YOu gave me a Brief, and a pertinent Deduction the other day, of the French Practices, and Designs; the Progress of their Arms, and the Methods of their Proceedings: Together with a Scheme of the Inevitable Ruine and Slavery that threatens Europe, without a speedy, and a powerful Conjunction against them.

After this general Contemplation of the present State of Christendom; you were pleased to take a particular Prospect of the Interest of this Na­tion; and how far we are to reckon our selves concerned in the com­mon Calamity: Coming at last to this Conclusion, that England cannot reasonably expect to stand long, after the Loss of Holland and Flanders. For the support of this Opinion, (besides the Force of your own Reasoning) you referr'd me to several Historical, and Political Treatises upon the subject; which I have diligently examin'd, and made use of, in this fol­lowing Discourse; wherein I take the Freedom to give you my Thoughts upon the whole matter.

Your first Charge upon the French, was, Breach of Faith: and you pitch'd upon the Cases of Spain, and Portugal; the barbarous usage of the Duke of Lorain; and the Nulling of the most Christian Queens Re­nuntiation upon Marriage; (which was the very foundation of the Pyrene­an Treaty) by a pretended devolution of the Spanish Netherlands, in the Right of that Match: Their underhand tampering of Denmark, and Swede, to draw the One from us, and hinder the Other from joyning with us; the Influence they had upon our Disgrace at Chatham; Their playing Boo­ty on both sides, betwixt England and Holland in the Dutch-war: And to these Instances, (which are all so notorious that they need no ex­pounding) you might have added a thousand more of the like Quality. But these may suffice for a seasonable, and a necessary Caution, and without the Helps of Aggravation and Clamour; especially that ex­traordinary Action of destroying the Queens Renunciation, and then in­vading the Spanish Netherlands upon it: An Action hardly to be para­lell'd in the Story of the whole World, for a concurrence of so many enormous Circumstances. There was in it, the Publique Faith of the two Crowns; which is the only security of Government, and the Bond of Humane Society: There was in it the Solemnity of an Oath at the very Altar; which is the most Sacred Tye of a Christian: There was also [Page 4] the highest Profession, and assurance of Friendship imaginable; which is ac­compted one of the most binding Obligations betwixt Man and Man: And then there was a Brother, a Cousin, and an Infant, in the Case; which makes it matter of Humanity and Honour. And yet all these Cords were as easily broken as Bulrushes. This single President may serve, however, for a warning to all Princes and States, not to leave them­selves at the mercy of men of such Principles. But His most Christian Majesty is not the only Prince that has been abused by Corrupt, and Ambiti­ous Ministers.

Your next Observation was, that they are the greatest intermediers in the World, in other Peoples Affairs; that they embroyl all whereever they come; and that there's hardly any Rebellion, but they are in the bottom of it. For their Mony walks in all the Courts and Councils of Christendom; nay, and beyond it too: For 'tis said, that the last Grand Visir was their Pentioner. Was it not France that debauch'd Scotland first; and after­wards England, into the late Rebellion? Nay, did they not stand still, and look on, to see the Crowning of the work which they themselves began, in the Execrable Murther of the late King? And did they not refuse to our Gracious and persecuted Sovereign — even a Retreat in their Dominions? How did they prolong the War in Portugal? What Havock have they made in Poland, and what work in Hungary? And are they not at this day in Counsel with the Port against the Empire, and undermining the Bullwark of Christendom? How have they dash'd England against Holland; blinded the Eyes of several Princes of the Empire; and baffled all Mediations towards a General Peace? Did they not formerly, under the Colour of protecting Germany, cut off Alsatia from the Empire? And in a word, this has been their practice wheresoever they have come: They Covet Harbours in Spain, (says the admirable Baron del' Isola) Leagues in the Empire; Factions in Poland; Wars in England and Holland; Passes into Italy; and the Sovereign Ar­bitrage every where. Their Quiet consists in the Trouble of all others, and their Advantage is in the Publique Calamities. Nor have they any other way, then by dividing, and weakening of the parts, to master the whole, which is the Capital design. And if so, There's no Fence against a Common Enemy, but a Common Ʋnion.

It is already made appear, by what is above said, how dangerous they are to mankind. The next hint you gave me, was to consider on't, whether the English may reasonably expect any better Quarter from them, then other People: in which point, I shall only lay the matter before you, and leave you the Judge on't.

The Four main Interests of a Nation, are, Religion, Reputation, Peace, [Page 5]and Trade. For the first of these; we shall neither fare the better, nor the worse: but lose just as much for being of another Communion, as his Catholique Majesty gets by being of the same. The Question now on Foot is a Communion of State, not of Faith. The Alcoran, and the Gospel go hand in hand; and at the same time, the Protestants are protected in Hungary, and persecuted in France. To say nothing of the Encouragements they give there to the Jansenists, which may, for ought we know, prove the greatest Blow to the Church of Rome that ever it received since the Re­formation. But what do I talk of Religion, in a Cause that is dipp'd in Christian Blood, and in the Tears of Widows and Orphans? A Cause that is propagated by Sacrilege, Rapes, Depopulation, Slavery, Oppression; and at least a Million of Lives sacrificed to it already? The very thought of it is enough to strike the Soul of any man with horrour and Indignation.

If you would see now how tenderly they have handled us in the Business of Reputation: Pray do but cast an Eye upon the Character of an English man in their Politique de France.

Quant à ce qui est des Anglois, ils n'ont aucuns amis, ce sont des gens sans Foy, sans Religion, sans Probité, sans Justice aucune, defians, legers au dernier point, Cruels, Impatiens, gourmands, superbes, audacieux, avares, propres pour les coups de main, et pour une promte execution, mais incapables de conduire une Guerre avec jugement. Leur Pais est assez bon pour vivre, mais il n'est pas assez riche pour leur fournir les moyens de sortir, & de faire aucune conqueste: aussi n'ont ils ja­mais rien conquis, excepte L'Irlande, dont les habitans sont fobiles, et mauvais Soldats, &c. i.e. As for the English, they are a People without Friends, without Faith, Religion, Honesty, or Justice; Distrustful, and fickle to the highest degree imaginable: Cruel, Impatient, Gluttonous, Proud, Audacious; they will do well enough for a Rubber at Cuffs, or a sudden Exploit, but they understand nothing at all of the Government of a War. The Country is passable enough for them to live in; but not Rich enough to offer at any Conquest abroad; nor did they ever make any, but upon the Irish, which are a weakly people, and ill Soldiers.

I think it were not amiss in this place, to desire our Impertinent Under­taker to turn back to the History of Philip de Valois, and he shall there find that our Edward the third made a shift with one Army to beat 60000 French, and leave betwixt thirty and forty thousand of them upon the place; and with another Army in the Bishoprick of Durham to defeat as many Scots, and cut off 15000 of them too. And it must not be here omit­ted, that this Scotch Army was also animated by French Counsels. I would not willingly run out a Letter into a Volume, so that all other Reflections apart, I shall only add, that if the English had not once recovered the Field, and another time made it good in two of the greatest Actions of late that have yet passed betwixt the Imperialists, and the French, 'tis the [Page 6]Opinion of wise men, that the latter would not have had much to brag of upon the success of this War. And this is some degree is acknowledg'd by the Author of a French Relation of the Actions betwixt the two Armies in 1675, 1676, and 1677, (how Romantical soever in other Cases.) Speak­ing of the Battle under the command of the Count de Lorge, after the Death of the Vicount Turenne, these are his words, Et à rendre justice aux Anglois, et aux Irlandois, on peut dire, qu'on leur doit une bonne partie de cette victoire; That is to say, And to give the English and Irish their due, France is indebted to them in a large measure for this Victory. But now to our Polititian again. Ils se haissent les uns les autres, et sont en division continuelle, soit pour la Reli­gion, soit pour le Government. The English, says he, hate one another, and are still quarrelling, either about Religion or Government.

These Indecencies would almost make a man call them Names; but let us pass without one Angry word, from the Interest of our Reputation, to that of our Peace. And enquire how they stand affected to us upon that point. To say, that England has not for a long time had any troubles ei­ther at home, or abroad, which the French have not promoted, or improv'd to their own Advantage; is to say no more then that they deal with Ʋs as they do with all the World beside; So that we must e'en have recourse again to their Politiques for some particular mark of their Favour, where you shall find that our State-Mountebank has not yet shewn all his Tricks, but puts himself with a very grave and fore-casting Countenance upon the very Project of our Ruine. Ʋne Guerre de France, de trois ou quatre ans contre eux les ruiner a entierement, ainsi il semble qu' il ne faut point faire de paix avec eux qu' à des Conditions qui nous soient tres avantageuses. A War (says he) of three or four years with France, would absolutely destroy the English; so that methinks we should not entertain any Peace with them, but upon very profitable terms. And then a little after. In fine, says he, the way to undo the English, is to make them keep an Army on foot; and there's no fear of their Landing in France, but to their certain destruction, unless they should be invited by a Rebel­lion; without which, their Troops will in a short time most undoubtedly fall foul one upon another. To keep them upon continual Expence, 'tis but giving them the Alarm upon the Isles of Jersey, and Gernsey, Wight, and Man, Ireland, and the Cinque-Ports; by which means, they will be put upon the Charge of Fortifi­cations and Garrisons, which will perswade the People that the King intends to set up a standing Army, and an Arbitrary Government. So long as this holds, the Nation will never be at quiet, but torment themselves with fears, and Jealousies, which may be easily fomented by letters in Cipher, to such or such particular per­sons; and in such sort to be intercepted as shall be found convenient. These Let­ters may give a Hint of a Descent in Ireland, and elsewhere, which would dis­pose the Irish, who mortally hate the English, to a Revolt; and among the suspici­ous [Page 7]Multitude they would pass for Gospel. This Contrivance would make the Scots also to bethink themselves of recovering their Liberty; where there must be Par­ties made, and the Sects encourag'd one against another; especially the Roman Catholiques, must be fairly handl'd, and private Assurance given (in the Name of the King of England) to the Benedictins, (who are easie enough to be impos'd upon) that they shall be restor'd to all their former Benefits, according to the Prin­ted Monasticon; which will presently make the Roman Catholiques declare them­selves; and the Monks will move Heaven and Earth for the bringing of mat­ters about: But then Care must be taken to carry on the Report that the King is of the Romish Religion; which will distract the Government, and throw all into an absolute Confusion.

From hence we may gather; first, what opinion the French have of us: Secondly, that it is not only their desire and study, but a formed design to embroyl us. Thirdly, that they will stick at nothing nei­ther, to compass that end; be it never so foul: Fourthly, this Libeller has trac'd us out the very methods of their working: As by amusing the People with forged Letters of Intelligence, where the first Author of the Plot must miraculously discover it: By filling the Peoples heads with fears and Jealousies, and leaving no stone unturn'd in England, Scotland, and Ireland, to stir up a Rebellion: Why has he not advis'd the Poisoning of all our Fountains too? which would have been a Course of as much Chri­stianity and Honour. But that this Trifler may not glorify himself too much in his wondrous Speculations, take notice, that he is only the Tran­scriber, not the Author of this goodly Piece, for the Original was betwixt Richlieu and Mazarine; and it amounts to no more in effect, then an im­perfect History of the French dealings with us for a long time, and par­ticularly in our late Troubles.

To come now from his most unmannerly Malice, to his Reason of State, If I am not mistaken, England might longer subsist in a War with France, then France could in a Peace within it self (the heaviest of all Judgments, when a Nation must be wicked upon necessity:) And again; when he says that England cannot hurt France by a Descent, unless call'd in by a Rebellion; he never considers that if England had an Army a foot, and stood inclin'd to make use of it that way, we should not be long without an Invitation. For we see what the Bourdelois, &c. did upon their own Bottom, and without any Foreign Encouragement; and the whole business miscarried only for want of a rigorous Second. Lastly; give me leave to say that he has extremely overshot himself in one thing more; for though this has been really the practice of the French, and is at this day the very Model and Rule by which their Emissaries govern themselves; it should yet have been kept as the greatest Secret in the World: for the owning of these [Page 8]Inglorious Artifices in publique, makes it one of the Grossest Libels that ever was written against the French Government: to say nothing of his oversight in disobliging the Roman Catholiques, and laying Snares to Tre­pan them.

The question of Trade has been so beaten already, that there remains Little to be added to it. Nor in truth needs it, since it is agreed at all hands, that the French set up for an Ʋniversal Commerce as well as for an Ʋniversal Monarchy. And in effect, the one is but a necessary consequent upon the other. Nor is it enough, it seems, for us to be design'd upon by them, without lending them our hands towards the cutting of our own Throats: For upon a sober and judicious estimate, we are Losers by our Trade with France, at least a Million and an half per Annum. I shall conclude this Head with one passage more out of our Politiques of France: (And you'l say 'tis a pleasant one too, but it must be under the Rose) Upon a Pre­supposal of mischief that's a Brewing in England, Now, says he, it will be our business to renew our Allyance with Holland; we can wheedle them into an Opinion, that they are the only men that understand the knack of Trade, so that they shall have that to themselves; the Talent of the French, alas! lies ano­ther way, and there's no forcing of any thing against Nature: and that now's their nick of time, to crush their Competitors for the Northern Seas. So that we are all of us to be served with the same Sauce; but 'tis some degree of Honesty yet, when they tell the World what they are to trust to.

Now to sum up all that's said. If the French can dispence with Oaths, and Solemn Contracts; If it be their Custom, and a Branch of their Policy, to fish in troubled Waters; If they hate us, as English-men, and are not for us, as Reformed Catholiques; If they do all they can to wound us, in our Reputation, our Peace, and our Trade, we may take for granted that they will destroy us to all purposes if they can, which naturally leads me to an Enquiry how far we are in their Power, or likely so to be, that we may take our measures accordingly.

It will not stand with the Brevity I propose in this Paper to give you a Geographical, or an Historical Accompt of Places, or Actions: But in as few words as I can, I am to present you with a general view of the pre­sent State of Christendom, with a regard to the Power of France; and then to consider how far England may come to be concern'd in the Com­mon Fate. Here it was that you and I brake off in our last Discourse; So that in the Prosecution of it, I must try to walk without Le [...]ding, (Sa­ving only the helps that I have gathered from certain Tracts which I have read, upon his Recommendation) wherein I shall steer a middle Course, betwixt some that overvalue the Strength of France, and others that will have it to be less then indeed it is.

That the Arms of France are at this day formidable to all Christen­dome, is not to be denied, and Tacitus gives you the reason of it, in the Case of the Romans and the Brittains, Rarus (says he) ad propulsan­dum commune Periculum conventus: ita, dum singuli pugnant, universi vincuntur. There must be a common force to oppose a common danger; they struggled one by one, till they were all destroyed. The French (no doubt of it) are a wealthy, a populous and a Military Nation. But it must be allowed that they are more indebted for their Greatness, to the slips and oversights of others, (And this without disparagement too) then they are to their proper Conduct and Valour. The advance they made into Flanders in 1667. was introduced by the Spaniards trusting to their Assurances of Friendship, and rather imputable to an excess of Charity than any want of Precaution; though it seemed not very likely that they should march with Horse, Foot, and Cannon, only to go a birding. Through these and the like Arts they have rais'd them­selves to that dangerous height where now we behold them; taking all advantages of the unsetled condition of Spain; the divisions of the Empire, the Factions in Holland, and of all other mistakes in point of fore-sight and Resolution elsewhere. You know very well, the Conquests they have made upon the United Provinces, the Spanish Netherlands; a considerable part of Germany with the Terror and De­vastation that accompanies them every where: The Progress of their Arms in Catalonia, Sicily, the West-Indies, &c. Now what may be the consequences of this over-growing Power, and how to prevent them, is the matter in Question.

AS it is without dispute, that the French aim at Universal Domini­on, (which is only a more plausible Cover for that Universal Slavery which must create it) so is it accompted as indubitable a Prin­ciple, that the Conquest of Flanders must be the Foundation of it. And according to this Maxim it is, that they take their Measures; for they have made themselves Masters of the Outworks already, in Va­lenciennes, Cambray and St. Omer; three places of very great strength and importance: And it is generally believ'd by the recalling of their Troops from the Rhine, and bending the flower of their Force that that way, that they will push for the rest this Campania. If they carry it, (as probably they will, without the speedy addition of some powerful Alliance) take notice I beseech you of that which Natural­ly follows. In the first place, the Charge and the Hazard of that War is over, which in Garrisons, and in the Field, has put his most Christian Majesty to expence of keeping near 100000 Men in Pay: (which will then be at liberty to fall in upon the Empire.) Beside, [Page 10]what has been expended in Management, as the French call it, which in honest English is down right Corruption. Secondly, This Acquisition will furnish the French King with men and monies, for an Army of fifty thousand Men, (and no better Souldiers in Europe.) Thirdly, what will become of the Duke of Brandenburg, if the French shall fall into Cleves, and Mark, with a matter of forty or fifty thousand Men more, and from thence into Pomeren, and Prussia? Fourthly, the whole Patrimony of the Empire, from the Rhine to the Frontiers of France, fall by an inevitable Consequence into the hands of the French; as they have already swallowed the three Bishopricks of Metz, Toul and Verdun. So that the Imperial Army will be forc'd o­ver the Rhine, and there probably kept in play, and upon the bare defensive, by the Princes of the French Interest; while in the mean time, the Princes of Westphalia will be reduc'd to an absolute necessity of ranging themselves under the French Protection and Changing their party. And what can then be expected from Holland, after what they have suffer'd already, and under their present despairs, but to content themselves with such Conditions as France will give them? For after the loss of Cleves and Flanders, their Case is wholly despe­rate, unless England should vigorously interpose to their Relief. And the State of the Empire is neither better nor worse than that of their Neighbours; for they must all submit their Necks to the same Yoak. When matters are brought to this Pass, they have before them, En­gland, Spain and Italy; the Cloud is gathered already, and it is whol­ly at their Choice where it shall break.

There are a great many people, I know, that promise themselves mighty things from the Event of another Campania, for want I fear of Consulting the Chart, and the almost insuperable difficulties that lie in the way; The means they propose, are either by carrying the War into France, by way of Revulsion, or by forcing the French upon a Capital Battel; The former Proposition seems first very im­practicable; and secondly, of little or no advantage, if it could be effected. It must be considered that beyond Mentz, Coblents and Treves, the Imperalists have no Magazine at all beside that betwixt Treves and France (a part of Luxenburg excepted) is absolutely in the Enemies Power. Now how should an Army subsist there, that must over and above, pass through a Country of about twenty Leagues, that is wholly laid wast, and in Ashes, and without any Cattle in it, or any other sort of Necessary provision?

Put the Case now that the Imperialists should break through all these difficulties, and carry an Army even into the Lorain it self, the Coun­try of Metzin, or Burgundy, (which would take them up the best [Page 11]part of a Summer too) all the strong holds are in the hands of the French, and the Country laid so desolate, that there's no living for an Army there. When 'tis come to this, they must resolve either upon a Battle or Siege. If the former; The French are at liberty whether they will fight, or no, and there's no compelling of them; for they are among their strong holds; and all's their own both be­hind them, and on each side, and the Country either burnt or de­serted. But carry it father yet, and suppose the French forc'd up­on the Risque of a Battle, First, The Imperialists are not sure to get the better of it. And Secondly, What if they should? Nay to the degree of an entire Victory? All that would be expected more for that year, would be only to take in some considerable Post, and make good the ground they had gotten for the next Campaign: For it would be a madness to pursue their Victory into the heart of an E­nemies Country, and leave so many strong Garrisons upon their Backs, which would undoubtedly cut off all their Convoys and starve them.

But this is still the supposing of a Thing not to be supposed; for the French in this Case, would stand upon the Defensive, and not to come to a Battle. Or in case they should, and be worsted; they have men enough in Garrison for Recruits, that would immediatly reinforce them.

Now on the other side, what if the Imperialists should chance to be routed? The Garrisons which the French hold in Lorain, Burgundy and Alsatia, would in such Case, totally destroy that broken Army, and cut out such work in Germany, as has not been known in the Empire for many Ages.

In this extremity, let us suppose that the Empire should yet bring another. Army into the Field; and try the issue of a Second Bat­tle, and miscarry: And that the disaffected Princes of the Empire, should declare themselves for the Enemy; all that part of Germany that lies within two or three days journy of the Rhine, would be ir­recoverably lost; a great part of it being so harrased already, that 'tis not able so much as to furnish an Army upon a March, much less for a Winter quarter.

Now to the Business of a Siege, the French have taught us, by Phi­lipsburg and Mastricht; that they want neither Skill to fortifie a place, nor Courage to defend it. So that without a great loss of Time and Men, it cannot be expected that the Imperialists should make them­selves Masters of any considerable place: And when they shall have carried it; what will a Town in Lorain, or Burgundy, signifie to the saving of the Spanish Netherlands, which if once lost, are hardly ever to be retriv'd?

Now taking this for granted; if England does not step in with all the speed and vigor imaginable, see what will be the end on't, First, That the French, being Masters of all the Posts, Passes and strong-holds in Lorain and Burgundy, may dodge and trifle the Imperialists at pleasure; and make them spend out the year without any Advan­tage to the Netherlands. The way would have been for the Imperialists to have prest with an Army of 50000 men directly into the body of France, and the Confederate Troops in the Low Countries, to have made another Inrode by the way of Picardy, or Bologne; but since the taking of Valenciennes, Cambray and St. Omer, there's no possibility of piercing France that way. So that a very small Army now upon the Spanish Netherlands, with the help of the French Garrisons, is sufficient to amuse and tire out the whole force of Spain, and Holland upon that Quarter.

Secondly, France being thus secur'd on that side will unquestionably fall in with all their Power upon the Empire; unless diverted by the Alarm they have now receiv'd from England. Now admitting this to be the Condition of France, let any man of sense judge, what good the Imperial Army can do to the Netherlands (upon which single point depends the Fortune of Christendom.) What if they should march up to the Borders of France with 50000 men? Will not the French en­counter them there with as many, or more? And with this odds too, that the Imperialists suffer a thousand Incommodities in their March, through a ruin'd Country; whereas the French have good Quarters, and plenty of all things at hand, watching the Others motions and emproving all Advantages against them.

Thirdly, In this posture of Affairs, the Confederates must never expect to do any great Matter upon the French, in these Provinces, unless they do very much out-number them.

And it is likewise to be considered, that these troubles falling out in the Minority of his Catholique Majesty, the distractions of that Go­vernment, the Revolt of Sicily, and great disorders upon the Fron­tiers of Spain; the Netherlands have been much neglected, till the E­levation of his Highness Don Joan of Austria to the dignity of Prime Minister. And that it is not possible for him, by reason of the many Exigencies of that Crown nearer home, to send any Considerable suc­cour to the Low Countries, otherwise than by supplies of Mony: So that by that time the Imperialists, and the Hollanders are got into their Winter-Quarters, or at least, before they take the Field again, the French from time to time will be ready with Fresh Troops out of their Garrisons to prosecute their Conquests; which by degrees must needs break the hearts of the Poor Inhabitants, when they find that [Page 13]neither their Faith, nor their Courage, is able any longer to protect them. And when that day comes; what by their Armies, and what by other Influences, the French will have as good as Subjected two thirds of Europe. And there will also occur these farther difficulties. First, no body knows where the French will begin their Attaque; which will oblige the Spaniard and Hollander to strengthen all their Garrisons as far as their Men will reach. Secondly, when the Spanish and Holland Troops shall be so dispers'd, wheresoever the French sit down, they must then give themselves for lost, for want of an Army to relieve them; beside their furious and obstinate manner of Assault, for they care not how many men they lose, so they carry the place. (And then most of the Men too are made Prisoners of War.) Nor is the season of the year any discouragement to them neither; witness their first Irruption into Burgundy, and the restless Activity of their Troops even at this Instant.

So soon as their Work in Flanders is over, (which only England, under Heaven, is able to Prevent or Check) the French will have an Army of at least 50000 Men about Lorain, Luxemburg, and Burgundy to face the Imperialists, and at the same time with as many more perhaps they will seize upon the Dutchy of Juliers, and of Cleves, and from thence pass the Rhine, to countenance those that are of the French Caball, on the side of Westphalia; and so in due time, several other Princes of the Empire. It is remarkable that in three years War against the Confederates, his most Christian Majesty has not only stood his ground, without losing so much as one Inch of his Ancient Patri­mony, but actually and almost without opposition, taken several Towns, and some entire Provinces, from the Principals of the Con­federacy; And made himself almost as Considerable at Sea, as he is at Land; Not only in the Mediterranean, and upon the Coasts of Spain and Italy, but in America too: where he has laid a Foundation of great mischief both to England and Holland, in the point of Com­merce; if not timely prevented. And he does little less by his mony than by his Arms; for he pays all, and with French mony, under pretext of Neutrality, maintains considerable Armies in the very heart of the Empire; which, 'tis feared, will be ready enough upon any disaster, to joyn with the Common Enemy. It is the French Court that manages the Counsels of Poland, and they govern the Swisse no less; who, by the Conquest of the Franche County are made little better than slaves. And yet by a fatal blindness that Republique still furnishes the French with the best of their Soldiers, and helps forward the destruction of Europe, never dreaming that they themselves are to be undone too at last.

But it is no great matter, you'l say, to impose upon the Swisse (which are a heavy and Phlegmatick people) but the French charms have bewitcht even Italy it self; though a Nation the most Clear-sighted, and suspicious of all others. For their Republiques lie as quiet, as if they were asleep; though the Fire is already kindled in Sicily, and the danger brought home to their own doors. It is a wonder, that they lay things no more to heart, considering, first, the Passages that the French have to favour their Entry. Secondly, that they are many, and small States; weak, and easily to be corrupted, if not so already. Thirdly, That though they have been formerly very brave, and many Particulars remain so still, yet in the generality they are soft and Effeminate. And Fourthly, That the French is there the Master of the Seas. These Reflections methinks might convince any man of the condition they are in. And certainly they that were not able to defend themselves against Charles the Eighth, will be much less able to encounter Lewis the 14th: Or if he gets in, to drive him out again, as they did the Other. For they must do it wholly upon their own Strength, having only the Turk in condition to help them. For Germany and Spain are sunk already; And the Swisse will neither dare to venture upon't, nor are they able to do it if they had a mind to't.

As for Spain, it is neither Populous, nor fortifi'd, and perhaps want of Provisions may keep it from an Invasion. And yet for all that, with a Body of Thirty or Forty thousand Men by the way of Fontaraby, and as many by Catalonia, the French may (if they please) in two Campania's make themselves Masters of Navarre, Arragon, Catalonia, and Valen­tia: and then it is but sortifying the Frontiers, and making his Catho­lique Majesty a Tributary in Castile; Who must content himself to take what they please to give him, over and above, in consideration of his Dominions in Italy, and the Spanish Indies: A Possibility that England and Holland shall do well to think of: For when he has the Mines in his Power, and Europe under his Feet, there will be no contending.

After this, they have only the Swisse or the English, to fall upon next: For the Former, they are neither fortify'd nor united in Affections or Religion.

As for England; They are a People not naturally addicted to the French; Sensible of their Honour, and of their Interest; and the whole World is convinced of their Courage. They are United under the Government of a Gracious Prince; and their Concerns are at this Instant lodged in the hands of the Most Loyal and Publique-spirited Representatives that ever acted in that Station; beside the strength of the Island by Situation: So that the French would find it a hard mat­ter, [Page 15]either to make a Conquest here, or, if they should surprize it, to keep it. But yet they have finer ways to Victory than by force of Arms; and their Gold has done them better service than their Iron.

What have we now to do then, but in a Common Cause, to arm against a Common Oppression? This is the time, or never, for Italy to enter into a League for their Common Safety, and not only to keep, but, if possible, to force the French from their Borders; while the Imperial Army holds the Capital Power of France in Play?

And this is the time too, for the Swisse to recall all their Troops out of the French Service, and to Strike a general League also for the Reco­very of Burgundy, the only Outwork of their Liberties, and to expel the French Garrisons, and deliver the places into the hands of the Right Owners.

And will it not concern Poland as much as any of the rest; that stands falls with the Empire, as the Defence of Christendom against the Turks, and whose own Turn is next?

This Alarm methinks should call off the Princes from the Acquisitions they have made upon part of the Swedes Possessions in the Empire, to the Assistance of the Spanish Netherlands; and make all the French Merce­naries in the Empire to bethink themselves of returning from the delu­sions which either the French Artifice or Mony has imposed upon them. He that has no regard for the Head, will have less for the Dependences, when he has them at his Mercy.

Nay the very French themselves should do well to contemplate the slavery that is now prepar'd for them. Their Laws and Liberties are trampled upon; and till the French Government be reduc'd to the Bounds of its Ancient Constitution, neither the People, nor their Neighbours, can ever be secure.

In this dangerous Crisis of Affairs, it has pleas'd Divine Providence to leave England the Arbitress of the Fate of Europe; and to annex such advantages to the Office, that the Honour, the Duty, and Security of this Nation seem to be wrapt up together. In the Point of Honour, what can be more Generous, than to succour the Miserable and the Oppress'd, and to put a stop to that Torrent that threatens Christendom with an Universal Deluge? Beside the Vindication of our selves for those Affronts and Indignities, both Publique and Private, that we have suffer'd upon our own Accompt. And then in matter of Duty; It is not only Christendom, but Christianity it self, that lies at stake. For, in the Ruine of the Empire, the Turks work is done to his hand, by breaking down the only Fence that has preserv'd us all this while from the In­cursions of the Ottoman Power. Now as nothing can be more Glorious, [Page 16]then at all hazards, to hinder the Effusion of more Christian bloud, and to save Christendom it self from Bondage; It is so much our Interest too, that we our selves are Lost without it. And as the Obligation is Reci­procal, so the Resolution is necessary: The choice we have before us be­ing only This, Either to unite with our Neighbors for a Common safety, or to stand still and look on, the tame Spectators of their Ruine, till we fall alone. This is so Demonstrative, that if we do not by a powerful Allyance, and Di­version, prevent the Conquest of Flanders (which lyes already a gasping) we are cut off from all Communication with the rest of Europe; and coop'd up at home, to the Irrecoverable loss of our Reputation and Com­merce; for Holland must inevitably follow the Fate of Flanders, and then the French are Masters of the Sea; Ravage our Plantations, and infal­libly possess themselves of the Spanish Indies, and leave Us answerable for all those Calamities that shall ensue upon it: which as yet, by God's Providence, may be timely prevented. But he that stills the raging of the Sea, will undoubtedly set Bounds to this overflowing Greatness; having now, (as an Earnest of that Mercy) put it into the hearts of our Superi­ours to provide seasonably for the Common safety, and in proportion also to the Exigence of the Affair; knowing very well, that things of this Nature are not to be done by halves.

We have to do with a Nation of a large Territory; abounding in Men, and Mony; their Dominion is grown so Absolute, that no man there can call any thing his own, if the Court says Nay to't. So that the Sober and Industrious Part are only slaves to the Lusts, and Ambition of the Military. In this Condition of Servitude, they feel already what their Neighbours fear, and wish as well to any Opportunity, either of avoiding, or of Casting off the Yoak: which will easily be given by a Conjunction of England and Hol­land at Sea: and almost infallibly produce these Effects. First; It will draw off the Naval Force of France from Sicily, America, and elsewhere, to attend this Expedition. Second­ly, The Diversion will be an ease to the Empire, and the Confederates, from whence more Troops must be drawn to encounter this Difficulty, than the French can well spare. Thirdly, It will not only encourage those Princes, and States that are already engag'd, but likewise keep in Awe those that are disaffected, and confirm those that waver.

'Tis true, this War must needs be prodigiously expensive; but then in probability it will be Short; And in Cases of this Quality, people must do as in a Storm at Sea, rather throw part of the Lading over-board, than Founder the Vessel. I do not speak This, as suppos­ing any Difficulty in the Case, for the very contemplation of it has put fire into the veins of every true Englishman; and they are moved, as by a sacred impulse, to the Ne­cessary, and the only means of their Preservation, And that which crowns our hopes, is, that these generous Inclinations are only ready to execute what the wisdom of their Superi­ours shall find reasonable to Command. I need not tell you how Jealous the People of England are of their Religion, and Liberties; to what degree they have contended, even for the shadow of these Interests; nor how much blood, and Treasure they have spent upon the Quarrel. Could any imposture work so much; and can any man imagine that they will be now less sensible, when they see before their eyes a manifest Plot upon their Religion, their Liberties invaded; their Traffique interrupted; the Honour, and the very Being of their Country at stake; their Wives and Children expos'd to Beggary and Scorn; and in Conclusion, The Priviledges of a Free-born Englishman Exchanged for the Vassalage of France?