THE prejudices and disaffecti­onsSect. 1. which have alienated so many from the Communion of the Church of England, owe themselves to no Original more; than to an Opinion taken up, that some Usages in our Church are Superstitious; An Opinion strongly concluded, but upon weak grounds, and by a Pro­cess very illogical. For when the [Page 2] Adversaries of our Order and Peace, have amply represented, how jea­lous God is of his Honour, how se­verely he hath threatned the breach­es of the second Commandment, and how sorely he hath punished the Idolatry of the Jews; in the ap­plication of these things to our Times, Superstition and Idolatry are frequently join'd, as equally forbid­den in that Commandment, and without more proof the Church of England is supposed guilty of Super­stition, and good people are exhor­ted to come out of her, upon pain of partaking of those Plagues which Idolaters have reason to fear.

From the times of Queen Eliza­beth down to our days, Superstition hath been laid to our Charge. M^r Hooker acknowledges and resents it.Ecclesiastic. Pol. Book 5. §. 4. So it is judged our Prayers, our Sacra­ments, our Fasts, our times and places of publick meeting together for the Worship [Page 3] and Service of God, our Marriages, our Burials, our Functions, Elections, and Ordinations Ecclesiastical, almost what­soever we do in the exercise of our Reli­gion, according to Laws for that purpose established, all things are some way or other thought faulty, all things stained with Superstition.

One of the Treatises that were sent abroad (as it were to give new light to a new World) 1660. under the name of M^r William Bradshaw, is about things Indifferent, where he thus speaks in the Marginal Notes.Notes on the fifth Chapt. of things Indiffe­rent. The Doctors of Oxford ask, what hurt can a wise Man see in a square Cap and a Surplice? Indeed there is no outward hurt or evil in it, but it must be considered, whether there be not any inward hurt therein; for if it can be proved, that by them the Souls of many are poisoned with superstitious conceits, then it is apparent that they have inward hurt in them. This is but a supposition, but it fol­lows [Page 4] dogmatically, The Ceremonies Ibid. Notes on Chap. 8. in Controversy have been and are, the spe­cial means and occasion of the Schism of many Hundred Brownists, of much Su­perstition in many Thousand Ignorant Protestants, and of Confirmation of many Infinites of wilful Papists in their Idola­try. He concludes the Treatise thus: The Ceremonies in Controversy are either excellent parts of our Religion (which he not yielding must believe the other part of the Disjunction) or no­torious parts of Superstition.

This is the dirt that was cast up­on the Church of England, in the be­ginning of King James his Reign, that he might be out of love with her. A reproach of which the Con­vocation of 1603. was so sensible (for though that Treatise came first out, a little after the Convocation, yet the suspicion was rife before) that they pass this Canon amongCanon 6. others: Whosoever shall hereafter af­firm, [Page 5] the Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England, by Law esta­blished, are wicked, Antichristian or Super­stitious, &c. Let him be Excommunica­ted, &c. This Canon did not re­strain the petulancy of Censorious men, for besides Mr. Bradshaws con­fidence; in the defence that D^r Bur­ges makes for Bishop Morton, it ap­pears,Burges An­swer Rejoin­ed Chap. 4. §. 1. that the N. C^sts of those times did thus argue. The Ceremonies of the Church of England have been and still are abused to Idolatry and Su­perstition by the Papists. And that we Id. ib. §. 4. cannot be thought sincerely to have repen­ted of that Idolatry and Superstition, ex­cept we cast away with detestation all the Instruments of it. Once more, they say, That a superstitious construction is Id. ib. [...] 79. made of our Cross, not only by the Pa­pists, but by our own Canons and Canoni­cal Imposers of it.

These Jealousies did but fly in the dark during King James his [Page 6] Reign, but soon after Charles the First came to the Throne, he recei­ved divers Complaints of this na­ture: The Parliament, Anno 1628.Rushworth Historical Collections, p. 526. complains of Idolatry and Supersti­tion as some of those heinous and cry­ing sins, which were the undoubted Cause of those evils that were fallen upon them. The Remonstrance which the Com­monsId. ib. p. 621. of the same Parliament made against the then Duke of Buckingham, expresses their fears concerning Inno­vation of Religion. A while after Mr. Rouse makes a Speech concerning Religion, wherein he desires it may be considered, what new paintings are laid on the old face of the Whore of Baby­lon. How the See of Rome does eat Ib. p. 645, 646. into our Religion, and fret into the banks and walls of it: for a remedy of which, he propounds the expedient of a Covenant, to hold fast God and Religion, to which Covenant he would have every man say Amen. This man does not [Page 7] (it is true) speak of Superstition, but he is understood to mean it, by ano­ther Orator of the same House (Mr. Pym) who complains that the Law Ib. p. 647. was violated in bringing in superstiti­ous Ceremonies. After whom, ano­ther in the same Session (Sir John Eliott) apprehends a fear of someIb. p. 649. Bishops then in place, that if they should be in their power, they might be in danger of having Reli­gion overthrown, because some of them were Masters of Ceremonies, and laboured to introduce new Ceremonies into the Church.

After those eager Debates, the motion for a Covenant slept for some years, but was renewed again in the Unhappy Times of the Fatal Parliament. In the times when it was a great part of the Impeach­ment against the Great Arch-Bishop of Canterbury, that he had traiterously Artic. of Impeach. 7. 10. endeavoured to alter and subvert Gods true Religion by law established in this [Page 8] Realm, and instead thereof to set up Po­pish superstition and Idolatry, and that he traiterously endeavoured to recon­cile the Church of England with the Church of Rome. In these times it was that Mr. Rouse's motion ripen'd up to a Solemn League and Covenant, wherein they obliged themselves to endeavour the Extirpation of Pope­ry, Prelacy, and Superstition. By which words the Covenanters (as some of them have since declar'd) believe themselves obliged against Conformity; for, this reason they give in a Book they call a Sober and Temperate Discourse concerning the Inter­est of words in Prayer, &c. in which the Title of one of their Chapters is: The Ministers Third Reason, viz.Chap. 10. why they do not meddle with the Common Prayer (as are the words of the Chapter) is, because they have sworn to endeavour a reformation in worship, and to endeavour to extirpate Superstition.

Nothing now can be more evi­dent, than that both of old, and in our times Superstition is objected to us. It does not come in my way to condemn, nor do I take upon me to justify the practises of all particu­lar persons; I concern my self only in the legal Establishments of our Church, and they would little need a vindication, if men would take the pains to enquire into the nature of Superstition; for they would soon find the Innocence of our Rites would defend themselves from this suspicion. But it is our Unhappiness that we have to deal with men who take things upon trust, who are not easily undeceived, because they will maintain a Conclusion, before they have examined the premises: ob­serving Superstition to be a word that signifies somewhat bad, they con­demn us without a Tryal, and be­fore they know what it means, [Page 10] conclude us guilty of Superstition.

I have waited some while in ex­pectation, that some abler Pen would engage in this Argument, but not finding that of late days, the Nature of Superstition has been parti­cularly and fully discovered or de­scribed, I have now undertaken the task, in which because I desire to be understood, I labour for no other ornament of stile than perspicuity: And without farther Preface I pro­ceed to enquire, what is this Super­stition with which the Church of Eng­land is so much upbraided.

There is no Precept in the Holy Scripture that forbids Superstition by that name, nor does any sacred Au­thor mention it, except St. Luke in two places to be considered in due time, when I examine how the word is used in other Authors; For by this Method, I conceive, I shall best accomplish my design, if

First, I enquire into the use of the Word. And secondly, into the na­ture of the thing signified by such a Word.

1. [...] (by which the GreeksSect. 2. express'd that which we now com­monly call Superstition) signifies most literally a service perform'd to God or to a Daemon, rather out of fear than love; An over-timerous and dreadful apprehension of the Deity, as the learned Smith, who also calls itSelect Dis­course of Su­perstit. p. 26. & 36. a compound of Fear and Flattery; such an apprehension of God in the thoughts of men, as renders him grievous and burden­some to them. But however this may be the primary sense of the word, yet that it hath been transfer'd to signifie more largely, is evident from Greek Authors. Plutarch in his Tract, [...], constantly discourses of it, as of an extream to Religion, to which he opposes A­theism as the other extream; Thus [Page 12] he begins, [...] Ignorance of God from the beginning hath run in Two Channels, one way to Atheism, and the other way to Superstition. And after he had in many like expressions, op­posed them to one another he con­cludes, [...] Some have run so far from Superstition, till they have over­shot themselves into Atheism, having neglected Religion which is the mean be­tween both.

Maximus Tyrius as plainly opposesDissertat. 4ta. the Religious, and Superstitious man. [...], &c. A Religious man is the Friend of God, A superstitious man is a Flatterer of God.

Antoninus gives this Character ofLib. 6. §. 30. himself, He was [...], Religious without Superstition.

The Incomparable D^r Hammond does (I know) pursue the Etymo­logy and Original Notion of [...], in the former part of his little Tract of Superstition; where he gives several Interpretations of [...], and afterwards gives these senses of the Compound word.

1. It is taken in general for Religion or Worshipping God.

2. For the worship of deify'd dead men, and Angels which the Heathens took to be True Gods.

3. For any part of Divine Worship which for fear of vengeance from God, any Worshipper perform'd to him.

4. For a trembling fear of Gods pu­nishment due for every sin.

5. For the use of Magical Spells. From whence he concludes the Modern use of the word improper; but whe­ther proper or improper, because it is use that gives the rule for our manner of speaking, therefore that [Page 14] must be considered: And that the word is used for somewhat undue in the worship of God, he himself ac­knowledges in these words. That which men see those of another perswasion do; which they like not, or think them not bound to, they call it straight their Super­stition.

And that thus Authors have made use of this word, will more appear by considering the Latin word, Su­perstitio. Concerning whose Etymo­logy all Criticks are not agreed. Tully discourses at large both of the name and thing, and he is the first among the Latin Authors now ex­tant, for so far as I can find, that so translates the Greek Word: for if Nigidius Figulus (of whom by and by out of A. Gellius) were before him, yet I suppose he hath no entire Vo­lume now extant. I therefore take some particular notice of what Tully says in this Matter. When he had [Page 15] given some natural Account of the Multitude of Gods that were so much talkt of in those Ages, and of the Superstitions that took rise from the Fables of the Poets concerning them, he proceeds to distinguish between Religion and Superstition, in memorable words. Cultus Deorum Cicero do Natura De­orum lib. 2. est Optimus idem (que) castissimus at (que) sanctis­simus, plenissimus (que) pietatis, ut eos sem­per purâ integrâ incorruptâ & mente & voce veneremur. Non enim philosophi so­lum, verum etiam Majores nostri Super­stitionem à Religione separaverunt. Nam qui totos dies precabantur & immo­labant, ut sui liberi sibi superstites essent, Superstitiosi sunt appellati, quod nomen patuit postealatius. Qui autem omnia quae ad Deorum cultum pertinerent, diligenter pertractarent & tanquam relegerent, sunt dicti Religiosi, &c. It a factum est in Superstitioso & Religioso, alterum vitii Nomen, alterum laudis. The best, and purest, and most holy worship that we [Page 16] can give to God, is to serve him with à pure and uncorrupt heart and voice. For it was not only peculiar to Philosophers, but our Forefathers also made a difference between Religion and Superstition, for they who prayed all day long and offer'd Sacrifice that their Children might survive them, were called Superstitious; A word which afterwards was extended to a larger signification: But Religious men had their name from their diligence and care in reviewing what pertained to Di­vine Worship. And hence it came to pass, that in the setled use of these words, Su­perstition was counted a Crime, Reli­gion a praise-worthy thing. According to which distinction he had said before: Superstitione facile est liberare, Id. ibid. lib. 1. cum sustuleris omnem vim Deorum: nisi forte Diagoram aut Theodorum qui omnino Deos esse negabant, censes Super­stitiosos esse potuisse. Horum enim sen­tentiae non modo Superstitionem tollunt in qua inest Timor inanis Deorum, sed [Page 17] etiam Religionem quae Deorum cultu pio continetur. It is an easy matter to se­cure men from Superstition, if you will make them Atheists; Unless you think such Atheists as Diagoras and Theo­dorus could be tainted with it, whose O­pinions did not only root out Superstition, which contains in it a vain and needless fear of God, but true Religion too, which consists in a right worship of the Deity.

The reasons which this learned Heathen assigns of the names and differences between Superstition and Religion, Lactantius likes not, andLactant. de verâ sapi­enti [...] Cap. 28. therefore when he had derived Reli­gion à Religando; of Superstition he speaks thus: Superstitiosi vocantur ii, qui super stitum memoriam defunctorum co­lunt, aut qui parentibus suis superstitibus colebant Imagines eorum domi tanquam Deos penates. Nam qui novos sibi ritus assumebant, ut in Deorum vicem mor­tuos honorarent quos ex hominibus in coelum receptos putabant, hos Superstitiosos [Page 18] vocabant; eos vero qui publicos & An­tiquos deos colerent, Religiosos nomina­bant, unde Virgilius,

They were counted Superstitious who did honour to the memory of the dead, or who while their Parents were alive, wor­shipped their Images as if they were Hous­hold Gods: for they who took up any new Rites, in giving honour to dead men, whom they thought to be taken up to Heaven among the Gods, were so called; whereas they were esteemed Religious, who con­fined themselves to the worship of those who were anciently reputed for Deities. Hence Virgil introduces Evander, ex­cusing himself to Aeneas, that the Ho­nour he did to Hercules did not deserve the name of Superstition.

There want not other Etymolo­giesSect. 3. of this word. Isidore is quoted [Page 19] for this, Superstitio quasi superstatuta M. Delrii Disqu is. Magic. lib. 1. Cap. 1. observatio. An unstatutable, unwarrant­able observation. Alii dicunt à senibus, quia multis annis superstites per aetatem delirant: then is introduced Lucre­tius, qui superstitionem dicit superstantium rerum, i. e. coelestium quae super nos stant, for which these Verses are quoted where he huffs at all Religion.

(So not only Delrio, but Turnebus al­soAdversar. lib. 10. Cap. 26. reads that Verse which others read thus,

according to Lucretius, all Religion, because it concerns it self in things above us, (with which that Atheist thought we had nothing to do) de­serves [Page 20] the name of Superstition.

Whatever the first Reason of this appellation might be, thus much is certain, that in ordinary use, it sig­nified somewhat undue in Divine Worship; and of this Tully was a­ware, when he made the acknow­ledgment, of which Lactantius for­got to take notice. Quod Nomen pa­tuit postea latius. Also Nigidius Fi­gulus in his Comment upon the old Verse,

takes Religiosus in an ill sense as allA. Gellii Noct. At­tic. lib 4. Cap. 9. one with Superstition. Religiosus is ap­pellabatur qui nimiâ & superstitiosâ Reli­gione sese alligaverat, ea (que) res vitio as­signabatur. He who was superstitious in his Religion (which was counted a Crime) was called a Religious man.

Seneca expresses the Import of thisSenec. E­pist. 123. [Page 21] word well, according to the Greek: Superstitio error insanus est, amandos ti­met, quos colit violat, quid enim interest utrum Deos neges an infames? Supersti­tion is a wild kind of error, it is afraid of him who ought to be loved, and dis­honours him whom it worships, for what difference is there whether you deny God or blaspheme him? In a former Epistle he discourses thus. Audiat quemadmo­dum Id. Epist. 95. se gerere in sacrificiis debeat, quam procul resilire à molestis superstitioni­bus. Nunquam satis profectum erit, nisi qualem debet Deum mente conceperit. He who desires to understand himself and his Religion, let him retire as far as he can from troublesome superstitions. No man will proceed well in Religion, who hath not right Conceptions of God.

In a like sense do other Latin Au­thors use the word, when they up­braid Christian Religion under that name, as apprehending it a false Re­ligion. So Tacitus when he speaks of [Page 22] Nero's laying the blame of the burn­ing of Rome upon the Christians, callsHistor. Au­gust. lib. 15. their way Exitiabilis Superstitio, A pe­stilent Superstition. Suetonius also in the life of the same Nero, calls theVit Neron. Cap. 16. Christians, Genus hominum superstitionis novae & maleficae. A sort of men of a new and mischievous Superstition. And Pliny to Trajan, gives Christian Reli­gion the same name though with somewhat a softer Epithet. Supersti­tio prava & immodica, An Immoderate Superstition.

This is then the Account I gather out of Heathen Authors, mostly hitherto: the sense they had of a Deity perswaded them not only that he ought to be worshipped, but also that every kind of service would not be acceptable to him. The right worship of God (that which they so apprehended) they called Religion, that which was undue, and therefore unacceptable, passed un­der [Page 23] the name of Superstition. Even as Festus did apply the name to the Religion of the Jews, as esteemingActs 25. Acts 17. it not the best way of worship. And St. Paul more truly, did so reprove the Idolatry of Athens.

When the World was better in­structed in the Notion of a Deity, and in the manner of worship that was due to him, we find the word still in use among Christian Authors. Lactantius hath been offered already. St. Austin comprehends Idolatry and many other particular Customs un­der this Term. Superstitiosum est, De Doctri­nâ Christi­anâ lib. 2. Cap. 20. quicquid institutum est ab hominibus ad facienda & colenda Idola, pertinens vel ad colendam, sicut Deum, creaturam par­témve ullam Creaturae, vel ad consulta­tiones & pacta quaedam significationum cum Daemonibus placita at (que) foederata, qualia sunt molimina Magicarum artium, &c. Ex quo genere sunt Haruspicum & Augurum libri, etiam omnes ligaturae [Page 24] at (que) remedia quae medicorum disciplina con­demnat, sive in praecantationibus sive in quibusdam notis quas characteres vocant. Idolatry and consulting with the Devil, or any kind of Witchcraft: The practices of Soothsayers, that would pretend to foretel future E­vents by the flying of Birds or En­trails of Beasts: Those Charms that are designed for the Cure of Disea­ses, of which no natural or physical account can be given: These and divers like Observations he taxes with Superstition.

And some of those (or others like them) which St. Austin there menti­ons, obtain still in the World: viz. If Rats do any mischief, to be afraid of that as an ill Omen of some death or disaster in the Family: And ma­ny other as unaccountable. If it rain or snow such a day, or be fair such a day (as Candlemas, and Swithin, and others) then the future part of [Page 25] the year will be so or so. These Observations have upon this ac­count been esteemed Superstitious, because they are taken to be an indication of the pleasure of God as to future Events, whereas we have no assurance that they are a sufficient indication. And it may deserve enquiry, whether the Cu­stom of praying God to bless per­sons when they sneeze, were not originally superstitious. I determine not in this case, because sneezing hath been sometimes reckoned a Disease, and then praying for such an one, is of the same import, with praying for any one in danger: but I make the doubt, because sneezing hath been sometimes reckoned an Omen of good or bad luck, and St. Austin mentions this in the same place where he speaks of Millia ina­nissimarum Id. ibid. observationum, when a man does redire ad lectum si dum se calceat ster­nutaverit. [Page 26] If a man chance to sneeze while he is putting on his shooes he must to bed again. These and a Thousand such observances as these, are deem­ed to have a relation to God, when it cannot be proved, and are therefore judg'd superstitious, so far as there is any Religion placed in them.

I proceed no further in examin­ing the use of the word, than to give Three Definitions of it, from Three men of several Ages, and several ways and Opinions, but such as do all amount to one and the same pur­pose.

Aquinas gives it thus: Superstitio Secunda secundae qu. 92. Art. 1, & 2. est vitium Religioni oppositum secundum excessum, quo quis divinum exhibet cul­tum vel cui non debet, vel non eo modo quo debet. And in the next Article con­cludes. Multae sunt superstitionis species, ut Indebitus veri Dei cultus, Idololatria, Divinationes & varia observationum ge­nera.

Zanchy to the same purpose. Ma­nifestum Tom. 4. lib. 1. Cap. 17. est superstitionem esse Religioni oppositam & per excessum. He adds, Unde etiam fit ut omnis falsus cultus su­perstitio appelletur.

Ames also says thus. Superstitio est Medul. Theolog. lib. 2. Cap. 13. quâ Deo cultus indebitus exhibetur, and again, Superstitio dicitur excessus Reli­gionis. The sum of all which is, as Atheism is a defect of Religion, so is Superstition an extream on the other hand, an Excessive Religiousness, when men go beyond their bounds in Di­vine Worship; so that all false wor­ship goes under the name of Super­stition. A man may be righteous over-much, and over-much wise, so may he also be, not too holy or too good, yet too religious, when he exceeds, and practises in matters of Religion upon Opinions false and unworthy of God.

This hath been the use of the word in approved Authors of divers [Page 28] Ages. It hath sometimes been de­termined to particular practices, as Magick and Enchantments; but upon a general reason, because these are undue mixtures in Religion, for so both in Heathen and Christian Authors this difference is commonly assigned between them. Religio est Ubi prius. veri Cultus, superstitio falsi, as Lactan­tius hath it. When we worship God aright that is Religion, when by any undue additions we corrupt Religion, in all those things we are superstitious.

2. The Enquiry into the NatureSect. 4. of the thing still remains. Whereby does it appear, whether the worship we here, or others elsewhere perform to God be regular and Religious, or excessive & undue, and so superstitious? The Resolution I give to this que­stion, I form into these Propositions.

1. Superstition is first in the Opinion, and thence influences upon the practice.

2. The Doctrines upon which the Con­formity [Page 29] of the Church of England is established, are not superstitious Opinions.

3. The Opinions that are indeed super­stitious (such as are divers that obtain in the Papacy and elsewhere) are rejected by the Church of England.

4. There are superstitious Omissions, of which men may be guilty, and that then, when they seem to have a great Zeal against Superstition.

1. Superstition is first in the Opinion before it can have any influence upon the practice. Practices are unlawful, when they transgress the Commands by which they are obliged, but super­stitiously unlawful they cannot be, unless they proceed from such Opi­nions: Hence it comes to pass, that the same practices are sometimes supersti­tious and sometimes not, according as mens Opinions are, by which they are perswaded to them. So is the dif­ference between the Ch. of England, and of Rome, in the use of the Cross, in [Page 30] kneeling in the act of receiving, &c. as will afterwards appear. I am not alone in thus stating the Notion of Superstition. A superstitious act is that Bishop Dur­ham (Mor­ton) Sermon on 1 Cor. 11. 16. which is founded upon a superstitious Opi­nion. It was not meerly the Pharisees often washing, but their Opinion of some especial purgation thereby, which Christ reprehen­ded in them. Nor was it the having an Altar for which St. Paul reproved the Athenians, when he called them super­stitious, but the opinion of honouring a God thereby they knew not whom.

To a like purpose, M^r Hooker, Superstition is when things are abhorred Eccles. Po­lity. Book 5. §. 3. or observed, with a zealous or fearful, but erroneous relation to God. And in words just before. Superstition is al­ways join'd with a wrong opinion touching things divine.

Conformably to both these, says a late learned Author, All Supersti­tious, Falkener Libert. Ec­clesiast. B. 1. Chap. 5. Sect. 2. §. 7. or other sinful honour of the Ele­ments, must be founded in embracing [Page 31] those false apprehensions and corrupt Do­ctrines which our Church rejects.

[...] refers to the inward sense and apprehension of our minds: or if it must be distinguished be­tween the thoughts of the mind, and the passions of the Soul; it is evi­dent, that fear arises from such opi­nions and apprehensions as admini­ster to it. Yea though superstition be (as hath been said) an excess of Re­ligion, and though this excess may discover it self in the practices of men, yet the reason and that which occasions this excess, is in the Opi­nion.

False Notions and apprehensions of God, tempt men to try by undue ways to please him. Men have a conceit, that such services are more grateful to him than they are: Or, there is a superstitious observation of some Accidents, as Prognosticks of Events, because of an Opinion ta­ken [Page 32] up, that God Almighty does by such signs declare his pleasure or dis­pleasure.

In all these Cases, the First Seat of Superstition is in the Opinion, and from thence it is derived into pra­ctice; for did these false Opinions which thus mislead men, cease by a better information of the under­standing, the practices and obser­vances that depend on them would also cease; or if they were continu­ed, they would be hypocritical, or vain, or any thing rather than super­stitious. For Example: It is supersti­tious (say we) to worship an Image, or to pray a Soul out of Purgatory, &c. because they are false and superstitious Opinions that induce men so to do. If it may be supposed that men who opine right, who do not in their judgment yield more to an Image than they ought, and who do not in truth believe Purgatory; may [Page 33] yet perform the same Ceremonies, and make the same prayers; I ask then, for what reason are these things done? If not for this reason, because men are of opinion that the Image deserves it, that the dead may be profited by their Devoti­ons; then is it a vain and ridiculous piece of Pageantry. Or if some po­litick reason, and secular Interest tempt men these ways; what they do may be excused from Superstition, because it is not intended for the ho­nour of God, and so is not perform­ed as a part of his Worship, but it is otherwise faulty, because by preten­ces of Religion they advance their Interest, and gain becomes their Godliness. If in truth there be any Religious intendments in these per­formances, then this is that which plainly renders them superstitious, be­cause they Originally proceed from superstitious Opinions.

This I have first said, because up­on this depends the Vindication I design of the Usages of the Church of England. For, if what is done in Di­vine Worship, be not otherwise su­perstitious, but as it proceeds from and is directed by superstitious Opini­ons; then if it can be evinc'd, that we are not guided by any such Opi­nions, it will follow that our Rites and Ceremonies are void of supersti­tion. And this I trust to make ap­pear in what next follows.

2. The Doctrines upon which the Sect. 5. Conformity of the Church of England is established, are not superstitious Opinions. Of which matter I give this Ac­count, which I shall take to be suffi­cient, till by an Enumeration of some other particulars, of which I am not aware, it be made appear, that there are some other Doctrines that may be suspected of superstition, which the Church of England in justifi­cation [Page 35] of her Conformity is obliged to maintain.

1. All Circumstances relating to the Worship and service of God, are not par­ticularly determined in the word of God.

2. Therefore, notwithstanding the De­terminations of the Holy Scripture, some things do remain Indifferent in their own Natures.

3. The Governours of the Church have power to make Determinations in things Indifferent.

4. Therefore people are bound to obey their Governours in such their Determina­tions.

5. It is not unlawful for Church-Go­vernours to appoint some significant Cere­monies. These are the foundations upon which we stand; upon which our Governours require, and upon which we practise Conformity, and none of these are superstitious Opini­ons. Wherefore in the application of these Generals to our Times and [Page 36] state of things, we conclude, the Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England not being for their num­ber burdensome (of which in due time) are not in their nature and kind superstitious.

1. He who judges all Circumstances relating to the publick worship of God not particularly determined in the word of God, is not superstitious in that Opinion. For this is so plainly and manifestly true, that it is a shame for any man to de­ny it. There hath been (I know) an Axiome among Cartwrights Disci­ples, That nothing ought to be establish­ed in the Church, which is not comman­ded in the word of God. This they thought plainly warranted by the manifest words of the law, about ad­ding to or diminishing from the word of God. Now (adds M^r Hooker) these Eccles. [...] Book 3. §. 5. men having an eye to a number of Rites and Orders in the Church of England, such as the Ring in Marriage, the Cross, &c. [Page 37] thought by the one only stroke of that Axiome to have cut them off. And T. C. is quoted as arguing thus. You which Ib. §. 2. distinguish and say, that Matters of Faith and necessary to salvation, may not be to­lerated in the Church, unless they be ex­presly contained in the word of God, or manifestly gathered; But the Ceremonies, Order, Discipline, Government in the Church, may not be received against the word of God, and consequently may be re­ceived, if there be no word against them, although there be none for them: You I say distinguishing in this sort prove an evil divider.

To all which there needs no other Answer than what M^r Hooker gives. Let that which they do hereby intend, be granted them; let it once stand as consonant to reason, that because we are forbid to add to the Law of God any thing, or to take ought from it, therefore we may not for matters of the Church make any law more than is already set down in Scri­pture; Ib. §. 6. [Page 38] who sees not what sentence it shall enforce us to give against all Churches in the World, in as much as there is not one, but hath had many things established in it, which though the Scripture did never com­mand, yet for us to condemn were rashness. He goes on to give the Example of the Church of God in the time of our Saviour instead of all others.

If this ratiocination be weak, they who suspect it have great reason to shew us out of Scripture an exact form of Church-Government; but instead of doing so, they only argue that so it must be, without directing us to the place where it is. To which I again oppose M^r Hookers words. As for those marvellous discour­ses, Ibid. ad fi­nem. whereby they adventure to argue, that God must needs have done the things which they imagine were to be done: I must con­fess I have often wondred at their boldness herein. When the question is, whether God hath delivered us in Scripture (as [Page 39] they affirm he hath) a compleat, particu­lar, immutable form of Church-Polity, why take they that other both presumptuous and superfluous labour, to prove he should have done it: There being no way in this case to prove the deed of God, save only by producing that Evidence wherewith he hath done it? But if there be no such thing apparent upon record, they do as if one should demand a Legacy by force of some written Testament, wherein there be­ing no such thing specified, he pleads that there it must be, and brings Arguments from the love of the Testator, imagining that these proofs will convict a Testament to have that in it, which other men can no where by reading find.

It will appear in the process of our arguing, that the very men who would insinuate to the disparage­ment of our Rites, that Divine Wor­ship must have a Divine Warrant, for Circumstances as well as for sub­stance, have not themselves been [Page 40] guided by this Opinion, but have ta­ken a liberty in their Directorian or Dictatorian way, which they have denied to others: And because I shall by and by bring them as wit­nesses for us and against themselves, I respit yet a little their farther Con­viction in this matter.

2. Notwithstanding the Determinati­ons Sect. 6. of the Holy Scripture, there do still re­main some things in their own nature Indif­ferent; and in this Opinion there is no Superstition. It might reasonably be thought, that this Proposition is so evident, that no man who pre­tends to learning will deny it. But so it is, that the power of Church-Governours may be reduc'd in a manner to nothing, some there have been, who will not own any thing Indifferent in these matters. I meet with two who have maintain'd this Assertion, and I presume they are the same whom Bishop Saunderson [Page 41] means, when he speaks of some ofSaunderson de Obliga. Conscient. praelec. 6. §. 23. this Opinion. Duo praesertim, alter ali­cujus nominis apud suarum partium homi­nes Theologus, alter è proceribus Regni laicus. Those Two, I conceive, must be M^r Bradshaw and the Lord Brooke.

I shall not do M^r Bradshaw right, if I do not acknowledge, that D^r Burges An­swer Re­join'd. Ch. 2. §. 9. Burges tells us, he revers'd his Opinion of things Indifferent. Surely he had great reason to do it. That he was once of the Opinion which I fasten on him, must not be denied. One of his Treatises Reprinted 1660. is Of the Nature and use of things Indifferent. Where he states the Case thus: A Chap. 2. thing Indifferent is a mean between good and evil, so that whatsoever is Indifferent is neither good nor evil, whatsoever is ei­ther good or evil is not indifferent. After this he avers, that no Action of Religi­on, Chap. 8. whether it be Moral or Ceremonial, is Indifferent, but either good or evil; and [Page 42] again, No Ceremony of Religion is In­different. Ibid.

A gross and palpable mistake and unworthy of a man so cryed up for his learning, the more pardonable indeed because he acknowledged his Error: but because they who Reprinted him, were not so just to his Memory as to insert that ac­knowledgment, and because they for whose sake he was reprinted, have not, it may be, that respect for D^r Burges as to read him, I must animadvert on it as I find it, and answer, That no considering man can think, that when we use an In­different Rite, we mean that we do neither good nor evil. No sure, that which is Indifferent in its Nature, may be in its use Necessary. We use it as being by sufficient Authority com­manded thereto, and therefore up­on such reasons as justifie us that we do well; if we are mistaken in our [Page 43] Judgment, and have no sufficient reason for what we do, it is ill done.

But this plainly we mean by a thing in its Nature Indifferent, some­what which is not in specie comman­ded of God, and so is not absolute­ly necessary, nor is it so forbid, therefore not simply Unlawful. This M^r Bradshaw might have known to have been our Notion of a thing In­different, for so M^r Hooker (at whom he sometimes nibbles) had told him. The nature of things Indifferent is, nei­ther to be commanded nor forbidden, but left free and Arbitrary. He instances quickly after. When many meats are set Eccles. Po­lity, Book 2. §. 4. before me, all are Indifferent, none Un­lawful, I take one as most convenient. If scripture require me so to do, then is not the thing Indifferent, because I must do what scripture requires. They are all In­different, I might take any; scripture does not require me to make any special [Page 44] choice of one, I do notwithstanding make choice of one, my discretion teaching me so to do. Now though eating of this dish rather than another, cannot be said, after my choice is made, to be neither good nor evil, (for I chuse discreetly or indiscreetly) yet before my choice determin'd me to one, they were both Indifferent (so in their nature they still remain) neither commanded, neither forbidden, nei­ther necessary, neither unlawful in its own Nature.

So in the Circumstances of Reli­gion, after my choice is determined by the Command of my Superiors, these things are not so Indifferent as that I do neither well nor ill in my obedience. Before they had deter­mined they found these things Indif­ferent in their Nature, their discre­tion having guided them to make choice of such a Vesture, &c. as they apprehended convenient, now that [Page 45] becomes necessary as to use, which at the same time remains Indifferent in its Nature.

The Lord Brooke by a little Me­taphysicalnessSect. 7. Disc. open­ing the Na­ture of Epis­cop. Ch. 5. goes farther, and from this principle, Optimum est sem­per eligendum, endeavours to prove this Conclusion. That there is nothing Indifferent in Re & in se, but to our Understandings some things seem so, for want of good light, but in the things them­selves every thing, pro hic & nunc, is either Necessary or Unlawful. It may seem harsh to say that a man is not always obliged to do that which is best. Where there is an apparent dif­ference and inequality in the matter of our actions, how far a man may satisfie himself to do that which is good, though he do not always that which is best, I digress not to exa­mine. The Assertion may be foun­ded upon another reason and state of things, and upon that I build and [Page 46] say, There is a Truth in this Propo­sition, A man is not always obliged to do that which is best; the reason is, be­cause in some Cases there is no Best, but the severals that fall under deli­beration are alike, no more Intrin­sick Good or Evil in one than another, but any of them if it were alone, were sufficiently eligible and satisfactory. Now if in every action of a mans life he must not proceed, till he can find a difference where none is to be found; If a man must no where act, till he see clearly what is best to be done, this must needs fill the minds of men with In­finite scruples and perpetual anxie­ties: And after a man is satisfied that this is good and lawful and fit to be done, yet must he demur and take heed he do it not, lest perad­venture somewhat else were better to be done in the room of it. I give Instances whereby it will appear [Page 47] we are not left to endless doubts in all Cases.

I am at Table and have many Dishes of meat before me which please me well, I care not to eat of all, but make my choice as it may happen, I cannot say it is Best to eat of this or that, either that which is commended to me, or that which is next me, or some like accident determines my choice, and if I had eaten somewhat else it would have been equally to my satisfaction. O­therwise, should I sit still and dis­pute with my self thus? I must do that which is Best, therefore I must consider of every Dish by it self, and diligently observe all the differences between them, and if I cannot clear­ly discern which is best of all, I must sit still till I can: so I might lose my Dinner, and when I rise, should find my mind as unsatisfied as my belly. Or, I am travelling and take [Page 48] up in a Town where I never was before; I see divers fair Inns before me, know none; nor have I any manner of reason to prefer one to another. I go to one as it happens, not out of this principle that I must do that which is best, for they are all alike, all Indifferent, and if I chuse not till I certainly know which is best for me, I may lie in the streets all Night. Once more, I go to Lon­don to buy somewhat that I want, without any other Interest or Ac­quaintance than my money. Many Shops sell the same Commodities, I can give no reason (but this only, that I must buy somewhere) why I call at the sign of the Sun, or the Moon, the Lyon, or the Bear. They are all alike, only some accident (without full perswasion that I do that which is best) determines me. And an Hundred such like Cases happen in the Course of Affairs.

Now in all these, what shall we say to Bradshaw? Cannot these things be Indifferent, unless what I do be neither good nor bad? No sure. Till I have made my choice, it is Indifferent, because I am under no Command in these Cases, but am left perfectly to the conduct of my own discretion. And what shall we answer to Brooke? Must I not stir till I know which is Best? There is no Best nor Worst. If I discern any in­convenience on one side more than on the other, then is there a diffe­rence, and I am unadvised if I do not consider it: but where I discern no difference, and yet scruple till I be satisfied which is Best, I shall scruple till Doomesday if I should live so long, because I have nothing to determine me but my own choice. It remains then, that there are things Indifferent in their own Nature. Where there is no Antece­dent [Page 50] Command to make such an Action necessary, nor Antecedent prohibition to make it unlawful, it is Indifferent in it self, not between good and evil, but between com­manded and forbidden, between absolutely necessary and simply un­lawful.

I have laid my Foundation thus low in a Consideration of the Na­ture of things, because the Object­ors I deal with goe thus far. It is not necessary to our Cause to affirm, that the Ceremonies of Religion in Controversy (the Surplice and Cross, &c.) are altogether so Indifferent, as that there should be no more reason to determine rather to one, than there is to take one Inn or Shop ra­ther than another. These Instances were produc'd to show where the Rule fails, Optimum est semper faci­endum, and to prove that there are things Indifferent in their own nature. [Page 51] To which I add, that some Rites and Ceremonies of our Religion are so too, as I prove by this Irrefraga­ble Argument. Whatsoever is in specie, neither commanded nor for­bidden (i. e. antecedently to hu­mane laws) is a thing Indifferent in its own nature. But the Surplice and the Cross, and Kneeling, &c. are in specie neither Commanded nor for­bidden. Ergo they are Indifferent.

They who deny the Major fight with their own shadows, and gain­say out of a spirit of opposition; for we persist in this (and they know it) that we mean nothing else by a thing Indifferent in its own nature, but somewhat left undetermin'd in the Holy Scripture. They who deny the Minor, must prove these things in the use of them forbid in Scri­pture; which if they shall endeavour to do, I doubt not but to pronounce them superstitious, and shall in the [Page 52] Conclusion prove it. In the mean time, because Negatives are hard to be proved, it concerns them to con­fute us by producing the Texts which forbid them: which Texts if they be no other than the second Commandment, or that in Coloss. 2. a­bout will-worship, or Matthew 15. Teaching for Doctrines the Commandments of men, or some such like these, then I demand farther, In as much as the Surplice, &c. are not named in any of these places, by what good Con­sequence, by what Demonstrative Syllogism shall it be proved from such a Text that it is not lawful to wear a Surplice? Here now will be the failure, they quote Texts from whence they declaim, but they do not argue closely and cogently. We know we do not add to the word of God (whether they do not Ipsi viderint, and I shall anon endeavour to open their Eyes) We do not teach [Page 53] for Doctrines the Commands of men. We do not urge humane Impositions upon account of Divine Institution (any otherwise than as it is the ap­pointment of God to obey Autho­rity) Wherefore when such a Text is one of the premises, we fear not with Confidence to aver, that this cannot be a good Conclusion. Ergo, to wear a Surplice is not Indifferent in its Nature but a Sin. But of this a little more hereafter.

Now I farther proceed and say, The Church of England does not reck­on these things so Indifferent as to partake nothing of the nature of good or evil (which is Bradshaws false Notion) or so Indifferent that all other things that may come in com­petition with them are as equal to them as one Shop or Inn may be to another. For Example. Kneeling is not so Indifferent that there is no more to be said for it, than for lying [Page 54] along. A White Garment not so In­different as that any other colour would be altogether as grave and decent: but therefore Indifferent, be­cause undetermin'd in Scripture. Ne­vertheless, when the Governours of the Church have descended to con­sider, what is expedient to be done in these matters, the determinations which they have made, have not been by chance as a man goes to his Inn, but they have proceeded ac­cording to the Rules of Christian Prudence (and it is to be hoped they may be allowed to do so, as well as the Assembly who in their Di­rectory so profess, as will presently be said) The general Rules of De­cency, Order, and Edification have set them their bounds. According to the best of their Wisdom, they have judged such and such Impositi­ons expedient, and therefore have so determin'd concerning them.

Which determinations when they are once made, so far as the Lord Brooks Notion is true, it serves our turn very well, Optimum est faciendum. We have so much Reverence for our Superiours, as to judge they have determin'd us to that, which they thought most fit and expedient: then for our own practice, we still esteem these things Indifferent in their nature, but necessary as to use. Be­ing satisfied that the Holy Scripture does not forbid such usages, we count them lawful. Being also satis­fied that our Governours command them, now by virtue of a Law In­tervening, they are necessary to us, because we are commanded to o­bey our Governours in all lawful things.

These things pertaining to the Propositions that next follow, I go on.

3. It is no superstitious Opinion to be­lieve, Sect. 8. [Page 56] that the Church may make determi­nations in things Indifferent. Our fore­mention'd Lord Brooke boggles here, I must therefore consider what he says.

First, He concludes thus. The Ib. Chap. 6. Church hath no power to make any one thing Indifferent in it self. (That, say I, she need not do, for she finds them Indifferent.) Again (he says) we cannot say the Church hath power to deter­mine what is Indifferent. In things that seem Indifferent, where neither of the ex­creams is necessary, there (especially where both are doubtful) [he conceives] the Church hath not power to determine to ei­ther extream. As suppose Black and White Colours should be doubtful, whether both or either, or neither were lawful; In this Case (says he) for ought I yet see, the Church hath no power to determine any one so doubting, either to Black or White; the reason is, because neither is necessary, there being so many Intermediate Colours [Page 57] between both. That is as much as to say (if these things be applyed) Mi­nisters may be determin'd neither to a White Surplice, nor to a Black Gown, because there are other Co­lours, and rather than the Church shall determine to one, Ministers shall be left to their liberty, to dress themselves in a Fools Coat. But he goes on to cut short the Churches power. When one of the extreams, be­tween which we waver as Indifferent, is necessary to be embrac'd, as in most cases it is, here all the power lawful (as he conceives again) can do no more but resolve which of the two extreams is best.

And is not this hitherto pretty well? A surplice cannot be said to be necessary, because a man may wear a Gown, or Cloak, or Coat, or Mantle, or if he be disposed, may nakedly hold forth the Truth. Kneel­ing is not necessary because a man [Page 58] may stand, or sit, or loll, or ly a­long. What then? Is it therefore unlawful for the Church to deter­mine to some one of these? No sure; for according to the latter Conception, when one extream is necessary to be embrac'd, the Church may resolve which is best. And this is the Case here. For though no one of the two be necessary, yet some one of them all must be embrac'd. For the Sacrament cannot be recei­ved but in some posture or other, &c. I conceive therefore his Lord­ships latter Conception, in the very birth of it pulls the former by the heel and supplants it. For if the Church may resolve which of the two extreams is best, where one is necessary; with as much reason may she resolve which of four or five is best, because some one of them must be embrac'd. Or else it will follow, because a Pulpit is not [Page 59] necessary, in as much as a man may preach in a Tub (at least if it be set on a Tressle) because a Folio Bi­ble is not necessary in as much as a man may read in a lesser print; be­cause a Communion Cup of Silver is not necessary, there being other Metals; therefore the Ecclesiastical Court may not compel a man to pay to the Church-Wardens rate, when he hath provided these things. And what a blessed Reformation will this be!

And yet it seems there is danger lest the powers already given should be too large, wherefore he limits again. This power wherever it is must be very warily exercised, since of all two extreams (and according toIdem ibid. his Principles the Case will be the same, where four, or five, or twen­ty things are opposed) only one can be lawful, so that one is wholsome and the other poyson. But where at last is this [Page 60] power? be it little or much, let us know its bounds. The Church hath a Judicative declarative power, like the Judges in Westminster-Hall, but not a legislative power, as the King and Par­liament. If a man may be bold to ask again; Who is this Church? You shall find his Lordship give a no­ble answer. By the Church here I mean (says he) not only one, or two, or a few of what rank soever, but all, even every true Member of the whole Church; for I conceive every such member hath de jure, a vote in this Determination.

A right Oecumenical Council indeed, when every member of the body must be conven'd to declare his opinion, about any Rite or Ce­remony that shall happen to be cal­led into question. If I may add a Conception of my own, I should think it worth enquiring, whether Women and Children be not true Members of the whole Church, the [Page 61] liberty of whose Consciences may be as little imposed upon as that of us men. Well, to gratifie his Lord­ship we will suppose what is Impos­sible to be put in practice: Every true Member of the whole Church, awaken'd and alarm'd with the scruples of John a Nokes, about the posture in which the Sacrament is be received; is met together to declare and determine what is best to be done. Now, it ever the Moun­tains brought forth a Mouse, you shall see how little this Convention signifies; for when every Calves- Head hath spoke an Oracle, every one passed their Vote, let us Ima­gine that some one among them (and it is hardly possible it should be otherwise) should be dissatisfied and dissent from the Judgment of the greatest part of the Church, and af­ter reading and praying should con­tinue to dissent, In this case (he con­ceivesIbid. [Page 62] once more) no power on earth ought to force that mans practice more than his Judgment.

Liberty! Oh sweet Liberty! What pity it is the Lord Brooke hath not another life to lose in defence of this Gospel liberty. But seriously (so far as amazement will admit) are not things now brought to a strange Conclusion? Will it not be perfect­ly in vain, to determine any thing at all about Church-Matters? For, even in those things that seem Indif­ferent, one is Best, the other Unlowful. When the Church hath resolved which is best, yet every man must be left to do what he thinks best. So is the State of the Church as deplo­rable as ever was that of the Com­mon-wealthJudges 21. of Israel. In those dayes when there was no King in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own Eyes.

There are many other scurvy [Page 63] passages in that ill-natur'd Book, and many Unworthy Reflections upon my Lords the Bishops that then were: but I must not digress to take notice of them. This process of his is sufficiently exposed by this ac­count of it.

I confess I have met with two other Pamphlets that also demur in this thing. A Modest Discourse concern­ing Ceremonies, believes that the Churches Authority in commanding mat­ters Page 1. of Indifferency, wants ground from Scripture. And M^r Bagshaw in his Two great questions concerning things In­different in Religious Worship, holds it utterly unlawful for any Christian Magi­strate Page 2. to impose the use of them. But neither of them are so extravagant, as to deny that there is any thing In­different, only they think what God hath not determin'd, men may not. Against whom I oppose to this pur­pose.

Either Church-Governours have power in these Cases to determine, or all people must be left to their li­berty, to determine for themselves. But what intolerable disorder and confusion would that bring into the Church? Then would God be the Author of confusion and not of peace. There is then no power now left in the Church, that may take care that things be done decently and in order: but this is orderly and decent, that every man should have liberty to break Order, and go his own way. And if in forms and modes of wor­ship there could be as many differ­ences (as those that are, are not few) as men, it might be lawful for every man to go by himself, and a single person should constitute a Church. Men would never agree neither about time, nor place of pub­lick Worship, nor about the person that should teach them and pray for [Page 65] them, nor about the manner of pub­lick Prayers, or publick Preaching, nor about the form of administring the Sacraments, nor is it easy to name any one thing in the publick worship of God, wherein all men would be of one mind, but if all were left to their liberty when Church-Governours have deter­min'd as they think most expedient; every private person shall have a Negative Vote, and if he like not to worship God in the same way as others do, he must pass without controul to worship as he pleases, or if it so please him, not to worship at all.

But these are but the Capricio's of some few particular men, the vani­ty of which I need not labour much to shew, because however the Fox pronounces the Grapes sowr which he cannot reach; however some discontented men quarrel at the [Page 66] power of the Keys, when they do not hang at their own Girdle, yet there never was any body of men, that did at any time usurp a power to make Laws, and determine in Church Affairs, but did proceed up­on this Principle, that it is lawful to make determinations in things In­different; and plain it is that the Pres­byterians and Independents both, allow what I now contend for.

The Presbyterians in the PrefaceSect. 9. to their Directory, distinguish some things to be of Divine Institution, and others not, and of these they say: Other things we have endeavoured to set forth according to the Rules of Christian prudence, agreeable to the gene­ral rules of the word of God. Also in their Confession of Faith set out withAssemb. Conf. of Faith. Ch. 31. their Catechisms they define: That it belongs to Synods and Councils to set down rules and directions for better order­ing the publick worship of God and Go­vernment [Page 67] of his Church, which Decrees and determinations if Consonant to the word of God (where it is worthy ob­serving, that when they are esta­blishing their own Authority and way, they expect not express Com­mands for every thing they do, how­ever they have been observed to huff at Episcopacy and to require Commands for our establishments) are to be received with reverence and sub­mission, not only for their agreement with the word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an Ordinance of God appointed thereto in his word.

Since these first attempts of the Assembly, we find some writing con­formably to their dictates and pro­fessing thus. We freely grant that the Discourse Liturg. &c. Chap. 16. Civil power, or the Church (orderly assem­bled) may determine at what hours on the Lords-day the Congregation shall meet, as also it shall determine particular times for Fasting or Thanksgiving, as Gods provi­dence [Page 68] shall administer Occasions, (and yet some of this way are against keeping Christmass, &c.) that places of publick worship shall be erected, frequented, kept decent, and an Hundred things of that Nature, which even reason and na­ture it self teaches all sober persons to be such, as that without some Order to be ob­served in them, the worship of God either would not be performed, or would be un­decently performed.

True it is that the same men say in the same Chapter, The Assertion of the Churches power in appointing Ceremo­nies and Circumstances of Divine Worship is the very root of all, the Pandora's Box, the very Fountain head of all those Impositions, which have bred so much trouble, disturbance, and persecutions in the Church of God. Which how to re­concile to what is just now quoted, I well know not, nor to another passage in the same Chapter, where though they desire to distinguish be­tween [Page 69] Circumstances and Ceremonies of worship, yet they acknowledge thus. That the word of God hath left many things (not possible to be determin'd by it) to the Authority of the Christian Magistrate cannot be denied, whether any Ceremonies or no is a question, divers Cir­cumstances relating to the worship of God, are undoubtedly so left.

When I compare these things, I know not how to understand the Coherence of them, unless it be thus. When Church-Governours are Episcopal, and shall assume a pow­er to appoint Ceremonies and Cir­cumstances of divine worship, this is the fountain head of Impositions that breed disturbance and persecutions: But if they shall chance to be Presbyteri­an, then there are an Hundred things not determin'd by the word of God, but left to their Christian Prudence. For Example: A Convocation may not by a Canon or Rubrick appoint, a font [Page 70] of stone at the West end of the Church, nor kneeling at the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, nor that the Bread and Wine be severally distributed to every Communicant, but the Dire­ctory may make appointments con­trary to all these and an hundred things of the like nature. For the Ordinance of Parliament (all the Au­thority it had) which established the Directory, says. The Directory for pub­lick worship herein set forth, shall hence­forth be used, pursued, and observed, in all exercises of the publick worship of God, in every Congregation, Church, Chappel, and place of publick Worship, within this Kingdom of England, and Dominion of Wales.

The Independents in their Confession of Faith, set out from the Savoy, 1658. speak to the same purpose. There Chap. 1. Sect. 6. are some Circumstances concerning the worship of God and Government of the Church, common to Humane Actions and [Page 71] Societies, which are to be Ordered by the light of Nature, and Christian prudence, according to the General Rules of the word, which are always to be observed.

Now I must crave leave that our Adversaries would judge whether they are not unequal to us, in deny­ing us a liberty which they grant to themselves. In this general Consi­deration of things, it is not mate­rial to ask for what reason they scru­ple our Ceremonies, whether as sig­nificant or popish, &c. which shall be examined in due time. All that I now conclude, is no more than what they themselves believe and practise, viz. It is no superstitious Opinion to believe that the Church may make Determinations in things Indifferent.

4. Where the Governours of the Church Sect. 10. have power to determine, it can be no su­perstitious opinion to believe, they ought to be obeyed, in the exercise of this their law­ful [Page 72] power. Yea, if it should be gran­ted (what I do not by any means grant, only to come as close as may be to our Adversaries, I suppose the case) that it is not well done to Im­pose such things Indifferent; yet if they be not in their own nature evil, it is better to obey than to disturb the peace of the Church, and to se­parate from established order. Zan­chy and Calvin are professedly our Advocates in this Matter, on whose Testimony I build the more, be­cause they are of great Authority with those who dissent from us.

Zanchy wrote a Letter to Queen Elizabeth, wherein he did earnestly perswade her not to Impose the Sur­plice and such like things upon the Clergy of England. This he did withZanch E­pistol. lib. 1. p. 111. Tom. ult. great Zeal, and it may seem with some acrimony; as if he had been a great Patron of Non-Conformity, and I will not deny that it seems by that [Page 73] Letter he did greatly dislike such Impositions; and but that he was commanded by his Prince to write as he did (he did Coactus scribere as he professes) it is a Letter that might argue him to meddle too much in the affairs of another Church: but we take it as we find it, and not­withstanding all that is there said, it is manifest that Zanchy was of our side.

That he was abused in the Infor­mation that was given him of our affairs, appears by his Letter to the Queen, wherein he complains of her introducing and establishing all the Massing attire of the Romish Priests, for so he calls them. Vestes albas ac lineas, quibus in papatu utuntur sacrifici: Antichristi supellectilem: Papistarum Im­piam pompam: Idololarriae & superstitio­nis Papisticae reliquias vel saltem symbo­la: that is in the English of some of our Malecontents, All the rags of the [Page 74] whore of Babylon. Whereas the at­tire of their Priests is made up of six Vestments (as a Learned man of our own hath observed out of their Ritualists) Amictus, Alba, Cingulum, Falkner Libert. Ec­clesiast. lib. 2. Cap. 4. §. 9. Stola, Manipulus, Capsula, all far dif­ferent from the Surplice; and these six Garments are accounted holy Garments used by their Priests, and all of them have their particular Consecrations, as the Sur­plice in the Church of Rome hath not. Zanchy then thus mistaking the case was more eager than he needed to have been, but he was under ano­ther and greater mistake.

It was reported to him that there was great danger, lest many pious men should be turn'd out of their Livings upon this Occasion; yea, it was told him, that there were ple­ri (que) Episcopi (that must be some con­siderable number of the Twenty six that are in England and Wales) Viri omni eruditione & pietate insignes, qui [Page 75] malint Officio & loco cedere quam istius­modi vestes admittere. There were many Bishops that would not con­form. Now who that knows any thing of the State of the Church of England, Anno 1571. (when that Letter was written) knows not that the Bishops of that time were suffi­ciently satisfied with the Conformi­ty that was then urged, nor was there one among them (for so far as I can now find) that made so much noise about these things as Bi­shop Hooper of Glocester did under Edward the Sixth: If therefore Zan­chy may be excused for endeavour­ing what he could in favour of those good and Learned men whose ex­auctoration he fear'd; yet that not being the case, the earnestness of his Letter (if we should yield more to his judgment than of necessity we are obliged to do) will not sig­nify much to the reproach of our Conformity.

But we have greater assurance that Zanchy was our Friend: For when he had dated his Letter to the Queen from Heidelberg, Sept. 10. 1571. he dates another the very next dayZanch. E­pist. lib. 2. p. 181. Tom. ult. to Bishop Juell (though it be doubt­ful whether he lived to receive it, because he died the 23d of the same Month) from the tenor of which I conclude, that in his Letter to the Queen he says nothing to prove the usages of our Church unlawful to be practis'd, (whatever his opinion might be of the conveniency of Im­posing them) or if he did, he un­says it again the very next day in his Letter to the Bishop, which of so Learned and fix'd a man, is not ea­sily to be believed. For the very occasion of that second Letter, was to desire Bishop Juell and other Bi­shops, to use their Authority with the rest to perswade. Ne si Regina amoveri nullo modo possit à sententiâ, ipsi [Page 77] propterea suas deserere malint stationes, quam edicto Regio obtemperare. If the Queen were resolv'd and would be obey'd, he would have all the Cler­gy rather obey than leave their places and Employments. He goes on declare his Opinion, that for such things as these, Ministers may not leave their Flocks: He acknowledges the Case, that where things are in their own nature evil, we must with the Apostles obey God rather than Man, and then adds, Si vero res suâ naturâ adia­phorae, lege mandato (que) regio praecipiantur, quando alterutrum necesse sit, ut aut ce­datur loco, aut tali mandato obtemperetur, obtemperandum potius esse, &c. When the Magistrates command Indifferent things upon this necessity, that men must obey or forsake their Ministry, they must rather obey. Nay he reckons this Case so clear, that he concludes: Esse vero hanc sententiam it a certam & perspicuam, tum in sacris literis tum apud [Page 78] patres & in Historiis Ecclesiasticis, ut supervacaneum omnino sit, ullam adferre probationem apud illos, qui vel mediocri­ter in scripturis sunt exercitati. Nun­quam enim propter res suâ naturâ adiapho­as, deserenda est vocatio legitima & necessaria. They who ever consulted the Scriptures, or Fathers, or Ecclesiastical Historians, will need no proof of this, That it can never be lawful for men to leave a necessary Employment (such as that of the Ministry is) for the sake of Indiffe­rent Rites.

If this will not convert a Non-Conformist, yet I hope it will make them asham'd to quote Zanchy's Let­ter to the Queen, as if it were much to our disadvantage (as the Replyer Vid. Bur­ges Answer Rejoin'd. Chap. 1. Sect. 19. upon Bishop Mortons defence does) let both his Letters be compar'd, and much good may they do them.

That this was Zanchy's setled Judgment, appears from what he [Page 79] elsewhere says, in defence of Gar­ments peculiar to Divine Service: Quod veteres Episcopi coenam administra­turi, Zanc. Tom. 4. de Cultu Dei exter­no lib. 1. Cap. 16. aliam induerint vestem, ad mutati­onem coenae nihil pertinet. Non enim Chri­stus jussit, ut communibus vestibus induti coenam administraremus, sicut & ipse in­dutus erat, sed tantum ut faceremus quod & ipse fecit. Idem de multis aliis rebus dici potest, tam in Baptismo quam in coe­nâ Dominicâ. Whereas the Bishops of old did celebrate the Eucharist in a pecu­liar Garment, this makes no change in that service, for our Lord Christ did not command us to be clothed as he was, but to do what he did. And the same may be said of many other things, both in Baptism and the Lords Supper.

The sum of all he thus expresses, Quae addita sunt, sed tanquam adiaphora, propter ordinem, propter decorum, & ad aedificationem, ea substantiam Sacramen­torum eo (que) cultum non mutarunt. Those things that are added for Order, Decency, [Page 80] and Edification, make no alteration in the substance of the Sacraments, or of Divine Worship.

I conclude then, though we yield Zanchy theirs, as to his Opinion, that it is not well done to impose these Indifferent things, yet he is clearly ours as to the Proposition I main­tain. When Indifferent things are once determin'd (whatever Gover­nours may have to answer for such Impositions) because they are not in their own nature evil, it is better to obey than to disturb the peace of the Church.

But M^r Calvin is a greater manSect. 11. than D^r Zanchy, and the cause which he condemns shall ly under a great prejudice: his opinion thereforeM. Durell View of Govern­ment and publick worship in the Reform. Churches beyond the Seas, pag: 161. &c. must be consider'd. However he be generally esteemed no great friend to Episcopacy, yet M. Durell hath endeavour'd to vindicate him from being very Antiepispocal▪ Be that as [Page 81] it will; if our N. Cts will stand or fall to Calvins Judgment, our advan­tage is as great as we need desire.

1. For first he does greatly ad­mire set forms of Prayer. So he says in a Letter to the Protector of Edward the Sixth. Quod ad formulam precum & Calv. E­pist. 87. Dat. 1548. Rituum Ecclesiasticorum, valde probo, ut certa illa extet à quâ Pastoribus discedere in suâ functione non liceat. I do greatly like that forms of Prayer, and the Rites of the Church should be stated, so as Mi­nisters in the exercise of their function should not have leave to vary from them. His reasons are Three, Ut consulatur quorundam simplicitati & Imperitiae: Ut certius constet omnium Ecclesiarum inter se consensus. Postremo ut obviam eatur desultoriae quorundam levitati qui novatio­nes quasdam affectant. First, For the sup­ply of some mens inabilities (a reason that our modern N. C^ts. in this time of Gospel light, think an underva­luing of them) Secondly, That the [Page 82] several Churches (of the same Domi­nion) may appear to consent together. Thirdly, For a security against Innova­tors (and in that also I wish they were not concern'd.) Upon this last reason Calvin adds, that there should be summa quaedam doctrinae ab omnibus recepta, quam inter praedicandum sequan­tur omnes, ad quam etiam observandam omnes Episcopi & Parochi jurejurando ad­stringantur, ut nemo ad munus Ecclesiasti­cum admittatur, nisi spondeat sibi illum sensum inviolatum futurum. Extet prae­terea communis Catechismi formula, &c. Which I thus accommodate to our Usage, he could not think it unlaw­ful to subscribe to the thirty nine Arti­cles.

2. Because some Ceremonies must accompany Divine Service, it ap­pears by the former words that he would have them stated too. I con­ceal not his Opinion, that he would have but few Ceremonies for fear of [Page 83] Superstition. Nihil consultius video Epist. 303. Dat. 1560. quam parcissimis Ceremoniis uti in Ec­clesiâ, satis enim Experientiâ constat, quàm proclivis sit lapsus in superstitio­nem.

Now if any shall hence infer, that Calvin, if he were alive, would judge us to abound in superfluous Cere­monies, I oppose his former Letter to the Protector, where he speaks, de abolendis & radicitus evellendis abusibus & corruptelis, of rooting out abuses: but he instances but in three things, Praying for the dead, Chrism and extream Unction. All which having now no place in our Church, and it being undeniable that we are reformed to some greater degrees than in Edward the Sixths time, we have fair reason to say that the present state of things is such as Calvin would not disallow; at most if he would have advised to have omitted some of our Ceremonies, yet in the same [Page 84] place where he desires Ceremonies should be few, he adds, Aliud vero est, cum nobis jus non est admittendi aut re­pudiandi quod videbitur. Si non licet ob­tinere quod cupimus, feramus istos defe­ctus, non approbemus. Where we are to obey and not to rule, let us bear with those defects which we need not approve.

3. But Calvin is the man, who called some of our Rites Fooleries. Be­cause our N. C^ts. shall have liberty to make the most of that word, I so translate it, though others think it may be rendred Unfitnesses. Let them take the advantage of it, provided they will acknowledge that at the same time he calls them tolerable. The words are in a Letter to some English Divines at Frankford, in Queen Maries time. In Anglicanâ Ep. 200. Dat. 1555. Liturgiâ qualem describitis, multas video fuisse tolerabiles Ineptias. Calvin being at a distance, takes things as they were represented to him, therefore [Page 85] he speaks of the English Liturgy ac­cording to the description they gave of it, and there is some reason to suspect, that they who gave him that account, misrepresented the case. I am not alone in the Imagi­nation. M. Durell is before me whoView of Go­vernment, &c. p. 117. undertakes it at large. But Calvin says moreover video fuisse: so it had been (he thought) in Edward the Sixths time, and who knows not what perfective alterations have been since made? Suppose at most he did not like some things, yet this is certain, that he did not think it worth while to contend about them, for so he says in the same Letter. In Id. ibid. rebus mediis ut sunt externi Ritus, facilem me & flexibilem praebeo. In such Indiffe­rent matters as outward Rites are, I am an easy man and ready to be perswaded. And I give but Two Instances more that I may have done with him.

When he writes to Bullinger a­bout [Page 86] Bishop Hooper's Scruples and troubles, he says, De pileo & veste Ep. 120. Dat. 1551. lineâ maluissem (ut illa etiam non probem) non us (que) adeo ipsum pugnare, id (que) etiam nuper suadebam. Though I do not much like the Square-Cap, and Surplice, yet I wish Hooper had not been so fierce a­gainst them, and so I lately perswaded him. Yea, in an affair of their own, Beza reports him to have been of the same temper. Some there were at Geneva who had upon some pretences in­troduc'd the use of Unleaven'd Bread (and of that only) at the Communion: At this others were so offended, that they inclin'd, rather to stay away than Communicate. Calvin whoBez. Vit. Calvini. An. 1538. was then withdrawn from Geneva, hearing of it, advised them, ne ob istud [...] litem moverent, sic obti­nuit panis Azymi usus, de quo etiàm postea restitutus Calvinus nunquam contenden­dum putavit, minimè tamen dissimulans quid alioqui esset magis probaturus. He [Page 87] would not have them quarrel about such an Indifferent matter. So the use of Un­leaven'd Bread was established, which when Calvin return'd again, he did not think fit to make any disturbance about, though he did not dissemble that he rather wished, it had been otherwise. It ap­pears then Calvin was not so inflexi­ble in all matters of Conformity as many of our Modern N. C^ts. are.

To Calvin and Zanchy it is easy toSect. 12. M. Durell View of Govern­ment, &c. p. 119. & deinceps. add like Testimonies out of other Authors magnified by the N. C^ts. M. Durell hath brought about forty, mostly Divines, as it were into Council, delivering their Opinions about Ceremonies and Circumstan­ces of worship. All unanimously agreeing against our present Dissen­ters, that these things, viz. the Sur­plice and Cross, &c. are not such, for which a separation is to be made: and if all do not speak to every par­ticular matter in Controversy be­tween [Page 88] us, yet all speak to some, and some to all, by all which it ap­pears, that the Church of England is not condemned by the Reformed Churches beyond the Seas, nay she is justified, nay she is admired.

For the particular purpose of the Argument now in hand, I offer a few of our own Countrymen, and I cannot begin better than with T. Cartwright, who is quoted as profes­sing Burges Preface to Answ. Re­join'd, p. 3, 4. to oppose our Ceremonies as inconveni­ent but not as unlawful, and therefore perswaded Ministers, rather to wear the Garments than cease their Ministry, and taught men to receive the Sacrament kneel­ing, if they could not have it otherwise, because though the gesture be (as he takes it) incommodious, yet he says it is not simply unlawful. M^r Sprint, also as­sures us, that D^r Humfrey, D^r Rai­nolds, Cassand. Anglic. p. 163. D^r Sparks, D^r Chaloner, D^r Ay­ray, M^r Chaderton, M^r Knewstubs, though they stood out and testified their [Page 89] dislike against sundry of the Ceremonies established, yet they did in case of depri­vation yield to them, and studiously per­swaded others in this case to this pra­ctice.

Of latter days M^r Baxter hath de­termin'd, that it may be very sinful to command some Ceremonies, when yet it may be the subjects duty to use them when they are commanded. Upon which Pro­position he says farther: If a thing Baxt. Dis­putat. of Church Go­vernment, p. 460. be simply unlawful, as being forbid by God himself, there no command of man can make it lawful: But if it be but incon­venient, or evil only by accident, or cir­cumstance, it is possible for the command of Governours to take off that accidental evil, and make it become a duty.

I have dwelt at large upon these Testimonies, not because the Rea­son of the thing is doubtful, so as to need such a Confirmation, nor because if it were, other Testimonies as considerable could not be pro­duced, [Page 90] but to comply with the hu­mor of the N. C^ts. and to deal with them at their own Weapon. They have made a great noise about the consent of the Reformed Churches, and did Covenant to endeavour a Reformati­on according to the Example of the best Reformed Churches; as if all that go under the name of the Reformed Churches beyond the Seas, did as much believe us Superstitious as these men pretend to believe. Whereas beside the Veneration which Span­hemius expresses to have for the Or­derEpist. ad tertiam partem. Dub. E­vangel. An. 1638. of the Church of England, in a time when Conformity went higher than of late days: besides Bogerman's ac­knowledgment at Dort to the Bishop of Landaffe that then was, Domine, nos Bishop Hall Episcopacy by Divine Right, Sec. 4. non sumus adeo foelices, It was their misfortune not to be under Episco­pal Government; we have many more clear evidences of the great respect which Foreigners bear to the Church of England.

I conclude this Proposition with the grave and excellent determina­tion of St. Austin, in which he gives account of St. Ambrose too. Monica coming to Milan, and observing the Order of the Church there, that they did not fast on Saturday as was usual in other Churches, was trou­bled about it; for her satisfaction St. Austin advises with St. Ambrose, who answers him, and resolves her, by his own practice. Cum Romam Augustin. Januario. venio, jejuno Sabbato, cum hîc sum non jejuno; sic etiam tu ad quam forte Eccle­siam veneris, ejus morem serva, si cui­quam non vis esse scandalo, nec quenquam tibi. When I am at Rome, I fast on Saturday as they do there, here I do not; so I would have you, wheresoever you come, observe the Order of the place, if you would neither give nor take offence. An An­swer which satisfied Monica, and pas­sed for an Oracle with St. Austin, who adds of his own in the same Epistle: [Page 92] Some things Universal tradition had so confirmed, that he did not think fit they should be alter'd, as the Ob­servation of Easter and Whitsuntide, &c. but then, Alia quae per loca terra­rum Id. ibid. variantur, sicut est quod alii jeju­nant Sabbato, alii non, alii quotidie com­municant, alii certis diebus, &c. & si quid aliud hujusmodi animadverti potest, Totum hoc genus rerum liberas habet ob­servationes, nec disciplina ulla alia est in his melior, gravi prudenti (que) Christiano, quam ut eo modo agat, quo agere viderit Ecclesiam ad quamcun (que) forte devenerit; quod enimne (que) contra fidemne (que) contra bo­nos mores injungitur, Indifferenter est habendum, & pro eorum inter quos vi­vitur societate servandum est. As to those Observances which are divers in divers Countries, that some fast on Saturday, others not; some communi­cate every day, others at stated times: All such things as these are free, and a grave and prudent Christian can follow no [Page 93] better rule, than to behave himself ac­cording to the Order of the Church, to which he shall chance to come: For what­soever is enjoin'd that is not against Faith, nor good manners, is to be esteemed In­different, and to be practised according to the Company with which we converse. St. Austin does rightly state the No­tion of a thing Indifferent (suppose the Surplice) somewhat in its own nature not necessary, therefore in a Church that does not enjoin it, it may be omitted, somewhat in its own nature not Unlawful, therefore in a Church that does enjoin it, it ought to be used.

5. It is no Superstitious Opinion to be­lieve Sect. 13. Discourse of Liturgies, Chap. 16. §. 9. that the Church may appoint signifi­cant Ceremonies. This is another mat­ter wherein the N. C^ts. speak big. It is not true that they have any Authority to appoint significative Ceremonies, where are sensible signs to affect the Understan­ding, this is to give them Authority to in­stitute [Page 94] Sacraments. Another formerly. All humane Ceremonies being appropriate Abridg. Lincoln. See Burges Answer Re­join'd. Chap. 3. Sect. 1. to Gods service, if they be ordain'd to teach any spiritual duty by their Mystical signification, are unlawful. But such are these Three, the Surplice, the Cross in Baptism, and Kneeling in receiving the Communion. Ergo, they are Unlawful. There is a clear difference between signs of Grace inwardly infus'd, and signs of duty enjoin'd. It is the na­ture of a Sacrament to be an out­ward sign of inward Grace. Where­fore because Christ is the Author of Grace, as it belongs to him whose the deed of Gift is to set to his Seal, so is it the Prerogative of our Lord Christ to institute Sacraments for his Church. But signs of duty are other things, and this distinction is thus expressed by the Learned Morton. There be two acceptions of the word My­stical, See Burges ut supra. Chap. 3. Sec. 4. one Sacramental by signification of Grace confer'd by God, the other only mo­ral, [Page 95] signifying some duty of men to God. The Mystical Ceremonies condemned by Learned Writers, are Sacramental; all the Ceremonies which we defend, are My­stical, Moral, not Sacramental.

They who have written of these things, have given us divers Instan­ces, both out of the Old Testament and New, where insignificant Ce­remonies have been allowably pra­ctised, although they have not been strictly Sacramental, nor of Divine Institution. That which I offer to consideration, is somewhat not fully retorted upon our Adversaries, that I have any where observed, there­fore I take liberty to inlarge upon it, when I have first mov'd one questi­on. Put the Case a Canon or Consti­tution of our Church, should enjoin the Sexton to make his Graves East and West, and to take care that they who are buried be laid with their Feet to the East. I ask, would it be [Page 96] lawful, or unlawful, to obey this Constitution? Unlawful? How can that be so, when it is commanded, which is now generally practised, and that without scruple? If lawful, then is a significant Ceremony al­lowed lawful, for though all men may not think of it, or may not so design, yet there can be no doubt but the Original of that Custom, had a Respect to the Resurrection of the Body, and to an expectation of Christs coming to Judgment, the belief of which was declar'd by this significant Ceremony.

But that which I urge is this. They against whom we argue, contend for sitting at the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, and that for this rea­son, because it is a significant posture. That it is any where in the New-Te­stament commanded to receive the Sacrament sitting, no man in his Wits will say: Yet the Presbyterians [Page 97] have often argued for it, upon the account of its significancy. So I have heard it out of the Pulpit. That gesture which ought to be kept above all the rest, is Sitting, because though it be but a Circumstance, yet it hath some sig­nificancy in it, because it is a supper ge­sture. And secondly and chiefly, because it signifies the familiarity that is between Christ and Believers, Luke 22. 30. This Supper is a Type of the Everlasting Supper in Heaven, where one shall not sit and another stand. I name not my Author because he is long since dead, but I am certain I do him no wrong. And to make it appear that this is their Doctrine, I add a Printed Te­stimony.

Among the Treatises that bear M^r Bradshaws name, one is a Propo­sition concerning Kneeling at the Sacra­ment, wherein are these words. Where­as Bradsh. se­veral Trea­tises. p. 104. the end of a Sacrament, is to inform the outward man, by sensible demonstra­tions, [Page 98] it pleased our Master to use such a gesture, as agreeably with Bread and Wine, setteth out our Communion and spi­ritual familiarity with him, and rejoicing in him, and therefore as he says, If any man hear my voice, &c. I will come in to him and sup with him, and he with me: So he says, Many shall come from the East and West, and shall sit with Abraham, &c. By which place it appears, that as by Supper, so by sitting, familiar rejoice­ing, or rejoicing familiarity is expressed. Therefore not kneeling but sitting is for receiving.

It is plain then, that sitting is reck­on'd a significant posture. It is also plain, that it is required in the Dire­ctory. Direc. Ce­lebra. Commun. The Table being decently covered, and so conveniently plac'd, that the Com­municants may orderly sit about it, or at it, &c.

I know the pretence is, that they do not Institute a significant Cere­mony, they only retain it, as having [Page 99] warrant from the Example of our Saviour. So says the foremention'd Proposition. Kneeling is contrary to Ibid. the Example of Christ and his Apostles, who ministred and receiv'd sitting, or in such a gesture as in those Countreys was most used at eating, from which Example to differ without warrant from Gods word, cannot be without fault, seeing the Ex­amples of holy men, much more that of Christ, are to be followed except there be some reasonable cause to the contrary.

In Answer to which I oppose three things.

First, If the Example of Christ were as they say, yet it does no more conclude for our sitting, than for our receiving at Supper time, &c.

Secondly, They have not the Example of Christ, for that manner of sitting which they now urge.

Thirdly, It is not absolutely certain, whether they have his Example for any manner of sitting at all.

1. Suppose the most, that theSect. 14. Apostles at the first Institution of the Sacrament, did receive it sitting, where is the Argument, because they did, therefore so must we? Let this be proved. Where is the parti­cular Command that makes it our duty to follow this Example? Cedo locum and we yield. That must not be said. What then? Will they ar­gue from the Equity of the Exam­ple? Let us go on then and say, Be­cause of the same Example we must receive at night, in an upper room, and only Males: For either the whole Example binds in all Circum­stances, or in none; or some differ­ence must be assign'd between this Circumstance and the other of Time and place, &c. And what I pray shall that be? Is it because (which is a sufficient reason) they were but Occasional? there was no design in Instituting and administring the Sa­crament [Page 101] in such a place, but be­cause it was judg'd by our Blessed Saviour a convenient place; Or at night, but because the Pass-over was first to be eaten, and that night our Blessed Saviour was to be betrayed, therefore that time of night was most proper, because it could not be sooner or later. Now let it be consider'd, was it not also Occasio­nal, that they receiv'd it sitting? so as their Master found them at the Pass-over (as is now suppos'd) so be­ing in hast, he administers this Sa­crament. Why therefore should this come into Example rather than the other Circumstances, unless (which can never be proved) there be some indications in the Gospel, that it was the pleasure of our Lord that this part of his Example should oblige and not the rest.

Oh! but this gesture signifies (as was before said) and does it so? Who [Page 102] can tell that? Who may be bold to say, that the posture which was used upon occasion, was intended for signification, when no such thing is said, only the wits of men have de­vised this reason, and imagin'd a sig­nificancy in it? But be it so. May not then also some signification be fasten'd upon the time and place? It is best to receive in an upper room: this signifies the exalted state to which Believers are receiv'd, and by which they are dignified, whereby also they are rais'd up to a nearness to Heaven in that holy Or­dinance. Again, it is best to receive at night: this signifies, after a poor Sinner hath been wearied in his days of sin, as men at night turn to their rest after the labours of the day; so now after the labours of sin, Return to thy rest, O my Soul, for the Lord hath dealt bountifully with thee, Psal. 116. and Come unto me all ye that labour, &c. [Page 103] and I will give you rest, Math. 11. I dare say as good Texts to prove re­ceiving at night, as sitting with Abra­ham in the Kingdom of God proves the posture. Thus is it easy to de­vise and imagine; and if this shall be thought a worshipping God after our own devices (as the men who seem so much to abhor Superstition will be ready to say) I see not but they who contend so much for sit­ting, will be guilty, unless they can make it appear that the Holy Scri­pture hath rather recommended one than another. Now if I should re­peat those Tragical Declamations against adding to the word of God, Will­worship, and mens devices in the worship of God, of which their writings are full; how would they all fit here? For what is, if this be not worship­ping God after mens Imaginations, when they will make differences where our Blessed Saviour hath [Page 104] made none? And yet this is the best that can be said of this Case: for this supposes that Christs Example recommends sitting.

2. Whereas this is farther to be said, They have not so much as Exam­ple for that manner of sitting which they now urge: [...] and [...],Matth. 26. Luke 22. the two words used by the Evange­lists upon this occasion, do not signi­fie such a sitting as is now in use: It is therefore generally agreed, that their posture was more like to lying than sitting. So that the best of their Argument can be but thus: Because our Blessed Saviour gave the Sacra­ment to his Disciples in that gesture which they used at Meals, which was a kind of lying, therefore we ought to receive it in the gesture now used at Meals which is sitting: where we must desire their Logick to tell us, what degree of necessity is in this sequele, because they did [Page 105] one thing, we must do another. Yet neither is this the worst of it, all this is but a supposition of that which they are never able to prove. For

3. It is not absolutely certain, in what posture they did then receive the Lords Supper. Probably they continued in the same posture, but who can peremptorily conclude it? Who can demonstrate to the con­trary, but that when our Blessed Sa­viour, while they were eating, so­lemnly betook himself to the Insti­tution of a new Sacrament, they to address themselves to a new service, might betake themselves to a new gesture? I cannot prove they did, nor (for ought I can find) can any body prove they did not. There is nothing conclusive in any of the Evangelists, that they did certainly continue in the same posture; Un­less the Order of St. Luke be insisted [Page 106] on, who (Chap. 22.) after the Insti­tution of the Sacrament hath these words, But behold the hand of him that betrays me is with me at the Table. Which Order signifies little to those who will not yield Judas to have been at the Sacrament (as divers of our Ad­versaries will not) but admit he was there, as seems very probable, yet though they were all at the same ta­ble as before (and who can demon­strate but it might be another table) yet it does not appear certain, that they were in the same posture as be­fore. This doubt I move, not as a thing in it self considerable, but to represent how strongly some men (and even the same who call so much for Scripture grounds, and for a di­vine warrant for Circumstances of worship as minute as this) will build upon probabilities, when it serves their turn. Because it is not said they rose up, it is by consequence gather'd [Page 107] they sat still. If they did, it was not our manner of sitting, but another. If they had sate as we, yet this Ex­ample is no more obligatory, than it is to other Circumstances of the same Institution. Yet through all these If's, and Consequences, and Suppositions, they conclude to the expedience, if not to the necessity of a significant Ceremony, though in us they call it Superstition.

The lifting up the hand at the Co­venant, the laying the hand upon the Book in swearing and other like Ceremonies, have been objected to them by others, I urge not that, but add another Instance whereby it will plainly appear, that many of the N. C^ts. though they suspect so much superstition in a significant Ceremony, yet can themselves allow and urge the use of a Ceremony, and that in a Religious matter, and because it is significant, although the particular [Page 108] Ceremony be no where in Scripture commanded.

They who have endeavour'd toSect. 15. settle Presbyterated and Associated Churches, have determin'd to do it by way of Covenant, so consenting to be a Member of such a Church. The Agreement of the Associated Church­es in Worcestershire, will give us light in this thing; who thus express themselves. Because Ministers should Agreement of the Asso­ciated Churches in Worce­stersh. §. 18. have a particular knowledge of their Charge, which now is uncertain, and for divers other reasons propounded and deba­ted among us; We judge it very fit, if not of necessity, to desire a more express signification of our peoples consent, to our Ministry and Ministerial actions, and in particular to submit to this discipline, as the members of that particular Church. Afterwards they tell us in what form of words they require this consent to be given.

The reasons why this was requi­red, M^r Baxter gives in his Explica­tion of that Agreement, not as hisIbid. own, but as those that mov'd the Association to make that determinati­on. The reasons are Twelve. In all which there is not so much as a pre­tence of a divine Institution, nay it is confessed in the Preface, that the sign it self of this consent is not particularly determin'd; and M^r Baxter after the reasons adds this Memorandum: Re­member yet that I maintain, that God does in Scripture require, only consent signified (a thing which I do not now debate) but hath not tyed us to this or that parti­cular sign, for signifying it, but having given us general Rules, that all things be done to Edification, decently, &c. he hath left it to humane prudence to determine of [Page 110] the particular sign, whether voice, sub­scription, &c. So then, such a form of words is own'd to be a sign signi­fying consent. It is also own'd a sign requir'd only upon General Rules of Scripture. What unpardonable crime is it then, if the Church of England agree upon some Ceremonies signifi­cant, by virtue of the same general Rules, of Edification and Decency? In which Cases if private men will be so wise as to abound in their own sense, whether or no such things be decent and edifying, the same M^r Baxter hath determin'd the Contro­versy in the same place: where though he assert, that the Pastors are to consult with the people about the convenience; yet he positively con­cludes: That people are to obey the deter­mination of their guides. And how now comes it to pass that the power which they in their times assum'd, should be denied the Church of Eng­land, [Page 111] viz. Power and Authority to appoint significant Ceremonies?

If they will distinguish between Discipline and Worship, and allow a significant Ceremony in that, but not in this, I reply, that in their con­tentions for Discipline about M^r Hookers time, that Axiome of theirs [Nothing ought to be established in the Church, which is not commanded by the word of God] was applied to Disci­pline as well as worship, and there­foreEccles. Pol. Lib. 3. Sect. 5. Degrees in the Universities, sundry Church-Offices and Dignities were struck at. Yea, they did affirm, that the Discipline was no small part of the Gospel, Survey of the preten­ded Holy Disciplin. p. 440. that without this Discipline there can be no right Religion, that they who reject the Discipline refuse to have Christ reign over them. However it is clear, A signifi­cant Ceremony because allowed in Discipline, is not in the Nature of the thing unlawful. Nor does it deserve the name of a Sacrament properly [Page 112] so called. Nor does the Church of England deserve to be upbraided with superstition because of such appoint­ments.

If these grounds be firm and good, I conclude that the Rites and Ceremo­nies of the Church of England, unless they be either burdensome in their Number, or requir'd as somewhat in nature and kind, greater and more necessary than things Indifferent, are not faulty or superstitious.

Both which Cases deserve Consi­deration.

1. If our Rites be in their natureSect. 16. Innocent, no man hath reason to find fault with their Number. The Com­pilers of our Liturgy have been aware, that an Objection might be here made, and have taken care to pre­vent the scruple. Some Ceremonies are Preface to the Liturgy, of Ceremo­nies. put away, because the great excess and multitude of them hath so increas'd in these latter days, that the burden of them [Page 113] was intolerable, whereof St. Austin in his time complain'd, &c. This our ex­cessive multitude was so great, and many of them so dark, that they did more con­found and darken, than declare and set forth Christs benefits to us. That Com­plaint of St. Austin, is in his Epistle to Januarius, where he acknowledges.Aug. Janu­ario Ep. 119. Quamvis enim ne (que) hoc inveniri possit, quomodo contra fidem sint; ipsam tamen Religionem, quam, paucissimis & mani­festissimis celebrationum sacramentis, mi­sericordia Dei esse liberam voluit; servi­libus oneribus premunt, ut tolerabilior sit conditio Judaeorum. Admit that such obser­vances be not against the Gospel; yet in as much as the Merciful God would have Religion free from the burden of many Ce­remonies; they have so clog'd it with bur­densome services, that the condition of the Jews was more tolerable than of Christi­ans now adays. That there may be no such Cause of Complaint among us, the Church of England hath been very [Page 114] moderate in this thing. Not so as to escape the ill will of her Adversaries, when they were resolv'd to find fault; for the Preface to the Directory complains of the many unprofitable and burdensome Ceremonies, contain'd in the Liturgy, which occasion'd much mischief: yet in cool blood some of the party are constrain'd to acknowledge the Disc. of Li­turgies, p. 91. number of Ceremonies retain'd in our Church, pretending to any legal Authority, but small. The Surplice, and Cross, and Kneeling at Sacrament are we think all. And they do us much wrong if they refuse this acknowledgment. For a great number of observations which obtain in the Church of Rome in the Celebration of the Sacraments (which from their number of seven we have reduc'd to Two) and in other parts of Divine Worship, have no place in the Church of England, lest they should divert the minds of men from worshipping God in spirit and truth. [Page 115] Ceremonies harmless in themselves may yet be hurtful in respect of their number, therefore hath our Church abrogated a great number of Saints­days and other like Customs, as M^r Eccles. Pol. lib. 4. Sec. 14. Hooker hath observed.

Wherefore such is the present state of our Church, that we may securely defy our Adversaries in this matter, if it were as easy to cure their Jea­lousies of what may be, as to answer their objections against what is esta­blished. But here they make difficul­ty. Though our present Number of Ceremonies be but small, yet they raise a doubt, how far a Church may go; how many Ceremonies may be establish'd, before the number be bur­densome. Where is the Maximum quod non, and the Minimum quod sic of su­perstition. This is thought a great Argument why no Ceremonies, (be­yond what are of direct necessity) should be imposed; because of theBagshaw's Two great Queries, p. 10. Impossibility to fix a point, where the Im­poser [Page 116] will stop. For do but once grant that the Magistrate hath power to impose, and then we ly at his mercy how far he will go. And they who allow our present number to be but small, yet think them too many, because, though there Discourse of Liturgies, p. 91. be no more Ceremonies established by law as yet, there are many probationers, and they can see no reason, but the Churches power if allowed to appoint any (save on­ly such, without which the service of God, would apparently to all rational men, be perform'd indecently and disorderly) may appoint Hundreds. It is also one of M^r Baxters reasons, against the Im­posing Crossing, and the Surplice, &c. When we once begin to let in Hu­mane Baxter Dis­put. of Ch. Govern­ment, p. 477. Mystical Rites, we shall never know where to stop, or make an end. On the same ground, that one age invents three or four, the next think they may add as many: and so it will grow to be a point of devotion, to add a new Ceremony (as at Rome it hath done) till we have more than we well know what to do with.

I answer. The Writings of Mo­ralists are not thought defective, though, when they have given Gene­ral Rules for Temperance, that men may not drink till they disable their Reason, and impair their health, &c. they do not descend particularly to determine how many Glasses a man may drink, and precisely to say, such a draught makes him Intemperate. Nor did M^r Chillingworth think, he was wanting to his Adversary, who counted it prodigiously strange, that Pro­testants Chillingw. Religion of Protest. &c. p. 128, 129. could not be induc'd to give in a particular Catalogue of points Fundamen­tal, when he calls it an Unreasonable demand, because variety of Circumstan­ces makes it impossible to set down an ex­act Catalogue of them.

I think I may have as much rea­son, to reckon it no Imperfection in this discourse, if I do not venture pun­ctually to determine, how great a number of Ceremonies may be re­quired, [Page 118] before we come at Supersti­tion. When the number becomes so great that the shadow darkens the substance: When the substantial ser­vice of God, which should be per­formed in spirit and truth, is preju­dic'd by the attendance that is given to the outward Ceremony: when the use of the means renders us unca­pable to obtain the end; then does it rise to that excessive multitude of which our Church speaks. But be­cause the use of our liberty in other lawful things, cannot be fix'd in an Indivisible point, but alters accord­ing to the various Circumstances of times, and persons, and conditions, and relations of men; therefore no wise man will give one particular determinate rule, which shall oblige equally in all Cases.

In like manner as our Church reckons Ceremonies Indifferent, so at the same time are they concluded [Page 119] alterable, and it is acknowledged, that upon weighty and important conside­rations, Preface to the Liturgy. according to the various exigency of times and occasions, such changes and alterations should be made therein, as to those in place of Authority should from time to time seem either necessary or expe­dient. And here sure must the thing rest. It must be left to the prudence of our Governours. If they shall im­pose any thing in which the Consci­ences of people are not satisfied; If in truth it shall be believed that the number of Ceremonies enjoin'd is so great, that the means disserve the end; that what is ordain'd as an help to Piety and Devotion, does rather hinder it: these persons so dissatisfi­ed about the number, are in the same case with those who are dissatisfied about the nature of an Injunction. If they scruple without cause, and are not duly inform'd, their scruples do not render the Injunction unlawful in [Page 120] it self. Nevertheless, the Doctrine of our Church does not encourage them to act against their Consciences, they must peaceably suffer where they cannot act. No doubt, but it is pos­sible Church-Governours (who a­mong us do not pretend to Infallibi­lity) may in some things be mista­ken: Yet such things as these must be left to their determination. For is it not so elsewhere? There may be too many Ale-Houses in a Town, and it may be difficult to determine exactly how many are sufficient, and where the number will exceed, but is it therefore unlawful for the Justi­ces to licence any? There may be in a Countrey, or Town, Parishes too many for the Maintenance, or too few for the people, and it may be difficult for Authority to know exactly how many are needful and convenient; Shall there be therefore no division made into several, for [Page 121] fear lest there should be too many or too few? What if there be the same difficulty in adjusting the true num­ber of Ceremonies? yet in as much as it is necessary there should be some, because else Religion in the substance would suffer and decay; therefore is it also lawful for our Governours to make a determination in this mat­ter.

The Determination of which num­ber must proceed upon the same Rules of Decency, Order, and Edifi­cation, which give a law to the kind and nature of Ceremonies. And in this General may men rest satisfied till the number shall grow doubtful. Then it will concern private persons to take heed as to their own practice, that the Ceremony do not devour the substance. But because at present there is no reasonable Cause to fear; because the Ceremonies that are now requir'd are so few, that no man may [Page 122] without peevishness quarrel at their number, if they be Innocent in their nature and use, therefore I return from this digression to consider that in the next place.

2. The Rites and Ceremonies of our Church are not required as things in their nature necessary, but Indiffe­rent.

The use of the Cross at Baptism isCanon 30. thus accounted for, as being purg'd from all Popish superstition and error, and reduc'd in the Church of England to the primary Institution of it, upon those true Rules of Doctrine concerning things In­different, which are consonant to the word of God and the Judgment of all Antient Fathers, &c. And upon the same Rules of Doctrine are our other Cere­monies established. For so the Pre­face to the Liturgy expresses it. The Ceremonies that remain, are retain'd for a Godly Discipline and Order, which (up­on just causes) may be alter'd and chang'd, [Page 123] and therefore are not to be esteem'd equal with Gods Law. And the Preface that was made upon the last establishment says. The particular forms of Divine Wor­ship, and the Rites and Ceremonies appoin­ted to be us'd therein, are things in their own Nature Indifferent and alterable, and so acknowledged. Words too plain to need a Comment, and lyable to no Objection that I can foresee, unless one of these two things shall be reply­ed both upon them, and all that hath hitherto been said in this matter.

First, That some things are re­quir'd under the Notion of things In­different, which are not so.

Secondly, Be it granted that some Indifferent things may be impos'd, yet it does not follow that all may, or that the things in controversy may.

We say, the things they scrupleSect. 17. are requir'd but as things Indifferent as indeed they are. They are not all sa­tisfied to think so of them. The time [Page 124] was, when T. C. did oppose our Ce­remonies, not as unlawful, but as in­convenient, as hath been already said. And M^r Ash in the Epistle to his Fu­neral Sermon on M^r Gataker, when he had named Cartwright, and Hilder­sham, and Dod, &c. he says of them, though these men dislik'd the use of supersti­tious Ceremonies, yet they oppos'd their Tenents and practice, who separated from the Church of England, condemning it and the Ministry of it as Antichristian. The separation is, it seems, now ad­vanc'd, for there are men that reckon there is more superstition among us, than was believ'd formerly, and there­fore separate farther from us. It is de­nied Modest Disc. of Ce­remon. p. 8. now that these are things of Indiffe­rency to be us'd (as is requir'd) in the ser­vice of God. And whereas it is sup­posed that we say that the Imposition of Rulers makes Indifferent things cease to be Indifferent, they answer. They are not Indifferent in the Judgment Petition for Peace, p. 12. [Page 125] of Dissenters, though they be so in ours. Exercit. a­bout an O­pining Can­sci. p. 80. They think they have probable Argu­ments to judge it unlawful to Minister in a Surplice, to sign with the sign of the Cross in Baptism, and to kneel in the Act of receiving the Lords Supper. Yea these things are so far from being In­different, that they are thought so Un­lawful, as that because of them peo­ple separate from our Churches. For whatever reasons may perswade their Guides not to conform, yet the peo­ple separate from us, that they may not partake with our Ceremonies, or for a worse reason.

I could not altogether omit so ne­cessary a part of my Discourse, but because it hath been so often said, I pass it in fewer words. Where no Law Rom. 4. is there is no Transgression. That which is not forbid is not Unlawful. Are these Rites and Ceremonies forbid in the word of God? By what Text? perhaps by the second Commandment, or [Page 126] by those words of St. Matth. Teaching for Doctrine the Commandments of men: Ch. 15. or by the Text of Will-Wor­ship, 2 Colos. or because we may not add to, nor diminish from the word of God, Deuteron. 4. Now because the Sur­plice, and Cross, and Kneeling, are not named in these Texts (as was upon occasion said before) therefore Con­sequences must be drawn from them, and labour'd so long, till the Conclu­sion must hold as firm as confidence can make it. Because the second Com­mand forbids making and worship­ing graven Images, therefore all de­vices and Inventions of mans brain must have no place in Divine Wor­ship. Ergo, what? Ergo, rend the Surplice, &c. As if the Bason at the Desk were not as much the device of man as the Font, and the Directory were not as obnoxious as the Ru­brick.

If our Church did equal her com­mands [Page 127] to the word of God, then were she guilty of adding to the word, and establishing the Commands of men in the room of the Doctrines of God. If any accidents may bring our Rites within the compass of some general prohibitions, the Unlawfulness of them upon that account, will be to be consider'd in what next follows. If they shall be denied Indifferent in their own Nature, and yet no one Text of Scripture can be produc'd that speaks one word about them, they who shall so deny, do both bring an Unanswerable prejudice against all the particular establish­ments, made by the General Rules of prudence, whether by the Pres­byterians or Independents, and do also quite mistake the nature of a thing Indifferent.

If we descend to particular Instan­ces, I desire to know, why the Sur­plice is not as Indifferent as a Gown or [Page 128] Cloak. Not because it is a white Garment, for then why are not Bands Unlawful? And where is the Text that forbids white more than black? Nor because it is of such a fashion; for the Scripture gives no more directions for the shaping of a Cloak than a Surplice. Why then? Surely either because it is thought decent or significant, or because it is appropriated to divine worship.

1. If it be decent, then is it no Er­rour to think it so; then the Aposto­lical Canon, let all things be done decent­ly, justifies and maintains it. And is it not decent? Does nature teach so, to whom St. Paul appeals? We do1 Cor. 11. not find any inbred shame, as if we did somewhat Unnatural in the use of it. Does Scripture pronounce it un­comely? We cannot find it. There is no other Rule for Decency, but either common estimation, or the pleasure of our Governours: for the [Page 129] latter we are secure, and set peevish­ness aside, fear not being condemn'd by the former.

2. Peradventure it is thought sig­nificant, therefore not Indifferent. I answer: that a significant Ceremony (if this should be such) only as such, is not superstitious. But who told our men of scruples, that it is urg'd as significant of Candor and Purity? By what Canon or Rubrick is any man oblig'd to have such an Opinion of it? Whatever others, who may have a better Opinion of significant Cere­monies, may think of it, he who is satisfied to wear it as a decent Gar­ment, transgresses no Law, if he think no more.

3. Is it unlawful and not Indiffe­rent, because it is appropriated to Divine Service? This it seems is D^r Collings Exercit. of Opin. Consc. p. 80. scruple, who thinks it Unlawful to wear any habit peculiarly appropriated to the worship of God. I wonder then how it [Page 130] can be lawful to lean on a Pulpit Cushion, or to use a Communion Cup, if the Church-Wardens should be so superstitious as to lock them up and preserve them from all other uses. If there be any thing in Scri­pture that forbids the use of a Gar­ment upon any of these accounts, somewhat will be offer'd worth con­sidering, till then, we continue to believe it Indifferent and free from su­perstition.

2. Why is not Kneeling, &c. Indiffe­rent? not because it is a posture, for so is sitting, but because it is such a posture. And what is it? A posture us'd upon any superstitious Opinion? Let us know what that is. Is it sus­pected to signifie our Adoration of the Elements? The Declaration of our Liturgy delivers us from that suspici­on, and authorizes us to reckon them pitifully Ignorant, or monstrously Uncharitable, who after so plain a [Page 131] Declaration will suspect it. What it signifies we there read. This Order Order for Adminis H. com­mun. is well meant for a signification of our hum­ble and grateful acknowledgment of the be­nefits of Christ, and for the avoiding of prophanation and disorder. If it be un­lawful to signify humility and thank­fulness, why do we at any time kneel or lift up our hands and eyes to Heaven? Or if it be unlawful to avoid prophanation and disorder, then let St. Paul be reproved for set­ting1 Cor. 11. things in Order in the Church of Corinth. Till I can find some Text that forbids Kneeling, or till I can be satisfied that some superstitious Opi­nion gives occasion to it, I must con­tinue to reckon this also Indifferent.

3. And to the same purpose I say of the Cross at Baptism. How supersti­tiously the Papists use it, I shall have occasion to say, but our use of it be­ing to where in Scripture forbid, un­less it can be proved, that our 30th [Page 132] Canon (of which before) gives a false Account of it, unless there be some Popish (or other) superstition or error from which it is not sufficiently purg'd, it remains in its nature Indif­ferent. Our general Answer in all is, as before, Where no Law is, there is no Transgression. What is not forbid, is al­lowed, is not Unlawful.

2. There may be some who willSect. 18. grant that some Indifferent things may be Impos'd, yet will not yield that our Ceremonies therefore may, be­cause of some objections against them, which have not equal force against all matters Indifferent. Such are these two thought to be.

1. The case of Scandal and give­ing offence to weak Brethren.

2. Because they have been abus'd among the Papists.

I should be asham'd to mention these things where in the N. C^ts. have been so often answer'd, did I not con­sider, [Page 133] that till this be clear'd, the prejudice which I desire to remove will still remain; for if for these reasons Conformity be Unlawful, then may it seem, that they who either im­pose or practise it, have an undue opinion of that which is so unlawful, and that opinion shall be suspected of superstition. I proceed therefore to say, If they who impose these Rites, did not in truth judge them expedient and decent in the worship of God, only because they think them barely lawful, they urge them as believing many scrupulous minds will be offended at them, and there­fore they lay them as Snares, and take advantage to incommode and bring under a penalty, those who scruple them; this might be called Tyranny, but not properly superstition, and so would not rach our Case. I make not this supposition as if I would tempt any dissatisfied man so [Page 134] to judge of them, for assuredly it is no less than a blaspheming of Dig­nities, to think they enact Confor­mity for this reason. But I find they who pretend to be dissatisfied will thus suspect. And M^r Bagshaw thus expresses it, Whoever obtrudes his con­ceits Two great Queries concerning things In­diff. p. II. upon others, who perhaps are not so well satisfied as he is; becomes impious to God, by invading his sovereignty, and lording it over another mans Conscience; and likewise injurious to men, by pressing such things as are only baits to the careless, and traps for the Conscientious. Unless there be more hypocrisy than super­stition in our Governours, this cannot be the case, for they profess to have done that which to their best understand­ings Preface to the Liturgy. they conceiv'd might most tend to the preservation of peace and unity in the Church, the procuring of Reverence, and exciting of Devotion, in the publick wor­ship of God, and the cutting off occasion from them that seek occasion of cavil or [Page 135] quarrel against the Liturgy of the Church. They have then imposed nothing, but what they judg'd not only law­ful, but expedient; which Impositi­ons being already prov'd Indifferent, unless the Circumstances that attend them render them such, may not be judg'd superstitious.

It is therefore to be consider'd, whether either of the two suspicions now mention'd, be reason enough to charge our way of worship as su­perstitious.

1. Suppose the Governours of the Church do not err in esteeming these things in their own nature Indifferent, yet say Dissenters, in as much as they are offensive to many Godly and Conscientious men, they ought not to be impos'd; or if they be, it will be doubtful, whether the great opi­nion they have of such matters, as to enjoin them notwithstanding their offensiveness, be not a supersti­tious Opinion.

I answer. If the Act for Unifor­mity should contradict those Pre­cepts of the Gospel, that oblige us not to lay stumbling-blocks, nor give of­fence to our weak Brother; in as much as giving offence and not walking chari­tably are the same thing, this proce­dure would be a trespass against the second Table, rather than the First, would be uncharitableness rather than superstition. It will be replyed. Though directly it be an offence against our Neighbour, yet reductively it is against the First Table, because such a practice is declarative of some un­due and superstitious Opinions of those things which are so impos'd. Let it be added therefore. So long as pri­vate persons are not determin'd by the Laws of their Superiors, it con­cerns them warily to use their liber­ty, to take heed that their doing that which is lawful, may not tempt others to do the same thing, while [Page 137] they judge it unlawful, which is the offending of our Brother, of which St. Paul speaks to the Romans and Co­rinthians, who only discourses of what ought to be done in those Cases, where no lawful power had inter­pos'd, to determine them one way or other. For eating flesh and letting it alone were both lawful, and re­main'd Indifferent in nature and use too: Now so long as the case re­mains thus, the Law of not scanda­lizing a weak Brother is a Moral Law, because it is an instance of the great Law of loving our Neighbour as our selves, and doing to others as we would have them do to us, wherefore so far as it is practicable it obliges. But this may not be extended to disob­lige the subject from obeying his superiours in lawful things, nor to disable the Magistrate from making laws in things Indifferent.

First, it does not disoblige the sub­ject, [Page 138] because the law of obedience to our Superiors being also a Moral Law, either we are at the same time oblig'd by two laws which contra­dict, or one must yield to the other. If wearing the Surplice offend, I must either disobey the Magistrate, or of­fend my Brother. Which then of these two must give place? Accord­ing to the N. C^ts. we must relinquish a certain Rule for that which is un­certain. What the Magistrate com­mands is certain, it is also certain, that I am in my Conscience resolv'd of the lawfulness of that which is so Commanded (taking it abstractly from its offensiveness) If I must now demur in my obedience lest I give offence, how shall I certainly know whether I offend or no? how shall I know how many I may offend? What assurance shall I have but my Non-Conformity may offend as ma­ny on the other side? I shall now [Page 139] proceed by an uncertain Rule, be­cause I know not whither it will carry me, and I am in a Case where­in one Moral Law must give place to another. Whereas upon our Principles things are fairly reconcile­able. In matters undetermin'd by Law, where we are at our liberty, we must walk charitably and take heed that we give no offence, that our liberty become not a stumbling-block, 1 Cor. 8. 9. this is the Moral Law, and this is Gospel. But there is no Precept of the Gospel that commands us to dis­obey our Superiors lawful com­mands for an uncertain danger of giving offence. Wherefore when we practise Conformity in obedience to establish'd Laws, although perad­venture we should offend our weak Brother, yet do we not thereby de­clare a superstitious Opinion of the Ceremonies we use. We may think our selves oblig'd to obey our Go­vernours [Page 140] in all lawful things, and yet not think of the Surplice or Cross, &c. more highly than we ought to think.

2. And as it does not disoblige the subject from Obedience, so neither may it be thought to disable the Magistrate from making laws about things Indifferent. For if it did, it were not safe to make any laws about De­cency and Order, because the Magi­strate can never be secure, but his Determinations may be so cross to the opinions of some of his subjects, as to make them offend if they obey. But it hath been already evinc'd, that the N. C^ts. yield the Magistrate a power to proceed according to the Rules of Christian Prudence in go­verning the Church: And the frame of the Directory, and the urging of the Covenant do sufficiently assure us, that the hazard of scandalizing a weak Brother, was no restraint to an Ordi­nance [Page 141] of the Lords and Commons. He who in his Conscience thought there was no way of worship so Regular as that of the Church of England: He who thought he should sin if he should conform to the Directory, was not thereby excus'd from sequestrati­on. Yet I dare say, they would take it ill, if they should be suspected of superstition, of having an undue opi­nion of their manner of Divine Ser­vice. And I cannot yet see why they, commanding men to receive the Sa­crament sitting, when probably that would tempt some men not to re­ceive it at all, did not as much offend their Brother, and did not as much declare that they had a superstitious opinion of such sitting, as the com­mands that now require Kneeling may be so interpreted.

2. Nor does the second scruple weigh much. Our Ceremonies are suppos'd to have been abus'd among [Page 142] the Papists, and this is made a great Argument by the N. C^ts. why they should not be retain'd. To this the Answer hath been so often given to this purpose, that by the same rea­son our Churches may not be now us'd, nor our Bells which have been Christen'd, nor any thing retain'd that relates to Divine Worship, but what is of absolute necessity, and is particularly commanded; that I dwell not here any farther than, ac­cording to my former Method, to give a Testimony how little this ob­jection signifies when it is made a­gainst them.

It had been laid to T. C' s. charge, that he should thus declaim against the Church of England. The Communion Survey of the H. pre­tended Dis­cipl. p. 315, 316. Book was taken out of the Mass-Book, that it were better to conform our selves in outward things to the Turks than to the Papists. Whatsoever comes from the Pope which is Antichrist, comes first from the [Page 143] Devil, &c. In the time of this Rail­lery it did chance to be laid to his charge, that their Disciplinarian way did smell of Donatism and Anabaptism, and was a kind of Papism. Now what defence does he make? If amongst the filth of their Heresies (viz. the Papists, Donatists, and Anabaptists) there may be found any good thing (as it were a grain of good Corn in a great deal of Darnel) that we willingly receive, not as theirs, but as the Jews did the Holy Ark from the Philistins, whereof they were unjust Own­ers. Yea it may come to pass that the Syna­gogue of Satan may at some time have some one thing with more convenience than the Catholick Church of Christ.

Our Liturgy is indeed taken from them, but as gold is purg'd from dross. And there are divers things wherein we agree with them, be­cause it is no crime to agree with them there, where they do not dis­agree with the word of God: And [Page 144] because it is not hard to believe that running into a contrary extream, that an Aversation from what is In­nocent among them, does harden them in their Errors as much, yea a great deal more, than a retaining some Customs which may honestly be retain'd. If we do not symbo­lize with them in the superstition of their Rites, there is no reason we should be charg'd with superstition; because we do not run a madding from them as far as we are able into another extream.

This is that I had to say to the second general Proposition (which hath exceeded the proportion of the other, because it was my chief de­sign.) The Doctrines upon which the Con­formity of the Church of England is esta­blished, are not superstitious Opinions.

3. The Opinions that are superstitious, Sect. 19. such as are divers which obtain in the Church of Rome and elsewhere, are re­jected [Page 145] by the Church of England. There are many differences between us and the Church of Rome, and they are not all reducible to this Topick of super­stition. There are Doctrines among them of other denominations, be­cause they serve some secular Interest of profit, or pleasure, or honour; so is it easy to evince, that the Doctrine of Purgatory, and Celibacy of Priests, and others are Doctrines of men who reckon gain their Godliness. The Do­ctrine of Indulgences and Dispensations, &c. does not only design profit, but together with other loose Doctrines of Morality, makes a very easie way to Heaven, and so is sensual and pleasurable. And the Supremacy of the Pope and exemption of Ecclesiasticks from secular Jurisdiction, is a Do­ctrine of Mundane greatness and un­sufferable Ambition. There may be a mixture of superstition in all or any of these, according as mens appre­hensions [Page 146] are concerning them. But there are other matters, wherein I give account of their superstition. Bishop Morton hath comprehended this in three generals, wherein he does at the same time vindicate the Church of England, and condemn that of Rome.

Our Church in her Service-Book does Presentment of a Schis­matick. p. 14. make known to all the World, that she does detest the superstition of the Romish Cere­monies, by condemning their superstitious Opinions. First, In making them neces­sary parts of Gods Worship. Secondly, In ascribing an efficacious sanctity to them. Thirdly, By arrogating a meritorious condignity from them to themselves. I need not restrain my discourse to Ceremo­nies only, be it in Ceremony or be it in substance; If I make it appear that they esteem that a necessary part of Gods worship which ought not to be so esteem'd, (and so for the other two) I shall conclude right when I charge them with superstition.

An Enumeration of particulars will be the best evidence in this mat­ter. I therefore give Instances to show that for these several reasons the Church of Rome is guided by superstiti­ous Opinions to superstitious practices, by which it will also appear that the Church of England does renounce those practices, at least if for other reasons some of them be retain'd, yet the Opinion which is the original of their practice is disowned by us.

1. That opinion is superstitious whereby men judge and esteem any usages in Religion necessary when they are not so, or more necessary than indeed they are. When men advance any thing in the worship of God beyond its nature, judging that to be holy, and to have a relation to God which hath none, or to have a nearer relation than in truth it hath. Pius IV. in a Creed which he impos'd,Oruphrius in Vit. Pii 4. p. (mihi) 384. furnishes us with sufficient Instances.

When he had by his Diploma al­low'd and confirm'd all that was done at the Council of Trent, he pro­ceeded to direct in what manner Bi­shops should be made.

Then it follows. Hanc Fidei formu­lam quam Episcopi designati profiterentur instituit. He appointed a certain Creed which all that were to be made Bishops should make profession of. In the Con­clusion of which Creed are these words. Hanc veram Catholicam fidem, extra quam nemo salvus esse potest sponte profiteor, &c. This true Catholick Faith, out of which no man can be saved, I wil­lingly profess. Now among the Cre­denda, which he reckons, and obli­ges others to reckon necessary to Salvation, are such as these. That there are seven Sacraments of the New-Testament properly so called, instituted by Jesus Christ. The propitiatory Sacrifice of the Mass, Transubstantiation, Purga­tory, Invocation of Saints, worshipping Re­liques [Page 149] and Images; and lest enough should not be crowded into that Creed, it is added. Caetera item omnia à sacrosanctâ Tridentinâ Synodo tradita, definita & declarata indubitanter recipio at (que) profiteor. All that was determin'd at the Council of Trent is to be receiv'd without scruple. This is the Faith without which (they say) no man can be saved.

How these Opinions are rejected by our Church is too plain to need proof. It rest to say, however other­wise faulty and dangerous they are, this makes them superstitious, that they are made necessary, whereas indeed they are false. I mean not every thing established by that Council of Trent, but the Articles before-named, and divers other like things decreed in that Council.

If the Intendment of this Essay were principally against the Church of Rome, it would the less be an ex­cursion, [Page 150] if the things now mention'd were severally consider'd, and their repugnancy to Scripture shown; but being design'd rather for the Vindi­cation of the Church of England, and that for the sake of those who agree with us in rejecting these Doctrines, I am not willing to engage in all these Controversies. I think it sufficient to add another instance under this Head, and so convict them together of superstition.

The Council of Trent does advanceHistor. Concil. Trident. Sess. 4. Unwritten Traditions to an Authority equal with the word of God. When the question is mov'd what are these Unwritten Traditions, their Authors distinguish between such as are Di­vine, Apostolical, and Ecclesiastical. Those which they call Divine are in the Ac­count of Azorius, such as these. Pur­gatory, Azor. In­stitut. Mo­ral. Part. 1. lib. 8. Cap. 4. Transubstantiation, Invocation of Saints, worshipping Images, Communion in one kind enough for Laicks, &c. Whereas [Page 151] the question may be again ask'd, how shall we know that these are Divine Traditions after some other Rules, Bellarmine wholly rests it upon theBellarm. De Verbo Dei non scripto. Cap. 9. Testimony of the Romish Church. Ex Testimonio hujus solius Ecclesiae sumi potest Certum Argumentum ad probandum Apo­stolicas Traditiones. From the Testimony of the alone Church of Rome may a man have a certain Argument to prove Aposto­lical Traditions. Which rule I suppose he intends for the assuring us of Di­vine Traditions too: for so he had before join'd them. Asserimus in scrip­turis Id. ibid. Cap. 3. non contineri Totam Doctri­nam necessariam, sive de fide sive de mo­ribus, & proinde praeter verbum Dei scriptum requiri etiam verbum Dei non scriptum, i. e. Divinas &. Apostolicas Traditiones. We assert that the scripture does not contain all necessary Doctrine, whether about Faith or manners, there is therefore moreover requir'd, Divine and Apostolical Tradition.

From these premises I argue to the superstition of the Church of Rome. Be­cause they practise in their Sacra­ments and elsewhere upon superstiti [...]us opinions. The Devotion of the JewsIsai. 29. is thus challeng'd, Their fear toward me is taught by the precept of men. The Messages which God Almighty sent them by his Prophets, were not the Rule of their worship, but the Tra­ditions of men were instead of the word of God. And this was their In­debitus cultus, their superstition: This Text the Septuagint translate, [...]. In vain do they worship me, Matth. 15. teaching the commands of men and Doctrins. St. Matthew hath alter'd the site of one word, and there we read in ap­plication to the Pharisees. In vain do they worship me teaching for Doctrines the Commands of men. The case to which this quotation is there apply­ed, is their making the Fifth Com­mandment of none effect by their [Page 153] Tradition. That which God had made necessary by his Command [Honour thy Father and Mother] with that they dispens'd. That which God had not made necessary by any ex­press Declaration of his pleasure, that was made necessary by their Tradi­tion. And this was their supersti­tion.

To which the case of the Church of Rome is but too parallel. They make the second Command of none effect by their Tradition of worshipping Ima­ges. In other things they make that necessary which the written word of God hath not made so. Some of which Traditions if they be not di­rectly contrary to the word of God, yet because they are arrogantly e­qualled, and commanded to be recei­ved Pari pietatis affectu & reverentiâ; the practices that flow from these Doctrines cannot be excus'd from su­perstition, as we now use the word [Page 154] (and as they, as well as we, define the thing) for an excess in Religion, whereby men worship God, after such a manner as they ought not.

2. The second Account of theirSect. 20. superstition is, that they ascribe an Ef­ficacious sanctity to their Ceremonies. Here also Instances will make it plain, both that they are thus chargeable, and that the Church of England does reject these Opinions.

The Doctrine of Rome is, that the Cross is to be worshipped with the highest kind of worship. Crux Christi in Aquin. ter­tia Pars qu. 25. Artic. 4. quâ Christus Crucifixus est, tum propter repraesentationem, tum propter membrorum Christi contactum Latriâ adoranda est. Crucis vero Effigies in aliâ quâ [...]is mate­riâ priori tantum ratione Latriâ adoranda est. The Cross whereon Christ was Cru­cified is to be worshipped with Latriâ, both because of its representation, and because of its touching the Body of Christ. But the sign of the Cross elsewhere, is to be wor­shipped [Page 155] only for the former reason, (which last words were well put in, for it would be a wonder indeed, if the sign of the Cross made at Rome, should deserve worship propter Con­tactum.) This we contend is supersti­tious, because the Opinions they have of the Cross are such. For they as­cribe such Effects to the Cross, which neither the word of God ascribes to it, nor any mans reason without the help of feigned Miracles, or Tradi­tions (before accounted for) would expect from it. Take it in Bellar­min's words. 1^o Tres sunt Effectus Crucis Bell. de Imagin. Sancto­rum lib. 2. Cap. 30. mirabiles. Terret & fugat Daemones: 2^o pellit morbos & omnia mala: 3^o San­ctificat ea quibus imprimitur. There are Three wonderful effects of the Cross. First, It frights and seares away the De­vil. Secondly, It drives away Diseases and all Evils. Thirdly, It sanctifies those things upon which it is made. The first of these effects he ascribes to it for [Page 156] Three Causes. Ex apprehensione Dae­monis, Ib [...] ex Devotione hominis, ex Instituto Dei. From the apprehension of the Devil, from the Devotion of man, from the Institution of God. So that they sup­pose the appointment of God hath empowr'd the Cross to scare the Devil. The power of sanctifying that upon which the sign of the Cross is made, he makes parallel with the power which he supposes in Reliques. San­ctificantur Ibid. aliquo modo ii qui tangunt Reli­quias, which he hath the confidence to assert upon the Authority of the Fathers.

Our 30^th Canon (as hath been said) rejects these superstitions and errors. Which superstition we therefore lay to their charge, because they ascribe an effect to a certain Cause, without a sufficient warrant. That the sign of the Cross hath not naturally in it self any power of sanctifying or curing, Bellarmine can't but acknowledge. [Page 157] Signum Crucis operatur mirabilia non ex Id. ibid. virtute suâ naturali quam habet ut figura quaedam, sed ut signum divinitus Institu­tum. The sign of the Cross works wonders, not as a certain figure, by any natural virtue, but as a sign appointed of God. Here is then superstition, to esteem the sign of the Cross more holy than in­deed it is, to believe it to have such a relation to God, which it can't be prov'd to have, to ascribe to it a vir­tue which no syllable in the H. Scri­pture declares to us. And who hath known the mind of God any farther than he hath been pleas'd to reveal it to us?

Estius makes a little attempt to de­liverEstius in sentent. Tom. 3. Distinc. 37. Sec. 8. such like Ceremonies as this is from superstition. Si debito decenti (que) mo­do exspectetur effectus aliquis à Deo, eti­amsi naturali virtute haberi non potest, nulla est superstitio. If the effect be ex­pected in a due and decent manner, though the cause cannot by any natural virtue [Page 158] produce it, it is no superstition. So, he says, the Church does consecrate Salt and Holy-Water, &c. because Christ gave his Apostles power over unclean Matth. 10. Luke 10. Spirits, and power to tread on Serpents and Scorpions, &c. which power he supposes still to reside in the Church. As Elisha cur'd the waters with salt, as Christ cur'd blind Eyes with clay and spittle, in like manner, potestas exorci­zandi Daemones à Christo Apostolis tradita us (que) in hodiernum diem in Ecclesiâ perman­sit. The power of casting out Devils com­mitted by Christ to his Apostles remains in the Church to this day. If we will take Forgeries and cheats for real miracles, the thing is proved. But if we should be a little scrupulous, and require bet­ter proof of matter of fact, and till that be given, should doubt whether the Apostles power of working Mi­racles be transmitted to this age, we are then at a great loss to solve the Phaenomenon, and to clear the use of [Page 159] the Cross and holy water, &c. from su­perstition. Whereas it is confessed, that the natural virtue of these Ceremo­nies can't produce such effects, it is also as plain, so far as the Word of God is our guide, that we have no sufficient warrant to expect these pre­ternatural and extraordinary Events, because there is no divine promise annex'd to the use of these things.

Of the same nature is that Doctrine that the Sacraments confer Grace, Ex opere Operato. The Council of Trent Histor. Conc. Trid. Sess. 7. anathematizes them who say, per Sacramenta non conferri gratiam virtute ministrationis eorum, sive ex opere operato. That the Sacraments do not confer grace by virtue of the very administration of them, or by the deed done. So Bellarmine begins his second Book, De effectu Sacramentorum, with this enquiry. An sacramenta novae legis sint verae Causae justificationis ex opere operato. Whether the Sacraments of the Gospel be true cau­ses [Page 160] of Justification by virtue of the deed done. That they are so, and that they are thereby distinguished from the Sacraments of the old Law, he offers to prove in the process of that Book. In which though it be true, that he speaks of Faith and Repen­tance as dispositions in the subject, to mollify the Opinion, yet there is no doubt but their Opinion is, that the Sacraments confer grace, however indispos'd the subject be. Which ap­pears by the absolutions that are gi­ven upon Confession, even there, where no Contrition shows it self. According to the Jesuit's Doctrine,Myst. Je­suitis. Let­ter 10. p. 145. 150. T. Bauny. Ibid. they ought not to be deny'd or delay'd abso­lution, who continue in habitual sias, against the laws of God, and nature, and the Church, though they discover not the least hope of amendment. And Valentia de­termins that Contrition is not requisite at all in order to obtain the principal effect of the Sacrament, nay on the contrary it is [Page 161] rather obstructive. Yea Bellarmine him­selfBellarm. de Imagin. Sanctorum lib. 2. Cap. 30. elsewhere distinguishes between opus operatum, and opus operantis. When men pray for help against Diseases, the effect does not infallibly follow, for this reason, quia tunc effectus non producitur ex opere operato, more Sacra­mentorum, sed ex opere operantis. Be­cause it is not produc'd by the deed done, as in the Sacraments, but supposes the dis­position of the doer. What they thus at­tribute to the Sacraments, Azorius ex­tends to sacramentals (though he con­sessesInstitut. Moral. Part. 1. lib. 4. Cap. 11. some Romanists are against him) he affirms that the very sprink­ling with Holy-Water without consi­deration of the act of Repentance, does away venial sins.

How much our Church ascribes to Sacraments, is plain. They are sure Artic. 25. witnesses and effectual signs of Gods Grace and good will towards us, by which he does work invisibly in us. But in the same Article it is declar'd against the Opus [Page 162] Operatum, for in such only as worthily re­ceive the same, they have a wholesome effect or operation.

The dangerous Consequences of this their Doctrine, especially as their late Casuists have improv'd it, I now exaggerate not. All that I would conclude hence is, that their worship of God in the Sacraments, because it is built upon this opinion, is superstitious. God alone is the foun­tain of Grace, he conveys it into the hearts of men as he pleases: But no man hath reason to expect it by any other means than what God hath promised to bless. The Sacraments are of excellent use: But there is no promise extant that the bare receive­ing the Eucharist, whatever the dispo­sition or indisposition of the Recei­ver be, shall produce this effect (and it is conferring grace in Adultis, that is now to be consider'd.) Nay, we are assur'd that he who eats and [Page 163] drinks unworthily, eats and drinks dam­nation to himself. Wherefore he who promises to himself, that which God hath not promis'd, he who expects grace upon these terms, who re­ceives the Sacrament upon an Opi­nion, that the deed done (however it be done) will bring him into a state of grace, is superstitious in so thinking and so doing.

The Doctrine of Merit is anotherSect. 21. Bellarm. de Justifi­cat. lib. 9. Cap. 17. superstitious Opinion. If Bellarmine un­derstood it, this it is. Opera bona Ju­storum meritoria sunt vitae aeternae ex con­digno, non solum ratione pacti & accepta­tionis, sed etiam ratione operis. The good works of just men do merit life eternal of condignity, not only because of the Cove­nant of grace, but also from the nature of the works themselves. Moreover be­yond the bare merit of good works, he affirms, that as a man may me­rit a reward to himself, so he may make satisfaction for the release and [Page 164] discharge of another. And this is the foundation of their doctrine of Indul­gences. Extat Thesaurus aliquis in Eccle­siâ qui sit Indulgentiarum Fundamentum. For the making good of which he thus argues and proceeds.

Prima Propositio. In bonis actionibus Bellarm. de Indul­gent. lib. 1. Cap. 2. hominum Justorum duplex valor sive pre­tium assignari potest, meriti, viz. & sa­tisfactionis.

Secunda Propos. Opus bonum quâ parte meritorium est, non potest alii applicari, potest tamen quâ satisfactorium.

Tertia Propos. Extat in Ecclesiâ The­saurus satisfactionum ex Christi passioni­bus infinitus, qui nunquam exhauriri po­terit.

Quarta Propos. Ad hunc Thesaurum superfluentium satisfactionum pertinent etiam passiones B. Mariae Virginis, & omnium aliorum sanctorum qui plus passi sunt quam eorum peccata requirerent.

That is in short. Together with the infinite value of the satisfactory sufferings [Page 165] of our Saviour, The sufferings of the B. Virgin Mary and all other Saints, who have suffer'd more than their sins requir'd, are to be join'd, by which as they have merited to themselves, so have they satis­fied for others.

How much this dishonours the Undertakings of our B. Saviour, and for what other reasons we explode the Doctrine of Merit, and the ap­pendage of satisfaction, and Indulgen­ces, I have not now to say. The superstition of these Opinions is now to be consider'd.

Bellarmin's Controversies would not have deserv'd the Character gi­ven them by Albertus Hungerus, in his approbation prefix'd to the First Tome, viz. Integerrimum, pulcherrimum absolutissimum (que) Controversiarum omnium corpus, A most Entire and Compleat bo­dy of Controversies; if he had balk't any of the Doctrines currant at Rome. So he must write when he [Page 166] pleads for a party; but I think it no very difficult task, to find some ac­knowledgments, even in those same Books of Controversies, which would greatly weaken most of the things in difference between us,Bellarm. de Justifi­cat. lib. 5. Cap. 7. which he would establish. In this of Merit, who hath not heard of that famous resolution of his: Propter incertitudinem propriae Justitiae & pericu­lum inanis gloriae, Tutissimum est fiduciam totam in solâ Dei misericordiâ & benigni­tate reponere. Because of the Uncertain­ty of our own righteousness, and the danger of vain glory, It is most safe to put our whole confidence only in the mercy and good­ness of God.

How well does this agree with what we say in our Office of the H. Communion! We do not presume to come [Page 167] to this thy Table, O Merciful Lord, trust­ing in our own righteousness, but in thy ma­nifold and great Mercies, &c. And with our 12 Article. Good works which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after Justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of Gods Judgment. We will join against the Antinomians, and with great zeal assert the necessity of good works, if the merit of them may be excluded, but that we can't but charge with superstition.

He who gives Alms, &c. does a good work acceptable to God by Jesus Christ; but he who opines, he thereby merits the favour of God (any otherwise than because God has promis'd to accept such services) He who apprehends such a worthi­ness in what he does, as that for its own sake he may expect to re­ceive some reward, because there is some proportion and equality in it, ad praemium vitae aeternae, as Bellarmine [Page 168] speaks: He who designs to oblige Almighty God by his good works; hath a proud conceit of himself, who when he hath done all he can, is but an Unprofitable servant; and he has a false and undue Opinion of God, to think a man may be profitable to God, as men may be one to another. Therefore are these services supersti­tious, because they are perform'd up­on false and undue Opinions, and he who thus worships God, does that which is not requir'd at his hands.

If these things wanted evidence, I might add their works of supereroga­tion, their Austerities and penances, so far as they apprehend a Merit in Opere Operato. Also other things might have a place in this Argument, and might range by themselves, if they be not reducible to any of Bishop Mortons general heads. Such as are, Their publick Prayers in the Church, in a Tongue not understood of the people. Their [Page 169] requiring and using such a vast num­ber of Ceremonies, which by their great excess and multitude become a burden intolerable (as the Preface to our Liturgy acknowledges) These and such like things can't be excus'd from superstition.

Together with these I might add a number of observations which are neither proper to Popery, nor indeed to the Christian Religion, but are scat­ter'd all over the World. Such as St. Austin means when he complains of Millia inanissimarum observationum, &c. and such as Aquinas comprehends, when he makes divers kinds of super­stition, Divinationes & varia observati­onum genera. Of which Customs Maho­metanism and Gentilism are very full. But having given account of these before, I pass them with this general acknowledgment.

Whatever we do upon a Religi­ous account, where Religion, pro­perly [Page 170] so called, ought not to be con­cern'd; When any undue Opinion of God excites us to any action, when we exercise our selves in that, which may be deservedly called, Indebitus Dei Cultus, when we think God is pleas'd with such a manner of per­formance, which does not please him; as it does well agree with the Import of [...] (an over-timor­ous and servile apprehension of the Deity) so may it properly be called supersti­tion.

But in as much as it is very evi­dent, that the superstitious Opinions of the Church of Rome are rejected by the Church of England, in as much as it can't be prov'd, that any of our service is enjoin'd upon any other Opinion equally superstitious; we conclude, there is wrong done us, when superstition is laid to our charge. Yea, if peradventure some of our Church should have private Opini­ons [Page 171] of their own, that might render their particular practices superstitious, yet this is enough to deliver our ser­vice from the Imputation, and in this we persist as our just Vindica­tion.

There is no Canon nor Rubrick, no Article nor Injunction that obliges any within our Communion to any superstitious Opinion.

4. Proposition. Sect. 22.

There are superstitious Omissions of which men may be guilty; and that then, when they seem to have a great zeal a­gainst Burges An­swer Re­join'd Pre­face, p. 64. superstition. It was laid to the N. C^ts. charge in King James his time, that they were guilty of negative su­perstition. A phrase cavil'd at by those who reply upon Bishop Mor­ton, but D^r Burges has sufficiently vindicated it, and commends them to their friend Ames, who compre­hends it in his definition of superstition. For when he had defin'd it to be an [Page 172] excess of Religion; He adds, cujus­modi Medul. Theolog. lib. 2. Cap. 13. excessus non tantum est in exercitiis positivis, sed etiam in Abstinentiâ à qua­rundam rerum usu, ut àcibis. This excess of Religion is not only in what we positively do, but may be also, in what we abstain from, as Meats.

True it is, that superstition is an ex­cess, as it hath been defin'd, yet the defect in the practice may be super­stitious, because it may proceed from excess in the Opinion. For if a super­stitious Opinion be the reason why men abstain from the use of a Cere­mony, that abstinence is as properly superstitious, as the use of it upon a su­perstitious Opinion can be. My Lord Bacon says well and wisely. There is Bacon Es­say of Super­stition. a superstition in avoiding superstition, when men think to do best, if they go farthest from the superstition formerly received. There is a superstitious fearfulness in some men, of which St. Austin com­plainsAugust. Ja­nuario. Ep. 118. thus. Sensi saepe dolens & gemens, [Page 173] multas infirmorum perturbationes fieri, per quorundam fratrum contentiosam obstina­tionem & superstitiosam timiditatem, qui in rebus hujusmodi, quae ne (que) sacrae scrip­turae Authoritate ne (que) Universalis Ecclesiae traditione ne (que) vitae corrigendae utilitate ad certum possunt terminum pervenire, tan­tum quia subest qualiscun (que) ratiocinatio, co­gitantis qut quia in vuâ patriâ sic ipse con­suevit, aut quia ibi vidit, ubi peregrina­tionem suam quò remotiorem à suis eò docti­orem factam putant, tam litigiosas exci­tant quaestiones, ut nisi quod ipsi faciunt nihil rectum existimant. Words which by a little alteration and paraphrase are but too accommodate to the case of our present Dissenters.

‘To the grief of my Soul I have often observ'd, how weak and scru­pulous minds have been miserably perplex'd in matters of Religion, by the contentious obstinacy and superstitious fearfulness of some who seem to be very Godly men. Dif­ferences [Page 174] arise in matters Indifferent and alterable in their own natures; such as the H. Scripture hath not any where particularly determin'd; nor hath any tradition of the Uni­versal Church fix'd them in one certain course; nor can it be said, that for the bettering the lives of men, it must be thus, and may not be so: yet there are Jealousies and scruples in their minds, it may be they remember it otherwise in their times, and where they have lived. It may be they have been as far as Scotland, Amsterdam, or Ge­neva, and have a greater opinion of what is done abroad: For one reason or other they are litigious and troublesome, and think no­thing well done, but what they do themselves.’

From this scrupulosity are men apt to call any thing into question, and for fear lest they should err on [Page 175] one hand, and run into superstition and Popery; they run as far on the other; and their Omissions are as su­perstitious, as they fear'd their practice would have been.

Such was the case of the Jews, 1 Machab. 2. when they were assaulted by their Enemies on the Sabbath day; rather than violate the Sabbath by defending themselves, they tamely suffer'd themselves to be destroyed. The law of self-preservation could not perswade them to any resistance, and if Mattathias had not been wiser than the rest, they might all have pe­rished.

Such also was the superstition of theKnol. Turk. History. Souldiers in Sfetigrade, when Amurath besieg'd it (An. 1449.) A Traytor in the City had cast a dead dog, into the only Well which supplyed the City with Water: which when it was espied in the Morning by the Souldiers, no Importunity could per­swade [Page 176] them to drink of that Water which they reputed Unclean by a dogs Carcass; so was the Governour com­pell'd to surrender the City.

And such surely was the conceit of that zealous man some while since among our selves, who cut out of his Bible, the Contents of the Chapters, and so would cut out the word of God it self, that was on the other side of the page, rather than suffer any Humane mixture with the pure word of God.

Whether the case of our N. C^ts. be not somewhat parallel, is now to be consider'd. They suspect superstition in the use of the Surplice and Cross, &c. and therefore Religiously ab­stain from them; but what if this Abstinence also should be superstiti­ous? If the Rites and Ceremonies of our Church be as they imagine, it must be, either because we judge that lawful which is Unlawful, or that necessary which is but Indifferent, or [Page 177] because these Ceremonies though granted in their own nature Indiffe­rent, yet by reason of some Accident that attends them, may not be im­pos'd, and may not be submitted to if impos'd. All which things have already had their Consideration, after all which I have not doubted to con­clude, that our Rites may be us'd without superstition.

But now I move a doubt on the other side, to which if they cannot give a better Answer than I am a­ware of, they can't excuse themselves from superstition. For what other rea­sons Conformity may be refus'd I now enquire not. If any refuse it, be­cause they cannot wear a Surplice, or use the Cross, and if any private per­sons neglect the Sacrament of the Lords Supper, because they cannot kneel as is commanded; I desire to know for what reasons they are not free to join with us in these Usages. [Page 178] Either they think them lawful or Unlawful: If lawful, such as may be submitted to, and yet for some po­litick respects they will not submit; this Abstinence of theirs may be free from superstition, but some other way it will be as Unaccountable: For he who without violating his Conscience can conform but will not, let him (if he can) excuse his disobe­dience to the Powers which God hath set over him, let him (if he can) deliver himself from the Character of a contentious man.

If without fraud or guile, there be a man who does not act because he dare not, who is perswaded in his Conscience, he should sin against God, and do that which is Unlaw­ful, if he should wear a Surplice, &c. This is the man whom I charge with superstition, because he judges that Unlawful, which is Indifferent, be­cause he proceeds upon a mistake of [Page 179] the nature of things, because a false opinion betrays him to this absti­nence. He declares hereby that he hath a wrong Notion and apprehen­sion of God, when he thinks him displeas'd by such an Action, against which the Scripture hath not de­clar'd his displeasure. As men may teach for Doctrines the positive Commands of men, so may they also teach for Doctrines the prohibi­tions of men; and this is adding to the word of God. And in this does Ames condition take place. In illâ Ab­stinentiâ Medul. Theol. prius. Honor aliquis singularis Deo in­tenditur. They conceit they Honour God by abstaining from that which is no where forbidden. It is no where said, neither in express words, nor in any equivalent phrase, That it is the will of God, no man should wear a white Gar­ment when he Ministers in Divine Offices; that no man should kneel [Page 180] when he receives the Sacrament, &c. Wherefore what God hath cleansed, why should we call Common? Where is the man that hath Autho­rity to pronounce that Unclean, which God hath not so pronounc'd? The necessary use of these things when they are commanded, does not take away the Indifferency of their na­ture, and this delivers us from super­stition: But to abstain from them as Unlawful in their nature, does direct­ly contradict the opinion of their In­differency, and leaves the men who so abstain, under the guilt and bond of superstition.

So may men find that at a Con­venticle, which they are afraid to meet at Church. Superstition lodges in the minds of men, and they who are inclin'd to it, may discover it when they sit still, as well as when they move. Touch not, tast not, handle not, are not greater Indications of a [Page 181] superstitious abstinence, than are wear not, kneel not, Cross not; when the Doctrine of these Ceremonies is known to be Innocent and allowa­ble. Wherefore they who are in­deed afraid of superstition, who are afraid of mixing their own Inventi­ons with the worship of God, and doing that which is not requir'd at their hands, are concern'd rightly to inform themselves, in what they are commanded to do: And when they find that the H. Scripture hath no where forbid the use of the Surplice upon those Terms upon which it is enjoin'd, (only the liberty which they themselves had power to deter­mine, is by the Magistrate deter­min'd for them, not lightly or wan­tonly, but for grave and weighty rea­sons) Let them not fear they shall transgress where there is no law. Let them not fear superstition in those pra­ctices to which they are induc'd by [Page 182] Opinions not superstitious. But on the other side let the fear be, lest they make the way to Heaven straiter than our Saviour hath made it. Lest they scruple and condemn that which does not appear unlawful. Lest they split upon Scylla while they shun Charybdis. Lest they run into supersti­tion while they desired to avoid it, and lest an Innocent Ceremony scare them to an Unjustifyable Separa­tion.