THE first and last are the direct acts and offices of Conscience: the o • her are reflex or consequent actions, but direct offices. The first act which is,

To dictate

Is of that which Divines call the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or the phylactery, the keeper of the records of the laws, and by it we are taught our duty: God having written it in our hearts by Nature and by the Spirit, leaves it there, ever plac'd before the eye of conscience as S. Bernara cals it) to be read and used for directions in all cases of dispute,Rom. 2. 15. or question or action: this is that which S. Paul cals the work of the law written in our hearts, and therefore it is, that to sin against our conscience is so totally inexcusable, and according to the degree of that violence which is done against the conscience, puts on degrees. For conscience dictates whatsoever it is perswaded of, and will not suffer a man to do otherwise then it suggests and tels us: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Iliad. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 said Achilles of Hector when he was violently angry with him; I would my conscience would give me leave to eat thy very flesh.

Its universal dictates are ever the most certain, and those are the first principles of justice and religion; and whatsoever else can be infallibly and immediately inferr'd from thence, are her dictates also, but not primely and directly, but transmitted by the hands of reason. The same reason also there is in clear revelation. For whatsoever is put into the conscience immediately by God, is plac'd there to the same purpose, and with the same efficiency and perswasion as is all that which is natural. And the conscience properly dictates nothing else, but prime natural reason, and immediate revelation; whatsoever •• es after these two, is reach'd forth to us by two hands, one whereof alone is ministred by conscience. The reason is this: Because all that law by which God governs is written in our hearts, put there by God immediately, that is antecedently to all our actions, because it is that by which all our actions are to be guided, even our discoursings and arguings are to be guided by conscience, if the argument be moral: now the ways by which God speaks to us immediately, are onely Nature and the Spirit: Nature is that principle which taught all men from the beginning until now; all that prime practical reason which is perfective of humane nature, and in which all mankinde agrees. Either the perfections, or the renovations, or the superadditions to this are taught us by the Holy Spirit, and all this being written in the conscience by the finger of God is brought forth upon all occasions of action; and whatsoever is done against any thing so plac'd, is directly and violently against the conscience; but when from thence reason spins a longer thred, and draws it out from the clue of natural principles or express revelation, that also returns upon the conscience and is plac'd there as light upon a wall, but not as the stones that are there: but yet whatever is done against that light is also against conscience but not so as the other. Just as it is in nature and accident. To eat poison, and filthiness is against every mans health and stomack; but if by an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a propriety of temper or an evil habit, or accidental inordination, wine, or fish makes a man sick, then these are against his nature too, but not so as poison is, or stones. Whatever comes into the conscience primarily, or consequently▪ right or wrong, is brought forth upon occasion of action, and is part of her dictate: but as a man speaks some things of his own knowledge, some things by hearsay; so does conscience, somethings she tels from God and her self, some things from reason and her self, or other accidental notices: Those and these do integrate and complete her sermons, but they have several influence and obligation according to their proper efficiency. But of this I shall give f • ll accounts in the second Book.

To testifie.

Conscience bears witness of our actions;3. so S. Paul, their conscience bearing witness: and in this sense,Rom. 〈◊〉 conscience is a practical memory. For as the practical knowledge, or notices subjected in the understanding make the understanding to be conscience; so the actions of our life recorded in the memory and brought forth to practical judgements, change the memory also into conscience. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Man differing from brute beasts by the use of reason, it is not likely he should be a stranger to his own actions as the beasts are, but that the evil which is done should be recalled to their minde with the signification of some displeasure. 〈◊〉 . 6. So Polybius discourses of the reason and the manner of conscience.

Every knowing faculty is the seat of conscience.4. and the same faculty when it is furnished with speculative notions retains its natural and proper name of Understanding, or Memory; but as the same is instructed with notices in order to judgements practical, so it takes the Christian name of Conscience, The Voltitive or choosing faculty cannot, but the intellectual may. And this is that Book which at Doomsday shall be brought forth and laid open to all the world. The Memory chang'd into Conscience preserves the notices of some things, and shall be reminded of others, and shall doe that work intirely and perfectly, which now it does imperfectly and by parts, according to the words of S. Paul, 1 Cor. 13 12. Then shall we know as we are known, that is, as God knows us now, so then shall we see and know our selves.Cicero 2. Tuscul. Nullum theatrum virtuti conscientiâ majus, shall then be highly verified. Our conscience will be the great Scene or Theatre upon which shall be represented all our actions good and bad. It is Gods Book,De Inter. dom. lib. 2. cap. ult. the Book of life or death. According to the words of S. Bernard, Ex his quae scripta erunt in libris nostris judicabimur: & ideò scribi debent secundùm exemplar libri vitae, & si sic scripti non sunt, saltem corrigendi sunt. We shall be judged by that which is written in our own books (the books of conscience) and therefore they ought to be written according to the copy of the book of life; and if they be not so written, yet they ought to be so corrected.

Consequently to these the conscience does5.

Accuse or Excuse.

So S. Paul joyns them as consequent to the former;Rom. 2. 1 • . Their conscience bearing witness, and their thoughts in the mean time accusing or excusing one another. Si optimorum consiliorum atque factorum testis in omni vita nobis conscientia fuerit, Cicero pro Cluentio. sine ullo metu summa cum honestate vivemus. If our conscience be the witness that in our life we do good deeds, and follow sober counsels, we shall live in great honesty and without fear. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , said Hierocles, God hath constituted a most righteous and domestick Judge, the Conscience and right Reason; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Every man ought most of all to fear himself, because it is impossible but we should know what we have done amiss, and it concerns us also to make righteous judgement, for we cannot escape our selves. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , said Isocrates. Etsi à caeteris silentium est, tamen ipse sibimet censcius est posse se meritò increpari, so Apuleius renders it. Though others hold their peace, yet there is one within that will not. Nec facile est placidam ac pacatam degere vitam, Qui violat factis communia foedera pacis:Lucretius▪ Etsi fallit enim Divum genus, Humanúmque; Perpetuò tamen id fore clam diffidere debet. It is hard to be concealed from God and man too, and although we think our selves safe for a while, yet we have something within that tels us 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , he that does any thing is espied, and cannot doe it privately. Quîcum in tenebris? was the old Proverb; Who was with you in the dark? And therefore it was that Epicurus affirm'd it to be impossible for a man to be concealed always. Upon the mistake of which he was accused by Plutarch and others, to have supposed it lawful to doe any injustice secretly; whereas his design was to obstruct that gate of iniquity, and to make men beleeve that even that sin which was committed most secretly, would some time or other be discovered and brought to punishment; all which is to be done by the ex raregular events of providence, and the certain accusations and discoveries of Conscience.

For Conscience is the Looking-glass of the soul,6. so it was called by Pe • ipha •• s in Plautus; In Epic ••• Non oris causâ modò homines aequum fuit Sibi habere speculum, ubi os contemplarent suum; Sed qui perspicere possent cor sapientiae: Igitur perspicere possent ut cordis copiam Ubi id inspexissent, cogitarent postea Vitam ut vixissent olim in adolescentia. And a man looking into his Conscience, instructed with the word of God, its proper rule,James 1. 21, 23, 24. is by S. James compar'd to a man beholding his natural face in a glass; and that the Apostle describes Conscience in that similitude, is to be gathered from the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , verbum insitum, the ingraffed word, the word of God written in our hearts, which who so looks on, and compares his actions with his rule, may see what he is: but he that neglects this word and follows not this rule, did indeed see his face, but hath forgotten what manner of man he was, that is, what he was fram'd in the works of the new Creation, when he was newly form'd and created unto righteousness and true holiness.

This accusation and watchfulness,7. and vocal, clamorous guards of Conscience are in perpetual attendance, and though they may sleep, yet they are quickly awakened, and make the evil man restless. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , said Epicurus, which is very well rendred by Seneca, Ideo non prodest latentibus, quòd latendi etiamsi felicitatem habeant, fiduciam non habent. They that live unjustly, always live miserably and fearfully; because although their crime be secret, yet they cannot be confident that it shall be so: meaning, that because their conscience does accuse them, they perceive they are discovered, and previous to an eye, which what effect it will have in the publication of the crime here and hereafter, is not matter of knowledge, but cannot choose but be matter of fear for ever. —Juven. Sat. 10. fiet adulter Publicus, & poenas metuet quascunque mariti Irati debent, nec erit felicior astro Martis, ut in laqueos nunquam incidat— If any chance makes the fact private, yet no providence or watchfulness can give security, because within there dwels a principle of fear that can never die, till repentance kills it. And therefore Chilon in Laërtius said upon this account, that loss is rather to be chosen then filthy gain; because that loss brings sorrow but once, but injustice brings a perpetual fear and pain. Anne magìs Siculi gemuerunt aera juvenci, 〈◊〉 . Sat. 3. Et magìs auratis pendens laquearibus ensis Purpureas subter cervices terruit? Imus, Imus praecipites, quam si sibi dicat, & intus Palleat infelix quod proxima nesciat Uxor. The wife that lies by his side knows not at what the guilty man looks pale, but something that is within the bosome knows; and no pompousness of condition can secure the man, and no witty cruelty can equal the torment. For that also, although it be not directly the office of conscience, yet it is the act and effect of conscience; when it self is injur'd, it will never let any thing else be quiet.

To loose or binde,

Is the reflex act of conscience.8. Upon viewing the records, or the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the Legislative part of conscience, it binds to duty; upon viewing the act, it binds to punishment, or consigns to comfort; and in both regards it is called by Origen, affectuum corrector, atque animae paedagogus, the corrector of the affections, and the teacher of the soul. Which kinde of similitude Epictetus in Stobaeus followed also, Parentes pueros nos paedagogo tradiderunt, qui ubique observaret ne laederemur, Deus autem clam viros insitae conscientiae custodiendos tradidit; quae quidem custodia nequaquam contemnenda est. As our parents have delivered us to a guardian who did watch lest we did or suffered mischief; so hath God committed us to the custody of our conscience that is planted within us; and this custody is at no hand to be neglected.

The binding to duty is so an effect of conscience,9. that is cannot be separated from it; but the binding to punishment is an act of conscience also as it is a Judge, and is intended to affright a sinner, and to punishment: but it is such a punishment as is the beginning of hell torments, and unless the wound be cured will never end till eternity it self shall go into a grave: Illo nocens se damnat quo peccat die,Apud Publianum. the same day that a man sins, on the same day he is condem'd; and when Menelaus in the Tragedy did ask, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ; what disease kill'd poor O • estes? he was answer'd, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , His disease was nothing but an evil conscience; he had done vile things, and had an amazed spirit that distracted him, and so he died. Curas ultrices Virgil cals the wounds of an evil conscience,Plautus. Revenging cares. Nihil est miserius quàm animus hominis conscius, said he in the Comedy; nothing is more miserable then an evil conscience, and the being pain'd with it, is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , to be choked or strangled with an evil conscience; by S▪ Chrysostome (who in his 22. Homily upon the first Epistle to the Corinthians, speaks much and excellently to the same purpose;) and there are some that fancy that this was the cause of Judas death; The horrors of his conscience were such that his spirits were confounded, and restless, and uneasy; and striving to go from their prison stopp'd at the gates of emanation, and stifled him. It did that, or as bad; it either choak'd him, or brought him to a haltar, as it hath done many besides him. And although I may truly say as he did, Non mihi si linguae centum— Omnia poenarum percurrere nomina possem, no tongue is able to express the evils which are felt by a troubled conscience, or a wounded spirit, yet the heads of them are visible and notorious to all men.

1.10. The first is that which Nazianzen cals 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , accusations and vexings of a man when he is in misery; then when he needs most comfort, he shall by his evil conscience be most disquieted. A sickness awakes a dull sleeping conscience, and when it is awaken'd it will make that the man shall not sleep.1 Macc▪ 6. 1 • . So Antiochus when his Lieutenant Lysias was beaten by the Jews, he fell sick with grief, and then his conscience upbraided him; but now (said he) I remember the evils that I did at Jerusalem; quia invenerunt me mala ista, so the Latin Bible reads it; because these evils now have found me out. For when a man is prosperous, it is easie for him to stop the mouth of conscience, to bribe or to abuse it, to fill it with noise, and to divert it with business, to outvie it with temporal gayeties, or to be flattered into weak opinions and sentences; but when a man is smitten of God, and devested of all the outsides and hypocrisies of sin, and that conscience is disintangled from its fetters and foolish pretensions, then it speaks its own sense, it ever speaks loudest when the man is poor, or sick, or miserable. This was well explicated by S. Ambrose, Dum sumus in quadam delinquendi libidine, nebulis quibusdam conscientiae mens obducitur, nè videat eorum quae concupiscit deformitatem. Sed cùm omnis nebula transierit, gravia tormenta exercentur in quodam malè conscii secretario. A man is sometimes so surpris'd with the false fires and glarings of temptation, that he cannot see the secret turpitude and deformity. But when the cloud and vail is off, then comes the tormentor from within: —acuúntque metum mortalibus agris,Aeneid. 12. Si quando lethum horrificum, morbósque Deûm Rex Molitur, meritas aut bello territat urbes. Then the calamity swels, and conscience increases the trouble, when God sends warre, or sickness, or death. It was Sauls case, when he lost that fatal battel in which the Ark was taken, he called to the Amalekite, Sta super me & interfice me, fall upon me and slay me; quoniam tenent me angustiae, I am in a great straìt. He was indeed; for his son was slain, and his army routed, and his enemies were round about: But then conscience stept in and told him of the evil that he had done in causing fourscore of the Lords Priests to be slain; and therefore Abulensis reads the words thus, Fall upon me and slay me, quoniam tenent me or ae vestimenti Sacerdotalis, I am intangled in the fringes of the Priests garments. Videbatur sibi Saul quòd propinquus morti videret Sacerdotes Dei accusantes eum in judicio coram Deo. He thought he saw the Priests of the Lord accusing him before God. And this hath been an old opinion of the world, that in the days of their calamity wicked persons are accus'd by those whom they have injur'd. Not much unlike to which is that of Plato, describing the torments of wicked souls, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , They roar and cry out. Some calling on them whom they kill'd, some on those they have calumniated; and calling they pray them whom they have injured to give them pardon. Then every bush is a wild beast, and every shadow is a ghost, and every gloworm is a dead mans candle, and every lantern is a spirit. —pallidúmque visâ Matris lampade respicit Neronem. When Nero was distressed, he saw his mothers tapor and grew pale with it.

2. The second effect is shame, 11. which conscience never fails to inflict secretly, there being a secret turpitude and baseness in sin, which cannot be better express'd then by its opposition and contradiction to conscience. Conscience when it is right makes a man bold; qui ambulat simpliciter, ambulat confidenter, he that walks honestly, walks confidently, because he hath innocence and he hath reason on his side. But he that sins, sins against reason, in which the honour and the nobleness of a man does consist; and therefore shame must needs come in the destitution of them. For as by reason men naturally rule, so when they are fallen from it, unless by some accidental courages they be supported, they fall into the stare of slaves and sneaking people. And upon this account it was that Plato said, Si scirem Deos mihi condonaturos, & homines ignoraturos, adhuc peccare erubescerem propter solam peccati turpitudinem. If I were sure God would pardon me, and men would not know my sin, yet I should be ashamed to sin, because of its essential baseness: The Mistresses of our vile affections are so ugly, we cannot endure to kiss them but through a vail; either the vail of excuse, or pretence, or darkness; something to hide their ugliness; and yet even these also are so thin that the filthiness and shame is not hid. Bona conscientia turbam advocat, mala autem in solitudine anxia atque sollicita est, said Seneca. An evil conscience is asham'd of light, and afraid of darkness; and therefore nothing can secure it. But being asham'd before Judges, and assemblies, it flies from them into solitudes, and when it is there, the shame is chang'd into fear, and therefore from thence it runs abroad into societies of merry criminals, and drinking sanctuaries, which is nothing but a shutting the eyes, and hiding the head, while the body is exposed to a more certain danger. It cannot be avoided, it was and is and will eternal • y be true, Perjurii poena Divina exitium, Cicero de • egib. l. 2. humana dedecus esto. Which S Paul perfectly renders, The things whereof ye are now ashamed; Rom • •• . the end of these things is death. Death is the punishment which God inflicts, and shame is that which comes from man.

3. There is another effect which cannot be well told by him that feels it,12. or by him that sees it, what it is; because it is a thing without limit and without order. It is a distraction of minde, indeterminate, divided thoughts, flying every thing, and pursuing nothing. It was the case of Nebuchadnezzar, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , his thoughts troubled him.A. Gell. l. 5. c. 1. Varios vultus, disparilésque sensus; like the Sophisters who in their pursuit of vainglory displeased the people, and were hissed from their Pulpits; nothing could amaze them more; they were troubled like men of a disturbed conscience. The reason, is, they are fallen into an evil condition which they did not expect; they are abus'd in their hopes, they are fallen into a sad state of things, but they know not yet what it is, nor where they are, nor whither it will bear them, nor how to get out of it. This indeed is commonly the first part of the great evil; shame goes along with the sin, in the very acting it, but as soon as it is acted, then begins this confusion, —nefas tandem incipiunt sentire peractis Criminibus— they thought of nothing but pleasure before, but as soon as they have finished, then they begin to tast the wormwood and the colliquintida; perfecto demum scelere, magnitudo ejus intellecta est, Lib. 14. Annal. said Tacitus. While they were doing it, they thought it little, or they thought it none, because their fancy and their passion rul'd; but when that is satisfied and burst with a filthy plethory, then they understand how great their sin is, but are distracted in their thoughts, for they understand not how great their calamity shall be. Occultum quatìente animum tortore flagellum, the secret tormentor shakes the minde, and dissolves it into indiscrimination and confusion. The man is like one taken in a lie, or surpris'd in a shameful act of lust, or theft; at first he knows not what to say, or think, or do, and his spirits huddle together, and fain would go some where, but they know not whither, and doe something, but they know not what.

This confusion and first amazement of the conscience in some vile natures,13. and baser persons proceeds to impudence, and hardness of face. —frontémque à crimine sumunt. when they are discover'd they rub their foreheads hard, and consider it cannot be worse, and therefore in their way they make the best of it; that is, they will not submit to the judgement of conscience, nor suffer her infliction, but take the fortune of the Banditi, or of an outlaw, rather then by the rule of subjects suffer the penalty of the Law, and the severity of the Judge. But Conscience hath no hand in this, and whatsoever of this nature happens, it is in despite of conscience; and if it proceeds upon that method, it goes on to obstinacy, hardness of heart, a resolution never to repent, a hatred of God, and reprobation. For if conscience be permitted to do its work, this confusion when it comes to be stated, and that the man hath time to consider, it passes on to fear; and that is properly the next effect.

4. An evil or a guilty conscience is dispos'd for fear,14. shame and fear cannot be far asunder: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 .Epicharm. Sin makes us asham'd before men, and afraid of God: an evil conscience makes man a coward, timorous as a child in a Churchporch at midnight; it makes the strongest men to tremble like to keepers of the house of an old mans Tabernacle. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , said Menander, No strength of body, no confidence of spirit is a defensative against an evil conscience which will intimidate the courage of the most perfect Warriour. Qui terret, plus iste timet, sors ista tyrannis Convenit, invideant claris, fortésque trucident, Muniti gladiis vivant, septíque venenis Ancipites habeant arces, trepidíque minentur. So Claudian describes the state of Tyrants and injurious persons,De 4 Hono • Con • u • . they do evil and fear worse, they oppress brave men, and are afraid of mean fellows; they are encompassed with swords, and dwell amongst poysons, they have towers with back doors and many outlets, and they threaten much, but themselves are most afraid. We read of Belteshazzar, his knees beat against each other upon the arrest made on him by the hand on the wall, which wrote the sentence of God in a strange character, because he would not reade the writing in his conscience. This fear is very great and very lasting even in this world: and is rarely well describ'd by Lucretius: Cerberus & Furiae— —neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse profectò: 〈…〉 Sed metus in vitâ poenarum pro malefactis Est insignibus insignis; scelerísque luela Carcer, & horribilis de saxo jacta deorsum, Verbera, Carnifices, robur, pix, lumina, taedae, Quae tamen etsi absunt, & mens sibi conscia facti Praemetuens adhibet stimulos, torretque flagellis; Which description of the evil and intollerable pains and fears of conscience is exceeded by the Author of the wisdome of Solomon, Indisciplinatae animae erraverunt. 〈…〉 That is the ground of their misery; The souls were refractory to discipline, and have erred. They oppress the holy Nation. The effect was, they became Prisoners of darkness, and fettered with the bands of a long night; fugitive perp • tuae providentiae • acuerunt, they became outlaws from the divine providence. And while they supposed to lie had in their secret sins, they were scattered under • dark vail of forgetfulness; paventes horrendè, & cum admiratione nimia perturbati, they did fear horribly, and disturbed with a wonderful amazement. For neither might the corner that held them keep them from fear, but a sound descending did trouble them; & personae tristes apparentes pavorem illis praestabant, sad appar • tions did affright them; a fire appeared to them very formidable; & timore percussi ejus quae non videbatur faciei; they were affrighted with the apprehensions of what they saw not: and all the way in that excellent description, there is nothing but fear, and affrightment, horrid amazement and confusion; pleni timore, and tremebund: peribant, full of fear, and they perished trembling; and then follows the philosophy and rational account of all this. Frequenter enim praeoccupant pessima redarguente conscientiâ. When their conscience reproves them, they are prepossess'd with fearful expectations. For wickedness condemn'd by her own witness is very timorous. Cùm enim sit timida nequitia, dat testimonium condemnata: Conscience gives witness and gives sentence, and when wickedness is condemn'd it is full of affrightment. For fear is praesumptionis adjutorium, the allay of confidence and praesumption, and the promoter of its own apprehensions, and betrays the succours that reason yeelds. For indeed in this case, no reason can dispute a man out of his misery, for there is nothing left to comfort the conscience, so long as it is devested of its innocence. The Prophet Jeremy instances this in the case of Pashur who oppressed the Prophets of the Lord, putting them in Prison and forbidding them to preach in the name of the Lord: Thy name shall be no more called Pashur but Magor Missabib, J • r. 2 • • 4. [that is, fear round about] for I will make thee a terror unto thy self.

This fear of its own nature is apt to increase,15. for indeed it may be infinite. Nec videt intereà quis terminus esse malorum Possit,Lucret. nec quae sit poenarum denique finis: Atque eadem metuunt magis, haec nè in morte gravescant. Hinc Acherusia fit stultorum denique vita. He that fears in this case, knows not the greatness and measure of the evil which he fears; it may arrive to infinite, and it may be any thing, and it may be every thing, and therefore there is,

5. An appendant perpetuity and restlesness; 16. a man of an evil conscience is never at quiet.De profugit. Impietas enim malum infinitum est, quod nunquam extingui potest, said Philo: He is put to so many shifts to excuse his crime before men, and cannot excuse it to God or to himself, and then he is forc'd to use arts of forgetfulness, that he may not remember his sorrow; he runs to weakness for excuse, and to sin for a comfort, and to the methods and paths of hell for sanctuary, and rols himself in his uneasy chains of fire, and changes from side to side upon his gridiron till the flesh drop from the bones on every side. This is the Poets vultur, Immortale jecur tundens, faecundáque poenis Viscera, rimatúrque epulis, habitátque sub alto Pectore, nec fibris requies datur ulla renatis. It gnaws perpetually, and consumes not, being like the fire of hell, it does never devour, but torments for ever.

6. This fear and torment,17. which is inflicted by conscience does not only increase at our death, but after death is the beginning of hell. For these are the fire of hell; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , I am tormented in this flame, so said Dives when he was in torments; that is, he had the torments of an evil conscience, for hell it self is not to be opened till the day of judgement; but the sharpest pain is usually expressed by fire, and particularly the troubles of minde are so signified. Urit animum meum; This burns, that is, this exceedingly troubles my minde; and uro hominem in the Comedy, I vex him sufficiently, I burn him; loris non ureris, thou art not tormented with scourgings. Poena autem vehemens,Juvenal. & multò saevior illis Quos & Caeditius gravis invenit, & Rhadamanthus, Nocte diéque suum gestare in pectore testem. This is a part of hell fire, the smoke of it ascends night and day; and it is a preparatory to the horrible sentence of Doomsday, as the being tormented in prison is, to the day of condemnation and execution. The conscience in the state of separation does accuse perpetually, and with an insupportable amazement fears the revelation of the day of the Lord. Et cum fateri Furia jusserit verum, Cogente clamet conscientiá scripsi.Martial. The fury within will compel him to confess, and then he is prepared for the horrible sentence, as they who upon the rack accuse themselves, and then they are carried to execution. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . Menippus in Lucian says that the souls of them that are dead are accused by the shadows of their bodies. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and these he says are 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 worthy of belief, because they are always present, and never parted from the bodies; meaning that a mans conscience which is inseparable as a shadow, is a strong accuser and a perfect witness: and this will never leave them till it carries them to hell, and then the fear is chang'd into despair, and indignation, and hatred of God, and eternal blasphemy. This is the full progress of an evil conscience, in its acts of binding.

Quest.

BUT if it be inquired by what instrument conscience does thus torment a man,18. and take vengeance of him for his sins, whether it hath a proper efficiency in it self, and that it gives torment, as it understands, by an exercise of some natural power; * or whether it be by an act of God inflicting it, * or by opinion and fancy, * by being perswaded of some future events which shall be certainly consequent to the sin, or by Religion and belief, * or lastly by deception and meer illusion, and upon being affrighted with bugbears? I answer,

That it does or may afflict a man by all these.19. For its nature is to be inquisitive and busie, querulous and complaining; and to doe so is as natural to it, as for a man to be grieved when any thing troubles him. But because men have a thousand little arts to stifle the voice of conscience, or at least that themselves may not hear it; God oftentimes awakens a man by a sudden dash of thunder and lightning, and makes the conscience sick, and troublesome; just as upon other accidents a man is made sad, or hardned, or impudent, or foolish, or restless: and sometimes every dream, or sad story that the man hath heard, the flying of birds, and the hissing of serpents, or the fall of waters, or the beating of a watch, or the noise of a cricket, or a superstitious tale, is suffered to doe the man a mischief and to increase his fear. —Ergo exercentur poenis, veterúmque malorum Supplicia expendunt. This the Poets and Priests expressed by their Adrastea, Nemesis, Minos, Aeacus and Rhadamanth, not that these things were real, —neque sunt usquam, neque possunt esse profectò, said one of them; but yet to their pains and fears they gave names, and they put on persons, and a phantastick cause may have a real event, and therefore must come from some further principle: and if an evil man be affrighted with a meteor or a bird, by the chattering of swallows (like the young Greek in Plutarch) or by his own shadow (as Orestes was) it is no sign that the fear is vain, but that God is the Author of conscience, and will beyond the powers of nature, and the arts of concealment set up a Tribunal, and a Gibbet, and a Rack in the Court of Conscience. And therefore we finde this evil threatned by God to fall upon sinners.Levit. 26. 36. They that are left alive of you in the land of your captivity, I will send fainting in their hearts, in the land of their enemy, and the sound of a leaf shall chace them: Deuter. 28. 65 • and again The Lord shall give thee there a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of minde, and thy life shall hang in doubt before thee, and thou shalt fear day and night, and shalt have no assurance of thy life: and this very fear ends in death it self; it is a mortal fear sometimes; for when the Prophet Isaiah had told concerning Jerusalem, Isai. 22. 2. Thy slain men are not slain with the sword, nor dead in battle; to the inquiry of those who ask how then were they slain? the answer is made by a learned gloss upon the place, Homines hi non expectato adventu hostis, velut transfossi exanimantur metu: They were dead with fear, slain with the affrightments of their own conscience, as if they were transfixed by the spear of their enemies.Lib. 1. c. • . Quid ergo nos à Diis immortalibus divinitùs expectemus, nisi errationibus finem faciamus, said Q. Metellus in A. Gellius: There is no avoiding punishment, unless we will avoid sin; since even a shadow as well as substances may become a Nemesis, when it is let loose by God, and conducted by conscience.

But the great instrument of bringing this to pass is that certainty of perswasion which is natural in all men,20. and is taught to all men, and is in the sanction of all laws expresly affirmed by God, that evil shall be to them that doe evil; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 ,Aeschyl. He that dishonours God shall not escape punishment: both in this life, Senec. 〈◊〉 Act. 3. Ultrix Erinnys impio dignum parat Lethum Tyranno— and after this life, for so they reckon'd, that Adulterers, Rebels, and Traytors should be kept in prisons in fearful expectation of horrid pains; Quíque ob adulterium caesi, quíque arma secuti Impia, nec veriti Dominorum fallere dextras, Inclusi poenam expectant— all this is our conscience, which in this kind of actions and events, is nothing but the certain expectation and fear of the Divine vengeance.

Quest.

BUT then why is the conscience more afraid in some sins then in others,21. since in sins of the greatest malignity we finde great difference of fear and apprehension, when because they are of extreme malignity there can be no difference in their demerit?

I answer;22. Although all sins be damnable, yet not onely in the several degrees of sin, but in the highest of all there is great difference; partly proceeding from the Divine threatnings, partly from fame and opinion, partly from other causes.

For 1. there are some sins which are called peccata clamantia, crying sins; that is, such which cry aloud for vengeance; such which God not onely hath specially threatned with horrid plagues, but such which doe seldome escape vengeance in this life, but for their particular mischief are hedged about with thorns lest by their frequency they become intolerable. Such are Sacrilege, Oppression of widows and Orphans, Murder, Sodomy, and the like • Now if any man fals into any of these crimes, he sees an Angel with a sword drawn stand before him; he remembers the angry words of God, and cals to minde that so few have escaped a severe judgement here, that Gods anger did converse with men, and was cloth'd with our circumstances, and walk'd round about us; and less then all this is enough to scare an evil conscience.

But 2. there are some certain defensatives and natural guards which God hath plac'd in men against some sins; such as are a natural abhorrency against unnatural lusts. A natural pity against Murder, and Oppression: the double hedge of sacredness and religion against Sacrilege. He therefore that commits any of these sins does so much violence to those defensatives, which were plac'd either in or upon his heart, that such an act is a natural disease, and vexes the conscience not onely by a moral but by a natural instrument.

3. There are in these crying sins certain accidents and appendages of horror which are apt to amaze a mans minde: as in Murder there is the circumstance and state of death, which when a man sees and sees alone, and sees that himself hath acted, it must needs affright him; since naturally most men abhorre to be alone with a dead corpse; so also in Oppression of widows, a man mee • s with so many sad spectacles, and hears so many groans, and clamorous complaints, such importunities, and such prayers, and such fearful cursings, and perpetual weepings, that if a man were to use any artifice to trouble a mans spirit, he could not dress his Scene with more advantage.

4. Fame hath a great influence into this effect, and there cannot easily be a great shame amongst men, but there must be a great fear of vengeance from God; and the shame does but antidate the Divine anger, and the man feels himself entring into it, when he is enwrapped within the other. A man committing a foul sin, which hath a special dishonour and singular disreputation among men, is like a wolf espied amongst the sheep: The outcry and noises among the shepherds make him flie for his life, when he hears a vengeance comming. And besides in this case, it is a great matter that he perceives all the world hates him for his crime, and that which every one decries must needs be very hateful and formidable, and prepar'd for trouble.

5. It cannot be denied, but Opinion also hath some hand in this affair; and some men are affrighted from their cradle in some instances, and permitted or conniv'd at in others; and the fears of childhood are not shaken from the conscience in old age: as we see the perswasions of childhood in moral actions are permanent, so is the fear and hope which were the sanction and establishment of those perswasions. Education and Society, and Country Customes, and States of life, and the Religion or Sect of the mans professing, have influence into their portions of this effect.

The consequent of this discourse is this; That we cannot take any direct accounts of the greatness or horror of a sin by the affrightment of conscience. For it is with the affrightments of conscience as it is in temporal judgements; sometimes they come not at all, and when they doe, they come irregularly, and when they doe not, the man does not escape. But in some sins God does strike more frequently then in others, and in some sins men usually are more affrighted then in others. The outward judgement and the inward fear are intended to be deleteries of the sin, and instruments of repentance; but as some great sins escape the rod of God in this life, so are such sinners oftentimes free from great affrightments. But as he who is not smitten of God, yet knows that he is always liable to Gods anger, and if he repents not, it will certainly fall upon him hereafter: so it is in conscience, he that fears not, hath never the less cause to fear, but oftentimes a greater, and therefore is to suspect and alter his condition, as being of a deep and secret danger: and he that does fear, must alter his condition, as being highly troublesome. But in both cases, conscience does the work of a Monitor and a Judge. In some cases, conscience is like an eloquent and a fair spoken Judge, which declaims not against the criminal, but condemnes him justly: In others, the Judge is more angry, and affrights the prisoner more, but the event is the same. For in those sins where the conscience affrights, and in those in which she affrights not, supposing the sins equal but of differing natures, there is no other difference; but that conscience is a Clock, which in one man strikes aloud and gives warning, and in another the hand points silently to the figure, but strikes not; but by this he may as surely see what the other hears, viz. that his hours pass away, and death hastens, and after death comes judgement.

But by the measures of binding,24. we may judge of the loosing, or absolution, which is part of the judgement of conscience, and this is the greatest pleasure in the world. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , 〈◊〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . a good conscience is the most certain, clearest, and undisturbed felicity. Lectulus respersus floribus bona est conscientia, 2 C •• 1. 1 • . bonis refect a operibus. No bed so soft, no flowers so sweet, so florid and delicious as a good conscience, in which springs all that is delectable, all that may sustain and recreate our spirits. Nullâ re tam laetari soleo quàm officiorum meorum conscienti • . I am pleased in nothing so much as in the remembrances and conscience of my duty, said Cicero. Upon this pillow and on this bed, Christ slept soundly in a storm, and S. Peter in Prison so fast that the brightness of an Angel could not awake him, or make him to rise up without a blow on his side. This refreshed the sorrows of Hezekiah when he was smitten with the plague, and not only brought pleasure for what was past, and so doubled the good of it, Vivere bis vitâ posse priore frui; but it also added something to the number of his years, Ampliat aetatis spacium sibi vir bonus— And this made Paul and Silas sing in Prison and in an Earthquake; and that I may summe up all the good things in the world, I borrow the expression of S. Bernard, Bona conscientia non solùm sufficit ad solatium sed etiam ad coronam: It is here a perpetual comfort, it will be hereafter an eternal crown.

25. This very thing Epicurus observ'd wisely, and in his great design for pleasure commended Justice as the surest instrument to procure it. So Antiphon, Conscium esse sibi in vitâ nullius criminis, multum voluptatis parit: and Cato in Cicero, Conscientia benè actae vitae multorúmque benefactorum recordatio jucundissima est: Nothing is a greater pleasure then a good conscience; for there is peace and no disturbance; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 : Quietness is the best fruit, and that grows onely upon the tree in the midst of Paradise, upon the stock of a holy Heart or Conscience. Onely care is to be taken, that boldness be not mistaken for peace, and hardness of heart for a good conscience. It is easie to observe the difference, and no man can be innocently abused in this affair. Peace is the fruit of a holy conscience. But no man can say, I am at peace, therefore I have a holy conscience. But, I have lived innocently, or I walk carefully with my God, and I have examined my conscience severely, and that accuses me not; therefore this peace is a holy peace, and no illusion. A man may argue thus: I am in health, and therefore the sleep I take is natural and healthful. But not thus: I am heavy to sleep, therefore I am in health, for his dulness may be a lethargy. A man may be quiet, because he inquires not, or because he understands not, or because he cares not, or because he is abused in the notices of his condition. But the true peace of conscience is thus to be discerned.

Signs of true peace.

1. Peace of conscience is a rest after a severe inquiry. When Hezekiah was upon his deathbed as he supposed, he examined his state of life, and found it had been innocent in the great lines and periods of it; and he was justly confident.

2. Peace of conscience can never be in wicked persons, of notorious evil lives. It is a fruit of holiness, and therefore what quietness soever is in persons of evil lives, it is to be attributed to any other cause, rather than innocence; and therefore is to be called any thing rather than just peace. The adulterous woman eateth and wipeth her mouth, Prov. 30, 20. and saith, I have done no wickedness. And Pilate washed his hands, when he was dipping them in the most innocent, the best and purest bloud of the world. But S. Paul had peace, because he really had fought a good fight. And it is but a fond way to ask a sign how to discern, when the Sun shines. If the Sun shines we may easily perceive it, and then the beams we see are the Sunbeams; but it is not a sure argument to say, I see a light, therefore the Sun shines; for he may espy onely a tallow candle, or a gloworm.

3. That rest which is onely in the days of prosperity, is not a just and a holy peace, but that which is in the days of sorrow and affliction. The noise and madness of wine,Eccl • s. 13 • 6. the transportations of prosperity, the forgetfulness of riches, and the voice of flatterers outcry conscience, and put it to silence; and there is no reason to commend a womans silence and modesty when her mouth is stop'd. But in the days of sorrow, then conscience is vocal, and her muffler is off; —Invigilant animo, 〈…〉 scelerísque patrati Supplicium exercent curae, tunc plurima versat Pessimus in dubiis augur timor— and then a man naturally searches every where for comfort; and if his heart then condemnes him not, it is great oddes but it is a holy peace.

4. Peace of minde is not to be used as a sign that God hath pardoned our sins, but is onely of use in questions of particular fact. What evils have I done? what good have I done? The peace that comes after this examination is holy and good. But if I have peace in these particulars, then have I peace towards God also, as to these particulars: But whether I have pardon for other sins which I have committed, is another consideration, and is always more uncertain. But even here also a peace of conscience is a blessing that is given to all holy penitents more or less, at some time or other, according as their repentance proceeds, and their hope is exercised: But it is not to be judged of by sense, and ease, but by its proper causes: It never comes but after fear, and labour, and prayers, and watchfulness, and assiduity; and then what succeeds is a blessing, and a fair indication of a bigger.

5. True peace of conscience is always joyned with a holy fear; a fear to offend, and a fear of the Divine displeasure for what we have offended; and the reason is, because all peace that is so allayed is a peace after enquiry, a peace obtained by just instruments, relying upon proper grounds; it is rational, and holy, and humble; neither carelesness, nor presumption is in it.

6. True peace of conscience relies not upon popular noises, and is not a sleep procured by the tongues of flatterers, or opinions of men, but is a peace from within,Lib. 4. de be • efic. c. 21. relying upon God and its own just measures. It is an excellent discourse which Seneca hath, Est aliquando gratus qui ingratus videtur, quae mala interpres opinio in contrarium deducit. Hic quid aliud sequitur, quàm ipsam conscientiam quae etiam obruta delectat, quae concioni ac samae reclamat, & in se omnia reponit, & cùm ingentem ex altera parte turbam contra sentientium aspexit, non numerat suffragia, sed unâ sententiâ vincit? Some men are thankful, who yet seem unthankful, being wronged by evil interpretation. But such a man what else does he follow but his conscience, which pleases him, though it be overborn with slander, and when she sees a multitude of men that think otherwise, she regards not, nor reckons suffrages by the poll, but is victorious by her single sentence? But the excellency and great effect of this peace he afterwards describes: Si verò bonam fidem perfidiae suppliciis affici videt, non descendit è fastigio, sed supra poenam suam consistit. Habeo inquit quod volui, quod petii. Non poenitet, nec poenitebit: nec ullâ iniquitate me eò fortuna perducet, ut hanc vocem audiam, Quid mihi volui? Quid mihi nunc prodest bona voluntas? prodest & in equuleo, prodest & in igne, qui si singulis membris admoveatur, & paul • tim unum corpus circumeat; licèt ipsum corpus plenum bonâ conscientiâ stillet, placebit ìllì ìgnis per quem bona fides collucebit. A good conscience loses nothing of its confidence and peace for all the tortures of the world. The rack, the fire shall not make it to repent and say, what have I purchas'd? But its excellency and integrity shall be resplendent in the very flames. And this is the meaning of the Proverb used by the Levantines, Heaven and Hell are seated in the heart of man. As his conscience is, so he is happy, or extremely miserable. What other men say of us, Orat. 25. is no more then what other men dream of us, said S. Gregory Nazìanzene; It is our conscience that accuses or condemnes to all real events and purposes.

And now all this is nothing but a perswasion partly natural,26. partly habitual, of this proposition which all the Nations, and all the men in the world have always entertained as the band of all their Religion, and private transactions of justice and decency, Deum Remuneratorem esse, that God is a just Rewarder of all actions.Cicero pro Milone. I summe up the premises in the words of the Orator; Magna vis est conscientiae, Judices, & magna in utramque partem: ut neque timeant qui nihil commiserint, & poenam semper ante oculos versari putent, qui peccarint. On either side conscience is mighty and powerful, to secure the innocent, and to afflict the criminal.

But beyond these offices now described,27. Conscience does sometimes only [Counsell] a thing to be done; that is, according to its instruction, so it ministers to holiness. If God hath put a law into our minds, conscience will force 〈◊〉 ••• nce, or make us to suffer for our disobedience; but if a proposition tending to holiness and its advantages be intrusted to the conduct of conscience, then it presses it by all its proper inducements, by which it was laid up there, and leaves the spirit of a man to his liberty; but if it be not followed, it upbraids our weaknesses, and chides our follies, and reproves our despi ••• holy degrees, and greater excellencies of glory laid up for loving and willing spirits. Such as is that of Clemens Alexandrinus in the matter of an Evangelical Counsel; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , He that does so and so, sins not; for he is not forbidden by the law of the Gospel; but yet he fals short of the perfection that is designed and propounded to voluntary and obedient persons. To summe up this.

When S. Paul had reproved the endless genealogies of the Gnosticks and Platonists,28. making c • rcles of the same things, or of divers whose difference they understood not; as Intelligence, Fear, Majesty, Foundation, Wisdome, Magnificence, Mercy, Victory, Kingdome, Foundation, God, and such unintelligible stuff which would make fools stare, and wise men at a loss; he subjoyns a short,2 Tim. • . • . but a more discernible genealogy,2 Tim. 2. 22. and conjugation of things to our purpose.2 Tim. 1. 3. The end of the Commandement is love out of a pure heart, H • b 9 14. 10. 22. 13. 18. and a good conscience, Acts 15 9. and faith unfeigned: that is, out of an unfeigned faith proceeds a good conscience; that is, abstinence from sin; and from thence comes purity of heart, or a separation from the trifling regards of the world, and all affections to sin; and these all end in charity: that is, in peace, and joy, and the fruition and love of God, in Unions and Contemplations in the bosome of Eternity. So that faith is the first mover in the understanding part, and the next is conscience, and they both purify the heart from false perswasions, and evil affections; and then they joyn to the production of love and of felicity.

Thus farre is the Nature and Offices of Conscience: It will concern us next, to consider by what General measures we are to treat our Conscience that it may be useful to us in all the intentions of it, and in the designs of God.

THIS Rule is intended against those whose understanding is right in the proposition,1. and yet declines in the application; it is true in thesi, but not in hypothesi; it is not true when it comes to be their case: and so it is in all that sin against their conscience, and use little arts to evade the clamor of the sin. They are right in the rule, and crooked in the measuring; whose folly is apparent in this, because they deny in particular what they affirm in the general; and it is true in all, but not in some. David was redargued wittily by Nathan upon this account; he laid the case in a remote Scene: Tìtius, or Sempronius, a certain rich man, I know not who, some body or other robb'd the poor man of his Ewe lamb. Therefore said David he shall die who ever he be. Yea, but you are the man: what then? shall he die still? This is a new arrest; it could not be denied, his own mouth had already given the sentence.

And this is an usual,2. but a most effective Art to make the conscience right in the particular, by propounding the case separate from its own circumstances, and then to remove it to its own place is no hard matter. It was an ingenious device of Erasistratus the Physician,De bellis Sytiacis. of which Appian tells: When yong Antiochus almost died for love of Stratonica his Father Seleucus his Wife, the Physician told the passionate and indulgent Father, that his son was sick of a disease, which he had indeed discovered, but found it also to be incurable. Seleucus with sorrow asking what it was? Erasistratus answered, He loves my wife. But then the old Kings hopes began to revive, and he turn'd wooer in the behalf of his son, begging of the Physician who was his Counsellor and his friend, for pity sake, for friendship and humanity to give his wife in exchange or redemption for the yong Kings life. Erasistratus replied, Sir you ask a thing too unreasonable and great; and though you are his Father, your self would not do it, if it were your own case; and therefore why should I? when Seleucus swore by all his Country gods that he would doe it as willingly as he would live; Erasistratus drew the curtain of the device, and applied it to him, by telling, that the cure of his son depended upon his giving the Queen Stratonica to him, which he did; and afterwords made it as lawful as he could, by a Law postnate to that insolent example, and confirm'd it by military suffrages.

In all cases we are to consider the rule,3. not the relation; the law, not the person: for if it be one thing in the proposition, and another in the assumption, it must be false in one place or the other, and then the Conscience is but an ill Guide, and an ill Judge.

This rule is not to extend to the exception of particular cases;4 nor to take away privileges, pardons, equity. For that which is fast in the proposition, may become loose in the particular by many intervening causes, of which I am to give account in its due place. For the present, this is certain, that, Whatsoever particular is of the same account with the general, not separate, or let loose by that hand which first bound it, is to be estimated as the general. But this Rule is to goe further also.

For hitherto, I have called the act of particular Conscience directing to a single and circumstantiate action by the name of Practical judgement: 5. and the general dictate of the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or Phylactery, or upper Conscience, teaching the kinds of good actions, by the name of Speculative judgement. But the rule also is true, and so to be understood, when practical and speculative are taken in their first and proper sense. If in Philosophy we discourse that the True God, being a Spirit without shape or figure, cannot be represented by an image; although this be onely a speculation, and demonstrable in natural Philosophy, and no rule of Conscience; yet when Conscience is to make a judgement concerning the picturing of God the Father, it must not determine practically against that speculation. *That an idol is nothing, is demonstrable in Metaphysicks; and therefore that we are to make nothing of it, is a practical truth: and although the first proposition be not directly plac'd in the upper region of conscience, but is one of the prime Metaphysical propositions, not properly Theological, according to those words of S. Paul, Concerning things sacrific'd to idols, 1 Cor. 8. 1. 4. we know 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 that we all have knowledge; and we know that an idol is nothing in the world; meaning, that this knowledge needs no revelation to attest it; we by our own reason and principles of demonstration know that; yet, the lower, or particular practical Conscience must never determine against that extrinsecal, and therefore (as to Conscience) accidental measure.

For whatsoever is true in one Science,6. is true also in another, and when we have wisely speculated concerning the dimensions of bodies, their circumscriptions, the acts of sense, the certainty of their healthful perceptions, the commensuration of a place and a body: we must not esteem these to be unconcerning propositions, if ever we come to use them in Divinity: and therefore we must not worship that which our senses tell us to be a thing below worship; nor beleeve that infinite which we see measured; nor esteem that greater then the heavens which I see and feel goes into my mouth. If Philosophy gives a skin, Divinity does not flea it off: and truth cannot be contrary to truth; and God would not in Nature teach us any thing to misguide us in the regions of Grace.

The Caution for conducting this proposition is onely this:7. That we be as sure of our speculation, as of any other rule which we ordinarily follow; and that we do not take vain Philosophy, for true speculations. He that guides his conscience by a principle of Zeno's Philosophy, because he hath been bred in the Sto • cal sect, and resolves to understand his Religion to the sense of his Masters Theoremes, does ill. The Christian Religion suffered much prejudice at first by the weak disputings of the Greeks; and they would not admit a Religion against the Academy, or the Cynicks, or the Athenian Schools; and the Christian Schools drew some of their articles thorough the limbecks of Plato's Philosophy, and to this day the relish remains upon some of them.Ad annum 538. sect. 34. And Baronius complains of Origen, that, In Paganorum commentis enutritus, eaque propagare in animo habens, divinas se utique Scripturas interpretari simulavit: ut hoc modo nefariam doctrinam suam sacrarum liter arum monumentis malignè admiscens, Paganicum & Manich • icum errorem suum atque Arrianam vesaniam induceret. He mingled the Gentile Philosophy with Christian Religion, and by analogy to that, expounded this, and how many Disciples he had, all the world knows. Nay not onely from the doctrine, but from the practises and rites of the Pagan Religion, many Christians did derive their rites, and they in time gave authority and birth to some docrines, Vigilias anniversarias habes apud Suetonium. A. D. 44. n. 88. Lustralem aquam, aspersionem sepulchrorum, lumina in iisdem parare, Sabbatho lucernam accendere, cereos in populum distribuere. The staff, the ring, the Mitre, and many other customes, some good, some onely tolerable, the Christians took from the Gentiles; and what effect it might have, and what influence it hath had in some doctrines, is too notorious to dissemble. Thomas Aquìnas did a little change the Scene, and blended Aristotle so with School Divinity, that something of the purity was lost, while much of our Religion was exacted and conducted by the rules of a mistaken Philosophy. But if their speculations had been right, Christianity would at first have entred without reproof, as being the most reasonable Religion of the world, and most consonant to the wisest and most sublime speculations; and it would also have continued pure, if it had been still drawn from the fountains of our Saviour thorough the limbecks of the Evangelists and Apostles, without the mixture of the salt waters of that Philosophy, which every Physician and witty man now adays thinks he hath reason and observation enough easily to reprove. But men have resolved to verify their Sect rather then the truth; but if of this particular we be careful, we must then also verify every speculation in all things where it can relate to practice, and is not altered by circumstances.

As a appendage,8. and for the fuller explication of this Rule, it is a worthy inquiry which is by some men made, concerning the use of our reason in our Religion. For some men finding reason to be that guide which God hath given us, and concreated with us, know that Religion which is superinduc'd, and comes after it, cannot prejudice that noblest part of this Creation. But then, because some articles which are said to be of faith, cannot be made to appear consonant to their reason, they stick to this, and let that go. Here is a just cause of complaint. But therefore others say, that reason is a good guide in things reasonable and humane, but our reason is blinde in things Divine, and therefore is of little or no use in Religion. Here we are to beleeve, not to dispute. There are on both sides fair pretences, which when we have examined, we may finde what part of truth each side aims at, and joyn them both in practise. They that speak against reason, speak thus.

1. There is to every state and to every part of man given a proportionable light to guide him in that way where he ought,9. and is appointed to walk. In the darknesses of this world, and in the actions of common life, the Sun and Moon in their proper seasons are to give us light: In the actions of humane entercourse, and the notions tending to it, reason is our eye, and to it are notices proportion'd, down from nature and experience, even from all the principles with which our rational faculties usually doe converse. But because a man is design'd to the knowledge of God, and of things spiritual, there must spring a new light from heaven, and he must have new capacities, and new illuminations; that is, new eyes, and a new light: For here the eye of Reason is too weak, and the natural man is not capable of the things of the Spirit, because they are spiritually discerned. Faith is the eye, and the Holy Spirit gives the light, and the word of God is the lantern, and the spiritual not the rational man can perceive the things of God. Secreta Dei, Deo meo, & filiis domus ejus. God and Gods secret ones onely know Gods secrets.

2. And therefore we finde in Holy Scripture that to obey God,10. and to love him, is the way to understand the mysteries of the kingdome. Obedite & intelligetis, If ye will obey, then shall ye understand: and it was a rare saying of our blessed Saviour,John 7. 17. and is of great use and confidence to all who inquire after the truth of God, in the midst of these sad divisions of Christendome; If any man will doe his will he shall know whether the doctrine be of God or no. It is not fineness of discourse, nor the sharpness of arguments, or the witty rencontres of disputing men that can penetrate into the mysteries of faith: the poor humble man that prays, and inquires simply, and listens attentively, and sucks in greedily, and obeys diligently, he is the man that shall know the minde of the Spirit. And therefore S. Paul observes that the Sermons of the Cross were foolishness to the Greeks; and consequently, by way of upbraiding, he inquires,1 Cor. 1. 10. Where is the wise man, where is the Scribe, where is the disputer of the world? God hath made the wisdome of the world foolishness; that is, God hath confounded reason, that faith may come in her place.

3. For there are some things in our Religion so mysterious, that they are above all our reason;11. and well may we admire but cannot understand them: and therefore the Spirit of God is sent into the world to bring our understanding into the obedience of Christ;2 Cor. 10. 5. we must obey and not enquire, and every proud thought must be submitted to him who is the wisdome of the Father, who hath in the holy Scriptures taught us all his Fathers will.

4. And therefore as to this nothing can be added from the stock of nature,12. or principles of naturall reason, so if it did need a supply, reason could ill doe it. For the object of our faith must be certain and infallible; but no mans reason is so, and therefore to put new wine into broken bottles is no gain, or real advantage; and although right reason is not to be gainsaid, yet what is right reason is so uncertain, that in the midst of all disputes, every man pretends to it, but who hath it no man can tell, and therefore it cannot be a guide or measure of faith.

5. But above all,13. if we will pretend to reason in Religion, we have but one great reason that we can be obliged to; and that is, to beleeve that whatsoever God hath said is true: so that our biggest reason in Religion, is to submit our reason, that is, not to use our reason in particular inquiries, but to captivate it in the whole. And if there be any particular inquiries, let them seem what they will to my reason it matters not; I am to follow God, not man; I may be deceived by my self, but never by God. It is therefore sufficient to me that it is in the Scriptures. I will inquire no further. This therefore is a concluding argument; This is in Scripture, therefore this is true: and this is against Scripture, therefore it is absurd, and unreasonable.

6. After all, experience is our competent guide warning to us:14. For we see when witty men use their reason against God that gave it, they in pursuit of reason go beyond Religion; and when by reason they look for God, they miss him; for he is not to be found but by faith, which when they dispute for, they finde not; because she is built and perswaded by other mediums, then all Schools of Philosophy to this day have taught. And it was because of reason, that the Religion of Jesus was so long oppos'd and hinder'd to possess the world. The Philosophers would use their reason, and their reason would not admit this new Religion: and therefore S. Paul being to remove every stone that hindered, bad them to beware of vain Philosophy; which does not distniguish one kinde of Philosophy from another, but marks all Philosophy. It is all vain, when the enquiries are into religious mysteries.

7. For is it not certain that some principles of reason are against some principles of faith and Scripture?15. and it is but reason, that we should hear reason where ever we finde it; and yet we are to have no entercourse with Devils, though we were sure they would tell us of hidden treasures, or secrets of Philosophy: and upon this account it is that all Genethliacal predictions, and Judicial Astrology is decried by all religious persons; for though there be great pretensions of reason and art, yet they being against religion and revelation are intolerable. In these and the like cases, reason must put on her muffler, and we must be wholly conducted by revelation.

These are the pretences against the use of reason in questions of Religion;16. concerning which the same account may be given, as is by the Pyrrhonians and Scepticks concerning their arguments against the certainty of sciences. These reasons are like Physick, which if it uncertainly purges out the Humor, it most certainly purges out it self: and these arguments either cannot prevail against the use of reason in Religion, or if they doe, they prevail against themselves: For either it is against Religion to rely upon reason in Religion, or it is not: If it be not, then reason may without danger to Religion be safely relied upon in all such enquiries. But if it be against Religion to rely upon reason, then certainly these reasons intended to prove it so, are not to be relied upon; or else this is no question of Religion. For if this be a question of Religion, why are so many reasons us'd in it? If it be no question of Religion, then we may for all these reasons to the contrary, still use our reason in Religion without prejudice to it. And if these reasons conclude right, then we may for these reasons sake trust the proposition which says, that in Religion reason is to be us'd; but if these reasons doe not conclude right, then there is no danger, but that reason may still be us'd, these arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.

But there is more in it then so.17. This foregoing discourse, or to the like purpose, is used by two sorts of persons; The one is by those, who in destitution of particular arguments, make their last recourse unto authority of men. For by how much more they press their own peremptory affirmative, by so much the less will they endure your reasons and arguments for the negative. But to these men I shall onely say, Let God be true, and every man a liar: and therefore if we trust men concerning God, we doe not trust God concerning men; that is, if we speak of God as men please, we doe not think of men as God hath taught us; viz. That they are weak, and that they are liars: and they who have by artifices, and little devices, acquir'd to themselves a reputation, take the less care for proving what they say, by how much the greater credulity that is, by which men have given themselves up to be possess'd by others. And if I would have my saying to prevail whether it be right or wrong, I shall the less endure that any man should use his own reason against me. And this is one of the great evils for which the Church of Rome hath given Christendome a great cause to complain of her, who not onely presses men to beleeve or to submit to what she says upon her own authority, without enduring them to examine whether she says true or no, but also requires as great an assent to what she cannot prove, as to what she can; requiring an adherence not less then the greatest, even to those things which she onely pretends to be able to prove by prudential motives. Indeed in these cases if they can obtain of men to bring their faith, they are safe; but to come accompanied with their reason too, that is dangerous.

The other sort of men,18. is of those who doe the same thing under another cover; for they not having obtain'd the advantages of Union or Government, cannot pretend to a privileged authority, but resolving to obtrude their fancies upon the world, and yet not being able to prove what they say, pretend the Spirit of God to be the author of all their theoremes. If they could prove him to be their author, the thing were at an end, and all the world were bound to lay their necks under that pleasant yoke; but because they cannot prove any thing, therefore it is that they pretend the Spirit for every thing: and if the noise of so sacred a Name will perswade you, you are within the snare; if it will not, you are within their hatred. But it is impossible that these men can prevail, because there are so many of them; It is as if there were twenty Mountebanks in the Piazza, and all saying they had the onely Antidote in the world for Poison; and that what was not theirs, was not at all, and yet all pretend severally. For all men cannot have the Spirit, unless all men speak the same thing: It were possible that even in Union they might be deceivers; but in Division they cannot be right; and therefore since all these men pretend the Spirit, and yet all speak severall things and contradictory, they doe well to desire of us not to use our reason, for if we doe, they can never hope to prevail; if we doe not, they may perswade, as they meet with fools, that were not possess'd before.

Between these two there is a third that pretends to no authority on one hand,19. nor Enthusiasm on the other; but offers to prove what he says, but desires not his arguments to be examined by reason, upon pretence that he urges Scripture; that is in effect, he must interpret it; but your reason shall not be judge whether he says right or wrong: for if you judge his interpretation, he says you judge of his argument, and make reason Umpire in questions of faith: and thus his sect is continued, and the systemes of Divinity rely upon a certain number of propositions from generation to generation, and the Scholar shall be no wiser then his Master for ever; because he is taught to examine the doctrines of his Master by his Masters arguments, and by no other. In effect, they all agree in this, they would rule all the world by Religion, and they would have no body wiser then themselves, but be fools and slaves, till their turn come to use others as bad as they have been used themselves: and therefore as the wolves offered peace to the sheep upon condition they would put away their dogs; so doe these men allow us to be Christians and Disciples, if we will lay aside our reason, which is that guard of our souls, whereby alone we can be defended against their tyrannies and pretensions.

That I may therefore speak close to the enquiry,20. I premise these considerations:

1. It is a weak and a trifling principle, which supposes faith and reason to be opposite: For faith is but one way, by which our reason is instructed, and acquires the proper notices of things. For our reason or understanding apprehends things three several ways: The first is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or the first notices of things abstract, of principles and the primò intelligibilia; such as are, The whole is greater then the half of the whole; Good is to be chosen; God is to be loved: Nothing can be and not be at the same time; for these are objects of the simple understanding, congenite notices, concreated with the understanding. The second is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or discourse, that is, such consequents and emanations which the understanding draws from her first principles. And the third is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is, such things which the understanding assents to upon the report, testimony, and affirmation of others, viz. by arguments extrinsecal to the nature of the thing, and by collateral and indirect principles. For example, I naturally know that an idol or a false God is nothing; this is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or the act of abstract and immaterial reason. From hence I inferre, that an idol is not to be worshipped: This my reason knows by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or illation and inference, from the first principle. But therefore that all monuments of idolatry are to be destroyed was known to the Jews by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , for it was not primely known, nor by the direct force of any thing that was primely known; but I know it from God by the testimony of Moses, into the notice of which I am brought by collateral arguments, by tradition, by miracle, by voices from heaven, and the like.

2. These three ways of knowing, are in all faculties sacred and prophane:21. for faith and reason doe not divide Theology and Philosophy, but in every Science reason hath notices all these ways. For in natural Philosophy there are prime principles, and there are conclusions drawn from thence, and propositions which we beleeve from the authority of Plato, or Socrates, or Aristotle; and so it is in Theology; for every thing in Scripture is not in the divided sense, a matter of faith: That the Sun is to rule the day, the Moon and the Stars to govern the night, I see and feel; That God is good, that he is one, are prime principles: that nothing but good is to be spoken of this good God, reason draws by a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or discourse and illation: but that this good God will chastise his sons and servants, and that afflictions sent upon us are the issues of his goodness, or that this one God, is also three in person, this is known by 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , or by beleef; for it is not a prime truth, nor yet naturally inferred from a prime truth, but told by God, and therefore is an object of faith; reason knows it by testimony, and by indirect and collateral probations.

3. Reason knows all things as they are to be known,22. and enters into its notices by instruments fitted to the nature of things. Our stock of principles is more limited then our stock of words; and as there are more things then words, so there are more ways of knowing, then by principles direct and natural. Now as God teaches us many things by natural principles, many by experience, many at first, many more in time; some by the rules of one faculty, some by the rules of another; so there are some things which descend upon us immediately from heaven, and they communicate with no principle, with no matter, with no conclusion here below. Now as in the other things we must come to notices of things, by deriving them from their proper fountains; so must we doe in these. He that should goe to revelation to prove that nine and nine makes eighteen, would be a fool; and he would be no less, that goes about to prove a Trinity of persons by natural reason. Every thing must be derived from its own fountain. But because these things which are derivatives from heaven, and communicate not at all with principles of Philosophy, or Geometry, yet have their proper fountains, and these fountains are too high for us to search into their bottome, we must plainly take all emanations from them, just as they descend. For in this case, all that is to be done, is to enquire from whence they come. If they come from natural principles, I search for them by direct arguments: If they come from higher, I search for them by indirect arguments; that is, I enquire onely for matter of fact, whether they come thence or no. But here my reason is set on work; first, I enquire into the testimony or ways of probation, if they be worth beleeving in what they say, my reason sucks it in. As if I be told that God said [there are three and one in heaven] I ask, who said it? is he credible, why? If I finde that all things satisfy my reason, I beleeve him saying that God said so; and then 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or faith enters. I beleeve the thing also, not because I can prove it directly, for I cannot, but I can prove it indirectly; testimony and authority is my argument, and that is sufficient. The Apostles entred into much of their faith by their senses, they saw many articles of their Creed; but as they which saw and beleeved were blessed, so they which see not, but are argued and disputed into their faith, and beleeve what they finde reasonable to beleeve, shall have the reward of their faith, while they wisely follow their reason.

4. Now in all this,23. here is no difference in my reason, save that as it does not prove a Geometrical proposition by moral Philosophy, so neither does it prove a revelation by a natural argument, but into one and the other it enters by principles proper to the inquisition; and faith and reason are not opposed at all. Faith and natural reason are several things, and Arithmetical and Moral reasons are as differing, but it is reason that carries me to objects of faith, and faith is my reason so disposed, so used, so instructed.

The result of these propositions is this one:

That into the greatest mysteriousness of our Religion,24. and the deepest articles of faith we enter by our reason: Not that we can prove every one of them by natural reason, for to say that, were as vain, as to say we ought to prove them by Arithmetick or Rules of Musick; but whosoever beleeves wisely and not by chance, enters into his faith by the hand of reason; that is, he hath causes and reasons why he beleeves. He indeed that hath reasons insufficient and incompetent, beleeves indeed not wisely, but for some reason or other he does it; but he that hath none, does not beleeve at all: For the understanding is a rational faculty, and therefore every act of the understanding is an act of the rational faculty, and that is an act of reason; as vision is of the visive faculty: And faith, which is an act or habit of the understanding consenting to certain propositions for the authority of the speaker, is also as much an act of reason, as to discourse in a proposition of Aristotle. For faith assenting to a proposition for a reason drawn à testimonio, is as very a discourse, as to assent to a proposition for a reason drawn from the nature of things. It is not less an act of reason, because it uses another topick. And all this is plain and certain, when we discourse of faith formally in its proper and natural capacity, that is, as it is a reception of propositions à testimonie.

Indeed if we consider faith as it is a habit infused by God,25. and by Gods holy Spirit, so there is something more in it then thus: For so, faith is a vital principle, a magazine of secret truths, which we could never have found out by natural reason, that is, by all that reason which is born with us, and by all that reason that grows with us, and by all secular experiences and conversations with the world; but of such things which God onely teaches, by ways supernatural and divine.

Now here is the close and secret of the Question,26. Whether or no faith in this sense, and materially taken, be contrary to our worldly or natural reason, or whether is any or all the propositions of faith to be exacted, interpreted, and understood according to this reason materially taken? that is, are not our reasons which we rightly follow in natural Philosophy, in Metaphysicks, in other Arts and Sciences, sometimes contrary to faith? and if they be, whether shall be followed? or can it in any sense be an article of faith, if it be contrary to right reason? I answer to this, by several propositions.

1. Right Reason (meaning our right reason,27. or humane reason) is not the affirmative or positive measure of things Divine, or of articles and mysteries of faith; and the reasons are plain: 1. Because many of them depend upon the free will of God, for which, till he gives us reasons, we are to be still and silent, admiring the secret, and adoring the wisdome, and expecting till the curtain be drawn, or till Elias come and tell us all things. But he that will inquire and pry into the reason of the Mystery, and because he cannot perceive it, will disbeleeve the thing, or undervalue it, and say it is not at all, because he does not understand the reason of it, and why it should be so, may as well say that his Prince does not raise an Army in time of peace, because he doe not know a reason why he should; or that God never did suffer a brave Prince to die ignobly, because it was a thousand pities he should. There is a ragione di stato, and a ragione di regno, and a ragione di cielo, after which none but fools will inquire, and none but the humble shall ever finde.

Who can tell why the Devil,28. who is a wise and intelligent creature, should so spitefully, and for no end but for mischief, tempt so many souls to ruine, when he knows it can doe him no good, no pleasure, but phantastick? or who can tell why he should be delighted in a pleasure that can be nothing but phantastick, when he knows things by intuition, not by phantasm, and hath no low conceit of things as we have? or why he should doe so many things against God, whom he knows he cannot hurt, and against souls, whose ruine cannot adde one moment of pleasure to him? and if it makes any change, it is infinitely to the worse: That these things are so, our Religion tels us; but our reason cannot reach it why it is so, or how: Whose reason can give an account why, or understand it to be reasonable, that God should permit evil for good ends, when he hates that evil, and can produce that good without that evil? and yet that he does so we are taught by our Religion: Whose reason can make it intelligible, that God who delights not in the death of a sinner, but he and his Christ, and all their Angels rejoyce infinitely in the salvation of a sinner, yet that he should not cause that every sinner should be saved, working in him a mighty and a prevailing grace, without which grace he shall not in the event of things be saved, and yet this grace is wholly his own production. —Omnipotens hominem cùm gratia salvat Ipsa suum consummat opus,Prosper c. • . de ingrat. cui tempus agendì Semper adest quae gesta velit, non moribus illi Fit mora, non causis anceps suspenditur ullis.

Why does not he work in us all to will and to doe, not onely that we can will, but that we shall will? for if the actual willing be any thing, it is his creation; we can create nothing, we cannot will unless he effect it in us, and why he does not doe that which so well pleases him, and for the want of the doing of which he is so displeased, and yet he alone is to doe it some way or other; humane reason cannot give a wise or a probable account.

Where is the wise Discourser, that can tell how it can be, that God foreknows certainly what I shall doe ten years hence, and yet it is free to me at that time, to will or not to will, to doe or not to doe that thing? Where is the discerning Searcher of secrets, that can give the reason why God should determine for so many ages before, that Judas should betray Christ, and yet that God should kill him eternally for effecting the Divine purpose, and fore-determined counsel? Well may we wonder that God should wash a soul with water, and with bread and wine nourish us up to immortality, and make real impresses upon our spirits by the bloud of the vine, and the kidneys of wheat; but who can tell why he should choose such mean instruments to effect such glorious promises? since even the greatest things of this world had not been disproportionable instruments to such effects, nor yet too great for our understanding; and that we are fain to stoop to make these mean elements be even with our faith, and with our understanding. Who can divine, and give us the cause, or understand the reason, why God should give us so great rewards for such nothings, and yet damne men for such insignificant mischiefs, for thoughts, for words, for secret wishes, that effect no evil abroad, but onely might have done, or it may be were resolved to be unactive? For if the goodness of God be so overflowing in some cases, we in our reason should not expect, that in such a great goodness, there should be so great an aptness to destroy men greatly for little things: and if all mankinde should joyn in search, it could never be told, why God should adjudge the Heathen or the Israelites to an eternal hell, of which he never gave them warning, nor created fears great enough, to produce caution equal to their danger; and who can give a reason why for temporal and transient actions of sin, the world is to expect never ceasing torments in hell to eternal ages? That these things are thus, we are taught in Scripture, but here our reason is not instructed to tell why or how; and therefore our reason is not the positive measure of mysteries, and we must beleeve what we can not understand.

Thus are they to be blamed, who make intricacies and circles in mysterious articles,29. because they cannot wade thorough them; it is not to be understood why God should send his holy Son from his bosome to redeem us, to pay our price; nor to be told why God should exact a price of himself for his own creature; nor to be made intelligible to us, why he who loved us so well, as to send his Son to save us, should at the same time so hate us, as to resolve to damne us, unless his Son should come and save us. But the Socinians who conclude that this was not thus, because they know not how it can be thus, are highly to be reproved for their excess in the inquiries of reason, not where she is not a competent Judge, but where she is not competently instructed; and that is the second reason.

2. The reason of man is a right Judge always when she is truly informed;30. but in many things she knows nothing but the face of the article: the mysteries of faith are oftentimes like Cherubims heads placed over the Propitiatory, where you may see a clear and a bright face and golden wings, but there is no body to be handled; there is light and splendor upon the brow, but you may not grasp it; and though you see the revelation clear, and the article plain, yet the reason of it we cannot see at all; that is, the whole knowledge which we can have here is dark and obscure; We see as in a glass darkly, saith S. Paul, that is, we can see what, but not why, and what we doe see is the least part of that which does not appear; but in these cases our understanding is to submit, and wholly to be obedient, but not to inquire further. Delicata est illa obedientia quae causas quaerit. If the understanding will not consent to a revelation, until it see a reason of the proposition, it does not obey at all, for it will not submit, till it cannot choose. In these cases, Reason and Religion are like Leah and Rachel: Reason is fruitful indeed, and brings forth the first-born, but she is blear-ey'd, and oftentimes knows not the secrets of her Lord; but Rachel produces two children, Faith and Piety, and Obedience is Midwife to them both, and Modesty is the Nurse.

From hence it follows,31. that we cannot safely conclude thus, This is agreeable to right reason, therefore this is so in Scripture, or in the counsel of God; not that one reason can be against another, when all things are equal, but that the state of things, and of discourses is imperfect; and though it be right reason in such a constitution of affairs, yet it is not so in others; that a man may repel force by force, is right reason, and a natural right, but yet it follows not, that it can be lawful for a private Christian to doe it, or that Christ hath not forbidden us to strike him that strikes us: The reason of the difference is this; In nature it is just that it be so, because we are permitted onely to natures provisions, and she hath made us equal, and the condition of all men indifferent; and therefore we have the same power over another, that he hath over us; besides, we will doe it naturally, and till a Law forbad it, it could not be amiss, and there was no reason in nature to restrain it, but much to warrant it. But since the Law of God hath forbidden it, he hath made other provisions for our indempnity, and where he permits us to be defenceless (as in cases of Martyrdome and the like) he hath promised a reward to make infinite amends: So that we may repel force by force, says Nature, we may not, says Christ, and yet they are not two contradictory propositions. For nature says we may, when otherwise we have no security, and no reward for suffering; but Christ hath given both the defence of Laws and Authority, and the reward of heaven, and therefore in this case it is reasonable. And thus we cannot conclude, This man is a wicked man because he is afflicted, or his cause is evil because it does not thrive; although it be right reason, that good men ought to be happy and prosperous; because although reason says right in it, yet no reason can wisely conclude, that therefore so it should be in this world, when faith and reason too tell us it may be better hereafter. The result is this, every thing that is above our understanding, is not therefore to be suspected or disbeleeved, neither is any thing to be admitted that is against Scripture, though it be agreeable to right reason, until all information is brought in, by which the sentence is to be made.

For as it happens in dreams and madness,32. where the argument is good, and the discourse reasonable oftentimes; but because it is inferred from weak phantasms, and trifling and imperfect notices of things, and obscure apprehensions, therefore it is not onely desultorious and light, but insignificant, and farre from ministring to knowledge: so it is in our reason as to matters of Religion, it argues well and wisely, but because it is from trifling, or false, or uncertain principles, and unsure information, it oftentimes is but a witty nothing: reason is an excellent limbeck, and will extract rare quintessences, but if you put in nothing but mushromes, or eggeshels, or the juice of coloquintida, or the filthy gingran, you must expect productions accordingly, useless or unpleasant, dangerous or damnable.

2. Although right reason is not the positive and affirmative measure of any article,33. yet it is the negative measure of every one. So that, whatsoever is contradictory to right reason, is at no hand to be admitted as a mystery of faith, and this is certain upon an infinite account.

1. Because nothing can be true and false at the same time,34. otherwise it would follow that there could be two truths contrary to each other: for if the affirmative be true, and the negative true too, then the affirmative is true and is not true, which were a perfect contradiction, and we were bound to beleeve a lie, and hate a truth; and yet at the same time, obey what we hate, and consent to what we disbeleeve: No man can serve two such Masters.

2. Out of truth nothing can follow but truth;35. whatsoever therefore is truth, this is therefore safe to be followed, because no error can be the product of it. It follows therefore, that by beleeving one truth, no man can be tied to disbeleeve another. Whatsoever therefore is contrary to right reason, or to a certain truth in any faculty, cannot be a truth, for one truth is not contrary to another: if therefore any proposition be said to be the doctrine of Scripture, and confessed to be against right reason, it is certainly not the doctrine of Scripture, because it cannot be true, and yet be against what is true.

3. All truths are emanations and derivatives from God,36. and therefore whatsoever is contrary to any truth, in any faculty whatsoever, is against the truth of God, and God cannot be contrary to himself; for as God is one, so truth is one; for truth is Gods eldest daughter, and so like himself, that God may as well be multiplied, as abstracted truth.

4. And for this reason God does not onely prove our Religion,37. and Jesus Christ prove his Mission by Miracles, by Holiness, by verification of Prophecies, and prediction of future Contingencies, and voices from heaven, and apparition of Angels, and Resurrection from the grave, and fulfilling all that was said of him by the Prophets, that our faith might enter into us by discourse, and dwell by love, and be nursed and supported by reason: but also God is pleased to verify his own proceedings, and his own propositions, by discourses meerly like ours, when we speak according to right reason. Thus God convinces the peevish people that spake evil of him,Isa. 1. 18. & 5. 3. Ezek. 18. 25. by arguing concerning the justice of his ways, and exposes his proceedings to be argued by the same measures and proportions by which he judges us, and we judge one another.

5. For indeed how can it be possibly otherwise?38. how can we confess God to be just if we understand it not? but how can we understand him so, but by the measures of justice? and how shall we know that, if there be two Justices, one that we know, and one that we know not, one contrary to another? if they be contrary, they are not justice; for justice can be no more opposed by justice, then truth to truth: if they be not contrary, then that which we understand to be just in us, is just in God, and that which is just once, is just for ever in the same case, and circumstances: and indeed how is it that we are in all things of excellency and vertue to be like God, and to be meek like Christ, to be humble as he is humble, and to be pure like God, to be just after his example, to be merciful as our heavenly Father is merciful? If there is but one Mercy, and one Justice, and one Meekness, then the measure of these, and the reason is eternally the same. If there be two, either they are not essential to God, or else not imitable by us: And then how can we glorify God, and speak honour of his Name, and exalt his justice, and magnify his truth, and sincerity, and simplicity, if truth, and simplicity, and justice, and mercy in him is not that thing which we understand, and which we are to imitate? To give an example. I have promised to give my friend a 100. pounds on the Calends of March: The day comes, and he expects the donative; but I send him answer, that I did promise so by an open promise and signification, and I had an inclination to doe so; but I have also a secret will to keep my money, and instead of that to give him a 100. blows upon his back: if he reproaches me for an unjust and a false person; I have nothing to answer, for I beleeve he would hardly take it for good paiment to be answered with a distinction, and told; I have two wils, an open, and a secret will, and they are contrary to each other: he would tell me that I were a false person for having two wills, and those two wills were indeed but one, nothing but a will to deceive and abuse him. Now this is reason, right reason, the reason of all the world, the measure of all mankinde, the measure that God hath given us to understand, and to walk, to live, and to practise by. And we cannot understand what is meant by hypocrisy, and dissembling, if to speak one thing and not to mean it, be not that hypocrisy. Now put case God should call us to give him the glory of his justice and sincerity, of the truth of his promises, and the equity of his ways, and should tell us. That we perish by our own fault, and if we will die, it is because we will, not because we must; because we choose it, not because he forces us; for he calls us, and offers us life and salvation, and gives us powers, and time and advantages, and desires it really, and endevours it passionately, and effects it materially, so farre as it concerns his portion: This is a certain evidence of his truth and justice; But if we can reply and say, It is true, O God, that thou dost call us, but dost never intend we should come, that thy open will is loving and plausible, but thy secret will is cruell, decretory and destructive to us whom thou hast reprobated; that thy open will is ineffective, but thy secret will onely is operative, and productive of a material event, and therefore although we are taught to say, Thou art just, and true in all thy sayings, yet certainly it is not that justice which thou hast commanded us to imitate and practise, it is not that sincerity which we can safely use to one another, and therefore either we men are not just when we think we are, or else thou art not just who doest and speakest contrary things, or else there are two contrary things which may be called justice.

For let it be considered as to the present instance;39. God cannot have two wills, it is against the unity of God, and the simplicity of God. If there were two Divine wills, there were two Gods; and if it be one will, then it cannot at the same time will contrary things; and if it does not, then when God says one thing, and yet he wills it not, it is because he onely wills to say it, and not to doe it; and if to say this thing of the good, the just, the true, the righteous Judge of all the world be not blasphemy, I know not what is.

The purpose of this instance is to exemplify,40. that in all vertues and excellencies there is a perfect unity: and because all is originally and essentially in God, and from him derived to us, and all our good, our mercy, our truth, our justice is but an imitation of his, it follows demonstratively, that what is unjust in men, and what is falshood in our entercourses, is therefore false or unjust, because it is contrary to the eternal pattern: and therefore whatsoever our reason does rightly call unjust, or hypocrisy, or falshood must needs be infinitely farre from God; and those propositions which asperse God with any thing of this nature, are so farre from being the word of God, or an article of faith, or a mystery of religion, that it is blasphemous and false, hateful to God and good men.

In these things there is the greater certainty,41. because there is the less variety and no mystery; these things which in God we adore as Attributes, being the lines of our Duty, the limits and scores we are to walk by; therefore as our reason is here best instructed, so it cannot easily be deceived, and we can better tell what is right reason in these things, then in questions not so immediately relative to duty and morality.

But yet this Rule also holds in every thing where reason is,42. or can be right; but with some little difference of expression, but generally thus:

1. Whatsoever right reason says cannot be done,43. we cannot pretend from Scripture, that it belongs to Gods Almightiness to doe it; it is no part of the Divine Omnipotency, to doe things contradictory; for that is not to be done which is not, and it is no part of power to doe that which is not an act or effect of power. Now in every contradictory, one part is a non-entity, a nothing, and therefore by power cannot be produced; and to suppose it producible or possible to be effected by an Almighty power, is to suppose an Almighty power to be no power, or to doe that which is not the effect of power.

But I need say no more of this,44. for all men grant it, and all sects and varieties of Christians indevour to clear their articles from inferring contradictions, as implicitely confessing, that it cannot be true to which any thing that is true is contradictory. Onely some men are forced by their interest and opinions to say, that although to humane reason some of their articles seem to have in them contradictions, yet it is the defect of their reason, and their faith is the more excellent, by how much reason is more at a loss. So doe the Lutherans about the Ubiquity of Christs body, and the Papists about Transubstantiation, and the Calvinists about absolute Reprobation, as being resolved upon the propositions, though heaven and earth confute them. For if men can be safe from argument with such a little artifice as this, then no error can be confuted, then there is nothing so absurd but may be maintained, and a mans reason is useless in inquiry and in probation; and (which is to me very considerable) no man can in any article be a heretick or sin against his conscience. For to speak against the words of Scripture, is not directly against our conscience, there are many ways to escape, by interpretation or authority; but to profess an article against our reason, is immediately against our conscience; for reason and conscience dwell under the same roof, and eat the same portions of meat, and drink the same chalice: The authority of Scripture is superinduced, but right reason is the eternal word of God; The kingdome of God that is within us; and the best portions of Scripture, even the Law of Jesus Christ, which in moral things is the eternal law of Nature, is written in our hearts, is reason, and that wisdome to which we cannot choose but assent, and therefore in whatsoever he goes against his reason, he must needs goe against his conscience, because he goes against that, by which he supposes God did intend to govern him, reason not having been placed in us as a snare and a temptation, but as a light and a starre to lead us by day and night. It is no wonder that men maintain absurd propositions, who will not hear great reason against them, but are willing to take excuses and pretences for the justification of them.

2. This is not to be understood,45. as if God could doe nothing but what we can with our reason comprehend or know how. For God can doe every thing, but we cannot understand every thing: and therefore infinite things there are, or may be, which our reason cannot master; they are above our understanding, but are to be entertained by faith. It is not to be said or beleeved that God can doe what right reason says cannot be: but it must be said and beleeved that God can doe those things to which our understanding cannot by all its powers ministred here below, attain. For since God is omnipotent, unless we were omniscient, we could not understand all that he can doe; but although we know but little, yet we know some propositions which are truths taught us by God, and they are the measures whereby we are to speak and beleeve concerning the works of God.

For it is to be considered,46. whatsoever is above our understanding, is not against it: supra and secundùm may consist together in several degrees: Thus we understand the Divine power of working miracles, and we beleeve and know God hath done many: and although we know not how our dead bones shall live again, yet our reason tels us, that it is within the power of God to effect it; and therefore our faith need not be troubled to beleeve it. But if a thing be against our understanding, it is against the work of God, and against a truth of God, and therefore is no part, and it can be no effect of the Divine power: Many things in nature are above our understanding, and no wonder if many things in grace are so too; The peace of God passeth all understanding, yet we feel something of it, and hope for more, and long for all, and beleeve what we yet cannot perceive. But I consider further:

There are some things in reason which are certainly true,47. and some things which reason does infallibly condemne: our blessed Saviours argument was certain, A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye perceive me to have; therefore I am no spirit: and S. Johns argument was certain, That which we have seen with our eyes, and heard with our ears, and which our hands have handled of the word of life, that we preach, that is, we are to beleeve what we see and hear and feel; and as this is true in the whole Religion, so it is true in every article of it. If right sense and right reason tell us clearly, that is, tell us so that there is no absurdness, or contradiction, or unreasonableness in it, we are to beleeve it, as we are to beleeve God; and if an Angel from heaven should tell us any thing against these propositions, I doe not doubt but we would reject him. Now if we inquire what things are certainly true or false; I must answer that in the first place I reckon, prime principles and contradictions. In the next place, those things which are manifestly absurd: but if it be asked further, which things are manifestly absurd, and what it is to be manifestly absurd? there can no more answer be given to this, then to him who asks, how shall I know whether I am in light or in darkness? If therefore it be possible for men to dote in such things as these, their reason is useless in its greatest force and highest powers: It must therefore be certain, that if the parts of a contradiction, or a right reason be put in bar against a proposition, it must not pretend to be an article of faith; and to pretend Gods omnipotency against it, is to pretend his power against his truth. God can deliver us from our enemies, when to humane reason it seems impossible, that is, when we are destitute of all natural help, and proper causes and probabilities of escape, by what we see or feel; that is, when it is impossible to men, it may be possible with God; but then the faith which beleeves that God can doe it, is also very right reason: and if we hope he will doe it, there is more then faith in it, but there is nothing in it beyond reason, except love also be there.

The result is this:48. 1. Our reason is below many of the works, and below all the power of God, and therefore cannot perceive all that God hath, or can, or will doe, no more then an Owl can stare upon the body of the Sun, or tel us what strange things are in that immense globe of fire. But when any thing that is possible is revealed, reason can consent; but if reason cannot consent to it when it is told of it, then it is nothing, it hath no being, it hath no possibility; whatsoever is in our understanding is in being: for that which is not, is not intelligible, and to what reason cannot consent, in that no being can be supposed.

2. Not onely what is impossible to reason is possible in faith,49. but if any thing be really absurd or unreasonable, that is, against some truth, in which humane reason is really instructed, that is a sufficient presumption against a proposition, that it cannot be an article of faith. For even this very thing (I mean) an avoiding of an absurdity, or an inconvenience, is the onely measure and rule of interpreting very many places of Scripture. For why does not every Christian pull out his right eye, or cut off his hand, and leg, that he might enter into heaven halt and blinde? why doe not we beleeve that Christ is a door, and a vine, and a stone, since these things are dogmatically affirmed in Scripture? but that we expound Scriptures as we confute them who deny principles, by declaring that such senses, or opinions introduce evil and foolish consequents, against some other truth in some faculty or other in which humane reason is rightly taught. Now the measure and the limit of this, is that very thing which is the reason of this, and all the preceding discourse, One truth cannot be against another; if therefore your opinion or interpretation be against a truth, it is false, and no part of faith. A commandement cannot be against a revelation, a privilege cannot be against a promise, a threatning cannot mean against an article, a right cannot be against a duty; for all reason, and all right, and all truth, and all faith, and all commandements are from God, and therefore partake of his unity and his simplicity.

3. This is to be enlarged with this advice,50. that in all questions of the sense of Scripture, the ordinary way is to be presumed before the extraordinary, and if the plain way be possible, and reasonable, and useful, and the extraordinary of no other use, but to make wonder and strangeness to the beleef of the understanding, we are to presume for that, and to let this alone, because that hath the advantage of reason, it being more reasonable that God will keep the methods of his own creation, and bring us to him by ways with which we are acquainted, and by which we can better understand our way to him, then that he will doe a miracle to no purpose, and without necessity; God never doing any thing for the ostentation, but very many things for the manifestation of his power, for his wisdome and his power declare each other, and in every thing where he shews his mightiness, he also shews his wisdome, that is, he never does any thing without great reason. And therefore the Romans doctrine of the holy Sacrament suffers an intolerable prejudice, because it supposes daily heaps and conjugations of miracles, wholly to no purpose; since the real body can be taken by them to whom it does not good; and all the good can be conveyed to us, though the body be onely taken in a spiritual sense; all the good being conveyed by moral instruments, and to spiritual effect; and therefore the ordinary way, and the sense which the Church of England gives, is infinitely to be preferred, because it supposes no violences and effects of miracles, no cramps and convulsions to reason: and a man may receive the holy Sacrament, and discourse of all its effects, and mysteriousnesses, though he doe not talk like a mad man, or a man going out of his wits, and a stranger to all the Reason and Philosophy of the world; and therefore it is remarkable, that there is in our faith no article, but what is possible to be effected by the ordinary power of God; That a Virgin should conceive is so possible to Gods power, that is possible in nature say the Arabians; but however, he that made the Virgin out of nothing, can make her produce something out of something: and for the resurrection of the dead, it is certainly less then the Creation, and it is like that which we see every year, in the resurrection of plants and dead corn, and is in many degrees imitable by Art, which can out of ashes raise a flower. And for all the other articles of our Creed, they are so far from being miraculous and strange to reason, that the greatest wonder is, that our beleef is so simple and facile, and that we shall receive so great and prodigious events hereafter, by instruments so fitted to the weakest capacities of men here below. Indeed some men have so scorn'd the simplicity of the Gospel, that because they thought it honourable to have every thing strange and unintelligible, they have put in devices and dreams of miracles of their own, and have so explicated them, that as without many miracles they could not be verified, so without one, they can hardly be understood. That which is easy to reason, and most intelligible, is more like the plainness, and truth, and innocence, and wisdome of the Gospel, then that which is bones to Philosophy, and iron to the teeth of babes.

But this is to be practised with caution;51. for every mans reason is not right, and every mans reason is not to be trusted: and therefore,

4. As absurd foolish things are not to be obtruded, under the pretence of being mysteries, so neither must mistaken Philosophy, and false notices of things be pretended for reason. There are mistakes on all hands, some Christians explicate their mysteries, and mince them into so many minutes, and niceties, and speak of them more then they are taught, more then is said in the Scriptures, or the first Creeds, that the article which in its own simplicity was indeed mysterious, and not to be comprehended by our dark and less instructed reason, but yet was not impossible to be beleeved, is made impossible to be understood by the appendages, and exposed to scorn and violences by hereticks and misbeleevers; so is the Incarnation of the Son of God, the mysterious Trinity, the presence of Christ in the holy Sacrament. For so long as the mysteries are signified in simple, wise, and general terms, reason can espy no particular impossibilities in them: but when men will explicate what they cannot understand, and intricate what they pretend to explicate, and superinduce new clauses to the article, and by entring within the cloud, doe less see the light, they finde reason amazed, where she could easily have submitted, and clouds brought upon the main article, and many times the body it self is supposed to be a phantasm, because of its tinsel and fairy dressing: and on the other side, he that would examine an article of faith, by a proposition in Philosophy, must be careful that his Philosophy be as right as he pretends. For as it will be hard to expect, that right reason should submit to a false article, upon pretence it is revealed, so it will be as hard to distrust an article, because it is against a false proposition, which I was taught in those Schools of learning who speak things by custome, or by chance, or because they are taught, and because they are not suffered to be examined. Whoever offers at a reproof of reason, must be sure that he is right in the article, and that must be upon the strength of stronger reason; and he that offers by reason to reprove a pretended article, must be sure his reason must be greater then the reverence of that pretension.

And therefore holy Scriptures command us in those cases to such purposes,52. as not onely teach us what to doe in it, but also confirm the main inquiry; for therefore we are commanded to try all things: Suppose that be meant that we try them by Scriptures; how can we so try them, but by comparing line with line, by considering the consequents of every pretence, the analogy of faith, the measures of justice, the laws of nature, essential right, and prime principles? and all this is nothing but by making our faith the limit of our reason, in matters of duty to God; and reason the minister of faith, and things that concern our duty. The same is intended by those other words of another Apostle, Beloved, beleeve not every spirit, but try if the spirits be of God; how can this be tried? by Scripture? yea; but how if the Question be of the sense of Scripture, as it is generally at this day? Then it must be tried by something extrinsecal to the Question, and whasoever you can call to judgement, reason must still be your Sollicitor and your Advocate and your Judge; onely reason is not always the Law, sometimes it is, for so our blessed Saviour was pleased to say, Why of your selves doe you not judge that which is reasonable? for so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 there is used,Luke 12. 57. that which is fitting and consonant to reason; and in proportion to this it was, that so much of the Religion of Jesus was clothed with Parables, as if the theoremes and propositions themselves were clothed with flesh and bloud, and conversed after the manner of men, to whom reason is the Law, and the Rule, the Guide and the Judge, the measure of good and evil for this life, and for that which is to come. The consequent is this:

He that says thus, This doctrine is against the word of God, and therefore it is absurd and against reason, may as it fals out say true; but his proposition will be of no use, because reason is before revelation, and that this is revealed by God, must be proved by reason. But,

He that says,54. This is absurd, or this is against reason, therefore this is against the word of God, if he says true in the antecedent, says true in the consequent, and the argument is useful in the whole, it being the best way to interpret difficult Scriptures, and to establish right senses, and to confute confident heresies. For when both sides agree that these are the words of God, and the question of faith is concerning the meaning of the words, nothing is an article of faith, or a part of the religion, but what can be proved by reasons to be the sense and intentions of God. Reason is never to be pretended against the clear sense of Scripture, because by reason it is that we came to perceive that to be the clear sense of Scripture. And against Reason, reason cannot be pretended; but against the words of Scripture produced in a question, there may be great cause to bring reason; for nothing seems plainer then those words of S. James, Above all things my brethren, swear not at all; and yet reason interposes and tels us, that plain words must not be understood against plain reason and plain necessity: For if oaths before Magistrates were not permitted and allowed, it were necessary to examine all men by torture; and yet neither so could they so well be secured of truth as they can by swearing. What is more plain then the words of S. Paul? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , mortify or kill your members, that are upon the earth; and yet reason tels us, that we must not hurt or destroy one limb, and where ever the effect would be intolerable, there the sense is still unreasonable; and therefore not a part of faith, so long as it is an enemy to reason, which is the elder sister, and the guide and guardian of the yonger.

For as when the Tables of the Law were broken by Moses, 55. God would make no new ones, but bade Moses provide some stones of his own, and he would write them over: so it is in our Religion, when God with the finger of his Spirit, writes the Religion and the Laws of Jesus Christ, he writes them in the tables of our reason, that is, in the tables of our hearts. Homo cordatus, a wise, rational man, sober, and humble, and discursive hath the best faith, but the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 (as S. Paul cals them) the unreasonable, they are such who have no faith, Rom. 12. 1. 2 Thess. 3. 2. For the Christian Religion is called by S. Paul 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , a reasonable worship; 1 Pet. 2. 2. and the word of God is called by S. Peter 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , the reasonable and uncrafty milk; it is full of reason, but it hath no tricks, it is rational, but not crafty, it is wise and holy: And he that pretends there are some things in our Religion, which right reason cannot digest and admit, makes it impossible to reduce Atheists, or to convert Jews and Heathens But if reason invites them in, reason can entertain them all the day.

And now to the arguments brought against the use of reason; thē answers may easily be gathered from the premises:

To the first I answer,56. That reason is the eye of the soul in all things, natural, moral and religious; and faith is the light of that eye, in things pertaining to God; for it is true, that naturall reason cannot teach us the things of God, that is, reason instructed onely by this world, which S. Paul cals the natural man, cannot discern the things of the Spirit, for they are spiritually discerned: that is, that they are taught and perceived by the aids of Gods Spirit, by revelation and divine assistances and grace: but though natural reason cannot, yet it is false to say that reason cannot; for reason illuminated can perceive the things of God; that is, when reason is taught in that faculty, under that Master, and by those rules which are proper for spiritual things, then reason can doe all its intentions.

To the second I answer,57. that therefore humility and piety are the best dispositions, to the understanding the secrets of the Gospel:

1. Because these doe remove those prejudices and obstructions which are bars and fetters to reason; and the humble man does best understand, because the proud man will not inquire, or he will not labour, or he will not understand any proposition that makes it necessary for him to lay aside his imployment or his vanity, his interest or his vice.

2. These are indeed excellent dispositions to understanding, the best moral instruments, but not the best natural: If you are to dispute against a Heathen, a good reason will sooner convince him then an humble thought; If you be to convert a Jew, an argument from the old Prophets is better to him then three or four acts of a gracious comportment.

3. Sometimes by way of blessing and reward. God gives understanding to good persons, which to the evil he denies, but this which effects any thing by way of Divine blessing, is not to be supposed the best natural instrument. Thus the Divines say that the fire of hell shall torment souls, tanquam instrumentum Divinae voluntatis, as the instrument in the hand of a voluntary, and almighty agent, but not as a thing apportioned properly to such an event, for the worm of conscience is more apt to that purpose.

4. And when we compare man with man, so it is true that the pious man should be sooner instructed then the impious, caeteris paribus, but if we compare discourse and piety, reason & humility, they excel each other in their several kinds, as wooll is better then a diamond, and yet a diamond is to be preferred before a bag of wool; they operate to the same purpose of understanding in several manners: And whereas it is said in the argument, that the doctrine of the Cross was foolishness to the Greeks, it is true, but nothing to the present question. For therefore it was foolishness to them, because they had not been taught in the secrets of God, they were not instructed how God would by a way so contrary to flesh and bloud, cause the spirits of just men to be made perfect. And they who were wise by Plato's Philosophy, and onely well skill'd in Aristotle, could doe nothing in the Schools of Jesus, because they were not instructed in those truths by which such proceedings were to be measured; but still, reason is the great wheel, though according as the motion was intended, new weights must be proportioned accordingly.

The third objection presses upon the point of duty,58. and because the Scripture requires obedience of understanding, and submitting our most imperious faculties, therefore reason is to be excluded: To this I answer, that we must submit our understanding to God, is very true, but that is onely when God speaks. But because we heard him not, and are onely told that God did speak, our reason must examine whether it be fit to beleeve them that tell us so; for some men have spoken falsly, and we have great reason to beleeve God, when all the reason in the world commands us to suspect the offerings of some men: and although we ought for the greatest reasons submit to God, yet we must judge and discern the sayings of God, from the pretences of men; and how that can be done without using out reason in the inquiries of Religion is not yet discovered, but for the obedience of understanding, it consists in these particulars.

The particulars in which obedience of Understanding consists.

1. That we submit to God onely and not to man;59. that is, to God where ever it appears reasonable to be beleeved that he hath spoken, but never to man unless he hath authority from reason or religion to command our conformity.

2. That those things which by the abuse and pretence of reason are passed into a fictitious and usurped authority,60. make no part of our Religion; for because we are commanded to submit our understanding to God, therefore we must call no man Master upon earth; therefore it is certain that we must not beleeve the reports or opinions of men against a revelation of God. He that communicates with holy bread onely, and gives not the chalice to all Gods people that require the holy Communion, does openly adhere to a fond custome and authority of abused men, and leaves the express, clearest, undeniable institution of God.

3. When reason and revelation seem to disagree,61. let us so order our selves that so long as we beleeve this to be a revelation, no pretence of reason may change our beleef from it: if right or sufficient reason can perswade us that this is not a revelation, well and good; but if reason leaves us in the actual perswasion that it is so, we must force our reason to comply with this, since no reason does force us to quit this wholly; and if we cannot quit our reason or satisfie it, let us carry our selves with modesty, and confess the revelation, though with profession of our ignorance and unskilfulness to reconcile the two litigants.

4. That whatsoever is clearly and plainly told us,62. we obey it, and rest in it, and not measure it by the rules of folly and weak Philosophy, or the sayings of men in which error may be ingredient; but when things are unequal, that is, when we can doubt concerning our reason, and cannot doubt concerning the revelation, we make no question but preferre this before that.

5. That in particular inquiries,63. we so order our selves as to make this the general measure, that we never doe violence to the word of God, or suspect that, but resolve rather to call our selves liars, then that Religion should receive detriment; and rather quit our arguments then hazard an article; that is, that when all things are equal, we rather preferre the pretence of revelation, then the pretences of reason, for the reverence of that and the suspicion of this. Beyond this we can doe no more.

To the fourth I answer,64. that it is true, reason is fallible, or rather to speak properly, ratiocination, or the using of reason is subject to abuse and deception; for reason it self is not fallible: but if reason, that is, reasonings be fallible, so are the pretences of revelation subject to abuse; and what are we now the nearer? Some reasons are but probable, and some are certain and confessed, and so it is in the sense of Scriptures, some are plain and need no interpreter, no discourse, no art, no reasonings to draw out their sense; but many are intricate and obscure, secret and mysterious; and to use a fallible reasoning to draw out an obscure and uncertain sense of Scripture, is sometimes the best way we have, and then we must make the best of it we can: but the use of reasoning is not onely to finde out truth the best we can, but sometimes we are as sure of it; as of light; but then and always our reason (such as it is) must lead us into such proportions of faith as they can: according as our reason or motives are, so ordinary is the degree our faith.

To the fifth I need give no other answer but this,65. that it confesses the main question: For if this be the greatest reason in the world, God hath said it, therefore it is true, it follows, that all our faith relies upon this one reason; but because this reason is of no use to us till the minor proposition be proved, and that it appear that God hath said it, and that in the inquiry after that, we are to use all our reason; the consequent is, that in the first and last, reason lends legs of faith, and nothing can be wisely beleeved, but what can by some rational inducement be proved. As for the last proposition in the objection, This is against Scripture, therefore it is absurd and unreasonable, I have already made it appear to be an imprudent and useless affirmative.

The sixth Objection complains of them that by weak reasonings lose their Religion,66. but this is nothing against right reasoning: For because Mountebanks and old women kill men by vile Physick, therefore is it true, that the wise discourses of Physicians cannot minister to health? half-witted people talk against God, and make objections against Religion, and themselves have not wit or will enough to answer them and they intending to make reason to be the positive and affirmative measure of Religion, are wholly mistaken, and abuse themselves and others. 2. We are not to exact every thing in Religion according to our weak reasonings; but whatsoever is certain in reason, Religion cannot contradict that; but what is uncertain, or imperfect, Religion oftentimes does instruct and amend it. But there are many mysteries of Religion contrary to reason, corrupted with evil manners, and many are contrary to reason, corrupted with false propositions; now these men make objections, which upon their own principles they can never answer: but that which seems impossible to vicious persons is reason to good men, and that which children and fools cannot answer, amongst wise men hath no difficulty; and the ignorant, and the unstable, wrest some Scriptures to their own damnation: but concerning the new Atheists that pretend to wit, it is not their reason, but their want of reason that makes them such, for if either they had more learning, or did beleeve themselves to have less, they could never be Atheists.

To the last I answer,67. that it is reason we should hear reason whereever we finde it, if there be no greater evil brought by the teacher then he can bring good; But if an heretick preaches good things, it is not always lawful to hear them, unless when we are out of danger of his abuses also. And thus truth from the devil may be heard, if we were out of his danger; but because he tels truth to evil purposes, and makes wise sayings to become craft, it is not safe to hear him. 2. But besides this, although it is lawful to beleeve a truth which the devil tels us, yet it is not lawful to goe to School to the devil, or to make inquiries of him, because he that does so, makes him his Master, and gives something of Gods portion to Gods enemy. As for Judicial Astrology and Genethliacal predictions, for my part I therefore reprove them, not because their reason is against Religion, for certainly it cannot be; but because I think they have not reason enough in what they say; they goe upon weak principles which they cannot prove; they reduce them to practice by impossible mediums: they draw conclusions with artless and unskilful heads, they argue about things with which they have little conversation, they cannot makes scientifical progress in their profession, but out of greediness to doe something; they usually, at least are justly suspected to take in auxiliaries from the spirits of Darkness; they have always spoken uncertainty, and most part falsly; and have always lived scandalously in their profession: they have by all Religions been cried down, trusted by none but fools, and superstitious people; and therefore although the art may be very lawful, if the starres were upon the earth, or the men were in heaven, if they had skill in what they profess, and reason in all their pretences, and after all that their principles were certain, and that the starres did really signify future events, and that those events were not overruled by every thing in heaven and in earth, by God, and by our own will and wisdome, yet because here is so little reason, and less certainty, and nothing but confidence and illusion, therefore it is that Religion permits them not; and it is not the reason in this art, that is against Religion, but the folly or the knavery of it, and the dangerous and horrid consequents, which they feel that run a whoring after such Idols of imagination.

BEcause this Rule is of good use,1. not onely for making judgement concerning the states of some men, but also in order to many practices, it will not be lost labour to consider, that there are three degrees of practical judgement.

The first is called an inclination,2. or the first natural consonancy between the faculty or disposition of man, and some certain actions. All men are naturally pitiful in some degree, unless their nature be lame and imperfect: As we say all men naturally can see, and it is true, if they have good eyes: so all men naturally are pitiful, unless they have no bowels: But some more, some less. And therefore there is in their natures a conveniency, or agreeing between their dispositions and acts of charity. In the first or lowest sort there is an aptness to it. 2. In the sweeter and better natures there is a virtual charity. 3. But in those that consider and choose, and observe the Commandement, or the proportions of right reason, there is in these onely a formal, deliberative, compound or practical judgement.

Now concerning the first sort,3. that is, the natural disposition or first propensity, it is but a remote disposition towards a right conscience and a practical judgement; because it may be rescinded, or diverted by a thousand accidents, and is nothing else but a relique of the shipwrack which Adam and all the world have made, and may pass into nothing as suddenly as it came. He that sees two Cocks fight, though he have no interest in either, will assist one of them at least by an ineffective pity and desire: but this passes no further then to natural effects, or the changes or affections of a load-stone; it may produce something in nature, but nothing in manners.

Concerning the second,4. that is, a virtual judgement, that is, a natural inclination passing forth into habit or custome, and delight in the actions of some vertues; it is certain that it is one part of the grace of God, and a more promoted and immediate disposition to the vertue of its kinde then the former. Some men are naturally very merciful, and some are abstemious, and some are continent: and these in the course of their life take in every argument and accidental motive, and the disposition swells, and the nature is confirm'd. But still it is but nature. The man, it may be, is chast, because he hates the immodesty of those addresses which prepare to uncleanness; or he loves his quiet, or fears the accidents of his Enemy-crime; or there was a terror infus'd into him by the sight of a sad spectacle, the evil reward of an adulterous person. —quosdam moechos dum Mugilis intrat. Concerning this kinde of virtual judgement or confirm'd nature, I have two things to say:

1. That this virtual judgement can produce love or hatred to certain objects,5. ineffective complacencies or disrelishes respectively, proper antipathies and aversations from a whole kinde of objects; such as was that hatred that Tamerlan had to Zercon, or some men to Cats. And thus much we cannot deny to be produc'd by the operation and simple apprehension of our senses by pictures and all impressions of fancy:Vide Aristot. de anima lib. 2. text. 154. Cum opinamur difficile aliquid aut terribile statim compatimur. Secundùm imaginem autem similiter nos habemus. We finde effects and impresses according to the very images of things we see, and by their prime apprehensions; and therefore much rather may these actus imperati, or more natural and proper effects and affections of will be entertain'd or produc'd respectively. Men at first sight fall in love with women, and that against their reason and resolution, and counsel, and interest, and they cannot help it; and so they may doe with some actions of virtue. And as in the first case they are rather miserable then vicious; so in this they are rather fortunate then vertuous: and they may be commended as we praise a fair face, or a strong arm, an athletick health, or a good constitution; and it is indeed a very good disposition and a facilitation of a vertuous choice. But,

2. This virtual judgement, 6. which is nothing but nature confirm'd by accidents, is not a state of good by which a man is acceptable to God. Neither is it a sufficient principle of a good life, nor indeed of the actions of its own kinde. 1. Not of good life, because it may be in a single instance; and it can never be in all. The man that is good natur'd, that is, naturally meek, and loving, goes the furthest upon this account; but without the conjunction of other vertues it is a great way off from that good state whither naturally it can but tend and incline: and we see some good things are made to serve some evil; and by temperance, and a moderate diet, some preserve their health, that they may not preserve their chastity: and they may be habitually proud, because they are naturally chast: and then this chastity is no virtue, but a disposition and an aptness onely. In this sense that of S. James may be affirmed, He that offends in one, is guilty of all; that is, if his inclinations, and his accidentally acquird habits be such as to admit a mixture, they are not genuine and gracious: such are these that are the effects of a nature fitted towards a particular virtue. It must be a higher principle that makes an intire piety; nature and the habits growing upon her stock, cannot doe it. Alexander was a continent Prince, and the captive beauties of Persia were secur'd by it in their Honours; but by rage he destroyed his friend, and by drunkenness he destroyed himself.

2. But neither is this virtual judgement a sufficient principle of the actions of its own kinde; for this natural strength is nothing but an uneasiness and unaptness to suffer by common temptations; but place the man where he can be tempted, and this good disposition secures him not, because there may be something in nature bigger then it.

It remains then,7. that to the constitution of a Right and Sure Conscience, there is requir'd a formal judgement, that is, a deliberation of the understanding, and a choice of the wi • l, that being instructed, and this inclined by the grace of God: tantóque laudabilior munificentia nostra fore videbatur, quòd ad illam non impetu quodam sed consilio trahebamur, Lib. 1. ep. 8. said Secundus: then it is right and good, then when it is not violent, necessary, or natural, but when it is chosen. This makes a Right and Sure Conscience, because the grace of God hath an universal influence into all the course of our actions. For he that said, Doe not kill, said also, Doe not steal: and if he obeys in one instance, for that reason must obey in all, or be condemn'd by himself, and then the Conscience is right in the principle and fountain, though defil'd in the issue and emanation. For he that is condemn'd by his own Conscience, hath the law written and the characters still fair, legible, and read; but then the fault is in something else; the will is corrupted. The summe is this:

It is not enough that the Conscience be taught by nature, 8. but it must be taught by God, conducted by reason, made operative by discourse, assisted by choice, instructed by laws and sober principles: and then it is Right, and it may be Sure.

HE that fasts to punish himself for his sins,1. and at the same time intends his health, though it will be very often impossible for him to tell himself which was the final and prevailing motive and ingredient into the perswasion, yet it is no detriment to his conscience; the religious motive alone did suffice to make it to be an act of a good conscience; and if the mix • ure of the other could change this, it could not be lawful to use, or in any degree to be perswaded by the promises of those temporal blessings which are reco • ded in both Testaments, and to which there is a natural desire, and proper inclination. But this also is with some difference.

2. If the secular ingredient be the stronger,2. it is in the same degree as it prevails over the vertuous or religious, a diminution of the worthiness of the action; but if it be a secular blessing under a promise, it does not alter the whole kinde of the action. The reason is this: Because whatever God hath promised, is therefore desirable and good, because he hath promised it, or he hath promised it because it is of it self good, and useful to us; and therefore whatever we may innocently desire, we may innocently intend: but if it be mingled with a religious and spiritual interest, it ought not to sit down in the highest place, because a more worthy is there present, lest we be found to be passionate for the things of this life, and indifferent for God and for Religion.

3. If the secular or temporal ingredient be not under a promise,3. and yet be the prime and chief motive, the whole case is altered: the conscience is not right, it is natural inclination, not conscience, it is sense or interest, not duty. * He that gives alms with a purpose to please his Prince, who is charitable and religious, although his purpose be innocent, yet because it is an end which God hath not encouraged by propounding it as a reward of charity the whole deliberation is turn'd to be a secular action, and passes without a reward. Our blessed Saviour hath by an instance of his own, determin'd this case. When thou makest a feast call not the rich, who can make thee recompence, but call the poor, and thou shalt have reward in heaven. To call the rich to a feast is no sin, but to call them is to lose the reward of charity, by changing the whole nature of the action from charity to civility, from Religion to prudence.

And this hath not other exception or variety in it,4. but when the mixture is of a thing that is so purely natural, that it is also necessary: Thus to eat upon a festival day to satisfy a long hunger, to be honestly imployed to get a living, doe not cease to be religious, though that which is temporal be the first and the greatest cause of the action or undertaking. But the reason of this difference (if any be apprehended) is because this natural end is also a duty, and tacitly under a promise.

Quest.

IT is usually requir'd,5. that all that enter into the holy Offices of the Ministery should so primely and principally design the glory of God, that all other considerations should scarce be ingredients into the resolution, and yet if it be inquired how far this is obligatory, and observe how little it is attended to in the first preparations to the Order, the very needs of most men will make the Question material.

But I answer to the Question,6. in proportion to the sense of the present Rule.

1. Where ever a religious act by Gods appointment may serve a temporal end and a spiritual, to attend either is lawful; but it is still more excellent, by how much preference and greater zeal, we more serve the more excellent. Therefore although it be better to undertake the sacred function wholly for ends spiritual, yet it is lawful to enter into it with an actual design to make that calling the means of our natural and necessary support. The reason is:

Because it is lawfull to intend what God hath offered and propounded.7. The end which God hath made, cannot be evil, and therefore it cannot be evil to choose that instrument to that end, which by Gods appointment is to minister to that end. Now since God hath ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel, it cannot be unlawful to design that in order to this.

2. If our temporal support and maintenance be the first and immediate design,8. it makes not the whole undertaking to be unlawful. For all callings, and all states, and all actions, are to be directed or done to the glory of God; according to that saying of S. Paul, Whether ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye doe, all to the glory of God: and that one calling should be more for Gods glory then another, is by reason of the matter and imployment; but in every one, for its portion still, Gods glory must be the principal, and yet no man questions but it is lawful for any man to bring his son up to the most gainful trade, if in other things there be no objection: and therefore why this may not be the first moving consideration in the susception of, or designation to the calling Ecclesiastical, cannot have any reason in the nature of the thing: For if in all things Gods glory must be the principal end, and yet in some Callings the temporal advantage is the first mover, then it may be so in all; the intention of Gods glory notwithstanding: for if it hinders not in that, it hinders not in this. But yet,

3.9. It is a great imperfection actually to think of nothing but the temporal advantages, of which God hath in that Calling made provisions; but I say, it is not always a sin to make them the first mover in the designing the person to that Calling.

But therefore this is onely tolerable in those persons,10. who at great distance design the Calling; as when they first study to make themselves capable of it, then it is tolerable, because they are bound to provide for themselves in all just ways, and standing at so great distances from it, cannot behold the beauties which are in interiori demo; the duty which is on them, is to doe that which is their proper work, that is, to fit themselves with abilities and skill to conduct it, and therefore their intention must be fitted accordingly, and move by the most powerful and prevailing motive, so it be lawful. He that applies himself to learn letters, hath an intention proportionable to his person and capacity when he first enters, and as he grows in powers, so must he also in purposes; so that as he passes on to perfection, he may also have intentions more noble and more perfect: and a man in any Calling may first design to serve that end that stands next him, and yet when he is possest of that, look on further to the intention of the thing, and its own utmost capacity. But therefore,

4. Whoever does actually enter into Orders,11. must take care that his principal end be the glory of God, and the good of souls. The reasons are these:

1. Because no man is fit for that Office,12. but he that is spiritual in his person, as well as his Office: he must be a despiser of the world, a light to others, an example to the flock, a great denier of himself, of a celestial minde, he must minde heavenly things; with which dispositions it cannot consist, that he who is called to the lot of God, should place his chief affections in secular advantages.

2. This is that of which the Apostle was a glorious precedent,13. We seek not yours, 2 Cor. 11. 14. but you; for the Parents lay up for the children, not children for their Parents: meaning, that between the spiritual and the natural paternity, there is so much proportion, that when it is for the good of the children, they must all quit their temporal advantages; but because this is to be done for the spiritual, it follows, this must be chief.

And this I suppose is also enjoyned by another Apostle,14. Feeding the flock of God, 1 P •• . 5. 2. not for filthy lucre sake, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is, but of a prompt, ready minde; a minde moved by intrinsick arguments of fair design, not drawn by the outward cords of vanity and gain.

3.15. The work of the Calling being principally and immediately for the good of souls, and for the glory of God, it cannot be pursued as the nature of the work requires, if that be not principally intended, which is principally to be procured; All that which is necessary in order to it must also be taken care of: Thus the Ministers of Religion may attend their health, and must look to their necessary support, and may defend themselves against all impediments of their offices in just and proportionable ways: but because all these have further purposes, although they standing nearest may be first regarded by an actual care, at some times, and in some circumstances, and by actual attention; yet habitually, and principally, and constantly, the glory of God, and the good of souls must be in the heart, and in the purpose of every action.

But the principality and preheminence of this intention is no otherwise to be judged of,16. either by our selves or others, then by these following significations.

1. No man can in any sense principally,17. that is, as he ought, intend the good of souls, who enters into the sacred Ministery without those just measures of preparation and disposition, which are required by the Church, and the nature of the thing it self; that is, that he be well instructed in the holy Scriptures, and be fit to teach, to exhort, to reprove. For he who undertakes a work which can serve Gods ends and his own in several capacities, and is not sufficiently instructed to serve the ends of God, it is apparent that what he undertakes is for his own end.

2. His intentions cannot be right, who by any indirect arts does enter, for that which does not begin at God, cannot be for God: Non enim ambitione, vel pretio, sed probatae vitae & disciplinarum testimonio, ad honoris & Sacerdotii insignia oportet promoveri, said the Emperour Theodosius. He therefore who symoniacally enters, fixes his eye and heart upon that which he values to be worth money, not upon the spiritual imployment, between which and money there can be no more proportion, then between contemplation and a cartrope; they are not things of the same nature; and he that comes into the field with an Elephant, cannot be supposed to intend to hunt a hare: neither can he be supposed to intend principally the ministery of souls, who comes to that office instructed onely with a bag of money.

3. He may be supposed principally to intend the Ministery of souls,18. and in it the glory of God, who so attends to the execution of his office, that it doe really and sufficiently minister to the thing. For since the Calling is by God really designed to that end, and if the Ministers be not wanting to themselves, they are sufficiently enabled and assisted to that purpose; he that zealously and wisely ministers in the office, hath given a most real testimony of his fair intention, because he does that thing so as those intentions onely can be effected. The thing it self is sufficient for the end if God blesses it; he therefore that does the thing, does actuate the intention of God, and sanctifies his own: But this is to be understood with the addition of the following caution.

4.19. He may be confident that his intentions for Gods glory and the good of souls are right and principal, who so conjoyns his other lesser ends with the conduct of the greater, that they shall always be made to give place to the greater. That is, who still pursues the interest of souls, and the work of his Ministery, when the hopes of maintenance, or honour, or secular regards doe fail. For he that for carnal or secular regards will either quit or neglect his Ministery, it is certain, his carnal or secular ends were his chief motive and incentive in the work. It was the case of Demas who was S. Pauls Minister and work-fellow in the service of the Gospel, 〈…〉 but he left him, because he loved the present world; concerning which, it is to be considered, that this lapse and recession of Demas from the assistances of S. Paul, did not proceed from that love of the wo • ld which S. John speaks of, 〈…〉 and is criminal, and forbidden to all Christians, which whosoever hath, the love of the Father dwels not in him, but is to be understood of such a love, which to other Christians is not unlawful, but was in those times especially) inconsistent with the duty of Evangelists, in those great necessities of the Church: Demas was a good man, but weak in his spirit, and too secular in his relations, but he returned to his station, and did the work of an Evangelist, a while after, as appears in the Epistle to the Colossians and Philemon; but for the present he was too blame. For he would secure his relations and his interests with too great a caution and diligence, and leave the other, to attend this. Such as now adays is too great case of our estates, secular negotiations, merchandizes, civil imployments, not ministring directly unto Religion, and the advantages of its ministration. For our great King the Lord Jesus, hath given to all Christians some imployment, but to some more, to some less, and in their own proportion they must give a return: and in a Minister of the Gospel, every inordination of carefulness, and every excess of attendance to secular affairs, and every unnecessary avocation from, o • neglect of his great work is criminal, and many things are excesses in them, which are not in others, because the Ministerial office requires more attendance and conversation with spiritual things, then that of others.

5. If ever the Minister of holy things,20. for hope or fear, for gain or interest descit his station, when he is persecuted, or when he is not persecuted, it is too much to be presumed, that he did not begin for God, who for man will quit Gods service. They that wander till they finde a rich seat, doe all that they doe for the riches of the place, not for the employment: Si non ubi sed • as locus est, est ubi ambules, said he in the Comedy; the calling of these men is not fixed but ambulatory: and if that which fixes them be temporal advantages, then that which moved them principally is not spiritual employment.

For it is considerable,21. that if it be unlawful to undertake the holy Calling, without a Divine vocation to it, then to forsake it without a Divine permission must be criminal. He that calls to come, calls to continue, where the need is lasting, and the office perpetual. But to leave the Calling when the revenue is gone, to quit the Altar when it hath no offering, to let the souls wander, when they bring no gifts, is to despise the Religion, and to love onely the fat of the sacrifices: For the Altar indeed does sanctify the gift, but not the gift the Altar; and he hath but a light opinion of an eternal Crown of glory, or thinks God but an ill paymaster, that will not doe him service upon the stock of his promises, and will not feed the flock, though he have no other reward but to be feasted in the eternal Supper of the Lamb: Who are hirelings, but they who fly when the Wolf comes? and woe be to that Evangelist who upon any secular regard neglects to preach the Gospel; woe be to him, to whom it shall be said at the day of Judgement, I was hungry, and my flock was hungry, and ye fed neither it nor me.

But this is to be understood with these liberties:

1. That it be no prejudice to those Ecclesiasticks,22. who in time of Persecution, doe so attend to their Ministeries, that no material part of it be omitted, or slightly performed, and yet take from it such portions of time as are necessary for their labour, or support by any just and honest imployment. Thus S. Paul wrought in the Trade of a Tent-maker, because he would not be a burthen to the Church of Corinth; and when the Church is stripp'd naked of her robes, and the bread of proposition are stollen from her table by Souldiers, there is no peradventure but the Ecclesiastical offices are so to be attended to, that the natural duty and necessity be not neglected.

2. That it be no prejudice to Ecclesiasticks in the days of peace or war,23. to change their station from Bishoprick to Bishoprick, from Church to Church, where God, or the Church, where Charity or Necessity, where Prudence or Obedience calls. Indeed it hath been fiercely taught, that Ecclesiasticks ought never, and upon no pretence to desert their Church, and goe to another any more then a man may forsake his wife; and for this a Decretal of P. Euaristus is pretended, and is recorded in the Canon Law. c. Sicut vir. Can. 7. q. 1. Sicut vir non debet adulterare uxorem suam, it a nec Episcopus Ecclesiam suam, ut illam dimittat ad quam fuit sacratus: and therefore when Eusebius the Bishop of Caesarea was called to be Bishop of Antioch, he refused it pertinaciously, and for it was highly commended by the Emperour; and S. Hierome in his Epistle to Oceanus tels, In Nicaenâ Synodo à Patribus decretum est, nè de alia in aliam Ecclesiam Episcopus transferatur, n • virginalis pauperculae societate contemptâ ditioris adulterae quaerat amplexus. Something indeed like it was decreed by the fifteenth and sixteenth Canons of the Nicene Councel; and it was an usual punishment amongst the holy Primitives, Careat Cathedrâ propriâ qui ambit alienam. But these things though they be true and right, yet are not a contradictory to the present case. For,

1.24. Euaristus (it is clear) forbad translations and removes from Church to Church, ambitus causâ, for ambition or covetousness, and therefore it is by him expresly permitted in their proper cases and limits; that is, [in inevitabili necessitate, aut Apostolicâ, vel regulari mutatione] when there is inevitable necessity, or the command and authority of a superiour power: and yet upon perusal of the Decree I finde, that Euaristus his intent was, that a Bishop should not thrust his Church from him by way of divorce, and excommunication, and take another, as appears not onely by the corresponding part of the Decree, viz. That neither must the Church take in another Bishop or Husband upon him to whom already she is espoused; but by the expression used in the beginning of it, dimittere Ecclesiam Episcopus non debet; and it is compared to the adultery of a man that puts away his wife, and marries another; and also it appears more yet by the gloss, which seems to render the same sense of it, and wholly discourses of the unlawfulness to excommunicate a Church or a City, lest the innocent should suffer with the criminal: for when a Church is excommunicated, though all those persons die upon whom the sentence fell, yet the Church is the same under other persons their successors, and therefore all the way it does injustice, by involving the new arising innocents, and at last is wholly unjust by including all and onely innocent persons. But which way soever this Decree be understood, it comes not home to a prohibition of our case.

2. As for Eusebius, 25. it is a clear case he imposed upon the good Emperour, who knew not the secret cause of Eusebius his denial to remove from Caesarea to Antioch. For he having engaged the Emperour before time to write in his behalf, that he might be permitted to enjoy that Bishoprick, was not willing to seem guilty of levity and easiness of change. But that was not all, he was a secret favourer of the Arrians, and therefore was unwilling to goe to that Church where his predecessor Eustathius had been famous for opposing that pest.

3. To that of S. Jerome out of the Nicene Council, I answer, That the prohibition is onely of such, as without authority, upon their own head, for their own evil purposes, and with injury to their own Churches did it: and of covetousness it is, that S. Jerome notes and reproves the practice: To despise our charge because it is poor, is to love the money more then the souls, and therefore this is not to be done by any one of his own choice; but if it be done by the command or election of our Superiour, it is to be presumed it is for the advantage of the Church in matter of direct reason, or collateral assistance, and therefore hath in it no cause of reproof.

And to this purpose the whole affair is very excellently stated by the 14.26. Canon of the Apostles; A Bishop must not leave his own Parish or Diocess, and invade that of another man, nisi forte quis cum rationabili causa compellatur, tanquam qui possit, ibidem constitutus plus lucri conferre, & in causa religionis aliquid profectûs prospicere. If there be a reasonable cause he may; and the cause is reasonable, if by going he may doe more good, or advantage to Religion: but of this he is not to be Judge himself, but must be judged by his Superiours; & hoc non à semetipso pertentet, sed multorum Episcoporum judicio, & maxima supplicatione perficiat; he must not doe it on his own head, but by the sentence and desire of the Bishops.

There needs no more to be added to this,27. but that if a greater revenue be annexed to another charge, and that it be in rem Ecclesiae, that the more worthy person should be advanced thither, to enable his better ministeries by those secular assistances which our infirmity needs, there is nothing to be said against it, but that if he be the man he is taken for, he knows how to use those advantages to Gods glory, and the good of souls, and the services of the Church; and if he does so, his intentions are to be presumed pure and holy, because the good of souls is the principal.

Upon the supposition of these causes,28. we finde that the practice of the ancient Bishops and Clerks in their translations was approved. Origen did first serve God in the Church of Alexandria, afterwards he went to Caesarea, to Antioch, to Tyre, and S. Gregory Nazianzen changed his Episcopal See eight times. Nay the Apostles themselves did so: S. Peter was first Bishop of Antioch, afterwards of Rome: and the necessity and utility of the Churches called S. Paul to an ambulatory Government and Episcopacy, though at last he also was fixed at Rome, and he removed Timothy and Titus from Church to Church as the need and uses of the Church required. But in this, our call must be from God, or from our Superiours, not from levity or pride, covetousness, or negligence. Concerning which, who please further to be satisfied, may read S. Athanasius his Epistle to Dracontius, of old; and of late, Chytraeus in Epistolis p 150. & 678. and Conradus Porta in his Formalia. This onely; If every man were indispensably tied to abide where he is first called to minister, then it were not lawful for an inferiour Minister to desire the good work of a Bishop; which because it is not to be administred in the same place or charge, according to the universal discipline of the Church for very many ages, must suppose that there can be a reasonable cause to change our charges, because the Apostle commends that desire which supposes that change.

These being the limits and measures of the Rule,29. it would be very good if we were able to discern concerning the secrets of our intentions, and the causes of actions. It is true, that because men confound their actions and deliberations, it will be impossible to tell in many cases what motive is the principal ingredient.Plin. li. • . ep. 2. Sed ut tunc communibus magis commodis quam privatae jactantiae studebamus, quum intentionem, effectúmque muneris nostri vellemus intelligi; ita nunc in ratione edendi, veremur nè fortè non aliorum utilitatibus, sed propriae laudi servisse videamur. It is hard for a wise and a gallant man, who does publick actions of greatest worthiness deserving honour, to tell certainly whether he is more pleased in the honours that men doe him, or in the knowledge that he hath done them benefits. But yet in very many cases, we may at least guess probably which is the prevailing ingredient,Vide Rule of Holy Living Chap. 1. §. 2. by these following measures; besides those which I have noted and applied to the special case of undertaking the calling Ecclesiastical.

Signes of difference, whereby we may in a mixt and complicated intention, discern which is the principal ingredient.

1. Whatsoever came in after the determination was made,30. though it adde much the greater confidence, and makes the resolution sharper and more active, yet it is not to be reckoned as the prevailing ingredient; for though it adde degrees, yet the whose determination was perfected before. The widow Fulvia was oppressed by Attillius; she complains to Secundus the Lawyer. He considers whether he should be Advocate for his friend Attilius, or for the oppressed Fulvia; and at last determines on the side of piety and charity, and resolves to releeve the Widow, but with some abatement of his spirit and confidence, because it is against his friend: but Charity prevails. As he goes to Court he meets with Caninius, who gloriously commends the advocation, and by superadding that spurre made his diffidence and imperfect resolution, confident and clear. In this case the whole action is to be attributed to Piety, not to the love of Fame; for this onely added some moments, but that made the determination.

2. When the determination is almost made,31. and wants some weight to finish it, whatsoever then supervenes and casts the scales, is not to be accounted the prevailing ingredient, but that which made most in the suspension and time of deliberation, and brought it forward. It is like buying and selling: not the last Maravidis that was stood upon was the greatest argument of parting with the goods; but that farthing added to the bigger summe, made it bigge enough: and a childs finger may thrust a load forward, which being haled by mighty men stands still for want of a little assistance.

3.32. That is the prevailing ingredient in the determination which is most valued, not which most pleases; that which is rationally preferred, not that which delights the senses. If the man had rather lose the sensual then, the intellectual good, though in that his fancy is more delighted, yet this is the stronger, and greater in the Divine acceptance, though possibly in nature it be less active, because less pleasing to those faculties, which whether we will or no, will be very much concerned in all the entercourses of this life. * He that keeps a festival in gratitude and spiritual joy to doe God glory, and to give him thanks, and in the preparation to the action is hugely pleas'd by considering the musick, the company, the festivity and innocent refreshments, and in his fancy, leaps at this but his resolution walks on by that, hath not spoil'd the regularity of his Conscience by the intertexture of the sensual with the spiritual, so long as it remains innocent. For though this flames brightest, yet the other burns hottest, and will last longer then the other. But of this there is no other sign, but that first we be infinitely careful to prescribe measures and limits to the secular joy, that it may be perfectly subordinate to, and complying with the spiritual and religious: and secondly, if we are willing to suppress the light flame, rather then extinguish the solid fire.

4.33. Then the holy and pious ingredient is overpowred by the mixture of the secular, when an instrument toward the end is chosen more proportionable to this, then to that. Caecilius to doe a real not a phantastick benefit to his Tenants, erected a Library in his Villa, and promised a yearly revenue for their childrens education, and nobler institution: And thus farre judgement ought to be made, that he intended piety rather then fame; for to his fame, Plays and Spectacles would (as the Roman humour then was) have served better: but when in the acting his resolution he prais'd that his pious purpose, and told them he did it for a pious, not a vainglorious end, however the intention might be right, this publication was not right: But, when he appointed that anniversary orations should be made in the praise of his pious foundation, he a little too openly discovered what was the bigger wheel in that motion. For he that serves a secret piety by a publick Panegyrick, disorders the piety by dismantling the secret: it may still be piety, but it will be lessen'd by the publication; though this publication be no otherwise criminal, then because it is vain.Plin. li. 1. ep. 8. Meminimus quanto majore animo honestatis fructus in conscientia quàm in fama reponatur. Sequi enim gloria non appeti debet: nec si casu aliquo non sequatur, idcirco quod gloriam meruit minus pulchrum est: Hi verò qui benefacta suae verbis adornant, non ideò praedicare quia fecerint, sed ut praedicarent, fecisse creduntur; which is the very thing which I affirm in this particular. If the intermediate or consequent actions serve the collateral or secular end, most visibly it is to be supposed, that this was the greater motive, and had too great an influence into the deliberation.

But because the heart of man is so intricate,34. trifling, and various, in most cases it must be sufficient for us to know, that if the mixture be innocent, the whole deliberation is secur'd in the kinde of it, and for degrees we must doe as well as we can.

But on the other side,35. if the secular end mixt with the spiritual, and religious, the just and the honest, be unlawful, and yet intended, though in a less degree, though but accidentally and by an after consent; the conscience is neither sure nor right, but is dishonour'd and defil'd: for the whole deliberation is made criminal by mingling with forbidden purposes. He that takes up arms under his Prince in a just warre, and at the same time intends revenge against his private enemy, casually engag'd on the adverse party, loses the reward of his obedience, and changes it for the devillish pleasures of revenge.

Concerning the measure and conduct of our intentions, there are some other things to be said, but because they are extrinsecal to the chief purpose of this Rule, they are properly to be considered under their own head.

NO object can have its denomination from the judgement of reason,1. save onely that from thence it may be said to be understood to be good, to be declar'd, to be consented to; all which supposes the object to be good, or to be so apprehended. Just as an emerald is green before the eye perceives it so: and if the object were not in it self good, then the reason were deceiv'd in consenting to it, and a deceiver in publishing it.

This is true in respect of the material, 2. fundamental, and proper goodness of the object; for this it hath independently of the conscience: and the rectitude of the conscience is dependent on this, and consequent to the perception of it. But yet there is a formal, extrinsecal, and relative goodness passed upon an object by the conscience, by whose perswasion although an evil object doe not become naturally good, yet it becomes personally necessary; and in the same proportion a good object may become evil.

The purpose of this is to remonstrate that we must rather look to the rule then to the present perswasion;3. first taking care that our conscience be truly informed, before it be suffered to pass a sentence; and it is not enough that our conscience tels us thus, unless God hath told the conscience. But yet if the conscience does declare, it ingages us, whether it be right or wrong. But this hath in it some variety.

1. The goodness of an act depends upon the goodness of an object,4. that is, upon its conformity to a rational nature and the commands of God. For all acts of will and understanding are of themselves indefinite and undetermined till the relation to an object be considered, but they become good or bad when they choose or refuse that which is good or bad respectively. To will to doe an act of theft is bad, because theft it self is so: to be willing to commit an act of adultery is evil, because all adultery is evil: and on the other side, to be willing to doe an act of justice, is therefore good because justice it self is good. And therefore Aristotle defines justice by a habitude or relation to its object. It is voluntas dandi suum cuique, a will of giving to every one that which is their due. And therefore our conscience, because it is to receive its information from the rule by which every action is made good or bad, and its motion from the object, is bound to take in that onely which is really and truly good, and without sin or error cannot doe otherwise.

2. Although conscience is bound to proceed this way,5. yet sometimes the younger the elder brother by the heel, or gets out before him, and the act gets before the object by indirect means. For though all things should be thought good because they are good, yet some things are made good because they are thought so; and the conscience looking out upon its object finds error dress'd up in the shape of truth, and takes it in, and adopts it into the portion of truth. And though it can never be made really and naturally good, yet by being supposed so by the conscience, it is sometimes accepted so by God.

3. Although the rule by which good and bad is measured,6. be in it self perfect, yet it is not always perfectly received by us. Good is proportionable to Reason; and as there is probabiliter verum, so there is probabiliter bonum, a probable good, as well as a probable truth: and in the inquest after this, we often shew a trick of humanity, even to be pitifully deceived; and although when it is so, it is an allay of the good it intends, yet it does not wholly destroy it: God in his goodness accepting at our hands for good, what we really and innocently suppose to be so. Just like the Country fellow that gave a handful of water to his Prince; he thought it a fine thing, and so it was accepted. For when the action and the rule are to be made even, if either of them comply and stoop, the equality is made. God indeed requires the service of all our faculties, but calls for no exact measures of any but the will. For the acts of the will are perfect in their kinde, but our understanding is imperfect, therefore this may finde an excuse, but that never.

4. Upon this account it is that though the goodness or badness of an act depends upon the quality of the object regularly and naturally, 7. yet the acts become irregularly or accidentally good or bad by the conscience, because the conscience changes the object; that is, the act is good by the object really good, or so apprehended. The object always changes or constitutes the act, but the conscience changing the object immediately, hath a mediate influence upon the act also, and denominates it to be such as in the event it proves. But then in what degrees, and to what events this change is made is of more intricate consideration.

What changes can be made in moral actions by the perswasion and force of Conscience.

1. Whatsoever is absolutely and indispensably necessary to be done,8. and commanded by God expresly, cannot be changed by Conscience into an evil, or into that which is unnecessary. Because in such cases where the rule is plain, easy, and fitted to the conscience, all ignorance is voluntary, and spoils the consequent act, but never can legitimate it. And the same reason is for things plainly and expresly forbidden, as adultery, murder, sacrilege, and the like; they can never become good by any act of Conscience. And therefore in such cases it often happened that God did declare his judgement to be contrary to the opinion which men had of themselves and of their actions. Somtimes men live contrary to their profession;Tit. 1. 16. they profess the worship of God, but deny him in their hearts, even when they least think they doe. Thus the Israelites having constrain'd Aaron to make a golden Calf proclaim'd a feast, To morrow is a feast unto Jehovah; Deuter. 32. 17. but God says of them, They offered sacrifice to Devils and not to God. And so it was with their children after them, who killed and persecuted the Apostles and servants of Jesus, and thought they did God good service. He that fals down before an idol, and thinks to doe honour to the Lord; or robs a Temple, and thinks it is for Religion, must stand or fall, not by his own fancy, but by sentence of God, and the rule of his Law; Protestatio contra factum is invalid in Law. To strike a mans eye out, and say he did it in sport; to kill his brother, and think it is well done, because done to prevent his sin, though it may be thought charity by the man, yet it is murder before God.

2. Where the rule is obscure,9. or the application full of variety or the duty so intricate that the conscience may inculpably erre, there the object can be changed by conscience, and the acts adopted into a good or an evil portion by that influence. He that thinks it unlawful to give money to a poor Turk, hath made it to become unlawful to him, though of it self it seems to be a pious act. So also it is in the uncertain application of a certain proposition. It is certainly unlawful to commit adultery; but if Jacob supposes he lies with Rachel, and she prove to be Leah, his conscience hath not chang'd the rule, but it hath chang'd the object and the act: The object becomes his own by adoption, and the act is regular by the integrity of the will. This is that which is affirm'd by the Apostle,Rom. 1 • 14. Vide Chrysost. in hunc locum, S. Ambros. ib. & Theophyl • . ibid. I know and am perswaded in the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of it self, but he that thinketh it is unclean, to him it is unclean. This instance is in a case in which they might easily be mistaken, and innocently abused by reason of the prepossession of their mindes by Moses Law; and therefore in such cases the conscience rules. They who beleeve themselves married, may mutually demand and pay their duty: But if they be not married, it is fornication or adultery (as it happens.) But if Conscience says they are married, it is not adultery, but an act of duty, because the same conscience that declares for the marriage, obliges also to pay their duty, as a matter of necessity. Where ever the understanding is wrong, and the will is wholly right, the action is accepted, and the error pardoned.

3. When the act is materially evil,10. the conscience adopting it into a good portion, that is, beleeving it to be good, does not make a perfect change, but leaves an allay in the several degrees of its perswasion. For it is impossible that a right conscience and a wrong should have no difference in the effect, especially if there be any thing criminal or faulty in the cause of the error. When two men take up arms in a differing cause, as suppose one for his Prince, and the other against him; though they be both heartily perswaded, and act according to Conscience, yet they doe not equally doe well or ill. The one shall be accepted, and it may be, the other pardoned, or excused in various degrees. But this which needs a pardon for one thing, is not in the whole constitution of it, good for any thing, nor can it be accepted to reward.

4. If the conscience dictate a thing to be necessary,11. the thing is become necessay, and at no hand to be declined.Gal. 5. 3. This was it which S. Paul said, He that is circumcised is a debtor of the whole Law; meaning, that though Christ had broken the yoke of Moses, yet if conscience did take up one end of it, and bound it upon it self; the other end would be dragg'd after it, and by the act of conscience become necessary. If a man inquires, whether he is bound to say his prayers kneeling, or whether he may doe it standing, or lying, or leaning; if his conscience be perswaded that he must doe it kneeling, it is necessary he should doe so, and he may not doe it in his bed: Because the Conscience is a Law-giver, and hath authority over the man, and ought to prevail, when the contrary part is onely, That they may doe otherwise. For whether this part be true or false, the matter is not so great, because there is no danger if a man doe not make use of a liberty that is just: He can let it alone and doe well enough; and therefore to follow the other part which is supposed necessary, must needs be his safest way.

But if the Question be, whether it be necessary to keep a Holy day, or necessary to let it alone; there if the Conscience determine that for necessary to be done, which is necessary to be let alone, the man is indeed bound to follow his conscience, but he cannot escape a sin. For conscience makes no essential alterations in the thing, though it makes personal obligations to the man; and if it be an evil superstition to keep a holy day, it cannot be made lawful, because the conscience mistaking calls it necessary. And if this were otherwise, it were not a pin matter what a man thought, for his thinking so becomes his law, and every man may doe what is right in his own eyes. And therefore God was pleased expresly to declare it, that if a Prophet did mislead the people, both he and they should perish; and our blessed Saviour signified the same thing in a Parabolical expression, If the blinde lead the blinde, they both fall into the ditch. But in this case there is a fault somewhere, and the man smarts under the Tyranny, not the Empire of his Conscience; for Conscience can have no proper authority against the Law of God. In this case that which the conscience falsly calls necessary, becomes so relatively and personally (that is, he thinks so, and cannot innocently goe in the right way, so long as his guide conducts him in the wrong, and yet cannot innocently follow his guide because she does abuse him) but in it self, or in the Divine acceptation, it onely passes for a bonum, something there is in it that is good, and that God may regard; there is a praeparatio animi, a willingness to obey.

5. If the Conscience being mistaken in a question, whether an action be good or no, calls that good which is nothing but indifferent; the Conscience alters it not, it is still but lawful; but neither necessary nor good, but relatively and collaterally: The person may be pitied, and have a gift given him in acknowledgement, but the thing it self cannot expect it. When the Lords of the Philistins, that they might deprecate the Divine judgements offered to God golden Mice and Emerods, the thing it self was not at all agreeable to the way by which God chose to be worshipped; but their conscience told them it was good, it therefore became lawful to them, but not good in it self; and God who is the Father of mankinde saw their heart, and that they meant it for good, and he was pleased to take it so. But the Conscience (I say) cannot make it good. For to be good or bad is wholly another consideration then to be necessary or not necessary. This distinction is relative to persons, and therefore can be made by Conscience in the sense above allowed. But good and bad is an abstract consideration, and relates to the materiality of the object, and is before the act of Conscience, not after.

6. If the Conscience being mistaken calls a thing lawful, 13. which is not so in the Rule, or Law of God, there the Conscience neither makes an alteration in the thing, nor passes an obligation upon the person. Eleonora de Ferrante was married to a Spanish Gentleman, who first used her ill, then left her worse. After some years she is courted by Andrea Philippi her Countriman, to marry him. She inquires whether she may or no, and is told by some whom she ought not easily to have beleeved, that she may; and so she does. But being told by her Confessor of her sin and shame, she pretends that she did it bono animo, her conscience was perswaded she might doe it, and therefore hopes to be excused or pardoned. He answers her; That her conscience could not make that lawful which God had forbidden, and therefore she ought not to pretend conscience; for though her conscience did say it was lawful, she was not bound to follow it; because thought she must doe nothing that is unlawful, yet she is not tied to doe every thing that is lawful: and though her conscience can give her a Law, yet it cannot give her a Privilege. She is bound to doe what her conscience says is necessary, though it be deceived, and if she does not, she sins against her conscience, which can never be permitted or excused. But if her conscience tells her onely it is lawful so to doe; if she does not doe the thing which her conscience permits, she offends it not, because though it allows, yet it does not command it. If therefore she does it, and there be an error in the conscience, the sin is as great as the error, great as the matter it self; as if the fact materially be adultery, it is also morally so, and the perswasion of the conscience does not excuse it from being such. The reason is plain; For since the conscience when she allows does not command, if the person chooses that thing which materially is a sin, it is in pursuance of her own desires, not in obedience to her conscience. It is Lust more then Conscience. * But yet whereas she says she hopes for pardon in this case, there is no question but she may. For she sinn'd as S. Paul did in persecuting the Church; he did it ignorantly and so did she. Here onely was the difference; he was nearer to pardon then she; because he thought he was bound to doe so, and therefore could not resist his conscience so perswaded: she onely thought she might doe it, and therefore might have chosen. The conscience hath power in obligations and necessities, but not so much, nor so often in permissions.

AGainst this S. 1. Bernard seems to argue earnestly; Lib. de praecept. & dispens. Si tantopere vitanda sunt scandala parvulorum, quantò ampliùs praelatorum, quos sibi Deus coaequare quodammodo in utroque dignatur, dum sibimet imputat & illorum reverentiam & contemptum? &c. If with so great caution we must be careful that we doe not offend any of Gods little ones, how much more must we be curious to avoid giving offence to great ones, to our Superiours, whom God seems in some manner to make equal to himself, while the reverence or the contempt that is done to them, he takes unto himself; saying, He that heareth you, heareth me, and he that despiseth you, despiseth me. But if you say, that men may be deceived in their inquest after the will of God, and may deceive others in reporting it; what is that to thee who knowest not that they are deceived? especially since from Scriptures thou art taught, That the lips of the Priest shall preserve knowledge, and they shall require the Law at his mouth, because he is the Angel of the Lord of Hosts. To which discourse of S. Bernard, the following consideration may adde some moment; and the discussing them, may give light to the inquiry.

2. For in things indifferent the command of the Superiour must needs be accounted the will of God; for although our Superiours are executioners of the Divine Laws, yet because they have also a Legislative power, they who can alter nothing in things commanded or forbiddden by God, must have a power to command or to forbid respectively in things indifferent or not at all. And therefore in such things our conscience is bound to obey.

3. And if conscience be pretended against it, it is an error and ought to be laid down, for to follow this erring conscience ingages us in sin all the way.

4. But as he that submits his understanding to the obedience of Jesus, pleases God most, even when he does it in defiance of all arguments and temptations to the contrary, which though he cannot answer, yet he resolves to follow Christ; so he does best who though his conscience pretend reasons against it, will yet lay aside those reasons that he may submit to his superiors.

5. For it is a great crime by rebelling against or slighting the command of our Rulers, to give offence to whole societies of men; * and there can be no greater contempt done to them, then by undervaluing their judgement to preferre our own; and therefore the Prophet pronounces woe to them who are wise in their own eyes.

6. But let a Subject be never so wise, he ought not to judge his Superiour, or to condemne his sentence; and therefore he must be judged by it, and not by his own erring conscience.

7. For as he who hath made a vow of obedience, hath devested himself of all pretences of contradicting what shall be imposed; and if his conscience shall check him in the instance, he ought to look upon it as a temptation and use it accordingly; so must it be also in every Subject, who by the Laws of God is as much tied to obey his Superiour, as he can be by any Law which he puts upon himself. The effect of these suggestions is this, that in things where the Law of God hath not declared positively, an erring conscience is not to be attended to, but the Law of the Superiour, and his sentence must be the guide of his Conscience.

To this discourse I answer in short,2. That it is all very true; that the lawful Superiours are Gods Vicegerents appointed over us in things pertaining to God, so as to be Executioners of the Divine Laws; and besides this, to make Laws in things indifferent and pertaining to men; That all contempt done to them is done to God; That it is scandalous to refuse obedience to them; That he is a proud man who says he is wiser then his Superiours; and he is intolerable that preferres his private folly before the publick wisdome: And therefore it is well inferred, that the error of an abused conscience ought to be laid down, and though he cannot in particular answer the arguments which trouble him, yet if he have reason to beleeve that though the arguments be too hard for him, yet that the Superiours command is innocent; it were well if he would lay aside those arguments and adhere to authority; yet all this touches not the secret of the Question. For,

He that compares the law of Conscience, with the law of the Superiour, compares the law of God and the law of man; 3. and the question is not whether a man should follow his Superiour, or follow himself, but whether God or Man be to be obeyed, whether the Superiour or the Supreme be to be attended to? The reason of this is, because the Conscience stands bound by the supposed Law of God, which being superiour to all the law of Man, must rather be obeyed; and therefore although the arguments conclude rightly that an erring conscience disobeying his Superiours lawful command does sin greatly, yet they cannot conclude that he avoids sin by obeying against his conscience. For his condition is indeed perplexed, and he can no way avoid sin, but by laying his error aside first, and then obeying. And since he sins whether he obeys his Superiours just command, or the unjust command of his conscience, the inquiry is, in this sad conjunction of things, by what hand he must be smitten, on which side he must fall, that he may fall the easier? To this the Rule answers, That his erring conscience must be obeyed rather, because he is perswaded that God speaks there, and is not perswaded that God speaks by his Superiour. Now though in this he be deceived, yet he that will not goe there where he thinks God is, and leave that where he thinks God is not, does uncertainly goe towards God, but does certainly forsake him, as much as lies in him. For,

It is to the Conscience all one as if the Law of God were really upon it,4. if it be thought it is. Idem est esse & apparere in this case, and therefore the erring conscience is to be attended to, because the will and the affections are for God, though the judgement hath mistaken a gloworm for the Sun. But this is to be understood onely, when the conscience erres innocently and unavoidably, which it can never doe in the precepts of nature, and brightest revelation.

But if the Conscience does erre vincibly, 5. that is, with an actual fault, and an imperfect, artificial resolution, such a one, as a good man will not, and a wise man need not have, his present perswasion excuses him not from a double sin, for breaking a double duty. For he is bound to correct his error, and to perform the precepts of his Superiour, and if he does not, his sin is more then that which was in the vicious cause of his misperswasion, as I shewed in the explication of the former Rules.

But according as the ignorance and error approaches towards pity, lessening 6. or excusing, so the sin also declines. He that thinks it is not lawful at all to take up arms at the command of his Prince in an unjust, or a dubious cause, sins if he does what he thinks so unlawful, and he commits no sin in disobeying, that onely excepted which entred into his misperswasion, which is greater or less, or next to none at all, according as was the cause of his error, which in the whole constitution of affairs, he could not well avoid. But he that is foolishly perswaded that all Government is unlawful and Antichristian, is bound to lay his error down, and besides the vicious cause of his error, he sins in the evil effect of it, though his imperfect, equivocal conscience calls on him to the contrary, yet he sins if he does not obey, because in such notorious and evident propositions an error is not onely malicious in the principle, but voluntary all the way; and therefore may easily, and must certainly be laid aside in every period of determination.

Whatsoever Cases are between these, partake of the extremes according to their proper reason and relation.

IF the error began with a sin,1. and still dwells there upon the same stock, or if it be productive of a sin, it is always to be discovered, though the greatest temporal inconvenience were certainly consequent to the discovery. Because a man must not be suffered to lie in sin, no not a minute, if he can be recovered or rescued from it; and no temporal advantage or disadvantage can be considerable in this case, which is the case of soul. An error that is vincible is all the way criminal and must not be permitted.

2.2. If the error be invincible and innocent or pitiable in the cause, and yet ends in an intolerable event, and the effect be a crime or a great danger to souls, the error must be discovered by them that can. The Novatians erred in the matter of Repentance: The inducing cause of their error was an over active zeal, and too wary a tenderness in avoiding scandal and judging concerning it. God served the ends of his glory by the occasion of that error, for he uses to bring good out of every evil; and the Church under a better article grew as wary as the Novatians, as watchful against scandal, as severe against lapsed persons. Now although in this case, the error was from an innocent cause, yet because it landed them upon a course of discipline, and perswasion that was not innocent, they were not to be permitted in their error, though the dissolut on of the error might or would have occasioned the remission of discipline. For their doctrine of repentance was dishonourable to the mercies of God, and instrument of despair, a rendring the power of the Keys and the Ministery of the order Ecclesiastical in a manner wholly useless, and would if it were pursued to its just consequents have hindred repenting sinners to revert to the folds of the Church; and therefore for the accidental good which God brought, or which was likely to have come from that error or the innocence of its principle, it was not to be conceal'd, but reprov'd and destroyed because it dwelt in sin. He that beleeves that repentance to be sufficient, which hath in it nothing but sorrow for what is past, and a present purpose without amendment really in the future, upon no pretence is to be complied withall in the palliation of his error, because the consequent of his error is such a danger, or such a state of sin, for which nothing can make amends.

3. If the error be invincible,3. and the consequent of the perswasion be consistent with the state of grace, the error must be opened or not opened, according to prudent considerations relating to the person and his state of affairs. So that the error must rather be suffered then a grievous scandal, or an intolerable, or a very great inconvenience. To this purpose Comitolus says it was determined by a Congregation of learned and prudent persons in answer to a strange and a rare case happening in Venice; A Gentleman ignorantly did lie with his Mother; she knew it, but intended it not, till for her curiosity and in her search whether her son intended it to her maid, she was surprised and gotten with child: She perceiving her shame and sorrow hasten, sent her son to travel for many years; and he returned not till his Mothers female birth was grown to be a handsome pretty Maiden. At his return he espies a sweet fac'd girl in the house, likes her, loves her, and intends to marry her. His mother conjured him by all that was sacred and profane that he should not, saying, she was a beggers child, whom for pities sake she rescued from the streets and beggery, and that he should not by dishonouring his family make her to die with sorrow. The Gentlemans affections were strong, and not to be mastered, and he married his own sister and his own daughter. But now the bitings of the Mothers conscience were intolerable and to her Cofessor she discovered the whole business within a year or two after this prodigious marriage, and asked whether she were bound to reveal the case to her son and daughter, who now liv'd in love and sweetness of society, innocently, though with secret misfortune which they felt not. It was concluded negatively, she was not to reveal it, lest she bring an intolerable misery in the place of that which to them was no sin; or lest upon notice of the error they might be tempted by their mutual endearment and their common children, to cohabite in despight of the case, and so change that into a known sin, which before was an unknown calamity; and by this state of the answer, they were permitted to their innocence, and the children to their inheritance, and all under the protection of a harmless, though erring and mistaken conscience.

4.4. If it be doubtful whether more good or hurt may be consequent to the discovery, it is better to conceal it. Because it is more tolerable to have a good omitted, then to have an evil done. That may sometimes be lawful, this can never; and a known evil that is not a sin, is rather to be admitted then an unknown, which no man can tell whether it will arrive. But in this, the prudence of a good and a wise man is to be his onely guide, and Gods glory his onely measure and the publick good, and the greater concernments of the interessed be chiefly regarded.

A Probable Conscience dwells so between the Sure and the Doubtful that it partakes something of both.1. For a sure Conscience may begin upon a probable inducement, but is made sure either by an assent to the Conclusion, stronger then the premises will inferre, or by a reflex act, or some other collateral hardness and adventitious confidence, and therefore the probable is distinguished from that by the imperfection of the assent. But because in that respect it approaches to the doubtful, and in that is alike, it is differenced from this by the determination. For a doubtful conscience considers the probabilities on each side, and dares not choose, and cannot. But the probable does choose, though it considers that in the thing it self there can be no certainty. And from them both it is distinguished by the intervening of the Will. For in the sure Conscience the Will works not at all, because it is wholly conducted by the understanding, and its proper motives. In the doubtful the Will cannot interpose by reason of fear and an uncertain spirit; but in the probable it can intervene, not directly, but collaterally and indirectly, because the motives of the probable conscience are not always sufficient to make the conclusion without something of the Will applied to extrinsecal motives which reflect also upon the understanding; and yet in this conscience there is no fear, and therefore the Will can here be obeyed, which in the first needs not, in the last it cannot. For it is remarkable, that a probable conscience though it be in speculation uncertain, yet it may be practically certain, that is, he that beleeves his opinion to be probable, cannot but think that it is possible he may be in an actual error, but yet he may know that it is innocent to doe that for which he hath a probable reason: for though in all these cases he may choose that which is the wrong part, yet he proceeds as safely as if he had chosen right, for if it were not safe to doe that which is onely probable, then nothing could be done till something were demonstrated; and then in moral Theology we should often stand still and suspend our act, but seldome doe any thing; nay sometimes 〈…〉 act nor suspend, it being but probable that either is to be 〈…〉 sometimes it happens what Aristotle said, that false things are 〈…〉 then true, as it is to all them who are innocently and in • 〈…〉 ; and in this case, if probability were not a sufficient convicti •• 〈…〉 such persons could not honestly consent to truth. * For even 〈…〉 disagree in their sentences of truth and error, and after a great search, 〈◊〉 doe they discover one single truth unto just measures of confidence; 〈◊〉 therefore no other law could be exacted for humane actions, then an opinion honestly entred into and a probable conscience. And it is remarkable that Cicero saith that the word Arbitror is verbum consideratissimum, & the old Romans were reserv'd and cautious in the decrees of Judges, and the forms of their oath began with arbitor although they gave testimony of things whereof they were eye witnesses; and the words which their Praetors did use in their sentences, was fecisse videtur, 〈◊〉 11 4. or non videtur. He that observeth the winds shall not sow, and he that watcheth the clouds shall never reap; which means, that if we start at every objection, and think nothing safe but what is certain, and nothing certain but what can be demonstrated, that man is over wise and over just, and by his too curious search misses what he inquires for. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , That is well enough prov'd, that is prov'd according to the subject matter. For there is not the same exactness to be look'd for in all disciplines, any more then in all manufactures. But in those things which are honest and just, and which concern the publick, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , there is so much dissention and deception that things are good or bad not by themselves, but as they are in law; 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 . He is well instructed who expects that manner of proof for things, which the nature of the things will bear,Ethic. l. 1. c. 1. said Aristotle. And in moral things, it is sufficient that a thing is judged true and certain, though by an uncertain argument; and the opinion may be practically certain, when the knowledge of it is in speculation onely probable.

It hath two sorts of motives,2. intrinsecal and extrinsecal. That is reason, this is authority, and both of them have great considerations in order to practice, of which I am to give account in the following Rules.

EVery probable argument hath in it something of perswasion and proof,1. and although it cannot produce evidence and intire conviction to a wise and a discerning spirit, yet it can effect all that it ought; and although, if the Will list, or if passions rule, the understanding shall be made stubborn against it, and reject it easily; yet if nothing be put in barre against it, it may bring a man to adhere to it beyond the evidence. But in some cases there are a whole army of little people, heaps of probable inducements which the understanding amasses together, and from every side gathers all that can give light and motion to the article in question, it draws auxiliaries from every thing, fights with every weapon, and by all means pursues the victory; it joyns line to line, and precept to precept, reason to reason, and reason to authority; the sayings of wise men with the proverbs of the people; consent of talkers, and the arguings of disputers; the nature of the thing, and the reasonableness of its expectations; the capacities and possibilities of men, and of accidents; the purposes and designs, the usefulness, and rewards; and by what all agents are and ought to be moved; customes are mingled with laws, and decencies with consideration of profit; the understanding considers the present state and heap of circumstances, and by prudence weighs every thing in its own ballance; it considers the consequent of the opinion it intends to establish, and well weighs the inconvenience of the contrary. But from the obscurity and insufficiency of these particulars, there cannot come a perfect light; if a little black be mingled with white, the product must have something of every influence that can be communicated from its principle, or material constitution; and ten thousand millions of uncertains cannot make one certain.

In this case the understanding comes not to any certainty by the energy of the motives and direct arguments of probability,2. or by the first effort and impresses of their strength, but by a particular reflexion which it makes upon the heap, and by a secondary discoursing extracted from the whole, as being therefore convinced, because it beleeves it to be impossible that so many considerations, that no way conspire either in matter or design, should agree in the production of a lie. It is not likely that so many beams of light should issue from the chambers of heaven for no other reason but to lead us into a precipice. Probable arguments and prudential motives are the great hinges of humane actions, for as a Pope once said, It is but a little wit that governs the world; and the uncertainty of arguments is the great cause of contingency in events; but as uncertain as most counsels are, yet all the great transactions of the affairs of the world are resolved on and acted by them; by suspicions and fears and probable apprehensions infinite evils are prevented; and it is not therefore likely to be an error by which so perpetually so many good things are procured and effected. For it were a disparagement to the wise providence of God, and a lessening the rare Oeconomy of the Divine Government that he should permit almost all the world, and all reiglements, the varieties of event, and all the changes of Kingdomes, and all counsels and deliberations, to be conducted by moral demonstrations, and to be under the power of probabilities, and yet that these should be deceitful and false. Neither is it to be imagined that God should permit wise men, and good, men that on purpose place their reason in indifference, that abate of their heats and quench their own extravagant fires, men that wipe away all clouds and mists from their eyes, that they may see clearly, men that search as they ought to do, for things that they are bound to finde, things that they are commanded to search, and upon which even all their interests depends, and yet inquiring after the end whither they are directed, and by what means it is to be acquired that these men should be inevitably abused by their own reason, by the best reason they have; and that when concerning the thing which cannot be demonstrated by proper and physical arguments, yet we are to enter into a perswasion so great, that for the verification of it men must venture their lives and their souls; I say, if this kinde of proof be not sufficient to effect all this, and sufficiently to assure such men, and competently to affirm and strengthen such resolutions, salvation and damnation must be by chance, or, which is worse, it must be impossible to be well, but when it cannot choose to be otherwise; and this I say is not to be imagined that God wil or does permit, since all these entercourses so much concern Gods glory and our eternal interest. The main events of heaven and hell doe in some regards depend, as to us, upon our faith, whose objects are represented with such lights from God and right reason as are sufficient to perswade, not to demonstrate; they are such which leave something to us of choice and love, and every proposition of Scripture though it be as sure, yet it is not so evident as the principles of Geometry; and the Spirit of God effects his purposes with an influence as soft and placid as the warmth of the Sun, while a physical demonstration blows hard and high as the Northwind; indeed a man must use rudeness if he does not quit his garment at so loud a call, but we are more willing to part with it when the Sun gently requires us: so is a moral demonstration, it is so humane, so perswasive, so complying with the nature and infirmities of man, with the actions of his life and his manner of operation, that it seems to have been created on purpose for the needs and uses of man in this life, for vertue and for hopes, for faith and for charity, to make us to beleeve by love, and to love by beleeving, for in heaven they that see and love, cannot choose but love, and see, and comprehend; for it is a reward and fils all their faculties, and is not possessed by us, but it self possesses us; In this world where we are to doe something our selves, though all by the grace of God, that which we doe of our selves is nothing else but to work as we our selves can, which indeed happens to be in propositions, as it is in the love of God, this cannot fail us, but we may fail of it, and so are the sentences of Religion, infallible in themselves, but we may be deceived, while by a fallible way we proceed to infallible notices, for nothing else could indear our labour and our love, our search and our obedience; and therefore this must be sufficient and acceptable, if we doe what we can: But then this also will secure our confidence, and in the noises of Christendome when disputing fellows say their brother is damned for not beleeving them, we need not to regard any such noises, if we proceed prudently as we can, and honestly as we ought, probable motives of our understanding are our sufficient conduct, and then we have this warrant, Brethren, if our hearts condemne us not, 〈◊〉 3. 21. then have we peace towards God. And God would never have inspired his Church with prudence, or made any such vertue, if the things which were put under the conduct of it, that is, probabilities, were not instrumental to the service of God, and to the verification of all its just and proper productions.

Probable arguments are like little starres,3. every one of which will be useless as to our conduct and enlightening, but when they are tyed together by order and vicinity, by the finger of God and the hand of an Angel, they make a Constellation, and are not onely powerful in their influence, but like a bright Angel to guide and to enlighten our way. And although the light is not great as the light of the Sun or Moon, yet Mariners sail by their conduct; and though with trepidation and some danger, yet very regularly they enter into the haven. This heap of probable inducements, is not of power as a Mathematical and Physical demonstration, which is in discourse as the Sun is in heaven, but it makes a Milky and a white path, visible enough to walk securely.

And next to these tapers of effective reason,4. drawn from the nature and from the events, and the accidents and the expectations and experiences of things, stands the grandeur of a long and united authority: The understanding thus reasoning, That it is not credible that this thing should have escaped the wiser heads of all the great personages in the world, who stood at the chairs of Princes, or sate in the Rulers chair, and should onely appear to two or three bold, illiterate, or vicious persons, ruled by lusts, and overruled by evil habits; but in this we have the same security and the same confidence that timorous persons have in the dark; they are pleased and can see what is and what is not, if there be a candle, but in the dark they are less fearful if they be in company.

This way of arguing some are pleased to call a moral demonstration,5. not that it can make a proposition clear and bright, and quit from clouds and obscurity, as a natural demonstration can, for I may in this case use Aristotles saying, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , Things of this nature may be very true, but are not very evident; but it can produce the same effect, that is, it can lead into truth, not with as much brightness, but with as much certainty and infallibility in the event of things. For a man may as prosperously and certainly arrive at his journeys end though but conducted by him that went the way but once before him, as if he had a straight path walled in on both sides; so may we finde truth as certainly by probabilities, as by demonstrations: we are not so sure that we finde it, but it is oftentimes as surely found. And if the heap arrive at that which we call a moral demonstration, it is as certain that no moral demonstration can be opposed against it, as that no natural demonstration can be brought in contradiction to a natural. For the understanding cannot call any thing a moral demonstration, till by considering the particulars on both sides, the reasonableness of one, and the unreasonableness of the other, with a cold sent, and liberty of spirit, and an unbyassed Will, it hath passed the sentence for the truth; and since in this case all the opposition is between strength and power on one side, and weakness and pretence on the other, it is impossible that the opposite parts should be demonstrations or seem so to the same man. And this appears by this also, that some propositions which are onely proved by a conjugation of probable inducements, have yet obtained as certain and as regular events as a natural demonstration, and are beleeved equally, constantly, and perpetually by all wise men, and the understanding does regularly receive the same impression, and give the same assent, and for ever draws forth the same conclusions when it is not abused with differing prejudices and preoccupations, when its liberty and powers are not infeebled with customes, examples and contrary breeding, while it is not brib'd by interest, or hurried away by passion.

Of this I shall choose to give one instance,6. which as it is of the greatest concernment in the world in it self, so the gay impieties and bold wits of the world who are witty against none more then God and Gods wisdome, have made it now to be but too seasonable, and that is, that the Religion of Jesus Christ, or The Christian Religion is from God; concerning which I will not now pretend to bring in all the particulars whereby each part of it can be verified, but by heaping together such heads of probabilities which are or may be the cause of an infinite perswasion, and this I had rather choose to doe for these reasons:

1.7. Because many men excellently learned have already discoursed largely of the truth of Christianity, and approved by a direct and close congression with other Religions, by examination of the contrary pretences, refutation of their arguments, answering their objections, and have by direct force so farre prevailed, that all the reason of the world appears to stand on the Christian side: and for me to doe it now, as there is no just occasion ministred by this argument, so neither can it be useful and necessary.

2. In that way of arguing,8. every man that is an adversary can answer one argument, and some can reprove many, and none can prevail singly to posses all the understanding, and to fill all the corners of consideration, but in a moral demonstration that can be supplied.

3.9. In the other way an adversary supposes himself to prevail when he can answer the arguments singly, and the discourses in that method are like the servants sent singly to gather fruits of the Husbandmen, they killed them as fast as they came, and a man may kill a whole Kingdome over, if the opponents come by single persons; but a moral demonstration is like an Army which can lose single persons and yet prevail, but yet cannot be beaten unless it be beaten all.

4.10. The few little things that Atheistical persons prate against the holy Jesus and his most excellent Religion, are infinitely outweighed by the multitude and variety of things to be said for it; and let the others stand (as if they meet with persons that cannot answer them) yet they are sure this greater ought to prevail, because it possesses all the corners of reason, and meets with every instance, and complies with the manner of a man, and is fitted to the nature of things, and complies with the Will, and perswades the understanding, and is a guard against the tricks of Sophisters, and does not onely effect its purpose by direct influence, but is secured by reflexion upon it self, and does more by its indirect strength, and by a back blow, then by its first operations; and therefore,

This instance and this way of argument may be of more use to those persons who cannot so dispute,11. but that they are apt to be abused by little things, by talkings and imperfect arguings; it may be a defensative against trifling objections, and the impious pratings of the nequam ingeniosi the witty fools, while the men are armed by love and prudence and wise securities to stand with confidence and piety against talkings and intrigues of danger; for by this way best, Wisdome is justified of all her children.

An instance of Moral demonstration, or a conjugation of probabilities, proving that the Religion of Jesus Christ is from God.

THis discourse of all the disputables in the world,12. shall require the fewest things to be granted; even nothing but what was evident, even nothing but the very subject of the Question, viz. That there was such a man as Jesus Christ, that he pretended such things and taught such doctrines: for he that will prove these things to be from God, must be allowed that they were from something or other. But this postulate I doe not ask for need, but for orders sake and Art; for what the histories of that Age reported as a publick affair, as one of the most eminent transactions of the world, that which made so much noise, which caused so many changes, which occasioned so many warres, which divided so many hearts, which altered so many families, which procured so many deaths, which obtained so many Laws in favour, and suffered so many Rescripts in the disfavour of its self; that which was not done in a corner, but was 33. years and more in acting; which caused so many Sects, and was opposed by so much Art, and so much power that it might not grow, which filled the world with noise, which effected such great changes in the bodies of men by curing the diseased, and smiting the contumacious or the hypocrites, which drew so many eyes, and fill'd so many tongues, and imployed so many pens, and was the care and the question of the whole world at that time, and immediately after; that which was consigned by publick acts and records of Courts, which was in the Books of friends and enemies, which came accompanied and remarked with eclipses and stars and prodigies of heaven and earth, that which the Jews even in spite and against their wills confessed, and which the witty adversaries intending to overthrow, could never so much as challenge of want of truth in the matter of fact and story; that which they who are infinitely concerned that it should not be beleeved, or more, that it had never been, doe yet onely labour to make to appear not to have been Divine: Certainly, this thing is so certain that it was, that the defenders of it need not account it a kindness to have it presupposed; for never was any story in the world that had so many degrees of credibility, as the story of the person, life and death of Jesus Christ: And if he had not been a true Prophet, yet that he was in the world, and said and did such things cannot be denied; for even concerning Mahomet we make no question but he was in the world, and led a great part of mankinde after him, and what was less proved we infinitely beleeve; and what all men say, and no man denies, and was notorious in it self, of this we may make further inquiries whether it was all that which it pretended, for that it did make pretences and was in the world, needs no more probation.

But now whether Jesus Christ was sent from God and delivered the Will of God,13. we are to take accounts from all the things of the world which were on him, or about him, or from him. Consider first his person: he was foretold by all the Prophets: He, I say, for that appears by the event, and the correspondencies of their sayings to his person: he was described by infallible characterisms which did fit him, and did never fit any but him; for when he was born, then was the fulness of time, and the Messias was expected at the time when Jesus did appear, which gave occasion to many of the godly then to wait for him, and to hope to live till the time of his revelation: and they did so, and with a spirit of Prophecie which their own nation did confess and honour, glorified God at the revelation: and the most excellent and devout persons that were conspicuous for their piety did then rejoyce in him, and confess him; and the expectation of him at that time was so publick and famous, that it gave occasion to divers Impostors to abuse the credulity of the people in pretending to be the Messias; but not onely the predictions of the time, and the perfect Synchronisms did point him out, but at his birth a strange starre appeared, which guided certain Levantine Princes and Sages to the inquiry after him; a strange starre which had an irregular place and an irregular motion, that came by design, and acted by counsel, the counsel of the Almighty Guide, it moved from place to place, till it stood just over the house where the Babe did sleep; a starre of which the Heathen knew much, who knew nothing of him; a starre which Chalcidius affirmed to have signified the descent of God for the salvation of man; a starre that guided the wise Chaldees to worship him with gifts (as the same disciple of Plato does affirm, and) as the holy Scriptures deliver; and this starre could be no secret; It troubled all the Country; It put Herod upon strange arts of security for his Kingdome, it effected a sad tragedy accidentally, for it occasioned the death of all the little Babes in the City, and voisinage of Bethlehem: But the birth of this young child which was thus glorified by a starre, was also signified by an Angel, and was effected by the holy Spirit of God, in a manner which was in it self supernatural; a Virgin was his Mother, and God was his Father, and his beginning was miraculous; and this matter of his birth of a Virgin was proved to an interested and jealous person, even to Joseph the supposed father of Jesus, it was affirmed publickly by all his family, and by all his disciples, and published in the middest of all his enemies, who by no artifice could reprove it, a matter so famous, that when it was urged as an argument to prove Jesus to be the Messias, by the force of a Prophecie in Isaiah [A Virgin shall conceive a Son] they who obstinately refused to admit him, did not deny the matter of fact, but denied that it was so meant by the Prophet, which if it were true, can onely prove that Jesus was more excellent then was foretold by the Prophets, but that there was nothing less in him then was to be in the Messias; it was a matter so famous that the Arabian Physicians who can affirm no such things of their Mahomet, and yet not being able to deny it to be true of the holy Jesus, endevour to elevate and lessen the thing, by saying, It is not wholly beyond the force of nature, that a Virgin should conceive, so that it was on all hands undeniable, that the Mother of Jesus was a Virgin, a Mother without a Man. This is that Jesus at whose presence before he was born, a babe in his mothers belly also did leap for joy, who was also a person extraordinary himself, conceived in his mothers old age, after a long barrenness, signified by an Angel in the Temple, to his father officiating his Priestly Office, who was also struck dumb for his not present beleeving: all the people saw it, and all his kindred were witnesses of his restitution, and he was named by the Angel, and his Office declared to be the fore-runner of the holy Jesus; and this also was foretold by one of the old Prophets; for the whole story of this Divine person is a chain of providence and wonder, every link of which is a verification of a Prophecie, and all of it is that thing which from Adam to the birth of Jesus was pointed at and hinted by all the Prophets, whose words in him passed perfectly into the event. This is that Jesus who as he was born without a Father, so he was learned without a Master, he was a Man without age, a Doctor in a Childs garment, disputing in the Sanctuary at 12. years old. He was a sojourner in Egypt, because the poor Babe born of an indigent Mother was a formidable rival to a potent King, and this fear could not come from the design of the infant, but must needs arise from the illustriousness of the birth, and the Prophecies of the child, and the sayings of the learned, and the journey of the Wise men, and the decrees of God; this journey and the return were both managed by the conduct of an Angel and a Divine dream, for to the Son of God all the Angels did rejoyce to minister. This blessed Person made thus excellent by his Father, and glorious by miraculous consignations, and illustrious by the ministery of heavenly spirits, and proclaimed to Mary and to Joseph by two Angels, to the Shepherds by a multitude of the heavenly Host, to the Wise men by a Prophecie and by a Star, to the Jews by the Shepherds, to the Gentiles by the three Wise men, to Herod by the Doctors of the Law, and to himself perfectly known by the inchasing his humane nature in the bosome and heart of God, and by the fulness of the Spirit of God, was yet pleased for 30. years together to live an humble, a laborious, a chast and a devout, a regular and an even, a wise and an exemplar, a pious and an obscure life, without complaint, without sin, without design of fame, or grandeur of spirit, till the time came that the clefts of the rock were to open, and the Diamond give its lustre, and be worn in the Diademes of Kings, and then this person was wholly admirable; for he was ushered into the world by the voice of a loud Crier in the wilderness, a person austere and wise, of a strange life, full of holiness and full of hardness, and a great Preacher of righteousness, a man beleeved by all the people that he came from God, one who in his own nation gathered disciples publickly, and (which amongst them was a great matter) he was the Doctor of a new institution, and baptized all the Country, yet this man so great, so rever'd, so followed, so listned to by King and people, by Doctors and by ideots, by Pharisees and Sadduces, this man Preached Jesus to the people, pointed out the Lamb of God, told that he must increase, and himself from all that fame must retire to give him place; he received him to baptism after having with duty and modesty declared his own unworthiness to give, but rather a worthiness to receive baptism from the holy hands of Jesus; but at the solemnity God sent down the holy Spirit upon his holy Son, and by a voice from heaven, a voice of thunder (and God was in that voice) declared that this was his Son, and that he was delighted in him. This voyce from heaven was such, so evident, so certain a conviction of what it did intend to prove, so known and accepted as the way of Divine revelation under the second Temple, that at that time every man that desired a sign honestly, would have been satisfied with such a voyce; it being the testimony by which God made all extraordinaries to be credible to his people from the days of Ezra, to the death of the Nation; and that there was such a voice, not onely then, but divers times after, was as certain, and made as evident as things of that nature can ordinarily be made. For it being a matter of fact, cannot be supposed infinite, but limited to time and place, heard by a certain number of persons, and was as a clap of thunder upon ordinary accounts, which could be heard but by those who were within the sphere of its own activity; and reported by those to others, who are to give testimony as testimonies are required, which are credible under the test of two or three disinterested, honest, and true men, and though this was done in the presence of more, and oftner then once, yet it was a divine testimony but at first, but is to be conveyed by the means of men; and as God thundred from heaven at the giving of the Law, though that he did so, we have notice onely from the Books of Moses received from the Jewish Nation; so he did in the days of the Baptist, and so he did to Peter, James, and John, and so he did in the presence of the Pharisees and many of the common people; and as it is not to be supposed that all these would joyn their divided interests, for and against themselves for the verification of a lye, so if they would have done it, they could not have done it without reproof of their own parties, who would have been glad by the discovery onely to disgrace the whole story; but if the report of honest and just men so reputed, may be questioned for matter of fact, or may not be accounted sufficient to make faith when there is no pretence of men to the contrary, besides that we can have no story transmitted to us, no records kept, no acts of Courts, no narratives of the days of old, no traditions of our Fathers; so there could not be left in nature any usual instrument whereby God could after the manner of men declare his own will to us, but either we should never know the will of heaven upon earth, or it must be that God must not onely tell it once but always, and not onely always to some men, but always to all men; and then as there would be no use of history, or the honesty of men, and their faithfulness in telling any act of God in declaration of his will, so there would be perpetual necessity of miracles, and we could not serve God directly with our understanding, for there would be no such thing as faith, that is, of assent without conviction of understanding, and we could not please God with beleeving, because there would be in it nothing of the will, nothing of love and choyce; and that faith which is, would be like that of Thomas, to beleeve what we see or hear, and God should not at all govern upon earth unless he did continually come himself: for thus, all Government, all Teachers, all Apostles, all Messengers would be needless, because they could not shew to the eye what they told to the ears of men; And it might as well be disbeleeved in all Courts and by all Princes, that this was not the letter of a Prince, or the act of a man, or the writing of his hand, and so all humane entercourse must cease, and all senses but the eye be useless as to this affair, or else to the ear all voyces must be strangers but the principal, if I say, no reports shall make faith: But it is certain, that when these voyces were sent from heaven and heard upon earth they prevailed amongst many that heard them not, and disciples were multiplied upon such accounts, or else it must be that none that did hear them could be beleeved by any of their friends and neighbours; for if they were, the voyce was as effective at the reflex and rebound as in the direct emission, and could prevail with them that beleeved their brother or their friend, as certainly as with them that beleeved their own ears and eyes.

I need not speak of the vast numbers of miracles which he wrought;14. miracles which were not more demonstrations of his power then of his mercy; for they had nothing of pompousness and ostentation, but infinitely of charity and mercy, and that permanent and lasting and often: he opened the eyes of the blinde, he made the crooked straight, he made the weak strong, he cured fevers with the touch of his hand, and an issue of blood with the hem of his garment, and sore eyes with the spittle of his mouth and the clay of the earth; he multiplied the loaves and fishes, he raised the dead to life, a young maiden, the widows son of Naim, and Lazarus, and cast out Devils by the word of his mouth, which he could never doe but by the power of God. For Satan does not cast out Satan, nor a house fight against it self, if it means to stand long, and the Devil could not help Jesus, because the holy Jesus taught men virtue, called them from the worshipping Devils, taught them to resist the Devil, to lay aside all those abominable idolatries by which the Devil doth rule in the hearts of men: he taught men to love God, to fly from temptations to sin, to hate and avoid all those things of which the Devil is guilty, for Christianity forbids pride, envy, malice, lying, and yet affirms that the Devil is proud, envious, malicious, and the Father of lies; and therefore where ever Christianity prevails, the Devil is not worshipped, and therefore he that can think that a man without the power of God could overturn the Devils principles, cross his designs, weaken his strengths, baffle him in his policies, befool him and turn him out of possession, & make him open his own mouth against himself as he did often, and confess himself conquered by Jesus and tormented, as the Oracle did to Augustus Caesar, and the Devil to Jesus himself, he I say, that thinks a meer man can doe this, knows not the weaknesses of a man, nor the power of an Angel; but he that thinks this could be done by compact, and by consent of the Devil, must think him to be an Intelligence without understanding, a power without force, a fool and a sot to assist a power against himself, and to persecute the power he did assist, to stirre up the world to destroy the Christians, whose Master and Lord he did assist to destroy himself; and when we read that Porphyrius an Heathen,Euseb. lib. 5. c. 1. praep. Euang. a professed enemy to Christianity, did say, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that since Jesus was worshipped, the gods could help no man, that is, the gods which they worshipped; the poor baffled enervated Daemons: He must either think that the Devils are as foolish as they are weak, or else that they did nothing towards this declination of their power; and therefore that they suffer it by a power higher then themselves, that is, by the power of God in the hand of Jesus.

But besides that God gave testimony from heaven concerning him;15. he also gave this testimony of himself to have come from God, because that he did Gods will; for he that is a good man and lives by the Laws of God and of his Nation, a life innocent and simple, prudent and wise, holy and spotless, unreproved and unsuspected, he is certainly by all wise men said in a good sense to be the son of God, but he who does well and speaks well, and calls all men to glorify and serve God, and serves no ends but of holiness and charity, of wisdome of hearts and reformat on of manners, this man carries great authority in his sayings, and ought to prevail with good men in good things, for good ends, which is all that is here required. But his nature was so sweet, his manners so humble, his words so wise and composed, his comportment so grave and winning, his answers so seasonable, his questions so deep, his reproof so severe and charitable, his pity so great and merciful, his preachings so full of reason and holiness, of weight and authority, his conversation so useful and beneficent, his poverty great but his alms frequen • , his family so holy and religious, his and their imployment so profitable, his meekness so incomparable, his passions without difference, save onely where zeal or pity carried him on to worthy and apt expressions a person that never laughed, but often wept in a sense of the calamities of others; he loved every man and hated no man, he gave counsel to the doubtful, and instructed the ignorant, he bound up the broken hearts, and strengthened the feeble knees, he releeved the poor, and converted the sinners, he despised none that came to him for releef, and as for those that did not he went to them; he took all occasions of mercy that were offered him, and went abroad for more; he spent his days in Preaching and healing, and his nights in Prayers and conversation with God, he was obedient to Laws and subject to Princes, though he was the Prince of Judaea in right of his Mother, and of all the world in right of his Father; the people followed him, but he made no conventions, and when they were made. he suffered no tumults, when they would have made him a King he withdrew himself, when he knew they would put him to death he offered himself; he knew mens hearts, and conversed secretly, and gave answer to their thoughts and prevented their questions: he would work a miracle rather then give offence, and yet suffer every offence rather then see God his Father dishonoured, he exactly kept the Law of Moses, to which he came to put a period, and yet chose to signify his purpose onely by doing acts of mercy upon their Sabbath, doing nothing which they could call a breach of a Commandement, but healing sick people, a charity which themselves would doe to beasts, and yet they were angry at him for doing it to their brethren: In all his life, and in all his conversation with his Nation, he was innocent as an Angel of light, and when by the greatness of his worth, and the severity of his doctrine, and the charity of his miracles, and the noises of the people, and his immense fame in all that part of the world, and the multitude of his disciples and the authority of his Sermons, and his free reproof of their hypocrisy, and his discovery of their false doctrines and weak traditions, he had branded the reputation of the vicious rulers of the people, and they resolved to put him to death, they who had the biggest malice in the world, and the weakest accusations were forced to supply their want of articles against him by making truth to be his fault; and his office to be his cr • me, and his open con • ession of what was asked him to be his article of condemnation, and yet after all this they could not perswade the competent Judge to condemne him, or to finde him guilty of any fault, and therefore they were forced to threaten him with Caesars name, against whom then they would pretend him to be an enemy, though in their charge they neither proved, nor indeed laid it against him, and yet to whatsoever they objected he made no return, but his silence and his innocence were remarkable and evident, without labour and reply, and needed no more argument then the Sun needs an advocate to prove that he is the brightest starre in the firmament.

Well,16. so it was, they crucified him, and when they did they did as much put out the eye of heaven as destroy the Son of God; for when with an incomparable sweetness, and a patience exemplar to all ages of sufferers, he endured affronts, examinations, scorns, insolencies of rude ungentle Tradesmen, cruel whippings, injurious, unjust and unreasonable usages from those whom he obliged by all the arts of endearment and offers of the biggest kindness, at last he went to death as to the work which God appointed him that he might become the worlds sacrifice, and the great example of holiness, and the instance of representing by what way the world was to be made happy [even by sufferings and so entring into heaven] that he might (I say) become the Saviour of his Enemies, and the elder Brother to his friends, and the Lord of Glory, and the fountain of its emanation. Then it was that God gave new testimonies from heaven; The Sun was eclipsed all the while he was upon the Cross, and yet the Moon was in the full; that is, he lost his light, not because any thing in nature did invest him, but because the God of nature (as a Heathen at that very time confessed, who yet saw nothing of this sad iniquity) did suffer. The rocks did rend, the ve • l of the Temple divided of it self and opened the inclosures, and disparked the Sanctuary, and made it pervious to the Gentiles eye; the dead arose, and appeared in Jerusalem to their friends, the Centurion and divers of the people smote their hearts, and were by these strange indications convinced that he was the Son of God. His garments were parted, and lots cast upon his inward coat, they gave him vinegar and gall to drink, they brake not a bone of him, but they pierced his side with a spear, looking upon him whom they had pierced; according to the Prophecies of him, which were so clear and descended to minutes and circumstances of his passion, that there was nothing left by which they could doubt whether this were he or no who was to come into the world: But after all this, that all might be finally verified and no scruple left, after three days burial, a great stone being rolled to the face of the grave, and the stone sealed, and a guard of Souldiers placed about it, he arose from the grave, and for forty days together conversed with his followers and Disciples, and beyond all suspicion was seen of 500. Brethren at once, which is a number too great to give their consent and testimony to a lye, and it being so publickly and confidently affirmed at the very time it was done, and for ever after urged by all Christians, used as the most mighty demonstration, proclaimed, preached, talked of, even upbraided to the gainsayers, affirmed by eye-witnesses, perswaded to the kinred and friends and the relatives and companions of all those 500. persons who were eye-witnesses, it is infinitely removed from a reasonable suspicion; and at the end of those days was taken up into heaven in the sight of many of them, as Elias was in the presence of Elisha.

Now he of whom all these things are true,17. must needs be more then a meer man, and that they were true was affirmed by very many eye-witnesses, men who were innocent, plain men, men that had no bad ends to serve, men that looked for no preferment by the thing in this life; men to whom their Master told they were to expect not Crowns and Scepters, not praise of men or wealthy possessions, not power and ease, but a voluntary casting away care and attendance upon secular affairs that they might attend their Ministery; poverty and prisons, trouble and vexation persecution and labour, whippings and banishment, bonds and death, and for a reward they must stay till a good day came, but that was not to be at all in this world; and when the day of restitution and recompence should come, they should never know till it came, but upon the hope of this and the faith of Jesus, and the word of God so taught, so consigned, they must rely wholly and for ever. Now let it be considered. how could matters of fact be proved better? and how could this be anything, but such as to rely upon matters of fact? what greater certainty can we have of any thing that was ever done which we saw not, or heard not, but by the report of wise and honest persons? especially since they were such whose life and breeding was so far from ambition and pompousness that as they could not naturally and reasonably hope for any great number of Proselytes, so the same that could be hop'd for amongst them, as it must be a matter of their own procuring, and consequently uncertain, so it must needs be very inconsiderable, not fit to outweigh the danger and the loss, nor yet at all valuable by them whose education and pretences were against it? These we have plentifully. But if these men are numerous and united, it is more. Then we have more; For so many did affirm these things which they saw and heard, that thousands of people were convinced of the truth of them: But then if these men offer their oath, it is yet more, but yet not so much as we have, for they sealed those things with their blood; they gave their life for a testimony; and what reward can any man expect, if he gives his life for a lye? who shall make him recompence, or what can tempt him to doe it knowingly? but after all, it is to be remembred, that as God hates lying, so he hates incredulity; as we must not beleeve a lye, so neither stop up our eyes and ears against truth; and what we doe every minute of our lives in matters of little and of great concernment, if we refuse to doe in our Religion which yet is to be conducted as other humane affairs are, by humane instruments and arguments of perswasion proper to the nature of the thing, it is an obstinacy that is as contrary to humane reason as it is to Divine faith.

These things relate to the person of the holy Jesus, 18. and prove sufficiently that it was extraordinary, that it was divine, that God was with him, that his power wrought in him; and therefore that it was his will which Jesus taught, and God signed. But then if nothing of all this had been, yet even the doctrine it self proves it self Divine and to come from God.

For it is a Doctrine perfective of humane nature,19. that teaches us to love God and to love one another, to hurt no man, and to doe good to every man, it propines to us the noblest, the highest, and the bravest pleasures of the world; the joys of charity, the rest of innocence, the peace of quiet spirits, the wealth of beneficence, and forbids us onely to be beasts and to be Devils, it allows all that God and nature intended, and onely restrains the excrescencies of nature, and forbids us to take pleasure in that which is the onely entertainment of Devils, in murders and revenges, malice and spiteful words and actions; it permits corporal pleasures where they can best minister to health and societies, to conservation of families and honour of Communities, it teaches men to keep their words that themselves may be secured in all their just interests, and to doe good to others that good may be done to them; it forbids biting one another that we may not be devoured by one another; and commands obedience to superiours, that we may not be ruined in confusions; it combines Governments, and confirms all good Laws, and makes peace, and opposes and prevents warres where they are not just, and where they are not necessary. It is a Religion that is life and spirit, not consisting in ceremonies and external amusements, but in the services of the heart, and the real fruit of lips and hands, that is, of good words and good deeds, it bids us to doe that to God which is agreeable to his excellencies, that is, worship him with the best thing we have, and make all things else minister to it; it bids us doe that to our neighbour, by which he may be better: it is the perfection of the natural Law, and agreeable to our natural necessities, and promotes our natural ends and designs: it does not destroy reason, but instructs it in very many things, and complies with it in all, it hath in it both heat and light, and is not more effectual then it is beauteous; it promises every thing that we can desire, and yet promises nothing but what it does effect; it proclaims warie against all vices, and generally does command every vertue; it teaches us with ease to mortify those affections which reason durst scarce reprove, because she hath not strength enough to conquer, and it does create in us those vertues which reason of her self never knew, and after they are known, could never approve sufficiently: it is a doctrine in which nothing is superfluous or burdensome, nor yet is there any thing wanting which can procure happiness to mankinde, or by which God can be glorified: and if wisdome, and mercy, and justice, and simplicity, and holiness, and purity, and meekness, and contentedness, and charity, be images of God and rays of Divinity, then that Doctrine in which all these shine so gloriously, and in which nothing else is ingredient must needs be from God; and that all this is true in the Doctrine of Jesus needs no other probation but the reading the words.

For that the words of Jesus are contained in the Gospels,20. that is, in the writings of them, who were eye-witnesses and ear-witnesses of the actions and Sermons of Jesus, is not at all to be doubted; for in every sect we beleeve their own records of Doctrine and institution; for it is madness to suppose the Christians to pretend to be servants of the Laws of Jesus, and yet to make a Law of their own which he made not: no man doubts but that the Alcoran is the Law of Mahomet, that the old Testament contains the Religion of the Jews; and the authority of these Books is proved by all the arguments of the Religion, for all the arguments perswading to the Religion are intended to prove no other then is contained in those Books; and these having been for 1500. years and more, received absolutely by all Christian assemblies, if any man shall offer to make a question of their authority, he must declare his reasons, for the disciples of the Religion have sufficient presumption, security and possession, till they can be reasonably disturb'd; but that now they can never be is infinitely certain, because we have a long, immemorial, universal tradition that these Books were written in those times, by those men whose Names they bear, they were accepted by all Churches at the very first notice, except some few of the later, which were first received by some Churches, and then consented to by all, they were acknowledged by the same, and by the next age for genuine, their authority published, their words cited, appeals made to them in all questions of Religion, because it was known and confessed that they wrote nothing but that they knew, so that they were not deceived; and to say they would lie must be made to appear by something extrinsecal to this inquiry, and was never so much as plausibly pretended by any Adversaries, and it being a matter of another mans will, must be declared by actions, or not at all. But besides the men that wrote them were to be beleeved because they did Miracles, they wrote Prophecies, which are verified by the event, persons were cured at their Sepulchres, a thing so famous that it was confessed even by the enemies of the Religion: and after all, that which the world ought to rely upon, is the wisdome and the providence and the goodness of God; all which it concerned to take care that the Religion, which himself so adorned and proved by miracles and mighty signs, should not be lost, nor any false writings be obtruded in stead of true, lest without our fault the will of God become impossible to be obeyed. But to return to the thing: All those excellent things which singly did make famous so many sects of Philosophers, and remarked so many Princes of their sects, all them united, and many more which their eyes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 dark and dim could not see, are heaped together in this systeme of wisdome and holiness. Here are plain precepts full of deepest mystery; here are the measures of holiness and approaches to God describ'd; obedience and conformity, mortification of the body, and elevations of the spirit, abstractions from earth, and Arts of society and union with heaven, degrees of excellencies, and tendences to perfection, imitations of God, and conversations with him; these are the heights and descents, upon the plain grounds of natural reason, and natural religion, for there is nothing commanded but what our reason by nature ought to choose, and yet nothing of natural reason taught but what is heightned and made more perfect by the Spirit of God; and when there is any thing in the Religion, that is against flesh and blood, it is onely when flesh and blood is against us, and against reason, when flesh and blood either would hinder us from great felicity, or bring us into great misery: To conclude, it is such a Law, that nothing can hinder men to receive and entertain, but a pertinacious baseness and love to vice, and none can receive it but those who resolve to be good and excellent; and if the holy Jesus had come into the world with less splendor of power and mighty demonstrations, yet even the excellency of what he taught, makes him alone fit to be the Master of the world.

But then let us consider what this excellent person did effect,21. and with what instruments he brought so great things to pass. He was to put a period to the Rites of Moses, and the Religion of the Temple; of which the Jews were zealous even unto pertinacy; to reform the manner of all mankinde, to confound the wisdome of the Greeks, to break in peeces the power of the Devil, to destroy the worship of all false Gods, to pull down their Oracles, and change their Laws, and by principles wise and holy to reform the false discourses of the world. But see what was to be taught, A Trinity in the Unity of the Godhead, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 , that is the Christian Arithmetick, Three are one and one are three, so Lucian in his Philopatris, or some other derides the Christian Doctrine; See their Philosophy, Ex nihilo nihil fit. No: Ex nihilo omnia, all things are made of nothing; and a Man-God and a God-Man, the same person finite and infinite, born in time, and yet from all eternity the Son of God, but yet born of a Woman, and she a Maid, but yet a Mother; resurrection of the dead, reunion of soul and body; this was part of the Christian Physicks or their natural Philosophy. But then certainly their moral was easy and delicious. It is so indeed, but not to flesh and blood, whose appetites it pretends to regulate or to destroy, to restrain or else to mortify: fasting and penance, and humility, loving our enemies, restitution of injuries, and self-denial, and taking up the Cross, and losing all our goods, and giving our life for Jesus: As the other was hard to beleeve, so this is as hard to doe. But for whom and under whose conduct was all this to be beleeved, and all this to be done, and all this to be suffered? surely for some glorious and mighty Prince, whose splendor as far outshines the Romane Empire as the jewels of Cleopatra outshined the swadling clothes of the Babe at Bethlehem. No it was not so neither. For all this was for Jesus whom his followers preached; a poor Babe born in a stable, the son of a Carpenter, cradled in a cratch, swadled in poor clouts; it was for him whom they indeed call'd a God, but yet whom all the world knew, and they themselves said, was whip'd at a post, nailed to a Cross; he fell under the malice of the Jews his Countrymen, and the power of his Romane Lords, a cheap and a pitiful sacrifice without beauty and without splendor. The design is great, but does not yet seem possible; But therefore let us see what instruments the Holy Jesus chose to effect these so mighty changes, to perswade so many propositions, to endear so great sufferings, to overcome so great enemies, to master so many impossibilities which this Doctrine and this Law from this Master were sure to meet withall.

Here,22. here it is that the Divinity of the power is proclaimed. When a man goes to warre he raises as great an Army as he can to out-number his Enemy, but when God fights, three hundred men that lap like a dogge are sufficient; nay one word can dissolve the greatest army. He that means to effect any thing must have means of his own proportionable, and if they be not, he must fail, or derive them from the mighty. See then with what instruments the holy Jesus sets upon this great reformation of the world. Twelve men of obscure and poor birth, of contemptible Trades and quality, without learning, without breeding; these men were sent into the midst of a knowing and wise world to dispute with the most famous Philosophers of Greece, to out-wit all the learning of Athens, to out-preach all the Roman Orators; to introduce into a newly setled Empire, which would be impatient of novelties and change, such a change as must destroy all their Temples, or remove thence all their gods: against which change all the zeal of the world, and all the passions, and all the seeming pretences which they could make, must needs be violently opposed a change that introduced new Laws, and caused them to reverse the old, to change that Religion under which their Fathers long did prosper, and under which the Romane Empire obtained so great a grandeur, for a Religion which in appearance was silly and humble, meek and peaceable, not apt indeed to doe harm, but exposing men to all the harm in the world, abating their courage, bl • nting their swords, teaching peace and unactiveness, and making the Souldiers arms in a manner useless, and untying their military girdle; a Religion which contradicted their reasons of State, and erected new Judicatories, and made the Romane Courts to be silent and without causes; a Religion that gave countenance to the poor and pitiful (but in a time when riches were adored, & ambition esteemed the greatest nobleness, and pleasure thought to be the chiefest good) it brought no peculiar blessing to the rich or mighty, unless they would become poor and humble in some reall sense or other; a Religion that would change the face of things, and would also pierce into the secrets of the soul, and unravel all the intrigues of hearts, and reform all evil manners, and break vile habits into gentleness and counsel: that such a Religion in such a time, preached by such mean persons, should triumph over the Philosophy of the world, and the arguments of the subtle, and the Sermons of the eloquent, and the power of Princes, and the interest of States, and the inclinations of nature, and the blindness of zeal, and the force of custome, and the pleasures of sin, and the busie Arts of the Devil, that is, against wit, and power, and money, and Religion, and wilfulness, and fame, and Empire, which are all the things in the world that can make a thing impossible; this I say could not be by the proper force of such instruments; for no man can 〈…〉 palm, nor govern wise Empires with Diagrams. It were impudence to send a footman to command Caesar to lay down his arms, to d • sband h • s legions and throw himself into Tyber, or keep a Tavern nex • to Pompeys Theatre; but if a sober man shall stand alone unarm'd, undefended, or unprovided, and shall tell that he will make the Sun stand still, or remove a mountain, or reduce Xerxes his Army to the scantling of a single Troop, he that beleeves he will and can doe this, must beleeve he does it by a higher power thee he can yet perceive, and so it was in the present transaction. For that the holy Jesus made invisible powers to doe him visible honours, that his Apostles hunted the Daemons from their Tripods, their Navels, their Dens, their hollow Pipes, their Temples, and their Altars, that he made the Oracles silent, as Lucian, Porphyrie, Celsus, and other Heathens confess; that against the order of new things, which let them be never so profitable or good doe yet suffer reproach and cannot prevail unless they commence in a time of advantage and favour, yet that this should flourish like the Palm by pressure, grow glorious by opposition, thrive by persecution, and was demonstrated by objections, argues a higher cause then the immediate instrument; now how this higher cause did intervene is visible and notorious: The Apostles were not learned, but the holy Jesus promised that he would send down wisdome from above, from the Father of spirits; they had no power, but they should be invested with power from on high they were ignorant and timorous, but he would make them learned and confident, and so he did: he promised that in a few days he would send the holy Ghost upon them, and he did so, after ten days they felt and saw glorious immission from heaven, lights of movable fire sitting upon their heads, and that light did illuminate their hearts, and the mighty rushing winde inspired them with a power of speaking divers languages, and brought to their remembrances all that Jesus did and taught, and made them wise to conduct souls, and bold to venture, and prudent to advise, and powerful to doe miracles, and w •• y to convince gainsayers, and hugely instructed in the Scriptures, and gave them the spirit of Government, and the spirit of Prophecy. This thing was so publick that at the first notice of it three thousand souls were converted on that very day, at the very time when it was done; for it was certainly a visible demonstration of an invisible power, that ignorant persons who were never taught, should in an instant speak all the Languages of the Romane Empire; and indeed this thing was so necessary to be so, and so certain that it was so, so publick and so evident, and so reasonable, and so useful, that it is not easy to say whether it was the indication of a greater power, or a greater wisdome; and now the means was proportionable enough to the biggest end; without learning they could not confute the learned world; but therefore God became their Teacher: without power they could not break the Devils violence, but therefore God gave them power; without courage they could not contest against all the violence of the Jews and Gentiles; but therefore God was their strength and gave them fortitude; without great caution and providence they could not avoid the traps of crafty Persecutors, but therefore God gave them caution, and made them provident, and as Besaleel and Aholiab received the spirit of God, the spirit of understanding to enable them to work excellently in the Tabernacle, so had the Apostles to make them wise for the work of God and the Ministeries of this Diviner Tabernacle, which God pitched, not man. Immediately upon this, the Apostles to make a fulness of demonstration and an undeniable conviction gave the spirit to others also, to Jews and Gentiles and to the men of Samaria, and they spake with Tongues and prophesied, then they preached to all Nations, and endured all persecutions, and cured all diseases, and raised the dead to life, and were brought before Tribunals, and confessed the Name of Jesus, and convinced the blasphemous Jews out of their own Prophets, and not onely prevailed upon women and weak men, but even upon the bravest and wisest. All the disciples of John the Baptist, the Nazarens and Ebionites, Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea, Sergius the President, Dionysius an Athenian Judge, and Polycarpus, Justinus and Irenaus, Athenagoras and Origen, Tertullian and Clemens of Alexandria, who could not be such fools as upon a matter not certainly true but probably false, to unravel their former principles, and to change their liberty for a Prison, wealth for poverty, honour for disreputation, life for death, if by such exchange they had not been secured of truth and holiness and the will of God.

But above all these was Saul, 23. a bold and a witty, a zealous and learned young man, who going with Letters to persecute the Christians of Damascus, was by a light from heaven called from his furious march, reproved by Gods Angel for persecuting the cause of Jesus, was sent to the City, baptized by a Christian Minister, instructed and sent abroad, and he became the prodigy of the world for learning and zeal, for preaching and writing, for labour and sufference, for government and wisdome; he was admitted to see the holy Jesus after the Lord was taken into heaven, he was taken up into Paradise, he conversed with Angels, he saw unspeakable rayes of glory, and besides that himself said it, who had no reason to lie, who would get nothing by it here but a conjugation of troubles, and who should get nothing by it hereafter if it were false; besides this I say, that he did all those acts of zeal and obedience for the promotion of the Religion does demonstrate he had reason extraordinary for so sudden a change, so strange a labour, so frequent and incomparable sufferings: and therefore as he did and suffered so much upon such glorious motives, so he spared not to publish it to all the world, he spake it to Kings and Princes, he told it to the envious Jews; he had partners of his journey who were witnesses of the miraculous accident, and in his publication he urged the notoriousness of the fact, as a thing not feigned, not private, but done at noon day under the Test of competent persons, and it was a thing that proved it self, for it was effective of a present, a great, and a permanent change.

But now it is no new wonder but a pursuance of the same conjugation of great and Divine things,24. that the Fame and Religion of Jesus was with so incredible a swiftness scattered over the face of the habitable world, from one end of the earth unto the other; it filled all Asia immediately, it passed presently to Europe, and to the furthest Africans, and all the way it went it told nothing but an holy and an humble story, that he who came to bring it into the world, died an ignominious death, and yet this death did not take away their courage, but added much: for they could not fear death for that Master, whom they knew to have for their sakes suffered death, and came to life again. But now infinite numbers of persons of all sexes, and all ages, and all Countries came in to the Holy Crucifix, and he that was crucified in the reign of Tiberius, was in the time of Nero, even in Rome it self, and in Nero's family by many persons esteem'd for a God; and it was upon publick record that he was so acknowledged; and this was by a Christian, Justin Martyr, urged to the Senate, and to the Emperours themselves, who if it had been otherwise could easily have confuted the bold allegation of the Christian, who yet did die for that Jesus who was so speedily reputed for a God; the Cross was worn upon brests, printed in the air, drawn upon fore-heads, carried on banners, put upon crowns Imperial; and yet the Christians were sought for to punishments, and exquisite punishments sought forth for them; their goods were confiscate, their names o • ious, prisons were their houses, and so many kinds of tortures invented for them that Domitius Ulpianus hath spent seven Books in describing the variety of tortures the poor Christian was put to at his first appearing▪ and yet in despite of all this, and ten thousand other objections and impossibilities, whatsoever was for them made the Religion grow, and whatsoever was against them made it grow; if they had peace, the Religion was prosperous, if they had persecution, it was still prosperous: if Princes favoured them the world came in because the Christians lived holily; if Princes were incensed, the world came in because the Christians died bravely. They sought for death with greediness, they desired to be grinded in the teeth of Lions, and with joy they beheld the wheels and the bended trees, the racks and the gibbets, the fires and the burning irons, which were like the chair of Elias to them, instruments to carry them to heaven, into the bosome of their beloved Jesus.

Who would not acknowledge the Divinity of this person,25. and the excellency of this institution, that should see infants to weary the hands of Hangmen for the testimony of Jesus? and wise men preach this doctrine for no other visible reward, but shame and death, poverty and banishment? and Hangmen converted by the blood of Martyrs springing upon their faces which their impious hands and cords have strained through their flesh? who would not have confessed the honour of Jesus, when he should see miracles done at the Tombs of Martyrs, and Devils tremble at the mention of the name of Jesus, and the world running to the honour of the poor Nazaren, and Kings and Queens kissing the feet of the poor servants of Jesus? Could a Jew Fisherman and a Publican effect all this for the son of a poor Maiden of Judaea? can we suppose all the world, or so great a part of mankinde can consent by chance, or suffer such changes for nothing? or for any thing less then this? The son of the poor Maiden was the son of God, and the Fishermen spake by a Divine spirit, and they catched the world with holiness and miracles, with wisdome and power bigger then the strength of all the Roman Legions. And what can be added to all this, but this thing alone to prove the Divinity of Jesus? He is a God, or at least is taught by God who can foretel future contingencies; and so did the holy Jesus, and so did his Disciples.

Our blessed Lord while he was alive foretold that after his death his Religion should flourish more then when he was alive:26. He foretold Persecutions to his Disciples; he foretold the mission of the holy Ghost to be in a very few days after his Ascension, which within ten days came to pass; he prophesied that the fact of Mary Magdalen in anointing the head and feet of her Lord, should be publick and known as the Gospel it self, and spoken of in the same place; he foretold the destruction of Jerusalem and the signs of its approach, and that it should be by Warre, and particularly after the manner of Prophets symbolically, nam'd the Nation should doe it; pointing out the Roman Eagles, he foretold his death, and the manner of it, and plainly before-hand published his Resurrection, and told them it should be the sign to that generation, viz. the great argument to prove him to be the Christ, he prophesied that there should arise false Christs after him, and it came to pass to the extreme great calamity of the Nation; and lastly, he foretold that his beloved Disciple S. John should tarry upon the earth till his coming again, that is, to his coming to Judgement upon Jerusalem; and that his Religion should be preached to the Gentiles, that it should be scattered over all the world, and be received by all Nations, that it should stay upon the face of the earth till his last coming to judge all the world, and that the gates of hell should not be able to prevail against his Church; which Prophecie is made good thus long, till this day, and is as a continual argument to justify the Divinity of the Author: The continuance of the Religion helps to continue it, for it proves that it came from God, who fore old that it should continue; and therefore it must continue because it came from God, and therefore it came from God because it does and shall for ever continue according to the word of the holy Jesus.

But after our blessed Lord was entred into glory,27. the disciples also were Prophets; Agabus foretold the dearth that was to be in the Romane Empire in the days of Claudius Caesar, and that S. Paul should be bound at Jerusalem; S. Paul foretold the entring in of Hereticks into Asia after his departure; and he and S. Peter and S. Jude and generally the rest of the Apostles had two great predictions, which they used not onely as a verification of the doctrine of Jesus, but as a means to strengthen the hearts of the Disciples who were so broken with persecution: The one was, that there should arise a Sect of vile men who should be enemies to Religion and Government, and cause a great Apostacy, which happened notoriously in the Sect of the Gnosticks, which those three Apostles and S. John notoriously and plainly doe describe: And the other was, that although the Jewish Nation did m • ghtily oppose the Religion, it should be but for a while, for they should be destroyed in a short time, and their Nation made extremely miserable; but for the Christians, if they would fly from Jerusalem and goe to Pella, there should not a hair of their head perish: the verification of this Prophecie the Christians extremely long'd for and wondred it staid so long, and began to be troubled at the delay, and suspected all was not well, when the great proof of their Religion was not verified; and while they were in thoughts of heart concerning it, the sad Catalysis did come, and swept away 1100000. of the Nation and from that day forward the Nation was broken in peeces with intolerable calamities, they are scattered over the face of the earth, and are a vagabond Nation, but yet like oyle in a vessel of wine, broken into bubbles but kept in their own circles, and they shall never be an united people till they are servants of the holy Jesus; but shall remain without Priest or Temple, without Altar or Sacrifice, without City or Country, without the land of Promise, or the promise of a blessing, till our Jesus is their high Priest and the Shepherd to gather them into his fold: And this very thing is a mighty demonstration against the Jews by their own Prophets, for when Isaiah and Jeremiah, and Malachi had Prophesied the rejection of the Jews and the calling of the Gentiles, and the change of the old Law, and the introduction of a new by the Messias, that this was he, was therefore certain, because he taught the world a new Law and presently after the publication of this, the old was abrogate, and not onely went into desuetude, but into a total abolition among all the world; and for those of the remnant of the scattered Jews who obstinately blaspheme, the Law is become impossible to them, and they placed in such circumstances that they need not dispute concerning its obligation; for it being external and corporal, ritual and at last made also local, when the circumstances are impossible, the Law that was wholly ceremonial and circumstantial must needs pass away, and when they have lost their Priesthood, they cannot retain the Law, as no man takes care to have his beard shaved when his head is off.

And it is a wonder to consider how the anger of God is gone out upon that miserable people,28. and that so great a blindness is fallen upon them, it being evident and notorious, that the old Testament was nothing but a shadow and umbrage of the new, that the Prophecies of that are plainly ver • fied in this; that all the predictions of the Messias are most undeniably accomplished in the person of Jesus Christ, so that they cannot with any plausibleness or colour be turned any other way, and be applied to any other person, although the Jews make illiterate allegations, and prodigious dreams, by which they have fool'd themselves for 1600. years together, and still hope without reason, and are confident without revelation, and pursue a shadow while they quit the glorious • ody; while in the mean time the Christian prays for his conversion, and is at rest in the truth of Jesus, and hath certain unexpressible confidencies and internal lights, clarities of the holy Spirit of God, and loves to the holy Jesus produc'd in his soul, that he will die when he cannot dispute, and is satisfied and he knows not how, and is sure by comforts, and comforted by the excellency of his beleef, which speaks nothing but holiness, and light and reason, and peace and satisfactions infinite, because he is sure that all the world can be happy if they would live by the Religion of Jesus, and that neither societies of men nor single persons can have felicity but by this, and that therefore God who so decrees to make men happy, hath also decreed that it shall for ever be upon the face of the earth, till the earth it self shall be no more. Amen.

Now if against this vast heap of things any man shall but confront the pretences of any other Religion,29. and see how they fail both of reason and holiness, of wonder and Divinity, how they enter by force, and are kept up by humane interests, how ignorant and unholy, how unlearned and pitiful are their pretences, the darknesses of these must adde great eminency to the brightness of that. For the Jews Religion which came from heaven is therefore not now to be practised, because it did come from heaven, and was to expire into the Christian, it being nothing but the image of this perfection; and the Jews needed no other argument but this, that God hath made theirs impossible now to be done, for he that ties to Ceremonies and outward usages, Temples and Altars, Sacrifices and Priests, troublesome and expensive rites and figures of future signification, means that there should be an abode and fixt dwelling, for these are not to be done by an ambulatory people; and therefore since God hath scattered the people into atomes and crumbs of society, without Temple or Priest, without Sacrifice or Altar, without Urim or Thummim, without Prophet or Vision, even communicating with them no way but by ordinary providence, it is but too evident, that God hath nothing to doe with them in the matter of that Religion, but that it is expired, and no way obligatory to them or pleasing to him which is become impossible to be acted; whereas the Christian Religion is as eternal as the soul of a man, and can no more cease then our spirits can die, and can worship upon mountains and caves, in fields and Churches, in peace and warre, in solitude and society, in persecution and in Sun-shine, by night and by day, and be solemnized by Clergy and Laity in the essential parts of it, and is the perfection of the soul, and the highest reason of man, and the glorification of God.

But for the Heathen religions it is evidently to be seen,30. that they are nothing but an abuse of the natural inclination which all men have to worship a God, whom because they know not, they guess at in the dark; for that they know there is and ought to be something that hath the care and providence of 〈1 page duplicate〉 〈1 page duplicate〉 their affairs. But the body of their Religion is nothing but little arts of Governments, and stratagems of Princes and devices to secure the Government of new Usurpers, or to make obedience to the Laws sure, by being sacred, and to make the yoke that was not natural, pleasant by something that is. But yet for the whole body of it who sees not that their worshippings could not be sacred, because they were done by something that is impure, they appeased their gods with adul • eries and impure mixtures, by such things which Cato was ashamed to see, by gluttonous eatings of flesh, and impious drinkings, and they did litare in humano sanguine, they sacrificed men and women and children to their D • mons, as is notorious in the rites of Bacchus Omesta amongst the Greeks, and of Jupiter, to whom a Greek and a Greekess, a Galatian and a Galatess were yearly offered; in the answers of the Oracles to Calchas as appears in Homer and Virgil; who sees not that crimes were warranted by the example of their immortal gods, and that what did dishonour themselves, they sang to the honour of their gods, whom they affirmed to be passionate and proud, jealous and revengefull, amorous and lustfull, fearfull and impatient, drunken and sleepy, weary and wounded, that the Religions were made lasting by policy and force, by ignorance, and the force of custome, by the preferring an inveterate error, and loving of a quiet and prosperous evil, by the arguments of pleasure, and the correspondencies of sensuality, by the fraud of Oracles, and the patronage of vices, and because they feared every change as an Earthquake, as supposing overturnings of their old error to be the eversion of their well established Governments: and it had been ordinarily impossible that ever Christianity should have entred, if the nature and excellency of it had not been such as to enter like rain into a fleece of wooll, or the Sun into a window without noise or violence, without emotion and disordering the political constitution, without causing trouble to any man but what his own ignorance or peevishness was pleased to spin out of his own bowels, but did establish Governments, secure obedience, made the Laws firm, and the persons of Princes to be sacred; it did not oppose force by force, nor strike Princes for Justice; it defended it self against enemies by patience, and overcame them by kindness, it was the great instrument of God to demonstrate his power in our weaknesses, and to doe good to Mankinde by the imitation of his excellent goodness.

Lastly,31. he that considers concerning the Religion and person of Mahomet, that he was a vicious person, lustful and tyrannical, that he propounded incredible and ridiculous propositions to his Disciples, that it entred by the sword, by blood and violence, by murder and robbery, that it propounds sensual rewards and allures to compliance by bribing our basest lusts, that it conserves it self by the same means it entred; that it is unlearned and foolish, against reason, and the discourses of all wise men, that it did no miracles and made false Prophecies: in short, that in the person that founded it, in the article it perswades in the manner of prevailing, in the reward it offers it is unholy and foolish and rude; it must needs appear to be void of all pretence, and that no man of reason can ever be fairly perswaded by arguments, that it is the daughter of God and came down from heaven. Since therefore there is so nothing to be said for any other Religion, and so very much for Christianity, every one of whose pretences can be proved as well as the things themselves doe require, and as all the world expects such things should be proved; it follows that the holy Jesus is the Son of God, that his Religion is commanded by God, and is that way by which he will be worshipped and honoured, and that there is no other name under heaven by which we can be saved, but onely by the name of the Lord Jesus. He that puts his soul upon this cannot perish neither can he be reproved who hath so much reason and argument 〈◊〉 his Religion. Sit anima mea cum Christianis; I pray God my soul may be n •• bred amongst the Christians.

THIS 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 I have here brought as an instance of moral demonstration, not onely to doe honour to my dearest Lord, by speaking true and great things of his Name, and indevouring to advance and esta •• lish his Kingdom • , but to represent in order to the first in • ention, that a heap of probabilities may in some cases make a sure Conscience; for as Ciecro says, Probable id est, 〈◊〉 habet in se quandam similitudinem, sive id falsum est, sive verum. For 〈◊〉 is not in the thing properly, for every thing is true or false in it self, and even false things may have the face and the likeness of truth, and cozen even w • se persons. It was said of Bias in Diogenes Laertius, Orator summus & 〈◊〉 , sed in bonam causam dicendi vim omnem exercuit, he could speak excell • ntly, but then he spake best when he had an ill cause. This Lactantius 〈…〉 malitiam, a cunning and an eloquent malice. But then as falshood many put on the face of truth, so may truth also look like it self; and indeed every truth that men preach in Religions is at least probable, that is, there is so much to be said for it, that wise and good men may be perswaded into every truth; an • the cause that it is onely probable is by reason of our want of knowledge of things; but if it so happen that there is much to be said for the truth, and little or nothing against it, then it is a moral demonstration, that is, it ought to perswade firmly, and upon it we may rest confidently.

This onely I am to admonish, that our assent in these cases is not to be greater then the force of the premises,33. and therefore the Church of Rome offering to prove all her Religion as it distinguishes from the other divisions of Christians, onely by some prudential motives, or probable inducements, and yet requiring that all her disciples should beleeve it with Divine and infallible faith, as certainly as we beleeve a Mathematical demonstration, does unjustly require brick where she gives no straw, and builds a tower upon a bu • rush, and confesses that her interest is stronger then her argument, and that where by direct proof she cannot prevail, she by little arts would affright the understanding. For to give a perfect assent to probable inducements can neither be reasonable nor possible for considering persons, unless these conditions be in it.

The Requisites or Conditions of a Moral demonstration for the assuring our Conscience.

1.34. That the thing be the most probable to us in our present condition: For there are summities and principalities of probation proportionable to the ages and capacities of men and women. A little thing determines a weak person; and children beleeve infinitely whatsoever is told to them by their Parents or Tutors, because they have nothing to contest against it. For in all probable discourses, there is an allay and abatement of perswasion by the opposition of argument to argument, but they who have nothing to oppose, and have no reason to suspect, must give themselves up wholly to it; and then every thing that comes is equally the highest, because it fully and finally must prevail. But then that which prevails in infancy seems childish and ridiculous in our youth and then we are concluded by some pretences and pretty • span, • which for want of experience we think very well of; and we can then doe no more; that is a demonstration to us, which must determine us, and these little things must then doe it, because somthing must be done, and we must doe it as wisely as we may, but no man is bound to be wiser then he can. As the thing seems, either in its ownlight or in our position, so we are to g • ve our assent unto it.

2.35. A heap of probable in lucements ought to prevail, as being then a moral demonstration when the thing is not capable of a natural; for then probabilities ought to prevail, when they are the best argument we have. For if any man shall argue thus; It is not probable that God would leave his Church without sufficient means to end controversies, and since a living in •• llible Judge is the most effective to this purpose, it is therefore to be presumed and relied upon that God hath done so. This argument ought not to prevail as a moral demonstration; for though there are some semblances and appearances of reason in it, Nihil enim est tam incredibile quod non dicendo fiat probabile, said Cicero in his Paradoxes, there is nothing so incredible, but something may be said for it, and a witty man may make it plausible, yet there are certainties against it. For God hath said expresly, that every man is a liar, and therefore we are commanded to call no man Master upon earth, and the nature of 〈◊〉 is weak, and his understanding trifling, and every thing abuses him, and every man that is wise sees his own ignorance, and he that is not wise is easily deceived, and they who have pretended to be infallible have spoken pi • iful things, and fallen into strange errors, and cannot be guarded from shame without a whole legion of artifices and distinctions, and therefore it is certain that no man is infallible; and where the contrary is certain, the probable prete • ce is but a fallacy and an art of illusion.

3.36. There can be no moral demonstration against the word of God, or divi • e revelation. He that should flatter himself with thinking the pains of hell sh • l • not be eternal, because it is not agreeable to the goodness of God to inflict a never ceasing pain for a sudden and transient pleasure, and that there can be no proportion between finite and infinite, and yet God who is the foun •• n of justice will observe proportions; (or if there could be ten thousand more little things said to perswade a sinning man into confidences of an end of torment) ye • he would finde himself dece • ved, for all would be light when put into the ballance against these words of our blessed Saviour [Where the worm never dies, and the fire never goeth out.]

4.37. Where there is great probability on both sides, there neither of them can pretend to be a moral demonstration, or directly to secure the conscience: For contradictions can never be demonstrated; and if one says true, the other is a fair pretender, but a foul deceiver; and therefore in this case the conscience is to be secured indirectly and collaterally by the diligence of search, the honesty of its intention, the heartiness of its assent, the infirmity of the searcher, and the unavoidableness of his mistake.

5.38. The certainty of a moral demonstration must rely upon some certain rule, to which as to a centre, all the little and great probabilities like the lines of a circumference must turn; and when there is nothing in the matter of the question, then the conscience hath 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 one great axiom to rely upon, and that is, that God is just, and God is good, and requires no greater probation then he hath en • bled us to finde.

6.39. In probable inducements, God requires onely such an assent as can be effective of our duty and obedience, such a one as we will rely upon to real events, such as Merchants have when they venture their goods to Sea upon reasonable hopes of becoming rich, or Armies fight battles in hope of victory, relying upon the strength they have as probable to prevail; and if any article of our Religion be so proved to us as that we will reduce it to practice, own all its consequences, live according to it, and in the pursuance of it hope for Gods mercy and acceptance, it is an assent as great as the thing will bear, and yet as much as our duty will require; for in these cases no man is wise but he whose ears and heart is open to hear the instructions of any man who is wiser and better then himself.

7.40. Rules of prudence are never to be accepted against a rule of Logick, or Reason, and strict discourses. I remember that Bellarmine going to prove Purgatory from the words of our blessed Saviour, It shall not be forgiven him in this world, nor in the world to come; argues thus, If this shall not be forgiven in the world to come, then it implies that some sins are there forgiven, and therefore there is a Purgatory; because in heaven there are no sins, and in hell there are none forgiven. This (says he) concludes not by the rule of Logicians, but it does by the rule of prudence. Now this to all wise men must needs appear to be an egregious prevarication even of common sense; for if the rules of Logick be true, then it is not prudence, but imprudence that contradicts them, unless it be prudence to tell or to beleeve a lye. For the use of prudence is to draw from conjectures a safe and a wise conclusion when there are no certain rules to guide us. But against the certain rule it is folly that declares, not prudence; and besides that this conjecture of Bellarmine is wholly against the design of Christ, who intended there onely to say, that the sin against the holy Ghost should never be pardoned; it fails also in the main inquiry, for although there are no sins in heaven, and in hell none are forgiven, yet at the day of Judgement all the sins of the penitent shall be forgiven and acquitted with a blessed sentence: but besides this, the manner of expression is such as may with prudence be expounded, and yet to no such purpose as he dreams. For if I should say, Aristobulus was taken away, that neither in this life, nor after his death, his eyes might see the destruction of the Temple, does it follow by the rule of prudence, therefore some people can see in their grave, or in the state of separation with their bodily eyes? But as to the main inquiry, what is to be the measure of prudence? For some confident people think themselves very prudent, and that they say well and wisely, when others wiser then they know they talk like fools, and because no established reason can be contradicted by a prudent conjecture, it is certain that this prudence of Bellarmine was a hard shift to get an argument for nothing, and that no prudential motives are to be valued because any man cals them so, but because they doe rely upon some sure foundation, and draw obscure lines from a resolved truth. For it is not a prudential motive, unless it can finally rest upon reason, or revelation, or experience, or something that is not contradicted by any thing surer then it self.

IN a right and sure conscience the speculative and the practical judgement are always united,Ch • . 2. Rule 2. as I have before * explicated;1. but in opinions that are but probable the case is contrary. It is speculation probable, that it is lawful to baptize in the Name of the Lord Jesus; but yet he that shall doe this practically, does improbably and unreasonably. If the opinion of the Primitive Christians had been probable that it is lawful to communicate infants, yet it were at no hand fitting to be done in the present constitution of affairs; and it were highly useful if men would consider this effectually; and not from every tolerable opinion instantly run to an unreasonable and intolerable practice.

For a • peculation considers the nature of things abstractedly from circumstances physically or me • aphysically,2. and yet when it comes to be reduc'd to practice, what in the head was innocent will upon the hand become troublesome and criminal. If there were nothing in it but the disorder of the novelty or the disturbance of mens minds in a matter that is but probable, it were highly enough to reprove this folly. Every mans imperfect discourse or half reasons are neither fit to govern the actions of others or himself. * Suppose it probable (which the Greek Church beleeves) that the Consecration of the blessed Eucharist is not made by the words of institution, but by the prayers of the holy man that ministers, the Bishop or the Priest; yet when this is reduc'd to practice, and that a man shall omit the words of institution or consecration, his practice is more to be reproved then his opinion could be possibly allowed. * Some think Churches not to be more sacred then other places; what degree of probability soever this can have, yet it is a huge degree of folly to act this opinion, and to choose a Barn to pray in, when a Church may be had.

For there are in actions besides the proper ingredients of their intrinsecal lawfulness or consonancy to reason,3. a great many outsides and adherencies that are considerable beyond the speculation. The want of this consideration hath done much evil in many ages; and amongst us nothing hath been more usual then to dispute concerning a rite or Sacramental, or a constitution whether it be necessary, and whether the contrary be not lawful; and if it be found probably so as the inquirers would have it, immediately they reduc'd it to practice, and caused disorder and scandal, schism and uncharitableness amongst men while they thought that Christian liberty could not be preserved in the understanding, unless they disorder all things by a practical conclusion. Videas quosdam quibus sua libertas non videtur consistere, nisi per esum carnium die Ver • is in ejus possessionem venerint; Lib. 3. c 9. instit. Calvin complains with reason. It is a strange folly that men will not think they have possession of Christian liberty, unless they break all Laws and all customs, as if men could not prove things to be indifferent, and not obligatory, unless they certainly omit them. Christian liberty consists in the head, not in the hand; and when we know we are free from the bondage, we may yet doe the work; and when our gracious Lord hath knock'd our fetters off, we may yet think it too fit to doe what his Stewards command us in order to his services. It is free to us to eat or to abstain, to contain or to marry; but he that onely marries because he would triumph and brag of his freedome, may get an imperious Mistress instead o • a gentle Master. By the Laws of Christian liberty indifferent things are permitted to my choyce, and I am not under their power; but no Christian liberty says that I am free from the power of a man, though I be from the power of the thing; and although in speculation, this last was sufficient to be considered, yet when the opinion comes to be reduc'd to practice, the other also ought to have been thought upon. And besides this, it is a strange pertness and boldness of spirit, so to trust every fancy of my own, as to put the greatest interest upon it; so to be in love with every opinion, and trifling conceit, as to value it beyond the peace of the Church, and the wiser Customes of the world, or the Laws and practices of a wise and well instructed community of men. Nothing can make recompence for a certain change but a certain truth, with apparent usefulness in order to charity, piety, or institution.

These instances are in the matter of Religion; it may also happen thus 〈◊〉 the matter of justice.4. When Lamech perceiv'd something stirre in a bush it was very probable it was a wild beast; but when he came to reduce his opinion to practice, he shot at it and kill'd a man. And in the matter of justice there is a proper reason for this rule: Because in matters of right or wrong, possession is not to be altered without certainty, and therefore neither can I seize upon my goods in another mans hand, unless I be sure they are mine, though I were not otherwise restrain'd by humane Laws; neither may I expose any thing to danger, of which I am not certainly Master.

This also is with great caution to be observ'd in the matter of chastity. Although it may be true that in many cases such or such aspects or approximations may be lawful;5. that is, those things so farre as they are considered have no dissonancy from reason: yet he that shall reduce this opinion to practice must also remember that he is to deal with flesh and blood, which will take fire, not onely from permissions, but from prohibitions and restraints, and will pass instantly from lawful to unlawful: and although this may not be a sin in consideration and discourse but is to be acquitted by the sentence of the Schools and Pulpit, yet when it comes to be view'd and laid before the judgement in the Court of conscience, and as it was cloth'd with circumstances it will be found, that when it came to be practised, other parts or senses were imployed which cannot make such separations, but doe something else.

But if it be ask'd,6 To what purpose it can be that any man should inquire of the lawfulness of such actions which whether they be lawful or unlawful, yet may not be done? I answer, That the inquiry is necessary for the direct avoiding a sin in the proper matter of the instance; For he that never inquires, sins for want of inquiry, and despises his soul because he takes no care that it be rightly informed; but if he inquires, and be answer'd that the opinion is false, or the action criminal, he finds by the answer that it was worth his pains to ask, because by it he is taught to avoid a sin: But then, besides the question of lawful or unlawful, there are further inquiries to be made concerning fitting and unfitting, offensive, or complying, safe or dangerous, abstractedly or in relation; for many things which are lawful in themselves become very bad to him that does them, and to him that suffers them.

THAT it is not ordinarily to be followed is therefore certain,1. because it cannot be supposed, but that its contradictory hath greater probability, and either he that follows this trifle is light of beleef, or unreasonable in his choice, or his reason is to him, but as eyes to an Owl or Bat, half-sighted and imperfect; and at the best, no fit motive to the Will. And if it could be lawful to follow every degree of probability, it were perfectly in any mans choice to do, almost what he pleased, especially if he meets with an ill counsellor and a witty advocate. For at this rate all marriages may be dissolved, all vices excused upon pretence of some little probable necessity; and drunkenness will be entertained as Physick, and fornication as a thing allowed by some vicious persons whose wit is better then their manners; and all books of Conscience shall become patrons or indices of sins, and teach men what they pretend against, and there shall be no such thing as checks of Conscience, because few men sin without some excuse, and it were no excuse unless it were mingled with some little probabilities; and there were in very many cases, no rule for conscience but a witty inventer of pretty little inducements, which rather then a man shall want, his enemy will supply to him out of his magazine of fallacies.

2. But that there are some cases in which it is to be permitted is therefore certain,2. because it may be necessary in some circumstances to doe so, and in these cases the former impediments cannot intervene, because the causes of necessity or great charity occurring but seldome destroy all power or pretence of an easy deception. Anna Murrana was married to her near kinsman Thomaso Grillo, but supposed him not to be so near. It was afterwards discovered to her that the propinquity was so great that the marriage was null and invalid: while this trouble was upon her, there happily comes a discreet old woman who tells her, that though it be true that Grillo's Father was supposed to have lien with her Mother, and that her self was born of that conjunction, yet she her self being private to the transaction did put another woman into the place of Murrana's Mother, and that her Mother was also deceived in the same manner; and though they thought they enjoyed each other, yet they were both cozened into more chast embraces. Now upon this the question arises, whether or no Murrana may safely rely upon so slight a testimony as the saying of this woman, in a matter of so great difficulty and concernment. Here the case is favourable. Murrana is passionately endeared to Grillo, and besides her love hath a tender conscience, and if her marriage be separated, dies at both ends of the evil, both for the evil conjunct • on, and for the sad separation. This therefore is to be presumed security enough for her to continue in her state.

Like to this is that of a woman in Brescia. Her husband had been contracted to a woman of Panormo, 3. Per verba de praesenti; she taking her pleasure upon the Sea, is with her company surprised by a Turks man of Warre, and is reported, first to have been defloured, and then kill'd. When the sorrow for this accident had boyld down, the Gentleman marries a Maid of Brescia, and lives with her some years; after which she hears that his first Spouse was not kill'd, but alive and in sorrow in the Isle of Malta, and therefore that her self liv'd in a state of adultery, because not she, but the woman in Malta was the true wife to her husband. In this agony of spirit a Mariner comes to her house and secretly tells her, that this woman was indeed at Malta, but lately dead, and so the impediment was removed. The question now arises, whether upon the taking away this impediment, it be required that the persons already engaged should contract anew? That a new contract is necessary, is universally beleeved, and is almost certain (as in its proper place will be made to appear) for the contrary opinion is affirm'd but by a very few, and relies but upon trifling motives, requiring onely the consent of either of the parties as sufficient for renewing of the contract. But this being but a slender probability ought not to govern her; she must contract anew by the consent of her husband as well as by her own act. But now the difficulty arises; for her husband is a vicious man, and hates her, and is weary of her, and wishes her dead; and if she discover the impediment of their marriage, and that it is now taken away, and therefore requires him to recontract himself, that the marriage which was innocently begun, may be firm in the progression, and legally valid, and in conscience; she hath great reason to beleeve that he will take advantage of it, and refuse to joyn in a new contract. In this case therefore, because it is necessary she should some way or other be releeved, it is lawful for her to follow that little probability of opinion which says, that the consent of one is sufficient for the renovation of the contract. And in this case all the former inconveniences mentioned before doe cease: and this is a case of favour, in behalf of an innocent marriage, and in favour of the legitimation of children, and will prevent much evil to them b • th. So that although this case hath but few degrees of probability from its proper and intrinsecal causes, yet by extrinsecal and collateral appendages it is grown favourable, and charitable, and reasonable: it is almost necessary, and therefore hath more then the little probabilities of its own account.

One case more happens in which a small probability may be pursued,4. viz. when the understanding hath not time to consider deeply, and handle the question on all sides; then that which first offers it self, though but mean and weak, yet if it be not against a strange argument at the same time presented, it may suffice to determine the action; for in case the determination prove to be on the wrong side, yet the ignorance is involuntary and unchosen.

These Rules are concerning a Conscience that is probable by intrinsecal motives, that is, by reason, whether the reason be direct or collateral. But because the conscience is also probably moved in very many cases, by Authority, which is an extrinsecal motive, this is also to be guided and conducted.

ANcient Writers are more venerable:1. Modern Writers are more knowing: They might be better Witnesses, but these are better Judges. Antiquity did teach the Millenary opinion, and that Infants were to be communicated; that without baptism they were damn'd to the flames of hell; that Angels are corporeal; that the souls of Saints did not see God before Doomesday; that sins once pardoned did return again upon case of relapse; that persons baptized by hereticks were to be re-baptized, and they expounded Scripture in places innumerable, otherwise then they are at this day by men of all perswasions; and therefore no company of men will consent that in all cases the Fathers are rather to be followed then their Successors. They liv'd in the infancy of Christianity, and we in the elder ages; they practised more and knew less, we know more and practise less; passion is for younger years, and for beginning of things, wisdome is by experience, and age, and progression. They were highly to be valued, because in more imperfect notices they had the more perfect piety: we are highly to be reproved, that in better discourses we have a most imperfect life, and an unactive Religion: They in their Cases of Conscience took the safest part, but the Moderns have chosen the most probable. * It was the opinion of the Ancient Divines and Lawyers, that every man is bound to make restitution of all that which he gains by play, by Cards and Dice, and all such sports as are forbidden by humane Laws. The modern Casuists indeed doe often reprove the whole process, and condemne the Gamesters in most circumstances, but doe not beleeve them tied to restitution, but to penance onely. The first is the safer and the severer way, but the later hath greater reasons, as will appear in its own place. All contracts of Usury were generally condemn'd in the foregoing ages of the Church: of late, not onely the Merchant, but the Priest, and the Frier puts out money to increase, and think themselves innocent: and although commonly it happens that our ignorance and fears represent one opinion to be safe, when the other is more reasonable; yet because men will be fearful, and very often are ignorant and idle in their inquiries, there will still remain this advantage to either side, that one is wiser, and the other in his ignorance is the more secure because he does more then he needs. And therefore it often happens that though we call the ancient Writers, Fathers, yet we use them like children, and think our selves Men rather then them, which is affirmed by some, but in effect practised by every man when he pleases.

But if any one shall choose the later Writers, he must first choose his interest and his side;2. I mean if he chooses to follow any upon their authority or reputation without consideration of their reasons, then he must first choose his side, for he can never choose his side by the men, because most Authors are of it themselves by interest. But because all probability is wholly derived from reason, every authority hath its degree of probability according as it can be presumed or known to rely upon reason. Now in this both the Ancients and the Moderns excel each other respectively. The Ancients were nearer to the fountains Apostolical, their stream was less pudled, their thred was not fine but plain and strong, they were troubled with fewer heresies; they were not so wittily mistaken as we have been since; they had better and more firm tradition, they had pass'd through fewer changes, and had been blended with fewer interests; they were united under one Prince, and consequently were not forc'd to bend their doctrines to the hostile and opposite designs of fighting, and crafty Kings; their questions were concerning the biggest articles of Religion, and therefore such in which they could have more certainty and less deception; their piety was great, their devotion high and pregnant, their discipline regular and sincere, their lives honest, their hearts simple, their zeal was for souls, and the blood of the Martyrs made the Church irriguous, and the Church was then a garden of the fairest flowers, it did daily germinate with blessings from heaven, and Saints sprung up, and one Saint could know more of the secrets of Christs Kingdom, the mysteriousnesses of godly wisdome then a hundred disputing Sophisters; and above all, the Church of Rome was then holy and Orthodox, humble and charitable, her authority dwelt in the house of its birth, that is, in the advantages of an excellent faith and an holy life; to which the advantages of an accidental authority being added by the Imperial seat, she was made able to doe all the good she desired, and she desired all that she ought; and the greatness of this advantage we can best judge by feeling those sad effects which have made Christendome to groan, since the Pope became a temporal Prince, and hath possess'd the rights of some Kings, and hath invaded more, and pretends to all, and is become the great Fable, and the great Comet of Christendome, useless and supreme, high and good for nothing in respect of what he was at first, and still might have been, if he had severely judged the interest of Jesus Christ to have been his own.

But then on the other side,3. the modern Writers have considered all the arguments and reasons of the Ancients; they can more easily adde then their Fathers could finde out; They can retain their perfect issues, and leave the other upon their hands; and what was begun in conjecture, can either be brought to knowledge, or remanded into the lot and portion of deceptions. Omnibus enim hic locus feliciter se dedit, & qui praecesserunt non praeripuisse mihi videntur quae dici poterant, sed aperuisse. Conditio optima ultimi est, said Seneca. They who went before us, have not prevented us, but opened a door that we may enter into the recesses of truth: He that comes last hath the best advantage in the inquiry. Multum egerunt qui ante nos fuerunt, sed non peregerunt, multum adhuc restat operis, multúmque restabit, nec ulli nato post mille secula praecludetur occasio aliquid adhuc adjiciendi. They who went before us have done wisely and well in their generations, but they have not done all; much work remains behinde, and he that lives a thousand ages hence, shall not complain that there are no hidden truths fit for him to inquire after. There are more worlds to conquer:

Every day brings a new light, and by hearty and wise labour we improve what our Fathers espied when they peep'd through the crevises. Every art, every manufacture was improved,

The Romanes out did the Greeks, even in things which they were taught in Athens, or on their hils of sport. But to proceed in the comparing the ages: These later ages have more heresies, but the former had more dangerous; and although the Primitive pie • y was high and exemplary, yet the effect of that was, that in matters of practice they were more to be followed, but not in questions of speculation; these later ages are indeed diseased like children that have the Rickets, but their upper parts doe swell, and their heads are bigger, sagaciores in dogmate, nequiores in fide, and if they could be abstracted from the mixtures of interest, and the ingagement of their party, they are in many things better able to teach the people then the Ancients: That is, they are best able to guide, but not always safest to be followed. If all circumstances were equal, that is, if the later ages were united, and governed, and dis • interest, there is no question but they are the best instructors; there is certainly more certain notice of things, and better expositions of Scriptures now then formerly, but because he that is to rely upon the authority of his guide, cannot choose by reasons, he can hardly tell now where to finde them upon that account. There is more gold now then before, but it is more allayed in the running, or so hidden in heaps of tinsel, that when men are best pleased, now adays they are most commonly cozened.

If a man will take the middle ages,4. he may if he will, and that is all that can be said in it; for there can be no reason for it, but much against it. Ego sanè veteres veneror, & tantis Nominibus semper assurgo. Verùm inter externa aetatem esse scio, omniáque non esse apud Majores meliora. I for my part doe more reverence the Ancients, and use to rise up and bow my head to such reverend names, as S. Irenaeus, S. Cyprian, Origen, S. Hierome, S. Austin; but I reckon age amongst things that are without, it enters not into the constitution of truth; and this I know, that amongst these Ancients, not all their sayings are the best. And on the other side, although Antiquity is a gentle prejudice, and hath some authority, though no certainty or infallibility; so I know that novelty is a harder prejudice, and brings along with it no authority, but yet it is not a certain condemnation. Quòd si tam Graecis novitas invisa fuisset Quàm est nobis,Horat. l. 2. ep. • . quid nunc esset vetus, aut quid haberet Quod legeret, tererétque vicissim publicus usus.

If our Fathers in Religion had refused every exposition of Scripture that was new, we should by this time have had nothing old; But in this case what Martial said of friendships, we may say of truths: Nec me, quòd novus sum tibi, recuses: Omnes hoc veteres tui sodales fuerunt.Videat lector epist. 19. Sancti Augustini; quae est ad Hieronymum. & epist. ad Fortunatum. Tu tantùm inspice qui novus paratur An possit fieri vetus sodalis.

Refuse nothing onely because it is new. For that which pretends to age now, was once in infancy; onely see if this new thing be fit to be entertained, and kept till it be old; That is, as the thing is in it self, not as it is in age, so it is to be valued, and so also are the men; for in this, as in all the other, the subject matter will help forward to the choice of a guide.

1. The analogy of faith.

2. The piety of a proposition.

3. The safety of it, and its immunity from sin; these are right measures to guess at an article, but these are more intrinsecal, and sometimes so difficult, that they cannot be made use of but by those who can judge of reason, and less need to be conducted by authority. But for these other who are wholly to be led by the power and sentence of their guide, besides what hath been already advised.

4. The faculty and profession of men is much to be regarded, as that we trust Divines in matters proper to their cognisance, and Lawyers in their faculty; which advice is to be conducted by these measures.

When the Authority of Divines is to be preferred, when that of Lawyers.

1. The whole duty of a Christian consists in the laws of Faith or Religion, 5. of Sobriety, and of Justice; and it is so great a work, that it is no more then needs that all the orders of wise and learned men should conduct and minister to it. But some portions of our duty are personal, and some are relative, some are private, and some are publick; some are limited by the Laws of God onely, and some also by the Laws of men; some are directed by nature, some by use and experience; and to some of these portions contemplative men can give best assistances, and the men of the world, and business can give best help in the other necessities. Now because Divines are therefore in many degrees separate from an active life, that they may with leisure attend to the conduct of things spiritual, and are chosen as the Ministers of mercy, and the great reconcilers of the world, and therefore are forbidden to intermeddle in questions of blood: and because the affairs of the world in many instances are so intangled, so unconducing to the affairs of the spirit, so stubborn that they are hardly to be manag'd by a meek person, carried on by so much violence, that they are not to be rescued from being injurious but by a violence that is greater but more just; and because the interests of men are complicated and difficult, defended by customs, preserved in records, secur'd by sentences of Judges, and yet admit variety by so many accidents, circumstances, and considerations, as will require the attendance of one whole sort of men, and of all men in the world Divines are the least fit to be imployed in such troubles and contracts, such violences. and oppositions, and yet they are so necessary, that without them the government of the world would be infinitely disordered, it is requisite that these should be permitted to a distinct profession. In particular matters of justice ordinarily and regularly Lawyers are the most competent Judges: In matters of Religion and Sobriety, the office of Divines is so wholly or principally imployed, that it ought to be chosen for our guide.

2. In matters of Justice which are to be conducted by general Rules,6. Theology is the best Conductress; and the Lawyers skill is but subservient and ministring. The reason for both is the same, because all the general measures of justice are the Laws of God, and therefore cognoscible by the Ministers of Religion; but because these general measures, like a great river into little streams, are deduced into little rivulets and particularities by the laws and customes, by the sentences and agreements of men, therefore they must slip from the hands of the spiritual man to the prudent and secular. The Divine can condemne all injustice, murder, incest, injurious dealing; but whether all homicide be murder, all marriage of kindred be incest, or taking that which another man possesses be injustice, must be determined by Laws, and the learned in them; and though Divines may rule all these cases as well as any of the long Robe, yet it is by their prudence and skill in Law, not by the proper notices of Theology.

3. But justice is like a knife,7. and hath a back and an edge, and there is a letter and a spirit in all Laws, and justice is self is to be conducted with piety, and there are modalities, and measures, and manners of doing or suffering in humane entercourses; and many things are just which are not necessary, and there are excesses and rigours in justice which are to be moderated, and there are evil and intangling circumstances which make several instances to justle one another; and one must be serv'd first, and another must stay its season; and in paying money there is an ordo ad animam, and justice is to be done for Gods sake, and at some times, and in some circumstances for charities sake; and the Law compels to pay him first that requires first; but in conscience, justice is oftentimes to be administred with other measures: so that as prudence sometimes must be called to counsel in the conduct of piety, so must piety oftentimes lead in justice, and justice it self must be sanctified by the word of God and prayer, and will then goe on towards heaven, when both Robes like Paranymphs attending a Virgin in the solemnities of her marriage, help to lead and to adorn her.

4. Sometimes Humane Laws and Divine stand face to face and oppose each other,8. not onely in the direct sanction (which does not often happen) but very often in the execution. Sometimes obedience to a humane Law will destroy charity, sometimes justice is against piety, sometimes piety seems less consistent with Religion. The Church is poor, our Parents are necessitous, the fabricks of the Houses of Prayer are ruinous, and we are not able to make supplies to all these; Here what is just, and what is duty, not the Law, but Theology will determine. I owe Sempronius a small summe of money; it happens that he comes to demand it when the gatherers of Gabels are present to demand an equal summe for Taxes; here I am to ask my Confessor, not my Lawyer whether of the two must be serv'd, since I cannot pay both: and in this case the Ministers of Religion are the guards and defensatives of her interest: Concerning which for the present, I onely insert this Caution; That when Religion and Justice are in contest, the Ministers of Religion are not always bound to give sentence on the side of Religion, but to consider which is the more necessary, and where the present duty stands; for sometimes it is absolutely necessary to doe justice, and actions of particular Religion must attend their season. But then even justice turns into Religion, and when it does so, Theology must conduct her into action.

5. When the question concerns an interest,9. relative to either faculty, it is hard choosing the authority on either part, for one judges for it self, and the other against his adversary; that is, in effect they are both Judges in their own cause. It is notorious in the Church of Rome, where the Canonists say, That a Canon Lawyer is to be preferr'd before a Divine in elections to Bishopricks; but you must think, the Divines say that themselves are farre the fitter. The Canonists say that Praedial tithes are due by Divine right. The Divines say they are onely due by positive constitution. The secret of that is, because most of the Divines that write books are Monks and Friers, and such which are no friends to Parishes, that the Pope may be allowed to have power to take tithes from the Parish Priests, and give them to the Monasteries; which he could not doe, if by Divine right they were annexed to their proper Cures. Amongst us the tables are turn'd, and the Lawyers take the Friers part, and the Divines generally affirm the Divine right of tithes. Concerning which it is to be considered, that though the authority of either part is not of it self sufficient to determine a doubting person, and where interest is apparent, the person perswading loses much of his authority, yet the proposition it self ought not to lose any thing. The interest appearing is no more warrant to disbeleeve the proposition, then it is to beleeve it. In this case there is interest on both sides, and therefore as to that the case is indifferent. The way to proceed is to consider the proper instruments of perswasion, and because a truth is not the worse for serving his ends that teaches it, I am to attend to his arguments without any prejudice. But if I am not able to judge of the reasons, but must be led by authority, the presumption lies for the Divines, I am to beleeve them rather then the Lawyers in such questions, because there is some Religion in doing so, and a relation to God, for whose sake it is, that I choose to obey their proposition.

6. Where by the favour of Princes or Common-wealths any matters of Justice are reserved to Ecclesiastical cognisance,10. in those affairs the authority of Divines is to be preferr'd before that of Lawyers, because the personal capacities of the men being equal in all things, the Divines are exercised in the same matters, and therefore are both concern'd and able, instructed and engaged, and though the Lawyers are to be supposed honest, and just, and wise, yet all that also is to be supposed in Divines, with some advantages of Religion, and tenderness which is bred in them by their perpetual conversation with the things of God. But in all things he comes the nearest to a sure way of being guided, who does his best and with greatest honesty of heart, and simplicity of pious desires to be truly informed. It was well said of Socrates, An placeant Deo quae feci, nescio; hoc certò scio, me sedulò hoc egisse ut placerent. The things which I have done, whether they please God or no, I know not; but this I know assuredly, that I did earnestly desire, and diligently take care that they might please him.

If the question be concerning other divisions of men,11. as of Schoolmen and Casuists, Criticks or Preachers, the answer can be no other, but that in all faculties relating to any parts of Religion, as there are very wise men, and very weak men, so there are some to be preferr'd in each faculty, if we could finde out who they are: but this praelation is relative to the men, not to the faculty, if they were rightly handled. For the several faculties are nothing but the proper portion of matter assign'd to the consideration of an order of men, in a proper method; but the great end is the same, onely the means of perswading the same truth is different. But in the Church of Rome they are made several Trades, and have distinct principles, and serve special and disunited ends and interests; and therefore which of them is to be preferr'd, as to the making a probable opinion is just to be answered, as if we should ask which is best of feathers or wooll; they both of them have their excellencies in order to warmth, and yet if you offer to swallow them down, they will infallibly choke you.