The first Proposition. It seems that there is something now in actual being.

THis Proposition is so evidently true, that it cannot possibly be de­nied, or called into question, by any one who ever reflected of what passed by most manifest experience in his own thoughts; and so neither ever was, not ever can be impugned by any who are in their right wits.

The second Proposition. Something is now in Actual Being.
Proof.

THis Proposition, the first being sup­posed as a most clear undeniable truth, is most evident, for that very seeming to any one, that something is, must be something; for it must be a Re­presentation that something now is: now every Representation represents some­thing either truly, or falsely; if it repre­sent something truly, then there is some­thing; if falsely, yet there is a false Re­presentation of something: now this Representation represents; to represent is to do something, that which does any thing, must be something; for nothing can do nothing: therefore if there seem to be something in Actual Being, there is something in Actual Being; to wit, that very Representation, or seeming that something is.

The third Proposition. There hath alwayes been something in Actual Being.
Proof.

IF ever there had been nothing at all in actual being, then there could not possibly be any thing now actually, which notwithstanding is proved to be true in the former Proposition; for that which should have been after there had been nothing at all, would either have been a being essentially necessary, which is impossible; for such a being must al­wayes be, and so there would alwayes have been something: or it must have been a contingent being, that is, which can be at one time, and not be at another: Now every such contingent thing must have some cause to give it its actual ex­istency, or being, which it hath not es­sentially of it self; for that which once was nothing, or had no actual being, can [Page 4]never become any thing of it self, or without a cause distinct from it: for all things contingent are indifferent, or in­determined of themselves before they are, to be or not to be actually. Now it is impossible, that that which of it self is indeterminate, or indifferent to be, or not to be actually, should determine it self of it self to be; for then it should be indeterminate, and determinate to be essentially, which is a plain Chymera, and contradiction. Therefore every con­tingent thing must be determined to be, and be put in actual being by some pro­ducing cause really distinct from it: now every cause must be supposed to be actu­ally, before it can be supposed to pro­duce any thing; for to produce any thing, is to do something; but nothing can do nothing. If therefore the time had ever been, when there was nothing, there could never have been any thing, but de facto, there is now something, as is proved: therefore there was alwayes something.

Neither would this truth be infringed, if one should deny all contingency, and put every thing to flow one after an­other, and have their beings for such, or such a space of time by inevitable neces­sity (which I will prove hereafter to be false;) for even this admitted for the pre­sent, yet the production of effects by di­stinct causes remaining still in force, it will remain evident by vertue of the for­mer argument, that there hath been al­wayes something in actual being; for had there ever been nothing at all, there could have been no cause of any thing; for nothing can do nothing. Neither can any thing possibly begin to be for such a determinate space of time, through an essential connexion to such a determinate time, as we shall see in the fifth Pro­position.

The fourth Proposition. There shall alwayes be something in actuall being.
Proof.

THere is now, and ever hath been something, as is proved; if there­fore it could ever happen that all things should cease to be; either something es­sentially necessary (if there be any such being amongst all things) must cease to be, which is impossible; for if it be essen­tially necessary, it cannot but be; for every thing must alwayes be what it is essentially: or if there be nothing essen­tially necessary, all things contingent must cease to be; but that is impossible: for seeing every contingent thing must have its being from some cause really distinct from it, so long as that cause is apt, and able to conserve it in being; and that there is no other cause present, and en­abled to destroy it, it must remain in its [Page 7]being: If therefore all things being con­tingent cease to be, they must either lose their beings for want of a cause to con­serve all things, or by reason of some cause which destroyes all things. Not the first, for nothing can cease to be for want of that which is wholly impossi­ble, and so can confer nothing neither to its being, or not being. Now that it is impossible that any cause can give being to all things, is evident; for seeing that very cause is comprized within the num­ber of all things; if it give being as a di­stinct cause to all things, it must give be­ing to it self, and so be distinct from it self, and be supposed to have a being before it is; for every cause, as is said, must be supposed to have an actual being, before it can be supposed to do any thing; for nothing can do nothing: and yet if it be its own cause primarily and absolutely, it cannot be supposed to be before it is produced; therefore it will be either sup­posed to be before it is, or not to be when it is: it is therefore evident, that seeing [Page 8]there can be no cause of all things, all things which are, cannot cease to be, for want of a producing cause. Neither for the like reason can all things cease to be, by reason of some cause destroying all things; for such a cause is wholly impos­sible: for if all things be destroyed, there can nothing remain in actual being; but that which destroyes all things, must be supposed to be whilst it destroyes all things; for to destroy any thing is to do something, and nothing can do nothing.

If it should be replied, that that which destroyes all other things distinct from it, may cease to be, after it has destroyed all those things, and so all things will lose their actual beings, and there will be nothing: I answer, If all things, as we now suppose, be contingent, then no­thing can destroy all things, save it self: for every contingent thing must have a cause, as is proved; it cannot therefore be supposed to be, unless the cause of it be also supposed to be actually, therefore is cannot destroy all things, save it self, [Page 9]and remain it self in being; for then a contingent thing should be without a cause, which is impossible. And the same argument concludes, admitting, that all things were succeeding one an­other by way of cause and effect, through inevitable necessity: For then every thing in actual being must suppose the being of its cause, and so could never destroy all things save it self, because it could not be, when its cause is destroy­ed. Thus the fourth Proposition is made evident, that seeing there is some­thing now, there must alwayes be some­thing hereafter.

The fifth Proposition Amongst all things which alwayes have been, are now, and ever shall be, there must be some (I determine not yet whether one or more) which is absolutely, and es­sentially necessary, and not produced by any different cause; that is, to which it is es­sential to be in actual being, and so cannot [Page 10]but be from all eternity to all eternity; the same without the least change or al­teration.
Proof.

IF there were no such essential necessa­ry being as this, there could never either have been, be now, or ever hereaf­ter be any thing in actual being; but there alwayes hath been is now, and ever shall be something in actual being, as is already proved. Ergo.

I prove the major, or first Proposition. Whatsoever is not essentially an actual being, cannot be of it self; for were it of it self, it must be of its own essence, or essentially; for the essence of a thing is nothing really, but the thing it self. Seeing therefore it cannot be of it self, whensoever it is, it must be from some­thing else, that is, from some cause; now if that cause be not essentially of it self, it requires as much another cause, to have an actual being, as the former re­quired it; and so there will be no settle­ment [Page 11]nor firm foundation in causing, till one come to some cause which proceeds not from any other, but is essentially of it self: but every thing which is unset­tled in it self, that it may have consisten­cy, must have its firmness and foundation from something, which is in it self firm and constant; for other wise it destroyes it self, and falls to nothing: therefore see­ing that every cause which is not essenti­ally from it self, is as unsettled, and in­firm in causing, as was the first cause men­tioned in this Argument; there must ne­cessarily be found some cause essentially from it self, to give firmness, as a foun­dation to all the rest: And to put a con­catenation in dependency of causes and effects, without such a firm cause as this, would be as foolish and absurd, as to put a wall of stones, one holding up an­other in the air, without any firm foun­dation, whereon some of them are to rest and stand. Neither will the infinite pro­gress in multiplying contingent, or cau­sed causes without end, help the matter: [Page 12]For as a wall composed of infinite stones, one holding up another, without a foun­dation, would be as absurd, as if it con­sisted of a finite and determinate number of stones; so will it be in this infinite progress in causes, without being sup­ported by a necessary existent cause; and there will be no other difference save this, that the one will be onely a finite, but the other an infinite absurdity. Nay, as the now instanced Wall would not be onely absurd, but a mere Chymera, and fiction of the Brain, unless it were su­stained by some power able to supply the want of a foundation; for otherwise it would fall down as fast as it is builded up, and never come to have any frame of a Wall in it: So the fore-mentioned contingent causes and effects, would not onely be inept and foolish, but wholly implicatory, and impossible: seeing in the former supposition there is nothing pos­sible, which can supply the absence of that essential actual being, which is to give firmness to all contingent causes, as [Page 13]their foundation in causing; and conse­quently all things would be impossible, and it would imply a contradiction that any thing should ever be put in actual be­ing: But that is manifestly false; for it is made evident, that something is now in a­ctual being, therefore there is some actual being essentially necessary. Neither will it any way darken the light of this Pro­position, if denying all contingency, one should say, that every thing proceeds by fatal necessity, and by an inevitable, and essential exigency one from another in their different successive durances, for such a determinate measure of time: (as hath been above touched, and shall hereafter be examined) For seeing even in this supposition every thing hath its necessity from its causes, and nothing from it self, or of it self, it will be as ridicu­lous, and implicatory a supposition, as the former supposing contingency. For Exempligratiâ, the effect A, will have no necessity of being now, but from the cause B; nor the cause B, but from its [Page 14]cause C, and so each will be necessary de­pendently of another cause; therefore un­less there be found a cause independent of all others, and having a necessary be­ing essentially from it self, it will be a collection of causes and effects, hanging one upon another, like the stones of a Wall in the air, without all ground or foundation; and therefore as absurd, and implicatory as the former. Whatso­ever Systeme therefore be put of causes and effects, the truth of this fifth Pro­position stands firm, and immoveable, that amongst all things in actual being, &c. there must be something essentially necessary.

Yet to give it more strength and light, I will endeavour to prove that the Sy­steme of succeeding subordinate causes, producing one another, without any cause improducible, (whereupon what­soever cause that is produced, depends either mediately, or immediately) whe­ther they have a contingent onely, or a necessary connection with their effects, [Page 15]to be wholly impossible by this Argu­ment.

If this Systeme be subsistent and so­lid, then all Causes and Effects, that ei­ther are now, or ever have beem are, and have been produced by a Cause; but that is impossible. Ergo, the Major is evi­dent, as containing nothing but the sup­posed Systeme; for whatsoever is pro­duced by a cause, must have a cause pro­ducing it. The Minor I prove. If it were possible, that all the Effects and Causes that are now, or ever were, could be, or have been produced by a Cause, then it is possible that they shold be all Causes, and Effects, and yet should not be all Causes and Effects that either are now, or ever were, but that is impossible. Ergo, The Minor is evident exterminis. For it onely asserts that both parts of a Con­tradiction, all, and not all, cannot be true. The Major I prove. Whatsoever is conceived to be produced by a Cause, must be conceived to have a producing Cause; this is clear. But if all Effects [Page 16]and Causes, that either are, or ever were, be conceived to have a producing Cause, they must be conceived to be all, and not to be all. Ergo, This Minor is evi­dent, for they must be conceived to be all, as is now supposed, and affirmed in the Systeme; and yet they cannot be conceived to be all, for the cause which is conceived to produce all, will be ex­cluded from the number of all that are, or ever were produced by a Cause. The force, &c. This Argument cannot possi­bly be avoided, otherwise then by an­swering that it proceeds upon a false sup­position; for the number of produced Causes and Effects being infinite, it is al­wayes false, to say all, for still there will be more, and more without end, and one can never reach to all. To this I reply, by demanding whether the Authours of this Opinion intend by this Answer to elude all universal Propositions de omni, concerning this number of produced Causes, by denying the supposition of all, by reason of the infinity of the num­ber, [Page 17]if it were admitted, exempli gratia, all effects and causes, that either are now, or ever were, are and were, either Corporal or Spiritual; all men that either are now, or ever were, are and were animalia rationalia, all bruits irra­tionalia, &c. If they intend this, they take away the chief gound of humane discourse, by denying all universal Propositions, upon pretence that they proceed upon false suppositions, there being no such thing as All, in an infi­nity of things proceeding one from an­other, in every particular species of them: so, omnis homo, omnis leo, omnis arbor, &c. will be false suppositions, and consequently cannot compose a true proposition; nor will this enume­rative argument be of force: Petrus est animal rationale, & Paulus, & Johannes, et idem de singulis aliis, ergo, omnis homo est animal rationale; for it may be eluded by saying I deny the supposition, omnis homo, all men; because all cannot be [Page 18]said in an infinite number. If this be their intention, then they are obliged to give disparity betwixt these fore­named universal propostions, and that proposition which I advanced, of all causes and effects produced, for this being as really and universally true, as the other, if the supposition of all be admitted, they must give a solid reason, why all causes may not be admitted in this, as well as all men, &c. in the other. If they should give this dispari­ty, that omnis homo, all men, &c. in the foresaid propositions, is an abstract from time and place, and so supposes not to signifie all men, as constituted in time and place, as omnes causa product &, all produced causes signifies in my pro­positions; for by omnis homo est animal rationale, is no more signified, then that it is the formal intrinsecal notion, or es­sence of a man, to be a reasonable crea­ture: I answer, that this is not a suffi­cient disparity, for omnis res est produci­bilis [Page 19]ab aliquâ causâ, abstracts as much from time and place, and (in this opi­nion which I impugne) is as much sig­nifying the formal intrinsecal notion of every thing, as animal rationale is of homo, in as much as res in genere is conceived in order to its existency, or actual being: and hence, as from the intrinsecal notion of a man, consisting in animal rationale, is rightly inferred this Proposition, That all the men that ever yet were, were animalia rationalia, because the same essence is common to all, and every individuum of the same kinde, though this second Proposition abstract not from time: so from this Preposition, omnis res est producibilis ab aliquâ causâ, must be rightly inferred this, All things that ever were yet in actual being, were produced from some cause. Neither will it avail any thing to instance in the infinite series of things in possibility to have an actual being hereafter one from another, by [Page 20]way of cause and effect without end, wherein it cannot be said, that all ef­fects shall proceed from causes, or all causes shall produce their effects, be­cause in this infinite series, there is no such thing as all. This, I say, availes nothing, for the comparison is not rightly instituted betwixt all things which have been, and all things which are in possibility, or may be hereafter; for those causes which have been, or which are past, though they be not now any thing themselves, yet they re­main in virtute sua, that is, mediately or immediately, in the works which they have produced, and whereof some now remain, by a continual descent of causation, from their efficient vertue; so that the present effect (a) exists by vertue of the cause (b), and (b) by ver­tue of (c), and (c) by vertue of (d), &c. so that the effect (A) hath so necessary a dependence immediate, or mediate, of every precedent cause in this line of [Page 21]production, that it could not now be, if any of the precedent causes, how distant soever from it, had not been before it; so that from the actual being of any effect now, the authors of this line of produced causes without end, must confess, that a forcible inference is drawn, of the actual praeexistency of all and every cause of the said effect, either immediately or mediately, ha­ving a necessary dependence a well of all, as of any one of them, as being a fruit lineally deduced from them all, which cannot possibly be true in an in­finite series of produced causes; be­cause in a number infinite, one can ne­ver say all, as these Authors affirme. but in the instance alledged, of Causes and Effects possible hereafter without end, and so infinite; those which re­main, and shall remain without end in the state of possibility, so long as they remain in that state, are a pure nothing, not having any being at all, neither in [Page 22]themselves, nor in virtute sua; there being nothing in actual or virtual be­ing, save onely causes able to produce them; so that they are meerly in poten­tia causae, and no more, neither recei­veth the cause any vertue to exist from the effects which it can produce; for that which is yet nothing, cannot give any thing to another thing: whence appears, that the instance objected is defective, there being an evident dis­parity, betwixt the causes which have been produced heretofore, and the ef­fects which may be produced without end, or time hereafter; for first from the effects which now are existent, by an ascendent successive line, a mediate consequence is forcibly drawn to all the causes, which by connected causa­lities, have wrought the being of this present effect, which cannot be done possibly in an infinite line, even accord­ing to the acknowledgement of these Authors; but contrariwise the actual [Page 23]existence of this present cause, hath no dependence at all of all or any of the effects, which may successively proceed from it; but can subsist actually by vertue of its causes, though it should never produce any effect at all; and therefore there is no necessary depen­dance immediate or mediate, betwixt the cause and the effect, as there is be­twixt the effect and the cause; whence no forcible inference can be drawne, from the actuality of the cause, to the necessary sequele of all possible effects; and consequently, all the causes that ever have been of this effects, mediate or immediate, are demonstrable by this present effect to have had an actual be­ing: but all effects which may possibly proceed mediately or immediately from this present cause, are not inferred from the actuality of this cause, so that all may be said in the one, but not in the other; the first therefore is finite, but the second is an infinite number. [Page 24]If therefore the instance had beene rightly instituted, it should not have been put betwixt the effects which are inpossibility to be hereafter, and the precedent causes which already have had their actuall being; but betwixt the effects which may be hereafter, per posterius & posterius without end, and the causes which might have been here­tofore per prius & prius without end. For both these are eqully infinite, inex­haustible, indeterminate in potentia, and syncategorematical; for as descending from this present effect (A,) there shall or may be alwayes effects one after an­other without end possible; so ascend­ing from the same effect (a) there might have been causes one before another without end. But as the instance thus stated concludes nothing, that the pro­duced causes have de facto prodeeded one from another without end; so supposes it some improducible cause, which might endlesly have produced [Page 25]causes one before another, and before all those which it actually produced. Or if we turn the comparison another way, it should have been proposed, be­twixt the causes which have had actual being, and the effects which shall have actual being, wheresoever they are in actual possession of that being, and then the instance had been of force; for as beginning from the cause (A) which now is in actual being, to all the effects hereafter possible, when they are put in actual being, the number will be deter­minate, exhaustible, and finite; so be­ginning from the same effects (A) to all the causes which have had actual being in their several precedences, the number will be exhaustible, and deter­minately finite: the infinity therefore is onely conceiveable in the endless succession of possible effects, whereof all can never be in actual possession of their beings à parte post, and an infinite precedency of possible causes, whereof [Page 26] all could never have been in actual possession of their beings à parte ante, which in effect is nothing else, then to say, that there is some necessary impro­ducible cause, which could have pro­duced causes one in time before an­other without end, and can produce effects one in time after another with­out end; and as this improducible cause can produce nothing so late, but he can product something which shall exist after it; so could it not produce any thing so soon, but it could have produced something which might have existed before it. Whence followes evidently, that there must be alwayes a first and a last, a beginning and an end, a determinate number, and so a proper all, of things which either have had, or ever shall have had the exercise of their actuall being: for the effects which are actual now, are the last of all actual beings which ever were be­fore, and those of the next ensuing mo­ment [Page 27]shall be then the last, and so shall it be without end. Now if actual things have an end, they must have had a beginning; for an infinite actual time without all beginning could never have come to an end, because infinity is that which is without end: seeing then all actual time which hath been heretofore, is come to an end in this present moment, which is the last that hath been, or is actual, it is evident, that it had a beginning. Neither will it avail to say, That it is onely infini­tum à parte ante, but not à parte post; for I answer, that such an actual infini­tum, is a pure Chymera, that is a thing without an end which hath an end. And it will press as little, to instance in the imaginary moments of precedent time, begore any thing was produced by a cause, which were infinite à parte ante, and yet came to an end à parte post, when things were first caused: For I answer that those moments were pure [Page 28]nothings, and mere fictious or false conceipts of our understanding; for time is nothing but either the measure of mutable things, or rather the muta­bility or mutation it self: (as I shall declare hereafter) when therefore it is supposed that no mutable thing is in actual being, it is impossible to con­ceive truly that there is any time; for those fained moments are nothing else, then that improducible, and immutable cause, which hath power to produce something actual and mutable, which should have bin before all other things which he hath caused, as the imagina­ry moments possible to be hereafter, are nothing save the same cause, either alone or with other causes which can produce mutable effects after all those which shall have been actually produ­ced; by reason therefore that this pow­er of the first cause is without begin­ning or ending, as being wholly im­mutable, and so not measurable by [Page 29]time, we conceipt that time possible in precedency, and of futurition, is com­posed of successive moments.

Thus therefore having passed through these occurring difficulties, I return to my former Argument, and press it thus: All the effects which now are in actual being (even according to the adverse opinion) have necessary dependance, mediate or immediate, of all the causes which have preceded them in the line of their causation; therefore it is a truth and a proper expression to say, that all those causes have concurred mediately or immediately to these pre­sent effects; but it is impossible that all those precedent causes should be produced by a cause, for then they would be all, and not all, as I have al­ready proved: therefore amongst the causes which in the line of causation have concurred immediately or medi­ately to these present effects, there must be at least some one which is a produ­cing [Page 30]onely, and not a produced cause, which is my fifth Proposition.

Hitherto I have only labor'd to evince, that such beings as are subject to con­tinual generation, and corruption, and which by a line of Succession follow one another, in production and desiti­on, must have had some improducible cause: some difficulty may yet remain in these greater and more solid parts of this Universe, as the Earth, Water, Air, Heaven, Sun, Moon, Stars, &c. for these still remaining (so far as we can judge by our experience) in that main substantial being which they ever had, may occasion a difficulty how they came to be. Forasmuch therefore as touches this present propostion, ei­ther it must be said, that they are of themselves, and never had any produ­cing cause, and then my present propo­sition is in part afferted, that amongst all actual beings there must be impro­ducible causes: or that they were pro­duced [Page 31]by causes successive one to an­other, and all caused, which I have al­ready confuted: or that they are causes one above another, and one producing another without end, and all actually and eternally existent, which I have à fortiori, evinced to be false, by my for­mer Argument, against infinite succes­sive causes; for it would be both an actu infinitum, and as hard to under­stand or believe, as a first improducible cause; and it would destroy it self by being as impossible, as that of succeed­ing causes, &c. Neither will the in­stance of infinite divisible parts less, and less without end, in continuo, make a parity with infinitum actu. For first, that opinion is not certain: and se­condly, if it be true, I answer, that parts whilst they are in continuo, are onely potential, and not actual parts, no nor entia actu; for nothing is an actual being but the totum it self, and [Page 32]when that is divided, of one totum or whole thing, there is made two, and if each of them be divided, they be­come two less totums, and so without end by each division, a new totum will begin to be, which was onely in poten­tia before; for so long as they are in continuo, they are the continuum with­out any beginning, ending, term, or determination, save onely the terms of the whole continuum; so that it is im­possible to say the part (a) is of this de­terminate length, bredth, or profundi­ty, so long as it remains in continuo, for it hath nothing to terminate it, till it come to the utmost superficies or point of the continuum. And seeing every actual being must be determinate, and no indeterminate thing can be ens actu, there will be nothing actual in continuo, save the totum it self, or the continuum, because that onely is ens determinatum, having its fixed and determinate limits: so that in every continuo, there is onely [Page 33]one actual thing, containing in potentia, many things, which by actual division may become acta less continuums then that is wherein they are contained; and so every continuum contained in potentia in a greater, will be less then its continent, when it becomes a conti­nuum by a new division, and this with­out end; there being then no actual determination of different parts in con­tinuo, there can be no actual distinction of them; and if no distinction, no actual number; and if no actual num­ber, there can be no actual infinity, or infinitum actu.

Thus I have proved my fifth Pro­position, and have been something prolix in it, because it contains the mainest difficulty of the whole de­duction.

Against the three last precedent pro­positions may be objected, that there appears no contradiction, in constitu­ting the essence of something not ab­solutely [Page 34]and alwayes necessary, but yet having a necessary and essential con­nection with such a determinate term of time, v. g. that it have an essence requiring necessarily to begin its actual being in the determinate instant (A), and to continue till the determinate in­stant (G), and the same is of so many determinate hours, dayes, moneths, years, &c. and this without any cause at all, but of its particular essence, or of it self: whence will follow, that one thing may begin to be actually in such a term of time, and then cease to be; and after many revolutions of time another thing may begin, and desist from being, in another discontinued portion of time, &c. So that a time may be given wherein there was no­thing at all, nor shall be any thing, though there be something now in actual being. I answer, that such an essence as this, implies a manifest con­tradiction, in our present supposi­tion, [Page 35] of no being at all: for supposing once that there be nothing at all, it can­not be supposed, that there are any de­terminate instants, or parts of time, to which that being can have any necessa­ry and essential relation; for those in­stants, or parts, must be something; and so this objection suppose nothing at all to be, and yet something to be, which is a clear contradiction. And hence also follows, that it is as clear a contradiction as the former, to affirm, that any thing essentially annexed to a determinate space of time, should be of it self, ab aeterno; for that limited eter­nity must be presupposed to be actual­ly, before you suppose that any thing can be actually and essentially annexed to it, seeing the actuality of no being can be essentially annexed to that which is nothing actually; for then something should depend of nothing: now I sub­sume, but it is impossible to conceive that pretended not beginning, or eter­nal [Page 36]determinate time designed in the objections to be presupposed as actu­ally existing, before that being com­mensured essentially to that forenamed space of time, ergo. This Minor I prove because it is wholly impossible to conceive any actual durance of time, whether eternal or not eternal, whether infinite of finite, before we conceive something actually existent, which is a second sign of posteriority of Nature, we conceive measured by such a determinate space of time; for no part of time whatsoever, can have any other proper notion (if it be any reality distinct from the thing which dures) then to be an affect, and (as many think) consequently an effect of that which dures by it; both which suppose either the thing effected to be its subject, or the thing effecting it to be its cause; and by consequence, that thing to be in priority, and this in posteriority of na­ture, in relation to it: whence it fol­lows, [Page 37]according to the common strain of Philosophers, that it can have no essential dependence of it in its actual being; for what is supposed to be actu­ally, before the actual being of another thing, cannot essentially depend in its actual being upon that before which it is supposed to be actually.

Secondly, seeing that that which this objection pretends to be eternal, or ab aeterno, must have an essential relati­on to this or that determinate actual space of time, for which alone, and for no other, it hath a necessary being of it self, and that ended ceases of it self to be any longer, I cannot conceive such an essence without a manifest contra­diction; for it is impossible to conceive any thing to have an essential relation to be so soon, or in such a priority of time that no time can be conceived to be possible before it, if it continue one­ly for a determinate space of successive time, and then as it existed (in his sup­position) [Page 38]of it self ab aeterno, so of it self it ceases to be in this or that deter­minate instant of time. For in this supposition, that determinate instant will terminate a time which is determi­nately finite; therefore from that in­stant ascending, one may attain to the first instant of that time; and so that time will have a final and last instant, and consequently be finite, and not eternal, wherein no first instant is to be found. Seeing therefore (as we shall see hereafter) successive eternity is but a meer possible indetermination of one priority conceived before another, and that no indeterminate thing so long as it remains indeterminate, or as such, can possibly be, or ever have been ens actu, an actual being; it is also impos­sible to conceive such an indeterminate successive eternity, to be any actual thing in it self, or any thing else, save the necessary and immutable power of some cause which can produce nothing [Page 39]so soon, but it could have produced something, which might have been be­fore whatsoever it hath actually pro­duced; and if it had produced any thing before that, it could yet have produced another thing which would have been, and so in infinitum, without all term or limit.

The sixth Proposition. Whatsoever is an actual being essentially, must be of it self, that is, independent of any cause different from it.
Proof.

THis Proposition is already pro­ved, for the essence of a thing is really the thing it self, as is evident; if therefore any thing exist actually from, or of its effence, it must exist actually from, or of it self: now every thing which is essentially an actual being, exists actually of its own essence; there­fore [Page 40]every thing which is essentially an actual being, exists actually of it self. If it should be instanced, that supposing an inevitable necessity of all things, all things would essentially be actual be­ings for that measure of time wherein they are, and yet they would not be of themselves, but from their determinate causes unavoidably producing them; I answer, that this necessity (were there any such) proceeds not from the essence of the effect, but from the determina­tion of the cause; for therefore onely the effect is necessary, because the cause cannot but produce it: for the effect be­ing purely nothing before it is produ­ced, cannot possibly necessitate the cause to produce it; for to necessitate any thing, is to do some thing, but no­thing can do nothing: it is not therefore the essence of the effect to be actually in such a space of time, but rather the es­sence of the cause to produce such an effect in such a time. So that even this [Page 41]false supposition admitted, what soever is an actual being essentially, must be of it self; for the supposed inevitable ne­cessity of all things is onely extrinse­cal from the cause, and so not essential, or intrinsecal to the thing in actual be­ing: neither indeed can either the be­ginning to be, or perseverance in being for such a determinate time onely, be essential to any thing; for time being nothing but a measure of mutability, or rather mutability it self, (as we shall see hereafter) whatsoever is essentially in or for such a determinate space of time, will be in time, and not in time, for that whole space wherein it is supposed to be: in time, as is supposed; and yet not in time, for whatsoever it is essen­tially it is immutably, for nothing can change its essence: To say therefore, that any thing can be essentially for, or in such a determinate time, is to affirm that is is mutable whilst it is not muta­ble, and necessary whilst it is not neces­sary, [Page 42]which is a plain contradiction. Nay farther, it is to affirm, that such a being is tota simul, because it cannot but be for such a time, and yet not tota si­mul, but by succeeding parts, because it is in time, which is another contra­diction.

The seventh Proposition. No actual being that is superfluous, de­fective, inordinate, absurd, or difform from the rule of right Reason, can be essentially necessary, or of it self.
Proof.

FOr what necessity can there be of absurdities or defects, &c. seeing their not being is better then their be­ing, and the works of nature are better without them then with them? For if any thing absurd and contrary to rea­son could be essentially necessary, and of it self, and all thing must proceed [Page 43]from that being which is essentially ne­cessary, and of it self, as is above pro­ved, then all things which have a being must be absurd and contrary to reason. But it is evident that all things which have a being are not absurd and contra­ry to reason, ergo. The Minor is evi­dent by the Reasonableness, Order, Beauty, Perfection, Connection, and Symmetry which are found in those things which we experience to be. The Major I prove, for nothing can give that which it hath not it self, therefore, if that which gives, that is, produces all things, be absurd and contrary to rea­son, it cannot give, that is, produce any thing which is perfect and according to reason. For if that which is contra­ry to reason could work according to reason; (and whatsoever gives or pro­duces any thing which is according to reason, must work according to reason) then that which is contrary to reason will be according to reason; for what­soever [Page 44]works according to reason, must participate of reason, and so be accord­ing to reason. Again, whatsoever is, there must be some reason why it is: But there can be no reason, why any thing which is contrary to reason should be, ergo. The Minor is evident, for if there were reason for it, it could not be contrary to reason, unless you make the same thing to be according to reason and contrary to reason. I prove the Major, for if any thing could be without any reason why it is, then any one may put what he pleaseth to be, or not to be, without any reason: and so all humane discourse will be frustrated, which gives reasons for what it affirms, and deduceth all things from reason. But of this more hereafter.

The eighth Proposition. No Actual Being, which is oboxious to Deordinations and Absurdities, can be essentially necessary, or of it self.
Proof.

SEeing no absurdity can be essenti­ally necessary, as is proved, nothing which can be subject to any absurdity can be essentially necessary; for what­soever actual being is essentially neces­sary, must alwayes be necessary; but that which is subject to such deviati­ons, may at some time not be necessary; for it may happen that it falls into some of those absurdities to which it is obnoxious, and then it becomes ab­furd and inordinate; but nothing which is absurd can be essentially ne­cessary: seeing therefore every actual being essentially necessary excludes all absurdities, nothing which can be ab­surd, can be an actual being essentially necessary.

The ninth Proposition. Nothing can be an actual being essentially, and of it self, which is not indued with the light of Reason.
Proof.

WHatsoever is an actual being essentially, must essentially ex­clude all disorders and abfurdities, as is proved in the two former Propositi­ons, but nothing save that which is in­dued with the light of reason, can es­sentially exclude all disorders and ab­surdities, ergo. I prove the Minor: whatsoever excludes essentially all dis­orders and absurdities, must have some­thing essentially repugnant to all dis­orders and absurdities; this is evident. But nothing is essentially repugnant to all disorders and absurdities, save the light of reason: Therefore, what so­ever hath not the light of reason ex­cludes [Page 47]not essentially all disorders and absurdities. I prove the Minor.

Therefore onely is any thing disor­dered and absurd, because it is contrary or difform to the light of reason is essen­tially repugnant to all disorders and absurdities. The antecedent is evident; for why is any thing disordered or ab­surd, then because it is otherwise then reason dictates it should be? I prove the consequence, for if disorder be nothing save a repugnancy to the light of reason, then nothing but the light of reason is essentially repugnant to all disorders.

I will give force and light to this Argument, by propounding it in an­other manner, thus. Whatsoever is not capable of it self, to govern and di­rect it self perfectly according to the rule of reason, cannot of it self pre­serve it self from all inconverniences, disorders, and absurdities; this is evi­dent, [Page 48]But whatsoever hath not the light of reason, cannot of it self go­vern it self perfectly according to the rule of reason, ergo. The Minor is clear; for who can possibly conceive, that that which hath no knowledge nor under­standing of it self, which neither knows whether it be good or bad, right or wrong, well or ill, orderly or dis­orderly, according or contrary to rea­son, nay, nor whether there be any such thing as reason or no, should be capable to govern perfectly it self of it self, ac­cording to the rule of reason? Thus were the Sun constituted so far from the Earth, that it could neither heat not enlighten it; or so near, that it blinded all who saw it, and burnt up all before it; or that the Earth were removed so far off, or near to the Sun, that the same inconveniences and disorders follow­ed; if neither any Tree ever bore fruit, not any sensible Creature exercised any faculty of his senses; if all bodies were [Page 49]weak, feeble, diseased, and deformed; if all things were put out of order, place, time, number, weight, measure, proportion, beauty, fill'd with nothing but horrid disorders, defects, deformi­ties, disproportions, absurdities, foole­ries, (which certainly, if we respect onely the course of Nature, are main transgressions against the rule of Rea­son, foul blots upon the beauty of creatures, and prodigious monsters in the progress of natural causes) yet what soever had not the light of rea­son, could neither prevent them, nor resent them, nor redress them of, and by it self, or by any thing included es­sentially in the actuality of its being; but every thing would actually exist as before, if some external cause did not destroy them, which could not be, if they were essentially actual beings, as is already proved.

It will be said this Argument proves too much, and so in effect proves just [Page 50]nothing: for it concludes not onely, that actual beings devoid of the light of reason cannot free themselves from all disorders and defects, but that they can free themselves from none at all; for if the light of reason be onely that which is essentially repugnant to dis­orders, they will have nothing essen­tially repugnant to any disorder what­soever, and so will be exposed to all, and unable to preserve themselves from any one. Which notwithstanding ap­pears manifestly false, to all who cast an eye upon the constant Symmetry, Splendor, and Proportion of this Uni­verse, and the specious progress of na­tural causes and effects; which though wholly empty of the light of reason, digest all things conformably to the rule of reason. I answer, that the Ar­gument contends not, that actual be­ings not inriched with the use of rea­son, cannot conform themselves to the prescript of reason in many things, but [Page 51]that they cannot effect it of themselves in all things, as not retaining any thing essentially repugnant to all in­conveniences (which may be cast upon them) in the actuality of their beings; for if they had any such perfection, they could not possibly be obnoxious to the least disorder: that conformity therefore which they have to reason, and the resistance to many accidents of disorder thwarting the laws of reason, they injoy not from themselves, but from reason, and that onely so far as they flow from reason, and are certain particles and participations of reason. That this may be understood, I divide reason into two branches; the one active, the other passive; the one work­ing, the other wrought; the one con­ceiving, the other expressing what it conceives; the one may be termed not unfitly. Ratio ratiocinans, Reason reason­ing, the other, Ratio ratiocinata, Reason reasoned. Thus the Idea of some cu­rious [Page 52]and sumptuous building framed in the minde of a skilful Architect, is Reason reasoning; that is, contriving, working, acting, ordering, digesting, the prefect proportion of that building within it self. But the building it self accomplished according to the Idea, will be Ratio ratiocinata, Reason reasoned, that is, wrought, expressed, formed, and framed according to the thoughts of that Idea. Thus a learned person com­poses a Treatise both according to be sense and words, by his inward thoughts, which are Reason reasoning; and after couches it in writing, which is Reason reasoned; and though who­soever contemplates with a considerate eye, the strength and art of reason, comprised in such expressions, yet he plainly discovers that neither the parts of the Building, nor the words of the Treatise had it from themselves, but from a working and active reason ex­pressing it self in them: and though [Page 53]those parts and words, so long as they remain conform to that reason which framed them, cannot swerve from rea­son, nor fall into disorder, or non­sense, yet they contain nothing in their actual beings which essentially repugns against the disordering and depraving them, but would retein them no less being dissipated and disordered, then they did before. And if the reason from whence they issued were so vigor­ous and active, that it constituted them in so firm a consistency of that posture and order, which it imprinted upon them, that no natural cause should have power to deface or sully it; yet even that immobility would disclose it self to a piercing eye, no more to proceed from it, then it proceeded from it self. And though such a constant beauty and decorum could not be interessed by the force of nature, or disturbed in its course; yet that touches not the essen­tial, but the natural, or well-being of [Page 54]it; not that it would lose its being, were it put in some disorder, but that nothing in nature is impowered to disorder it.

Thus though the cariere of the Sun and Heavens finde no obstancle or re­mora in nature, yet were they curbed in their full speed, they would not in a moment fall to nothing.

By this distinction thus illustrated, (whereon I will more insist hereafter) it is evidenced, that the light of reason is onely essentially opposed to all in­conveniences and deordinations; and that whensoever that which is not il­lustrated with this active light, pre­ferves it self from any of them, it pro­ceeds not originally, or essentially, from it, but from that participation of pas­sive reason, which the active hath in­fused into it.

Seeing therefore that all the beauty and decorum of irrational beings, is onely a copy drawn by the alive hand [Page 55]of Reason, the ninth Proposition remains evident, That nothing can be an actual being essentially, and of it self, which is not indued with the light of Reason.

Hence therefore followes first, the implicancy of that old, deceased, bu­ried, rotten, and consumed Error, now lately raked out of the ashes of Hea­thenish Ignorance, and Poetical Ficti­ons, That there is an universal Matter, infinite in extent, and eternall in du­rance, without beginning or ending, whose being is essentially actual, and of it self, incapable of being produ­ced, or destroyed by any cause what­soever. For seeing this supposed mat­ter is not indued essentially with the actual light of reason, nay, is so far from it; that it is in the least capacity of all other things, to preserve it self from disorders; as being nothing but a compact of disorders, a chaos of confusion, and a being so rude and de­formed, that were not there some in­telligent [Page 56]cause to order and digest it in­to some form and fashion, it would remain the most absurd of all beings, and the very next to nothing; having, as they coin it, all things in power or possibility and yet being nothing of any thing which it hath. In a word, it is no better, when these new inven­tors have made the best of it, then all things in disorder: it is the Mirror of misule, the Embrio of beings, the World in a lump, Heaven and Earth in morter; and the first edition of Ab­surdities written in the large volumes of infinty. For whether they make it consist of Atomes, as the Ancients did, or of different Spirits, as others lately have conceited, it is nothing but infinite confused mixtures both of the one and the other, till brought into some fixed posture and proportion, some determinate being is drawn out of it. Is it then possible to conceive, that such anear alliance to nothing, as [Page 57]this Matter is, should arrive to that infinite height of perfection, to be es­sentially and actual being, of, and from it self? Were it of it self, it must be essentially and absoluterly necessary, as is proved; but what absolute necessity is there of absurdities and disorders? Were it wholly necessary, it could ad­mit of no change or alteration; for whatsoever is essentially necessary, is, and must be always, what ever it was: but this supposed Matter is, and ever was, and will be subject to infinite al­terations, putting on perpetually new forms, postures, proportions, mixtures, distances, approximations, places, fi­gures, correspondences, conjunctions, separations, unities, divisions, conti­nuations, contiguities, and a thousand more, so that it is constant in nothing but inconstancy; were it an actual be­ing essentially, it must be a rule of rectitude to it self, and so be essential rectitude, excluding all disorders; [Page 58]when this Matter has disorder coeternal with it, and coessential to it. How came it alone of it self to give being to it self, when of it self alone it can give a determinate being to nothing else, but onely suffer other active and efficient causes, to make out of it, de­terminate beings?

Let therefore the authors of this most pernicious and Antichristian no­velty, either prove that this infinite, eternal, and uncreated matter, had from all eternity a most perfect actual light and use of understanding, to re­ctifie it self according to the perfect rule of reason; or confess that it must essentially depend in the actuality of its being, of some cause indued with such a light: or all the world will see that they speak against reason, and de­ceive themselves, and others, by a vain and sensless fiction.

Hence also it followes evidently against Arislotle, that the whole Moles, [Page 59]or fabrick of this visible World, could not be of it self, or essentially, an actual being, without any cause; for neither the Earth, whereof all inferior visible things are naturally composed, nor the other Elements, nor the spaci­ous body of the Heavens, nor that glory of the Sun, not that beauty of the Moon, nor that lustre of the Stars, nor that admirable composition and proportion of the bodies of Men and Beasts (seeing they are so far from pos­sessing the light of Reason, that have neither sense nor life: nor Plants and Trees, though they have some degree of life) nor Beasts, Birds, and Fish, though they have life and sense, be­cause none of these have the light of Reason: no nor the Souls of men, nor the Angels themselves, though indued with the light of Reason and Under­standing, can possibly have been essen­tially actual beings, and from them­selves; for the actual light of reason [Page 60]which they have, is not essential, but accidental to their beings; because, as appears in Infants, they can be actually, without the actual use of reason. All therefore that is essentially included in the actual being of an Angel, or hu­mane Soul, is to be a power, or vertue, able to use reason and understanding; so that they are truly conceived to be, before they are conceived to exercise reason: wherefore, they can be actual­ly no more of themselves, then any other thing which hath no such power; for it is not the power to use reason, but the actual use of reason, which en­ables any thing to exclude essentially all disorders, and defects against reason from it self. Seeing therefore Men and Angels must be supposed to be actually, before they can be supposed to produce any act of reason, (for the being of all causes must be presuppo­sed to the production of their effects, for nothing can produce nothing) their [Page 61]beings include not essentially the actu­al use of reason, and so cannot essenti­ally exclude all deviations and deordi­nations from reason, which can be one­ly effected by an act of reason.

Hence also follows, the actual use of Reason, or the acts of Reason, as they are experienced and actuated amongst men, (and the same is of Angels) can­not be of themselves, or essentially ne­cessary, both because they presuppose the beings of Men and Angels, as their producing cause; as also, because such acts of reason being limited and finite, though they may essentially ex­clude sorne disorders, yet they are still subject to a thousand, or rather infinite others, which by reason of their nar­rowness and shallowness, they can nei­ther foresee, nor prevent, nor remedy. These truths therefore being settled, I come to the tenth Proposition.

The tenth Proposition. Onely Actual Reason, in its full perfecti­on and latitude, that is, Reason it self, is an actual being essentially neces­sary.
Proof.

THis Proposition follows evident­ly from the precedent; for seeing there is now, ever was, and shall be something in actual being, and that this could not be, unless there had been alwayes some thing, or things, essen­tiall necessary; and that nothing fru­strate, disordered, defective, or absurd, actually, or possibly, can be a necessary actual being: and that whatsoever hath not the light of reason, actually exer­cised, nay, even acts of reason limited and imperfect, cannot essentially ex­clude all disorders and inconveniences, &c. from their actual beings; it fol­lows [Page 63]inevitably, that actual reason in its full perfection, or reason it self, and that onely, is an actual being essentially necessary: which Argument may be thus framed by way of resolution. If actual reason it self, or in its full per­fection, be not essentially a necessary actual being, all other things would be subject to disorder; if all were subject to disorder, nothing could be essenti­ally necessary; if nothing were neces­sary, nothing could have been which is not essentially necessary; that sup­posed, no actual being could be now; but is most manifest that there is now some actual being, therefore from the first to the last, Reason it self, must be essentially a necessary actual being.

Or yet more briefly and clearly thus: Something must be essentially necessa­ry, as is proved in the fourth Proposi­tion; but nothing (as is proved in the following Propositions) which is not reason in self, or in its full perfection, [Page 64]can be essentially necessary; therefore onely reason it self in its full perfecti­on is essentially necessary.

The eleventh Proposition. Onely Actual Reason in its full perfection, or Reason it self, is essentially an actual being of it self.
Proof.

THough I use onely in these and the former Propositions the word, Actual Reason, because it is the fittest in our language to express my mean­ing, yet I take indifferently for Syno­noma's, or words of the same signifi­cation, Actual Reason, Understanding, Knowledge, Wisdom, and the like; all being in reality the same thing: this premised, I prove the Proposition.

This Proposition is manifest: first, from the precedent and sixth Proposi­tion, [Page 65]wherein is proved, that whatso­ever is an actual being essentially ne­cessary, is of it self. Secondly, from the Arguments for proof of the former Proposition. Thirdly, a priori, or from the very nature of Reason it self, thus: That must necessarily be of it self, which must be, and cannot possi­bly be conceived to be from any thing else: But reason it self must be, as is proved from the former Proposition, and cannot possibly be conceived to be from any thing else, Ergo, &c. The Major is most evident; the first part of the Minor is already proved; I prove the second part of the Minor. If reason it self could possibly be conceived to be from any thing else, that from which it is conceived to be, must be either wholly devoid of reason, or indued with imperfect reason, or reason it self in its full perfection. It cannot be from reason it self as from any thing distinct from it self I for reason it self [Page 66]cannot be any thing but what it is, to wit, reason it self. Neither can it pro­ceed from imperfect reason; for no cause can totally produce any thing perfecter then it self; for nothing can give that to another which it hath not it self: now it is evident, that reason in its full perfection, is perfecter then imperfect reason. Neither can it be produced, by any thing devoid of rea­son, for the same reason; for that which is reason it self, is more perfect (according to all Philosophers) then that which hath in it no reason at all, and the reason hereof is evident; for that which essentially excludes all im­perfections, as is already proved, rea­son it self does, must be more perfect then that which excludes them not, as is above demonstrated, that nothing devoid of the light of reason can ex­clude them all essentially; therefore reason in it's full perfection must be of it self. Fourthly, I prove the said Pro­position [Page 67]by another Argument, a priori, in this manner. Whatsoever hath in it self all things essentially required to be of it self, must necessarily be of it self; this is evident: But reason in its full perfection, hath all things essenti­ally required to be of it self, in it self; Therefore it is of it self. I prove the Minor. All that can be conceived to be essentially required for any thing to be of it self, is, that it self be a most perfect actual rule of Rectitude to it self; for this is to be its owne rule, its own measure, its own directi­on, its own rectitude, light, know­ledge, life, being, existency; for were such a being from any thing save it self, that from which it proceeded, as from a different cause, would be the rule of rectitude and perfection to it, and not it self to it self; for the totall cause must always be the rule and measure of all the perfections which are in the effect; for whatsoever is in the effect, [Page 68]must have been precedently in the cause, for nothing can give that which it hat not: whatsoever therefore is a most perfect actual rule and measure to it self, must be equivalently as much to it self, as if it were its own cause; and be as truly and adequately of it self, as other things are from their total causes: so that if it have no other rule, nor measure of rectitude and perfection then it self, it can have no cause at all different from it self, and so must have its actual being essentially of it self. Now I subsume, but actual reason in its full perfection, is a most perfect actual rule of rectitude to it self; therefore actual reason in its full per­fection, is an actual being essentially of it self. The consequence is clear, I prove the Minor Actual reason it self, or in its full perfection, is a most per­fect actual understanding and compre­hension of it self; it is, Intellectio [...]psius intellectionis, An actual understanding [Page 69]of actual understanding: it is Cognitio cognitionis, A knowledge of knowledge. For it would not be reason and under­standing in its full perfection, if it were ignorant of any thing; and if it know not it self, it must be ignorant of some­thing, nay, of the best of all things. Seeing therefore it is a most perfect knowledge of it self, it is a guide and rule unto it self; and being reason it self, which is the original rule of all rectitude, it must be a most perfect rule of rectitude to it self, and so must be its own rectitude, and rectitude it self; for it is impossible to conceive, that reason it self either should be contrary to reason, or admit of any thing in it self contrary to reason; for then reason should not be reason. And thus I have made way to the twelfth and last Pro­position.

The twelfth Proposition. Reason it self, being essentially necessary, and of it self, is God.
Proof.

THis Proposition is clear, ex ter­minis, by the bare notion of the terms wherein it is propounded; for the true God was never conceived by any who had a real notion of him, to be any thing, save actual Intellection, or Reason if self, essentially necessary and of it self; an essentiall rule of Re­ctitude to it self; a most clear compre­hensive Knowledge of it self, or neces­sary exclusion of all defects and defor­mities from it self; the Quintessence of all true perfection within it self, and the source of all beings without it self. Seeing therefore I have evidently pro­ved in the former Propositions, that [Page 71]there is now something in actual be­ing; and thence evidently deduced, the necessity of the actual being of Rea­son it self, beautified with all these admirable perfections; I have made evident, what I intended and promised in the Title of this small Treatise, that there is a God: and therefore may safe­ly conclude, there is either A GOD, OR NOTHING; but it is evident there is something, therefore it is evi­dent there is A GOD. From this truth that God is reason it self, or in its full perfection, I draw these insuing Corrollaries, or Deductions; of the Attributes of God.