A letter to an officer of the army concerning a select senate mentioned by them in their proposals to the late Parliament the necessity and prudentialness of such a senate is here asserted by reason and history : whereunto are added sundry positions about government, and an essay towards an secure settlement / by Henry Stubbe ...

A letter to an officer of the army concerning a select senate mentioned by them in their proposals to the late Parliament the necessity and prudentialness of such a senate is here asserted by reason and history : whereunto are added sundry positions about government, and an essay towards an secure settlement / by Henry Stubbe ...

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Title page

A LETTER To an OFFICER of the ARMY Concerning A Select Senate, &c.

A LETTER To an OFFICER of the ARMY Concerning A Select Senate, &c.

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SIR,

WHen I was last at London, you were pleased to honour me with a Discourse about the Proposals of the Army, and particularly about their desires for a Select Senate: I professe your words have left such an Impression in me, that I am ready to cry out with Tully, Pudendum sit, honestiora esse legionum decreta, quam S [...]natus; and wish the Parliament no other Resolves than what you had Proposed. The Select Senate, whose very Name hath amased some, and exasperated others, was by you not onely allayed, as to its harshnesse, but rendered plausible and to be desired by every honest heart. It was then, I saw, your Desires were not to oppresse others, but Secure your selves, [Page] not to overthrow a Common-Wealth, but to preserve it, not to advance an I take Oligarchy here, as the ignorant Vulgar mistake it; for the corruption of Aristocracy; whereas Oligarchy is but the Government of a few, and not of the Body: And it is observed by Crag. upon the Spartan Republick, that Oligarchy is a word of an Innocent, yea, a good signification; and the Reiglement of Lacedaemon is called an Oligarchy by Isocrates, and others; though he who shall examine the institution of the Senate will say it was made up of the best, and so was an Aristocracy. Oligarchy, but to continue all in that Freedome whereunto the Lord hath called us, God having ceased to work any greater miracles than those whereby he dis-ingaged us from Slavery: you were not now to say to a Republick NELY, as Ioshua did to the Sun and Moon formerly: Sun stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou Moon in the valley of Ai [...]lon; and yet, me thoughts, I saw you distracted betwixt a tendernesse for others, and a regard for your selves, and if to deny the latter, had not been to betray the good old Cause, to frustrate all your Performances, to forsake the returns of your Prayers, to undervalue Mercies, when given, which you so prised at their imploring; In fine, to make the bloud of the Saints under the Altar to cry as loud against you as it did against their Oppressours: You were so carefull for Others, as to need a Monitour to advise you to love your selves as you do men of an unkind neighbour-hood. You represented unto me the posture of affaires, amongst us, the different factions and parties, and how some did think all the Liberty, purchased hitherto, was, that they might depresse others. You told me, how it was not impossible, but God might dispose the result of our present Counsels to a generous and happy issue, but that it was hard to see how an absolute Power could be bound, or find security that the next Assembly should not undoe all that this could establish. You acquainted me with the thoughts of many precious men, that there ought some things to be declared Fundamental, and Immutable hereafter. As,

That all Power is derived from the People, and that the Assemblies, that shall be, are but the Peoples Trustees.

That all delegated Power is for the preservation, not destruction of the People.

That to admit any single Person, who si meerly bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, as endowed with the Supreme Legislative power, is absolutely destructive to the Liberties of the Nation; and, to place the Executive in One, so dangerous, (as Reason and late Experiences teach us) that it [Page]might scarce deserve a milder censure.

That, since the men from whom this power is to be deduced are men of different gifts & dispensations, their Trustees are not to intermeddle with matters of Religion; It being to be supposed, that the Delegators will not give them any such Power, upon the account mentioned, as it may be proved (and hath been

See H. S in defense of the good old Cause

) that they neither could give, nor the others any way receive or execute such a Power.

These (and it may be some other) things you said were intended by you as Fundamentals for the new Government to be erected on, and which if they might be continued without alteration, you did not desire that any number of men should Oligarchically rule the great Assembly of the Peoples Representatives hereafter, and practise a Negative, which the Nation hitherto could not brook. You shewed me how, what was your care now, had been heretofore the thoughts of other Republicks; the Cretans had their ten Cosmi, the Spartanes five Ephori, the Romans first five, and after ten Tribunes annually for the People: You acquainted me with the unapplicablenesse of those meanes to our times, not onely for the exceptions made against the two former by Aristotle, Polit. l. 2. c. 7. and others; but because that our Democracy must not be really such, but such by Representatives, and to reside in a City (of which if we may judge by the great trouble you were lately put to in Sir George Boothes Insurrection, to keep it in peace) not so well affected to the aforesaid Fundamentals, but that they will become an Army to assist, or force the Representatives (not too well affected, if chosen as intended by some) to subvert the proposed Basis when there shall be no more to shew in its behalf then a Scrole signed by Mr. St. Nicholas. If the constitution of the Tribunes were at any time effectuall for the Peoples safety and protection, it was because they made their Intercessions against the Senate and Consuls, in a place where they could raise armes in their defence with as much ease as they could interpose their Authority, and send the Consul, or Censour to Prisons, and oppose the [Page] Dictator, had they not been thus seconded by the People (as a standing Army) their place would have been uselesse, or prejudicial to the Republick, as serving onely to create divisions, not redresse or prevent grievances. Of this we have an instance in the case of the Gracchi, who being Tribunes were slain notwithstanding that the Office did render their persons sacred, Manut. de Legib. Sig [...]nsus de jure civ. Rom. l. 1. c. 6. and any man might kill him that should oppose them, without being punished. They were to sit at the door of the Senate constantly (after-times did place them in the Senate) and all the Decrees of the Senate were transmitted to them for their approbation; if they allowed them, then were they valid, being signed with the Letter T. but if they disliked them then did they write thereon VETO, Bodin. de repub. l. 2. I forbid, and they were cassated: The Tribunes could assemble the people at any time, they could call them away from any other assemblies whatever: yet could not all this secure the peoples freedome. And if so, how can they be secure without these provisions for their Fundamental constitutions? In the beginning of the warrs betwixt Caesar and Pompey, Caes. de bel. civ. l. 1. it was one part of the pretenses of the former to uphold the Tribunes.

Lucan l. 1.

Expulit ancipiti discordes urbe Tribunos,

Victo jure minax jactatis Curia Gracchis.

Sparta at first, by the constitution of Lycurgus, was a Common-wealth equally constituted of a Sanate proposing, an a popular Assembly resolving, in which posture it continued about 100, or 130 years, their Kings being only the fore-men of the Senate. Then Polydorus and Theopompus finding that the people in their Assembly did not well resolve upon wholesome proposals made by the Senate, these men did upon a pretended advice from the Oracle, erect an Aristocracy, Bodin. de Repub. l. 2. c. 1. or government of 30 Senators, in the election of whom all that I find the people did, was, that as the Candidates passed by, some were to stand, observe what applaudes they received,Bodin. Meth. Histor. c. 6. and accordingly the deceased Senators places were filled up: and beyond this the [Page] people had no further power in the government. So that the Lacedaemonians or Spartans were for an Optimacy, or ruling by a Senate for life, consisting of 30 persons; and this government did they endeavour to introduce in all places of Greece, and upon this account did they mannage the Peloponnesiack war 20 years, the Athenians endeavouring to plant Democracies, Bodin. de Repub. l. 2. c. 1. the Lacedaemonians on the contrary Aristocracies in the Cities of Greece. And since Mr. Harrington dispunges all the time after this war from the happy constitution of the Common-wealth, against Mr. Wren. p. 41. he must give me leave to think the History of Lacedaemon is a plea of Optimacie. A plea grounded upon the experience [...] of an equal Common-wealth established by the prudent Lycurgus in a Senate proposing, and people resolving, and practised for more than one generation, (that custome might inure them to it) upon such circumstances as are not to be hoped for amongst us, yet could not all this so settle the State, If any say with Polybius and others that the constitution of the Ephori made it to be alwayes a Democracy, since it is the general opinion that they were answerable to the Roman Tribunes: I am so far from thinking so, that I imagine the Ephori to have had no share in the Legislative power at all being erected, for ought I have hitherto informed my self out o! Plato and Plutarch as a curb to their hereditary Kings, and not to the Senate in which was the Legislative power, and not in the Kings, who had only the executive, and that there should be no error or encroachments committed therein, I suppose them to have been instituted. I find not that they sate in the Senate, or were to practise any negative, or that their consents was demanded to Laws; they every moneth made the Kings take oath that he would rule according to the Laws in being; and in time of war two of them did accompany him to the said end. Another end of their institution may have been to attend upon judicature in emergent controversies betwix [...] private persons, for the decision whereof Lycurgus did not provide, but ra [...]her that there should none arise ( [...], Plutarch [...] in Lycurg.) and one way to de [...]erre them from strife (of the ma [...]y which he took) was that there was no judge to determine them, nor no penalties for transgressors of that kind; where none could be damaged but who was criminal to the Common-wealth. Now as the Ephori did judge in these cases, and had their Court [ [...]] to this purpose, so I guess they may have been appointed by Theopompus to this end, and either of these grounds is reconcilable to the answer of Theopompus to his wi [...]e, when she reproved him for diminishing his power; his reply being, that his security was the greater. How they afterwards did aggrandise themselves, as the way is easily deducible from the original which I ascribe them; so it makes for another Po [...]ition of mine, if they flourished under so usurping an Ephorate, viz. That where the Spirit of the people is qualified for liberty (and the Spartan being once demanded what he knew, answered; to be free) there a Common-wealth under bad orders, may subsist and that long; (for as the exhorbitateing Tribunes did render Rome an Anarchy, so did the Ephorate Sparta) But where the people are not so qualified, there a Common-wealth cannot be in its extent setled; or if it be, will not continue. For the proof of which I refer my self, to those two great Politicians in their discourses, M [...]lv [...]zzi and Baru [...]a, where they enquire why Rome could not establish her liberty, after the death of Caesar. but tha [...] they preferred an Aristocracy before that condition, and did recommend it to others. Whilest the popular cons [...]itution of Athens presents us with very little that might endear it unto us: The multiplicity of Orators, and Philosopher [...] however they uphold their credit abroad, did not adv [...]ntage them at home; less talk and more prudence would have proved them more real benefits, then those that their acquests were not great, or of that durance, and their domestick postura hath been more celebrated now then by them that lived and acted in it, and who are famed in their writings.

[Page]But to observe one thing before I pass hence: Lacedaemon and the Country of Laconia inhabited by the Helotes made one Common-wealth, a part only managing the Government as to Magistratical and Military commands and performances,It is very probable that the Helotes were numerous in Laconia, at home since in the wars each Spartan had nine of them to attend him, as Herodotus saith, l. 9. Polit. l. 2. c. 9. Maximus Tyrius, Or. 3. doth reckon for governments purely Aristocratical or Oligarchical that of Thessaly, Pellene, and Mantino [...], together with Lacedaemon and Crete. See the preface to H. S. in defence of the good Old Cause. the other being excluded all acts of government, and having subjection entailed on them as boores or peysants, yet this Common-wealth, so unequal, subsisted above 700 years; notwithstanding all that is in our dayes pleaded to evince the impossibility of such a frame, and if there did arise wars amongst them from the Helotes, yet was not that thorough defect in the constitution, but that being Seated in the main Land, their neighbours did excite and assist the Helotes: whereas in Crete (which is an Island, as ours) though there was the same constitution of government which was in Sparta (this being made a pattern for the other by Lycurgus) their Periaeci did not create them the like disturbances as Aristotle observes. So in Israel there were the Gibeonites, and other Canaanites remaining in the Land, from natives changed by the new polity into Strangers, excluded from all Israelitish government, though they had Magistrates of their own, (from whence I may infer an inequality of fortunes) besides these there were the descendants of those which came out of Egypt with them, who were deprived of their liberty; in so much that in Salomons time there were numbred of [Page] the men able to work, an hundred and fifty thousand, and three thousand, and six hundred, 2 Chron. 2.17. besides there were the Proselytes of jus [...]ice or Converts such as embraced the Iewish religion entirely; these, in the flourishing dayes of Salomon and David as Mr. Selden reports out of the Rabbies,

Jur. natural. Heb.

If they had been admitted to entire Proselyteship, they might by their number have overthrown the State, having Votes in the Assembly of the Lord.

were so numerous that they were not received to become entire proselytes (being as it was to be imagined, converted rather by a sight of the flourishing condition Israel was than in, than apprehensions of conscience) and so enjoy the priviledg of entering into the popular Assemby, termed the Congregation of the Lord: It is not to be doubted, but there were many Bastards considering the politick disposition of the Iews) who were not to enter into the Congregation of the Lord even to the tenth Generation, Deut. 23.1, 2. And at all times the Proselytes of justice were excluded though not from suffrage in the Congregation of the Lord, yet from bearing any Office of Power or publick Trust, though several places of Prosit they were capable of. Notwithstanding this inequality, I do not see or read, that the ruine of that State was thereby hastened. ‘From whence I do conclude, That the Divisions, Disturbances, and Dangers, which they who oppose an unequal Common-wealth do threaten us with, are but imaginary, (upon other accounts, as well as, that we are Islanders) and not of that moment, as to induce us to quit real and present Assecuration: And if they do ever actually befal us, it must be through our own Defaults; which is no prejudice to the form of Government fixed upon, but to them who shall ill manage good Contrivances.’

[Page]After we had discoursed about these Forraign Contrivances of the People to secure their Liberty, not against conquered Enemies, but prese [...]t Friends, whose ambition (not malice, animated with a conceit of Religion) was dreaded by them; we came to examine modern projects of our own and neighbour Nations, laid for the attaining the same end: whose circumstances might be as suitable to ours at present, as the republicks of Greece possibly may be disproportioned through the different temperament of the people; which is a note of so much value, that Aristotle upon that sole inducement would have given us other advise then our Politicians;Polit. l 7. c. 7. Campanella pol. c. 4. S. 19. since he makes the Europaeans, Asiaticks, and Greeks upon that ground to be incapable of a resembling Government; and for us, he is positive in it, that we are not capable of a right Common-welth. [...]. So that we ought not to be discouraged if such a model be proposed, as hath some inconveniences in it, as examined by the rules of the Grecian Politicks; it being no less evident that all the inconveniencies which ensued upon such constitutions in Greece are not to be feared amongst us; which I could evince to the most refractory person, if I had leisure.

Here I instanced, that it was not altogether unusual upon a Civil War, for the Party prevailing against their oppressing Rulers, to assign them a certain number of persons (with power to arm upon occasion) for the Securing unto them those Liberties and Priviledges, which they had fought for; however Sylla, Mar [...]us, Augustus Caesar, took more severe wayes: In France we find that Lewis 11. upon the prevalence of the league for the publick good, had 36. appointed him out of the three Estates by a general Assembly of them, to be Curators of the publick, and to see justice administred duly: as Hottoman informs us out of Monstrelletus, Lamar [...]ius and other Historians. Franco Gal. p. 211, 212, 213. In England, upon the Barons Wars with K. Iohn, the like was practised: They having caused him to sign the Magna Charta, and Charta Forrestae, to secure themselves in the aforesaid Liberties, they gave him a check in the Government,Speed Hist. of K. Iohn S. 56. viz. Twenty five selected Peers, to whose commands all the other [Page]Barons were bound by oath to be obsequious. Had they not taken this course, all their Grants, though subscribed by never so many hands, and authenticated by never so many Seals, would upon any emergency have been as unserviceable as Muncer's Cloak, which he perswaded the German Boores (whom he had seduced into a rising) if spread abroad, Sle [...]dan [...] comment: lib. 5. would in the day of Battail secure them from all the small and great shot of their enemies. If it be objected that neither the French nor English project did procure the effects designed.What it was that ruined them, it is rather unsafe, then difficult to explain. It is easily answered that the Contrivance was not therefore bad, because frustrated by their subtil enemies; and we ought rather to seek how to prevent their mistakes, and the errors they committed, then fall into greater by acquiescing in single votes, and Resolves, or such like paper ware.

After a reflection upon the condition of our affairs, I concluded that a Parchment Law, though never so fairly engrossed, could not satisfie them that were engaged in the Cause of Liberty. ‘When the Ligue called the Commonweale was on foot against Lewis 11. the Duke of Millain sent to his aid five hundred men at Arms,W. H's. Observations upon History. with three thousand Foot, and with this power he presents his advice, That he should yield to any conditions to divide his Enemies, and be careful still to preserve his men. This Counsel was of more advantage to Lewis than all the Armies he could have Levyed in his Dutchy: for by this he kept his Majesty entire, and referred nothing to the uncertainty of Fortune. But the former part of his advice was a stronger battery against the Enemies design, than all the Artillery that Age could make. For to divide their Forces,☜ was to destroy them, and to bring them into jealousie of each other, was to make each the others executioner. By which he was secure, at the Enemies cost and danger, to work his own triumph. Then for yielding to conditions, it was safer for Lewis to descend one step beneath Soveraign Command, then to be enforced to fall down all the stairs: and having both wit and [Page] courage he could not doubt but occasion would present him with meanes to recover, if not transcend his former height.’ Hereupon at the first overture he entertaines a treaty, which suddainly took effect; No demand of the Princes receiving the least deniall: Whereat they dissolved their Forces and Ligue, retiring to take possession of what none did enjoy long. Methinks we may learn from these, and a thousand more such like passages in History, how unsafe it is to rest in a bare Declaration, and thereupon to close and unite into an equall Common-wealth, with our inveterate enemies. It was not an hasty attempt of Sir G. Booth to make an Insurrection, no it was an universall engagement, if not by active correspondencies, at least in mind. The Forces which went upon the Northern expedition with the Lord Lambert, bear witnesse to the generall disaffection, and neutrality of all that were not (as they commonly call them) Sectaries. And I do verily believe, that the quarrel was Toleration, or no Toleration, rather then Monarchy and the Stuartian interest.

Having here mentioned Sir G. Booth, and his Insurrection, I shal desire you to inform me, What was the intent of his rebellion? It is to be presumed, that his aimes were further then to leave things in the posture they were in before his arming. His Declaration was against Anabaptists, Quakers, and (by which having expressed the two former he can mean the Independents onely) Sectaries; and to subvert them without fighting, since that was his Promise to those of Cheshire, it must have been effected by a suddain Massacre of the Army at least. If that was not his intent, (as it is discretion in his Partizans not to own it now) yet that it would have been as outragious an issue, is not to be doubted, since it would not have been prudentiall, or indeed possible for him and his confederates (especially in London) to have restrained the affectionate ardours of an incensed rabble. But suppose we, Sir G. Booth to be Victor, how many would have been found, the House as filled up, and free to vote against you, being disarmed, would have pleaded for your Toleration, since there are so few will do it [Page] now that you (and they in part) are in a different condition? To secure themselves they must have outed you out of all commands, and places of Trust, yea, and purged you from serving under them; and having performed thus much, as they could have no security that you would not have resented this procedure, so they could not but endeavour to prevent the dangers imminent from such provocation. As for the dis-banded Souldiery, it would have been but an easie instruction for the Iustices to oppresse, and the Iudges to hang them, the sense of their former actings making that Iustice, which otherwise would be Barbarousnesse, and the general voyce wil cry out, that all is a Iudgement upon such persons, though never so repugnant to Iustice. It is recorded by a great Courtier and States-man, ‘That, if it was not given in charge to them, it was the practise of the Iudges after the Irish warrs to hang Souldiers for faults, which others did scape or obtained pardon for.’ And for others who may by the thoughts of a competent estate repute themselves more secure, I must tell them that it is but a vain imagination, if they understand who are likely to rule, and have the Militia, by the Carisbrook-Castle-Treaty: I would rather bid them read their doome in the Spanish procedure against the Iewes, when K. Sisebutus did not onely banish them all from Spain, but by threats and torments enforced some to the profession of Christianity: (though even Mariana the Iesuite say, that It was never esteemed consonant to Christian behaviour to compell any to the profession of true piety. Marian. de reb. Hispan. l. 6. c. 3.) and after that under K. Egica, such as had concealed themselves were made slaves for ever, and their goods confiscated. So Ferdinandus and Issabella, having conquered Granada, (and so become safe from neighbouring dangers) did banish all the Iewes, giving them four moneths time to sell their goods in, after which time it should not be lawfull for any to buy or sell, entertaine, or assist them any way. If the Heretick, or he who falls under the censure of the Church continue impenitent, after admonition by the Minister reiterated three times, on three Sundays, then he is to be declared Excommunicated from God, and from the society of the Church. After which Sentence no person may have any kind of Conversation with him, (his Wife and Family excepted) in eating, drinking, buying, selling, saluting, or conforming with him, unlesse the same be licensed by the Ministery: That he finding himself abhorred by the faithfull and godly, may take occasion to repent, and so be saved. And intimation of this sentence is to be given through the Realm, least any should pretend ignorance of the same. I have set down their own words (and what is the practise of Scotland as Col.— told me) out of Spotswoods History of Scotland, p. 166. that so all that are or may be guilty of Presbyteri [...]ll Censures, for any opinions they have, may, or do hold, and for what they have already done or may do, and find themselves not likely to retreat, may know what to expect from their prevailing. You have been in Scotland and seen how great an Affinity their proceedings have with this demeanour of the Papists: You know the dismall effects of their great Excommunication, [Page] which if it leave a man Life, yet it is not as an effect of their tendernesse, but cruelty, since he is not onely incapacitated as to all preferments, but deprived of all that might render his life a comfort, to be tormented by so much Charity as will not let him dye: Besides all the contumelies and indignities that will be put upon them by the multitude, you need not to question but that these Hereticks and Sectaries, (who are now so maligned, regretted and occasionally disgraced) will be represented in their Memories to Posterity, as so vile, that it will be lesse ignominious to be recorded in the Annals of Tiburne.

What affyance can you put in those whom your Victory and Successe, not proper inclinations gain you? Whosoever he be whose judgement disallowes a Tolleration, his compliance is but temporising; and though Conveniency or necessity bend him down to such conditions as he otherwise regrets, yet do they seldome oblige the Conscience longer than Fortune restrains the Power. To assent unto a mixture of the Army with men of an un-army spirit, though there be a Select Senate of the best affected men on earth, is a presage of ruine, unlesse your Select Senate be made up of Davids Worthies, each whereof could attaque whole Armies, 2 Sam. 22. with assurance of Victory. They who to alienate our care for Self-preservation, tell us, that the men we resent are honest godly men; create us no security and do in effect tell us, that we are villanous caytiffes, and that to endeavour our extirpation is consistant with godlinesse and honesty. To let you a little more see how little trust is to be placed in the combinations with those men, [Page] behold the Character which K. Iames doth give of them, and after the testimony of one who was from his cradle educated amongst them, & experimented what he averrs (besides what you cannot but have fresh upon your own thoughts) joyn in an equal Common-Wealth with them if you dare.

Take heed (my Son) to such (Scottified) Puritanes, very Pests in the Church and Commonweal, whom no Deserts can oblige, neither Oathes nor Promises bind, breathing nothing but Sedition, and Calumnies, aspiring without measure, railing without reason, and making their own imaginations (without any warrant of the Word) the square of their Conscience. I protest before the great God, and since I am here as upon my Testament, it is no place for me to lye in, that you shall never find with any High-land or Border-Thieves, greater ingratitude, and more lyes, and evil perjuries, than in these phanatick Spirits.

King James, Basil. Dor. lib. 2.

If the Declarations of the whole world besides prevaile not with you, at least, but learn of your enemies what to do. If some body must be trusted, (and give me leave to tell you that to erect an equall Common-wealth, is to trust some body, since you are not likely in such a constitution to be the Majority) why do they not trust you? May not you, (I hope you do so) have as good opinion of your selves, as they of themselves? And setting aside the consideration of personal uprightnesse and sincerity, is it not equity and Prudence, that they rather be trusted whose sense and interest it is to preserve a Toleration, then they [Page] who for the subverting of it lie under the greatest motives that flesh and blood can be tempted with, I mean PROFIT, REVENGE, RELIGION, HONOVR? Were the case insisted on, a small thing, I should not thus debate it: but it is no less than your whole fortunes, and your judgments, and those of your posterity, freedome as to purse, as to mind, all is engaged in this question: and a power hangs over your heads (like a cloude out of the North) much more dreadful to tender consciencs (if all my reading and intelligence yield me any insight in things) then the Romish inquisition, & in comparison whereof the return of Charles Stuart with his Bishops, would prove a moderate desire.

But you perhaps will say that you are no Heretick your self, whatsoever others may be: you are an Orthodox Independent of the Savoyards confession; you agree with them in all fundamentals, it is but a small circumstance you differ about contained in a leaf or two, all the rest is not dissonant, but that there is a perfect Harmony betwixt the two Assemblies of Savoy, and Westminster, Sr. give me leave to undeceive you a little in this point, for that which you alledge as a ground of your security, will aggravate your fault, and that wherein you differ is sufficient for your extirpation, since it is the main cause why others are to be persecuted. Are you so shallow as to think it is conscience and not interest rules them? And do you not know that it is worse to withhold a Tythe-pigg, then to deny Christ to be come in the flesh. It is an old complaint, quis Iovinianis, quis Pelagianis diem dixit? The abettours of free-will; they who thought it unlawful to eat Rabbets because strangled, or who did not concur about the Doctrine of the Trinity (I mention things little and great) as the Greek and Latine Churches, could retain communion together, whilest the Aerians, the Waldenses, the Erastians of late were not to be endured? Search the Books of Martyrs, you will find more die for opposing the interest of the Clergy, under the Romanists; than for professing Christ under the Heathen Emperours. Iohn Huss [Page] suffered for writeing false Latine, and opposing the Popes and Clergies revenues, as you may see in the Council of Constance. But Sr. do you think the difference that amounts to 3 or 4 Pages in quarto to be so inconsiderable? I have heard a dappled Presbyterian highly commend Athanasius, that he would not grant the Arians one iota, (I use his own words) this being all the differance between them; and where are you now, Sr? Besides, if you examine the differences betwixt you,Sr. G. Booth makes you Sectaries. as D. Cawdrey and others state it, you are Schismaticks, you deny (at least in effect) their Churches to be Churches, and their Ministers to be Ministers of Christ, (and this is true) you make them Antichristian, and then shake hands of fellowship with them; either condemn your selves for this, or approve them. But I will tell you a greater exception against you than this, and for which you must into the stool of Repentance, and whither they will urge you to repent in the short, or the more tedious way, I know not; but I believe the latter, since you are not like to be a great person, when you come to this tryal; They say, if you be Orthodox in judgment, yet you have been false in your practice: you defeated the holy Synod in their consultations by your contests and contrivances, until that Tares had over-run the field of Christ, and Heresies too deeply rooted themselves in the land; that you pleaded for a Toleration first, and now that it is clear you would give none, it is too late: that you procured you a Sub-committee, to enform your consciences, and would not tell them nor the world perfectly what you thought, until you published an Apologetical narration, that you were not to be convinced, having studied as unpartially and unprejudicially as men made of flesh & blood are ever like to do, the (God knows what, for you explained it not) points in controversy; and for the Sub-committee, having dallyed with it so long as you thought it convenient, you gave it over sultenly. If you differed so little, say they, why did you raise so great stirrs? why did you speak so darkly, that we could-never come to an agreement in opinion, until we come to agree in one single person? [Page] And after you had agreed in your confession, and respects to a single person; when he who assured you of his heart, did begin to make the like, or greater professions in the behalf of your reconciled brethren, did not you (say they) pull him down because he would destroy your Hopes, not your Churches? I know not, nor do I hear of any who converse with the Presbyterians unvailed, but sayes, the person who drew up the Savoy confession, is the Pest of this nation, that he either shall receive, or merits an halter: and in the heat of the rising (which is infinitely more a Presbyterian-plot, then that of the Powder-treason ascribable to the Papists) did not — picture a Gallows on his Lodgings with this inscription—'s fortune? How do you intend to subsist together, and how is it imaginable you should, if it be tolerated that you impale in your assemblies the chief persons in their parishes? With what face can you think to invite a man from a way which you will not say is bad, unto one which you dare not say is better? But let us imagine that you are allowed to say your way of Assembling is Christs way, and that yours is the instituted, and incorrupt way, (from whence the inference is clear [...] that what is not instituted is to be forsaken, what is not of Christ, ought not to be owned as his; what is corrupted (and you must say if you condemn not your selves, that in what you differ, the corruption is on their side) must be redressed.) Supposing this I say, how will you perswade the same men that they ought to pay Tythes to their Parish-Minister, whose pastorage they are not under, and at the same time to pay for the maintenance of their elect Teacher, how shall an Independent Father call to account his Presbyterial Family? though you agree never so in Doctrinals, yet it will be a very great censure, that each is not under the discipline of Christ. Is any refractory? you teach them to reject Synods and their Anathema's, as insignificant, humane, ungospel combinations; how will you then complot that the Nation may be in peace, and unity? believe them not; who profer you a Society that is not durable; flie from their embraces if you love your selves, [Page] (and they say you do) as from the hugges of Mil [...]ch wherewith that Idol received the children that were to perish betwixt his armes. As for the Estates you have got, are not they the divisions of Deane and Chapter-lands? And is it not a decree in the Scotch Discipline, that all Tythes, Rents, Lands, Oblations, yea whatsoever hath been given in former times, or should be given in future times to the service of God, was the patrimony of the Church; and ought to be collected and distributed by the Deacons as the word of God appoints. That to convert any of this to their particular, or profane use of any person, is detestable Sacriledge before God. And else-where, Gentle-men, Barons, Earls, Lords, and others, must be content to live on their j [...]st rents, and suffer the Kyrke to be restored to her liberty. What this liberty is follows in the same place, All things given in hospitality, all rents pertaining to Priests and Chanteries, Colledges, Chappelries, Fryeries of all orders, the sisters of the Seynes, all which ought to be retained still in the use of the Kyrk. Give them but leave to take their breath, and expect the rest: The whole revenues of the temporalties of the Bishops, Deans, and Arch-deans lands, and all rents pertaining to Cathedral Kyrks. Then supposing an objection that the possessours had leases and estates, they answer, that those who made them were thieves and murtherers, and had no power to alienate the common good of the Kyrk. That this is their judgment, it is proved by the Author of the Warning, to beware of Scotch Discipline, who transcribes what I have set down out of their very Book of Discipline. And with his assertions does agree what Spots-wood in his History of Scotland, out of Authentick acts, doth relate. Pag. 164. It is true, that in the same declaration they wish recompense to be made to such as have debursed sums of money to those unjust possessours: but they do declare, that it is to be but a reasonable recompense, into which the profits of the years past are to be reckoned. And there is another proviso, that the same have not been bought of late, in prejudice of the Church, and no conllusion used. This you may see in Spots-wood, [Page] P. 164. So that if they prevail, however they may stroak you, they will not want pretenses to undoe you upon the principles aforesaid, when explained and improved by a preval [...]nt authority, which is to be wholly at the devotion of their Synods. Nor ought they now to cajol you into a complyance, since to my knowledg under Richard, it was all their talk, to make you degorge, and that you should repute it a favour in extraordinary, if you were repayd what you disbursed, without being questioned for past profits and dilapidations. No, it is not in the power of a few men of complying principles or pretenses to assure you of an after-reckoning, where the Emolument is so great, the means so facile and plausible, and if the injury be any, it is but offered to the Egyptians. Let the present partisans (of whose minds you are uncertain, because prosperity and power infuses new thoughts) speak you never so fair in a Convention of Presbyters, it is in vain to mention prudence, especially where it is ballaned with the cause of God, and interest of the Kingdome of Iesus: not the most meek and moderate, but the most fierce sway there, and the most zealous & hot is the better Christian: So that it is not to be doubted, but an assembly in England as well as Edinburgh (in 1647) may constitute, that the next Parliament, the Church should be fully restored to its patrimony, & that nothing should be past in Parliament till that be done. Behold, I give you a fair warning: These inconveniences will befal you, when you will have nothing left you in your power but an unprofitable repentance, when the sense of your being deceived will be an additional to those miseries, which are otherwise unimaginable. A thousand things also more will be objected unto you Savoyards, whose principles all Sects go upon, and differ from you in Superstructure, not foundation: I shall not urge you any more in a case so ticklish, and wherein I doubt not but you understand your adversaries: if they have not written hitherto against your confession, it is because your Deaths or exile will be more beneficial to them, and they will not spoil this opportunity, by a previous Alarm. I had intended to present you with a Sermon (such as assuredly will [Page] be made against the Army, when scattered) at the first Presbyterian Cruzada that shall be, but I find my self to enlarge too much: I shall therefore omit it this time, and resume our discourse about the Select Senate.

After we had debated the fore-going examples of a power established for the securing a people in their Liberties, I mentioned one more concerning the Iustitia of Aragon, out of the constitution of which Kingdome (it being made up of men not much different in temper from the English, rough-hewen, and sturdy Mountaneers) much might be drawn for modelling of us into a Settlement: I shall now give you a more full account thereof.

About the year of our Lord, DCCCXLII. when Sanctius Carsias IV. King of Suprarbia was slain by Muza Abenheazin and the Moors, the Suprarbians and Aragoneses (who were ligued with them under an Earl) which escaped out of the Battaile, This following whilest as discourse is most extracted out of Hieronymo de Blancas native of Saragossa, Cronologer of Aragon, who wrote whilest as ye [...] the Iustitiate was in being, and made it principal businsinesse, to discover the nature of that Office out of the most ancient and authentick Records, and dedicated his Commentaries to the eight Deputies of Aragon, Protectors of the Iustitia. fled into the Mountaines together with their Wives and Children, and did there imbody and fortify themselves, living upon the spoiles which they got from the Moores who then possessed Spaine. Being destitute of a King, they at first chose twelve Men, (Sennores) to rule them, such as were of the greatest prudence, as well as gravity and age. And thus they continued a long time, enlarging their bounds by little and little. But finding that the aforesaid Reiglement was not very suitable to the posture of their affaires, which required a quicker dispatch of Counsels, then was to be found in the joynt-Government, of so many men, they being to make excursions upon, and to expect Inroades continually from the Moores. Hereupon they resolve to erect such a Government, as might redresse the present Inconveniences, and yet not destroy their own Liberty. They dispatched Embassadors to Pope Adrian II. and to the Lombards, (whose Empire was indeed overthrown then, but many eminent persons of that People were in being, and the memory of their well-founded Governments as to Lawes and Civil Liberties was renowned every where) who advised them, That they should first of all agree upon some FVNDAMENTAL LAWES, ☜ Righs and Liberties to [Page]be inviolably observed; and then choose them a King (no Forreigner, but such as for whose good inclinations they might have the security, his birth and allyances, and education, amongst them could yield) of such extraction as not to disgrace the dignity, nor yet of that power and meanes as to be able to subvert their Foundation-Lawes. Whereupon the Suprarbians and Aragoneses did agree upon the Fueros or Forum Suprarbiense, being certain Lawes to be preserved immutably, however the King with the Cort-General, or General Convention of Estates might make a further provision of Lawes, as they should see occasion, without retrenching upon what was the Foundation and Basis of the Government instituted. I shall not trouble you with all the particulars that were for ever, to be incapable of Alteration;

Of the nature of fundamentals in reference to their mutability by the people, I shall speak more in the close of the letter.

Apud nos prius leges canditas, quam reges creatos fuisse. [...]0 Blanca.

they being for ought I can judge, not very materiall to our affaires or my purpose; Though it be well worth your Observation (in opposition to some that are excellently versed in Politicks, and use high Rodomontado's to decry even the possibility, much lesse the plausibility of such Acts) That by the advise of as wise men as ever the world produced, upon many yeares mature deliberation, the Aragoneses did in the erection of their new Government, previously agree upon some things that were to be immutably preserved by their Trustees. And it is registered for an everlasting Memoriall in the Proeme to their Fueros, or Lawes; That their Lawes were first made, and afterwards their Kings. However I shall repeat some of them.

IVRA DICERE REGI NEFAS ESTO, NISI ADHIBITO SVBDITORVM CONSILIO.

It shall not be lawfull for the King (who was to do nothing of moment but by the advise of his Council) to enact any Law, but by the advice of his Subjects in Cort general.

BELLVM AGGREDI, PACEM INIRE, INDVCIAS AGERE, REMVE ALIAM MAGNI MOMENTI PERTRACT ARE CAVETO REX, PRAETERQVAM SENIORVM ANNVENTE CONSENSV.

[Page]Let the King take heed how he make War, conclude a Peace, or Cessation and Truce, or intermeddle with any businesse of great moment, otherwise than by the Advice and consent of his Sennores, that are to be of his Councill.

For the securing of them in these (and other) Fundamental Constitutions, it was agreed upon, that there should be a Magistrate ordained, who should make it his duty and businesse to see that their Lawes and Liberties were no way infringed, unto whom there should lye an Appeale, or any other Officer, if any private man were wronged, and who should defend the Republick, if the King did oppresse, or go about to oppresse that.

NE QVID AVTEM DAMNI DETRIMENTIVE LEGES AVT LIBERTATES NOSTRAE PATIANTVR, IVDEX QVIDAM MEDIVS ADESTO AD QVEM A REGE PROVOCARE, SI ALIQVEM LESERIT, INIVRIAS Q. ARCERE, SI QVAS FORSAN REIPVB. INTVLERIT, IVS FAS Q. ESTO.

And least we should suffer any detriment or diminution in our Lawes, and Liberties, let there be an intermediate Judge appointed, unto whom there may lie an appeale from the King, if he wrong any man, and by whom the State may be righted, if it be any way injured.

After they had long debated these Fundamentals, and agreed on them, they took a long time to elect a King, and at last Anno Dom. DCCCLXVIII. They fixed upon Innicus Arista King of Navarre to be their King, who being to swear to the observation of all these Fundamental Lawes, before that they would make Oath of Fealty to him; Innicus was at first surprized at the Office of IVSTITIA, as thinking it a very hard condition for a King, to have another to Iudge of his Actions, and watch him, being

Non Roy de nom, mais le Maistre des Roys.

But after a serious debate with the Suprarbians and Aragoneses (whom I shall henceforward call by the name of Aragoneses [Page] in generall) having heard their reasons, how Monarchy was of that nature as even to debauch the best men; and though the King should not infringe their priviledges, yet could they find no satisfaction therein, since he might if he would; another procedure than what they had taken would reduce all to a dependance upon the goodnesse of the King, and not their prudent contrivance; That if they should hereafter fall into slavery, having been perfectly free, the regret would be insupportable, being at once to lament their misery and folly, which had precipitated them into it, and mourn, that being likely for ever to desire Freedom, they did not provide for the perpetuation thereof. That for a King to be bound to what was good and just, was not to be in Fetters, or wear Manacles; That he might be as sure of not being affronted by the Justitia, as he was of his good deportment.

That such a Magistrate could not create any Disturbances, but to which he must give cause, and if the Nation did happen to fall into any Division and Warre; though it be true that all Commotions are grievous, yet some are necessary, and honest, and to be preferred (as Physick to distempered bodies) before a peaceable yielding to Oppressours.

His hominibus diligenter perpensis omnes ad unum Scriptores testantur, non p [...]tuisse eundem Innicum Aristam Regem vehementer non probare praecliram illam, quiete vivendi, apertamque, simplicem, ac directam viam a nostris omnibus constitutam, adhibitamque ab ipsis omnium, incommodo, rum cautionem. 80 Blanca. In fine, Innius Arista having weighed these Discourses, it is the universall assertion of all Writers, that he did highly approve of the Constitution, as Innocent and Prudentiall, and of his own accord did add to their primitive Fueros, this Law or Priviledge.

SI CONTRA FOROS AVT LIBERTATES REGNVM A SE PREMI IN FVTVRVM CONTINGERET, AD ALIVM, SIVE FIDELEM, SIVE INFIDELEM, REGEM ADSCISCENDVM LIBER IPSI REGNO ADITVS PATERET.

[Page]If he should any way oppresse the Kingdome hereafter, contrary to the Laws and Liberties thereof, then it should be free unto the People to choose or call in another King either Christian, or Infidell.

The Aragoneses refused the Liberty of recurring to an Infidell for Aide or Protection, but engrossed the rest as a Fundamentall Law, and so it was accounted in the time of Philip II. King of Spaine, 1592. when they took up Armes against that King under Joannes Nuca, the Justitia, in defence of their Priviledges.

The Justitia of Aragon (I shall constantly terme him so, though he be, not so named in the Fueros, and was called sometimes Justitia Major, and Justitia Regis, or Justitia per manum Regis, and the Justitia of Saragossa, but the most u [...]iversal Title given him for several hundreds of yeares in the Aragonian Histories and Records, is Justiciado de Aragon). He was to be elected by the King [and his Council which was made up of twelve Sennores or Ricos Hombres at first; and afterwards of eight Deputies of the Cort general] but being once Elected he held it for Life, unlesse the Cort general (before whom he might be accused, which practise was afterwards commuted into a Committee of Seaventeen, styled Forus inquisitionis Officii Justitiae Aragonum, or, Inquisitors into the deportment of the Justitia of Aragon) did think fit to depose, or punish him; which latter was performed according to the injury he had done any body either in life, limbe, or estate, he being to suffer the same, but his Sentence was never to be reversed.

The Justitia was to reside about the Kings person, whose Court being commonly at Saragossa (after it was taken from the Moores) the Justitia was there too.

He was to be present at the Kings Council when he pleased, and I find his name often at the Regal Charters, Deeds and Conveyances.

He was not to be one of the principal Nobility, such as they called Ricos hombres de natura, and Ricos hombres de mesnada, because they could not be punished with death, or any corporal punishment, unto which the Justitia was lyable, [Page]if ye were found to merit it: though in all the Aragonian History, I do not read of any complaint made against him by the people, or that any of them was ever punished in any manner for injustice by the Cort General, or Inquisitors.

The Justitia was not to be an inferiour person, nor a practitioner at Law (though many of them were excellent Lawyers, as Salanova, Cerdanus, &c.) but he was to be Miles, a Cavallero, and his way of proceeding was not by way of tedious process, Lawyer like, with nice debates and critical disputes, but breviter, Summarie, et de plano, sine strepitu, et figura judicij, by a brief proposal of the case, and collation with the positive Letter of the Law. If he had been one of the Ricos Hombres, he might have made use of the justitiate to his own designs, having an army at command constantly of his own creatures; and if he had been sordidly educated, or accustomed to receive fees, protract cases, and countenance the most notorious corruptions, the Office would soon have become prejudicial to the publick. But I observe the Aragoneses were no such friends to Lawyers in practice,As the Iustitia was not to proceed in his decisions by juridical debates, and tedicus contests upon strained interpretations of the Fueros: but diligently to regard the tenour of the Law, and observances or usages of the Nation. And in all their Courts that people made it their rule, that the Laws should not be extended by the Magistrate, but that he as well as the people should be obliged by them: So that it is truly sa [...]d by Blanca, It is our laws that speak, and the judges are but dumb Executers of them. Unde vere dici potest, leges nobis esse loquentes; mutos autem earum Ministr [...]s Magistratus. And at the conquest of Valentia, when Laws were to be made by the Aragoneses under Iacobus 1. who subdued that Kingdome: though it was moved, that the new Lawes might be penned in Latine, or Aragonese, it was resolved they should be written in the language of the countrey, which though conquered was to be ruled by them, the Aragonese and others their Auxiliaries, being principal Lords, the re [...]son of which is given by Bernardinus Gomesius in Vit: reg. Jacob. l. 12. Rex plebiscita & municipales leges Valentinis dedit vulgari conscriptas sermone, ut populo melius innotescerent; ut (que) perspi [...]uitate, a vari [...] eas, confusa saepe, interpretatione juris, et captionibus essereret: whatever might be said for the elega [...]cy or antiquity of the Aragonian language, or for the Majesty of the chief conquerours, that [...]he Laws should not only be given by them, but in their language, yet he thought that it would be more for the convenience and unity of the Realme, that a few should learn the vulgar tongue, [which was not the Saracen but Aqui [...]an, whom he plan [...]ed there as the people] then that all should study the dialect of the nobess: that it would alleviate the sense of their subjection, and also be for their benefit, since the Laws hereupon were perspicu [...]us, and freed from variety and confusion in intempretations, and captiousness. ‘He made the utility of the people his design, and not the in [...]rest of a few, or his own glory: he thought those Laws to be elegant enough, which were plain and intelligible unto th [...]se who were to be ruled by them. He did not propose unto himself the advantage of a sort of men to be bred up as Assessours or advocates, wi [...]hout which the Country should be at a stand, and not know how to determine any thing. No, this was far from that Kings intention, who did therefore contrive Laws in the vulgar tongue, that he might exterminate out of the Land the veri [...]us, subtile, spiny and difficult interpretations, the unavoidable consequences of Laws being written in a forraign tongue, together with their interpreters themselves: and if there happened any doubt in Law, which might retard the Judges in their decision, it was not remitted to them, but to the judgment of a certain number of honest and plain men, who were to inquire into the true and naked state of the case, and pronounce accordingly. There being nothing more popular than that when doubtful cases arise amongst the people, they be determined by some of their own degree and rank: for they will think well of them, but as for professours of Law they will suspect and hate them, as being to live by the litigiousness of the people’ This is the account which Bernardinus Gomesius a native of Valentia gives of their Laws original: In favour of my Aragoneses, I shall observe cut of Bodin a famous Lawyer, that the good government of the Ethiopians, (civil rights are no where better preserved) subsists without Lawyers And Ferdinand K. of Spain prohibited any Lawyers to go into the Indies, least they should instruct the people in the way of contention. The same man condemns Matthias Corvinus, K. of Hungary, for inviting by large Salaries several professours and Practitioners of the Law out of Italy, to teach a people ignorant of those arts the intrigues of contention; the issue of which project of the King's was, that in a general convention of the States, he was desired to banish again all Lawyers. He saith that it is natural for the French to be lit [...]gious, and that he would destroy that countrey who should bring the Lawyers practise into di [...]use; but as for more northern nations, and particularly England, it is but an introduced custome, not founded on the natural inclination and genius of the people, whereunto it is altogether unsuitable, and is no other then a French fashion, Gallia ca [...]sidicos docuit facunda Britannos. And this is the judgment of Bodin, (de repub. L. 5. C. 1.) then whom I think the world never yet produced a more solid and judicious writer, one who had studled men as well as books, and had been particularly in England, and honoured with the familiarity of Q. Elizabeth, and others of the Nobility. as to prefer them to any place of trust and power, for they were not only excluded the Justitiate, but they could not be of the Inquisitors into the Justitia's actings, though the Inquisitors were to advise with them, and then to dismiss them before they came to definitive sentence. The Iustitia had several notorious Lawyers, and two Deputies, Lugartenimentes del justitia de Aragon, of the same profession, to assist him in Court, and preserve a forme of dispatch and management of things.

[Page] What Salary he had I cannot inform my self, it not being expressed, but only in general: but doubtless his Revenue and Maintenance was with convenient Port and State: though it was not so great as that he should over-ballance affairs. At such time as he did not act as Justitia, but Counsellour[Page]to the King, I find him seated by Petrus de Luna, (being Pope) below the Ricos hombres, though i [...] is to be granted they lived in a pomp not much inferiour to Kings; which made Alphonsus 3. say, quando havia en el Regno tantos Reges, como Ricos hombres. And in subsignations of Charters, &c. wherein he acted only as Counsellour or Witness, I find him ranked after the Ricos hombres, and Bishops, yea and Zalmetina or Chancellour of Saragossa.

As for his Power, if any Judge, yea or the King himself with his Council, or otherwise, were passing or executing a Sentence upon any Man, or Men, he might inhibite upon complaint, (i. e.) help, help, force, force. Jura nostra plenissime vetant ut quicquam fiat nisi ad illius, cujus principal [...]ter intersit, instantiam: nempe qula majores nostri voluerunt, sui quimque jurls & retinendi & dimitendi esse dominium, idque nervos esse atque artus libertatis. Blanca. Avi, Avi, fuerza, fuerza, (for without complaint he was not to intermeddle) the process or execution, until he was satisfied that all was legally done. He had a particular prison called la carcel de los manifestados, whither he did remove Prisoners if they implored his help, and to prevent all inconveniences and dangers eminent, he could issue out a Writ called Jurisfirma. He was Supreme interpreter of the Laws, and therein Paramount to the King. He did determine of the Kings Letters mandates, (yea and the Results of the Cort general, which were managed by him Segūt fuero, e Segūt antiquamēt fue a cossubrado.) whether they were repugnant to the Laws and Observances (so they call their usages, they having but few written Laws) or not; and whether they were to be obeyed, or not. He had power to issue out his Inhibitions unto the greatest persons, (yea Cities and Kingdomes not subject to Aragon, though under the same King, if the King failed; and take exemplary punishment of them) and the King himself was upon appeals subordinate to him, and to obey him, though his Writs did run (even to the King himself) in the King's name.

Before he came to any definitive Sentence, he was to summon all the Lawyers in Saragossa, or (if he were any where else) that could well be procured, excepting those that were de partida, retained by the persons concerned; and to take their advice, and according to the majority of their Votes, he was afterwards in his own Court to pronounce Sentence: [Page]and the Sentence so given was called, Determinatio consilii Justitiae Aragonum, and was of as much validity as if it were a written Law. Afterwards in Criminal Causes it was thought sufficient that he should have seven Lawyers to advise with, which were called Los Siete de la Rota.

To make his [...]udgment significant, and that it's Execution might not be ended, and his Authority thereby become contemptible and unserviceable to the preserving of the fundamental constitutions, and other Laws in being; he had from the beginning of that Kingdome unto Petrus 4. King of Aragon, sirnamed the Ceremonious, in 1348. a power to call together (without any pretense for refusal) all the Ricos hombres, and to arm City and Country immediately for the effecting thereof, without long temporising. This was called the priviledge of Union, it being thereby according to the Fundamental Constitution Lawful, and no way to be accounted Ignominious and Rebellion, for the whole Country, Los quatro Brac, os del Regno, to arm against the King in the behalf of the Justitia, or (as sometimes happened) in favour of the King against the Nobles or Ricos hombres.

But to preserve the constant repute of the Justitia; At the Cort general de Aragoneses, or general Assembly of the States, the King sate upon thrones to an heighth more than ordinary above the rest, then at his feet, yet higher than the rest, was placed the Justitia of Aragon in great Majesty, and though the King were there, yet was he President of the Cenvention, and ordered every thing according to his Fueros; he adjourned, or prolonged the Assembly, even the King being present, but in the Kings name. This Cort general was held at first every two years, and afterwards every three or four years, to enquire into the national constitution, the Exchequer, the deportment of the Justitia, and the like; as also to recognize the power of the Cort general and Justitiae according to the fundamental Fueros. It is very remarkable that was done in this Cort. Whensoever the new King was to be enstalled, or rather made (for though the primogenito or eldest Son, or next heir, did succeed, yet did not he come to it by way of inheritance, being not to exercise the power or [Page]own the title of King, untill his enstalment in the Cort general) a general Assembly of the States was summoned, and after that the Corte was opened by a speech of the primogenito (as general Governour by place after the decease of his Father: at other times the Kings did it) to the States, and an answer of theirs returned by the Bishop of Saragossa, then the Justitia, being desired thereto, made an enquiry i [...]to the Legality of the Corte, and what Members were absent, whom after three dayes expectation (summoning them formally each day) on the fourth he fixed a Mulct on them, and declared that their absence did not impair that Authority of the Cort general. Then the Justitia in his habiliments, and having written on his breast, Hattoman: Francogal: P. 123. Junius Brutus in vindic. contra Tyr. qu. 3. Answer to misled Dr. Fern. P. 18. IVS ARAGONICVM, or The Laws of Aragon, (after some consultation with the Corte) tendred him an oath, that he will inviolably preserve the Fueros or Laws & Observances of Aragon; having first accosted him with this address, NOS QVI VALEMOS TANTO COME VOS, Y PODEMOS MAS QVE VOS, VOS ELEGIMOS REY: CON EST AS Y EST AS CONDITIONES: INTRA VOS Y NOS, VN QVEMANDA MASQVE VOS. That is, We that are as great as you are, and are of more power than you, have chosen you our King, upon these and these conditions; betwixt you and us, there is one that is of more power than you; After that the King had made Oath to the Justitia, then the Justitia and rest of the Assembly sware fealty to the King. And this Ceremony was reiterated every Cort general, with as much solemnity as at the first inauguration; and the last day of the Session, when all things that were agreed upon to be passed, were ratified and sworn to by the King first, and then the Justitia, (all running in this form, El Sēnor Rey de voluntad de la Corte estatuesce y ordena) from this ceremony, that day is called, El dia de la celebracion del Solio, or the day of celebrating of the inauguration.

And indeed, before I pass any further, I cannot choose but reflect upon the admirable contrivance of this Government, [Page] that each Officer might know his duty, the King his power, and the Iustitia his, and the Peoples Soveraignty stated, so as they who were most willing to forget, could not; and the People were hereby so animated, as no perswasions should work upon them to think or assent to, that where the word of a King is, there is more power, then he saw biennially attributed to him. God in the Iewish polity seems to evince the utility of these recognisances, that the Magistrates may be put in mind of their original and duty, whilest he enjoyns,So the Ephori of Sparta did swear their King every moneth solemnly, that they should rule according to Law, and after their Kings had sworn, then did they in the name of the people reciprocally swear, that if so, they would preserve them safe. that the King when he sitteth upon the Throne of his Kingdome, that he shall write him a copy of the regal Law, or that according to which he was particularly to demean himself, in a book, out of that which is before the Priests and the Levites; and it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the dayes of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, to keep all the words of this Law, and these Statues to do them; that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren, and that he turn not aside from the commandment to the right hand, or to the left, Deut. 17.18, 19, 20.

I shall now give you some account of the deportment of this Justitia, that you may see it was no insignificant constitution, but that it did merit that commendation which is universally given it, to have been the preservation of their Laws, and Liberties. Petrus 2. laid on the people an unusual tax called Monedage: the Justitia being appealed to by some that refused to pay it, gave sentence concerning its illegality, and immediately cites the Ricos hombres, Cities, Universities, and Corpo [...]tions to prosecute his sentence by way of Union. Whereby the King was forced to ease the People, and to recognise particularly in Cort general the Law or Priviledge of Union.

Jacobus 1. sirnamed the Conquerour had, by reason of dangers imminent from the Moores,Monetaticum. procured the grant of a Tax from the Catalonians, termed Bovaticum, to be raised upon every head of Cattel; he desired the like concession from the Aragoneses in Cort general, the Nobility refused to pay, and all were upon so high terms that the Corte broke [Page]up tumultuarily, Gom [...]z. In Vit. Jacob. 1. lib. 16. and not by a legal dissolution: Since neither King nor People did recur to the Justitia, he could not interpose, nor did he. Things came to an open War, and after some skirmishes and conflicts, the Nobility did invoke the Justitia, (in the constitution of which Office this King by long Wars attended with conquest and plantations of additional forraign strengths, had introduced some corruption) who forthwith took cognisance of the business, issued out an Inhibition or Jurisfirma to the King, to stop the proceedings of his potent and victorious Army, and in a peaceable manner determined the whole controversie, and so disposed the King that a Cortgeneral was called, and all abuses or inconveniences in the Justitiate were redressed.

Alphonsus 3. the Munificent, having disgusted the Aragoneses by assuming the title of King, before his acknowledgment and oath made to the People in Cort general; they began to be jealous of their Liberties, and fear that additional conquests would be more dangerous to them in the end, than they were at present beneficial: upon this account in the first Cort general at Saragossa they began to debate upon some Laws whereby to prevent future perils: The King resented their actings, though they pleaded their Fueros, and disorderly withdrew from the Corte. This last departure of his being also contrary to the Fueros, they in Corte appealed to the Justitia, who takes cognisance of the thing as a violation of Priviledges and Laws, and puts in force the Union against the King. Alphonsus to allay this storm, being at Osca, by the advice of some Counsellours that were with him, makes and publishes several extraordinary good and plausible Laws, and such as would have quieted all mens minds, had they been passed in Corte, and not by the King and a few Counsellours. The dreadfulness of this President made them more vigorously prosecute the Union, that in a little time, they so humbled the King, as to assent to their desires and recognise the priviledge of the Union solemnly. After this all was quiet, and never was any King more revered and beloved than he after that passage.

Vnder Jacobus 2. the Cavalleros murmured at the King [Page]for depriving some of them of their Cavallerias, or Lands which they held in Knights-Fee, and disposing of them, and others, It was no Vnion, but a combination, unless made by the Iustitia. contrary to the Fueros of Suprarbia: and hereupon they combined together unanimously against the King to right themselves without ever troubling the Justitia. The King being in some strait, protests he had not wronged them, at least not wittingly, and appeals to the Justitia, according to the Fundamental Costitutions of the Land. Eximinus Petri Salanova being Justitia, issues out a Jurisfirma to inhibite the Cavalleros from all violent actings; The Cavalleros protested against his Authority; for being that they charged the King with breach of his Coronation-oath, they said the business was not to be decided by a Secular, but Ecclesiastical Iudge and Arbitrator. But the Justitia peremptorily decides the Controversie; declares their combination to be illegal, though to Unite were not, and consequently that the Oaths they had mutually taken, and the Hostages they had given to each other, the former to be null, and the latter to be restored again. And further resolves it, that the Cavallerias were in the Kings disposal, though their Lives & other fortues were not. So he determined this great Controversie, and dissolved as great and firmly made a League as one shall read of; desiring the King to deal favourably with them (being so numerous and potent a part of the Aragoneses) and neither punish them with a total confiscation, perpetual imprisonment, or exile.

Vnder Petrus 4. the Ceremonious, when his brother Jacobus was put by the General-governourship (which appertained to him by Law, as next Heir to the Crown) by that King, the Justitia put in practise the Union against him, after the usual manner, whereby they vindicated their Priviledges. But the King having Catalaunia and Valentia (being not subordinate in Government, though they several. times made up a Cort general with Aragon) to assist him, besides the Kingdomes of the Baleares, &c. and having bought off many Lawyers and others, Noble Men and Cavalleros by Gifts, Honores and Cavallerias collated, he did not value the Justitia and Union, especially since the Justitia, Garfias Ferdinandi Castrus, had been his Counsellour [Page]and Governour in his Father's time, and afterwards one of his Mesnadero's or domestique creatures, and alwayes expressed a particular inclination for him. So things came to open War, to the utter ruine of the Union. For the King was resolute and fierce, and set to destroy the Priviledges of the Ricos hombres, and their way of Uniting; and the Jutitia did faintly prosecute him out of natural weakness as well as personal regards; and at last being not able to reduce the King by fair means to equitable terms, and being loath to see either his friend, or his Country ruined (and possibly not able to endure the contumelies and affronts put on him by such as he ought to have protected) he died, and thereby endamaged them more than by his life. For the Election of the Justitia being in the King, he deferred to make one till he had subdued the Union, which now was become of no Authority (though they did choose Conservators of the Union) by reason there was no Justitia in being. This consideration made both sides hasten to a Battail, wherein after a bloody conflict, the Union was dissipated, and the King absolute Conquerour, who thereupon made one Galacianus Tarba to be Justitia, who had been instrumental in betraying the Union to which he first adhered; and he did publickly with his sword cut in pieces the Writings containing the Priviledge of Union, and destroyed all the memorials thereof which he could come by, and enacted, that it should never be revived again. As for the Justitiate, it was weakened (though not frustrated) by being turned into a Court of Judicature, and to be managed accordingly, eight men (of the great Personages) being enjoyned in each Cort general to help him in the executing of his Sentence. And it did prove a great protection to the Aragoneses as to criminal Causes, and things of lesser moment, but though the old Solemnities were upheld, yet did not that restrain their Kings from retrenching upon their Fueros, there being no standing Militia under the Ricos hombres to assist him. This happened in the year, 1348. After this it continued in manner aforesaid, (doing sometimes notable service) to the great satisfaction of the n [...]w effeminated and degenerating Aragoneses, [Page] until the reign of Philip 2. King of Spain, at what time the Justitia having interposed in the case of Antonius Perez a prisoner whom the King would have executed out of reason of State, Philip was hereat so angry that he sent an Army under Alphonsus Vargas to deprive them of their priviledges, who pretended he was to march against France, and not them, and so temporised with them until it was too late for them to arm, and advance the Standard of the Union: there was no standing trained Army, nothing but effeminacy and luxury in the great men, whom the Gold of the Church had debauched, their Counsels were tedious, being first to be resolved on by the eight (which were the Kings Officers too) and then to be referred to the Cort general, which was to be summoned by the King, or Vice-Roy; so that though the Nation did at last Arm, and the Clergy preach up Liberty, yet the tediousness of the dspatch, and their intestine weaknesses concurring, they were not able to bear up against a King so potent as Philip, who was Lord of all the Kingdomes about them, so that there was no hope of Forraign aid.

Thus fell the Iustitiate of Aragon, having continued [...]24. years, longer than most Common-weaths ever did, yielding more Peace, Security, and universal Satisfaction to the People, than any Government I have read of. Hieronymus Blanca (who lived when it was in being, only deprived of that quick prosecution which the Vnion afforded, 1588.) gives it this commendation, after a diligent enquiry into the Nature and History of it; That by the means of the Iustitiate, Jure affirmare possumus, in hoc uno, e [...] re [...]g [...]bus & regno civilis tuendae concordia summam ext [...]isse. the Majesty of their Kings, and the Liberties of the People, both had been preserved still, and that in a peaceable manner: for the prosecution of the Vnion was a thing of sudden dispatch, and never came to much Blood-shed, but under Petrus 4. This is the Government so long debated of, and set on foot by so many eminent men who devised it: celebrated by all that mention it; even Ferdinand (who married Issabella) when the Castilian Counsellours exhorted him to overthrow it as being inconsistent with the Majesty and Grandeur regal: [Page] He did not onely refuse to subvert it,

Thuanus Hist. lib. 104.

Ac vel ex eo maxime praestans, magniquesemper habita, quod in tanto sibi jure, ac praesidendi potestate collata nulli fuit unquam Tyrannldi, neque perturbationi rerum obnoxia Gomez. l. 16.

but (though he had experimented an absolute Monarchy, and its pleasures in Castile) did infinitely praise it. Bernardinas Gomezius of Valentia, writing the Life of Iacobus 1. amongst other Elogies, saith of it, that Notwithstanding the greatnesse of its Power, the Iustitiate was never obnoxious to raise a tyranny, or create disturbances. That it was so far from fomenting divisions, that it appeased or prevented them; so far from debasing the King, that it preserved him; — and that it was by this meanes that the Kings of Spain did receive fewer complaints from Aragon then any of their other Dominions. In fine, as Blanca observes, they continued in the enjoyment of their Fueros, when Navarre (which refused to erect a Iustitia, being destitute of a King at the same time that the Suprarbians were) had lost theirs, So true it is that the same Author observes, ‘Our Ancestors did secure our Liberties at first unto us by three most sure Guards: viz. The Iustitia: The great power of the Ricos Hombres; And the Priviledge of Vnion. The first was a Civil and Forensical curbe: The second, a Domestick, and more pinching one: The third, Popular and Warlike. Nor indeed could there have been less provision made for it, that it might continue to our times.’ It fell not to the prejudice of the Dignity, or out of any evils it did in it self draw upon the Nation; but when nothing but arrogancy and ambition would overthrow it, and nothing but basenesse and malice could speak ill of it, when it might have subsisted longer by its intrinsick constitution, and when the People, Laiety and Clergy, were ready to expose their lives for its continuance.

I should now accommodate my discourse to our present times, and deduce something from the Constitutions of Aragon, that might be advantageous to England. But as my own disabilities and unexperiencednesse makes it impossible for me to serve you herein, so the sence of your actings make me unwilling to attempt it. If Scripture had not prohibited me to meddle with them that are given to change; common discretion would me better to engage [Page] my self by advise with persons so irresolute. Consider your dealings; I am loath to give a Name to some of them; but loe! are you not become as Mungrel Samaritans, who by the dictate of their own inclinations, and the delusions of intermixing Priests were brought to divide their service betwixt the true and false God? Do not you now caresse the honest party, yet comply effectually with— Give me leave to be free with you for once, I know not whether your inadvertency, and the active malice of your enemies may not reduce you to such a streight as not to receive a second Application from me. The good things you speak and make semblance of to do, I know not whether they are your Raptures, or your Reason; your lucid Intervals, or your Phrenzies: You are too Mercenary to be reputed publick spirits, you are too publick-spirited to be Mercenaries: Nay it may be (so usuall it is for the most Victorious to be outwitted) it may be that there is not such a man as Collonel —, it may be you are ignominiously Cashiered, and excommunicated the Society of all the faithfull and godly!☜ not to receive a good word from them, who never intended you more, nor had given you that, but to overthrow you: or it may be you are not so stubborne but to expiate your former actings against the [Presbyterial] Church of God by some moneths Repentance, solemnly performed in Margarets Westminster; It being a thousand pitties that since you agree in Fundamentals, and make one common profession of Faith, that such a Ceremony as the standing in the Stoole of Repentance (by which they reconciled themselves to their King Charles Stuart in Scotland, and you must not expect more favour) and the giving up of one thousand pound per annum, given you for the Arrearage of Services against your gude Brethren, should create any strife. It may be too, that you are now in Prison, voted to the Tower, shipped for the Barbadoes, or flying into Holland, and what I have already writ shall never come to your hands. However, since I believe that God will dispose of all things for the Salvation of his dear ones, and bring your Freakes to a better issue then your Counsels, [Page] I shall deposite with you an hasty essay towards that Settlement which is expected. Things are brought to that passe as if God by his Providence had left you no more to do, then Moses, had to secure Israel after the passage through the Red-Sea, he did but stretch out his hands, and the waters returned and covered the Egyptians, and they were seen no more. Do but dare to be honest; and be otherwise at your perill. But though you do ruine your selves, yet will not we despaire: For He who is the Hope of Israel is mighty to save: and His Word failes not, though you recede from yours. He that we trust in, is the same in the Mountaiues and Valleys, in our Highest, in our Lowest condition, and howsoever you put men to a losse or stand in their purposes, you but carry on His still.

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Miscellaneous Positions concerning Government.

I. ALl men are by nature free, and equally free from an over-ruling Magistratical Power.

II. The rise, extent and limitations of Magistratical Power is from the people.

III. When a Government is broken, all men are cast into their Natural freedom.

IIII. When any men agree to erect a Government, they being at liberty so to do, there the Government established is lawful.

V. They who have any such intentions, may appoint Legislatours for themselves, but not for others directly.

VI. Where there is any such intention in any nnmber of men, and it be certain, or highly probable that others who either live intermixed with them, or joyning unto them, will oppose or subvert the Government which they are going to establish: it is lawful, and an Act of self-defence, to subject such persons, or parties, and so far to depresse them, as there is danger of their prejudicing the Government intended.

VII. The demeanour of the prevailing party or people towards them that are thus subjected, is not to be examined by a rigorous justice, but there is a great latitude granted, within which all the procedure is just.

[Page]VIII. If there be any excess in the sufferings of a party so depressed, they are to consider not what the prevalent party does, but what occasions they give them for such actings: The natural deceitfulnesse of the heart of men, together with [possibly] additional breach of trust or inconsistency of principles, and the greatnesse of the danger upon any miscarriage, justify a Scrupulous severity.

IX. It is the duty of a prevailing party to give every person his due liberty.

X. So much liberty is due to such as oppose or are inconsistent with the rising Government, as may consist with the continuance thereof.

XI. To allow them more, is in the Legislatours a breach of Trust, they being to make laws for the preservation of them who entrust them: and in the people themselves, if they ratifie such concessions, not onely folly, but an unlawful, unwarrantable Act, being a neglect of that selfe, the love whereof is to regulate our love to others.

XII. Where there are two or more parties disagreeing as to the erection of a Government, and but one agrees to this determinate form, there the Magistrate hath a direct power onely from and over them: his power over others is indirect, & in order to the safety of those who impowred him.

XIII. There is a great difference betwixt the liberty of men by nature, and that which they enjoy under Government.

XIII. By Nature a man is absolved from all lawes but such as God hath imprinted in his soul, or revealed unto him by his spirit: in a constituted Government he is obliged by accessional orders: by [Page] nature there is no property, but his possessions are as great as he can make them: in a constituted Government, things are not so, but the greatnesse of his possessions, and the manner whereby he is to attain, maintain and dispose of them, all depends upon lawes agreed upon by the whole people engaged into that polity; and every man living under it is to be presumed to have given away all those claimes which are prejudicial to the durablenesse of the league contracted. So that in a Government it is perfect liberty, if men with security enjoy what they honestly get under such lawes as they themselves enact, or choose who shall enact, (and can repeal them, if they be found grievous) and none of them be secluded from Government, and making or executing their own lawes by any superiour power, but by accidental circumstances, as defect in abilities or estate, (and the like) whereby to be able to discharge such places.

XV. Humane prudence is not to be neglected in the choice of Governours, or erection of Government.

The innocence of Doves is not more enjoyned,Godliness and Saintship is so far from being the sole qualification of a ruler, that in the election decreed by Moses, Deut. 1.13 i [...] is only required that the [...]ulers be men known (for their just deportment and visible godliness) wise and understanding. then the wisdome of Serpents, such prudence doth not repugne to godlinesse, it being the very gift of God, prayed for by Solomon, 2 Chron [...] 1.10. Give [...]e wisdome and knowledge, that I may go out and come in before this people: for who can judge this thy people, that is so great? and for which praye [...] God doth highly commend him, and as a blessing for so discreet a choise God gives him riches and honour; that which he desired, was not that wisdome which should qualifie him in the condition of a Saint but in the regal posture, viz. wisdome and knowledge, that he might judge his people. The conveniences attending the Pursuit whereof [...] and the inconveniences following upon its neglect, are so published in Scripture Pov. ch. 1.2, 3, 4, 5. that he may justly deserve to become a Proverb himself who doth vilifie it.

XVI. In the founding a Government, the Legislatours must be accurate and distinct: it being [Page] no where more verified then here, that a small errour in the beginning doth aggrandize in the end.

XVII. Since the good of the people is the end of Government, and regulates as well as gives a due val [...]e unto the meanes ordained thereunto: it is necessary to be known who the PEOPLE are.

XVIII. To be a part of the people it is not necessary that one actually have land in such or such a Countrey: as is clear from the examples of Rome [...] Athens, Sparta.

XIX. To become a part of the people it is not sufficient that one do live in this or that Countrey, and either farm, or actually possesse lands therein: The Helots were not the people of Lacedemon, though they were the Boo [...]es and pesantry thereof, renting the whole Countrey, and infinitely more in number then the Lacedemonians; the Proselytes for inhabitation amongst the Iewes were not a part of the people, nor the Gibeonites, though they were considered in the Iewish Polity. And in Sparta if any Citizen did not submit to the fundamental discipline of the Countrey, through dissolutenesse or tendernesse, though he did not forfeit his Lot, or Land, yet did he cease to be a part of the people. So Xenoph. de repub. Lacedaem. [...]. They who observe the rigor of the Spartan laws though they be insufficient in strength of Body, or Riches, yet are they citizens, and equally share in the publique liberties: but if any through effeminacy or other motives declines their way of educatio [...], he is not reputed any longer as a part of the people, notwithstanding his means, or abilities of body.

XX. They onely are the people who upon the erection of a Government, have impowred the Legislatours to act, being avowedly ready to stand by and uphold them in their actings.

XXI. To be in the pay of a State doth not render an Army mercenaries or deprive them of their share in being the people. It did not so in Rome nor Sparta.

[Page]XXII. In the enquiry after the people of England, I think it most rational to make that division amongst us, which God by his providence, and signal distinguishing mercies hath ordered: and that, whom God hath separated, man be cautious how he joyn them.

XXIII. The last division which God prouidentially hath made in this Nation, is that of such as adhered to or abetted S. George Booth and his confederates, and such as actively owned the Parliament at that day of trial.

XXIV. Neuters in the constitution of a Government are not considered as the people, or any part of them; since they confer no power on the Magistrate, (being meerly passive) but submit to what another shall give him: and consequently neither do the Magistrates receive, nor the people give any other power over Neuters, then what ariseth from the apprehensions of their proper security.

XXV. Whether we reflect upon addresses previously delivered to the Parliament, or subsequent actings, I believe the Army and their adherents (without any deep scrutiny into what hath been confessed) are satisfied, that by the last division which God hath made, the Presbyterians are excluded.

XXVI. In the last division which God hath made, the Sectaries are all included, both by previous addresses and subsequent services.

XXVII. Whom God hath joined, let man be tender how he separate.

XXVIII. The basis upon which the aforesaid people can erect any lasting Government, must be [Page] such a Toleration as each may be secured of the continuance thereof without molestation from, yea under the protection of the Magistrate.

XXIX. The Toleration of others who are not the people, is to be regulated by their compossibility and consistency with such a Toleration, and Government erected thereupon.

XXX. No religion doth enterfere with such a Toleration.

XXXI. There is no religion which can lead a man to renounce the performances of such actions, as render him capable of civil or political Society.

XXXII. If the weakest amongst the Sectaries be so gifted as that he may receive from God that Elogy;Luke 19.17. Well, Matth. 25.21. thou good Servant: because thou hast been faithful in a very little have thou authority over te [...] cities: If God will say thus to them, why should man say otherwise? since that little in which they have been undeniably faithful, is that whereby the State hath been & must be preserved, and is sufficient to discharge satisfactorily what an equal Toleration will make them capable of.

Silence is not to be taken for consent, where a party is under force.XXXIII. Where one part of a Nation doth withhold the rest from such a Government as they would otherwise erect, or continue; and doth set apart Legislatours upon their own account, without the concurrence of the other either tacite or open: there after the actual establishment of such a Government uniuersally, the after-act and reception of the other party, kept under force, is not a collation of power to the Magistrate: or if it [...]e; upon such a change of circumstances as may render them free, their former acts are revocable according to the common usage of the world justified by eminent Lawyers.

[Page]XXXIV From whence it is clear,I say force them, because I think a prejudiced people, passionate and ignorant naturally, will so long stick at the [...]l [...]ction, withou [...] force, as to ruine us all. that there is no security in any ratifications that can be drawn from such as we are (by some) perswaded to force into an equal Commonwealth with us; but if they get once a power they will as little want the desire, as plausible pretences for annulling all preceding actions.

XXXV. To step forthwith into an Equal Commonwealth (supposing that it could be regularly done) considering our present divisions and jealousies, is a desire not unlike to the superstitious observation of the Arabians, where several words come together having over them the point Vashlu: viz. they are to be pronounced with one breath, and that must be done, although a man stifle himself about it.

XXXVI. It is not only unlawful in our Commonwealth that is to be erected, but unnecessary in any Republique that all therein (excluding sojourners) be equally regarded in priviledges.

This appears from the constitutions of Israel, Rom [...] and Venice: not to mention what I have already said concerning Israel, I shall here exhibit a brief description of that Commonwealth and the other of Rome as to this inequal constitution of theirs out of Selden de jur. natur. Hebr. Li 2. c. 4. p. 164. Having discoursed concerning proselytes and their admission into the participation of the name of Iews and Commonwealth of Israel, he shews that they were never so franchised as not to retain a character of their having been aliens, an Hebrew of Hebrews being distinctly recorded from an Hebrew proselyte, Philip. 3.5. who yet were ca [...]led Iews, Ioseph. orig. l. 13. c. 17. and as to real immunities, he doth thus summarily express their condition. ‘Let us suppose aliens not descended from Roman families initiated in the Roman religion, to be customarily called Romans, and yet to be excluded all honours aud dignities within the city of Rome or its precincts: and that several other things are denied them upon the account of their being strangers by descent; yet that they participate in many things. This would be the express condition of the Iewish proselytes, that embrac [...]d totally that religion. Those aforesaid would receive a demonination from Rome, into which (as if it were a new native country) they should have adopted themselves, for as much [Page] as by a solemn initiation they should become Romans, and enjoy sundry priviledges God wards, and amongst men, and live in the Roman territory under new Laws. Yet for so much as some things (according to our Supposal) should be denied them upon the account of their being aliens, it would necessarily follow that they lye under a perpetual distinction of being strangers. So as, though they should be never reputed of otherwise then as Romans, yet should they fall under the exception of being Stranger-Romans; such as were not plenarily citizens, but in pa [...]t onely. In so much as these proselytes, retaining this character of their being aliens, should much resemble the Cumani, Acerrani, and Atellani [...] people that were upon this account made Citizens of Rome, Festus in Municeps. that they should alwaies continue their re [...]glement or Commonwealths in several from the people of Rome, and serve in the Roman Legions, but beare no Office or dignity; or the Municipes Agel [...]. noct. Attic. lib. 16. c. 13. who were honorarily entitled to the City, but without power of Suffrage, or being Magistrates. So that if we follow Aristotle, who doth Suppose a Citizen to be no way better defined then by a capacity of being preferred to judicatures and Magistracy, [...] Polit. 3. c [...] 1. & 3. A proselyte of justice however he might vary his appellation, and be stiled a Iew, yet was not he simply to be reputed a Iewish citizen, but alwaies a stranger who had gained several rights and immunities amongst the free-born citizens. The posterity of such proselytes were in the same condition with their anc [...]stours, nor did they ever reap greater immunities then their parents. The like practice hereunto is found in Spain established by Law, where such Mahometans, and Iews as are converted to Christianity, they retain for ever a memorial of their having been aliens, and upon that account are excluded, both the one and the other, from places of honour and civil employments almost all upon that very account. As Ludovicus a Peguera, Ioannes Escober, and other Spanish Lawyers largely inform us.’

And thus much out of Mr. Selden concerning the inequality of the Commonwealths of Rome and Israel; yet does not all the History of the Iewes acquaint us with any detriment (or least insurrection) that befell them from such a constitution,By stranger is meant such a Proselyte as I speak of. in which they thought there was so much of justice as did not retrench upon the precept, Num. 15.15. One ordinance shall be both for you of the congregation and the stranger that sojourneth with you. As ye are, so shall the stranger be before the Lord. Nor repugne to that prohibition which they had received not to vex or oppresse a stranger, Levit. 19.33. yea Philo, though their priviledges were no other then Selden relates, boasteth of the favourablenesse of the [...]ewish Legislatour, who had given Proselytes equal priviledges with the natives, [...]. lib. de Monarch & de legat. ad Cajum. and placed them in equal esteem.

In Venice there are three sorts or ranks of Citizens, the Commonalty, the Cittadini, and the Patricians: who yet are not to be reputed [Page] Citizens according to the definition of Aristotle, for the two former are excluded from publick Magistracy. So in Rome some were Citizens of greater priviledges then others: Citizens of the best quality, or cives optimo jure, Citizens of an indifferent quality, cives mediocri jure, This distinction of the Roman citizens doth not respect the richest, but such as were incorporated, they were priviledged without detriment to the publique, in a different way. As for the native Citizens of Rome, he that will may learn the great inequality they lay under in their Comitia Centuriata & Tributa out of Sir Robert Filmores discourses upon Aristotles politicks: but I doe not remember that I have read how from such inequality either the people became mutinous or the republick, damnified, much lesse overthrown. and Citizens of the worst quality, Cives deterrimo jure, such were the people called Cerites, who were declared Citizens without any power of suffrage. One of the Cittadini may be Chancellour of Venice; they may be sent as Residents to any below the degree of a King, and other places of profit (as Secretaries of State) are allowed them. As for the common Artisans and Tradesmen they enjoy nothing of priviledge, nor no interest in preferments, or government, only some immunities as to customes and taxes, wherein they pay but half so much as others, and pettit colledge-offices. And this account is given of Venice by Bodin in his Method of History, c. 6. and the C [...]mmentatour upon Gianotti, p. 324 &c.

XXXVII. Experience tells us that a Commonwealth thus unequal may stand under good Orders, and flourish: and where any of this nature (and such ever were the best and most flourishing) have been overthrown, it was not thorough any intrinsecal defect in such a constitution, but thorough a defect originally or afterwards contracted in the regulation or management of orders necessary to their preservation.

XXXVIII. Good orders do not secure a Commonwealth wherein the major or more active part is not spirited for such a form.

XXXIX. Where men are never so well disposed and spirited for a Government, it is by a due constitution of orders that they must hope to subsist.

XL. By orders is not meant a bare vote, or proper design, but an actual m [...]delling of the people into a determinate posture under law & Officers suitable to the continuance of them herein.

[Page]XLI. It is not the erecting of a Commonwealth by force, which subjects it to destruction, but the not making it Natural afterwards.

XLII. Nature is nothing else but a determination of adjoyning causes where a thing acts thus, or thus.

For a stone to move downward, it is natural: because God hath so determined the univers [...], as to impresse a gravi [...]ation into it If the circumstances were altered, it would be as natural for a stone to mount upward.

LXIII. To make a Government natural the circumstances of affaires must be so disposed of that they may necessitate to such a posture.

XLIV. A violent necessitation is not durable.

There is a necessitation to be laid upon men which is durable, and not violent.

The difference betwixt Moral and Natural causes is in the Manner of operation, not in the uncertainty of producing the effect; but men usually mistake herein, and suppose the falliblenesse to be in the cause, which indeed is in themselves, who from different circumstances look for resembling events. He must not deny this, whosoever in humane actions demands, why? or debateth how this or that is to be done?

XLV. He that would make a durable Commonwealth upon the means aforesaid, must consider what is the Basis whereon its erection depends and what are the means naturally conducing to its establishment.

XLVI. In every Government where the determinate form is agreed upon, it is fundamental that the means conducing to it's establishment be upheld.

The means conducing to the obtaining an end may be two waies considered: either in themselves, or as to be practicated in this or that place. Though some things may not be fundamental to a government absolutely considered, yet they may be, as it is not otherwise possible to be erected in a nation: and so the accessional care of them becomes a fundamental to the Legislatours; since w [...]thout the consideration of such circumstances, they who are not likely to want opposition, will want defence. And so I conceive a Toleration to be fundamental to a Commonwealth in England; for upon lesse security then [Page] that it shall be irrepealable, and meanes used to continue it so, how can it bee expected that the Secta [...]ies (as they are called) should venture their lives and fortunes chearfully in the behalf of them, who onely seek for a present subsistence by their h [...]lp, and may afterwards reduce them to a worse condition then ever a Court of politicians will put them under.

XLVII. Lycurgus his law was fundamental to Sparta; and so was Moses his law to Israel; though it were not fundamental in the latter that they should be executed by a Senate: for they might choose a single person to that, Deut. 17.14.

From whence it is clear that the distinction of things into fundamental, and not fundamental in a republick is not absurd, though it be not imaginable how an absolute power can be bound extrinsecally: since intrinsecally and by natural necessity an absolute power may be bound; as it was ordered by Moses and Lycurgus. If they who desire any thing should be fundamental, do not purpose the establishment of means suitable thereunto, it is indiscretion in them: but if they doe, it is an impertinency to demand, how this or that shall be unalterable? when the means are exhibited whereby to keep it from being altered [...]

Whilest I was reflecting upon the constitutions of Aragon, and weighing the different circumstances wherein they at first were to what ours are, I thought the following proposals might advantage something to a secure establishment amongst us.

I. Let all those who have adhered to the Army and Parliament in the time of the last conspiracy by an active compliance be registred as the Liberators of their countrey, every one of them: and let care be taken by countrey registers, and court of Honour, for the perpetuating of their memory in Families, and their descendants after them. Let them be as the prime-gentlemen, and at present only capable of places of power and trust; and hereafter if they or their posterity shall be found of equal abilities with others, let them claim the preheminence before others.

II. Let them be all put into a Military posture under faithful Commanders, and accustomed to one another and so correspond in a more firm [Page] amity: which will be effected by frequent musters to the same benefit to the Commonwealth, that the publick Feasts in Switherland produce, or the old Andria and Phiditia in Crete and Sparta.

III. Let none else be permitted the use of Arms, unlesse publick exigency require it; then they may be imployed as the Iewes did their proselytes, and the Spartans their Helots.

IV. In case any Gentlemen shall give by a succession of services and deports answerable, testimonies of his good affection and fidelity so as to be trusted, let him be admitted to the priviledge of a Lib [...]ratour of his Countrey, yet retaining a distinguishing character of his being onely impriviledged. So in Aragon there were Ricos hombres de natura, and Ricos hombres de mesnada: besides the examples of Venice whereof I have already spoke [...]

V. As for the inferiour sort (of whose coming in there is as little doubt, as danger) let them be priviledged after some time: but admitted to Musters before.

VI. Let the Armies of Ireland and Scotland be included in the number of the Liberatours of the Commonwealth of England, and registred accordingly: every man being to take care for his being registred, if he intend that himself or family shall reap any benefit hereafter. The like custom is observed in Venice amongst the Cittadini.

VII. Let all this body of the Militia of England including the Armies of Ireland & Scotland choose a proportioned number of deputies at their several musters, who may out of their number by the Ballot elect some persons [it may be nine or thirteen] who shall make up the Select Senate or Conservators[Page]of the liberties of England.

VIII. Let this Senate be for life; so as that once in two years there be the like procedure as for the election of the Senate, to elect a determinate number of men to be inquisitors into the deportment of the Senate, with power to examine briefly and plainly their behaviour, and by Ballot to sentence by fine or deposition, any or all of them: and to issue out summons for a new election.

IX. Let the Senate, and the Inquisitors be inviolably so to be elected as that they bear some proportion with the Chambres impartes in France; as those Courts are made up out of Protestants and Papists entermixed, so let the Senate and Inquisitors be made up of the several parties in the Nation ligued in the establishment of a Commonwealth, viz. Independents, Deut. 23. Anabaptists, Fifth-Monarchy-men, and Quakers.

X. Let Papists, Prelatical. and Presbyterial persons be for ever excluded the Senate.

XI. The Select Senate is not to intermeddle ordinarily either in the Executive or Legislative power of the nation by their own proper authority.

XII. The end of their appointment is to secure the fundamental constitutions unto the Liberatours of the Commonwealth: that so they being secured, the other part of the Nation may enjoy that freedom which otherwise could not be permitted them with safety.

XIII. The Security which the people (for so I shall for brevity sake call the Liberatours) can have as to their fundamentals, doth lie in the management of the Militia, Vniversities and Ministry: therefore the inspection and care of all those [Page] (according to fitting wayes) must be vested entirely in them; and the Inquisitors are to research into their faithful deportment herein.

XIV. Let all their processes run in the name of the Commonwealth of England, and be signed only by the Conservators of the Liberties of England.

XV. Let the forces now in being continue for ever; those in Ireland and Scotland for the security of those Provinces: (and let me be recorded as a fool and Ideot to all posterity, if that the incorporation of those countries prove not destructive to the English Liberties, and particularly Scotland, which if ever it unite in our Parlaments, farewel peace and liberty of conscience.) The Army in England must be kept up as Guards to the Parlament, Council of State, and Select Senate, but to be under the latter, and whom the Commander in chief is to recognize.

XVI. This care being taken for securing fundamental liberties, let the Parlament be chosen by the whole Nation, and not the people onely, upon due qualifications, and a regulated way of Elections.

XVII. Let each County choose a triple number to what shall serve in the House; and let them by an after-election agree upon their Members.

XVIII. Though the President of the Select Senate be to be elective and vary every two months: yet at the Session of the Parlament, however it happen, let them agree upon a particular President, who shall be Speaker of the House pro tempore, and who jointly with them shall examine all elections, and tender a recognition of the fundamentals to each member.

XIX. All the Select Senate must have the priviledge of sitting as members in Parlament.

[Page]XX. Let the making of laws not retrenching upon the fundamentals nor power of the Senate about the Militia, Ministry, or Vniversities, be in the power of the Parlament; as also war, peace, matter of trading, taxes, customs, enquiry in [...]o the receits and disbursments of monies, as also the disposal of places of profit, &c. Iustices of peace, but not Sheriffs; let them be nominated by the select Senate.

Let the Parlament be called ordinarily once in two years, and to endure Three months after the first opening of the Session by the Speaker; and to be summon'd upon any extraordinary emergency, by the Council of State.

Let the Parlament choose out of their number a Council of State to manage affairs in the intervals of Parlament, and to be accountable to them.

Let Three of the Select Senate be at the Council of State constantly, with a liberty of debate, but not suffrage; and let them be as inferiours to the members of the Council, whilest they are in the Council, and at other times, saving when they act in their own Court as Conservators of the Liberties of England.

I shall not particularize any thing further, by reason of the small insight I have in our national constitution [...] I shall not touch upon the regulation of the Law, Ministry, Elections and qualifications of Parlament men, or the like: whereof none can judge, but they who are thoroughly acquainted with circumstances whereto, I could never attain. If I favour the perpetuation of the Army, it is because I think it necessary that there be an alteration of quarters in the forces of Scotland and Ireland, which if they be relieved by fresh Forces out [Page] of England, the Governours there will be able to fasten the lesse interest in the Soldatesque, and the people less imbue them in principles of disaffection. ☞ Besides, I am of the mind that all Government is by an Army; and that the Signiory of Venice is no lesse a military Government then the Empire of Turkey. The difference (as to the execution of lawes) lying in this; in Turkey lawes are enforced by a standing Army, and in Venice the Army is not in pay, but he who shall refuse to submit to the lawes will soon discover this truth, that the foundation of all jurisdiction is an Army. I have already shewed the small assurance that a Parlamentary vote gives, or a select Senate not backed with an Army, in the good discipline whereof the Conservatours of the liberties of England will be so much concerned as to look thereto, for otherwise their condition will be unsafe. When Tiberi [...]s Gracchus endeavoured to establish the Licinian law, the nobility slew him, though a Tribune of the people, aud dearly loved of them; at whose death they who should have defended him, were so astonished, as they moved not to revenge it. In like manner was Cajus Gracchus slain, and his death not resented: so little trust is there to be put in an establisht Senate which may be thus overthrown when the people (as not in a constant Military posture) are their security. But it is obvious to any one, whose will be the Army, if the present forces be disbanded: I am sure they who are concerned in a Toleration will not be able to bear up.The Iustitia of Aragon lost his authority when the standing Army of the Ricos hombres was put down; though his power were rather greatned in legal concessions. Yea, any popular tumult in that unruly City of London may destroy them irrevocably. Thus a standing Army is at present necessary, and will hereafter be prudential by reason of the City of London, which without such a counterpoise is able to give lawes to the Nation, and make the authoritity of the Nation precarious. As to what inconveniences ma [...] arise from the standing Army; the provinces being their enemies, & they being subjected to the Senate, who are likewise to have a care of the Countrey Militia, I think there needs no further corrective.

[Page]I should end my discourse here, but that some reflections upon the whole precedent discourse do now come into my mind, without an hastie solution of which difficulties I think uncivil to break of. I confesse to any Objector, that all our debate concerning the Ephori of Sparta, the Roman Tribunes, the Select Council appointed Lewis of France, or K Iohn of England, as far as they purely are alledged, for proofe of a Power to be constituted for the preservation of Fundamental Liberties against a popular Assembly, so far they are impertinent unto our affaires, who doubt not but there may be a way to restrain the exorbitancy of Kings, though not of Parliaments. How this later may be done is our Inquiry now, and a President for that is demanded, as wel as contrivance by model. I say hereupon that the Iustitia of Aragon was a Check to the Parliamentary Assembly of that Kingdome: For he might not onely suppresse any Party as the Ricos Hombres, or Cavalleros, or Cities, upon any emergency by the priviledge of Vnion; but also frustrate all the Decrees of the Cort general, if they did not proceed according to his Fueros. I have given you an instance hereof in my relation of the Iustitia's actings under Iacobus 1. nor do I doubt but if his ayde had been implored by the Commonalty, he might have advanced the Standard of the Vnion, and by the People themselves have prosecuted even the Cort general, if they infringed his Iustitiate. So that it is clear that though there be no ballance for the people themselves, if they fixe upon the overthrow of fundamentals, yet there may be a counter-poyse for the representatives of the people. This truth will much more appear from the Constitution of Rome, in which I find the People ballanced by the Order of their Classes and Centuries in their great Assembly, or Comitia centuriata. The whole People were divided into six Classes, and each Classis into Centuries of a very unequal proportion. The Patricians, Senators, Noblemen, Knights, and Gentlemen of Rome, made up the first Classis, and Ninety eight Centuries. All the poorest sort of People made up but one Classis a [...]d Century, whereas upon a due proportion of number, they should have made up a thousand Centuries. Here you have a ballance [Page] for the People by the Original design of the Common-wealth: For if 98. Centuries of the Gentry, and first Classis, or 97. agreed, (things carried not by Poll, but number of Centuries concurring) then were not the other Centuries called to suffrage, being a Political Minority. So that it is possible you see by an Original contrivance to limit the Legislating People themselves. But to give you a further and very material instance for a select Senate, I aver that the Senate of Rome was in its Constitution until I. Caesar's time, such a coordinate Senate as many now cry up. That the Executive power was in them is not doubted: That they were concluded by the Laws enacted by the People, is unquestionable. They had moreover a dormant Power to secure the Fundamental Lawes and Frame of the Common-wealth, even against the Representatives of the People, viz. the Tribunes, or even the People themselves: And of such emergencies they themselves were Iudges. This appears by the power they had to create a Dictator Paramount to all patrician or popular Magistrates, who might arbitrarily dispose of the Life and Fortunes of any Roman Citizen, or parties. Secondly they had upon cases of intestine dangers from the Tribunes or populace: A Power to make that extream and ultimate Vote, of Viderint Consules nequid Resp. detrimenti capiat. Let the Consuls take care that the Republick be not prejudiced. And when this Vote was made, the Consuls might fall on any mutinous Citizens, and slay them without triall: by such a Decree were the Tribunes of the Gracchi slain, and those in the time of Caesar forced to fly Rome, as any one may read in Caesars Commentaries of the Civil war, Lib. 1. Thirdly, this Senate (which was for life, unlesse the Censor outed any for misdemeanours) had a power to annul Lawes made by the People, as Manutius in his Book de Senatu, shewes out of Tully. So that it is manifest, that as all the good government of that Republick, and all the grandeur was derived from the Senate, so the aforesaid Senate was a power in some cases co-ordinate, or rather Supreme to the People. And I will evidence it, that such a power in that Senate was not the cause of the subversion of that Common-wealth, but other male-constitutions, [Page] which if they had not been, this Frame had not been ruined.

Having mentioned unto you Fundamental Constitutions of the Roman Common-wealth: you may possibly demand of me, if they had any such? Sir, you will not be the first who make this enquiry, but I assure you they had, and that they were not only unalterable, but never altered. The People in their Secession to the Mons Sacer did ordain them,Manut [...] de leg [...] Rom. p. 190. and the Senate (without such demurs as we are now troubled with) did assent to them, and they were called Leges Sacratae, or Sacred Laws. All other Laws might be abrogated, Manut. de leg. Rom. P. 351. but not these: the Executive Magistracy might be new modelled and varied, but not these Laws. Nor do I find that the having such Fundamentals was accounted by any judicious man heretofore an imprudent act; or found in practise detrimentitious to the People or State.

But further, it is a ridiculous argument, The People generally assembled, can lie under no restrictions of their power [...] (which is false; for their way of assembling may be so contrived, and a party so ordered as to be able to check the more numerous, if they should, who are morally inhabilitated to such a design, conspire to subvert the Fundamentals.) Therefore the Peoples Representatives can lie under no restrictions. The People personally assembled are an Army, and so the Power as well as Authority visible: but their Representatives are not so; and therefore may be checked by the Senate, impowered to that end with their Guards.

This last discourse suggests unto me another Model, which I shall exhibite to you, leaving circumstances to further contrivance.

Let there be a Select Senate for the securing of the Fundamentals, with the standing Army for their Guards, and a power to curb the Trustees of the whole Nation in Parliament, if they go about to subvert the Fundamentals. Let them have the Executive power, and the Parliament in ordinary the Legislative.

I have not time now to discriminate their powers, but if the posture of the people in a Militia be setled according to my other model, according to this all parties may receive a fair establishment. There may be Censors [Page] contrived, or Inquisitors; to enquire into the deportment of the Senate, and supply their number. And if it be thought meet to fix an extraordinary character upon any person amongst us; He may be as in the Roman Senate, princeps Senatus, or Prince of the Senate, a Title which hath nothing of power, or of a single person, but only Honour; for the power was in the Consuls and Senate, the prince was only reputed the best and ablest man in the republick, and who had signalised himself by his actings formerly, and was first to give his suffrage, or deliver his mind by speech, [...]f he thought it meet.

I have been the longer herein, not only because I take an infinite pleasure in entertaining you, but because possibly your negligence may bereave me of any opportunity of writing to you more. It is not now a time to dally; hitherto your neighbours were not at leasure to attend your actions, or contrive your ruin, now they are not only vacant to wa [...]ch all advantages, but it is become their interest to effect it [...] Thus your Dangers multiply from abroad, and your Friends decrease: a league with you is like an Egytian Reed, which is likely either to fail, or wound him that loans thereon: none can build any certainty upon your promises, yea it is dubious whether they may ever come to be ratified. How then can your Envoyes abroad treat, or how can you expect but that all should desert you, since it will become their prudence to do so? If you defer your Settlement some moneths (for I shall not suspend my thought till May) all your confederates must fix upon other designes then you would wish. And at home, how do you think they who are called Sectaries shall support you, upon no other, nor more advantagious terms than of bleeding for insensible and discurteous Friends? I at present call you Friends, though your deportment shews that you are, or would be even their Masters? If their hands are weakned, how will others be enraged who have not fastened the like obligations upon you, that you have received from them. If they who met you in the Wilderness, who refreshed you in your distress be thus disgusted by you, what fears will seise upon them who might justly dread what God awarded to Amalek? But to conclude; Be more suspicious of your enemies, and less jealous of your friends: nothing can secure you of the former but an utter impossibility of hurting you, and of the latter you have the assurance not only of their affection, but incapacity of prejudicing you. Regulate the —erect —destroy the established intrest of—let them shift for their livings, who plot to take away your lives: when ye have done thus let him be a Monarch that will. The most wise cannot effect a regality, nor a fool keep it. You may commit a thousand errours in the government you establish, but the greatest you can possibly fall into is the leaving us in unsettlement. I beseech you to excuse the freedome I make use of in this address; the smitings of a friend are faithful, & if I have let fall any thing that may give you cause to entertain other thoughts of me, I shall upon any opportunity evince unto you, how I am with the greatest inclinations possible.

Sir,

Your most affectionate-humble Servant; H. S.

Ch. Ch. Oct. 13. 1659.

FINIS.

[Page]

§

[Page]

[Page]

A LETTER TO An OFFICER of the ARMY CONCERNING A SELECT SENATE mentioned by them in their Proposals to the late Parliament.

The Necessity and Prudentialness of such a Senate is here asserted by Reason and History.

Whereunto are added sundry Positions about GOVERNMENT, and an ESSAY towards a secure Settlement.

By HENRY STUBBE, of Ch. Ch. in Oxon.

Salus Populi suprema Lex esto.

LONDON, Printed for T. B. and are to be Sold at the three Bibles in Paul's Church-yard; and in Westminster-Hall. 1660.

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A letter to an officer of the army concerning a select senate mentioned by them in their proposals to the late Parliament the necessity and prudentialness of such a senate is here asserted by reason and history : whereunto are added sundry positions about government, and an essay towards an secure settlement / by Henry Stubbe ...

Stubbe, Henry, 1632-1676.

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1660

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2003-01 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

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A61886

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Wing S6054A

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ESTC R31960

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12281346

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58713

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— A letter to an officer of the army concerning a select senate mentioned by them in their proposals to the late Parliament the necessity and prudentialness of such a senate is here asserted by reason and history : whereunto are added sundry positions about government, and an essay towards an secure settlement / by Henry Stubbe ..., Stubbe, Henry, 1632-1676..

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[2], 76, [i.e. 56] p.

Printed for T.B. ...,. London :: 1660.. (Reproduction of original in the Harvard University Library.)

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Users should be aware of the process of creating the TCP texts, and therefore of any assumptions that can be made about the data.

Text selection was based on the New Cambridge Bibliography of English Literature (NCBEL). If an author (or for an anonymous work, the title) appears in NCBEL, then their works are eligible for inclusion. Selection was intended to range over a wide variety of subject areas, to reflect the true nature of the print record of the period. In general, first editions of a works in English were prioritized, although there are a number of works in other languages, notably Latin and Welsh, included and sometimes a second or later edition of a work was chosen if there was a compelling reason to do so.

Image sets were sent to external keying companies for transcription and basic encoding. Quality assurance was then carried out by editorial teams in Oxford and Michigan. 5% (or 5 pages, whichever is the greater) of each text was proofread for accuracy and those which did not meet QA standards were returned to the keyers to be redone. After proofreading, the encoding was enhanced and/or corrected and characters marked as illegible were corrected where possible up to a limit of 100 instances per text. Any remaining illegibles were encoded as <gap>s. Understanding these processes should make clear that, while the overall quality of TCP data is very good, some errors will remain and some readable characters will be marked as illegible. Users should bear in mind that in all likelihood such instances will never have been looked at by a TCP editor.

The texts were encoded and linked to page images in accordance with level 4 of the TEI in Libraries guidelines.

Copies of the texts have been issued variously as SGML (TCP schema; ASCII text with mnemonic sdata character entities); displayable XML (TCP schema; characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or text strings within braces); or lossless XML (TEI P5, characters represented either as UTF-8 Unicode or TEI g elements).

Keying and markup guidelines are available at the Text Creation Partnership web site.