I. I Hapned two days since to meet a Sheet called, A Second Vindication of the Magistracy and Go­vernment of England; and upon perusal, found it to be a weak Effort to justifie what had been before writ in the behalf of the Government and its Ministers, for the Condemnation and Execution of my Lord Russel. It does particularly take notice of a Half sheet entituled, A Justification of the Act which reverses that Noble Lord's Attainder; And I must needs own, that if impudent, downright Affirma­tions of Law and Facts, passes for Argument and Proof, he has effectually performed what he arrogantly undertakes, which is, the refuting the Reasons and Au­thorities of that and the other more Learned late Prints [Page 6]which have been published to do Right to the Name and Memory of a Person, whose Character is very well descri­bed by one of those worthy Gentlemen, who attested in his Favour at his Trial, That he was one of the best Sons, one of the best Fathers, and one of the best Masters, one of the best Husbands, one of the best Friends, and one of the best Christians we had.

II. I shall not presume to obtrude a Defence in the behalf of Sir R. A. and Mr. H. I shall not do them so much Injustice, as to impose on them so ill ad Advo­cate: And therefore the Province I do assign my self principally is, to expose the Weakness and Fallacies of that Part of the Sheet which relates to the Justificati­on, and shall not meddle with the rest, farther than is necessary to make good the Authorities and Positions from which the Justifier infers that Noble Lord was so far from being guilty of a Legal Treason, that the Kings Judges and Counsel (in subserviency to a Predestination of the State, for removing him right or wrong out of the way) were forced to call such Vertues Treason, as in a more just and grateful Age would have deserved Statues, Triumphs, and other Demonstrations of Ho­nour, paid by the Romans and other Nations to their Patriots, and the Assertors of the Liberties of their Country.

III. Our Author observes, (pag. 2.) That Sir R. A. calls the Sentence and Execution a Murder; and if so, he is sure that he is bound in Conscience to prosecute an Indictment against the Judges, Recorder, the Grand and Petit Jury, &c. But he concludes, that nene of these shew any fear of it. The Justifier, and all that have writ on the same Sub­ject, did also in effect, tho' not perhaps in express Terms, concur in that Opinion; and for my part, I do not see how it can deserve a more soft and gentle Appellation. Our Author says indeed, The Persons that [Page 7]were concerned in it, are as safe as under an Act of In­dempnity. My Temper and Disposition always inclines me to Mercy; and tho' I must allow in the Speculati­on, that the Executing of Justice upon Offenders is as great a Duty as shewing them Mercy; yet I find a very great difference in the Practice; the Exercise of Acts of Mercy being much more pleasing and agreeable than of Justice. But if I had the Honour of being a Member of Parliament, I should think that this natu­ral Tendency of my Mind ought not to make me for­get, that Acts of Indempnity, and all Humane Laws and Sanctions, must be consistent with the Statutes and Ordinances of God himself; and where he in his Sacred Word has been pleased to declare himself, in such Cases neither the Parliament, nor any other Political Consti­tution, can exert its Authority. There must therefore be some Account taken for the innocent Blood that has been spilt in this Kingdom of late Years.

There neither is, nor ever was, any Municipal Law in the World more careful to preserve the Lives of the Subject, than the Law of England; but 'tis not to be denied, that this Law hath suffered extremely in its Re­putation both at home and abroad, and particularly in that excellent Part of it, Trials by Juries, because it hath been the Instrument and Property (tho' a forced and unwilling one) of its own and the Churches Ene­mies, to take away the Lives of this Noble Lord, and others, who they thought willing or able to obstruct or disappoint their Designs of introducing Popery and Ty­ranny. And shall there be nothing done to vindicate the Reputation of our Law, and to make it appear to the World, that the Fault was not in the Law it self, but in those wicked and corrupt Ministers and Judges who had the distribution of it?

The Occasion and Inducement of the Statute of 25 E. 3. was, that corrupt Judges did adjudge Crimes Treason, that were not really so great: But our Mo­dern Judges have exalted themselves beyond those; they have condemned a Man of Treason, that was not only innocent of the Crime, but was eminent for his Vertues, and indeed for no other Crime than dis­charging his Duty: For I do conceive, that 'tis a Duty incumbent upon every Subject, to support and defend the Government he lives under, and to oppose all Mo­tions and Steps towards the Change and Alteration of it, that have not the Concurrence of the Legislative Authority.

I think this Proposition will be allowed as a Principle, and then I am sure my Lord R. is to be both justified and applauded for all that he transacted: For, what other Charge was he guilty of than this? King Charles the Second (who was a Concealed Papist, and by so much the more Dangerous) had, in conjunction with His Brother, (who was an Owned one, and by so much the more Generous) formed a Project to extirpate the Protestant Religion, and establish their own in these Kingdoms; and, as previous and necessary thereto, there was a necessity to destroy the Laws, and to change the whole Frame of the Government; for both, as they then stood, and were constituted, were such a strong Guard and Defence to the Protestant Religion, and were so particularly calculated against the return of Popery, that it was in vain to attempt any thing, either to the prejudice of the one, or in favour of the other, so long as the Laws and the Government continued.

Tho' there were formerly (I know) several good Protestants that were incredulous of this Design; yet the Transactions of the State after, and that King's owning himself a Romanist at his Death, has abundant­ly [Page 9]satisfied all unprejudiced Men of the Truth of it since. My Lord R. was one of those that had so early and so large a Prospect in this Matter, that his Reason fully convinced him at that time of what every one has been since convinced of. Then the Treason of my Lord R. resolves into this; That he being upon good and rational Grounds, determined in the belief that King Charles the Second and the Duke of Y. had conspired to abolish the Church of England, and to subvert the Laws and the Government; and observing the Counsels, Measures, and all the Proceedings of the Court to be correspondent to that End, and to have a direct and natural tendency towards it; He did joyn with one Judas, but with divers other Great and Worthy Perso­nages, to consider how to preserve our Religion, our Government, and our Laws, in that time of danger and distress: For before the date of any of the pretended Treasonable Practices objected to him, it ought to be remembred, 1. That the Fountain of all our Laws and Liberties, our High Court of Parliament, was polluted by Court-bribery and Subornation. 2. That it had been frequently and abruptly broke up and dissolved, before it could perform any of the Trusts or Duties it owed to the Country. 3. That there was an infamous Declara­tion ordered to be read in all Churches, solemnly, in the time of Divine Service, against the Proceedings of the House of Commons; which could have no other aim, than to render that part of the Constitution obnoxious to the People, and to make them believe it was become impracticable, and unsafe for the Government to assem­ble them. 4. That there was a mortal Wound given to the Privilege and Rights of Parliament, by the Trial of Fitzhrrris in the Kings-Bench, being under an Impeach­ment, and by the Encouragement and Welcome given to the Addresses and Abhorrences of the Mobile, im­porting a Condemnation of Parliamentary Proceedings. 5. That there had been Witnesses tampered with, if [Page 10]not actually suborned, to swear divers Noblemen and Gentlemen out of their Lives. 6. That there was a bold and open Incroachment on the Charter and Fran­chises of the City of London, which usher'd in that ge­neral Desolation which succeeded on all the Corpora­tions of England. The extorting the Charters from all Cities and Burroughs by Quo Warranto's, and involuntary Surrenders (which divers were forced to make to save their Lands and their Charitable Donations, which they were threatned should be otherwise seised) did effectu­ally encompass the Design of overturning the Govern­ment. For all Writers in Politicks do agree in this Pro­position, That when the Legislative Power is removed, or altered from that Place, State, or Position in which it was setled upon the Original Constitution, that Govern­ment is dissolved: And I think it very clear, that by the Destructions of the old Charters, and the Establishment of our Cities and Burroughs under the new, the King had in effect usurped the whole Legislative Authority: For he had before a Power over two Parts of it, which were Himself and the House of Lords; because he could prefer what Number he pleased of his own Creatures to be Members of that House, who should vote as He should order and direct; and he had now got the House of Commons under his Girdle, by the Powers he reser­ved in the New Charters, to model and change the Magistracy, and the Officers who had the Conduct of the Elections, and the right of returning the Persons E­lected. In these violations of our civil Rights, some Persons (as I have the Charity to believe) did ingage and concur through Inadvertency, not seeing through that Scheme which had been concerted between the two Brothers, for the bringing about their design, and these withdrawing from their Counsels when it appeared bare­faced; and their being so instrumental and assisting to the late Revolution, and the setling us in our present Condition of Happiness, seems to Attone for past Er­rors. [Page 11]7. It must not be forgot, that originally in Scotland, the Priviledges of the Subject were greater, and the Prerogatives of the Crown not so large as in England, and yet there the old Constitution was so de­molished, that there hardly remained the Ruines of the ancient Government; but it might be said jam seges ubi Troja fuit, and there was (avowedly) exercised an Ar­bitrary and Despotick Jurisdiction. The Duty and O­bligation of the King was as great to govern the Peo­ple of Scotland according to their Laws, as to govern us according to our Law; and therefore we might con­clude we should receive the same fate and the same mea­sures of Justice, whenever the King should think it as safe and as feasible. There were these and several o­ther palpable steps and advantages towards Popery and Arbitrary Power, antecedent to any of the Facts charg­ed on my Lord Russell: And was it not every English Man's Duty as well as Interest, to endeavour a stop to the Course of those Counsels, which were so directly aimed and levelled at our Church and Government? And was there the least Proof that my Lord Russell's Con­sent or Privity extended any further?

IV. In Page 3. He bestows large Commendations on the Person that was the Kings Sollicitor at that time, and excuses the Council, by saying, That every Advocate is to do his utmost, and a failure had deserved the worst of Names, &c. I do acknowledg that in all times Lawyers have allowed themselves too great a Latitude, when they Act meerly as Council, and 'tis an Opinion that has obtained among us, That we ought not judicially to be called to an Account for any thing we offer or press in favour of our Clyent, or against his Advesary, so we have it in our Instructions; and though I must always have a deference to the Memory of my Lord Coke, and must own my Obligations to his Learned and Pain­ful Works, yet I cannot without the highest degree of [Page 12]Indignation, consider his Conduct when he was Attorney General against Sir Walter Raleigh in his Tryal; nor can I forgive my Lord Bacon for his vehement and partial streining of Law and Fact against his Patron and Bene­factor the Earl of Essex in his first Tryal upon the Arti­cles exhibited against him for miscarriages in Ireland. But let it not pass for Authentick Doctrine, That a Council is a Criminal, or that he does not perform his Duty if he does not impose false Law upon the Court, and false Facts, and false Consequences deduced from the Facts upon the Jury, which was plainly done in the Case of my Lord Russell, as has been already, and shall be in this again further evinced. As to the then Sollicitor's Character, if his Actings as Counsel against this Ho­nourable Lord, and some other Persons, be put in a Parenthesis, 'tis as great as any Man of the Profession of the Law; but if he were my Father, I must condemn his Deportment in those Cases, and some others whilst he was Sollicitor to the two last Kings.

V. In the same Page, our Author says, ‘That the World guesses that he who wrote the Reply (viz. Sir R. A.) did write the half Sheet, called the Justification, and says 'tis really sportive to read the Justifier, commending the Defender and Replyant doing the same good Office for the Justifier; and that he spends a whole Page in the most fulsome Praises on that small bulk Author, and rejoyces that the Work was done to his hand, which is a very pretty Jest. It is at most but R. for A. and A. for R. and R. A. still, which is much better than the contrary Practice, of which some Authors have been guilty.’ 1. The World he here means is (I dare say) his own self, since none else can have so weak a Judgment, as so far to wrong the Defender, by suspecting him to write so simple a thing; and I assure our Author, if I had not a very mean Opinion of his Understanding, the Justifier would value himself extreamly upon the mistake. 2. The [Page 13]Justifier owns the Defender to have disparaged his Judgment, in the Praises he has bestowed upon him, to which he was led by his Zeal and Affection to the subject Matter the Justifier writ upon; the Justifier disclaims all Title and Merit to any other Commen­dation than this, That he writ upon no other Principle hope, or inducement, than the doing right to the Me­mory and Reputation of the Noble Lord who is dead, to his Lady, Children, and other Relations who are living; and to the Publick Justice and Laws of Eng­land, which were violently wrested to give a Sanction to his Condemnation, that we may reasonably pre­sume was first resolved upon, before the Crime was con­sidered or concerted that he should be Condemned for. 3. He might have spared his Reflection on the small bulk Author, since he was industriously so for the Rea­sons therein mentioned, it being hinted, that it was design'd only for the satisfaction of such as had not the opportunity, or wanted leisure to peruse the greater and more deserving Works upon the same Subject. 4. In the next Print 'tis desired our Author will be pleased to explain his last Period recited in this Secti­on, viz. It is at most but R. for A. and A. for R. and R. A. still, which is much better than the contrary Practice, of which some Authors have been guilty. I understand what is intended by the Capital Letters, but for my Soul I cannot find out the Antecedent to the Relative It; or if It be a Mark of impersonally, I am at a loss for the Antecedent to the first Relative Which; and I am at a loss to know what Practice it is that some Authors are guilty of contrary to the Practice of R. A. At present all this is unintelligible, and therefore the Author must pardon me if (until his Clavis or Commen­tary comes out) I put this Sentence under Title Non­sence in my common Place.

VI. In Page 4. He says, The Author of the Remarks quarrels with the legality of the Jurors, the Defender with that of the Indictments, and both with the Evidence. The Author of the Sheet differs from them in the two first, but agrees with them in the last. The Author of the half Sheet, called the Justification (which I suppose he means by the Author of the Sheet) is so far from differing from them in the two first, that he does think the In­dictment faulty, and not so certain as it ought to be; but he conceives the Objections to the Jurors and to the Evidence are never to be got over. Indeed the Justifier takes no notice of the defects of the Indictment nor of the Jury; not only because he could add nothing on those Heads to what had been observed before, but like­wise because it was not so pertinent to his purpose, which was to frame and digest the Case of my Lord Russell into such a plain, short, and easie Method, that no Person might want Leisure to read, or Capacity to understand it: And therefore where he was obliged to use our legal Terms and Ideoms, he was very careful to add an Explanation to them. To understand the Force and Validity of the Objections to the Indict­ment, and to the Jury, there was required considerable Skill in Law and the Rules of Pleading; and the Justi­fier did not presume to be able to instruct any one so qualified; but there is no Woman wants Logick to con­clude, that my Lord Russell was innocent, if it be true, as the Justifier affirmed, and proved by quoting his Au­thorities, That his Sentence was against the express and di­rect Opinion of the two greatest Men of the Law, the Lord Coke and Hales; against the Opinion of several Parlia­ments; against a general and certain Maxime of the Law, and against the First and Original end of making any Sta­tute concerning Treasons. I say there could be none of so small an Understanding, but must upon the reading, determine either, That the Judgment against my Lord Russell was Illegal and Arbitrary, or that the Justifier [Page 15]was disingenious, in imposing upon the People false Quotations and Authorities, which even our Author has not the brow to charge him with, though he does endeavour to avoid the force of them by such di­stinctions, as shall be considered in their proper Place. Our Author therefore has given us a great Instance, either of his Candor or his Sence, by inferring that the Justifier differs in his Opinion from the two Learn­ed Gentlemen abovementioned, as to the Indictment and Jury, because he was filent, and delivered no Opi­nion at all one way or other.

VII. In Page 5. He says, That the Replyant refers his Reader to the Justification, and therefore let's examine that a little; a third part of it is spent upon the Evidence, but that is not within my Province, &c. 1. He is ex­treamly mistaken in his Computation, for there is not a tenth part of it spent upon the Evidence: The Justifier did, and does conceive the Evidence in respect of the Character of the Witnesses in general, the particular Circumstan­ces they were under, and of the subject Matter which they did Depose, to be so defective, and so far from maintaining the Charge of the Indictment, that he took it for granted, that there was none so hardy as to defend it. 2. But our Author did not consider well, when he said that the Evidence was not within his Pro­vince; for the Province he has undertaken, is to Vin­dicate the Government in its Proceedings against my Lord Russell; and if the Government be suspected and charged, for giving assurance to Prisoners, that they should be Pardoned or Hanged according as they Swore Matter to Convict or Acquit this Noble Lord and o­thers, and for refusing to grant Pardons, until the Terms and Conditions of obtaining the same were actually performed, by swearing this Lord out of his Life to save their own; I say, if the Government be charged for using these and other indirect Courses, to [Page 16]procure Evidence against him and others, (as it really is from the Mouth of one, if not more, of the Wit­nesses themselves) then the Government wants Vindi­cation in that Particular, and consequently the Evi­dence is as much within his Province as the Indictment and Judgment; and as the Actings of the Judges and Counsel, which in another place he owns to be his Province to defend and justifie. I desire our Author hereafter, to postpone the giving his Works a Title till he has finished them; for the Contradiction and Incon­gruity between the Title and Body of his Sheet is really a very great scandal and reproach to him.

VIII. In the same Page he goes on thus: As to the rest, the force of it, if any seems to be founded on his first As­sertion, the Conspiring to do a thing is not the doing a thing, and he quotes two great Mens Names for it, I would have agreed that, though he had spared the Authority to justifie it, but this is sufficiently answered in the Sheet. 1. Our Author now gives us an instance of his Sinceri­ty, as he has done before several times of his Judgment; I desire him to point at that part of the Justification, out of which he quotes that absurd and ridiculous Assertion, That the Conspiring to do a thing is not the doing a thing. I should never have been able to guess what he meant, if he had not added the Quotation of the two great Mens Names; the two great Men are the Lords Coke and Hales, which the Justifier cites to prove, That Con­spiring to Levy War is not Treason, nor an Overt Act to prove the Intention or compassing of the King's death. The Justifier uses their own Words, and tells his Reader so; and is not our Author a Man of a strange Forehead, to Construe Positions laid down by Coke and Hales so absurdly? 2. If the Proposition, Conspiring to Levy War is not Treason, be to be expounded, (as our Author does) That Conspiring to do a thing is not doing the thing, what becomes of our Judges, who have adjudged, That the Conspiring to do a thing was the doing a thing? for [Page 17]they adjudged to Levy War, Treason, within the intent of Stat. Edw. 3. tho it be not in the Letter. Our Author one might think play'd Booty; for tho he assumes the Stile of the Judges Vindicator; yet he loads them with a more gross and stupid Imputation, than either the Defence, Remarks, or Justification; but I'le be his Compurgator, I believe him true and faithful to his Trust, this was a Blunder, and Blunders we find to flow from him, with a wonderful and natural Facility; and we may observe one more in this period, where be says, This is sufficiently an­swered in the Sheet: Now, tho I never saw that Sheet (he must mean his first Sheet) till lately; yet, I am assured it was printed before the Justification came out, and then I desire to know, how he comes to Answer a Paper he ne­ver saw, nor knew to be in being; there must be Prophe­sy or Revelation in the Case, that is certain; but admit­ting he had said, That what was writ in the Sheet, did re­sute this part of the Justification, and so rendred an an­swer now unnecessary, which was his intent, if he had any at all, I say, That to a general Affirmative, I can but op­pose a general Negative, that 'tis not, &c. I confess I might have spared my Criticism on the Incorrectness of our Authors Expressions, since there are so many more important Faults and Errors, to entertain me with.

IX. In the same page, He says, that the Justifier offers an Argument from the late Statutes declaring Treasons; because they were Temporary; but I answer as the Sheet doth, they were in affirmance of the Old Law; and I can shew him three or four Temporary, and an hundred other Acts of Parliament that are so, and therefore that is no Argument at all; but I am, as the Party I justify was, confined to a Sheet, and therefore cannot enlarge. 1. The Temporary Statutes for making a bare Conspiracy to levy War, Treason, were one of the Topicks from which the Justifier drew his Arguments to prove that it was not Treason within the intent of the Statute of E. 3. upon which my Lord Russel was indicted; for he did, and does still think, that so many Parliaments would not have [Page 18]troubled themselves to make special Statutes concerning it, if they had thought it Treason by any Statute before in be­ing; and did also infer, that all those Parliaments did not judge it fit to be a continued standing Treason, because then they would have made their Statutes perpetual, and not remporary. When there were Jealousies and Apprehen­sions of an Invasion from a Foreign Enemy, and of the Sub­jects holding a correspondency with him, as in Queen Eli­zabeth, and other Reigns; upon such, and the like Emer­gencies, the Wisdom of the Parliament did think fitting to make a Conspiracy to levy War Treason; and there is no doubt but such an Act would be at this time seasonable. 2. His bare and confident averment that they were in affir­mance of the Old Law, and that he can shew three or four Temperary Statutes that are so, must not bear down those strong Reasons which induce me to believe that they were introductive of New Law; I believe he may be so learned as to produce a great many other Acts, that are only decla­ratory of the Old Law; but I'm sure 'tis not common nor usual to make temporary Acts in affirmance of perpetual Acts of Parliament, which is the Point in question: For if our Author means any thing that is pertinent, 'tis that these temporary Acts are in affirmance of the Statute of E. 3. which is perpetual. 'Tis true, the temporary Statute of 13 Car. 2. (as our Author cites) does enact, That if any person or persons whatsoever shall, within the Realm, or without, compass or imagine the Death of the King, &c. and such Compassings, Imaginations, &c. shall express, utter, or declare, by any Printing, Writing, Preaching, or malicious-advised Speaking, being legally convicted thereof by, &c. then every such, &c. shall, &c. But no man (except our Author) would say that this is in affirmance of Stat. E. 3. as to the compassing the King's Death. The Statute of E. 3. does provide, That there must be some Overt-act; but it does not determine what shall be a good and suffici­ent Overt-act to prove the Compassing: If the matter be clear, it leaves it to the Judges; if there be any doubt or difficulty, then it does expresly direct the Judges to respit [Page 19]their Judgments till the meeting of the Parliament, that the Case may be resolved there. But the Statute 13 Car. 2. declares the compassing the King's Death, and particu­larly the expressing the same by any Printing, Writing, Preach­ing, or malicious-advised Speaking, to be Treason, the Co­pulative And makes it clear, that the principal End of this part of the Statute was to particularise and ascertain, That such Facts therein mentioned should be sufficient Overt­acts of the compassing during King Charles's Life, that were not so by the Statute of E. 3. which left it general, and at large. Is not our Author a man of an excellent Head, to apprehend this to be only a Confirmation of the Old Statute in words at length? Indeed he does say, That it was agreed to be so in the House of Commons, 1 Jac. 2. and when a Motion was made to renew that Law, the Lawyers, answer was, That the 25 E. 3. did the same thing. I have enquired of some diligent and observing Members of that Parliament concerning the truth of this Allegation, and they assure me there was no such Answer made by the Lawyers, nor no such thing agreed by the House; but they give me this Account of the matter: There was a Bill brought in to renew the Statute of 13 Car. 2. and upon the second or third reading, it was moved by Mr. Tipping ('tis for his Credit to be named), That there might be an explanatory Proviso, That Preaching, Writing, or Speaking against Popery, and against the Doctrines and Principles of the Church of Rome, should not be construed or intended within the intent of the Act. This was thought so reaso­nable, that it was immediately agreed unto, and a Com­mittee appointed presently to withdraw into the Speaker's Chamber, to pen the Proviso, and the Bishop of St. Asaph came there to be assisting in it. Upon this, the Bill was dropt and let fall, and no man ever after pressed it further; which may give all men satisfaction what use was at that time designed to be made of it; and that all our Learned Clergy who did since Preach and Write against Popery, would have been in danger (if the Bill had passed) to have been construed into a Treason, Praemunire, or some [Page 20]other great Penalty within the intent of that Bill, to the ruine of Them and their Families. This was in King James's first Parliament, when we had the most simple, plain, and solemn Assurances of Protecting our Religion and our Laws, that was possible to be devised. It does now sufficiently appear how insufficiently our Author has answered this Argument of the Justifier: 'Tis true, he does make an Apology (and a very pretty one it is), That he is confined to a Sheet, and therefore cannot enlarge. He says, when he comes to answer Mr. H. That he wants time. But I desire to know, How it comes that he can­not spare time, or that he is limited to a Sheet? Who is it that does set these bounds unto his Writings? It were to be wished, That the person who has so great Autho­rity over him as to confine him to a Sheet, would im­prove it a little further, and engage him not to write at all. If it had been a year ago, I should have presumed he were thus streightned from the attendance he owed to some great Place; for I believe truly, his Parts, Learn­ing, Integrity, and other Qualifications, could not fail of recommending him to an Eminent Office (perhaps a Recorder of a Great City, or the like) in the late Reign. The Reader may observe what sort of man he is, who when he is gravell'd, and can offer nothing of Reason, is forced to have recourse to so poor and pitiful a shift, as to pretend he wants time, or that he is confined to a Sheet, which bears the Price of four Sheets; and, consi­dering the value of if, he might have afforded more of them for our Money.

X. In the same Page he observes, That the Justifier lays down a Rule for Construction of Statutes, That a thing par­ticularis'd in one part, is not to be construed within the ge­neral words of another part; but that Rule has near four­score Exceptions in the Books: Besides, it comes not to this Case; for here is compassing the King's Death made Treason, and declared by Overt-act; then levying War is made Trea­son. Now, says the Repliant, nothing can be an Overt­act [Page 21]of the first, that does any way concern the latter, which is a Non sequitur, &c. 1. 'Tis very true, the Justifier does lay down the Rule, and does thence deduce, That conspiring to levy War cannot be within the meaning of the Clause of Compassing the King's Death in the Stat. E. 3. because levying War is particularly mentioned in the Statute after. 2. The Rule is admitted; but it has, it seems, near fourscore Excep­tions; though, by reason of the misfortune of our Author's being confined to a Sheet, or time being wanting, he has not obliged his Reader with one of that great number. It would have been much more material for him to have shewed, That any of the said Exceptions, or the Reason of them, did extend to the Point in Question, than to tire his Reader with a long impertinent Preface, and a tedious in­significant Digression of the King's Prerogative of Peace and War, (which take up two or three Pages). If he had omit­ted these, he needed not to have exceeded the Standard of a Sheet, and yet have room enough to have given better and more satisfactory Answers, if he could. 3. The Consequence, That conspiring to levy War is not an Overt-act of the Compassing, &c. because it belongs to ano­ther species, is clear from the express words of Coke and Hales; which see in the Justification. And if the Makers of the Statute had designed to conclude Conspiring, &c. it would not have cost them above three words more to have added it to the Clause of levying War, where it would have more properly come in, then under the Clause of Compassing, to which it has no Relation, nor no Man could dream of finding it: The positive Opinions of Coke and Hales, the Authority of a Rule of Law, and the conside­ration of the motive and end of the Statute, which all make against our Author, do justly merit so great a Com­plement and Respect to be paid them, that the Case should be admitted to be doubtful; and if it be doubtful, then by the express Direction of the Act, the Judges ought to have suspended their Judgment, till they received the Deter­mination of the Parliament. Our Author refers to the Sheet for several Instances to the purpose; I have exa­mined [Page 22]a great many of them, (at length I was weary) and I'le assure him there was not one that warranted the Judg­ment in my Lord Russel's Case; Mr. H. has been so par­ticular in answering them, that he has saved all others the Labour. I do not say, but that there has been as ex­travagant Opinions as this, as in the Case of him, who said, His Son was Heir to the Crown, meaning a House, that had a Crown for a Sign to it; and of him, Who wished Stag-horns, and all in Kings Belly, meaning one of that Name, &c. These and the like were in violent corrupt times, adjudged Treason; but no man ever defended these Resolutions, or esteem them to be Law, tho they have the Sanction of the judicial Opinions of their side.

XI. He proceeds and says, The Lord Cobham's Case is endeavoured to be answered by a wonder, that Sir Edward Coke, late Lord Chief Justice, and then Sheriff, should differ from Mr. Attorney Coke; for we know his Thoughts in Sir Walter Rawleigh's time, and in his Speeches in Car. 1. his time, they are as different each from the other, as the times were. I have now (as I had before) occasion to re­prove our Author for false Recitals; the Justifiers never said, nor wondered, that my Lord Coke's Opinion was different at one time, from what it was at another; and he was so far from saying, that his Opinion was different when he was Attorney, from his Opinion in his third In­stitution, (which our Author means) that he believed there was no such Resolution, as was pretended in the Lord Cobham's Case, because my Lord Coke did not take notice of it in his Inst where he taught a Do­ctrine quite contrary; and also, because Hales gives ano­ther Account of the Offence of the Lord Cobham, than was alledged in my Lord Russel's Tryal, by the Kings Council. 2. I am as free to Reproach my Lord Coke, for his Carriage against Sir Walter Rawleigh, as I am the late King Charles the Second Council, for theirs against my Lord Russel; but for his Speeches in Car. 1. his time, [Page 23]if he means these delivered in Parliament; as many as I have read of them, are very Honest, and denote a Zeal and Affection to the Laws and Liberties of his Countrey, and do not in the least derogate from the just and ancient Prerogatives of the Crown. 3. Upon the whole, there is nothing material here answered to the Objections made by the Justifier against the Authority of the Lord Cobham's Case, quoted in the Tryal, as will appear by comparing this answer with the Justification; nor is there any thing said to my Lord Hales stating Cobham's Crime different from the Tryal, from whence we may conclude it was more than a bare Conspiracy, &c.

XII. He says, Sir Henry Vane's Case is endeavoured to be answered by this, that Syderfin mentions not the Overt-Act in the Indictment, but he does say the Treason alledged, was a compassing the Kings Death; and every Man knows what Sir Henry Vane did to accomplish that; he neither Signed the Warrant to Execute that Murder, nor was he actually con­cerned in it; The Justifier says, He does not remember it printed any where, but in Syderfin's Reports; for the refresh­ment of his Memory, I'le tell him of another Book, where it is, and that is Keeble's Reports 1 Vol. 304. and there the Indictment is said to be, for compassing the Kings Death, and endeavouring to accomplish the Treason, by Changing and Usur­ping the Government, and Levying War; which Case does di­rectly overthrow all the Defenders, Justifiers, and Repliants Arguments, from the distinctness or difference of the sort of Treasons. 1. Here is another mistake, for the Justifier does not endeavour to answer Sir Henry Vane's Case, because Syderfin mentions not the Overt-Acts; but he does not only endeavour, but does effectually answer it, because there was other Matters proved against him, that did amount to a good Overt-act; and tho he did not Sign the Warrant to Execute that Murder, yet he was concerned in Designs for incompassing his Civil Death, which is within the Act, as well as his Natural. 2. The Devil owed our Author a shame, when he prompt him to refer us to Keeble; for by [Page 24]that Book, it expresly appears, that the Changing and Usurping the Government, was part of Sir Henry Vane's Charge, as well as Levying War, which does necessarily imply the Kings Deposition, which no man ever doubted, but was Treason; but, how comes this to be applicable to my Lord R's Case? 3. This Case is so far from over­throwing all the Defenders, Justifiers, and Repliants Ar­guments, from the distinctness of the Treason, that 'tis plainly consistent with them, and all other Arguments they use.

XIII. Then for Doctor Story's Case, 'tis hard to justify it for Law, whereas there are above forty places, where it is cited, and agreed, &c. if any thing be Law, that is so, and not distin­guishable from the Case in question; but that the Evidence was different, which the Justifier would make a reason to invalidate this Indictment; the Logick of it passeth all understanding, &c. 1. I do say, 'Tis hard to justify Doctor Story's Case accord­ing to the summary and imperfect Report of it in Dyer; but take it with all the Circumstances, it is Treason; and is nothing like my Lord Russel's Case, who was never pre­tended to be guilty of adhering to a Foreign Enemy, nor a design of Deposing the King, as in truth Story was. 2. I desire our Author to reconcile his saying here, That the Justifier would invalidate the Indictment with what he said before, that the Justifier admitted the Indictment to be good, and only quarrelled with the Evidence; but Contra­dictions and Incongruities, are small Faults. 3. If the Lo­gick of distinguishing my Lord Russel's Case from Story's, because the Evidence against them were different, be past his understanding, I cannot imagine what is within the reach of his Understanding; for 'tis clear, that the Evi­dence is the principal and most essential Thing to be weighed and considered: 'Tis true, our Author has said, That the Evidence was not his Province, but that his Busi­ness was to defend the Court and Council. I have alrea­dy delivered my Thoughts upon that Expression, and shall now further ask our Author one Question concerning it; [Page 25]whether, if the Evidence was short, and did not warrant the Indictment, it was not the duty of the Court to tell the Jury so much, and that therefore they ought to have ac­quitted the Prisoner? By his Doctrine, if any Man be Indicted of compassing Death of the King, and the Evidence be crossing a Ri [...]er in a pair of Oars, the Court is not to trouble it self about the Evidence, nor to instruct the Jury of the insufficiency of it; and if the Party be Convicted, the Court is in no Fault, because the Indict­ment was as good as against the Murderers of King Charles the First, and the Cases are only distinguishable by the proof. Now I have been all along under an Error, (and the una­nimous Consent of the Books have led me to it) that the Jurors were entirely to be determined in Points of Law by the Court, and that the Court was to state the Law, arising from the Proofs to the Jury, and that they were only Judges of the Fact.

XIV. In 2d Ander. Grant's Case, 'twas held, That when any Person intendeth or contriveth to Levy War for a thing which the Queen by her Law or Justice, ought or may do in Government, as Queen; it's not material, whether they intend any hurt to Her Person; but if they intend to Levy War against the Office and Authority of the Queen, that's enough; and that Resolution overthrows the Justifiers No­tion, that J. S.'s design was only to defend the Laws; though the 13 Eliz. was then in force, it's a good Argument to an­swer that Pretence. 1. I have not 2d Ander. by me; 'tis out of Print, and I can't procure it, tho I've sent to se­veral Booksellers. 2. But even as our Author represents it, 'tis nothing to his purpose, because he was Indicted on the 13 Eliz. which made a Conspiracy to Levy War, Treason during her Life; and also, because his Design was against the Office and Authority of the Queen, which im­plies her Dethroning or Deposition: But by the whole Te­nor of the Evidence against my Lord Russel, it is plain, he was assenting to no Consultation, Debate or Resolution, than what was for the support of the Regal Office and Authority, [Page 26]if the Preservation of our Religion, Laws and Government be so.

XV. Our Author refers us to the Case of the Earls of Es­sex, &c. before the then High Steward. In that Case, there was an actual sorce, and levying War, and therefore not applicable to the Case in question; for their Offence was specified in the Stat. E. 3. which my Lord Russel is not con­cerned in.

XVI. In page 6. Our Author, under the pretence of justifying the Guards, makes a long impertinent Excursion, and maintains the King's Prerogative of Peace and War, and challenges any body to shew the time that there were no armed men in England; and expounds the meaning of the Parliament, that they did not design the Guards in their Instrument of Grievances. 1. No man questions the King's Prerogative of Peace and War; and the Author must own himself impertinent to talk of it here, unless he will justify this Consequence, That if the King can declare War, &c. then he may keep standing Guards in times of Peace. 2. It is as little to the purpose, though England was never without Armed Men; for we know there were several Castles, Garisons, &c. kept up, and maintained as necessary for the defence of the Realm against Fo­reign Enemies; but I challenge him to shew me where any Kings in times of peace were allowed to keep, and quarter Soldiers upon the Subjects, until King Charles the Second's time. 3. I desire to know whether the Guards were not part of King James's Army? and whether they were not quartered contrary to Law? and if so, then, I'm fure, they must be included in the Instrument of Grie­vances, as well as any other part of the Army. But he takes no notice of what the Justifier said, That they were on great debate voted illegal by the House of Commons in King Charles the Second's Long Parliament, of whose zeal to the Prerogative no man ever doubted. [Page 27]Nor did he consider that time was, when Judges and others were impeached for persuading the King to give Liveries to great and unusual numbers of men to attend him, which were no other than Guards. (Temp. Rich. II.) That one Article of Male-administration against that King himself, was grounded upon his Armed Multitude of Che­shire men. That even in the times of the War betwixt York and Lancaster, when the Title to the Crown was so ticklish; yet Standing Armies were not endured then. That King Henry the Seventh, having occasion to raise some Forces, was limited by Act of Parliament to the Number of Twelve Thousand. That our later Acts a­gainst Martial Law, and quartering of Soldiers upon Persons against their Will, presuppose all Standing Forces in times of Peace to be Illegal: since without Marshal-Law, and Quartering of Soldiers, a Standing Force cannot subsist. We know of how late standing the very Yeomen of the Guards are: And by an old Act of Parliament we are taught, That to the King it belongs to prohibit all Force and Arms; And that in order thereunto, His Leiges are bound to Assist him according to the Laws and Customs of the Realm (7 Edw. 1.) But I find no Legal Warrant for our King's raising a Force in times of Peace and Quiet, with­out Consent of Parliament.

XVII. I have now considered all that our Author hath been pleased to answer to the Half sheet called the Justi­fication, &c. and do conceive the several points it undertook to make out, to be vindicated from our Author's Cavils (viz.) That the Judgment against my Lord Russel was, 1. Against the Authority of the two best, and most authen­tick Opinions of our Lawyers, Hales and Coke. 2. Against the Opinions of several Parliaments. 3. Against a known Rule and Maxim. 4. And Lastly, Against the end and induce­ment of the Stat. Ed. 3. And if this be true, then I submit to any impartial Judgment, whether the Noble Lord might not be said to be Murthered? It is not such a Murther as can be punished in the ordinary course and methods of [Page 28]Justice, because it was committed under the countenance of Law, which I take to be so far from lessening the guilt, that it is an aggravating Circumstance, To pervert that Law which is framed and instituted for the security of the Subject, to be a means of his ruine and destruction, by undue, vio­lent, and arbitrary Interpretations of it. The Original Le­gislators and Founders of our Government never thought, nor could comprehend, that any Age could arrive to such pitch of wickedness, and therefore they provided no punish­ments for the offence: As the Law of Rome had appointed no punishment for Parricide, because they believed no Man would be so great a Monster as to be guilty of it. Crimes of such an extraordinary nature, are to receive their condem­nation by the Legislative Authority of every Government; and here in England it has been very frequent with our Par­liaments to enact punishments other than were appointed by preceding Laws; or to add to them, when the offence was accompanied with unusual and aggravating circum­stances; neither can it be pretended that there is any in­justice in punishing by a Law, ex post facto; any thing that is an offence in it self, and that receives its denomination of evil from an intrinsick quality inherent in it; such as Parricide, which in Rome had no punishment allotted by the Law; and the barbarous Murders of the Duke of Gloucester in Calais, and of the Bishop of Rochester's Servants by Poison, were by special Statutes declared Treason, and the Murtherers of the Duke of Gloucester underwent the common punishment of High-Treason; and those of the Bishop of Rochester's Family, were ordered to be Boiled to death; neither of which was the legal punishments of their respective Crimes: But indeed it would be very unjust, at once to make the Offence and to punish a person who had been guilty of it, when neither the Word of God, the Light of Natural Reason, nor any previous municipal Law did warn or instruct him of the Transgression; such are the Facts of Coyning of Money, Transporting of Wooll, and the like, which are very innocent in themselves, and are unlawful and punishable, because they are prohibited [Page 29]as things of a publick damage and detriment. Acts of this kind never were, nor ought to be punished without an an­recedent Law to justify it. I do not now plead for except­ing out of the Indemnity any persons whatsoever; my de­sign is only to shew what is just and lawful, not what may be expedient for the Parliament to determine against such as brought my Lord Russel and others to an illegal, cruel, and untimely death; and it is our Author's bold affirmation, That they are as safe as under an Indemnity, that has ministred the occasion of discoursing upon this Topick. I consess I am very ill instructed in the Cases of the rest that were hurried to their Graves through the violence of the late times; my remembrance of them is not more perfect, than one may be presumed to retain from a transient and cursory perusal of their Trials; but by a general consent of all Lawyers, the Sentence against many of them is not more to be defended than that of my Lord R. Mr. Sidney's, and Mr. Hampden's, had the same weak foundation, only with this difference, That the latter pleaded guilty; but it is plain from what has been already said upon my Lord Russel's Case, that he was not, unless he was conscious of some other guilt, than was charged on that Noble Lord. 'Tis true, in all Inferior Jurisdictions and Courts he is estop't to say he is innocent, and that the Plea was extorted from him through menace of Hang­ing, Drawing and Quartering, because the admittance of such a Plea is, repugnant to a Rule of Law, That there can be no averment against matter of Record, and the Plea is re­corded: but whatever Acts in pais, and that are not recorded, a man executes unvoluntarily by duress or threat of being beaten, imprisoned, or sear of other bodily hurt, he may a­void them by pleading the special matter in an Inferior Court; as for the purpose, all Bonds, Specialties, Deeds, Con­veyances, &c. If a man consider this difference abstracted from the aforesaid Maxim, it will seem very absurd, and unreasonable, that one shall be allowed to disannul an Act he persormed to save a beating, or a short Imprisonment (for which the Law would have given him reparation [Page 30]proportionable to the damage he should sustain) and that Mr. H. shall not be received to make vo [...]d his Plea, by saying, That he was forced to it to save himself and Fa­mily from the ignominy of dying under a Gallows; there­fore in Cases of this nature the Parliament ought to give aid and relief, which may be done without inconvenience; since the Parliament (the Seat of the Legislative Power) has an unlimited Jurisdiction, and neither is, nor ought to be so streightly bound up as Subordinate Courts. From Mr. Hambden's Plea there ought no inference to be made to the prejudice of my Lord Russel, since it was altoge­ther involuntary. Upon the whole, I have perused that Noble Lord's Trial with the exactest care and curiosity, and I do profess I can discover no Crime, nor Conspiracy, o­ther than he was engaged in by an hereditary and un­shaken Zeal and Concernment for the Religion; Laws and Liberties of his Countrey; and yet our Author has the bold­ness to repeat in both his Sheets, That his Relations were pleased with the Justice dispenced to him by the Court. His Judgment cannot be defended without reflexion on our present Government, which is founded on the generous, and successful Attempt made by the People of England, under the Auspicious Conduct of His present Majesty, to recover their Ancient Birthrights. 'Tis true, we that en­gaged in this Revolution, are justified by a greater number of breaches and violations of our Laws. And we have carried our resentments further. There were Incroach­ments sufficient upon the people (as appears before) to authorize whatever he transacted; and we found they im­proved and grew at length to such a height, that we were forced to abandon our beloved Doctrine of Passive-Obedi­ence and Non-resistance; for a long time we were re­strained the use of other than the Spiritual-weapons of Prayers and Tears; so long, that all the Secular and Civil Rights of the Kingdom were destroyed: At length those two Leviathans, the Dispencing Power, and the High Com­mission Court were set up, and began to prey upon the Liberties and Properties of the Church, and then our Con­fessors [Page 31]gave us leave to resort to other sort of Arms, which in less than six weeks time redeemed them and us. For my part, I was bred, and will live and dye in the Commu­nion of the Church of England, as by Law established. I believe it to be the best constituted Church in the World both for Doctrine and Discipline; and as upon the Refor­mation She cash [...]ered those luxuriant Ceremonies that in the Church of Rome spread so far as to cover and shadow the root and substance of Religion, so She seems to retain sew more than are competent and necessary for the decent and orderly discharge of Divine Service; but my Affection to the Church cannot so far blind my Judgment, as to ap­prove the conduct of a great many of her Ministers, and Clergy. I was willing to compound with them, and to admit, That Fighting their Mothers Battle with so great Courage in her late distress, should be an expiatory sacri­fice to shrieve and absolve them from their former errors and miscarriages: But I can hardly forgive such as now unseasonably return to their Vomit of Passive Obedience (which they themselves, by experience, so lately found to be absurd and inconsistent with the general Laws of Nature and Self-preservation) and that endeavour by their exam­ple (as much as in them lye) to alienate the bearts of the people from the Government, at a conjuncture, when the common danger of Religion and Laws do absolutely re­quire the closest union, and the strongest and most entire coallition of all the Protestants Power and Interest. I can­not frame any colourable excuse or apology for these sort of Men. Their Murmurings and Discontents cannot proceed from the influence of their ancient and exploded Principle; for even those steps towards the late Change which they encouraged, authorized, or concurred in, were as much a departure from, and a contradiction to the notion of Non-resistance, as the Abdication it self: Nei­ther can I allow that they can be the result of just and ra­tional fears of a design to turn this well tempered Monar­chy into a Republick; since that is more effectually obvi­ated and prevented by setling Their Majesties upon the [Page 32]Throne, than it would have been by the Regency, or any other project that has been propounded or discoursed of; nay, I had almost said, That the Regency did change our Monarchy into a Commonwealth; for it stript King James of all his Prerogatives and Powers; it left him indeed the Title of a King, but the administration of the Go­vernment was to be lodged and intrusted in other hands. Sparta had an Officer that bore the style of King; but not­withstanding that, the Government of Sparta is transmit­ted to us under the Title of a Commonwealth; for in truth, the King had not these Jurisdictions nor Franchises, in which the Essence of Monarchy consists. Such a King as there was (of old) in Sparta, would the Project of the Regency have made King James; which really was no more than to set him up as a Pageant of State, and a Statue of Authority: But by setling the Crown upon Their Ma­jesties, it is preserved in its true, rightful and ancient Lustre, Powers and Prerogatives. 'Tis true, The Rules of the Hereditary Succession are, and must have been broke when King James was laid aside, and no person whatsoever could, during his Life, be exalted to the Throne under that Qualification; for non est baeres viventis, a li­ving Man can have no Heir, is a Maxim of our Laws. Since therefore all thoughts of King James's Restitution were abandoned, and that no person could of right lay claim to the Crown, it would have been next degree to madness, to appoint any person for King, that was not in a capacity to discharge the Duty and Office of a King, which is to defend and protect his People. Such a Power I do conceive to be a more essential Qualification and Property of a Sovereign Prince, than any Right or Title by Descent or Proximity of Blood; for that is required by the Fundamental Maxims of Government in general; this only by Municipal Laws and Sanctions. So that if a People set up for their Supream Governor one that wants some Legal Qualifications, the worst imputation that malice can fix upon them, is, that they do transgress against the Laws of their Country; but, if they let up one for their [Page 33]Governor that is not able to protect them, they do certain­ly offend against the first and original End of all Political Constitutions, which is the Publick Peace and Safety: and how far the Municipal Laws of any particular Kingdom or State do retain their force, when they come to inter­fere with the Superior Laws of Nature and Self-preserva­tion, and with the Ends of Government in general, I sub­mit to every man's consideration. What our Ancestors here in England thought of this Matter, may be easily col­lected from the great number they had of Kings de facto, that were not so de jure; and as no man that is versed in our Histories can be ignorant of this, so no man that is any thing acquainted with with our Laws, but must know they make no difference (in point of Allegiance) between a King de facto and de jure. Whatever is High-Treason against the one, is against the other; nay, our Books car­ry this matter higher, and do teach us, That the levy­ing War under the Authority of a King de jure against him that is King de facto, is such an indelible Character of a Traytor, that he may be tried and condemned in the Reign of such King de jure, if ever he happens to be a King de facto likewise.

As His present Majesty was the only Person able to re­store to us our Religion, and our Ancient Government; so it was on Him alone we could have depended for the conti­nuance of these Blessings. When I reflect upon the Tem­per and Disposition of our English Army after the Revoluti­on, upon the Powers and Strength of France and Ireland, and upon the uncertainty of Scotland, I do not see how it was possible for us to have supported our selves, if the Prince of Orange had withdrawn himself, and his Troops, from among us, and left us to shift for our selves, as undoubtedly he would, and ought to have done, if we had excluded him from any share in the Regal Office; for every body knows he made such a Figure in the Government of the States Gene­ral of the United Provinces; as rendred him one of the greatest and most considerable Princes of Christendom; and [Page 34]was it reasonable to expect he should have relinquished his Post in his Native Countrey, and be content to live among us in the quality of a Subject? Was it reasonable that he should expose his Life, his Fortune, and all that was dear to him, to rescue us from that State of Thraldom and Mi­sery, that we and our Posterities seemed to have been con­demned to; and should we make so ungrateful a return on our parts, as to place him in a meaner Degree, and in­a more private Condition of life, than he was before he un­derwent such hazards, and sustained such Difficulties for our sakes? Certainly the dissatisfaction some People express at our present Establishment, must be occasioned for want of a due and serious consideration of that Deliverance which Providence has made our King the Instrument of. If any man maturely reflects upon the preceding and concurring Accidents and Emergencies of the late astonishing Revolu­tion, he must admit, that God Almighty did in an extraor­dinary and particular manner direct, conduct and approve the Rise, Progress and Conclusion of it.

To conclude, The setting the Character of my Lord Russel in its true and deserved Light; the redeeming his Name and Memory from the stain and infamy of the highest Crimes; the proving his Childrens Title to the greatest degree of Honor and Vertue on the part of their Father (which by the Universal consent of all they will de­rive and inherit from their Mother,) and restoring to the Laws and Justice of England their primitive Credit and Re­putation, are the sole abstracted Motives which prompted me to this undertaking. I have not left the least handle for malice or ill nature to suspect, that what has been here said in relation to the Government, or my Lord Russel, is the result of any external hope of advantage or preferment, or of a servile disposition to flatter such as are in Power. My Resolution not to be known, will both se­cure me against those Imputations, and against that Con­tempt, which is the reward of ill Writers.

I do not pretend to be of so morose, nor Stoical a tem­per, as to think that at all times, and upon all occasions, men should confine themselves to speak or write nothing but what is the true and real Dictates of their Judgments. The extravagant strains of Flattery which Pliny bestows upon the Roman Emperors in his Panegyricks, was no hin­drance to his living and dying with the reputation of a very honest and sincere Person: To magnify the Power of Jupiter, and the other Heathen Gods, in a Declaration or Poem, was never esteemed Blasphemy against the Great Jehovah: And if a man be to speak or write to his Mistress, 'twill be ill manners to tell her that he courts her for her Fortune, though it be the truth. I do not censure the Uni­versity Orator (who, I've heard, did in his Speech to Charles the Second, highly commend him for his Sincerity, Singleness of Heart, and his exact observation-of his Word and Promises) for any other thing than this, That he should have praised him for some other Vertues, than those he was so universally known never to have practised. Up­on these Occasions 'tis expected men should exert their Wit and Fancy, not their Veracity; and I cannot deny, That to make truth on these Occasions the standard, may be clownishness and ill-breeding. But, I'm sure, I would as soon cut off my Right Hand, as suffer it to write any thing that is not the result of my sober and deliberate Thoughts and Judgment upon so serious, weighty and solemn a Sub­ject as I have here presumed to discourse upon.