WE live in an Age where­in there are great pre­tensions made to Reli­gion, and no less to Honour. And as these two are in themselves excellent Things, so I must confess 'tis a great satisfaction to me, that they continue to bear so general a Reputation in the World. It cannot indeed be won­dred, that Things which are both excellent in their Nature, and like­wise [Page 2]of universal Esteem, should be the Objects of most Mens aim and ambition; since its very natu­ral, it should be so. But if Men were as well agreed, what is most truly and properly meant by the Terms, Religion and Honour, as they are agreed, that these two things deserve their Esteem and Prosecution; we might hope for some visible Improvements both in their Sentiments and Practice.

It is our misfortune, that we are too often carried away by Appear­ances; and calling things by wrong Names, are insensibly led into er­rour, whilst we think our selves altogether in the right. We apply to some things the characters that are due to others, and give magnifi­cent Names to things that are, in their nature, either vitious and faul­ty, or at best but trivial and incon­siderable. Thus it sometimes falls out, that Men call that by the name of Religion, which either is not [Page 3]Religion, or which at best has but little to do with it; and by the name of Honour, that which either is not so, or which, at best, scarce de­serves to be considered under that Title. Now he that has, in this manner, entertained mistaken No­tions about either Religion, on the one hand, or about Honour on the other, is neerly concerned to re­ctifie such Mistakes; and that, for one plain Reason, among others, to wit, Because the abuse of a very good thing commonly produces very ill effects.

It is not my design to enter into a large Disquisition upon the Sub­jects of Religion and Honour; I must content my self to touch on them incidently, so far as they re­late to my present Argument: In the prosecution whereof, I hope nevertheless, to make some advan­tage of the universal Esteem which these two have justly obtained in the World. And since Generosity has a [Page 4]natural Affinity both to Religion and to Honour, I suppose a Dis­course upon that Subject, will be thought the more suitable to the Genius of the Times. But, which is of much greater Importance, it may likewise be hoped, that the Man of Religion will be induced to entertain the better thoughts of Honour; and on the other hand, the Man of Honour, to entertain the better thoughts of Religion, when they shall respectively consi­der, that these two have, in them­selves, a natural Relation and Affi­nity to each other, at how great di­stance soever the opinion or pra­ctice of some Men may seem to have set them. For I am persuaded, it will be no hard matter to reconcile these two, if we will but resolve them into their first and naked Prin­ciples, and will but take the pains to separate each from its abuses and the false characters attributed to it: Which being the only occasion of [Page 5]the seeming difference, as soon as those are removed, that seeming difference will vanish, and the na­tural agreement there is between them will shew it self. That there is really such an agreement between them, will, I hope, be made out in the process of this Discourse; at least so far as may be necessary to my present purpose; which I shall think sufficient.

When I speak of a conformity or agreement between Religion and Honour, it is evident I don't mean by Religion, particular modes or distinctions of Religion, or di­stinctions of Sects or Professions, which are sometimes call'd by that Name; nor do I mean by Honour, temporal Dignity or height of Ti­tle or Station, ancienty of Family, right of Precedence or Jurisdiction, Gentility, or any of those external Gallantries that are wont to make such a glare in the Eyes of the World; which are likewise some­times [Page 6]called by the name of Honour. There is indeed difference enough between Religion and Honour taken respectively in these Senses. But by Religion I mean, the Law of the rational Nature, or the complex of these Laws which are given by God Almighty unto Mankind for the Government of their Lives and Actions. And by Honour, I mean, That Principle residing in Mens minds, by which they are excited to chuse and do those things which are really worthy and becoming, and to refuse and avoid those which are really base and unbecoming: Which Principle, because it gives Men the genuine stamp of Honour, is rightly called by that name. And it is between these two, taken re­spectively in the latter sense, that I affirm there is such a Conformity: I mean a Conformity between the Rule of Religion, and the Rule of Honour; and between the Prin­ciple of Religion and the Principle of Honour.

If we look into the Composure of Mankind, we shall find that they are naturally endowed with a Principle of Self-love. And this Principle is found to be of vast and universal influence upon them, and the secret Spring as it were of all their Acti­ons. Now one effect of this Prin­ciple is, That it disposes Men to value themselves for something or other, and to a certain ambition or desire of having those Qualities or doing those Actions which they ac­count great and admirable. This may be called Self esteem: And is a Principle which operates variously in different Persons, according to their different Application of it, and the different Conceptions which they have of things: Insomuch that it carries some Men into an infinite number of Follies, whilst it proves to others who make the right use of it, a Spur to brave and worthy Actions and Designs: Of which more in its place.

If any Man think, that all man­ner of Self-esteem is vitious and con­demnable; he may please to consi­der, that what I here call Self-esteem taken in a Philosophical sense, is a Principle which we have unavoid­ably, without our own Choice: It necessarily results from the general Principle of Self-love fundamental­ly implanted in us by Nature, and is far different from what is ordi­narily called Self-conceit. Those Principles or Dispositions which we have in us by Nature, ought not, when considered only in their pure Naturals to be deemed culpable; left thereby we obliquely accuse the Author and Lord of Nature him­self. It is universally allowed by considering Men, that the Affecti­ons which are put in us by Nature, such as Love, Hate, Desire, Joy, Grief, and the like, are in them­selves innocent and inculpable; and that 'tis only the excess and abuse which renders them vitious. It is [Page 9]not our Fault, that we have in us the Affections of Love or Hate, for that we have naturally and una­voidably: But our Fault is, that we Love or Hate undue Objects, or Love or Hate immoderately. So it is not our Fault that we have in us the Affection of Self-esteem; for that we have also unavoidably from Nature it self, so that 'tis impossi­ble to erace it out of our minds: But our Fault is in misapplying this Affection, by esteeming our selves without just cause, or by doing it to excess; in which case, we fall into Pride, Self-conceit, and the like Vices, which are justly con­demned by all Mankind.

Since, therefore, there is put in Man, by Nature, such an Affection or Principle of Self-esteem; and since it is of such vast influence upon his thoughts and actions, it must needs be of huge importance to re­gulate this Affection rightly, so that it may be applyed to just Objects [Page 10]and exerted in a just manner: Espe­cially considering, that 'tis as bene­ficial to use it right, as 'tis pernici­ous and dangerous to abuse or mis­apply it. But we need not think, that we are under any obligation to endeavour to extirpate this Princi­ple or Affection out of our minds, any more than we are, those of Love, Desire, Joy, Grief, Hope, Fear, and such like; we are not obliged to things impossible: But we are under the strongest Obliga­tions in the World, to endeavour to correct in them whatever tends to abuse or excess: And this is not only possible, but is indeed one of the grand businesses of our Life. As for the Affection of Self-esteem, I am persuaded, the Vertue or Prin­ciple of Generosity, which I am a­bout to treat of, will be of great use to regulate it, and I think I may say, without fallacy, most of the other Affections too.

Now in handling the present Argument, I shall endeavour to do these three things.

• First, To explain the Nature of Generosity.
• Secondly, To shew the usefulness of the Principle, for the due go­vernment of our Actions.
• Thirdly, To shew how Genero­sity may be acquired, or afterwards improved in our Minds.

First, I shall try to shew the Na­ture of Generosity. Now Genero­sity may, in general, be considered under a twofold respect, 1. As a Passion or Affection in Man; and this is the more narrow and re­strained Notion of it. And next, As a Power or Principle immedi­ately founded in the rational Na­ture; and this is the more large and comprehensive Notion of it. So far as it is attended with a Commotion in the Blood and Spirits, or with a Sensation more immediately rela­ting to the Body, so far it has the [Page 12]nature of a Passion or Affection. And so far as it depends purely on the rational Nature of a Man, and is attended with such Cogitations as immediately relate to the Soul, so far it may be considered as an in­tellectual or rational Power. Nor need we think it strange, that hav­ing but one Name, it should, under different respects, have the nature of an Affection, and likewise of an intellectual Power. The Names we give to things are not always ade­quate; and its scarce possible they should be in Matters of this kind. There is so strict an Union betwixt the Soul and Body of Man, and such a reciprocal operation of the one upon the other, that sundry of his Acts are compounded, partly of Sensations referring to the Animal Nature, and partly of Cogitations referring to the Rational. Since, therefore, those Cogitations of the Soul, which either produce a Ver­tue in Man or accompany it, are in [Page 13]most Cases either attended with or confirmed by some Perception or Affection of the Animal Nature: And since, on the other hand, some Perfections or Affections of the Ani­mal Nature dispose the Soul to cer­tain Cogitations helpful to the pro­ducing in it the acts of some parti­cular Vertues: It is easie to believe, there will be in the effect of this re­ciprocal Operation, a mixture of the Vertue and Affection; and so we find it falls out. Humility is a known Vertue, and Pride a known Vice; yet each of these are in some sense a Passion or Affection, as well as upon other accounts a Vertue and a Vice. Humility, for instance, has the nature of a Vertue, so far as it is a Power or Principle referring purely to the Soul, and producing such Cogitations and Actions as are commendable by the Laws of the rational Nature; but is still a Passi­on or Affection, so far as it is ac­companied with a commotion in the [Page 14]animal Spirits, or in general with any corporeal Impression. The like might be said of several other Ver­tues; and, mutatis mutandis, of several Vices.

Generosity then, considered as an Affection, consists in a just Self-esteem, whereby a Man values him­self just so much as he lawfully and fairly may. And under this respect it is a Species of the general Affe­ction, called Admiration, and holds the Medium between the two Passi­ons of vitious Humility and Pride, correcting what is amiss in each. But there are likewise certain other Dispositions or Habitudes (worth remarking, because they are of great use and ornament) which may be referred to Generosity; of which sort are, a masculine Firm­ness and Constancy, Presence of Mind and Sweetness of Temper. This Firmness and Constancy is of force to compose a Mans Spirits, to establish his Thoughts, and to pre­serve [Page 15]him steady and consistent with himself; and by those means secures him, not only from many of the Livities and Imbecilities which they are apt to fall into, who are guided by impulse and fortuitous impressi­on; but also, from several of those errors and preposterous act­ings to which fear or feebleness of Spirit are wont to expose Men. And so Presence of Mind, operates in much the same manner, in case of sudden emergencies; and by pre­serving the mind intrepid, undi­sturbed, and present to it self on such occasions, secures the Man from being surprized into things hurtful or indecent. So, likewise, the Sweetness of Temper which ac­companies Generosity, serves to render Men pacifick, agreeable and easie to themselves and others. And as it tends to overcome the humor­ous and sour Qualities which make Men uneasie to themselves, and dis­agreeable in Conversation; so it [Page 16]likewise disposes them to all the decent Expressions imaginable of Civility and Complaisance.

It is true, the several Dispositi­ons aforesaid may be many times owing to Mens natural Tempera­ment. But yet, if Men have them not by the gift of Nature, 'tis in great measure within their power to acquire them, or to cultivate and improve them when acquired; and to correct the contrary Quali­ties. Some Men indeed have the happiness to be naturally of an in­genuous Disposition, Candid, Sin­cere, Modest, and of a firm and masculine Temper; having, by the particular vouchsafement of God Almighty, a loveliness and sweet­ness of Spirit which cannot be ex­press'd, and such a Command over their Spirits as is of extraordinary advantage to them. They who have these and the like Qualities implanted in them by Nature, are in a sort born to Generosity. And [Page 17]even they who have them in a low­er degree, are altogether unexcusa­ble if they do not endeavour to cherish and improve them, since the acquisition of Generosity would be so easie, where there is such a na­tural aptitude for it. On the con­trary, some Men are particularly unhappy in their composure, being naturally of a rough and feral Tem­per, dark and solitary in their Minds, stubborn, haughty, or of feeble and impotent Spirits. He who is concerned in any of these or such like ill Qualities (for one cannot with a good Grace suppose them all in one Man) is, its true, under peculiar difficulties as to the acquiring of Generosity. But as that ought to quicken his diligence and care to overcome those Impe­diments which his natural Temper puts him under, so if he does over­come them, his Conquest will be the more glorious: But I am not to insist upon that in this place. But [Page 18]from the different Dispositions of People, we may observe in what manner Generosity resides in Mens Tempers, and how it mixes it self with their other Affections and Dis­positions. And this, I think, does partly tend to shew the Nature of it; which is what we have been considering.

But since my design is, to consider Generosity, not barely as it falls un­der the notion of a Passion or Affe­ction; but principally, as it is a Vertue or intellectual Power inhe­rent in the Mind, under which re­spect it is of the greatest use: I must now advance a little further. Now if Generosity be (as I hope to shew that it is) an intellectual Pow­er of the Soul, helpful for the good government of a Mans Passions, cor­poreal Impressions and Appetites, and disposing him to prosecute that which is absolutely best (which is the character and description of Vertue) then we shall be obliged, [Page 19]in reason, to acknowledge it to be a Vertue. And if, moreover, it be (as indeed it is) such an intellectual Power of the Soul, as serves to produce in Men the habit and pra­ctice of several particular Vertues; then it will rather fall under the notion of a general Principle of Vertue, than of a particular Ver­tue. And as such, chiefly, I mean now to consider it; not singly as a particular Vertue, but in a larger extent, as 'tis a general Principle of the rational Nature, and the fruitful Parent of many particular Vertues.

But before I proceed further up­on this Matter, it will, I conceive, be proper to premise a few summa­ry Considerations, for clearing the way to what follows. It is ac­knowledged by all Men, who are in their right Mind, That there is an essential difference between Good and Evil; a difference founded in the nature of things, so that some [Page 20]things are essentially Good, and others essentially Evil: That what is Good, is Eligible, Honourable and becoming Mans Nature, and tends to advance and perfect it: And on the contrary, that what is Evil, is to be refused and avoided, is dishonourable and misbecoming, and tends to a Man's Shame, Re­proach and Misery. That what is Good, naturally imports in it the character of Honourable, that is, challenges and deserves Honour; and the doing of it, cannot be mat­ter of just shame or disgrace to a Man: And on the contrary, that what is Evil, naturally imports in it the character of Dishonourable, and the doing of it, cannot be mat­ter of just praise or ornament to a Man. And that Mankind are en­dued with Notions corresponding to the nature of things in this case; and have, by the Principles inhe­rent in their minds, an ability of discerning, in some measure, what [Page 21]is Good and what Evil, what is Honourable and Becoming, and what is Dishonourable and Unbe­coming. These things are clear in themselves; and they are likewise confirmed to us by the universal consent of wise Men, who have, in all Ages, esteemed some things Good, and others Evil: The for­mer they have accounted Great, Worthy and Honourable; the latter, Base, Rascally and Dishonourable. Hence they have called Vertue, an [...], that is, a Resemblance or Conformity to God, that which is Fit, Equitable, Becoming, Beautiful, Divine, and the like; giving the contrary Ap­pellations to Vice. Hence they al­ways deemed the former worthy of Esteem, Veneration and Re­ward; and the latter, worthy of Shame, Contempt and Punishment. And hence such Persons as have been endowed with extraordinary [Page 22]Qualifications, and have done great and worthy things, have been in all Ages thought to deserve Esteem and Honour: But on the contrary, such as have been vitious and de­praved in their Minds, or guilty of base and infamous Actions, have been thought to deserve Shame and Ignominy. And upon such Princi­ples as these, is founded the very notion of Merit, which implies in it, as well the suitableness and con­gruity there is, that such as have brave Spirits, and perform brave and worthy things, should be ho­noured and esteemed, as likewise the right and title they have to such Honour and Esteem, as the just reward of their Vertue. And hence all wise Lawgivers have thought it both necessary and just, to appoint Honours and Rewards for vertuous and heroical Actions: and Shame and Punishments for vi­tious and infamous ones. The foregoing Considerations amount to [Page 23]this, That nothing can be truly and intrinsically Honourable, but what is according to Vertue: That what is according to Vertue, is truly and intrinsically Honourable: That Praise and Honour are by a natural and indelible Right due to true Merit; and true Merit is founded only in true Vertue and Goodness. Thus it may be seen, what is most truly honourable and conducing to our Happiness, and the Perfection of our Nature. And in regard we have in us, by Nature, a vehement desire of Happiness and Perfection, it highly concerns us to make use of that Principle for the purposes which God Almighty appears to have designed in his im­planting it in us; that so we do not abuse or pervert a Principle which is given us for excellent ends, and which is of mighty in­fluence upon our Minds and Acti­ons, and put upon our selves the fatal Cheat of pursuing an imagi­nary [Page 24]Good, and an imaginary Felicity, instead of that which is real and solid: But on the con­trary, being made sensible in what our true Honour and Happiness consist, we may prosecute that with our utmost intention and di­ligence. And how serviceable the Principle of Generosity may be to us in that good Design, may be worth our while to enquire.

Now I come to speak of Genero­sity, as it is founded in, or more immediately relates to the rational Nature. And under this Notion it may, in like manner as before, be considered, first, with respect to the Principle of Self-esteem, and then with respect to those other Qualifications or Powers of the ra­tional Nature, which it either pro­duces or is wont to be attended withal. So that being now to dis­course of it as an intellectual Prin­ciple, I must be allowed to take it in a fuller Latitude than I have yet [Page 25]done, or could properly do when I consider'd it barely as a Passion or Affection. And after I have spoken something concerning the Princi­ple of Self-esteem, I shall endea­vour to shew, how Generosity is suited to regulate and conduct it rightly, and then shall take notice of some particular Vertues which belong, or may be referred to the character of Generosity.

Tho' the Principle of Self-esteem be common to all Men, being im­planted in them by Nature, yet it is found to operate diversly in dif­ferent Persons, and even in the same Person at different times. Be­ing of a very lively and moving Nature, it will exert it self one way or other, either for better or worse. If it be not made an Instrument to Vertue, it will prove an Instru­ment to Vice; and for want of being rightly managed and con­ducted, will carry Men into those Extreams which are vitious and [Page 26]culpable. Thus it has very diffe­rent Effects, according as Men use it rightly or amiss. As, when a Man reflecting inwardly upon him­self, suffers the Self-esteem that is in him to work upon false grounds or to exceed its just limits, and either imagines that he has in him those good Qualities which he real­ly has not, or swells beyond due bounds those good Qualities which are really in him; and thereupon sets a higher value upon himself than in Justice and Reason he ought; or unjustly prefers himself before other Men: Then that Self-esteem which was in its pure Natu­rals an innocent Affection, degene­rates into Pride, and becomes just­ly blameable. And on the other hand, when a Man reflecting upon himself, from the contemplation he has of his own Imbecillities, and of his inability to conduct his Passi­ons and Actions aright, is depres­sed in his Thoughts for want of [Page 27]sirmness and steadiness of Mind, aggravates his own Imperfections, and depretiates what is really com­mendable in him; and thereupon sets a lower value upon himself, at least while this Passion continues, than in reason he ought: Then his Self-esteem (if one may here so call it) degenerates into vitious Humi­lity or Abjectness; which is like­wise blameable. But in opposition to both these, when upon the Re­flection a Man makes on himself, he sets such a value upon himself as is no more or less than what is just and warrantable, and poises his Mind between the extreams of Pride and Abjectness; then his Self-esteem is rightly tempered and conducted, and the Man is led to that Temper of Mind which is the character of Generosity.

It will be readily acknowledged, that 'tis much more frequent for Men to err by esteeming themselves over-much, than by sinking their [Page 28]own value. For though Self-con­tempt, as well as Pride, proceeds from the operation of Self-love, the former being compounded of Self-love, Admiration and Grief, for the defects which a Man finds or supposes to be in him; as the latter is compouned of Self-love, Admiration and Joy, for the Ex­cellencies he finds or supposes to be in him: Yet the Self-love that is in Men, does, as it falls out, more easily and readily produce Self-e­steem than Self contempt. There is a stronger Byass on that side than on the other. And therefore 'tis no wonder that Pride, which is a kind of Self-esteem, to wit, a wrongful or excessive one, should be a more common Error than viti­ous Humility which is a kind of Self-contempt. Nor will it seem strange, that Pride should be the more growing and thriving Vice of the two, if it be consider'd, that the Self-love that is in Men has not [Page 29]only the greater Byass towards Pride, but likewise operates more vehemently that way; which may easily occasion that Vice to spread further, and run more into the ex­tream: As when a thing is moving, the stronger its Motion is, the fur­ther it is like to run beyond the Lines. Upon which account, it seems necessary, for Men to guard them­selves with the greater care and cau­tion on that side where there is the greater danger. But since I am not advising any Body, either to over­rate himself for fear of falling into a vitious Humility, or to under­rate himself for fear of falling into Pride; but am endeavouring to point at a Method for avoiding both those extreams: I shall think it sufficient for my present purpose to observe, That both those Ex­treams are condemnable; and that Generosity is a Remedy against both.

But in the mean time, is it really a disadvantage and snare to us, that we are naturally more disposed to Esteem than Dis-esteem our selves? Or, may not that natural Disposi­tion be so tempered and applyed as to be of great advantage to us? If it be a disadvantage and snare to us, it becomes so through our own fault; and if it be not made use of to our greater advantage and bene­fit, it will likewise be our own fault. The disposition to esteem our selves, is strong and weighing; but what is its natural tendency and use? Is it the natural use of it, to encline us to esteem our selves upon false or frivolous Grounds, or to esteem our selves beyond the just measure? Is the natural use of it to lead us to Pride, and the nu­merous train of hateful and black qualities that are wont to accom­pany it? Certainly it cannot be. These are Faults which proceed from the gross abuse of this disposi­tion, [Page 31]and therefore cannot be the natural use of it. Or is it designed only to give us the fantastick plea­sure of Self-applause? Sure this is too low and mean a Design for a Principle of so great and universal influence as this is upon our thoughts and actions. On the con­trary, without doubt the natural use and design of it is, To beget in Men an emulation and ambition for Vertue, to establish and com­pose their Minds; and in a word, to incite them to worthy and be­coming things, and deter them from the contrary. If Men were void of all Self-esteem, they could not be touch'd with the sense either of Honour or Shame. These would take no hold of them, since they are founded upon the esteem which Men have of themselves, and cannot subsist without it. Now the im­pressions of Honour and Shame are found to lay a great Restraint upon Mankind; and sometimes work [Page 32]upon them, when other Considera­tions prove ineffectual. But if Men were destitute of all Self-esteem, they would be loose from this Re­straint; which I think 'tls clear would be a great disadvantage to them: And therefore sure 'tis an advantage to them to have such a Principle. So likewise, since Men are so naturally disposed to esteem themselves; that both may and ought to be an Argument to them, to undertake and do those things only which are really Praise-wor­thy. Seeing they love and are willing to have esteem; that is a proper Motive to them to do those things which may deserve and pro­cure it. But the Self-esteem that is in Men, is also of use, as it serves to compose and establish their Minds. It brings with it a calm and serenity into the Mind, and puts it, as one may say, into a good Humour. It produces in Men such Sentiments as give them a stea­diness [Page 33]and assurance of Mind, and secure them from the disorder and embarass which the Affection of Self-contempt is wont to be at­tended with. And it is likewise of great force to animate and enliven the Mind, and to dispose Men to action and effort. For being in its operation, mixed with a kind of Joy and Complacency, the sensati­ons that are thereby produced in the Man, serve to open his thoughts, and to dispose him to a lively and active temper of Mind: Which is of considerable use. Whereas on the other hand, the Affection of Self-despect tends to deaden and discompose the Mind; and being in its operation mixed with the sluggish and melancholy Passion of Grief (as I before observed) brings upon the Mind such a Languor as is oftentimes very prejudicial. So that seems in it self rather be­neficial it than hurtful to Man­kind, that they have such a natu­ral [Page 34]Byass and Disposition to Self-esteem.

But you will say, this Self-esteem is apt to exceed its just bounds, and to betray Men into Pride and an extravagant conceit of themselves. But is it therefore in it self culpa­ble? If it be mischievous in its A­buse, may it not be advantagious in its right and regular use? If it pro­duce this effect in us, it does not (as I have already said) do this na­turally and unavoidably, but by ac­cident and by our own Fault. There are several Principles or Propensi­ties that belong to our Nature, which will certainly run into ex­treams if they be not ballanced and rightly managed; especially those which are, as this is, vehement and of powerful influence upon us. And if we are not wont to think that they are in themselves culpable and unmanageable, why should we think this to be so? Let us turn our Eyes but to a few Instances. [Page 35]Every Body knows we have in us a Principle of Self-preservation: Which is indeed both innocent in it self, and also of great and ne­cessary use. But this is likewise apt to exceed its just bounds. If Men should give it a lose Rein and follow without reserve its blind Dictates, it would in all probabi­lity throw them into such an ex­cess of Fear and Solicitude for them­selves, as would render them use­less to their Friends or their Coun­try, as would disable them to pur­sue the Rules of Justice, Charity, Fortitude and all other Vertues, the practice whereof may be at­tended with danger and hazard, and would perhaps sometimes de­stroy the very end for which this Principle seems designed, as it be­falls them, who hurl themselves in­to Danger or Death, through ex­cessive Fear of it and Solicitude to avoid it. There is also in Men a vehement desire of Procreation. [Page 36]And that Propensity is innocent in it self, and both may and ought to be so governed, as to answer its end without exceeding the just bounds. Yet should Men let them­selves loose to follow its impulse without fear or wit, no doubt but it would carry them into the last Extravagancies. So likewise the innate desire of Happiness that is in Men, is capable of being dire­cted rightly; and we ought to make use of it, as may be subservi­ent to the end for which it was given us. But Men may misapply it; and when they do so, it will, by the prevailing influence it has upon them, carry them far into the Extream, and inspire them with as great a Fervency in the pro­secution of a false or imaginary Good, as of the real and true One. In short, these and other vehement and operative Principles or Pro­pensities are given Men for wise and good Purposes; some of which [Page 37]we are able easily to discover, and if they be rightly managed will be of great use. But if we do not en­deavour to conduct them by our Reason and the Laws which God hath given us for that purpose, the blame will justly fall upon our own selves. It will not therefore, I conceive, either turn to so good account, or so well become us, to bequarrel and find fault with our own Nature and Composure, as it will, to endeavour all we can to at­temper and conduct the Principles and Propensities that are in us, by the Laws of Reason and Revela­tion. But I am now concerned on­ly with the Principle of Self esteem, and therefore shall proceed to con­sider, how it is mixed with Gene­rosity, and conducted by it.

Whoso exactly observes the Na­ture of Mankind, will find, that there is nothing which can so properly and absolutely be called a Man's own, as the free disposal of his [Page 38]own Will: And that generally speaking, a Man cannot justly be either praised or dispraised, but for those Actions which depend on this freedom of his Nature: because he has nothing else so entirely in his own power. Now agreeably hereto, the Character of a Gene­rous Man will be such as fol­lows:

The Generous Man finds in him­self a Resolution to use that Free­dom of his Will rightly, and thereupon is always enclined to undertake and execute what he shall judge best and most fitting to be done. And then, he values him­self upon nothing so much as upon the sincere use of his Natural Free­dom, and the firm purposes he makes to prosecute Vertue with an extream application. He does not value himself upon account of any of those things which are wont to beget Pride in Men, such as Ho­nours, Riches, Wit, Beauty, Suc­cess, [Page 39]or the like: but upon account of that, which no Man can, pro­perly speaking, be proud of, be­cause it is not an Excellency pecu­liar to himself above other Men, but a Property of the Human Na­ture in general, to wit, The Free Disposal of his own Will. And by this means he is secured from Pride. On the other hand, he is very sensible of the Failings and Imperfections incident to Human Nature, by reason whereof he knows himself to be liable to those Errours and Offences which he sees in other Men. And he considers at the same time, that other Men, as having the free disposal of their own Wills, as well as himself has of his, may use that freedom as well as himself does or better, if they be not themselves in fault. And therefore he is not enclined to entertain big thoughts of himself, or to prefer himself before other Men. And this preserves him in [Page 40]an humble and modest temper of Mind. But in regard he finds in himself (as I have said) a steady Purpose of using his Natural Free­dom rightly, and of doing always, as near as he can, that which is really and absolutely best, which he thinks is the main thing that gives Men a real value or worth: He is satisfied, that he ought not to be contemned though he want several of those External Considerations for which Men are generally valued in the World, such as Honours, Wealth, Beauty, or the like. Nor does he much care if he be con­temned for the want of them. Much less is he concerned, if he fortune to be disvalued for a defect in some of those trivial things, which in the opinion of some People pass for Recommendations of a Man; such as Garb, Air, Mien, Accent, or the like. And thus he is placed a­bove the reach of Contempt, and secured from a vicious Humility or [Page 41]abjectness of Spirit. And when he surveys, (according to the best of his skill, be it greater or less) both the Human Nature in general, and Himself in particular, he becomes sensible, that he has no absolute need of any thing which it is not in his own power, by the help of God, to acquire and keep. And therefore he is not much disquieted, though he want several of the Or­naments and Accommodations of Life which others have. Thus, if he have not those External Things which Men are ordinarily valued for, he does not upon that account think himself much inferiour to those that have them: And if he have, he does not think himself su­periour upon that account, to those that have them not. He has a low va­lue for External things; and is per­swaded, that the possession of them cannot justly advance, or the want of them justly sink a Man's real Price. And therefore in estimating either [Page 42]himself or others, he is satisfied, that these or any other things ex­trinsical to a Man, or which de­pend on the circumstances of Mens Life and Fortunes, or for which they must be entirely beholden to other Men, ought not to be brought to account. And by such Conside­rations as these he regulates the Self-esteem that is in him, and makes use of it for good purposes.

He is likewise persuaded it would be against the Rules of Ju­stice, to value another Man either beneath or above what we know to be his just Desert; and that for the same Reasons it would be against Justice to do so by himself. And this is another Consideration by which he regulates the Self-esteem that is in him, and comes to think of himself as near as he can, nei­ther more nor less than he lawfully and fairly may. But as he is care­ful not to undertake another, through Envy, Hatred or other si­nister [Page 43]Motive; so he is likewise careful not to over-value himself, out of Partiality and Self-love: But in the judgment he passes either on himself or others, endeavours to make all those allowances which Reason and Justice require. And tho' he does not take any more de­light than other Men in the Con­templation of himself, and is re­solved to make no other use of that Self esteem which he has in him, than only to establish his Mind, and excite him to the more vigorous prosecution of that which is Best and most Honourable; yet when a necessary or just occasion is offered for his passing a judgment upon himself in this nature, then he falls into such cogitations as carry him even between Pride and Abjectness, and secure him from the Errors of both.

Agreeably hereunto, from the consideration of the Dignity of the rational Nature, and of the Obli­gations [Page 44]that arise from thence to act suitably to that Character, the generous Man finds himself obliged to make a firm and constant Reso­lution, not to do any thing that is dishonourable or unbecoming. The just apprehensions he has touching his own Nature, restrain him from doing those things which are, in the concurrent judgment of wise Men, base and ignominious; and excite him to whatever is ex­cellent and praise-worthy. When he considers the character which Mankind bear in the Creation, how that they are placed in a middle rank between the Angelical and the Brutal Nature: This suggests to him, that it is unbecoming and be­neath him, to sink himself to a con­formity with the latter; and that 'tis no less worthy of his care and ambition, to aspire after a simili­tude to the former (as far as may consist with the impotency of his Nature) by a just observation of [Page 45]those Laws which the supream Cre­ator has given the rational World to govern themselves by. And therefore he thinks, 'tis for his Credit and Honour to do those things which tend to advance his Nature, as on the t'other hand 'tis a shame and disgrace to him, to do those things which tend to debase it. But though he have in his Breast an extream sense of Honour, yet that does not operate within him as a fantastical airy Principle, but as a Spur to vertuous and wor­thy Actions: For he is far from the empty humour of Popularity or Vain-glory, and places true Ho­nour, not in the little niceties or punctilio's of pretended Reputati­on and Gallantry, but in those things which will recommend him to God and good Men, and which import a real and solid Worth. And when (to carry this Conside­ration a little further) he calls to mind the Relation he stands in un­to [Page 46]to God Almighty himself, whose Image and Offspring he, in some sense, is, this lets him see that he is under the strongest Obligations in the World, of Duty, Reason and Honour, to do those things which are Vertuous and Becoming, and to avoid the contrary. And, whereas, by this Contemplation of the human Nature, and of the Pow­ers and Endowments which it hath pleased God to bestow on it, he is made sensible that Vertue is a thing practicable and within his Power: This arms him against the sugge­stions of those who would discour­age him from attempting the pro­secution of Vertue and Felicity, un­der pretence that they are things placed out of his reach: And on the other side, engages him to exert his utmost endeavours to attain as great a Perfection in Vertue as he can; since he sees no reason to de­spair of an Improvement corre­sponding to his Endeavours. He is [Page 47]persuaded it is in his power to be­come Vertuous and Happy; and that if he be not such, 'twill be his own Fault. This excites his Reso­lution and animates his Endeavours, and makes him with Courage and in good Earnest set about that ar­duous Affair, in which he has so good assurance of an answerable Success. Thus Generosity helps Men to estimate themselves and o­thers rightly, and inspires them with such Sentiments and Resoluti­ons, as serve both to dispose them to Vertue, and likewise to render them vigorous in their endeavours to improve in that Character.

Now if any Man should at first be apt to think, that Generosity leads Men to Pride, he may, I be­lieve, without much difficulty, see that there is no such matter, if he will but consider well what Pride is. Now Pride, taken absolutely or with respect to a Man's own self, consists in an unjust or excessive [Page 48]Opinion or Esteem of one's self. Unjust, when a Man either values himself for something that he real­ly has not; which is the worst sort of Pride, and the most gross and unreasonable: Or else for some­thing, which properly speaking, has not in it self any real Worth, and so cannot communicate any to its possessor. Excessive, when he values himself more than he ought, for something laudable, which he has really in some measure in him. But the Generous Man does not do either of these. It is his Chara­cter, that he values himself just so much as he ought; neither more nor less than he lawfully and fairly may. Now it is repugnant for a Man to value himself justly or exactly, and at the same time to value himself wrongfully or exces­sively. That is to be Proud, and not to be Proud, both at once. On the contrary, if we look exactly in­to the thing, we may discern, that [Page 49]Generosity produces the true and regular Humility, and such a one as is perhaps both less artificial, and better grounded than any other. Thus Generous People are com­monly found by experience, more addicted to Humility and Modesty, and the Ungenerous to Pride and Insolence. So also Pride, taken relatively, or with respect to o­thers, is an unjust preferring our selves before other Men; when we falsly think we excel other Men. But the Generous Man is perhaps less inclined than others, to prefer himself. If he has an asteem for himself, he has so likewise, and that upon the same Reasons, for the Human Nature in general. If he esteems himself for the Resolu­tions he makes to use his Natural Freedom rightly, he esteems other Men equally upon that account. And if another Man be more pun­ctual in keeping his Resolutions of that kind than himself is, he finds [Page 50]no difficulty to give him the pre­ference. But in regard he does not esteem himself for any thing which is not common to other Men equally with himself; he is the less liable to be proud: Since Pride is ground­ed upon a conceit, that we have in us something Excellent, which is not to be found in the generality of other Men. Men are not wont to be Proud, (I might say, cannot be so) for their having somewhat which every body else both has as well as they, and may, if he will, use as well as they do. One may be Proud, because he either surpas­ses other Men in Understanding, Strength, Beauty, or the like; or imagins that he doth so: But I ne­ver heard of any Body in his Sen­ses that was Proud, because Man­kind at large, are rational and in­telligent Creatures, or because they are of a comely and beautiful Fi­gure, or upon the account of those Qualities which are common to the [Page 51]whole Species. If Pride be a kind of Self-esteem (as doubtless it is) it cannot take place in these Cases, which do not relate to our selves only, but to Mankind in general. And to do right to thegenerous Man I must observe, that he does not de­sire to compare himself with those who may perhaps come short of him, in order to prefer himself before them, or gain a reputation from their Defects. But he rather chuses to compare himself with those who excel him, to the end he may be thereby excited to an emulation of their Vertue, and to a desire of equalling or exceeding them if he can, in that which is Vertuous and Praise-worthy. In a word, if the generous Man endeavours to value both the Human Nature in gene­ral, and himself in particular, just so much as he lawfully may, and no more, then he cannot reasonably be thought more, but indeed much less liable to Pride than other Men.

They indeed who are desirous to fasten upon the Generous Man the imputation of Pride, upon any Terms, may perhaps carry the Charge a little further, and pre­tend, that if he be not Proud with respect to Men, by preferring him­self unjustly before them, yet he is Proud and Assuming with respect to God Almighty, by arrogating to himself such a freedom of Acti­on, and such a Power of chusing and doing Good, as they imagine does detract from the divine Grace and Concurrence. But I desire it may be considered, that the Gene­rous Man does not assume to him­self this natural Freedom and Choice, in opposition to the divine influence and concurrence, but in opposition to a necessity of acting. There is no Man more willing than he, to acknowledge, both the de­pendance which Mankind have on the divine Being; and likewise, that whatever Powers or good [Page 53]Qualifications they have, they re­ceive the same from God Almighty, from whom, as the Scripture testi­fies, and all considering Men ac­knowledge, even upon the foot of natural Theology, ‘Every good Gift cometh.’ But as he is satisfied, that both the Beginnings and In­creases of Vertue and Goodness in Men, are from God Almighty: So he is also satisfied, from his own and the experience of all other Men, that Mankind are free Agents, and are obliged by the Laws of God and Man, to use that Freedom rightly. And therefore he does not think himself much concerned to determine (as some Men venture to do) in what particular manner God is pleased to communicate Vertues and good Qualities unto Men; or how, in particular, the divine Aids work with or upon that natural Freedom which we have, either antecedently or concomi­tantly, or any, or what other way; [Page 54]or how in particular the Divine Concurrence and our natural Free­dom consist together. He thinks these are things, in a great measure out of his reach: And that as he can­not expect to acquire an entire Cer­tainty about them; so he may be as good a Man without the certain knowledge of them, as with it. But being on the own hand assured, that God Almighty is the primary Author of all good, he thinks, Men are obliged to depend on the Di­vine Majesty, and to ascribe to him the Beginnings and Increases of Ver­tue and Goodness in them: And being on the other hand assured, that Mankind are free Agents, he sees no reason to doubt, but that they can and ought to use that Freedom rightly, and that that is the way for them to become Vertuous and good Men.

To this I may add, that the cur­rent Notions which Men have in cases of this Nature about Self-e­steem; [Page 55]and about Pride and Humi­lity, agree very well with what I have before spoken touching the Sentiments which accompany Ge­nerosity. We are not wont to blame Men, or account them Proud (nor can we indeed justly so do) for resolving (which in the mean time supposes Freedom and Choice) to become as Vertuous and Good as they possibly can; or for believing, that their Resolution and Endea­vour to be such, is a proper and conducive means to that end: For thinking it beneath them, to re­venge an Affront or Injury; or to commit a vile and ignominious thing: For having an ambition for that which is Vertuous, Decent and Venerable, and an abhorrence of the contrary, or the like. These we esteem laudable Principles and according to Vertue. And are wont to make use of the innate em­mulation and desire of Glory, which we find in our selves or o­thers, [Page 56]in order to excite our selves or them to things of a worthy and becoming Nature. And on the other side, we cannot reasonably, and, I think, usually do not, esteem it a Part or Instance of true Humi­lity, for Men to disparage and de­grade the human Nature without grounds: Torepresent Mankind as a company of necessary Agents, or of Beings either not at all Superiour to Brutes, or (which will render them much worse than Brutes) void of all Goodness. Humility does not require that which is against Justice or Truth. So also we do not count it an instance of true Hu­mility, that a Man can descend to the vilest Actions, and thinks no­thing unbecoming or beneath him. But we rather, and no doubt very deservedly, esteem him to be in a profligate State, who has no regard to his Reputation or Honour.

But further, as to those Vertues or good Dispositions of the Mind [Page 57]which belong to Generosity, and by the Method before proposed, come to be consider'd next: I shall touch upon some of them now, and shall by and by have occasion to speak of some others, when I come to give a further Interpretation of this Principle, by shewing the Affi­nity and Connexion there is be­tween it and several other Vertues of considerable Note. Now Gene­rosity does in general draw to it all those Vertues which bespeak a Manly temper of Mind, and pro­duce a tenour of Action becoming the human Nature; which Vertues I shall not go about exactly to enu­merate: But there are some which I must not omit naming particu­larly, because they seem to have a nearer cognation to it than ordi­nary. Of this sort are, Firmness of Mind, Goodness and Ingenuity of Temper, Liberality in distribu­ting Favours, Sincerity and Recti­tude of Spirit, Dispassionateness or [Page 58]Tranquility, Evenness of Temper and Judgment, exact Observation of Decorum; in a word, an ex­tream Love and Veneration for Vertue.

Wherein this Firmness of Mind principally consists, may perhaps be most commodiously seen by con­sidering the Qualities opposite to it. Now Firmness of Mind is op­posed to that impotency of Spirit which lays Men open to the incursions of Fear and Affrightment; by which their Reason is sometimes rendred useless to them, and the Men sub­jected to the Torment, Perplexi­ties, and other innumerable ill ef­fects of that extravagant Passion. It is opposed to that softness or vi­tious Modesty, which enclines Men to comply with others in things evil and dishonourable (sometimes even against their own Judgment) only to avoid their Confrontments or Reproaches. It is also opposed to another kind of impotency of Spi­rit, [Page 59]whereby a Man for want of Judgment and of Resolution to use his natural Freedom rightly, is either held from acting, by conti­nual fluctuation of Mind, or can never keep a consistency with him­self in the course of his Actions, but is oftentimes enclined to do and actually does those things, of which he knows at the same time he shall afterwards have cause to Repent. It is also opposed to that sort of im­potency of Spirit, which keeps Men servilely under the power of Custom and Prepossession; and ren­ders them unable to quit those Er­rors which are fixt in them by Cu­stom, Education, or the power of fancy and corporeal Impression, though upon the clearest Reasons and fullest Conviction that can be. There are some People, who are very unhappy in this particular. They are oftentimes guided by Fan­cy and Humour; by the cogitati­ons which are raised in them by [Page 60]their Passions or corporeal Impres­sions, which though never so slight and trivial, they have accustomed themselves to attend unto; not considering so much, whether they have any solid reason for what they do resolve to do, as whether their Humour, Fancy or Prepossession encline them to do it: And not di­stinguishing the Impressions that are made upon them by external things, or by their own Imagination, and the Perceptions which are by these means excited in their Brain and Spirits, from the Principles of the rational Nature, or the Cogitati­ons that purely relate to the Soul, suffer themselves to be carried away by uncertain and fortuitous Impres­sions, in so much that they act as it were by chance, without being able in many things, to give a tole­rable reason for what they do. This habit betokens a great Infirmity: And as it is most incident to Wo­men and People of effeminate and [Page 61]feeble Spirits, so it is directly op­posite to Generosity. It is opposed also, to another kind of Impoten­cy of Spirit, whereby Men are un­able to demean themselves steadily and evenly in the two different states of Life: But are either tran­sported to an excess of Levity and Folly by Prosperity, or confound­ed and dispirited by the access of Adversity. It is also opposed to that sort of Impotency of Spirit, which discovers it self by Trepi­dity upon the approach of Danger, by a dulness and drowsiness of Mind, and by an aversion to undertake or go through those Posts and Em­ployments which are attended with labour and hazard. These and such like are the Qualities opposite to it. So that if we turn the Tables, we shall easily see wherein this firmness of Mind consists: To wit, in Cour­age and Constancy, in a judicious Uniformity of acting, in the presi­dence of Reason over our Prejudi­ces [Page 62]and corporeal Impressions, in a constancy and evenness under every State of Life, in a discreet bold­ness and activity. And since these Qualities which I have mentioned as opposite to firmness of Mind, discover an imbecillity of Spirit, and dispose Men to act upon child­ish and weak Principles; the con­trary Qualities may, not impro­perly, be thought to belong to the Character of Generosity.

The goodness and ingenuous­ness of Temper which I just now mentioned, consists in that Candor and Humanity which renders Men peaceable, agreeable and well hu­moured, willing to pass by Injuries upon reasonable Terms, and to put the most favourable construction that may fairly be upon things; which fills Men with sentiments of Tenderness and Compassion, and of Clemency and Mercy; which makes them obliging and civil in Conversation; and enclines them [Page 63]to render not only unto their Friends and Neighbours, but like­wise to Strangers and others, as occasion may be, the respective of­fices of Curtesy and Good-will, and to do all that lies in their power to preserve and maintain amity and good understanding with those with whom they converse. For the Ge­nerous Man has an esteem for the human Nature in general; and therefore thinks, that all Men are entituled to those respects and good Offices which identity of Blood and Nature challenge from him. He remembers likewise the imbecil­lities that belong to human Na­ture; that no Man is wise at all times; that there are a great ma­ny accidents and emerging Circum­stances which lead Men insensibly into Error, insomuch that the most vigilant and cautious are sometime or other deceived and intrapped: And therefore he is not apt to be severe in his Censures, or to con­demn [Page 64]Men of improbity or insince­rity for a single unadvised Action. The knowledge he has of his own Infirmity, restrains him in that particular, and makes him willing to give other Mens Actions that connivance or favourable Constru­ction which he himself may desire or stand in need of for his own. And when he considers, that other Men, as well as himself, have by Nature the free disposal of their own Wills, he is disposed to be­lieve, that they resolve as well as himself does, to use that power rightly, and thereupon that the Errors or Faults which they com­mit, are owing rather to want of Judgment or to Incogitancy, than to ill Will or sinister Intention. And when he observes on the one hand, how much the several social Vertues contribute to make Con­versation agreeable, delightful and orderly; and on the other hand, how much the contrary Qualities [Page 65]contribute to disturb and bring it into disorder: He thinks himself obliged by these Considerations, and likewise by the Rules of Good-breeding and Decorum, to endea­vour to exercise those Vertues which are of so great Use and Or­nament.

Liberality in distributing Fa­vours, is another Qualification be­longing to Generosity. This is so far acknowledged by most Men, that in ordinary Discourse, the li­beral Man is most usually honoured with the name of Generous. But tho' Liberality does not give us a compleat Idea of Generosity; for Generosity is not to be restrained within so narrow a compass: Yet it is true, that this is one of its Cha­racters. Now this Liberality is, in a Generous Man, attended with such Sentiments as these: An E­steem for Mankind on general, which makes him look in them as proper Objects, not only of Justice, [Page 66]but also of Kindness and Benefi­cence; a serenity of Mind mixt with the Perceptions of Kindness and Gratitude, and a sense of De­corum; which kind of Sentiments serve to open his Heart, and to dis­pose him as well to make suitable acknowledgments of Favours and Obligations, as likewise to do these and other things in such a manner as may seem most becoming a great Mind.

To Generosity do likewise be­long Sincerity and Rectitude of Spi­rit: Of which I shall have occasion to speak more particularly anon.

And to it likewise belong Dis­passionateness and Tranquility. 'Tis well known, that Mens Passi­ons and unbridled Appetites do ruffle and disorder them to a ve­ry great degree, and by disturbing the regular use of their natural Freedom, and raising Storms and Tempests in their Minds, impel them to the commission of many [Page 67]foolish, extravagant and wicked things, which afterwards bring upon them shame, regret, remorse of Conscience, and many other In­conveniences. Now Generosity is adapted to remedy these Evils. For the Generous Man, by the Com­mand he has over his own Spirit, and the Government he maintains over his Passions and Inclinations, is the better secured in that Tran­quility, which the regular use of Mens natural Freedom is wont to produce: And since he endeavours to do nothing whereof he shall have just cause afterwards to Repent, he is the more likely to escape Re­morse of Conscience; than which there is nothing that gives the Mind a more sharp and tormenting Pain.

Evenness of Temper in Judging and Acting is another Property of Generosity. This is much the same with that which is sometimes called in one word Moderation. [Page 68]And is produced or maintained by that Firmness of Mind and Tran­quility, which I have before men­tioned. It is easy to discern, that the due government of a Man's Spi­rit, and of his Passions, corporeal Impressions and Inclinations, the irregularities whereof do so much pervert Mens Judgments concern­ing things, and betray them into so many weak and wicked Actions, must needs conduce very much to establish him in this even Temper of Mind.

Exact observation of Decorum, is likewise another Property of Ge­nerosity. We know there are se­veral things, either Lawful or at least countenanced by the general Practice of Men, which yet are real­ly not expedient or fitting to be done; as being against Decency and good Grace. In such Cases, the Generous Man considers, not barely what is lawful or practica­ble, but withal what is decent and [Page 69]seemly. The respect he has for the Humane Nature, enclines him to conceal its imperfections; to cover what is uncomely with the vail of Modesty; and to submit quietly to the laws of the animal nature without violating Puri­ty or Decency internally in his Mind, or openly in his words or actions. He will not offer un­handsome things to Matrons or Virgins, or put modest persons to the blush; and endeavours in gene­ral, to avoid such words and gestures as are ungraceful. So likewise he is not apt to be assum­ing, impertinent, or troublesome in company; to put the banter and ridicule upon others; to re­flect upon them or insult over their weakness and imperfection; to pry into other Mens secrets, or meddle with matters which do not concern him. He bears with ma­ny things, connives at, and passes many things over in silence. In [Page 70]a word, he considers his sex, his age, his station, his character, and the circumstances of his condition, and endeavours with respect to them all, to comport himself as neer as he can by the rules of Decorum. And since Decency is a thing of a refined and delicate nature, and the perfection as it were of Right and Lawful, as Equity is the per­fection of Justice: The Generous Man, who resolves to do, to his power, that which is best and most becoming, and to attain as high a degree in Vertue as he can, must neeeds find himself under an obli­gation to observe the rules of De­cency.

In short, Generosity imports an extreme Love and Veneration for Vertue. The Generous Man looks upon Vertue and Goodness to be the most honourable and becoming thing in the World, and the greatest Ornament and perfection of the Human nature. It is to [Page 71]him the great index and rule of Honourable and Dishonourable. And therefore when he looks round about him, he can see nothing that deserves to be the object of his esteem and ambition in comparison of it: Being satisfied, that there is nothing so worthy of his care and regard, as that which tends to advance him to a conformity unto the supreme and most perfect Being, and which leads him in a direct line to the truest and high­est Felicity his nature is capable of. So that when he resolves to use his natural Freedom rightly, and to prosecute with all his might that which is simply and absolute­ly best; he does so, for the sake of Vertue; That is the secret Spring of his motions, and the Butt of his Ambition.

This may serve for a general ex­plication of the nature of Gene­rosity. In the next place I am to speak somewhat, to shew the a­greement [Page 72]and affinity there is be­tween it, and several other Vertues which have been deservedly esteem­ed of the first rank; and likewise between it, and some of those ex­cellent rules of conduct which have been approved by the common con­sent of mankind in most ages of the World. And after that, I would consider briefly the influence it has even upon what is more strictly called Piety and Religion. By all which it may appear, that the sen­timents and dispositions of mind which Generosity is attended with all, do entirely correspond and are in effect the same with those sentiments and dispositions which the most eminent Vertues and ap­proved rules of Action serve to produce in us. And the doing of this will, I conceive, not only af­ford us a fuller interpretation of the Principle which we are now considering, but likewise be of con­siderable use to us in our Practice.

Now there are six Principal Ver­tues, which I shall take particular notice of in this place; to wit, Prudence, Sincerity, and Patience; which are called Primitive Vertues: And Justice, Fortitude, and Tem­perance, which are called Deriva­tive ones.

Prudence is a Vertue, whereby a Man judges rightly of things. And this no Man can well do, who is not competently free from the power of Prejudice, Passion, and the other imbecillities which hin­der Men from the clear discern­ment of what is good and true. Now it is the generous Mans con­stant endeavour to overcome, and keep his Mind free from those im­pediments; as I have before no­ted: And by that means he is very much secured from several of those errors which are opposite to Pru­dence, such as Rashness, Precipi­tance, Levity, Credulity, Obstina­cy, blind Zeal, Partiality, and [Page 74]the like: And on the contrary is disposed and enabled to judg and chuse rightly. To explain this, I shall at present only make use of the following instance, waiving others which might be given. We find, there is a sort of Imprudence which Men are betrayed into by an unaccountable gayety of temper that sometimes befalls them. And though this be commonly most in­cident to young People, who by reason of the fire and briskness that is in their Blood and Spirits, are most apt to be carried away by vehement and sudden emotions; yet there are many who retain this levity and gayety of temper, till they come to be far advanced in years. Now Generosity helps to correct the Irregularities of this temper; as it ballasts and poises the Mind, and excites Men to do those things only, which are grave, manly, and discreet; that is, to act according to the rules of Prudence. [Page 75]And in regard 'tis part of the character of a Generous Man, firmly and advisedly to resolve to prosecute, in all his actions as neer as he can, that which is ultimately and simply best: Whilst we sup­pose him to do that, we must sup­pose him to be competently conu­sant and capable of judging what is best: that is, to be at least a com­petently Prudent Man.

Sincerity is a Vertue, whereby a Man is disposed, sincerely and uprightly to prosecute that which he deems to be simply best. This Vertue is one of the brightest cha­racters of the Soul: 'Tis the life and Spirit of other Vertues; And that which is in a particular man­ner pleasing and acceptable to God Almighty, as we may judg from the nature of the thing, and as sufficiently appears from several express Declarations in the Gospel of our Saviour. So that 'twill be a great Recommendation to Gene­rosity, [Page 76]if that be found to have a Cognation with it. Now Sinceri­ty has an especial relation to the Will. It consists in a simplicity of Mind, and a Rectitude of Will and intention. It is that Purity and uncorrupt Chastity of the Will, whereby a Man is engaged to ad­here unto that which appears to be best. But Generosity is like­wise accompanied with the same disposition of Mind, which Sin­cerity produces in Men. For Ge­nerosity has in like manner an es­pecial relation to the Will. It is attended with that Rectitude of the Will, whereby a Man is con­tinually engaged to endeavour to use his Natural Freedom rightly, and to chuse and do, to his power, in all cases, that which appears to be best. The very description of these two correspond mutually, and enter into one another. Since that which appears to be best, is for an inviolable Law both to the [Page 77]sincere, and to the Generous Man; these two Vertues must needs have the strictest Connexion imagina­ble.

As for Patience, which is a Ver­tue of the Soul, whereby a Man for the sake of Vertue and Good­ness is contented to endure those things which are difficult and un­ungrateful to the Animal nature: This Vertue evidently appertains to Generosity; and may in parti­tular be referred to the Masculine Firmness of Mind, which makes part of that character. For Pati­ence do's not reside in a feeble Spi­rit; or in a Breast agitated with untamed and impetuous Passions. It dwells in Masculine and firm Minds; which are able to endure the shock of Hardships; and think it inglorious to shrink when they are engaged in the Cause of Ver­tue. Thus also the Generous Man confirms himself in a resolution to bear the injuries of Men and other [Page 78]misfortunes that may befall him; And though he does not throw himself rashly into dangers or mis­fortunes; yet he resolves to go through them with an even and un­daunted Spirit. Nor indeed can the Generous Man, without a due Proportion of the Masculine Ver­tue of Patience, execute those re­solutions which he makes of pur­suing the highest good. Without it, the formidable prospect of Death, Pain, Poverty, Shame, on the like, would quickly break his Measures, and dissolve his Resolu­tions. And therefore he thinks he is obliged to arm himself with this Vertue, that he may be able the more constantly and steadily to put in are the just Resolutions he makes of acting upon the Prin­ciples of Honour and Vertue. So likewise we may observe, that there are a great many things which put Men into disorder and impati­ence, that do befall them unavoid­ably [Page 79]and without their own choice; such as neither their In­dustry or Foresight can prevent: And that on the other Hand, Men do oftentimes, by their own folly and peevishness, create Vexati­ons to themselves, when it is in their power to be in quiet. And whether Men are under misfor­tunes of the First or Latter sort, we find by experience, that the greatest part of the uneasiness they endure in those cases, is owing to the impatience and ungovernable­ness of their Spirits, by means whereof that which would other­wise be easy to be endured, be­comes intolerable to them. Now as to the vexations which we vo­luntarily bring upon our selves, I need not say that Generosity helps us to endure them, for (which is much better) it does really help to prevent them. It tends to cure Men of those little freaks and imbe­cillities of Spirit which are the [Page 80]cause of them: And so by taking away the cause, takes away the effect. And as to the other sort of misfortunes which 'tis less in our power to prevent, Generosity, which helps us to govern our Pas­sions and Appetites, which arms our Minds with Masculine Resolu­tions, in a Word, which makes us sensible that there is all the rea­son in the World to submit pati­ently to the soveraign and wise Government of Almighty God, whether he distribute sweet or un­grateful things, and to suffer hardships for the sake of Vertue: I say, Generosity which operates within us in this manner, must needs conduce very much to beget in us a patience and constancy of Mind.

Next consider Justice, which is a constant and uniform purpose of giving to every one his due. Now the Generous Man pursues the dictates of this Vertue. And is [Page 81]willing to do right, both to him­self, and likewise to every body else. For he neither envies nor hates any body. He thinks it a dishonourable part to do an un­just thing to another, either by detracting from his just desert, or by wronging him in his Estate, his Bed, or his Person. And so he is kept from several Vices, which are opposite to Justice, such as Slander, false Testimony and Subordination, Bribery and unjust Judgment, Co­vetousness, Extortion, Murder, Adultery, Rapine, Oppression, fraud, Cruelty, and the like. Nay, he is not content to do strict Justice to other Men; But chuseth to render them more than what is in strict­ness due, rather than less. He re­laxes and qualifies, as far as he lawfully may, what is rigorous and extreme; and exerciseth Justice with that Moderation and Equity which is indeed the Flower and perfection of it. And since it is [Page 82]part of his character, that he has no mighty value for Honour, Riches, or the like external things, he is under the less temptation to wrong others in order to advance or enrich himself with their spoils. So likewise he esteems it a mean and abject thing, to be ungrateful to such as have obliged him or done him good offices: And therefore is careful to shew, upon all fit oc­casions, his gratitude to his Bene­factors; accounting it a piece of Justice and Honour so to do. And he is likewise careful to demon­strate an entire Fidelity to those who have committed to him a Trust; accounting it both unjust and mean-spirited, to be treache­rous or unfaithful. And whilst he considers the strait alliance and consanguinity there is between Man and Man, upon account of the common nature they are all partakers of; and likewise the just Title that all Men who are not fal­len [Page 83]from the common Rights of their nature, have, not only to his esteem and good will, but also to all those good offices which 'tis in his power upon reasonable terms to render to them: He finds himself engaged, even in point of Justice, to be courteous, affable, easy of access, humane, candid, and obliging to all Men; and to exercise, as far as he fairly may, the respective offices of Charity, Beneficence, Hospitality, and Phi­lanthropy, towards them. And as he thinks himself obliged to do those things which Justice requires with respect to mankind: So he considers also the Justice that is due to Almighty God: And this en­gages him to the exact performance of the respective Offices of Piety which relate to Almighty God. So likewise he remembers, that he ows a duty and Respect to Truth also. And this obliges him to an entire Veracity; and makes him [Page 84]punctual to his promises and con­tracts, as far as lies really and bona fide in his power. And consider­ing, that Lying, Equivocating, or Dissembling, are mean and rascally actions, and for the most part the tokens of an abject Spirit; he finds himself obliged to avoid these and such like little Arts, if he would pursue the Character of a Just and Generous Man.

As for Fortitude, whereby Men are enabled, for the sake of Ver­tue and Goodness, to atchieve and undergo great and difficult things, and even to suffer Death it self with a firm and intrepid Mind: It is so neerly allied to Ge­nerosity, that several of the Cha­racters of Generosity have been wont to be ascribed by Moralists to it; and to be represented under the name of Fortitude or Magna­nimity. Now Fortitude or Mag­nanimity consisting in that true Gallantry of Mind which qualifies [Page 85]Men for great undertakings, which enables them to encounter with a constant and serene mind, the dif­ficulties and dangers that attend elevated imployments both in Peace and War; and all this, in gene­ral for the sake of Honesty and Ver­tue, and in particular for the good and safety of their Country: Ge­nerosity and It appear to have an undivided cognation. And as For­titude has in most ages been esteem­ed and honoured in a peculiar man­ner; insomuch that the other good habits or powers of the Soul are called Vertues from the proper name of this: So the Generous Man has a Genius peculiarly suited to make good the characters of that Vertue. And though he be as sen­sible of Pain and misfortunes as other Men, yet he endeavours to keep his Spirit from being oppres­sed or softned by them; and in a word, to support himself under all, with a steadiness and constancy be­coming his character.

Then for Temperance, which is a Vertue, whereby Men are re­strained in the use of sensitive plea­sures, that they may the better pursue things more sublime and noble: This is evidently of kin to Generosity; which likewise sug­gests, that we ought to postpone all manner of sensitive Gratificati­ons to those other exercises of the Mind whereby it is led to that which is simply and absolutely best. He cannot prosecute that which is absolutely best, with a just Vigour, who is continually enclined to gra­tify the Body in its several Appe­tites; because there is nothing that does, more than that, hinder Men in the pursuit of Vertue and Goodness. But the Generous Man is sensible, that 'tis unbecoming the dignity of the Rational nature; for a Man to indulge himself too much in corporeal pleasures, or gratify the extravagant desires of the Body: That this would be to [Page 87]set the Rational and the Animal na­ture upon the same Level, or per­haps to prefer the Latter before the Former: And being satisfied, it is no part of true Humility, to condescend so low, he endeavours to maintain the dignity of that rank and order, wherein God Al­mighty hath placed him. And all this he does, not out of a Con­tempt of other Creatures more ig­noble than himself, but out of a just esteem of the Dignity of his own Order, and out of a sincere regard to Vertue. And when he observes, how much, Voluptuous­ness tends to bewitch Mens Minds, to render Men soft, terrene, and degenerate, and to extinguish the Seeds of goodness in them: He concludes, that if he be not tempe­rate and discreet in the use of sen­sual pleasures, he shall be in appa­rent danger of forfeiting those Vertuous habits and dispositions of Mind, wherein he places his [Page 88]greatest Honour and Happiness. And thus he is armed against seve­ral Vices that are opposite to Tem­perance, such as Lasciviousness, Excess in Meats and Drinks, Va­nity in Behaviour or Apparel, and other softnesses wherein there is any thing of Luxury or Abuse.

But further, as touching those excellent Rules of conduct, which I before took notice of, let us see how Generosity stands with re­spect to them. Of this sort there are two principally to be consider­ed. ‘Do as you would be done by:’ And, ‘Know thy self.’

As for the former of these, ‘Do unto others as you would they should do unto you; and, Do not to others what you would not they should do unto you:’ They are so easy to be understood and applied, that I need say no more of them, than that they contain the Sum of Natural Justice and E­quity; and being of a comprehen [Page 89]five and delicate nature, do not only direct us to act according to the Or­dinary Rules of Justice, but like­wise serve to guide us by the Rules of Equity and Mercy, where those of Justice seem to be either ob­scure or defective. And this is one great use of Generosity, which is also a Principle so comprehen­sive, that as I have already ob­served, it imports in it the Sum of that Justice and Equity which Men ow to one another, and is of so fine and delicate a nature, that it restrains Men from doing many things, which according to human Laws or the ordinary Rules of Justice, may appear lawful, and enclines them oftentimes, as the circumstances of things may be, to do more than those ordinary Rules in strictness require at their hands.

As to the latter Precept, ‘Know thy Self.’ This we are told was formerly had in great Reve­rence, [Page 90]insomuch that 'twas suppo­sed to have been immediately com­municated unto Men from Hea­ven—E Coelo descendit, [...]. And it well deserves to be esteem­ed and observed at this day. Now the Knowledge of our selves is of use principally two ways: To wit. As it makes us sensible on the one hand of the Imperfections, and on the other of the Dignity of our Nature. First, by Knowing our Selves, and by contemplating the Infirmities and Imperfections that adhere to our Nature, we are taught to be humble and modest, patient, temperate, submissive to the divine Will, beneficent and merciful, and the like. When we we consider, that our Knowledge and other Abilities are compara­tively imperfect, how many things we are ignorant of, and in how many we err and do amiss: This and such like Considerations help to keep us from being Proud and [Page 91]Presuming with respect to our selves, and from being rigid, cen­sorious and ill-natured, with re­spect to others whom we find of­fending or mistaken. And, on the contrary, dispose us to Charity, Goodness, Forbearance, Candor and Mercy towards them: Since we are thereby made sensible, that we our selves are liable to many, or all, of the Errors and Offences which we see in other Men. So likewise when we observe, how helpless and impotent we are, how unable to forsee or prevent the ac­cidents, revolutions and changes that attend our Lives, and either to procure to our selves many of those external good Things which we want, or to avert those Mis­fortunes which we suffer or appre­hend, it suggests to us a notable Lesson of Patience and of Submissi­on to Almighty God, as the most effectual means to keep a serenity in our Minds, notwithstanding all [Page 92]that may befal us. And further, when we consider the frailty and abjectness of our Bodies, that be­ing the meanest and most despica­ble part of us, they do not deserve we should be so very intent upon the gratifying of them, much less that our Solicitude about them should either exceed or hinder our care and concern about our nobler and better Part: This instructs us to avoid Covetousness, Intempe­rance and Excess in the Love or Use of things relating to the Body. And, further, when under the con­sideration of this Infirmity of our present State, we become sensible, that there are many things necessa­ry to the support and well being of Men, and that therefore such as are destitute of these things, deserve to be consider'd by us, as far as we are fairly able; that is an Argu­ment to us, to give them help and and relief: Especially when we remember, that by reason of the [Page 93]mutability of our condition in this World, we our selves, tho' per­haps at present in a flourishing State, may be an easy turn of Af­fairs, be brought into the same ne­cessitous condition we see others in.

But then the Knowledge of our selves is likewise of use another way, viz. as it makes us sensible of the Dignity of our Nature; and by that means engages us to the doing of such things as are becom­ing the Character we bear in the Creation, and deters us from do­ing whatever is disparaging or dis­agreeable to that Character. For since Vertue is in its Nature Noble and Honourable; and Vice the quite contrary: Upon that Princi­ple, the Knowledge of our Selves serves to excite in us on the one hand that laudable Ambition, whereby we aspire after those things which are Vertuous and truly Honourable, and on the other [Page 94]hand that commendable Shame which deters us from things of the contrary Nature. Now Generosi­ty operates both these ways. It confirms Men on the one hand in a just Humility, Meekness, Patience, Charity, and other like Vertues, as may appear from what has been already said: And on the other hand, disposes Men to those Vertues which are produced and maintained by the consideration of the Dignity of the human Nature, and of the Obligations that result from thence to act agreeably to that Character: But it is more pe­culiarly suited to operate this latter way: As it excites in Men that no­ble Ambition, which is grounded on the consideration of the honour­ble Nature of Vertue, and of the auspicious and happy Consequences it brings after it, and that vertu­ous Shame which is grounded on the turpitude and dishonourable Nature of Vice, and of the mis­chievous [Page 95]and unhappy Effects which attend it. For the Generous Man, according to that excellent Precept, [...], ‘Above all Revere thy Self’, would be ambitious of Vertue, tho' he had no prospect of acquiring external Reputation by it, and would be touch'd with a sense of Shame, if he went about to commit a vile Action never so privately, even where he could be in no danger of publick disparagement. So that the Sentiments which are raised in Men by the just Knowledge of themselves, agree with those which are raised in them by the Principle of Generosity: Both serving to spur them on to vertuous and be­coming Actions, and to deter them from foul and vitious ones, from much the same Considerations.

But Generosity enters also into that part of Religion which more immediately relates to God Al­mighty; and mixes it self with [Page 96]the habits of Piety and Devotion. There are three great faults, to wit, Superstition, Hypocrisy, and Prophaneness, into one or o­ther of which, those who err with respect to Religion, commonly fall. And Generosity is suited to help against each of these. Against Superstition; as it excites in mens minds manly and becoming thoughts of Almighty God, such as are suitable to the Divine Na­ture: By which means it serves to rid their Minds of those light and childish conceptions touching the Nature and Worship of God, which are the Seeds of Bigottry and Superstition. For when Men have by the Divine aid, and by due care and exercise, habituated their Minds to just apprehensions of the Pure and Excellent Nature of God: They cannot think it sufficient, to express the veneration and service which they ow unto him, by those trivial and insignificant instances [Page 97]of Devotion and Worship, or that partial and reserved Obedience, which superstitious and weak Peo­ple are wont to content them­selves withal; or indeed by any thing less than an entire dedicati­on of their Souls and Bodies to him, in pure and ardent Devotion, joyned with an entire and hearty Obedience to his Laws; that is, by adjusting both their Worship and Conversation unto a confor­mity to his most Excellent Nature And when likewise, they have pos­sessed their Minds with manly and Rational thoughts of Religion: they will be the less subject to be carried away by the errours of Enthusiasm and pretended Spiri­tuality; which is also a kind of Superstition.

And for Hypocrisy, which is another great Abuse of Religion; Generosity is naturally suited to cure or prevent it. For Genero­sity is wont to be accompanied [Page 98]with such a Sincerity of Mind, as is not consistent with Hypocrisy. And whilst it teaches Men to act upon the true Principles of Ho­nour, it will easily make them sen­sible; that 'tis an unworthy and base practice, to go about to delude other Men with a Pretence of Re­ligion, when at the same time they are conscious to themselves, that they have nothing of that Princi­ple within them; and that Reli­gion is a thing of so noble and ele­vated a nature, that it ought not to be made subservient to the little ends of Worldly profit and inte­rest.

So also Generosity helps against Prophaneness. For since Gene­rosity is founded in the just know­ledg of our selves; from the con­sideration, that we are compara­tively frail and impotent Creatures, and entirely dependant on God Almighty for our Being and all that we have; it serves to suppress in [Page 99]us those extravagant and big thoughts of our selves, which would lead us to prophaneness and contempt of God; and on the con­trary to engage us to love and gra­titude to his Divine Majesty, from whom we continually receive so many demonstrations of Bounty and Philanthropy. And from the consideration of the infinite dist­ance there is betwixt God and Men, it serves to awaken the innate Prin­ciple we have in us, of honour­ing and reverencing whatever per­son or being appears to be Great and Excellent; and so engages us to express that Honour and Reve­rence we have for Almighty God (who is infinitely the greatest and most excellent Being) in such ways as are most proper to signify and declare the same; to wit, by Worship, Reverence of him, and all that relates to him, and by Con­formity to his Nature and Laws, as far as we are able. Which [Page 100]is indeed the Sum of Religion.

From these short instances it may be seen, that Generosity is a Principle neerly allied to the seve­ral Vertues of the Divine Life, and likewise extremely accommo­dated to preserve Men straight and even in the practice of true Religi­on. And these considerations will, I conceive, serve both to explain the Notion of Generosity, and likewise to shew the intimate A­greement there is between Religi­on and Honour, being rightly un­derstood and applied. So much then for what I proposed to speak in the Interpretation of Generosity.

But now I am well aware, that 'tis likely, that such persons as have been accustomed to frame a narrow and restrained notion of Genero­sity, and to think it consists only in Liberality, or what is common­ly called good breeding, or such like, may imagine, that I do amiss, in taking it in so large and compre­hensive [Page 101]a sense, and attributing to it such noble Characters, as I have done. But I am persuaded, that when things come to be weighed, I shall be acquitted of blame in that particular. I have been consider­ing Generosity, not barely as a particular Vertue or good quality, but chiefly as such a Principle in the Rational Soul as is of a Metaphysi­cal and universal nature. Now the Principles of this kind are such that they may be applied as vari­ously as there are various actions in human life: And so must needs be of a large and comprehensive na­ture, since they pervade the whole Body of a mans Cogitations and Actions, and are the Principles from which he Acts, not only in some few but in very many cases. And that Generosity is a Principle of this kind, may appear from what I have already said. Even mens Natural Temper, discovers it self in most of their actions, in [Page 102]Natural, Civil, Moral and Religious ones. And so far as it hath influence up­on the Mind, produces as great a vari­ety of sensations and dispositions in the Man, as there is great variety of Ob­jects about which he is conversant. But the Principles immediately referring to the Mind, are much more accommoda­ted to spread through all the actions of a Man: For as the Mind is the seat of a Mans Thoughts, and his Thoughts the Spring of his Actions: So the Prin­ciples of the Mind, which have the na­ture of universal Cogitations, are as uni­versal in their Operation, as they are in their Root; or if you will, as univer­sal considered objectively, as they are, considered formally. Thus Sincerity taken as a general Principle of the Mind, extends it self to most of the actions of Ruman Life, to those which fall under a Civil, Moral or Religious Considera­tion: And may be exerted by Men of all Faculties, Professions, Trades, Or­ders and Degrees, in the actions which relate to the several conditions of Life, by which they are diversified from one another, and in those which are com­mon to them all. The same may be said of the general Principle of Pru­dence: [Page 103]And likewise of the general Frinciple of Generosity. And if Gene­rosity be such a Principle, as is, not on­ly of a large and extended Nature, but is likewise in an extraordinary manner congenial and agreeable to the most re­fined Principles of our Minds, and is accompanied with, or serves to pro­duce in us, those sentiments and dis­positions of Mind, which tend to the advancement and perfection of our Na­ture: I say, if the Case be so, I am persuaded, I cannot be justly accused of having extended the Notion of it too far, or having given it too high Characters.

But I think I need not be very soli­citous about this Matter. 'Tis suffici­ent for me, that however some Men may dislike or quarrel with the Name of Generosity, because perhaps they have been used to speak of those things which make up its Character, in other Terms than those I here use, or for o­ther Reasons best known to themselves: Yet they cannot, without doing some violence to their own Minds, but ad­mire and esteem the Thing, and ac­knowledge that the Characters which I have said do belong to it, import that [Page 104]which is really Noble and Illustrious. And peradventure, they may discern that Mankind do universally agree in these Sentiments, when they observe how naturally and readily Men are wont to describe Persons or Actions that are eminent for their goodness and rectitude, by the Name of Generous, Great, Noble, and such like Epithets, which properly belong to this Chara­cter.

If then the ancient Philosophers and Moralists do not make mention of Ge­nerosity under that particular Name, or, describe it with exactly the same Cha­racters which I have herein attributed to it, that ought not to be any Preju­dice against what I have said upon this Head. We all speak the same thing in substance and effect, and sometimes in much the same words. What is Generosi­ty but an [...], a fortitude or manli­ness of Spirit, a [...], or great­ness of Soul? What is it but a Composi­tum jus fas (que) animi, a steady rectitude of the Mind, a Generosum honestum, a generous Vertue? What is it but a [...] a goodness of Temper, a [...] or divine Principle accommo­dated to the human Nature, and residing [Page 105]in human Breasts? The like might be said in many other Particulars.

Suppose also that the sacred Writers themselves do not make mention of Ge­nerosity under that express Name, or under the self-same Characters by which I have described it; neither will that, I conceive, justly prejudice what I have said upon this Subject. If there be in Men such Principles as Self-love and Self-esteem, as Ambition, as Honour and Shame: If these Principles may and ought to be made use of for the purposes of Vertue: If the just use of these Principles serves to produce Ge­nerosity in Men: If Generosity, by ope­rating upon these Principles and con­ducting them rightly, be helpful to ad­vance Men in Vertue and Goodness: If the Characters herein ascribed to Gene­rosity be consonant to the purest Prin­ciples of our Minds, and to the clear and undoubted Notions which wise Men have all along had of things: Then the main of what I have before offer'd, will not, I conceive, be shaken by a side-wind Objection. It was not, nor is it necessary, or indeed possible, that Men in all Countries or Ages of the World should follow just the same [Page 106]Modes of conception or expression, or the same Methods of Discourse. There is, no doubt, a great Latitude that may be fairly taken, in the manner of discoursing about the particular Ver­tues, and of referring them to certain general Principles of the rational Soul. Accordingly, we find that the Holy Writers themselves do fall into that va­riety in this Case, which the nature of things so easily admits. They often va­ry from one another in their Expressi­ons, and in their Methods of Discourse and Exhortation upon much the same Subjects. They give us diversly the de­scriptions or characters of particular Vertues: Sometimes in such manner as seems agreeable to the true nature of them, and at other times in such man­ner as is mostly suited to the present Argument or Purpose of the Writer, or to the Principles of the Mind to which they are for that time referred. Let us for the present only take notice, how many several ways Vertue in general, or Religion, or Holiness, or Goodness, (call it by what such-like Name you will) is represented to us by the several Writers of the holy Books. Sometimes it is represented under the name and [Page 107]characters of Wisdom, as in the Wri­tings of King Solomon. Sometims un­der the name of Righteousness (that is, Justice or Rectitude) as in several of the sacred Books. Sometimes it is compre­hended under the general Phrase, The Fear of the Lord, as in many of the sa­cred Books both of the old and new Testament. Sometimes under that of Love or Dilection, comprizing in it the love of God and of our Neighbour, as in some of the Books of the old Testa­ment, and most of the Books of the new, particularly in the Writings of St. John and St. Paul. Sometimes under the ge­neral Term, Faith, exhibiting to us the sum of our Duty, as in several Books of the new Testament, especially in the Writings of St. Paul. If therefore the several holy Writers vary from one ano­ther in this manner, we need not won­der that others should vary from them in things wherein there is naturally so much Latitude. Admit then that some one or more of the holy Writers inti­mates, that Faith is a Principle serving to produce in Men several particular Vertues, we must not think that that contradicts or excludes what is spoken by such one or more of the holy Writers [Page 108]as intimates, that Love, or the Fear of God, are Principles serviceable to that end. Here are now, suppose, before our Eyes four things which may be deemed Principles of Vertue and Goodness; viz. Faith, Love, Fear of God, and Generosity. But surely the saying that Faith is such a Principle, does not exclude Love from being such too. And saying that Love is such a Principle, does not exclude the Fear of God from being such too. And saying that the Fear of God is such a Princi­ple, does not exclude Generosity from being such too; because they are, each of them, more or less such. Nor on the other side, will Generosity exclude the other Principles of Faith, Love, or the Fear of God, or they exclude it, any more than they exclude one another, or any more than they exclude Prudence and Sincerity (considered as general Principles of Vertue) or indeed any o­ther general Principle besides, which serves for producing Vertue in Men. The Principles aforementioned may be all of them jointly and severally Prin­ciples productive of Vertue. And ac­cordingly, to them, as such, either to all of them together, or to any of them [Page 109]apart, several particular Vertues may properly be referred. And of this we have, in the case of Faith, a great In­stance in the 11th Chapter to the He­brews, where we find attributed to Faith, a great number of Vertues which distin­guished and signalized the Heroes and good Men in several Ages of the World. So that upon the Matter, the conside­ration of the Style, or the manner of Writing, used by the holy Penmen of the Scripture, will not, I conceive, af­ford any just exception against what I have before offer'd, or give any occasi­on to doubt but that Generosity is such a Principle of Vertue and Goodness as I pretend it is. But to speak freely, why indeed should we think, that none of the holy Writers take notice of the Principle of Generosity; when we find that St. Paul gives so lively a descri­ption of it, in which he concludes and sums up his other particular Exhortati­ons, Phil. 4.8. Finally, my Brethren, says he, whatsoever things are True, what­soever things are Honest [or Venerable] whatsoever things are Just, whatsoever things are Pure, whatsoever things are Lovely, whatsoever things are of good Re­port; if there be any Vertue, and if there [Page 110]be any Praise [that is, if they be Vertu­ous and Praise-worthy] think on these things. And, when we likewise find in general, that the several Vertues which I have shewn do belong to its Chara­cter, are by frequent and earnest Pre­cepts and Exhortations inculcated upon Men throughout their Writings, tho' in other Words perhaps, or under o­ther Heads and Relations; I say, when we find the Case to be thus, why should we think, that the holy Writers take no notice of this Principle? We need not be much concerned about a Word or Name, when we have the Thing and Substance. If the Thing may in the Substance of it be found in Scripture: Or if it be not really and materially repugnant to what is delivered there: Or if (which is all one in effect) it may be demonstrated by rational and convincing Considerations, to be a good and useful Principle; that ought, as I take it, to content us.

II. In the next place I should en­deavour to shew the usefulness of the Principle of Generosity for the due Go­vernment of our Actions. But from the Interpretation of this Principle, which I have before offer'd, we may pretty [Page 111]well discern that it is like to be of great use for that purpose. And this will in great measure supersede what I intended to speak under this Head; at least, will oblige me to handle it with the more brevity.

We find, there is a vast variety of Circumstances wherein Men may be placed when they come to chuse and act. Men fall at times under different Relations to one another; and their Cases come to be diversified by Cir­cumstances and Accidents emerging. By which means it comes to pass, that they are oftentimes at a loss how to chuse and act, even in Cases, which, if they were strip'd of several of their Circumstances, would seem plain and clear. And thus being in a kind of sus­pense, they are many times impelled one way or other by very light Mo­ments, and often chuse and act for the worse. Men often encourage themselves to the doing of what they acknowledge in general to be unlawful or unfitting, by little excuses and pretences which they fetch from the Circumstances of the Case they are in; and being by as­sed and enclined to comply with their Passions and Interests, make use of these [Page 112]Arts to vindicate their Reputation with Men, or avert the checks and re­proaches of their own Minds; and so insensibly beguile themselves into base and vitious Actions whilst they pretend both to know and practise better. So likewise, there are many Cases where­in a thing, about the doing or refusing whereof we come to deliberate, may in strictness be lawful to be done, but peradventure may not be expedient, fitting, or honourable. Again, some things lie as it were between the Con­fines of Vertue and Vice, lawful and unlawful. A little excess or defect may make the Action either vertuous or vi­tious, as the Case may be. Now in such Cases as these, it is of mighty use to lay before our selves some Rules or Principles of universal extent, which will reach our Case whatever almost it be, and bring us under their obligation, where particular ones either would fall short, or may seem to be less clear and undoubted, or are capable of being elu­ded by the subtilty which we are wont to make use of for the more secure and uninterrupted gratification of our De­sires. And such a Principle is this of Generosity: Which they that are accu­stomed [Page 113]to put it in practice, sensibly find to be of great and universal influ­ence, and to be as well a Restraint upon them from committing of many things which perhaps might upon the foot of particular Vertues or Rules of Action, be deemed lawful, as likewise an in­citement to them to the doing of many things which particular Vertues, consi­dered strictly, or as they are ordinarily wont to be, may not absolutely re­quire.

Another considerable use of this Prin­ciple is, That it easily and without la­bour of Thought opens it self to our Minds; and so is always ready and at hand for our direction. It sometimes falls out, that when we come to act, we are unresolved whether we shall do a thing or not, and before we can well resolve, are obliged to argue and con­sider with our selves (more or less, as the Case may be) and so come gradu­ally to a Resolution, by a train of in­ductions, to the making whereof is re­quired some intention or application of Mind. And on the other side, it some­times falls out, that the nature of the thing before us is such, that it will not give us leave to spend much time in de­bating [Page 114]the Matter with our selves, but requires an immediate Resolution to be taken. Now it must needs be of great advantage to us in such Cases, to pro­pose to our selves, some such Principle or Principles, as do easily and instantly open themselves to our Minds, and without labour of Thought suggest what is fit to be done, 'Tis easie to discern, that one considerable use of that excel­lent Rule, Do as you would be done unto, consists in this, that it gives us a ready direction on the sudden, and quickly clears the thing in hand from many of the Difficulties which our prepossess'd Affections or Inclinations would mix with it. For by making the Case our own, we quickly discern what we our selves would desire to have done to us, and by consequence, how we should carry it to others in the same circum­stances. Thus it is with respect to Ge­nerosity. It operates by plain, simple and easie Suggestions: It leaves us only to resolve upon the single Point, whe­ther the thing be decent and honour­able; whether it be fit for a Man of Spirit and Temper, to do that about which we deliberate; whether, admit­ting it be lawful to do the thing, it [Page 115]would not be much better and more ho­nourable to do otherwise; or the like. It operates in Men upon these Occasions, by such a Sincerity of Mind as dispo­ses them to prefer that which is best and most becoming. And tho' it helps them to resolve on the sudden, yet it helps them to resolve rightly. Now I believe it will be readily acknowledged, that a Principle which works this way, must needs be of great use. And this will be further confirmed to us, if we consider the easiness and advantage there is in acting by a Principle that is ho­mogeneous and all of a piece, beyond what there is in being guided by a great many particular Rules, which ly broken and piece-meal in the Mind; and not having a strait connexion with one another may easily slip from the Memory when they should be put in practice, or if we remember them, are likely in many Cases to be defective and inadequate. Proverbs and Maxims well applied, are profitable to ripen our experience in things, and to help us in our Practice; and particular Pre­cepts of Vertue have their use: But there seems to be nothing more effectu­al to render the tenour of Mens Acti­ons [Page 116]strait, even and uniform, than a ge­neral Principle of the Mind that is en­tire and one; which operates without varying or mixing of Ideas; and as it cannot easily be absent from the Mind when they come to act, so neither is it likely to prove short and defective. And such a one is the Principle now before us.

Another considerable use of this Prin­ciple, is, That 'tis a mighty help to Mens improvement in Vertue. I do not mean barely, that 'tis in general ac­commodated to serve this end, as seve­ral other things are: But if I am not mistaken, it has something extraordina­ry in it, effectual for that purpose: Insomuch that he who will pursue its Dictates, may promise himself such im­provements in Vertue, as are not to be expected from any other but a lively and vigorous Principle. For the truth of this I may safely appeal to the expe­rience of those who have accustomed themselves to act upon this Principle. But it will appear to have nothing of improbability in it, if we consider well on the one hand the nature of Genero­sity, and on the other hand the course and order wherein Mens cogitations [Page 117]and actions were wont to be produced and conducted, together with the Prin­ciples they naturally act upon. We shall not perhaps think it strange, that Gene­rosity should have this effect, if we con­sider that it opens Mens Minds to great and exact Thoughts; that it steers and directs the Will in its right course; that it serves to represent Vertue as a lovely thing, and puts Men into a Me­thod of doing and repeating vertuous Actions with Delight; and by that means, as also by exciting in them a commendable Ambition of excelling in Vertue as the most honourable thing in the World, engages them vehemently in the pursuit of it. But since there is nothing so likely to convince Men in this Matter, as their own tryal and ex­perience, that is it which I shall prin­cipally recommend to them. And there is the greater encouragement to make a Tryal, because they cannot reasonably think, that, supposing it be not a help, it will be any impediment to them in a vertuous course; or that the measures it puts them into will be harsh and un­delightful, when the Principle it self is so congenial, and so agreeable to the pu­rest and most uncorrupt Sentiments of their Minds.

In sum. If this Principle were well pursued, there would in all appearance be a great deal more Justice, Order, Quiet and good Agreement in the World, than now there is. It is in its nature extreamly accommodated to pro­duce these auspicious effects. And being of a very large and extended nature, it reaches to all orders and degrees of Men. It enters into the Laws of Na­ture and of Nations: Which cannot well subsist without a regard to the Rules of Humanity, Decency and Ho­nour. It mixes it self with the Laws of particular Polities; and by disposing Men to a regular performance of the respe­ctive Duties relating to Government and Subjection, tends to preserve that Or­der and Quiet which is the last end of Government. Thus a Generous Prince will endeavour to administer his Go­vernment with an even and steady hand, to protect his Subjects strenuously, to maintain the just Honour of the Crown and Faith of the Treasury, to shun those little Arts which are sometimes made use of to amass Wealth, or to en­croach on the Rights of Subjects or Neighbours. He will think himself obliged to avoid whatever is mean, dis­honourable. [Page 119]and unbecoming his Chara­cter: And by how much he is elevated in Power and Dignity above other Men, will esteem himself by so much the more engaged to observe, as near as he can, the Rules of Conduct and Honour. And on the other side, Ge­nerous Subjects will not be peevish and ill-natured towards their Prince, or rashly put on his Actions an unfavour­able Construction: They will not en­vy him for his Greatness, or his just Rights and Prerogatives: They will chearfully render him his Tribures and Duties: In a word, they will honour his Person and obey his Commands; and where they cannot bona fide in Law or Conscience do the latter, they will meekly submit and pay a Deference to his Authority, tho' they cannot actively obey it; chusing rather to suffer in their own private Concerns, than by opposition to affront their Prince, or disturb the repose and tranquility of the Publick. Thus the Principle of Generosity is of great benefit to the State.

And so it is likewise to the Church. It will dispose the Clergy to be Manly, Grave and Discreet in discharging the [Page 120]Offices of their Function; to exercise Discipline with a Courage and Exact­ness, mixed with Temper and Mode­ration; to be vigilant and careful in looking to their respective Charges; to perform the Offices of divine Wor­ship with such a Decency, Order and Devotion, as may be suitable to the nature of the thing, and helpful to main­tain it in that just esteem which it ought to have in the World; to shut out of their Discourses and Instructi­ons, precarious Hypotheses, pious Frauds, Pedantry and Ostentation of pretended Learning, indecent Ex­pressions, and whatever is disagreeable to true Reason and the holy Scriptures; to avoid Simoniacal Arts and mean Compliances; and, in a word, what­ever is really unbecoming their Order. And on the other side, a Generous Man of the Laity, will respect and esteem the Clergy for their Office-sake; he will neither envy them their Revenues nor defraud them of their Dues; he will cover their Faults, and candidly receive their Instructions; he will not for slight and trivial pretences make or countenance a Separation from the Church under which he was born, or [Page 121]break its Communion and disturb its Peace for the sake of things confessedly harmless and indifferent in themselves; and as he is not in his Temper incli­nable to oppose his Governors, so he has no Temptation either to think him­self exempt from their Authority, or to imagine that a thing indifferent in it self can meerly by the command of a Superiour be rendred unlawful. In short, Generosity opens Mens Minds to such Sentiments as dispose them to Mo­desty, Peaceableness and Goodness of Temper: Which cannot but be of great Benefit both in Church and State.

But Generosity is also of great use to the Publick, by its suitableness to influ­ence all Orders and Degrees of Men. It is indeed a Principle in which the No­bility and Gentry seem to have in some sort a more peculiar Interest than other Men. Yet there is no Man, tho' of mea­ner Fortunes, but he is more or less con­cerned in it. All Men have equally a natural freedom of acting, and are, as far as relates immediately to the Laws of Vertue, equally engaged to use that Freedom rightly; being equally enti­tuled to the Rewards of using it right­ly, [Page 122]and subject to the Punishments which ensue the Abuse of it. And so also all Men who are not fallen from the Rights of the human Nature, are interessed in that Reputation and E­steem which is due to vertuous and worthy Actions; and are concerned to maintain a Reputation accordingly. However there seem to be additional Obligations lying upon the Nobility and Gentry, to act upon the true Principles of Honour, which affect them more peculiarly than other Men: The honourable Style and Titles that belong to them, as well as the Emi­nence of their Station and Degree should put them continually in Mind of acting upon these Principles, and of endeavouring to surpass others therein. For what can be more dis­agreeable, than for a Gentleman or Man of Quality, to be of a pitiful sordid Spirit, to be rough and ill­bred, and destitute of all sense of Ho­nour and Vertue. And on the con­trary, it must needs be a great Orna­ment to such Persons to have that firmness and rectitude of Mind, that candour and goodness of Temper, [Page 123]that Civility and decent Address, and that conformity to the Laws of Deco­rum, Honour and Vertue; which are Properties of Generosity. And herein, those of ancient Families, and those of later Creation, are both con­cerned. He that is Noble by De­scent, has great Obligations to spur him on to Generous and Worthy Acti­ons: He has the Obligations that arise from the Dignity in which he is placed, and likewise the Example of his brave Ancestors; which ought to inspire him with a just emulation of their Vertue, and make him afraid of incurring the Character of Degene­rous, — Magnorum indignus Avo­rum. And he that has acquired No­bless by his own Merit, has, not only the Obligations which arise from the Dignity of his present Station, but al­so those concurrent Reasons which should engage him to act suitably to the Character he has gained; lest he should afterwards forfeit by Ignoble Actions, the Esteem and Dignity which he had before so worthily ac­quired, and should as it were degene­rate from himself. These are Consi­derations [Page 124]which as they more particu­larly affect the Nobility and Gentry, so they ought to be of great weight with them. It is true, that the most solid Obligations of all, to Genero­sity, are those which result from the Nature of Things, and which con­cern all Men equally of whatever de­gree. For 'tis undoubtedly more ho­nourable to imitate God Almighty himself, than the most vertuous and excellent Men that ever were: And there are stronger Reasons to engage Men to a generous and vertuous Be­haviour, which may be fetch'd from the nature of Vertue it self, than any that arise barely from the considera­tion of secular Dignity and Emi­nence, or the Example of Ancestors. Nevertheless, where there are concur­rent Reasons, some of higher, others of lower Obligation, they ought all to be allowed their just force, and all made use of to engage Men to honourable and vertuous Courses, since all the Arguments of both sorts which can be brought, are commonly found hardly effectual for that pur­pose. But as Generosity is a Princi­ple [Page 125]of acting, very much becoming Persons of elevated Character and great Fortunes; and they have addi­tional Arguments above many other Men, to engage them to the practice of it: So it is easie to discern, that the practice of it is like to be more illu­strious in them, and more beneficial to the World, than the practice of the same in Men of inferiour Condition. The Vices of great Men are more conspicuous than those of meaner Folks: And so are their Vertues. Their Character and Station is more Publick, and their Example both of greater force and of more diffused Influence: And the greater is their Power of doing either good or hurt, They have commonly many Tenants, Clyents and Dependents, to whom their Generous Behaviour is like to bring great Advantage, and the con­trary, great Mischief and Damage: And perhaps the well or ill-being in the World, of these People, must be in great measure owing to the gener­ous or ungenerous disposition of their Patrons. So that it must needs be of very diffusive Benefit, for Men who [Page 126]have high Characters or great Com­mands, who are Governours of Ter­ritories, or Lords of great Demeans, or who have great Offices and Entrust­ments in the State, and in Proportion, for others of lesser Quality or Power, to be of a true and generous Temper. And this will be, not only of great Ornament, but likewise of great use to themselves. It will gain them the Affection and Esteem of their Depen­dants and Neighbours, and likewise their Prayers and good Wishes; it will give them Power and Sway in their Countries; it will engage all that know them to stand by them, and render them all the good Offices they can: In short, it will procure them the satisfaction and pleasure of Mind that attends generous and worthy Acti­ons in this Life, and the Rewards of Vertue in the future Life.

It would moreover be of great Ad­vantage to the Publick, if Men in their several Professions and Em­ployments would pursue this Princi­ple more exactly. And the more re­putable a Mans Profession is, he has in a sort the greater Obligation upon [Page 127]him so to do. Thus, for Instance, a Generous Lawyer would think it di­shonourable to betray a Cause he is entrusted in; to plead in a Cause, af­ter he is fully satisfied 'tis unjust, with that warmth and application which is due only to a just one; to give Advice with a regard rather to his own Profit, than either to the Law or the Suitors Benefit; to blow the Coals of Contention, or encour­age litigious and frivolous Suits which he knows before-hand will be of no Fruit to the Party; or in more just or colourable Causes to spend the Clients Mony unnecessarily in skir­mishing and playing of Prizes about Matters wherein Justice or the Me­rits of the Cause are nothing con­cerned; to apply the Law to the contriving or defending of Frauds and Oppressions, or pervert it to the hurt or ruin of the innocent and honest Person whom it is or­dained to protect. These things, and such like, a Generous Man, whe­ther he be of higher or lower Cha­racter in the Profession, will think himself obliged to avoid as disho­nourable [Page 128]nourable and base. And the same Principle will influence the Physi­tian and Men of other Professions, in their respective Employments. And likewise the Merchant and Tradesman in his Dealings and Commerce. It would be a means to restrain Men from the injurious Arts of Monopoly and Exaction, from Lying, Dissembling and other insi­dious and ill Practices that are too often used in buying and selling. And as the several ill Practices be­fore mentioned, are dishonourable in themselves, contrary to the Rules of Sincerity and Justice, and prejudici­al to the good Order and Prosperi­ty of the Publick: So the Vertues opposite thereunto, which Generosity is suited to produce, are both ex­cellent in themselves, and likewise of great benefit to the Publick.

Nor is there indeed any Body of so inferiour a Station in the Common­wealth, but what is capable of act­ing, in some measure, by this Prin­ciple. The meanest Artificers and Countrymen have a Reputation as well as other Men, and are concern­ed [Page 129]to preserve it inviolate. They are all under the Laws of Vertue and Decorum. They have all a Free­dom of Nature, and can resolve to use it for the best Purposes. And sometimes are found to act upon bet­ter and nobler Principles, than Men of Character and Education. It must be confess'd, that Generosity does not consist in bearing the Port of a Gentleman, or making a Figure in the World. It is compatible with all Conditions of Human Life. And is indeed more effectually demon­strated by submitting to a mean For­tune for the sake of Honesty and Ver­tue, than by seeking a higher Chara­cter or Station at the Price of good Conscience or Discretion. It is ex­ercisable by all Men in their several Degrees, whether they be in higher or lower Capacity; and serves to distinguish Men by their Minds and Spirits, rather than by their external Character or Station. Particularly, it may be exercised in the state of Marriage or single Life, of Master­ship or Service, of Travel or Resi­dence, of Plenty or Penury; in Offi­ces [Page 130]Judicial or Ministerial, in Em­ployments Civil or Military, in Peace or in War, in Victory or Defeat, in Honour or Disgrace, in Health or Sickness, in Safety or Danger. It is of use to preserve Peace and good Understanding between Domesticks and Kinsfolks, between Neighbours and Townsmen, and People that have mutual Intercourse; by engaging Men to that Civility, Complaisance and Decency of Deportment, which is of great force to prevent Quarrels or Mis-understandings, and the ill Consequences of them; by deterring Men from a sordid or provoking Car­riage towards one another; by cure­ing or preventing that Envy and Ill­nature which too often happen be­tween Men of the same Callings or of the same Families or Neighbour­hoods; and which sometimes produce mischievous Effects. It will help to give a Sweetness and Ornament to Conversation: And make Friend­ships and Correspondencies delight­ful, orderly and lasting. In a word, there is no State of Life, or Relation that Men stand in to one another, [Page 131]which excludes the exercise of it. Thus it is very ample and extended in its Influence, and helps Men to govern their Actions in such manner as is very conducive to preserve Ver­tue, Order, Quiet and good Agree­ment amongst Men. As to several other particular Uses of this Princi­ple, they may, many of them, be so evidently collected from what has been spoken in the Description and Interpretation of it, which I am not willing to repeat; and others may be so easily supplied from any Mans own Observation; that I think it need­less to enter upon detailing them. So much then for the Usefulness of this Principle.

But after all, if any Man, upon comparing the Temper of Mind and Course of Action of those who are or pass for Generous Men, with the Description which I have given of Generosity, should pretend that Gene­rosity, as I have described it, looks rather like an airy Idea than a thing practicable by Mankind; since it would be hard (if not impossible) to find a Man endued with all those [Page 132]Qualities which I have ascribed to it: I say, if any Man should object in this manner, he may please to ob­serve, that I do not say, he cannot be a Generous Man who has not eve­ry particular Qualification which I have ascribed or which may be ascrib­ed to that Character. A Man may, no doubt, be a Generous and Vertu­ous Man, though he be not perfect in Generosity and Vertue. The Ha­bits of the Mind are capable of seve­ral degrees, or receive (as they speak) Magis & Minus. There is confessed­ly a great deal of difference between Vertue considered formally or in its pure Nature, and considered subje­ctively or under that Allay in which it is wont to appear in human Acti­ons. It were indeed much to be wish'd, that Mankind could as easily express the Purity and Sublimity of Vertue in their Spirits and Actions, as they can represent it in Words and Descriptions. But this is not to be expected. For my part, I am as ready as any one, to acknowledge the Im­becillity of our Nature, since I find so many sensible Proofs of it in o­ther [Page 133]Men, but particularly in my self. And, I believe, it is a subject of great Grief to those who sincerely aspire after Vertue, to find so many Obstructions and Impediments in their Progress, arising from their own Nature: To find themselves divided as it were against themselves, so that whilst one part of them is enclined to make its Efforts after Vertue, ano­ther part of them retards and hin­ders by its revulsive Motions. This is the conflict of the Flesh and Spi­rit, which gives Men so many diffi­culties, and renders their practice of Vertue so feeble and imperfect. But as this shews only the Imperfection of our Nature, so it can be no just Argument against the excellency of this or any other Vertue considered in it self. If then we would take an Idea of any Vertue, we must not take it barely from the practice of particular Men, or the feeble Repre­sentations which they are wont to give of it in their Spirits and Acti­ons, but from that and from the na­ture of Vertue it self together. We are to consider the nature of things, [Page 134]and to frame a Notion of the excel­lency of the Principles of our Minds by the consideration of their abstra­cted Nature, and of their Confor­mity to that Exemplar of Perfection which is in the divine Mind. If therefore we find the Characters of Generosity agreeable to the noblest and divinest Principles of our Minds, in conformity to that original Perfe­ction which is in the divine Nature it self (to which all Vertues and good Qualities that are in Men, are in their measure and degree conforma­ble and correspondent; otherwise they could not be such:) We cannot reasonably deny it to be in it self of that Excellency and Usefulness which I have mentioned, how faint­ly or imperfectly soever it may be ex­hibited in the Spirits and Practice of particular Men. But it ought to be thought sufficient, that all the Chara­cters which I have attributed to it, are to be found upon some ones or o­thers of that Body of great and good Men which have been or are in the World; and consequently have had, and now have, a real Existence. From [Page 135]hence then we may conclude, that there is in reality such a Principle, and that it is in some degree attain­able by us. And the more excellent a Principle it is in it self, we ought in reason the more earnestly to en­deavour to attain as great a Perfection in it as 'tis possible for us: Not faint­ing though we cannot make good in our Spirits and Actions all the Chara­cters of it, but endeavouring to make good as many of them as we are able; and labouring throughout the course of our Life (which will be a noble Ambition) to make continually further Advances.

Having thus given a Description of Generosity, I think it superfluous to use Arguments to engage Men to the Love and Practice of it. If it be of so lovely and excellent a Nature, as I have set it forth to be, that is the most forcible Argument in the World, why we should endeavour after it. One need not take pains to incite Men to love a beautiful Object; they do it naturally, and cannot help it. Demonstrating that a thing is such, is beyond all the collateral Arguments [Page 136]of Persuasion that can be used. If in the process of this Discourse, I have done that with respect to Generosity, there will be no need of further Per­suasions: And if I have not, Persuasi­ons would be insignificant.

III. In regard, therefore, Genero­sity is a thing so excellent in its Na­ture, and so beneficial in its use, 'tis like to be worth our Pains to enquire, How it may be acquired, or after­wards improved in our Minds. Now when I speak of acquiring it, I do not suppose that there is any Man, by Nature, totally void of it, or at least of some Predisposition to it. All Men have the Seeds and Rudi­ments of it so far as they have a sense of Good and Evil, Decency and Indecency, Honour and Shame. But since those Rudiments cannot pro­perly, of themselves, give Men the denomination of Generous; for no­thing can do that, but some degree of the habit of Generosity: He who would acquire that Character, must improve those Rudiments to that de­gree, at least, which may be effectual [Page 137]to denominate him such. Now to discover how this may be done, there is not, I conceive, need of any ex­traordinary Art. The thing is plain and obvious to any Mans Under­standing.

First, therefore, we must address our selves in a due manner to God Almighty, beseeching him to bestow upon us this Vertue. And, Second­ly, we must firmly and maturely re­solve to do all that we can possibly to attain it. The Consideration, that God Almighty is the Soveraign Au­thor and Giver of all Vertues, shews the necessity of the former: And the Consideration, that Men cannot or­dinarily become Vertuous or Happy, without their own Choice and Endea­vour, shews the necessity of the lat­ter. And indeed the reasonableness and necessity of doing these two Things is so evident, that I think it needless either to insist upon prove­ing it, or to use Arguments to engage Men to put them in practice. But it must be observed, that these two ought to go hand in hand. And both must be performed with that Sincerity [Page 138]of Mind which is necessary upon so just an occasion. As for what relates to our own Endeavours, the Method we take in other Cases, will serve in this. If we would acquire a Habit of Justice, Temperance, or the like Vertues: We stedfastly resolve, and excite our selves, to perform those Offices which pertain to Justice, Tem­perance, &c. and endeavour to avoid the contrary Vices: If we offend, we renew our good Resolutions, and with doubled care and diligence en­deavour to put them in Execution. The like we must do in this Case. And herein we have this further En­couragement, that the same Methods which serve for acquiring this Habit, will likewise serve for our improve­ing in it. But more particularly, let us consider briefly, in what manner our Endeavours upon this occasion may be exerted.

First; because we find it natural to Mankind to act agreeably to the No­tions which they have conceived of things: And because Men cannot Chuse, nor by consequence Act, right­ly, till they can competently distin­guish [Page 139]between things, and know what is fit to be chosen and what is to be refused: It is necessary, therefore, that we endeavour in the first place to possess our Minds with just Sentiments concerning the nature of Things; par­ticularly, concerning the Differences between Good and Evil, Decent and Indecent, Honourable and Dishonour­able. So also, because it is found by experience, that there are many things which Men will not set about in good earnest, till such time as they are con­vinced that they are under some Obli­gation to the doing of them, or that it is for their Honour or Interest to do them: It is necessary, that we repre­sent to our Minds with all the force and perspicuity possible, those Consi­derations which demonstrate, as well the honourable and becoming nature of Vertue and its happy Consequen­ces, as likewise the firm and indispen­sable Obligation we are under, to act according to the Rules which it pre­scribes. And, because, on the other hand, it is found by experience, that 'tis of great use to restrain Men from the Commission or Practice of seve­ral [Page 140]things, to convince them that they ought not to do those things, and that the doing of them will be both very Pernicious and very Dishonourable to them: It seemeth necessary, that we likewise represent to our Minds, with all the force and perspicuity possible, those Considerations which serve to make us sensible, that Vice is really Base and Dishonourable, that it draws after it the bitterest and most pernici­ous Consequences that can be imagi­ned, and that we are under the most solid Obligations in the World, to refuse and avoid it with all our Power. And this is to be done so frequently, that the wholesome Con­clusions we draw from these Conside­rations may make a deep Impression upon our Minds, and beget in us an habitual and immoveable Conviction of the reasonableness and necessity of acting accordingly. Having, there­fore, opened our Minds to a just and exact Consideration of the true na­ture of Things, and thereupon form­ed certain general Judgments or Rules by which we may conduct our Acti­ons so, as to ehuse that which is Good, [Page 141]Decent and Honourable, and to shun and avoid the contrary; and even to prefer that which is more Good, De­cent and Honourable, before that which is less so: It will only remain, that we firmly and advisedly resolve with our selves to go, in all Cases, as near as we can, by those Rules; and whether we be more or less knowing, endeavour to act according to the best of our Skill and Knowledge. And by this means we shall be put in a way of making the right and best use both of our Understandings and our Wills, which are the two great Springs from whence our Actions do pro­ceed.

But, further; because it is found, that Men are naturally bent to desire and prosecute those things which ap­pear to be lovely and amiable; It seemeth proper, that we should like­wise take all fit Occasions to contem­plate and represent to our selves the amiable nature of this Vertue of Ge­nerosity; that as it is very beautiful in it self, so it may appear, in a lively manner such to our Minds. A Beau­ty will not Charm, if concealed or un­observed. [Page 142]Nor will Generosity ap­pear to us Lovely, as it is, unless we turn the Eyes of our Minds towards it. It is necessary, therefore, in this Case, that we apply our selves as well to consider the Characters of Ge­nerosity in the Theory, as likewise to observe, how beautiful it appears to be in such as exercise it in a just man­ner; what a Charm and Engagement it carries with it; how Decent, how Venerable, how Agreeable to our best Thoughts, it is. By this means we shall be inspired with the Love and Admiration of it, and consequently be engaged to pursue it with Vigour.

In a word; though it be of good use to set before our selves, in general, good and wholsome Rules of acting, and to make general Resolutions of pursuing them, and to strengthen those Resolutions with such Conside­rations and Motives as are proper for that purpose: Yet it seems material to be observed, that this will hardly be effectual, unless we likewise enure our selves, actually to put in execution the Resolutions which we make, and re­duce those Rules into Practice in par­ticular [Page 143]Cases. Experience shews, how heedless and unvigilant Men are wont to be, and how ineffectual and ill usory their general Resolutions often prove: Insomuch, that for want of confirming themselves in the Habits of Vertue by particular and repeated Acts, they sometimes fall into the contrary Habits of Vice, and undo all the good Reso­lutions they had formerly made. It is found, that Habits are gained by the frequent repeating of particular Acts, and are confirmed and improved by Use and Practice; nor can indeed long subsist without it. And so in particu­lar is the Habit of Generosity. And, therefore, we must of necessity enure and accustom our selves to particular Acts of Generosity, if we desire to ac­quire the Habit of it, or to continue or improve in that Character.