, and at ano­ther time the Apostles must no more have preached in the name of JEsus. But here was manifest error. And the case is the same to every man that invincibly and therefore innocently beleeves it so. Deo potius quàm hominibus is our rule in such cases. For al­though every man is bound to follow his guide, unless he beleeves his guide to mislead him; yet when he sees reason against his guide, it is best to follow his reason: for though in this he may fall into error, yet he will escape the sin; he may doe violence to truth, but never to his own conscience; and an honest error is better then an hypocriticall profession of truth, or a violent lu­xation of the understanding, since if he retains his honesty and simplicity, he cannot erre in a matter of faith or absolute neces­sity: Gods goodness hath secur'd all honest and carefull persons from that; for other things, he must follow the best guides he can, and he cannot be obliged to follow better then God hath given him.

And there is yet another way pretended of infallible Numb. 3. Expositions of Scripture; and that is, by the Spirit. But of this I shall say no more, but that it is impertinent as to this question. [Page 164] For put case the Spirit is given to some men enabling them to expound infallibly, yet because this is but a private assistance, and cannot be proved to others, this infallible assistance may de­termine my own assent, but shall not inable me to prescribe to o­thers, because it were unreasonable I should, unless I could prove to him that I have the Spirit, and so can secure him from being deceived, if he relyes upon me. In this case I may say as S. Paul in the case of praying with the Spirit, He verily giveth thanks well, but the other is not edified. So that let this pretence be as true as it will, it is sufficient that it cannot be of consideration in this question.

The result of all is this; Since it is not reasonable to limit and prescribe to all mens understandings by any externall rule in the Numb. 4. interpretation of difficult places of Scripture which is our rule: Since no man nor company of men is secure from error, or can secure us that they are free from malice, interest and design; and since all the wayes by which we usually are taught, as Tradition, Councels, Decretals, &c. are very uncertain in the matter, in their authority, in their being legitimate and naturall, and many of them certainly false, and nothing certain but the divine autho­rity of Scripture, in which all that is necessary is plain, and much of that that is not necessary is very obscure, intricate and involv'd, either we must set up our rest, onely upon articles of faith, and plain places, and be incurious of other obscurer revelations, (which is a duty for persons of private understandings, and of no publike function) or if we will search further (to which in some measure the guides of others are obliged) it remains we inquire how men may determine themselves, so as to doe their duty to God, and not to diserve the Church, that every such man may doe what he is bound to, in his personall capacity, and as he re­lates to the publike as a publike minister.

SECT. X.

HEre then I consider, that although no man may be trusted to judge for all others, unless this person were infallible and Numb. 1. authorized so to doe, which no man nor no company of men is, yet every man may be trusted to judge for himself, I say every man that can judge at all, (as for others they are to be saved as it pleaseth God) but others that can judge at all must either choose their guides who shall judge for them, (and then they of­tentimes doe the wisest, and alwayes save themselves a labour, but then they choose too) or if they be persons of greater under­standing, then they are to choose for themselves in particular, what the others doe in generall, and by choosing their guide; and for this any man may be better trusted for himselfe then any man can be for another: For in this case his own interest is most con­cerned; and ability is not so necessary as honesty, which certain­ly every man will best preserve in his owne case, and to himselfe, (and if he does not, it is he that must smart for't) and it is not required of us not to be in errour, but that we endeavour to a­void it.

2. He that followes his guide so far as his reason goes along with him, or which is all one, he that followes his owne reason Numb. 2. (not guided onely by naturall arguments, but by divine revelation, and all other good meanes) hath great advantages over him that gives himselfe wholly to follow any humane guide whatsoever, because he followes all their reasons and his own too; he follows them till reason leaves them, or till it seemes so to him, which is all one to his particular, for by the confession of all sides, an erro­neous Conscience binds him, when a right guide does not bind him. But he that gives himselfe up wholly to a guide is often­times (I meane, if he be a discerning person) forc'd to doe vio­lence to his own understanding, and to lose all the benefit of his owne discretion, that he may reconcile his reason to his guide. And of this we see infinite inconveniences in the Church of Rome, [Page 166] for we finde persons of great understanding, oftentimes so amused with the authority of their Church, that it is pity to see them sweat in answering some objections, which they know not how to doe, but yet beleeve they must, because the Church hath said it. So that if they reade, study, pray, search records, and use all the means of art and industry in the pursuite of truth, it is not with a resolution to follow that which shall seem truth to them, but to confirm what before they did beleeve: and if any argument shall seeme unanswerable against any Article of their Church, they are to take it for a temptation, not for an illumination, and they are to use it accordingly: which makes them make the De­vill to be the Author of that which Gods Spirit hath assisted them to find in the use of lawfull means and the search of truth. And when the Devill of falshood is like to be cast out by Gods Spirit, they say that it is through Beelzebub; which was one of the worst things that ever the Pharisees said or did: And was it not a plain stifling of the just and reasonable demands made by the Emperour, by the Kings of France and Spaine, and by the a­blest Divines among them which was used in the Councell of Trent, when they demanded the restitution of Priests to their li­berty of marriage, the use of the Chalice, the Service in the vul­gar Tongue, and these things not onely in pursuance of Truth, but for other great and good ends, even to take away an infinite scandall and a great schisme? And yet when they themselves did profess it, and all the world knew these reasonable demands were denyed meerly upon a politick consideration, yet that these things should be fram'd into articles, and decrees of faith, and they for ever after bound not onely not to desire the same things, but to think the contrary to be divine truths: never was Reason made more a slave or more useless. Must not all the world say, either they must be great hypocrites, or doe great violence to their understanding, when they not onely cease from their claim, but must also beleeve it to be unjust? If the use of their reason had not been restrained by the tyrannie & imperiousness of their guide, what the Emperour, and the Kings, and their Theologues would have done, they can best judge who consider the reasona­bleness of the demand, and the unreasonableness of the denyall. But we see many wise men who with their Optandum esset ut Ec­clesia [Page 167] licentiam daret, &c. proclaime to all the world, that in some things they consent and doe not consent, and doe not heartily be­leeve what they are bound publickly to profess and they them­selves would cleerly see a difference, if a contrary decree should be fram'd by the Church, they would with an infinite greater con­fidence rest themselves in other propositions then what they must beleeve as the case now stands, and they would find that the au­thority of a Church is a prejudice as often as a free and modest use of reason is a temptation.

3. God will have no man pressed with anothers inconvenien­ces in matters spirituall and intellectuall, no mans salvation to de­pend Numb. 3. upon another, and every tooth that eats sowre grapes shall be set on edge for it selfe, and for none else: and this is remarka­ble in that saying of God by the Prophet, If the Prophet ceases to Ezek. 33. tell my people of their sins, and leads them into error, the people shall die in their sins, and the blood of them I will require at the hands of that Prophet: Meaning, that God hath so set the Prophets to guide us, that we also are to follow them by a voluntary assent by an act of choice and election. For although accidentally and occasionally the sheep may perish by the shepherds fault, yet that which hath the chiefest influence upon their finall condition, is their owne act and election, and therefore God hath so appoin­ted guides to us, that if we perish, it may be accounted upon both our scores, upon our own and the guides too, which sayes plain­ly, that although we are intrusted to our guides, yet we are in­trusted to our selves too. Our guides must direct us, and yet if they faile, God hath not so left us to them, but he hath given us enough to our selves to discover their failings, and our own duties in all things necessary. And for other things we must doe as well as we can. But it is best to follow our guides, if we know nothing better; but if we doe, it is better to follow the pillar of fire, than a pillar of cloud, though both possibly may lead to Ca­naan: But then also it is possible that it may be otherwise. But I am sure if I doe my own best, then if it be best to follow a Guide, and if it be also necessary, I shall be sure by Gods grace and my own endeavour, to get to it; But if I without the particular in­gagement of my own understanding, follow a guide, possibly I may be guilty of extream negligence, or I may extinguish Gods [Page 168] Spirit, or doe violence to my own reason. And whether intrust­ing my self wholly with another, be not a laying up my talent in a napkin, I am not so well assured. I am certain the other is not. And since another mans answering for me will not hinder, but that I also shall answer for my self; as it concerns him to see he does not wilfully misguide me, so it concerns me to see that he shall not if I can help it, if I cannot it will not be required at my hands: whether it be his fault, or his invincible error, I shall be charg'd with neither.

4. This is no other then what is enjoyned as a duty. For since Numb. 4. God will be justified with a free obedience, and there is an obe­dience of understanding as well as of will and affection, it is of great concernment, as to be willing to beleeve what ever God sayes, so also to enquire diligently whether the will of God be so as is pretended. Even our acts of understanding are acts of choice, Mat. 15. 10. Joh. 5. 40. 1 Joh. 4. 1. Ephes. 5. 17. Luk. 24. 25. Rom. 3. 11. 1. 28. Apoc. 2. 2. Act. 17. 11. and therefore it is commanded as a duty, to search the Scriptures, to try the spirits whether they be of God or no, of our selves to be able to judge what is right, to try all things, and to retaine that which is best. For he that resolves not to consider, resolves not to be care­full whether he have truth or no, and therefore hath an affection indifferent to truth or falshood, which is all one as if he did choose amiss; and since when things are truly propounded and made reasonable and intelligible we cannot but assent, and then it is no thanks to us; we have no way to give our wills to God in matters of beliefe, but by our industry in searching it and exa­mining the grounds upon which the propounders build their di­ctates. And the not doing it is oftentimes a cause that God gives a man over [...], into a reprobate and undiscerning mind and understanding.

5. And this very thing (though men will not understand it) is Numb. 5. the perpetuall practice of all men in the world that can give a reasonable account of their faith. The very Catholike Church it selfe is rationabilis & ubi (que) diffusa, saith Optatus, reasonable, as Lib. 3. well as diffused, every where. For take the Proselites of the Church of Rome, even in their greatest submission of understan­ding, they seem to themselves to follow their reason most of all. For if you tell them, Scripture and Tradition are their rules to follow, they will beleeve you when they know a reason for it, [Page 169] and if they take you upon your word, they have a reason for that too, either they beleeve you a learned man, or a good man, or that you can have no ends upon them, or something that is of an equall height to fit their understandings. If you tell them they must beleeve the Church, you must tell them why they are bound to it, and if you quote Scripture to prove it, you must give them leave to judge, whether the words alledged speak your sense or no, and therefore to dissent if they say no such thing. And al­though all men are not wise, and proceed discreetly, yet all make their choice some way or other. He that chooses to please his fancie takes his choice as much as he that chooses prudently. And no man speaks more unreasonably, then he that denyes to men the use of their Reason in choice of their Religion. For that I may by the way remove the common prejudice, Reason and Authori­ty are not things incompetent or repugnant, especially when the Authority is infallible and supreme: for there is no greater rea­son in the world then to beleeve such an authority. But then we must consider, whether every authority that pretends to be such, is so indeed. And therefore Deus dixit, ergo hoc verum est, is the greatest demonstration in the world for things of this nature. But it is not so in humane dictates, and yet reason and humane authority are not enemies. For it is a good argument for us to fol­low such an opinion, because it is made sacred by the authority of Councells and Ecclesiasticall Tradition, and sometimes it is the best reason we have in a question, and then it is to be strictly fol­lowed; but there may also be at other times a reason greater than it that speaks against it, and then the authority must not carry it. But then the difference is not between reason and authority, but between this reason and that, which is greater: for authority is a very good reason, and is to prevaile, unless a stronger comes and disarms it, but then it must give place. So that in this question by [Reason] I doe not meane a distinct Topick, but a transcendent that runs through all Topicks; for Reason, like Logick, is instru­ment of all things else, and when Revelation, and Philosophie, and publick Experience, and all other grounds of probability or demonstration have supplyed us with matter, then Reason does but make use of them; that is, in plain terms, there being so ma­ny wayes of arguing, so many sects, such differing interests, such [Page 170] variety of authority, so many pretences, and so many false be­liefes, it concernes every wise man to consider which is the best argument, which proposition relies upon the truest grounds: & if this were not his only way, why doe men dispute and urge argu­ments, why do they cite Councels & Fathers, why do they alledge Scripture and Tradition, and all this on all sides, and to contrary purposes? If we must judge, then we must use our reason; if we must not judge, why doe they produce evidence? Let them leave disputing and decree propositions magisterially, but then we may choose whether we will believe them or no; or if they say we must believe them, they must prove it, and tell us why. And all these disputes concerning Tradition, Councells, Fathers, &c. are not arguments against or besides reason, but contestations and pretences to the best arguments, and the most certain satisfaction of our reason. But then all these comming into question, submit themselves to reason, that is, to be judged by humane understan­ding, upon the best grounds and information it can receive. So that Scripture, Tradition, Councells, and Fathers, are the evi­dence in a question, but Reason is the Judge: That is, we being the persons that are to be perswaded, we must see that we be perswa­ded reasonably, and it is unreasonable to assent to a lesser evi­dence, when a greater and cleerer is propounded, but of that eve­ry man for himselfe is to take cognisance if he be able to judge, if he be not, he is not bound under the tye of necessity to know any thing of it; that, that is necessary shall be certainly conveyed to him, God that best can, will certainly take care for that; for if he does not, it becomes to be not necessary; or if it should still remain necessary, and he damned for not knowing it, and yet to know it be not in his power, then who can help it? there can be no further care in this business. In other things, there being no ab­solute and prime necessity, we are left to our liberty to judge that way that makes best demonstration of our piety and of our love to God and truth, not that way that is alwayes the best argu­ment of an excellent understanding, for this may be a blessing, but the other onely is a duty.

And now that we are pitch'd upon that way which is most na­turall Numb. 6. and reasonable in determination of our selves rather then of questions, which are often indeterminable, since right reason [Page 171] proceeding upon the best grounds it can, viz. of divine revelati­on and humane authority, and probability is our guide, (Stando in humanis) and supposing the assistance of Gods Spirit (which he never denies them that faile not of their duty in all such things in which he requires truth and certainty) it remaines that we consider how it comes to pass that men are so much deceived in the use of their reason, and choice of their Religion, and that in this account we distinguish those accidents which make error in­nocent from those which make it become a heresie.

SECT. XI.

1. THen I consider, that there are a great many inculpable causes of Errour, which are arguments of humane imper­fections, Numb. 1. not convictions of a sinne. And (1.) the variety of hu­mane understandings is so great, that what is plaine and apparent to one, is difficult and obscure to another; one will observe a consequent from a common principle, and another from thence will conclude the quite contrary. When S. Peter saw the vision of the sheet let downe with all sorts of beasts in it, and a voice say­ing, Surge Petre, macta & manduca, if he had not by a particular assistance beene directed to the meaning of the holy Ghost, pos­sibly he might have had other apprehensions of the meaning of that vision, for to my selfe it seemes naturally to speake nothing but the abolition of the Mosaicall rites, and the restitution of us to that part of Christian liberty which consists in the promiscu­ous eating of meates; and yet besides this, there want not some understandings in the world, to whom these words seeme to give Saint Peter a power to kill hereticall Princes. Me thinkes it is a strange understanding that makes such extractions, but Bozius and Baronius did so. But men may understand what they please, especially when they are to expound Oracles. It was an argu­ment of some wit, but of singularity of understanding, that hap­ned in the great contestation betweene the Missalls of Saint Am­brose and Saint Gregory. The lot was throwne, and God made [Page 172] to be Judge, so as he was tempted to a miracle, to answer a que­stion which themselves might have ended without much trouble. The two Missals were laid upon the Altar, & the Church door shut and sealed. By the morrow Mattins they found S. Gregories Missall torne in pieces (saith the story) and thrown about the Church, but S. Ambrose's open'd and laid upon the Altar in a posture of being read. If I had been to judge of the meaning of this Mira­cle, I should have made no scruple to have said it had been the will of God that the Missall of S. Ambrose which had been anci­ently used, and publickly tryed and approved of, should still be read in the Church, and that of Gregory let alone, it being torn by an Angelicall hand as an argument of its imperfection, or of the inconvenience of innovation. But yet they judg'd it otherwise, for by the tearing and scattering about, they thought it was meant, it should be used over all the world, and that of S. Am­brose read onely in the Church of Millaine. I am more satisfied that the former was the true meaning, then I am of the truth of the story: But we must suppose that. And now there might have been eternal disputings about the meaning of the miracle, and no­thing left to determine, when two fancies are the litigants, and the contestations about probabilities hinc inde. And I doubt not this was one cause of so great variety of opinions in the Primitive Church, when they proved their severall opinions which were my­sterious questions of Christian Theologie, by testimonies out of the obscurer Prophets, out of the Psalmes and Canticles, as who please to observe their arguments of discourse and actions of Councel shall perceive they very much used to doe. Now although mens understandings be not equall, and that it is fit the best un­derstandings should prevaile, yet that will not satisfie the weaker understandings, because all men will not think that another un­derstanding is better then his own, at least not in such a particu­lar, in which with fancy he hath pleased himself. But commonly they that are least able, are most bold, and the more ignorant is the more confident, therefore it is but reason if he would have a­nother beare with him, he also should beare with another, and if he will not be prescribed to, neither let him prescribe to others. And there is the more reason in this; because such modesty is commonly to be desired of the more imperfect; for wise men [Page 173] know the ground of their perswasion, and have their confidence proportionable to their evidence, others have not, but over-act their trifles: and therefore I said it is but a reasonable demand, that they that have the least reason should not be most imperi­ous; and for others it being reasonable enough, for all their great advantages upon other men, they will be soone perswaded to it; for although wise men might be bolder, in respect of the persons of others less discerning, yet they know there are but few things so certaine as to create much boldness and confidence of assertion, If they doe not, they are not the men I take them for.

2. When an action or opinion is commenc'd with zeale and piety against a knowne vice or a vitious person, commonly all the Numb. 2. mistakes of it's proceeding are made sacred by the holiness of the principle, and so abuses the perswasions of good people, that they make it as a Characteristick note to distinguish good per­sons from bad; and then whatever error is consecrated by this means, is therefore made the more lasting, because it is accounted holy, and the persons are not easily accounted hereticks, because they erred upon a pious principle. There is a memorable instance in one of the greatest questions of Christendome, viz. concerning Images. For when Philippicus had espyed the images of the six first Synods upon the front of a Church, he caused them to be pulled down; now he did it in hatred of the sixth Synod: for he being a Monothelite, stood condemn'd by that Synod. The Ca­tholiques that were zealous for the sixth Synod, caused the ima­ges and representments to be put up againe, and then sprung the question concerning the lawfullness of images in Churches; Phi­lippicus and his party strived by suppressing images to do dispa­ragement to the sixth Synod: the Catholiques to preserve the ho­nour Vid. Paulum Diaconum. of the sixth Synod, would uphold images. And then the question came to be changed, and they who were easie enough to be perswaded to pull downe images, were over-awed by a pre­judice against the Monothelites, and the Monothelites striv'd to maintain the advantage they had got by a just and pious pretence against images. The Monothelites would have secur'd their error by the advantage and consociation of a truth, & the other would rather defend a dubious and disputable error, than lose and let [Page 174] goe a certain truth. And thus the case stood, and the successors of both parts were led invincibly. For when the Heresie of the Monothelites disbanded, (which it did in a while after) yet the opinion of the Iconoclasts, & the question of Images grew stron­ger. Yet since the Iconoclasts at the first were Heretiques, not for their breaking Images, but for denying the two wils of Christ, his Divine and his Humane: that they were called Iconoclasts was to distinguish their opinion in the question concerning the Images, but that then Iconoclasts so easily had the reputation of Hereticks, was because of the other opinion which was conjunct in their persons; which opinion men afterwards did not easily distinguish in them, but took them for Hereticks in gross, and whatsoever they held to be hereticall. And thus upon this preju­dice grew great advantages to the veneration of Images, and the persons at first were much to be excused, because they were mis­guided by that which might have abused the best men. And if Epiphanius who was as zealous against Images in Churches as Philippicus or Leo Isaurus, had but begun a publike contestation, and engaged Emperours to have made Decrees against them, Christendom would have had other apprehensions of it, then they had when the Monothelites began it. For few men will endure a truth from the mouth of the Devill, and if the person be suspect­ed, so are his wayes too. And it is a great subtlety of the Devill so to temper truth and falshood in the same person, that truth may lose much of its reputation by its mixture with error, and the error may become more plausible by reason of its conjuncti­on with truth. And this we see by too much experience, for we see many truths are blasted in their reputation, because persons whom we think we hate upon just grounds of Religion, have taught them. And it was plain enough in the case of Maldonat, that said of an explication of a place of Scripture, that it was In cap 6. Io­han. most agreeable to Antiquity, but because Calvin had so expoun­ded it, he therefore chose a new one. This was malice. But when a prejudice works tacitely, undiscernably, and irresistabl [...] of the person so wrought upon, the man is to be pityed, not condemned, though possibly his opinion deserves it highly. And therefore it hath been usuall to discredit doctrines by the personall defaillan­ces of them that preach them: or with the disreputation of that [Page 175] sect that maintains them in conjunction with other perverse do­ctrines. Faustus the Manichee in S. Austin, glories much, that in their Religion God was worshipped purely and without Images. L. 20. c. 3. cont. Faustum Man. L. 1. c. ult. de Imagin. S. Austin liked it well, for so it was in his too, but from hence Sanders concludes, that to pull down Images in Churches was the heresie of the Manichees. The Jews endure no Images, therefore Bellarmine makes it to be a piece of Judaisme to oppose them. He might as well have concluded against saying our prayers, and Church musick, that it is Judaicall, because the Jews used it. And De reliq. SS. l. 2. c. 6. Sect. Nicolaus. he would be loth to be served so himself, for he that had a mind to use such arguments, might with much better probability con­clude against their Sacrament of extreme unction, because when the miraculous healing was ceased, then they were not Catho­liques, but Heretiques that did transferre it to the use of dying persons, (sayes Irenaeus;) for so did the Valentinians: And indeed L. 1. c. 8. adv. haer. this argument is something better then I thought for at first, be­cause it was in Irenaeus time reckoned among the heresies. But there are a sort of men that are even with them, and hate some good things which the Church of Rome teaches, because she who teaches so many errors, hath been the publisher, and is the pra­cticer of those things. I confess the thing is alwayes unreasona­ble, but sometimes it is invincible and innocent; and then may serve to abate the fury of all such decretory sentences, as con­demne all the world but their own Disciples.

3. There are some opinions that have gone hand in hand with Numb. 3. a blessing, and a prosperous profession; and the good success of their defenders hath amused many good people, because they thought they heard Gods voice where they saw Gods hand, and therefore have rushed upon such opinions with great piety and as great mistaking. For where they once had entertain'd a feare of God, and apprehension of his so sensible declaration, such a feare produces scruple, and a scrupulous conscience is alwayes to be pityed, because though it is seldome wise, it is alwayes pious. And this very thing hath prevail'd so farre upon the understandings even of wise men, that Bellarmine makes it a note of the true Church. Which opinion when it prevailes is a ready way to make, that instead of Martyrs all men should prove hereticks or a­postates in persecution; for since men in misery are very suspici­ous, [Page 176] out of strong desires to finde out the cause, that by re­moving it they may be relieved, they apprehend that to be it that is first presented to their fears; and then if ever truth be af­flicted, she shall also be destroyed. I will say nothing in defiance of this fancy, although all the experience in the world sayes it is false, and that of all men Christians should least believe it to be true, to whom a perpetuall crosse is their certain expectation, (and the argument is like the Moone, for which no garment can be fit, it alters according to the success of humane affairs, and in one age will serve a Papist, and in another a Protestant) yet when such an opinion does prevaile upon timerous persons, the malignity of their error (if any be consequent to this fancie, and ta­ken up upon the reputation of a prosperous heresie) is not to be considered simply and nakedly, but abatement is to be made in a just proportion to that feare, and to that appre­hension.

4. Education is so great and so invincible a prejudice, that he Numb. 4. who masters the inconvenience of it, is more to be commended than he can justly be blam'd that complyes with it. For men doe not alwayes call them principles which are the prime fountaines of reason, from whence such consequents naturally flow, as are to guide the actions and discourses of men; but they are princi­ples which they are first taught, which they suckt in next to their milke, and by a proportion to those first principles they usu­ally take their estimate of propositions. For whatsoever is taught to them at first they believe infinitely, for they know nothing to the contrary, they have had no other masters, whose theoremes might abate the strength of their first perswasions, and it is a great advantage in those cases to get possession; and before their first principles can be dislodg'd, they are made habituall and comple­xionall, it is in their nature then to believe them, and this is hel­ped forward very much by the advantage of love and veneration which we have to the first parents of our perswasions. And we see it in the orders of Regulars in the Church of Rome. That opi­nion which was the opinion of their Patron or Founder, or of some eminent Personage of the Institute, is enough to engage all the Order to be of that opinion; and it is strange that all the Dominicans should be of one opinion in the matter of Prede­termination [Page 177] and immaculate conception, and all the Franciscans of the quite contrary, as if their understandings were form'd in a different mold, and furnished with various principles by their ve­ry rule. Now this prejudice works by many principles, but how strongly they doe possess the understanding is visible in that great instance of the affection and perfect perswasion the weaker sort of people have to that which they call the Religion of their Fore­fathers. You may as well charm a feaver asleep with the noise of Optima vati ea quae magno os­sensu, recepta sunt, quorum (que) exempla multa sant, nec ad ra­tionem, sed ad similitudinem vivimus. Sen. Vid. Minut. Fel. octav. bells, as make any pretence of reason against that Religion which old men have intayl'd upon their heirs male so many generations till they can prescribe. And the Apostles found this to be most true in the extremest difficulty they met with, to contest against the rites of Moses, and the long superstition of the Gentiles, which they therefore thought fit to be retain'd, because they had done so formerly, Pergentes non quo eundum est, sed quo itur, and all the blessings of this life which God gave them, they had in conjunction with their Religion, and therefore they beleeved it was for their Religion, and this perswasion was bound fast in them with ribs of iron, the Apostles were forc'd to unloose the whole conjuncture of parts & principles in their understandings, before they could make them malleable and receptive of any im­presses. But the observation and experience of all wise men can justifie this truth. All that I shall say to the present purpose, is this, that consideration is to be had to the weakness of persons when they are prevail'd upon by so innocent a prejudice, and when there cannot be arguments strong enough to over-master an habituall perswasion bred with a man, nourish'd up with him, that alwayes eat at his table, and lay in his bosome, he is not easi­ly to be called Heretique, for if he keeps the foundation of faith, other articles are not so cleerly demonstrated on either side, but that a man may innocently be abused to the contrary. And there­fore in this case to handle him charitably, is but to doe him ju­stice: And when an opinion in minoribus articulis, is entertain'd upon the title and stock of education, it may be the better per­mitted to him, since upon no better stock nor stronger arguments, most men entertain their whole Religion, even Christianity it selfe.

5. There are some persons of a differing perswasion, who there­fore Numb. 5. [Page 178] are the rather to be tolerated, because the indirect practices and impostures of their adversaries have confirmed them, that those opinions which they disavow, are not from God, as being upheld by means not of Gods appointment: For it is no unrea­sonable discourse to say, that God will not be served with a lye, for he does not need one, and he hath means enough to support all those truths which he hath commanded, and hath supplyed eve­ry honest cause with enough for its maintenance, and to contest against its adversaries. And (but that they which use indirect arts will not be willing to lose any of their unjust advantages, nor yet be charitable to those persons, whom either to gain or to undoe, they leave nothing unattempted) the Church of Rome hath much reason not to be so decretory in her sentences against persons of a differing perswasion, for if their cause were entirely the cause of God, they have given wise people reason to suspect it, because some of them have gone to the Devill to defend it. And if it be remembred what tragedies were stirred up against Luther, for saying, the Devill had taught him an argument against the Mass, it will be of as great advantage against them, that they goe to the Devill for many arguments to support not onely the Mass, but the other distinguishing Articles of their Church: I instance in the notorious forging of Miracles, and framing of false and ri­diculous Legends. For the former I need no other instances then what hapned in the great contestation about the immaculate con­ception, when there were Miracles brought on both sides to prove the contradictory parts; and though it be more then pro­bable that both sides play'd the jugglers, yet the Dominicans had the ill luck to be discovered, and the actors burn'd at Berne. But this discovery hapned by providence; for the Dominican opini­on hath more degrees of probability then the Franciscan; is cleerly more consonant both to Scripture and all antiquity, and this part of it is acknowledged by the greatest Patrons them­selves, as Salmeron, Posa and Wadding, yet because they played the knaves in a just question, and used false arts to maintain a true proposition, God Almighty to shew that he will not be served by a lye, was pleased rather to discover the imposture in the right opinion then in the false, since nothing is more dishonourable to God, then to offer a sin in sacrifice to him, and nothing more in­congruous [Page 179] in the nature of the thing, then that truth and falshood should support each other, or that true doctrine should live at the charges of a lye. And he that considers the arguments for each opinion will easily conclude, that if God would not have truth confirmed by a lye, much lesse would he himself attest a lye with a true miracle. And by this ground it will easily follow, that the Franciscan party, although they had better luck then the Dominicans, yet had not more honesty, because their cause was worse, and therefore their arguments no whit the better. And although the argument drawn from miracles is good to attest a holy doctrine, which by its own worth will support it selfe, after way is a little made by miracles, yet of it selfe and by its owne reputation it will not support any fabrick; for instead of pro­ving a doctrine to be true, it makes that the miracles themselves are suspected to be illusions, if they be pretended in behalfe of a doctrine, which we think we have reason to account false. And therefore the Jews did not beleeve Christs doctrine for his Mi­racles, but dis-beleeved the truth of his Miracles, because they did not like his doctrine. And if the holinesse of his doctrine, and the Spirit of God by inspirations and infusions, and by that which Saint Peter calls a surer word of prophecy, had not attested the Divinity both of his Person and his Office, we should have wanted many degrees of confidence which now we have upon the truth of Christian Religion. But now since we are fore-told by this surer word of prophecy, that is, the prediction of Jesus Christ, Vid. Baron. AE. D. 68. n. 22. Philostrat. l. 4. T. 485. com­pend. Cedren. p. 202. that Antichrist should come in all wonders, and signs, and lying miracles, and that the Church saw much of that already verified in Simon Magus, Apollonius Tyaneus, and Manetho, and divers Stapleton. prompt. Moral. pars aestiva, p. 627. Heretiques, it is now come to that passe, that the argument in its best advantage proves nothing so much as that the doctrine which it pretends to prove, is to be suspected, because it was foretold that false doctrine should be obtruded under such pre­tences. But then when not onely true miracles are an insufficient argument to prove a truth since the establishment of Christianity, but that the miracles themselves are false and spurious, it makes that doctrine in whose defence they come, justly to be suspected, because they are a demonstration that the interested persons use all means, leave nothing unattempted to prove their propositi­ons; [Page 180] but since they so faile as to bring nothing from God, but something from the Devill for its justification, it's a great signe that the doctrine is false, because we know the Devill, unlesse it be against his will, does nothing to prove a true proposition that makes against him. And now then those persons who will en­dure no man of another opinion, might doe well to remember how by their exorcismes, their Devils tricks at Lowdon, and the other side pretending to cure mad folkes and persons bewitched, and the many discoveries of their jugling, they have given so much reason to their adversaries to suspect their doctrine, that either they must not be ready to condemne their persons who are made suspicious by their indirect proceeding in attestation of that which they value so high as to call their Religion, or else they must condemne themselves for making the scandall active and effectuall.

As for false Legends, it will be of the same consideration, be­cause Numb. 4. they are false Testimonies of Miracles that were never done, which differs onely from the other as a lye in words from a lye in action, but of this we have witness enough in that decree of Pope Leo X. session the eleventh, of the last Lateran Councell, where he excommunicates all the forgers and inventors of visions and false Miracles, which is a testimony that it was then a pra­ctice so publicke as to need a Law for its suppression; and if any man shall doubt whether it were so or not, let him see the Cen­tum gravamina of the Princes of Germany where it is highly com­plain'd of. But the extreme stupidity and sottishness of the in­ventors of lying stories is so great, as to give occasion to some persons to suspect the truth of all Church [...]. I [...]d. Pelus. story, witness the Le­gend of Lombardy: of the author of which the Bishop of the Ca­naries gives this Testimony, In illo enim libro miraculorum monstra saepius quam vera miracula legas. Hanc homo scripsit ferrei oris, plumbei cordis, animi certe parum severi & prudentis. But I need not descend so low, for Saint Gregory and V. Bede themselves re­ported miracles, for the authority of which they only had the re­port of the common people, and it is not certaine that S. Hierome Vid. L. 11. loc. Theol. cap. 6. had so much in his stories of S. Paul and S. Anthony, and the Fauns and the Satyrs which appear'd to them, and desir'd their Canus ibid. Prayers. But I shall onely by way of eminency, note what Sir [Page 181] Thomas More sayes in his Epistle to Ruthal the Kings Secretary before the Dialogue of Lucian [Philopseudes] that therefore he undertook the translation of that dialogue, to free the world from a superstition that crept in under the face and title of Religion. For such lyes (sayes he) are transmitted to us with such authority that a certaine impostor had perswaded S. Austin, that the very fable which Lucian scoffes, makes sport withall in that Viz. De duo­bus spu inis, al­tero decedente, altero in vi­tam redeunte post viginti di­es; quam in ali is nominibus videt [...]cianus. Vide etiam ar­gumentum Gil­berti Cognati, in Annotat. in hunc Dialog. Dialogue was a reall story, and acted in his owne dayes. The Epistle is worth the reading to this purpose; but he sayes this abuse grew to such a height, that scarce any life of any Saint or Martyr is truly related, but is full of lyes and lying wonders, and some persons thought they served God if they did honour to God's Saints by inventing some prodigious story, or miracle for their reputation. So that now it is no wonder if the most pious men are apt to believe, and the greatest historians are easie enough to report such stories, which serving to a good end, are also consigned by the report of persons, otherwise pious and prudent enough. I will not instance in Vincentius his speculum, Turonensis, Thomas Cantipratanus, John Herolt, Vitae Patrum, nor the revelations of Vid. Palaeot. de sacra sindone, part 1. Epist. ad Lector. Saint Briget though confirmed by two Popes, Martin V. and Boniface IX. even the best and most deliberate amongst them, Lippoman, Surius, Lipsius Bzovius, and Baronius are so full of fa­bles that they cause great disreputation to the other Monuments and records of antiquity, and yet doe no advantage to the cause under which they serve and take pay. They doe no good and much hurt; but yet accidentally they may procure this advantage to charity, since they doe none to faith; that since they have so abused the credit of story that our confidences want much of that support we should receive from her records of antiquity, yet the men that dissent and are scandaliz'd by such proceedings should be excused if they should chance to be afraid of truth that hath put on garments of imposture: and since much violence is done to the truth & certainty of their judging, let none be done to their liberty of judging: since they cannot meet a right guide, let them have a charitable judge. And since it is one very great argument against Simon Magus and against Mahomet that we can prove their miracles to be impostures, it is much to be pittied if timorous and suspitious persons shall invincibly and honestly [Page 182] lesse apprehend a truth which they see conveyed by such a testimo­ny which we all use as an argument to reprove the Mahumetan superstition.

6. Here also comes in all the weaknesses and trifling prejudices which operate not by their own strength, but by advantage taken Numb. 7. from the weaknesse of some understandings. Some men by a Proverb or a common saying are determin'd to the beliefe of a proposition, for which they have no argument better then such a Proverbiall sentence. And when divers of the common People in Jerusalem were ready to yeild their understandings to the be­liefe of the Messias, they were turn'd cleerly from their apprehen­sions by that proverb, looke and see, does any good thing come from Galilee? And this, when Christ comes, no man knowes from whence he is; but this man was knowne of what parents, of what City. And thus the weaknesse of their understanding was abused, and that made the argument too hard for them. And the whole seventh Chapter of Saint Iohns Gospell is a perpetuall instance of the efficacy of such trifling prejudices, and the vanity and weak­nesse of popular understandings. Some whole ages have beene abused by a definition, which being once received, as most com­monly they are upon slight grounds, they are taken for certain­tyes in any science respectively, and for principles, and upon their reputation men use to frame conclusions, which must be false or uncertaine according as the definitions are. And he that hath observ'd anything of the weaknesses of men, and the successions of groundlesse doctrines from age to age, and how seldome definiti­ons which are put into systemes, or that derive from the Fa­thers, or approved among Shool-men are examined by persons of the same interests, will beare me witnesse, how many and great inconveniences presse hard upon the perswasions of men, who are abused and yet never consider who hurt them. Others, and they very many, are lead by authority or examples of Princes, & great personages, Numquis credit ex Principibus? Some by the reputa­tion of one learned man are carryed into any perswasion what­soever. Joh. 7. And in the middle and latter ages of the Church, this was the more considerable, because the infinite ignorance of the Clerks, and the men of the long robe gave them over to be lead by those few guides which were mark'd to them by an eminency, [Page 183] much more then their ordinary: which also did the more amuse them, because most commonly they were fit for nothing but to admire what they understood not; their learning then was in some skill in the Master of the Sentences, in Aquinas or Sco­tus whom they admir'd next to the most intelligent order of An­gels; hence came opinions that made Sects & division of names, Thomists, Scotists, Albertists, Nominalls, Realls, and I know not what monsters of names; and whole families of the same opini­on, the whole institute of an Order being ingag'd to believe ac­cording to the opinion of some leading man of the same Order, as if such an opinion were imposed upon them in vitute sanctae obedientiae. But this inconvenience is greater when the principle of the mistake runs higher, when the opinion is deriv'd from a Pri­mitive man and a Saint, for then it often happens that what at first was but a plain innocent seduction, comes to be made sacred by the veneration which is consequent to the person for having lived long agone; and then, because the person is also since ca­noniz'd, the error is almost made eternall, and the cure despe­rate. These and the like prejudices which are as various as the miseries of humanity or the variety of humane understandings are not absolute excuses, unlesse to some persons, but truly if they be to any, they are exemptions to all, from being pressed with too peremptory a sentence against them, especially if we consider what leave is given to all men by the church of Rome to follow any one probable Doctor in an opinion which is contested a­gainst by many more. And as for the Doctors of the other side, they being destitute of any pretences to an infallible medium to determine questions, must of necessity allow the same liberty to the people, to be as prudent as they can in the choice of a fallible guide; and when they have chosen, if they doe follow him into er­ror, the matter is not so inexpiable for being deceiv'd in using the best guides we had, which guides because themselves were abused, did also against their wills deceive me. So that this prejudice may the easier abuse us, because it is almost like a duty to follow the dictates of a probable Doctor, or if it be over-acted or acciden­tally passe into an inconvenience, it is therefore to be excused because the principle was not ill, unlesse we judge by our event, not by the antecedent probability. Of such men as these it was [Page 184] said by Saint Austin, Caeteram turbam non intelligendi vivacitas, sed Contr. Fund. c. 4. credendi simplicitas tutissimam facit. And Gregory Nazianzen, [...]. The common sort of people are Orat. 21. safe in their not inquiring by their owne industry, and in the sim­plicity of their understanding relying upon the best guides they can get.

But this is of such a nature in which as we may inculpably be deceived, so we may turne it into a vice or a designe, and then Numb. 6. the consequent errors will alter the property, and become here­sies. There are some men that have mens persons in admiration because of advantage, and some that have itching eares, and heap up teachers to themselves. In these and the like cases the authority of a person, and the prejudices of a great re­putation is not the excuse but the fault: And a sinne is so farre from excusing an Errour, that Errour becomes a sinne by reason of it's relation to that sinne as to it's parent and prin­ciple.

SECT. XII.

ANd therefore as there are so many innocent causes of Error, as there are weaknesses within, and harmlesse and unavoyda­ble Numb. 1. prejudices from without, so if ever errour be procured by a vice it hath no excuse, but becomes such a crime, of so much ma­lignity, as to have influence upon the effect and consequent, and by communication makes it become criminall. The Apostles no­ted two such causes: Covetousness & Ambition, the former in them of the Circumcision, and the latter in Diotrephes and Simon Ma­gus; and there were some that were [...] 2 Tim. 3. they were of the long robe too, but they were the she-Disciples, upon whose Consciences some false Apostles had influence by ad­vantage of their wantonness, and thus the three principles of all sinne become also the principles of heresie, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life. And in pursuance of these arts the Devill hath not wanted fuell to set aworke incen­diaries [Page 185] in all ages of the church. The Bishops were alwayes ho­nourable, and most commonly had great revenues, and a Bisho­prick would satisfie the two designs of Covetousnesse and Am­bition, and this hath been the golden apple very often contended for, and very often the cause of great fires in the Church. Thebulis quia rejectus ab Episcopatu Hierosolymitano, turbare coepit Ecclesiam, said Egesippus in Eusebius. Tertullian turn'd Montanist in dis­content for missing the Bishoprick of Carthage after Agrippinus, and so did Montanus himselfe for the same discontent, saith Ni­cephorus. Novatus would have been Bishop of Rome, Donatus of Carthage, Arrius of Alexandria, Aerius of Sebastia, but they all missed, and therefore all of them vexed Christendome. And this was so common a thing, that oftentimes, the threatning the Church with a schisme, or a heresie, was a design to get a Bisho­prick: And Socrates reports of Asterius, that he did frequent the Conventicles of the Arrians; Nam Episcopatum aliquem am­biebat. And setting aside the infirmities of men, and their inno­cent prejudices; Epiphanius makes pride to be the onely cause of heresies, [...], Pride and Prejudice cause them all, the one criminally, the other innocently. And indeed S. Paul does almost make pride the onely cause of heresies, his words can­not be expounded, unlesse it be at least the principall, [...], and consents not to sound words, and the doctrine that is ac­cording to godlinesse, [...].

The summe is this, If ever an opinion be begun with pride, or manag'd with impiety, or ends in a crime; the man turns Here­tique: Numb. 2. but let the error be never so great, so it be not against an Article of Creed, if it be simple and hath no confederation with the personall iniquity of the man, the opinion is as innocent as the person, though perhaps as false as he is ignorant, and therefore shall burne though he himselfe escape. But in these cases and ma­ny more, (for the causes of deception increase by all accidents, and weaknesses, and illusions) no man can give certaine judge­ment upon the persons of men in particular, unlesse the matter of fact and crime be accident and notorious. The man cannot by humane judgement be concluded a heretique, unlesse his opinion be an open recession from plaine demonstrative divine authority [Page 186] (which must needs be notorious, voluntary, vincible and criminal) or that there be a palpable serving of an end accidentall and ex­trinsecall to the opinion.

But this latter is very hard to be discerned, because those acci­dentall and adherent crimes which makes the man a heretique, Numb. 3. in questions not simply fundamentall or of necessary practice, are actions so internall and spirituall, that cognizance can but sel­dome be taken of them. And therefore (to instance) though the opinion of Purgatory be false, yet to beleeve it cannot be heresie, if a man be abused into the beliefe of it invincibly, because it is not a Doctrine either fundamentally false or practically impious, it neither proceeds from the will, nor hath any immediate or di­rect influence upon choice and manners. And as for those other ends of upholding that opinion which possibly its Patrons may have, as for the reputation of their Churches infallibility, for the advantage of Derges, Requiems, Masses, Monthly minds, Anniver­saries, and other offices for the dead, which usually are very profi­table, rich and easie, these things may possibly have sole influences upon their understanding, but whether they have or no God only knowes. If the proposition and article were true, these ends might justly be subordinate and consistent with a true propositi­on. And there are some truths that are also profitable, as the ne­cessity of maintenance to the Clergy, the Doctrine of restitu­tion, giving Almes, lending freely, remitting debts in cases of great necessity: and it would be but an ill argument that the prea­chers of these doctrines speake false, because possibly in these articles they may serve their owne ends. For although De­metrius and the Crafts-men were without excuse for resisting the Preaching of S. Paul, because it was notorious they resist­ed the truth upon ground of profit and personall emoluments, and the matter was confessed by themselves, yet if the Clergie should maintaine their just rites and Revenues which by pious dedications and donatives were long since ascertained upon them, is it to be presumed in order of Law and cha­rity, that this end is in the men subordinate to truth, because it is so in the thing it selfe, and that therefore no judge­ment in prejudice of these truths can be made from that obser­vation?

[Page 187] But if aliunde we are ascertain'd of the truth or falshood of Numb. 4. a proposition respectively, yet the judgement of the personall ends of the men, cannot ordinarily be certaine and judiciall, because most commonly the acts are private, and the purpo­ses internall, and temporall ends may sometimes consist with truth, and whether the purposes of the men make these ends principall or subordinate, no man can judge; and be they how they will, yet they doe not alwayes prove that when they are conjunct with error, that the error was caused by these purposes and cri­minall intentions.

But in questions practicall, the doctrine it selfe and the person Numb. 5. too, may with more ease be reproved, because matter of fact being evident, and nothing being so certaine as the experiments of hu­mane affaires, and these being the immediate consequents of such doctrines, are with some more certainty of observation redargued, then the speculative; whose judgement is of it self more difficult, more remote from matter and humane observation, and with lesse curiosity and explicitenesse declared in Scripture as being of lesse consequence and concernment in order to Gods and Man's great end. In other things which end in notion and ineffective contemplation, where neither the doctrine is malicious, nor the person apparently criminall, he is to be left to the judgement of God, and as there is no certainty of humane judicature in this case, so it is to no purpose it should be judged. For if the person may be innocent with his Error, and there is no rule whereby he can certainly be pronounced, that he is actually criminall; (as it happens in matters speculative.) Since the end of the Command­ment is love out of a pure conscience, and faith unfained; and the Commandment may obtaine its end in a consistence with this simple speculative Errour, Why should men trouble themselves with such opinions, so as to disturbe the publicke charity or the private confidence? Opinions and persons are just so to be jud­ged as other matters and persons criminall. For no man can judge any thing else: it must be a crime, and it must be open, so as to take cognizance, and make true humane judgement of it. And this is all I am to say concerning the causes of heresies, and of the distinguishing rules for guiding of our judgments towards others.

[Page 188] As for guiding our judgements and the use of our reason Numb. 6. in judging for our selves, all that is to be said is reducible to this one proposition. Since errors are then made sinnes when they are contrary to charity or inconsistent with a good life and the honour of God, that judgement is the truest, or at least that opi­nion most innocent that 1. best promotes the reputation of Gods Glory, and 2. is the best instrument of holy life. For in questions and interpretations of dispute, these two analogies are the best to make propositions, & conjectures and determinations. Diligence and care in obtaining the best guides, and the most convenient as­sistances, prayer, and modesty of spirit, simplicity of purposes and intentions, humility and aptnesse to learn, & a peaceable dispositi­on, are therefore necessary to finding out truths, because they are parts of good life, without which our truths will doe us little advantage, and our errours can have no excuse, but with these dispositions as he is sure to find out all that is necessary, so what truth he inculpably misses of, he is sure is therefore not necessary, because he could not finde it when he did his best and his most innocent endeavours. And this I say to secure the persons; because no rule can antecedently secure the proposition in mat­ters disputable. For even in the proportions and explications of this rule there is infinite variety of disputes: And when the dis­pute is concerning free will, one partie denyes it because he be­leeves it magnifies the grace of God, that it workes irresistably; the other affirmes, because he beleeves it engages us upon grea­ter care and piety of our endeavours. The one opinion thinks God reapes the glory of our good actions, the other thinks it charges our bad actions upon him. So in the question of merit, one part chooses his assertion because he thinks it incourages us to doe good works, the other beleeves it makes us proud, and therefore he rejects it. The first beleeves it increases piety, the second beleeves it increases spirituall presumption and vanity. The first thinks it magnifies God's justice, the other thinks it de­rogates from his mercy. Now then, since neither this nor any ground can secure a man from possibility of mistaking, we were infinitely miserable if it would not secure us from punishment, so long as we willingly consent not to a crime, and doe our best endeavour to avoid an errour. Onely by the way, let me observe, [Page 189] that since there are such great differences of apprehension con­cerning the consequents of an article, no man is to be charged with the odious consequences of his opinion. Indeed his doctrine is, but the person is not, if he understands not such things to be consequent to his Doctrine; for if he did, and then avows them, they are his direct opinions, & he stands as chargeable with them as with his first propositions; but if he dis-avowes them, he would certainly rather quit his opinion then avow such errours or impi­eties, which are pretended to be consequent to it, because every man knows that can be no truth, from whence falshood naturally and immediately does derive, and he therefore beleeves his first proposition, because he beleeves it innocent of such errors as are charg'd upon it directly or consequently.

So that now, since no error neither for its selfe nor its conse­quents Numb. 7. is to be charg'd as criminall upon a pious person, since no simple errour is a sin, nor does condemne us before the throne of God, since he is so pittifull to our crimes, that he pardons many de toto & integro, in all makes abatement for the violence of temptation, and the surprizall and invasion of our faculties, and therefore much lesse will demand of us an account for our weak­nesses; and since the strongest understanding cannot pretend to such an immunity and exemption from the condition of men, as not to be deceived and confesse its weaknesse; it remaines we inquire what deportment is to be used towards persons of a dif­fering perswasion, when we are (I doe not say doubtfull of a proposition, but) convinc'd that he that differs from us is in Errour, for this was the first intention, and the last end of this discourse.

SECT. XIII.

FOr although every man may be deceived, yet some are right and may know it too, for every man that may erre, does Numb. 1. not therefore certainly erre, and if he erres because he recedes from his rule, then if he followes it he may doe right, and if ever [Page 190] any man upon just grounds did change his opinion, then he was in the right and was sure of it too, and although confidence is mista­ken for a just perswasion many times, yet some men are confident, and have reason so to be. Now when this happens, the question is what deportment they are to use towards persons that disagree from them, and by consequence are in error.

1. Then no Christian is to be put to death, dismembred, or otherwise directly persecuted for his opinion, which does not Numb. 2. teach impiety or blasphemy. If it plainly and apparently brings in a crime, and himselfe does act it or incourage it, then the matter of fact is punishable according to its proportion or ma­lignity; as if he preaches treason or sedition, his opinion is not his excuse, because it brings in a crime, and a man is never the lesse traitor, because he beleeves it lawful to commit treason; & a man is a murtherer if he kills his brother unjustly, although he thinks he does God good service in it. Matters of fact are equally ju­dicable whether the principle of them be from within or from without: And if a man could pretend to innocence in being se­ditious, blasphemous, or perjur'd by perswading himself it is law­full, there were as great a gate opened to all iniquity, as will en­tertaine all the pretences, the designes, the impostures, and dis­guises of the world. And therefore God hath taken order that all rules concerning matters of fact and good life shall be so cleerely explicated, that without the crime of the man, he cannot be ignorant of all his practicall duty. And therefore the Apo­stles and primitive Doctors made no scruple of condemning such persons for hereticks, that did dogmatize a sinne. He that teaches others to sinne, is worse then he that commits the crime, whether he be tempted by his owne interest, or incouraged by the others doctrine. It was as bad in Basilides to teach it to be lawfull to renounce Faith and Religion, and take all manner of Oathes and Covenants in time of persecution, as if himselfe had done so; nay it is as much worse, as the mischeife is more univer­sall, or as a fountaine is greater then a drop of water taken from it. He that writes Treason in a booke, or preaches Sedition in a Pulpit, and perswades it to the people, is the greatest Traitor and incendiary, and his opinion there is the fountaine of a sinne, and therefore could not be entertain'd in his understanding [Page 191] upon weaknesse, or inculpable or innocent prejudice; he cannot from Scripture or divine revelation have any pretence to colour that so fairely as to seduce either a wise or an honest man. If it rest there and goes no further, it is not cognoscible, and so scapes that way; but if it be published and comes à stylo ad Machae­ram (as Tertullians phrase is) then it becomes matter of fact in principle and in perswasion, and is just so punishable, as is the crime that it perswades: such were they of whom S. Paul com­plaines, who brought in damnable doctrines and lusts. S. Pauls Gal. 5. Utinam abscindantur is just of them, take it in any sense of rigour and severity, so it be proportionable to the crime, or criminall doctrine. Such were those of whom God spake in Deut. 13. If any Prophet tempts to idolatry, saying, let us goe after other Gods, he shall be slaine. But these doe not come into this question. But the proposition is to be understood concerning questions disputa­ble in materiâ intellectuali, which also for all that law of killing, such false Prophets were permitted with impunity in the Syna­gogue, as appeares beyond exception in the great divisions and disputes betweene the Pharisees and the Sadduces. I deny not but certaine and knowne idolatry or any other sort of practi­call impiety with its principiant doctrine may be punished cor­porally, because it is no other but matter of fact, but no matter of meere opinion, no errors that of themselves are not sins are to be persecuted or punished by death or corporall inflictions. This is now to be proved.

2. All the former discourse is sufficient argument how easie it is for us in such matters to be deceived. So long as Christian Re­ligion Numb. 3. was a simple profession of the articles of beliefe, and a hearty prosecution of the rules of good life, the fewnesse of the articles and the clearnesse of the rule, was cause of the seldome prevarication. But when divinity is swell'd up to so great a bo­dy, when the severall questions which the peevishnesse and wantonnesse of sixteene ages have commenc'd, are concentred into one, and from all these questions something is drawne into the body of Theologie till it hath ascended up to the greatnesse of a mountaine, and the summe of Divinity collected by Aquinas, makes a volume as great as was that of Livy mock'd at in the Epigramme,

It is impossible for any industry to consider so many particu­lars in the infinite numbers of questions as are necessary to be consider'd before we can with certainty determine any. And after all the considerations which we can have in a whole age, we are not sure not to be deceived. The obscurity of some questions, the nicety of some articles, the intricacy of some revelations, the variety of humane understandings, the windings of Logicke, the tricks of adversaries, the subtilty of Sophisters, the ingagement of educations, personall affections, the portentous number of writers, the infinity of authorities, the vastnesse of some argu­ments, as consisting in enumeration of many particulars, the un­certainty of others, the severall degrees of probability, the diffi­culties of Scripture, the invalidity of probation of tradition, the opposition of all exteriour arguments to each other, and their open contestation, the publicke violence done to authors and re­cords, the private arts and supplantings, the falsifyings, the indefa­tigable industry of some men to abuse all understandings, and all perswasions into their owne opinions, these and thousands more, even all the difficulty of things, and all the weaknesses of man & all the arts of the Devill, have made it impossible for any man in so great variety of matter not to be deceived. No man pretends to it but the Pope, and no man is more deceived then he is in that very particular.

3. From hence proceeds a danger which is consequent to this proceeding, for if we, who are so apt to be deceived, & so in­secure Numb. 4. in our resolution of questions disputable, should persecute a dis-agreeing person, we are not sure we doe not fight against God, for if his proposition be true and persecuted, then, because all truth derives from God, this proceeding is against God, and therefore this is not to be done upon Gamaliel's ground, lest per­adventure we be found to fight against God, of which because we can have no security (at least) in this case, we have all the guilt of a doubtfull or an uncertaine Conscience. For if there be no se­curity in the thing as I have largely proved, the Conscience in such cases is as uncertaine as the question is, and if it be not doubt­full where it is uncertaine, it is because the man is not wise, but as confident as ignorant, the first without reason, and the second [Page 193] without excuse. And it is very disproportionable for a man to per­secute another certainly, for a proposition, that if he were wise, he would know is not certaine, at least, the other person may in­nocently be uncertaine of it. If he be kill'd, he is certainly kill'd, but if he be call'd hereticke, it is not so certaine that he is an he­reticke. It were good therefore, that proceedings were accor­ding to evidence, and the rivers not swell over the banks, nor a certaine definitive sentence of death pass'd upon such perswa­sions which cannot certainly be defin'd. And this argument is of so much the more force, because we see that the greatest per­secutions that ever have been, were against truth, even against Christianity it selfe, and it was a prediction of our blessed Saviour, that persecution should be the lot of true beleevers: and if we compute the experience of suffering Christendome, and the pre­diction, that truth should suffer, with those few instances of suffe­ring hereticks, it is odds, but persecution is on the wrong side, and that it is errour and heresie, that is, cruell and tyrannicall, especially since the truth of Jesus Christ, and of his Religion are so meeke, so charitable, and so mercifull: and we may in this case, exactly use the words of S. Paul, But as then, he that was borne after the flesh, persecuted him that was borne after the spirit; even so it is now: and so it ever will be till Christs second coming. Numb. 5.

4. Whoever persecutes a disagreeing person, armes all the Quo comperto illi in nostram pemiciem licen­tiore audacia grassabuntur. S Aug. epist. ad Dona. Pro­cons. & Contr. ep. Fund. ita nunc debeo su­stinére & tan­tâ patientiâ vobiscum agere quantâ mecum egerunt proxi­mi mei cum in vestro dogmate rabiosus ac ca­cus err [...]rem. world against himselfe, and all pious people of his owne perswa­sion, when the scales of authority return to his adversary, and at­test his contradictory; and then, what can he urge for mercy for himselfe, or his party that sheweth none to others? If he sayes, that he is to be spared because he beleeves true, but the other was justly persecuted because he was in errour, he is ridiculous. For he is as confidently beleeved to be a heretick, as he beleeves his adversary such, and whether he be or no, being the thing in questi­on, of this he is not to be his owne judge, but he that hath authority on his side, will be sure to judge against him. So that, what either side can indifferently make use of, it is good that nei­ther would, because neither side can with reason sufficient doe it in prejudice of the other. If a man will say, that every man must take his adventure, and if it happens authority to be with [Page 194] him, he will persecute his adversaries, and if it turnes against him he will bear it as well as he can, and hope for a reward of Martyr­dome, and innocent suffering; besides that this is so equall to be said of all sides, and besides, that this is a way to make an eter­nall disunion of hearts and charities, and that it will make Chri­stendome nothing but a shambles, and a perpetuall butchery, and as fast as mens wits grow wanton, or confident, or proud, or abused, so often there will be new executions and massacres. Besides all this, it is most unreasonable and unjust, as being con­trariant to those Lawes of Justice and Charity, whereby we are bound with greater zeale to spare and preserve an innocent, then to condemne a guilty person, and there's lesse malice and iniquity in sparing the guilty, then in condemning the good. Be­cause it is in the power of men to remit a guilty person to divine judicature, and for divers causes, not to use severity, but in no case is it lawfull, neither hath God at all given to man a power to condemne such persons as cannot be proved other than pious and innocent. And therefore it is better, if it should so happen, that we should spare the innocent person, and one that is actually deceiv'd, then that upon the turn of the wheele, the true believers should be destroyed.

And this very reason, he that had authority sufficient, and ab­solute to make Lawes, was pleased to urge as a reasonable induce­ment Numb. 6. for the establishing of that Law which he made for the in­demnity of erring persons. It was in the parable of the tares ming­led with the good seed in Agro dominico the good seed (Christ himselfe being the interpreter) are the Children of the King­dome, the tares are the children of the wicked one, upon this comes the precept, gather not the tares by themselves, but let them both grow together till the harvest, that is, till the day of Judge­ment. This Parable hath been tortur'd infinitely to make it con­fesse its meaning, but we shall soone dispatch it. All the difficul­ty and variety of exposition is reducible to these two questions; What is meant by [Gather not,] and what by [Tares.] That is, what kind of sword is forbidden, and what kind of persons are to be tolerated. The former is cleare; for the spirituall sword is not forbidden to be used to any sort of criminals, for that would destroy the power of excommunication. The prohibition [Page 195] therefore lyes against the use of the temporall sword, in cutting off some persons. Who they are, is the next difficulty. But by tares, or the children of the wicked one, are meant either persons of ill lives, wicked persons onely in re practicâ, or else another kind of evill persons, men criminall or faulty in re intellectuali. One or other of these two must be meant; a third I know not. But the former cannot be meant, because it would destroy all bodies politique, which cannot consist without lawes, nor lawes without a compulsory and a power of the sword, therefore if criminalls were to be let alone till the day of Judgement, bodies politique must stand or fall ad arbitrium impiorum, and nothing good could be protected, not Innocence it selfe, nothing could be se­cure but violence and tyrannie. It followes then that since a kind of persons which are indeed faulty are to be tolerated, it must be meant of persons faulty in another kind, in which the Gospell had not in other places cleerely established a power ex­ternally compulsory, and therefore since in all actions practically criminall a power of the sword is permitted, here where it is de­nyed must meane a crime of another kind, and by consequence errors intellectuall, commonly call'd heresie. Numb. 7.

And after all this the reason there given confirmes this Vide S. Chry­sost. homil. 47. in Cap. 13. Matth. et. S. August. in­terpretation, for therefore it is forbidden to cut off these tares, lest we also pull up the wheat with them, which is the summe of these two last arguments. For because Heresie is of so nice con­sideration, and difficult sentence, in thinking to root up heresies, Quest. in cap. 13 Mat. S. Cy­prian. Ep. lib. 3 Ep. 1. we may by our S. Hieron. in cap 13. Matth. ait, per hanc parabolam sig­nificari, ne in rebus aub [...]is praecep [...] fiat judicium. mistakes destroy true doctrine, which although it be possible to be done in all cases of practicall question, by mi­stake, yet because externall actions are more discernable then inward speculations and opinions, innocent persons are not so Theophyl. in 13. Matth. easily mistaken for the guilty, in actions criminall, as in matters of inward perswasion. And upon that very reason Saint Martin was zealous to have procured a revocation of a Commission granted to certaine Tribunes to make enquiry in Spaine for sects and opinions; for under colour of rooting out the Priscilia­nists, there was much mischiefe done, and more likely to hap­pen to the Orthodox. For it happened then, as oftentimes since, Pallore potius & veste quam fide haeretieus dijudicari sole­bat aliquando per Tribunos Maximi. They were no good inquisi­tors [Page 196] of hereticall pravity, so Sulpitius witnesses. But secondly, the reason sayes, that therefore these persons are so to be permitted as not to be persecuted, lest when a revolution of humane affaires sets contrary opinions in the throne or chaire, they who were persecuted before, should now them­selves become persecutors of others, and so at one time or o­ther, before or after, the wheat be rooted up, and the truth be persecuted. But as these reasons confirme the Law, and this sense of it, so abstracting from the Law, it is of it selfe conclu­ding by an argument ab incommodo, and that founded upon the Numb. 8. principles of justice, and right reason, as I formerly alledged.

4. We are not onely uncertaine of finding out truths in mat­ters disputable, but we are certaine that the best and ablest Illi in vos saeviant qui nesciunt cum quo labore ve­rum invenia­tur, & quam difficilè cave­antur errores. Illi in vos saeviant qui nes­ciunt quam ra­rum et arduum sit carnalia phantasmatae piae mentis se­renitaete supe­vare. Illi in vos saeviant qui nesciunt quibus & suspi­riis & gemiti­bus fiat ut ex­quantulācun­que parte possit intelligi Deus. Postremo illi in vos saeviant qui nullo tali errore decepti sunt, quali vos deceptos vi­dent. Doctors of Christendome have been actually deceived in mat­ters of great concernment, which thing is evident in all those instances of persons from whose doctrines all sorts of Christi­ans respectively take liberty to dissent. The errors of Papias, Irenaeus, Lactantius, Iustin Martyr in the Millenary opinion, of Saint Cyprian, Firmilian, the Asian and African Fathers in the question of Re-baptization, Saint Austin in his decretory and un­charitable sentence against the unbaptized children of Christian parents, the Roman or the Greek Doctors in the question of the procession of the holy Ghost, and in the matter of images, are examples beyond exception. [...]. Now if these great personages had been per­secuted or destroyed for their opinions, who should have answered the invaluable losse the Church of God should have sustained in missing so excellent, so exemplary, and so great lights? But then if these persons erred, and by consequence, might have been destroyed, what should have become of others whose understan­ding was lower, and their security lesse, their errors more, and their danger greater? At this rate all men should have passed through the fire, for who can escape, when Saint Cyprian and Saint Austin cannot? Now to say these persons were not to be persecuted because although they had errors, yet none condem­ned by the Church, at that time or before, is to say nothing to the purpose, nor nothing that is true. Not true, because Saint Cypri­ans S. August. Contr. Ep. Fund. error was condemned by Pope Stephen, which in the present [Page 197] sense of the prevailing party in the Church of Rome, is to be con­demned by the Church. Not to the purpose; because it is nothing else but to say that the Church did tolerate their errors. For since those opinions were open and manifest to the world, that the Church did not condemne them, it was either because those opi­nions were by the Church not thought to be errors, or if they were, yet she thought fit to tolerate the error and the erring per­son. And if she would doe so still, it would in most cases be bet­ter then now it is. And yet if the Church had condemned them, it had not altered the case as to this question, for either the per­sons upon the condemnation of their error should have been per­secuted or not. If not, why shall they now, against the instance and precedent of those ages who were confessedly wise & pious, and whose practice are often made to us arguments to follow? If yea, and that they had been persecuted, it is the thing which this argument condemnes, and the losse of the Church had been invaluable in the losing or the provocation and temptation of such rare personages: and the example and the rule of so ill consequence, that all persons might upon the same ground have suffered, and though some had escaped, yet no man could have any more security from punishment then from error.

5. Either the disagreeing person is in error, or not, but a true believer; in either of the cases to persecute him is extremely im­prudent. Numb. 9 For if he be a true beleever, then it is a cleere case that we doe open violence to God, and his servants, and his truth. If he be in error, what greater folly and stupidity then to give to error the glory of Martyrdome, and the advantages which are accidentally consequent to a persecution? For as it was true of the Martyrs Quoties morimur toties nascimur, and the increase of their trouble was the increase of their confidence and the esta­blishment of their perswasions: so it is in all false opinions; for that an opinion is true or false is extrinsecall or accidentall to the consequents and advantages it gets by being afflicted. And there is a popular pity that followes all persons in misery, and that compassion breeds likenesse of affections, and that very often produces likenesse of perswasion; and so much the rather, because there arises a jealousie and pregnant suspicion that they who per­secute [Page 198] an opinion are destitute of sufficient arguments to confute it, and that the hangman is the best disputant. For if those ar­guments which they have for their owne doctrine were a suffici­ent ground of confidence & perswasion, men would be more wil­ling to use those means arguments which are better complyan­ces with humane understanding, which more naturally doe satisfie it, which are more humane and Christian, then that way which satisfies none, which destroyes many, which provokes more, which makes all men jealous. To which adde that those who dye for their opinion, leave in all men, great arguments of the hearti­nesse of their beliefe, of the confidence of their perswasion, of the piety and innocencie of their persons, of the purity of their in­tention and simplicity of purposes; that they are persons totally disinterest, and separate from designe. For no interest can be so great as to be put in balance against a mans life and his soul, & he does very imprudently serve his ends who seeingly & fore-know­ingly loses his life in the prosecution of them. Just as if Titius should offer to dye for Sempronius upon condition he might re­ceive twenty talents when he had done his work. It is certainly an argument of a great love, and a great confidence, and a great sincerity, and a great hope when a man layes downe his life in at­testation of a proposition. Greater love then this hath no man, then to lay downe his life, saith our Blessed Saviour. And although lay­ing of a wager is an argument of confidence more then truth, yet laying such a wager, staking of a mans Soule, and pawning his life gives a hearty testimony that the person is honest, confident, re­signed, Charitable and Noble. And I know not whether truth can doe a person or a cause more advantages, then these can doe to an error. And therefore besides the impiety, there is great im­prudence in Canonizing a hereticke, and consecrating an errour by such meanes, which were better preserv'd as incouragements of truth, and comforts to reall and true Martyrs. And it is not amisse to observe that this very advantage was taken by hereticks who were ready to shew and boast their Catalogues of Martyrs, in particular the Circumcellians did so, and the Donatists, and yet the first were heretickes, the second Schismaticks. And it was remarkeable in the Schollers of Priscillian, who, as they had their Master in the reputation of a Saint while he was living, so when [Page 199] he was dead, they had him in veneration as a Martyr; they with reverence and devotion carryed his, and the bodies of his slaine companions to an honourable sepulture, and counted it Religion to sweare by the name of Priscillian. So that the extinguishing of the person, gives life and credit to his doctrine, and when he is dead he yet speaks more effe­ctually.

6. It is unnaturall and unreasonable to persecute disagreeing opinions. Unnaturall; for Understanding being a thing wholly Numb. 10. spirituall, cannot be restrained, and therefore neither punished by corporall afflictions. It is in alienâ republicâ, a matter of ano­ther world; you may as well cure the colick by brushing a mans clothes, or fill a mans belly with a syllogisme: these things doe not communicate in matter, and therefore neither in action nor passion; and since all punishments in a prudent government punish the offender to prevent a future crime, and so it proves more medicinall then vindictive, the punitive act being in order to the cure and prevention: and since no punishment of the body can cure a disease in the soule, it is disproportionable in nature, and in all civill government, to punish where the punishment can doe no good. It may be an act of tyrannie, but never of ju­stice. For is an opinion ever the more true or false for being per­secuted? Some men have beleeved it the more, as being provo­ked into a confidence, and vexed into a resolution, but the thing it selfe is not the truer, and though the hangman may confute a man with an inexplicable dilemma, yet not convince his under­standing, for such premises can inferre no conclusion, but that of a mans life: and a Wolfe may as well give lawes to the under­standing, as he whose dictates are onely propounded in violence, and writ in bloud. And a dog is as capable of a law as a man, if there be no choice in his obedience, nor discourse in his choice, nor reason to satisfie his discourse. And as it is unnaturall, so it is unreasonable, that Sempronius should force Caius to be of his opinion, because Sempronius is Consul this yeare, and commands the Lictors: As if he that can kill a man cannot but be infallible: and if he be not, why should I doe violence to my conscience, be­cause he can doe violence to my person?

7. Force in matters of opinion can doe no good, but is very Numb. 11. [Page 200] apt to doe hurt; for no man can change his opinion when he will, or be satisfied in his reason that his opinion is false, be­cause discountenanced. If a man could change his opinion when he lists, he might cure many inconveniences of his life: all his feares and his sorrowes would soone disband, if he would but al­ter his opinion, whereby he is perswaded, that such an accident that afflicts him is an evill, and such an object formidable; let him but beleeve himselfe impregnable, or that he receives a bene­fit when he is plundered, disgraced, imprisoned, condemned, and afflicted, neither his sleeps need to be disturbed, nor his quietnesse discomposed. But if a man cannot change his opinion when helists, nor ever does heartily or resolutely but when he cannot do other­wise, then to use force, may make him an hypocrite, but never to be a right beleever, and so instead of erecting a trophee to God and true Religion, we build a Monument for the Devill. Infinite examples are recorded in Church story to this very purpose: But Socrates instances in one for all; for when Eleusius Bishop of Cyzicum was threatned by the Emperour Ualens with banish­ment and confiscation, if he did not subscribe to the decree of Ariminum, at last he yeilded to the Arrian opinion, and presently fell into great torment of Conscience, openly at Cyzicum recan­ted the errour, asked God and the Church forgivenesse, and com­plain'd of the Emperours injustice, and that was all the good the Arrian party got by offering violence to his Conscience. And so many families in Spain which are as they call them new Christi­ans, and of a suspected faith, into which they were forc'd by the tyrannie of the Inquisition, and yet are secret Moores, is evidence enough, of the Ejusmodi fuit Hipponensium conversio, cujus quidem species decepit August. ita ut opinare­tur haereticos licet non morte trucidandos vi tamen coer­cendos. Expe­rientiaenim de­monstravit eos tam facile ad Arianismum transiisse at (que) ad Cathelicis­mum, cum Arri­ani Principes rerum in ed ci­vitate petiren­tur. inconvenience of preaching a doctrine in ore gladii cruentandi. For it either punishes a man for keeping a good con­science, or forces him into a bad; it either punishes sincerity, or perswades hypocrisie; it persecutes a truth, or drives into error: and it teaches a man to dissemble and to be safe, but never to be honest.

8. It is one of the glories of Christian Religion, that it was so pious, excellent, miraculous and petswasive, that it came in upon its owne piety and wisdome, with no other force but a torrent Numb. 12. of arguments and demonstration of the Spirit; a mighty rush­ing wind to beat downe all strong holds, and every high thought [Page 201] and imagination; but towards the persons of men it was alwayes full of meeknesse and charity, complyance and toleration, con­descension and bearing with one another, restoring persons over­taken with an error, in the spirit of meeknesse, considering lest we al­so be tempted. The consideration is as prudent, and the proposition as just as the precept is charitable, and the precedent was pious and holy. Now things are best conserved with that which gives it the first being, and which is agreeable to its temper and consti­tution. That precept which it chiefly preaches in order to all the blessednesse in the world, that is, of meekness, mercy and charity, should also preserve it selfe and promote its owne interest. For indeed nothing will doe it so well, nothing doth so excellently in­sinuate it selfe into the understandings and affections of men, as when the actions and perswasions of a sect, and every part and principle and promotion are univocall. And it would be a migh­ty disparagement to so glorious an institution, that in its principle it should be mercifull and humane, and in the promotion and propagation of it so inhumane: And it would be impro­bable and unreasonable that the sword should be used in the perswasion of one proposition, and yet in the perswasion of the whole Religion nothing like it. To doe so, may serve the end of a temporall Prince, but never promote the honour of Christs Kingdome; it may secure a designe of Spaine, but will ve­ry much disserve Christendome, to offer to support it by that which good men believe to be a distinctive cognisance of the Ma­humetan Religion, from the excellencie and piety of Christianity, whose sense and spirit is described in those excellent words of S. Paul, 2 Tim. 2. 24. The servant of the Lord must not strive, but be gentle unto all men, in meeknesse instructing those that oppose themselves, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging the truth. They that oppose themselves, must not be strucken by any of Gods servants; and if yet any man will smite these who are his opposites in opinion, he will get nothing by that, he must quit the title of being a servant of God for his paines. And I think a distinction of persons Secular and Ecclesia­sticall will doe no advantage for an escape, because even the Se­cular power if it be Christian, and a servant of God must not be [...], I meane in those cases where [Page 202] meeknesse of instruction is the remedy, or if the case be irremedia­ble, abscission by Censures is the penalty.

9. And if yet in the nature of the thing it were neither unjust Numb. 13. nor unreasonable, yet there is nothing under God Almighty that hath power over the soule of man, so as to command a perswasi­on, or to judge a disagreeing: Humane positive Lawes direct all externall acts in order to severall ends, and the Judges take cog­nisance accordingly, but no man can command the will, or punish him, that obeys the Law against his will: for because its end is served in externall obedience, it neither looks after more, neither can it be served by more, nor take notice of any more. And yet possibly the understanding is lesse subject to humane power then the will, for that humane power hath a command over externall acts which naturally and regularly flow from the will, & ut plu­rimùm suppose a direct act of will, but alwayes either a direct or indirect volition, primary or accidentall; but the understand­ing is a naturall faculty subject to no command, but where the command is it selfe a reason fit to satisfie and perswade it. And therefore God commanding us to beleeve such revelations, per­swades and satisfies the understanding, by his commanding and revealing: for there is no greater probation in the world that a proposition is true, then because God hath commanded us to be­lieve it. But because no mans command is a satisfaction to the understanding, or a verification of the proposition, therefore the understanding is not subject to humane authority. They may per­swade, but not enjoyne where God hath not; and where God hath, if it appeares so to him, he is an Infidell if he does not be­leeve it. And if all men have no other efficacie or authority on the understanding but by perswasion, proposall and intreaty, then a man is bound to assent but according to the operation of the argument, and the energie of perswasion, neither indeed can he, though he would never so faine, and he that out of feare and too much complyance and desire to be safe, shall desire to bring his understanding with some luxation to the beliefe of humane di­ctates and authorities, may as often misse of the truth as hit it, but is sure alwaies to lose the comfort of truth, because he beleeves it upon indirect, insufficient, and incompetent arguments: and as his desire it should be so is his best argument that it is so, so the [Page 203] pleasing of men is his best reward, and his not being condemned and contradicted all the possession of a truth.

SECT. XIIII.

ANd thus this truth hath been practiced in all times of Chri­stian Religion, when there were no collaterall designes on foot, nor interests to be served, nor passions to be satisfied. In S. Pauls time, though the censure of heresie were not so loose and forward as afterwards, and all that were called Heretiques were cleerly such, and highly criminall; yet as their crime was, so was, their censure, that is, spirituall. They were first admonished, once at least, for so l. 3. cap. 3. Irenaeus, de pre­script. Tertullian, lib. ad Quirinum. Cyprian, in hunc locum. Am­brose, and ibidem. Hierome read that place of Titus 3. But since that time all men, and at that time some read it, Post unam & alteram admonitionem, reject a Heretique. Rejection from the communion of Saints after two warnings, that's the penalty. Saint John ex­presses it by not eating with them, not bidding them God speed, but the persons against whom he decrees so severely, are such as denyed Christ to become in the flesh, direct Antichrists: and let the sentence be as high as it lists in this case, all that I observe is, that since in so damnable doctrines nothing but spirituall cen­sure, separation from the communion of the faithfull was en­joyned and prescribed, we cannot pretend to an Apostolicall precedent, if in matters of dispute and innocent question, and of great uncertainty and no malignity we should proceed to sen­tence of death.

For it is but an absurd and illiterate arguing, to say that excom­munication is a greater punishment, and killing, a lesse; and there­fore Numb. 2. whoever may be excommunicated may also be put to death (which indeed is the reasoning that Bellarmine uses) for first, ex­communication is not directly, and of it self a greater punishment then corporall death. Because it is indefinite, and incompleat, and in order to a further punishment, which if it happens, then the excommunication was the inlet to it, if it does not, the excom­munication [Page 204] did not signifie halfe so much as the losse of a mem­ber, much lesse, death. For it may be totally ineffectuall, either by the iniquity of the proceeding, or repentance of the person: and in all times and cases it is a medicine if the man please; if he will not, but perseveres in his impiety, then it is himselfe that brings the Censure to effect, that actuates the judgement and gives a sting, and an energy upon that which otherwise would be [...]. Secondly, but when it is at worst, it does not kill the Soule, it onely consignes it to that death which it had deserved, and should have received independently from that sen­tence of the Church. Thirdly, and yet excommunication is to admirable purpose; for whether it referres to the person censured or to others, it is prudentiall in it selfe, it is exemplary to others, it is medicinall to all. For the person censured, is by this meanes threatned into piety, and the threatning made the more energe­ticall upon him because by fiction of Law, or as it were by a Sa­cramentall representment the paines of hell are made presentiall to him; and so becomes an act of prudent judicature, and excel­lent discipline, and the best instrument of spirituall Government: Because the neerer the threatning is reduced to matter, & the more present and circumstantionable it is made, the more operative it is upon our spirits while they are immerged in matter. And this is the full sense and power of excommunication in its direct intention: consequently and accidentally other evills might follow it, as in the times of the Apostles, the censured persons were buffeted by Satan, and even at this day there is lesse security even to the temporall condition of such a person whom his spiri­tuall parents have Anathematiz'd. But besides this, I know no war­rant to affirme any thing of excommunication, for the sentence of the Church does but declare, not effect the finall sentence of damnation. Whoever deserves excommunication deserves damnation; and he that repents shall be saved, though he dye out of the Churches externall Communion, and if he does not repent, he shall be damn'd though he was not excommunicate.

But suppose it greater then the sentence of corporall death, yet Numb. 3. it followes not, because hereticks may be excommunicate, there­fore kill'd, for from a greater to a lesse, in a severall kind of things the argument concludes not. It is a greater thing to make an ex­cellent [Page 205] discourse then to make a shooe, yet he that can doe the greater cannot doe this lesse. An Angell cannot beget a man, & yet he can doe a greater matter in that kind of operations which we terme spirituall and Angelicall. And if this were concluding that whoever may be excommunicate may be kill'd, then, be­cause of excommunications the Church is confessed the sole and intire Judge, she is also an absolute disposer of the lives of per­sons. I beleeve this will be but ill doctrine in Spaine: for in Bullâ Coenae Domini the King of Spaine is every year excommunicated on Maunday Thursday; but if by the same power he might also be put to death (as upon this ground he may) the Pope might with more ease be invested in that part of S. Peters patrimony which that King hath invaded and surpriz'd. But besides this, it were ex­treme harsh Doctrine in a Roman Consistory, from whence ex­communications issue for trifles, for fees, for not suffering them­selves infinitely to be oppressed, for any thing; if this be greater then death, how great a tyrannie is that which does more then kill men for less then trifles, or else how inconsequent is that argument which concludes its purpose upon so false pretence & supposition?

Well, however zealous the Apostles were against hereticks, yet none were by them, or their dictates put to death. The death of Numb. 4. Ananias and Saphira, and the blindnesse of Elymas the Sorcerer amount not to this, for they were miraculous inflictions: and the first was a punishment to Vow-breach and Sacriledge, the second of Sorcery, and open contestation against the Religion of Jesus Christ; neither of them concerned the case of this present questi­on: or if the case were the same, yet the authority is not the same: For he that inflicted these punishments was infallible, and of a power competent: But no man at this day is so. But as yet, peo­ple were converted by Miracles, & Preaching, and Disputing, and Hereticks by the same meanes were redargued, and all men in­structed, none tortured for their opinion. And this continued till Christian people were vexed by disagreeing persons, and were impatient and peevish, by their owne too much confidence and the luxuriancy of a prosperous fortune: but then they would not endure persons that did dogmatize any thing which might in­trench upon their reputation or their interest. And it is observa­ble that no man, nor no age did ever teach the lawfullnesse of [Page 206] putting hereticks to death, till they grew wanton with prosperi­ty. But when the reputation of the Governours was concerned, when the interests of men were indangered, when they had some­thing to lose, when they had built their estimation upon the cre­dit of disputable questions, when they began to be jealous of o­ther men, when they over-valued themselves and their owne opi­nions, when some persons invaded Bishopricks upon pretence of new opinions, then they as they thrived in the favour of Empe­rours, and in the successe of their disputes, sollicited the temporall power to banish, to fine, to imprison, and to kill their adversaries.

So that the case stands thus. In the best times, amongst the Numb. 5. best men, when there were fewer temporall ends to be served, when Religion and the pure and simple designes of Christianity were onely to be promoted; in those times and amongst such men, no persecution was actuall, nor perswaded nor allowed to­wards disagreeing persons. But as men had ends of their owne and not of Christs, as they receded from their duty, and Religi­on from its purity, as Christ anity began to be compounded with interests, and blended with temporall designes, so men were per­secuted for their opinions. This is most apparent, if we consider when persecution first came in, and if we observe how it was chec­ked by the holiest and the wisest persons.

The first great instance I shall note was in Priscillian and his Numb. 6. followers, who were condemned to death by the Tyrant Maxi­mus. Which instance although S. Hierom observes as a punishment, and judgement for the crime of heresie, yet is of no use in the pre­sent question, because Maximus put some Christians of all sorts to death promiscuously, Catholike and Heretick without choyce, and therefore the Priscilianists might as well have called it a judge­ment upon the Catholiques, as the Catholiques upon them.

But when Ursatus and Stacius, two Bishops, procured the Priscilianists death by the power they had at Court: S. Martin Numb. 7. was so angry at them for their cruelty, that he excommunicated them both. And S. Ambrose upon the same stock denyed his com­munion to the Itaciani. And the account that Sulpitius gives of the story is this, Hoc modo (sayes he) homines luce indignissimi pes­simo exemplo necati sunt. The example was worse then the men. If the men were hereticall, the execution of them however was unchristian.

[Page 207] But it was of more authority that the Nicene Fathers suppli­cated Numb. 8. the Emperour, and prevailed for the banishment of Arius, Sozom. l. 1. c. 20 of this we can give no other account, but that by the historie of the time we see basenesse enough, and personall misdemeanour, Socrat. l. 1. c. 26 Cont. Crescon. Grammat. lib. 3. c. 50. vide etiam Epist. 61. ad dulcilium. et Epist. 158. et 159. et lib. 1. c. 29. cont. tit. petilian. vide etiam Socrat. li. 3. c. 3, et c. 29. and factiousnesse of spirit in Arius, to have deserved worse then banishment, though the obliquity of his opinion were not put into the ballance; which we have reason to beleeve was not so much as considered, because Constantine gave toleration to diffe­ring opinions, and Arius himselfe was restored upon such conditi­ons to his country and office, which would not stand with the ends of the Catholiques, if they had been severe exactors of con­currence and union of perswasions.

I am still within the scene of Ecclesiasticall persons, and am considering what the opinion of the learnedest and the holiest prelates were concerning this great question. If we will beleeve Lib. 2. Cap. 5. retractat. vide Epist. 48. ad vincent. script. post. retract. et Epist. 50. ad Bonifac. Saint Austin (who was a credible person) no good man did al­low it. Nullis tamen bonis in Catholicâ hoc placet, si us (que) ad mor­tem in quenquam licet haereticum saeviatur. This was S. Austins finall opinion; For he had first been of the mind that it was not honest to doe any violence to mis-perswaded persons; and when upon an accident happening in Hippo he had altered and retracted that part of the opinion, yet then also he excepted death, and would by no means have any meere opinion made capitall. But for ought appears, S. Austin had greater reason to have retracted that retractation, then his first opinion. For his saying of nullis bo­nis placet was as true as the thing was reasonable it should be so. Witnes those known testimonies of ad S capulā. Tertullian, lib. 3. Ep. 1. Epist Cyprian, Lib. 5. c. 20. Lactantius, in cap 13. Matth. et in cap. 2. hos. Hierom, in vit: S. Martin. Severus Sulpitius, O ctav. Minutius, cont. Aux­ent. Arr. Hilary, 3. sect: C. 32. Damascen, in cap. 13. Matth. hom: 47. Chrysostome, in cuang. Matth. Theophylact, and in verba Apost. fides ex auditu. Bernard, and divers others, whom the Reader may find quoted by the Arch-Bishop of Spalato, Lib. 8. de rep. Eccles. cap. 8.

Against this concurrent testimony my reading can furnish me with no adversarie, nor contrary instances, but in Attious of C. P. Theodosius of Synada, in Stacius & Ursaeus before reckoned. On­ly indeed some of the later Popes of Rome began to be busie and unmercifull, but it was then when themselves were secure, and their interests great, and their temporall concernments highly considerable.

[Page 208] For it is most true, and not amisse to observe it, that no man who was under the ferula did ever think it lawfull to have opi­nions Numb. 11. forced, or heretiques put to death, and yet many men who themselves have escaped the danger of a pile and a faggot, have changed their opinion just as the case was altered, that is, as them­selves were unconcern'd in the suffering. Petilian, Parmenian, and Apud Aug li. 1. c. 7. coat. Epist. Parme­nian. & l. 2. c. 1 [...]. coat. tit. Petilian. Gaudentius, by no means would allow it lawfull, for themselves were in danger, and were upon that side that is ill thought of and discountenanc'd: but Epist. 1. ad Tu [...]bium. Gregory and Lib. 1. cp. 72. Leo, Popes of Rome, upon whose side the authority and advantages were, thought it lawfull they should be punished and persecuted, for themselves were un­concerned in the danger of suffering. And therefore S. Gregory commends the Exarch of Ravenna, for forcing them who dis­sented from those men who called themselves the Church. And there were some Divines in the Lower Germany, who upon great reasons spake against the tyrannie of the Inquisition, and restrai­ning Prophesying, who yet when they had shaked off the Spanish yoke, began to persecute their Brethren. It was unjust in them, in all men unreasonable and uncharitable, and often increases the error, but never lessens the danger.

But yet although the Church, I mean, in her distinct & Clericall capacity, was against destroying or punishing difference in opinion, Numb. 12. till the Popes of Rome did super-seminate and perswade the con­trary, yet the Bishops did perswade the Emperours to make Lawes against Heretiques, and to punish disobedient persons with fines, with imprisonment, with death and banishment respective­ly. This indeed calls us to a new account. For the Church-men might not proceed to bloud nor corporall inflictions, but might they not deliver over to the Secular arme, and perswade Tempo­rall Princes to doe it? For this, I am to say, that since it is noto­rious that the doctrine of the Clergie was against punishing Here­tiques, the Lawes which were made by the Emperours against them might be for restraint of differing Religion in order to the preservation of the publique peace, which is too frequently viola­ted by the division of opinions. But I am not certaine whether that was alwayes the reason, or whether or no some Bishops of the Court did not also serve their owne ends in giving their Prin­ces such untoward counsell; but we find the Lawes made severally [Page 209] to severall purposes, in divers cases and with different severity. Constantine the Emperour made a Sanction, Ut parem cum fideli­bus Apud Euseb. de vita Con­stant. ii qui errant pacis & quietis fruitionem gaudentes accipiant. The Emperour Gratian decreed, Ut quam quis (que) vellet religionem se­queretur; & conventus Ecclesiasticos semoto metu omnes agerent. But he excepted the Manichees, the Photinians, and Eunomians. Theodosius the elder made a law of death against the Anabaptists of his time, and banish'd Eunomius, and against other erring per­sons vide Socrat. l 7. c. 12. appointed a pecuniary mulct; but he did no executions so severe as his sanctions, to shew they were made in terrorem onely. Vid. Cod. de heretic. L. ma­nichees. & leg. Arriani, & l. Quicunque. So were the Lawes of Valentinian and Martian, decreeing contra omnes qui prava docere tenent, that they should be put to death; so did Apud Pau­lum Diac. l. 16. & l. 24. Michael the Emperour, but Iustinian onely decreed ba­nishment.

But what ever whispers some Politiques might make to their Princes, as the wisest & holiest did not think it lawful for Church­men alone to doe executions, so neither did they transmit such Numb. 11. persons to the Secular Judicature. And therefore when the Edict of Macedonius the President was so ambiguous, that it seemed to threaten death to Heretiques, unlesse they recanted; S. Austin admonished him carefully to provide that no Heretique should be put to death, alledging it also not onely to be unchristian, but il­legall also, and not warranted by imperiall constitutions; for be­fore his time no Lawes were made for their being put to death: but however he prevailed, that Macedonius published another Edict, more explicite, and lesse seemingly severe. But in his Epistle to Donatus, the African Proconsul, he is more confi­dent and determinate, Necessitate nobis impactâ & indictâ, ut potiùs occidi ab eis eligamus, quam eos occidendos vestris judiciis ingeramus.

But afterwards many got a trick of giving them over to the Secular power, which at the best is no better then hypocrisie, re­moving Numb. 12. envie from themselves, and laying it upon others, a refu­sing to doe that in externall act, which they doe in councell and approbation: which is a transmitting the act to another, and re­taining a proportion of guilt unto themselves, even their own and the others too. I end this with the saying of Chrysostome, Dog­muta Serw. de Ana­themate. [Page 210] impia & quae ab haereticis profecta sunt arguere & anathemati­zare oportet, hominibus autem parcendum & pro salute eorum c­andum.

SECT. XV.

BUt although Hereticall persons are not to be destroyed, yet heresy being a work of the flesh, and all hereticks criminall persons, whose acts and doctrine have influence upon Communi­ties of men whether Ecclesiasticall or civill, the governours of the Republique, or Church respectively are to do their duties in re­straining those mischiefes which may happen to their severall charges, for whose indemnity they are answerable. And there­fore according to the effect or malice of the doctrine or the per­son, so the cognisance of them belongs to severall judicatures. If it be false doctrine in any capacity and doth mischiefe in any sense, or teaches ill life in any instance, or incourages evill in any particular, [...], these men must be silenced, they must be convinced by sound doctrine, and put to silence by spirituall evi­dence, and restrained by authority Ecclesiasticall, that is, by spiri­tuall censures according as it seemes necessary to him who is most concern'd in the regiment of the Church. For all this we have pre­cept and precedent Apostolicall, and much reason. For by thus doing, the governour of the Church uses all that authority that is competent, and all the meanes that is reasonable, and that pro­ceeding which is regular, that he may discharge his cure and secure his flock. And that he possibly may be deceived in judging a do­ctrine to be hereticall, and by consequence the person excommu­nicate suffers injury, is no argument against the reasonablenesse of the proceeding. For all the injury that is, is visible and in appea­rance, and so is his crime. Iudges must judge according to their best reason guided by law of God as their rule, and by evidence and appearance as their best instrument, and they can judge no [Page 211] better. If the Judges be good and prudent, the error of procee­ding will not be great, nor ordinary, and there can be no better establishment of humane judicature, then is a fallible proceeding upon an infallible ground; And if the judgement of heresie be made by estimate and proportion of the opinion to a good or a bad life respectively, supposing an error in the deduction, there will be no malice in the conclusion; and that he endeavours to secure piety according to the best of his understanding, and yet did mistake in his proceeding, is onely an argument that he did his duty after the manner of men, possibly with the piety of a Saint, though not with the understanding of an Angel. And the little inconvenience that happens to the person injuriously judged is abundantly made up in the excellency of the Discipline, the goodnesse of the example, the care of the publike, and all those great influences into the manners of men which derive from such an act so publiquely consign'd. But such publique judgement in matters of opinion must be seldome and curious, and never but to secure piety, and a holy life; for in matters speculative, as all determinations are fallible, so scarce any of them are to purpose, nor ever able to make compensation of either side, either for the publike fraction, or the particular injustice if it should so happen in the censure.

But then as the Church may proceed thus far, yet no Christian man, or Community of men may proceed farther. For if they Numb. 2. be deceived in their judgement and censure, and yet have passed onely spirituall censures, they are totally ineffectuall, and come to nothing, there is no effect remaining upon the soule, and such censures are not to meddle with the body so much as indirectly. But if any other judgement passe upon persons erring, such judge­ments whose effects remaine, if the person be unjustly censured nothing will answer and make compensation for such injuries. If a person be excommunicate unjustly, it will doe him no hurt, but if he be killed or dismembred unjustly, that censure and in­fliction is not made ineffectuall by his innocence, he is certainly kill'd and dismembred. So that as the Churches authority in such cases so restrained and made prudent, cautelous, and orderly, is just and competent: so the proceeding is reasonable, it is pro­vident [Page 212] for the publike, and the inconveniences that may fall upon particulars so little, as that the publique benefit makes ample compensation, so long as the proceeding is but spiri­tuall.

This discourse is in the case of such opinions, which by the former rules are formall heresies, and upon practicall inconve­niences. Numb. 3. But for matters of question which have not in them an enmity to the publique tranquillity, as the Republique hath no­thing to doe, upon the ground of all the former discourses; so if the Church meddles with them where they doe not derive into ill life, either in the person or in the consequent, or else are destructi­ons of the foundation of Religion, which is all one, for that those fundamentall articles are of greatest necessity in order to a vertu­ous and godly life, which is wholly built upon them, (and there­fore are principally necessary) If she meddles further, otherwise then by preaching, and conferring, and exhortation, she becomes tyrannicall in her government, makes her selfe an immediate judge of consciences and perswasions, lords it over their faith, destroyes unity, and charity; and as if he that dogmatizes the opinion becomes criminall, if he troubles the Church with an im­modest, peevish, and pertinacious proposall of his article, not simply necessary; so the Church does not doe her duty, if she so condemnes it pro tribunali as to enjoyne him and all her subjects to beleeve the contrary. And as there may be pertinacy in do­ctrine, so there may be pertinacy in judging, and both are faults. The peace of the Church and the unity of her doctrine is best conserved when it is judged by the proportion it hath to that rule of unity which the Apostles gave, that is the Creed for Articles of meer beliefe, and the precepts of Jesus Christ, and the practicall rules of piety, which are most plaine and easie, and without controversie, set downe in the Gospels, and Writings of the Apostles. But to multiply articles, and adopt them into the family of the faith, and to require assent to such articles which (as S. Pauls phrase is) are of doubtfull disputation, equall to that assent wee give to matters of faith, is to build a Tower upon the top of a Bulrush, and the further the effect of such pro­ceedings does extend, the worse they are; the very making [Page 213] such a Law is unreasonable, the inflicting spirituall censures up­on them that cannot doe so much violence to their understan­ding as to obey it, is unjust and ineffectuall; but to punish the person with death, or with corporall infliction, indeed it is ef­fectuall, but it is therefore tyrannicall. We have seen what the Church may doe towards restraining false or differing opinions, next I shall consider by way of Corollarie what the Prince may doe as for his interest, and onely in securing his people, and ser­ving the ends of true Religion.

SECT. XVI.

FOr upon these very grounds we may easily give account of Numb. 1. that great question, Whether it be lawfull for a Prince to give toleration to severall Religions.

For first, it is a great fault that men will call the severall sects of Christians by the names of severall Religions. The Religi­on of JESUS CHRIST is the forme of sound doctrine and wholsome words, which is set downe in Scripture indefinitely, actually conveyed to us by plaine places, and sepa­rated as for the question of necessary or not necessary by the Sym­bol of the Apostles. Those impertinencies which the wantonness and vanity of men hath commenced, which their interests have promoted, which serve not truth so much as their own ends, are farre from being distinct Religions; for matters of opinion are no parts of the worship of God, nor in order to it, but as they promote obedience to his Commandments; and when they contribute towards it, are in that proportion as they contri­bute parts and actions, and minute particulars of that Religion to whose end they doe, or pretend to serve. And such are all the sects and all the pretences of Christians, but pieces and mi­nutes of Christianity, if they doe serve the great end, as every man for his owne sect and interest beleeves for his share it does.

[Page 214] 2. Tolleration hath a double sense or purpose, for sometimes by it men understand a publick licence and exercise of a sect: Sometimes it is onely an indemnity of the persons privately to convene and to opine as they see cause, and as they meane to ans­wer to God. Both these are very much to the same purpose, un­lesse some persons whom we are bound to satisfie be scandaliz'd, and then the Prince is bound to doe as he is bound to satisfie. To God it is all one. For abstracting from the offence of persons, which is to be considered just as our obligation is to content the persons, it is all one whether we indulge to them to meet pub­likely or privately, to do actions of Religion concerning which we are not perswaded that they are truely holy. To God it is just one to be in the dark and in the light, the thing is the same, onely the Circumstance of publick and private is different, which cannot be concerned in any thing, nor can it concerne any thing but the matter of Scandall and relation to the minds and fantasies of certaine persons.

3. So that to tolerate is not to persecute. And the question Numb. 3. whether the Prince may tollerate divers perswasions, is no more then whether he may lawfully persecute any man for not being of his opinion. Now in this case he is just so to tollerate diversity of perswasions as he is to tolerate publike actions, for no opinion is judicable, nor no person punishable, but for a sin, and if his opi­nion by reason of its managing, or its effect, be a sinne in it selfe, or becomes a sinne to the person, then as he is to doe towards other sinnes, so to that opinion or man so opining. But to be­leeve so, or not so, when there is no more but meere beleeving, is not in his power to enjoyne, therefore not to punish. And it is not onely lawfull to tollerate disagreeing perswasions, but the authority of God onely is competent to take notice of it, and in­fallible to determine it, and fit to judge, and therefore no humane authority is sufficient to doe all those things which can justifie the inflicting temporall punishments upon such as doe not conforme in their perswasions to a rule or authority which is not only fal­lible, but supposed by the disagreeing person to be actually de­ceived.

But I consider that in the toleration of a different opinion, Numb. 4. [Page 215] Religion is not properly and immediately concerned, so as in any degree to be endangered. For it may be safe in diversity of per­swasions, and it also a part of Christian Humani iu­ris & natura­lis peteslatis, unicuique quod putaverit, cole­re Sed nec re­ligionis est co­gere religionem, quae suscipi sponte debet, non vi. Tertul. ad Scapulam. Religion that the li­berty of mens Consciences should be preserved in all things, where God hath not set a limit and made a restraint; that the soule of man should be free, and acknowledge no master but Jesus Christ; that matters spirituall should not be restrain'd by purishments corporall; that the same meekenesse and charity should be pre­served in the promotion of Christianity, that gave it foundation and increment, & firmness in its first publication; that conclusions should not be more dogmaticall then the vertuall resolution and efficacy of the premises: And that the persons should not more certainly be condemned then their opinions confuted; and lastly, that the infirmities of men and difficulties of things should be both put in ballance to make abatement in the definitive sentence against mens persons. But then because tolleration of opinions is not properly a question of Religion, it may be a question of poli­cy: And although a man may be a good Christian, though he be­leeve an errour not fundamentall, and not directly or evidently impious, yet his opinion may accidentally disturbe the publick peace through the over-activenesse of the person, and the confi­dence of their beliefe and the opinion of its appendant necessity, and therefore tolleration of differing perswasions in these cases is to be considered upon politicall grounds, and is just so to be ad­mitted or denyed as the opinions or tolleration of them may consist with the publicke and necessary ends of Government. Onely this: As Christian Princes must looke to the interest of their Government, so especially must they consider the interests of Christianity, & not call every redargution or modest discovery of an established errour, by the name of disturbance of the peace. For it is very likely that the peevishness and impatience of contra­diction in the Governours may break the peace. Let them remem­but the gentlenesse of Christianity, the Liberty of Consciences which ought to be preserved, and let them doe justice to the per­sons, whoever they are that are peevish, provided no mans person be over-born with prejudice. For if it be necessary for all men to subscribe to the present established Religion, by the same reason [Page 216] at another time a man may be bound to subscribe to the contra­dictory, and so to all Religions in the world. And they only, who by their too much confidence intitle God to all their fancies, and make them to be questions of Religion, and evidences for Hea­ven, or consignations to Hell, they onely think this doctrine un­reasonable, and they are the men that first disturb the Churches peace, and then thinke there is no appeasing the tumult but by getting the victory. But they that consider things wisely, under­stand that since salvation and damnation depend not upon im­pertinencies, and yet that publick peace and tranquillity may, the Prince is in this case to seeke how to secure Government, and the issues and intentions of that, while there is in these cases di­rectly no insecurity to Religion, unlesse by the accidentall uncha­ritablenesse of them that dispute: Which uncharitablenesse is also much prevented when the publike peace is secured, and no person is on either side ingaged upon Dextera prae­cipuè capit in­dulgentia men­tes, A [...]peritas oditi saeva (que) bella parit. revenge, or troubled with disgrace, or vexed with punishments by any decretory sentence against him. It was the saying of a wise states-man (I meane Thuanus) Haeretici qui pace data factionibus scinduntur, persecutione uniuntur contra Remp. If you persecute heretickes or discrepants, they unite themselves as to a common defence: If you permit them, they divide themselves upon private interest, and the rather, if this in­terest was an ingredient of the opinion.

The Summe is this, it concernes the duty of a Prince because it concernes the Honour of God, that all vices and every part of Numb. 5. ill life be discountenanced and restrain'd: And therefore in relati­on to that, opinions are to be dealt with. For the understanding being to direct the will, and opinions to guide our practices, they are considerable onely as they teach impiety and vice, as they ei­ther dishonour God or disobey him. Now all such doctrines are to be condemned; but for the persons preaching such Do­ctrines, if they neither justifie nor approve the pretended Con­sequences which are certainly impious, they are to be separated from that consideration. But if they know such consequences and allow them, or if they doe not stay till the doctrines produce impiety, but take sinne before hand, and mannage them impiously in any sense; or if either themselves or their doctrine doe really [Page 217] and without colour or fained pretext, disturb the publique peace Extat pru­dens monitum Mecaenatis a­pud Dionem Cassium ad Augustum in haec verba. Eos vero qui in Divinis ali­quid inno­vant, adio habe, & coerce, non Deorum solùm causâ: sed quia nova numina hi tales introducentes mulios impellunt ad mutationem rerum. Unde conjurationes, seditiones, Conciliabula existunt, res pro­fectò minime conducibiles principatui. Et legib us quo (que) expressum est, quod in religionem com­mittitur, in omnium fertur injuriam. and just interests, they are not to be suffered. In all other cases it is not onely lawfull to permit them, but it is also necessary, that Princes and all in authority should not persecute discrepant opi­nions. And in such cases wherein persons not otherwise incom­petent are bound to reprove an error, (as they are in many) in all these if the Prince makes restraint, he hinders men from doing their duty, and from obeying the Lawes of JESUS CHRIST.

SECT. XVII.

VPon these grounds it remaines that we reduce this doctrine Numb. 1. to practicall Conclusions, and consider among the differing sects and opinions which trouble these parts of Christendome, and come into our concernment, which sects of Christians are to be tolerated, and how farre? and which are to be restrained and punished in their severall proportions?

The first consideration is, that since diversity of opinions does Numb. 2. more concerne publike peace then religion, what is to be done to persons who disobey a publike sanction upon a true allega­tion; that they cannot believe it to be lawfull to obey such con­stitutions, although they dis-believe them upon insufficient grounds, that is, whether in constituta lege disagreeing persons or weake consciences are to be complyed withall, and their diso­beying and disagreeing tolerated?

1. In this question there is no distinction can be made between Numb. 3. [Page 218] persons truely weake, and but pretending so. For all that pre­tend to it, are to be allowed the same liberty whatsoever it be; for no mans spirit is knowne to any, but to God and himselfe: and therefore pretences and realityes in this case, are both alike in order to the publike toleration. And this very thing is one ar­gument to perswade a Negative. For the chiefe thing in this case is the concernment of publique government, which is then most of all violated, when what may prudently be permitted to some purposes, may be demanded to many more, and the piety of the Lawes abused to the impiety of other mens ends. And if laws be made so malleable, as to comply with weak consciences, he that hath a mind to disobey, is made impregnable against the coercitive power of the Law by this pretence. For a weak con­science signifyes nothing in this case, but a dislike of the Law up­on a contrary perswasion. For if some weak consciences doe o­bey the law, and others doe not, it is not their weaknesse inde­finitely that is the cause of it, but a definite and particular per­swasion to the contrary. So that if such a pretence be excuse suf­ficient from obeying, then the law is a sanction obliging every one to obey that hath a mind to it, and he that hath not, may choose, that is, it is no Law at all, for he that hath a mind to it may doe it if there be no Law, and he that hath no mind to it need not for all the Law.

And therefore the wit of man cannot prudently frame a law Numb. 4. of that temper, and expedient, but either he must lose the for­mality of a law, and neither have power coercitive nor obligato­ry, but ad arbitrium inferiorum, or else it cannot antecedently to the particular case give leave to any sort of men to disagree or disobey.

2. Suppose that a Law be made with great reason so as to satis­fie divers persons pious & prudent, that it complyes with the ne­cessity Numb. 5. of government, and promotes the interest of Gods ser­vice and publike order, it may easily be imagined that these per­sons which are obedient sons of the Church, may be as zealous for the publike order and discipline of the Church, as others for their opinion against it, and may be as much scandalized if diso­bedience [Page 219] be tolerated, as others are if the Law be exacted, and what shall be done in this case? Both sorts of men cannot be complyed withall, because as these pretend to be offended at the Law, and by consequence (if they understand the conse­quents of their owne opinion) at them that obey the Law: so the others are justly offended at them that unjustly disobey it. If therefore there be any on the right side as confident and zea­lous as they who are on the wrong side, then the disagreeing per­sons are not to be complyed with, to avoid giving offence; for if they be, offence is given to better persons, and so the mis­chiefe, which such complying seeks to prevent, is made greater and more unjust, obedience is discouraged, and disobedience is legally canonized for the result of a holy and a tender con­science.

3. Such complying with the disagreeings of a sort of men, is Numb. 6. the totall overthrow of all Discipline, and it is better to make no Lawes of publique worship, then to rescind them in the very con­stitution: and there can be no end in making the sanction, but to make the Law ridiculous, and the authority contemptible. For to say that complying with weake consciences in the very framing of a Law of Discipline, is the way to preserve unity, were all one as to say, To take away all Lawes is the best way to prevent disobedience. In such matters of indifferencie, the best way of cementing the fraction, is to unite the parts in the authority, for then the question is but one, viz. Whether the authority must be obeyed or not? But if a permission be given of disputing the particulars, the questions become next to infinite. A Mirrour when it is broken represents the object multiplyed and divided: but if it be entire and through one centre transmits the species to the eye, the Vision is one and naturall. Lawes are the Mirrour in which men are to dresse and compose their actions, and there­fore must not be broken with such clauses of exception which may without remedy be abused to the prejudice of authority, and peace, and all humane sanctions. And I have knowne in some Churches that this pretence hath been nothing but a designe to discredit the Law, to dismantle the authority that made it, to [Page 220] raise their owne credit, and a trophey of their zeale, to make it a characteristick note of a sect, and the cognisance of holy persons, and yet the men that claim'd exemption from the Lawes, upon pretence of having weake consciences, if in hearty expression you had told them so to their heads, they would have spit in your face, and were so farre from confessing themselves weake, that they thought themselves able to give Lawes to Christen­dome, to instruct the greatest Clerks, and to Catechize the Church her selfe; And which is the worst of all, they who were perpetually clamorous that the severity of the Lawes should slacken as to their particular, and in matter adiapho­rous (in which, if the Church hath any authority, she hath power to make Lawes) to indulge a leave to them to doe as they list, yet were the most imperious amongst men, most decretory in their sentences, and most impatient of any disagree­ing from them though in the least minute and particular: where­as by all the justice of the world, they who perswade such a complyance in matters of fact, and of so little question, should not deny to tolerate persons that differ in questions of great difficulty and contestation.

4. But yet since all things almost in the world have beene Numb. 7. made matters of dispute, and the will of some men, and the malice of others, and the infinite industry and pertinacie of con­testing and resolution to conquer hath abused some persons in­nocently into a perswasion, that even the Lawes themselves, though never so prudently constituted, are superstitious or im­pious, such persons who are otherwise pious, humble and reli­gious, are not to be destroyed for such matters, which in them­selves are not of concernment to salvation, and neither are so accidentally to such men and in such cases where they are innocently abused, and they erre without purpose and de­signe. And therefore if there be a publike disposition in some persons to dislike Lawes of a certaine quality, if it before-seene it is to be considered in lege dicendâ; and whatever inconveni­ence or particular offence is fore-seene, is either to be directly avoided in the Law, or else a compensation in the excellency of [Page 221] the Law, and certaine advantages, made to out-weigh their pretensions: But in lege jam dictâ, because there may be a necessi­ty some persons should have a liberty indulged them, it is necessary that the Governours of the Church should be in­trusted with a power to consider the particular case, and in­dulge a liberty to the person, and grant personall dispensati­ons. This I say is to be done at severall times, upon parti­cular instance, upon singular consideration, and new emergen­cies. But that a whole kind of men, such a kind to which all men without possibility of being confuted may pretend, should at once in the very frame of the Law be permitted to disobey, is to nullifie the Law, to destroy Discipline, and to hallow dis­obedience; it takes away the obliging part of the Law, and makes that the thing enacted shall not be enjoyn'd, but tolerated onely: it destroyes unity and uniformity, which to preserve was the very end of such lawes of Discipline: it bends the rule to the thing which is to be ruled, so that the law obeyes the subject, not the subject the law: it is to make a law for particulars, not upon generall reason and congruity, against the prudence and designe of all Lawes in the world, and absolutely without the example of any Church in Christendome; it prevents no scan­dall, for some will be scandalized at the authority it selfe, some at the complying, and remisnesse of Discipline, and severall men at matters, and upon ends contradictory: All which cannot, some ought not to be complyed withall.

6. The summe is this. The end of the Lawes of Discipline are in an immediate order to the conservation and ornament of the Numb. 8. publique, and therefore the Lawes must not so tolerate, as by con­serving persons to destroy themselves and the publike benefit, but if there be cause for it, they must be cassated, or if there be no suf­ficient cause, the complyings must be so as may best preserve the particulars in conjunction with the publike end, which because it is primarily intended, is of greatest consideration. But the parti­culars whether of case or person are to be considered occasionally and emergently by the Judges, but cannot antecedently and regu­larly be determined by a Law.

[Page 222] But this sort of men is of so generall pretence, that all Lawes Numb. 9. and all Judges may easily be abused by them. Those sects which are signified by a Name, which have a systeme of Articles, a body of profession, may be more cleerly determined in their question concerning the lawfulnesse of permitting their professi­ons and assemblies.

I shall instance in two, which are most troublesome and most dislik'd; and by an account made of these, we may make judge­ment what may be done towards others whose errors are not ap­prehended of so great malignity. The men I meane are the Ana­baptists and the Papists.

SECT. 18.

IN the Anabaptists I consider onely their two capitall opini­ons, the one against the baptisme of infants, the other against Numb. 1. Magistracy: and because they produce different judgements and various effects, all their other fancyes which vary as the Moon does, may stand or fall in their proportion and likenesse to these.

And first I consider their denying baptisme to infants; al­though it be a doctrine justly condemned by the most sorts of Numb. 2. Christians, upon great grounds of reason, yet possibly their de­fence may be so great, as to take off much, and rebate the edge of their adversaries assault. It will be neither unpleasant nor unpro­fitable to draw a short scheme of plea for each party, the result of which possibly may be, that though they be deceived, yet they have so great excuse on their side, that their errour is not impudent or vincible. The baptisme of infants rests wholly upon this discourse.

When God made a covenant with Abraham for himselfe and his posterity, into which the Gentiles were reckoned by sprituall Numb. 3. adoption, he did for the present consigne that covenant with the Sacrament of circumcision. The extent of which rite, was to all his family, from the Major domo, to the Proselytus domicilio, and to infants of eight dayes old. Now the very nature of this cove­nant being a covenant of faith for its formallity, and with all faithfull people for the object; and circumcision being a seale of this covenant, if ever any rite doe supervene to consigne the same covenant, that rite must acknowledge circumcision for its type and precedent. And this the Apostle tels us in expresse doctrine. Now the nature of types, is to give some proportions to its suc­cessour the Antitype, and they both being seales of the same righ­teousnesse of faith, it will not easily be found where these two seales have any such distinction in their nature or purposes, as to appertaine to persons of differing capacity, and not equally con­cerne all, and this argument was thought of so much force by some of those excellent men which were Bishops in the primi­tive church, that a good Bishop writ an Epistle to S. Cyprian, to [Page 224] know of him whether or no it were lawfull to baptize infants be­fore the eighth day, because the type of baptisme was ministred in that circumcision, he in his discourse supposing that the first rite was a direction to the second, which prevailed with him so farre as to believe it to limit every circumstance.

And not onely this type, but the acts of Christ which were Numb. 4. previous to the institution of baptisme did prepare our under­standing by such impresses as were sufficient to produce such per­swasion in us, that Christ intended this ministery for the actuall advantage of infants as well as of persons of understanding. For Christ commanded that children should be brought unto him, he took them in his armes, he imposed hands on them and blessed them, and without question did by such acts of favour consigne his love to them, and them to a capacity of an eternall partici­pation of it. And possibly the invitation which Christ made to all to come to him, all them that are heavy laden, did in its pro­portion concerne infants as much as others, if they be guilty of Originall sinne, and if that sinne be a burthen, and presses them to any spirituall danger or inconvenience. And it is all the reason of the world, that since the grace of Christ is as large as the preva­rication of Adam, all they who are made guilty by the first Adam, should be cleansed by the second. But as they are guilty by ano­ther mans act, so they should be brought to the Font, to be puri­fyed by others, there being the same proportion of reason, that by others acts, they should be relieved who were in danger of pe­rishing by the act of others. And therefore S. Austin argues ex­cellently to this purpose. Accommodat illis mater Ecclesia aliorum pedes, ut veniant; aliorum cor, ut credant; aliorum linguam, ut fate­antur: ut quoniam quod aegri sunt, alio peccante praegravantur, sic cum Serm. 10. de verb. Apost. sani fiant alio confitente salventur. And Iustin Martyr, [...]. Resp. ad Or­thodoxos.

But whether they have originall sinne or no, yet take them in puris naturalibus, they cannot goe to God, or attaine to eternity: Numb. 5. to which they were intended in their first being and creation, and therefore much lesse since their naturals are impair'd by the curse on humane nature, procur'd by Adams prevarication. And if a naturall agent cannot in puris naturalibus attaine to heaven, [Page 225] which is a supernaturall end, much lesse when it is loaden with accidentall and grievous impediments. Now then since the only way revealed to us of acquiring Heaven is by Jesus Christ; and the first inlet into Christianity, and accesse to him is by Baptism, as appears by the perpetuall Analogy of the New Te­stament; either Infants are not persons capable of that end which is the perfection of humane nature, and to which the soule of man in its being made immortall was essentially design'd, and so are miserable and deficient from the very end of humanity, if they die before the use of reason; or else they must be brought to Christ by the Church doores, that is by the Font and waters of Baptism.

And in reason, it seemes more pregnant and plausible that In­fants rather then men of understanding should be baptized: For Numb. 6. since the efficacy of the Sacraments depends upon Divine Insti­tution and immediate benediction, and that they produce their effects independently upon man, in them that doe not hinder their operation; since Infants cannot by any act of their own promote the hope of their own salvation, which men of reason and choice may, by acts of vertue & election; it is more agreeable to the goodnesse of God, the honour and excellency of the Sacra­ment, and the necessity of its institution that it should in In­fants supply the want of humane acts and free obedience. Which the very thing it selfe seemes to say it does, because its effect is from God, and requires nothing on man's part, but that its efficary bee not hindered: And then in Infants, the disposition is equall, and the necessity more: they cannot ponere obicens, and by the same reason cannot doe others acts, which without the Sacraments doe advantage us towards our hopes of heaven, and therefore have more need to be supplyed by an act, and an Institution Divine and supernaturall.

And this is not only necessary in respect of the condition of Infants in capacity, to doe acts of grace, but also in obedience Numb. 7. to Divine precept. For Christ made a Law whose Sanction is with an exclusive negative to them that are not baptized, [Unlesse a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he shall not enter into the Kingdome of heaven;] If then Infants have a ca­pacity of being co-heires with Christ in the Kingdome of his [Page 226] Father, as Christ affirms they have, by saying [for of such is the kingdome of heaven] then there is a necessity that they should be brought to Baptism, there being an absolute exclusion of all persons unbaptized, and all persons not spirituall from the king­dome of heaven.

But indeed, it is a destruction of all the hopes and happinesse of Infants, a denying to them an exemption from the finall Numb. 8. condition of Beasts and Insectiles, or else a designing of them to a worse misery, to say that God hath not appointed some externall or internall meanes of bringing them to an eternall happinesse: Internall they have none; for Grace being an improvement and heigthning the faculties of nature, in order to a heigthen'd and supernaturall end, Grace hath no influence or efficacy upon their faculties, who can do no naturall acts of understanding: And if there be no externall meanes, then they are destitute of all hopes, and possibilities of salvation.

But thanks be to God, he hath provided better and told us Numb. 9. accordingly, for he hath made a promise of the holy Ghost to Infants as well as to men: The Promise is made to you and to your children, said S. Peter; The Promise of the Father, the Promise that he would send the holy Ghost: Now if you ask how this Promise shall be convey'd to our children, we have an ex­presse out of the same Sermon of S. Peter, Be baptized, and ye Act. 2. 38. 39. shall receive the gift of the holy Ghost; So that therefore be­cause the holy Ghost is promised, and Baptism is the meanes of receiving the Promise, therefore Baptism pertaines to them, to whom the Promise which is the effect of Baptism does ap­pertaine. And that we may not think this Argument is fal­lible, or of humane collection, observe that it is the Argument of the same Apostle in expresse termes: For in the case of Cor­nelius and his Family, he justified his proceeding by this very medium, Shall we deny Baptism to them who have received the gift of the holy Ghost as well as we? Which Discourse if it be reduced to form of Argument sayes this; They that are capa­ble of the same Grace are receptive of the same sign; but then (to make the Syllogism up with an assumption proper to our present purpose) Infants are capable of the same Grace, that is of the holy Ghost (for the Promise is made to our Children [Page 227] as well as to us, and S. Paul sayes the Children of believing Pa­rents are holy, and therefore have the holy Ghost who is the Fountaine of holinesse and sanctification) therefore they are to receive the sign and the seale of it, that is, the Sacrament of Baptism.

And indeed since God entred a Covenant with the Jewes, Numb. 10. which did also actually involve their Children, and gave them a sign to establish the Covenant, and its appendant Promise, ei­ther God does not so much love the Church as he did the Sy­nagogue, and the mercies of the Gospel are more restrain'd, then the mercies of the Law, God having made a Covenant with the Infants of Israel, and none with the Children of Christian Parents; or if he hath, yet we want the comfort of its Consignation; and unlesse our Children are to be baptiz'd, and so intitled to the Promises of the new Covenant, as the Jewish Babes were by Circumcision, this mercy which apper­taines to Infants is so secret and undeclar'd and unconsign'd, that wee want much of that mercy and outward Testimony which gave them comfort and assurance.

And in proportion to these Precepts and Revelations was the practise Apostolicall: For they (to whom Christ gave in Numb. 11. Precept to make Disciples all Nations baptizing them, and knew that Nations without Children never were, and that therefore they were passively concern'd in that commission,) baptized whole Families, particularly that of Stephanus and di­vers others, in which it is more then probable there were some Minors if not sucking Babes. And this practise did descend upon the Church in after Ages by Tradition Apostolicall: Of this we have sufficient Testimony from Origen, Pro hoc Ecclesia In Rom. 6. tom. 2. pag. 543. ab Apostolis traditionem accepit, etiam parvulis baptismum dare: And S. Austin, Hoc Ecclesia à majorum fide percepit: And Serm. 10. de verb. Apost. c. 2. generally all Writers (as Calvin sayes) affirm the same thing: For nullus est Scriptor tam vetustus, qui non ejus originem ad Apostolorum saeculum pro certo referat. From hence the Con­clusion 4. Instir. cap. 16. §. 8. is, that Infants ought to be baptiz'd, that it is simply necessary, that they who deny it are Hereticks, and such are not to be endured because they deny to Infants hopes and take away the possibility of their salvation, which is revealed to us [Page 228] on no other condition of which they are capable but Baptism. For by the insinuation of the Type, by the action of Christ, by the title Infants have to Heaven, by the precept of the Gospel, by the Energy of the Promise, by the reasonablenesse of the thing, by the infinite necessity on the Infants part, by the practise Apostolcall, by their Tradition, and the universall practise of the Church; by all these God and good people proclaime the law­fulnesse, the conveniency, and the necessity of Infants Baptism.

To all this, the Anabaptist gives a soft and gentle Answer, that it is a goodly harangue, which upon strict examination will Numb. 12. come to nothing, that it pretends fairely and signifies little; That some of these Allegations are false, some impertinent, and all the rest insufficient.

For the Argument from Circumcision is invalid upon infinite Numb. 13. considerations; Figures and Types prove nothing, unlesse a Commandement goe along with them, or some expresse to sig­nifie such to be their purpose: For the Deluge of Waters and the Ark of Noah were a figure of Baptism said Peter; and if therefore the circumstances of one should be drawn to the o­ther, we should make Baptism a prodigy rather then a Rite: The Paschall Lamb was a Type of the Eucharist which succeeds the other as Baptism does to Circumcision; but because there was in the manducation of the Paschall Lamb, no prescription of Sacramentall drink, shall we thence conclude that the Eu­charist is to be ministred but in one kind? And even in the very instance of this Argument, supposing a correspondence of analogy between Circumcision and Baptism, yet there is no correspondence of identity: For although it were granted that both of them did consign the Covenant of Faith, yet there is nothing in the circumstance of childrens being circumcised that so concernes that Mystery, but that it might very well be given to Children, and yet Baptism only to men of reason; because Circumcision left a Character in the flesh, which being imprin­ted upon Infants did its work to them when they came to age; and such a Character was necessary because there was no word added to the sign; but Baptism imprints nothing that re­maines on the body, and if it leaves a Character at all it is up­on the soule, to which also the word is added which is as much [Page 229] a part of the Sacrament as the signe it selfe is; for both which reasons, it is requisite that the persons baptized should be ca­pable of reason, that they may be capable both of the word of the Sacrament, and the impresse made upon the Spirit: Since therefore the reason of this parity does wholly faile, there is no thing left to inferre a necessity of complying in this cir­cumstance of age any more then in the other annexes of the Type: And the case is cleare in the Bishop's Question to Cyprian, for why shall not Infants be baptized just upon the L. 3. Epist. 8. ad Fidum. eighth day as well as circumcised? If the correspondence of the Rites be an Argument to inferre one circumstance which is impertinent and accidentall to the mysteriousnesse of the Rite, why shall it not inferre all? And then also Femals must not be baptiezd, because they were not circumcised: But it were more proper if we would understand it right, to prosecute the analogy from the Type to the Anti-type by way of letter and spirit, and signification, and as Circumcision figures Baptism, so also the adjuncts of the Circumcision shall signifie something, spirituall, in the adherencies of Baptism: And therefore as In­fants were circumcised, so spirituall Infants shall be baptized, which is spirituall Circumcision; for therfore Babes had the mi­nistry of the Type, to signifie that we must when we give our names to Christ become [...] children in malice, [for unlesse you become like one of these little ones, you cannot enter into the Kingdome of heaven] said our blessed Saviour, and then the Type is made compleat. And this seemes to have been the sense of the Primitive Church; for in the Age next to the Apostles they gave to all baptized persons milk and honey to re­present to them their duty, that though in age and understanding they were men, yet they were Babes in Christ, and children in malice. But to inferre the sense of the Paedo-baptists is so weak a manner of arguing that Austin whose device it was (and men use to bee in love with their own fancies) at the most pretended it but as probable and a meare con­jecture.

And as ill successe will they have with the other Arguments as with this; For from the action of Christs blessing Infants Numb. 14. to inferre that they are to be baptized, proves nothing so much [Page 230] as that there is great want of better Arguments; The Con­clusion would be with more probability derived thus: Christ blessed children and so dismissed them, but baptized them not, therefore Insants are not to be baptized: But let this be as weak as its enemy, yet that Christ did not baptize them, is an Argument sufficient that Christ hath other wayes of bringing them to heaven then by baptism, he passed his act of grace upon them by benediction and imposition of hands.

And therefore, although neither Infants nor any man in puris naturalibus can attain to a supernaturall end without the addi­tion Numb. 15. of some instrument or meanes of Gods appointing ordina­rily and regularly, yet where God hath not appointed a Rule nor an Order, as in the case of Infants we contend he hath not, the Argument is invalid. And as we are sure that God hath not commanded Infants to be baptized; so we are sure God will doe them no injustice, nor damn them for what they cannot help.

And therefore, let them be pressed with all the inconveniences that are consequent to Originall sinne, yet either it will not be Numb. 16. laid to the charge of Infants, so as to be sufficient to condemn them; or if it could, yet the mercy and absolute goodnesse of God will secure them, if he takes them away before they can glorifie him with a free obedience; Quid ergo festinat innocens aetas ad remissionem peccatorum, was the Question of Tertullian, (lib. de bapt.) he knew no such danger from their Originall guilt as to drive them to a laver of which in that Age of innocence they had no need, as he conceived. And therefore, there is no necessity of flying to the help of others, for tongue, and heart, and faith, and predispositions to baptism; for what need all this stirre? as Infants without their own consent, without any act of their own; and without any exteriour solennity contracted the guilt of Adams sinne, and so are lyable to all the punish­ment which can with justice descend upon his posterity who are personally innocent; so Infants shall be restored without any solennity or act of their own, or of any other men for them, by the second Adam, by the redemption of Jesus Christ, by his righteousnesse and mercies applyed either immediatly, or how or when he shall be pleased to appoint. And so Austin's [Page 231] Argument will come to nothing without any need of God­fathers, or the faith of any body else. And it is too narrow a conception of God Almighty, because he hath tyed us to the ob­servation of the Ceremonies of his own institution, that there­fore he hath tyed himselfe to it. Many thousand wayes there are by which God can bring any reasonable soule to himselfe: But nothing is more unreasonable, then because he hath tyed all men of years and discretion to this way, therefore we of our own heads shall carry Infants to him that way without his di­rection: The conceit is poore and low, and the action conse­quent to it is too bold and ventrous, mysterium meum mihi & filiis domus meae: Let him doe what he please to Infants, wee must not.

Only this is certain, that God hath as great care of Infants as of others, and because they have no capacity of doing such acts Numb. 17. as may be in order to acquiring salvation, God will by his own immediate mercy bring them thither where he hath intended them; but to say that therefore he will doe it by an externall act and ministery, and that confin'd to a particular, viz. This Rite and no other, is no good Argument, unlesse God could not doe it without such meanes, or that he had said he would not: And why cannot God as well doe his mercies to Infants now immediately, as he did before the institution either of Circum­cision or Baptism?

However, there is no danger that Infants should perish for want of this externall Ministery, much lesse for prevaricating Numb. 18. Christs precept of Nisiquis renatus fuerit, &c. For first, the Wa­ter and the Spirit in this place signifie the same thing; and by Water is meant the effect of the Spirit, cleansing and purifying the Soule, as appears in its parallel place of Christ baptizing with the Spirit and with Fire. For although this was literally fulfilled in Pentecost, yet morally there is more in it, for it is the sign of the effect of the holy Ghost, and his productions upon the soule; and it was an excellency of our blessed Sa­viour's office, that he baptizes all that come to him with the holy Ghost and with fire; for so S. John preferring Christs mission and office before his own, tells the Jewes, not Christ's Disci­ples, that Christ shall baptize them with Fire and the holy Spi­rit, [Page 232] that is, all that come to him, as John the Baptist did with water, for so lies the Antithesis: And you may as well con­clude that Infants must also passe through the fire as through the water. And that we may not think this a trick to elude the pressure of this place, Peter sayes the same thing; for when he had said that Baptism saves us, he addes by way of explicati­on [not the washing of the flesh, but the confidence of a good Con­science towards God] plainly saying that it is not water, or the purifying of the body, but the cleansing of the Spirit, that does that which is supposed to be the effect of Baptism; and if our Saviour's exclusive negative be expounded by analogy to this of Peter, as certainly the other parallel instance must, and this may, then it will be so farre from proving the necessity of In­fants Baptism, that it can conclude for no man that he is ob­lig'd to the Rite; and the doctrine of the Baptism is only to derive from the very words of Institution, and not be forced from words which were spoken before it was Ordain'd. But to let passe this advantage, and to suppose it meant of exter­nall Baptism, yet this no more inferres a necessity of Infant's Baptism, then the other words of Christ inferre a necessity to give them the holy Communion, Nisi comederitis carnem filii hominis, & biberitis sangninem, non introibitis in regnum coelonum; and yet we doe not think these words sufficient Ar­gument to communicate them; if men therefore will doe us Justice, either let them give both Sacraments to Infants, as some Ages of the Church did, or neither. For the wit of man is not able to shew a disparity in the Sanction, or in the Energie of its expression. And therefore they were honest that understood the obligation to be parallel, and performed it accord­ingly, and yet because we say they were deceived in one instance, and yet the obligation (all the world cannot reasonably say but) is the same; they are as honest and as reasonable that doe nei­ther. And since the Ancient Church did with an equall opi­nion of necessity give them the Communion, and yet men nowadayes do not, why shall men be more burthened with a preju­dice and a name of obloquy, for not giving the Infants one Sacra­ment more then they are disliked for not affording them the other. If Anabaptist shall be a name of digrace, why shall not some [Page 233] other name be invented for them that deny to communicate In­fants, which shall be equally disgracefull, or else both the opi­nions signified by such names, be accounted no disparagement, but receive their estimate according to their truth?

Of which truth since we are now taking account from pre­tences Numb. 19. of Scripture, it is considerable that the discourse of S. Peter which is pretended for the intitling Infants to the Promise of the holy Ghost, and by consequence to Baptism, which is suppo­sed to be its instrument and conveyance, is wholly a fancy, and hath in it nothing of certainty or demonstration, and not much probability. For besides that the thing it selfe is unreasonable, and the holy Ghost works by the heigthning and improving our naturall faculties, and therefore is a promise that so con­cernes them as they are reasonable creatures, and may have a title to it, in proportion to their nature, but no possession or reception of it, till their faculties come into act; besides this, I say, the words mentioned in S. Peter's Sermon (which are the only record of the promise) are interpreted upon a weak mistake: The promise belongs to you and to your children, therefore Infants are actually receptive of it in that capacity. That's the Argument; but the reason of it is not yet discove­red, nor ever will, for [to you and your children] is to you and your posterity, to you & your children when they are of the same capacity, in which you are effectually receptive of the promise: But he that when ever the word [children] is used in Scripture shall by [children] understand Infants, must needs believe that in all Israel there were no men, but all were Infants; and if that had been true, it had beene the greater wonder they should overcome the Anakims and beat the King of Moab, and march so farre, and discourse so well, for they were all called the children of Israel.

And for the Allegation of S. Paul that Infants are holy, if Numb. 20. their Parents be faithfull, it signifies nothing but that they are holy by designation, just as Jeremy and John Baptist were sancti­fied in their Mothers womb, that is they were appointed and design'd for holy Ministeries; but had not received the Promise of the Father the gift of the holy Ghost, for all that sanctifica­tion; and just so the Children of Christian Parents are sanctified, [Page 234] that is design'd to the service of Jesus Christ, and the future participation of the Promises.

And as the Promise appertaines not (for ought appears) to Numb. 21. Infants in that capacity and consistence, but only by the title of their being reasonable creatures, and when they come to that act of which by nature they have the faculty; so if it did, yet Baptism is not the meanes of conveying the holy Ghost. For that which Peter sayes, be baptized and ye shall receive the holy Ghost, signifies no more then this: First be baptized and then by imposition of the Apostles hands (which was another my­stery and rite,) ye shall receive the Promise of the Father: And this is nothing but an insinuation of the rite of confirma­tion, as is to this sense expounded by divers Ancient Authors, and in ordinary ministry the effect of it is not bestowed upon any unbaptized persons; for it is in order next after Baptism; and upon this ground Peter's Argument in the case of Cornelius was concluding enough à majori ad minus: Thus the holy Ghost was bestowed upon him and his Family, which gift by ordinary ministery was consequent to Baptism, (not as the effect is to the cause or to the proper instrument, but as a consequent is to an antecedent in a chaine of causes accidentally and by po­sitive institution depending upon each other) God by that mi­racle did give testimony, that the persons of the men were in great dispositions towards Heaven, and therefore were to be ad­mitted to those Rites, which are the ordinary inlets into the Kingdome of Heaven. But then from hence to argue that wherever there is a capacity of receiving the same grace, there also the same sign is to be ministred, and from hence to inferre Paedo-baptism, is an Argument very fallacious upon severall grounds. First, because Baptism is not the sign of the holy Ghost, but by another mystery it was conveyed ordinarily, and extraor­dinarily, it was conveyed independently from any mystery, and so the Argument goes upon a wrong supposition. Secondly, if the supposition were true, the proposition built upon it is false; for they that are capable of the same grace, are not alwayes ca­pable of the same sign; for women under the Law of Moses, al­though they were capable of the righteousnesse of Faith, yet they were not capable of the sign of Circumcision: For God does not [Page 235] alwayes convey his graces in the same manner, but to some me­diately, to others immediatly; and there is no better instance in the world of it, then the gift of the holy Ghost (which is the thing now instanc'd in this contestation) for it is certain in Scripture, that it was ordinarily given by imposition of hands, and that after Baptism; (And when this came into an ordinary ministery, it was called by the Ancient Church Chrism or Confirmation) but yet it was given sometimes without im­position of hands, as at Pentecost and to the Family of Corne­lius; sometimes before Baptism, sometimes after, sometimes in conjunction with it.

And after all this, least these Arguments should not ascer­taine Numb. 22. their Cause, they fall on complaining against God, and will not be content with God, unlesse they may baptize their Children, but take exceptions that God did more for the Children of the Jewes. But why so? Because God made a Co­venant with their Children actually as Infants, and consign'd it by Circumcision: Well; so he did with our children too in their proportion. He made a Covenant of spirituall Promises on his part, and spirituall and reall services on ours; and this pertains to Children when they are capable, but made with them as soon as they are alive, and yet not so as with the Jewes Babes; for as their rite consign'd them actually, so it was a Nationall and temporall blessing and Covenant, as a sepa­ration of them from the portion of the Nations, a marking them for a peculiar people, (and therefore while they were in the Wildernesse and separate from the commixture of all people, they were not at all circumcised) but as that rite did seale the righteousnesse of Faith, so by vertue of its adherency, and re­manency in their flesh, it did that work when the Children came to age. But in Christian Infants the case is otherwise; for the new Covenant being establish'd upon better Promises, is not only to better purposes, but also in distinct manner to be un­derstood; when their spirits are as receptive of a spirituall act or impresse as the bodies of Jewish Children were of the sign of Circumcision, then it is to be consign'd: But this busi­nesse is quickly at an end, by saying that God hath done no lesse for ours, then for their Children; for hee will doe the [Page 236] mercies of a Father and Creator to them, and he did no more to the other; but he hath done more to ours; for he hath made a Covenant with them and built it upon Promises of the greatest concernment; he did not so to them: But then for the other part which is the maine of the Argument, that unlesse this mercy be consign'd by Baptism, as good not at all in respect of us, because we want the comfort of it; this is the greatest vanity in the world: For when God hath made a Promise per­taining also to our Children (for so our Adversaries contend, and we also acknowledge in its true sense) shall not this Pro­mise, this word of God be of sufficient truth, certainty, and efficacy to cause comfort, unlesse we tempt God and require a sign of him? May not Christ say to these men as sometime to the Jewes, a wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, but no sign shall be given unto it? But the truth on't is, this Argument is nothing but a direct quarrelling with God Al­mighty.

Now since there is no strength in the Doctrinall part, the Numb. 23. practise and precedents Apostolicall and Ecclesiasticall, will be of lesse concernment, if they were true as is pretended, be­cause actions Apostolicall are not alwayes Rules for ever; it might be fit for them to doe it pro loco & tempore as divers others of their Institutions, but yet no engagement past thence upon following Ages; for it might be convenient at that time, in the new spring of Christianity, and till they had engag'd a considerable party, by that meanes to make them parties against the Gentiles Superstition, and by way of pre-occupation to ascertain them to their own sect when they came to be men; or for some other reason not trasmitted to us, because the Question of fact it selfe is not sufficiently determin'd. For the insinuation of that precept of baptizing all Nations, of which Children certainly are a part, does as little advantage as any of the rest, because other parallel expressions of Scripture doe determine and expound themselves to a sence that includes not all persons absolutely, but of a capable condition, as adorate eum omnes gentes, & psallite Deo omnes nationes terrae and di­vers more.

As for the conjecture concerning the Family of Stephanus, Numb. 24. [Page 237] at the best it is but a conjecture, and besides that it is not prov'd that there were Children in the Family; yet if that were granted, it followes not that they were baptized, because by [whole Fa­milies] in Scripture is meant all persons of reason and age within the Family; for it is said, of the Ruler at Capernaum, Ioh. 4. that he believed and all his house: Now you may also suppose that in his house were little Babes, that is likely enough, and you may suppose that they did believe too before they could understand, but that's not so likely; and then the Argument from baptizing of Stephen's houshold may bee allowed just as probable: But this is unman-like to build upon such slight aery conjectures.

But Tradition by all meanes must supply the place of Scrip­ture, Numb. 25. and there is pretended a Tradition Apostolicall, that Infants were baptized: But at this we are not much moved; For we who rely upon the written Word of God as sufficient to esta­blish all true Religion, doe not value the Allegation of Tradi­ons: And however the world goes, none of the Reformed Churches can pretend this Argument against this opinion, be­cause they who reject Tradition when tis against them, must not pretend it at all for them: But if wee should allow the Topick to be good, yet how will it be verified? for so farre as it can yet appeare, it relies wholly upon the Testimony of Origen, for from him Austin had it. Now a Tradition Apostolicall if it be not consign'd with a fuller Testimony then of one person whom all after-Ages have condemn'd of many errors, will obtain so little reputation amongst those who know that things have upon greater Authority pretended to derive from the Apo­stles, and yet falsly, that it will be a great Argument that he is credulons and weak, that shall be determin'd by so weak pro­bation in matters of so great concernment. And the truth of the businesse is, as there was no command of Scripture to ob­lige Children to the susception of it, so the necessity of Paedo­baptism was not determin'd in the Church till in the eighth Age after Christ, but in the yeare 418 in the Milevitan Coun­cell, a Provinciall of Africa, there was a Canon made for Pae­do-baptism; never till then! I grant it was practiz'd in Africa before that time, and they or some of them thought well of [Page 238] it, and though that be no Argument for us to think so, yet none of them did ever before, pretend it to be necessary, none to have been a precept of the Gospel. S. Austin was the first that ever preach'd it to be absolutely necessary, and it was in his heat and anger against Pelagius who had warm'd and chafed him so in that Question that it made him innovate in other doctrines possibly of more concernment then this. And that although this was practised anciently in Africa, yet that it was with­out an opinion of necessity, and not often there, nor at all in other places, we have the Testimony of a learned Paedo-baptist, Ludovicus Vives, who in his Annotations upon S. Austin, De Civit. Dei. l. 1. c. 27. affirms, Neminem nisi adultum antiqui­tùs solere baptizari.

But besides that the Tradition cannot be proved to be Apo­stolicall; we have very good evidence from Antiquity, that it Numb. 26. was the opinion of the Primitive Church, that Infants ought not to be baptiz'd; and this is clear in the sixth Canon of the Councell of Neocaesarea, The words are these, [...]: The sence is this, A woman with child may be baptized when she please; For her Baptism concernes not the child. The reason of the connexion of the parts of that Canon is in the following words, because every one in that Confession is to give a de­monstration of his own choyce and election: Meaning plain­ly, that if the Baptism of the Mother did also passe upon the child, it were not fit for a pregnant woman to receive Bap­tism, because in that Sacrament there being a Confession of Faith, which Confession supposes understanding, and free choyce, it is not reasonable the child should be consign'd with such a mystery, since it cannot doe any act of choyce or under­standing: The Canon speaks reason, and it intimates a practise which was absolutely universall in the Church, of interrogating the Catechumens concerning the Articles of Creed: Which is one Argument that either they did not admit Infants to Bap­tism, or that they did prevaricate egregiously in asking Que­stions of them, who themselves knew were not capable of gi­ving answer.

[Page 239] And to supply their incapacity by the Answer of a God­father, Numb. 27. Quid ni ne­cesse est (sie le­git Franc. Iu­nius in notis ad Tertul.) sponsores eti. am periculo ingeri qui & ipsi per morta­litatem desti­tuere promissi­ones suas pos­sint, & proven­tu malae indo­lis falli? Ter­tul. lib. de bap­tis cap. 18. is but the same unreasonablenesse acted with a worse circumstance: And there is no sensible account can be given of it; for that which some imperfectly murmure concerning stipulations civill perform'd by Tutors in the name of their Pu­pils, is an absolute vanity: For what if by positive Consti­tution of the Romans such solennities of Law are required in all stipulations, and by indulgence are permitted in the case of a notable benefit accruing to Minors, must God be tyed, and Christian Religion transact her mysteries by proportion and complyance with the Law of the Romans? I know God might if he would have appointed Godfathers to give Answer in be­halfe of the Children, and to be fidejussors for them; but we cannot find any Authority or ground that he hath, and if he had, then it is to be supposed he would have given them Com­mission to have transacted the solennity with better circum­stances, and given Answers with more truth. For the Que­stion is asked of believing in the present. And if the God­fathers answer in the name of the child, [I doe believe] it is Lib. de baptis. prope finem, cap. 18. itaque pro personae cujusque con­ditione ac dispositione, etiam aetate, cunctatio bap­tismi utilior est, praecipuè tamen circa parvulos....Fi­ant Christiani cum Christum nosse potue­rint. notorious they speak false and ridiculously; for the Infant is not capable of believing, and if he were, he were also capable of dissenting, and how then doe they know his mind? And therefore Tertullian gives advice that the Baptism of Infants should bee deferred till they could give an account of their Faith, and the same also is the Councell of Orat. 40, quaest in S. Bap­tisma. Gregory Bishop of Nazianzum, although he allowes them to hasten it in case of necessity; for though his reason taught him what was fit, yet he was overborn with the practise and opinion of his Age, which began to beare too violently upon him, and yet in ano­ther place he makes mention of some to whom Baptism was not adminstred [...], by reason of Infancy; To which if we adde that the Parents of S. Austin, S. Hierom, and S. Ambrose although they were Christian, yet did not baptise their children before they were; o years of age, it will be very considerable in the example, and of great efficacy for destroying the suppo­sed necessity or derivation from the Apostles.

But however, it is against the perpetuall analogy of Christs Numb. 28. Doctrine to baptize Infants: For besides that Christ never gave [Page 240] any precept to baptize them, nor ever himselfe nor his Apostles (that appears) did baptize any of them; All that either he or his Apostles said concerning it, requires such previous dispositi­ons to Baptism of which Infants are not capable, and these are Faith and Repentance: And not to instance in those innumera­ble places that require Faith before this Sacrament, there needs no more but this one saying of our blessed Saviour, He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not Mar. 16. shall be damned; plainly thus, Faith and Baptism in conjunction will bring a man to heaven; but if he have not Faith, Baptism shall doe him no good. So that if Baptism be necessary then, so is Faith, and much more; for want of Faith damnes abso­lutely; it is not said so of the want of Baptism. Now if this decretory sentence be to be understood of persons of age, and if Children by such an Answer (which indeed is reasonable enough) be excused from the necessity of Faith, the want of which regularly does damne, then it is sottish to say the same incapacity of reason and Faith shall not excuse from the actuall susception of Baptism, which is lesse necessary, and to which Faith and many other acts are necessary predisposions when it is reasonably and humanely received. The Conclusion is, that Baptism is also to be deferr'd till the time of Faith: And whe­ther Infants have Faith or no, is a Question to be disputed by persons that care not how much they say, nor how little they prove.

1. Personall and actuall Faith they have none; for they have Numb. 29. no acts of understanding; and besides how can any man know that they have, since he never saw any sign of it, neither was he told so by any one that could tell? 2. Some say they have im­putative Faith; but then so let the Sacrament be too, that is, if they have the Parents Faith or the Churches, then so let Baptism be imputed also by derivation from them, that as in their Mothers womb, and while they hang on their breasts, they live upon their Mothers nourishment, so they may upon the Baptism of their Parents or their Mother the Church. For since Faith is necessary to the susception of Baptism (and they themselves confesse it by striving to finde out new kinds of Faith to dawb the matter up) such as the Faith is, such must be the [Page 241] Sacrament: for there is no proportion between an actuall Sa­crament and an imputative Faith, this being in immediate and necessary order to that: And whatsoever can be said to take off from the necessity of actuall Faith, all that and much more may be said to excuse from the actuall susception of Bap­tism. 3. The first of these devices was that of Luther and his Scholars, the second of Calvin and his; and yet there is a third device which the Church of Rome teaches, and that is, that In­fants have habituall Faith: But who told them so? how can they prove it? what Revelation, or reason teaches any such thing? Are they by this habite so much as disposed to an actuall beliefe without a new master? Can an Infant sent into a Ma­humetan Province be more confident for Christianity when he comes to be a man, then if he had not been baptized? Are there any acts precedent, concomitant or consequent to this preten­ded habit? This strange invention is absolutely without art, without Scripture, Reason or Authority: But the men are to be excused unlesse there were a better; But for all these stra­tagemes, the Argument now alledged against the Baptism of In­fants is demonstrative and unanswerable.

To which also this consideration may be added, that if Baptism Numb. 30. be necessary to the salvation of Infants, upon whom is the im­position laid? To whom is the command given? to the Pa­rents or to the Children? not to the Children, for they are not capable of a Law; not to the Parents, for then God hath put the salvation of innocent Babes into the power of others; and Infants may be damn'd for their Fathers carelessnesse or malice. It followes that it is not necessary at all to be done to them, to whom it cannot be prescrib'd as a Law, and in whose behalfe it cannot be reasonably intrusted to others with the ap­pendant necessity; and if it be not necessary, it is certain it is not reasonable, and most certain it is nowhere in termes prescribed, and therefore it is to be presumed, that it ought to be understood and administred according as other precepts are with reference to the capacity of the subject, and the reasonablenesse of the thing.

For I consider, that the baptizing of Infants does rush us up­on Numb. 31. such inconveniences which in other Questions we avoid like Rocks, which will appear if we Discourse thus.

[Page 242] Either Baptism produces spirituall effects, or it produces them not: If it produces not any, why is such contention about it, what are we the nearer heaven if we are baptized? and if it be neglected, what are we the farther off? But if (as without all peradventure all the Paedo-baptists will say) Baptism does doe a work upon the soule, producing spirituall benefits and advantages, these advantages are produc'd by the externall work of the Sa­crament alone, or by that as it is help'd by the co-operation and predispositions of the suscipient.

If by the externall work of the Sacrament alone, how does this differ from the opus operatum of the Papists, save that it is worse? for they say the Sacrament does not produce its effect but in a suscipient disposed by all requisites and due preparatives of piety, faith, and repentance; though in a subject so dispo­sed, they say the Sacrament by its own vertue does it; but this opinion sayes it does it of it selfe without the help, or so much as the coexistence of any condition but the meare reception.

But if the Sacrament does not doe its work alone, but per modum recipientis according to the predispositions of the susci­pient, then because Infants can neither hinder it, nor doe any thing to further it, it does them no benefit at all. And if any man runs for succour to that exploded [...], that In­fants have Faith, or any other inspir'd habite of I know not what or how, we desire no more advantage in the world, then that they are constrained to an answer without Revelation, a­gainst reason, common sense, and all the experience in the world.

The summe of the Argument in short, is this though under another representment.

Either Baptism is a meare Ceremony, or it implyes a Duty on our part. If it be a Ceremony only, how does it sanctifie us, or make the commers therunto perfect? If it implyes a Duty on our part, how then can Children receive it, who cannot doe duty at all?

And indeed, this way of Ministration makes Baptism to be wholly an outward duty, a work of the Law, a carnall Ordi­nance, it makes us adhere to the letter, without regard of the Spirit, to be satisfied with shadowes, to return to bondage, [Page 243] to relinquish the mysteriousnesse, the substance and Spirituality of the Gospel. Which Argument is of so much the more con­sideration, because under the Spirituall Covenant, or the Gospel of Grace, if the mystery goes not before the Symbol (which it does when the Symbols are Seales and Consignations of the Grace, as it is said the Sacraments are) yet it alwayes accom­panies it, but never followes in order of time: And this is clear in the perpetuall analogy of holy Scripture.

For Baptism is never propounded, mentioned or enjoyn'd as a meanes of remission of sinnes, or of eternall life, but some­thing of duty, choyce and sanctity is joyn'd with it, in order to production of the end so mentioned, Know ye not that as ma­ny Rom. 6. 3. as are baptized into Christ Jesus, are baptized into his death? There is the mystery and the Symbol together, and declared to bee perpetually united, [...]. All of us who were baptized into one, were baptized into the other, Not only into the Name of Christ, but into his death also: But the meaning of this as it is explained in the following words of S. Paul, makes much for our purpose: For to bee baptized into his death, signifies to be buried with him in Baptism, that as Christ rose from the dead, wee also should walk in newnesse of life: That's Vers. 4. the full mystery of Baptism; For being baptized into his death, or which is all one in the next words, [...] into the likenesse of his death, cannot goe alone; if we be so plan­ted Vers. 5. into Christ, we shall be partakers of his Resurrection, and that is not here instanced in precise reward, but in exact Duty, for all this is nothing but crucifixion of the old man, a destroying the Vers. 6. body of sinne, that wee no longer serve sinne.

This indeed is truly to be baptized both in the Symbol and the Mystery: Whatsoever is lesse then this, is but the Symbol only, a meare Ceremony, an opus operatum, a dead letter, an empty shadow, an instrument without an agent to manage, or force to actuate it.

Plainer yet: Whosoever are baptized into Christ have put on Christ, have put on the new man: But to put on this new man, is to be formed in righteousnesse, and holinesse, and truth: This whole Argument is the very words of S. Paul: The Major pro­position is dogmatically determin'd, Gal. 3. 27. The Minor in [Page 244] Ephes. 4. 24. The Conclusion then is obvious, that they who are not formed new in righteousnesse, and holinesse, and truth, they who remaining in the present incapacites cannot walk in new­nesse of life, they have not been baptized into Christ, and then they have but one member of the distinction, used by S. Peter, they have that Baptism which is a putting away the filth of the flesh; but they have not that Baptism which is the answer of a 1 Pet. 3. 21. good conscience towards God, which is the onely Baptism that saves us: And this is the case of children; And then the case is thus.

As Infants by the force of nature cannot put themselves in­to a supernaturall condition, (and therefore say the Paedo-baptists, they need Baptism to put them into it:) so if they be baptized before the use of reason, before the works of the Spirit, before the operations of Grace, before they can throw off the works of darknesse, and live in righteousnesse and newnesse of life, they are never the nearer: From the paines of Hell they shall be saved by the mercies of God and their own innocence, though they die in puris naturalibus, and Baptism will carry them no further. For that Baptism that saves us, is not the only washing with water, of which only, Children are capable, but the answer of a good conscience towards God, of which they are not capable till the use of reason, till they know to chuse the good and re­fuse the evill.

And from thence I consider anew, That all vowes made by persons under others Names, stipulations made by Minors, are not valid till they by a supervening act after they are of suffi­cient age doe ratifie them. Why then may not Infants as well make the vow de novo, as de novo ratifie that which was made for them ab antiquo when they come to years of choice? If the Infant vow be invalid till the Manly confirmation, why were it Vide Eras­mum in prae­fat. ad Anno­tat. in Matth. not as good they staid to make it till that time, before which if they doe make it, it is to no purpose? This would bee considered.

And in Conclusion, Our way is the the surer way, for not to baptize Children till they can give an account of their Faith, is Numb. 32. the most proportionable to an act of reason and humanity, and it can have no danger in it: For to say that Infants may be damn'd [Page 245] for want of Baptism, (a thing which is not in their power to acquire, they being persons not yet capable of a Law) is to af­firm that of God which we dare not say of any wise and good man. Certainly it is much derogatory to Gods Justice and a plaine defiance to the infinite reputation of his goodnesse.

And therefore, who ever will pertinaciously persist in this opi­nion Numb. 33. of the Paedo-baptists and practise it accordingly, they pol­lute the blood of the everlasting Testament, they dishonour and make a pageantry of the Sacrament, they ineffectually re­present a sepulture into the death of Christ, and please them­selves in a sign without effect, making Baptism like the fig-tree in the Gospel, full of leaves but no fruit; And they invocate the holy Ghost in vaine, doing as if one should call upon him to illuminate a stone, or a tree.

Thus farre the Anabaptists may argue, and men have Dispu­ted Numb. 34. against them with so much weaknesse and confidence, that they have been encouraged in their errour [...] as Nazianzen observes of the case of the Church in his time. more by the acci­dentall advantages we have given them by our weak arguings, then by any truth of their cause, or excellency of their wit. But the use I make of it as to our present Question is this: That since there is no direct impiety in the opinion, nor any that is apparently consequent to it, and they with so much probabili­ty doe or may pretend to true perswasion, they are with all meanes, Christian, faire, and humane, to be redargued, or in­structed, but if they cannot be perswaded they must be left to God, who knowes every degree of every mans understanding, all his weaknesses and strengths, what impresse each Argument makes upon his Spirit, and how unresistible every reason is, and he alone judges his innocency and sincerity; and for the Question, I think there is so much to be pretended against that, which I believe to be the truth, that there is much more truth then evidence on our side, and therefore we may be confident as for our own particulars, but not too forward peremptorily to prescribe to others, much lesse damne, or to kill, or to per­secute them that only in this particular disagree.

SECT. XIX.

BUt then for their other capitall Opinion, with all its branches, Numb. 1. that it is not lawfull for Princes to put Malefactors to death, nor to take up desensive Armes, nor to minister an Oath, nor to contend in judgement, it is not to be disputed with such liberty as the former: For although it bee part of that Doctrine which Clemens Alexandrinus sayes was delivered per secretam traditionem Apostolorum, Non licere Christianis con­tendere L. 7. Stromat. in Iudicio, nec coràm gentibus, nec coràm sanctis, & per­fectum non debere Iurare; and the other part seemes to be warranted by the eleventh Canon of the Nicene Councell, which enjoynes penance to them that take Armes after their conversion to Christianity; yet either these Authorities are to be slighted, or be made receptive of any interpretation rather then the Common-wealth be disarmed of its necessary supports, and all Lawes made ineffectuall and impertinent: For the interest of the republique, and the well being of bodies politick is not to depend upon the nicety of our imaginations, or the fancies of any peevish or mistaken Priests, and there is no reason a Prince should ask John-a-Brunck, whether his understanding will give him leave to raign, and be a King: Nay, suppose there were divers places of Scripture which did seemingly restraine the Politicall use of the Sword, yet since the avoyding a per­sonall inconvenience, hath by all men been accounted sufficient reason to expound Scripture to any sense rather then the lite­rall, which inferres an unreasonable inconvenience, (and there­fore the pulling out an eye, and the cutting off a hand, is ex­pounded by mortifying a vice, and killing a criminall habit) much rather must the Allegations against the power of the Sword endure any sence rather then it should be thought that Christianity should destroy that which is the only instrument of Justice, the restraint of vice and support of bodies politick. It is certain that Christ and his Apostles, and Christian Religion [Page 247] did comply with the most absolute Government, and the most imperiall that was then in the world; and it could not have been at all indured in the world if it had not; for indeed the world it selfe could not last in regular and orderly communi­ties of men, but be a perpetuall confusion, if Princes and the Supreme Power in Bodies Politick, were not armed with a coercive power to punish Malefactors: The publike necessity, and universall experience of all the world convinces those men of being most unreasonable, that make such pretences which destroy all Lawes, and all Communities, and the bands of ci­vill Societies, and leave it arbitrary to every vaine or vitious person whether men shall be safe, or Lawes be established, or a Murderer hang'd, or Princes Rule. So that in this case men are not so much to Dispute with particular Arguments, as to consider the Interest and concernment of Kingdomes and Pub­lick Societies: For the Religion of Jesus Christ is the best establisher of the felicity of private persons, and of publick Communities; it is a Religion that is prudent and innocent, humane, and reasonable, and brought infinite advantages to man­kind, but no inconvenience, nothing that is unnaturall, or un­sociable, or unjust. And if it be certain that this world can­not be governed without Lawes, and Lawes without a com­pulsory signifie nothing, then it is certain, that it is no good Re­ligion that teaches Doctrine whose consequents will destroy all Government; and therefore it is as much to be rooted out, as any thing that is the greatest pest and nuisance to the pub­lick interest: And that we may guesse at the purposes of the men, and the inconvenience of such Doctrine; these men that did first intend by their Doctrine to disarme all Princes, and bodies Politick, did themselves take up armes to establish their wild, and impious fancie; and indeed that Prince or Com­mon-wealth that should be perswaded by them; would be ex­posed to all the insolencies of forraingners, and all mutinies of the teachers themselves, and the Governours of the people could not doe that duty they owe to their people of protecting them from the rapine and malice which will be in the world as long as the world is. And therefore, here they are to be re­strained from preaching such Doctrine, if they mean to preserve [Page 248] their Government, and the necessity of the thing will justifie the lawfulnesse of the thing: If they think it to themselves, that cannot be helped; so long it is innocent as much as con­cernes the Publick; but if they preach it, they may be accounted Authors of all the consequent inconveniences, and punisht ac­cordingly: No Doctrine that destroyes Government is to be en­dured; For although those Doctrines are not alwayes good that serve the private ends of Princes, or the secret designes of State, which by reason of some accidents or imperfections of men may be promoted by that which is false and pretending, yet no Do­ctrine can be good that does not comply with the formality of Government it selfe, and the well being of bodies Politick; Au­gur cum esset Cato, dicere ausus est, optimis auspiciis ea geri Cicero de senectute. quae pro Reipub. salute gererentur; quae contra Rempub. fierent contra auspicia fieri: Religion is to meliorate the condition of a people, not to doe it disadvantange, and therefore those Do­ctrines that inconvenience the Publick, are no parts of good Re­ligion; ut Respub. salva fit, is a necessary consideration in the permission of Prophecyings; for according to the true, solid, and prudent ends of the Republick, so is the Doctrine to be per­mitted or restrained, and the men that preach it according as they are good Subjects, and right Common-wealths men: For Religion is a thing superinduced to temporall Government, and the Church is an addition of a capacity to a Common-wealth, and therefore is in no sense to disserve the necessity and just in­terests of that to which it is super-added for its advantage and conservation.

And thus by a proportion to the Rules of these instances, all Numb. 2. their other Doctrines are to have their judgement, as concerning Toleration or restraint; for all are either speculative, or practicall, they are consistent with the Publick ends or inconsistent, they teach impiety or they are innocent, and they are to be permit­ted or rejected accordingly. For in the Question of Tolera­tion, the foundation of Faith, good life and Government is to be secured; in all others cases, the former considerations are effectuall.

SECT. XX.

But now concerning the Religion of the Church of Rome (which was the other instance I promised to consider) we Numb. 1. will proceed another way, and not consider the truth or falsity of the Doctrines; for that is not the best way to determine this Question concerning permitting their Religion or Assem­blies; because that a thing is not true, is not Argument suffi­cient to conclude that he that believes it true is not to bee endured; but we are to consider what inducements there are that possesse the understanding of those men; whether they be reasonable and innocent, sufficient to abuse or perswade wise and good men, or whether the Doctrines be commenc'd upon designe, and manag'd with impiety, and then have effects not to be endured.

And here first, I consider that those Doctrines that have Numb. 2. had long continuance and possession in the Church, cannot easily be supposed in the present Professors to be a design, since they have received it from so many Ages, and it is not likely that all Ages should have the same purposes, or that the same Doctrine should serve the severall ends of divers Ages. But however; long prescription is a prejudice, oftentimes so insup­portable, that it cannot with many Arguments be retrench'd, as relying upon these grounds, that truth is more ancient then falshood, that God would not for so many Ages forsake his Church, and leave her in an errour; that whatsoever is new, is not only suspicious, but false; which are suppositions, pious and plausible enough. And if the Church of Rome had communi­cated Infants so long as she hath prayed to Saints, or baptized Infants, the communicationg would have been believed with as much confidence, as the other Articles are, and the dissentients with as much impatience rejected. But this consideration is to be enlarg'd upon all those particulars, which as they are apt to abuse the persons of the men and amuse their understandings, [Page 250] so they are instruments of their excuse, and by making their errours to be invincible, and their opinions, though false, yet not criminall, make it also to be an effect of reason and charity, to permit the men a liberty of their Conscience, and let them answer to God for themselves and their own opinions: Such as are the beauty and splendor of their Church; their pom­pous Service; the statelinesse and solennity of the Hierarchy; their name of Catholick, which they suppose their own due, and to concern no other Sect of Christians; the Antiquity of ma­ny of their Doctrines; the continuall Succession of their Bishops; their immediate derivation from the Apostles; their Title to succeed S. Peter; the supposall and pretence of his personall Pre­rogatives; the advantages which the conjunction of the Imperiall Seat with their Episcopall hath brought to that Sea; the flat­tering expressions of minor Bishops, which by being old Re­cords, have obtain'd credibility; the multitude and variety of people which are of their perswasion; apparent consent with Antiquity in many Ceremonialls which other Churches have rejected; and a pretended, and sometimes an apparent consent with some elder Ages in many matters doctrinall; the ad­vantage which is derived to them by entertaining some perso­nall opinions of the Fathers, which they with infinite clamours see to bee cryed up to be a Doctrine of the Church of that time; The great consent of one part with another in that which most of them affim to be de fide; the great differences which are commenc'd amongst their Adversaries, abusing the Liberty of Prophecying unto a very great licentiousnesse; their happinesse of being instruments in converting divers Nations; the advantages of Monarchicall Government, the benefit of which as well as the inconveniences (which though they feele they consider not) they daily doe enjoy; the piety and the austerity of their Religious Orders of men and women; the single life of their Priests and Bishops; the riches of their Church; the severity of their Fasts and their exteriour obser­vances; the great reputation of their first Bishops for Faith and sanctity; the known holinesse of some of those persons whose Institutes the Religious Persons pretend to imitate; their Miracles false or true, substantiall or imaginary; the [Page 251] casualties and accidents that have hapned to their Adversaries, which being chances of humanity are attributed to severall causes according as the fancies of men and their Interests are pleased or satisfied; the temporall selicity of their Professors; the oblique arts & indirect proceedings of some of those who depar­ted from them; and amongst many other things, the names of Heretick and Schismatick, which they with infinite pretinacy fasten upon all that disagree from them; These things and di­vers others may very easily perswade persons of much reason and more piety, to retain that which they know to have been the Religion of their fore-Fathers, which had actuall possession and seizure of mens understandings before the op­posite professions had a name; And so much the rather because Religion hath more advantages upon the fancy and affections, then it hath upon Philosophy and severe discourses, and there­fore is the more easily perswaded upon such grounds as these, which are more apt to amuse then to satisfie the under­standing.

Secondly, If we consider the Doctrines themselves, we shall Numb. 3. finde them to be superstructures ill built, and worse manag'd, but yet they keep the foundation, they build upon God in Je­sus Christ, they professe the Apostles Creed, they retain Faith and Repentance as the supporters of all our hopes of Heaven, and believe many more truths then can be proved to be of sim­ple and originall necessity to salvation: And therefore all the wisest Personages of the adverse party allowed to them possi­bility of salvation, whilst their errours are not faults of their will, but weaknesses and deceptions of the understanding. So that there is nothing in the foundation of Faith, that can rea­sonably hinder them to be permitted: The foundation of Faith stands secure enough for all their vaine and unhandsome super­structures.

But then on the other side, if we take account of their Do­ctrines as they relate to good life, or are consistent or incon­sistent with civill Government, we shall have other conside­rations.

Thirdly, For I consider, that many of their Doctrines doe Numb. 4. accidentally teach or lead to ill life, and it will appeare to any [Page 252] man that considers the result of these propositions: Attrition (which is a low and imperfect degree of sorrow for sin, or as others say a sorrow for sinne commenc'd upon any reason of temporall hope, or feare or desire or any thing else) is a suffici­ent disposition for a man in the Sacrament of penance to re­ceive absolution, and be justified before God, by taking away the guilt of all his sinnes, and the obligation to eternall paines. So that already the feare of Hell is quite removed upon con­ditions so easie, that many men take more paines to get a groat, then by this Doctrine we are oblig'd to, for the curing and acquitting all the greatest sinnes of a whole life, of the most vitious person in the world: And but that they affright their people with a feare of Purgatory, or with the severity of Pe­nances in case they will not venter for Purgatory (for by their Doctrine they may chuse or refuse either) there would be no­thing in their Doctrine or Discipline to impede and slacken their proclivity to sinne; but then they have as easy a cure for that too, with a little more charge sometimes, but most commonly with lesse trouble: For there are so many confrater­nities, so many priviledged Churches, Altars, Monasteries, Coe­meteries, Offices, Festivals, and so free a concession of Indulgences appendant to all these, and a thousand fine devices to take away the feare of Purgatory, to commute or expiate Penances, that in no sect of men, doe they with more ease and cheapnesse re­concile a wicked life with the hopes of heaven, then in the Ro­man Communion.

And indeed if men would consider things upon their true Numb. 5. grounds, the Church of Rome should be more reproved upon Doctrines that inferre ill life, then upon such as are contrariant to Faith. For false superstructures doe not alwayes destroy: Faith; but many of the Doctrines they teach if they were pro­secuted to the utmost issue would destroy good life: And there­fore my quarrell with the Church of Rome is greater and stronger upon such points which are not usually considerd, then it is upon the ordinary disputes, which have to no very great purpose so much disturb'd Christendome: And I am more scandaliz'd at her for teaching the sufficiency of Attrition in the Sacrament, for indulging Penances so frequently, for remitting [Page 253] all Discipline, for making so great a part of Religon to consist in externalls and Ceremonialls, for putting more force and Ener­gy and exacting with more severity the commandments of men then the precepts of Justice, and internall Religion: Lastly, be­sides many other things, for promising heaven to persons after a wicked life upon their impertinent cryes and Ceremon alls trans­acted by the Priest and the dying Person: I confesse I wish the zeale of Christendome were a little more active against these and the like Doctrines, and that men would write and live more earnestly against them then as yet they have done.

But then what influence this just zeale is to have upon the Numb. 6. persons of the Professors is another consideration: For as the Pharisees did preach well and lived ill, and therefore were to be heard not imitated: So if these men live well though they teach ill, they are to be imitated not heard: their Doctrines by all meanes, Christian and humane, are to be discountenanc'd, but their persons tolerated eatenùs; their Profession and De­crees to be rejected and condemn'd, but the persons to be per­mitted, because by their good lives they confute their Doctrines, that is, they give evidence, that they think no evill to be con­sequent to such opinions, and if they did, that they live good lives, is argument sufficient that they would themselves cast the first stone against their own opinions, if they thought them guilty of such misdemeanours.

Fourthly, But if we consider their Doctrines in relation to Numb. 7. Government, and Publick societies of men, then if they prove faulty, they are so much the more intolerable by how much the consequents, are of greater danger and malice: Such Doctrines as these, The Pope may dispence with all oathes taken to God or man: He may absolve Subjects from their Allegiance to their naturall Prince: Faith is not to be kept with Hereticks, Hereticall Princes may be slaine by their Subjects. These Pro­positions are so deprest, and doe so immediately communicate with matter, and the interests of men, that they are of the same consideration with matters of fact, and are to be handled accordingly. To other Doctrines ill life may be consequent; but the connexion of the antecedent and the consequent is not (peradventure) perceiv'd or acknowledged by him that believes [Page 254] the opinion with no greater confidence then he disavowes the effect, and issue of it. But in these, the ill effect is the direct profession and purpose of the opinion, and therefore the man and the mans opinion is to be dealt withall, just as the matter of fact is to be judg'd; for it is an immediate, a perceiv'd, a direct event, and the very purpose of the opinion. Now these opinions are a direct overthrow to all humane society, and mu­tuall commerce, a destruction of Government, and of the lawes and duty and subordination which we owe to Princes; and there­fore those men of the Church of Rome that doe hold them, and preach them, cannot pretend to the excuses of innocent opini­ons, and hearty perswasion, to the weaknesse of humanity, and the difficulty of things; for God hath not left those truths which are necessary for conservation of publike societies of men, so intricate and obscure, but that every one that is honest and desirous to understand his duty, will certainly know that no Christian truth destroyes a mans being sociable and a mem­ber of the body Politick, co-operating to the conservation of the whole as well as of it selfe. However, if it might happen that men should sincerely erre in such plaine matters of fact (for there are fooles enough in the world) yet if he hold his peace, no man is to persecute or punish him, for then it is meare opinion which comes not under Politicall Cognisance, that is, that Cognisance which onely can punish corporally; but if he preaches it, he is actually a Traytor, or Seditious, or Au­thor of Perjury, or a destroyer of humane Society, respective­ly to the nature of the Doctrine; and the preaching such Do­ctrines cannot claime the priviledge and immunity of a meare opinion, because it is as much matter of fact, as any the actions of his disciples and confidents, and therefore in such cases is not to be permitted, but judg'd according to the nature of the effect it hath or may have upon the actions of men.

Fifthly: But lastly, In matters mearly speculative, the case is wholly altered, because the body Politick which only may law­fully Numb. 8. use the sword, is not a competent Judge of such matters which have not direct influence upon the body Politick, or upon the lives and manners of men as they are parts of a Community (not but that Princes or Judges Temporall may [Page 255] have as much ability as others, but by reason of the incompe­tency of the Authority;) And Gallio spoke wisely, when he discoursed thus to the Jewes, If it were a matter of wrong or Act. 18. 14. wicked lewdnesse ô ye Jewes, reason would that I should hear you; But if it be a question of words, and names, and of your Law, look ye to it, for I will be no Judge of such matters: The man spoke excellent reason; for the Cognisnance of these things did appertain to men of the other robe: but the Ecclesiasticall power, which only is competent to take notice of such questi­ons, is not of capacity to use the Temporall sword or corpo­rall inflictions: The meare doctrines and opinions of men are things Spirituall, and therefore not Cognoscible by a temporall Authority; and the Ecclesiasticall Authority, which is to take Cognisance is it selfe so Spirituall, that it cannot inflict any pu­nishment corporall.

And it is not enough to say that when the Magistrate re­straines Numb. 9. the preaching such opinions, if any man preaches them he may be punished (and then it is not for his opinion but his disobedience that he is punish'd) for the temporall power ought not to restraine Prophecyings, where the publick peace and interest is not certainly concern'd. And therefore it is not sufficient to excuse him, whose Law in that case being by an incompetent power made a scruple where there was no sinne.

And under this consideration, come very many Articles of the Church of Rome, which are wholly speculative, which doe Numb. 10. not derive upon practise, which begin in the understanding and rest there, and have no influence upon life and government, but very accidentally, and by a great many removes, and therefore are to be considered only so farre as to guide men in their perswasions, but have no effect upon the persons of men, their bodies, or their temporall condition: I instance in two; Prayer for the dead, and the Doctrine of Transubstantion, these two to be instead of all the rest.

For the first, This Discourse is to suppose it false, and we are Numb. 11. to direct our proceedings accordingly: And therefore I shall not need to urge with how many faire words and gay pretences, this Doctrine is set off, apt either to conzen or instruct the con­science [Page 256] of the wisest according as it is true or false respective­ly. But we finde (sayes the Romanist) in the History of the Maccabees, that the Jewes did pray and make offerings for the dead (which also appeares by other Testimonies, and by their forme of prayers still extant which they used in the Captivity) it is very considerable, that since our blessed Saviour did reprove all the evill Doctrines and Traditions of the Scribes and Phari­sees, and did argue concerning the dead and the Resurrection against the Sadduces, yet he spake no word against this pub­lick practise, but left it as he found it, which he who came to declare to us all the will of his Father would not have done, if it had not been innocent, pious and full of charity. To which by way of consociation, if we adde that S. Paul did pray for Onesiphorus, That God would shew him a mercy in that day, 2 Tim. 1. 18. that is, according to the stile of the New Testament, the day of Judgement: The result will be, that although it be proba­ble, that Onesiphorus at that time was dead (because in his salutations he salutes his houshold, without naming him who was the Major domo, against his custome of salutitions in other places:) Yet besides this, the prayer was for such a blessing to him whose demonstration and reception could not be but after death; which implies clearly, that then there is a need of mercy, and by consequence the dead people even to the day of Judgement inclusively are the subject of a misery, the object of Gods mercy, and therefore fit to be commemorated in the duties of our piety and charity, and that we are to recom­mend their condition to God, not only to give them more glory, in the reunion, but to pitty them to such purposes in which they need; which because they are not revealed to us in particular, it hinders us not in recommending the persons in particular to Gods mercy, but should rather excite our charity and devotion: For it being certaine that they have a need of mercy, and it being uncertain how great their need is, it may concern the prudence of charity to be the more earnest as not knowing the greatnesse of their necessity.

And if there should be any uncertainty in these Arguments, Numb. 12. yet its having been the universall practise of the Church of God in all places, and in all Ages till within these hundred [Page 257] yeares, is a very great inducement for any member of the Church to believe that in the first Traditions of Christianity, and the Institutions Apostolicall, there was nothing delivered against this practise, but very much to insinuate or enjoyn it; because the practise of it was at the first, and was universall. And if any man shall doubt of this, he shewes nothing but De corona milit. c. 3. & de monogam. c. 10. that hee is ignorant of the Records of the Church, it being plaine in Tertullian and S. Ep. 66. Cyprian (who were the eldest Writers of the Latine Church) that in their times it was ab antiquo, the custome of the Church to pray for the Soules of the Faithfull departed, in the dreadfull mysteries: And it was an Institution Apostolicall (sayes one of them) and so trans­mitted to the following Ages of the Church, and when once it began upon slight and discontent to be contested against by Aërius, the man was presently condemn'd for a Heretick, as appeares in Epiphanius.

But I am not to consider the Arguments for the Doctrine Numb. 13. it selfe, although the probability and faire pretence of them may help to excuse such persons who upon these or the like grounds doe heartily believe it. But I am to consider that whether it be true or false, there is no manner of malice in it, and at the worst, it is but a wrong errour upon the right side of charity, and concluded against by its Adversaries upon the confidence of such Arguments, which possibly are not so probable as the grounds pretended for it.

And if the same judgement might be made of any more of Numb. 14. their Doctrines, I think it were better men were not furious, in the condemning such Questions which either they under­stood not upon the grounds of their proper Arguments, or at least consider not, as subjected in the persons, and lessened by circumstances, by the innocency of the event, or other pruden­tiall considerations.

But the other Article is harder to be judged of, and hath made greater stirres in Christendome, and hath been dasht at Numb. 15. with more impetuous objections, and such as doe more trouble the Question of Toleration. For if the Doctrine of Transub­stantiation be false (as upon much evidence we believe it is) then tis accused of introducing Idolatry, giving Divine worship [Page 258] to a Creature, adoring of bread and wine, and then comes in the precept of God to the Jewes, that those Prophets who perswaded to Idolatry should be slaine.

But here we must deliberate, for it is concerning the lives Deut. 13. of men, and yet a little deliberation may suffice: For Idola­try Numb. 16. is a forsaking the true God, and giving Divine Worship to a Creature or to an Idoll, that is, to an imaginary god, who hath no foundation in essence or existence: And is that kind of su­perstition which by Divines is called the superstition of an undue object: Now it is evident that the Object of their Adoration (that which is represented to them in their minds, their thoughts, and purposes, and by which God principally if not solely takes estimate of humane actions) in the blessed Sacra­ment, is the only true and eternall God, hypostatically joyned with his Holy humanity, which humanity they believe actually present under the veile of the Sacramentall signes: And if they thought him not present, they are so farre from worshipping the bread in this case, that themselves professe it to be Idola­try to doe so, which is a demonstration that their soule hath no­thing in it that is Idololatricall. If their confidence and fancy­full opinion hath engag'd them upon so great mistake (as with­out doubt it hath) yet the will hath nothing in it, but what is a great enemy to Idolatry, Et nihil ardet in inferno nisi propria voluntas: And although they have done violence to all Philo­sophy, and the reason of man, and undone and cancelled the principles of two or three Sciences, to bring in this Article, yet they have a Divine Revelation whose literall and Grammaticall sense, if that sense were intended, would warrant them to doe violence to all the Sciences in the Circle; and indeed that, Transubstantiation is openly and violently against naturall rea­son, is an Argument to make them disbelieve, who believe the mystery of the Trinity in all those niceties of explication which are in the Schoole (and which now adayes passe for the Doctrine of the Church) with as much violence to the prin­ciples of naturall and supernaturall Philosophy, as can be imagin'd to be in the point of Transubstantiation.

1. But for the Article it selfe, we all say that Christ is there Numb. 17. present some way or other extraordinary; and it will not be [Page 259] amisse to worship him at that time, when he gives himselfe to us in so mysterious a manner, and with so great advantages; especially since the whole Office is a Consociation of divers actions of Religion and Divine Worship. Now in all opinions of those men who think it an act of Religion to communicate and to offer; a Divine Worship is given to Christ, and is transmitted to him by mediation of that action and that Sa­crament, and it is no more in the Church of Rome, but that they differ and mistake infinitely in the manner of his pre­sence; which errour is wholly seated in the Understanding, and does not communicate with the will; for all agree that the Divinity and the Humanity of the Sonne of God is the ulti­mate and adequate object of Divine Adoration, and that it is incommunicable to any creature whatsoever, and before they venture to passe an Act of Adoration, they believe the bread to be annihilated or turn'd into his substance who may lawfully be worshipped; and they who have these thoughts, are as much enemies of Idolatry, as they that understand better how to avoid that inconvenience which is supposed to be the crime, which they formally hate, and we materially avoid: This consi­deration was concerning the Doctrine it selfe.

2. And now for any danger to mens persons for suffering Numb. 18. such a Doctrine, this I shall say, that if they who doe it, are not formally guilty of Idolatry, there is no danger that they whom they perswade to it should be guilty; and what persons soever believe it to be Idolatry, to worship the Sacrament, while that perswasion remaines will never bee brought to it, there is no feare of that: And he that perswades them to doe it by altering their perswasions and beliefes, does no hurt but altering the opinions of the men, and abusing their understand­ings; but when they believe it to be no Idolatry, then their so believing it is sufficient security from that crime which hath so great a tincture and residency in the will, that from thence only it hath its being criminall.

3. However, if it were Idolatry, I think the Precept of God Numb. 19. to the Jewes of killing false and Idolatrous Prophets will be no warrant for Christians so to doe: For in the case of the Apostles and the men of Samaria, when James and John would [Page 260] have cald for fire to destroy them even as Elias did under Moses Law, Christ distinguished the spirit of Elias from his own Spirit, and taught them a lesson of greater sweetnesse, and consign'd this truth to all Ages of the Church, that such severi­ty is not consistent with the meekenesse which Christ by his example and Sermons hath made a precept Evangelicall: At most it was but a Iudiciall Law and no more of Argument to make it necessary to us, then the Mosaicall precepts of putting Adulterers to death, and trying the accused persons by the waters of jealousie.

And thus in these two Instances, I have given account what Numb. 20. is to be done in Toleration of diversity of opinions: The re­sult of which is principally this: Let the Prince and the Secular Power have a care the Common-wealth be safe. For whether such or such a Sect of Christians be to be permitted is a que­stion rather Politicall then Religious; for as for the concern­ments of Religion, these instances have furnished us with suf­ficient to determine us in our duties as to that particular, and by one of these all particulars may be judged.

And now it were a strange inhumanity to permit Jewes in Numb. 21. a Common-wealth, whose interest is served by their inhabita­tion, and yet upon equall grounds of State and Policy, not to permit differing Sects of Christians: For although possibly there is more danger, mens perswasions should be altered in a com­mixture of divers Sects of Christians, yet there is not so much danger when they are changed from Christian to Christian, as if they be turn'd from Christian to Iew, as many are daily in Spaine and Portugall.

And this is not to be excused by saying the Church hath no Numb. 22. power over them qui foris sunt as Iewes are: For it is true the Church in the capacity of Spirituall regiments hath nothing to doe with them, because they are not her Diocesse: Yet the Prince hath to doe with them, when they are subjects of his regiment: They may not be Excommunicate any more then a stone may be kild, because they are not of the Christian Com­munion, but they are living persons parts of the Common-Wealth, infinitely deceived in their Religion, and very dange­rous if they offer to perswade men to their opinions, and are [Page 261] the greatest enemies of Christ whose honour and the interest of whose Service a Christian Prince is bound with all his power to maintaine. And when the Question is of punishing disa­greeing persons with death, the Church hath equally nothing to doe with them both, for she hath nothing to doe with the temporall sword, but the Prince whose Subjects equally Chri­stians and Iewes are, hath equall power over their persons; for a Christian is no more a subject then a Iew is, The Prince hath upon them both the same power of life and death, so that the Iew by being no Christian is not foris, or any more an ex­empt person for his body, or his life then the Christian is: And yet in all Churches where the secular power hath temporall rea­son to tolerate the Iewes, they are tolerated without any scru­ple in Religion; which thing is of more consideration, because the Iewes are direct Blasphemers of the Sonne of God, and Blasphemy by their own Law the Law of Moses is made ca­pitall; And might with greater reason be inflicted upon them, who acknowledge its obligation then urg'd upon Christians as an Authority, enabling Princes to put them to death, who are accused of accidentall and consequutive Blasphemy and Idolatry respectively, which yet they hate and disavow with much zeale and heartinesse of perswasion. And I cannot yet learn a reason why we shall not be more complying with them, who are of the houshold of Faith; for at least they are children though they be but rebellious children (and if they were not, what hath the Mother to doe with them any more then with the Iewes?) they are in some relation or habitude of the Fa­mily, for they are consigned with the same Baptism, professe the same Faith delivered by the Apostles, are erected in the same hope, and look for the same glory to be reaveled to them, at the comming of their Common Lord and Saviour, to whose Service according to their understanding they have vowed themselves: And if the disagreeing persons be to be esteemed as Heathens and Publicans, yet not worse, Have no company with them, that's the worst that is to be done to such a man in S. Pauls judgement, Yet count him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother.

SECT. XXI.

FRom these premises, we are easily instructed concerning the lawfulnesse or duty respectively of Christian Communion, Numb. 1. which is differently to bee considered in respect of particular Churches to each other, and of particular men to particular Churches: For as for particular Churches, they are bound to al­low Communion to all those that professe the same Faith up­on which the Apostles did give Communion; For whatsoever preserves us as Members of the Church, gives us title to the Communion of Saints, and whatsoever Faith or beliefe that is to which God hath promised Heaven, that Faith makes us Members of the Catholick Church: Since therefore the Iudi­ciall Acts of the Church are then most prudent and religious when they nearest imitate the example and piety of God: To make the way to Heaven straighter then God made it, or to deny to communicate with those whom God will vouchsase to be united, and to refuse our charity to those who have the same Faith, because they have not all our opinions, and believe not every thing necessary which we over-value; is impious and Schismaticall, it inferres Tyranny on one part, and perswades and tempts to uncharitablenesse and animosities on both; It dissolves Societies, and is an enemy to peace, it busies men in im­pertinent wranglings, and by names of men and titles of factions it consignes the interessed parties to act their differences to the height, and makes them neglect those advantages which piety and a goodlife bring to the reputation of Christian Religion and Societies.

And therefore Vincentius Lirinensis, and indeed the whole Numb. 2. Church accounted the Donatists Hereticks upon this very ground, Cap. 11. Vid. Pacian. Epist. ad Sem­pron. 2. because they did imperiously deny their Communion to all that were not of their perswasion; whereas the Authors of that opini­on for which they first did separate, and make a Sect, because they did not break the Churches peace nor magisterially prescib d to [Page 263] others, were in that disagrecing and errour accounted Catho­licks, Divisio enim & disunio facit vos haereticos, pax & unit as L. 2. c. 95. contra liter. Petilian. faciunt Catholicos said S. Austin; and to this sense is that of S. Paul, If I had all faith and had not charity, I am nothing: He who upon confidence of his true beliefe denies a charitable Communion to his brother, loses the reward of both. And if Pope Victor had been as charitable to the Asiaticks as Pope Anicetus, and S. Polycarp were to each other in the same dis­agreeing concerning Easter, Victor had not been [...], so bitterly reprov'd and condemn'd as he was for the uncharitable managing of his disagreeing by Polycrates and Euseb. l. 5. c. 25, 26. Irenaeus; Concordia enim quae est charitat is effectus est unio voluntatum non opinionum. True Faith which leads to cha­rity Aquin. 22^ae. q 37 a 1. leads on to that which unites wills and affections, not opi­nions.

Upon these or the like considerations, the Emperour Zeno Numb. 3. publish'd his [...] in which he made the Nicene Creed to be the medium of Catholick Communion, and although he liv'd after the Councell of Chalcedon, yet he made not the Decrees of that Councell an instrument of its restraint and limit, as preferring the peace of Christendome, and the union of charity farre before a forced or pretended unity of perswasion, which never was or ever will be reall and substantiall; and although it were very convenient if it could be had, yet it is therefore not necessary because it is impossible; and if men please, whatever advantages to the publick would be consequent to it, may be supply'd by a charitable complyance and mutuall permission of opinion, and the offices of a brotherly affection prescrib'd us by the Lawes of Christianity: And we have seen it, that all Sects of Christians, when they have an end to be serv'd upon a third, have permitted that liberty to a second, which we now contend for, and which they formerly deny'd but now grant, that by joyning hands, they might be the stronger to destroy the third. The Arrians and Meletians joyned against the Catholicks: The Catholicks and Novatians joyn'd against the Arrians. Now if men would doe that for charity which they doe for interest, it were handsomer and more ingenuous; For that they doe permit each others disagreeings for their interest's sake, [Page 264] convinces them of the lawfulnesse of the thing, or else the un­lawnesse of their own proceedings, and therefore it were better they would serve the ends of charity then of faction, for then that good end would hallow the proceeding and make it both more prudent and more pious, while it serves the design of religious purposes.

SECT. XXII.

AS for the duty of particular men in the Question of com­municating with Churches of different perswasions, it is Numb. 1. to be regulated according to the Lawes of those Churches; for if they require no impiety, or any thing unlawfull as the condition of their Communion, then they communicate with them as they are Servants of Christ, as Disciples of his Do­ctrine and subjects to his Laws, and the particular distinguishing Doctrine of their Sect hath no influence or communication with him who from another Sect is willing to communicate with all the Servants of their Common Lord: For since no Church of one name is infallible, a wise man may have either the misfortune or a reason to believe of every one in particular, that she erres in some Article or other, either he cannot com­municate with any, or else he may communicate with all, that doe not make a sinne or the profession of an errour to be the condition of their Communion. And therefore, as every par­ticular Church is bound to Tolerate disagreeing persons in the senses and for the reasons above explicated; so every particular person is bound to Tolerate her, that is, not to refuse her Communion when he may have it upon innocent conditi­ons: For what is it to me if the Greek Church denies Pro­cession of the third Person from the second, so she will give me the right hand of Fellowship, (though I affirm it) there­fore [Page 265] because I professe the Religion of Jesus Christ, and retain all matters of Faith and necessity? But this thing will scarce be reduced to practise, for few Churches that have fram'd bo­dies of Confession, and Articles, will endure any person that is not of the same confession; which is a plaine demonstrati­on that such bodies of Confession and Articles doe much hurt, by becomming instruments of separating and dividing Communions, and making unnecessary or uncertain propositions a certaine meanes of Schism and disunion: But then men would doe well to consider whether or no such proceedings doe not derive the guilt of Schism upon them who least think it, and whether of the two is the Schismatick? he that makes unne­cessary and (supposing the state of things) inconvenient imposi­tions, or he that disobeyes them, because hee cannot with­out doing violence to his conscience believe them? Hee that parts Communion, because without sinne hee could not entertain it, or they that have made it necessary for him to separate, by requiring such conditions which to man are simply necessary, and to his particular are either sinfull or im­possible?

The Summe of all is this, There is no security in any thing Numb. 2. or to any person, but in the pious and hearty endeavours of a good life, and neither sinne nor error does impede it from producing its proportionate and intended effect: because it is a direct deletery to sin and an excuse to errors, by making them innocent, and therefore harmlesse. And indeed this is the in­tendment and design of Faith: For (that we may joyn both ends of this Discourse together) therefore certain Articles are prescribed to us, and propounded to our understanding, that so we might be supplyed with instructions, with motives and en­gagements to incline and determine our wills to the obedience of Christ. So that obedience is just so consequent to Faith, as the acts of will are to the dictates of the understanding: Faith therefore being in order to obedience, and so farre excellent as it selfe is a part of obedience or the promoter of it, or an en­gagement to it; it is evident that if obedience and a good life be secured upon the most reasonable and proper grounds of [Page 266] Christianity, that is, upon the Apostles Creed, then Faith also is secur'd. Since whatsoever is beside the duties, the order of a good life, cannot be a part of Faith, because upon Faith, a good life is built; all other Articles by not being necessary, are no otherwise to be requir'd, but as they are to be obtain'd and fourd out, that is, morally, and fallibly, and humanely; It is fit all truths be promoted fairely and properly, and yet but few Articles prescribed Magisterially, nor framed into Symbols and bodies of Confession; least of all after such composures, should men proceed so furiously as to say all disagreeing after such de­clarations to be damnable for the future, and capitall for the present. But this very thing is reason enough to make men more limited in their prescriptions, because it is more charitable in such suppositions so to doe.

But in the thing it selfe, because few kinds of errours are damnable, it is reasonable as few should be capitall. And be­cause Numb. 3. every thing that is damnable in it selfe and before Gods Judgement Seat, is not discernable before men (and questions disputable are of this condition) it is also very reasonable that fewer be capitall then what are damnable, and that such Questi­ons should bee permitted to men to believe because they must be left to God to judge. It concernes all persons to see that they doe their best to finde out truth, and if they doe, it is certain that let the errour be never so damnable, they shall escape the errour or the misery of being damn'd for't. And if God will not be angry at men for being invincibly deceiv'd, why should men be angry one at another? For he that is most displea­sed at another mans errour, may also be tempted in his own will, and as much deceived in his understanding: For if he may faile in what he can chuse, he may also faile in what he cannot chuse: His understanding is no more secur'd then his will, nor his Faith more then his obedience. It is his own fault if he offends God in either but whatsoever is not to be avoided; as errours, which are incident oftentimes even to the best and most inquisitive of men, are not offences against God, and therefore not to be punished, or restrained by men; but all such opinions▪ in which the publick interests of the [Page 267] Common-wealth, and the foundation of Faith, and a good life, are not concern'd, are to be permitted freely, Quisque abundet in sensu suo was the Doctrine of S. Paul, and that is Argu­ment and Conclusion too; and they were excellent words which S. Ambrose said in attestation of this great truth, Nec Imperiale est libertatem dicendi negare, nec sacerdotale quod sentias non dicere.