THE First Dialogue BETWEEN Mr. FREEMAN, a Gentleman, AND Mr. MEANWELL, a Civil Lawyer, Supposed to be immediately upon the late KING IAMES's first Departure.

GOOD Morrow Sir, what! at your Study thus early this Morn­ing.

That is no wonder, if you were acquainted with my Hours: But pray Sir, may I not likewise ask you what ex­traordinary occasion brings you out of your Lodgings so much sooner than your ordinary time?

Why Sir, I'll tell you: Being awake very early this Morning, and not able to sleep for thinking on the great Change, that might happen, let either the King or Prince get the better: and hearing some odd Rumours last Night of the King's Intentions to go away: I was resolved to get up, and go to the Coffee-house, to hear what News; where I had scarc [...] sat [...] down, before a Gentleman comes in from Whitehall, and brings us a certain account, that the King withdrew himself this Morning between three and four of the Clock, no Body knows whither, (tho' most believe he is gone after the Queen into France) which I thought would be so surpri [...]ing (I will not say welcome) to you, that being so near your Lodgings, I thought it would be worth while to step up, and tell you of it, and take your Thoughts of this great (and I hope happy) Change, which so great a Revolution is likely to produce in this Nation.

I thank you, Sir, for your kindness, tho' it is not half an Hour ago, that one I employ in some Business relating to a Client of mine, came hither, and gave me the same account that you do, tho' it was no great surprize to me, for ever since Sunday that the King sent the Queen and Prince away, I be­liev'd that he gave the Game for lost.

I must confess I was of another Mind, and thought that when he had secured the Queen and Child, he would have had one Brush with the Prince before he could have got to London, and if he had the worst of i [...], he could have but gone away at last. But to leap away on this Manner, and to loose Three Kingdoms without ever striking one stroke, it is not, I confess, suta­ble to that high Character his Admirer have always had of his Courage and Conduct.

Alas! Good King what would you have him do? Or whom could he relye on? When some of his near Relations, and divers of those whom he had raised almost from nothing had deserted him? How could he then trust an Army of Mercenaries, who being most of them but the Dregs of the People, would, it is likely, rather have delivered him up to the Prince, than have ventured their Lives for him.

What you have said concerning his Majesties Relations and Confidents deserting him, makes rather against than for the King's Cause; since it can­not be supposed they would have left a Prince to whom they were so much obliged, to joyn themselves with his Enemy, from whom they had no reason to expect greater Advantages, than they had already, unless they had been satisfied in their Conscience [...] that the Protestant Religion Establisht in these Nations, and also our Civil Rights and Liberties were in imminent danger of being utterly lost and destroyed; and tho' I grant that some of the King's Officers and Souldiers went over to the Prince; yet considering how few they were, that did so, not being (as I am credibly informed) above seven or eight hundred Men at the most; and what great numbers of Men he had left with him, he might methings, have turned out those Officers, he suspected, and put others in their Rooms, who would have Engaged to Live and Die with him, and if this would [...]ot have done, he might have sent those Regiments he most suspected back to London: And then reckoning the Scotch and Irish Forces that came lately over, besides the Papists he had in his Army, and those who having more Courage, than Conscience, could never expect to Fight for a Prince, who would pay them better: I am confident (if this had been done) he migh after the going over of those few Troups, have made up as good, if not a better Army than the Princes; and so need not have scampored last Week from Salisbury in that haste he did, whilst the Enemy was near fifty Miles off. But as it is, I am very well satisfied with all that hath happen'd in this great Revolution, and convinced of the Truth of that old saying▪ Ques perdora vult Iupiter, demantat pri [...].

So far I go along with you, that God doth often make use of the Wick­edness and Treachery of Men, to bring his great Designs about▪ But whe­ther God hath ordained this great Revolution, as you call it, for a Deli­verance or Punishment to this Nation, I am yet in doubt, for if you please to consider how much those two Causes have contributed to this turn of Affairs, I suppose if you argue according to my Principles we must own that tho' this Change hath happened by Gods permissive Providence, (as all [Page 3] things else tho' never so ill) yet whether he doth approve of [...]ll that hath been done to procure it, I much doubt; since if divers of our Nobility, with some of our Clergy had not quitted their Doctrines of Passive Obedience, and Non Resistance, so long owned by the Church of England, this Revolu­ion could not have happened at all, or at least not so suddenly, as it did: So that indeed I must confess, I am not only grieved at his Majesties hard Fortune, but also stand amazed, and cannot but reflect with wonder on the strange Vi­cissitude of Worldly Affairs, to see a Great King, who but last Week com­manded a Powerful Army of more than Forty Thousand Men forced out of his Throne, and made to fly his Kingdom by a Prince that did not bring half that Number into the Field. And who can sufficiently Bewail the King's Misfortunes, who hath been at once betrayed by the ill Advice of his Counsellors, the Trea­chery of his Friends, and tho Cowardice of his Souldiers?

Methinks Sir. there is no such great cause of wonder, much less of con­cern in all this: For who can much admire that a Prince should be thus used, who had not only provok'd a Powerful Enemy to invade him from Abroad, but (by industriously labouring to introduce Popery and Arbitrary Government at Home) had lost the Hearts of almost all, except his Popish Subjects, inso­much that many of his own Souldiers were so terrified with the Thoughts of being discarded (like the Protestant Army in Ireland) to make room for Irish and French Papists, that they had very little Courage to Fight, when they saw Casheering was the best Reward they could expect, if they proved Victorious: And who can much pity a Prince, who would rather loose the Affections of his People, than displease a few Priests and Jesuites: So that if he suffers he may thank himself; it not being Religion, but Superstition, which brought this Misfortune upon him. Since the King having got a Prince of Wales, and (as it is highly suspected) joined himself in a strict League with France for the Extirpation of Hereticks, it laid an absolute necessity upon the Prince of Orange to come over, that by the Assistance of the States of Holland, he might not only relieve us, but vindicate his own, and her Royal Highness his Princess [...]s Right to the Succession, and secure his Countrey from a dangerous and power­ful invasion, which it was threatned with both by Sea and Land, whenever the Kings of France and England should be at leisure to joyn their Forces to make War upon them; which you know all Europe hath expected for above these two Years last past.

These things were somewhat, if they could be proved; but indeed, to deal freely with you, I look upon this League, and the Story of the Supposi­tious Birth of the Prince of Wales, as meer Calumnies cast out of Wicked and Crafty Men to render the King more odious to his People.

Nay, Sir, you don't hear me positively affirm, either the one or the o­ther; since I grant they are not yet made out; but whatsoever will consider all the Circumstances of the Birth of this Child cannot but be strongly in­clined to believe it an Imposture, notwithstanding all the Depositions that are taken to the contrary. And as for the French League, you may be sure if there be any such thing, it is kept very private; and yet I must tell you there are very high and violent Presumptions to believe it true, or else why should the King of France in a late Memorial to the Pope, complain that his Holi­ness by Opposing his Interest in Europe had hindered him in those great De­signs [Page 4] he had for the Extirpation of Heresie, by which he must surely intend England or Holland; Protestantism being sufficiently expelled out of his own Countrey already. And he could not do it in either of the other without the Consent and Assistance of his Brother the King of England? Or to what pur­pose should the King of England joyn with France to ruin Holland, and his own Son in Law into the Bargain, but to make a War meerly for Religion; since neither the Dutch, nor the Prince their Stadt-holder, gave him till now any just Provocation?

Well, however, these are but bare suspitions and presumptions, at most, and not proofs; and therefore in a doubtful matter, as this is, if we ought to judge favourably of the Actions of others, much more of Princes, whose Councils and Actions, tho' private, yet are still exposed to the Censure and Calumnies of their Enemies, and therefore I hope you will not blame me, if I freely confess, that I am deeply concerned to see an innocent and Misled King forced to seek his Bread in a Forreign Land, and the more, since many of the Nobility, Gentry and Common People have contributed so much to it, by taking up Arms against him; and that so great a part of his own Army, and Officers should contrary to their Allegiance and Trust reposed in them, run over to the Enemy. Nay, that some of our Bishops and Clergy-men should, contrary to the so often acknowledged Doctrines of Passive [...] Obedience and Non-Resistance, not only Countenance, but be likewise active in such desperate undertakings, and this in-direct opposition to the known Laws of God and this Kingdom; which must needs make our Church a Scorn to our Enemies the Papists, and a Shame and Reproach to all Protestant Churches abroad, and ren­der the people of England odious to all the Crowned Heads in Europe.

Well, Sir, I see you are very warm, and I hope, more than the cause deserves. You may Judge as favourably of the King's Proceedings, and as hardly of the Actions of the Nobility, Gentry, Clergy and People in this matter as you please. But yet I think I can make it as clear as the Day, that they have done nothing by joining in Arms with he Prince of Orange, but what is justifiable by the Principles of Self preservation, the Fundamental Constitutions of the Government, and a just Zoal for their Religion and Civil Liberties, as they stand secured by our Laws; unless you would give the King a Power of making up Papists, and Slaves whenever he pleased. But as for your Doctrine of an Absolute Obedience without Reserve, and the Divine Right of Monarchy and Succession, you need not be much concerned whether the Papists laugh at you or no, since there are very few of them (if any) who are such Fools themselves as to believe such futilous Opinions. But indeed they have more reason to laugh at you whilst you maintain, than when you quit them; since as they have only rendered you a fit Object of their Scorn, so they would have made you but a more cas [...] Sacrifice to their Malice. For what can Thieves desire more, than that those they design to Rob, should think it unlawful to resist them? And what could the Papists have wisht for more, than that our Hands being fotterred by this Doctrine of an indefinite Passive-Obedience, our Lives, Religion and Liberties should lye at their Mercy; Which how long we should have enjoyed, whenever they thought themselves [...]rong enough to take them away, the late cruel Persecutions, and Extirpations of the Protestants in France, Savey, Hungary, and other places have proved but too fatal Examples, and therefore no wonder (let your high­flown [Page 5] Church-men write or preach what they please) if the Body of the Nobility, Gentry, and People of England could never be perswaded to swallow Doctrines so fatal to their Religion, and destructive to their Civil Rights and Liberties both as Mon and Christians.

And as for the Antiquity of these Doctrines, I think they are so far from be­ing the Antient Tenets of the Church of England, that they are neither to be found in its Chatechism, Thirty Nine Articles, or Book of Homilies, taken in their true Sense and Meaning; thô indeed there is something that may tend that way in some of the late Church-Canons about fifty years ago, but I do not look upon them as the Antient Establisht Doctrine of our Church, because these Canons are not confirmed, but condemned by two Acts of Parliaments, and consequently never legally Established as they ought to be by the publick Saction of the King and Nation? Our Old Queen Elix Di­vines,Vid [...] Bilson of Christian Sub­jection, Edi [...]. 1586. p. 2 [...]9, 280. such as Bishop Bilson and Mr. Hooker being wholly ignorant of these Doctrines, nay, teaching in several places of their Writings the quite contrary. No [...] was this Doctrine of absolute Subjection, and Non-Resistance ever generally maintained, until about the middle of King Iame's Reign, when some Court Bishops and Divines began to make new Discoveries in Politicks as well as Divinity, and did by their Preaching and Writings affirm that the King had an absolute Power over Mens Estates.Hooke [...]'s Ecclesi­as. Policy, L. 1. p. 11. So that it was unlawful in any Case to disobey or resist his Personal Command [...], if they were not directly contrary to the Law of God, as may appear by Dr. Hars [...]et then Bishop of Chichester, his Sermon upon this Text, Give unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, wherein he maintained, That all the Subjects Goods and Money were Caesar's, that is, the Kings, and therefore were not to be denied him if he demanded them for the publick use; which Sermon, (thô order'd by the Lords and Commons to be Burnt by the Hangman) yet was so grateful to the Court, that he was so far from being out of Favour for it, that he was not long after Translated to Norwich, and from thence to the Archbishoprick of York. So likewise about the beginning of the Reign of King Charles the First, Dr. Manwaring preached before him, the substance of whose Sermon was somewhat higher than the former,R. H. C. p. 609. (viz.) That the King was not bound by the Laws of the Land, not to impose Taxes or Subsidies without the Consent of Par­liament, and that when they were so imposed, the Subjects were oblieged in Conscience, and upon pain of Damnation to pay them; which if they re­fused to do they were guilty of Disloyalty and Rebelion. For which Sermon he was Impeacht by the Commons in Parliament 4. Car. I▪ and thereupon Sentenced by the House of Lords, to be Disabled to hold or receve any Ecclesiastical Living, or Secular Office whatever, and also to be Imprisoned, and Fined a Thousand Pound. Notwithstanding all which, we find him presently after the Parliament was disolv­ed, not only at Liberty,Ib. 635. but also presented by the King to a Rich Benefice in Essex, and not long after made Bishop of St. Davids. So likewise: one Dr. Sibthorp about the same time preached an As [...]ize Sermon at Northamt [...]n, on Rom. 13.7. wherein he maintained much the like Doctrines, as that it was the King alone that made the laws and that nothing could excuse from an active Obedience to [Page 6] his Commands, but what is against the Law of God and Nature: And that Kings had Power to lay Pole Money upon their Subject Heads▪ But this much I have read, that this Sermon was Licensed by Dr. Laud then Bishop of St. Davids, Vide Archbishop Abbot's Narra­tive, R. H. C. p. 434. because Archbishop Abbot had refused to do it as contrary to Law, for which he was very much frwoned upon at Court, and it is supposed to have been one of the main causes of his Suspension from his Arch-Episcopal Jurisdiction, which not long after hap­pened. But as for this Sioth [...]rp, tho he lived long after, (even till the Kings Return) yet being (as Archbishop Abbot describes him) a man of but small Learning, I cannot learn that he was ever preferred higher than the Parsonages of Barchley, and in Northamptonshire.

But I find a New Doctrine broach'd by some Modern Bishops and Divines about the middle of the Reign of King Iames the first. That Monarchy was of Divine Right, or Institution at least; so that any other Government was scarce warrantable or lawful; and of this New Sect we must more especially take notice of Sir R. F. who hath written several Treatises to prove this Do­ctrine, and which is worse, That all Monarchs being Absolute, they cannot be limited or obliged either by Oaths, Laws or Contracts with their People,F. P. c. 3. § 7, 8. farther than they themselves shall think fit, or consistent with their supposed Prerogatives; of which they only are to be the Sole Judges: So that whoever will but consider from the Reign of our four last Kings, what strong inclinations they had to render themselves Absolute, and that few Divines, or Common, or Civil Lawyers were preferr'd in their Reigns to any considerable Place, either in Church or State,See Cowel's In­terpreter Titles King, Parliament, Prerogative. who did not maintain these New Opinions both on the Bench and in the Pulpit: You need not wonder when the Stream of Court Preferment ran so strong that way, if so many were carried away with it; since it was but to expose themselves to certain mise­ry, if not to utter ruin, to oppugn it. All who offered by Speaking or Wri­ting to maintain the contrary, being branded with the odious Names of Puri­tans, Common-wealths-men, Whigs, &c. Some of whom you may remem­ber were not long since imprisoned, Fined, nay, Whipt for so doing. So that it was no wonder if there were but very few to be found who durst with so great hazard speak what they thought, nor could any thing but the imminent danger upon our Laws, Religion and Properties, proceeding from the Kings illegal practices have opened the Eyes of a great many Noblemen, Gentlemen and Clergy, who contrary to the Opinions so much lately in vogue, did generously venture both their Lives and Estates, to joyn their Arms with the Prince of Orange against the King's unjust and violent Proceedings.

I do not doubt, notwithstanding all you have said, to prove before I have done, these Doctrines of Non-Resistance, and of the Divine institu­tion of Monarchy to be most consonant to the Word of God, and to the Doctrine of the Primitive Church, and also to that of our Reformed Church of England. Nor were those Divines you mention in K. Iames the First's time, the Authors or▪ inventers of these Doctrines which were publickly received, and Decreed by both Houses of that Convocation which began in the first Year of K. Iames, and continued till the Year 1610. as appears by divers Ma­nuscript [Page 7] Copies of the Acts or Decrees of this Convocation, the Original of which was lately in the Library founded by Dr. Cousins late Bishop of Durham, besides a very fair Copy, now to be seen in the Archbishops Library at Lambeth: which if you please to peruse, you may be quickly satisfied that the Church of England (long before ever Sir R. F. writ thoses Treatises you mention) held that Civil Power was given by God to Adam and Noah, and their Descendants, as also that absolute subjection and obedience was due to all Soveraign Powers, without any resistance; as claiming under those Original Charters: These Doctrines being there fully and plainly laid down and asserted, as the Doctrines of our Church: So that you deal very unjustly with the memory of those Divines, as also of Sir R. F. to make them the first breachers of it, whereas you may find that it was the opinion of the whole Convocation, for many years before ever those Divines, or that Gentleman began to Preach, or write upon this subject; Nor were these the only men who maintained these Principles, but Archbishop Usher and Bishop Sanderson, (whom I suppose you will not reckon among your flattering Court Bishops) have as learnedly and fully asserted those Doctrines, you so much condemn, as any of that party you find fault with, and have very well proved all resistance of the Supream Powers to be unlawful, not only in absolute but limited Monarchies Of the Truth of which you may sufficiently satisfie your self, if you will but take the Pains to read the Learned and Elaborate Treatises written by those good Bishops, (viz.) The Lord Primate Usher's Power of the Prince, and Obedience of the Subject, and the Bishop of Lincoln's Preface before it, as also the said Bishop's Treatise de Iura nouto, written whilst he was Doctor of the Chair in Oxford.

I must beg your pardon, Sir, if I have never yet seen or heard of that Convocation Book you mention, much less of the opinions therein contained, since there is no mention made of their proceedings, in any History or Record of those times either Ecclesiastical or Civil, as I know of. But this much I am certain of; That these Determinations or Decrees you mention, (call them which you please) never received the Royal Assent, much less the con­firmation of the King and Parliament, one of which (if not both) is certain­ly requisite to make any opinion either in Doctrine or Discipline to be received by us Lay-men for the Doctrine of the Church of England, otherwise the Ca­nons made in 1640 would oblige us in Conscience, tho' they stand at this day condemned by Act of Parliament: so that however, even according to your own Principles, you cannot urge this Book as the Authoritative Doctrine of the Church of England, unless their Determinations had received the Royal Assent: which you your self do not affirm they had, for you very well know that, as in Civil Laws, no Bill is any more than waste Parchment if once the King hath refused to give his Royal Assent to it, so likewise in Spiritual or Ecclesiastical matters, I think no Decrees or Determinations of Convocations are to be received, as binding either in points of Faith or Manners by us Lay­men, till they have received the confirmation of the King, and the two Houses of Parliament; or otherwise the consequence would be, that if the King who hath the nomination of all the Bishopricks and Deaneries, as also of most of the great Prebendaries in England, of which the Convocation chiefly consists, should nominate such men into those places, which would agree with him to alter the present establisht Reformed Religion [...]n Governmen [...], and to bring in Popery or Arbitrary Power, the whole Kingdom would be obliged in Con­science [Page 8] to embrace it, or at least to submit without any contraditio [...] to those Canons the King and Convocation should thus agree to make, which of how fatal a consequence it might prove to the Reformed Religion in this Kingdom, this Kings choice of Bishops and Deans, such as he thought most fit for his turn, would have taught [...]s when it had been too late.

You very must mistake me Sir, if you believe that I urge the Authority of this Book to you, as containing any Ecclesiastical Canons, which I grant must have the Royal Assent, but whether that of the two Houses of Parlia­ment, I very much question, since the King without the Parliament is Head of the Church, and diverse Canons made under Queen Elizabeth, and King Iames are good in Law at this day, tho' they were never confirmed by Par­liament. But I only urge the Authority of this Book to you, to let you see that these Doctrines are more Antient than the time you prescribe, and also that the Major part of the Bishops and [...]lergy of the Church of England, held these Doctrines which you so much condemn, long before those Court Bishops or Divines you mention; medled with this controversie, and I sup­pose we may as well quote such a Convocation Book, as a Testimony of their sense upon these subjects, as we do the French, Helvetian, or any other Protestant Churches Confessions of Faith, drawn up and passed in Synod of their Divines, tho' without any confirmation of the Civil Power.

If you urge this Convocation Book only as a Testimony, and not Au­thority, I shall not contend any further about it, but then let me tell you, that if the Canons or Decrees of a Convocation, though never so much con­firmed by King and Parliament, do no further oblige in Conscience, than as they are agreable to the Doctrine of the Holy Scriptures, sure their deter­minations without any such Authority can only be look'd upon as the Opi­nions of so many particular private Men. And tho' I have a very great Re­uerence for the Judgments of so many Learned Men; yet granting those Do­ctrines you mention to be contained in this Book, I think notwithstanding, that we may justly examine them according to the Rules of Reason, and ex­press Testimonies of Scripture, by either of which, when I see you can con­vince me of the falshood of my Tenets, I shall count my self happy to be be [...]er informed. But as for those Treatises of Bishop Us [...]er, and Bishop [...]anderson which you now mentioned, I must needs confess they are learned­ly and elaborately writen, and tho' I am against Rebellion as much as any man, and do believe that subjects may too often be guilty of it, yet am I not therefore convinced that it is absolutely unlawful in all cases whatso­ever, even in the most Absolute and Arbitrary sort of Civil Government, for the People when violently and intolerably opprest, to take up Arms and resist such unjust violence, or to join with any Foraign Prince who will be so generous as to take upon him their deliverance. So that though I freely ac­knowledge that those good Bishops you mention, were very Pious and Learn­ed men, [...]im [...]hat I bear great reverence to their memories, yet doth it not therefore follow, that I must o [...] them to be Infallible, or as great Poli­titians as they were Learned Divines; or that they understood the Laws of England as well as they did the Scriptures or Fathers; and perhaps there may be a great deal, more said on their behalfe than can be for divers others, who have since W [...]een and Pr [...] so much upon those subjects, for if you [Page 9] please to consider the times of their writing those Treatises, you will find them written about the beginning or middle of the late Civil Wars, which they sup­posed to be beg [...]n and carried on contrary to all Law and Justice, under the pretenced Authority of the two Houses of Parliament, against King Charles the First; and therefore it is no wonder if they thought themselves obliged to Write very high, for the Prerogatives and Rights of Princes, and the abso­lute obedience of Subjects when they saw even the Kings just and lawful Pre­rogatives in danger to be taken from him by force. And altho' they may per­haps stretch several of these points too far, yet this may be very excuseable, since it is a hard matter to Write so exactly against any error, as not to fall into the contrary Extream, which nevertheless may sometimes prove useful enough: As those who would set a stick straight are forced to bend it to the other side: and so these Doctrines which might then be seasonable, whilst the People carried on their animosities against the King, farther than in Justice they ought, have not now the same reason and cogency, when this King hath so manifestly endea­voured to pull up the very foundations both of our Religion and Government▪ So that I am perswaded, could those good Bishops have lived by the course of Nature to our times, and have seen the ill and fatal use hath been made of those Doctrines by those in Power, they would either absolutely have renounc'd them, or at least have been very cautious how they publish't such doubtful opinions to the World.

I must beg your pardon Sir, if I am not of your Opinion, for I look upon the absolute subjection of the subjects to the higher or supream Powers to be a thing of such constant and eternal Obligation, that no change of times or circumstances can ever dispense with us in, or discharge us from it; and I am so far from believing that those good Bishops would ever have recanted their opinions in this particular, that had th [...]y lived until this time, I think they could not, without the imputation of time servers, have forborn publickly to declare and maintain them: for sure we must not deny or lay aside true Principles, because of some inconveniences or hardships that may thereby happen to our Religion, Persons or Civil Liberties, since that were the ready way to give a Licence to the rankest Rebellion, and the highest disobedience to the Supream Powers, for so the Primitive Christians might have claimed a right to Rebel against the Heathen Emperors, pretending they were not bound to submit themselves unto them, because they persecuted Gods Church, and put the Christians to death for no other reason than that they were such. Whereas we may plainly see St. Peter and St. Paul teach us another lesson, and command absolute subjection without reserve to the higher Powers, which were then the Tyrannical persecuting Emperours, and that the Primitive Christians, who immediately followed the Apostles, understood them in this sense; and altho' they had sufficient strength, yet thought it unlawful to resist those [...]ea­then Emperor's under which they liv'd. I refer you to that vast Treasure of Quotations, out of the Fathers and Antient Church Historians, collected with such Learning and Industry by the Lord Primate Usher in the second Trea­tise.

It is not my intention Sir, at present to fall into a severe examination of so many Texts of Scripture and Quotations of Fathers and other Authors, as are made use of by those Learned Men you lately mentioned, which require [Page 10] more consideration than our short time will now afford, therefore the best me­thod I can propose to you for the true stating and understanding this Noble Con­troversie, were first to look into the Natural state of Mankind, after the Fall of Adam, and enquire, First, If God has appointed any kind of Government by Divine Institution before another. Secondly, If he has not; how far Civil power may be lookt upon as from God, and in what sense, as deriv'd from the people. Thirdly, Whether Resistance by the Subjects, in some Cases, be incompatible and absolutely destructive to all Civil Government whatsoever. Fourthly, Whether such Resistance be absolutely contrary to the Doctrine of Christ contain'd in the Scriptures, and that of the Primitive Church pursuant thereunto. Fifthly, Whether such Resistance be contrary to the Constitution of this Government. and the express Laws of the Land. Sixthly, Whether what has been done by the Prince of Orange, and those of the Nobility, Gentry, &c. in pursuance of these Principles, has been done according to the Law of Nature, the Scrip­tures, and Ancient Constitutions of this Kingdom; which material Points, if we can once suttle, and discover where the Truth lyes, it will prove the clearest Comment and best Interpretation of all those places of Scripture, and Quo­tations of Fathers, and other Authors which are Cited by Divines or other Writers, for the Doctrines of the Divine Institution of Monarchy, and the Absolute Subjection of Subjects without any Resistance. For when we have once discovered what the Law of Nature or right Reason dictates; I think we may rest satisfy'd that that is the true Sense of the Scripture: God not having given us any Precept or Command, in Moral, or Practical things, that can be contrary to the Law of Nature or Reason; or incompatible with the happiness and welfare of Mankind in this Life; as the Reveal'd Will of God does chiefly regard that which is to come.

I do very well approve of your Proposal, and therefore pray give me first your Opinion on those Heads, that I may see how far I may agree with you, and wherein I must differ from you; for I do assure you my Intention is not to argue with you meerly for disputes sake, but that we may correct the Errors of each others understanding, and discover, if it be possible, where the Truth lyes; therefore pray Sir, begin first with the Natural state of Mankind, but re­member to do it like a Christian, and one that believes that we are all deriv'd from one first Parents, and that we did not at first spring up out of the Earth like Mushrooms, or as the Men whom Ovid [...]eigns to have been produc'd of the Dragons Teeth Cadmus is feigned to have sown, who as soon as they sprung out of the Earth, immediately fell a Fighting and Killing each other.

I thank you Sir for your honest and kind advice, and shall therefore in the first place suppose, that the necessity as well as being of all Civil Go­vernment, proceeded from the Fall of Adam, since if that had not been, we had still liv'd as the Poets fancy Men did under the Golden Age, without any need of Kings or Common-wealths to make Laws against Oppression, Theft, Adultery, Murder, and those other Injuries which Men are now too apt in this lapsed corrupt state to commit against each other, much less would there have been any need of Judges or Executioners, either to sen­tence or punish Offenders, for if Man had continued as free from Sin as he was in Paradise, there could have been no need of a Supream Coercive Power, since every Man would have perform'd his Duty towards God and [Page 11] his Neighbour without any punishment or constraint, So that all the Au­thority that can be suppos'd could have been then necessary for the Good and Happiness of Mankind, would have been no more than that of the Hus­band over his Wife, or that of Parents over their Children, the former of which would not have been an Absolute Coercive power neither, but rather such a power as his understanding then had over the inferiour Faculties of his Soul, join'd with a voluntary submission of her will to his, the Coercive power of the Husband, and his more absolute Rule over her being conferr'd by God on Adam, and in him on all his posterity after the Fall, for the regula­ting and restraining the unreasonable desires and passions of the Woman, which then began to exert and shew themselves in her; and as for paternal Authority, that would have been so far from being Coercive, that Children having no Inclination to disorder either in their Wills, Appetites or Passions, there would have been so little need of punishments, that they would not have required so much as reproof or correction: God having planted the Laws of Nature or Reason in every Mans Breast, then free from Rebellions Motions against it, so that Children then could have had no more to do, than to pay their Parents all that Gratitude. Duty and Obedience which was due to them, as the subordinate Causes of their Being, which could on­ly consist in performing those indifferent things, which they then would have had occasion to command them, since Mankind being Immortal, and the Earth bringing forth of it self all Necessaries for Humane Life, there could have been no occasion of attending and relieving their Parents when Sick, Old or Decrepit, and unable to keep themselves; and so likewise upon the same grounds all other Men would have been equal by Nature, in respect of any civil difference; for when there was no necessity of Mens Service, there would have been no distinction between Master and Servant: But after the Fall, the stare of Mankind was altered, and Self-love, and the desire of Self-preservation grew so strong and exorbitant above all Natural Equity, that the inordinate passions of Men blinding their Reasons, they began to think they had a Right, not only to the Necessaries of Life, but to whatever their unruly Appetites d [...]sired, or that they thought they could make themselves Masters of. To remedy which Inconveniences, I suppose the Fathers and Masters of Families, and other Freemen (in whom alone then resided that little Government that then was in the World) were forced after some time to agree upon one or more Men into whose hands they might resign all their particular powers, and to make Laws for the due Governing and Re­straining those disorderly Appetites and Passions, and also endowing them with a sufficient Authority to put them in Execution: But which of the Go­vernments now extant, or that have been formerly, were Prior in Nature, I think cannot well be known; whether it was a Monarchy, or an Aristocra­cy, consisting of all the Heads or Fathers of Families, or Freemen, is not material since the SS. are silent in it; but it being sufficient to suppose, that it was at first begun by the perswasion or mediation of some one or more Wise and Vertuous persons, and was consented to by thy whole num­ber, consisting of many Families, who were sensible of those great Inconve­niences and Mischiefs they lay under for want of Civil Government. But be it which way it will, 'tis most certain that it was principally intended by God, for the God and Preservation of the Governed, and not for the Greatness or Advantage of the Person or Parsons appointed t [...] Gover [...], since [Page 12] God designed all Civil Government for the restraining of Mans inordinate Passions and Lusts after the Fall, and procuring by sufficient rewards and puni [...]ments, that Peace and Happiness which could now no longer be obtained by Mens Natural Inclinations to that which was equitable and honest; and besides, it is absolutely impossible to suppose, that any great number of people not pressed by the Invasion of a powerful Enemy from abroad▪ (which could not be supposed in this early Age of the World) would ever be brought to consent to put themselves under the absolute power of others, but for their own greater Good and Preservation, or to part with their Natural Liberty without advantaging themselves at all by the Change.

I will not take upon me to assert, after what manner Mankind would have been governed in case our First Parents had continued in their Primi­tive state of Innocency; But this much I think I may boldly affirm in op­position to what you have already said, that Civil Government after the Fall was not alike in all the Fathers and Masters of Families, but that Adam alone was by God endued with it, as the great Father and Monarch of Man­kind; so that not only Civil Power, in genere, but in specie, R. F. A. M M. p. 254, 255. (viz.) Monarchical, was immediately after the Creation conferred by God upon him. And Adam was Monarch of the whole World even before he had any Subjects.

Sir, not to interrupt you, it seems somewhat hard to conceive how Adam could be a Father before he had Children, or a Monarch before he had Sub­jects.

If you please to consider it, you will find no absurdity at all in this Assertion. For though I confess there could be no actual Government without Subjects,Ibid. nor Fatherhood without Sons; yet by the Right of Nature it was due to Adam to be Governour of the World, when as yet he had neither Sons, nor Subjects, so though not in act, yet at least in habit, or in Potentia (as they say in the Schools) Adam was a King, and a Father, from his Creation, and even in the state of Innocency, he had been Governour over his Wife and Children; for the Integrity, or Excellency of the Subjects doth not take away the Order, or Eminency of the Governour: For Eve was subject to Adam before he sinned, and the Angels who are of a most pure Nature, and cannot Sin, are yet Subjects to God, and perform all his Commands: Which will serve to con­ [...]ute what you say in Derogation of Civil Government, or Power, that it was introduced by Sin, or the Fall of Man. Government, I grant as to co-active Power, was not till after Sin, because Co-action supposeth some disorder which was not in the state of Innocency; but as for directive Government, the State of Humane Nature requires it; since Civil Society cannot be imagined with­out a Power of Government. For although as long as Men continued in the State of Innocency, they might not need the direction of Adam in those things that were necessarily and morally to be done. Yet things indifferent that depended meerly on their Free-will, might well be directed by Adam's sole Com­mand.

Pray, Sir, give me leave to settle this Point-between us, before you proceed farther, and I doubt not when you better consider what I say, you will not think we have any just occasion to differ. So far then you and I are agreed, that even before the Fall, Adam was superior over his Wife and [Page 13] Children, and that they owed him, not only Gratitude and Respect, as a Parent, but also Obedience in all indifferent things: Yet I deny that this Power or Sup [...]iority of Adam over his Wife and Children, was at all a De­spotical or Civil Power, but meerly Oeconomical, for the Good and Con­venience of Adam, and the well ordering and preservation of his Family; which you will easily grant, if you please to consider what are the Essential Differences of Civil Government from Oeconomical. Now the Essential Pro­perties of Civil Government consist in preserving and defending the Subjects, both in War and Peace, from Forreign Enemies, and Intestine Injurie [...], and Invasions of Mens Persons or Properties, and in revenging and punishing all such Transgressions by Death, or other Punishments, and consequently in making Laws concerning Property, and for restraining all Robberies, Mur­ders, and the like▪ Now, in the state of Innocency there could be no need of any of these Essential Functions of Civil Power; for your self must grant, that Man was then not apt to Sin, and immortal; so that all Laws about Peach or War, Punishments of Offences, publick Judgments concerning Meum, & Tuum, and all Injuries, were absolutely needless, and had never been in Nature, if Adam had not sinned; and then how you can call this Authority, or Supe­riority (which I grant Adam had over his Wife and Children) Civil Power, I can by no means understand.

But I do utterly deny, that even after the Fall, Adam was a Monarch, or Sole and Absolute Lord over the whole Earth, and all Creatures therein contained; and desire you to give me such plain proofs of it, either from Reason, or Scrip­ture, that I need no more doubt of it, than your self.

I shall first of all give you an Argument drawn from the Reason of the thing▪ and in the next place, the Authority of Scripture, for my Opinion: and first, I think it is evident, that every Man that is Born, is so [...]at from being Free, that by his very Birth he becomes a Subject of him that begets him; and even Groti [...] h [...]mself acknowledges that, Generatione [...]us acquiritur in liberos. And indeed, the Act of Begetting, being that which makes a Man a Father, his Right of a Father over his Children, can Naturally arise from nothing else; and the same Author in another pl [...]ce hath these words upon the Fourth Com­mandment, Parentum nomine, qui naturales luns Magistraus, etiam alios Rectores par est iutelligi▪ quorum authoritas Soci [...]tatem humanam continet: And if Parents be natural Magistrates, Children must needs he Born Natural Subjects. So that, not only Adam, but the succeeding Patriarchs had, by Right of Fatherhood, Regal Authority over their Children, as may [...] by divers Testimonies out of Scr [...]pture, and therefore at is very reasonable that all Fathers should have a Power over the Lives of their Children, since it is to them that they owe their Life, Being and Education; and I think that even the Power which God himself exerciseth over Mankind, is by Right of Fatherhood.

Before you come to Scripture, give me leave, in the first place to exa­mine your first Argument, which you deduced from the Law of Nature or Reason: For I doubt, if you please better to consider of it, you will and that so light and Transitory an▪ Action, as that of Generation, canno [...] give any Man an absolute Property and Dominion over the Person and [...]fe of those whom he Begets; since sew Men do principally intend the giving of a Being [Page 14] to another, so much as[?] they do their own pleasure, in that Action; nor do we owe our Lives (properly speaking) to our Parents, but to God, who is the true and original Cause of our Being, though it is true, he makes use of our Parents as Physical, though not as Moral Means, or Instruments for that end; since it doth not lye in their power to hinder their Generating of Children, if they perform the Acts necessary thereunto; so that both the an­tecedent and the consequent are altogether false, viz. That Parents give their Children, Life and Being, and that therefore they have and absolute power over their Lives and Persons; which if it were true, would give the Mother an equal Title to the Lives of the Children, as the Father, seeing they owe their Lives as much to the one as the other: Which power in the Mother, I am sure you will not admit of. But as for what you say concern­ing the power of Fathers, arising from Education, though I confess that is a much better Title than the other: Yet doth it not follow, that, because by reason of my Parents care of me before I was able to help my self, I owe my preservation and well being to them; that therefore they are to be per­petual and absolule Lords over my Person and Life: Since by thus breeding me up, they only perform'd that Duty, and Trust which God had laid upon them, for the good and preservation of Manking, and which they could not without committing a Sin, either refuse or decline, and therefore their Authority or Power over my Person, being only for my well-being, can extend no farther tan whilst I am not of years of discretion to understand the true means of my own good and preservation: And though I grant that I am bound in gratitude to return this Care and Kindness by all Acts of Duty and Piety towards them, as long I live; yet doth it not therefore follow, thar they are Masters of my Life, and of all that I have; since this were to take away more than they themselves ever gave▪ and though I should grant you that even the Power which God himself exerciseth over Mankind is by Right of Fatherhood; yet this Fatherhood is such,T. T. G. c. 5. p. 69. as utterly excludes all pretence of Title in Earthly Parents; for he is our King, because he is indeed maker of us all, which no Natural Parents can pretend to be of their Children: but if you please more closely to consider your own Argument, you will find that he will quite destroy your Hypothesis. For if all Fathers have an absolute power over their Children, by Generations, then Adam could only have power over his own Children which he begat, and none at all over his Grand-Children, since their Fathers by this Argument of Gene­ration ought to have had the same power over their Children, which A­dam had over them, for the same reason: So that this Monarchical Power of Adam as a Father could extend no farther than one Genera­tion

I shall not further urge this Argument of Generation, since I see you are not satisfied with it; but this much I think I can clearly prove from Scripture, that Adam was Lord over the Persons and Lives of his Wife and Children, by vertue of that command which God gave Eve, Gen. 3. v. 16. Unto the Woman he said, I will greatly mutilply thy sorrow and thy Conception; In sorrow thou shalt bring forth Children, and thy desire shall be to thy Husband, and he shall rule over thee. From which words it appears that Adam had not only an absolute Power granted him by God over his Wife, but all the posterity that should be born of her. For in the first place it here [Page 15] appears that Eve was to yield an absolute subjection to her Husband; who was to rule over her as her Lord, from these Words, and thy desire shall be [subject] to thy Husband, (as it is better exprest in the Margin) and he shall rule over thee. And if his Wife was thus to be subject to him,B. P. P. § 21. then likewise by a party of reason all her Children were to be so too: it being a maxime in the Law of Na­ture, as well as in the Civil Law, that Partus sequitur ventrem: so that if Eve was to be absolutely subject to Adam, the Issue by her must be so too, as in the case of a Master of a she Slave, not only the person of the Woman, but all that are begotten of her either by her master or any other man, are likewise his servants, otherwise the Children would be in a better condition than their Mother, for Adam having no Superiour but God, both his Wife and Children must have been a like subject to him. There is likewise another rule in the Civil Law,Ib. § 32. which is a voice of Nature too, quicquid ex me, & uxore mea nascitur, in potestate mea est, and tho this is true in some sense in all Fathers whatsoever; yet it was so in a more superlative degree, where the Father had no Supe­riour over him but God; as Adam had not;Ib. § 20, 21. and farther it seems apparent to me from the very method that God us'd in Creating Mankind that Adam's Wife and Children should be subject to him: for if Adam and Eve had been Created at once, it could not have been known which of these two had the best right to com­mand, and which was to obey. For Adam's strength or wit alone, would not have given him any Authority over her, and it might be that Eve was as strong and as wise as he, or at least she mi [...]ht have thought her self so, and if these two had differ'd and fought, nought but the event could have declared which of them should have been Master.

So when they had Children born between them, the Children could have told as little which of the Parents they should have obey'd, in case they had differ'd in their commands: so that it had been impossible this way that any Government could have been in the World. But when God Created only one Man,Ib. § 22. and out of him one Woman was made, sure he had some great design in this, for no other Creature was thus made at twice but Man.§ 24. 1 Tim. 2.12, 13 Now St. Paul shews a reason for Gods acting thus, when he says, the Woman should not Teach, nor usurp Authority over the Man, &c. And mark the reason; for Adam was Created and then Eve. So that in the Apostles Judgment this was one main cause why Adam should be Superiour to his Wife, and all other Hus­bands to their Wives;§ 25. and in the Corinthians from the Hi­story of the Creation the same Apostle deduces two other Reasons,1 Cor. 11.8, 9. for the Superiority of the Man over the Woman. For (says he) the Man is not of the Woman, but the Woman of the Man; (that is, Eve was formed out of Adam) neither was the Man Created for the Woman, but the Woman for the Man: So that you see here is Adam stated in a degree Superiority over his Wife before the Fall: and immediately after it, God again renewed Adam's Title,§ 26. when he told Eve (as I have but now mention'd) thy desire shall be subject to thy Husband, and he shall rule ever thee; now I so far agree with what you at first lay'd down; that if the fall [Page 16] had not disordered her faculties, and rendered her apt and prone to disobey her Husband, this command need not have been given her, but she would have known her duty from the order and end of the Creation, without this explicite positive Command.

You have Sir, taken a great deal of pains to prove that which I do not at all deny, that as well before as after the Fall, Adam (and consequently all other Husbands and Fathers) ought to be Superiour to their Wives and [...]hil­dren, and likewise Govern and Command them in all things relating to their own good and that of the Family, as long as they continue Members of it: nay, that after Children are separated from their Fathers Family, they still owe their Parents all the gratitude, duty, and respect imaginable; but yet I deny that this power which Adam had over Eve, and his Issue by her, and all other Husbands have over their Wives and Children, is a regal despotical power, or any more than Conjugal in respect of his Wife, and Paternal in respect of the Children, nor is that filial reverence: and obedience which Children yield their Fathers, the same with that respect and duty which a Wife owes her Hus­band, or the same with that servile subjection which slaves owe their Lord and Master; neither is the duty of a Wife of the same kind with that which Sons pay their Fathers, or Slaves their Lords; nor did Sarah when she called Abra­ham Lord (who was then Master of a separate Family, and so subject to none) ever suppose that her Husband had the same Authority over her as he had over Hagar her Bond-woman, to sell her, or turn her out of doors at his pleasure: but to make it more apparent to you, that this power granted to Adam over Eve, was not regal nor despotical, but only conjugal, and for the well ordering of the Family, where some one must command in chief, and the rest obey to avoid confusion, will appear, first, If you consider that this Subjection of Eve to Adam was not enjoyn'd till after the Fall, and is part of Gods Judg­ments denounc'd against Her, for tempting Her Husband to eat the forbid­den Fruit, and certainly included somewhat more than that Superiority which he had over her by his Creation, or else God should not have made it any part of the Judgment denounc'd upon her. If this submission she ow'd to her Husband before the Fall, had been of the same Nature with that Subjection she was to be under after it; which yet I take to be neither servile nor absolute, but only a conjugal Obedience or Submission of her will to his, in all things Relating to the Government of the Family and the carriage of her self; though I do not deny but the Husband may sometimes restrain her by force▪ in case she carries her self unchastly, or indiscreetly, to the loss of her Reputation, and prejudice of his Interest, when she will not be directed, or advis'd by his persua [...]ion, or commands, which before the Fall when she was in a state of Innocency there was no need of; since, (as your self grant) before the Fall she know what was her duty, and per­formed it without any force or [...], &c. And therefore that Text which you have now quoted out of Genesis, thy desire shall be [Subject] to thy Husband, and he shall rule over thee, is not fairly cited, for as for the Marginal addition, viz. [Subject] to thy Husband, it is not warranted from the H [...] ­brew Original or Version of the LXX. The Hebrew having no more than (thy desire shall be to thy Husband) which the LXX renders i. e. the conversion or inclination of the desire; by which some Interpreters understand no more than the carnal Appetite: so likewise from the words [Page 17] (rule over thee) they likewise observe that Moses makes use of the same Hebrew word, when he makes mention of the Sun and Moon ruling the Day and Night, tho they do not do it by any violence, or corporeal force; so likewise by this ruling of the Husband, is not to be understood any absolute, despotick power, whereby he hath a right to dispose of the person and actions of his Wife in all things at his pleasure, but that she may in many cases refuse, nay controul his commands, and resist his actions, in case they prove unlawful or destructive to her self and Children.

But that this Argument of St. Paul of the Husband's Superiority over his Wife, was not granted to Adam alone, but equally extends to all Husbands whatsoever, appears from the very Text it self, or otherwise St Paul had argu­ed very impertinently of the duty of all Wives; and if so, it will follow that every one of Adam's Sons as soon as he took a Wife, had the like Authority over her as Adam had over their Mother; And if over their Wives, then by your Maxims (of partus sequitur ventrein) & quicquid e [...] me & uxore mea nasci­tur, in potestate mea est, all the Sons of Adam must have had the same Power over their Children as their Father had over them: So that the same conse­quence will still follow from theses places of Scripture, and also from you Civil Law Maxims, that either Adam had no Civil, or Despotick Power over his Wife, and Children, or else, if he had, that every one of his Sons when Married, an separated from his Fathers Family had the same, and consequently there were as many Princes as distinct Masters of Families, and then what would become of Adam's Monarchy, I give you leave to Judge.

I must beg your pardon if I am not satisfied with your answer to my last argument: For I am still of opinion notwithstanding what you have said, that Eve was to yield an absolute subjection to her Husband, from that place already cited, That her (viz. Eve's) desire (i. e. will) should be subject to her Hus­band, &c. To which you answer that this subjection of Eve to Adam, was not the same which Sons owe their Fathers, or Slaves to their Lords; And that Eve owed Adam, not a filial, or servile, but a conjugal subjection.

For I would [...]ain know the difference in the State of Nature,B. P. P. § 27, 28. be­tween one and the other: For if you please to compare that place of Genesiis, I but now quoted with that other, where God gives Cain power over Abel his Younger Brother, you will find them the same in words as also in sense. For in this God likewise tells Cain, That unto thee, shall his desire be subject and thou shalt rule over him. Gen. 4.7. And [...]ure God could not intend by these words, that Abel should yield a Conjugal, but a filial subjection to his elder Brother, and these words are not capable of two senses, but must be understood a like in both places (i. e.) That the Desire (which is a Faculty of the Soul, and that the most active too) was to be subject, and the body, and all the Powers of it, were to be over-ruled by him▪ which is as full and absolute a subjection as can be ex­press'd in words; and whereas you say that these words were not spoken till after the Fall, and thence seem to infer, that Eve did not owe Adam so much as a Conjugal Subjection before that; St. Paul hath given you an answer to that already, which it is needless to repeat, and therefore upon the whole matter I think your distinction of a Conjugal Subjection different from a Filial or Servile one, will signifie nothing,

I doubt not, Sir, but I shall be able to make good this distinction of a Servile and a Filial Obedience, and in order to it, shall reply to the consequence you have made, for Eve's absolute subjection to Adam from the like Expression used by God to Cain, concerning his ruling over his Brother Abel, as is us'd here to Eve concerning her Subjection to her Husband; and that because the Subjection of Abel was absolute, that therefore her Subjection must be so too. I must crave your pardon if I deny your Assumption; for I think I am able to prove, that neither Abel, nor any other younger Brother, was, or is obliged, by vertue of this Text to yield an absolute Obedience to his Elder Brother, in the state of Nature or that he is therefore his Lord and Master. Nor can I see any absurdity, but that the same words might be spoken to several Persons, yet in different senses, which according to the Nature of the Persons to whom they were spoken might have different Effects. As here these words when spoken to Eve enjoyn a Conjugal Submission of Eve's Will to Adam as her Husband, but when spoken to Abel they may signifie a Fraternal Submission of Abel's Will to Cain's as the Elder, and perhaps the wiser of the two, but without giving any absolute or despotick power over either.

I cannot be yet satisfied with your Reply; for methinks this is but to play the Fool, and trifle with God's Word, when he told Cain thy Brother's desire shall be Subject to thee, that is, (say you,) Thou shalt rule over him only as far as he thinks sir, or if thou hast the knack to wheedle or perswade him: Was not this a mighty matter for God Almighty to appear to Cain about? An Ex­cellent and Rational way to appease his Wrath towards his Brother? Whereas God here plainly enjoyneth a subjection from Abel to his Elder Brother, and if so, by Vertue of the same words, a like Subjection of Eve to Adam, and then it will likewise follow, that as the streams are of the same Nature with the Fountain, the Subjection of all her Posterity will likewise be included in hers, which I have sufficiently proved already, had you not mistaken the true sense of those two Maxim [...] I laid down. For first, if Partus sequitur vontrem▪ and the Mother be a Subject, as Eve was, all her Posterity must be so to all Genera­tions. And if Quicquid ex me & uxore mea nascitur in potestate mea est be true, then Adam's Grand-Children, and Great-Grand-Children, deriving them­selves from him and Eve, must be likewise under Adam's power. Nor ca [...] I see how his Sons, or Grand-Children, by setting up separate Families, could ever discharge themselves from this absolute Subjection to Adam, since they could never have quitted his Family without his consent; and when they did quit it, unless he pleased to manumit them, they, their Wives and Children, were still as much Subject as they were before. Since I do not see if they were once Sub­jects to him, how any thing but his express will, and consent could ever discharge them from it. Nor was that Authority (which every one of these Sons of Adam might Exercise over their Wives and Children, though they were not freed from the power of their Father) any more inconsistent with that Subjection and Obedience they owed him, as their Prince, than in an absolute Monar­chy, the power of Fathers, and Husbands, over their Wives and Children, as to the things relating to the well-ordering and governing their Families, is inconsistent with that supreme predominant power which the Monarch hath over the Father himself, and all his Family, or than the power of a Master of a Family, in the Isle of Barbadoes, over his Slaves that are Married, and [Page 19] have Children, is inconsistent with that Marital and Paternal power which such a Slave may exercise over his Wife and Children within his own Family, though still subordinate to the will of the Master, who may forbid any such Slaves, or their Children to Marry, but where he hath a mind they should and may like­wise hinder them, from correcting or putting to Death their Wives and Children without his consent. Though such Subjects in an absolute Monarchy, or Slaves in a Plantation cannot have or enjoy any Property in Lande or Goods but at the Monarchs, or Masters will▪ And so likewise at first none of these Sons of Adam, though they set up distinct Families from their Fathers, could enjoy or inclose any part of the Earth without his Grant or Assignment to whom the whole was given by God before.

It seems likewise to be a great mistake, when you at first affirmed that all Civil Government was Ordained by God, for the benefit and advantage of the Subjects, rather than the Governours. Whereas from the first and most Natural Government it appears that Children who were the Subjects were Or­dained as much for the benefit and help of their Parents, who were the first Monarchs, as their Parents for them. From all which we may draw these Conclusions:F. A. M. M. p. 244. First, that from Gen. 3. v. 6. already Cited, we have the Original Charter of Government, and the Fountain of all Civil Power derived from Adam as the Father of all Mankind. So that not only the Constitution of power in general, but the special limitation of it to one kind, (viz.) Monarchy, and the determination of it, to the individual person of Adam, are all Ordinances of God. Neither had Eve or her Children any Right to limit Adam' [...] Power, or joyn themselves with him in the Government. Now if this Supreme Power was setled, and sounded by God himself in Fatherhood, how is it possible for the people to have any Right to alter, or dispose of it otherwise; it being God's Ordinance that this Supremacy▪ should be unlimited in Adam, and as large as any Acts of his Will. So that he was not only a Father, but a King and absolute Lord over his Family; a Son, a Subject, and a Servant, or Slave, being one and the same thing at first, the Father having power to dispose of or sell his Children or Servants at his pleasure;F. P. O. A. and though perhaps he might deal too severely or cruelly in so doing, yet there was none above him, except God, in the state of Nature, who could call him to an account, much less resist or punish him for so doing▪

You have, Sir, made a very long Speech upon the Monarchical power of Adam, which you have made of so large an Extent, that this imaginary Kingship will swallow up all the other more dear and tender Relations both of a Husband, and of a Father▪ So that were I not satisfied you were a very good natured Man, and spoke more the sense of others than from your own Natural Inclinations, I should be apt to believe that if you had suffi­cient Power you would prove as great a Tyrant over your Wife, Children, and all that should be under your Command; as such Arbitrary Tenets would give you leave; but since I hope your Errour lyes rather in your Understanding, than in your Nature [...] I shall make bold to shew you the mistakes you have committed in those Principles you here lay down. I might first begin with the place of Scripture you farther insist upon; for Eve's absolute Subjection to Adam from the like Expression used by God to [Page 20] Cain concerning his ruling over his Brother Abel, as is us'd here to Eve, and tho' you are pleased to think my exposition of this place so ridiculous; yet I doubt not but I be able to prove, when I come to speak of this pretended Divine Author of Elder Brothers over this younger, that this place cannot be under­stood in any such sense, according to the best Interpretation that both the reason of the Subject, and the sense the best Commentators put upon it can allow▪ but I shall defer this till we come to discourse concerning the successors of Adam in this Monarchical Power you suppose. And therefore I shall only at present pursue that absolute Power, which you suppose Adam to have had, not only over Eve, but all her descendants. So that your Argument of Eve's, and consequently all her Childrens, absolute Subjection to Adam, depends upon a very false supposition. For if the Subjection of Eve to Adam, and of all Wives to their Husbands is not servile or absolute, neither can that of the Chil­dren be so, since according to your own simile, if the streams are of the same nature of the Fountain, they can never rise higher than it, and tho' I grant, Adam might in some cases have put his Wife or Children to death, for any enormous crime against the Law of Nature, yet I allow him that power, not as a Husband or Father, but only as a Lord or Master of a separate Family, who having no Superiour in the state of Nature, I grant it is endued by God with this Prerogative, for the good of his Family, and preservation of Mankind, lest such horrid crimes, so much to its prejudice should pass unpunisht. But that the Husband or Father doth not act thus in either of these two capacities, I can easily prove.

First, Because the Scripture tells us the Husband and Wife are one Flesh,Gen. 2.24. Ephes. 5.29, 30. and that no man ever yet hated his own Flesh▪ so that it is impossible for a Husband to put his Wife to death, till by the greatness of her Crimes, she be­comes no longer worthy of that tender affection he ought to bear her. Then as to the Father, he, as a Father, ought not to desire to put his Son to death, whose being he hath been the cause of, and who is principally made out of his own substance, and on whom he hath bestowed nourishment and education for so many Years, until he finds that instead of a Son he proves an Enemy to his Family, or hath so laid wait against his Life, that as long as he lives he cannot be safe; or else commits some of those heinous crimes which by the Laws of God and Nature do justly deserve no less punishment than Death, in short when he ceases any longer to deserve the name of a Son.

Yet this Authority holds no longer than whilst the Son remains part of his Fathers Family, and so Subject to his Power, and this I take to be the reason why we do not read, that Adam took any notice of Cains's murdering his Bro­ther, because he was before freed from his Power, by setting up another Family, which certainly had been Adam's duty to have done, had he been then under his jurisdiction, Murder being as great a crime before the Flood as a [...]ter,Gen. 9.5. tho' the punishment of in by Death were not posi­tively enjoin'd by God till then: But I shall prove this point more particularly by and by, as also, that Adam's Children might enjoy, or enclose some part of the Earth without any grant or assent from Adam, to whom you suppose (tho' without any proof as yet) that the whole Earth was given by God.

[Page 21]To conclude, I doubt you mistook me when you say, I at first affirmed that all Civil Government was ordained by God, for the benefit or advantage of the the Subjects, rather than that of the Governours, and therefore you undertake to shew me, that in the first and most natural Government, viz. that of a Fa­mily, Children who are subjects in the state of Nature, are ordained as much for the benefit, and help of their Parents, who are their Princes or Masters, as their Parents for them; in which assertion you fall in to more than on mistake, for I do not assert that in Civil Government the benefit or advantage of the Sub­ject, is only to be considered; For I shall easily grant that Princes may very well challenge a very great share in the honour and other advantages that may be reapt by their Government; and yet for all that when the happiness and pre­servation of the Subjects, is incompatible with that of the Prince, the former is to be preferred, and Bishop Sanderson is of this opinion; when he tells us in his Lecture De oblg. consc. Prael. 5. §. 19. De Iuramento; That the end of Civil Government, and the obedience that is due to it, is the safety and tranquillity of humane society, and therefore the end is certainly to be preferred before the means, when they cannot both consist together; but this is no argument for the preferring the benefit or advantages of Parents, before that of their Children, since Paternal Government is not Civil Government; nor are Fathers absolute Princes or Masters over their Children, as you suppose, and yet I think I may safely affirm, that even in this Paternal Government, tho' it be granted that Children are ordained for the benefit, or help of their Parents, yet when their happiness and preservation is inconsistent with that of their Children, it may be a great doubt which is to be prefer'd, since Gods chief intention in Parents, was for the Preservation and Propagation of Mankind; and therefore I cannot see how it could ever be any part of the Pa­ternal Power, for a Father to make his Child a Slave, or to sell him to others at his pleasure as you suppose: This being no part or end of the design or duty of a Father.

And whereas you lay to my charge my mistaking the true sense of those Civil Law Maxims you have quoted; I think I can easily prove that the mi [...]ake lyes on your side, and that you have misapplied them, to make them serve your purpose: For as to your first Maxim, Partus sequitur Ventrem, from which you infer, that the Child ought to be of the same condition with the Mother, this rule in your Civil Law relates only to Bastards, and not Legitimate Children, who follow the condition of the Father according to your Digest:Dig. 1. Tit. 6. L. 16. Qui ex uxore mea nascitur filius mariti est habendus, so likewise in your Code, Cod. Tit. 19. L. 14. Cum legitimae nuptiae factae sunt, patrem liberi sequun­tur, vulgo quaesitus matrem sequitur. Nor is your second Maxim more true;Dig. Tit. 5. L. 19: for tho' I grant according to your Ro­man Law, the Father might have absolute power over his Wife and Children: yet I cannot see how this word and nascitur, can be extended beyond those that are born of a man and his Wife, and therefore can never con­cern Grand-children, much less any more remote Descendants, and this very Law, that a Son or Daughter might be killed by a Father, seem'd so cruel and odious, even to the Antient Romans themselves, that neither the Law of the Twelve Tables, nor the Iulian Law of Adulteries, which were pro­vided against Fathers, Sons, and Daughters, ever extended it to the Grand-Father, [Page 22] Grand-son, or Grand-daughter by Interpretation; or argument à cas [...] consimili. Nor do these words, in Potestate mea est, prove more than that all Children are born under the Power of their Parents, tho' whether they shall always continue so as long as they live; is not to be proved from this Maxim; nor if it were, doth that make it a Law of Nature. For I must needs observe this, of divers of you Civilians, that what ever Maxim you find in your Civil Law Books, that will make for your Notions, you presently adopt them for Laws of Nature, without ever enquiring by the strict Rules of Reason, and the Good of Mankind, (by which alone any Law of Nature is to be tryed) whether they are so or no.

I shall not trouble my self to confute those false Conclusions you have brought from those weak Promises; for if I have destroyed your Foundation, I think your Superstructure cannot stand; and therefore you must pardon me, if I cannot find this Original Charter of Government, and of all Civil Power, to be derived from Adam by any Argument that yet you have brought either from Scripture, or Reason; only give me leave to observe thus much, upon what you have said, That if not only the Constitution of Civil Power in general, but the special Limitation of it to one kind, (viz.) Monarchy, be the Ordi­nance of God, I cannot see how any other Government but that can be lawfully set up, or obeyed by Men, since no Government can challenge this Priviledge against Divine Institution.

Since this Hypothesis doth not please you, I shall be glad if you can shew me any better Original, either of Adam's Paternal Power,B. P. P. § 36. or of Civil Government, than this, that God gave Adam over Eve, who indeed was as at the first Subject, so the Representative of all that followed, and it reaches not only to all her Daugh­ters in relation to their Husbands, but to all of them in relation to their Fathers, and to her Sons too, in relation to both their Father, and their Eldest Brother after his Decease, if no body Superior to both of them, and him interposed, and diverted, or rather over-ruled it.

For (1.) If a Priority of Being gave Adam a power over his Wife, it gave him much more so over his Children.

(2.) If God's taking Eve out of Adam, the forming her of one of his Ribs without his concurrence, did yet make her his Inferiour, his Children were much more so, which were derived from him, and by his Act.

(3.) If she were formed for him, not he for her; and that was another rea­son; this extended to his Children too, who were begotten for the comfort and assistance of both him, and her.

(4.) When God put Eve under the Subjection of her Husband after the Fall, her Children must needs be so too, if they were not excepted, but we Read of no exception.

(5.) Is it not an Eternal Law of Nature, that all Children should be subject to their Parents? And did not this Law spread it self over the Face of all the Earth, as Mankind encreased?

And whereas you would limit this Power of Parents over their Children,Ibid. both in its Extent and Duration, this is purely owing to the Civil Laws of Nations, and not to the Laws of Nature, and is different in different places; some having restrained the Powe [...] of Pa­rents more▪ and some less. But God gave the Parents a Power of Life and Death over their own Children, amongst his own People the Jews, and that not [Page 23] limited in Duration neither, for the Fathers Power over his Son was not deter­mined but by his Death, though they could not execute that Power, but in the presence of a Magistrate. And I am also sure that in all the Histories and Re­lations I have met with, amongst civiliz'd Nations (where it is not otherwise order'd by the Civil Laws of the Country) all Husbands, and Fathers have Power of Life and Death over their Wives, and Children, and so it is at this day amongst many Eastern Nations, and was antiently amongst the Romans, Gauls, and Persians, &c. Which power I take not to have been given, or conferred on them, but rather left to them by the Civil Laws of their Country in the same state, as it was establisht by the Law of Nature, or rather Nations. Now if such Husbands and Fathers antiently had, and still have a power of Life and Death in divers Countries over their Wives and Children, I desire to know what higher power they could enjoy, since he that hath power over a Man's Life, which is of the highest concern to him, may certainly command him in all things else?

But as for your last Scruple that you cannot see, if Monarchy be of Divine Institution, how any Government but that can be lawfully set up or obeyed by Men, I think it may be a satisfactory Answer, if I tell you, that if those who are Born under a Monarchy can justifie the Form they live under to be God's Ordinance,F. A. MM. p. 266. they are not bound to forbear their own Justification, because others cannot do the like for the Forms they live under; let others look to the defence of their own Govern­ment: If it cannot be proved, or shewed that any other Form of Government had ever any Lawful beginning, but was brought in, or erected by Rebellion, must therefore the Lawful and Just Obedience to Monarchy be denied to be the Ordinance of God?

I hope before I have done, to give you a clearer Original from the Law of Nature, as well of Paternal Authority, as Civil Government, without re­curring to Divine Revelation which (as I said before) would oblige none but Jews, and Christians, or Mahometans, whose Law is a mixture of both the other. In the mean time give me leave to tell you, that Eve's being the Representative of all Wives, did not put either her self or her Daughters into any absolute Subjection either to Adam, or their Husbands; if it did, then could not this Subjection be likewise owing either to Adam as the Patriarch, or Grandfather of the Family, or to his Eldest Son after his Decease, since this would make every Wife in the state of Nature to have had two absolute Lords, her Husband, and her Husband's Father, which is contrary to our Saviour's Rule, That no man can serve two Masters, that is, in the same kind of Service: And therefore it plainly makes out my distinction, that there is a great deal of difference between a Conjugal Submission of a Wife to her Husband, and a Servile Subjection of a Servant to his Lord, as also of that Obedience, or Duty, which a Subject oweth his Soveraign, since by your own Hypothesis it necessarily follows that either Cain's Wife (for Example) was not to be subject to her Husband, or else must be free from all Subjection to her Father Adam: But as for any Submission to Cain, as Elder Brother after Adam's Decease, I desire to be excused medling with it till we have dispatcht the Question in hand.

I come now to those fresh Considerations you bring for this Monarchical power of Adam; for indeed I cannot call them new Arguments, because most of them have been answered already. The first Consideration is from [Page 24] the Priority of the Being which you suppose gave Adam a Power over his Wife, and consequently over his Children; but I think his Priority of Being could give him no such Power at all over her, and consequently not over them, for I desire to know whether if God had been pleased to have Created, the same day that Eve was made, twenty single Men, and their Wives, that therefore Adam must have been from his being first Created, Monarch over them all, unless God had particularly commanded it?

I grant indeed that from God's Creating Eve out of Adam, it did render her inferiour to him, and also from God's express command, that she was to be subject to him in all Conjugal Duties, yet did neither of these render her, or her Children absolute of perpetual Subjects, and Slaves to Adam. And that their being deriv'd from him, or by his Act doth not at all alter the Case, I have al­ready proved.

As for the third, that if she wene formed for him, and not he for her, that this must be another reason which must extend to his Children too: Here the As­sumption is not only false, but the Consequence too: For she was not only formed for him, but that they might be a mutual help to each other, and there­fore the Scripture tell us, A Man shall leave his Father and his Mother, Gen. 2.24. and shall cleave unto hit Wife, and they two shall be one Flesh; which words (in my Opinion) are very far from proving any such absolute Subjection; for no Man can ever tyrannize over his own Flesh; and if such an absolute Subjection had been intended, from Eve to Adam, it had been more consonant to reason, for the Scripture to have enjoyn'd her to have left her Father, and Mother, to cleave to her Husband. Whereas indeed there was no more meant by this Text, than that when a Man marries, he may freely quit his Fathers Family, and joyning himself to his Wife, may set up another of his own. But as for the Children that were begotten between them, tho' I grant they might be intended both for the comfort, and assistance of him, and her, yet I have already proved that the Parents are more chiefly intended for their Childrens Propagation, and Preservation, than the Children are for their Interest and Happyness.

Your fouth consideration is only a supposition of the question which is yet to be p [...]oved, that Eve was under an absolute subjection to Adam after the Fall, I have already proved this supposition not to be true, and therefore the conse­quence, as to the Children is false likewise.

Your fifth, is rather an interrogation than an Argument, whether Children ought not to be, and have not always, been subject to their Parents all over the World? In answer to which I grant that it is true, that they have ever been so, tho' not in your sense. For I hold this subjection neither to be servile, or absolute, nor yet perpetual, as long as they live: but in reply to this limitation of the Power of Parents over their Children both in its extent and duration, you tell me this is purely owing to the Civil Laws of Nations, and not to the Laws of Nature, and for a proof of this you produce Gods own people the Jews, for an example that the power of the Father over his Son, was not determined but by his Death. But your self confesses that he could not exercise this Power of Life and Death, but in the presence of the Magistrate; the circumstances of which if they be considered, will rather make against you; for first the Father could not have this rebellio [...]s▪ Son put to Death, till he had accus'd him before the Elders of the City, that, is the Judges who were establisht in every Precinct, who [Page 25] upon a solemn hearing, were to sentence such a rebellious Son to be stoned to Death by all the People of the City: where you may observe that the Father had no power to put him to Death himself, and therefore acted in this case as an accuser or a witness, not as a Judge. But if you'l believe Maimonides, one of the most Learned of the Jewish Rabbins, he will tell you that by the Municipal Law of the Jews,Tract. Memarim. this power of the Father did scarce extend beyond the thirteenth year of the Son's Age, after which the Son was reckoned Adult, and Emancipated from his Fathers Powers, and could not after that incur this punishment of a Stubborn and Rebel­lious Son; and a Father who did but strike his Son after he was Adult, incurr'd Excommunication, for that he offended against the Law. And tho' I grant that the Nations you mention did exercise a Power of Life and Death over their Wives, and Children, yet will not the Practice of some particular Nations, tho' never so much civiliz'd, amount to a proof of a Law of Nature, which is only to be made out from evident Rules of Right Reason, and the great end of this Law, the common good of Mankind; and especially when against the Examples of those Nations which you produce, I can likewise set those of many more Nations, where this Custum was not allowed, after once Civil Government was establisht. And as for the Romans themselves, amongst whom the greatest Examples of this kind are to be found, they will not all of them amount to above three, or four, in six or seven hundred years, and then, tho' there might be very good cause for it, yet the People of Rome never so much esteemed or loved such Fathers after they had put their Sons to Death, as they did before, but counted them too severe and cruel for so doing.De Clem. And you read in Valerius Maximus, and Seneca, that they killed Erixiin a Roman Gentleman, for whipping his Son to Death like a Slave; so much did they abhor all such Cruelty of Parents towards their Children; and afterwards, when by the General Corruption of Manners amongst the Romans, Fathers grew more cruel to their Children, and often put them to Death without cause. Those of your Faculty, suppose that some of the Roman Emperous (tho' it is uncertain who) took away this Power from Fathers, and made it (as it is now among us) Murder, for a Father to put his Son to Death, tho' others, since there are no particular Edicts to be found concerning this matter, do suppose this Law to be changed by degrees, and to be left off by common consent of the Romans themselves for it seems dangerous to grant to a private person the cognizance of any crime, which might belong to publick Authority; and they thought it better to strengthen both the Paternal and Marital Power by other Laws than putting to Death. And therefore Simplecius upon Epictetus his Enchiridion, says, that the Romans allowed Fathers this Power, because they thought they might very well trust their Natural Affection to their Children, for the exercise of that Power of selling them or putting them to Death, which 'twas supposed they would rarely use, unless compelled by extream necessity or unpardonable crimes; and therefore if a Father would put his Son to death, he was to do it with his own hands, that he might suffer as well as his Son, but when this render affection [...]oo failed, it was no wonder that the Roman Empe­rors did not think it for the common good of their People, to trust Fathers with this Power any longer, which they had hitherto exercised, not so properly by right of Fatherhood, as that of the Master of a Family, who governed his Servants and his Sons by a like Authority.

[Page 26]To conclude, I cannot but observe, how slyly▪ you wave my objection a­gainst the Divine Institution of Monarchy, for tho' you seem loth expresly to condemn all other Governments as unlawful, yet the consequence will be the same upon your principles: For if it be a good argument which some make use of, for the Government of the Church by Bishops, be­cause that Government being supposed by them to have been instituted by the Apostles by Divine Precept, therefore that no other Government but Episcopacy can be lawful, or any true Church, where that Government is not in use: so the same argument will likewise hold in Civil Govern­ments, that all others must be unlawful if Monarchy alone were ordained by God, and that all other forms whatsoever began from Rebellion or the Fancies of Men.

To answer what you have said, in the first place I cannot so slightly pass over this argument of the Law of Nations, by which I supposed the Power of Fathers over the Persons of their Children is sufficiently esta­blished, and from whence also it appears that among the Iews as well as Romans, the Children were lookt upon as part of the substance of their Father, and consequently that they had a perpetual right in their Persons, as long as they lived, that the Romans had the power of selling their Chil­dren three times, your self do not deny; that the Iews also had it in use among them appears, first by the story of the poor Woman, the Widdow of one of the Sons of the Prophets, who complained to Elisha, in the second of Kings, Chap. 4.1. telling him that her Husband is dead, and the Creditor is come to take her two Sons to be Bond-men. And so likewise in the New Testament, our Saviour in St. Matthew, supposes it as a thing commonly practised in those parts of the World where he lived. For in the Parable of the King, who would take account of his Servants,Matth. 18.24, 25. amongst whom one owed him Ten thousand Talents: But for as much as he had nothing to pay, his Lord commanded him to be sold, and his Wife, and Children, and all that he had, and payment to be made. Which was founded upon that Law amongst the Jews, that Fathers might sell their Children for Bond-servants,Verse 5. until the year of Iubilee ▪ as appears by Nehemiah, Chap. 5. where he relates the Com­plaint of those poor Jews, who had been forced for want to bring their Sons and their Daughters into Bondage: Neither was it in their power to redeem them, for other Men had their Lands, and their Vineyards.

And amongst the Romans, this Power of selling their Children continued till it was forbidden by the Emperour Iustinian. And as for the Grecians, Plu­tarch in his Life of Solon relates, that till his time it was lawful amongst the Athenians, for Fathers to sell their Children to pay their own Debts: And I suppose it was upon this account, that Cymon the Son of the great General Miltiades, was kept in Prison by the Athenians, till he had paid the Fine of ten Thousand Talents, which his Father died indebted to the Common-wealth. And Philostratus in his Life of Apollonius Thyanaus relates, that it was com­mon amongst the Phrygians to sell their own Sons: And to come to more Modern Times, a Son amongst the Muscovites ▪ may by sold four times, but after the fourth Sale the Eather hath no longer a Right in him, as the Baron [Page 27] of Heber [...]lein tells us in his Relation of Muscovy; and it is not only in use amongst them, but also amongst the Tartars, East-Indians, Chineses, and the People of Japan, not only to sell their Children themselves, but also, that they are liable to be sold by the Prince, or his Officers, for their Fathers Debts, or Offences: So that you see here is the Consent of most of the Civiliz'd Nations in the World, who sure, in this, follow the Dictates of Nature, and Reason, in the exercise of a full, and absolute Propriety, and Dominion in, and over the Persons of their Children; so that if it be a received Custom, or Law amongst most Nations, it is also from Reason too, since the Law of Nations is only that which receives its obligation from the Consent of many Nations, as Grotius well observes: And Aristotle lays it down as one of the strongest proofs, when all men agree in any thing: And Cicero tells us, That the Consent of most Nations is to be looked upon as a Law of Nature; and therefore these Customs are to be esteemed as obligatory amongst all Ci­viliz'd Nations, where the Municipal Laws of those Countreys have not re­strained or altered this Natural Power, and Interest, which Fathers had origi­nally over the Persons of their Children.

But as for what you say, that according to my Principles no other Go­vernment can be Lawful besides Monarchy, I shall give you the same Answer, that some of the most Moderate of our Divines have given to those, who would make the like Objection against us of the Church of England, tha [...] believe Episcopacy to be Iure Divin [...]; viz. That God may for the ne­cessity of some Ecclesiastical Order and Government in a Church, allow that Form of Government to be Lawful, which himself never Instituted; Nay, which perhaps was unlawful to have been set up in the Church at all; and so likewise in Civil Governments, I will not deny, that those Forms may be lawfully obeyed as the Ordinance of God which he never Institu [...]ed, but have wholly proceeded from the Rebellions, or Inventions of Men.

I must confess, Sir, I cannot see how any Law of Nations can be supposed to lay any Obligation upon Mankind different from the Law of Nature, and Reason, or the revealed Law of God in Scripture. And, tho' I confess there is some division amongst Learned Men about this matter; yet I think it is far more rational to suppose▪ that there are but two Law that can be Rules of Humane Actions, the Natural Law, and the Divine. And of this Opinion is the Learned Grotius himself in the place you but now cited, where he says, he added the words, many Nations, because there can scarce be found any Natural Law, which is also wont to be called the Law of Nations, that is common to all Nations: Yea, that is often lookt upon as a Law of Nations in one Country, which is not so any where else; as (says he) we shall shew in its due place, concerning Captivity, and Postluminium.

And for a farther confirmation of this, I will make bold to read to you in English some part of what th [...] Excellent Pu [...]endof hath writ­ten upon this Subject in his Learned Work De Jure Na­turae & Gentium, S. 23. Lib. 2. Cap. 3. which you may here read with me.

[Page 28] The Law of Nature and the Law of Nations is accounted by many one and the same, which only differ by an extrinsick denomination. And form hence, Hobbs, De Cive, C. 14. § 4. Divides the Law of Nature into the Natural Law of Men, and the Natural Law of Common Wealths, which is commonly called Jus Gentium: And then adds that the Precepts of both are the same; but because Common-Wealths, when once instituted do put on the personal pro­perties of Men, that Law which speaking of the duty of particular men, we call Natural, being applied to all Common-Wealths or Nations, is called Jus Gentium▪ to which opinion we do likewise subscribe; neither do we think there can be any other voluntary or positive Law of Nations, which can have the power of a Law properly so called, and which may oblige all Nations as pro­ceeding from a Superiour. But most of those things which amongst the Roman Civil Lawyers, and others are referred to the Law of Nations, as suppose about the manner, of acquiring of Contracts, and the like, do either belong to the Law of Nature, or else to the Civil Laws of particular Nations, which agree together, for the most part, in these things: yet from which n [...] new, or distinct sort of Law is Rightly constituted, because those Laws are common to Nations not from any Agreement or Mutual Obligation, but in that they do by accident agree from the peculiar Will of the Law-givers in each particular Common-Wealth; from whence the same things may be changed by one People or Nation, without consulting the rest, and often times are found to be so changed.

And of this he here gives us several Examples of different customs amongst Nations in making War upon each other, according to diverse forms, or tacit Agreements, whereby War may be managed with a little Cruelty as may be: but thus he proceeds;

These Customs altho' they may seem to contain some Obligation, as arising from this sort of Tacit agreement amongst Nations, yet if any Prince shall wage a lawful War, or neglect them, or should do quite contrary to them, he would not be guilty of any sin against the Law of Nature; but only of a piece of Roughness or Incivility, that he did not make War according to those Rules of Honour which are used among them, by whom War is looked upon as a liberal Art. [And a little farther proceeds thus.]

Amongst the principal Heads of the voluntary Law of Nations, Grotius reckons the right of Ambassadors, where we also suppose that by the very Law of Nature, Ambassadors are inviolable even with the Enemy, as long as they appear Ambassadors, and not Spyes, and do not contrive Plots against those to whom, they are sent, and having shown the necessity of Ambassadors in order to Peace, he thus goes on; but there are other priviledges Attributed to Am­bassadors, especially to those, who reside in a place rather to fish out the Se­crets of another State, than for Peace sake, those priviledges depend from the meer indulgence of that Prince to whom they are sent, and so if it seems good to him may be denied them, without the violation of any Right, if he will likewise suffer that his own Ambassadors should be Treated in a like man­ner.

I see whether this Author tends, but do not understand what use you [...]an make of it to your purpose.

But I will quickly shew you if you please to have a little Patience, and therefore to apply what I have now read, to the matter in hand, in the first place, it is apparent from this Author, that the Law, or Custom of Nations, hath no Obligation as such, but only as it agreeth with the Law of Nature, and the Law of God, and what Laws of Nations, are founded on the Law of Nature, can only be tryed by some rule, which certainly is not to be learned from the Knowledge of the Customs or Laws of all Nations, since who is able to know them all? And therefore these Laws must be tryed either by the natural light of a Mans own Conscience, or else by considering whether this or that practice of a Nation conduces to the Honour or Service of God, or the com­mon good and happiness of Mankind, and so may be known as well by the unlearned as the learned. Now I suppose you will not affirm, that this Law of the absolute Property and Dominion of Fathers in and over their Children, can be discovered by either of these ways, or that a Mans Conscience will tell him, that it is his duty to let his Father Kill him or Sell him, or use him like a Brute, without any contradiction or resistance. And as for the other, I think I have sufficiently proved that this absolute power which you assert of Fathers over their Children, doth not proceed from that great Law of Nature, viz. the common good and preservation of Mankind, to which the practice of it may prove very destructive, which if proved, I think, I may easily answer all that you have now said about the particular Customs, or Laws of diverse Nations concerning this Matter, tho' your Instances were many more than they are.

For in the first place as for those you alledge out of the Scripture, they do (as I said before) only regard th [...] Municipal Laws of the Iews; those of the Romans touching this matter, did only concern those Common-wealths whilst they were in being and no other Nations whatsoever, and for this opinion, I have both Grotius and Pufendrof of my side, for the former in the beginning of the Chapter last quoted, after having set down the different Powers which Fathers may exercise over their Children, according to their different Ages: thus affirms; as you may here see. ‘Whatsoever is beyond these Powers, proceeds, only from a voluntary Law, which is different in diverse places so by the Law which God gave the Iews, the Power of the Father over his Son or Daughter, to dissolve their Vows was not perpetual, but only endured as long as the Children were parts of their Fathers Family.’

And by the same Rule I may add, that Children were not reckoned as part of their Fathers Goods, and to be sold by him, or seized upon by Credi­tors for his Debts any longer, than they continued Members of their Fathers Family, and consequently were not seized upon as his Sons, but Servants. And I desire you to shew me an Example, where ever among the Iews, the Children after they were Adult, and parted from their Fathers House, were sold or seized as Slaves for their Fathers Debts. And as for the Romans, it is plain, they acknowledged their Patria Potestas to be in use amongst them, nei­ther by the Law of Nature, or Nations, but only from their own Civil Law, as appears by this Title, almost at the very beginning of Iustini­nian's [Page 30] Institutions, (as I suppose you know better than I) Patria Potestas est Juris Civilis, Iust. L. 1. § 2. T 9. & Civium Romano­rum propria. The Text follows in these words (as I re­member) Jus Potestatis quod in liberos habemus proprium est Civium Roma­norum, nulli enim alii sunt homines qui talem in liberos habeant Potesta­t [...], qualem nos habemus; And therefore they would not permit strangers to exercise it over their Children within the City of Rome. And if the Power of the Father among the Jews and Romans was not by the Law of Nature, or Nations, no more could it be so, tho' exercised amongst never so many other Nations, since if it were one of the Laws or Preceps of Nature, it could never have been taken away, or restrained by any Civil Law without the express Consents of all Fathers. And as for your Instance of Cymon a­mongst the Athenians; it makes nothing to this purpose; since if I take it at the worst, it maketh no more, than that the Athenian Common-wealth dealt very ungratefully, and Tyrannically with Miltiades and his Son; and it might be that they kept him Prisoner as being Heir to his Fathers Principality in the Thracian Chersonnese, out of which they supposed he might pay the Debt; as the King with us doth often put an Heir in Prison for his Fathers Debts, where he hath Assets by Descent.

But for all your other Examples, unless they have a reason in Nature to support them, they will no more prove that by the Law of Nations Fa­thers should have a Right of Life and Death, or of selling their Children, than if you should argue from the Common Custom amongst the Lacedemo­nians, the Aborigines in Italy, the Inhabitants of the Kingdom of Sophiris, as amongst the Indians mentioned by Qu Curtius, and the Chineses, and the Inhabitants of Formosa at this day; all which either did, or now do destroy their Children as soon as they are brought forth, or else in the Womb afore they are born, if they please so to do. And as for some of these Nations you have instanced in, and particularly the Muscovites, who can [...]ell their Children, but four times, it is apparent it is only a Municipal Law; for if the Property of the Father over the Sons Persons were by them looked upon as perpetual, he might not only sell him four times, but forty, if it were possible.

But on the other side, I have against this Custom of your N [...]tions, the Examples of divers altogether as Wise, and Civiliz'd, who did not permit Fathers to exercise this absolute Power over their Children, and therefore against your Example of the Jews, I set that of the Egyptians, who did not Permit Parents to put their Children to Death, nor yet to sell them, unless in case of great necessity, and when they could not otherwise maintain them, and then I grant it may be necessary, So likewise against your Roman Law, I set that of all the Greek Nations, none of whom per­mitted Fathers to put their Children to Death,Plutarch in Lycurgo. except the Spartans, and that was only in one case, and that was only in one case, and that with the judgment and consent of the eldest Men of the Family, yet when their new born Infants were so weak or ill shaped as to be thougt not worth the rearing. So likewise against▪ your examples of the Antient Gauls, I set that of the Germans, a Nation altogether as wise and civilized as the other, to whom I could likewise add the Antient [Page 31] Britains, Spaniards, and divers others, and to the more Modern examples of the Eastern Nations, where this custom is permitted of selling or killing their Children; I shall oppose the Turks and Persians, amongst whom it is forbid­den, as also amongst all the Nations of Europe, who believe Christianity; and if we go over to America, we shall find that they are there so indulgent to their Children, that no fault whatsoever, tho' never so great, shall make them put them to Death. And to let you see that this is most suitable to Reason, the two greatest Philosophers amongst the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle, have condemned it; The former in his Laws, where he expresly forbids it, supposing that in no case whatever, a Father ought to put off all Piety and Humanity towards his Son, and that a Son should be rather led by Nature, than driven by force to obey his Father; especially since his Power is suffi­ciently established by the Law, and the appointing of publick Judges; and Aristotle in his Morals to Nicomachus, Lib. 8. cap. 12. accuses the Jus Pa­trium in use among the Persians as Tyrannical, and Grotius tells you; he makes use of these examples of the Romans and Persians, only that we might distinguish Civil Rights from natural. VI. P. Aerodius Rerum Judica­tarum L▪ VI. cap. 17. De emen­datione Liberorum. From whence it appears that the putting of Children to death by Pa­rents, was lookt upon as an odius thing amongst the wisest of the Antients; and therefore neither the Lex Regia, nor the Law of the XII. Tables, nor the Julian Law de Adulteriis (all which left Fathers a Power over the Lives of their Sons and Daughters) yet would ex­tend this Power by Interpretation to the Grand Father towards his Grand-Son or Grand-Daughter.

Yet for all this I think all the wisest and most Civilized Nations were of my opinion, and it is from them that we ought to take this Law of Na­tions rather than the others; and therefore I think the Romans were a great deal wiser and better People than the Greeks, and the Antient Gauls, than the Germans. Nor does your argument against this power of Life and Death in Fathers by the Law of Nature, seem cogent, that if it were so, it could never be taken away or restrained by any Civil Law▪ since this argument will make v [...] much against that power of Life and Death, with which you invest your Fa­thers of Families in the state of Nature, since if they have it by the Law of Nature, it could no more he restrained, or taken away by Civil Laws, than any Paternal Power in the like case.

I pray Sir, hold, if this controversie is to be decided by the Wisdom and the Civility of Nations, we shall never have done; For in the first place, who shall judge of this consent of the most Civilized People? and that no account is to be made of those whom you call Barbarous; for what Nation will acknowledge it self to be so; or can arrogate so much to it self, as that it may require all others to conform themselves to their Laws and Customs; and that all Nations must be barbarous that act otherwise? Antiently the arrogance of the Greeks, made them look upon all other Nations as Barbarous, and then the Romans succeeded in this foolish con­ceit of themselves; and at this day we People of Europe (who are but a few in comparison of the rest of the World) do suppose our selves to exceed all others in Knowledge. And yet on the other side there are diverse [Page 32] Nations who prefer themselves far before us, and I have read that the Chineses have a saying, that the Europeans see with one Eye, themselves with two, but that all the rest of the World are stark blind, and yet this Nation maintains a Power of selling, and exposing their Children, which we Europeans abhor. Now pray tell me if there is not some common rule to be drawn from reason, or the common good of Mankind, how shall we judge which is in the right? So that notwithstanding all that hath been said on this subject: I think I may safely conclude with the Judgment of the Learned Pufendorf, in Lib. 6. Cap. 2. where speaking of the Paternal Power, he says thus, But neither th [...] same Power as such, seems to extend it self to that of Life and Death by reason of any fault, but only to a moderate chastisement. For since this authority is employed about an Age, that i [...] weak and tender, and in which such incorrigible crimes can hardly be committed, which nothing but Life can expiate, it is much better that a Father should turn out of Doors a Son who doth willfully refuse through obstinacy and wickedness all due correction. So that Abdication and Disinheriting seems to be the utmost punishment which can be inflicted by a Father on a Son considered as such.

I see it is to no purpose to spend longer time about this question but since your self have all along allowed that the Father of a separate Family in the state of Nature, hath a Power to put his Wife or Children to Death, in case they have committed any heinous sins or offences against the Laws of God or Nature, but you have not yet told me (and I doubt cannot) how Adam or any other Master of a Family could be endued with this Power of Life and Death, unless it were granted him by God.

I promise to give you full satisfaction to this question by and by; but in the mean time, pray let me make it a little more plain to you, that this Power of Life and Death, which may be exercised by Masters of separate Families, over their Wives and Children in some cases, is not by any Power they receive from God, as Husbands or Fathers but only as Heads or Masters of such Families, may by proved by this instance, suppose a Master of a Family independant on any other (as in the Indies) hath neither Wife nor Children, yet sure he hath notwithstanding the same Power of Life and Death over his Servants or Slaves, for such great offences as you have mentioned, in case there be no superiour Power over him to take Cognizance of such Crimes. And to make this yet plainer, suppose a Married Man having a Wife and Children will live (together with them) in the Family of such a Master as I have now described (yet not a [...] a Ser­vant, but as an Inmate or Boarder) and whilst he so continues, his Wife Kills one of her Children, or one of his Sons, Murders his Brother, who hath right to punish this offence, but the Master in whose Family he is an Inmate▪ And this follows from your own supposed: for if every separate Family in the state of Nature be a distinct independant Government, then all those that enter themselves, as Members of such a Family must be subject to the Master or Governour of it. Nor do you reduce me into any absurdity by your reply to my argument, That if▪ the Power of Life and Death were Originally in Fathers by the [Page 33] Law of Nature, it could never be restrain'd nor taken from them without their consent; that then this will make as much against the like Power of Masters of Families; since I must grant, this is taken away by Civil Laws, And why not the other? To this I reply, that you do not observe the strength of these words, Without their consent; For I suppose that no Power whatever can take this out of the hands of such Fathers, or Masters of Families in the state of Nature, without they assign it to the Supream Powers of the Common­wealth upon its first Institution; whereas you make this Power to be obtain­able by Force, as by Conquest, or Usurpation, not only over those that are not at their own disposal, as Children and Servants; but over their Fathers and Masters too, without their consents; which is contrary to the Law of Na­ture and Reason.

I see you take it for granted, that I will admit your Instance of the Power of Life and Death to be in the Masters of Families, and not as Fathers in the State of Nature: But as plain as you think it, since you question the Power of Life and Death, which I suppose to be inherent in all Fathers; I know not why I may not with more Reason question your allowing the like Power to Masters of separate Families, since there is no reason, in my Opi­nion, which you can bring for such a Power in your Masters of Families, which I cannot with like reason urge may be also exercised by Fathers, and Husbands, over their Wives and Children, in case they deserve it. For if it be for the good and preservation of mankind, that great and enormous Crimes, such as Murder and Adultery, should be punished, and that with Death; Who is more fit to inflict these punishments, or who can be supposed to judge more impartially of them, than the Father, or Husband himself? Since he cannot put his Son or Wife to Death, however they may deserve it, without very great reluctancy; since he, a [...] it were, thereby lops off a Limb from his own Body. And therefore I cannot see any Reason, why such a Married man as you describe, should by coming under another Man's Roo [...] only, as an Inmate, or Boarder, and not as a Slave, (which I grant would alter the Case) should lose that Power of Life and Death, which I suppose he hath by the Laws of God and Nature over his Wife and Children, unless he had actually given it up to the Master of that Family with whom he came to Board. And therefore as I do not deny, but that a Master of a separate Family hath power of Life and Death, and also of making Peace and War, with other such Masters of Families, nay, with Princes themselves, if there be occasion, as we read in Genesis, Chap. 14. That Abraham made War with the four Kings who had taken Lot Prisoner. So likewise when Judah pronounced Sentence of Death against Thamar his Daughter-in-Law, for playing the Harlot, Bring her forth, says he, and let her be burnt, Gen. 38. I own this was not done by the Authority of a Father alone (she not being his own Daughter, and his Son being then dead;) but as the Master of a separate Family, who hath (I grant) power of Life and Death, as he is Lord over the persons of his Children, a [...] Servants, and consequently over their Wives also; for if he hath power over his Son, he hath certainly the like over all that belong to him, as long as they continue members of his Family, and that he hath not thought fit to manumit, or set them free. But now I desire to know by what right these Patriarch [...] could exercise all these mark [...] of Soveraignty, especially this great Power of Life and Death, unless it were derived from [Page 34] God at first; since no Man hath any power to dispose of his own Life at his pleasure, and therefore sure hath naturally no power over that of another man's: So that not only this Power of the Patriarchs, but also that of all Mo­narchs to this day, must be derived from this Divine Original.

Well then, I find you're forced to quit the power of a Father, as such by Generation, since it plainly appears, that this power of Life and Death, which you affirm a Husband, or Father may exercise over their Wives or Children in the state of Nature, is not, quatenus, as a Father, but Lord and Master over them; which in the first place I cannot allow to be true in relation to the Wife; nor that the submission of the Wife's Will to the Husband must imply a power of Life and Death over her; for if she is not his Slave (as certainly she is not, for then a Man might sell his Wife when he pleased) I cannot see how she her self could convey by force of the contract, any such Power over her Life, tho I grant, indeed, if she happen to commit Murder upon one of her Children, or other Person of the Family, he may proceed against her as an Enemy, but not as a Subject; and if it be for Adultery it self, I cannot see that the Husband can by the Law of Nature punish her with Death; for since that Crime doth really dissolve the bond of Matrimony, Divorce, or putting her away, and deserting the Child born in Adultery, was even a­mong the Romans look'd upon as a sufficient punishment. But as for the Power of Parents over their Children, I do not deny, but that a Father may have the like power over his Children whilst they are part of his Family, as over his Slaves or Servants in Case of such great and enormous Crimes as you have already mentioned; but that this is not as a Father, but Master of a Family, your self have already granted in your Instances of Abraham and Judah; tho if you will consider the last a little better, you will find that Judah did not pro­ceed thus against Thamar, as her Father, or Master, but by some other Right; For if you please to look upon the 11th Verse of that Chap. of Genesis, from whence you cite this Example, you will find that Thamar, after the Death of Onan her Husband, went with Judah's leave, and dwelt in her own Father's House, and she was then a Member of his Family, and consequently (ac­cording to your Hypothesis) not under Judah's Power, when she was thus got with Child by him; and therefore not he, but her own Father ought to have condemned her, if this Judgment had belonged to him as to the Master of the Family. And therefore some of the Rabbins suppose, that when Judah gave this Judgment against Thamar, he did not act either as a Father, or Master of the Family, for he was then under the Power of the Cananites; (who cer­tainly had some Civil Government among them at that time) and therefore they suppose that he acted thus as a Civil Judge, appointed by the supreme Magistrate of that Nation.

But to defend the Instance I have given you of a Father of a Family lo­sing his power of Life and Death, upon his becoming a part or Member of another Family; you your self have already yielded me as much as I can rea­sonably desire for the defence of my Assertion, since you allow this power of Life and Death to Fathers, not as such, but as Lords, and Masters over their Children, as over their Slaves; and if so, I desire to know who can challenge this Power but the Master of the Family with whom he [...]ives, un­less you can suppose two distinct Heads, or Masters in the same House, and [Page 35] then they will not be one Family, but two, under distinct Heads, each of them still retaining their distinct Rights. But you will say, that this Boarder, or Inmate, is not a Servant, or Slave to the Master with whom he lives, and therefore hath not forfeited; or given up his Right, or Power of Life and Death over his own Children to him; but it is no matter whether he did, or not, since by making himself a Member of the others Family, he ceased to be Master of his own, and concequently must lose all the Natural Rights or Prerogatives belonging to it, of which, I grant this of Life and Death to be the chief; for if Families in the state of Nature, are like so many distin Commonweat [...], in­dependant upon each other; it will likewise follow, that the Heads of those Families must be in all things necessary for the Good and Preservation of the Family, like so many distinct Civil Soveraigns, and consequently must have a power of Life and Death, and also of making Laws, with Punishments an­nexed to them▪ in all Cases where the good and peace of the Family require it. If therefore in a Civil State, or Monarchy, and a [...]solute Prince come into the Dominions or Teritories of another, it is acknowledg'd by all Writets on this Subject, That such a Prince loses that power of Life and Death which he had be­fore, and cannot exercise it as long as he is in the other Princes Dominions: So by the same Reason, if the Masters of Families, in the State of Nature, are like so many Civil Soveraigns, it will follow, that they must cease to be such, when they become members of anothers Family, unless you will fall into the absurdity of supposing to absolute independant Heads, or Masters, in one and the same House; which, what a confusion it would bring, I leave to your self to judge.

I shall not much dispute this Power of Life and Death with you, as belonging to Masters of seperate Families: But pray shew me how they can exercise this Power over the Lives of those that are under their Jurisdiction, un­less it were granted them by God, by virtue of that Original Power given to Adam, not only as a Father, but Prince of his Posterity.

I do not doubt but I shall give you a satisfactory Answer to this important Demand, without supposing any extraordinary Divine Commission from God to Adam; For as for your Instance of Abraham's making War, Leagues, or Covemants with other Princes, it i [...] no more than what any Master of a seperat [...] Family may do for his own and their defence; and what if you or I were Masters of a Family in the In [...]ies, where their is no Power above us, we might do as well as Abraham, and all this without any other Commission from God, than the great Right of Nature, Self-preservation, and the Well performance of that trust which God hath put into our hands, of defending, and providing for our selves and our Families, since if God hath ordained the End, he hath likewise ordained all means necessary thereunto; and therefore there is no such great Mystery in this as you suppose.

If there were no more in it than a meer Right of Self defence, for which I grant Re [...]aliation, or Revenge may be also necessary, you would have a great d [...]l of Reason on your side; But pray shew me how a Fa­ther, or Master of a Family▪ can Cond [...]mn either his Wife, Child, or Servant to Death, as a Punishment for any enormous Crime, such as I have mentioned (and you agreed to) without such a Divine Comm [...]ssion as I suppose Adam had. Since I own Revenge or Re [...]alla [...]ion may [...]e used by private men in the State of Nature, by the Right of Self defence, [...] [Page 36] grant may be exercised between equals; But since all punishments, properly taken, are the Acts of Superiors towards their Inferiors, I cannot conceive how any Father, or Master of a Family, can inflict so great a Punishment as Death upon any Member of it, unless he derived this Power immediately from God, by virtue of the Divine Charter committed by him to Adam, and and from thence to be derived to all Masters of Families, or civil Soveraigns, who could never derive this Power from the Joynt Compacts or consent of Fa­thers, of Masters of Families; since no man could convey that to another, which he had not himself. And I have already, I think, with a great deal of Truth Asserted, That no man hath power over his own Life, to take it away when he pleases, and therefore cannot have it over another man's; much less can convey any such Right to others, except it were granted at first by God, in the manner I have supposed, which I conceive may easily be made out by several places in Genesis; by which it plainly appears that Adam, and after him Noah, were supernaturally endued with this Divine Power.

Tho [...] am satisfied that this Hypothesis is extreamly absurd, since if it were so only, Christian or Jewish Soveraigns, or Magistrates, who acknow­ledg the Scriptures, could lay any claim to▪ or exercise this Divine Power; whereas we find it practised by all those Nations, with whom the memory of Adam, and Noah is quite lost, and therefore must claim this Prerogative, not from any Revealed, but Natural Law of God; yet however since you think you have such clear Texts of Scripture on your side, I desire you to produce them, tho, if they should make out what you say, they would only serve to confirm, by Divine Revelation, that Prerogative of Life and Death, which all Masters of Families, as well as Civil Soveraigns, enjoyed by the Law of Nature, before ever the Bible was written.

As for my own part, I am so well satisfied of this Supream Power of life and death granted at first by God to Adam, and after to Noah, that I cannot see that without the supposal of this, any Supream power could lawfully be exercised by civil Soveraigns at this day: And therefore I am of Mr. Selden[?]'s opinion, who in his most learned Treatise, De Iure gentium apud Hebraeos, maintains with the Iewish Rabbins, That the Law of Nature can never be planly proved, and made out by Reason, without a Tradition of its Preceps, as given by God to Adam, and thence conveyed to Noah, and his posterity: Which Divine Laws, or Commands, are called by the Iews the Seven precepts of Noah, which whatsoever Nation, or People, would observe, they permitted them to live as Inhabitans among them; though they did not embrace Circumci­sion, or those other Rights and Ceremonies commanded by the Law of Moses. Now amongst these Precepts, that of instituting publick Judgments for capital Crimes, is one of the first, in pursuance of that Command which God gave Noah immediately after the Flood, Gen. 9. v. 6. Whosoever sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man. By which Text almost all Commentators understand that it is not any com­mon man, but the person of the civil Magistrate or Soveraign that is to be meant: Since it would be both impracticable, and also breed great confusion in civil Societies, if by this word man, every common person, not endued by God with this Supream Power of Life and Death, should be understood; and there­fore I do suppose with the most Learned Iews, that this Power was first exer­cised by vertue of that Divine Charter that was given of it by God to Adam, and then renewed again to Noah, by the Text abovementioned.

[Page 37]Now that Adam had by Divine grant an absolute Dominion over the whole World,F. O▪ 210, 211▪ and all Creatures therein contained, will appear from Gen. 1. v. 27, 28. (here is the Bible, I desire you would read it with me) So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them; and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the Earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowl of the Air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth. By which Grant, or Donation, from God of subduing the Earth, and having dominion over the Creatures, Adam was made the general Lord of all things, with such a particular propriety to himself, as did exclude his Children from having any share in it. So that if Cain had his Fields for Corn, or Abel his Flocks, and Pasture for them, it was only by Adam's Grant▪ or Assignation, none of his Children or Descendents having any property in Lands or Goods, without his particular Grant, or Permission.

You must pardon me, Sir, if I cannot be of your Opinion, that all the Preceps of the Law of Nature must depend upon no firmer foundation, than a Tradition of the Seven Preceps, supposed by the Jewish Rabbins to be given to Adam, and Noah, and from them conveyed to all their Posterity, since we find not the least mention of any such Precepts in the Scripture, or in Josephus, Philo Judaeus, or any other ancient Writer, but only in the T [...]lmud: Which though it pretends to a great Antiquity in its Traditions, yet any judicious man that will but peruse it, may easily see the falshood, as well as absurdity of the pretended Tradition of these Precepts; one of which is against ea [...]ing the Members of any living Creature; which savours so strongly of a Jewish Su­perstition, that if that were a true Precept, or Law of Nature, no man could eat a Dish of Lambstones, or a Black pudding, without sinning a­gainst the Law of Nature: And it is very impro [...] to suppose, that all mankind, except Jews, Christians and Mahometans, should be obliged to live or act by those Laws or Preceps they never heard of. For▪ it (as you your self must grant) the memory or tradition of these Precepts be quite lost amongst all Nations, except the Jews, it is all one as if they had acted without any Law at all; and consequently, if they have not some better grounds for their obser­vation of the Law of Nature, than these Preceps of Noah, I doubt whether (ac­cording to your Hypothesis) all Civil Soveraigns that do not own the original of their Power of life and death▪ to this Divine Charter granted to Adam, and Noah, must be no better than Murtherers, since they take upon them to exer­cise this great Prerogative without any Divine Authority for so doing. But I hope to shew you before we have concluded this conversation, that, not only the Power of Life, and Death, but also other Laws of Nature, may easily be deduced, by Reason, to have been given by God to Mankind, by the ordi­nary Course of his Providence, without recurring to Divine Revelation; which can only oblige those that have heard of it. But since you lay so much stress upon those Texts of Scripture you have now cited; I pray give me leave to examine, whether they will bear that sense you put upon them. As for the first of those Texts you quote, Whosoever sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed, &c. Suppose I should take it in that sense you put upon it, only to extend to Civil Soveraigns, or Magistrates, it will be so far from proving a Power of Life and Death to have been granted by God to Adam, and from him conveyed to Noah, that this place seems to imply the [Page 38] contrary; for if it was a known Law before, that Murther was to be punish­ed with death by a Father, or other Magistrate, to what purpose was this Command now given to Noah? Since if it were a Divine Law before the Flood, wherefore is it here repeated? And therefore all Expositors a­gree, that this is the first Precept enjoyning Murther to be punished by the Civil Magistrate, which, before any of the Kin of the Person slain might have executed, as appears by Genesis 4. v. 14. when Cain said unto the Lord, I shall be a fugitive, and a vagabond on the Earth; and it shall come to pass, that every one that findeth me, shall slay me; which had been a needless fear, if none but Adam had a power to take away his life for the murther of his Brother, as you suppose; much less that God should have needed to have set a mark upon him to keep him from being murthered by his Brethren, or other Relations. Nor will that other place you cite out of Genesis prove Adam's sole dominion over the Earth, and all the things and persons therein contain­ed: For if you please to consider it, you will find, That it is so far from pro­ving your Opinion, that it speaks the direct contrary. pray therefore ob­serve of whom Moses speaks in that place; surely not of Adam alone, when he says, Male and Female created he them; and God blessed them, and said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the Earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowl of the Air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth: From whence we may observe,P. n. M. p. 10. First, That these words being di­rected in the plural number, both to the Male and Female, were not intended to Adam alone, but by way of anticipa­tion, not only to himself, and Eve, (who was not then made) but likewise to their Posterity (that is) all mankind; Then that they should be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the Earth, and subdue it, (that is, possess and enjoy it) and have dominion, &c. over every living thing that moveth (in the Hebrew) creepeth upon the face of the Earth. By which words it appears, That not any dominion over Mankind, but only over Bruit-beasts, that move or creep upon the Earth, is hereby conferred. And that this must be the true meaning of this place, is plain, if you will but read the two next Verses that follow. And God said, Behold, I have given you every Herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the Earth; and every Tree, in which is the fruit of a Tree yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat. And to every beast of the Earth, and to every Fowl of the Air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the Earth, wherein there is life▪ I have given every green Herb for meat; and it was so. Which words are certainly directed to the same persons as the former (that is) to all Mankind, by the same Argument as that every green Herb is here granted for meat to every Beast of the Earth, and every Fowl of the Air, &c. that then was, or ever shall exist in Nature. So that this Text which you have cited to prove this absolute and sole dominion of Adam over the Earth, and all thee Creatures therein contained, is so far from proving any such thing, that it seems to me to make out the direct contrary Doctrine, viz. That the Earth, and all the Creatures th [...]rein, were not granted to Adam alone, as the sole Lord and Master of them; but in common to himself, his Wife, and all his Po­sterity, who had as good a right to them, `as he had himself. So that I must tell you, if you intend to bring me over to your Opinion, you must produce some better proofs out of Scripture, or Reason, than those made use of by [...] R. F. and therefore I desire that you would give me some plaine [...] proof [...] for Adam's [Page 39] absolute Power over his Wife, and all his posterity, than hitherto you have done; since I cannot see any Divine Charter granted by God in Scripture, of any absolute power, or dominion, over their Lives, or Persons.

I shall, Sir, do my best endeavour to give you all the satisfaction I can possibly therein; therefore I desire you farther to take notice, That Mr. Sel­den, in his Mare Clasum, and all the Jewish Rabbins have understood this Text in Genesis, L. 1. c. 4. to give Adam an absolute power over the Earth, and all things therein contained, ex­clusive to his Posterity as long as he lived. And the said Au­thor from the ancient Tradition of the Jews, Ibid. is of the same Opinion in his Mare Clausum ▪ So that if Sir R. F. and divers others have erred in the sense of this place, I believe it is more than you or I can prove, since sure they would not have put this sense upon it, without they had some good reason for it.

But this much I suppose you will admit, that Adam was created by God,Luke 3.27. and is in Scripture called the Son of God, as indeed he was; and if so, let your self, or any other ra­tional man consider [...] Whether it be at all likely that God should not endow this Son of his,B. P. P. Sect. 32. the Father of mankind, with somuch Authority and Power as should enable him to govern his own Family, and Children, as long as he lived, without depending upon them for their consent, and chopping Logick with them, whethe [...] his Commands were reasonable, or lawful or not: And if a po­wer of life and death was necessary (as the murther of Abel by Cain shews it was) whether Adam had no more share in that Power, than any of his Chil­dren, or Grand-children: which is sufficient to shew you the absurdity of your Tenets. That the Authority of Adam over his posterity was not absolute in its exercise, as well as perpetual in its duration; and this I think you cannot but admit, because you have already acknowledged this Power of life and death to proceed from, or to be granted by God to Adam; and so consequently must have continued with him as long as he lived.

Well, I perceive you find your Monarchy, or absolute Dominion of Adam over Eve, and all her Posterity, as also over all the Creatures of the Earth, not to be proved from any of these Places of Scripture you have brought for this extravagant Opinion▪ and therefore you now urge upon me my own concession of this Supream and Absolute Authority of Life and Death, which I do not de­ny but Adam might have exercised in some cases over his Wife and Children as long as they continued part of his Family: But that he was not endued with this Prerogative as a Father, but as a Head or Master of his own Family, I think I have sufficiently proved, and therefore need not repeat it. And indeed your own instance of the murther of Abel by Cain, (which for all we can find past unpunish'd by Adam) sufficienly proves, That this Power of Life and Death o­ver his Children or Grand children, when once they were separated from his Fa­mily, was not a necessary Prerogative of his Government, or else that his Chil­dren, and Grand-children, when they have erected [...] milies of their own, had it as much from God as he▪ and that from the same reason which you give, why God endowed Adam with it, viz. because without such a Power they could not have been enabled to Govern their Children and Families as long as they lived. So that Adam's being created by God, or called his Son, gave him not a jo [...] more power over his Children, and his Descendents, than what [Page 40] as a Master, or Head of a Family he would have had by the Law of Nature however; and it is all one in this Case, whether you suppose Mankind to have been created by God, or to have existed from all Eternity, provided you hold the being of a God, according to the Hypothesis of the more modern, Plato­nists, who tho they held the Eternity of the World, yet likewise owned all things to be governed by God's Providence: And therefore if on this Suppo­sition, Mankind could not be well governed, nor preserved, without inflicting of Capital Punishments for great Crimes, and that they are necessary for its peace and preservation; it is likewise as necessary, that there should be some Judge appointed by God to inflict them, which in the State of Nature can be only the Head, or Master of a Family; as after Civil Government is once in­stituted, it belongs to the Civil Sovereign, or Commonwealth. And this I hope will serve to answer your Scruple, how Adam, or any other Master of a separate Family, may very well be endued with this great Power of Life and Death by the Law of Nature, without supposing any Charter granted him for it by Divine Revelation▪ or else depending upon his Childrens consent for his exercise of it.

But before I farther consider, whether this Power of Adam, or of any other Father, or Master, be perpetual or not, and extends any farther than his own Family, give me leave to examine, Whether or no Children, when grown to years of Discretion, and even whilst they continue Members of their Father's Family, may not in some Cases chop Logick with him (as you call it) and not only question, but judge whether their Commands be reasonable, or lawful, or not; or else Abraham (for example) mut have sacri­ficed to Idols,Vid. Jos. Ant. lib. 1. c. because his Father bid him. Whereas Josephus tells us, He rather chose to quit his Country, and his Father's house, than to sin against God. And therefore I think you cannot deny, but if Husbands, or Fathers command their Wives or Children to do any thing that is morally unlawful, or contrary to the Laws of God, or Nature, they may lawfully (nay are obliged) not to obey such unlawful Commands.

I shall so far agree with you, That if the thing command­ed be apparently contrary to the Laws of God,B. P. P. Sect. 48. and Nature, that they are not obliged to obey their Commands; but they must be evidently, and apparently so, before they thus take upon them to refuse obedience to them; otherwise I deny that their Conscience, how­ever misguided, ought to be any excuse, or just ground of their disobedience. For if their Conscience be truly grounded upon the Laws of God, or Nature, that will excuse them, but if it be not, Conscience without such a Law, can never do it. And yet this non-performance of the unlawful Commands of the Husband, or Father, may very well consist without any Anarchy, or disorder in the Family, since the Wife and Children must always yield him an active-obe­dience, in performing all his Commands; or else a passive one, in submitting to whatever harsh usage, or punishment such a Husband, or Father shall please to exercise, or inflict upon them for their non performance of them, tho never so unlawful▪ But yet certainly in all possible and indifferent things, Children are boun [...] yeild, not only a passive, but an active obedience to their Father's commands. For if his Children should have a liberty to judge of his commands, whether they are reasonable, or not, what can ensue but Anarchy and Confusion in all Families?

Well, I am glad we are so far agreed, that a Wife and Children in the [Page 41] state of Nature have liberty to Judge of their Husband's and Father's Com­mands, whether they are lawful, or not, and also to disobey them, when they are not so: And I think I may carry this a little farther, and affirm, That such Wife and Children ought not to obey the Commands of such a Husband or Father, though they are not really contrary to such Divine, or Moral Laws, but only erroneously supposed so by them; and therefore most Casuists agree, That even an erroneous Conscience does oblige, as long as a man lies under that mistake. For St. Paul tells us, Whatsoever is not of faith, is sin, Rom. 14. Nay farther, Such an erroneous Conscience may excuse a man before God, if his ignorance was not wilful, but invincible, and not proceeding from his own fault; but of this no man can Judge, but God alone, and the Party whose Conscience it is; and therefore such a Husband, or Father, can have no Right or Authority to compel their Wives and Children to perform such Com­mands, because the Will ought always to follow the Dictates of the Under­standing; and therefore they should not be forced to do that which they Judge contrary to God's Moral, or Divine Law; since Conscience may be instructed, but can never be forced. Neither will your distinction of an Active and Passive Obedience help you in this matter; For Active Obedience I understand well enough; but as for Passive Obedience, I think it is next door to that we call a Bull, or Nonsense. And to prove this, I shall give you this plain instance; Suppose you had a Iew to your Servant, and should command him to do you some work or other on a Saturday, which he judged a Breach of the Fourth Commandment, that forbids him to work on the Seventh Day, (or Sabbath) and you being very angry, should cudgel him soundly for this refusal; where­upon he tells you, That you may beat him as long as you please, he would not resist, but yield a passive Obedience; but yet could not perform your Com­mands. I ask you now, Whether you would rest satisfied that this Iewish Ser­vant had sufficiently performed what you bad him, by submitting to your cudgelling? And whether your Dinner or Horse would not be as much un­dress'd after this sort of passive Obedience, as it was before?

Perhaps indeed this Phrase of Passive Obedience may be somewhat im­proper, and may be more properly termed an absolute Subjection, or Submissi­on; but it is all one what we call it, as long as you understand what we mean, since such Submission doth sufficiently avoid that Anarchy and confusion which would necessarily follow, in case it were lawful for Wives, or Children, in any case whatsoever, to resist their Husbands, or Fathers, though for the defence of life it self; since no Government can be maintained, where the Parties go­verned have a right to resist their Superiors, or Governors, in any case.

I grant indeed that no Government can be maintained where the Parties governed resist their Superiours or Governors in the due exercise of their Power;P. n. M. p. 110. but when, they exceed those limits, they cease to Act as true Superiors, or Governors; and therefore when instead of Husbands, or Fathers, they prove Destroyers of their Families, I doubt not but they may then be lawfully resisted by them. For suppose such a Father of a Family should in a furious or drunken fit go about to kill his Wife, or one of his innocent Children, can any body think this was Treason against the Monarch of the Family, if his Wife, or one of his Sons, should rescue her self, or this innocent Child out of his hands by force, if they could not otherwise quiet him?

This supposition of Madness, or Drunkenness, in Fathers of Families,B. P. P. Sect. 47. you Gentlemen of Commonwealth Principles make great use of, to justify your Doctrin of Resistance; and I know no reason why you might not extend it as well to Anger, Lust, or any other Passion that a man is subject to; and have given all the World a power to Judg when a man is Drunk, or mad, as well as his Wife, Children, or Servants, nor do I know why you so much insist upon it, but because the Authors from whence you had it, are so in love with Rebellion and Disorder, that they seek and catch at every opportunity to recommend it to the World. But, I believe, had you a Wife, Child, or Servant, that should take the liber­ty of controling you upon this pretence, you would be more enraged with the Reason of the Resistance, than with the Resistance it self.

I am sorry, Sir, any thing I have said can so far transport you to passion, as to make such unkind Reflections upon your Friends; but pray be not so hot; is it not possible that a Master, or Father, in the State of Nature, may be mad, or drunk?

Yes; And is it not possible also that the Wife may be so too?B. P. P. Ibid. Now suppose they should mutually charge each other with madness, or drinking too much, who shall Judg betwixt them [...] What horrible confusion must this introduce into all Societies, to give inferiors a power to Judg their Superiors to be mad, or drunk, and there­upon to resist, and oppose them with force? But if it doth at any time happen; Wives, Children, and Servants, that are dutiful, may have ways to appease their Husbands, Fathers, or Masters, when mad, or drunk, without resisting or Fighting them; as by getting out of the way, or by submission, Prayers and Tears, which Nature hath taught them on such occasions to make use of, and which is a thousand times a better method, than those violent Courses you propose.

All I desire of you in this Conversation, is, that you would be pleased to believe, I do not Argue out of any love to Rebellion, or Disorder, or that I desire to encourage it in private Families, much less to recommend it to the World; only what I speak, is purely out of a desire of the happiness and pre­servation of Mankind; and I hope I say no more, than what all sober men will allow may be every day practised in private Families; and therefore, since you will needs have it, I do extend this Power of Resistance, not only to Madness, or Drunkenness alone, but even to Anger, Lust, or any other Exorbitant Passion a man can be subject to; and I do likewise give all the World a power to Judg when such a man is mad, or furiously passionate, as well as his Wife, Servants, or Children, if in those drunken or mad fits he goeth about to kill them, or any else. For I think in that case, you will not deny, but any honest Neighbour may step in and bind him, or hold his hands, and so may likewise the Wife or Children themselves. As suppose this Father or Husband should be so far Transported with passion, or lust, as to go about to kill his Wife, or ravish his Daughter; I hope you will not deny, but they may lawfully resist him, if they can neither run away, nor yet pacify him by submission, prayers, or tears, which I grant are much better methods, if they may prevail: But what if they can neither get away, nor yet any of those gentle means, you propose, can work any good upon him, what shall they do then? Can any one believe that God hath appointed an innocent Wife, or Children, to be made a Sacrifice to the madness, drunkenness, passion, or lust of such a Father, or Husband? And as for the Case you put, Where the [Page 43] Husband or Wife should charge each other with madness, or drinking too much, who should judg between them? it is a meer Cavil; for as long as they only fall out, and only brangle, it is no matter whether there be any Judg, or not. But if it proceeds to blows, and they are like to mischif or kill each other, no doubt but the Children or Neighbours may come in, and part them; and may either hold, or shut up one, or both of them, till they are sober.

Pray, Sir, let us leave this touchy Discourse concerning Self-defence, till anon, when we shall have occasion to fall more naturally upon it. Suppose then I should at present grant you, That a Wise or Children may (in case of such Extremities as may happen to them by the madness, or Drunkenness of the Husband, or Father) restrain, or resist his violence, in case no other means can prevail; what is this to disobeying his Commands, or resisting him when he is sober? Which certainly they have no right to do. But to come as near you as possible I can, and to let you see I am not a man of a domineering temper, and who approves of unnecessary Severities, or unnatural Rigours, either in Masters of Families, Husbands, or Fathers; I grant that no Father, or Master of a Family, has any right to punish, or put to death the meanest of his Slaves, much less his Children, without a sufficient cause; or that he may sell his Chil­dren, or otherwise Tyrannize over them by cruel usage, or too severe punish­ments, since they are not only part of his own Substance, and to whom by the order of the Creation he gave a being, but was also (as you well observe) ordained by God for their happiness, and preservation, as they were also (as well as his Wife) for his constant help, comfort and subsistence; and therefore they were, as much, or more, made for him, as he for them, as it is plain concerning the Wife from the Text in Genesis, when God said, It is not good that the man should be alone, I will make him a help meet for him, Gen. 2.17. (viz.) the Woman; and therefore, as her subjection to her Husband is perpe­tual, as long as she lives, so likewise is that of the Children in whom he acqui­reth a Property by their Education for so many years; which I look upon as a greater obligation than their Generation; and over both whom he must, in the State of Nature, have an absolute power of life and death; which though I grant he may happen sometimes to abuse, yet I suppose no person living hath any right in that state to resist him in the Execution of it, much less to call him to an account, or punish him for the Male-administration of his Power. And you have granted, that the Husband in the state of Nature hath a power of life and death over his Wife, if she murthers her Children, or commits any other abominable sin against Nature; and that then she may be justly cut off from the Family, and punish'd as an Enemy to Mankind, and so certainly may his Children too. But what need I say any more of this Subject, when you have not as yet answered my former Arguments, concerning the absoluteness and per­petuiry of this Conjugal Subjection, (and that which will likewise follow from it) the constant service and subjection of Wives and Children to their Fathers in the state of Nature. Therefore pray, Sir, let us return again to that Head, and let me hear what you have to object against those Reasons I have brought for it.

I beg your pardon, Sir, if I have not kept so close to the Point as I might have done; but you may thank your self for it, who brought me off from what I was going farther to say on that Head, by your discourse of Passive Obedience and Non-Resistance, and I know not what strange unintel­ligible Power of Life and Death conferred by God on Adam, as a Husband, and a Father. But first give me leave farther to prove, that this subjection of [Page 44] the Wife is neither absolute, nor irrevocable. For proof of which I shall lay down these Principles. 1. That the Wife in the State of Nature, when she submits her self to the power of her Husband, does it to live as happily as she did before, o [...] rather to enjoy more of the comforts of life than in a sin­gle State. 2. That therefore she did not renounce either her own happiness or Self-preservation. 3. Neither did she make him the sole and absolute Judg of the means that may conduce to these ends: for if this were so, let him use her never so cruelly, or severely, she could have no cause to censure him, or complain in the least against him. 4. If she have not so absolutely given up her Will to his, she is still Judge when she is well used by him; or else so cruelly, that it is no longer to be endured. And therefore if such a Hus­band will not allow his Wife sufficient Food and Raiment, and other neces­saries; or that he uses her cruelly, by beating, or other punishments, or hath endeavoured to take away her Life; in all these cases in the State of Nature, and where there is no Superior Power to complain, or appeal to, she may certainly quit him; and I think she is not bound to return, to co-habit with him again, until she is satisfied he is sorry for his former cruel Treatment of her, and is resolved to make amends for the future. But whether this Re­pentance be real, or not, she only can be Judge, since she can only Judge of her own happiness, and the means of her preservation. And the end of Matri­mony being for their mutual happiness, and help to each other; if he have broke his part of the Compact, she is then so far discharged from hers, and consequently in the meer state of Nature (which is that we are now talking of) the Vinculum Matrimonii (as you Civilians term it) will be likewise dissolved: So likewise such a Husband, for no just cause, or crime in the Wife, but only to be rid of her, should endeavour to take away her life, as suppose to strangle her in her sleep, or the like, no doubt but she may (notwithstanding your Conjugal Subjection) resist him by force, and save her life, until she can call in her Children, or Family, for her rescue and assistance; who sure may also notwithstanding this absolute Daspotick Power you place in their Father, or Master, rescure her from his rage and malice whether he will or not: Nay they are bound to do it, unless they will be Accessaries to her Murther.

These are doubtful Cases at best, and do very seldom happen; and a Husband can scarce ever be supposed to be so wicked, as to hate, and destroy his own Flesh, and therefore we need not make Laws on purpose for Cases that so rarely happen.

Rarely happen! I see you are not very conversant at the Old Bayly, nor at our Countrey Assizes; where if you please to come, you may often hear of Cases of this Nature; and I wonder you that are a Civilian, and have so many Matrimonial Causes in your Spiritual Courts, brought by Wives for Separation, propter Saevitiam, &c. Should doubt whether Husbands do often use their Wives so ill, that it is not to be endured. But if the Wife have these Privi­leges, pray tell me why the Children shall not have the same, according to your own Maxime of partus Sequitur Ventrem, since the Subjection of Chil­dren must be according to your own Principles, of the same natere with that of the Mother; and then pray what becomes of this absolute and perpetual Subjection you talk of?

Yet I hope you will not affirm, but that Children are under higher ob­ligations of Duty and Obedience to their Father, than a Wife is to her Hus­band, with whom perhaps she may in some cases be upon equal terms; but Children can never be so in respect of their Father, to whom they are always [Page 45] inferior, and ought to be absolutely Subject in the state of Nature (that is) be­fore Civil Laws have restrained Paternal Power.

I thank you Sir, for bringing me so naturally to the other Head I was coming to, and I agree with you in your other Maxim, of Quicquid ex me & [...]xore mea nascitur in potestate mea est, yet not in your sense; For i [...] I should grant, that the Father's Power over the Child, commences from his Power over the Mother by her becoming his Wife, and submitting her self, and con­sequently all the issue that should be begotten of her, to her Husband's Power; yet (as I have proved already) in case of the Wife, so I think I may affirm the same in that of the Children, That they are not deliver'd by God so abso­lutely to the Father's Will, or disposal, as that they have no Right, when they attain to years of Discretion, to seek their own happiness and preservation in another place, in case the Father uses them as Slaves, or else goes about to take away their Lives without any just cause, since when Children are at those years, I think they are by the Laws of Nature sufficient Judges of their own happiness, or misery, that is, whether they are well, or ill used; and whether their Lives are in danger, or not, by their Father's Cruelty.

For tho' I grant that Children considered as such, are always inferior to their Parents; yet I must likewise affirm, that in another respect, as they are men, and make a part of that great aggregate body of mankind, they are in all points equal to them; that is, as the Parents have a right to Life, Happiness, and Self-preservation, so have they likewise, and consequentially to all necessary means thereunto, such as Food, Cloaths, Liberty (I mean from being used as Slaves) which Principles, if true, will likewise serve for a farther proof against that absolute Property, and Dominion, you supposed to be conferred on Adam over the Earth, and all things therein, exclusive to that of his Wife and Children. For if they had a right to a Being and Self-preservation, whether he would or not, so had they likewise to all the means necessary thereunto; and he was not only obliged to provide Food and Raiment for his Children, whilst they were unable to do it for themselves, but also when they grew up to Years of Discretion, they might take it without his assignment, and this by Virtue of that Grant in Genesis, I before quoted, And God said, Gen. 1. (viz. to the Man and the Woman, and in them to all mankind then in their Loins) Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of the Earth, &c. Behold, to you it shall be for meat. So that sure you were too rash, in affirming with Sir R. F. That a Son, a Slave, and a Servant, were all one at the first: For I hope I have proved the Father doth not acquire any absolute Property in the person of the Son, either by his begetting him, or bringing him up; for then I grant, a Son and a Slave would be all one. But if you please better to consider it, you will find, that Fathers were never ordained by God for perpetual Lords and Masters over their Children, but rather as Tutors and Guardians, till they are of Years of Discretion, and able to shift for themselves; God having designed the Father to beget, and bring up his Child, nor for his own interest, or ad­vantage only, but rather for the Child's happiness and preservation, which by the Laws of God and Nature he is bound to procure: For as it is the Son's Duty never to do any Action that may make his Father repent his be­getting, or bringing him up; so on the other side, the Father ought not to Treat his Son so severely, as to make him weaay of his Family, much less of his Life. It is the Apostle's Precept, Ephes. 6.4. Parents provoke [Page 46] not your Children to wrath; which certainly he knew they were apt to do, or else that precept had been needless. Now pray tell me, if Adam had used one of his Sons (whom he loved worse than the rest) so cruelly, as to make him a Slave instead of a Son, and when grown a Man, should have put him to all the servile and hard labour imaginable, with scarce Victuals enough to live upon, or Cloaths to cover him, What must this Son have done? Born all patiently? Or else do you think it had been a damnable sin, if he had fled into the Land of Nod, to Cain his elder Brother?

To answer your Question, I think in the first place it had; for I do not only take Cain to have been the first Murderer,B. P. P. c. 2. Sect. 9. but Rebel too; and in the next place this Question is needless; for it can scarce be supposed, that ever Adam, or any Father can be so wicked and ill-natur'd, as to use a Son thus cruelly without some just occasion; but if he had, I think he ought to have endured any thing from his Father, rather than have left him without his leave, since I cannot see how Children can ever set themselves free from their Father's Power, whether they will or no.

If that be the condition of Children, they are then, instead of Sons, as absolute Slaves as any in Turkey, whenever their Father pleases. But you have already granted, that Fathers ought not to use their Children like Slaves, nor to sell them for such to others; And tho I have no great kindness for Cain, yet I know not what warrant you have to call him Rebel; I am sure neither the Scripture, nor Iosephus, mention his going to the Land of Nod, as an offence committed against his King and Father Adam; but rather as a piece of compliance, or obedience to God's Sentence, who had made it part of his Curse so to do.

I shall not much trouble my self whether Cain was a Rebel or not; I only tell you▪ what some Learned men have thought of his quitting his Coun­try; but as for other Children, tho I grant their Fathers ought not to use them like Slaves, yet if they should happen to do so, I think such Children ought to bear it as a Judgment inflicted by God for their Sins, and should not by any means set themselves free, tho their Fathers use them never so severe­ly, since it is God's will they should be Born, and continue under the power of such severe Fathers.

But pray, Sir, tell me, what if this Son had fallen into the power of a Stranger who would thus make a Slave of him, Was he likewise bound to bear this as a punishment from God for his Sins, and might he by no means set himself free? Since this could not happen without God's permissive Providence at least, and I think you will s [...]arce prove it more in the Case of the Father, unless you will allow God to be the Author of Tyranny and Oppression.

I Grant that a Man that is made a Slave to a Stranger by force, without just cause given by him, may set himself free by what means he can; But I deny he hath the same Liberty in respect of his Father, since the Father's power over him is from God, and so is not the Stranger's.

What power of the Father do you mean? That of making his Son a Slave, or of using him as a Father ought to use a Son? The latter of these I very well understand to be from God, but not the former; And if the Father hath no such power from God, I cannot see how it can be any Act of disobedience in a Son to look to his own Liberty, and Preservation, since Cruelty and Ty­ranny can never be Prerogatives of Paternal Power, as you your self confess.

I grant, indeed, a Father hath no such Power from God to treat his Son thus cruelly; but if he does, I say again▪ That God having ordained the Son to be absolutely subject to his Father, he must endure it, let the consequence of it be what it will: And I suppose you will not deny, but that in case of ne­cessity, as when a Father hath not wherewithal to nourish, and breed up his Children, he may sell, or assign his interest in them to any person who will un­dertake to provide for their Nourishment and Education; and that the Chil­dren so sold, or assigned, do thereby become absolute Servants to the person to whom they were thus assigned as long as they lived; and why this should be their condition in respect of a Stranger, and not so to their Father, I can see no Reason, since their Father would have been at as much trouble and charge for their Education as the Stranger.

I so far go along with you, that in case of such necessity as you mention, a Father may sell, or assign the present interest in his Child to a Stranger; yet I cannot see any Reason that this Sale, or Assignment, should confer so abso­lute a Property in the Person of this Child, as that therefore he should be a Slave to this Master, or Fosterer, as long as he lived, since admitting that the Father, or other person who takes upon him that Care, may perhaps justly claim a Right in the Service or Labour of the Child, to satisfy them for their trouble and charge in bringing him up; yet it doth not therefore follow, that this Service is due as long as the Child lives, but rather until such time as they can make their Labour satisfy them for their Charge and Trouble in keeping him, which may very well be by that time the Child attains to Twenty five years of Age at farthest; and there are those that have offered, to breed up and maintain all the Foundlings, and Bastard Children in England, if they may be bound to serve them until about that Age; so that I see no reason, why a few years of Education, should give any Man a right over another's person as long as he lived.

But if you urge, that the Child owed his Life to his Father, or Fosterer, since without his assistance he must have perished, and therefore the Service of the Child's whole Life is but little enough to recompence it: To this I Answer, That the Parents are under an absolute Obligation, by the Laws of God and Nature, to breed up their Child, and they sin, if they do not per­form it as they ought; the end of a Father being chiefly for the Breeding up, and preservation of the Child, and therefore there is no Reason he should acquire such a property in him, merely because he did his Duty; And the Duty of a Father being to better the condition of his Son, and not to make it worse, I doubt whether an absolute and perpetual Servitude, or Death it self, were the better bargain; and if this Right will not hold for the Father himself, much less will it be for a Fosterer, since he is likewise obliged by the Laws of Nature, and common Humanity, as well as by his Contract with the Father, to breed up this Child so assigned him; and not to let him perish, if he be able to breed him up. Nor ought this Father's or Fosterer's temporal advantage, which he may make of this Child, to be the principal end of his undertaking, but the doing good to mankind, and the advantage he may reap thereby, is to be considered only as an encouragement, and not as the only motive to this Duty, since he is Obliged to do the same thing, tho he were sure the Child would either dye, or be taken away from him, before he could be with him half long enough to satisfy him for his Charge.

[Page 48]Neither doth this reason hold true even according to the Scripture Rules of gratitude, That a Man hath a right to exact of one to whom he hath done a Courtesy, or bestowed a Benefit, a return as great as the benefit bestowed; since this were not Beneficence, but meer Bartering, or Exchange; and a Man who had his Life saved by another's assistance, (suppose by pulling him out of the Water) must be obliged by this Principle to submit his Life to his disposal ever after. And therefore I desire you would give me some better Reasons, why such a Son ought to be so absolutely subject to his Father's Power, as that it is not lawful for him upon any account whatsoever to free himself from it, let his Father use him never so cruelly or severely.

Well Sir, since you desire it, I will give you the best Reasons I have, why God cannot permit so unreasonable a Liberty as this would give to all Children, in case they should make use of it whenever they thought fit; and therefore God hath ordained it thus, to take away all those pretences of un­dutifulness and disobedience which Children might make, should they be per­mitted to be their own Judges, when they might quit their Father's Family without his leave; which pretence of cruel usage they would be sure to make use of, thereby to leave their Parents upon every slight occasion, saying, That their Fathers were so cruel and severe, that there was no living with them any longer; when, indeed, it was not so, but on the contrary, no just cause of complaint against them, more than bare correcting them for their Faults, and so the Father be Berest of any, nay, all his Children who should be helpful and serviceable to him in his old Age, which would breed great confusion and inconveniences in Families, especially in the State of Nature, as in the Case you have put concerning Adam's Sons, they being the only Servants he could have to make use of, on all occasions.

I desire you in the first place to take notice, That I put this Case con­cerning Adam by way of supposition only; not but that I have a better opi­nion of our first Parent (notwithstanding his Fall) than to believe him so ill-nattur'd, or that he was ever so cruel as to use his Children thus hardly. But in this depraved state of Nature such unnatural Rigours and Cruelties in Fa­thers, as well as Disobedience in Children, is but too frequent, which no man needs to doubt of, that will but consult the Custom of divers Nations in Africa, and other Countries at this day, where they sell their Sons for Slaves, and ex­ercise this Fatherly Power with the greatest Tyranny and Rigor; using them as Slaves, or felling them to others for such things as they want. And if you think it against the Law of Nature for such Children, when they see themselves ready to be sold to work in the Mines in Peru, or Sugar-works at Barbadoes, to run away into another Countr [...]y to avoid such a Condition, which is as bad or worse than death, you may enjoy your own opinion; but I am sure you'l have but f [...]w Proselites, but such as are of the like Arbitrary Principles; and as for your Pretence, that if Children should be allowed to judge when their Fathers treated them too severely, or like Slaves, they would all run away, that is but a Subterfuge: For first, it is a needless Caution, Children being, when young, not apt to leave their Parents who have bred them up, [...]pon whom they depend for their subsistence, and to whom, if they are treated like Children, they seldom fa [...]l to bear a natural Duty and Affection; and if well used, they will, when of years of discretion, be likewise willing to stay with them, and look after them when Sick, or Old, not only for Duty, but also for their own advantage, and in hopes of having a share in what Goods, of Estates they may leave behind them when they dye. But if, when they [Page 49] come to years of discretion, they can better their condition by marrying, and leaving their Fathers Family, their Parents are bound in conscience to let tehm go, since it is their duty to better the condition of their Children, and not to make it worse: Always provided that such Children either take care of their Parents themselves, or else hire others to do it for them, in case they want their assistance by reason of their old age, Poverty or Sickness; but if children may not quit their Fathers Families, thô they are never so hardly or severly dealt with, the consequence will be, that Fathers may keep their children as Slaves as long as they live, thô it were a hundred years, or else may sell them to others, to be used worse if possible; the absurdity of which assertions, and how contrary to the common good of Mankind, I might leave to any indifferent Person to judge of.

Therefore, I think, I may very well (according to the learned Grotius) di­vide the lives of children into three Periods of ages. The first is the Period of Infancy or imperfect Judgment, before the child comes to be able to exer­cise his reason. The Second is the Period of perfect Judgment or discretior, yet whilst the child continues still part of his Fathers Family. The third is, after he has left his Fathers, and entered into another Family, or sets up a Fa­mily himself. In the First Period, all the actions of children are under the ab­solute Government of their Parents: For since they have not the use of reason, nor are able to judge what is good or bad for themselves, they could not grow up nor b [...] preserv'd, unless their Parents judged for them what means best con­duced to this end; yet this power is still to be directed to the principal end, viz. The good and preservation of the Child. In the second Period, when they are of Mature Judgment, yet continue part of their Fathers Family, they are still under their Fathers Command, and ought to be obedient to it in all actions which tend to the good of their Fathers Family and concerns. And in both these Ages, I allow the Father has a Right to make his Children work, as well [...] enable them to get their own living, as also to recompence himself for the pains and care he has taken, and the charge he may have been at in their Edu­cation, and also to correct them in case they refuse to work or obey his Com­mands. But in other actions, the Children have a Power of acting freely, yet still with a respect of gratifying and pleasing their Parents, to whom they are obliged for their being and Education▪ Since without their care they could not have attain'd to that age. But this duty being not by force of any absolute sub­jection, but only of Piety, Gratitude and Observance, it does not make void any act, thô done contrary to their duty. The third and last Period is, when the Son being of years of discretion, either by marriage or otherwise, is seperated from his Fathers Family. In which Case, he is in all actions free, and at his own disposal, thô still with respect to those duties of Piety and Observance, which such a Son must always owe his Father, the cause thereof being perpetual.

I must beg your pardon if I cannot come over to your opinion, notwith­standing all you have said in this long discourse; since I cannot conceive,F. O. G. p. 22.6. how in any Case Children can natu­rally have a power or moral faculty of doing what they will without their Parents leave; since they are always bound to study to please them, and thô by the Laws of some Nations, Children when they attain to years of discretion, have a power and Liberty in many actions, yet this Liberty is granted them by positive and humane Laws only, which are made by the Su­pream [Page 50] Fatherly Power of Princes, who can regulate, limite or assume the Au­thority of inferiour Fathers for the publick benefit of the Common-wealth. So that naturally the Power of Parents over their Children never ceases by any seperations, thô by the permission of the transcendant, Fatherly power of the Supream Prince, Children may be dispens'd with or priviledged in some cases from obedience to subordinate Parents.

And I must beg your pardon, Sir, if I cannot alter my opinion in this matter, for all that you have now said, since you can give me no better Reasons than what you did at first; and thô you say, you cannot conceive how Children can ever in any case, have a power or moral faculty of doing what they will without their Parents leave, yet they may have such power in many cases, whether you can conceive it or no. For thô I do grant, that Children are always bound to study to please their parents,P. n. M. 20.21. yet doth not this duty of gratitude or compla­cency include a full and perfect Dominion of Fathers, in the state of Nature o­ver the persons of their Children, and an absolute power over them in all cases whatsoever, so that the Children can have no right to consult their own good or preservation, however it may be endangered by their Fathers passion or ill nature, since a Wife is always obliged to this duty of complacency to her Hus­band; yet is not this so absolute, but that in a State of Nature she may quit his Family in those Cases I have already mentioned, and against which you had nothing to object; and I deny your position, that Children when they at­tain to years of discretion, derive that power, and liberty they use it many actions, from positive Humane Laws only, or that the power which Parents naturally have over their Children, can never cease by any seperation, but on­ly by the permission of the Father.

For as for Bodin, and divers others that have written on this Subject, they do no more than follw others, who have asserted this absolute power of Fa­thers upon no better grounds than the Civil or Roman Municipal-Laws, with­out ever troubling themselves to look into the true Original of Paternal Autho­rity or Filial Subjection, according to the Laws of Reason or Nature. And most Treatises of this Subject being commonly writ by Fathers, no wonder if they have been very exact in setting forth their own power over their Children, but have said little or nothing of the Rights of Children in the State of Nature, and therefore I shall farther let you see, that this duty of Children, even of pleas­ing or obeying their Parents, can only extend to such things as they may rea­sonably or Lawfully command. For suppose, that Adam had commanded some of his Sons or Daughters never to Marry, you cannot deny but this command had been void: (that being the only means then appointed to propagate Man­kind,) for when there then lay a higher obligation upon them to encrease and multiply, than there is now, they might then certainly have chosen Wives for themselves, when they were of years of dicretion and capable of Marriage.

And farther to shew you, that Children may in some Cases seperate them­selves from their Fathers Family and Subjection, without their Fathers consent, is apparent, as to the Daughters, who if they were at first obliged by this pre­cept to Marry, might likewise do it, whether he would or not, and were to be obedient to their Husbands when they were Married, the obedience which they before owed to their Father, being now transferred to their Husband, or also they must serve two Masters, which is against our Saviours Rule, by which it [Page 51] appears, that the subjection of Daughters in the State of Nature is not perpe­tual: And to prove that Sons have a like Right to separate from their Fathers Family, let us suppose that Adam had been so cruel, and unnatural as some Fathers are, that being only sensible of the profit he received from his Sons labours, he would never have permitted them to leave his Family, nor to en­joy any thing of their own, but would have kept them like Slaves as long as they lived; if you affirm, that he might have done so if he had pleased, and that the Sons had no Lawful means to help themselves, since he only was Judge whether ever he thought fit to set them free or not: You your self have already granted the contrary, when you affirmed, that a Father had no Right to sell his Child as a Slave, and then sure he can have as little Right to use him so himself.

But as for what you say against that natural equality of Children to their Parents considered as Men, you might easily have understood it, if your thoughts were not so wholly taken up with this transcendant imaginary Empire of Fa­thers in the State of Nature, as if they were some what more than Men. For pray tell me, are they not equal, who have the same Right from God to the same things? For if Fathers have a Right to live and be preserved, so likewise have the Children, and if they have a Right to the end, they have likewise the same to the means necessary thereunto, such as are food rayment freedom from Slavery, &c. And if they are thus equal, they must likewise when they attain to years of discretion, be endued with a Power of judging for themselves, con­cerning what things are necessary to their happiness and perservation, and what tends to their misery or destruction, and consequently may very well judge whether their Fathers treat them kindly or cruelly; for if the Father in the State of Nature in the sole Judge of the means that conduce to his Sons happi­ness and preservation, without his consent he may determine that Poverty. Sla­very and Torment, shall be fit means, and conducing to this end, which is a­gainst sense and reason; and tho I grant, that Sons may sometime be mistaken in the true means that may lead to these great ends of life, yet doth not this take away their Right of judging for themselves, any more than it doth the same Right from their Fathers, who as Men are also lyable to the like mistakes. Neither did any Slave or Subject ever give up his will so totally to his Master or Monarch, as absolutely to renounce all Right to happiness and self preserva­tion, or to the means that may conduce thereunto. But I think, we have suffi­ciently debated this great point of the Natural Power of Fathers over their Children, and therefore.

Let us in the next place consider whether Children may not upon these Principles in some Cases make use also of self defence, even against their Fathers, if they cannot otherwise avoid certain ruine and destruction, therefore I will first ask you what you think of this Case? A Son in the State of Nature being separated from his Father's Family, and having Children and House of his own, what shall he doe in Case his Father, by the evil suggestions of a Step-mother, or other wicked Persons, be so far incensed against his Son, as to send Men to burn his House, plunder him of his Goods, and destroy his Plantation?

If the Son be absolutely set free from his Fathers Family and Power with his consent, I do not deny but that such a Son may resist those Persons his Fa­ther sends to ruine him and his Family, and may repel their violence by force, but I do not allow the Son the same power to resist the Person of the Father, if he should come himself thus to destroy him.

Why so? Do you think a Father by being so, hath any greater Right to destroy his Son and ruine his Family then a Stranger?

No; but because the Person of a Father ought always to be esteemed by the Son as Sacred as his Natural Prince, and if he should have a Right to resist his Father by force, he might happen to kill him in the scuffle, which would be a sin against Nature.

Well, suppose the worst, would this be more a sin against Nature, than to suffer himself, Wife, and Innocent Children to be turned out of all they have, and left to perish by hunger and cold? St. Paul says, That he that doth not provide for his Family is worse than an Infidel, and I think so would the Son be if for fear of hurting his Fathers Person, he should permit all his Family to be exposed to certain beggery and ruine.

This precept of St. Paul obliges only, when a Man may provide for his Family by Lawful means, but not when it cannot be procured but by doing what is unlawful, as I take this resistance of the Person of the Father to be.

I grant indeed that a Father, acting as such, is not to be resisted, even when he corrects his Son, but I suppose you will not say that in the Case I put, he acts as a Father, but an Enemy, when he goeth about without any just occasion to kill or ruine him, unless you can suppose, that the will to preserve and destroy can consist together in the same Subject; neither can you affirm that the Father hath any right to deal thus wickedly and violently towards his Son, and his innocent Family. By what Law then must the Son be obliged to Sacrifice his own life, and that of Wife and Children, and all that he hath, to this imaginary Duty?

There seems to me two good reasons for it. The first is that gratitude which the Son must always owe his Father for his Being and Educa [...]ion, and therefore if he give up his Wife, Children, and all that he hath to his Will, it would scarce be a sufficient requital for all the Benefits he hath received from him. The second is, because no circumstances whatsoever can take off or obliterate this Relation; and thô 'tis true your Father, whilst acting thus doth not deal with you as a Father, but an Enemy, yet he is still your Father, and you are and will be always his Son do what you can, and so consequently you will still owe him Subjection. For it is a maxime not only of the Civil Law,B. P. P. §. 15. but that of Nature too, and this most of all in the State of Nature, that is, before Civil Laws had restrained tha [...] Paternal Power, Iura Sanguinis nullo delicto dirimi possunt, and lastly from the fourth Commandment of, Honour the Father, &c. Now no Man can tender honour to him whom he goeth about to resist, and so may also destroy.

I consists you have urged this Argument as home as the thing will bear; but yet I think I can shew you, that the Son is so far from acting against the Law of Nature in thus resisting his Father, that I think he would rather trans­gress it if he acted otherwise. But first to answer your Arguments, I deny, that either Generation or Education do confer so great a benefit, that a Man is obliged to Sacrifice himself, his Wife, and Children, and all he hath in return for it. First for Generation, I suppose you will not much insist on that, since you must grant that a Father doth not act in that matter, as a voluntary, but Natural Agent; neither is it in his Power to hinder the Child that he gets from being conceived or born; neither did he get him so much to propagate his Spe [...]ies, as to gratify his own present natural appetite.

Then for Education, which I grant is much the greater obligation, since [Page 53] by the former I am only born an irrational helpless Creature, but by the other I am made a reasonable Man, able to help and provide for my self, and know­ing my duty to God and other Men, yet even these obligations are not great enough to make me Sacrifice my self and all that I have to his fury or humour. I grant indeed, that if it were to save a kind Father's life, a Son may be obliged to venture, nay lay down his life to perform it; but I deny, that even for such a Father, he hath a Right to give up the lives of others which are not at his disposal (as those of his Wife and Children are not) in this case. For this were not only to return more than was first given, but also to pay debts with that which is not my own; and to give up their lives, and let my Father take them away is all one, if I can hinder it, qui non prohibet facit. Then as for the Relation of a Father, which you say no fault of his can obliterate or destroy; you must grant that it may be suspended for a time, as when a Man binds, or resists his mad or druken Father who would kill him, or his Wife or Children, he doth not do it to the Father, but to the mad Man or Drun­kard, and so likwise in this Case, he doth not resist his Father, but a furious un­reasonable Creature, who is so far from behaving himself as becomes a Father, that he doth not act like a Man: Nor doth your Maxime hold true in all Cases, and therefore is no Law of Nature, for Iura Sanguinis aliquo delicto dirimi possunt, or else a Father could never put his Son to death for any crime whatever, which you have affirmed he may; but certainly when he acts thus, it is not as a Father, nor doth he destroy him as a Son, but an Enemy or Malefactor.

Now I desire you or any indifferent Man to consider, since the common good of Mankind is the sum of all the the Laws of Nature, and the great rule by which they are to be tryed, which rule is to be preferred, and conduces more thereunto when they cannot consist at once or together. That a Father, who by your own confession, comes to do an unlawful wicked action, (viz.) to ruine and destroy his Son, with his Wife and Children, should be resisted, and con­sequently one Mans life put in hazard, than that many innocent Persons should be ruined, and perhaps starved to death for want of food and shelter. And as for the fifth Commandment, that extends no more to the Father than to the Mother; thô you are pleased to leave her out, because it makes against your opinion: and therefore if by Honour, is meant, Thou shalt no resist, then no Man should resist his Mother any more than his Father, if she went about to kill him, and yet not the Mother, but the Father, is by your Hypothesis, the natural Monarch that hath this Power of Life and Death over the Son. But let us pur­sue this point no farther, if you will not be convinced I cannot help it.

But pray tell me now, what a Son must do, if his Father transported by fury and malice should go about to kill him with a Sword or other Weapon, and that he hath no other way left to save his life, neither by intreaty nor flight, (which I grant ought to be done if possible,) whether he may resist his Father with what next comes to hand, or suffer himself to be killed?

I am much better satisfyed in this Case than in the other, that he ought rather to let his Father take away his life than resist him, since here is but one life to be lost, whereas, I confess, the other Case was harder, because there were more lives concerned than the Sons, and I am of this opinion partly for the same reasons as before, and partly because 'tis more suitable both to Reason, and the Law of Nature, as also to Holy Scripture, Preceps and Examples: For i [...] St. Peter command, Servants to be Subject to their Masters, &c. Not only to th [...] good and gentle, but also to the froward. And if Servants, much more [Page 54] Sons, who owe their Fathers a higher duty and obedience, than Servants can owe their Masters; and Isaac was so far convinced, that his Father Abraham had Power over his life; that thô he was a lusty young Man, and could carry Wood enough to consume a Burnt-offering, yet do we not find, that he offered in the least to resist his Father, when he was about to bind him to be Sacrificed: For he very well knew, that his Father could not be resisted without endanger­ing his life if not taking it away in the scuffle; and sure you will grant, that a Son ought rather of the two to let his Father kill him, than he take away his life, by whose means he received his own; especially since Abraham was the Master of a great Family; and in whose life and well being, not only his Mo­ther, but all the Family had an interest as necessary for their well being and happiness: Nor can I think, that Abraham would have so readily assented to God's Command for the doing of it, had he not been already satisfyed, that he had an unaccountable power of Life and Death over his Son by the Laws of God and Nature.

In the first place, to answer your authorities from Scripture, as for that place of St Peter you have cited, i [...] is not a precept given by the Apostle to Sons, but to Servants or Slaves, whose lives and all that they had were at their Masters absolue disposal, being those whom the Apostle Paul calls, Servants under the yoke; and unless you will make a Slave and a Son to be all one, (which you have already denyed) this precept doth not at all concern them. And as for Example of Isaac, that will make as little for your advantage, for first as to Abraham, he could not but know, that to kill his Son without any just cause, was as much murder in him as in any other Man: Now what could be a juster or a higher cause than Gods particular Command? So that as this act of Abraham is not to be taken as an Example by other Fathers, so neither doth the Exam­ple of Isaac oblige other Sons to the like Submission; therefore it is most rea­sonable to suppose, that Isaac being then (as Chronologers make him to be) about nineteen or twenty years of age,P. n. M. p. 27. and of years of discretion to ask where was the Lamb for the Burnt-offering, was also instructed by his Father, before he came to be offered, of the reason of his dealing thus with him, and then the Submission was not payed to his Fathers but to Gods will, from whom he miraculously received his being. But if any Man doubt wheter resistance in such a Case were Lawful, I leave it to his own conscience to consider, whether if his Father had him alone in a place where he could neither run away nor yet call for help, he would suffer his Fa­ther to cut his Troat without any resistance, only because he pretended Divine Revelation for it. Not but that I so far agree with you likewise, as to limit such a resistance only to the holding his Fathers Hands, or warding off his blows, but not to the taking away his life, but of the two rather to lose his own than to kill him, for the reasons you have given, and which I will not deny; but yet if the Father be mad, I much doubt whether the Son is bo [...]nd to let him kill him rather than take away his life, since such a Father's life is no way useful to the good of the Family. So that thô I should grant that Paternal Power is from God, and consequently irresissible, yet doth it not follow that all the unjust force or violence, which a Father as a Man may use against his Sons life or fortune, is such part of a Paternal Power as God hath commanded us not to resist, since your self must grant that he doth not thus act (in going about to kill his Son) as a father, but a violent and wicked Man: So that where the father hath no Right, to take away his Sons life, I think in all such Cases, [Page 55] the Right of the Son to resist him doth take place. And if a Man may resist or bind his Father when he is Mad or Drunk, and in such fits goeth about to kill him, I can see nothing to the contrary why he may not do the same thing, when his Father is transported by a sudden rage or unreasonable malice, since both of them do take away the use of natural Reason as much the one as the o­ther, according to that saying of the Poet, Ira furor brevis est. Anger is but a short madness: Fury and Malice being alike fatal and destructive to the Sons life and safety, with Drunkenness and Madness; nor doth such a Son resist his Paternal Power but only his Brutish force and violence. So that if Sons when grown to years of discretion) have not a right to defend their lives in the State of Nature against all Persons whatsoever, who go about to take it away without any just Cause, every Son ought to suffer his Father to kill him, when ever being transported by madness, drunkenness or sudden passion, he hath will so to do: which how it can consist with that great Law of Nature, of propagating and preserving the species of Mankind, if a Father should have any unreason­able unlimitted Power, I'll leave it to your self or any other reasonable Man to consider; nor doth it follow, that because a Son can in no wise be Superiour to his Father, he ought not therefore to resist him; since thô I grant punishment is a Right of Superiours over their In­feriours,P. n. M. yet so is not resistance; since every one knows that resistance; is exercised between equals, as I have already proved, Sons are to their Fathers in all the Rights of life and self-preservation: and conseqently to judge when their Lives and Estates are unjustly invaded.

I must confess I am in a great doubt which will most conduce to that great Law you mention, (which I grant to be the Sum of all the Laws of Na­ture) viz. of preserving or prosecuting the common good of Mankind; that Fathers should have an absolute irre [...]istible Power over the Lives and Fortunes of their Children, let them use it how they will, or else that Children should have a Right to resist them in some cases, when they go about to take away either of them without any just Cause: for thô I own, that (if the former Prin­ciple be true) Parents may be sometimes tempted to take away their Childrens Lives or Estates without any just Cause: so on the other side if Children shall assume such a Power to themselves of judging when their Fathers do thus go a­bout, to invade either their Lives or Estates, it will (I doubt) lay a foundation for horrid confusions and divisions in Families, since if Children are under a constant subjection to their Fathers, they ought then to be absolutely Subject to them in the State of Nature, and therefore ought not to be resisted: For if all Fathers, and Masters of Families, are trusted by God with an absolute Power of Life and Death over the Wife, Children, and Servants of the Family, as your self cannot deny, then no resistance of this absolute Power can subsist with the peace and tranquility of that Family, without the diminution or total de­struction, of that absolute Power, with which they are intrusted.

And thô I admit that Parents ought neither to use nor sell their Children for Slaves, not to take away either their Lives or Goods without great and sufficient Cause: yet of these Causes Fathers in the state of Nature must be the only and uncontrolable Judges; since if Children (whom I still consider as Subjects, thô not as Slaves in the State, as long as they continue members of their Fathers Family,) should once have a Right to resist, when they thought their Lives or Estates were unjustly invaded; they might also oftentimes through undutiful­ness or false suggestions pretend or suppose that their Fathers were mad drunk [Page 50] or in a passion, and went about to take away their Lives, when really they in­tend no such thing, but only to give them due correction: Which would give Children an unnatural power of resisting, or perhaps of killing their Fathers upon false surmises or flight occasions.

And as this would introduce great mischief and confusion in privte Fami­lies, so would it likewise prove a Foundation of Rebellion against all Civil Powers whatsoever; if Subjects who are the same thing in a Kingdom, that Children are in a Family, (in the State of Nature) should take upon them to resist their Prince when ever they think he goeth about to invade either their Lives or Fortunes, which would likewise serve to justify all the most horrid Rebellions in the World; since all Rebels whatsoever may or do pretend, that their Lives, Liberties and Fortunes are unjustly invaded, when indeed they are not, and Likewise upon the least hardship or injustice in this kind inflict­ed upon any private Subject, either by the Prince or his Ministers, (which abuses and violences do often happen even under the Best Governments,) any such private Person who shall think himself thus injured, may upon this prin­ciple take up Arms, and endeavour to right or defend himself against such violence, by which means under pretence of securing a few Men in their Lives or Estates, whole Kingdoms (if such Persons can find follows enough) may be cast into all the mischiefs and confusions of a Civil War, till the Prince and Government be quite destroyed.

I must confess, the Arguments you now bring are the best you have yet produced, since they are drawn from that great and certain Law of procuring the common good and peace of mankind. But, I hope I shall make it plain to you, that no such terrible consequences will follow from the Principles I have already laid down, and therefore I must first take notice that you have in your answer confounded two Powers together, which ought to be distingishued in the State of Nature. (viz.) The Power which Fathers, as Masters or Heads of Fa­milies, may exercise over the Lives of their Children or Servants whilst they re­main Members of their Family; and that reverence and duty which Children must always owe their Fathers as long as they live, even after they become Fathers or Masters of Families of their own. In the first State, I have already allowed, that such Fathers, as Masters of Families may Lawfully exercise a far greater Power over their Children, whilst they are members of their Family, than they can when they are seperated from it, yet is not this Power in all Ca­ses absolute or irresistible, as I have already proved; and therefore I do in the first place restrain this Right of self-defence, only to such Cases, where a Father would take away a Sons life in a fit of drunkenness, madness or sudden passion, without any crime committed or just cause given: which I also limit to a bare self defence, without injuring or taking away the life of the Father if it can possi­bly be avoided; and in this Case if the Son, who is like to suffer this violence, may not judge when his life is really in danger to be destroyed, because he may pretend so when really it is not. This is no just reason to overthrow so great a Right as self Preservation; since if this were a sufficient objection, it would have the same force against all self defence whatsoever: For it doth often happen that wicked and unreasonable Men will pretend that they were forced to take a­way the lives of others only to preserve their own, when indeed it was altoge­ther false and needless, and they only killed them to satisfy their own malice or passion, And therefore, as there is no reason that the abuse of this natural Right should be used as an Argument against the use of all self-defence by any Man [Page 57] whatsoever. So likewise neither ought the like abuse hereof by some wicked Children to be brought as an Argument against its being made use of at all by others, who are never so unjustly assaulted, and in danger of their Lives from their Fathers violence. If the first principle be true, (on which this is found­ed) that a Son may excercise this Right of self-defence in such Cases, without any intrenchment upon his Fathers Paternal Authority, or that Filial duty and respect which he must always owe him when ever he returns to himself, and will behave himself towards him as becomes a Father, and not like an Enemy or Cut-throat.

And as for the quarrels and confusions, which you alledge may happen in Families between Fathers and Children, in case such a liberty should be allow­ed, those inconveniencies will prove very inconsiderable if you please to take Notice, That first I do not allow this Right of resistance to be exercised by any Children before they attain to years of discretion. Secondly, that after they have attained to these years, no resistance ought to be made against a Father whilst they remain part of their Fathers Family, but only in defence of their own, their Mothers, Wives▪ and Childrens Lives; since I grant, that a Son as long as he continues a member of his Fathers. Family, ought to bestow all his own labour for his Fathers profit, and cannot acquire any property either in Lands or Goods without his Fathers consent: And since you conceive this Right of self-defence, if allowed to Children, would be the cause of so great mischiefs in Fami­lies, if Children should have no Right to judge when their Fathers abused their power over them; let us a little consider on which side this abuse is most likely to happen, for if you please but to look into the World, and survey the Nature of Fathers and Children, and set the faults of the one against the other, you will find, (that as I confess,) it is the Nature of many Children to contradict and disobey their Fathers Commands, and that most young people hate restraint, and love too much liberty, and may oftentimes think their Fathers too harsh or severe to them, when really they are not; yet doth such false surmises and dis­obedient actions seldom end, either in absolute resistance or taking away their Fathers lives by force, or if they do so, it is really done for their own defence, or whilst they are assaulted by them in their own Lives, or those of their Chil­dren, but is commonly acted privately to satisfie their own revenge or malice, which I hold to be utterly unlawful, so likewise let us consider on the other side,P.n. M.p 41, those temptations that Fathers lye under of injuring their Children, or taking away their Lives, or u [...]ing them like Slaves, without any just Cause; you'll find that they by reason of their age, natural temper or infirmities, may be easily transported to that degree of passion, that not considering the follies of Youth, they may oftentimes in their passion, either beat them so cruelly, as utterly to disable or maime them, or else take away their Lives for little or no Cause. And besides, Fathers being of­ten covetous and ill-natured, (which are the vices of old age,) may (where there is no power over them to restrain them from it) either keep them as Slaves themselves, or else sell them to others for that purpose, (as I have already given you an example of the Negroes in Africa,) and which of these two inconve­niencies are most likely to happen between Children and Parents in the State of Nature; I should leave is to any indifferent Man to judge between us. And therefore I think, it more conduces to the good and peace of Families, and con­sequently the happiness and preservation of Mankind, (which are the end of all Laws) that Children should be allowed these Rights (I have al [...]erdy laid down) [Page 58] of asserting this Natural Liberty from Slavery, and defending their Lives, and those of their Wives and Children from the unjust violence of their Fathers than that they should be left wholly at disposal to be maimed, killed or ruined, when over this coveteousness, passion or malice may prompt them to it: Sence if all Fathers were satisfied that their Children have a Right thus to defend themselves in these Cases against their unjust violence, it would be a means to make them act more catiously, and to behave themselves with great­er tenderness and moderation towards them.

So than to conclude, I utterly deny that these Principles I have here laid down, do at all rend to countenance Rebellion, or raising disturbances in Civil Govern­ments, since I cannot allow you have proved Parents to be Princes or Monarchs in the State of Nature, or that Families, and Kingdoms or Commonwealths are all one: Or if I should grant them to be so, yet would it not therefore follow, that every private Subject in a Civil State hath the same Right to de­fend his life, or that of his Wife and Children, against the violence or injustice of the Supream Powers, as a Son may have in the State of Nature to defend his life, &c. against his Fathers rage or violence; since I grant no particular Subject can contradict or resist the Supream Power of the Lawfull Magistrate (however unjustly exercised) by force, without disturbing or at least endanger­ing the quiet and happiness of the whole Community, and perhaps the disso­lution of the Government it self, which is against the duty, not only of a good Subject, but also of an honest Moral Man, who will not disturb the publick tran­quility for his own private security or revenge. But in private Families the Case is otherwise, and Children may resist their Father in the Cases already put, without introducing either Anarchy or Civil War in the Family; since it can scarce be presumed that either their Mother, Brothers or Sisters, will take part with a Son or Brother against their Husband and Father, unless it ware that they might thereby hinder him from committing murder, by defending their Son or Brothers life, when thus violently and without cause assaulted; and if it should sometimes happen otherwise, yet this would be a much less mischief, then that out of this fear the Lives and Liberties of an innocent Wife and Chil­dren, should suffer without cause by his drunkenness or passion.

But as for the resistance which Sons may make in the State of Nature, and when separated from their Fathers Families, it is of a much larger extent since they may then not only defend their own Lives, but also those of their Wives and Children with their Estates against their Fathers unjust violence, Thò I do here likewise restrain this self-defence, only to cases of actual invasion or asault of such Fathers, upon the Lives and Estates of his Children, in which cases, I also absolutely condemn all actions and proceedings done by way of prevention, before such violence or assault is actually begun to be made upon them; much less do I allow of any revenge or return of evil for evil, by such Children, when the danger is over; since however such revenge may be Lawful between Per­sons in the State of Nature, no ways related or oblieged to each other; yet do I by no means allow the same Priviledge to Children against their Parents, since I look upon the obligation they have to them to be of so high a Nature, that it can never totally be cancelled, thô in those cases of self-preservation and de­fence they may be suspended for a time, As if I owed my life, and all that I have to some great Person, who hath either saved the one, or bestowed the other up­on me, thô I should be very undutiful and ungratful too, if upon his be­coming my Enemy thô without any just cause, I should go about to return his [Page 59] injuries in the same kind; yet were I not therefore obliged to give up that Life and Estate he had before bestowed upon me, when ever he thought fit, without any just occasion to take them away; and I am confident that Resistance in these cases, and with these restrictions, doth neither derogate from that Gratitude and Piety, which Children always ought to pay their Fathers, nor yet can tend to encourage either Anarchy or Rebellion; since such Sons when once married and are become Masters or Heads of Families themselves, they then cease to be under their Fathers Subjection as they were before, tho I confess they are always to honour and reverence him according to Gods Command in all cases, when they will deal with them as Fathers, and not as Enemies

I shall no longer dispute this Right of Resistance in Children in the Cases you have put, since I see it is to little purpose to argue longer with you about it; but this much I think is still true, that all Supream Powers whatever, cannot without Rebellion and absolute dissolution of the Government be risisted by the Subject; so that if the Government of Fathers or Heads of Families be Supream as you seem to grant, that cannot be resisted neither, without bringing all things therein to Anarchy and confusion.

Pray give me leave Sir to interrupt you a little; I desire you to remember that I do not allow the Power of Fathers or Masters of Families to be any more then Oeconomical and not Civil Power, and I have already shewed you how Resistance of such a Power, when violently and unjustly exercised, may be re­sisted without any Anarchy or confusion in the Family; but as for Resistance of Civil Powers in some Cases, it is not the Subject of this discourse, and there­fore I desire you would now mind the Subject in Hand, and not pass off to any other till we have dispatcht this, so that I would rather if you have any fresh objections to make, that you would now do it, because it groweth late.

I must confess ingeniously, your Arguments have much s [...]aggered me, since I see great inconveniencies may happen, on either side; for if the Father or Master may be the sole Judg, when and how he may exercise this absolute Power. I grant all those mischiefs may sometimes fall out, which you have here set forth, so on the other side if the Children may be Judges in their own case, those evils may often happen, which I have already alledged: And therefore pray pardon me, if I am not too hasty in altering my opinion in this point without better consideration; but methinks you have not yet fully answered one of my main Arguments, to prove the Power of Life and Death to proceed from God alone, and therefore must have been conferred as first on Adam, since no Man hath a Power over his own life, (as I said before) and therefore cannot have it over that of others.

I thought I had already as good as answered this doughty objection, when I had yielded to you, that neither private Men nor Masters of Families have any Right to defend their own lives, much less to take away those of others, but as it is granted them by God in the Law of Nature, in order to the procuring the great end of it, viz. the happiness and propagation of Mankind, which I own, could not in this lapsed and depraved State of Nature we now are in, long subsist without such a Power. Yet I think I have already sufficiently proved, that we have no need to recur to I know not what divine Charter granted by God to Adam or Noah, and from them derived to all Civil Magistrates that ever have been or shall be in the World, the consequence of which would be, that no Sentence of Death could be justly given against any Man, but in such King­doms or Common-wealths, who own this Authority as conferred on them by [Page 60] God in Adam or Noah, from which they must deride their Title to it. Now I desire you would shew me how many Kingdoms or Common-wealths there are in the World, who ever heard of, much less owned this Divine Charter, this fine notion, yea scarce reaching farther, than some few Divines and high Roy­alists of our own Island.

But be it as it will, the Antecedent, or first Proposition is not true, that no Man in any case whatsoever hath power over his own life, and therefore nei­ther is your consequence; for I suppose, that for the same End for which the Civil Powers may take away another Man's life, viz. in order to the greater good of Mankind, (of which my Religion or Countrey is a part,) I am like­wise Master of my own, and may lay it down or expose it, when I think it can conduce to a greater good than my single life can amount to. And there­fore the Example of Codrus the Athenian King is highly celebrated by all an­cient Authors, and is not condemned by any Christian Writer, that I know of, for Exposing himself to certain death to gain his Citizens the Victory, the loss of which would have been the ruin of the State. And in the first Book of Mac­cabees, Chap. 6.43. (which th [...] it be not Canonical Scripture, yet is allowed to be Read in our Churches, as containing Examples of good manners,) you may Read, that Eleazar the younger Brother of Iudas Maccabeus, is there high­ly commended for his valour in killing the Elephant, on which the supposed King Antiochus was mounted, that he might thereby destroy him likewise, tho he might be assured of his own death by the Elephants falling upon him: And the zeal for the Christian Religion amongst the Primitive Christians was so great that we may read in Tertullian, and divers Ecclesiastical Historians, of whole Troops of Martyrs, who tho unaccused, yet offered up their lives at the Heathen Tribunals to a voluntary Martyrdom; and farther, Eusebius him­self, doth not condemn,Euseb. l. 8. cap. 12. but rather commends some Primitive Christians, that being like to be taken by their Heathen Persecu­tors, cast themselves down head long from the top of their Houses, esteeming (as he their tells us) a certain Death as an advantage, because they thereby avoided the cruelty and malice of their Persecutors. I could likewise give you (if it were not two tedious) several other Examples of Ancient Martyrs, who have given up themselves to certain Death to save the Lives of some of their friends, or else of Christian Bishops, whom they lookt upon as more useful to the Church than themselves, and which St. Paul himself does likewise suppose to be Lawful, when he tells the Romans, That the scarce­ly for a Righteous Man would one dye, Rom. 5. v. 17. yet per adventure for a good Man som [...] would even dare to dye, that is a Man highly beneficial to others. And the same Apostle, in the last Chapter of this Epistle, returns thanks to Priscilla and Aquila, not only on his own behalf, but also for all the Churches of the Gentiles, because they had for his Life laid down their own Necks, that is, hazarded their lives to save his, and where ever they might have thus exposed them, surely they might have lost them too. And therefore I think, I may with reason affirm, that in most Cases, where a Prince or Commonwealth may command a Man to expose his Life to certain destruction for the publick good of his Religion or Countrey, he hath power likewise to do it of his own accord, without any such command, the Obligation proceeding not only from the orders of his Superiour, but from that zeal and affection, which by the Laws of God and Nature he ought to have for his Religion and Country, even beyond the preservation of his own Life.

Well, I confess, that this that you have now said carries, some colour of reason with it, and is more than I had considered before. But pray resolve me one difficulty more, which still lies upon my mind. By what Authority, less than a Divine Commission from God himself revealed in Scripture, do Supream Powers take upon them to make Law [...]? And that under no less penalty than Death it self, against such offences, as by the Laws of Nature do no ways de­serve Death, such as Theft, Counterfiting the publick Coyn, with divers other offences, needless here to be reckoned up. And if a Father (as you will not allow him) hath no Right over the Lives or Persons of his Wife and Children, I cannot see how a Master of a separate Family can have any such Power, more than his Wife or any other of the Family; and the Scripture seems to countenance this Power of punishing for Murder, to be in any that will take it upon them, and therefore you see Cain, said, whoever meets me will slay me. And God tells Noah, whoever sheddeth Mans Blood, by Man shall his Blood be shed, without restraining it to any Man particularly who is to do it.

This Objection is easily answered, if you please to consider, what you your self did a good wh [...] since urge to me, that God endowed Adam with so much Authority, as should enable him to govern his own Family and Children as long as he lived; which I readily granted you, and I only differed in the manner of its derivation, you affirming it to proceed from a Divine Charter or Grant, by Revelation conferred upon him by God, and I maintaining, that both he and every other Master of a separate Family, derive it only from Gods Natural and not Revealed Law, which if it be well proved, such Masters of Families, as also all Civil Powers (whom I suppose to be endued with the Power of all such Masters of Families or Freemen taken together) may for the s [...]me end, (viz.) the good Government, and Peace of [...]heir Families and Commonwealths, make Laws under no less a Penalty than Death it self, against such offences as by the Law of Nature do not deserve it, since without such a Power (the wickedness of Man being come to this height it is) no Family or Commonwealth, could be long preserved in Peace or safety. And therefore, I suppose you will not affirm, but that such a Master of a Family, may very well inflict any punishment less than Death for such offences, which if they find too gentle to amend those crimes, they may likewise for the same reason encrease the punishments ordain­ed for it. And therefore, I yield, that tho Theft doth not in its own Nature deserve Death, yet if the Master of such a separate Family shall find his Chil­dren or Servants to be so addicted to this vice, as not to be amended by any less punishments than Death, he may, for the quiet of his Family, make a general Law, that whosoever for the future shall commit Theft, shall suffer Death; and I doubt not, but such a Law when promulged, may be Lawfully Executed, since this Master of a Family is intrusted by God with the sole Power of judging, not only what are crimes, but also what are fit punishments for them, since both are alike necessary for the happiness and preservation of the Family. And I so far agree with you, that such Masters of Families, have as much Power over the Lives of their Children and Servants, as the most absolute Monarchs have over their Subjects, that is, for their common good, and no farther. And upon the same Principles, do all Kings and Common wealths inflict capital punishments for the Transgression of all such Laws, as do any way entrench upon the com­mon interest and safety of their People, and upon this ground, they may just­ly inflict no-less punishments than Death, for Coyning of false Money, which is but a sort of Theft from the publick Treasure of the Commonwealth. And [Page 62] the same may be said for all capital punishments ordained against other offences of the same Nature.

If Fathers or Masters of Families are endued by God, (as you your self now own,) not only with this Power of Life and Death, for enormous crimes against the Laws of Nature, but also to make new Laws, or ordain what punish­ments they please for such offences, as they shall judg destructive to the quiet and happiness of their Families, I see no difference (notwithstanding what you have hitherto said to the contrary) between Oeconomical and Civil Power.F. P. c. 1. §. 10. For if we compare the Natural Rights of a Fa­ther or Master, with those of a King or Monarch, we shall find them all one without any difference at all, but only in the latitude or extent of them. For as the Father or Master over one Family: So a King, as a Father or Master over many Families, extends his care to Preserve, Feed, Cloath, in­struct, and Defend the whole Common-wealth; his War, his Peace, his Courts of justice, and all his Acts of Soveraignty, tend only to preserve and distribute to every Subordinate, and inferior Father and his Children, their Rights and Priviledges. Hath a Monarch Power to make new Laws, and ap­point what punishments he will to enforce their Observation? So also hath a Father of a Family. Hath an absolute Prince Power to command or dispose of the Goods and Estates of his Subjects, for their common quiet and security? So also hath a Father or Master of a Family. So that all the Duties of a King, are summed up in this Universal Fatherly care of his People; and if the Sove­raignty be the same, I cannot see and Reason, why the Rights and Prerogatives of it should not be so too. And therefore, if non resistance against their Au­thority, be an unseparable Prerogative of Soveraign Power, then if a Father or Master of a Family be endued with it, he ought no more to be resisted, than the most absolute Monarch.

I perceive your Head is very full of this Notion of the idintity of Natu­ral and Civil Power, or else you would never insist so long upon it as you do, after what I have proved to the contrary. And therefore, since I see you look upon this as your topping Argument; I shall do my endeavour to shew you more plainly the difference between them. For tho I grant, that such Fathers or Masters of Families, (as we here treat of,) are indued by God with divers Powers, which are Analogous, or perhaps the same with those of a King or Monarch, that is, of defending their Families as far as they are able from For­reign force and Domestick injuries, and of revenging and punishing all offences that may prove prejudicial or destructive to the Peace and Happiness of their Families; yet doth it not therefore follow, that the Government of private Families and Kingdoms are all one, since they differ very much, not only in their Institution, but also in their End. For first, the Fatherly Power by the Law of Nature, is ordained only for the Generation and Education of the Children till they come to be grown up; and his Authority as a Father, is or­dained by God only for those Ends; and therefore this Relation of a Father is so inherent in him, that it can never be parted with, or assigned over to any other, so as to make the Child or Son so Assigned, to owe the same duty to him, as he did to his Father.

There is also, besides the Power of a Father, that of a Master, or Head of a Family over his Children and Servants, whilst they continue Members or Subjects of it, which Power I grant may be assigned, or made over to one, or more Persons, when ever such Master shall think fit to institute a Kingdom or [Page 63] Commonwealth: Yet, as Dr. Sanderson very well observes, this Power of a Master differs very much from that of the Civil Powers of a Kingdom or Com­monwealth, as well in the object as end of this Power. For first, the Power of a Father is only over one single Family, whereas that of a Commonwealth is over divers Families, united under one Civil Head. Secondly, in respect of the end, the Power of the Master is chiefly ordained for his own interest and advantage, but that of the Civil Power, chiefly respects the good of the whole People or Community. Lastly, the Power of the Master of the Family, is only for the maintaining his own Natural Property, in those things which he hath acquired in the State of Nature, whereas one great end of Civil Government, is to introduce and establish Civil Property in things, according to the Laws of the Commonwealth, and also to maintain it when so constituted. To conclude, Fathers beget their Children, and Masters acquire to themselves Slaves and Servants, but it is from the consent of Fathers or Masters of seperate Families, that any sort of Civil Government commenced at first, so that the People at first made Kings, and not the Kings the People: And further, it is the duty of Fathers and Masters to provide for their Children and Servants, but the People ought to provide for their Kings, not only for their necessities, but for their Magnificence and Grandure; so that the Power of Fathers and Masters is Natural, whereas that of Kings and Republicks is Political and Artificial, as proceeding from compacts or the consents of divers Heads of Families or other Free-men. And as Kingdoms and Families differ in the manner of their Intituti­on, so do they likewise in their ends, which is of a far larger extent in the lat­ter than in the former, the maine design of instituting Kingdoms and Common-wealths, before not only to defend their Subjects from such injuries or violence that they may do each other, but chiefly by their united Forces, to Guard them from the violence and invasion of Foreign Enemies.

For thô I grant, it may be sometimes happen, that a Family may consist of so great a number of Children, Servants or Slaves, as may make a little Army, such as Abraham's was when he made War againk the four Kings, yet is this purely accidental, and not at all essential to the being of a Family, which is as perfect in all its constituted parts, if it consists of three or four Persons, as of three or four hundred. Whereas a Kingdom or Commonwealth cannot subsist, unless it can either by its own Power or united Forces, defend its Members from Foreign Force and Invasions: So also in private Families, in the State of Nature, there can be no property acquired in Lands or goods by any Members of it, without the Masters express will or permission. But in all Civil Governments, the very institution and preservation of Civil Proper­ty was one of its chiefest ends, which may be easily proved by experience: Since in all Nations, where there is any property either in Lands [...]or Goods, there is a necessity of some Civil Government to maintain i [...]. Whereas in divers parts of Africa and America, where there is no distinct property in Land, and where there are no other Riches, than every Man's Cottage and Garden, with their Hunting and Fishing Instruments, there is no need of any Common or Civil Power over them, higher than that of Masters or Fathers of Families, who own no Superiority among themselves, unless it be when they go to War, and then they chuse out of their own numbers for their Captains or Leaders, those whom they know to be stoutest and most experienced, whose Power determines as soon as the War ceases.

But to make an end of this long Discourse, suppose, I should grant all you [Page 64] can desire, the Oeconomical and Civil Government do not differ in kind, but in largeness or extent, yet will it not follow, that therefore it must be in all Cases irresistable, since I think I am able to prove, that no Power whatever (except that of God himself, can be endued with this Prerogative) if once it goes about to frustrate, and destroy all the main ends of Government, (viz.) the happiness and safty of the Subjects, either by dowright destroying of them, or else by reducing them to a condition of Slavery and Misery, as the Great Turk uses his Christian Subjects. But to let you see, I would deal fairly with you, I will discourse this point of Adam's Soveraignity no farther, but will at present take it as the Lawyers say, de bene esse, or for granted, and I desire you would shew me in the next place when Adam dyed, by what Law, either Divine or Natural, Cain or Seth (chose which you will) could command over all the rest of his Brethren and their Descendants. And then again, if you could do this, what benefit this Doctrine would yield to all Princes and States at this day, or how you intend to deduce a Title for them from Adam or Noah, or any of their Sons to their respective Kingdoms, and consequently to an absolute Subjection of their Subjects, without which all your Hypothesis will signifie nothing.

I must return you thanks Sir for your candid dealing, and for the great pains you have taken to enlighten my understanding in this important question. And thô I doubt, you have laid down Principles not so suitable to Gods Will revealed in the Holy Scripture, yet I will not imput it to any want of sincerity in your self, who I hope, are satisfied of the truth of what you have main­tained; so on the other side, I desire you not to take it ill, if I cannot leave my own opinion, which I have always hitherto lookt upon, as most suitable to the Doctrine of the Church of England, and to the Practice of the Primi­tive Church, and to the Laws of the Land, and must continue therein, till I am convinc'd I am in an Error. But since I desire to have a further Con­versation with you upon this important Subject, pray let me know, when we shall meet again, that I may prove to you, from Holy Scripture as well as those Authors, I have perused that there is a Divine Right of Blood instituted by God for the Succession of Kingdoms, which cannot without a kind of Sacri­ledge, or the highest Injustice, be taken away from the Right Heir.

I kindly accept your profer, and if you please shall Discourse this im­portant Question with you to Morrow in the Evening, if your Occasions will give you leave.

I expect you between seven and eight, and in the mean time am your Servant.

THE Second Dialogue BETWEEN Mr. FREEMAN a Gentleman AND Mr. MEANWELL a Civilian.

YOU are I see, Sir, a punctual man to your hour; Pray do me the favour to sit down by the Fire, I will but make an end of what I am writing, and wait on you pre­sently.

Your Servant Sir, take your own time, but pray remember the point you are now to satisfie me in.

Now Sir, I have done, and if I remember right, I am to derive a Title to all the Kings, and Monarchs that have ever been or shall be in the World from that Supream Fatherly Power conferred by God on Adam. But pray take notice I undertake this Task only for Monarchies, not Com­mon-Wealths, whom I must own to be of meer Humane Invention; And tho' I will not say that they are absolutely unlawful, yet I think they are not the Powers ordained by God in Scripture.

Well Sir, we will discourse farther of that anon: and therefore I do assure you, I do not desire any more of you now than that you should prove the Divine Institution of Monarchy, and I think that task sufficient if it can be made out in one or two meetings.

It may seem indeed somewhat absurd to maintain, that all Kings are now the Fathers of their People, since you'll say experi­ence shews the contrary.F. P. Ch. 1. § 8. It is true all Kings are not now the Natural Parents of their Subjects, yet they all either are, or are to be reputed the next Heirs to those Primoge­nitors, who were at the first the Natural Parents of the whole People, and do in their right succeed to the exercise of the Supream Jurisdiction, and such Heirs are not only Lords of their own Children, but also of their Brethren, and all others that were subject to their Fathers, and therefore [Page 66] I suppose, that God, when he conferred this Supream Power on Adam, did not intend it should die with him, but descend to his Heirs after his Decease.

Well, I shall at present grant you all this likewise, tho' it might be questioned. But pray who were those Heirs? many, or but one Person?

I suppose you will also grant me at present, what we before dis­puted, that the Power of Fathers over their Children, being the Fountain of all Regal Authority,Ibid. by the Or­dination of God himself, it follows that Civil Power, not only in General is by Divine Institution, but even the assignment of it specifically to the eldest Parents.

Pray whom do you mean by Eldest Parents, our Great Grand­mother [...] if you mean by it one that had longest had Children, she must come in as next Heir by these words.

No Sir, you altogether misapprehend me, I mean the Eldest Son of Adam; Eve was his Wife, and could have nothing to do to inherit in an Hereditary Monarchy as this was.

[...] your pardon Sir, if I misunderstood you, but you must thank the loosness or impropriety of your expression for it, for I suppose you cannot deny, but Eldest Parents commonly signifie either the Eldest men, or Women that have Children, or those who have longest had Issue and then in either of these senses, our Great Grand-Mother Eve, stood fairest to be Heir of this Divine Power of Adam; but this I am sure of, Parents can never signifie Heirs Male or Female, much less a Child who may some­times (according to your hypothesis) happen to be Heir; but since I am gotten into this mistake, I shall not leave my hold, but shall make bold a little to argue our Great Grand Mother's Title, for indeed I cannot see any reason why her Eldest Son (for Example) should have any right to Govern his Mother, and all his Brothers and Sisters, whilst she was alive.

For first, if your Argument from Generation must be good, that every man that is born, becomes a subject to him that begets him, this Argu­ment will serve for Eve as well as Adam; since (as I have already proved) the Mother hath as great (if not a greater) share, in the Generation of the Children, than the Father; Or secondly, if you insist upon the Divine grant you so much [...]lked of last time, of Adam's Dominion over the Creatures, in which his Children were included; I then proved to you, that this Grant was made as well to Eve as Adam; And consequently th [...] either she must have thereby an equal right with him, or at least after his Decease to this Dominion, as a Husband and Wife when joynt Purchasers have to an E [...]tate at Common Law. And lastly, If the Commandment of Honour thy Father and thy Mother, were then in Force by the Law of Na­ture or by express Command from God, and that by Honouring, obeying must be meant (as most Commentators agree) then it will follow, that after Adams Decease, all Eves Sons and Descendants, tho' never so remo [...]e, were to have obeyed or been subject to her, and not to her Eldest Son, unless you can shew me that the Salique Law against the succession of Wo­men was made by Adam the first Monarch, which I suppose you will not undertake to prove.

I must confess, I did not consider this difficulty, for indeed it might never have happened, since Eve might have died before Adam, or if she did out-live him (which is uncertain) yet she was then very old, and consequently (besides the natural weakness of her Sex) uncapable, or un­fit for Government, and so might very well leave it to Seth, since Cain the Eldest had by the Murder of his Brother, and his flying away into another Country, forfeited his Birth-right, and made himself uncapable of the Succession.

So then here is a Forfeiture, and an Abdication of this Divine Right of Succession in the very first Descent; whereas indeed I supposed, that this Divine Right had been at least as unforfeitable as the Crown of England, the very Descent of which, as our Lawyers tell us, purges all de­fects in the next Heir, tho' he had murdered his Father and Elder Brother too. But I only shew you the absurdity of this Notion, and shall not longer insist upon it, therefore pray proc [...]ed.

I cannot tell what might have been said, if Cain had come to claim his Birth-Right, but this is certain, that he neither did or could come to do it, since God condemned him to live in a strange Country far from his Brethren,B. P. P. c. 2. § 9. Gen. 4.16, 17. and we read That Cain went out from the presence of the Lord, and dwelt in the Land of Nod, on the East of Eden, and he built a City, and called the Name of it Enoch, after the Name of his Son Enoch. And there are four descents set down immediately of his Family, which could be no other than the Princes of that City of Cain's Race. So that you see, even in Cain's Line, the Principality descended to the Eldest Son.

I confess Cain's Children and Grand-Children are particularly set down in Scripture, but that they were Princes or Monarchs over their Posterity, or which way this City was Governed after Cain's Death, whe­ther by one, or by all the Sons of Cain is no where mentioned, but I see some Men can find even absolute Monarchy in a Text, where the Scrip­ture mentions no such thing, and no wonder, for the Alchymists have found out likewise the invention of their Elixir, or Philosophers Stone, in such Texts as you or I can see no such thing. But to be more se­rious;

That a Father should be Lord over his Children and Posterity. I con­fess there may be some colour of reason, tho' none cogent enough to make it out: But that an Elder Brother hath any Natural or Divine Right, to be Lord over all the rest of his Brethren, I can find no ground for, in rea­son, even upon your own Principles, for if every Man by his Birth become the subject of him that begets him, it will necessarily follow, that a Man by his Birth cannot become a subject to his Brother, who (sure) did not beget him.

Therefore I suppose you will still insist upon that place in the fourth of Genesis, which you cited at our last Meeting, when God told Cain (speaking as you suppose) of his Brother Abel, His desire shall be subject unto thee, and thou shalt Rule over him. From which words I then told you. I thought an absolute subjection of Abel, and of all younger Brothers whatsoever could not reasonably be inferred, for you may remember I shewed you, that [Page 68] this Promise by God to Cain concerning Abel might be only personal, and relate to Abel only, and not to the rest of his Brethren, much less, all other younger Brothers, that should be in the World; And in the next place this Ruling might only have been by advice and perswasion, and not by any Authority or Right of commanding him. So that if this be the place (as I suppose it is) from whence you would deduce your Divine Right of Elder Brothers being Monarc [...]s over the younger in all Heredi­tary Monarchies, I must freely tell you I think it a very bold undertaking to found a Divine Right upon such doubtful expressions, as these of God to Cain.

I confess, I was now about again to urge this place to you; for as I was not then well satisfied with your explanation of it, which you now again repeat, so upon second thoughts I am much more unsatisfied with your Paraphrase upon them. For you seem to me plain­ly to pervert the sense of the words,BPP. § 64. and make them sig­nifie just nothing. For sure when God spake the same Words to Eve concerning Adam, as he did to Cain concerning Abel, can you conceive they were meant personally to Eve only, and concerned no other Wife that should be after her? Or can you assign any Reason why these words should be rather meant personally in the last, and not in the first case? Unless you will do it out of pure Love to Anarchy and confu­sion. And if you say these words do not signifie any despotick Power, but a Ruling or Governing by fair means or persuasion, this seemeth meer trifling with Gods Word, who says expresly, Thy Brothers desire shall be Subject to thee; That is (say you) as far as he thinks fit, and thou shalt rule over him, that is, if thou hast the knack to wheadle or persuade him. Would not this have been a mighty matter for God Almighty to have ap­peared to Cain about, and an excellent Argument to com­fort him,Ib. c. 2. § 7. and to appease his Wrath against his Brother? So that it seems apparent by this Law given by God to Cain and Abel, that this Regal and Paternal Authority was not to dye with him, nor [...]o be equally divided amongst all his Children at his Death, or that from thenceforth no man should have a Right by Birth of commanding another, for this command to Abel could not be supposed to take place in the Life of Adam, for then Adam was Lord over all his Children, and so none of them without his permission could rule over the rest, and if it were other­wise by Adam's appointment, then Adam was the Soveraign still, and the Son or Grand-Son so exercising this Power was but his Deputy: but after Adam's decease then it became a real Soveraignty in his Eldest Son, as ha­ving none but God Superior to it.

I hope you will judge more charitably of me▪ than to believe that the sense that I have put upon these words, tho' different from yours, is out of any love of Anarchy or confusion, much less out of any design to pervert or wrest this place of Scripture: and if I should be so severe as you are, perhaps I might with more reason lay this charge at your Door: for in the first place, I am not satisfied with your Argument, that these words could not be meant personally, or concerning Abel only, because the same words when spoken of Eve do likewise concern her Posterity, [Page 69] and therefore when spoken concerning Abel they must likewise relate to all Younger Brothers in Hereditary Monarchies: which consequence I may with very good reason deny, for whatsoever subjection may be due by vertue of the like words from Eve and her Posterity, to Adam and all other Husbands, is to be supposed to have been enjoyned, because all Wo­men are descended from Eve, and so were represented by her as their first Parent. Thus St. Paul supposes all men to be in a state of Sin and Death,Rom. 5. v. 12. as represented by Adam; their Ancestor, by whose disobedience all have sinned. But no man will affirm that all the Elder Brothers, or Monarchs in the World were represented by Cain, and all younger Brothers by Abel, no man at this day being (as appears in Scripture) descended from either of them: and I cannot but take notice that the better to strengthen your Notion you again foist in out of the margin of our English Bible, His desire shall be subject to thee, whereas in the Hebrew it is no more than, His or its desire shall be to thee.

And that the words Rule over, are to be interpreted according to the subject, and do not always mean a ruling by force, or command appears by the same Hebrew words made use of in the first of Genesis ▪ concerning the two great Lights that God set in the Firma­ment, v. 17, 18. to give Light upon the Earth, to rule over the Day, and over the Night, which cannot signifie a ruling by force or command, but only by a natural influence, or preheminence of the Sun and Moon above the Stars or Planets. And tho' you are pleased to ridicule this explanation of mine, yet I think, I may with as much reason treat yours with the like contempt, for since your self grant that this Power of Cain over Abel, was not to commence till after the Death of Adam, and that this Murder of Abel was committed above a hundred years after Adams Creation,Gen 5. v. 3. appears by the time of the Birth of Seth, (who was born sometime after Abel's Death) would not this thing have been a mighty comfort to Cain, when he was in his dogged humor, if God had bid him chear up, for the time should come that if he behaved himself well, about eight hundred years hence, when his Fa­ther Adam should die, he should then Lord it over his Brother, and be revenged of him for the affront he had received in having his Sacrifice pre­ferred before his own? So that this interpretation of yours is so absurd, that I do much rather agree with divers learned commentators as well Jews as Christians, who make not only a quite different interpretation, but also a different version of these words from the Hebrew Text, and if you have the Learned Jesuit Menochius his Notes upon the Bible, I pray let me see them. Here pray observe what he says upon this place. Se [...] sub te erit appetitus ejus; in Hebraeo, & apud LXX est, ad te conversio ejus: sensus est, Peccatum ejus (que) appe­titus, & concupiscentia te sollicitabit ad consensum▪ sed ita, ut ad te converti, & a te conseusum petere, & impetrare debeat; id noster interpres ad sensum clare vertit, sub te erit appetitus ejus; by all which he means no more, than that sin should tempt, or sollicit him to offend, but that he should rule over it, that is, had a power so to do if he would use it as he ought. So likewise Mr. Ains­worth upon this place, (as you may see in Pool's Criticks) puts a li [...]e sense upon the following words, referring the whole sentence to [Page 70] the sin in these words, Peccatum ponitur pro poena Peccati; juxta Hebraeos ita accipitur, Gen. 19.15. Lev. 20. 9. 1 Rep. 7.9. sinsus est prope te punitio peccati & ad te desiderum ejus, i. e. cupit te[?] poena peccati tui, ut solet post pecca­tum admissum. Sed tu si vis dominaberis illi, i. e. potes declinare peccatum, q. d. poena haec, sicut canis est, qui ad ostium cubat▪ cupiens ingredi, sed in potestate Domini est, vel claudere ostium, ne ingrediatur, vel aperire ut intret. Probatur hic sensus 1. Prius membrum de praemio l [...]quitur, reportabis[?] scil. praemium, ergo po­sterius loquitur de poena, peccatum jam inerat ipsi, punitio vero nondum, sed ad fores erat. So that according to these learned Comentators, this place is to be thus turned out of Hebrew, If thou dost not well, sin lyeth at the door, and to thee is its desire, but thou mayst or shalt rule over it, which seems to me to be a much more Genuin and Rational Interpretation, than that of our English or Latin Bibles; so that I think I may justly except against the Au­thority of so doubtful and obscure a place, as sufficient to found your Monarchical Power of Elder Brothers, in the State of Nature.

Well Sir, since you are no better satisfied with this Testimony o [...] of Genesis, for the Divine Right of Primogeniture, I will no longer insist upon it, tho' I am not yet convinced, but that my Interpretation of this place is truer than yours, since I have likewise great Authorities on my side, both Antient and Modern, besides our common versions to authorize it, and therefore since I have many other examples out of Scripture of this kind, I shall the less insist upon it, but will now proceed to the examples before the Floud. First therefore, it seems highly probable if not certain, that whatever Civil Government there was in the World, before that period of time (as it is very rational to believe there necessarily m [...]st be some in so long a space as near two hundred years) it was chief [...]y administred by those first Patriarchs, whose names you'l find particularly recited in the fifth of Genesis, and sure that long Chain we there have of them,B. P. P. § 52. by whose Lives the Chronology of the World is only reckoned till the Floud, were in their several Generations considerable persons, nay Princes over their own Families which could not but be very numerous, and indeed the very counting the Age of the World by the years of their lives is to me an Argument that they were no obscure unregarded men, but that they were either Monarchs or Princes of all Mankind or at least over that part of the World in which they lived, [...]. [...]. and Iosephus is likewise of my opinion in the first Book of the Jewish Antiquities, where (as you may see) cap. 3. he expresly tells us, thus, Seth autem centesimo & quinto anno genuit Eno [...]. Qui dum quinque & nongentos vixisset annos. rerum curam tradidit filio suo Carnae, and immediately after proceeds thus, La­mec [...]um autem filium genuit Ma [...]husalas, Enocho oreus, cum annos ipse habere [...] CLXXXVII. Imperium vero Lamecho eidem tradidit paren [...], quod jam tenuerat ipse annos DCCCCLXIX. Lamechus pariter Principatum re­liquit Noe filio, post quam regnasset annos DCCLXXVII. Noe deni (que) verum summam tenuit annos nongentos & quin­quaginta; Lamecho annos 382. aetatis habenti[?] genitus. [Page 71] And Noah, the last of the Ten Patriarchs, and the sur­viving Patriarch of all Mankind, was declared by God the Universal Monarch of the World, as soon as he came out of the Ark, to whom he granted the Do­minion over all things, as appears by those words of God to Noah, V. 2▪ 3. F. O. G. p. 47. L. 1. C. 4. Gen. 9. whereby I conceive, that tho' it hath been thence concluded by Mr. Selden in his Mare Clausum, that there was a general Commu­nity between Noah, and his Sons, yet the Text doth not clearly warrant it: For altho' the Sons are there joyned with Noah in the blessing, yet it may best be understood, with a Subordination, or a Benediction in Succession; and the Blessing might truly be fulfilled, if the Sons either under, or after their Father enjoyed a Private Dominion: Nor is it probable, that the Pri­vate Dominion, which God gave to Adam and by his Dona [...]ion, Assignation or Cession to his Children, was abrogated, and a Community of all things instituted between Noah, Ioseph. Antiq. Iud. Lib. 1. Cap. 3. § 4. Oxon. edit. and his Sons after the Flood. And when Noah was left the sole Heir of the World; why should it be thought that God would disinherit him of his Birth right and make him only Tenant in Common with his Children? And if the Blessing given to Adam, Gen. 1.128. be com­pared to that given to Noah, and his Sons, Gen. 9.2. there will be found a considerable difference between these two Texts. In the Benediction of A [...]m we find expressed a subduing of the Earth and a Dominion over the Creatures; neither of which are expressed in the Blessing of Noah, nor the Earth there once named: It is only said, The Fear of you shall be upon the Creatures, and into your hands are they delivered; then immediately it fol­lows, Every moving thing shall be meat for you, as the green Herb, &c. The first Blessing gave Adam Dominion over the Earth, and all Creatures; the latter allows Noah Liberty to use the Living Creatures for Food: Here is no al­teration or diminishing of his Title to an absolute Propriety of all things, but only an Enlargement of his Commons.

As for the Government of the World before the Flood, I have al­ready acknowledged, that the Scrip [...]res being silent in it, no man can affirm any thing positively concerning it, whether it was Regal, Aristocra­tical, or Paternal, neither is it any Proof, that because God thought fit for our understanding the Age of the World, or the Genealogy of Noah, from whom all Mankind now takes its Original to set down a Series of the Pa­triarchs from Father to Son, or that because they were no obscure, unre­garded Men, that therefore they must all be absolute Princes, or Monarchs over their Families. This is, as a Father said long ago, Divinare [...]agis, quam scire. But I see, when Prejudice once blinds our Reasons, we easily make good that old saying, Facile credimus quod volumus. But as for your Quotation out of Iosephus, I grant indeed, that at the first sight it makes for you; but suppose it doth, I cannot see how a Man may can lay any stress upon it, since the Scripture, being silent of any such Monarchy, or Princi­pality [Page 72] in these Patriarchs, since this Author writes his History above three sand years, after the time that these Patriarchs lived, which he there men­tions; and that we are sure there were no Authors then extant, that writ of the Ante-Deluvian Patriarchs, but Moses only, Iosephus could speak no otherwise than by guess, or from some uncertain Tradi [...]ions preserved amongst the Pharisees, of which Sect he was: To which Traditions, when not warranted by Scripture▪ how little Credit is to be given, our Saviour himself teaches us. And also the many futilous Traditions of the Rabbins at this day, do sufficiently shew us: But I suppose that by this word [...], there used by Iosephus, (which is rendered by the Latine Version Principa­tus) is not meant any Monarchical Power, but only that Principality or Eminency, or that Reverence, and Respect which their Posterity paid them, either in regard of their great Age and Experience, or of the Spirit of God, with which they might be supposed to be endued, sufficient to make them to be taken notice of, and reverenced above all other Men living in their time. I have likewise upon better consideration, two other Reasons to add, why by the curam rerum, mentioned in this place, cannot be meant a Regal Power, because Iosephus mentions no such thing of Adam the f [...]rst Father, and as you suppose Monarch of Mankind; which sure he would have done had he believed him endued by God with such a Power.

The second Reason is, that if you please to observe, he ascribes to Ma­thuselab, Lamech, and Noah, as many years of Empire, as of Life: So that either this place of Iosephus signifies nothing at all, or else will make nothing to your purpose to prove these Antient Patriarchs to have been so many Monarchs.

I come now to the next Period of time after the Flood, and whereof I grant we may discourse with more certainty: But I could have wished you would have repeated more particularly the words, whereby you suppose God granted to Noah alone, an absolute Dominion over the whole Earth, and all the Creatures therein contained: But I perceive you thought the words not very favourable for you, or else you would have repeated, or read them to me, which since you omitted, I pray give me leave to do it for you, and then I will leave it to your self to judge whether there can be any thing drawn from this Text to countenance your Opinion;Gen. 9.1, 2, 3. the words are these: And God blessed Noah, and his Sons, and said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and Replenish the Earth. And the fear of you, and the dread of you shall be upon every Beast of the Earth, and upon every Fowl of the Air, upon all that moveth upon the Earth, upon all the Fishes of the Sea, into your hand are they delivered. Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for you; even as the green Herb have I given you all things: Where you may plainly see, that Noah hath no Prehe­minence in this Grant above his Children, who were (for as much as I can see) by this Text to be Tenants in Common with him of the Earth, and all its Creatures▪ Nor is there much difference between this Grant to Noah, and his Sons, and that made to Adam, and Eve, which I proved extended alike to all Mankind, more than that the Brute Animals are here granted to Noah, and his Sons for Food, which they were not before to Adam.

But I perceive you your self are sensible, that this is the most plain, and obvious sense of these words, and therefore you have thought good to [Page 73] wrest them so as may best serve your purpose; and indeed you deal very cunningly to say, that this Grant may be best under­stood with a Subordination in Succession;T. T. G. c. 4. p. 41. 'Tis true indeed, it serves best for your purpose, that it should be so understood, but that will be best understood by any body else, which best agrees with the Plain, and obvious Sense of the Words. Nor will your reason signifie any thing, that the Blessing might be truly fulfilled if the Sons either under, or after their Father enjoyed a private Dominion: Since that were to say that a Grant whose express Words, give a joynt Title in present (for the Text saith, Into your hands they are delivered) may best be understood with a subordination, or in succession, because 'tis possible that in subordination, or succession it may be so enjoyed, is all one as to say, that a Grant of any thing in present Possession, may best be understood in Reversion, because 'tis possible one may live so to enjoy it. And as for the other parts of this Grant, they are so expressed, that they must needs be understood to belong to Noah's Sons, not with a subordination, or in suc­cession, but as full and equally as to Noah himself: The fear of you, and the dread of you (says God) shall be upon every Beast, &c. Can any body in rea­son say, that the Creatures were to fear, and stand in awe of Noah only, and not of his Sons without his leave, or till after his death? And are the following words, (into your hands they are delivered,) to be understood, (as you say) if your Father please, or they shall be delivered into your hands hereafter? You do also as wisely to say, that if Adam had a private Dominion given him by God, that he would not now abrogate it: For I grant, that if he had given Adam any such private Dominion, that there had been no reason for him now to have changed it. But I think I have suffi­ciently proved at our last meeting, that he had no such private Dominion given him any more than Eve, and those Children that were to proceed from them. So that this supposition being false, there will be no such con­siderable difference as you suppose, between these two Texts. For certainly, (tho' it be not here expressed) Noah's Sons had as much Right to subdue or possess the Earth, as the Posterity of Adam had before the Flood, and like­wise to enjoy, or eat the Products thereof; only here is granted to Noah, Ib. p. 47. and his Sons, a Power to kill the Crea­tures for food, which was not granted to Adam, or those that lived before the Flood: And tho' you will have this Grant to be no diminishing of Noah's Title to a sole Propriety in all things, but only an Enlargement of his Commons; yet methinks it is a considerable Priviledge not only to himself, but his Sons likewise, who are hereby impowered to use the Creatures for food, as well as their Father, or else their Case[?] had been very hard, if when the Creatures were sufficiently multiplied, they might not have killed so much as a Hare, or a Partridge without his leave. And if they had a Right thus to use these Creatures, how this differs from an absolute Propriety in them when ever they are taken, my dull under­standing is not able to comprehend.

Well, since you will not admit of this sole Dominion of Noah over all things in the World: I shall not longer insist upon it, but will pass over to those other Authorities I have to produce out of Scripture.

I pray Sir, do; and to let you see how fair an Adversary I will be, [Page 74] I will for the present admit, that Noah was a Prince or Monarch over all his Posterity; but then pray shew me to whom this Power descended after his Decease, for I can see nothing in Scripture, that favours your Divine Right of Primogeniture, but that every one of Noah's Three Sons was a Prince alike over his own Family, and had an equal share in the Earth, and all its Products, the one as much as the other; so that here it is appa­rent your sole Monarchy of the World dwindles into a sort of Gavel-kind where all the Sons inherit alike.

I cannot deny the matter of Fact to be as you have laid down, but then there might be very good reason for it, which might render the sole Principality of Noah's Eldest Son to be not only unlawful,F. O. G. p. 49. but unpracticable, for in the first place Mr. Selden in his Mare Cl [...]sum (in the place afore­cited) tells us,L. 1. c. 4. from the Antient Tradition of the Jewish Rabbins, That Noah himself, as Lord of all, was Author of the distribution of the World, and of private Dominion, and that by the appointment of an Oracle from God, be did confirm this distribution by his last Will, and Testament, which at his Death he lef [...] in the hands of his Eldest Son Shem, and also warned all his Sons, that none of them should invade any of their Brothers Dominions, or injure one another, because from thence Discord, and Civil Wars would necessarily follow.

Nor do I see any reason why Noah might not emancipate his two Youn­ger Sons from the Dominion of the Elder, and likewise give them a sepa­rate share of the Earth, and also an independent Power over their own Fa­mily, and Posterity. In the second place, it might be impracticable for one Man to Govern all Mankind, when in a little time it became so multiplied and dispersed over the Face of the Earth, and the Languages so confounded by the Act, or Will of God, that it was impossible for the Three Elder Sons, of these three great Patriarchs, to govern them. But during the Life of Noah, B. P. P. § 10. we do not read that any of his Chil­dren, or Descendants, withdrew themselves from him with­out his leave,Gen. 11.1, 2. but rather the contrary; for it is said, The whole Earth was of one Language, and of one Speech; and it came to pass as they journeyed from the East, that they found a Plain in the Land of Shi­nar, &c By which words it appears they kept well enough together; and the very reason why they began to build the Tower, was left, (said they) We should be scattered abroad upon the Face of the whole Earth: So that there was no disunion amongst them, nor so much as a desire of it, whilst Noah lived.

I pray give me leave to answer what you have said concerning this Distribution of the Earth by Noah's last Will, and also his making all his Sons Lords, or Monarchs alike, both which favour so strong­ly of the Rabbinical Liberty of Invention, that I wonder how any Learned Man can believe such idle Stories, especially when the Scripture, and the most Antient Histories, and Records that are extant in the World, mention no such thing; and tho' Ios [...]phus may in the place you have cited suppose that every one of the Patriarchs he mentions, were Princes, or Monarchs, yet he doth not say any thing like it, concerning the Three Sons of Noah's being Monarchs, or of this Partition of the Earth between them, but maketh [Page 75] them to live together in those Mountainous parts, till they descended from thence into the Plain; so that it was impossible for Noah to make a Distri­bution of those parts of the Earth, which were not yet discovered; and it is apparent by the Scripture it self, that a considerable time after Noah's Death all Mankind lived together, and therefore there was no impossibility (as you suppose) why Noah's Eldest Son could not have commanded his Brethren, and their Descendants, they being not as yet dispersed, or sepa­rated from each other, as you may see by the first Verses of [...] of Genesis, which you cited but now. So that if Noah's Eldest Son was dis­inherited of his Right of Governing his Brethren, and their Descendants, that could not be the cause of it, which you assign; and if Primogeniture be a Divine Right appointed by God himself, and unalterable by Humane Laws, as you suppose, I cannot see how the Will of a Father▪ which is but a Humane Institution, can ever alter it: For I remember you laid it down as a Maxim, at our last meeting, That the Divine Right of the Right Heir never dies, can be lost, or taken away; so that if there hath been any such thing as a Divine Right of Primogeniture belonging to the Eldest Son of Noah, it is not likely that he would have permitted his two Brothers to have usurped it from him.

I shall not insist longer on this Tradition, concerning the Distri­bution of the Earth amongst the Sons of Noah; but certainly it is not a thing to be made so slight of as you do, since Cedrenus a Modern Greek Hi­storian, is very particular in it; besides, so many other Learned Men (and the great Selden among the rest) have given countenance to it. And tho' I grant that Primogeniture is of Divine Right, yet that might very well be altered by Noah's Will, especially, since his Children might be satisfied that he being a Prophet, and Preacher of Righteousness, might make this Di­vision of his Paternal Power by a Divine Command.

But I shall not dwell longer upon this, but proceed to the next Period of Time; (viz.) that of the Confusion, and Dispersion of Tongues, in which there are more evident Footsteps of this Right of Primogeniture, as also of the Patriarchal Power I maintain: And therefore pray turn to the 10th of Genesis, and there you will find (after the Recital of the Genealogy of eve­ry one of the Sons of Noah, whose Des [...]endants are there particularly set down) these words in the fifth verse; By these were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their Lands; F. P. P. § 4. every one after his Tongue, after their Families in their Nations: And likewise in the 20th verse; These are the Sons of Ham, after their Families; after their Tongues in their Countreys, and in their Nations. And in the last verse; These are the Families of the Sons of Noah, and their Generations in their Nations; and by these were the Nations divided in the Earth after the Flood. So that if we consider the first Plantations of the World, which were after the Building of Babel, and the Confusion of Tongues, we may find the Division of the Earth into distinct Kingdoms, or Nations, by several Families and Languages,F. A. MM. p. 275. whereof the Sons, or Grand-children of Noah, were the Kings, or Gover­nours, by a Fatherly Right: And for the preservation of this Power, and Right in these Fathers, God was pleased upon several Families to bestow a Language on each by it self, the better to unite it into a Nation or Kingdom. [Page 76] So that it becoming impossible (as I said before) for the Elder Sons or De­scendants of these Three great Patriarchs to Govern all Mankind, who now no longer understood each other's Language, it was absolutely necessary that the Heads of the several Families should take that care upon them, and their Children submit to them; wherein they had the direction of God Almighty, who had commanded them to obey their Parents, and a mira­culous declaration of his Will for their Dispersion, by the confounding of their Language, and that so ordered by God too, that the Descendants of the same Person, and Family, spoke one Tongue; was not this a declaring these Fathers Princes of these several Families, and Tongues by God him­self, who by his Providence had thus confounded their Tongues, and dis­persed them by Families, that they could no longer be governed by Three, or Four Patriarchs, but must have as many distinct Governments, as there were different Tongues, there being no means at present of any intercourse, or correspondence one with another, or with their former Governours? So that however in this Confusion of Tongues (by which, as Iosephus supposes, there were Seventy two distinct Nations erected) yet were they not con­fused Multitudes without Heads, or Governours, and at liberty to chuse what Governours, or Government they pleased, but were so many distinct Families which had Fathers for Rulers over them of the same Speech:B. P. P. § 10. Whereby it is manifest, that even in the Confusion, God was careful to preserve Fa­therly Authority, and Monarchical Power entire, by distributing the di­versity of Languages according to the diversity of Families; which shews that God was still for Government, and that Paternal too, since it is evi­dent that every People followed their Ancestor, or Patriarch, as their Prince or Leader in this Dispersion, who had a Patriarchal Authority over their Posterity; for by what else can you suppose they could have made their Children, and Descendants, to have followed them as far as the ut­most Isles of the Gentiles?

I confess there are many difficulties as well in the time, as manner of this Dispersion, according to our Common Chronology; for if you suppose, that the Building of the Tower of Babel, fell out within two hun­dred years after the Flood, as most of our Chronologers, who follow the Hebrew account, do, then it is certain, that Noah, and his Sons, were still alive, who lived till above four hundred years after the Flood; so that either Noah, and his Sons, did not travel with the rest of their Descendants into the Plain of Shinar, where they built the Tower of Babel, which yet seems contrary to the Text, which says, All Mankind being of one Language, they travelled, &c. And if these Children, and Grand-children left their An­cestors at home, what become of their Monarchical Authority, when their Subjects were gone? & you your self do assert, that none of Noah's Posterity divided from him, as long as he lived; so on the other side, if you suppose, that Noah, and his Sons marched along with them in this Expedition, you must make them either to have quitted their Authority over their Descen­dants, or else to have joyned with them in this wicked, and foolish Enter­prize of Building a Tower, whose top should reach to Heaven, which is very hard to conceive of Noah, a Preacher of Righteousness, or his Sons, whom the Scripture no where mentions, or blames for having a hand in this Attempt.

[Page 77]But if you will lay the fault of Building this Tower upon Nimrod, as Iosephus doth, who makes him a great Tyrant, and a wicked Man,L. 1. c. 4. this will make against your own Hypo­thesis, which supposes no Rebellion, or Usurpation to have been during the Life of Noah. So that to avoid these Absurdities, and Difficulties that will follow by the placing the Building of the Tower of Ba­bel, within two hundred years after the Flood (as you must do if you fol­low the present Hebrew Account) I think it were much better to embrace the Account of the LXX. which by adding a hundred years to the Lives of each Patriarch between Noah, and Abraham, makes the Confusion of Tongues to have happened not till about five hundred years after the Flood, which takes away those Absurdities I mentioned, of making Noah, and his Sons to have had a hand in the Building of the Tower of Babel, or else that Nimrod did it, whether they would or not; which is likewise as hard to suppose; all which Difficulties, according to this Account, may very well be taken away; since then, Noah, and his Sons were dead, before ever this Tower began to be built: And for the further proof of this, I refer you to the Learned Isaac Vossius his Vindication of the Translation of the LXX. and his Chronology accommodated to that account, as most agreeable to the Antient Hebrew Original; but this is only by the by.

I thank you, Sir, for your solution of this great Difficulty which I am satisfied cannot be better solved, than by this Account of the LXX Ver­sion. But I pray answer my Argument, which in my Opinion clearly makes out the Divine Institution, as well as necessity of Patriarchal Power.

I was just coming to it, and therefore in the first place I must tell you, that I cannot imagine how you can prove from this Text concerning the Dispersion of Nations, and their following certain Leaders of their own Family, and Language, when otherwise they could not have conversed to­gether, that therefore God must be careful in all this transaction to pre­serve your Imaginary Patriarchal Power entire; of which the Scripture is altogether silent;F. T. G. c. 11. p. 177. and you might as well tell me, that because in Hannibal's, or Darius's Army, there were whole Squadrons of different Languages, who were ranged under Captains of their own Language or Countrey, that therefore Fathers, or Grand-fathers were Leaders of each Squadron, or that Darius, or Hannibal, were careful to preserve Paternal Authority.

But suppose I grant you the utmost you can ask, yet, since God thought fit at this Confusion of Tongues, that all those of one Tribe should speak the same Language, which was not understood by any other, it is likewise very reasonable to suppose, that they could not travel so far as the utmost parts of Asia, without chusing, and following some Captain Leaders to be their Guides, and Commanders in so long a Journey; and whom could the People sooner chuse to follow for this purpose than their Fathers, or Grand-fathers, to whose natural Affection, Wisdom, and long Experience, they had from their very Infancy always paid a great respect, and submis­sion: Yet doth it not therefore follow, that such Fathers, or Grand-fathers, thus led, or commanded their Children, and Posterity (now grown up to be Men and Women) by any Natural, or Divine Right, or that they [Page 78] followed them otherwise than as an Army of Volunteers, or than as a Caravan in the Desarts of Arabia doth a Captain of its own chusing. But if you will suppose any thing beyond this, you will find your self involved in greater Difficulties, and Absurdities. For pray tell me, what great Care was there to preserve a Patriarchal Authority in this Confusion and Dis­persion, by breaking it into so many parts? Indeed I am so blind I cannot see it. For as I will not deny, but it was God's Will to confound the Lan­guage, and disperse the Families of Mankind, both for a Punishment, and also for the better Peopling of the World: So am I not convinced, that God in acting thus, was at all careful to preserve the Patriarchal Authority, deriv'd from Adam. For you cannot deny but that at the same time he de­stroyed the true Supreme Fatherhood of the Natural Monarch, or Heir of Adam, who could be but one Person, as you your self have already asserted; or, can it be any reason to say, that God for the preservation of Paternal Authority, let so many several new Governments, with their Governours start up, who must all enjoy this Authority? And is it not more reaso­nable to say, that God was careful to destroy this Paternal Authority, when he suffered those of Noah's Sons, or Descendants then actually in Possession of it, to have their Monarchy torn in pieces, and shared by so many of their Subjects? And would it not be an excellent Argument for Monar­chical Government to say, when any Monarchy was shattered to pieces, and divided amongst many revolted Subjects, that God was only careful to preserve Monarchical Power, by rending a great settled Empire, into a multitude of little Governments. So that it is altogether irrational to con­ceive, that if any three, or more Right Heirs of Noah had Paternal Autho­rity, or Soveraignty by Right of Fatherhood over Mankind at Babel, that the next moment, (all they yet living) seventy two others should have a like Soveraignty by Right of Fatherhood over the same People, divided into so many distinct Governments; either then these seventy two Fathers were actually Rulers, just before the Confusion, and then they were not one People, but an Aristocratical Common-Wealth, and then where was your Monarchy? Or else these seventy two Fathers had Paternal Authority, but knew it not, which is hard to suppose. And if these seventy two Grand-children of the Sons of Noah, had a Right to divide this Supreme Pa­ternal Authority of Adam into as many distinct Governments as there were Heads of Families, why might not their Sons have done so in infinitum? And then there could never be any Common Prince, or Monarch set over them all, but by Force, or Conquest, or else by Election: Either of which destroys your Notion of the Divine Right of Primogeniture.

'Tis a very pleasant Notion, methinks, this of yours, that the Po­sterity of the first Planters of the World, should follow their Ancestors, not as Children, or Subjects, but as Volunteers, and from a Reverence (forsooth) and Affection to their Age,B. P. P. § 60. Wisdom, and Experience. Indeed I am thus far of your mind, that these Children followed their Fathers freely, and were not driven afore them, nor dragged after them with Chains: But to infer from hence, that they owed their Father none of this Service, or Attendance, but out of meer good Nature and Gratitude, which are due to Strangers that have obliged us, by being our Benefactors, is a Notion [Page 79] that only becomes one, that owns no Right to be derived from Patriar­chal, or Paternal Power; and since there was none of these Patriarchs, who were the Leaders of Mankind in this Dispersion, but might be one, or two hundred years old, if not more; can any thing in Nature look more ridi­culous, than for the Children, and Descendants of these Old Men to elect them who begat them to be their Leaders, and Governours, at a hundred years of Age?

And to give you an Answer why Governments might not upon my Principles crumble into new ones,Ib. 63. in infinitum, I think it may be sufficient to tell you, that First, God prevented it, and that for the most part by Monarchs, ever since the Creation of the World; and altho' he was pleased to permit many Divisions after this time; yet he would ne­ver suffer Mankind to be crumbled into such small Divisions as to make every distinct Houshold an Independent Government. Secondly, Those Monarchs prevented it, who would be sure to reduce to their Subjection, any person that should attempt to divide himself, or Family, from the rest, and set up for an Independant State without his leave, and liking. Thirdly, The necessity of Mankind prevented it, such small parcels of Men not being able to preserve themselves, but by uniting with the rest, for their Support and Protection: So that if you could never so clearly prove that here was no Subordination to the Eldest Son, or Heir of Noah, yet this sig­nifieth nothing, for God ordered it so to be; and if these Grand sons of Noah were Independant Governours of their own Families, with any Sub­ordination to the Eldest Son's Son or Heir of Noah; yet were they still So­veraign Princes, and much less had any dependance upon their own Chil­dren and Descendants. So that hitherto the Multitude were kept under Subjection, and could not set up a Common-wealth without rebelling against those Independant Governours.

Now if in this horrible Confusion of Tongues, the People by the Will of God still fell under the Monarchical Government of these Fathers of Fa­milies, I desire to know when they could obtain their Freedom, and in what Age it began?

I must confess you had some Reasons to look upon my Notion of the Descendants of the Sons of Noah following their Ancestors in this Dis­persion, not as Children, or Subjects, but as Volunteers, to be as ridiculous as you are pleased to make it, could you have any way proved at our last meeting, that the Power of Parents over their Children, and Grand-chil­dren to all Generations, is as absolute, and perpetual, as that of a Master over his Slaves, and that a Son and a Servant were all one at the first; but since you failed in that Proposition, which is the ground-work of all the rest, I must beg your pardon, if I cannot found the Descendants of Noah, following their Fathers, or Ancestors in the Dispersion, upon any higher ground, than meer Gratitude and Esteem: I mean for all such of them, who were themselves at that time Masters, or Heads of separate Families; and I desire to know of you by what other Motive, or Obligation, a Great Grand-son (for Example) was obliged to follow his Great Grand father to the World's end, as his Prince, or Leader, when perhaps his own Father thought fit to lead him another way; and I desire you to shew me if they had (as they might very well have) commanded different things, which [Page 80] was to be obeyed? And how Disobedience to a Man's own Father in this case would have consisted with that Law of Nature, which you so much in­sist upon, of honouring a Man's Father. But indeed all this mistake pro­ceeds from your first false Notion, which I see you cannot yet be quit of, in still supposing the Obedience, and Subjection of Children to their Fa­thers to be absolute, and perpetual: The contrary to which I have alrea­dy made out at our last meeting: And therefore I must tell you again, that this Notion of these Grand-children, or Descendants following their Fa­thers, or Ancestors, not out of Duty, but Choice, is not so ridiculous as you are pleased to make it; and tho' I do not suppose that they Elected these Ancestors of theirs for their Leaders by a Balotting-Box, yet this much I am sure of, that they might prefer, if they pleased, the following of their Father, or Grand-father, rather than their Great Grand-father, if they perceived that he had doted through Age, or else by Weakness, or Infirmities, was unable to lead them, or that his natural temper was so Imperious, and Tyrannical, that there was no living under his Government? Neither doth the Scripture it self any where declare the contrary, only says in general, that by these Grand-sons of Noah, the Isles, or Countreys of the Gentiles were divided, according to their Families, and Nations, without particularly telling us, who were the Princes, or Leaders of each Tribe, or Family. And to instance, if this Division happened in the time of Peleg, or Phaleg, as the Greek LXX. makes it, then not Arphaxad the Great Grand-father, or Selah the Grand-father, but Heber the Grand-son was the Prince or Leader of his Family at this Division: Since it is from him that Iosephus supposes the Hebrews not only to have descended,L. 1. c. 6. but to have taken their Names.

Nor do you any better answer the other Difficulty, how all these Seventy two Patriarchs, or Great Grand-fathers, could all of them claim alike Regal Power from Adam, or Noah, whose Right Heir could be but one Per­son. Indeed you tell me, that God ordered it so, by appointing every Nation a distinct Language, and to be led by the Ancestor of their Family: This is altogether gratis dictum; for tho' it be true, that the Scripture says, That this Division of Tongues was made according to the different Tribes, or Families of these Descendants of Noah; yet doth it no where mention their being led or commanded by Seventy two Grand-fathers Patriarchs, and there might be, for ought that you or I know, not only Seventy two, but Seven-score such Captains, or Leaders of them, Nay, every distinct Father of a Family, when this Monarchical Power came to be crumbled into so many parts, might as well have claimed a share in this Regal Power, they being by this Confusion wholly reduced again into a State of Nature.

Nor are your Reasons sufficient to convince me of the contrary. As for your first Reason, that God hath not suffered it to be so, signifies little; for either he hath hindered it by an express Command, or by the Ordinary Course of his Providence: The former, I am sure, you can no where shew me; and as for the latter, when ever any Nation, or People, shall be pres­sed with the like Necessity of separating themselves from the Government under which they were born, as the several Families of Mankind had at this Division of Tongues: I see no reason why they may not have a like Right of quitting their Countrey, and becoming Subjects to another [Page 81] Government; or else of setting up one of their own if they can.

As for your second Reason, that Monarchs would be sure to reduce to their Subjection any person that should offer to divide himself, and Fa­mily from the rest, and set up for an Independant State without their good leave, and liking. This is a good Argument indeed, tha [...] they might not be able to do it, but none at all that they ought not to do it if they could, since this were but to exercise that Supreme Paternal Authority with which God hath invested them as much as ever [...]e did any of those Seventy two Descendants of Noah, who set up so many New Governments without the Consent of Noah's Heir.

Your third Reason, I confess, is somewhat better: That the Necessity of Mankind prevented it, but this also makes quite against you, and only proves, that the Heads or Masters of Families being sensible they could not preserve themselves, but by uniting with others for their mutual Safety, and Protectio [...], were fain to submit, (tho' b [...] their own Consents,) to some Common Power, for their own as well as their Families Preserva­tion. So that I cannot see from any thing you have said, that God had that great care you suppose of maintaining your Patriarchal Power, much less this Divine Right of Primogeni [...]ure.

I see it is to no purpose to wrangle with you any farther about the Patriarchal Power of these Sons of Noah, and there­fore I shall proceed to the Times after the Confu­sion of Tongues;F. P. c. 1. § 8. in which, the first Instance I shall give you is, that of Iacob, who when he had bought his Brothers Birth-right,Gen. 27.29. Isaac blessed him thus; Be Lord over thy Brethren, and let the Sons of thy Mother bow down before thee. By which is plainly denoted a Regal Power, or Dominion over Esau his Brother, and the rest of his Brethren, if he had had any. So likewise we find—

I pray give me leave to interrupt you alittle, for I have a great deal to say to this Instance you have now brought of Iacob, and Esau, and therefore I desire I may speak it before you proceed any further. And first by the way, I cannot but observe, that this Divine Right of Primogeni­ture which you suppose here to be meant by the word Birth-right, was ca­pable of being sold for a Mess of Pottage, and all Esau's Heirs disinherited of their Right, because their Father preferred his Belly, before his Honour or Interest. But if your Principles are true, a Divine Right never dieth, nor can be lost or taken away.

The second thing I must take notice of,T.T.G. c. 11. p. 145. is your un­fair dealing, in making Isaac to have presently after this Sale of the Birth right, and as it were in confirmation of it, to have given Iacob his Blessing, whereas it is apparent by this story in Gen. 25. that many years past (perhaps twenty or thirty) between Iacob's buying of this Birth-right, and Isaac's conferring of the Blessing upon him, as any one that will but read the 26th of Genesis, may easily see. But if you had better observed this Text, you would have found that this Blessing was nor in­tended for Iacob, but Esau for whom Isaac then mistook him; but be it as it will, whether the Blessing was given to Iacob, or Esau, it matters not; [Page 82] for from these words I can by no means gather, that any Government, or Superiority, was thereby conferred on Esau over Iacob, or Iacob over Esau. For first▪ as to Iacob this Blessing was never fulfilled, as to be [...]ord over Esau, who was Prince of Mount S [...]ir in Iacob's life time; and as for bow­ing, or any other token of Superiority, we read indeed that Iacob at his meeting his Brother Esau, bowed seven times towards him to the ground, tho' he had before sold his Birth-right to Iacob; and therefore this Birth-right cannot mean any Ruling Power, or Lordship over his Brethren; since it is manifest from the Text, that Iacob had no more Brothers than Esau;Ib. p. 146. nor had Isaac any consideration of Iacob's having then bought this Birth-right; for when he thus blessed him, he took him not to be Iacob, but Esau; nor did Esau understand any connexion between the Birth-right, and the Blessing; for▪ says he to his Father, He hath supplanted me th [...]se two times, he took away my Birth right, and behold now he hath taken away my Blessing. Whereas, had this Blessing, to be Lord over his Brethren belonged to the Birth-right, Esau could not have complained of this second as a Cheat, Iacob having got no­thing▪ but what Esau had sold him long before.

So that it is plain Dominion was not then understood to belong either to the Birth-right, or Blessing. And therefore it is more rational to suppose, that this word Birth right, only relates to the Right of Priesthood, which the Jews supposed always to descend to the Eldest Son, before the Law was given: And that by Blessing, is meant no more, than that double portion of Goods, which by the Jewish Law was due to the First-born; and that this is the true sense of this place, I desire you to look in Gen. 21.10. (if you please to give me your Bible I will shew you the place, and will read the words to you) where Sarah taking Isaac to be Heir, says, Cast out this Bond-woman and her Son, for the Son of this Bond-woman shall not be Heir with my Son: Whereby could be meant nothing, but that he should not have a Pretence to any equal share of his Fathers Estate after his Death, but should have his Portion presently, and be gone: And Farther we read,T.T. G. p. 147. Gen. 25.5, 6. That Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac, but unto the Sons of the Concubines which Abraham had, Abraham gave Gifts, and sent them away from Isaac his Son, while he yet lived; that is, Abraham having given Por­tions to all his other Sons, and sent them away, that which he had reserved, being the greatest part of his Substance, Isaac as Heir possessed after his Death, but by being Heir he had no Right to be Lord over his Brethren: For if he had, why should Sarah desire to rob him of one of his Subjects, or Slaves, by desiring to have him sent away?

So likewise, if you look into the first of Chron. chap. 5. v. 12. you will find a place, that plainly confirms this Interpreta­tion, where it is said;Ib. p. 148. Reuben was the First-born, but for as much as he defiled his Fathers Bed, his Birth-right was given unto the Sons of Joseph, the Son of Israel, and the Genealogy is not to be reckoned after the Birth-right; for Judah prevailed above his Brethren, and of him came the Chief Ruler; but the Birth-right was Joseph's; tho' he was the Youngest Son; and that this Birth right was Iacob's Blessing on Ioseph, Gen. 58.28. tells us in these words; Moreover I have given thee one Portion [Page 83] above thy Brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorites with my Sword' and with my Bow. Whereby it is not only plain, that the Birth-right was nothing but a double Portion; but the Text in Chronicles is expresly against your Opinion, and shews that Dominion was no part of the Birth-right; for it tells us, That Joseph had the Birth-right, but Judah the Domi­nion. So that unless you were very fond of this word Birth-right, without considering in what sense it is to be taken, you would never bring this In­stance of Iacob and Esau, to prove that Dominion belongs to the Eldest Son, over his Brethren: For if this Blessing of Isaac upon Iacob signifies any thing more than this, it could not relate to his own Person, who never Ruled over his Brother at all; and therefore it is at most no more, than a Prophecy, shewing that the Jews, as being descended from Iacob, should in after-times Rule over the Edomites, or Posterity of Esau, according to what Rebekah had been foretold from God. Two Nations are in thy Womb, Gen. 25.23. and two manner of People shall be separa­ted from thy Bowels, and the one People sha [...]l be stronger than the other People, and the Elder shall serve the Younger. And so Iacob bles­sed Iudah, and gave him (tho' not in his own Person, but in his Posterity) the Scepter, and Dominion: From whence you might have argued as well, that the Dominion belonged to the Third Son over his Brethren; as well as from this Blessing of Isaac, that it belonged to Iacob, they being both but Predictions of what should long after happen to their Posterities, and not declaring any Hereditary Right of Dominion in either Iacob, or Iudah.

I will not rigorously insist, that Primogeniture is such a Divine Right as cannot be altered by any Humane Act, or Constitution; but yet I take it to be such a Right, that without the Father orders it otherwise, B. P. P. § 68. in his life-time, or that the Elder Brother doth of his own accord depart from his Right, he will have a good Title to his Fathers Government, or Kingdom, and conse­quently to Command over the rest of his Brethren; and therefore Grotius makes a great deal of difference, between Hereditary, and Patrimonial Kingdoms, the former being to descend to the Eldest Son only, but the latter are divisible amongst all the Sons, if the Father please: And hence I sup­pose it was, that as Mankind encreased, one petty Kingdom grew out of another.Ibid. § 12. Thus the Land of Canaan, which was Peopled by six Sons of Canaan, and Philistim the Son of Mizraim, had eight or nine Kings in the time of Abraham, and above thirty Kings in Ioshua's time, which could proceed from no other Cause, but the Fathers dividing their Kingdoms in their life-times, or at their Death amongst their Sons, and Descendants; for we hear not of one Tittle of Popular Elections in those early days. And I have proofs enough of this in Scripture. Since thus we find it to have been among the Sons of Ishmael, F. P. c. 1. v. 16. § 6. v. 40. and Esau, as appears by Gen. 25 and 26. where it is said, These are the Sons of Ishmael, and these are their Names by their Castles, and Towns, &c. Twelve Princes of their Tribes, and Families. And these are the Names of the Dukes that came of Esau, according to their Families, and their Places by their Nations. And hence it is, that in after Ages, Princes did often divide their Kingdoms amongst their Children, of which you may [Page 84] see divers Examples in Grotius de I. B. L. II Cap. 7. which Di­visions,§ 12. when made and submitted to by the Eldest Son, I doubt not but were good. Yet I think it cannot be denied for all this, that by the Law of Nature, or Nations, where there is no Will of the Father de­clared to the contrary, the Eldest Son ought to inherit. And this is the Judgment not only of Christian, but Heathen Writers. Thus Herodotus the most Antient Greek Historian,Herod. Polym. lays it down for a general Custom of all People, or Nations, that the Eldest Son should enjoy the Empire; and the Romans were likewise of this Opinion; and therefore Livy, when he speaks of two Brothers of the All [...]broges, contending for the Kingdom, says, The Younger was more strong in Force, than Right. And in another place, he calls this Right of the Eldest Son, the Right of Age and Nature; as also doth Trogus Pompaeius in his Epitome of Iustine, Iustin. L.XI. when he calls it the Right of Nations; and in another place, a Right of Na­ture, when he says,Iustin. L.II. that Artabazanes the Eldest Son of the King of Persia, challenged the Kingdom himself, which the Order of his Birth and Nature it self appointed amongst Nations. I could give you many other Authorities from more Modern Authors, but I rather chuse to give you these, because you cannot except against them, as Writers pre­possest by either Jewish, or Christian Principles. So that if this Right of Primogeniture be not absolutely Divine, yet it is at least most Natural, and Reasonable.

I see you are convinced, that this Divine Right of Primogeniture, is not to be proved out of Scripture, and therefore you are contented to fall a Peg lower, and to take up with the Right of Eldership by the Law of Nature, or Nations, which howsoever you are pleased to confound them, are for all that two distinct things; for if the Succession of the Eldest Son were by the Law of Nature, it were no more to be altered by the Will of a Father, than the Law of God it self; and therefore notwithstanding all your Quotations, your Right of Primogeniture amounts to no more than this, that it hath been a Common, and received Custom in many King­doms, or Nations to observe it; and therefore Herodotus, whom you have now quoted, calls it very rightly a Custom of Nations, that the Eldest Son should enjoy the Empire: Which yet is not true amongst all Nations, or People by your own confession: For then there would have been no difference be­tween Hereditary, and Patrimonial Kingdoms; but the Eldest Son should have inherited alone in the one as well as in the other. Unless you can sup­pose (as sure you will not) that some Kingdoms are to be disposed accord­ing to the Law of Nature, and others not. But if you would have consider­ed Grotius (whom you have now made use of) he would have instructed you better. For in the Chapter you have now cited, he makes the diffe­rence between them to depend upon the manner of acquiring the Kingdoms he speaks of; if you please I will shew you the words; Sed in Regnorum Successione distingui debent Regna quae pleno modo possidentur, G. I. B. Lib. II. Cap. 7. § 12. & in Patrimonio sunt, ab his quae modum habendi accipiunt ex populi consensu, de quo discri­mine egimus supra. Prioris generis Regna dividi possunt etiam inter Mares, & foe­minas ut in Aegypto, & Britannia: olim factum vidimus.

ait Lucanus; de Britannis Tacitus, Neque enim Sexum in imperio discernunt. But look a little farther, and you will find the reason of the difference be­between them: At ea Regna quae populi libero consensu facta sunt haereditaria, § 14. ex praesumbia populi voluntate deferuntur. Praesumitur autem populus id voluisse quod maxime expedit: And of this you may see he giveth divers Examples, which we need not particularly recite: But this much is apparent, that Patrimonial Kingdoms are divisible among all the Children, because they are supposed to be wholly in the Father's Power, either by Conquest, or the first Plantation of them: But Hereditary ones that descend to the Eldest Son, can only become so, by the free Con­sent of the People by whom they were Instituted; and therefore both Ishmael, and Esau, whose Territories were wholly Patrimonial, might very well divide them alike, amongst all their Sons; but then your Natural Right of Primogeniture is quite destroyed. The like may be said of other Kingdoms, where this Custom took place: And therefore those places which you have cited out of the Greek and Roman Authors of the Succes­sion of the Eldest Son to be by the Law of Nature, is to be understood ac­cording to the sense of those Authors, who often confounded the Law of Nature, or Reason, properly so called, with those commonly used, or recei­ved Customs among Civilized People; which they called the Law of Na­tions, which yet were not Laws properly so called, since they may without any transgression of the Law of Nature be practised different ways.

And therefore, tho' I allow Primogeniture, as well in Families, as King­doms, to have had a just Preheminence by the Practice of many Civilized Nations, and look upon it as an excellent sort of Natural Lot (where the Elder Brother is fit to Govern) that he should succeed before the Younger, to avoid Strife among such Relations, and Civil Wars in Kingdoms: Yet that this is still to be understood, according to the Custom of the Country, or Will of the People, that Instituted the Monarchy, I desire to go no farther, than that Example that you have but now brought of Artabazanes, who was the Eldest Son of Artaxerxes, but born before he was King, and Xerxes his Younger Son, but born after his obtaining the Crown; the matter be­ing referred to the People, they determined it in favour of Xerxes; as you will find in Herodotus and Iustin, whom you have but now quoted. And tho' I grant, that when afterwards in the same Kingdom the like Contro­versie was started between Cyrus and Arsicas (who was afterwards called Artaxerxes Mnemon) i [...] was judged just the quite contrary way, whether by Right, or Favour, I will not determine; yet this may let you plainly see, that this Antient, and Wise Nation, had no settled [...]aw, either Natural, or Municipal concerning this matter. I could give you several other Instances of the same kind, which you may consult at your leisure in Grotius, and other Authors; only this much may be certainly gathered from what your self, as well as I have said concerning it, that there is no certain Rule, or Law, either of Nature, or Nations concerning this matter: And therefore your Instances of the Sons of Esau, and Ishmael, are so far from making out your Hypothesis, that if their Fathers could divide [...]heir Kingdoms into as many parts as they had Sons, without any Subjection to the Elder Brother, [Page 86] I can see no reason why every one of their Children, or Descendants, might not have done the like if they had pleased, till their Principalities had be­come as small, as those of the Princes Ashalt, or Dukes of Saxony are at this day; so that I cannot see, to what purpose you have brought these last In­stances out of Scripture, unless it were to make against your self, and to prove, that there were then, as there are now in the World, a sort of Prin­ces, who may be lawfully so, without claiming any Title from Adam, or Noah, much less by any Right of Primogeniture.

It is sufficient for my purpose to be able to shew you from these Examples of the Sons of Esau, and Ishmael, that as well Hereditary as Testa­mentary Kingdoms, did Antiently commence according to the Law, or received Custom amongst Nations without any consent of the People, or Descendants of those that were to be Governed by them, and as long as the Succession to such Kingdoms were by any certain, or known Rule constantly practised among Mankind, the matter is not much whether the Eldest Son succeed to his Father alone, or that his Brethren shared with him in the Inheritance. For since it was God's will to institute Civil Government amongst Mankind, it must be also his Will to make the Suc­cession to it clear, and certain to all the Subjects that were to submit to it, as he hath done, whether one Brother or many succeed, since the Will of the Father is as certain a Rule of Succession, as that by Inheritance and therefore what you have said in answer to my last instances of the Sons of Esau and Israel signifies not much.

I did not then deny, but grant at your last meeting, that Fami­lies might at first grow up into Kingdoms, but yet I do still (as I did then) assert that such Governments could not be instituted by any Father, or Grand-Father alone, without the express or tacit consent of his Children and Descendants, supposing them once Married and separated from their Fathers or Ancestors Families; but it is needless to repeat what I then said only, give me leave to mind you, that at the beginning of this Discourse, you maintain'd that not only Kingly Power in General, but also the suc­cession to it by the Eldest Son, or his next Brother is of Divine Right or Institution, or else all that you urged concerning the Natural right of Do­minion of Cain over Abel was to no purpose; But now you insist that succession by a Testament, or Will of the Father, is also as much by the Law of Nature as the other, in which I think you are very much mistaken, since the right of bequeathing Kingdoms, or any thing else by Testament is neither prescribed by the Revealed Will of God, nor the Laws of Nature, since all setled Property in Lands or Goods, before the institution of a Civil Government, proceeding only from occupancy or possession, must cease in the State of Nature, with the life of the occupant or possessor. Therefore in that state a Testament cannot take place by the Testators Death; since as soon as he Dyeth, his right in the thing bequeathed is quite lost and extinguished; so that the Dead not having an interest in any thing, the Legatee cannot sustain the person of the Testator, whose Right ceases before that of the Legate can take place? And there­fore the Testament or Disposition of such things, may then without any Crime be neglected or altered by the Survivors, unless all those who pretend an interest in it do agree to it, or swear to see it fulfilled, [Page 87] during the Testators Life time: And for this cause we find Abraham binding his Servant that ruled over his House with an Oath not to take a Wife for his Son of the Daughters of the Land;Gen. 24.2, 3. And Iacob taking an Oath of Ioseph, Gen. 49.29. not to bury him in Egypt, because they doubted whether they could ob­lige their Sons or Servants to do it by their Testaments; So that it appears evident to me that the Power of making Testaments, and bequeathing Lands or Goods, is but a consequence of that Propriety, in Lands, Goods, or Domi­nions, which arises from compact or common consent in a Kingdom or Common-wealth, after it is instituted as I think I am able to prove whenever you please to discourse with me farther about it. But as for the Right of be­queathing Crowns or Kingdoms by Testament, as I will not deny, but that some Kingdoms may have been bequeathable by their Original Constitution, and others become so by Custom, yet I cannot grant that this Right belonged to the Prince or Monarch by the Laws of God or Nature; but proceeded p [...]rely from the received Law or continued Custom of that Kingdom, so that you must either confess, that there is no such thing as a Divine Right of Succession, or else it is such a one as signifies as much as nothing, since hu­mane Laws or Constitutions can alter it or take it away. So that after all this Pother about this Divine Right, it is not so good as an old Estate Tayle, which formerly no fine could bar; And I must farther tell you, that I can­not assent to your opinion, that succession by a Will or a Testament is so certain as that by Inheritance, since all such Testaments must depend upon the Credit of the Witnesses, whose Credit may often be questioned by the Subjects, and who may very well for their own ends make a Younger Son to have the whole, or at least a share in the Kingdom to whom his Father never intended any; and which was likewise more easie to be done before such time as Written Wills or Testaments, solemnly published accord­ing to forms of Law, came in use.

But because you suppose that the Natural Laws of Succession to King­doms are so plain and certain, that I may a little convince you of your mistake in this matter, I shall for the present suppose that the Succession of an Elder Son or Brother is sufficiently easie to be known; Yet I doubt it will not prove so in many other Instances; And therefore to let you see, I do not make this Scruple without cause, suppose Abel (for example) to have left a Son or a Daughter behind him, when his Brother murdered him, pray tell me who was to succeed after the Death of Adam, this Son or Daughter of Abel, or Seth their Uncle?

We do not read of any Children that Abel had, and therefore I cannot tell what to say to it.

Well but since it is probable he might have had Children pray tell me (supposing he had) whether this Child were it Son or Daughter, or Seth the Uncle was to succeed?

Since you will needs have me speak my opinion in a thing so un­certain, I think this Child were it Son or Daughter ought to have succeeded before the Uncle.

Pray Sir, tell me by what Law or Rule you thus Judge; Whe­ther by the Law of God or Nature?

I must confess God hath prescribed nothing expresly concerning it; more than what he says, Numb. 27. that if a man dies leaving no Sons, ver. 8. ye shall cause his Inheritance to pass unto his Daughter, with diverse other Rules of Succession to Inheri­tances there specified, and besides it is more suitable to the Laws of Na­ture, that the Children of the Elder Brother should inherit before their Uncle, there being no reason that they should be punished for their Misfor­tune in having their Father Dye before he could succeed to the Government.

I doubt the place of Scripture you have cited doth not reach this Case of Kingdoms, for first this being a Municipal Law of the Iews, could only concern that Common-Wealth; and secondly, it only relates to Private Inheritances: and that this is so, may be proved from the next verse, where it is said, that a Mans Brethren shall be his Heirs, that is, all of them were to be Heirs alike, only the Eldest was to have a double por­tion; And if this Law concerning Daughters were to reach the Succession of Kingdoms at this day, the Laws of France and other Countries, where Women are barred from succeeding to the Crown, would be against the Laws of God and Nature: And the like may also be said concerning the Succession of the Nephews before their Uncles, or of Uncles rather than the Nephews, whose Fathers never injoyed the Crown; diverse Nati­ons having different Customs, and that with a like appearance of reason concerning it. For on the one hand, if the Son of Abel might have plead­ed, that he was the first born of the Eldest Son of Adam, and so ought to represent his Father; Seth the Uncle might likewise with as good reason urge, that he was more nearly related in Bloud to Adam, as being his Son, than the Son of Abel who was but his Grandson, and besides being older than he, was endued with more Wisdom and Experience, and consequent­ly was [...]itter to Govern; But if Abel left only one Daughter or more, I doubt not, but the question would have been harder to be decided, since if Women are not permitted to Govern in Private Families, they will not (especially amongst Warlike Nations) be admitted to Govern Kingdoms, especially since it would be left in her Power, not only to govern her self, but by marrying to chuse a King for her Subjects, whom they do not ap­prove of. And therefore we read that in diverse of the Antient Kingdoms of the World, Women were excluded from the Succession.

Nor are these the only questions, that either might then, or else have in latter Ages been started concerning Succession in Kingdoms,TT. G. c. 11. p. 157, 158. and Principalities, and have been the cause of great disputes between Pretenders to Crowns, where a King Dies without Lawful Issue, as whether a Grandson by a Younger Daugh­ter, shall inherit before a Grand-daughter by an Elder Daughter? Whe­ther the Elder Son by a Concubine before the Younger Son by a Wife? From whence also will arise many Questions concerning Legitimation, and what by the Laws of Nature is the difference betwixt a Wife and a Concubine? All which can no ways be decided but by the Municipal or Positive Laws of those Kingdoms or Principalities. It may further be en­quired whether the eldest Son being a Fool or Madman, shall inherit this Paternal Power before the Younger a Wise Man? And what degree of [Page 89] [...]olly or madness it must be, that shall exclude him? and who shall be the Judges of it? Also whether the Son of a Fool so excluded for his Folly shall succeed before the Son of his Wiser Brother who last Reigned? Who shall have the regal Power whilst a Widdow Queen is with Child by the Deceased King, until she be brought to Bed? These and many more such difficulties might be proposed about the Title of Succession, and the Right of Inheritance to Kingdoms, and that not as idle speculations, but such as in History we shall frequently find examples of, not only in our own, but likewise other Kingdoms. From all which we may gather, that if the Laws of God or Nature had prescribed any set rules of Succession, they would have gone farther than one or two cases; as concerning the Succession of Elder Sons or Brothers, where an Elder Son dies without Issue; and would also have given certain infallible rules in all other Cases of Succession, besides these, and not have left it to the Will, or particular Laws of diverse Nations, to have established the succession so many seve­ral ways, as I am able to shew have been practised in the World.

I must confess you have taken a great deal of pains to perplex the Succession to Adam, which seems designed for nothing else, but to make me believe, that if Adam, or any of his Sons were Kings or Princes, it must have been by the Consent, or Election of their Children, or Descendants: which is all one as to say that those Antient Princes derived their Titles from the Iudgment or Consent of the People, the contrary to which is evident as well out of Sacred as Civil History.

Since you appeal to History, to History you shall go, and to let you see, that I have not invented these doubts about Succession of my own Head, and that there might have very well been a real dispute about the Succession to Adam in the Cases I have put, may appear by the many dis­putes and quarrels, that have been in several Nations concerning the Right of Succession between the Uncle and the Nephew, of which Grotius is so sensible,G. I. P. L. 11. c. 7. § 30, 31. that he confesses in the latter end of the Chapter last cited, that where it could not be decided by the Peoples Iudgment, it was fain to be so by Civil Wars, as well as private Combats, and therefore he is forced inge­nuously to confess, that this hath been practised divers ways according to the different Laws and Customs of Nations: and he gives us here a distin­ction between a direct Lineal Succession and a transversed; and acknow­ledges that amongst the Germans, as also the Goths and Vandales, Nephews were not admitted to the Succession of the Crown before their Uncles; the like may be said of the Saxons and Normans, and therefore we find in our Antient English History, that before the Conquest the Uncle, if he were Older, always enjoyed the Crown before the Nephew, which I can more particularly shew you if you think fit to question it. The like manner of succession was also amongst the Irish-Scotch for above 200 years after [...]rgus their first King. The like Custom was also observed among the Irish as long as they had any Kings amongst them, and is called the Law of Tanistry. The same was also observed in the Kingdom of [...]astile, where after the death of Alphonso the fifth, the States of that Kingdom, admitted his Younger Son Sancho to be King, putting by Ferdinand de la Cerda the [Page 90] Grand-Son to the late King by his Eldest Son, tho' he had the Crown left him by his Grand-Father's Will. So likewise in Sicily upon the Death of Charles the Second, who left a Grand Son behind him by his Eldest Son, as also a Younger Son named Robert ▪ between whom a difference arising concerning the Succession, it being referred to Pope Clement V. He gave Judgment for Robert the Younger Son of Charles, who was thereupon Crowned King of Sicily; and for this reason it was that Earl Iohn Brother to King Richard the second was declared King of England by the Estates, be­fore Arthur Earl of Brittain Son of Ieoffrey the Elder Brother, and Glanvil, who was Lord Chief Justice under Henry the second, in that little Treatise we have of his, makes it a great question who should be preferred to an Inheritance, the Uncle or Nephew.

But as for Daughters, whether they shall inherit at all or not, or at least be preferred before their Uncles is much more doubtfull, since not only France, but most of the Kingdoms of the East at this day, from Turkey to Iapan do exclude Women from the Throne: And it was likewise as much against the Grain of the Antient Northern Nations, and hence it is that we find no mention of any Queen to have reigned amongst the Antient Germans, or Irish-Scots, and never but two among the English-Saxons, and those by Murder or Usurpation, and not by Election as they ought to have done. And upon this Ground it was that the Nobility and People of Eng­land put by Maud the Emperess, and preferred Stephen Earl of Blois to the Crown before her, for tho' he derived his affinity to the Crown by a Wo­man; yet as being a Man he thought himself to be preferred before her. So likewise in the Kingdom of Aragon, Mariana in his History tells us that Antiently the Brother of the King was to inherit before the Daughter, ex­amples may also be given of divers of the other instances, but these may suffice.

I Pray give me leave to interrupt you a little, for by these ex­amples you would seem to infer, that these Laws about setling the succes­sion of Crowns in several Kingdoms depended upon the Will of the People, whereas I may with better reason suppose, that if such Laws and Altera­tions have been in such successions they were made by the sole Will of the first Princes, in which the People had no hand, for in the most Antient Monarchies,B. P. P. § 71. there was a time, when the People of all Countreys were Governed by the Sole Wills of their Princes, which by degrees came to be so well known in se­veral instances, that inferior Magistrates needed not resort to them in those cases, and the People being for a considerable time accustomed to such Usages, they grew easie and Familiar to them, and so were retained, tho the Memory of those Princes, who first introduced them was lost, and after Kings, finding it better to continue what was so received, than to run the hazard and trouble of changing them, were for their own ease, and the good of their Subjects contented they should be still from Age to Age so continued. Which custom may hold as well in Laws about Successi­on as other things: And therefore we find that even in those Monarchies, where the People have nothing to do in making Laws Women are exclud­ed, which could proceed at first from nothing else, but the declared Will [Page 91] or Law of the first Monarchs. So likewise the Original of the Salique Law is wholly ascribed to Pharamond the first French King, and Mariana (whom you lately cited) tells us that Alphonso King of Arragon made a Law, that where Heirs Male were wanting, the Sons of a Daughter should be pre­ferred before the Aunt, which Law is wholly attributed to the King, for he adds presently after, Sic saepe ad Regum arbitrium jura regnandi commu­tantur.

Granting all this true that you have said, you cannot but confess that the Laws of God and Nature have established nothing in this matter, or else it could not be in the Power of Kings to make or alter Laws concern­ing the succession, as your last Quotation intimates they may; yet even in the most absolute Monarchies, the Laws about the Succession of the Crown, must wholly depend upon the Consent of the People, who are to see them observed, or else every Monarch might alter these Laws of Succession at his pleasure, and the Great Turk, or King of France (now the Assembly of Estates is lost) might leave the Crown to a Daughter if either of them pleased, and disinherit the next Heir Male.

But as for the Original of this [...]alique Law in France, you'l find your self much mistaken if you suppose that that Law was made by the Sole Authority of Pharamond, Vid. Hotoman Franco-Gallia. cap. 1. for the An­tient French Histories tell us that the Body of Salique Laws which are now extant, were made by the Common Consent of the whole Nation of the Francs, who commit­ted the drawing of them up to three Judges or Commissioners, and which Laws Pharamond did only confirm; and any one that will but consult those Histories may see, that Kings were so far from having the Sole Legislative Power in their own hand, that they were frequently Elected by the Estates, nor is it truer that you suppose from Mariana, that the Kings of Arragon had Power alone to make Laws, it appears quite contrary from the Con­stitutions of that Kingdom▪ where the King could do nothing of this kind without the Consent of the Estates, and was not admitted to the Crown without taking an Oath to the Chief Justice in the name of the People, that he would observe the Laws and Constitutions of the Kingdom, otherwise that they would not be obliged to obey him.

But at once to let you see, that about the Succession of the Sons or Descen­dants by Daughters, the Cases are much more nice and intri­cate, and that when such Cases happen in limited Monar­chies where there is an Assembly of Estates, P. N. M. Ib. 55. they are the Sole Iudges of such differences, may appear by two famous examples in modern History; The first is in Scotland, about four hun­dred years ago,VI. Hect. Boeth. L. when after the Death of King Alexander III▪ who died without Issue, when two or three several competitors claim'd a Right to the Crown, as descended from several Daughters of David Earl of Huntington, great Uncle to the last King, the Chief of which being Iohn Bayliol, and Robert B [...]u [...], the Estates of the Kingdom not being able to decide it, they agreed to refer it to Edward I. King of England, who adjudged the Crown to Bayliol; yet did not this put an end to this great controversie, for not long after Bay­liol [Page 92] being deposed, Bruce revived his Title, and the States of Scotland de­clared him King, whose Posterity enjoy it at this day.

A like Case happened in the last Age in Portugal, after the Death of Henry, surnamed the Cardinal without Issue, when no less than four Eminent Competitors, put in their Claim; some claiming from the Daughters of Don Durate, youngest Brother to the last King Henry: But the King of Spain, and other Princes as Sons to the Sisters of the said King; Henry dying without Issue,Vid. Marian Hist. Hisp. left ten Governours over the Kingdom to decide together with the Estates the Diffe­rences about the Succession, who quarrelling among themselves, as also with the Estates before it was decided, Philip the second King of Spain raised an Army, and soon conquered Portugal: And yet we have seen in his Grand son's time, that the Estates of Portugal de­clared this Title void, and the Crown was settled in the Posterity of the Duke of Braganza, who still enjoy it.

And how much even Kings themselves have attributed to the Authority of the Estates in this matter,P.N.M. Ib. p. 59. appears by the League made between Philip the Long, King of France, and David King of Scots, Vid. Mezeray in the Reign of Philip de Long. wherein this condition was exprest; That if there should happen any Difference about the Succession in either of these Realms, he of the two Kings, which remained alive, should not suffer any to place himself on the Throne, but him who should have the Judgment of the Estates on his side, and then he should with all his Power oppose him, who would after this, contest the Crown. To conclude, I cannot see any means, how if such Differences as these had arisen in the first Generation after Adam, I say, how they could ever have been decided without a Civil War, or else leaving the Judgment thereof to the Heads or Fathers of Families, that were then in being: Which how much it would have differed from the Judgment, or Declaration of the States of a Kingdom at this day, I leave it to your self to judge.

I shall not trouble my self to determine how far Princes may tye up their own hands in this matter of the Succession, and leave it to the States of the Kingdom to limit, or determine of it, but from the begin­ning it was not so; and therefore give me leave to trace this Paternal Government a little farther:F. P. C. 1. § 7. For tho' I grant that when Iacob, and his twelve Sons, went into Egypt together with their Families, they exercised a Supreme Patriarchal Jurisdiction, which was intermitted because they were in Subjection to a stronger Prince: Yet after the return of these Israelites out of Bondage, God from a special care of them chose Moses ▪ and Ioshuah successively to Govern as Princes in the Place, and [...]ead of the Supreme Fathers: And after them likewise for a time, he raised up Judges to defend his People in time of Peril. Yet that all these were endued with Regal Authority, may appear in that Moses is called in Deuteronomy, a King in Ieshurun, (that is,Deut. 33.5. B. P. P. § 35. Numb. 27.16, 17. over Israel) And when Moses saw that he was to die, he besought God, to set a Man over the Congrega­tion, that the Congregation of the Lord be not as Sheep which have no Shepherd. And as for the Judges, it is apparent from the Book that bears their Name, that they had Power of making [Page 93] Peace, and War, and of Judging in all Cases of Appeal, insomuch that whosoever would not hearken to the Priest,Deut. 17.11, 12. or to the Iudge, even that Man should die. But when God gave the Israelites Kings—

I pray give me leave to interrupt you a little, for I have a great [...]eal to say against your Notion of the Government of the Israelites before they had Kings actually nominated by God; for notwithstanding all you have said, it doth not appear to me that either Moses, Ioshuah, or the Judges, were any more than figuratively, or in a larger sense to be stiled Kings: For as for Moses his being called King in Ieshurun, he only calls himself so Poetically, in that excellent Hymn of Blessing, which he bestoweth upon the Twelve Tribes: For certainly God did not suppose him to have been a King, when in Deut. 17.14. he speaks of the Children of Israel setting a King over them, as a thing that was to happen many years after, and there lays down Rules how he should Govern himself, which had been needless if they had had a King already: And that Moses was not a King, Iosephus himself shews us in his Antiquities, Lib. 4. where he makes Moses to have instructed the Children of Israel at the time of his Death to this purpose; Aristocracy is the best Form of Government, and the life that is led under it the most happy, and therefore let not the desire of any other sort of Government take Possession of you, owning no other Master than the Laws, and doing every thing according to it. For God is your King, and that is sufficient for you; and if Moses was no King, then certainly Ioshua was none neither.

Pray give me leave to answer, what you have now said against the Kingly Power of Moses, and Ioshua; for if you will please to remember,B. P. P. § 36. that tho' the Sanhedrim had been constituted before this time, yet Moses esteemed them as Sheep without a Shepherd, if a Man was not set over them which might go out before them, and which might lead them out, and bring them in; and God approved his desires, and appointed Ioshua to succeed him, and the People received him accordingly, and told him; All that thou commandest us we will do and whithersoever thou sendest us we will go, Iosh. 1.16, 17. according as we hearkened unto Moses in all things, so will we hearken unto thee. If this were not Kingly Power, then is there no such thing. So that this Discourse which Iosephus puts into Moses his Mouth, seems directly contrary to Moses his Thoughts, and Pra­ctice. And whereas he makes Moses to have opposed Obedience to the Laws to Kingly Government, it is a pure Greek Notion: For whilst the Grecians lived under Kings, they had [...]ew, or no Laws; but when they set up Common-Wealths, they then found the necessity of having Laws, and then the Dominion of Laws was opposed to the Government of Princes: But this was contrary to the Practice of Israel; for they were to live ac­cording to their Laws as well under Kings as without them, in all Estates and Conditions; and their Kings were bound to Govern them by the Law, and not by their Wills contrary to the Law. So that in this Iosephus clearly made the Antient Customs of his Country to comply with a Greek Notion that had no being for some hundreds of years after Moses was dead.

And as for the time of the Judges, even in the Intervals between them, [Page 94] when every one did that which was right in his own Eyes, even then the Israelites were under the Kingly Government of the Fathers of the particu­lar Families over whom the Prince, or Head of it had likewise a Supreme Power.

But pray give me leave to speak a little farther; Let me ask you, what is an Aristocrac [...] if this be not? (viz.) an Assembly of the Elders, or Chief Fathers of Families of each Tribe meeting, consulting, and resolving of the Publick Affairs of the Common-Wealth, under their Head or President the Chief of the Tribe; and this is the Government for which Iosephus makes Samuel so much afflicted, when the People would quit it for a Monarchy.

I think you are much mistaken in this Point, for it is no where de­clared that these Fathers of Families Governed their own Families inde­pendently; for then there would have been no Publick Government at all: Nor yet is it said, that these Fathers Governed by Majo­rity of Voices chosen out of themselves,B. P. P. § 31. for then I grant it would have been a Democracy; nor yet doth it appear, that a few of the better sort of Fathers of every Tribe Governed it by a Counsel, and Magistrates, or that there was such Counsel of the several Tribes; but on the contrary, every Tribe was Governed by the Prince, or Head of it; and these Princes Moses calls the Heads of the House of their Fa­thers, in Numb. 7.2. and who were over those that were numbered and made their Offerings. And Moses tells us particularly what every Man's Name was;V. 12.18. as Nashon the Son of Ami­nadab of the Tribe of Judah, and Nathaniel the Son of Zuar, Prince of Issachar, &c. Now if there was in those days any Government at all in Israel, then were these Princes the Governours of the several Tribes, and so every Tribe was under a Monarch, tho' the whole State of Israel was not under any one Person, or constant standing Council, and consequently was a System of little Monarchies.

I am not at all better satisfied with your last Reply; For in the first place I have Iosephus on my side, who must needs know what the Go­vernment of his Country had been, better than you or I; and he expresly calls it an Aristocracy, in which the Judge (when there was one) was only in the nature of a General, or Statholder, to whom the last Appeal was to be made in all Causes; and it is also as plain, that neither Moses, Ioshua, nor the Judges had Monarchical Authority: F [...]r tho' it be true, the two first could make War, and Peace, yet this was also with the Consent of the Princes of the Congregation, as plainly appears by the Story of the Peace made with the Gibeonites, which the Princes of the Congregation con­firmed by an Oath: Iosh. 9. Neither could they raise Taxes upon the People, or take any thing from them without their Consent;1 Sam. 1.3. and therefore Samuel appeals to them how little he had opprest them, whose Ox or whose Ass have I taken? whom have I defrauded? whom have I opprest? Neither could they, nor the Judges their Successors, make any new Laws for the People; God himself being their King, and Legislator; and therefore what you urge as to the Regal Power of Moses, and Ioshua, after the Sanhedrin had been constituted, amounts to no more, but that both of them were Heads, or [Page 95] Captains of the People, to lead them out to War, and bring them back again, which is exprest by going in and out before them, and their Obedience to their Military Orders, as also to such things, which God hath expresly com­manded, is understood by these words; All that thou commandest us, we will do; and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will go: Yet still this was with respect to their obtaining the Land of Canaan, for otherwise if either Moses, or Ioshua should have gone about of their own Heads to have Led them again into Egypt, I suppose you will not say, the Israelites were bound either to have followed them, or submitted to them; but rather might have resisted them in such cases.

And therefore Iosephus his Speech which he makes Moses to deliver, is not so ridiculous as you are pleased to make it; for the Laws here mentioned by him, and here set in opposition to Monarchy, were not such Laws, as were made by the Greek Common-Wealth, as you suppose, but the Law given from God by his hand, and these he might well think were sufficient with such Power, as he and Ioshua enjoyed, without having any recourse to a Human Monarchical Government, since God himself was their King; and as for the Judges that succeeded them, they had much less Power, than ei­ther Moses, or Ioshua: Since it is apparent by the Story of Deborah and Ba­rak, Iudges the 4th, who were the Princes or Generals of the Tribes of Ze­bulun, and Naphtali, that they had no power to force the People to go out to fight against the Canaanites, whether they would, or no. And therefore you will find in the next Chapter, in the Song of Victory, which they sung, that many of the Tribes came not in to their Assistance; therefore it is there said, That for the Divisions of Reuben there were great thoughts of heart; therefore they ask, Why abidest thou among the Sheepfolds, &c. And presently after it is said, Gilead abode beyond Jordan: and why did Dan remain in the Ships? Asher continued on the Seashore, and abode in his breaches. And so they conclude with Curse ye Meroz, curse ye bitterly the Inhabitants thereof, because they came not to the help of the Lord against the Mighty. So that I am perswaded, it was the want of this Power in the Judges of making Laws, of imposing Tributes, or Taxes, and of forcing Men to serve in the Wars against their Enemies, (which they did before only as Volunteers,) that made the Israe­lites the more desirous to have a King over them, like those of other Na­tions, who were endued with these Prerogatives. And therefore the best Commentators do interpret the Prediction of Samuel con­cerning the manner of the King, 1 Sam. 8 11, 12. that should Reign over them, and would take their Sons for his Chariots, and his Horse men, and to be Captains over thousands, &c. to relate to his Royal Power of enrolling, and making them serve in his Army, either as Officers, or Souldiers, and the taking of their Fields and their Vineyards, and the Tenth of their Seeds &c. to give his Officers, and Servants; to signifie no more than his Power of imposing Publick Tribute, and Impositions on the People, to maintain his Royal Splendor, & the Necessities of the State, as other Neighbouring-Kings were wont to do; all which they not being used to before, they should cry unto the Lord by reason of them as a great oppression: And that Saul, when he came to be King used this Prerogative of forcing the People to come, and serve in the War, in a higher manner than Samuel, or the Judges had done before, appears by the 11th Chapter of this Book, when Nahash the Ammo­nite [Page 96] came to make War against Iabesh, Saul took a Yoke of Oxen, and hewed them in pieces, and sent them throughout all the Coasts of Israel by the hands of Messengers, saying, Whosoever cometh not forth after Saul, and after Samuel, so shall it be done unto his Oxen; and the fear of the Lord fell on the People, and they came out with one Consent.

And it seems evident to me that the Power which Samuel ▪ had before the Children of Israel desired a King was not Monarchical, but mixt of Aristocracy and Monarchy together, in which Samuel as Judge had a Judi­cial Authority, and likewise a Supream Military Power of leading them out to War against the Philistines and other Enemies, and yet notwith­standing, the Supreme Power in all other things remained wholly in the Principal Heads or Fathers of the Tribes, which whether they were cho­sen by the People, or enjoyed it by Right of Inheritance, I confess the Scripture is silent, and therefore I am not at all satisfied with your No­tion, that the Government of these People when they had no Judges, con­sisted of Twelve petty Monarchies, under the Heads or Princes of the Tribes, for there is no Authority in Scripture to countenance any such opinion, the place you bring for it out of the 1st and 7th of Numbers, not at all proving it. For tho' I grant, there were twelve Princes of the Tribes whose names are there set down, and who are called Heads of the Houses of their Fathers, yet is it no where said, that these were endued with Ci­vil Power, or were Chief Rulers over the Tribes: for it is apparent all Civil Power remained then in Moses and the Sanhedrim, who under him decided all controversies: So that it is most natural to suppose that these Heads of the Tribes were not Civil Magistrates, but the Military Leaders or Captains of each Tribe, when they went out to War, and are the same who in this Chapter, are called the renowned of the Congregation, &c. and Heads of the Thousands of Israel.

Nor doth it follow, that because there were such Officers in Moses his time, that they must continue the same after, under the Judges, so many Slaveries and oppressions that this People had undergone, or that if they did still continue, that their Power was Monarchical; or that they could do any thing without the consent of the Heads, or Fathers of Families, of each Tribe, in whom I suppose the Supream Authority was in the In­tervals of the Judges; and therefore we find in the ninth of Iudges, that the men of Shechem, and all the House of Millo made Abimelech King, that is, not over all the Tribes of Israel, but over Ephraim and half Manasses only, which is to be understood by Israel in this Chapter, where it is said v. 18. by Iotham the Son of Gideon speaking to the Men of Shechem, that they had made Abimelech the Son of a Maid Servant, King over the Men of Shechem, because he is your Brother.

So likewise after Abimelech was Dead, the Children of Ammon made War against the Children of Israel, as appears by the 10th of Judges, and they encamped in Gilead, which was a Country on the other side of Iordan, which was inhabited by the Reubenites, the Gadites, and the other half of Manasses, who by themselves consulted for their own safety; for it is said in the last verse of this Chapter, And the People and Princes of Gilead said one to another, What man is he that will begin to fight against the Children of Ammon? He shall be Head over all the Inhabitants of Gilead. From which [Page 97] assembly and consultation, it plainly appears that they looked upon them­selves to have a Right of setting a Prince or Head over them, distinct from the rest of the Tribes of Israel; And in the next Chapter you will find that Iephtha was made Prince, or Judge by the Elders of Gilead, and tho' it is said that Iephtha went with the Elders of Gilead, and that the People made him Head and Captain over them, yet that cannot be meant of all Israel, but only of the two Tribes, and a half, which inhabited the Land of Gilead, for we find chapter the 12. the Men of Ephraim making War upon Iephtha, because he had not called them out to sight against the Am­monites, and you will find verse the 4th. that Iephtha gathered together the Men of Gilead, and fought with Ephraim, and that the Men of Gilead smote Ephraim. In all which story it appears, there was none concerned in this War but the Gileadites only: that is, those Tribes that inhabited that Re­gion.

I have likewise another Authority for this separate Power of each Tribe, when there was no common Judge over them, as may appear from the Story of the Danites in the 18th chapter, who wanting a Country to dwell in, it is there said the Children of Dan, sent five men of their Family to Spy out a Country for them; which thing could not be done, without an Assembly of the Chief of the whole Tribe: Neither is there any mention in all this Story of any such Chief or Prince of the Tribe, as you suppose, only that six hundred men went by common consent, who made War, and Conquered the City and Country of Laish, which they called Dan.

But that all the Children of Israel, during the Intervals of the Judges, did meet in one Common Council or Assembly, upon any great accident or emergency, appears by the twentieth Chapter of this Book of Iudges ▪ where after the Rape and Murder committed upon the Levite's Wife, it is said in the two first verses, Then all the Children of Israel went out, and the Congregation was gathered together as one man from Dan even to Beershebah, with the Land of Gilead, unto the Lord in Mizpeh. And the Chief of all the People, even of all the Tribes of Israel, presented themselves in the Assembly of the People of God, four hundred thousand footmen that drew Sword: Who being thus met, the Levite, the Husband of the Woman that was slain, having told them the Story, concludes thus, Behold ye are all Children of Israel, give here your Advice and Counsel, and the result is, All the People arose as one Man, saying, We will not any of us go to his Tent, neither will we any of us turn into his House, &c. Now if this were not as Democratical an Assembly, as you can any where meet with in either the Roman or Greek Hist. I leave it to you your self to Judge: tho' I grant the chief of the People, or Tribes of Israel might preside in it. To conclude, I think I may with very great reason maintain with Iosephus, that the Government of the Tribes of Israel, was Aristocratical before their setting a King over them: for had Samuel been endued with an absolute Monarchical power (as you suppose) it had been a very needless request of the Children of Israel, to ask him to make them a King, to Judge them, as other Nations.

You have made a very long (I had almost said a tedious) dis­course, to prove that the Government of the Children of Israel was not Monarchical, before the time of Saul: and tho' I cannot now well remem­ber [Page 98] all the particulars of your discourse, yet this much I can gather from it,F P. C. 2. § 10. that you are fain to confess that during the Intervals of the Judges, and when there was no King in Israel, but that every Man did that which was Right in his own Eyes: Even then, the Israelites were under the Kingly Government of the Fathers of particular Families; For in the Consultation after the Benjamitical War,Iudg. 21.16. you mentioned, for providing Wives for the Benjamites, we find the Elders of the Congregation bare the only sway: To them also were Complaints to be made, as appears by Verse 22. And though mention be made of all the Children of Israel, all the Congregation, and all the People; yet by the Term of all, the Scrip­ture means only all the Fathers, and not all the whole multitude,ver. 1, 2. as the Text plainly expounds it self, in the second of Chronicles, where Solomon speaks unto all Israel, viz. to the Captains,1 King. 8.12. 2 Chron. 5.2. the Judges, and to every Governour the Chief of the Fathers; So the Elders of Israel are expounded to be the Chief of the Fathers of the Children of Israel.

But I am less edified with your Notion, in making any of the Tribes to have set a Judge or Captain over themselves distinct from the rest of the Tribes of Israel. For the example you quote of Abimelech makes directly against you, it being said, verse the 22d of that Chapter, that Abi­melech Reigned three Years over Israel, and in the next chapter it is said, there arose to defend Israel, Tola the Son of Puah, and that he Judged Israel, that is, all the twelve Tribes, twenty years; and if Gideon the Father of Abi­melech was Judge over all Israel, as it appears by the Story he was, it will likewise follow, that Abimelech his Son succeeded (tho by Force and Mur­der) into the same power. It is likewise as plain (notwithstanding what you have said to the contrary) that the Elders of Gilead did not alone make Iephtha their Head or Captain: For tho' I grant Jephthah tells them, that if he fought, and delivered them from the Children of Ammon, that he would be their Head; Yet it is plain by the 11th verse of that Chapter, that Jephthah went with the Elders of Gilead, and it was the People (viz. of all Israel) made him Head and Captain over them: and it appears that Jephthah uttered all these words before the Lord in Mizpeh, where it appears by the se­venteenth verse of the former chapter, the Children of Israel were then assembled and incamped.

Nor am I yet satisfied, but that tho' God out of a special love, and care to the House of Israel, did chuse to be their King himself, yet did he Go­vern them at that time, by his Vice-Roy Samuel, and his Sons; And there­fore God tells Samuel, They have not rejected thee, but me, that I should not reign over them; It seems they did not like a King by Deputation, but desired one by Succession, like all the Nations. All Nations belike had Kings then, and those by Inheritance, not by Election, for we do not find the Israelites Prayed that they themselves might chuse their own King; they dreamt of no such Liberty, and yet they were the Elders of Israel gathered together: If other Nations had elected their own Kings, no doubt but they would have been as desirous to have imitated other Nations as well in the electing, as in the having a King: And therefore I am sure there is nothing to be found in Scripture that Countenances your Notion of the Peoples having a Right to Elect their own King. But this only by the by.

[Page 99]But to prosecute the matter in Hand, when God gave the Israelites Kings,F. P. c. 1. § 7. he re-establisht the Antient, and Prime Right of Lineal Succession to Paternal Government. And whensoever he made choice of any special person to be King he intended that the Issue also should have benefit thereof, as being comprehended sufficiently in the person of the Father, altho' the Father only was named in the Grant. Which Lineal Right of Succession continued in the Family of David until such time as his Successors by their Idolatry so far provoked Gods anger as to deliver them up to the King of Babylon, under whose and his Successors Power, they, and their Posterity continued Subjects for many Ages.

I shall not dispute any farther with you (since I see it is to no pur­pose) concerning the Government of the Israelites, whether it was Monar­chical or Aristocratical before the Reign of Saul; nor yet shall I positively assert, that Abimelech or Jephthah and other of the Judges were Rulers of some particular Tribes only. Yet Vid. Io [...]an. Marshami Chron. Can. Sect. XI. p. 291, 292, & 293. very Learned Men are of this Opinion, since they can find no other way, but by a Synchronism in the times of the Judges, as also of the years of Rest, and Servitude, as may appear from Iudg. 10. v. 6, 8. compared with Iudg. 13.1. to reconcile that great Difference that will be found in the Sacred Chronology, from the time of the Children of Israel's coming out of Egypt, to the fourth year of Solomon, in which the Temple was begun to be built, which doth amount to four hundred and eighty years;1 Kings 6.1. whereas if you please to take the pains to cast up the years from the Children of Israel's coming out of Egypt, to the beginning of Saul's Reign, according to the common Account of the years of the Judges, reckoned with the Reigns of Saul, and David, to that time, &c. it will amount to 600 years, which is more by 120 years than all the time from the said Epocha to the fourth year of Solomon taken altogether.

But as for the several Tribes alone consulting and ordering their own af­fairs, it is so plain from the Examples of the People, and Princes of Gilead, as also from that of the Danites, that you have nothing to object against it: And so likewise in the Instance of all the Children of Israel meeting, and consulting, what to do with the Benjamites, where since you cannot de­ny the matter of Fact, you have no way to evade it, but by supposing I know not what Kingly Authority in the Fathers of particular Families, whom you do suppose to have then bore the only sway, because it is said in that Chapter you quoted, that in the consultation after this War, the Elders of the Congregation proposed it to them, saying; How shall we do for Wives for them that remain, seeing the Women, are destroyed out of Benjamin? And then follows the result of the Congregation in the next verse; And they said, (viz. all the Congregation agreed) that there must be an Inheritance for them that be escaped out of Benjamin, &c. all which amounts to no more, than what I granted at first, that the Heads, or Elders of the Tribes presided in this Assembly, and put the question to them: Which is so necessary in all great Assemblies, that without such Officers they cannot come to any reso­lution; and therefore you should do well to prove the Monarchical Power of these Elders by some better Authority than this Text.

But if the Judges had Monarchical Power as you suppose, notwithstanding [Page 100] all you have said, against the Peoples Electing them, it plainly appears by the Examples of Abimelech, and Iephthah, that the People did often Elect a Judge, or Captain over them, without any Nomination by, or Inspira­tion from God.

But to return to that which is most material, your supposed Restauration of Patriarchal Government under Moses, and Ioshua, after the Israelites re­turned from the Egyptian Bondage, I cannot but here by the way take no­tice, that the Truth will sometimes slip from you before you are aware; for if it be true what you at first asserted, at our last meeting, That a Ser­vant, or Slave, and a Subject, were all one at the first; and also that all Monarchs are endued with Fatherly Power, then if Pharaoh was a Monarch, the Children of Israel were not, according to your Principle, brought into Bondage by Pharaoh, but they were only Adopted into another Fatherly Power. But you should have done well to have shewn more clearly than you have hitherto done, that this Patriarchal Iurisdiction was exercised by Abraham, Isaac, or Iacob before the Descent into Egypt, since all the Instances you have yet given of such a Power, have proved very unlucky: For tho' I read in St. Stephen's Speech in the Acts, Acts VII. 9. that the Patriarchs moved with Envy sold Joseph into Egypt; yet is it no where mentioned, (nor I believe will you your self affirm) that these Patriarchs ever had a Monarchical Power. For till Iacob went into Egypt, that Power was solely in him, according to your Principles, and after that in Pharaoh as King of Egypt: So that tho' I can find the word Patriarch (but once) in Scripture, yet I can see no ground for your Patriarchal Authority, or Iurisdiction; and therefore that could suffer no intermission, which never had any beginning in Nature.

But after this you tell me, that God chose Moses, and Ioshua successively to Govern as Princes, in the place of those Supreme Fathers, or Patriarchs; which is easily, I confess, affirmed, only it wants proof. For tho' you endea­vour to prove that all Paternal Power was Regal, yet it still remains unpro­ved that all Regal Power is Paternal. It is true that God did appoint Moses, and Ioshua, to be the Rulers of his People under him, but that doth not at all make out that they succeeded in the stead of Supreme Fathers, much less that they succeeded, as Heirs, or Successors to the Patriarchal Power of Adam. For Moses, and Ioshua, being chosen by God to be Rulers of his People,TT. G. p. 201. will no more prove that Government be­longed to Adam's Heir, as to his Fatherhood, than God's chusing Aaron of the Tribe of Levi to be Priest, will prove that the Priest­hood belonged to Adam's Heir, or the Prime Fathers, since God could chuse Aaron to be Priest, and Moses Ruler over Israel, tho' neither of those Offices, were settled on Adam's Heir, or the first Patriarchs. So likewise for what you say concerning God's raising up the Judges to defend his People, proves Fatherly Authority to be the Original of Government just after the same rate; and cannot God raise up such men unless Paternal Power give a Title to the Government?

But to come to your darling Instance, the giving of the Israelites Kings, whereby you suppose God re establisht the Antient Prime Right of Lineal Succession [...] Paternal Government. This I can by no means understand; for if by Li­ [...]l Succession you mean to Adam, I desire to know how you will make it [Page 101] out that either Saul, or David could be Heirs of Adam's Power? or how the Power that those Kings were endued with by God, was the same Power, which Abraham, Isaac, and Iacob enjoyed before. For if you please to con­sider it, your Hypothesis consists of two Propositions; the first is, that all Paternal Power is the same with Regal Power; which if it be proved not to be true, the other convertible Proposition (which is but the Conversion of this) will likewise be as false; viz. that all Regal Power is Paternal. Nor is what you said last of all any truer than the rest, that whensoever God made choice of any person to be King, he intended that the Issue (I suppose you mean his Issue) should have the benefit thereof: For either Moses, and Io­shua, and the Judges, were no Kings, (tho' you have asserted the former to be so) or else they had not the benefit of this Grant: But certainly Saul was a King, and yet his Issue never succeeded; but you speak very warily to sup­pose this Grant to be made to the Issue in general, without specifying in particular, who should enjoy it, because I suppose you are sensible, that So­lomon, whom God expresly appointed to be David's Suc­cessor, and Iehoahaz, 2 Chron. 26.1. whom the People of the Land made King in the room of Iosiah, were neither of them Eldest Sons of the Kings their Fathers. To conclude, I desire you would shew me, what Relation or Title all Kings, or Princes now-a-days have, or can claim as Heirs to Adam, or Noah; or how that Power with which God endued those Fathers of Mankind, is the same which you say all Princes, or Monarchs, may now claim to be given them by God: For I confess I can see no likeness, or Relation at all between them.

It may indeed seem absurd to maintain, that Kings now are the Fathers of their People, since Experience shews the con­trary. It is true,F. P. § 8. all Kings are not the Natural Parents of their Subjects, yet they all either are, or are to be reputed the next Heirs to those first Progenitors, who were at first the Natural Pa­rents of the whole People, and in their Right succeed to the exercise of Su­preme Jurisdiction; and such Heirs are not only Lords of their own Chil­dren, but also of their Brethren, and all others that were subject to their Fathers. And tho' I have all along supposed, that Paternal Government was at first Monarchical; yet I must likewise grant, that when the World was replenished with People, that this Paternal Government by Succession ceased,F. D. O. p. 67. and a new kind of it started up either by Election Conquest, or Usurpation; yet this was still Paternal Power, which can never be lost, or cease, tho' it may be transferred, or usurped; or it may be ordained a new in a person who otherwise had no Right to it before. Thus God, who is the Giver of all Power, may transfer it from the Father to the Son, as he gave Saul a Fatherly Power over his Father Kish.

So that all Power on Earth is either derived,Ib. p. 70. or usurped from the Fatherly Power, there being no Original to be found of any Power whatsoever; for if there should be granted two sorts of Power without any subordination of one to the other, they would be in perpetual strife, which should be Supreme for two Supremes cannot agree; if the Fatherly Power be Supreme, then the Power of the People must be subordinate, and depend on it; if the Power of the People be Supreme, then [Page 102] the Fatherly Power must submit to it, and cannot be exercised without the Licence of the People, which must quite destroy the frame and course of Nature.

If this be all you have to say for the proof of so weighty an Hypo­thesis, I confess I wonder how you, or any rational Man can lay so great stress upon it: For tho' I should grant you, that some Fathers of Families at first became by the tacit, or express Consent of their Children, and Descen­dants, to be Kings, or Princes over them; doth it therefore follow that all Kings Govern by Right of Fatherhood at this day?

'Tis true you tell me, that all Kings, tho they are not now the Natural Fathers of their People, Yet are still to be esteemed as such by them, as Succeeding either as Heirs, or Successors to those that were so. I grant indeed if any Kings now adays could prove themselves right Heirs to Adam, or Noah, this were somewhat to the purpose, but to talk of a Paternal Power proceeding from Election, Conquest, or Usurpation, is perfect Iargon to me; for pray tell me, can a Man become endued with Paternal Power over me, by my Electing him to be my King? or can a Man by Conquest, or Usurpation oblige me to yield him a Filial Duty, and Obedience? for if this were so, if a Father of a se­parate Family (such as Abraham was) should be conquered by the head of another separate Family, nay tho he were a Thief, or a Robber, if once the true Father were Killed, or destroyed, all the Children, and Descendants of the Family must pay the same Duty, and Obedience, to this unjust Conquerour, or Robber, as to their true Father; and the same may be said in Usurpations, in case, after the death of such a Father of a Family, a Younger Brother or Nephew, should get possession of the House, and Estate, and force all his Brethren, and Kinsmen to Submit to him, they must then all own him to be endued by God with the same Paternal Power, which their Father, or Grand-father had; and consequently must Honour and Obey him as their true Father: Both which examples, being contrary to the Common sense, and reason of Mankind, may shew you, how absurd this Hypothesis is; whereas indeed Fatherhood being a Relation of Blood, and the Duty and Respect we owe to him, that is our Father, pro­ceeding from that Piety, and Gratitude we owe him both for our Generation, and Education; how can this Relation, or these Obligations be ever trans­ferred to, or usurped by any other, so that any other man can become my Father, or I owe him that Filial Duty, and Respect, as to him that begot me and brought me up?

And tho' I grant that God may confer a Regal Power on whom he pleases, either by his express Will, or the ordinary course of his Providence; yet when such a person who was not a King before, doth become so, I utterly deny that the Power he hath then conferred upon him, is a Paternal Power in relation to his Subjects; which is evident from your own Instance of Saul's becoming a King over his Father Kish. For tho' you say that God then con­ferred a Fatherly Power on Saul over his own Father, this is a great mistake: For then Saul would have been immediately discharged from all the Duties of Piety, and Gratitude, which he owed his Father; and they were all trans­ferred from Kish to Saul; so that after he became King, he might have treat­ed his Father with no more Respect, or Deference, than any other Subject; which is contrary to God's Commandment, that bids all Men, Honour their [Page 103] Father, and Mother. And I know not how Kings can be excepted out of this Precept. So that your mistake arises from this preposterous confound­ing of Paternal Authority with Regal Power: And because Adam, Noah, or any other Father of a separate Family may be a Prince over it in the State of Nature, that therefore every Monarch in the World is also endued with this Paternal Power: Which that they are distinct may farther appear from your own supposed Monarchical Power of Adam, who tho' granting him to have been a Prince over his Posterity, yet did not this discharge any of his Descendants from their Duty and Obedience to their own Father: And tho' I confess you talked at our last meeting of a Fatherly Power to be exercised in subordination to the Supreme Fatherly Power of Adam; yet this is a meer Chimera: for Filial Honour, and Obedience, being due by the Commandment only to a Man's own Natural Father, can never be due to two different persons at once, since they may command contradictory things, and then the Commandment of Honour (that is, obey) thy Father, cannot be observed in respect of both of them; and therefore granting Adam, or Noah, to have exer­cised a Monarchical Power over their Children, and Descendants, it could not be as they were Fathers, or Grand-fathers, when their Sons, or Grand-chil­dren were separated from them, and were Heads of Families of their own, for the reasons already given; so that if they were Princes in their own Fa­milies, whilst their Sons, or Grand-children continued part of them, it was only as Heads, or Masters of their own Families, but not by any such Patriar­chal, or Paternal Authority as you suppose. But as for the Conclusion of your Discourse, it being all built upon this false Foundation, that all Power on Earth is derived, or usurped from the Fatherly Power; I need say no more to it: For if that be false, all that you argue from thence concerning the sub­ordination of all other Powers to this, will signifie nothing.

I think I can yet make out my Hypothesis, notwithstanding all you have said against it: For tho' I grant the Paternal Relation it self can never be usurped, or transferred; yet you may remember, I at first affirmed,F. P. A. P. that Adam was not only a Father, but a King and Lord over his Family, and a Son, a Subject, a Servant, or a Slave, were one and the same thing at first; and the Father▪ had power to dispose of, sell, or Alien his Children to any other; whence we find the Sale, and Gift of Children, to have been much in use in the begin­ning of the World, when Men had their Servants for a Possession, and an In­heritance, as well as other goods; whereupon we find the Power of Ca­strating or making Eunuchs much in use in old times. And as the Power of the Father may be lawfully transferred, or aliened; so it may be unjustly usurped. And tho' I confess no Father, or Master of a Family, ought to use his Children thus Cruelly, and Severely, and that he sins mortally if he doth so; yet neither they, nor any Power under Heaven can call such an Indepen­dant Father, or Monarch to an account, or punish him for so doing.

I am glad at last we are come to an Issue of this doughty con­troversie, and tho I forced you at our last meeting to confess, that Fatherly Power was not despotical, nor that Fathers upon any account Whatsoever, were absolute Lords, over their Children and all their Descendants in the State of Nature: Yet now I see to preserve your Hypothesis, You are fain [Page 104] to recur to this Despotical Power of Fathers in the State of Nature: Because without supposing it, and that it may be transferred, or usurped, Princes at this day (whom without any cause you suppose to be endued with this Paternal, Despotick Power) could never claim any Title to their Subjects Allegiance. And then much good may do you with your, and Sr. R, F's excellent discovery: For if, as you your self acknowledge, Princes are no longer related in Blood to their Subjects, any nearer than as we all proceed from Adam our Common Ancestor, that relation being now so remote, signifies little or nothing, so that the true Paternal Authority being lost (as you confess) the Despotick Power of a Lord over his Servants, or his Slaves only remains; since therefore you make no difference in Nature, between Subjects, and Slaves, then all Subjects Lye at the mercy of their Kings to be treated in all things like Slaves, when ever they please; And they may exercise an absolute Despotick Power over their Lives, and Estates as they think fit: So that I can see nothing that can hinder them from sel­ling their Subjects, or castrating them as the King of Mingr [...]lia, doth his Subjects at this day; and as the Great Turk, and Persian Monarchs do use those Christian Children whom they take away from their Parents to make Eunuchs for their S [...]raglio's, and then I think you have brought Mankind to a very fine pass to be all created for the Will, and Lust of so many single Men, which if it ever could be the Ordinance of God, I leave it to your self to judge.

I was prepared for this objection before, and therefore I think it will make nothing against this Absolute Power, with which I suppose God to have endued Adam, and all other Monarchs at the first: So that I am so far from thinking that this Doctrine, will teach Princes Cruelty towards their Subjects, that on the contrary nothing can better incul­cate their Duty towards them:B. C. P. § 3. For as God is the Au­thor of a Paternal Monarchy; so he is the Author of no other. He introduced all but the first Man into the World, under the Subjection of a Supream Father, and by so doing hath shewn that he never intended there should be any other Power in the World, and whatever Authority shall be extended beyond this is accountable to him alone, so that Princes are bound to treat their Subjects as their Children with Mercy, and Lenity as far as they are capable of it, and not as their Brutes. And granting that Subjects and Servants or Slaves were at first all one, yet I think even they ought to be treated only as Younger Children, yet as Chil­dren still: Nay even conquered People that are in some Countries treated as Slaves, and but a little better than brutes, have certainly a very good appeal to the Tribunal of God against their Princes, who will undoubt­edly right them in another World if they suffer patiently in this. If it be the Character of a good Man that he is merciful to his Beast, I doubt not but the very Brutes have a Right to be Governed with mercy and Justice, and that God who is their Creator as well as ours will punish cruel men if they Tyrannize over them, and much more if any man shall exercise Cru­elty on another man who is of the same, not only Nature, but Blood.

Whereas all other Hypotheses leave the Prince at Liberty to make his Bar­gain with his Subjects, as well as he can; and if they be brought by force, or fraud, to an entire Submission at Discretion, they may then be treated [Page 105] accordingly, and must stand to their Compact, be the terms never so un­equal, and then the Case of a Man, and a Brute, may differ very little; and if the Subject may resist, the Prince may take care to prevent it, and the War may be just on both sides, which is impossible.

I could likewise shew you many other Benefits that would accrew both to Princes, and Subjects, were this Hypothesis but once generally taught, and believed by both of them.

I pray Sir, spare the giving your self that trouble, for I will not dispute how honestly this Hypothesis may be designed, or what mighty Fea [...]s it might do, were it once universally received. But this neither you, nor I can ever expect will come to pass▪ because neither Princes, nor People will ever believe it to be true: For in the first place, the People will never be convinced of it, it being above a vulgar understanding, that their Princes whom they are very well assured are not their Fathers, nor yet right Heirs to Adam, or Noah, should notwithstanding lay claim to a Paternal Authority over them. In the next place, Princes can never believe that they are Fa­thers of their People for the same Reason: I grant indeed, that they may be very willing to believe one half of your Hypothesis, that they are Absolute Lords, and Masters over them, and so would be willing upon that account, to use their Subjects like Slaves, but that they should look upon themselves as Fathers of their People, and the Heirs or Assigns of Adam, or Noah, I think no Prince in Christendom can be so vain to believe. So that what­ever Power Adam, or Noah, or any other Father might be intrusted with by God, because of that Natural Affection which they were supposed to bear toward their Children; yet sure Princes at this day, can lay no claim to it, since none but true Fathers can be endued with this Paternal Affection.

And whereas you suppose, that Princes ought to treat their Subjects, nay even those that are conquered like Children, and not like Slaves, or Brutes: This can have very little effect upon them, who can as little believe it, as the People, for if Monarchical Power is not Paternal (as I think I have clear­ly made out) then there can lye no obligation upon Monarchs, to treat their Subjects like Children, and therefore Since the Despotical or Masterly Power only remains, which is ordained Principally for the good, and Be­nefit of the Master, and not of the Servant, or Slave: Who can blame Princes, if they exact the utmost of their due Prerogatives, and so treat their Subjects like Slaves, whenever it serves their humour, or interest so to do; nor are they any more to be blamed for thus exerting their Power, than a Master of Negroes in the West-Indies is for making the best of the Service of those Slaves whom he hath bought with his Mony, or are born in his House: Whom tho I grant he is not to use like Brute Beasts, for the Reasons you have given: Yet doth it not therefore follow, that he is obliged to use them like his Younger Children; for then sure he could not have a Right to keep them for Slaves as long as they lived, & to let them enjoy nothing but a bare miserable Subsistance; and there is very good reason for this, for almost every Planter in Barbadoes knows very well, the difference between the Rela­tions of a Father, a Master, and a Prince, and that the one is not the other; and it is from your jumbling together these three different Relations of a Son, a Slave, and a Subject, that hath led you into all these mistakes. For tho' it should be granted, that the right of a Master over his Slaves, may [Page 106] be acquired by Conquest, or assigned to, or usurped by another; yet cer­tainly the Authority, or Relation of a Father, and the Monarchical, or Civil Power of a Monarch can never be acquired by Conquest, nor yet usurped without the Consent, and Submission of the Children, and Subjects.

And therefore to conclude, I do not think your Hypothesis one jot the better, by your founding it upon an Imaginary Paternal Power, rather than upon Compact, which I am sure can never be made upon so unequal term [...], as to render the Case of a Man, and a Brute, very little different; since it would be to no purpose for any Subject to make a Bargain with their Monarch, or Conqueror; and yet to leave themselves in as bad, or worse condition than they were in the State of Nature: So that however conve­nient your Hypothesis may be either for Prince, or People, it signifies no more than the Popish Hypothesis of the Infallibility of the Pope, and General Council, which because they suppose necessary, and is indeed very beneficial for the Church; therefore God hath conferred it upon them: But how false a way of reasoning this is, hath been sufficiently demonstrated. The Application of this Comparison is so obvious, that I leave it to you to make.

I cannot but think, for all you have yet said, that God hath endued all Princes with a Paternal Authority, and for this, I have the Church of Eng­land on my side, which in its Catechism, in the Explanation of the Duties contained in the 5th Commandment, Honour thy Fa­ther, &c. doth comprehend under that Head,F. P. § 10. F. O. G. p 254. not only to Honour, and Succour our Fathers and Mothers, but also to Honour, and Obey the King, and all them that are put in Au­thority under him; as if all Power were originally in the Father: So that this Command gives him the Right to Govern, and makes the Form of Go­vernment Monarchical. And if Obedience to Parents be immediately due by a Natural Law; and Subjection to Princes but by the Mediation of an Human Ordinance, what reason is there, that the Laws of Nature should give place to the Laws of Men? As we see the Power of the Father over his Child, gives place, and is subordinate to the Power of the Magistrate. And that this is not the Doctrine of Christianity alone, but was also believed by the best Moralists amongst the Heathen, may appear by this remarkable passage out of Seneca de Clementia, which is so put to this purpose,Lib. 1. Cap. 14. that I took the pains to translate it into English in my Common-place-book: Some of which I will now read to you. What is the Duty of a Prince? That of kind Parents, who use to chide their Children sometimes sweetly, and at other times with more sharpness, and sometimes correct them with blows. And after having shewn that a good Father will not proceed to disinherit his Son, or inflict any more severe punishments upon him till he is past all hopes of amendment; He proceeds thus. No Parent proceeds to Extir­pation, till he hath in vain spent all other Remedies. That which becomes a Parent, becomes a Prince who is stiled without flattery, The Father of his Country; in all our other Titles we consult their (i. e. the Emperours) Honour. We have called them the Great, the Happy, the August, and heaped upon ambitious Majesty, all the Titles we could invent, in giving th [...]se to them: But we have stiled him, The Fa­ther of his Country, that the Prince might consider the Power of a Father, was given him: Which is the most temperate of all Powers, consulting the Welfare of the Children, and preferring their Good before its own.

[Page 107]And as for your Objection, why Princes should not be loved, and reveren­ced, as if they were our Fathers, because not being our Natural Fathers, they may possibly want that Natural, and Fatherly Affection to their Subjects, and consequently may Tyrannize over them; I think this is easily answered: For

First, God, who is, and ever was the True Disposer of Kingdoms, hath in his hands the hearts of all Princes, and endows them with such Affections, as he thinks fit not only towards the People in general, but towards each particular person: And therefore as he was the Author of all Government, and is still the Preserver of it; so no inconvenience can happen, but he is able to redress it.

2. That there was as great, or rather greater Inconveniencies which sprung at first from the too great Lenity of these Natural Princes, for want of Power, or Will to punish the Disorders of their Subject Children, as have ever sprung since, from the Tyranny, and Cruelty of the worst Princes: And I believe to this was owing that excessive wickedness, which forced as it were God Almighty, to put an end to the first World, by that time it had stood about 1600 years. And we see afterwards Eli, and Samuel, good men, and severe Judges towards others, were yet too indulgent to their own Children; which shews the weakness of your Reasons, and the greatness of the Wis­dom of God, in making all Government to spring from Paternal Power, which is the mildest of all Powers, and to descend by degrees to Hereditary Monarchies, which are the Divinest, the most Natural, and the best of all Go­vernments, and in which the People have the least hand.

I see plainly that you think the Laws of Nature, or Reason are not on your side and therefore you are forced to recur not to the express words of Scripture, but to the Paraphrase, or Explanation of them in our Church Catechism, which certainly never was intended to have that consequence drawn from it, which you have made, for tho you are pleased to omit one part of the Commandment, with an, &c. Yet the Words are as you your self must acknowledge. Honour thy Father, and thy Mother; and if from Hon­our thy Father, you will gather that all Power was Originally in the Father, it will follow by the same Argument, that it must have been as Originally in the Mother too: Father, and Mother, or Parents, being mentioned toge­ther, in all Precepts in the Old, and New Testament, where Honour, or Obedience is enjoyned on Children; And if these Words, Honour thy Father, must give a right to Government, and make the form also Monarchical, [...], if by these Words must be meant Obedience to the Political Power of the Supream Magistrate, it concerns not any Duty we owe to our Natural Fa­thers, who are Subjects: Because they by your Doctrine are divested of all that Power, it being placed wholy in the Prince, and so being equally Subjects, and Slaves with their Children, can have no Right by that Title to any such Honour, or Obedience, as contains in it Civil Subjection. But if Honour thy Father and thy Mother, Signifies the Duty we owe our Natural Parents. (as by our Saviours interpretation Matth. 15.4. and all the other places 'tis plain it doth,) then it cannot concern Political Ob [...]dien [...], but a Du [...]y that is owing to Persons who have no Title to Soveraignty, no [...] any Political Authority as Monarchs over Subjects. For Obedience to a Private Father, and that Civil Obedience which is due to a Monarch, a [...] quite different, and many times contradictory, and inconsistent with each [Page 108] other. And therefore, this Command, which necessarily comprehends the persons of our Natural Fathers and Mothers, must mean a Duty we owe them distinct from our Obedience to the Magistrate, and from which the most absolute Power of Princes cannot absolve us. And to make this yet plainer, suppose upon your Hypothesis, that Seth, as Eldest Son of Adam, was Heir of all his Patriarchal Power, how could all his Brethren, and Sisters Honour, that is, Obey Eve their Mother at the same time, supposing Seth, and her to have commanded them things contradictory at the same time [...]

So that, tho' I grant the Compilers of our Church Catechism, did intend in this Explanation to comprehend all the great Duties towards our Govern­ours: Yet it is plain, they never dreamed of this far-fetched inference, that you have drawn from their Explanation of it, for tho under this Com­mand of Honour thy Father, and thy Mother, they do indeed comprehend Obe­dience, and Honour to be due to the King, &c. this no more proves that they believed all Kingly Power to be Paternal, than that because they likewise there Infer from this Command, a Submission to be due to all Gover­nours, Teachers, Spiritual Pastors, and Masters, that therefore all these Par­ties, here named, do likewise derive their Authority from Adam's Father­hood, or that because under the Command against bearing False-Witness we are taught to refrain our Tongues from Evil Speaking, Lying, and Slan­dering, that therefore all Lyes, and Evil Speaking whatsoever is down-right bearing False-Witness against our Neighbour, Since nothing is more certain than that a man may commit either of the formerr without being guilty of the latter. And to Answer your Query, if Obedience to Parents be imme­diately due by a Natural Law, and Subjection to Princes but by a Humane Or­dinance, what reason is there that the Laws of Nature should give place to those of Men? I can easily reply, that the Power of a Father over his Child gives place, and is Subordinate to the Supream Powers, because they are both ordained so by God, in the Law of Nature, it being highly reasonable, that the good of a private Family should give place to the common good of the Common-Wealth, which is a sufficient reason, and extends to all Nations, which never so much as heard of the Ten Commandments.

But to come to your Quotation out of Seneca, I think this hath a great deal less weight in it, than your Argument from the Fifth Commandment: For tho' this Philosopher writ to the Emperour, to perswade him to Clemency; yet this I am sure of, that as he never dreamt of this Notion of Adam's Soveraignty, or believed that every Prince was endued with Paternal Autho­rity, because amongst other Titles, he was stiled Pater Patriae. And there­fore what this Author here says, is to be looked upon, only as a Rhetorical flourish, or at the most, to be understood but in a Metaphorical sense, the Arguments of this Author not being to be always taken strictly as a Logician, but only as an Orator, who was to make use of all appearances of Reason to perswade a young Prince to Mercy, and Clemency; and yet all this was not sufficient, as Seneca himself found before he died, by woful expe­rience. And Seneca very well knew, that Tully was stiled Pater Patriae by the Senate, tho' he was never endued with your Imperial, or Paternal Authority.

But, to reply a little to your Answer, against my last Argument, that Prin­ces not being our Natural Fathers, must often want that Natural, and Fa­therly Affection towards their Subjects, and therefore may Tyrannize ove [...] [Page 109] them: I think the first part of your Reply will make nothing in confutation of what I have said: For tho' I will not deny, but God, who hath the hearts of Princes in his hands, may sometimes endue them with such Affections, as he thinks fit, not only towards the People in general, but towards each particu­lar person; yet this may be as well evil as good Affections: As God is said in Iudg. 9. To have sent an evil Spirit between Abimelech, (one of your usurping Monarchs) and the Men of Sichem, his Subjects: And therefore God may as well send the one for the punishment, as the other for the benefit of a Na­tion: And that God is more likely to incline the hearts of Princes to such evil, than good Affections towards their Subjects, may appear from Man­kinds more often deserving God's Anger, for their evil deeds, than Favours for their good ones.

And I desire you would shew me in how many Absolute Monarchies now in the World, God Almighty is pleased to declare this wonderful Operation of these Fatherly Affections towards their People. I pray deal ingenuously, and tell me, is it to be found in our European Monarchies, where most Princes do not only miserably harass, and oppress their Subjects, by intolerable Taxes, and standing Armies, till they reduce them to the Lowest condition of Beg­gary, and Desperation; and where for the least differences in Religion they take away their Subjects lives by that Cruel Tribunal of the Inquisition, without any Fair, or Legal Tryal, or else where notwithstanding all Edicts, Oaths, and Vows to the contrary, they seize upon, and spoil their Subjects of their Estates, and imprison, and torment their persons by those Booted Apostles the Dragoons; because Faith is not to be kept with Hereticks; or else in another Country, where the Prince took upon him a Prerogative to dispense with all Laws at his pleasure, and to imprison, and turn men out of their Freeholds, contrary to the known Laws of the Kingdom? Or to con­clude, must we look for these Divine Operations amongst the Eastern Monarchy, where they treat their Subjects like Slaves, and allow them no Property ei­ther in Lands, or Goods, farther than they think sit, and to have their persons, and lives wholy at their mercy to be castrated, made Slaves of, or killed, as often as it shall please their humour, or passion? And I doubt, if you will but read Antient, as well as Modern Histories, and also survey the State of Man­kind in all the Absolute Monarchies between France, and Iapan; you will find more frequent Examples of the evil, than good Affections of these your Ar­tificial Fathers towards their Adopted Children.

I cannot deny, but you have given a very Tragical Account of the Tyranny, and Oppressions under divers Absolute Monarchies now in the World; yet this is not the fault of the Government, but of the Evil Principles, b [...]d Education, or Temper of those Monarchs, as also often times from the un­quiet, and rebellious disposition of their Subjects, from the distrusting of which,B. C. P. § 3. they place all their security in stand­ing Armies, and Guards, so that I must grant, that all those Governments that are maintained by Armies too strong for the Subjects in general, are [...] and degenerate into Despotick Monarchies, and are unsafe both to the Princ [...] and People. And to let you see, that it is not my intention [...] maintain,F. P. § 6. or defend Oppression, or Tyranny, I must freely assert, with Sir R. F. (whose Prin­ciples I here take upon me to maintain) that all Princes are bound to treat [Page 110] their Subjects as their Children, and that it is contrary to the Nature of Man­kind, to make their Off-spring Slaves; and that all Kings, (nay Conquerors too) are bound to preserve the Lands, Goods, Liberties, and Lives of all their Subjects not by any Municipal Law, but by the Natural Law of a Father, which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Fore fathers, and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their Subjects: But yet you have not done fairly, not to take notice of the great Oppressions, that are exer­cised in some Common-wealths likewise, towards their Subjects, which if you would please to consider, and weigh the fewness of these against the great number of Monarchies now in the World, I believe you will have good cause to confess, that there are many more good Monarchs, B. P.P. § 12, 13. than Equal Common-wealths; and I do be­lieve there was as much Tyranny exercised in these Three Kingdoms during our late Civil Wars, and afterwards under the Govern­ment of the Rump, and Cromwell, till the return of the late King Charles, as in all the Absolute Monarchies between France and China, or from the North to the South Pole. And it is very remarkable, that when Oliver Cromwell set up the most Absolute, and Tyrannical Government, that ever was in this Island, there was yet no noise of any Fears, or Jealousies of it in all his times.

I am very well pleased to find you so heartily agree with me, in condemning of Tyranny, and oppression in all sorts of Governments whatever, and I do assure you, I do as little approve of it, if it be any where exercised in Common-Wealths, as you can do in Monarchies, only I must needs tell you, I am not at all of your Opinion, that the Oppressions, or abuses committed by the Magistrates in Common-Wealths, are to be com­pared with the Tyrannies, and Cruelties exercised by absolute Monarchs, and their Subordinate Ministers. For tho' I grant they often lay very severe Taxes, and impositions, upon their Subjects, especially such as they have acquired by Conquest, and so act like absolute Monarchs over them, Yet are these oppressions not at all to be compared to those under Arbitrary Mon­archies; for tho' perhaps divers Common-Wealths may impose greater Taxes upon their Subjects than some Neighbouring Monarchs; yet doth it not fol­low that their Government is more severe for all that; since the People ha­ving an opportunity by free Trade & Liberty of Conscience in such Common-Wealths, to acquire a greater share of Riches, are also thereby enabled to Con­tribute more to the maintenance of the Government, by which they reap so great Benefits. Thus we see a Citizen of Amsterdam is able to pay six times the Taxes of one of Antwerp, and Therefore I dare for all that, appeal to any Common Subject (tho' a Papist) of the United Provinces, whether he had not rather live under the States of Holland, than under the French King, or to any Subject of the Common Wealths of Venice, Genoa, or Luca whether he doth not prefer his Condition, as bad as it is, to that of any of the Sub­jects of the Pope, Duke of Florence, or any other Italian Prince, not to go over into Turkey, and those other Eastern Monarchies, where the Yoke of Slavery lyes yet more heavy upon the Subjects, than in Europe.

And as for what you say in the comparing of those Illegal Arbitrary Pro­ceedings, that were exercised in England, during the late Civil Wars, and after­wards till the Kings coming in, I must beg your pardon if (besides the great Hyperbole in your expressions on that occasion, which I am sure are very far [Page 111] from Truth) I impute those Miscarriages not as the fault of this or that [...]ort of Government, but rather to a Powerful Faction Backt by a Standing Army, which was more like a Tyranny or corrupt Oligarchy, than any Settled Government. Nor is what you say concerning Oliver's Govern­ment more true than the former, for all men except his own Faction, were not only afraid, but really sensible of the lo [...]s of their Liberties under his Tyrannical Usurpation: Tho' indeed there was a very good reason, why there should be fewer fears, or Jealousies of it than in his late Majesties time, when his Government began to grow uneasie through the Peoples fear of Popery, and Arbitrary Government, which the former People had no Jealousie of in Cromwel's time, and as for the latter they had no occasion to fear that which was already happened.

But that you may not mistake me for a Common-Wealths Man, I must so far agree with you, that to condemn Monarchy as such, were to re­pine at the Government of God himself, so that I also grant that the fault lies not in the form of Government but in the Frail Nature of Men, which can rarely administer that great Trust committed unto them, as be­comes what they take upon them to be, God's Vicegerents upon Earth, And I must own, that I esteem Monarchy limited by known Laws, as the best, and most Equal Government in the World; and under which both Prince, and People may live most happily, and easily, if each of them will be but contented with their due share.

But I beg your pardon for this digression; and to come to a conclusion, I must freely tell you, it is not a Straw matter, what yours or Sr R. F's Principles are concerning the Fatherly Power of Princes, for as long as there is no ground for it in Scripture, or Nature, you cannot expect that either Princes or People will ever believe you; neither is it true that Princes as Fathers are bound to treat their Subjects in all things like their Children, for then Princes ought to maintain their Subjects, and not Sub­jects their Princes; since it is the Apostles Rule, That Children ought not to lay up for the Parents, but the Parents for the Children: And tho' you pretend not to plead for Tyranny,2 Corinth. 12.14. or Ar­bitrary Government, yet I cannot at all understand, why if it were not for this end, you should assert not long since, in your answer to me, that God thought fit to change Paternal Government, into Hereditary Monarchy, because of the excessive Wickedness of Mankind before the Flood proceeding from tho too great Lenity of those Patriarchal Prin­ces, in not punishing the disorders of their Subject Children, which is a very bold assertion; Since you know no more than I, what that wicked­ness was in particular for which God drowned the World, much less what was the occasion of it. And therefore if God thought fit to change Paternal Power into Hereditary Monarchies which (as I have proved) do not at all pro­ceed from Paternal Power, it will also follow that the Government of your Patriarchs was not sufficient for the well-being, and happiness of Mankind, or else God would never have thought fit to have altered it, for a more Cruel and severe way of Government.

But as for what you say, concerning those Princes that place all their security in Guards, and Armies too strong for the Subjects, that they are uneasie, and degenerate into Despotick Monarchies, (you might better have [Page 112] said Tyrannies) and that they are unsafe both for Prince and People, is very true, and I altogether agree with you in it. But those of your Principles have no reason to find fault with Princes for so doing; for since they do but use their just Prerogative over their Slaves, or Vassals, it is but fit that they should be made to undergo that Yoke, whether they will or no, which they would not bear willingly, and as long as Princes look upon themselves to be (what they really are upon your Principles) the Masters and not the Fathers of their People, as they suppose the Goods, and Estates of their Subjects to be wholly at their disposal, So can they never command them as they please, without the Assistance of Standing Armies; nor have you any reason to complain of those Princes for keeping them too strong for the Subjects, since upon your Principles be they Strong, or Weak, the Subjects are not to resist them; but if Princes, without your extraordinary fondness of using their People like Children, would but always use them like Subjects, with ordinary Justice, and Moderation; and not oppress them with excessive Taxes, and unnecessary Penal Laws about Religion, you would find there would be no need of Standing Armies to keep the People in awe, who would themselves be the best defence not only against Dome­stick, but Forreign Enemies, and this I'll assure you is a much better re­ceipt against Rebellion, than all your new Recipe's of Paternal Power in Mon­archs, which is not only without all ground of reason but above common apprehensions.

You have made a long Speech in answer to my Hypothesis, which since you are not satisfied with, I can likewise shew you another very good reason, why the People should love, and reverence their Princes, and that is those great Liberties, and Concessions, that all the Monarchs of Europe have granted their Subjects, which are now past into the settled Laws and Cu­stoms of those Kingdoms with which the People ought to be very well con­tented; nor ought they to rebel or resist, tho' they may sometimes out of wantonness, and necessity, infringe, or intrench upon those Priviledges which they or their Ancestors have conferred upon them; since they can never forseit that Power they have originally over them.

I do not very well understand what you mean; for I have hitherto supposed that all Subjects have a Property in their Estates, and a Freedom for their Persons by the Laws of Nature; and which no Civil Power what­ever could deprive them of, without their Consent: And therefore I desire you would shew me, that if Children, Subjects, and Slaves, were all one at the first, how we in this side of the World, came to be in a better condition, than those in Asia, and Africa? Or that we English-men can claim a Proper­ty in our Estates, and a Right to our Lives, which the Prince cannot take away but according to some known Laws?

I think I can easily do this, not only in Relation to England, but any other Kingdom, which is now governed by known Laws and that upon Sir R. F's Hypothesis; which I shall do as near (as I can remember) in the words of that excellent person the late Earl of Clarendon in his Survey of Mr. Hobbs Leviathan, Chap. 20. p. 69, 70. who suppose [...] ac­cording to this Hypothesis, That some one of Noah's Descen­dants was an Absolute Monarch, at first over all his Posterity, which might con­tinue [Page 113] in his Line for some Ages, till at last their Relation by Blood to their Subjects was removed at so great a distance, that the Account of their Kindred, or Relation to each other, was scarce remembred, whereby they who had the Soveraign Power, still exprest less Paternal Affection in their Government, looking upon those they Governed as meer Subjects, and not as their Kinsmen or Allies, till by degrees, ac­cording to the Custom of Exorbitant Power, they (considering only the extent of their own Iurisdiction, and what they might, rather than what they should do) treated them who were under them, not as Subjects, but as Slaves, who having no Right to any thing, but what they permitted them, they would allow them to possess nothing, but what they had no occasion to take away; Estates they had none, that they could call their own, because when their Prince called for them, they were his; their Persons were at his command, when he had either occasion, or appetite to make use of them; and their Children inherited nothing but their Fathers Subjection; so that they were happy, or miserable, as he who had the Power over them pleased to exercise it with more, or less Rigour, or Indulgence; yet they submitted alike to both; acknowledging his Dominion to be naturally as absolute as their Subjection, and Obedience.

These Princes might for some Ages have pleased themselves with this Exorbitant Exercise of their Power, which tho' it had been always the same, yet the exercise of it had been very moderate, whilst there remained the tenderness, or memory of any Relation. But these Princes began at lest to discern, and be convinced that the great strength they seemed to be possest of, would in a short time degenerate into weakness, and the Riches they seemed to enjoy, would end in want, and necessity, as well in themselves, as in their Subjects; since no Man would build a good House, that his Children could not inherit, nor cultivate their Land, with any good hus­bandry, and expence, since the profit thereof might be given to another Man; And that if the Subjects did not enjoy the Conveniences of Life, they could not be sure of their help, and affection, whenever they should have War with another Prince, as absolute as themselves; but they would rather chuse to be subject to him under whose Government they might live with greater Liberty, and Satisfaction. And lastly, That if they ingrost all the Wealth, and Power into their own hands, they should find none who would defend them in the possession of it: And that there was a great difference between that Subjection, which Love and Duty pays, and that which results only from Fear, and Force, since Despair often puts an End to that Duty, which Reason, and it may be, Conscience, would otherwise have perswaded them still to continue: And therefore, that it was necessary that their Subjects should find ease, and profit in Obeying, as well as Kings pleasure in Commanding; these wise, and wholesom Reflections might prevail with Princes, for their own, as well as Subjects benefit, to restrain their Power, and to make it less absolute, that it might be more useful, and, to give their Subjects such a Property in their Goods, and Lands, as should not be invaded, but in such cases, and on such occasions as the necessities of the Government really required. But as they found the benefit arising from these Condescensions, highly tend to the Improvement of the Riches, and Civi­llity of their Subjects, with all those additions of pleasure, and industry, which ren­der Man's Life, as well as the Government easie, and pleasant, they still in seve­ral Generations enlarged these Graces, and Concessions to their Subjects, yet re­serving all in themselves that they did not part with by their voluntary Grants or Concessions. And if we take a View of the several Kingdoms of the World, we shall see another face of things, both of Power, and Riches in those Governments, [Page 114] where these Cond [...]scensions and Concessions have been best observed; than in those Kingdoms where the Soveraigns either retain, or resume to themselves all those Rights, or Prerogatives, which are invested in them from the Original Nature of Government; so that there still remains enough in the Princes hands to be made use of, for the preservation of his own Power, and the defence of his Subjects, for whose benefit it was intrusted with him by God. So far the late great Chan­cellor.

And these Priviledges, and Condescensions, being once past into constant, and standing [...]aws, by the Princes that gave them, and also solemnly sworn to by their Coronation Oaths, do for the future bind, not only those Prin­ces that granted them, but also their Successors, to their observation: And I then look upon them bound, under pain of Damnation, not to break, or infringe them, without very great necessity.

But however, if they shall happen so to do, since they were matters of meer Grace, and Favour at the first, and not of Right, the Princes that thus transgress them, are only accountable to God, and punishable by him, and not by their Subjects, for any Breaches, or Infringements of such Liberties, and Immunities: And this may serve against the Fancies of all those who think Princes have nothing, but what the People have given them; and likewise against such as Mr. Hobbs, who maintain so much is conferred on them, that they have a Right to leave no body else any thing to enjoy, that they have a mind to take from them. And this I take to be a much better Security for the Peoples Liberties, to leave it to the Honour, and Consci­ence of their Princes, and that Fear they ought to have of the Divine Ven­geance, in case they oppress their Subjects contrary to Law, than your heady, and violent Methods of Resistance for the Oppression, or Tyranny of Prin­ces, which would but give the common people a pretence of taking Arms, and Rebelling against their Princes upon every slight provocation.

You have made a very plausible Discourse, whether of your own, or from the Author you quote, is not much material; for I doubt when it comes to be examined, it will appear much more like a Romance than a true History: And therefore granting at present your Principles to be true, (tho' they are not) I desire you to shew me, how you can make it out, ei­ther from Sacred, or Prophane History, that any Limited Kingdom now in the World, ever had its Original from those gracious Condescensions, or Concessions of Princes, as you here mention: For by all that ever I can read, or observe, either from our own, or Foreign History, all the Liberties, and Priviledges which Subjects enjoy at this day, proceeded at first, either from the Original Contracts, Customs, or Constitutions of those Kingdoms, or Nations, at the first Institution of their Government; or else were for­ced from Princes by their Subjects, who would no longer endure the seve­rity of their Yoke, or else were granted by some of them, who believing they had worse Titles than their Competitors to the Crown, were willing to▪ engage the People to their side, by granting them greater Priviledges, than they before enjoyed.

And tho' I grant the Reflections you make upon the exercise of Arbitrary Power, and the Miseries it brings both upon the Prince, and People, are very true: Yet I am sure the practice of most Absolute Monarchs through­out the whole World, hath run quite contrary to your suppositions. For [Page 115] Princes are so far (by what I ever read, or observed) from being willing to part with any of their Power, that they have still endeavoured by de­grees to enlarge it, and render it more absolute than it was left them; as you may observe in the Government of France, Spain, Denmark, and Swe­den in this last Age; and what Encroachments were made in this Kingdom by the Prerogative upon the Peoples Liberties, during the Reigns of our last Princes, he is a stranger to the History of the Country, that hath not read of, if he do not remember them. And how much higher they would have been carried, if this strange, and sudden Revolution had not put a stop to it, I had rather you and I should understand in Idea than by Experience.

But if such grave Reflections as these of yours, were able to work upon the first Monarchs, I desire to know the reason why those of Turkey, Persia, Russia, and the African Emperors of Morocco, and of the Abissines (who sure have been as wise as any you can name) should not in so many Ages as they have Governed, see these Inconveniences you mention, and restrain their Exorbitant Power within some moderate Limits: Nay, to the contrary, one of the most ambitious and aspiring Monarchs in Europe, is making what haste he can to reduce his Kingdom into the same Model. And what do you think would the Princes, and Councellors of these Empires say to such a one as you, or I, who should offer to preach this strange Doctrine to them, That they ought under pain of Damnation to use their Subjects as their Children, and not as Slaves, or meer Vassals? I doubt they would make us pay dear for publishing such false Doctrine in their Dominions, or at least would despise us for half-witted fellows, without any true Notions in Po­liticks, since they believe, that the true Security, and Glory of a King, con­sists in vast Standing Armies, Great Fleets, and a power to take from their Subjects, and Neighbours, whatever they please, thereby to enjoy their own pleasures and humours in all their hearts can desire, and to extend their Empires (per fas & nefas) as far as ever their Conquering Swords will give them leave. And if you should tell them, that their Subjects could not love them, nor live happily, nor contentedly under such a Govern­ment; I suppose their Answer would be (if they could speak Latine) Ode­rint dum metuant, or in the Language of their own Country, that they would rather trust a Standing Army, than the Affections of their People; and that it is better to take from their Subjects what they have a mind to▪ than to leave it to their good will what they will give them. These are all the Antient, and Modern Politicks that I can observe in most Absolute Mo­narchies, or in those Kingdoms, where Kings have taken upon them so to Govern their Subjects, at this day: But I defie you to shew me any one Kingdom in the World, where the People owe all their Liberties, and Pri­viledges meerly to the good will, and favour of their Princes▪ who granted them only out of those wise considerations you have now mentioned.

But as for the Expedient at the latter end of your Speech, that these Pri­viledges, and Condescensions, when once granted by Kings to their Subj [...]cts, and past into constant, and standing Laws, and also solemnly sworn to by Princes at their Coronation, do not only bind those Princes that granted them, but also their Successors under pain of Damnation; I so far agree with you, tho' I must beg your pardon if I cannot think this a sufficient Security, for several Reasons I can give you at a more convenient time when I shall, when you please, more fully discuss this point.

I must freely tell you Sir, I am not yet satisfied neither with the Instances you have brought, nor yet with your replies to my answers, and I think I can shew you as to this Kingdom, that they are false in mat­ter of Fact. For if that the first and most ancient Kingdoms and Monar­chies began by Conquest at first, and that perhaps for the most part by Wars unjustly made, as I may also Instance in England, if this were a proper season for it, so that indeed the greatest Liberty in the World, (if it be duely considered) is for a People to live under a Paternal Monar­chy. It is the Magna Charta of this Kingdom, all other shews, or Pretexts of Liberty are but several degrees of Slavery, and a Liberty only to destroy Liberty.

So that I think I may very well keep my first opinion, that Paternal Government is the Foundation of all other, and I have ever thought God's Love, and Kindness to Mankind did never appear in any thing more, (ex­cept in Man's Redemption) than in Creating only one Man, and out of him only one Woman: So that Adam was a kind of a Father to his Wife▪ That Marital as well as all other Power might be founded in Paternal Iuris­diction. That all Princes might look upon the meanest of their Subjects, as their Children: And all Subjects upon their Prince as their Common Fa­ther: And upon each other as the Children of one Man; that Mankind might not only be United in one common Nature, but also be of one Blood, of one Family and be habituated to the best of Governments from the very Infancy of the World.

Were this well considered as there could be no Tyrants, so neither would there be any Traitors; and Rebels: But both Prince and People would strive to outdo each other in the offices of Love, and Duty: And now do you, or any Man living read Sir R. F's Patriarcha or other works, and see if either he, or I have ascribed one Dram of Power to Princes which will not Naturally Spring from this Supream-Paternal Power.

So that upon the whole, I think reason it self would conclude, that this way of Solving the first Rise of Government is true, and that it is the Du­ty of all, who by the Blessing of God are under Paternal Monarchies, to be very thankful for the favour, and to do the utmost that in them lies to pre­serve, and transmit that best form of Government to their Children after them. And surely there is no Nation under Heaven hath more reason for this than the English, who are under a Paternal Monarchy, which has taken the best care, that can be to secure them not only from oppression, and wrong, but from the very fear of it.

Since you lay the chief stress of your assertion, upon the Original of most of the Kingdoms and Monarchies now in the World, and of our own in particular, I think I may safely joyn issue with you on both points, and in the first place affirm that an unjust Conquest gives the Con­querour no right to the Subjects Obedience much less over their Lives, or Estates, and if our Norman William and his Successours had no more right to the Crown of England than meer conquest, I doubt whether they might have been driven out, after the same manner they came in: But I believe you will find upon second thoughts that Unjust Conquests and Usurpations of Crowns be no firm Titles for Princes to relye on; lest the Old English [Page 117] Proverb be turned upon you, viz. That which is Sauce for a Goose, is Sauce for a Gander; but I Shall defer this discourse concerning Titles by Conquest, and in particular that of our Kings to this Kingdom to some other time when I doubt not but to shew, that it is not only false in matter of fact, but also that it will not prove that for which it is brought.

And therefore what you say in your conclusion in exaltation of God's Love, and Kindness to Mankind, in Creating one Man, and out of him on­ly one Woman; that Adam might be a kind of Father to his Wife, is a very pretty and indeed singular Notion, and you would do very well to move the Convocation next time it sits, that this explanation may be add­ed to the fifth Commandment, that Women may be taught in the Cate­chism that Obedience to Husbands, is due by the Precept, of Honour thy Fa­ther and thy Mother.

And therefore I need give no other Answer to all the rest you have said however Specious the Hypothesis may seem (as you have drest it up,) for Princes, and People; yet till you have proved that all Paternal Power is Monarchical; and that all Monarchical Power is derived from Father­hood, it signifies nothing.

Nor can these Piae Fraudes do any more good in Politicks than Religion: For as Superstition can never serve to advance the True Worship of God, but by creating false Notions of the Divine Nature in Me [...]s Minds, which doth not render it, as it ought to be, the Object of their Love, and Reverence, but Servile Fear: So I suppose this asserting of such an unlimited Despotical Power in all Monarchs, and such an entire Subjection as Sir R. F. and you, your self exact from Subjects, can produce nothing but a flavish Dread without that esteem, and affection for their Prince's Person, and Govern­ment; which is so necessary for the quiet of Princes, and which they may always have, whilst they think themselves obliged in Conscience, and Ho­nour, to protect their Lives and Fortunes from Slavery, and Oppression, according to the just and known Laws of the Kingdom, and not to dispense with them in great, and Essential Points, without the Consent of those who have a hand in the making of them: And all false Notions of this Supreme Power as derived from I know not what Fatherly, (but indeed Despotick) Power are so far from settling in Peoples Minds, a sober and rational Obe­dience to Government, that they rather make them desperate; and care­less, who is their Master, since, let what Change will come, they can expect no better than to be Slaves.

Nor are Subjects put in a better condition by this Doctrine of Absolute Non Resistance, since all Princes are not of so generous a Nature, as not to Tyrannize, and Insult the more over those whom they suppose will not, or else dare not resist them; and therefore I cannot see how such a submis­sion can soften the hearts of the most Cruel Princes in the World, as you suppose, much less how Resistance in some cases can inrage the mildest Princes to their Peoples Ruine, since all Resistance of such mild, and mer­ciful Princes I grant to be utterly unlawful; nor do I hold Resistance ever to be practised, but where the People are already ruined in their Liberties and Fortunes; or are just at the brink of it, and have no other means left but that to avoid it.

To conclude, I so far agree with you, that I think it is the Duty of [Page 118] all that are born under a Kingly Government Limited by Laws, to be very thankful to God for the Favour, and to do the utmost that in them lies to preserve and transmit this best Form of Government to their Children after them, without maintaining such unintelligible Fictions as a Paternal Monarchy derived from Adam, or Noah. And tho' I own that some of our former Kings have taken the best care they could, to secure this Nation from Popery, and Arbitrary Power; yet whether the Method of our three last Kings have been the readiest way to secure us from the fears of it, I leave it to your own Conscience (if you are a Protestant) to judge.

But since you defie me to shew you out of Sir R. F's Patriarcha, that he hath ascribed one Dram of Power to Princes, which doth not naturally arise from a Supreme Paternal Power, and that this is no Exorbitant heighth; I think I am able to prove from many passages in his Patriarcha, as well as other Works, that no Author hath made bolder Assertions to render all Mankind Slaves, instead of Subjects, and all Princes Tyrants, instead of Kings; and that his Principles are so far from being safe, that if they are duly lookt into and weighed, they will prove destructive as well to the Rights of Princes, as to the Liberties of the People.

I should be very glad to see that proved, for I must always be­lieve till you shew me to the contrary, that this Excellent Author lays it down for a Ground, that Princes being as Fathers to their People, are bound to treat their Subjects as Children, and not as Slaves; and therefore waving this last Controversie, which we have argued as far as it will go; pray make out what you say from his own words, and I will give up the Cause.

I wonder how you can be so partially blind, as not to see this, since you your self have already made use not only of a great deal of his Doctrins, but also of his very words: And therefore pray see his Obedience to Government in doubtful times, as also in his Preface to the Observa­tions upon Aristotle's Politicks, where you will find he asserts,page 4th. That Adam was the Father, King and Lord over his Family; a Son, a Subject and a Servant, or a Slave were one, and the same thing at first: The Father had power to dispose of, or sell his Children, or Servants: Whence we find, that at the first reckoning of Goods in Scrip­ture, the Man-servant, and the Maid-servant are number'd among the Pos­sessions, and Substance of the Owner, as other Goods were. So that then, if the Power of a Father, and of a Monarch be all one, and that all Monarchi­cal Power is Despotical, the Consequence is also as evident, that all Subjects are also naturally Slaves, unless their Princes shall please to lay an easier Yoke upon them.

Perhaps Sir R. F. may have carried this matter a little too far; yet if you please to look into his Patriarcha, Chap. 3. Par. 1. you will find, that he hath this passage, which plainly speaks the contrary: The Father of a Fa­mily Governs by no other Law, than by his own Will, not by the Laws and Wills of his Sons, and Servants. There is no Nation that allows Children any Action, or Remedy for being unjustly Governed; and yet for all this, every Father is bound by the Law of Nature to do his best for the preservation of his Family; but much more is a King always tyed by the same Law of Nature, to keep this general Ground, That [Page 119] the Safety of his Kingdom be his Chief Law. Whence you may observe, that tho' he takes away all Remedy from Children against their Parents, for be­ing ill Governed, yet doth he not set the Father free from all Obligation to preserve the Good of his Family, of which sure a Man's Children are a principal part.

And if you please to look back to the second Chapter, Par. 3. you will find these words. To answer in particular to the first Text, it may be said the sense of these words, By the Law of Nature all Men are born free, must needs mean a Freedom only, that is opposite to such a Subjection as is between Father, and Son. This is made manifest by the Text of the Law: For Ulpian in this place speaketh only of Manumission, which is a setting at Liberty of Servants from Servitude, and not of Emancipation, which is the freeing of Children from the Fathers Tuition. Servitude, as the Law teacheth, is a Constitution of the Law of Nations, by which a Man is subject to the Dominion of any other Man against Nature. So not every Subjection is Servitude, but Subjection contrary to the Law of Nature. Yet every Man is born subject to the Power of a Father. This the Law it self saith; In Potestate nostra Liberi nostri sunt. So that you see here be maketh a difference between Servitude, and that Subjection that is due to Fathers.

Give me leave to answer these two Instances before you proceed any farther, and I shall in the first place make bold to answer your last In­stance first, because I shall be much shorter upon it. But pray take notice by the way, that this Author is very high, and rigorous for the Absolute Power of Life, and Death in all Fathers, over their Children in the State of Nature, and that they may exercise it for very slight Offences; and there­fore in this Chapter you have last quoted, he seems very well satisfied with the Example of Cassius▪ who threw his Son out of the Consistory for publishing the Agrarian Law, for the Division of Lands; and I think this was no such great Crime, for which a Father might justifie the putting his Son to Death. And in the Section before this, he justifieth the Power of Fathers amongst the Romans, as being ratified, and amplified by the Laws of the XII Tables, en­abling Parents to sell their Children two or three times over. So that these things considered, I cannot see, how this Distinction of Sir R. F. out of the Civil Law, will do him any service. For tho' I grant indeed that Manumission, and Emancipation are two different words, yet do they both signifie the same thing; and tho' for the greater respect which they would shew to the Con­dition of Children, above that of Slaves, they were pleased to make use of different expressions; yet, whoever will look more closely into the Nature of the Subjection, that Children were in, under their Parents, by the Roman Law, will find, that the Condition of Children, was no better than that of Slaves. For First, The Father had such an Absolute Power over the Person of the Son, that he could sell him three times, whereas he could sell a Slave but once. Secondly, He had such an Absolute Power over his Life, that he could take it away whenever he pleased. Lastly, A Son could have no Pro­perty in any Goods without his Fathers Consent, till he was emancipated, or made free: So that if his Father were harsh, and ill natured, the Condition of a Son was worse than that of a Slave, as long as his Father lived.

And therefore I am still of the Opinion of the Antient Civil Lawyers, which assert the Natural Freedom of Mankind, according to the Maxim you have now cited. And they acknowledge that the Servitude, or Absolute-Subjection [Page 120] of Children to their Fathers, was not by the Law of Nature, but by the Civil or Roman Law, peculiar to themselves; as I have already proved at our last meeting.

But to come to your first Quotation, whereby you would justifie Sir R. F. for maintaining any unjust Severity in Fathers, or Tyranny in Princes, be­cause they are both to endeavour the Common Good of the Family, and Kingdom, tis very true he says so; but of this Common Good they themselves are the sole Iudges: So that if the Father please to sell one or two of his Children, whom he least loveth, to provide Portions for the rest, he may lawfully do it for any thing I see to the contrary. So likewise imme­diately after he asserts the Superiority of all Princes above Laws, because there were Kings long before there were any Laws. And all the next Pa­ragraph is wholy spent, in proving the Unlimited Iurisdiction of Kings above Laws, as it is described by Samuel, when the Israelites desired a King: So that it signifies little what Laws Princes make, or what Priviledges they grant their Subjects, since they may alter them, or abrogate them when ever they please.

But pray take along with you, what he says in the next Paragraph you quote; where you may see these words; It is [...]here evidently shewed, that the scope of Samuel, was to teach the People a dutiful Obedience to their King, even in those things which themselves did esteem Mischievous and Inconvenient: For by telling them what a King would do, he indeed instructs them what a Subject must suffer; yet not so, as that it is Right for Kings to do Injury, but it is Right for them to go unpunished by the People if they do it: So that in this point it is all one, whether Samuel describe a King, or a Tyrant; for patient Obedience is due to both: No Remedy in the Text against Tyrants, but in crying, and pray­ing unto God in that day. And that Sir R. F. is very far from justifying Kings in the unnecessary Breach of their Laws, may farther appear by what he says, Chap. 3. Par. 6. of this Treatise, where pray see this passage. Now albeit Kings who make the Laws, be (as King James teacheth us) above the Laws; yet will they Rule their Subjects by the Law; and a King Governing in a Settled Kingdom, leaves to be a King, and degenerateth into a Tyrant, so soon as he leaves to Rule according to his Laws; yet where he sees the Laws rigo­rous, or doubtful, be may mitigate and interpret them. So that you see here he leaves the King no Power or Prerogative above the Laws, but what shall be directed, and employed for the general Good of the Kingdom.

But pray, Sir, read on a little farther, and see if he doth not again undo all that he hath before so speciously laid down, and if you will not read it, I will: General Laws made in Parliament, may upon known respects to the King, by his Authority, be mitigated, or suspended upon Causes only known to him. And altho' a King do frame all his Action to be according to the Laws, yet he is not bound thereto, but at his good Will, and for good Example: Or so far forth as the General Law of the Safety of the Common-Weal doth naturally bind him; for in such sort only, Positively Laws may be said to bind the King, not by being Positive, but as they are naturally the best, or only means for the preserva­tion of the Common-Wealth.

So that if the King have this Prerogative of mitigating, interpreting, and suspending all Laws, in Cases only known to himself, and that he is not bound [Page 121] to the Laws but at his own good will, and for good example. I desire to know what greater Prerogative a King can desire, than to suspend the Exe­cution of any Law, as often as he shall think fit. For tho' I grant the Suspen­sion of a Law differs from the Abrogation of it, because the former only takes away the force of it in this or that particular case, whereas the latter wholy annuls the Law; yet if this Suspension be general, and in every case, where the Law is to take effect, it amounts to the same thing with an Abro­gation of it; as may be plainly seen in the late King's Dispersing Power. For tho' it be true he pretended to no more, than to dispense with this, or that Person, who should undertake a publick Employment, either Military, or Ci­vil, without taking the Oaths, and T [...]st; yet since he granted this Dispensa­tion generally to all Papists, and others, that would transgress this law, it amounted to the same thing during his pleasure, as an Absolute Abrogation of it. And therefore I do very much wonder why divers who are very zea­lous for the Church of England, and the King's Prerogative, should be so angry with him for erecting that Power, which not only this Author, but all others of his Principles have placed in him: And if the King may suspend this, and all other Laws, upon Causes only known to him, I do not see how he differs from being as Absolute and Arbitrary a Monarch, as the Great Turk himself, and may when he pleases, notwithstanding all Laws to the contrary, take away Men's Lives without any due Forms of Law, and raise Taxes with­out Consent of Parliament.

But pray read on a little farther, and you will find that he very much restrains this Absolute Power, in these words: By this mean, are all Kings, even Tyrants and Conquerors, bound to preserve the Laws, Goods, Liberties and Lives of all their Subjects, not by any Municipal Law of the Land, but by the Na­tural Law of a Father, which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Fore-fathers and Predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their Subjects.

Were I a Monarch limited by Laws, I would desire no greater a Power over them, than this you have here brought out of this Author. For he says▪ Positive Laws do not bind the King, but as they are the b [...]st or only means for the preservation of the Common Wealth. In the next place you see that all Kings are bound to preserve the Lives and Estates of their Subjects, not by any Municipal Law of the Land, but by the Natural Law of a Father, which binds them to ratifie the Acts of their Predecessors in things necessary for the publick good of their Subjects. Now this Paternal Power is large enough of all Conscience to discharge Princes from any Obligation to the Laws far­ther than they please. For it before appears that the Father of a Family go­verns by no other Law than by his own Will, and not by the Laws and Wills of his Sons or Servants; therefore if the Power of the King be wholy Paternal, he may alter this Will of his as often as he please: Nor can his Sub­jects, who are all one with Sons and Servants, have any reason to find fault with it For he says, There is no Nation that allows Children any Remedy for being unjustly Governed. And tho' it be true, that he restrains this Prerogative both in Fathers and Kings to the publick good of their Children and Subjects; yet as long as he is left the sole and uncontroulable Judge of what is for the publick good, all these fine Pretences will signifie nothing. For he is bound to observe or ratifie no Laws or Acts of his Predecessors, but what he is sa­tisfied tend to this End: So that if he thinks fit to Judge, that Magna Charta, [Page 122] for example, for the Statute de Tallagio non concedendo, or any Liberty we enjoy, are not necessary, or contrary to the common good, he is not tied to observe them: And upon this Principle it was that the Judges in the Reign of King Charles the First founded the King's Prerogative for Ship money: For they supposed that the King in case of necessity (that is, for the publick good of the Subjects) might lay a Tax upon the Kingdom, tho' without Consent of Parliament. So that upon this pretence▪ the King being the sole Iudge of the Necessity, he might quickly have raised what Taxes, and as often as he had pleased

But, lest our Kings should think themselves too strictly bound by their Coronation Oaths, to observe the Laws, pray see in the next Paragraph, how this Author endeavours to help the King to creep out of that Obligation too. Therefore pray read on. Others there be that affirm, that altho' Laws of themselves do not bind Kings, yet the Oaths of Kings at their Coronations tye them, to keep all the Laws of their Kingdoms: How far this is true, let us but examine the Oaths of the Kings of England at their Coronation, the words whereof are these: Art thou pleased to cause to be administred in all thy Judgments indifferent, and upright Justice, and to use Discretion with Mercy, and Verity? Art thou pleased, that our upright Laws, and Customs be observed; and doest thou promise, that those shall be protected and maintained by thee? These two are the [...]rticles of the King's Oath, which concern the Laity, or Subjects in ge­neral; to which the King answers affirmatively; being first demanded by the Arch-bishop of Canterbury: Pleaseth it you to confirm, and observe the Laws, and Customs of Antient Times granted from God, by just and devout Kings unto the English Nation, by Oath unto the said People, especially the Laws, Liberties and Customs granted unto the Clergy and Laity, by the Fa­mous King Edward? We may observe in these words of the Articles of the Oath, that the King is required to observe, not all the Laws, but only the upright, and that with Discretion and Mercy. The word upright cannot mean all Laws, because in the Oath of Richard the Second, I find Evil, and Unjust Laws mentioned, which the King swears to abolish; and in the Old Abridgment of Statutes set forth in King Henry the Eighths days▪ the King is to swear wholy to put out Evil Laws, which he cannot do, if he be bound to all Laws.

Now what Laws are Upright, and what Evil, who shall judge but the King? since he swears to administer Upright Iustice with Discretion, and Mercy; (or as Bracton hath it) aequitatem praecipiat, & Misericordiam. So that in effect the King doth swear to keep no Laws but such as in his Iudgment are Up­right, and those not literally always, but according to the Equity of his Conscience, joyned with Mercy, which is properly the Office of a Chancellor rather than of a Iudge: And if a King did strictly swear to observe all the Laws he could not with­out Perjury give his Consent to the Repealing, or Abrogating of any Statute by Act of Parliament, which would be very mischievous to the State.

But let it be supposed for truth, that Kings do swear to observe all the Laws of their Kingdoms; yet no man can think it reason, that Kings should be more bound by their voluntary Oaths, than common persons are by theirs. Now if a private person make a Contract, either with Oath, or without Oath, he is no farther bound than the Equity, and Iustice of the Contract tyes him; for a Man may have Relief against an unrea­sonable, and unjust Promise, if either Deceit, or Error, Force, or Fear induced him thereunto; or if it be hurtfuls or grievous in the performance; since the Laws in [Page 123] many Cases give the King a Prerogative above common persons, I see no reason why he should be denied the Priviledge which the meanest of his Subjects doth enjoy.

I need not make any long Paraphrase upon these words; it is sufficient that the King is here left sole Iudge of what Laws are Upright, and what Un­just, and consequently what Laws he pleases shall be observed, and what not▪ So that no Laws, tho' thought never so just, and necessary by the Parliament at the time of making of them, shall signifie any thing, if he thinks sit af­terwards to judge otherwise. And lest this should not be sufficient, he hath found out another way whereby Princes may absolve themselves of this troublesom Obligation of Oaths; and therefore he would have them no more bound up than common persons, who because they may have Relief in Publick Courts of Justice, against an unjust Promise, if either Errour, De­ceit, Force, or Fear, induced them thereunto; nay more, if it be hurtful or grievous in the performance, Kings who have a Prerogative above common persons, and who acknowledge no Tribunal above themselves, may absolve them­selves of their Oaths whenever they think good; by saying it was extorted from them by Deceit Force, or Fear; or if they cannot satisfie themselves with­out it, they might have had formerly the Pope's Dispensation for Money, which we read King Iohn, and Henry the Third obtained to be ab­solved of the Oaths they had taken to observe Magna Charta; but this Author hath found out a shorter cut, and hath made Kings both Judges, and Parties, and to ab­solve themselves by a Fundamental Right of Government. And what hath proved the Conclusion of such Princes who have taken this Authors Liberty of breaking their Coronation Oath at their pleasure? it hath only taught their Subjects to imitate their Example, and to make as light of their Oath of Al­legiance.

I will not deny but perhaps Sir R F. may have carried the Pre­rogative in this point a little too far; yet that he meant honestly towards the Common weal, in all this, I pray see the 8th Section of this Chapter, where you'll find these words: Many will be ready to say, It is a slavish, and dangerous Condition to be subject to the Will of any one M [...]n, who is not subject to the Laws But such Men consider not, 1. That the Prerogative of a King is to be above all Laws, for the good only of them, who are under the Laws, and to defend the Peoples Liberties, as His Majesty graciously affirmed in his Speech after his last Answer to the Petition of Right; howsoever some are afraid of the name of Pre­rogative, yet they may assure themselves the Case of Subjects would be desperately mi­serable without it. So that you see here he asserts no Prerogative in the King to be above all Laws, but only for the good of the people, and to de­fend their Liberties, which I think is a sufficient restraint of Prerogative.

But read a little lower, and the People will have no such great cause to thank him, as you may see by these words: In all Aristocracies the Nobles are above the Laws; and in all Democracies the People. By the like reason in a Mo­narchy the King must of necessity be above the Laws; there can be no Soveraign Ma­jesty in him that is under them. That which gives the very being to a King, is the Power to give Laws; without this Power he is but an Equivocal King.

And most part of what follows in this Treatise is only to prove▪ that the Parliament, or Assembly of Estates was a Creature wholy of the King's Crea­tion, and consequently that he alone makes the Laws in it. And he hath also written a whole Treatise called, The Free-holders Grand Inquest, to prove that [Page 124] it is the King's Authority alone, that makes the Laws, and therefore that he can interpret, and dispense with them at his pleasure. So that Richard the Second, had this Author lived in his time, might have made him a Judge as we [...]l as Tre [...]illian and Belknap, since they all maintained the same Principles. But, lest we should mistake him, see what he says at the conclusion of this Treatise: For the confirmation of this Point, Aristotle saith, That a perfect King­dom is that wherein the King Rules all things according to his own Will; for he that is called a King according to the Law, makes no kind of Kingdom at all. This it s [...]ems also the Romans well understood to be most necessary in a Monarchy; for [...] th [...]y were a People most greedy of Liberty, yet the Senate did free Augustus from all necessary of Laws, that he might be free of his own Authority, and of absolute Po [...]r over himself, and over the Laws to do what he pleased, and leave undone what he li [...]t, and this Decree was made while Augustus was yet absent. Accord­ingly we find that Ulpian the great Lawyer delivers it for a Rule of the Civil Law; Princeps Legibus solutus est ▪ The Prince is not bound by the Laws.

So that upon these Principles all Kings are not only discharged from the Penalty, but also the very Obligation of observing Laws farther than they shall think sit. And indeed this Author carries this Prerogative beyond what the most moderate Roman Emperours ever pretended to, as I can ea­sily shew you from your own Civil Law-Books; and therefore pray reach me down your Volume of the Code, and fee here what the Emperour declares on this matter de Testamentis. L. 3. Lib. 6. T. 23. Ex imperfecto Testamento nec Imperatorem haereditatem vindicare posse, sape constitutum est, licet enim Lex Imperii Solennibus juris Imperatorem sol­verit; Nihil tamen tam proprium Imperii est, quàm Legibus vivere. See likewise in the Theodosian Code, these words; Digna vox est Maje­state Regnantis, C. de Legibus l. 4. Lib. 1. T. 14. Legibus alligatum se Principis prositeri, aded de Authoritate juris, nosira pendet Authoritas, & re vera ma­jus Imperio est submittere Legibus Principatum, & oraculo praesentis Edicti quod nobis licere non patimur, aliis indicamu [...], (viz. Successor [...]bu [...] Theodosio & Valentino.)

So that you may here see, that even the Roman Emperours were more modest than to declare themselves discharged by their Prerogative, or thought of any of these subtile distinctions of this Author from their obliga­tion to the Laws, however they were from the Penalty; which is the true sense of this phrase of being Legibus solutus.

But God be thanked, most of our own Kings have been more conscien­tious than to maintain that they were not bound by their Coronation Oath farther than they pleased. For you may see in the Pre­amble to the Statute of Provisours made in the 25th of Ed. 3d.Rastal, s. 99. where it is declared and acknowledged by the King himself, and both Houses of Parliament, that the Right of the Crown of England, and the Law of the Realm is such, that upon the Mischiefs and Da­mages which happen to the Realm, he ought, and was bound of his said People in his Parliament thereof to make Remedy, and Law, in voiding the Mischiefs which come thereof: And the King seeing the Mischiefs, and Damage aforesaid, and having regard to the said Statute (scil. the former Statute of Provisours) he here farther acknowledges, that he is bound by his Oath to do the same to be kept, as the Law of his Realm, tho' by sufferance and negligence it hath been hitherto attempted to the contrary.

[Page 125]So likewise King Henry the fourth declares in full Parlia­ment, (as appears by the Parliament Roll) that whereas the Commons in Parliament had granted,Rot. Parl. H. 4. n. 108. Act pour garder, les leys. that the King should be in as great Liberty as any of his Noble Progenitors: on which our said Lord of his Royal Grace, and tender Consci­ence, hath granted in full Parliament; that it is not his in­tent, nor will he alter the Laws, Statutes, and good Usages, nor take any Ad­vantages by the said Grant, but will keep the ancient Laws, and Statutes or­dained, and used in the times of his Noble Progenitors, and do Right to all People in Mercy and Truth Selon [...] son Serment, i. e. according to his Coronati­on Oath.

I will not affirm, but Sir R F. observing how much the Kings Pre­rogative was run down by the long Parliament and how the least Slips, and Miscarriages in Government were aggravated by the Demogogues that then Domineered, as open and violent breaches of his Coronation Oath, might be willing to make the best defence he could for such Miscarriages, and this Treatise of Patriarcha being a Posthumous piece, perhaps he would have al­tered many things in it, had he lived to publish it himself; but I doubt not, but he was a very honest Man, and meant well to the Kingdom for all that. And therefore I hope you will not be too rigorous in your Censure of him.

I'll assure you Sir, I shall not, because he hath been dead many years, and therefore I had much rather censure his Writings, than his Person, which I never knew. But, if I may Judge from his Works, he was certainly no Friend to Parliaments, or the Power of the Laws above the Prerogative: But that I may also shew you how dangerous, and Derogatory his Opinions like­wise are to the Titles of all Soveraign Princes, and Monarchs, now in the World, however he may seem to write in their defence; pray turn to his Patr. Chap. 1. Par. 9. and to a Question, [...] becomes of the Right of Fatherhood in case the Crown escheat for want of an H [...]ir; he thus replies, which pray read. It is but the Negligence, or Ignorance of the People to lose the Knowledge of the true Heir: For an Heir there always is; If Adam himself were still living, and now ready to dye, it is certain there is o [...] Man, and but one in the World, who is next. Heir, altho' the Knowledge who should be that one man be quite lost. The which he likewise repeats to the same Effect, in his Treatise of the Anarchy of a limi­ted, or mixed Monarchy. Pray see the place, and read these words. It is a truth undeniable, Miscel. p. 273. that there cannot be a Multitude of Men whatso­ever, either great or small, tho' gathered together from the several Cor­ners, and remotest Regions in the World; but that in the same Multi­tude considered by it self, there is one Man amongst them, that in Nature hath a Right to be the King of all the rest, as being the next Heir to Adam, and the other Subject unto him; every Man by Nature is a King, or a Subject. So that I think no Kings in the World being able to deduce their Pedigree from Adam (of whom there can be but one Right Heir) they all (or at least all but one) are only Kings de Facto, and not de Iure, and Usurpers upon this Heir of Adam. So that, if God would but be pleased to reveal, who this next Heir is, all the Kings of the Earth were bound in Conscience to lay their Crowns at his Feet: tho' he were but a Cobler, or a Link-boy. How ridiculous a Notion this is I leave it to any indifferent Man to Judge.

I hope this opinion is like to have no very ill effect, unless any [Page 126] Prince by vertue of this Title of Adams Right Heir should pretend a Right to an Universal Monarchy, and then I think it were but reasonable, he should be put to make out his Title; but seeing no body doth so, to the best of my Knowledge, it is but reasonable that all Princes should in the mean time enjoy what they are in lawful Possession of, till this Heir of Noah hath made out his Title, and then they may consider farther of it.

And it is very well, that this Right Heir is not to be found, for if he were, all Princes would be Usurpers, who did not immediately resign to him. But this Doctrine is of more fatal consequence than you imagine: For it doth not only concern Princes in respect of Adam's Right Heir only, but also of any other Right Heirs to Princes, who have lost their Right to a Crown, never so many Ages ago: For look into his Directions for Obedience in doubtful times, and read this Passage: By humane Positive Laws, a Possession time out of Mind takes away, or Bars a former Right, to avoid a general Mischief of bringing all Right into a Disputation not decideable by proof, and consequently to the overthrow of all Civil Government in Grants, Gifts, and Contracts between Man and Man; but in Grants, and Gifts that have their Original from God, or Nature (as the Power of a Father hath) no Inferiour Power of Man can limit, nor make any Law of Prescription against them. Upon this ground is built that Nullum tempus occurrit Regi, no time Barrs a King. And a little before, he gives us this reason of it. For tho' by humane Laws a long Prescription may take away Right; yet a Divine Right never dies, nor can be lost or taken away. By which Principle, he renders the Titles of most (if not all) of the Princes of Europe at this day very weak and disputable; whenever any other Person shall set up a Title against them.

But Sir R. F. hath found a very good Expedient for this, for he tells us, in the last cited Discourse that the Paternal Power cannot be lost, tho' it may ei­ther be transferred, or usurped; and in his Anarchy of a limited Monarchy,pag. 273. he thus more at large expresses it. Many times by the Act either of an Usurper himself, or of those that set him up, the true Heir of a Crown is dispossessed, God using the Ministry of the wickedest Man for the removing, and setting up of Kings, in such Cases, the Subjects Obedience to the Father­ly Power must go along, and wait upon Gods Providence, who only hath right to give and take away Kingdoms, and thereby to adopt Subjects into the Obedience of another Fatherly Power. And Lastly in his Discourse of Obedience, &c. he more clearly f [...]tleth this Point in answer to an Objection there made, that most Kings now in the World have no other Titles to their Crowns but Conquest, or Usurpation; he replieth, That tho' all Kings were Usurpers, yet still the first Usur­per hath the best Tale, being in Possession by the Permission of God; and where an Usurper hath continued so long, that the Knowledge of the Right Heir is lost by the Subjects; in such case the Usurper in Possession is to be taken and reputed by such Subjects for the true Heir, and is to be obey'd by them as their Father. And I think you your self will not deny, but that Kingdoms may be transferred from one Prince to another by Conquest, or a long Usurpation; and that when there is no other, better Title extant, the King in Possession, or his Heirs may have a good Title by a long Possession, tho' it began by Usurpation at first.

I have not now time to answer all that your Author hath as falsly, as incoherently said concerning this Subject of Usurpation; and I should be glad to hear you, or any man else that will undertake to defend him, make [Page 127] him consistent, not only with reason, but with himself in this Discourse you quote, concerning Obedience to Government in doubtful times. For to pass by his unintelligible Notion of supposing two supream Paternal Powers sub­sisting at once, and each of them laying claim to the Obedience, and Submis­sion of the Subjects, the former that of the Usurper, W [...]o being in Possession of the Crown by the permissive Will of God, who hath thought fit to adopt the Subjects into a Fatherly Power, and the latter, that Paternal Right which he supposes still to remain in the expulsed Prince, and his Heirs for ever. By which means the Allegiance of the Subjects is so divided and perplext, that they can never be able to tell, when the Allegiance to the Right Heir is to take place before that of the Usurper.

But if you had been pleased better to observe this Discourse, you would find that Sir R. F. hath very well obviated this Objecti­on, as appears by these Words.Ib. p. 68. The Right of Fatherly Govern­ment was ordained by God for the Preservation of Mankind; if it be usurped, the Usurper may be so far obeyed as may tend to the Preservation of the Sub­jects, who may thereby be enabled to perform their Duty, to the true and right Sove­reign when time shall serve, in such cases to obey an Usurper is properly to obey the first and Right Governour, who must be presumed to desire the safety of his Subjects. The Command of an Usurper is not to be obeyed in any thing tending to the Destructi­on of the Governour, whose Being in the first place is to be looked after.

This is I confess a very pretty distinction to make the Usurper, who governs, whether the right Heir will or no, yet to do it by his Consent, and that the Subjects when they Act thus do but still obey their rightful Gover­nour, which supposition would be contradictory to what your Author hath already laid down of the Subjects being adopted into the Obedience of ano­ther [...]atherly. Power by the Usurpa [...]ion; for if it be as he now makes it, they still remain under the Paternal Power of the former Prince and the U­surper governs only as his Deputy w [...]ich is a very choice refined Notion: By which all men had been obliged in Conscience to yield as full an Obedience to Cr [...]mwell and the Rump in all things that did not tend to the Destruction of [...]he [...] Kings Person, as to him himself, which I suppose you high Royalists will by no means admit of.

But this is not the main matter, that I have to except against, for if the Principles I have read out of that Treatise be true, That the Right of a Lawful Monarch, and his Right Heirs is a Divine Right, and that no length of time or Pre­scription can bar it, because a Divine Right never dyes, can be lost, or taken away; till the Knowledge of the Right Heir be lost by all the Subjects; and till when U [...]urpers and their Heirs can never acquire an absolute, and indefeasible Right in the Kingdoms they possess; it will certainly follow that the Title that most Princes of Christen [...]om have to their Crowns, will be hereby rendred dispu­table, and uncertain, for since this Author acknowledges, that the Titles of most Kings at this day begun by unjust Conquests or Usurpations at first: The Right Heirs of many of which expulsed or deposed Princes are still, or wore lately in being, they might upon this pretence make War upon the Prince in Possession, and his Heirs, to the Worlds end; and tho' I grant, he says, that an Usurper is to be fully obeyed when the Knowledge of the Right Heir is lost by all the Subjects, it is extreamly uncertain, and doubtful, what he means by it: For if he means a personal Knowledge, few ordinary Subjects, but those that have personally known all the Royal Family, can thus know who was [Page 128] the Right Heir; and so consequently, as soon as ever his Father, or Ancestor that held the Throne, is turned out, or dead, few private Subjects can have any personal knowledge of this Heir. But if he means a Moral, or Traditio­nal Knowledge, such as is conveyed down to Posterity by History, Authen­tick Records, or Genealogies; I know not how such a knowledge can ever be said to be lost, as long as such Histories or Memorials remain in being: And that this is so, is apparent, many Princes in Europe having upon this ground better Right to the Crowns of some Neighbouring Kingdoms, than those that wear them: And we know that by vertue of such an old Title from Charles the Great, the King of France looks upon himself to have a good Title to Alsatia, Flanders, and all the Low Countries, and as much of Ger­many as he can get: So that I will leave it to your self to judge whether these Principles do not only render the Titles of most Princes doubtful, and un­certain, but the Subjects Allegiance too.

I cannot deny but Sir R. F. may have carried this Point of Obedi­ence, and Submission to Usurpers, and of a concurrent Right in the Lawful Monarch, and his Heirs, a little too far. For I think it were much better to suppose with Grotius, and other Writers, that after the third Generation, or Succession of the Crown in the Family of the Usurper, they may have a good and perfect Title to their Crowns against the Right Heirs of the Lawful Monarch;) and this I take to be highly reasonable for the Peace, and Wel­fare of Mankind (than that they should not be always divided in their Al­legiance between two opposite Princes; but till then I suppose the Subjects are bound to assist, and stand for the Lawful Heir, and his Posterity, as far as is possible, without their own apparent Destruction.

I confess this supposition is much more reasonable, than the former, but I should be glad to know by what Law of God, or Nature, the peace­able possession of a Crown by an Usurper, and his Heirs, just for three Gene­rations, or Successions, should give a Prince a better Title than Three, or Four years Possession; for God may have declared his Will as sufficiently in that time, as in three or four hundred: And if your reason be good, that it is for the Peace, and Safety of Mankind, that the Title of the Right Heir, should be lost, and extinct after such a time; I cannot see why it should not be more for the Good of Mankind, that their Allegiance should be settled, and ascertained in a far less space, that is, as soon as the Con­queror, or Usurper is quietly settled in the Throne, and hath received the Consent or Submission of all the Subjects. But I do not desire at present to enter any farther into this knotty Dispute, about Conquest, or Usurpations, but I rather desire to refer it to our next meeting.

Well, since you will have it so, I yield to it, but in the mean time, I cannot but smile at your great partiality to the People, who upon your Principles, if they have but once given their Consent to the Usurper, he shall presently have as good a Title as the most Rightful Monarch in the World: So that Cromwell having had this Consent of the People in his Mock-Parliament, had as good a Title as King Charles II. So that notwithstanding whatever you may pretend to the contrary, you are no such Enemy to Usurpers, as you would make your self: But however, you have no reason in the World (even by your own Principles) to except against this Author's Hypothesis of transferring the Subjects Allegiance by a Conquest, or Usurpation.

I do not deny what you say, but then the Conquest must be in a Just, [Page 129] or Lawful War, or else if the Great Turk, or French King, should without any provocation given, make War upon, and Co [...]quer this Kingdom, and use the People with the highest Tyranny, and Cruelty, they must be all bound, in Conscience, not only to become, but continue absolute Subjects, nay Slaves to such a Conqueror, without any Resistance. But let the Power of Usurpers, or Conquerors, be what it will, I am sure it cannot be that of Paternal Authori­ty, for the reasons already given, nor can it be the Usurpa [...]ion, or Acquisition of the Power of a Master of a Family, for then the Subjects not being the Chil­dren of the Conqueror, or Usurper, must be all Slaves instead of Subjects: So that I must again tell you, that it is from your want of distinguishing be­tween Paternal, Masterly, and Rega [...] Authority, which hath led you into all these mistakes in this matter: For the Relations of a Father, a Master, and a King, are all really distinct, and different, so that one of them is not the other, as any Man may easily perceive that doth but hear the three names pronounced to him, and consider their signification: And therefore quitting this Subject for the present, if you have any better Arguments to prove your Divine Institution of Monarchy, pray produce them, for it grows late.

I shall readily obey your Commands, but pray Sir, in the mean time remember, that we reassume this Question the next time we meet. But to come to the matter in hand, I think there are yet some material Arguments behind, to prove Monarchical Government of Divine Institution. For in the first place you may please to remember, that you your self have acknowledged, that all Civil Government proceeds from God. Secondly, You have likewise admitted, that the Government of Fathers, or Heads of Families, was the first and most Antient Government of any in the World after the Fall; when some Go­vernment became necessary for the punishment of offences, and the re­straining of the inordinate Appetites, and Passions of Mankind. And lastly, That this Government having absolute Power of Life, and Death, in some cases over the Wife, Children and Servants of the Family; and that if this Power is conferred upon them by God (which you likewise granted) and doth not depend upon the consent, or compact of the Wife, Children, and Servants: If these things were so, I leave it to your self to consider, from the Premises, whether this Power in Heads, or Fathers of Families (call them which you please) is not a Monarchical Power, or the Government of one Man, and that ordained by God; and that this was the only Government in the World, before the Institution of Common-Wealths, you your self cannot deny.

I shall shew you plainly, that you would impose a Fallacy either up­on your self, or me in this Argument, and such a one which I have likewise already answered at our last meeting. For I then told you, that the Govern­ment of such Heads or Fathers of Families, was only an Oeconomical, and not a Civil Power; and this I proved by divers Arguments against what you then argued to the contrary; and therefore I think I may yet safely affirm, that Kingly, or Monarchical Power, cannot be proved to be of Divine Institution, by this Argument: And I have a greater Man than Sir R. F. viz. the Judicious Mr. Hooker on my side, who makes a plain distinction between such a Head, or Master of a Family, and a King, as appears by these words in his Ecclesi­astical Policy, which I desire you would read with me; It is no improbable Opinion therefore, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. lib. 1. § 10. which the Arch-Philosopher was of, That the Chief person in every Houshold was always as it were a King; so when numbers of Housholds joyned themselves in Civil [Page 130] Societies together, Kings were the first kind of Governours amongst them; which is also as it seems the reason why the name of Fathers continued still in them, who of Fathers were made Rulers; as also the Antient Customs of Governours to do as Mel­chisedeck, as being Kings to exercise the Office of Priests, (which Fathers did at the first) gr [...]w, perhaps by the same occasion. Howbeit this is not the only kind of Regiment, that hath been received in the World; the inconveniences of one kind have caused sundry others to be divised. So that in a word all Civil Regiment, of what kind soever, seems evidently to have risen from the deliberate Advice, Consul­tation, and Composition, between Men judging it convenient, and helpful, there being no impossibility in Nature considered by it self, but that Man might have lived with­out any Publick Regiment. So that you may see, that tho he places the Ori­ginal of all Governments in the Heads, or Fathers of Families (which Opi­nion I shall not oppose;) yet it is plain▪ that he makes a clear distinction between Oeconomical Government, and that Politique or Civil Power which arises from Compact between Men. So that this will not serve the purpose you bring it for. You may now proceed to what other Arguments, and In­stances you please; but pray do not make use any more of the Examples of the Patriarchs either before, or after the Flood; since they are either altoge­ther uncertain, or else as to those after the Flood▪ I have proved them to have been not Kings, but only Masters of separate Families. And you may likewise omit Moses, Ioshuah, and the Judges, as Instances of Monarchical Power by Divine Institution; since I have so lately proved their Authority, not to have been at all Absolute, or Regal.

I shall not any longer insist upon them, since you will not admit of those Instances, tho' I think there may be a great deal of weight in them. But this much I suppose you cannot deny, as well from the Testimony of Sacred, as Prophane History, that Monarchy is the first and most antient Govern­ment in the World, as appears by those remains we have left concerning the Egyptian, and Assyrian Monarchies. And as for the Government of Gods own People the Jews, he was pleased to be King over them himself, tho' to Go­vern by his Viceroys, till such time as he was pleased to make Saul, and Da­vid Kings over them. Now what can be a greater argument than this for the Divine Institution of Monarchical Government.

I suppose you will not urge the Antiquity of a Government to be a mark of its Divine Institution; it may indeed be an argument to prove that Monarchy was the most Natural Government, because the most simple, and easie for Men to light on; and so no doubt it was, in the first Ages of the World, before Ambition, Avarice, and Luxury had debauched the Minds of Monarchs, the best sort of Government. And so on the other side, there is this to be objected against it, that the setting up of so many Common-wealths upon the Ruines of Monarchies, shewed that Men found great Mischiefs, and Inconve­niences in that sort of Government when once it grew Tyrannical, or else they had never departed from it. And this made them, as Brutus said, at the beginning of the Roman Common-Wealth, to invent other sorts of Govern­ment which might partake of all the Benefits without the Inconveniences of Absolute Monarchy.

But as for your Instance of God's being himself King over the People of Israel, this touches not the Question in hand, since that being a Theocratical, and not a Civil Common-Wealth, could concern no other Nation but them­selves. And as for your other Instance of God's making Saul King, I hope you [Page 131] will not bring that for an Argument of his Approbation, which it appears he was so angry with the Israelites for desiring. And though it is true, he did, at their Request, make them a King; yet it is apparent, God would have been much better pleased, had they still continued without one. So that I think there can no Conclusive Argument be drawn from any Exam­ples in the Old Testament, to prove Monarchical Government to be of Divine Institution.

Well; However slight you make of my Authorities out of the Old Testament; yet I hope I shall be able to shew more cogent ones out of the New, to prove, that Monarchy is the only Power Instituted; or so much as taken Notice of by our Saviour Christ and his Apostles. And therefore when he would Command the Pharisees to yield Obedience to the Supreme Power then in Being, He bids them, upon their shewing him a Piece of Mony, To render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. Not taking any notice of the Senate, Matt. 22.21. F. P. O. or People, whose Authority these Caesars had Usurped. And if St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, had only said, Let every Soul be subject to the Higher Powers, and said no more; then Men might indeed have disputed, whether St. Paul, by Higher Powers, had not meant as well other Governours, as Kings, or other Forms of Government, as Monarchy. But the good luck is, St. Paul hath been his own Interpreter; for, after the General Doctrin of Obedience to be given by all Men to the Higher Powers, he proceeds next to charge it home upon each particular Man's Conscience, under pain of Damnation, saying, Wilt thou not be afraid of the Power? which Power he expounds in the Singular number, restraining it to one Person; He is the Minister of God to thee, &c. It is not, They are the Ministers: And then again▪ He beareth not the Sword in vain; And a third time, in the same Verse, lest we should forget it, he says, for he is the Minister of God, &c. So St. Peter also doth the like; for the self-same word that St. Paul useth for higher, in St. Peter is Translated Supream: So that though in our English Bibles the words differ, yet in the Original they are both the same; And St. Paul might have been Englished, Let every Soul be subject to the Supreme Powers; or St. Paul might have been also Translated, whether to the King as to the Higher. Yet there is this difference; That where­as St. Paul useth the word in the Plural number, St. Peter hath it in the Sin­gular, and with Application to the King only, without taking any notice of any Governours but Kings, and those sent by them. And it is farther to be noted, that St. Peter and St. Paul Wrote their Epistles at a time when the Ro­man Senate had some share in the Government; and that it was (in appear­ance at least) a Common-wealth. So that some Authors suppose, that not­withstanding the Emperors, by strong hand, had Usurped a Military Power, yet a great share of the Government was, for a long time, nay even then in the Senate and People. But for all this, neither of the two Apostles take any Notice of any such Popular Government. No nor our Saviour himself, who divideth all between God and Casar, and allows nothing, that we can find, for the People, or Common-wealth.

I think your Quotations out of the New Testament will prove of no more weight than those from the Old, and that they will not make out Mo­narchy to be of Divine Institution, any more than the former. For our Savi­our's Answer to the Iews signifieth no more, than that Tribute, and all Law­ful Dues were to be pay'd to Caesar, as the Supreme Power then in being; to [Page 132] Answer those Iews, who doubted, whether any Obedience were to be given to a Forreign Prince of another Religion than their own. The like Answer may be given to what St. Paul says in the Romans Let every Soul be subject to the Highest Power; which was chiefly directed to the Newly-converted Iews, who might doubt as well as their Country-men in Iudea, whether they were bound in Conscience to be subject to Heathen Magistrates; As also against the Sect of the Gnosticks (then newly sprung up) who, though they called themselves Christians, yet looked upon themselves to be thereby discharged from all Subjection or Obedience to Civil Powers; being those whom St. Iude expresly speaks against,Iude 8. Who despise Dominion, and speak evil of Dignities. And therefore when St. Paul speaks of such Higher Powers, it is not in the Plural, but Singular Number; Terming him, the Minister of God; because, that at that time, there was no such thing as a Common wealth (as he knew of in the World) the two greatest Empires, the Roman, and the Parthian, being then Govern'd by Monarchs. The like I may say to that other Text you have quoted out of St. Peter; which may very well be reconciled with that place of St. Paul, though the one called the Higher Powers, the Powers ordained of God; and the other calls them, an Humane Ordinance, or Creature (as it is in the Ori­ginal) since they certainly derive their Authority from God, though by the Mediation, or Consent of Men.

And I believe you will prove mistaken, in affirming, that the Senate, or People had any Power when St. Peter and St. Paul Wrote these Epistles. For it plainly appears that whether these Epistles were Written in the Reigns of Claudius or Nero the Government was then wholly in the Roman Emperours; For though I grant, that during the time of Augustus, the Senate had some shadow of Power, and that divers Provinces were under their Government; yet by that time Tiberius had Reigned but a few years, he quite took away all Power from the Senate, and made them no more, than what the Parliament of Paris are to the French King, meer Ministers of his Tyranny, and oblig'd to verify all his Edicts; and the Compliance and Flattery of these Senators was so servile, that they passed whatsoever Decrees he sent them, without the least Hesitation; till it became so fulsome even to himself, that it made him cry out, O Gens in servitute [...] natapunc; So that all you have said on this Sub­ject, signifies no more, than that our Saviour and his Apostles did not come into the World to dissolve, or alter the Civil Governments, or the Policies of Kingdoms, but to Command Obedience to them▪ as they found them setled in the World, as the Moderate Mela [...]cthon very well observes, Christus non venit mutaré Politias.

And I doubt not, but if our blessed Saviour had thought sit to come into the World about half an Age sooner, and to have been Born, and Preached the Gospel in the time of the Roman Common-wealth, but he would have com­manded the Iews to have paid Tribute to the Senate, and People of Rome, as well as he did to Caesar. And S. Peter would have enjoyned all Subjection, and Obedience to be given them; and might have said with greater Reason of them, than of those Subordinate Magistrates they sent to Govern their Pro­vinces, that they were the Ministers of God▪ And if your Arguments for the Divine Right of Kings be true, it would be no Rebellion at this day for Sub­jects to rise up, and destroy the Supreme Powers in all Common-wealths, be­cause they are not Monarchical; And consequently those in Relation to whom [Page 133] God hath left us no Rules of Obedience. Which Doctrine, if any Man [...] offer to Preach in the Territories of Venic [...], or Holland; I think, in the [...] the Preacher might very deservedly be sent to the Gallies: and, in the lat [...]r, they would, at least, send him a pair of Shoes. But if you have any thing fa [...] ­ther to urge for the Iure Divinoship of Monarchy, pray will you let me hear it, for I am weary with Answering such Trifles[?].

I confess I have not much to object against what you have now reply­ed [...] therefore I shall insist no farther upon it; only thus much I am satisfi­ed of; That God, by his own Example, as well as Institution among the Iews, seems more particularly to have approved of Kingly Government (and that ab­solute too) than any other; not that I will condemn all Common wealths, as un­law [...] but that as being Soveraign Powers, they may be also Ordained of God.

But I have another Objection to make against your Hypothesis, and that is, you have in your former Conversation supposed a Natural Property in things, Pre­cedent to Civil Government, which can scarce be understood. For by what Rig [...]t can any Man lay claim to any Property, but by the Laws of the Govern­ment in which he lives?S. P. P. And how can there be any such Laws before there was some Supreme Legislator to make them? So that the only way (I know of) to solve this difficulty, is to suppose. That the Sole Dominion of things was in No­ah after the Floud; And that whatsoever Property, in any thing, his Posterity possest in Several, they enjoyed it by his Grant and Allotment; and, in vertue thereof, Transmitted the same to their Posterity, without waiting for the Electi­on, or Consent of the People, or entring into any Articles of Capitulation with them, whom they were to Govern; as you suppose was necessary for the Insti­tution of Civil Government. And the Texts, in the Tenth of Genesis, Vers. 5.32. seem to import as much. By these were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their Lands, every one after his Tongue, after their F [...]ilies in their Nations. T [...]ese [...] the Families of the Sons of Noah,Vers. 32. after their Generations in th [...]ir Nations; and by these were the Nations divided in the Earth after the Floud. That is, not only the Nations themselves, but the Isles or Countries[?] of the Earth were divided by these Patriarchs, amongst their Posterities, into particular States[?] and Territories.

And so likewise in all the Absolute Monarchies in the World; all the Pro­perty that Men enjoy either in Goods or Lands, is either Actually in the Prince, or else was at first derived from him; though I do not deny, but when such a distinct Propriety in Goods, or Lands, is once Instituted by the Monarch in any Kingdom, that he cannot again alter it, or take it away without manifest Violence and Injustice.

And hence it is that our Common Lawyers maintain, That all the Lands in England are held of the King, either mediately, or immediately. For upon the Conquest by William the Conquerour, all Mens Estates were thereby Vested in him: So that there is no way so natural, and easie to solve all those Difficulties that do arise concerning the Original of Civil Government and Property, than to make them begin together in the Persons of Adam, and Noah, and thence de­riv'd to all their Posterity. So that whatsoever absolute Dominion Princes or States have claimed in those Countries, and Places which they have either seiz'd upon themselves, as the first Occupants, or else have Conquer'd from o­thers, they enjoy'd them meerly as they represented Adam or Noah, the First Mo­narchs of the World. Nor can we other way avoid these several other intole­rable [Page 134] Inconveniences, and Absurdities that will follow from supposing an Ori­ginal Community of things, or that every Man at first might take what quantity of Land he pleas'd, without the Authority or Assignment of any Supreme Power.

As to what you say, concerning God's approving Monarchy above all other Governments, by his Instituting it among the Iews; that way of Arguing is ve­ry uncertain and fallacious; since one may, by the same reason argue, That the Ceremonial part of the Mosaical Law was the best that God could have contrived, because he was pleased to prescribe it to the Iews, during the time they should be under the Government of it: no doubt God prescribed them such a Govern­ment both in Church and State, as he thought fit for their present occasion, and Inclinations; but whether that were the best, or of perpetual Institution, is no where said. But as for the other part of your Argument;

I thought you had been very well satisfied by what I said at our first Meeting, That neither Adam, nor Noah, had by Grant or Donation from God, a Sole right to the Earth and all things therein. But since you are not yet satisfied with what I there said, I shall Answer this Objection more particularly, and I doubt not but I shall make it so plain to you, that you your self shall confess, That there is no such great Mystery, or Difficulty in the Tracing of Property, as also Civil Government to their first Origina's, without supposing any such Absolute Dominion, or Property in Adam and Noah, or in any other Supreme Power, as their Successors. I shall therefore first of all remove the main Obstacle you have laid in the way, and shew you, that the places of Scripture you have cited to this purpose, do not prove the thing you intend them for: I did before shew you, That there was no manner of Ground for Sir R. F's. Opinion, That none of Adam's Sons could have a Property in any thing, without Adam's Assignment; nor that any of Noah's Sons, when separated from their Fathers Family, could have any Property in any thing but by their Fathers Donation; Scripture and An­tient History being altogether silent in these matters. And therefore you are fain to lay hold of the first place of Scripture that you think might serve your turn, which will not do the Business neither.

For supposing I should grant you, that in the Dispersion, or Division, that was made of Mankind after the Floud, over a great part of the World, the Peo­ple that then followed their Ancestors, or Leaders, after this Dispersion (though the Text doth not mention any such thing) followed them as Princes or Mo­narchs. Yet this will not prove what you would have, That these Fathers of Nations made this Division of the Earth, in Right of that Dominion, which God conferred at first on Adam and Noah. Since (as I have already proved) if this Division had been made in Right of the Dominion that descended upon Noah, it ought to have been performed by the Authority of only one Man, and him the Eldest Descendant of the Eldest Son of Noah: And I have also sufficiently shewed you the absurdity of this Fancy of such a Divine Right. And besides, it plainly contradicts its self; for either this Division you talk of, was made in the days of Noah, or it was not; if the latter, then it is apparent, that from the time of Noah to that of Heber, there was a Community of things, and Pro­perties; though you have asserted the contrary: If the former, and that the Earth was divided before, Then to what purpose was this Division in the days of Peleg ▪ And though I grant, that about that time, every Language, or Na­tion, might, under the Conduct of their Prince, or Leader, seize upon some Territory, or Island, sufficient for them to Inhabit in; Yet doth not the Text tell us, whether the Countrey they lived in was by them divided into particu­lar [Page 135] shares, or whether they made use of it in common, as the Indians of Ame­rica do at this day, where the Quantity of Land doth far exceed that of the Inhabitants that live in it.

Nor lastly, Supposing that a Division was made of these Countries, they then in­habited, doth it tell us, whether it was done by the Sole Authority of their Prince, or Leader, claiming as his own the whole Dominion of it; so that no Man could have Right to a foot of Ground in it, but himself; or whether this Division was made by the Joynt Consent and Agreement of all the rest of the Heads of Families, and other Freemen that went along with him. The Scripture is silent in these Circum­stances, that only telling us that the Great Grand-sons of Noah mentioned, Gen. 10. The Isles of the Gentiles were divided in their Lands, every one after his Tongue, after their Families in their Nations. And that this Division was in the days of Peleg, but no where declares whether every particular Region, or Countrey was then divided in­to distinct Shires, or not.

And as for what you say, that all Princes and Conquerors of Territories, and Countries, have the like Absolute Dominion and Property in them as Adam, and Noah had over the whole World, if it were no more than that, I doubt it would be very little, since I have already proved, and I think you must grant, that no Monarch at this day can claim his Crown as the Right Heir of Adam, or Noah, or as their Representatives, and it will, I think, be much harder to prove, that the Sole Property of an acquired Country, or Kingdom, must be in them by vertue of any such Right: But as for your Instance of William the Conqueror's having a Right to all the Lands in England by Conquest; since it requires somewhat a longer Answer, than the time will now afford, I shall refer speaking farther of it, till another oppor­tunity: But pray Sir, at present, make me see a little plainer what those Inconve­niences, and Absurdities are, that will follow from my Hypothesis, that God at first gave the World, and all Creatures therein to Mankind, to be used and enjoyed in common if they thought fit.

I shall shew you some farther Absurdities that will follow from it, than I have done already; For tho' Grotius and Selden indeed maintain, that a Community of things was by the Law of Nature,F. O. G. p. 48. of which God is the Author, and yet that such a Community should not be able to continue, seems to derogate [...] from the Providence of God, to ordain a Com­munity of things, which could not continue. And it seems also an Act of high pre­sumption in the Descendants of Noah, to abrogate the Natural Law of Community by introducing that of a Propriety in things.

I pray give me leave to interrupt you, that you may not run on in a mistake; for let Grotius, or Selden assert what they please, I am not tied to submit to it; and therefore when I say, that God gave the World, and all the Creatures therein to Men to be used in common if they please, I thereby understood, that God hath by the Laws of Nature commanded nothing in this matter, but hath left the Earth, and all things therein, to be used in common, or in several, as may best consist with the Convenience, Necessity, or Customs and Laws of each particular Nation, or Com­mon-Wealth, who God designs should live peaceably together, and make the best use of the Country where they inhabit, and the things therein contained, for their own common maintenance, and safety; according to the expression of the Royal Psalmist; But the Earth hath God given to the Children of Men, i. e. all the Descendants of Adam.

Well, suppose it were so, the prime Duties of the Second Table are chiefly [Page 136] conversant about this Right of Propriety, but if this Propriety were introduced by Human Laws, Ib. or Agreements, as Grotius, and you your self suppose, then both the Moral, and Divine Law would depend upon the Will of Men, so that there could be no Law of Nature against Adultery, or Theft, if Women, and all things else had been in common.

This Objection wholy proceeds from your not having any distinct, or true Notions of the Nature and true Original of Propriety; and therefore if you please to hear my Account of it, I hope you will grant (when I have done) that your Objection against the Community or things, will be to no purpose; I do therefore in the first place distinguish between a Natural and a Civil Propriety: By the former M [...]n might be guilty of The [...]t, before Civil Propriety was instituted; But as for Adultery ▪ that was always unlawful both by the Laws of God, and Nature, which abh [...]rs Community of Women, and Promis [...]uous Copulations; and God hath particularly, ordained that the Man and his Wife should be one Hesh, and no Man that maintains a Natural Community of things, ever supposed that Women were amongst those things that were to be in common, or that a Man had the same kind of Propriety in his Wife, as in his Horse, so that the Command against Adultery might very well consist with the Community of things.

Suppose I grant this, I do not understand how there can be a Natural Propriety, and yet a Community in things as you suppose.

I wonder you should not be able to apprehend this, and have been so often at an Ordi­nary, and a Play-house▪ at the former you know, tho' a Man hath a Right to his Dinner, yet all the Meat at the Table being in common▪ he cannot call any part of it his own, till he hath cut it, or di­vided it from the rest. And at the latter, a Man hath a Right to a Place, either in the Box, or in the Pit, and yet he cannot tell where it is, till he hath placed himself in it, or sent some body to keep it for him.

I do apprehend what you mean, but pray explain to me the manner of this Natural Pro­priety, [...] little more at large.

I would readily do it, since if that were well done, I grant it would be a great step to the clearing of the Original, and Nature of all Civil Power. I would readily do it, were it not now too late to enter upon so long a Subject, and therefore I think we may both be sufficiently [...] with Talk, so as to put it off until another opportunity, when I shall give you my thoughts of the [...] Original of Civil Government, in what sense it proceeds from God, and yet how far the Consentus the People is necessary to make it obligatory on the Consciences of the Subjects; which when it is once well setled, I hope there will be little need of disputing farther whether this great Alteration hath been brought about by Lawful means or not.

I thank you for the pains you have taken to inform my understanding in this matter: And therefore since 'tis now very late, I desire we may Adjourn our conversation to another time: And then I desire that you would prepare your self to discourse with me of the second important Question▪ we agreed on, viz. the irresistibility if all Supreme Powers by their Subjects, not only be­cause Resistance in any case whatsoever [...] inconsistent with Supreme Power, and destructive to the Peace of Civil Society, but chiefly as they derive their Authority immediately from God, and are only to render an Account to him of their Actions.

I will not deny but what you have said is true in some sense, That all Soveraign Power is derived from God, and is also as such irresistible by Subjects. But to affirm generally and abso­lutely (as most of your Opinion do) that all Commands and Acts of Men end [...]d with this Su­preme Authority, whether good, or bad, lawful or unlawful, are part of that Authority derived from God, and therefore irresistible in any cas [...], or upon any necessity whatsoever, is so dange­rous a Proposition, that I know none that hath contributed more to the encouragement of the R [...]ng and the Popish Faction we favoured, to make all those Breaches upon our Laws▪ Religion and Liberties which we have suffered since the beginning of his Reign.

I am so well pleased with the Freeness▪ and Ingenuity of your Conversation, that I de­sire nothing more than to discuss this important Question with you at our next meeting: But I beg your pardon, if being taken up by Come Business to morrow▪ I adjourn our next meeting to the Day after, when, if you please to come at the same hour at you did to night, you shall here find me ready to wait on you. In the mean time I must bid you good night.

Your Servant Sir, I wish you heartily good night, I will not fail to meet you at the time appointed.

THE Third Dialogue BETWEEN Mr. MEANWELL a Civilian AND Mr. FREEMAN a Gentleman.

You are welcome, Sir, I see you are a punctual Man to your Word. Will you be pleased to sit down by the fire, and drink a dish of Tea.

I thank you, Sir, I assure you, I love to be punctual in small things, as well as in great ones, when I am not hindred, or prevented by business.

Before we come to the Question, we the last time resolved to make the Subject of our present Entertainment, it will, I think, be convenient for me to look back, and see what I have already proved, at our two former Conferences, viz.

• 1. That Adam had not, either by Natural Right of Fatherhood, or by Positive Donation from God, any such Authority over his Children, or Dominion over the World, as you pretended.
• 2. That if he had, yet his Sons, or Heirs, had no Right to it.
• 3. That if his Heirs had, there being no Law of Nature, nor Positive Law of God, that determines who is the Right Heir in all Cases that may arise, the Right of Succession, and consequently of bearing Rule, could not have been certainly determined, without the Judgment of the rest of the Children, or Descendants of Adam.
• 4. That the knowledge of the Right Heir of Adam, (supposing still there was one,) being now long since lost, no Prince or Monarch in the World can graft any Title upon this Paternal Dominion of Adam or Noah.
• 5. That all Authority of inflicting Punishments of Life and Death, or other less Penalties for the Breach of the Laws of Nature, or the Transgressi­on of the Civil Laws of the Common-wealth is originally derived from God, as being that Power with which God in the State of Nature hath intrusted, all Masters, or Heads of separate Families, and this not as Fathers, but as Masters.
• 6. That since all Kingdoms and Commonwealths at this day do owe their Ori­ginal [Page 146] either to the Election of the People, or to Usurpation, or Conquest; God doth not now by the ordinary Course of his Providence confer this Divine Au­thority on any Persons whatsoever, so as to give them a Right to the People's Allegiance without the People's Consent first had, or else an Owning of their Ti­tles by a Subsequent voluntary Submission to them.

I grant indeed, that you have with great labour, and some appea­rance of reason too, endeavoured to prove those Principles you have here laid down; yet however, tho' the five first of them should be true, I have a great deal still to except against the last, if you please to hear me. For I think, I can shew you a great many evil Consequences, that will follow from this Principle of making the Consent, or Submission of the People at all neces­sary to the Conveying of a Supream Power, or of that Divine Authority which you grant to be derived from God himself on all Monarchs, and Supream Magistrates in Commonwealths.

I pray give me leave a little to interrupt you. I know very well what this evil Consequence is, of supposing the Consent of the People as a means at all necessary, for the Conveying of this Divine Authority, that is, in plain English, because it will destroy your darling Doctrine of PASSIVE OBEDI­ENCE and NON-RESISTANCE; therefore if it be so, pray let us rather fall presently to the Question it self, than argue by Consequences, which if we should go that way to work, I have my Consequences likewise to urge; some of which I have given you already. Therefore, if you please, let us begin a fairer way, and hear me propose those Heads, in which I doubt not but we do both agree, and then I will bring it to the main Case or Question, in which perhaps we differ.

I confess, I had somewhat more to say, which would have tended to prove this Doctrine of Non-resistance, but since you are pleased to propose another Method, which you better approve of; I am ready to comply with you. Therefore, Sir, go on, in what way you think fit.

I shall then in the first place lay it down for a Principle, (which I suppose you will not deny) that all Civil Power being from God, it was prin­cipally instituted by him, for the Peace, Happiness and Safety of Mankind; that is, of all the Subjects who are to live together in a Commonwealth, or Civil Society.

2: That all Kings, or Supream Magistrates, are likewise secured by Gods Au­thority in those due Rights and Prerogatives which are necessary, for their well discharging this great Trust or Duty which God requires of them, and in Consideration of which the People at first Elected, or Submitted themselves to them.

If therefore you grant, as I suppose you will, these two reasonable Propo­sitions, the Question will amount to no more than this, whether, if the Supream Power in any Kingdom, or Commonwealth, so far abuses this Trust, which God by the People hath committed to them, and instead of pre­serving and defending the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of their Subjects, they manifestly go about to destroy, or grievously to oppress them, by ma­king them, instead of Subjects, meer Slaves, and Vassals; the Question, I say then, is, whether, if such violence or oppressions be committed upon the whole People, or so considerable a part of it, as that the safety and well-being of [Page 147] the whole Commonwealth cannot in any likelihood subsist without it, the Peo­ple, or such a considerable part of them, may not, (in Case their Lives, Li­berties and Persons are unjustly assaulted, and oppress't by the Officers or standing Armies of the Prince, or other Supream Powers) for their own de­fence take up Arms to defend their Lives, Liberties and Estates against such an armed force, and violence. Where, by the way, I desire you to take no­tice, that I do here asolutely disclaim all Resistance of, or Self defence against Civil Authority, or the Officers Commissioned by it, by any private single Person, whether such Power be exerted according to Law or not, or else abused in some cases to the hurt or destruction of such single Person only: So that I suppose this Resistance to be lawful only in case of a general Destructi­on, or intolerable oppression of the whole People, or at least a very considerable part of them, and those that are in the chiefest places of the Administration.

I confess the Doctrine of Resistance, as you have put it; seems at first somewhat plausible, and to tend to the Common Good, and preservation of the People, or Civil Society. But let me tell you, I am of opinion, that when ever it comes to be put in practice, it proves (like the other Speculations of Commonwealths-men) more hurtful than beneficial to the Common Safety, and Preservation of the People; and consequently more destructive to the main ends of Government, than conducive to the Good and Happiness of Mankind; and last of all, that such Resistance cannot well be maintained, or executed without the deposing, or absolute Destruction of the Prince, or other Supream Magistrates, whatever may be pretended to the contrary. And indeed it is almost impossible to suppose, that any Monarch or Supream Magistrates, should ever (unless they were stark mad) purposely go about to kill or de­stroy their Subjects, in the Multitude and Safety of whom, consists his chief Strength, and Riches. And you may as well tell me, that a Shepherd, whilst he is in his right Wits, should go about to kill, or destroy his Flock, as that a Monarch should wilfully intend to kill, or destroy his People.

To conclude, since the People must be in all Cases of Tyranny, or Oppressi­on their own Iudges, and Executioners too, there is no Rebellion so rank, and wicked, that this pretence of a Self-defence of Men's Lives, Estates, and Liber­ties may not justifie; whereas indeed, it is contrary to all Natural, and Ci­vil Justice, for the injured party to be his own Judge, and Executioner too. For then the other side may pretend to the like Right, and the Tryal must be referred to Force, and Arms, in which Contention, if the People are over­come they are certainly reduced to a worse Condition, than they were be­fore: But if the Prince, or Supream Magistrates have the worst on't, the Ci­vil Power then in being is absolutely ruined: So that whether the People, or Magistrate overcome, the state of both of them is very deplorable; besides divers other evil Consequences of this Doctrine, which I shall defer, till I hear what you can say, to what I have now urged against your Opinion.

You have made a very plausible Speech, in setting forth the dread­ful Consequence of this Doctrine of Resistance in any Case whatsoever; and I confess, if what you lay down be true, viz., that such Resistance always brings along with it greater Misery upon a People, than what the utmost Violence and Oppression of Princes can produce, then your Consequence would be also true, that such Resistance is never to be practised upon any ac­count whatsoever. So on the other side, if that be not true, neither will your consequence signifie anything.

[Page 148]I suppose you will not deny, but that there may be such a thing as a Tyrant, and that that part of Mankind who live under him may be sensible of his Tyran­ny, or else the Definition which King Iames I▪ gives us of a Tyrant in a Speech which he made to the Parliament in 1603, would be altogether in vain. But the words are so fit for this purpose, that I will read them to you out of his Works. I do acknowledge, that the special, and greatest point of difference that is between a Rightful King, and an Usurping Tyrant, is this: That whereas the Proud, and Ambitious Tyrant doth think his Kingdom, and People are only ordained for the satisfaction of his desires, and unreasonable Appetites, the Righteous and Iust King doth by the contrary acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the Wealth and Prosperity of his People. And so likewise in another Speech he made to the Parliament, he hath this memorable passage, That a King go­verning in a settled Kingdom, leaves to be a King, and degenerates into a Tyrant, so soon as he ceases to rule according to the Law. So that since it is plain, that the People may judge, when they have a Tyrant, instead of a King to rule over them; and that under such a Tyrant, the Condition of the People may be very deplorable; the Question still remains, what is best for them to do in this Case: Whether it be better for them, or they be obliged, by the Laws of Reason, and Nature, patiently to submit to it, or else, if they can, either by their own force, or the Assistance of a Forreign Prince, to cast off the Yoke. And I think I may still maintain, that they may do it, notwithstan­ding what you have yet urged to the contrary.

In the first place therefore, tho' you count it an almost impossible thing to suppose, that a Prince or Monarch would ever go about to murder, or de­stroy his Subjects, yet as incredible as it is, I can give you several examples out of History both Ancient, and Modern, that some Tyrants have been so brui­tish as not only to endeavour it, but actually to put it in practice. Of the first kind is that of Caligula, whom Suetonius mentions, to have wisht, that all the People of Rome had but one Neck, that he might cut it off at once. The other is of Nero, (in the same Author, as also in Tacitus) who set the City of Rome on fire, and consequently would have burnt all the People in it to please his humour, and that he might sing his Ballad of the Destruction of Troy the more naturally whilst it burnt. A third example, I find related in Mocquet's Travels into the East-Indies, of a certain King of Pegu, Vid. Moc­quets Travels, Lib. 4. p. 333. about an hundred years ago, who, by the perswasion of some of his Diabolical Priests, or Magicians, took such an aversion to his Subjects, that he was resolved to destroy them, and therefore forbid them to sow their Lands for two, or three Years, by which means a great part of them died of Famine, or were forced to devour each other. And in such Cases as these, I suppose, the Laws of Nature, and Reason will justifie Self-defence in the People, and sure it had been Lawful for the People of Rome to have resisted Caligula's Guards, if he had gone about to put his wicked Wish into Execution, or likewise to have resisted, or put to death those Incendiaries they found firing the City, tho' they might have had the Emperour Nero's Commission for it. So likewise sure it would have been as lawful for the People of Pegu, to have resisted those whom the Emperour might have sent to hinder them from Ploughing, and Sowing their Lands. And that I am not the only Man of this Opinion, I de­sire you to consult what Barclay hath in his Treatise, contra Monarchomachos [Page 149] which he writ against Buchanan, de Iure Regni apud Scotos, and the Author of Vindiciae contra Tyrannos; where, tho'he be a most Zealous assertor of the un­limited, and irresistible Power of Prince [...], Yet in his third Book chap. 8. he speak­eth to this effect, the sense of whose words, as near as I can, I will give you in English.

‘Now if any one should say, But must the People always yield their Throats to the Fury, and Cruelty of Tyranty [...] Must they patiently permit their Ci­ties to be destroyed by Hunger, F [...]e or Sword, and their Wives and Chil­dren to be exposed to the lust of a Tyrant, and also themselves to be brought into the utmost dangers, and Miseries of Life? Must that be denyed to them which is the Right of all Animals by Nature, that is, that they may repel force with force, and defend themselves from Injury? To this it may easily be answered, that Self-defence, which is of Natural Right, ought not to be denyed to the People: And therefore if the King doth not only exert his hatred against some Single persons, but also shall go about to destroy the bo­dy of the Common-Wealth, of which he is Head, that is, shall exert his Hatred a­gainst the whole People, or some considerable part of them by an horrid, and in­tolerable Cruelty, or Tyranny, There is a Power in the People in this Case, only of De­fending it self, but not of Invading the Prince, or of Revenging the Injury given, neither of departing from their due Reverence, because of the Injury receiv­ed; in short it hath Right only of repelling a Present force, but not of re­venging a past injury, for one of them indeed is from Nature, that we should defend our lives, and Persons from injury, and therefore the People may be able to prevent an Evil before it be done, but cannot revenge it upon the King after it is done. Therefore the People hath this Right more than a Private Man, that he hath no other Remedy left him but Pat [...]ence; Whereas the People, if the Tyranny be intolerable, may still resist, tho' with Respect.’

In all which this Author hath there said we may easily understand his meaning, unless it be in this of resisting force with Respect, and Reverence. For I cannot understand how a Man may sight against his Prince with Reverence, or give his Guard, a Knock over the Pa [...]e, or a Cut in the Face, with Respect to the Prin­ce's Authority. But the reason is plain why the people may act thus, because when a Prince once Goeth about to destroy, and make War upon his People, he doth not act then, as a Monarch, but like a Cut-throat, and Enemy to the Common-Wealth; And no man can imagine, a Will to destroy, and to protect the people, can at once subsist in the same Person.

But pray give me leave to interrupt you a little, I grant indeed that by the Political Laws of any Government, which are made to Secure the Rights of the Subjects in their Lives, and Fortunes, No Prince, can,H. I. chap. 10. p. 203. or ought to, take away his Subjects Lives, or Es [...]ates con­trary to Law; Yet by the IMPERIAL LAWS in every Govern­ment, and by the Laws of the Gospel, which (As I shall hereaf­ter shew) establish those Laws in all perfect Governments (and particularly in the English,) all these Rights Legally belong to the civil Soveraign especially to be accountable to none, but God, to have the Sole Power, and disposal of the Sword, and to be free from all Coercive, and Vindicative Power, and from all Resistance by force. It is by these Common Laws of Soveraignty, that the Gospel requires Passive Obedience, which is but another name for Non-Resistance, these Laws are in eternal force against the Subjects in defence of the Soveraign, be he [Page 150] Good, or Evil, Just, or Unjust, Christian, or Pagan, be he what he will, no Subject [...] or number of Subjects whatsoever, can lift up his or their hands against the So­veraign, and be Guiltless by these Laws. Therefore for the Subjects to bear the Sword against their Soveraign, or to defend themselves by force against him, or his Forces, is against the Common Laws of Soveraignty, and by consequence Passive Obedience even unto Death, becomes a duty in Soveraign Governments, by vertue of those Laws, and we are not to resist them upon any pretence whatsoever, but therefore all Subjects are bound to Suffer Death wrongfully, rather than to re­sist them upon any pretence or account whatsoever. So that let Popish Writers (though never so moderate) say what they please, concerning the Lawfulness of Resistance in some Cases, Yet We of the Church of England have learned bet­ter things from the Scripture and the Examples of the Primitive Christians, which we think our selves obliged most strictly to observe. And therefore in relation to our own Government, and the present State of Affairs, I shall reduce all that I have to say against Resistance of the King, or those commissioned by him into this Syllogisme. Not to be resisted by the Subjects is an Inseparable Right of all Soveraign Power. But the King is here the only Soveraign Power. Ergo the King is upon no pretence whatsoever to be resisted by his Subjects. So that not to quarrel any longer about words, Non-resistance is the same thing with Passive Obedience and Submission, and by consequence these are required by the IM­PERIAL LAWS of the Government. Therefore, Whatsoever the Imperial Laws of the Government require of its Subjects, if it be not contrary to God's Laws, they are bound to perform it. But Passive Obedience, or Patient Suffering of Injuries from the Soveraign, is not forbid by God's Laws, And therefore Subjects are bound to perform it, where it is required by the Im­perial Laws.

I Shall forbear to say any thing, as yet, concerning what Doctrines the Scriptures teach, or the Primitive Christians practised concerning this mat­ter, because I desire to discourse that Question apart from this of the Laws of Nature, or Reason, which We are now upon, Therefore I must tell you, that tho' this new Fingle-fangle Term of Imperial Law of Non-resistance may sound very prettily to their Ears who mind words more than sense, Yet I must free­ly confess, that I am altogether a Stranger to this Notion of Imperial Laws, as also of the distinction you make between the Imperial and Political Laws of this Kingdom; and if by Imperial Laws you mean those of the Roman Empire: I never knew that those Laws had any thing to do in England before, but al­ways supposed the Politick Laws of our Country to be the only measure of the King's Prerogative, as also of the Subject's Obedience and Subjection. Nor do your own Civil Laws, by as much as I know of them, make any difference be­tween the Imperial and Political Laws of the Empire, for by the one, as well as the Other, the Civilians understand such Laws, or Edi [...]ts, of the Emperours which with the Approbation of the Senate were made for the Peace and Well government of the Common-Wealth, but I never yet heard of any Imperial Laws whereby the Emperour declared, that he had a Right to plunder, or murder all the Citizens of Rome, or that they believed they were obliged to Suffer by your Imperial Laws without any Resistance. I am sure, the Senate and People did not believe, that the Emperour had any such Authority, when they declared Nero, and Maximin, for their intolerable Cruelty, not only Enemies of the Common-Wealth, but of Mankind. But if by these Imperial Laws of [Page 151] Non-resistance you mean no more than what you laid down in your Syllogism, That it is an inseparable Right or Prerogative of Soveraign Powers, not to be re­sisted by their Subjects, when you have proved this Proposition, by the Laws of Nature and Reason, I shall then believe it. But as for your Conclusion, it being founded upon these Premises, it needs no Confutation, for if the Im­perial Laws of Government do not require your Passive Obedience; then Subjects are not bound to perform it. And to shew you the Falseness and ab­surdity of this Assertion that Whatsoever the Imperial Laws of any Govern­ment require of its Subjects, if it be not contrary to God's Laws, they are bound to perform it. In stead of Passive Obedience, or Patient Suffering of In­juries, let us insert, to give up to the Soveraign all our Civil Properties and Estates, if demanded by him, is not forbid by God's Laws, and therefore Subjects are bound to perform it when ever it is required by the Imperial Laws: For certainly the abso­lute disposal of the Estates of the Subjects is as unseparable a Prerogative of So­veraign Power as Irresistibility it self, as I think I am able to prove, if you think fit to dispute that Question.

But at present I shall only confine my self to confute the Major in your Syllogism. In the first place therefore, tho' I do grant what you lay down for a Ground to be true, That it belongs to Soveraign Powers to be accountable to, or punishable by, none but God, Yet, I suppose, Resistance of their Violence and Tyranny may very well be perform'd by the People, without calling them to a Iudicial Account or erecting a Tribunal for that purpose; Calling to an Ac­count, and Punishment are acts of Authority of Superiours over Inferiours, But Resistance for self-defence is a Right of Nature, and which no Man, by entering into Civil Government, ever parted withal, but out of Considerati­on of a Greater Good to be obtained thereby, (viz.) his own greater Secu­rity together with the Common Good of that Civil Society, whereof he is a Member; which, when by the Prince's violence it is once like to be wholly lost, his Natural Right of Self-defence for the Preservation of him­self, and Family again takes place; Nor doth he then resist the Supreme Pow­ers as such, but as Murderers, and Cut-throats, who by going about to de­stroy the People have already loft all that Right, they formerly had: And of this opinion is that moderate Romish Author, Barclay before cited, Who in the 16 Chap. of the Book last quoted, hath this Remarkable passage.

‘What then? Can there no Cases happen in which it may be lawful for the People by their own Authority, to rise up, and resist a King governing Tyrannical­ly? His Answer to this Question is, there are certainly none as long as he con­tinues King: for the Scriptures forbid it; which say, Honour the King, and he who resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God; Therefore the Peo­ple can have no Power against him, unless he committeth something, by which he may cease to be King; for then he himself abdicates his Kingship, and becomes a private Man, and by this means the People being made Free, that Right returns to them, which they had before the King was made; But there are but few Facts of that Nature, which can produce Such effects; And I cannot, when I think of it, find more than two Cases, in which a King doth ipso facto make himself no King, and thereby depriveth himself of all Honour, Regal Dignity, and Power, (which also Winzerus takes notice of.)’ One of these is, if he destroys his Kingdom; and then gives us the Examples of Nero, and Caligula as I have already done; ‘And next proceeds to this purpose that [Page 152] when any King designs, and doth seriously endeavour, to put this in pra­ctice, he casts off all care, and desire of Governing; And therefore thereby loses his Empire over his Subjects, as a Lord of a Servant loses his Dominion over him, by giving up all Care, and Government of him.’ And of this Opinion likewise are Lib. 1. cap. 4. §. 7.11. Grotius, and P [...]ffendorf Lib. vii cap. 8 §. 6 7. the two best, and most learned Writers on this Subject. ‘Who do not think it inconsistent with the Rules of the Gospel, for Subjects to resist the King, if with a Hostile mind, He seeks the Destruction of his People, for, says the former, the Will of commanding and destroying cannot consist together; And therefore he who professes himself an Enemy of the whole People, does there­by abdicate the Kingdom, but that can Scarce seem to happen in a King in his right Witts, and who commands only one Kingdom. But if he commands more Kingdoms, it may so happen, that he would destroy the People of one Nation, to gratifie the other, that he may there make Colonies of them.’ And this, I suppose, Grotius spoke in relation to the King of Spain who (they say) had declared, that if he overcame the Dutch, then in Arms against him, he would fell the People for Slaves into America, and people the Coun­try with Spaniards.

You very much mistake me, if you think, by Imperial, I meant the Roman Laws, but only the Common Laws of Soveraignty, which, tho' they destroy no Man's Natural,H. I. Ib. or Civil Rights, Yet both grant, and confirm unto the Legal Soveraign in every Government the Es­sential Rights of Soveraignty, of which I take Non-resistance, not only for Wrath, but Conscience lake, to be one of the Chief. And therefore it were much better to venture the utmost that a Tyrant can do towards his People by de­stroying them, than to give the least inlet to Rebellion, by Supposing the Peo­ple may in any case whatsoever resist their Prince; For granting the worst that may happen, that a Prince once in 1000 years to be so wicked and Malicious, as to go about to destroy his People, yet he could scarce find means and hands enough to bring it about; and admit he should destroy by his Mercenary forces, 30, or 40000, of them, it were better all these should perish, than that the Nation should be involved in Civil War, and the Prince's Person and Govern­ment destroyed by Resistance; And therefore in all Governments whatsoever, whether Monarchies or Common-Wealths, there must be an absolute Trust placed by the People in one, or more persons, which Trust they can neither recall when they will, nor yet resist upon the Non-performance of it. And there­fore it is a mistake, when you affirm with those Authors you have quoted, that a King, or other Supream Powers can ever lose their Right, by going a­bout to destroy the People, much less when they only think their Liberties, in danger; and I have several reasons to give you for my Assertion.

As first from the Common Notion of a Trust, For what is more generally understood by trusting another,V. I. R. p. 6. than that we lodge our concerns with him, and put them out of our disposal? When I trust a Man with my life, or Fortune, all men agree, that I put it in his Power to deprive me of both, For to deliver any Property to another with a Power of Revocation is to trust him (as we say) no farther than we can see him. He that can recover a Sum of money he hath deposited, when he plea­ses, to speak Properly, hath it still, in his Custody, and trusts his Friend no [Page 153] more, than he doth his own Coffers, and therefore if we consule our own Thoughts, we shall find, that a Trust Naturally Implies an Entire Reliance up­on the Conduct, and Integrity of another, which makes us resign up our Liberty, or Estate to his Management, imagining them Safer in his hands, than in our own. In short, a Trust, where there is no Third person to Judge of the performance, (as in these Pacts between Subjects, and Soveraign, there is not,) I say, such a trust includes a Translation of Right, and in respect of the irrevocableness of it, is in the Nature of a Gift. So that there seems on­ly to be this difference between them, that a Gift ought to respect the Benefit of the Receiver, whereas a Trust is generally made, for the advantage of him who Conveyed it.

And in every Civil Society or Government under Heaven that doth not depend upon another,B. D. F. p. 8. there must be an absolute, and unco [...]troulable Power fixed somewhere, which may irresistibly dispose of the E [...]ves, Estates, and Persons of the Subjects within that Civil Society, or Government; For if every Man be left at Liberty to dispose of his own Estate, and person, as he pleases himself, then can he promise himself no Protection, but what his own natural force will afford him, and that will certainly be over powered at one time, or other, by others. Without this Trust, there can be no Justice administred within the Civil Society, For if every particular man may be Judge in his own Case, the Right will certainly be asserted on both sides, tho' it really can be but in one, No Malefactor will ever condemn himself, nor Submit to Justice if he can, and may resist; and if a War happen, every man will be for saving his own Goods, from the ex­pence, as his own person from the Danger of it, and the Consequence must be, that that Civil Society must perish either by internal disorders, or internal Force.

Therefore this Power is, and must be in one Person, or body of men in every Civil Society,Id. pag. [...]. and is also indivisible; For sup­posing that it should be divided to the same Civil Society into two, or more Parts, as between two men, and two Senates, or Councils, without any dependance upon each other, or any Third power, the Conse­quence must needs be, that they differing, and opposing one another, and having no Lawful Power fixed in either of them to oblige the other to submit, must have recourse to Force, and Arms; So that this Civil Society can never rest, till this Supreme Soveraign Power be reduced again into one. And if you suppose this Power of Iudging, and Resisting in the People, or Multitude▪ the matter is ten times worse, that being a blind, and heady Monster, easily provoked upon flight occasions, commonly judging false, even in its own Concerns, and as impl [...]cable in its Rage, as un [...]atiable in its Re­venge.

To conclude, whether this Supream Power be in a Single person, or in a few, or in all, where ever it is lodged, none must oppose, none must resist it, nor can any Man assure himself of more Justice, or better usage from a Senate, or a Multitude, than from a Prince, or Single Person. So that this inconvenience of being liable to have our Lives sometimes taken away, our persons injured, and our Estates opprest, by the Evil management of our Go­vernours, is one of those humane miseries that by the Corruption of Men's nature from the Fall took possession of the World, and can never be purged [Page 154] out of it till the Final Conflagration. ‘And therefore the Advice of Cerialis in Ta­citus is always to be remembred, that Tyrants, and evil Princes are to be born with, as Immoderate Rains, and unkind Seasons, and amends may be made by a better Successor: Since Resistance will not Cure, but only en­flame the Distemper.’

You have made a long Speech, wherein I see you have heared toge­ther, all that Wit, or Interest can produce on the behalf of Tyranny, tho' I must confess, I did not expect to find you of any Man, so Zealous an Advo­cate for it. But I forgive it, as long as I really believe, that only a mistaken Conscience, and not any Private Interest prompts you to it. But that I may take your Speech to pieces in order to answer it: In the first place, as to what you say concerning a Trust, I think you are under a very great mistake. For no Man, either in a Civil State, or in that of Nature, ever yet so trusted a­nother, as that, if he abused his Trust, he had not reserved to himself a Right of Appeal; Under all Civil Governments this is Notorious, since it is one of the main Businesses of Supream Courts of Justice, upon Complaints, or Appeals, of Breaches of Trust, to call the Trustees to an Account, and force them to make Restitution for the wrongs they have done: And whereas you say, that in the State of Nature, where there is no third person to judge of the Performance, such a Trust includes a Translation of a Right (as in these Pacts between Subjects, and Soveraigns:) This is likewise a mistake, tho' it be true, that in that State, if I trust a Man with my Life, and Fortune. I put it in his Power to deprive me of both, and that this Trust naturally im­plies a Reliance upon the Conduct, and Integrity of another; which makes me resign my Liberty, or Estate to his Management; Yet doth it not there­fore follow, but that upon the abuse of this Trust, I may have a Remedy a­gainst him, who thus breaks this Trust I have so reposed in him. And when there is no third Person to Iudge between me, and my Trustee. I my self am the Sole Iudge of the Wrong he doth me, and may not only turn him out of his Trust, if I find he abuses it; but may also force him to make me Satisfaction for the Wrong he hath done: So that, if in the State of Nature I trust a Man with a Bag of Silver to keep for me: If he either Imbezels, or runs away with it, I may certainly force him to make me Restitution ▪ or else enter into a State of War with him, till he do; And where there is no Common Power over us to whom we can Appeal, this Difference can no way be Decided but by the Sword. And therefore no Trust (as in those mutual Pacts between Subjects, and Sove­raigns) can be Irrevocable, or include a perfect Translation of a Right, and no Trust can ever be supposed to be given but with this tacit Condition, that the Trustee doth not abuse it: And you your self have made a sufficient Difference between a Trust, and an Absolute Gift, but granting that a Gift respects, the benefit of the Receiver, whereas a Trust is for the Advantage of him who convey's it; From whence it must necessarily follow, that if this Trust be for his Advantage; he hath still an Interest in the thing Trusted, and consequently may call the Trustee to an Account in the State of Nature, and upon Satisfaction denyed, Appeal to God himself by Battle, or Combat. So that if the Supream Powers are but Trustees of the People, they may be Resisted, when by going about to Destroy them they break their Trust.

But as for the Second part of your Argument, that in all Civil Governments under Heaven, there must be an absolute and uncontroulable Power fixed some [Page 155] where, that may irresistibly dispose of the Lives, Persons, &c. of the Subjects. This, tho' it seems a better Argument than the former, yet is all one in Effect, for the Question is still, Whether the People ever reposed such an absolute Power in their Supream Magistrates, or not. I grant indeed, that as far as they act, as the nature of Civil Power, requires, they are not by any means to be resisted, but the Question still is, whether, when a Prince makes War upon the People, or goeth about to destroy them, there is then any Civil Power in being; and whether the Government be not already dissolved, since the main Ends of Government, viz. the Good and Preservation of the Subjects, are quite destroyed. And now pray tell me, which is most suitable to that prime Law of Nature, the endeavour of the good, and happiness of mankind, that a whole Nation should be enslaved, or destroyed by the boundless Will of a Tyrant, or that Rulers should be sometimes resisted, when they grow intolerably Tyrannical, & abuse their Power to the total destruction of the Lives, and Properties of their Sub­jects. So then, if such an absolute Arbitrary Power, in Princes, or States, can never consist with the main Ends of Civil Society, the Peace & Happiness of the Subjects, it is plain that when ever they are reduced to such a State, they will look upon themselves, as again in the State of Nature, nor would they have ever quitted their Natural Freedom, & tyed themselves up from providing for the security of their Lives, and Properties by such means as they might before have justly exercised, had it not been to obtain these Ends with much greater certainty by entring into Civil Society, and by Stated Rules of Right, and Wrong to secure their Lives and Properties, with their future peace, and Quiet, by surer means, than they could hope for in the meer State of Nature.

For it cannot be supposed that the People would ever confer such an Arbitrary unlimited Power on one Man, or many, over their Lives, and Estates that they might take them away without any just cause. For this were to put themselves into a worse Condition, than the meer State of Nature, wherein they had a Liberty to defend their Just Right against the Injuries of others, and were upon equal Terms of Force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single Man, or many in a Combination.T. T. G. part 2. p. 359. Whereas, by supposing they have thus given up themselves to the absolute Arbitrary Power, and Will of a Single Person. They have wholly disarmed themselves, and only armed him to make a Prey of them, whenever he pleases. He being in a much worse Condi­tion, that is exposed to the Arbitrary Power of one Man, who hath the Command of 100000 Men than he that is expos'd to the Arbitrary Power of 100000 single Men, no body being secure that his Will who hath such Command is better, than that of other Men, tho' his force be 100000 times stronger.

To conclude, granting a Supreme Power to be plac'd somewhere, either in a Single Person, or in many, yet it can by no means be absolutely Arbitrary and Irresi­stible over the lives, and Fortunes of the People. For their Authority being (as I have already proved in the former Conference) no more than that Power which God hath granted to every particular head of a Family, and other Freemen at his own dispose, for the security of their own Persons, and the Common Good of those whom God hath intrusted to their Charge, they cannot confer upon the supreme Magistrate any more Power, than what God hath conferred upon them before, and so can be no more than those Persons had in the State of Nature; before they enter'd into Society, and before they gave up their Power to these Supream Magistrates; viz. that only what God had before trusted them withal. Now (accord­ing to your own Principles) no Man is trusted by God in the State of Nature, with an absolute Power over his own life, much less to destroy, or take a­way the life,Id. p. 355. or Property of another, and therefore cannot convey [Page 156] any such Power to those he would intrust with it. So then if a Man can­not Subject himself to the Arbitrary Power of another, neither hath he in the State of Nature such an Arbitrary Power over the life, Liberty or Possessions of ano­ther, but only as much as the Law of Nature gave him for the Preservation of him­self, and the Common Good of Mankind; This is all he doth, or can give up to the Common-Wealth, so that if it can have no more than this. Its Power in the utmost bounds of it is still limited to the publick good of the Civil Society.

All which if duly considered, the rest of your weaker Arguments are easily an­swered. For supposing but one Prince in a 1000 years so wicked as to go about to destroy his People, it will then, whenever it happens, be as much their Right to de­fend themselves, as if it were to happen every year. And tho' you assert he could scarce find means, or hands to bring it about. Yet that makes nothing to the Pur­pose, for if he hath no Right to destroy 30, or 40000 of the Subjects, as you suppose he may, by his Mercenary forces, then that 30, or 40000 may defend themselves if they can: For when once a Prince hath thus enter'd into a State of War with his People; who can tell when or where it will end, or can assure himself, that he shall not be the next man that shall be d [...]stroyed, and it is very pleasant, that you allow the Prince this Power of murdering to avoid Civil War, as if there could be no War begun, unless there be fighting on both Sides; Whereas Mr. Hobbs himself acknowledges, the very assaulting, or setting upon any Man, to be entring in­to a State of War with him; And sure I think to fall upon the People without Cause, and Killing 30, or 40000 of them is entring into a State of War, or else no­thing is. And therefore you mistake the question, when you argue, from the In­divisibility of the Supreme Power, that it must not be resisted. For the Question is not here, whether it be divisible or not, but whether it be not absolutely dissolved by thus entering into a State of War with the People, whom all Civil Magistrates are supposed to protect when they assume the Government. Nor doth this give any countenance to Male factors, or other single Persons to rise in Arms, and defend themselves against the supreme Powers when they have offended against the Laws, or that they think themselves injured by the undile execution of them; Since such abuses of Power cannot suddenly, or upon every slight occasion disturb the Government. And in the Case of Malefactors, the Supream Power is still sure to have all the People on its side, for their own Security, and in case of some Murders, or oppressions committed by such Supream Magistrates, on the Lives or Estates of some Private Persons, tho' I suppose that even such private Men have a Right in the state of Nature to defend their Lives, and to recover by Force, what by unjust Force is taken from them, yet this Right must still give place to the Publick Place, and Safety of the Common-Wealth whereof they are members, which must not be disturb [...]d for the sake of a few, and of this the People themselves are so sensible that it is almost as impossible, Ib. 429. for a few oppressed men to disturb the Government, where the Body of the People do not think themselves concerned to it, as for a Ra [...]ing Mad-man or Heady Malecontent to overturn a well setled Sta [...]e, the People being as little a [...]t to follow the one, as the other. So on the other side, when over the People are once convinced that their Governours, instead of Protecting, go about to destroy them, it is as impossible for any Man to persuade them not to take up Arms, and defend themselves against them, if they are able to make Sufficient Resi­stances. And therefore tho' I so far agree with you, that some oppressions, and vi­olences may be practised in all Civil Governments whatsoever, since such abuses will continue as long as Men are Men, yet doth it not therefore follow that the [Page 157] Supream Powers, must always be born withal, and never resisted, no not when they go about to destroy the whole Body of the People.

But pray tell me, is it not a very mischievous, and unjust thing, that Subjects should be both Iudges and Parties too in their own Case. Since they may pretend, that the King goeth about to destroy them, when really he does not de­sign any such thing; and would not this bring all things into Anarchy and Confusi­on? I shewed you the fatal consequences of this at the Beginning, but you have not yet thought fit to answer them.

I begg your pardon, Sir, I have been so taken up with answering the main Arguments, that you have proposed against this Right of Resistance, that I have not had time to consider this Objection, which is but a Consequence thereof. And therefore in the first place give me leave to ask you this Question. Suppose you were Master of a separate Family in the Indies, and a Neighbouring Prince, or Cacich of the Indians, should come to Kill you, or to drive you out of your Plantati­on, might you not defend your self, because you are both Iudge and Party too in your own Case? or suppose you should so far abuse this Power of self defence, as to pre­tend this Neighbouring Prince was coming to assault you, when he realy was nor, and should therefore (to prevent it) set upon him first, and Murder him, and his Followers, must your abuse of this Right which you have by the Law of Nature be a sufficient Argument, that neither you, nor any Man else in the State of Na­tio [...], should ever for the future exercise this Right? no more will the abuse of either of these be [...] sufficient Argument against the Right of Self-defence against the supream Powers.

I grant indeed they are not in the State of Nature, but it is much other­wise after People are entered into a Civil Society, or Common-Wealth and that upon your own Principles. For then they have given up all that Equality which you suppose between men, in the State of Nature. For supposing what you affirm should be true, That Civil Government at first began from the whole Body, or major part of the Peoples making over all their Right of Governing themselves to one Person, or more, upon Conditions of being Protected in their Lives, and Estates, they must likewise make over all their Right of Iudging for themselves, what means are neces­sary for their Common Good, and Preservation; after which transferring of their Po­wer, they can never have any Right to meet again in a body either by themselves, or their Representatives to Judge of these Breaches, or the Transgressions of those Conditions which they at first Proposed, and agreed upon with such Princes, or Go­vernours. And when the People come once to multiply into a Nation, it in abso­lutely Impossible for them ever to meet altogether again, and give their Iudg­ment of the Good or Evil Consequence of the Monarchs actions, or to come to any resolution upon them; So that their opinion can never afterwards be known other­wise, than by the Murmurs of particular Persons, which none can certainly know neither, unless they could speak with every Individual Person of that Kingdom, which is impossible. But if you will say, this oppression needs not to be known by Words, or Votes, but actions, viz. by the Peoples actual taking up Arm', this must either be by the whole People altogether at once, or at least the major part of them, or else of some particular Bodies of Men much less than the whole, or major part. Now the whole, or major part of a People of a Nation to rise and take up Arms all at once a [...] one Man, is morally impossible. And if any part less than this whole, or Major part (as suppose a whole Province, or City) every such party or Body of Men so rising, must be guilty of Rebellion and disturbing the Publick Peace of the Common-Wealth [Page 158] as being but private single Persons, which you your self granted, and condemned as unlawful. And therefore I desire to know, who shall Judge when this Body, or Major part of the People, are thus assaulted, so that they may just­ly defend themselves? But indeed this Licence of taking up Arms is not only un­practicable, but unreasonable too: For it supposes, that after the People have gi­ven up all the Power they had of Iudging what was bad or good for the Publick, they have this Power still left in them, which would make them at once both Sub­jects and Soveraigns, which is a Contradiction.

Had you been pleased but better to have observed what I said the last time I spoke, a great part of this Objection had been saved. For I there expresly assert­ed, that the Security of mens Lives, Liberties and Estates, being the Main Ends for which men entered at first into Civil Society, and likewise desired to continue in it, as being the only means why Civil Government is to be preferred before the State of Nature, the People neither did nor can give up their Right of Iudging, when these are invaded, or taken from them. And therefore you are very much mistaken to believe, that at the Institution of Civil Society, Men must have given up their Common senses, and reason too of Iudging, when they are like to be murdered, or made Slaves of, or their Fortunes unjustly taken from them, by those, whom they have ordained to be their Governours; and I suppose you will not say, that they thereby acquire a Power of altering the Nature of things, or of making War, Slavery or Beggery the means of procuring the Welfare, and Happiness of the People, any more than they can enact, that hunger, or diseases should conduce to the preservation of any mans life; And therefore as the Judgment of these things was obvious, and natural to every mans senses, and understanding in the State of Nature, so it is as plain, they never intended wholly to give up all their Right of Judg­ing concerning their own Preservation and Happiness, and all means necessarily tending thereunto, but only in such Cases, and concerning such matters as are beyond the Power, or above the Knowledge of every ordinary private subject: thus in a disease, tho' I give up my self to the skill, and Judgment of a Physician, yet I do it not so absolutely, but that I still reserve to my self a Right of Iudging, whether he gives me Poyson, instead of a Purge. and if Princes or Supream Magistrates were thus absolutely invested with an Arbitrary Power of doing whatsoever they pleased with the Lives, Liberties and Estates of the People, they would then be in a much worse con­dition under Civil Government, than they were in the State of Nature, as I have alrea­dy proved, And therefore there is no need of any such general Meetings, or Assem­b [...]ies of the whole Body, or Representatives of the People, to Iudge when these Fun­damental Conditions of all Government are notoriously violated and broken: Since it will be apparent to every mans sense and reason that is thus assaulted or injured.

And as for the other part of your Objection, how the People can know, when the whole Body, or Major part, of them, is thus assaulted, or opprest, and being so assaul­ted, or opprest, what number are necessary to justifie this Resistance? To this im­portant Question, I thus answer; that if such a War, or assault be made upon such a considerable part of the People, as may justifie their Resistance to be much better for the Good of the Common-VVealth, than that so many People should be destroyed, Resistance certainly is then Lawful; And the reason why every particular person, when unjustly assaulted by his Princes Order, or his Estate taken a­way by his unjust Edicts, or Decrees, ought not to make any publick disturbance only to save the one, or recover the other, I have given you before, viz. because the pub­lick peace is to be preferred, before that of any private Person: Yet even then such a private Person may very well defend himself, if unjustly assaulted by Assassinates, whom [Page 159] the Prince, or other Supream Magistrates shall send to take away his Life without any just Cause, or Legal Tryal ▪ tho' I grant he may not sollicit others to rise with him, and take his part or help him to defend his Life, or Estate. Yet (as a Reverend Dignitary of our Church very well observed.S. C. R. p. 59.) No Man can want Authority to defend his Life against him, who hath no Authority to take it away. But much more when this assault, or oppression is either made upon the whole People in general, or upon so considerable a Part, or Member thereof, as the Common-Wealth could not well subsist without, if it were destroyed, in all such cases, I suppose the People thus assaulted, or opprest have a sufficient Right to defend their Lives, and free themselves from that slavery, and oppression they lye under; and thus the People of Rome might very well have justified their Resistance of Nero's Incendiaries, when he sent to Burn the City, tho' they had been his own Guards. We read likewise in the Hist. August. that the Emperour Caracalla, the People happening to laugh at him (for his Folly) in playing the Gladiator in his Circus Maximus, sent his Guards to kill them; So likewise in Herodian, that, upon another supposed affront, he sent his Pretorian Bands to Murder most of the Inha­bitants of Alexandria, who came out to meet him with a Solemn Procession. And, I suppose, no rational Man will deny, but that, if the Citizens of Rome, or Alexan­dria, had had Arms in their hands, they might have Lawfully defended their Lives against these Murdering Guards. For I think it was much better that those should be destroyed who were the Aggressors, than that so vast a Body of Innocent People, should be made Sacrifices to the undreasonable Passion, or Revenge of a Cruel Tyrant. So that when the oppression, or Violence to Mens Liberties and Properties is general, and notorious, and affect the whole Body of the People, I do then suppose that any Part of them, that are sufficient to defend themselves, may do it, till they can find Assistance either from the rest of the People, or else from some Forreign Prince, or State, who will vindicate their cause, and come in to their Assistance. And thus we read the Town of Brill in Zealand, Vi. Meterani Hi­stor. under the Conduct of the Count of Mark first revolted from the Tyranny of the Duke of Alva, which example was afterwards (tho' not immediately) followed by most of the Cities of Holland, and Zealand, and the Courage, and Re­solution of this Count, as also of the Citizens of this Town, is highly commended by the Historians of that time, for so nobly venturing their Lives, and Fortunes to [...]diem their Co [...]utry from that slavery it then lay under till at last they were relie­ved, and assisted by Queen Elizabeth to whom the Vnited Provinces owe that Free­dom they now enjoy.

I shall not now dispute with you what Right the States of the Vnited Provin­ces, might have to resist the Tyranny of the Duke of Alva, then Governour for the King of Spain, since Grotius, and most Writers which are not of the Spanish Faction, sup­pose, that King to have had a Conditional Right of Governing those Provinces accord­ing to their own Laws, and Priviledges from the very first Institution of the Go­vernment; And therefore not being an absolute Monarch over them, he might well be resisted upon the Breach of those Condition [...]: But this is not the Case now in hand: since we are now discoursing of absolute Monarchies, or Common-Wealths, who being invested with the Supream Power by the Consent of the People (as you suppose:) And therefore may have by their Consents (whether forced or Volunta­ry it matters not) according to your own Principles a Supream Vnaccountable Power over them; And in the first place I can shew you, how a Man may make over all the Power he hath in his own Person irrevocably to another; As when a Man sells, or [Page 160] grants himself for a Slave to another by his own Consent; who when he hath once put himself into this Condition, his Master hath an absolute Property in his Person, and an indefesible Right for ever to his Service. So that notwith­standing all the Cruel, Harsh, and unreasonable Usage, he may meet with from his Master, he can never regain his Freedom without the Consent of his Lord. And this I take to be an uncontested Truth agreed on by the Law; of Na­tions, and established by the Law of God. Thus St. Peter chargeth those, who are in this State of Servitude: Pet. Ep. 1. ch. 2. v. 18. To be subject to their Masters with all Fear, not only to the Good, and Gentle, but also to the Froward. So likewise St. Paul in both his Epistles to the Ephe­sians, and Colossians, Eph. 6. v. 5. Col. 3.22. Commands Servants to be obedient to them that are their Masters according to the Flesh, &c. And that this particularly respects Slaves, appears by the 8. verse of the 6. Chapter of the former of these Epistles.

So that if a Man may thus make himself a Slave, or perpetual Servant to another by his own consent, I cannot see any Reason why a whole Nation may not do the same, and deliver themselves up to one Man, or more to be Go­verned, and treated both for their Lives, Liberties, and Fortunes, at his or their Discretion. So that, tho' he may perhaps abuse this Power to the seve­rest Tyranny, or Oppression: Yet have they no Right to shake off this Yoak, or to resist him; since their Lives, and Fortunes are wholly at his disposal, by their own Act, and Consent. And that whole Nations may justly surrender them­selves for Slaves or absolute Subjects, I can give you two Examples approved of by God in the Scriptures: The first is, that of the Egyptians, who, when they had sold all their Goods and Lands to Pharaoh for Bread, to keep them­selves alive in the seven years of Famine we read of in Genesis. You'll find they were afterwards such absolute Servants or Slaves to Pha­raoh. Gen. 47.21, 22. That as for the People he removed them to Cities, from one end of the Borders of Egypt even to the other end thereof, only the Land of the Priests bought he not, &c. The other is, that of the Gibeonites, of whom we read, that they accepted of their Lives from Ioshua, and the Elders of Israel: Tho' on the Condition of the greatest slavery, ra­ther than they would venture to be destroyed. So that if absolute Monarchy were not Lawful, but contrary to God's Will and Institution, most of the great­est Kingdoms in the World would be governed contrary to the Laws of God and Nature; and the Subjects of all the Kingdoms from France to China, (not reckoning those of Africa) might immediately, if they were able, rebel against their Monarchs, and set up what sort of Government they thought fit: Since none of the Subjects in those Kingdoms hold their Lives, Liberties or Estates by any other Tenure, than the Good Will or Pleasure of the Monarch, who may take away all or any of them as often as he pleases to do it, and that without any right of Resistance in all, or any of their Subjects, let them use them never so severely.

I cannot deny, but what you say is so far true, that one Man, or ma­ny together may grant, or sell themselves for Slaves by their own Consent; and that the Persons who thus make over themselves, have afterwards no Right, or Property in any thing, more than a bare Subsistence, yet that servitude is not by the Law of Nature, but only brought in by Custom ▪ or the Law of Nations, as all Writers agree, and is so far lawful, because it tends to the Good, and Pre­servation [Page 161] of Mankind, that Prisoners taken in War should rather be kept as Slaves, than immediately slain, or that Men compelled by extream necessity, should sell themselves, or their Children, rather than both should perish; and therefore it is no wonder, that the Apostles who were not sent to a [...]ter the State of things in the World, or to entrench upon any Man's civil Righ [...]s, should command Servants, or Slaves, to be Subject to their Masters, tho' un­believers: Yet doth it not therefore follow, that when men are forced to give themselves thus up to the Power of another, they likewise give him an abso­lute Right over their Lives, so as that their Masters may take them away, whenever they please; for that was more than they ever had over themselves. Nor doth God confer any such Power upon Masters, and therefore, if the Ma­ster hath no such absolute Right, or Property in the Persons of his Slaves, as he hath in his Sheep, or Cattle; I see no reason, why even Slaves, if their Masters go about to take away their Lives for no other Cause, but to satisfie their own humour, or passion, may not, (if they cannot otherwise escape) resist their Masters, and save their Lives if they can. For all Writers agree, that if a Master doth so inhumanely abuse his Slave; that he can no longer en­dure it without danger of his Life, he may in that Case Lawfully run away, and escape from him; and why he may not as well resist him to save his Life, when his Master goeth about thus unjustly, and without any Cause to take it away; I can see no reason to the contrary: Since it was only for the saving his Life, that such a Man could ever be supposed to yield himself a Slave to another; and which Condition being broken on the Masters part, the Servant is again in the State of Nature, and the relation of Master and Servant so far ceases; or is at least suspended, during that Violence.

This being the state of particular Men, I cannot think that God hath put whole Nations in a worse Condition; nor can I ever imagine, that any whole Na­tion, unless urged by some extream necessity, would ever give up themselves so absolutely for Slaves, as not to have any Right to defend their own Lives, or a Property in any thing they can enjoy; and if ever they could be supposed to have done so, I think I may boldly affirm, that such a Nation are not Subjects, but Slaves, and the Prince not a Monarch or Civil Governour, but only a Lord of a Great Family, or Master of a publick Work-house.

For I take the difference betwixt Subjects, or Slaves, and Princes and Masters of Families to consist in this, that the Power of a Prince, is chiefly ordained for the Good, and Preservation of his Subjects, tho' I grant his own may likewise be included in it, as an Encouragement, and Reward for his Labour; yet not as the principal End of his Institution: Whereas in a Family of Slaves, they are chiefly ordained for his profit, or Benefit that maintains them; but their Happiness, and Preservation is only accidental, and as it may conduce to that. The main End also of Civil Government is to institute and maintain a distinct Property in men's Estates, and which the Prince, or Common-wealth can have no Right to take away. And therefore, tho' I grant that in those Despoti [...]k Monarchies you mention, the Monarchs do exercise an Absolute, Arbitrary Power over the Lives, Liberties, and Estates of their Subjects: Yet that this is by Divine Right, or Institution I utterly deny, or that it was always so in all of them from the beginning; for most of those Empires you mention can no otherwise subsist than by a Constant maintaining vast standing Armies, or Guards to keep their Sub­jects in Obedience.

[Page 162]Nor can any Governments be of Divine Institution, which are exercised with a sole Respect to the personal Power, and Grandeur of the Prince, rather than the Good and Preservation of the People. So that if you will but survey the accounts that Travellers give us of those Eastern Parts of the World, you will find, that there are no known setled Laws or Properties in those Countries, except at the Arbitrary Will of the Monarch, or his Viceroys; and thus all those rich, and fruitful Countries of Egypt, and Asia, which formerly flourished in all Arts, Knowledge and Civility, and abounded in Multitudes of People, are now in most places reduced to meer Deserts, and do not breed a Tenth part of that number of People, as they did in former Ages: Which proceeds from no other cause but the Cruelty, and Injustice of the Government, quite diffe­rent from what it was in the time of the Roman Emperours, who tho', I con­fess, they were in some sence absolute too, yet governed by, and were obliged to observe Known Laws ▪ and the People had a settled Property in their Estates, which the Prince had no Right to take away. I shall not enquire how all these Monarchs came to be so Arbitrary at first, and thus to abuse their Power. But the Generality, or Antiquity of this abuse can be no more a Plea for its Right, than that because Idolatry was generally practised throughout the World within three or four hundred Years after the Flood, till three or above four hundred Years after Christ, therefore, Idolatry was the True and Ancient Reli­gion of the World.

Now, tho' I will not condemn this sort of Government ▪ where the Subjects enjoy no setled Property in Lands, or Goods, as absolutely unlawful, and direct­ly contrary to the Laws of God, or Nature: Yet in those Kingdoms and Com­mon-wealths, where Civil, or Hereditary Property is once introduced, I think it is not Lawful, nor indeed in the Power of the Prince or Common-wealth to destroy, or take it away. And therefore if the Roman Emperours should have endeavoured by any Laws, or Edicts of their own making to have d [...]stroyed all Civil, or Hereditary Property in Lands and Goods, and to have reduced all the Estates of their Subjects into their own Possession: I think they might have been Lawfully disobeyed, and resisted by the People, since they went about to destroy one great End of Civil Government, viz. the Instituting, and Maintaining of Civil Property.

To conclude, I freely grant that in all Countries which are governed, either by absolute Monarchies, or Common-wealths, the Soveraignty, is so fully in one Per­son, or Body of Men, that it hath no other Bounds or Limits under God; but its own Will, or Commands: Provided they do not apparently tend to the absolute Ruine, and Destruction of the People; for that being inconsistent with the Noti­on, or End of governing them, they are, and ever will be Iudges of it. And therefore even amongst the Turks, and Tartars themselves, if they should once find their Prince go about wil [...]ully to destroy them, or sell them for Slaves; you would soon find (notwithstanding this servile Subjection,) That they would quickly be rid of them, as the Ianisaries have served their Emperours of late Years, for far less faults.

I cannot deny but you have spoken reasonably enough on this Sub­ject, and perhaps if you had restrained this Power of Resistance only to such Ca­ses, where the Prince, or Monarch makes open War upon his People, or doth otherwise actually go about to destroy them, it might have been a tolerable do­ctrine that they may lawfully resist the Forces he shall send against them, but [Page 163] this is a Case that so seldom happens (if ever at all) that it can never be sup­posed, and no Prince, unless he were Mad, can be guilty of it; and therefore when ever he Acts thus, I think he may not only be Lawfully resisted, but tyed up for a Madman. But this is seldom, or never the Case between Monarchs, and their People, for most of the Rebellions, and Insurrections that I have ever read of, or observed in the World, have not proceeded from any necessity that the Peo­ple had to rise up in Arms, and Rebel against their Supream Magistrates, because their Lives, or Estates were assaulted, or in danger to be taken away, but for the most part they arose either from the too Great Cruelty, or severity of the Supream Power towards some particular Private Men, who by themselves, and their Friends and Relations have gone about to revenge those Injuries, that they supposed had been done them. And of this, all Histories are to full, that I need give no particular Instances of them; all which abuses may be reduced to these Heads. First, when a Prince doth commonly himself violate the Cha­stities of the Wives, or Daughters of the Subjects, which tho' it hath been the ruine of divers Princes, yet is he able to do this only to some few particu­lar Persons, and tho' if he should permit his Soldiers, or Officers generally to do this, without any Punishment; yet even this, can hardly, if ever, extend to all the Wives, Daughters, or Women in a whole Countrey: And there­fore both these Cases are to be born withal, according to your own Principles, since it doth not tend to the Slavery, or Destruction of the People, I mean, as to their whole complexed Body. A Second is, when an absolute Prince or Monarch goeth about to alter the established Religion of his Countrey, and to introduce a different one by his own sole Authority, whilst the Major part of the People con­tinue of another Opinion. In this Case, I suppose you will not affirm, that the Subjects have a Right to resist their Prince for so doing. For then the Ro­mans might justly have rebelled against Constantine, when he shut up the Hea­then Temples, and forbad all publick Sacrifices to their Gods, and thereby made the Christian Religion the established Profession of the Empire.

But pray Sir, give me leave to interrupt you a little, might not Con­stantine have a Right to do this, because the Christian Religion is the only true one; and that the Idolatry the Romans then practised, was against the Law of Nature?

Whatever weight there may be in this answer, yet you have no rea­son to put this Question now; since you have already, viz. at our first Confe­rence asserted, that, an Erroneous Conscience gives men a Right to follow it, during the time they are under this Ignorance of the Truth: And therefore if the Roman Emperours had not a Right to do this by their own Authority with­out any resistance, the Subjects, whilst they believed the Worship of their God to be thereby destroyed, might, nay, ought to have resisted the Emperour, rather than to have suffered him to have altered the antient Religion of the Empire, and to have brought in another, which they look't upon as an upstart; and it is very natural for Men to do so, since nothing ought to be more dear to them, than the Worship and honour of God.

I do not desire at present to Embark my self in this tedious, and trou­blesome dispute about the Authority of the Supream Powers in matters of Reli­gion; and therefore I shall say no more to it at present, but if your Assertion be true, that an absolute Monarch may set up what Religion he pleases, without [Page 164] being resisted by the Subjects, whom I suppose to be of another perswasion, it will then follow, that if the French King, or Emperour of Musc [...]vy, should turn Mahometan, and should set up that Superstition by force, for the Publick, and National Religion of the Countrey, tho' with the Destruction of all that should oppose it, none of their Subjects might resist them in so doing; and if so, I desire you to consider, what you have gained to Religion by thus asserting such an unlimited Prerogative to all Monarchs. But laying aside this Dispute till another time, I pray go on to the rest of those Cases in which the People do take upon them to resist the Supream Powers.

I shall comply with your desires, and therefore a Third Pretence of Subjects to rebel, is, when the Supream Powers shall think it necessary to levy upon their People more heavy and grievous Taxes, and Impositions, than the People are willing, or, it may be, able to pay. Now, if your Principle be true, that they may rise in Arms, and resist the Supream Powers, whenever they think themselves thus intolerably oppressed, and if they shall be sole Iudges of this oppression, then all the Rebellions that ever were made in England, or elsewhere, by reason of such excessive Tributes, or Taxes, whould be Lawful. Which would be a perpetual Ground of Anarchy, and Confusion: For private Subjects, not being admitted into the Privy Councils of Princes, or States, can never be supposed to understand, whether the necessities of the Common-wealth may require them, or not. And indeed the People do so often repine and mur­mur at the Government, when the Publick Necessities require to impose great­er Taxes, or Gabels than they think they can well bear, that the Mobile of any great City or Province for Example, who think themselves thus oppressed, beyond what they are able, or perhaps willing to bear; may rise in Rebellion and throw off all Obedience to Civil Authority, and they may have a very good Pretence for it, according to your Principle, because they may look upon them­selves as a very considerable, nay, necessary part of the Common-wealth. And thus the Common People of Kent might have justified their Rebellion in Richard the seconds time under Wat Tyler, and Iack Straw; and the People of Devon­shire, and Somerset-shire might likewise have justified their Insurrection in Henry the sevenths Reign under Flammock the Black smith. And I could mention others of the like Nature, but I forbear, because you may say they were upon account of Religion. And lastly, this Principle might very well justifie the In­surrection of the People of Naples under Massaniello, which besides the vast spoil it made upon the Goods and Palaces of the Nobility, ended at last (whatso­ever they pretended at first to the contrary) in delivering up themselves to the King of France, who refusing to protect them they were soon reduced to their former Obedience to the King of Spain.

In short, if the People should take upon them to Resist, or Rebel, whenever they thought themselves intolerably injured, and oppressed in their Estates by im­moderate Taxes, there would be no End of such Rebellions, especially conside­ring the advantage which Wicked, Crafty, and Ambitious men would there­by take to excite the People to rise and depose their Lawful Governours, and set up themselves in their Room upon Pretence of better Government, and greater Liberty. And how prone the Common People have been to receive such Impressions, He is but meanly a [...]d [...]ed in Antient, and Modern History, who is not convinced of it.

To answer this Objection, before you proceed farther, my opinion in [Page 165] short is, that tho' such Taxes may often prove an Universal Dammage, and a great impoverishment to the Subjects; yet if they are such as may be born with less trouble, than can follow from a Civil War, or the change of the Go­vernment, there is no just or sufficient cause of Resistance of the Soveraign Magi­strates commands, or Edicts concerning them. As for Example, such great Taxes as the Subjects pay, and perhaps may bear it well enough in Holland and other Countries; since there may be a necessity for such Taxes, and of this I grant the Supream Authority of the Nation can be the only Iudges. And how far this may extend, I cannot positively determine. For suppose you should ask me, if the Supream Powers should borrow all the Ready Money the Subjects had, for the necessary uses of the State, so that they would give them Leather, or Brass Money instead of it, to go at the same value, for the necessary uses of Commerce, yet if they did not take away their Property in their Lands, Corn, or Living Stock; which are the necessary means of their Subsistance, I do not think it were a sufficient Cause, to take up Arms against their Governours for so doing; be [...]ause the Subjects cannot tell, but that the necessities of the State, (for their necessary defence against a Potent Forreign Enemy) may require it. And sure, it is a much greater Evil to fall into a Civil War, or to be subdued by Strangers, than to part with their Money; since by such a War, or Conquest they might not only lose that Money, but also their Liberties, and Estates.

Yet, on the other side, I would not be understood to give the Supream Ma­gistrates, a Power to invade the Properties, and Estates of their Subjects to what degree they thought fit. For then they might Tax them to that extremi­ty as might force them to sell themselves, and their Wives and Children for Slaves, or else being unable to pay, must be forced to run away and leave their Habitations, (as the Peasants often do in France;) whereby whole Villa­ges, nay Towns, may become depopulated, as they are in divers parts of Italy, and Turkey, by such extraordinary Severitles, and therefore in absolute Monarchies, where there is no Nobility, Gentry, nor Yeomen, who can claim any Pro­perty in their Estates, which with us make up the best and most considerable part of the People; and where the Government being wholy Military, and is ex­ercised, over the People, only by force of Arms; I doubt not but such a People reduced to this extremity, may not only quit the Countrey, where they are thus in [...]olerably oppress't, but that, if they are not of themselves strong enough to make Resistance and cast off this intolerable Yoke by force, they may (if an occasion be offered) [...]oyn with any Neighbour Prince, or State, tha [...] will under­take their Quarrel, and upon this account, I think▪ we may very well justifie the Revolt of the Greek Christians from the Ottoman Yoke, and putting them­selves under the Protection of the Venetians, both in the Morea, and other pla­ces; and also upon the same Principles, I conceive, the Common People of France, who are reduced to the like extremities, might also with a safe Consci­ence revolt from the Present King, and put themselves under the Protection of the Prince of Orange, our now present Soveraign, or the States of Hotland ▪ if ever they should be successful enough to make any considerable Invasion upon that Kingdom.

And therefore I must confess, that there can be no certain and stated Rule set down to what Proportion absolute Princes or Commonwealths may Tax their Subjects, since in some Countreys the People can better part with a Shil­ling, than in others they can pay a Peny. And as I grant it must be left to [Page 166] the Mercy, and Discretion of the Governours what Taxes to impose without thus ruining and destroying their People, as it is left to the Judgment of the owner of the Beast, how much burden it is able to bear. So if he, by laying too great a weight, breaks the Back of his Horse or Beast, he not only hath the Loss, but makes himself the Laughing-stock of all his Neighbours: So that, tho' I confess the People ought to have Patience, and rather to suffer many Oppres­sions, and hardships, than to put themselves in this miserable State of War; Yet there is a midst in all things, and the People may be so Cruelly Oppressed by Taxes, and other Impositions, as it is impossible for them longer to Subsist or provide Necessaries for themselves, and their Families: And since you have already granted, that the People may Iudge when their Prince makes War up­on them, and goeth actually about to destroy them by the Sword, I cannot see, why they may not have the same Right of Iudging when they are like to be destroyed by Famine too. And who can be Iudge of this, but those who feel it?

But indeed it is Morally impossible for the People to be mistaken in so plain a Case. For, tho' this many-headed beast (as you commonly call them,) the People can­not argue very Subtilly of the future Consequences of things, yet they have a very Nice and Tender Sense of feeling, and can very well tell, when they are so in­jured, and oppressed: that they can bear it no longer, for then sure, they may be allowed to have as much Care, and Sense of their own Preservation, as Camels, and Dromedaries, which (as Travellers Relate) tho' they are taught by their Masters to Kneel down, and to receive their Loads, which they will patiently endure as long as they are able to bear them, Yet when once their Masters do over-exceed that weight, neither fair means nor foul, can pre­vail upon them to rise, or they will throw off those Loads if risen, that they feel will otherwise break their Backs. But I have Discoursed long enough on this Head, and therefore if you have nothing more material to except against it, I pray proceed to the rest of the Causes, that Subjects may, as you think, pretend to have, to take up Arms against the Supream Powers.

I have somewhat more to urge, towards proving that this Liberty which you allow the Subjects, wholy tends to Anarchy, and Confusion; but I shall reserve it to the last, when I shall Sum up all that I have farther to urge upon this Subject, and therefore I shall proceed to the other Pretences that Sub­jects in absolute Monarchies may make to Rebel; and the next may be, that the Monarch looking upon his Subjects as his Slaves, may either use them so himself, or Sell them to other Nations for that purpose, as Mon­fieur Chardin tells us,Vi. Sir Jo. Chardins Travels L. 1. the King of Mingrelia often doth diverse of his People to Raise Money, And tho' I will not be so Ridiculous as to suppose That such a Monarch can Sell away all his People at once; for then he should be left alone without any Subjects, and Consequently become no King. Yet in such Monarchies as diverse of the Ea­stern, and African are at this day, where (as you your self own) the People having no Setled or Hereditary Property in their Estates, the Monarch may dis­pose of their Particular Persons as he thinks fit; I cannot see any reason, why, the Monarch may not in these Countries without any blame exert his Preroga­tive if he pleases, and take as many of his Subjects, or their Children to serve him as Slaves, as he thinks necessary for his Service.

And therefore whatsoever People or Nation have thus Subjected themselves to [Page 167] the Absolute Power, or Dominion of one Man, they have no more Right to Regain their Natural Liberty, than I should have of taking away any thing by Force which I had before given or granted to another: For this Sort of Civil Servitude, is not so Repugnant to Nature as some Imagine, or that because Subjects were forced to consent to it for the avoiding of some Greater Evil, they can afterwards have any Right to shake it off again when ever they will. For, tho' I grant, that God hath not Instituted any such Servitude, yet when once it is introduced in any Country, Men are not at Liberty to cast off the Yoke when ever they please, but to observe St. Paul's Rule, If thou art a Servant, care not for it, but if thou are free, chuse it rather, That is, Freedom is to be preferred before Servitude or Subjection. But where Providence hath made Men Absolute S [...]rvants, or Subjects; they are bound to continue in that State, unless the Supream Powers, they are under, think fit to Release them from it. And therefore this can be no good Pretence under Absolute Monarchies for Subjects to take up Arms against their Prince, for such a State of Liberty which they never enjoyed.

I shall not trouble my self to Dispute, what Right an Absolute Mo­narch may have over the Persons of his People in a Country, where they have no Property, nor Written Laws, and where they look upon themselves as no bet­ter than Slaves to their Prince, and perhaps may take a Pride in it, (as I have read the Russians do.) And therefore if they have so wholy Submitted themselves, I grant what you assert, is true, and that they have no Right to Resist, according to the Old saying, Volenti non fit Injuri [...]. And yet even in these Despotick Mo­narchies, tho' the Prince may pick out here and there some of his Subjects to sell for Slaves, or else to use them as such himself; yet I do much question, if he should go about to make any Considerable Number, (as suppose to take 20, or 30000 all at once for Slaves,) I say, I do much question whether these People would be so Convinced of your Principles of Passive Obedience, and Non-Re­sistance, as to let their Monarch's Guards drive them into Slavery, like Sheep to the Market, but would, if they were able, make a Vigorous Resistance, and knock their Drivers on the Head. Whether Iure, vel injuria, I shall not dis­pute.

But for all this, even in Absolute Monarchies, where the People have a Set­led Legal Property in their Lands, and Estates, and consequently where their Persons are free, I doubt not, if their Princes should go about to make all his Subjects Slaves; but that they might Lawfully Resist him, or those he im­ploys in so doing. And tho' it be true, he could not make all his People Slaves at once, Yet if he asserted it as a part of his Royal Prerogative, and also exerci­sed it on particular Persons, as often as he thought sit, or could, I doubt not but the People might make it a common cause; Since none can know whose turn it may be next: For sure Liberty from Servitude is as necessary to Man's Happiness and Well-being, as Life is to his Existence: Which would seem no great Benefit to those.Martial. who being Born Free, were reduced to Sla­very; it being well said by the Poet, Non est vivere, Sed-valere vita.

And tho' the Roman Emperors did exercise an Absolute Power over their Sub­jects, yet I never read, that they durst presume to make Slaves of Free­born Romans, nor indeed of any of those Nations they Subdued; For they had too great a Sense, and Love of Liberty themselves, ever to Impose such a Yoke [Page 168] upon the People they Conquered, which was so Destructive to the Common Hap­piness and Preservation of Mankind. And suppose if the French Grand Seig­ni [...]ur, as absolute as he is, or pretends to be, should go about to Sell his Sub­jects, (especially the Nobility) for Slaves, all that the Iesuites (those Instru­ments of Slavery) could do, would not, I believe, be able to Keep that People from Rising against him. But if you have nothing farther to object against what I have now said; I pray proceed to the next Flead, if you have any more Instances to make.

I am now come to the last Pretence, that Subjects may make to Re­bell. And that is, Supposing the Monarch, should at once, or by Degrees turn the Subjects out of their Legal Hereditary Properties in their Estates; And of this you your self grant, there can be no Dispute in those Despotick Monarchies, where there is no Hereditary Property allowed; And as for all other Govern­ments, since you do own that all Legal, and Civil Property in Lands did chiefly proceed, or at least is Established by the Civil Power, I cannot see, why, those Powers in any Kingdom (if they think it would conduce to the Good of the Common-Wealth,) may not Destroy this Civil Property, and either make all Estates equal, or else ordain, that they shall be enjoyed (as in all absolute Mo­narchies) at the Will of the Prince; since, if the Supream Powers are the Au­thor of this Property, sure they may alter, and Abrogate it again as often as they think fit.

I shall not Dispute with you concerning such Kingdoms, where there is no Civil Property yet Instituted, or where the People do own themselves Slaves to the Prince: But if such a Monarch, hath remitted any thing of this Right; and hath Instituted a Legal Hereditary Property in Estates; such a Law being once made, I do not think it is in the Prince's Power to revoke it, any more than it is for a Master to Reduce his Slaves again to Servitude after he hath once set them free; Since both Men's Liberties, or a Setled or Hereditary Property an Estates do equally conduce to the Happiness and Propagation of Mankind, and the Good of that People, or Nation, wherein it is introduced. And I doubt not, but Pharaoh, tho' he was Lord of all the Lands of Egypt, by the Grant of the Egyptians, yet might lawfully have been Resisted by them, if he had gone to take away those Four Fifth parts of the profit of the Lands, which he had left thern free by his own Concession.

So that even in such Absolute Empires, the Monarchs have Power to Dispose of the Estates of the People, only as far as the Compact ▪ or Concession at first made by them or their Predecessors do allow: But it is also not much otherwise where the Subjects do not acknowledge their Estates as the Gift, or Benefit of the Supream Powers, and that may happen chiefly two ways, Either 1. When any Free People, under the Conduct of a Captain or Leader, Created by themselves, have Conquered any New Territory, and Habitation; or else, 2. When Diverse Fathers, or Masters of a Family, who had Estates of their own before have agreed for their Mutual Security, and the quiet Enjoyment of what they were already possess of, to joyn together into one Common-Wealth, under the Com­mand of one, or more Men, or else of others that will bring their Estates, and joyn themselves to such a Government already Constituted, and will Sub­iect themselves to this Supream Power, according to the Conditions already agreed on amongst them. A third Case may be, when an Hereditary Property in Land was Establisht before the Monarchy began, as in the Roman Common-Wealth, [Page 169] this Property was Establish't before the Government was changed from a Re­publick to a Monarchy, so that the People did not owe their Property to the Em­perors Grant, or Donation.

In the former case, if such a Free People Conquer a Country under the Con­duct of a Captain or Leader, tho', I grant, such a Country may be Assigned by him to all the People by Lot, or in Proportion to the greater Merit, or Service of his Fellow Adventurers, or Soldiers, (tho' it may seem that the Property of Particular Men, may have proceeded, not from their own Right, or Pos­session, but from the Assignment of their Chief Captain or Leader,) Yet are not the Estates which such particular Men enjoy, to be look't upon only, as the meer Grace, or Favour of such a Prince, since most of those who followed him in this Conquest, or Expedition, did it not, as Subjects, but as Volunteers, and without whose Assistance, he could never have Conquered at all: So that they have thereby acquired to themselves a certain Portion, or Share in the Land so Conquered, tho' for avoiding Dissentions, and Qu [...]rrels amongst them, it was left to the Disposal of this New Prince, as a publick Trustee, to Distribute to each person what share he should have. But in the other Case, when Fathers, or Masters of Families, before Free, and Possest of Hereditary Estates, do submit themselves to the Command of one Man Voluntarily, or by Election. Those Estates do much less depend upon the Will or Favour of that Prince. And therefore, if such a Prince should without their consents go about to take away their Property in their Estates, he might very Iustly be Resisted by them, since a quiet enjoyment of these in Peace, and Safety, was one of the chief rea­sons, that made them chuse him for their Prince, and was certainly one of the Original Compacts of the Government.

And that in Absolute Monarchies, where the Subjects were not Slaves, they look't upon themselves to have such a settled Property in their Persons, and Estates, by Compact, That Seneca boldly pronounced, Errat, siquis existimat sutum [...]sse ibi R [...]gem, ubi nihil à Regetutum est; Securitas Securitate mutua pa­ciscenda est. And Mr. Hobbs himself, as much a Friend as he was to the Ar­bitrary Power of Monarchs, and an Enemy to the Natural Rights of Subjects, yet is forced in his Leviathan to confess, that the Riches, Power, and Honour of a Monarch, arises only from the Riches, Strength, and Reputation of his Sub­jects, for no King can be Rich, Pag. 96. nor Glorious, nor Secure, whose Subjects are [...]her poor, or contemptible. Tho' how this Riches, and Strength of Sub­jects can consist with that Absolute Power which he gives his Sovereign over the Persons, and Estates of his Subjects, I cannot understand; since he will not allow of any Compacts, or Conditions between him and them. But that their Propriety may very well consist with the Power of the Prince; Seneca shews us; Iure Civili (says he) omni [...] R [...]gis sunt, & tamen illa quorum ad Regem pertinet universa pos­sessio in singulos Dominos descripta sunt, & unaquaeque res habet possessorem suum. Itaque dare Regi, & donum, & mancipium & pecuniam possumus, nec donare illi de suo dicimur. Ad Reges enim Potestas omnium pertinet, ad singulos Proprietas. And the Earl of Clarendon in his Survey of the Leviathan makes this excellent remark upon this Passage of Seneca: cap. 24. And that Prince who thinks his Power so Gre [...], that his Subj [...]cts have nothing to give him, will be very unhappy, if he hath evern n [...]ed of their Hands, or their Hearts. So that notwithstanding this Universal Power, or Supereminent Dominion of the Emperour over all things, which Seneca there supposes, yet, if he should [Page 170] have gone about to have Invaded all Men's Properties, and reduced all Men's Estates into the Publick Treasury, I doubt not but he would soon have had not only his own Legions, but the whole Empire about his Ears. And tho' I have heard that the French King, doth by his Ex [...]roitant Taxes, and Gabels raise more M [...]ney out of the Kingdom of France, and the Territories annexed to it, than the Ottoman Emperour doth out of that vast Empire (of which he hath the Sole Propriety of the Lands in himself) Yet if the French King should indeavour by the Power of his Standing Army to take away all Men's Hereditary Properties in their Estates, and make them all to be holden at Will, I doubt not, but he would not only be Opposed by his Subjects, and perhaps ruined in the Attempt; but also, if he should Succeed in it, would be so far from being the Richer, or more Powerful, that he would become the Poorer, and Weaker, when he had done: Since no Man would take the Pains to build, till, or improve their Estates, any more than they do in Turkey, when they were not sure [...] soon they might be turned out of them; or at least could hold them no longer, than for their Lives, or a few years. So prevalent a thing is this empty shadow, and bare Name of Property that is now left in France (being often charged with [...] to above half the value of the Estates) to encourage the People to beautifie, cultivate, and improve a Country abounding with all those Riches, that Nature, or Art can produce.

And to let you see, I am not at all partial, I think I may safely affirm the same of the Legislative Power in this Kingdom, so that, if it should happen (which tho' highly improbable, yet it is not impossible) that the Lords and Commons Assembled in Parliament should so far abuse the Trust reposed in them, as to give up all their Civil Properties in their Estates into the Kings F [...]ands, to be disposed of as he should think fit, and that the King should thereupon go about to turn all the People out of their Estates, I doubt not, but they might in that case resist the King if he went to do it by force, Notwithstanding this Act of Parliament, and my reason it, that a [...] Hereditary Property in Estates, being an Antient, if not more, than Parliament themselves in this Nation, must consequently be a Fundamental Law of the Govern­ment, and so cannot be altered by its Representatives. For tho' it be true, the People have given them a Power to dispose of what part of their Estates they should think [...], yet did they not make it absolute, to extend either to their Liberties (I mean in respect of Slavery) or their whole Properties in their Estates. And if the King may be resisted, if he invade them by his own Sole Authority, the reason would be the same why he might be also resisted, tho' back't by an Act of Parliament: Since the ta­ [...]ing away of Civil Property would prove as dist [...]uctive to the People [...] Liberties and Happiness in the one case, as in the other, and as great an abuse of the Trust reposed [...] them; that were designed to protect it.

I cannot except against your distinction between those Governments where a Property in Estates, did precede the Institution of the Government it sell; for there, I grant, that such a Property may be a Fundamental Law of the Govern­ment, but in those Monarchies that have begun by Conquest, under the Command of a King; or absolute Prince, over an Army of his own Subjects, in that case upon the Conquest of a Kingdom, or forreign Nation, not only the Prey, or Goods of the [...], but also their Estates were forfeited to the Conquerour, who had a Right either to retain them for himself, or else to distribute them as Rewards amongst his [...], and Soldiers: And that this is the Right of all Conquerors, whether Common-Wealth, or Monarchs, by the Law of Nations, and was exercised amongst the An­tient [Page 171] Greeks, and Romans, as well as other Nations, I referr you to your own Au­thors Grotius, and Pufendors. And therefore, since it appears from History, that most of the Kingdoms now in Europe, and particularly this of England, began from Conquest, under the Conduct of their first Kings, if then whatsoever was so Con­quered was acquired for them, and they alone had a Property in it, it will necessarily follow that all Estates which the Subjects of all sorts now enjoy, must have pro­ceeded from their Grants or Concessions; And hence it is, that not only in England but also in Scotland and France, they are all held either mediately, or immediately, of the King: as being at first all derived from him; and we read in the antient Laws of Scotland, that the King had the whole Property of the Country, till the Reign of Mal­colm Conmor, who, as we read in the Ancient Histories of that Country, granted all the Lands in Scotland to his Nobility, and Gentry, according to that old Maxim in their Law, Rex distribuit totam Toram Scotiae hominibus juis: And therefore if Hereditary Pro­perty in Estates were only from the Gift and Bounty of our Kings without any Funda­mental Contract between them, and their Subjects, as you suppose; I cannot see any reason (granting the worst that can happen, which is highly improbable) if the Kings of this, or of our Neighbouring Nations, should go about by force to destroy, and take away this Hereditary Property they now enjoy, That the People should have any Right to resist them; But that it would be not only Ingratitude, but Rebelli­on so to do. For tho' I own that Kings were guilty of Perjury in the sight of God if they did it, yet that being an [...]ffence only against God, the Subjects could have no more right to resist, than Sons in the State of Nature had to resist their Father, if he should go about to take away those Estates, which he had before bestowed upon them.

And as for what you say concerning the Roman Common-Wealth, I grant in­deed, that the Government of the People did there precede that of the Emperour, yet if you please to Remember, Monarchy was the first, and most Antient Government of that People. And I doubt not but all the Property the Romans had in their Estates, tho' they preceeded from Conquest of their Arms, yet it was wholly owing to the Grace and Bounty of their first Kings, and when upon the Ex [...]ulsion of Iarquin, the Supream Power became divided between the Senate and People, the Property of all the Lands that were Conquered devolved upon them, who often divided them to particular Private Men as they thought fit, tho' I confess the Not dividing of these Lands amongst the Common People, was afterwards the Cause of great Tumults, and Commotions amongst them; Yet notwithstanding the Senate and Nobility still maintained their Power, and to the last refused to make a Division of those Lands, they had formerly Conquered; So that the Roman Emperors succeeding in the Power of the Senate, and People, they were likewise restored, as it were ex pos [...]liminio, to the Prerogatives of the first Kings, and consequently, as Seneca himself confesses in the place you have quoted, tho' the particular Propriety of Estates was in Private Men, yet you see he grants the Vniversal Possession, or Dominion of them was in the King, or Emperor, from whom they were Originally derived.

I would not be thought to speak thus, as if I were an Enemy to Mens Liberties, and Properties, or that I either Fear, or desire any Change in them, from what we now enjoy, but since I think it a thing Morally Impossible to alter them, and that there­fore no King will be so ill advised, as to go about to Seize them into his own hands; but only by way of discourse, supposing the worst that can happen, I think we are not only Obliged in Conscience, but also that it were much better for the Common Peace that the Ring should take all we have, than that we should involve the Nati­on in Civill War, and confusion, and our Consciences under the Guilt of a Mortal Sin, by such Resistance, and Rebellion.

I am very sorry to see, that by your Principles all the Free Nations of Eu­rope[?] lye at the Mercy of any Prince to be made as arrand slaves as any are in Turkey, when ever their Monarch please, or that they think that they can make more of their People by taking away their Estates and Liberties, than by let [...]ing them enjoy them, which would render Civil Property in all Kingdoms like private Estates, which every Man may let to his Tenants a [...] VVill, upon a Rack Rent, or for Years, or Lives as they shall think fit. But I think I may very well differ from you in both your Pro­positions: For, omitting any farther discourse of th [...]se Eastern Monarchies, where I grant the People are little better than Slaves; Yet I think I can easily prove, out of the Ancient Histories of those Kingdoms that are now in Europe, that tho' most of them began by Conquest, yet was it not under the Conduct of Absolute Monarchs, but under such Princes, or Leaders, whose followers (as I said before at our last meeting,) were not properly Subjects nor Mercenaries, but Volunteers, under those that Com­manded them. And therefore would never have gone out of their own Countries, but to advantage themselves, and to enjoy those Priviledges, which their Country-men had at home, of which, Liberty in their Persons, and Property in their Estates, were the Chief; and this is apparent in the French Nation, who whatever their Conditi­on may be now, yet Anciently called themselves Francs ▪ in opposition to that Ser­vitude, which they supposed their Neighbouring Nations amongst the Germans were in to the Romans at that time: And tho' I grant, that these Nations of the Goths, Van­dals, Francs and Saxons from whom most of the Kingdoms in Europe are now deri­ved, might Vest, or intrust the Lands of the Countreys they had Conquered, in him whom they had made their King, yet still it was with this Trust, that retaining a suf­ficient part to sustain the Royal Dignity, they should distribute the rest to all their Officers, and Soldiers, according to each man's Valour, or Merit; And if they had refu­sed to have done this, can any Man believe, that so free a People, as the Antient Hi­stories relate them to have been, would ever have suffered it, without pulling down those Kings they had set up, which was then very common among them for much slighter occasions? And to go no higher than William (whom you call the Conque­rour) can any Man believe, that if he had retained all the Lands of England to himself, not only his own Norman Lords and Souldiers, but those of other Forreign Na­tions, who assisted him in this Expedition, would ever have suffered him to have reigned in quiet over them, if instead of a Limited King, he had set himself up for an absolute Monarch, and have granted them no Estates but at his Will, and Pleasure: which would have reduced the Conquerour, and the Conquered to the same condition ▪ But as for your Example of Malcolm Canmor, I cannot believe that the Kings of Scotland were so lately as his Reign possessed of the whole Hereditary Property of all the Lands in that Kingdom, so as that no Man had any setled Interest in them before that time, and therefore I must beg your pardon, if I think this Passage in their Historians to be very suspicious, if not false: But I speak this only by the by, and I reserve what I have more to say on this Head, for another time, wherein, I doubt not but to be able to shew you, as evidently as can be done after so many Ages, that all the Kingdoms in Europe which are descended from the Gothick or Ger­man Nations commenced at first from Compact, with their first Kings, and have thereby an unalterable Right, in their Lives, Liberties, and Estates; And if so, have likewise Right to defend them, if generally, and Vniversally invaded by their Princes.

But granting for the present, what you have asserted to be true, that all this Pro­perty, which is now in Europe, proceeded wholly from the Grants, and Concessions of Princes; yet will it not follow, that by the Law of Nature, or Nations, if any King [Page 173] should go about generally, or at once to invade the Liberties, and Properties of their People, they might not Lawfully be re [...]isted, for, as I said before, even a sl [...]ve when Manumitted by his Patron, may Lawfully d [...]fend his Liberty against him, if he goeth about to take it away, and reduce him again into slavery; So likewise in the same State of Nature▪ if a Prince freely grant his Subjects a setled and Hereditary Property in their Estates, they have likewise a Right to defend them, against him, or any other that would endeavour by force to take them away; For he that in this State grants any thing to another, grants him likewise a Right to Keep it, whether the Donor will, or not, or else it were indeed [...], For he, that in the State of Nature grants another Man any thing to be possessed, or enjoyed only as long as he himself, or his Heirs, shall think fit, doth in effect grant him as good as nothing; since he may alter his mind to morrow and demand it again, and take it away the very next day. So that if you will grant, that Subjects have such a Right to their Estates, as that the Prince cannot without manifest violence, or in­justice take them away, you must likewise grant, that they have also a Right to defend them.

But I suppose you will not deny that Right, that all Men have to their Civil Properties in all our European Kingdoms,T.T. G. c. 19. and Common-Wealths, tho' never so absolute: But your Objection against the sub­jects defending it by force, if it be invaded, is, that it may cause Rebellion, and Con­fusion; I grant indeed, it may sometimes occasion Civil Wars, or Intestine Commotions, if the People finding their Liberties and Properties notoriously invaded, shall op­pose the unjust violence of those who, contrary to the trust reposed in them, do thus vio­lently invade them: therefore, (forsooth) if this Doctrine be allowed, it may prove destructive to the Peace of Kingdoms, and Common Wealths and Consequently to the good, and happiness of Mankind: But methinks you might as well have ar­gued, that honest Men might not resist Robbers or Pirates, because it may occasion Disorder, and Bloodshed; If any mischief come in such cases, sure it is not to be char­ged upon him, who defends his own Right, but on him that invades anothers. If the Innocent honest Man must quit all he hath for quietness sake to him who will lay Violent Hands upon it, I desire it may be considered, what a kind of Peace there will be in the World, which would consist only in Violence, and Rapi [...], and which would be maintained only for the benefit of Publick Robbers, and Oppressors.

But pray, do you make no difference between a knot of Thieves and Rob­bers and the Civil Government of a Monarch, or Common-VVealth, which I suppose may very well be maintain'd without any Hereditary Property in Lands as you have granted? And it were much better in my mind to forego these outward things, than resist the Civil Government which is the Ordinance of God, as you your self ac­knowledge.

I think the best way to end this controversy, will be, to desire you to give a Definition of Civil Government, that we may know what we mean by it, therefore, pray, will you give me an easy and plain Definition of it.

VVell Sir, I shall comply with your desires; I then take Civil Government to be an Authority conferred by God, on one, or more Persons, to make Laws for the benefit, and Protection of the Subjects, and to inflict such Punishments for their Transgression, as they shall think fit, and by the Subjects Obedience, and Assistance to protect them against Forreign Enemies, and also to appoint what share of Civil Property each Person in that Common-Wealth shall enjoy.

Sir, Tho' your Definition be somewhat lame, yet I am pretty well content­ed [Page 471] with it, only I will shew you by and by wherein it is deficient: The first and therefore chiefest Branch, or Office of Civil Magistrate [...], [...], to make Laws for the Benefit, and Protection of the Subjects: Is it then a Branch of this Power, to send Souldiers, or Dragoons, to take away their Liberties, Lives or Estates▪ This sure is directly contrary to their Duty, and that Trust which God hath conferred upon them. Let us go on to the next Branch: The inflection of Punishments for the transgr [...]ssion of such Laws; Is this a part of Civil Government not only to send their Souldiers, and other Officers to take away their Subjects Lives and Estates, but also to let the most Capital Offenders or Robbers pass unpunish'd when they have done; if you maintain these to be the Prerogatives of Civil Government, or that to be Civil Government where these things are commonly practised, you may, even with Mr. Hobbs set the great Levi­athan Free from all obligation to his Subjects, any further than he shall think fit for his own interest, and make them always in a State of Nature, that is, (as he sup­poses) of War with them, and then pray tell me, whether such a State, can be the Ordinance of God, or not? But to come to the last Branch of your Definition (and in which alone I think it deficient) the appointing what share of Property each per­son in that Common-Wealth shall enjoy; Tho' I grant it may be the Prero­gative of Civil Governments to appoint this at first, Yet are they likewise ob­liged to maintain this Property when it is once Instituted; and the People have as much Right to it as any King can have to his Crown, viz. the Civil Law of that Country, or Consent of the whole Nation: And therefore, if, according to King Iames the First his Rule, a King of a Setled, (or limited) Kingdom will break all the Laws thereof, and Degenerate into a Tyrant; unless such Tyrant be the Ordinance of God, he may certainly be so far Opposed, for what can Pirates, or Robbers do more than his Officers, and Guards by his Commission? The for­mer can but Murder Men, Ravish their Wives, burn their Houses, and take away their Estates; and if the latter may do so too, pray where is the Diffe­rence? Or what satisfaction is it to me, that I am Ruined by one Man having the King's Commission, or by another that Ruins me without it? Since I am sure, God hath given the one no more Authority to do it, than the other; if then this unlimited Power be neither conferred by God, nor Man upon the Civil Magistrates, I would fain know any Reason, why Thieves, and Pirates may be Resisted, but their Instruments may not, that do the same things; And why, when Civil Authority exceeds its utmost Bounds, the State of Nature, or Self-defence, may not take place; Since the Civil Government is as much Dissolved by such Violent Actions, as if a Forreign Enemy had broke in, and Conquered the Country?

But to Answer your Query, whether I think a Civil Government may not be, where there is no Setled Property in Estates, and whether the Eastern Monar­chies are not Civil Governments? To this I answer, that I have Aristotle on my Side, who, not without Reason Affirms, that the Government of one Man, where there is no Civil Property, and where all Men are Slaves, is not Civil Government, but that of a Master of a Great Family over his Slaves: And tho' I grant, that they may have some shew of Civil Government among them, as in a Plantation, where one of the Slaves may complain to the Master against another for any Injury or Wrong done him, yet is not this Property Civil Government any more than that of the Master of a Separate Family who looks upon himself as Absolute Lord over all his Slaves, and they allowed him by God, only for his Benefit, and Grandeur, and not he instituted, (as all Civil Powers are) for the Good, and Preservation of the Subjects.

But methinks you seem herein to Condemn the Government of Gods own People the Iews, which no doubt was an Absolute Monarchy; And that re­strained by no Laws, except what God had expresly prescribed them; And yet you see notwithstanding Samuel told them, that their Kings should take away their Fields, and their Vineyards, and give them to his Servants, and take their Sons and Daughters to be his Servants, or Slaves; Yet God leaves them no Power to Resist them, for so doing: But all the Remedy left them,1 Sam. 8.18. is, that they should Cry out in that day, because of the King which they had chosen, and the Lord would not hear them, that is, there was no Remedy left them but Patience.

I have already given you my Sense of that Place, and I shall speak more particularly to it, when you shall come to those Texts of Scripture, that you said you would produce for Absolute Subj [...]ction, and Non-Resistance: And therefore at present: I shall only here shew you what the Earl of Clarendon in the above mentioned Survey of the Leviathan, cap. 19. hath very prudently as well as honestly said concerning this Text:pag. 74.77. ‘They who will deduce the extent of the absolute and illimited Power of Kings, from that Declaration by Samuel, which indeed, seems to leave neither Property nor Liberty to their Subjects, and could be only intended by Samuel to terrifie them from that Mutinous, and Seditious Clamor; as it hath no Foundation from any other part of Scripture, nor was ever practi­sed, or exercised by any Good King, who succeeded over them, and was blessed, and approved by God. So when those State Empiricks (of what de­gree, or Quality soever) will take upon them to prescribe a new Dyet, and Exercise to Soveraign Princes, and invite them to assume new Powers, and Prerogatives over the People, by the Precepts, Warrants, and Prescriptions of the Scriptures: they should not presume to make the Sacred Writ Subject to their own private Fancies.’ So likewise in a Leaf or two before, he speaks much to the same Purpose. ‘That what Samuel had said was rather to terrifie them, from pursuing their foolish Demands, than to Constitute such a Prerogative as the Kings should use,pag. 74. whom God would ap­point to go in and out before them; which methinks is very ma­nifest, in that the worst Kings that ever reigned over them, never challen­ged, or assumed those Prerogatives Nor did the People conceive themselves liable to those impositions; as appears by the application they made to Reho­boam upon the Death of Solomon, that he would abate some of that Rigor his Father had exercised towards them, the rough Rejection o [...] which request, contrary to the Advice of his Wi [...]est Counsellours, cost him the greater part of his Dominions: And when Rehoboam would by Arms have reduc'd them to Obedience, God would not suffer him, because he had been in the fault himself.’ From whence you may conclude, that this Great Man did not think all Resistance unlawful, in Case of General, and Intolerable Oppressi­ons.

I shall give you my Opinion farther, of what you have now said, when you have told me more plainly in what Cases you allow Resistance of the Supream Powers, and in what not. For till you have been more clear in this matter, I cannot tell what Judgment to make of your Tenets.

I thank you for putting me upon so fair a Method, And therefore [Page 176] that you may not mistake me, and suppose that I would go about to allow Subjects to Resist, and take up Arms against the Supream Power upon any less Occasion than an Absolu [...] Necessity, and apparent Danger of being Destroyed, and Ruined in their Lives, Liberties, and Estates; first therefore, considering that the Corruption of Humane Nature is such, that no sort of Government whatsoever can continue long, without some Inconveniences, and Mischiefs, to particular Men, not that any Man either Prince, or [...]ubject was ever Master of such perfect Wisdom, and Goodness, as always to peform his Duty so exactly, as never to Offend; I do in the first place, grant, that it would be both Un­dut [...]ful ▪ as well as Unjust for Subjects to Rebell a [...]ainst their Prince for his Per­sonal Failings, or Vices; Undutiful, Since the Prince may be often times an ill Man in his private Capacity, and yet a good Governour, in respect of the Pub­lick; and also Unjust, since neither do we our selves exactly perform our Duties toward the Supream Powers (or to one another) as we ought: And therefore it is highly reasonable for Subjects to endure▪ and pass by the personal Faults or Failings of Princes, in consi [...]eration of that Protection, and Security, in their Lives, and Fortunes, which they do enjoy under them▪ since it hath been found by experience with how great a Slaughter of People, and how great a confusion, and danger of the whole Common-Wealth, Evil Princes have been resisted, or turn'd out of their Thrones: And therefore I grant the Private Injuries of Princes are to be past over, in consideration of that great Charge they undergo, and for those greater Benefits we receive from their Go­vernment, but chiefly for the publick Peace of the Common Wealth, or Ci­vil Society; And therefore I own it is very well said by that Master in Politicks, Tacitus, That the ill Humours or Dispositions of Kings, are to be born withal, and that often Mutations of Governments are of dangerous Consequence. And he wisely introduces Ceriales speaking to this purpose to the Rebellious Treveri: That they ought to bear with the Luxury and Avarice of Rulers, as they do with immoderate showers, and other unnatural Evils, since there will be Vices whilst there are Men, yet neither are these continual, but are often recompensed by the Intervention of bet­ter.

But I will now particularize those Cases wherein I do absolutely disallow, and disclaim all Resistance in Subjects against the Supream Powers.

1. I deny all Resistance to Subjects against their Princes, or Supream Magi­strates, in all such Actions, or Prerogatives which are absolutely necessary to the Exercise of their Supream Power, viz. of Protecting and Defending their Peo­ple, as also against those who are Commission'd by them for the Execution of such Powers.

2. I Condemn all Rebellion against Princes, or States, meerly on the Score of Religion, or because they are not of the Religion of their People, or Subjects, if there be no positive Law Extant, Disabling or Forbidding Princes, or other Magistrates of different Religions than that of their People, from being admit­ted to the Throne, or Government.

3. I look upon it as Rebellion in the People, Tumultuously to rise up in Arms to alter, or reform the Religion of the Nation, or Kingdom already established by Law, without the Consent of the Legislators.

4. I Disclaim all Resistance, or Self-defence in Subjects, upon the account that the free, or publick Exercise of that Religion they profess, is not al­lowed them by the Legislative Power of the Kingdom, or Nation, provided [Page 177] that such Supream Powers do not forbid, or hinder the People professing such a different Religion, to Sell, or Transport their Estates, and Persons into any other Country where they please.

5. I Deny Resistance to Subjects against their Princes or Governours upon Pretence of any Personal Vices, as because they are wicked, Atheisti [...]al, Cruel, Lustful, or Debauched, provided they generally Protect their Subjects in their Lives, Liberties, and Properties.

6. I Deny this Right of Resistance to any particular person less than the wh [...]le Body, or Major part of the People, or at least such a considerable Portion of a Nation, as are able, when Assaulted, or Oppressed in their Lives, Liberties, or Estates to constitute a distinct, and entire Kingdom, or Common-Wealth of themselves.

7. I look upon it as Wicked, and Rebellious for any private Subjects to Assassinate, Murder or Imprison their Monarch, or other Supream Governour, since no private Person whatever ought to lay Violent Hands upon his Prince, whose person ought to be Sacred, and in no wise to be Violated, unless he put off the Character of a Prince, and Actually make War upon his People. But if in this Case, he happen to be Resisted, and Perish in the Attempt, he falls not as a Prince, but as a Common Enemy, by breaking the Original Compact with his Peo­ple; and entring into a State of War against them: As a Father who unjustly makes War upon his Children, may be, (as I have already proved at our first conference) Resisted by them in the State of Nature.

But as for all other Grievances, or Oppressions, if they are of that Nature as may Ruine the whole Common-Wealth, yet not suddenly, but after some time, and often Repeated, I cannot allow such Grievances, or Oppressions, as a Sufficient Cause of Resistance; For as on the one hand, there is no Incon­venience so small, but in process of time it may turn to the Ruine of the Com­mon-Wealth, if it be often Repeated, and excessively Multiplie [...]; so on the other side, length of time produces so great Changes, that the Nature of these Encroachments, or Injuries are not sufficient to justifie Resistance, and the Breach of that Peace and Unity in a Common Wealth, which must necessarily follow by entering into a State of War.

To conclude, I do not in any Case whatever allow of Resistance; but only in these three necessary ones: When the Lives, Liberties, or Estates of the whole People, of the greatest part of them, are either actually Invaded, or else taken away, and when they are Reduced into so bad a Condition, that a State of War is to be preferred before such a Peace; a [...]d when the End of Civil Go­vernment being no longer to be obtained by it, the Common-Wealth may be look't upon as Dissolved.

Tho' you have been pretty long in treating of this Matter, yet I did not think it Tedious, since I confess you have given me honestly enough, (and so far I agree with you) all those Cases wherein you say it is U [...]law­ful for Subjects to take up Arms, or Resist the Supream Powers: But I wonder you have not added one Case more, which Diverse Authors, that are high enough against Non-Resistance, in other things, do yet allow to be a sufficie [...]s Cause of taking up Arms, and Resisting their Prince; And that is, when he Actually hath, or goeth about to Alie [...]ate, or make over his Dominion and Subjects to some Forreign Prince, or State.

I am not ignorant of what you say, but I thought it not worth speak­ing [Page 178] ot, because in absolute Monarchies, (which we are now treating of;) if such Kingdoms are Patrimonial, and that the Monarch hath such an absolute Dominion over his Subjects, as neither to let them enjoy any Liberty in their Persons, nor Properties in their Estates, but at his Pleasure; I cannot see any reason, why such a Prince may not alienate his Dominion, over such a Kingdom, and People, as well as any private-Man, may his Property in his Estate: Nor have the People any Cause to be concerned at it, since they can then likewise be but Slaves, and enjoy nothing but at their Princes Pleasure, as they did before; so that whether He, or a Stranger govern them▪ it is all one as to their Circumstances; But yet under such Governments, as are absolute, where the People enjoy their personal Lib rites, and Properties in their Estates, the Case may be much otherwise; since they may not be sure, that the Foreign Prince, to whom their own Monarch, or other Supream Powers hath assigned them, will maintain their Liberties, and Properties as the former did: And therefore not being Slaves before, they cannot be Alienated without their own Consents, and consequently they may take up Arms, and defend themselves if they are able; [...]nle [...]s the Prince, or State to whom they are so Alienated will give them the like assurance to preserve their Lives, Liberties, and Properties, as their former Governours did; and therefore I do conceive, the People of the Islands of Cyprus, and Candy, might very well have refused to become Sub­jects to the Grand Seignior, in case the Venetians should have Sold, or Alien' [...] their Dominion over them, before he had actually conquer'd them. But in Li­mited, or Hereditary Kingdoms, which are so by their fundamental Constitution, I suppose, the Prince cannot upon any account whatsoever, make over his Do­minions, to a Foreign Prince without the consent of his People, and next Heir: And therefore, (granting the Story to be true;) I doubt not but the People of this Kingdom might very well have opposed King Iohn, if he had gone about to have subjected it, to the Dominion of the Emperour of Morocco, up­on Condition that he would Assist him with an Army of Moors to subdue h [...]s Barons, and Nobility then in Arms against him.

I confess it is not worth while to dispute about that which so seldom happens, and is indeed almost impossible to be put in practice, and therefore I shall not much oppose you in what you have said upon this Case; yet, that I may be as good as my word, and give you my Judgment concerning what you have lately said, I must freely tell you, that as it may happen, that a Prince, or State may sometimes abuse their Power, so as to take away the Li­berties, and Estates of all their Subjects, as you have set forth, (and which I confess is a very great mischief) yet upon second thoughts, I think it were much better that this Inconvenience should be suffered, rather than the work mischief of leaving Subjects to be the sole Iudges, when their Liberties, and E­states are invaded, or like to be taken away; nay, every private Subject would be first Iudge of it, or else the whole People could never come to pass their Iudgment upon it, which would leave too great a latitude for [...]urbulent, and Rebellious Spirits to make disturbances in Kingdoms, and Commonwealths: especially if there be any small Grievances, on the Subjects, especially too, [...] they touch at those things they account their Hereditary Liberties, and Properties: these, (tho' never so small) if the People are suffered to be their own Iudges (as you make them to be in their own Case) will soon be aggravated, and blown up to intolerable Oppressions of, and Invasions upon their Liberties and [Page 179] Properties, when indeed they are not: This is a pernitious Doctrine, for it will be a perpetual Cause of Quarrels, Civil Wars, and Rebellions, which would turn all Commonwealths, tho never so well Constituted, into Anarchy, and Confusion. So that as you have stated this Question, you have broach­ed a Principle highly destructive to all Civil Government; for if All, or Any of the People, may Resist, or Rebel, (call it what you please) when­ever they think themselves oppressed in their Liberties and [...] ­s [...]ates,L. O. this is for them only to be obedient, when they think themselves well governed; but stubborn, and Rebellious when they believe they are not, which would be to make all Government Precarious and Condi­tional, and the People not only Parties but Iudges, and Executioners too in their own Case; how far these Conditions are observed on the Governours part, and then the Regularity, or Irregularity of the Administration will no longer be the Question, but the Validity of the Power to Command ▪ And there wants no more to dissolve such a Government, than for Dick, or Tom, and every Rascal of the Mobile to say, This or That, is destructive to the Peoples Liber­ties, and Properties, and therefore an insupportable grievance, and oppression. And if you will once allow any number of the People, tho' never so many, to Iudge This, or That Law, or Order of the Government, not to be for their Good, and that they may likewise Resist, and Right themselves by Arms, when ever they thus fancy, they will quickly come to say, that the Government it self is not for their good neither; and upon this ground all the Rebellions [...]a [...] ­sed by an Incensed, and mistaken Multitude against the Government in all Ages, may easily be justified, and Wa [...] ▪ Tyler, and Mass [...]an [...]llo shall be so far from being Rebels, that they may pass in future Ages for Heroes, and Noble Assertors of the Peoples Liberties; and I hope you will believe, I do not speak this out of any liking, or Approbation of Tyranny, or that I desire, that Princes should stretch their Power to the utmost, to Invade their Subjects Liberties, or Estates; but only to let you see, how far your Principles may serve the Pretences of wicked Men to set whole Kingdoms together by the Ears, whenever they find the People so far discontented with the Government, as to believe their Malicious and wicked Insinuations; of all which those long, and cruel, Civil Wars, and Rebellions which for several Years tormented, and almost ru­ined these three Kingdoms, are too late, and sad Examples.

I confess Sir, you have made a very Pathetick speech, and exerted, I suppose the utmost Strength of your reason and Eloquence on this Subject, for you have made the Consequences of this Principle, viz. (That the People may judge when their Liberties, and Properties are invaded) to seem very dreadful, but after all, it is no more than what you have urged in great part already, and the main Strength of your Argument lyes here, that if the People should take upon them but once to judge, when they were notoriously injured, or op­press't, and thereupon take Arms, to right themselves; they would soon make bold to put this Power into use and Practice, when they had no occasi­on for it at all, or at least not sufficient to make any open Insult. But to shew you, that there is no need, of such an infallible Iudge, as you suppose, to be necessary in a Commonwealth any more than there is in the Church; pray, tell me, Sir, would it not have been very convenient, if Christ had appointed, an Infallible Iudge, (be it the Pope, or General Counsel, or both together, [...] to decide all Controversies in Religion, and to whose Judgment all People ought to submit?

I cannot deny, but it would have been a very ready way to end all Disputes about Religion, but since God hath not thought fit to appoint any such Iudge, it were very great Presumption in us to set up one to please our humour, since such a one could have no Infallibility, unless it were given him from above.

You Judge very well; and doth it not therefore follow, that since there is no such infallible Judge, all Men ought to Iudge for themselves of the Truth of their Religion, and also in the Christian Religion, what Doctrines are agreeable to the Word of God, and what not, and yet you see that from the ill use of this Liberty have sprung all the Different Sects, and Heresies in the World? Does it therefore follow, that Men must not make use of this Liber­ty, because they may abuse it? So likewise, must Subjects judge in no Case what­soever, when the Supream Power Tyrannizes over them, beyond what they are able to bear? and must they never resist, or endeavour to cast off this in­supportable Yoak, because they may happen one time or other to be wanton, and believe themselves oppress't when indeed they are not?

I grant your Parallel would have some what in it, were the Conse­quences of every Mans judging for himself in Matters of Religion, as fatal to the Peace, and Happiness of Mankind, as your Doctrine of the Subjects judging, when it is fit for them to resist the Supream Powers; for I do not at all de­bar them from the Right of Iudging, when they are oppress't, or ill used by them, for that may very well consist with the Publick Peace, but I utterly dis­allow all manner of Resistance by Force, because it tends, not only to dissolve all Civil Government, but to disturb the Common Peace, and safety of Man­kind.

Notwithstanding your Distinction, the Parallel with hold in both Cases, for are not differences in Religion as fatal to the Peace, and Unity of the Church, as the Subjects judging, when they are oppress't, and thereupon taking up de­fensive Arms, can be to that of a Civil State? And do not more Wars, and Quarrels arise about Mens differences in Religion, than from any other Cause you can Name? So that if the Peace of the Church were a sufficient Cause for supposing a certain, or Infallible Iudge in Religion, there would be the same Reason to suppose it in Civil Matters too. And therefore your Argument, from the abuse of this Liberty of the Subjects judging, when they may resist, is of no more force in one Case, than the other; for I grant it may so hap­pen in a Civil State, as well as in an Ecclesiastical, that the Subjects may rise up, and resist their Civil, as well as Spiritual Governours, without any just Cause: doth it therefore follow, that God hath wholly delivered up Mankind to the domineering humours of Men in Power, let them abuse it never so grosly? And therefore we must not be wiser than God Almighty himself, and when he hath not appointed any certain, and Infallible Iudges either in Civil or Spi­ritual matters without any Contradiction, or Resistance, we ought not to suppose a necessity of such Judges, meerly because of some Inconveniences, which may perhaps often happen from the abuse of that Christian Liberty he hath given us. For then I doubt you will find the Remedy would be much worse than the Disease, as if to avoid Heresies, we should set up the Pope for an Infallible Iudge. So would it be likewise if to avoid Civil Wars, and Rebel­lions [Page 181] we should set up the Supream Magistrate (as Mr. Hobbs hath done) for a certain, and Irresistible Iudge of whatsoever Means are necessary for the Peo­ple's Quiet and Preservation, since I have already proved, that an Insupportable Tyranny is not Civil Government, and that the Supream Powers can no more alter the Nature of things, but their own Laws, or Edicts, than they can or­dain Poyson to be used, in stead of wholesom Food, by the Peo­ple.

I confess what you have now said, carries some weight with it, and my own Carnal Reason doth very much incline me to your Opinion, were it not for two things, the one (as I said) is the Horrid Rebellions, that have, and may again arise in these Kingdoms from this Principle; which hath made God so strictly forbid, all Resistance of the Higher Powers, upon any account what­soever; And therefore you are much mistaken, when you assert, that Resistance, tho' for Self defence, is one of the Liberties, that God hath left us; since cer­tainly he would never so severely have forbidden it, but that he not only knew how prone Men's Corrupt Natures were to Rebellion, but also foresaw the fatal Consequence of it.

If God's Commands in Scripture be the greatest Argument, you have against all Resistance whatever, I doubt not but to shew you, (when We come to it,) that you as well as others are mistaken in that Strict Interpretation of those places of Scripture; and as for the Evil Consequences you suppose may fol­low from this Doctrine, I doubt not likewise but to convince you, that much worse will follow from the Irresistible Tyranny of the Supream Powers, than ever have happen'd from the Dreadfullest Rebellions. And therefore I desire you to take Notice, that what I have now said, is not out of any design to Iustifie so Horrid a Crime, as I grant Rebellion to be, or to incite Subjects to be Guilty of it; but only to hinder Civil Government from being destroyed, and Man­kind from being made Miserable.

For I have first Asserted, that no Resistance whatever is to be made in Abso­lute Governments; but in those Cases in which the main Ends of Civil Govern­ment are Visibly destroyed, or so near it, that there is no other means left but Resistance to prevent it. And then when things are once brought to this Pass, it is not the People, that make this War, but the Governours, who by their Ty­ranny have brought the Common-Wealth into this Anarchy, and Confusion you so m [...]ch Dread; so that it is not the People, but they that are the Aggres­sors.

And as for the ill use that may be made of this Doctrine, to stir up the Peo­ple to Rebellion, when they have no just, or sufficient Provocation to Re [...]st. This will not prove of that Dangerous Consequence, you imagine if you will but consider, that I do not allow this Resistance in any Case; but when the Vi­olence, or Oppression of the Governors is so Evident, and Insupportable to all the People, that groan under it, that no indifferent Man in his Senses, will be able to deny it; for as long as there remains, any Disputableness whether, or no the People are sufficiently Opprest ▪ in their Liberties, or Estates, the Trust Reposed in the Supream Magistrates makes them the Sole Iudges of the Necessity of such Exorbitant Actions, as being Intrusted by the People as Men supposed, to be both Wise, and Good, and themselves Ignorant in Diverse Cases of the true means of their own Preservation, and the Supream Powers remain the Sole Iudges, as long as the Case is Doubtful, or Uncertain.

[Page 182]But since you have already acknowledged, that the People might Iudge (if such a Case should happen) whether the Prince, or other Supream Magistrate makes Actual War upon them, I would very fain know, why the People can­not as plainly distinguish when he sends his Guards, or Dragoons to take away their Lives and Liberties, or to turn them out of their Estates: And [...] this be done, and the Tyranny so evident, and general, and insupportable, that it is past all question I grant that the People ought to have Patience, and rather suffer many Oppressions, and Hardships, than put themselves into a State of War. So that I think it is Morally impossible, that the People can be mistaken in [...] evi­dent a Case: Nor I believe can you scarce shew me one Example, either out of Antient or Modern History, of any whole Nation, or People, or the Major part of them, that did ever rise in Arms to cast off either a Foreign, or Do­mestick Yoke, which pressed too hard upon them; but when they had the most unavoidable, and justest causes so to do. And I believe I can shew you Ten Examples out of Histories, (if the Question were to be decided by them) for one you can shew me to the Contrary. 'Tis true, some private Men may sometimes make Disturbances, or Rebellions; but it is commonly to their own Iust Ruine, and Perdition; for, till the Mischief be grown General, and the Violence of the Rulers become Evident, and their Attempts to Destroy, or make Slaves of them, are most sensible to all, or the greatest part of the People; they are commonly more a great deal disposed to Suffer, than to Right themselves by Resistance, well knowing the Mischiefs of War, and how Destructive it will prove, not only to their Lives, but to the Welfare of their Families and Posterities, as well as Private Concerns. So that the Example of some particu­lar Injustice, Oppression, nay, or Absolute Ruine of here and there an Unfor­tunate person, moves them not. But if once they find their Lives, Liberties, and Estates Universally Assaulted, and about to be taken away, who is to be blamed for it: The Magistrate, or the People? for the former might have avoided it if they had pleased, either by not urging them to that Extremity at all, or at least Redressing those Grievances, and Oppressions before they be­came so General, and Insupportable, as not to be any longer endured.

So that, tho' I grant, the Ambition, or Turbulency of private Men have sometimes caused great Disorders in Common-Wealths, and Factions have been fa­tal to States, and Kingdoms, Yet whether this Mischief hath oftner begun from the People's Wantonness; and desire to cast off the Lawful Authority of their Rulers, or from the Rulers Insolence, and Endeavours to get, and Exercise a Tyrannical Arbitrary Power over their People, that is, whether Oppression, or Disobedience gave the first Rise to the Disorder, I leave it (as I said) to Impar­tial History, to Determine.

But this I am sure of, whoever (either Ruler, or Subject) goes about by force to Invade the Rights of either Prince, or People, and lays a Foundation for over­turning the Original Constitution, and Frame of any Civil Government, he is Guilty of the greatest Crime, I think a Man is capable of, being to Answer for all those Mischiefs, Bloudshed, Rapine, and Desolations which the breaking to pieces of Governments does bring on a Country▪ And he who doth it is justly to be esteemed a Common Enemy, and is to be treated accordingly.

But as for the Instances you give of Wa [...] Tyler, and Massianello, I grant indeed it may so happen, that a Great part of the Common People, or Rabble may [Page 183] sometimes upon sudden, or false Apprehensions, occasioned by some Real Grievances or Oppressions, such as are great Taxes, or Gabels imposed by the State, take up Arms, and Rebell against the Supream Powers; Yet these Ex­amples do not reach the Question in Hand, these Insurections, or Rebellions you mention being of a much less number, than the whole People, or the Major part of them, and in which I still include the Nobility and Gentry, and other Land-holders, as the most considerable part. And so those Insurrections were in no wise Iustifiable, especially in such a Government as ours, where no Man can be Taxed but by his own Consent included in his Representatives, whereas all these Rebellions were chiefly (if not altogether) made by the meaner sort, or Scum of the People, of one, or a few Countries, whom I can never allow to make Disturbances, since they, having very little to lose, ought in all Ci­vil Governments whatsoever, to be directed and Governed by those, in whom the Ballance of the Government in Lands, and other Riches doth reside and on whom they chiefly depend for their Protection and Subsistance, and consequent­ly ought to make no Alterations in the State without their consent, and Appro­bation.

But as for your other Instance of the Wars raised in these Three Kingdoms, against King Charles the First, upon the Pretence of our Religion, Liberties, and Properties being Invaded, it is not proper to be Treated of in this place: Since we are now Discoursing of the Power of Princes, and the Right of Sub­jects under Absolute, and not limited Monarchies; And I grant that some Re­sistance may be Rebellion, under Absolute Monarchies which would not be so under limited ones: Yet I do still suppose that it may be Lawful under such li­mited Monarchy for the People to take up Arms, and make Resistance in defence of those Iust Liberties, and Priviledges which they Lawfully enjoy either by the Original Constitution of the Government, or by Acts of Grace, or Conces­sion of the Prince; but this requires a more large, and accurate Discourse which at another time, I am ready to give you. Therefore granting at pre­sent, that those Wars were down Right Rebellion against the King, and also that they were made under Pretence of the Principle I now assert, yet doth it not at all overthrow the Iustice of that Cause, which I now maintain; since (as I have already more than once intimated) the abuse that may be sometimes made of a Natural Right, by some Wicked, Factious, or Hypocritical Men ought not in the least to preju [...]ice the Exercise of that Right to all the rest of Man­kind; who may lye under a Real Necessity of making use of it.

To conclude, if the People may nev [...]r be trusted to Iudge when their Li­berties and Properties are actually Invaded, because they may happen one time or other to be mistaken, and so enter into a State of War without cause to the Destruction of Mankind, this Argument would serve as well against all Princes, and Common-Wealths, who, being in the State of Nature with each other, should never make War for any Cause or Provocation, how great soever, because being Iudges and Executioners too in their own Case, they may more easily happen to be mistaken, I suppose you your self will grant, that one, or a few Men are more apt to be in an Error, than 100000, and I have already proved, that where the People have never wholly given up their Liberties, and Properties unto the Absolute Will of the Supream Powers, they are as to that still in a State of Nature, and do reserve to themselves a Right of Iudging when they are Violently and Insupportably invaded and Consequently of vindicating themselves from [Page 184] that Oppression. And therefore granting what you have said to be true, that the People may sometimes happen to abuse this Natural Right of Iudging, and re­sisting by exerting it, when there is no real and absolute necessity: so on the other side, if they are wholy debarred from it, because they may happen some­times to abuse it, the Freest People in the World, viz. (our selves for Example) may easily be reduced into a Condition of absolute Slavery and Beggery, and that without all Remedy, by any Humane means that I can think of, and which is the worst mischief of these two, I leave to your self, or any indifferent Man to Iudge.

If you will have my Opinion in this point [...], I must freely tell you, that it is a hard matter to find out a mischief so destructive to the People, and which they should exchange for this miserable State of War, which you suppose may prove so beneficial to them, and yet I doubt, if it be throughly lookt into, not only the Doctrine it self, but also the lasting Wars, and miseries it may pro­duce, would sufficiently prove the contrary since the cruellest Tyranny, Slavery, and loss of Estates, or any thing else almost may be better born with in Peace, and Unity than a Civil War, with the greatest Liberty, and Plenty: seeing all such comforts would quickly be devoured like Pharaoh's Fat Kine, by such a Cruel M [...]nster feeding in their bowels: And therefore since Civil War is one of the greatest Calamities, and Punishments that God uses to send upon a Na­tion, it seems evident to me, that the Wellfare of any State, or People requires them to be Obedient unto the Supream Powers, tho' they be never so great Op­pressors, or Cruel Tyrants. For when once they enter into this dismal State of War, who can tell whether it will have an End, without almost the total de­struction of the Nation, or at least by bringing them into a far worse Condition of Slavery and Suffering, than they were before, since the State of Princes, or o­ther Supream Powers can never be so mean, and inconsiderable in the World, as not to find, when like to be Opprest by such insurrections, and Rebellions of their Subjects, sufficient assistance from Neighbouring Princes or States, who making the Cause of such a Prince their own, will be sure to assist him to the utmost of their Power, it being found true by experience as Tully long ago observed:Cicero orat. pro Lege Manil. ‘That the afflicted State of Kings do easily draw the help and Pity of many others, especially of those, who are either Kings themselves, or do live in a Kingdom, the Regal Name being by them esteemed to be great and Sacred.’ And far­ther▪ how ready a way it is to subvert the State of any such distract [...]d Kingdom, and to bring it under the Subjection of Foreigners, we need not seek a plainer Proof, than by an Example no farther off than Ireland, where Derm [...]t King of Leinster being forced by his Rebellious Subjects to [...]rave the Aid of King Henry the II. for his Restoration to his Kingdom, his assistance to recover his Right produced that effect, which we now see, viz. That the Irish lost their Domi [...]ion, and became Subject to the Crown of England even to this day.