IN the beginning of this Chapter we read of one of the greatest and most improbable designs that ever was, viz. Christ's sending out his twelve Apostles to convert and to reform the World. For, although the occasion of their first Mission, was to prepare the Jewish Nation for en­tertaining the doctrine of the Messias, and there­fore they are commanded to go to the lost sheep of the House of Israel; and as they went to preach; saying, The v [...] v. 7 Kingdom of Heaven is at hand; yet our Saviour in his following discourse mentions several things which cannot be applied to their first going abroad; particularly, that which relates to their hard usage and bad entertainment from the world; which we do not find they met with from the Jews upon [Page 2] this general message, but rather the contrary: for which cause he bids them to provide nothing for v. 9, 10, 11. themselves, foreseeing that in all places there would be some that would be ready to receive them kindly; and when the Seventy Disciples were sent upon a like errand, they returned with joy, which such Luk. 10. 17. young beginners would hardly have done, if they had met with such sharp persecutions then, which Christ here foretells his Apostles should suffer for preaching the Gospel. Either therefore we must say that St. Matthew puts things together by way of Common Place, as he seems to do the Miracles and Parables of our Saviour, without pur­suing the Order of time, as S. Luke doth, and so up­on occasion of Christs sending out his Apostles sets down all that relates to their Mission, although de­livered at several times; or else that Christ himself did now at first acquaint them with all the diffi­culties that should attend their imployment in preaching the Gospel to the world, and conse­quently thought it necessary to give them at once their full instructions for their discharge of so great a trust, and due behaviour under so hard a service. A trust indeed so great, a service so hard as to require the Wisdom of an Angel, and the Inno­cency of Adam in Paradise; so many were the diffi­culties, so powerful were the prejudices, so dan­gerous were the snares and temptations, which in all places did hinder the success of so great a [Page 3] Work. We are apt to admire and applaud the mighty conquests which men do make over some small parts of the world, by the subtilty of their Wit, or by the force of their Arms, or by the vast­ness of their Treasure; but in all these cases, there is nothing wonderful; for the causes being sup­posed, there is at least a great probability the event should follow: But for twelve inconsiderable persons, as to all outward circumstances, with­out craft, without arms, without money, to un­dertake the conquest of the world, by changing not only mens opinions as to Religion, but which is far more uneasie, the hearts and lives of men; seems at first appearance so unlikely a thing, that though none but very wise men could hope to manage it, yet none who were thought so would ever undertake it. Yet no less than this was the work which Christ sent abroad his twelve Apostles upon; and he tells them, very little to their com­fort, what hardship they were like to meet with, to be betrayed by friends, persecuted by enemies v. 21, 22. 17. and hated of all men for his names sake: yea so great would the rage and malice and cruelty of men be against them, that he saith in the beginning of this verse, Behold I send you forth as sheep in the midst of Wolves. What! to be destroyed and devoured by them? No, but to turn those very Wolves into sheep. But what powerful charms must they use to secure themselves from present danger, and to work such [Page 4] mighty change? no other than those which our Saviour recommends in the words of the Text, Be ye therefore wise as Serpents, and harmless as Doves. Not as though we were to search all the proper­ties of Serpents and Doves to understand the mean­ing of these words, and to determine the truth or falshood of all the relations that are made con­cerning both of them; but as Solomon chose the Ant for an example of diligence, so our Saviour de­signing to joyn Wisdom and Innocency together pro­poses the Serpent for one and the Dove for the other; to let his Disciples understand that he al­lows them so much Wisdom as is consistent with innocency, and perswades them to no more simpli­city than is consistent with Wisdom. For Wis­dom without Innocency turns into craft and cunning; and Simplicity without Wisdom is meer folly.

But the great difficulty lyes in the joyning these two together. For as the world goes and is like to do, men will be apt to say, How can those be as wise as Serpents, who must be as harmless as Doves? If all the world were agreed in the practice of in­nocency, and men did not fare the worse for it, it might pass for wisdom; but when they have to deal with others who will use all the Wisdom of the Serpent, and are so far from being harmless as Doves, that they will take all the advantages that mens innocency and simplicity gives them, it seems hard [Page 5] to reconcile these two together. To what pur­pose, may some say, are mens eyes bid to be open, when their hands are tyed up? Had they not bet­ter be without the Serpents sagacity and quick­ness of sight, than espy their dangers, and not use the most likely means to prevent them? What doth the simplicity of the Dove signifie, but to make them a more easie quarry for the birds of prey? Simplicity, and innocency, and patience, which our Saviour recommends under the phrase of be­ing harmless as Doves, are good lessons for another world, but what do they signifie in this, which is made up of nothing but artifice and fraud, and wherein the great art and business of life seems to be overreaching and deceiving one another? Those only seem to have the true subtilty of the Serpent who can turn and wind themselves every way as makes most for their advantage; Who by their soft and easie motions, by their artificial gli­dings and insinuations get an interest great enough to mischief while they watch for an opportunity to do it. As the Serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, 2 Cor. 11. 3. i. e. say the Fathers by the familiarity and easiness Ramirez de Prado Pen­tecont. c. 1. of access which he had, playing as some fancy, about the Neck and Arms of Eve in the state of In­nocency. Those have the true subtilty of the Ser­pent who creep into Houses and understand the secrets of persons and families; and so know how to ad­dress, and how to keep in awe: who seem as harm­less [Page 6] as Doves till they have a fair opportunity of in­stilling their poison, and do the greater mischief by being thought so innocent. Who have the dange­rous teeth and the double tongue, who can deny the Truth without lying, and forswear themselves without perjury; who would sanctifie the great­est villanies by their good intentions; and when they are ravenous as Wolves, and as cruel as Vultures, would yet be thought as harmless as Doves, or as in­nocent as a Child new born.

What now can simplicity and innocency, and meekness, and patience signifie against all this serpentine subtilty? And if you take away from the Serpent his artificial motion and his poison, you leave him weak and contemptible, ready to be trampled on by every passenger, having no­thing to defend himself but his skin and eye sight. And if you do allow his most natural properties, the innocency of the Dove is a very unequal match for him if they be opposed, and seem of so different natures that they can hardly be joyned together in the same subject.

And yet notwithstanding all these objections, it was certainly the design of our Saviour in these words,

1. To recommend the conjunction and union of these two to his disciples, being wise as Serpents, and harmless as Doves.

2. To do it chiefly upon this consideration, [Page 7] that this would be the best means to promote his Religion against all the arts and designs of men, as well as the best security for themselves.

And therefore in the prosecuting this subject I shall endeavour these two things,

• 1. To shew wherein the conjunction of these two doth consist.
• 2. That this is the best means to promote the Christian Religion against all the mischievous arts and devices of men.

1. Wherein the conjunction of these two doth consist. It is no hard matter to tell men how they may be wise as Serpents, viz. by foresight and caution, so as to discern and prevent unnecessary dangers; not to run themselves foolishly and vainly upon needless troubles, nor to draw per­secutions upon themselves, when they can decent­ly and lawfully avoid them; not to give advan­tages to their enemies by their weakness and in­discretion, nor a just occasion of offence to any; but in all lawful things to endeavour to gain upon them, and by all acts of kindness and charity to recommend our Religion to them. Neither is it hard to tell wherein we must appear to be harm­less as Doves, viz. by simplicity and integrity of mind, by meekness and patience, by forgiving in­juries, and bearing persecutions as becomes Chri­stians, by a holy, innocent, and unblameable con­versation: but the difficulty still lyes in the con­junction [Page 8] and mixture of both these; which as S. Chrysostome observes, is the thing which Christ Chrys. in loc. especially aims at, so as to make one vertue arise from both of them; as Greg. Nazianzen said of Greg. Na­zian. orat. 19. his Father, that he neither suffered the Wisdom of the Serpent to degenerate into cunning, nor the innocency of the Dove into indiscretion, but made up one compleat kind of vertue from the mixture of both together; and that I suppose lyes in these things, (1.) Integrity of Mind, (2.) Ingenuity, or fairness of behaviour; (3.) Meek­ness and Patience: and in the due practice of these consists that prudent Simplicity which results from these two, being wise as Serpents, and harmless as Doves. Which I shall make appear by shewing, that men cannot be harmless as Doves without them; and that they are so far from being inconsistent with being wise as Serpents, that a great part of wisdom lyes in them.

1. Integrity of Mind; which is opposed to false­ness and hypocrisie; and therefore S. Paul joyns simplicity and Godly sincerity together. We read of some in Scripture who are said to have a double heart, 2 Cor. 1. 12. Psal. 12. 2. Jam. 4. 8. as well as a double tongue: they are [...], saith S. Iames, men with two Souls, one for God and ano­ther for the world; or rather none at all for God, (since he must have all or none) but one to ap­pearance and another in reality, having quite other thoughts, intentions and designs than they [Page 9] make the world believe. Some tell us that the Isid. Orig. l. 12. c. 4. Serpent hath no forked tongue, but through the quickness of its motion, and suddenness of its vibration it appears to be so; men have but one heart and mind, but they may use such artificial motions and sudden turnings, as to appear to have more. But this is contrary to that integrity and simplicity which Christ requires, and the Scripture every where so much extols, as to place mens perfection and wisdom in it. Noah was said to be a Gen. 6. 9. just man and perfect in his Generations, because he main­tained his integrity in a very corrupt and degene­rate Age. Iob is said to be a man perfect and Job 1. 1. upright, one that feareth God and escheweth evil: and in another place of Iob, the perfect and the wicked are 9. 22. opposed: he destroyeth the perfect and the wicked; i. e. the good and the bad. Mark the perfect man and be­hold Psal. 37. 37. the upright, saith the Psalmist. The righteousness Prov. 11. 5. of the perfect shall direct his way, saith Solomon; but the wicked shall fall by his own wickedness; and in the next words; The righteousness of the upright shall de­liver 6. them, but transgressors shall be taken in their own naughtiness. And if Solomons word may be taken, a mans integrity is his greatest wisdom; for righ­teousness, 13. 6. saith he, keepeth him that is upright in the way; but wickedness overthroweth the sinner. He that walketh 10. 9. uprightly, walketh surely; but he that perverteth his wayes shall be known. And therefore he concludes that a man of understanding will walk uprightly. 15. 21.

[Page 10] All this seems a strange Paradox, and to come from such as are not versed in business, nor ac­quainted with affairs of the world, or from those who are resolved to maintain their hypothesis, though against the common sense of mankind, as the Stoicks of old who made their Wise man beau­tiful though never so deformed, rich though rea­dy to starve for poverty, and a Prince though sold for a slave; just thus doth it seem to some men to talk of the consistency of Wisdom and Simplicity together, or to suppose those take the most pru­dent care of their own interest, who are tied up to the strict rules of downright honesty, and are resolved with Iob to hold fast their integrity.

But that there is nothing absurd or unreasonable in this supposition, nothing but what is true, and may be justified by the common sense and experi­ence of mankind will appear by these conside­rations.

1. That is the truest Wisdom of a man which doth most conduce to the happiness of life. For Wisdom as it refers to action lies in the proposal of a right end, and the choice of the most proper means to attain it. Which end doth not refer to any one part of a mans life, but to the whole as taken together. He therefore only deserves the name of a Wise Man, not that considers how to be rich and great when he is poor and mean, nor how to be well when he is sick, nor how to [Page 11] escape a present danger, nor how to compass a particular design; but he that considers the whole course of his life together, and what is fit for him to make the end of it, and by what means he may best enjoy the happiness of it. I confess it is one great part of a wise man never to propose too much happiness to himself here; for whoever doth so, is sure to find himself deceiv'd, and consequently is so much more miserable as he fails in his greatest expectations. But since God did not make men on purpose to be miserable, since there is a great difference as to mens conditions, since that difference depends very much on their own choice, there is a great deal of reason to place true wisdom in the choice of those things which tend most to the comfort and happiness of life.

2. That which gives a man the greatest satis­faction in what he doth, and either prevents or lessens or makes him more easily bear the troubles of life, doth the most conduce to the happiness of it. It was a bold saying of Epicurus, That it is more d [...]sirable to be miserable by acting according to rea­son, than to be happy in going against it; and I can­not tell how it can well agree with his notion of felicity: but it is a certain truth, that in the conside­ration of happiness, the satisfaction of a mans own mind doth weigh down all the external accidents of life. For, suppose a man to have riches and ho­nours as great as Ahoshuerus bestowed on his high­est [Page 12] favourite Haman; yet by his sad instance we find that a small discontent when the mind suffers it to encrease and to spread its venom, doth so weaken the power of reason, disorder the passions, make a mans life so uneasie to him, as to precipitate him from the height of his fortune into the depth of ru­ine. But on the other side if we suppose a man to be always pleased with his condition, to enjoy an even and quiet mind in every state, being neither lifted up with prosperity, nor cast down with adversity, he is really happy in comparison with the other. It is a meer speculation to discourse of any com­pleat happiness in this world; but that which doth either lessen the number, or abate the weight, or take off the malignity of the troubles of life, doth contribute very much to that degree of happiness which may be expected here.

3. The integrity and simplicity of a mans mind doth all this. (1.) It gives the greatest sa­tisfaction to a mans own mind. For although it be impossible for a man not to be liable to error and mistake, yet if he doth mistake with an innocent mind, he hath the comfort of his innocency when he thinks himself bound to correct his error. But if a man prevaricates with himself and acts against the sense of his own mind, though his conscience did not judge aright at that time, yet the goodness of the bare act with respect to the rule, will not prevent the sting [Page 13] that follows the want of inward integrity in doing it. The backslider in heart, saith Solomon, shall be fil­led Pro. 1 [...]. 1 [...]. with his own ways, but a good man shall be satisfied from himself. The doing just and worthy and ge­nerous things without any finister ends and de­signs, leaves a most agreeable pleasure to the mind, like that of a constant health which is bet­ter felt than expressed. When a man applies his mind to the knowledge of his duty, and when he doth understand it, (as it is not hard for an honest mind to do, for as the Oracle answered the Servant Clem. Alex. Str. 4. who desired to know how he might please his Ma­ster, If you will seek it, you will be sure to find it,) sets himself with a firm resolution to pursue it, though the rain falls, and the floods arise, and the winds blow on every side of him, yet he enjoys peace and quiet within, notwithstanding all the noise and bluster­ing abroad; and is sure to hold out after all, be­cause he is founded upon a rock. But take one that endeavours to blind, or corrupt or master his conscience, to make it serve some mean end or de­sign; what uneasie reflections hath he upon him­self, what perplexing thoughts, what torment­ing fears, what suspicions and jealousies do di­sturb his imagination and rack his mind? what art and pains doth such a one take to be believed honest and sincere? and so much the more, be­cause he doth not believe himself: He fears still he hath not given satisfaction enough, and by [Page 14] overdoing it, is the more suspected. It is a very unsa­tisfactory imployment that man hath who under­takes to perswade others of the truth of that which himself at the same time knows to be false; for he is not convinced by his own arguments, and there­fore despises those that are, and is afraid of those that seem to be; either he thinks them fools for be­lieving him, or that they only flatter and seem to believe when they do not; and then he thinks his arts are understood and his credit lost, and fears while he goes about to impose upon others, they may do the same by him. So that unless he could see into the hearts of men, (which would be no very comfortable sight to him) all his craft and subtilty must leave him under perplexity and continual fear. But suppose that through over­officiousness he happens to take some false step, and so fall into the disfavour of those whom above all he desired to please; how miserable is that mans condition when he finds himself forsaken of God, despised by men, and without any peace or con­tentment within? (2.) Because integrity doth more become a man, and doth really promote his in­terest in the World. It is the saying of Dio Chryso­stom an Heathen Orator, that Simplicity and Truth is a great and wise thing; but Cunning and Deceit is foolish Dle Ch [...]rs. de regn. or. 1. p. 6. and mean; For, saith he, observe the beasts, the more courage and spirit they have, the less art and subtilty they use; but the more timorous and ignoble they are, the more [Page 15] false and d [...]ceitful. True Wisdom and Greatness of mind raises a man above the need of using little tricks and devices. Sincerity and honesty carries one through many difficulties which all the arts he can invent would never help him through. For nothing doth a man more real mischief in the world than to be suspected for too much craft; because every one stands upon his guard against him, and suspects plots and designs where there are none intended; insomuch that though he speaks with all the sincerity that is possible, yet nothing he saith can be believed. And is this any part of true Wisdom to lose reputation, up­on which mens power and interest so much de­pends? From hence the most artificial men have found it necessary to put on a guise of simplicity and plainness, and make greatest protestations of their honesty when they most lie in wait to de­ceive. If then the reputation of integrity be so necessary, the main point to be considered as to wisdom is this, whether such reputation can be sooner gained and longer held by meer pretend­ing to simplicity, or by the practice of it? He that only pretends to it, must act otherwise than he designs, and yet is concerned to make others be­lieve he doth not: but in this he puts a force and constraint upon himself which is uneasie to any man, and he lets the vizard fall off sometimes when it is more observed than he thinks, and [Page 16] then his countenance is taken at the greatest dis­advantage, and this is given out for the only true Copy. And while he keeps it on; it is a hard matter to deceive all eyes; for it may be some by­standers have practised the same arts themselves, and they know the make and the fashion, and all the several strings which help to keep it from falling off: and when the suspicion grows strong, the laying aside the disguise will not be able to give satisfaction. But he that walketh uprigh [...] and Psal. 15. 2. worketh righteousness, and speaketh the truth in hi [...]t, as the Psalmist describeth the practice of integrity, may possibly meet with such as will be ready to condemn him for hypocrisie at first; but when they find he keeps to a certain rule, and pursues ho­nest designs, without any great regard to the opi­nion which others entertain concerning him; then all that know him cannot but esteem and value him; his friends love him, and his enemies stand in awe of him. The path of the just, saith Prov. 4. 18. the Wise man, is as the shining light which shineth more and more unto the perfect day. As the day be­gins with obscurity and a great mixture of dark­ness, till by quick and silent motions the light over­comes the mists and vapours of the night, and not only spreads its beams upon the tops of the Moun­tains, but darts them into the deepest and most sha­dy Valleys: thus simplicity and integrity may at first appearing look dark and suspicious, till by [Page 17] degrees it breaks through the clouds of envy and detraction, and then shines with a greater glory. Thus the Christian Simplicity was despised and reproached as folly and obstinacy, and many hard censures and sharp persecutions did men undergo for the sake of it for a long time, (as the most durable Kingdoms have had the sharpest pangs and been the longest in the birth:) but at last persecuted and despised innocency prevailed over all the craft and power of the World. It was then the great glory of Christians that their enemies could reproach them for nothing but their Re­ligion; that they were in all other things honest and good men, only they were Christians: and then true Religion is most like to prevail in the world, when mens other vertues commend their Religion, and not when zeal for their Religion is their only vertue. When righteousness, and peace, and humility, and charity, and temperance, and patience, and a constant integrity make men enquire after a Religion which produces such fruits as these are, then it will appear that Apostles and preachers of Religion are then wise as Serpents as to the promoting the honour of their Doctrine, when by the innocency and simplicity of their lives they are harmless as Dove [...].

(3.) But suppose that troubles and persecuti­ons do arise, what becomes of the harmless Doves then; they are soon taken and easily destroyed, [Page 18] when those who are only wise as Serpents may see many wayes to escape danger, which the inno­cent Doves dare not follow them in; what wis­dom then can there be in so much simplicity as makes suffering unavoidable?

This is the hardest part of the case, but that which our Saviour doth here suppose, when he saith, Behold I send you forth as sheep in the midst of Wolves; be ye therefore wise as Serpents, &c. So that, if we cannot make out this to hold in respect of sufferings, we must yield this counsel or advice of Christ to his Disciples to be defective as to the main occasion of it. To this therefore I answer in these particulars;

1. Our Saviour doth allow the wisdom of pre­vention as to all unnecessary dangers; for other­wise he would never have bid his Disciples be wise as Serpents, but only be as quiet as Sheep and as harm­less as Doves. God forbid that Christian simplici­ty should be taken in so ill a sense as to hinder us from a just and necessary care of our own safety: and not only for the preservation of our selves but of our Religion too. When we have liberty and opportunity to do it, it is being stupid as Sheep, and careless as the Ravens of their young ones, and not being only harmless as Doves, to neglect the doing it. In such a case it is a violation of the duty we owe to God and to Posterity, if we do not use all lawful endeavours for the preservation of [Page 19] our selves and our Religion from all the attempts of wicked and unreasonable men. But in case storms do arise after all our care, Christ doth not seem to forbid his Disciples making use of a pre­sent shelter till the storm be blown over; But when they persecute you in this City, flee to another Mat. 10. 23. And some say, the likeness to Doves is recom­mended in regard that its safety lyes chiefly in the quickness of its flight. But our Saviour neither imposes a necessity of suffering in all cases, nor allows a liberty of flying upon every apprehensi­on of danger, but leaves this matter to be deter­mined according to circumstances, as makes most for Gods honour, and his Churches good: i e. herein to be wise as Serpents and harmless as Doves; by not exposing themselves to needless dangers when they may be avoided with a good consci­ence, nor declining any necessary duty for the sake of any trouble which may follow upon it. There were some in the Primitive Church who thought it unlawful in any case to avoid persecution, and Ter­tullian pleads their cause with many plausible rea­sons; saying, that persecution is designed on purpose for Tertul. de fug. c. 1. &c. c. 6. tryal by God himself; that the allowance for flying was peculiar to the Apostles case, not to avoid persecution, but for the more speedy propagation of the Gospel; and some of the Christians were so far from flying that they ran upon persecution and seemed ambitious of Chrys. hom. 40. in Iuv. & Max. Martyrdom. S. Chrysostom saith, it was one of the [Page 20] reasons Julian gave why he would not openly persecute Christianity; because he knew the Christians gloried in be­ing Martyrs; and he would not humour them so much as to spread his Nets to catch such silly Doves, that never minded the danger they fell into. But the Christian Church never approved rash and indiscreet suffering, as much as it encouraged all Christians to patience and courage and perseve­rance; for they required not only a just cause, but a necessary occasion of suffering, and blamed those who hastned their own destruction; for they observe Clem. Alex. S [...]r. 4. p. 481. that Christ himself made use of prudent caution when he knew the Jews had designed to put him to death; for it is said, from thence forward he Joh. 11. 54. walked no more publickly among the Iews. When the storm seemed to threaten the leaders of the Church in such a manner that by their with­drawing Orig. in Job. Tom. 31. the People might probably enjoy more quiet, and not want help enough to perform the necessary Offices, even the Bishops were allowed to retire; and upon this ground S. Cyprian and C [...]pr. [...]p. 14 Athan. ac­ [...]ga. Athanasius justified themselves: but when the case is common, when the necessities of the Church require the presence of their Pastours, then the good Shepherd must lay down his life for the Sheep, as S. Augustin hath resolved this case in his Epistle to Ho­noratus. Aug cp. 1 [...]0 So that this whole matter belongs to Christian prudence, which is then most needful and fit to be used, when the resolution of the case de­pends [Page 21] upon particular circumstances; so as not to shun any necessary duty for fear of danger, nor to run upon any unnecessary trouble to shew our courage.

2. Since no wisdom is great enough to pre­vent all troubles of life, that is the greatest which makes them most easie to be endured. If the Wisdom of the Serpent could extend so far as to avoid all the calamities that mankind is subject to, it would have a mighty advantage over the simpli­city of the Dove; but since the most subtle contri­vers cannot escape the common accidents of life, but do frequently meet with more vexati­ons and crosses than innocent and undesigning men do, we are then to consider, since the burden must be born, what will make it sit most easily up­on our shoulders: And that which abates of the weight, or adds to our strength, or supports us with the best hopes, is the truest wisdom. And who is he that will harm you, saith S. Peter, if ye be fol­lowers 1 Pet. 3. 13. of that which is good? i. e. innocency is the best security against trouble which one can have in this World; but since the World is so bad as that the best may suffer in it, and for being such, yet that ought not to trouble or affright them; But and if ye suffer for righteousness sake, happy are ye; 14. and be not afraid of their terrour, neither be troubled. But should it not trouble a man to suffer innocent­ly? yes, with a respect to others, but as to him­self [Page 22] he may more justly be troubled if he suf­fered justly. For nothing makes sufferings so heavy to be born as a guilty Conscience: that is a burden more insupportable to an awakened mind than any outward affliction whatsoever. Iudas thought himself to be wise as a Serpent, not only in escaping the danger which he saw Christ and his Disciples falling into by the combination of the Priests and Scribes and Pharisees against them; but in ingratiating himself with them and ma­king a good bargain for his own advantage: but the want of a Dove-like innocency marred his whole design; and filled his conscience with such horrour as to make him own his guilt, and put an end to his miserable life. Where­as the other Apostles whose chief care was to preserve their innocency as to any wilful sins, though they had too much of the fearfulness as well as the simplicity of Doves, till the descent of the Holy Ghost upon them; yet they held out in the midst of fears and dangers, and came at last to rejoyce in their sufferings. And S. Paul tells A [...]t. 5. 41. us what the cause of it was, For our rejoycing is this, the 2 Cor. 1. 12. testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity, and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God, we have had our conversation in the world. See here, not only what peace and serenity, but what rejoycing follows an innocent mind, and the Testimony of a good conscience! when all the [Page 23] arts of fleshly Wisdom will be found vain and use­less, affording no satisfaction to a mans mind, when he looks back upon all of them, then since­rity and integrity of heart will give a man the most comfortable reflections, and fill him with the most joyful expectations. This ena­bles a man to look back without horrour, to look about him without shame, to look within with­out confusion, and to look forward without despondency. So that as the streight line is the shortest of any; so upon greatest considerati­on it will be found that the upright and sin­cere man takes the nearest way to his own hap­piness.

II. Prudent Simplicity implies the practice of Ingenuity; which is such a natural freedom in our words and actions, that men may thereby understand the sincerity of our mind and inten­tion. Not that men are bound to declare all they know to every impertinent enquirer, which is simplicity without prudence; but in all cases where­in men ought to declare their minds, to do it without fraud and dissimulation; and in no case to design to overreach and deceive others. This is that simplicity of Conversation which our Saviour requires when he saith, let your communication be yea, yea, nay, nay, i. e. you ought to converse Mat. 5. 37. with so much sincerity, that your bare affirma­tion [Page 24] or denial may be sufficient, this being the proper use of speech that men may understand each others minds by their words: for whatso­ever is more than these cometh of evil, i. e. the wick­edness of mankind and that distrust and suspi­cion which is occasioned by it, is the reason they are ever put to make use of oaths to make their Testimony appear more credible. And therefore nothing but such necessity can justifie the use of them; Oaths and Wars being never lawful but when they are necessary. Some un­derstand M [...] al [...]. m [...]. [...] 12. S [...]ct. [...]. p. 98. the reduplication of those words, yea, yea, nay, nay, after a more emphatical manner; viz. that our words must not only agree with the truth of the thing, but with the conception and sense of our minds; and so the greatest candour and sincerity is commanded by them. Truth was described of old, sitting upon an Adamant, Themist. orat. 3. with garments white as snow, and a light in her hand, to intimate that clearness and simplicity and firm­ness that doth accompany it; such as was most remarkable in the primitive Christians; who ab­horred any thing that looked like dissimulation and hypocrisie, especially in what concerned their Religion. In this they were plain and open, hearty and sincere, neither exasperating their enemies by needless provocations, nor using any artificial ways of compliance for their own security When the casting some few grains of [Page 25] incense on the altar, and pouring out wine before the Emperors statue might have saved their lives, they chose rather to dye than to defile their con­sciences with that impure and Idolatrous Wor­ship. To be dismissed after summons to the tri­bunal without compliance was a scandal, and rai­sed Euscb. l. 8. c. 3. suspicions of some secret assurances given; to be proclaimed to have sacrificed though they had not, and not to contradict it was great infamy; To procure a certificate of sacrificing though they did not; or to pay fees to the Officers to be ex­cused from doing it, made them a sort of libel­lati, although their names were never entred in the Heathen Rolls, and they were forced to un­dergo Rigalt. ad Cypr. cp. 81. severe penance before they were restored to the communion of the Church. So much simplicity and singleness of heart was then sup­posed necessary to the Christian profession. No directing the intention, no secret reservation, no abso­lution either before committing the fact or im­mediately upon confession of it, were ever heard of or allowed in those days of Christian inno­cency and simplicity. If the Heathen Officers sought after Christians, they neither lied to them, Aug. d [...] Mend. c. 1 [...] nor betrayed their Brethren; but would rather endure torments themselves, than expose others to them; for which reason S. Augustin highly commends the resolution of Firmus an African Bishop, who rather chose to be tortured himself [Page 26] than discover a Christian committed to his care, who was sought after for no other reason, but because he was a Christian; and the Heathen Emperour himself was so pleased with it, that for his sake he forgave the other person and suffer­ed him to enjoy his liberty. When the Christi­ans were summoned before the Heathen Tri­bunals, they used no shifting tricks or evasions, they concealed no part in their minds of what was necessary to make what they spake to be true; they did not first peremptorily deny what they knew to be true, and then back such a denial with horrid oaths and dreadful imprecations upon themselves, and after all think to justifie the doing so by vertue of some secret reservation in their own minds. Is this becoming the simplicity and ingenuity of Christians? Such may possibly think themselves Wise as Serpents in so doing, but I am sure they are far from being innocent as Doves. But are there any who go under the name of Christians, who own and defend such practices? I think indeed scarce any who went under the name of honest Heathens ever did it. For they did not only require constancy and fidelity in oaths and promises, but simplicity an [...] sinceri­ty both in the making and keeping [...] them. They condemned the Romans wh [...]t to avoid their oath by a trick, and [...]ck Cicer. de Offic. l. 1. [...]t 3. to the Carthaginians: they mig [...]e [Page 27] constancy of Regulus in observing the words of his oath as to his return, although very capable of a mental reservation; and if he did not pro­mise the Carthaginians to perswade the Roman Se­nate to the Peace, he behaved himself with great sincerity as well as constancy. When the King of Persia thought by a trick to avoid the Eutych. Alex. To. 2. p. 119. oath he had made to one of his Neighbour Princes, viz. That he would not pass such a stone which was set up as a Boundary between them, and he took up the stone and caused it to be carried before his Army; his Counsel­lours told him they feared such deceit would never prosper with him, because as the Prince sent him word, Covenants are to be under­stood according to the plain meaning of the p. 123. words, and not according to any secret reser­vation.

Since then the very Heathens disallowed such artifices and frauds, are there any worse than Heathens that justifie and maintain them? Is not this rather an artifice and fraud of their Adversaries to render them odious? But even in this respect we ought to be harmless as Doves, and therein lies a necessary part of Christian In­genuity, in not charging on others more than they are guilty of.

I shall therefore fairly represent the doctrine held in the Church of Rome about these matters, and [Page 28] leave you to judge how far it is consistent with Christian Simplicity.

There are some things wherein the Divines of the Roman Church are agreed, and some things wherein they differ.

The things wherein they are agreed are these.

1. That an Officious lie is but a venial sin. This they do not stick to declare to be the common opinion of all their Divines. Ex communi-omnium sen­tentiâ, saith Azorius, A lie that hurts no-body, but is in­tended for the good of others is no mortal sin; and herein Azor. Ins [...]it. Moral. par. [...]. l. 13. c. 1. [...]. 2. Re [...]inald. prax. l. 24. sect. 5. n. 13. all are agreed, saith Reginaldus; because say they, where there is no other fault but the meer falsity, it is not of its own nature and kind any mortal sin; for a lye of it self is a harmless thing, or at least, saith Lessius, the hurt is not great that it doth, and it is no Less. de just­ [...] pure, l. 2. c. [...]7. d [...]b. 6. n. 40. great matter whether men be deceived or not, if they do not suffer much by it; and from hence he concludes it to be venial in its own nature. It is true, they say an officious lie may become a mortal sin by accident, when it is confirmed by an oath, when it is too publick and scandalous and used by those from whom the people expects Truth, as Bishops and Preach­ers and Religious men, saith Sayr. Not even in Sayr. Cl [...]. Reg. l. 11. c. 3. [...]. 1 [...]. N [...]va [...]. Man [...] [...]8 [...]. 2. [...]. [...] them, saith Navarr, unless the scandal be great, or their consciences tell them they are mortal sins; or some other circumstances make it so. If it be in matter of judicature; although the thing be small, yet I think a lie a mortal sin, saith Cajetan, because men are [Page 29] then bound to speak truth. That reason is of no force at all, say Soto and Navarr, for that circumstance alone doth Soto de rat. tezendi [...]e­ [...]r [...]r. memb. 2. qu. [...]. Nava [...]. [...] supr. Bassae. The [...]. Pract. [...]. pec­cat. 1. [...]. 3. 8. Bell. de omiss. grat. & stat. pec­cati, l. 1. c. 13 not alter the nature of the sin. So that if a man tells never so many lyes, provided he intend to hurt no body by them, they do not make one mortal sin. For that is a fixed Rule among the Casicists, that an infinite number of venial sins do not amount to one mortal; and consequently though they have obliquity in them, yet they do not put a man out of the Favour of God. But upon these princi­ples what security have men to invent and spread abroad lyes, provided they are intended for a good end in their own opinion? What sincerity is to be expected, when the confessing a truth may do them injury; and the telling a lye may do them good? For even Cajetan himself makes that only Cajet. in 2. 2. q. 110. a [...]. 4. a pernicious lye, when a man designs to do mischief by it. They cry out upon it as a great scandal for any of us to say, they think it lawful to lye for the Catholick cause; and in truth they do not say so in words; for they still say, a lye is unlawful for any end whatsoever; but here lyes the subtilty of it; They grant it in general to be a fault, but such a venial, such an inconsiderable fault, if it be for a good end; and they have so many wayes to expiate the guilt of venial sins; that the difference is very lit­tle as to the practice of it, from making it no sin at all. And some think they had better own down­right Grot. de ju [...] belli & pa [...] l. 3. c. [...] n. 17. lying, than make use of such absurd wayes [Page 30] of evading it by mental reservations; by which men may be truly said to affirm that which they do deny, and to deny that which they do affirm. But notwithstanding this,

2. They are agreed, that in some cases, th [...] which otherwise would be a lye, is none by [...] help of a mental reservation. Let us not there­fore do the Iesuites so much injury to charge that upon them as their peculiar doctrine, which is common to all their Divines and Casuists. And herein F. Parsons was in the right, when he as­serted, that the doctrine of Equivocation and mental re­servation Treatise tending to Mitigation. c. 7. §. 2, 3. hath been received in the Roman Church for, four hundred years: only some have extended the practice of it farther than others have done. But in the Case of Confession they all agree without exception, saith the same Author, that if a man hath confessed c. 10 §. 1. a thing to a Priest, he may deny and swear that he never confessed it, without being guilty either of a lye or perjury; reserving this in his mind, that he hath not confessed it so as to utter it to another. And I find the greatest Genes. Sc­pulveda de rat. D [...]endi testim. c. [...]. B [...]rns c. AEq [...]v. §. 28. n. 4. p. 255. Hurtad [...] Re­solut. Moral. p. 449. Caram [...]. de restrict. mental. art. 13. p. 360. Steph. à Sancto Paulo Theol. [...] tr. 5. disp. 5. aub. 7. §. 3. n. 232. enemies to the Use of Mental reservation in other cases, do allow it in this; and do not barely al­low it, but think a man bound in conscience to use it, under grievous sin, saith Parsons, when by no other means of silence, diversion, or evasion the said secresie can be concealed. I do not now meddle with the [Page 31] inviolableness of the Seal of Confession, which I do not deny a great regard ought to be had to, (where an obligation greater than that of keep­ing a secret doth not take it off, as where the Life of my Prince or the publick Safety are concern­ed) not from any Divine Institution, but from the baseness of betraying a Trust: but I wonder how they came to think it to be no lye or perjury in this Case, and yet to be so in any other? It is to no purpose to alledge other Reasons peculiar to this ase, for the single question is, whether what a man keeps in his mind, can keep him from be­ing guilty of a lye, or of perjury in his words? If it cannot, then not in the case of Confession; if it may, then a mental reservation will equally do it in any other Case. And consequently no man who doth allow it in this case, can on that ac­count disallow it in any other.

This Navarr very well saw, and therefore from Navarr. in c. human. a [...] ­res, qu. 1. n. 2, 3. the allowance of it in this Case of Confession he de duces the lawfulness of the use of it in all cases wherein a man is not bound to speak all he knows. The common answer in this case is, Quare om­nes qui fa­tentur quod Confessarius verè [...]icere potest, Ille hoc non est mihi confessus, subintelligendo ita ut tenear prodere; cog [...]n­tur profecto consiteri quod etiam alius quilibet qui non tenetur aliquid dicere, verè poterit respondere illud sibi non esse dictum, subintelligendo non esse ita ei dictum, ut te­neatur id prod [...]e. Cum igitur omnes con [...]itcantur illud, nemo debet hoc negare. Nav. ib. n. 8. that in confession the Priest doth not know as man but as God; and therefore when he is asked any thing as a man [Page 32] he may deny what he knows as God. But Navarr at large shews the folly and absurdity of this Answer, because this doth not salve the contra­diction, for to say he doth not know is as much as to say he doth not any way know it; which is false if he doth know it in any capacity: and it is false that he doth not know it as man, because he knows it as a Priest, and as such he is not God but man. And the very Seal of Confession discovers that it is made known to him as a Man, and with the consent of the penitent a Priest may reveal what he heard in confession; and in other cases he may make use of that knowledge as a man, without particular discoverie. I do not therefore wonder to see the stout and plain-hearted Defenders of the lawful­ness of this practice in other cases, to express so much astonishment at the nicety and scrupulosity of those, who dispute against it as so dangerous and pernicious a thing upon other occasions, when they think it so pious and innocent in this. For, say they, If it be a lie to deny what a man knows, it is not in the power of the Church or of God himself for Si enim est mendacium inficiari quod nove­ris, non est in Ecclesiae, imò neque in ip­sius Dei potestate, quocunque tandem ex sine efficere, ut Sacerdos licitè inficietur quae no­vit, Emoner. Splendor verit. Moral. c. Barnes. c. 16. n. 3. any end whatsoever to make it lawful for a Priest to deny what he knows. And if it be not a lie in that Case, neither is it in any other.

But although none in the Roman Church are able to answer that argument, yet I must do some of [Page 33] them that Justice, as to clear them from the owning the allowance of this practice in o­ther common cases upon the same ground. Yet I fear upon strict enquiry we shall find that those do equivocate more who seem to deny it, than those who openly assert it. For, although two persons of the Roman Church seem wholly to reject it, except in the case of Confession; yet the Genes. Se­pulveda de nat. dicendi Testimon. one of them is charged with Emoncr. c. 13. p. 241. singularity and suspicion of Here sie, and the Barns c. AEquivocat. other with little less than Heresie and Apostasie; and their proceedings with him shew what esteem they had of him. After Fa. Barns had written his Book against Equivocation, and otherways provoked the Iesuites, by order of the Pope and by means of Albertus, he was seized on, and carried to Rome, and there died mad in the Inquisition. V. Leodegar. Q [...]intin. Hoeduum advers. Th. Hurt [...]do p. [...]. where the Iesuite relates the story. But most of their other Divines and Ca­suists do approve it in case of Testimony and accusation. So­to V. Theophil. Ra [...] sive Emoncrium adit. ad Disput. n. 4, 5, 6. doth allow a Witness be­ing examined about a secret crime to say, he doth not know any thing of it, although he were privy to it: and for this he quotes some Divines of great Authority before him; as he might have done many others: but he will not allow him to say he did not see the fact S [...]to de rat. reg. secret. memb. 3. qi [...]. 3. [...]ncl. 4. Adrian. 6. quod l. 11. ad 2. princip. C. C. Sylvest. v. Iu [...]am. committed, nor that he heard nothing of it, because, saith he, words of knowledge seem to be restrained by judicial proceedings to that which a man is bound to declare. But this [...]ubtilty the latter Casuists will by no means admit of, and allow denying the fact in any words; [Page 34] and say of him, that he was afraid where no fear was. They therefore say, It is enough that a witness Cos [...]. Philiarchus de O [...]c. Sacerd. [...]. 1. p. 2. l. 3. c. 14. Navar. ubi supra [...]. 9. Sayr. Clav. Reg. l. 12. c. 17. n. 24. answers to what ought to have been the intention of the Iudge, whatever his actual intention was; and therefore if a man supposes the Judge not to proceed legally Sa [...]z de juram. l. 3. c. 10. n. 3. against him, he may not only deny the fact he knows, but swear to that denial, provided he keeps this in his mind that he denied any such fact which belonged to the Iudges conusance; or that he did not do it publickly, M [...] de [...] in 4. [...]. disp. 2. Testis ver [...] [...] Neseio quam verè sciat, quia testis non tenetur respondere Iudici secundum suam iniquitatem, sed scundum id quod potest ut Iudex, et secundum mentem quam debet habere, etiams [...] [...] non habeat. Mich. Salon. 2. 2. q. 69. art 2. controv. 11. and in this case, say they, there is neither lie, nor per jury.

Others say, no more is necessary to avoid a lie, or perjury in such cases, but only to understand the word of denial with this restriction so as to be bound to tell you. And this is the common case which Par­sons Q [...]o igi­tur [...] ne­gat [...], id i [...] [...] debet, ut ne­get se non co [...]t tale crim [...]n de quo Iudex interrogate debeat. Et idem est dicere, non feci hoc-crimen, ac si diceret non [...] feci, quod varum est. Et cum haec responsio sit vera, nullum [...]rit peccatum, [...] in­tercedat [...]. Lud. Carbo tr. de restit. q. 19. concl. 8. and others speak of. If a man be examined upon oath whether he be a Priest or not, they say, he may with a safe conscience deny it with that poor reservation in his mind; and that is a known rule in this case among them that what a [Page 35] man may truly say, he may truly swear. So that a Priest may Qua [...]s re­gulariter ad [...] d [...] ­beat [...] ­ranti juxta mentem ejus, fallit tamen ca doctrina, quando alia mente quam debet ad­juratur; tunc enim sufficit ut respondeat verum secundum mentem & intentionem s [...] [...]n, licet falsum sit secundum mentem interrogantis, & a [...]uranti [...]. Greg. Sayr. C [...]v. Reg. l. 12. c. 17. n. 21. &c. Parsons Treatis. of [...]i [...]gat. c. 8. n. 20. 5 [...]. 5 [...]. c. 9. n. 2. not only say, but swear he is none, and yet by this ad­mirable art neither tell a lie, nor forswear himself.

Some of later times being made sensible of the pernicious consequences of the imputation of such doctrines and practices to their Church have en­deavoured to qualifie and restrain the Abuse of them. But upon due examination we shall find this to be only a greater art to avoid the odium of these things and a design to deceive us with the greater fineness. For they allow the same words to be said either in oaths or Testimonies, i. e. a plain denial of what they know to be true, but only differ from the other as to the way of excusing such a denial from being a lie: which say they, de­pends on the circumstances of denying, and not upon the reservation of the mind. So Malderus himself grants, that a guilty person being examined upon M [...]. de ab [...]. c. Mental. c. 10 §. 1. p. 64. a capital Offence, may deny the fact with this reser­vation, so as to be bound to tell it; but then he saith, the circumstances give that sense and not the reservati­on in his mind. But saith Emonerius (or rather a famous Iesuite under that name) these cir­cumstances E [...]ner. splend [...] e [...]i [...] mo [...]l [...]. c. 16. only limit the words to such a sense which they [Page 36] cannot otherwise bear, because in such circumstances a man is not bound to declare what he knows, therefore, saith he, whereever there is a reasonable cause of concealing what a man knows, such mental reservations are to be under­stood, and so there is the same liberty allowed in practice.

Among the late Casuists none hath seemed to have written with more pomp and vanity against mental Restrictions than Caramuel; yet he not only allows a Confessour to deny upon oath what he Caramuel Haplot [...]s sive de re­strict. men­tal. art. 13. p. 360. heard in Confession; but in case of secret Murder that a man may with a good conscience deny the Fact, though the Judge be competent and pro­ceed according to due form of Law. What way can this be excused from a lye, since he saith, a mental reservation will not do it? He hath a fetch beyond this. A Iudge is only to proceed upon evidence; if there be no sufficient evidence against him, he may persist in denying it, because it cannot be fully proved, and therefore his de­nyal, saith he, is of such a fact which he can pro­ceed upon, and what cannot be proved is none in Law. These are the shifts of those who seem Qu [...] [...] plen [...] [...] non [...], infectu [...] ci­vili [...] [...] virt [...]aliter est, hoc est prudentura judicio & estimtione ita s [...] [...], [...] non [...]. At quae s [...]ta non sunt negari possunt; ergo [...] qu [...] s [...]. C [...]. p. 302. most to oppose the Iesuitical art of Equivocation; and inveigh bitterly against it, as a thing wholly repugnant to the Truth of our words and the sin­cerity of our minds, and that Candour and Sim­plicity [Page 37] which ought to be in Christians.

But in my apprehension they had altogether as good take up with the dull way of lying, or with the common artifice of equivocation and mental reservation, as make use of such refinings as these.

But however, we gain this considerable advan­tage by them, that they do assure us, that mental reservations are so far from excusing the words C [...] 2. 2. [...]. [...]9. art. 7. ad 4. spoken from being a lye, that they contain a pre­meditated lye; and so the sin is the more aggravated by them; that all such propositions are in them­selves false, and designed only to deceive others, I [...]o [...] ipsa sa [...] restricti­one convin­citur non praecipitan­ter fuisse mentitus, sed quod [...] modo meditatus fuisse menda­ciu [...] quod gravitatem peccati a [...] ­get. M [...] ­der. de a [...]su restr. ment. c. 10. §. 2. p. 70. Ut quidvis li [...]t falsissi, mum verum fieri po [...]it restrictione sola mentali. Id. p. 28. Caram [...]l. lb. art. 2. concl. 4. p. 28. and so all the effect and consequence of lying follow them; that there is nothing so false but may be made true, nothing so true but may be made false by this means. Caramuel gives a re­markable instance of this kind in some of the Ar­ticles of the Creed; for by this way of mental reser­vation a man might truly say, Christ was not born, un­derstanding it secretly, at Constantinople. He did not suffer, viz. at Paris. He was not buried, viz. in Persia. He did not rise again, viz. in Japan. Nor ascended into Heaven, viz. from America: so that by this blessed Art, the most abominable Heresies may be true doctrine; and the most cursed lyes prove precious Truths.

Besides, they confess that it takes away all confi­dence in mens words, and destroys all sincerity of conver­sation, [Page 38] and the very inclination to speak Truth: For as Th. [...]b. Stat. Morum Tom. 1. p. 17 [...]. [...]. p. 24. A [...]. I [...]. p. [...]. [...]. c. 4. [...]. [...]. [...]. [...]. [...]. Malderus well observes, there is no reason men should not have the same liberty in private conversation which is allowed them before an incompetent Iudge: and some Iesuites themselves grant, that if the common use of it be allowed, there can be no security as to mens words, there being nothing so false but it may be made true in this way. And no man can be charged with a lye till they know his heart; nor the Devil himself in all his lying Oracles; who surely had wit enough to make some secret reservation; and a very little will serve for that according to Suarez, who saith, [...] de R [...]. To. 2. l. 3. c. 10. n. 4. it is enough in the general, that a man intend to affirm or deny in some true sense; although he know not what.

Since from their own Authors, we thus far un­derstand the mischievous consequence of these practices, it will not be amiss to set down briefly the cases, wherein they are commonly al­lowed.

1. In general, Whereever there is a just and reasonable Cause for concealing of Truth. For that is the most general rule they give in this case; where a man [...] & [...]ure l. [...]. [...]. 4 [...]. [...] 4 [...]. is not bound to speak his whole mind, he may utter one half, and reserve the other half of one entire proposition. Now a just and reasonable Cause with them is declining of danger, or obtaining any ad­vantage to themselves either as to body, honour, or estate. In all such cases, they allow that a man may speak [Page 39] what is simply false and swear to it too, provided that he Potest ali­quis jurare simpliciter falsum ad­dendo ali­quid mente, ex quo jura­me [...]um sit verum, quo­ties interve­nit justa causa. Iu [...]a causa esse potest necessitas, vel utilitas ad salutem corporis, honoris, rerum familiarium, vel etiam qua [...]lo injusta interrogatio proponitur. Dian. part. 3. tr. 6. resol. 30. Sed juramentum cum deficit sola discretio, non est peccatum mortale. Sanch. in sum. tom. 1. l. 3. c. 6. n. 22. aliique. hold something in his mind which makes it true. But if a man happen to do it without just cause, what then? doth he lye? doth he forswear himself? by no means. But he is guilty of Indiscretion: and is that all? then they tell him for his comfort, that an oath that wants only discretion is no mortal sin.

2. If a man be barred the use of Equivocation, or mental reservation, that doth not hinder the using it, even in renouncing equivocation. Even Soto himself saith, that if a Magistrate requires from a person to speak Soto de rati­on. tegend. secret. memb. 3. qu. 3. concl. 4. simply all he knows of such a matter; i. e. without any reservation; a man may still answer he knows nothing of it; i. e. with this reservation, to tell him. But what if in particular, saith he, he asks about a secret Murder; whether Peter killed John, which he alone saw, doth it not seem to be a lye for him to say, he knows nothing of it? No, saith he; for still the meaning is, so as he is bound to tell. F. Parson speaks home to this point; Sup­pose, V. Barns c. AEquivo­cat. §. 20. n. 3. p. 174. §. 22. n. 7. saith he, a Iudge asks a man whether he doth equi­vocate or not? He may answer, Not, but with another equivocation. But if he still suspects he equivocates, what then is to be done? he may deny it with another equivo­cation; and so, toties quoties, as often as he asks, the [Page 40] other may deny and still with a farther equivocation. Sup­pose a Priest, saith Iacob. à Graffiis, be asked a thing he heard in confession, may he deny that he knew it? Yes, saith he, and swear it too; because he knew it not as man. Iac. de Graff [...]s de­cis. aur [...]c l. 1. c. 23. n. 3. Quando quis iniquè inter­rogat exclu­dendo om­nem aequivo­cationem, posse inter­rogatum u [...]i aequivocati­one apponen­do aliquam particulam in mente, per quam ver [...]m essiciatur juramentum. Bonacina To. 2. disp. 4. q. 1. punct. 12. n. 5. But suppose he be asked whether he knew it not as man, but as God? He may deny it still, with another equivocati­on, i. e. not as God himself, but as his Minister. What if a Iudge, saith Bonacina, be so unreasonable to bar all equivocation? yet the respondent may equivocate still. And he cites several others of theirs who defended this practice; and therefore Barns saith, it is so slippery a thing, that the faster you think to hold it, the sooner it gets from you.

3. If a man be charged with a secret crime, which cannot be sufficiently proved by Testimo­nies beyond all exception, he may safely deny it, though he were guilty of it. If a man, saith Lessi­us, can make any exception against the Witnesses, or shew Less. de ju­stit. & jure, l. 2. c. 31. dub. 3. n. 8. that it was a report spread abroad by men, that bore ill will to him, or that there was some mistake in it, he is not bound to confess the truth, and consequently he may deny it with a reservation. Nay, as long as the thing is so se­cret, that a man may probably defend himself, and hope to escape, he may persist in denying the fact; although the Iudge do proceed according to due Form of Law, saith the same Lessius. It is no mortal sin to deny it, saith [Page 41] Filliucius. Not, though others be like to suffer for it, Filliuc. Mor. Quaest. tr. 40. c. 9. n. 266. Sà Apho­rism judici­al. Actus, n. 3. saith Em. Sà; especially if the punishment be capital, saith Filliucius and others in him. But if a man doth suspect whether the Judge doth proceed according to due form of Law, which depends upon his opi­nion of the proofs and Witnesses brought against him, they make no question then, but he may de­ny the fact by help of an easie reservation in his mind.

4. If a man hath denyed the Fact when he was bound to confess it in Court, according to their rules, yet they will not allow that he is bound to confess it before execution. Because saith Navarr, confession to a Priest and absolution by him is Navarr. Man. c. 25. n. 38. Dian. Sum. v. Reus n. 12. Iac. de Graffiis, l. 3. c. 7. n. 17. Escobar tr. 6. ex. 6. n. 62. Azor. p. 3. l. 13. c. 25. dub. 5. Sayr. Clav. Reg. l. 12. c. 17. Layman. l. 3. tr. 6. c. 5. n. 3. Sà Aphor. de Reo. n. 5, 6. Bass. reus p. 5. n. 15. sufficient for salvation. His Confessour ought not to put him upon it, saith Diana. Not un­less it be clearer than Noon-day that the Law compels them to it, say others; i. e. that they have no kind of exceptions again the judicial proceedings. Some thought they ought then to do it for the reputation of the Judges who otherwise might suffer in the esteem of the People as condemning innocent persons; but this is over-ruled by the generality of the later Ca­suists, because the presumption is alwayes on the side of the Judges, when they proceed according to Law. But one of the latest Casuists hath given [Page 42] an excellent Reason against Imo pu [...]llanines & si ul [...]i [...]bentur si ea fate [...]ntur. Dicast illo de jura [...]ento d [...]sp. 2 dub. 12. n. 377. publick Confession, be­causeI [...]go de Iust [...]t. & jure Tom. 2. Desp. [...]. s [...]. 1. n. 19.they are accounted Cowards and Fools that make it.

5. Where the Judge is supposed incompetent, they make no question of the use of Equivocation and mental reservation in denying the crimes they are guilty of. An incompetent Iudge is one that wants lawful jurisdiction over the person; as if a Lay­man pretend to judge one in Orders according to their doctrine of exemption; or if a Heretick or ex­communicated person take upon him to judge good Catholicks.

And thus they look on all our Iudges as incompe­tent; of which, besides the general charge of He­resie, we have this particular evidence. When the unquietness of the Iesuites gave just occasion to those severe Laws which were made after the Bull of Pius 5. several cases were proposed at G. Abb [...]t de M [...]ndac. p. 41, 42. & in p [...]f. p. 9. &c. Rome for Resolution in order to the better conduct of their affairs here; and among the rest this, Suppose an oath be required in an Heretical Court before incompetent Iudges (quales sunt omnes nunc in An­glia, as all are now in England) how far doth such an oath bind? The Answer is, no farther than the Person that swears did intend it should: and he may either refuse the oath, or he may Sophisticè ju [...] are & Sophisticè respondre: he may swear and answer with [Page 43] juggling and equivocation: and he that discovers any by vertue of his oath commits a double sin. And in the Answers approved by Pius 5. our Iudges are declared incompetent; and our Courts of Iudicature unlawful Courts; and therefore no man by his oath is bound to conf [...]ss any thing to the prejudice of the Catholick Cause; nor to an­swer according to the intention of the Iudge, but in some true sense of his own.

So that we not only see the doctrine and pra­ctice of equivocation approved by the Holy Sec, but all legal Authority among us utterly rejected as having no jurisdiction over them. And all who allow this practice do thereby discover that what they call Heresie doth take away the civil Rights and Properties of men. For if Heresie makes out Iudges incompetent, by necessary consequence it must deprive the King of the right to his Throne, it must take away all the obligation of our Laws, and the title every man hath to his estate. Such pernicious consequences do follow the wisdom of the Serpent, where it is not joyned with the inno­cence and simplicity of the Dove: and not only perni­cious to Government, but to themselves too when these arts are understood and discovered; for what se­curity can there be from the most solemn oaths, the most deep and serious protestations of those persons who at the same time believe that none of these things do bind them, but by some secret reserve they may turn the sense quite another way [Page 44] than we imagined, and when they pretend the greatest simplicity and seem to renounce all equivoca­tion, may then equivocate the most of all? If men had invented ways to fill the world with per­petual jealousies and suspicions of their practices and intentions, they could never have thought of any more effectual than these two, that Heresie, or differing in opinion from them, deprives them of their civil rights, and that they may deny what is true, and swear to what is false, and promise what they never mean to perform by vertue of some secret reservation in their minds. How can they live as fellow-subjects with others who do not own the same Authority, the same Laws, the same Magistrates, who look on all He­reticks in a State of Usurpation, and all judicial pro­ceedings against them as meer force and violence, and parallel the case of answering in our Courts with that of oaths and promises to Thieves and Rob­bers? for upon these grounds all the bonds of So­ciety Molan. de side haeret. serv. l. 4. c. 8. are dissolved where what they call Heresie prevails; and no obligation can lie upon them by vertue of any Laws, or oaths, or promises. I do not say that particular persons may not, upon common principles of honesty, make conscience of these things: but I speak of what follows from these allowed principles and practices among them, and what may be justly expected by vertue of them. How can we be sure that any man means what [Page 45] he saith, when he holds it lawful to reserve a mean­ing quite different from his words? What can oaths signifie to the satisfaction of others; when it is impossible to understand in what sense they swear? and when they pretend the greatest sim­plicity in renouncing all arts, may then by allow­ance of their Casuists use them the most of all? But can men upon sober reflections think it any Barns de AEquivocat. §. 23. n. 2. p. 194. part of true Wisdom to lose all the force of their oaths and promises with those among whom they live? Will they never stand in need of being believed or trusted? And then, if they desire it never so much, how can they recover any credit with out plain disowning all such principles, and in such a way if such can be found out, which is un­capable of any mental reservation. Such kind of Artifices can only serve for a time, but when once they are throughly understood, they fall heavily upon those that use them. For although frost and fraud may hold for a while, yet according to the true saying, they both have dirty ends. The summ of what I have to say is this, That however Simplicity and sincerity of conversation may in some particular circumstances expose men to greater danger and difficulties than fraud and deceit may do; yet upon the whole matter considering the con­sequences of both, it will be found much greater Wisdom always to preserve the innocency of the Dove, than to use the greatest subtilty of the Serpent with­out [Page 46] it. Which although it may seem to take off from the fineness of the Serpents Wisdom, yet it adds very much to the safety and soundness of it.

III. Prudent simplicity lies in the practice of Meekness and Patience. The Serpent doth not imploy its subtilty only in defending it self and avoiding dangers, but in watching its opportunity to do mischief, A [...]ist. hist. Anim. l. 1. c. 1. Gen. 49. 17. being both revengeful and insidious: therefore we read of the Adder in the path that lies undiscerned in the sands, that biteth the horse-heels so that the rider shall fall backward. It doth mischief se­cretly, spitefully and artificially, by fit means and instruments. But Christ would have his Disci­ples to be Wise to that which is good, but simple or harm­less concerning evil; so S. Paul explains these words of Rom. 16. 19. our Saviour, Be ye wise as Serpents and harmless as Doves. Which although they want no Gall, yet do not shew that they have any, whatsoever usage they meet with. Christ foretels his Disciples the injuries and reproaches they were like to suffer un­der, that their condition was like to be no better than that of sheep in the midst of Wolves; notwith­standing he would not suffer them to be furious as wild beasts, or cruel and rapacious as the Birds of prey; but in gentleness and meekness and pati­ence to be as harmless as Doves. Not, as though Christianity did forbid men the just and lawful ways of preserving themselves, but it takes away [Page 47] all malice and hatred and revenge and cruelty out of mens minds; it softens and sweetens and calms the tempers of men, and fills them with Kindness Mat. 5. 44. and Good Will even to their enemies, not being o­vercome with evil, but overcoming evil with Good. Ne­ver Rom. 12. 21. any Religion in the world was such an enemy to all kind of Malice, Revenge and Cruelty as the Christian; that which we call good nature seems to come very near that Divine grace which S. Paul calls Charity, and doth so admirably describe and so highly extol above miraculous gifts and some of the greatest graces. Charity suffereth long 1 Cor. 13. 4, 5, 6. 7. and is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not it self; is not puffed up; doth not behave it self unseemly; seeketh not her own; is not easily provoked; thinketh no evil; rejoyceth not in iniquity but rejoyceth in the truth; beareth all things, believeth all things: hopeth all things, endureth all things, i. e. in short, it hopes, believes, and does the greatest good; it modestly bears and heartily forgives the greatest evil. And here­in consists that Dove-like temper, which Christ would have his disciples remarkable for. Which however it may be despised and scorned by furi­ous and self-willed men, yet upon consideration it will be found a great part of the Wisdom of living. Revenge is the pleasure only of weak and disor­derly minds: for what real satisfaction can ano­thers loss or pain give to any considering man? The only pretence or colour for it is the prevent­ing [Page 48] more mischief coming on ones self; and yet e­very act of revenge is a fresh provocation; so that either quarrels must continue without end, or some body must think it their Wisdom to forgive at last. And if so, I appeal to any mans under­standing whether it were not greater Wisdom to have prevented at first all the vexation and disqui­et, besides other inconveniences, which must needs follow a continued quarrel. If any thing tend to make a mans life easie and pleasant to himself and others, it is innocency and gen­tleness, and patience, and doing good and ver­tuous things, whatever the world thinks of them.

And this was it which recommended the Chri­stian Religion to the World, that its great business and design was, to perswade the disobedient to the Wisdom Luke 1. 17. of the just; by laying aside all malice, and all guile, and bypocrisies, and all evil speakings; not rendering evil for evil, 1 Pet. 2. 1. 3. 9. 2. 20, or railing for railing; and if when they did will they suffer­ed for it, by taking it patiently; following therein the 21, 22, 23. example of Christ himself, who did no sin neither was guile found in his mouth; who when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatned not, but committed himself to him that judged righteously. These are the instructions of S. Peter, to the primitive Christians, and the ways he judged most effectual to pro­mote the honour of their Religion, among those who were most apt to think and speak evil of it. [Page 49] And because that was a very corrupt and a busie and factious age, especially in those Cities where the Iews and Gentiles inhabited together, therefore he adviseth the Christians not only to purity and in­nocency, but to a quiet submission to Authority, and however the Iews looked on Heathen Government as 2. 11 12 a meer appointment of men; yet he commands them to submit to every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whe­ther it was the Imperial, the Proconsidar, or the Praeto­rian power, 13, not considering so much the Persons im­ploy'd as the design of the Institution, which was for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them 14, that do well. For so is the Will of God, that with this sort of well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foo­lish 15. men, who are apt to quarrel with Religion, especially when it appears new, as that which gives occasion to many disturbances of the Civil Government. And that there might be no colour for any such cavil against Christianity, no Religi­on that ever was, did so much inforce the duty of obedience as Christ and his Apostles did, and that upon the greatest and most weighty conside­rations, for conscience sake, for the Lords sake, for Rom. 13. 5. their Religions sake. For consider I pray, if the Do­ctrine of Christ had given encouragement to facti­on and rebellion under pretence of it, if S. Peter himself had taken upon him to dispose of Crowns and Scepters, or had absolved Christians from their Allegiance, even to their greatest persecutors, what [Page 50] a blot this had been upon the whole Religion, such as all the blood of the Martyrs could never have washed off. For it would have made the conditi­on of Princes more precarious, and the duty of Subjects more loose and uncertain, and all Nations that regarded their own peace and safety shie of entertaining a Doctrine which would give so much countenance to Rebellion. And yet among all the causes alledged for the persecution of Chri­stians, this was never once suggested, which would not have been omitted (if any such thing had been owned by the Christians) by persons so jealous of their Power, as the Roman Emperours were. It is an intolerable reproach to Christianity to impute their patient submission to Authority to their weak­ness and want of force: which is all one as to say, Bell. de Rom. Pont. l. 5. c. 7. they would have resisted if they durst: this is not to make them harmless as Doves, but to have too much of the subtilty of the Serpent, in pretending to be innocent when they only wanted an oppor­tunity to do mischief.

But the security the Christian Religion gave to Government was from the principles and precepts of it, the design of its doctrine as well as the pra­ctice of its followers. So that if their Religion were true, it did oblige them to all acts of cha­rity and kindness, to meekness and patience, to peaceableness and a quiet and prudent behavi­our in all the changes of humane affairs.

[Page 51] From what hath been already said, it is no hard matter to understand the Reason why our Saviour gave such directions to his Apostles, and made choice of such means to promote his Religion, be­cause they would hereby see, that he sent not his Apostles upon any ambitious or secular design, not to disturb Governments upon pretence of setting up a new Monarchy in it either of Christ or his pre­tended Vicar; but to prepare men for another World by the Love of God and our Neighbour, by sub­duing our lusts and taking off our affections from present things; and because he knew what perse­cutions would follow his doctrine, he adviseth his Disciples neither to suffer as Fools, nor as evil-doers, but to be wise as Serpents and harmless as Doves.

Let no man then think our Religion weakens their understanding, or impairs their discretion, or puts men upon doing foolish and impru­dent things. As it is founded on the best reason, so it brings men to the best temper, and governs their actions by rules of the truest Wisdom; not only as it provides for the most desirable end in another world, but even in this, it secures most the honour, interest and safety of men; and if cir­cumstances happen to be hard here, it gives the highest assurance of an infinite and eternal recom­pence. But if men under a pretence of zeal for Religion do wicked things, and carry on treache­rous and malicious designs, if instead of directing [Page 52] mens Consciences in the wayes of innocence and goodness, they teach them the art of putting tricks on God Almighty, (as one called the Casuistical [...] Epist. Pro­vinc. 3. Not. 3. Divinity of the Iesuites) or the way of breaking his Laws by certain shifts and evasions; if instead of meekness and patience they put men upon acts of revenge and cruelty; if instead of promoting peace and tranquillity in the world, they plot mis­chief and stir up faction and rebellion, we are sure whose Disciples soever they pretend to be, they are none of Christs; for although they should not all be capable of being wise as Serpents, yet they are bound to be harmless as Doves.