TWISSE Conſideration.

AS touching the pretence of Antiquity; I find many are very apt to make plauſible uſe of this, when either indeed, or at leaſt in their imagination, it ſeems to ſerve their turnes. And becauſe I am put upon it, I will ſpeak ſomewhat of it in generall, and then proceed to conſider it as it is appyable to the preſent occaſion.

As concerning the firſt, I find no ſmall equivocation in the word Ancient: For if we compare an ancient man with a younger, in all probability the ancient is likely to be more wiſe then the other; becauſe he hath more experience, by reaſon of the length of his daies, according to that of Job. 12. 12. Amongſt the ancient is wiſdome, and in length of daies is underſtanding. But this holds not of that which is ancient, as it ſignifies that which goes before another. For it is well known, that youth goeth before old age; yet no man will ſay, that the opinions of men in their youth, are more likely to be ſound, then the opinions of riper age. Neither doth any man call or account youth Antiquity. Yet our Fathers we call our Ancients, becauſe they have gone before us, but little reaſon there is in my judgement, to count their faith the more ſound by reaſon of ſuch Antiquity; no more then why the opinions of man in his youth, ſhould be reputed more ſound, then the opinions of his age. For as there is a youth in man; ſo there is to be acknowledged a youth of the world; and ſo likewiſe of the Chriſtian World, even of the Church of God. The Holy Ghoſt ſpeaks in this language. For even they who were the great Anceſtors of the Jews in the daies of Jeremy, are called the youth of Iſraell, as the youth of Gods Church. Jerem. 2. 2. I remember thee with the kindneſſe of thy youth, and the love of thy marriage, when thou wentſt after me in the wilderneſſe, in a land that was not ſowen. Iſrael was as a thing hallowed unto the Lord, &c Ezech. 16. 60. I will remember my Covenant made with thee in the daies of thy youth. In like ſort the Ancients counting them immediately from the Apoſtles daies, are the very youth of the Church Chriſtian. Now like as it is not to be exſpected that a man ſhould have as great perfection of knowledge in his youth, as in his age; ſo neither is it to be ſuppoſed, that the Church of Chriſt ſhould have as great perfection of knowledge in her youth as in her age. This is to be underſtood caeteris paribus; otherwiſe there lies a double exception againſt it: the One in the way of Gods extraordinary mercy, the Other in the way of Gods extraordinary judgement. For God may extraordinarily inſpire a young man with the ſpirit of Prophecy, and ſo make him wiſer then the aged. Such was the condition of Gods exuberant grace in the daies of the Apoſtles, enduing them with power from on high, not only to inſtruct them with all ſpirituall wiſdome and underſtanding in the myſteries of the Goſpell, but enabling them alſo to expreſſe it in diverſe languages, that ſo they might be able Miniſters of Chriſt, to carry the glad tidings of ſalvation over all the World. On the other ſide, the ſinnes of the Chriſtian world not embracing Gods Truth with love, may deſerve at the hands of God, that he ſhould give them over to illuſions to believe lies. Then no marvaile if our former light ſet in obſcure darkneſſe, and degenerate daies come in place of better and more noble times; which may more eaſily come to paſſe, conſidering that the light of the Goſpell is a ſpirituall light of faith, no naturall light of reaſon; though even this naturall light of reaſon comes to be amended and perfected by that light of grace.

But it may be ſaid, that They who lived neer the Apoſtles daies, are like to be better acquainted with the truth of God then wee. I have found ſome to pleaſe themſelves in this conceit, and it runns ſmooth and glibb, and it ſeems very plauſible to winne approbation. But as Auſtin ſaith of ſome things, that acutule ſonant, but diſcuſſa reperiuntur obtuſa: ſo many times it falls out, that reaſons plauſible at firſt, when exploration comes, prove very unſound; like the fruit Solinus writes of, which grew about Sodome, Faire to the eye, but being cruſhed in cineres abeunt & vanam fuliginem. And for the diſcovering of the emptineſſe of this reaſon, I proceed thus.

When you ſay of thoſe Ancients, that they were neer to the Apoſtles. I demand whether the meaning be, they were neer to the times of the Apoſtles, or neer to the Perſons of the Apoſtles, or neer to the word of the Apoſtles. The former two, doe nothing at all conduce to the perfection of Chriſtian knowledge, or ſoundneſſe of faith. For certainly both Jews and Heathens profeſſed enemies to the croſſe of Chriſt were as neer to their Times and Perſons as believing Chriſtians, but they were not ſo familiarly acquainted with their word. But as touching familiar acquaintance with the word of the Apoſtles; as alſo the embracing of it by faith: Nothing I truſt hindereth us from being as neer to the Apoſtles, as the Ancients were. Nay it is well known, that as touching divers peeces of the books of the New Teſtament, we receive them for Canonicall, which many of the Ancients doubted of. And as touching divers books concerning the times of the Old Teſtament, they are diſcovered unto us to be Apocryphall, which to many of the Ancients were not.

But it may be ſaid, that theſe Ancients to whom they pretend ſo much reverence (which indeed is but reverence to themſelves, and to ſerve their own turnes) were ſo neer to the Apoſtles, that they not only were partakers of their writings, but of their Preaching alſo by word of mouth? To this I anſwer.

1. That it is a very rare thing to meet with any ſuch now adaies, unleſſe it be ſome counterfeit Author: neither doe I find any ſuch alleadged by any, leaſt of all by any Arminian, who yet upon my knowledge doe diſcourſe after this manner, as touching their neerneſſe to the Apoſtles.

2. But ſuppoſe there were any ſuch, and they ſhould tell us what they heard preached by the Apoſtles, ſhall we take their relations for Oracles, and make the word of God to conſiſt, partly of that which is written by them, and partly of that which is not written, but delivered by word of mouth, and commended unto us by tradition? Then farewell the doctrine of Proteſtants concerning the rule of faith, that it is only the written-word; and let us with the Papiſts, joyne thereunto traditions to make up a compleat Rule of Faith.

It may be farther ſaid, that by reaſon of their neerneſſe to the Apoſtles, they may be better acquainted with the meaning of the word written.

To which I anſwer; if ſo, then either from the Apoſtles own mouthes, or by relation from others. Of any that report what they heard from the Apoſtles own mouths, they alleadge none. If they did, what were this other then to bring in Tradition to be a Rule, if not of faith, yet of interpretation of Gods word, which is as foule every way as the former, conſidering that ſoundneſſe of faith, is grounded upon the ſoundneſſe of interpretation of Gods word. If only by relation from others, the ſame exceptions lye againſt this and over and above, this muſt be of ſomewhat farre leſſe authority then the former: it being ſo difficult a matter to report from another without adding ſomewhat of his own, whether it be much or little, as Chaucer ſpeaketh.

Laſtly, let the Commentaries of theſe daies, be compared with the Commentaries of the Ancients, and let the indifferent reader judge, which of them are moſt true, moſt learned, moſt ſubſtantiall. So that I ſuppoſe, I may be bold to conclude, that this reaſon drawn from the neerneſſe of the Ancients to the Apoſtles, how plauſible ſoever it ſeems at firſt ſight, yet indeed is of no force.

Now to the contrary we have theſe reaſons.

1. Like as it is fit every man ſhould profit in the knowledge of God more and more, as long as he lives: ſo in all likelihood, the Chriſtian world doth profit more and more, as they draw neerer to the end of the world, excepting thoſe times of Gods judgements in giving the world over to illuſions to believe lies. Auſtin did profit, as in other points of Chriſtian knowledge, ſo in this as concerning Predeſtination, and blames the Maſſilienſes for not profiting with him. De Praedeſtin. lib. 1. cap. 4. Videtis quid tunc de fidei & operibus ſentiebam, quamvis de commendandâ dei gratiâ labor arem; In qua ſententia iſtos fratres nostros eſſe nunc video: quia non ficut legere libros meos, ita curaverunt proficere mecum.

2. We have more means and helps for our furtherance in Chriſtian knowledge, then they had, and that in divers reſpects. Firſt, becauſe we enjoy their labours, they enjoyed not ours, nor the like before them. So that by the reading of their writings we ſoon attain to that knowledge which they had, they communicating it unto us; and it were very ſtrange we ſhould adde nothing thereunto; eſpecially conſidering that Veritas was wont to be accounted temporis filia: and Ariſtotle accounts it an eaſy thing to adde; Any man ſaith he may doe that, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , and thus, ſaith he, Arts come to their perfection 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . A tall man is able to diſcover much farther then a Dwarfe, but let a Dwarfe be advanced upon the ſhoulders of that tall man, and he will diſcover much farther then he. Let then thoſe Antients goe for tall fellowes in the diſcovery of Chriſtian truth, let the Divines of moderne ages be but Dwarfes, as the Children of Iſrael ſeemed to be, but Grashoppers in compariſon of the Canaanites, eſpecially to the ſonnes of Anack; yet if by their pious labours and induſtries, which they have with much ingenuity communicated unto us, they ſuffer us to get upon their ſhoulders, ſhall not we though Dwarfes, be enabled hereby to diſcover ſomewhat more then they? The Eagle is a fowle of great ſtrength and ſoareth high, the higheſt of all Kites and Haukes, yet let her carry a Wren along with her on her ſhoulders in her aëriall aſcentions, when ſhe is weary and can fly no higher, can it ſeem ſtrange, if the Wren carried thus high by this Anakim of fowles, preſumes of her own ſtrengh to fly a little higher then ſhe? or is this any glory to the Wren, or diſparagement to the Eagle?

2. Secondly Have not we better helpes of Art then they, eſpecially as touching the knowledge of the Tongues, and Logicall reſolutions of the Text. The Latine Fathers moſt of them were little acquainted with the Greek; neither Latine nor Greek Fathers were uſually much acquainted with the Hebrew: Origen amongſt the Greek, and Hierom amongſt the Latine, had not their fellows for this.

3. Laſtly, the Ancients in their daies were not ſo put unto it as the latter; Nothing did more quicken them, or doth us, then contentions with Heretiques. And therefore look how they were exerciſed with Hereſies, ſo it is to be expected they were beſt ſeen in thoſe Articles of Faith, which were moſt ſhaken by Heretiques. This both Auſtin and Gregory take notice of; and Auſtin is moſt frequent herein, ſome paſſages to this purpoſe I ſhall relate hereafter. Now before Pelagius his daies, the Fathers were much exerciſed in oppoſing the Manichees, and accordingly gave themſelves to the maintenance of Free-will, as Aniarius obſerves by the relation of Sixtus Senenſis. But Pelagius was the firſt that oppoſed Gods grace; and therefore thoſe Bibl. l. 5. annot. 101. Fathers that contended with him, gave themſelves chiefely to the maintenance of Gods grace.

And now am I come to the treating of Ancients no longer in generall, but in a ſpeciall reference to the doctrine of predeſtination. Now herein the Papiſts themſelves (who in other points labour to beat us down with nothing ſo much as with the noiſe of Antiquity) are willing to confeſſe that in the point of grace and predeſtination we need not trouble our ſelves, with inquiry after the doctrine of the Ancients before Pelagius roſe, and that upon the ground before mentioned, to wit, becauſe they were nothing exerciſed hereabouts. As for example Bellarmine, De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. lib. 1. c. 14. having propoſed diverſe paſſages of the Fathers favouring, as it ſeemed, the doctrine wherewith Pelagius troubled the peace of Gods Church, makes Auſtin to anſwer for him, Veteres Patres qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaeſtionem iſtam nunquam accuratè tractaſſe, ſed incidentèr ſolum, & quaſi per tranſitum illam attigiſſe. Addit verò (ſaith Bellarmine) in fundamento hujus ſententiae, quod eſt, Gratiam Dei non praevenire ab ullo opere noſtro, ſed contrà ab illâ omnia opera noſtra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omnino boni quod attinet ad ſalutem ſit in nobis, quod non ſit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambroſiſium & Nazianzenum: yet he takes a courſe to reconcile them to the truth; ſo doth Sixtus Senenſis Bibl. Sanct. lib. 6. Annota. 251. ſo doth Alvarez. de Auxil. lib. 5. diſp. 37.

Again conſider. The decrees of predeſtination and reprobation are ſecret, neither doe they appeare of what condition they are, but by the manner of their executions. Now their executions doe conſiſt partly in beſtowing ſalvation on ſome, and inflicting damnation on others; partly in beſtowing the grace of faith and repentance on ſome, and denying it unto others. As touching ſalvation and damnation we willingly profeſſe, that the ſalvation of men of ripe years, doth alwaies preſuppoſe Faith and perſeverance therein; and the damnation of others doth alwaies preſuppoſe finall perſeverance in ſinne unrepented of. But we deny that herehence it followeth, that either faith precedes the decree of ſalvation, or ſinne precedes the decree of damnation, or the preſcience of either. That faith cannot precede election, nor ſinne reprobation, is evident; For as much as election and reprobation are eternall, but faith and ſinne are things temporall: but that wich is temporall cannot precede that which is eternall. Neither doth it follow, that becauſe faith precedes ſalvation, therefore faith precedes the decree of ſalvation. For it is faith exiſtent in time that precedes ſalvation; but no Divine will ſay that faith exiſtent in time, precedes Gods decree of ſalvation, unleſſe it be ſome ſuch as maintaine with Vorſtius, that Gods decrees are not eternall. In like ſort, it is ſinne exiſtent in time, that precedes damnation; but no wiſe Divine will ſay, that ſinne exiſtent in time precedes Gods decree of damnation; the former being a thing temporall but this decree eternall. Laſtly, neither will it follow that becauſe faith precedes ſalvation and ſinne damnation, therefore the foreſight of faith, is antecedanious to the decree of ſalvation, and the foreſight of ſinne is antecedent to the decree of damnation. For no Enthymeme of this nature is ſound, but ſo farre forth as it is reducible into a good Categorical Syllogiſme, whereof theſe Enthymems are uncapable. For Enthymems reducible unto good Syllogiſmes muſt agree, either in their Subjects or in their Predicates, but theſe doe not. Again all the termes in a good Enthymeme muſt be expreſſed in that Syllogiſme whereunto it is reduced▪ But each of theſe Enthymemes conſiſteth manifeſtly of four termes; as in the firſt, the • e, Faith, and the Foreſight of faith, Salvation and the Decree of ſalvation; Of the ſecond, theſe, Sinne, and Foreſight of ſinne, Damnation and the Decree of damnation; and conſequently that Syllogiſme whereunto either of theſe quaternary of termes is clap'd, cannot be good; For no Categoricall Syllogiſme is good that conſiſteth of foure termes. As for the reducing of them into a Syllogiſme Hypotheticall, ſuch Reductions were never heard of in the Schooles of the learned and that for juſt reaſon; becauſe that is no courſe to juſtify the ſoundneſſe of the Enthymemes, but a meer begging of that which is in queſtion. As in caſe a man ſhould reduce it thus; If faith be precedanious to ſalvation, then the foreſight of faith is precedanious to the decree of ſalvation; But faith is precedanious to ſalvation, Therefore it is precedanious to the decree of ſalvation. In this Hypotheticall Syllogiſme, the conſequence of the Major is the very Enthymeme which is in queſtion, for the ſubſtance of it and conſequently no proving of it, but a meere begging of it. Yet notwithſtanding we doe not deny, but that God did decree that no man ſhould be ſaved, but ſuch as being of ripe years, ſhould be found to perſevere in faith unto death none ſhould be damned, but ſuch as ſhould be found finally to perſevere in ſinne. The other execution of theſe decrees conſiſts (as I ſaid) in the beſtowing of the grace of faith and repentance on ſome, and denying it unto others. Now the queſtion is, Whether God be indeed the author of faith and repentance, yea, or no; and becauſe the Arminians dare not profeſſedly deny this. (though lately they are come ſo farre as profeſſedly to deny that Chriſt merited it) therefore let the queſtion proceede about the manner how God beſtowes it, as namely, whether he beſtowes it of his meer pleaſure on ſome, denying it to others, or, Whether the reaſon why God beſtowes it on ſome and not on others, be, becauſe God findes ſome good work in one, which he findes not in another. This queſtion being decided, it will clearly appeare, whether predeſtination proceeds upon the foreſight of ought in man, yea or no. For if God of his meer pleaſure doth beſtow faith on one, and not on another, it followes undeniably, that God predeſtinated him hereunto abſolutely, and of his meer pleaſure, without conſideration of any future work of man. But if God beſtowes faith on man upon conſideration of ſome precedent work of his, which was not the work of God, then (and not otherwiſe neither) it will follow, that upon the conſideration of that future work of man, God did elect him unto faith, or predeſtinate faith unto him. So that if we deſire ſincerely and ingeniouſly to inquire what was the opinion of the Ancients about the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination, we ſhould ſtate the queſtion as touching Predeſtination unto faith, and not as touching Predeſtination unto ſalvation. For we all confeſſe that God predeſtinated no man unto ſalvation, but ſuch as he foreſaw, coming unto ripe years, would believe ſooner or later. And therefore the main queſtion between the Remonſtrants and Contraremonſtrants was, whether this decree were the whole decree of Predeſtination, and whether there were not another decree of Predeſtination beſides, as namely, whether God did not decree to beſtow faith on ſome, and deny it unto others. And ſecondly to inquire, Whether this decree of beſtowing faith on ſome, did not proceed according to Gods good pleaſure, without conſideration of any different work in man. And the moſt compendious reſolution hereof, is to inquire of the manner how God carrieth himſelfe in the beſtowing of faith and repentance on ſome, and denying it unto others; as namely, Whether on his meer pleaſure he hath not mercy on ſome, giving them faith and repentance, and of his meer pleaſure, denyes the gift of faith and repentance unto others. Now let the Fathers, (whoſoever thinks good) be admitted to bring in their ſuffrages on this Article, and remember what was decreed in the firſt Synode that was gathered, to make peace in the Church after Pelagius had diſturbed it, namely, Gratiam non dari ſecundum merita, that is, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth, Gratiam non dari ſecundum opera. Laſtly, all of us now a daies conſent, as De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. l. 6. c. 5. touching Gods concourſe to the ſubſtance of every act of the creature whether good or evill. Now let this Author or any other, repreſent unto us, what footing he finds in Antiquity concerning this. But I come to anſwer particularly, according to this Authors text.

He cannot find abſolute and inevitable reprobation to have any footing in Antiquity. Belike he can find reprobation evitable; a ſtrange phraiſe either way. Theſe attributes applied to damnation doe carry a faire ſenſe with them, damnation being a work of God wrought in time, and undoubtedly may be avoided, may be incurred for the time to come. But reprobation is eternall as God himſelfe, and how that ſhould be fancied to be of an avoidable condition for the time to come, I cannot comprehend, unleſſe this Author be of their opinion, who deſire to ſhape Gods decrees of a revocable nature, as being both to impute unto him an impotent immutability, as ſome are pleaſed to phraiſe it.

But leave we reprobation unavoidable, take we the abſolute nature of it into conſideration: this he cannot find in all Antiquity. But conſider I pray, he pretends theſe motives, as inducements to change his former opinion: ſo then belike, he ſtood ſometimes for reprobation abſolute; but did he find any footing in Antiquity for it, what time he embraced it? if he did formerly embrace it, notwithſtanding he found no footing in Antiquity for it, why ſhould he now relinquiſh it, for finding no footing in Antiquity for it? Belike the older he waxeth, the more he groweth in love with Antiquity. Again when formerly he did embrace the doctrine of abſolute reprobation, upon what grounds did he embrace it? was it becauſe he was in hope he ſhould hereafter find Antiquity for it? or was it only for the authority of them who brought him up in this opinion? What ſorry grounds are theſe to build a mans faith upon? Yet this is not our courſe to impoſe Articles of faith on any, but rather to endoctrinate them out of the word of God. If then a mans Chriſtian faith be built upon the Word of God, is it a Chriſtian courſe to renounce it, or to queſtion the integrity of it, becauſe he finds no footing in Antiquity for it? What then ſhall become of the faith of Laicks, and ſuch as are unlearned? Muſt the writings of the Fathers be tranſlated into all vulgar Languages, and the unlearned addict themſelves to the ſtudy of them, leaſt otherwiſe their faith prove a wavering faith, for want of finding Antiquity to favour it? Belike the writings of the Prophets and Apoſtles, are no part of Antiquity, in this Authors more mature judgement. But if formerly the doctrine of abſolute reprobation were received upon the evidence of Gods word, as it is fit the faith of every Chriſtian ſhould be grounded thereupon, eſpecially the faith of a Divine called to be a Teacher of others; I ſhould think there were no juſt cauſe of alteration, but upon diſcovery of the errour of thoſe grounds, whereupon formerly it was builded; and the diſcovery hereof alone, were chiefly to the preſent purpoſe, namely to ſhew juſt cauſe of change of mind, & alteration of judgement, but no ſuch courſe doe I find taken here. Theſe motives and reaſons here propoſed, may carry a ſhew of reaſon, why a man being yet to chuſe his faith in theſe particulars, poſſeſſed with neither way, but indifferent, might preferre one way before another, one opinion before another, but nothing ſufficient to juſtify a change, unleſſe the weakneſſe of former grounds be laid open. For it may be that the former grounds might be ſuch as upon due compariſon would be found to overweigh theſe pretences. For upon view that I have taken of the diſcourſe following, I find not one argument drawn from thoſe places of Scripture that treat of election and reprobation; theſe I find are purpoſely declined as ſo many rocks, as if the Author feared to make ſhipwrack of his errours (pardon my boldneſſe in ſo naming them, Auſtin is my precedent in this ſaying, Hoc ſcio contra istam praedeſtinationem quam ſecundum ſcripturas defendimus, neminem niſi errando diſputare poſſe) but in the mean time while he fears to make ſhipwrack of his errours, let him take heed leaſt he make ſhipwrack of a good conſcience.

But proceed we with him about the inquiry what footing this doctrine finds in Antiquity. Aug. de den. Perſev. c. 19. He ſaith he cannot find it; but it is more then I find that ever he made any convenient ſearch after it, his whole diſcourſe hereupon is of ſo hungry a nature. The abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation, we conclude in Chriſtian reaſon from Gods abſolute carriage in giving and denying grace, underſtanding thereby the grace of regeneration. Now the abſoluteneſſe herein, as we ſuppoſe, conſiſts in beſtowing this grace on ſome, and denying it to others, according to the meer pleaſure of the Lords will. Now hath not the Apoſtle (more ancient then all the Antiquity he ſpeaketh of) profeſſed in expreſſe termes, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth? What need we ſeek farther amongſt the Ancients for the iuſtification Rom. 9. 18. of this? And that mercy here is meant, ſuch a mercy in beſtowing faith on ſome, which is denied to others, in converting the wills of ſome unto good, when others are not converted, I could prove by variety of places out of Auſtin, whoſe authority in this caſe is farre more worthy, then all the authority this Author produceth. Neither is this the voyce of Auſtin only, but of Ambroſe alſo in that famous ſaying of his Quem vult religioſum, facit, ſo much magnified by Auſtin. And not Ambroſe alone, but Nazianzen De dono Perſev. 19. alſo, and Cyprian are alleaged by him, as concurring with him in the foundation of the doctrine of predeſtination, which he makes to be the freedome of Gods grace in converting whom he will. And which is farre more then this, yea farre more then all that can be produced to the contrary, by the very Prayers of the Church every where in uſe, he iuſtifies the generall concurrence in that which he accounts the foundation of predeſtination. As when their common courſe was to pray unto God, that he would be pleaſed to convert unto the faith of Chriſt the hearts of Heathens; and wherein did this converſion conſiſt, but in giving them faith and repentance: manifeſtly giving us to underſtand thereby, that the whole Catholique Church did concurre in this Article of Faith, that it was in the power of God according to his free grace, to convert whom he would unto the faith of Chriſt, and conſequently not to convert whom he would. For if there were any cauſe on mans part, why he doth not convert ſome converting others, then there were alſo on mans part, a cauſe why God doth convert ſome not converting others, and conſequently grace ſhould be given according unto works, that is in the phraſe of the Ancients, Gratiam dari ſecundum merita (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) which was ever accounted expreſſe Pelagianiſme, Bellar. de grat. & lib. arbit. l. 6. c. 5. and was as expreſſely condemned in the Councel of Paleſtina above 1200 years agoe, and Pelagius himſelfe was driven to ſubſcribe unto it, by ſhamefull diſſimulation ſo to prevent Anathematization of his own perſon.

But the upper way (ſaith this Author) was never taught or approved by any of the Fathers for 600 years. Here breaks forth another reaſon of this Authors (or his that directed him) cunning carriage in diſtinguiſhing the two waies of our Divines in maintaining the abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation, to wit, that in the courſe of his diſcourſe he might ſerve his turne with both, and where Antiquity ſerved not his turne againſt the one, yet might it ſerve his turne, as he thought againſt the other. But the truth is, there was no ſuch queſtion at all ventilated in thoſe daies, as touching the obiect of predeſtination, no nor in Auſtins neither, nor many hundred years after, that I know. And no marvell; For it concernes the ordering of Gods decree aright, which is meerly Logicall, as I have ſhewed in my Vind. Grat. Dei. Its true that St Auſtin doth uſually accommodate that of St Paul, Rom. 9. 21. concerning the Maſſe, unto mankind conſidered in Maſſa damnata as he commonly calls it, that is, in the corrupt Maſſe; but not alwaies, but ſometimes he ſpeaks of it, and accommodates it cleerely unto the Maſſe of mankind uncorrupt, yea, as yet not created, as there I have ſhewed. And as for the right ordering of Gods decrees, and the right ſtating of the object of predeſtination and reprobation, We deſire no better, nor other ground then that of the Apoſtle, God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth, that is, he cures infidelity and hardnes of heart in whom he will, by beſtowing faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in whom he will by denying faith and repentance unto them. And as for the rigour of this Tenent (as it is commonly accounted) of making the Maſſe of mankind not created the object of predeſtination, I have already ſhewed the vanity of that conceit and denomination; for as much as hereby neither is the decree of damnation made to precede the conſideration of ſinne, no nor of finall impenitency in any moment of nature, nor in any moment of nature is the decree of ſalvation made by mee, to precede the conſideration of finall perſeverance in faith and repentance. But whereas ſome, who are moſt rigid indeed in their diſcourſe, make the decree of ſaving ſome and damning others to precede the decree of creating and permitting of ſinne both originall and actuall; others who are moſt diſſolute, make the decree of creating and permitting of ſinne, to precede the decree of ſaving ſome and damning others, My Opinion is equally removed from theſe extreames, and conceives none of theſe decrees to be either way ſubordinate, but all coordinate and ſimultaneous, as being decrees only of various means, tending to one and the ſame end; thus God doth decree both to create ſome, and to permit to ſinne, and finally to perſevere therein, and to damne them for their ſinne, to the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of juſtice vindicative. On the other ſide, God doth decree to create others, and permit them to ſinne, and raiſe them out of ſinne by faith and repentance, and reward them with everlaſting life, to the manifeſtation of his glory, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice.

Farther conſider that as touching predeſtination it ſelfe, there was no queſtion moved thereabouts in the Church of God, before the daies of Pelagius; and what credit can they get, who conſult with them in ſuch points, wherein they were not exerciſed. For we find by experience, that to contend with Heretiques hath been an ordinary means in the courſe of Gods providence, for the more diligent inquiſition after the truth of God and happy diſcovery thereof. Sancta Eccleſia (ſaith Gregory) in Epiſt. lib. 7. epiſt. 3. De don. Perſ. cap. 20. ſuâ ſemper eruditione inſtruitur, dum Haereticorum quaeſtionibus impugnatur. And Auſtin in like manner, Didiſcimus, ſaith he, ſingulas quaſ que Haereſes intuliſſe Eccleſiae proprias quaeſtiones, contra quas diligentius defenderetur ſcriptura divina, quam ſi nulla talis neceſſitas cogeret. And on the other ſide, before queſtion hath been moved on a poynt, the Fathers have delivered themſelves ſomewhat improvidently, whereupon Heretiques have taken advantage to countenance their errours by the writings of the Ancient. This Hierome obſerves in the poynt of Arrianiſme, proving thereby, that the Ancient Apolog: 2. adv. Ruffin. Writers before the Arrian Hereſy aroſe, were no competent judges in that poynt. Si me cauſas vitiorum (ſaith he) in Patrum Scriptis neſcire reſpondero non ſtatim illos Haereticos judicabo. Fieri enim poteſt ut vel ſimpliciter erraverint, vel alio ſenſu ſcripſerint, vel a Librariis imperitis eorum paulatim ſcripta corrupta ſunt, vel certè antequam in Alexandriâ quaſi daemonium Meridianum Arrius naſceretur. Innocenter quaedam & minus cautè locuti ſunt & quae non poſſunt perverſorum hominum calumniam declinare. Marke it well, Before Arrius like a Devill from the South roſe up, the Fathers delivered ſome things innocently, yet leſe warily, and ſuch as cannot avoid the calumny of perverſe perſons. Upon the ſame ground it is, that Auſtin excuſeth Ticonius, and that in Aug. de doctr. Chriſt. l. 3. c. 33. the ſame particular wherein he approached neere to Pelagianiſme, to wit, before the Church of God was acquainted with that Hereſy; his words are theſe, Sed non erat expertus hanc Haereſin Ticonius quae noſtro tempore exorta multum nos, ut gratia Dei quae per Dominum nostrum Jeſum Chriſtum eſt adverſus eos defenderemus, exercuit; & ſecundum id quod ait Apoſtolus, Oportet Haereſes eſſe ut probati manifesti fiant in vobis, multò vigilantiores diligentioreſ que reddidit: ut advérteremus in ſcripturis Sanctis, quod iſtum Ticonium minús attentum, minuſ que ſine hoſte ſollicitum, fugit, etiam ipſam ſcilicet fidem donum illius eſe, qui ejus menſuram unicui que partitur. Ticonius conſidered not that faith it ſelfe is the gift of God, neither was he ſo carefull to look into the truth of this; and why? ſurely becauſe he had no enemy to put him to it, as being not acquainted with the errour of Pelagius. But this Hereſy, ſaith he, ariſing in our daies, hath put us upon the defence of the grace of God, which is given us through our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, and hath made us more watchfull and diligent to obſerve, that even faith it ſelfe is his gift, who diſtributes to every one a meaſure thereof. Hence it is that the ſame Auſtin, when Proſper ſignified that thoſe of Marſeiles would reſt contented if he could make good the opinion which he maintained in the point of predeſtination, out of the Writings of the former, and more ancient Divines, returnes for anſwer, that there was no need hereof, conſidering that They living before this Hereſy was known, (to wit, of Pelagius) were not at all put upon the diſcuſſing of this queſtion, which ſurely they would have done, had they been conſtrained Aug. de Praed. ſanct. l. 1. cap. 14. to make anſwer to any ſuch as the Pelagians were. See his own words, Si hujus ſententiae defenſionem ex divinorum eloquiorum nos praecedentibus Catholicis tractatoribus promerem, profectò hi Fratres quibuſcum nos agimus, acquieſcerent. Hoc enim ſignificaſtis Literis veſtris. This was Proſper's motion; now mark Auſtin's anſwer. Quid igitur opus eſt ut eorum ſcrutemur opuſcula, qui priuſquam iſta Haereſis oriretur, non habueruni neceſſitatem in hac difficili ad ſolvendum quaeſtione verſari, quod proculdubio facerent, ſi reſpondere talibus cogerentur. Charity did ſuggeſt unto him, this would have been their courſe, had they been exerciſed with Pelagius, as he was. For it was his own caſe. For there was a time when himſelfe thought that albeit holineſſe and good works conſequent to faith together with ſalvation, were the work of God, yet faith it ſelfe he conceived to be the work of man; to wit, before he was exerciſed with Pelagius as appears, Liber Propoſitionum ex Epiſtolâ and Romanos. Non ergo elegit Deus opera cujus que in praeſcientiâ, ſed fidem elegit in praeſcientiâ, vel quem ſibi crediturum eſſe praeſcivit, ipſum elegit cui Spiritum Sanctum daret, ut bona operando eriam vitam aeternam conſequeretur. For he profeſſeth in the words following that he then conceived, Noſtrum eſſe credere, to believe was a work of our own. Afterwards he retracteth this, Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. profeſſing, I had never ſaid this, had I known faith it ſelfe to be the gift of God, Si ſciviſſem fidem ipſam inter Dei munera quae dantur per Spiritum Sanctum reperiri. Nam quamvis credere & operari utrum que noſtrum ſit propter liberum voluntatis arbitrium & quae non niſi volentibus nobis fiunt, utrum que Dei donum eſt qui & credere, & velle, & perficere ſubminiſtrat. The Papiſts themſelves, notwithſtanding the great devotion they pretend towards the Ancients, yet are driven to deviſe what may be ſaid to excuſe them; as in the very point of Free-will they deſire to excuſe Chryſoſtome. Sixtus Senenſis, Biblioth •• . lib. 5. annotat. 101. Uel dicendum est ſicut etiam Annianus in Praefatione Commentariorum Chryjoſtomi in Math. annotavit Chryſoſtomum interdum naturae noſtrae vires plus aequo extuliſſe ex contentione diſceptandi cum Manichaeis & Gentilibus, qui hominem aſſerebant vel naturâ malum vel fati violentia ad peccandum compelli. Nay what think we of Voſſius himſelfe, from whoſe labours it is, and nothing of their own, that our Arminians would ſeem to breath ſo much Antiquity. This Voſſius profeſſeth, they miſtake him that taketh him to be of any other opinion in the poynt of predeſtination, then Auſtin was of. De Hiſtoricis Lat. lib. 2. cap. 17. Yet doth he acknowledge that Auſtin did reject the opinion of the Ancients both Greeks and Latines who went before him, in the point of predeſtination. Hiſtor. Pelag. pag. 655. Patres Graeci & Latinorum illi qui ante Auguſtinum vixerunt, ipſe que aliquandiu Auguſtinus, verba Apoſtoli interpretari ſolent de electione quorundam ad ſalutem ſecundum fidem & pietatem praeviſam; & aliorum reprobatione aeterna ob praeſcientiam malorum operum quae in vita acturi eſſent. Sed Auguſtinus (here comes in the Adverſative) rejectâ hâc opinione exiſtimabat Apoſtolorum loqui de quorundam electione ad vitam, aliorum item praeteritione, non habitâ vel in his vel in illis ratione, ſive bonorum, ſive etiam malorum quae perſonalia forent. And which is more then this, Pag. 653. profeſſeth a third interpretation of that paſſage Rom. 9. 11, 12, 13. differing both from Auſtins interpretation, and from that of the Fathers Greeke and Latine that went before him, and makes it diſputable, which is trueſt, though this third opinion hath no footſtep amongſt the Ancients, and thus he carrieth himſelfe, notwithſtanding all the pretence of his reverence of Antiquity. And to vindicate Auſtins interpretation, as well as the reſt, from countenancing abſolute reprobation, he calls in to help at a dead lift, the doctrine of the Jeſuits, concerning Scientia Media. And I deſire upon no better termes to contend then this in Scholaſticall Divinity, whether this doctrine be not a moſt unſober invention without all ground. And whereas Voſſius acknowledgeth Auſtins opinion to be for the abſoluteneſſe of election (and he profeſſeth himſelfe to be of Auſtins opinion.) I dare appeale to any learned Divines ſober judgement, whether this doctrine of Scientia Media doth not equally juſtify the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation, as the abſoluteneſſe of election. Yet after all this, I would not have any think, that I reject any of theſe ancient Fathers, that ſeem to be moſt oppoſite to Auſtins opinion in the point of predeſtination. I think they may be fairely and Scholaſtically reconciled without acknowledging ſo much difference between them, as Voſſius maketh, and that by ſuch an interpretation as ſometimes is admitted by Voſſius himſelfe, of his own phraiſe of his own diſtinction, though he dreames not of the applyable nature of the ſame to the will of God in predeſtination. His diſtinction is of Voluntas Dei antecedens, & voluntas conſequens; and this he makes equivalent to that other diſtinction of the will of Hiſt. Pelag. lib. 7. God, to wit, Abſoluta & Conditionalis. Now this Conditionall will of God he interprets not quoad actum volentis, but quoad Res volitas: Like as Doctor Jackſon profeſſeth Of Providence in expreſſe termes, that the former diſtinction of voluntas antecedens & conſequens, is to be interpreted, namely, quoad res volitas, and not quoad actum volentis. Now according to this conſtruction, there is no difference between them and Auſtin, nor the leaſt impediment to the making of the will of God, both in predeſtination and reprobation to be moſt abſolute. For though ſinne be acknowledged to be the cauſe of the will of God in reprobation quoad res volitas, that is, in reſpect of the puniſhment willed thereby, this hinders not the abſoluteneſſe of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis. And unleſſe we underſtand the Fathers thus, we muſt neceſſarily charge them with ſuch an opinion, whereof Aquinas is bold to profeſſe, That never any man was ſo madde as to affirme, to wit, that any merits ſhould be the cauſe of Predeſtination quoad actum praedeſtinantis. And why ſo? to wit, becauſe predeſtination is the act of Gods will, and there can be no cauſe of Gods will quoad actum volentis. Now who ſeeth not that by the ſame reaſon there can be no cauſe of divine reprobation quoad actum reprobantis; for even reprobation is the act of Gods will, as well as predeſtination, and every way it muſt be as madde a thing to deviſe a cauſe of reprobation quoad actum reprobantis.

They did all generally agree, ſaith this Author, upon the contrary concluſion. Now the contrary Concluſion to abſolute and unavoidable reprobation is to maintain conditionall and avoidable reprobation; but this is not the contrary concluſion here ſpecified by this Author, but rather that damnation was avoydable, ſuch is his looſe diſcourſe; whereas there is no queſtion at all concerning damnation, whether it be conditionall or abſolute. We all confeſſing, that like as ſalvation is not ordained to befall any man of ripe years, but upon the performance of faith and repentance and finall perſeverance therein; ſo damnation is not ordained to be the portion of any, but upon their finall perſeverance in ſinne. In like ſort as touching the poſſibility of ſalvation, not one Divine of ours, that I know, denyes the poſſibility of any mans ſalvation while he lives in this World. Doctor Jackſon indeed hath an opinion, that a man may proceed ſo farre in ſinne in this life, that the doore of repentance may be ſhut upon him. Wee have no ſuch opinion; We acknowledge, that as God calls ſome at the firſt houre, ſo may ſome be called at the laſt houre of the day, yea the Thiefe upon the Croſſe, yea, inter Pontem & Fontem. In a word, We ſay plainly, that it is poſſible for any man at any time to be ſaved by grace giving repentance: without repentance none can be ſaved; which is, I preſume, without queſtion between us. In like ſort it is poſſible for any man to repent, provided that God be pleaſed to give him repentance, and whether God will give him repentance or no we know not. Therefore the Apoſtle inſtructs Timothy after this manner, The ſervant of the Lord muſt not ſtrive, but muſt be gentle towards all men, apt to teach, ſuffering the evill, inſtructing them with meekneſſe that be contrary minded, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , if at any time God may give them repentance, that they may acknowledge the truth and come to amendment out of the ſnare of the Devill, of whom they are taken Priſoners to doe his Will. Here is clearely an acknowledgement of a poſſibility of repentance, ſooner or later, but upon the gift of God, not otherwiſe. The contrary opinion whereunto, this Author ſeemeth in this paſſage very ſtrongly to ſavour of, but alleageth not one Father for the proofe of it, to give us ſome document of his judicious carriage in the ſurvey of the Fathers which here he pretends to have been made by him, and that with very great oſtentation; Yet I ſeem to be very well acquainted with the ſpirit that breatheth here; and I wonder the paſſages of the Ancients to this purpoſe (which yet I am perſwaded are nothing to the purpoſe) are not collected out of Doctor Uſhar's diſcourſe In cauſa Godaeſchalci inſcribed to Gerardus Voſſius; and I doubt not but the iſſue will be this, that God is ready to give all men repentance in caſe they performe ſomewhat; and ſo the grace of repentance ſhall be given according to mens works, which was condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Paleſtine, and ever ſince accounted no better then flat Pelagianiſme. And which is worſe then this, as that which ſtands in oppoſition to common ſenſe, they wil be driven to profeſſe, that God is ready to give a reprobate repentance, in caſe he will repent, yea the very will to repent, in caſe he will repent. This deſperate reſolution I have already found by experience, and if I be not deceived, breathed by the very ſame ſpirit that breatheth heere.

At length we are like to receive an account of this Authors judicious ſurvey of the Ancients out of Calvin and Beza. Ne que haec vulgò recepta opinio ſolius vulgi eſt; (ſaith Calvin) habuit enim ſaeculis omnibus magnos authores. To this I anſwer,

1. That this is farre from juſtifying, that abſolute reprobation, and abſolute election had no footing in Antiquity, that the Upper way was never taught for the ſpace of 600 years, nor the Lower way till the time of St Auſtin. Though in all ages it had great Authors to impugne it, yet it might alſo have in all ages as great Authors to maintain it, and more too, for ought theſe words of Calvin in his opinion doe manifeſt to the contrary.

2. Albeit not ſome but all had maintained election and reprobation to proceed according to foreknowledge of mens works, yet this nothing hinders the abſoluteneſſe either of election or reprobation. For conſider, it is one thing to ſpeak of election unto grace, another to ſpeak of election unto glory; one thing to ſpeak of reprobation, as it ſignifies a purpoſe to deny grace, another thing to ſpeak of it, as it ſignifies a purpoſe to inflict damnation. It was never known I think, that any maintained, that God upon the foreſight of mens faith, did elect them unto faith, or purpoſe to give them faith; or that God foreſeeing men would not believe, nor repent, did decree that they ſhould neither believe nor repent. Upon which brainſick conceit our Arminians are caſt now a daies, and all the embracers of Scientia Media: But many of them profeſſed indeed that God did decree to beſtow ſalvation upon them whom he foreſaw would finally perſevere in faith and repentance; and to damne thoſe whom he foreſaw would finally perſevere in infidelity or impenitency. We acknowledge as much as they, but ſtill the way is open to enquire of the order of theſe, namely, Whether the foreſight of faith and repentance were before the decree of ſalvation, or after it, or ſimultaneous with it: Whether the foreſight of infidelity and impenitency were before the decree of damnation, or after it, or ſimultaneous with it; but where is any ſuch queſtion to be found amongſt the Ancients? We willingly profeſſe that God did not purpoſe to beſtow eternall life on any of ripe years, but as a reward of their faith and repentance and good workes; that God did not purpoſe to inflict damnation on any of ripe years, but as a condigne puniſhment of their finall infidelity and impenitency; and the Ancients who maintained that God decreed to ſave ſome and damne others, according to his preſcience of the piety of the one, and impiety of the other, had no other meaning that I know, or this Author is able to make good, or any other, as I am perſwaded.

3. But let us farther enquire what thoſe Ancients thought concerning faith and repentance; as whether they thought them to be the gifts of God, or no; dares this Author or any Arminian deny, they maintained them to be the gifts of God, the Scripture being ſo full and expreſſe for this? Secondly, enquire what their opinion was concerning the manner how God gave faith to one, and not to another, as 'tis manifeſt he did not, he doth not give it to all; as namely, whether it was of the meer pleaſure of God, that he converted ſome, and not others; or whether he beſtowed faith on ſome, and not on others, becauſe he found thoſe ſome to have prepared themſelves for the receiving of faith, not ſo others. If it was of the meer pleaſure of God, it manifeſtly followeth, that election unto grace and reprobation from grace, was abſolute: which is the main thing in queſtion in theſe our daies. For we who are accounted moſt rigid herein, doe not affect to ſay, That God decreed to ſave whom he will, or to damne whom he will; but to the contrary we ſay, God decreed to ſave none, but ſuch as believe and repent, and to damne none, but ſuch as dye in infidelity or impenitency: but we profeſſe willingly, that God decreed to beſtow faith and repentance on whom he would, and deny it to whom he would, the Scripture being expreſſe, that God hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth. And Auſtin is moſt frequent in this profeſſion, and this is that Grace which he acknowledgeth to be the foundation of predeſtination, and wherein both Cyprian, and Nazianzene, and Ambroſe did agree with him. And Ambroſe in ſpeciall ſort he magnifies for this profeſſion. And Calvin hereupon obſerves, that whereas the Pelagians charged him, with differing from the ancients herein. Valet Auguſtini teſtimonium, ſaith he, apud eos, qui libenter in Patrum authoritate acquieſcunt. Quanquam non patitur Auguſtinus ſe a reliquis diſjungi, ſed claris testimoniis divortium hoc cujus invidia gravabant eum Pelagiani, oſtendit falſum eſſe. Citat enim ex Ambroſio (lib. de Praedeſtin. ſanct. cap. 19.) Chriſtus quem dignatur vocat (here is the criticall point of this queſtion concerning the abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation) Item ſi voluiſſet ex indevotis feciſſet devotos. Sed Deus quos dignatur vocat, & quem vult religioſum facit. Si ex Auguſtino integrum volumen contexere libeat, lectoribus oſtendere promptum eſſet mihi non niſi ejus verbis opus eſſe: ſed eos prolixitate onerare nolo. This was Calvins judgement, as touching the judgement of Antiquity in this.

4. Yet I confeſſe there was a time when Auſtin did not conceive faith to be amongſt the gifts of Gods ſpirit, but being exerciſed with the Pelagians, he came to acknowledge the ſpeciall grace of God in this; and hereupon made faith an effect of predeſtination, and not any precedent thereunto, and doubts not, but the Fathers would have expreſſed as much, had they been exerciſed with the Pelagians as he was; for ſo much he ſignifies unto Proſper as before I ſhewed, and withall ſhewes how in the foundation of predeſtination they agreed with him, in as much as they agreed in the nature of grace, acknowledging the converſion of the heart to be the gift of God; And not they only, but the whole Catholique Church, as appeared by their common prayers, that God would convert the hearts of Infidells; and to ſay, that God doth not convert the hearts of men according to the meer pleaſure of his will, but according to mens preparations, is clearly to maintaine that God gave grace according unto works, which doctrine was generally exploded as meer Pelagianiſme.

5. Suppoſe they did all acknowledge the decree of election and reprobation, to be conditionall, yet if they interpreted this conditionally, not quoad actum Volentis, but quoad Res volitas, this is nothing oppoſite to the abſoluteneſſe of election and reprobation quoad actum elegentis and reprobantis, but only quoad res volitas, to wit, ſalvation on the one ſide, and damnation on the other ſide. And we willingly acknowledge that God hath not ordained that ſalvation or damnation ſhall befall any man but in caſe they believe and repent, or refuſe to believe, or repent. Now that the Ancients did in this manner underſtand voluntas conditionata in God, Voſſius himſelfe (upon whom our Arminians doe moſt depend as touching the authority of the Ancients) doth improvidently, and ere he is a ware, confeſſe. Hiſt. Pelag. pag. 638. his words are theſe. Aliqua abſolutè vult & ſimpliciter: quomodo creare mundum voluit & extremo die volet reſurrectionem carnis. De qua voluntate intelligi debet illud, Pſal. 115. 3. Deus noster in coelo, quaecun que voluit facit. & Apoſt. ad Rom. 9. 19. Voluntati ejus quis reſiſtit? Aliqua item vult cum conditione quae idcirco in effectum non prodeunt niſi conditione impletâ: quomodo omnes homines ſalvari vult, ſed per & propter Chriſtum fide apprehenſum. Atqui non omnes fide aphrehendunt Chriſtum, ſed abſ que paenitentiâ ac fide plurimi de hoc mundo decedunt. Quo reſpectu tales in aeternum ſtatuit damnare. De conditionatâ illâ voluntate extant longè plurima apud Veteres Scriptores. Aliqua hoc loco aſcribemus.

Such indeed are Beza's words upon that of the Apoſtle, Who hath given firſt unto God? Rom. 11. 35. Eſt autem etiam hic locus (ſaith he) diligenter obſervandus adverſus eos qui fidei, vel operum praeviſionem faciunt electionis cauſam. In quem errorem ſanc turpiſſimum. Origenes veteres pleroſ que tum Graecos tum Latinos adegit donec; tandem Dominus Auguſtinum per Pelagianos ad hunc agnoſcendum & corrigendum errorem excitaret. The firſt part this Author conceales, it being by Beza delivered as touching election; and this Author deales purpoſely on reprobation only. The latter part likewiſe he paſſeth by; for Beza confines this which he ſaith of the Ancients to a certain time, namely, the time preceding the troubles raiſed by Pelagius. But this Author had rather it ſhould runne at randome without any determination; and then againe, the mentioning of Auſtin raiſed by God upon occaſion of Pelagius his doctrine, to take notice of this errour, and correct it, he well ſaw was like enough to blaſt all the ſhew he makes of the Ancients, eſpecially conſidering how that Pelagian faction was not by Auſtin only, but by the Catholique Church of thoſe daies beaten down. And it is well known how the writings of Auſtin were countenanced, and how many Councells of thoſe daies, made decrees againſt the Pelagian Hereſy. And for both theſe paſſages, it ſeems he was beholding to Voſſius in his Pelagian Hiſtory, Lib. 6. Theſ. 8. which is this, Graeci Patres ſemper, Patrum verò Latinorum illi qui ante Auguſtinum vixerunt, dicere ſolent, eos eſſe praedeſtinatos ad vitam, quos Deus p • e recte que victuros praevidit, ſive ut alii loquuntur quos praevidit credituros, & perſeveraturos, &c. Quod ita interpretatur ut praedeſtinatio ad gloriam facta dicitur, ſecundum praeſcientiam fidei & perſeverantiae. And next unto ſome paſſages alleadged out of Origen he brings in theſe two paſſages of Beza and Calvin. Now it liked not this Author to take his courſe to begin with Clemens Alexandrinus, and his Scholler Origen, as Voſſius doth: For albeit Origen was a man for his learning of great authority in the Church of God, in ſuch ſort that it was wont to be ſaid, that Origenis ingenium Eccleſiae Sacramentum, and no marvail if many followed him, and 'tis uſuall even with Hierome in his Commentaries to follow him. Yet after his death, his Writings were found at length to have a very ill ſavour in the Catholique Church. And amongſt other foul opinions found in him, one nearly concerning this very particular we have in hand, was that which Voſſius there delivers in this manner, Veterum multorum opinio eſt, putâſſe eum animas corporibus vel praedeſtinatorum, vel reproborum uniri pro iis quae bene vel male egiſſent ante conditum corporeum hunc mundum. Judge I pray whether here be not a ſweet noſegay for the Divill, as touching the foreſight of works, not to come, but of works paſt before they were borne, and thereupon their ſoules united either to bodies predeſtinated unto life, or reprobated unto death. Yet Voſſius would not have us think either Origen deceived by Clement (which no man ever ſaid that I know, neither doth Voſſius pretend any ſuch thing) or that Chryſoſtome was deceived by them, or thoſe that followed, by him, all this ſeems to be delivered only to croſſe Beza, who profeſſed the Greek and Latine Fathers were deceived by Origen. Yet it is well known of what eſtimation Origen was in the Church, none of the others like him, but what is his reaſon? becauſe forſooth Ireneus lib. 4. cap. 76. profeſſeth that God did deſtinate heaven to them that ſhould believe; and to them which ſhould not believe, hell. But could he be ignorant that Fulgentius profeſſeth the ſelfe ſame, lib. 1. ad Monimum; namely, Deum praedeſtinaſſe ad regnum quos ad ſe praeſcivit miſericordiae praevenientis auxilio redituros, & in ſe miſericordiae ſubſequentis auxilio eſſe manſuros. Yet this very Author in his Preface profeſſeth that Fulgentius amongſt others, albeit they maintained that God did deſtinate no others to ſalvation, then ſuch as whom he foreſaw by the pure gift of his grace, would have the beginnings of faith, and a good will, and perſevere in good, yet notwithſtanding they withall maintained, that this preſcience divine of their faith and perſeverance, did flow from Gods abſolute decree to ſave them. Nay Auſtin himſelfe in Joan. Tract. 42. (as Hunnius and others alleage him, and I find it true) hath theſe words of thoſe of whom our Saviour ſaith, Therefore you heare not, becauſe ye are not of God; Praecogniti erant quòd non fuerant credituri eâ fide quâ ſolâ poſſint a peccatorum obligatione liberari; and afterwards ſaith, ſecundum hanc praedeſtinationem loquutus eſt Dominus. But will it herehence follow that Auſtin did deny abſolute predeſtination? Voſſius himſelfe acknowledgeth the contrary of him, as Praef. in Hiſt. Pelag. well as of Fulgentius, namely, that Gods foreknowledge of perſeverance in good, proceeded from Gods abſolute decree of ſaving them. And let every ſober reader judge whether upon the ſame grounds it doth not follow, that Gods foreknowledge of mans perſeverance in infidelity, doth not likewiſe follow from Gods abſolute decree of reprobating him. For what is the ground of the former, but this, that God had abſolutely decreed to give faith unto ſome? Now doth it not herehence follow, that God abſolutely decreed to deny faith unto others? For as Ambroſe ſaith, and as Auſtin alleageth out of him, ſi voluiſſet ex indevotis feciſſet devotos. Yet am not I of Voſſius his opinion in this. I ſay rather, Gods foreknowledge of one mans faith, proceeds from his decree not of ſaving him, but of giving him faith; and Gods foreknowledge of another mans finall perſeverance in infidelity, proceeds from Gods decree, not of damning him, but of denying him grace to cure his infidelity. And as for the decree of ſalvation, I deny it to be in any moment of nature, before the decree of giving grace; in like ſort, I deny the decree of damnation to be in any moment of nature before the decree of permitting mans infidelity to continue uncured unto the end. And the criticall queſtion in this point conſiſts in this, Whether the granting of grace, or deniall of grace, be not meerely of the pleaſure of God, and not according to any different diſpoſitions in man; by grace underſtanding grace effectuall to the working of faith and true repentance. And unleſſe the Ancients be ſhewed to have maintained, either that faith, and repentance, are not the gifts of God; or, that if they be the gifts of God, that God diſpenſeth his effectuall grace for the working of them, not according to the meer pleaſure of God, but according to the different diſpoſitions of men; all that they talke of the Ancients in this point, is meerly vaine and to no purpoſe.

But I come to Proſper, whoſe relation, I doubt not, this Author takes to be of greateſt moment. Now to this I anſwer.

1. To ſay that, Penè omnium par invenitur & una ſententia, qua propoſitum & praedeſtinationem Dei ſecundum praeſcientiam receperunt, doth not prove that there is no footing amongſt the Ancients for abſolute predeſtination. Neither doth Voſſius alleage halfe ſo many Fathers for this opinion, as were thoſe Biſhops who joyned with Cyprian in decreeing the Rebaptization of Hereticks.

2. This ſeems to be related by Proſper, not ſo much out of his own opinion, as by way of an objection propoſed by the Maſſilienſes, deſiring Auſtin to ſhew how it is to be anſwered. Illud etiam (ſaith he) qualiter dilucitur quaeſumus demonſtres quod retractatis Priorum hac de re opinionibus, penè omnium invenitur par & una ſententia, &c. And this is farther evidenced by theſe words of Proſper. Obſtinationem ſuam vetuſtate defendunt ut ea quae de Epiſtolâ Pauli Romanis ſcribentis, ad manifeſtationem divinae gratiae praevenientis Electorum merita proferuntur, a nullo unquam Eccleſiaſticorum ita eſſe intellecta ut nunc ſentiuntur, affirment.

3. Obſerve, When Proſper urged them to expound thoſe paſſages in St Paul, after what meaning they thought beſt, they forthwith profeſſed ingeniouſly that they found nothing in the Fathers that gave them content: their words related by Proſper are theſe, Nihil ſe inveniſſe quod placeret.

4. Bellarmine, De Grat. & liber. Arbit. lib. 2. cap. 14. takes notice of this objection drawn out of Proſper and anſwereth it, according unto Auſtin in this manner, Auguſtinus ipſe in libr. de Bono Perſev. cap. 20. dicit Veteres Patres, qui ante Pelagium floruerunt, quaeſtionem iſtam nunquam acuratè tractaſſe ſed incidenter ſolùm & quaſi per tranſitum illam attigiſſe. Addit verò in fundamento hujus ſententiae quod eſt, Gratiam Dei non praeveniri ab ullo opere noſtro; ſed contrà, ab illo omnia opera noſtra praeveniri, ita ut nihil omninò boni quod attinet ad ſalutem, ſit in nobis quod non ſit nobis ex Deo, convenire Catholicos omnes; & ibidem citat Cyprianum, Ambroſium, Nazianzenum. So that it appears hereby, that Auſtin did not acknowledge the former Writers to have embraced this opinion, though the Maſſilienſes pretended ſo much. And herewithall he openeth unto us, a way how to conceive aright of their opinion in predeſtination; namely, that as many as acknowledge Gods grace preventing us in every good work, they all are to be accounted to agree with him in the doctrine of predeſtination. For it is apparent, that in the contrary doctrine Pelagius grounded his opinion concerning predeſtination. And Auſtin himſelfe ſometime thought that God, quem ſibi crediturum eſſe praeſcivit, ipſum elegit, cui ſpiritum ſanctum daret, ut bona operando vitam aeternam conſequeretur: and why ſo? becauſe forſooth he at that time conceived it to be mans work to believe, which ſaith he, I had never ſaid, had I known faith it ſelfe to have been amongſt the gifts of the holy Ghoſt. Retract. lib. 1. cap. 25. and therefore De Praedeſti. Sanct. cap. 1. in his anſwer to the Letter of Hilarius, mark what courſe Auſtin takes for the juſtifying of his own doctrine concerning predeſtination. Prius fidem quâ Chriſtiani ſumus donum Dei eſſe debemus ostendere. And Bellarmine in the place above cited profeſſeth, that Auſtin did herehence rightly collect out of the Fathers, Gratuitae praedeſtinationis ſententiam & fidem in Eccleſiâ Catholicâ ſemper fuiſſe. Ne que olim (ſaith he) defendi poteſt praedeſtinatio ex operibus praeviſis, niſi aliquid boni ponatur in homine juſto, quo diſcernatur ab impio quod non ſit illi à Deo; quod ſanè (ſaith he) Patres omnes cum ſummâ conſenſione rejiciunt. In like ſort, Junius in his anſwer to Baro for the juſtifying of gratuitous predeſtination, counts it ſufficient to prove, Fidem eſſe donum praedeſtinantis & miſerentis Dei ex praedeſtinatione ipſius. And adds ſaying, Hoc omnes Patres uno conſenſu ex Chriſto & Paulo agnoverunt. Ipſe Juſtinus Martyr Apolog. 2. & alii. Graviſſimè verò Clemens Alexandrinus (in hac alioqui paleſtrâ non ita exercitatus) ut ſequentia ſaecula. Stromat. lib. 2. Baſilidis & Valentimi dogma eſſe dicit, quod fides à naturâ ſit. In my poor judgement, the Fathers, as many as ſtated predeſtination according to the preſcience of mens works, had no other meaning but this, that God did predeſtinate no man to eternall life, but ſuch as coming to ripe years ſhould believe in Chriſt and repent; no man unto eternall death, but ſuch as ſhould finally perſevere in infidelity and impenitency; ſo making works foreſeen the cauſe of ſalvation, but not of Gods decree. And Aquinas was bold to profeſſe that, Nemo fuit it a inſanae mentis qui diceret merita eſſe cauſam praedeſtinationis divinae quoad actum praedeſtinantis. And 'tis a good rule that Gerſon gives, that holy mens Writings are not to be urged preciſely according to the letter, De Vitâ Spirituali animae Sect. 1. co. 11. Notet his quód Doctores etiam ſancti ſunt magis reverenter gloſſandi in multis, quàm ampliandi: quoniam non omnes ſemper adverterunt, aut advertere cogitaverunt ad proprietatem locutionis. Improprietas autem non ampliari debet, ſed ad proprietatem reduci, alioquin quid mirum ſi augetur deceptio.

5. We know what anſwer Auſtin himſelfe makes unto this, De Praedeſtin. Sanct. cap. 14. Quid igitur opus eſt ut eorum ſcrutemur opuſcula, qui priuſquam iſta Haereſis oriretur, non habuerunt neceſſitatem in hac difficili ad ſolvendum quaeſtione verſari, quod proculdubio facerent ſi reſpondere talibus cogerentur.

6. As before I ſhewed, Fulgentius himſelfe maintaines predeſtination to be ſecundum praeſcientiam; yet Voſſius acknowledgeth him as well as Auſtin, to have maintained the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination.

7. Laſtly, this paſſage concerneth predeſtination alone, as it ſignifies the divine decree of conferring glory; but who ever was known to maintaine the divine decree of conferring grace to have been ſecundum praeſcientiam, according to foreſight of any work in man? For this is plainly to maintain, that grace is given according unto works, which in the Ancients phraiſe is all one, as to acknowledge, that grace is given according unto merits, which is direct Pelagianiſme, and condemned 1200 years agoe in the Synod of Paleſtine.

As for that of Minutius Foelix, We deny that God doth, ſortem in hominibus punire, non voluntatem. We doe not ſay, Genitura plectitur; we ſay that in every one who is puniſhed by God, ingenii natura punitur; Wee confeſſe that Fatum illud est quod de unoquo que Deus fatus eſt; and that pro meritis & ſingulorum qualitatibus, etiam fata determinat. Yet the holy Ghoſt profeſſeth in the mouthes of all his Apoſtles, that both Herod, and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and People of Iſrael, were gathered together againſt the holy ſonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and Gods councell predetermined to be done; and yet this predetermination divine, I ſhould think, was nothing prejudiciall to the liberty of their wills.

As for Hierome, this Author ſaith that he was an eager oppoſer of the Pelagians, but no where doth it appeare, that the point of predeſtination comes in queſtion between them. Theſe very paſſages out of Hierome are propoſed by Grotius in his Pietas Ordinum Hollandiae, and anſwered by Gratianus Civilis punctually, and long before by Bellarmine Lib. 2. de Grat. & lib. arb. cap. 14.

I anſwer, what is this any other, but that which the Fathers many of them have profeſſed in ſaying, that predeſtination is ſecundum praeſcientiam; And doth not Fulgentius affirm the ſame? Yet is he acknowledged by Voſſius, a maintainer of the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination as well as Auſtin. Did Hierome deny faith to be the gift of God? or granting it to be the gift of God, did he maintaine, that God gave it according unto works? If not, but according to the meer pleaſure of his will, having mercy on ſome, while he hardned others; the caſe is cleare, that he maintained abſolute election unto faith. As for Gods decree of ſalvation and damnation, we willingly profeſſe, that God decreed to ſave no man but upon his finall perſeverance in faith and piety; to damne none, but ſuch as finally perſevere in infidelity and impenitency. Now compare we theſe decrees together, the decree of giving faith, and the decree of ſaving; which of theſe are moſt likely to be the foremoſt; it is apparent that ſalvation is more likely to be the end in reſpect of faith, and faith the means in reſpect of ſalvation, then the contrary. And the generall and moſt received rule of Schooles is, that the intention of the end is before the intention of the means. I think the glory of God in the way of mercy, mixed with juſtice is the end of both; and that the decrees of giving faith and ſalvation are ſimultaneous, as decrees of means tending to the ſame end, and ſo neither before the other. But Hierome ſaith, that, ex Praeſcientia futurorum naſcitur dilectio vel odium. I confeſſe he doth in a disjunctive manner thus, vel ex praeſcientia vel ex operibus. And we know that paſſions ſuch as Love and Hatred, are commonly ſaid to be attributed to God, not quoad affectum but quoad effectum, and ſo they may fairely ſtand for ſalvation and damnation, which proceed ex operibus in Hieroms phraiſe. But admit he means hereby, decretum ſalvandi which riſing expraeſcientia fidei, muſt preſuppoſe the decree of giving faith to precede. I anſwer then, there is to be acknowledged an impropriety of ſpeech, and here is place for Gerſons rule, Sancti non ſemper adverterunt ad proprietatem locutionis. And the rather becauſe Hierome we never find exerciſed in this Controverſy. And it is againſt common reaſon, that faith ſhould be intended before ſalvation. And laſtly, this were to impute unto him to acknowledge 2 motive cauſe of Predeſtination quoad actum praedestinantis: which Aquinas profeſſeth againſt, as a thing impoſſible; namely, that there ſhould be a cauſe of Gods will quoad actum volentis; Nay he is bold to ſay that, No man was ſo mad to ſay that merits are the cauſe of Predeſtination quoad actum praedeſtinantis.

The laſt part of this Authors performance in the poynt of Antiquity is the Councell of Arles, ſubſcribing as he ſaith, the letter which was written by Fauſtus againſt Lucidus the Predeſtinarian (for ſo he ſtyles him) and in his Epiſtle he inſiſts upon two Anathema's, the one this, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepiſſe ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit. The other this, Anathema illi qui dixerit quod vas contumcliae non poſſit affurgere, ut ſit vas in honorem.

Firſt, I will anſwer as touching the Anathema's themſelves, then as touching the credit and authority of this ſtory.

1. As touching the Anathema's. The firſt proceeds as well of him that is baptized and afterwards periſheth, as of him that is a Pagan and never was baptized, and periſheth in his Paganiſme, as the Anathema it ſelfe witneſſeth, if it be repeated at full, thus, Anathema illi qui dixerit illum qui periit non accepiſſe, ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit, id eſt, vel de baptizato, vel de illius aetatis Pagano, qui credere potuit & noluit. By which latter clauſe it appears, that accipere ut ſalvus eſſe poſſit, is no other then to receive Poſsibilitatem credendi (I ſay Poſſibilitatem not Potentiam, becauſe I find this is Faustus his uſuall phraiſe, as it was the phraiſe of Pelagius before him) and this is as much as to ſay, that every man hath power to believe if he will. Now obſerve I pray, This kind of power is meerely nature, not that which we commonly call Grace, whereby we underſtand ſomething diſtinct from nature. And Auſtin acknowledgeth both, De Gen. contr. Manichae. lib. 1. cap. 3, that all men, poſſunt credere ſi velint; and that this is no more then is ſignified by that naturall illumination wherewith God enlightens every man, when he comes into the world, Iohn. 1. 9. And, De Praedeſt. Sanct. cap. 5. Poſſe habere fidem, ſicut poſſe habere charitatem, naturae eſt hominum. Fidem verò habere, ſicut & charitatem habere gratiae eſt fidelium. And more then this, the ſtate of the queſtion between Pelagius and the Catholiques of thoſe daies is ſo propoſed by Auſtin, as not at all to conſiſt about the poſſibility of believing or doing any good work, but meerly about the willing & doing of it. In ſo much that Auſtin profeſſeth, that if Pelagius would acknowledge the will and doing of good to be from God, as he did the poſſibility hereof to be from God, there ſhould be an end of all controverſy between them, and Pelagius ſhould be received as a good Catholique. This appears in his book, De Gratiâ Chriſti contra Pelagium & Caeleſtium cap. 6. Pelagius his words were theſe ſpeaking of God Qui ipſius voluntatis & operis poſſibilitatem dedit. Hanc autem poſſibilitatem (ſaith Auſtin) in naturâ eum ponere de verbis ejus ſuperioribus clarum eſt. Sed, ne nihil de gratiâ dixiſſe videretur, adjunxit, qui que ipſam ipſam voluntatem gratiae ſuae adjuvat ſemper auxilio. Now this adjutorium poſſibilitatis, in what ſence he delivered it, Auſtin profeſſeth to be obſcure, both as touching the nature of it, and as touching the manner how he conceived the nature of man to be aided thereby; but in other places, ſaith he, where he ſpeaks more plainly, it appears to conſiſt in giving a law, and affording inſtruction. Now by the way mark Auſtins obſervation upon theſe words of Pelagius, Qui que ipſam poſsibilitatem gratiae ſuae adjuvat ſemper auxilio; non ait, ſaith Auſtin, ipſam voluntatem vel ipſam operationem, quod ſi diceret, non abhorrere à doctrinâ Catholicâ videretur. Now, voluntatem adjuvari, in Auſtins meaning, is, Voluntatem praeparari à Domino ut velit; & operationem adjuvari is, voluntatem corroborari ne fruſtrà velit. The one operation he calls grace prevenient, the other ſubſequent, according to that, Nolentem praevenit ut velit, volentem ſubſequitur ne fruſtrà velit. And cap. 25. of the ſame Book, Non ſolum Deus poſſe nostrum donavit at que adjuvat, ſed etiam velle & operari operatur in nobis, whereby it appears that Voluntatem at que operationem noſtram adjuvari à Deo, is Deum operari in nobis & velle & operari quod bonum eſt; which if Pelagius had acknowledged he had been received for a Catholique. So that he excepted not againſt him for acknowledging Poſsibilitatem volendi, at que agendi quod bonum eſt.

As touching the ſecond Anathema, I ſay that Vas contumeliae may be taken in a double ſenſe: either to ſignify a veſſel deſerving contumely, deſerving wrath; or to ſignify a Veſſell ordained to contumely, and to the ſuffering of eternall wrath. In the firſt ſenſe, there is no queſtion but a man may change from being a veſſell of contumely, or a veſſell of wrath, into the condition of a veſſell of honour; but in the ſecond ſenſe, it is as impoſſible there ſhould be any ſuch change, as it is impoſſible there ſhould be any change in God, whereof I think there is no queſtion: and both Fauſtus and Lucidus might take the phraiſe in the former ſenſe: but if they did take it in this latter ſenſe, dares this Author juſtify them?

2. Now I come to the credit and authority of this ſtory concerning the Councell of Arles; and

1. I ſay, ſuppoſe it be a truth; yet about the yeare 494. there was a Roman Councell wherein Gelaſius and 70 Biſhops with him juſtify the writings of Auſtin, and Proſper, and condemne the writings of Caſſian and Fauſtus, by whoſe procurement it is here pretended the Biſhops of Arles ſubſcribed this Epiſtle of Fauſtus unto Lucidus. And the Fathers of this pretended Councell of Arles are not reckoned up above ſixteen.

2. The credit of this ſtory lyeth wholly upon Fauſtus his relation and his honeſty therein, a man infamous in the Church for oppoſing Auſtin and his doctrine of grace and predeſtination, as appears by the Writings of Fulgentius, Petrus Diaconus, Alchimus Avitus and others. Ado Viennenſis in Chron. ad ann. 492. writes of him thus. Fauſtus ex Abbate Monaſterii Licinenſis apud Regem Galliae Epiſcopus facius, Pelagianorum dogma deſtruere conatus (which yet may be made apparent to have been meerly in pretence) in errorem unde qui ejus ſenſus in hac parte Catholicos praedicant, ſicut Germadius de Viris illuſtribus ſcribens, omninò errant. Ita enim liberum arbitrium tàm Auguſtinus quam caeteri Catholici in Eccleſia Dei docent ut illuminatio, virtus & ſalus illi à Chriſto, per Chriſtum, & in Chriſto ſit. Fauſtus verò iſte ita liberum Chriſtianorum arbitrium docere conatur, ut illuminatio, virtus & ſalus non à Chriſto, ſed a naturâ ſit. Contra hunc ſcribit beatiſſimus Avitus Viennenſis Epiſcopus lucidiſſima fide ejus redarguens errorem; ſimiliter & Joannes vir eruditiſſimus Antiochenus Presbyter. Iſidore in his Book De Viris illuſtribus, teſtifies that Fulgentius wrote ſeven Books againſt Fauſtus, Qui mirâ calliditate Catholicus videri volebat cum Pelagianus eſſet. Auctor quo que Vitae 5ti Fulgentii teſtatur à Sancto Fulgentio refutatos libros duos Fauſti de Grat. & Liber. Arbitrio. And Petrus Diaconus in his Book De Incarnatione & Gratiâ Chriſti cap. ultim. Anathema dicit Libris Fauſti, And this Bellarmine, de Script. Eccleſ. writes to admoniſh them, who in theſe Letters contend, that Fauſtus was a Catholique.

Farther obſerve the Biſhops who are pretended to have ſubſcribed Fauſtus his Epistle to Lucidus are numbred theſe.

Auxianus. Claudius. Euphronius. Eutropius. Fauſtus. Julianus. Leucadius. Megetius. Patiens. Paulus. Pragmatius.

But the Biſhops that were aſſembled at the Councell of Arles are Theſe.

Agricii nomine Cataphronius. Caeleſtinus. Caeſarius. Conſtantini nomine Leontius. Contumelioſius. Cyprianus. Eucherius. Florentius. Galliani nomine Melerius. Joannis nomine Deſiderius. Julianus. Maximus. Philagrius. Praetextatus. Proitianus. Severi nomine Cataphronius.

Thus they are reckoned up on both ſides by Voſſius, amongſt whom there is but one name common. To help this, Voſſius deviſeth a 4th Councel of Arles and that the Biſhops mentioned to have ſubſcribed Fauſtus his Epiſtle, to be the Biſhops aſſembled in the 4th Councel of Arles, and not thoſe whom we read to have been aſſembled at the Third. But that any ſuch Biſhops were aſſembled at a 4th Councell of Arles he brings no evidence, that I find; but his own conjecture is the beſt ground for this. And all this pains is taken to ſalve Fauſtus his reputation in this. And the reaſon that moves Voſsius to conceive that this ſubſcription was not a meer fiction of Fauſtus, is this; Becauſe forſooth if this had been a meer fiction of Fauſtus, ſurely Maxentius in oppoſing him, would not have failed to have caſt this in his teeth. Binius is eager in the defence of theſe Epiſcopall ſubſcriptions, but withall confeſſeth, that either Fauſtus himſelfe, or ſome in his name, practiſed to countenance his Books alſo by the authority of thoſe Biſhops. In fine (ſaith he) hujus Commentarii & Libelli, ipſe Faustus, vel alius quis dolosè addider at haec verba, In quo quidem opuſculo poſt Arelatinſis Concilii ſubſcriptionem, novis erroribus deprehenſis adjici aliqua Synodus Lugdunenſis exegit, ut ſcilicet (ſaith Binnius) aliquo fuco venditari poſſet quaſi ſcriptum de gratiâ & libero arbitrio Commentarium duae Synodi recepiſſent & approbaſſent. Now if ſuch were the diſhoneſt art of Fauſtus in counterfeiting this, why might he not be as diſhoneſt in counterfeiting the former Epiſcopall ſubſcriptions alſo? And if Voſſius his reaſon to ſalve Fauſtus his credit, were of force in this, why ſhould it not be in force in the other alſo? For Maxentius we doe not find to have excepted againſt his fidelity, more in the one then in the other? And why might not Maxentius be ignorant of them both? And in Biblioth. Sanct. Patrum. there is an admonition added to Fauſtus his Epiſtle to Loentius, ex Indice Expurgat. M. Script. Pelatii, wherein though Fauſtus his epiſtle to Lucidus, is acknowledged to have been approved by the Epiſcopall ſubſcriptions in the Councell of Arles, yet as touching Fauſtus his mendicating authority from thoſe Fathers to his books, De Grat. & Lib. Arbit. The Author thereof ſpares not in plain termes to give Fauſtus the lye in theſe words. Neutiquam tamen ullus ob id exiſtimet ab utro que Concilio approbatos tres libros Fauſti de Gratiâ, ut ipſe mendaciter innuere videtur in ea quae his ſubjicitur, praefatoriâ Epistolâ ad Epiſcopum Leontinum &c. But can Voſſius ſhew that Maxentius did caſt this jugling courſe of Fauſtus in his teeth?

But it ſeems that Voſſius had no great need to trouble himſelfe in the vindicating of Fauſtus his reputation in pretending the ſubſcription of Biſhops to his Epiſtle written to Lucidus. For how doth it appeare that Fauſtus is the author of any ſuch pretence? It is true, in the Epiſtle it ſelfe that he wrote to Lucidus, he profeſſeth that he kept a copy of it, to ſhew to that aſſembly of Biſhops, Hujus Epiſtolae exemplar mecum retineo in conventu Sanctorum Antiſtitum, ſi ita neceſſe fuerit, proferendum: by the way obſerve that this reſolution of his, was not abſolute, but ſi ita neceſſe fuerit, and this neceſſity he ſignifies wherein it did conſiſt, namely in caſe Lucidus by his ſilence, did give teſtimony of his continuance in his errour, as he calls it, His words are theſe, Quod ſi eam ſubſcriptam tranſmittere nolueris, aperte adhuc te in errore perſiſtere ipſo ſilentio comprobabis, ac perinde iam neceſſitatem mihi facies ad perſonam tuam publicis conventibus exponendam. Now as for that which followes after the end of the Epiſtle, Et ſubſcripſerunt Epiſcopi, qui ordine ſubſequuntur qui in eâ quo que Synodo adfuerunt.

Auxanius in Chriſti nomine Epiſcopus, Relegi & ſubſcripſi Fauſtus exemplar Epiſtolae meae Relegi & ſubſcrip. Paulus Epiſcopus in Chriſti nomine, Rel. & ſubſcrip. Eutropius &c.

Obſerve the admonition ſubjoyned by Henricus Caniſius. Theſe ſubſcriptions, ſaith he, are not in the Manuſcript. Hae ſubſcriptiones non ſunt in Manuſcripto Codice. Conſider I pray the fair iſſue of this Authors learned pretence of Antiquity, he honoureth the gray haires of Fauſtus, and thoſe grave aſſemblies mentioned by him whereof we have no certainty; but how honoureth he the grayer haires of Auſtin, & of all the Aſſemblies againſt the Pelagians, that you may gueſſe, though he concealeth it. And herein his devotion to this kind of Antiquity, where he thinketh it will ſerve his turne, he is content you ſhould conceive it doth exceed the devotion of Calvin and Beza, yea and of Auſtin alſo; whoſe anſwer to Proſper he is content to paſſe by as not ſavouring ſo much of piety in his judgement, but the Maſſilienſes zeale of the Ancients repreſented by Proſper unto Auſtin, that is ſuitable to his humour, he reliſheth that well, and ſo well that he thinks it fit vehemently to miſtruſt thoſe doctrines which they never approved, but diſliked and condemned. Yet of any condemnation other then what is implied by Fauſtus, a man infamous, and whoſe Writings were condemned by 70 Biſhops, he makes no mention. And before Auſtins daies, and the daies of Pelagius, the Ancients were not exerciſed with any controverſy hereabouts. And was their non-approbation of his doctrine, concerning abſolute predeſtination, any motive to Auſtin vehemently to miſtruſt the truth thereof? I think he will not ſay it was; and therefore I hope he will give Calvin and Beza leave, never a whit the more for that cauſe, to miſtruſt the ſame doctrine, in granting the Ancients to have conceived predeſtination to proceed ſecundum praeſcientiam according unto foreknowledge, he is content to conform himſelfe to their judgement; but in miſtruſting the contrary doctrine, hereupon you muſt give him leave to follow his own, or any, rather then not Calvins or Beza's, but even Auſtins alſo, though never ſo much magnified by the Church of God, and his writings countenanced eſpecially againſt the Pelagians, and the contrary condemned, by other manner of Councells then Arelatenſe 3d, and Lugdunenſe. I remember when Epicurus was demanded why, ſeeing he followed Leucippus ſo much, he did not follow him throughout, made this anſwer ſaying, I doe as a man that is a thirſt when he takes the cup to drink, for he drinks what will ſerve his turne, and ſets the reſt by: ſo you muſt give this Author leave to repreſent his devotion to gray haires, ſo farre as they ſerve his turne, and no farther. Yet I have ſhewed how Auſtin maintaines, as touching the Ancients that went before him, that they concurred with him in fundomento praedeſtinationis, which he accounted the the doctrine of Free grace, and cites to this purpoſe Cyprian, Ambroſe, and Nazianzen, and by the common prayers of the Church, that God would convert the unbelievers unto the faith of Chriſt; that the ſame doctrine, which was in his judgement the foundation of predeſtination, as he maintained it according to the Word of God, was generally received in the Church of God.

Before I part from this, I think fit to adde ſomething concerning the ſtile here given to Lucidus, before the revocation of his pretended error; for here I find him ſtiled the Predeſtinarian. Now I preſume this Author, that pretends ſo great reverence to gray haires, and ſo much preferres Antiquity before Novelty, hath good ground for this his denomination of him, and that out of Antiquity. Now I deſire he would be pleaſed to communicate unto us, his learned reading in Antiquity for this; and the rather, becauſe in the whole ſtory of the buſineſſe between Fauſtus and Lucidus, I find no mention of any ſuch attribute given to his perſon, or to the doctrine (reputed by Fauſtus erroneous) maintained by him. The terme Praedeſtinatus qualirying a perſon, I find firſt in Arnobius junior, and from that time I find not the Praedeſtinati, or Praedeſtinatians mentioned till the daies of Hinemarus, about the year of our Lord God 850. And as for the ſtory of the Predeſtinarian Hereſy, which this Author licks his lipps at, the originall whereof is referred to the yeare 415 by Sigibertus; it is very ſtrange, that in Auſtins daies it was not known unto him, or being known, not taken notice of by him, nor by Proſper neither after him. And Alphonſus à Caſtro in his Book contra Haereſes, profeſſeth that the Author of this Hereſy he found not, neither in Sigibert, nor in any other; becauſe indeed not one of thoſe who wrote of Hereſics makes mention of this Hereſy, beſides Bernard of Lutzenburg in his Catalogue of Heretiques; and he ſaith no more of it, then what Sigibert mentioneth in his Chronicle. And withall he addes, that after this errour was buried, by the ſpace of almoſt a thouſand years, it was revived by John Huſſe the Bohemian. Whereby it appears, that Alphonſus was not of this Authors opinion in cenſuring this Lucidus for a Predeſtinarian. And the firſt that I find to intimate ſo much is Hincmarus about the yeare 850. In like ſort Prateölus acknowledgeth that, Quis corum Dux & inſtitutor fuerit, neſcitur. But Gerardus Voſſius hath herein helped us with this conjecture, referring the originall of this Hereſy to the Monks of Adrumetum; and Biſhop Uſher in his Hiſtoriá Godeſcalci ſaith, Voſſius was the firſt that charged thoſe Adrumetine Monks to be the author thereof. Yet if I be not deceived, he might be beholding to Coccius for helping him to this conceit. But this makes the matter more ſtrange another way, namely that Auſtin ſhould not take notice of this Predeſtinarian Hereſy, ſeeing none was ſo well acquainted with the opinion of thoſe his neighbour Monks, as he, being the man, whom they conſulted about the difference that roſe thereabouts, and wrote two Books thereupon and compoſed all. And yet I ſee no reaſon why Voſſius ſhould referre it to the Adrumetine Monks hand over head, when as it is cleer by the relation of them, that came over to Auſtin to complaine thereof, and to conferre with him thereupon; that they were but few, who were carried away with that errour, whereof they complained, and that it was but one, that troubled the place of their Monaſtery herein, who was as it were the Ringleader to the reſt; of which Voſſius could not be ignorant. And therefore I ſee no cauſe why he ſhould charge them all indifferently, or that party either, who were tainted herewith, as is pretended; ſeeing there was an Anteſignanus who led the reſt, of whom Voſſius ſpeaks nothing at all; and I ſuppoſe he knew ſome good cauſe why. Beſides, the Predeſtinarian Hereſy is pretended to have riſen Ab Auguſtini libris malè intellectis. Now I find no colour of evidence hitherto, that theſe Monks of Adrumentum, whom Voſsius makes the founders of this Hereſy, were led awry by the miſunderſtanding of Auſtins writings. Neither doth Voſſius any where, that I know, take any pains to cleare this. And I would gladly be beholding to this Author, that pretends ſo much zeale unto, and skill in the knowledge of Antiquity, and ſo boldly ſtileth Lucidus a Predeſtinarian, for communicating unto us his rare evidences concerning this point, out of his great obſervations. And ſo much the rather, to take mee off from mine errour, who ſince the firſt time that I travelled in the ſearch after this Predeſtinarian Hereſy in dealing with Corvinus, which is now ſome three years agoe. I have been apt to conceive that this Hereſy from the firſt, was but a meer fiction of the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians, cunningly to diſgrace thereby the doctrine of St Auſtin. And ſince the coming forth of Dr Uſhers Hiſtory in the cauſe of Godeſcalcus, I have been confirmed herein; as wherein he gives to underſtand, that whereas Tyro Proſper wrote hereof before Sigibert, although the Printer hath made him to ſpeak as Sigibert doth, namely, that Haec Haereſis orta eſt ab Auguſtini libris malè intellectis: yet that is not the language of Tyro himſelfe, but plainly this, Haec Haereſis ab Augustino orta eſt, and that learned Biſhop hath ſhewed out of two Manuſcripts of Tyro, the one in Bennet Colledge in Cambridge, the other in our Kings Library: and this he farther confirmes by comparing the deſcription which Gennadius makes of that, which he calls the Predeſtinatian Hereſy, with the doctrine of Auguſtin. lib. 5. cont. Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. & de Bono Perſev. cap. 15. And withall the ſame learned Biſhop makes it appeare, that look what doctrine Sigebertus aſcribes to the Predeſtinatians, the ſame doctrine was charged upon Auſtin, and ſuch as concurred with him therein. This I ſay that learned Biſhop proves out of the beginning of the 6 Book Hypemneſticon. Credere nos vel praedicare ſugillatis quod Deus quoſdam hominum ſic praedeſtinet ad vitam regni caelorum, ut ſi nolint or are, aut jejunare, aut in omni opere divino vigiles eſſe, eos omninò perire non poſſe, nec prorſus ſui debere eſſe ſollicitos quos Deus quia voluit ſemel jam elegendo praedeſtinavit ad vitam: quoſdam verò ſic praedeſtinavit in Gehennae paenam ut etiam ſi credere velint, ſi jejuniis & or ationibus, omni que ſe voluntati divinae ſubjicerent, in his Deum non delectari & vitam illis aeternam in totum dari non poſſe, &c. Now this in effect is the very Hereſy of the Predeſtinatians related by Sigebert. Therefore I much deſire this Author would take the paines to prove, that this pretended Predeſtinarian Hereſy was indeed received to be an Hereſy by the Catholique Church, and not rather a fiction of the remnants of the Pelagians, wherewithall to reproach the doctrine of S. Auſtin in the poynt of Predeſtination.

Thus have I examined this Authors pretence of the Novelty of our Tenent. I come to the conſideration of that which followes.

TWISSE Conſideration.

VVHo are theſe Authors of this Doctrine, who here are ſaid to have been backward to bring it to the ſtandard? Is Beza thoſe Authors? whereof was he the Author? Was it the doctrine of predeſtination as proceeding of the meer pleaſure of God, and not upon foreſight of mans faith and works? Is it not apparent that this was the doctrine of Auſtin 1200 years agoe, and that in oppoſition to the Pelagians and Semi-Pelagians? Or was it the doctrine of reprobation, as not proceeding upon the foreſight of ſinne, but of the meer pleaſure of God? Is this Author ſo ignorant, as not to know what are the concluſions of Alvarez in the queſtion, Whether there be any cauſe of reprobation on mans part. Lib. 10. de Auxil. diſc. 110. pag. 866.

1. His firſt Concluſion is this, Reprobation whereby God decreed not to give unto ſome everlaſting life, and to permit their ſinne, is not conditionate, but abſolute: neither doth it preſuppoſe in God, foreſight of the deſerts of reprobates, or of their perſeverance in ſinne unto the laſt period of their life.

2. His next Concluſion is, In the Angells that fell, there is no cauſe of their reprobation on their part, as touching the whole effect thereof, but before any foreſight of their future ſinne, God, pro ſua Voluntate, of his meer will, did reprobate ſome of them, and ſuffered them to fall into ſinne.

3. The third, Infants departing in Originall ſinne alone, there is no cauſe on their part of reprobation, if they be conſidered in compariſon with others which are not reprobated, and the like is to be ſaid proportionably of men of ripe years.

4. The fourth, Not only comparatively, but abſolutely there is no cauſe of reprobation. Therefore neither ſinne actuall, nor originall, nor both of them foreſeen by God, was indeed the meritorious and motive cauſe of the reprobation of any, as touching all the effects thereof, and the proofe hereof he proſecutes at large.

5. Reprobation as touching the laſt effect thereof, preſuppoſeth in ſigno rationis the foreſight of ſinne originall, or actuall, for which a reprobate is damned. Marke it well, He does not ſay as the cauſe for which God decrees his damnation, but as the cauſe for which a reprobate is damned. And Aquinas (whoſe followers the Dominicans are) expreſſeth this doctrine in this manner, and that more Scholaſtically and accurately then Alvarez. Praeſcientia peccatorum poteſt eſſe aliqua ratio reprobationis ex parte paenae quae praeparatur reprobatis, in quantum ſcilicet Deus proponit ſe puniturum malos propter peccata, &c. in Ad Rom. 9. Sect. 2. in fine, that is, Preſcience of ſinnes may be ſome reaſon of reprobation on the part of puniſhment, to wit, in as much as God purpoſeth to puniſh wicked men for their ſinnes. Where ſinne is evidently made the cauſe of damnation, and that by vertue of Gods purpoſe, but by no means the cauſe of the decree it ſelfe. And the ſame Aquinas elſewhere profeſſeth that, No man was ſo mad as to affirme that merits are the cauſe of Predeſtination, as touching the act of God Predestinating: and that it cannot be the cauſe thereof, he proves, becauſe nothing can be the cauſe of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, but as touching the things willed by God, as formerly he had proved. The ſame doctrine in effect is taught by Durand in 1. diſt. 41. q. 2. Bonaventure applies the ſame diſtinction to reprobation it ſelfe. Odium aeternum, ſaith he, implies two things, Principale ſignificatum & connotatum &c. & primum non eſt ex meritis, ſed ſecundum. This he explicates in the words following, Quod patet ſi reſolvatur, quia Odium eſt propoſitum puniendi: Propoſitum autem nullus meretur ſed paenam, that is, Hatred (or reprobation) is Gods purpoſe to puniſh: Of this divine purpoſe there is no meritorious cauſe, but only of the puniſhment. The ſame was the Opinion of Gandavenſis, Scotus, Halenſis, as I have ſhewed in my Vindiciae.

Now judge I pray with how little judgement, or modeſty this Author intimates Beza to be the author of the doctrine of abſolute reprobation. Perhaps he will ſay his meaning is, that he was the author of the Upper-way, as touching the making of the object of Predeſtination mankind not yet created. But to this I anſwer, that Beza doth ſo indeed, but he was never called to a conference hereabouts, and conſequently he never declined it. And that which was declined, he makes to be declined by the abettors, as well as the authors; which cannot be underſtood of this nice and Logicall poynt, as touching the object of reprobation. The main queſtion is, whether there be any cauſe of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating: the Negative whereof, was maintained very generally amongſt Schoole-Divines before Beza was borne. And was it ever known, that thoſe I have named did ſhrink in their heads or decline the triall thereof? What a ſilly thing is it then to inferre, that becauſe Beza at ſuch a time, did decline the diſputation hereof, and the Contra-Remonſtrants at another time, therefore it is ſuſpectable to be an untruth? Yet let us examine his inſtances.

Beza he ſaith did decline the ſifting of this doctrine (to wit, of predeſtination) (for on that they were moved to diſpute.) I doubt this Author ſpeaks by rote, and that he is nothing at all acquainted with the ſtory hereof, either in Oſiander or in Beza, but tranſcribes only what another hath prompted unto him. For it is apparent by Oſianders Hiſtory, that they did conferre thereof. It is true he ſtood off at the firſt, and gave reaſons for it, but at length he and his fellowes, condeſcended to the inſtance and importunity of their Adverſaries, and ſo came on to the Conference hereabout, His words are theſe. Praefat. in 2. part. Reſponſ. ad Acta Colloq. Mompelg. Quamvis quò evaſura eſſent reliqua ſatis proſpiceremus, mane nihilominus mutata ſententia Illuſtriſſ. Principe ſalutato, in reliquam ſequentem Collationem conſenſimus; eâ tantùm conditione additâ, ne propter proximum Paſchae Feſtum, ea diſceptatio longius protraheretur. Et ita demùm ad audiendas D. Andreae declamationes rurſum proceſſimus.

Was it this point alone the ſifting whereof, as this Author phraſeth it, Beza declined? It is apparent they were no leſſe then three Points. This appears by the ſecond part of Beza's anſwer Ad act. Colloq. Mompelg. as alſo by the anſwer of Jacobus Andreae, as if he were the mouth of the Prince, namely, that if they liſt not De Tribus illis conferre, yet he thought it fit that Theſes written by them on thoſe three Articles ſhould be rehearſed in the hearing of all, which afterwards Beza and his fellowes might take home with them to addreſſe an anſwer to them afterwards, as they thought good. And theſe three Articles were concerning, Predeſtination, Baptiſme, and the putting down of Images in Churches. Concerning all which Jacobus Andreae gives his reaſons, why he thought it fit they ſhould entertaine farther Conference; Whereunto Beza makes anſwer in his Praeface to that ſecond part of his Anſwer Ad Act. Colloq. Mompelg. It is true, this reaſon Beza gave why he thought it not fit in that place publiquely to diſpute thereof, to wit, of predeſtination, Quod haec graviſſima quaestio publicè in illo caetu allatis utrin que contrariis ſententiis diſceptari abſ que nonnullorum offendiculo non poſſe videretur. For both the myſterious nature of it is ſuch, as few are capable of it; the Maſſilienſes profeſſed as much, as appears in Proſpers Epiſtle unto Auſtin, De his taceri exigunt (ſaith Proſper) quorum altitudinem nullus attigerit. And to the ſame purpoſe, even they who durſt not diſlike Auſtins doctrine thereof profeſſed as much, as appears by the Letter of Hilarius unto Auſtin. Conſentientibus etiam his qui hanc definitionem improbare non audent, ut dicant, Quid opus fuit hujuſmodi diſputationis incerto tot minus intelligentium corda turbari? Then again it was in a Lutheran Aſſembly, and amongſt many brought up in the hatred of the doctrine which Beza maintained, who in all likelihood would be the more exaſperated. Cauſas verum tacendi Aug. de Den. Perſev. c. 16. tongum eſt omnes quaerere (ſaith Auſtin) quarum tamen eſt & haec una ne priores faciamus eos qui non intelligunt. No wiſe man, ſaith our Saviour, putteth new wine into old bottells. Quanto minus ſapit, ſaith Beza in that Preface of his, qui de praeſt antiſſimo vino prius in utres faecibus adhuc, & vappa obſitos immittendo quàm de repurgandis illis & apparandis cogitet. Laſtly, Beza perceiveth the practice of Jacobus Andreas ſtanding upon a place of advantage, to urge them to conferre upon ſuch a poynt, the truth whereof is moſt harſh to carnall affections, that ſo he might have the better opportunity to make them odious. And truly what Jacobus Andreas was, I know not, but Beza ſets him forth as a man of a moſt malevolent diſpoſition to the French Proteſtants: and our Saviour hath admoniſhed us, Not to give that which is holy unto doggs, or to caſt pearle before ſwine. Yet Andreas to ſerve his turne, and to draw them into a ſnare, pleads that the doctrine of Predeſtination, is not ſo to be put over in the Schooles, ut non opus ſit eam rudi & imperito populo ponere; yet Hunnius a man of the ſame profeſſion, is ſo farre different from Iacobus Andreas, that he thinks it not fit to preach before the rude people of preſcience divine, but very ſparingly; how much leſſe would he think it fit to Preach before them of Predeſtination divine? De Praedeſt. queſt. & reſponſ. pag. 394. his words are theſe, Interim hoc repeto quod ſupra monui rudioribus (quibus Apoſtolus vult lac propinari, non cibum ſolidum apponi) non eſſe multum de praeſcientiâ Dei diſputandum, hâc ſolummodo de cauſa quia haud perinde capiunt ea quae alias in Scholis in Diſputationibus contra adverſarios, &, ut Paulus ait, inter perfectos utiliter & ex fundamentis eloquiorum Dei aſtrui ſolent. Coram rudioribus ergo ſimplicior loquendi ratio & ipſorum captui accommodatior eſt ſi dicamus, Deum ad haereditatem regni caeleſtis elegiſſe & certo ſalvare decreviſſe eos omnes qui reſipiunt, & in vera fide filii Dei ex hâc vitâ decedunt. Its well known what order King Iames took in his time, in the reſtraint of preaching this doctrine in the Pulpits, by any under the degree of a Deane, and counſelled the States likewiſe to forbid the preaching of thoſe controverſall points amongſt them. And if it were wiſdome in them to take this courſe, without any prejudice to the truth of the doctrine, why ſhould Beza's with-holding from conference hereupon, be any thing prejudiciall thereto.

But were there not other cauſes of moment, to move him hereunto, which this Author conceales, and which Beza propoſeth in the firſt place? as namely, that the Prince who invited them hereunto, in his Letters Miſſive, alleaged no other cauſe of that meeting, but Infaelicem de Coenâ Domini controverſiam, that unhappy Controverſy about the Supper of the Lord. Secondly, that their Citties ſent them over accordingly to this Conference for no other cauſe, but to conferre thereabours. This Iacobus Andreas acknowledgeth, and giveth a reaſon why in thoſe Letters of the Prince, there was no mention made of thoſe three Articles, whereabout they were afterwards urged to conferre, to wit, quod illos in iſtis quo que diſſidere non intellexerat Princeps Illuſtriſſimus. And thirdly, becauſe the Feaſt of Eaſter approched, and they deſired to be at home in their own Citties by that time.

Laſtly, doth if follow, that becauſe they declined the ſifting the truth of theſe poynts (as this Author phraiſeth it) after ſuch a manner, to wit, by publique diſputation; doth it herehence follow, that they declined the ſifting of it? They made this offer to propoſe their opinion herein, and the confirmation of it out of the Word of God, in private before the Prince: and if Jacobus Andreas were pleaſed to propoſe any Theſes againſt it, they would take them along with them and upon conſideration to addreſſe a convenient Anſwer thereunto; This Beza ſets down in that Preface: Let D. Andrews ſhew if he can, ſaith Beza, hanc Chriſtianae doctrinae partem aut à noſtris ſive ſcribendo ſive concionando praetermiſſam, aut a ſuis rectius & acuratius quàm a noſtris pertractatam. And truly for my part, I no way like ſuch conferences, being privy to mine own imperfections, as having neither ſuch ſtrength of memory as to command a preſent uſe of my knowledge in theſe poynts upon all occaſions, nor ſuch command of my paſſions, as to keep them from breaking forth in ſuch ſort as might be obnoxious to cenſures, not knowing how I might be provoked; but certainly I feare not to come to the examination of any of their Writings, or to offer mine own to be examined by any of them. One thing I had almoſt omitted out of Beza, in his Preface to the Firſt Part of his Anſwer to theſe Acts. It was Beza's motion that all things paſſing between them on both ſides, might be ſet down in writing, under the hands of Collators; and this courſe I confeſſe I could willingly approve of, and after this manner to conferre with any. But this ſo faire a motion was rejected by Andreas; He would conferre rather by word of mouth then by writing. A ſecond motion propoſed by Beza was this, that what was ſpoken on both ſides, might be ſet down in writing by Notaries choſen and appoynted thereunto by common conſent. But neither would Andreas admit of this. Petivimus, ſaith Beza, initio ut utrin que omnia ſcriptis propria Collocutorum manu ſubſignatis agerentur. Quod cum D. Andreae non placuiſſet qui verbis agi malebat (for the Auditory was very propitious to him for the moſt part) poſtulavi ut utrin que dicta à probatis & utriuſ que partis conſenſu delectis Notariis exciperentur, quae deinde cui que parti recognoſcere & addita ſubſcriptione confirmare liceret. Haec enim erat profectò juſta & ſincera colloquendi ratio ut ſic falſationi occurreretur. Quum autem ne hoc quidem admitteret D. Andreas, &c. Now let any indifferent perſon that is not ſowred with partiall affections, judge whoſe carriage is to be thought in equity more prejudiciall to their cauſe, the carriage of Andreas, or the carriage of Beza.

I come to the Contra-Remonſtrants unwillingneſſe to conferre upon the poynt of reprobation. What their reaſons were I know not. But this I am ſure of, the Scripture is free in ſpeaking of election, and expreſſe; not ſo of reprobation, leaving us to take notice of the condition of reprobation by its oppoſition to election. And in conformity hereunto, both Auſtin in his time, and Remigius in his time, and Bradwardine in his time, ſpeaks liberally of predeſtination, but very ſparingly of reprobation. And the doctrine of reprobation as it is nothing leſſe myſterious then that of election; ſo it is farre more harſh to carnall affections. And it is well known that at the time of the Hague Conference, Barnavelt that ruled the roſt amongſt the States, was too great a friend to the Arminian Party.

But, what boldneſſe doth this Author take in paſſing his ſuſpicious cenſures upon a doctrine, becauſe ſome defenders of it, at ſome time have been loath to come to entertaine a publique Conference thereupon? For what argument call you this, The Contra-Remonſtrants would not be brought to give their reaſons on this point; therefore the doctrine of Auſtin delivered 1200 years (or thereabouts) before, concerning the abſoluteneſſe both of Predeſtination on the one ſide, and of preterition on the other (as Voſſius acknowledgeth) is to be ſuſpended of untruth? And if my readineſſe to come to the triall hereon doth nothing credit the cauſe as maintained by others; why ſhould others unwillingneſſe to come to the ſame triall, be any diſparagement to the ſame cauſe, as it is maintained by me or any other? It is well known that Peter Moulin, concurring with us in the poynt of abſolute predeſtination, maintaines reprobation to proceed upon the divine foreſight of finall perſeverance in impenitency. If this Author differed from us no more the Mr Moulin doth, and acknowledged the meer pleaſure of God, in giving grace to whom he will, and denying it to whom he will, I doe not think any friend of his would think any whit the worſe of him, or charge him with defection from the truth of God in this. Neither can I think, that he ever was of any other opinion, conſidering how many worthy Divines oppoſite to the Arminians, doe either conceive, or at leaſt ſeem to conceive that the purpoſe of God to damne, doth preſuppoſe in ſigno rationis the foreſight of finall impenitency, yet concurring with us in this, that all are fallen in Adam and ſo brought forth into the world in damnatâ Maſſà, as Auſtin calleth it. God of his meer pleaſure cures this naturall corruption (the fruits whereof are infidelity and impenitency) in ſome, by regenerating them and beſtowing the grace of faith and repentance upon them, and leaves it uncured in others by refuſing to regegenerate them, to beſtow faith and repentance upon them; We give the hands of Chriſtian fellowſhip, and brotherly amity one unto another, without all exception notwithſtanding ſome nice differences, which in the iſſue I hope, will prove to be meerly Logicall, and nothing Theologicall.

Laſtly, however this poynt of unwillingneſſe in ſome, to come to conferre in the poynt of reprobation, might caſt ſome colour of ſuſpicion to the prejudicing of their cauſe; yet leaſt of all did it become this Author to take advantage hereof, conſidering that it is his own caſe, as who declineth not one poynt only, but all the reſt in this his diſcourſe, and cleaves only to that of reprobation, nothing anſwerably (I preſume) to The Doctor directs his ſpeech unto S. Nathaniel Rich. your expectation, who put this task upon him: and whether it be any thing anſwerable to the promiſe he made unto you, your ſelf are beſt acquainted therewith. Yet becauſe the Remonſtrants hereupon (to wit, upon the Contra-Remonſtrants declining this Controverſy) have taken liberty to oppoſe the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtrants in this poynt, ſo farre forth, as they made conſtruction of their opinion hereupon, by their doctrine concerning election; therefore I will not ſpare even here, to digreſſe ſo farre, as to take notice what they delivered, and to addreſſe an anſwer hereunto, the rather becauſe I find this diſcourſe of theirs inſerted in their Relation of that Conference at Hague.

Now, whereas firſt, by a long deduction upon conſideration of the Contra-Remonſtrants doctrine in the poynt of election, they doe inferre Colloq. Hagh. Bertii p. 120. that like as faith is made by them a fruit of election, ſo infidelity is by them to be made a fruit of reprobation: this conſequence we utterly deny. It only followes herehence, that like as faith, whereby mans naturall infidelity is cured, is by them made the fruit of election, ſo the denyall of faith, that is, the not curing of mans infidelity, or the leaving of it uncured is the fruit of reprobation. And indeed conſidering the means muſt be his work who intends the end, wherehence it followeth, that look what end God doth intend in mans election, the means tending thereunto muſt be Gods work, as namely, faith; in like ſort, whatſoever be the end which God intends in reprobation, the means tending thereunto, muſt be his work, which cannot be infidelity or ſinne, but the permiſſion of ſinne rather and infidelity, or the not curing of that corruption and infidelity which is naturall unto us all. Hereupon they proceed to propoſe two things to be queſtioned, in congruity to the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtrants. 1. Utrumne Fides in conſilio & decreto Dei de electione ad ſalutem, eam ipſam electionem ordine praecedat an verò conſequatur? 2, Ex alterâ parte; An Infidelitas in eodem Conſilio & Decreto Dei de reprobatione ad exitium, eam ipſam reprobationem ordine praecedat an ſequatur? The latter of theſe is only pertinent to our preſent purpoſe; yet ſeeing they handle them both, ſo farre as to diſpute againſt the opinion of their oppoſites in both, and carry themſelves herein Magnificentiſſimè, I am content to weigh their arguments, in the ballance of Scholaſticall conſideration, leaſt ſome ſuch as this Author, ſhould affect to ſeem judicious in ſuſpecting my declining of them to ſavour of ſome inability to encounter them.

Thus therefore they beginne.

If faith followes election unto ſalvation, then alſo the decree of ſending Chriſt as a Saviour into the World, muſt neceſſarily follow that election; But this conſequent is abſurd, and pertains notably to the ignominy of Chriſt.

To this I anſwer. Firſt out of mine own opinion, Thus.

Faith is ſuppoſed to follow Election unto ſalvation, upon no other ground then becauſe the intention of giving faith, is ſuppoſed to follow the intention of giving ſalvation. But this I ſhould deny, and that for this reaſon, becauſe this ſubordination is grounded only upon ſuppoſition, that ſalvation is the end which God intends, and faith the means tending unto that end: but this I deny. Firſt, becauſe the end of Gods actions, is not the ſalvation of man, but the manifeſtation of his own glory. For he made all things for himſelfe, Pov. 16. 4. and reaſon juſtifies it. For God being the ſupream efficient, muſt be the ſupream end; and being Optimus as well as Maximus, he muſt needs be both moſt lovely and moſt loving, of that which is moſt lovely, that is, of himſelfe. But becauſe ſome may conceive that though Gods glory be the ſupream end, yet mans ſalvation may be the intermediate end: therefore to this I anſwer; Firſt, let ſuch ſhew then what is the glory of God, which ſalvation of the creature ſetteth forth, and I doubt not, but if that glory be ſtated right, it will appeare, that not ſalvation alone, but ſomething elſe is required to be joyned with it; as namely, the miſſion of Chriſt, yea and faith in Chriſt, to compleat that means, which tend to the procurement of ſuch an end, that is, to the ſetting forth of ſuch a glory. Secondly, the end whether ſupream or intermediate is alwaies ſuch as being rightly underſtood, doth break ſuch a means; but ſalvation is not ſo in reſpect of faith; for it doth not beſpeak it, as is apparent in the ſalvation of Angels, of Infants; as alſo in this, that it was abſolutely poſſible for God to ſave even ſinners without Chriſt, as may be demonſtrated and I have demonſtrated in my Vind. Grat. Dei. by variety of evident reaſons.

In a word, if Gods ſupream end, were the manifeſtation of his glory on ſome conſidered, as meerely poſſible in doing them good in the higheſt degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice, and that ex Condigno & ex Congruo; it is apparent, that the means required hereunto, and beſpoken hereby, is a body conſiſting of divers particulars, all together compleating the integrall means required hereunto. For herehence it followeth, that they muſt be both created, without which no glory of God at all can be manifeſted upon them and permitted to ſinne, otherwiſe God could not doe them good in the way of mercy, which ſuppoſeth miſery, but alſo that a Saviour muſt be ſent, and he no leſſe then the Sonne of God, to deſerve the pardon of their ſinne and ſalvation, otherwiſe it could not be in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice de Condigno: and faith and repentance muſt be beſtowed on them, otherwiſe the good done them, could not be by way of reward: and laſtly, ſalvation, otherwiſe good could not be done them in the higheſt degree. And thus in no moment of nature is the Predeſtination of Chriſt either before or after the Predeſtination of man; as our Brittiſh Divines maintained at the Synod of Dort; but at once God predeſtinated both him to be our Head and us his Members; like as Aquinas maintained Chriſts predeſtination, and our predeſtination to be one act in God, and conſequently neither could be the cauſe of another.

Thus have I diſpatched mine anſwer unto them, as touching mine own opinion. But ſuppoſing the method of the Contra-Remonſtrants ſound, in making ſalvation of man, to be intended by God as an end, and both mans faith in Chriſt, and Chriſts Miſſion to be intended as means. We deny this to be abſurd or ignominious unto Chriſt. Lets heare how they prove it, thus; If the decree of ſending Chriſt be poſterior to the electing of ſingular perſons unto ſalvation, then the intention of mans ſalvation was poſterior to Gods intention of ſatisfaction to his juſtice, which ſay they is abſurd and fooliſh, to wit, to decree the ſalvation of ſinners, unleſſe firſt he decree ſatisfaction to his juſtice. But I anſwer according to the forme of the Contra-Remonſtrants doctrine: Firſt, by proving their order to be ſound: Secondly, by ſhewing the invalidity of the Remonſtrants diſcourſe.

Firſt therefore: There was never any other order of intentions acknowledged by the learned, then ſuch as is found between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means tending thereunto. And the Order moſt received is this; That the intention of the end, is before the intention of the means. Now let every man that is is his right Witts conſider, which is more likely to be the end, and which the means of theſe two, Mans ſalvation, and Chriſts Miſſion to ſatisfy for the ſinne of man. Was ever any man known to be ſo brainſick as to affirme, that the ſalvation of man is a means tending to this end, namely, the ſending of Chriſt into the World to ſatisfy for the ſinne of man? On the other ſide, how fair and plauſible is it to affirme, that Chriſt was ſent into the world, to ſatisfy for mans ſinne, to this end, that man might be ſaved? whence it followeth evidently by the moſt approved rules of Schooles, that the intention of mans ſalvation is in ſigno rationis, before the intention of ſending Chriſt into the world, to make ſatisfaction for ſinne. Againe, if Chriſts ſending into the world to make ſatisfaction for ſinne, be firſt in intention, then it ſhould be laſt in execution, by rules undeniable, and ſuch as are manifeſt by the very light of nature; Whence it followeth, that man ſhould be firſt ſaved and after that Chriſt ſent into the World, that, by his ſufferings, Gods juſtice might be ſatisfied.

Now I come to the conſideration of the Remonſtrants argument. The Conſequence of the Major we grant, but the Minor we deny. And it is a vaine thing for them to cry out, that it is abſurd and fooliſh to ſay, that the intention of ſalvation, precedes the intention of ſatisfying Gods juſtice; for words muſt not carry it: and it is well known that the moſt empty veſſells give the greateſt ſound. I have ſhewed how abſurd it is to conceive, that man was ſaved to this end, that Gods juſtice may be ſatisfied, and that 'tis farre more probable to ſay, That by Chriſts ſufferings, Gods juſtice was ſatisfied to this end, that man might be ſaved. For the ſalvation of man we ſay, was not intended by God ſimply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice; which end doth not preſuppoſe the permiſſion of ſinne, as theſe Remonſtrants ſhape the matter to varniſh over their conſequence, with ſome colour of probability: but rather it beſpeaks, both the permiſſion of ſinne, and ſatisfaction to be made for ſinne, to the end that ſo man might be ſaved, not ſimply, but after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of mercy mixed with juſtice. But ſuppoſe they were conſidered as ſinners, Why ſhould the Remonſtrants look ſtrangely upon this doctrine, namely, that God ſhould intend the ſalvation of ſinners in ſigno rationis, before he intended that his juſtice ſhould be ſatisfied? For doe not they maintaine, that God by power abſolute, can pardon ſinne without all ſatisfaction? But ſuppoſing that God will not pardon ſinne without ſatisfaction, in this caſe they may contend, that God muſt firſt intend to take a courſe, that ſuch ſatisfaction may be made, and then intend to ſave. And let them contend but in the name of reaſon, and not of clamours, and content themſelves, with the infatuation of themſelves, with ſuch ſenſeleſſe conceits, and not ſpread this ſcab unto others alſo. My reaſon to the contrary is ſtill the ſame, namely, that if God be pleaſed to ſave ſinners in deſpight of ſinne, in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice, the caſe is cleare, that ſatisfaction for ſinne, is rather a means of mans ſalvation, then mans ſalvation is a means tending to the procurement of ſatisfaction for ſinne, and conſequently the intention of ſalvation of ſinners, is in reaſon to precede the intention of procuring ſatisfaction, rather then to follow after it; as the intention of the end, is rather to be accounted before, then after the intention of the means. Yet ſay theſe Remonſtrants, if a man will be ſo obſtinate, as (notwithſtanding the felicity of theſe Remonſtranticall witts in fruitfull inventions and ſubtile argumentations) ſtill to deny that there is any abſurdity herein, thus over and above we prove it. For as yet they have runne themſelves out of breath. If, ſay they, the decree of Chriſt a Saviour, be after the election of particular perſons unto ſalvation, it followeth that God did decree ſome particular mens ſalvation, before he ordained Chriſts merits to procure their ſalvation; but this is fooliſh and abſurd.

I anſwer, No more fooliſh and abſurd then the former: and indeed every one of theſe conſequences for the expreſſing whereof, they affect to ſeem very inventious, doe ſavour of no invention at all; the Conſequents doe ſo evidently, even every one of them appeare as clearely in the Antecedent, as a mans face in a glaſſe, and are to be accounted rather Tautologies, then deductions, much leſſe doe they relliſh of any ſubtilty of wit. So that all this while, they ſeem to be in travell with nothing but wind, or ſick of the diſeaſe called Tenaſmus, ſtriving mightily to doe ſomewhat, when indeed they doe nothing at all. And our former argument ſtill hath place, and here alſo applied, doth manifeſt, that ſeeing the merits of the ſonne of God are the means of mans ſalvation, then mans ſalvation is the end of Chriſts merits; therefore in all probability, the intention of mans ſalvation, as the intention of the end, ſhould precede the intention of ſending Chriſt to merit as the means, rather then to be ſubordinate unto it. And indeed if the ſending of Chriſt into the World to merit, ſhould be firſt in intention, then ſhould it be laſt in execution; that is, All the elect ſhould firſt be ſaved, and then Chriſt ſhould be ſent into the world to merit their ſalvation. Therefore to mend the matter (for who is ſo ſilly as not to perceive, that if the conſideration of Chriſts obedience, as ſatisfactory, will not ſerve their turne, ſurely neither will the conſideration of his obedience as meritorious, ſtand them in any ſtead) they put into this Conſequence another clauſe, without all art, and without all honeſty, pretending, that hereby we make ſalvation deſtinated to man, before it is decreed to man: as if we put any difference in this caſe between deſtination and decree, or as if we make ſalvation deſtinated to a man hereby, before it is deſtinated unto him; whereas we only make the end (that is ſalvation) intended before the merits of Chriſt (which are the means of ſalvation) are intended. And would any man that is in his right witts, ſay this is to make ſalvation deſtinated to a man before it is deſtinated to him? Farther, it is to be obſerved, that we may omit nothing, but take notice of the uttermoſt of their ſtrength, and the rather, becauſe it will notably diſcover either their ignorance, or which is moſt likely, (for as much as they doe not directly inſiſt, as they might upon a new argument farre more plauſible with the ignorant) their unconſcionableneſſe. For they ſignify that hence it will come to paſſe, that the intention of ſalvation, being before the intention of finding of Chriſt to merit, ſalvation ſhall exiſt, being decreed as preſent to God, before Chriſt is conſidered as he that by his Croſſe hath deſerved it. Now had they ſaid before Chriſt hath deſerved it, I ſhould readily have granted it. For I hope none of thē would deny, that the ſalvation of many a Prophet and Patriarch, exiſted not only before God, but actually and really before Chriſt was crucified. To prevent this eluſion of their argument, they expreſſe it thus, Before Chriſt was conſidered as he that hath deſerved it. Yet here they fall foule upon an indecent expreſſion. For I will be bold to deny, that Chriſt was conſidered by God, as one that had deſerved mans ſalvation, before he had deſerved it. For before he had deſerved it by his Croſſe, to ſay, that God conſidered him as one that had deſerved it, is either to erre or to feigne, neither of which is incident unto God. God conſidered him from everlaſting, as one that in the fulneſſe of time ſhould deſerve it, by ſuffering upon the Croſſe, not as one that had deſerved it. For to conceive him after the former manner, is to conceive aright, but to conceive him after the latter manner, is to conceive amiſſe. But I will take the pains to mend this argument for them thus. If their ſalvation were decreed before Chriſts merits, then their ſalvation did exiſt as preſent with God before Chriſts merits did exiſt, as preſent with God. But this is not to be admitted: Now I come to diſcover their ignorance, which they betray in this. Firſt, neither Gods preſcience, nor Gods decree doth make things to exiſt, otherwiſe then in Eſſe cognito & in eſſe velito; but this is not to exiſt. Therefore they qualify it by the addition of the manner, ut praeſens Deo; which indeed is Terminus diminuens in this caſe. For it is preſent to God by vertue of his decree intentionally only, and not really, which alo • e is to exiſt. But let this Peccadillio paſſe. Secondly, Who ſeeth not that this argument tends to the utter deſtruction of all diſtinct intentions of end, and means in God? For if there be any ſuch diſtinct intentions in God, the one muſt be acknowledged to be before the other. As for example, What was the end of creation? Lets goe no farther then the manifeſtation of Gods power and wiſdome as the end thereof. Now hence it will follow by the quaintneſſe of this argumentation, that the manifeſtation of Gods wiſdome and power in creating the world did exiſt, as preſent with God, before the creation. Is not here a proper argumentation. Spectatum admiſſi riſum teneatis amici.

Thirdly, to draw neerer to the diſcovery of their ignorance. I grant it ſhall firſt exiſt; but how? Not in duration; We acknowledge no ſuch priority in God, between the intention of the end, and the intention of the means; though ſuch a priority in this caſe is found in man. What then? Ile tell you: They commonly call it a priority of nature. But take heed you doe not apply it to any of the two kindes of priority of nature mentioned by Ariſtotle. For try if you pleaſe, and you ſhall find that none of them can poſſibly ſerve the turne; What then is this priority of nature ſo called? I anſwer, it is only Prioritas rationis: And ſo I formerly ſaid, that the intention of the end is in ſigno rationis, before the intention of the means. You may farther demand, Wherein doth this Prioritas rationis conſiſt? I anſwer out of Durand, it conſiſts in this, that, Ratio unius petitur a ratione alterius, and ſo indeed, Ratio mediorum petitur a ratione finis. This generally holds of the intention of end, and means, as well in God, as in the creature. For alwaies the nature of the end duely conſidered, doth beſpeak what ſhall be the condition of the means. So that this makes no priority of exiſtence at all, neither in duration nor in nature properly ſo called, but only ſuch a ſubordination between them, that the reaſon of the one, that is, the nature or condition of the one, depends upon the nature and condition of the other. Now let any ſober man judge, Whether the ſalvation of man be required to the procuring of Chriſts merits, and not rather, Chriſts merits are required to the procuring of mans ſalvation; which yet is not true of ſalvation conſidered ſimply, but only as to be beſtowed after a certain manner, to wit, in the way of juſtice, and by way of ſatisfaction made for ſinne, that ſo a man may be ſaved by grace in deſpight of ſinne. In the cloſe of all they ſignify that this of theirs in the laſt place ſeriouſly conſidered will make it appeare, that this doctrine of their Adverſaries, tends notably to the diminution of Chriſts honour, and to the annihilation of Chriſts merits, to wit, unleſſe Chriſts merits be acknowledged the end of mans ſalvation, and not mans ſalvation the end of Chriſts merits, Chriſt ſhall be diſhonoured, and his merits annihilated. Here they are quite out of breath, and that which is wanting, they leave to be ſupplied by the ſerious (they ſhould ſay ignorant) conſideration of their Proſelites. They preſume this colour of diſhonour redounding hereby to Chriſt, will be ſufficient to blow up their Adverſaries, though it prove of no more force then a ſquibbe. This carriage of theirs calls to my remembrance, a mad prank plaid by the Engliſh at Delfe, while they were billeted there, which was told me merrily, by one of the number. One of the Souldiers was billeted in an old Widdowes houſe, and another being a Goldſmith, told him and another conſort of theirs, he had a deviſe to put mony in all their purſes, for he knew how to make a Rex-dolar of three-pence ſylver, and in that Widdowes houſe they would ply their buſineſſe very ſecurely. To work they went, and caſting plates of Tinne to the quantity of one of thoſe Dolars, and ſtamping them full and faire, this Gold-ſmith, with the quantity of three pence ſilver, ſylvered them over very fairely, and, leaſt they ſhould ſeem too light, hangs them up in the chimny in a bagge, that the ſmoak might bring them to the ſadder hew. Thus having met with a mine of Sylver in their lodging, one is imployed as a Merchant-man to goe to the Staple of Cloth, and he laies out their coyne in cloth, whereof afterwards they made good ſilver indeed: at length one of them paying a debt of his to a Dutchman in Delfe, in one of theſe Rex-dolars, he found the Dutch to betray ſome ſuſpicious geſtures and interpretations upon the coyne. That was a faire warning to an intelligent man of armes; and hereupon they get them packing ing away with all ſpeed; and home they come, and make themſelves merry with the relation. In like ſort theſe Remonſtrants ſhew a great deale of Tinne and traſh in theſe argumentations, and they have not ſo much as three pence ſilver to colour it therewithall to cheat the World, if they will be cheated. But they hope the colour of ſome diſhonour by their adverſaries doctrine redounding unto Chriſt, will be taken for a peece at leaſt of good ſilver. I confeſſe, I am ſomewhat the more merrily diſpoſed at this time, For being taken off from the midſt of a ſentence, by the courteous invitation of a Gentleman, to come unto him to his Inne: He was pleaſed to entertaine me with ſuch good diſcourſe, that it did not a little refreſh my ſpirits. His reaches were after new diſcoveries for the advancement of learning; and endoctrinated me more in one halfe hower, then ſeventeen years ſtudy in the Univerſity. For whereas I never learned there, more cauſes then foure, he was pleaſed to acquaint me with nine; which I took ſome pains to learn without book, and they were theſe, Matter, Forme, Workman, Will, Power, Time, Finding out, Accident, End. And moſt courteouſly offered himſelfe to enlarge on every one of them; but having left off at a broken ſentence, I was deſirous to return to my ſtudies Theologicall, and to let thoſe Philoſophicall progreſſes alone. But I proteſted unto him ſeriouſly, that he had informed me more in the number of cauſes in a ſhort ſpace, then Oxford had done in many years; he entreated I would conſider of them, and I promiſed I would, and conferre of them too, with all the Schollers I companied with; which he took in very goo part; and ſo I took my leave. And finding my ſpirit not a little elevated with this recreation, I reſolved, forbearing my uſuall time of ſupper, to follow theſe ſtudies cloſe that night, which truly fell out very happily. For one of thoſe cauſes being found out, otherwiſe called, Invention (as for Judgement, I doe not remember that it was admitted into the number) I made uſe of it very happily in finding out, or diſcovery of the foppery of theſe Remonſtranticall argumentations.

Now I proceed to the ſecond Queſtion, as more ſeaſonable to the preſent occaſion. And here firſt they begin with their former artifice, making infidelity on the part of reprobation, anſwerable to faith on the part of election, which is moſt untrue, as formerly I ſhewed: Only the not curing of infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us ſubordinate to reprobation; as the curing of naturall infidelity by the grace of faith, is made by us ſubordinate to election. But they goe on, as in ſhaping our Tenent at pleaſure, ſo in baſting it with their very liberall cenſures, as abſurd and execrable, in ſuch ſort, as the bare commemoration of it, they take to be ſufficient to repreſent the horrour of it, and to confute it, and this they commit to the judgement of all the faithfull of Chriſt. And indeed their beſt ſtrength lyeth in ſetting forth their Adverſaries doctrine in ſuch colours, as the Devill is painted with. And in this particular, they conceive good hope (no doubt) that propitious Readers will conceive hereby, that the infidelity of man is made by their Adverſaries the work of God, as well as Faith; Whereas it is well known, that there is ſo little need of working men to infidelity, that all being borne in ſinne, and corrupted and eſtranged from the life of God, through the fall of Adam, infidelity is as naturall and hereditary to a man, as any other corruption. And it is as well known and undeniable, that none can cure it but God, by faith; but this he cures in whom he will, by giving Faith to whom he will, and if he refuſe to cure it in any, that, and that alone is enough to make him a veſſell of wrath, that ſo Gods glory may be manifeſted upon him, in the way of juſtice vindicative. But come we to their Arguments.

1. The firſt is this. If Infidelity followeth Reprobation unto deſtruction, then God cannot in justice deſtroy Reprobates for their infidelity. For there is no greater injustice, then to deſtroy a man for that, that followeth neceſſarily upon reprobation which is the work of God. To this I anſwer.

1. According to mine ordering the decrees divine. Secondly, according to the Contra-Remonſtrants Tenent in ordering them.

1. According to my ordering of the decrees divine; In no moment of nature or reaſon is the decree of damnation precedent to the decree of permitting infidelity, or leaving the infidelity of ſome men uncured, to wit, by denying them faith, by denying the grace of regeneration. But the decrees of creating all in Adam, of permitting all to fall in Adam, in bringing all men forth into the World in the ſtate of Originall ſinne, of leaving this originall ſinne uncured in them, and laſt of all, of damning them for their ſinnes; are decrees not ſubordinate, but coördinate, as decrees de Mediis, tending joyntly to one ſupream end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory upon them in the way of juſtice vindicative; as alſo to ſhew the riches of his glory upon the veſſels of mercy, whom he hath prepared unto glory, to wit, by beholding Rom. 9. 22. in others that miſerable condition, which through Gods meer grace and goodneſſe they have eſcaped.

2. According to the Contra-Remonſtrants Tenent, I anſwer,

1. Many of them doe not maintaine that infidelity is conſequent to the decree of damnation, but in the foreſight of God, precedent rather: as appears by the Brittiſh Divines their Theſes De Reprobatione; and Alvarez profeſſeth the ſame. The denyall of grace, and ſo the permitting of naturall infidelity to remain uncured, they make conſequent (as it ſeems) to a negative decree of denying glory. And to the decree of permitting infidelity, they make the foreſight of infidelity ſubſequent; and this foreſight of infidelity they make precedent to reprobation, as it ſignifies the decree of damnation. And thus farre I agree with them, That in no moment of nature, or ſigne of reaſon did God ordain any man to damnation, but for ſinne; and conſequently in no moment of nature, or ſigne of reaſon, did the decree of damnation goe before the foreſight of ſinne or infidelity.

2. But ſuppoſe, as theſe Remonſtrants collect and pick out their meaning, They make the decree of reprobation, in all poynts proportionable to the decree of ſalvation, that like as the decree of giving faith, they conceive to be ſubordinate to the decree of ſalvation; ſo the decree of permitting infidelity, or denying faith (for herein conſiſts the juſt proportion, and not as they feigne it, between faith on the one ſide, and infidelity on the other) is with them made ſubordinate to the decree of damnation. Then I anſwer,

1. Their Conſequence ſhould be this, If the permiſſion of Infidelity followeth the decree of damnation, then God cannot in juſtice damne them for Infidelity. Now here is no colour of good Conſequence.

2. If they reply, That in caſe infidelity followeth neceſſarily upon Gods permiting of it, the Conſequence is as good as in caſe infidelity followed upon reprobation. For even hereby it appears, that infidelity followeth upon reprobation though not immediately, but by the mediation of the divine permiſſion thereof; but whether it followeth mediately or immediately all is one, as touching the force of the Conſequence.

Reſp. Now to this I Reply, Granting that all is one, as touching the force of the Conſequence: but then conſider.

1. All the force of the argument depends not upon the conſequution of infidelity, ſimply unto the decree of damnation, but only upon the neceſſary conſequution thereof. And yet no mention at all was made hereof, in the Conſequence of the Major, but it is brought afterwards over and above moſt illogically.

2. In this caſe all the force of the Conſequence depends upon the neceſſary conſequution of ſinne in generall, or infidelity in ſpeciall, upon Gods permitting of it.

So that whether Gods decree to permit the ſinne of infidelity, be antecedent or conſequent to the decree of damnation all is one. Yet theſe Remonſtrants make the force of their argument, to conſiſt only in the ſubordinating of the decree divine, as touching the permiſſion of infidelity to the decree of damnation, which yet appears by this to be of no force.

3. But if they hereupon take a new courſe of argumentation, and diſpute thus; If Infidelity followeth neceſſarily upon Gods permitting of it, then God cannot in juſtice damne a man for Infidelity; pretending no injuſtice to be greater, then to damne a man for that which followeth neceſſarily upon permiſſion, which is Gods work.

Reſp. I anſwer.

1. That thus their former argumentation is caſhierd as unprofitable.

2. We deny this Conſequence; and call in no meaner name then Arminius himſelfe to beare us out in this our deniall. Who expreſſely profeſſeth, That in caſe God permits a man, Velle peccatum, neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum. Exam. pag. 153. I could adde Vorſtius alſo, herein concurring with Piſcator, Perkins, and Navarrettus the Dominican is as expreſſely in this as any other; as alſo in ſubordinating it to the decree of reprobation. Arminius likewiſe profeſſeth faith and repentance, Niſi Deo dante haberi non poſſe. Exam. 57. and that both of them are denied to the reprobates by the decree of reprobation. See his own words, At Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare. Concedo lubens, illam aſſumptionem, ſed rectè intellectam: He laboureth to charme this inconvenient grant of his, but no charme will ſerve to keep this adder, from ſtinging and wounding their doctrine of reprobation unto death. He ſaith, Faith is given by way of ſuaſion. We ſay, that matters nothing; for ſo it be given by God whereſoever it be found, and ſo it be denied to reprobates by the decree of reprobation, we deſire no more. We our ſelves acknowledge, that faith is not given to the elect, but by way of ſwaſion, the Word working faith, running in this manner; Repent and believe the Goſpel; and whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved. For God hath ſet forth his Sonne to be a Propitiation for our ſinnes, through faith in his bloud.

3. At length he proceeds in his charming courſe, but moſt unſucceſſefully, as whereby his former ſaying is nothing charmed. His care rather ſeems to be to eat his own words, as Satan devoured his own children. For diſtinguiſhing ſuaſion into that which is ſufficient, and that which is effectuall: this effectuall ſuaſion, he confeſſeth to be adminiſtred by the decree of election; but as for that ſufficient ſuaſion, though withall he accounts it allwaies ineffectuall, yet he ſaith it is adminiſtred by the decree of providence, not by the decree of reprobation. At length he confeſſeth, that by the decree of reprobation is denied grace effectuall, that is ſuch a grace as whereupon he foreſaw they would believe. Now herein I appeale to the judgement of every ſober man. Take we two men into conſideration, the one elect as Paul, the other reprobate as Eſau. Of two ſufficient graces, the Lord foreſeeth which of them will prove effectuall with Paul, and which ineffectuall; and he makes choice to give him ſuch a grace, as he foreſeeth will prove effectuall. Again he foreſeeth of two ſufficient graces, which of them will prove effectuall with Eſau and which ineffectuall, and makes choice to afford him only that which he knowes will prove ineffectuall. Now what can be the reaſon hereof, but becauſe he purpoſeth to ſhew his mercy in the ſalvation of the one, and his juſtice in the damnation of another. Before Arminius came to this reſolution, as expreſſely to profeſſe, That by the decree of reprobation is denyed grace effectuall, he found himſelfe in a ſtreit upon his diſtinction of grace ſufficient and effectuall, and the deſcription of each; he drew his breath very ſhort; and therefore to get, as it were, more liberty of ayre, he concluded that diſcourſe with, Haec ex Auguſtini ſententiâ dicuntur. pag. 58. and in the next page. Hiſce autem ita explicatis ex mente Auguſtini & fortè Scripturae ſenſu. But, What, a miſchiefe, doth this great Doctor mean to tell us? Firſt, that he willingly grants that, Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare (provided it be well underſtood) and after all this explication, tells us, that all this explication of his is delivered ex ſententiâ & mente Auguſtini, and but perchance, ex Scripturae ſenſu, concealing all the while what is his own Opinion. Is this to give us the right underſtanding of that Aſſertion (Deus ſtatuit decreto reprobationis reprobis fidem & paenitentiam non dare) moſt prejudiciall to his own Tenent at firſt fight, and much more by the diſtinction following of Gratia ſufficiens & efficax; which he ſo well perceived, that he is content to clap it upon Auſtins back to beare the burthen of it; and puts it but upon adventure, that it may prove to be the Scripture meaning. And in like ſort, when, pag. 98. having propoſed two things to be neceſſarily unfolded by him. Primò, de Gratiâ ſufficiente & efficaci. Secundo, de utriuſ que diſpenſatione, diſpenſationiſ que Cauſis: He leaves off there, giving it over in plain ground. What doth this argue? but that he manifeſtly perceived, he was not able in any tollerable manner, to ſhape this diſtinction in congruity to his own Tenent. Let this Author well conſider this, that talkes ſo much of our Divines unwillingneſſe to come to tryall in the poynt of reprobation; When Arminius durſt not adventure upon the explicating of his own opinion, touching the diſtinction of grace ſufficient and effectuall, and in giving us the definition of each. The like to have been the courſe of other Arminians, I have known, declining the point of effectuall grace, as a precipice and breakneck unto them: And when others have been put upon it, they have placed it in the grace ſubſequent, and have not been aſhamed to make it conſiſt in this, that God by effectuall grace, doth work in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere, modo velit, and why not as well, that he workes in man, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Credere, modo Credat, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Reſipiſcere modo Reſipiſcat. This that I ſpeake, I can ſhew under the hand of one of them, a great ſtickler for the Arminian Cauſe; great I ſay in reſpect of affection, not of judgement. And I have cauſe to conceive, that both this Authors Diſcourſe, and that others I have had to deale withall, is but as a ſmoake, that for a great part, if not for the moſt of it, comes out of the ſame Chimney.

4. Let the argument ſtand as it doth, let infidelity by Gods permiſſion follow upon the decree of damnation, and that neceſſarily. Yet conſider.

1. Gods permitting of it, is no other then the leaving of it uncured: not that hereby infidelity followeth, which was not before; but being in all before, as the fruit of that naturall corruption wherein all were borne, as all confeſſe, as many as concurre againſt the Pelagians, in acknowledging Originall ſinne. By Gods permiſſion of it, it continueth to be uncured; What actuall ſinne is there in the World, or habituall ſinne ariſing thereupon, which God cannot cure if it pleaſe him? If then he will not cure it in ſome, ſhall it not be lawfull for him to puniſh it, where he findes the continuance of it unto the end, without breaking off by repentance?

2. Suppoſe all men had power to doe any good thing; if God will not give them Velle quod poſſunt (as Auſtin ſaith he dealt with Adam in his innocency, and gave the Angels that ſtood, amplius Adjutorium, then he gave the others; whereby it came to paſſe, that they ſtood in obedience when the other fell) what ſhall wee ſay in this caſe, is it poſſible that they ſhould Velle bonum, if God will not work it in them, of whom the Apoſtle profeſſeth, that he works in us both the Will and the Deed? Or ſhall wee hereupon ſay, they doe not ſinne freely? What ſhift have they to avoyd this, but either by contradicting the Apoſtle, and ſaying God doth not work in us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, or by ſaying that God doth work in us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle, modò Velimus, as plain a contradiction as ever proceeded from the mouth of any, The ſelfe ſame act, being made before and after it ſelf; for the condition is allwaies before the thing conditioned. And is this to work in us the Will according to Gods pleaſure, or according to mans good pleaſure? What is it to ſay, that grace is given according unto works, if this be not?

3. We deny, that any evill act therefore comes not to paſſe freely, becauſe it comes to paſſe neceſſarily, upon ſuppoſition of Gods denyall of grace, to refraine from it. For like as good works, are not therefore not wrought freely by us, becauſe God by his grace workes us to the performance of them; (For who dares deny that it is in Gods power to make us work this or that freely) in like ſort, and much more, evill works are not done the leſſe freely, becauſe God denies ſpeciall and effectuall grace to abſtain from them. For, want of grace doth not take away willingneſſe unto that which is evill, but leaves too much rather in man of that kind. As Auſtin ſaith, that Libertas ſine gratiâ non eſt libertas ſed contumacia. Now where there is contumacy, there is rather too much will then too little. For Contumacy is Wilfulneſſe.

4. The Schooles teach, that liberty of will conſiſts only, in electione mediorum, in the election of means to certain ends. Now when the Goſpel is preached to a carnall man, whoſe ends are only carnall, as the Apoſtle ſaith, Philip. 3. 20. They mind earthly things; ſo farre forth as he ſhall find it ſerviceable to his carnall ends, he may believe it and make profeſſion of it, as many times Hypocrites doe, and ſometimes in ſuch ſort, as it is hard to diſtinguiſh, between a true and an Hypocriticall profeſſour. This moved the Apoſtle to exhort the Corinthians, famous for their faith, to examine themſelves, and prove themſelves, Whether they were in the faith, that is, in faith unfaigned. For there is not only a groſſe Hypocriſy, whereunto a mans own heart is privy, but a ſecret Hypocriſy whereof the man himſelfe is nothing conſcious; yet ſuch a faith undoubtedly is performable by a naturall man. Now when a man rejects the Goſpell, the faith and profeſſion whereof he finds nothing ſerviceable to his carnall ends, doth he not judiciouſly and deliberately, yea and wiſely too (according to the wiſdome of fleſh and bloud) reject it?

5. Auſtin profeſſeth Lib. 1. De Gen. contr. Manich. cap. 3. That all men may believe if they will, and juſtifies it in his Retractations. But if the will of man be corrupt, and averſe from believing, We juſtly ſay, ſuch a man cannot believe; as our Saviour ſaith, How can you believe that receive honour one of another, and ſeeke not the honour that cometh of God alone. Joh. 5. 44. yet this is an impotency Morall only, which is to be diſtinguiſhed from impotency Naturall. For notwithſtanding this, it may be truely ſaid, that, All men may believe if they will, and herein conſiſts the naturall liberty of the will. The Morall liberty conſiſts, rather in a ſanctified inclination unto that which is good, whereby it is freed from the power of ſinne and Sathan; then in a power to doe good if they will, and not otherwiſe. But I never find that Arminians doe diſtinguiſh theſe.

6. It is not ſufficient for Arminians to conclude, that ſuch a thing upon ſuppoſition comes to paſſe neceſſarily, therefore it comes not to paſſe freely.

1. For upon ſuppoſition that God decreed to create the World, the creation of the World came to paſſe neceſſarily; yet ſimply the World was made by God freely.

2. In like ſort, upon Gods foreknowledge that ſuch a man will not believe it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a one will not believe; and ſo the like may be ſaid of the moſt free act that is performed. But will it follow herehence, that it is not done freely?

3. In like ſort upon the denyall of an effectuall impediment of ſinne, unto a man it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a man will ſinne, according to Arminius his doctrine, and this holds applied to any particular ſinne whatſoever. But will it herehence follow according to Arminius, that ſuch a ſinne is not committed freely? nonothing leſſe.

2. The Remonſtrants ſecond argument is this.

What God cannot performe that God cannot will. But God cannot damne a man for infidelity flowing from ſuch a decree of Reprobation.

Reſp. 1. But who ſaith that infidelity floweth from the decree of reprobation? Not one that I know, but Piſcator upon theſe words, Yee therefore heare not my words, becauſe yee are not of God. But underſtand him aright, it is as if he John 8. 47. ſhould ſay, Therefore ſuch a man goeth lame, becauſe the Phyſitian will not cure him: yet it is well known the cauſe of his lameneſſe is from within, and perhaps procured by ſome diſtemper of his own: yet in caſe a Surgeon could cure him and will not, he may be ſaid to be the cauſe of lameneſſe; but how? per modum non removentis. This is well known by the learned to be a kind of cauſe whereof notice is taken in Naturall Philoſophy. And in this ſenſe and no other, it is well known that Piſcator makes God the cauſe of infidelity, and that according to the expreſſe Word of God. But in my judgement Piſcator miſtakes the phraſe, To be of God, which he conceives to denote election. I rather take it to denote regeneration, as much as to ſay, yee therefore he are not my words, becauſe God hath not hitherto by regeneration cured that naturall infidelity which is in you.

2. But take the argument according to the former expreſſion, God cannot damne a man for that infidelity which is conſequent to reprobation; And then my Anſwer to the former argument in every particular thereof, may be accommodated unto this.

3. The Third followeth. If Infidelity flowes from reprobation, then God can neither require Faith of reprobates, nor ſeriouſly offer ſalvation unto them, but neceſſarily counterfeit. For it is manifeſt Hypocriſy, to invite thoſe unto faith and ſalvation, who are excluded from both by the decree of God.

Reſp. 1. Here again Infidelity is made to flow from reprobation; whereas nothing flowes from reprobation by the doctrine of the Contra-Remonſtranes, but the not curing of mans naturall infidelity, like as the curing of it by faith, is that which flows from election.

2. I ſay, There is no ſimulation at all of God in this. For that wich he propoſeth is but this, that, Whoſoever believeth ſhall be ſaved, and Whoſoever believeth not ſhall be damned. He ſends his Miniſters to Preach this, and to Beſeech them to believe, and to be reconciled unto God, yea, all they meet with. But for whoſe ſake? Not for the reprobates ſake, but for the elects ſake, Who becauſe they are mixed among reprobates, and God hath not revealed to his Miniſters, Who are elect and who are not (as neither was it fit he ſhould, many of the Miniſters themſelves, even of thoſe that not only prophecyed in his name, but caſt out Devills, being reprobates) therefore it was fit their Commiſſion ſhould be generall to Preach to all. Yea, did not the Apoſtles themſelves take notice of this? Doth not Paul profeſſe that, He became 2 Corinth. 6. all things to all that he may ſave ſome? And who were thoſe ſome, but the very elect of God, as the ſame Apoſtle elſewhere profeſſeth, ſaying, I ſuffer all things for the elects ſake. And doth not Auſtin profeſſe that if we knew who were reprobate, 2. Tim. 2. 10. we would no more pray for them, then for the Devills? De Civit. Dei lib. 21. cap. 24.

4. The Fourth and laſt. If Incredulity followes the decree of reprobation, then God conſidered the reprobates in his counſell of reprobation, either as creatable, or as created in the state of innocency, or as falne into Originall ſinne. Sed falſa ſunt haec omnia. All theſe things are falſe. And theſe things, he ſaith, are delivered, contra abſurdam, deteſtabilem, at que abominabilem ſententiam.

Reſp. Here is froth enough of words, but a very hungry diſcourſe for ſubſtance of argumentation throughout.

1. Yet as I ſaid, All this nothing toucheth them, Who albeit they maintaine that God of his meer pleaſure, hath mercy on ſome, giving them faith and repentance (conſidering all in the corrupt Maſſe) and of his meer pleaſure hardens others (no worſe in nature then the former) by denying them faith and repentance, yet as reprobation ſignifies the decree of damnation, doe permit thereunto the foreſight of finall perſeverance in ſinne.

2. According to my Ordering of Gods decrees, Who conceive mankind not yet created to be the object of all Gods decrees, they being eternall, and but one act in God, and that act his very Eſſence, and all other things being temporall. I doe not maintain that the decree of damnation, is in any moment of nature or reaſon, before the conſideration of mans finall impenitency. As neither doe I conceive it to be after this, but both ſimultaneous; for as much as the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, together with the decree of finall leaving ſome therein, and the decree of damning them for ſinne, I take not to be ſubordinate, but coordinate and ſimultaneous.

3. Whether we take the Firſt-way for ſhaping the object of predeſtination, or the Second, or the Third, I Anſwer.

1. The difference hereabout is in my judgement meerly Logicall, nothing Theologicall; the reſolution whereof according to generall rules, is eaſily made by light of nature, if once it be agreed upon in Divinity, What is Gods end both on the part of election, and on the part of reprobation, and what are the means that tend unto thoſe ends.

2. Which way ſoever we take of the Three, I never found any reaſon given by Arminians of any force to take us from it, as I have juſtified in my Vindiciae, as touching the Firſt-way; And in my Examination of the Conference between Arminius and Junius, as touching the Second-way; And in my Anſwer to Corvinus againſt Tilenus, as touching the Third-way, and therein, I truſt, routed and profligated the 20 Reaſons of Arminius, propoſed againſt the Firſt and Laſt-way, but chiefly againſt the Firſt, in the Declaration of his Opinion before the States.

Now I returne to the Author of this diſcourſe, and to the remainder of his ſecond Motive, from whence I have digreſſed.

I was here paſſing over unto the third inſtance, to wit, of the proceedings in the Synod of Dort; but upon my looking into the Hiſtory thereof, to prepare my ſelfe for an anſwer thereunto, ere I was a ware, I lighted upon the reaſons of that the Contra-Remonſtrants motion to be ſpared, preferred unto the State. And they utterly deny what is here caſt upon them, namely, that they deprecated at all, that they might be ſpared from conferring upon the poynt of reprobation. But whereas the Remonſtrants had incumbred the point of election and reprobation with ſeaven Queſtions, which pertained not to the ſtate of the Controverſy concerning the firſt Article, and being alſo imperfect and intricate for the moſt part, and propoſed to this end, to draw their Adverſaries away from the true ſtate of the Queſtion; They deſired to be ſpared from anſwering unto them. And upon this Petition of theirs it pleaſed the States, that leaving thoſe thorny queſtions, they ſhould come to the handling of the Articles. This is ſet down in the Preface to thoſe Acta Synodalia, ſet forth by the Authority of the States. Fol. 10. pag. 1. For after the propoſing of theſe two queſtions to the Remonſtrants, as touching the decree of Predeſtination. 1. Whether the intire decree of Predeſtination were contained in this Article, namely, That God did from everlaſting decree to ſave believers, which no man denies. 2. Whether they thought faith & perſeverance therein, did precede election, as the Cauſes or Conditions thereof. After the Remonſtrants had anſwered affirmatively unto them both; hereupon they bring in their ſeaven, for the moſt part, intricate queſtions. Reponebant deinde ſeptem alias tum de electione tum de reprobatione, queſtiones, ad quas a Paſtoribus à Claſſibus deputatis reſponderi volebant. Quae cum ad controverſiae de primo articulo ſtatum non ſpectarent, etiam mutilae at que intricatae plerae que eſſent; eum que in finem ab illis proponerentur, ut hoc modo a praecipuo controverſiae statu recta que agendi ratione, in ambages ad ducerent. Paſtores expoſitâ per Libellum ſupplicem Illuſt. Ordd. iniquâ hâc agendi ratione, non quidem deprecati ſunt, ne de reprobatione ſententiam ſuam manifestarent (uti Remonſtrantes improbè ſaepius ipſis objectarunt) ſed diſertè ſententiam ſuam quantum ad Eccleſiarum pacem at que aedificationem ſufficere exiſtimarent, non tantum vivâ voce ſed & ſcripto declararunt. Se nimirum cum aeternum electionis ſingularium perſonarum decretum ponunt, ſimul quo que ponere aeternum de reprobatione & rejectione quarundam ſingularium perſonarum decretum, quum fieri nequeat ut ſit electio, quin ſimul quò que ſit aliqua reprobatio aut derelictio. Difficiles omnes circa hunc articulum quaeſtiones temere excutere, nihil aliud eſſe quam inutilibus diſputationibus & nihil profuturis litibus, Eccleſiam replere, ejus que pacem perturbare. Declarationem ſuam hanc Libello ſupplice expreſſam, moderatis omnibus, pace • que amantibus ingeniis, ſufficere debere: Credi videlicet ac doceri ab ipſis, Deum neminem condemnare, imò verò ne ſtatuiſſe quidem condemnare quenquam niſi juſtè propter propria ipſius peccata: Placuit ita que Illuſt. Ordd. ut miſſis illis ſpinoſis quaeſtionibus, ad articulorum pertractationem deveniretur. And Pag. 136. & 156. I find this objection propoſed by the Remonſtrants in theſe words. Pag. 156. In Collatione Haghienſi Libello ſupplice Illuſt. Hollandiae & Weſtfriziae Ordinibus exhibito, deprecati ſunt Contra-Remonſtrantes ne de reprobatione ageretur: & more at large Pag. 195. Thus, Ipſi Contra-Remonſtrantes cum in Colloquio Haghienſi juſſi eſſent, ad interrogata quaedam noſtra de reprobatione reſpondere Magiſtratui morem gerere gravati fuerint, uſ que adeò ut Collationem caeptam abrumpere ſe malle profiterentur quàm ut ſummarum Poteſtatum imperio ſe conſtringi paterentur, nihil aliud conſcientiae ſuae praetexentes quam quod Eccleſiae aedificationi obfuturam eam agendi rationem judicarent. Now to this Pag. 157. Feſtus Hominus, one preſent in that Conference, ſtands up and anſwers, Expoſuit que paucis quàm non bonâ fide haec de illis dicerentur. Se Libello ſupplice non fuiſſe deprecatos, ne de reprobatione ageretur: caeterùm quia Remonſtrantes ſubdolè in ipſo Collationis initio, ſeptem queſtionibus ſpinoſis ac minime neceſſariis non tantum ad reprobationis, ſed electionis quoque doctrinam ſpectantibus, à recto agendi ordine Contra-Remonſtrantes in ambages adducere conarentur. Contra-Remonſtrantes Libello ſupplice apud Illuſt-Ordd. de tam iniquâ agendi ratione conqueſtos fuiſſe at que ut Remonſtrantibus mandaretur, ne extra juſtam agendi rationem jam inchoatam evagarentur petiiſſe. De reprobatione autem Contra-Remonſtrantes quantum ad aedificationem ſatis erat, ſententiam ſuam clarè ibidem explicaſſe uti ſcriptorum editorum fide probari poteſt. Idem etiam Reverendus & Doctiſſimus vir, D. Joannes Becius qui & ipſe huic interfuerat Collationi, ſuo praeſens comprobabat teſtimonio.

Now I come to the Synod of Dort.

4. This Author ſaith the Remonſtronts were there warned by the Preſident of the Synod, Ut de electione potius quàm de odioſâ reprobationis materiâtagerent. And truly at firſt I wondered not a little, that the Preſident of that Synod ſhould account, the matter of reprobation (which is as much as to ſay, the doctrine of reprobation) an odious matter, an odious doctrine. For we commonly ſignify hereby, ſuch a doctrine as deſerves to be hated; but I thought withall, that they might expreſſe rather, what is the condition of it in the event, namely, that it is entertained with hatred, not of all neither, nor of any of thoſe, that ſubmit their judgements to the word of God; but rather of thoſe, and of thoſe only, who follow the judgement of fleſh and bloud. Yet I thought good to enquire into the truth of the fact here mentioned; and I find it in the page mentioned, and how the Remonſtrants themſelves doe expreſſe this, even as here it is expreſſed, thus, A Reverendo Praeſide moniti ſumus ut à negativis enunciationibus abſtineremus & de electione potius quàm odioſâ reprobationis materiâ ageremus. Yet I confeſſe this did not ſatisfy me; For why ſhould this Author make choyce to expreſſe it in the Remonſtrants termes, rather then in the words of the Preſident himſelfe. Therefore I turne to the beginning of that Seſſion, being Seſſ. 32. There I find this particular, Submonuit & Praeſes ut potius quaeſtionibus illis inhaererent, quae circa ſuavem de electione doctrinam verſarentur, quàm ut d • odiosè doctrinam de reprobatione exagitarent. Now I find a great deale of difference between profeſſing the matter of reprobation, or the doctrine hereof to be odious, and admoniſhing to ſpare the exagitation thereof after an odious manner. This indeed being their uſuall courſe, to make it as odious as they can, like as Arminius, Doctrinam de praedeſtinatione odioſam reddere conabatur, as it is profeſſed in the Preface to thoſe Act. Synod. fol. 7. pag. 2. and fol. 8. pag. 2. They profeſſe in like manner of the Remonſtrants, namely, that in their Remonſtrance they endeavoured, Illuſt. Ordd. odioſam reddere doctrinam Eccleſiarum Reformatarum, and that not only, de divinâ predeſtinatione, but alſo de Gratiâ Dei & Sanctorum Perſeverantiâ, but all this malâ fide, nec ſine apertis, atrocibuſ que calumniis. Moreover I find, Seſſ. 39. pag. 151. this decree of the Synode gratifying the Remonſtrants, and yeelding to their motion made, which was, that they might have liberty to treat as well of reprobation as of election, thus, Quoniam Remonſtrantes aliquoties profeſſi ſunt, ſe per conſcientiam in Synodo ſubſiſtere ulterius non poſſe, niſi prius caveatur ipſis fore, ut de electione & reprobatione, eâ ratione quam in Theſibus & Scriptis ſuis hactenus exhibitis propoſuerunt, in poſterùm agatur. Synodus quò magis ipſis fiat ſatis, publice ac coràm omnibus declarat, ſtatuiſſe ſeſe ac ſtatuere ſententiam ipſorum, non de electione modò, verum etiam de reprobatione expendere at que examinare. Quantum nempe in conſcientiâ ad Dei gloriam, aedificationem & tranquillitatem Eccleſiae, omnium que conſcientiarum poſſe ac debere ſatis eſſe, ipſa judicaret. Ad agendi verò modum, qui hic eſt ſervandus & ordinem quod attinet, ſuum eſſe de eo diſpicere, non autem fratrum Remonſtrantium qui huc ſunt citati, quicquam praeſcribere, exiſtimat. This decree being read to the Remonſtrants, they refuſed to give way unto it. The 40 Seſſion contains the altercation thereabout, between the Synod and them. They forſooth would preſcribe to the Synod de modo Agendi, the Synod muſt not preſcribe to them. And they profeſſe againſt it Seſſ. 41. pag. 155. in this manner, Nec ſatisfit nobis ſi dicatur Synodum permiſſuram, ut nostram de reprobatione ſententiam tractemus quoad illa ipſa ad gloriam Dei, aedificationem Eccleſiarum, conſcientiarum tranquillitatem fore judicabit. Nam hâc ipſâ reſtrictione, nobis praeciditur libertas & plenaria ſententiae noſtrae defenſio, & contrariae Impugnatio. Praeterquam quòd non levis ſuſpicandi nobis data ſit occaſio, Synodum, ubi nos de electione diſſerentes audiverit, nequaquam permiſſuram ut Contra-Remonſtrantium & eorum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, de reprobatione ſententiam prout neceſſarium judicabimus, ad incudem revocari. Hereupon the Synod entreats the judgement of Forraine Divines; and they all with one conſent profeſſe, Tantam Remonſtrantibus libertatem ad defenſionem cauſae ſuae conceſſam eſſe, quantâ ex ratione & dignitate Synodi Citatis concedi poſſet. Ac proinde nullam eſſe cauſam cur Synodicum decretum mutandum videretur, aut cur Remonſtrantes querelam inſtituerent, vel authoritatem hujus Synodi ſubterfugerent. Nihil illis eſſe imperatum quod ullo modo conſcientias ipſorum gravare poſſet. Ac proinde conſcientiae velum fruſtra pervicaciae obtendi. Abundè iis omnibus que modis ſatisfactum jam eſſe. Abſolutam illam, nulliſ que circumſcriptam limitibus libertatem quam petunt, à Synodo concedi ipſis non poſſe. Aequum eſſe ut certis ſeſe legibus ſubmittant, quibus, ſi exorbitent, coërceantur. Nay in the next Seſſion, which is Seſſ. 42. there is a repreſentation made of their unreaſonable demand in theſe words. Profeſſi ſunt ſibi agendi modum a Synodo praeſcriptum, iniquum videri. Sibi permitti velle non tantum primo loco, ſed & circa omnes articulos & Theſes, ſingula que argumenta de ſententiâ Contra-Remonſtrantium, & corum quos illi pro Orthodoxis habent, quoad reprobationem agere, quia in hoc argumento calceus illos maximè urgeat. Hereupon the Opinions of the forraigne Divines were required, to wit, Whether it were fit to yeeld unto them, as to treat of Reprobation, before they treated of Election, Qui conſentientibus declarabant ſuffragiis, ab omni ratione & methodo eſſe alienum id quod Remonſtrantes peterent, ut prius de reprobatione quàm de electione agere ſibi liceret. Their judgements hereupon are here repreſented ſeverally and at large; Firſt of our Brittiſh Divines, then of the Palatine Divines, then of the Divines of the Land of Heſſe, then of the Helvetians, then of thoſe who were of the correſpondency of Weteraw, then of thoſe of Geneva, then of thoſe of Breme, and laſtly of thoſe of Emden.

5. Upon the former bald and baſe pretences, as if, Concluſum eſſet contrà Manichaeos, the Author proceeds crowing magnificentiſsimè, and demanding in this manner.

Can this doctrine be a truth, and yet bluſh at the light which makes all things manifeſt, eſpecially conſidering theſe things?

1. That Reprobation is a principall Head of practicall Divinity by the well, or ill ſtating, or ordering of which, the glory of God, and good of Religion, is much promoted or hindered.

2. That there is ſuch a neceſſary connexion between the points of election and reprobation (both being parts of predeſtination) that the one cannot be well handled without the other.

3. That Reprobation was the chiefe cauſe of all the uproares in the Churches of that time.

4. That it was accuſed with open mouth and challenged of falſhood, and therefore bound in juſtice to purge it ſelfe of the crimination.

5. That it may eaſily be defended, if (as ſome ſay) it be ſuch an apparent truth. For, Nihil eſt ad defendendum puritate facilius, ſaith St Hierome.

Now albeit for the diſcovery of the vile vanity of this concluſion, I need take no other pains, then to appeal to your, or any ſober mans due conſideration of the premiſes duely examined according to my former anſwer; yet I think good not to paſſe it over without ſuch particular conſideration as it deſerves. Firſt, I pray conſider, what is that light that makes all things manifeſt? Is it the light of Conference? In the Conference of Mompelgard there were diverſe other things diſputed of, beſides this of predeſtination. Now is the truth manifeſted hereby in all thoſe particulars? If it be, I pray, let him ſignify on whoſe ſide, whether on the part of Jacobus Andreas, or on the part of Beza? To whom is it made manifeſt? To either ſide, or only to that ſide, on whoſe ſide this Author conceives the truth to ſtand? Doe you not manifeſtly perceive the crudity of this conceit? Nay, who ſeeth not, that it is not the condition of conference, but the quality rather and ability of the conferrers, that is apt to manifeſt the truth. And ſuch men are able to manifeſt, as well out of conference in their diſcourſes, either Poſitive, or Controverſiall, as in conference; yea, and farre better; Thoſe diſcourſes being more quietly carried, and more free from altercation, then conferences; eſpecially in caſe they meet with malignant oppoſites. And indeed it is the Word of God alone, which is that ſpirituall light, which giveth manifeſtation to all ſpirituall truth. And conſequently neither are they to be cenſured as bluſhing at the light, that prefer to write quietly of theſe controverſies, then to conferre about them in ſome caſes; or that preferre conference by the penne as Beza did, before conference by word of mouth, though this better pleaſed the lipps of Jacobus Andreas. Yet neither Beza did refuſe to yeeld to Andreas his own way, neither did either the Contra-Remonſtrants at the Haghe Conference, or the Divines of Dort, refuſe to treat of reprobation, as well as election, as formerly I have ſhewed by authenticall evidences. But ſuppoſe Beza and his fellowes, whether two or three had altogether declined to conferre at all, as in my judgement they had good reaſon to refuſe, muſt this be cenſured their bluſhing at the light? Auſtin profeſſeth as I have formerly vouched him, that there may be many cauſes of forbearing to deliver the truth at ſome times. He little dreamed of expoſing the truth thereby to ſuch a cenſure, as if it bluſhed at the light. And if ſome few might be juſtly cenſured as bluſhing at the light, muſt all for their ſakes, by the rules of juſtice, be made obnoxious to the ſame cenſure, and not the Doctors only, but the Doctrine it ſelfe? Is it not apparent that a true and ſound doctrine, may be weakly apprehended by many, though learned, and Veritas eſt temporis filia, and the accurate handling and maintaining of the truth in plainer points then this of reprobation, comes not to perfection, but by degrees, and after much ventilating of it in a ruder manner. Thus I think I have crackt the crowne of this concluſion; I may proceed with the greater facility to the reſt.

1. That Reprobation is an Head to any part of practicall Divinity, I never read, nor heard till now. But yet in every theoreticall poynt, as touching the nature of God and his attributes, by the true doctrine thereof, the glory of God, and good of Religion is promoted, & by the erronious doctrine thereabouts it is as much impaired. For like as it is blaſphemy, to attribute that unto God, which doth not become him; ſo is it blaſphemy alſo, to deny unto him that which doth become him. As for the entertaining or refuſing conference thereabouts, I have already ſpoken ſufficiently; yet two particulars more I have to deliver, which I purpoſe to ſubjoyne to the end of thoſe five conſiderations here diſtinguiſhed, as remarkable ones, if my memory failes me not.

2. A Connexion I grant there is, between election and reprobation, and the clearing of the truth in the one, doth give light unto the other. But which of theſe is to be handled firſt, that the clearing of the truth therein, may give light to the ſtating of the other, I ſhould think no ſober man would make queſtion. Yet the Remonſtrants at the Synod of Dort, were eager to begin with Reprobation, but were therein generally cenſured by the conſent of forraine Divines that aſſiſted there. But that one of them cannot be handled without the other, is a palpable untruth, as appears by the very practice of this Author himſelfe, and his own carriage in this buſineſſe. For he undertakes only the poynt of reprobation.

3. As touching the third particular, in charging the doctrine of reprobation, with being the chiefe cauſe of all the uproares in the Church at that time; this author takes to himſelfe a ſtrange liberty of diſcourſe. We read and heare of no ſmall ſtirres in the Church of Rome, between the Dominicans and the Jeſuits; but I never read that the Jeſuits laid to the Dominicans charge, that their Doctrine as touching the predetermination of the creatures will to every act thereof, was the cauſe of any uproare in the Church of Rome: But to the contrary rather. I read that in the contention between the Dominicans and Jeſuits in Rome it ſelfe, wherein Valentianus through ſome heat in diſputation, caught a feaver whereof he dyed within three daies after; of the relation whereof, made by one Pet (that had been a Prieſt) in Oxford I was ſometimes an eare witneſſe. The Jeſuits were rather taxed for their heterodoxy in the poynt de auxiliis, as Petrus Mattheus in his Hiſtory reports it. And from D. Jacksons mouth, I have heard what a Spaniard ſhould deliver upon the mention of Molina the Jeſuit, namely, that he was the man, qui tantos tumultus excitavit, to wit, in Spain. But as for Churches Proteſtant, he doth well to limit his crimination to a certain time. For the ſtirre that was raiſed by Huberus in the Lutheran Churches, was neither cauſed nor occaſioned by our doctrine concerning reprobation. Huberus his cauſe was, a pertinacious ſtanding for an univerſall Election. It ſeems he hath relation only to the Haghe conference, and the uproares, as he calls them, amongſt the States only, and their particular, or provinciall congregations alone (as it ſeems) he denominates the Churches. Now let us conſider, Who made thoſe uproares, were they the Contra-Remonſtrants, or the Remonſtrants only? If he chargeth this upon the Contra-Remonſtrants, let him prove it, leaſt he be juſtly cenſured for one of thoſe wild beaſts, an Emperour was ſometimes warned to beware of, they were the ſlanderers. If the Remonſtrants were the authors of theſe uproares, how doth he prove that the doctrine of reprobation, was the chiefe cauſe of them, Were not thoſe Arminians voluntary agents in thoſe uproares? If they conceived their oppoſites doctrine to be unſound, could they not oppoſe it without uproares, without violent proceedings? Againe, their oppoſites doctrine, was it never received or preached 'till thoſe daies? Or was there any uproare made thereupon, 'till Arminius his innovating? And is that the chief cauſe of an uproare, which hath no ſuch conſequent enſuing untill it meets with ſome turbulent ſpirits, which begin to ſtirre as innovators in a Church or State. And yet was reprobation that alone, whereupon they ſtirred? Is it not apparent, that about the five Articles commonly ſo called, they conferred alike? But he ſaith it was the chiefe cauſe, and only ſaith it, yet Molinaeus profeſſing reprobation to proceed, upon foreſight of finall impenitency, as in truth it cannot be denied, but that as the Contra-Remonſtrants profeſſed, as well in that Conference at the Hague, as in the Synod of Dort, that God did never intend to damne any man of ripe years, but for finall perſeverance in infidelity and impenitency. Did their contentions hereupon, either totally ceaſe or in part? But ſuch criminations are nothing ſtrange. We know after what manner of greeting wicked Ahab ſaluted the holy Prophet Elijah. Art thou he that troubleth Iſrael? but he ſpared not to anſwer him, I am not he that troubleth Iſrael, but Thou and thy Fathers houſe. In the like manner were Paul and Silas entertained Act. 16. 20. when being caught and brought before the Magiſtrates, heard ſuch an accuſation made againſt them, Theſe men which are Jewes trouble our citty: and preach Ordinances which are not lawfull for us to receive, neither to obſerve, ſeeing we are Romans. And no marvaile if the Devill roares, when he falls from heaven, like lightning, and his kingdome is ſhaken. But becauſe he putts us to it in this crimination, I think it fit to give a taſt of the violent proceedings in thoſe parts, as I find them ordered in the Preface to the Synod. Dordrac. ſet forth by the authority of the States. And becauſe uproares concern inſurrections againſt government in Church or State; The firſt particular I obſerve of this nature is, Fol. 3. pag. 1. where after Arminius had been much ſuſpected, and divers times urged to declare his opinion, upon certain poynts which hitherto he had declined, ſaving in a falſe manner, his proteſtation in the iſſue, proving directly contrary to his practice. The Rectors of particular Churches, ſowred with the leaven of his doctrine, openly refuſe to ſubſcribe the Confeſſion of the Catechiſme, though the Synod of South-Holland commanded them. Paſtores Arminii ſententiam amplexi paſſim in Claſſibus recuſabant mandato Synodi de ſubſcriptione Confeſſion is, ac Catecheſeos morem gerere. Here we have the begining of a manifeſt ſchiſme. Now conſider we the progreſſe hereof. Hereupon a reſolution was made (it being high time) by the States, for the calling of a Nationall Synode, in the yeare 1605. about November 26. the execution whereof, was by divers practiſes of the Arminian Faction, delayed, and put off from time to time, for the ſpace of 13 years. Fol. 5. pag. 2. Arminius himſelfe acknowledgeth, de Heterodoxiâ ſuâ varios rumores omnes jam eccleſias pervaſiſſe, incendium que à ſe ſuſcitatum ipſa Eccleſiae tecta ſuper are dici. Fol. 8. pag. 1. In the mean time, Anno 1608. the States declared their purpoſe was, to call a Provinciall Synode in October following, and ſignification hereof being made, the Rectors of particular Congregations, as many as were addicted to Arminius, being admoniſhed to manifeſt their conſiderations in their ſeverall Deanaries, that ſo they might be fairely ſent to the Synod that approached. They put this off alſo. Illi vero ut antea, ita nunc quo que ſinguli conſuetis tergiverſationibus pariter hoc detrectarunt. The like refuſall was afterwards made in the Synod of South-Holland, though they were urged by the Synod to declare themſelves (for as for the Provinciall Synod, that was deferred two months longer.) Whereupon the Synod decreed, that they ſhould give up their conſiderations within a Months ſpace, or be obnoxious to Cenſure Eccleſiaſticall. Hereupon was means made by Utenbogard, for letters from the States unto thoſe Paſtors, to ſend up unto them their conſiderations ſealed, that ſo they might reſerve them to the Provinciall Synod ſhortly to be held. In theſe proceedings a man may eaſily ſmell Barnavells hand all along. Hereupon came forth at length Arminius his Declaration before the States. In anſwer whereunto Gomarus riſeth up, as there we may read, Fol. 6. pag. 2. And amongſt other courſes of Arminius, makes relation of this, as how Spretis Synodorum Claſſium & Prebyteriorum judiciis ac decretis ad ſupremi Magiſtratus tribunal prima inſtantia proſiluiſſe, ibi que querelas at que accuſationes ſuas adverſus Eccleſiarum doctrinam propoſuiſſe, artibuſ que aulicis favorem ſibi Eccleſiis verò odium conſiliare diligenter studiiſſe. And hereupon beſought the States, that ſeeing Contentiones gliſcerent, Eccleſiae turbarentur, Civeſ que in partes diſtraherentur, the Nationall Synod which they had promiſed might be gathered together with the firſt; which yet by the practice of Utenbogard and others was ſtill delayed. Hereupon Arminius his Faction grew ſo bold, as publiquely to Preach againſt the received Doctrine, as Bertius ſpared not to declare himſelfe; but wherein? Mark I pray the Article well, becauſe this Author drawes all to reprobation. Now the Articles whereupon Bertius declared himſelfe, to differ from the Doctrine received, were, De juſtificatione hominis coram Deo, De Praedeſtinatione, De Gratiâ Dei, & libero arbitrio, De Perſeverantiâ fidelium; and upon theſe very points afterwards, proceeded the Conference between Arminus and Gomarus before the States. And one Venator ſpared not publiquely to broach Pelagian and Socinian errours. Whereupon he was ſuſpended by the Churches of North-Holland. In ſpite of whom notwithſtanding, he continued his courſes of Preaching. Now whereas the Orthodox Paſtors in the Deanary of Alomar conſidering he was lawfully ſuſpended, and withall a man of impure life, refuſed to admit him into their company. Hereof complaint was made to the States, and by Utenbogards practice a Mandate obtained from them, that they ſhould admit him. Now when the States conſidering the preſent exigent, were eaſily like to condeſcend to a Provinciall Synode, the Arminians moved, that the Deputies to be ſent thither, ſhould not be appointed thereunto by the Churches, according to the uſuall courſe, but only by the States, preſuming hereby, that either none, but ſuch as favoured their cauſe ſhould be ſent, or at leaſt ſuch as were leſſe alienated from their Opinion. fol. 8. p. But though they could not effect this, yet by their practice it came to paſſe, that the calling, not only of a Provinciall Synode, but of the yearely Synods were hindered. Shortly after this, finding what liberty they had, they met together of their own accord privily, Sine Magiſtratus Supremi authoritate magno numero. At que ibi inter ſe initâ per ſubſcriptionem nominum confaederatione ſeu conſpiratione, manifeſtum in Eccleſiis Reformatis Schiſma inſtituunt. That year came forth the Remonſtrance. Upon this by the practice of the Remonſtrants, Vorſtius is brought in to be a Profeſſor in the place of Arminius. For as touching the exceptions taken againſt him, the Remonſtrants profeſſed before the States, he had given them good ſatisfaction, Fol. 10. pag. 2. Then follow their practiſes for the removing of ſuch Rectors from their Churches, as were their oppoſites, and obtruding upon the people ſuch as were of their own Party. At Alcmar, Adolphus Venator, a man of impure life and faith, moved the people to Armes againſt the Magiſtrate, whereby he was driven to relinquiſh his place, and others brought in of Venator his Faction. Fol. 12. pag. 1. Hereupon the Elders and Deacons of that place were removed, and two Paſtors, the one having formerly executed his Miniſtry amongſt them for fifty years continuance. Grevincovius in like ſort, with the Magiſtracy of Rotterdam, to deprive his Colleague there Cornelius Geſelius of his Miniſtry firſt, and then by their Sergeants to caſt him out of the Citty. Utenbogard ſends Remonſtrants into Utrecht, and amongſt others, Jacobum quendam Taurinum hominem turbulentum & ſaevum. Fol. 12. pag. 2. In Gelderland alſo the ordinary and annuall Synodicall Aſſemblies were hindred by the practice of Utenbogard, like as ſtill they continued withall their art to hinder the calling of a Nationall Synod, ſo often promiſed by the States, and ſo many years deferred. William of Naſſau moved both Utenbogard on the one ſide, and Feſtus Hommius on the other ſide, to conſider of a courſe how theſe ſtirres might be pacified. To which motion Feſtus Hommius makes anſwer, that in caſe the Remonſtrants differed from the Churches only in five Articles, he could think of a courſe whereby ſome peace might be made in the interim, untill a Nationall Synod were gathered. This is the more obſerveable, becauſe this Author layeth all the cauſe of thoſe uproares (as he calls them) upon Reprobation. But he profeſſeth they had great cauſe to ſuſpect the Remonſtrants differed from them in greater points of moment. And theſe are afterwards declared to be theſe, Fol. 14. pag. 1. De perfectâ Chriſti pro peccatis Satisfactione, de Juſtificatione hominis coràm Deo, de Fide Salvificâ, de Peccato Originali, de Certitudine ſalutis, & de Perfectione hominis in hâc vitâ. And whereas, they deſired the Remonſtrants would deale clearly and make known what their opinion was in thoſe poynts: Utenbogard having laboured to have a hearing before the States alone, There traduceth the actions of his Brethren in demanding the Declaration of their minds hereupon, as if this were to bring in a new kind of Inquiſition amongſt them, not to be endured. And hereupon obtaines of the States, that no ſuch Declaration ſhould be required at their hands. And more then that, finding the Deputies of the Synode by their continuall ſollicitations with the States (as it well became them in their places) to be moſt prejudiciall to their proceedings, they brought it ſo to paſſe, that like as formerly their Annuall Synods were hindered, ſo now it was forbidden to the Deputies themſelves, thenceforth to take any ſuch ſtile unto them, or performe any ſuch office as whereabout they were then imployed. And ſo the Relator proceeds in ſetting downe their inſolent courſes untill at length perceiving, that by the mediation of the King of Great Brittaine, all for the moſt part, inclined to the convocation of a Nationall Synod, they fell plainly on, upon theſe deſperate Counſells openly profeſſing that the calling of a Nationall Councell, would prove prejudiciall to the Majeſty and Liberty of the Provinces, manifeſting themſelves hereby utterly averſe from ſuch a courſe; which yet hath been moſt in uſe in the Church of God, and that of ancient times, for the pacifying of contentions ariſing in matter of Religion. I profeſſe, I nothing affect to ſpend time in ſuch ſearches and relations, I had rather imploy it another way, but you ſee I am driven unto it, to repreſent the unſhamefaſed condition of this Narration.

4. And whereas he ſaith, It was accuſed with open mouth, and challenged of falſhood, it is apparent that the Remonſtrants would very well have reſted contented with a mutuall toleration of one another in their ſeverall waies. For when Utenbogard and Feſtus Hommius were to meet together, and treat upon ſome faire courſe of compoſition, Utenbogard, together with thoſe of his ſide, profeſſed they knew no other courſe for ſetling peace, but my mutually tolerating one the other; Feſtus Hommius and others with him on the other ſide, profeſſed they knew no better courſe then convocation of a Nationall Synode, and in the interim to tolerate one another, provided they would declare themſelves to differ from the received doctrine in the Church, in no other points then in the five Articles. But how they carried themſelves herein refuſing to declare themſelves, I have formerly ſhewed. And farther, in the purſuit of this their practice to enjoy toleration, it is farther ſtoried, by what means they procured a Letter from King James to farther them therein, and after that an Edict to that purpoſe from ſome of the States. And conſider farther, If any amongſt us ſhould riſe up, and confederate themſelves and impugne any five Articles of the Church of England, and accuſe us for maintaining erronious doctrine therein, and challenge us for falſhood, if they doe it with never ſo open mouth, ſhall this be ſufficient to juſtify them and condemne us, if wee doe not come to a tryall with them to diſpute the caſe, though Wee are the Poſſeſſours, They the Intruders and Innovators? Wee maintaining no other Doctrine then that which is by Authority eſtabliſhed amongſt us, and They which impugne the doctrine received, are they not uſually judged amongſt us, as ſuch who are rather to be cenſured then diſputed with? And withall conſider, that this mutua tolerantia, which the Remonſtrants ſo much preſſed and were ſo glad to enjoy, was with greateſt inſtance ſtood for long after the Conference at the Hague. Laſtly, how often was Arminius himſelfe queſtioned and called upon to give ſatisfaction for his Heterodoxies, and how often did he decline it? When at the firſt, Motion was made for his ſurrogation into the place of Iunius beind deceaſed, then the ſuſpicions of his Heterodox breaking forth, and they of Amſterdam not well likeing to let him goe from them, amongſt whom at that time, he exerciſed his Miniſtry; and that becauſe they obſerved his luxuriant and novelizing Wit, which was like to breed dangerous effects in an Univerſity: at length upon the great inſtance both of Utenbogard and Arminius himſelfe, way was made for him unto the Chayre, upon condition he ſhould conferre with Gomarus upon ſome chief heads of Doctrine, and by a round declaration of his mind thereon, remove all ſuſpicion of Heterodoxy, having formerly by a ſolemne Proteſtation given his word, that in caſe he had any ſingular opinion of his own, he would not ſpread it. Hereupon he made open profeſſion, that he condemned the chiefe Pelagian opinions concerning grace naturall, the ſtrength of Free-will, Originall ſinne, the perfection of man in this life, and Predeſtination, and that he approved all thoſe diſputes, which Austin and other Fathers had written againſt them; and that in his judgement the Pelagian errours were rightly refuted by thoſe Fathers, and withall promiſed, that he would teach nothing that differed from the received Doctrine of the Churches; and hereupon he was admitted to a Profeſſors place in the Univerſity. In the beginning whereof he laboured by all means to quench all ſuſpicion of Heterodoxy in himſelfe, and maintained the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, De ſatisfactione Chriſti, de Fide juſtificante, de juſtificatione per fidem, de Perſeverantiâ verè fidelium, de Certitudine ſalutis, de Perfectione hominis in hac vitâ &c. all which he afterwards contradicted, as alſo did his Followers. This I ſay, he then at the firſt maintained publiquely, contrà ſententiam ſuam (which let every man judge, whether it be not as much as to ſay, againſt his own Conſcience) and Corvinus is alleaged as in a certain Writing of his ſet forth in Low-Dutch ingeniouſly profeſſing as much, Praefat, in Synod. Dordracen, Authoritate Ordinum Fol. 2. p. 1. But after he had been a yeare or two in the place, he begins to unmaske himſelfe, and by his Publique Lectures, and chiefly by his dealing with his Schollers in private, his heterodoxy diſcovered it ſelfe. Here upon the deputies from the Churches of South and North Holland are ſent unto him, who acquaint him with the rumours that went of him, praying him that if he diſliked ought in the doctrine received, he would ſincerely declare it unto his Brethren, to the end, either by a friendly Conference, he might receive ſatisfaction, or the whole buſineſſe might lawfully be put over to the conſideration of a Synod. Arminius his anſwer was, that he never gave any juſt cauſe, why ſuch rumour ſhould be ſpread of him, neither was it wiſdome for him to treat with them as with Deputies, that ſhould make relation of the whole matter to a Synod, though as private perſons, he refuſed not to conferre with them, provided that in caſe they differed, no relation hereof ſhould be made unto a Synod. The Church of Leyden alſo admoniſhed him, that there might be a Conference between him and his Colleagues, before the Presbytery of that Church. To them he anſwered he could not yeeld thereto, without leave from the Gurators of the Univerſity, and that he perceived not, that any benefit was like to redound unto the Church by ſuch a Conference. At another time Fol. 4. p. 2. being entreated by the Profeſſors and Paſtors with great earneſtneſſe, that if he had ought to ſay againſt the doctrine received in their Confeſſion and Catechiſme, he would freely and brotherly communicate it unto them, promiſing their endeavours to give him full ſatisfaction, or if not ſo, yet that he and his Colleagues under certain conditions might come to a faire agreement, to live together in peace, and that the reconciliation being made, nothing which paſſed between them ſhould be divulged. The anſwer he made, was this, It was no wiſe part for him to yeeld to their motion, neither was he bound thereto, the preſent meeting being not ordained unto any ſuch purpoſe, fol. 5. p. 2. Gomarus openly tells him, how it became him to declare his opinion, ne que ejuſmodi ſubterfugiis diutius hâc in re uti, & fol. 6. p. 2. before the States he repreſents his continuall practice thereunto, in concealing his Opinion, His words are theſe, Quibus inſuper artibus opiniones ſuas diſſeminare; Publicè ſcilicet ab Eccleſiis rogatum obteſtatum que , ſententiam ſuam occultare, privatim vero Paſtoribus quos in eam pertrahi poſſe ſperaret, ac diſcipulis ſuis diligentèr eam inculcare; argumenta Noſtrorum praecipua quibus astrui doctrina Orthodoxa ſoleret enervare, Jeſuitarum verò aliorum que Adverſariorum, quibus doctrinam Eccleſiarum Reformatarum oppugnant confirmare, Varias de doctrinae receptae Veritate dubitationes diſcipulorum animis ingerere, eandem que cum doctrinâ heterodoxâ prius, quaſi in aequilibrio ſuſpendere, ac deinde prorſus rejicere, nullam hactenus ſinceritatis ac conſenſus in doctrinâ, licet ſaepius ab Eccleſiis amanter fraterne que rogatum Declarationem edere voluiſſe. Now let any indifferent perſon compare the carriage of Arminius the Innovator, with the carriage of the Contra-Remonſtrants, ſtanding for the doctrine heretofore received, and judge impartially which of them betrayes the greater diſtruſt of the integrity of their Cauſe.

5. As for the eaſineſſe of defending it, if it be not, or were not ſo in their opinion, who are here pretended to have declined the ſifting of it, What is that to the purpoſe? Then who are they, who ſay it may ſo eaſily be defended? I never read any hitherto, who doe not acknowledge a great myſtery in the divine providence. And from the daies of Anſelme unto this preſent day, it hath ever been accounted (in my obſervation) a very difficult poynt to accord predeſtination divine, with the liberty of mens wills. But put the caſe it may eaſily be defended, as of evident truth by the word of God, yet notwithſtanding, if it be found harſh to mens affections, are they likely to admit it with ſuch eaſe? I ſhould think it ought to be put out of queſtion, that God hath mercy on whom he will, in beſtowing faith and repentance upon them, and thereby curing their naturall infidelity and hardneſſe of heart, as alſo that God hardneth whom he will, leaving their infidelity and hardneſſe of heart uncured; yet when fleſh and bloud riſeth up againſt this doctrine thus, Why then doth God complaine; (to wit, of mans diſobedience) for who hath reſiſted his will? And the Apoſtle addreſſeth hereunto no other anſwer but this, O man who art thou who diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed ſay to him that formed it, why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the ſame lump, to make one veſſell unto honour, another unto diſhonour? Is fleſh and bloud, I pray, apt to reſt ſatisfied with this?

Now as touching the two things I promiſed to adde, they are theſe.

1. I pray conſider whether in all this, this Author doth not very judiciouſly pronounce ſentence againſt himſelfe. For you know, your own motion you made unto him, and the promiſe he made unto you; and I pray conſider how anſwerable hereunto hath been his performance. The certain Controverſies, as touching which he profeſſeth change of Opinion, what are they, but the five Articles ſo much agitated between the Remonſtrants, and the Contra-Remonſtrants? Doe you not perceive how he makes choyce only of reprobation to grate upon? Is he not content to lye cloſe as touching foure of them? What is this, but according to his language, the coveting of corners? And what willingneſſe of abideing the tryall doth this manifeſt? Yet he pleaſeth himſelfe in a conceit, of being as free from guile, as David was when he offered himſelfe to the Lords tryall, and thereupon advanceth himſelfe to the greater liberty of cenſuring others, ſuch as Beza, and Muſculus, and their Fellowes, together with the Contra-Remonſtrants, as too full of that guile, whereof himſelfe, by virtue not of his Free-will, but of a grace of God of his ſhapeing, is voyd. This is an uſuall courſe with thoſe of his ſpirit, whereof I have had plentifull experience in this very kind. For if you believe them, all the Arminians Geeſe are Swannes, and all our Swannes are Geeſe in compariſon to them. He hopes you will not think he hates the light, or refuſeth to come to the light, (in his phraſe) this is the cenſure he liberally beſtowes upon his oppoſites. For though ſome of our Divines are willing enough to treat of the five Articles, yet to treat of reprobation, which is a part of one of thoſe, they are not ſo willing, but this young Maſter in Iſrael, out of the plerophorious conceit of his own integrity and ſufficiency, is very willing to treat of this of reprobation, though he leaves all the reſt alone. Yet I pray make the ſcales even, What inſtance can be given, I doe not ſay of Beza, Muſculus, or any one of the Contra-Remonſtrants, but of any one of the like condition to himſelfe, that being entreated by a friend (as this Author was by you) to ſhew the reaſons, why he hath changed his mind from Arminianiſme, to the oppoſite opinions, hath carried himſelfe, as this Author hath done, to give his reaſons only on the part of one of them, and yet paſſeth his cenſure ſo prodigally on others for refuſing triall, by the way implying, a glorious oſtentation of his own performances to the contrary, as if he had done a notable piece of ſervice, whereas all that he hath performed hereon, by proofe from teſtimonies of Scripture, are little more then two Leaves, and therein alſo as it were purpoſely, declines all thoſe places, wherein the Scripture ſpeaketh directly of election, predeſtination, and of that, which in effect, is all one with reprobation. Such places pregnantly ſpeaking hereof, he purpoſely declines, and yet he calls the places he inſiſts upon, pregnant teſtimonies; and indeed ſo they are, but nothing at all to the purpoſe of predeſtination, election, or reprobation. Yet I marvaile not he is ſo well conceited of his atchievements. I remember the Fable of the fly, ſitting on a Cart-wheele, in a dry ſummers day, and ſaying, See what a duſt I make. For, becauſe he hath diſcharged himſelf ſo unworthily with you, he may be bold to conceit, that if he had to deale with Beza, or with any of the Contra-Remonſtrants, or of the Synod of Dort, he would make it ſoon appeare, that Hereſy and untruth condemnes it ſelfe (this is the ſweet accommodation he makes of that the Apoſtles 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ) to wit, by their refuſing the touch-ſtone, and his readineſſe backed with all ſufficiency to come thereto, whereof he hath given ſo plentifull demonſtration in this he hath written unto you; as if he had been with ſome Oracle of late, who had not only revealed unto him, ſome reaſonable motives, and wiſe carriages of the matter, but inſpired him alſo with ſome martiall ſpirit, fit for any encounter, deſpiſing his Adverſaries, as empty Schollers, and as if their parts were but copper, to his gold. Therefore he may take heart to ſpeak boldly, and ſhew himſelfe in the clear day, when ſuch as Beza make choyce to walk in miſtrs, and dwell in ſilence. Beſides his care is very Apoſtolicall for the peace of the Church, whereas Beza's was not at Mompelgard, nor the Contra-Remonſtrants, neither at the Hague Conference, or at the Synod of Dort. For none of theſe belike, have been ſo forward to ſhew themſelves unto the World, and upon the ſtage, for the maintenance of their doctrine (at leaſt in the poynt of reprobation) no not Beza in his Lectures upon the ninth to the Romans. Yet neither this man nor his Oracle hath done ought that I know, but in corners. And in corners I find theſe ſpirits exceeding buſy; and I have been ſo happy (for ſo I account it, although I confeſſe my time might be farre more profitably beſtowed) as to meet with ſome of their Myſteries, ere I was aware. And I find their Lyons skinnes, doe ſmell farre more of the Fox then of ehe Lyon.

2. The ſecond is this, Why ſhould their carriage be any prejudice to others, who are as willing to give an account of their faith in theſe particulars, as any Arminian whatſoever. For my part, I never met with any of them, that I declined, nor I hope never ſhall. I heartily wiſh, time might ſerve me for them all. I have dealt with Arminius his Examen, his Conference with Junius, Corvinus his anſwer unto Tilenus, I have entred upon Voſſius his Pelagian Hiſtory. I deſire I might have time and opportunity, for their Synodalia Dordracena, but moſt of all with the Jeſuits; while I deale with them I learne ſomewhat, but nothing at all while I am occupied with the Arminians.

3. Let mee adde one thing more: In the Articles of our Church, the ſeaventeenth is concerning Predeſtination and Election, not one concerning Reprobation. If any of us, ſhould forbeare to meddle with the doctrine of reprobation in diſpute, may we not juſtly plead, a faire conformity to the wiſdome of the Church whereof we are members? And by the way to touch one thing, Might not this be the reaſon, why this author utterly pretermits the proſecuting his opinion concerning Predeſtination and election, to wit, leaſt thereby he ſhould fall foule upon the doctrine of our Church, ſo evidently ſet downe in that Article concerning the poynt of Predeſtination? The Church of Ireland content themſelves, with the very forme of that 17th Article of ours concerning Predeſtination: Only they premiſe two Theſes; the one whereof is this, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable Councell ordaine, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe, yet ſo, as thereby no violence is offered to the Wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty, nor the contingency of the ſecond cauſe is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather; The other this, By the ſame eternall Counſell, God hath Predeſtinated ſome unto life, and Reprobated ſome unto death, of both which there is a certain number, known only unto God, which neither can be increaſed nor diminiſhed.

TWISSE Conſideration.

HIs third Topick place, is drawn from the Infamy of this doctrine, and that amongſt Papiſts and Lutherans. And this is a grand motive with him to abhorre it. But I pray conſider, was not the doctrine of the Goſpell infamous at the firſt, both amongſt Jewes and Gentiles? What time the Jewes were the only people of God, how doth Tacitus out of his worldly wiſdome brand them? Doth he not call them Gentem teterrimam, Cenus hominum inviſum Diis? And as touching Hiſt. l. 5. their religious Rites, marke what cenſure he paſſeth upon them, Profana illic omnia, quae apud nos ſacra, rurſus conceſſa apud illos, quae apud nos inceſta, and comparing them with Annal. the Rites of Bacchus, ſaith, Liber feſtos, laetoſ que ritus poſuit, Judaeorum Mos abſurdus ſordidus que . And ſpeaking of the Chriſtians he calls them, Genus hominum propter flagitia inviſum. This cenſure he paſſeth upon them in the daies of holy Paul, who forbad them to doe evill that good might come thereof, and commands every ſoule to be ſubject to the Higher Powers, even then, when ſoules were at the beſt, and powers at worſt. And ſee I pray what the King of Aſhurs judgement was, concerning the Religion of Samaria and Jeruſalem, in compariſon to the Religions of their Nations, which were heatheniſh. Iſa. 10. 10. Like as mine hand hath found the Kingdoms of the Idolls, ſeeing their Idolls were above Jeruſalem, and above Samaria. So that of an heatheniſh Religion, he had a better eſtimation then of the Religion of the Jewes. Now if ſome Rabſhakeh amongſt them ſhould turne heathen (for ſuch a tradition, as I remember is received amongſt the Rabbins, namely, that Rabſhakeh was a Jew, but turned heathen) and afterwards endeavoured to entice the Jewes to doe as he did, and that becauſe of the infamous nature of their Religion amongſt heathens, how deſerved ſuch a one to be entertained by them? Was he not by the Law of God to be ſtoned to death? In like manner, if in the primitive daies of the Church, ſome Chriſtian ſhould turne Jew or Infidell, and practice to ſeduce others from the obedience of faith, repreſenting unto them how every where it was contradicted, how Chriſt himſelfe was counted a blaſpheamer, a ſorcerer, how the Goſpell was a ſcandall to the Jewes, fooliſhneſſe to the Gentiles, and that in killing the holy Apoſtles, the world thought they did God very good ſervice. Saint Paul himſelfe profeſſing of himſelfe and his fellowes, That they were made as the filth of the world, the offſcouring of all things. Did this infamy prevaile with 1 Corinth. 4. 13. Paul, or any other holy ſervant of God, to remit any thing, in the maintenance of his Chriſtian faith? Nay, doth he not profeſſe, ſaying, I paſſe not for theſe things, neither is my life deare unto me, ſo I may fulfill my courſe with joy, and the Miniſtration that I have received to teſtify the Goſpell of the grace of God? And that in all things, They approve themſelves as the Miniſters of God by honour and diſhonour, by good report and evill report, as deceivers and yet true. Act. 20 2 Cor. 6. 4, 8.

Againe, Is it to be expected, that any doctrine ſhould be well ſpoken of, by ſuch as are oppoſites and adverſaries thereunto? Suppoſe a rigid Lutheran ſhould by Gods providence, be taken off from their ubiquitary doctrine; and in juſtifying himſelfe for the change of his Opinion, ſhould repreſent unto them, the infamous condition of that doctrine, both in the judgement of Papiſts, and in the judgement of Calviniſts; I pray conſider, How in all likelyhood would this plea be entertained? Could he expect any better recompence hereof, then to be caſt out of their Synagogues? Suppoſe a Papiſt ſhould have his eyes opened, and brought to the truth of God in the poynt of juſtification, and, being demanded the reaſon of this change of mind in him, ſhould anſwer, that the infamy of this doctrine, both amongſt Lutherans and Calviniſts is ſo great, and that ſuch a morſell, which neither Lutherans nor Calviniſts can ſwallow, ſhould therefore (in his judgement) not down very eaſily with Papiſts, and without ſuſpicion. Now let any indifferent Reader confider, how this plea in all probability would be received amongſt papiſts. Yet I mean not to quiet my ſelfe, or content my Reader with this parallell. Of that which he here delivers of Papiſts, he gives us no evidence but his bare word in pawne, for the credit of this aſſertion. Neither gives he any teſtimony of Lutherans, their calling us damned Calvenists, and though he had, I pray, what were we the farther off from the kingdome of God for that? And I pray conſider, is it not in our power to recompence them, and call them, damned Lutherans, if we liſt to recompence malice with malice, ſo to ſerve our own turnes? And all this is delivered by him without diſtinction of Papiſts, learned and unlearned, Dominicans and Jeſuits; in like ſort without all diſtinction of Lutherans, whether rigid or moderate. But let us examine his crimination a part.

And firſt, as for Papiſts; not one is here named, nor any reference made to any of of them. St Pauls prayer was, that they might be delivered from unreaſonable men. I think never Sect roſe upmore unreaſonable then this Sect of Arminians. This Writing came unto my hands, before I had diſpatched a large diſcourſe ſent unto me from one of ſame Sect, and therein I have met with pregnant evidences, that more heads then one, were employed thereabouts. And there I am told to my face, that our doctrine of abſolute reprobation, we have learned from the Papiſts. Another with whom I had to doe not long before, profeſſeth in plain manner thus; The Jeſuits ten of them for one, favour the abſolute irreſpective decree, following herein as they think St Auſtin, but eſpecially their St Thomas, and Scotus, with all the rabble of rotten Schoolmen, and the whole Tribe at this day of the Dominicans, who are buzy zelots for the cauſe; of whoſe conſent ſome amongſt us are not aſhamed to bragge. If our irreſpective decree, be ſo joyntly maintained by both Jeſuits, and Dominicans, and that as they think according to Auſtin, how is it poſſible our doctrine herein, can be ſo odious to the Papiſts? Or what Papiſts doth he mean, if neither Jeſuits nor Dominicans, nor any ſuch as concurre with either of them? Or if it be ſo odious unto them, as one Arminian Proſelite profeſſeth, how can it be ſo concordantly maintained by them, as another Arminian proſelite avoucheth? And if we have learned it at the hands of Papiſts, what will theſe Lutherans gaine, by uniting with Papiſts rather then with us, that is, with the Maſters rather then with the Schollars. And if a Lutheran ſhould be converted to the embracing of our Tenent herein, and to juſtify himſelfe ſhould plead; That we Calviniſts are ready to proteſt, that in the doctrine of reprobation and predeſtination, we had rather unite our ſelves with Papiſts then with them, Of what moment think you, would this motive be with them, which this Author moſt inconſiderately propoſeth, as a poynt of very ponderous conſideration?

But as touching Papiſts, their diſlike of us, he confines it only to the Supralapſarian-way. And indeed that diſtinction of the Supralapſarian and Sublapſarian-way. was brought in meerely to get thereby ſome more elbow roome. For if they agree with us in the poynt of Gods abſolute and irreſpective decrees, how improbable is it, that the doctrine of any of our Divines, in ſtating the object of predeſtination to be humanum genus nondum conditum, will prove odious unto them; conſidering this is a meer Logicall difference, as I have ſhewed in my Vindic. Grat. Dei cap. 1. pag. 1. De Predeſtinatione digreſſ. 1. Yet as touching the Supralapſarian-way, that opinion is imputed unto Junius by Arminius, as alſo to Thomas and his Followers. Collat. Armin. cum Juni. pag. 4. and if ſo, how improbable is it, that ſuch an Opinion ſhould be ſo odious to the Papiſts, as this Author upon his bare word avoucheth. And Alphonſus Mendoza ſpares not to profeſſe, that ſupernaturalls were intended by God before naturalls; and his diſcourſe hereupon, was taken with admiration by his Auditors in Spaine, and he was urged as himſelfe profeſſeth, to ſet it forth in Print. And the Quatuor ſigna Franciſci Mayronis (mentioned by Mr Perkins De Praedeſt. Modo & Ordine) doe manifeſt that he took the ſame way; and theſe quatuor ſigna, Franciſcus Mayro received from the doctrine of Scotus. It is well known that in the Synod of Dort, there met Divines different in this poynt, who yet neither hated one anothers doctrine nor perſons for this difference; like as ſo it is amongſt us, as in the place above mentioned I have ſhewed. Nay it is apparent, that Junius took upon him to reconcile all three opinions there abouts, and Piſcator after him, who alſo hath diſcharged his part herein, farre more clearely then Iunius. And no marvail, Iunius having firſt broken the ice. But that the truth may not be carried in the clouds of ambiguities, as they deſire, who are in love with errour: All the queſtion between theſe our Divines conſiſts in this, Whether it were the will of God that Adam ſhould fall by his permiſſion, ſo to make way for Gods glorious ends, to wit, the manifeſtation of his glory, in the incarnation of the Sonne of God, as alſo in the way of mercy, in the ſalvation of ſome; and in the way of juſtice, in the condemnation of others. The Supralapſarians maintaine, that ſuch was the will of God, leaſt otherwiſe way ſhould be made for the manifeſtation of Gods glorious works by accident, rather then by Gods providence. Other Divines that take the Sublapſarian way, had rather decline this nice poynt as difficult, then oppoſe it as odious. But ſay I, the doctrine wherein both Jeſuits and Arminians doe agree, will abundantly ſerve us to juſtify us, in the poſitive and affirmative part of ſo nice a poynt as this. For by their doctrine of Scientia Media, God did foreſee, that upon ſuch an adminiſtration of his providence about Adam as was uſed, Adam would fall; and more then this, that God could have brought forth other adminiſtrations of his providence in very great variety, ſome whereof were ſuch, that if God had uſed, Adam would not have fallen. Now being pleaſed to make uſe of ſuch an adminiſtration of providence divine, upon the purpoſe whereof, he foreſaw Adam would fall; and not being pleaſed to uſe ſuch a providence, upon the purpoſe whereof, he had foreſeen Adam would not have fallen; I call here all the indifferent of the World to judge, whether it doth not manifeſtly follow herehence, that it was the will of God, Adam ſhould fall by his permiſſion.

Again, throughout our doctrine, nothing is more harſh then that of Gods determining the will of the creature, to every act of his, as touching the ſubſtance thereof. Dares this author betray ſuch ignorance, as hand over head to profeſſe, that this doctrine is odious unto Papiſts? Whereas the moſt learned in the Church of Rome, are well known to maintain it in expreſſe termes, whereas our Divines courſe is, to keep themſelves to the phraſe of Scriptures. And as for the Jeſuits who oppoſe it, and in the place thereof bring in Scientia Media, and Gratia Congrua, ſhaped after the genius of Scientia Media. I can ſhew an expreſſe acknowledgement under the hand of a zealot for the Arminian cauſe, that between the Gratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans, and Gratia congrua of the Jeſuits, there is no ſuch materiall difference at all, but that the abſoluteneſſe of predeſtination and reprobation doth follow, as well upon the one, as upon the other.

To conclude, I would this Author would be ſo wiſe, as once more to conſult with his Oracle, and enquire, Whether Papiſts are more ready to joyne with Lutherans, in their doctrine of Chriſts Ubiquity, as touching his Manhood, then with us in the poynt of Reprobation, or of Gods concourſe. For ſuppoſe we held as Suarez is pleaſed to ſtate our Tenent, namely, Quod Deus omnipotenti voluntate nobis neceſſitatem imponat; yet the ſame Suarez ſaith, that in this very poynt, we are not reprehended of them, as if we affirmed ought, Quod vel in re ipſâ contradictionem involvat, aut Dei omnipotentiam ſuperet. I preſume no Papiſt is ſo well conceited in the Lutherans doctrine in the poynt of Ubiquity.

From that which he affirmes of Papiſts, I come to that which he affirmes of Lutherans. And what one inſtance hath he given of any Lutheran, ſpeaking againſt our making the corrupt Maſſe the object of predeſtination or reprobation? Surely not one, either out of Sir Edwin Sands, nor out of Oſiander; Nay what cauſe is there, why either Papiſt or Lutheran ſhould, in caſe the object thus ſtated (or in a more rigid forme of the Maſſe Uncorrupt) doth no way conſtraine us to maintaine, that God doth intend the damnation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the conſideration of him, as departing out of this World, under the power of ſinne; no nor to maintain, that God doth intend the ſalvation of any man, in any moment of nature, before the conſideration of him, in finall perſeverance in faith and repentance, provided God ſuffer him, to live untill the uſe of reaſon, as I have ſhewed, and endeavoured to juſtify, and make appeare, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, in the digreſſions concerning Predeſtination. For indeed not any of our Divines was, I think, ever known to maintain, that God did intend to damne any man but for ſinne; Neither doe I maintaine, that God intended to beſtow ſalvation on any man of ripe years, but by way of reward of his faith and repentance. The true and principall, reall (not verball only) difference between us, and the Arminians, is about Gods beſtowing of faith and repentance, and his purpoſe thereof. Now let any learned Lutheran deliver his mind on this, namely, upon the foreſight where of it is, that God gives faith and repentance unto ſome, and denyes it unto others. When Toſſanus makes relation of Hunnius his expoſition of that place Acts 13. 48. Et crediderunt quotquot ordinati erant ad vitam, thus, id eſt, qui ſeſe ordinarant & diſpoſuerant ad audiendum Dei verbum; Et illud fide amplectendum. Hunnius in his refutation of Toſſanus his Theſes, cites Toſſanus to appear before the tribunall ſeat of the Judge both of quick and dead, and to ſhew in what place of his writings, this is to be found, profeſſing that ſuch doctrine is the very Pelagian Hereſy, and that himſelfe never approved it, but diſproved it rather, and moſt conſtantly impugned it. What Lutheran was ever known ſo abſurd, as to ſay, that God worketh in us, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Velle credere, modò Velimus? Yet this doctrine I can ſhew in expreſſe termes delivered by an Arminian. But come to the conſideration of the inſtances propoſed by him.

The firſt is the Relation of Sir Edwin Sands. And I remember well to have read in him ſomewhat concerning the Predeſtinary Peſtilence, ſo called by ſome. And I might wonder at this Authors wiſdome, in pretermitting that paſſage; but upon ſearch finding it about Fol. 59. though my Book hath no quotation at all of pages, I ceaſed to wonder at his concealing of it. I have rather cauſe to commend his wiſdome therein, although it expreſſeth that whereupon this Author formerly touched, as concerning the Lutherans readineſſe to returne to the Papacy rather then to admit that Predeſtinary Peſtilence. For predeſtinary peſtilence goeth not here alone, but is joyned with the Sacramentary peſtilence, For theſe two poynts, ſaith he, are the ground of the quarrell; but he addes I confeſſe, that the Predeſtinary peſtilence was more ſcandalous at that day then the former. Yet the ſame Author profeſſeth Fol. 73. of the Lutherans, that if he fetch an elle forwards one way, for an elle he looſeth another way, it is only by a kind of boyſterous force and violence againſt the Calviniſts, as in Straſborough of late. And the reaſon hereof he takes to be in part the Abſurdities of the Ubiquitary Chimaera. And as for the paſſage here alleaged, I find it about Fol. 86. Wherein I conſider, Firſt that the ſpeculative opinions he ſpeaks of are not about the eternall decrees of God only, or eſpecially above all others, as here by cunning carriage it is pretended. For the words runne thus; It can be no blemiſh to them to reviſe their Doctrine, and to abate the rigour of certain ſpeculative opinions, eſpecially touching the eternall decrees of God, the quality of mans nature, the uſe of works, wherein ſome of their chiefe Authors have come to ſuch an utter oppoſition, &c So that the poynts of rigorous doctrine, which were to be qualified in this Gentlemans judgement, are many, but eſpecially three; The firſt whereof is touching the eternall decrees of God, The ſecond concerning the quality of mans nature, The third concerning the uſe of Works: So that the doctrine of Gods eternall decrees is not the poynt alone, the rigour whereof eſpecially is to be qualified in this Authors judgement, but this eſpeciall care of qualification, is by him referred to the three poynts formerly mentioned, and that indifferently. Secondly, Whereas this Author relates, that this is delivered, not as out of the relators judgement only, but as out of the judgement of men whom he commends for ſingular learning and Piety. I find no ſuch matter in the Relation that I have, though I have ſearched after it, both by conſidering what went before, and what comes after, as farre as he treats of the ſame matter. Whether this comes in a ſecond Edition I know not: in mine I find no ſuch thing. So that the weight of this motive hitherto, lies wholly upon the authority of this Gentleman. And ſurely I ſhould think it were nothing hard to counterballance this authority to the full. And it may be he ſpeaks herein no other thing then wherein he was endoctrinated by his Tutor, as lately an ingenious and grave divine, differing from us in the poynt of reprobation, moſt ingeniouſly acknowledged, that he was brought into that opinion of his by his Tutor, who was a Lutheran: And I doubt we have too many ſuch amongſt us. Of late I have heard, that one of good place ſpared not openly to profeſſe, ſaying, Call us as we ought to be called, for we are Lutherans: I would wee had not too many Popiſh-hearted amongſt us.

Thirdly, whereas this Gentleman adviſeth us to reviſe the Doctrines, and this Author accommodates it only to Gods eternall decrees; I have already performed this, and qualified the rigour of ſome mens opinions thereabouts. For whereas ſome have ſubordinated Gods decree of permitting ſinne, to the decree of damnation, I have taken another courſe, and doe maintain, that in no moment of nature is the decree of damnation, before the decree of permitting finall perſeverance in ſinne. Again, I preſume this Gentlemans meaning is not, that the doctrine of the Church of England is rigorous, as touching Gods eternall decrees. I willingly profeſſe, I deſire no better triall of the truth of the Doctrine I maintain hereabouts, next unto the Word of God, then to be tried by the 17th Article of the Church of England, and by the Articles of the Church of Ireland, ſet forth in the daies of King James Thirdly, I would it were put unto this Gentleman, if he be living, Whether in his Opinion, God of his free grace doth beſtow faith and repentance on ſome, thereby to cure that naturall infidelity and hardneſſe of heart, which is originally found in all, and of his meer pleaſure, he denies it unto other: Or whether finding ſome morall difference or preparation in one more then in another, is hereupon moved to give faith and repentance unto them, and deny it unto others. If he ſhall acknowledge, that God doth ſhew his mercy to whom he will, that is, of his meer pleaſure, and denies it to whom he will, I am ready to profeſſe, that let him ſtate Gods eternall decrees after what manner he will, I ſhall willingly ſubſcribe thereunto; provided it be ſuitable unto the former ground: and as for the unſuitable nature thereof, if in caſe it ſo fall out, let the proofe and evident demonſtration thereof, lye on mee. But if his opinion be, that God beſtowes faith and repentance on man, moved thereunto by ſome morall preparation, which he finds in one, rather then in another, I appeale to the Lutherans themſelves, whether this be not in plain termes no better then Pelagianiſme.

As for his calling their opinions in this poynt, ſpeculative opinions (as this Author would have us obſerve) I am willing to obſerve it: and withall I think, he doth it with better judgement, then this Author doth in calling them practicall.

And whereas it is pretended, that our Divines have been carried into theſe opinions of theirs, in oppoſition to Popiſh Doctrine, This is ſo out of ſeaſon in theſe daies (notwithſtanding the raw judgement of this Author) that our Arminians ſpare not to profeſſe (as formerly mentioned) and charge us to our face, that we have learned this doctrine of ours, out of the Writings of Papiſts. And Grevincovius, againſt Ameſius, ſpares not to pronounce, that They may with better credit follow the Jeſuits, then Wee the Dominicans, conſidering that the Dominicans are the great Adminiſtrators of the Inquiſition in Spaine. This is delivered as touching the poynt of grace and Free-will: but as touching the poynt of election and reprobation abſolute, I can ſhew under the hand of an Arminian, that herein there is no materiall difference between the Dominicans, and moſt part of the Jeſuits; ſo little difference there is between the Gratia Praedeterminans of the one, and the Gratia Congrua of the other. So that if this be true, it is not probable, that hereby we ſcandalize the judicious and learned Papiſts; and what thoſe other Churches are which we ſcandalize, excepting Churches Lutheran, either this Author knows not, or is well content to diſſemble it, to wit, the Churches of Socinians and Anabaptiſts. And how doe we more ſcandalize the Churches Lutheran herein, then they ſcandalize us? Was it ever known, that by meer differing in Opinion from other Churches, Chriſtian men were ſaid to ſcandalize them? Or if it were ſo, muſt not the ſcandall in this caſe, be equall on both ſides?

As for the leaving many of our own very ill ſatisfied, why ſhould that ſeem ſtrange? What doth Carryer write of many well known to him in this our Church of England, of the ſame mind with himſelfe, ſome Papiſts, ſome Lutherans? And may there not be as many amongſt the Lutherans, as ill ſatisfied with the doctrine commonly received amongſt them, ſave that they are farre more forward, to excommunicate all ſuch, as ſoon as they appeare, then Wee? Beſides all this, The poynt of ſcandall is brought in very unſeaſonably; For if it be a truth that we maintain and profeſſe, if any are ſcandalized by it, it is a ſcandall taken, not given: God forbid we ſhould grow ſo profane, as to account it a ſcandalous thing to make profeſſion of Gods truth; eſpecially this truth we maintain being ſo neere to a cleare oppoſition to Pelagianiſme, a Hereſy condemned by the Church above 1200 years agoe.

When Frederick Duke of Woortenberg exhorted his Divines to acknowledge Beza, and his Company for Brethren, and to declare it by giving them their hands; The anſwer of refuſall was made by Jacobus Andreas a moſt bitter enimy, and one whom Beza deſcribes, tanquam virum ſanguinarium, and his carriage throughout was moſt imperious. And it becomes an Arminian ſpirit well, to make the rancour of his malicious heart, a rule wherebyto cry down the doctrine which he abhorred. With a farre better grace might a Papiſt cry down our faith, oppoſite to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, by the Popes abhorring it, and damning of it to the pit of hell. For ſurely it is fit he ſhould be of farre more authority then Jacobus Andreas; not to ſpeak of the Anathematization of it in the Councell of Trent, nor of the common argument of Papiſts, in that they deny that we can be ſaved, many amongſt us are of opinion, that a Papiſt can be ſaved, therefore better to be a Papiſt then a Proteſtant; yet ſurely it is in the power of our corruption to requite malice with malice, and as much to ſcorne with our heeles their Brotherhood, as they ours. But if through the grace of God, we doe not give our ſelves leave to requite their malice, if that be no ſcandall to themſelves, there is no cauſe why it ſhould be any ſcandall unto us. In Sir Edwin Sands about Fol. 59. there is ſuch a relation as this, Though the Princes and Heads of the weaker ſides in thoſe parts both of Palſgrave and Landſgrave, have with great wiſdome and judgement (to aſlack thoſe flames) impoſed ſilence on that poynt, to the Miniſters of the one Party, hoping that the charity and diſcretion of the other ſort, would have done the like: yet it falleth out otherwiſe, that Lutheran Preachers rage hitherto in their Pulpits. Now let Arminians if they think good, conclude herehence, that ſeeing there was ſo little charity and diſcretion, in the Lutheran Preachers, it becomes them in their writings and Concluſions, to ſhew as little charity and diſcretion as they for their hearts; and that grace of God which they faſhion to themſelves, will bear them out in this, it beeing meerely the power of their own free-wills. But this is not all I have to ſay in anſwer hereunto.

The phraſe in Oſiander is not, errorum teterrimorum, but haereſcωn teterrimarum, of which this Author ſaith, they reckoned this for one. And let him ſpeak out and tell us, what were the others. Was not the denyall of Conſubſtantiation another? As alſo the denyall of the lawfulneſſe of that Baptiſme, which was adminiſtred by Woemen; (the practice whereof King James reformed in our Book of Common-Prayer:) As alſo their not concurrence with them in opinion about the Perſon of Chriſt, which by their Ubiquitary Chimaera (as Sir Edwin Sands call it) they doe miſerably deforme. Theſe and other ſuch like were the errours, whereof this Author ſaith, Beza and his Fellowes were proved to be guilty of in this Conference, for ſo I take his meaning, pronouncing thereby ſentence tanquam ex Cathedra Judicis; or the Lutheran Party throughout in that Conference: which Conference was not of Predeſtination alone, but de Caenâ Domini, de Perſonâ Chriſti, de Imaginibus, de Baptiſmo, and laſt of all de Praedestinatione.

Yet I have not done with this. For I beſeech you conſider, whether this Author, or his Oracle, be not miſerably deceived in all this, and that theſe teterrimae Haereſes are not ſuch as Iacobus Andreas with his Lutheran party, laid to the charge of Beza and his Brethren, but rather ſuch as Beza and his Brethren, laid to the charge of the Lutherans; and that not in this Conference, but in their Writings, in Scriptis, ſo goeth the relation. Whereas this Conference was not by writing, but only by word of mouth; Iacobus Andreas not enduring to give way to Beza's motion as touching the conſigning of that which they delivered in writing under their hands. For the relation in Oſiander runs thus; Ad haec D. Iacobus reſpondit, Woortenbergicos Theologos Deum oraturos, ut Bezae & ipſius Collegis oculos mentis aperiat. Ut autem illis dextram fraternitatis praebeant non ignor are illos quàm horribilium errorum & teterrimarum haereſeω • in ſuis Scriptis coram Fccleſiâ ipſos reos egerint; Ideo que ſe mirari quomodo eos pro fratribus agnoſcere poſſint aut velint, aut corum fraternitatem expetant, ſi pro talibus agnoſcant, qui damnatas Haereſes ab Orco revocent ut Eccleſiae Dei obtendant. Now theſe words though at firſt ſight they may ſeem to be referred, either to the Woortenbergers as accuſing Beza and his Brethren, of ſuch errours and hereſies; yet the words following, Ideo que ſe mirari quamodo eos pro fratribus agnoſcere poſſint aut velint, aut eorum fraternitatem expetant, ſi pro talibus agnoſcant, qui damnatas Haereſes ex Orco revocent: theſe words I ſay doe farre more incline to ſignify, that Beza and his Brethren, laid theſe horrible errours and hereſies to the charge of the Lutherans; and therefore the Lutherans wondred, how they could deſire their Brotherhood, whom they accounted ſuch horrible Heretiques; rather then the Lutheran party, ſhould wonder how they ſhould affect Brotherhood with Beza, ſeeing they neither did affect any ſuch, and if they had it was not fit they ſhould wonder at their own actions. But that which followes puts it out of all queſtion; where comes in manifeſtly, what the Lutheran Party conceived of the Doctrine of Beza implying thereby, what Beza and his Fellows conceived of the Lutherans Doctrine, was formerly expreſſed; the words following are theſe, Contrà verò in quibus & quàm tetris erroribus ipſi verſentur (that is Beza and his company) hac Collatione iis demonſtratum eſſe: In quibus cum adhuc perſeverent ipſos intelligere quòd eos pro fratribus agnoſcere non poſſint. In which words Andreas gives the reaſon why he and his Fellowes cannot acknowledge Beza and his fellowes for brethren, becauſe they maintained, tetros errores (as he calls them;) for proofe whereof he appeales to the preſent Conference. And this being delivered on the contrary part to that which is delivered before, as appears by the very firſt word, Contra verò, it followeth, that in the former part was ſet down, the reaſon why Beza and his fellowes, ſhould not deſire the fraternity of the Lutheran party, to wit, becauſe they laid to the Lutherans charge, that they maintained horrible errours and moſt peſtilent Hereſies, for proof whereof, he appeals not to this preſent Conference, which was carried wholly by word of mouth, but to their Writings. This being clearely the meaning of Andreas, it is apparent, that the charge laid by Beza and his fellowes, upon the Lutherans, was of fouler crimes, by Andreas his relation, then was the charge laid by Andreas upon Beza and his Brethren. For Andreas charged Beza only with, errores tetros; but Beza and his are ſaid to have charged the Lutherans with horribiles errores, & haereſes teterrimas. So that this Author doth miſerably miſtake his own evidences, and ſhamefully abuſeth himſelfe firſt, and others after him, if they will be abuſed by him. And whether he hath not taken it from ſome Achates of his upon truſt I know not; and if it be ſo that ſome Achates hath helped him hereunto, certainly he hath not proved Fidus Achates in this.

In the cloſe, it will not be amiſſe to ſhew, how Mr Maſon of St Andrews Vnderſhaft in London, alleageth this carriage of Jacobus Andreas, as a teſtimony of the Lutheran uncharitableneſſe, in compariſon with the charitable condition of their oppoſites, in a ſmall Treatiſe of Contentment in Gods gifts. pag. 19. And ſhall their uncharitableneſſe plead for the truth of their way, or be any juſt argument, of the untruth of our way, in any ſober and wiſe mans judgement.

Of Hemingius his leaving his own ſide, I never heard or read before, unleſſe that of a Papiſt he became a Proteſtant. But the difference is well known between the rigid and moderate Lutherans, and theſe are called by the other Semi-Calviniani. And what I pray hath Hemingius deſerved, that his authority ſhould be greater then the authority of Zuinglius, Calvin, Junius; Zanchius, Piſcator. The Lutherans themſelves (I ſuppoſe) will hardly think him worthy to be remembred the ſame day with Martin Luther. And as for Martin Luthers doctrine herein, to my judgement, he is farre more expreſſe and reſolute then Calvin, and I find that Beza in his Conference of Mompelgard, doth ſometimes twit his oppoſites with Luthers Doctrine, whereunto throughout that Conference, I doe not find they anſwer any thing at all.

When he ſaith, It is a Morſell, which the greateſt part of the Chriſtian Churches cannot ſwallow; What a wild courſe doth he take in theſe his Motives. Muſt we for every doctrine of ours, examine whether the moſt part of Chriſtian Churches doe embrace it yea or no? Why ſhould wee not then runne out in this our ſearch, and enquire, what is the Moſcoviticall and Grecian Faith, what the Aethiopian, and Abyſſine, and ſo proceed in our contemplative perambulations, all the World over, and what we have found preacht unto our people alſo, to their more profound, and ſubſtantiall edification, if they liſt to believe us upon our word. But I ſuppoſe he looked no farther then to this Weſterne World, ſecluding the new diſcoveries within the laſt hundred years or ſomewhat more. And very confidently he muſt exclude all Popiſh Churches, or preſume they are for him in this. Yet as I ſaid, the very laſt Arminian, I have had to deale with, hath told me to my face, that my Doctrine of abſolute Reprobation, I have learned it of the Papiſts; and another to this purpoſe, there is no materiall difference between the Gratia Congrua of the Jeſuits, and Cratia praedeterminans of the Dominicans. And ſecluding Popiſh Churches, I know not who they are, whom he calls the greateſt part of the Chriſtian Churches. Be it, that the Lutheran Churches are a greater Party, then the Churches of the Calviniſts (which is more then I find in Sir Edwin Sands his Relation.) Now ſuppoſe the number of the Calviniſts and their power were greater then that of the Lutherans; ask I pray any Lutheran in the World whether that were any reaſonable motive unto him to change his Religion and turne Calviniſt? If it be of no weight to perſwade them, why ſhould it be of any moment to prevaile with us?

I come now to the Fourth and laſt of theſe Motives.

TWISSE Conſideration.

OUR Doctrine I ſee is cryed downe, not only as infamous, but alſo as Stoicall, and Manichaicall. Now I had thought the infamy of it had conſiſted only in the Stoicality of it, and it is no way fit to coordinate the Genus with the Species, in multiplying criminations. But I remember what the Poet obſerves to fall out ſometimes, namely, that,

Accedit fervor capiti numeruſ que lucernis.

It calls to my remembrance a ſtory that Mr Baſtard ſometimes told my good friend D. Hoskins, it was of a neighbour that came to him complaining of a friend of his, that had loſt all his five Senſes; as for example, his ſight and his ſeeing, and ſo proceeded in his amplification: with whom Mr Baſtard as it were, condoling, anſwered, Though he had loſt his fight, yet if he had retained his ſeeing, there had been ſome comfort. True Sir quoth the plain fellow. In like ſort, I might ſay, that though our Doctrine in this poynt be Stoicall, yet if it were not infamous there were ſome comfort in it, but the heavy crimination laid to our charge is, that it is not only Stoicall, but infamous alſo. But let this be our comfort, that nothing herein is laid to our charg, which was not laid to the charg of Auſtin, many hundred years agoe. This Proſper teſtifies after Austins death, to have been the practice of the Pelagians. Prout ſibi obnoxias aliquorum aures opportunaſ que repererint, ſcripta ejus quibus error Pelagianorum impugnatur, Proſp. Epiſt. ad Ruffin. infamant, dicentes, eum liberum arbitrium peni • ùs ſubmovere & ſub gratiae nomine neceſſitatem praedicare fatalem. Neither was he free from this reproach while he lived, as appears by divers paſſages; as Contr. duas Epiſtol. Pelagiani. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sub nomine, inquiunt, gra •• ae ita fatum aſtruunt, ut dicant, quia niſi Deus invito & reluctanti homini in • piraverit boni & ipſius imperfecti cupiditatem, nec à malo declinare, nec bonum poſſet arripere. This is the objection; His Anſwer followeth in theſe words. Nec ſub nomine gratiae Fatum aſſerimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibuſdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nurcupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, ſed de verbis contendere non amamus. And cap. 6. Fatum qui affirmant de ſyderum poſitione ad tempus quo concipitur quiſ que vel naſcitur, quas Conſtellationes vocant, non ſolùm actus & eventa, veram etiam ipſas noſtras voluntates pendere contendunt. Dei verò gratia non ſolùm omnia ſydera & omnes caelos, utrum etiam omnes Angelos ſupergreditur. Deinde Fati aſſertores & bona & mala hominum Fato tribuunt. Deus autem in malis hominum meritis eorum debita retributione proſequitur; bona verò per indebitam gratiam miſericordi voluntate largitur: utrum que faciens non per ſtellarum temporale conſortium, ſed per ſuae ſeveritatis & bonitatis aeternum altum que conſilium. Neutrum ergò pertinere videmus ad Fatum. And cap. 8. Iam de Gratia & Fato quàm inani alloquuntur oſtendimus. Nunc illud est quod debemus advertere, utrum invito & reluctanti homini Deus inſpiret boni cupiditatem, ut jam non ſit reluctans, non ſit invitus, ſed conſentiens bono, & volens bonum. In like ſort, the Pelagians charged Auſtin with Manicheiſme, De Nupt. & Concupiſc. lib. 2. cap. 3. to whom he anſwereth thus, Quid obtendis ad fallendum communis dogmatis tegmen, ut operias proprium crimen, unde vobis inditum eſt nomen, at que ut nefario vocabulo terras imperites, dicis, ne igitur vocentur Haeretici, fiant Manichaei. And more at large, Contr. duas Epiſt. Pelag. ad Bonifacium, cap. 2. Manichaei dicunt Deum bonum non omnium natuarrum eſſe creatorem: Pelagiani dicunt, Deum non eſſe omnium aetatum in hominibus mundatorem, ſalvatorem, liberatorem. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, & contra Manichaeos defendens Dei creaturam ne ab illo inſtituta negetur ulla creatura; & contrà Pelagianos ut in omnibus aetatibus perdita requiratur humana natura.

2. Manichaei carnis concupiſcentiam non tanquam accidens vitium, ſed tanquam naturam ab aeternitate malam vituperant: Pelagiani eam tanquam nullum vitium ſed naturale ſit, bonum inſuper laudant. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, Manichaeis dicens non natura, ſed vitium eſt; Pelagianis dicens, Non à Patre, ſed ex mundo eſt, ut eam velut malam valetudinem ſanari utr • que permittant, deſinendo illi tanquam inſanabilem credere, iſti tanquam laudabilem praedicare.

3. Manichaei negant, homini bono ex libro arbitrio fuiſſe initium mali; Pelagiani dicunt etiam hominem malum ſufficienter habere liberum arbitrium ad faciendum praeceptum bonum. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, & illis dicens, Fecit Deus hominem rectum; & iſtis dicens, ſi vos Filius liberaverit, verè liberi eritis.

4. Manichaei dicunt, animam particulam Dei, naturae malae commixtione habere peccatum; Pelagiani dicunt, animam juſtam non quidem particulam, ſed creaturam Dei, etiam in iſtâ corruptibili vitâ non habere peccatum. Catholica utroſ que redarguit, Manichaeis dicens, Aut facile arborem bonam, & fructum ejus bonum, aut facile arborem malam & fructum ejus malum; Pelagianis dicens, ſi dixerimus quia non habemus peccatum, noſmetipſos ſeducimus. His morbis inter ſe contrariis Manichaei Pelagiani que confligunt diſſimili voluntate, ſimili vanitate, ſeperati opinione diverſâ, ſed propinqui mente perverſâ. Iam verò gratiam Chriſti ſimul oppugnant, Baptiſmum ejus ſimul evacuant, Carnem ejus ſimul inhonorant, ſed etiam hoc modis cauſiſ que diverſis. Nam Manichaei meritis naturae bonae, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonae perhibent divinitus ſubveniri. Illi dicunt, debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum ſuorum: Iſti dicunt, debet hoc virtutibus ſuorum. Utriſ que ergò merces non imputatur ſecundum gratiam, ſed ſecundum debitum.

But come we to the conſideration of the particulars delivered by this Author.

1. As touching the opinion of the Stoicks and Manichees. 2. As touching the Parallell he makes, between their opinion and ours, in the poynt of Predeſtination.

1. The Chaldeans and Aſtrologers, did altogether place Fate, in the influencies of the ſtarres, and becauſe thoſe glorious bodies, did infatuate the World with a ſhew of Divinity (which the Lord Laboured to prevent in the Jewes. Deutr. 4.) no marvail if the vulgar ſort did acknowledge no other fate, but that. As Auſtin ſaith, De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 1. Id (Fatum) homines quando audiunt uſitatâ loquendi confuetudine non intelligunt, niſi vim poſitionis ſyderum, qualis eſt quando quis naſcitur ſive concipitur. But I doe not find that the Stoicks did thus diſtinguiſh, but by their Series Cauſarum, they comprehended all cauſes caeleſtiall or ſublunary. Ramus indeed conceived ſuch a difference between Poſſidonius and Chryſippus both Stoicks, but Turnebus makes bold to tell him, that herein he erred. Quod autem Poſsidonium dicis studio Aſtrologiae oblectatum, Fatum ſyderibus attribuiſſe in eo peccas, quod aliam ejus quam Chryſippi ſententiam putas, nec eam totam complecteris. Nam ſi in ſimul aegrotantibus fratribus cauſam eſſe dicebat in ſyderum & caeli conſtitutione & affectione, non tamen idcircò in aliis rebus Fatum non eſſe judicabat. Nay he profeſſeth that according to all the Stoicks, Fatum was God himſelfe and nature; and that by Fatum they underſtood, omnem naturae contagionem, which was Cicero's phraſe. As indeed the whole frame of nature is knit together per contactum, which Cicero called Naturae contagionem. And he proves as much of Poſſidonius out of Cicero De Divinatione. For Quintus therein profeſſing according to the opinion of Poſſidonius, that all force and courſe of Divination, was derived from God, from deſtiny, and from nature, he concludes therehence, that all kind of artificiall and naturall Divination, were in his opinion comprehended under the notion of Fate. And out of Cicero's ſecond Book of Divination ſhewes, that whereas Poſſidonius his opinion was, Vim quandam ſentientem & divinam quae tota confuſa ſit mundo, ad hoſtiam deligendam ducere. He concludes thus; Satis ut opinor, ſignificat Poſſidonium non in ſyderibus tantum Fatum poſuiſſe, ſed per omnem mundi continuationem & naturae conjunctionem, ordinem ſeriem que cauſarum permanare credidiſſe. Idem Poſſidonius (ſaith he) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ſcripſerat, quod non feciſſet, ſi in ſyderibus tantum Fatum eſſe ſenſiſſet. And like as Poſsidonius did not inſiſt only in the ſtarres, for the confirmation of Fate, ſo neither did Chryſippus in inferior cauſes. Neceſſitatem nature acutus interpres (he taxeth Ramus) ad Chryſippum pertinere aſtrorum ad Poſſidonium credidiſti; errorem errore cumulaſti. Nam nec Poſsidonius in ſolis aſtris Fatum ponebat ſed in totâ naturae contagione, ut ſuprà docui: & Chryſippus in eâdem naturae contagione, quâ etiam aſtra continentur, quod non intellexiſti. And that he proves out of Cicero anſwering Chryſippus in this manner. Ut igitur ad quaſdam res natura loci pertinet, ad quaſdam autem nihil: ſie affectio aſtrorum valeat, ſivis ad quaſdam res; ad omnes certè non valebit. Chryſippum enim alloquitur (ſaith Turnebus) ut vel puero notum eſt, ut me tui pudeat & pigeat, qui Poſſidonium intelligis. Thus he diſciplines Ramus, and proceed farther, ſaying, Chryſippum autem in aſtrorum conſtitutione, & affectione Fatum poſuiſſe, audi ex Cicerone; ſi quis, verbi cauſâ oriente Caniculâ natus eſt, is in mari non morietur. Vigila Chryſippe &c. Nihil iſtud argumentum (thus Turnebus concludes herehence) niſi etiam in astris Fatum poneret. So that the foure opinions concerning Fate, related by Ludovicus Vives in 4. lib. Auguſt. De Civit. Dei cap. 8. and that out of Picus Mirandula, lib. 2. Contra Aſtrologos; The firſt whereof is ſaid to be Nature; The ſecond, a Series of cauſes neceſſary knit together, the Third the Starres, the Fourth the Execution of Divine Decree. I ſay all theſe make but one Fatum with the Stoicks, yea with all the Stoicks in the judgement of Turnebus. And Auſtin De Civit. Dei lib. 5. cap. 8. expreſly includes the will of God within that Series of cauſes, which was accounted Fatum in the Opinion of the Stoicks, and upon that ground approves of it. As for neceſſitation by reaſon of diſpoſition of the Matter Prime, whereby things were brought to paſſe in deſpite of God; I find no ſuch thing, neither in Auſtin, nor in thoſe that comment upon him, Ludovicus Vives and Coqueus, nor in Ramus or Turnebus; but rather to the contrary in Ludovicus Vives, who diſtinguiſheth out of the opinion of Plato, as touching one God whom he made Principem Parentem que caeterorum; the Caeteri belike were ſuch ſpirits as wee call Angells. And that Maximi Dei leges were inevitabiles, and this was called Neceſſity, and ſuch a Neceſſity, cui ne Deos quidem (that is inferior ſpirits) reſiſtere poſſe. Quae verò ab Aſtris geruntur, talia interdum eſſe ut evitari ſapientiâ, induſtriâ, labore queant, in quo ſua eſt Fortuna. Quae verò certis cauſis progrederentur ac permanerent fixa, id dici Fatum quod tamen neceſſitatem non afferat electioni.

That the Manichees maintained two ſupreme and coëternall cauſes of all things, we read; the one the cauſe of Good, the other of Evill: and that every creature was a ſubſtantiall part of one or both; and that man in his nature was compounded of both, and that his corruption was eſſentiall from the ſupream Author of evill, and not ſuch as acrewed to him of diſobedience, We read. But of their opinion that all things were determined by them, both good, and evill, I no where read, but in this Authors Legend. Danaeus hath commented upon Auſtin de Haereſibus, and to every Head of Hereſy draws what he hath read thereof in other Authors. But I find no mention at all of this Article amongſt 21 ſhamefull errours of theirs which he reckons up. The 19th is this, Voluntatem malè agendi, quod vocant liberum arbitrium, nob is à naturâ ipſâ inſitam, non rebellione noſtrâ accerſitam, vel ex inobedientiâ natam; Quanquam homines propriâ voluntate peccant. And where Auſtin anſwereth the criminations againſt the Catholiques made by the Pelagians, I find no mention at all of this. He ſhould have ſhewed from whom he takes this, that underſtanding their Opinion aright, we might the better judge of the reproachfull compariſon which he makes.

2 To the conſideration of which compariſon of his, I now addreſſe my ſelfe. He propoſeth two things, one whereof he ſaith, muſt needs be maintained.

The Firſt whereof is this; That all actions naturall and Morall, good and evill, and all events likewiſe, are abſolutely neceſſary.

Concerning which, I ſay Firſt; I have cauſe to doubt that this Author underſtands not aright, the very notions of abſolute neceſſity, and neceſſity not abſolute. There is no greater neceſſity, then neceſſity of nature. And this neceſſity is twofold; either in Eſſendo, in being, or in Operando, in working. God alone is neceſſary in being, and his being is abſolutely neceſſary; it being impoſſible he ſhould not be, as not only we believe, but Schoole Divines demonſtrate, and that with great variety, of evident, and curious concluſions. As for the other neceſſity, which is in reſpect of operation: Firſt, this is no way incident unto God, ſpeaking of operation ad extrà, and ſecluding the myſterious emanations within the Divine Nature; ſuch as are the Generation of the Sonne by the Father, and the wonderfull Proceſſion of the Holy Ghoſt from the Father and the Sonne. But ad extra this neceſſity of operation is only found in the creature, and that only in ſuch creatures, as by neceſſity of nature are determined one way: as fire to burne; heavy things to move downwards, and light things upwards; the Sunne, Moone, and ſtarres to give light; and the heavens to turne round; all naturall Agents in a word diſtinct from rationall are thus determined, to wit, to work that, whereunto they are inclined by neceſſity of nature; but yet ſo that being finite, they are ſubject to ſuperiour powers, and thereby obnoxious to impediment moſt of them, even to powers create; all of them to power increate. Whence it comes paſſe that no work of theirs is abſolutely neceſſary, eſpecially in reſpect of God, who can either ſet an end to all when he will, or reſtraine their operations at his pleaſure. We know the Three Noble Children, when they came forth of the fiery oven, had not ſo much as any ſmell of the fire upon them. And therefore Durand profeſſeth that theſe things which are commonly accounted to come to paſſe moſt neceſſarily, doe indeed come to paſſe meerely contingently, in reſpect of the will of God.

Nevertheleſſe we willingly profeſſe, that upon ſuppoſition of the will of God, that this or that ſhall come to paſſe, it followeth neceſſarily that ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe; like as upon ſuppoſition, that God knowes ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe, it followeth neceſſarily, that ſuch a thing ſhall come to paſſe; but how? not neceſſarily: but either neceſſarily according as ſome things are brought to paſſe by naturall agents, working neceſſarily after the manner aforeſaid; or contingently and freely according as ſome things are brought to paſſe, by rationall agents, working contingently and freely. And therefore as touching the Queſtion of the Schooles about the root of contingency, Aquinas and Scotus concurre in reſolving it into the Will of God, but with this difference; Scotus relates it into the will of God as a free agent. Aquinas reſolves it into the Will of God, as an efficacious agent. For the will of God is ſo efficacious, that he can effectually procure, both that things neceſſary ſhall be brought to paſſe neceſſarily, and things contingent, contingently; and according he hath provided congruous cauſes hereof, to wit, both agents naturall for the produceing of neceſſary things neceſſarily, and agents rationall for the producing of contingent things, contingently and freely. Thus God preordained that Joſias ſhould burne the Prophets bones upon the Altar, that Cyrus ſhould proclaim liberty to the Jewes, to returne into their Country; yet what ſober Divine hath made doubt, whether Joſias and Cyrus did not herein, that which they did freely. And as in doing, ſo in abſtaining from doing. For God ordained that Chriſts bones ſhould not be broken; as alſo that when the Jewes, all the Males, came up to the Lord thrice in the year to Jeruſalem, None of their neighbours ſhould deſire their land. Exod. 34. 24. Yet what ſober man ſhould make queſtion, whether the Souldiers did non as freely abſtaine from breaking Chriſts bones, as from ought elſe, and ſo likewiſe the bordering Nations did as freely abſtaine, from invading the land of Iſrael. And how often is this phraſe uſed in Scripture, Neceſſe eſt, of ſome things coming to paſſe, which yet came to paſſe as contingently and freely, as ought elſe. And unleſſe this be granted, that Gods determination is nothing prejudiciall to the freedome of the creatures will, either we muſt deny faith and repentance to be the gifts of God, or that they are works produced freely, and ſo every action pleaſing in the ſight of God. For the Scripture expreſſely profeſſeth, that God it is, who worketh in us every thing that is pleaſing in his ſight. And whatſoever God workes in us, or beſtows upon us in time, the ſame he determined, to work in us, and to beſtow upon us from everlaſting. For he worketh all things according to the counſell of his will Epheſ. 1. 11. and the counſell of his Will was everlaſting, it being the ſame with God himſelfe.

Now I come to the ſecond.

2. And that is this. That all mens ends are unalterable and indeterminable by the power of their Wills; and this he ſaith is upon the matter all one.

1. Now this is moſt untrue, there being a vaſt difference between the actions of men, and the ends of men; The ends of men being the works of God. And what a monſter ſhall he be in the Church of God, that with Vorſtius ſhall dare to affirme, that all the works of God, were not determined from everlaſting; or being determined, they are alterable, and that in ſuch ſort, as to be otherwiſe determinable by the wills of men; eſpecially conſidering that the very acts of mens wills, being wrought by God, (as all ſides now a daies confeſſe) it conſequently followes that they were alſo determined from everlaſting, by the Will and Counſell of God. What ſhould I alleage the 11th Article of Ireland for this? God from all eternity did by his unchangeable Counſell ordaine, whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe: yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather. There is no Arminian that I know dares deny, either that every act of man is wrought by God, or that, look what God doth work in time, the ſame he did before all time decree, and that from everlaſting. I know there is a main, and a moſt Atheiſticall difference between us on one part, but I doe not find them willing to ſhew their hornes directly therein, but carry the matter ſo, as if they would obtrude upon us the acknowledgement, either of the temporall (not eternall) condition of decrees divine, or at leaſt of their alterable nature; whereas themſelves dare not plainly manifeſt themſelves, to be of any ſuch Atheiſticall beliefe. Let us inſtance in particular: Let the ſalvation of ſome, and damnation of others, be the ends this Author meaneth. Now dare any of them with open face profeſſe, that the ſalvation of the elect, and damnation of the reprobate was not from everlaſting determined by God. Be the ſupream ends of God concerning man, the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of mercy on ſome, in the way of vindicative juſtice on others. Dare any of them profeſſe, that any of theſe ends are not from everlaſting determined by God; or being ſo determined, dare they profeſſe, that theſe divine decrees are alterable, or poſſible to be undetermined by the will of the creature? What a prodigious aſſertion were either of theſe? If they dare not ſay, Gods will is changeable, What an unſhamefac'd courſe is this, to obtrude upon us an alterable, that is, a changeable condition of Gods decrees? But perhaps you may ſay, here is no mention at all made of Gods decrees, but of mans ends. And I willingly confeſſe there is not. And I am perſwaded, this Author dares not in plain termes profeſſe, that Gods decrees are alterable. But hereby you may perceive, and have a manifeſt document of the illuſions of Satan, and how mens carnall affections, which are more in love with errour then truth, doe make them to ſhut their eyes againſt the one, and open them unto the other. It were a very harſh thing to ſay plainly, that Gods decrees are alterable, and that being determined by him, they might be undone, or made undetermined by the wills of men. Therefore the Devill finds a means to draw us, to entertain the ſame blaſphemous opinion, not barefac'd, but hoodwickt as it were, and that is by changing the phraſe. For though it be uncouth to heare of an alterable condition of Gods decrees, yet it ſeems nothing harſh to diſcourſe of the alterable condition of mens ends. But give me leave to unmask the Witch, and make it appeare how the Devill gulls us in this.

Mens ends are either ſo called, as intended by man himſelfe, or as appoynted by God. If this Author ſpeak of mens ends, as intended by man himſelfe, wee willingly grant, that they are alterable at his pleaſure; as for example, Man intends one thing to day, he may intend another thing to morrow, he intends one thing this houre, he may intend another thing the next, and at his pleaſure reverſe his former intentions. And no marvail, conſidering that man partly is of a fickle diſpoſition in reſpect of his affections, ſtudious of change, and ſubject to innovation as the Moone; partly of an improvident diſpoſition, he knows not what a Yeare, what a Month, what a Day, what an houre may bring forth. And therefore though never ſo wiſe and conſtant in his courſes, yet may he have juſt cauſe to change his reſolutions and purpoſes. But of ſuch ends of man, to wit, as intended by man, it is manifeſt this Author ſpeaks not.

But of ends appointed by God, theſe be the ends he will have to be alterable and determinable anew by the wills of men, which cannot be without the alteration and change of Gods purpoſes and intentions, which is as much as to ſay, without the change and revocation of Gods decrees. And an end not yet actually exiſting, but only in intention, can admit of no other alteration then in intention, which this Author conſidering not, though perhaps he abhorres to ſay Gods decrees are changeable and alterable, and ſhuts out ſo uncouth an aſſertion at the fore-doore, yet as it were by a back-doore to receive it in, and in the dark and mufled, or veyled only with a different phraſe, a different expreſſion; Yet forthwith he takes a new courſe; For whereas by the word unalterable, he did imply that Gods decrees concerning mens ends, ſhould be of an alterable condition; in the words following he changeth his tone, and will not have the ends of man to be determined by God at all, but left unto man to be determined; as when he ſaith, In vaine is our freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at be pitched and determined. Whereby it is manifeſt, he will not have the end whereunto men drive to be determined. And this end can be no other then ſalvation; for that alone I take to be that whereto men drive, and which they labour to attaine, every one naturally ſeeking after Summum bonum, after happineſſe. So that in the iſſue it comes to this, The ſalvation of this Author is not yet determined by God, but left to be determined by his will, and that I take to be in the way of a moving cauſe, and that moving cauſe I gueſſe to be, his finall perſeverance in faith and repentance, whereupon and not till then, ſhall this mans ſalvation be determined by God, as much as to ſay, that Gods decrees are as meerly temporall as are the executions of them. And herein this Author doth exactly agree with Doctor Jackſon perhaps being ſo happy as to underſtand him, or perhaps being ſo happy as to light upon an interpreter of him ſome one that breaths the ſame ſpirit of oppoſition to Gods truth, and that after the ſame way. For ſometimes the Doctor pleads for a revocable condition of the divine decrees. For the Pope never bindes his hands by any Grant he makes; and why ſhould God bind his hands by any decree he makes? eſpecially conſidering that God hath more wiſdome and goodneſſe to manage ſuch authority then the Pope. But if it be diſhoneſty for a man to take liberty to break his promiſes, I pray what goodneſſe is required to the managing thereof? Yet that Doctor keeps his courſe in diſcourſing of an impotent immutability, and ſaith, it is indecent to attribute any ſuch immutability unto God; whereas immutability is a notion which connotates no power of doing at all, but only a power of ſuffering, and formally denotes the negation thereof. And what madneſſe is it to ſay, that the leſſe power God hath of receiving change, the leſſe power he hath of working? Yet this is not all; He hath another device anſwerable to the latter courſe of this Author, and that is, that Nothing, concerning any mans ſalvation or damnation, is determined by God before he is borne, or before his death: and to that purpoſe he ſaith that God is ſtill decreeing, as if hitherto he had not decreed ought. And would you know of whom he learned this? Rogers in his expoſition of the Articles of the Church of England, a Book dedicated to Arch-Biſhop Bancroft, & allowed by the lawfull authority of the Church of England, writing upon the 17th Article, and delivering his ſecond propoſition, collected therehence, in this forme, Predeſtination hath been from everlaſting; when he comes to ſet forth the Adverſaries of this truth, Thoſe wrangling Sophisters, ſaith he, are deceived, who becauſe God is not included within the compaſſe of any time, but hath all things to come as preſent before his eyes, doe ſay, that God he did not in the time long agoe paſt only, but ſtill in the time preſent likewiſe doth Predeſtinate.

2. Conſider we the reaſon he gives for ſo ſhamefull an aſſertion, as touching the alterable condition of Gods decrees, or as touching the ends of men, as yet undetermined by God, In vaine, ſaith he, is freedome in the actions, if the end which they drive at, be determined. Here, Firſt, we have a wild phraſe Freedome in actions. For by freedome we underſtand an active power of working after a certain manner, which power is found in the will, not in the actions. Secondly, a bare avouching that unleſſe God as yet hath left the ends of men living undetermined, or in caſe he hath determined them, unleſſe theſe determinations of his be alterable, Freedome of Will is given in vaine; as much as to ſay, unleſſe we admit of ſuch monſtrous aſſertions, the freedome of mans Will is in vaine. But we ſay this conſequence is moſt untrue, and we give our reaſon for it. For whether ſalvation or damnation be the ends he meaneth, no creature is capable of either, but only creatures rationall; and the one being beſtowed by way of reward, and the other inflicted by way of puniſhment, each of theſe preſuppoſeth freedome of Will in the parties thus proceeded with: Or whether the ends are the manifeſtation of Gods vindicative and remunerative juſtice, for the ſame reaſon now ſpecified, each of theſe doth neceſſarily beſpeak freedome of Will in them, who after either way are made uſeleſſe on whom the glory of God is to be manifeſted. When he addes ſaying Omnis actio is propter ſinem. This altogether concernes the ends intended, and propoſed by the author of the action, nothing concernes the ends propoſed by another. And the ends of a man propoſed by himſelfe, are either ſupreame or intermediate, ſtill every action deliberate (for ſo alone it holds) tends to one end or other, which man himſelfe intends. The ſupream end of every one is his chief good; but as touching that wherein this conſiſts, all doe not agree. Some place it in wealth, ſome in pleaſure, ſome in honour, ſome in virtuous life. By the light of Grace we are taught, that as we are creatures, our end, which we ſhould propoſe unto our ſelves, is the glorifying of God our Creator, though there were neither reward nor puniſhment. But if there be a glorious reward to be gotten by it, and a dreadfull puniſhment to be ſuffered of them, that ſeek the ſatisfying of their own luſts, and not the glory of God, this is a double hedge unto us, to keep us in the good waies of the Lord, and to move us to make ſtrait ſtepps unto him; but ſurely the end of the creature, ſtill is the glorifying or God that made him. God makes it his care to provide for us, let our care be to glorify him; for ſeeing all things are from him, therefore all things muſt be for him; and ſeeing we are reaſonable creatures, and know this we muſt goe on, in conforming our ſelves hereunto, and ſeeking his glory. And albeit this Author may conceive, that ſalvation is the end he aimes at, yet can I not beleeve that he makes damnation the end that any man drives at. Nothing being fit to be a mans end, but that which hath rationem Boni, which ſurely damnation hath not.

3. His Annotations as touching the three Opinions propoſed by him, come to be conſidered in the next place; and theſe are two.

1. The Subſtance and Formality of them, which, as he ſaith is an unavoidableneſſe of mens actions and ends whatſoever they be. And in this, he ſaith, all of them agree, all holding that in all things, undeclinable Fates, and inſuperable neceſſity doe domincere. Whereunto I anſwer, that this is contradictory to his own premiſes, as touching the third Opinion. For againſt the Maintainers of Gods abſolute decree, he did formerly object only disjunctively, that either all mens actions were abſolutely neceſſary, that is unavoidable, or at leaſt, that mens ends were unavoidable; which is to inferre, that but one of them is avoidable; but here he profeſſeth (as upon that which he had formerly delivered) that by the Third Opinion, both mens actions and their ends were unavoidable. And as for the ſecond Opinion of the Manichees, I find no mention of the unavoidable condition, either of mans actions or ends at all, in the Relation thereof, by thoſe who have moſt ſtudied their Hiſtory. And as for the Stoicks, I no where find, that they denied the liberty of mens will, or that it was in mans power, either to forbeare the doing of that he doth, or to doe the things he forbears to doe; but rather the contrary, that they made choyce, ſome of them at leaſt, (though Auſtin delivers it without any ſuch diſtinction) to exempt the wills of men from ſubjection unto Fate: though I deny not, but that many vain diſcourſes might be differently entertained by them, having no better light to guide them, then the light of nature, and wanting that which God hath in great mercy vouchſafed unto us, the light of grace, and that in very plentifull manner. Much leſſe doe I find by them, that any thing came to paſſe, invito Deo. Though I willingly confeſſe, that ſuch a generation hath riſen up in theſe daies, affirming that God willeth and deſireth the ſalvation of all men, and yet the greater part of men are damned. And what is to come to paſſe, invito Deo, if this be not, I willingly profeſſe I know not.

But Melancthon, he ſaith, doth not ſpare to call this abſolute decree, Fatum Stoicum, Tabulas Parcarum, and to charge the Church of Ceneva, with labouring to bring in the Stoicks errours, as appears by Melancthons Epistle to Peucer, and Beza's confeſsion in the life of Calvin. To all which I anſwer.

1. That this Author either was better read in Melancthon then in Luther, or no ſo juſt matter could he find in Luther, to cry down the abſolute nature of Gods decrees.

2. Beza reports what Melancthon ſeems to ſome, and that Epiſtle of his to Peucer might be their ground. Now therein he delivers his mind meerly upon Laelius his relation, which was this, De Stoico Fato uſ que adeò litem Genevae moveri, ut Quidam in carcerem conjectus ſit propterea quod a •• one differret. This I ſay is Laelius his relation made unto Melancthon, whereupon Melancthon ſaith no more then this, O Mijera tempora! doctrina ſalutis peregrinis quibuſdam diſputationibus obſcuratur.

3. Melancthon died foure years before Calvin, the one Anno 1560. the other 1564. And therefore if he did paſſe any cenſure on the Church of Geneva, it was in Calvins daies, many years before his death. Now Calvin and he were very great: Melancthon ſo well known and eſteemed by Calvin, that more then once he appeals to Melancthons judgement. Once in the point De Caenâ Domini, mentioned by Oſiander, Hiſt. Eccleſ. Cent. 16. Anno 1558. pag. 666. which was but two years before his death. Likewiſe in the poynt of Free-will and Predeſtination, as appears by Calvins Epiſtle unto him, prefixed to his Books, de Libero Arbitrio, which he ſent unto Melancthon: Was it ever known that Melancthon paſſeth any cenſure upon them?

4. When Grotius in like manner objected Melancthon, ſee I pray how Lubbertus anſwereth him, In Reſpon. ad Pietatem Grotii. Quod ad Melancthonem attinet, erras ſi ipſam ſtare pro Remonſtrantibus exiſtimas, &c. Idem Melancthon in 9. ad Romanos, Cur inquit nos ad Evangelium vocavit & non vocavit Alexandrum Macedonem, Auguſtum, Socratem, Pomponium Atticum, qui non minus civilitèr vivebant quàm nos. Hic neceſſe eſt cauſam rejicere in voluntatem Dei. Et Jacob electus eſt, Eſau reprobatus priuſquam quicquam boni vel mali feciſſent: Ergo opera non erant cauſa, ſed voluntas vocantis. Non addam hic, quomodo cavillentur ista nonnulli. Tantum hoc meminerit Lector, ſi opera ſecutura in vita erunt cauſa electionis, non licuit Apoſtolo dicere, Non ex operibus. Ex his conſtat (ſait Lubbertus) Melancthonem idem cum Calvino & Luthero de praedeſtinatione ſenſiſle. Fatetur hoc ipſe Melancthon ad Calvinum; ſuo (inquiens) haec cum tuis congruere, ſed mea ſunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , & ad uſum accommodata. Idem in Epiſtolâ ad Eraſmum: Ego integrâ conſcientiâ non poſſum Lutheri dogmata damnare. He proceeds farther to ſhew, the different Method uſed by them in delivering the doctrine of Praedeſtination. Calvinus, ſaith he, à Priori docet, illos qui electi ſunt, immutabili Dei conſilio electos eſſe, at que inde infert illos perire non poſſe. Melancthon verò a Poſteriori docet, nos ex verâ fide & ſeriâ reſipiſcentiâ diſcere quòd ſumus electi, Ego credo in Jeſum Chriſtum & ſeriò reſipiſco, ergo ſum electus: at que ita in ipſâ re conſentiunt. Hanc enim Melancthonis argumentationem approbat Calvinus, & illam Calvini approbat Melancthon, tantum abeſt, ut alter alterius doctrinam rejiciat aut contemnat.

5. When I obſerved this relation made out of an Epiſtle of Melancthons unto Calvin, I could not reſt ſatisfied untill I had ſeen the Epiſtle it ſelfe: at length I found it amongſt Calvins, Epiſt. 49. Therein coming to the poynt, Ad Quaeſtionem (ſaith he) de praedeſtinatione habebam amicum Tubingae doctum hominem Franciſcum Stadianum, qui dicere ſolebat, ſe utrum que probare, Evenire omnia ut divina providentia decrevit, & tamen eſſe contingentia; ſed ſe haec conciliare non poſſe. Here we have gotten one friend more then we looked for, and that a friend of Melancthons alſo: And to what end doth he make mention hereof, but to give Calvin to underſtand, that with him at Tubing, there wanted not ſuch as concurred with him in opinion, and that as touching the eveniency of all things, by the decree of Gods providence, which yet might well conſiſt with Contingency, though we are not able to reconcile theſe, ſuch is the myſterious nature of Gods providence. And herein Stadianus agrees with Cajetan, and Alvarez. For Cajetan having profeſſed that the diſtinctions deviſed by the Learned, for the reconciling of Gods predeſtination with the liberty of mans will, did not, quietare intellectum, thereupon he ſaith, Ego captivo meum in obſequium fidei; In quo (ſaith Alvarez) doctiſſimè & pi • ſſimè loquitur. Melancthon goes on to repreſent his carriage in Teaching, Ego, ſaith he, cùm Hypotheſin hanc teneam, Deum non eſſe cauſam peccati nec velle peccatum, poſteà contingentiam in hâc nostrâ infirmitate judicii admitto, ut ſciant rudes, Davidem ſuâ voluntate ultrò ruere & eundem ſentio, cum haberet ſpiritum ſanctum, potuiſſe cum retinere; & in eâ lucta aliquam eſſe voluntatis actionem. All theſe things he grants afterwards, to agree with the Doctrine of Calvin. But may not a man proceed farther? and to diſpute hereof ſomething more accurately then this, He denyes it not: Haec etiamſi ſubtilius diſputari poſſunt, tamen ad regendas mentes hoc modo propoſita, accommodata videntur. In the ſame manner he goes on, Accuſemus ipſi noſtram voluntatem cùm labimur, non quaeramus in Dei conſilio cauſam & contra eum nos erigamus; ſciamus Deum & velle opitulari & adeſſe luctantibus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (inquit Baſilius) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Yet I preſume no Arminian will conceive that Melancthon did not acknowledge this very act of willing to be the work of God, conſidering the Apoſtle ſo expreſſely profeſſeth, that God worketh in us both the Will and the deed, according to his good pleaſure; and Leo Serm. 8. de Epiphan. Dubium non eſt hominem bona agentem ex Deo habere & effectum operis & initium volumatis: & Fulgentius Epiſt. 4. Ab ipſo (Deo) eſt initium bonae voluntatis. And if Melancthon had any conceit oppoſite hereunto, yet let the Opinion of the Affrican Biſhops prevaile in authority above Melancthon, who in their Synodicall Epiſtle write thus (as it is alleaged by our Divines Act. Synod. Dordrac. pag. 270) In vivificandis hominibus Deus nullum initium humanae voluntatis expectat ſed ipſam voluntatem, bonam faciendo, vivificat. And drawing to an end, I doe not write theſe things (ſaith Melancthon) to deliver dictates unto you, who are moſt learned and moſt expert in the exerciſes of Piety. And truly I know (ſaith he) that theſe things doe agree with yours, haec cum tuis congruere ſed ſunt 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , woven with a thicker thred, & ad uſum accommodata Thus Melancthon unto Calvin, having received his Books ſent unto him, and written of Free-will and Predeſtination.

5. Within two years after I find a Letter written by Calvin unto Melancthon, wherein he profeſſeth his joy of their agreement, as touching the main poynt, in that whereabout their opinions were asked, albeit with ſome difference in certain particulars, it is Epiſt. 63. amongſt thoſe of Calvins, and the words are theſe. Deo autem maximas gratias agere non deſino, qui dedit ut in ejus quaeſtionis ſummâ de quâ rogati eramus, ſententiae nostrae congruerent. Tametſi enim paululum eſt diſcriminis in particulis quibuſdam, de re tamen ipſâ optime inter nos convenit.

The ſecond Annotation of this Author is, the circumſtance or the ground of the three opinions mentioned. The Stoicks deriving their neceſſity from the Starres or firſt matter; The Manichees from the two ſupream cauſes; And the Authors of the third, from the peremptory decree of Almighty God. And that in this difference, the Stoicks and the Manichees have the better, it being better (as he ſaith) to derive the neceſſity of evill actions, or unhappy events, from an evill God, or from the courſe of nature, then from the decree of that God who is infinitely good. The ſubſtance of the opinion is all one, the ground wherein they differ, is but accidentall to the errour.

To this I anſwer.

1. Is it ſo indeed, Better to derive the neceſſity of unhappy events, from an evill God, or from courſe of nature, then from the decree of God? Is not God then to be accounted the author of evill in the way of puniſhment? Is there any evill in the Citty, and the Lord hath not done it? Or doth it leſſe become him to be the author Amos 2. Ier. 9. 24. of affliction then of proſperity? Doth not the Lord in the ſame place, and in the ſame manner profeſſe, that he delights in the execution of judgement, as well as of mercy?

2. As touching the neceſſity he ſpeaks of, whether in good, or in evill actions; conſider I pray his carriage, He did not object unto us, that we made all the actions of men abſolutely neceſſary, but either ſo, or the ends of men unavoidable. Yet here he ſuppoſeth the former to ſerve his own turne in this preſent crimination, he holds it up, as it were contrary to his own conſcience. We acknowledge the actions of men to be free, not one being performed by any, but in ſuch ſort, that they had power to forbear it, and ſtill have to forbear the like: But upon ſuppoſition of Gods decree, either to work in us any thing, that is pleaſing in his ſight (which to be his gracious courſe, the Apoſtle expreſly profeſſeth, Heb. 13. 20.) or to permit any particular evill, we willingly profeſſe, that as well upon this, as upon Gods foreknowledge, it followeth conſequently that neceſſe eſt, that ſuch a thing come to paſſe; but how? not neceſſarily, but agreeable to the condition of our reaſonable natures, contingently and freely. And this Arminius in plain termes profeſſeth in the poynt of evill, to wit, ſuppoſing God permits a man to will this or that evill; Neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum, Exam. pag. 153. But I will farther diſplay the doctrine of theſe Arminians, and prove, Firſt, that no evill comes to paſſe, but that God did will it. Secondly, that never was there any greater neceſſity known to the World, then that which theſe men bring upon good and evill actions, a neceſſity that binds the Lord himſelfe.

1. As touching the firſt; Theſe words of Arminius are well known, Deus voluit Achabum menſuram ſcelerum ſucrum implere. But I will prove it by their Doctrine of ſcientia Media: For hereby they maintain, that God foreſeeth by what motives ſinne will be hindered, or not hindered, without any prejudice to the liberty of the creatures will; As alſo that God in the ſtorehouſe of his wiſdome, hath ſuch ſtore of morall impediments, as that he knows thereby, how to hinder any ſinne if it pleaſed him. His words are theſe, Praeter illa ſufficientia impedimenta, etiam efficacia habet in ſuo ſapientiae & potentiae promptuario, quibus productis certò & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. And this is the difference with him, between a ſufficient impediment of ſinne, and impediment effectuall. Effectuall is that upon the uſe whereof, he knows full well, that ſinne will be hindered. Sufficient is that upon the uſe whereof, ſinne will not be hindered, and this is known to the Lord from everlaſting. Now let them tell me, why would not God make choyce to uſe ſuch an impediment, which he knew would prove effectuall, but ſuch rather, as he knew would prove ineffectuall. Doth it not manifeſtly appear hereby, that it is Gods will, that ſinne ſhall come to paſſe by his permiſſion? Like as the Scripture is expreſſe to this purpoſe, as where it is ſaid, that Herod and Pontius Pilate with the Gentiles, and people of Iſrael were gathered together againſt the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand, and his counſell, had foredetermined to be done. Now this is well known to have been no leſſe then the ignominious handling and crucifying of the Sonne of God. Acts 4. 28. And Revel. 17. 17. God put into the hearts of the Kings to doe his will, and to give their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, as much as to ſay, to uſe their Regall power, to the ſupporting of Antichriſt, which we know was in part by Maſſacring the Saints of God.

2. Now to diſcover the ſtrange neceſſity, that theſe men bring in upon all things: It cannot be denied, but that God knoweth all future things, before they come to paſſe. Therefore they are preſuppoſed to be future in order of reaſon before God, knows them to be future; therefore all things future, are either ſuch by neceſſity of nature, or by ſome cauſe; not by any cauſe, for if there were any cauſe hereof, to wit, to make them paſſe out of the condition of things meerly poſſible of their own nature, into the condition of things future, then this cauſe ſhould be found either within God or without God. Not without God can any cauſe hereof be found. For this paſſage of things, out of the condition of things meerly poſſible, into the condition of things future, was from everlaſting, therefore the cauſe hereof muſt have exiſtence from everlaſting. But nothing was everlaſting, Extra Deum, out of God; Therefore if any cauſe hereof be to be found, it muſt be within God; otherwiſe it muſt be confeſſed, that all things became future by abſolute neceſſity of nature. If to help this, they will deviſe ſomething within the nature of God, to be the cauſe hereof, let them tell us what that is. Not the Science of God, for all confeſſe, that ſecluding the divine will, Gods knowledge is the cauſe of nothing. If they ſay, the will of God, they concurre with us in embracing the ſame Opinion, which they ſo much abhorre. Nothing remaines to fly unto, but the Eſſence of God; If they plead, that I demand, whether the Eſſence of God working freely, be the cauſe of the futurition of all things, or as working neceſſarily? If as working freely, that is as much as to confeſſe in expreſſe termes, that Gods will is the cauſe thereof: But if they ſay the divine Eſſence is the cauſe hereof, as working neceſſarily, hence it followes, that all things good and evill come from God, as working by neceſſity of nature. See I pray and conſider the abominable, and Atheiſticall opinions, that theſe Arminians doe improvidently caſt themſelves upon, when they ſtretch their witts to overthrow Gods providence, as it is carryed in the 11th Article of Ireland, which is this, God from all Eternity, did by his unchangeable Counſell ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe; yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor contingency of ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather.

In the Concluſion, that which he vaunts of, as touching the Fathers, is meer wind; for he gives you nothing but his word for it; which of what credit it deſerves to be, I leave to the indifferent to judge. And as for the plucking up of the rootes of vertue which he fables of: Conſider I pray, what Sect of Philoſophers were ever known to be more vertuous then the Stoicks; and how was Zeno himſelfe honoured by the Athenians, for his grave and vertuous converſation? Hath not Eraſmus delivered it, as out of the mouth of Hierome, that Secta Stoicorum was Secta ſimillima Chriſtianae? Yet I no where find, that they brought in any neceſſity, that was not ſubordinate to the Will of the ſupream God: But theſe Arminians bring in a neceſſity of nature from without God, to make him to doe this, or that, if he doth any thing; or at leaſt, to make God himſelfe a neceſſary Agent, devoyd of all liberty and freedome, contrary to that of Ambroſe concerning the manner of Gods working, namely, that it is, Nullo neceſſitatis obſequio, but ſolo libertatis arbitrio. But according to theſe Divines it muſt be quite contrary, Nullo • ibertatis arbitrio, ſolo neceſſitatis obſequio.

And thus much as touching the firſt ſort of this Authors Reaſons, which he accounts only Inducing; I come to the other ſort, which he eſteemes convincing.