Deus Justificatus.TW …

Deus Justificatus.

TWO DISCOVRSES OF ORIGINAL SIN, Contained in two Letters TO PERSONS of HONOUR, Wherein the question is rightly stated, several objections answe­red, and the truth further cleared and proved by many arguments newly added or explain'd.

By Jer. Taylor D.D.

LONDON, Printed for Richard Royston 1656.

Deus Justificatus,

OR, A Vindication of the glory of the Divine Attributes in the Question of ORIGINAL SIN.

Against the Presbyterian way of Understanding it.

By JER. TAYLOR, D.D.

Lucretius. Nam neque tam facilis res ulla est, quin ea primum, Difficilis magis ad credendum constet—

LONDON, Printed by R. N. for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivie-Lane. 1656.

TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE and religious Lady, The Lady CHRISTIAN, Countesse Dowager of Devonshire.

Madam,

WHen I reflect upon the infinite disputes which have troubled the pub­lick meetings of Christendom con­cerning Original sin, and how impatient and vext some men lately have been, when I offered to them my endeavours and conjectures concerning that Question, with purposes very differing from what were seen in the face of other mens de­signes, and had handled it so, that God might be glorified in the Article, and men might be instructed and edified in order to good life; I could not but [Page 2] think that wise Heathen said rarely well in his little adagy, relating to the present subject; [...]. Mankind was born to be a riddle, and our nativity is in the dark; for men have taken the liberty to think what they please, and to say what they think; and they affirme many things, and can prove but few things; and take the sayings of men for the Ora­cles of God, and bold affirma­tives for convincing arguments; and Saint Pauls text must be understood by Saint Austins commentary, and Saint Austin shall be heard in all, because he spake against such men who in [Page 3] some things were not to be heard; and after all, because his Do­ctrine was taken for granted by ignorant ages, and being received so long, was incorpo­rated into the resolved Doctrine of the Church, with so great a firmnesse, it became almost a shame to examine what the world believed so unsuspecting­ly; and he that shall first at­tempt it, must resolve to give up a great portion of his re­putation to be torn in pieces by the ignorant and by the zealous, by some of the learned, and by all the Envious; and they who love to teach in quiet; being at rest in their chaires and pul­pits [Page 4] will be froward when they are awakened, and rather then they will be suspected to have taught amisse, will justifie an error by the reproaching of him that tells them truth, which they are pleased to call new.

If any man differs from me in opinion, I am not troubled at it, but tell him that truth is in the understanding, and charity is in will, and is or ought to be there, before either his or my opinion in these controversies can enter, and therefore that we ought to love alike, though we do not understand alike; but when I finde that men are angry at my Ingenuity and opennesse of dis­course, [Page 5] and endeavour to hinder the event of my labours, in the ministery of Souls, and are im­patient of contradiction or va­riety of explication, and under­standing of Questions, I think my self concerned to defend the truth which I have published, to acquit it from the suspition of evil appendages, to demon­strate not onely the truth, but the piety of it, and the necessity, and those great advantages which by this Doctrine so understood may be reaped, if men will be quiet and patient, void of pre­judice and not void of Cha­rity.

This (Madam) is reason [Page 6] sufficient why I offer so many justifications of my Doctrine, before any man appears in pub­lick against it; but because there are many who do enter in­to the houses of the rich and the honourable, and whisper secret oppositions and accusations ra­ther then arguments against my Doctrine; and the good women that are zealous for Religion, and make up in the passions of one faculty what is not so visi­ble in the actions and operati­ons of another, are sure to be affrighted before they be in­structed, and men enter caveats in that Court before they try the cause. I have found, that some [Page 7] men, to whom I gave and de­signed my labours, and for whose sake I was willing to suffer the persecution of a sus­pected truth, have been so un­just to me, and so unserviceable to your Honour (Madam,) and to some other excellent and rare personages, as to tell stories, and give names to my proposition, and by secret murmurs hinder you from receiving that good which your wisdom and your piety would have discerned there, if they had not affrighted you with telling, that a snake lay under the Plantane, and that this Doctrine wich is as whole­some as the fruits of Paradise, [Page 8] was inwrapped with the infold­ings of a Serpent, subtle and fallacious.

Madam, I know the arts of these men; and they often put me in mind of what was told me by Mr. Sackvill the late Earl of Dorsets Vncle; that the cun­ning Sects of the World (he na­med the Jesuits and the Pres­byterians) did more prevail by whispering to Ladies, then all the Church of England and the more sober Protestants could do by fine force and strength of ar­gument. For they by prejudice or fears, terrible things, and zea­lous nothings, confident sayings and little stories, governing [Page 9] the Ladies consciences, who can perswade their Lords, their Lords will convert their Te­nants, and so the World is all their own. I wish them all good of their profits and purchases; but yet because they are questions of Souls, of their interest and advantages; I cannot wish they may prevail with the more Re­ligious and Zealous Personages: and therefore (Madam) I have taken the boldnesse to write this tedious letter to your Honour, that I may give you a right un­derstanding and an easy expli­cation of this great Question; as conceiving my self the more bound to do it to your Honour, [Page 10] not onely because you are Zea­lous for the Religion of this Church, and are a person as well of reason as of Honour, but also because you have passed di­vers obligations upon me, for which, all my services are too little a return.

Deus Justificatus, OR, A Vindication of the Di­vine Attributes.

IN Order to which, I will plainly describe the great lines of difference and dan­ger, which are in the errors and mistakes about this Question.

2. I will prove the truth and ne­cessity of my own, together with the usefulness and reasonableness of it.

3. I will answer those little mur­murs, by which (so far as I can yet learn) these men seek to invade the understandings of those who have not leisure or will to examine the thing it self in my own words and arguments.

4. And if any thing else falls in by the bie, in which I can give satisfa­ction [Page 12] to a Person of Your great Worthiness, I will not omit it, as be­ing desirous to have this Doctrine stand as fair in your eyes, as it is in all its own colours and proporti­ons.

But first (Madam) be pleased to remember that the question is not whether there bee any such thing as Originall Sin; for it is cer­tain, and confessed on all hands al­most. For my part, I cannot but confess that to be which I feel, and groan under, and by which all the World is miserable.

Adam turned his back upon the Sun, and dwelt in the dark and the shadow; he sinned, and fell into Gods displeasure and was made na­ked of all his supernaturall endow­ments, and was ashamed and senten­ced to death, and deprived of the means of long life, and of the Sacra­ment and instrument of Immortali­ty, [Page 13] I mean the Tree of Life; he then fell under the evills of a sickly bo­dy, and a passionate, ignorant, unin­structed soul; his sin made him sick­ly, his sickliness made him peevish, his sin left him ignorant, his igno­rance made him foolish and unrea­sonable: His sin left him to his na­ture, and by his nature, who ever was to be born at all, was to be born a child, and to do before he could understand, & bred under Laws, to which he was alwayes bound, but which could not always be exacted; and he was to choose, when he could not reason, and had passions most strong, when he had his understand­ing most weak, and was to ride a wilde horse without a bridle, and the more need he had of a curb, the less strength he had to use it, and this being the case of all the World, what was every mans evill, became all mens greater evill; and though [Page 14] alone it was very bad, yet when they came together it was made much worse; like Ships in a storm, every one alone hath enough to do to out-ride it; but when they meet, besides the evills of the storm, they find the intolerable calamitie of their mutuall concussion, and every ship that is ready to be oppressed with the tempest, is a worse tempest to every vessell, against which it is violently dashed. So it is in man­kind, every man hath evill enough of his own; and it is hard for a man to live soberly, temperately, and reli­giously; but when he hath Parents and Children, brothers and sisters, friends and enemies, buyers and sel­lers, Lawyers and Physitians, a family and a neighbourhood, a King over him, or Tenants under him, a Bishop to rule in matters of Government spirituall, and a Peo­ple to be rul'd by him in the affaires [Page 15] of their Souls, then it is that every man dashes against another, and one relation requires what another de­nies; and when one speaks, another will contradict him; and that which is well spoken, is sometimes inno­cently mistaken, and that upon a good cause, produces an evill effect, and by these, and ten thousand o­ther concurrent causes, man is made more then most miserable.

But the main thing is this; when God was angry with Adam, the man fell from the state of grace; for God withdrew his grace, and we re­turned to the state of meer nature, of our prime creation. And al­though I am not of Petrus Diaconus his mind, who said, that when we all fell in Adam, we fell into the dirt, and not only so, but we fell also up­on a heap of stones; so that we not onely were made naked, but defiled also, and broken all in pieces; yet [Page 16] this I believe to be certain, that we by his fall received evill enough to undoe us, and ruine us all; but yet the evill did so descend upon us, that we were left in powers & capacities to serve and glorifie God; Gods ser­vice was made much harder, but not impossible; mankind was made mi­serable, but not desperate, we con­tracted an actuall mortality, but we were redeemable from the power of Death; sinne was easie and ready at the door, but it was re­sistable; Our Will was abused, but yet not destroyed; our Understand­ding was cosened, but yet still ca­pable of the best instructions; and though the Devill had wounded us, yet God sent his Son, who like the good Samaritan poured Oyle and Wine into our wounds, and we were cured before we felt the hurt, that might have ruined us upon that Occasion. It is sad enough, but not [Page 17] altogether so intolerable, and de­cretory, which the Sibylline Oracle describes to be the effect of Adams sin.

[...]
[...]
[...]
Man was the worke of God, fram'd by his hands,
Him did the Serpent cheat, that to deaths bands
He was subjected for his sin: for this was all,
He tasted good and evill by his fall.

But to this we may superadde that which Plutarch found to be experi­mentally true, Mirum quod pedes [Page 20] moverunt ad usum rationis, nullo au­tem fraeno passiones: the foot moves at the command of the Will and by the empire of reason, but the passionsare stiff even then when the knee bends, and no bridle can make the Passions regular and temperate. And indeed (Madam) this is in a manner the sum total of the evill of our abused and corrupted nature; Our soul is in the body as in a Prison; it is there tanquam in alienâ domo, it is a so jour­ner, and lives by the bodies mea­sures and loves and hates by the bo­dies Interests and Inclinations; that which is pleasing and nourishing to the body, the soul chooses and delights in: that which is vexatious and troublesome, it abhorres, and hath motions accordingly; for Pas­sions are nothing else but acts of the Will, carried to or from ma­teriall Objects, and effects and im­presses upon the man, made by such [Page 21] acts; consequent motions and pro­ductions from the Will It is an use­less and a groundless proposition in Philosophy, to make the Passions to be distinct faculties, and seated in a differing region; for as the reason­able soul is both sensitive and vege­tative, so is the Will elective and passionate, the region both of choice and passions, that is, When the Object is immateriall, or the motives such, the act of the Will is so meerly intellectuall, that it is then spirituall, and the acts are proper and Symbolical; but if the Object is materiall or corporall, the acts of the Will are adhaesion and aversati­on, and these it receives by the needs and inclinations of the body; now because many of the bodies needs are naturally necessary, and the rest are made so by being thought needs, and by being so naturally pleasant, and that this is the bodies [Page 22] day, and it rules here in its own place and time, therefore it is that the will is so great a scene of passion and we so great servants of our bodies.

This was the great effect of Adams sin which became therrefore to us a punishment because of the appendant infirmity that went a­long with it; for Adam being spoi­led of all the rectitudes and super­natural heights of grace, and thrust back to the form of nature, and left to derive grace to himself by a new Oeconomy, or to be without it; and his posterity left just so as he was left himself; he was per­mitted to the power of his enemy that betray'd him, and put under the power of his body whose ap­petites would govern him; and when they would grow irregular could not be mastered by any thing that was about him, or born with [Page 23] him, so that his case was miserable and naked, and his state of things was imperfect and would be dis­ordered.

But now Madam, things being thus bad, are made worse by the su­perinduced Doctrines of men, which when I have represented to your Ladiship and told upon what accounts I reprove them, your Honour will finde that I have rea­son.

There are one sort of Calvins Scholars whom we for distinctions sake call Supralapsarians, who are so fierce in their sentences of predesti­nation and reprobation, that they say God look'd upon mankinde onely, as his Creation, and his slaves, over whom he having absolute power, was very gracious that he was pleased to take some few, and save them absolutely; and to the other greater part he did no wrong, [Page 24] though he was pleased to damn them eternally, onely because he pleased; for they were his own; and Qui jure suo utitur nemini facit injuriam saies the law of reason, every one may do what he please with his own. But this bloody and horrible opinion is held but by a few; as tending directly to the dis­honour of God, charging on Him alone that He is the cause of mens sins on Earth, and of mens eternal torments in Hell; it makes God to be powerfull, but his power not to be good; it makes him more cruel to men, then good men can be to Dogs and sheep; it makes him give the final sentence of Hell without any pretence or colour of justice; it represents him to be that which all the World must naturally fear, and naturally hate, as being a God delighting in the death of innocents; for so they are when he resolves to [Page 25] damn them: and then most tyranni­cally, cruel, and unreasonable; for it saies that to make a postnate pre­tence of justice, it decrees that men inevitably shall sin, that they may inevitably, but justly, be damned; like the Roman Lictors who because they could not put to death Seja­nus daughters as being Virgins, de­floured them after sentence, that by that barbarity they might be capable of the utmost Cruelty; it makes God to be all that thing that can be hated; for it makes him nei­ther to be good, nor just, nor rea­sonable; but a mighty enemy to the biggest part of mankinde; it makes him to hate what himself hath made, and to punish that in another which in himself he decreed should not be avoided: it charges the wis­dom of God with folly, as having no means to glorifie his justice, but by doing unjustly, by bringing in [Page 26] that which himself hates, that he might do what himself loves: do­ing as Tiberius did to Brutus and Ne­ro the Sons of Germanicus; Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, Sueton. in vita. liber.c. 54. et concitati perderentur; provoking them to raise, that he might punish their reproach­ings. This opinion reproaches the words and the Spirit of Scripture, it charges God with Hypocrisy and want of Mercy, making him a Father of Cruelties, not of Mercie, and is a perfect overthrow of all Re­ligion, and all Lawes, and all Gover­ment; it destroyes the very being, and nature of all Election, thrusting a man down to the lowest form of beasts and birds, to whom a Spon­taneity of doing certain actions is given by God, but it is in them so na­turall, that it is unavoidable. Now concerning this horrid opinion, I [Page 27] for my part shall say nothing but this; that he that sayes there was no such man as Alexander, would tell a horrible lie, and be injurious to all story, and to the memory and fame of that great Prince, but he that should say. It is true there was such a man as Alexander, but he was a Tyrant, and a Blood-sucker, cruel and injurious, false and dissembling, an enemy of mankind, and for all the reasons of the world to be hated and reproached, would certainly dishonour Alexander more, and be his greatest enemy: So I think in this, That the Atheists who deny there is a God, do not so impiously against God, as they that charge him with foul appellatives, or maintain such sentences, which if they were true, God could not be true. But these men (Madam) have nothing to do in the Question of Originall Sin, save onely, that they say that [Page 28] God did decree that Adam should fall, and all the sins that he sinn'd, and all the world after him are no effects of choice, but of predesti­nation, that is, they were the acti­ons of God, rather then man.

But because these men even to their brethren seem to speak evil things of God, therefore the more wary and temperat of the Calvi­nists bring down the order of repro­bation lower; affirming that God looked upon all mankind in Adam as fallen into his displeasure, hated by God, truly guilty of his sin, lia­ble to Eternal damnation, and they being all equally condemned, he was pleased to separate some, the smaller number far, and irresistibly bring them to Heaven; but the far greater number he passed over, lea­ving them to be damned for the sin of Adam, and so they think they salve Gods Justice; and this was [Page 29] the designe and device of the Sy­nod of Dort.

Now to bring this to passe, they teach concerning Original sin.

1. That by this sin our first Pa­rents fell from their Original righ­teousnesse and communion with God, and so became dead in sinne and wholly defiled in all the facul­ties, and parts of soul and body.

2. That whatsoever death was due to our first Parents for this sin, they being the root of all mankinde, and the guilt of this sin, being imputed, the same is conveied to all their posterity by ordinary genera­tion.

3. That by this Original cor­ruption we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evill; and that from hence proceed all actual trangressions.

4. This corruption of nature re­maines [Page 30] in the regenerate, and al­though it be through Christ pardo­ned and mortified, yet both it self and all the motions thereof, are trulie and properly sin.

5. Original sin being a transgres­sion of the righteous Law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the Law, and so made subject to death with all miseries, spiritual, tempo­rall, and eternal. These are the say­ings of the late Assembly at West­minster.

Against this heap of errors and dangerous propositions I have made my former discoursings, and sta­tings of the Question of Original sin. These are the Doctrines of the Presbyterian, but as unlike truth, as his assemblies are to our Church; for concerning him I may say.

[Page 31]Nemo tam propè procul (que) nobis.

He is the likest and the unlikest to a Son of our Church in the world; he is neerest to us and furthest from us; and to all the world abroad he calls himself our friend, while at home he hates us and destroyes us.

Now I shall first speak to the thing in general and its designes, then I shall make some observations upon the particulars.

1. This device of our Presbyterians and of the Synod of Dort is but an artifice to save their proposition harmless, & to stop the out-cries of Scripture and reason, and of all the World against them. But this way of stating the article of reprobati­on is as horrid in effect as the o­ther. For

1. Is it by a natural consequent [Page 32] that we are guilty of Adams sin, or is it by the decree of God? Naturally it cannot be; for then the sins of all our forefathers, who are to their posterity the same that Adam was to his, must be ours; and not onely Adams first sin, but his o­thers are ours upon the same ac­count. But if it be by the De­cree of God,Instit. l. 3. c. 23. Sect. 7. Vind. Grat. l. 1. p. 1. di­gres. 4. c. 3. by his choice and constitution, that it should be so. (as Mr. Cal­vin and Dr. Twisse (that I may name no more for that side, do expresly teach) it followes, that God is the Author of our Sin; So that I may use Mr. Calvins words; ‘How is it that so many Nations with their Children should be involved in the fall without remedy,’ but because God would have it so? and if that be the matter, then to God, as to [Page 33] the cause, must that sin, and that damnation be accounted.

And let it then be considered, whether this be not as bad as the worst, For the Supralapsarians say, God did decree that the greatest part of mankind should perish, only because he would: The Sublapsari­ans say, That God made it by his decree necessary, that all wee who were born of Adam should be born guilty of Originall Sin, and he it was who decreed to damne whom he pleased for that sin, in which he de­creed they should be born; and both these he did for no other considera­tion, but because he would. Is it not therefore evident, that he abso­lutely decreed Damnation to these Persons? For he that decrees the end, and he that decrees the onely necessary and effective meanes to the end, and decrees that it shall be the end of that means, does decree abso­lutely [Page 34] alike; though by several dis­pensations: And then all the evill consequents which I reckoned be­fore to be the monstrous producti­ons of the first way; are all Daugh­ters of the other; and if Solomon were here, he could not tell which were the truer Mother.

Now that the case is equall be­tween them, some of their own chiefest do confess, so Dr. Twisse. If God may ordain Men to Hell for Adam's sin, which is derived unto them by Gods onely constitution: he may as well do it absolute­ly without any such constitution: The same also is affirmed by Maccovius, Disp. 18. Inst. lib. 3. cap. 23. Sect. 23. and by Mr. Calvin: and the reason is plain; for he that does a thing for a reason which himself makes, may as well do it without a reason, Or he may make his owne Will to be the reason, be­cause the thing, and the motive of [Page 35] the thing, come in both cases, equal­ly from the same principle, and from that alone.

Now (Madam) be pleased to say, whether I had not reason and neces­sity for what I have taught: You are a happy Mother of an Honorable Posterity, your Children and Ne­phews are Deare to you as your right eye, and yet you cannot love them so well as God loves them, and it is possible that a Mother should forget her Children, yet God even then will not, cannot; but if our Fa­ther and Mother forsake us, God ta­keth us up: Now Madam consider, could you have found in your heart when the Nurses and Midwives had bound up the heads of any of your Children, when you had born them with pain and joy upon your knees, could you have been tempted to give command that murderers should be brought to slay them a­live, to put them to exquisite tor­tures, [Page 36] and then in the middest of their saddest groans, throw any one of them into the flames of a fierce fire, for no other reason, but because he was born at Latimers, or upon a Friday, or when the Moon wasin her prime, or for what other reason you had made, and they could never a­void? could you have been delighted in their horrid shrieks and out-cries, and taking pleasure in their una­voidable and their intollerable cala­mity? could you have smiled, if the hangman had snatched your Eldest Son from his Nurses breasts, and dashed his brains out against the pavement; and would you not have wondred that any Father or Mother could espie the innocence and prety smiles of your sweet babes, and yet tear their limbs in pieces, or devise devilish artifices to make them roar with intollerable convulsions? could you desire to be thought good, and [Page 37] yet have delighted in such cruelty? I know I may answer for you; you would first have dyed your self. And yet say again, God loves man­kind better then we can love one a­nother, and he is essentially just, and he is infinitely mercifull, and he is all goodness, and therefore though we might possibly do evil things, yet he cannot, and yet this doctrine of the Presbyterian repro­bation, saies he both can and does things, the very apprehension of which hath caused many in despair to drown or hang themselves.

Now if the Doctrine of absolute Reprobation be so horrid, so intole­rable a proposition, so unjust and blasphemous to God, so injurious and cruell to men, and that there is no colour or pretence to justifie it, but by pretending our guilt of Adams sin, and damnation to be the punishment: then because from [Page 38] truth nothing but truth can issue; that must needs be a lie, from which such horrid consequences do pro­ceed. For the case in short is this; If it be just for God to damne any one of Adam's Posterity for Adam's sin, then it is just in him to damne all; for all his Children are equally guilty; and then if he spares any, it is Mercy: and the rest who perish have no cause to complain. But if all these fearful consequences which Reason and Religion so much ab­horr do so certainly follow from such doctrines of Reprobation, and these doctrines wholly rely upon this pretence, it follows, that the pretence is infinitely false and intol­lerable; and that it cannot be just for God to damne us for being in a state of calamity, to which state we entred no way but by his constituti­on and decree.

You see, Madam, I had reason to [Page 39] reprove that doctrine, which said, It was just in God to damne us for the sinne of Adam.

Though this be the maine error; yet there are some other collaterall things which I can by no means ap­prove, such is that. 1. That by the Sin of Adam our Parents became wholly defiled in all the faculties and Powers of their souls and bo­dies. And 2. That by this we also are disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all e­vill. And 3. That from hence pro­ceed all actuall transgressions. And 4. that our naturall corruption in the regenerate still remains, and is still properly a sin.

Against this, I opposed these Pro­positions; That the effect of Adams sin was in himself bad enough; for it devested him of that state of grace and favour where God placed him; it threw him from Paradise, and all [Page 40] the advantages of that place, it left him in the state of Nature; but yet his nature was not spoiled by that sin; he was not wholly inclined to all evill, neither was he disabled and made opposite to all good; only his good was imperfect, it was naturall and fell short of heaven; for till his nature was invested with a new na­ture, he could go no further then the designe of his first Nature, that is, without Christ, without the Spi­rit of Christ, he could never arrive at heaven, which is his supernatu­rall condition; But 1. There still remained in him a naturall freedom of doing good or evill. 2. In every one that was born, there are great inclinations to some good. 3. Where our Nature was averse to good, it is not the direct sin of Nature, but the imperfection of it, the reason being, because God superinduced Lawes against our naturall inclination, and [Page 41] yet there was in nature nothing suf­ficient to make us contradict our nature in obedience to God; all that being to come from a supernaturall and Divine principle. These I shall prove together, for one depends up­on another.

1. And first, that the liberty of will did not perish to mankind by the fall of Adam is so evident, that St. Austin who is an adversary in some parts of this Question, but not yet, by way of question, and confi­dence askes, Quis [...]utem nostrum dicat quod primi hominis peccato perierit li­berum arbitrium de huma­no genere? Lib. 1. ad Bonifac. c.2. Which of us can say, That the liberty of our Will did perish by the sin of the first Man? And he adds a rare reason; for it is so certain, that it did not perish in a sinner, that this thing onely is it by which they do sinne, especially [Page 42] when they delight in their sinne, and by the love of sin, that thing is pleasing to them which they list to do.] And therefore when we are charged with sin, it is worthy of in­quiry, whence it is that we are sin­ners? Is it by the necessity of nature, or by the liberty of our Will? If by nature, and not choice, then it is good and not evil; for whatsoever is our Nature is of Gods making, and consequently is good; but if we are sinners by choice & liberty of will, whence had we this libertie? If from Adam, then we have not lost it; but if we had it not from him, then from him we do not derive all our sin; for by this liberty alone we sin.

If it be replied, that wee are free to sin, but not to good; it is such a foolery, and the cause of the mi­stake so evident, and so ignorant, that I wonder any man of Learning or common sense should own it. For [Page 43] if I be free to evill; then I can chuse evill, or refuse it; If I can refuse it, then I can do good; for to refuse that evill is good, and it is in the Commandement [Eschew evill] but if I cannot choose or refuse it, how am I free to evill? For Voluntas and libertas, Will and Liberty in Philoso­phy are not the same: I may will it, when I cannot will the contrary; as the Saints in Heaven, and God him­self wills good; they can not will evill; because to do so is imper­fection and contrary to felicity; but here is no liberty; for liberty is with power, to do, or not to do; to do this or the contrary; and if this li­berty be not in us, we are not in the state of obedience, or of disobedi­ence; which is the state of all them who are alive, who are neither in hell nor Heaven. But that our case is otherwise, if I had no other argu­ment in the world, and were never [Page 44] so prejudicate and obstinate a per­son, I think I should be perfectly convinced by those words of S. Paul 1 Cor. 7.37. The Apostle speaks of a good act tending not onely to the keeping of a Precept, but to a coun­sel of perfection; & concerning that, he hath these words; Neverthelesse, he that standeth stedfast in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power o­ver his own will, and hath so decreed in his heart that he will keep his Vir­gin, doth well; The words are plain, and need no explication. If this be not a plain liberty of choice, and a power of will, then words mean nothing, and we can never hope to understand one anothers meaning. But if sinne be avoidable, then wee have liberty of choice. If it be un­avoidable, it is not imputable by the measures of Lawes, and Justice; what it is by Empire and Tyranny, let the Adversaries inquire and [Page 45] prove: But since all Theology, all Schools of learning consent in this, that an invincible or unavoidable ignorance does wholly excuse from sin; why an invincible and an una­voidable necessity shall not also ex­cuse, I confesse I have not yet been taught.

But if by Adam's sinne wee be so utterly indisposed, disabled, and op­posite to all good, wholly inclined to evill, and from hence come all actuall sinnes, that is, That by Adam we are brought to that passe, that we cannot chuse but sinne: it is a strange severity, that this should de­scend upon Persons otherwise most innocent, and that this which is the most grievous of all evills; prima & maximapeccantium poena est pec­casse. (Seneca) To be given over to sin, is the worst calamity, the most extreme anger never inflicted di­rectly at all for any sinne, as I have [Page 46] therwise proved, and not indirectly, but upon the extremest anger; which cannot be sup­posed, unlesse God be more angry with us for being born Men, then for choosing to be sinners.Doctr. and Pract. of Repent.

The Consequent of these Argu­ments is this; That our faculties are not so wholly spoiled by Adams fall, but that we can choose good or e­vill, that our nature is not wholly disabled and made opposite to all good: But to nature are left and gi­ven as much as to the handmaid A­gar; nature hath nothing to do with the inheritance, but she and her sons have gifts given them; and by nature we have Laws of Virtue and inclinations to Virtue, and natural­ly we love God, and worship him, and speak good things of him, and love our Parents, and abstain from incestuous mixtures, and are pleased [Page 47] when we do well, and affrighted within when we sin in horrid instan­ces against God; all this is in Nature, and much good comes from Nature,Plinius. ep.12.lib. neque enim quasi lassa & effaeta natura est, ut nihil jam lau­dabile pariat; Nature is not so old, so absolute and dried a trunck as to bring no good fruits upon its own stock; and the French-men have a good proverb, Bonus sanguis non mentitur, a good blood never lies; and some men are naturally chast, and some are abstemious, and many are just and friendly, and noble and charitable: and therefore all actual sins do not pro­ceed from this sin of Adam; for if the sin of Adam left us in liberty to sin, and that this liberty was be­fore Adams fall; then it is not long of Adams fall that we sin; by his fall it should rather be that we cannot choose but do this or that, [Page 48] and then it is no sin; But to say that our actuall sins should any more proceed from Adams fall, then Adams fal should proceed from it self, is not to be imagined, for what made Adam sin when he fell? If a fatal decree made him sin, then he was nothing to blame.

Fati ista culpa est
Nemo fit fato nocens
No guilt upon mankinde can lie
For whats the fault of destiny.

And Adam might with just rea­son lay the blame from himself, and say as Agamemnon did in Ho­mer,

[...]
[...]

[Page 49]It was not I that sinned, but it was fate or a sury, it was God and not I, it was not my act, but the ef­fect of the Divine decree, and then the same decree may make us sin, and not the sin of Adam be the cause of it. But if a liberty of will made Adam sin, then this liberty to sin be­ing still left us, this liberty and and not Adams sin is the cause of all our actual.

Concerning the other clause in the Presbyterian article, that our na­tural corruption in the regenerate still remaines, and is still a sin, and pro­perly a sin: I have (I confesse) heartily opposed it, and shall be­sides my arguments, confute it with my blood, if God shall call me; for it is so great a reproach to the spirit and power of Christ, and to the effects of Baptisme, to Scrip­ture and to right reason, that all good people are bound in Consci­ence [Page 50] to be zealous against it.

For when Christ came to recon­cile us to his Father, he came to take away our sins, not onely to pardon them, but to destroy them; and if the regenerate, in whom the spirit of Christ rules, and in whom all their habitual sins are dead, are still under the servitude and in the stock's of Original sin, then it fol­lows, not onely that our guilt of Adams sin is greater then our own actual, the sin that we never consented to, is of a deeper grain then that which we have chosen and delighted in, and God was more angry with Cain that he was born of Adam, then that he kill'd his Brother; and Judas by descent from the first Adam contracted that sin which he could never be quit of: but he might have been quit of his betraying the second Adam, if he would not have despai­red; [Page 51] I say not onely these horrid consequences do follow, but this also will follow; that Adams sin hath done some mischief that the grace of Christ can never cure; and generation staines so much, that re­generation cannot wash it clean. Besides all this; if the natural cor­ruption remaines in the regenerate and be properly a sin, then either Gods hates the regenerate, or loves the sinner, and when he dies he must enter into Heaven, with that sin, which he cannot lay down but in the grave: as the vilest sinner layes down every sin; and then an unclean thing can go to Heaven, or else no man can; and lastly, to say that this natural corruption, though it be pardoned and mortified, yet still remaines, and is stil a sin, is perfect non-sence; for if it be mortified, it is not, it hath no being; if it is pardoned it was indeed, but now is no sin; for [Page 52] till a man can be guilty of sin with­out obligation to punishment, a sin cannot be a sin that is pardoned; that is, if the obligation to punish­ment or the guilt be taken away, a man is not guilty. Thus far (Ma­dam) I hope you will think I had reason.

One thing more I did and do re­prove in their Westminster articles: and that is, that Original sin, mea­ning, our sin derived from Adam, is contrary to the law of God and doth in its own nature bring guilt upon the sinner; binding him over to Gods wrath &c. that is, that the sin of Adam imputed to us is properly, formally, and inhaerently a sin. If it were properly a sin in us, our sin, it might indeed be dam­nable; for every transgression of the Divine Commandment is so: but because I have proved it cannot bring eternal damnation, I can as [Page 53] well argue thus: this sin cannot just­ly bring us to damnation, therefore it is not properly a sin: as to say; this is properly a sin, therefore it can bring us to damnation. Either of them both follow well: but be­cause they cannot prove it to be a sin properly, or any other wayes but by a limited imputation to certain purposes; they cannot say it infers damnation. But because I have proved, it cannot infer dam­nation, I can safely conclude, it is not formally, properly, and inhe­rently a sin in us.

[Page 54]
Nec placet ô superi vobis cum ver­tere cuncta
Propositum, nostris erroribus addere crimen.
Nor did it please our God, when that our state
Was chang'd, to adde a crime un­to our fate.

I have now (Madam) though much to your trouble quitted my self of my Presbyterian opponents, so far as I can judge fitting for the present: but my friends also take some exceptions; and there are some objections made, and blows given me as it happened to our Blessed Saviour, in domo illorum qui dilige­bant me; in the house of my Mo­ther and in the societies of some of my Dearest Brethren. For the case is this.

[Page 55]They joyn with me in all this that I have said; viz. That Origi­nal sin is ours onely by imputation; that it leaves us still in our natural liberty, and though it hath devested us of our supernaturals, yet that our nature is almost the same, and by the grace of Jesus as capable of Heaven as it could ever be, by de­rivation of Original rightousnesse from Adam. In the conduct and in the description of this Question, being usually esteemed to be onely Scholastical, I confesse they (as all men else) do usually differ; for it was long ago observ'd, that there are 16. several famous opinions, in this one Question of Original sin. But my Brethren, are willlng to confesse, that for Adams sin alone no man did or shall ever perish. And that it is rather to be called a stain then a sin. If they were all of one minde and one voice in this [Page 56] article, though but thus far, I would not move a stone to disturb it, but some draw one way and some an­other, and they that are aptest to understand the whole secret, do put fetters and bars upon their own understanding by an importune regard to the great names of some dead men, who are called masters upon earth, and whose authority is as apt to mislead us into some pro­positions, as their learning is use­full to guide us in others: but so it happens, that because all are not of a minde, I cannot give ac­count of every disagreeing man; but of that which is most mate­rial I shall. Some learned persons are content I should say no man is damned for the sin of Adam a­lone; but yet that we stand guilty in Adam, and redeemed from this damnation by Christ; and if that the article were so stated, it would [Page 57] not intrench upon the justice or the goodnesse of God; for his justice would be sufficiently declared, be­cause no man can complain of wrong done him when the evil that he fell into by Adam is taken off by Christ; and his goodnesse is manifest in making a new Census for us, taxing and numbring us in Christ, and giving us free Re­demption by the blood of Jesus: but yet that we ought to confess that we are liable to damnation by Adam, and saved from thence by Christ; that Gods justice may be glorified in that, and his goodnesse in this, but that we are still real sinners till washed in the blood of Lamb; and without God, and with­out hopes of heaven, till then: and that if this article be thus handled, the Presbyterian fancie will disap­pear; for they can be confuted without denying Adams sin to be [Page 58] damnable; by saying it is pardo­ned in Christ, and in Christ all men are restored, and he is the head of the Predestination; for in him God looked upon us when he designed us to our final state: and this say they is much for the honour of Christs Redemption.

To these things (Madam) I have much to say; some thing I will trouble your Ladiship withal at this time, that you and all that con­sider the particulars may see, I could not do the work of God and truth if I had proceeded in that me­thod. For

1. It is observable that those wi­ser persons, who will by no means admit that any one is or ever shall be damned for Original sin, do by this means hope to salve the justice of God; by which they plainly im­ply that to damn us for this, is hard and intolerable; and therefore [Page 59] they suppose they have declared a remedy. But then this also is to be considered; if it be intolera­ble to damn children for the sin of Adam, then it is intolerable to say it is damnable; If that be not just or reasonable, then this is also un­just and unreasonable [...] for the sen­tence and the execution of the sen­tence are the same emanation and issue of justice and are to be e­qually accounted of. For.

2. I demand, had it been just in God, to damn all mankinde to the eternal paines of hell, for Adams sin, commited before they had a being, or could consent to it, or know of it? if it could be just, then any thing in the world can be just, and it is no matter who is innocent, or who is criminal directly and by choice, since they may turn De­vils in their Mothers bellies; and it matters not whether there be any [Page 60] laws or no, since it is all one that there be no law, and that we do not know whether there be or no; and it matters not whether there be any judicial processe, for we may as well be damned without judgment, as be guilty without action: and besides, all those arguments will presse here which I urged in my first discourse. Now if it had been unjust actually to damn us all for the sin of one, it was unjust to sen­tence us to it; for if he did give sentence against us justly, he could justly have executed the sentence; and this is just, if that be. But

3. God did put this sentence in execution; for when he sent the Holy Jesus into the world, to die for us and to Redeem us, he satis­fied his Fathers Anger, for Origi­nal sin as well as for actual, he paid all the price of that as well as of this damnation; and the hor­rible [Page 61] sentence was brought off; and God was so satisfied that his justice had full measure; for so all men say who speak the voice of the Church in the matter of Christs sa­tisfaction, so that now, although there was the goodnesse of God, in taking the evil from us; yet how to reconcile this processe with his justice, viz. That for the sin of ano­ther their God should sentence all the world to the portion of devils to eternal ages; and that he would not be reconciled to us, or take off this horrible sentence, without a full price to be paid to his justice; by the Saviour of the world, this, this is it that I require may be re­conciled to that Notion which we have of the Divine justice.

4. If no man shall ever be dam­ned for the sin of Adam alone, then I demand whether are they born quitt from the guilt; or when they [Page 62] are quitted? if they be born free; I agree to it; but then they were ne­ver charg'd with it, so far as to make them liable to damnation. If they be not born free, when are they quitted? By baptisme, before, or after? He that saies before or af­ter, must speak wholly by chance and without pretence of Scripture or tradition, or any sufficient war­rant; and he cannot guesse when it is. If in Baptisme he is quitted, then he that dies before baptisme, is still under the sentence, and what shall become of him? If it be an­swered, that God will pardon him, some way or other, at some time or other; I reply, yea, but who said so? For if the Scriptures have said that we are all in Adam guilty of sin and damnation, and the Scrip­tures have told us no wayes of be­ing quit of it, but by baptisme, and faith in Christ; Is it not plainly con­sequent [Page 63] that til we believe in Christ, or at least till in the faith of others, we are Baptised into Christ, we are reckoned still in Adam, not in Christ, that is, still we are under damnation, and not heires of hea­ven but of wrath onely?

5. How can any one bring him­self into a belief that none can be damned for Original sin, if it be of this perswasion that it makes us li­able to damnation; for if you say as I say, that it is against Gods justice to damn us for the fault of a­nother, then it is also against his justice to sentence us to that suffe­ring which to inflict is injustice. If you say it is beleeved upon this ac­count, because Christ was promi­sed to all mankinde, I reply, that yet all mankinde shall not be saved; and there are conditions required on our part, and no man can be sa­ved but by Christ, and he must [Page 64] come to him or be brought to him, or it is not told us, how any one can have a part in him; and therefore that will not give us the confidence is looked for. If it be at last said that we hope in Gods goodness that he will take care of innocents, and that they shall not perish, I answer, that if they be innocents, we need not appeal to his goodnesse, for, his justice will secure them. If they be guilty and not innocents, then it is but vain to run to Gods goodnesse, which in this particular is not revealed; when it is against his justice which is revealed; and to hope God will save them whom he hates, who are gone from him in Adam, who are born heires of his wrath, slaves of the Devil, ser­vants of sin (for these Epithetes are given to all the children of [Page 65] Adam, by the opponents in this Question) is to hope for that a­gainst which his justice visibly is ingaged, and for which I hope there is no ground, unlesse this instance of Divine goodnesse were expres­sed in revelation; For so even wicked persons on their death-bed are bidden to hope without rule and without reason or sufficient grounds of trust. But besides; that we hope in Gods good­nesse in this case is not ill, but I ask, is it against Gods goodnesse that any one should perish for Original sin? if it be against Gods goodnesse, it is also a­gainst his justice; for nothing is just that is not also good. Gods goodnesse may cause his justice to forbear a sentence, but whatsoever is against Gods goodnesse, is against [Page 99] God, and therefore against his ju­stice also; because every attribute in God is God himself: For it is one thing to say [This is against Gods goodnesse] and the contrary is a­greeable to Gods goodnesse] What­soever is against the goodnesse of God is essentially evil: But a thing may be agreeable to Gods good­nesse, and yet the other part not be against it. For example; It is against the goodnesse of God to hate fools and ideots: and therefore he can never hate them. But it is agreea­ble to Gods goodnesse to give hea­ven to them and the joyes beatifi­cal: and if he does not give them so much, yet if he does no evil to them hereafter, it is also agreeable to his goodnesse: To give them Heaven, or not to give them Heaven, though they be contra­dictories; yet are both agreeable to his goodnesse. But in contraries [Page 67] the case is otherwise: For though not to give them heaven is consistent with the Divine goodnesse, yet to end them to hell is not. The rea­son of the difference is this. Be­cause to do contrary things must come from contrary principles; and whatsoever is contrary to the Di­vine goodnesse is essentially evil. But to do or not to do, supposes but one positive principle; and the other negative, not having a con­trary cause, may be wholy inno­cent as proceeding from a negative: but to speak more plain. Is it a­gainst Gods goodnese that Infants should be damned for Original sin? then it could never have been done, it was essentially evil, and there­fore could never have been decreed or sentenced. But if it be not a­gainst Gods goodness that they should perish in hell, then it may consist with Gods goodness; and [Page 89] then to hope that Gods goodness will rescue them from his justice, when the thing may agree with both, is to hope without ground; God may be good, though they pe­rish for Adams sin; and if so, and that he can be just too upon the account, of what attribute shal these innocents be rescued; and we hope for mercy for them.

6. If Adams posterity be onely liable to damnation, but shall ne­ver be damned for Adams sin, then all the children of Heathens dying in their infancy, shall escape as well as baptized Christian children: which if any of my disagreeing Brethren shall affirm, he will indeed seem to magnifie Gods goodness, but he must fall out with some great Doctors of the Church whom he would pretend to fol­low; and besides, he will be hard put to it, to tell what advantage [Page 69] Christian children have over Hea­thens, supposing them all to die young; for being bred up in the Christian Religion is accidental, and may happen to the children of unbelievers, or may not happen to the children of believers; and if Baptisme addes nothing to their present state, there is no reason in­fants should be baptized; but if it does add to their present capacity (as most certainly it does very much) then that Heathen infants, should be in a condition of being rescued from the wrath of God, as well as Christian Infants, is a strange unlookt for affirmative, and can no way be justified or made probable, but by affirming it to be against the justice of God to condemn any for Adams sin. Indeed if it be unjust (as I have proved it is) then it will follow, that none shall suffer damnation by it. But if [Page 70] the hopes of the salvation of Hea­then infants be to be derived onely from Gods goodnesse, though Gods goodnesse cannot fail, yet our argument may fail; for it will not follow, because God is good, therefore Heathen infants shall be saved: for it might as well follow, God is good, therefore Heathens shal be no heathens, but all turn Christians. These things do not follow affirmatively. But negative­ly they do. For if it were against Gods Goodnesse that they should be reckoned in Adam unto eternal death, then it is also against his Justice, and against God all the way; and then, either we should finde some revelation of Gods ho­nour in Scripture, or at least, there would be no principle (such as is this pretence of being guilty of dam­nation in Adam) to contest against it.

[Page 71]7. But to come yet closer to the Question, some Good Men and wise suppose, that the Sublapsarian Pres­byterians can be confuted in their pretended grounds of absolute re­probation, although we grant that Adams sinne is damnable to his po­sterity, provided we say, that though it was damnable, yet it shall never damne us. Now though I wish it could be done, that they and I might not differ so much as in a cir­cumstance, yet first it is certain that the men they speake of can never be confuted upon the stock of Gods Justice, because as the one saies, it is just that God should actually damn all for the sin of Adam: So the other saies, it is just that God should actu­ally sentence all to damnation; and so there the case is equall: Secondly, they cannot be confuted upon the stock of Gods goodnesse; because the emanations of that being whol­ly [Page 72] arbitrary, and though there are negative measures of it, as there is of Gods Infinity, and we know Gods goodness to be inconsistent with some things, yet there are no positive measures of this goodnesse; and no man can tell how much it will do for us: and therefore without a re­velation, things may be sometimes hoped, which yet may not be presu­med; and therefore here also they are not to be confuted: and as for the particular Scriptures, unlesse we have the advantage of essentiall rea­son taken from the divine At­tributes, they will oppose Scripture to Scripture, and have as much ad­vantage to expound the opposite places, as the Jewes have in their Questions of the Messias; and there­fore si meos ipse corymbos necterem, if I might make mine own arguments in their society, and with their leave; I would upon that very account su­spect [Page 73] the usuall discourses of the ef­fects and Oeconomy of Originall sinne.

8. For where will they reckon the beginning of Predestination? will they reckon it in Adam after the fall, or in Christ immediately promised? If in Adam, then they return to the Presbyterian way, and run upon all the rocks before reckoned, e­nough to break all the World in Pie­ces. If in Christ they reckon it (and so they do) then thus I argue. If we are all reckoned in Christ before we were borne, then how can we be reckoned in Adam when we are born I speak as to the matter of Pre­destination to salvation, or damnation; For as for the intermedial tem­poral evills, and dangers spirituall, and sad infirmities, they are our na­ture, and might with Justice have [Page 74] been all the portion God had given to Adam, and therefore may be so to us, and consequently not at all to be reckoned in this inquiry: But cer­tainly, as to the maine.

9. If God lookes upon us all in Christ, then by him we are rescued from Adam; so much is done for us before we were born. For if this is not to be reckoned till after we were borne, then Adam's sin pre­vailed really in some periods, and to some effects for which God in Christ had provided no remedie: for it gave no remedie to children till after they were born, but irre­mediably they were born children of wrath; For if a remedy were given to children before they were born, then they are born in Christ not in Adam; but if this remedy was not given to children before they were born, then it followes, that we were not at first looked [Page 75] upon in Christ, but in Adam, and consequently he was caput praede­stinationis the head of predestinati­on, or else there were two; the one before we were born, the other after. So that haeret lethalis arundo: The arrow sticks fast and it cannot be pulled out, unlesse by other in­struments then are commonly in fashion. However it be, yet me thinks this a very good probable argument.

As Adam sinned before any childe was born, so was Christ promised before; and that our Redeemer shall not have more force upon children, that they should be born beloved and quitted from wrath, then Adam our Progenitor shall have to cause that we be born ha­ted and in a damnable condition, wants so many degrees of proba­bility, that it seems to dishonour the mercy of God, and the reputa­tion [Page 76] of his goodesse and the power of his redemption.

For this serves as an Antidote, and Antinomy of their great ob­jection pretended by these learned persons: for whereas they say, they the rather affirm this, be­cause it is an honour to the redemp­tion which our Saviour wrought for us, that it rescued us from the sentence of damnation, which we had incurred. To this I say, that the honour of our blessed Saviour does no way depend upon our ima­ginations and weak propositions: and neither can the reputation and honour of the Divine goodnesse borrow aids and artificial supports from the dishonour of his Justice; and it is no reputation to a Physiti­an to say he hath cured us of an e­vil which we never had; and shall we accuse the Father of mercies to have wounded us for no other rea­son [Page 77] but that the son may have the Honour to have cured us? I under­stand not that. He that makes a necessity that he may finde a reme­die, is like the Roman whom Cato found fault withal; he would com­mit a fault that he might begge a pardon; he had rather write bad Greek, that he might make an apo­logie, then write good latine, and need none. But however; Christ hath done enough for us; even all that we did need, and since it is all the reason in the World we should pay him all honour; we may re­member, that it is a greater favour to us that by the benefit of our Blessed Saviour, who was the Lamb slain from the beginning of the world, we were reckoned in Christ, and born in the accounts of the Di­vine favour; I say, it is a greater fa­vour that we were born under the redemption of Christ, then under [Page 78] the sentence and damnation of A­dam; and to prevent an evil is a greater favour then to cure it; so that if to do honour to Gods good­nesse and to the graces of our Re­deemer, we will suppose a need, we may do him more honour to suppose that the promised seed of the woman did do us as early a good, as the sin of Adam could do us mischief; and therefore that in Christ we are born, quitted from a­ny such supposed sentence, and not that we bring it upon our shoul­ders into the World with us. But this thing relies onely upon their suppositions,

For if we will speak of what is really true and plainly revealed: From all the sins of all mankinde Christ came to redeem us: He came to give us a supernatural birth: to tell us all his Fathers will; to reveal to us those glo­rious [Page 79] promises upon the expecta­tion of which we might be ena­bled to do every thing that is re­quired; He came to bring us grace, and life, and spirit; to strengthen us against all the powers of Hell and Earth; to sanctifie our afflicti­ons, which from Adam by Natu­ral generation descended on us; to take cut the sting of death, to make it an entrance to immortal life; to assure us of resurrection, to intercede for us, and to be an advocate for us, when we by in­firmity commit sin; to pardon us when we repent. Nothing of which could be derived to us from Adam by our natural generation; Mankinde now, taking in his whole constitution, and designe, is like the Birds of Paradice which travel­lers tell us of in the Molucco Islands; born without legs; but by a ce­lestial power they have a recom­pence [Page 80] made to them for that de­fect; and they alwayes hover in the air, and feed on the dew of heaven: so are we birds of Paradice; but cast out from thence, and born without legs, without strength to walk in the laws of God, or to go to heaven; but by a power from above, we are adopted in our new birth to a celestial conversation, we feed on the dew of heaven, the just does [...]live [...]oy faith, and breaths in this new life by the spirit of God. For from the first Adam nothing descended to us but an infirm body, and a naked soul, evil example and a body of death, ignorance and passion, hard labor and a cur­sed field, a captive soul and an im­prisoned body, that is, a soul na­turally apt to comply with the ap­petites of the body, and its desires whether reasonable or excessive: and though these things were not [Page 81] direct sins to us in their natural a­bode and first principle, yet there are proper inherent miseries and principles of sin to us in their e­manation. But from this state, Christ came to redeem us all by his grace, and by his spirit, by his life and by his death, by his Do­ctrine and by his Sacraments, by his promises and by his revelations, by his resurrection and by his ascen­sion, by his interceding for us and judging of us; and if this be not a conjugation of glorious things great enough to amaze us, and to merit from us all our services, and all our love, and all the glorifications of God, I am sure nothing can be added to it by any supposed need of which we have no revelation: There is as much done for us as we could need, and more then we could aske,

[Page 82]
Nempe quod optanti Divûm promit­tere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en attulit ultro!
Vivite faelices anime quibus est for­tuna peracta.
Jam sua—

the meaning of which words I render, or at least recompence with the verse of a Psalm.

To thee O Lord I'le pay my vow
My knees in thanks to thee shall bow,
Psal. 56. by Bp. King.
For thou my life keepst from the grave
And do'st my feet from fal­ling save,
That with the living in thy sight
I may enjoy eternal light.

[Page 83]For thus what Ahasuerus said to E­ster, Vetercs literas muta, change the old letters; is done by the birth of our Blessed Saviour. Eva is chan­ged into Ave, and although it be true what Bensirach said, From the woman is the beginning of sin, and by her we all die, yet it is now chang'd by the birth of our Redeemer, from a woman is the beginning of our restitution, and in him we all live; thus are all the four quarters of the World renewed by the second A­dam: [...], The East, West, North, and South, are represented in the second Adam as well as the first, and ra­ther, and to better purposes, be­cause if sin did abound, Grace shall superabound.

I have now Madam given to your honour such accounts, as I hope be­ing added to my other papers, may satisfie not onely your Ladiship, but [Page 84] those to whom this account may be communicated. I shall onely now beg your patience, since your Ho­nour hath been troubled with Que­stions, and inquiries, and objections, and little murmurs to hear my an­swers to such of them as have been brought to me.

1. I am complained of, that I would trouble the World with a new thing; which let it be never so true, yet unlesse it were very useful, will hardly make recompence for the trouble I put the world to, in this inquiry.

I answer; that for the newnesse of it; I have already given accounts that the opinions which I impugne, as they are no direct parts of the ar­ticle of Original sin, so they are newer then the truth which I have asserted. But let what I say seem as new as the reformation did, when Luther first preached against indul­gences, [Page 85] the presence of Novelty did not, and we say, ought not to have affrighted him; and there­fore I ought also to look to what I say, that it be true, and the truth will proove its age. But to speak freely Madam, though I have a great reverence for Antiquity, yet it is the prime antiquity of the Church; the ages of Martyrs and Holinesse, that I mean; and I am sure that in them, my opinion hath much more warrant then the con­trary; But for the descending a­ges I give that veneration to the great names of them that went be­fore us, which themselves gave to their Predecessors; I honour their memory, I read their books, I imi­tate their piety, I examine their ar­guments; for therefore they did write them, and where the reasons of the Moderns and their's seeme equall, I turn the ballance on [Page 86] the elder side, and follow them; but where a scruple or a grane of reason is evidently in the other ballance; I must follow that. Nempe qui ante nos ista moverunt, non Domini nostri, sed Duces sunt. Seneca. ep. 33. They that taught of this Article before me, are Good Guides, but no Lords and Masters; for I must acknow­ledge none upon earth: for so am I commanded by my Master that is in Heaven; and I remember what we are taught in Palingenius, when wee were boyes.

Quicquid Aristoteles, vel quivis dicat eorum,
Dict a nihil moror à vero cum fortè re­cedunt:
Saepe graves magnos (que) viros, fama (que) verendos
Errare & labi contingit, plurima secum
Ingenia in tenebras consueti nominis alti,
Authores ubi connivent deducere e­asdem.
[Page 87]
If Aristotle be deceiv'd, and say that's true,
What nor himself, nor others ever knew,
I leave his text, and let his Schollers talke
Till they be hoarse or weary in their walke:
When wise men erre, though their fame ring like Bells,
I scape a danger when I leave their spells.

For although they that are dead some ages before we were borne, have a reverence due to them, yet more is due to truth that shall ne­ver die; and God is not wanting to our industry any more then to theirs; but blesses every age with the understanding of his truths. AEta­tibus omnibus, omnibus hominibus com­munis sapientia est, nec illam ceu pecu­lium licet antiquitati gratulari. All [Page 88] ages, and all men have their advan­tages in their inquiries after truth; neither is wisedome appropriate to our Fathers. And because even wise men may be deceived, and therefore that when I find it, or suppose it so (for that's all one as to me and my dutie) I must go after truth where ever it is; certainly it will be lesse expected from me to follow the popular noises and the voices of the people, who are not to teach us, but to be taught by us: and I believe my self to have reason to complain when men are angry at a doctrine because it is not commonly taught; that is, when they are impatient to be taught a truth, because most men do already believe a lie; recti apud nos locum tenet error ubi publicus fact [...]us est, So Seneca (Epist. 123.) complain­ed in his time: it is a strange title to truth which error can pretend, for its being publick; and we refuse to [Page 89] follow an unusuall truth; quasi ho­nestius sit quia frequentius, and indeed it were well to do so in those propo­sitions who have no truth in them but what they borrow from mens opinions, and are for nothing tolle­rable, but that they are usuall.

Object. 2. But what necessity is there in my publication of this do­ctrine, supposing it were true; for all truths are not to be spoken at all times; and if a truth gives offence, it is better to let men alone, then to di­sturb the peace.

I answer with the labouring mans Proverb; a pennyworth of ease is worth a Penny at any time; and a little truth is worth a little Peace, e­very day of the weeke: & caeteris pa­rióus, Truth is to be preferred before Peace; not every trifling truth to a considerable peace: but if the truth be material, it makes recompence, though it brings a great noise along [Page 90] with it; and if the breach of Peace be nothing but that men talke in Private, or declame a little in pub­licke; truly then (Madam) it is a very pittifull little proposition, the discovery of which in truth will not make recompence for the pratling of disagreeing Persons. Truth and Peace make an excellent yoke; but the truth of God is alwayes to be pre­ferred before the Peace of men, and therefore our Blessed Saviour came not to send Peace, but a sword; That is, he knew his doctrine would cause great devisions of heart; but yet he came to perswade us to Peace and Unity. Indeed if the truth be cleare, and yet of no great effect in the lives of men, in government, or in the honour of God, then it ought not to break the Peace; That is, it may not run out of its retirement, to disquiet them, to whom their rest is better then that knowledge. But if [Page 91] it be brought out already, it must not be deserted positively, though peace goes away in its stead. So that peace is rather to be deserted, then any truth should be renounced or denied; but Peace is rather to be procured or continued, then some truth offer'd. This is my sence (Madam) when the case is otherwise then I suppose it to be at present. For as for the pre­sent case, there must be two when there is a falling out, or a peace bro­ken; and therefore I will secure it now; for let any man dissent from me in this Article, I will not be trou­bled at him; he may doe it with li­berty, and with my charity. If any man is of my opinion, I confesse I love him the better; but if he re­futes it, I will not love him lesse af­ter then I did before: but he that dissents, and reviles me, must ex­pect from me no other kindness but that I forgive him, and pray for him, [Page 92] and offer to reclaim him, and that I resolve nothing shall ever make me either hate him, or reproach him: and that still in the greatest of his difference, I refuse not to give him the communion of a Brother; I be­lieve I shall be chidden by some or other for my easinesse, and want of fierceness, which they call Zeal, but it is a fault of my nature; a part of my Original sin:

Vnicui (que) dedit vitium Natura Creato,
Mî Natura aliquid semper amare dedit. Propert.

Some weaknesse to each man by birth descends,
To me too great a kindnesse Nature lends.

But if the Peace can be broken no more then thus; I suppose the truth [Page 93] which I publish will do more then make recompence for the noise that in Clubs and Conventicles is made over and above. So long as I am thus resolved; there may be injury done to me, but there can be no duell, or losse of Peace abroad. For a single anger, or a displeasure on one side, is not a breach of peace on both; and a Warre cannot be made by fewer, then a bargain can; in which alwaies there must be two at least.

Object. 3. But as to the thing; If it be inquired [...] [...]; what profit, what use, what edification is there, what good to souls, what honour to God by this new explication of the Ar­ticle? I answer; that the usuall Do­ctrines of Originall sinne are made the great foundation of the horrible proposition concerning absolute Reprobation; the consequences of it [...] reproach God with injustice, [Page 94] they charge God foolishly, and de­ny his Goodness and his Wisdom in many instances: and whatsoever can upon the account of the Divine At­tributes be objected against the fierce way of Absolute Decrees; all that can be brought for the reproof of their usuall Propositions concer­ning Originall sinne. For the con­sequences are plaine; and by them the necessity of my Doctrine, and its usefulnesse may be understood.

For 1. If God decrees us to be born sinners; Then he makes us to be sinners: and then where is his goodnesse?

2. If God does damne any for that, he damnes us for what we could not help, and for what him­self did, and then where is his Ju­stice?

3. If God sentence us to that Damnation, which he cannot in ju­stice inflict, where is his Wisdome?

[Page 95]4. If God for the sinne of Adam brings upon us a necessity of sin­ning; where is our liberty? where is our Nature? what is become of all Lawes, and of all Vertue and vice? How can men be distinguish'd from Beasts: or the Vertuous from the vitious?

5. If by the fall of Adam, we are so wholly ruined in our faculties, that we cannot do any good, but must do evill; how shall any man take care of his wayes? or how can it be supposed he should strive a­gainst all vice, when he can excuse so much upon his Nature? or indeed how shall he strive at all? for if all actual sins are derived from the Ori­ginall, and then is unavoidable, and yet an Unresistable cause, then no man can take care to avoid any actu­all sinne, whose cause is naturall, and not to be declined. And then where is his providence and Government?

[Page 96]6. If God does cast Infants into Hell for the sinne of others, and yet did not condemne Devills, but for their owne sinne; where is his love to mankind?

7. If God chooseth the death of so many Millions of Persons who are no sinners upon their own stock, and yet sweares that he does not love the death of a sinner, viz. sin­ning with his owne choice; how can that be credible, he should love to kill Innocents, and yet should love to spare the Criminall? where then is his Mercie, and where is his Truth?

8. If God hath given us a Na­ture by derivation, which is wholly corrupted, then how can it be that all which God made is good? for though Adam corrupted himself, yet in propriety of speaking, we did not; but this was the Decree of God; and then where is the excellency of [Page 97] his providence and Power, where is the glory of the Creation?

Because therefore that God is all goodness, and justice, and wise­dome, and love, and that he go­verns all things, and all men wisely and holily, and according to the capacities of their natures and Persons; that he gives us a wise law, and binds that law on us by promi­ses and threatnings; I had reason to assert these glories of the Divine Majestie, and remove the hindran­ces of a good life; since every thing can hinder us from living well, but scar cely can all the Arguments of God and man, and all the Powers of heaven and hell perswade us to strictnesse and severity.

Qui serere ingenuum volet a­grum,
Liberet arva priùs sruticibus
[Page 98]Falce rubos, silicem (que) resecet,
Boeth. lib. 3. Metr. 1.
Ut novâ fruge gravis Ceres eat.
He that will sow his field with hopefull seed,
Must every bramble, every thi­stle weed:
And when each hindrance to the graine is gone,
A fruitfull crop shall rise of corn alone.

When therefore there were so many wayes made to the Devill, I was willing amongst many others to stop this also; and I dare say, few Questions in Christendome can say half so much in justification of their owne usefulnesse and necessity.

I know (Madam) that they who are of the other side doe and will disavow most of these conse­quences; and so doe all the World, [Page 99] all the evils which their adversaries say, do follow from their opinions; but yet all the World of men that perceive such evills to follow from a proposition, think themselves bound to stop the progression of such opinions from whence they be­leeve such evils may arise. If the Church of Rome did believe that all those horrid things were chargable upon Transubstantiation, and upon worshipping of Images, which we charge upon the Doctrines, I doe not doubt but they would as much disowne the Proposition, as now they doe the consequents; and yet I doe as little doubt but that we do well to disown the first, because we espy the latter: and though the Man be not, yet the doctrines are highly chargable with the evils that follow it may be the men espy them not; yet from the doctrines they do cer­tainly follow; and there are not it [Page 100] the World many men who owne that is evil in the pretence, but many doe such as are dangerous in the ef­fect; and this doctrine which I have reproved, I take to be one of them.

Object. 4. But if Originall sinne be not a sinne properly, why are children baptized? and what bene­fit comes to them by baptisme?

I Answer, as much as they need, and are capable of: and it may as well be asked, Why were all the sons of Abraham circumcised, when in that Covenant there was no re­mission of sins at all; for little things and legal impurities, and irre­gularities there were; but there be­ing no sacrifice there but of beasts, whose blood could not take a­way sinne, it is certaine and plainly taught us in Scripture, that no Rite of Moses was expiatory of sinnes. But secondly. This Objection can presse nothing at all; for why was [Page 101] Christ baptized, who knew no sinne? But yet so it behoved him to fulfill all Righteousnesse. 3. Baptisme is called regeneration, or the new birth; and therefore, since in Adam Children are borne onely to a natu­rall life and a Naturall death, and by this they can never arrive at Hea­ven, therefore Infants are baptized, because untill they be borne anew, they can never have title to the Pro­mises of Jesus Christ, or be heirs of heaven, and coheir's of Jesus. 4. By Baptisme Children are made parta­kers of the holy Ghost, and of the grace of God; which I desire to be observed in opposition to the Pela­gian Heresy, who did suppose Na­ture to be so perfect, that the Grace of God was not necessary, and that by Nature alone, they could go to heaven; which because I affirm to be impossible, and that Baptisme is therfore necessary, because nature is [Page 102] insufficient, and Baptisme is the great chanel of grace; there ought to be no envious and ignorant load laid upon my Doctrine, as if it com­plied with the Pelagian, against which it is so essentially and so mainly opposed in the main diffe­rence of his Doctrine. 5. Children are therefore Baptized, because if they live they will sinne, and though their sins are not pardoned before hand, yet in Baptisme they are ad­mitted to that state of favour, that they are within the Covenant of re­pentance and Pardon: and this is ex­presly the Doctrine of St. Austin, lib. 1. de nupt. & concup. cap. 26. & cap. 33. & tract. 124. in Johan. But of this I have already given larger ac­counts in my Discourse of Baptisme. part. 2 p. 194. in the great Exem­plar. 6. Children are baptized for the Pardon even of Originall sin; this may be affirmed truly, but yet [Page 103] improperly: for so far as it is impu­ted, so farr also it is remissible; for the evill that is done by Adam, is al­so taken away in Christ; and it is im­puted to us to very evill purposes, as I have already explicated: but as it was among the Jewes who believed then the sinne to be taken away, when the evill of punishment is ta­ken off; so is Originall sinne taken a­way in Baptisme; for though the Material part of the evill, is not ta­ken away, yet the curse in all the sons of God is turn'd into a blessing, and is made an occasion of reward, or an entrance to it. Now in all this I affirme all that is true, and all that is probable: for in the same sense, as Originall staine is a sinne, so does Baptisme bring the Pardon. It is a sinne metonymically, that is, because it is the effect of one sinne, and the cause of many; and just so in bap­tisme it is taken away, that it is now [Page 104] the matter of a grace, and the op­portunity of glory; and upon these Accounts the Church Baptizes all her Children.

Object. 5. But to deny Originall sinne to be a sinne properly and in­herently, is expressly against the words of S. Paul in the 5. Chapter to the Romanes, If it bee, I have done; but that it is not, I have these things to say. 1. If the words be capable of any interpretation, and can be per­mitted to signifie otherwise then is vulgarly pretended, I suppose my self to have given reasons sufficient, why they ought to be. For any in­terpretation that does violence to right Reason, to Religion, to Holi­nesse of life, and the Divine Attri­butes of God, is therefore to be rejected, and another chosen; For in all Scriptures, all good and all wise men doe it.

2. The words in question [sin] [Page 105] and [sinner] and [condemnation] are frequently used in Scripture in the lesser sense, and [sin] is taken for the punishment of sin; 1 Kings. 1. 21. Zech. 14. 19. 2 Cor. 5. 21. Isai. 53. 10. Hebr. 9. 28. 1 Kings. 1. 21. and [sin is taken for him who bore the e­vil of the sinne, and [sin] is taken for le­gal impurity; and for him who could not be guilty, even for Christ himself; as I have proved already: and in the like manner [sinners] is used, by the rule of Con­jugates and denominatives; but it is so also in the case, of Bathsheba the Mother of Solomon. 3. For the word [condemnation,] it is by the Apostle himself limited to signifie his temporal death; for when the Apostle sayes Death passed upon all men, in as much as all men have sinned; he must mean temporal death; for e­ternal death did not passe upon all [Page 106] men; and if he means eternal death he must not mean that it came for Adams sin; but in as much as all men have sinned, that is, upon all those upon whom eternal death did come, it came because they also have sinned. 4. The Apostle here speaks of sin imputed; therefore not of sin inherent: and if imputed onely to such purposes as he here speaks of, viz. to temporal death, then it is neither a sin properly, nor yet imputable to Eternal death so far as is or can be inplyed by the Apostles words. 5. The A­postles sayes; by the disobedience of one many were made sinners: so that it appears that we in this have no sin of our own, neither is it at all our own formally and inherently; for though efficiently it was his, and effectively ours as to certain pur­poses of imputation; yet it could not be a sin to us formally; because [Page 107] it was Vnius inobedientia, the dis­obedience of one man, therefore in no sense, could it be properly ours. 6. Whensoever another mans sin is imputed to his relative, there­fore because it is anothers and im­puted, it can go no further but to effect certain evils to afflict the relative, but to punish the cause; not formally to denominate the descendant or relative to be a sin­ner; for it is as much a contra­diction to say that I am formal­ly by him a sinner, as that I did really do his action. Now to impute] in Scripture, it signifies to reckon as if he had done it; Not to impute is to treate him so as if he had not done it. So far then as the imputation is, so far we are reckoned as sinners; but A­dams sin being by the Apostle sig­nified to be imputed but to the condemnation or sentence to a tem­poral [Page 108] death; so far we are sinners in him, that is, so as that for his sake death was brought upon us; And indeed the word [imputare] to impute] does never signifie more, nor alwayes so much. Imputare verò frequenter ad significationem ex­probrantis accedit, sed citra reprehen­sionem, sayes Laurentius valla; It is like an exprobation, but short of a reproof; so Quintilian. Imput as nobis propitios ventos, & secundum mare, ac civitatis opulentae liberalita­tem. Thou doest impute, that is, upbraid to us our prosperous voy­ages, and a calm Sea, and the li­berality of a rich City. Imputare signifies oftentimes the same that computare; to reckon or account: Nam haec in quartâ non imputantur, say the Lawyers, they are not impu­ted, that is, they are not computed or reckoned. Thus Adams sin is impu­ted to us, that is, it is put into our [Page 109] reckoning, & when we are sick and die, we pay our Symbols, the por­tion of evil that is laid upon us: and what Marcus said, I may say in this case with a little variety legata in hae­reditate—sive legatum datum sit hae­redi, sive percipere, sive deducere vel retinere passus est, ei imputantur: the the legacy whether it be given or left to the heire, whether he may take it or keep it, is still imputed to him; that is, it is within his reckoning

But no reason, no Scripture, no Religion does inforce; and no di­vine Attribute does permit that we should say that God did so impute Adams sin to his posterity, that he di really esteem them to be guilty of Adams sin; equally culpable, equally hateful; For if in this sense it be true that in him we sinned; then we sinn'd as he did, that is, with the same malice, in the same acti­on; [Page 110] and then we are as much guil­ty as he; but if we have sinned lesse, then we did not sin in him; for to sinne in him, could not by him be lessen'd to us; for what we did in him we did by him, and therefore as much as he did; but if God im­puted this sin lesse to us then to him, then this imputation supposes it onely to be a collateral and indi­rect account to such purposes as he pleased: of which purposes we judge by the analogy of faith, by the words of Scripture, by the pro­portion and notices of the Divine Attributes. 7. There is nothing in the designe or purpose of the A­postle that can or ought to infer any other thing; for his purpose is to signifie that by mans sin death entred into the world; which the son of Sirach Ecclus. 25. 33. expresses thus; à muliere factum est initium peccati, & inde est quod morimur; [Page 111] from the woman is the beginning of sinne; and from her it is that we all die: and again, Ecclus. 1. 24. by the envie of the Devil death came into the world; this evil being Universal, Christ came to the world, and be­came our head, to other purposes, even to redeem us from death; which he hath begun and will fi­nish, and to become to us our Pa­rent in a new birth, the Author of a spiritual life; and this benefit is of far more efficacy by Christ, then the evil could be by Adam; and as by Adam we are made sinners: so by Christ we are made righteous; not just so; but so and more, and therefore, as our being made sinners, signifies that by him we die, so being by Christ made righte­ous must at least signifie that by him we live: and this is so evident to them who read Saint Pauls words [Page 112] Rom. 5. from verse 12. to verse 19. inclusively, that I wonder any man should make a farther question concerning them; especially since Erasmus and Grotius who are to be reckoned amongst the greatest, and the best expositors of Scripture, that any age since the Apostles and their immediat successors hath brought forth, have so under­stood and rendred it. But Ma­dam, that your Honour may read the words and their sense together, and see that without violence they signifie what I have said, and no more; I have here subjoyned a paraphrase of them; in which if I use any violence I can very easily be reproved.

[Page 113]As by the diso­bedience of A­dam, Rom. 5. 12. As by one man sinne entred into the world, and Death by sin: and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. sin had it's beginning; and by sin death, that is, the sentence and preparati­ons, the solenni­ties & addresses of death, sicknesse, calamity, dimi­nution of strengths, Old age, mis­fortunes, and all the affections of Mortality, for the destroying of our temporall life; and so this mor­tality, and condition or state of death pass'd actually upon all man­kind; for Adam being thrown out of paradise, and forc'd to live with his Children where they had no trees of Life, as he had in Paradise, was remanded to his mortall, naturall state; and therefore death passed up­on them, mortally seized on all; for that all have sinned; that is, the sin [Page 114] was reckoned to all, not to make them guilty like Adam; but Adams sinne passed upon all, imprinting this real calamity on us all: But yet death descended also upon Adams Posterity for their own sins; for since all did sinne, all should die.

And mar­vell not that Death did presently de­scend on all mankind,13. For untill the law, sin was in the World, but sin is not imputed where there is no law. e­ven before a Law was given them with an appendant penalty, viz. With the expresse intermination of death; For they did do actions un­naturall and vile enough, but yet these things which afterwards up­on the publication of the Law were imputed to them upon their per­sonall account, even unto death, were not yet so imputed. For Nature alone [Page 115] gives Rules, but does not directly bind to penalties. But death came upon them before the Law for A­dams sin; for with him God being angry, was pleased to curse him also in his Posterity, and leave them also in their meere naturall condition, to which yet they dispos'd themselves, and had deserved but too much by committing evill things; to which things, although before the law, death was not threatned, yet for the anger which God had against man­kind, he left that death which he threatned to Adam expresly, by im­plication, to fall upon the Posteri­tie.

[Page 116]And therefore it was that death reigned from A­dam to Moses, 14. Neverthe­lesse death reign­ed from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the si­militude of A­dam's transgres­sion, who is the figure of him which was to come. from the first law to the se­cond; from the time that a Law was given to one man, till the time a Law was given to one nation; and although men had not sinn'd so grievously as A­dam did, who had no excuse, many helps, excellent endowments, migh­ty advantages, trifling temptations, communication with God himself, no disorder in his faculties, free will, perfect immunity from violence, Originall righteousnesse, perfect po­wer over his faculties; yet those men, such as Abel, and Seth, Noah, and Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Joseph, and [Page 117] Benjamin, who sinned lesse, and in the midst of all their disadvantages, were left to fall under the same sen­tence; and this, besides that it was the present Oeconomy of the Di­vine Providence and Government, it did also like Janus looke [...], it looked forwards as well as backwards, and became a type of Christ, or of him that was to come. For as from Adam evill did descend upon his naturall Children, upon the account of Gods enter­course with Adam; so did good descend upon the spirituall Chil­dren of the second Adam.

[Page 118]This should have been the latter part of a similitude,15. But not as the offence, so also is the free gift: for if through the of­fence of one many be dead much more the grace of God, & the gift by grace, which is by one man Jesus Christ hath a­bounded unto ma­ny. but upon further consideration, it is found, that as in Adam we die, so in Christ we live, and much rather, and much more, therefore I cannot say, As by one man [vers. 12] so by one man [verse 15.] But much more; for not as the offence, so also is the free gift, for the offence of one did run over unto many, and those many, even as it were all, all except Enoch, or some very few more of whom mention peradventure is not made, are alrea­dy dead upon that account, but when God comes by Jesus Christ to shew mercy to mankind, he [Page 119] does it in much more abundance; he may be angry to the third and fourth generation, in them that hate him, but he will shew mercy unto thousands in them that love him; to a thousand generations, and and in ten thousand degrees; so that now although a comparison pro­portionate was at first intended, yet the river here rises far higher then the fountain; and now no argument can be drawn from the similitude of Adam and Christ, but that as much hurt was done to hu­mane nature by Adams sin, so ve­ry much more good is done to mankinde by the incarnation of the Son of God.

[Page 120]And the first dis­parity and excesse is in this particu­lar: for the judg­ment was [...],16. And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift; for the judgement was by one to con­demnation, but the free gift is of many offences unto justification [...] & [...], by one man sinning one sin; that one sin was imputed; but by Christ, not onely one sin was forgiven freely, but many offen­ces were remitted unto justifica­tion; and secondly, a vast disparity there is in this; that the descendants from Adam were perfectly like him in nature, his own real natural pro­duction, and they sinned (though not so bad) yet very much, and therefore there was a great parity of reason that the evil which was threatened to Adam, and not to his [Page 121] children should yet for the likeness of nature and of sin descend upon them. But in the other part the case is highly differing; for Christ being our Patriarch in a spiritual birth, we fall infinitely short of him, and are not so like him as we were to Adam, and yet that we in greater unlikelinesse should receive a greater favour, this was the ex­cesse of the comparison, and this is the free gift of God.

[Page 122]And this is the third degree, or measure of ex­cesse of efficacy on Christs part, over it was on the part of Adam. 17. For if by one offence [so it is in the Kings MS. or,] if by one mans offence death reigned by one, much more they which re­ceive abundance of grace, and of the gift of righ­teousnesse, shall reign in life by one Jesus Christ. For if the sin of Adam alone could bring death upon the world, who by imitation of his transgression on the stock of their own natural choice did sin against God, though not after the similitude of Adams transgression: much more shall we, who not onely receive the aides of the spirit of grace, but receive them also in an abundant measure, re­ceive also the effect of all this, even to reign in life by one Jesus Christ.

[Page 123]Therefore now to re­turn to the other part of the si­militude where I began; al­though I have shown the great ex­cesse and abundance of grace by Christ,18. Therefore as by the offence of one judg­ment came upon all men to condemnation: e­ven so by the righteous­nesse of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. over the evil that did de­scend by Adam; yet the propor­tion and comparison lies in the main emanation of death from one, and life from the other; [judgement unto condemnation] that is, the sen­tence of death came upon all men by the offence of one; even so, by a like Oeconomy and dispen­sation, God would not be behind in doing an act of Grace, as he did before of judgmenr: and as that judgement was not to condemna­tion [Page 124] by the offence of one: so the free gift, and grace came upon all to justification of life, by the righ­teousnesse of one.

The sum of all is this; by the dis­obedience of one man [...] [...] many were constituted or put into the or­der of sinners they were made such by Gods appointment,19. For as by one mans diso­bedience many were made sin­ners: so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous. that is, not that God could be the Author of a sin to any, but that he appointed the evill which is the consequent of sin, to be upon their heads who de­scended from the sinner: & so it shall be on the other side; for by the obe­dience of one, even of Christ, many shall be made, or constituted righte­ous. But still this must be with a sup­position of what was said before, [Page 125] that there was a vast difference; for we are made much more righteous by Christt, [...]hen we were sinners by Adam; and the life we receive by Christ shall be greater then the death by Adam; and the graces we derive from Christ, shall be more and mightier then the corruption and declination by Adam; but yet as one is the head, so is the other: one is the beginning of sinne and death, and the other of life and righteousnesse.

Now the consequent of this dis­course must needs at least be this; that it is impossible that the greatest part of mankinde should be left in the eternal bonds of hell by Adam; for then quite contrary to the dis­course of the Apostle, there had been abundance of sin, but a scarcity of grace; and the accesse had been on the part of Adam, not on the part of Christ, against which he so [Page 126] mightily and artificially contends: so that the Presbyterian way is per­fectly condemned by this discourse of the Apostle; and the other more gentle way, which affirmes that we were sentenc'd in Adam to eternal death, though the execution is ta­ken off by Christ, is also no way countenanced by any thing in this Chapter; for that the judgement which for Adams sin came unto the condemnation of the world, was nothing but temporal death, is here affirmed; it being in no sense imaginable that the death which here Saint Paul sayes passed upon all men, and which reigned from Adam to Moses, should be eternal death; for the Apostle speaks of that death which was threatened to Adam; and of such a death which was af­terwards threatened in Moses Law; and such a death which fell even upon the most righteous of Adams [Page 127] posterity, Abel, and Seth, and Me­thusela, that is, upon them who did not sin after the similitude of Adams transgression. Since then, all the judgement which the Apostle saies, came by the sin of Adam, was ex­pressly affirmed to be death tempo­ral, that God should sentence man­kinde to eternal damnation for A­dams sin, though in goodnesse tho­rough Christ he afterwards took it off; is not at all affirm'd by the A­postle; and because in proportion to the evil, so was the imputation of the sin, it follows that Adams sin is ours metonymically and im­properly; God was not finally an­gry with us, nor had so much as any designes of eternal displeasure up­on that account; his anger went no further then the evils of this life, and therefore the imputation was not of a proper guilt, for that might justly have passed beyond [Page 128] our grave; if the sin had passed be­yond a metonymie, or a juridical, external imputation. And of this God and Man have given this fur­ther testimony; that as no man e­ver imposed penance for it; so God himself in nature did never for it afflict or affright the consci­ence, and yet the Conscience ne­ver spares any man that is guilty of a known sin.

Extemplo quodcunque malum commit­titur, ipsi
Displicet Authori,
He that is guilty of a sin
shal rue the crime that he lies in

And why the Conscience shall be for ever at so much peace for this sin, that a man shall never give one groan for his share of guilt in Adams sin, unlesse some or other [Page 129] scares him with an impertinent proposition; why (I say) the Con­science should not naturally be af­flicted for it, nor so much as na­turally know it, I confesse I can­not yet make any reasonable con­jecture, save this onely, that it is not properly a sin, but onely me­tonymicall and improperly. And indeed there are some whole Chur­ches which think themselves so little concern'd in the matter of Original sin, that they have not a word of it in all their Theology: I mean the Christians in the East­Indies, concerning whom Fryer Luys de Urretta in his Ecclesiastical story of AEthiopia, saies, that the Christi­ans in AEthiopia, unde the Empire of Prestre Juan, never kept the imma­culate conception of the Virgin Ma­ry [no se entremetieron enessas Teolo­gias del peccado Original: porque nun­ca tuvieron los entendimientes may [Page 130] metafisicos, antes como gente afable, benigna, Uana, de entendimientos conversables, y alaguenos, seguian la dotrina de los Santos antiguos, y de los sagrados Concilies, sin disputas, ni diferencias] nor do they insert into their Theology any propositions concerning Original sin, nor trou­ble themselves with such Metaphy­sical contemplations; but being of an affable, ingenuous, gentile com­portment, and understanding, fol­low the Doctrine of the primitive Saints and Holy Councels without disputation of difference, so sayes the story. But we unfortunatly trouble our selves by raising ideas of sin, and afflict our selves with our own dreams, and will not beleeve but it is a vision. And the height of this imgination hath wrought so high in the Church of Rome, that when they would do great ho­nours to the Virgin Mary, they were [Page 131] pleas'd to allow to her an immacu­late conception without any Ori­ginal sin, and a Holy-day appoin­ted for the celebration of the dream. But the Christians in the other world are wiser, and trou­ble themselves with none of these things, but in simplicity, honour the Divine attributes, and speak nothing but what is easy to be un­derstood. And indeed religion is then the best, and the world will be sure to have fewer Atheists, and fewer Blasphemers, when the un­derstandings of witty men are not tempted, by commanding them to beleeve impossible articles, and unintelligible propositions: when every thing is believed by the same simplicity it is taught: when we do not cal that a mystery which we are not able to prove, and tempt our faith to swallow that whole which reason cannot chew.

[Page 132]One thing I am to observe more, before I leave considering the words of the Apostle. The Apo­stle here having instituted a com­parison between Adam and Christ; that as death came by one, so life by the other; as by one we are made sinners, so by the other we are made righteous; some from hence suppose they argue strongly to the overthrow of all that I have said; thus: Christ and Adam are compared, therefore as by Christ we are made really righte­ous: so by Adam we are made really sinners: our righteousnesse by Christ is more then imputed, and therefore so is our unrighte­ousnesse by Adam [...] To this, be­sides what I have already spoken in my humble addresses to that wise and charitable Prelate the Lord Bishop of Rochester, deliver­ing the sense and objections of o­thers; [Page 133] in which I have declared my sense of the imputation of Christ's righteousnesse; and be­sides, that although the Apostle offers at a similitude, yet he findes himself surprised, and that one part of the similitude does far ex­ceed the other, and therefore no­thing can follow hence; but that if we receive evil from Adam, we shall much more receive good from Christ; besides this I say, I have something very material to re­ply to the form of the argument, which is a very trick and fallacy. For the Apostle argues thus, As by Adam we are made sinners, so by Christ we are made righteous; and that is very true, and much more; but to argue from hence [as by Christ we are made really righte­ous, so by Adam we are made re­ally sinners] is to invert the pur­pose of the Apostle, (who argues [Page 134] from the lesse to the greater) and to make it conclude affirmatively from the greater to the lesse in matter of power: as if one should say: If a childe can carry a ten pound weight, much more can a man: and therefore whatsoever a man can do, that also a childe can do. For though I can say, If this thing be done in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry? yet I must not say therefore, If this be done in the dry tree, what shall be done in the green? for the dry try of the Crosse could do much then the green tree in the Garden of Eden. It is a good argument to say; If the Devil be so potent to do a shrewd turn much more powerful is God to do good: but we cannot con­clude from hence, but God can by his own meer power, and plea­sure save a soul; therefore the [Page 135] Devil can by his power ruine one: In a similitude, the first part may be, and often is, lesse then the se­cond; but never greater: and there­fore though the Apostle said, as by Adam &c. So by Christ &c. Yet we cannot say as by Christ, so by Adam: We may well reason thus. As by Nature there is a reward to evil doers; so much more is there by God; but we cannot by way of conversion, reason thus; As by God there is an eternal re­ward appointed to good actions; so by Nature there is an Eternal reward for evil ones. And who would not deride this way of ar­guing. As by our Fathers we re­ceive temporal good things; so much more do we by God: but by God we also receive an immor­tal Soul; therefore from our Fa­thers we receive an immortal bo­dy. [Page 136] For not the consequent of a hypothetical proposition, but the antecedent is to be the as­sumption of the Syllogisme; This therefore is a fallacy, which when those wise persons, who are un­warily perswaded by it, shall ob­serve, I doubt not but the whole way of arguing will appear uncon­cluding.

Object. 6. But it is objected that my Doctrine is against the ninth Article in the Church of England; and that I heare Madam does most of all stick with your Ho­nour.

Of this Madam, I should not now have taken notice, because I have already answered it in some additional papers, which are al­ready published; but that I was so [Page 137] delighted to hear and to know that a person of your interest and Honour, of your zeal and pru­dence, is so earnest for the Church of England, that I could not pass it by, without paying you that regard and just acknowledgment which so much excellencie de­serves. But then Madam I am to say, that I could not be delighted in your zeal for our excellent Church, if I were not as zealous my self for it too: I have often­times subscribed that Article, and though if I had cause to dissent from it, I would certainly do it in those just measures which my duty on one side, and the inte­rest of truth on the other would require of me; yet because I have no reason to disagree, I will not suffer my self to be supposed to be of a Differing judgement from [Page 138] my Dear Mother, which is the best Church of the world. Indeed Madam, I do not understand the words of the Article as most men do; but I understand them as they can be true, and as they can ve­ry fairely signifie, and as they a­gree with the word of God and right reason. But I remember that I have heard from a very good hand, and there are many alive this day that may remember to have heard it talk'd of publickly, that when Mr. Thomas Rogers had in the yeer 1584. published an ex­position of the 39. Articles, ma­ny were not onely then, but long since very angry at him, that he by his interpretation had limited the charitable latitude which was al­lowed in the subscription to them. For the Articles being fram'd in a Church but newly reform'd, in [Page 139] which many complied with some unwillingnesse, and were not wil­ling to have their consent broken by too great a straining, and even in the Convocation it self so many being of a differing judgement, it was very great prudence and pie­ty to secure the peace of the Church by as much charitable latitude as they could contrive; and there­fore the Articles in those things, which were publickly disputed at that time, even amongst the Do­ctors of the Reformation (such were the Articles of predestinati­on, and this of Original sinne) were described, with incompara­ble wisdom and temper; and there­fore I have reason to take it ill, if any man shall denie me liberty to use the benefit of the Churches wisdom; For I am ready a thou­sand times to subscribe the Article, [Page 140] if there can be just cause to do it so often; but as I impose upon no man my sense of the Article, but leave my reasons and him to struggle together for the best, so neither will I be bound to any one man, or any company of men but to my lawful Superiours, speaking there where they can and ought to oblige. Madam, I take nothing ill from any man, but that he should think I have a lesse zeal for our Church then himself, and I will by Gods assistance be all my life confuting him; and though I will not contend with him, yet I will die with him in behalf of the Church if God shall call me; but for other little things and trifling ar­rests and little murmurs I value none of it.

[Page 141]
Quid verum atque decens curo, & ro­go, & omnis in hoc sum;
Condo & compono quod mox deprome­re possim,
Nullius addictus jurare in verba Ma­gistri:
Quo me cunque rapit tempestas defe­ror—

I could translate these also into bad English verse as I do the others; but that now I am earnest for my liberty, I will not so much as con­fine my self to the measures of feet. But in plain English I mean by rehearsing these latine verses, that although I love every man, and value worthy persons in pro­portion to their labours and abili­ties, whereby they can and do serve [Page 142] God and Gods Church, yet I in­quire for what is fitting, not what is pleasing; I search after wayes to advantage soules, not to comply with humours, and Sects, and in­terests; and I am tied to no mans private opinion any more then he is to mine; if he will bring Scripture and right reason from any topic, he may govern me and perswade me, else I am free, as he is: but I hope I am before hand with him in this question. I end with the words of Lucretius.

Desine quâ propter novitate exterritus ipsâ
Expuere eo animo rationem, sed magis acri
Judicio perpende, & si tibi vera vide­tur.
[Page 143]Dede manus, aut si falsa est, accinge­re contrà.
Fear not to own whats said, because 'tis true,
Weigh well and wisely if the thing be true.
Truth and not conquest is the best reward;
'Gainst falshood onely stand upon thy guard.
The End.
MADAM,

I Humbly begge you will be pleased to entertain these papers, not onely as a Testimony of my Zeal for truth and peace below, and for the Ho­nour of God above; but [Page] also of my readinesse to seize upon every occasion whereby I may expresse my self to be

Your Honours most obliged and most Humble Servant in the Religion of the H. Jesus, Jer. Taylor.

The Stationers Postscript To the READER.

I Am not my self Ignorant, ha­ving learned it from those, whose words had in them reason and Au­thority too, that the world is most benefited by those pieces, which with greatest difficulty were gai­ned from the modesty, or seve­rity, or fears of their Authors. The fruits that first drop from the tree, are not the longest ere they rot, and the corn that lies longest [Page] in the ground, bis quae solem, bis frigora—most pleases the Hus­band-man. I have some confidence, the Reader, who has yet given his name to no sect, will by the excellencies of this discourse I have now presented, be so fairly dis­posed to receive my excuse, when I tell him that I publish it without the Reverend Authors consent, that he will become rather a Patron than an Accuser of that great ambition, he observes in me, to offer some­thing that may instruct him, and please him too. Because so many papers passe the Presse, that de­serve to finde it the place of their Burial rather than their birth, I was persuaded, my Charity would have in it something more of merit. I intended a Benefit to the Rea­der, and if my designe meet with reproof in the Successe, I am sure [Page] it deserved none in its principle, for I shall not misse my aims, if his intentions in receiving instru­ction be but as cleer as mine were to assist him in my meaner ca­pacity. The Discourse in its own behalf will to the Intelligent give sufficient assurance, that though the Authors consent be wanting, nothing else is, that should come from him to make it intire: for I know what was fitted for the use and made able to endure the judgment of the Honourable per­son, who was the occasion of this, will with some security passe lesser judgements. And this favour the charitable Reader will the more easily grant me, because it will be a good advantage towards the re­covering the favour of the worthy Person, who wote the Discourse; whose displeasure I have reason [Page] to fear, I have too far provoked by making his secrets publike without his leave. But if the intel­ligent Reader shall receive this little piece with the same kind­nesse, as the others, that were sent from the same hand, the pleading of my own cause will put me to the lesse expence of words. And I know the Reverend Author go­verns all his passions with such an excellent charity, and levels all his designes of this kinde to that great end of advancing piety, and holy living, that my boldnesse will the more easily find pardon, because the right understanding of this Questi­on has a great influence upon all the parts of holy obedience; and the discourses of this Letter, I have good authority to say, add much to the clearnesse and defence of his former writings upon this [Page] Subject. The question as it is ne­cessary to be understood now, that it is set on foot, so is it very diffi­cult to all those, that first choose their interest, and then such con­clusions as are consistent with that, and frame their arguments and premisses last of all. And no man for this can charge me highly, but he must also affirme, it is fit some things be concealed, that would free the judgements of men from those prejudices of custome, par­tiality and humour, with which Error hath fortified her self in the understandings of many. The er­rors of this question are so deere to one kinde of men, that nothing will more provoke their pens, then to be contradicted in this Proposi­tion; and for the advantage of truth and the common benefit, it was my designe, that whatsoever [Page] was needful to be said to make the truth more clear, might first get possession of the understandings of men. Which could not, certainly, have been done if I had delayed my hand, till I could, at that great distance from me, where he lives, have consulted with the Author, and received returns from him. And have no lesse hope, that the Honourable Person, into whose Cabinet I have too boldly admitted the common eye, will pardon my presumption, because it is the in­terest of Religion, which is so deer to every rightly instructed Chri­stian, that they will neither re­fuse for its advancement to give up their priviledges, nor their life. And when she feels the benefit of being free'd from those Scruples, which this Discourse was designed to remove, she will not conceive her [Page] light will be made less by being common, but will be rather plea­sed, to have obliged, by the e­manations of a Pen so learned, all those that shall receive benefit from it.

R. Royston.

The names of some Books and Sermons written by Jer. Taylor D.D.

1. [...], Course of Sermons for all the Sundayes in the yeer, together with a Discourse of the Divine Institution, Ne­cessity, and Separation of the Office Ministerial, in fol.

2. The History of the Life and Death of the Ever-blessed Jesus Christ, 2. Edit. in fol.

7. The Rules and Exercises of ho­ly living, in 12.

8. The Rule and Exercises of holy dying, in 12.

10. The Golden Grove, or, A Ma­nual of daily Prayers fitted to the dayes of the week, together with a short Method of Peace and Holiness.

11. The Doctrine and practise of Repentance rescued from Po­pular Errors, in a large 8. New­ly published.

The Errata.

PAge. 93. line ult its. r. it. pag. 13.l. 12. and bred r. and to be bred. p. 134. l. 15.r. do much more then 142. l. 17. expuere ex animo. 36l. 11.r. taken pleasure 61. l. 1. was brought off. r. was bought-off. 85.l. 1. presence of novelty. r the pre­tence of novelty. 99.l.ult. r. are not in.

An Answer to a Lette …

An Answer to a Letter Written by the R. R.

The Ld Bp of Rochester.

Concerning The Chapter of Original Sin, In the Unum Necessarium.

By JER. TAYLOR D. D.

London, Printed by E. Cotes for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivie-lane, 1656.

An Answer to a Letter Written by the R. R. The L. Bp. of Rochester.

R. R. Father and my good Lord,

YOur Lordships Letter Dated July 28. I received not till Septemb. 11. it seems R. Roy­ston detained it in his hands, sup­posing it could not come safely to me while I remain a prisoner. But I now have that liberty, that I can receive any Letters, and send any; for the Gentlemen under whose custody I am, as they are carefull of their charges, so they are civil to my person. It was necessary I should tell this to your Lordship, that I may not be under a suspicion [Page 2] of neglecting to give accounts in those particulars, which with somuch prudence and charity you were plea­sed to represent in your Letter con­cerning my discourse of Original Sin. My Lord, in all your Ex­ceptions, I cannot but observe your candor and your paternal care con­cerning me. For when there was nothing in the Doctrine, but your greater reason did easily see the ju­stice and the truth of it, and I am perswaded could have taught me to have said many more material things in confirmation of what I have taught; yet so careful is your cha­rity of me, that you would not omit to represent to my considera­tion what might be said by captious and weaker persons; or by the more wise and pious who are of a different judgement.

But my Lord, first you are pleased to note that this discourse runs not [Page 3] in the ordinary channel. True; for if it did, it must nurse the popular error: but when the disease is epidemical, as it is so much the worse, so the extraordinary remedy must be ac­knowledg'd to be the better. And if there be in it some things hard to be understood, as it was the fate of S. Paul's Epistles (as your Lord­ship notes out of S. Peter) yet this difficulty of understanding proceeds not from the thing it self, nor from the manner of handling it, but from the indisposition and prepossession of mens minds to the contrary, who are angry when they are told that they have been deceived: for it is usuall with men to be more displeased, when they are told they were in error, then to be pleased with them who offer to lead them out of it.

But your Lordship doth with great advantages represent an ob­jection [Page 4] of some captious persons, which relates not to the material part of the Question, but to the rules of art. If there be no such thing as Original Sin transmitted from Adam to his posterity, then all that sixth chapter is a strife about a shadow, a Non ens. A. It is true my Lord, the Question as it is usually handled, is so. For when the Franciscan and Dominican do eternally dispute about the conception of the Bles­sed Virgin, whether it was with, or without Original Sin, meaning by way of grace and special exemption, this is de non ente; for there was no need of any such exemption: and they supposing that commonly it was otherwise, troubled themselves about the exception of a Rule, which in that sense which the sup­pos'd it, was not true at all: she was born as innocent from any im­purity or formal guilt as Adam was [Page 5] created, and so was her Mother, and so was all her family. * When the Lutheran and the Roman dispute, whether justice and original righ­teousness in Adam was Natural or by Grace, it is de non ente: for it was positively neither, but nega­tively only; he had original righte­ousness till he sin'd, that is, he was righteous till he became unrighte­ous. * When the Calvinist troubles himself and his Parishioners with fierce declamations against natural inclinations or concupiscence, and disputes whether it remains in bapti­zed persons, or whether it be taken off by Election, or by the Sacra­ment, whether to all Christians or to some few; this is a [...]; for it is no sin at all in persons baptiz'd or unbaptiz'd, till it be consented to.

My Lord, when I was a young man in Cambridge, I knew a lear­ned professor of Divinity, whose [Page 6] ordinary Lectures in the Lady Mar­garets Chair for many years toge­ther, nine as I suppose, or therea­bouts, were concerning Original Sin, and the appendant questions: This indeed could not choose but be Andabatarum conflictus. But then my discourse representing that these disputes are uselesse, and, as they discourse usually, to be de non ente, is not to be reprov'd. For I professe to evince that many of those things, of the sense of which they dispute, are not true at all in any sense, I declare them to be de non ente, that is, I untie their intricate knots by cutting them in pieces. For when a false proposition is the ground of disputes, the process must needs be infinite, unless you disco­ver the first error. He that tels them they both fight about a sha­dow, and with many arguments proves the vanity of their whole [Page 7] processe, they (if he saies true) not he is the [...]. * When S. Au­stine was horribly puzled about the traduction of Original Sin, and thought himself forc'd to say that either the Father begat the soul, or that he could not transmit sin which is subjected in the soul, or at least he could not tell how it was transmitted: he had no way to be relieved but by being told that Ori­ginal Sin was not subjected in the soul, because properly and for­mally it was no reall sin of ours at all; but that it was only by imputa­tion, and to certain purposes, not any inherent quality, or corrupti­on: and so in effect all his trouble was de non ente. * But now some wits have lately risen in the Church of Rome, and they tell us another story. The soul followes the tempe­rature of the body, and so Origi­nal Sin comes to be transmitted by [Page 8] contact: because the constitution of the body is the fomes or nest of the sin, and the souls concupiscence is deriv'd from the bodies lust. But besides that this fancy dis­appears at the first handling, and there would be so many Origi­nal Sins as there are several con­stitutions, and the guilt would not be equal, and they who are born Eunuchs should be lesse infected by Adam's pollution, by having lesse of concupiscence in the great in­stance of desires, [and after all, con­cupiscence it self could not be a sin in the soul, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it] Besides all this, (I say) while one does not know how Original Sin can be derived, and another who thinks he can, names a wrong way, and both the waies infer it to be another kinde of thing then all the Schools of learning teach [and in [Page 9] the whole process it must be an im­possible thing, because the instru­ment which hath all its operations by the force of the principal agent, cannot of it self produce a great change and violent effect upon the principal agent] does it not too clearly demonstrate, that all that in­finite variety of fancies agreeing in nothing but in an endless uncertain­ty, is nothing else but a being busie about the quiddities of a dream, and the constituent parts of a shadow? But then, My Lord, my discourse representing all this to be vanity and uncertainty, ought not to be call'd or suppos'd to be a [...]: as he that ends the question between two Schoolmen disputing about the place of Purgatory, by saying they need not trouble themselves about the place; for that which is not, hath no place at all; ought not to be told he contends about a shadow, when he [Page 10] proves that to be true, which he sug­gested to the two trifling litigants.

But as to the thing it self: I do not say there is no such thing as Original Sin, but it is not that which it is supposed to be: it is not our sin formally, but by imputation on­ly; and it is imputed so, as to be an inlet to sickness, death and disorder: but it does not introduce a necessity of sinning, nor damn any one to the flames of Hell. So that Original Sin is not a Non ens, unless that be nothing which infers so many real mischiefs.

The next thing your Lordship is pleas'd to note to me, is that in your wisdome you foresee, some will argue against my explication of the word Damnation, in the ninth. Article of our Church, which af­firms that Original Sin deserves damnation. Concerning which, My Lord, I do thus (and I hope fairly) acquit my self.

[Page 11]1. That it having been affirmed by S. Austin that Infants dying un­baptized are damn'd, he is deserved­ly called Durus pater Infantum, and generally forsaken by all sober men of the later ages: and it will be an intolerable thing to think the Church of England guilty of that which all her wiser sons, and all the Christian Churches generally ab­horre. I remember that I have heard that King James reproving a Scottish Minister, who refus'd to give private Baptism to a dying In­fant, being askt by the Minister, if he thought the childe should be damn'd for want of Baptism? an­swer'd, No, but I think you may be damn'd for refusing it: and he said well. But then my Lord, If Original Sin deserves damnation, then may Infants be damn'd if they die without Baptism. But if it be a horrible affirmative, to say that [Page 12] the poor babes shall be made De­vils, or enter into their portion, if they want that ceremony, which is the only gate, the only way of salva­tion that stands open; then the word [Damnation] in the 9. Article must mean something less, then what we usually understand by it: or else the Article must be salved by ex­pounding some other word to an allay and lessening of the horrible sentence; and particularly the word [Deserves] of which I shall after­wards give account. Both these waies I follow. The first is the way of the Schoolmen.

For they suppose the state of un­baptized Infants to be a poena damni; and they are confident enough to say that this may be well suppos'd without inferring their suffering the pains of hell. But this sentence of theirs I admit and explicate with some little difference of expression. [Page 13] For so far I admit this pain of loss, or rather a deficiency from going to Heaven, to be the consequence of Adam's sin, that by it we being left in meris Naturalibus, could never by these strengths alone have gone to Heaven. Now whereas your Lord­ship in behalf of those whom you suppose may be captious, is pleas'd to argue. That as loss of sight or eyes infers a state of darkness or blindness: so the losse of Heaven in­fers Hell; and if Infants go not to heaven in that state, whither can they go but to hell? and that's Damnation in the greatest sense. I grant it, that if in the event of things they do not go to Heaven (as things are now ordered) it is but too likely that they go to Hell: but I adde, that as all darkness does not infer horror and distraction of minde, or fearful apparitions and phantasms: so neither does all Hell, [Page 14] or states in Hell infer all those tor­ments which the Schoolmen signi­fie by a poena sensus (for I speak now in pursuance of their way). So that there is no necessity of a third place; but it concludes only that in the state of separation from Gods presence there is a great va­riety of degrees and kinds of evil, and every one is not the extreme: and yet by the way, let me observe, that Gregory Nazianzen and Nice­tas taught that there is a third place for Infants and Heathens: and Irenaeus affirm'd that the evils of Hell were not eternal to all, but to the Devils only and the greater criminals. But neither they nor we, nor any man else can tell whether Hell be a place or no. It is a state of evil; but whether all the damned be in one or in twenty places, we can­not tell.

But I have no need to make use [Page 15] of any of this. For when I affirm that Infants being by Adam reduc'd and left to their meer natural state, fall short of Heaven; I do not say they cannot go to Heaven at all, but they cannot go thither by their naturall powers, they cannot with­out a new grace and favour go to heaven. But then it cannot pre­sently be inferred, that therefore they go to hell; but this ought to be infer'd, which indeed was the real consequent of it; therefore it is necessary that Gods Grace should supply this defect, if God intends Heaven to them at all; and because Nature cannot, God sent a Saviour by whom it was effected. But if it be asked, what if this grace had not come? and that it be said, that with­out Gods grace they must have gone to Hell, because without it they could not go to Heaven? I answer, That we know how it is, now that God in his goodness hath [Page 16] made provisions for them: but if he had not made such provisions, what would have been we know not, any more then we know what would have followed, if Adam had not sinned; where he should have liv'd, and how long, and in what circumstances the posterity should have been provided for in all their possible contingencies. But yet, this I know, that it followes not, that if without this Grace we could not have gone to Heaven, that therefore we must have gone to Hel. For although the first was ordinarily impossible, yet the second was absolutely unjust, and against Gods goodness, and therefore more impossible. But because the first could not be done by nature, God was pleased to promise and to give his grace, that he might bring us to that state whi­ther he had design'd us, that is, to a supernatural felicity. If Adam had not fallen, yet Heaven had not been [Page 17] a natural consequent of his obedi­ence, but a Gracious, it had been a gift still: and of Adam though he had persisted in innocence, it is true to say, that without Gods Grace, that is, by the meer force of Nature, he could never have ar­riv'd to a Supernatural state, that is, to the joyes of Heaven; and yet it does not follow, that if he had re­main'd in Innocence, he must have gone to Hell. Just so it is in In­fants, Hell was not made for man, but for Devils; and therefore it must be something besides meer Nature that can bear any man thi­ther: meer Nature goes neither to Heaven nor Hell. So that when I say Infants naturally cannot go to Heaven, and that this is a punish­ment of Adam's sin, he being for it punished with a loss of his gracious condition, and devolv'd to the state of Nature, and we by him left [Page 18] so; my meaning is, that this Dam­nation which is of our Nature, is but negative, that is, as a consequent of our Patriarchs sin, our Nature is left imperfect and deficient in order to a supernatural end, which the Schoolmen call a poena damni, but improperly: they indeed think it may be a real event, and final con­dition of persons as well as things: but I affirm it was an evil effect of Adam's sin: but in the event of things it became to the persons the way to a new grace, and hath no other event as to Heaven and Hell directly and immediately. In the same sense and to the same purpose I understand the word Damnation in the 9. Article.

But the word [Damnation] may very well, truly, and sufficiently sig­nifie all the purposes of the Article, if it be taken only for the effect of that sentence which was inflicted [Page 19] upon Adam, and descended on his posterity, that is, for condemnation to Death, and the evils of mortali­ty. So the word is used by S. Paul 1 Cor. 11. 29. He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh Damnation to himself. [...] is the word, but that it did particularly signifie temporal death and evils, appears by the instances of probation in the next words, For, for this cause some are weak a­mongst you, some are sick, and some are fallen asleep. This also in the Article. Original Sin deserves dam­nation, that is, it justly brought in the angry sentence of God upon Man, it brought him to death, and deserv'd it: it brought it upon us, and deserv'd it too. I do not say that we by that sin deserv'd that death, neither can death be properly a punishment of us till we superadde some evil of our own; yet Adam's [Page 20] sin deserv'd it so, that it was justly left to fall upon us, we as a conse­quent and punishment of his sin be­ing reduc'd to our natural portion. In odiesis quod minimum est sequi­mur. The lesser sense of the word is certainly agreeable to truth and reason: and it were good we us'd the word in that sense which may best warrant her doctrine, especi­ally for that use of the word, having the precedent of Scri­pture.

I am confirm'd in this interpre­tation by the 2. §. of the Article: viz. of the remanency of concu­piscence or Original Sin in the Re­generate. All the sinfulness of Ori­ginal Sin is the lust or concupi­scence, that is, the proneness to sin. Now then I demand, whether Con­cupiscence before actual consent be a sin or no? and if it be a sin, whe­ther it deserves damnation? That [Page 21] all sin deserves damnation, I am sure our Church denies not. If therefore concupiscence before con­sent be a sin, then this also deserves damnation where ever it is: and if so, then a man may be damned for Original Sin even after Baptism. For even after Baptism, concupi­scence (or the sinfulness of Origi­nal Sin) remains in the regenerate: and that which is the same thing, the same vitiousness, the same enmity to God after Baptism, is as damna­ble, it deserves damnation as much as that did that went before. If it be replied, that Baptism takes off the guilt or formal part of it, but leaves the material part behinde, that is, though concupiscence re­mains, yet it shall not bring damna­tion to the regenerate or Baptized. I answer, that though baptismal re­generation puts a man into a state of grace and favour, so that what [Page 22] went before shall not be imputed to him afterwards, that is, Adam's sin shall not bring damnation (in any sense) yet it hinders not, but that what is sinful afterwards shall be then imputed to him, that is, he may be damn'd for his own concupi­scence. He is quitted from it as it came from Adam; but by Baptism he is not quitted from it, as it is sub­jected in himself, if (I say) concu­piscence before consent be a sin. If it be no sin, then for it, Infants un­baptized cannot with justice be damn'd; it does not deserve dam­nation: but if it be a sin, then so long as it is there, so long it de­serves damnation; and Baptism did only quit the relation of it to Adam (for that was all that went before it) but not the danger of the man. *But because the Article supposes that it does not damn the regenerate or baptized, and yet that it hath the na­ture [Page 23] of sin, it follows evidently and undeniably, that both the phrases are to be diminished and understood in a favourable sense. As the phrase [the Nature of sin] signifies; so does [Damnation] but [the Na­ture of sin] signifies something that brings no guilt, because it is af­firm'd to be in the Regenerate, therefore [Damnation] signifies something that brings no Hell: but [to deserve Damnation] must mean something lesse then ordinary, that is, that concupiscence is a thing not morally good, not to be allowed of, not to be nurs'd, but mortifi'd, fought against, disapprov'd, con­demn'd and disallowed of men as it is of God.

And truly My Lord, to say that for Adam's sin it is just in God to condemn Infants to the eternal flames of Hell: and to say, that concupiscence or natural inclinati­ons [Page 24] before they pass into any act, could bring eternal condemnation from Gods presence into the eter­nall portion of Devils, are two such horrid propositions, that if any Church in the world would expres­ly affirm them, I for my part should think it unlawful to communicate with her in the defence or profession of either, and do think it would be the greatest temptation in the world to make men not to love God, of whom men so easily speak such horrid things. I would suppose the Article to mean any thing rather then either of these. But yet one thing more I have to say.

The Article is certainly to be expounded according to the analo­gy of faith, and the express words of Scripture, if there be any that speak expresly in this matter. Now whereas the Article explicating Ori­ginal Sin affirms it to be that fault [Page 25] or corruption of mans nature (vi­tium Naturae, not peccatum) by which he is far gone from ori­ginall righteousness, and is in­clin'd to evil: because this is not full enough, the Article adds by way of explanation [So that the flesh lusteth against the spirit] that is, it really produces a state of evil temptations: it lusteth, that is, actually and habitually; [it lusteth against the spirit, and therefore deserves Gods wrath and damnation] So the Article: Therefore; for no other reason but because the flesh lusteth against the spirit; not because it can lust, or is apta nata to lust, but because it lusteth actually, therefore it de­serves damnation: and this is Ori­ginal Sin: or as the Article ex­presses it, it hath the nature of sin; it is the fomes, or matter of sin, and is in the original of man­kinde, [Page 26] and deriv'd from Adam as our body is, but it deserves not damnation in the highest sense of the word, till the concupiscence be actual. Till then, the words of [Wrath and Damnation] must be meant in the less and more ea­sie signfication, according to the former explication: and must on­ly relate to the personal sin of Adam. To this sense of the Ar­ticle I heartily subscribe. For besides the reasonableness of the thing, and the very manner of speaking us'd in the Article; it is the very same way of speaking, and exactly the same doctrine which we finde in S. James, (Jam. 1. 14.) [...]: Concupi­scence, when it is impregnated, when it hath conceiv'd, then it brings forth sin: and sin when it is in production, and birth, brings forth death. But in Infants, concu­piscence [Page 27] is innocent and a virgin, it conceives not, and therefore is without sin, and therefore with­out death or damnation. * Against these expositions I cannot imagine what can be really and materially objected.

But my Lord, I perceive the main outcry is like to be upon the authority of the Harmony of Confessions. Concerning which I shall say this, that in this Article the Harmony makes as good mu­sick as bels ringing backward; and they agree, especially when they come to be explicated and untwisted into their minute and explicite meanings, as much as Lutheran and Calvinist, as Papist and Protestant, as Thomas and Scotus, as Remonstrant and Dor­drechtan, that is, as much as pro and con, or but a very little more. I have not the book with me here [Page 28] in prison, and this neighbour­hood cannot supply me, and I dare not trust my memory to give a scheme of it: but your Lord­ship knows that in nothing more do the reformed Churches dis­agree, then in this and its ap­pendages; and you are pleased to hint something of it, by say­ing that some speak more of this then the Church of England: and Andrew Rivet, though unwil­lingly, yet confesses, de Confessio­nibus nostris & earum syntagmate vel Harmonia, etiamsi in non nul­lis capitibus non planè conveniant, dicam tamen, melius in concordi­am redigi posse quàm in Ecclesia Romana concordantiam discordan­tium Canonum, quo titulo decretum Gratiani, quod Canonistis regulas praefigit, solet insigniri. And what he affirmes of the whole collecti­on, is most notorious in the Ar­ticle [Page 29] of Original Sin. For my own part I am ready to subscribe the first Helvetian confession, but not the second. So much difference there is in the confessions of the same Church.

Now whereas your Lordship adds, that though they are falli­ble, yet when they bring evidence of holy Writ, their assertions are infallible, and not to be contra­dicted: I am bound to reply, that when they do so, whether they be infallible or no, I will beleeve them, because then though they might, yet they are not deceived. But as evidence of holy Writ had been sufficient without their au­thority: so without such evidence their authority is nothing. But then, My Lord, their citing and urging the words of S. Paul, Rom. 5. 12. is so far from being an evident probation of their Ar­ticle, [Page 30] that nothing is to me a surer argument of their fallibi­lity, then the urging of that which evidently makes nothing for them, but much against them: As 1. Af­firming expresly that death was the event of Adam's sin; the whole event, for it names no other; temporal death; according to that saying of S. Paul, 1 Cor. 15. In Adam we all die. And 2. Af­firming this process of death to be [...], which is and ought to be taken to be the allay or condition of the condemnati­on. It became a punishment to them only who did sin; but upon them also inflicted for Adam's sake.

A like expression to which is in the Psalms, Psal. 106. 32, 33. They angred him also at the waters of strife, so that he punished Moses for their sakes. Here was plainly [Page 31] a traduction of evil from the Na­tion to Moses their relative: For their sakes he was punished, but yet [...] for as much as Moses had sin'd: for so it fol­lowes, because they provoked his spirit, so that he spake unadvised­ly with his lips. So it is between Adam and us. He sin'd and God was highly displeased. This dis­pleasure went further then upon Adam's sin: for though that on­ly was threatned with death, yet the sins of his children which were not so threatned, became so punished, and they were by na­ture heirs of wrath and damna­tion; that is, for his sake our sins inherited his curse. The curse that was specially and only threat­ned to him, we when we sin'd did inherit for his sake. So that it is not so properly to be called, Ori­ginal Sin, as an original curse upon our sin.

[Page 32]To this purpose we have also another example of God trans­mitting the curse from one to ano­ther: Both were sinners, but one was the original of the curse or punishment. So said the Prophet to the wife of Jeroboam, 1 King. 14. 16. [He shall give Israel up be­cause of the sins of Jeroboam, who did sin, and who made Israel to sin] Jereboam was the root of the sin and of the curse. Here it was also (that I may use the words of the Apostle) that by the sin of one man [Jeroboam] sin went out into all [Israel] and the curse, captivity, or death by sin, and so death went upon all men [of Israel] [...] in as much as all men [of Israel] have sinned. If these men had not sinned, they had not been punished: I cannot say they had not been afflicted; for David's childe was smit­ten [Page 33] for his fathers fault: but though they did sin, yet unless their root and principal had sin­ned, possibly they should not have so been punish'd: For his sake the punishment came. Upon the same account it may be, that we may inherit the damnation or curse for Adam's sake, though we deserve it; yet it being transmit­ted from Adam and not particu­larly threatned to the first poste­rity, we were his heirs, the heirs of death, deriving from him an original curse, but due also (if God so pleased) to our sins. And this is the full sense of the 12. verse, and the effect of the phrase [...] [...].

But your Lordship is pleased to object that though [...] does once signifie [For as much as] yet three times it signifies in or by. To this I would be content to [Page 34] submit, if the observation could be verified, and be material when it were true. But besides that it is so used in 2 Cor. 5. 4. your Lordship may please to see it used (as not only my self, but indeed most men, and particular­ly the Church of England does read it and expound it) in Mat. 26. 50. And yet if [...] were written [...], which is the same with in or by, if it be rendred word for word, yet [...] twice in the Scripture signifies [for as much as] as you may read Rom. 8. 3. & Heb. 2. 18. So that here are two places besides this in question, and two more ex abun­danti to shew, that if it were not [...], but said in words expresly as you would have it in the mea­ning, yet even so neither the thing, nor any part of the thing could be evicted against me: [Page 35] and lastly, if it were not only said [...] but that that sense of it were admitted which is desired, and that it did mean in or by in this very place: yet the Question were not at all the nearer to be concluded against me. For I grant that it is true [in him we are all sinners] as it is true that [in him we all die] that is, for his sake we are us'd as sinners; be­ing miserable really, but sinners in account and effect: as I have largely discoursed in my book. But then for the place here in question, it is so certain that it signifies the same thing (as our Church reads it) that it is not sense without it, but a violent breach of the period without prece­dent or reason. And after all; I have looked upon those places where [...] is said to signifie in or by, and in one of them I finde it so, [Page 36] Mar. 2. 4. but in Act. 3. 16. & Phil. 1. 3. I finde it not at all in any sense: but [...] indeed is used for in or by, in that of the Acts; and in the other it signifies, at or upon; but if all were granted that is pretended to, it no way prejudices my cause, as I have already pro­ved.

Next to these your Lordship seems a little more zealous and decretory in the Question upon the confidence of the 17, 18, & 19. verses of the 5. chapter to the Romans. The sum of which as your Lordship most ingeniously sums it up, is this. ‘As by one many were made sinners: so by one many were made righteous, that by Adam, this by Christ. But by Christ we are made [...] just, not by imputation only, but effectively and to real purposes; therefore by Adam [Page 37] we are really made sinners. And this your Lordship confirms by the observation of the sense of two words here used by the A­postle, The first is [...], which signifies a sentence of guilt, or punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon whom the condemnation comes, because God punishes none but for their own sin, Ezek. 18. 2. From the word [...] clear from sin, so your Lordship ren­ders it: and in opposition to this, [...] is to be rendred, that is, guilty, criminal per­sons, really and properly.’ This is all which the wit of man can say from this place of S. Paul, and if I make it appear that this is invalid, I hope I am se­cure.

To this then, I answer: That the Antithesis in these words here [Page 38] urg'd, (for there is another in the chapter) and this whole argu­ment of S. Paul is full and in­tire without descending to mi­nutes. Death came in by one man, much more shall life come by one man; if that by Adam, then much more this by Christ: by him to condemnation, by this man to justification. This is e­nough to verifie the argument of S. Paul, though life and death did not come in the same manner to the several relatives; as indeed they did not: of which afterwards. But for the present: It runs thus. By Adam we were made sinners; by Christ we are made righteous: As certainly one as the other, though not in the same man­ner of dispensation. By Adam [...] death reigned; by this man the reign of death shall be destroyed, and life set up in [Page 39] stead of it; by him we were us'd as sinners, for in him we died: but by Christ we are justified, that is, us'd as just persons, for by him we live. This is suffici­ent for the Apostles argu­ment, and yet no necessity to af­firm that we are sinners in A­dam any more then by imputa­tion: for we are by Christ made just no otherwise then by imputa­tion.

In the proof or perswasion I will use no indirect arguments, as to say, that to deny us to be just by imputation is the Doctrine of the Church of Rome and of the Socinian Conventicles, but ex­presly dislik'd by all the Luthe­ran, Calvinist, and Zuinglian Churches, and particularly by the Church of England, and indeed by the whole Harmony of Confes­sions: [Page 40] this I say, I will not make use of; not only because I my self do not love to be press'd by such prejudices rather then arguments; but because the question of the imputation of righteousness is very much mistaken and misun­derstood on all hands. They that say that Christs righteousness is imputed to us for justification, do it upon this account, because they know all that we do is imperfect, therefore they think themselves constrain'd to flie to Christ's righteousness, and think it must be imputed to us, or we perish. The other side, considering that this way would destroy the ne­cessity of holy living; and that in order to our justification, there were conditions requir'd on our parts, think it necessary to say that we are justified by inherent righteousness. Between these the [Page 41] truth is plain enough to be read. Thus:

Christ's righteousness is not imputed to us for justification di­rectly and immediately; neither can we be justified by our own righteousness: but our Faith and sincere endevours are through Christ accepted in stead of legal righteousness: that is; we are ju­stified through Christ, by impu­tation, not of Christs, nor our own righteousness: but of our faith and endevours of righteous­ness as if they were perfect: and we are justified by a Non-impu­tation, viz. of our past sins, and present unavoidable imperfecti­ons: that is, we are handled as if we were just persons and no sinners. So faith was imputed to Abraham for righteousness; not that it made him so, legally, but Evangelically, that is, by grace and imputation.

[Page 42]And indeed My Lord, that I may speak freely in this great question: when one man hath sin'd, his descendents and rela­tives, cannot possibly by him, or for him, or in him be made sinners properly and really. For in sin there are but two things imagina­ble: the irregular action; and the guilt, or obligation to punishment. Now we cannot in any sense be said to have done the action which another did, and not we: the acti­on is as individual as the person; and Titius may as well be Cajus, and the Son be his own Father, as he can be said to have done the Fathers action; and therefore we cannot possibly be guilty of it: for guilt is an obligation to punish­ment for having done it: the acti­on and the guilt are relatives; one cannot be without the other: something must be done inwardly [Page 43] or outwardly, or there can be no guilt. * But then for the evil of punishment, that may pass further then the action. If it passes upon the innocent, it is not a punish­ment to them; but an evil in­flicted by right of Dominion; but yet by reason of the relation of the afflicted to him that sin'd, to him it is a punishment. But if it passes upon others that are not in­nocent, then it is a punishment to both; to the first principally; to the Descendents or Relatives, for the others sake; his sin being im­puted so far.

How far that is in the present case, and what it is, the Apostle expresses thus: It was [...], vers. 18. or [...]; vers. 16. a curse unto condemna­tion, or a judgement unto con­demnation, that is, a curse inhe­rited from the principal; deserv'd [Page 44] by him, and yet also actually de­scending upon us after we had sin'd, [...] or [...]; that is the judgement passed up­on Adam; the [...], or [...] was on him; but it prov'd to be a [...], or a through condemna­tion when from him it passed upon all men that sin'd. [...] and [...] sometimes differ in degrees: so the words are used by S. Paul other­where (1 Cor. 11. 32.) [...]; a judgement to pre­vent a punishment, or a less to fore­stal a greater in the same kinde: so here the [...] pass'd further; the [...] was fulfilled in his posterity passing on further, viz. that all who sin'd should pass under the power of death as well as he: but this became formally and actual­ly a punishment to them only who did sin personally: to them it was [...].

[Page 45]This [...] or [...], is the [...] [...], vers. 17. the reign of death; this is called [...] [...], vers. 21. the reign of sin in death: that is, the effect which Adam's sin had, was only to bring in the reign of death, which is already broken by Jesus Christ, and at last shall be quite destroyed. But to say that sin here is properly transmitted to us from Adam, formally, and so as to be inherent in us, is to say that we were made to do his action, which is a perfect contradiction.

Now then your Lordship sees that what you note of the mea­ning of [...] I admit, and is indeed true enough, and agree­able to the discourse of the Apo­stle, and very much in justificati­on of what I taught. [...]sig­nifies a punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon whom [Page 46] the condemnation comes. I ea­sily subscribe to it: but then take in the words of S. Paul, [...] [...], by one sin, or by the sin of one the curse passed upon all men unto condemnation; that is, the curse descended from A­dam; for his sake it was propa­gated [...] to a real con­demnation, viz. when they should sin. For though this [...] or the curse of death was threatned on­ly to Adam, yet upon Gods be­ing angry with him, God resol­ved it should descend: and if men did sin as Adam, or if they did sin at all, though less then Adam, yet the [...] or the curse threatned to him should pass [...] un­to the same actual condemnation which fell upon him, that is, it should actually bring them under the reign of death.

[Page 47]But then my Lord, I beseech you let it be considered, if this [...] must suppose a punishment for sin, for the sin of him, his own sin that is so condemn'd, as your Lordship proves perfectly out of Ezek. 18. how can it be just that the [...] condemna­tion should pass upon us for A­dam's sin, that is, not for his own sin who is so condemn'd, but for the sin of another? S. Paul easily resolves the doubt, if there had been any. The [...], the reign of death passed upon all men [...] in as much as all men have sinned. And now why shall we suppose that we must be guilty of what we did not, when without any such [...] there is so much guilt of what we did really and personally? why shall it be that we die only for Adam's sin, and not rather as [Page 48] S. Paul expresly affirms [...] [...] in as much as all men have sinned, since by your own argument it cannot be in as much as all men have not sinned; this you say cannot be, and yet you will not confess this which can be, and which S. Paul affirms to have been indeed: as if it were not more just and reasonable to say, that from Adam the curse descended unto the condemnation of the sins of the world, then to say the curse descended without conside­ration of their sins; but a sin must be imagined to make it seem reasonable and just to condemn us. [Now I submit it to the judge­ment of all the world, which way of arguing is most reasonable and concluding: You my Lord in be­half of others argue thus. [...] or condemnation cannot pass up­on a man for any sin but his [Page 49] own: Therefore every man is truly guilty of Adam's sin, and that becomes his own. Against this I oppose mine. [...] or condem­nation cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own: therefore it did not pass upon man for A­dam's sin; because Adam's sin, was Adam's, not our own: But we all have sinned, we have sins of our own, therefore for these the curse pass'd from Adam to us. To back mine, besides that common no­tices of sense and reason defend it, I have the plain words of S. Paul; Death passed upon all men, for as much as all men have sinned; all men, that is, the gene­rality of mankinde, all that liv'd till they could sin, the others that died before, died in their nature, not in their sin, neither Adam's nor their own, save only that A­dam brought it in upon them, or [Page 50] rather left it to them, himself be­ing disrobed of all that which could hinder it.

Now for the word [...], which your Lordship renders [clear from sin] I am sure no man is so justi­fied in this world, as to be clear from sin; and if we all be sinners, and yet healed as just persons, it is certain we are just by imputation only, that is, Christ imputing our faith, and sincere, though not unerring obedience to us for righteousness: And then the Antithesis must hold thus; By Christ comes justification to life, as by Adam came the curse or the sin to the condemnation of death: But our justification which comes by Christ is by imputa­tion and acceptilation, by grace and favour: not that we are made really, that is, legally and perfectly righteous, but by im­putation [Page 51] of faith and obedience to us, as if it were perfect: And therfore Adam's sin was but by im­putation only to certain purposes; not real, or proper, not formal or inherent. For the grace by Christ is more then the sin by Adam: if therefore that was not legal and proper, but Evangelical and gracious, favourable and imputa­tive, much more is the sin of Adam in us improperly, and by im­putation. * And truly my Lord, I think that no sound Divine of any of our Churches will say that we are [...] or [...] in any other sense: not that Christs righ­teousness is imputed to us with­out any inherent graces in us, but that our imperfect services, our true faith and sincere endevours of obedience are imputed to us for righteousness through Jesus Christ: and since it is certainly [Page 52] so, I am sure the Antithesis be­tween Christ and Adam can never be salved by making us sinners really by Adam, and yet just or righteous by Christ only in ac­ceptation and imputation. For then sin should abound more then grace; expresly against the ho­nour of our blessed Saviour, the glory of our redemption, and the words of S. Paul. But rather on the contrary is it true, That though by Christ we were really and legally made perfectly righ­teous, it follows not that we were made sinners by Adam in the same manner and measure: for this similitude of S. Paul ought not to extend to an equality in all things; but still the advantage and prerogative, the abundance and the excess must be on the part of Grace: for if sin does abound, grace does much more abound; and [Page 53] we do more partake of righteous­ness by Christ, then of sin by Adam. Christ and Adam are the several fountains of emanation, and are compar'd aequè, but not aequaliter. Therefore this argu­ment holds redundantly, since by Christ we are not made legally righteous, but by imputation only; much less are we made sinners by Adam. This in my sense is so in­finitely far from being an ob­jection, that it perfectly demon­strates the main question; and for my part I mean to relie up­on it.

As for that which your Lord­ship adds out of Rom. 5. 19. That [...] signifies sinners, not by imitation, as the Pelagians dream, but sinners really and ef­fectively; I shall not need to make any other reply; but that 1. I do not approve of that gloss of [Page 54] the Pelagians, that in Adam we are made sinners by imitation; and much less of that which af­firms, we are made so properly and formally. But [made sinners] signifies, us'd like sinners; so as [justified] signifies healed like just persons: In which interpreta­tion I follow S. Paul, not the Pelagians; they who are on the other side of the question, follow neither. And unless men take in their opinion before they read; and resolve not to understand S. Paul in this Epistle, I wonder why they should fancy that all that he sayes sounds that way which they commonly dream of: But as men fancy, so the Bels will ring. But I know yovr Lordships grave and wiser judgement, sees not on­ly this that I have now opened, but much beyond it, and that you will be a zealous advocate [Page 55] for the truth of God, and for the honour of his justice, wisdome and mercy.

That which followes, makes me beleeve your Lordship resolv'd to try me, by speaking your own sense in the line, and your tempta­tion in the interline. For when your Lordship had said that ‘[My ar­guments for the vindication of Gods goodness and justice are sound and holy]’ your hand run it over again and added [as ab­stracted from the case of Original Sin.] But why should this be ab­stracted from all the whole Oeco­nomy of God, from all his other dispensations? Is it in all cases of the world unjust for God, to im­pute our fathers fins to us unto eternal condemnation; and is it otherwise in this only? Certain­ly a man would think this were the more favourable case; as be­ing [Page 56] a single act, done but once, repented of after it was done, not consented to by the parties inter­ested, not stipulated by God that it should be so, and being against all lawes and all the rea­son of the world: therefore it were but reason that if any where, here much rather Gods justice and goodness should be relied up­on as the measure of the event. * And if in other cases lawes be never given to Ideots and Infants and persons uncapable, why should they be given here? but if they were not capable of a Law, then neither could they be of Sin; for where there is no law, there is no transgression. And is it un­just to condemn one man to hell for all the sin of a thousand of his Ancestors actually done by them? and shall it be accounted just to damn all the world for one sin of [Page 57] one man? But if it be said, that it is unjust to damn the innocent for the sin of another; but the world is not innocent, but really guilty in Adam. Besides that this is a begging of the question, it is also against common sense, to say that a man is not innocent of that which was done before he had a being; for if that be not suffici­ent, then it is impossible for a man to be innocent. And if this way of answer be admitted, any man may be damned for the sin of any Father; because it may be said here as well as there, that although the innocent must not perish for anothers fault, yet the son is not innocent as being in his fathers loyns when the fault was committed, and the law cals him and makes him guilty. And if it were so indeed, this were so far from being an excuse, to say [Page 58] that the Law makes him guilty, that this were absolute tyranny, and the thing that were to be com­plain'd of.

I hope, by this time your Lord­ship perceives, that I have no rea­son to fear that I praevaricate S. Paul's rule: [...] [...]. I only endevour to un­derstand S. Paul's words, and I read them [...], in proportion to, and so as they may not intrench upon the repu­tation of Gods goodness and ju­stice: that's [...], to be wise unto sobriety. But they that do so [...] as to resolve it to be so whether God be honour'd in it, or disho­nour'd, and to answer all argu­ments, whether they can or can­not be answered, and to efform all their Theology to the ayre of that one great proposition, and [Page 59] to find out waies for God to pro­ceed in, which he hath never told of, [...] waies that are crooked and not to be insisted in, waies that are not right, if these men do not [...], then I hope I shall have less need to fear that I do, who do none of these things.

And in proportion to my secu­rity here, I am confident that I am unconcern'd in the consequent threatning. If any man shall E­vangelize, [...] any o­ther doctrine then what ye have received, something for Gospel which is not Gospel, something that ye have not received, let him be accursed. My Lord, if what I teach were not that which we have received, that God is just and righteous and true: that the soul that sins the same shall die: that we shall have no cause [Page 60] to say, The Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge: that God is a gracious Father, pardoning iniquity, and therefore not exact­ing it where it is not: that Infants are from their Mothers wombs beloved of God their Father: that of such is the Kingdome of God: that he pities those souls who cannot discern the right hand from the left, as he declar'd in the case of the Ninevites: that to Infants there are special Angels appointed who alwaies behold the face of God: that Christ took them in his arms and blessed them, and therefore they are not hated by God, and accursed heirs of Hell, and coheirs with Satan: that the Messias was promis'd be­fore any children were born; as certainly as that Adam sin'd be­fore they were born: that if sin [Page 61] abounds, grace does superabound; and therefore children are with greater effect involv'd in the grace then they could be in the sin: and the sin must be gone before it could do them mischief: if this were not the doctrine of both Testaments, and if the contrary were, then the threatning of S. Paul might well be held up against me: but else my Lord, to shew such a Scorpion to him that speaks the truth of God in sincerity and humility, though it cannot make me to betray the truth and the honour of God, yet the very fear and affrightment which must needs seize upon every good man that does but behold it, or hear the words of that angry voice, shall and hath made me to pray not only that my self be preser­ved in truth, but that it would please God to bring into the way [Page 62] of truth all such as have erred and are deceived.

My Lord, I humbly thank your Lordship for your grave and pi­ous Councel, and kisse the hand that reaches forth so paternal a rod. I see you are tender both of truth and me: and though I have not made this tedious reply to cause trouble to your Lordship, or to steal from you any part of your precious time, yet because I see your Lordship was perswa­ded induere personam, to give some little countenance to a po­pular error out of jealousie against a less usual truth, I thought it my duty to represent to your Lordship such things, by which as I can, so I ought to be defended against captious objectors. It is hard when men will not be pati­ent of truth, because another man offers it to them, and they did [Page 63] not first take it in, or if they did, were not pleas'd to own it.

But from your Lordship I ex­pect, and am sure to finde the ef­fects of your piety, wisdome and learning, and that an error for being popular shall not prevail against so necessary, though un­observed truth. A necessary truth I call it; because without this I do not understand how we can declare Gods righteousness and justifie him, with whom unrighte­ousnesse cannot dwell: But if men of a contrary opinion, can reconcile their usual doctrines of Original Sin with Gods justice, and goodness and truth, I shall be well pleased with it, and think better of their doctrine then now I can.

But untill that be done, it were well (My Lord) if men would not trouble themselves or [Page 64] the Church with impertinent con­tradictions; but patiently give leave to have truth advanced, and God justified in his sayings and in his judgements, and the Church improved, and all errors confuted, that what did so prosperously be­gin the Reformation, may be ad­mitted to bring it to perfection, that men may no longer go quâ itur, but quâ eundum est.

The Bp of Rochester's Letter to Dr. Taylor, with an account of the particulars there given in charge.

WORTHY SIR,

—Let me request you to weigh that of S. Paul, Ephes. 2. 5. which are ur­ged by some Ancients: and to remember, how often he cals Concupiscence Sin; whereby it is urg'd that although Baptism take a­way [Page 66] the guilt as concre­tively redounding to the person, yet the simple ab­stracted guilt, as to the Na­ture remains: for Sacra­ments are administred to Persons, not to Natures. I confess, I finde not the Fa­thers so fully, and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till Pelagius had pudled the stream: but, after this, you may finde S. Jerom in Hos. saying, In paradiso omnes praevaricati sunt in Adamo. And S. Ambrose in Rom. 1. 5. Manifestum est omnes peccasse in Adam, quasi in massâ, ex eo igitur [Page 67] cuncti peccatores, quiae ex eo sumus omnes; and as Greg. 39 Hom. in Ezek. Sine culpâ in mundo esse non potest, qui in mundum cum culpâ ve­nit; But S. Austin is so fre­quent, so full and clear in his assertions, that his words & reasons will require your most judicious examinati­ons, and more strict weigh­ing of them; he saith epist: 107. Scimus secundum A­dam nos primâ nativitate contagium mortis contrahere; nec liberamur à supplicio mor­tis aeternae nisi per gratiam renascamur in Christo; Id. de verb. Apost. Ser, 4. pec­catum [Page 68] à primo homine in om­nes homines pertransiit, etenim illud peccatum non in fonte mansit, sed pertransiit, and Rom. 5. ubi te invenit? ve­nundatum sub peccato, tra­hentem peccatum primi ho­minis, habentem peccatum antequam possis habere arbi­trium. Id. de praedestin. & grat. c. 2. Si infans uni­us diei non sit sine peccato, qui proprium habere non po­tuit, conficitur, at illud traxe­rit alienum; de quo Apost. Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum; quod qui negat, negat profectò nos esse mortales; quoniam mors est [Page 69] poena peccati. Sequitur, ne­cesse est, poena peccatum. Id. enchir. c. 9. 29. Sola gra­tia redemptos discernit à perditis, quos in unam per­ditionis massam concreverat ab origine ducta communis contagio, Id. de peccator, mer. & remiss. l. 1. c. 3. Concupi­scentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis, Quid potest, aut potuit nasci ex servo, nisi servus? ideo sicut omnis homo ab Adamo est, ita & omnis homo per Adamum servus est peccati. Rom. 5. Falluntur ergo om­nino, qui dicunt mortem so­lam, [Page 70] non & [...]peccatum tran­siisse in genus. humanum. Pro­sper. resp. ad articulum Au­gustino falsò impositum; Om­nes homines praevaricationis reos, & damnationi obnexios nasci perituros (que) nisi in Chri­sto renascamur, asserimus. Tho. 12. q. 8. Secundum fi­dem Catholicam tenendum est, quod primum peccatum pri­mi hominis, originaliter tran­sit in posteros, propter quod etiam pueri mox nati defe­runtur ad baptismum ab in­teriore culpâ abluendi. Con­trarium est haeresis Pelag. un­de peccatum quod sic à pri­mo parente derivatur, dicicitur [Page 71] Originale, sicut pecca­tum, quod ab animâ deriva­tur ad membra corporis, dici­tur actuale. Bonavent. in 2. sent. dist. 31. Sicut pec­catum actuale tribuitur ali­cui ratione singularis perso­nae: it a peccatum originale tribuitur ratione Naturae; corpus infectum traducitur, quia persona Adae infecit na­turam, & natura infecit per­sonam. Anima enim inficitur à carne per colligantiam, quum unita carni traxit ad se al­terius proprietates. Lombar. 2. Sent. dist. 31. Peccatum originale per corruptionem car­nis, in animà fit: in vase enim [Page 72] dignoscitur vitium esse, quod vinum accescit.

If you take into conside­ration the Covenant made between Almighty God and Adam as relating to his posterity, it may conduce to the satisfaction of those who urge it for a proof of Original Sin. Now that the work may prosper under your hands to the manife­station of Gods glory, the edification of the Church, and the satisfaction of all good Christians, is the hear­ty prayer of

Your fellow Servant in our most Blessed Lord Christ Jesu.
Jo. Roffens.
My Lord,

I Perceive that you have a great Charity to every one of the sons of the Church, that your Lordship refuses not to sollicite their objections, and to take care that every man be answered that can make objections against my Doctrine; but as your charity makes you refuse no work or la­bour of love: so shall my duty and obedience make me ready to perform any commandement that can be relative to so excellent a principle.

I am indeed sorry your Lord­ship is thus haunted with obje­ctions about the Question of Ori­ginal [Page 74] Sin; but because you are pleas'd to hand them to me, I cannot think them so inconside­rable as in themselves they seem; for what your Lordship thinks worthy the reporting from others, I must think are fit to be answe­red and returned by me.

In your Lordships of Nevem­ber, 10. these things I am to re­ply to:

Let me request you to weigh that of S. Paul Ephes. 2. 5. The words are these [Even when we were dead in sins, (God) hath quickned us together with Christ] which words I do not at all suppose relate to the matter of Original Sin, but to the state of Heathen sins, habitual Idolatries and impurities; in which the world was dead before the great Reformation by Christ. And I do not know any Expo­sitor of note that suspects any [Page 75] other sense of it; and the second verse of that chapter makes it so certain and plain, that it is too visible to insist upon it longer. But your Lordship addes fur­ther.

And to remember how often he cals concupiscence Sin] I know S. Paul reckons Concupiscence to be one of the works of the flesh, and consequently such as excludes from heaven, Col. 3. 5. Evil concupiscence] concupiscence with something superadded, but cer­tainly that is nothing that is na­tural; for God made nothing that is evil, and whatsoever is natural and necessary cannot be mortified; but this may and must, and the Apostle cals upon us to do it; but that this is a super­inducing, and an actual or habi­tual lusting appears by the fol­lowing words, vers. 7. in which [Page 76] ye also walked sometimes when ye lived in them, such a concupi­scence as that which is the effect of habitual sins or an estate of sins, of which the Apostle speaks, Rom. 7. 8. Sin taking occasion by the com­mandement wrought in me all man­ner of concupiscence; that is, so great a state of evil, such strong incli­nations and desires to sin, that I grew as captive under it; it in­troduced a necessity like those in S. Peter, who had eyes [...] full of an Adulteress: the women had possessed their eyes, and therefore they were [...] [...] they could not cease from sin: because having [...] all concupiscence, that is the very spirit of sinful desires, they could relish nothing but the producti­ons of sin, they could fancy no­thing but Colloquintida and Toad­stools of the earth. * Once more [Page 77] I finde S. Paul speaking of Con­cupiscence, 1 Thess. 4. 5. Let every man knew to possess his vessel in holiness and honour, not in the lust of concupiscence, as do the Gentiles which know not God. In the lust of Concupiscence, that is plainly in lustfulness and im­purity: for it is a Hebraism, where a superlative is usually ex­pressed by the synonymon: as Lutum coeni; pluvia imbris; so the Gall of bitterness and the ini­quity of sins; Robur virium; the blackness of darkness, that is, [...], the outer darkness, or the greatest darkness: so here the lust of Concupiscence, that is, the vilest and basest of it. I know no where else that the Apostle uses the word in any sense. But the like is to be said of the word lust, which the Apostle often uses, for the habits produced or the preg­nant [Page 78] desires, but never for the na­tural principle and affection, when he speaks of sin.

But your Lordship is pleased to adde a subtlety in pursuance of your former advices and notices, which I confess I shall never un­derstand.

Although Baptism take away the guilt as concretively redound­ding to the person, yet the simple abstracted guilt as to the Nature remains; for Sacraments are ad­ministred to persons, not to na­tures] Thus I suppose those per­sons from whom your Lord­ship reports it, intended as an an­swer to a secret objection. For if Concupiscence be a sin, and yet remains after baptism, then what good does Baptism effect? But if it be no sin after, then it is no sin before. To this it is answered as you see: there is a [Page 79] double guilt; a guilt of person, and of nature. That is taken away, this is not: for, Sacraments are given to Persons, not to Na­tures.

But first, where is there such a distinction set down in Scri­pture, or in the prime antiquity, or in any moral Philosopher? There is no humane nature but what is in the persons of men; and though our understanding can make a separate consideration of these, or rather consider a per­son in a double capacity, in his personal and in his natural, that is (if I am to speak sense) a person may be considered in that which is proper to him, and in that which is common to him and others; yet these two considera­tions cannot make two distinct subjects capable of such different events. I will put it to the trial.

[Page 80]This guilt that is in nature, what is it? Is it the same thing that was in the person? that is, is it an obligation to punishment? If it be not, I know not the meaning of the word, and therefore I have nothing to do with it. If it be, then if this guilt or obliga­tion to punishment remains in the nature after it is taken from the person, then if this concupiscence deserve damnation, this nature shall be damned, though the per­son be saved. Let the Objectors, my Lord, choose which they will. If it does not deserve damnation, why do they say it does? If it does, then the guilty may suffer what they deserve, but the inno­cent or the absolved must not; the person then being acquitted, and the nature not acquitted, the nature shall be damn'd and the person be saved.

[Page 81]But if it be said that the guilt remains in the nature to certain purposes, but not to all; then I reply, so it does in the person; for it is in the person after Baptism, so as to be a perpetual possibili­ty and proneness to sin, and a principle of trouble; and if it be no otherwise in the nature, then this distinction is to no purpose; if it be otherwise in the nature, then it brings damnation to it, when it brings none to the Man, and then the former argument must return. But whether it pre­vail or no, yet I cannot but note, that what is here affirmed is ex­presly against the words common­ly attributed to S. Cyprian (De ablutione pedum) Sic abluit quos parentalis labes infecerat, ut nec actualis nec Originalis macula post ablutionem illam ulla sui vestigia derelinguat: How this supposing [Page 82] it of Baptism can be reconcil'd with the guilt remaining in the nature, I confess I cannot give an account. It is expresly against S. Austin (Tom. 9. Tract. 41. in Johan. epist. ad Ocean.) saying, deleta est tota iniquitas! expres­ly against S. Hierom, Quo [...]odo justificati sumus & sanctificati, si peccatum aliquid in nobis relin­quitur?

But again (My Lord) I did suppose that Concupiscence or Ori­ginal Sin had been founded in nature, and had not been a per­sonal but a natural evil. I am sure, so the Article of our Church affirms; it is the fault and cor­ruption of our Nature. And so S. Bonaventure affirms in the wo [...]ds cited by your Lordship in your Letter: Sicui peccatum actu­ale tribuitur alicui ratione singula­ris persona: ita peccatum origi­uis [Page 83] tribuitur ratione naturae. Ei­ther then the Sacrament must have effect upon our Nature, to purifie that which is vitiated by Concupiscence, or else it does no good at all. For if the guilt or sin be founded in the nature, (as the Article affirms) and Baptism does not take off the guilt from the nature, then it does no­thing.

Now since your Lordship is pleas'd in the behalf of the ob­jectors so warily to avoid what they thought pressing, I will take leave to use the advantages it ministers: for so the Serpent teaches us where to strike him, by his so warily and guiltily de­fending his head. I therefore argue thus.

Either Baptism does not take off the guilt of Original Sin, or else there may be punishment [Page 84] where there is no guilt, or else natural death was not it which God threatned as the punishment of Adam's fact. For it is cer­tain, that all men die as well af­ter baptism as before; and more after then before. That which would be properly the consequent of this Dilemma, is this, that when God threatned death to A­dam, saying, On the day thou ea­test of the tree thou shalt die the death, he inflicted and intended to inflict the evils of a trouble­some mortal life. For Adam did not die that day, but Adam be­gan to be miserable that day, to live upon hard labour, to eat fruits from an accursed field, till he should return to the earth whence he was taken. (Gen. 3. 17, 18, 19.) So that death in the common sense of the word was to be the end of his labour, [Page 85] not so much the punishment of the sin. For it is probable he should have gone off from the scene of this world to a better, though he had not sin'd; but if he had not sin'd, he should not be so afflicted, and he should not have died daily till he had di­ed finally, that is, till he had returned to his dust whence he was taken, and whither he would naturally have gone: and it is no new thing in Scripture that mi­series and infelicities should be cal­led dying or death. (Exod. 10. 17. 1 Cor. 15. 31. 2 Cor. 1. 10. & 4. 10, 11, 12. & 11. 23.). But I only note this as probable; as not being willing to admit what the Socinians answer in this argu­ment; who affirm that God threatning death to the Sin of Adam, meant death eternal: which is certainly not true; as we learn [Page 86] from the words of the Apostle, saying, In Adam we all die; which is not true of death eternal, but it is true of the miseries and cala­mities of mankinde, and it is true of temporal death in the sense now explicated, and in that which is commonly received.

But I add also this probleme. That which would have been, had there been no sin, and that which remains when the sin or guiltiness is gone, is not properly the punishment of the sin. But dissolution of the soul and body should have been, if Adam had not sin'd, for the world would have been too little to have en­tertain'd those myriads of men which must in all reason have been born from that blessing of Increase and multiply, which was given at the first Creation; and to have confin'd mankinde to the [Page 87] pleasures of this world, in case he had not fallen, would have been a punishment of his innocence; but however, it might have been, though God had not been angry, and shall still be, even when the sin is taken off. The proper con­sequent of this will be, that when the Apostle sayes, Death came in by sin, and that Death is the wages of sin, he primarily and literally means the solemnities, and causes, and infelicities, and untimeliness of temporal death, and not meer­ly the dissolution, which is direct­ly no evil, but an inlet to a better state. But I insist not on this, but offer it to the consideration of inquisitive and modest persons.

And now that I may return thi­ther from whence this objection brought me; I consider, that if any should urge this argument to me:

Baptism delivers from Origi­nal Sin.

[Page 88]Baptism does not deliver from Concupiscence; therefore Concu­piscence is not Original Sin.

I did not know well what to an­swer; I could possibly say some­thing to satisfie the boyes & young men at a publique disputation, but not to satisfie my self when I am upon my knees and giving an ac­count to God of all my secret and hearty perswasions. But I con­sider, that by Concupiscence must be meant either the first inclina­tions to their object; or the pro­per acts of Election which are the second acts of Concupiscence. If the first inclinations be meant, then certainly that cannot be a sin which is natural, and which is ne­cessary. For I consider that Con­cupiscence and natural desires are like hunger; which while it is natural and necessary, is not for the destruction but conservation [Page 89] of man; when it goes beyond the limits of nature, it is violent and a disease: and so is Concupiscence; But desires or lustings when they are taken for the natural propen­sity to their proper object, are so far from being a sin, that they are the instruments of felicity for this duration, and when they grow towards being irregular, they may, if we please, grow instru­ments of felicity in order to the other duration, because they may serve a vertue by being restrai­ned; And to desire that to which all men tend naturally, is no more a sin then to desire to be happy is a sin: desire is no more a sin then joy or sorrow is: nei­ther can it be fancied why one passion more then another can be in its whole nature Criminal; either all or none are so; when any of them growes irregular or [Page 90] inordinate, Joy is as bad as Desire, and Fear as bad as either.

But if by Concupiscence we mean the second acts of it, that is, avoidable consentings, and deliberate elections, then let it be as much condemned as the Apostle and all the Church after him hath sentenc'd it; but then it is not Adam's sin, but our own by which we are condemned; for it is not his fault that we choose; If we choose, it is our own; if we choose not, it is no fault. For there is a natural act of the Will as well as of the Understanding, and in the choice of the supreme Good, and in the first apprehen­sion of its proper object, the Will is as natural as any other faculty; and the other faculties have de­grees of adherence as well as the Will: so have the potestative and intellective faculties; they are de­lighted [Page 91] in their best objects. But because these only are natural, and the will is natural some­times, but not alwaies, there it is that a difference can be.

For I consider, if the first Con­cupiscence be a sin, Original Sin, (for actual it is not) and that this is properly, personally, and inhe­rently our sin by traduction, that is, if our will be necessitated to sin by Adam's fall, as it must needs be if it can sin when it can­not deliberate, then there can be no reason told, why it is more a sin to will evil, then to understand it: and how does that which is moral differ from that which is natural? for the understanding is first and primely moved by its object, and in that motion by no­thing else but by God, who moves all things: and if that which hath nothing else to move it but the [Page 92] object, yet is not free; it is strange that the will can in any sense be free, when it is necessitated by wisdome and by power, and by Adam, that is, from within and from without, besides what God and violence do and can do.

But in this I have not only Scripture and all the reason of the world on my side, but the com­plying sentences of the most emi­nent writers of the Primitive Church; I need not trouble my self with citations of many of them, since Calvin (lib. 3. Instit. c. 3. § 10.) confesses that S. Au­stin hath collected their testimo­nies and is of their opinion, that Concupiscence is not a sin, but an infirmity only. But I will here set down the words of S. Chry­sostome (Homil. 13. in epist. Rom.) because they are very clear; Ipsae passiones in se peccatum non sunt [Page 93] Effraenata verò ipsarum immode­rantia peccatum operata est. Con­cupiscentia quidem peccatum non est quando verò egressa modum fo­ras eruperit, tunc demum adulte­rium fit, non à concupiscentia sed à nimio & illicito illius luxu.

By the way I cannot but wonder why men are pleased, where ever they finde the word Concupiscence in the New Te­stament, presently to dream of Original Sin, and make that to be the sum total of it; whereas Con­cupiscence if it were the product of Adam's fall, is but one small part of it; [Et ut exempli gratia unam illarum tractem] said S. Chry­sostome in the forecited place; Concupiscence is but one of the pas­sions, and in the utmost extension of the word, it can be taken but for one half of the passion; for not only all the passions of the [Page 94] Concupiscible faculty can be a principle of sin, but the Irascible does more hurt in the world; that is more sensual, this is more devillish. The reason why I note this, is because upon this account it will seem, that concupiscence is no more to be called a sin then anger is, and as S. Paul said, Be angry, but sin not; so he might have said, Desire, or lust, but sin not. For there are some lustings and de­sires without sin, as well as some Angers; and that which is indiffe­rent to vertue and vice, cannot of it self be a vice; To which I add, that if Concupiscence taken for all de­sires be a sin, then so are all the passions of the Irascible faculty. Why one more then the other is not to be told, but that Anger in the first motions is not a sin, ap­pears, because it is not alwaies sin­ful in the second; a man may [Page 95] be actually angry, and yet really innocent: and so he may be lust­ful and full of desire, and yet he may be not only that which is good, or he may overcome his desires to that which is bad. I have now considered what your Lordship received from others, and gave me in charge your self, con­cerning concupiscence.

Your next charge is concerning Antiquity, intimating that al­though the first antiquity is not clearly against me, yet the second is. For thus your Lordship is pleased to write their objection [I confess I finde not the Fathers so fully and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till Pelagius had pudled the stream; but after this you may finde S. Jerom &c.]

That the Fathers of the first 400 years did speak plainly and fully of it, is so evident as nothing [Page 96] more, and I appeal to their testi­monies as they are set down in the papers annexed in their proper place; and therefore that must needs be one of the little arts by which some men use to escape from the pressure of that authority, by which because they would have other men concluded, sometimes upon strict inquiry they finde them­selves entangled. Original Sin as it is at this day commonly expli­cated, was not the Doctrine of the primitive Church; but when Pelagius had pudled the stream, S. Austin was so angry that he stampt and disturb'd it more: and truly my Lord, I do not think that the Gentlemen that urg'd against me S. Austin's opi­nion, do well consider that I pro­fess my self to follow those fa­thers who were before him; and whom S. Austin did forsake as I [Page 97] do him in the question. They may as well press me with his autho­rity in the Article of the damna­tion of Infants dying unbaptized, or of absolute predestination. In which Article, S. Austin's words are equally urged by the Janse­nists and Molinists, by the Remon­strants and Contra-remonstrants, and they can serve both, and therefore cannot determine me. But then (My Lord) let it be remembred, that they are as much against S. Chrysostome as I am against S. Austin, with this only difference; that S. Chrysostome speaks constantly in the argument, which S. Austin did not, and particularly in that part of it which concerns Concu­piscence. For in the inquiry, whe­ther it be a sin or no; he speaks so variously, that though Calvin complains of him, that he cals [Page 98] it only an infirmity, yet he also brings testimonies from him to prove it to be a sin, and let any man try if he can tie these words together. (De peccator. mer. et remission l. 1. c. 3.) Concupiscen­tia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis. Which are the words your Lordship quotes: Concupiscence is a sin because it is a disobedience to the Empire of the spirit. But yet in another place; (lib. 1. de civit. Dei cap. 25.) Illa Concupi­scentialis inobedientia quanto ma­gis abs (que) culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si abs (que) culpa est in corpore dormientis? It is a sin and it is no sin, it is criminal, but is without fault; it is culpable be­cause it is a disobedience, and yet this disobedience without actual consent is not culpable. If I do beleeve S. Austin, I must disbe­leeve [Page 99] him; and which part soever I take, I shall be reproved by the same authority. But when the Fathers are divided from each other, or themselves, it is indiffe­rent to follow either; but when any of them are divided from reason and Scripture, then it is not indifferent for us to follow them, and neglect these; and yet if these who object S. Austin's autho­rity to my Doctrine, will be con­tent to subject to all that he saies, I am content they shall follow him in this too, provided that they will give me my liberty be­cause I will not be tied to him that speaks contrary things to himself, and contrary to them that went before him; and though he was a rare person, yet he was as fallible as any of my brethren at this day. He was followed by many ignorant ages, and all the world [Page 100] knowes by what accidental advan­tages he acquired a great reputa­tion: but he who made no scru­ple of deserting all his predeces­sors, must give us leave upon the strength of his own reasons to quit his authority.

All that I shall observe is this, that the Doctrine of Original Sin as it is explicated by S. Austin, had two parents; one was the Do­ctrine of the Encratites, and some other Hereticks, who forbad Mar­riage, and supposing it to be evill, thought they were warranted to say, it was the bed of sin, and children the spawn of vipers and sinners. And S. Austin himself, and especially S. Hierom (whom your Lordship cites) speaks some things of marriage, which if they were true, then marriage were highly to be refused, as being the increaser of sin rather then of [Page 101] children, and a semination in the flesh, and contrary to the spirit, and such a thing which being mingled with sin, produces uni­vocal issues, the mother and the daughter are so like that they are the worse again. For if a proper inherent sin be effected by chaste marriages, then they are in this particular equal to adulterous em­braces, and rather to be pardoned then allowed; and if all Concupi­scence be vicious, then no marri­age can be pure. These things it may be have not been so much considered, but your Lordship I know remembers strange sayings in S. Hierom, in Athenag or as, and in S. Austin, which possibly have been countenanced and main­tained at the charge of this opi­nion. But the other parent of this is the zeal against the Pelagian Heresie, which did serve it self [Page 102] by saying too little in this Arti­cle, and therefore was thought fit to be confuted by saying too much; and that I conjecture right in this affair, I appeal to the words which I cited out of S. Austin in the matter of Concupiscence; concerning which he speaks the same thing that I do, when he is disingaged; as in his books De eivitate Dei: but in his Tractate de peccatorum meritis & remis­sione, which was written in his heat against the Pelagians he speaks quite contrary. And who ever shall with observation read his one book of Original Sin against Pelagius, his two books de Nuptiis & Concupiscentia to Valerius, his three books to Marcellinus, de pec­catorum meritis & remissione, his four books to Boniface, contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, his six books to Claudius against Ju­lianus, [Page 103] and shall think himself bound to beleeve all that this ex­cellent man wrote, will not only finde it impossible he should, but will have reason to say, that zeal against an error is not alwaies the best instrument to finde our truth. The same complaint hath been made of others; and S. Jerome hath suffer'd deeply in the infir­mity. I shall not therefore trou­ble your Lordship with giving particular answers to the words of S. Jerom and S. Ambrose, be­cause (besides what I have al­ready said) I do not think that their words are an argument fit to conclude against so much evi­dence, nor against a much less then that which I have every where brought in this Article, though indeed their words are capable of a fair interpretation, and besides the words quoted out [...] [Page 102] [...] [Page 103] [Page 104] of S. Ambrose are none of his; and for Aquinas, Lombard, and Bo­naventure, your Lordship might as well press me with the opinion of Mr. Calvin, Knox and Buchannan, with the Synod of Dort, or the Scots Presbyteries: I know they are against me, and therefore I re­prove them for it, but it is no disparagement to the truth, that other men are in error. And yet of all the Schoolmen, Bonaven­ture should least have been urg'd against me, for the proverbs sake: for, Adam non peccavit in Bonaven­tura; Alexander of Hales would often say, that Adam never sin'd in Bonaventure. But it may be he was not in earnest: no more am I.

The last thing your Lordship gives to me in charge in the be­half of the objectors, is that I would take into consideration the [Page 105] Covenant made between Almigh­ty God and Adam, as relating to his posterity.

To this I answer, that I know of no such thing; God made a cove­nant with Adam indeed, and us'd the right of his dominion over his posterity, and yet did no­thing but what was just; but I finde in Scripture no mention made of any such Covenant as is dreamt of about the matter of original sin: only the Covenant of works God did make with all men till Christ came; but he did never exact it after Adam; but for a Covenant that God should make with Adam, that if he stood, all his posterity should be I know not what; and if he fell, they should be in a damnable conditi­on, of this (I say) there is nec vo­la nec vestigium in holy Scri­pture, that ever I could meet [Page 106] with: if there had been any such covenant, it had been but equity that to all the persons interessed it should have been communicated, and caution given to all who were to suffer, and abilities given to them to prevent the evil: for else it is not a Covenant with them, but a decree concerning them; and it is impossible that there should be a covenant made between two, when one of the par­ties knowes nothing of it.

I will enter no further into this enquiry, but only observe, that though there was no such co­venant, yet the event that hap­ned might without any such co­venant have justly entred in at many doors. It is one thing to say that God by Adam's sin was moved to a severer entercourse with his posterity, for that is cer­tainly true; and it is another [Page 107] thing to say that Adam's sin of it self did deserve all the evill that came actually upon his chil­dren; Death is the wages of sin, one death for one sin; but not 10000 millions for one sin; but therefore the Apostle affirms it to have descended on all, in as much as all men have sin'd, But if from a sinning Parent a good childe descends; the childs inno­cence will more prevail with God for kindness, then the fathers sin shall prevail for trouble. Non omnia parentum peccata dii in libe­ros convertunt, sed siquis de ma­lo nascitur bonus, tanquam benè affectus, corpore natus de morboso, is generis pana liberatur, tan­quam ex improbitatis domo, in ali­am famil [...]am datus: qui vero mor­bo in similitudinem generis refer­tur at (que) redigitur vitiosi, ei ni­mirum convenit tanquam haeredi [Page 108] debitas poeas vitii persolvere, said Plutarch (De iis qui sero à Nu­mine puniuntur. ex interpr. Clu­serii.) God does not alwaies make the fathers sins descend upon the children. But if a good childe is born of a bad father, like a healthful body from an ill affected one, he is freed from the punishment of his stock, and passes from the house of wickedness in­to another family. But he who inherits the disease, he also must be heir of the punishment; Quo­rum natura amplexa est cognatam malitiam, hos Justitia similitudi­nem pravitatis persequens suppli­cio affecit, if they pursue their kindreds wickedness, they shall be pursued by a cognation of judge­ment.

Other waies there are by which it may come to pass that the sins of others may descend upon us. [Page 109] He that is author or the perswa­der, the minister or the helper, the approver or the follower, may de­rive the sins of others to him­self, but then it is not their sins only, but our own too, and it is like a dead taper put to a burning light and held there, this derives light and flames from the other, and yet then hath it of its own, but they dwell together and make one body. These are the waies by which punishment can enter, but there are evils which are no pu­nishments, and they may come upon more accounts, by Gods Do­minion, by natural consequence, by infection, by destitution and dere­liction, for the glory of God, by right of authority, for the institu­tion or exercise of the suffe­rers, or for their more immediate good.

[Page 110]But that directly and properly one should be punish'd for the sins of others was indeed practi­sed by some Common-wealths; Utilitatis specie saepissimè in re­pub. peccari, said Cicero, they do it sometimes for terror, and be­cause their waies of preventing evil is very imperfect: and when Pedianus secundus the Pretor was kill'd by a slave, all the family of them was kill'd in punishment; this was secundum veterem morem said Tacit. (Annal. 14.) for in the slaughter of Marcellus the slaves fled for fear of such usage; it was thus, I say, among the Romans, but habuit aliquid iniqui, and God forbid we should say such things of the fountain of Justice and mercy. But I have done, and will move no more stones, but hereafter carry them as long as I can, rather then make a noise by [Page 111] throwing them down; I shall only add this one thing: I was troubled with an objection lately; for it being propounded to me, why it is to be beleeved that the sin of Adam could spoil the nature of man, and yet the nature of Devils could not be spoiled by their sin which was worse; I could not well tell what to say, and therefore I held my peace.

THE END.

An Advertisement to the Reader.

PAg. 8, & 9 there are seven lines misplaced, which are to be read thus: pag. 8. lin. 16. read, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it] [and in the whole process it must be an impossible thing, because the in­strument which hath all its operations by the force of the principal agent, cannot of it self produce a great change and violent effect upon the principal agent] Besides all this, (I say) while one does not know how Original Sin can be derived, and another who thinks he can, names a wrong way, and both the waies infer it to be another kinde of thing then all the Schools of learning teach: does it not too clearly demonstrate,—

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